Chapter 1: The Chains that Bind?


(Pre-edited and pre-formatted version)

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1 The Chains that Bind?

Throughout history, technology has been instrumental in the undertaking of violent acts. Perhaps as with no other area of technical development, weaponry makes explicit the potential for innovations to serve destructive ends. With the development of new destructive capabilities have come attempts to establish and enforce agreements that certain acts are wholly inappropriate – that is, they lay outside the realm of the necessary, just or civil. Establishing such accords entails surveying across the landscape of injuries and deaths inflicted in conflict in order to offer some general account of what is acceptable and what is not.

With varying degrees of success, in the past attempts have been made to signal out crossbows, firearms, and poisons as deplorable options. At the start of the 21st century, through their actions and statements, many governments have reinforced long standing claims made by a wide range of social groups that chemical and biological weapons are abhorrent and unacceptable. That some might use, proliferate, possess or be suspected of possessing such indiscriminate and deadly ‘weapons of mass destruction’ can, at least on some occasions, lead to a significant response in the international community of states.

Although typically topics of less high profile media coverage, in recent years non-governmental organizations have led efforts to halt or curtail the spread of landmines, small arms, cluster bombs and other weaponry. A plethora of sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting formal and informal means – international treaties, humanitarian law, customary law, rules of engagement, codes of conduct – have been employed to delineate the rights and wrongs with force. Government officials deciding on the suitability of arms exports, non-governmental organizations campaigning for the end to state practices, or diplomats formulating international arms control treaties do so through making determinations about the relative acceptability of the development, deployment or use of weaponry.

Existing international and national prohibitions identify various topics for concern: the types of weapons developed, their purpose, who uses them and in what circumstances, who suffers from them, or other consequences of their use. Alternative determinations of what is the primary source of concern justify alternative assessments of what needs to be done. In practice, agreement on the ‘it’ or ‘its’ that should be the center of attention often proves elusive. Many may agree on the need to control ‘weapons of mass destruction’, but what that should mean by way of specifics does not follow on in some straightforward fashion. Despite the often expressed condemnation of this category of weaponry in political debate, there is arguably little interest today among nuclear nations in abolishing all such weapons, specifically the nuclear ones. In addition, while limiting who possesses chemical, biological or nuclear weapons is a matter of focused international attention, attempts to establish prohibitions are confounded by disagreement about what ‘having’ these weapons means in the first place. Should the desire to control only require action in addressing the actual possession of weapons, the believed intention of acquiring them, or the potential capability to do so? As well, the recurring interest in countries such as the United States and the Russian Federation into developing ‘tactical’ (low yield)
nuclear weapons and incapacitating biochemical agents indicate the potential importance of circumstantial and consequential considerations in determinations of the rights and wrongs of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

This book examines attempts to limit, regulate, and outlaw the development and use of weaponry in relation to humanitarian concerns; or just how it is possible to set the ‘limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity’ to quote from the groundbreaking 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg. It considers the challenges of cutting through complex and often contested situations in order to offer appraisals of what prohibitions are prudent and workable. It asks what is at stake in how determinations are made about what constitutes ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappropriate’ technologies of violence. On what basis then, do individuals identify particular forms of inflicting death and injury as unacceptable whereas others are deemed permissible or at least tolerable? Determinations of the acceptability of force and thus the need for prohibitions are not commonly conceived across the globe or invariant over time, but rather topics of dispute and reappraisal.

Stated in somewhat different terms, this book searches for meaning about the acceptability of force and technology -- how problems are identified and how evaluations are negotiated. It considers how classifications are marshaled to impose an understanding on controversial events so as to suggest what should be done and when enough has been done. Just how determinations are made of what is really taking place and why are matters of some importance that arguably raise highly problematic empirical and ethical questions. As contended here, discussions about the merits of force and the prohibition of weapons are characterized by a complex inter-play between moments of treating the world as fixed, determinate, and known and alternatively treating it as fluid, indeterminate and unknown. While attempts to capture some definitive understanding of what is taking place and why that might underpin control measures are ever elusive, attempts to devise prohibitions necessitate trying to do just that.

As argued, the fundamental and (in many respects) inescapable disagreements and controversies associated with specifying the acceptability of weaponry should serve to alert us to the pervasive problems associated with the very analysis of this topic. So, as this book considers contentions with devising and enforcing prohibitions, it seeks to work out something the problems of associated with analyzing the acceptability of force. In doing so, it scrutinizes how descriptions, evidence and arguments are employed to justify conclusions about the appropriateness of weaponry and equipment.

Overall, this book seeks to bring the study of arms control up to date theoretically and empirically. In doing so it addresses varied substantive, conceptual and practical issues associated with establishing and policing ethical limits on technology.

**The Meaning of Metal**

As a starting point into the wide ranging analysis that follows, the remainder of this chapter considers disputes about the humanitarian acceptability of so-called “leg-irons”. As will be elaborated in later chapters, debates about the appropriateness of the development or employment of certain weapons often involves weighing
complicated evidential claims in circumstances where uncertainties are rife. As opposed to the complexity of modern high-tech weapons, restraint technology such as handcuffs and leg cuffs consist of little more than the cuff ‘bracelets’ themselves and linking devices. Used by incarceration centers, police agencies, military forces, and paramilitary organizations across the world for centuries, the case of physical restraint equipment would seem to be a straightforward area for devising and implementing controls. Briefly considering why this is not the case and why the very analysis of debates about restraint technologies should not be taken as straightforward will indicate something of the themes elaborated in later chapters.

Shortly after coming into political office, as part of its promise to bring an ethical dimension to the UK’s foreign policy, in July 1997 the British Labour Government announced that it ‘would take the necessary measures to prevent the export or transhipment from the UK’ of various equipment designed primarily for torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; this including ‘leg-irons, gang-chains, shackles—excluding normal handcuffs—and electric-shock belts designed for the restraint of a human being’. The statement set out an official classification of what various forms of leg restraints were primarily for (i.e., torture or other forms of cruel treatment) and thus their offensiveness. Since that time the UK has publicly supported a similar classification be adopted by European Union under its Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

Concern about the need for prohibitions on the export of leg-irons (sometimes called leg cuffs) did not begin or end with the 1997 statement. In a 1992 publication entitled Repression Trade (UK): How the UK Makes Torture and Death its Business, the human rights group Amnesty International provided an account of its previous encounters with restraint controls. As told therein, in 1983 two reporters from the newspaper the Daily Mirror were offered a supply of leg-irons from the company Hiatts based in Birmingham, England. Citing evidence regarding abuses committed with leg-irons and their medical effects, Amnesty International led a campaign against their export. In March 1984, the then Conservative government announced that ‘Licences will not be issued for the export to any destination of leg-irons, shackles and gang-chains for the restraint of prisoners.’

Just what the phrase ‘leg-irons, shackles and gang-chains’ meant came under question in 1991 when undercover human rights workers attending the Covert and Operational Procurement Exhibition (London) obtained a brochure for leg cuffs through a US company called Hiatt Thompson. Hiatt Thompson was formed in 1985 through a joint venture by Hiatts of England and the US Thompson Corporation. The brochure indicated the materials had been manufactured in Birmingham, England.

In an attempt to explain how British manufactured components were still appearing in prohibited leg cuffs, on 17 October 1991 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Tim Sainsbury announced: ‘The export of leg irons, shackles–excluding handcuffs–and gang chains is subject to control under the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1989 and requires an export licence from my Department.’ The Secretary explained that while no export licenses had been granted for ‘leg-irons’ in recent years, licenses had been ‘issued for "oversized handcuffs" and linking chains’. The potential for evading export controls for ‘leg cuffs’ through shipping their individual component parts (labeled as ‘oversized handcuffs’) lead to an official redefinition of the term
‘handcuff’. Secretary Sainsbury declared that in the future, for the purposes of export controls, handcuffs would be defined as restraints where ‘the maximum length of two cuffs and connecting chain [is] 240 mm. This standard would bring “oversized handcuffs” under control. The only United Kingdom exporter is being advised.’

Amnesty International later reported the spirit of the export regulations were violated in 1995 when journalists bought Hiatt leg cuffs in the US. In this case, ‘It would seem that Hiatts had been exporting oversized handcuffs to a US company called Hiatt Thompson, where longer chains were added to turn them into leg cuffs, whose sale and export is still legal in the United States.’

Just as what separates a ‘leg cuff’ from a ‘handcuff’ has been a topic of disagreement, so too has the desirability of prohibiting the former. Both the 1997 Labour government policy and Amnesty International’s position condemning leg cuffs are bound up with their classification as tools for torture or cruel treatment. In 1992, for instance, Amnesty International called for a prohibition on the manufacture of equipment that can only be used ‘for torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of prisoners’, this including ‘leg-irons and gang chains’. Cited as part of the case for this, the organization argued, ‘Leg-irons are designed to restrict severely the movement of prisoners. Their use is specifically prohibited by Rule 33 of the 1955 United Nations’ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. This rule states ‘Instruments of restraint, such as handcuffs, chains, irons and strait-jackets, shall never be applied as a punishment. Furthermore, chains or irons shall not be used as restraints.’ Amnesty International’s condemnation of leg-cuffs was also supported by numerous accounts of how the equipment had been used and to what results. To cite just one account:

Leg-irons are designed to severely restrict a prisoner's movement, making the wearer unstable and liable to overbalance, and often causing chafing of the skin. Welts and sores appear on the ankles of prisoners restrained in leg-irons after approximately 24 hours. They can also be used to facilitate torture.

Patrick Foster witnessed fellow prisoners hung upside down by the leg-irons they were wearing and beaten [in Saudi Arabia]. Orton Chirwa [of Malawi] was handcuffed, leg-ironed and held in a squatting position by a metal bar behind his knees for two days and nights. Sipho Pityana, a former prisoner in South Africa described how leg-irons were used to torture him: "They tied electric wires on the irons... so the iron was a contact between the flesh and the electric device." Sipho also described how his captors used the leg-irons to hold him upside down in the sea for long periods of time.

That such practices should lead to categorical condemnations of leg cuffs has not been shared everywhere. In contrast to outlawing a whole class of technology, security agencies in countries such as the US have sought to adopt guidelines for how leg restraints ought to be used in order to minimize any potential for serious harm or misuse. The use of leg restraints on prisoners is fairly widespread in domestic incarnation settings and they have also figured into high profile military operations including the imprisonment of detainees in Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo Bay. Such policies seek to make a legitimate place for leg-irons by shifting the focus from leg cuffs themselves to how they are used and by whom. Herein categorical
condemnations misconstrue the source of any problems. How can a whole class of technology (so ubiquitous in the US) be ruled out?

The potential for legitimate practices with leg-irons is at least acknowledged in the 1955 United Nations’ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. While (as noted by Amnesty International) Rule 33 specifies irons should not be used as restraints, all of the UN recommendations are prefaced with the qualification that:

the rules cover a field in which thought is constantly developing. They are not intended to preclude experiment and practices, provided these are in harmony with the principles and seek to further the purposes which derive from the text of the rules as a whole. It will always be justifiable for the central prison administration to authorize departures from the rules in this spirit.

Just what counts as ‘in harmony’ with the principles expressed in the rules ‘as a whole’ is a key question.

Returning to the 1997 Labour government policy announcement, disputes similar to those surrounding the meaning of leg cuffs that preceded the announcement subsequently followed it. In November 1999 the newspaper The Independent reported that two of its journalists purchased Hiatt Thompson leg-irons in the US with 'Made in England' engraved on the cuffs and the Birmingham-based Hiatt’s address printed on the box. Chuck Thompson of Hiatt Thompson reportedly said such restraints were needed for criminals and others in the US because ‘Their guys are big animals. They do more kicking now because they watch all this Bruce Lee fist fighting’. When asked to explain how such UK-made products were still available for sale, Mr. Thompson said the cuffs for the leg-irons ‘must have been old stock from the early 1980s’. This contention was challenged by the British Member of Parliament (MP) David Chidgey during a House of Commons meeting when he stated the leg-cuffs and chains in question ‘were bright, shiny and seemingly new.’ Furthermore, added Chidgey:

When Hiatt-Thompson, of the United States, was challenged on the manacles and chains, it claimed that they were made at its own premises, which turn out to be a warehouse that is barely the size of the average high-street shop. Thus a British company seems to be manufacturing components of banned instruments and implements of torture -- oversized cuffs and separate chains -- which, subsequently, are assembled overseas. Moreover, the practice is perfectly legal under current legislation. Customs and Excise officers have seen components in packing cases, but are powerless to intervene in their export.

On 11 February 2000 the government Minister Peter Hain gave a Parliamentary statement maintaining that: ‘During the course of our investigations into the allegations in The Independent newspaper on 16 November that UK-made leg-irons were on sale in the US, we …. found no evidence that there had been a breach of the ban on the export of leg-irons.’ Echoing Hiatt Thompson’s contention, Minister Hain said it appeared ‘likely’ the leg-irons were produced from old stock. He went on to say ‘We are also satisfied that the leg-irons mentioned in The Independent articles were not manufactured using oversized individual cuffs exported without a licence from the UK. Although we have no evidence to suggest that such single cuffs have ever been exported, there is a hypothetical loophole and amending legislation to extend controls to cover large individual cuffs is in preparation.’
government announced that all cuffs with an internal diameter greater than 52 millimeters would require a license.

Related allegations about the failure of British arms export policies were made in September 2000 when the newspaper *The Guardian* reported that a British company was willing to supply ‘barbaric torture equipment’ such as leg-irons to Rwanda where this equipment had been used in the past by military officers in acts of torture. In this case, the export controls were reportedly to be evaded through brokering the equipment to Rwanda by the Spanish firm Larrañaga y Elorza.

Attention returned to Hiatts of England again in late 2002 when the Birmingham newspaper the *Sunday Mercury* printed a story with the head caption ‘Exporters of Torture.’ A journalist from the *Sunday Mercury* bought a pair of leg-cuffs from the US, compared them to over-sized ‘Big Brutus’ handcuffs made in England and concluded the cuffs were identical, with only the length of link chain separating the handcuffs from the leg cuffs. A spokesperson from Amnesty International was quoted as saying ‘There are serious concerns that loopholes in the licensing system are allowing companies in Britain to export equipment that, once assembled overseas, can be used as leg-cuffs, manacles and other restraint devices frequently used by unscrupulous governments to inflict suffering. This type of medieval metalwork would not be allowed for export from the UK. Why is it apparently permissible for a British company to supply the key components of the products to its US distributor?’

In 2003 as part of the hearings of the House of Commons Committees on Strategic Export Controls – a body set up by the Labour government to provide parliamentary oversight of its export decisions – some of the questions surrounding over-sized handcuffs and leg cuffs were put to government officials. In an exchange that evokes images of an export system simultaneously transparent and nontransparent as well as functioning and dysfunctional, David Chidgey MP and Tim Dowse (Head of the Non-Proliferation Department of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office) debated the merits of licenses to various countries which the government asked to be unidentified in the public record:

David Chidgey: …in a further memorandum to the Committee the Government says that "Handcuffs were licensed for export to reputable organisations akin to" our own UK Prison Service, for example, in Canada, New Zealand, Australia and America. They were "for use either in escorting or transporting prisoners. There was no clear risk of use for internal repression in any of these cases. Handcuffs licensed to the *** were also for use in escorting prisoners.” I want to ask you…was there a clear risk of use for internal repression in the case of the handcuffs permitted for export to ***?

Tim Dowse: I think that in terms of the licences that you are referring to—and we approved one and I think refused two—the cases involved different types of handcuffs in each case. To run through them, in the case of licence 28374, which we approved, the goods involved were normal over-sized handcuffs. We did not believe that there was a clear risk that the *** would use them in any way other than as over-sized handcuffs. In the case of licence 17084, ***. We have no particular grounds for concern that the *** would misuse the equipment, but we did nevertheless judge that there was a clear risk that it
could clearly easily be disassembled and reassembled in the form of leg-irons and therefore was covered by the scope of our export ban. A similar consideration was applied in the case of licence 21003. So I think it is an example, if you like, of the really rather detailed care that we do give in assessing individual licences case by case.

David Chidgey: I will shorten this, but I would just make the point that the concern that we have is that the export licence that was granted was granted to escort handcuffs that in fact could be converted to shackles or leg-irons by virtue of a steel chain. I just make the point, rather than ask for an answer. There is a further point, if I may very quickly. This again refers to a specified end-use of a licence issued for the export of over-sized *** handcuffs which were the same mark and model as you have just referred to from ***. This was to ***. According to their own directives, leg-irons must be used for all inmates deemed to be a security risk and so on, but in this specification at their own direction they are saying that "*** cuffs shall be used". The end-user of the over-sized handcuffs licensed for export to *** requires the use of leg-irons whenever a prisoner is deemed a security risk. My concern, and the Committee's concern, is that in this case, where they prescribed that this should be used, they are actually specifying that they should use *** cuffs with "minimum one arm and one leg cuffed to secured bed or examining table". So what we are really seeking is, what assurances has the Government received that the *** cuffs licensed for export to the *** will not be used as shackles or leg-irons? How can we have any confidence about that, when they are actually specifying how they should be used?

Tim Dowse: The short answer is that we did not seek assurances. When the assessment of the risk was made, we judged that we had no end-user concerns. We will obviously be interested in any information you can pass to us.

While the Committees on Strategic Export Controls noted in its report following the hearing that they ‘would not expect oversized handcuffs to be the Government’s top priority among military exports of potential concern’ they criticized a number of ‘administrative failures’, including the handcuff cases alluded to in the previous quote. Nevertheless, the Committees concluded that overall the ‘export control system usually—eventually—produces the right results…The Government deserves praise for the transparency that it has brought to its operation of strategic export controls and to the policy refinements it has introduced. But a little information can be more frustrating than none at all.’

The preceding text indicates something of dispute about the rights and wrongs of restraint technologies and what should be done about them. Various sources of concern have been singled out – the entire class of leg cuff technology, the rules in place for their use, the ‘big animals’ they are used on, and the potential for restraints to be disassembled and reassembled. The repeated introduction of controls for leg cuffs has been followed by questions about whether these measures are prudent or being adhered to. At this early stage in the book, let me suggest a few preliminary observations regarding what the case of leg restraints might suggest about prohibitions.
First, the idea that concerns about the rigor of export controls will be resolved through the next tightening up of export controls is questionable. Categories and rules about even the simplest of technologies are not merely applied, but interpreted and negotiated. What differentiates leg cuffs from handcuffs, handcuffs from oversized cuffs and even ‘normal over-sized handcuffs’ from presumably un-normal over-sized cuffs has not been something spelled at one time for all times. Rather, for the purposes of export controls such distinctions have been remolded and reconfigured in response to criticisms of practices. With further events or technical developments, the existing understanding of categories will again be re-worked.

Along these lines, for instance, following various controversies about the role of its Member States’ exports in human rights abuses, the European Parliament has called for the European Community to both place a ‘ban on the promotion, trade and export of police and security equipment whose use is inherently cruel, inhuman or degrading, including leg-irons, electroshock stun-belts and inherently painful devices such as serrated thumb cuffs’ and ‘suspend the transfer of equipment where its use in practice has revealed a substantial risk of abuse or unwarranted injury, such as leg-cuffs, shackle boards, restraint chairs and pepper gas weapons’ (emphases added). This parliamentary ‘resolution’ aims to make a division between leg-irons which are deemed intolerable outright and leg-cuffs whose acceptability depends on how they are used. In doing so it challenges the British government totalizing categorization that all leg restraints are primarily for torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. With the European Parliament’s distinction, current or future plastic or Velcro-based leg restraints, for instance, might count as ‘cuffs’ rather than ‘irons’. Yet, on just what basis leg-irons should be distinguished from leg cuffs is not specified in the resolution. The distinction has played no part in the implementation of British controls. Should such a division be made though, there seems enough historical precedent for safely assuming its meaning would be matter of imaginative argumentation.

As a second observation, discussions about the adequacy of prohibitions cannot be separated from questions about who is able to comment about such measures. Not every thing – classification, export decision, use of force, etc. – that is contestable is contested in practice. As suggested above, despite repeated claims by governmental representatives that certain exports are prevented, holes in legislation are being plugged, and that proper licensing decisions are being made, through campaigning and investigative activities outsiders to the corridors of power have challenged such optimistic appraisals. Had it not been for such efforts it seems doubtful that successive British governments would have revised exports control classifications in the manner they did. While the text above would suggest that intense and wide ranging media scrutiny has been cast on British exports, this is an artifact of the specific argument made. All of the newspaper stories cited, at least in large part, derive from the behind the scenes primary investigative work of one small and precariously funded research organization based in England. This situation would suggest some caution in speaking about the adequacies and inadequacies of prohibitions. What is known, what is debated, what is considered to be the state of world is a function of who is in a position to know and say.
Third and related to this, whether the failures of export controls suggested above should be taken as justifying a skeptical or cynical orientation to official statements is a topic of some importance. Yet any assessment of this will no doubt depend on evaluations made of a range of other issues. For instance, the proposed continuing deficiencies associated with regulating restraints could be taken as indicating an inability or unwillingness of governments to act in a manner consistent with their stated principles. To the proposal that the granting of questioned licenses proves the UK exports system is in ‘shambles’, government officials would likely respond as UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw did respond when this was put to him: ‘Hang on…I do not accept that for a second. There may be discrepancies sometimes, but this is a very carefully administered system, all right, and I do not think that kind of description is at all justified. It is a complex system, complex because Parliament, quite properly, required that it should be thorough.’ Rather than being contingent matters of priority and purpose, however regrettable, dubious export licenses are presented as inevitable lapses due to the complications of the matters at hand. Whether or not such licenses should be understood as unavoidable or not depends on assessments of the practical ability of officials to scrutinize export applications.

Likewise, assessments of whether the continuing deficiencies of export policy in relation to restraint exports reflect some unwillingness of governmental officials to act in a manner consistent with their stated principles can depend what is taken as a relevant context for making judgments. It is in relation to some sense of context that particular decisions are given their meaning. So while noting various ‘discrepancies’ or ‘administrative failures’ of exports controls, the Committees on Strategic Export Controls nevertheless gave the Labour government an overall positive evaluation citing the initiatives it had undertaken to improve decision making transparency— not least the establishment of the Committees on Strategic Export Controls. As noted above, that the Committees did not think leg restraints would be ‘the Government's top priority among military exports’ is another way of minimizing the relevancy of certain dubious transfers. Instead of focusing on these procedural changes, those that doubt the sincerity of government policy in the area of leg restraints have done so by situating it to a string of other questionable past transfers. Instead of praising the Labour government for making improvements in export transparency (save for a discussion of *** country and ***cuffs as illustrated above), it could be criticized for failing to take other steps such as prohibiting the manufacture (rather than merely the export) of cuffs that are incorporated into leg cuffs. The set of contested relevances forwarded is central to alternative justifications for what has happened and why, and thereby what if anything is required in terms of further action.

Restricting a discussion of the difficulties associated with giving meaning to decisions about exports as done in the last few paragraphs arguably provides a fairly limited analysis. If a ‘little information can be more frustrating than none at all’ for committees scrutinizing export decisions then the same could be said for those reading case studies of prohibitions. The analysis presented in this chapter can be questioned in the same way accounts given by human rights groups or Parliamentary committees were questioned above. Nothing like a full and comprehensive historical analysis has (or indeed could) been given of prohibitions for leg restraints in the UK; not least because what should be taken as relevant to such a discussion is itself debated and part of justifying what appraisal should be given of the situation. This
condition poses significant questions for the import and purpose of analysis, issues that deserve considered attention.

References

7 Ibid., p. 9.
10 In 2003, 43 American firms were reported manufacturing leg irons, shackles or thumb-cuffs with a further 10 companies in Western Europe, see Steve Wright. 2003. ‘Civilising the torture trade’ *The Guardian*, 13 March 2003.
14 P. Hain, *Hansard*, 15 February 2000: Column: 491W.
16 See as well Anon., ‘Una empresa vasca exporta grilletes para presos que España no permite por vejatorios’ *El País*, 2 October 2000.
20 Foreign Affairs, *Second Joint Report*.