

**RENAISSANCE IDEAS OF PEACE AND WAR,
AND THE HUMANIST CHALLENGE TO THE SCHOLASTIC
JUST WAR: THE *DISPUTATIO DE PACE ET BELLO* OF 1468;
ERASMUS AND MACHIAVELLI**

Thesis for a Doctor of Philosophy in Politics

Michael John Cailes

April 2012

**RENAISSANCE IDEAS OF PEACE AND WAR,
AND THE HUMANIST CHALLENGE TO THE SCHOLASTIC JUST WAR: THE
DISPUTATIO DE PACE ET BELLO OF 1468; ERASMUS AND MACHIAVELLI**

Submitted by Michael John Cailes to the University of Exeter
as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Politics
In April 2012

This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has been previously submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature

ABSTRACT

This thesis compares and contrasts Renaissance ideas of peace and war, focussing on the humanist challenge to the scholastic just war tradition. I argue that rather than representing a strong continuity of the latter, the period is more accurately seen as being without adequate ideas on the justification for, and moral restraint in, war. I consider two paradigmatic writers, Erasmus and Machiavelli, and argue that despite evident differences in the underlying religious and social ontology, there is also an instructive commonality in their challenge to the weak representation of the just war tradition.

I first set the ideas in their historical and intellectual context: aspects of contemporary warfare, the church and the papacy; medieval traditions and ideas; and the scholastic tradition and Renaissance humanism. I then examine a mid-fifteenth century disputation, *Disputatio de pace et bello*, which differentiates sharply between the humanist challenge and contemporary church orthodoxy. This is evident from very different understandings of the concepts of peace and war, and is further reflected in their approaches to the justification of war, and to its conduct. I apply this template of ‘concept’, ‘justification’ and the ‘conduct’ of war, throughout the thesis. I consider a range of interpretations of Erasmus, and argue that he is a pacifist by conviction, but is forced to prevaricate. This is especially clear when he accepts a necessary war of last resort, but does not allow for adequate and acceptable means with which to conduct it. In Machiavelli’s thought, I emphasise the key relationship between politics and war, and argue that far from advocating unrestrained violence, he insists on applying a firm ‘bridle’ on the use of force. There is, however, little aspiration for peace. Finally, I briefly follow these ideas through into the Early Modern period, concluding that Lipsius exemplifies a necessary re-balancing of ideas on peace, war, and the just war tradition.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION.....	11
General.....	11
Literature.....	18
Terms and Definitions	19
Methodological Issues	23
CHAPTER 2 – HISTORICAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT.....	30
Introduction.....	30
Historical Context	33
Contemporary Warfare	33
The Church and Papacy	40
Humanism and the Scholastic Tradition.....	45
The Medieval Just War Tradition.....	46
The Humanist Challenge	50
The Scholastic Justification for War	54
Augustine and Aquinas.....	60
Ideas Governing the Conduct of War.....	69
Canon Law	70
Chivalry	71
Discipline	76
Conclusions – A Period of Crisis?	79
CHAPTER 3 – <i>DISPUTATIO DE PACE ET BELLO</i>	83
Introduction.....	83
Context	86
Bartolomeo Platina	89
Rodrigo Sánchez	94
Structure and <i>Prologus</i>	96
Bartolomeo Platina:.....	101

<i>De laudibus pacis</i>	101
Rodrigo Sánchez:	112
<i>Commendatio belli</i>	112
<i>De difficultate verae pacis</i>	130
Discussion and Summary	143
CHAPTER 4 - ERASMUS.....	151
Introduction.....	151
Primary Literature	152
Style.....	155
Context	158
Concepts of Peace and War	165
The Justification for War in Erasmus.....	172
Interpretation and Ambiguity.....	172
Case against war.....	177
Case for war	182
Just war.....	185
Summary.....	190
The Conduct of War in Erasmus.....	191
The Evil of Soldiering	193
A Paucity of Ideas for Improvement	198
Summary and Conclusions	202
CHAPTER 5 – MACHIAVELLI.....	207
Introduction.....	207
Concepts of Peace and War	211
Peace and War.....	211
War and Politics	218
Finance.....	224
Types of War.....	226
The Humanitarian Dimension.....	232

The Justification for War.....	237
Discussion: Parel and Hörnqvist	238
Examples from The History of Florence	240
The Conduct and Restraint of Warfare.....	247
Discipline	249
Religion.....	254
Glory.....	258
Political Restraint	261
Summary and Conclusions	267
CHAPTER 6 - EARLY MODERN DEVELOPMENTS.....	271
Historical Development.....	271
Summary.....	281
Lipsius	283
CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSIONS.....	293
Discussion.....	293
Conclusions.....	296
APPENDIX 1 - DISPUTATION ON PEACE AND WAR	305
Prologue.....	309
Bartolomeo Platina – In Praise of Peace	313
Rodrigo Sánchez: – A Commendation of War	329
Rodrigo Sánchez: – True Peace and Human Quietude	364
APPENDIX 2 – PRAYER BEFORE BATTLE	389
APPENDIX 3 – DISCOURSE ON THE ORGANISATION OF THE FLORENTINE STATE FOR ARMS	393
BIBLIOGRAPHY	401
Primary Sources	401
Secondary Sources	403
Journal Articles	411
Electronic Resources	413

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

General

The Renaissance is characterised in different ways and in different disciplines. In his account, the historian John Hale cites a contemporary versifier: ‘Peace and war, war and peace / These two rule the world today’¹. In the Renaissance we do see periods of great optimism for peace: the end of the 100 Years War; the treaty and Peace of Lodi from 1454; and the expectations leading to the Field of the Cloth of Gold in 1520. However, as well as any peace, we also find a flourishing of innovative, heterogeneous, and often vicious warfare: vicious, especially in lacking evident moral restraint.

Earlier, medieval wars were not lacking in cruelty, but their nature and scope are seen as less extensive, for Hale, they were ‘chiefly a matter of violent housekeeping’, or a ‘continuation of litigation by other means’². In many ways, worse was to follow in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years War, but from the invasion of Italy in 1494, Europe’s wars are widely characterised by an increase in scale, and a more violent nature.

The paradoxes presented by peace and war are recurring themes in Renaissance culture, artistic as well as textual. In art, peace and war are frequently portrayed by a juxtaposition of Venus and Mars. Two works are particularly useful in depicting an underlying theme of this thesis: effective and ineffective approaches to limiting the worst effects of war. On the one hand, in Botticelli’s *Venus and Mars*, a resplendent and triumphant

¹ Hale, J. R., *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998), p. 15. The versifier is anonymous.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 13 and 29. Beatrice Heuser also attributes ‘litigation by other means’ to Jeremy Black: Heuser, Beatrice, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 49, and Black, Jeremy, *European Warfare 1494-1660* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 22. However, Hale is the earlier citation.

Venus looks on as a peacefully sleeping Mars is successfully disarmed by forest satyrs. On the other hand, in Rubens' dramatic *Consequences of War*, a desperate and distraught Venus fails to restrain a rampaging and extremely destructive Mars. These paintings fit well with their historical context: *Venus and Mars* painted in 1483, central within the Italian Peace of Lodi; and the *Consequences of War* between 1638 and 1639, central within the Thirty Years War³.

Another feature of the Renaissance that I posit here is that it is a moment of transition. There was a distinct, antecedent, medieval world view, which includes a theologically justified war, canon law and the code of chivalry. We also clearly identify subsequent Early Modern ideas: a clear neo-scholastic statement of the just war, and nascent international law with, for example, Grotius. However, there is no clean break between these periods; instead we find considerable flux, overlap, and interaction, if not confusion, between differing sets of ideas and discourses. The Renaissance, therefore, is a transitional moment of considerable complexity, but there are certain key issues which I will now identify.

It is often assumed in the scholarship that a strong just war tradition continued from Augustine, was developed by Aquinas in the late thirteenth century, and continued on into the Early Modern period. James Turner Johnson has consistently argued that the tradition reaches a 'classic' form with Vitoria, in the mid-sixteenth century⁴. However, there are problems with this assumption. First, it is difficult to reconcile with the condition of vicious warfare, and with the bellicose politics not only of princes, but of many popes, especially

³ Botticelli, *Venus and Mars*, 1483, National Gallery, London; Rubens, *Consequences of War*, 1638 - 1639, Palazzo Pitti, Florence. Further such iconography is discussed, for example, in Cuneo, Pia, (ed.), *Artful Armies and Beautiful Battles: Art and Warfare in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), especially Liana De Girolami's discussion of "Medicean Emblems of War and Peace", pp. 107 – 130.

⁴ For example, in: Johnson, James, Turner, "Two kinds of Pacifism: Opposition to the Political Use of Force in the Renaissance-Reformation Period", *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 12, No. 1, (Spring, 1984), p. 43; and more recently, *Ethics and the Use of Force*, p. 2. Vitoria's lectures were delivered in 1539, and first published as *De Indis* and *De iure belli belli* in 1557.

Alexander VI and Julius II between 1492 and 1513. I question, therefore, the extent to which just war thinking is indeed evident in contemporary church and papal orthodoxy.

Secondly, ideas emerge, themselves in apparent opposition, but which also challenge the continuity of a just war tradition. On the one hand, there is a move towards an outright rejection of war as a rational and political instrument, with a strong emphasis on seeking to manifest an ideal of peace. Such thinking draws attention to contemporary conflicts initiated for questionable causes, fought with little moral restraint, and resulting in considerable social deprivation. Erasmus has come to emblematised this line of thought⁵. On the other hand, a second line of thought emerges which appears to accept the condition of war far less critically, and any justification, where this is evident at all, is based on the political community. Broadly identified as *ragione de stati*, Machiavelli is usually located as being at the outset of this line of thought⁶. To a considerable extent, these diverging patterns of ideas share a humanist pedigree, and therefore, I will come to consider them in the context of the broader humanist challenge to the scholastic tradition.

I do not believe that the scholarship has comprehensively addressed this complexity of ideas, and many assumptions remain unchallenged or insufficiently explored. Much of the scholarship on historical ideas of peace and war is focussed on either the Middle Ages or the Early Modern; or in considering the flow of ideas, many studies move on quickly from one period to the other. Johnson admits that his focus has been ‘on the big picture’ and the ‘broad

⁵ For Erasmus, where possible, I will cite both the English translation of *The Collected Works of Erasmus* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1968 -), cited as ‘CWE.’ followed by the volume number and title; and also a reference from a more available translation. In some cases I use the Latin title where this has become the more familiar, as with *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, *De Copia*, and *De bello turcico*.

⁶ Again, for Machiavelli, as well as citing from a more accessible English text, where possible I will also refer to a collected works, this usually being the Italian: Machiavelli, Niccolò, *Tutte le opere*, Martelli, Mario, (ed.) (Florence: Sansoni, 1971), and cited as ‘*Opere*’. Alternatively, if the latter is not available, I use, *Tutte le opere: storiche, politiche e letterarie*, Capata, Alessandro, (ed.) (Rome: Newton and Compton, 1998), and cited as ‘*Opere*, Capata’. The origin of *ragioni di stato* is discussed, for example, by Maurizio Viroli, who points out that although the term was first written by Guicciardini, it is ‘surely right’ to identify the ‘substance’ of what was later described as ‘reason of state’ with Machiavelli; Viroli, Maurizio, “The Origin and Meaning of the Reason of State”, Hampsher-Monk, I., Tilmans, K., and Vree, F., van, (eds.), *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998), pp. 67 – 73; Machiavelli is discussed on p. 70.

development' of traditions through time, and which does result in a 'selective' reading of history⁷. Within Renaissance scholarship itself, relevant discussion is often focussed on one particular area of interest, for example, on either Erasmus or Machiavelli. Seldom are their ideas brought together in order to be adequately compared and contrasted.

In addressing this shortfall, I focus on three main areas of interest or concern. First, I turn to a clear, contemporary, example of the opposition of ideas on peace and war: the *Disputatio de pace et bello*, written in 1468. This is a disputation between an Italian humanist, Bartolomeo Platina, and a Spanish bishop and papal diplomat, Rodrigo Sánchez. Platina argues in praise of peace and provides a critique of war; Sánchez responds with a detailed examination of the nature of peace and a commendation of war. The *Disputatio* therefore promises to provide a sharp demarcation of key areas of difference. It is little studied in English, but it is the subject of a study in German by Wolfram Benziger⁸. Among his conclusions, Benziger poses the question as to whether the ideas expressed in the *Disputatio* can be seen as prefiguring those of Erasmus and Machiavelli, writing some fifty years later⁹. One task of my thesis, therefore, is to continue Benziger's study by answering this question.

This raises a second area of concern: Erasmus and Machiavelli are readily used to emblematised particular, and opposing, positions on peace and war in Renaissance thought, but this opposition is rarely questioned. On the defence of the state, Quentin Skinner writes in the *Foundations of Modern Political Thought*: 'Between Erasmus and Machiavelli – writing

⁷ Johnson, *Ethics and the Use of Force: Just War in Historical Perspective* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), p. 8.

⁸ This provided the subject for Benziger's PhD thesis, and subsequently published as: Benziger, Wolfram, *Zur Theorie von Krieg und Frieden in der italienischen Renaissance: Die Disputatio de pace et bello zwischen Bartolomeo Platina und Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo (Rom 1468) und andere anlässlich der Pax Paolina entstandene Schriften* (Berlin and New York: Peter Lang, European University Studies, 1996).

⁹ On Erasmus, for example: 'Man muß nicht weitschweifen, um eine Parallele zum Friedenslob Platinas zu finden: 1517 schrieb Erasmus von Rotterdam seine berühmte 'Querela Pacis'; *Ibid.*, p. 190. On Machiavelli: 'Ein so radikaler Ansatz wie bei Sánchez und *let*i findet sich zunächst nicht, doch zeichnet sich eine veränderte Haltung gegenüber dem Krieg schon bei Niccolò Machiavelli (1469 – 1528) ab'; *Ibid.*, p. 192.

at the same moment from within the same intellectual tradition – lies the greatest of ethical divides¹⁰. Many of the issues raised by Skinner’s *Foundations* have been widely discussed, for example, with the *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought*¹¹. However, Skinner’s claim, along with his whole section on ‘the justification of war’, has yet to be seriously critiqued¹². Again, for example, in their account of war in *Renaissance Philosophy*, Copenhaver and Schmitt write: ‘To imagine a moral distance greater than between Erasmus and Machiavelli on this point is difficult’¹³. But their claim has neither been further explored, nor subsequently challenged.

In her historical account of *The Evolution of Strategy*, Beatrice Heuser considers the ethics of war, and the question: ‘Eternal War or Eternal Peace’¹⁴. However, she does not begin her account of those who take the natural state of man to be one of peace, until Pufendorf¹⁵. Therefore, the considerable writing on peace during the Renaissance, including Erasmus, and indeed the significant period of the early Christians, are passed by. Furthermore, when Heuser does consider Erasmus, this is not only all too brief, but as I will come to argue, erroneous. For Heuser, Erasmus exemplifies humanist endeavours to ‘limit’ the cruelties of war¹⁶. I argue that Erasmus believed it impossible to limit the cruelties of war, instead he sought to banish it altogether.

With Erasmus and Machiavelli, therefore, important questions remain: how can this divergence of ideas, ‘at the same moment from within the same intellectual tradition’, be

¹⁰ The ‘same intellectual tradition’ being the humanist tradition to which I have referred. Skinner, Quinton, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Vol.1: The Renaissance*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 250.

¹¹ Brett, Annabel and Tully, James, with Hamilton-Bleakley, Holly, (eds.), *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 244 – 248. Martin van Gelderen contributes to this ‘*Rethinking*’ with an article on theories of resistance in early modern Europe, but Skinner’s discussion of the wider questions of peace and war are not included in this critique.

¹³ Copenhaver, B. P., and Schmitt, C. B., *Renaissance Philosophy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 273.

¹⁴ Heuser, *Evolution of Strategy*, pp. 72 – 75.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

accounted for? Is the divergence as wide as implied by most of today's scholarship? To what extent is it due to the personal, historical, or intellectual context of the period? Furthermore, both Erasmus and Machiavelli have been variously interpreted, very markedly so. Therefore, it is first necessary to clarify certain key issues before establishing my own position.

As an example of the difficulties of interpretation: many would not hesitate to attribute the claim that 'war is a business governed by necessity', to Machiavelli, and to Erasmus these rhetorical reflections on the human cost and tragedy of war: 'Wherever you turn your eyes, you see the earth wet with tears and blood / Let him turn his eyes here who wishes to behold the sorrows of others, and let him consider if ever before now the sun has looked upon such savagery ...'¹⁷. They would, of course, be wrong. Erasmus makes the first claim when discussing how people may be made 'enthusiastic' to fight in a war that he explicitly supports¹⁸; and Machiavelli wrote these tercets on 'Ambition' almost certainly having witnessed at first hand the aftermath of battle¹⁹. Particular care, therefore, is needed in interpreting the primary texts of these authors.

This then leads to my third area of interest and concern: what can be said of those traditional ideas, including the medieval just war tradition, from which Erasmus and Machiavelli apparently diverge? Scholarship gives differing views. On the one hand, as we have already seen, there is a view that the medieval just war tradition continued in a line of development, through Aquinas, and reaching Johnson's 'classic' phase with Vitoria. Elsewhere, for example, Johnson describes how: 'The tradition had, throughout the late

¹⁷ Machiavelli, *Tercets on Ambition* (ca 1509), in Gilbert, A., (trans.) *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others* (Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1965), I, pp. 735-9: '*Dovunque gli occhi tu rivolti, miri / di lacrime la terra e sangue pregna, /...Rivolga gli occhi in qua chi veder vuole / l'altrui fatiche, e riguardi se ancora / cotanta crudeltà mai vidde il sole. Opere*, pp. 984 and 986.

¹⁸ Erasmus, *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 252. Also Rummel, E., (ed.), *The Erasmus Reader* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 328.

¹⁹ Machiavelli, 'On Ambition', *The Chief Works*, pp. 735-9. These tercets on the tragedy and all-pervading influence of 'Ambition and Avarice', were most likely written in Verona after Machiavelli witnessed the aftermath of a battle between Julius II's allies and Venice in 1509. The sense of the tercets is confirmed in official dispatches written on the 26th November and the 7th December, 1509.

Middle Ages, developed as an increasingly coherent and comprehensive doctrine justifying the political uses of force...a development that reached a kind of climax in the writings of the Spanish neo-scholastic Victoria (*sic*)²⁰. For Alex Bellamy, by the time scholastic approaches to war had become challenged by humanist methodologies, they had ‘reached their apex in terms of refinement and comprehensiveness’²¹.

On the other hand, for Frederick Russell, the more theological and canonically coherent just war theory became, the less relevant it was in practice, and when it concentrated on practical advice, it became less coherent: the ‘scholastic just war in its balance of competing values imposed a perpetual intellectual gymnastic on human minds and acts’. In short, the medieval just war had become ‘a dead letter’²². Wolfram Benziger also claims that the period shows all ‘the symptoms of a crisis’, because earlier theories ‘did not fit anymore to the political realities of the end of the late Middle Ages, and new explanations were still out of reach’²³.

The aim of this thesis therefore, is to critically examine the diversity of ideas on peace, war, and the conduct of war, during the European Renaissance. In turn, I first consider the historical and intellectual context, with a critical examination of the condition of the just war tradition. Is there a period of crisis? Secondly, I turn to a clear example of an opposition of ideas with Benziger’s analysis of the *Disputatio de pace et bello*. Thirdly, I examine the works of both Erasmus and Machiavelli: providing my own interpretation on contentious

²⁰ Johnson, “Two kinds of Pacifism”, p. 43; also as described in: *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, p. 174; Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, p. 42; and *Ethics and the Use of Force*, p. 2.

²¹ Bellamy, Alex, J., *Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq* (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2006), p. 49.

²² Russell, Frederick, H., *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 307.

²³ Benziger, Wolfram, “Zwischen *bellum iustum* und modernem Völkerrecht”, *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*, Vol. 65, No. 1, 2006: http://www.oldenbourg-verlag.de/sites/default/files/filebase/files/ov/MGZ_2006_Heft_65-1.pdf (last accessed: 7 Nov11).

issues; and compare and contrast their respective views, and the views expressed in the *Disputatio*. Finally, I briefly consider these ideas from an Early Modern perspective.

Literature

A broad range of scholarship is relevant to my thesis, drawing on political theory, theology, and military history; with commentary on the medieval, Renaissance and Early Modern periods. Therefore, I will review the literature pertaining to each chapter or section closer to the time that it is discussed. However, there are certain established texts which underpin the thesis as a whole²⁴.

For historical context, my research begins with the pertinent works of John Hale: *Renaissance War Studies*; and especially his instructive *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620*²⁵. For an account of Renaissance philosophy, I start with *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*²⁶, and Copenhaver and Schmitt's *Renaissance Philosophy*²⁷. For a starting point with the political thought of the Renaissance, I turn to Quentin Skinner's two series: *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, and *Visions of Politics*²⁸. Indeed, and as already discussed, my thesis in part seeks to continue the 're-thinking' of Skinner's *Foundations*.

For an established, historical account of the ethics of war, I start with the foundational works of James Turner Johnson: *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740*; together with *The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*:

²⁴ Biblical references are usually taken from the Douay – Rheims Vulgate online edition: <http://www.drbo.org/> (last accessed: 27 Mar 12).

²⁵ Hale, J. R., *Renaissance War Studies* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1983); *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998). (First published by Fontana in 1985).

²⁶ Schmitt, Charles, B., Skinner, Quinton, Kessler, Eckhard, and Kraye, Jill, (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

²⁷ Copenhaver, B. P., and Schmitt, C. B., *Renaissance Philosophy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

²⁸ Skinner, *Foundations, 1: The Renaissance* and *2: The Reformation*; and Skinner, Q., *Visions of Politics: Volume 2, Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

A Moral and Historical Inquiry; and *The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History*²⁹. These works have been more recently reviewed in the *The Journal of Military Ethics*³⁰. A valuable reference work is also provided by Reichberg, Syse, and Begby's *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings*³¹.

Terms and Definitions

I now clarify my use of certain key terms which are variously understood, in particular: the Renaissance, humanism, pacifism, and the just war tradition. I will shortly discuss certain methodological issues relevant to these terms, but my purpose here is to provide an initial clarification of their use in this thesis. First, I use the term 'warfare' in the familiar sense which is to describe the practical conduct, i.e. to fare, do, or perform, 'war'³².

There has been criticism of the term 'Renaissance', and the practice in some scholarship is to demarcate only two epochs: the European 'Middle Ages' and the 'Early Modern'. Denys Hay would 'banish the word altogether'³³. I will retain 'Renaissance' for several reasons. First, my period of interest lies at the centre of what is commonly accepted as, and widely understood as, the Renaissance, both the earlier Italian, and the later northern Renaissance. It is contemporaneous with the lives of Erasmus and Machiavelli, who are both recognised as figures of the Renaissance. Secondly, the spirit of the Renaissance, the 're-birth' of the ideas of pagan antiquity, and their accommodation with a Christian Europe, are

²⁹ Johnson, James, Turner, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740* (Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 1975); *The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton and Guilford: Princeton University Press, 1981); *The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History* (Princeton and Guilford: Princeton University Press, 1987). I have already referred to Johnson's article, "Two kinds of Pacifism".

³⁰ A special edition includes Johnson, James, Turner, "Thinking Historically about Just War", *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2009), pp. 246-259.

³¹ Reichberg, G. M., Syse, H., and Begby, E., *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings* (Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

³² I do not, therefore, follow Christopher Coker with his use of the word 'warfare' in his thesis *Barbarous Philosophers*, although I agree with much of the distinction he makes. He uses 'warfare', to designate the antecedent, 'zero-sum', primal form of conflict which has neither norms nor value; and out of which 'war' emerges as the 'non zero-sum', activity with rules and norms; Coker, Christopher, *Barbarous Philosophers* (London: Hurst & Co., 2010), pp. 16 and 144.

³³ Hay, Denys, *The Italian Renaissance in its Historical Background* (Cambridge: 1961), p. 8.

all relevant to the discussion. Thirdly, the Renaissance is seen as the ‘eve of the Reformation’ with its moral and theological challenges to the hegemony of Rome. Again, this is central to my thesis.

I also follow Skinner’s discussion of the term. He sees some merit in Kristeller’s argument against the use of ‘Renaissance’: Kristeller provides a ‘continuity of thought’, and a corrective for the discontinuity and dramatic change characterised in the ‘classic analysis’ of Burckhardt. However, for Skinner, Kristeller’s critique also ‘gives rise to an oversimplified understanding of Renaissance political thought’³⁴. My thesis explores a complexity of explanations which are typical to this period, and therefore, with Skinner, it is useful to retain the designation of ‘Renaissance’.

Humanism is also a term that needs clarification. Again I follow Skinner’s usage, and confine ‘humanist’ to its Renaissance meaning: ‘the students and protagonists of a particular group of disciplines centered around the study of grammar, rhetoric, history and moral philosophy’³⁵. I will later discuss the nature of humanism in relation to this thesis in depth³⁶, but note here that it does not contain any one set of doctrines. Indeed, as Charles Nauert describes in his study, *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*, it is identifiable more as a ‘critical method’ than having any specific content: ‘There is no identifiable set of philosophical doctrines that all humanists held and that could identify them as a distinct philosophical school’³⁷.

Stephen Lee describes humanism as assuming many ‘shapes’, ‘two of which were especially pronounced’: the first is ‘Christian humanism’, and the second is ‘secular

³⁴ Skinner, *Foundations*, 1, pp. 101 -103. Skinner discusses Kristeller’s critique found, for example, in Kristeller, Paul, Oskar, *Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters* (Rome: 1956), and Burckhardt’s classic account in Burckhardt, Jacob, *The Civilisation of Renaissance Italy*, Middlemore, S. G. C., (trans.) (London: Phaidon, 1960).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xxiii – xxxiv.

³⁶ “The Humanist Challenge”, from p. 49.

³⁷ Nauert, Charles, G., *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 9.

humanism', which includes 'civic humanism', and with which Machiavelli is generally associated³⁸. Christian humanism is, I believe, the more problematic term. It normally describes that form of humanism which is directed at the reform of Christianity, utilizing the techniques of the humanist. However, as Jill Kraye has argued, this can be mis-leading in that all contemporary humanists were ostensibly Christian,³⁹ and their zest for religious reform varied greatly. It is also a term that is frequently and confusingly applied to the critique of war by certain northern humanists. In this context, for example, Skinner refers to 'the so-called Christian humanists'⁴⁰. Where possible, I will avoid this term, but later discuss a further descriptor, 'Erasmian humanist'.

I use 'rhetoric' as the use of persuasive language which is a characteristic style of argument for the humanists. Nauert notes how Petrarch, Valla and Erasmus did not conceive of rhetoric 'as just a means of embellishing human discourse but rather a means of arguing for or against a specific course of action'⁴¹. The purpose is not merely to add colour to a descriptive work, but to make a more persuasive and convincing argument. In particular, I contrast 'rhetoric' with the more abstract, logical method of argument, which is characteristic of the scholastics. This will become very evident with my discussion of Platina and Erasmus.

I understand a pacifist, in part following Johnson's discussion, as someone who ranks peace as the highest or near highest 'value', even in relation to justice⁴². I do not believe this to be a widely inclusive term, nor one which can include a vague acceptance of war in a just cause or as a last resort. This distinction will become significant in my thesis⁴³. I use the term

³⁸ Lee, Stephen, J., *Aspects of European History: 1494 - 1789* (London: Routledge, 1984), p. 3. Also, as discussed, for example, by Skinner, *Foundations*, I, p. 152.

³⁹ Argued by Jill Kraye at "Erasmus Politicus: Erasmus and Political Thought", the international symposium held at the 'Erasmus Centre for Early Modern Studies', in Rotterdam, 13-15th November 2008.

⁴⁰ Skinner, *Foundations*, I, p. 245.

⁴¹ Nauert, Charles, G., *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p 204.

⁴² Johnson, James, Turner, "Threats, Values, and Defence", in Elshtain, Jean, Bethke, (ed.), *Just War Theory* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1992), pp. 60 - 65.

⁴³ I do not, for example, agree with the descriptions given in: Gill, Robert, *A Textbook of Christian Ethics* 3rd ed., (London and New York: T. & T. Clark, 2006), p. 193. Here a 'selective pacifism' includes a willingness to

‘pacific’, to describe a broader advocacy of peace and reluctance to countenance war; and I juxtapose ‘pacifist’ with ‘bellicist’, that is someone taking war as the highest, or near highest value. Therefore, when I refer to those humanists associated to a greater or lesser degree with an anti-war position, I will adopt the descriptor of ‘pacific humanist’. This is not confined to a particular grouping of humanists, nor does it necessarily imply an ‘absolute’ pacifism which I specify when it becomes appropriate. I later consider contemporary understandings of ‘peace’ in considerable depth.

In clarifying my use of the term ‘just war tradition’⁴⁴, I agree with Cian O’Driscoll, for example, that its purpose today is to provide ‘a medium of shared understanding’, a language, which enables us ‘to make sense of, and respond to, the moral experience of war’⁴⁵. David Whetham describes a ‘framework or tool for balancing ethical considerations’, and ‘for distinguishing between justifiable military action within an ethical framework, and murder on a massive scale’⁴⁶. Therefore, I will continue to use the term ‘just war tradition’ in this broad sense of a language and framework, but I will add qualifications which are relevant to my thesis.

First, some scholarship implies that the just war tradition is one which very broadly encompasses most ethical processes applied to conflict. For Alex Bellamy, the ‘Just War’ tradition includes ‘myriad sub-traditions, including scholasticism, neo-scholasticism, canon law, chivalry, holy war, secular natural law, positive law, various types of “reformism”, and

fight when convinced of a just cause, and is juxtaposed with a ‘selective militarism’. First, I believe it too broad a definition of pacifism, it conflates pacifism with an advocacy or acceptance of a ‘just war’. Secondly, I would use ‘militarism’ to associate the advocacy of the military profession, lifestyle or values as ends in themselves, not war.

⁴⁴ I will follow Johnson in the use of the lower case ‘just war’, which is also better accommodated with, for example, a use of a lower case ‘humanism’ and ‘scholasticism’.

⁴⁵ Here, O’Driscoll is developing the ideas of Michael Waltzer; O’Driscoll, Cian, “Learning the Language of Just War Theory: The value of Engagement”, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2007), p.109. In part, O’Driscoll cites from Ball, T., Farr, J., and Hanson, R. L., (eds.) *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 2.

⁴⁶ Whetham, David, in: “Ethics, Law and Conflict”, and “The Just War Tradition: A Pragmatic Compromise”, in Whetham, David, (ed.), *Ethics, Law and Military Operations* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 15, and 85, respectively.

realism'⁴⁷. This, I argue, is too general, and loses the association of being, in some way, 'just'. I will be working with certain arguments which question, and set out to avoid, the term or language of 'just war' altogether, and therefore I will be specific. I retain the term 'just war tradition' only when it clearly incorporates some acknowledgement of being, or seeking to be, 'just'. Thus, unlike Bellamy, I exclude any restraint on the conduct of war that I will argue is derived from Machiavelli's realism.

As a further qualification, in today's broader scholarship there is a tendency, I believe understandable and correct, to avoid referring to 'doctrine', but I will come to argue that it is appropriate to use the term, when, for example, medieval 'doctrine' is being discussed. I will specifically discuss theological and scholastic accounts, and when the ideas being discussed amount to doctrine, I will identify a 'theological', or 'scholastic', 'just war doctrine'. This follows Johnson who refers to both 'religious', that is 'theological and canonical', and 'secular' doctrine⁴⁸.

Methodological Issues

In considering methodological issues, I begin with Iain Hampsher-Monk's "The history of political thought and the political thought of history"⁴⁹. Hampsher-Monk identifies the 'primary tension in the field' as being 'between the historical and the philosophical'. Then, drawing on Oakeshott, he goes on to introduce a further 'tension of polarity', that of 'practice'⁵⁰. I will consider in turn how these 'tensions' will relate to my thesis.

⁴⁷ Bellamy, *Just Wars*, p. 4.

⁴⁸ He also argues more specifically, that there is no 'classic just war doctrine existing before about 1500'; Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, p. 8.

⁴⁹ Hampsher-Monk, I., "The history of political thought and the political history of thought", in Castiglione, D., and Hampsher-Monk, I., (eds.), *The History of Political Thought in National Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 159 – 173.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 160 – 1.

The first question, therefore, is whether, or the extent to which, the ideas in question have a trans-historical or ‘perennial’ nature, or whether they can only be understood, and have any meaning, in their immediate historical context. Indeed, the very character of the Renaissance contains the attempt to re-use the ideas of antiquity for contemporary advantage. Copenhaver and Schmitt describe how certain Renaissance translators saw the texts of antiquity as ‘expressing truths unconstrained by time and place’. However, it was Bruni who saw a need to ‘master the broader cultural context in which a text had emerged’, and insisted that the reader should ‘see the text in the wider historical perspective’⁵¹.

In our turn, for us to gain an understanding of the texts of the Renaissance, Skinner is quite clear that it is essential ‘to consider the intellectual context in which the major texts were conceived’⁵². However, I do not believe that the imperative of contextual determination precludes the possibility of any trans-historical meaning. Hampsher-Monk points to strong contextualists who have admitted to ‘at least one perennial problem’⁵³. I would add that problems arising from the nature of peace and human conflict are amongst the hardest of ‘perennials’. This being the case since Socrates asked of Alcibiades:

‘Then the “better” in relation to waging or not waging war against those we ought or ought not and when we ought or ought not... does it happen to be anything other than the more just? Or not?’⁵⁴.

For example, in considering against whom we ought to wage war, a consensus can generally be found that it is morally wrong to kill the innocent. This was the case in antiquity, the

⁵¹ Copenhaver and Schmitt, *Renaissance Philosophy*, p 83.

⁵² Skinner, *Foundations*, 1, p xi.

⁵³ Hampsher-Monk, I., “The history of political thought and the political history of thought”, p. 170. The reference is to John Dunn’s account of ‘Democracy’, and the balance between arbitrary external constraints and reasonable personal choice.

⁵⁴ Plato, *Alcibiades*, I, 107c – 109d, in Lord, Carnes, (trans.), Pangle, Thomas, L., (ed.), *The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 182-3; and cited in Reichberg, *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 22.

Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and has been ever since. However, more contextual interpretation might well be needed to determine exactly who the innocent are.

Heuser describes how many ideas about war are found to be enduring, describing a ‘quest for eternal principles’, while other ideas are more changeable. She usefully quotes Azar Gat: ‘while the forms (*Formen*) of war may change with time, its spirit (*Geist*), or essence (*Wesen*), remains unchanged’⁵⁵. In a Renaissance context, Michael Mallett describes how: ‘The Italian Wars were one vast melting pot; the heat and flames were new, the ingredients were not’⁵⁶.

Therefore, in order to gain as complete an insight as possible into the ideas in question, I will draw on the full context of the Renaissance: philosophical, theological and historical. At the same time, I fully recognise, and take full account of, a strong, enduring, and diachronic content to many of the ideas under discussion.

The second, and related, question considers how ideas relate to practice: whether, or the extent to which, ideas have traction in the world of experience. Can the musings of a friar influence the actions of an adrenalin fuelled, bloodied soldier breaking through the walls of a city? One aspect of this is the qualification of an author to write on conduct in war, and I will come to discuss the approach taken by the authors examined: Sánchez, a cleric, lawyer and administrator; Erasmus, a cleric and scholar; Machiavelli, in effect a civil servant; and Lipsius, an academic.

There is a deeper aspect to this question. Ian Clark opens his *Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction* with the claim that ‘war is a supremely practical activity’⁵⁷. However, he goes on to argue that the separation between the philosophy and the practice of

⁵⁵ Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy*, pp. 100 – 101; Gat, Azar, *Military Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 67.

⁵⁶ Mallett, Michael, *Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy* (London, Sydney and Toronto: The Bodley Head, 1974), p. 260.

⁵⁷ Clark, Ian, *Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p 1.

war is far from distinct. Drawing on Michael Oakeshott's discussion of 'the so-called practical', Clark concludes that when we refer to the practice of war, 'we do not refer simply to the actions which people perform, but to the context of choice and understanding in which certain acts of violence are recognised as acts of war'. Furthermore, 'our moral assessments will vary in accordance with our degree of common recognition of war's nature and its necessary features'⁵⁸. This point is taken up by David Whetham in concluding his *Just Wars and Moral Victories*: 'rules are not something external to war, they are not merely 'bolted on' in an effort to restrain it somehow; rules and law are central to the whole idea...'⁵⁹.

Therefore, in this thesis I recognise the importance of drawing together an author's writing on the practice of war with his understanding of the concepts of peace and war, including in a metaphysical sense. My method will be to apply a template as I come to examine each text or author. In sequence, I consider the issues I have discussed above. I will generally begin with contextual issues; secondly, move on to the conceptual understanding of peace and war; thirdly consider the justification of war, and finally move to the political and military issues associated with its conduct. In a sense, this sequence partly follows the logical pattern of the just war tradition, whether or not the language of the tradition has been adopted by the author. Each chapter considers a subject area, text or author.

In Chapter 2, I situate the thesis in its historical and intellectual context. Historically, I review contemporary warfare, politics, and the influence of the church. I then focus on the broader humanist challenge to the scholastic tradition, and on the legacy of Augustine and Aquinas in particular. Finally, I test the thesis that the period should be seen as one of 'crisis', in that earlier ideas have lost their force, and later ideas have yet to be fully developed. In no small part, I agree.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 4 – 5. Oakeshott, Michael, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 57.

⁵⁹ Whetham, David, *Just Wars and Moral Victories: Surprise, Deception and the Normative Framework of European War in the Later Middle Ages* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 251.

Chapter 3, considers the text of the *Disputatio*. First, I provide my English translation of the text at Appendix 1. I then analyse Benziger's interpretation of the disputation; compare and contrast the contributions of the disputants; give my assessment of the text; and identify areas relevant in assessing the text in relation to Erasmus and Machiavelli.

The aim of Chapter 4 is to provide a comprehensive analysis of Erasmus's writings on peace and war. This includes his extensive use of rhetoric, his well-known works, but also his minor works, and some less familiar theological works. The chapter also reviews the broad range of interpretation seen in today's scholarship. I argue that he writes with an ambiguity on war, but there is a strong theme against war, using what we might refer to today as *jus contra bello*. I also argue that there is an inconsistency, in that even when he does eventually, and unequivocally, come to allow for a war, he has not allowed for the means with which it can be adequately fought. I include Erasmus's 'Prayer for a Soldier' at Appendix 2.

Chapter 5 repeats the process with a full analysis of Machiavelli on peace and war. Scholarship on Machiavelli is especially diverse, but I argue my particular view that, far from a permissive approach to war, Machiavelli imposes strong restraints on its justification and conduct, and importantly, these include political control. This does, however, bring its own dangers. I draw especially on less studied speeches from *The History of Florence*, in which Machiavelli relates contemporary arguments for and against particular wars. I also draw on his own experience in the political control and management of warfare. I provide my translation of his "Discourse on the organisation of the Florentine State for arms", which I believe is an important text but not readily available in English, at Appendix 3.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I briefly consider how the divergence of ideas examined in the thesis develop into the Early Modern period. I also argue that Lipsius should be seen as an

example of a re-convergence of the separate lines of thought: *vis* restrained by *virtus*, and guided by a *prudentia mixta*.

CHAPTER 2 – HISTORICAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

To describe the nature of war after the Middle Ages, Ian Clark refers to the disintegration of the medieval idea of a unified Christendom¹. With this disintegration, a dominant element in the restraint of war was lost, and therefore, ‘some code of moderation was required to take the place of the disintegrating medieval norm’. The loss was aggravated by the complexities and flux of contemporary political structures that ‘made the search for such a new value system that much more difficult’. Clark goes on to ask: ‘What was the universal norm that could be appealed to (to) moderate the excesses of war ...?’ The answer, he argues, lies with the move towards a ‘voluntary law of nations’².

In the early seventeenth century, Grotius is generally seen to bring together a concept of natural law with a revived just war tradition, and in a form many now recognize as a founding treatise of the new discipline of international law, *De iure belli ac pacis*³. However, as he looked back over the preceding years, and a long-term failure to create any effective regulation of European conflict, he wrote his oft quoted lament to describe the sense of normative breakdown:

‘Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of. Men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and when arms have been taken up there is no

¹ Clark, *Philosophical Introduction*, p. 40.

² *Ibid.*

³ Reichberg, *et al.*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 385-6.

longer any respect for law, divine or human, as if, in accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for the committing of all crimes...'⁴.

Therefore, if new norms were to emerge in later centuries, we are left without authoritative norms of restraint for a not inconsiderable period of transition between the late medieval and the modern eras. My focus is on the period I have delineated within the Renaissance. Indeed, as we have seen, Benziger claims that this period shows all 'the symptoms of a crisis', not only because new theories were as yet 'still out of reach', but because the 'essential theories previously elaborated' no longer fitted the political realities⁵. Before focussing on the Renaissance, therefore, we must consider those theories 'previously elaborated'. First, I discuss some general points on the notion of a normative breakdown at the end of the Middle Ages.

As we have seen there are no clear boundaries between the medieval world view and the Early Modern. Indeed, for Howard, much of the 'self-conscious archaism' of the later Middle Ages would still be evident until the middle of the sixteenth century, at least until the passing of the 'princely rivals', who in many ways embodied this notion⁶. There were, for example, repeated challenges to personal combat between Charles V and Francis I, even as late as 1536⁷. However, I argue that this element of continuity, the lingering embers of medieval traditions in the conduct of war, only adds to the normative confusion of a transitional period. Old traditions and ideas were losing their sway, and new systems had yet to emerge.

⁴ Grotius, Hugo, *De iure belli ac pacis* (1625), Prologomena, s 28. Kelsey, Francis, W., *et al*, (trans.) (Oxford, 1925); and Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 390-391. Quoted also, for example, in Howard, Sir Michael, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 24; and Tallett, Frank, *War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, 1495-1715* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 239.

⁵ Benziger, Wolfram, "Zwischen *bellum iustum* und modernem Völkerrecht", *Militär-geschichtliche Zeitschrift*, Vol. 65, No. 1, 2006: http://www.aldenbourg-verlag.de/sites/default/files/filebase/files/ov/MGZ_2006_Heft_65-1.pdf (last accessed: 7 Nov11).

⁶ Howard, *War in European History*, p. 20-1.

⁷ *Ibid.* Howard cites the 1536 challenge, while Jeremy Black describes an earlier challenge in 1528: Black, Jeremy, *European Warfare 1494-1660* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 6.

Also, the Middle Ages themselves were by no means peaceful or free from cruelty. Thus, the effectiveness of medieval restraints can be questioned, further blurring any ‘transition’ between this and following period⁸. However, Jonathan Barnes asks of the medieval ‘Just War’ in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*: ‘Did it prevent a single bloody battle? Did it curb a single ambitious Prince?’⁹. As he maintains, only detailed historical research would answer this, but he goes on to argue that critics underestimate the effect of medieval theory on action. Barnes points to chronicled evidence that participants ‘were concerned with, and moved to action by, the very considerations of justice which the theorists were debating’¹⁰.

There is a further point, in the sense that the Renaissance is a reaching back to antiquity. Today, we have learnt to credit the achievements of the Middle Ages, but this has not always been the case. As Nauert points out, we might well view the notion of a sudden ‘restoration of true civilisation after many centuries of barbarian darkness’, or Burkhardt’s new spirit of ‘individualism’, as being ‘wholly unfair to the cultural achievements of the Middle Ages’. However, a sudden restoration of civilisation was a claim that was repeatedly made by writers of the Renaissance, particularly humanists from Petrarch to Erasmus, and if we are to fully understand their world view we have to take this into account¹¹. The notion of a complete failure of medieval normative systems, therefore, appears sharper in Renaissance eyes than ours.

In this thesis, I follow Barnes in characterising the medieval traditions as viable normative systems in their time, despite evident injustice and misconduct. In this chapter I

⁸ The cruelty of the Middle Ages, ‘the savage reality of the so-called “Age of Chivalry”’ is amply and vividly described, for example, in Sean McGlynn’s *By Sword and Fire: Cruelty and Atrocity in Medieval Warfare* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2008).

⁹ Barnes, Jonathan, “The Just War”, in: Kretzmann, N., Kenny, A., and Pinborg, J., *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 783.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 783-4.

¹¹ Nauert, *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*, p. 21.

relate the ideas of my Renaissance study to key aspects of this historical context: the nature of contemporary warfare; the chivalric tradition; and the Church and papacy. I also consider key features of the intellectual context: the humanist challenge to the scholastic tradition; and more specifically, the medieval just war tradition.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

I now turn to examine two features of the historical context of the Renaissance: the nature of contemporary warfare; and the condition of the papacy and the church of Rome. It is, of course, the nature of this thesis that these two subjects are closely related, even though it is the earnest wish of many, Erasmus most prominently, that this were not the case.

Contemporary Warfare

Conflict in Europe at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century occurred at various levels of threat and intensity. Europe was plagued with crime and the brigandage often associated with demobilised soldiers and armies in transit. Cities, nascent states, republics and monarchies vied and fought with varying degrees of intensity, but the emergence of national wars is seen to bring a net increase in overall violence. Then from outside Christian Europe, the Ottomans and other non-Christian or non-European entities and empires, posed an ever present challenge.

A considerable amount of historical scholarship exists for these various forms of contemporary conflict. Here I focus on three issues relevant to my thesis: the extent to which the period can be seen as one of transition; the evidence for a lack of restraint in contemporary warfare; and much discussed by Renaissance writers, the use of mercenary soldiers.

Warfare at this time, at the very outset of the Early Modern period, is often described as undergoing fundamental change. Historians have written of a ‘revolution’, a transformation, a ‘Renaissance’ and a ‘reformation’ of warfare. Notably, for example, Geoffrey Parker writes in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, that ‘European warfare was transformed between 1450 and 1530 by a number of basic changes’¹². In *The Renaissance at War*, Thomas Arnold discusses a ‘military Renaissance’¹³ where everything was to be reviewed. Not only was there considerable change in techniques and technology, but social and strategic change brought the underlying spirit of warfare into question.

Arnold is clear that by ‘the middle of the sixteenth century European war was very different from what it had been a century before’¹⁴. Knights had become officers, armies were led by generals, infantry marched in step and manoeuvred in formation. The dominance of knights and heavy cavalry was giving way to the prominence of an infantry of largely common men, described by Ayton and Price in *The Medieval Military Revolution* as soldiers of ‘sub-genteel status’¹⁵. Technological development is seen by many to be especially significant, with gunpowder superseding muscle power, and cannon, arquebus, and early musket making an impact on the shaping of new armies.

The effect of steadily improving, more powerful, and more mobile, cannon is particularly evident, for example, against medieval city walls during Charles VIII’s lunge through Italy in 1494. Francesco Guicciardini, the contemporary historian, records ‘this new plague of artillery’ whose ‘shots were so frequent and so violent was their battering that in a

¹² Parker, G., “Warfare”, in Burke, P., (ed.), *The New Cambridge Modern History: Vol. XIII Companion Volume* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 201; and as cited by Jeremy Black in his critical discussion of the idea of a ‘military revolution’, in Black, *European Warfare*, p. 34, and nn. 2 – 3, p. 220. The caution of Jeremy Black and other historians to these claims will be discussed in turn.

¹³ Arnold, Thomas, F., *The Renaissance at War*, (London and New York: Harper Collins, 2006), pp. 26-27.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 25 - 6.

¹⁵ Ayton, Andrew, and Price, J.L., (eds.), *The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995), p. 9.

few hours they could accomplish what previously in Italy used to require many days'¹⁶. On the other hand, Michael Mallett provides a thorough and critical analysis of use of artillery in this campaign, demonstrating that its actual use was very limited¹⁷. But as Guicciardini himself points out, the perception was powerful enough: 'above all, the fury of the artillery filled all Italy with so much dread that no hope of defending oneself remained'¹⁸.

However, eminent historians also urge great caution with claims of the changing face of warfare. Howard cautions against seeing change as a result of 'striking technological or scientific advances', but more to 'a process of trial and error and to minor adjustments...within a very stable and limited technological framework'¹⁹. Jeremy Black certainly stresses the difficulties in analysing both the impact and timing of the process of transformation, especially in considering any 'military revolution'. He cautions against over-emphasising, not only technological change, but 'cultural-organisational factors' and 'changes in military institutions and methods of raising troops'²⁰. Indeed, as George Gush emphasises, the pike rather than gunpowder was as much an influence 'to end the Middle Ages'. The developed manoeuvre of formations of pikemen, to be so admired by observers rooted in the classics, enabled the common foot soldier to face 'his mounted, armoured "betters" in open battle'²¹.

Vegetius and other classical military writers had been well studied through the Middle Ages, but Heuser makes an important point to which we will return, with Machiavelli

¹⁶ Guicciardini, Francesco, *The History of Italy*, Alexander, Sidney, (trans. and ed.) (London and New York: Macmillan, 1969), Bk. 1, pp. 50 - 51. Also, as an example of artillery on an open field of battle, Guicciardini's brother Jacopo provided an account of the battle of Ravenna in 1512: 'It is a horrible and terrible thing to see how every shot of the artillery made a lane through those men-at-arms, and how helmets with the heads inside them, scattered limbs, halves of men, in vast quantity, were sent flying through the air'; quoted in Mallett, Michael, "The Transformation of War, 1494-1530", in Shaw, Christine, (ed.) *Italy and the European Powers: The Impact of War, 1500-1530* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), p.14, with an abbreviated version in Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, Bk. 10, p. 248.

¹⁷ Mallett, "The Transformation of War", pp. 12 - 14.

¹⁸ Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, Bk. 15, p. 341.

¹⁹ Howard, *War in European History*, p. 30.

²⁰ Black, *European Warfare*, pp. 214-5.

²¹ Gush, George, *Renaissance Armies 1480 - 1650* (Cambridge: Patrick Stevens, 1975), p. 9.

especially. Unlike medieval authors, the broader ‘rebirth’ of classical attitudes brought about an attitude whereby instead of an overriding ‘trust in divine providence’, there was an acknowledgement of other independent variables in war. This in turn brought about the conviction that humans were expected ‘to do their part’ in achieving a successful outcome²².

It is clear that military and social change occurred, and I argue that the historian’s caution actually underlines the sense of overlap, admixture and adaptation. New ideas, tactics and drills had yet to be formulated, while old techniques were increasingly inadequate. In his *War and Chivalry* Michael Vale identifies the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries as a time when ‘the effects of the changes in warfare (were) multiplied’, and that in ‘this transitional period new and old techniques were of course mingled in a constantly changing relationship’²³. In varying measures of decline and advancement, contemporary battlefields saw both crossbow and arquebus; armoured knights and large formations of infantry; mercenary, militia and national armies. Not only did each bring their own equipment and techniques, but also, and important to my thesis, their own ideals, motivations and codes of behaviour.

The period has also attracted a reputation for increasingly unrestrained warfare, and this is my second particular concern. In *War and Public Opinion in Renaissance Italy*, for example, Hale describes the particularly bloody nature of the fighting between 1494 and 1514 when it could not be believed ‘how much blood could be spilt in an hours fighting’²⁴. Howard also discusses the period between the battles of Fornovo in 1494 and Pavia in 1525, where the convergence of Swiss pike battalions, French *gend’armes* and Spanish *tercios* brought ‘a

²² Heuser, *Evolution of Strategy*, pp. 52 – 53.

²³ Vale, Michael, *War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages* (London: Duckworth, 1981), p. 146.

²⁴ Hale, J.R., “War and Public Opinion in Renaissance Italy”, in Hale, J.R., *Renaissance War Studies* (London, The Hambledon Press, 1983), p. 377.

new thoroughness and with it a new bloodiness to the battlefields of Italy'²⁵. This particular period is seen by Ayton and Price as one of unusually open battle. Old city walls were vulnerable to canon, thus forcing more open battle. However, while Charles VIII's invasion of Italy had purported to show a potency in siege artillery, 'by the early years of the sixteenth century' this would come to be checked by improved fortifications such as the bastion and the angled constructions of the *trace italienne*²⁶. With improved fortifications and siege techniques, early-modern warfare tended to revert to the largely static and lengthy sieges, but only after a notably bloody interval, an interval which coincides with the period of my thesis.

Hale describes an evident moral descent that is characterised by the effect of this warfare on the civilian populations. It was not unusual, in itself, for armies to live off the local populations. Indeed, with limited transport and supply capabilities there would usually be no alternative. However, the size of contemporary armies was growing rapidly. Tallett, in discussing the problems of logistics, notes a significant growth in the first half of the sixteenth century when armies were bigger than most of the towns of the period²⁷. This would include both light and heavy cavalry, increasing numbers of infantry, longer artillery trains, more material for sieges, and the inevitable camp followers. The more armies ventured longer distances, as with repeated invasions down through Italy, the more demands were made on local populations. Those areas of Europe that were the focus of repeated campaigns would suffer the most, and areas of agricultural and commercial prosperity attracted most attention, for example, the Rhineland, Westphalia, Lombardy, the Spanish Netherlands and northern

²⁵ Howard, *War in European History*, p. 26.

²⁶ Ayton and Price, *Medieval Military Revolution*, p. 7. Also quoted is Phillippe Contamine who noted 'by a dialectical process which may be found in all periods, progress in the art of siege was answered by progress in the art of fortification, and visa versa'.

²⁷ Tallett, *War and Society*, pp. 9 and 54.

France²⁸. For Hale, the demands made on civilian populations were practised with ‘unheard of cruelty and callousness’²⁹.

A further dimension is added in that not only did armies have to feed themselves, but they were also prone to employ economic warfare by denying subsistence to an enemy. The classical and medieval teaching on this is described by a contemporary chronicler: ‘lay waste the countryside / ... That nothing be left for them, either in wood or meadow / Of which in the morning they could have a meal’³⁰. Such tactics continued to be employed with vigour during campaigns of the Renaissance. When combined with the ill-discipline of so much of the soldiery, the effect is repeatedly seen as catastrophic. In discussing the direct impact of war on civilians, Hale notes how, ‘compared with the spasmodic nature of the Hundred Years War, the Wars of Italy and the Netherlands were almost unremitting molestations of normal life’³¹. Vale writes of the ‘unnerving ease with which armies – particularly bands of infantry – could dissolve into packs of brigands and pillagers’³², and Guicciardini’s contemporary observation was that many local populations:

‘...saw nothing but scenes of infinite slaughter, plunder and destruction of multitudes of towns and cities, attended with the licentiousness of soldiers no less destructive to friends than foes’³³.

Finally, I briefly consider the context of contemporary mercenaries as they come in for considerable criticism by both Erasmus and Machiavelli. The rationale of the mercenary

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

²⁹ Hale, *Renaissance War Studies*, p. 377.

³⁰ Gillingham, J., “Richard I and the science of war in the Middle Ages”, in Gillingham, J., and Holt, J., (eds.), *War and Government in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Boydell Press, 1984), pp. 82 – 5; Gillingham provides the quotation from Jordan Fantosme’s *Chronical*, (Oxford, 1981), 11, pp. 430 – 50. Also, Tallett, *War and Society*, p. 66.

³¹ Hale, *War and Society*, p. 179.

³² Vale, *War and Chivalry*, p. 164.

³³ Guicciardini, *Storia d’Italia*, Panigada, C., (ed.) (Bari, 1929), ii, p. 245. Also, quoted in Hale, (1998), p. 179.

is money or personal gain as opposed to any notions of duty or honour.³⁴ Again, however, some caution is appropriate. Certainly, the practice of employing mercenary troops was longstanding and commonplace. Bernard Guenée describes how ‘between the age of the feudal army and that of the standing army, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were the era of the contract army’³⁵. Their presence extends for a considerable period, and takes root in northern Europe after flourishing in Italy, but this is not without reason. In Florence, it was a merchant and commercial class who employed mercenaries because they opted to focus on their own commercial skills, and thereby, also create the necessary finance. In 1428, for example, the merchant Goro Dati argued the case for employing mercenaries because, for the commercial class to fight, would be time-consuming, expensive and ‘pointless’³⁶.

Michael Mallet provides a full account in *Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy*. He notes, for example, an ‘increased civility’ with the fifteenth century *condottiere* captain, who ‘was more likely to spend his idle hours playing chess, listening to his musicians, and gambling, than dreaming of conquests, counting his profits, or torturing his prisoners’³⁷. Such captains often came from nobility, or would rise to attain such status, most notably with Francesco Sforza becoming Duke of Milan in 1450. A study of one particular group of mercenaries concludes that far from criminals and vagabonds, the rank and file were raised by gentlemen and drawn ‘from their traditional connections – from clients, retainers and tenants’³⁸. The issue of their doubtful loyalty is often raised, but, as

³⁴ The subject of mercenaries will be examined again in the contexts of both Erasmus and Machiavelli.

³⁵ Guenée, B., *States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe* (Oxford, 1985), p. 142. Also quoted in Ayton and Price, *The Medieval Military Revolution* (1995), p. 12.

³⁶ Bayley records the debate in Bayley, C.C., *War and Society in Renaissance Florence: The De Militia of Leonardo Bruni* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 55.

³⁷ Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters*, p. 258.

³⁸ Trim, D. J. B., ‘Ideology, Greed and Social Discontent in Early Modern Europe: Mercenaries and Mutinies in the Rebellious Netherlands, 1568-1609’, in Hathaway, J., (ed.), *Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective* (Westport, C.T., 2001), p. 52. Quoted in Black, *European Warfare*, p. 13.

Jeremy Black cautions, the “changing of sides” has to take note of the porosity and mutability of the “sides”³⁹.

However, the many disadvantages in the employment of mercenaries came to outweigh any perceived advantage. Gradually, in Italy, the large mercenary companies came to be disregarded in favour of other sources of troops, although the individual *condottiere* and smaller groups persisted. At one level, there were issues of discipline and particularly misconduct toward the civilian population. These became exacerbated with problems of payment. Howard points out that their ‘only bond of loyalty to their employer was the assurance of cash payment, punctually and in full’⁴⁰. But the inability of employers to meet the growing costs of a war, plus the problems of supply and communication, would often mean the failure of payment or any semblance of a contract. The nadir of the mercenary tradition is seen with roving bands of unemployed, often foreign, mercenaries plundering the countryside, and violently imposing themselves on the population.

The Church and Papacy

The papacy is central to the conception of moral authority in medieval Europe. In the ninth century, a clear division of responsibility exemplified the supposedly ideal form of this authority. The Emperor, Charlemagne, avowed to be the pope’s protector, leaving the incumbent pope, Leo III, free from the needs of even self-defence, and able to devote himself to his spiritual responsibilities as leader of the Christian faith. This faith was recognized throughout Western Europe, and its precepts were generally respected. In his study of *The Contribution of the Medieval Church to International Law and Peace*, Robert Wright describes a Europe of contending feudal principalities, among which the Church created: ‘a

³⁹ Black, *European Warfare*, p. 14.

⁴⁰ Howard, *War in European History*, p. 25.

unity which was broader and deeper than mere nationality, by a moral tie which was superior to mere force'. He argues that the Church's censures were feared and respected, and thereby 'war and ferocity' were restrained⁴¹.

Yet, in 1527 Rome suffered a siege and bloody sacking by troops of the Empire. Many of these soldiers were Catholic, but many were Protestant and held the Pope in no religious or moral esteem whatsoever. The Pope was forced, temporarily, to flee. Why, therefore, was there such a collapse of papal authority, and how does this loss impinge on this discussion of peace and war? I largely draw on two accounts: David Chambers *Popes Cardinals and War: The Military Church in Renaissance and Early Modern Europe*⁴²; and Christine Shaw's "The Papacy and the European Powers" in *Italy and the European Powers: The Impact of War, 1500-1530*⁴³.

Attention readily turns to two particular popes: Alexander VI (1492-1503) with his son Cesare Borgia; and the 'soldier pope', Julius II (1503-1513)⁴⁴. The secular ambitions of these popes to regain political control of previously lost papal territories did indeed lead to a deep involvement by the papacy in the wars of Italy. In the case of Julius this was a direct and robust personal involvement. Observers of the 1511 winter siege of Mirandola were led to remark that the sight of Julius on the battlefield was both shocking and 'unknown to history'⁴⁵. The extent of his secular ambitions provoked much criticism, the strength of which is summarised in the satire of 1518, *Julius Excluded*, which for Chambers is a 'gross if not

⁴¹ Wright, R. F., *Medieval Internationalism: The Contribution of the Medieval Church to International Law and Peace* (London: William and Norgate, 1930), pp. 10-11.

⁴² Chambers, D. C., *Popes Cardinals and War: The Military Church in Renaissance and Early Modern Europe* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006), p. 122.

⁴³ Shaw, Christine, "The Papacy and the European Powers", in Shaw, Christine, (ed.), *Italy and the European Powers: The Impact of War, 1500-1530* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006). A recent, but more general, account can be found with Norwich, J. J., *The Popes: A History* (London: Chato and Windus, 2011).

⁴⁴ The reputation these two popes is illustrated by Norwich who critically deals with both in a chapter entitled "The Monsters: 1492 - 1513", Norwich, *The Popes*, pp. 254 – 278.

⁴⁵ Chambers, *Popes Cardinals and War*, p. 122.

wholly undeserved caricature⁴⁶. Saint Peter denies Julius's entry to heaven, and accuses him of being:

‘...a leader of the world, not of the church; not merely worldly, either, but pagan, and even more wicked than the pagans. Your proudest boast is your power to break treaties, to spark off wars, to provoke the slaughter of human beings’⁴⁷.

Shaw describes how the pope had to choose allies among European powers, but ‘this was not a choice that he would have been expected to make, before the Italian Wars’⁴⁸. The immediate context is therefore significant. However, she also points to a much deeper legacy, where ‘the perceived domination of papal policy by temporal concerns ... (was) evident before the wars’⁴⁹. Chambers argues that the problems should be seen as embedded more in the long-term history of the papacy, and less as associated with any particular period or pope. Julius's personal command of offensive operations is but ‘one episode of a complex and continuous theme in the history of the papacy’⁵⁰, a theme of involvement in secular politics and war.

Chambers discusses the various *casus belli* of the popes. First, there was a rivalry for influence between pope and Emperor, a lasting source of faction and feud between Guelf and Ghibeline which splits the communities of Italy⁵¹. Secondly, the papacy had to defend its divine authority against a succession of challenges from papal claimants, ‘anti-popes’, and dissident cardinals. This frequently involved the use of force, which was readily justified by

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

⁴⁷ The authorship of *Julius Excluded* is usually attributed to Erasmus, and I will return to this text. Erasmus, *Julius Excluded*, CWE., 27, p. 191; also, Rummel, *The Erasmus Reader*, p. 232.

⁴⁸ Shaw, “The Papacy and the European Powers”, p. 126.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁵⁰ Chambers, *Popes Cardinals and War*, p. 3.

⁵¹ Later, p. 227, I consider Machiavelli's own account of the many factions dividing of Florence.

jurists such as John of Legano at the time of the Great Schism⁵². Thirdly, Christendom had to be maintained against external challenge, as manifest in the Muslim threat from both the Moors and the Ottomans. Again, jurists readily justified military action in relation to Muslims, with popes often volunteering to take an active part, even if such ambition was never to be realised. No pope was able to maintain the policy of peacefully converting the Muslims that many had initially argued for. Even the more pacific Adrian VI, as Chambers notes, was forced into presenting ‘the very image of the papacy he had not wished to foster’⁵³. Fourthly, force was needed to suppress ‘erring Christians’, and internal heresy. One notable example was the Hussites of Bohemia in the fifteenth century, and such outbreaks of dissidence indicate a growing challenge to the authority of the papacy that eventually breaks out in the Protestant Reformation.

However, and as Chambers demonstrates, the popes went to war most frequently over the control of land, titles and possessions in Italy. The temporal political standing of the Bishops of Rome had increased with various ‘donations’, most notably, the ‘Donation of Constantine’. That this donation was eventually to be so vigorously disputed indicates the significance of the issue. The challenge made by Lorenzo Valla in his 1440 *Declamation on the Falsely Credited and Fabricated Donation of Constantine* struck at the heart of papal authority. As Nauert describes, it also exemplifies the early humanist critical method of searching out textual error and forgery⁵⁴.

Indeed, throughout feudal Europe, bishops came into temporal as well as spiritual authority. Through institutions such as the bishop’s feudal lordships, many inherited land and manors, but with this came the responsibilities of temporal management. Such responsibility

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. xiii – xxii, and pp. 31-32. Also, Reichberg, *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 211.

⁵³ Chambers, *Popes Cardinals and War*, pp. 143 – 144. On accommodation with the Turks, for example, John of Segovia wrote *On Sending the Spiritual Sword among the Saracens* in the mid fifteenth century, albeit this was written from a position of retirement and semi-disgrace, *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁵⁴ Nauert, *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*, p. 40.

came to include defence, and this would draw the church into considerably partisan conflict. In order to first survive, and then to flourish and dominate, as Chambers summarises: ‘for better or worse, the papacy almost inevitably became in many respects more like other Italian principalities’⁵⁵.

Furthermore, to be respected as such, ‘it needed a reputation for armed strength and readiness to use that strength; in campaigns against secular enemies and non-compliant vassals, this would usually be without even the pretence of waging a holy war’⁵⁶. Therefore, with its increasing concern for its property, the papacy became another temporal power, rather than being seen as a moral authority sitting over the princes of Europe. For Shaw, it became ‘difficult, if not impossible’, for the princes of Europe ‘to accept the pope in the guise of disinterested arbiter between them’⁵⁷. Indeed, far from the pope fulfilling the function of an arbiter of conflicts, the princes became obliged to arbitrate in the conflicts of the papacy⁵⁸. The papacy gained a reputation for being only too ready to resort to war, with policies of ‘extraordinary aggression and bellicosity’. Added to this, the popes’ more disastrous campaigns only served to weaken any temporal standing they had managed to secure.

The participation of the ‘warrior cardinals’ is also significant. Cardinals were often delegated the task of either leading a campaign themselves, or accompanying the secular, military leadership, be this prince or mercenary. In the reign of Julius, the Sacred College is described as being almost a ‘cadre of staff officers’⁵⁹. The involvement of the clergy in actual fighting was a live issue, and participation in combat varied. Certainly the supporting and encouraging of soldiers was common, but seldom did cardinals or clergy actually wield a

⁵⁵ Chambers, *Popes Cardinals and War*, p. 40.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Shaw, “The Papacy and the European Powers”, p. 117.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 108. Shaw describes how Louis XI and Ferdinand of Aragon were invited to act as arbitrators and mediators in both the Pazzi War and the Neapolitan Baron’s War.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

weapon to fight themselves⁶⁰. However, it was this involvement that was to attract so much criticism of the religious reformers. While these cardinals were, more or less, adept at their military duties, many went on to gain a reputation for ruthlessness which was notable even for the standards of the time. Cardinal Giovanni Vitelleschi, for example, acquired a reputation as a ‘master of sackings, massacres and summary executions’⁶¹.

To summarise in Shaw’s words: there was a developing ‘disaffection from and lack of respect for the papacy’⁶². The church had its own considerable temporal interests in disputes; it became closely involved, often very readily, in contemporary warfare; and the conduct of its own participants could often be questioned. There was, therefore, little prospect of an effective European moral consensus led by a pope. The authority of the papacy, and of the broader Catholic church, to pass critical judgement on justifications for war, and misconduct during war, was severely diminished.

HUMANISM AND THE SCHOLASTIC TRADITION

This diminishing of moral authority also has to be seen against the broader intellectual challenges to the papacy, and I will come to consider what is essentially a humanist questioning of scholastic and canonist orthodoxy. First this should be seen in a context of broader criticism. Certainly there had been scholarly dispute through the Middle Ages, as seen, for example, between the Albertist, the Thomist, and the Scotist⁶³. However, a broader sense of critique and of questioning orthodoxies opens up. As Copenhaver and Schmitt summarise, ‘the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries abounded in unorthodox thinkers, some of

⁶⁰ The soldiers provided by various Holy Orders, such as the Knights Templar, is a separate matter, and not considered here.

⁶¹ Chambers, *Popes Cardinals and War*, p. 42.

⁶² Shaw, “The Papacy and the European Powers”, p. 107.

⁶³ Or between Augustinian Platonists and Aristotelian Thomists, the *via moderna* and the *via antiqua*; as discussed, for example, in Copenhaver and Schmitt, *Renaissance Philosophy*, pp. 40-44.

whom can be called Aristotelians only in the loosest sense'⁶⁴. There was also a revival of Scepticism: a 'critical and anti-dogmatic way of thinking', important in antiquity but which had faded through the Middle Ages, again 'disturbed Europe's conscience'⁶⁵. A growing interest in the more scientific applications of Aristotle provided a further 'inducement to secularisation'⁶⁶. However, we find the main intellectual critique of orthodoxy with the humanists.

The Medieval Just War Tradition

The medieval just war tradition, as it might be found prior to the Renaissance authors of my thesis, has been widely described and discussed. Here, I introduce this phase of the tradition, and in the rest of the chapter I pursue a more critical analysis as these ideas come to bear on those of the Renaissance. As a foundational text, I draw on Johnson's *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*⁶⁷, and discussion in Reichberg *et al*, *The Ethics of War*⁶⁸. I also refer to Bellamy's more concise account in his *Just Wars*⁶⁹. A more critical account is found with Russell's *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, which I later consider in detail for my critical examination of the scholastic just war.

The Middle Ages saw a development of various strands of ideas, broadly categorised by Johnson as the 'churchly' and the 'secular'⁷⁰, and which include: the scholastic, or theological just war tradition; canon law; and the code of chivalry. For Johnson, as we have seen, these strands come together to form a 'classic just war doctrine', albeit this overarching

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16. I will not discuss the more extreme challenges to religious orthodoxy, such as the Waldenses, Hussites, Taborites, Czech Brethren and the Anabaptists. The pacifism associated with these movements and sects normally accompanies a complete withdrawal from worldly affairs. They are discussed, for example, in Brock, Peter, *Varieties of Pacifism: a Survey from Antiquity to the outset of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998).

⁶⁷ Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, pp. 26 - 81.

⁶⁸ Reichberg, *et al*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 91 - 230.

⁶⁹ Bellamy, *Just Wars*, pp. 30 - 48.

⁷⁰ Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, pp. 26 - 33.

doctrine would ‘come to pieces shortly after it reached full expression’, that is, for Johnson, in the ‘sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’⁷¹. In my thesis, I argue instead, that these medieval ideas lost their meaningful impact much earlier, and certainly before the Renaissance of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Nevertheless, I do broadly concur with Johnson’s account of the preceding medieval tradition.

I have already argued that a sense of normative restraint has been an enduring characteristic of the nature of warfare. This is clearly evident in antiquity, with, for example, the Socratic consideration of war being the more or less ‘just’⁷², and Cicero’s concern that a ‘justice of warfare’ is to be ‘very much preserved in public affairs’⁷³.

With the onset of Christianity, the early Christians anticipated an imminent new millennium, and this expectation encouraged a more detached view of worldly affairs, and a pacifist position with respect to war. This changed over time, particularly with a Christian Emperor, Constantine, and a justification for participation in war is evidenced in works by, for example, Lactantius (ca. 240 – 320) and Ambrose (ca. 339 – 397), and is then most notably confirmed by Augustine (354 – 430).

In answering the pacifism of early Christians, Augustine is seen to provide, in Bellamy’s words: ‘the basic ideas that would inform judgements about the legitimacy of war for many centuries to come’⁷⁴. Augustine describes two cities: the City of God, *civitas Dei*, and the Earthly City, *civitas terrena*⁷⁵. God’s city is eternal and perfect, whereas we live in the temporal city which is filled with imperfections. God’s city is present among his true ‘pilgrims’ on earth, but until the day of judgement the true identity of these is not always clear. In the meantime, a measure of order and justice has

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 29 and 33.

⁷² Plato, *Alcibiades*, I, 107c – 109d, as cited in Reichberg, *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 22.

⁷³ Cicero, *On Duties (De officiis)*, Griffin, M. T., and Atkins, E. M., (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), I, 34, p. 14.

⁷⁴ Bellamy, *Just Wars*, p. 8.

⁷⁵ Augustine, *The City of God (De civitate Dei)*, in, for example, Augustine, *Political Writings*, Kries, D., and Tkacz, M. W., (trans.) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994); and Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*.

to be maintained in the imperfect city, and this is the duty of the state. It is therefore ‘just’, and still in God’s plan, to maintain temporal order, justice and peace on earth, including the waging of ‘just’ wars.

Spread throughout his works, and not in a concise format, Augustine specifies the core criteria by which these just wars are to be fought. First, there should be just intention, including the aim of peace, ‘war is waged in order to attain peace’⁷⁶, and soldiers ‘serve peace and the common well-being’⁷⁷. Furthermore, this ‘ordered concord’⁷⁸ is the ‘peace of the just, not the ‘peace of the ‘iniquitous’⁷⁹. The wise man does not relish the prospect of war, instead he would ‘rather lament the necessity of waging just wars’⁸⁰. Then, ‘it makes a great difference by which causes and under which authorities men undertake the wars’⁸¹.

Augustine specifies just causes as ‘those which avenge injuries... or to return something that is wrongfully taken’⁸²; but with a caution, ‘let the power of avenging not make you callous’⁸³. On authority, war can only be ‘waged by someone who has the right to do so, because not all men have that right’⁸⁴; but a just man ‘could rightly wage war at the king’s command’, even a sacrilegious king⁸⁵.

The next key figures to consider are Gratian (mid-twelfth century) and Aquinas (ca. 1225 – 1274), both of whom closely follow the argument of Augustine. The works of both are seen as enduring features of the just war tradition, and here, I briefly note their position in the medieval context before a more detailed critique later in this chapter. For Johnson, Gratian’s *Corpus Juris Canonici*, and the *Summa Theologica* of Aquinas, together form a

⁷⁶ ‘Letter 189’, to Boniface, in Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 79.

⁷⁷ *Against Faustus the Manichean*, XXII, 74, *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁷⁸ *City of God*, XIX, 15, in *Political Writings*, p. 154.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 12, in Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 79.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 7, in *Political Writings*, p. 149.

⁸¹ *Against Faustus the Manichean*, XXII, 74, in Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 81.

⁸² *Questions on the Heptateuch*, VI, 10, *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁸³ ‘Letter 133’, to Marcellinus, in *Political Writings*, p. 247.

⁸⁴ *Questions on the Heptateuch*, VI, 10, in Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 83.

⁸⁵ *Against Faustus the Manichean*, XXII, 74, *Ibid.*, p. 82.

‘bench mark’ in the thirteenth century when the church sought to consolidate and clarify its position on war⁸⁶. Both will inform subsequent canon law and scholastic theology on this subject.

In defining a ‘just war’, Gratian incorporates Augustine’s criteria of intention, cause, and authority. I make two further points. First, Gratian emphasises the importance of a correct inward disposition, as introduced by Augustine, and as distinct from the outward action. He discusses precepts ‘for the preparation of the heart which is internal, (rather) than for the deed which is in the open’. Secondly, in addition to the secular criteria for war, Gratian also specifically allows war, as Johnson describes, ‘for the sake of religion’⁸⁷; and as Bellamy points out, this is made clear with Gratian separating secular and ecclesiastical sources⁸⁸. Thus, a secular authority to wage war for its own purpose is made clear, but also, the church is permitted to ‘coerce’ its enemies, opening a justification for ‘holy’ war. Gratian’s work on war will, in particular, feed into the very strong canon law of the later Middle Ages.

However, Gratian cannot be seen as having provided a succinct statement of just war thought. Aquinas, on the other hand, is taken as contributing a ‘deft ordering of ideas...thereby providing a compact précis of the emerging medieval consensus on just war’⁸⁹. For Reichberg *et al*, this concise, systematic treatment of Augustine, combined with his standing as a theologian ensures the enduring legacy of Aquinas⁹⁰. The requirements for just intention, cause and authority are made very clear indeed in his concise statement within

⁸⁶ Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, p. 34.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁸⁸ Bellamy, *Just Wars*, p. 34.

⁸⁹ Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 170.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

the *Summa Theologica*⁹¹. In addition, I note Bellamy's argument that with Aquinas, there is very much a 'presumption against war', and a strong sense that 'the injustice inflicted by war (might) be less than the total justice delivered by it'⁹². In this way, Aquinas provides a clear restraint on the prosecution of war. The problem, however, as I will shortly demonstrate, is that Aquinas cannot be considered a significant influence on the period of my thesis.

The Humanist Challenge

Turning to the humanists, I first look again at the significance of the various 'shapes', or types, of humanism. Hanan Yoran considers this diversity, within humanism itself, before presenting his thesis on the 'humanist republic of letters'⁹³. Because, and as I have argued, there is no 'specific content' to humanism, Yoran emphasises that 'humanists could accommodate to a range of different social and political realities'. Indeed, wherever they were linked to the dominant political establishment, they 'usually adhered to and represented the hegemonic ideology'⁹⁴. Indeed, we are familiar with the advocacy by different humanists, or even one humanist in different texts, of varieties of monarchies, aristocracies, republics and mixed constitutions.

Yoran continues by pointing out that when humanism is thus defined, by 'form rather than content', it can be seen why 'different humanists held contradictory views, some utterly conventional and some highly original and innovative, on a range of subjects'. Humanism, therefore, 'could adapt itself to varying social, political and cultural contexts'⁹⁵. On this argument, therefore, we ought not be too surprised to find distinct ideas on peace, war and the

⁹¹ Aquinas, Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, Regan, R. J., (trans.) in Baumgarth, W. P., and Regan, R. J., (eds.), *On Law, Morality and Politics* (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2002), II-II, Question 40, pp. 164 – 167; also for example, in Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 176 – 182.

⁹² Bellamy, *Just Wars*, p. 38.

⁹³ I will discuss Yoran's thesis later with "Interpretation and Ambiguity" in Erasmus, from p. 171. Yoran, Hanan, *Between Utopia and Dystopia: Erasmus, Thomas More, and the Humanist Republic of Letters* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010).

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 17 – 18.

conduct of war, in Skinner's words, 'within the same intellectual tradition'. Indeed, we should be more surprised to find conformity to a single idea or set of ideas.

I now turn to discuss humanism as a challenge to the prevailing scholastic tradition. For Richard Tuck, 'Since the thirteenth century there had been two ways of talking about ethics and politics in Europe, marked by quite separate technical Latin vocabularies'. One was used by the scholastics, drawing largely on Aristotle; and the other by the humanists⁹⁶. Humanism has also been contrasted as a 'rhetorical' manner of thought, against the scholastic 'philosophical' manner⁹⁷. Some see the divide in rigid and exclusive terms. Copenhaver and Schmitt describe how: 'throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, (the) condemnation of scholastic university education was the ceaseless hue and cry of the humanists'⁹⁸.

However, I also heed the caution provided by John Pocock: it would be 'misleading in the highest degree to attempt a hard and fast separation between two such large and indeterminate groups of practitioners whose membership overlapped and who borrowed constantly from one another'⁹⁹. Indeed, some scholars have been very critical of setting up an opposition between these groups: for Kristeller it is more a 'departmental rivalry', a difference of approach within a unified whole, with the scholastics unchallenged in their particular intellectual sphere¹⁰⁰. Kristeller's objection is well discussed, and Skinner's response is instructive in accounting for the nature of the humanist challenge.

Skinner acknowledges that Kristeller provides 'a valuable corrective', but argues that his perspective becomes 'misleading': it 'underestimates the growing confidence with which

⁹⁶ Tuck, Richard, *Philosophy and Government, 1572 – 1651* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 6.

⁹⁷ Yorán, *Between Utopia and Dystopia*, pp. 24 – 25.

⁹⁸ Copenhaver, B. P., and Schmitt, C. B., *Renaissance Philosophy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 29.

⁹⁹ Pocock, J. G. A., *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 560 - 561.

¹⁰⁰ Kristeller, Paul, Oskar, *Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters* (Rome: Storia e letteratura, 1956), pp. 263 – 4, and 572; As discussed and quoted in Skinner, *Foundations*, 1, p. 104.

the humanists were in fact willing to invade scholastic fields of study, to denounce their rivals for continuing to follow benighted methods, and so to insist with growing imperialism on the need for the special techniques of humanism'¹⁰¹. Skinner goes on to describe the ways in which the humanists 'impugn' both the methodology and the preoccupations of the scholastics. I note three aspects pertinent to my thesis.

Firstly, the humanists challenged a key assumption of Augustinian Christianity which viewed 'the march of history as a linear development'. Instead, following Aristotle, Polybius and Cicero, they came to see human events as following a 'series of recurring cycles'¹⁰². Later, I will discuss the importance of this cyclic interpretation of history for Machiavelli: peace is inevitably followed by war, then a return to peace, and so the cycle continues. In a more Augustinian view, by contrast, we occupy an imperfect City of Man in the present, and this will eventually be followed by God's eternal peace, from which there will be no return.

Secondly, Skinner emphasises that as humanists rejected 'scholastic abstractions, they became increasingly anxious to maintain that all knowledge ought to be for use'. Petrarch 'snarls' at the schoolmen who 'consume their time learning to know virtue instead of acquiring it'; and Salutati dismisses their logic which 'proves in order to teach', while the humanist 'persuades in order to guide'. Hence, Skinner notes, the importance of rhetoric and eloquence to 'persuade our wills and thus come to exercise a beneficial influence on political life'¹⁰³.

A third aspect, and one developed by Nauert, is the humanist challenge to the scholastic appeal to authority. The 'great virtue' of scholastic discourse found, for example with Aquinas's *Summa Theologica*, was that it 'probed each issue in an orderly and rational

¹⁰¹ Skinner, *Foundations*, 1, pp. 104 - 105.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 109 - 110.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 107; Petrarch, "His Own Ignorance and that of Many Others", Nachod, Hans, (trans.), in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, Cassirer, Ernst, *et al*, (ed.) (Chicago: 1948), p. 105; Salutati, "Letter to John Dominici", Emerton, Ephraim, (trans.), in *Humanism and Tyranny*, (Cambridge, Mass.: 1925), p. 358.

way, collecting the various opinions and making the determination'. However, its 'great intellectual vice' was that 'it simplified and distorted the opinions of the authorities by reducing each author's opinion to a single statement, totally divorced from its original context'¹⁰⁴. From Petrarch onwards, therefore, the humanists laid great emphasis on the context of the author, and I would add, of the judgement being made. While the scholastic was critical 'through logical analysis of individual statements', the humanist sought to comprehend 'unique circumstances...truth seemed particular, conditioned, and subject to many limitations'¹⁰⁵.

I now begin to focus on the scholastic tradition of a just war. On this, I believe Skinner's account is less than complete. He does eloquently describe the early humanist's general avoidance of the subject, albeit this is found amongst several of his accounts of broader humanism. For Skinner, humanists such as Petrarch and Pontano objected to employing *vis*, force, at the expense of *virtus*, civic virtue, which would signify 'mere bestiality'¹⁰⁶. Then, while both the scholastics¹⁰⁷, and later civic humanists¹⁰⁸, made clear the need for both *vis* and *virtus* to ensure the peace and safety of the community, early humanists would 'glide urbanely past the problem'¹⁰⁹.

Northern humanists subsequently 'revolt against the venerable doctrine of the just war'¹¹⁰, and I believe Skinner is correct here to apply the descriptor 'doctrine'. However, he then readily describes this challenge to a 'dangerous orthodoxy'. Copenhaver and Schmitt also describe how: 'in explicit terms...humanists abandoned the scholastic doctrine of Just

¹⁰⁴ Nauert, *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*, p. 18.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁰⁶ Skinner, Quentin, *Visions of Politics: Volume II, Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 123.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Skinner, *Foundations*, p. 246.

¹⁰⁹ Skinner, Quentin, "Political Philosophy", in Schmitt, *et al*, *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, p. 443.

¹¹⁰ Skinner, *Foundations*, p. 245.

War and repudiated the Aristotelian citizen warrior, favouring the Stoic opinion that all war is fratricide over the more bellicose teachings of Augustine and Aquinas'¹¹¹. I make two observations here.

First, I note the sense in which Skinner, Copenhaver and Schmitt together describe the 'more bellicose teachings' of a 'dangerous orthodoxy'. Whilst this might suggest a pre-disposition on the part of these scholars against the scholastic just war, more pertinently, their description implies a contemporary perception that the scholastic doctrine was not acting effectively in restraining violence.

Secondly, I note that it is possible to see the critique of scholastic teaching of a just war as an exemplification of the humanist challenge to the scholastics. Again, I will go on to examine this more fully, but even a cursory review of the familiar Question 40, of Aquinas's *Summa Theologica*¹¹² illustrates the humanist critique. Aquinas includes: abstract concepts such as a 'just' war; logical reasoning from premises of just cause, authority and intention to a conclusion of a just war¹¹³; and frequent appeals to patriarchal and scriptural authority. Whatever their own particular objections to the concept of a just war, there is a common humanist critique of the scholastic methodology. In Skinner words, they are 'within the same intellectual tradition'.

The Scholastic Justification for War

In his critical account of *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, Frederick Russell argues: the 'crucial question is that of the relevance, the adequacy, and the applicability of the just

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

¹¹² Aquinas, Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, Regan, R. J., (trans.) in Baumgarth, W. P., and Regan, R. J., (eds.), *On Law, Morality and Politics* (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2002), II – II, Question 40, pp. 164 - 167.

¹¹³ In effect, the logic is *Modus Ponens*: $p \rightarrow q, p$, therefore q ; where p = just cause + authority + intention, q = just war.

war theories to the contemporary political scene'¹¹⁴. At issue in my thesis is the durability of this medieval just war tradition, whether it sustained its force into the politics and conflict that followed the Middle Ages. This section will therefore examine the development and standing of the scholastic just war tradition, and its 'relevance, adequacy and application' into the period of the European Renaissance.

Russell describes how two main strands were to develop, that of canon law and that of the theologians. Even though for Russell, in a 'seamless if intricate web', the Augustinian imprint remained crucial to both 'the theories of lawyers and theologians alike'¹¹⁵. Johnson, in his analysis of *The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, also considers both the church's 'Canon Law tradition', through Gratian and the Decretists, and a 'theological tradition' through Aquinas¹¹⁶, the latter more usually associated with the scholastics. Here, I will follow Johnson in using the descriptor 'theological tradition', although I will come to argue that the presentation of this particular body of ideas, in this context, is more clearly and accurately described as 'just war doctrine'.

I will not relate the detail of the medieval theological tradition, which starts as a reaction to Early Christian pacifism, and continues, for example, with Ambrose, Augustine Gratian and Aquinas¹¹⁷. Aquinas draws together his three clear criteria for a war to be just: authority, cause and intention¹¹⁸. I will make two general comments; and then review Russell's critique of the tradition.

¹¹⁴ Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, p. 294.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 292.

¹¹⁶ Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, p. 122.

¹¹⁷ I would chose to begin, for example, with: Johnson, "Perspectives on the Middle Ages", in *The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, Ch. 5, pp. 121 – 171; Reichberg *et al*, "Part 2 - Medieval" in *Ethics of War*, pp. 91 – 233; and Barnes, "The Just War", in Kretzmann, *et al*, *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, Ch. 41, pp. 771 - 784.

¹¹⁸ Aquinas, *Summa*, Regan (trans.), II-II, q. 40, pp. 164-7.

My first general comment is that the theological tradition mainly concerns these three *jus ad bellum* criteria of Aquinas, described by Johnson as ‘core’ criteria¹¹⁹. It has yet to broaden out to include the full, and variously listed, criteria which we encounter today. In particular it appears less concerned with the conduct of warfare. Several reasons are given for this. First, in this medieval tradition the conduct of fighting is treated less as a separate issue, but more as an extension of the ‘core’ *jus ad bellum*, especially in having the correct disposition and intention. This is made clear by Reichberg when discussing the emphasis of military prudence in Aquinas: instead of ‘intention’ some writers came to substitute ‘*debitus modus*, the right manner of waging war, the limit not to be exceeded’¹²⁰.

Secondly, medieval society strongly emphasises obedience to godly and secular authority. If the war is deemed to be just in the eyes of God, and his prince is commanding its conduct, the precise manner of fighting is seen as less of a concern to the obedient soldier. Augustine writes: ‘In these matters the only thing a righteous man has to worry about is that the just war is waged by someone who has the right to do so’¹²¹.

Thirdly, warfare was governed by other ‘streams’ of the overarching just war tradition. As we have seen, for Johnson the theological tradition is closely linked to Canon law which is more concerned with conduct¹²². Indeed, as I demonstrate with Russell, it can be

¹¹⁹ Johnson, James, Turner, *Morality and Contemporary Warfare* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 44.

¹²⁰ Specifically, Aquinas writes on military prudence in the *Summa*, II–II, q. 50, a. 4. See Reichberg, Gregory, “Thomas Aquinas on Military Prudence”, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (2010), pp. 262 – 275, and as cited, p. 264. In a companion article, Ryan Gorman emphasises the place of virtues in Aquinas: “War and the Virtues in Aquinas’ Ethical Thought”, *Ibid.*, pp. 245 – 261. Also, Reichberg cites from Reichberg, G. M., “Just War and Regular War: Completing Paradigms”, in Rodin, D., and Shue, H., (eds.), *Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and legal Status of Soldiers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

¹²¹ Augustine, *Questions on the Heptateuch*, Bk. VI, Ch. 10, in Swift, Louis, J, (ed. and trans.), *The Early Fathers on War and Military Service* (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1983), p. 138. Cited in Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 83.

¹²² Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, p. 122.

said that there came to be a confusing multiplicity of canon, decretal and anathema.

Furthermore, Johnson adds the ‘streams’ of temporal civil law and the chivalric tradition¹²³.

My second general comment on the theological tradition concerns the scope for interpretation, and the erosion of the universal authority of the church. It is certainly the case that many writers adjusted to the diminished universal authority of the Holy Roman Emperor, which had become the ‘polite fiction’ described by Jonathan Barnes¹²⁴. Just war theory had long allowed the relevant temporal authority, for example king or prince, to be the ‘just’ authority, and only in a few cases was this identified with the Emperor himself. However, as well as the multiplicity of political authorities, the fracturing of moral authority also undermined the interpretation of cause and intention. These became easily manufactured by intermediating bishops to suit the particular justifications, private gain, or glory of the many princes, and we will see this as a recurring critique of the tradition.

I now turn to the strong critique by Frederick Russell of what he describes as just war theory. As we have seen, Russell argues strongly that just war theory had lost its force by the end of the high Middle Ages: ‘At this point the just war theory as a restraint on violence became a dead letter’¹²⁵. His argument considers a number of issues.

Firstly, there was the loose interpretation of just war theory¹²⁶. It could too easily become the enabler, rather than, as intended by Augustine and Aquinas, the restraint of war. It became a ‘right to war’ within the ‘elastic restrictions of Christian morality’, where the ‘warfare of monarchs was assumed by an indulgent clergy to be just unless directed against its own (the clergy’s) interests’. Christian dogma was used to rationalise legal killing in what became very questionable circumstances, ‘even of the most indiscriminate sort in that

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ Barnes, “The Just War”, p. 776.

¹²⁵ Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, p. 307.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 301.

consecrated war and its bloody martyrdom, the crusade'. Just war theory was even to become double edged, being turned by monarchs to justify conflict against the ecclesiastical authority that was supposed to be its sponsor.

Secondly, medieval just war theory was 'time bound' to a period where the Pope exerted a fuller and wider influence, and therefore, given its confessional fragility, contained the 'seeds of its own destruction'¹²⁷. Any such moral authority became less influential when 'national states were fiercely locked in combat'. In practical terms, it was also too bound to a feudal system of warfare dominated by a knightly class. For example, clerical observers eventually came to consider the abuses of the mercenary tradition, but long after such troops had become a major component of contemporary warfare. Nor were civil militias given adequate treatment. This leads Russell to conclude that 'mercenaries and standing armies of Renaissance Italy dealt the death blow to just war theories based on feudal rights and duties'¹²⁸.

Thirdly, medieval just war depended on an assumption of guilt to legitimise war¹²⁹. From 'Augustine to Aquinas', and indeed beyond, there is a convergence of the concepts of avenging injuries, punishment and defence. This leaves the Church, with its claim to authority over Christendom, with wide-ranging powers to punish but with no scope for impartial adjudication. Russell argues, for example, that the avenging by More's Utopians of an injury to a third party, but not to themselves, belongs to a world with 'different assumptions about the international community'.

For Russell, this leads to the fourth weakness, that there was no analysis of unjust war except as a 'mirror image' of just war, and no competent authority to examine and verify

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

claims¹³⁰. There was a scholastic assumption that in a just war the ‘ruler acted out of pure and impartial motives and without passion’, an assumption which, he claims, is not supported by the evidence of the period. There was no purchase with which to make a well-supported designation of a just or an unjust cause, in Russell’s words, with ‘necessity and Providence as escape clauses, the concept of just war is emptied of its meaning’. Rulers were simply not acting ‘out of pure and impartial motives’, and would claim various justifications. Foremost, was the claim that war was either simply ‘necessary’, and we will consider necessity in some detail with Machiavelli, or a matter of God’s will.

Russell concludes with a two-fold claim. On the one hand, the more theological and canonically coherent the theory became, it grew too complex to be an effective practical influence. On the other hand, the more practical it sought to become, it lost critical purchase. He summarises: the ‘scholastic just war in its balance of competing values imposed a perpetual intellectual gymnastic on human minds and acts’¹³¹. It would take the realities of the modern world, including the sovereign state, to sweep away ‘the very complexities’ of the theory. As a restraint on violence, for Russell, the medieval just war had become ‘a dead letter’¹³². Russell’s critique, therefore, is a strong argument against the continuity of the just war tradition.

The theological tradition was not to disappear, even if, and as Russell argues, it was failing to develop in any meaningful way and had become largely ineffective in European politics and conflict. Cardinal Thomas de Vio, or Cajetan wrote on the tradition of the just war in two works: his Commentary on the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas, completed

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

¹³² *Ibid.*

in 1517, and in his collected *Summula* of 1524¹³³. However, I argue that there are limitations to Cajetan's contributions.

Cajetan makes a useful distinction between a more easily justified defensive war, and a more problematic offensive war¹³⁴. For Cajetan, the latter remains first and foremost a matter of vindictive justice and punishment, which is more in keeping with medieval theology. This concept is to be challenged by later scholastics, such as Molina, who move away from the connection between justified war and vindictive punishment¹³⁵. I argue, that even if it is short of naked aggression, the very notion of 'vindictive punishment' still serves to 'enable' war by contemporary popes and princes rather than to 'restrain' it. Cajetan was, after all, influential during the papacies of Alexander VI and Julius II, both notable for a readiness to go to war. Therefore, and as summarised in *The Ethics of War*, while it is possible to detect a 'glimmer toward a new European system' of regulation, with his theological discussion of punishment, there very much remains a 'medieval cast of his work'¹³⁶.

Augustine and Aquinas

Before leaving the theological tradition, I will comment specifically on Augustine and Aquinas, two of the main and often cited patriarchal authorities of the just war tradition generally, and of the theological tradition in particular. My purpose is to establish the context for discussion that will continue throughout the thesis. First, I emphasise the dualities

¹³³ Andrews and Haggemacher (trans.) in: Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 240-50.

¹³⁴ Reichberg makes clear that offensive war has very much been part of the just war tradition where: 'offensive war thus does not equate to the modern notion of "aggression"', Reichberg, Gregory, "Just War or Perpetual Peace", *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2002), pp. 21 – 22. In a modern context this distinction between defensive and punitive war is discussed in *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 10, No. 3, (2011), Special Issue: The Just War Tradition and the Continuing Challenges to World Public Order.

¹³⁵ Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 333.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.* p. 240. Also as discussed by Reichberg in: Reichberg, G. M., "*Jus ad Bellum*", in May, Larry, (ed.), *War: Essays in Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.28, and n. 55.

inherent in Augustine; and secondly, and importantly, I question the influence of Aquinas on just war thinking in the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

Augustine is frequently cited as a major authority in writing on peace and war in the Middle Ages, through the Renaissance, and on to the present day. All reasonable accounts of Augustine credit his contemporaries, such as Ambrose; and explain how his writing on just war is not readily accessible, but spread throughout his work. Indeed, Johnson reminds us that his passages on just war are brief when compared to his writing on other subjects, such as marriage, and would ‘only occupy a few typed pages today’¹³⁷. Also, in rightly crediting Augustine for this foundational work, many accounts pass over the duality, some argue ambiguity, found in Augustine. Therefore, because it becomes important to subsequent discussion, I will now emphasise this issue.

From the considerable scholarship on Augustine, I draw especially on the established works by Herbert Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine*¹³⁸, and Robert Markus, *Sacred and Secular*¹³⁹. More specifically on just war, sources include John Langan’s article, “The Elements of St Augustine’s Just War Theory”¹⁴⁰, and John Mattox’s more recent study: *Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War*¹⁴¹.

As we have seen, the duality in Augustine is rooted in his account of the two cities: the City of God, *civitas Dei*, and the Earthly City, *civitas terrena*. Secular authorities have to maintain a just and ordered society, as best they can, in the Earthly City. This is not a straightforward task. Deane describes inherent ‘ambiguities and limitations’, ‘almost

¹³⁷ Johnson, *Ethics and the Use of Force*, p. 16.

¹³⁸ Deane, Herbert, A., *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (London and New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

¹³⁹ Markus, R. A., *Sacred and Secular: Studies on Augustine and Latin Christianity* (Aldershot and Vermont: Variorum, Ashgate Publishing, 1994).

¹⁴⁰ Langan, John, “The Elements of St. Augustine’s Just War Theory”, *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 12, No. 1, (Spring, 1984), pp. 19-38.

¹⁴¹ Mattox, J. M., *Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War* (London and New York: Continuum, 2006).

insoluble moral dilemmas’, and temporal politics as a ‘realm in which paradox, irony, and dark shadows abound’¹⁴². This is reflected in Augustine’s writing on peace and war.

For example, Deane goes on to remind us that ‘Augustine uses terms like “justice”, “harmony”, and “peace” in two quite different senses’. These different senses become blurred and confused. ““True” or “genuine” justice, peace and concord are found only in the City of God... In earthly institutions, whether social, economic, or political, we find only the shadows or traces of these supernal qualities’, and furthermore, these shadows differ from the originals in ‘both kind and degree’¹⁴³.

True peace, therefore, is, as Deane continues: ‘the absence, not only of overt conflict, but of all resistance, contradiction and opposition. It is clear that as long as we live in this world (the Earthly City) true peace is completely unattainable’. Indeed, for Augustine, it is ‘folly’ to think otherwise¹⁴⁴. The ‘wicked’ have a life of ‘strife and conflict’, and even “saints and faithful ones” must constantly wrestle with the devil... and with the troubles and desires of this world’¹⁴⁵. Lagan sums up how this distinction can lead to ambiguity in discussing peace: ‘...a great deal will depend on whether one stresses the similarities between the two forms of peace or the differences’¹⁴⁶.

Also, Augustine’s justifying of war is more complex than is often portrayed. Markus notes that under ‘certain specifiable circumstances killing in war may be morally justifiable looks like a simple unambiguous statement’, but for those inclined to pacifism, it makes ‘the unthinkable thinkable’, and for the more bellicose, it makes ‘the unquestionable questionable’¹⁴⁷. The possibility of various interpretations is inherent to the reconciliations

¹⁴² Deane, *Political and Social Ideas of Augustine*, pp. 141, 222, and 241.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

¹⁴⁶ Lagan, “The Elements of St. Augustine’s Just War Theory”, p. 29.

¹⁴⁷ Markus, *Sacred and Secular*, p. 2.

achieved by Augustine. Augustine is usually read today as a ‘Reluctant Just War Theorist’¹⁴⁸, but I will later demonstrate a position in Sánchez, and also drawn from Augustine, which unhesitatingly embraces the concept of war which is ordained by God¹⁴⁹.

Lagan describes Augustine’s own position as one of ‘ambivalence and complexity’, where various ‘elements could be put together in support of a just war position or a holy war position or a pacifist position’¹⁵⁰. We have seen the generally accepted justification of a just war to maintain order in the imperfect world, but other, more selective, readings have been taken. As Mattox repeatedly insists, it is ‘difficult if not impossible’ to read an Augustine ‘devoid of theological consideration’¹⁵¹. If therefore, emphasis is given to the element of God’s plan and command, it is a short step to holy war and crusading. On the other hand, if you are led to believe that you are one of God’s elect ‘pilgrims’, then it is a short step to embracing what you take to be God’s peace, removing yourself from earthly affairs, and adopting a pacifist stance, as did the contemporary Anabaptists.

There are other areas of ambiguity. For example, as a lesser evil, but still an evil, the wise ruler will not only be reluctant, but ‘mournful’ about going to war. Augustine does not pursue the implications of maintaining morale, and the will to win, in an army of ‘mournful’ or ‘sorrowful soldiers’, but I will return to this issue in discussing Sánchez, and Machiavelli’s militia. On the other hand, Augustine also writes that the removal of a gross injustice is, in itself, a cause for happiness¹⁵², thus perhaps vindicating, in part, the Roman practice of a ‘triumph’.

¹⁴⁸ Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 71.

¹⁴⁹ For my discussion of Sánchez on Augustine, see p. 146.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁵¹ Mattox, *Augustine and the Theory of Just War*, p. 163, also for example: pp. 172 – 4.

¹⁵² Augustine, *City of God*, 4, 15, in *Political Writings*, Kries, D., and Tkacz, M. W., (trans.) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), p. 32.

To illustrate how a more permissive, even bellicose, interpretation might be drawn from the ambiguity in Augustine, I turn to Gratian. We have seen how Gratian separates the inward ‘preparation of the heart’ from the outward deed. Importantly, this encourages a correct inward disposition, but also I argue that the separation can also excuse and even encourage a permissive approach in the execution of the deed. For example, based on Gratian, the Decretalists came to the view that, as Bellamy describes, ‘when a war was just, any necessary means might be used to ensure victory’¹⁵³. Immoderate means might then be employed, while a moderate inward disposition is still claimed, but which, of course, remains internal to man, and the sincerity of which is ultimately beyond challenge.

Gratian himself, uses very strong Old Testament examples, which Johnson concedes ‘have the flavor of aggression’¹⁵⁴. Furthermore, while on the one hand Gratian stresses that ‘revengeful cruelty’ was to be ‘reproved’¹⁵⁵; on the other hand, he describes God’s direction to the Israelites, as the instrument of his punishment for the sins of the Amorites and Canaanites: to possess their land, and ‘not to spare any of them but to put them all to death...it is without sin that noxious blood is spilled’¹⁵⁶. I have earlier suggested that Aquinas can be seen as a more limiting influence, which would balance this ambiguity stemming from Augustine, and which is carried through to Gratian. However, I now turn to question the relevance of Aquinas to the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

On Aquinas, again I draw on a wide range of theological works and writing on just war; I will also consider discussion by Skinner in *Foundations* and ideas raised in *Rethinking*

¹⁵³ Bellamy, *Just Wars*, p. 36.

¹⁵⁴ Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, p. 37. Johnson qualifies this using the example of ‘right of passage’ in Gratian, *Decretum*, Question II, Canon 3, not the example which I cite below, and which I would argue amounts to genocide.

¹⁵⁵ Gratian, *Decretum*, I, 4, in Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 112.

¹⁵⁶ Gratian, *Decretum*, V, 49, in Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 120 – 121.

Foundations. Aquinas wrote the *Summa theologiae* between 1268 – 1271, and in this work he includes his more schematised account of Augustine’s just war¹⁵⁷. As Ryan Gorman reminds us, there is also a central place for virtue based judgement¹⁵⁸. In many historical accounts of the just war, he is therefore depicted as being the foremost representative of the developing tradition through the late middle-ages up to the neo-scholastics of the 16th century. This is made especially clear in diagrammatic depictions: Johnson has the scholastic theology of Aquinas feed into a ‘Classic Just War Doctrine’ of Vitoria¹⁵⁹; and more recently Bellamy has the scholasticism of Aquinas feed directly into the later scholasticism of the Spanish School¹⁶⁰. A theological account of just war, the *Catholic Perspectives on Peace and War*, describes how Vitoria and Suárez ‘continued to develop the insights of Aquinas’¹⁶¹. In Heuser’s account of strategy, we are given the impression of a continual process: Vitoria in his turn, ‘built on Thomas Aquinas’¹⁶². In his account of contemporary pacifist ideas, Ben Lowe cites and utilises Johnson’s development of ‘classic just-war doctrine’¹⁶³.

I argue that this is at best a misleading impression, and from the perspective of my thesis, it is incorrect. Vitoria developed and built on a ‘revived’ Aquinas, and the interest of my thesis is on what preceded this ‘revival’. On this hypothesis, therefore, I ought not expect to find a vibrant and widely influential Aquinas. To develop this argument, I will consider: the authorities cited in contemporary literature; historical accounts of Aquinas and Thomism; and scholarship on the ‘revival’ of Aquinas.

¹⁵⁷ Aquinas, *Summa*, Regan (trans.), II – II, q. 40, pp. 164 - 167. Also: Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*: <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3011.htm> (last accessed: 6 May 11).

¹⁵⁸ Gorman, Ryan, R., “War and the Virtues in Aquinas’s Ethical Thought”, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (2010), pp. 245-261.

¹⁵⁹ Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, p. 25.

¹⁶⁰ Bellamy, *Just Wars*, p. 8.

¹⁶¹ Massaro, T. J., and Shannon, T. A., *Catholic Perspectives on Peace and War* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).

¹⁶² Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy*, p. 60.

¹⁶³ Lowe, Ben, *Imagining Peace: A History of Early English Pacifist Ideas* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 3.

In the course of my thesis I examine various Renaissance texts, and establish the extent to which Aquinas is cited as an authority, or where his influence might extend, but he is un-cited. However, in the context of the later Middle Ages, he is not cited in at least three of the more familiar texts: Bouvet's *The Tree of Battles* (ca.1387)¹⁶⁴, Christine de Pizan's *The Book of Deeds of Arms* (1410)¹⁶⁵, and the anonymous *Boke of Noblesse* (1475)¹⁶⁶. It might be argued that these texts are more concerned with the practicalities of war fighting, but they do also discuss the nature and justice of war. Furthermore, Johnson argues that the traditions of chivalry and the church 'join in mutual support, and it is clear in Bonet's (*sic*) mind they are saying much the same thing'¹⁶⁷. It would be reasonable, therefore to find Aquinas cited, but he is not.

There is a certainly a sense of Aquinas in *The Tree of Battles* with, for example, discussion on war being justified under 'all laws': divine, natural, canon and civil¹⁶⁸. However, Bouvet makes frequent reference to the 'decretals'; and in his review of the sources used by Bouvet, Coopland only discusses John of Legano, Martin the Pole and Bartholomew of Lucca as a named sources. The latter was even a fellow Dominican, 'friend, confessor, and on one occasion the travelling companion' of Aquinas. Even allowing for Bouvet's 'economy' in citing his sources, it is clear that Aquinas is not recognised as a source or authority¹⁶⁹. After Bouvet, Christine de Pizan mainly uses classical sources to discuss the practice of arms, and also includes consideration of just cause. Again, she gives no citations

¹⁶⁴ Bouvet, Honoré, *The Tree of Battles*, (ca. 1387), Coopland, G. W., (trans.), (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949).

¹⁶⁵ Pizan, Christine de, *The Book of Deeds of Arms and Chivalry* (ca.1410), Willard, Charity, Cannon, (ed.), Willard Summer, (trans.), (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

¹⁶⁶ Anonymous, *The Boke of Noblesse* (1475) (New York: Burt Franklin, 1972).

¹⁶⁷ Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, p. 69.

¹⁶⁸ Bouvet, *The Tree of Battles*, 4, Ch. 1, pp. 125 – 126.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, "Sources", pp. 25 – 56; Cited comment on Bartholomew of Lucca at p. 48.

in the text, but Willard identifies Augustine and John of Legnano as probable sources¹⁷⁰.

Discussion of the lawful cause of war in the *Boke of Noblesse* only cites Christine de Pizan¹⁷¹. Therefore, the idea that Aquinas is a strong influence on late medieval authors has yet to be demonstrated.

The historical account of Aquinas also reveals the limits of his influence¹⁷². It is often acknowledged that Aquinas did not achieve great influence in his lifetime. The philosophy of Aquinas was certainly not broadly accepted by the Catholic church, being denounced in both Paris and Oxford shortly after his death in 1277. As Charles Nauert describes, opposition was focussed in particular on the rationalism of Aquinas, in turn derived from a long held Christian suspicion of rationality¹⁷³. Aquinas and Thomism would meet opposition by orders such as the Franciscans, and even from some Aristotelians who disagreed with a Christian reading of Aristotle. His influence did spread, but this accompanied the growth of his Dominican order. The *Summa theologica* supplanted the *Libri quatuor sententiarum* of Peter Lombard as the text-book of theology in the middle of the 14th Century, but again, this was confined to Dominican schools. As Janet Coleman notes, the influence of Aquinas was largely confined ‘for some time to come...within his own order alone’¹⁷⁴.

However, as we will see, by the time of Erasmus, Aquinas was becoming more widely read, and Erasmus himself would have been familiar with the renewed interest in Aquinas. He was eventually to be crowned as the ‘Prince of Theologians’ and declared a

¹⁷⁰ Pizan, *Book of Deeds of Arms and Chivalry*, 1, Ch. 4, p. 16, n. 8. John of Legnano was a contemporary of de Pizan’s father at Bologna, and she writes of the conflict around Bologna in 1350, and which would have influenced *Tractus de bello*.

¹⁷¹ *The Boke of Noblesse*, pp. 6 – 8.

¹⁷² I have drawn on a number of sources including: Honderich, Ted, (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 873; and the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14698b.htm> (last accessed: 6 May 2011).

¹⁷³ Nauert, *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*, p. 208.

¹⁷⁴ Coleman, Janet, *A History of Political Thought from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), p. 116.

Doctor of the Universal Church, but this did not occur until the Council of Trent in 1567¹⁷⁵, and well after the ‘revival’ by the neo-scholastics. Clearly, therefore, his philosophy and influence does not appear to be so widely recognised in fifteenth century Europe, before this recognition. I now turn to the scholarship for a ‘revival’ of Aquinas and Thomism.

Skinner describes the beginning of the ‘great sixteenth century revival of Thomism’¹⁷⁶. From beginnings in the University of Paris, it was taken up, as we have seen, by Cajetan with his commentary on Aquinas. It really became manifest, especially for the just war tradition, with Vitoria in his work on the Indies. Skinner is clear that this marks a ‘revival’, and this is taken up in *Rethinking the Foundations*. Harro Höpfl questions certain aspects in Skinner’s account, but he agrees that although ‘scholasticism’ in the narrow sense of ‘university teaching’ had continued uninterrupted, ‘Thomism attained a new vitality and prestige under particularly able exponents’¹⁷⁷. In her analysis of Skinner’s account, Annabel Brett points out in discussing Aristotle, how our perception of the centrality of Aquinas is ‘indebted to a neo-Thomist philosophical and theological perspective’¹⁷⁸. Indeed, Brett continues, recent scholarship on the reception of Aristotle now focuses more broadly on the conditions in the universities, than on Aquinas himself. Vivian Geen also reminds us that our knowledge of the thought of Aquinas does not stem from medieval manuscripts, but from ‘editions of their works printed in the sixteenth century’¹⁷⁹. Therefore, we would be mistaken to view Aquinas as a central figure before the ‘revival’.

¹⁷⁵ His *Summa* was laid on the altar, and St Pius V proclaimed him a Doctor of the Universal Church.

¹⁷⁶ Skinner, *Foundations*, 2, p. 135.

¹⁷⁷ Harro Höpfl, “Scholasticism in *The Foundations*”, in Brett *et al*, *Rethinking Foundations*, pp. 116 – 117; Höpfl goes on to question, for example, Skinner’s account of the use of the revived Thomism in dealing with heresy.

¹⁷⁸ Brett, Annabel, “Scholastic political thought and the modern concept of the state”, in Brett *et al*, *Rethinking Foundations*, p. 131.

¹⁷⁹ Green, V.H.H., *Renaissance and Reformation: A Survey of European History between 1450 & 1660* (London and New York: Edward Arnold, 1972), p. 24.

Elsewhere, José Fernández-Santamaria is unequivocal: this is a return ‘not to the ailing Scholasticism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but to the vigorous Thomism of the thirteenth’¹⁸⁰. Again therefore, for the period prior to the renewal, and the subject of this thesis, we should not expect to see a strong manifestation of Aquinas’s ideas, and I argue that this includes his account of a just war. This is important in view of the perception in much just war scholarship of a continuity between Aquinas to Vitoria, which I believe is not the case.

IDEAS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF WAR

Johnson argues that a continuity of ideas occurs when ‘the ecclesiastical and chivalric ideas of non-combatant immunity came together, moreover, they became a mutually supportive amalgam’¹⁸¹. For Johnson, the theological tradition has to be seen in combination with the contemporary traditions of canon law and chivalry. Wright also claims that chivalry, as an effective ‘international and living system’, cannot be traced back further than the time that it came under the ‘direct influence’ of the church¹⁸². The argument follows, that in this way, in combination, these ideas would later re-emerge and inform the developing international and military law and written codes of the following modern era.

However, my concern is the period before such ideas fully re-emerge, alone or in combination. We have seen the case that the theological, scholastic tradition justifying war loses its force, and I now turn to ideas which set out to govern the conduct of war: canon law, secular chivalric codes, discipline and law.

¹⁸⁰ Fernández-Santamaria, J. A., *The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance 1516-1559* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 4.

¹⁸¹ Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, p. 171.

¹⁸² Wright, *Medieval Internationalism*, p. 154.

Canon Law

As Janet Coleman describes, Canon law was ‘set in train’ to establish the church as an ‘autonomous, legal, and governing institution’¹⁸³. The function and force of Canon Law is strongly defended by Wright, in his study of the medieval church, as the application of a judicial test to real world events. He believes that ‘Augustine’s contribution, and its influence through Canon Law, was no small gift to the peace of the world in Medieval times’¹⁸⁴. Certainly, much was discussed, written, decreed and anathematised on a range of subjects including non-combatant immunity, the prohibition of combat by clergy, respect for holy days and places, tournaments, espionage, deception, weapon technology and even the trading of arms¹⁸⁵.

However, even Wright acknowledges that Canon Law loses its impact by the close of the Middle Ages, and that this loss has significant consequences: ‘the awful lawlessness which prevailed after the break-up of the Canon Law influence’¹⁸⁶. Indeed, we have seen Grotius’s later lament that ‘there is no lack of men who view this (international) branch of law with contempt as having no reality outside of an empty name’¹⁸⁷. Grotius recognizes that there had been no universally recognized, effective legal framework in Europe for a significant period.

In part, the reason for Canon Law’s decline as an influence of effective restraint lies, as we have seen, with the diminishing authority of a single church as an ‘autonomous, legal, and governing institution’. Respect for the church, and its laws, becomes more questioned,

¹⁸³ Coleman, Janet, *A History of Political Thought from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), p. 27.

¹⁸⁴ Wright, *Medieval Internationalism*, p. 137.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-181. Significant events in this include: Canon 1 of the Council of Clermont of 1095, which decreed that women, priests, and unarmed agriculturalists were to be treated as non-combatants and left in peace; and the Truce and Peace of God which were summed up with the Second Lateran Council of 1123. See also, for example: Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 93 – 97; and Barnes, “The Just War”, p. 783.

¹⁸⁶ Wright, *Medieval Internationalism*, p. 16.

¹⁸⁷ Grotius, *De iure belli ac pacis*, p. 9.

particularly in the approach to the Reformation. Indeed, the symbols of that church might well become the target of brutal assault rather than a respected moderator of military conduct. Also, as Johnson asserts, Canon Law is closely linked to the theological tradition for the justification for war, what I refer to as contemporary just war doctrine. Again therefore, it attracts the critique of Russell: the more theological and canonically coherent the theory became, the less relevant it was in practice, and when it concentrated on practical advice, it became even less coherent. It is therefore reasonable to question the efficacy of a ‘perpetual intellectual gymnastic’ on the conduct of soldiers in battle¹⁸⁸.

It can certainly be argued that for the more devout Catholic soldier the edicts of the church will be more ingrained into his character. However, not only is such devotion less and less guaranteed, it became an aggravating factor in inter-confessional conflict. Huizinga remained sceptical that any such law could ever have become a restraint in war. Instead, honour, the central concept of chivalry, would still need to be present if the conduct of war was ever to be restrained: ‘If a little clemency was slowly introduced into political and military practices, it was a result rather of the sentiment of honour than of legal and moral convictions’¹⁸⁹. I therefore turn to the concept of chivalry.

Chivalry

The main question for my thesis is the extent to which chivalry was a restraining influence on the conduct of warfare in the Middle Ages, and whether this continued into the late fifteenth and the early sixteenth centuries. I will not rehearse the full range of scholarship and debate on medieval chivalry. Whetham critically reviews recent scholarship, and emphasises that there was more to medieval warfare than the set piece battles dominated by

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

¹⁸⁹ Huizinga, Johan, “The political and military significance of chivalric ideas in the late Middle Ages”, *Men and Ideas*, Holmes, J.S., and Marle, H., van, (eds.) London, 1960), p. 205.

knightly concepts of glory and honour¹⁹⁰. Here, I will consider the long established account of Johan Huizinga¹⁹¹, and continue to draw on Michael Vale's *War and Chivalry*¹⁹², and the many works by Maurice Keen, including his *Chivalry*¹⁹³. More recent commentary includes Nigel Saul's *For Honour and Fame*¹⁹⁴.

Chivalry is a complex phenomenon that is widely understood as having evolved into a set of ideas and values determining conduct in war. Stacey describes how chivalry 'emerged... out of an interplay of knightly custom and Roman law'¹⁹⁵; and Helen Nicholson further describes the German and other influences of European culture¹⁹⁶. For Saul, it is 'a much contested phenomenon', being variously understood as a code of war, a legal construct, an aristocratic value system, a collection of ideal qualities, or a literary phenomenon. I follow his focus on the interpretation as a 'code of military behaviour', the essence of which was 'found in a set of humane values'¹⁹⁷. The chivalric code 'limited the horrors and excesses of war by prescribing an ethical basis of reasonable conduct between knights'¹⁹⁸. As such, there are relevant strengths and weaknesses.

An advantage of the chivalric tradition, I argue, is that it was developed as much, if not more, by the practitioners of medieval war as by theologians or scholars. It therefore reflects a greater measure of immediacy and relevance in the restraint and conduct of fighting. It also adds a potential to endure independent of theological.

¹⁹⁰ Whetham points especially to the 'erroneous understanding' arising from the works of Charles Oman and Hans Delbrück. Whetham, *Just Wars and Moral Victories*, pp. 7 – 24.

¹⁹¹ Huizinga, Johan, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, Hopman, F., (trans.) (Harmondsworth, 1965).

¹⁹² Vale, *War and Chivalry*.

¹⁹³ Keen, *Laws of War*, and, for example, Keen, Maurice, *Chivalry* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984).

¹⁹⁴ Saul, David, *For Honour and Fame: Chivalry in England, 1066 – 1500* (London: Bodley Head, 2011).

¹⁹⁵ Stacey, *Age of Chivalry*, p. 31.

¹⁹⁶ For example, the Ostrogothic culture in the C6th; Helen Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare: Theory and Practice of War in Europe 300 – 1500* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 28 – 30.

¹⁹⁷ Saul, *For Honour and Fame*, p. 348.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

On the other hand, it was confined to a feudal system of knights, and its benefits are not necessarily available to wider society. As Robert Stacey describes, while it was the ‘job of knights to protect (and exploit) these noncombatant *pauperes*’, in practice peasants and townsmen often fought, and when they did, ‘no mercy was owed them on the battlefield or off’ and they were frequently ‘massacred at will’¹⁹⁹. Secondly, while chivalry might exercise greater force in restraining conduct when this knightly group was dominating, or having greater control of, the battlefield, it would lose this force when this ceased to be the case. As we have seen, other arms including the infantry will indeed come to supplant this dominance.

Both the just war and the chivalric traditions have also been criticized for their apparently contradictory role as both an enabler and a restraint in warfare. We will see how, certainly for Erasmus, chivalric appeals to honour serve as a particular encouragement to unnecessary violence, far less a restraint. On the other hand, for Huizinga, moral restraint was particularly necessary in the Middle Ages, when ‘all emotions required a rigid system of conventional forms, for without them passion and ferocity would have made havoc of life’²⁰⁰. Therefore, he continues, as late as the fifteenth century, ‘chivalry was still, after religion, the strongest of all the ethical conceptions which dominated the mind and the heart’²⁰¹. Vale agrees, and demonstrates the effectiveness of chivalry as a restraining influence in war, where a chivalrous education and training encouraged the humane treatment of prisoners, safe-conduct and immunities, rules for the conduct for battles and sieges, and adherence to various limitations of time and space²⁰².

¹⁹⁹ Stacey, Robert, C., “Age of Chivalry”, in Howard, Sir Michael, Andreopoulos, George, J., and Shulman, Mark, R., (eds.) *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 30. Stacey refers to Keen, *Laws of War*, p. 231. Again, plenty of graphic examples are provided by Sean McGlynn in his *By Sword and Fire*.

²⁰⁰ Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, p. 48.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 55. Quoted in Vale, *War and Chivalry*, p. 5, with comments on Huizinga’s qualification of the quote in a lecture of 1921, n. 21..

²⁰² Vale, *War and Chivalry*, p. 8.

However, a number of factors work against chivalry. First, for example, the mercenary tradition cut deeply into the chivalric association with feudal nobility. Howard discusses the complete and systematic effect of mercenaries on the feudal system. ‘Even where feudal obligations to knight service survived, as it did in France in the *ban* and *arrière ban* in the early years of the sixteenth century, the *noblesse* had either lost their military inclinations or preferred to turn them to commercial profit’²⁰³. The nobility of Europe often, therefore, came to sell their military expertise. Even if there was to be a certain ‘domestication’ of *condottiere* in Italy, the widespread use of mercenaries throughout Europe has come to be seen as significantly contributing to the demise of feudal chivalry.

A further attack on the role of feudal nobility in war is found in the Italian republican tradition. The loyalty of the aristocracy in serving the best interests of the state is often questioned, and as we will see, Machiavelli certainly sought to minimise their presence in his proposals for military reform. This critique is found with Bruni: through his personified ‘country’ in *De Militia*, Bruni berates the feudal knight:

‘On the strength of your vows and professions I admitted and received you; I conferred honours upon you... Why desert your post?... Why deceive me with a false flourishing of medals? It is intolerable that one should hold rank over others who is in fact just like the rest.’²⁰⁴

Therefore, both Huizinga and Vale acknowledge the demise of the influence of the medieval chivalric tradition, which had been bound to the feudal conditions of the Middle Ages. As an ethical code, by the close of the late Middle Ages it had reached an ‘autumnal phase’, having outlived its value. Albeit, as we note, vestiges of chivalric display remain well

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁰⁴ Bruni, Leonardo, *De Militia*, (1421), in *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni: Selected Texts*, Griffiths, G., Henkins, J., and Thompson, D., (trans.) (Binghampton, New York, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1987), pp. 144-5.

into the sixteenth century and notions of chivalric honour will long endure in other forms.

Huizinga writes of chivalry: that warfare ‘had long since given up all thought of conforming to its rules’²⁰⁵.

As to when medieval chivalry can be said to ‘go into decline’, Saul responds that it depends on the way chivalry is defined and understood. As a ‘code of military behaviour’, he is specific: earlier than often supposed, the beginnings of an ‘erosion of chivalric values’ are found in the late thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries, with ‘the first signs of a falling away of mutual respect between knights in war’²⁰⁶. Certainly by the mid-fifteenth century, Vale notes an incongruous juxtaposition of unrestrained war and the outward displays of chivalry. He describes an ‘increasingly impersonal and savage’ war in Ghent, between 1465 and 1468, which undermined both ‘the ethic of chivalry and its formal and outward expressions’²⁰⁷.

I leave a final word on chivalry for the contemporary Bouvet. He clearly describes his view at the end of the fourteenth century, that chivalry no longer represented a force for good and restraint:

‘I do not call that war, but it seems to me to be pillage and robbery. Further, that way of warfare does not follow the ordinances of worthy chivalry or of the ancient custom of ancient warriors who upheld justice, the widow, the orphan and the poor. And nowadays it is the opposite that they do everywhere, and the man who does not know how to set places on fire, to rob churches and usurp their rights and to imprison the priests, is not fit to carry on war. And for these reasons the knights of today have not the glory and the praise of the old

²⁰⁵ Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, p. 100.

²⁰⁶ Saul, *For Honour and Fame*, p. 348.

²⁰⁷ Vale, *War and Chivalry*, p. 161.

champions of former times, and their deeds can never come to great perfection of virtue²⁰⁸.

Discipline

Along with much of the just war tradition, elements of the chivalric tradition will re-emerge in any later European consensus based on international and military law. Keen, in his *Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* notes how ‘the chivalrous conceptions of honour and loyalty of an age when the idea of nationality was not fully understood prepared the way for the notion of a law of nations’²⁰⁹. Much of the nobility would continue to function in military leadership, often as infantry officers, and they would have some direct influence on the writing of military codes of conduct. This process of codifying discipline can be seen in the French standing army from the middle of the fifteenth century. Vale describes how the Burgundian military ordinances of 1473 translate chivalric ideas into terms easily understood by a standing army. The reasons given for Captains to do their duty include ‘their own honour and renown’²¹⁰.

It is certainly possible to see examples of continuity: the ‘essence’, the need for, and provision of, restraint; even if, in Gat’s description, the ‘forms’ change with time²¹¹. Keen remarks on the Roman influence on medieval chivalry: ‘to the people of that period, the difference between the rules of chivalry and the discipline of the imperial Roman armies was merely chronological’²¹². Stacey, for example, then remarks how this ‘essence’ continues

²⁰⁸ Bouvet, *The Tree of Battles*, 4, Ch. 103, p. 189.

²⁰⁹ Keen, M. H., *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London, 1965), p. 247.

²¹⁰ Vale, *War and Chivalry*, p. 168.

²¹¹ Gat, *Military Thought*, p. 67; and cited in Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy*, pp. 100 – 101.

²¹² Keen, *Laws of War*, p. 241.

when knights became officers in new national armies, and ‘what had been a chivalric code of military conduct was thereby transformed into a code of conduct for officers’²¹³.

However, this is not to say that the spirit of chivalry passed immediately into effective modern laws. It would take time for such laws and codes to become widely adopted, and certainly before they would have any significant and lasting effect on Europe’s battlefields. Parker records the first code ‘enacted as permanent legislation by a state’ as that issued by the States-General of the Dutch Republic in 1590²¹⁴.

As well as the moral questions, there were pragmatic reasons for improving this situation. For example, uncontrolled plunder would leave the countryside bare, denying the ground to armies for further manoeuvre. Eventually, answers to the logistical dilemmas would include more regulation of plunder, improving communications, spreading armies over wider areas of subsistence by opening up several fronts²¹⁵, and all the bureaucratic and fiscal apparatus associated with later regimes. Most significantly, attention also had to be given to the question of ill-discipline.

While much reworking of the classics focused on tactical lessons, there was also a special respect for the discipline of the ancients. Discipline was needed for the tactical coherence of marching formations of pike-men and arquebusiers, reminiscent of classical formations. However, discipline and obedience were also particularly relevant in countering the persistent misconduct both within, and outside of, combat. Again this had plenty of classical precedence, but we will later see how ideas can develop beyond a harsh, imposed discipline.

²¹³ Stacey, Robert, C., “Age of Chivalry”, in Howard, Sir Michael, Andreopoulos, George, J., and Shulman, Mark, R., (eds.) *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 39.

²¹⁴ Parker, Geoffrey, “Early Modern Europe”, in Howard, *et al*, *Laws of War in the Western World*, p. 234, n. 6.

²¹⁵ Tallett, *War and Society*, p. 67.

Practical remedies do emerge. In Venice in 1514, Bartolomeo d'Alviano turned to the discipline of antiquity and instigated a strict military code to 'establish the spirit of the legions', with oaths of allegiance, and punishment for 'blasphemy, brawling and whore-mongering'. As Arnold argues, the military reformers not only wanted 'new battle schemes; they were after a whole new military ethic'²¹⁶. In 1549 Fourquevaux issued *Instructions sur le faict de la Guerre*, addressing the problem of ill-discipline. As Vale describes, if Fourquevaux had an ideal, it was 'the Roman General who ensures the total and unswerving obedience of his troops'²¹⁷. The *prévôt des maréchaux* were formed to police the army with a brutal discipline. If soldiers could not instinctively obey the ordinances of war, they would be forced to do so with 'exemplary punishment'²¹⁸. In the absence of chivalric honour, therefore, we see enforced and codified discipline, more appropriate to large armies of commoners.

Again, however, such measures take time, and the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were marked by a variable mix in standards of military discipline, and all too often, a complete absence of restraint. Codes of conduct took time to develop. Henry VIII's 1513 code, for example, has been described as a 'disordered ragbag' when compared with English codes later in that century²¹⁹. As Johnson sums up, 'the armies of the sixteenth century were still an undisciplined lot...good examples of armies with really tight discipline did not appear until the seventeenth century'²²⁰. Where the tradition of chivalry had any influence at all, 'it was chivalry at its decadent worst, a state of affairs that persisted for two more centuries'²²¹.

Therefore, a range of developments contribute to the misconduct so evident in contemporary warfare, particularly at the opening of the sixteenth century. Certainly, the

²¹⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 78-9.

²¹⁷ Vale, *War and Chivalry*, p. 164.

²¹⁸ *Ibid*.

²¹⁹ Tallett, *War and Society*, p. 124.

²²⁰ Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, p. 184. Also, Johnson, *Ethics and the Use of Force*, pp. 78 – 79. Good examples of the new discipline are seen with the Swedish army of Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years War, and Cromwell's New Model Army in the English Civil War.

²²¹ *Ibid*, p. 186.

traditional code of chivalry, if not completely absent, becomes less effective in the face of military and cultural change. Notions of chivalry and honour are eroded, and new modes of discipline, even when conceived, are not mature enough to be effective.

CONCLUSIONS – A PERIOD OF CRISIS?

I have examined the historical and intellectual context against which Renaissance ideas of peace, war, and the restraint of war, have to be seen. Most significant, I believe, is the weakening of the central moral authority of the church and papacy, upon which the medieval approach to the restraint of conflict depended. The diminishing authority of a universal church compounds the loss of influence of earlier moral traditions. A few conspicuous popes only epitomise a long process of questionable papal involvement in temporal affairs and war.

The theological just war is described by Russell as a ‘dead letter’: it comes to be too loosely interpreted, an enabler and ‘right to war’, rather than a restraint; it is time-bound to a feudal era; and there is too much convergence between notions of defence and punishment, with a dependence on the church as the sole arbiter on matters of guilt. This is a strong critique, but not, I believe, without foundation. Indeed, I argue that it is appropriate to speak here of just war ‘doctrine’, which is bound within a particular framework of scholastic authority, but it is a framework that is increasingly challenged.

I have demonstrated that Aquinas cannot be seen to underpin any continuity of just war thought from the late Middle Ages. The neo-scholastics will progress a Thomist just war tradition but this comes later in the sixteenth century. I have emphasised the ambiguity in Augustine which, I argue, has a serious influence on subsequent thinking on peace and war.

Orthodoxy is challenged by a revived scepticism, the nascent features of the Reformation, and above all, for my thesis, by humanists.

The period is one of military and cultural change. The timing and full effect of change is much discussed by historians, but change occurs, and I argue that significant overlap and admixture adds to the conceptual confusion. Historians describe a period of warfare characterized by the ferocity and indiscriminate effect of much of its violence. Chivalry had been a key influence of restraint in the Middle Ages, but it too loses its force with the passing of feudal social systems and values. Canon law also loses its universal jurisdiction and force in restraining conduct. Eventually, much is addressed with the military codes, laws and the standing national armies of Early Modern Europe, but these are not judged to be really effective until the seventeenth century.

I have argued, therefore, that a period emerged when old norms had lost their force and new norms, or even revisions of the old ones, had yet to take effect. Does this amount to a 'crisis'? I believe that the 'ferocity and passion' described by Huizinga, that had been subject to ideas of restraint up to the late Middle Ages, was making more of a 'havoc of life'. The inhabitants of the repeatedly ravaged areas of Europe would certainly have perceived a crisis, even if princes, popes and soldiers were absorbed in their endeavours. In terms of intellectual context, there was certainly a paucity of useful thinking in the just war tradition, which could have helped inspire and guide the much needed restraint. On balance, therefore, I agree with Benziger, it is not unreasonable to describe the period as in a crisis.

I will now go on to consider what appears to represent a clear, but opposing, set of views in the contemporary discourse of peace and war: the *Disputatio de pace et bello*. After this text is written, there is much in both the Italian and northern Renaissance that is generally considered to be outside of the just war tradition, with Erasmus and Machiavelli being the most recognisable representations. I will consider these in turn. However, I have established

in this chapter that they are all writing during a period that was significantly lacking in both clear and effective normative theory on peace and war; and a diminishing consensus upon which the justification and restraint of contemporary war could be grounded.

CHAPTER 3 – *DISPUTATIO DE PACE ET BELLO*

INTRODUCTION

The *Disputatio de pace et bello* (*Disputatio*) was written in Rome in 1468 as a disputation on peace and war with two contributions. The first, *De laudibus pacis*, is by the Italian humanist Bartolomeo Platina (1421-1481), and is an argument in praise of peace with a critique of war. The second is by a Spanish bishop and papal diplomat, Rodrigo Sánchez (1404-1470), and consists of two parts. The first, the *Commendatio belli*, is an affirmation of war that responds to Platina's critique. The second, *De difficultate verae pacis*, distinguishes between various types of peace, in particular the distinction between true or godly peace, *pax vera*, and earthly or human peace, *pax humana*, and discusses issues that arise from this distinction. The *Disputatio* opens with a dedicatory prologue, *Prologus*, which, it is purported, was jointly written by both authors. At the time, and as I will discuss, Sánchez was the Keeper of the Castel St Angelo in Rome, and Platina was a prisoner.

The *Disputatio* is the main subject of the study by Wolfram Benziger: *Zur Theorie von Krieg und Frieden in der italienischen Renaissance: Die Disputatio de pace et bello zwischen Bartolomeo Platina und Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo*¹. Benziger is not aware of any similar such disputation on peace and war before this time². Among his concluding

¹ Benziger, Wolfram, *Zur Theorie von Krieg und Frieden in der italienischen Renaissance: Die Disputatio de pace et bello zwischen Bartolomeo Platina und Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo (Rom 1468) und andere anlässlich der Pax Paolina entstandene Schriften* (Berlin and New York: Peter Lang, European University Studies, 1996).

I will continue by citing Benziger's commentary as Benziger, *Zur Theorie*; and the text itself by the appropriate Part: *Prologus*, *De laudibus pacis*, *Commendatio belli*, or *De difficultate verae pacis*. Benziger produced both the Latin and a German translation of the *Disputatio* with his thesis, and I my English translation, is included in Volume 2, Appendix 1, from p. 7.

² Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 44. 'Ein direktes Vorbild der 'Disputatio de pace et bello' ist nicht zu erkennen: Es gibt meines Wissens kein vergleichbares Streitgespräch über Krieg und Frieden, das vor 1468 entstanden und den Verfassern der 'Disputatio de pace et bello' bekannt gewesen wäre'.

observations, he suggests that a parallel in praising peace might be found between Platina and Erasmus, who will write fifty years later. However, he believes this requires further study, in particular into the juxtaposition between a love of peace and a war against the Turks³.

Similarly, although Benziger claims that such a radical thesis, ‘*radikaler Ansatz*’, as the *Commendatio belli* is difficult to find in other contemporary works, he points to Machiavelli as a variation of it. For Benziger, Machiavelli emancipates politics from religion but instead maintains the preservation of the state as the over-riding objective of war⁴.

Of particular interest is the emphasis placed throughout the *Disputatio* on the conceptual understanding of both war and peace. Indeed, for Benziger the ‘underlying difference between *De laudibus pacis* and the *Commendatio belli* lies in the different understandings of war and peace’⁵. On the other hand, there are few explicit references to ‘just war’ thinking, and even these few are open to interpretation. For example, Benziger argues that Platina purposely avoids any formulation of *bellum iustum*, by not using these words next to each other⁶. Indeed, Benziger himself gives little attention to any ‘just war’ content of the *Disputatio*.

In this chapter, I will pursue certain aims. First, I will critically examine the *Disputatio* and Benziger’s analysis of it. Secondly, I will take Benziger’s thesis forward, as he suggests, by comparing the arguments of the *Disputatio* with those of Erasmus and Machiavelli. At this stage, prior to a more detailed examination of Erasmus and Machiavelli, this will be an initial comparison with the general and more familiar ideas of the two later thinkers. Thirdly, I will examine the clear, but very different, contemporary conceptual understandings of peace and war found within the *Disputatio*. Finally, and more closely than

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 190-1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 192-3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 89: ‘*Der grundlegende Unterschied zwischen De laudibus pacis und der Commendatio belli liegt in den unterschiedlichen Begriffen von Krieg und Frieden*’.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49: ‘...er ist in seiner Rede deutlich bemüht, die Worte ‘*bellum*’ und ‘*iustum*’ nicht nebeneinander zu verwenden’.

Benziger's analysis, I will seek and examine ideas, explicit or implicit, on the justification of war and its conduct, and specifically, just war thinking. My analysis will start with some introductory observations and consider the context. I then proceed through the text of the *Disputatio*, taking these aims into account, before drawing together a summary and conclusions.

There is a very limited scholarship on the *Disputatio*⁷. The fullest critique in English was by Geoffrey Butler in 1920⁸. Butler questioned the *Disputatio*'s authenticity, suggesting that Sánchez was responsible for the whole work. This could have been to support the use of force against heresies and the Turkish threat, or as Butler put it, against 'the pacifism of decadence and intellectuality The moment was opportune for the counterblast'⁹. Indeed, at a time when pacifism would have amounted to heresy, Sánchez would certainly be taking an active stance against it.

However, the authenticity of the *Disputatio* has also been defended. Paola Masotti studied the handwriting of the text and its amendments, and concluded that both authors were closely responsible for their own work¹⁰. Also, for Benziger, in comparing the *Disputatio* with other works by its two authors, and with other contemporary works, the arguments are not incongruous and represent a continuity with views expressed elsewhere, even if the presentation of the *Disputatio* is somewhat unique.

The circumstances of the *Disputatio* are unusual. Platina, and twenty other humanists of the *Accademia Romana* were imprisoned on charges of heresy and treason. These charges

⁷ Benziger reviews the scholarship to date: *Ibid.*, pp. 2-6.

⁸ Butler, Sir Geoffrey, 'Bishop Roderick and Renaissance Pacifism', *Studies in Statecraft* (Cambridge, 1920), pp. 1-25. The *Disputatio* is also discussed in a biography of Sánchez: Trame, Richard, H., *Rodrigo Sánchez de Avévalo (1404-1470): Spanish Diplomat and Champion of the Papacy* (Washington D.C., 1958), pp. 182-185; Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 3, n. 6.

⁹ Butler, *Studies in Statecraft*, p. 15. Quoted in Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 3, n. 5.

¹⁰ Paola Medioli Masotti, *Codici scritti dagli Accademici Romani nel carcere di Castel S. Angelo (1468-69)*, in *Vestigia* (Rome, 1984), pp. 451-459. Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 4, n. 10.

would be dropped, but while imprisoned they were evidently permitted, indeed encouraged, to write. The *Disputatio* between Sánchez and Platina is one example of this intellectual activity. There is, therefore, the artificiality of an intellectual contest, described by Benziger as the ‘*spielerisch-fictiven*’¹¹, and I will later consider whether this might have affected the positions taken by the participants. However, despite this possible element of artificiality, I believe that the *Disputatio* remains a clear, unique, contemporary example of differing ideas of peace and war. Even if Sánchez did manipulate it, which is far from certain, it still represents the views of a contemporary papal establishment, and therefore a form of orthodoxy, in responding to certain key questions. The context of the *Disputatio* is important, and I will now consider both the broader context and the situation of the authors.

CONTEXT

After years of warfare between the Italian states, in 1454 the Peace of Lodi secured a period of relative peace that was to last until the French invasion of 1494. A sense of optimism, the ‘Spirit of Lodi’, became evident. There are various explanations for this: a general mood for peace; a balance of power into which the Italian states had ground themselves; a perception of common external threats including the Ottomans, and the French, recently freed up from the 100 Years War; and a structure of nascent diplomacy that had developed in Italy, with some credit to humanists and their particular attributes and skills¹². As Mattingley describes in *Renaissance Diplomacy*: ‘Everyone...was really tired of war’, and the response of the Italian powers ‘aroused the rosier hopes among the humanists’¹³.

¹¹ Benziger describes this artificiality variously as ‘*spielerisch-fictiven*’, a ‘*literarische Auseinandersetzung*’ or ‘*gelehrten Spieles*’.

¹² For example: Wright, E., *et al*, *The Medieval and Renaissance World* (London: Hamlyn 1979), pp. 222-3; and Mattingly, Garret, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (New York: Dover, 1988), pp. 74-77. Mattingly further cites Francesco Antonini, ‘*La pace di Lodi ed i segreti maneggi che la prepararono*’ in *Archivio Storico Lombardo*, LVII (1930), pp. 233-96.

¹³ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 75-76.

At this point, I note how a similar spirit of optimism existed, for a time at least, among the humanists of Northern Europe, especially with events surrounding the Treaty of Universal Peace in 1518. Henry VIII's secretary relates: 'now all the Christian princes were conducting themselves as though they had, as one, accepted the humanist critique of war as correct'¹⁴. And Richard Pace coins the phrase 'perpetual peace', 'that is, not only shall all war be removed, but suspicion of any war shall be totally taken away'¹⁵.

In Italy meanwhile, the 'Spirit of Lodi' would be punctuated by periods of instability and fighting, and it is this that provides the close historical context for the *Disputatio*. Instability and fighting arose after a series of deaths and successions¹⁶. The fighting was stopped when Pope Paul forced through a peace process, 'on the strength of his own authority', and ultimately, 'whether the princes agree or not'¹⁷. This peace was made official in May 1468, and would become known as the *Pax Paolina*.

Significantly, this was a papal initiative, and Benziger emphasises the Pope as being the driving force, for Benziger, '*die treibende Kraft*'¹⁸. Among the conditions of the agreement, the Pope was established as the supervisor, arbitrator and guarantor of peace and security between Christian powers, and punishments of the church, excommunication or anathema, would be awarded against transgressors of the peace¹⁹. It was perceived as a reinstatement of the Peace of Lodi. Benziger also describes a sense of pragmatism, *realpolitisches*, in the *Pax Paolina*. Peace was not seen as an elevated ideal, '*nicht als ein*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

¹⁵ Pace, Richard, *Oration*, (1518), Russell, D. A., (trans.), in Russell, Jocelyn, G., *Peacemaking in the Renaissance* (London: Duckworth, 1986), p. 240.

¹⁶ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 32-42. On 1 August 1464, Cosimo de' Medici died, to be succeeded in Florence by Piero, and leading to anti-Medici plotting; fourteen days later, on 15 August, Pope Pius II died, to be followed by Paul II; and the situation becomes very charged with the death of Francesco Sforza of Milan on 8 March 1466. In 1467 Venice attacked Florence's ally, Milan.

¹⁷ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 36, and n. 19: '*...kraft eigener Autorität einen Frieden für Italien zu verkünden*' ... '*ob den Fürsten das nun paßte oder auch nicht*'; Benziger quotes from *Annali Veneti*: '*volessero i Principi della Ligha o no volessero*'.

¹⁸ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 36.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-7. Benziger quotes from Giovanni Pillinni: '*...pacem indicere, pacem praeferre et praedicare*'.

abgehobener Begriff, but expressed through practical, and if necessary, expedient, measures in attaining unity, ‘*concordia, unitas, confederatio*’²⁰. For example, in order to forestall resentment, the ‘aggressing’ *condottieri*, Bartolemeo Colleoni, was promoted to command all future alliance troops²¹. Peace was an absence of war, and a political agreement.

Generally, for as long as the *Pax Paolina* was viewed as a success it generated considerable papal acclaim, as evidenced in paragraph 2 of the *Prologue* to the *Disputatio*: ‘Through recent testing, indefatigable effort, and wonderful vigilance, our most holy Majesty secures the peace between the Italian peoples’. But when the *Pax Paolina* was then perceived to fail, it would only serve to further degrade papal authority. It can also be seen why, with the ebb and flow of the Peace of Lodi and the *Pax Paolina*²², the concept of peace, and what could be expected of it, would have been a topic for contemporary intellectual debate, and therefore, of the *Disputatio*.

Also, in both the texts and in Benziger, I note ambiguity in referring to a ‘just war’. For example, Christian scholars referred to the initiating attack by Venice, with questionable provocation, as a necessary ‘*bellum iustum*’; and Benziger, when discussing a crusade as a condition for peace loosely conflates a ‘holy war’, a ‘*Kreuzzug*’, with a ‘*iustissimum bellum*’²³.

The *Disputatio*, therefore, is very much part of its historical context, and especially for humanists, a context of optimism with prospects of peace. Nevertheless, key questions on the nature and durability of peace are raised, and will be dealt with by the authors of the *Disputatio*. I now turn to the biographical context of these authors.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

²¹ Much celebrated by the Venetians, Colleoni’s statue by Verrocchio remains in Venice to this day.

²² Benziger reviews some of the scholarship, Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 39-41. There is some consensus at least, that the *Pax Paolina* was one contributory factor in a complex of factors that determined this period of relative peace in Italy.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

Bartolomeo Platina

For Benziger, Platina is firmly in the humanism of the Italian Renaissance, ‘*ein namhafter Vertreter des Renaissancehumanismus*’²⁴. This being the case, it can also be said that he had a varied relationship with the papacy²⁵. Little is known of his early life, but he was born near Mantua in central, northern Italy, and purports to have been a soldier for four years. Again, nothing more is known of this service, whether it was with a local militia, or more active, but I note that Mantua lies in a strategically sensitive area, between Milan and Venice. He then became a tutor, studied Greek philosophy in Florence, and moved to Rome.

He was elected to the College of Abbreviators but his post, along with many others, was abolished²⁶. His vociferous objections resulted in a first spell of imprisonment in the Castel St Angelo, for insolence. After this, he associated with a society of Roman humanists, the *Accademia Romana*²⁷. It is with this society that he was collectively imprisoned on charges of heresy and treason, and during this second incarceration of eighteen months, he contributed to the *Disputatio*. The heresy and treason charges were dropped, but on release in

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁵ Biographical details are drawn from Benziger’s account: Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 9-23; Copenhaver and Schmitt’, *Renaissance Philosophy*; and the entry in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*: Stein, J., ‘Bartolomeo Platina’ in *Catholic Encyclopedia*, (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911), retrieved on 22 July 2008 from New Advent: <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12158a.htm>; and other general reference works. Benziger’s sources include: Cosenza, Mario, Emilio, *Biographical and Bibliographical Dictionary of the Italian Humanists*, Vol. 4., pp. 2839-2846 (Boston, 1962); Gaida, Giacinto, *B. Platyna* (Città di Castello, 1913); and Palermino, Richard, J., *Platina’s History of the Popes* (Edinburgh, 1973).

²⁶ The task of the College of Abbreviators was to formulate papal documents. Pope Paul II imposed severe cuts on this college resulting in the loss of many posts such as Platina’s.

²⁷ The *Accademia Romana* was founded by a Julius Pomponius Laetus in mid-C15th Rome. It was devoted to the study of antiquity, literature and archaeology, but they also celebrated ancient Roman rites, changed their Christian names to names from Roman antiquity, and became suspected of heresy. The general, and more acceptable rise of humanism in Rome is described, for example, by Charles Nauert in his chapter, ‘Humanism and Italian Society’, in *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), especially p 60.

July 1469, he was not, as he had hoped, re-employed by the papacy of Paul II²⁸. Later, with Sextus IV he regained papal favour and was notably employed as the Vatican librarian, a post into which he settled well. He wrote his ‘*Lives of the Popes*’²⁹, which was well received, and takes the opportunity to snipe back at Paul II, describing him as ‘cruel and an enemy of science’³⁰. For this period, a critical description reads that he ‘felt the need for critical research, but shirked the examination of details’³¹. His rehabilitation with the papacy is well illustrated in the Vatican library fresco of his inauguration as the first Prefect of the Library³². He kneels in supplication before Pope Sextus IV, but I also note, perhaps ironically, that standing immediately behind Platina is Giuliano della Rovere, later to become the ‘warrior pope’, Pope Julius II.

Two other works of Platina are relevant to an examination of the *Disputatio*. These are: a ‘mirror for princes’ tract, *De principe*³³; and a work discussing a war against the Ottoman Turks, *Ad Paulum II pontificem maximum de pace Italiae componenda atque de bello Turcis indicendo (De bello Turcis)*³⁴.

Platina wrote *De Principe* in 1470, after his second imprisonment. As Benziger describes, a Part I considers family and religion; Part II, personal qualities, duty, wisdom, counsel, and the virtues. Courage is given both an internal and an external, political meaning. Part III, *De re militaria*, considers external factors, where discussion of the art of war is given prominence. Benziger notes that the tension between the need for arms and appeals for peace

²⁸ *Catholic Encyclopedia*, ‘Bartolomeo Platina’, as above. Benziger considers the scholarship examining this ‘Conspiracy of 1468’ which generally agrees there was nothing to substantiate these charges. However, such arrests were not unusual when the papal authorities were very sensitive to disloyalty, and some clerics had defected to the Ottoman Turks. Copenhaver and Schmitt list the charges against the circle as ‘sodomy, heresy and sedition’, Copenhaver and Schmitt, *Renaissance Philosophy*, p. 89.

²⁹ *Vitae Pontificum* (Venice, 1479).

³⁰ *Catholic Encyclopedia*, ‘Bartolomeo Platina’, as above.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² The fresco is by Melozzo da Forlì, “The foundation of the Vatican Library”, (1470-77), in the Pinacoteca Vaticana. Described for example in: Bicheno, Hugh, *Vendetta: High Art and Low Cunning at the birth of the Renaissance* (London: Phoenix, 2007), p. 210.

³³ Benziger cites: Platina, *De principe*, Ferraù, Giacomo, (ed.) (Palermo, 1978).

³⁴ Benziger reproduces *De bello Turcis* as an Appendix to Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, in Latin, pp. 97-105, with a German translation, pp. 75-83, and a discussion, pp. 102-9. Other minor works include *De honesta voluptate et valetudine*, 1474, (On honourable pleasure and health); and a history of the Mantua and Gonzaga families.

is not unusual in the ‘mirror for princes’ genre, however, he sees more ambivalence with Platina’s *De principe*. I will argue, against Benziger, that Platina is not culpably ambivalent, but recognizes the need for striking a balance: the prince must be prepared for the possibility of wars; but they must be justified, and clear moral restraint is required. This contrasts with the position of Erasmus.

On causes for war, *De principe* gives specific justifications: recovery of robbed possessions; defence against aggression; and protection of trade, which, as Benziger notes, reflects the highly developed structure of contemporary trade. Platina refers to Roman *fetial* procedures requiring deliberation, priestly approval, and a warning to be given to the opponent before military action³⁵.

As will be repeated in *De laudibus pacis*, Platina sees the right to defend as being in nature, for Benziger, ‘*Das Recht zur Verteidigung leitet Platina...von der Natur ab*’. Animals have teeth, claws and beaks for defence, while men have the natural gift of making and using weapons, *ex industria*³⁶. This will contrast strongly with Erasmus, for whom man’s soft nakedness is evidence of intended ‘goodness and brotherly love’³⁷. Drawing on Cicero, Platina acknowledges inherent dangers of injustice associated with military force which must be guarded against: by maintaining the justice of the cause, by the exercise of virtues, such as clemency, *clementia*, and by not acting ‘out of bloodlust’.

Significantly, however, in *De principe* Platina argues the necessity to prepare for war, and then to gain and maintain the tactical advantage. Benziger finds it interesting that Platina speaks of military training and preparations, but not in a crude militaristic or bellicist

³⁵ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 111-112.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 111. Benziger cites Platina, *De principe* III, 7., also *De laudibus pacis*, para. 4.

³⁷ For example: *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, pp. 401 – 2; also in Mann Phillips, Margaret, *The Adages of Erasmus: A Study with Translations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 310-11. I will discuss this contrast later with *De laudibus pacis*.

manner³⁸. Platina says of the good prince: ‘In accordance with the ideas of all the philosophers who have discussed politics, he will always keep a part of the citizenry skilled in the ways of war, so that they will be able to protect the land and the population from an enemy’s aggression’³⁹. Any such idea is not, I will emphasize, evident in Erasmus.

On hunting, Benziger describes Platina’s discussion in *De principe* of its value in training for war, ‘*belli quaedam simulacra*’⁴⁰. This is perfectly in keeping with Machiavelli on hunting, but completely against the explicit opinions of Erasmus, and also of Thomas More⁴¹. Importantly, however, Platina does not forget the brutalizing effect of hunting⁴². For Benziger, this again shows ambivalence in Platina’s advice⁴³: on the one hand it is full of pragmatism and efficiency, on the other hand he calls for *humanitas*. Again, I argue that, rooted in Cicero, Platina is balancing the needs for both military and moral preparedness. War is brutal, but one must strive to maintain humanity. Platina emphasizes in *De principe*: ‘War should be taken very seriously, in order to live in peace and without injustice; but if victory is to be achieved, one must keep to that which is not bloodthirsty or wanting to kill, but to fight with honour and glory’⁴⁴.

³⁸ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 113: ‘*Interessant ist an diesem Beispiel, daß Platina einerseits auf militärische Ertüchtigung und Formung wertlegt, andererseits aber nicht in einen kruden Militarismus und Bellizismus verfällt*’.

³⁹ My translation, Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 110, and Platina, *De principe* III, 3: ‘*Philosophorum omnium sententiis, qui politica scripsere, partem enim civium bellicae rei semper ascribunt, qui agros ab incursionibus hostium et urbanam multitudinem tueantur*’.

⁴⁰ Platina, *De principe* III, 2. Aristotle also argued for the military value of hunting: Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 8, (1256b).

⁴¹ Machiavelli encourages hunting and discusses its military value in Chapter 14 of *The Prince*: Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Bull, G., (trans.) (London: Penguin, 1999), pp. 47-8. More’s Utopians consider hunting ‘unworthy’ and encouraging of a ‘cruel disposition’; More, Thomas, *Utopia* (1516), Logan, George, M., and Adams, Robert, M., (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 71. Erasmus, for example, considers hunting ‘perverse’ and not conducive to performing duties with ‘careful consideration’; Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, p. 280; also Jardine, Lisa (ed.), *The Education of a Christian Prince* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 100.

⁴² Platina, *De principe* III, 2.

⁴³ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 115: ‘*Auch hier zeigt sich einmal die Ambivalenz der Ratschläge Platinus: Einerseits sind sie ganz pragmatisch auf Effizienz bedacht, andererseits fehlt nie der Aufruf zur humanitas*’.

⁴⁴ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 110, and Platina, *De principe* III, 3: ‘*Bellum enim suscipienda sunt ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur, Parta autem victoria conservandi sunt ii, qui non de vita et sanguine, sed de principato et Gloria tecum contendere*’.

The second relevant work, *De bello Turcis*, was written while Platina was in prison, and within a few weeks of *De laudibus pacis*. As Benziger notes, while *De bello Turcis* fits in with a genre of work on war against the Turks, the particular feature with Platina is his grounding of any such war within the Pax Paolina. However, it is not only a war to protect the true Christian God and his believers, holy articles and places; it is very much seen as a just and necessary secular defence against an aggression by an enemy with a reputation for being merciless and cruel, ‘*immanes et crudeles in proelils*’⁴⁵. It is against an injustice. Neither does Platina argue a primary justification for material gain, *utilitas*, although such benefits will be a consequence. He grounds the justification very much in terms of a *bellum iustum*, from which any ‘holy war’ aspect is separated.

Platina makes a number of practical points, necessary to enable a war against a numerically superior Turkish enemy: a tactical consideration that a war should be fought at precisely the right moment; the relevance of military strength; sound financial preparations; the necessary encouragement; and a comparison between the European and the Asiatic perspectives. Such practical concerns, I argue, contrast with the approach we will see in Erasmus’s *De bello Turcico*, where even when he becomes supportive, passes over the ‘details of the enterprise’⁴⁶.

In summary, Platina lives and works close to the papacy with whom he has a varied, and not uncritical relationship. In his other works he presents what I believe is a reasoned and balanced approach to war, and this will be made more clear when seen against his role in praising peace in the *Disputatio*, and when contrasted with the ideas of Erasmus.

⁴⁵ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 107, and Platina, *De laudibus pacis*, para. 10.

⁴⁶ ‘I cannot predict the outcome nor do I know enough details about the enterprise; I am merely giving our rulers a warning...’; Erasmus, *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 264; and Rummel, *Erasmus Reader*, p. 333.

Rodrigo Sánchez

For Benziger, Sánchez represents the teaching of the scholastics, ‘*ein Mann mittelalterlich-scholastischer Gelehrsamkeit*’⁴⁷, and this is indeed reflected in his career⁴⁸. He was born in 1404 to parents who were leading city figures. Educated by local Dominicans, he went on to study law and theology at Salamanca. He became secretary to John II of Castille, and at the Council of Basle in 1439 he earned a reputation for his strong advocacy of papal supremacy, *suprema potestas*, against the challenge of the conciliarists⁴⁹. This was noted as a recommendation for future employment: among the many influential friends he made at this time was the future Pope Pius II. He then undertook various appointments, until it could be said by his biographer, that by 1440 he had ‘reached that maturity of experience which would henceforth enable him to serve his king and the Church as a diplomat with understanding, prudence and skill’⁵⁰. Thereafter followed 17 years on diplomatic missions around Europe, and in 1457 he was appointed Bishop of Oviedo in Spain.

Following Pope Paul II’s assumption of office, Sánchez took up the well regarded position of Keeper of the Castel St Angelo in Rome. He also held a title as a papal teacher and acquired additional dioceses, including Calahorra, which appears in the title of the *Disputatio*. He wrote a great deal during his time at the Castel St Angelo, which included the period of the imprisonment of the humanists from the *Accademia Romana*. As well as with Platina, he wrote with others of this group.

⁴⁷ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 2.

⁴⁸ Biographical details are drawn mainly from Benziger’s account: Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 23-31. Benziger’s sources include: Trame, Richard, H., *Rodrigo Sánchez de Arávalo (1404-1470): Spanish Diplomat and Champion of the Papacy* (Washington, D. C, 1958); Laboa, Juan, Maria, *Rodrigo Sánchez de Arávalo, Alcaide de Sant’ Angelo* (Madrid: Universitaria Española, 1973); Toni, Teodoro, *Don Rodrigo Sánchez de Arávalo (1404-1470): Su personalidad y actividades, el tratado “de pace et bello”*, in: *Anuario del derecho español 12* (Madrid, 1941) and other editions; Lambert, Dom., A., *Arávalo, Rodrigo ou Ruy Sánchez ou Sang de*, in: *Dictionnaire d’histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique*, Vol. III (Paris: 1924).

⁴⁹ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 127: The doctrine that the authority of the Pope was superior to the authority of the General Council of the Church, *suprema potestas*, was important to Sánchez, as was the relation of particular kings to the Emperor, and he supported Spanish independence from the Emperor. The Conciliar Movement is discussed, for example, in Skinner, *Foundations, 2, Reformations*, pp. 36-47.

⁵⁰ Trame, *Rodrigo Sánchez de Arávalo*, p. 27.

Sánchez wrote extensively, including 28 major works, and numerous articles, speeches and notes⁵¹. Two works, both prior to the *Disputatio*, are particularly relevant: *Suma de la politica* (1454-5)⁵²; and his mirror for princes, in Castilian, *Vergel de los principes* (1456-7)⁵³. Benziger examines scholarship that views the *Commendatio belli* as being written within, and determined by, the artificiality of the *Disputatio*⁵⁴. It need not, therefore, have been close to Sánchez's own views. However, Benziger argues against this, and sees a continuity, 'einer Kontinuität stehen', certainly between the *Suma de la politica*, *Vergel de los principes* and the *Commendatio belli*⁵⁵. The *Commendatio belli* is not isolated within a particular intellectual contest but very much draws on these earlier arguments⁵⁶, and indeed on common medieval authorities, most notably, Augustine and Gratian.

Benziger describes how issues of war and peace became as central in the thoughts of Sánchez, as had issues of papal authority and *suprema potestas*⁵⁷. In all his works Sánchez is convinced that war is a necessity of the present world order, and with Heraclitus, that everything is in a state of conflict, 'omnia secundum litem fieri'⁵⁸. Also, earthly wars are a reoccurrence of the struggle between good and evil that has raged since the fall of Lucifer, and will only cease with the final victory of good at the end of time and the great judgment of Christ. If, for Sánchez, earthly war is unavoidable, it must indeed be fought to help the victory of the good. The consequences of this position are, for example, that Sánchez does not compromise in considering any war between believers and unbelievers; even clerics are

⁵¹ His most famous work was *Speculum humanae vitae* (1468). Others include: *De arte, disciplina et modo aliendi et erundiendi filios, pueros et juvenes* (1453); and a history of Spain, *Compendiosa historia Hispanica* (circa 1470).

⁵² As cited by Benziger, p. 127: Sánchez de Arévalo, Rodrigo, *Suma de la politica*, (1454-5), in Penna, Mario, (ed.), *Biblioteca de autores españoles*, Vol. 116: *Prosistas castellanos del siglo XV*, Vol. I (Madrid, 1959), pp. 243-245.

⁵³ *Vergel de los principes* (1456-7), *Ibid.*, pp. 311-341.

⁵⁴ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 118-126.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* '...nicht nur als der Situation eines intellektuellen Spiels erklärt werden. Sánchez mußte nicht erst neue Argumente suchen, sondern konnte auf frühere Überlegungen zurückgreifen'.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 127: '...das Thema Krieg und Frieden neben den Überlegungen zur *suprema potestas* des Papstes...einen zentralen Platz im Denken von Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo eingenommen hat'.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 158: 'Sánchez war überzeugt, daß Krieg eine Notwendigkeit irdischer Ordnung ist'; furthermore, 'alles gemäß dem Streit entstehe'.

not excused in a fight against evil; and there is a clear place for virtuosity in war. I will consider these issues as they become evident in the *Commendatio belli*, but they are certainly evident in his earlier works.

However, despite these elements of continuity, Benziger also recognizes differences. In the *Suma de la politica*, the *Vergel de los principes*, and other works, Sánchez is far less outspoken in favour of war than his one-sided commendation found in the *Disputatio*. In both earlier works he clearly distinguishes between necessary, permissible and non-permissible grounds for war⁵⁹. Clearly reflecting Aristotle, war serves the defense and well-being of the community, so that, as far as possible, a virtuous life can be led⁶⁰. Therefore, and as Benziger concludes, the beliefs of Sánchez remain essentially consistent, but to an extent they become radicalised in the *Disputatio*. I would add that with Sánchez being close to the papal *curia*, his views on peace and war, even if ‘radicalised’ within the *Disputatio*, will not be inconsistent with papal orthodoxy. This, in itself, informs my thesis of the nature of contemporary thinking on peace and war.

STRUCTURE AND PROLOGUS

I will now briefly consider the structure of the *Disputatio*, the style of authors, and their intentions as set out in the *Prologus*, drawing on both Benziger’s analysis and the text of the *Prologus*. The participants liken the *Disputatio* to the athletic games of antiquity, an even-sided contest, in public view⁶¹. It is not a dialogue, but what Benziger describes as an

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 160: ‘...in beiden Schriften hält Sánchez noch für erforderlich, zulässige und unzulässige Gründe eines Krieges zu unterscheiden’.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* ‘...dient der Krieg der Verteidigung des Gemeinwohls, das als Möglichkeit, ein tugendgemäßes Leben führen zu können’.

⁶¹ *Prologus*, para. 3.

exchange of proposition and answer. Indeed, there is very little direct interaction between the writers within the text itself.

For Benziger, both the full title, *Altercatio sive disputatio*, and the rigid procedural framework, show that the *Disputatio* conforms to the style of a medieval university disputation: typically an altercation of thesis and antithesis⁶². Platina's address on the praise of peace, *De laudibus pacis*, can be understood as a 'thesis', and the two contributions by Sánchez as the 'antithesis'. Sánchez firstly establishes the advantages of war, *Commendatio belli*, and secondly, argues the difficulties of true peace, *De difficultate verae pacis*. For Benziger, the absolute fulfilment of true peace is contrasted with the deficiencies of earthly peace, and against these imperfections of peace, war comes to be valued. Therefore, the second part of the tract also serves to praise war but with a changed premise to the argument.

However, I add two qualifications. First, Sánchez does not directly oppose Platina's 'praise', *De laudibus*, of peace with a 'praise' of war, but instead provides a 'commendation', *Commendatio*. Commending an activity does not carry the implications of value that come with praising it. Indeed, Sánchez emphasizes that both war and earthly peace are part of the imperfect condition of man. Secondly, Platina does not just 'praise' peace and discuss the many disadvantages of war, but also includes the occasional necessity of war. This, therefore, presents a much deeper discussion than just a thesis of 'praise', even though this is the major constituent.

The styles in which the authors write are also very distinctive. Platina writes in the free, rhetorical, and more emotive style associated with much humanist writing, especially Erasmus's popular works. Platina himself is often referred to as 'my most learned and most

⁶² Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 43. In discussing the genre of medieval disputations, Benziger refers further, for example, to: Miller, L., *Disputatio(n)*, in *LdMA*, III, (München und Zürich, 1986), pp. 1116-1120).

eloquent Platina', *doctissime ac eloquentissime*⁶³. In the *Prologus* Platina describes himself as 'the younger of the two, the more aggressive and pursue(s) the contest out of a conviction...' ⁶⁴. Sánchez, on the other hand, writes in a characteristically scholastic style. His arguments appear methodical, following a clear format with point matching point, and his two-part response is considerably longer than Platina's thesis⁶⁵. He claims that this 'follows long nights of study', to ensure 'no small or trivial disadvantage'⁶⁶. As with most scholastic writing, it is unemotionally confined within a framework, and might well appear insensitive. I do not agree with Benziger, however, that this is necessarily inhumane.

Benziger considers the use of references. Platina makes sparse use of references and these are mostly used as confirmatory citations, which as Benziger describes, is typical of Renaissance humanism⁶⁷. Sánchez, in his medieval scholastic style, tries to make the citations speak more for themselves⁶⁸. Sánchez makes extensive use of the patriarchs, especially Augustine; full use of the classics, especially Aristotle; and full use of the Bible, both Old and New Testaments⁶⁹. I will consider the significance of these citations as they occur, and return in particular to consider Augustine, but here I observe that the use of references by Platina and Sánchez strongly confirms their respective styles and intellectual character.

⁶³ For example: *Commendatio belli*, Prologue to Part 1, para. 1.

⁶⁴ *Prologus*, para. 4: '... *ut iunior cuius natura aggressiva est*'.

⁶⁵ Nearly four times as long. In my English translation, Sánchez's thesis is 21,190 words to Platina's 5,963.

⁶⁶ *Disputatio*, Sánchez's Prologue to *Commendatio Belli*, para. 3: '... *sic ego pauca nec parva ex inerti pace incomoda*'.

⁶⁷ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 92-3. In *De laudibus pacis* Platina uses Virgil twice, para.13 and 20; Livius once, para. 22; Hesiod once, para. 25; and Sallust once, para. 26; and in one passage, the bible three times, para. 24, and these are used only as confirmatory citations.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 93-4, Benziger reviews Sánchez's citations: The patriarchs: Augustine, approximately 45 citations; Gregory the Great, 8; and lesser use of Leo the Great, Chrysotomus, Hieronymus, Hilarius, Cassidor, Cyprian, and Isodor. The classics: Aristotle, 29; Seneca, 4; Cicero, 4; Vegetius, 4; and also lesser use of Homer, Plato, Livius, Valerius Maximus, Ennius, Horace, Boethuis, and Solinus. Medieval authorities: Petrarch, 3; and Bernhard of Clairvaux once. To the Bible: approximately 100 citations in total, including the Psalms, Job, Isaiah, and Jeremiah; to the New Testament, from the letters of St Paul, and once from the Gospel of John; and for positive examples of godly war to the Maccabees.

In the *Prologus*, the disputants briefly set out their key arguments. Platina will argue the advantages of peace, and the disadvantages of war as being ‘the enemy of peace’⁷⁰. This is a short, clear statement, but one which, I argue, begins to separate Platina from the typically Aristotelian or Augustinian idea of peace being the aim of war. For Aristotle, ‘there must be war for the sake of peace’; for Augustine, ‘war is waged in order to attain peace’⁷¹, but here for Platina, war is the enemy of peace.

Sánchez states that he will firstly differentiate between *paxis*, as the eternal peace of God, and *quietus*, as the temporal peace and quietude of mankind. The latter being ‘idle, timid, insecure, untruthful and nurturing of vice’⁷². This is a key distinction and draws on Augustine’s distinction between earthly and godly peace. Secondly, Sánchez will contrast Platina’s attribution of ‘everything favourable’ and all virtue to peace, with his attribution (implying to quietude) of ‘laziness, idleness, corruption and negligence’⁷³. Thirdly, he will present unbeatable arguments for the ‘origins, nobility and necessity’ of war and the use of force⁷⁴. Again, this contrasts sharply with Platina’s simple polarity of war being the ‘enemy of peace’.

However, despite setting out their opposition, Sánchez and Platina do seek to make clear some common ground. They jointly state in the *Prologus* that ‘the wonderful praise of peace and the quietude of mankind cannot become sufficiently dignified and valued until the glorifying, spread, and necessity for arms and warfare becomes a distant memory’⁷⁵. For each, peace as respectively defined, cannot exist at least at the same time as war. A final point is that in a competition a judge is required, and in the *Prologus* the participants submit their

⁷⁰ *Prologus*, para. 4: ‘... in bellum veluti pacis hostem’.

⁷¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, Bk. VII, 1334a, Everson, S., (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 187. Augustine, Letter 189 to Boniface, in Augustine, *Political Writings*, p. 220.

⁷² *Prologus*, para. 4: ‘... tanquam plurimorum vitiorum nutricem inertem, timidam, instabilem...’.

⁷³ *Ibid.*: ‘... ego ignavie, desidię, secordie...’.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*: ‘...bellorumque originem, nobilitatem simul et necessitatem invincibilibus’.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 3: ‘Pacis ergo atque humane quietis mirrificas laudes non satis arbitramur agnosci posse, nisi armorum ac bellorum preconia, commoditas et necessitas recolantur’.

contributions to the judgement of a Cardinal. Although no response or judgement has ever been recorded, Benziger notes that the dedicatory letter does serve to bring the separate contributions together into one framework⁷⁶.

To summarise this introductory discussion, the *Disputatio* is very much part of its context. Hitherto, it has not been widely considered in English. There has been scepticism as to the authenticity of the contributions, but this is disputed, and we have also seen evident continuity with the authors' other works. In Platina's other writing I argue that we find a balanced approach to war. On the one hand, war can be justified, indeed defence is a right of nature, and due moral and physical preparations need to be made. However, clear restraint is required both in justifying and in the conduct of war. For Benziger, this is ambivalence, but I argue it is an attempt to balance and reconcile key issues. Platina writes in a rhetorical, humanist style that will become very familiar in Erasmus. Sánchez is a Spanish scholastic experienced in canon law and diplomacy, and he has strongly supported the papacy and papal doctrine. His views expressed in other works includes the universe existing in a normal condition of conflict and war, although Benziger sees him elsewhere as less one-sided than he is praising war in the *Disputatio*. His style is less rhetorical than Platina and more analytical.

The context of the *Pax Paolina* gives rise to some optimism for peace, but its fragility also raises questions as to what might be expected of peace. The *Disputatio* will give valuable contemporary insights on the concepts of peace and war. In reviewing the context, just war thinking is rarely explicit, and even then its terms are loosely applied. I will now examine the content of the three parts of the *Disputatio*: *De laudibus pacis*, the *Commendatio belli*, and *De difficultate verae pacis*.

⁷⁶ The arbitrator selected is Cardinal Marco Barbo who also headed the investigation into the *Accademia Romana*. Therefore, as Benziger suggests, it is not surprising that he did not become too closely involved with the activities of the prison inmates.

BARTOLOMEO PLATINA:

De laudibus pacis

In my analysis of *De laudibus pacis* I assess the extent to which Platina prefigures Erasmus and later pacific humanists. I also argue, against Benziger, that Platina does express a significant conceptual understanding of war, and that he does demonstrate basic just war thinking, explicitly or implicitly. Structurally, as Benziger describes, *De laudibus pacis* is rhetorical and complex⁷⁷, but after an introductory paragraph it falls into two parts: first, in paragraphs 2-17 there is an argument against war, its disadvantages and attendant evils; and this is followed in paragraphs 18-26 by a positive argument on the advantages of peace.

In his introduction, Platina states that he does not mind if his argument, that peace is to be preferred to war, is a minority view. This, I believe, concedes a perception of a considerable, even a majority or orthodox view, to the contrary. However, he does go on to say that his is a straightforward argument, as both benefit and virtue, *utilitatem et honestatem*, and which we recognise as Ciceronian values, are preferred by most people. Also, as in the *Prologus*, he poses a clear choice between peace and war, which again separates him from any idea that the two conditions might be linked. However, I note that this does leave an opening, as should greater benefit and virtue clearly lie with an act of war, then that should be the chosen course. As we will see, this is indeed the case for Platina.

The first section on war can again be divided: first, two long paragraphs, 2 and 3, give a long litany of the evils of war; but this is followed in paragraph 4 with a short, unambiguous statement justifying necessary wars; paragraphs 5 to 17 then deal with

⁷⁷ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 49: ‘...mit den Mitteln der Rhetorik statt mit einer ausgefeilten Argumentation’.

particular disadvantages of war, but which I will argue mostly refers to ‘unrestrained’ war, with paragraph 17 again supporting a necessary defensive war.

In the first two paragraphs, Platina provides a rich litany of the evils of war: the destruction of civil life and property; considerable attendant crime, including murder, rape and robbery; personal tragedy and family loss; and loss of religion. As I have discussed, these descriptions are not without empirical foundation. Erasmus is to become the acknowledged master of the rhetoric employed by the pacific humanists, and will deploy a litany of evils frequently throughout his works. In particular, I note that the length, style, balance, and content of the litany in the *Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria*⁷⁸, is very close to Platina’s earlier *De laudibus pacis*. This challenges claims often made today that this style of anti-war writing is in some way original to Erasmus or the Northern humanists. Here we have a clear precedent with the earlier Roman humanists.

However, one of the ills in Platina’s litany is not repeated to the same extent anywhere by Erasmus, and this is the suffering of the common soldier. Platina, proportionally, gives considerable attention to the death, pain and suffering of the soldier on the battlefield, and of the subsequent loss to his dependant family. This could well reflect his own military experience. Erasmus only occasionally discusses the lot of the soldier, and then with no sense of immediacy, and with considerably less sympathy⁷⁹.

Platina’s litany of evil, however, is followed by what I argue is a particularly significant paragraph 4, where he states unequivocally that there are occasions for rightfully taking part in war. These are clearly iterated: in defence of ‘fatherland, home and kin’, *pro*

⁷⁸ Erasmus, *Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria (Panegyricus ad Philippum Austriae ducem)*, (1504), CWE., 27, pp. 53 - 4; and in Jardine (ed.), *The Education of a Christian Prince*, p. 137. Other close examples, include *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, pp. 403 – 4; and in Phillips, *Adages of Erasmus*, pp. 313-4.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 326, beginning: ‘Who could possibly reckon up all the hardships which these military idiots undergo in their camps...’; and also in ‘Military Affairs’, *Militaria*, in *The Colloquies of Erasmus*, Thompson, C. R., (trans.) (Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 11-15.

patria, pro laubis; against an injustice, *propulsare nimirum iniuriam*; and in a ‘just fashion with a lawful cause’, *modo iusta et legitima subsit causa*. Later, in paragraph 17 he repeats the case for defence: ‘philosophers have been in praise of the art of war’; which is ‘indispensable for the protection of the state’; but that it is for defence only, and is to be waged ‘without inflicting injustice’⁸⁰. I will now show how Erasmus differs from Platina on these points, and what the passage reveals about Platina’s concept of war, and about his just war thinking.

As I discuss later with the extent of Erasmus’s pacifism, few Erasmian scholars now see him as an absolute pacifist. However, there is considerable ambiguity, and I believe good reason for scholars to differ. I argue that the overwhelming volume and tone of his rhetoric on the ills of war, creates ambiguity when seen against his relatively isolated references to a justified war. Erasmus himself acknowledges this, and as we will see, tries less convincingly to deny it in *De bello turcico*⁸¹. In contrast, while Platina’s *De laudibus pacis* also contains litanies in praise of peace and against war, by putting down a clear and early marker that he does indeed countenance war under certain circumstances, he avoids the ambiguity later found in Erasmus. Furthermore, when seen in the fuller context of his other work, there is even less ambiguity with Platina.

Benziger argues that Platina does not define a concept of war or its causes in *De laudibus pacis*⁸², but I believe a concept is very clear. As we will see in his discussion of peace, for Platina, nature is very much at peace and this is part of God’s design. However, injustice occurs and when it does it is in accordance with nature to repel it. He describes in paragraph 2 how nature becomes disturbed by the heat of war, but that this is both necessary

⁸⁰ *De laudibus pacis*, para. 17: ‘...ad tutelam rerum publicarum necessariam esse militiam ostendant... modo armis ad tutelam et non ad inferendam iniuriam’.

⁸¹ Erasmus, *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, pp. 233 - 4; and Rummel, *Erasmus Reader*, p. 318. I discuss this with ‘Interpretation and Ambiguity’ in Erasmus, pp. 166 - 167.

⁸² Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 52: ‘Platina definiert weder sein Verständnis des Begriffes ‘Krieg’ noch erläutert er dessen Ursachen’.

and natural in order to overcome injustice. Also in paragraph 4: ‘It is without doubt permissible to fight an injustice, especially as it is encouraged by nature, who gave teeth and claws to animals for protection, and to humans, hands with which to arm themselves’⁸³. Nature is at peace, and it is natural to fight injustice when it disturbs that peace. Platina illustrates this with his evocative description of a storm in paragraph 25, where nature is violently disturbed, but returns once again to a state of peace. In this way therefore, Platina clearly does provide a concept of peace and war, and of their place in nature, and it is a concept that will stand comparison to that presented by Sánchez.

Even if, as we have seen Benziger insist, Platina does not use the words ‘just’ and ‘war’ together, I will go on to argue that just war thinking is indeed evident in Platina’s *De laudibus pacis*. Furthermore, Platina clearly argues the case for the possibility of a war fought for a lawful cause and in a just and restrained way. Indeed, and I will return to this point, much of the evil of war described in his litany, he attributes to the ‘absence of restraint’ by soldiers, *licentiam militarem*; ‘unrestrained warfare’, *armorum licentia*; and the ‘frenzy’, *rabies*, of battle⁸⁴. This point will be taken up by Sánchez who argues that such evils are not the result of war itself, but of the abuse of war.

Platina is not explicit in recognising the idea of a just authority, but he frequently does refer to the responsibility of kings and rulers in embarking on a war. On intention, in paragraphs 4 and 5, for example, he is perfectly clear on the idea of, and necessity for, what we understand as just intention, and recognise from Augustine. War should be fought ‘against an injustice’, *propulsare nimirum iniuriam*, and not out of any ‘desire to dominate’, *libidine dominandi*. Also, as we have seen, Platina is very clear in paragraph 4 that war should only be fought for a ‘just fashion with a lawful cause’, *modo iusta et legitima subsit causa*. This is

⁸³ *De laudibus pacis*, para. 4: ‘... *propulsare nimirum iniuriam licet natura ipsa adiuvante*’.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, para.14 and 16. Benziger translates such lack of restraint as *Hemmungslosigkeit des Krieges*.

confirmed in paragraph 5 when he moves on to consider motives in more depth. However, he complains that it is too frequently the case that the causes for war turn out to be unjust. They might well appear honourable, but invariably wars overturn ‘every godly and human order’, *divina humanaque omnia pervertentes*. As we will see, Erasmus will also argue that most wars are undertaken for inadequate, unnecessary, petty, and therefore unjust, causes, ‘the private, sinister, and selfish motives of princes’⁸⁵.

As well as doubting restraint in going to war, therefore, Platina comments in particular on unrestrained behaviour, *licentiam militarem*. He describes this in some detail, as with his earlier litany of evils. There are numerous examples from antiquity, and it extends through paragraphs 11 to 17. He frequently cites the lack of restraint shown in the murder and mistreatment of prisoners and non-combatants, and the wanton destruction of civil infrastructure. ‘This’, he states, ‘is the hideous and detestable face of war’ that brings so much distress, and which, anticipating his *Disputatio* opponent, cannot be praised as this would be ‘to endorse evil’⁸⁶.

However, warfare can be restrained. In paragraph 9, Platina argues that we are drawn away from unrestrained behaviour ‘by nature and the command of God’⁸⁷; and in paragraph 7, it is given ‘by nature’ for man to practise mercy⁸⁸. Furthermore, in addition to God and nature, Platina argues that restraint is in accordance with the laws of man. He states that ‘there will be the justice of war (*iura belli*), when all those who are guilty of serious inhumanity and cruelty are held to account’. This *iura belli*, or *Kriegsrecht*, Benziger refers

⁸⁵ Erasmus, ‘Letter to Anthony a Bergis’, in Mayer, P., *The Pacifist Conscience* (London: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 59. Again, for example, Erasmus challenges leaders who might falsely claim necessity as a justification for war, ‘take off the costume...you’ll find it was wrath, greed, and stupidity that got you involved, not necessity...’, Erasmus, *The Complaint of Peace (Querela pacis)* (1517), CWE., 27, p. 310; and in Adams, Robert, M., (ed. and trans.), *The Praise of Folly and Other Writings*, (London and New York: Norton, 1989), p. 105.

⁸⁶ *De laudibus pacis*, para. 14-15: ‘*Hæc est illa dira et destanda bellorum facies... quam malum approbet*’.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 9: ‘... *a qua certe natura et dei mandato retrahimur*’.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 9: ‘... *a qua certe natura et dei mandato retrahimur*’; para. 7: ‘... *ita homini natura tributum*’.

back to Cicero's 'fair code of warfare'⁸⁹. Platina illustrates and supports the idea of restraint in the conduct of war by giving many examples of clemency and compassionate behaviour, especially by victorious troops⁹⁰.

Even so, Platina is sceptical as to whether these standards of behaviour can be maintained. First, his examples of a lack of restraint far outnumber those of restraint being shown. Indeed, in referring to antiquity in paragraph 19 he identifies the similar period in Greece that lacked restraint, with 'ancient confusions', and 'Greek chaos'⁹¹. Secondly, in paragraph 6, he suggests that when compassion is shown, it is not so much genuine compassion as circumstantial. Virtue is demonstrated not for the sake of virtue, but as a consequence of the overwhelming scale of the defeat imposed, 'because of the mass of enemy dead...not so much in the character as in the strength of arms'⁹². Thirdly, in paragraph 17, he doubts the ability of those holding power to exercise restraint, especially in the position of having defeated an unrestrained enemy. He draws on the analogy that it is more likely that a massive river in flood would keep within its banks, than would such a victor act with 'moderation, counselling justice and every virtue'⁹³.

In a typically humanist way, Platina considers the example of the Romans to seek out a solution. He notes in paragraph 17 that in order to prevent a lack of restraint, the Romans imposed a stringency and discipline, *re militari severitas*, which even included decimation. However, he also argues that this extreme discipline was counter-productive, driving soldiers

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 7: '*Hoc volunt et iura belli, que qui preteriere immanes omnino et crudeles sunt habitus*'. Benziger's citation is found in: Cicero, *On Duties (De officiis)*, Griffin, M. T., and Atkins, E. M., (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), I, 11, 35, p. 15.

⁹⁰ Platina cites Hercules in para. 5, Philip of Macedonia in para. 6, Fabius and Marcellus in paragraph 14, and in para. 17: Camillus, Cincinnatus, Papirius, Fabricus, Cato, Scipio the Elder and Alexander the Great.

⁹¹ *De laudibus pacis*, para. 19: '*... rerum confusion... quam Greci chaos*'. The lack of restraint evident in classical Greece is discussed, for example, in Bellamy, *Just Wars*, pp. 15-17: here Thucydides portrays the Peloponnesian War 'as a story of Athens moral decay and the dramatic erosion of the customs of war'.

⁹² *Ibid.*, para. 6: '*... ob multitudinem interfectorum hostium... non in animo potius quam in lacertis sit posita*'.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, para. 7: '*... mediocritatem, quam iusticia ac virtutes omnes coniectant*'.

to mutiny and creating even more problems⁹⁴. But in paragraph 22, he does look more favourably at strong Roman discipline, where he describes its use in the interests of ‘peace and fidelity’, observing ‘the justice of the *fetiales*’, the endorsement of a war by the Roman priesthood⁹⁵.

Platina is bound by the *Disputatio* to make an argument which emphasises the disadvantages of war, and here he does this well. But he also demonstrates the need for ideas to enable and support restraint in war, given that wars occur. Despite his expressed scepticism, for Platina restraint is still possible and it accords with God, nature and the laws of man. Therefore, I believe he produces a more balanced discussion of the issue than will be found in Erasmus. Erasmus will resign himself to the inevitability of *licentiam militarem*, with no real consideration of ways of restoring the required discipline. Platina, on the other hand, is not just complaining about the evils incurred, he is also pointing towards possible cures.

Another area of commonality between Platina and Erasmus, is their use of sources from antiquity. In *De laudibus pacis*, in paragraph 6, Platina positively cites ‘honest historians (who) write that men are made immortal through virtue...’⁹⁶; and later in paragraph 19, that ‘we do not dismiss the myths but use them to reconcile conflict’, as poets give the example ‘to put down the sword and negotiate peace’⁹⁷. Erasmus will also encourage learning from selected historical figures, especially in the *Education of a Christian Prince*⁹⁸. However, more significantly, they both believe that the wrong myths and the wrong history will teach the wrong lessons, particularly in encouraging tyranny and war. For Platina in paragraph 5: ‘It is because of writers and tellers of stories who give us their accounts, especially of history,

⁹⁴ Benziger describes this *re militari severitas* as: *die Strenge, die Disziplin, die Dezimierung*.

⁹⁵ *De laudibus pacis*, para. 17: ‘*pacis auctoritas et fidei, ut observato iure feciali*’.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 6: ‘*Immortales fieri homines virtute...*’.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 19: ‘... *quandiu eius opera ad ponendas lites dii, ne a fabulis discedamus, utuntur*’.

⁹⁸ Erasmus, *Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, pp. 250 – 253; and Jardine, (ed.), pp. 61 - 65.

that more men have been killed in battle...'⁹⁹. Tales of war encourage yet more war. Erasmus will also repeatedly urge caution, for example, young and naturally violent boys should not read 'Achilles or Alexander the Great or Xerxes or Julius Caesar', at least not without a strong antidote¹⁰⁰. The same caution applies to Old Testament accounts of bloody wars, and reading the tales of Arthur.

Coker has recently discussed this imitative factor in wars, where the Greeks themselves 'were seduced into fighting war by the wish to imitate the exploits of Achilles and Hector'¹⁰¹. However, I believe that there is considerable scope for interpretation, and the selective, and variously interpreted, use of antiquity is a feature of Renaissance writers, especially humanists. Later, I contrast the very different positions of Erasmus and Budé on Alexander¹⁰². Here, however, Platina and Erasmus broadly concur.

In the second part of *De laudibus pacis*, paragraphs 18-26, Platina turns to the subject of peace. I examine what he means by peace, and how this compares with the ideals of Erasmus. For the latter I draw on Erasmus's *Complaint of Peace*¹⁰³. Platina describes a threefold structure for peace: peace is given by God; it is natural; and finally man can help himself in both maintaining peace and in enjoying its benefits.

First, above all else, for Platina peace is given to man by God. In paragraph 24, he uses the text from John's Gospel to support this claim: 'Peace...I bequeath you, my own peace I give to you', *pacem meam relinquo vobis*¹⁰⁴, and furthermore, to wish for war is to scorn 'the fear of God'. Erasmus will not deviate from this most basic assumption, also quoting frequently from the New Testament, for example, 'peace cannot be where God is not,

⁹⁹ *De laudibus pacis*, para. 5: 'Factum est hoc scriptum culpa, maxime vero historicorum, qui, quo plures quis in praelio interfecerit...'

¹⁰⁰ Erasmus, *Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, pp. 250 and 252; and Jardine, pp. 61 and 64.

¹⁰¹ Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, p. 91.

¹⁰² I discuss this with my section "Context" of Erasmus.

¹⁰³ Erasmus, *Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27; and in Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*.

¹⁰⁴ John 14, 27.

and God cannot be where peace is not'¹⁰⁵. However, as we will see, Sánchez challenges Platina's interpretation of the text from John by differentiating between forms of 'peace'.

With God as the highest source of peace, both Platina and Erasmus then go on to describe how peace becomes manifest in nature. All of God's creation, the heavens, the earth and all that is on the earth, is by nature in harmony. Platina provides vivid descriptions of this argument in paragraphs 19 and 25. As befits the contemporary interest in astronomy, in paragraph 19 he includes an account of the harmony of the heavenly bodies. Two points are significant to later analysis. First, the harmonious movement of the heavenly bodies does not just 'influence' harmony on earth; the two run together in a way that will contrast with Sánchez's distinction between various types of peace. 'This harmony of heavenly bodies is taken to be complete and just peace, and peace is nothing other than a state of concord and respect between people'¹⁰⁶. Secondly, because 'the earth was ruined and horrors were brought down', there is the potential for discord, but God compensates through nature, 'through his support and his eternal ordering we are brought to peace'¹⁰⁷. The sun lightens the darkness, and the 'ferocity' of Mars is restrained and calmed down by the 'forgiveness and clemency' of Venus. Erasmus will echo these ideas. In *Complaint of Peace*, he describes the celestial bodies 'living and flourishing in harmony with one another', and although they might 'often battle with each other, generally strike a balance by which they maintain a constant peace'¹⁰⁸.

It is common to both writers that this harmony permeates everything on earth, animate and inanimate. In paragraph 25, Platina points out that 'even the inanimate elements...appear

¹⁰⁵ Romans 15, 33 and Colossians 3, 15. *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 299; and in Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 95.

¹⁰⁶ *De laudibus pacis*, para. 19: 'Hanc celestium corporum pacem non immerito dicamus, cum pax nihil aliud sit quam convenientia et quidam concentus hominum interse'.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 19: '...noxia et horribilia terris', but '...et deum concentu ac perpetuo ordine, quem paci comparamus...';

¹⁰⁸ Erasmus, *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 294; and in Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 90.

to be striving for peace'¹⁰⁹, and Erasmus extends his full account of benign nature to include inanimate rocks.¹¹⁰ Both writers also claim that animals of the same species do not fight and kill each other: Platina in paragraph 10, and Erasmus, for example, 'the savagery of lions is not directed at other lions'¹¹¹. It is only for the necessities of life that animals hunt at all. Again, Sánchez is to dispute this particular empirical claim, indeed, he challenges the overall assumption that the heavens and nature are in harmony. For Sánchez, and this is the deep difference between the two disputants, the heavens and nature are in a state of war.

The third source of peace for Platina, along with God and nature, is man's ability to generate peace himself. At the close of paragraph 26, he argues that 'the whole earth can be ruled with reason, constancy and certainty', *considerate, integer, ad constanter*, when 'we choose: peace from war...'. Man, therefore, has the capability to live in peace, should he so decide, and law is central to this. In paragraph 18, Platina points to the periods of peace and law in Roman antiquity compared to times of blood and cruelty. He sees the advantages of law as emanating from the founding Greeks, Solon and Lycurgus, to then spread throughout the civilised world.

However, I argue that Erasmus is more sceptical of man's ability to organise and live in peace. If Platina writes in praise of peace, *De laudibus pacis*, Erasmus writes more pessimistically of the complaint of peace, *Querela pacis*. At one point in *Querela pacis*, Erasmus will point to the benefits of being 'governed by laws rather than soldiers'¹¹², but more often he laments that laws are not adhered to. The laws of our ancestors 'we twist out of shape', and princes 'snatch up arms right away' rather than refer to law and arbitration¹¹³. Elsewhere, he strongly advises his prince against treaties and agreements, because they will

¹⁰⁹ *De laudibus pacis*, para. 25: '...cum elementa etiam inanimate quidem ... pacem expetere videantur'.

¹¹⁰ Erasmus, *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, pp. 293 – 5; and Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, pp. 89-91.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 294; and p. 90.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 321; and p. 116.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 308 and 310; and pp.104 and 105.

not be kept¹¹⁴. Instead, for Erasmus a more fundamental change, a ‘Philosophy of Christ’, is required. Such views will stand in sharp contrast to Machiavelli, for whom both laws and arms are required for the foundation of a state. Indeed, ‘...where there are good arms, good laws inevitably follow’¹¹⁵.

Finally, for Platina, peace is rational because of its benefits. He graphically lists the benefits in his penultimate paragraph, where he describes the benefits of industry, commerce, agriculture and learning¹¹⁶. Utility is certainly one of the key arguments of Erasmus, who will frequently argue that even if things go well in a just war, on balance, ‘it is clear that the cost would far exceed the gain’¹¹⁷. Sánchez is to present the opposite judgement: war has great benefits, and peace incurs considerable cost.

In summary therefore, firstly, Platina does give a concept of peace and war in *De laudibus pacis*. Peace exists universally: by God’s design; it is immanent in nature; and it is also within man’s capability to re-create. Erasmus is more sceptical of man’s capabilities. For Platina, it is then natural to repel injustice with justified warfare when this peace is disturbed. He unambiguously approves of such just and necessary war, but Erasmus is much less clear. Platina requires such wars to have adequate ‘cause’, and to be motivated by correct ‘intention’, even if as Benziger insists, he does not semantically conjoin ‘just’ with ‘war’. However, war comes with a train of evils that Platina describes with a rhetorical style and content very close to that later used by Erasmus. Most of these ills are attributed by Platina to *licentiam militarem*, unrestrained warfare. This is against God, nature, and the laws of war, and therefore war can, and should, be restrained. However, he does view the prospects of a victorious soldier acting with virtue as being as likely as a river’s banks restraining a river in

¹¹⁴ Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, pp. 275 – 7, and in Jardine, (ed.), p. 93-95.

¹¹⁵ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 12, p. 39. ‘...dove sono buone arme conviene sieno buone legge’, *Opere*, p. 275.

¹¹⁶ On learning, Platina describes peace as the opportunity to study, but in Italy Erasmus will lament that wars interrupt study; as described in Halkin, Léon-E, *Erasmus: A Critical Biography*, Tonkin, J., (trans.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 66.

¹¹⁷ Erasmus, *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, 430 and 437; and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 343 and 350.

full flood. Platina attends more than Erasmus to the tragedies experienced by the soldier, and this will underscore the intense dislike, indeed contempt, of Erasmus for any soldiery.

To conclude thus far, Platina's impassioned pleas for peace and arguments against war can certainly be seen to prefigure Erasmus, but I have argued that he gives a more balanced account than the later Northern humanist. Platina does give a clear conceptual account, the universe is essentially at peace, and he seeks, albeit with reservations, a restraint in war that is fully in line with just war thinking.

RODRIGO SÁNCHEZ:

Commendatio belli

Sánchez responds to Platina's thesis, that war is disadvantageous and peace is inherently a 'good', with a two-part antithesis: firstly, in the *Commendatio belli* war is argued to be an inherent 'good', and not an 'evil'; secondly, in *De difficultate verae pacis* temporal peace is distinguished from God's peace, and is shown to have inherent difficulties. In an ordered scholastic style, Sánchez divides each part into a prologue and ten chapters. In examining both parts, I continue to pay particular attention to concepts of war and peace, just war content, and Benziger's analysis. I also consider Benziger's claim that Machiavelli's thought can be seen as a variation of Sánchez's arguments.

A summary of the *Commendatio belli* can be drawn, as Sánchez intended, directly from its ten chapter headings. Firstly, he discusses a basic concept of war: war originates naturally; everything in nature is derived from a state of struggle; and war is both necessary and beneficial¹¹⁸. However, because of influences that are not of nature, there are different

¹¹⁸ *Commendatio belli*, 1, *Bellorum naturalis origo... conservari naturaliter quadam pugna... necessaria et utilia*.

forms of, and justifications for, war¹¹⁹. War not only occurs on earth but also between good and malignant spirits¹²⁰. Following on from this spiritual dimension, for Sánchez, the church approves of war, consecrates weapons of war, and God himself is called on in the name of war¹²¹.

He then argues that there are advantages of war. A commonwealth of mankind benefits because it is united and preserved by war and the arms of war¹²², without which it can neither grow or prosper. War is a cure for the world and is very positive and beneficial for it¹²³. War is ordained for peace, because peace is achieved through war, and peace and war are in no way contradictory¹²⁴. War brings out the most virtue, while peace encourages many imperfections; and furthermore, peace cannot be guaranteed without war¹²⁵. War exercises and strengthens virtue¹²⁶. Finally, arms and warfare are the basis of nobility and the highest forms of honour, but which are extinguished by a long peace; furthermore, arms and warfare are the very becoming, the essence, of the world¹²⁷.

In his *Prologus*, Sánchez sets out this plan and makes introductory comments. He makes clear in paragraphs 2 and 3 that what Platina takes for peace is not true peace but ‘earthly quietude’, *terranam quietem*¹²⁸. Furthermore, the inertia, *inerti*, of this state of quietude inevitably nurtures and brings forth corruption, *nutrix vitiorum*. Like Platina, he also claims to have the least support, and he warns in the *Prologus* that his arguments might well

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 2, *Supranaturaliter inclinari... quod varia sunt genera bellorum diversaeque cause.*

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 3, *Inter incorporeos spiritus bonos et malos.*

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 4, *Bellica arma ecclesia benedict et Deus ipse bellorum titulis appellatur.*

¹²² *Ibid.*, 5, *Bellis et armis humanam rem publicam dirigi et conservari.*

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 6, *Bellum medicamina esse orbis illique perutilia et expediencia fore.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 7, *Bella ad pacem ordinata fore ad quam non nisi bellando pervenitur... pacem minime bello adversari.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 8, *Bella virtutes plurimas parere, pacem vero multa nutrire vicia... nec fore pacem securam sine bello.*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 9, *Bella terrena exercicia et incrementa fore virtutum.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 10, *Bellica arma nobilitatem et summos honores generant ipsaque longa pax extinguit ... quod bella cedant ad decorum universsi.*

¹²⁸ Some of the other terms that will be used by Sánchez for earthly quietude are: *temporalis quietude*, temporal quietude; *pax mundi*, worldly peace; *temporalis securitatis*, temporal surety; and Benziger’s translation of *irdische Ruhe*, earthly quietude.

have ‘the appearance of much unpleasantness’¹²⁹. In paragraph 1, Sánchez states that most people fear the very mention of war, and that he will meet widespread defamation for his commendation of it. However, as I have discussed, Sánchez will not stray too far from papal orthodoxy. His response is that it is easier to praise peace with words, than to maintain peace with deeds and effort¹³⁰. Sánchez then goes on to develop this theme of relative support for the disputants in paragraph 4, making, I believe, a significant point that is missed by Benziger.

Benziger highlights Sánchez’s claim that Platina’s support is based merely on the common mass of people, *vulgares*, who cannot be relied upon¹³¹. However, Sánchez says a great deal more of those who support Platina, and who instinctively praise his peace. Clerics and monks maintain that peace can only be honoured in times of peace; citizens, following Aristotle, will claim that unity and concord can only be identified with peace, this being the end, *telos*, of human society; traders, farmer, and craftsmen require peace; and also magistrates and judges will claim that there is no justice where the law of force is the strongest. Sánchez counters this, not by disputing their respective claims, but by pointing out that they ‘only have words to defend themselves’, indeed, most would be unable to wield a sword in their own defence¹³². Sánchez, on the other hand, claims the support of experienced and renowned military and political leaders. Here, therefore, Sánchez is not disputing the value of civil society, but arguing the greater necessity of force to enable and maintain it. Similarly, Machiavelli will not dispute the value of good laws, but argue that without good arms they are useless. From the beginning, therefore, Sánchez is stressing a pre-political necessity for arms, which will also be fundamental in Machiavelli.

¹²⁹ *Commendatio belli*, Prologue, para. 1, ‘tantoque duriorem suscepisse provinciam videor...’.

¹³⁰ Benziger attributes this partially to Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 11, in *Political Writings*, p. 150.

¹³¹ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 59.

¹³² *Commendatio belli*, Prologue, para. 4: ‘... verbis tantum partes tuebuntur tuas’.

In three chapters, Sánchez deals with his concept of war and its causes. In Chapter 1, Sánchez argues that war is a natural phenomenon, *bellum naturale*, of primitive origin *antiqua origo*, at the creation of mankind¹³³. He concludes in paragraph 12: that the ‘wise men’ were clear, ‘the impulsion to war and to fight is established in nature, (and) has natural origins’¹³⁴. This is the case for Sánchez, and against both Platina and Erasmus, because all of creation is in a state of conflict, a view conforming to the early account of Heraclitus. Sánchez illustrates this by describing: firstly, nature in conflict in paragraphs 2-6, drawing heavily on Petrarch¹³⁵; and then the conflict evident in mankind and his activities, in paragraphs 6-13, drawing heavily on John of Legnano. He makes a broad range of empirical claims, and I note especially that many of these directly contradict claims we have seen being made by Platina, and later by Erasmus. For example: for Sánchez, the planets are in tension, not harmony, paragraph 2; animals of the same species do attack each other, paragraph 4; and even rocks have a magnetic opposition, and are not in a state of rest, paragraph 7.

Sánchez then describes the natural opposition found in mankind and all of his activities, for example: family relationships in paragraph 6; music in paragraph 7; and philosophy in paragraph 8. Pride battles with humility, just as heat battles with the cold, and virtue with vice. A point of note is his claim in paragraph 6 of conflict between brothers, ‘...those who imbue the blood of brothers’¹³⁶. While Platina, and especially Erasmus, apply a Stoic cosmopolitan view and argue that war within the brotherhood of Christianity amounts to fratricide, for Sánchez, war between brothers would not be unnatural or unexpected.

In a large Chapter 2, Sánchez discusses a very multi-faceted approach to war. Natural inclinations are not the only factors, and he argues in paragraph 1 that it is necessary to

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 1, para 13: ‘...in ipso paradise terrestri in prima hominis origine’.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 1, para. 12: ‘...naturalem ipsam ad bella et pugnam inclinationem ex principis naturalibus fuisse introductam’. Benziger attributes much of this quotation to John of Legnano, *De bello*, XI.

¹³⁵ This is Sánchez’s understanding of ‘nature’, and while he does refer to the stars and planets, the celestial dimension is dealt with more fully in Chapter 2.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1, para. 6: ‘...fraterno sanguine maduisse’.

differentiate between ‘different kinds of war’, *diversas bellorum species*¹³⁷. Firstly, there is *bellum naturale*, which he has already discussed; secondly, there is *bellum caeleste*, or heavenly war; and thirdly, human war, *bellum humanum*, which he further sub-divides into internal and external, *bellum humanum interius* and *bellum humanum exterius*. Not yet listed, but the subject of Chapter 3, will also be spiritual war, *bellum spirituale*. As we will see, Benziger is particularly critical of aspects of this analysis.

Sánchez draws on John of Legnano, Aristotle, and other philosophers to describe *bellum caeleste*, where the heavenly bodies, that is the stars and planets, are in a constant state of movement, and which he describes, ultimately is a state of conflict. This planetary conflict, which follows nature and is mentioned in paragraph 1, is reflected in the world of mankind, specifically in man’s innate ability to hate. Such astrological claims have been well known throughout man’s history. Significantly however, Sánchez also takes account of a Christian free will, and in paragraph 2 stresses that *bellum caeleste* does not fixedly determine man’s actions: ‘the advocates of a Christian interpretation teach that the natural powers and effects of the stars are not aligned directly with an immediate necessity of war, *non directo ad bella necessitare*, so that people can turn away, albeit this is unusual’¹³⁸.

The third category is *bellum humanum*, which in its internal form is the contrary nature of mankind. This is seen in the reoccurring condition of the imbalance of the humours. Sánchez draws on biblical references and John of Legnano, and describes how when the humours overflow, it results, for example, in the lusts of the flesh. Sánchez uses the medical analogy to describe the remedy. I believe it is very significant that he describes a full form of

¹³⁷ Today, we are used to such an interdisciplinary approach. For example, in his *Philosophy of War*, Alexander Moseley considers in turn the metaphysical, psychological, cultural, sociological and the political aspects of war. Moseley, Alexander, *A Philosophy of War* (New York: Agora Publishing, 2002). In this context, a theological dimension is also very much relevant. However, Sánchez is very much discussing different kinds, *species*, of war, and not the various ‘forms’ of earthly war.

¹³⁸ *Commendatio belli*, 2, para. 2: ‘...*quanquam catholici interpretes fateantur ipsam naturalem potentiam et astrorum vim non directo ad bella ipsa necessitare, quin resisti eis possit ab hominibus, licet id rarum sit*’.

the medical analogy, which is to progressively apply: firstly, medicines; then fire to seal and purify; and finally, as a ‘last resort’, the ‘iron’ knife, to cut away rotten parts or infected and gangrenous limbs. The art of medicine cannot be considered an evil, *nec propterea mala*, when it cuts off a rotten limb and prevents infection¹³⁹, but importantly, the knife is a means of ‘last resort’. In his “Medical Moment”, Nikola Regent describes the deep classical tradition of the ‘knife’ analogy. However, he only deals with the ‘knife’ in isolation, and I argue that the full analogy is important¹⁴⁰. We will later see Machiavelli describe the medical analogy being used in justifying a war, and also Erasmus’s critical response¹⁴¹.

In paragraph 2, Sánchez makes the move from man in ‘microcosm’, *parvus mundus*, to man in ‘macrocosm’, *magnus mundus* or *universum*, and argues that this conflict of internal humours is replicated in man’s external relations, *exterius*, in wider society, or in paragraph 3, the ‘totality of the world’, *mundi universitas*. Again, when other remedies are ineffective, the necessary and unavoidable corrective to deal with corruption and disordered humours, is war¹⁴².

Finally in Chapter 2, in paragraphs 4 and 5, Sánchez reiterates key points. He again stresses the inevitability of war. This does not annul man’s freedom of will, but should be seen ‘in the sense of an inevitability of providence’¹⁴³, what God wills will occur. He uses many biblical references to support this inevitability of war, including from the New

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 2, para. 3: ‘*Sic enim natura docet in humano corpore, quia invalescentibus humoribus necessaria est primo farmachia, deinde ignis et ferri cauterium. Nec propterea mala est medicine ars, quæ iubet prescindi unum membrum putridum et inobediens, ne totum corpus corrumpatur*’.

¹⁴⁰ Regent, Nikola, “A ‘medical moment’: Guicciardini and Lycurgus’ knife”, *History of European Ideas*, 34, (2008), pp.1-13.

¹⁴¹ Described by Machiavelli with Albizzi’s speech in “Examples from the History of Florence”, p. 236; and I discuss Erasmus’s response to the analogy in my section on his “Case against War”.

¹⁴² The ontological basis for moving from the micro environment to the macro can of course be questioned. Although more focussed on legal rights, a related and modern discussion is found with Michael Walzer’s ‘domestic analogy’, in Waltzer, Michael, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977, 4th ed., 2006), from p. 58; and Jeff McMahan’s challenge to Walzer, in McMahan, Jeff, “The Sources and Status of Just War Principles”, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2007), pp. 95-97.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 2, para. 4: ‘*Sed sane sumenda sunt videlicet de necessitate providentiæ...*’.

Testament: ‘It is necessary for troubles to come’, and ‘nation will fight against nation...’¹⁴⁴.

For Sánchez, in paragraph 4, this inevitability is further evidenced because since the beginning of time the devil has been trying ‘to interrupt the peace of men, to break their unity, and finally to contaminate the human race and bring it to chaos’¹⁴⁵. The time described by Isaiah, when people will no longer lift up their swords against other people, and war will no longer be studied, will come, but not be until after the day of judgement¹⁴⁶. Until then, therefore, earthly peace remains reliant on war to sustain it.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with spiritual war, *bellum spirituale*, which, as Benziger emphasises¹⁴⁷, Sánchez has not included in his earlier three part *generi belli*. Nonetheless, drawing on Augustine and a variety of sources, Sánchez produces his evidence of the war between good and evil spirits, *inter incorporeos in spiritus bonos et malos*¹⁴⁸. This leads to his conclusion, following Augustine, ‘that if godly beings have fought with each other, then wars between peoples are excused’¹⁴⁹. But this is more than a mitigation of wars between men, because if Christ is struggling with evil-loving enemies, *hostes maligni*, then mankind is also obliged to struggle against the wicked, *hostes nequissimi*. Benziger notes here that Sánchez does not speak of Christ as *dominus noster*, a head of household, but as *imperator noster*, or in his translation, *Herrscher*, an army general or ruler, which gives the argument a more military character.

As Christ and the benevolent spirits are engaged in fighting evil in a *bellum spirituale*, it is a *sequitur* in Chapter 4, that the Church will approve of war against evil. Sánchez supports this by using Augustine, and examples of those Old and New Testament references

¹⁴⁴ Mathew 18, 7 and Luke 21, 10 respectively.

¹⁴⁵ *Commendatio belli*, 2, para. 4: ‘...qui a principio create mundi pacem inter homines violare, unitatem scindere, et tandem humanum genus inficere et perturbare conatur’.

¹⁴⁶ Isaiah 2, 2 - 4.

¹⁴⁷ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 69.

¹⁴⁸ As Benziger notes, the whole of Chapter 3 draws on Augustine, *City of God*, 2, 25, and 3, 25.

¹⁴⁹ *Commendatio belli*, 3, para. 1: ‘Si veraciter inter se numina pugnaverunt, bella civilia excusantur humana’; following Augustine, *City of God*, 2, 25.

that can be taken as approval of war. These include John's message to the Centurion to be content with his wages, which had also been used by Augustine and Gratian¹⁵⁰. I note the command from Joel to 'cut your ploughshares into swords', of which the reverse form that swords will be turned into ploughshares, is the more familiar to us¹⁵¹. However, Sánchez would certainly reply to us that the former, from Joel, is a command appropriate to our temporal and imperfect condition, and the other is a prophecy of the perfect, post-judgement, condition. Also in Chapter 4, David and others are offered as proof that war is far from reprehensible. But, as we will see, Erasmus will use David as a counter-example, that although a great biblical figure, David was not allowed to build the house of God because as a soldier his hands had been polluted with human blood in war¹⁵².

At the conclusion of the chapter Sánchez employs one of his rare references to a 'just war', *iusta bella*. In a somewhat circular argument, he maintains that war cannot be a sin, because otherwise we would not be able to allow just wars. However, this is less circular for Sánchez, because he takes the Augustinian and patriarchal pronouncements on *iusta bella* to be absolute. I also note from this discussion that Sánchez takes *iusta bella* very much as a ready permission to go to war, rather than as a restraint and opportunity for scrutiny. He then concludes the chapter by emphasising that service in war is ordained by holy teachers, and confirmed by 'the binding force of obedience to do battle without personal guilt'; obedient even to a pagan prince, and even if the soldier himself is unsure of God's command¹⁵³.

¹⁵⁰ For example: Augustine, *Against Faustus the Manichaeon*, XXII, 73-79, in *Political Writings*, p. 222; and *Decretum Gratiani* II, C. XXIII, q. 1, c. 2.

¹⁵¹ The quote from Joel 3, 10 is 'Cut your ploughshares into swords, and your spades into spears'. This is the opposite of Isaiah 2, 4: 'they shall turn their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into sickles'; and again at Micheas 4, 3: 'they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into spades'.

¹⁵² Erasmus, *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 300; and in Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 96. This was the case even though David warred at God's command against an impious foe, and before Christ's command to love one's enemy. Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 208.

¹⁵³ *Commendatio belli*, 4, para. 1: '... licite sub principe etiam pagano bellare, licet incertum sit, an contra domini preceptum tale bellum committatur, quia bellatorem innocentem facit ordo serviendi'. Benziger notes that Sánchez is following Gratian.

Benziger is critical of Sánchez's account of the various kinds, *species*, of war. While he accepts that it is a complex account, *komplexere Begriffe*, he believes it 'lacks stringency and a system', *fehlt den...Systematik und Stringenz*¹⁵⁴. Benziger sees Sánchez as essentially using the account of John of Legnano, but because of differences in Sánchez's account, the latter lacks the coherence of a complete system. For John of Legnano, *bellum caeleste* is *bellum spirituale caeleste*. The supernatural war of the heavens is a category of spiritual war; it precedes the other forms in cause and time; and has a direct influence on the affairs of mankind. For Sánchez, *bellum caeleste* concerns the stars and heavenly bodies, but as we have seen, Christian free will prevents any full determinism of the stars. Instead, Benziger sees the primary cause of conflict in Sánchez, not as *bellum spirituale caeleste*, but as the internal *bellum humana*, which is then additionally influenced by the 'devil'¹⁵⁵.

However, if Sánchez does differ in certain areas from John of Legnano, I argue, and against Benziger, that this is with good reason and not because it lacks stringency. First, while influential through medieval times, astrology was having a particular impact on Italian Renaissance thinking, described by Baron as 'a new era of astrological ascendancy'¹⁵⁶. Sánchez would have been sensitive to this, and therefore is putting greater distance between the Christian account and claims made for astrology, especially in allowing for an element of free will. Secondly, and as I argued earlier, Sánchez is giving a multifaceted approach to war which encompasses the natural, celestial, human and spiritual. This is to a greater extent than John of Legnano writing earlier in the Middle Ages, and Sánchez gathers together a broader range of sources. To argue that there are a number of aspects to the questions raised by peace and war is not necessarily to lack stringency or system as Benziger suggests. Indeed, however

¹⁵⁴ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 63.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p 64: '...für die bella humana als verantwortlich ansieht', and p 66: '... Kampf des Teufels gegen den Menschen an...'.

¹⁵⁶ Baron, Hans, "Towards a more positive Evaluation of the Fifteenth Century Renaissance", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, (1943), IV, p. 29. Baron is quoted in Parel, Anthony, J., *The Machiavellian Cosmos* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 4, where the influence of astrology is discussed.

we judge the assumptions he makes, I believe Sánchez's work in the *Disputatio* remains very systematic, which is fully in keeping with his scholastic and legal background.

We will later see how Machiavelli's position with respect to the ideas of this section of the *Disputatio*. He will certainly deploy a rich account in his literary works which will relate to a popular audience. In his political works he will be much more straightforward. He is not going to assign a determinate political role to Christian influence, but *fortuna* is fundamental to his thinking, and we will see how he attributes half of the influence on man to *fortuna*, and half to man's own will. For Machiavelli, as for Sánchez, man still has some choices to make in matters of war and peace, as in other affairs.

In Chapters 5 and 6, Sánchez argues the benefits of arms and war to the political community. Here, Benziger's analysis digresses into a lengthy consideration of Aristotle on war and slavery¹⁵⁷. Sánchez's brief mention in paragraph 1 of Chapter 5 covers only two points, that for Aristotle: war can be used to enforce those naturally 'born to slavery'; and that the slave mentality is of 'weak character', and will not produce an honourable fighter¹⁵⁸. This much is relatively undisputed in the scholarship, and I will not consider it further. I believe that Benziger does not give sufficient attention to Sánchez's essential argument, which is the fundamental political importance of the ability to successfully wage war, and to which I will now turn.

To support his argument, Sánchez calls on various Greek and Roman authorities. First, he argues a basic pre-political place for warfare: that without a secure community, there can be no politics. He best illustrates and develops this in paragraph 2 by drawing on Aristotle: war is necessary to defend the polity; men cannot live without the polity; therefore,

¹⁵⁷ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 70-71.

¹⁵⁸ Aristotle, *Politics*, Everson, S., (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), I, 6, (1255 a), pp. 17-8, and (1256 b), p. 21.

without war men cannot rightfully live a good life¹⁵⁹. Secondly, as the means to ensure success in this warfare, the community must provide, maintain, and train its soldiers. For this, Sánchez uses Plato's account of the 'guardian' class, and how their skills of war are as necessary to protect the polity, as to rule it¹⁶⁰. Interestingly, Sánchez does not refer to, or side with, Aristotle's arguments for a citizen militia in preference to Plato's professional class of soldiery¹⁶¹. This will be a major issue with Machiavelli, who will take a very Aristotelian, albeit not attributable, stance on this.

Sánchez also cites Hippodamus, the craft of war is essential and the armed defenders, *bellantes*, are the most useful of the components in the order of a state, and above artisans and agricultural workers. Finally, Octavian particularly emphasises the necessity to work to maintain weapon skills. The argument here will be clearly replicated in Machiavelli, who likens an institution or city that is not supported by adequate military power, to a roofless palace. It might be full of jewels, but everything will 'moulder into ruin' come 'the ravages of the weather'¹⁶².

Sánchez also directly responds to Platina on the ills of war, and this again will apply to Erasmus. Sánchez sums up his argument in paragraph 2 of Chapter 5. 'The practice of war is as necessary as the defence of the citizens: remove the soldiers from the polity and you will

¹⁵⁹ Following Aristotle, *Ibid.*, I, 2, (1253 a), pp. 13-14; III, 6, (1278 b), pp. 69-70. Also, for example, Aristotle emphasises that war is only a means to an end, that end being the good life, and that the primary cause for war is to prevent one's own enslavement; *Ibid.*, 7, 14, (1333 a – 1334 a), pp. 187-8.

¹⁶⁰ Plato, *The Republic*, Ferrari, G. R. F., (ed.), Griffith, Tom, (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 2, 14, (373 d – 374 d), pp. 56-7.

¹⁶¹ Plato's main argument here, and in keeping with the thesis of *The Republic*, is that soldiers have to be professionals because each man has his own excellence, and must keep to it, and soldiering is the most vital of skills. Aristotle's direct response is that: first, exceptionally, the 'many' may achieve military excellence, also 'mass' is relevant, and there will never be enough professional to make up the numbers; Aristotle, *Politics*, 3, 7, (1279 b), p. 71. Secondly, while professionals might appear better trained, compared to a citizen militia, they lack the true virtue of courage. Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Ross, D., (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, World Classic, 1980), 3, 8, (1116a10 – 1116b17), pp. 67 - 72.

¹⁶² Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, (1521), Wood, Neal, (ed.), Farnsworth, Ellis, (trans.) (Da Capo Press, 2001), p. 4; '...uno superbo e regale palazzo, ancora che ornate di gemme e d'oro, quando, senza essere coperte, non avessono cosa che dalla pioggia le difendesse', *Opere*, p. 301.

see ...everything forced into a state of chaos by murder and arson'¹⁶³, and he goes on to list the ills of young women stolen, families violated, and both the holy and the secular defiled. Thus, he uses the very same litany of the evils of war so favoured and well used by the pacific humanists, and turns it around. Good soldiers are necessary to protect against these very same ills. For Platina, unrestrained warfare is graphically blamed for the destruction of cities; for Sánchez, warfare lies at the foundation and well-being of cities¹⁶⁴. For Erasmus, the 'riffraff of dirty scoundrels' will be the very cause of the litany of ills, and 'every sort of crime'; for Sánchez, well-trained soldiers are essential for both the existence of the polity, and defence against the same ills¹⁶⁵. Here, therefore, much depends upon assumptions being made about the role and quality of the soldiery, and the extent to which warfare is seen as *licentium militarium*.

In Chapter 6, Sánchez moves on to why, for him, war is beneficial to the world. It is beneficial because it is a corrective, we are 'wrestling with sin'. He repeats previous ideas: the medical analogy; and because man's guilt is one of the causes of conflict, man has himself largely to blame. Also, war is the punishment of God, *ius divinum*. This idea, I argue, produces two extremes of interpretation. Firstly, as instruments of God we must embark on holy war, with tendencies against the limitation of warfare. Secondly, we must not resist aggression, but accept it as God's punishment. The latter is evident, for example, with Luther's initial message of non-resistance to the Turks, and Savanorala's view of the French as God's punishment on Florence. Finally in Chapter 6, and I believe most fundamental even if it is again passed over in Benziger's analysis¹⁶⁶, war protects. Beyond the pre-political

¹⁶³ *Commendatio belli*, 5, para. 2: 'Tam igitur necessaria est bellorum exercitatio quam defensio civitatum: Tolle enim bellatores a re publica...'

¹⁶⁴ Platina, *De laudibus pacis*, para.12. Both Sánchez and Platina, almost word for word alike, include young maidens being torn from the arms of their parents as being among the ills suffered.

¹⁶⁵ As but one example, Erasmus, *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, 437; and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 350.

¹⁶⁶ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 71-72.

sense, good arms continue to protect society from ills. Sánchez asks: ‘Who will condemn war when it protects life, sanctity, home, children, the elderly: in short human society’¹⁶⁷?

In Chapter 7, Sánchez now directly confronts Platina on the nature of war and peace, introducing arguments that he will deal with again in *De difficultate verae pacis*. For Sánchez, war and peace are not opposites, indeed, the opposite of peace is not war, but hate, *odium*¹⁶⁸. War and peace are mutually dependent on each other; war leads to peace; and the intention of war is peace. This means, quoting Vegetius, that ‘those who wish for peace should contemplate war’. We have seen how the idea that the intention of war should be peace draws on Aristotle and Augustine, and underlies the key criteria of ‘intention’ in ‘just war’ thinking. Sánchez supports this idea with the example of soldiers who were inwardly peaceful, ‘as gentle as lambs in spirit’, but outwardly to the enemy, they were ferocious, ‘as courageous as lions’¹⁶⁹. They were not fighting with vengeance or hate, but were still effective.

Also in this chapter, Sánchez presents, I believe, a further response to Platina’s litany of ills accompanying war. Earlier, his point was that soldiers, good soldiers, were needed to protect against these ills. Here in paragraph 3, Sánchez argues that the ills were not caused by war as such, but by the ‘misuse and excesses of war’, *ex belli abusu et excessu*. Indeed, as he will argue further in *De difficultate verae pacis*, peace is also abused with idleness, luxury, uninhibited pleasure and excessive wealth. While it is one thing to attribute many of the ills of war to abuse and excess, Sánchez does go further in the *Commendatio belli* and argues that war itself, not just certain benefits of war but the general condition of war, is a ‘good’. He endeavours to use a cause and effect argument: because war leads to peace, peace is a good,

¹⁶⁷ *Commendatio belli*, 6, para. 3: ‘*Quis ea bella damnabit, quæ vitam, quæ sacra, quæ templa, quæ patriam, quæ liberos, quæ parents, quæ ipsam denique humanam societatem protegunt?*’

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*: ‘*Non igitur bellum paci emulator. Sed est alia pestis, odium videlicet, quæ directo paci contrariatur.*’

¹⁶⁹ *Commendatio belli*, 7, para. 2: ‘*... qui, dum contra hostes pugnarent, animo agnis mitiores errant, foris vero leonibus forciores.*’

therefore war must be a good. This view that war might itself be a ‘good’, is what might well be considered the more radical part of *Commendatio belli*, and goes beyond war seen as a ‘lesser evil’, and which today is a more common interpretation of Augustine. However, it is not completely without foundation in Augustine, who writes that if war means the defeat of the wicked, ‘...it is not inappropriate to call even this necessity “happiness”’¹⁷⁰.

I make two points on Benziger’s analysis of chapter 7¹⁷¹. First, Benziger focuses on a duality in Sánchez, which reduces all the issues of peace and war to ‘a model of opposition’, *auf das Grundmodell eines Gegensatzes*¹⁷². Such opposition will not be resolved until the day of judgement. However, Benziger misses the point of the chapter, that for Sánchez it is not war and peace that are in opposition. As we have seen, the opposition is peace and hate, and later, in Chapter 9, paragraph 1, Sánchez explicitly gives ‘safety’, *securitas*, not peace, as the opposite of war¹⁷³. Secondly, Benziger introduces one of his main criticisms of Sánchez, which is that Sánchez argues in absolute and abstract terms, *absolut und abstract*, which as Benziger will later argue, lacks humanity. This is especially the case when war is seen as a ‘good’. Platina, on the other hand, Benziger describes as arguing with consideration for individual fates and sensibilities for the feelings of, for example, mourners¹⁷⁴. Here, Benziger does highlight a significant difference, certainly in style. But I have already shown that this is well grounded in the humanist and scholastic approaches; and also Sánchez does indeed respond to the litany of inhumane ills made by Platina.

In Chapters 8 and 9, Sánchez further directly confronts the arguments of Platina, which Erasmus will repeat and amplify with his account of war as the ‘cesspit of all that is evil’. Sánchez argues that war promotes, exercises and strengthens virtue, whereas it is peace

¹⁷⁰ Augustine, *City of God*, 4, 15, in *Political Writings*, p. 32.

¹⁷¹ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 72-74.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹⁷³ *Commendatio belli*, 9, para. 1: ‘...qui confligunt unitas cum discordia, odia cum pace, securitas cum bello’.

¹⁷⁴ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 73: ‘...die Berücksichtigung des individuellen Schicksals und die Sensibilität für die Gefühle der Leidtragenden...’.

that nurtures vice, *multa nutrire vicia*. Chapter 8 calls on classical and medieval sources, and Chapter 9 on Christian sources. For Sánchez, only war and its special conditions bring out true virtue. Simple outdoor living helps, but it is vital to ‘remain under control when the spear and sword are being wielded in difficult and terrifying situations’, *in rebus arduis et terribilibus*¹⁷⁵. I would add that such control is not only for tactical efficiency, but is essential in avoiding the consequences of the unrestrained warfare so often cited by Platina and Erasmus. In paragraph 2, warfare is virtuous by being temperate and just, *iustos*, which is itself a significant reference to ‘just war’ thinking, especially in its conduct and what we would now call *ius in bello*. As Benziger describes, for Sánchez, a war without virtue is depraved¹⁷⁶.

These virtues are: the ability to endure deprivation or long-term hardship, *patientia* or *perseverantia*; a moral attitude which puts care of one’s life after the well-being of the state, *magnitudo* or *animi*; bravery, *fortitudo*; justice, *iustitia*; temperance, *temperantia*; magnanimity or noble heartedness, *magniminitas*; liberality or munificence, *liberalitas*; and especially prudence, *prudentia*, which Sánchez refers to Aristotle’s description of not only civil, but also military wisdom, *prudentia bellica*. For Sánchez, a war must be ‘moderate and just’, *temperatos et iustos*, to abate ‘injustice’, *iniurias inferre*¹⁷⁷, but this requirement is subsumed deep in a discussion of virtue, and does not indicate a significant reference to ‘just war’ thinking.

Sánchez then introduces the theme of *De difficultate verae pacis* by describing how vice is nurtured by peace. As Benziger points out, while Platina describes a decline of morals in war, Sánchez takes the opposite view and describes the decline of morals in peace.

¹⁷⁵ *Commendatio belli*, 8, para. 1: ‘*Qui enim obedientes sunt in his, que ferro et gladio aguntur, veluti in rebus arduis et terribilibus*’.

¹⁷⁶ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 75: ‘...da ein Krieg, in dem die Tugenden sich nicht bewiesen, von den Menschen depraviert würde’.

¹⁷⁷ *Commendatio belli*, 8, para. 2.

Furthermore, he attributes the downfall of many cities and societies to too much peace. Without the challenges and tests of war, for Sánchez, people will inevitably become wanton, hedonistic, soft, indulgent, careless, idle, flaccid, and desirous of luxury and wealth¹⁷⁸. Chapter 9 then places this in a religious context whereby Christians in this world will inevitably be in a state of conflict, persecution and troubles. This is necessary and beneficial ‘in the trials of virtuosity by which we are led to blessedness’¹⁷⁹. The Christian must be inured to this state of conflict.

In the final chapter, again drawing on various sources, Sánchez firstly argues that secular nobility and high honour, *nobilitatem et summos honores*, are acquired through war. In paragraph 1, he briefly describes the ‘high and pure’ status of nobility. However, most of his discussion on nobility refers less to an aristocratic class, but more to a particular skills group, like the ‘tradesman, merchant, or moneylender’ who are held in higher esteem because they evidently deserve to be. Because they give the highest commitment, *in bellis agonizant*, they deserve the highest praise¹⁸⁰. Sánchez contrasts a rich man comfortable at home, with a soldier, Scipio, enduring hardship and risk away from home, fighting the enemy. The need for the soldier to avoid becoming ‘soft’ is again stressed.

Benziger’s analysis maintains that this nobility does not come from nature, but ‘arises from the arts of war’¹⁸¹. However, this misses the fundamental point that Sánchez has argued at length in the earlier chapters, that for Sánchez, war is a natural phenomenon. Again, in paragraph 2 of Chapter 10, Sánchez explicitly illustrates the natural nobility of superior fighting skills, with comparisons between lion and hare, goshawk and partridge. Such nobility might well be accrued from a warrior’s labours and success, but for Sánchez this is

¹⁷⁸ Described variously in *Commendatio belli*, 8, para. 2 and 3.

¹⁷⁹ *Commendatio belli*, 9, para. 1: ‘*Ea igitur bella et persecutions necessaria et nobis sunt tanquam experimenta virtutum, quibus conducimur ad beatitudinem*’.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 10, para. 2: ‘*Constatitaque bellatores fortes quam maxime fore honoratos pro eo, quod in bellis agonizant*’.

¹⁸¹ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 77: ‘...nicht von nature...sondern erst durch das Kriegswesen entstünden’.

completely natural. This also accords with the idea of natural hierarchies existing throughout nature, the persistence of which, as Eustace Tillyard describes, persists beyond the medieval¹⁸².

This discussion becomes particularly significant in considering the area of difference between Machiavelli and Erasmus. Certainly, Machiavelli will approve of: examples from antiquity; honouring success in battle; and attaining true ‘glory’ as a fundamental motive for politics. However, as we will see, along with much of the civic humanist tradition, he will not only be sceptical of the aristocratic nobility, but will disapprove of any separate class or profession of soldiery. Instead, for Machiavelli, the answer lies with a citizen’s militia. For Erasmus, the contrast is stark, and well beyond the views of Platina. Without differentiating between any type or form of soldiery, Erasmus will describe the ‘very dregs of humanity’, that he takes as soldiers, and doubting even ‘if one can give brutes of that kind the name of man’, never mind honours¹⁸³. Indeed, even fighting in a war against the Turks, of which Erasmus approves, ‘war is a business governed by necessity rather than by honour’¹⁸⁴. Again, therefore, a great difference lies in different assumptions made about the military. Machiavelli will generally follow Sánchez, for example on military virtue, but differ, for example, on Plato’s professionalism. For Erasmus, virtue cannot possibly be associated with soldiers, and honour is even more inappropriate.

Sánchez then makes, or re-emphasises, a number of points. First, war has the additional advantages of focussing the mind, eliminating error, addressing the priorities of life, and as he suggests, countless more. Then he gives an unconvincing etymology of ‘*bellum*’ as magnificence or adornment. Other writers give various such etymologies,

¹⁸² Tillyard, E. M. W., “The Elizabethan World Order”, *Shakespeare’s History Plays* (The Macmillan Co., 1946), pp. 10 – 20.

¹⁸³ Erasmus, *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, 437; and Phillips, *Adages*, 350.

¹⁸⁴ Erasmus, *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 253; also Rummel, *Erasmus Reader*, p. 328.

including Erasmus who will claim that grammarians called war '*bellum*' as 'antiphrasis', precisely because 'in war there is nothing either good or beautiful'¹⁸⁵. Sánchez goes on to discuss earthly war as a practice for the spiritual war, because, for example, we are taught to apply reason. He then stresses that peace and war should be used correctly, but peace is being misused and war is being used as an end in itself, and is therefore devalued.

Finally, Sánchez provides his summary of the key points of the *Commendatio belli*. First, war is necessary and beneficial, and warfare is worthy of advocacy, praise and reward. Secondly, the cruelty, desolation, death and other ills that were argued by Platina, are not due to war itself, which is instituted for peace, but due to its misuse and excess, *abusus and excessus*. Thirdly, peace also comes with countless indulgences which all mis-lead and corrupt mankind, *ex inerti pace plura ad luxum*. Finally, the ills of war apply to wars with 'immoral war aims' as described by Augustine.

This latter point had not been previously discussed in detail, and can be disputed. Certainly today, it is argued that there is no necessary connection between *ius ad bellum* and *ius in bello*, and that the just conduct of a war, for example, does not necessarily follow from a just cause. With Erasmus, more pessimistically, the train of evils 'are the natural consequences of a war considered wholly just'¹⁸⁶. For Sánchez, war is more than even a 'lesser evil', to the extent that only good will emanate from correct war. I will consider this further, after first examining the second part of Sánchez's contribution to the *Disputatio*, which considers the concept of peace in more detail, *De difficultate verae pacis*.

There are further significant points with Sánchez's summary which are not fully expressed by Benziger. First, Sánchez takes a multifaceted and analytical approach to war,

¹⁸⁵ Erasmus, *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, p. 405; and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 314. Juan Luis Vives also writes 'truly fighting belongs neither to good men nor thieves, nor to any that are men at all, but is right bestial fury, and therefore was it named *bellum*, of *bellua*, a beast'. Vives in his commentary on Augustine's *City of God*. Quoted in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 193.

¹⁸⁶ Erasmus, *Panegyric*, CWE., 27, p. 55; and Jardine, (ed.), *Education of a Christian Prince*, p. 139.

more so than Platina. Good arms have a pre-political role in establishing the conditions for political society, and thereafter, they protect society from ills, many of which are the same ills as vividly enumerated in the litanies of Platina and Erasmus. Secondly, Sánchez only rarely refers explicitly to ‘just war’, and then usually in a permissive sense. However, just war thinking is often implicit: soldiers must fight with the right intention, not out of hatred; and war is the last resort, the iron knife, after fire and medicine. Finally, the antithesis of peace is not war, but hatred.

De difficultate verae pacis

In his *Prologus* to *De difficultate verae pacis*, Sánchez establishes that he will enumerate the ‘disadvantages, damage, crime, considerable vice and evil’, that are brought about by the ‘negligent and lethargic’ advocates of ‘freedom from stress and temporal quietude’, *inertis ac desidose securitatis et temporalis quietudinis*, and which Platina takes for, and praises as, peace¹⁸⁷. For Benziger, and following Butler, this second part of Sánchez’s contribution is largely ‘a repetition of the first argument, *mutis mutandis*, from a different angle of approach’¹⁸⁸.

I would add two points. First, Sánchez moves from a commendation of war to a critique of peace as presented by Platina. He attacks the ‘praise’ of peace, *De laudibus pacis*, by pointing up the ‘difficulties’ associated with the concept of ‘true’ peace, *De difficultate verae pacis*. Secondly, throughout *De difficultate verae pacis* Sánchez refers only to the disadvantages and ills of earthly peace, but he had just stated, at the conclusion of his *Commendatio belli*, that the ills of both peace and war were due to the ‘misuse’ of peace and

¹⁸⁷ *De difficultate verae pacis*, *Prologus*, ‘...in qua inertis ac desidose securitatis et temporalis quietudinis, plurimorum vitiorum nutricis, quam tu pacem vocas et tantopere laudas, incommoda, danna et discrimina et calamitates brevi percurram’.

¹⁸⁸ Butler, p. 24; quoted in Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 79.

war respectively¹⁸⁹. He does not argue with peace, as he does with war, that a well-used human peace will not produce these ills. Most probably, this is due to the constraints of the *Disputatio* that require him to weight his argument against peace. Also, in Chapter 10 he does significantly come around to the idea that man should still aspire to earthly peace, which is essential to good government.

Drawing on Isidor and Augustine, Sánchez argues in the *Prologus* that peace depends on both agreement and ‘reassurance and calmness of spirit’. However, as these conditions cannot be met by all people, it is necessary to settle for a less perfect form of peace. He then describes nine categories of ‘peace’. These are: peace within the body; of the inclinations, between feelings; of the rational soul, between knowledge, emotion and action; of the soul and the body; of the household, and domestic harmony; of man with God within eternal law; earthly peace between citizens and states; heavenly peace; and finally the peace and order of God’s creation¹⁹⁰. Sánchez main concern here will be with the seventh category, which is earthly peace, *pax terrestris*. As *pax civitatis terrestris*, this includes a ‘regulated balance’ between temporal authorities and citizens, *ordinata Concordia civium imperandi atque obediendi*. This can be seen to imply a citizen’s obligation to obey, and the importance of a just authority, as seen with the Just War tradition.

He then repeats, at the beginning of Chapter I, that true peace, *pax vera*, requires exacting conditions which are nearly impossible to meet, and that this true peace, therefore, should not be confused with a temporary ‘laying down of swords and weapons of war’, or a

¹⁸⁹ *Commendatio belli*, Chapter 10, para. 2.

¹⁹⁰ *De difficultate verae pacis, Prologus*, ‘... (prima) pax corporis... (secunda) pax anime irrationalis, que est ordinata requies et concordia appetitium... (tertia) pax anime rationalis et est quedam ordinate consensio cognitionis, affectionis et actionis... (quatra) pax est anime et corporis... (quinta) pax domus et est quedam ordinate concordia simul habitantium... (sexta) pax hominus et dei et est quedam ordinate obedientia in fide et lege eterna hominis ad deum... (septima) pax civitatis terrestris et est ordinate concordia civium imperandi atque obediendi... (octava) pax celestis et est quedam ordinatissima concordia et societas fruendi deo... (nona) pax est universi et est tranquillitas ordinata...’.

‘cessation during wars that are undertaken with pure hearts’¹⁹¹. Sánchez lists nine conditions for true peace, and these form the chapter headings for *De difficultate verae pacis* as he demonstrates how each condition fails to be achieved. Therefore, as Benziger sums up, ‘Where there is no true peace’, *wo nicht wahr Friede herrscht*, ‘there is war’, *ist Krieg*¹⁹². I will now consider each chapter and condition in turn.

Sánchez’s first condition is that ‘true peace requires a unity of thought and deed among fellow men, not contention, and that this is rarely found in human peace’¹⁹³. The emphasis is on both thought and deed, and Sánchez argues, supported by quotations from Psalms, that even if there is agreement in words, there will still be anger and conflicts of opinion. Men live together in close communities, and there will inevitably be conflict and disunity arising from: ‘various and contrasting preferences, different mentalities, different passions, and finally, different ambitions’¹⁹⁴. Furthermore, citing Cicero, Augustine and others, this will be much worse in the societies of the godless. With strong echoes of Augustine, change will come about but only at the day of judgement, and which I note, also echoes his earlier argument of nature and man in conflict. This opposes Platina’s natural state of concord, but agrees with Machiavelli’s deeply pessimistic view of human nature, even though Machiavelli is to remain silent on the question of Christian judgment.

The second condition is that true peace ‘requires unity of thought with God the creator and with oneself, something rarely found in people’¹⁹⁵. Benziger points out that no new arguments are introduced here, but further supporting citations are given from the Bible, Augustine, Gregor and Pope Leo. All flesh resists God, *omnis caro resistat creatori*, all

¹⁹¹ *De difficultate verae pacis*, 1, para.1: ‘... quæ a gladiis materialibus, quæ ab armis militaribus, quæ a bellis simpliciter sumptis cessare cogit’.

¹⁹² Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 81.

¹⁹³ *De difficultate verae pacis*, I, Sub-title: ‘Pax vera ininitatem animorumque exigit conformitatem ad homines absque discrepantia, que res in pace humana difficile reperitur’.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1, para. 2: ‘...ubi plurimi sunt homines diversos et adversos mores, diversos animos, diversos passiones, diversos denique appetites habentes...’.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 2, Sub-title: ‘Pax vera conformitatem expetit cum Deo creatore et se ipso absque residential, quod perraro in mortalibus invenitur’.

mankind has deviated, *omnes declinaverunt*, and within man, the will disobeys reason, which in turn is given by God.

Thirdly, ‘true peace and the ease of quietude create a sense of peace without the antagonism of human emotions’¹⁹⁶. Human emotions, therefore, prevent true peace. Again no essentially new arguments are put forward here, but Sánchez does specify and discuss the human emotions: hate, anger, love and fear, *odio videlicet, ira, amore aut timore*. Hate arises from jealousy, and citing Seneca, whoever is jealous also afflicts, weakens, hates, and detracts, all of which are rivals for peace. Instead of anger, one should have pity for one’s enemies. Uncontrolled love of oneself or others opposes peace, because from uncontrolled love there arises the fear of losing the object of love, which in turn denies tranquility of spirit. I note here that Sánchez is not discussing ‘love’ in general, but has specified a disordered, or ‘unrestrained’ love. Fear is also an opponent of security and peace, although, one might add that it has always been a factor in achieving peace through deterrence. I also emphasise Sánchez’s repeated assertion that these antagonistic emotions ‘are so part of mankind that they cannot really be avoided’¹⁹⁷, and therefore, drawing on Augustine, we cannot experience true peace.

The fourth condition is that ‘true peace requires a spirit that is far from worldly lust, and is therefore free for good desires’. However, ‘this people totally lack and it appears completely impossible to achieve’¹⁹⁸. Sánchez argues, as will Machiavelli, that man’s incessant ambition leads inevitably to war, and also to treachery and fraud. He finishes with an assertion that because the hope to gain is typical of competitors, it is understandable that those who live in war, ‘value war higher than peace’¹⁹⁹. This appears to be an attempt to

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3, Sub-title: ‘*Pax vera et quieta securitas reddit peccatum animum absque humanorum affectuum contradictione*’.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 3, para.1: ‘*Ea igitur cum ita mortalibus insint, ut vix vitari possit*’.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 4, Sub-title: ‘*Pax vera liberum exigit animum a terrena concupiscentia semotum bonis desideris. Que impossibile pene videtur hominibus perfecte inesse*’.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 4, para. 2: ‘*Quare, ut bello noncareat, dignum est, velutiqui pluris bellumquam pacem emit*’.

explain the competitive, if not addictive, attitude towards war of contemporary politicians and soldiers. However, as everyone is inevitably in a state of ‘war’, Sánchez is again emphasising the inevitable position of mankind.

With Chapter 5, Sánchez turns from the requirements of true peace to the problems of human peace, *pax humana*. Here, again with a variety of sources, he seeks to show that ‘human peace is insecure, deceptive, transitory and uncertain’²⁰⁰. These attributes he takes from Augustine and then adds that peace is venal, *mercenaria*. For Benziger, Sánchez is arguing the inferiority of human peace to war, because human peace is condemned to be fragile and timid, *timida* or *furchtsam*²⁰¹. Sánchez makes much of its supposed femininity, *fœmina*, and it being a feminine word in Latin, *fœmineo nuncupata nomine*. That effeminacy should be seen as political weakness was indeed common at the time, and will be very evident in Machiavelli.

For Sánchez, peace is timid and distressed because it continually fears war, and fears losing everything it might have gained. As Benziger explains, peace then becomes venal, *käuflich*, because it is ‘bought’ in a trade-off with war. Indeed, the serious charge then is that peace is a deceptive illusion, *simulata*, at best a ‘perfidious delaying of war’, *subdola belli cessatio*. The unreliability of treaties and truces is a much discussed contemporary topic, and certainly not without historical justification. Machiavelli will see them as instrumental, although we will see that breaking one’s word is not an option for Machiavelli, if it means compromising ‘glory’. Erasmus will certainly consider treaties to be false. For Erasmus, the alternative is universal peace and Christian love²⁰²; for Sánchez the alternative is war.

In Chapter 6, Sánchez returns to a topic covered in part in Chapters 8 and 9 of the *Commendatio belli*: ‘Human peace produces the most error, while virtue and honesty are

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, ‘*Pax humana pavida, instabilis, dolosa, fugax et incerta demonstratur*’.

²⁰¹ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 83-4.

²⁰² Erasmus makes this clear in his chapter on treaties in Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, pp. 275 – 7; Jardine, (ed.), pp. 93-5.

forced out'²⁰³. Benziger makes little comment on this chapter, but I believe several points are worth emphasizing. In paragraph 1, Sánchez qualifies peace by questioning on what terms it is achieved. Drawing on Augustine, he claims that peace cannot be so called, if it is the peace and order of the iniquitous, the unjust, and the perverted. Peace cannot be obtained on any terms. Turning then to his main point in the chapter, Sánchez again argues, that in any event peace nurtures vice. Claiming historical evidence, he maintains that war forces out imperfections, ambition, greed and hedonism. There is no room for vice and indulgence amid the struggle and demands of war. The false security of peace, on the other hand, encourages 'sluggishness, corruption, gluttony and the addiction to sleep'²⁰⁴.

This theme is, I believe, central to his argument in the *Disputatio*, and he summarises it at the end of the chapter with an anonymous citation: 'Nothing is more corrupting than idle peace, in which the use of weapons is forgotten, small mindedness is nourished, strength flags away, inertia creeps in, and good character becomes ensnared in obscenity and every conceivable imperfection'²⁰⁵. This again brings out the over-riding necessity to maintain military skills in times of peace, a central point in Machiavelli which he will link closely with the maintenance of civic virtue. As we will see, Machiavelli's Prince 'must never take things easy in times of peace'²⁰⁶.

Despite the impression given by the pacific humanists, the idea of 'corrupting peace' was not uncommon in contemporary thought, including humanist thought. Budé, for example, also argues that despite its apparently rational attraction, long and constant peace tends to produce laziness and luxurious living²⁰⁷. Castiglione also makes it clear in *The*

²⁰³ *De difficultate verae pacis*, 6, Sub-title: '*Pax humana plurima vicia nutrit, virtutes et honores pellit*'.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 6, para.1: '*...torpore pigris ventrique et somno deditis obvenire potest*'.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 6, para. 2: '*Nihil...inerti pace perniciosius; qua usus armorum dediscitur, nutritur pusillanimitas, vires fatiscunt, obrepit inertia et ad immunditias et queque vitia animus implicatur*'. Benziger believes this was deliberately left anonymous, but suggests the influence of Petrarch.

²⁰⁶ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Bull, G., (trans.) (London: Penguin, 1999), 14, p 49. '*...e mai ne' tempi pacifici stare ozioso; Opere*, p. 280. As I discuss, pp. 208 - 210.

²⁰⁷ Quoted and discussed in Tracy, James., D., *The Politics of Erasmus: A Pacifist Intellectual and his Political Milieu* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), p. 46-7.

Courtier, but he does add a prognosis that peace requires as much training and application to virtue, as does war. Many republics and principalities succeed in war, ‘only to fall into decay and lose their greatness and splendor, as soon as they achieve peace, as iron grows rusty with disuse. And the sole cause of this is their not having been properly taught how to live at peace or learned how to make use of the fruits of leisure’. Therefore, just as practical virtues have to be studied for success in war, rulers ‘should apply themselves to the moral virtues to which the practical virtues lead’²⁰⁸.

As one corrupting influence of peace, Chapter 7 of *De difficultate verae pacis* focuses on material wealth, which for Sánchez, as Benziger suggests, is the heaviest problem for peace. Sánchez argues that ‘human peace is a means for increasing both the desire and the possibilities for wealth, the abundance of which is a hindrance to true peace’²⁰⁹. The dangers arising from wealth will again be a recurring theme with Machiavelli. For example, he argues that a city will face ruin with men putting property above honour, therefore such ambitions have to be kept in check²¹⁰.

As Benziger describes²¹¹, from the general explanation that peace encourages the unrestrained desire of men for wealth, Sánchez makes three points on the evil of wealth, and the striving for wealth, in relation to peace. First, Sánchez uses Aristotle and argues that it is not peace, but virtue-forming actions, that are the highest aim for society. In paragraphs 2 and 3, he argues that peace has no virtue-forming deeds, *secundum virtutem operatio*, but even has virtue-destroying deeds, *constant itaque pacem non esse operationem*. Sánchez argues that not being satisfied with one’s own business, but aspiring to affect another’s, does not meet Aristotle’s definition of the highest good. This restates his theme that peace encourages

²⁰⁸ Castiglione, Baldesar, *The Book of the Courtier*, Bull, George, (trans. and ed.) (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1967), 4, (Signor Ottaviano), pp. 302-4.

²⁰⁹ *De difficultate verae pacis*, 7, Sub-title: ‘*Pax humana instrumentum est augende rei familiaris et cupiditatis diviciarum. Quarum habundancia veram impedit pacem*’.

²¹⁰ Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, 1, 37, p. 203.

²¹¹ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 85-6.

greed and corruption. Also, envy and contempt between the propertied and the poor makes for social and political unrest. To avoid this Sánchez follows Aristotle by suggesting a levelled, middled state of well-being. The final point, in paragraph 4, is that earthly peace cannot be permanent because it is built not on virtue, but on striving to fulfil ambition. With injustice, wars of ownership are sparked off, which Sánchez illustrates with examples from the Old Testament.

In Chapter 8, Sánchez argues that ‘human peace is the opponent of true and perfect peace’²¹². There are essential differences, and a particular problem in achieving peace is a lack of truthfulness, *defectum veritatis*. He describes the opposition between *pax humana* and *pax vera* in three paragraphs. Firstly, on intention: earthly peace seeks worldly goods, and is tempted by sin; the aim of true peace is virtuosity and heavenly peace. Secondly, earthly peace is totally outward looking, it cannot be turned inwards because it lacks truth, and is therefore unfulfilled; true peace is orientated both outwards and inwards, and is fulfilled. Thirdly, earthly peace is imperfect and therefore leads to error, only true peace is perfect peace.

For Benziger, this absolute opposition between earthly and true peace is the essence of Sánchez’s case. Benziger argues that the opposition here is more complete than that found in Augustine, where earthly peace, in spite of its shortcomings, passes over into true peace²¹³. However, Benziger also points out that at the end of the *Disputatio* Sánchez will also take this latter view, even though in Chapter 8 he takes a position of absolute opposition. Again, this is probably another example of the context of the *Disputatio* forcing Sánchez to take a more extreme position than he normally would. Earlier, as we have seen, he states that it is the ‘misuse’ of war and peace that is responsible for the ills under discussion. But here he

²¹² *De difficultate verae pacis*, 8, Sub-title: ‘*Pax humana adversatur vere et perfecte pace*’.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 86: ‘...wonach der menschliche Friede trotz seiner Unvollkommenheit in den himmlischen Frieden übergeht’.

appears more compelled to portray earthly peace as a ‘bad’ in itself. This will certainly not be the case for Erasmus, whose ‘Philosophy of Christ’ is seen as grounding earthly peace on godly virtue.

Sánchez returns to the requirements of true peace in Chapter 9, ‘true peace cannot exist without law and justice, and it scorns pride and arrogance’²¹⁴, which is why it is so rarely achieved. In the first of two parts, using Augustine and citations from the Bible he shows how justice and peace are inseparable: to live in peace requires agreement with one’s neighbour. He continues that of all injustices, unpunished crime is the worst. Unpunished crime cannot coexist with a society in quietude, therefore war is justified in punishing crime and sin. However, this is more than just repeating previous arguments of the *Commendatio belli*, as Benziger suggests it is. The medical analogy is again invoked, but here the emphasis is focused much more on punishment. ‘God has ordered that sin and infamy be punished’²¹⁵, otherwise a society cannot aspire to live in quietude. Furthermore, if we do not duly punish, then God’s justice is disturbed, and God will also punish us. Any war taken to the wicked as an act of punishment will ‘be fought justly and necessarily’²¹⁶.

This, I believe, is particularly significant. I have discussed the inherent ambiguity that is possible in Augustine, and here with his vindictive sense of a justified war, Sánchez is making a very permissive interpretation of Augustine. War is not only justified for immediate defense, but also to ‘avenge injuries’, with an obligation to mete out appropriate punishment²¹⁷. Later, this will be emphasised by Cajetan, but its clear expression by Sánchez underlines a continuing presence in Church doctrine, prior to Cajetan²¹⁸.

²¹⁴ *De difficultate verae pacis*, 9, Sub-title: ‘Pax vera legibus et iusticia non constat, elacionem et arroganciam respuit’.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 3: ‘Etenim peccata et cuncta flagitia puniri deus iubet’.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, ‘Nedum iuste, sed necessario bella gerantur, ut mali coerceantur’.

²¹⁷ Augustine, *Questions on the Heptateuch*, 4, Ch. 10, cited in Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 82.

²¹⁸ Cajetan’s argument as in *Commentary on the Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas* (completed 1517), and his *Summula* (1524); as discussed in Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 240-250.

On the other hand, the justification of war as punishment will be challenged by subsequent thinkers. An early example is Molina, who ‘severed the tight connection which Cajetan had earlier established between offensive war and vindictive justice’²¹⁹. More recently, the question has been discussed by Joseph Boyle who concludes that, although possible, a sufficient justification for a punitive war is unlikely, because the act of imposing ‘unwelcome damage on enemies... does not comport as well with the deepest motivations of just war theory as does a more thoroughgoing defensive concept of just cause’²²⁰. This question is important in the context of this thesis because avenging an injury, and vindictive punishment, all too readily become used as a pliable justification for instigating war. As Erasmus will strongly argue, it is relatively easy for a prince to convince himself that his cause is just.

Returning to Chapter 9, with rich citations and examples from the Bible, Sánchez argues that peace is not compatible with the pride, arrogance, conceit and contentiousness of mankind. Unless new people are created, true peace will not be possible with people ‘benighted with so many flaws’²²¹.

The final problem with human peace, and the first subject of Chapter 10, is that it ‘inevitably dulls useful exercise and the war of the spirit’²²². Before concluding *De difficultate verae pacis*, Sánchez then restates what is really meant by true and perfect peace and some of the obstacles to achieving it. If in the *Commedatio belli* Sánchez saw earthly war as a preparation for the *bella spiritualia*, so in Chapter 10 of *De difficultate verae pacis*, with many biblical citations, he argues that earthly peace saps the strength of men for the *bella spiritualia*. Poor performance in one is linked to poor performance in the other. However,

²¹⁹ Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 333.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, Boyle, Joseph, “Waging Defensive War: the Idea and its Normative Importance”, *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 10, No. 3, (2011), Special Issue: The Just War Tradition and the Continuing Challenges to World Public Order, p. 158.

²²¹ *De difficultate verae pacis*, 9, para. 5: ‘*Ex quibus aspicias mortales tot vitiis optenebratos non facile...*’.

²²² *Ibid.*, 10, Sub-title: ‘*Pax humana torpescere cogit ad utilia exercicia et bella spiritualia*’.

throughout the chapter he does stress the difference between spiritual and earthly war and peace. Those who take ‘ a particular, temporary truce, or a pause from war that is being jostled in, for the true peace... hugely deceive themselves’²²³.

Sánchez then makes two salient points on earthly war and peace. Firstly, as noted by Benziger, it appears that Sánchez makes a concession in that he still sees this human peace as the highest target for every human society: ‘...the temporal surety that human peace brings is worthy of desire, and without it the highest aim of every human political ordering cannot be achieved’²²⁴. The highest ends of society are, as previously discussed, felicity, *felicitas*, and virtue-enabling acts, *secundum virtutem operatio*²²⁵. Therefore, I believe it is clear here, if less so elsewhere in the *Disputatio*, that for Sánchez human peace can indeed be a ‘good’. Indeed, he says that it is a necessary aspiration in order to gain a measure of justice and order for human society. However, there are many problems and dangers associated with it, and even earthly peace will require virtue and God’s sanction. Again, one of Sánchez’s main concerns is that imperfect peace should be mistaken for true peace and this would lead to false assumptions in the conduct of struggles on earth, especially in relation to war.

Secondly, Sánchez emphasises the cruelties of both earthly peace and war. Concerned that imperfect peace should be mistaken for true peace, he argues that peace is cruel because it harbours deceptive hate and tyrannies, against which there is no clear defence. It should not be called ‘sweet’, as is often the case, but more accurately, ‘bitter and deadly’²²⁶. He sees war as being crueller in its indirect form. Open, legitimate combat between armed opponents is less cruel than when it involves the unarmed and the exposed, those who cannot strike back.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 10, para. 3: ‘*Fallitur ergo plurimum, quisquis ille est, qui inducias quasdam temporis et a bello interpellatas cessationis pacem veram putat, quam deus nobis reliquit et tantopere commendavit*’.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, ‘*Scio equidem optanda est ipsa temporalis securitas, quam pax humana inducit, sine qua finis optimus cuiusque policie humane haberi facile non potest*’.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 7, para. 2.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 10, para. 2: ‘*...etsi pacis nomen dulce fuerit, ipsa tamen pax amara atque mortifera fuit*’.

War, he argues, becomes more cruel the further away it is from view. Although, for Sánchez, this would still be *ex belli abusu et excess*, an abuse and excess of war.

Sánchez's final point, as he concludes *De difficultate verae pacis*, is to commend neither war nor temporal peace, but the superior eternal peace. It is eternal but begins here, and those who keep faith with it are best able to 'struggle against the flesh, the world, and the demons', *contra carnem et mundum et demons*. This multi-layered struggle is, for Sánchez, the inevitable lot of man.

Before closing my analysis of Sánchez's contribution, I will again consider the influence of Augustine. Within Augustinian scholarship, the separation between the peace of God and earthly peace, *pax vera* and *pax mundi*, is relatively undisputed, and it is fundamental to Sánchez's argument. However, Benziger also reviews the scholarship, and acknowledges that the question as to how far earthly peace is attainable is more disputed. He takes the view himself that it does not follow from Augustine that it is impossible to attain earthly peace²²⁷, and striving for earthly peace is connected to true peace, *pax vera*²²⁸. Benziger therefore differs from Sánchez. While Sánchez does argue that earthly peace should be aspired to, and that 'striving' is a condition for good earthly governance, his whole argument is based on the inadequacies of any temporal peace. For Sánchez, a satisfactory earthly peace is not possible.

On earthly war, Benziger questions how Sánchez, who is so influenced by Augustine, can come to praise war, *Krieg zu loben*²²⁹. In answer to this, I have already noted: first, the semantic point that Sánchez is 'commending' war, *commendatio/Plädover* not 'praising' war, *laudibus/Lob*; and secondly, Augustine's statement, not mentioned by Benziger, that the necessity of fighting and overcoming an evil can be seen as a 'happiness', a good. Then there

²²⁷ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 99. Benziger considers Joachim Laufs against Harold Fuchs: '...nicht zu folgern, daß Augustine einen irdischen Frieden für unmöglich erklärt'.

²²⁸ *Ibid.* '...ein Verbindung zwischen der pax vera und dem auf Erden zu erstreben Frieden'. Citing: Augustine, *Narrations on Psalms* 33, 19.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 98-9.

is Augustine's case for just war, and the ambiguity I have discussed. Sánchez does not interpret Augustine as a reluctant advocate of a 'lesser evil', but as meeting God's purpose in avenging injury and punishing sin. Correctly fought war, for Sánchez, is a virtuous activity, not an evil.

However, Benziger's main criticism of the *Commendatio belli* is that it shows no sign of the pain felt by Augustine over this earthly condition that necessitates war. This, for Benziger, means that such humanity is missing in Sánchez, and this is his key failing²³⁰. I argue that Sánchez has indeed responded to Platina's 'litany of ills': these result from the abuse of war, not war itself; good soldiers are very much needed for protection from such abuse; and peace brings about its own 'litany of ills'. I do not believe, therefore, that humanity is necessarily absent from Sánchez's argument.

Certainly, the balance between pragmatism and humanity in the bloody business of war is not a straightforward issue. Nevertheless, I argue that the way Augustine is interpreted affects the approach taken to war and its conduct. Once war is accepted as a necessity, a train of consequences comes into play. First, sufficient means are required to prosecute a war, including: maintaining the will to succeed; acknowledging the virtues and attributes required to win; and acknowledging and rewarding success. Sánchez, as will Machiavelli, makes all of this very clear in his argument. Indeed, failure to take such measures jeopardizes success. However, different possibilities then open up, following the lines of the ambiguity identified earlier in.

On the one hand, war is waged to avenge injury and punish sin. It is part of God's plan and fought against an implacable evil. Therefore, beyond necessity, war becomes valued as a good in itself. Sánchez does appear, here at least, to have taken this extra step. Secondly,

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100. Indeed, Benziger believes this apparent lack of humanity is cause enough for him not to be counted among the greatest thinkers on war and peace: '*Die Commendatio belli gibt in keiner Weise den Schmerz des Kerkenvaters über die irdischen Zustände wieder, die seiner Meinung nach zum Krieg nötigen...Solche Menschlichkeit läßt der Spanier vermissen: Grund genug, ihn nicht unter die wirklich großen Denker über Krieg und Frieden zu zählen*'.

success in war supersedes all other considerations, and we will come to discuss how this may, or may not, be a charge against Machiavelli. Thirdly, recourse to war becomes too easily made, a clear feature of the historical context. This is a fair critique made by both Platina and Erasmus, and is rightly leveled at many popes and princes. There is, in sum, an overall inclination towards bellicosity.

On the other hand, for Augustine, war should only be undertaken reluctantly. Therefore, following a less permissive interpretation, war is a ‘lesser evil’, but an ‘evil’ nonetheless. War is much more difficult to justify, and with or without the labels, the principles of restraint inherent in just war thinking are more readily seen as appropriate. I argue that this is not completely absent in Sánchez, but it is certainly more explicit in Platina.

To summarise *De difficultate verae pacis*, Sánchez has replied to Platina’s praise of peace by breaking down what is meant by peace. *Pax vera* will follow, as a matter of Christian conviction, but not until after God’s judgement. Sánchez argues that *pax vera* is not yet possible because of the inherent conflict in creation and mankind. What is taken as *pax humana* has many problems, it is deceptive, timid, nurtures vice, and negates virtue, and long periods of peace erode a society’s ability to defend itself. All of this will be seen in Machiavelli, albeit without the Christian foundations.

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY

To summarise the discussion presented in the *Disputatio de pace et belli*, and the *Resumé* given by Benziger²³¹, I will consider my themes of: concepts of peace and war; the justification of war; and its conduct. We have seen how the context of the fragile *Pax Paolina* would have given added significance to the paradox presented by peace and war. Benziger himself recognizes the paradox, but does not explore it beyond claiming that any position not

²³¹ Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, pp. 89-91.

radically supporting either war or peace has to be a self-contradiction²³². I believe there are key points still to be made.

Benziger is absolutely correct in his essential point: the underlying difference, *grundlegende Unterschied*, between *De laudibus pacis* and *Commendatio belli* lies in their fundamentally different understandings, *unterschiedlichen Begriffen*, of war and peace²³³. Platina firmly describes the whole of God's creation as a work of peace, *Friedenswerk*; while for Sánchez it is in a state of struggle, *im Kampf*, and any temporal peace has to be distinguished from God's true peace, *pax vera*. I agree that this is the main conceptual point and I will return to develop it further.

Meanwhile, Benziger describes how Platina understands peace as a temporal condition, *ein diesseitiger Zustand*, which is recognised by an absence of war; and war as armed conflict between political communities. War and peace are not religious or metaphysical categories, even though Platina refers frequently to the Bible. For Benziger, Platina's basic understanding of war and peace remains very secular, *einen säkularen Begriff*, indeed largely Ciceronian. On the other hand, Benziger describes Sánchez as having a more complex understanding, *komplexere Begriffe*, of war and peace. For Sánchez, war is grounded in the metaphysical struggle of good and evil, of God and Satan. This struggle also repeats itself inside men, where reason and desire engage each other, *bellum humanum interius*. Benziger highlights the different interpretations of the text from John, 'Peace I bequeath you, my own peace I give to you'²³⁴. For Platina, this is peace being gifted to man for this world; for Sánchez it differentiates *pax vera*, as 'my peace', from *pax mundi*. Benziger describes how for Sánchez, because earthly happenings are part of a more complex struggle that has endured since the Fall, and because God's *pax vera* is an overarching peace,

²³² Benziger, *Zur Theorie*, p. 161: 'Im Grunde trägt jede Position, die sich weder radikal für den Frieden noch radikal für den Krieg ausspricht, den Widerspruch schon in sich'.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

²³⁴ John 14, 23. Platina uses this in *De laudibus pacis*, para. 24; and Sánchez in *Commendatio belli*, X, para. 3.

the underlying differences between earthly war and peace are lost. In worldly time, the struggle between good and evil continues unabated.

While I generally agree with Benziger that the *Disputatio* represents a secular conception of war and peace set against a more complex conception, I believe there are qualifications to be made. First, as a matter of style and of philosophy, we would indeed expect the scholastic analysis to break the material down into many constituent parts, while the more rhetorical humanist would maintain the convincing force of simplicity. Secondly, while Sánchez outlines many different forms of war in his complex account, the subject in hand is still very much *bellum humanum exterius*, which is his term for men's wars on earth, and which coincides with Platina's temporal war. Benziger seldom refers to *bellum humanum exterius*. Thirdly, Platina also employs a complexity, in his three-fold analysis based on God, nature and man. Furthermore, Platina remains a Christian whatever his humanist characteristics, and he certainly would not deny a spiritual dimension to human affairs. Even if, as a humanist he might be selective in choosing particular secular and religious themes as they might support an argument.

Because Platina's concept of war and peace is more temporal, I argue that it supports a humanist conclusion that it is very much within man's capabilities to improve the situation, by striving for greater peace. Conversely, because Sánchez's conception is placed in a context of powers greater than man, it leads to a greater acceptance of inevitable struggle and violence. For Sánchez, Christians must expect struggle, and prepare for it. The difficulty thus presented, is how to reconcile preparing for struggle and war with an aspiration for peace. I believe the *Disputatio* is evidence of this difficulty, which is seen in the divergence of ideas stemming from the very different ways war and peace have been conceptually understood.

A further question is whether war and peace are seen as opposites. The disputants say together in the *Prologus* that peace, any peace, cannot exist together at the same time as war.

Platina argues that they are indeed opposites: war is the enemy of peace and a source of evil. However, Sánchez stresses throughout that far from being its enemy, the intention of war is peace. He further emphasises that the opposite of peace is not war, but hate. Hate has no place in Sánchez's correctly conducted war. And the opposite of war is security. It is essential to Sánchez's argument that a correctly fought war is neither 'evil', nor in opposition to peace, and he therefore makes these points clear.

The difference between their understandings of whether creation is either at peace or in conflict is, as we have seen, systematic and completely consistent with their other works. This is deeper than, and less affected by, the literary context of the *Disputatio, als Rollenspieles*. But the divide becomes even starker when they present mirror images of: empirical examples from nature; interpretations of biblical references; and selections from antiquity.

There are also key points to be made when this is seen in relation to the ideas of Erasmus and Machiavelli. As we have seen so far, Platina's three-fold account of peace is almost, but not fully, reflected in Erasmus. For Erasmus, peace is undoubtedly derived from God and is fully manifest in nature, but he will have reservations about man's ability to live in peace without the profound change of his 'Philosophy of Christ'. Erasmus will see the potential for change in line with humanist education, but the whole message of his *Complaint of Peace* is man's inability to live in peace with other men. He doubts the power of laws and treaties that are evident in Platina's account of man's abilities to generate peace. Historical circumstances are relevant here. Platina is writing in a period of great optimism with the Spirit of Lodi and the *Pax Paolina*. On the other hand, the mood of optimism in the north is all too brief. Erasmus is writing, for the most part, against the background of the Italian wars, conflict in the Low Countries, and certainly the later Erasmus senses the impending catastrophies that will encompass all of Europe.

Elements of Sánchez's conceptual account are certainly to be found in Machiavelli, in his literary writing if less so in his political works. Also, as I will demonstrate, the effects of fortune, and an acceptance of a condition of inevitable conflict, are very evident: war is the 'red splash' that is set to re-occur on the wheel of time and fortune²³⁵. If nature is in conflict, then in a pre-political sense, success in war is necessary to bring the peace necessary to ground society. Thereafter, as Sánchez describes, armed force is necessary to maintain this peace and protect society, or for Machiavelli it will be the 'roof on the palace'. They both argue strongly that 'good' arms are necessary to ensure this success, and Machiavelli will have much more to say with his particular ideas for a militia. Benziger writes that in Machiavelli the state replaces Sánchez's Church of God as the ultimate determinant. I believe that this is essentially correct, but Machiavelli certainly considers the instrumental value of 'a' religion, as a political and social phenomenon, to be essential. He frequently refers to the beneficial influence of religion on Roman warfare.

Following Augustine, Sánchez relies a great deal on a differential account of God's peace and earthly peace. However, as I have demonstrated, Augustinian scholarship differs as to the extent man can either strive for earthly peace, or accept an imperfect world. In turn, this affects the approaches and priorities taken on going to war. I argue that a very permissive interpretation is seen in Sánchez, and this is very evident in Renaissance politicking and war. That notion that war is 'ordained' by God is also found with many late medieval writers. For John of Legnano, a major influence on Sánchez: '... we must note that wars were introduced not only with the permission, but with the positive allowance of the Lord'²³⁶. Again for Bouvet, '...war comes from God, and not merely that he permits war, but that he ordained it'²³⁷.

²³⁵ Hale, J.R., *Renaissance War Studies* (London, The Hambledon Press, 1983), p. 362.

²³⁶ Legnano, Giovanni da, *Tractus de bello, de represalis et de duello*, (Bologna, 1360), Holland, T. E., (ed.), Briely, J. L., (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1917), p. 224.

²³⁷ Bouvet, *The Tree of Battles*, 4, Ch. 1, p, 125.

Turning from the concepts of war and peace to just war thinking, the question is how far just war thinking reflected in the *Disputatio*. Conspicuous to us, I argue, is the absence of Thomas Aquinas and his systematic ordering of just war principles. Indeed, as we have seen, the Thomist tradition had yet fully to emerge, and at the time of the *Disputatio* Aquinas was not being cited as an authority. Benziger is correct in pointing out that there is little direct reference to ‘just war’ by the disputants.

Against this, I have argued that restraint, as an ‘essence’ of warfare, endures even if its contemporary ‘forms’ are weak reflections of it. This is the case with the *Disputatio*. If not explicit, a great deal is implied. For example, Sánchez repeatedly emphasises intention in war, which should not be driven by hate and vengeance; and recognises the significance of correct authority. Platina repeatedly deplores indiscriminate and disproportionate suffering, and the absence of adequate cause for war. And, both imply the need for war as last resort, which is well illustrated with the medical analogy.

However, such implied regulation is clearly more open to neglect and misinterpretation for not being made clear and explicit. Also, as with chivalry, just war thinking is not always seen as a restraint of war, which is closer to its intention, but as the facilitator of war, and this is susceptible to abuse. Platina very clearly invokes restraint in war: restraint is godly, natural and in accordance with man’s laws. Sánchez, however, tends to use *iustus* in the *Disputatio* more in a permissive sense: if a war is seen as possessing *iustus*, then it must be vigorously pursued. It is ‘just’, and encouraged, to wage war in order to punish, and this opens up the potential for a more bellicose approach. This, I believe, is fully reflected in contemporary church and papal orthodoxy.

The conduct of war, for Platina, can and should be restrained, although too often this is not the case. For Sánchez, unrestrained warfare, *licentiam militarem*, is a result of the

abuse of war, not war itself. War fought for the correct reasons will not produce *licentiam militarem*: it is ordained by God and does not produce evil. Such an idea will be strongly rejected by Erasmus for whom all war inevitably produces unmitigated evil. A middle ground, and more in line with Platina, is that all warfare certainly has the potential for abuse, and therefore all forms of restraint, godly, natural and man-made, are essential.

To summarise, the *Disputatio* is an informative work that reveals and draws together a number of contemporary ideas on peace and war, and its historical context brings these ideas into sharp focus. The authors are bound by the context of a disputation, but their arguments are essentially consistent with ideas found in their other works, only occasionally becoming more radicalised for the disputation. Their humanist and scholastic styles, and their selection and use of sources, firmly characterise the disputants. I further argue that Platina produces a form of work that is clearly recognisable in later humanist writing; and Sánchez, as a figure close to the papal establishment, mirrors ideas on peace and war that are evident in contemporary politics. Above all, the *Disputatio* clearly demonstrates the importance of clarifying different conceptual understandings of peace and war.

CHAPTER 4 - ERASMUS

INTRODUCTION

A cleric and intellectual of the Northern Renaissance, Erasmus has always been closely associated with a pacific approach to issues of peace and war. But this has not been without significant differences of interpretation. These arise from his use of rhetoric and style of writing; over questions of theology; or, and central to my thesis, over the depth and consistency of his apparent pacifism.

For example, the political theorist Fred Dallmayr begins his review of pacific thought, *Peace Talks-who will listen?*, with an examination of Erasmus¹. Dallmayr looks back to a ‘gentle Erasmanian aura of enlightened or undogmatic piety’, as a ‘guidepost’ out of an age of ‘turbulence and its bent to restless violence’². With a different nuance, the historian Michael Howard also begins his account of *War and the Liberal Conscience* with Erasmus³. Erasmus, with his ‘diatribes against war’, ‘was the first in a long line of humanitarian thinkers for whom it was enough to chronicle the horrors of war in order to condemn it’, but then ‘provide little constructive advice as to how to deal with the phenomenon they find so abhorrent’⁴.

In introducing *The Pacifist Conscience*, Peter Mayer claims that Erasmus, with largely secular and rationally grounded arguments, provided ‘the first great humanist attacks in the West on the divine right of kings and nations to involve their subjects in bloodshed’⁵. Vicesimus Knox, however, while still supporting Erasmus’s critique of war, saw a strong

¹ Dallmayr, F., *Peace Talks – Who Will Listen?*, (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2004), p. x.

² *Ibid.*, pp. x and xiii.

³ Howard, Sir Michael, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (London: Hurst, 2007). (First published in 1978).

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 6 and 8.

⁵ Mayer, P., *The Pacifist Conscience* (London: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 16.

religious, not secular, grounding: ‘On the rock of religion he planted the artillery of solid arguments against it’⁶.

In this chapter, I continue the themes of my thesis by focussing on: what Erasmus understands by the concepts of peace and war; how he justifies, or denies, going to war; and what he says about conduct in the waging of war. I consider how his ideas stand in relation to the *Disputatio*, and to just war thinking. I also identify areas of Erasmus’s thought to compare and contrast with Machiavelli. I will consider the range of interpretations, develop my own position on key issues that are variously interpreted, and develop my own critique of Erasmus on peace and war. I now review some of the primary literature; and consider the important question of style.

Primary Literature

Erasmus wrote extensively, and while his critique of contemporary warfare occurs throughout his work, which is largely theological, there are certain key texts on politics, peace and war. Among earlier works, in 1501 he writes a *Handbook for the Christian Soldier* (*Enchiridion militis christiani*), a handbook for the good Christian⁷, and in 1504 delivers a *Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria* (*Panegyricus ad Philippum Austriae ducem*)⁸. I will show the date and content of the latter to be particularly significant in assessing Erasmus’s ideas, and is often overlooked.

⁶ As Bruce Mansfield suggests, this is possibly pushing a metaphor too far. Mansfield, B, *Man On His Own: Interpretations of Erasmus, circa 1750-1920* (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 1992), p. 82. Knox, Vicesimus, (trans.) *AntiPolemus, Plea of Reason, Religion and Humanity Against War*, and first printed in 1795. Later published in Vol 5 of *The Works of Vicesimus Knox, D.D.* (London: Mawman, 1824).

⁷ Erasmus, *Handbook for the Christian Soldier* (*Enchiridion militis christiani*), 1501, in Rummel, E., (ed.), *The Erasmus Reader* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp. 138 - 154. This is a guide to being a good Christian, and not as Bertrand Russell describes, a handbook for a soldier; Russell, B., *History of Western Philosophy* (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1979), p. 503.

⁸ Erasmus, *Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria* (*Panegyricus ad Philippum Austriae ducem*), 1504, CWE., 27, Radice, Betty, (trans.), pp. 1 – 75; also in Jardine, (ed.), *The Education of a Christian Prince*, pp. 111 - 145.

His more political works include his popular *In Praise of Folly* (*Moriae encomium*) first published in 1509⁹. Although its attribution to Erasmus is not certain, the satire *Julius Excluded from Heaven* (*Julius exclusus e coelis*)¹⁰ of 1514 comments on the warlike ambitions of Pope Julius II. The minor adage, *War is sweet to the inexperienced* (*Dulce bellum inexpertis*), had first appeared in 1500, but was developed into the major work by 1515¹¹. As a pacific argument, this is his more commonly referred to text, and also appears as: *Erasmus Against War* (*Bellum Erasmi*)¹². Two of Erasmus's main political commentaries are produced during the period that he was appointed councillor to Charles V: firstly, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, (*Institutio principis Christiani*)¹³ of 1516; and secondly, his focussed polemic against war, *The Complaint of Peace* (*Querela pacis*)¹⁴ in 1517.

Later, and contemporaneously with the siege of Vienna in 1529, he more closely addresses the question of 'legitimate' war in *On the War against the Turks* (*De bello*

⁹ Erasmus, *In Praise of Folly* (*Moriae encomium*), (1509), CWE., 27, Radice, Betty, (trans.), pp. 77 - 153; also in Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, pp. 6 - 88.

¹⁰ Erasmus, *Julius Excluded from Heaven* (*Julius exclusus e coelis*), (1514), CWE., 27, Heath, Michael, J., (trans.), pp. 155 - 197; also Rummel, E., (ed.), *The Erasmus Reader* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp. 216 - 238; and Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, pp. 142 - 173.

¹¹ Erasmus, *War is sweet to the inexperienced* (*Dulce bellum inexpertis*), (1515), CWE., 35, *Adages*, Drysdall, Denis, I., (trans.), pp. 399 - 440; also in Phillips, Margaret, Mann, *The Adages of Erasmus: A Study with Translations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 308 - 355; and Barker, W., (ed.), *The Adages of Erasmus* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

¹² Erasmus, *Erasmus Against War* (*Bellum Erasmi*), as quoted in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, pp. 93 - 111. A further version, but with a dedication to Julius II appears in 1507 as the *Plea of Reason, Religion and Humanity Against War* (*AntiPolemus*). The origin of this text is unclear, but an explanation is found in CWE., 35, p. 435, n. 161. However, I believe *AntiPolemus* to be a close version of *Dulce bellum inexpertis* and *Bellum Erasmi*, the correlation is very close rather than a completely separate text as inferred by the CWE., n. 161. The text is found at: Erasmus, *Antipolemus; or, the Plea of Reason, Religion, and Humanity against War* (1507), Knox, Vicesimus., (trans., 1795), (Liberty Fund, Online, 2005): http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=630&chapter=210929&layout=html&Itemid=27 (last accessed: 21 Mar 2012).

¹³ Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince* (*Institutio principis Christiani*), (1516), CWE., 27, Cheshire, Neil, M., and Heath, Michael, J., (trans.), pp. 199 - 288; also *The Education of a Christian Prince*, same trans., in Jardine, (ed.), pp. 1 - 110; again in Rummel, (ed.), *The Erasmus Reader*, pp. 249 - 287.

¹⁴ Erasmus, *The Complaint of Peace* (*Querela pacis*), (1517), CWE., 27, Radice, Betty, (trans.), pp. 289 - 323; also in Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, pp. 88 - 116.

turcico)¹⁵. This work, and the date of its writing, is very relevant to the questions of this thesis, but only relatively recently has it been more widely considered.

On minor works, from his letters and as a contribution to *The Pacifist Conscience*, Mayer selects the “Letter to Anthony a Bergis”¹⁶ written in 1513. In letters written in 1517¹⁷, Erasmus comments on the Guelders war of that year, and two further useful letters are those to Pope Leo X in 1521¹⁸, and to Francis I in 1523¹⁹. Of his *Colloquies*, three are especially relevant: “Military Affairs” (*Militaria*)²⁰ of 1522; “The Soldier and the Carthusian” (*Militis et Cartusiani*)²¹ of 1523; and “Charon” which was first printed in 1529²².

Less political works, but which are still useful include: his *Foundations of the Abundant Style (De Copia)* on education²³; his commentary on St Luke’s Gospel²⁴; and amongst his collection of prayers, is a brief, but I argue very instructive, “Prayer before Battle”²⁵. I enclose the latter at Appendix 2.

On terminology, Erasmus uses the term ‘evil’ frequently, both in a theological context, and rhetorically. In this paper I use it to refer to that, which for Erasmus, is implacably and irredeemably opposed to the Christian ‘good’. ‘Barbarian’ is usually used by Erasmus to refer to the ‘other’, outside of the Christian brotherhood, and against whom war might be more acceptable. In contemporary politics, this becomes the Turks, indeed, the

¹⁵ The siege had in fact been lifted by the time he wrote, but the threat, real and perceived, remained. Erasmus, *On the War against the Turks, (De bello turcico)*, (1529), CWE., 64, Heath, Michael, J., (trans.), pp. 211 – 266; An abridged version is found in Rummel, (ed.), *The Erasmus Reader*, pp. 315 – 333.

¹⁶ Erasmus, “Letter to Anthony a Bergis”, (1513), in Mayer, *Pacifist Conscience*, pp. 54 – 59. Taken from a 1795 English edition translated by Vicesimus Knox.

¹⁷ Erasmus, *Collected Works of Erasmus: The Correspondence of Erasmus* (University of Toronto Press, 1974-77). Quoted in Tracy, J. D., *The Politics of Erasmus: A Pacifist Intellectual and his Political Milieu* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), pp. 97 – 99.

¹⁸ Quoted in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 124.

¹⁹ Quoted in Fernandez, (1973), pp. 223-4.

²⁰ Erasmus, “Military Affairs” (*Militaria*), (1522), in Thompson, C.R., (trans.) *The Colloquies of Erasmus* (Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 11-15.

²¹ Erasmus, “The Soldier and the Carthusian” (*Militis et Cartusiani*), (1523), in Thompson, *Colloquies*, pp. 127-132.

²² Erasmus, “Charon”, (1523), in Thompson, *Colloquies*, pp. 388-394.

²³ Erasmus, *De Copia*, (1512), CWE., Vol., 24, *Literary and Educational Writings*, pp. 598 – 601.

²⁴ Erasmus, *Paraphrase on St Luke’s Gospel, (Paraphrasis in Lucam)*, (1523), CWE., Vol., 48, pp. 195 – 7.

²⁵ Erasmus, *Some New Prayers (Precationes Aliquot Novae)*, (1535), CWE., Vol., 69, “Prayer before Battle”, p. 137.

Turks for the Renaissance are compared to the Goths who sacked ancient Rome²⁶. However, Erasmus also remarks that the Turks, as Muslims, are ‘in large part half-Christian and perhaps nearer to true Christianity than most of our own folk’²⁷. Also, ‘barbarian’ is used for bands of irredeemably ‘evil’ mercenaries.

As I later discuss in detail, Erasmus is more circumspect in using the term ‘just’ in relation to war, with only occasional references. However, a war against the Turks, for example, might become ‘legitimate’²⁸, or ‘rightfully undertaken’²⁹. Again, without referring to a war being ‘just’, it might be ‘approved’ by a true Christian teacher, who might call it ‘permissible’, even though it is ‘against his will, and in grief’³⁰. War is therefore a matter ‘governed by necessity’³¹, ‘since there are evil men who must be restrained’³².

Style

Erasmus became pre-eminent in his usage of Latin. Much of his writing is strongly rhetorical, and especially so when he addresses issues of war and peace. He can be very descriptive, wielding considerable satire and irony, Russell describes his overall style as ‘incurably and unashamedly literary’³³. However, opinions vary as to why Erasmus is so rhetorical when writing on war. For Dallmayr, this is deliberate and necessary to counter the confusion and bellicosity of the times³⁴, but for Howard, the ‘diatribes’ are largely emotional. I will discuss the merit of both views.

²⁶ As discussed, for example, in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, pp. 15, and 194. Also, in *Julius Excluded*, Erasmus has Pope Julius II use ‘barbarian scum’ in the classical and Italian sense of including North Europeans. *Julius Excluded*, CWE., 27, p. 185, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 161.

²⁷ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, pp. 432 – 3; and *Bellum Erasmi*, quoted in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 209.

²⁸ *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 232, and Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, p. 317.

²⁹ As used by Heath in: *Ibid.*, Rummel, (ed.), p. 319, but he uses ‘justifiable’ at CWE., 64, p. 235.

³⁰ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, p. 426; and *Bellum Erasmi*, quoted in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 255.

³¹ *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 252, and Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, p. 328.

³² Letter to Pope Leo X, 31st August, 1521, cited in: Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 194.

³³ Russell, B., *History of Western Philosophy* (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1979), p. 503.

³⁴ Dallmayr, *Peace Talks*, p. 1.

On the one hand, as we have seen, rhetoric is a deliberate tool of humanists, and is evident with Platina's *De laudibus pacis*. The Erasmian scholar, Erica Rummel, elaborates and describes how Erasmus writes in different styles: the descriptive and rhetorical style for the broader audience; and a more concise, scholarly style for specialist audiences³⁵. As an example of the latter, his *De Copia* contains advice on training children in convincing, concise, logical argument³⁶. I believe there is a consistency in content across both styles.

On the other hand, I agree with Howard that there is a strong emotional element to much of his writing against war, and this is especially so when directed against the soldiery. I would not speculate here on likely causes, although for Howard, Erasmus's 'disgust at war' is probably due to 'a purely personal, emotional shock' on hearing of the death in battle, in 1513, of a 'beloved' former pupil³⁷. While this might well be a contributory factor in the maturing of Erasmus's ideas, his basic views and rhetorical critique, were already clear in the *Panegyric*, (1504), and *Praise of Folly*, (1509). Also, Adams is of the view that: 'Between 1500 and the accession of Henry VIII in 1509, the English humanists (among whom he includes Erasmus) made striking progress toward a full-fledged critique of war'³⁸.

Others also note how Erasmus lacks restraint and is unusually verbose when writing about war. An early translator of *Complaint of Peace*, Thomas Paynell, remarks that when considering 'war and mischief', Erasmus 'could not temper himself nor yet his pen'³⁹. Adams describes some of Erasmus's dialogues as 'so full of anti-militaristic satire that examples are almost too numerous to mention'⁴⁰.

³⁵ A point made by Erica Rummel at the conference "Erasmus Politicus", Rotterdam, 2008.

³⁶ Erasmus, *De Copia*, CWE., Vol., 24, pp. 598 – 601.

³⁷ Alexander, son of King James IV of Scotland was killed with his father at Flodden, 1513; Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience*, p. 6. Howard cites Margaret Mann Phillips, *Erasmus and his Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 110, along with the text of Erasmus's lament: *Spartam nactus es, hanc orna*.

³⁸ Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 29.

³⁹ Thomas Paynell, quoted in: Phillips, Margaret, Mann, *Erasmus and the Northern Renaissance* (London, 1949), pp. 140-1; citing: *Thomas Paynell*, Hutten, W. J., (ed.) (New York: 1946).

⁴⁰ Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 34.

This element of ‘diatribe’ in Erasmus is evident when compared with his contemporaries. For example, Thomas More’s account of Utopians at war is also satirical and also written with a keen wit, and yet, as I discuss later, More deals more comprehensively with the issues of contemporary soldiers than Erasmus’s blunt and oft repeated dismissal of them as the ‘dregs’ of society⁴¹.

Another flaw in the style is seen with *The Praise of Folly*, where Folly personified ironically praises a succession of Erasmus’s *bête-noirs*. However, as A. E. Douglas points out, the work contains an ‘incoherence’: at times the views of Erasmus, and not the irony of Folly, are presented directly to the reader⁴². I argue that this is particularly so with war. Instead of Folly ironically praising war, in line with the theme of the work, she directly attacks it: ‘such a monstrous pursuit that it’s proper only for beasts’. This inconsistency, in not reducing his message to subtle character play used for other subjects, again shows that on war, he frequently does ‘not temper himself nor yet his pen’.

As a final point on style, I have already noted that Erasmus’s descriptive style against war has at least one clear antecedent in Platina. It is not, therefore, as unique to Erasmus and the Northern Renaissance, as commentaries often imply. For example, Adams describes how thinkers such as More and Erasmus ‘moulded’ the ‘initial modern pattern’ of the critique of war, and how such northern thinkers were ‘pre-eminently its explorers’⁴³. Such claims, I have shown, need to be qualified, acknowledging earlier contributions such as Platina’s *De laudibus pacis*. In this thesis, I go on to question whether the rhetoric in Erasmus is indeed

⁴¹ More, Thomas, *Utopia* (1516), Logan, George, M., and Adams, R. M., (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Book 2, ‘Military Practices’, pp. 85 - 92. I discuss More’s Utopia in this context with ‘A Paucity of Ideas for Improvement’ on p. 193.

⁴² Douglas, A. E., ‘Erasmus as Satirist’, in: Dorey, T. A., (ed.) *Studies in Latin Literature and its Influence: Erasmus* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 31 - 54. The ironic form is seen, for example, with Folly turning ‘fortune favours the brave’ into ‘fortune favours the dimwits and the brash’, Erasmus, *The Praise of Folly*, CWE., p.141, and Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 73.

⁴³ Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 4.

excessive, and therefore contributes to unnecessary ambiguity, and difficulties in reconciling his apparent pacifism with wars ‘rightfully undertaken’.

CONTEXT

In his account of Erasmus, James Tracy refers to ‘a pacifist intellectual and his political milieu’⁴⁴, and in reviewing the context of Erasmus I broadly follow this descriptor. I will consider the context of specifically Northern Renaissance humanism; Erasmus’s relationship with his ‘political milieu’; and his personality.

Adams specifically places Erasmus in the context of English humanism along with Colet, More and Vives⁴⁵. For Nauert, Erasmus’s early studies ‘became more directed towards issues of religious reform making him the embodiment of the association between humanistic learning and the desire for spiritual renewal that is often labelled “Christian humanism”’⁴⁶. Certainly, they give Erasmus greater opportunity to get behind what he sees as the stifling ritual of medieval, scholastic Christianity; to re-emphasise the value of individual conscience; and to return to the ‘source’ of Christian teaching. This, as Huizinga describes, he does with a ‘heartfelt aversion to everything unreasonable ... purely formal’⁴⁷. Erasmus’s critique of the scholastic just war tradition, as we will see, conforms to his broader critique of contemporary doctrine. Anthony Levi also points out that with his use of a ‘philosophy of Christ’, Erasmus is using the ‘stylistic register’ of a humanist, as the scholastics did not really see Christ as a philosopher⁴⁸.

⁴⁴ Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, title page.

⁴⁵ As made clear throughout his work in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*.

⁴⁶ Nauert, *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*, p. 158.

⁴⁷ Huizinga, “Erasmus’s Mind”, in Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 297.

⁴⁸ Levi, Anthony, “Pagan Virtue and the Humanism of the Northern Renaissance”, *The Royal Society for Renaissance Studies*, Occasional Paper No. 2, (1974), p. 12.

Erasmus's cause has also been described as one of '*bonae literae*'⁴⁹, a struggle of good letters over medieval procedures, and he finds support for this especially among educated men, for Trevor-Roper, 'an educated bourgeois'⁵⁰. Erasmus was well-placed in the window of opportunity between the arrival of the early printing press, but before the imposition of strict religious and political controls⁵¹.

However, as Phillips describes, Erasmus is 'only up to a point an admirer of Reason'⁵². He can be suspicious of intellectuality for its own sake, certainly of any 'aristocracy of the intellect, flowering out of a comfortable middle-class environment'⁵³. This is an aristocracy that he targets in many of his *Colloquies*, where the Christian examples of piety and humility are paramount. Furthermore, against the acceptance of war by this intellectual aristocracy, he considers himself to be in an objecting minority, complaining that it has 'almost come to the point that it is foolish and irreverent to open one's mouth against war'⁵⁴.

Hanan Yoran identifies an 'Erasmian humanism' which creates the 'universal intellectual'⁵⁵. However, Yoran critically argues, ultimately even this figure becomes locked in a 'disembodied intellectual sphere, a literally utopian location', with an identity betraying 'fundamental ambiguity and instability'. For Yoran, the mainstream humanists sever the medieval and scholastic 'connection between human reality and the transcendent order'. The 'Erasmian humanist' differs, and instead of focussing on the humanist practical concerns of a

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

⁵⁰ Trevor-Roper, H.R., 'Desiderius Erasmus', in Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 274.

⁵¹ The *Index of Forbidden Books* with the Council of Trent, proscribed all of Erasmus's works by 1559. Later, in 1564, some expurgated versions were permitted, but *The Praise of Folly* and the *Colloquies* remained suppressed. See, for example, Rummel, (ed.), *The Erasmus Reader*, p. 11.

⁵² Phillips, *Erasmus*, p. 99.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 122. Also, for example, he finds academics at Cambridge dull and self-conceited, 'Cyprian bulls and dung eaters', *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁵⁴ *Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 308, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 104.

⁵⁵ Yoran, Hanan, *Between Utopia and Dystopia: Erasmus, Thomas More, and the Humanist Republic of Letters* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 188 - 9.

vita activa, Erasmus remains focussed on Christian ideals, and the same ‘transcendent realm’ identified with the scholastics⁵⁶.

On the other hand, Tracy describes how Erasmus does closely observe the realities of contemporary politics⁵⁷, and this is reflected in his correspondence. He is appointed councillor to the Prince, later Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor, an honorary appointment and more in connection with spiritual education. In this context, Erasmus writes on politics and the need for restraint in war in his ‘mirror for princes’, *The Education of a Christian Prince*. I will now briefly consider this text, in particular to assess whether Erasmus is overly focussed on Christian ideals.

As Adams argues⁵⁸, in this text Erasmus departs from the traditional pattern of the ‘mirror for princes’ genre, by including only a limited section on war. Indeed, I would add that it is more concerned with avoiding war than with the attributes required by a Prince to win one. Tracy considers the extent to which the text is presenting an ‘ethical ideal’⁵⁹. It contains frequent references to Plato⁶⁰, and for a Renaissance humanist, following Ficino’s translations of Plato, this renewed interest in Plato’s ideal form of a republic is significant. Certainly, I believe that Erasmus is influenced by the purity of Platonic forms.

At times he does appear to concede that he is presenting a moral ideal that he does not expect to be fulfilled. On dynastic marriage, for example, he discusses what he believes should happen, but qualifies this by conceding that the reality might never be changed⁶¹.

Adams argues that it ‘does not attempt to deal with specific problems of politics’, but tries ‘to

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, p. 6.

⁵⁸ Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 116. Erasmus’s contribution to the advice to princes genre is compared, for example, by Tracy with: Machiavelli’s *The Prince (Il Principe)* of 1513, Budé’s *The Institution of the Prince (De l’institution du prince)* of 1519, and More’s *Utopia* of 1516, as well as work by Colet and Vives. Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, pp. 4-9. I also later refer to McNeil’s work on Budé which again includes a comparison between Erasmus’s *Education of a Christian Prince*, Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, and Budé’s *The Institution of the Prince*, in McNeil, David, O., *Guillaume Budé and Humanism in the Reign of Francis I* (Geneva: Libraire Droz, 1975), pp. 39 – 42.

⁵⁹ Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, pp. 65 - 66.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 168, n. 140; Tracy refers to Hans Hillerbrand who counted fourteen references to Plato.

⁶¹ Erasmus, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, p. 279; also Jardine, (ed.), 9, p. 98.

offer some basic, time tested principles for the guidance of the prince'⁶². For Jardine, 'Erasmus represents his role as that of general educator, rather than of providing policy decisions on individual issues'⁶³.

However, I argue that he certainly does address the issue of war very specifically, and his ideas, far from representing a traditional 'time tested' approach, are radical. Indeed, my contention in this chapter is that with Erasmus on the subject of war there is a confusion of practical detail and ideals, and this is exemplified in *The Education of a Christian Prince*: a detailed critique, followed by a broad, idealised corrective. I would also point to the assumption of Christian purity that permeates Erasmus's advice on treaties and foreign policy, and which amounts to 'Christian ideals'. European princes are joined by a 'most binding and holy contract... simply from the fact that they are Christians'⁶⁴. This claim is not qualified by Erasmus: he actively seeks, and believes in a Europe governed by virtuous Christian princes, an ideal influenced by the virtue of Plato's philosopher kings, and by their education. Significantly, however, I later consider how Erasmus conspicuously avoids any discussion of Plato's guardian soldiers⁶⁵.

Returning to the general historical context, Erasmus does acquire an international reputation, meeting heads of state, 'both as a councillor to the emperor and at the invitation of his English friends'⁶⁶. He certainly shares the moment of humanist optimism for the new Pope Leo X, and the young European princes: Henry in England, Francis in France, and Charles destined to be the Holy Roman Emperor⁶⁷. But more generally he remains suspicious of the motives of princes. He fears they act too often for private gain, because 'all the causes

⁶² Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 113.

⁶³ Jardine, "Introduction", p. xxiii.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 8, p 93.

⁶⁵ With a 'Paucity of ideas for Improvement', pp. 191 – 192.

⁶⁶ Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, p. 112.

⁶⁷ This is evident in accounts of Erasmus being invited to England at the coronation of Henry VIII. The basis of this optimism is discussed by Adams, R. P., in *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 113.

of war can be seen to arise from matters which are none of the people's concern'⁶⁸. This also applies to popes and their clerics, 'since by longstanding custom the religious have joined company with the profane'⁶⁹. His strong criticism of the war-making ambitions of Pope Julius II is well documented, the 'Julian trumpet summoned all the world to arms'⁷⁰, and is exemplified by his disgust on witnessing Pope Julius riding into Bologna wearing armour⁷¹.

Erasmus has been described as 'apolitical'⁷², but for Geldner, he is 'a democrat in theory, an aristocrat by preference, and, in the face of reality, a monarchist'⁷³. Although suspicious of the power of individual rulers, he accepts as *de facto* the monarchies of France, Spain and England, and acknowledges the power of the Holy Roman Empire over the Low Countries. However, he also shares a traditional Netherlands preference for a more constitutional monarchy, and at times appears sympathetic to the renaissance of republican ideals. Though not an aristocrat by birth, he appreciates the comfort and order of civilised existence. For Tracy, therefore, he is not untypical of the political milieu of his time, although he is more distinctly marked out by his ecclesiastical views, and in particular by his critique of war. Indeed, and again in Platonic style, Erasmus describes an ideal state in which the rights of the people, ecclesiastical authority, and the Prince would all be in a healthy, moderate balance⁷⁴.

Erasmus shows concern for the common man. He wants the gospels translated and understood by everyone, 'all good wives', and sung by 'husbandmen while ploughing' and 'the weaver at his loom'⁷⁵. However, he can also be disparaging in referring to the common

⁶⁸ *Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 318, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 113.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 93. This suspicion is fuelled throughout Erasmus's visit to Italy, Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, pp. 36-7.

⁷⁰ Adams, R. P. *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 63.

⁷¹ Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, p. 24.

⁷² Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, pp. 125, and 189.

⁷³ Geldner, Ferdinand, *Die Staatsauffassung und Fürstenlehre des Erasmus von Rotterdam* (Berlin: Eberling, 1930) p. 88. Quoted in Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, p. 132.

⁷⁴ In his dedicatory epistle to *On the Use and Abuse of the Human Tongue (Lingua)* in 1521. Quoted in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 249.

⁷⁵ Huizinga, "Erasmus's Mind", in Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 304.

population, and this ambiguity will become especially evident when we later consider their responsibility for conflict⁷⁶. Certainly, he fears anarchy and disorder, ‘yet for now (evil princes) are to be tolerated, lest tyranny be replaced by anarchy, an evil almost worse’⁷⁷.

Erasmus is especially concerned with internecine Christian wars, both local and dynastic. There is considerable local conflict in Northern Europe, including his native Netherlands. He makes a remark which we will see echoed by Machiavelli describing contemporary Italy: ‘what a wretched country this is, with so many vultures gnawing at it; and how happy they might be, if the communes were united amongst themselves’⁷⁸. In correspondence, Erasmus comments in particular on the 1517 war with the Guelders, including the bloody sackings of Alkmaar and Asperen⁷⁹.

At another level he is deeply affected by struggles of the great powers of Christian Europe that draw all parts of Christendom into conflict with each other. In his satire *Charon*, Erasmus graphically describes the bloody struggles between ‘the three rulers of the world’, the Emperor Charles V, Francis I of France, and Henry VIII of England, who ‘in deadly hatred clash to their mutual destruction’⁸⁰. I contrast this mood with the optimism for peace felt earlier for the three young princes.

At a still further level, Erasmus becomes increasingly disturbed how Christian Europe itself is increasingly threatened with invasion from the ‘barbarian’ Turks. He had earlier referred to this threat, but when the Ottoman Turks reach Vienna, Erasmus is led to write *De bello turcico*. Here, he unambiguously justifies a war, indeed he writes encouraging it, and I

⁷⁶ Discussed with “Just War”, pp. 180 – 181.

⁷⁷ Quoted in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 248.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 160. There had been much local and factional conflict among city republics in the region described as the ‘*landen van herwarts over*’, roughly Benelux. Traditional factions included the *Hoeks* and the *Kabiljauws*. There was opposition to both Burgundian and Habsburg rule and regional conflict was endemic. For a comparison with Machiavelli, for example, I discuss lines from his tercet ‘On Ambition’, with Machiavelli, “Concepts of Peace and War”, pp. 210 – 211.

⁷⁹ See Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, pp. 92 and 97.

⁸⁰ “Charon”, Thompson, *Colloquies*, pp. 388-96. Charon is the boatman who ferries the souls of the dead. He is having to invest in a new ferryboat on hearing of more conflict between the European powers, and is looking forward to the upturn in business.

later examine this justification in depth. The Ottoman threat to Europe does not diminish in his lifetime, leading him to write in 1531: ‘The rumour here ... is that the Turk will invade Germany with all his forces, to do battle for the great prize, whether Charles or the Turk be monarch of the entire globe, for the world cannot any longer bear to have two suns in the sky’⁸¹.

In terms of personality, Erasmus is described by Huizinga⁸² as standing somewhat above earthly concerns and affairs of state, with his ‘sense of decorum, his great need of kindly courtesy’ and his hatred of ‘the violent and the extravagant’. He was certainly not impressed by the ‘extravagant parades of Henry VIII and Francis I, and the bellicose trumpeting of Pope Julius II’⁸³. Of his own poems, Erasmus himself notes a lack of pathos, ‘there is not a single storm in them, no mountain torrent overflowing its banks’⁸⁴. Especially, therefore, he was naturally averse to the confusion of war, particularly contemporary warfare which he saw as dominated by roving bands of mercenaries, and prone to bloody abuse.

Certainly, the Netherlands suffers atrocities in this way⁸⁵. Also, while in Italy, Erasmus complains of the disruption caused by war, but above all to his scholarship: ‘studies are singularly chilled, while wars are hot’⁸⁶. However, there is no evidence of Erasmus having close personal experience of conflict, as is often assumed⁸⁷. Adams describes an early Erasmus as deploring the struggles of war, while remaining ‘aloof’ from them⁸⁸.

Before leaving the focus of contextual issues, I note that much commentary, makes only brief reference to the contemporary French humanist Budé. Budé is considered the equal

⁸¹ Tracy, James, D., *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International finance, and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 27.

⁸² Huizinga, in Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 301.

⁸³ As described in Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience*, p. 8.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ Such as those committed by Albert of Saxony’s *Groote Gaard*, and the ‘Black Band’. See Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, p. 88.

⁸⁶ Letter, *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁸⁷ Despite a common and mistaken assumption to the contrary, James Tracy argues firmly that Erasmus had not directly witnessed war himself, and I agree. As discussed at the conference “*Erasmus Politicus*”, Rotterdam, 2008.

⁸⁸ Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 25.

of Erasmus as an intellectual and literary humanist, but these two exceptional humanists had a disagreement which is taken to centre on Erasmus's social criticism. For Budé, Erasmus was being trivial in his attacks on monarchic abuses of power and needless wars. These were not matters of critical concern for Budé. As David McNeil notes: 'Nowhere in Budé do we find "cosmopolitanism" or pacific sentiment; he is very nationalistic'⁸⁹. This is also clear, for example, in their respective treatments of Alexander: for Erasmus, he is a 'bandit', a 'mad demigod'; for Budé, a king of 'noble virtue'⁹⁰. Contemporary French nationalism generally, and the humanist Budé in particular, must therefore qualify Allen's description of a more pacific, less patriotic, northern Renaissance humanism.

Finally, I underscore two key, contextual points. First, the extent to which he was personally deeply affected by the gross misconduct evident in much contemporary European warfare. Secondly, for Erasmus and his circle, following a period of optimism for peace there is a marked decline in this optimism: wars continue between the 'great powers', and the Ottoman threat becomes more significant toward the later stages of his life.

CONCEPTS OF PEACE AND WAR

Against this background, we can now examine Erasmus's account of the essential natures of peace and war. In what Dallmayr calls a 'philosophic anthropology'⁹¹, Erasmus repeatedly stresses the 'peace and concord' he finds in nature, if not with mankind⁹². For Erasmus, in contrast to Sánchez, there is no violence in nature except in cases of essential

⁸⁹ McNeil, David, O., *Guillaume Budé and Humanism in the Reign of Francis I* (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1975), p. 30, n. 33. Also, Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 110.

⁹⁰ Budé, *The Institution of the Prince (De L'Institution du Prince)* (1519), (Farnborough: Gregg Press, 1966), pp. 98, 123 – 4, and 161. For Erasmus on Alexander, see for example, *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 421, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 333.

⁹¹ Dallmayr, *Peace Talks*, p. 32.

⁹² Vives echoes this view: 'all things consist by peace and concord' and wonders at the 'perverse nature of men that love dissensions'. Quoted in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 202.

need, a claim to which I will return. He writes that ‘only those among the beasts who are called wild ever engage in war; and those not with one another, but with brutes from another species...either in defence of their young or for food’⁹³. Indeed, Erasmus reasons that contemporary man could not be compared to beasts, because it would be unfair to the beasts⁹⁴. At times he graphically disparages Christians at war for acting like beasts, but such violent wild animal analogies are the exceptions to his essentially peaceful natural world.

Man in his natural state is essentially peaceful. ‘Man alone (nature) produced naked, weak, delicate, unarmed, with very soft flesh and a smooth skin’⁹⁵. Unlike other creatures, humans appear ‘mild and gentle bearing the signs of love and goodness’, signs which are iterated at length by Erasmus in a catalogue of human compassion⁹⁶. Again, ‘nature, or rather God, created this being not for war but for friendship, not for destruction but for preservation, not for aggression but to be helpful’⁹⁷. Humans are destined not for enmity and slaughter, but for ‘thankfulness and friendship’⁹⁸.

However, man has become vicious and warlike. Erasmus claims that man is distinct even from wild animals, again contrary to Sánchez, ‘even the most ferocious animals make and keep agreements with each other. The savagery of lions isn’t directed against other lions...only men cannot be united in mutual love by nature’⁹⁹. In *Dulce bellum inexpertis* he argues that, ‘snake lives in peace with snake’, and even when animals do fight this tends to be more single combat, ‘when did anyone hear of a hundred thousand animals falling dead together after tearing each other to pieces, as men do everywhere’¹⁰⁰.

⁹³ “Letter to Anthony a Bergis”, in Mayer, *Pacifist Conscience*, p. 55.

⁹⁴ Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 97.

⁹⁵ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, p. 402; and Dallmayr, *Peace Talks*, p. 33.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 401; and p. 32.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 401; and, p. 33.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 406; and p. 31.

Therefore, if war is not a product of a benign natural world, but a failing of human culture and education, there is the possibility of improvement. As Tracy discusses, for Erasmus such a culture is ‘subject to change’¹⁰¹, and Skinner writes of Erasmus, ‘people are not born but made’¹⁰². And for Dallmayr, Erasmus’s style of writing throughout is educational, and aimed at moral transformation¹⁰³.

As a Christian humanist, Erasmus argues for recreating the condition of benign nature: ‘what is the philosophy of Christ, which he himself calls *Renascentia*, but the restoration of Nature created good...yet also in pagan books much may be found that is in accordance with it’¹⁰⁴. In *Bellum Erasmi*, he provides a humanist account of the historical degeneration of man from this benignity. From living in the woods, naked and without walled towns or weapons, man needs to defend himself against animals¹⁰⁵. This becomes systematic hunting, killing for food, and then evil passions ‘overwhelm all virtue’. Fighting progressed from single combat to the growth of empires and the proliferation of advancing weapon technology¹⁰⁶.

From this humanist perspective, Erasmus complains that mankind fails to achieve his full potential, especially because of his forgetfulness, a failure to learn from experience. War cannot be a product of reason: the ‘foolishness’ that stirs men to war is ‘more to be lamented than reasoned’¹⁰⁷. However, on this account I do not believe that Erasmus adequately explains why mankind, with superior intellect and reason, is in such an inferior position compared to the rest of nature when it comes to aggressive behaviour. Therefore, there is a degree of pessimism, that despite innate reason, and despite nature being at peace, man

¹⁰¹ Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, p. 5.

¹⁰² Skinner, *Visions of Politics: Volume II, Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 170.

¹⁰³ Dallmayr, *Peace Talks*, p. 32.

¹⁰⁴ Quoted by Huizinga, in Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 304.

¹⁰⁵ In Erasmus’s account a vegetarian diet is not included.

¹⁰⁶ Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, pp. 98-100.

¹⁰⁷ *Bellum Erasmi*, in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 108.

appears naturally condemned to aggression. War is apparently due to an amnesia that does not exist elsewhere in nature, and therefore for Erasmus, education is the only corrective.

Tracy discusses an ‘educational determinism’ in Erasmus¹⁰⁸, where for example, men of *bonae literae* could be expected to act in one way, and chivalric nobles bought up on ‘the stupid and tyrannical tales of King Arthur’ in another way¹⁰⁹. However, as Tracy also points out, Erasmus’s commentary is incomplete as there are many examples of contrary behaviour: experienced nobles advising against war, with sober warnings of the hazards of battle, while many who would be regarded as humanists of *bonae literae* press vociferously for the punishment of ‘heretics’¹¹⁰. Also, we have seen that the chivalric tradition had provided a strong source of limitation on war and its conduct¹¹¹. As I have discussed, one of the strengths of chivalry is that it originates from among the actual practitioners of war, rather than detached clerics and theologians. Erasmus, however, takes the opposite view. He stresses the importance of a pious, Christian education, to counter the ‘chivalric sense of honour’ and a too ready recourse to violence hitherto taught to Princes.

Erasmus’s theology supports this position, and restates a traditional doctrine of ‘original sin’. Given his clerical background this need not be surprising, although Erasmus the humanist seeks more than is given by ‘standard’, medieval theology¹¹². In this chapter I argue that this theology remains fundamental to his approach to war and the apparatus of war.

In the *Complaint of Peace*, Erasmus questions ‘you furious warriors, you see under whose banner you fight, the banner of him who first sowed the seeds of dissent between God and man. Whatever calamities the human race has suffered since are due to that first

¹⁰⁸ Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, p. 127.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-80. The humanist attack on medieval literature is also discussed in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, pp. 223-234.

¹¹⁰ Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, pp. 68-9 and 122-3.

¹¹¹ For example Christine de Pizan, *The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, and *The Book of Peace*. See Reichberg *et al*, pp. 210-225.

¹¹² As argued, for example, in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 52.

division'¹¹³. Furthermore, there is no hope of man recovering from this fallen condition on his own ability. 'Nothing will succeed that depends exclusively on human intentions, but Christ himself will favour pious measures of which he was the original author and sponsor'¹¹⁴. Here therefore, a purely secular, humanist education is apparently not sufficient to re-establish the 'peace and concord' of nature. For Erasmus, the way back to peace is offered through the ideal he perceives in Christ and the early apostles who, in his view, 'persuade us to flee war'¹¹⁵. War violates the uncorrupted Christian's true nature, whose model is Christ's own life.

As with the natural degeneration of mankind, Erasmus also accounts for the theological degeneration of Christian man. Causes of failure include pagan 'philosophers, poets and orators', interest in Aristotle, in sum: a 'gobbet of civil laws', and scholastic sophistries¹¹⁶. Therefore, on the one hand it is claimed that the corruption is man-made and not inevitable, but also there is an element of theological determination in the 'seeds of dissent' between God and man.

Huizinga summarises this dualism¹¹⁷. Erasmus is relying on the dictates of nature, which produce mankind with an inclination to be good, but which can only succeed if 'imbued with faith and piety'. For Phillips, Erasmus 'accepts the doctrine of the Fall and the faultiness of man's perverted nature, but being a humanist, he prefers to lay stress on the potentialities for good that also exist in the nature of man'¹¹⁸. Dallmayr argues that Erasmus, as a 'Christian humanist', is reluctant to charge 'human beastliness' as a slur to either nature's, or to God's, design. Erasmus is not producing a 'foundational' explanation of human conflict, but is suggesting that mankind should use the capabilities, not only of speech

¹¹³ *Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 299; and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 95.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 321; and, p. 116. A possible comparison might be argued with the role of *Fortuna* in Machiavelli.

¹¹⁵ Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 106.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

¹¹⁷ Huizinga, "Erasmus's Mind", in Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 302. Huizinga also likens this to the approach of More's *Utopia*.

¹¹⁸ Phillips, *Erasmus*, p. 82.

and reason, but particularly of ‘reflective remembrance’, to fulfil mankind’s peaceful potential. Such capabilities have not always been used or developed because lessons go unlearned, and war becomes ‘such an accepted thing’¹¹⁹. However, I emphasise that Erasmus is also saying that war is much more than a cultural failing because it is a deep theological ‘evil’, existing because of ‘him who sowed the seeds of dissent’.

It might be argued, therefore, that this theological dimension undermines the aspiration of a cultural, educational remedy to the problem of war. The argument that without ‘faith and piety’ there is no solution brings an element of theological determinism. Erasmus wants nature to be benign, but a theological ‘evil’ is still abroad. This is consistent with his position on the middle ground of the contemporary theological debates of free-will and determinism. Man has fallen from grace, but has the option of at least partially redeeming himself through his good works, even if secular education alone cannot remedy the causes of conflict. Nevertheless, even if there is some hope for fallen man in Erasmus, as I will consider later, soldiers remain an irredeemable ‘evil’.

A strong contrast can also be found between Erasmus and Sánchez on how to interpret Augustine, along the lines I discussed earlier. We have seen Sánchez frequently citing Augustine, arguing that the ‘Peace of God’, *verae pacis*, will not be obtained in this life, and therefore appropriate measures including justified wars are required in the present. Erasmus, who rarely cites Augustine, takes a much more aspirational view: ‘In the heavenly city there is complete concord, and Christ wanted his church to be no less than a heavenly people on earth living, as far as possible, in the image of that city, hastening towards him and depending on it’¹²⁰. For Erasmus, there is a massive presumption towards peace, even on earth. This is more generally described by Johnson: in the Augustinian tradition, war is ‘to be abolished

¹¹⁹ Dallmayr, *Peace Talks*, pp. 33-35.

¹²⁰ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 418, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 329

only in the *Civitas Dei* and the end of time', but in the more optimistic view of the pacific traditions, 'it has become a real possibility for men to bring about'¹²¹.

Finally, in considering Erasmus's conception of war, he is especially concerned by the breach in Christian brotherhood caused by internecine war. He repeatedly asserts that Christians are brothers, and therefore war between them amounts to an act of 'fratricide'¹²². However, Erasmus himself acknowledges that since Cain and Abel bitter quarrels between brothers have not been unusual: quoting Euripedes: 'Wrangling in speech when they fall into strife'¹²³. Despite this, for Erasmus, there is a common humanity which at times even extends to the Turks, but at best Turks are only 'half Christian', and are more likely to appear as 'barbarian'. Indeed, he sees great folly with Christian princes quarrelling amongst themselves instead of uniting against the Turks, and becomes increasingly concerned simply for the safety of Christendom.

To summarise Erasmus's concept of peace and war, I have argued that on the one hand, he conceives war to be an act of human irrationality, which is a human, cultural failing rather than any natural condition. The natural world is peaceful and benign. On the other hand, this approach is combined with a theology in which the 'evil' of war is due to the 'fallen' condition of mankind. Therefore, there are grounds for either a more secular, or more theological interpretation of Erasmus. For Erasmus, war can never be a reasoned instrument of policy because it is not only a 'folly', it is an 'evil', and cannot be fully condoned. However, even after this apparent double condemnation of war, humanist and theological,

¹²¹ Johnson, James, Turner, "Towards Reconstructing the *jus ad bellum*", *Monist*, 57, (1973), p. 483. Also cited by Reichberg: Reichberg, Gregory, "Just War or Perpetual Peace", *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2002), p. 25.

¹²² *Complaint of Peace*, in Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 105. Radice uses 'parricide', CWE., 27, p. 310. Adams, R. P., also uses 'parricide' in discussing *Bellum Erasmi, The Better Part of Valour* p. 103. Vives argues that war between Christians is fratricide, 'as though parts of the same body were to fight together'. *Ibid.*, p. 207. This idea has classical antecedents, for example, Plato draws a clear distinction of 'civil war' fought between Greeks, and war against barbarians. This becomes extended to consider all men as brothers, with a Stoic consciousness of the human species as a fundamental unity. This is also discussed, for example, in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 8.

¹²³ Erasmus, CWE., 31, *Adages*, pp. 191-2.

there remain grounds for ambiguity and disagreement, and eventually, he apparently concedes that a war might have to be fought.

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR WAR IN ERASMUS

In Platina's *De laudibus pacis*, we find an early and unambiguous statement that there are certain wars which must be fought for just and lawful causes. The sense of this is maintained throughout his praise of peace and complaint of the ills of war. I argue that this is not the case in the works of Erasmus, where we find different positions, different interpretations, ambiguity and inconsistency. Later, I consider the consequences of this for the conduct of war in Erasmus. Here, I demonstrate from the textual evidence the scope of the ambiguity, issues of interpretive difficulty, and how this is reflected in the scholarship. I then develop my own critique of his stated opposition to, and/or permission for, war, including his position in relation to the just war tradition.

Interpretation and Ambiguity

We readily find statements of unqualified opposition to war by Erasmus: on religious grounds, 'the whole philosophy of Christ argues against war'; and on consequential grounds, 'there is no other way by which states go more quickly and completely to ruin than by war'¹²⁴. And yet, he still acknowledges that 'it is a splendid thing...to defeat a foe by valour'¹²⁵, and occasionally concedes that wars have to be fought. This apparent concession, I call his 'let out clause'. I believe one key in exploring the scope of this apparent contradiction lies in the text of *De bello turcico*, where in the context of the Ottoman siege of Vienna, Erasmus unambiguously supports a war. His purpose becomes 'to wage war on them

¹²⁴ Erasmus, *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 437; and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 350. The sense of bringing the state to 'the brink of disaster' is found again, for example, in *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, p. 285; and Jardine, (ed.), 11, p. 105.

¹²⁵ *The Panagyric*, CWE., 27, p. 51, and Jardine, (ed.), *Education*, p. 134.

successfully and to win truly splendid triumphs for Christ'¹²⁶. However, as we have seen with his rhetorical style, hitherto his flow of invective against war has been stark and indisputable. Significantly, when he does come to support the war against the Turks, he himself acknowledges the ambiguity of his position and the difficulty of interpretation.

Here, Erasmus clearly states that it is 'mistaken' and 'dangerous' to 'think that the right to make war is totally denied Christians', furthermore, he finds this view 'too absurd to require refutation'¹²⁷. Then he admits to the ambiguity and differences of interpretation: '... although there has been no lack of people willing to contrive similar accusations against me, because in my writings I am lavish in my praise of peace and fierce in my detestation of war'¹²⁸. He attempts to reconcile this by claiming that 'honest men reading my works will recognize, without any prompting from me, the manifest impertinence of such knavery'.

Certainly, an absolute pacifist position could indeed be seen, not just as 'impertinent knavery', but as heresy in opposing church doctrine. We have seen the position of the contemporary church and papacy to be far that of a pacifist, and Suárez, for example, will later explicitly denounce a pacifist position as heresy. He begins his Disputation *On War*: 'The first heresy (in connection with this subject) consists in the assertion that it is intrinsically evil and contrary to charity to wage war'¹²⁹. Erasmus is never going to break away so far from the church of Rome, and this helps to explain the tenor of his argument at this point. But the admitted ambiguity remains, and I argue that many 'honest men' and women have not, and still do not, recognize any force in his let out clauses, as he claims they would.

¹²⁶ *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, pp. 246 and 258, and Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, pp. 325.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, CWE., 64, p. 233, and Rummel, (ed.), p.318 .

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, CWE., 64, pp. 233 – 4, and Rummel, (ed.), p. 318.

¹²⁹ Suárez, (1597) *Metaphysical Disputations: Disputation XIII, On War*, as cited in Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 340. Erasmus alludes elsewhere to the danger of being taken as a heretic, for example: war is 'such a respectable thing that it is wicked and, I might almost say, 'heretical' to disapprove of this'; *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 401, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 310. Also: 'Things have reached the point now that it's considered foolish and even wicked to protest against war...'. *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 308, Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 104.

In order to demonstrate the range of possible interpretation, I will cite examples from what I consider to be three broad categories of interpretation. By variously interpreting the textual evidence, the scholarship has drawn different conclusions for his policy position on war. Some tend to the view that Erasmus is consistent, he always has been, and remains, against any war. Some say that he is inconsistent, and holds different views or changes position. And some claim that he is consistent, that he always has been, and remains supportive of just or necessary war.

First, there are those for whom Erasmus appears consistently opposed to all war. In his *Quest for Peace*, Johnson argues that Erasmus clearly denies the political use of force. Furthermore, Erasmus ‘extends this...to include war with the Turks’, denying ‘the right to go to war with Christians and Turks alike’¹³⁰. Here, Johnson fails to consider the text *De bello turcico*, but the Renaissance scholar Michael Heath translated, and widely comments on *De bello turcico*. However, despite this, Heath still judges it to be ‘the least enthusiastic endorsement (for war) imaginable’. Indeed, for Heath, Erasmus is saying that if you fight the Turks without moral reform, you will surely lose; if you do reform, ‘God’s scourge’ will be lifted and there is no necessity to fight. Ultimately, Erasmus remains consistently pacific¹³¹. Total opposition is certainly consistent with the sheer weight of Erasmus’s ‘fierce detestation’ of war, although Heath’s interpretation does depend on a theological position that war is an instrument of God’s justice.

Next, there are scholars who find different positions in Erasmus. José Fernández, a writer on the Spanish School, wrote a key paper in 1973, *Erasmus on the Just War*¹³². Taking *De bello turcico* fully into account, he argues that Erasmus was forced from a position where

¹³⁰ Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, p. 160.

¹³¹ Heath, CWE, *Expositions of the Psalms*, 64, p 208. Heath lectured to the Warburg in 1995 on the subject of *On the Turkish War*, and has commented on it since 1976. I would include the Erasmian scholars Margaret Mann Phillips and Robert Adams as sharing this view.

¹³² Fernández, José, A., “Erasmus on Just War”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 34, No. 2, (Apr.-Jun., 1973), pp. 209-226; and again in *The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance 1516-1559* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

no just war could become a reality, into a standard just war position similar to that of Vitoria: ‘...in his later years, with the illusions of his halcyon days shattered, a less uncompromising position towards war emerges’¹³³. Erasmus changes position. For the medievalist Norman Housley, Erasmus becomes caught in a paradox of differing views, a ‘cul-de-sac fashioned by his loathing for war and the Ottoman advance’¹³⁴. Erasmus cannot successfully reconcile these different positions.

Then we move towards those for whom Erasmus had always allowed for war, as he himself claimed in *De bello turcico*. Ross Dealy argues that he was not caught in an irreconcilable paradox, but that his ideas on war represent a dynamic, not ‘either/or’ but ‘both/and: both abstract truth and the truths of practical implementation’¹³⁵. But, within this dynamic, Erasmus had consistently allowed for a necessary war. Finally, Dallmayer, traces a line of irenic thinking from Erasmus up until today. But, again he sees no inconsistency: Erasmus ‘readily admitted that under certain circumstances, or under extreme provocation, war may be unavoidable and justified. The Turkish assault on Vienna was such a provocation’¹³⁶. This view was also broadly reflected at the *Erasmus Politicus* conference: Erasmus had always allowed for war¹³⁷.

This latter view, I believe, becomes more readily accepted: first, after Fernández’s paper, which challenged the traditional pacifist interpretation; and secondly, after the CWE translation of *De bello turcico* which made the text more accessible, and more widely read as a challenge to a pacist interpretation of Erasmus. Scholars who focus on the political works written between 1514 and 1517, and do not take *De bello turcico* fully into account, often tend toward the pacific interpretation, as is the case with Johnson, and my next example.

¹³³ Fernández, *State, War and Peace*, p. 143.

¹³⁴ From his chapter: “A Necessary Evil? Erasmus, Crusade and War against the Turks”, in Housley, Norman, *Crusading and Warfare in Medieval and Renaissance Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), p. 274.

¹³⁵ Dealy, R., “The Dynamics of Erasmus’ Thought on War”, *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society, Yearbook 4*, (1984), p. 64.

¹³⁶ Dallmayer, *Peace Talks*, p. 24.

¹³⁷ The conference “*Erasmus Politicus*”, Rotterdam, 2008.

Finally, I argue that one recent analysis, by Hanan Yoran, tries unsuccessfully to include most of these points of view. Yoran seeks to use Erasmus's pacifism to exemplify his 'Republic of Letters', and rejection of 'mainstream Christian thought after Augustine', by undercutting 'centuries of abstract discussion about "just war"'¹³⁸. Yoran admits that he 'concentrate(s) on a limited number of works, written in the decade or so after 1514', and from these he argues that Erasmus was 'the most decisive and prominent pacifist among his contemporaries'¹³⁹. Erasmus is 'unambiguous' in his 'condemnation of the much-discussed holy war against the Turks' and even rejects 'the rhetoric of self-defense mobilized to justify the war'¹⁴⁰.

Yoran immediately qualifies this: 'Erasmus does not argue that waging war is prohibited under any circumstances (a position difficult to defend indeed)'. However, further discussion is relegated to a relatively brief end-note¹⁴¹. Here, Yoran firstly cites Erasmus's denial of the 'absurd' from *De bello turcico*; but follows this with a close repetition of Heath's position: essentially it remains impossible for Erasmus to approve of any war. Yoran also misleadingly cites Fernández in a cursory end-note¹⁴². Therefore, while Yoran is correct in pointing to the humanist critique of the form of scholastic just war, I do not believe he presents a clear position of Erasmus, as he claims to do.

Instead, I argue that Yoran's account does reflect the mutable mass of Erasmus's work on war: it is ambiguous in that no clear view emerges; but it also misleads by placing due consideration of possible war into parenthesis, an end-note for Yoran, or isolated 'let out clauses' in Erasmus. This use of parenthesis is also seen when Jardine introduces her widely read Cambridge translation of *The Education of a Christian Prince*. She makes an apparently

¹³⁸ Yoran, *Between Utopia and Dystopia*, p. 97.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 10 and 97.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 212, n. 83.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 211, n. 80. Yoran cites Fernandez in pointing out that it is too easy for princes to claim just cause. As I have shown, however, Fernandez strongly argues that Erasmus conforms to a standard just war position.

definitive statement: ‘Notoriously, Erasmus was a life-long pacifist’, but then in parenthesis, ‘(... on occasion he could countenance military action in a just cause)’, with a footnote pointing to Dealy’s article describing ‘dynamic’ thought¹⁴³. I will later argue that such ambiguity and relegation to parenthesis carries implications for the conduct of war, and is inadequate when it comes to providing advice to princes.

Case against war

For my own critique, I first present Erasmus making a clear case against war. He is not just making a reasonable presumption against war, and accepting that *in extremis* some wars might have to be fought. The presumption against war is massive, and Erasmus makes a strong case based on his particular theology and brand of humanism, which is combined with strong rhetoric.

To demonstrate his case against war, I will take each of the points which he clearly iterates in his example of logical argument in *De Copia*, the ‘foundations’ of *Foundations of the Abundant Style*, and support it with references to his more rhetorical works, the ‘abundant style’. In one of two examples against war in *De Copia*, Erasmus argues against a war with the King of France¹⁴⁴. Erasmus separates the general from the particular, and here I consider the general propositions. To improve the force of the argument, he advises moving in a series of propositions from a more general, ‘startling’ claim towards the particular proposition in question. He does this with seven propositions, in two stages. The first stage establishes, as we have seen elsewhere, that war is not a natural condition, but a failing of man.

¹⁴³ “Introduction”, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, Jardine, (ed.), p. viii. I earlier discussed *A Textbook of Christian Ethics* which ambiguously includes a category of ‘Selective Pacifism’, which it purports to permit a just war, as well as ‘Thoroughgoing Pacifism’, which is absolute in its prohibition. Again, I believe Jardine’s account is similarly ambiguous. Her descriptors of ‘Notorious... lifelong’ imply an absolute position, but while just cause is seemingly maintained, it is again relegated to parenthesis, as if hidden away in embarrassment. Gill, Robert, *A Textbook of Christian Ethics*, 3rd ed., (London and New York: T. & T. Clark, 2006), p. 193.

¹⁴⁴ Erasmus, *De Copia*, CWE., Vol., 24, pp. 598 – 601. The other example concerns war between the Pope and Venice, and focuses on particular issues of papal authority.

First, Erasmus asserts in *De Copia* that ‘war is not natural to man who was born to feel goodwill’¹⁴⁵. This is repeated in most of his rhetorical, descriptive accounts: ‘war is such a monstrous pursuit that it’s proper only for beasts, not men’; unlike the vividly described natural armoury of beasts, ‘man was produced naked, weak, tender, unarmed, with very soft flesh and skin... born for friendship...’¹⁴⁶. Second, fighting is not even natural to all beasts, ‘only wild ones’¹⁴⁷. Elsewhere, he describes how it is ‘only the really savage ones like lions, wolves and tigers’, ‘harmless’ animals include the ‘fallow deer’, sheep, and the hare, ‘who had committed no other crime than be eatable’¹⁴⁸. Third, he claims, with Platina and against Sánchez, that even wild beasts do not war within their own species, ‘dogs do not eat dog flesh’, as ‘mortal men do’. Furthermore, wild beasts ‘only fight to defend their young, or when driven mad by hunger’, while man fights for ‘vain ambition’¹⁴⁹.

The second stage then narrows the focus within mankind. The fourth proposition is that ‘granted’ that men do make war, ‘it is the mark of uncivilized ones to do so’¹⁵⁰. This is key to the humanist element of his argument: man might be ‘born for friendship’ with the potential of reason and language, but a corrupted and ‘uncivilised’ man is prone to war. This proposition is frequently and graphically repeated throughout his works, and is a topic I to which I will return in considering the conduct of war. Soldiering belongs with the ‘cesspit of all that is evil’; ‘For at the first hint of a military campaign the dregs of humanity from all over the globe emerge from their hiding places, and collect in dark places like bilge water’.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 600.

¹⁴⁶ *The Praise of Folly*, CWE., 27, p. 139, and Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 72; and *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 402, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 311. Also, for example, this account is discussed at some length in *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, pp. 294 – 296, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, pp. 90 – 92.

¹⁴⁷ *De Copia*, CWE., Vol., 24, pp. 600 – 1.

¹⁴⁸ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, pp. 405, and 408 – 9, and Phillips, *Adages*, pp. 315 and 318.

¹⁴⁹ *De Copia*, CWE., Vol., 24, p. 601. These are an often repeated assertions: most animals move peacefully in ‘herds’ and ‘live in harmony and good order with their own kind’, but ‘Christians assail Christians with machines out of hell’. *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 405, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 315; and *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, pp. 306 – 7, and Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 102. Lists of wild animals at peace within their species are also found, for example, Jardine, (ed.), *The Education of a Christian Prince*, 1, p. 30.

¹⁵⁰ *De Copia*, CWE., Vol., 24, p. 601.

War is most effectively waged by ‘the most cruel of thieves’, gangs of ‘cutthroat murders’ and ‘lawless swashbucklers’; and furthermore, significantly for my later critique, one should ‘take care that only bad people are involved’¹⁵¹.

The fifth proposition is that ‘even if’ civilized men do make war, ‘it is not the mark of Christian men to do so’¹⁵². Again, this is an important point which Erasmus often repeats. He cites the New Testament with a contrary interpretation to Sánchez, ‘...since Christ gave the command to put up the sword it is not fitting for Christians to fight...in war with any mortal man’. Interestingly, Phillips notes that the 1515 edition stipulates ‘it is a sin’, *nefas est*, but the later 1523 edition, and less condemnatory, ‘it is not fitting’, *non decet*¹⁵³. But also from the same text, less ambiguously: ‘...we mix up Christ with a thing so diabolical’; ‘Why do we drag Christ into it, when he would be less out of place in a house of ill fame than in war?’; and war is ‘a thing so hellish, so foreign to the life and teaching of Christ...to be avoided, averted, and excluded by all possible means’¹⁵⁴. Finally, a point to which I will return, Erasmus considers that it ‘should be sufficient for men killed in war to be buried in unconsecrated ground’¹⁵⁵. His point is that war is not a fitting occupation for a Christian.

The sixth proposition brings in a strong consequentialist element. ‘Even if it were proper to undertake the war, it would not be to your advantage because, when all is weighed

¹⁵¹ This theme is repeated throughout his works: wars are fought by ‘beasts’, ‘men polluted with every kind of crime, if one can call brutes of that kind the name of men’, ‘seed-beds of crime’, ‘godless’, ‘blackguards, murderers and robbers...the very dregs of humanity’. *Panegyric*, CWE., 27, and Jardine, (ed.), p. 138; *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, pp. 267 - 8, and Jardine, (ed.), 6, p. 83. *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, pp. 304 and 317, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, pp. 99 and 111 (again war is the ‘cesspool of every iniquity’, CWE., or ‘cesspit of all vice’, Adams.); *The Praise of Folly*, CWE., 27, p. 139, and Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 72; *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 438, and Phillips, *Adages*, pp. 350 – 1.

¹⁵² *De Copia*, CWE., Vol., 24, p. 601.

¹⁵³ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, Phillips, *Adages*, p. 336, n. 3. Mathew, 26, 52, John, 18, 11. This observation is repeated in the CWE translation by David Drysdall, who uses ‘not proper’ for the later usage, 1520 – 33, of *non decet*, CWE, 35, p. 424, n. 113.

¹⁵⁴ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, pp. 411 – 2, and 438, and Phillips, *Adages*, pp. 321 – 2, and 351; This is a strong point of argument in this text, other examples include: It is the ‘worst’ kind of war when ‘Christians fight other men...the very worst of all for Christians to fight Christians’; and ‘War is so impious that it is utterly detestable to Christ’; Phillips, p. 321; and discussion, *Ibid.*, pp. 346 – 7.

¹⁵⁵ *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 313, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 108.

up the evils... are far greater in number than the advantages that even the victor secures'¹⁵⁶. He frequently asserts, indeed declares 'boldly... however unfair', that 'even the most advantageous war... will be preceded, accompanied, and followed by such an ocean of ills, so vast a swamp of wickedness, so black a plague of immorality'¹⁵⁷. A cost-benefit analysis, therefore, cannot justify war: 'But if you sum up all these separate items accurately and don't find that you could have secured peace for just a tenth of the cost, you can all make an end of me: I shan't protest'¹⁵⁸.

We have seen the commonplace medical analogy used by Sánchez: that after medicine and fire, an infected wound must be cut out with a knife for the long term benefit of the patient. Likewise, the sword must be applied to the infected body politic. Erasmus is aware of this analogy but turns it around: 'Better to leave the wound alone, if no surgery can be done without grave harm to the whole body'¹⁵⁹. It is a desperate cure that will have even worse consequences, as Housley describes: 'a medicine which stood a fair chance of killing the patient'¹⁶⁰. In *De bello turcico* Erasmus again reverses the medical analogy: 'If war is begun in an unjust cause or conducted in an unjust way, it is no more acceptable than someone trying to ward off illness by witchcraft'; and again, 'we are like an invalid seeking help from a sorcerer, not a doctor'¹⁶¹.

¹⁵⁶ *De Copia*, CWE., Vol., 24, p. 601.

¹⁵⁷ *Panegyric*, CWE., 27, p. 55, and Jardine, (ed.), p. 139; also for example, 'even the most just of wars brings with it a train of evils', *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, p. 282, and Jardine, (ed.), 11, p. 103).

¹⁵⁸ *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 318, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 112. Elsewhere he urges: 'If we will only do the arithmetic and weigh up in honest terms the cost of war and the cost of peace, we shall soon discover that the latter can be bought for one tenth part of the worry, effort, distress, risk, expense and bloodshed that war involves', *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 416; and again at p. 437, 'If you are lured by the hope of gain, make some calculations'; and Phillips, *Adages*, pp. 326 and p. 350.

¹⁵⁹ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, p. 428, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 340. Phillips is cited here with 'surgery' rather than the more general 'treated' as used in the CWE. As discussed earlier, I argue that surgery, the knife, is significant as a last option. However for Erasmus, and as Housley describes, war is not so much a necessary evil as 'a medicine which stood a fair chance of killing the patient', Housley, "Erasmus, the Crusade and War against the Turks", p. 279.

¹⁶⁰ Housley, "Erasmus, the Crusade and War against the Turks", p. 279.

¹⁶¹ *De bello turcico*, CWE., p. 240.

Finally, with the seventh proposition: ‘Even if it were advantageous, it would not be safe, as the outcome of war is always uncertain’¹⁶². Elsewhere, he again notes how ‘the outcome of any battle is uncertain’; and asks, when you have done the calculations, ‘... why should you prefer a throw of the dice with Mars? Who but a madman would fish with a golden hook?’¹⁶³.

This ends the series of general propositions, and Erasmus moves on to consider more particular issues. War, therefore, is seen as unnatural, uncivilized, un-Christian, without any cost-benefit advantage, and inherently risky. However, from this series I believe he still leaves a door of possibility open, as the series could well continue: ‘even if it is risky, war might still be the right course of action’. Even if the war is lost, he still concedes in *De bello turcico* that it is better for a man of spirit ‘to meet his end in battle...’¹⁶⁴. But here in *De Copia*, as in many other texts, he does not go that far. We are simply left to conclude that war is implacably wrong.

A strong presumption against war, I argue, is also found with his religious argument. As I have demonstrated, and discuss further in relation to the just war tradition, Erasmus sits well with the humanist critique in rejecting the scholastic tradition; he argues for returning as close as possible to ‘the source’. On war therefore, and against the interpretations of Sánchez, Erasmus advocates a return to early Christian pacifism with a pacific reading of the New Testament. As we have seen, war is against his whole ‘Philosophy of Christ’. Elsewhere, he considers that even if it were argued that war is excusable in nature, in law, or by custom, ‘the grace of the gospel is more effective than all these’¹⁶⁵. We have seen that, unlike Sánchez, he does not believe that we have to resign ourselves to live within the incomplete peace of man, instead we should be living ‘in the image of that city, hastening towards him,

¹⁶² *De Copia*, CWE., 24, p. 601.

¹⁶³ *Panegyric*, CWE., 27, p. 55, and Jardine, (ed.), p. 139; *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, p. 430, and again at p. 437, the ‘return is not only much smaller, but uncertain too’; and Phillips, *Adages*, pp. 343 and 350.

¹⁶⁴ *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 258, (not included in Rummel (ed.) *Reader*).

¹⁶⁵ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 426, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 338.

drawing strength from it'¹⁶⁶. Therefore, his advice to princes on foreign policy and treaties stems, 'simply from the fact that they are Christians'¹⁶⁷.

For scholarship which focuses on Erasmus's religious works, therefore, it is understandable that a pacific interpretation emerges. Generally, I believe he does argue convincingly against war, especially when combined with the sheer weight of rhetoric, but this depends on a particular interpretation of the New Testament, and he still frequently allows a 'let out' clause. I will now turn to the possibility that he is, after all, positive in approving certain wars.

Case for war

Erasmus makes his most convincing argument permitting war in *De bello turcico*, within the context of defending Christendom against a serious and pressing Ottoman threat. He clearly, and repeatedly asserts that his plan is 'to fight the Turks with more success than hitherto', with encouragement to 'march against the flesh and blood Turks under the banners of Christ and...defeat him'¹⁶⁸. Furthermore, as I have demonstrated, he claims that he had always been ready to support certain wars by Christians. Here, I will demonstrate that he is correct in making this claim. Indeed, I argue that this is not strictly confined to war against the Ottomans. He attaches many qualifications to this support for war, and I will consider these later with the just war tradition.

He appears strong in acknowledging support for war in the more political texts where the secular context suggests this to be most likely: not only *De bello turcico*, 1529, but with

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 418, or Phillips, p. 329.

¹⁶⁷ *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, pp. 275 - 7, and Jardine, (ed.), 8, pp. 93 - 95.

¹⁶⁸ Erasmus, *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 242, and Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, p. 324. Also for example: we 'must conceive a plan ...fight the Turks with more success than hitherto', and '...that we fight beneath his standard ...and march against the enemy', *Ibid.*, CWE., 64, p. 249, and Rummel, (ed.), pp. 326 - 7, where the latter uses 'attack the enemy'. Again: '...to wage war on them successfully', CWE., 64, p. 246; and more rhetorically, '...shall we choose to place our necks beneath the Turkish yoke?...What man is there of little spirit left who would not rather meet his end in battle than endure a humiliating slavery under those barbarians', CWE., 64, p. 258.

The Education of a Christian Prince, 1516, and even earlier with the *Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria*, 1504. In the *Panegyric*, he fully accepts war ‘if peace cannot be maintained in any other way’, albeit it is ‘wickedness’ for any other reason¹⁶⁹. Again, he provides balance: the ‘best examples of the greatest spirits are those, in my view, who neither fear wars when they are unavoidable, nor provoke them when they can avoid doing so, and who are always ready and prepared to withstand them but never moved to undertake them unnecessarily’¹⁷⁰. Also, if the leader undertakes war, with qualifications that I argue closely follow just war criteria, ‘to him is accorded the glory of war’¹⁷¹. These are general endorsements of war, the Ottomans are not mentioned, indeed, they would have been less of a concern in Europe at the particular time of the *Panegyric*.

As we have seen, compared to other books of the genre, *The Education of a Christian Prince* contains considerably more advice on avoiding wars than fighting them. However, his advice to a ‘good prince’ is not to start a war at all ‘unless...’, and again he iterates conditions: ‘it cannot by any means be avoided’; to keep it in proportion, with the ‘least possible harm’ and ‘to end it as soon as possible’¹⁷². This is advice on war generally, but also specifically on the Ottomans he exhorts: first ensure our own Christian values, ‘then, if it seems appropriate, let us attack the Turks’¹⁷³.

The text *De bello turcico* contains the most positive affirmations for war, and I have referred to some. An important and repeated theme is that while he does ‘not welcome’ war, nor is he ‘arguing against it... but I am doing my utmost to show how it may be begun and conducted with success’¹⁷⁴. Erasmus is trying to be positive, but I will later consider the value of his advice to a prince. A further point by Erasmus in this text extends self-defense to

¹⁶⁹ *Panegyric*, CWE., 27, p. 57, and Jardine, (ed.), p. 141.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 57, and p. 141.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 58, and p. 142.

¹⁷² *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, p. 282, and Jardine, (ed.), 11, p. 103.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 287, and p. 109.

¹⁷⁴ Erasmus, *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, pp. 264 – 5, Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, p. 333. I have counted some 23 positive affirmations by Erasmus for war in this text.

include mutual defense. Referring, almost certainly, to the failure of Roman Christians to aid the Byzantines prior to the fall of Constantinople, he writes that it is not just your business if your neighbour's house catches fire, but 'it becomes the whole city's business whenever a single house catches fire'¹⁷⁵.

As well as in the texts where permission for warfare might be expected, a 'let out' clause does also occur elsewhere. Even within his most significant and oft quoted work against war, *The Complaint of Peace*, there can be found the one qualifying clause: 'I am speaking about the wars which Christians generally fight against other Christians; I take a different view of men who repel the violent attacks of barbarian invaders by their wholehearted and loyal determination, and protect the peace and security of their country at their peril'¹⁷⁶. Again, in his letter declaiming war to Anthony Bergis: in 'defending the faith, the Christian peace is to be defended against the attack of barbarians, war is not at all opposed by men of acknowledged piety'¹⁷⁷.

The clause in *The Complaint of Peace* is perfectly clear, but only amounts to 5 out of approximately 1329 lines of text strongly denouncing war with no further such distinction. Nor does a clear let out clause occur in many other key anti-war passages such as are found in *The Praise of Folly*. This clause compares to that made in Platina's *Praise of Peace*, but the latter is 5 out of 550 lines, and the sense is again repeated elsewhere in the same text. Also, Platina endorses justified war more frequently in his other works¹⁷⁸. Again, the weight of rhetoric denouncing war in Erasmus is overpowering.

Erasmus therefore, appears to have allowed for a defensive war against 'barbarians', and at times this extends to more generally protecting the peace and defending the

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, CWE., 64, p. 220, and Rummel, (ed.), 316.

¹⁷⁶ *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 314, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 108.

¹⁷⁷ Erasmus, "Letter to Anthony a Bergis", in Mayer, *The Pacifist Conscience*, p. 58.

¹⁷⁸ Paragraph 8 of *De laudibus pacis*, and again for example at paragraph 17. A key difference, however, and as I discuss elsewhere, is Platina's assertion that nature equips man for war with hands, whereas Erasmus is always keen to argue that man is naturally defenceless.

commonwealth. Wars between Christians are a frequent target, however, and any permission here is heavily qualified. I will now consider such qualification with a closer look at Erasmus and just war thinking.

Just war

Erasmus makes clear his apparent disdain for the language of a just war. A just war means: ‘any war declared in any way against anybody by any prince’¹⁷⁹. In examining this claim, I first look at his discussion of the medieval just war tradition, and then specifically at the Thomist criteria of a just war.

Erasmus argues directly against the medieval just war tradition of the church. This occurs notably in *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, where he disapprovingly cites Bernard and Aquinas; and *The Education of a Christian Prince*, where he cites Augustine and Bernard. It is also found, for example, in the letter to Anthony Bergis¹⁸⁰. In these texts, the argument of Erasmus is essentially: first, these ‘fathers’ who ‘somewhere’ ‘apparently mentioned war with approval’, are ‘few’ and ‘mere men’ compared to ‘Christ himself... the Apostles... orthodox and approved fathers’. Their ‘mere maxims’ are few compared with ‘the innumerable writings of authors of unquestioned sanctity which argue against war’, or who ‘condemn and curse it’. Secondly, they are writing in later times, ‘when the fervour of the Gospel was weakening’, ‘contaminated by the writings of the dialecticians, sophists, mathematicians, orators, poets, philosophers and lawyers of the pagan world’¹⁸¹.

Erasmus, therefore, appeals for a return to the pacifism of early Christians, and elsewhere vividly opines as to the failings he perceives in the church’s medieval doctrine,

¹⁷⁹ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 425; and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 337.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 426 – 7; and pp. 331 and 339. “Letter to Anthony a Bergis”, in Mayer, *The Pacifist Conscience*, p. 58. Discussed in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, pp. 104 - 108.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

especially ‘nonsense out of Aristotle’¹⁸². This sits well with the broader humanist critique of the scholastics. It certainly does not sit well with most accounts of the medieval just war tradition.

I now consider examples of the just war criteria more closely and demonstrate how the ambiguity of Erasmus’s discussion continues. On the one hand, Fernández argues that Erasmus conforms to a classic just war position. I also demonstrate that Erasmus, even if he avoids the terminology, refers closely to each of the traditional Thomist criteria, *jus ad bellum*, and also anticipates many of the other criteria, more familiar to us today, both *ad bellum* and *in bello*. On the other hand, I argue that Erasmus’s consideration of just war takes the form of what is now referred to as *jus contra bellum*¹⁸³. As I will demonstrate, he takes the conditions required for a just war, but argues that they can never be achieved given the condition of the world.

First on authority, Erasmus appears to conform to the tradition by arguing that ‘we must also grant monarchs the right to make war’¹⁸⁴; and in *Militaria* the comment is made to a soldier, ‘war might be just for a prince, but not necessarily for you’¹⁸⁵. On the other hand, Erasmus ironically deprecates just authority by defining ‘what has been declared so by the Prince, be he child or idiot’¹⁸⁶.

¹⁸² Also, the effect of too much Aristotle has been the ‘mixing of fire and water’. *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, pp. 419 – 20, and Phillips, *Adages*, pp. 331 – 2.

¹⁸³ For example, Sharma, Serena, “The Legacy of Jus Contra Bellum: Echoes of Pacifism in Contemporary Just War Thought”, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2009), pp 217-230.

¹⁸⁴ *De bello turcico*, CWE., 65, p. 235, and Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, 319, where the term ‘princes’ is used.

¹⁸⁵ “Military Affairs”, Thompson, *Colloquies*, p. 14. This reply appears selectively omitted by Adams in using this exchange as an example of the ‘evil’ trade of soldiering; Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 200.

¹⁸⁶ *Bellum Erasmi*, quoted in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 254. *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, p. 420, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 331. CWE., 35 uses ‘minor’, but I believe ‘child’ retains the rhetorical force, as opposed to the legal definition which is the concern of CWE., 35, p. 420, n. 93. This note, however, points to the similar sentence added by Erasmus in a later (1526) edition: “‘just’, however, means any war declared in any way against anybody by any prince”; CWE., 35, p. 425. Phillips, however, does not annotate this as a later addition, Phillips, p. 337.

Therefore, because government ‘depends to a large extent on the consent of the people’¹⁸⁷, which can be rescinded, Erasmus further qualifies princely authority by further insisting on a general consensus among the people in favour of war. Princes, although they have a ‘special responsibility, ‘must not resort to this most dangerous of expedients without the consent of their citizens and of the whole nation’¹⁸⁸. This is a significant development from the authority of princes and kings found, for example, with Aquinas, but it conforms to the humanist malleability on monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic authority; and also to Erasmus’s view that it is the citizens who stand to suffer most in war. Therefore, it is reasonable that the citizens should participate in the decisions, even if it amounts to a complete veto.

However, as I have noted, elsewhere Erasmus questions the judgement of the people. In *Complaint of Peace*, ‘Peace’ cannot find accommodation with the ordinary citizens who are too ‘eaten up’ with dissension, and ‘she’ is forced to ‘leave out the common people, who are swayed by their passions like a stormy sea’¹⁸⁹. On this view, the citizens are unlikely to come to a reasonable consensus, and if they do it is as likely to be one of mob bellicosity. For Adams, the reaction to the Peasants Rebellion of 1524-1526 marks a departure from the earlier humanist assumption of the people being saner than their princes, with Erasmus then describing the populace as a ‘fickle, many headed beast’¹⁹⁰. However, *Complaint of Peace* was written in 1516, thus confirming a much deeper seated suspicion of popular judgement.

Secondly, Erasmus appears to retain the essence of the criterion of just cause. In reply to the soldier who questions the rightfulness of his work, the Carthusian replies: ‘Maybe if he

¹⁸⁷ *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, p. 284, and Jardine, (ed.), p. 105. Also: ‘The good prince uses the public interest as a yardstick in every field, otherwise he is no prince’, *Ibid*. That a prince cannot have the same rights over his people as ‘cattle’ is stressed by Erasmus in this passage, and repeated in *Dulce bellum inexpertis*: ‘No-one can have the same rights over men, free by nature, as over herds of cattle. This very right which you hold was given by popular consent. Unless I am mistaken, the hand which gave can take it away’, *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, p. 428, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 341. Also discussed at Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 147.

¹⁸⁸ *De bello turcico*, CWE., 65, p. 236, and Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, p. 320.

¹⁸⁹ *Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 296, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 92.

¹⁹⁰ Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 247.

attacks your country. Then it does seem righteous to fight for wife, children, parents and friends and for civil peace'¹⁹¹. It might be expected that a Carthusian gives a traditional reply, but Erasmus repeats the sense of this in *De bello turcico*: 'you go to war for your wives and children, "hearth and home"... for your churches and your priests'¹⁹². Occasionally, he also invokes punishment as just cause, as in the Ottoman context: 'war is nothing more than the punishment of the many by the many if their crimes cannot be dealt with in any other way'¹⁹³. More often, however, he underscores the unacceptable cost of war even if 'a cause which is undoubtedly just and a war which is wholly successful in its outcome'¹⁹⁴; and again 'in the most just of causes', 'no matter how serious or just the cause'¹⁹⁵.

On the other hand, Erasmus also very clearly questions whether a just cause can ever exist. He underscores the subjective nature of just cause, repeatedly asking: 'who does not think his cause is entirely just'¹⁹⁶? He ridicules what he sees as unjust causes: 'God in heaven, we humans, what tragedies of wars we stir up, and for what frivolous causes! For the emptiest of territorial claims, out of childish anger, because some woman we intended to marry has been denied us, for reasons even more ridiculous than these'¹⁹⁷. "Peace" complains that wars are started for some 'trivial incident... and what a tiny spark can set such a holocaust ablaze... Furthermore, when there is no cause to hand they invent their own reasons for picking a quarrel'¹⁹⁸. To those falsely claiming necessity or duress as cause, he

¹⁹¹ "The Soldier and the Carthusian", Thompson, *Colloquies*, p. 130.

¹⁹² *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 255, and not included in Rummel (ed.), *Reader*.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, CWE., 64, p. 235, and Rummel, (ed.), p. 319, which uses the term: 'judicial retribution' on a large scale.

¹⁹⁴ *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 317, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 112.

¹⁹⁵ *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, pp. 234 – 5, and Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, p. 319.

¹⁹⁶ *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, p. 283, and Jardine, (ed.), 11, p. 104; and again, 'Who does not think his own cause just?' *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 425, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 337.

¹⁹⁷ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, p. 406, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 315. The claims to territory could refer to the French claims to Milan and Naples, the latter being taken as the start of the Italian Wars in 1494. The marriage promise could refer to 'Anne of Brittany, betrothed to Maximilian, but married to Charles VIII in 1491', or possibly, I believe, it could also be a classical reference to the Trojan wars. The rhetoric of this passage is discussed in Douglas, A.E., "Erasmus as a Satirist", in Dorey, T. A., (ed.) *Studies in Latin Literature and Its Influence: Erasmus* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 33. Translations here include 'the kidnapping of a wench...or reasons far sillier still!'. Also in the same text, for example, 'Yet it is remarkable how widely these days, how rashly, for what trivial reasons war is begun'; CWE, 35, p. 401.

¹⁹⁸ *The Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 314; and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 109.

adjures: ‘take off the costume...you’ll find it was wrath, greed, and stupidity that got you involved, not necessity – unless you think it was a kind of necessity that your mind cannot be satisfied with less than everything’¹⁹⁹.

Thirdly, Erasmus appears to retain the criterion of a just intention. Regardless of any particular justice or necessity for war, it has to be approached in a ‘religious spirit’ in which, and following the sense, but not the name, of Aristotle and Augustine, it ‘aims only at the peace of the state’²⁰⁰. He exhorts us ‘that our intentions be pure and honourable’; and describes ‘a pure and pious zeal (which) summons men to defend themselves’²⁰¹. On the other hand, he again widely condemns what he sees as the intention underlying most contemporary conflicts, which amounts to ‘lust for power, ambition, private grievances, or the desire for revenge, it is clearly not war, but mere brigandage’²⁰². He questions the real motives of princes, suspecting that they are driven by greed or even ill temper.

Erasmus also goes further than these core, Thomist criteria of just war thinking. He frequently stipulates the condition of last resort: ‘I teach that war must never be undertaken unless, after everything else has been tried, it cannot be avoided...’; ‘The good prince will never start a war, unless after everything else has been tried...’; ‘...when you have left nothing untried and no stone unturned in your search for peace’²⁰³. Also, the criterion of proportion, particularly *in bello*, is made very clear: ‘The princes first concern should be to fight with the least possible harm to his subjects, at the lowest cost in Christian blood, and to

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 310; and p. 105.

²⁰⁰ *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 236, or Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, p. 320. Ambrose is cited specifically by Erasmus.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, CWE., 64, p. 249; and *The Complaint of Peace*, Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 108, which Radice translates as ‘wholehearted and loyal’, CWE., 27, p. 314.

²⁰² *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, pp. 235 - 6, or Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, p. 319. Another reference to ‘brigandage’ occurs when he compares contemporary conflict with primitive fighting: ‘...what is now called brigandage was then called war’. *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 409, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 319.

²⁰³ *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 234, and Rummel,(ed.), p. 318; *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, p. 282, and Jardine, (ed.), 11, p. 103; *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 438, and Phillips, *Adage*, p. 351. Also, for example: ‘everything must be tried in preference to war ...unless all possible remedies have been exhausted and it cannot be avoided’, *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 235, and Rummel,(ed.), p. 319; ‘...because peace cannot otherwise be maintained ...only if compelled to do so’, *Panagyric*, CWE., 27, pp. 57 and 58, and Jardine, (ed.), *Education*, pp. 141 and 142.

end it as quickly as possible'; '...at the smallest cost in terms of his subjects lives'²⁰⁴. Indeed financially, 'demands must be made moderate... without overburdening the people'²⁰⁵. And in his prayer before battle: 'let victory be gained with the least shedding of blood and the smallest loss'²⁰⁶.

A further point of critique I would add, is that Erasmus uses the criteria of just war to condemn what would be, on most judgements, clearly 'unjust' scenarios. A just war theorist would readily agree that the examples he negatively describes do not meet the established criteria. Trivial causes are clearly 'unjust'. Empirically, few now dispute the 'unjust' nature of much contemporary warfare. As such, his argument has some validity and usefully exemplifies the subjective weakness of just cause and its abuse. However, this cannot be generalised to a criticism of all war, although his *jus contra bellum* approach rests on such an generalisation²⁰⁷.

Summary

I now summarise the textual evidence on justification that I have discussed. I believe that there is sufficient evidence to sustain a strong position of Erasmian opposition to most, if not all, war. Indeed some interpretations include opposition to even a Turkish war. This is strongest when it is based on his pacific interpretation of the New Testament and use of early Christian writings. The sheer weight of rhetoric also supports this view, although I have also shown how it is condensed into more concise, reasoned passages.

However, Erasmus is correct in claiming that he has consistently allowed for certain wars. I have shown that this is mostly confined to often isolated 'let out clauses', and he

²⁰⁴ *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, p. 282, and Jardine, (ed.), p. 103; also *Panagyric*, CWE., 27, p. 58, and Jardine, (ed.), *Education*, p. 142.

²⁰⁵ '...and to allow the poor to survive'. *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, pp. 254 and 256, but not included in Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*.

²⁰⁶ *Some New Prayers*, CWE., 69, "Prayer before Battle", p. 137.

²⁰⁷ A similar point is made by Johnson with respect to the 'modern-war pacifism' of US Catholic Bishops: 'its assumptions about the inherent injustice of contemporary warfare can, in principle, be overturned or proven not to hold, at least in given cases', Johnson, *Ethics and the Use of Force*, pp. 10 – 11.

himself admits to ambiguity, in large part caused by the weight of his contrary rhetoric on the ills of war. A clear case for Erasmus supporting war does emerge, however, and for most commentators it is confirmed with the text *De bello turcico*. As well as defending Christendom against the Turks, there are occasions when this permission is broadened to include a less specific defence of the commonwealth, ‘hearth and home’.

On just war, I have shown how in the humanist context, Erasmus argues against the scholastic schematisation of a just war. I have also shown the evidence of what for Fernández is a traditional just war position; but also of what I believe is one of *jus contra bellum*. He provides many rhetorical examples of the latter, particularly questioning the possibility of just cause. The weight of rhetoric again lies with this *contra bellum* position. And yet, when war becomes permissible, certainly to defend Christendom, he himself conforms to the reasoning of a just war position, even if he avoids traditional terminology. Indeed, it could be argued that he is ahead of the tradition in clearly re-iterating the criteria of last resort and proportion, and giving consideration, at least, to the authority of the people. Again therefore, and unlike Platina, he remains ambiguous. While expressing doubts ‘if indeed any war can really be called just’, in his advice to princes he decides to ‘suspend judgement on whether any war is entirely just’²⁰⁸.

THE CONDUCT OF WAR IN ERASMUS

Turning to the conduct of war, I have already demonstrated Erasmus’s statement on what we now refer to as the *jus in bello* criteria of proportion. He is also keenly aware of the second issue dealt with by *jus in bello*, that of discrimination: ‘old men left desolate...old women left destitute, condemned to a crueller death than by the sword; so many wives left

²⁰⁸ *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, pp. 282 – 3, and Jardine, (ed.), 11, pp. 103 - 4.

widows, children left orphans, homes filled with mourning'²⁰⁹. We have also seen that Erasmus uses examples like this in a *contra bellum* sense, precluding *jus ad bellum*. I now turn to focus on his failure to consider how the evident ills in the conduct of contemporary war might be remedied.

It might be argued that while expressing concerns on the conduct of war, he does not need to attend to the minutia of contemporary military debate, especially as a cleric. Indeed he himself claims that it is for him to deal with the moral, and not the military issues²¹⁰. This would be convincing if his criticisms were similarly tempered, but they are not. Erasmus has a great deal to say about military affairs in the form of harsh criticism. He freely opines as to its inherent 'evil'; is robust and colourful in his invective; and he is uncompromising, without the ambiguity that is evident in his discussion on the justification of war.

As to Erasmus's ability to give positive advice, whether or not he is so inclined, scholarship again differs. For example, for Heath, Erasmus's strategic acumen is 'precise, practical and up-to-date', enabling him to give a 'lucid analysis of the historical, political, strategic, and economic factors', he has 'an unexpected talent for armchair strategy'²¹¹. On the other hand, for Housley: 'No attention at all was accorded to the complex issues of recruitment, goals and strategy', indeed, 'Erasmus was airily, and defensively, dismissive of such technicalities'. Housley continues, 'the reason, surely, was that they entailed thinking about mercenaries, destruction and conquest, and he felt too much distaste for such horrors to go into detail'²¹².

As a main point of my critique, I argue that Erasmus's omission, whether due to ability or inclination, in providing positive advice is a serious imbalance which compromises his advice to princes. I will first consider the 'evil' of soldiering for Erasmus: in general terms,

²⁰⁹ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 404, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 313.

²¹⁰ Erasmus, *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 220, or Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, p. 316.

²¹¹ Heath, M. J., CWE., 64, *Introduction to: De bello turcico*, p. 203; and Heath, M. J., "Twelfth Annual Bainton Lecture: Erasmus and the Infidel", *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society, Yearbook* 16, (1996), p. 27.

²¹² Housley, "Erasmus, the Crusade, and War against the Turks", p 278.

and the particular issues of Christians, mercenaries, technology and political control. I will then discuss the significance of the dearth of ideas for improvement. Much of this discussion on soldiering follows on from *De Copia*'s fourth and fifth propositions against the justification of war: that it is uncivilised and un-Christian.

The Evil of Soldiering

We have already seen examples of powerful rhetoric as Erasmus repeatedly, and forcefully, condemns contemporary soldiering. In the *Complaint of Peace* he writes: 'if you want to see clearly how immoral a thing is war, you have only to look at the agents it employs'²¹³; and again, 'in wartime it's the worst scoundrels who seize authority. The men who in peacetime you would haul to the gallows find their chosen careers in war'²¹⁴. While he reserves particular condemnation for mercenaries, in much of his work there is no apparent distinction between the various types of contemporary soldier. In *Militaria* he deprecates all soldiers as 'some hired for pay, others for nothing... a splendid trade – burning houses, looting churches, violating poor people, murdering harmless ones'²¹⁵. At one point, he shows awareness of the 'incommodious life' and 'so many sorrowful labours must they take in hand', but then only to exemplify the 'most wretched' condition of these 'idiots of soldiers'²¹⁶.

On this point, the scholarship is in general agreement. For Adams, Erasmus uses the *Colloquies* especially, to 'strip from the military profession any shades of tawdry glamour', and aims this at the youth as potential recruits as much as experienced soldiers²¹⁷. The Carthusian colourfully describes not only the physical perils of soldiering, but how it results

²¹³ *Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 317, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 111.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ "Military Affairs", Thompson, *Colloquies*, pp. 13 - 14.

²¹⁶ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 415, and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 326. Also quoted and discussed in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 102.

²¹⁷ Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 199.

in a soul ‘as pure as the Paris sewer’²¹⁸. Adams also notes Erasmus citing St Bernard in equating *militiam* (soldiers) with *malitiam* (evil men), which Erasmus certainly believes to be true²¹⁹. Fernández concludes that war is the main obstacle to Erasmus’s goal as a Christian humanist: above all, ‘it is practised by spawns of the devil, by beasts who neither reason nor know of Christ, by soldiers’, a group of men who ‘left an indelible mark on Erasmus’s soul’²²⁰.

Fighting is an ‘evil’, and therefore to be avoided. Erasmus demands that men of goodwill ‘must certainly not approve or take part’²²¹. Indeed, he advises his Prince at one point, that because soldiering ‘causes the total destruction of everything worthwhile and opens up a cesspit of everything that is evil’, it would be as well for the Prince to banish the like ‘from his realm’²²². However, this leads to the question as to who will fight for the prince when war is eventually deemed permissible.

The answer to this is largely evaded, but nevertheless a form of answer can be found. Significantly, he notes that should war become necessary, ‘the best expedient will be to ensure that, being an evil thing, it is the exclusive responsibility of evil people’²²³. This much is clear, and conforms to Erasmus’s theme that there is no hope of salvation for soldiers, but it raises the further point that if war is just left to ‘evil people’, neither is there hope of improving the misconduct about which he so vociferously complains. That war should be left to ‘evil people’ is also cited by Dallmayr. However, I believe that Dallmayr is pre-occupied

²¹⁸ “The Soldier and the Carthusian”, Thompson, *Colloquies*, pp. 131 - 3.

²¹⁹ Erasmus, *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 234, and Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 299.

²²⁰ Fernández, “Erasmus on Just War”, p. 226.

²²¹ *Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 313, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 108.

²²² *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, p. 268, and Jardine, (ed.), 6, p. 83. Vives, in his *On Education* of 1531, advises that ‘wars and battles need not be studied closely. Quoted in Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 26.

²²³ *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE, 35, p. 438, and Phillips, *Adages*, pp. 351. Phillips’s translation gives a ‘bad’ thing best left to ‘bad’ people.

with the supposed Erasmian wisdom of avoiding ‘military bravado’, and he fails to derive the logical conclusion that armies become for ever condemned to regimes of misconduct²²⁴.

The connection between the essential ‘evil’ of war and the people who prosecute it, leads Erasmus to denounce soldiering as ‘unworthy...indeed of Christians’, through the character Peter in *Julius Excluded*²²⁵. Erasmus considers King David a great biblical figure, but he was not allowed to build the house of God because his hands had been polluted with human blood from war²²⁶. It is not possible to approach holy altars ‘polluted with human blood’²²⁷, and Erasmus declaims: ‘What have you got to do with the cross, you scoundrel soldier’²²⁸? Significantly, he contemplates a decree that ‘those killed in battle should not be buried in consecrated ground’²²⁹. Soldiers are again beyond any hope of redemption, or even of the earthly glory we will see promoted by Machiavelli.

More specifically, Erasmus targets the participation of clerics in war. In doctrine, this is not at all unusual²³⁰, but as we have seen the practice in various forms had become widespread. A culmination for Erasmus is the ‘soldier pope’, Julius II, to whom Peter stresses again in *Julius Excluded* that the use of the sword is totally ‘unworthy of a priest’²³¹. Their role is especially attacked in the satires *Cyclops* and *Charon*: ‘Creatures in black and white

²²⁴ Dallmayr, *Peace Talks*, p. 35.

²²⁵ *Julius Excluded*, CWE., 27, p. 175, and Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 150.

²²⁶ *Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 300, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 96. This being the case even though David warred at God’s command against an impious foe, and before Christ’s command to love one’s enemy. Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 208.

²²⁷ Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, p. 89.

²²⁸ *Complaint of Peace*, in Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 104; or ‘What is the cross to you villainous soldier?’ CWE., 27, p. 309. Erasmus also strongly condemns the contemporary practice of naming artillery pieces after the Apostles, for example, by both Charles V and Henry VIII.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 108. As for example with suicides. This also challenges the not uncommon idea that soldiers dying in a ‘just’ war would automatically go to heaven, which reoccurs in *Militaria*. This fate had been awarded for various social misdemeanours. Incendiaries and those dying in ‘detestable’ jousts should be denied a Christian burial, according to the Second Lateran Council of 1123. Reichberg, *et al.*, (2006), p. 97. Clerics dying in war or jousts, however, while to be judged, are not to be denied burial, *Ibid.*, p. 123.

²³⁰ For example, *Summa Theologica*, pp. 503-6. Priests might support war, but it is not in keeping with the nature of their calling to participate by fighting themselves. In the same way, Aquinas writes, the priesthood supports marriage while they remain celibate.

²³¹ *Julius Excluded*, CWE., 27, p. 175, and Adams, R. M., (ed.) *Other Writings*, p. 150.

cloaks', who 'never leave the courts of Princes' and 'instil into their ears a love of war'²³².

Erasmus rhetorically asks: 'what has a mitre to do with a helmet'²³³? Indeed, 'such things are better left to men who do not profess the perfection of the gospel'²³⁴.

Again, in his condemnation of mercenaries Erasmus is not unique, but he is especially scathing. For him, there is a double objection of principle: such people are manifesting 'evil', and also they do so for personal gain. They are 'the meanest and most sordid of mankind, hireling man-killers, to whom a little paltry pay is dearer than life'²³⁵; 'no class of men more abject and indeed more damnable'²³⁶. His inclination to withhold 'Christian clemency' is again apparent: commenting on a reprieve in the slaughter of captured mercenaries during the Guelders War, he regrets 'the clemency with which the mercenary army was dismissed unharmed'²³⁷. However, Erasmus makes no contribution to the contemporary debate on the best way to acquire a military force other than, as we have seen, to leave it to 'evil people', or aspire that it will not be needed.

This uncompromising negativity is also manifest when Erasmus considers new weapon technology, such as gunpowder, cannon and early firearms. Erasmus was one voice in a chorus of opposition, when he considers these 'inhuman weapons'²³⁸. However, Hale points to one theological argument deployed in their favour: God's gift to man was his intelligence to invent, therefore, not to use gunpowder, particularly against an 'evil' enemy so equipped,

²³² Most probably referring to Dominicans, "Charon", Thompson, *Colloquies*, p. 391. Also, Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 271.

²³³ '...a crozier with a sword, the Gospel with a shield'. *Complaint of Peace*, CWE., 27, p. 307, and Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 103.

²³⁴ *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 252, or Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, p. 328.

²³⁵ *Letter to Anthony a Bergis*, Mayer, *The Pacifist Conscience*, p. 55.

²³⁶ *The Education of a Christian Prince*, CWE., 27, p. 283, and Jardine, (ed.), 11, p. 103.

²³⁷ Letter to Spalatin in 1517. Quoted in Tracy, *The Politics of Erasmus*, p. 98. This refers to the captured 'Black Band' involved in the sack of Asperen. Erasmus wished they could have been burnt to cinders, becoming 'truly black'. As Tracy discusses, and as Erasmus appears unaware, the slaughter was probably halted with a pragmatic view to re-employing those same mercenaries.

²³⁸ *Complaint of Peace*, in Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 105, or Radice: 'arms such as we have now', CWE., 27, p. 310.

would be to ‘insult the Creator and to ignore His gifts’²³⁹. Indeed, Platina argues that man was given ‘reason’ to defend himself. Erasmus does not agree. Such weapons are another example of ‘fallen man’ drifting further from a state of natural order and peace. He applies his usual invective: while animals fight with natural weapons, mankind had devised ‘machines out of hell’, and enlist ‘a terrific arsenal...in the service of their rage’²⁴⁰. Again, in a war which he eventually permits, the armies of his prince would be disadvantaged and out dated. Even the Ottomans were developing significant artillery capabilities²⁴¹.

One final issue to consider here is that Erasmus observes the tendency in war for power to centralise, and he fears that some princes use war as an excuse to solidify their hold on power. He sees that after seventy years of local war, as it is, ‘the freedom of the people, the power of the towns, the authority of parliaments’ has diminished, while ‘what pleases the prince, that is the law’²⁴². Therefore, when it becomes necessary to fight the Turks, every effort should be made to avoid suspicion. Money raised, must be seen to be used for the purposes claimed. The ‘expedition must not be made an excuse to undermine the freedoms and laws of the various states... we must not bring a new and worse tyranny upon ourselves’²⁴³.

This appears a reasonable concern on the misuse of power, and follows on from his argument that princely authority in declaring war should be checked by the people. However, as Phillips observes, while strongly advocating that princely power should be directed to the good of the people, ‘(n)owhere does he give any detailed suggestion of how this is to be

²³⁹ Hale, J. R., “Gunpowder and the Renaissance: an Essay in the History of Ideas”, in *Renaissance War Studies* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1983), p. 394.

²⁴⁰ *Complaint of Peace*, Adams, R. M., (ed.), *Other Writings*, p. 102, or Radice: ‘infernal machines’, *CWE.*, 27, p. 306.

²⁴¹ Hale demonstrates the acceptance of such weapons, not so much on intellectual argument, but because such weapons ‘worked, they won battles, they demolished walls’, Hale, “Gunpowder and the Renaissance”, p. 402. Firearms became a general feature of Renaissance life, even of art. A friend of Erasmus, Peter Falk, is described as carrying a sidearm for the ingenious novelty value. *Ibid.*, p. 405. Hale cites: Nichols, F.M., *The Epistles of Erasmus* (3 vols., London, 1907-17), II, pp. 335-6.

²⁴² *De bello turcico*, *CWE.*, 64, p. 261, or Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, p. 330.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, *CWE.*, 64, p. 254, or Rummel, (ed.), p. 329.

achieved²⁴⁴. Although I would add, he believes this follows from princes behaving as true Christians, and having the benefit of his humanist education.

On the conduct of war, therefore, and the general issue of contemporary soldiering, Erasmus makes a very rhetorical critique, deploying the full force of his invective. Adams repeatedly argues that Erasmus is being ‘realistic’, and it is errant kings who have false ‘ideals’ of glory²⁴⁵. However, I do not believe this amounts to an adequate defence of Erasmus against charges of idealism. Erasmus is negative and uncompromising, and my argument now concerns how little he has to say about how the conduct in war might be improved.

A Paucity of Ideas for Improvement

First, I consider what Erasmus does have to say about dealing with misconduct in contemporary warfare, and then demonstrate a significant contrast in the approach of contemporaries. I also make a further observation on Erasmus’s use of Plato. When it comes to *De bello turcico*, Erasmus does acknowledge a need for preparation, but he says that his concern is less with military, than with the moral preparations, ‘of course, we must make all the preparations necessary for such an arduous war, but before that we must make the preparations without which military strength will be in vain’²⁴⁶. While claiming concern for moral preparation, however, he also argues that conduct in war is driven by necessity. In denigrating any idea of ‘honour’ being associated with war, he also argues: ‘the necessities of the moment rather than the rules of honour often dictate the tactics used in war’. War is ‘a

²⁴⁴ Phillips, *Erasmus*, p. 148.

²⁴⁵ Adams, R. P., *The Better Part of Valour*, p. 68; also pp. 63, 83, 93, and 112 – 118.

²⁴⁶ *De bello turcico*, CWE., 64, p. 220, or Rummel, (ed.), *Reader*, p. 316.

business governed by necessity ... rather than by honour²⁴⁷. Again, should it become necessary, war is best left to less than honourable people.

He does very briefly consider the quality and moral calibre of the soldier, almost admitting to the weakness in his argument, but he moves the question to one of leadership. It cannot be expected that there are no 'wicked' men among the common people, therefore, the leadership must give a moral lead: 'it does not matter quite so much what the common soldiers are like, if the monarchs and generals agree to do what is right'²⁴⁸.

However, here Erasmus is relying on the national leadership to suddenly balance the gross litany of 'evil' he had hitherto attributed to the soldiery, and which was far more than an occasional 'wicked' commoner. Previously, this was sufficient to sway the balance against even 'just' wars, *contra bellum*. Therefore, the leadership would have an impossible challenge at the moment of last resort. Even if Erasmus is considering a defence by citizens, and not the vexacious mercenaries, it is not clear how this task can be achieved, and any discussion is overwhelmed by his ire at soldiering in general. Again, he is blatantly dismissive of the common soldier, 'it does not matter' what they are like.

In contrast, his friend and contemporary Thomas More, does address the contemporary debate of how to provide for a credible military²⁴⁹. As a first option, mercenaries would be hired to fight for the *Utopians*: not only, but importantly, because of their aptitude and experience, but also because their death would not be a loss to the civilised world. Secondly, these would then be backed up by alternative troops, auxiliaries or foreign troops, and finally a citizen militia. The latter involves all citizens, men and women, who devote considerable time and effort to regular military training. Of course, More can be seen as being ironic on

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, CWE., 64, p. 252, or Rummel, (ed.), p. 328.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, CWE., 64, p. 263, and Rummel, (ed.), p. 332. Again, on the misconduct of soldiers, 'a heavy responsibility lies with their commanders, and still more with their monarchs', *Ibid.*, CWE., 64, p. 250, or Rummel, (ed.), p. 327.

²⁴⁹ More, Thomas, *Utopia* (1516), Logan, George, M., and Adams, Robert, M., (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 2, Military Practices, pp. 85 - 92.

this, as with the many other social issues raised in *Utopia*: the spectacle of all citizens ‘swimming in armour’ need not be seen as entirely plausible. However, my point is that More at least rehearses the range of options in the debate, and which we see again with Machiavelli. Erasmus, on the other hand, does not even refer to this not uncommon humanist debate.

I have shown that Erasmus considers soldiers to be beyond redemption, for example, with the idea of burial in un-consecrated ground. Martin Luther takes a different view, and gives a positive answer to ‘*Whether Soldiers Too can be Saved*’²⁵⁰. Perhaps more mindful of a need for secular protection, Luther distinguishes between the occupation and the holder. The office of the soldier is a justified, indeed a divine calling, but care is needed to ensure that ‘those who do the work are the right kind of persons, that is godly and upright’. He acknowledges that there are some ‘rough and cynical people in service’, but these need not be ‘the true core of the army’²⁵¹. There are, of course, many points of disagreement between Luther and Erasmus, but here Luther does provide a theological contrast to Erasmus on soldiering.

The significance of failing to provide for an adequate and convincing defence is underlined in Bayley’s account of contemporary warfare. Defeat might not just be the result of a lost battle. Particularly in mercenary led campaigns, there is a tendency against overt and bloody confrontation, the ‘supreme manifestation of the military art was a bloodless victory, when an enfeebled and demoralised foe tamely withdrew or capitulated’²⁵². By manoeuvre and posture, an enemy weak in either military strength or moral resolve is forced to accept terms. It follows that without a well prepared, suitably equipped and credible deterrence,

²⁵⁰ Luther, Martin, *Whether Soldiers Too Can Be Saved* (1526), Jacobs, C. M., (trans.), Schultz, R. C., (rev.), in Schultz, R. C., and Lehmann, H. T., (eds.) *Luthers Works, Vol.46, ‘The Christian in Society’* (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1967).

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

²⁵² Bayley, C.C., *War and Society in Renaissance Florence: The De Militia of Leonardo Bruni* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 184.

defeat is not only likely, it is invited. Erasmus's failure to consider maintaining a credible force, even in times of peace, contrasts with some of his English contemporaries. As we have seen, More's Utopians go to great lengths to maintain their skills and capabilities, 'so they are fit to fight should the need arise'; and Dudley argues that 'good and suer preparation for warr' encourages honourable peace, and should be pursued during peace²⁵³.

As has been discussed in the context of Renaissance humanism, Erasmus readily turns to Plato to exemplify the importance of education for his Christian prince. I find it very noticeable, therefore, that he does not refer at all to Plato's guardian soldiers, for whom training and education were also so important, and on which Plato writes a great deal. For example, Plato uses the analogy of 'pure-bred dogs' who can be 'both gentle and full of spirit', and know when, and with whom, to act appropriately²⁵⁴. However, 'lack of discipline, hunger or some fault of character leads them to try to attack the sheep themselves, and start behaving like wolves instead of dogs'²⁵⁵. This not only clearly portrays much of the misconduct about which Erasmus complains, but points to education, discipline and other remedies which are fully in keeping with a humanist programme. But Erasmus, and quite unlike Sánchez, avoids any reference to Plato's guardian soldiers.

To summarise on the conduct of war, for all his invective, not only has Erasmus omitted to give any serious consideration to the provision of soldiers, but on his recommendation the military would remain a disapproved of profession, devoid of 'men of goodwill', if not banished altogether. On the basis of this negative critique, Christendom would not find adequate protectors when it needs them. Militias take time to train, and the support of stipendiary troops cannot be guaranteed, indeed they would have little reason to fight for Erasmus's ideal prince. Moreover, the people would have been so appraised of the 'evil' of

²⁵³ More, *Utopia*, p. 85. Dudley, E., *The Tree of Commonwealth*, Brodie, D. M., (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), p. 50.

²⁵⁴ Plato, *The Republic*, Ferrari, (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 2, 375 c.–e., p. 59.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 3, 416 a., p. 109.

war that the Christian prince would struggle to create a sufficiently supportive political will to prepare for, and sustain, the military campaign. The only hope he offers lies with the ideal of a perpetual and universal Christian peace, and the avoidance of war.

I agree, therefore, with Howard: Erasmus firmly belongs with those ‘humanitarian thinkers for whom it was enough to chronicle the horrors of war in order to condemn it; men who may command one’s instinctive agreement, but provide little constructive advice as to how to deal with the phenomenon which they find so abhorrent to nature and reason’²⁵⁶. Although, for Erasmus I would add: abhorrent to God.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Erasmus writes on peace and war with a keen wit and in a strong humanist style of which he is seen as a master. In both style and content, his rhetoric against the ills of war and his praise of peace closely correlates with Platina’s earlier *De laudibus pacis*. Therefore, with clear antecedents in the Italian Renaissance, the broad claims of originality that we have seen for Erasmus and the Northern Renaissance need to be qualified.

It is reasonable to describe his writing on the ills of war as ‘diatribes’, and this evidences a strong personal disposition against war. But he writes widely for both popular and intellectual readerships, and his writing against war cannot be portrayed as completely rhetorical. I have shown consistency, in his complaints at least, between the rhetoric and the more concise, but less familiar, argumentation.

Historical context is pertinent. Erasmus was certainly influenced by the local violence in the Low Countries, although there is no evidence of direct, personal experience of conflict.

²⁵⁶ Howard, Sir Michael, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (London: Hurst, 2007), p. 8.

Erasmus is central to the relatively brief wave of northern humanist optimism for peace, to be secured by a new generation of 'young princes'. This approach echoes Platina's writing during a mood of optimism with the Pauline Peace and the Peace of Lodi. For Erasmus, the sense of strong optimism is reflected in the more frequently cited political works written at this time, and is very pronounced, for example, in the Christian ideals so evident in his discussion of treaties in *The Education of a Christian Prince*.

There is a change of mood and a noted pessimism in later life. This is in part accounted for by: continued dynastic war; his failure to reconcile the developing debates of the Reformation; and an increasing Ottoman threat to Christendom as a whole. However, this changing context, though certainly relevant, is not sufficient to explain the mutability of his arguments on war: the ambiguity and his 'let out clauses' appear consistently throughout his writing career, certainly since the *Panagyric* of 1504.

Erasmus's natural world is at peace, and in this, he closely matches Platina, and is contrary to Sánchez. Man is born soft-skinned, defenceless and created for friendship, not conflict. In both his anthropology and theology, war is a corruption. Therefore in order to restore peace, man requires: in secular terms, education and the fulfilment of humanist ideals; and in theological terms, God's grace and a return to early Christian pacifism. I have shown that, while he is ambiguous on the issue of determinism, it is very clear that for Erasmus, the whole profession of soldiering is beyond God's grace and hope of redemption.

I argue that Erasmus has to be seen within the context of Renaissance humanism and the many, often changing, positions that are taken within this framework. His political commentary reflects the humanist mutability between monarchy, aristocracy and the various republican traditions. He is ambiguous on the influence of the people: at times the people check the warlike ambitions of princes; elsewhere, they are prone to factionalism and war.

Erasmus often denounces intellectuality for its own sake, but his particular circle of humanist intellectuals are themselves criticised for forming an idealistic elite.

I have considered the considerable variation in the scholarship interpreting Erasmus on war. There are grounds for arguing that he consistently opposes all war: this is evidenced by a pacific reading of Christian doctrine; and the sheer weight of rhetoric deployed against war. On the other hand, he himself has argued clearly to the contrary: both in *De bello turcico*, and with a 'let out clause' in most of his major political works. Yet more scholarship argues for a form of compromise: he either changed his views, or represented a combination of views.

In developing my own position, I examine his argument, consistent in both rhetorical and more succinct writing, that war is: unnatural, uncivilized, un-Christian, without any consequential advantage, and inherently risky. I balance this against his further claim that he always had allowed for a necessary war. I also note that his critique of the scholastic just war tradition is in keeping with the broader humanist critique of the scholastics. Erasmus deprecates constant appeals to the authority of medieval patriarchs, including Augustine; and claims that draw conclusions from premises of authority, cause or intention.

Nevertheless, he does frequently refer to the principles of the just war criteria, if not in precise form of the scholastics. In addition to the core criteria of cause, authority and intention, he clearly iterates, ahead of most accounts of the tradition, conditions of last resort and proportion, and of authority qualified with a power of veto by the people. However, I argue that he uses these principles in two contrasting ways. First, in line with the just war tradition, he demonstrates the restraints to be imposed on a permitted war. But secondly, in keeping with *jus contra bellum*, he more frequently argues that such conditions are not fulfilled in contemporary wars, and he doubts that they ever could be. In this, Erasmus over-

generalises: citing what are clearly unjust examples, and inferring that all wars will necessarily be similarly at fault.

I conclude, therefore, that Erasmus intentionally maintains a duality, even ambiguity, in his denial and justification of war. This is more than a humanist malleability of political principle, or of shifting between intellectual viewpoints. Erasmus has a clear, personal abhorrence of warfare. He identifies firmly with a pacific reading of the New Testament, and with the writings of the early, pre-Augustinian, Christians. By most understandings of the term today, he is a pacifist. However, in the political and religious context of his time, he is never going to subscribe to the extremism that a full pacifist position would require. Erasmus is not going to break with Rome. He prevaricates, but is eventually forced by circumstances to explicitly acknowledge the necessity of a war against the Ottomans. I believe that he is fully aware of his dilemma, and when he writes that it is 'knavery' to accuse him of pacifism, he does so with clear, humanist irony. But for Erasmus, war remains a deeply serious and personal issue.

We have also seen that most of his advice on treaties and the conduct of foreign policy is based on the assumptions of a Christian ideal. Specifically, on the conduct of war I argue that there is a serious flaw. He is totally consistent and unambiguous in his condemnation of all soldiering, without exception. Unlike most contemporaries, at no point does he make suggestions, refer to, or initiate a debate, as to how this can be improved. It is significant that the education of Plato's guardian soldiers is ignored. Indeed, because war is such an 'evil', Erasmus is clear that it is best left to 'evil' people. His only hope, therefore, is that with universal moral reform, again the Christian ideal, they will not be needed. But even when he does acknowledge the need for a war, he remains dismissive of improving such 'wickedness'. He is equally dismissive of military technology.

Therefore, his advice not only leaves his prince to face a better provided-for enemy, but the social ills of an ill-disciplined soldiery, of which he bitterly complains, will continue to be visited on the general population. Furthermore, his reluctance to consider improving the situation is strengthened by the ambiguity on justifying war: there is no compulsion for it to be improved. I disagree, therefore, with Dallmayr: Erasmus does not provide a useful guidepost for an age of violence.

Before turning to Machiavelli's approach to peace and war, considered by most to be at an opposite extreme to Erasmus, I conclude my critique of Erasmus, perhaps ironically, by citing a rarely read prayer. I believe that his Christian ideals, faith in divine providence, but also his neglect in the provision of an adequate military, are encapsulated in a 'Prayer before Battle'²⁵⁷. In this, he straightaway turns to David's victory over Goliath as an exemplar: success is granted by God, and achieved by David who 'was small, without weapons, and unskilled in war'²⁵⁸. I now turn to examine Machiavelli's position on these and related questions.

²⁵⁷ Included in my Volume 2, Appendix 2, p. 89. Erasmus, *Some New Prayers*, CWE., 69, "Prayer before Battle", p. 137.

²⁵⁸ David is, of course, a celebrated Renaissance figure, and Michelangelo's statue in Florence is normally seen as representing the city's heroic stand against tyranny. This was not universal, as Leonardo da Vinci was especially critical, as discussed, for example, by Jonathon Jones in his chapter "Stoning David": Jones, Jonathan, *The Lost Battles: Leonardo, Michelangelo and the Artistic Duel that defined the Renaissance* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2010), pp. 70 – 89.

CHAPTER 5 – MACHIAVELLI

INTRODUCTION

Machiavelli wrote extensively on military history and the ‘*Arte*’ of war¹, and is credited by Ian Clark with providing ‘one of the finest examples of the political philosophy of war’². Yet, despite this, Machiavelli appears to have little to say on the normative aspects of peace and war. There is a perfunctory claim in *The Discourses*, that ‘war is justified if necessity forces one to it’³, which is usually taken by commentators as a dismissal of the whole issue of a ‘just war’. Again, he appears to dismiss further moral consideration with the claim that: ‘when the safety of one’s country wholly depends on the decision to be taken, no attention should be paid to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its being praiseworthy or ignominious’⁴.

Beyond the ‘*Arte*’ of war, Machiavelli’s general normative stance has been, and continues to be, variously interpreted. Bernard Crick reviews the range interpretation, concluding: ‘... there is no end to it, nor ever will be’⁵. Humfrey Butters discusses the problem of identifying any patterns of thought, or structures in Machiavelli, for whom a leader who puts faith in ‘structure, in regular, recurrent and predictable forms of behaviour

¹ Hale estimates that technical military material alone not only constitutes almost all of the *Art of War*, but also about one sixth of the *Prince*, one fifth of the *Discourses*, and forms many of the few generalisations made in the *History of Florence*. Hale, J. R., *Renaissance War Studies* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1983), p. 381.

² Clark, *Philosophical Introduction*, p. 53.

³ Machiavelli continues: ‘...and to arm is a duty, if in arms lies one’s hope’. I will later consider these quotations in detail. Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, (cited as *The Discourses*) Walker, Leslie, J., (trans.), Crick, Bernard, (ed.) (London: Penguin, 1974), 3, 12, p. 442. Machiavelli is citing a Samnite general, in Latin: ‘*Iustum est bellum quibus necessarium, et pia arma quibus nisi in armis spes est*’, *Opere*, p. 218.

⁴ *The Discourses*, 3, 41, p. 515. ‘...dove si delibera al tutto della salute della patria, non vi debbe cadere alcuna considerazione né di giusto né d’ingiusto, né di piaso crudele, né di laudabile né d’ignominioso’, *Opere*, p. 249.

⁵ Crick, Bernard, “Introduction” to, *The Discourses*, p. 17. More recent interpretations of Machiavelli’s ethics to which I will refer include Erica Brenner’s ‘dialectic’ account: Benner, Erica, *Machiavelli’s Ethics* (Princeton and Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2009).

and stable patterns of relationships courts disaster'⁶. This was particularly so at the time of the Italian Wars, when Italians were seen as 'helpless victims in a world out of control'⁷. More simplistically, for Sydney Anglo, Machiavelli is '...inconsistent, ambiguous, and emotional'⁸. It appears particularly challenging, therefore, to understand Machiavelli on normative issues of peace and war, if on the one hand he apparently says so little about it, and on the other, the interpretation of any normative issue is so problematic.

However, after drawing on his lesser-read political and literary works, and revisiting his major works and pertinent scholarship, I believe that a fuller and clearer picture emerges than has hitherto been apparent. This chapter asks of Machiavelli the questions of my theme: what does he understand by the concepts of peace and war; how, or if, he justifies wars; and what moral discussion, if any, does he provide on the conduct of warfare? Much has been debated on the broader Florentine Renaissance, therefore to maintain focus, I will consider contextual issues as they arise.

I will argue that Machiavelli does have a consistent and clear view of the nature of peace and war. I demonstrate how he deals with the whole contemporary, justificatory language of war, and not only 'just war'. Politics is a crucial factor, and I show how this is reflected in issues such as finance and the humanitarian dimension. Significantly, I argue that he places considerable restraint on the conduct of war, above all, political restraint. Therefore, to view Machiavelli's war, in Neal Woods' words, as a 'no-holds-barred contest'⁹, or to readily dismiss a 'just war' in favour of a 'necessary war', is inaccurate. Instead, the

⁶ Butters, H. C., "Political Allegiances and Political Structures in the Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli and Francesco Guicciardini", in Shaw, Christine, (ed.), *Italy and European Powers: The Impact of War 1500-1530* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), p. 99.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁸ Anglo, Sydney, *Machiavelli – The First Century: Studies in Enthusiasm, Hostility, and Irrelevance*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 680.

⁹ Wood, "Introduction" to Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, (cited as *The Art of War*), Wood, Neal, (ed.), Farnsworth, Ellis, (trans.) (Da Capo Press, 2001), p. xxv.

idea of restraint, to ‘bridle an armed multitude’¹⁰, is intrinsic to his political and military thought. I also continue to compare and contrast Machiavelli’s work with that of Erasmus and the contributors to the *Disputatio*.

From his major works, I focus especially on speeches and debates on the justification of particular wars in *The History of Florence*¹¹. Of his minor political writings, particularly informative are: the 1503 oration by Machiavelli on making financial provision for war¹²; and also his 1506 discussion and orders for the Florentine militia, referred to as “Discourse on the organisation of the Florentine State for arms”, “*Discorso dell’ordinare lo stato di Firenze alle armi*”¹³. I provide my English translation of the latter at Appendix 3.

From the range of scholarship on Machiavelli, I draw on selected texts. For the concepts underpinning Machiavelli’s world view, Anthony Parel has produced his analysis of *The Machiavellian Cosmos*¹⁴, and Viroli his recent discussion of *Machiavelli’s God*¹⁵. A

¹⁰ *The Art of War*, 6, p. 165. ‘...a frenare gli uomini armati’, *Opere*, p. 370.

¹¹ Machiavelli, *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, Felix (ed.) (New York: Harper and Row, 1960). I share Filippo Del Lucchese in appreciating *The History of Florence* as a ‘more mature work’ from ‘Machiavelli’s final years’, and the value of the speeches contained therein, although Lucchese’s focus is on social conflict rather than foreign wars. Lucchese, Filippo Del, “Crisis and Power: Economics, Politics and Conflict in Machiavelli’s Political Thought”, *History of Political Thought*, Vol. XXX, No. 1, (Spring, 2009), pp. 75-96; I cite from p. 75 and p. 81.

¹² Machiavelli, “Words to be spoken on Law for appropriating Money, after giving a little Introduction and Excuse”, (1503), in *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others*, Vol.3, Gilbert, A., (trans.) (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1965), pp. 1439-43. Although usually dated at 1503, Gilbert discusses the possibility of this being written at a later date, in view of its similarity to the ‘invented’ speeches he uses in *The History of Florence*. “*Parole da dirle sopra la provisione del danaio facto un poco di proemio e di scusa*”, *Opere*, pp. 11-14. Also: *Arte della guerra e scritti politici minori*, Bertelli, Sergio, (ed.) (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1961), pp. 57-62.

¹³ Machiavelli, “Discourse on the organisation of the Florentine State for arms”, (1506), in *Arte della Guerra e scritti politici minori*, Bertelli, (ed.), pp. 95-100; and *Opere*, pp. 40 – 51. I cite this as “Discourse on the Florentine State for Arms”, and provide my own translation in Volume 2, Appendix 3; it is also sometimes referred to, particularly by Hörnqvist, as the “*La Cagione dell’Ordinanza*”. There are a number of papers written or drafted by Machiavelli associated with the militia project, in or around 1506. First, a very brief collection of thoughts, “*Giribizi d’ordinanza*”. Second, the *Discorso* or *Cagione*, which I would describe as a positioning paper. Third, the full instruction, usually referred to as the “*Ordinanza*”, “*Ordinance*”: “*Provisioni della repubblica di Firenze per istituire il magistrato de’ ufficiali dell’Ordinanza e Milizia fiorentina, dettate da Niccolò Machiavelli*”, “Provisions by the Republic of Florence instituting magistrates and officials for the Ordinance of the Florentine Militia”. This is subdivided with a “*Provisione*” on infantry; and another on cavalry following in 1512. Other papers include one on ‘captains of infantry’, and one on the reconstitution or revision of the Ordinance. These are all found in Italian in the Bertelli’s *Arte della Guerra e scritti politici minori*.

¹⁴ Parel, Anthony, J., *The Machiavellian Cosmos* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992).

context for Machiavelli's wider political thought is provided by John Pocock's *Machiavellian Moment*¹⁶, and Quinton Skinner's work, especially from *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*¹⁷. However, with his *Machiavelli and Empire*¹⁸, Mikael Hörnqvist challenges what he describes as a republican, and militarily defensive posture in both Pocock and Skinner. A number of recent contributions are brought together in the 2010 edition of *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli*¹⁹. A sharp critique can usually be found with Sidney Anglo, starting with his *Machiavelli: A Dissection*²⁰.

More specifically on war, the starting point of my research is Neal Wood's "Introduction" to *The Art of War*²¹, and the paper by Timothy Lukes, "Martialing Machiavelli: Reassessing the Military Reflections"²². Hörnqvist produces a useful study of the militia in his 2002 article "Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506", with other contributions and authors on this subject in *The Cambridge Companion*²³. Butters' work on Florentine government, which is critical of Machiavelli's militia, begins with his *Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth-Century Florence 1502-1519*²⁴. Sebastian de Grazia

¹⁵ Viroli, Maurizio, *Machiavelli's God*, Shugaar, A., (trans.) (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010).

¹⁶ Pocock, J. G. A., *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003).

¹⁷ Skinner, *Foundations*, 1 and 2.

¹⁸ Hörnqvist, Mikael, *Machiavelli and Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

¹⁹ Najemy, John, M., (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²⁰ Anglo, Sydney, *Machiavelli: A Dissection* (London: Granada, 1969). Anglo's critical commentary is described by Michael Mallett, for example, as 'rather acid': *Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy* (London, Sydney and Toronto: The Bodley Head, 1974), p. 274, n. Ch.10.

²¹ Wood, Neal, "Introduction" to, Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, (1521), Wood, Neal, (ed.), Farnsworth, Ellis, (trans.) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001).

²² Lukes, Timothy, J., "Martialing Machiavelli: Reassessing the Military Reflections", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 66, No. 4, (November 2004).

²³ Hörnqvist, Mikael, "Perché non si usa allegare i Romani: Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506", *Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol. 55. No.1 (Spring, 2002), p. 162. Also, this militia is discussed in his "Machiavelli's military project and the Art of War"; and Roslyn Pesman's "Machiavelli, Soderini, and the republic of 1494-1512"; both in *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli*. I also consider the discussion by Erica Benner in *Machiavelli's Ethics*, 2009), pp. 292-3.

²⁴ Butters, H. C., *Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth-Century Florence 1502-1519* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).

includes a short, but comprehensive, section on war and peace, in his *Machiavelli in Hell*²⁵.

Other sources are accessed on topics such as justice, religion and glory²⁶.

CONCEPTS OF PEACE AND WAR

Peace and War

Machiavelli certainly employed the language of religion and astrology, particularly in his literary work. This is the contemporary idiom, for Viroli, ‘the religious consciousness of the Florence of his time’²⁷. At a deeper level, Parel’s thesis in *Machiavelli’s Cosmos* is that ‘a pre-modern cosmology and a pre-modern anthropology underlie Machiavelli’s political theory’²⁸. Indeed, Parel clearly argues that Machiavelli ‘still believed that the heavens did exert their causality on human beings through motion, power, and signs’²⁹. Viroli, while arguing for Machiavelli’s belief in a particular religion and God, also acknowledges Machiavelli’s extensive reference to this cosmology³⁰. Albeit, Viroli rightly cautions that we might never know Machiavelli’s true personal beliefs: ‘...perhaps an impossible undertaking’³¹.

In reviewing certain key passages, I argue that two themes emerge from this cosmology. First, there is a resigned acceptance of the inevitable cycle of peace and war. Secondly, Machiavelli is of the view that ambition and avarice are the source and fuel of human conflict.

²⁵ Grazia, Sebastian, de, *Machiavelli in Hell*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp.164 – 173.

²⁶ For example: **Justice**: Parel, A. J., “Machiavelli’s Notions of Justice”, *Political Theory*, Vol. 18, No.4, (November, 1990), pp. 528-544). **Religion**: Hochner, Nicole, “A Ritualist Approach to Machiavelli”, *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 30, No. 4, (Winter, 2009), pp. 575-95. **Glory**: Price, Russell, “The Theme of Gloria in Machiavelli”, *Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 4, (Winter 1977), pp. 588 – 631; and Zmora, Hilla, “A World Without Saving Grace: Glory and Immortality in Machiavelli”, *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 28, No. 3, (Autumn 2007), pp. 449 – 468.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁸ Parel, *The Machiavellian Cosmos*, p. 153.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³⁰ Viroli, *Machiavelli’s God*, pp. 27-33. I will return shortly to the nature of this religion as described by Viroli.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

The inevitability of war emerges from, what Gwendolyn Trotteim describes in Machiavelli as, ‘the mutability of the heavens and nature as opposed to their fixed and orderly character and movement’³². In *The Golden Ass* Machiavelli describes how the planets, stars and moon ‘go wandering...without any rest’, and ‘likewise nothing on earth remains in the same condition always’. He continues:

‘From this result peace and war; on this depend the hatreds
among those whom one wall and one moat shut up together’³³.

This is firmly in the Heraclitian tradition, and we have seen Sánchez argue similarly in his *Commendatio bello*. Indeed, the place of the verse in a literary text shows that Machiavelli believed such a world view to be a common-place with his audience. As with celestial bodies, so it is with states. As Parel summarises, ‘it is difficult for states to “stand still”’³⁴, and inevitably they come into conflict.

A cyclic pattern in the life of a province is well described by Machiavelli in the oft cited passage from *The History of Florence*: ‘...valour produces peace; peace, repose; repose, disorder; disorder, ruin; so from disorder order springs; from order virtue, and from this glory and good fortune’; and again: ‘Arms having secured victory, and victory peace...’³⁵. And a contemporary describes war as a recurring ‘red splash on Fortune’s turning wheel’³⁶. Again, Machiavelli evokes a traditional and widely held view associated with the Polybian cycle,

³² Trotteim, Gwendolyn, “Battling Fortune in Sixteenth-Century Italy”, in Cuneo, Pia, (ed.), *Artful Armies and Beautiful Battles: Art and Warfare in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 216.

³³ “The [Golden] Ass”, (ca 1517), in *The Chief Works*, 1, pp. 757 - 8. ‘Vedi le stele e 'l ciel, vedi la luna, / vedi gli altri pianeti andare errando / or alto or basso senza requie alcuna; ...Di quivi nasce la pace e la guerra’, *Opere*, p. 961.

³⁴ Parel, *The Machiavellian Cosmos*, p. 37.

³⁵ *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 5, 1, p. 204. ‘Perché la virtù partorisce quiete, la quiete ozio, l’ozio disordine, il disordine rovina; e similmente dalla rovina nasce l’ordine, dall’ordine virtù, da questa gloria e buona fortuna... avendo le buone e ordinate armi partorito vittorie, e le vittorie quiete’; *Opere*, p. 738.

³⁶ The ‘red splash’ is attributed to Luigi da Porto, and Hale compares Machiavelli’s cyclic account to that of Luigi da Porto. Hale, *Renaissance War Studies*, p. 362; and *Lettere Storiche di Luigi da Porto*, Bressan (ed.) (Firenze, 1857), pp. 26 and 46.

which reinforces a resigned acceptance both of the temporary nature of earthly peace, and of the inevitability of violence.

Machiavelli is not totally fatalistic, however, as the whole point of his concept of *virtù* is that man can, to an extent, resist the effects of fortune. He is clear that ‘fortune is the arbiter of half the things we do, leaving the other half or so to be controlled by ourselves’³⁷. Indeed, he acknowledges that when good princes rule, there is ‘a world replete with peace and justice’³⁸. But of course, this is not the condition in which he finds contemporary Italy, ‘as far as I recall, war has either been going on or it has been talked of’³⁹.

Peace and war are set to reoccur with the cycle of fortune. There is little scope, therefore, to aspire to improve this position and minimise the occurrence of war; instead we must accept it as a fact of the human condition and work within these parameters. This contrasts with the more aspirational view of both Platina and Erasmus, for whom it is possible, indeed obligatory, to strive for peace. Coker points out that ‘we act according to the way we conceive the world’, and to see war as inevitable ‘is of course to encourage us to go to war in order to change the world’⁴⁰. I argue, therefore, that in Machiavelli not only is there an acceptance of the condition of war, but there is dangerously little aspiration for peace.

Motion, tension, and confrontation are constant, but Machiavelli is clear in his distinction between peace and war: ‘...for that cannot be called peace in which states frequently assail each other with arms, nor can those be considered wars in which no men are

³⁷ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, (cited as *The Prince*), Bull, G., (trans.) (London: Penguin, 1999), 25, p. 79.

‘...iudico potere essere vero che la fortuna sia arbitra della metà della azioni nostre, ma che etiam lei ne lasci governare l'altra metà...’, *Opere*, Capata, p. 51.

³⁸ *The Discourses*, 1, 10, p. 137. ‘... ripieno di pace e di giustizia il mondo’, *Opere*, p. 92.

³⁹ Letter to Guicciardini, 3 January, 1526. *The Letters of Machiavelli*, Gilbert, A., (ed. and trans.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 223. ‘*Sempre, mentre che io ho di ricordo, o e' si fece guerra, o e' se ne ragionò*’, *Opere*, p. 1227.

⁴⁰ Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, p. 60.

slain, cities plundered, or sovereigns overthrown'⁴¹. War is therefore characterised here by the actual use of lethal violence, and peace by its absence. Machiavelli does not include the threat of force in defining war, and he is disparaging of the period covered by the Peace of Lodi, in effect, a balance of power and an uneasy peace.

Peace is not always benign. First, for Machiavelli, disagreement, friction and confrontation continue. Wood describes how 'tensions accumulate below the surface to erupt anew', and Hale describes in Machiavelli a 'war-like peace', continually 'on the verge of war'⁴². Secondly, as with Sánchez and fundamental for Machiavelli, peace produces lethargy and corruption. Extended peace will sap military energy, the 'vigour of the martial mind'⁴³, and undermine readiness for the next cycle of war.

This debilitating effect of peace is, of course, an idea rooted in the classics. The whole rationale behind Vegetius's *Epitoma Rei Militaris* was that 'the strength of former times had been broken by neglect'⁴⁴; and N. P. Milner describes how Machiavelli would 'augment, modernise, illustrate and supplement' the widely read Vegetius, 'making notable use of Polybius, (with his cyclic account of growth and decay), Frontinus and Livy'⁴⁵. Plato warns of an extended peace producing a generation 'incapable of waging war and losing their freedom'; although Plato does equally warn of an 'excessive enthusiasm for military life' and seeks a correct balance⁴⁶. Parel also explains that 'in astrological natural philosophy, a long

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

⁴² Wood, "Introduction" to *The Art of War*, p. lix. Hale, *Renaissance War Studies*, p. 386. This also finds a more recent echo in Foucault, for whom peace was an ongoing 'battlefront', running through society 'continuously and permanently', 'peace itself is a coded war', Foucault, Michel, *Society Must Be Defended*, Macey, D., (trans.) (Penguin, 2004), p. 225.

⁴³ Machiavelli, *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 5, 1, p. 204. '...la fortezza degli armati animi', *Opere*, p. 738.

⁴⁴ Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Science, (Epitoma Rei Militaris)*, Milner, N. P., (trans., and ed.) (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993 and 2001), p. 32.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

⁴⁶ Plato, *The Statesman*, Waterfield, Robin, (trans. and ed.), Annas, Julia, (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 307e – 308a, pp. 80 – 81. As Waterfield and Annas note, the creation and maintenance of a balanced posture then becomes a subject of *The Laws*. *Ibid.*, n. 79., and Plato, *The Laws*, Saunders, Trevor, J., (trans. and ed.) (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 8, 13, 829a/b, p. 276.

peace is not desirable... (it) could so weaken the country as to expose it as possible prey for a stronger country'⁴⁷. Therefore, drawing on this classical tradition Machiavelli sees it as crucial for a prince, 'never to take things easy in time of peace, but rather use the latter assiduously', because when fortunes change, 'he will be found ready to resist adversity'⁴⁸.

Machiavelli sets about resolving the problem of maintaining an adequate capability for war, during peace: 'For, since no soldiery is always at war, nor yet can be, it is important to train it in time of peace'⁴⁹. Yet, he argues, for professional soldiers and especially mercenaries, 'war will not maintain them in time of peace', and they will therefore seek either 'to prevent a peace', or take such measures for provisioning that will not be 'consistent with the common good'⁵⁰. In itself, this is a widely acknowledged problem, especially by Erasmus, but Machiavelli's solution lies with a militia who are self-supporting in peace. Again, a militia was not a new concept, even to Florence, but hitherto it would only have been considered a temporary measure for times of crisis⁵¹. Mallett describes how 'there was not yet felt a need to maintain large numbers of trained infantry on a permanent basis', although attitudes were changing, for example, the success of the Swiss pike militia in defeating cavalry was much copied⁵². There are certainly sufficient grounds for Hörnqvist to argue that the 'radically novel' aspect of Machiavelli's militia is that it is a permanent organisation, with part time soldiers who would 'continue to be enrolled, trained and

⁴⁷ Parel, *The Machiavellian Cosmos*, p. 37.

⁴⁸ *The Prince*, 14, p. 49. '...e mai ne' tempi pacifici stare ozioso; ma con industria farne capital... quando si muta la fortuna, lo truovi parato a resisterle', *Opere*, p. 280.

⁴⁹ *The Discourses*, 3, 31, p. 491. 'Perché sempre non sis ta in guerra, né si può starve, però conviene poterla esercitare a tempo di pace', *Opere*, p. 239.

⁵⁰ *The Art of War*, 1, p. 15. '...perché questa arte non gli nutrisce nella pace; donde che sono necessitate o pensare che non sia pace, o tanto prevalersi ne' tempi della guerra', *Opere*, p. 305.

⁵¹ Hörnqvist, "Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506", pp. 148-9 and 153. Hörnqvist cites Chabod, Frederico, *Scritti su Machiavelli* (Turin: 1964), pp. 331-32. See also, for example: Sydney Anglo's summary in: Anglo, *A Dissection*, p. 119; Skinner's discussion in *Foundations: Vol. 1*, p. 130.

⁵² Mallett, Michael, "The Transformation of War, 1494-1530", in Shaw, Christine, (ed.) *Italy and the European Powers: The Impact of War, 1500-1530* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), pp. 17-19. Mallett further argues that the 'levels of skill and discipline among professional troops, whether foreign mercenary or "national", made part-time and militia service increasingly anachronistic', and therefore Machiavelli's solution as ultimately 'unrealistic'. However, the point at issue here is Machiavelli's recognition of a need to maintain sufficient levels of preparedness for war, in times of peace.

equipped in time of peace'⁵³. This requirement to maintain an adequate military in times of peace has deep political implications, and I will frequently return to it.

A further point arises when Hörnqvist usefully points to differences in the scholarship on Machiavelli's concept of peace⁵⁴. On the one hand, he cites Felix Gilbert to the effect that in all of *The Prince* or *The Discourses* we find 'nothing about the desirability of peace', instead war is an 'inescapable force'⁵⁵. On the other hand, he describes a view which he attributes to Viroli, de Grazia, and Skinner, that 'Machiavelli's preoccupation with war and military affairs is conditioned by a desire for peace'⁵⁶, and that the concept of republican liberty was 'purely defensive in character'⁵⁷. Hörnqvist argues an alternative view that Machiavelli is driven by the 'natural desire' of the Florentine state for expansion. However, the argument that I will develop is that Machiavelli advocates different forms of warfare, appropriate to differing circumstances⁵⁸. The expansive and defensive postures described here are but two forms of war; and all conditions of war and peace will come round in their turn of the cycle, and are to be dealt with appropriately.

Finally, on Machiavelli's understanding of the nature of peace and war, I turn to his discussion of ambition. If conflict is inherent in nature, for Machiavelli, it is ambition which fuels war and most of the ills which befall mankind. Ambition and greed together are the underlying cause of war. This idea occurs throughout his works but is most poetically expressed in his tercets *On Ambition*: 'Hardly had God finished creation when a hidden power which sustains itself in heaven... to man's being by no means friendly... sent two Furies to dwell on earth... to deprive us of peace and to set us at war'. These Furies were

⁵³ Hörnqvist, "Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506", p. 154.

⁵⁴ Hörnqvist, *Machiavelli and Empire*, pp. 87-8.

⁵⁵ Hörnqvist cites: Gilbert, Felix, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War", in Paret, Peter, (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 24.

⁵⁶ Hörnqvist, *Machiavelli and Empire*, p. 87.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁵⁸ I develop this further with "Types of war", from p. 220.

Ambition and Avarice, and with their ‘pestilential venom they armed Cain against his good brother’ and ‘the first violent death was seen in the world, and the first grass red with blood’⁵⁹. Later in the tercets he applies this to his own region:

I see Ambition, with that swarm which Heaven at the world’s
beginning allotted her, flying over the Tuscan mountains;
and already she has scattered so many sparks among those people
swollen with envy that she will burn their towns and their
farmsteads if grace and good government does not bring her to naught⁶⁰.

The cure is a combination: first, by ‘grace’, a concession to religious language but implying ‘fortune’; and secondly, ‘good government’⁶¹, it therefore becomes a political issue.

It is clear from this tercet that the forces creating the conditions for war in human affairs, Ambition accompanied by Avarice, Envy, Sloth and Hatred, are essentially malevolent. As Ascoli and Capodivacca point out, this is not ‘ambition’ that is well used, ‘in concord with the members of one’s community... and thus also a source of Machiavellian *virtù*’⁶². Indeed, Machiavelli is referring to the corrupt nature of men, consistent with the ‘wretched creatures’ repeatedly described in *The Prince*⁶³, and which also infects states. In *The Discourses* he describes the ‘natural hatred which neighbouring princes and

⁵⁹ Machiavelli does not appear to be referring here to original sin, *per se*, he describes these events as being after the exit from the Garden of Eden. Machiavelli, Tercet “On Ambition”, (ca 1509), in *The Chief Works*, 1, pp. 735-6. ‘Di poco aveva Dio fatto le stelle... potenza occulta che 'n ciel nutrica... a la natura umana poco amica... Per privarci di pace e porne in guerra ... mandò duo furie (l’Ambizione e l’Avarizia) ad arbitrare in terra... Queste del lor pestifero veneno, contr’ al suo buon fratel, Cain armaro... poi che, per la tua voglia ambiziosa, si fe’ la prima morte violenta nel mondo, e la prima erba sanguinosa!’; *Opere*, p. 984.

⁶⁰ *The Chief Works*, p. 739. ‘Io sento Ambizion, con quella scola / ch’al principio del mondo el ciel sortille, / sopra de’ monti di Toscana vola; / e seminato ha già tante faville / tra quelle genti sì d’invidia pregne, / ch’arderà le sue terre e sue ville, / se grazia o miglior ordin non la spegna’; *Opere*, p. 987. I consider a further catalogue of the ills of war, very similar to those seen in Erasmus and other pacific humanists, with “The Humanitarian Dimension”, pp. 227 - 228.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Ascoli, Albert, Russell, and Capodivacca, Angela, Matilde, “Machiavelli and Poetry”, in Najemy, John, M., (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 196-7.

⁶³ For example, *The Prince*, 17, p. 54, and 18, p. 56; ‘omini tristi’, *Opere*, pp. 282, and 283.

neighbouring republics have for one another’, and how this is fuelled ‘by the ambition which moves states to dominate one another’⁶⁴. Throughout *The History of Florence* he refers to ambition as the cause of dissension and conflict, starting with: ‘The ambition of the Roman people caused many wars between them and the pontiffs’⁶⁵.

Viroli is correct, therefore, in describing Machiavelli’s war as ‘the outcome of ambition’⁶⁶, but I do not agree with Viroli that his ‘war is the greatest evil that affects the human condition’⁶⁷. Machiavelli certainly acknowledges the ills that accompany war, as I will discuss with humanitarian issues⁶⁸, but he would not judge war the ‘greatest evil’. First, he gives this position to the antecedent ambition and greed, as we have seen. Secondly, some benefit, at least, does accrue from war. For Coker, Machiavelli’s war ‘is an inherently *normative* exercise...’, because it enhances the political relationship between soldier and citizen⁶⁹. I now turn to this key relationship between war and politics in Machiavelli.

War and Politics

That Machiavelli closely associates war with politics is widely acknowledged. For Wood: ‘almost unanimous praise is bestowed upon his idea that politics and war constitute a kind of functional unity, with war serving as an instrument of politics’⁷⁰. Pocock describes how *The Art of War* and *The Discourses* ‘without over-interpretation can be brought together’⁷¹. Gilbert even claims that Machiavelli ‘became a political thinker because he was a

⁶⁴ *The Discourses*, 3, 12, p. 441. ‘... e’ naturali odii che hanno i principi vicini, e le repubbliche vicine, l’uno con l’altro: il che procede da ambizione di dominare’, *Opere*, p. 217.

⁶⁵ *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 1, 4, p. 18. ‘A’ pontifici faceva allora assai Guerra l’ambizione del popolo romano’, *Opere*, p. 643.

⁶⁶ Viroli, Maurizio, *Machiavelli*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 15 - 16.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁶⁸ “The Humanitarian Dimension”, from p. 226

⁶⁹ Croker, Christopher, *Barbarous Philosophers* (London: Hurst & Co., 2010), p. 145.

⁷⁰ Wood, Neal, “Introduction” to *The Art of War*, p. xxvi.

⁷¹ Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, p. 199.

military thinker⁷². This is a reasonable claim in the sense that Machiavelli's early diplomatic work made him acutely aware of Florence's military weaknesses. This prompted military deliberation, for example the militia project, well before the political writings which began in earnest with the space afforded by exile⁷³. Here, I will emphasise the importance of this association of war and politics in Machiavelli by developing two key aspects: the common political purpose of all forms of warfare; and the inter-connection of soldier and citizen.

As we have seen, for Machiavelli war is a prevalent condition. Therefore, the role of force is first and foremost to secure the space, and create the order for the state and its laws to exist; and then to protect that space and order so that the state can flourish. This sequence is clear in *The Prince*, '...where there are good arms, good laws inevitably follow'⁷⁴. It is also seen in his cyclic account of the life of a province: peace follows war and disorder. The civil polity, the state, cannot exist without the protection of armed force. For Machiavelli, without such protection the political enterprise would be 'a roofless palace which, though full of jewels and costly furniture, must soon moulder into ruin since it has nothing but its splendour and riches to defend it against the ravages of the weather'⁷⁵.

Once the state is secure, armed force is then available to further serve as its instrument, to protect it, and to enable it to function in a violent world. This service covers a wide range of options which I later explore in more depth, but as Gilbert describes, for

⁷² Gilbert, Felix, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War", in Paret, Peter, (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 11.

⁷³ There is little to support Gilbert's claim in a literal sense. For example, Machiavelli's first written reflections concern Savanorala. Also, we know little of his formative years, and the anecdote of him as a boy being 'fascinated' with mercenary soldiers billeted in the family home might be interesting, but it is not exceptional; as described in his father's diary, and cited in: White, Michael, *Machiavelli, a Man Misunderstood* (Abacus, 2007), pp. 9-10.

⁷⁴ As well as the sequence of arms before laws, it is also important to note that both arms and laws are described as being 'good'. Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 12, p. 39. '...dove sono buone arme conviene sieno buone legge', *Opere*, p. 275.

⁷⁵ *The Art of War*, Preface, p. 4. '...uno superbo e regale palazzo, ancora che ornate di gemme e d'oro, quando, senza essere coperte, non avessero cosa che dalla pioggia le difendesse', *Opere*, p. 301.

Machiavelli it 'is the most essential activity in political life'⁷⁶. A key point is that armed force is not independent of politics, it remains, as Machiavelli stipulates, 'under the control of either a prince or a republic'⁷⁷, and for all types of warfare the common purpose remains political, and as directed by that prince or republic.

The association of politics and armed force is amply reflected in the close relationship between Machiavelli's citizen and his militia soldier, and I will now return to the ideas behind his citizen army in order to exemplify this relationship. Throughout Europe, after the unease felt with mercenary troops the future would lie more with nationally supported, disciplined, professional armies. Indeed this was already becoming apparent in other Italian states, but it was not Machiavelli's solution. As Mallet describes, these other options 'did not provide for the universal strengthening of the morale and collective virtue of the citizenry which Machiavelli was seeking'⁷⁸. Machiavelli argues in the Preface to *The Art of War* that even though civil and military life appeared at the time to be 'discordant and incongruous', they should exist in a 'very close and intimate relation'. They are 'not only compatible and consistent with each other, but necessarily connected and inter-related'⁷⁹.

Here there are well discussed, but still valuable, themes from Machiavelli. First, the citizen makes the best soldier: he is fighting for his 'hearth and home'; he is at one with his domestic political structure; and is content to return to his normal occupation, *arte*, and means of support, after the fighting. This contrasts with mercenaries and those who have no

⁷⁶ Gilbert, F, "The Renaissance of the Art of War", p. 24.

⁷⁷ *The Prince*, 12, p. 40. '...le arme hanno ad essere operate o da uno principe o da una republica', *Opere*, p. 275.

⁷⁸ Mallet, Michael, "The theory and practice of warfare in Machiavelli's republic", in Bock, G., Skinner, Q., and Viroli, M., (eds.), *Machiavelli and Republicanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 177. Bruni, for example, had called for a revival of medieval militia, along with a reverence for chivalry and discipline, however, for Lukes, Bruni's 'crude imposition of traditional military matters on civilian life' is considered unworkable for Machiavelli three generations later; Bruni, Leonardo, *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni: Selected Texts*, Griffiths, G., Hankins, J., and Thompson, D., (trans.) (Binghamton, N.Y., Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1987), pp. 127-45, and Lukes, "Martialing Machiavelli" pp. 1093-4.

⁷⁹ *The Art of War*, Preface, p. 4, 'Non si troverebbono cose più unite più conformi e che, di necessità, tanto l'una amasse l'altra, quanto queste', *Opere*, p. 301.

close affinity with the region or city, in Pocock's words, those with 'no home but the camp'⁸⁰.

Secondly, the good soldier makes the best citizen: he is accustomed to subordinating his individual interests to a 'common good'; and he is disciplined. Military discipline, since that 'established by the first kings' has contributed to the good of the republic⁸¹. Pocock's claims in this context, and his use of the term 'common good' in particular, are challenged by Vickie Sullivan⁸². Her concern is that Pocock is unable to cite Machiavelli in promoting the subordination of individuals to a 'common good', a property of the soldier which is claimed to be transmitted to the citizen. However, and as Woods notes, this is perfectly clear in *The Art of War*, for example: those 'previously given to faction and discord, become united...'⁸³.

Thirdly, less explicit in Machiavelli, there is a further argument that only, exclusively, the soldier can make a good citizen. In this argument, military *virtù* necessitates the best political values, defined by Machiavelli as 'fidelity, love of peace, and fear of God'⁸⁴. While both soldier and citizen have the same end of the common good, the soldier requires these qualities in greater proportion. He must, for example, face death for the common good. Therefore, if this represents ultimate *virtù*, then only the soldier can fully attain it. However, such exclusivity is not explicit in Machiavelli. As Pocock points out, Machiavelli's concern is to pursue the participation of 'the many in citizenship... *governo largo*'⁸⁵. Indeed, Machiavelli is proposing a citizen militia, not a militarised society, and is therefore less concerned with any 'ultimate' *virtù*, than in imbibing a broad citizen base with as much benefit from perceived military virtues as is possible. Pocock is correct, though, in stressing

⁸⁰ Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, pp. 200-1.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

⁸² Sullivan, Vickie, B., "Machiavelli's Momentary 'Machiavellian Moment': A Reconsideration of Pocock's Treatment of the Discourses", *Political Theory*, Vol. 20, No.2, (May, 1992), pp. 313-314.

⁸³ *The Art of War*, pp. 40-1, and n. 84.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁸⁵ Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, p. 201.

the dependency, in Machiavelli's ideal, of the civil on the military: Machiavelli is led 'to ground citizenship upon military virtue to the point where the former becomes an outgrowth of the other'⁸⁶.

Sullivan is also concerned to point out that Machiavelli does not state that a militia is unique to a republic, which she believes Pocock implies⁸⁷. Indeed, Machiavelli advocates a militia for Medici governments and princes, but this is not denied by Pocock⁸⁸. The point, as Pocock argues throughout his *Machiavellian Moment*, is that Machiavelli is making clear the additional advantages for a republican militia. By exercising a civic duty, a citizen soldier participates in republican governance; it is an exercise of both individual and collective *virtù*. Hanan Yoran, for example, has recently discussed the extra relevance of republics to humanism, and I also emphasise that the republican 'contingent political body' has to rely on its own means to defend itself, without a divine or monarchic lead⁸⁹.

Certainly, therefore, the soldier citizen relationship is close, mutually dependent, and mutually advantageous, but the particular advantage to either part is not the main issue. The advantage lies not just with the better soldier or the better citizen, but with the common good. Or as Hörnqvist describes, 'the "*proprie*" in Machiavelli's "*arme proprie*" refers not to the individuals who carried the weapons, but to the state or city commanding them'⁹⁰. For Pocock, and I agree, neither is merely a detached 'instrument in the public hand'⁹¹. The military and the civil are one within, and together benefit, the political whole.

⁸⁶ Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, p. 203.

⁸⁷ Sullivan, "Machiavelli's Momentary 'Machiavellian Moment'", p. 314.

⁸⁸ This is not only evident throughout *The Prince*, but again in 1525 he was actively promoting a militia as a solution for Pope Clement's military affairs in Romagna, albeit this was opposed and blocked by Guicciardini; as discussed, for example in *Machiavelli and his Friends: Their Personal Correspondence*, Atkinson, J. B., and Sices, D., (trans. and ed.) (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), p. 353.

⁸⁹ Yoran, Hanan, "Machiavelli's Critique of Humanism and the Ambivalences of Modernity", *History of Political Thought*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, (Summer, 2010), pp. 252-3.

⁹⁰ Hörnqvist, "Machiavelli's military project", p. 115.

⁹¹ Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, p. 203.

There are, however, grounds for caution. First, the enthusiastic advocacy of a militia has led to charges of militarism⁹². Steven Marx, for example, includes Machiavelli in what I believe to be an inaccurate and generalised group of ‘humanist militarists’, for whom war is ‘an end in itself’⁹³. I argue that there most certainly is a further end for Machiavelli’s war, it is very much political: it is to maintain the state. Also, the functions of soldier and citizen remain separate, even when they are being carried out by the same person. Machiavelli stresses that with a militia: ‘The commanders ... returned with eagerness to their former manner of living; and the common soldiers laid down their arms with more pleasure than they had taken them up. Each resumed the calling by which he had gotten his bread before’⁹⁴. He argues against full-time soldiering, and therefore might be better accused of ‘amateurism’ rather than ‘militarism’.

Secondly, contemporary politics were far from stable. Therefore, it is quite possible that either: a strong military seeks its own advantage and usurps power for itself; or a popular militia in the service of a benign Republic becomes a nation under arms in the service of a tyranny. I later discuss Machiavelli’s response to these possibilities with the need for ‘political restraint’⁹⁵, but I note here that the very nature of the politics presents a further level of danger to Machiavelli’s discussion.

Thirdly, this discussion has focused on Machiavelli’s ideal of a citizen soldier. In reality, his project would be limited to the rural *contado*, and would never achieve the

⁹² As I defined earlier, the term militarism implies the military as an end in itself, or an excessive pre-occupation by a society or community in their military. I do not juxtapose pacifism to militarism, instead to bellicosity which better encapsulates war for the sake of war; “Terms and Definitions”, p. 21, and n. 42.

⁹³ Marx, Steven, “Shakespeare’s Pacifism”, *Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol.45, No. 1, (Spring 1992), p. 51.

⁹⁴ Here Machiavelli adds emphasis which I discuss later: with glory, ‘contenting themselves with the honor of a triumph; and with conduct, ...and none had any hopes of advancing himself by plunder and rapine’. *The Art of War*, I, pp. 17-8. ‘*Ma quegli che eranocapitani, contenti del trionfo, con disidero tornavano alla vita private; e quelli che erano membri, con maggior voglia deponavano le armi che non le pigliavano; e ciascuno tornava all’arte sua mediante la quale si aveva ordinate la vita; né vi fi mai alcuno che sperasse con le prede e con questa arte potersi nutrire*’; *Opere*, p. 306.

⁹⁵ “Political Restraint”, from p. 255.

inclusion of the citizens of Florence, or even provincial towns, the *distretto*. Machiavelli's explanation is that to avoid confusion such a difficult project is 'best arrived at slowly'⁹⁶. For Hörnqvist, this is a 'strategic master stroke that helped make the militia possible'.⁹⁷ More critically, Machiavelli's militia was never, in reality, a completed project⁹⁸.

Finance

Finance is a crucial aspect of contemporary Florentine life⁹⁹, and it is therefore relevant to understanding Machiavelli's political-military thesis. In *The Discourses* he is explicit in denying that money is of primary importance in war: '...it is not gold, as is acclaimed by common opinion, that constitutes the sinews of war, but good soldiers'¹⁰⁰. His argument here is, in part, that soldiers can acquire gold, but not the reverse. This is consistent with his foundational role of the military, and with his rejection of the mercenary system. It confirms his citizen-soldier.

However, Machiavelli does not deny that money is important, or that it has considerable instrumental value. This is seen forcefully in his 1503 oration: "Words to be spoken on Law for appropriating Money"¹⁰¹. Instead of relying on France for protection, Machiavelli exhorts the Florentines to make adequate and timely financial provision for their own arms, to have your own 'sword at your side and to gird it on when the enemy is at a

⁹⁶ "Discourse on the Florentine State for Arms", my Volume 2, Appendix 3, p. 95 – 96. '... *le cose grandi hanno bisogno d'essere menate adagio*', *Arte della Guerra e scritti politici minori*, Bertelli, (ed.), p. 96.

⁹⁷ Hörnqvist, Mikael, "Machiavelli's military project and the *Art of War*", in *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli*, pp. 115-7.

⁹⁸ Ironically, in the same year, 1506, Machiavelli initiated his shorter lived militia project, and the papacy hired a company of professional Swiss troops who remain in the Vatican to this day.

⁹⁹ As described, for example, in Tim Parks, *Medici Money: Banking, Metaphysics and Art in Fifteenth-Century Florence* (London: Profile Books, 2005).

¹⁰⁰ *The Discourses*, 2, 10, p. 302, and as discussed pp. 300-3. '*Dico pertanto, non l'oro, come grida la commune opinione, essere il nervo della Guerra, ma i buoni sodati*', *Opere*, p. 159. Also, for example: "Really Powerful Republics and Princes do not purchase Alliances with Money, but obtain them by means of the Virtue and the Reputation of their Forces", *Ibid.*, 2, 30, Chapter title, and as discussed pp. 372-6. '*La repubbliche e gli principi veramente potenti non comperono l'amicizie con danari, ma con la virtù e con la riputazione della forze*'; *Opere*, p. 190.

¹⁰¹ Machiavelli, "Words to be spoken on Law for appropriating Money", in *The Chief Works*, 3, pp. 1439-43. '*Parole da dirle sopra la provisione del danaio, facto un poco di proemio et di scusa*', *Opere*, p. 11.

distance, because afterward another man is too late and you have no resource'¹⁰². Money has a role, but it is subsidiary to arms, and also to the virtue of prudence in knowing how to spend it wisely.

He gives two dramatic examples which are worth noting. First, the Emperor of Constantinople correctly anticipated the Ottoman advance and appealed for funds to strengthen defences, but the people refused. However, 'when they heard within their walls the thunder of artillery', they ran to the Emperor with money, and Machiavelli credits him with the reply: 'Go to die with this money, since you have not wished to live without it'¹⁰³.

Secondly, he refers to recent outlying Florentine losses. Any provision for defence was six months too late, and Machiavelli reminds his audience how because of this, 'you saw your houses burned, your goods plundered, your subjects killed, led prisoners, your women violated, your property laid waste without being able to give any protection. And those who, six months before, had not wished to agree to pay twenty ducats had taken from them two hundred, and they had to pay the twenty just the same'¹⁰⁴. These examples not only demonstrate the instrumental value of money in providing for defence; but also the citizen's responsibility in adequately providing for their own defence, and which needs to be exercised in good time.

¹⁰² *The Chief Works*, p. 1442. '... né sempre si può metter mano in su la spade d'altri, et però è bene haverla allato et cignersela quando el nimico è discosto, ché altri non è poi a.ttempo et non truova rimedio'; *Opere*, p. 12. Also cited in Jones, *The Lost Battles*, pp. 255 and 326; and Atkinson and Sices, *Machiavelli and his Friends*, p. 81. Machiavelli also includes economic considerations in his list of 'general rules' in *The Art of War*. At 'Rule 25' he includes money this time as a 'sinew of war', but again, still a subordinate one: 'Men, arms, money, and provisions are the sinews of war, but of these four, the first two are the most necessary', *The Art of War*, 7, p. 204. 'Gli uomini, il ferro, i danari e il pane son oil nervo della Guerra; ma di questi quattro sonno più necessary i primi due', *Opere*, p. 386.

¹⁰³ *The Chief Works*, p. 1442. '... come sentirno sonare le artiglierie nelle lor mura', the Emperor replied: 'Andate ad morire con cotesti danari, poiché voi non havete volute vivere senza epsi', *Opere*, p. 13.

¹⁰⁴ *The Chief Works*, p. 1443. '... vedesti ardere le vostre case, predare la roba, ammazzare e vostri subditi, menarli prigioni, violare le vostre donne, dare el guasto alle possession vostre, senza posservi fare alcun rimedio. Et coloro che, sei mesi innanzi, non haven volute concorrere ad pagare venti ducati, ne fu tolti loro 200, et e venti pagorno in ogni modo'; *Opere*, p. 13. This refers to losses to Duke Valentino in 1501.

Butters argues the point that, in reality, Florence got a poor service from its paid *condottieri* because of the ‘parsimony’ with which it treated them. This is in contrast to a more secure Venice, and the more generous treatment bestowed by the Venetians on their *condottieri*¹⁰⁵. I agree that Machiavelli has very little to say on Venice’s relative success with *condottieri* and mercenary troops. But I argue that his advocacy of a militia concerns its superior permanence and identity with a *patria*, which he believed money could never buy.

Types of War

Machiavelli describes different forms of war, which I introduced in discussing concepts of peace and war. Hörnqvist argues that in Machiavelli’s ‘healthy republic’, the people’s ‘passion for military undertakings’, and their ‘love of liberty’, are driven by ‘their desire for territorial acquisition and material gain’¹⁰⁶. Hörnqvist emphasises a longstanding tradition of Florentine imperialist republicanism. He argues against Skinner, de Grazia and Viroli, who in his view, ‘paid little attention to its imperialist aspects, and at times even argued that the republican liberty promoted by Florentine pre-humanists and humanists was purely defensive in character’¹⁰⁷. However, for de Grazia, Machiavelli holds that ‘wars fought out of necessity and in the defence of the liberty of one’s city, or the protection of one’s subjects – are legitimate, while he condemns military aggression and wars of conquest as unnecessary and unjust’¹⁰⁸. For Viroli: ‘Machiavelli’s advocacy of military discipline and

¹⁰⁵ Butters, *Governors and Government*, p. 310.

¹⁰⁶ Hörnqvist, *Machiavelli and Empire*, p. 88.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 87-8. Hörnqvist cites Skinner, “The Vocabulary of Renaissance Republicanism: A Cultural *Longue-durée*?” in *Language and Images of Renaissance Italy*, Brown, A., (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) and de Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell* (London: Picador, 1992), pp. 164-73. He also cites Viroli, *From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics 1250-1600* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 164.

virtue certainly does not entail that his republicanism is inspired by a fascination for conquest and predation'¹⁰⁹.

Hörnqvist, therefore, sets up two opposing views of the role of force in Machiavelli's republic: one purely defensive; and his argument in support of an expansionist policy. My purpose here is to use this apparent opposition to illustrate Machiavelli's understanding of the more complex nature of war. In this, there are many forms of war, and I argue that both views in Hörnqvist's opposition have their place. There are times when either an expansionist or a defensive posture is appropriate, or often no clear distinction can be made, but all will come round in the cyclic account of the lives of states and empires. I now discuss the range of warfare considered by Machiavelli, and also how this affects its conduct.

The opposition set up by Hörnqvist correlates perfectly well with *The Discourses*, where Machiavelli writes that 'war is made on a commonwealth for two reasons: (i) to subjugate it, and (ii) for fear of being subjugated by it'¹¹⁰. Here we are given a clear distinction between an offensive and a defensive use of force in an absolute sense. The need for defence might arise for different reasons. On the one hand, you have to defend against the 'ambition of princes or of republics which are seeking to set up an empire'¹¹¹. This he considers the less dangerous reason. On the other hand, when your territory is invaded by an entire displaced population, which itself has been displaced by 'famine or war'. Here, the intention is not just to colonise, but the invader 'takes possession of every single thing, and expels or kills the inhabitants. This is war of the most cruel and terrifying kind'¹¹². It is the

¹⁰⁹ Viroli, *Machiavelli*, pp. 139 - 141.

¹¹⁰ *The Discourses*, 1, 6, p. 122. 'Perché, per due cagione si fa guerra a una repubblica: l'una, per diventarne signore; l'altra, per paura ch'ella non ti occupi', *Opere*, p. 86.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 2, 8, p. 294. 'L'una è fatta per ambizione de' principi o delle repubbliche, che cercano di propagare lo imperio', *Opere*, p. 156.

¹¹² *The Discourses*, 2, 8, pp. 294-5. '... per possederla tutta particolarmente, e cacciarne o ammazzare gli abitatori antichi. Questa guerra è crudelissima e paventosissima', *Opere*, p. 156. In *The History of Florence* Machiavelli frequently discusses examples of displaced populations. For example, in the opening paragraph of

war of annihilation or genocide, an existential threat to an entire nation, and is an issue to which I shortly return.

However, the defensive and offensive distinction is often far from clear. On the one hand, Machiavelli discusses ways of provoking war in order to attribute blame¹¹³. On the other hand, even if states seek to maintain the ‘*status quo*’ with a non-expansionist posture, as did Venice or Sparta, because ‘all human affairs are ever in a state of flux and cannot stand still’, they can be forced by ‘necessity’ into taking offensive action¹¹⁴, and indeed it would, therefore, be better to be so prepared.

Also, below the level of full intensity warfare, Machiavelli recognises other roles for armed force. These include the policing and internal security of one’s own state, and to protect civil politics from the dis-order and factions which are regular occurrences throughout *The History of Florence*. For example: ‘Neither was the city disturbed with one division alone, but by many; first the enmity between the people and the nobility, then that of the Ghibellines and the Guelphs, and lastly, of the Bianchi and Neri. All the citizens were, therefore, in arms...’¹¹⁵. This especially applies to newly acquired territory, and Machiavelli devotes a full section in *The Discourses* to ‘the Management of a Populace’¹¹⁶. Throughout

the book, the ‘migrating masses’ which destroyed Rome were forced out of their northern homelands because the available land could not support the burgeoning population, *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 1, 1, p. 1.

¹¹³ *The Discourses*, 2, 9, p. 299.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1, 6, p. 123. ‘*Ma sendo tutte le cose degli uomini in moto, e non potendo stare salde.... E la necessità la conduce ad ampliare*’, *Opere*, p. 86. In military terms, Machiavelli discusses elsewhere, and at some length, the military advantages and disadvantages of whether to take the offensive, or remain on the defensive, when faced with an aggression. He concludes that for a people who are ‘well armed and equipped for war’, ‘*popoli armati ed ordinate la guerra*’, which he clearly believes should be the case, the advantage lays with remaining on the defensive at home, and letting the aggressor come to you. However, the advantage lays with the offensive, in going out to meet the aggressor on his territory, for a people with ‘ill-armed subjects and a country unused to war’, ‘*suoi sudditi disarmati, ed il paese inusitato alla guerra*’, *Ibid.*, 2, 12, pp. 305-310. A similar discussion occurs in *The History of Florence* when Machiavelli has the Florentine’s debate, in 1423, the respective advantages and disadvantages of pre-emption or waiting to be attacked, *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 4, 1, pp. 162-3.

¹¹⁵ Machiavelli, *The History of Florence*, 2, 4, p. 71. ‘*E non solo quella città da uno umore, ma da molti era perturbata; sendo in essa le inimicizie del popolo e de’ Grandi, de’ Ghibellini e Guelfi, de’ Bianchi e Neri. Era adunque tutta la città in arme e piena di zuffe*’; *Opere*, p. 671. The Bianchi and the Neri being essentially family factions derived from the family dispute between the Cerchi and the Donati. *Ibid*, from p. 65.

¹¹⁶ *The Discourses*, 1, 50-55, pp. 233-248.

his work he details a range of lower intensity military contingencies, from a display of ‘grave and highly respected’ authority in crowd control¹¹⁷ to, as described in *The Prince*, the radical but selective elimination of preceding institutions¹¹⁸.

It is in these discussions that Machiavelli takes a more flexible approach to the use of armed force, compared to an absolute approach in the face of an existential threat. For example, it is with the ‘management of conquered peoples’ that he compares the treatment of previously independent, neighbouring cities. He argues, albeit contingently, that more humane measures can achieve better results than using unnecessary force, ‘how a humane and kindly act sometimes makes a much greater impression than an act of ferocity or violence’¹¹⁹.

I will return to these lower intensity options in discussing the justification of war and humanitarian concerns. Here, I argue that this range in the typology of warfare helps to explain the apparently extreme opposition we earlier saw deployed by Skinner in contrasting Machiavelli’s stance with that of Erasmus, ‘the greatest of ethical divides’¹²⁰. For Skinner, in Machiavelli’s case: ‘you must be prepared to do anything, however unsavoury, in order to maintain your state’¹²¹. To ‘maintain the state’, *mentenere lo stato*, is a phrase frequently stressed by Skinner with good reason, but I argue that it is not appropriate in this particular case.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1, 54, pp. 242-3. ‘... con uomini gravi e pieni di reverenza’, *Opere*, p. 136.

¹¹⁸ *The Prince*, 5, p. 17. Lower intensity operations are less prominent in *The Art of War* which is more focussed on high intensity warfare culminating in Machiavelli’s model battle.

¹¹⁹ *The Discourses*, 3, 20, p. 461. He continues, ‘...and how districts and cities into which neither arms nor the accoutrements of war, nor any other kind of human force would have been able to obtain entry, it has been possible to enter by displaying common humanity and kindness, continence or generosity’. ‘...quanto qualche volta possa più negli animi degli uomini uno atto umano e pieno di carità, che uno atto feroce e violento; e come molte volte quelle provincie e quelle città che le armi, gl’instrumenti bellici ed ogni altra umana forza non ha potuto aprire, uno esempio di umanità e di pietà, di castità o di liberalità, ha aperte’; *Opere* p. 226.

¹²⁰ Skinner, *Foundations*, 1, p. 250.

¹²¹ Skinner, *Foundations*, 1, p. 249.

Machiavelli's extreme injunction, referred to by Skinner, is found in *The Discourses*: '... when the safety of one's country wholly depends on the decision to be taken, no attention should be paid either to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its being praiseworthy or ignominious. On the contrary, every other consideration being set aside, that alternative should be wholeheartedly adopted which will save the life and preserve the freedom of one's country'¹²². However, the language here is not '*mentenere lo stato*', but '*salvi la vita*' and '*la patria*'. This is the extreme case of fighting annihilation, when the very existence of the nation and its values 'wholly depends' on the action taken. This is different, for example, than when '*mentenere lo stato*' is used with the much more measured injunction to have 'a flexible disposition, varying as fortune and circumstances dictate... not (to) deviate from what is good, if that is possible, but (to) know how to do evil, if that is necessary'¹²³.

For Machiavelli's contemporaries the context of the extreme injunction is better exemplified by the Ottoman expansion through the Balkans, with communities destroyed or lost to slavery, than the frequent in-fighting between Italian city states. Indeed, we have seen a similar distinction made by Erasmus in his complaint against the frequency of wars fought for inadequate causes, 'petty affairs'. The issue is not so much whether or not to be 'enslaved by a tyrant', but whether to 'pay tax to Phillip or Louis'¹²⁴.

Indeed, I argue that this is the position, albeit in a different context, that is discussed today as Michael Walzer's 'supreme emergency': when a state is struggling to survive against an external threat. Ultimately for Walzer, an impending 'disaster to a political

¹²² *The Discourses*, 3, 41, p. 515. '*... dove si delibera al tutto della salute della patria, non vi debbe cadere alcuna considerazione né d'ingiusto né di crudele, né di laudabile né d'ignominioso; anzi, posposto ogni altro rispetto, sequire al tutto quel partito che le salvi la vita, e mantenghile la libertà*'; *Opere*, p. 249.

¹²³ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 18, p. 57. '*E però bisogna che egli abbia una animo disposto a volgersi secondo ch'è venti della fortuna e le variazioni delle cose li comando, e, come di sopra dissi, non partirsi dal bene, potendo, ma sapere intrare nel male, necessitato*'; *Opere*, p. 284.

¹²⁴ Erasmus, *Dulce bellum inexpertis*, CWE., 35, p. 428; and Phillips, *Adages*, p. 341. Or again: 'for the emptiest of claims to sovereignty, because of childish passion, or the kidnapping of a wench, or for reasons far sillier still', *Ibid.*, p. 406, and p. 315.

community...may well require exactly those measures that the war convention bars'¹²⁵.

Walzer certainly approaches this claim with some scepticism, and it has not gone without challenge¹²⁶. For example, a 'supreme emergency' might be too easily invoked to justify a less intense conflict. However, Machiavelli is alert to this possibility, as we will later see in the rhetoric used in *The History of Florence*, and as to when extreme measures might be justified, I argue that 'glory' is the main test applied by Machiavelli¹²⁷. Many writers since antiquity have addressed this question, and taken a view which supports Walzer. Augustine considers a state would have to forgo the 'fidelity of its obligations' in order to prevent it being 'destroyed, obliterated, annihilated'¹²⁸. More recently, John Rawls has followed the Walzer position¹²⁹.

More generally, Hörnqvist argues that Machiavelli advocates choosing between the extreme options of a dilemma, as Machiavelli believed was the way of the Romans, and against the Florentine predisposition for a 'middle way'¹³⁰. We will return to this point with Hörnqvist's analysis of Machiavelli's discussion of Pisa in *The Prince*. But, as Atkinson and Sises also argue, if it is a 'middle way' that offers the most suitable option, Machiavelli will pragmatically advocate this option, and there are examples of this¹³¹. He would be willing, therefore, to consider a fuller range of options than Hörnqvist suggests.

¹²⁵ Waltzer, Michael, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York, Basic Books, 1977, 4th ed., 2006), pp. 268 and 251. Also, '...a supreme emergency, where one might well be required to override the rights of innocent people and shatter the war convention', p. 259. Discussed again, for example, in 'Emergency Ethics', in Walzer, M., *Arguing about War* (Newhaven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 33 – 50. Walzer is discussing the C20th context of aerial bombardment, but I argue that Walzer is positing the same level of existential threat as does Machiavelli in the defence of the very life and freedom of the community.

¹²⁶ For example: Cook, Martin, L., "Michael Walzer's Concept of Supreme Emergency", *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2007), pp. 138-151; and Walzer's "Response", *Ibid.*, pp. 168-171.

¹²⁷ Discussed with Lucca in "Examples from the History of Florence", p. 238; and "Glory", from p. 252.

¹²⁸ Augustine, *City of God*, 12, Ch. 6, as cited and discussed by Herbert Deane, *Political and Social Ideas of Augustine*, p. 167.

¹²⁹ John Rawls in "Fifty Years after Hiroshima", as cited in Reichber *et al*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 637 – 8.

¹³⁰ Hörnqvist, Mikael, *Machiavelli and Empire*, p. 105.

¹³¹ Machiavelli's letter of 29 April 1513 to Vettori: Atkinson and Sises, *Machiavelli and his Friends*, p. 505, n. 53. Other examples of Machiavelli advocating a 'middle way' are given as *The Prince*, 19, and *The Discourses*,

To summarise, Machiavelli fully recognises that there are different ways in which armed force can be deployed, and these might be of higher or lower intensity. It is false and misleading to suggest that he is exclusively an advocate for an extreme, ‘no-holds barred’ approach. Instead the extreme case is but the final resort appropriate to an existential threat, when otherwise he considers a range of options. I will now turn to question another frequent assertion. This is the claim that when it comes to deciding the appropriate level of force, from the range of options we have discussed, humanitarian considerations are irrelevant to Machiavelli. I argue that he is well aware of the dangers of excessive force, and this is fundamental to his concept of war.

The Humanitarian Dimension

It might be assumed that with his apparent readiness to embrace a brutal course of action, humanitarian concerns have no place in Machiavelli’s reckoning. Price, for example, describes how ‘war exacts its toll; men will die or be wounded; it brings rapine, destruction and ruin ... but Machiavelli shows little awareness of this darker side’¹³². I argue that this is a false claim on Machiavelli. Even on a consequential argument, regardless of principle or virtue, he is perfectly ‘aware’ of the consequences of a ‘darker side’: of the adverse consequences of violent inhumanity; or of the beneficial consequences of acting humanely.

Throughout his works, there are examples of Machiavelli’s consideration of the more humane course of action. We have seen Machiavelli’s discussion in *The Discourses* on managing the Falisci, how ‘a single act of humanity made a greater impression than did all the forces of Rome’¹³³. In *The History of Florence* he recounts examples of the consequences

2, 27. I would add *The Art of War*, 1, p. 26, where Machiavelli recommends, through Fabrizio, a ‘middle way’ on military service, between the extremes of compulsion and volunteering.

¹³² Price, Russell, “The Theme of Gloria in Machiavelli”, *Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 4, (Winter 1977), p. 629.

¹³³ *The Discourses*, 3, 20, p. 461. ‘Uno esempio di umanità appresso i Falsci potette più che ogni forza romana’; *Opere*, p. 226. Also, had the Florentines been ‘the more humane and the more easy going’, as the

of inhumane conduct. After the bloody capture of a town by Florentine troops, he quotes an official: ‘To me the place seems rather lost than won’, as more force and expenditure would be required to keep the town, than had ‘it been received on more equitable terms’¹³⁴. In his *Ghiribizzi* of 1506, Machiavelli starkly contrasts the humane against the brutal option. Scipio achieved the same result of effective control over an army and a population with ‘compassion, loyalty, and piety’; as did Hannibal who employed ‘cruelty, treachery, and impiety’¹³⁵.

Machiavelli’s awareness of, indeed sensitivity to, ‘the darker side’ is even more evident in his literary work than in the main political texts. In his account to the ‘unidentified lady’ of the sacking of Prato, he writes of extensive death, rape and sacrilege, but spares her the details to avoid a ‘depression of spirits’¹³⁶. In *On Ambition*, he writes of the consequences of man’s ambition, as we have seen, the cause of ‘the first violent death ... the first grass red with blood’:

Romans had been in Capua, they would have been ‘unquestionably lords of Tuscany today’, *The Discourses*, 2, 21, p. 343. ‘...quanto più se’ umano e dimestico con loro...sanza dubbio e’ sarebbero signori di Toscana’; *Opere*, pp. 177-8. Again, in managing the Capuans, the best results will be achieved by the ‘ambitious prince or republic’: ‘the greater the liberality he displays towards his neighbours, and the more averse he is in seizing their lands’; *The Discourses*, 2, 20, p. 341. ‘Ed un principe o una republica ambizione... quanto più si mostra liberalità cin i vicini, e di essere più alieno da occupargli’, *Opere*, p. 176.

¹³⁴ This occurred at Volterra in 1472 by Florentine forces under Federigo, Lord of Urbino. The reply continues that on more equitable grounds ‘... advantage and security would have been the result; but having to retain it by force it will in critical junctures, occasion weakness and anxiety, and in times of peace injury and expense’; *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 7, pp. 347-8. ‘A me pare ella perduta: perché, se voi la ricevevi d’accordo, voi ne traevi utile e securità; ma avendola a tenere per forza, ne’ tempi avversi vi porterà debolezza e noia, e ne’ pacifici danno e spesa’; *Opere*, p. 813. Machiavelli gives another contemporary examples of Florentine troops, who, on defeating Lucca in 1430, went on ‘to plunder and destroy the whole country, with the greatest avarice and cruelty, making no distinction in favour of consecrated places, and violating the women, both married and single’. This follows a debate by the Florentine council on the justification for the war, which I later discuss at p. 239. The massacre is made all the more significant in terms of political consequences when Machiavelli recounts how badly the news was received in Florence, not only by the council, but by all the city. *History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 4, 4, p. 182. ‘... e di poi gli prese tutti prigioni, e alle sue genti fe’ saccheggiare e destruggere tutto il paese, con esemplo crudele e avaro, non perdonando a luoghi pii, né a donne, così vergini come maritate. Queste cose, così come le erano seguite, si sepono a Firenze, e dispiacquono non solamente a’ magistrato, ma a tutta la città’. *Opere*, p. 727.

¹³⁵ Machiavelli, “*Ghiribizzi*”, Letter to Giovan Battista Soderini of 13-21 September 1506, in Atkinson and Sices, *Machiavelli and his Friends*, p. 134. ‘...l’uno con la crudeltà, perfidia, inreligione...l’altro, con la pieta, fedeltà et religione’, *Opere*, p. 1082.

¹³⁶ *The Letters of Machiavelli*, Gilbert, A., (ed. and trans.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), Letter No. 115, Sep. 1512, to an ‘Unidentified Lady’, p. 94. ‘Né ad V. S. ne referirò i particolari per non li dare questa molestia d’animo’, *Opere*, Capata, p. 904.

‘Let him turn his eyes here who wishes to behold the sorrows of others,
and let him consider if ever before now the sun has looked upon such
savagery...

‘A man is weeping for his father dead and a woman for her husband; another man,
beaten and naked, you see driven in sadness from his dwelling...

‘Foul with blood are the ditches and streams, full of heads, of legs, of arms, and
other members gashed and severed...

‘Wherever you turn your eyes, you see the earth wet with tears and
blood...’¹³⁷.

These poetic lines compare with his official dispatches written around the same time. For Allan Gilbert, they not only show a ‘contact with reality (and) depth of emotion’, but also sensitivity: ‘sympathy for innocent people subjected by conquerors to the violence of war’¹³⁸.

However, in *The Prince* especially, Machiavelli can appear inclined to over-ride humanitarian concerns. This is especially the case in his discussion of ways of controlling a city used to its previous freedoms, and he recommends that ‘there is no surer way of keeping possession than by devastation’¹³⁹. Hörnqvist usefully considers the question, ‘to destroy them or to live there’¹⁴⁰. As we have seen for Hörnqvist, Machiavelli works with the ‘by now familiar Roman formula of the two extremes, destruction or benefits’, and significantly, the alternative to destruction, to confer benefit, is very much alive in the historical account. From *The Discourses*, Machiavelli is clear that force ‘should only be used as a last resort, when

¹³⁷ Machiavelli, ‘On Ambition’, *The Chief Works*, 1, pp. 735-9. ‘...si fe’ la prima morte violenta nel mondo, e la prima erba sanguinosa!’; ‘...Rivolga gli occhi in qua chi veder vuole / l’altrui fatiche, e riguardi se ancora / cotanta crudeltà mai vidde il sole / ... Chi ‘l padre morto e chi ‘l marito plora; / quell’altro mesto del suo proprio tetto, / battuto e nudo, trar si vede fora. / ... Di sangue son le fosse e l’acque sozze, / piene di teschi, di gambit e di mani, / e d’altre membra laniate e mozze. / ... Dovunche gli occhi tu rivolti, miri / di lacrime la terra e sangue pregna, / e l’aria d’urla, singulti e sospiri’. *Opere*, pp. 984 and 986.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 735. These tercets on the tragedy and all-pervading influence of Ambition and Avarice, were most likely written in Verona, after Machiavelli saw the aftermath of the battle when Julius II’s league defeated Venice in 1509, and the dispatches were written on the 26th November and the 7th December, 1509. Detmold, Christian, E., (trans.), *The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli* (Boston, J. R. Osgood and Company, 1882). Vol. 4, “Mission to Mantua”, Letters VI and VII.

http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php&person=3801 (last accessed: 23 Mar 2012). I will refer to these dispatches again under military discipline.

¹³⁹ *The Prince*, 5, p. 17. ‘Perché, in verità, non ci è modo secure a possederle, altro che la ruina’, *Opere*, p. 264.

¹⁴⁰ Hörnqvist, *Machiavelli and Empire*, pp. 113-147.

other means prove inadequate'¹⁴¹. In the circumstances under discussion, Hörnqvist describes how the opportunity for the more humane option, benefit, no longer existed: 'the time when Florence could secure her neighbour's loyalty through a policy of friendship, humanity and liberality had passed'¹⁴². Therefore, the extreme option of destruction is, in this particular example in *The Prince*, the only option available.

Machiavelli discusses other examples of brutal treatment, for example the Roman killing of Carthaginian prisoners in *The Discourses*¹⁴³. However, I argue that Machiavelli is reasonably consistent in that: first, he does not present the brutality as a 'good', it remains an 'outrage', evil remains evil. Secondly, he does not advocate that such an example should be unconditionally followed, instead it is a conditional action to obtain certain ends.

Interestingly, Machiavelli is silent on his personal involvement in another example of potentially inhumane action. Detmold describes how Machiavelli was charged in August 1508, with the destruction of crops before Pisa, thus forcing famine on the civilian population of Pisa. However, Machiavelli makes no record of this project himself, therefore, if it was executed, he was not recording it as an example¹⁴⁴. Gilbert writes how Machiavelli did not look on the Pisans as an 'aggressive Florentine', but with some sympathy, an impartiality that was 'not cold but warm and interested'¹⁴⁵.

He is certainly conscious of the cost and pain inflicted on one's own people: 'a ruler possessing any degree of humanity, cannot rejoice in a victory that afflicts his subjects'¹⁴⁶.

¹⁴¹ *The Discourses*, 2, 21, p. 343. '...sidebbono riservare in ultimo luogo, dove e quando gli altri modi non bastino', *Opere*, p. 178.

¹⁴² Hörnqvist, *Machiavelli and Empire*, p. 144.

¹⁴³ *The Discourses*, 3, 32, pp. 492-3. For other examples of inhumanity, I later consider the case of Agathocles with the test of glory.

¹⁴⁴ Footnote to 'Second Mission to the Interior of the State', in Detmold, *The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings*, 4. There is also a letter from Florence to Machiavelli, urging more speed in executing this task. Atkinson and Sices, *Machiavelli and his Friends*, Letter 157, 26 August 1508, p. 170.

¹⁴⁵ Gilbert, *The Letters of Machiavelli*, p. 51.

¹⁴⁶ *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 6, 1, p. 257. '... e se gli ha in sé alcuna umanità, non si può di quella vittoria interamente ralegrare, della quale tutti i suoi sudditi si contristano'; *Opere*, p. 765.

This is consistent with Machiavelli's discussion as to whether a ruler should be loved or feared, but certainly not hated¹⁴⁷. To be hated undermines the governance of both people and armies, and brutal and inhumane treatment is a certain way to incur hatred. For Butters, 'Machiavelli stresses the need for princes to have the *popolo* on their side'¹⁴⁸, but this cannot be achieved if the *popolo* are inhumanely treated.

Viroli is right, therefore, to emphasise Machiavelli's disapproval of cruelty in war, particularly when unleashed 'on women, children, and non-combatants'¹⁴⁹. However, again I believe that Viroli goes too far in implying that this is always, inevitably, a consequence of war as the 'greatest evil'. First, as Sánchez had argued, the ills of war were due to its abuse and excesses, and this can certainly be inferred from Machiavelli. For example, Machiavelli's citizen soldier is very much a part of, not distinct from, normal society, and would empathise with non-combatant citizens. Secondly, Machiavelli argues that conduct in war can be restrained, as I shortly examine in detail. But measures for restraint, as well as other fighting skills, have to be well-founded. De Grazia writes of Machiavelli's war: 'the hell that it is, the gore that it trudges in, at best can be held to a minimum only by preparing yourself'¹⁵⁰. This is perfectly consistent with Machiavelli's ideas for a well-disciplined, peacetime, militia.

To conclude, Machiavelli is perfectly 'aware' of the 'the darker side' and its consequences. There is even evidence to suggest that he is sensitive to them. He is certainly aware of the beneficial consequences of more humane approaches, and explicitly recommends them if they are appropriate. I emphasise, even without raising questions of virtue and principle, that Machiavelli's consideration of humane and inhumane conduct in war is fundamental to his broader political discussion.

¹⁴⁷ *The Prince*, 17, pp. 53 - 6.

¹⁴⁸ Butters, "Good Government and the Limitations of Power", p. 415.

¹⁴⁹ Viroli, *Machiavelli*, pp. 15 - 16.

¹⁵⁰ De Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, p. 167.

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR WAR

I now turn to the justification of war. As I have pointed out, from the paucity of references in his major political works it can appear that any normative perspective of justification does not concern Machiavelli. Wars are simply an inevitable fact of human existence and need either no further justification, or possibly a justification of simple necessity. We have seen his perfunctory quotation of the Samnite general, that ‘war is justified if necessity forces one to it’¹⁵¹. However, several points can straightaway be drawn from this. First, it suggests that the idea of justifying a war is at least familiar to Machiavelli and his audience. Secondly, he does not specify what particular necessity might force a war. I will argue that a ‘necessary’ war is as subjective a claim as a ‘just’ war.

He comes closer to a moral injunction with the claim that it is ‘the man who uses violence to spoil things, not the man who uses it to mend them, that is blameworthy’¹⁵². Again, however, the precise nature of the ‘things’ to be either mended or spoilt is not clear. Elsewhere, there are indications of a more cautious approach, and we have seen his clear statement of the principle of force as a ‘last resort...when other means prove inadequate’¹⁵³. To explore this issue further, I will first consider two opposing interpretations: Parel, who claims that Machiavelli is ‘fascinated’ by the notion of a just war; and Hörnqvist for whom Parel’s claim is ‘deeply problematic’. I will then turn to examples from *The History of Florence* where I believe there is a rich seam of justificatory material, largely untapped.

¹⁵¹ *The Discourses*, 3, 12, p. 442. ‘*Iustum est bellum quibus necessarium, et pia arma quibus nisi in armis spes est*’, *Opere*, p. 218.

¹⁵² *The Discourses*, 1, 9, p. 132. ‘...perché colui che è violento per guastare, non quello che è per racconciare, si debbe riprendere’, *Opere*, p. 90.

¹⁵³ *The Discourses*, 2, 21, p. 343. ‘...sidebbono riservare in ultimo luogo, dove e quando gli altri modi non bastino’, *Opere*, p. 178.

Discussion: Parel and Hörnqvist

In his study of “Machiavelli’s Notions of Justice”, Parel claims that it is ‘not quite accurate to say that Machiavelli has no use for justice’, instead Machiavelli has a very ‘positivistic conception’ of justice associated with law and ‘the external ordering of the city’¹⁵⁴. Within this wider conception of justice, law and order, Parel further claims that ‘the notion of *bellum justum* seems to have fascinated Machiavelli’¹⁵⁵. He points to three references in *The Prince*, *The Discourses*, and *The History of Florence* respectively¹⁵⁶, and emphasises the ‘common thread’ of necessity underlying them. He goes on to argue, however, that without the ‘impartial authority’ the ‘application of the concept of necessity always remains subjective’¹⁵⁷.

Hörnqvist attacks Parel’s discussion. For Hörnqvist, in all the coverage of armed conflict in *The Prince*, *The Discourses*, and *The Art of War*, ‘the issue of whether the war in question was just or unjust rarely, if ever, is raised’¹⁵⁸. Furthermore, Parel’s contention that Machiavelli’s ‘deep interest in the notion of a just war’ based on necessity, self-preservation and liberty, is for Hörnqvist, ‘highly problematic’: ‘necessity, being notoriously difficult to define, lends itself to abuse’¹⁵⁹. A real divide then opens up when Hörnqvist introduces the possibility of manipulating necessity. Hörnqvist claims that, for Parel, Machiavelli would not approve of using the concept for ‘questionable ends’, because it was ‘associated with good

¹⁵⁴ Parel, A. J., “Machiavelli’s Notions of Justice”, *Political Theory*, Vol. 18, No.4, (November, 1990), p. 536.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 535.

¹⁵⁶ I have already referred to the Samnite general quotation from *The Discourses*, ‘war is justified if necessity forces one to it’, and here I will be discussing the question of necessity further. I will shortly examine the reference from the *History of Florence* in much greater depth than Parel. Parel also refers to *The Prince*, 26, p. 85, where Machiavelli closes his final chapter with an exhortation for a ‘just enterprise’, but this ‘enterprise’ of regenerating the glory of Italy is used in a much broader rhetorical context than a specific ‘just war’; ‘...*che si pigliano le imprese iuste*’, *Opere*, p. 298.

¹⁵⁷ Parel, “Machiavelli’s Notions of Justice”, p. 535.

¹⁵⁸ Hörnqvist, *Machiavelli and Empire*, p. 94.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

government and justice'. Instead, for Hörnqvist, Machiavelli most certainly uses this concept, along with 'justification by faith and protestations of peaceful intentions', to 'inspire courage in war and to cloak expansionist policies'¹⁶⁰.

There is, therefore: disagreement between Hörnqvist and Parel on the level of Machiavelli's interest in justifying war; clear agreement on the question of subjectivity and necessity; and apparent disagreement on manipulation. I would agree that for a prolific writer on contemporary wars, the paucity of references to just war thinking in his major political works is in need of explanation. However, I will show how this subject does appear more in *The History of Florence*, where he provides more empirical, descriptive, accounts of past conflicts, and the contemporary discussions surrounding them. Also, when combined with the concept of necessity, the justification of wars can indeed be seen as a more commonplace topic in his major works. As to the subjective nature of ideas of either a just war or one of necessity, the agreement between Hörnqvist and Parel is noteworthy. Indeed, when judgement is left to the princes of this world, even Erasmus agrees. However, for Machiavelli, I argue that the necessity for war remains political, and tied to the well-being of the state and the common good. It is not intended to be open to the arbitrary will of princes, when this differs from the common good.

The question as to how Machiavelli uses these concepts, is more complex. Parel is, I believe, amiss in not explicitly developing this theme. Although his claim that Machiavelli is 'fascinated' by the justification of war might appear extravagant, it is the case that he sees such justifications as having considerable political utility. Hörnqvist, on the other hand, I argue is too cynical, or too tied to his interpretation of an expansionist Machiavelli. Peoples and soldiers do fight all the better when convinced of the cause they are engaged in, whether the policy is one of expansion or defence, and Machiavelli is well aware of this. Indeed, in

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

terms of defending a republic, the worthiness of the cause is fundamental to his concept of the well-motivated citizen-soldier. For contemporary exemplification of Machiavelli on the justification of war I now turn to *The History of Florence*.

Examples from The History of Florence

The History of Florence contains, as Felix Gilbert describes, an abundance of ‘carefully worked out speeches placed in the mouths of the chief actors, and which could be read as if they were brief independent treatises’. Gilbert describes ‘concise statements of Machiavelli’s ideas’. But the speeches are, as Filippo Del Lucchese cautions, not necessarily ‘direct expressions’ of Machiavelli, and they have to be read carefully and in context¹⁶¹.

Some speeches concern the justification for a particular war and are therefore very relevant to this thesis, even when they are clearly rhetorical and describing fourteenth century events. In an early example, Machiavelli clearly differentiates between wars waged for the common good or for private gain. He describes a speech condemning private factions, when ‘nothing is too unjust... Thus laws and ordinances, peace, wars, and treaties are adopted and pursued, not for the public good, not for the common glory of the state, but for the convenience and advantage of a few individuals’¹⁶².

The reference cited by Parel from *The History of Florence* has Machiavelli giving an account of a speech by a Florentine exile, Albizzi, imploring the Duke of Milan to attack

¹⁶¹ Gilbert, “Introduction” to *The History of Florence*, pp. xiii, and xvi. The work is, as Gilbert describes, ‘permeated by a pessimistic mood... in the History of Florence Machiavelli found again and again private ambitions, egoisms, and thirst for personal power’, p. xvii, and yet he is seizing the opportunity to work and write for the Medici Pope Clement. His difficulty in achieving the right balance is expressed in his letter to Guicciardini: ‘I would need to learn from you whether or not I am being too offensive or exaggerating in the facts. Nevertheless, I shall continue to seek advice from myself, and I shall try to do my best to arrange it so that – still telling the truth – no one will have anything to complain about’. Letter to Guicciardini, 30 August, 1524, Atkinson and Sices, *Machiavelli and his Friends*, p. 342. ‘...harei bisogno di intendere da voi se offendo troppo o con lo esaltare o con lo abbassare le cose; pure io mi verrò consigliando, et ingegnerommi do fare in modo che, dicendo il vero, nessuno si possa dolere’. *Opere*, p. 1212. Filippo Del Lucchese, “Crisis and Power”, p. 91.

¹⁶² This speech was made in Florence in 1371 by a representative of a gathering of concerned citizens and delivered to the Signoria. *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 3, 1, pp. 114-5. ‘... non é cosa sì ingiusta... Di qui gli ordini e le leggi, non per publica, ma per propria utilità si fanno; di qui le guerre, le paci, le amicizie, non per Gloria commune, ma per sodis fazione di pochi si deliberano’. *Opere* p. 693.

Florence, and claiming that it would be a just war¹⁶³. However, as Parel describes, this is blatantly an unjust cause, ‘hardly justifiable, by even the prevailing code of international behaviour’. To have Albizzi invoke the ‘formula for just war’, is to say ‘that what constitutes necessity is something that a state or a statesman is utterly free to determine’¹⁶⁴. Certainly, Machiavelli is rhetorically demonstrating the subjective nature of both just war thinking and necessity; however, I believe that there is much more to be drawn from this speech.

First, with more than a passing reference, the three traditional, Thomist criteria of a just war, authority, cause and intention, are very apparent. It is to the just authority of the Duke of Milan that the supplication is made. Then, the supplicant repeatedly explains why ‘our cause is just’: the Florentines, for example, betrayed a solemn peace, ‘ample justice is on our side’¹⁶⁵. Finally, just intention is dealt with in several ways: the conspiring parties had the intention of peace, they ‘were really desirous of peace’¹⁶⁶; and the intention, the underlying motive, will not be seen as ‘ambitious and unwarrantable’ but ‘merciful and just’¹⁶⁷.

Secondly, the principle of necessity is closely interwoven with that of a just war. The supplicant repeats the Samnite quotation: ‘no wars are just but those that are necessary’, but unlike the citation from *The Discourses*, here a particular necessity is then specified. Referring to a claim that Florence is in the grip of a tyranny, Albizzi is explicit: no ‘necessity can be greater than ours...which rescues our country from slavery’¹⁶⁸. Necessity is being understood as the maintenance of the state and its liberty, although clearly, Machiavelli

¹⁶³ This Albizzi speech was made in 1435. *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 5, 2, pp. 214-6. Viroli considers this speech, but focusses on its rhetorical value, and ‘love of country’ rather than the justification for a war. Viroli, *Machiavelli*, pp. 162 - 163.

¹⁶⁴ Parel, “Machiavelli’s Notions of Justice”, p. 535.

¹⁶⁵ *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 5, 2, p. 215. ‘...è certissimo per tanto la causa nostra essere piatosa e giusta... Né per la parte tua questa giustizia manca’; *Opere*, p. 744.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 214. ‘...quando noi te cognoschemmo volto ad una vera pace, fummo più desiderosi di quell ache tu medesimo’; *Opere*, p. 743.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 216. Not ‘ambizioso e violento’, but ‘al presente sarà giusto e pietoso existimato’. *Opere*, p. 744.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 215. ‘Sono solamente quelle guerre giuste che sono necessarie... non so quale necessità sia maggiore che la nostra... che tragga la patria sua di servitù’; *Opere*, pp. 743-4.

would not agree that it is the Florentine people who were enslaved at that juncture. Again, he is employing a rhetoric of double meaning, and later we see him implying that the Florentines would indeed be enslaved if the attack by the Duke went ahead.

Thirdly, beyond just war criteria, the whole contemporary language of rationalising war is invoked. The Duke of Milan is described as acting in self-defence against a ‘league’ of rebels, and cannot be reproached if ‘he endeavours to defend his country’¹⁶⁹. Furthermore, the Florentines are no longer ‘animated by the valour of former times’, they are disunited, and an ‘easy victory’ over them is assured. Today, we would describe this as a reasonable chance of success¹⁷⁰. And, on a cost-benefit calculation, ‘incalculable advantage’ will be accrued, as will glory and ‘an honourable renown’¹⁷¹.

Albizzi also focusses on the ‘oppressed’ people of Florence, who ‘feel more deeply the avarice of their rulers than the rapacity of the enemy’. Therefore, a war to free them would be a lesser evil: ‘for there is hope of being ultimately relieved from the latter evil (war), but none from the former (oppression)’¹⁷². Nor can it be ‘universally condemned’ for the Florentine exiles to invoke war against their own people, because the Florentine body is shown to be diseased, and there would be greater ‘blame in leaving her uncured’. Therefore ‘the application of fire and steel’ is required, a ‘necessity for the sword’¹⁷³. This is the familiar medical analogy we saw deployed by Sánchez, and ironically critiqued by Erasmus.

¹⁶⁹ The Florentines are said to be in league with the Genoese who had earlier rebelled against the Duke, *Ibid.*, p. 215 and *Opere*, p. 744. ‘No good man will ever reproach another...’, *Ibid.*, p. 214; ‘*Niuno uomo buono riprenderà mai alcuno che cerchi di defendere la patria sua, in qualunque modo se la difenda*’, *Opere*, p. 743.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 215-6; ‘... quando le fussino di quella medesima virtù che allora... disunito... anzi è da sperarne una certa vittoria’, *Opere*, p. 744.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 216. ‘... utile grandissimo e farma onestissima a parturire’. *Opere*, p. 744.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 215. ‘... opprimere... ai populo nuoce molto più l’avarizia de’ suoi cittadini che la rapacità degli nimici; perché di questa si spera qualche volta vedere il fine, dell’altra non mai’. *Opere*, p. 744.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 214-5. ‘Né sia alcuno che danni le armi in qualunque modo contro alle patria mosse; perché le città, ancora che sieno corpi misti, hanno con i corpi semplici somiglianza, e come in questi nascono molte volte infirmità che senza il fuoco o il ferro non si possono sanare, così in quelle molte volte surge tanti inconvenienti che uno pio e buono cittadino, ancora che il ferro vi fusse necessario, peccherebbe molto più a lasciale incurate che a curale’. *Opere*, p. 743.

Notably, Albizzi does not directly invoke the notion of ‘last resort’ which I have pointed out with Machiavelli elsewhere. Albizzi could be made to say, for example, that any effort at negotiation would be pointless. However, given Machiavelli’s suspicion of exiles, it is more a case of the exile Albizzi, or Machiavelli’s characterization of Albizzi, not wanting to even raise the prospect of a negotiated settlement between Milan and Florence, he simply wants war and a change of regime in Florence. This is consistent with Machiavelli’s discussion concerning exiles in *The Discourses*: they are disingenuous and liable to precipitate action, ‘so intense is their desire to get back home’¹⁷⁴.

The irony is that an apparently watertight case is being laid out by Machiavelli, through Albizzi, for a war of which Machiavelli himself would certainly disapprove. This disapproval, I argue, becomes even more evident with a closing apparent justification for the Duke to attack Florence. The liberated people of Tuscany would be so grateful that they would ‘be bound by so powerful an obligation’¹⁷⁵, and would therefore be of great, future service to the Duke. The notion that a people should be bound by an obligation to a foreign military power is, of course, anathema to Machiavelli’s sense of civic *virtù*. Significantly, Albizzi’s claim contrasts sharply with Machiavelli’s account earlier in the same chapter, of the armed rebellion by the Genoese people against the same Duke of Milan. The Genoese, Machiavelli describes, ‘... raised the cry of liberty. It was wonderful to see how eagerly the citizens and people assembled at the word’. By their own actions, we might say *virtù*, they overthrew the Duke’s regime in Genoa and ‘delivered themselves entirely from his yoke’¹⁷⁶.

¹⁷⁴ *The Discourses*, 2, 31, pp. 376-7. ‘... egli è tanta la voglia estrema che è in loro di ritornare in casa’, *Opere*, p. 192.

¹⁷⁵ *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 5, 2, p. 216. ‘... e per tale e tanto obbligo obligata’, *Opere*, p. 744.

¹⁷⁶ ‘The Genoese having placed the government in the hands of free magistrates, in a few days recovered the castle, and the other strongholds possessed by the duke...’; *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 5, 2, pp. 213-4. ‘...gridò il nome della libertà. Fu cosa mirabile a vedere con quanta prestezza quel popolo e quelli cittadini a questo nome concorressino... E ridutta i Genovesi la città sotto i liberi magistrate, in pochi giorni il castello e gli altri luoghi forti posseduti da il Duca occuporono, e al tutto da il giogo del duca Filippo si liberorono’. *Opere*, p. 743.

Machiavelli's understanding of the deeper causes of war, I believe, follows straight after Albizzi's speech, in which he has rehearsed a full justification for war, and which he now describes as essentially superfluous: 'Many words were not requisite to induce the Duke to hostilities against the Florentines, for he was incited to it by hereditary hatred and blind ambition', which had been aggravated by recent injury¹⁷⁷. This is completely consistent with his view that war is caused by ambition and hatred which we have seen in the tercets "On Ambition" and elsewhere¹⁷⁸.

Finally, at the end of the chapter, Machiavelli provides further contrast. The Milanese co-opt their ally, Lucca. Machiavelli, without any of the preceding rhetoric, summarily justifies a subsequent defensive Florentine action against Lucca, who, '...having received the enemy into their city, and allowed him to attack them, would have no ground for complaint'¹⁷⁹. Meanwhile, inside Lucca, a leading citizen exhorts the population to defend themselves against Florence, a situation brought about 'by our weakness and their ambition'¹⁸⁰. He invokes the language of the existential threat that I described earlier with the concept of 'supreme emergency': '...you have to dread the Florentines, for they would not be satisfied by submission and tribute, or the dominion of our city, but they would possess our entire substance and persons...'¹⁸¹.

With Albizzi's speech, Parel is correct in saying that Machiavelli is acknowledging the subjectivity of claims for either a just or a necessary war. However, I have shown that it is

¹⁷⁷ The recent injury resulted from the alleged league between Florence and rebellious Genoa, *Ibid.*, p. 216. '*Non erano necessarie molte parole a persuadere al Duca che movesse guerra a' Fiorentini, perché era mosso da uno ereditario odio e una cieca ambizione, la quale così comandava; e tanto più sendo spinto dalle nuove ingiurie, per lo accord fatto con i Genovesi*'. *Opere*, p. 744.

¹⁷⁸ Machiavelli, "On Ambition", *The Chief Works*, 1, pp. 735-6; and, for example, *The Discourses*, 3, 12, p. 441.

¹⁷⁹ *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 5, 2, p. 218. '*...e che i Lucchesi, per avere ricevuto in casa i nemici loro e permesso gli assalissimo, non si potevano in alcuna parte dolere*'. *Opere*, p. 745.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 5, 3, p. 219. '*...ma sì bene la debolezza vostra e la ambizione loro*'; *Opere*, p. 746.

¹⁸¹ He continues, '...that they might satiate their cruelty with our blood, and their avarice with our property'. *Ibid.*, p. 221. '*...perché a loro non basterebbe la ubbidienza e i tribute nostril con lo imperio di questa nostra città, ma vorrebbero le persone e le sustanze nostre, per potere con il sangue la loro crudeltà, e con la roba la loro avarizia saziare*'; *Opere*, p. 746.

much more than this. With an impressive rhetorical device, similar in style to Erasmus's *Praise of Folly*, Machiavelli lays out the full panoply of the contemporary justificatory language for war, but questions its value. He confirms his view that wars are caused simply by blind ambition and inherent hatred, and to defend the state and its liberty in the face of this does not, in normative terms, require further justification. He recognises instrumental value and contemporary usage in persuading princes or peoples to undertake a war, but in this particular case, although the full rhetoric is deployed, for Machiavelli it was superfluous. On the other hand, acts of *virtù* to gain liberty, as with the Genoese, or of ambition and hatred, as with the Duke of Milan, are self-evident.

A further reference to just war appears in *The History of Florence* when Machiavelli describes a debate of the Florentine Council seeking to justify another war on Lucca, a war which Machiavelli himself believes to be unnecessary. This is not mentioned by Parel but it is discussed by Erica Benner¹⁸². The substance of the justification for the war is similar to that of Albizzi's speech. It concludes by claiming that no earlier action by Florence had ever had such 'perfect facility, more positive advantage, or greater justice in its favour'¹⁸³.

However, in the reply against the war, there is an immediate riposte that Florence 'never entered on a more unjust or more dangerous project, or one more pregnant with evil'¹⁸⁴. With the immediacy of this counter, I argue that Machiavelli again rhetorically makes clear the subjective nature of the justice of a war. The opponent of the war argues from principled obligations the 'unjust' nature of a war, for example: because a free Lucca had never 'done an injury to the Florentines'¹⁸⁵. However, the war's opponent has to concede

¹⁸² This debate took place in 1429, and we are informed that 498 citizens of the Council assembled, out of which only 98 came to oppose the war. *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 4, 4, p. 179-180. The ethical issues are discussed in Benner, Erica, *Machiavellian Ethics*, pp. 335-340.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 180. '... né più facile, né più utile, né più giusta', *Opere*, p. 726.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.* 'Firenze non fece mai impresa più ingiusta, né più pericolosa, né che da quella dovessero nascere maggiori danni'.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.* 'E che nelle memorie delle cose nostre non si troverrà mai Lucca libera avere offeso Firenze'.

with a telling statement: ‘...as it was usual at present to pay little or no regard either to equity or injustice, he would consider the matter solely with reference to the advantage of Florence’¹⁸⁶. As justice evidently carried no weight in the discussion, he continues by challenging the consequential assumptions of the pro-war argument. The pro-war camp wins the vote, but Machiavelli later describes how the predicted consequential penalties are indeed subsequently incurred.

Benner argues that the principled arguments put forward in this case exemplify how such ‘obligations form the grounding level of Machiavelli’s ethical arguments’ in a deontological sense rather than the more familiar consequential reasoning¹⁸⁷. I will not pursue the essential nature of Machiavelli’s ethics here, but argue that we do at least see Machiavelli’s familiarity, if not his conviction, with the language of a principled justification for war, and its utility and rhetorical value in attempting to justify and denounce conflicts. However, we are also led to see the limits to these just war arguments: they are subjective, and they do not always address the practical outcomes.

To conclude on justification, I underscore three points from the Parel- Hörnqvist discussion, and from the Albizzi speech, the latter being a succinct rhetorical device, reflecting the full panoply of contemporary justificatory language. First, for Machiavelli, the concept of a ‘necessary’ war is as subjective as a ‘just’ war. But these are not meaningless concepts, because secondly, he demonstrates the instrumental value of these and other justificatory concepts in terms of persuasion and motivation. Yet, thirdly, war is ultimately caused by ambition and innate hatred, and appropriate defence against such forces does not require further moral justification in a world condemned to a cycle of war and peace.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.* ‘Ma poi che si viveva oggi in modo che del giusto e dello ingiusto non si aveva a tenere molto conto, e pensare solo alla utilità della città’.

¹⁸⁷ Benner, *Machiavellian Ethics*, p. 340.

THE CONDUCT AND RESTRAINT OF WARFARE

I now turn from the justification of war to the next theme of my thesis, its conduct. It is frequently asserted by commentators that, for Machiavelli, the conduct of war is unbounded by moral constraints. In introducing Machiavelli's *Art of War* Wood asserts: 'War for him is war, a no-holds-barred contest... Behaviour towards the enemy is not subject to common moral considerations. Every type of trickery and violence is legitimate when used against the enemy'¹⁸⁸. Skinner concludes that 'anything, however unsavoury' is permissible in defence of the state¹⁸⁹. I have already considered the exceptional case of a 'supreme emergency', where restraint is indeed less evident. But now I will argue that Machiavelli's general approach to the conduct of war is imbued with an ethos of restraint, and in particular, political restraint. It is not simply a case of 'no-holds-barred', but strictly those 'holds' that are approved by the prince, the republic, or their representatives. It is of fundamental importance, in Machiavelli's own words, 'to bridle an armed multitude'¹⁹⁰.

Anglo, cynically and I believe unfoundedly, even describes 'really bloody battles' delighting Machiavelli 'in the safety of his study'¹⁹¹. Machiavelli might have been confined to his farm while in exile, but this he found frustrating, and takes place after an active career. He was essentially a civil servant, nevertheless: he maintained close contact with those who had 'real' experience of bloody battles; he was very active in the field, including in areas of fighting; and in his diplomatic and political life endured considerable physical risk and hardship. During the siege of Pisa, the Florentine *Signoria* sought to move him from the front line to a safer rear area. He refused: 'I know that encampment would be less dangerous and less strenuous, but had I not wanted danger and hard work, I would not have left Florence.'

¹⁸⁸ Wood, "Introduction" to *The Art of War*, p. xxv.

¹⁸⁹ Skinner, *Foundations*, 1, pp. 249-50.

¹⁹⁰ *The Art of War*, 6, p. 165. '...a frenare gli uomini armati', *Opere*, p. 370.

¹⁹¹ Anglo, *A Dissection*, p. 137.

So, may it please Your Lordships, let me stay here in these camps and work with the commissioners and events that may occur; here I can be of some good use; there I should be of no good use at all and I would die of despair'¹⁹².

Machiavelli, therefore, wrote with the benefit of experience, but there are good reasons for believing that he did not think that moral restraint was appropriate in the conduct of war. First, there is the argument to which I referred earlier, that morality has no place in any of his political ideas, and therefore we should not expect it in this instance. Furthermore, even if restraints do apply in other areas, war can be seen as a special case¹⁹³. For Butters, Machiavelli's government is subject to a number of restrictions, which as he points out, 'limit (a) rulers' freedom of action'. Yet, in 'defence of the *patria* no moral consideration should be allowed to hamper the efficient execution of the task'¹⁹⁴. In the pre-political sense, law and a moral framework can never even exist without the security of armed force, and armed force operates in a particular environment where the laws and morality of normal life do not yet exist, or are suspended. Barbara Spackman argues that Machiavelli's war is 'the continuous creation and violation of the rules of the game'. War differs from chess because 'only those who change the rules can win'¹⁹⁵.

A second reason for the tendency to overlook restraint in Machiavelli's war is that in his major works he is preoccupied, not with restraining, but with exhorting the Florentines to

¹⁹² Machiavelli to the Ten of War, 16 April 1509, cited in, for example: Ridolfi, Roberto, *The Life of Niccolò Machiavelli*, Grayson, C., (trans.) (London, 1963), p. 107; White, Michael, *Machiavelli, a Man Misunderstood* (Abacus, 2007), p. 148; and Hörnqvist, "Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506", p. 162. 'So che la stanza sarebbe meno pericolosa e meno faticosa, ma se io non volessi né pericolo, né fatica, io non sarei uscito di Firenze; sicchè mi lascino vostre signorie stare infra questi campi, e travagliare fra questi commissari delle cose che corrono, dove io potrò esser buono a qualche cosa, perchè io non sarei quivi buono a nulla, e vi morrei disperato'. *Opere*, p. 992.

¹⁹³ The quotation from Cicero's *Pro Milone*, 'Inter arma, silent leges', 'In times of war, the laws fall silent', is often deployed at this juncture. However, caution is required, as Cicero certainly believed in the need for a legal and normative framework in war. This is discussed, for example, in Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 50 – 1.

¹⁹⁴ Butters, Humfrey, "Good Government and the Limitations of Power in the Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli", *History of Political Thought*, Vol. VII, No. 3, (Winter, 1986), p. 416. Butters describes Machiavelli's government as limited by: 'Fortune, social structure, human nature and the desires and beliefs of their subjects'.

¹⁹⁵ Spackman, Barbara, "Politics on the Warpath", in Ascoli, A., R., and Kahn, V., (eds.), *Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 186.

greater military prowess; to rely on their own arms; or to be more assertive and self-reliant in their foreign policy. His whole concept of *virtù* is predicated on positive action in the face of *fortuna*. He frequently castigates the Florentine lack of assertiveness, as Roslyn Pesman pithily describes: the issue is less about prowess, ‘rather the reverse: the military weakness, instability ... and absence of leadership that dogged the Florentine Republic’¹⁹⁶. In his poetic history, *Decennale*, Machiavelli laments of Florence: ‘You were unarmed and always in great terror...but the voyage would be easy and short if you would reopen the temple of Mars’¹⁹⁷.

Instead of placing a ‘bridle on the armed multitude’, therefore, he is often seen as giving it free rein, or even crop and spurs, rather than restraint and guidance. However, the major function of the bridle is restraint and guidance, and this is the analogy he uses. In developing this idea, I will now examine the ways Machiavelli sees restraint being imposed: through military discipline, religion, glory, and political authority.

Discipline

As we have seen, ill-disciplined troops are a much-discussed blight on contemporary Europe, especially on Italy. Here, I consider particular military, social and political implications of this blight, and Machiavelli’s proposed remedies through military discipline. We have also seen contemporary military developments, and how tactical discipline becomes increasingly important in coordinating manoeuvre by larger numbers of infantry, armed with various combinations of pikes, short swords, and early firearms; and between the infantry,

¹⁹⁶ Pesman, Roslyn, “Machiavelli, Piero Soderini, and the republic of 1494-1512”, in Najemy, John, M., (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 48.

¹⁹⁷ Machiavelli, “First Decennale”, (1504), lines 319 and 549-50, in *The Chief Works*, 3, pp. 1452 and 1457. ‘...*Eri sanz’armi e ‘n gran timore...ma sarebbe il cammin facil e corto, / se voi el tempio riaprisi a Marte*’. *Opere*, pp. 946 and 950. While this lack of Florentine assertiveness is a major theme of the “First Decennale”, Machiavelli does not confine himself to Florence. Venice, or ‘Mark’, for example: ‘Mark, full of fear and full of thirst, between peace and war is wholly in suspense...’, *Ibid*; ‘*Marco, pien di paura e pien di sete, / fra la pace e la guerra tutto pende*’, *Opere*.

cavalry and artillery. Without strong discipline, as Machiavelli himself notes, ‘... so much confusion arises that the whole army is frequently ruined’¹⁹⁸.

The History of Florence is also replete with examples of the consequences of ill-disciplined plunder where military advantage, even victory, is hazarded or lost because of it. The *condottiere*, Piccinino, suffered defeat, ‘disgrace, and with the loss of great numbers of his men’, because defences were incomplete and ‘his men were dispersed in quest of plunder, or exhorting money from the inhabitants by way of ransom; and he could not collect them in time’¹⁹⁹. Machiavelli describes such inadequate soldiers in almost Erasmian, rhetorical terms: ‘a parcel of intemperate, licentious, and drunken fellows’²⁰⁰; or ‘a parcel of corrupted, debauched rascals and foreigners’²⁰¹. He bemoans how indiscriminate plunder is the cause of great disorder, with soldiers, ‘so greedy for spoil that they lay aside all regard for order and military discipline’²⁰².

With larger formations covering longer distances, depending on forage and plunder, and making demands on local populations, ill-disciplined and uncontrolled soldiers become an increasing social problem. Machiavelli witnesses the consequences, describing what

¹⁹⁸ *The Discourses*, 2, 16, p. 320. ‘...ne nasce tanta confusion, che spesso un minimo accidente rovina uno esercito’. *Opere*, p. 167.

¹⁹⁹ This incident at Verona occurred 1439. *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 5, 5, p. 240. ‘...con vergogna di Niccolò e danno delle sue genti...perché le sbarre alle rocche non erano fatte, e i soldati, per la avarizia della preda e della taglia, erano divisie; né potette unirli sì tosto...’; *Opere*, p. 756. Again, for example, after Anghiari in 1440 Florence’s soldiers, in a ‘wretched state of discipline’, ‘esempio grande della infelicità di questa guerre’, plunder neighbouring Arezzo. Their absence enabled their principle prisoner, the same Piccinino, to escape, who quickly returns ‘reorganised his forces... and even more powerful in the field than ever’, ‘maggior guerra faceva... più potente che prima’. *Ibid.*, 5, 7, p. 253 and 6, 1, p. 258; *Opere*, pp. 763 and 766. This defeat of Piccinino at Anghiari is the subject of Leonardo da Vinci’s fresco in the Great Hall at Florence, and which Machiavelli was instrumental in commissioning, as discussed in detail by Jonathan Jones in his *The Lost Battles*. Another particularly graphic example described by Machiavelli is the ill treatment, and treachery, meted out to the inhabitants of Seravezza by Florentine troops under Astorre Gianni in 1429. This follows the Lucca war debate in the Florentine Council, discussed above, *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), 4, 5, pp. 183-4. Also, the massacre of civilians at Volterra to which I have referred and where Machiavelli remarks, ‘the place seems rather lost than won’. *Ibid.*, pp. 347-8.

²⁰⁰ ‘Instead of imitating the regularity and sobriety of the ancients...’; *The Art of War*, 6, p. 168. ‘...meritamente non si possono chiamare ordinate e sobrii come gli antichi, ma licenziosi ed ebbriachi’; *Opere*, p. 371.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 7, p. 210. ‘...maligni, male custoditi e forestieri’. *Opere*, p. 388.

²⁰² ‘...hence it has often happened that the conqueror has had the victory snatched out of his hands again’. *Ibid.*, 6, p. 140. ‘...che il soldato diventa più cupido del predare e meno osservante degli ordini; e molte volte si è veduto come la cupidità della preda ha fatto perdere chi era vittorioso’. *Opere*, p. 360.

amounts to criminality in his 1509 dispatches: ‘this country cannot long remain in the present condition ... for the inhabitants of the city are devoured by the troops quartered in their houses, whilst those who live outside of the city are plundered and killed’²⁰³. As I have argued, he is not insensitive to this human cost, and in the same year writes in his lament of the consequences of ambition and war: ‘Ambition results in two kinds of action: one party robs and the other weeps for its wealth ravaged and scattered’²⁰⁴. Machiavelli, therefore, certainly shares the disgust felt and expressed by Erasmus and other pacific humanists for ill-disciplined soldiery, even if his concern is to be more consequential. The key difference, I argue, is that instead of being satisfied with rhetorical condemnation, he looks for remedies.

There is also a political dimension. As Brenner describes, military discipline in Machiavelli is not ‘a mere means to a military ends’, it is inextricably linked to ‘political and legal justice’²⁰⁵. I agree: first, the perceived benefits of tactical discipline, such as the subordination of individual interest to a common purpose, come to infect citizens through militia service²⁰⁶. This does not mean, however, a militarised society, as military and civil functions remain separate. Secondly, the blame for failure to instil such discipline rests not with the people, ‘but rather their princes’²⁰⁷, for Machiavelli, discipline reflects broader social issues, and it is very much a responsibility of political leadership. Thirdly, as I have argued, for Machiavelli, military defeat or success is closely inter-twined with political failure or success.

²⁰³ Detmold, *The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings*, 4, “Mission to Mantua”, Letter VII. Also: ‘The soldiers here are occupying themselves with plundering and ravaging the country around, and we see and hear daily of the most unexampled and extraordinary things ...’, *Ibid.*, Letter VI.

²⁰⁴ Machiavelli, Tercet “On Ambition”, (ca 1509), in *The Chief Works*, 1, p. 738. ‘*Vedrai d’Ambizion l’una e l’altra arte: / come quell ruba e quell’altro si duole / de le fortune sue lacere e sparte*’. *Opere*, p. 986.

²⁰⁵ Brenner, *Machiavelli’s Ethics*, pp. 292-3.

²⁰⁶ Machiavelli will remain immune to suggestions that the reverse might also apply: civil indiscipline comes to infect the soldiery.

²⁰⁷ Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, 7, p. 209. ‘*Ma i popoli non ne hanno colpa, ma sì bene i principi loro*’. *Opere*, p. 388. Erasmus makes the point in *De bello turcico*: responsibility for military misconduct lies with the head of state and generals. However, this is the limit of any practical recommendation by him on this, and it only occurs when he is particularly concerned with the Ottoman incursion.

In searching for remedies for ill-discipline he is not the first, or last, humanist writer to appeal to antiquity²⁰⁸, drawing particularly on Roman examples²⁰⁹. For Machiavelli, the major part of the solution is to replace mercenary troops with a militia, with the mutually supporting influences of the military and civil environments that I have discussed. But this alone is not sufficient. Indeed, the advantage in tactical discipline most probably lies with professional troops. He himself apparently appreciated this advantage in the account of his disaster in exercising a formation of troops himself, when given the opportunity by a *condottiere*, and having to be rescued by the professional²¹⁰. In the “Discourse on the Florentine State for Arms”, he clearly allows for professional ‘constables’ at appropriate levels of command throughout the organisation of his ideal militia²¹¹.

Throughout *The Art of War*, Machiavelli has Fabrizio expound on what he is looking for in terms of military discipline. As well as purely tactical discipline, he includes ‘general rules of military discipline’ which note how ‘(g)ood order and discipline in an army are more to be depended upon than ferocity’²¹². There are exhortations to good order: to abhor ‘fastidious living and luxurious dress’²¹³; nor should soldiers be given time for ‘women, gambling, or any of those vile avocations which commonly make soldiers idle and

²⁰⁸ Anglo, for example, provides a useful summary of earlier writers in *Machiavelli: A Dissection*, 5, pp. 118-21; and later writers in the first chapters of his *Machiavelli: The First Century*.

²⁰⁹ There exists considerable scholarship on Machiavelli’s relationship to the Roman model, but for Butters: ‘utopian visions move Machiavelli not at all, and the Roman model so attracted him because it had proved itself in the real world’; Butters, “Good Government in Machiavelli”, p. 412.

²¹⁰ The incident is reported to have occurred in Lombardy when Machiavelli was with papal troops in the summer of 1526. The *condottiere* in question was Giovanni de’ Medici, and the professional troops were from the Black Band. The account, possibly apocryphal, is retold, for example, by Michael Mallett in *Mercenaries and their Masters*, p. 259, and 274, n. Ch.10; also by Urban, W., *Medieval Mercenaries: The Business of War* (London and Minnesota: Greenhill, 2006), p. 271-2. It has to be noted, however, that both Mallett and Urban are presenting an account of professional soldiers as opposed to the militia ideal. Mallett cites the Bertelli edition of *The Art of War, Biblioteca di classici italiani* (Milan, 1961), p. 317. Also, Machiavelli’s ‘tangle’ is described in Atkinson and Sices, *Machiavelli and his Friends*, p. 376.

²¹¹ “Discourse on the Florentine State for arms”, my Volume 2, Appendix 3, p. 97.

²¹² *The Art of War*, 7, pp. 202-4. ‘...alcune regole generali... Può la disciplina nella guerra più che il furore’. *Opere*, p. 385.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 204. ‘...a spregiare il vivere delicate e il vestire lussurioso’. *Opere*, p. 386.

sedition²¹⁴. But, as well as negatives, there are positives. These include the disposition to ‘readily’ carry heavier loads, to march further, and to dig your own earthworks rather than depend on a burdensome train of labourers. The latter would be particularly unwelcome to the aristocratic or mercenary traditions. Plunder should ‘belong to the public treasury’, and not be considered as individual profit, as had become customary²¹⁵.

Implementation includes ‘fear and punishment’ but also ‘hopes and rewards’.

Machiavelli’s controversial employment of Borgia’s former henchman, Michelotto, to police his militia, exemplifies Machiavelli himself actually implementing a policy of fear and punishment²¹⁶. Rewards are encouraged to ‘...excite men to behave themselves well from motives of both hope and fear’. Such rewards are linked to reputation among colleagues, civilian friends and relatives on returning home²¹⁷, a point to which I will return in relation to glory. A commander must also be competent in using rhetoric to harangue, ‘rebuke, entreat, threaten, praise, reproach’, and in ‘all other arts that can either excite or allay the passions and appetites of mankind’²¹⁸. Discipline and military skill does not mean a rigid, traditional mind-set, a failing he believes of the Swiss and Spanish, but a disposition to learn and adapt²¹⁹.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 6, p. 165. ‘...che non restava loro tempo a pensare o a Venere o a’ giuochi, né ad alter cose che facciano i soldati sediziosi e inutile’. *Opere*, p. 370. Machiavelli repeats his belief that soldiers should be kept from: ‘gambling, drinking, whoring, swearing, and insubordination common among soldiers in these times’. *Ibid.*, 7, p. 208. ‘...asterrebbe egli da’ giuochi, dale lascivie, dale bestemmie, dalla insolenze che ogni dì fanno’. *Opere*, p. 387.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 5, p. 141. ‘...tutta la preda si metteva in mezzo’, *Opere*, p. 360.

²¹⁶ Lukes discusses the employment of Michelotto, also known as Don Michele di don Giovanni da Coriglia da Valenza, in “Martialing Machiavelli”, pp. 1089-1108. Against those who prefer to distance Machiavelli from de Michelotto, I believe his employment is perfectly consistent with a policy not only of strong punishment, but also reward. I also consider Hörnqvist’s discussion of Michelotto, Hörnqvist: “Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506”, pp. 171-186, with “Political Restraint”, on p. 257.

²¹⁷ *The Art of War*, 6, pp. 163-4. ‘...vi deono essere ancora i primi, a volere che gli uomini ad un tratto temano o sperino’, *Opere*, p. 370.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 4, p. 128. ‘...riprende, priega, minaccia, riempie di speranza, loda, vitupera, e a fa tutte quelle cose per le quali le umane passion si spengono o si accendono. *Opere*, p. 354.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 7, p. 209.

In concluding, I note one final example of effective military discipline which is particularly pertinent to the issue of plunder. Machiavelli gives the account of a lone fruit tree on the site of a temporary Roman encampment. The army descends for the night, and when it moves off the following morning, the tree and all its fruit are left intact²²⁰. For Machiavelli, military discipline is driven by social and political, as well as military demands. In all its forms it is not sufficient to guarantee good conduct, but it is a necessary mechanism to control and restrain a body of aggressive, often hungry, soldiers. However, because such measures are insufficient on their own, Machiavelli also turns to religion to ‘bridle’ conduct.

Religion

Religion in Machiavelli remains a much-debated topic. For some he is an atheist, for others he is a pagan²²¹. Viroli argues that Machiavelli certainly has a God, but one who supports his civic discourse, a religion which ‘...educates the faithful to a sense of duty, that teaches its adherents to love liberty, and which helps men to find within themselves the moral strength to defend the free way of life’²²². Most agree that Machiavelli questions such Christian values as compassion and humility, but on the other hand he makes only sparse reference to an assertive Christianity, for example the crusades²²³. Höpfl argues that

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 208. Woods, at n. 42, cites Marcus Scaurus, 115 BC, from Fontinius, IV, 3, 13. Lipsius, as we will see, also uses this example, although here the tree is at the end of the camp, just within the enclosure, Lipsius, Justus, *Politica: Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction*, Waszink, Jan, (ed. and trans.) (Assen: Royal van Gorcum, 2004), 5, p. 603.

²²¹ Summarised, for example, in Viroli, *Machiavelli's God*, pp. 2-3.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 185.

²²³ Perhaps limited to: ‘The proudest successes attended the beginning of this enterprise’, then because of the ‘talents’ of Saladin, and the ‘disagreements of Christians among themselves, the crusaders were robbed of all that glory which they had at first acquired; and after ninety years were driven from those places which they had so honourably and happily recovered’. Characteristically for Machiavelli, Saladin’s *virtù* defeats the factious crusaders. Machiavelli, *The History of Florence*, Gilbert, (ed.), I, 4, p. 21. ‘*Fu questa impresa nel principio gloriosa... e con varia fortuna insino a’ tempi del Saladino saraceno combatterono; la virtù del quale e la discordia de’ Christiani tolse alla fine loro tutta quella gloria che si avevano nel principio acquistata, e furono dopo novanta anni cacciati di quello luogo ch’eglino avevano con tanto onore felicemente recuperato*’. *Opere*, p. 645.

Machiavelli fails to explain how Christians ‘often displayed unparalleled martial valour’²²⁴, a Christianity of which Machiavelli would undoubtedly approve. However, there is a consensus that Machiavelli’s main opposition is to what Viroli describes as a ‘religion of idleness’²²⁵, or any religion which inhibits personal responsibility and active *virtù* in the affairs of this world. Machiavelli has the “Golden Ass” articulate:

‘To believe that without effort on your part God fights for you,
while you are idle and on your knees, has ruined many king /
doms and many states’²²⁶.

I will not enter further into the broader debate of Machiavelli and religion, or the issue of a ‘Holy War’. Instead, I focus on his use of religion to restrain temporal conduct, especially ‘how much religion helped in the control of armies...’²²⁷.

Machiavelli describes the instrumental use of religion to induce the ‘fear of God’, or ‘a’ god, very clearly in both *The Discourses* and *The Art of War*. While arguing that the controls of man will eventually prove inadequate to restrain conduct, he uses the analogy of the ‘bridle’: ‘But since neither fear of laws nor reverence to man are sufficient to bridle an armed multitude, the ancients used to call in the aid of religion...’²²⁸. He describes how the ‘fear of God’ is especially relevant to the soldier, ‘daily exposed to innumerable dangers, men

²²⁴ Höpfl, Harro, “Orthodoxy and Reason of State”, *History of Political Thought*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, (Summer, 2002), p. 231; Höpfl’s point here is that for the Spanish Jesuits this apparent omission by Machiavelli was seen as ‘uniquely fatuous’.

²²⁵ Viroli, *Machiavelli’s God*, pp. 6-7.

²²⁶ Machiavelli, “The [Golden] Ass”, *The Chief Works*, pp. 763-4. ‘*Creder che senza te per te contrasti / Dio, standoti ozioso e ginocchioni, / ha molti regni e molti stati guasti*’. *Opere*, p. 967. In particular, the target here is the notion articulated by, for example, Origen that Christians and not only clerics can best support a ‘just cause...through their prayer to God’, rather than actually ‘doing battle’; Origen, *Against Celsus*, Bk. 8, Chap. 75, cited in Reichberg *et al.*, *Ethics of War*, p. 65.

²²⁷ Controlling the military is one of several instrumental reasons for keeping religion given by Machiavelli. *The Discourses*, 1, 11, p. 140. ‘...quanto serviva la religion a comandare gli eserciti’, *Opere*, p. 94.

²²⁸ *The Art of War*, 6, p. 165. ‘*E perché a frenare gli uomini armati non bastono né il timore delle legge, né quello degli uomini, vi aggiugnevano gli antichi l’ autorità di Iddio*’; *Opere*, p. 370.

who have the most occasion for his protection'²²⁹. There is an implied logic here, that to control soldiers already facing death in this life, they should be kept in awe of the consequences of an afterlife. However, he does not allow this to detract from his instrumental focus remaining clearly on conduct in this life²³⁰. Certainly, Romans 'were more afraid of breaking an oath than breaking the law, since they held in higher esteem the power of God than the power of man'²³¹.

Much has been written on his discussion in *The Discourses*: 'Concerning the Religion of the Romans'²³². Certainly, the use of auguries and bloody ritual has utility in convincing soldiers that the gods were on their side, and therefore that their cause was what we might call just²³³. However, this commentary often misleads when it only considers religion as an incentive to violence. Gilbert limits his assessment of Machiavelli's account of bloody, Roman pre-battle rituals and sacrifices to 'intoxicating men with bellicose zeal'²³⁴. Nicole Hochner focuses on Machiavelli's use of the rituals of religion, and rightly sets out to discuss their use as 'regulatory mechanisms that re-establish limits and impose restraints', the 'control of force'²³⁵. However, for soldiers, her argument is confined to claims that Machiavelli uses religion more to inciting them from a state of idleness, *ozio*, to imitate a state of 'initial barbarism and primal ferocity'²³⁶.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, Preface, p. 4. 'In quale debbe essere più timore d' Idio, che in colui che ogni dì, sottomettendosi a finite pericoli, ha più bisogno degli aiuti suoi?'. *Opere*, p. 301.

²³⁰ This also applies to the immortality of 'glory', as I will discuss shortly.

²³¹ *The Discourses*, 1, 11, p. 139. '...temevono più assai rompere il giuramento che le leggi; come coloro che stimavano più la potenza di Dio, che quella degli uomini'; *Opere*, p. 93.

²³² *The Discourses*, 1, 11-15, pp. 138-152.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 148. That the gods were on their side, of course, also brings the promise of victory, and this is certainly behind Machiavelli's point. However, the Roman use of *fetiales* is firmly linked with law and the idea of a just war in, for example "Roman Law of War and Peace (Seventh Century BC to First Century AD) – *Ius Fetiale*", in Reichberg, *et al.*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 47-9.

²³⁴ Gilbert, Felix, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War", in Paret, Peter, (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 26.

²³⁵ Hochner, Nicole, "A Ritualist Approach to Machiavelli", *History of Political Thought*, Vol. XXX, No. 4, (Winter, 2009), p. 578, and 580.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 588.

There certainly are times when such ferocity is warranted, but of equal concern is the return back from ferocity to good order, or holding the aggressive soldier in check, avoiding unbridled ferocity. Machiavelli is very conscious of this, as evidenced in the frequent examples of plunder and ravage after victory. Discussion in *The Discourses* invokes religion as an aid to reducing a ‘ferocious’ people to ‘civic obedience’, and ‘how much religion helped in the control of armies’²³⁷. Even when he discusses appropriate aggression, it is more about instilling ‘into the minds of the soldiers an obstinate will to conquer’²³⁸, than with Gilbert’s ‘intoxicating bellicosity’. It is also more in keeping with Machiavelli’s admiration of strict Roman military discipline, as religion is a way of internalising discipline. Viroli emphasises that for Machiavelli, soldiers without shame are bad soldiers, and that ‘religion is necessary as a way of teaching soldiers to experience shame at doing wrong’²³⁹. Also, Viroli points out, ‘the oaths that soldiers swore were an essential aspect of good military discipline’²⁴⁰, and in his militia instructions Machiavelli required the militia to take an oath on the gospels, with words that ‘would most effectively bind them body and soul’²⁴¹.

A further question considered by Machiavelli, is whether religion can have a sufficient impact on people to act as a brake on conduct. Hörnqvist points to the impact of the preaching of Savonarola, and Machiavelli’s remarks as to how so many Florentine citizens believed that Savonarola spoke with God²⁴². On the other hand, Lukes argues that for Machiavelli, ‘the future is that of an informed and sceptical citizenry, that will not be

²³⁷ Machiavelli refers to Numa’s use of religion to subdue the Roman people. *The Discourses*, 1, 11, pp. 139-40. ‘Il (Numa) quale, trovandouno popolo ferocissimo, e volendo ridurre nelle obediienze civili con le arti della pace, si volse alla religio ...quanto serviva la religion a commandare gli eserciti’, *Opere*, pp. 93-4.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, 1, 15, p. 150-1. ‘...era necessario indurre ostinazione negli animi de’ soldati, e che a indurvela non era migliore mezzo che la religion’; *Opere*, p. 98.

²³⁹ Viroli, *Machiavelli’s God*, p. 189. I would not agree with Viroli however, when he continues by claiming that in Machiavelli, the Christian religion is a ‘brake’ on unjust wars. There is no evidence to support this.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-7.

²⁴¹ Hörnqvist, Mikael, ‘Machiavelli’s military project and the *Art of War*’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli*, p. 116.

²⁴² *Ibid.* Machiavelli described the early Romans as ‘stupid’ in this respect, *The Discourses*, 1, 11, p. 141; ‘grossi’, *Opere*, p. 94.

whipped into a violent frenzy by leaders who speak regularly with nymphs'²⁴³. However, on balance, Machiavelli clearly concludes that religion was among the primary causes of Rome's success, and this was not going to significantly change as 'men are born, live and die in an order which remains ever the same'²⁴⁴.

Therefore, to summarise, we find a general consensus that Machiavelli certainly approves of the instrumental value of religion, but disapproves of any religion inducing a withdrawal from worldly affairs. I argue in addition that, in respect of armed force, religion for Machiavelli is not so much an inducement to bloodlust, as a restraint on misconduct. It is explicitly a 'bridle' on the armed multitude. Another significant 'bridle' considered by Machiavelli is the idea of glory.

Glory

While the concept of glory has come to be seen by many as an incentive to unnecessary violence, I will demonstrate how Machiavelli sees it as a restraint in war. He makes a clear distinction between 'a contented army which fights for the glory of the thing and one that is ill disposed', and notes how 'those who fight for glory's sake make good and faithful soldiers'²⁴⁵. Glory in Machiavelli has been widely discussed, and I select two representative papers: one by Russell Price²⁴⁶; and the other by Hilla Zmora²⁴⁷. It is

²⁴³ Lukes, Timothy, J., "Martialing Machiavelli: Reassessing the Military Reflections", *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 66, No. 4, (November 2004), p. 1103.

²⁴⁴ *The Discourses*, 1, 11, p. 142. '...nacquero, vissero e morirono, sempre. Con uno medesimo ordine'. *Opere*, p. 95.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 1, 43, p. 218. 'Quegli che combattono per la gloria propria, sono buoni e fedeli soldati... quanta differenza è, da uno esercito content e che combatte per la gloria sua, a quello che è male disposto...'. *Opere*, p. 126. Also, Machiavelli notes how successful Roman generals were content with the honour and glory, and did not need further reward; *The Art of War*, 1, pp. 17-18.

²⁴⁶ Price, Russell, "The Theme of Gloria in Machiavelli", *Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 4, (Winter 1977), pp. 588 – 631. Price claims some leadership in a general discussion of 'Gloria' in Machiavelli, a theme that had been 'almost entirely neglected', p. 588.

²⁴⁷ Zmora, Hilla, "A World Without Saving Grace: Glory and Immortality in Machiavelli", *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 28, No. 3, (Autumn 2007), pp. 449 – 468. Dan Elder also makes useful points on the boundaries of morality in Machiavelli, but is mainly focuses on examples of 'prudent villainy' rather than general war

generally accepted that glory for Machiavelli consists, as Price describes, ‘in the external recognition of outstanding deeds or achievements’, and in Machiavelli such deeds are confined to ‘politics, diplomacy and war’²⁴⁸. Again, it is normally seen as a spur and encouragement to achieve.

Zmora usefully describes Machiavelli’s conception and utilisation of glory, following a humanist theme, as ‘a means to convert the natural vice of selfish ambition into a public benefit’²⁴⁹. Zmora’s thesis is that Machiavelli presents ‘the human world as miserable’, yet forecloses ‘in particular the Christian promise of an afterlife’: ‘a world without saving grace’²⁵⁰. Therefore, in a non-Christian context, glory remains for mankind, ‘the only path that Machiavelli does leave open for them to attain some form of immortality’²⁵¹. As with religion, glory, as a reward which continues after death, is a particularly apt incentive for those frequently facing death. I have already noted Machiavelli’s emphasis on the particularly vulnerable mortality of a soldier, ‘exposed to innumerable dangers’²⁵², and Price readily asserts that there are far more references in Machiavelli to military, than to political glory²⁵³.

For Price, significantly, glory in Machiavelli can be lost as well as gained, it ‘... may be tarnished or forfeited by later misadventures, mistakes, misdeeds or crimes’²⁵⁴; and for Zmora, it ‘acts as a check, a “regulator” (*regola*) ... it restrains individual behaviour by setting norms whose breach is penalised by the denial of glory’²⁵⁵. There are two clear

fighting: Elder, Dan, “Glory and the Boundaries of Public Morality in Machiavelli’s Thought”, *History of Political Thought*, Vol. VII, No. 3, (Winter, 1986), pp. 419-438.

²⁴⁸ Price, “The Theme of Gloria”, pp. 591-2, and 621.

²⁴⁹ Zmora, “Glory and Immortality”, p. 450. This can be compared to Augustine’s approach to ‘glory’. The desire for glory can lead to pride or a desire to dominate, however, when it is channelled to the ‘common good’ it is appropriate reward for human beings in the City of Man. It might not be true virtue which serves human glory, but it is better ‘than if they had none at all’. Augustine, *City of God*, 5, 15-19, in *Political Writings*, pp. 40-42.

²⁵⁰ Zmora, “Glory and Immortality”, p. 449.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 464.

²⁵² *The Art of War*, Preface, p. 4. ‘...che in colui che ogni dì, sottomettendosi a finite pericoli...’. *Opere*, p. 301.

²⁵³ Price, “The Theme of Gloria”, p. 599.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 593.

²⁵⁵ Zmora, “Glory and Immortality”, p. 451.

examples. Firstly, both Price and Zmora refer to Machiavelli's frequently discussed denial of glory to Agathocles in *The Prince*: 'Yet it cannot be called prowess to kill fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be treacherous, pitiless, irreligious. These ways can win a prince power but not glory...his brutal cruelty and inhumanity, his countless crimes, forbid his being honoured among eminent men'²⁵⁶.

Glory is withheld from a figure who has succeeded in gaining power, but is guilty of persistent cruelty and inhumanity. Machiavelli is perfectly clear that a denial of glory is the penalty imposed on Agathocles's conduct, whether or not, as Zmora infers and as is frequently debated, Machiavelli actually approves of the conduct²⁵⁷. Victoria Kahn, in discussing *virtù* in the case of Agathocles, also concludes that 'it is this concern for glory that will induce the prince to moderate his violent behaviour and take greater interest in the welfare of his people'²⁵⁸. Indeed, Kahn goes on to argue that it is the prince's need to 'generate the consensus and support of the people', that acts as a restraint on his conduct²⁵⁹. Thus, political support is reflected in the concept of glory.

The second clear example of glory acting as a restraint is Machiavelli's discussion in *The Discourses* on the use of fraud in warfare. This is a traditional dilemma that is only briefly referred to by Price: whether or not it is acceptable to deceive an enemy. There had always been a debate, including Canon and ecclesiastic pronouncements, indeed the Renaissance debate continues, for example, with Thomas More's Utopians²⁶⁰. There are questions of honour, but also humanitarian and pragmatic considerations: if bloodshed can be

²⁵⁶ *The Prince*, 8, p. 28. 'Non si può ancora chiamare virtù ammazzare e' sua cittadini, tradire gli amici, essere senza fede, senza pietà, senza religione; il quali modi possono fare acquistare imperio, ma non Gloria... la sua efferata crudeltà e inumanità, con infinite scelleratezze, non consent che sia infra gli eccellentissimi uomini celebrato'. *Opere*, p. 269.

²⁵⁷ Zmora, "Glory and Immortality", p. 451, n. 14.

²⁵⁸ Kahn, Victoria, "Virtù and Agathocles", in Ascoli and Kahn, *Discourse of Literature*, p. 204.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

²⁶⁰ More, *Utopia* (1516), Logan, George, M., and Adams, Robert, M., (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Bk. II, "Military Practices", p. 91.

avoided by the intelligent use of a ruse, then so much the better. It also allows for the best use of resources. The question of deception in the Middle Ages is fully discussed by Whetham in *Just Wars and Moral Victories*, where he concludes by emphasising the need to operate within ‘mutually accepted rules’, if success is to be accepted by all concerned²⁶¹. I argue that for Machiavelli, acknowledged success is important, and public glory largely depends on, and is a measure of, being seen to conform to widely approved behaviour.

Machiavelli gives examples, demonstrating how defeating an enemy by deceiving him accrues as much praise as defeating an enemy with force. However, he goes on to clarify: ‘I do not mean that a fraud which involves breaking your word or the contracts you have made, is glorious’, because even if this wins a state or kingdom, ‘it will never bring you glory’²⁶². Glory, therefore, is the test. Machiavelli is not exceptional here, but conforms closely to the Christian and chivalric traditions: stratagems, ambushes, deception plans, or *ruse de guerre* might be acceptable, but breaking one’s word, dishonouring treaties and agreements was not. For Benner, ‘Machiavelli’s views on these matters are old-fashioned, not daringly subversive’²⁶³, but I emphasise that for Machiavelli, it is the secular concept of glory that is important, not medieval ecclesiastical judgement. Furthermore, glory should be seen as much a ‘bridle’ and check on conduct, as an incentive to action.

Political Restraint

I believe the most significant ‘bridle’ on warfare in Machiavelli, beyond discipline, religion and glory, is the restraint imposed by political leadership. Politics is at the core of his experience and thinking, and here I will assess the ways he sees politics restrain the conduct of warfare. These are manifest throughout his work, but in particular I will consider the

²⁶¹ Whetham, *Just Wars and Moral Victories*, p. 249.

²⁶² *The Discourses*, 3, 40, p. 513. ‘...io non intendo quella fraude essere gloriosa, che ti fa rompere la fede data ed i patti fatti; perché questa, ancora che la ti acquisterà mai gloria’. *Opere*, p. 248.

²⁶³ Benner, *Machiavelli’s Ethics*, p. 315.

instructions he drafted to establish the Florentine militia in 1506, centered on “Discourse on the Florentine State for Arms”²⁶⁴. This has immediacy, it is clear, and hitherto has not been fully utilised.

It had long been the established practice in Italy for governing bodies to attach commissioners, *provveditori*, to hired mercenary troops: providing political oversight, ensuring the political aim of the operation was met, and organising certain logistics, most importantly pay²⁶⁵. As Secretary to the Ten, Machiavelli worked extensively with such commissioners, as is very clear from his correspondence. Indeed his supervision of the commissioners often involved visiting or deploying with them, as he frequently did during the confrontation with Pisa. He was, therefore, familiar on a day-to-day basis with the political control of the military, and was fully aware of the difficulties, both in ensuring that the task was done, and that it was carried out appropriately. In this way he became frustrated with the conduct, at times amounting to treachery, of certain *condottieri* at Pisa. This made a deep impression on him, and he relates the lesson in *The Prince* thirteen years later²⁶⁶. On the other hand, he is also perfectly aware of the dangers of over-supervision, of causing ‘indescribable confusion’, and therefore he sets a limit on the number of commissioners²⁶⁷.

²⁶⁴ Machiavelli, “Discourse on the Florentine State for Arms”, Appendix 3.

²⁶⁵ An account of these commissioners is given, for example, by Michael Mallet in *Mercenaries and their Masters*, pp. 88-91, and on Florence in particular, p. 129. Machiavelli’s personal experience in this area is discussed, for example, by Hörnqvist in “Machiavelli’s military project and the *Art of War*”, p. 114.

²⁶⁶ For example, Machiavelli refers to the case of Paulo Vitelli who was to be executed by the Florentines for treachery, the evidence for which became even clearer: Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 41. An account of this is given by Paul Strathern in *The Artist, the Philosopher and the Warrior* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2009); and some mitigation is given by Michael Mallet, *Mercenaries and their Masters*, p. 249. There were many other difficulties with pay and similar issues during this campaign, eg: Wood, “Introduction to *The Art of War*”, p. xii; and Black, Robert, “Machiavelli in the chancery”, in *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli*, pp. 35 – 41.

²⁶⁷ Machiavelli is concerned with both too many commissioners and too many military commanders. But it is the contemporary practice of over-providing commissioners that had brought about so many disasters. *The Discourses*, 3, 15, pp. 449-50. ‘...una inestimabile confusione’. *Opere*, p. 222.

Controversially, as we have seen, Machiavelli advocates and secures the employment of Michelotto as the commander of the militia²⁶⁸. Michelotto had a fearsome reputation as an unprincipled agent under Cesare Borgia, but Machiavelli argued that the particular circumstances called for a ‘severe’ as opposed to a ‘humane’ commander. Later, it emerged that Michelotto had transgressed, and he wrote an apology to Machiavelli. Whether the apology was genuine is another question, but the wording makes very clear the political ‘bridle’ kept on him personally by Machiavelli. Michelotto stresses that he has no private interest, only the common good and service to the Florentine authority, and implores Machiavelli: ‘For I still have the instructions that your Lordship gave me already a year and a half ago, and I have them in my heart and inside my head ...’²⁶⁹.

One good reason for a political ‘bridle’ is the danger of an errant military usurping political authority for itself or for another agent. Mercenaries are often assumed to be the principle liability here. We have seen Pocock emphasising: ‘a mercenary with no home but the camp may become the instrument of tyranny over the city he was hired to defend’²⁷⁰. Machiavelli does refer to usurpation by particular *condottieri*, for example Sforza of Milan²⁷¹, but he does not see mercenaries themselves as such a risk at all.

On this point, for example, Hörnqvist conflates auxiliaries, that is foreign troops²⁷², and mercenaries, dismissing both together as ‘completely useless’²⁷³. This is not an accurate reflection of Machiavelli. In *The Prince* Machiavelli is clear that the problems with

²⁶⁸ As I discuss earlier with “Discipline”, p. 247; and as discussed by Hörnqvist: “Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506”, pp. 171-186.

²⁶⁹ The transgression was ‘becoming embroiled in local feuds’ during his policing of the *contado*, *Ibid.*, p. 182; quoted from don Michelotto’s letter of 15th September, 1507. Atkinson and Sices, *Machiavelli and his Friends*, p. 162.

²⁷⁰ Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, p. 201.

²⁷¹ *The Art of War*, 1, pp. 15-16.

²⁷² Defined by Machiavelli as ‘those that a prince or republic sends to help you under commanders appointed and paid by that prince or that republic’, *Discourses*, 2, 20, p. 339. ‘...*soldati ausiliari sono quegli che un principe o una repubblica manda, capitanati e pagati da lei, in tuo aiuto*’. *Opere*, p. 176.

²⁷³ Hörnqvist, “Machiavelli’s military project and the *Art of War*”, p. 118.

mercenaries are ‘cowardice’, and general incompetence. They cannot, therefore, present such a serious threat of usurpation as do auxiliary troops, which are his main concern. The danger with auxiliaries is their ‘valour’, and efficiency: ‘(A)uxiliaries are fatal; they constitute a united army wholly obedient to someone else’, therefore ‘you are left in the lurch if they are defeated, and in their power if they are victorious’²⁷⁴. Again, in *The Discourses*, it is auxiliaries who are in this respect ‘the most hurtful’, being prone to ‘prey on those who have commissioned them’²⁷⁵.

Many of Machiavelli’s contemporaries, especially the Florentine *ottimati*, saw his militia as the most likely to unbalance authority, not auxiliaries or mercenaries. Hörnqvist describes the concerns of the *ottimati*, who saw ‘the very idea of the *gonfalonier* having several thousand armed peasants at his disposal as a serious threat to their own dominant position’²⁷⁶. Machiavelli is keenly aware of this argument and raises it himself in *The Art of War*: ‘if the militia consists of soldiers of *virtù*, the commander may very well use it to seize governmental power’²⁷⁷. He refers to the Venetian preference for foreign troops ‘to prevent their own citizens from staging a coup’²⁷⁸, but does not see this as an option for Florence. Indeed, for Hörnqvist, Machiavelli’s case is assisted by the continuing unreliability of hired troops²⁷⁹. Therefore, Machiavelli lays great stress on providing political control, a political ‘bridle’ on the armed multitude, both in principle, and in the constitutional measures which

²⁷⁴ *The Prince*, 13, p. 44. ‘Perché in queste è la ruina fatta: sono tutte unite, tutte volte alla obediencia di altri...perdendo, rimani disfatto: vincendo, resti loro prigione... In somma, nella mercenarie è più pericolosa la ignavia, nelle ausiliarie, la virtù’. *Opere*, p. 277.

²⁷⁵ *The Discourses*, 2, 20, p. 340. ‘... gli ausiliari sono i più dannosi... il più delle volte predano così colui che gli ha condotti’; *Opere*, p. 176.

²⁷⁶ Hörnqvist, Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506, p. 154; also, Pesman, “Machiavelli, Soderini, and the republic of 1494-1512”, pp. 56-7.

²⁷⁷ *The Art of War*, I, p. 28. ‘...o ella fia virtuosa, e, mediante quella, chi la governa ce lo potrà facilmente torre’. *Opere*, p. 311.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-9. I have discussed under financial provision a possible explanation for this: the Venetians were more generous with their *condottieri* contracts than the Florentines, by nature, were ever likely to be.

²⁷⁹ Hörnqvist, Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506, p. 154.

he writes into the “Discourse on the Florentine State for Arms”, and accompanying legislation.

In principle, his preference for a *governo largo* already places the citizen-soldier firmly in a political process. He is also clear that sound political leadership is crucial in managing a militia, as expressed through Fabrizio in *The Art of War*: ‘... tyranny and usurpation are not a result of arming the citizens, but of leading a government weakly, and that while a state is well led, it has nothing to fear from its subject’s arms’²⁸⁰. Furthermore, ‘no subjects or citizens, when legally armed and kept in due order by their masters, ever did the least mischief to any state’²⁸¹.

Machiavelli also ensures that constitutional arrangements support this principle of political leadership. As both Pesman and Butters demonstrate, Machiavelli inserts these structural requirements into the organisation of his militia to the extent that it is ‘difficult to envisage’ the *gonfaloniere* ever taking control of the militia²⁸². He describes most of these measures in the “Discourse on the Florentine State for Arms”²⁸³. The militia are placed under the Ten in wartime, and a new committee of the Nine in peacetime. Machiavelli is given chairmanship of the Nine, which comprises opponents as well as supporters of the *gonfaloniere*, and who are limited to eight month terms. He also recommends other measures to ensure the loyalty of militia commanders, and that the right troops, the less likely to mutiny, are recruited²⁸⁴. Butters summarises: commanders were to be from a different region

²⁸⁰ *The Art of War*, p. 32. ‘...l’armi in mano a’ loro cittadini non gli potevano fare tiranni, ma i malvagi ordini del governo chef anno tiranneggiare una città;’ *Opere*, p. 311-2.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 30. ‘...l’arme in dosso a’ suoi cittadini o sudditi, date dale leggi e dall’ordone, non fecero mai danno, anzi sempre fanno utile e mantengonsi le città...’. *Opere*, p. 311.

²⁸² Butters lists the opponents of Soderini who served on the Nine: Jacopo Salviati, Alamanno Salviati and Francesco Pepi. Butters, H. C., *Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth-Century Florence 1502-1519* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 113. Also discussed in Pesman, “Machiavelli, Soderini, and the republic of 1494-1512”, p. 57; and Hörnqvist, “Machiavelli’s military project and the *Art of War*”, p. 114.

²⁸³ “Discourse on the organisation of the Florentine State for arms”, my Volume 2, Appendix 3, pp. 99 - 100.

²⁸⁴ *The Art of War*, p. 29: to avoid the danger of armed citizens, militia should be neither ‘raw or inexperienced’, nor ‘compelled to serve by force’. Here, Machiavelli, does argue for a compromise on this point.

from their soldiers; they were only to remain in one particular post for one year; and battalions would not combine for joint exercises²⁸⁵.

However, these restrictions to preclude disloyalty are also blamed for military weakness, and here Butters is especially critical of Machiavelli's project. They result in a militia 'never trained as one army... (or) accustomed to one leader'²⁸⁶, indeed the militia is 'fatuous ... a body of ill-trained troops'²⁸⁷, whose performance at Prato in 1512 was 'pathetic'²⁸⁸. The failure at Prato is uncontroversial in itself, but I believe Butters is too dismissive and does not consider the many factors contributing to this failure²⁸⁹. Unlike other commentators, Butters does not even partially credit the militia with earlier success at Pisa in 1509, when a jubilant contemporary, Vespucci, wrote to Machiavelli: 'you with your battalions... restored the affairs of Florence'²⁹⁰. Many others have identified the Pisa success as the 'high point' of his Chancery career²⁹¹. However, it is not my purpose here to further evaluate the military effectiveness of the force, there are undoubtedly strengths and weaknesses, successes and failures. My purpose is to exemplify Machiavelli's deep conviction in the need for political restraint to be imposed on the militia, which Butters does not deny.

²⁸⁵ Butters, *Governors and Government*, p. 112.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

²⁸⁸ Butters, "Political Allegiances and Political Structures", p. 95.

²⁸⁹ Butters does not, for example, explore the resentment of rural militia felt against the city of Florence; nor the fact that with the French withdrawal from Italy, the loss of their major ally, the war was already effectively lost. Machiavelli himself cautions against being 'so peremptory in pronouncing such forces altogether unserviceable because they lost one battle', instead, better to examine the reasons for failure and take remedial action, as the Romans did, who themselves were often routed. *The Art of War*, p. 30; '...non deono misurare questa inutilità dallo avere perduto una volta, ma credere che, così come e' perde, e' si possa vincere e rimediare alla cagione della perdita'; *Tutte le opera: storiche, politiche e letterarie*, Capata, Alessandro, (ed.) (Rome: Newton and Compton, 1998), p. 281.

²⁹⁰ Agostino Vespucci, Florence, 8 June 1509, Letter 167 in Atkinson and Sices, *Machiavelli and his Friends*, pp. 180-1. '...voi con vostri battaglioni ...restitueritis rem florentinam'. *Opere*, p. 1107.

²⁹¹ Atkinson, "Niccolò Machiavelli: a portrait", in *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli*, p. 20. Against Butters' claim that treaties were solely responsible for success at Pisa, for Robert Black, 'Florentine military operations were still needed', Black, R., "Machiavelli in the chancery", *Ibid.*, p. 36. For Roslyn Pesman, success was 'achieved in part by the militia, Pesman, R., "Machiavelli, Soderini, and the republic of 1494-1512", *Ibid.*, p. 51.

To summarise, first, this is an area where Machiavelli had a great deal of experience, and he provides both theoretical and practical discussion, concerning both the more routine conduct of military affairs, and also at a higher level, the problem of military usurpation. Machiavelli's explicit response is that effective political leadership negates this danger, but he is also aware of the balance required to prevent strong political controls degrading military capability. However, a final observation is that with a well- controlled and responsive military, greater onus is placed on the nature of the political authority. As I have discussed in the context of an unstable politics, potentially, an efficient instrument of power becomes available to a less than benevolent political authority.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter set out to examine, more substantially than is often the case, normative questions of peace and war in Machiavelli: what he understands by peace and war; his position on the justification of war; and certain normative claims for its conduct. Machiavelli understands peace and war as part of the motion and cycle of human affairs, which he expresses in contemporary, religious and astrological language. Earthly peace is therefore temporary, and exists between inevitable cycles of war. Such views were not uncommon, but they do contrast with those in which the natural state is one of harmony. His acceptance of a condition of conflict similarly contrasts with those who aspire to create a stronger peace. Machiavelli frequently reduces the causes of conflict simply to malign ambition, greed and innate hatred.

For Machiavelli, war is not an end in itself, but is closely entwined with his politics. Armed force has a pre-political role in creating and maintaining the space for civil society, but thereafter remains its instrument, and operates under political control. Against arguments that Machiavelli is committed either to an expansionist military policy, or a republican and defensive strategy, I argue that he is not solely committed to any type or form of warfare,

offensive or defensive. All such postures have their turn in the cycle of human affairs. It is, however, necessary to provide for armed force in good time, and preparations are required even in times of peace. This reinforces his militia project and the intimate relationship between soldier and citizen.

Against the view that Machiavelli is unaware of, or unconcerned with, the ‘darker side’ of war and ‘brutal’ conduct, I argue that he is perfectly aware of the consequences of inhumane behaviour, and conversely, the benefits of humane behaviour. This awareness is fully incorporated into his considerations for appropriate action. Indeed, to incur the hatred of either an army or a people by acting inhumanely would be counter-productive. In dealing with the extreme existential threat he does invoke a response which, I argue, is akin to Walzer’s ‘supreme emergency’. Importantly, however, he recognises many other applications of force, of less intensity or brutality.

Machiavelli’s justification for war is usually dismissed as being a malleable and perfunctory claim that a just war is a necessary war. However, even in his main political works there is evidence of a more considered approach: force should be a last resort; and violence should be essentially constructive. Also, a wider review of his works provides much more evidence. The Parel- Hörnqvist discussion highlights several key issues. First, that a ‘necessary’ war can be seen as subjective a concept as a ‘just’ war. Secondly, whether or not Machiavelli sees justifying war as a normative issue in itself, he does recognise justification has an instrumental value in terms of persuasion and motivation.

The rhetorical Albizzi speech gives a clear, concise, yet comprehensive case for a war, deploying the full panoply of justificatory language: just war criteria of authority, cause and intention; arguments of necessity; self-defence; a cost-benefit analysis; an assessment of likely success; the medical analogy of removing fatal infection; and war seen as the lesser

evil. Yet, Machiavelli considers all these as superfluous when ambition and innate hatred have already been triggered. The debate on attacking Lucca confirms the subjectivity of a just war, and were eventually discussed in terms of consequential advantage. Both examples, however, show that Machiavelli was fully cognisant with this justificatory language. They also show that while he recognises the instrumental value of such justificatory arguments as tools of persuasion, in these cases at least, he is unconvinced of their logical force.

Arguments from justice clearly have little policy traction in the circumstances of the day.

Most importantly, despite there being good reasons to view Machiavelli's attitude to conducting warfare as one of exhortation and of encouraging prowess and *virtù*, I argue that it should be viewed as one of stringent control, and not as one of 'no holds barred'. The political authority stipulates which 'holds' are allowed. He discusses ways to impose restraint. Military discipline is essential, and with many others he turns mostly to the Romans for examples of reward and punishment. It is the responsibility of governments to impose military discipline, and failure has severe consequences, both military and social. The notion of glory also imposes restraint on political and military action. However, temporal measures will not be sufficient, and Machiavelli also turns to the instrumental use of religion. Both glory and religion have the benefit of an after-death reward or sanction.

Machiavelli had considerable experience in implementing political oversight over both *condottiere* and militia. Political restraint is necessary, for example: to ensure that the political aim of military action is achieved in an approved manner; and to counter the danger of a military usurping political authority. Machiavelli considers these needs in both principle and in practice, especially in the detailed arrangements for his militia project.

However, the close linkage of the military with the political also raises issues: a part time militia-style force can lead to charges of military inefficiency. This can be compounded

by political interference, although Machiavelli is acutely aware of this danger. There is also the danger of a responsive military, with the potential power of a nation under arms, becoming available to a despotic regime. This is especially the case given the notorious instability of contemporary politics. Indeed, by closely linking military capability with the political, the latter now bears even greater responsibility for the conduct and restraint of warfare.

I have argued that Machiavelli advocates a ‘bridle’ on the conduct of war using a range of contemporary means of restraint. This need not be surprising. As David Lonsdale points out, those associated with a realist perspective would certainly consider such measures if, instrumentally, they contribute to overall success: ‘Ethics are so woven into our societies; they cannot be ignored. Therefore, the realist must include ethical concerns into their calculations’²⁹². In comparing Machiavelli with the other positions considered in this thesis, I argue that Machiavelli is notably amenable to the concept of restraint. Whetham writes: ‘A realism that accepts constraints, even in a purely instrumental way to acknowledge the social context, is moving towards a compromise position’²⁹³. However, it has been necessary to counter a prevalent view that Machiavelli disregards such constraints.

I will go on to compare these conclusions with those I have already drawn from my consideration of the *Disputatio de pace et bello*, and the northern humanist discussion reflected in Erasmus. First, however, I briefly consider how the ideas so far examined developed further, from the Renaissance, on into the Early Modern period.

²⁹² Lonsdale, David, J., “A View from Realism”, in Whetham, (ed.) *Ethics, Law, and Military Operations*, pp. 31 and 41.

²⁹³ Whetham, “The Just War Tradition: A Pragmatic Compromise”, *Ibid.*, p. 67.

CHAPTER 6 - EARLY MODERN DEVELOPMENTS

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

My thesis has focussed on lines of Renaissance humanist thought on peace and war set against, what I argue to be, a weakened scholastic position. After this time, starting for example with the 1539 lectures of Vitoria¹, the historical development of these ideas into the early modern period is dealt with by a wealth of primary and secondary scholarship. My purpose here is to consider how these later developments relate to my thesis. I will draw on four established accounts: Quinton Skinner for a basis in political thought; Richard Tuck and José Fernández-Santamaria for their work on politics, war and peace; and James Turner Johnson for his account of the justification of war. First, I will consider general changes in the scholastic position.

A renewed scholasticism was greatly influenced by a number of concerns, which include: the growing impact of, and need to react to, the Reformation; the broad humanist critique; and concerns over newly discovered territories. The Spanish school is at the centre of the renewal which is set to address these concerns. As we have seen, one particular feature is a revived interest in Aquinas, and for Fernández, the renewal is a return ‘not to the ailing Scholasticism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but to the vigorous Thomism of the thirteenth’². Furthermore: ‘War, its origin, practice, and consequences, is of exceptional importance here because it lies at the foundation of the political thinking of the Spanish

¹ Published later in 1557 as *De Indies (On the American Indians)* and *De iure belli (On the Law of War)*, Vitoria, Francesco de, *Political Writings*, Pagden, A., and Lawrence, J., (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

² Fernández, *State, War and Peace*, pp. 3-4. As Fernández points out, this Thomist revival is already clear, for example at the University of Paris, and was pioneered by Peter Crockaert and Tommaso de Vio, or Cajetan, *Ibid.*, p. 3, n. 1. This is also fully discussed by, for example, Skinner in *Foundations: Volume 2*, 1978, Chapter 5.

school'³. Therefore, the basis is laid for a renewal of Aquinas's clear exposition of a just war, and drawing on the Thomist formulation of natural law. This is evident from the time of Cajetan's commentary on the *Summa theologiae* in 1517⁴, but as I have noted, Aquinas is not an authority often cited in the period of my thesis, especially in the *Disputatio*.

Another feature of the new scholastic thinking is a reversal of the earlier doctrinal latitude given to waging war against natives of the Indies. As Skinner describes, Vitoria reverts 'to the pivotal Thomist claim that there is an equal capacity in all men, whether or not they are Christian, to establish their own political societies'⁵. Furthermore, the Pope does not have the power to grant the enforcement of Spanish rights and jurisdiction over the Indians. Vitoria is still vulnerable to criticism on this question, for example, a door is left ajar, and is exploited, to wage war defending a right of passage. Also, the very distance between Spain and the colonists in the New World certainly added to the tendency for pronouncements to be variously interpreted, or even ignored⁶. Nevertheless, it is almost without dispute that with the revised scholastic position on the Americas, the latitude for making war is considerably closed down.

More broadly, and turning to Skinner's account of this period, Skinner describes how by the late sixteenth century 'two rival political moralities were ...confronting each other in every commonwealth of Europe'⁷. One of these centred on the renewed scholasticism, and the other, Skinner describes as the 'theory of Machiavelli and the *politiques*' (*los politicos*)⁸.

³ Fernández, *State, War and Peace*, p. 2.

⁴ Cajetan's "Commentary on the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas" was completed in 1517, and his later *Summala*, also discussing a just war, was published in 1524. Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 240-250, with translations of the Latin text by Robert Andrews and Peter Haggenmacher.

⁵ Skinner, *Foundations*, 2, p. 169.

⁶ For example, the lip service often paid to the implementation of the *Requerimiento*. A strong critique of Vitoria is found, for example, with Todorov, although even he acknowledges that 'Vitoria demolishes the contemporary justifications of the wars waged in America'. Todorov, Tzvetan, *The Conquest of America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), p. 149-151.

⁷ Skinner, *Foundations*, 2, p. 172.

⁸ *Ibid.*

Erasmian humanism is not evident here⁹. Skinner even writes that it is ‘important to emphasise how quickly and decisively Vitoria and de Soto hardened in their opposition to Erasmus’, as they have been characterised as ‘combining scholasticism with Christian humanism’¹⁰. More specifically, Skinner describes the largely theological basis of this opposition to Erasmus¹¹. He goes on to note how ‘the campaign against Erasmus was later intensified at the Council of Trent’, with Erasmus ‘placed in the highest category of offenders against the teachings of the church, the entire corpus of his writings being wholly condemned’. Indeed, we have seen Suárez explicitly denounce as heresy the pacific ideas that had been argued by Erasmus. Therefore, we lose sight of the Erasmian critique of war against the prevailing neo-scholastic just war.

On Machiavelli, Skinner presents the relatively uncontested account of the scholastic rejection of the ‘more insidious and dangerous threat’ they find with Machiavelli¹². The thrust of this rejection is that Machiavelli fails to recognise, in the ‘lofty’ words of Possevino, that ‘the minds of wise men are imbued with a divine and natural light sent from God’¹³. However, and unlike earlier humanist critiques, the Jesuits do concede that at times ‘the maintenance of state’ and ‘the safety of his kingdom’ are ‘overriding political values’¹⁴. But this is not the end of the matter, as Ribadeneyra argues: it is both ‘insane’ and ‘impious’ not to keep God ‘pleased and propitious’, by obeying his ‘His holy law’ and mandates¹⁵. For Suárez, Machiavelli’s ideas are of no value in maintaining even ‘a temporal republic or

⁹ A full study of the interpretation of Erasmus until the present is found with Bruce Mansfield’s trilogy: *Phoenix of his Age, Interpretations of Erasmus 1550 - 1750*, (Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1979); *Man on his Own: 1750 – 1920*, (1992); and *In the Twentieth Century: 1920 – 2000*, (2003).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

¹¹ *Ibid.* Two main areas of alleged theological ‘error’ are described by Skinner: first, Erasmus’s insistence on a new translation of the bible being made freely available, a ‘Lutheran’ tendency; secondly, issues concerning the teaching of the laity, and the training of the clergy.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 171.

¹³ *Ibid.* Possevino, Antonio, *A Judgement on the Writings of Jean Bodin, Phillipe Mornay and Nicolai Machiavelli* (Lyons, 1594), p. 129.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 172-3. Ribadeneyra, Pedro, *Religion and the Virtues of the Christian Prince against Machiavelli*, Moore, G. A., (trans.) (Maryland, 1949), p. 253.

kingdom' because 'honesty is in fact of greater power in maintaining peace and political felicity' than all else. Machiavelli is 'thus rejected on 'pragmatic as well as moral grounds'¹⁶.

Tuck's account is given in the opening chapters of his *The Rights of War and Peace*¹⁷. For Tuck, 'broadly speaking', there are two lines of development. First, there is the scholastic tradition, strongly visible with the Dominicans and Jesuits of Spain and Portugal, this 'persists in judging warfare by the Thomist criteria, and which is therefore inevitably critical of much actual modern military activity'¹⁸.

On the other hand, there was a 'humanist tradition which applauded warfare in the interests of one's *respublica*'¹⁹, a development following on from Machiavelli. Tuck emphasises that the 'constraints imposed by a combination of Augustine, Aristotle, and Aquinas were to be effective within the scholastic tradition, but with the humanists such constraint would prove 'feeble''²⁰. Most of the latter would take 'war for glory and dominion...to be justifiable'²¹. Even Erasmus and the northern humanists are 'associated' with this tradition, with a *respublica Christiana* replacing the normal humanist *civitas*. In this context, Erasmus had 'insisted' that he was not opposing war against the Turks²². However, I believe Tuck's analysis of Erasmus here is erroneous. For example, he does not consider the key Erasmus text on this question, *De bello turcico*, nor does he consider the considerable ambiguities that I have examined earlier.

Fernàndez considers the Spanish reaction to Erasmus, and differs from Skinner and Tuck in arguing that the Erasmanian humanist position on war eventually collapses into a

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 172. Suárez, Francisco, *A Treatise on the Laws and God the Lawgiver* (Naples, 1872), Volume 1, p. 198. As Skinner notes, Suárez devotes a special chapter to Machiavelli.

¹⁷ Tuck, Richard, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 29.

scholastic just war, and not, as Tuck presents, into a humanist defence of *respublica Christiana*. More broadly, Fernández sees the pacific humanists, though ‘men of goodwill and fine sensibilities’, as standing ‘helpless before a fact of life’, that is war. Therefore, ‘to a man, the more they search for ways and means to end the evil the greater their helplessness grows until, willingly or reluctantly, completely or partially, they must admit the seeming wisdom of Saint Augustine’s ruthless realism’²³.

Fernández compares Vitoria’s to some of Erasmus’s specific claims on war. They are found to agree: on the foundation of a Christian ethics; that war brings misfortune; and on the unique power of the prince. However, while Erasmus is completely vague as to when the prince may authorise war, Vitoria provides detailed discussion and ‘canon’²⁴. When Erasmus prevaricates as to whether Christians may wage war, Vitoria ‘is swift and to the point’: they may do so²⁵. Erasmus abhors the prospect of innocent casualties; but for Vitoria, at times the innocent may have to suffer if it is absolutely necessary for ‘the securing of a just peace’, and after every effort at prevention²⁶. This leads to Erasmus’s broader claim that an unjust peace might be preferable to a just war. The result of this, ‘the Spanish doctors argue unanimously, would be to further encourage the rapacity of the lawless and so plunge humanity into further chaos’, unequivocally, therefore, ‘under no circumstances can an unjust peace be preferable to a just war’²⁷.

Ultimately, however, and as we saw Fernández argue forcefully earlier²⁸, Erasmus’s allowance for certain wars, and the conditions he proposes, bring him ‘into the fold of those

²³ Fernández, *State, War and Peace*, p. 158.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-8.

²⁸ Fernández, “Erasmus on Just War”, pp. 209-226. As discussed with “Interpretation and Ambiguity”, pp. 168 – 169.

thinkers who accept that war may under certain circumstances be just'²⁹. Against 'a rather flimsy political structure', which for Fernández is a weakness of Christian humanist political thought, 'Erasmus is compelled to accept a series of premises which are integral parts of the traditional theory of the just war', until effectively, on war: 'so important a factor in the age's political schemes, there is no fundamental difference between neo-scholasticism and Christian humanism'³⁰. Again, we see Erasmanian pacific humanism collapsing into the neoscholastic just war, with the latter remaining relatively intact.

While Fernández describes Machiavelli as having an 'extreme' position³¹, compared to the traditions discussed above, he also considers Machiavelli favourably. He suggests that the age was coming to recognise, 'with ever increasing imperiousness, the idea, old in practice but never doctrinally admitted until Machiavelli', that there were two ethics, one for the individual and one for the state. Therefore, 'perhaps the Florentine's approach to the problem of war, inseparable from his view of the state, succeeded where Neoscholasticism and Christian humanism failed'³². However, for Fernández, Machiavelli is still 'parochial' in disregarding some of 'the age's traditional imperatives': the influence of the Christian church on ideas and policy. It could be argued that this depends on the interpretation of Machiavelli and Christianity. Viroli, for example, goes some way in accommodating this criticism, and a 'Christian religion properly interpreted' will serve Machiavelli's 'civic task'³³. But for Fernández, Machiavelli disregards the Christian religion. Fernández argues that even though the traditional Christian outlook falls short of the demands of the age, it is still sufficient an

²⁹ Fernández, *State, War and Peace*, p. 144.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 115.

³³ Viroli, Maurizio, *Machiavelli's God*, Shugaar, A., (trans.) (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. xi.

operator ‘to bar the success of a doctrinal justification of society, the state and war in purely secular terms’³⁴.

However, the ‘main stumbling block’, was still that the ‘visible moral authority of Christianity’ was insufficient to the task of accommodating the conflicting imperatives of the age. Therefore, Fernández concludes that ‘neither the abstractions of Neoscholasticism, nor the shallow concreteness of political empiricism, nor the idealism of the Christian humanists sufficed in isolation to explain a phenomenon – war – which by reason of its universality touched upon all aspects of life in the Renaissance, abstract and doctrinal as well as real and pragmatic’³⁵.

Finally, Johnson writes specifically on the development of ideas justifying war. Earlier, I discussed his broader account of two medieval traditions: one theological and focussing on *ad bellum*; and one secular and focussing on the conduct of war. These coalesced, and he repeatedly describes how an ‘increasingly coherent and comprehensive doctrine... reached a kind of climax in the writings of the Spanish neo-scholastic Vitoria [*sic*]...’³⁶. As I have pointed out, Johnson erroneously continues here that Vitoria is writing ‘towards the middle of the fifteenth century’, and not, as is the case, towards the middle of the sixteenth century. This is compounded by his statement that Vitoria precedes Erasmus³⁷, but Vitoria’s key lectures were given in 1539, 3 years after Erasmus’s death, and were not published until 1557. These might be seen as technical errors in one particular paper, but I believe they are indicative of a glossing over, by Johnson, of the period of my thesis, which adds to the impression of strong continuity in the just war tradition. Johnson, of course, correctly dates Vitoria in other works, for example: ‘...from the mid-sixteenth century

³⁴ Fernández, *State, War and Peace*, p. 116.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Johnson, “Two kinds of Pacifism”, p. 43; also as described in, for example: *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, p. 174; Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, p. 42; and *Ethics and the Use of Force*, p. 2.

³⁷ Johnson, “Two kinds of Pacifism”, p. 49,

through the first half of the seventeenth. This period begins with the Spanish Neo-Scholastics Vitoria...³⁸.

While not disputing the significance of Vitoria, my thesis argues that this underestimates the challenges posed by the Renaissance to scholastic just war thinking. Although, at one point Johnson does note, in describing the ‘conscious theoretical effort’ to restate the just war tradition for ‘the early modern era’, that this occurred ‘only after it had been challenged – by pacifism on the one hand and by changes in the nature of war on the other’. Erasmus is one ‘these strong pacifist currents’³⁹. While this is some acknowledgement of the impact of pacific humanism, it is comparatively isolated in Johnson’s work. Also, he does not link this pacific challenge with the many other challenges to what he sees as, but I argue is nevertheless disputed, an ‘increasingly coherent and comprehensive doctrine’ of just war. Elsewhere, he does note that Vitoria writes ‘with a particular eye to the Spanish encounter with the Indians in the New World’⁴⁰, but this is treated quite separately.

Having reached this climax, Johnson continues, this ‘classic Christian just war doctrine’ then bifurcates: in one direction there is a strong ‘theological component’, what he describes as a ‘Holy War Doctrine’, and for which he draws heavily on contemporary English writing; the second, and antithetical direction, proceeds with a ‘naturalist component’ in two phases leading eventually into a ‘Just war doctrine of International Law’⁴¹. The first phase includes theorists who ‘remain close to the classic doctrine and form a bridge between it and the overtly secular war doctrine of modern international law’: the Spanish Vitoria and Suarez,

³⁸ Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, p. 42; also for example: *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, p. 174.

³⁹ Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, p. 142. As discussed in the note above, this also counters Johnson’s statement in “Two kinds of pacifism” that Vitoria pre-dated Erasmus.

⁴⁰ Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, p. 174.

⁴¹ Johnson uses the terms ‘holy war’ and ‘crusade’ as interchangeable, but notes the preference of English writers for the term ‘holy war’, *Ibid.* p. 84, n. 1.

and the English Ames, Sutcliffe and Fulbecke. In the second phase, ‘clearly well over the bridge from the Middle Ages’, Johnson includes Grotius, Locke and Vattel⁴².

However, Johnson gives only sparse consideration to Machiavelli⁴³. In a brief reference, with no mention of civic humanism or *The Discourses*, Machiavelli is placed at the ‘opposite extreme’ to Erasmus, and his prince wages war only in considering his ‘own advantage’⁴⁴. At one other point, in opposition to ‘Machiavellian doctrine’, credit is given to the ‘courage of soldiers who believe their cause to be just, that other things being equal, provides the margin of victory’⁴⁵. However, I have argued that well motivated soldiers believing in their cause, are at the core of, much less in opposition to, Machiavelli’s ideas.

Johnson gives much more consideration to Erasmus, as one form of pacifism alongside the pacifism of some radical Protestants. Indeed, despite conceding ‘a kind of just war stance’, for Johnson, and against Fernández, Erasmus ‘is so unrelievedly negative and his alternatives to war so decisively preferred that he establishes himself in the tradition that attempts to deny the political use of force’⁴⁶. Significantly, Johnson argues here that Erasmus uses ‘just war reasoning to his own ends’, when he claims that the inevitable suffering outweighs any possibility of a just cause. I have argued that this is the issue that we discuss today as *jus contra bellum*, although in today’s discussion Johnson does not explicitly acknowledge the Erasmian antecedent⁴⁷.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23. Johnson depicts this diagrammatically in Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, p. 5.

⁴³ Machiavelli is not even indexed in Johnson’s major works.

⁴⁴ Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, p. 159.

⁴⁵ ‘Victory is thus grounded in the natural’, and not ‘unequivocally in God’s help’, nor a case of ‘might is right’; Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, pp. 159-60. This is a reference to ‘Machiavellian’ as opposed to Machiavelli, but in these works Johnson does not appear to differentiate between the terms.

⁴⁶ Johnson, “Two kinds of Pacifism”, p. 50.

⁴⁷ Johnson, “Thinking Historically about Just War”, p. 255. Also today’s formulation of *jus contra bellum* is discussed in Sharma, Serena, “The Legacy of Jus Contra Bellum: Echoes of Pacifism in Contemporary Just War Thought”, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2009), pp. 217-230. I have already noted Johnson’s point on the generalisations made in a modern *jus contra bellum* example, Johnson, *Ethics and the Use of Force*, pp. 10 – 11.

Also, Johnson is not clear on the future of the Erasmian line of pacific thinking. He claims that these lines of pacific thought ‘develop further in subsequent areas’⁴⁸. While he is clear in describing a contrasting, and more literalist, line of ideas from the Swiss Brethren as far as the Mennonites and the Amish tradition, he does not, or I believe cannot, trace a clear line of continuity from Erasmus on into the early modern period. Albeit, as I have noted, Johnson does give the generalised reference to what can be found today as a rejection of war on the basis of the evil caused by violence itself, *jus contra bellum*.

My main contention with Johnson is that, at best, he understates the debilitating effect for the just war tradition of the many factors that I consider in my thesis. With Vitoria, I do not see continuity and a ‘climax’ of medieval thought, an ‘increasingly coherent and comprehensive doctrine’. Instead, I see an attempt at correction after considerable trauma, whether or not, as Benziger claims, this amounts to a period of ‘crisis’, or as Russell argues, by the end of the medieval period, ‘the just war theory as a restraint on violence became a dead letter’⁴⁹.

One explanation for Johnson’s account of continuity might lie with his view that Vitoria was ‘still depended heavily on concepts and conventions of thought inherited from the Middle Ages’. Indeed, ‘no society in Europe in Vitoria’s [*sic*] time was more medieval than Spain’⁵⁰. However, Vitoria’s Spain is only one centre of thought. Significant challenges to continuity arise from the many other factors I consider, including: humanism in all its forms, and the loss of papal moral authority. Johnson himself concedes that within a hundred years of the Reformation, ‘*jus ad bellum* as explicated in traditional doctrine was no longer able to operate as an effective brake on warfare’⁵¹. I argue that this failure is clearly evident

⁴⁸ Johnson, *Quest for Peace*, pp. 170-2.

⁴⁹ Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, p. 307.

⁵⁰ Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, p. 174.

⁵¹ Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, p. 203.

well before this, and certainly by the time of Erasmus and Machiavelli who, in large part, are reacting to it.

I emphasise one final point: at the Council of Trent in 1567 the *Summa theologiae* was placed on the altar alongside the ‘Sacred Scriptures’ by Pius V, and as we saw earlier, Aquinas was pronounced ‘Doctor of the Universal Church’ and ‘Prince of Theologians’. With this level of subsequent affirmation, I strongly believe that we would be more accurate, and should not hesitate, to refer to Aquinas’s writing on just war in the *Summa theologiae* as ‘doctrine’. Indeed, I argue this applies to much of the broader scholastic, and neo-scholastic, theological tradition. If the expression and reception of a set of ideas amounts to doctrine, it should be described as such, and made distinct from a broad, inclusive and adaptive ‘tradition’.

Summary

To summarise this section, I first note Fernández’s claim that the scholastic renewal, which includes a revival of Aquinas, follows a preceding diminution of scholastic doctrine, an ‘ailing Scholasticism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries’⁵². This supports my contention that the scholastic tradition, essentially a doctrine, of just war was also ‘ailing’ at this time. Similarly, I question Johnson’s view that Vitoria is a ‘climax’ of an ‘increasingly coherent and comprehensive doctrine’, and compare it with the contrary view that there had been a ‘crisis’ of clear ideas. Johnson acknowledges that even the renewed scholastic *jus ad bellum* ceases to be ‘an effective brake on warfare’ after the religious wars of the Reformation. I argue that this is evident much earlier during the period of my study.

Machiavelli’s continued presence in the discourse of political thought is confirmed by Skinner; and more specifically on the discourse of peace and war by both Tuck, less

⁵² Fernández, *The State, War and Peace*, p. 4.

favourably, and Fernández, more favourably. He is barely mentioned by Johnson, which I believe is a serious limitation of his account. Tuck's view that the humanism of Machiavelli is completely driven by 'glory and dominion' is questionable, as I have argued earlier. For Fernández, while Machiavelli's ideas appear to succeed where scholasticism and Christian humanism fail, Machiavelli still remains dismissive of contemporary Christianity. However, a Christian God is becoming less central to developing ideas of natural law. As Frederic Baumgarten reminds us of Grotius, 'he pays less attention to God's role in creating natural law; it is valid, asserts Grotius, "even if we should grant that there is no God"'⁵³.

In none of these accounts, is Erasmian thought on war and peace sustained into the early modern period. For Tuck, Erasmus is 'associated' with the humanism derived from Machiavelli: but his account of Erasmus on this point is limited in scope. For Fernández, and I believe more plausibly, Erasmus is subsumed into the neo-scholastic just war account. For Johnson, Erasmus's ideas are essentially pacific, in direct contrast to Fernández's view, but no continuation is demonstrated. Even Dallmayr, an advocate of Erasmus, acknowledges that Erasmus's admonitions 'went largely unheeded'⁵⁴. Nauert, while charting the development of humanist, and indeed Erasmian influence, notes uncompromisingly how 'Erasmus' momentary dream of 1517, that a golden age of peace, justice, and orderly religious reform was about to dawn, had been shattered'⁵⁵. For Hale, 'the international wave of quasi pacifist feeling... soon died away'⁵⁶. Such claims, of course, are not without challenge. It is argued,

⁵³ Baumgarten emphasises how the citation continues: 'which, of course, would be the "greatest Wickedness"'. However, he also points out that this "impious thesis" was also often used by medieval thinkers. Although I argue that writing after the trauma of the Reformation and Wars of Religion, Grotius had more grounds to make this claim than in the Middle Ages. Baumgarten, Frederic, J., *Declaring War in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 146 and 179, n. 16. Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, Tuck, R., (ed.) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), 1, p. 89.

⁵⁴ Dallmayr, *Peace Talks*, p. 40.

⁵⁵ Nauert, *Humanism and Culture*, p. 170.

⁵⁶ Hale, *War and Society*, pp. 40-1. In this 'wave of quasi pacifist feeling', Hale includes: More in England, Erasmus in Holland, Guillaume Budé in France, Juan Luis Vives in Spain, and in a less systematic way, Baldassare Castiglione in Italy. As I have discussed we would not expect to find the nationalistic French humanist, Budé.

for example, that the pacific trend was ‘suppressed’ rather than ‘dying away’⁵⁷. However, I have shown a broad consensus that a ruler could be justified in using force. Thereafter, Hale continues, ‘the most concerned minds, instead of denouncing war, concentrated on ways of ameliorating it’⁵⁸.

LIPSIUS

One of these ‘concerned minds’ was Justus Lipsius, writing immediately prior to Grotius, and I will now consider him as a pertinent example of developing Early Modern ideas of war and peace. I argue that he exemplifies a development from, indeed a useful reconciliation of, many of the ideas seen with Erasmus and Machiavelli. I refer to Waszink’s translation of Lipsius’s *Politica: Six Books of Politics*⁵⁹, and draw on commentary by: Gerhard Oestreich⁶⁰, with his Neostoic emphasis; Jan Waszink, with his challenge to Oestreich⁶¹; and Halvard Leira’s recent paper on Lipsius and International Relations⁶². I first look at general questions of interpretation, and then more specifically on Lipsius’ ideas.

Disagreement exists on the extent to which Lipsius sees warfare as central to his political ideas. For Leira, warfare was not only crucial to changes in contemporary political thinking, but ‘war was also of the essence for Lipsius’⁶³. For Oestreich, Lipsius ‘saw military force (*vis*) as the real foundation of the state. He made it more and more central to his teaching...’⁶⁴. For Waszink, however, even though ‘Lipsius certainly makes the army an

⁵⁷ Marx, “Shakespear’s Pacifism”, pp. 55 – 56.

⁵⁸ Hale, *War and Society*, p. 41.

⁵⁹ Lipsius, Justus, *Politica: Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction*, Waszink, Jan, (trans. and ed.), (Assen: Royal van Gorcum, 2004).

⁶⁰ Oestreich, Gerhard, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, Oestreich, Brigitta, and Koenigsberger, H. G., (eds.), McLintock, D., (trans.), (London, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

⁶¹ Waszink, Jan, “Introduction”, to Lipsius, Justus, *Politica: Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction*, (Assen: Royal van Gorcum, 2004).

⁶² Leira, Halvard, “Justus Lipsius, political humanism and the disciplining of 17th century statecraft”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4, (October, 2008), pp. 669-692.

⁶³ Leira, “Lipsius”, p. 674.

⁶⁴ Oestreich, *Neostoicism*, p. 71.

important instrument of the prince', Oestreich's claim is 'untenable', indeed the 'military is not central to the *Politica* at all'⁶⁵. Waszink argues that discussion of the army is almost confined to just one of the six books of the *Politica*, that is Book 5 on foreign wars⁶⁶. I disagree with Waszink's specific claim here: not only are key references overlooked by Waszink⁶⁷, but the wider discussions of virtue and prudence throughout the text remain very pertinent to Book 5, as I will argue.

However, I believe Waszink is right in being cautious of interpretations that might imply that Lipsius favours a militarised society. This tendency is encouraged, for example, by Oestreich's comments in describing the Neostoicism which, for Oestreich, drives Lipsian political thinking. This Neostoicism not only demanded 'self-discipline', but 'the moral education of the army, the officials, and indeed the whole people, to a life of work, frugality, dutifulness and obedience'⁶⁸. But here, Oestreich is talking of Neostoicism more broadly, not Lipsius specifically; and also, importantly, this in itself does not necessarily imply a militarised society. To claim that something of a perceived military virtue can benefit civil society is one matter; but to claim that this makes for a militarised society is quite another. I have argued that Machiavelli does not go this far, nor does Lipsius. Indeed, as we will see in discussing discipline, Lipsius stresses the unique and exceptional role of the soldier.

However, while Lipsius is certainly not advocating a militarised society, I will argue that there is a great deal more in Oestreich's account than Waszink acknowledges.

⁶⁵ Waszink, "Introduction", pp. 101-2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* Waszink claims that apart from 'brief and subordinate' discussion in Book 4, chapters 7-9, discussion of the military is not found outside of Book 5.

⁶⁷ For example, Waszink maintains that the army 'does not figure...surprisingly' in Book 6, which deals with civil war, *Ibid.* However, this overlooks the direction given by Lipsius in Book 6, when he begins to discuss the conduct of a civil war, that the 'way is equal or identical to the way in which a foreign war is conducted'; Lipsius *Politica*, 6, 2, 1, p. 671. Therefore, all that has been said in the preceding chapter on the conduct of the army in a foreign war, applies again, in effect, 'as above'. Another explicit reference, again not used here by Waszink, again shows how fundamental the army is to Lipsius' overall thesis. He is discussing taxes: 'For neither can peace among nations be maintained without armies, nor armies without wages, nor wages without taxes. Taxes are the equipment of peace, and the reserves of war'; *Ibid.*, 4, 9, 5, p. 471.

⁶⁸ Oestreich, *Neostoicism*, p. 7.

Turning to consider the divergence of ideas seen with Erasmus and Machiavelli, I believe that Lipsius reconciles much of this divergence. For Lipsius, power and force are essential to the state's well-being, but it is power combined unambiguously with virtue, and exercised with prudence. Lipsius writes that 'there are two things which make a realm peaceful and stable: Force and Virtue'⁶⁹. On force: 'majesty without force is hardly stable'⁷⁰; but by 'force I mean this mixture of force and Prudence'⁷¹. On virtue, this is not just a matter of reputation, 'it is required for its own sake'⁷², and 'for his subjects' sake too'⁷³. 'Without Virtue, no association of people is sound or lasting'⁷⁴. Oestreich develops this theme: the essentials of national life for Lipsius are 'power (*vis*), together with *virtus*'⁷⁵; and while appealing to the *prudentia* of leaders, Lipsius 'calls for *vis* to be restrained by *virtus*'⁷⁶; and power 'tempered and directed by prudence (*vis temperata*) is the ideal'⁷⁷.

Lipsius acknowledges that the demands of virtue and necessity will come into conflict. However, he would 'loathe and condemn' any idea of 'departing straightforwardly from the Honourable'⁷⁸. He considers at length the dilemma posed by gaining any advantage by deceit, the recurring question we saw discussed earlier. He draws an analogy of mixing water with the wine of virtue, 'does it mean I depart from Virtue? Wine does not stop being wine when it is mixed with a little water', and concludes: 'I say: mix'⁷⁹. As Leira summarises, it is a '*prudentia mixta* that is prescribed for dealing with external affairs', but a *prudentia mixta* that rests on 'dignity, self-constraint and discipline'⁸⁰.

⁶⁹ Lipsius *Politica*, 4, 7, 1, p. 415.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 4, 9, 5, p. 433.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 3, 1, 1, p. 347.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 2, 7, 1, p. 311.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 2, 8, 1, p. 315.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Oestreich, *Neostoicism*, p. 46.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁷⁸ Lipsius, *Politica*, p. 509.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Leira, "Lipsius", p. 684.

There are a range of views on Lipsius, Machiavelli, power and reasons of state. This scholarship is usefully reviewed by Waszink⁸¹, and here I will only illustrate Lipsius' qualified endorsement of Machiavelli. Lipsius comments favourably on Machiavelli, who: 'must not be so categorically condemned', as there is a certain 'honourable and praiseworthy cunning'⁸². Again, Lipsius considers him uniquely worthy among near contemporary writers, Machiavelli '...whose genius I do not despise, sharp, subtle and fiery that it is'. However, Lipsius goes on to qualify this: '... if only he had directed his Prince on the straight path towards that great temple of Virtue and Honour! But all too often he strays from that road'; and adding a note that 'Machiavelli is shrewd but often immoral'⁸³.

As we have seen, pacific Erasmian humanism is less persistent by the time of Lipsius, and he is less specific in referring to this than to discussion on Machiavelli and power. However, with his mixed wine analogy, he qualifies his emphasis on virtue. He notes how some insist on staying with 'a good and pure liquid', that is pure virtue. But these 'seem not to know this age and its men, and to speak their opinion as if in Plato's Republic...'⁸⁴. Again, therefore, he advocates a *prudential mixta*. This is a critique of a Platonism reminiscent of Erasmus's frequent use of Plato in *The Education of a Christian Prince*⁸⁵, and as I have stressed, with Erasmus completely omitting any reference to the training of Plato's guardians. However, as well as this emphasis on virtue, Erasmian ideas are evident in other areas of Lipsius, which I will now consider in the sequence of my thesis: concepts of peace and war; the justification of war; and its conduct.

⁸¹ Waszink, Introduction", pp. 98-102.

⁸² Lipsius, *Politica*, 4, 13, 2, p. 511. Lipsius adds in a note 'Some rage too much against Machiavelli'. 'Honourable and praiseworthy cunning' is attributed to 'Basil. Hom. In Prov. Vol. 31'.

⁸³ Lipsius, *Politica*, Preliminaries, 4, p. 231. Waszink points out that these references, and those from Book 4, above, were altered or removed in editions from 1596 onwards; Waszink, "Introduction", p. 99. As Waszink emphasises, Lipsius was aware of contemporary sensitivities to Machiavelli.

⁸⁴ Lipsius, *Politica*, 4, 13, 1, p. 507.

⁸⁵ I have referred earlier to James Tracy's discussion of the frequent appearance of Plato's *Republic* in the *Education of a Christian Prince*: Tracy, James., D., *The Politics of Erasmus: A Pacifist Intellectual and his Political Milieu* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), p. 168, n. 140.

For Lipsius, ‘the natural state of relationships between mortals is that of peace’⁸⁶; and, in keeping with Erasmus’s praising of peace, he devotes the concluding chapters of Book 5, on foreign wars, to ‘a heartfelt exhortation to peace...both pleasant and beneficial’⁸⁷. Lipsius invokes the Aristotelian and Augustinian claim that peace is the end of war, and specifies why: peace is honourable, advantageous, and brings the greater safety⁸⁸. However, there are qualifications. He considers the Ciceronian suggestion, taken up by Erasmus and rejected by Vitoria, that an unjust peace might be preferable to a just war. Lipsius insists that a peace must still be ‘honourable and simple’, neither a ‘contract for slavery’, nor a peace that brings a prince ‘a stain or disgrace’⁸⁹. Nor should it be a ‘fictitious and falsified peace, a peace which is war dressed up as peace’⁹⁰. Also, as with Machiavelli, it is certainly necessary to maintain adequate preparations for war in times of peace, indeed, these can deter aggression and war. Such preparations include money, supplies and equipment, as ‘it is difficult to build these things at short notice’⁹¹. However, this comes without the strong critique of peace found with Sánchez and Machiavelli, peace clearly remains the desired state.

On the causes of war, Lipsius gives the same simple formula which I have noted frequently expressed by Machiavelli, and which would not conflict with Erasmus. The straightforward causes of unjust wars are ‘Ambition and Greed...the deep desire for Power and Wealth’. Lipsius then adds that ‘Wrath’ as an unjust cause of wars, ‘being provoked by wrath or hatred’. As found in Machiavelli, therefore, war is caused by ambition, greed, and also inherent hatred.

However, on the question of justifying wars, Lipsius draws back from the scepticism we have seen with both Erasmus and Machiavelli, and he unambiguously reproduces the

⁸⁶ Lipsius, *Politica*, 5, 4, 1, p. 545. Lipsius cites Augustine in *Contra Faustus*.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 5, 19, 1, p. 653.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 5, 20, 1, p. 659.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 5, 19, 2, p. 655.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 5, 19, 2, p. 657.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 5, 6, 2, 559.

criteria for a just war. This is in a clear and succinct Thomist style, but Augustine, and not Aquinas, is the authority cited. He gives, in his words, an ‘ordered and methodical exposition of the things which are required for a just war; and most of all for which causes it may be started’⁹². With repeated use of the word ‘just’, *iusto/iustum*, he discusses the requirements of just agent, cause and ends.

However, Lipsius’ account does differ from that of Aquinas, in that for Aquinas the prince or agent carries the sword ‘as God’s servant, an avenger to execute wrath on the evildoer’⁹³. This is repeated in Vitoria’s account⁹⁴. But the idea of the prince being the agent of God in authorising a war is absent from Lipsius, who instead talks of ‘the natural relationships between mortals’⁹⁵. Natural law does indeed feature in the accounts of the scholastics; and God certainly has a place in Lipsius’ account. However, the omission of God on this point of just authority and cause is, I believe, significant in the development towards secular theories of just war and international law. Especially, I argue, the account is also a conspicuous move away from the scepticism about the possibility of just war found with both Erasmus and Machiavelli.

Finally, in turning to the conduct of war in Lipsius, I will consider the important issues of recruitment and discipline. First, however, Lipsius answers the question why he, as a scholar, should ‘dare to discuss this topic...one who has never actually seen the enemy and the army camp’⁹⁶. He affirms that he seeks only to give his ‘advice and judgement’, based on an extensive reading of history. While he would not comment on the actual handling of weapons, there still remained many issues ‘which are part of managing a war’, and on which

⁹² *Ibid.*, 5, 4, 1, p. 545. Lipsius cites Augustine, *Against Faustus the Manichean*, 22, 75; Augustine, *Political Writings*, pp. 220 – 223; also Reichberg *et al*, *Ethics of War*, pp. 81 – 82.

⁹³ Aquinas, Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, Regan, R.J., (trans.) *On Law, Morality and Politics* (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2002), ST II-II, q. 40, a. 1, p. 165.

⁹⁴ ‘He beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil’; Vitoria, *On the Law of War*, q.1, a.1, in Reichberg, *et al*, *Ethics of War*, p. 309.

⁹⁵ Lipsius, *Politica*, 5, 4, 1, p. 545.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5, 1, 1, p. 535.

he could usefully comment⁹⁷. Indeed, there is strong empirical evidence that his ‘advice and judgement’ had a considerable influence on subsequent Dutch army reforms⁹⁸. My point here is to contrast this position with that of Erasmus, who, also a scholar, absolves himself from serious discussion of improving military discipline. Indeed, I have argued that he considers the soldiery as a lost cause.

Lipsius is appalled by the conduct of the army, a ‘cause of shame’⁹⁹, but unlike Erasmus, makes key, practical recommendations. He writes on the make-up of an army, developing the humanist discussion, strong in Machiavelli, of the dangers of foreign troops, and of the relative merits of militia over professionals. Lipsius recommends a mixed force of native regular and reserve troops, and draws on the advantages of both. There should be a force of full-time ‘full-fledged soldiers...true off-spring of Mars’. But, because of issues of cost, disturbance, and the danger of usurpation, this force should be limited in number¹⁰⁰. Therefore, the professionals are supplemented by a larger force of reservists, ‘spread over various professions’, to supplement the regulars when required¹⁰¹. In addition, a great deal of care is taken with selection and recruitment¹⁰². In this way the problems of mercenaries, and of recruiting from the ‘dregs of humanity’ so frequently castigated by Erasmus, are avoided.

Lipsius makes a key distinction in the relationship between soldier and citizen. The soldier, militia or professional, comes from the civil community, and is maintained by that community. Soldiers must ‘not misbehave’ but ‘live together with the local population

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 5, 1, 1, p. 537. There is a practical element to Lipsius’s work as well as a philosophical. A discussion on this point in a modern context is found with Clark in, *Philosophical Introduction*, pp. 1-4. C

⁹⁸ While there were certainly many influences on the Dutch army reforms, Oestreich claims that it was Lipsius who ‘had first stimulated’ them; Oestreich, *Neostoicism*, p. 5. Again, ‘it was only Lipsius who, borrowing from this or that writer, had the good fortune to find in Maurice of Orange and his cousins John and William Louis, the energetic reformers who, with the Dutch army at war with Spain, would give an impressive testimonial to the rightness of his proposals’; *Ibid.*, p. 50. Oestreich also notes that Lipsius, whether or not invited by them, did receive a payment from the States General; *Ibid.*, n. 11.

⁹⁹ Lipsius, *Politica*, 5, 8, 1, p. 565.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 5, 11, 1, p. 575.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 5, 11, 2, p. 577.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 5, 12, pp. 581-589.

according to civil law...that shield of your army must create peace for the villagers'¹⁰³. On the other hand, the role of the soldier in war requires a special discipline, not relevant to the civil population. He notes that, 'for some reason or other it is difficult to bind the behaviour of men who are constantly fighting, to rules'. Therefore, harsher and more concise measures are required, because 'once they have strayed from the straight path, (they) will oppress if they are not oppressed themselves'¹⁰⁴.

Discipline, therefore, is the key component of Lipsius' recommendations. As we have seen, humanists had often looked to the classical sources, especially Roman, for examples of military discipline, Machiavelli especially. Lipsius recognises, as do many, that contemporary military discipline is not so much 'asleep, but is dead; nor is it bad, but none'¹⁰⁵. But for Oestreich, and I agree, Lipsius adds a particular dimension. On discipline, Lipsius talks in terms of training, order, restraining, and the setting of examples with reward and punishment. While training and order relate to strength, restraint relates to virtue and to examples of both strength and virtue¹⁰⁶. It is the virtue-based restraint that is of particular interest: 'the part which controls and bridles the behaviour of the soldier'¹⁰⁷. It consists in continence in food and sex; moderation in speech, clothing and actions; and refraining from 'violence and pillage...to have unstained hands'¹⁰⁸.

For Lipsius, this restraining of the soldiery is a matter of virtue. Occasionally, harsh punishment is still necessary, but this is dealt with separately. Machiavelli, as I argued, saw that on occasions a more benign discipline was appropriate, and on others a harsher discipline. But for Lipsius, 'restraint' is consistently the product of virtue. Oestereich

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 5, 13, 6, p. 603. Lipsius cites Cass. Var. 6.22.3., and 7.4.3.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 5, 13, 7, p. 605.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 5, 13, 1, p. 589.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 5, 13, 1, p. 591.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 5, 13, 4, p. 597.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 5, 13, 6, p. 603.

translates this third element, restraint, from *coerctio* into ‘self-discipline’¹⁰⁹. Oestereich describes the ‘iron discipline’ of the *Landsknechte*, for example, but claims that Lipsius ‘was the first to go beyond this narrow concept of discipline by complementing it with exercise, order and self-discipline’¹¹⁰. This, I believe is an important development in improving the state of European armies. Discipline in this context is not only imposed from outside, indeed, it is more effective as a self-discipline in correctly selected, trained, motivated, and properly employed soldiers, and there is contemporary empirical evidence to support this¹¹¹.

In summary, therefore, I believe Lipsius provides a useful illustration of the development of ideas into the early modern period, and an attempt to reconcile many of the issues dividing the Renaissance humanists. Lipsius argues for both force and virtue, *vis* restrained by *virtus*, and policy guided by *prudentia mixta*. He recognises merit in Machiavelli, but criticises a perceived lack of morality. He writes of the primacy of virtue and the benefits of peace, but is critical of idealistic aspirations. Peace must still be realistic and honourable, and sound preparations for war are still required in peace. War is caused by ambition, greed and hatred, a formula found explicitly in Machiavelli and is also evident in Erasmus.

Significantly, and without the scepticism of Erasmus and Machiavelli, Lipsius justifies war with the clear criteria for a just war: authority, cause and intention. However, he also shifts the emphasis away from a theological account towards a greater basis in natural

¹⁰⁹ Oestereich, *Neostoicism*, p. 53.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 54. For Oestereich, this is firmly anchored in Neostoicism, but my point, I believe, remains as relevant whatever the classical origins.

¹¹¹ It is worth noting Oestereich’s account in detail: ‘Lipsius had called for military ethics to be treated as an equally important ingredient of reform; these also did not remain merely on paper...the Venetian ambassador recorded with great surprise that Dutch towns applied for troops to be quartered in them and that the citizens thought nothing of leaving their wives and daughters alone with the soldiers – “a thing that would not do elsewhere”. And Hugo Grotius tells us that Maurice set up a market in his army camp, where the farmers went, without fear of violence, to sell food to the soldiery, whom they had formerly taken care to avoid. “Friend and foe admired the authority that Maurice had over his troops”. Velázquez, in his painting of the surrender of Breda, captured the early peak of this moral transformation, which was produced by the Neostoic military ethos even in the Spanish enemy’. *Ibid.*, p. 79. For the quotation from Grotius, Oestereich cites: Gustav Roloff, ‘Moritz von Oranien und die Begründung des modernen Heeres’, *Preussische Jahrbücher* 111, 1903.

law. Finally, his practical military discussion and recommendations, quite absent in Erasmus, are a key feature in Lipsius where he again often seeks to reconcile traditional humanist discussions. He recommends a mixed army: a professional core; supported by a militia; all are native troops; and are well selected, trained, motivated, and disciplined. As Oestreich argues, a strong element of self-discipline, *coerctio*, is essential in restraining the soldiery. This has more to do with virtue than harsh, imposed discipline, and is characteristic of Lipsius' discussion of peace and war: *vis* restrained by *virtus*, and guided by *prudentia mixta*.

CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis, having first considered relevant contextual issues, I have sought to follow a sequence in discussing each author or section: the concepts of peace and war; the justification for war; and finally, ideas on its conduct. By applying this template I have been able to analyse the texts, compare and contrast contemporary ideas, and formulate conclusions on the specific questions posed at the outset. In closing, I summarise the general discussion, and then answer these questions, with conclusions on: an assessment of the just war tradition; my analysis of the *Disputatio*; the works of Erasmus and Machiavelli, and the extent of opposition between their expressed ideas. I end by briefly considering some broader implications of these conclusions.

Discussion

I have described the Renaissance as a moment of transition, with a considerable overlap and admixture of ideas. An antecedent world view, the medieval, has lost its strength, and the Early Modern world has yet to fully emerge. Social and military developments also characterise the period. Battlefields see a multiplicity of forms of warfare, each with their respective, but often contrary, codes of behaviour: knight, mercenary, militia, and national professional. The church and the papacy are no longer widely seen as the unifying power they once represented; and the influence and reach of Canon law and scholastic doctrine are diminished. Indeed, popes are seen more as participants in, rather than impartial arbiters of, temporal conflict.

Renaissance humanism takes many forms, and writers easily shift between positions. I have focussed on strands of civic and pacific humanism, but imbued with their rhetorical style

of argument, humanists in general share in their challenge to scholastic methodology: a reliance on patriarchal authority, and deduction from abstract principles. There is no evidence to show that Aquinas is the authority that he is later to become with his revival by the neo-scholastics. He is not cited in the *Disputatio*, or other significant late medieval texts.

In understanding contemporary concepts of peace and war, the clear oppositions set out in the *Disputatio* are especially informative. But all the writers, Platina, Sánchez, Erasmus, and Machiavelli in his literary works, present a similar account of the medieval Christian concept of original sin. Pride resulted in the casting out of Satan which triggered conflict in the heavens; from this the twin ‘furies’ of ‘ambition’ and ‘greed’ came to earth, bringing this conflict with them. In Machiavelli’s descriptive account, this leads to the first spilling of blood on earth.

However, differences of interpretation then appear, particularly with the authors’ understanding of peace. For Platina and Erasmus, it is God’s plan that the universe is at peace: planets move in harmony, and nature is in a state of concord. Furthermore, a reasonable state of peace among men can be achieved on earth, and to which men should aspire. Platina depicts the sea and land return to a natural state of peace after a storm. Erasmus moves between moments of optimism for a better peace on earth, and moments of despair. For Machiavelli and Sánchez, notwithstanding any eternal plan, for now the universe is in conflict, the planets move in a state of tension, and nature is in motion and conflict. Temporal peace is short-lived, and brings many perils.

The latter view, very explicitly in Sánchez, draws on Augustine’s account that true peace is only found in the City of God, and in the Earthly City we have to deal with enmity and conflict until a day of judgement. War is therefore inevitable, but here, I argue, a further divergence of interpretation opens up. On the one hand Augustine is extremely regretful and

reluctant to go to war, which is a lesser evil but still very much an evil. This is the more familiar interpretation of Augustine to us today.

On the other hand, war is part of God's ordained plan; and is approved by God in the fight against evil. We need not, indeed should not, feel any reluctance in taking part in such a worthy endeavour. This is a widely held view from the late Middle Ages and, I believe, better reflects church orthodoxy into the Renaissance than one of a limiting just war. The more extreme position sees war not only as a religious duty, but as a positive good within God's plan. Sánchez's account in the *Disputatio* is close to this position. His complex concept of peace reinforces the belief that we can never experience meaningful peace on earth. For Machiavelli, war is also inevitable and has to be dealt with, but it is not, I emphasise, an end in itself. It is very much subordinated to a political aim. Peace again has its dangers, but this is well based in antiquity, Machiavelli does not need Augustine for this.

The conceptual understanding of peace and war influences the way authors justify war. Because they accept the inevitability of war, I argue that neither Machiavelli nor Sánchez see any great need to elaborate criteria to justify particular wars. This absence of serious justification is widely reflected in the actions of popes and princes. Machiavelli certainly recognises the utility of people believing in their cause, and in his militia ideal this is underscored with a sense of '*patria*', but there is no intrinsic, deontological, moral justification. Erasmus would like to argue, *jus contra bellum*, that the criteria for conduct are so demanding that no wars can be justified. Instead, with moral reform driven by his 'Philosophy of Christ', war will be eradicated among Christians, and minimised if not eradicated, even against non-Christians. Only with Platina, therefore, do we find clear recognition of any moral need to justify particular wars.

Machiavelli and Sánchez, accepting both that wars will be fought, and the imperfections of human nature, see a need to restrain conduct. Sánchez repeats the Augustinian view that this is a matter of inward disposition and virtue, but he is less clear on what this is, or how to bring it about. Machiavelli applies a full range of ideas: classical discipline, reward, punishment, religion, and above all, political restraint with a combination of civic and military virtue. Platina holds that God, nature and law require restraint in war, but is also sceptical that anything can really be done to stop a river in flood. Erasmus simply believes that because war is so evil, if it has to be fought, it should be left to evil people. He is adamant that soldiers are irredeemable, and any notion of military virtue is completely oxymoronic. Only with Machiavelli, therefore, do we find serious and full consideration of restraining conduct in war.

Conclusions

My first specific question addressed the condition of the just war tradition during the period under study, and whether it is reasonable to describe the period as one of crisis. I have argued that there is no evidence of a strong just war tradition. This is not to say that the notion of restraining warfare by codes and laws had been completely lost: there is a considerable overlap of both passing and embryonic codes and sets of ideas. But the weakness of any restraining influence on policy or conduct is reflected empirically in wars of the period, and even more so in wars shortly to come about. It is also the case that traces of just war criteria are found with all the authors. However, this is more implicit than explicit, and only serves to confirm an ‘essence’ of war: restraint is part of its enduring nature, albeit weakly expressed in this context.

It is, therefore, inaccurate and misleading to claim continuity in a Thomist just war tradition. For Russell, the theological just war doctrine and medieval Canon law are ‘dead in the water’. This is a strong critique, but I believe, not without substance. Indeed, we find

greater evidence of a bellicose church orthodoxy, in which war is: 'ordained' by God; seen as 'vindictive' punishment; and not only inevitable, but a positive good requiring little justification. For Johnson, the just war tradition 'reacted' to the humanist challenge, but I argue that much earlier in time, both the pacific and civic forms of this challenge react to, or seek to compensate for, an already weak scholastic just war tradition.

Does this amount to a crisis? There is certainly a crisis in the circumstances of those seemingly locked in a cycle of suffering, and this is reflected in contemporary literature. I have demonstrated the weaknesses of contemporary ideas of restraint, with any adequate corrective yet to be formulated. Therefore, I conclude with Benziger, that it is reasonable to use the term 'crisis'. Furthermore, I believe it is more instructive to recognise this as a period lacking in clear and substantial ideas of restraint, than to perpetuate a notion of continuity in the just war tradition. Appropriate lessons can then be drawn.

My second question asks what can be learnt from the *Disputatio*, and how it relates to the later works of Erasmus and Machiavelli. Despite its context and artificiality, I believe this text provides: good examples of humanist and scholastic styles; a Roman humanist critique of war; an example of the complexity of scholastic analysis of peace and war; and a contemporary discussion of war, but again without any significant reference to Aquinas. Benziger is correct to point to the relatively extreme nature of Sánchez's account, but I argue that it represents a prevailing orthodoxy which stems from war being seen as a positive good within God's ordained plan.

Erasmus's work on war has strong similarities to Platina's *De laudibus pace*. This similarity militates against claims of originality in Erasmus's, or more generally the northern humanists', rhetorical critique of war. However, Platina is very clear in approving a just war,

while Erasmus is ambiguous. Platina acknowledges the need for restraint in war, while Erasmus is dismissive of the possibility.

Machiavelli shares Sánchez's acceptance of the inevitability of war, with consequently little need to justify it. This position does not have to be based on the latter's medieval Christian account, although Machiavelli would accept: first its utility, if it succeeds in a motivational sense; and secondly, its version of the original and robust Christianity to which he indicates he is more disposed. The key difference is that Sánchez remains with a theological and strong scholastic account, while Machiavelli is politically focused, drawing on civic humanism. The similarity is limited in this respect.

Thirdly, I question the extent of difference between, and provide my own critique of, Erasmus and Machiavelli. Certainly the underlying social and religious ontology is very different. They have rightly come to emblematised divergent views, one a pacific ideal, and the other a realistic acceptance of conflict. The more Erasmus is seen as rejecting all war, and the more Machiavelli is seen to pass over the need to justify it, the starker this divergence becomes. However, I have shown that such a divergence of interpretation is deeply problematic.

Erasmus and Machiavelli also have a great deal in common. They are both sceptical of the church in Rome, of the language of the scholastic just war, and of aristocratic chivalry. They are both disgusted by aspects of contemporary warfare, in particular of mercenaries. Machiavelli questions the place of justice in war, but I have argued that this is only in the context of a 'supreme emergency', which need not be seen as an extreme view. In his war with the Turks even Erasmus concedes the battlefield is controlled by necessity. Indeed, I have shown that the effective restraint of mis-conduct on the battlefield is more likely with Machiavelli's approach, than it is with that of Erasmus. Therefore, I do not believe they have

to be seen as so far apart, especially when considered as two elements within the same broader humanist critique of scholastic just war. I do not accept, therefore, Skinner's assertion that on war, 'the greatest of ethical divides' lies between them.

Turning specifically to Erasmus, I argue that he is essentially opposed to all war, but is forced to obfuscate. The ambiguity of this position, in my view, inevitably devalues his guidance to princes. My main point of critique is that because of his absolute rejection of the possibility of improving the condition of the soldiery, a condition he so volubly condemns, not only is his prince left with an inadequate military, but the war to which he eventually agrees is left without any reasonable prospect of restraint. His overwhelming desire for peace, with only a token acceptance of a war of last resort, paradoxically results in ever more vicious warfare, and ever more *licentiam militarem*.

On the other hand, my main argument from Machiavelli, is to point out that he goes to great lengths to advocate mechanisms of restraint, above all for political restraint, and it is wrong, therefore, to describe his war as being a 'no holds barred' affair. In contrast to that of Erasmus, I argue that Machiavelli's war stands to be less vicious, and with less *licentiam militarem*. However, I still have significant criticisms of Machiavelli. First, because he is so accepting of a general condition of conflict, he does not demonstrate any meaningful aspiration to achieve a temporal peace. Secondly, while his militia ideal has value at a theoretical level, there are issues of practicality when compared to professional alternatives, and it remains vulnerable to a corrupted political authority.

To summarise, in this thesis I have examined ideas of peace and war in the Renaissance, more comprehensively than is often the case. The Middle Ages and the Early Modern periods have their own particular, and recognisable, world views, but I have shown the Renaissance to be distinctive for its lack of credible ideas. Fernandez is not amiss, therefore, in claiming:

‘neither the abstractions of neo-scholasticism, nor the shallow concreteness of political empiricism, nor the idealism of the Christian humanists’ suffice in isolation to answer our questions¹. We do not see a continuation of Thomist thought reaching a classic phase with Vitoria. Instead, we see some relatively bellicose ideas representing a church orthodoxy, and an early humanist reaction which includes both a secular realism and a pacific idealism.

Therefore, given this lacuna of effective ideas, I conclude by asking what the Renaissance period can indeed contribute to subsequent just war thinking, and what the humanist contribution to ideas of peace and war means for later discussions on the justification for, and moral restraint of, warfare. I broadly accept Johnson’s account of how the just war tradition developed in the Early Modern period, with a ‘bifurcation’ into: a theological element, developed first by the neo-scholastics, but which, I add, is then maintained and developed further in various theological circles; and secondly, a more secular development, especially as redeveloped by Grotius into nascent international law, and as relevant to the emergent nation-state. The just war tradition is then to be much revived in the twentieth century, with the works of Ramsey, Waltzer, and Johnson himself. Here, I note a number of the key contributions made by Renaissance thought which are relevant both to the earlier developments, but also to discussion through to the present.

The first contribution to which I turn is in scholastic, rather than humanist thought. A fundamental element of neo-scholastic theology is the revival of Aquinas. The neo-scholastic re-statement of just war doctrine follows this theology, and strongly reflects Aquinas: with the clarity of his exposition; and a less ambiguous presumption against war than, I have argued, had hitherto been apparent. I have shown that it is correct to see the influence of Thomist thought on the just war tradition as being effective from the beginning of the sixteenth century, and not as persisting through late medieval thought, as it is often portrayed. Aquinas

¹ Fernández, *State, War and Peace*, p. 116.

is very important to the subsequent development of the tradition, and this influence is a product of the later Renaissance period, being fully in keeping with: the Renaissance re-examination of medieval doctrine; the reaction to Renaissance humanism; and the period's spread of learning, helped for example, by printing.

Secondly, on the other hand, the civic humanism of the Renaissance, and Machiavelli in particular, make an important contribution toward a greater secularisation of European politics. This is a long process, but Machiavelli, as I have shown, is an early, and widely acknowledged, exponent of the view that, whatever its instrumental function, religion is not the major determinant of state affairs. This applies to decisions of peace and war. In Europe, following Machiavelli, war comes to be seen as a matter for the politics of the nation state, and not a matter of divine sanction, especially not of divine command. Clausewitz will come to be recognised as the clearest exponent of war as an extension of state politics, with an admixture of other means, and it is significant that he wrote approvingly of Machiavelli on this point².

Thirdly, the period eventually leads to a reconciliation of differing approaches to the major ethical questions of peace and war. This is evident from both the pacific and civic strands of Renaissance humanism, and the comparisons I have drawn between the authors examined in this thesis. A re-convergence, or a balancing, of their differences can be seen with Lipsius's *prudentia mixta*. Force is important, but *vis* must be restrained by *virtus*, and this is much clearer with Lipsius than with Machiavelli's account of virtue. Unlike Erasmus, Lipsius gives a central place to *virtus* in the conduct of war, and suggests a range of practical measures to achieve this: with the selection and training of soldiers, law, and above all a virtue based self-discipline, with harsh discipline only as a last resort.

² As discussed, for example, in Paret, Peter, *Clausewitz and the State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 169 - 175. Indeed, Clausewitz notes in 1807: 'No book on earth is more necessary to the politician than Machiavelli's', *Ibid.*, p. 171.

Fourthly, the Renaissance discourse on peace and war brings a further sense of balance into sharp relief: the balance between a laudable aspiration for peace; and maintaining adequate preparations, in times of peace, for a just and necessary war of last resort. This issue is a hardy ‘perennials’, being clearly set out, for example, by Socrates, for whom: the opposing ‘virtues’ are ‘inherently at odds’, with disastrous consequences for the freedoms enjoyed in times of peace, if the balance is misjudged³. With Erasmus we see an earnest aspiration for peace, but my critique warns of the dangers of a strong presumption in favour of peace which avoids serious discussion of, and due preparation for, a justified war. We have seen scholarship which places any such reference ‘in parenthesis’, or relegated to an ‘end-note’. Machiavelli points to the mutual benefit of a strong link between the civil and military communities, and warns of the consequences of breaking that link. He stresses the importance of keeping the military subordinate to the political; and describes a full range of ‘bridles’ to employ appropriately with the use of force. But we also see a dangerous lack of aspiration for peace. I believe this debate is especially pertinent to modern democracies. For example, I would argue that Coker is dangerously optimistic when he accepts that democracies will never be adequately prepared for war, but will always win through because of their ‘tenacity’ and ‘moral conviction’⁴.

Finally, the essence of the Renaissance, the essence on which I have focused in this thesis, is the broader humanist challenge to the scholastics. In particular, I have discussed the humanist objections to the scholastic just war doctrine, a doctrine described by Russell as having become an exercise of ‘intellectual gymnastics’. The humanists rejected what they saw as a staid, abstract, and inaccessible doctrine which was ill-equipped to deal with the more immediate challenges and realities of peace and war, be they moral or pragmatic.

³ Plato, *The Statesman*, Waterfield, Robin, (trans. and ed.), Annas, Julia, (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 80 - 81.

⁴ Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers*, pp. 171 – 172; here Coker is following Raymond Aron.

Today, I believe that the just war approach is frequently rejected for similar reasons. For example, the concept of ‘just war’ is often wrongly construed as presenting either: an absolute value which would be impossible to achieve, *jus contra bellum*; or an over-generalised justification for all war. Johnson himself concedes that the ‘model’ of ethics of which he writes does not ‘travel’ universally, depending as it does on ‘cultural traits, political, religious and social traditions’⁵. I argue further that it is in danger of being confined within particular disciplines of scholarship.

If the just war tradition is to give us a language with which a democracy can engage the moral questions of peace and war, then it is important that everyone participating is conversant with that language. This is not, I submit, always the case with the just war tradition today. An important contribution of the Renaissance discourse to our discussions, therefore, is to remind us that the essential arguments of the moral and prudential constraints on war must be clearly expressed in an appropriate and relevant form, a form which is accessible and widely understood.

⁵ Johnson, “Reflections on *The Journal of Military Ethics*”, *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (2012), p. 7.

APPENDIX 1 - DISPUTATION ON PEACE AND WAR

English translation by Mike Cailes

Annotations by Wolfram Benziger

A DISPUTATION ON PEACE AND WAR

BETWEEN

THE HONOURABLE FATHER RODRIGO BISHOP OF CALAHORRA, SPAIN

AND

BARTOLOMEO PLATINA

Rome, 1468

TO THE MOST WORTHY FATHER IN CHRIST MARCO BARBO, HOLDER OF THE RELIGIOUS ORDER OF SAINT MARCUS, PRIEST CARDINAL, AND BISHOP OF VICENZA.

THIS DEBATE SETS OUT THE RESPECTIVE ARGUMENTS FOR WAR AND PEACE AS PUT FORWARD BY THE HONOURABLE FATHER RODRIGO, BISHOP OF SPAIN, AND BARTOLOMEO PLATINA. ONE WHO EXTOLS PEACE; AND ONE WHO ADVOCATES THE USE OF FORCE, AND IN COMMENDING THE MILITARY AND THE ART OF WAR, ARGUES TO THE CONTRARY, THAT PEACE BRINGS ABOUT CORRUPTION.

PROLOGUE

[1] To the most holy father in Christ, Marco Barbo, holder of the religious order of Saint Marcus, priest cardinal, and Bishop of Vicenza, from the unworthy Rodrigo, Bishop of Calahorra, disciple of our most holy magnificence Pope Paul, keeper of his castle, Fort St Angelo in Rome, and from Bartolomeo Platina, with both our most humble offerings.

[2] Through recent testing, indefatigable effort, and wonderful vigilance, our most holy Majesty secures the peace between the Italian peoples, after which men of violence and hate keep their distance, men who would close in on the people from all sides, throwing very many devout people into certain ruin. Such an important and sensitive a topic, and for the people such an extremely valuable topic of discussion, does not arise without immense gain to the papal reputation. That the joy on attaining peace be increased, turns ever more on the immeasurable advantages of peace.

[3] But as the light shines only in the dark, and the good only pays respect to the sufficiently healthy, only when one comes to know the power of sickness does it stand out among the concerns of men: it follows that the more a particular business shines forth the more significant and stronger is the enemy. We believe that a fighter is motivated not so much by

the glory as by the strength of the enemy. Therefore, we say that strength becomes more evident against a much stronger opponent. The strength of Hercules was revealed as stronger than the lion in all respects, and how the bravery of David becomes so clearly evident against the mighty fighting skills of his opponent, Goliath. We believe also that the wonderful praise of peace and the quietude of mankind cannot become sufficiently dignified and valued until the glorifying, spreading and necessity for arms and warfare becomes a distant memory. As it was also the custom in the ancient world, a peace agreement was opened with a single, even sided contest between several athletes, an event open to public view, so we have decided to undertake a two-sided contest, looking forward to peace. Meanwhile, therefore, we are thankful to the eternal God and his highest governor on earth for the peace in our hearts as we undertake a two-sided contest on peace and war. Thus we celebrate peace through a particular kind of 'war'.

[4] It is also an excellent and stimulating exposition, whereby each sets out his respective position:

I, Bartolomeo Platina, as the younger of the two, am the more aggressive, and pursue the contest out of a conviction and love of peace, and in the praise of peace against war as the enemy of peace. Thus, I launch my considered and decisive assaults.

I, however, Rodrigo, Bishop of Calahorra, will not only advance on many fronts against the earthly quietude that is called peace, but which on reflection, is an idle, timid, insecure and untruthful nurturer of vice, but I will also efficiently and effectively defend the use of military force and the art of war against criticism. My friend Platina assigns everything that is favourable to peace: the fear of God, love of neighbours, justice, moral order, the shunning of laziness, in sum, the endeavour to every kind of virtue; while I attribute laziness, idleness, corruption and negligence. In short, I will produce what one can call 'undefeatable' arguments and deliberations on the origins, nobility, and the necessity of war and the use of force.

[5] But because, as it is said, the affairs of men are thrown into doubt by contradiction, there is need of a judge. Herewith, with unanimous agreement, all present call on a very upright judge to reach a verdict on our competing, chosen positions, having listened to, and followed both sides. Accordingly, we call on you, distinguished Father, that you, as we with all certainty know, because of the absolutely incorruptibility of your character, and your unique wisdom and intelligence, that you will arrive at a just and well grounded verdict that is not only binding on us, but so that everyone who is involved in such a struggle and contest can be enlightened, so large is the strength and reputation of your worth. To these tests we submit all that we put forward, and humbly stand to be corrected.

BARTOLOMEO PLATINA – IN PRAISE OF PEACE

IN PRAISE OF PEACE, BY PLATINA, OF OUR HOLIEST MAJESTY, GROUNDED IN GODLY PROVIDENCE, THE RECENTLY PROCLAIMED POPE PAUL II, TO THE HONOURABLE AND MOST EDUCATED FATHER IN CHRIST, RODRIGO, BISHOP OF CALAHORRA, AND FAITHFUL KEEPER OF THE CASTLE OF SAINT ANGELO IN ROME.

[1] It is hardly wrong, or a contradiction of my literary studies, if I argue that peace is to be preferred to war, and most men of notable intellect, education, cultivation and experience, judge otherwise. Nor do I believe that I must labour very hard with this task, because the conviction that our business is grounded on benefit and virtue is an effective part of the argument, and a very powerful recommendation and defence. Above all, is there a person, provided that he is not completely from Mars and steeped in disorder, who would not rather approve that which is entirely beneficial, over that which causes harm?

[2] In war, the plundering of provinces, the destruction of cities, death, robbery, arson, blasphemy, theft, treachery, trickery, fraud and every form of disgrace, become commonplace; and nature, our best leader when we emulate him, becomes twisted and distorted in the heat; too often we see sad and grieving parents arranging to bury their sons, cruelly and prematurely killed. The unavoidable consequence is that later in old age they will have to lead a wretched and pitiful life, because any guarantee of their livelihood is lost along with those who were killed in battle. What are the prospects for their women who have lost their livelihood with a married man, and have been left behind widowed? What of their sons left behind orphaned, without a livelihood, who depended directly on their father for the entitlements, services, and instructions of the fatherland? What of the surviving family, who earlier had their attention directed away from gossiping old men and onto the strong men of the younger generation, but when these fail as supports, they are completely brought down? Suffer you poor, suffer you unfortunate elders, suffer you surviving, abandoned widows, suffer you orphaned son of a longed-for father.

[3] What can one say? How does it come to be that far from the gravestones of the forefathers and the earth of their homeland, without a funeral, without mourners, without being dressed or attended to, and without any adequate provision, they lie unburied like the corpses of cows, exposed to vultures and wild beasts? I absolutely do not care to speak about the agonies as they die from such terrible injuries, with most of these mangled men suffering without the attention of a doctor or a nurse. What terrors they must endure as they suffer and die among weapons and horses, in the noise of battle, amid the fearful trumpets of war, and completely without the care for body, life, and soul, that we would normally provide for the sick. The attentive wife is not there, nor the loving children, nor the friends, to comfort and help the lamented and severely injured. There are no priests to visit the dying with the duty and attention possible in times of peace, and which we receive daily for the forgiveness of sin: the administration of the holy sacraments; learning the Christian and true way to salvation; the expectation of future bliss; and the hope and trust of the favour of the highest God. It is so tragic. When death comes so easily, we see the example of many who, even if the possibility of a return to life were offered, would in all seriousness prefer to die, especially if they die at peace with God and with every true and honest favour taken into account.

[4] I would absolutely not deny, that for the fatherland, for home and kin, war must be fought, but only in a just fashion with a lawful cause. It is without doubt permissible to fight an injustice, especially as it is encouraged by nature, who gave teeth and claws to animals for protection, and to humans, hands with which to arm themselves. It is this, I believe, that requires strength: not to lose the remaining virtue, especially that of justice.

[5] Or will you consider it brave, intelligent or just, out of a desire to dominate, to lay waste to foreign lands, raze cities, obliterate villages, slaughter free people, or to enslave the workers¹. I ask you this, do you consider it brave, that most men are thrown into ruin, robbed, and killed, for the sake of title and fame? With such behaviour we also bravely become highwaymen, gladiators, hired guards, executioners, and men born to destruction; in any event opposed to all god fearing, and neighbourly humanity. It is because of writers and tellers of

¹ Non-literal following of Isidor, *Etym.* XVIII, 1.

stories who give us their accounts, especially of history, that more men have been killed in battle while striving for triumph, monuments, trophies, and for godly as well as worldly honour. Every destruction-wrought struggle has started out because of such reasons, with Alexander Achilles, Milciades Themistoclem, Cimonem Themistocles, Ceasar Alexander seeking to emulate deeds of action or even surpass them, while overturning every godly and human order². These ancient heathen were even worse, as these bloodthirsty people carried their savagery and barbarity even to God. There is certainly nothing of the godly order that we constantly seek, it being easier to oppose than to keep the fear of God, neighbourliness, humanity, friendship and justice. What madness is it, for the sake of God, to have killed a single person to stop the ungodly and criminal, and then to have cast a hundred thousand into corruption, destroyed the earth and defiled the temple; and he wanted to go to heaven in order to admire the godly and contemplate with them? That is not to include the former Hercules, who, as the poets write, with much sweat and great danger tamed a monster who had been born to corrupt mankind. Then, he did not slaughter many thousand men, nor drown provinces or lands with blood, nor colour the rivers blood red, as did Kyros, Alexander, Hannibal, Claudius Nero, Marius, Sulla, Pompey, or Caesar.

The triumph of the destruction of so much of the human race became so greatly esteemed that even today it is still spoken about and regarded with admiration. Therefore, on this subject especially, I must consider my position conscientiously and intelligently, that this tragedy might be stopped. They are of the view that because of this mad slaughter, they take courage, becoming immortal. By Hercules, I would rather die, wishing that also for my friends, than by might and dominion so unimaginably many people should be destroyed. Hope of immortality, yes, their criminal business depends so much on the desire for profit and impunity, that I see that by applying every form of disgrace and barbarity they stand out uniquely from the masses.

[6] Honest historians write that men are made immortal through virtue, not through crime, deceit, pride and cruelty. How is it then, that their way of life is condemned by the good, and their souls are tormented in the underworld on charges of cruelty and pride? When, on the basis of godly justice, the good have the prospect of reward, and the bad of punishment and pain. You see before your own eyes, how false is the judgement of men in human affairs.

² Follows Sallust, *Cat.* 12.

Those who have shown clemency and mercy in time of war, while they have shown a great deal of consideration, as did Phillip, the father of Alexander the Great with the Greeks, Pyrrhus with the Roman prisoners³, and Caesar with his fellow citizens, they changed their songs of praise because of the mass of enemy dead, the destroyed cities and the ravaged countryside under the skies. Indeed, every fortitude that the philosophers so strongly praise, exists not so much in the character as in the strength of the arms.

[7] As it is natural among animals to practise mercy, if only their wildness and excess can be satisfied, so it is given by nature to men, that cruelty and anger be held back. Even when there is just cause to fight to the end, to then spare the masses, and preserve innocent citizens; and after the laying down of arms, plead with outstretched hands to be granted protection and take allegiance, after the customs of the elders. There will also be the justice of war, when all those who are guilty of serious inhumanity and cruelty are held to account⁴.

[8] What really is praiseworthy? What makes a great and renowned man worthy? As far as it is possible, what enables us to resemble God, as men, after which humanity and peacefulness are named, to spare and preserve lives that are not received from oneself but from God?

Without question, when a bloodbath occurs a great injustice is done to that highest creator of all things⁵, an injustice that mankind himself has created and brought about as other creatures are unable to. It should be something special to look up to heaven from earth as a most pleasing and not unimportant prospect, because when these wretched lives are summoned after death, if we have so deserved, we count as immortal. Just as holy insight is part of the high mass, for the care of their souls these forefathers punish those criminals in the new generations that follow. Those guilty of serious injustice or wickedness are punished with banishment and ostracism, and even people in the image of God are punished with death.

[9] If a single guilty person is drawn back by the forgiving hand, the power of awe before God, and by grace, are those men who murder their victims, and continue in the drawing of

³ Compares with Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, 12, 38.

⁴ Follows *Ibid.*, I, 11, 35.

⁵ Genesis 1, 25.

blood, also to be praised by way of a triumph under the applause and gaze of fellow citizens, for, as it is written, they search for false praise and eternity if they have slaughtered so great a number and seized so much plunder? What madness is it, when these people are even intentionally incited to cruelty? If a commander expels an enemy, only an ovation is given to him, as though he deserves less because of his mildness. But, if an already defeated enemy is slaughtered in a bloodbath, he receives the highest triumphal honour on earth, and with the full approval of the citizens. Thus, the prospect of reward drives mankind to cruelty, but from which we are drawn away by nature and the command of God. Such is the wild and cruel mentality of mankind!

[10] Although different types of creature do not harm their own kind, still I beg to suggest, they are preserved and protected against injustice. Would you, as the only creature with reason, take no part in so great a good? Pray still yourselves, still your blood! We stem from the same father, and we go to the same place if we are good and have respected the ways of God that remind us of peace. More suitable to us as a place of mutual praise, it is a place to which the soul of the murderer can only be raised if he is cleansed through the great power of atonement, so far fallen is he from the eternal and almighty God, who lays his powerful, reconciling hand on his tiny creation and brings to himself such great pleasure.

[11] They destroy the work of many days and many years. Those to whom the parents gave birth as the support of life, for the benefit and prosperity of the family, and who have been nurtured and prepared for the general good with great care and love, the murderer kills in his madness in barely a moment, and thereby leaves the parents in grief, houses abandoned, and cities returned to desolation. Then, if the farmers grieve and complain that the trees that were planted and have grown so well, promising fruit, have been felled, how much more must the dead give cause for complaint? From them not the fruit, nuts grapes and apples as from a tree, but aid and counsel, which in the life of a man is the indispensable fruit that is expected of it. Sometimes commonwealths defy their great destruction if a single person perishes, as with the death of Epaminondas of the Thebes, Philopomen of the Acheans, Alexander of the Macedonians, Pyrrho of the Epirus, Cimon of the Athenians, Dario of the Persians. So important are virtue and personal commitment to a uniquely well-educated people.

[12] However, how many crimes will be committed with the plunder and destruction of cities by a victorious and rampaging enemy, I cannot say without grief and tears. Children are murdered, inevitably with their innocent parents as if wild animals have appeared, as we read of Cyrus and Romulus, and then the old men are slaughtered. Even if they are silent, those parents who are unsuitable for the war must still without question be cut down by the swords of the whirling madmen. And young maidens are torn from the clutches of their mothers to be violated. What more? Everywhere the young men are killed, the houses of God desecrated, sanctuaries despoiled, the buildings of ancestors plundered, and hallowed young women defiled⁶. Then, it is no insult to look through the eyes of the unfortunate, as they see that all the belongings accumulated for their needs through so many past years, are scattered. And when they lament, to look with them at the arson and destruction of their houses, inherited from their forefathers and in which they were born and cared for, burnt and levelled to the ground. From there as strangers and homeless they leave their ancestral earth to lead a wretched and unfortunate life. Is it not perhaps the greatest injustice, against human right and godly favour, contemptuous of the fear of God, love of one's neighbour, humanity and justice, out of imperiousness to burn, kill, plunder, lay waste, pillage, demolish and wipe out whatever comes across your path and which serves your voracious appetite? Everywhere smoke rises from the houses, harmless trees are burnt, farmers killed and livestock driven away.

[13] Who does not elicit tears, when one reads in the poets and historians of the demise of once famous cities, of Troy, Thebes, Numidia, Corinth, Babylon, Jerusalem and Rome, and with grief see such ruins that may wondrously appear? I truly read this verse from Virgil with dismay and horror:

Thus Priam fell, and shar'd one common fate
 With Troy in ashes, and his ruin'd state:
 He, who the scepter of all Asia sway'd,
 Whom monarchs like domestic slaves obey'd.

⁶ Follows Sallust, *Catilina*, 51, 9.

On the bleak shore now lies th' abandon'd king,
 A headless carcass, and a nameless thing.⁷

[14] Does not the distress of the citizens of Saguntum and Carthage, those who would end their life by hanging, dagger, or poison rather than fall into the hands of the arrogant enemy, indict the cruelty of Rome and Hannibal? What was it with this Fulvius who destroyed Capua? Into what affliction were the inhabitants of Campania bought? So many would destroy themselves and also, astonishingly, their wives and children, in order to avoid the face of the triumphant, rampaging enemy. His lust for revenge was so great that, against the advice of his colleagues, and against the forbiddance by the Roman people, he slaughtered the Campanian senate, scattered the people, and in such a mighty city left no building behind. I would rather he had emulated Fabius or Marcellus, who after a violent conquest pitied the weeping occupants of Syracuse and Tarentum and allowed them to be spared the fury of battle and absence of restraint. This is the hideous and detestable face of war, this is the infernal beast that brings more distress than the hydra of Lerneia, the lion of Nemeos, or the boar of Calidonio.

[15] I do not see that he who praises this does other than to endorse evil, as this madness can be deservedly considered and recognised as the source and origin of everything evil. He who is spurred on by this can with certainty cherish neither justice nor other form of virtue, as even without reflection he prefers the contempt of God to the fear of God, cruelty to humanity, might and power to moderation and equanimity.

[16] Yes, this unrestrained frenzy of war does not spare the homeland or the citizen! After Peisistratos had defeated the foreign enemy, he applied the weapons and ruses of war for himself, in order to establish the tyranny. Similarly, Pausanias, as commander and king of the Spartans, tried to succeed by making contact with the barbarians. Marius, having gained power with his victory over the Cimbri, tried to suppress the might of the aristocracy by force of arms. How Sulla, still inclined to cruelty, incited factions, besmirched Rome and nearly all of Italy with the blood of the citizens. How unrestrained and with impunity, in his cruel drive

⁷ Vergil, *Aeneid* 2, 554 - 558.

to pave the way for a permanent dictatorship, he displayed lists of the proscribed, in which huge rewards were given to murderers. His path, just as the rivals Pompey and Caesar, and after their demise, Anthony and Octavian, stain the whole world with their own blood and the blood of relatives while striving to win by force of arms. We know that some killed themselves, when after the rage of war had subsided and they had regained their clear thinking, they realised that their own relatives had been killed. By the eternal God, what a mad triumvirate that was, the death of Cicero helped Octavian gain power, and Lepidus consented to the deaths of his brothers Paul and Anthony, and of his uncle Lucius Caesar! Is it to be believed that these, who with sober minds bought the demise of others with their relatives' blood, would show consideration towards strangers, or humanity in sparing the defeated?

[17] It will be replied that the glory of war is not to be despised, that the greatest of philosophers have been in praise of the art of war, arguing that it is indispensable in the protection of the state. I argue that we should only use arms for defence, and not to inflict injustice. But who are they, who in a position of power would act with all moderation, counselling justice and every virtue? It is more likely that a river in a massive flood would keep within its banks, than would a victor over a more wanton and uninhibited enemy. There is no business, given to us by nature or our own skill, which we use in a more unrestrained way than that of war. It is the easiest way to fulfil our basest lust because it promises freedom from punishment for all crime. Not with all the military commanders do we find such temperance or virtue as by Camillus, Cincinnatus, Papirius, Fabricius, Cato, Scipio the Elder and Alexander the Great, the latter two returning captive women, the aged and innocent spouses. I also recall the generosity of Africanus who settled the dowry of ten imprisoned girls from his own pocket. Alexander thought so much of him, especially in this matter, that he made his imprisoned mother the wife of Darius, so that she would be saluted and admired as a queen, and his daughter would be honoured with a royal wedding. This example, although rare, without doubt serves to illustrate the earlier point that the frenzy of war does not normally pick out what is decent but what gives pleasure. From this comes this stringency of those experienced in war, which Manilius also showed towards his son who had engaged the enemy without his order⁸. And yet, what of the stringency, the discipline, the decimation

⁸ Follows Livy, VII, 7.

of the soldiers, the abusive dismissal of the legions, the ejection from the Senate of outrageous and inflammatory military leaders, that the unscrupulousness grew to such an extent that the unassuming, ordinary soldiers, who never spare a thought for the fatherland let alone the foreigner, killed or exalted their commanders at will. Therefore, it is decided through divine judgement that riches obtained by blood will perish and the victor be killed.

[18] Let us lay aside this unruly self-indulgence of war and examine this permanent and constant glory, that is absolutely and perfectly achieved through grace not blood, through bravery not cruelty, and through deliberation not violence. Was Pompilius, who was summoned because of his justice for the Sabines, of less use to the Roman people for peace and godliness than Romulus the father and founder of the city? Less Tullius Servius after distinguishing between the classes after the census than Ancus Marcius, or Tullus Hostilius? Less the men who set twelve laws in stone, than Brutus who through the expulsion of Superbus freed the fatherland with armed force? Surely that which through peace and law, through effort and industry is first acquired and then welcomed and increased! There is absolutely no doubt that the laws of Solon and Lycurgus brought the people to value honourable and just conduct, not only the Spartans and Athenians but almost all of Europe, because from them flowed the justice and peace that the other Greeks, and also the Romans, acquired and used as the pattern in establishing their commonwealths.

[19] When will mankind finally throw off the veil of ignorance and stupidity and raise the eyes to heaven! Then they will certainly understand that they were created by almighty God to strive after him as far as it is possible, and with the casting out of ancient confusions, all that is recalled by the Greek chaos, we form and create this world of goodness and perfection in wonder of the eternal peace. In nine circles, or rather spheres, he had better differentiated what we with one world call 'world'. The highest circle, that gives cohesion to all and gives to the stars their firm position, has seven stars, which are called the Latin and the Greek planets. It is said that they naturally follow opposite paths. Indeed, they produce the greatest harmony that is known on earth. This harmony of heavenly bodies is taken to be complete and just peace, and peace is nothing other than a state of concord and respect between people. Yes, the same Father and creator of all things, when even the earth was ruined and horrors were brought down, controlled the stars Saturn and Mars and placed the very harmonious Jupiter

between them both. He also created the Sun, whose light and utility are likened to peace, but darkness, the enemy of mankind, is chased away and cast out. After the sun, however, the great work was not finished and in his order God included Venus, Mercury, and the moon, fulfilling his task so well that through his support and his eternal ordering we are brought to peace, to bring joy, just as all creatures found in the midst of the world order bring joy and life. Therefore, with the star of Mercury, as with the Gods, we do not dismiss the myths, but use them to reconcile conflict. The poets write that Caduceus is used as an example to put down the sword and negotiate peace. Furthermore, it can be seen that the ferocity of Mars can only be restrained by the forgiveness and clemency of a good star, and it is through its union with Venus that it is calmed down. That Minerva, the Goddess of peace and wisdom, was born out of the star Jupiter, is a means to understand and to reason with godly insight, that peace lives on and war is rejected. Minerva is that fruitful olive tree, which remains green in summer and in winter. This tree exemplifies that whereas in peace everything prospers, in war everything is wasted and destroyed. As our Saviour entered Jerusalem, olive branches were spread out, by which he showed that he was coming in peace and not in war. In the same way Caesar, on entering Rome in triumph, had claimed that the earthly world was subject to his rule.

[20] How exalted is this thought-provoking event that is praised by the writers of history, that in the reign of Numa Pompilius, after the first Punic Wars, and in the time that Augustus ruled over the world as victor, all people lived in great joy and happiness, and the temple of Janus, that is not opened without fear and terror, was closed. Only through this verse of the vaunted Maro is the memory valued:

Then dire debate and impious war shall cease,
 And the stern age be soften'd into peace:
 Then banish'd Faith shall once again return,
 And Vestal fires in hallow'd temples burn;
 And Remus with Quirinus shall sustain
 The righteous laws, and fraud and force restrain.
 Janus himself before his fane shall wait,
 And keep the dreadful issues of his gate,

With bolts and iron bars: within remains
 Imprison'd Fury, bound in brazen chains;
 High on a trophy rais'd, of useless arms,
 He sits, and threatens the world with vain alarms⁹.

Who is it that is not only eager to take plunder from strangers but yearns after human blood; and who is it that justly chooses peace from war, yea good from evil, charity from cruelty, and humanity from arrogance.

[21] But in this, as in other affairs, we value peace in war and war in peace; albeit this is actually a clear sign of inconsistency. Also, we never regret the capabilities of arms, unless, that is, the injustice suits our purposes. Then firstly we want peace, and then we accept the most unfavourable conditions as being God's will, so that through loss we finally come to recognise the good. Probably, the name of the Carthaginians, the Numidians, and the Corinthians would have continued until today, had not their misfortune in breaking agreements, and in seeking satisfaction in war instead of peace, been tested earlier. For these reasons, not only were the Samnites, the Campanians, and the Equos, but also the Philippians, Persians, Antiochs, and Ptolomies, all with very mighty rulers, and all struck down. The misfortune of the people, the desolation of the countryside, and the destruction of the cities remain very sound grounds for complaint, even if the demise of him who out of imperiousness invokes so much ungodliness, is not to be regretted. The responsibility for so much misfortune cannot be redressed by yet more aggravation and savagery.

[22] Everyone, especially those ancients with whom insight is found, curses Homer, the leader of Paris and Helena in the Trojan war, because of whom so mighty a city, with so mighty a king, who had so splendid an issue of sons, completely perished. Yet, to be saved, and standing out against so much ungodliness, and certainly not given to injustice, were Aneas and Antenor, who, as Livy said, had always spoken out for peace and the return of Helena¹⁰. So much so also with the ancient Romans, who so valued peace and fidelity that they observed the justice of the fetials and repeatedly demanded the certain execution, and the

⁹ Vergil, *Aeneid* I, 291-296.

¹⁰ Livy, I, 1, 1.

passing of pronounced punishments, on even excellent military commanders and very brave soldiers when agreements were broken. How often were whole legions executed because they fought for booty, against godly justice and the laws of human society? Remember those soldiers in the Second Punic War who killed the queens they should have protected, and occupied the city of their ally; they were executed to the last man with the axe.

[23] Peace must be preserved, and so we are not left facing its mere appearance, we ceaselessly ask eternal God through prayers and offerings what we must despise and disdain when we have achieved it. What, please, do the crowds of mothers and children want from the hallowed states? What are the prayers of the priests and nuns? Do they crave for war or peace? Peace of course! Why not war, even while they live in peace? Because nothing in human fortune is more antagonistic than chaos and blind rage, the companions and kin of war. Whoever, even if he is steady and courageous, is not shocked by the terrifying name of war? How terrifying is every command that calls a man to arms and to certain death: We should grip the iron we are using, not to rip open the love of mankind and hack off limbs, but to order the fields and care for the general good!

[24] There is nothing so salutary or so special that our Saviour left behind for us when he left our earth, as peace; and of him the expression is remembered: ‘Peace’, he said, ‘I bequeath you, my own peace I give to you’¹¹. He willed that in this way we would easily follow his example, because existence is grounded in a good and fortunate life of virtue that leads to peace. And he also willed that those who wished for war would, through the growth of power and domination, scorn charity, belief, fear of God, oaths, humanity, grace, duty and the most holy commandments. Would that they worship God; would that they stop short of perjury, human blood, foreign property; would that they allow love towards elders, awe before God, humanity towards friends, clemency in caring for the needy and defeated, care towards the sick, and generosity towards the poor? Would anyone help him who declares war against all power, not only of men, but even of the primary matter, the material of heavenly beings and also of almighty God, with counselling, explanation, exhortation, and castigation, especially on what exactly a good man is? These are Christ’s words: ‘He who is not with me is against

¹¹ John 14, 27.

me'¹². Furthermore, the same teacher of good life and death exhorted his pupils to offer peace when they enter the house of another person¹³.

[25] But where am I leading to with these examples from the heavenly and human spheres, when even the inanimate elements from which our bodies originated appear to be striving for peace? How terrifying is the sight of the sea churned up by the winds, and how devastating for the coastal and seagoing folk who know the breakers of the rolling seas as a clenched fist, and often suffer shipwrecks in the storms. But how still is the sea when the wind blasts no more and the waves subside, how pleasant, how homelike, how beneficial for the sailor, so that even suspicious merchants are attracted by its stillness and are lured to it. Then in such times of peace, swarms of fish swim about at will, off the coast and in the open sea, no longer afraid of being cast on the rocks or thrown onto the beach, as often happens with the force of the waves. Birds search the beaches for food, and kingfishers, who lay and hatch their eggs only on the coast, build their nests in safety. Even we, and all living creatures, are influenced by the wind: if it is boisterous we suffer under winds, cold rain, winter snowfalls, hail, thunder and lightning. Then we see with sorrow how the fruits of trees, vines, berries and nuts are blown down before their maturity, and that the seeds that are disturbed for many days are destroyed. Then we notice that people's bodies weaken and fall to various illnesses. The birds are sad, living creatures sigh, as Hesiodus said¹⁴, and look to the cover of their hideaways to escape calamity. But things cheer up and the peace of the earth is given back, they are thankful and celebrate their deliverance in calm and tranquillity. Then the birds chirp, four legged creatures frolic around, and all other living creatures skip about and, because they had reached a state of safety, they freely run to and fro wherever nature leads, because they remember too little of the past evil, and so great is their pleasure in the present good! What can be more unwholesome than war, because the God of the people punishes our errors with a corruption wrought sky? How many burials do people see then, houses filled with sorrow, folk in mourning, cities abandoned and countryside laid to waste? When the peace of God is obtained and the fog of so much calamity gradually fades away, everyone returns to their duties caring for state and family as labours of peace.

¹² Mathew 12, 30.

¹³ Follows Luke 10, 5.

¹⁴ Benziger: citation not found.

[26] But we still have a question, which is clear and can be seen with our own eyes: which calamities come with war and which fortunes with peace? Because, as Sallust said, with harmony small states will grow, but with discord and turmoil even the greatest will decay¹⁵. When the citizens are united then states are mighty, but even if they are strong and great they cannot endure without laws, good customs, an equal distribution of justice, and order in life, all of which are works of peace¹⁶. Because a certain love, meekness, and respect are innate, peace makes it possible for us to develop¹⁷: houses are built for the people, so that the menace of cold is averted and the discomfort of the heat is tempered; we care for the well-being of the sick; we operate ships, and to the benefit of mankind goods are imported and exported; we harvest and store grain and fruits; we hue stone and marble from the rocks; we make bricks and cement for the construction and adornment of cities, in both public and private areas; we mine ore, gold and silver from the depths of the earth¹⁸, which can be used to help people in the buying and selling of goods; we build canals, channel rivers, drain fields, we block rivers with dams, so they do not flood their banks¹⁹; we establish cities and ports, build temples for religious practices, build public institutions to organise our taxes and raise harbour duties. Both tradesmen and teachers also gain handy skills that are shared generally around the city, and shoes, containers, clothing and other conveniences of human civilisation are manufactured. Moreover, only fools would fail to appreciate that herds of four legged creatures can graze providing almost uncountable benefits for mankind: we eat milk, cheese and meat²⁰, and clothe ourselves in wool and leather. Horses, cows and other draught cattle are domesticated, which, not without reason, are called ‘beasts of burden’. Important studies continue, which cannot prosper without the support of the state system. In war they are interrupted by unrest and the din of battles, but in peace when the spirit and body are at rest, their progress is remarkable. I do not see from this what could be better or more beneficial than achieving not only a relaxation of spirit and rest from cares, but also a knowledge of holy and human things, and the state of constancy that a social community draws from temperance and wisdom²¹. With these virtues, not only a citizenship or a province, but the whole earth can be ruled with reason, constancy and certainty, if, as is indeed appropriate, we choose: peace

¹⁵ Sallust, *Iugurtha*, 10, 6.

¹⁶ Cicero, *De officiis*, II, 4, 15.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 4, 13.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 3, 13.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 4, 14.

²⁰ Cicero, *Tusc.*, V, 32, 90.

²¹ Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 43, 153.

from war, justice from robbery, prudence from temerity, and temperance from a lack of self control.

[27] Therefore, Honourable Father and most learned Rodrigo, I have made clear that which I would wish to write to you on the praise of peace. On the one hand, and as you would wish, I take up your challenge in a worthy manner. On the other hand, I particularly show how Pope Paul II, having taken control of all the men-at-arms, and because the Italians quickly grow restless, with good cause and by the most praiseworthy of means brought about an exceptional and rewarding peace.

RODRIGO SÁNCHEZ: – A COMMENDATION OF WAR

A COMMENDATION OF MILITARY FORCE, AND THE NECESSITY AND BENEFIT TO DEFEND THE ART OF WAR AGAINST CRITICISM. IT IS SHOWN HOW DIFFICULT IS THE STATE OF HUMAN QUIETUDE THAT IS WIDELY CALLED PEACE, AND THE NATURE OF TRUE, PRAISEWORTHY, AND YEARNED FOR, PEACE IS EXPLAINED. ABOUT THE DISADVANTAGES AND EVILS THAT RESULT FROM THE PROLONGED, INACTIVE SECURITY OF PEACE. THE SUBMISSION OF THE WORTHY FATHER RODRIGO, BISHOP OF CALAHORRA IN SPAIN, KEEPER OF THE CASTLE SAINT ANGELO IN ROME, IN REPLY TO THE FOREGOING TREATISE.

PROLOGUE

[1] While I am, in principle, to speak on the aforementioned use of force and on the advocacy of war, its necessity and its utility, I am under no illusion that after peace has been praised with such extraordinary vigour, especially by the learned and eloquent Platina, with myself following, not one person, not many, but the entire human race will attribute hate and war to me alone. Because of you, the task that I have taken on has the appearance of so much unpleasantness. So, who could praise war without risk, unhindered and honestly, and even at a time without any actual war? Believe me, between peace and war lie various types of praise, and in any event it is easier to praise peace than it is to maintain it. If we would praise it, we only need words; however, if we wish to achieve it, we need effort, strength, feeling, and no small amount of virtue¹. War is the opposite. We can certainly achieve it easier than we can praise it. Furthermore, those who praise peace seek to illuminate, as with a torch. Its praise is the most pleasing business that one could wish for, and by all accounts, one would say that the great Aurelius Augustine is the most renowned for it². But war, which only in name could

¹ Partial following of: Augustine, *Sermo* 357 (PL 39, 1582, z.7 ff.)

² Follows Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 11.

please, people refer to in fear, careful not only not to praise it, but not even to hear of it with calmness or composure. But we have selected the most renowned, unbiased judge among the people. His immeasurable wisdom, clear mindedness, decency, and uprightness, ensures a sound position from which to view our contest. For him, worthy Father, being free to judge and guide, I will take up the challenge.

[2] I do not address ordinary people, but because of the understanding that human fortune exists only in the temporally bounded peace of worldly things, it is my intention to consider not the peace of the world, but to defend war and warfare, without which it appears that peace cannot really be maintained. As you have challenged this war, it is therefore beneficial that I defend war with war, certainly not an illegal attack with the sword, rather an appropriate defence with helmet and shield. With these honourable ways of fighting I will assault the earthly quietude that you take for peace, as being without any doubt unfruitful, and for a guardian, most burdensome.

[3] While the stronger points will stand, being better organised and explained, I will deconstruct Platina's treatise. If Aristotle is correct, then things become clearer when they are placed side by side with their opposites³, as you very skillfully demonstrate in the first part your speech, that the most unholy of weapons, casualties, death, sacrilege, and almost countless crimes, result from the conduct of war⁴. On the contrary, I will not only defend war and exercising for war, against the reproach of guilt and sin, but also argue for, for the most part, a special recommendation for glory and honour. I will follow your method in a second way: as you have justified the highest and pleasing aspects of peace, with its very many benefits for human life, I will present and discuss the results of long nights of study: the disadvantage, loss, or even crime, which result from the inertia of peace are in no way small or trivial. Furthermore, I will add a short section showing what true peace really is, that which does deserve your praise.

³ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, III, 9, 8 (1410a).

⁴ Sánchez refers to Platina's *Praise of Peace*, para. 2.

[4] Above all, most learned Platina, I know very well that in this our coming to terms, you have the support of the most people, to be precise, the whole common mass of people. Indeed, the clerics and monks support you, and say with the apostle Paul that the eternal God, as the creator of peace, can only be honoured in times of peace⁵. Indeed, on this the citizens of the towns also flatter you, because, on the evidence of Aristotle, the harmony and concord of the citizens are identified with the name of peace, the exact end of human society. On this, the magistrates and the judges also gratefully speak for you, because, so they claim, the sword has no justice where the law of force is the strongest. Indeed, the traders follow you, as do the farmers, craftsmen, and the rest of the uneducated masses, mocking Ennius, all demanding peace⁶. Nevertheless, if I am not mistaken, they become part of your argument because they only have words with which to defend themselves. For them, weapons are either too heavy, or too much of a burden to ever take up themselves, as indeed you would also never consider. But as such they are of no help to you in this conflict: and would not be accused of desertion if they changed to the enemy camp. In this discussion, I have taken as fellow fighters and defenders of my cause all those who have ever ruled Rome or ruled in the world, and also those, who from the beginning of the world to the present, have been the most renowned. Finally, I am pleased that fighting on my side is the one you have eloquently named: the unbeatable Nembroth, but also Abraham the friend of God, on whose command he often waged war. Moses the military leader and priest would go to war, saying: ‘Everyone gird his sword and shield and fight with me’⁷. The holy David fights, who served God with arms and war and established a great reputation. Also, the Maccabees are not wanting, men known to every generation. With me is that holy centurion, who said to Christ ‘I am not worthy’⁸. With whom do I fend you off? Alexander the Great, the Macedonians, Darius, Achilles, Hector, Hercules, Cyrus, Romulus, Hannibal, the Scipiones, the Camilli, the Bruti, and the Publicole all defend my case. Pomeius, Caesar, Octavian and Anthony and all the others stand with me. These people have not been slow to make friends, in the way that many famous men are bought down, but they are celebrated by the whole world with eternal praise because of

⁵ Benziger: such a sentence could not be found in the Vulgate, but see Gregor, *Epist.* IX, 66 (*Corp. Christ.* 140 a, s. 622),

⁶ Benziger: citation not found for Ennius, but see Vahlen, *Scenica* 342-343.

⁷ Exodus 32, 27.

⁸ Mathew 8, 8.

their deeds of arms and warfare. With peace, they achieved little amity or quietude, or none at all.

CHAPTER 1

THE NATURAL ORIGIN OF WAR. FURTHERMORE, IT IS ARGUED THAT IN NATURE ESSENTIALLY EVERYTHING RESULTS IN SOME WAY FROM, AND IS TESTED IN, STRUGGLE. FINALLY, IT IS ARGUED THAT WAR IS BOTH BENEFICIAL AND NECESSARY.

[1] We begin now with the first part and from all of the acts of war and attributes of skill-at-arms, we bring forward ten statements of commendation, even of praise. The precedence of war, it can be said in brief, lies with its origins in the grey times of antiquity, and in the origin of all things at the beginning of the world.

[2] Among others, I recall the words of your Homer, the great and princely poet, that truly everything originates in conflict and war⁹. You should understand that this principle is founded completely in the operation of natural power and the actual ways of God. Why does the earth shake, the sea surge, why do the stars move against the motionless canopy of the sky, the breezes squabble amongst each other, the winds pursue eternal war, and why even do the year's seasons wrestle with each other, summer and winter, spring and autumn? In short: every individual struggles against itself, and everything together against us.

[3] Furthermore, the discord of the weather, that we take for change, is none other than conflict. Do not believe, that there is some other reason for so many terrifying earthquakes, so many horrific gales, so much lightning, so many hail storms, so many furious typhoons, such thundering of the sea. Because of the fighting of the winds you

⁹ Benziger questions the citation from Petrarch, but gives: Francesco Petrarch, *De remedies utriusque fortunae*, in *Opera omnia* (Basel, 1554), 3Bde., Bd. 1, s. 1-254.

see in the oceans the rising of the floods, supplanting each other in restless change, and the regularity of ebb and flood¹⁰.

[4] Finally, when you turn to the creatures that are known to man, all pursue a natural, eternal and hate filled war amongst each other. No animals are excluded from struggle: fish, wild animals, birds, snakes, ultimately mankind pursues a life of war. No creature is granted peace. One species incites the other: the lion hunts the wolf, the wolf the dog, the dog the hare¹¹. And not only does an animal hunt another species, but also their own species, their own kind!¹² You can certainly observe birds attacking others of the same kind, and by destroying the eggs, kill the future young¹³. You see with them the use of many other different cases of hostility, precautions and ruses. Furthermore with this natural struggle there comes the very acute vigilance of the hunt, the highly developed skill to ensnare wild animals, birds and fish¹⁴. All are equipped for war¹⁵.

[5] When you separate out the impure creatures, you see an irresolvable struggle between the snakes, the frogs and the storks. You know, as Aristotle¹⁶ writes in his treatise on animals, how the basilisk, unlike other snakes, terrify and scare away with their hissing, and kill with their glance. But also among the peaceable animals there is no rest. Then what a battle nature gives us between the dogs and bears! Again, between bulls living freely in the wild: as it is certainly reported, there exists so great a rivalry among them, that they engage in combat with locked horns, returning to take revenge. So, if you see it correctly, absolutely all animals pursue a particular combat; and mother nature has not created them without the skills to fight. Which bird do not you see fighting? Cocks fiercely battle with each other spurs, that one must wonder how so much hate and arrogance could exist in so small an animal. But geese, that they have no weapons, rush each other with their cries and their wings, striking with their beaks. Also, in the oceans battles are pursued unrelentlessly: fish eat each other without sparing their

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, in lib. II, s. 154.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 156.

¹² *Ibid.*, 182.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 156.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 156/8.

¹⁵ Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 8 (1256b).

¹⁶ Benziger questions this reference, noting that Aristotle would not be familiar with this snake of classical legend.

own kind. And it does not change, most learned Platina, when you assert that creatures only pursue hateful war for prey and food. Why should war cease without these conditions?¹⁷

[6] Finally to come to mankind: Who does not know of conflict and fighting, suspicion between married couples, and the indignation of sons: we wish that they would be good, and complain that they are bad if they once defy our wishes?¹⁸ What is it with brothers? Then do not complain that the queen of the universe is discredited by frequent battles, when you read of those who imbue the blood of brothers. What is it with wars between those already born? Would you complain if you knew how much fighting there is between the unborn, as we know from the testimony of the Bible¹⁹ that brothers have fought in the belly of their mothers? Why should those already born live without war when they had so much of it before their birth? Or is it to be wondered, with so many lustful, armed wars taking place, that the unborn are also not without lust as they come to full term? In short, we direct everything that we do to war and combat. Why are we constructing strongly fortified castles and defensive towers with such care and assiduousness, if not to undertake war or to defend? Thus we pursue war in either thought or in deed.

[7] Furthermore, things without feeling also have their wars: what of the dispute the magnet has with iron, what of that with steel and the magnet? If the cause of their conflict is hidden, their battle is still evident: the magnet rejects iron, gathers up steel, as Aristotle says²⁰. From this it is clear that these words of Homer²¹ are very true, that everything is in a state of war. Even more evident in the realm of uncertainty, is musical sound: only by discord does man arrive at true harmony and musical consistency. If you think of everything, to review in your mind's eye, do you recall everything under the heavens, on the earth and in the oceans: in the depths of the oceans and in the various far reaches of the earth, in woods, fields, deserts, streets, and cities an eternal struggle

¹⁷ Petrarch, *De rem.*, in lib. II, s. 150/160/162.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, s. 162.

¹⁹ Genesis 25, 23.

²⁰ Benziger: Petrarch does not refer to Aristotle.

²¹ Benziger: Petrarch does not refer to Homer.

dominates and it is not an imaginary war. It is to be wondered at that mankind, albeit rational, believes with certainty that he can live his life without struggle, in spite of the fact that he pursues an irresolvable struggle, not only with other things, but with himself, as we have discussed at some length. But as a poet beautifully said, if it was only war that the Romans gave us, it would be enough for the world²².

[8] But why have we discussed these examples? Then why should there be no war or battle, if we are already well aware of the investigation of the beliefs, disagreements, and irresolvable differences? Who does not know the mighty disputes of philosophy, the huge diversity of academic disciplines? And as Petrarch said: Why should the king or the people lead a quiet life, when the philosophers do not give any rest and the wise are fighting? In truth, these struggles of humanity become godly affairs, that one is an Academic, one a Stoic, and another a Peripatetic. But also the scholar of grammar follows one or other of the ways. To the dialectician, on the other hand, war is so appropriate, so natural, that his whole discipline is only war, fighting, and various ways to separate opinions, you fight as you find the hue and cry. As the scholars of law quarrel, it shows the eternal persistence of legal conflict. Only with the conflict of the doctor is it so far demonstrated, that they shorten the lives of the sick with their disputes. However, those of religion and holy ways are so very quarrelsome amongst each other, so that even if, as Aristotle²³ showed, everything is reconciled with the truth, among themselves they mostly form differing opinions. What more do you see in the affairs of men, if not opposition, so that the words of Horace appear true, that the ideas of everyone are all in conflict with each other²⁴. In everything you will find conflict and war. Immediately before the battle you will see another battle, between military leaders as they arrange the armies. In the enactment of laws, challenges are the first step with the appeals of the magistrates²⁵. Also, the mechanical skills do not proceed without disagreement and conflict. While a carpenter builds a house, he builds a second; in planning the door, he compares one position to another²⁶.

²² Petrarch, *De rem.*, in lib. II, s. 170/172/174/176.

²³ *Ibid.*, s. 178.

²⁴ Horace, *Epist.* I, 1, 97. Benziger: Sánchez has taken this from Petrarch.

²⁵ Petrarch, *De rem.*, in lib. II, s. 176/178.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, s. 178. Benziger: a variation on Petrarch.

[9] In short: all the affairs and plans of men are based on opposition, as we see that within us are different and contradictory impulses. That one certainly will, the other will not; as one loves, the other hates; as one endears, the other threatens; one ridicules, one lies, one deceives; one rests, one ponders vengeance; one knows, another does not; one forgets, another remembers; one cherishes his fellow men, another is dismissive of them. What is so burdensome for these people, is that completely without rest, from entry into this valley of tears to the exit from this human life, weaving one way and then another between different battles. Fighting lies within, pursuing a form of unavoidable conflict of the passions, so you can be certain that it creates discord and fighting in all things²⁷. Only with drive or diversion is fighting or battle avoided, and general agreement reached. Even then, as it is also only a mark of virtue in mankind, it is necessary to straight away either pursue or experience serious warfare. Who is actually capable of describing the endless conflict and permanent warfare of virtue against vice? Pride battles humility, transient glory ridicules the fear of God, hypocrisy the worship of God, human contempt charity; conceit battles against humility, abuse against right-minded critique, anger against forbearance, impudence against caution, idleness against the exercise of virtue; dissipating agitation battles against spiritual concentration, lust against contempt for worldly things, a pack of lies against truthfulness, the insatiability of the stomach against moderation in eating, debauchery against integrity of the body, false mirth against moderate sorrow.

[10] You see then, that a powerful, unavoidable battle is inherent in mankind: you see starkly gathered together forces, armies, the might of battle in the breasts of men. Here you have seen, eloquent Platina, particular examples in order to demonstrate empirically how everything is in conflict, everything is at war.

[11] It still remains, for you to recognize by means of general proofs, that war itself and a clear antagonism from nature are inherent, so that there can be no doubt that the

²⁷ *Ibid.*, s. 180/182.

aforementioned exercise of weapons and military activities stand directly in natural law and the original order of things²⁸.

[12] Aristotle asserts that the basis of existence is more opposition and very strong resistance; and furthermore he teaches that a single opposition is the point of departure for all existence²⁹. This implies that all of existence and the substance of all things is not only created but also maintained through a certain struggle and natural antagonism of opposites. Furthermore, we believe, as do all philosophers, that a natural inclination is born to all things to readily exclude all antagonisms. And this is not only with simple but also in complex, natural things³⁰. Then it is clear that the world is put together from different, opposing elements, between which, as we religious have said, a constant battle dominates, appropriately: the warm acts against the cold, and the wet objects to the dry. It is a characteristic of water to inhibit, contain, and fight fire, which as we believe, only occurs because of the opposition of its natural properties. But we observe the same thing in such combinations as we have seen earlier with animals³¹, who simply by the drive of their characteristic, antagonistic properties of nature, pursue various battles against each other, to preserve themselves³² and to drive away enemies. Among the birds, even the larger and nobler varieties such as eagles and goshawks live only by fighting and robbery against other types of birds. This can be identified still clearer with beings of reason, because nature was appropriately obliged to create us with more care than beings without reason³³. From nature mankind had the disposition to banish and chase away everything that is harmful and in opposition to him. Mother nature allows no less subtlety and care with the preservation of reasoning life than with the animals, because it is far nobler. From this it comes, that mankind is itself drawn from the oppositions of the elements of which men are formed, and the natural opposition of the different humours in men³⁴. If these oppositions cease, inevitably the life in mankind ceases. Also, it is absolutely clear that the creatures of nature are warlike. Otherwise they follow a life of slavery, or die. Aristotle says of this in *The Politics*, that warlike activities conform to

²⁸ Follows John of Legnano, *Tractatus de bello, de represallis et de duello*, c. XI, S. 90.

²⁹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 7 (189b – 191a).

³⁰ John of Legnano, *De bello*, XI, S. 90.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

nature³⁵. War is also established by nature itself. And if you will take these ideas further, you will see that the lives of all men exist in a certain struggle, not only against themselves but against the rest of mankind, and it is confirmed, as the holy Job said³⁶, that the life of man on earth is only warfare and fighting. We also find support with the opinion of the jurists, who clearly state that war is established through the law of nations. We are of the view that this is the full and complete understanding. We say absolutely clearly, as is the opinion of the wise men, that the impulsion to war and to fight is established in nature, has natural origins, but that the order and direction of such drives are based in the law of peoples³⁷.

[13] Further, the grounds for the justification of war are evidenced by its antiquity. Right at the beginning, in earthly paradise at the creation of mankind, war existed not only between people and snakes, but between God and man, God and snakes. The jurists associated themselves with this origin of war³⁸ and published it with their laws, when they said that the Romans had earlier undertaken the legal basis for war. And another jurist said³⁹ that for the Romans, weapon practice was the first love of the sons.

CHAPTER 2

NOT ONLY ARE ALL PEOPLE INCLINED TO NATURE, BUT THERE ARE INFLUENCES TO GO TO WAR THAT ARE NOT OF NATURE. THERE ARE DIFFERENT FORMS OF, AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR, WAR, AND DIFFERENCES IN THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT IS DEEMED NECESSARY.

[1] A second advantage for the exercise of war and for strongly promoting the art of warfare is found not only with natural inclinations, but with those dispositions that are not of nature. To explain the derivation of this thesis, I believe that it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of war: one being natural, a second celestial, and a

³⁵ Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 2 (1253 a); I, 8 (1256 b); VII, 15 (1334 a).

³⁶ Job 7, 1.

³⁷ John of Legnano, *De bello*, XI, S. 90, f.

³⁸ Benziger: citation not found.

³⁹ Benziger: citation not found.

third human. Human war is again subdivided into an internal and an external, and several philosophers are of the view that these forms of war are inevitably grounded on dispositions that are not of nature. However, if the natural ways, and then the movements and influences of the heavenly bodies are considered, heaven itself and earthly creation can only exist by differences in movement, and by war. Therefore, it must certainly be the case that war in this world is a necessity⁴⁰. This argument appears consistent because it follows the view of Aristotle that there is an eternal movement of the heavens⁴¹. From this it follows that the heavenly bodies, following nature, are in conflict in exercising their effect on this lower world. It is necessary that higher requirements are subdued for this lower world, as the wise men have taught, so that virtuous actions and war-like disputes will influence the circumstances lower down with mankind. It suggests the view that such conflict only exists because of the differences in appearance of the heavenly bodies and their movements, and which allows their meaning to be recognized later. Since civilisations have existed, it has been repeatedly revealed by the mixed relations of the heavenly bodies, that man by nature can hate. For example, effusive but unrequited love would be one justification among many others⁴².

[2] By critical analysis one learns that war and the conflicts of mankind only develop from hate and the incompatibility of opposing impulses, and it is also clear that these impulses are in turn aligned towards the qualities of the heavenly bodies. The philosophers view is consistent with interpretation of the natural paths of the stars by the canonist scholars, that the world cannot exist without war and conflict, even though the advocates of a Christian interpretation teach that the natural powers and effects of the stars are not aligned directly with an immediate necessity of war, so that people are able to turn away, albeit this is unusual⁴³. They say that that on the inside of humanity each person finds sufficient conflict to give a convincing argument for external war. This can be proved, it seems, with help of models of scientific explanation. Then it is clear that man is a microcosm. As the process of development plays out in microcosm, so a completely similar process appears in macrocosm. Once again, in microcosm there is undoubtedly no turmoil, no antagonism, in short no war, when the mixture of the humours is not exceeding its measure. When these overflow, either because of a

⁴⁰ John of Legnano, *De bello*, V, VI, S. 81, f.

⁴¹ Aristotle, *Meteorology*, I, 2.

⁴² John of Legnano, *De bello*, IV, V, VI, S. 81.

⁴³ *Ibid*, VI, S. 82, and V, S. 81.

disorderly system or an over-dominance of one of the humours, the war and conflict that lead to the ruin of the human body are the unavoidable consequence. To at least press them back, there is for the most part insufficient natural force. From this comes the need for active remedies, that can attack the sickness at its roots; and it is absolutely just the same in the wider world. If the sensual drives of all people obey reason then certainly everywhere there is peace. However, because they not only oppose the determining and guiding influences of reason, but also significantly provoke the other limbs of the mysterious body of the world, wars are the inevitable consequence⁴⁴. Such wars can be hard, such battles bad for the microcosm, as the apostle said: ‘I see that my body follows another law that battles against the law which my reason dictates’⁴⁵. This means that it is natural for man to live in conflict, not only with himself but also with others. The prophet wrote: ‘From one end of the earth to the other there is no peace for any living thing’⁴⁶. And with the Maccabees it is written that after the bad of the earth had reproduced, they bought many wars⁴⁷. Jeremiah did not deny it, he said: ‘You have born me to be a man of strife and dissension in all the land’⁴⁸. These words show that it is a characteristic of their creation for mankind to live in conflict. The argument that underlies this is very strongly based, because it is easier to come down than climb up, and also because we can be divided through our own efforts, but it is impossible to achieve unity. It is then with the help of God’s grace, as God said through Jeremiah: ‘I will give them a different heart’⁴⁹. And further: ‘Your misfortune comes only from yourself, your salvation from me’⁵⁰. And another prophet said that God exists to give peace and abolish evil⁵¹. Therefore, it is shown that we can only have peace with difficulty, and we are nourished with war. Who is it then, and we would praise him, who is so at rest with himself, has all the movements of his natures firmly in his hand, is subject to reason, and who controls his fleshly lusts? Of this, Augustine said that in these mortal lives this subjugation of the flesh by the spirit, and of the emotions by reason, can only be found unfulfilled⁵².

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, X, S. 86-87.

⁴⁵ Romans 7, 23.

⁴⁶ Jeremiah 12, 12.

⁴⁷ I Maccabees 1, 10 *et al.*

⁴⁸ Jeremiah 15, 10.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 32, 39.

⁵⁰ Osee 13, 9.

⁵¹ Isaiah 45, 7.

⁵² Follows Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 27.

[3] That man cannot completely avoid fighting against himself is repeated in the same way in the totality of the world, when the opposition of minds created from its wars can scarcely be avoided. Then it is sound and consistent to argue from the microcosm to the totality, and similarly from the individual to the entirety. If it were possible to identify one such case that mankind was free from excess and discord, then we would also not be experiencing wars. But because we see, repeatedly and in ever more cases, that so very many excesses develop that lead to the destruction of earthly government, and the dissipation of their power and natural health, and because sincere requests and admonishments are inadequate, it is unavoidable that man reaches for a remedy to attack the sickness at its roots, namely war⁵³. The nature of the human body teaches that if the humours become too strong, first the arts of medicine, then the instruments of fire, and then metal are applied. In this way, the practice of medicine is not evil when it is called on to cut off a rotten and useless limb and thereby to prevent the infection of the entire body.

[4] You see what I mean, most eloquent Platina, if you heed the opinions of the philosophers, that everyone has a certain opposition that is innate, and is similarly preserved by certain and necessary struggle. Therefore, you should not believe that human war can easily be avoided, but that on the basis of certain necessity, about which you will hear, it must occur. Then if you are of the view that the judgement of the scholastic teachers⁵⁴ corresponds more to the truth, you must agree that human war exists as a necessity for mankind. And the schoolmen also hand down⁵⁵ that if the heavenly bodies are inclined to descend into a certain conflict that is not of their making, deciding freely, then they are not governed by necessity. On this basis one believes that war and the fighting of the world exist only through the envy of malignant enemies of the human race, and their steadfast struggles against this reason-given creature. Then we believe, in a religious sense, that such conflicts and fighting are fuelled by the sins and the 'fall' of the first fathers. And the Apostle was referring to no other war when he said: 'Put on God's armour so as to be able to resist the deceits of the devil'⁵⁶, who since the beginning of time has tried to interrupt the peace of men, to break their unity, and finally to contaminate the human race and bring it to chaos. It hurts him, as Hieronymous

⁵³ Follows John of Legnano, *De bello*, X, S. 86, f.

⁵⁴ Benziger: no literal citation could be found for this general reference.

⁵⁵ Follows John of Legnano, *De bello*, X.

⁵⁶ Ephesians 6, 11.

said⁵⁷, that the unity that in heaven he could not observe, on earth men keep. And it is not without reason that the originator of dissension is so called. And as long as this sacred problem continues, it is necessary that conflict and war oppress the world. Christ had actually made this necessity known in his Gospel: ‘In the world you will have trouble’⁵⁸. And again: ‘It is necessary for troubles to come’⁵⁹. Note he said: ‘It is necessary...’, and Christ applied these words to no other trouble than to war and conflict. I suggest, therefore, that here the words of Christ are not to be understood in the sense of a pre-determined necessity, that as we have said annuls the freedom of the will. But they must be taken in their complete meaning, which is in the sense of an inevitability of providence: that which God intends as an occurrence, necessarily occurs. In any event it is clear that God intended that war would exist, when he said: ‘Nation will fight against nation, kingdom against kingdom’⁶⁰.

[5] Furthermore, it is in another sense unavoidable that war oppresses the world, namely in the attainment of the end: it is beneficial that there is war because if the bad pursues the good, the greater virtue of the good and its steadfastness are proven. But it is also necessary that there is war because of the necessity that human lust spoiled the essence of humanity. As a wise doctor said about the unhealthy life of people: it is inevitable that they die or become very seriously ill. As we see, the issue is none other than the internal growth of hate and human lust. We reason correctly if we say that wars in this world are inevitable, because if we do not oppose the human enemies, and instead comply and reinforce our vice and lust, it is necessary for the just God to beset us with war because we have abused the peace with vice. According to the prophet Ezekiel, he said: ‘I will judge you as your conduct deserves and call you to account for all your crimes’⁶¹. And: ‘My anger rages against all alike’⁶². And: ‘On him he poured out the blaze of his anger and the furies of war’⁶³. Then it is necessary to punish by war those who do not banish the causes of war. Those who did not oppose the enemy who declared war, are not considered worthy for peace and concord. Finally, this necessity of war is clearly inculcated by Christ, our Lord, when he said that wars and rumours of wars would

⁵⁷ Follows John of Legnano, *De bello*, VII, S. 82.

⁵⁸ John 16, 33.

⁵⁹ Mathew 18, 7.

⁶⁰ Luke 21, 10.

⁶¹ Ezekiel 7, 8.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 7, 14.

⁶³ Isaiah 42, 25.

come; and he added: ‘For such things must needs be’⁶⁴. We do not believe it is by chance that he spoke of ‘rumours of wars’, when it might have seemed sufficient to say ‘wars and conflict’. It clearly shows that war might now and then be avoided or delayed, but rumours of wars can never be eliminated. People who are led by a desire for plunder look forward to more favourable opportunities in future wars against a weaker prey. From this it follows that wars can be intermittent, but rumours of wars, however, remain continuous, especially if the causes of wars are not eliminated but increased day by day. Also Isaiah had rightly pointed out that in the last days, that is when the judgement of the world has arrived⁶⁵, no people will raise the sword against another, and henceforth war will no longer be studied⁶⁶. He is also clear that before these times it is necessary for man to be oppressed by war and rebellion. This is helpful, because the opinion of Augustine is that there is no rest of the spirit, the spirit is not free from anger, hate, fear, love, pride and other passions, and it is not capable of achieving peace⁶⁷. Also that he who is subjected to this burden necessarily thinks about war, without which he cannot satisfy his lusts⁶⁸. As the prophet said: ‘Who have devised iniquities in their hearts: all the day long they designed battles’⁶⁹. According to the testimony of Augustine what would pride not do out of necessity to follow war? As he said: ‘Cyrus in Africa, and Sparta and Athens in Greece, pursued countless wars out of pride’. And Augustine added⁷⁰ that this deadly profanity then gives way to the rage of war. Such is this gift mankind gives to God. To put it briefly: the only world without war must be a world without flaws. And we believe it is so very significant that Christ said: ‘Blessed are the pure in heart’⁷¹, and continued, ‘Blessed are the peacemakers’⁷², as this shows unmistakably that true peace emerges from purity of heart. However, the prophet said: ‘There is no peace in my bones because of my sins’⁷³. Augustine continued: ‘When you have been made inwardly free from any blight of sin, and thereby no discord springs from your passions, then you begin to be at peace with yourself, so that you can bring

⁶⁴ Mark 13, 7.

⁶⁵ Isaiah 2, 2.

⁶⁶ Isaiah 2, 4.

⁶⁷ Benziger: no reference found.

⁶⁸ Benziger: no reference found.

⁶⁹ Psalms (PsG) 139, 3.

⁷⁰ Benziger: no reference found.

⁷¹ Mathew 5, 8.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 9.

⁷³ Psalms (PsG, PsH) 37, 4.

peace to others'⁷⁴. And he said further: 'In peace live those who are free from any sin; this sort of peace' he said, 'we do not have, while we are still saying: forgive us our sins'⁷⁵. And the Apostle beautifully invoked: 'Always be wanting peace with all the people and holiness'⁷⁶. Note he said: holiness and peace, as if one without the other would be of no use.

[6] See, most learned Platina, what I believe: just as a doctor is unable to leave the care of his patient without removing the cause of the sickness, so it is a great ignorance of mankind not to address the causes of war, the greatest of which are well known to be hate, greed and a lust to dominate, as Seneca said: 'mankind would live in complete quietude if 'mine' and 'yours' were not to be found in nature'⁷⁷. Peace is a mistaken judgment if the actual causes for war and conflict are not cut away. As Augustine said: 'Men will therefore not have peace, because they struggle in ever more unfortunate poverty for things that they cannot share together'⁷⁸.

[7] Therefore, the evidence is clear that it is necessary for mankind to be affected by war, conflict and unrest. Hence, it is not at all easy to bring an end to war. It appears that the apostle was not to be denied when he said: 'If it be possible, as much as is in you, have peace with all men'⁷⁹. And not without good reason did he add: 'if it is possible...', as it is with great difficulty that one lives in peace with everyone⁸⁰.

CHAPTER 3

WAR OCCURS NOT ONLY ON EARTH, BUT ALSO BETWEEN GOOD AND MALIGNANT SPIRITS.

⁷⁴ Ambrose, *Lucam* V, 58 (Corp. Christ, 615-617).

⁷⁵ Augustine, *Joh. evang. tract.* 77, 4.

⁷⁶ Hebrews 12, 14.

⁷⁷ Taken from: Sedulius Scottus, *Collectaneum miscellaneum*, IV, 53.

⁷⁸ Follows Augustine, *City of God*, 15, 4.

⁷⁹ Romans 12, 18.

⁸⁰ The argument follows: Gregor d. Gr., *Epist.*, XI, 1 (Corp. Christ. 140 a, s.858, z.30ff.); *Regula pastoralis* III, 22 (PL 77, 70).

[1] ⁸¹The third issue relating to the exercising of the profession of arms, and the third defence of war against criticism, is as a wise man said: ‘I do not understand why earthly war should not be spoken of without guilt, when heavenly war is so commended’⁸². As the poets wrote, and as Augustine stated, fierce battles were fought between the gods⁸³. The poets claim that Bellona fought with the goddess of harmony and won. They say that Bellona was enraged with the goddess of harmony because she had not deserved a temple among the gods. She had agreed, one believes, that the earth frequently falls into violent unrest; and she became all the more bitter when she saw a temple being built for her opponent, in front of her⁸⁴. But Bellona had, for her part, raised the struggle to one of Roman quality, as the Romans, after the example of their gods, committed no injustice in the running of their battles⁸⁵. Furthermore, and to move on from the figments of the poets, who else doubts that the heavenly lords fight out their wars? The princes of darkness, better called evil angels, certainly fight against each other. Augustine tells knowingly, how evil spirits are often seen on the field of battle fighting against each other, posing as knights of war, both on foot and on horseback, and how it has been observed that two knights fought with each other the whole daylong⁸⁶. When these combats cease, the signs of fighting on foot and on horse have indeed been discovered⁸⁷. But we doubt that fighting takes place between the good angels and the blessed spirits, because there is no apparent difficulty in agreeing. The angel that spoke to Daniel wanted the deliverance of the Jews, as the holy writer showed, because it showed justice in that the prayers of Daniel would be heard. But the guardian angel of the Persians did not want this, and they opposed it with war. Moreover, Job said rather unclearly: ‘That the peace is made by its highest’⁸⁸, which means by the angels if they are not making war amongst themselves. We believe from the testimony of Augustine⁸⁹, that this lasts until godly providence favours union. Finally, we see from the Apocalypse of John, that war between good and evil angels has taken place when he said: ‘And there was a great battle in heaven, Michael and his angels fought with the dragon, and the dragon fought

⁸¹ Benziger: The whole of Chapter 3 draws on Augustine, *City of God*, 2, 25, and 3, 25.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 2, 25.

⁸³ Follows: *Ibid.*, 2, 25; and 3, 25.

⁸⁴ Partly follows: *Ibid.*, 3, 25.

⁸⁵ Follows: *Ibid.*, 2, 25.

⁸⁶ Partly follows: *Ibid.*, 2, 25.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 2, 25.

⁸⁸ Job 25, 2.

⁸⁹ Benziger: no exact reference found, but correlates generally with Augustine, *City of God*, 2, 25.

and his angels'⁹⁰. Again, a wise man said: 'If godly beings have fought with each other, then war between peoples is excused'⁹¹. And lastly, who doubts that there is war between our most majestic Christ and the evil-loving enemies, because we know that such harmful enemies must be confronted.

CHAPTER 4

THE CHURCH CONSECRATES WEAPONS OF WAR, AND EVEN GOD'S HOLY NAME IS CALLED UPON TO FIGHT A WAR.

[1] The fourth issue that supports the use of force, and the fourth defence of war against criticism, arises because war, for the most part, is blessed and spoken of in holy terms in sacred writings. In vain were the church's weapons blessed on holy alters if the war was not righteous. As the king and prophet David lamented over the dead Saul: 'Saul has perished for his shield was not anointed with oil'⁹². Also, as the prophet Jeremiah was commanded by God to say to his people: 'Bless this war and rise up'⁹³. And another of the godly prophets said: 'Proclaim ye this among the nations: prepare war, rouse up the strong: let them come, let all the men of war come up. Cut your ploughshares into swords, and your spades into spears. Let the weak say: I am strong',⁹⁴ such is the war of the Lord. From this it follows that if war was a sin, our innocent and Holy Lord would never have spoken in the praise of war. He would not be called the God of parsimony, the God of arrogance, or the God of injustice, but the God of wars and the Lord of Lords⁹⁵, as in the Holy Scriptures. Furthermore, who doubts that most wars were ordered by God and pursued in God's name? Of this the scriptures say: 'Fight with courage and in the spirit of war, then it will not be you fighting, but God'⁹⁶. As Augustine said: 'If the Christian teachers had declared all war a sin, and the gospel, from which they sought council for their well-being, had particularly directed that they keep away from war, they

⁹⁰ Apocalypse 12, 7.

⁹¹ Augustine, *City of God*, 2, 25.

⁹² 2 Samuel (2 Kings) 1, 21.

⁹³ Jeremiah 6, 4.

⁹⁴ Joel 3, 9-10.

⁹⁵ Benziger: trans. '*dominus exercituum*'.

⁹⁶ 2 Paralipomenon (Chronicles) 20, 15.

would have cited John: “Do no-one violence and be content with your pay”. But Augustine also said: ‘Of those of which he had talked, that they should be content with their wages, and he had not forbidden the practice of war’⁹⁷. To which he added further: ‘Do not believe that God does not like anybody who serves with weapons and warfare. Among such was the holy David, who rendered a great testimony for the lord, and was the most just of his time’⁹⁸. If it were a sin to wield arms and make war, in no way would God have ordered war to be chosen and weapons to be taken up. For a choice gives only of good. As the scriptures say: ‘The Lord chose new wars, and he himself overthrew the gates of the enemies’⁹⁹. It is added that Abraham, Moses, David and the other holy men, as the Maccabees had acted unjustly, made war at the command of God and at times with the angels giving their support. How can the church request help for weapons and wars, or to ask for a just war, if war is a sin? In the end: who would condemn war if it is ordained by the holy teachers of the scriptures that believers are permitted to serve in war under a pagan prince, and because of the binding force of obedience, they do battle without personal guilt, even though it is uncertain if such a war is waged against God’s command¹⁰⁰.

CHAPTER 5

A COMMONWEALTH OF MANKIND IS UNITED AND PRESERVED BY WAR AND THE ARMS OF WAR, WITHOUT WHICH IT CAN NEITHER GROW OR PROSPER.

[1] The fifth issue that speaks for the profession of war, and the fifth defence of the practice of war, is that without arms for defence an earthly commonwealth cannot survive for long. Aristotle, in his time a famous man, revealed what godly wisdom has only briefly acknowledged, that there are two motives given by all men to wage war, not only from necessity, but also as being very beneficial. The first, is to readily bring under control the perjurers and the rebellious, so that they are contained and brought to justice;

⁹⁷ Augustine, *Decretum Gratiani* II, C. XXIII, q. 1, c. 2.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, c. 3.

⁹⁹ Judges 5, 8.

¹⁰⁰ Partly follows: *Decretum Gratiani* II, C. XXIII, q. 1, c. 4, s 1.

the other, is to enforce, and thereby maintain, slavery for those born to slavery¹⁰¹. As Seneca said: ‘If you will not to fight with strength, you may not with dignity keep common people as slaves. You must choose between two things: force or slavery. To fight is an indication of a strong character, slavery a great wretchedness. One means honour, while slavery is effeminate and derisory’¹⁰². It is natural for all men, through a desire for freedom, to fight badly when held in the yoke of slavery. Who can endure the many violent lusts of mankind, if they have no control over the terrors of war? Who will give satisfaction to the many thousand restless lusts of mankind, so many active tyrannies who would not subdue a house or an acre, but cities, provinces, kingdoms and empires? The Roman Vegetius, who produced an exceptional treatise on the art of war, wrote: ‘Who would doubt that warlike actions are the mightiest of all things, and by which freedom and human values are preserved, and states are saved’. He continued: ‘People believe this, that everything is based on this art or can be achieved through it’¹⁰³. Also, Valerius Maximus said: ‘Warlike breeding, constantly and clearly maintained, had enforced the dominance of the Roman empire over Italy and brought power over many cities, great kings, and mighty tribes’¹⁰⁴. Finally, Livy said that nothing more saved the Romans from decline, and expanded the Republic, than skill at arms¹⁰⁵. To very briefly summarise: in times of inactive peace empires perish, but in war they achieve permanence.

[2] If we follow Aristotle, he refers to the opinion of Hippodamus, that in every good political system the craft of war is essential¹⁰⁶. Hippodamus was of the opinion that there are three indispensable components in the order of a state: artisans, husbandmen and armed defenders, that is soldiers who are given priority, awarded extraordinary privileges and receive full and unique glory, honour and praise. But he was also of the view that they are superior to others in their usefulness, which he strongly commends in the tenth section of the first part. However, it is clear that what is necessary is something that serves the institution. But if, by extension, the government or administration is the

¹⁰¹ Benziger: The last part of the sentence comes from Aristotle, *Politics*, VII, 14 (1333 b) and I, 8 (1256 b); the argument as a whole draws on *Politics*, I, 8., and on Aristotle’s justification of slavery at *Politics*, I, 5 (1254 a).

¹⁰² Benziger: citation not found.

¹⁰³ Vegetius, *De re militaria*, III, 10.

¹⁰⁴ Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, II, ext. VIII.

¹⁰⁵ Benziger: citation from Livy could not be verified.

¹⁰⁶ Follows Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 8 (1267 b).

distinguished class of the citizenry, as was Plato's opinion, then war is still much more necessary, because, as Plato himself said, the skills of war are necessary not only to rule but also to protect the other parts of the polity¹⁰⁷. Nor would the endeavours of the artisans or husbandmen of the polity be fulfilled without soldiers. Also, as shown by Aristotle, men can only live in a polity, therefore there is no doubt that without war as the indispensable component of this citizenry, life cannot be rightly lived¹⁰⁸. Therefore, the practice of war is as necessary as the defence of the citizens: remove the soldiers from a polity and you will see that young women will be stolen from the embrace of their parents, mothers of families violated and taken away, holy and secular alike defiled, and everything forced into a state of chaos by murder and arson¹⁰⁹. Vegetius, that very wise man, said that in the exercise of the arts of war, and under the protection and safety of the state, peace is clearer and more restful¹¹⁰. So glorious was at least the name of the art of war, that in a state of men who had gained fame in these skills, statues would be constructed and only with a military posture, as it was especially distinguished to bestow honours for these skills.

[3] It is further told, that Socrates would say that weapons of defence were allowed by nature, whereby the right of defence was granted¹¹¹; and that offensive weapons were essential for a special art of mankind that is found in every state, the soldier. Of this, the very successful Octavian, who had his adopted son trained in the military skills, was of the opinion that in no other way can one's own preservation, and that of others, be acquired. The very famous emperor knew that not even during an inactive peace could government be maintained, except through weapons and war. Therefore, he taught him to throw deadly, aimed projectiles, and also that every war must be either fought or delayed. He knew precisely: 'A bottle preserves the perfume for a long time, then it is opened once to be used'¹¹².

CHAPTER 6

¹⁰⁷ Follows Plato, *Republic*, II, 14 (373 d – 374 d)

¹⁰⁸ Follows Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 2 (1253 a); III, 6 (1278 b).

¹⁰⁹ Follows Sallust, *Catilina* 51, 9.

¹¹⁰ Benziger: citation not found.

¹¹¹ Plato, *Republic*, II, 14 (373 d – 374 d).

¹¹² Horace, *Epist.*, I, 2, 69.

WAR IS A CURE FOR THE WORLD AND IS VERY POSITIVE AND BENEFICIAL FOR IT.

[1] The sixth issue that speaks for the practice of war, clearly demonstrates that not only are arms necessary, but they are extremely beneficial and positive in warding off the lusts of evil men and the infamous actions of criminals. Hence, the etymological derivation of ‘*militia*’ from ‘*mala dicta*’, is in no way absurd. It is at least beneficial for the world that the force of arms deters, repels or suppresses arrogance, and that the just ambition of men is maintained. Indeed, as another learned writer said: ‘God ruled in his inexhaustible mercy that war is pursued in the manner, whereby through the taming and dissipating of lust, much evil is liquidated which could not otherwise be effaced or removed’¹¹³. Note that he said ‘could not’. Through these established and public statements not only is the utility of war demonstrated, but also its efficacy. In a similar vein, Augustine said that considering the impudence of evil, a matter of some fear, arms are beneficial to a commonwealth, ‘He who has the opportunity to wrestle with sin, will win to great benefit’¹¹⁴. Through his infinite wisdom, God has arranged with certainty that lusts fear war, and thereby the lusts and yearning after things are held in check. Of which it is written in the Holy Scriptures, God said: ‘For I have wounded thee with the wound of an enemy, with a cruel chastisement: by reason of the multitude of thy iniquities, thy sins are hardened.’¹¹⁵, and further: ‘Why criest thou for thy affliction? Thy sorrow is incurable’¹¹⁶.

[2] I also believe, most learned Platina, that it is unjust to complain about approaching war. As our compatriot Isodore said: ‘Conflict and war rage partly because of the origins of mankind, and partly because of our personal guilt. Therefore, men complain unjustly to God when they engage in war and it is bought about by their own guilt. War is not grounded in his nature, but through our guilt of evil: if he accuses us, we have deserved it. Light is good, but the sick hate it; however, this is because of the weakness of the eyes, not the nature of seeing. If people are marked by conflict and war, they deserve

¹¹³ Follows Augustine, *Epistles*, 138, II, 14.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, and *Decretum Gratiani* II, C.XXIII, q. 1, c. 2, s 4.

¹¹⁵ Jeremiah 30, 14.

¹¹⁶ Jeremiah 30, 15.

punishment for their sins because of their mis-behaviour, as goodness is the opposite of evil'¹¹⁷.

[3] Finally, who will condemn war when it protects life, sanctity, home, children, the elderly: in short human society? Of this, Augustine pardoned the ancient Romans, when they were heathen, for waging so great a war when they were compelled to defend themselves against an enemy's aggression, but were hasty and recklessly caused distress. However, they not only wanted to win glory, but were compelled to protect their lives, peace and freedom¹¹⁸. Augustine very succinctly comments further that wars among people are not waged without God, it is in his power to decide who in war holds the upper hand and who is subjugated, for some the kingdom is gained, for some the king is defeated¹¹⁹; and all should know, that they could be chastised by the same war and the same scourge when they decide to strike others down.

[4] Furthermore, war is the remedy against evil people. As we have discussed above, medicine is essential for the preservation of human bodies, whereby wasteful and damaging fluids are cleansed, just as fire is the cure for iron; war is necessary in the mystical body of temporal states to serve as the remedy in countering the lusts and other pestilent errors of mankind. As the holy Job very clearly said: 'The revenger of iniquities', he said, 'is the sword'¹²⁰ and war.

CHAPTER 7

WAR IS ORDAINED FOR PEACE, BECAUSE PEACE IS ACHIEVED BY ENGAGING IN WAR. FURTHERMORE, WAR AND PEACE ARE IN NO WAY CONTRADICTORY.

[1] The seventh issue that speaks for war and arms, and the seventh defence against criticism, is mainly that man only attains through war what you so strongly advocate,

¹¹⁷ Isidore, *Sententiae libris tres*, I, 9.

¹¹⁸ Augustine, *City of God*, 3, 10.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, 18, 2.

¹²⁰ Job, 19, 29.

that is earthly peace. As Aristotle said: ‘Nobody wages war for the sake of waging war, but we wage war in order to ensure peace’¹²¹. Thus, Augustine said: ‘Earthly states will achieve peace through war’¹²². Thus, the praise of war is not irrelevant or unimportant when the people long for peace. In this way, the Roman Vegetius said: ‘Those who wish for peace should contemplate war, and those who want to win must arm their soldiers. Nobody’, he said, ‘aggressively attacks you if they know that you are armed and ready’¹²³. Furthermore: ‘See how good and useful war is in the service of the state, because men long for peace’¹²⁴. Everything points to war being in no way contradictory to peace, as simple natures imagine. If they were contradictory then it would be clearly a case of one or the other. But it is clear, as Augustine testifies, that there cannot be war without peace, because one is ordered for the other. As there can be no pain without life, there can be no war without peace¹²⁵. In view of these conclusive arguments, it is clear that war and peace are not contradictory, but rather serve each other. Of this Christ, our Lord and Lord of Lords, said: ‘When a strong man armed keepeth his court, those things are in peace which he possesseth’¹²⁶, which is to say that the strong and constant practice of arms leads to and protects the peace, and everything is preserved in quietude. In addition, when the peace is good, the weapons of war, with which it is led and protected, are good. According to the testimony of Aristotle the cause is good if the effect is good¹²⁷. If a cause gives something a quality, then there is much more of the quality in the cause. If the health is good, then the medicine that is responsible is also good and absolutely essential.

[2] However, most learned Platina, I see that you remain implacable on arms, and that your sharp condemnation of war brings you against me. You have, indeed, frequently and eloquently argued that destruction, murder, injury and desecration are the results of war, and how this contrasts to peace. Do not take this wrongly, but nothing here proves that war is by nature evil and is to be condemned, nor that peace is contrary to it, and I plead your attention. Whoever so blackens something seriously errs; such war can easily

¹²¹ Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7 (1177 b 5-6, 9-12). *Politics*, VII, 14 (1333a) and 15 (1334a).

¹²² Follows Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 12 and 17.

¹²³ Partly follows Vegetius, *De re militaria*, III.

¹²⁴ Benziger: no citation found.

¹²⁵ Partly follows Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 13.

¹²⁶ Luke 11, 21.

¹²⁷ The argument is from Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I, 6, 3-4 (1362a).

be put against the mildness of peace. As it is written in the Maccabees, brave men stride peaceably to war. How these very brave men, inwardly peaceful, but outwardly to the enemy ferocious, were ordained to be remembered in sacred history. They fought with weapons in their hands, but in their hearts they prayed to God; while they fought against the enemy they were as gentle as lambs in spirit, and outwardly as courageous as lions¹²⁸. Augustine meant nothing else. He said that while certain things are blamed on war: the lust to destroy, the cruelty of the thirst for revenge, the ferocity of an impatient and arrogant temper that is impossible to calm; yet war is not a sin when clemency, an eagerness for peace, the correction of evil, the furthering of the good, and the protection of the state, life and honour, are all practiced. In these circumstances war is just and is undertaken and waged with God's agreement¹²⁹. War is not the antithesis of peace. Peace is directly opposed by another corruption, namely hate. Hate arises out of a degenerate, and in a sense confused, mentality that brings forth uncontrollable conflict, and because of this, comes war. Because peace is bound to charity¹³⁰ it is clearly opposed to hate, but not to war, which is based on the intention to acquire peace as a cause is to its effect. That a cause contradicts its effect is totally absurd.

[3] You also see, most learned Platina, that war, as man knows it, is based on the intention to acquire peace, it is just and without any surge of emotion, and it can even be waged in a peaceful mood. Apart from that, it does not help you that we see so very many unholy and sacrilegious evils in raging against war. I put it to you that in everything there is to be found both benefit and the consequences of misuse. The evils that you have enumerated as being found in the conduct of war, apply not to war itself, but to the misuse and excesses of war. So very often we misuse such good things. We misuse virtue, without affecting it. For example, what is holier and godlier than a gift made out of charity? Even so, it can still have a negative connotation when it is given too lavishly. Finally, we often misuse wisdom and scholarship when we take pride and not modesty from it, and think of learned glory. As the apostle said: 'Knowledge gives self-importance'¹³¹. Who will blame the blacksmith when someone murders with a sword that was made by him to bring benefit? My consideration of war is not to be seen

¹²⁸ Benziger: this appears to be only in the sense of Maccabees, a direct citation cannot be found.

¹²⁹ Part literal, part in the sense of: Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, XXII, 74. Also: *Decretum Gratiani*, II, C.XXIII, q.1, c.2; Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 12.

¹³⁰ Caesarius of Arles, *Sermo* 174.

¹³¹ I Corinthians 8,1.

otherwise. It is very often the case that we misuse war when it is not being waged to bring peace or for the ends that we have discussed. Likewise, we can also misuse peace. Yes, when we use peace only for idleness, or to strive for luxury, uninhibited pleasure, and the accumulation of riches that serve to oppress the poor! Finally, it is a misuse of peace when we allow the bad to merge with, and corrupt, the good. As Gregory said, it is fatal when the evil have peace because the unjust push their mockery of the good so much harder, becoming stronger and more united¹³².

CHAPTER 8

WAR BRINGS THE MOST VIRTUE TO THE FORE, BUT PEACE ENCOURAGES MANY IMPERFECTIONS. FURTHERMORE, PEACE CANNOT BE GUARANTEED WITHOUT WAR.

[1] The eighth issue which argues in favour of arms and acts of war results from the mass of evidence that the most, and the particularly outstanding, virtues are bought to the fore with the practice of war. Aristotle took the same position. He said that the Spartans' great and outstanding virtue was achieved from their longstanding wars against the Arcadia and Messana. As they prepared for war they readied themselves to obedience to their military leaders and to every appropriate virtue¹³³. Of this Vegetius said: 'The exercise of war was much vaunted by the ancients because it gave them various recommendable skills and virtues'¹³⁴. And the all blessed Gregory knew this. He said in his *Moralia*: 'Nobody is aware of his vigour in peace. When there are no wars, virtues do not benefit from being tested'¹³⁵. Then it is paramount for those who undergo wars that they customarily obey their leaders. In the event of war, because of their well-established obedience towards their rulers and leaders and in all other matters, they are eminently manageable. They will, in all likelihood, remain under control when the spear and sword are being wielded in difficult and terrifying situations, just as they would in

¹³² Gregory, *Regula pastoralis*, III, 23 (Pl 77, 71, Sp. 93, z. 1-6).

¹³³ Follows Aristotle, *Politics*, II, 9 (1270a).

¹³⁴ Follows Vegetius, *De re militaria*, I, 7.

¹³⁵ Gregory, *Moralia*, XXIII, 25, 51.

other, less dangerous and difficult situations. In the exercise of war men first acquire patience and fortitude, which are virtues. The warrior acquires these through long periods of suffering, and the demands of war produce so many unpleasant and terrifying situations that they can scarcely be counted. Finally, the wonderful virtue of bravery is obtained through the business of war: the moral greatness that those who experience war, and all its associated terror, are ready to die for the preservation of the state without hesitation. With these actual confrontations with fearful situations, not only is the body made more efficient and stronger, but also the spirit is made stronger and more courageous. Therefore, Cicero said ¹³⁶, enduring long wars brings out courage. Everything involves courage, as he readily learnt. But also Suetonius said in his work on the twelve Caesars, in a fitting way, that to take part in war, those who are untrained use up two out of three chances when they are directly confronted with danger ¹³⁷; this becomes clear with a full discussion of virtue. They use the first, when they are in an extreme state of wonder and are unable to act in the unprecedented situation; the second because they fear the unknown; and the third when they flee through lack of bravery and courage on seeing unknown dangers. However, those who are trained in weapons and warfare neither wonder at what they have often seen, nor are afraid of what they have often experienced, nor flee from the dangers that they have often stood up against.

[2] Furthermore, the exercising of war brings a noble heartedness when renowned princes and noblemen think of even greater honour. But also, the virtue of munificence is brought out by the practice for war. As the writer noted, Mars is so munificent that he could hand out riches with his eyes closed. Temperance is also well born out in war: without this virtue war cannot rightly be waged because war must be moderate and just: to wrench it from excessive pampering in times of peace; to abate injustice; and to be able to hold on to the simple pleasures. A long time in peace, without sufficient demands, makes men very given over to a soft and self-indulgent life. But warriors, as is generally known, strive for self-control, to diminish all the desires for the luxury that the idle in peace and at leisure have at their disposal. From this it follows that through shortages and need, warriors become familiar with the virtue of self-control. Therefore, the wise men of antiquity observed that there existed an enduring purity in warriors and with the outdoor life, and that armies and armed camps, places of purity and order, were

¹³⁶ Benziger: citation not found.

¹³⁷ Benziger: citation not found.

in a sense informed through purity¹³⁸. But those who give themselves to peace and unmitigated idleness are beset with wastefulness and many other problems. As Aristotle said: ‘Like unused iron they lose their edge in times of peace’¹³⁹. Never would Roman virtue have become so faded had their war against Carthage continued unabated. The peace with Carthage was the downfall of the city of Rome, and for all other cities it is eternal evidence that peace for empires and provinces is not always for the best. Nasica, the successful commander, knew this very well when he affirmed that a long period without challenges is dangerous because, as he said, peace causes pride, carelessness, much idleness, and flaccidity¹⁴⁰. Valerius Maximus showed how Appius Claudius used to say: ‘We believe’, he said, ‘that work is better for the Roman people than leisure’, even though he knew precisely how pleasant the state of peace is. Then, because he understood that the wider empire was inspired by the practice of deeds to promote virtue, and because too much quietude led to torpidity, he recommended that war should not cease¹⁴¹. It is the highly valued opinion of Quintus Metellus, who said before the Senate after the destruction of Carthage, that he did not know whether this victory was good or bad for the state; if the restoration of peace was beneficial, it had caused damage with the removal of Hannibal¹⁴². First, if there is truth with the censor, he recognised that the peace that is aspired to is far from secure. Often those who are in battle and are armed are safer than the civilians, as most wars demonstrate¹⁴³. Marius is unclear whether one becomes more renowned through mistakes or virtue, but in these matters a very certain, albeit sad, testimony can be rendered if one’s deeds are remembered. He does not say whether one becomes better off in war or more harmed by peace, but in any event, he had preserved the Roman state with arms as a matter of priority, because civilians, with every type of fraud rather than with weapons, brought ruin in many alien ways¹⁴⁴.

[3] Certainly, peace has the worst side effects: wantonness, hedonism, and many vices, neither smaller nor less than in war. So, every word of Petrarch is true, that for the most part armour brings more fortune than the toga, the battlefield more security than the bed

¹³⁸ Isidore, *Etym.* IX, 3, 44.

¹³⁹ Aristotle, *Politics*, VII, 14 (1334a).

¹⁴⁰ Partly follows Petrarch, *De rem.*, I, 106, s 144.

¹⁴¹ Valerius Maximus, *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, VII, 2, 1.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, VII, 2, 3.

¹⁴³ Partly follows Petrarch, *De rem.*, I, 106, s 144.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, s 146.

chamber, the call of the trumpet more security than the flute, and the heat of the sun more security than the cool of the clouds. For Julius Caesar, who lived in war and won greatness, peace was more dangerous¹⁴⁵, but we will elaborate on this towards the end of the tenth section of Part Two. Augustine, who deliberated and judged on these types of arguments, said that during the seven hundred and one years from Tullus Hostilius to Ceasar Augustus, only for one summer did Roman flesh not sweat any blood¹⁴⁶. However, it is a fact that in this very fortunate period the Roman state was for the most part developing through war, as it could take possession of the world. Seldom is peace conserved without mistakes¹⁴⁷. It is also very clear to all, that the lengthy peace had brought out great mistakes, because we clearly recognize that the great carelessnesses of the Roman people had corrupted the morals not only of particular people but of even the richest, and of the conquerors of the whole world. It broke with the wondrous virtuosity of those people who for so long had shined forth, and for so long had existed in the good order that had been found in war. Cicero¹⁴⁸ accurately lamented long periods of peace, when the victor of the people in war, and even more gloriously the victor of himself, the conqueror of vice, was finally corrupted and brought down after long periods of security.

[4] Finally, the practice of war brings out wisdom. According to Aristotle in *The Politics*, every state needs a two-fold wisdom: a civil and one for war¹⁴⁹. With civil wisdom people strive for goodness and the avoidance of harm, and this they achieve sufficiently by formulating laws. With military wisdom, however, the people come to know with an absolute conviction: to resist those who oppose and do injustice, to defeat the covetous, and to overcome obstacles. Things are achieved only through military virtue. Therefore, Aristotle had rightly spoken of the military arts as a particular type of wisdom¹⁵⁰. In short, the correct practice of war provides a tremendous source for all virtues, and condemns what the virtues scorn.

CHAPTER 9

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, s 148.

¹⁴⁶ Follows Augustine, *City of God*, 3, 9.

¹⁴⁷ Follows *De rem.*, I, 106, s 148.

¹⁴⁸ Benziger: citation not found.

¹⁴⁹ Follows Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 5 (1254b).

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 9 (1270a).

WAR ON EARTH EXERCISES AND STRENGTHENS VIRTUE.

[1] The ninth issue favouring the practice of war and the use of arms, and the ninth defence against criticisms, is that in wars of this type, as in other oppositions, god fearing and just men become valued and used to best effect. The stronger in quality will forebear. Therefore, war is so useful and beneficial for mankind, that whosoever rejects it is also admitting that he will live without God. This was beautifully acknowledged by Augustine: ‘You want’, he said, ‘no war, to endure no persecution, thus do you also want to live without fearing God?’ Christ said: “All those who live in devotion to Christ will suffer persecution”¹⁵¹. Augustine continues: ‘It is inevitable that you will be thrown to the ground by the godless’, and further, ‘We fight our lusts, we fight externally with the disobedient, everywhere we are fighting’. He also said of the word of the apostles: ‘See, the day without fighting and enduring persecution is bad. The unjust live here, those who live with evil’¹⁵². On this, I have often argued that every word of the most eloquent Pope Leo is true that unity is a contradiction of discord, hate of peace, safety of war¹⁵³. Sometimes it is of benefit that people are exercised directly in battle, or become shocked by lusts and are thereby constrained. These wars and persecutions are necessary and very beneficial for us in the trials of virtuosity by which we are led to blessedness. As Chrisostomus said¹⁵⁴, and as Christ said: ‘Blessed are the peacemakers’¹⁵⁵, but he straightaway added: ‘Blessed are those who are persecuted’¹⁵⁶. Thereby people do not honestly believe that it is always good to work for peace, or more emphatically, that with peace, war and persecution are certain. And a more believing person would not be mistaken at the prospect held out by the Evangelist when he declared: ‘In the world you will experience troubles’¹⁵⁷.

CHAPTER 10

¹⁵¹ 2 Timothy 3, 12.

¹⁵² Augustine, *Psalmos* 127, 16.

¹⁵³ Benziger: no citation found.

¹⁵⁴ Benziger: no citation found.

¹⁵⁵ Mathew 5, 9.

¹⁵⁶ Mathew 5, 10.

¹⁵⁷ John 16, 33.

ARMS AND WARFARE ARE THE BASIS OF NOBILITY AND THE HIGHEST FORMS OF HONOUR, BUT ARE EXTINGUISHED BY A LONG PEACE. FURTHERMORE THEY ARE VERY BECOMING OF THE WORLD.

[1] The tenth issue that favours the art of war is shown to be that people, through their endeavour, achieve what nature alone cannot bring about. It is self-evident that mother-nature, without the support of virtue and especially without these military exercises of war, cannot effect a true nobility of the flesh, that we call a politician. First, arms and war accrue high honour, high glory and all that is won with triumph and praise. Take nobility, it is clearly the case that the most important rationale for nobility lies in these noble exercises of arms, because, as Aristotle said, a plebian who is so brave and powerful in bearing arms, and through his actions and bravery defeats the enemy and frees the fatherland, is endowed with privilege¹⁵⁸. It is the general consensus that because of his deeds he is to be taken from the plebeians and promoted to the nobility. As the wise men wrote: ‘The people praised the one with a victorious hand’¹⁵⁹. An innate social order, that was earlier called plebian and menial, is overturned by the distinguished conduct at arms and is changed to produce the high and pure status which we call nobility. Of which the wise men said: ‘Remove arms, remove war, and you also remove nobility’¹⁶⁰. On the evidence of Vegetius: ‘When there is no war and the skills-at-arms fade, there is no distinction between a plebian and a noble, or between a labourer and a soldier’¹⁶¹. Hieronymus also said: ‘What does a nobleman do in a house of fathers, a softened soldier in leisure? Where there is war, there is honour. Who is brave? The one for whom the cold of winter gets under the skin. The soldier accustomed to softness who rejects armour, who rejects a helmet for a cloth cap, and for whose hands, softened with leisure, the sword grip is too rough’¹⁶². Therefore, it is clear that nobility originates from frequent exercises of war. But if these military exercises bring honour, praise and glory to the fore, then it is also clear that men make honourable deeds even more honourable.

¹⁵⁸ Benziger: this text by Aristotle could not be found.

¹⁵⁹ Follows Wisdom 10, 20.

¹⁶⁰ Benziger: citation not found.

¹⁶¹ Vegetius, *De re militaria*, II, 23.

¹⁶² Follows Hieronymus, *Epist.*, XIV, 2.

[2] Therefore, it is clear that brave soldiers are held in high esteem because in war they fight for life and death. Hence, Aristotle said that all people admire bravery, tenacity and justice the most. He said bravery is beneficial because they are at war, and justice in war as much as in peace¹⁶³. He said further that victorious acts of war demonstrate the excellences of virtue, and consequently the honours and the nobles¹⁶⁴. No person is praised as when it is due to the greater power of virtue. As it is written: ‘A chosen work is honourable’¹⁶⁵. This we know even with the dumb animals. The four footed animals or birds that are warlike are certainly held to be noble and worthier than the non-warlike, as can be seen with the lion and the hare, the goshawk and the partridge. As Livius accurately said: ‘It is craven to believe that a citizen, even a rich man, is more honourable and worthy living in the city in peace, than Scipio who is away in Africa fighting the enemy’¹⁶⁶. It is the testimony of Aristotle in *The Politics*, that a civilian tradesman, merchant, or moneylender, does not stand in the same esteem as a warrior or soldier¹⁶⁷. Nor are those who turn towards peace treated with similar honour as those who weather the war. Those who decide the outcome, to them the victory. Hence, the wise men said: ‘Better is a poor man who is sound, and strong of constitution, than a rich man who is weak and afflicted with evils’¹⁶⁸. Also, there is less honour where the danger is less. Hippodamus was right, referring to Aristotle, that the greater honours are deserved by those who weather the greater danger¹⁶⁹. Not without reason then, are rewards and prizes given to those who fight, and are not awarded to those who decay during peace and leisure. The Bible shows in discussing the concept of war that it is always worthy of glory and praise. It says: ‘No crown to him who does not fight justly’¹⁷⁰. And further: ‘God is at my side, a mighty hero’¹⁷¹. Not without reason have the most notable states bestowed special honours on their bravest warriors, for which other men were not entitled. These include being immortalized in verse, the building of temples, dwelling places, monuments, having busts and statues erected, state pensions provided, and other rewards to bring eternal praise¹⁷². That all these are, on the

¹⁶³ Follows Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I, 9, 6 (1366b).

¹⁶⁴ Benziger: citation of Aristotle not found. But see also *Politics*, VII, 14 (1333b-1334a).

¹⁶⁵ Ecclesiasticus 14, 21.

¹⁶⁶ Possibly follows: Petrarch, *De rem.*, I, 21, s. 68 and 70.

¹⁶⁷ Generally follows Aristotle, *The Politics*, II, 8 (1267b and 1268b).

¹⁶⁸ Ecclesiasticus 30, 14.

¹⁶⁹ Aristotle, *The Politics*, II, 8 (1267b-1268b).

¹⁷⁰ 2 Timothy 2 5.

¹⁷¹ Jeremiah 20, 11.

¹⁷² Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I, 5, 9, (1361a).

testimony of Aristotle¹⁷³, highly revered signs of respect, we have identified in the fifth section. There are other examples. How much hope had Romulus, a famous man of his time who had led states in war, put in just this measure of life, not only in guiding and leading his own life, but after his death in rising to be a god as a prophecy had made clear. His last words, as a wise man said, are these to Julius Proculum: ‘Say’, he said, ‘the gods wanted of the Romans that my Rome be the head of the world. Hence they should attend to the ways of war and become familiar with them, and so following generations would come to understand that no might could defy Roman arms’. With these words he entered the family of the gods¹⁷⁴.

[3] Furthermore, there are so very many other beneficial and advantageous properties of skills at arms and the arts of war that one can scarcely record them. Among them, it is not inconsequential that enduring war causes the eradication of error. Finally, the uncertainty and the absence of rest during war sharply highlight the woefulness of this life.

[4] A further step in the defence of war against criticism is that war often leads to magnificence and the adornment of the universality. For this reason, we believe, war is named ‘bellum’, because it is a glorious and illustrious affair (*bella res*)¹⁷⁵. As Augustine said: ‘Not only does the simple good, without complication, but also the well constructed malignance, excellently show the beauty of the world, and readily provide more beautiful testimony to the might of the creator’¹⁷⁶. As it is not to be wondered, that in a palace there are found gold and earthenware vases at the same time¹⁷⁷, so the stimulus of the world is shown to change with times of peace to times of ill-conceived bad warfare. Finally, in another sense war demonstrates the admirable order of the creator, whereby the world does not fall back into disorder. There is really little order in the universe if people do not use peace and war correctly, but instead misuse peace, or desire war as an end in itself, becoming devalued. Then, as Cyprian appropriately said¹⁷⁸: ‘To fully understand war it is necessary to appreciate that in peace war is not

¹⁷³ Follows: Aristotle, *The Politics*, II, 8 (1267b).

¹⁷⁴ Livius, I, 16, 7.

¹⁷⁵ Augustine, *Principia dialecticae*, c. 6. Benziger: Other meanings can be derived for Augustine.

¹⁷⁶ See Augustine, *Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate*, c. 3.

¹⁷⁷ See 2 Timothy, 2, 20.

¹⁷⁸ Benziger: citation not found.

known, and that in war peace is not worthwhile. Just as it is very much the case that with the hardships of war, peace is quickly recognized or loved, so it can also be treated carelessly if it is too readily accepted back'¹⁷⁹. Also, war is seen to be appreciated because god's justice is shown through it, as injustices are corrected directly by the justice of war. As the most just God warned in the holy scriptures when he said: 'A kingdom is transferred from one people to another, because of injustices, and wrongs, and injuries, and divers deceits'¹⁸⁰. Clearly, the transposing and occupation of kingdoms occurs only in war, so it follows that where injustices rage war necessarily follows.

[5] Finally, it seems not to be the worst argument for war, that with this exercising of war on earth people acquire the habits and ability for the spiritual war, as we learn to stand against uncertain enemies. As is found in the opinion of Hieronymus: 'Wars on earth are the image of, and have a sure similarity to, the wars of the spirit'¹⁸¹. Yes, in a certain way they are even preparation and practice for the fight against the invisible enemy. This is because both wars have the same origin: the discord and conflict between sensual urges and reason. If the human will obeys reason, both the earthly and the spiritual war, as much against an uncertain enemy as against the burdens which daily rage against us, will cease. Then, because both wars have sprung from the same roots, they must also be waged and dispelled in similar ways. Whoever is resolute and brave in winning earthly war, is thereby also brave and equipped against the enemy in waging spiritual war.

[6] Then you know from the discussion up until now, most learned Platina, not only the justification, but even the conspicuous advocacy, praise, and reward, as well as the necessity and usefulness of the practice of war. Because all that amounts from your interjecting, I believe, is that you have argued the cruelty, death, injury, desolation and so many more evils of war. You will see that all this derives, if I am not mistaken, not from the essence of war, which is instituted for peace, but out of its considerable abuse. One also knows that with idle peace, waste, lethargy, luxury, and almost uncountable indulgences will all mislead in many diverse ways, as we have discussed earlier and indeed identified. Also, we believe that what you have redoubtably said about war,

¹⁷⁹ Follows Petrarch, *De rem.* I, 105, s. 138.

¹⁸⁰ Ecclesiasticus 10, 8.

¹⁸¹ See Augustine, *Decretum Gratiani*, II, C.XXIII, q.1, c.1.

clearly applies to those wars that in full justice can be accused of having immoral war aims, which include, as Augustine originally set out, the lust to destroy, the avenging of cruelty, the savagery that can in no way be calmed, impatient characters, and the striving for domination¹⁸².

This is sufficient for the first part.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, c.4; also Augustin, *Contra Faustum*, XXII, 74.

RODRIGO SÁNCHEZ: – TRUE PEACE AND HUMAN QUIETUDE

PART TWO, WHICH CONSIDERS THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN QUIETUDE THAT MEN TAKE FOR PEACE. WHAT WAR TRULY IS. ON THE CORRUPTION AND SUFFERING THAT ARISES FROM THE CARELESSNES CAUSED BY THE INERTIA OF PEACE.

(PROLOGUE)

[1] The agreed structure of the treatise requires, most eloquent and persuasive Platina, that after the justification and recommendations for the necessity and utility of military force and war, we now come to the second part. Here, I will enumerate the disadvantages, damage, crime, considerable vice and evil, that is brought about by the negligent and lethargic advocates of the freedom from stress and of temporal quietude, which you call peace, and strongly praise. Following the order of the previous parts, I will briefly list ten of the clear disadvantages of your vaunted peace, and of its difficulty, if not impossibility, while trusting in the fair guidance of our common and most excellent judge.

[2] Because I speak on peace, my arguments will follow after first establishing, as the learned writers describe, that peace derives from agreement, when such agreement is made¹, and also from the reassurance and calmness of the spirit. From this it follows that, where the concord of a unifying and conciliatory spirit is missing, inevitably there can be no real peace. A real and perfect peace is difficult for all people, not only to praise, but by all worthy means to achieve in this life. Instead, another peace must be adopted, of the sort that justice and injustice are of equal worth². As one of the saintly scholars of divine law said: ‘Human peace

¹ Isidor, *Etym.*, V, 24, 18.

² Partly follows Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 26 (last sentence).

is like the sun, the wind, the rain and other benefits that are beyond ingratitude and being undervalued'³.

[3] Secondly, so that in our treatise on peace we are not similarly deceived by an ambiguous understanding of peace, before setting out my arguments, we must establish what we have learnt from the learned writers: that there are nine types of peace. Firstly, there is the peace of the body. This is none other than a well-ordered temperance and harmony between the humours and the organs. The second is the peace not of the rational soul, but an ordered stillness of the inclinations. The third is the peace of the rational soul, with an ordered balance of knowledge, emotion and action. The fourth is the peace of the soul and the body, and it is an ordered life and well-being of creature. The fifth is called the peace of the house, and is a unity of living together. The sixth is the peace of man with God, and is a regulated obedience of people to God along with faith and eternal law. The seventh is the earthly peace of state citizenship, with a regulated balance of the citizen with command and obedience. The eighth is the heavenly peace as a very correct, regulated unity and society of godly pleasure. The ninth is the peace of creation as the calmness of order, by which the eternal God justly divides all according to weight, number and measure⁴. We pass over the remainder and will select the seventh, the peace of citizenship on earth, which Augustine defined as a form of concord where all are reconciled in tranquillity and goodness⁵. In other ways it has been defined as the pleasure of understanding, calmness of spirit, simplicity of heart, and the bonding of life⁶.

[4] After these introductory remarks I will now set out the disadvantages, as well as the distortions and the difficulties of worldly peace.

³ *Ibid.*, III, 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, XIX, 13. (Not the precise wording).

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Caesarius of Arles, *Sermo* 174.

CHAPTER 1

TRUE PEACE REQUIRES A UNITY OF THOUGHT AND DEED AMONG FELLOW MEN, NOT CONTENTION, AND THAT IS RARELY FOUND IN HUMAN PEACE.

[1] The first problem with earthly quietude, or the freedom from worldly troubles that is taken for peace, and the difficulty this presents, is that if you consider the appropriate conditions of the true peace, you would come to see that it is nearly an impossibility that peace can be found, or rightly established, on earth. After this explanation you will, and do not think evil of me, have to be with me on a view of peace. You should not believe, eloquent Sir, that all these commendations that you have given with such lustrous eloquence, may be applied to every type of peace or to the lesser forms of a laying down of swords and weapons of war, or a cessation during wars that have been undertaken with pure hearts. But, if I am not mistaken, the only peace which deserves such wondrous praise has, in the view of the scribes, ten conditions which I will innumerate⁷:

One, when it is grounded on unity among men, without hate or discord.

Two, when it is unreservedly in conformity with God.

Three, when it finds tranquillity of spirit, without conflict.

Four, when it preserves the peace of desires, without covetousness.

Five, when it is constant, free from fear, certain and without pretence.

⁷ Benziger: this list could not be found as a citation.

Six, when it drives out vice and promotes virtue.

Seven, when it scorns desires for worldly things and debauchery.

Eight, when it does not oppose peace with God.

Nine, when it strives for justice, punishes wrongdoing, and scorns pride and arrogance.

Ten, when it is not a hindrance in the war against the invisible enemy.

[2] Because these conditions are extremely difficult, indeed almost impossible with all that is inherent in mankind, it is clear that there is no likelihood of attaining true peace. There are so many conditions entailed with true peace, so many troubles with a worldly and incomplete peace, and as I also believe, so many difficulties in reaching a complete peace. It is necessary, however, to examine the detail.

[3] Firstly: Who is in agreement and at one with their neighbours, without a spark of contention or disunity? What is certainly impossible, is that in a house, a city, or a province, where there are so many people with various and contrasting preferences, different mentalities, different passions, and finally different ambitions, everyone would be so bound together and enmeshed that they form one unified entity, and all would be identical? Or what is the benefit, if we are living together in a household and a difference of will divides us? Certainly, it is a mistake to believe that peace is achieved with an agreement of words when there is a conflict of opinion. The prophet had described such a peace: ‘They speak’, he said, ‘of peace with their neighbours, but anger is in their hearts’⁸. True peace is grounded in the virtue from which harmony springs. However, it is clear that there is no such harmony among the wicked. Because, according to Cicero, there is harmony among the good, as there are divisions among the bad⁹. There is neither unity nor peace with the bad. More often than not, even a fair conflict ends in a bad peace, as we read of the Tower of Babel. Hence a prophet said: ‘The injustice disturbed me when I saw that the godless were so well’¹⁰, because there cannot be peace among the bad. As another wrote: ‘There is no peace for the wicked, saith

⁸ Palms (PsG) 27, 3.

⁹ Benziger: citation not found.

¹⁰ Palms (PsG) 72, 3.

the Lord'¹¹. Augustine interpreted this and said: 'In no way can people without a good will and without a godly disposition keep the peace'¹². Because, as the same Augustine said elsewhere: 'A true peace must be respected and loved, but it is not true that the adulterer, bandit, drunkard, and the haughty live together in peace, because it has not grown from the roots of neighbourliness and justice'¹³. Again, in these words from the Bible: 'In his days shall justice spring up, and abundance of peace, till the moon be taken sway'¹⁴. 'Greater peace', Augustine explained, 'followed justice not error. This peace is nevertheless given, "until the moon has taken sway", that is until the mere mortality of flesh is given up at the general resurrection; or also "the moon has taken sway" means: The *ecclesia militans* is raised up to *ecclesia triumphans*'¹⁵. Take note of what we say in the sixth critique of peace. You will see the disadvantages and difficulties of human peace.

CHAPTER 2

WITHOUT RESERVATION, TRUE PEACE REQUIRES UNITY OF THOUGHT WITH GOD THE CREATOR AND WITH ONESELF, SOMETHING RARELY FOUND IN PEOPLE.

[1] The second problem with temporal surety, and the second difficulty with your peace, is that generally nobody achieves a true peace unless he is prepared to be peaceful in himself and is, without reservation, in accord with his creator, something which is so difficult and rare. However, who actually is so endowed with reason, who is so at one with God, and who is so praiseworthy that he obeys his inner reason, and if it commands does not resist? It necessarily follows that one cannot easily be at peace with someone else when he is at war with himself. As the blessed Pope Leo said: 'Mankind has true peace: when the will and reason render no resistance, when the flesh is subject to the soul, when desire and will are not in opposition, when the will obeys reason, when reason is led by God's command'¹⁶.

¹¹ Isaiah 48, 22.

¹² Benziger: citation not found.

¹³ Follows: Augustine, *Caesarius of Arles*, Sermon 166, 4.

¹⁴ Palms (PsG) 71, 7.

¹⁵ Follows Augustine, *Psalmos* 71, 10 (7).

¹⁶ Partly follows Leo Magnus, *Tractus*, 39, 2.

Furthermore, who is so driven by peace that he is obedient to God's command without resistance? Who actually is so provided that he really has true peace, as the creator of peace said through the scriptures: 'Keep my principles'¹⁷. Again: 'They will bring you peace'¹⁸. And again: 'Greater peace has the love of your name and does not founder'¹⁹. However, as Isaiah wrote: 'If only you had obeyed my commandments your peace would have been as a torrent of water'²⁰. Whereof Augustine said: 'He does not have true peace who does not live according to God's precepts for living'²¹. On the contrary, he who resists God's will and does not obey his commands, cannot have true peace, as the holy Job said: 'Who can resist him and have peace'²²? He said as if it was nothing. Gregory nicely explained, that when men resist the creator, the compact of peace is scattered²³. Because rightly there is no peace, as the creator of peace disavows unjust deeds. As Augustine said very well, that so contrary is a rebellion with God that whoever would have no peace with God has war with himself²⁴. But then all flesh resists God, and fails to obey his commands, as the Holy Scripture says: 'But they have all deviated and all are incapable; there are none who do good, not one'²⁵. Then they deservedly have no peace. It is written: 'Because we have not kept your commands, so are we given over to plunder'²⁶.

CHAPTER 3

TRUE PEACE AND THE EASE OF QUIETUDE ENGENDER A SENSE OF PEACE WITHOUT THE ANTAGONISM OF HUMAN EMOTIONS. OF THE DIFFERENT EMOTIONS THAT ARE OBSTRUCTIVE TO PEACE.

¹⁷ Proverbs 4, 4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 3, 2.

¹⁹ Psalms (PsG) (PsH) 118, 165.

²⁰ Isaiah 48, 18.

²¹ Augustine, *Caesarius of Arles*, Sermo 166, 4.

²² Job 9, 4.

²³ Gregory, *Moralia*, in Job IX, V, 5.

²⁴ Augustine, *Psalmos*, 75, 4.

²⁵ Psalm (PsG) 13, 3.

²⁶ Tobit 3, 4.

[1] The third problem with earthly quietude and the third difficulty in achieving true peace, is that true peace brings a tranquillity of spirit without antagonism. Therefore, true peace does not come from human passions and emotions, as these are struck with unrest, or with hate, anger, love or fear. They are so part of mankind that they cannot really be avoided, and it follows that because of their agitation, true peace cannot be found in these mortal lives. As the learned writer said: ‘They that have true peace do not defy; this type of peace we do not have, because until today we pray: “Forgive us our sins”’²⁷.

[2] We begin with the first emotion, which is called hate. Because, as we have argued above, hate directly contradicts peace, it follows that whoever hates his neighbours cannot be peaceable. Therefore, as the Holy Scriptures show, it cannot be said that Cain could be peaceable towards his brother Abel, because he hated him²⁸. Again, because the brothers saw that Joseph was more loved by the father than the others, they could not say anything peaceable about him²⁹. However, this hate develops out of jealousy, and envy is also in evidence. The explanation for this is that people are generally given to hate that which causes them most badness. It is also the case that jealousy puts grief over goodness. Because if jealousy exists then there can be no peace. The fury of jealousy has, as Seneca said, four companions in rivaling peace. Whoever is jealous: afflicts, weakens, hates and detracts; increasing injustice so much that he afflicts the fortunes of everybody³⁰. And there are just as many joys of the fortunate as sighs of the jealous.

[3] Anger is also the enemy of peace. Anger arises, as the philosopher said³¹, out of disregard or contempt. It is clear that those who show contempt or a lack of respect do not have a tranquil spirit. It is, however, certain that peace is nothing other than tranquillity of spirit. Finally, because anger is the drive to punish, we are not easily at peace with those whose punishment we wish. Peace does not value anger and punishment, because it exudes unity, and they exude discord, as Solomon said in the Proverbs: ‘By whipping up anger you produce

²⁷ Augustine, *Evang. tract.*, 77, 4; and *De ser. Dom. in monte*, I, 2.

²⁸ Follows Genesis 4, 3-8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 37, 4.

³⁰ Seneca, *Epist. moral.*, 81, 23.

³¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II, 2, 3-6 (1378b).

strife³². And the blessed Augustine beautifully explained this. He said: ‘Who loves peace, pities his enemy, just as if you love the light, you are not angry with the blind, but you pity them’³³. How rare it is to pity your enemies, and how much rarer not to be angry, is expressed well by the prophet when he said: ‘My eyes are clouded over with anger’³⁴. And further: ‘The godless will see it, and it will mortify them’³⁵. Rightly, those who seethe with anger and revenge, have no peace, and will be punished by the war that they wish on others, because it is written: ‘He that seeketh to revenge himself, shall find vengeance from the Lord’³⁶.

[4] Love, however, which is listed with the other emotions, is no less opposed to peace, be that the uncontrolled love of oneself or of others. Of this Augustine said: ‘Self-love caused the citizens of Babel to be bought into contempt with God’³⁷. However, it is evident that those whom God avenges can have no peace. As the prophet said: ‘Who will resist him, and have peace?’³⁸.

[5] Finally, fear is an opponent of security and peace. Fear arises from the uncontrolled love of worldly things, because what people love the most, they fear to lose. People only fear opposition because of what they love. Because peace and spiritual tranquillity are without conflict, it is clear that those who are inordinately fearful and those who love themselves, cannot have absolute tranquillity of spirit. Without a quiet spirit, fear will torment, because, as it is said, peace is never at one with fear.

[6] Therefore, people strive for peace so urgently, so veraciously, so as to be free from these passions and emotions. Job characterized such people when he said: ‘Caravans turn from the way’³⁹, which is to say that they are bought into disorder, and off of the way, because of human emotions. Chrisosthomus taught that these passions oppose inner peace. He said that

³² Proverbs 30, 33.

³³ Augustine, *Sermo* 357 (PL 39, 1582, 18).

³⁴ Psalms, (PsG) 30, 10.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 111, 10.

³⁶ Ecclesiasticus 28, 1.

³⁷ Partly following Augustine, *Psalmos* 64, 2.

³⁸ Job 9, 4.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 6, 18.

there is no peace, unless what is diseased is cut away, and what conflict brings is severed⁴⁰. He added, that it is as possible for the heavens to be joined with the earth, as it would be to achieve peace, if those passions of the spirit that hinder peace are not cast out.

CHAPTER 4

TRUE PEACE REQUIRES A SPIRIT THAT IS FAR FROM WORDLY LUST, AND IS THEREFORE FREE FOR GOOD DESIRES. THIS, PEOPLE TOTALLY LACK AND IT APPEARS COMPLETELY IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE.

[1] The fourth problem with quietude on earth and worldly peace is manifest with the great difficulty in fully achieving it. Peace requires a yearning free from worldly desires. This is because he who has some good, but desires something more that he does not have, is unable to have a restful state of mind if he does not achieve the desired object. As Gregory said: ‘As one who desires nothing lives with a restful state of mind, so he is not at rest if he lusts after something more and is given to worldly yearnings’⁴¹. Hence, Cassiodorus rightly defined peace as none other than the appropriately ordered tranquillity and concord of the spirit, which we know to be a direct contradiction of lust⁴². Jeremiah agrees, indeed he says that all are dishonest, the lesser and the greatest, and they console his people in their misfortune by saying: ‘Peace! Peace! But there was no peace’⁴³. You see how strongly peace is opposed to worldly lust. You will find an allegory of this in the book of Genesis⁴⁴, as Abraham, at the behest of God, split in half a three year old cow, goat and ram, but he did not split the turtledove or pigeon. This is because those of the flesh and desire are always divided in themselves. However, the pure of heart and those who are free from worldly lust, as symbolised by the pigeon and bird, are not divided but joined together by the bond of love.

⁴⁰ Benziger: citation not found.

⁴¹ Benziger: similar to Gregory, *Moralia*, XVIII, 43.

⁴² Cassiodorus, *Expos. Psalm 75*, 3. Benziger: Sanchez also gives a citation for Augustine in Prologue, para 3.

⁴³ Follows Jeremiah 8, 10-11.

⁴⁴ Follows Genesis 15 9-10. Interpretation follows *Caesarius von Arles*, Sermo 82.

Our compatriot Seneca said of this that a spirit that is made guilty through lust is never tranquil or free from cares⁴⁵.

[2] In what way can we mortals achieve true peace, we who are given over to lusts which are the enemy of peace, who cannot enjoy peace or tranquillity of spirit, whose desires are always growing, always hoping? If we achieve what we hope for, we direct our hopes further, to the more inaccessible, and then on again. Is tomorrow's day not brighter for us than today's, because we believe that the future is always better than the present? Moreover, nothing is more uncomfortable for us, than desiring so much but gaining so little; hoping for more, but not once achieving sufficient to satisfy the hope, or none of the desired things happen⁴⁶. Because of this we nurture desire and hope not only through the power of war, but also through treachery, fraud and various machinations. Therefore the argument is consistent, that because of the lust for worldly things, we have an uncomfortable spirit and cannot achieve peace. As Bernhard said: 'There is no peace except to those of good will'⁴⁷. Where there are many desires that are not satisfied, the heart is not quiet, it longs for the glory of the world, and has neither peace nor does it achieve that glory⁴⁸. Finally, should we not take these words for absolute truth: 'Put away desires', Petrarch said, 'and you will achieve complete inner peace'⁴⁹. Hoping to gain a lot is typical of only those who compete. Therefore, it is understandable that those who live in war value war higher than peace.

CHAPTER 5

IT IS SHOWN THAT HUMAN PEACE IS INSECURE, DECEPTIVE, TRANSITORY,
AND UNCERTAIN⁵⁰.

⁴⁵ Benziger: no specific citation found but possibly a general reference to Seneca.

⁴⁶ See Petrarch, *De rem.* I, 121.

⁴⁷ Follows Luke 2, 14.

⁴⁸ Bernhard of Claivaux, *Sermo super cantica canticorum*, XIII, 5.

⁴⁹ Petrarch, *De rem.*, I, 121.

⁵⁰ Augustine, *Sermo.*, 168, 2 (PL 38, 912); Similar in Augustine, *Psalm* 127, 16.

[1] The fifth problem with human peace and the fifth difficulty in achieving it, is that it is anxious, uncertain, transitory, insidious and mercenary. I say it is uncertain and anxious because it is a woman, who is by nature fearful, uncertain and inconsistent, and it is given a feminine name. It is in all things that have fear, that they are as disturbed as that which they fear. Because human peace constantly fears war, this peace is held to be of less value. It is rightly fearful, because it is not only easily broken, unsettled and shaken by concrete instances of war, but even by the barest rumour of war. See how distressed, how shocked it is. Against war it can only defend itself by war. What is more distressing and fragile than it can only hope to be sheltered and preserved from the enemy? Others defy the enemy and freely clear the field, but peace never has a happy day. Because come the day, those who want more safety are shaken by the even stronger fear of war, and the expression of Job is very true: ‘The cry of terror sounds in his ears’⁵¹. Always it expects the terrifying, always it is wary of events, everywhere it sees the sword. Because of this it cannot bring tranquillity, quietude or security. As Augustine testifies⁵²: how can human peace be secure, when it never ceases to fear?

[2] Human peace acquiesces in a not insignificant amount of distress. Whatever unfortunate peace has striven for with much sweat and danger, is not meant for it, but is conceded to unconquered war. It is so poor in all things, that it cannot be freed, and finally all benefits are kept for war. Its unhealthy misfortune was described by the prophet when he said: ‘Foreigners rob their goods’⁵³, and: ‘The enemy will get rich on the plunder of strangers’⁵⁴.

[3] Furthermore, human surety is elusive and misleading, because it is considered not only in peace but especially, when it is undertaken, in war. While intending to abide by the advocates of peace, it is itself too weak to gain from the consequential benefits.

⁵¹ Job 15, 21.

⁵² Benziger: citation could not be found.

⁵³ Psalms (PsG) (PsH) 108, 11.

⁵⁴ Follows Proverbs 1, 13.

[4] When it is finally adopted, it can be seen as a means in setting up even more conflict. Note how true are the words of Solinus⁵⁵, that only a moment of peace between people can be achieved when they trust each other and appear equal. When one of them is less fortunate, then little is achieved towards a state of peace, as the superior is not satisfied with a similar portion and hopes to gain everything. Of nothing else laments the ancient writer: ‘Falsely’, he said, ‘do you believe that you have achieved peace: you have given the enemy time to gather strength and to strike you harder, as this mutual peace is achieved only when both sides become overwhelmed. Then the fear of losing peace is as terrifying as the fear of war, and the question is whether to hang in the air or to fall. In my opinion it is a miserable situation when you can have neither peace or war’⁵⁶. Not without reason, therefore, has the great Augustine taken human peace to be an uncertain good, because we do not know the mind of those with whom we would share it⁵⁷. The reason for this view is clear. There is no trap so well concealed as the insidious, fake and obligating behaviour, which under some label of peace is disguised as necessity. Thus, we can easily evade the familiar enemy⁵⁸, but we can in no way attain true and enduring peace because war is hidden among the shadows of peace. As it is said, the inconstancy of its touch, no less than the actual fighting with an enemy, does not produce pure and enduring peace⁵⁹. The prophet described peace as uncertain and fallacious, indeed he said: ‘Peace! Peace! But there was no peace’⁶⁰. And, as it is written in the Book of Maccabees, the dangerous enemy was disguised as peace until the time that he struck⁶¹. As Augustine said in contemplating the legitimacy of human peace: in this life there can be no complete peace because it is indulged with frivolous actions, thoughtless talk and erratic thinking⁶². I do not understand this game of people having their fun with peace, or what benefits are bought by an inconstant peace, or rather the perfidious delaying of war which people take for peace, except that, as one says, he who has an incurable disease takes a little relief from the anguish of the pain in being brought to a place of healing and health. Seneca said of this: ‘There was no long peace: there was a short truce’⁶³.

⁵⁵ Benziger: citation could not be found.

⁵⁶ Petrarch, *De rem.*, I, 106, s. 148.

⁵⁷ Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 5.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*. Augustine cites Cicero, *In Verrem*, II, 1, 15.

⁵⁹ Petrarch, *De rem.*, I, 106, s. 144.

⁶⁰ Jeremiah 6, 14; and 8, 11.

⁶¹ 2 Maccabees 5, 24.

⁶² Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 27.

⁶³ Seneca, *Ad marciam de consolatione*, 16, 5.

CHAPTER 6

HUMAN PEACE PRODUCES THE MOST ERROR. VIRTUE AND HONESTY ARE FORCED OUT.

[1] The sixth problem with human surety and quietude, that is called peace, arises largely from it being the disciple of error and the enemy of most virtues, as we have argued in detail in Part One, and especially in the eighth and tenth pleas. As Augustine also said appropriately in a well known phrase: such a peace should not to be so called when one chooses the justice of the infamous and the order of the perverted⁶⁴, and ending, that there is no true peace if one obeys vice⁶⁵. Yes, a peace whose character is depraved through abundance is even crueler than the practices of war. The first ruin the earth, the latter avenge the defeated. And he goes on to say, and prove with strong arguments, that a long peace is as a cruel stepfather to virtue, and an enemy to men who are following the perfect and the virtuous⁶⁶. He said that when the Romans had long been striving against Carthage, Cato wanted it to be destroyed, but Scipio disagreed because he saw that the security of peace is an enemy for weak characters, obliges irresponsible citizens, and that fear is a necessary tutor⁶⁷. Finally, he goes on to say that when there is war, imperfections such as ambition, greed, and hedonism are all forced out⁶⁸.

Indeed, this is proven with an example: as the Romans achieved surety after the storming of Carthage, a civil war broke out and eviscerated the state⁶⁹. As to why peace is a problem to those of little virtue, we know without difficulty: because people who lack virtue are easily overwhelmed in time of peace. There is no doubt that those who fear being overwhelmed by their enemies, pursue virtue more strongly. The motive for this is pure fear. Petrarch teaches beautifully how adverse the security of peace is for good men, as he had learnt from Augustine. ‘It is the sign of an indolent and limp character’, Petrarch said, ‘to decay with long periods of tranquillity; nothing is as scandalous, nothing can be more akin to a funeral,

⁶⁴ A partial rendering of Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 12.

⁶⁵ Benziger: an accurate citation was not found, but see Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 12.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 1, 30.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 1, 31.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 1, 30.

and nothing can be more inglorious than to be bestowed with sluggishness, corruption, gluttony, and the addiction to sleep. And finally, he continued, it is an error to believe that healthy citizens in a city at peace can live as worthily as those who are away fighting the enemy in Africa with Scipio⁷⁰.

[2] Hence, it is absolutely clear, that virtue is not acquired without the harsh, constant fighting in war. The long surety of peace enfeebles not only the character, it afflicts the body, and weakens and ruins good assets⁷¹. As a wise man of few words described: ‘Nothing’, he said, ‘is more corrupting than idle peace, in which the use of weapons is forgotten, small mindedness is encouraged, strength flags away, inertia creeps in, and good character becomes ensnared in obscenity and every conceivable imperfection’⁷².

CHAPTER 7

HUMAN PEACE IS A MEANS FOR INCREASING BOTH THE DESIRE AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR WEALTH, THE ABUNDANCE OF WHICH IS A HINDRANCE TO TRUE PEACE.

[1] The seventh problem with human quietude, which people call peace, and its seventh difficulty comes from this, that it can be seen as a means to increase people’s lust for earthly goods. This cannot really be avoided because the insatiable flood of worldly things is manifestly the first reason for the break up and ruination of peace, when self-indulgent greed seizes almost everyone, as the writer said: ‘They are all greedy, the least and the greatest’⁷³. It follows that it is difficult to achieve peace on earth as the number of worldly things to desire still increases.

⁷⁰ Petrarch, *De rem.*, 1, 21, s. 68-70.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Benziger: possibly deliberately left as an unnamed ‘wise man’, but see Petrarch, *De rem.*, 1, 106.

⁷³ Jeremiah 6, 13.

[2] To understand this clearly, I believe one must take as a basis every word of Aristotle's *Politics*, that human peace is not in any way the goal of ordinary people, and that fortune or business decide virtue⁷⁴. It is also clear that peace is not a deliberate act, but more a form of perversion, a mistaken act. And if it had some form of essence, it would be nothing other than the quieting of order among the citizens for the purpose of more virtuous affairs. Such quieting, as the wise man defined⁷⁵, would not be an end in itself, but by way of something else. Peace is not the highest goal of states, as certain people might suggest.

[3] Further, we believe it must be held fundamentally that human fortune, which people call an act measured by virtue and which is the goal of temporal peace, is to the greatest degree held back by the abundance of worldly goods. This is shown first by ethical and secondly by holy evidence. It is Aristotle's opinion that there are especially difficult requirements for true peace. Hence, firstly, that people behave so that everyone's goal is directed towards the well being of the state⁷⁶, and that the citizens of a state neither have so very much nor do they suffer from want. Instead they find the mean. Therefore, Aristotle gave the following principle: whoever lives in the most abundance readily disdains others; whoever is poor envies the rich⁷⁷. However, it is certainly true that neither peace nor quietude are compatible with disdain or envy, they even struggle against each other.

[4] A second requirement for true peace is that the citizens are virtuous and obey reason, because as a philosopher said, everything harmonises with virtue. From this it comes that people do not achieve true peace if they are not inclined to reason and virtue, but wish for, and are directed to, the increased benefit and pleasure of quietude. The concord of people, which is gained by worldly benefit and pleasure, does not create peace because such peace exists only as long as the benefit and delight last. You see, most eloquent Platina, the great extent to which the abundance of worldly goods throws people into ruin. Furthermore, the testimony of the Holy Scriptures is abundantly clear. As the biblical accounts show, the worldly property of Abraham and Lot grew, and this gave grounds for conflict and quarreling

⁷⁴ Aristotle, *Politics*, III, 9 (1280b-1281a); and VII, I (1324a).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 6 (1278b); and III, 13 (1283b).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, IV, 11 (1295b).

between the herdsmen and the retinue of both brothers⁷⁸. You see that even good and just ownership of worldly goods greatly hinders and strangulates peace. Therefore, elsewhere in the scriptures: ‘Conflict existed between the herdsmen of Isaac and Gerar because of a rich abundance of sheep and cattle’⁷⁹. Another scriptural writer said: ‘These were your sins, Sodom: a superfluity of bread, gluttony, and idleness’⁸⁰. Again, in the opinion of the prophet when he said: ‘How your iniquity came from riches, as they became the addiction of your passion and heart’⁸¹, that is a heart glowing for the abundance of worldly goods.

CHAPTER 8

HUMAN PEACE IS THE OPPONENT OF TRUE AND PERFECT PEACE. ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM, AND ON THE DIFFICULTY IN ACHIEVING PEACE BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF TRUTHFULNESS.

[1] The eighth problem with temporal peace, and the eighth difficulty that arises, is that human peace, to a great extent, is contrary to godly and true peace. It is obviously not a good, if it opposes good, and human peace opposes true peace in three respects:

[2] First, precisely because of its purpose. It is a fact, as we have just discussed, that with the temporal peace of quietude and peaceful pleasures, people are oriented towards worldly goods. From this, it follows that even in peace the people are always misled in sin. Full and true peace, however, is not so intended as a matter of priority to freely gain worldly goods, but as we have said, to exercise virtue and for heavenly peace. Thus, on the testimony of

⁷⁸ Genesis 13, 5.

⁷⁹ Genesis 26, 20.

⁸⁰ Ezekiel 16, 49.

⁸¹ Psalm (PsG) 72, 7.

Augustine, the citizens of heaven direct earthly peace towards the heavenly, which is the true peace⁸².

[3] Furthermore, earthly peace contradicts godly peace because it is only turned outwards, as we have previously said in the fifth commendation. True peace, however, is fulfilled because it allows both inner and outer quietude, and is not without truthfulness. Only truthfulness reconciles those in dispute. King Ezechias requested this peace, rooted in truthfulness, when he said: ‘There is only peace, respite, and truthfulness in my days’⁸³. You see also that with those, between whom there is no truthfulness, there can be no peace, as Boethius said: ‘There is no conflict for men that are bound to one another in truth’⁸⁴. And Hilarius said: ‘Between asserting the truth and defending the comfortable there is a tough fight, yet the truth holds and the will protects’⁸⁵. Thus, it is certainly the case that without truthfulness there can be no peace. How seldom there is truthfulness on earth, the holy writer taught, indeed he said that there is no truthfulness on earth⁸⁶. Furthermore, the prophet said, ‘In their mouth there is no truth’⁸⁷. And again, ‘Truth has decayed among men’⁸⁸.

[4] Thirdly, and finally, worldly peace contradicts true peace because of its imperfection; because worldly peace is imperfect, and people use it only as a respite to develop other benefits, which, as we have said, mostly lead to error. But the peace of God, therefore, is perfect because through ordered virtue it produces inner and outer quietude. Therefore, and without doubt no perfect and true peace can be found in this life.

CHAPTER 9

⁸² Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 17.

⁸³ 4 Kings 20, 19; and Isaiah 39, 8.

⁸⁴ Boethius, *De cons.phil.*, V, *Carmen* III, 6-7.

⁸⁵ Hilarius, *De trinitate*, X, 1.

⁸⁶ Osee 4, 1.

⁸⁷ Psalm (PsG) 5, 10.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 11, 2.

TRUE PEACE CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT LAW AND JUSTICE, AND IT SCORNS PRIDE AND ARROGANCE. THIS IS WHY PEACE IS SO DIFFICULT AND RARELY ACHIEVED.

[1] The ninth difficulty, and near impossibility, to achieve true peace at this time is shown in that true peace is the companion of justice. Furthermore, it scorns pride and arrogance. It is so difficult for people to achieve true peace, because it is so seldom that they keep justice in their hearts, and it is even more difficult for them to scorn arrogance and pride.

[2] That we would start with justice is remembered with that expression of the holy Job. He said: ‘As you are clean and upright, so God will make your dwelling with your justice’⁸⁹. Then it is clear that there cannot be true peace without justice. Of this said the wise man: ‘The fruit of justice shall be peace’⁹⁰. Thus, justice firstly requires a certain equality. It is not the case that everyone wishes for justice. As Augustine said, everyone wants human peace, but a peace of this sort is what one will wish it to be. People desire peace with those who would live according to their will. As they would also, as far as possible, possess those with whom they make war, and when they are subservient, impose on them their law of peace⁹¹. Finally, justice for others will be what they want it to be⁹², because peace requires agreement with one’s neighbour. This agreement is justice. Of this the Apostle said: ‘Justice, peace and joy’⁹³. So as conflict leads to a needed agreement, joy and peace are created⁹⁴. They are inseparable from each other, because it is written: ‘Justice and peace have kissed’⁹⁵. Interpreting these words Gregory said: ‘Justice and peace are two sisters, two friends, they kiss; if you do not love the friend of peace, then you do not love peace and it will not come to you’⁹⁶. But what is justice in this worldly home, declared the prophet, indeed he said: ‘All our justice is as an unclean rag’⁹⁷. Furthermore: ‘There is no justice along their ways’⁹⁸. And in

⁸⁹ Job 8, 6.

⁹⁰ Isaiah 32, 17.

⁹¹ Augustine, *City of God*, 19, 12.

⁹² Follows Augustine, *De verbis Domini, sermon 82, 2*.

⁹³ Romans 14, 17.

⁹⁴ Augustine, *De verbis Domini, sermo 82, 5*.

⁹⁵ Psalm (PsG) 84, 11.

⁹⁶ Benziger: not Gregory but Augustine, *Psalmos 84, 12*.

⁹⁷ Isaiah 64, 6.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 59, 8.

another scripture: ‘There are no just men on earth to do good’⁹⁹. But the wise man also knew very well: ‘I saw under the sun...in the place of justice iniquity’¹⁰⁰. And further: ‘Justice is destroyed by the son of man’¹⁰¹. Rightly, there is no peace because justice has been lost, as another prophet said: ‘Your ways are unjust, therefore peace drains from you’¹⁰².

[3] Of all types of injustice, the most detestable is when crimes which are committed against God, the state and fellow men, go unpunished. That is why peace and earthly tranquillity are so distant. Unpunished criminals and a society in quietude cannot coexist. As the human body cannot be healthy and at rest if overpowering fluids are not corrected, or drawn from the body to prevent infecting the whole body, so the mystical body of the state can in no way be healthy or at rest, if the riotous and profligate limbs are not corrected. Therefore, said the sage: ‘When sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without any fear. But a sinner can do evil a hundred times, and by patience be borne withal’¹⁰³. Therefore, he continued: ‘And I know that it will be well with the people’, that is for peace and quietude, ‘when the days of the wicked are cut short’¹⁰⁴. God ordered that sin and infamy be punished so that the coexistence and universal agreement of mankind, that is peace itself, should not be broken by audacity and godlessness. Augustine said, as he spoke about the son of the centurion, that this war would be waged with the goodwill of God, so that the victor can readily give comfort to the community of peace and justice. Whoever takes the opportunity to sin will dress it up with higher motives, because he calculates that it will not be as unfortunate as the misfortune of sin, for which the wanton impunity and the anger of the will become most harsh, like an enemy on the inside¹⁰⁵. And further: ‘The war will be fought not only justly, but necessarily, so that the wicked and their barriers will be dealt with’¹⁰⁶. If the sinner is justly left with his freedom, why has God struck down the stubborn Israelites with numerous wars? Gregory said in a Canon, that offending, wrongdoing people must be punished, not that through disrespect the wrath of God descends and the sword of war brings your death, but so that a sinner far from the path of truth and

⁹⁹ Ecclesiastes 7, 21.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 3, 16.

¹⁰¹ Benziger: Text could not be verified.

¹⁰² Benziger: Text could not be verified.

¹⁰³ Ecclesiastes 8, 11-12.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

¹⁰⁵ Augustine, *Decretum gratiani*, II, C. XXIII, q. 1, c. 2, s 4; and Augustine, *Epist.*, 138, 2, 14; also: Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II, II, 40, 1.

¹⁰⁶ Augustine, *Decretum gratiani*, II, C. XXIII, q. 1, c. 6.

justice, is brought back¹⁰⁷. Furthermore: ‘If we put off the punishment of sins which offend God, we inevitably invite the wrath and retribution of God. As Achor, the son of Sarah, was struck down with numerous wars because he did not punish sin’¹⁰⁸. Justice acts out of the most just God, and if we have offended God and he takes peace away from us, it is the just God punishing those sins that were carelessly committed in peace, with war. It is written: ‘He that neglects his own way, shall die’¹⁰⁹. Again, ‘Do not wonder if he has also lost respect for you’¹¹⁰, if you lose respect for him because you are not true’.

[4] Finally, the true unity and concord of peace do not tolerate pride and arrogance. As peace creates clemency, equality, and humility, so contention develops arrogant conceit, as it stands in the writing of the wise: ‘Among the proud there is always contention’¹¹¹. This can be explained thus: the proud always wants to be in the front row. Furthermore, there is reproach, as Solomon testifies: ‘where there is pride there is reproach’¹¹². It is therefore certain that it is not conducive to peace to outclass others and add to your disgrace. Thus, how shall a person be able to have unity and peace, who despises an inferior, who finds gratification in domineering his superiors and equals, and who, the higher they rise the further they are removed from peace? Also, they are never satisfied with the pretensions and aspirations in either themselves or in others: not in themselves because they overestimate themselves; not with others, because on first meeting they thrust themselves forward, answer back in council meetings, arrive uninvited, interfere without behest, disturb the order, redo the well-furnished; everything that they themselves had not done, they see as incorrect and badly arranged; they judge the judge, and prejudge those who would be judged. It is easy to see how much all of this stands in opposition to peace. Rightly, Seneca said: ‘Pride and arrogance were never a safe means to elevate yourself or push others down’¹¹³.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, q. IV, c. 47. Also: Gregory, *Epist.*, VII; and Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II, II, 40, 1.

¹⁰⁸ Follows: Augustine, *Decretum gratiani*, II, C. XXIII, q. 1V, c. 50.

¹⁰⁹ Proverbs 19, 16.

¹¹⁰ Follows Leviticus 26, 14 - 16.

¹¹¹ Proverbs 13, 10.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 11, 2.

¹¹³ Benziger: citation not found.

[5] Therefore, unless you create or invent new people, you see that people benighted with so many flaws will not easily achieve true peace. The Apostle correctly described this when he said: ‘They shall say: peace and security, then shall sudden destruction come upon them’¹¹⁴.

CHAPTER 10

HUMAN PEACE INEVITABLY DULLS USEFUL EXERCISE AND THE WAR OF THE SPIRIT. WHAT THE OBSTACLES ARE TO A TRUE PEACE. AND FURTHERMORE, WHAT A TRUE AND PERFECT PEACE IS.

[1] The tenth problem with earthly quietude, that man calls peace, and the tenth difficulty in achieving it, is that with this temporal peace we slacken in the most beneficial task, which is the war of the spirit. This war we must wage against the enemy of the human race, as Paul, the chosen instrument¹¹⁵, said: ‘For our fight is not against flesh and blood, but against princes that rule in the darkness of the world’¹¹⁶. The Romans exhorted the same Paul: ‘Thereafter must there be no more war waged against the flesh’¹¹⁷. Rather, as Gregory explained: ‘The struggle of the soul against spiritual enemies must be fought out’¹¹⁸. With this struggle, the true peace of God is nourished within us, as Gregory said in the *Moralia*, that a stronger peace grows for us when we have a harder fight with the enemy¹¹⁹. Paul asks us to conduct this war, although for us it is very uncertain and the fiercest, indeed he said, ‘Put on the armour of God that you may withstand the attacks of the devil’¹²⁰. This struggle is certainly very hard, especially if not armed, as Christ as military leader advises us, indeed he said: ‘Do not think that I came to send peace upon earth: I came not to send peace, but the sword’¹²¹. He comes, he said, not to bring peace on earth, nor quietude between people and those spirits who have been destined to be our opponents and enemies since the creation of

¹¹⁴ I Thessalonians 5, 3.

¹¹⁵ Acts 9, 15.

¹¹⁶ Ephesians 6, 12.

¹¹⁷ Follows: 2 Corinthians 10, 4: ‘For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal...’.

¹¹⁸ Benziger: text not found with Gregory, but see *Decretum Gratiani*, II, C. XXIII, q. 1, c. 1.

¹¹⁹ Gregor, *Moria in Iob*, VI, 33, 51.

¹²⁰ Ephesians 6, 11; and *Decretum Gratiani*, II, C. XXIII, q. 1, c. 1.

¹²¹ Matthew 10, 34.

the world, indeed he said: ‘I will put enmities between thee and the woman and her sons’¹²²; or rather war, whereby the good war ends the bad peace. For if we fail to gain eternal surety, it will be deserved if we did not exercise for the rewarding, spiritual war, but instead became beset by worldly affairs and lost even temporal quietude. And it is right that those who become overwhelmed in easier, worldly wars, either slacken or are more quickly defeated in the harder wars of the spirit. In short, as testified by the holy Job: ‘The life of man upon earth is a warfare’¹²³. It is necessary that those not engaged in spiritual war, grind with the clash of temporal wars.

[2] You see well, learned and eloquent Platina, the disadvantages and difficulties with earthly quietude, which you call peace, and the almost impossibility of achieving it in this rivalry of men. So, I will finally come to an end if I may only add one more, and I would that you take it to heart. That the name of ‘peace’ should not be referred to as ‘sweet’, as indeed it still is, when peace is actually bitter and deadly¹²⁴. You have often read, if not seen, how the peace that is wished for so many times brought for cities, provinces and very great empires, a subversion of states and all things, and a measure of ruin. It is accompanied by the worst companions, which are sly hate and often tyranny, and even when it is good in itself, it is only a rare and godly gift. Therefore, I take those words of Cicero to be true, that for brave men, freedom in war is far better than slavery in peace¹²⁵. Because, as you read with Augustine, the cruel security that the Romans chose brought death and much cruelty took place in the peace. Where peace competes with war in cruelty, it also defeats it in this type of war. If those who are armed die, so also do those stretched out unarmed and exposed, because as it is said, war is less cruel if those who are being slain can also strike back. Peace is crueller and less certain, not because those who flee stay alive, but because those who are in the throws of death cannot defend themselves¹²⁶.

[3] Apart from this, you should not believe, most eloquent Platina, that with what we have said we condemn all earthly quietude or would view it as completely unfavourable and

¹²² Genesis 3, 15.

¹²³ Job 7, 1.

¹²⁴ Petrarch, *De rem.*, I, 105, S. 136.

¹²⁵ Similar to Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, 81; also, Petrarch, *De rem.*, I, 105, S. 140.

¹²⁶ Follows Augustine, *City of God*, 3, 28.

difficult. I know that, ‘Lovely and attractive are the feet of him who preaches the gospel of peace’¹²⁷. I also know that the temporal surety that human peace brings is worthy of desire, and without it the highest aim of every human, political ordering cannot be achieved, because it is written: ‘He hath placed peace in thy borders’¹²⁸. Nevertheless, we still say that even this other peace can only be fulfilled and achieved by men pursuing virtue. It exists in the reconciliation with enemies, in forgetting injustice and offence, suffering evil and in the uniting of difference, in the bringing together of those in dispute, and thereby removing hate. Furthermore, we avow that peace is for every soul of man, not a peace of tongue, but of the heart. The eternal God provides us with this peace as an ideal after which we should seek, as he said: ‘My peace I give unto you’¹²⁹. Notice he said ‘my’, and he did not add, ‘The peace of the world I give unto you’, but ‘my peace’, which is the peace of the heart, and for which the church prays. He strives for a peace, he said, which the world cannot therefore give, because it cannot be fully preserved in this world. This distinction is made in other words by the holy Augustine when he showed us what godly peace is, he said: ‘I give you my peace’, Christ said. He gives us his peace; he provides us with a peace that will come at the end. If we believe in him we can defeat the enemy. ‘He is giving us his peace’ when we come to prevail without enemies¹³⁰. But whoever takes a particular, temporary truce, or a pause from war that is being jostled in, to be the true peace that God left behind for us and has strongly commended, hugely deceives themselves.

[4] Believe me, learned Platina, there is no true and complete peace in this world, as Augustine assured us when he said in his exposition on the Psalms that there will be no true peace or tranquillity in this mortal life, but for those who enjoy the friendship of the immortal and the company of angels. And everyone here who has not striven for it, will not have it when he comes¹³¹. How can we, who are always waging or planning for war, in deed or in thoughts, have true peace, the peace of God? In my opinion it makes no difference whether weapons are wielded with the hands or in the imagination, but that war is waged with more cruelty, the less it is observed by the enemy. As a learned writer said¹³², we wage a persistent

¹²⁷ Isaiah 52, 7; and Romans 10, 15.

¹²⁸ Psalm (PsG) 147, 14.

¹²⁹ John 14, 27.

¹³⁰ Augustine, *Johannis Evangelium tractus*, 77, 3. Benziger: a very shortened version of the text.

¹³¹ Augustine, *Psalmos* 33, 2, 19, 40.

¹³² Benziger: citation could not be found.

and enduring war whose victory can only kill us. Or if you want it in another way: Christ our Lord has commended his peace to us, the universal agreement of the spirit with the godly will, because, as the most blessed Pope Leo said, the true peace cannot be separated from the will of God¹³³. This peace is not just temporal but eternal, because it begins here in time and finally continues on into eternal immortality, and that whoever keeps it can good and manfully struggle against the flesh, the world and the demons.

This peace may be given to us by him who is blessed in all eternity. AMEN.

¹³³ Leo Magnus, *Sermo* 29, 1.

APPENDIX 2 – PRAYER BEFORE BATTLE

English translation and annotated by Stephen Ryle

PRECATIONES ALIQUOT NOVAE

SOME NEW PRAYERS

Collection of Erasmus's prayers in 3 parts, Froben imprint of 1535.

PRAYER BEFORE BATTLE¹

Almighty King of Sabaoth, that is, of armies, you determine both war and peace for the regions of the earth by means of your angels appointed for the task². You gave new heart and strength to the boy David, so that although he was small without weapons and unskilled in war he attacked and overthrew the giant Goliath with a sling³. If we are fighting for a just cause, if we are forced to fight, I pray you, first, to turn the hearts of our enemies to the desire for peace, so that no Christian blood may be spilt upon the earth; or to spread the fear that men could panic,⁴ or to let victory be gained with the least shedding of blood and the smallest loss by those whose cause is more pleasing to you, so that the war may be quickly concluded and we may sing songs of triumph with one accord to you, who reign in all and above all.

Amen.

¹ *Collected Works of Erasmus (CWE)* Vol. 69, p. 137. 'Dedicated to David, a young man of promise, son of the distinguished Joham Paumgartner of Paumgarten... "Nothing in human life is better than piety", Freiburg im Breisgau 13th February 1535', *Ibid.*

² Deut. 32, 8, which in the Septuagint version seems to be the basis for the persuasion of some patristic and later writers that each nation or province was protected by a special angel.

³ 1 Sam. 17, 1 - 54.

⁴ The biblical paradigm for this is found at Judg. 7, 18 - 22.

**APPENDIX 3 – DISCOURSE ON THE ORGANISATION OF THE
FLORENTINE STATE FOR ARMS**

English translation by Mike Cailes

DISCOURSE ON THE ORGANISATION OF THE FLORENTINE STATE FOR ARMS¹

You have asked that I write on the foundation and positioning of this Ordinance. In order to add to your knowledge, I will write as much as your patience permits.

I pose the question as to whether or not it is good to organise the state completely with its own arms. As everyone knows, be they for empire, kingdom, principality, or republic, and as stated by every commander, from the first grade down to the captain of a brig, it is a matter of both justice and arms. And you have little justice and no arms. Therefore, how do we restore both of these to good order, and maintain them, with arms being only in the service of the public good? Do not be deceived by the fact that you have lived otherwise for the past hundred years, because if you look back closely at those times, you see that it is impossible to continue your freedom in the same way. This is clear when you realise what you can achieve by other means. The situation, therefore, is as follows.

Assuming that approval is given for the necessary Ordinance, and that it favours a good army with the State of Florence organised for arms, it is now necessary to examine how this militia will be introduced. As your State is divided into the city, the *contado*, and the *distretto*², it has to be considered whether the militia should begin in one of these areas, two, or all three at once. But because great matters should be arrived at slowly, you cannot begin

¹ Translated from: *Arte della guerra e scritti politici minori*, Bertelli, Sergio, (ed.) (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1961), pp. 95 - 100.

² Bertelli, p. 95, n. 3: The city, *città*, consists of the immediate subjects; the *contado* consists of the surrounding countryside, hinterland or *retrotterra*; and the *distretto* is made up of the villages.

in any two, or all three, of the aforementioned areas without considerable risk and confusion: therefore, choose one.

This will not please the ‘city towers’³, because any one army is divided up, roughly speaking, into men who command and men who obey, and again into foot soldiers and mounted soldiers. We have to introduce the structure of an army into any one province, therefore, instead of all the arms together, as in all other affairs we must start with the easiest part. Without doubt it is easier to introduce a militia of foot than the cavalry, and it is much easier to learn to obey than to command. And because in your city you are the type of person who either fights with the cavalry or who takes command, we cannot begin with you because you are the most difficult part. Therefore, to begin with the infantry and those who obey, we must start in your *contado*.

Nor does it appear possible to choose the *distretto*, even if you were able to introduce a militia of foot. This is because it would not be safe to leave your city, especially in those *distretto* with large fortified villages, and where a province strives for independence. The mood of Tuscany is such that one concession of power towards self-government, and it would not benefit the governing authority to have them fully armed and the government disarmed. Therefore the *distretto* must either never be ordered to arms, or you must wait until your infantry from the *contado* are mobilised, and have built up a reputation. Those *distretto* that cannot be armed are either where they have concentrations of population, such as Arezzo, Borga ad San Sepolcro, Cortona, Volterra, Pistoia, Colle Val d’Elsa, and Sangimignano. Or where they are more fortified, such as the Romagna, Lunigiana, etc, they are of less concern because they recognise no authority other than Florence, or because they have no higher private authority that would intervene in your *contado*: to a lesser extent,

³ This is taken to be a colloquial expression for the dominating, but rigid and less intelligent, figures of the establishment.

Casentino and Valdarno, and to a greater extent, Mugello etc. Even if they have plenty of men they have no leadership other than Florence, and any number of castles will not make a difference.

However, when the Ordinance is started in the *contado*, where we want to establish order, it is necessary to give it order and form: insignia to mobilise under; stocks of weapons with which to arm; to determine who mobilises under which insignia; and give leaders to implement the order. As to how many arms are given to them, these are listed⁴. As to how many insignias, it seems that all the banners should be with the one same insignia of the Lion⁵, to which all of your men would have the same loyalty, without others that would conflict with the public insignia, and divide support for it. Thus arranged, each separate leader recognises this to be the case. Thus enumerated, the city can take hold of the *contado*, and command it more easily.

It is also necessary to determine the territorial boundary of each banner, and whether to use the latest boundary or to revert to the old. Because there are divisions and jurisdictions of captains, vicars, mayors, communities and people, it is preferable to choose one or other of these orders: and it is the boundaries of the mayoral Council's banner that determine whether the others are too large or too small. Therefore, each Council is given one banner; and two, three, four or five banners are given a constable to instruct them, subject to the ease of assembly, and to the number of men listed under that banner. Thus, your thirty banners are controlled by eleven constables. The areas from where they are placed are: Mugello, Firenzuola, Casentino, Valdarno more or less, Pescia and Lunigiana.

⁴ Bertelli, p. 97, n. 12: In the First Provision for the Infantry, of 6th December 1506.

⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 13: The sign of Marzocco.

It would seem appropriate, even when things are not yet ready, to write under each banner how many more men each Council can provide⁶, because as Messr. Ercole⁷ said in one of his memoranda: this order will always be judged by appearances, and only sometimes by the facts. But it will not be convincing if only a small number of men are listed when more are needed, better more than less. Similarly, it does not prevent the ordering of more of the country's men without forcing them to do more than 12 – 16 military exercise a year, and giving them free licence to go where they want to do their business. Therefore, the order should be interpreted with a great deal of prudence, with the intention of not having to force or take from their homes those who have an honest reason to stay there, or are known to be of little use. It is better that there appears to be a higher number than there exists in reality, because you can always make new and better choices when you have had more opportunities to actually see them, than is the case when you have not seen them. You therefore find it written, in places emphasised, that under thirty banners and eleven constables there are more than five thousand men, when in reality Florence has one thousand two hundred, duly processed, new, and well ordered. However, there cannot be more, or the appearance will inevitably be ruined and the façade destroyed, as without giving them their captain or guide they will not hold up against their enemies.

It is necessary to give them a captain, to make a law enabling this, and a magistrate to apply and enforce it. Such a law must be well written, well argued, and presented so that no offence is caused, and the men are remunerated⁸. To keep order, this magistrate must have the authority to punish, and the means to carry out the substance of what the law requires. To ignore this will cause damage. If you are forced to remove a number of soldiers, at least keep the banner, and the constable to provide arms for musters and tournaments, to review each

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98, n. 18: As described in the Ordinance, and in *Arte della Guerra*, 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 19, Ercole, Bentivoglio, Captain General of the armies of the Republic of Florence.

⁸ Bertelli, p. 97, n. 12, refers to *The Discourses* I, 51. This discusses the decision of the Roman Senate to remunerate military service.

account, to cancel certain days and times, to re-schedule others, and to inculcate a sense of religion to make them more obedient⁹.

As to how much order to impose to prevent the men from causing harm, one has to consider two likely ways in which harm can be caused: either between themselves, or against the city. Between themselves it is possible to cause injury as an individual or in other specific ways, or as is usually the case, to congregate together to commit villainy. In the first case you want to double the penalty and maximise its effect during a muster¹⁰, but when the punishment is carried out elsewhere, one can follow the old law. When the injury is caused by an assembled gang, you must make a live and convincing demonstration of the ring leaders, and a sufficient example for men to remember.

Harm against the city can be caused in the following ways: either to rebel and join up with a foreign power; or to act unconstitutionally against a magistrate or a private individual. When the men have joined with a foreign power, and are assembled in the aforesaid places, it is without doubt impossible to act. When they have harmed a magistrate, you must arrange things in the best and most appropriate way. And in considering the best way to act, I believe it fitting to acknowledge: who it is that looks after them, who commands them in war, and who remunerates them.

Because it would be dangerous to recognise all authority as being vested in a single superior, it would be as well to consider which new magistrate is appropriate for this domestic situation. The Ten exercises command in time of war; and the Signori, the Colleges, the Ten, and the new magistrates reward and remunerate the men. Certainly therefore, it will always be a matter of some confusion as to who their superior is, and how to distinguish

⁹ Bertelli, p. 99, n. 24: *Arte della guerra*, I.

¹⁰ Bertelli, at p. 99, n. 26, describes the term '*Mostre*' as '*parate militari*'. I translate these as 'muster' and 'military parade': 'muster' is a term associated with the periodic assembling of contemporary militias. The sense is taken to be that of achieving maximum deterrent effect when the punishment takes place during a muster in front of other troops.

between a public body from a private one. And because a multitude without a leader never achieved anything but harm, albeit it is easy to suppress, it is necessary to warn all leaders who give banners and go on to command, not to seize more authority than they reasonably should. It is possible to seize more authority in many ways, or to command in their own interests. Therefore, it is necessary to stipulate that nobody is native to a place where they have a banner, or has homes or possessions where they command. This means people from Casentino for Mugello, and for Casentino, people from Mugello. And because authority corrupts with time, it is well to change the constables each year, to have a new command, and to prohibit the same men from returning to command within a given period of time. When all these things are well ordered and well observed, there will be no doubts. Also, when reward is not thought to be immediately necessary but only the exercise of authority, as was mentioned above, deal with the rewards later and then give directly to each according to their merit.

When the Ordinance is well established in the *contado*, it will then be necessary to make a gradual start with the city, and this will be an easy introduction. You will see for yourself the difference in having your soldiers from the city choose freely, and not with the corruption that is presently the case. Because if each man does not voluntarily obey his fatherland, it will be those who are bred in brothels that will become soldiers. But in coming from honest schools and a good education, they will honour both themselves and their *patria*. Everything is now ready to ensure that this project earns a good reputation, and it is clear that, by necessity, we begin the Ordinance with the *contado*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

1. Anonymous, *The Boke of Noblesse* (1475) (New York: Burt Franklin, 1972).
2. Aquinas, Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, Regan, R. J., (trans.) in Baumgarth, W. P., and Regan, R. J., (eds.), *On Law, Morality and Politics* (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2002).
3. Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Ross, D., (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, World Classic, 1980).
4. ——— *Politics*, Everson, S., (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
5. Augustine, *Political Writings*, Kries, D., and Tkacz, M. W., (trans.) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994).
6. Bouvet, Honoré, *The Tree of Battles*, (circa.1387), Coopland, G. W., (trans.), (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949).
7. Bruni, Leonardo, *De Militia*, (1421), in *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni: Selected Texts*, Griffiths, G., Henkins, J., and Thompson, D., (trans.) (Binghampton, New York: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1987).
8. Castiglione, Baldesar, *The Book of the Courtier*, Bull, George, (trans. and ed.) (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1967).
9. Cicero, *On Duties (De officiis)*, Griffin, M. T., and Atkins, E. M., (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
10. Erasmus, Desiderius, *The Collected Works of Erasmus* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1974).
11. ——— *The Erasmus Reader*, Rummel, E., (ed.) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
12. ——— *Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria (Panegyricus ad Philippum Austriae ducem)* (1504), Jardine, Lisa, (trans. and ed.), in *The Education of a Christian Prince* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
13. ——— *War is Sweet to the Inexperienced (Dulce bellum inexpertis)* (1515), in Phillips, Margaret, Mann, *The Adages of Erasmus: A Study with Translations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964). Also in Barker, W., (ed.), *The Adages of Erasmus* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

14. ——— *The Education of a Christian Prince (Institutio principis christiani)* (1516), Cheshire, Neil, M., and Heath, Michael, J., (trans.) in Jardine, Lisa (ed.), *The Education of a Christian Prince* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
15. ——— *The Colloquies of Erasmus*, Thompson, C. R., (trans.) (Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1965).
16. ——— *On the War Against the Turks (De bello turcico)* (1530), in Rummel, E., (ed.), *The Erasmus Reader* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
17. ——— *The Complaint of Peace (Querela pacis)* (1517), in Adams, Robert, M., (ed. and trans.), *The Praise of Folly and Other Writings*, (London and New York: Norton, 1989).
18. Grotius, Hugo, *De iure belli ac pacis* (1625), Kelsey, Francis, W., et al, (trans.) (Oxford, 1925).
19. Guicciardini, Francesco, *Storia d'Italia*, Panigada, C., (ed.) (Bari, 1929); and in English as *The History of Italy*, Alexander, Sidney, (trans. and ed.) (London and New York: Macmillan, 1969).
20. Legnano, Giovanni da, *Tractus de bello, de represalis et de duello*, (Bologna, 1360), Holland, T. E., (ed.), Briely, J. L., (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1917).
21. Lipsius, Justus, *Politica: Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction*, Waszink, Jan, (ed. and trans.) (Assen: Royal van Gorcum, 2004).
22. Luther, Martin, *Whether Soldiers Too Can Be Saved* (1526), Jacobs, C. M., (trans.), Schultz, R. C., (rev.), in Schultz, R. C., and Lehmann, H. T., (eds.) *Luthers Works, Vol.46, 'The Christian in Society'* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967).
23. Machiavelli, Niccolò, *Tutte le opera*, Martelli, Mario, (ed.) (Florence: Sansoni, 1971).
24. ——— *Tutte le opera: storiche, politiche e letterarie*, Capata, Alessandro, (ed.) (Rome: Newton and Compton, 1998).
25. ——— “First Decennale”, (1504), in *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others, Vol.3*, Gilbert, A., (trans.) (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1965).
26. ——— Tercets “On Ambition”, (ca 1509), and “On Fortune”, (of unknown date), in *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others, Vol. 1*, Gilbert, A., (trans.) (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1965).
27. ——— *The Art of War*, (1521), Wood, Neal, (ed.), Farnsworth, Ellis, (trans.) (Da Capo Press, 2001).
28. ——— *Arte della guerra e scritti politici minori*, Bertelli, Sergio, (ed.) (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1961).

29. ——— *The Letters of Machiavelli*, Gilbert, A., (ed. and trans.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961).
30. ——— *The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli*, Detmold, Christian, E., (trans.), (Boston: J. R. Osgood and Company, 1882).
31. ——— *Machiavelli and his Friends: Their Personal Correspondence*, Atkinson, J. B., and Sices, D., (trans. and ed.) (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996).
32. ——— *The Prince*, Bull, G., (trans.) (London: Penguin, 1999).
33. ——— *The Discourses*, Walker, Leslie, J., (trans.), Crick, Bernard, (ed.) (London: Penguin, 1974).
34. ——— *The History of Florence*, introduced by Gilbert, Felix (New York: Harper and Row, 1960).
35. Pace, Richard, *Oration*, (1518), Russell, D. A., (trans.), in Russell, Jocelyn, G., *Peacemaking in the Renaissance* (London: Duckworth, 1986), pp. 234 - 242.
36. More, Thomas, *Utopia*, (1516), Logan, George, M., and Adams, Robert, M., (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
37. Pizan, Christine de, *The Book of Deeds of Arms and Chivalry* (ca. 1410), Willard, Charity, Cannon, (ed.), Willard Summer, (trans.), (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).
38. Plato, *The Republic*, Ferrari, G. R. F., (ed.), Griffith, Tom, (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
39. ——— *The Laws*, Pangle, T. L., (trans.), *The Laws of Plato* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
40. ——— *The Statesman*, Waterfield, Robin, (trans. and ed.), Annas, Julia, (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
41. Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Science, (Epitoma Rei Militaris)*, (Milner, N. P., (trans., and ed.) (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993 and 2001).
42. Vitoria, Francesco de, *Political Writings*, Pagden, A., and Lawrence, J., (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Secondary Sources

1. Adams, Robert, P., *The Better Part of Valour: More, Erasmus, Colet and Vives on Humanism, War, and Peace, 1496 – 1535* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962).
2. Anglo, Sydney, *Machiavelli: A Dissection* (London: Granada, 1969).
3. Anglo, Sydney, *Machiavelli: The First Century: Studies in Enthusiasm, Hostility, and Irrelevance*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
4. Arnold, Thomas, F., *The Renaissance at War*, Keegan, J., (Series ed.) (London and New York: Harper Collins, 2006).
5. Ascoli, Albert, Russell, and Capodivacca, Angela, Matilde, “Machiavelli and Poetry”, in Najemy, John, M., (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 190 - 205.
6. Ayton, Andrew, and Price, J.L., (eds.), *The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995).
7. Barnes, Jonathan, “The Just War”, in: Kretzmann, N., Kenny, A., and Pinborg, J., *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
8. Baumgarten, Frederic, J., *Declaring War in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
9. Bayley, C.C., *War and Society in Renaissance Florence: The De Militia of Leonardo Bruni* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961).
10. Bellamy, Alex, J., *Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq* (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2006).
11. Benner, Erica, *Machiavelli's Ethics* (Princeton and Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2009).
12. Benziger, Wolfram, *Zur Theorie von Krieg und Frieden in der italienischen Renaissance: Die Disputatio de pace et bello zwischen Bartolomeo Platina und Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo und andere anlässlich der Pax Paolina (Rom 1468) entstandene Schriften* (Berlin and New York: Peter Lang, European University Studies, 1996).
13. Berlin, Isaiah, “The Originality of Machiavelli”, in Gilmore, Myron, P., (ed.), *Studies on Machiavelli* (Florence: Sansoni, 1972).
14. Bicheno, Hugh, *Vendetta: High Art and Low Cunning at the birth of the Renaissance* (London: Phoenix, 2007).
15. Black, Jeremy, *European Warfare 1494-1660* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).

16. Black, Robert, "Machiavelli in the chancery", in Najemy, John, M., (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 31 - 47.
17. Brett, Annabel, "Scholastic political thought and the modern concept of the state", in: Brett, Annabel and Tully, James, with Hamilton-Bleakley, Holly, (eds.), *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 130 - 148.
18. Butters, H. C., *Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth-Century Florence 1502-1519* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
19. Butters, H. C., "Political Allegiances and Political Structures in the Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli and Francesco Guicciardini", in Shaw, Christine, (ed.), *Italy and European Powers: The Impact of War 1500-1530* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), pp. 91 - 106.
20. Castiglione, D., and Hampsher-Monk, I., (eds.), *The History of Political Thought in National Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
21. Chambers, D. C., *Popes Cardinals and War: The Military Church in Renaissance and Early Modern Europe* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006).
22. Clark, Ian, *Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
23. Coleman, Janet, *A History of Political Thought from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000).
24. Copenhaver, B. P., and Schmitt, C. B., *Renaissance Philosophy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
25. Crick, Bernard, "Introduction" to, Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, Walker, Leslie, J., (trans.), Crick, Bernard, (ed.) (London: Penguin, 1974).
26. Coker, Christopher, *Barbarous Philosophers* (London: Hurst & Co., 2010).
27. Cuneo, Pia, (ed.), *Artful Armies and Beautiful Battles: Art and Warfare in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
28. Dallmayr, F., *Peace Talks – Who Will Listen?* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2004).
29. Deane, Herbert, A., *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (London and New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).
30. Dorey, T. A., (ed.) *Studies in Latin Literature and its Influence: Erasmus* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970).
31. Elshtain, Jean, Bethke, (ed.), *Just War Theory* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1992).
32. Faluday, George, *Erasmus of Rotterdam* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1970).

33. Fernández-Santamaria, J. A., *The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance 1516-1559* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
34. Gilbert, Felix, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War", in Paret, Peter, (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 11 - 31.
35. Gill, Robert, *A Textbook of Christian Ethics*, 3rd ed., (London and New York: T. & T. Clark, 2006).
36. Grazia, Sebastian, de, *Machiavelli in Hell*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1988).
37. Green, V.H.H., *Renaissance and Reformation: A Survey of European History between 1450 & 1660* (London and New York: Edward Arnold, 1972).
38. Gush, George, *Renaissance Armies 1480 – 1650* (Cambridge: Patrick Stevens, 1975).
39. Hale, J. R., *Renaissance War Studies* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1983).
40. Hale, J. R., *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998) (First published by Fontana, 1985).
41. Halkin, Léon-E, *Erasmus: A Critical Biography*, Tonkin, J., (trans.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
42. Hampsher-Monk, I., Tilmans, K., and Vree, F., van, (eds.), *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998).
43. Heuser, Beatrice, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
44. Hexter, J. W., *The Visions of Politics on the Eve of the Reformation* (London: Allen Lane, 1973).
45. Hörnqvist, Mikael, *Machiavelli and Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
46. Hörnqvist, Mikael, "Machiavelli's military project and the *Art of War*", in Najemy, John, M., (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 112 - 127.
47. Housley, Norman, *Crusading and Warfare in Medieval and Renaissance Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).
48. Howard, Sir Michael, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).
49. Howard, Sir Michael, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (London: Hurst, 2007).

50. Howard, Sir Michael, Andreopoulos, George, J., and Shulman, Mark, R., (eds.) *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994).
51. Huizinga, Johan, "The political and military significance of chivalric ideas in the late Middle Ages", *Men and Ideas*, Holmes, J.S., and Marle, H., van, (eds.) London, 1960).
52. Huizinga, Johan, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, Hopman, F., (trans.) (Harmondsworth, 1965).
53. Huizinga, Johan, "The Mind of Erasmus", in Adams, Robert, M., (ed. and trans.), *The Praise of Folly and Other Writings*, (London and New York: Norton, 1989).
54. Hyma, A., *The Youth of Erasmus* (Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1930).
55. Johnson, James, Turner, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740* (Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 1975).
56. ——— *The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton and Guilford: Princeton University Press, 1981).
57. ——— *The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History* (Princeton and Guilford: Princeton University Press, 1987).
58. ——— *Morality and Contemporary Warfare* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999).
59. ——— *Ethics and the Use of Force: Just War in Historical Perspective* (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011).
60. Jones, Jonathan, *The Lost Battles: Leonardo, Michelangelo and the Artistic Duel that defined the Renaissance* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2010).
61. Kahn, Victoria, "Virtù and Agathocles", in Ascoli, A. R., and Kahn, V., (eds.), *Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 195 - 218.
62. Kahn, Victoria, "Machiavelli's reputation to the eighteenth century", in Najemy, John, M., (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 239 - 256.
63. Keen, M. H., *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London, 1965).
64. Kretzmann, N., Kenny, A., and Pinborg, J., *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
65. Lee, Stephen, J., *Aspects of European History: 1494 - 1789* (London: Routledge, 1984).
66. Lowe, Ben, *Imagining Peace: A History of Early English Pacifist Ideas* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

67. Mallett, Michael, *Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy* (London, Sydney and Toronto: The Bodley Head, 1974).
68. Mallett, Michael, "The theory and practice of warfare in Machiavelli's republic", in Bock, G., Skinner, Q., and Viroli, M., (eds.), *Machiavelli and Republicanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 173 - 180 .
69. Mallett, Michael, "The Transformation of War, 1494-1530", in Shaw, Christine, (ed.) *Italy and the European Powers: The Impact of War, 1500-1530* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), pp. 3 - 22.
70. Mansfield, B, *Man On His Own: Interpretations of Erasmus, c 1750-1920* (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 1992).
71. Markus, R. A., *Sacred and Secular: Studies on Augustine and Latin Christianity* (Aldershot and Vermont: Variorum, Ashgate Publishing, 1994).
72. Massaro, T. J., and Shannon, T. A., *Catholic Perspectives on Peace and War* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).
73. Mattingly, Garret, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (New York: Dover, 1988).
74. Mattox, J. M., *Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War* (London and New York: Continuum, 2006).
75. May, Larry, (ed.), *War: Essays in Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
76. Mayer, P., *The Pacifist Conscience* (London: Penguin Books, 1966).
77. Moseley, Alexander, *A Philosophy of War* (New York: Agora Publishing, 2002).
78. Najemy, John, M., (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
79. Nauert, Charles, G., *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
80. Oestreich, Gerhard, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, Oestreich, Brigitta, and Koenigsberger, H. G., (eds.), McLintock, D., (trans.), (London, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
81. Pangle, Thomas, L., (ed.), *The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987).
82. Parel, Anthony, J., *The Machiavellian Cosmos* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992).

83. Pesman, Roslyn, "Machiavelli, Piero Soderini, and the republic of 1494-1512", in Najemy, John, M., (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 48 - 63.
84. Phillips, Margaret, Mann, *Erasmus and the Northern Renaissance* (London, 1949).
85. Phillips, Margaret, Mann, *The Ages of Erasmus: A Study with Translations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964).
86. Pocock, J. G. A., *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003).
87. Pocock, J. G. A., "Rome: the republic as ideal and as history", in Najemy, John, M., (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 144 - 156.
88. Reichberg, G. M., Syse, H., and Begby, E., *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings* (Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).
89. Ridolfi, Roberto, *The Life of Niccolò Machiavelli*, Grayson, C., (trans.) (London, 1963).
90. Russell, B., *History of Western Philosophy* (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1979).
91. Russell, Frederick, H., *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
92. Russell, Jocelyn, G., *Peacemaking in the Renaissance* (London: Duckworth, 1986).
93. Shaw, Christine, (ed.) *Italy and the European Powers: The Impact of War, 1500-1530* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006).
94. Schmitt, Charles, B., Skinner, Quinton, Kessler, Eckhard, and Kraye, Jill, (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
95. Skinner, Quinton, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume I: The Renaissance*, and *Volume II: The Age of the Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
96. Skinner, Q., *Visions of Politics: Volume II, Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
97. Smith, Preserved, *Erasmus: A Study of his Life, Ideals and Place in History* (New York: Dover, 1962).
98. Spackman, Barbara, "Politics on the Warpath", in Ascoli, A., R., and Kahn, V., (eds.), *Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 179 - 194.

99. Strauss, Leo, *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press).
100. Tallett, Frank, *War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, 1495-1715* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).
101. Taylor, F. L., *The Art of War in Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921).
102. Tracy, James, D., *The Politics of Erasmus: A Pacifist Intellectual and his Political Milieu* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978).
103. Tracy, James, D., *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International finance, and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002).
104. Tuck, Richard, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
105. Urban, William, *Medieval Mercenaries: The Business of War* (London and Minnesota: Greenhill, 2006).
106. Vale, Michael, *War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages* (London: Duckworth, 1981).
107. Viroli, Maurizio, *Machiavelli*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
108. Viroli, Maurizio, *Machiavelli's God*, Shugaar, A., (trans.) (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010).
109. Waltzer, Michael, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York, Basic Books, 1977, 4th ed., 2006).
110. Waszink, Jan, "Introduction", Lipsius, Justus, *Politica: Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction*, (Assen: Royal van Gorcum, 2004).
111. Whetham, David, *Just Wars and Moral Victories: Surprise, Deception and the Normative Framework of European War in the Later Middle Ages* (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
112. Whetham, David, (ed.), *Ethics, Law and Military Operations* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
113. Wood, Neal, "Introduction" to, Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, (1521), Wood, Neal, (ed.), Farnsworth, Ellis, (trans.) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001).
114. Wright, E., (ed.), *The Medieval and Renaissance World* (London: Hamlyn, 1979).
115. Wright, R. F., *Medieval Internationalism: The Contribution of the Medieval Church to International Law and Peace* (London: William and Norgate, 1930).

116. Yorán, Hanan, *Between Utopia and Dystopia: Erasmus, Thomas More, and the Humanist Republic of Letters* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010).

Journal Articles

1. Benziger, Wolfram, “Zwischen *bellum iustum* und modernem Völkerrecht. Überlegungen zum Denken über Krieg und Frieden am Ende des Mittelalters”, *Militär-geschichtliche Zeitschrift*, Vol. 65, No. 1, (2006), pp. 131 – 151.
2. Butters, Humfrey, “Good Government and the Limitations of Power in the Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli”, *History of Political Thought*, Vol. VII, No. 3, (Winter, 1986), pp. 411-417.
3. Cochrane, E. W., “Machiavelli: 1940-1960”, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 33, (1961), pp. 119-36.
4. Cook, Martin, L., “Michael Walzer’s Concept of Supreme Emergency”, *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2007), pp. 138-151; and Walzer, Michael, “Response”, pp. 168-171.
5. Dealy, R., “The Dynamics of Erasmus’ Thought on War”, *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society, Yearbook* 4, (1984), pp. 53 - 67.
6. Elder, Dan, “Glory and the Boundaries of Public Morality in Machiavelli’s Thought”, *History of Political Thought*, Vol. VII, No. 3, (Winter, 1986), pp. 419-438.
7. Fernandez, José, A., “Erasmus on Just War”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 34, No. 2, (Apr.-Jun., 1973), pp. 209-226.
8. Gorman, Ryan, R., “War and the Virtues in Aquinas’s Ethical Thought”, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (2010), pp. 245-261.
9. Heath, M. J., “Twelfth Annual Bainton Lecture: Erasmus and the Infidel”, *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society, Yearbook* 16, (1996), pp. 19 - 33.
10. Hochner, Nicole, “A Ritualist Approach to Machiavelli”, *History of Political Thought*, Vol. XXX, No. 4, (Winter, 2009), pp. 575-95.
11. Höpfl, Harro, “Orthodoxy and Reason of State”, *History of Political Thought*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, (Summer, 2002), pp. 211-237.

12. Hörnqvist, Mikael, “*Perché non si usa allegare I Romani: Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506*”, *Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol. 55. No.1, (Spring, 2002), pp. 148-191.
13. Johnson, James, Turner, “Towards Reconstructing the *jus ad bellum*”, *Monist*, 57, (1973), pp. 461 – 488.
14. ——— “Two kinds of Pacifism: Opposition to the Political Use of Force in the Renaissance-Reformation Period”, *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 12, No. 1, (Spring, 1984), pp. 39-60.
15. ——— “Thinking Historically about Just War”, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2009), pp. 246-259.
16. ——— “Reflections on *The Journal of Military Ethics*”, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (2012), p. 7.
17. Langan, John, “The Elements of St. Augustine’s Just War Theory”, *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 12, No. 1, (Spring, 1984), pp. 19-38.
18. Leira, Halvard, “Justus Lipsius, political humanism and the disciplining of 17th century statecraft”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4, (October, 2008), pp. 669-692.
19. Levi, Anthony, “Pagan Virtue and the Humanism of the Northern Renaissance”, *The Royal Society for Renaissance Studies*, Occasional Paper No. 2, (1974).
20. Lucchese, Filippo Del, “Crisis and Power: Economics, Politics and Conflict in Machiavelli’s Political Thought”, *History of Political Thought*, Vol. XXX, No. 1, (Spring, 2009), pp. 75-96.
21. Lukes, Timothy, J., “Martialing Machiavelli: Reassessing the Military Reflections”, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 66, No. 4, (November, 2004), pp. 1089-1108.
22. Marx, Steven, “Shakespeare’s Pacifism”, *Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 1, (Spring, 1992), pp. 49-95.
23. McMahan, Jeff, “The Sources and Status of Just War Principles”, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2007), pp. 91-106.
24. O’ Driscoll, Cian, “Learning the Language of Just War Theory: The value of Engagement”, *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2007), pp. 107-116.
25. Parel, A. J., “Machiavelli’s Notions of Justice”, *Political Theory*, Vol. 18, No.4, (November, 1990), pp. 528-544).
26. Price, Russell, “The Theme of Gloria in Machiavelli”, *Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 4, (Winter 1977), pp. 588 – 631.
27. Reichberg, Gregory, “Just War or Perpetual Peace”, *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2002), pp. 16 – 35.

28. Reichberg, Gregory, "Thomas Aquinas on Military Prudence", *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (2010), pp. 262 - 275.
29. Sharma, Serena, "The Legacy of Jus Contra Bellum: Echoes of Pacifism in Contemporary Just War Thought", *The Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2009), pp. 217-230.
30. Sullivan, Vickie, B., "Machiavelli's Momentary 'Machiavellian Moment': A Reconsideration of Pocock's Treatment of the Discourses", *Political Theory*, Vol. 20, No.2, (May, 1992), pp. 309-318.
31. Yorán, Hanan, "Machiavelli's Critique of Humanism and the Ambivalences of Modernity", *History of Political Thought*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, (Summer, 2010), pp. 247-282.
32. Zmora, Hilla, "A World Without Saving Grace: Glory and Immortality in Machiavelli", *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 28, No. 3, (Autumn 2007), pp. 449 – 468.

Electronic Resources

1. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*: <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3011.htm> (last accessed: 6 May 11).
2. Benziger, Wolfram, "Zwischen *bellum iustum* und modernem Völkerrecht", *Militär-geschichtliche Zeitschrift*, Vol. 65, No. 1, 2006: http://www.oldenbourg-verlag.de/sites/default/files/filebase/files/ov/MGZ_2006_Heft_65-1.pdf (last accessed: 7 Nov 11).
3. Bible: Douay – Rheims Vulgate online edition: <http://www.drbo.org/> (last accessed: 27 Mar 12).
4. Catholic Encyclopedia, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14698b.htm> (last accessed: 6 May 11).
5. Detmold, Christian, E., (trans.), *The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli* (Boston, J. R. Osgood and Company, 1882), http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php&person=3801 (last accessed: 23 Mar 2012).
6. Erasmus, *Antipolemus; or, the Plea of Reason, Religion, and Humanity against War* (1507), Knox, Vicesimus, (trans., 1795), (Liberty Fund, Online, 2005), http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=630&chapter=210929&layout=html&Itemid=27 (last accessed: 21 Mar 2012).

