

**A Comprehensive Conventional Weapons Convention:
Military Expenditure, Conflict, Democracy, and Development Nexus**

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has been written by me and all the work reported in it is my own work.

The thesis has not previously been submitted for any degree in Exeter University or any other university or institution in the world. It has not been published partially or completely anywhere.

Exeter, November 2011

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Abstract

Military expenditure continues to rise and conventional weapons continue to reach areas of conflict, violators of human rights, and terrorist groups, increasing the number of internal and external conflicts, escalating the level of internal oppression and contributing to the deterioration of living conditions. Every day, thousands of lives are lost, and many more people are injured, orphaned or displaced because of armed violence by conventional weapons, yet no comprehensive treaty on conventional weapons has yet been reached.

There has been no lack of effort and initiatives, but rather a lack of goodwill, proper guidelines, and instruments that would control the arms trade. Therefore, the central arguments the present thesis seeks to examine are the consequences of this lack of an international conventional arms trade treaty on international security, especially in the conflict-torn Middle East. In order to support the claims made in this study the statistics of global arms sales in different time periods are presented and the relationships between armament, conflict, and development examined. Initiatives to regulate arms sales are also reviewed. In order to elicit information on the role of conventional arms deals on the stability, security, and development of Middle-Eastern countries a questionnaire was distributed to a cross-section of people from those countries, and interviews were conducted with a number of diplomats and politicians.

The findings reveal that increasing armament does not decrease the internal or external threat against the country, instead it jeopardizes its economic growth and prevents progress. The findings also indicate that lack of democracy plays an important role in increasing armament, so arms can be used against opponents of the regime, and not to defend the homeland.

The thesis recommends that governments and international agencies such as the UN should work seriously towards an international conventional arms treaty similar to those on weapons of mass destruction.

Dedication

This work is dedicated to Rawan
my daughter who is living with me in every second despite the distance

to my wife Ghada, and my children Alhusein and Ali

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.0 Introduction

World military expenditure has risen year after year to reach unprecedented figures in 2010. There were hopes that the end of the Cold War in 1991 would bring about a reduction in military expenditure after the elevated military spending had been justified during that period because of the threat environment and confrontation between the two superpowers and their allies. After some years of reduction in the early 1990s, however, these hopes soon vanished, and since 1997 military expenditure has resumed its increasing trend.

The terrorist attacks that hit the US in 2001 added a new enemy that has been used by many countries to justify their high levels of military expenditure. Huge budgets have been allocated to the so-called ‘war on terror’ in Iraq, Afghanistan and other parts of the world, and large arms deals have also been agreed.

The financial crisis that broke in 2008 resulted in a fall in the global economy. As a result, governments’ revenues fell and deficits increased, which has had a negative impact on all sorts of public spending in almost all countries. However, world military expenditure has remained the only exception in both developing and developed countries. In 2009, it increased 5.9 per cent and the rise was in 65 per cent of the countries for which data was available. The increase took place in the larger economies: 16 of the 19 countries in the Group of 20 (G20)¹ increased their military spending. (Perlo-Freeman *et al.* 2010, p. 177).

This massive increase in world military expenditure has been the main determinant of the world financial crisis, and the impact of this crisis on the large US economy has been particularly marked, because the military expenditure of the US is very high, accounting for just under half of world military expenditure. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the increase in the military spending of the US after 2001 due to its global ‘war on terror’ and the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan is an important

¹ The G20 includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, the USA, and the European Union.

factor in the deterioration of the US economy (SIPRI 2007). While the US takes the lead in military expenditure, China, France, UK and Russia follow but at a considerable distance behind the US (see 2.4.1).

The Middle East has been number one client in the arms market for many decades, and its major defence market is dominated by the US, with only few exceptions, such as Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran which are equipped by Russia. Moreover, in 2010 the Middle East had the heaviest economic burden in terms of its share of GDP, spending an estimated 6% of its GDP on the military, compared to a global average of 2.3% (see 2.5).

However, while some theorists argue that military expenditure serves as a cost-effective way of increasing the security of human lives, others argue that it has devastating effects on human life and that non-military spending helps much more as a means of providing security and achieving development.

This chapter presents an outline of the thesis. First, it presents the security challenges that jeopardize stability in the Middle, followed by a summary of small arms and their role in aggravating conflicts. After that it presents the objectives of the research, the statement of the problem, the significance of the study, the research methods and questions, and finally a summary of the forthcoming chapters.

1.1 Security Challenges in the Middle East

The Middle East refers to the countries sited in Northern Africa, Arabian Peninsula Bahrain, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and East African countries such as Egypt and Sudan and what is called Israel. For the sake of this research, the Middle East countries that the research will consider are: Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Iran, Israel, and Gulf countries.

The Middle East is an international flashpoint, a place where open warfare could erupt at any time. This could be related to different factors such as economical, geographical and political ones. After World War II, the United States took over a universal leadership role. It started looking for new partners and found in the Middle Eastern countries the best

companions as they ensure its access to vast energy resources. Similarly, the Western countries sought energy and oil resources, therefore they shared the US in its aspirations and attempts to dominate the area directly and indirectly (see 3.1.3). Motivated by the desire for power and obsessed with rich natural resources in the Middle East region rather than ideals of moral ethics, the US and some Western countries tried to control the area.

In addition to the security threat which the presence of oil and energy resources impose, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict plays a decisive factor in jeopardizing the security of the Middle East. The aggravated fears in the Gulf countries of Iran, and the outstanding borders disputes between Arab-Arab and Arab-neighbouring countries raise the tension in the area. Among these outstanding conflicts we can mention the Sudan-Southern Sudan conflict and war, Iraq-Kuwait war, KSA-Qatar, and Iran –UAE borders' dispute, and the Israeli occupation of Syrian and Lebanese lands. The ideological tension in some countries and the sectarian clashes in others raise the security challenges in the Middle East and provide justification for arms races (see 2.4.6, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.1.4). The biggest tension in the area was caused by the Iraqi-Iranian war, and Iraq invasion of Kuwait, and then by the US invasion of Iraq. This was done not for security and stability purposes, rather for various strategic issues among which controlling oil and energy resources.

The Middle Eastern countries namely: Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and the occupied Palestinian land have experienced more than 60 years of bloody conflict, and despite some short intervals of optimism in the early 1990s, “the history of conflict and mistrust between and within these countries, the ongoing occupation of Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights, and periodic hostilities mean that a durable peace in the region remains a distant prospect” (Brown and Crawford 2009. p. 2).

Against this backdrop, water problems in the Middle East remain a hidden and a secondary concern that might be addressed once other problems have been resolved. Water conflicts in the Middle East primarily deal with three major river basins: the Jordan River Basin, the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin, and the Nile River Basin. Therefore, countries that these rivers run through are always in a state of explicit and implicit conflict.

In general, the security challenges that face the Middle East area as highlighted above will be tackled in more detail in Chapters Two, Three, Seven and Eight. Data collected from

Middle Eastern countries namely a questionnaire and interviews aim to elicit information and responses about important issues. For example, the questionnaire aims to get responses about important issues such as the level of democracy in the Middle East, the respondents' opinions about the regional relationships, and the opinion of the people about the US-Arab relationship, etc. (for more details see 6.2.3, and Chapter Seven). As for the interviews data, they were conducted with diplomats and politicians, and aimed at establishing links between arms spending and economic growth in the Middle East. They also tried to get information about the way Arab rulers utilize conventional weapons, and provided information about the role of the international organization in calling for transparency in armament (see 6.3.5 & Chapter Eight).

1.2 Small Arms: Understanding Small Arms

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) have permanently formed the scene of modern conflict and daily life. While there is no universally accepted definition, 'small arms' is a term used to refer to infantry, or military weapons and commercial firearms soldiers and people in dispute may carry. According to the UN General Assembly resolution A/60/88, in 2005, small arms refer to revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine-guns and light machine-guns; and light weapons refer to heavy machine-guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoil-less rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre" (p. 7).

According to the Small Arms Survey, the global trade in small arms and light weapons ammunition is much less transparent than the trade in the weapons themselves, and the global trade in light weapons ammunitions is also much less transparent than the trade in small arms ammunition. The report shows that in 2007, only 26 countries documented their exports of ammunition for small arms worth more than \$10 million. So, taking into consideration that most governments obtain most of their light weapons ammunition from domestic producers when possible, we can say that international transfers of light weapons ammunition are most likely a small percentage of world public procurement (Small Arms Survey 2009. p. 7).

The 2011 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer identifies the UK, Germany, Serbia and Romania as the most transparent of the major small arms and light weapons exporters, and Iran and North Korea as the least transparent ones. It also classifies the US, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Switzerland, Israel, Austria, South Korea, Belgium, the Russian Federation, Spain, Turkey, Norway, and Canada the top exporters of small arms and light weapons in 2008 and the US, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, France, and Pakistan as the top importers for the same year.

According to the Small Arms Survey (2007), there are at least 875 million combined civilian, law enforcement and military firearms in the world, 75% of which belong to civilian owners (Small Arms Survey 2007. p. 39). The average annual value of authorized international transfers of ammunition for small arms and light weapons between 2006 and 2009 is estimated at \$ 4.3 billion: \$ 1.8 billion is ammunition for small arms and \$ 2.5 billion is for light weapons. These figures do not include man-portable guided missiles or single-shot, disposable rockets (Small Arms Survey 2009, p. 7). However, the Small Arms Survey (2010) states that these figures do not reflect the real value of small arms trade, because a big part of it is done illegally. In addition, other parts of the trade that have to be added, including light weapons, parts and accessories, will add billions more to the total.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) reveal that the widespread of SALW facilitates violations of International Humanitarian Law, increases civilian suffering, impedes assistance for the victims, increases the lethal effects and duration of conflicts, hinder delivering humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and reconciliation, worsens the effects of armed conflicts as they are used not only to kill but also to threaten, bully, rape, forcibly recruit children as combatants and force people to flee from their home, destroy the economy, the infrastructure and social fabric (ICRC Report 2006, WHO Report 2002. pp.12-23). Moreover, the WHO finds that small arms violence has ‘a range of health problems, including depression and anxiety, suicidal behavior, alcohol abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder’ (WHO Report 2002. p.22). A number of other UN agencies such as UNDP, UNIFEM, and UNIDIR, also issued many reports and studies about the human costs that resulted from the rise in using small arms and insisted on the importance of reducing the damage and destruction on individuals caused by small arms.

The cost of small arms and light weapons is very high in Africa where most conflicts are done with small arms. A study conducted by the International Action Network on Small Arms, Saferworld, and Oxfam International finds that the cost of the armed conflicts in Africa is about \$18 billion each year and about US \$300 billion from 1990 to 2005. During this period, 23 African nations experienced war: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, and Uganda (Jacques 2009).

Controlling international (SALW) transfer is fundamental for all states. The global earnings, according to Amnesty report (2012), from legal exports of small arms and light weapons (SALW) amount to US \$4 billion worldwide a paltry sum if compared with the humanitarian, economic, and development costs that result from the uncontrolled proliferation in both developed and developing countries. Therefore, the primary responsibility for controlling the flow of arms rests with governments of both manufacturers and recipients of SALW. It is true that every country has the right to acquire weapons for legitimate self-defence; however, it is similarly important to ensure that transferred arms are not instrumental in violating international human rights, or hampering development.

1.2.1 Actions against Small Arms

In the 1990s, small arms proliferation emerged as a major international issue which required a comprehension of the real dimensions of the problem and a special focus on transfer controls (Small Arms Survey 2007. pp. 39-40). In 1999, the UN General Assembly voted to hold in 2001 the first global "Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects". The Conference focused on the challenges to peace and security posed by SALW and suggested establishing clear international standards and controls on the trade of SALW. The meeting resulted in the adoption of a Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN, A/CONF.192/15). Moreover, the UN called to hold biennial meetings to review the progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action and held in 2006 another conference to review the progress made on the issue.

The United Nations has also issued many Resolutions and Reports that highlighted the issue of SALW. It has stressed the importance of exerting efforts at the national, regional and international levels to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of this kind of weapons and their ammunitions. It has also warned that the uncontrolled spread in many regions of the world has a broad range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences and poses a grave threat to peace, reconciliation, stability, safety, security, and sustainable development at the individual, local, national, regional and international levels. It has also encouraged all initiatives that contribute to small arms control (UN Resolutions: 2001, A/RES/56/24; 2003, A/RES/58/55; 2006, A/RES/60/68; 2010, A/RES/64/50; 2011, A/RES/65/64; 2011, A/RES/65/50 and 2012: A/RES/66/47).

The Programme of 2001 was supported by most of the exporting and importing countries of small arms and was insisted on in the biennial meetings in 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2010. The 2010 meeting adopted, for the first time by consensus, a substantive Outcome Document which addressed the issue of illicit trade across borders (UN 2010: A/CONF.192/BMS/2010/3), Yet, compliance to the Programme remains weak because the international efforts are not serious enough to control SALW sales. What is required in this concern are obligations under the Charter of the United Nations which include: decisions of the Security Council to impose arms embargoes on countries that are not totally committed to arms control. It also needs to develop legally binding tools to implement the Programme and other UN resolutions.

In his 2008 report on small arms, the UN Secretary- General provided an overview of the negative impact of illicit small arms on security, human rights and social and economic development, particularly in areas of conflict. He suggested that the issue of small arms needs not only arms control measures, but also a policy that deals with security, crime, human rights and development (Report of the Secretary-General, S/2008/258). In his 2011 report, the Secretary-General focussed on many topics related to small arms. He mentioned that the value of global authorized trade in SALW and their ammunition is estimated at more than \$7 billion a year, and that the value of the unauthorized one runs also in the billions. He added that the trade in small arms is considered the least transparent of all weapons system, due to the lack of regulations and controls. Small arms fall into the hands of those who use them to commit violation of international humanitarian or human rights

law or divert them to the illicit market through theft, leakage, corruption or pilferage (Report of the Secretary-General, S/2011/255)

Despite this, small arms trade is neither monitored nor regulated, or included into arms sales figures to the same degree as major defence systems. According to Stohl and Tuttle (2009), “small arms and light weapons have everlastingly shaped the scene of daily life and modern conflict” (p.22), and still there exists no data on international transfers of small arms and light weapons. International attention is focused on the need to control weapons of mass destruction, overlooking the trade in small arms and conventional weapons which continue to work in a legal and moral vacuum. There are more than 1000 companies from 100 countries that produce SALW and their ammunition. The number of countries which produce small arms in a way that meets their local needs is on the increase. The dominant world trade countries in arms are the permanent UN Security Council members—the US, UK, France, Russia, and China— therefore they hamper any serious attempts to control arms. As such, it is found that the key weaknesses are lax controls on licensed production and the use of arms. Besides, arms get into the wrong hands through the weak control on weapons by weapon dealers and managements (Amnesty 2012).

The impacts of small arms and light weapons are very important, yet, I am not going to include figures on the value of this trade in the next chapter which will focus on military expenditure and arms transfers. This is due to the following reasons. Firstly, the value of world small arms trade is very small compared to that on other kinds of weapons, and consequently, they will not be essential to the purpose of my study. Secondly, the figures on military expenditure and arms transfers cover both the Cold and post-Cold War eras, whereas there are no resources that provide data on small arms for both periods, and this will make any comparison misleading. Thirdly, small arms are not so important in the Middle East which my thesis focuses on because most threats in the regions are external and need major advanced weapons systems. Fourthly, there is lack of data on small arms due to the black market trade and this leads to misleading results and the real figures on this trade is much higher than the ones declared.

Researchers (Blanton 1999, 2000, 2001, Craft *et al.* 2002), who focused in their studies on human security, internal conflict, Africa and other less developed countries (LDCs), depended on WMEAT database which includes data on small arms. This is due to the fact

that the impact of small arms is much higher in Africa and LDCs where they are used in internal conflicts. However, Craft *et al.* (2002) who conducted their study on the political violence in Sub-Sahara concluded that the data available with WMEAT on small arms trade does not reflect the real value due to the black market trade (pp. 693-710).

1.3 Objectives of the Research

The increase in military expenditure is a significant point that deserves serious attention. A huge amount of money has been drained from the global economy at the same time as 10 million citizens have died in East Africa because of a hunger crisis. Instead of bringing life to those people and better living conditions to other people who are living for less than one dollar a day, we find that world military expenditure is reaching \$1630 billion a year.

Weapons continue to reach where they are needed, and for arms-manufacturing countries arms sales have become a foreign policy, a business, and a means of keeping conflict running in regions where superpowers have vital interests. The Middle East has been subject to many wars in the last six decades, making it the most violent region. It was also the largest market for conventional arms in the same period. Yet arms and wars cannot solve any of the outstanding conflicts. On the contrary, arms have contributed to the militarization of the region, to an increasing lack of democracy, and to violation of human rights and more poverty.

Much has already been said about conventional arms, but no effective measures have been taken to minimize the negative impacts of such weapons on developing countries, where arms mean wars, underdevelopment, and more lack of democracy and violation of human rights. Billions of dollars have been drained in conventional arms purchases that have led in most cases to violent wars and destruction.

Trade in conventional arms continues to operate in a legal and moral vacuum and this would not be the case if a blind eye had not been turned on this issue. Therefore, it is intended that this research will examine why efforts have not been made towards reaching strict regulation on arms sales or developing the instruments necessary for monitoring military expenditure and arms sales in effective ways. Moreover, it will examine why a

treaty on conventional arms similar to those on weapons of mass destruction has not yet been raised.

In this research, I will examine why conventional arms have been left unrestricted by any law, binding treaty, or even regulations. I will also examine why they have not been taken more seriously in the United Nations and why the five permanent members in the Security Council have not used its powers to place controls on conventional arms or to solve the outstanding conflicts with peaceful means to minimize the need for conventional arms. The research will also examine the reasons that have led the five permanent members to be the top arms spender countries, as well as the top arms sellers to developing countries. It will also study why these countries have facilitated, by different means, arms being sold to developing countries, areas of conflict, and to countries that violate human rights and humanitarian law.

Being described as the biggest market for arms and the most violent region, the Middle East becomes an interesting case to study. Therefore, this research will focus on the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular to show how the flood of conventional arms to non-democratic regimes and areas of dispute has resulted in a divided, insecure, and underdeveloped area. It will examine why arms-producing countries have continued to supply this region with conventional arms instead of looking into the security-related factors that lie behind military expenditure in the region, or seeking non-military means to prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts. In addition, the thesis will examine the outcomes of selling arms to Middle-Eastern countries despite their huge impact on the region, the latest of which is that these weapons are currently being used against freedom seekers and also against civilians in the occupied Palestine.

1.4 Statement of the Problem

James Madison, the fourth president of the United States, who is regarded as the 'Father of the Constitution' and who is the author of the United States Bill of Rights noted in 1795 (Madison and Ketcham 2006, p. 236):

Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from

these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few. In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended... No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.

President Dwight David Eisenhower (2011) also expressed his fears concerning military spending. He reminded the Americans that military spending competes with American businesses and undermines the US's economic strength. He warned them that each armament diverts resources from the free enterprise system and 'we must not destroy from within what we are trying to defend from without'. In his speech to the American people in 1953, President Eisenhower said (p. B3):

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. ... This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.

In his presidential campaign in 1976, Jimmy Carter told Americans that the US could not be the leading arms supplier and the world's oldest and most widely respected democracy at the same time. He said: 'we cannot have it both ways. We cannot be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of arms' (Carter 1978, pp. 266–75). Moreover, Carter's 'policy of arms restraint' adopted in May 1977 noted that the unrestrained spread of conventional weapons would 'threaten stability in every region of the world' and that the US bore 'special responsibilities' to take the lead in restraining its military sales (Carter 1981, pp. 122–23).

Furthermore, in his presidential campaign, President Obama promised to cut the military expenditure of the US and to back rewriting the rules that govern arms exports. However, Jeff Abramson, deputy director of the Arms Control Association finds that the reality is different from what Obama promised. He finds that 'there is an Obama arms bazaar going on' (quoted in Kimes 2011). Moreover, Loren Thomson, a veteran defence consultant, finds that 'Obama is much more favourably disposed to arms exports than any of the

previous Democratic administrations' (quoted in Kimes 2011). However, he finds that the President supports foreign arms sales in order to maintain jobs internally, support alliances, and play a broader role in the world.

The harmful impacts of armament have also been discussed in the literature and many studies have been published on the relationship between armament, conflict, and economic growth, and how one leads to the other. Many efforts have been exerted to bring in a set of regulatory principles in order to minimize the impact of armament and military expenditure on human life. The international community, starting with the League of Nations, and later in the United Nations (UN), has passed many resolutions and issued many other documents and studies on the link between armament, disarmament, and development. These resolutions and documents testify to the potential effects of armament and arms transfers on regional and international peace and security, as well on the process of the peaceful social and economic development of all people. They also stress the link between armament, disarmament, and development, and the importance of reducing military expenditure to achieve development. They called upon member states to exercise effective control over their weapons and military equipment, and consequently over their arms imports and exports.

Moreover, different devices have been established to achieve the transparency needed to stop arms being delivered to areas of conflict, being used for violating human rights, or by terrorist groups. However, the efforts of the international community have not been able to stop arms from being delivered to their destinations or resulted in reduced military expenditure. The resolutions passed by the UN have not firmly restricted military expenditure and arms sales, rather they just warned of 'excessive and destabilizing arms build-up', and that 'arms transfers destabilize areas where tension and regional conflict threaten international peace and security', and that 'arms transfers have potential negative effects on the progress of the peaceful social and economic development of all peoples'. Moreover, the resolutions only insisted on 'confidence building among Member States' and that 'arms transfers in all their aspects deserve serious consideration by the international community for their potential effects', and that 'transparency in armaments helps promoting confidence building and security among States'.

Despite the many warnings about its negative impacts, world military expenditure has continued to rise and this rising trend has been entirely due to the increasing expenditure of the US which has continuously been the top spender country in almost every year of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. The US accounts for almost half of the world's total military spending, more than the following seventeen top spender countries, and forty-seven times the spending of the six countries that it classifies as 'rogue states'. The massive increase in US military spending has been one of the factors contributing to the deterioration of the economy of the US since 2001, yet the requested defence budget for 2012 is just \$14 billion less than that of 2011. The top spenders, in both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, have continuously been the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, whose responsibilities, according to the Charter of the United Nations, are to maintain international peace and security by peaceful means. The other top spender countries have also been either oil-rich or conflict-ridden countries, or countries that have achieved high economic growth and hope to become regional powers or Security Council permanent members.

Moreover, the five permanent Security Council members are also the top arms sellers to developing countries. All wars in the Middle East, which is classified as a developing region and is also the most violent region in the world, are waged using weapons from the Security Council permanent members. Moreover, these weapons were used in 2011 in many Middle-East countries, in what is called the Arab Spring, to kill the demonstrators who were demanding regime change.

Despite the security challenges, there has not been a serious effort to ban conventional weapons or even to put rigid restraints on the manufacturing or selling of arms. Existing arrangements and measures are aimed at preventing excessive transfers and stockpiling of conventional arms by improving the transparency of arms transfers and sensitive dual-use equipment and technologies, but no rigid constraints have been put in place to stop the manufacture of arms or the transfer of arms to other countries.

This research attempts to bridge a gap in the literature by showing the negative impacts of military expenditure on development, conflict, and human welfare. It will also attempt to show why the permanent members of the UN Security Council continue to be the top arms spenders and sellers, especially to developing countries and countries which violate human

rights. Moreover, the research will attempt to show why the permanent members have not sought more effective measures or Security Council resolutions to restrict arms sales to such countries. Further, I will try to show why conventional arms have not been dealt with through a binding treaty similar to those of weapons of mass destruction, despite the fact that all wars have been carried out using conventional weapons. Furthermore, the thesis will show who is preventing the development of the instruments necessary for monitoring military expenditure and arms sales in effective ways. Finally, the research provides some explanations for why no efforts have been made to find non-military means of preventing the outbreak of armed conflicts.

1.5 Significance of the Study

There is some relatively good literature about the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth. However, this literature does not reflect the figures that have been issued concerning the money spent on armament, taking into consideration that this money is much more than the figures declared. The research described in this thesis tries to bridge this gap by showing the impact of the money spent on armament on development in the region. Moreover, there is not enough literature about the actual impacts of military expenditure in the Middle East. Military expenditure in this region has completely drained countries' resources and has not contributed to scientific research or economic growth in the region. Military expenditure has also not contributed to solving any of the outstanding conflicts in the region. On the contrary, it has just pushed all countries into an arms race and has fuelled many wars that have burdened the economy of Middle-Eastern countries without seeing a winner in any of them. In fact, the arms race has not recycled petrodollars, as some researchers call it; instead it has drained all the productive resources of the countries.

In addition, in the case of Israel, military expenditure has contributed to making that country an arms-producing country that benefits from the armament business and provides a means of power that allows it to extend its occupation. So this research attempts to bridge the gap by focusing on the top arms sellers and the top arms spenders in the Middle East. It will also show how arms sales to the Middle-Eastern countries have been paid for, and what they have been used for. Unlike the US, military expenditure in the Middle East is not paid for by taxpayers, but rather takes from the basic needs and daily supplies of the

people. It also does not contribute to scientific research, but rather to more wars, deaths, destruction, and displacement.

Furthermore, there are not enough studies that cover the reciprocal relationship between military expenditure, development, and conflict in the region. This research also tries to bridge this gap in the literature by investigating the reciprocal relationship between the three, and how each affects and is affected by the other two.

Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State during the Nixon and the Ford presidencies and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, wished that the Iraq–Iran War, which lasted for eight years and drained the capabilities of both countries on all levels, would never end and that both countries would lose out (Miller 1996, pp. 132-134). However, in the literature about the region we cannot find anything that reflects the real meaning of what Kissinger said, nor the impact of this war on both countries and the region. There is also not enough literature on why the US supplied both countries with arms during the war, and why it continues to supply arms to the region. Similarly, it is not clear how the Iraq–Iran War has contributed to a religious conflict that is feeding arms sales and violence in the region, and why arms regulations are left unrestricted to serve this purpose. Therefore, this research tries to show the reasons that led the US to transfer arms to areas of conflict in the Middle East. It also reviews all the attempts that have been made to formulate regulations, codes of conduct, and treaties to regulate conventional arms transfer, as there is no one source that combines all of these in one reference.

1.6 Research Methods

To explore the objectives of the research, 44 closed-format questions were prepared and distributed to 400 people from fourteen different Arab countries, with different cultural, religious, and ethnic backgrounds. The questionnaire concentrates on the causes that I believe contributed to the armament in the Middle East and Iraq and played a great role in the creation of the conflict in that region. The main issues raised in the questionnaire are related to ideas of democracy, Arab anticipation and reaction in respect to American foreign policy, and the impact of military expenditure and arms transfers on conflict and development in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. The questionnaire also investigates the relationships between armament in the Middle East and the creation of

conflict in this area. Further, it sheds light on the opinions of people concerning US foreign policy in creating an unsafe and unstable Middle East.

The other research method used in this study is the interview. I conducted eight interviews with senior diplomats, covering two sets of questions. Each set serves particular objectives.

The first set of interviews includes twelve questions. It was designed to cover the factors that contribute to military expenditure, conflict, and development in the Middle East, and Iraq in particular. The questions aim at finding answers to how Middle-East politicians look at conflict in the region and whether arms sales to the region have contributed to a safer Middle East or a more violent one. The questions also examine whether arms-seller countries are interested in a settled Middle East or a violent one and if their policy towards the Middle East is reliable.

The second set of interviews includes four questions designed to cover how seriously military expenditure and arms transfers have been looked at internationally and in the United Nations. It also covers the reasons that lie behind not reaching a binding treaty that prohibits or puts restraints on military expenditure and arms transfers.

1.7 Research Questions

Considering the issues have been mentioned above, this research tries to find answers to the following research questions:

RQ1. If conventional weapons have been used in most wars and have cost humanity a dear price, why has a binding comprehensive treaty on the production and stockpiling of this kind of weapon not yet been reached?

1.1 Are the current arms export regulations and codes of conduct enough to control military expenditure and arms transfer?

1.2 Have the efforts to control arms export been effective in regulating military expenditure and arms transfer?

The main research question and its sub-divisions discuss the lack of a comprehensive arms treaty that regulates conventional arms sales. Chapter 5 reviews all international attempts, agreements, treaties, and codes of conduct that have been produced so far to assess their

effectiveness. It also presents the reasons that, according to this research, lie behind the lack of a comprehensive conventional arms transfer treaty.

RQ2. If the main conventional rationale for military expenditure is related to international security, then has the end of the Cold War brought about a reduction in military expenditure and arms transfers?

This question attempts to provide figures about military expenditure and arms sales in the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras, and to examine whether military expenditure and arms sales are a Cold War phenomenon or an all-times phenomenon. Chapters 2 and answer this question.

RQ3. Why do the UN Security Council permanent members continue to be the top spender countries and the top arms sellers to developing countries and areas of conflict? And why have they not looked for other, peaceful, means to solve the outstanding conflicts in the region?

Facts are presented to show how UN Security Council permanent members continue to be the top spender countries and at the same time the top arms sellers to developing countries, oppressive regimes, and areas of conflict. Chapters 2 and 3 present statistics and answers to this research question.

RQ4. Does the level of democracy in the Middle East affect the level of armament or vice versa?

4.1 What is the impact of the level of democracy on regional cooperation, military spending, and development?

4.2 Do arms exports to the region help promote democracy or fortify dictatorships?

The main research question and its sub-divisions try to show the relationship between lack of democracy and armament. They also try to study the impact of lack of democracy on regional cooperation and development. Chapters 3, 7 and 8 provide answers to these questions.

RQ5. Do military expenditure and arms sales contribute to world development and international security?

5.1 Does military expenditure have the same impact on developed and developing countries?

5.2 Does high military expenditure in the Middle East contribute to the stability and development of the region?

5.3 Does conflict in the Middle East contribute to the increase in its military expenditure?

5.4 Can high military expenditure in the Middle East help these countries defend themselves?

5.5 Do arms sales to the Middle East prevent the outbreak of wars or contribute to them?

5.6 Who is paying for and benefiting from military expenditure and arms transfers?

The main research question and its sub-divisions try to show the impact of military expenditure on world development and security and assess whether military expenditure has the same influence on developed and developing countries. They also try to show the impact of military expenditure on the stability and development of the Middle East. In addition, they try to examine the reasons why peaceful solutions to the outstanding conflicts have not been sought, and highlight the parties that have benefited from the continuation of conflicts in the region. Chapters 3, 4, 7, and 8 provide answers to these questions.

RQ6. What is the relationship between the US's policy towards the region and the growth of public hostility to the US and the rise of extremism?

This research question tries to reveal the relationship between the growth of extremism and hostility to the US in the Arab world and the US's foreign policy towards the Middle East. Chapters 3, 7 and 8 provide answers to this question.

These six research questions focus on the Middle East. The research tries to show through figures and numbers the impact of armaments on conflict, stability, and development in the region. The responses from the questionnaire in Chapter 7, and from the interviews in Chapter 8 provide methodological evidence to back up the theoretical facts presented in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5.

1.8 A Summary of the Forthcoming Chapters

The thesis consists of nine chapters, each focusing on a group of themes. In this chapter (Chapter 1), I have presented the objectives of the research and the problems it tackles. I

have also introduced the research methods, highlighted the significance of the study, and provided a summary of the forthcoming chapters.

Following this, Chapter 2 is one of five chapters that review the relevant literature in relation to the foci of this study. It concentrates on the trends in world military expenditure and arms transfers in both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. It also examines military expenditure and arms transfers by region, country, and income group, and as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). Further, it shows which are the top spender, exporter and recipient countries, and the share of military expenditure in their GDP. The aim of this literature review is to show the amount of money spent military expenditure and the continuous rising trend of this expenditure. Consequently, it tries to say who it is that is responsible for this rising trend.

In Chapter 3, I discuss the determinants and justifications of military spending and arms transfers in the Middle East. This chapter presents the determinants and justification of the Middle East countries to buy arms, and also the determinants and justifications of arms seller countries to sell arms to the region. Chapter 4 shows the relationship between armament, development, and conflict and describes how each can lead to the other. The aim of this chapter is to show that there is a causal link between the three. It also shows that there is a gap in the literature in relation to the causal relationship between the three, especially in developing countries.

After presenting the attempts and instruments applied to regulate conventional arms and minimize their negative impacts on human life, Chapter 5 shows how these regulations and instruments have been insufficient, full of loopholes, and inadequate to counter the threats posed by conventional arms. Following that, Chapter 6 presents the research methods used to explore the aims of the research. Methods of data collection, namely the questionnaire and interviews, are introduced. The aim and design of the questionnaire and the outline of the interviews is presented. Chapters 7 and 8 report the results of the data analyses. Chapter 7 presents the results of the questionnaire analysis, and Chapter 8 demonstrates the analysis of the interviews. In Chapter 9, I conclude the thesis by revisiting my objectives, summarizing the findings, and suggesting areas for further studies.

Chapter 2

Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers

2.0 Introduction

The literature review in this chapter and the following ones will give us the opportunity to confirm or modify the findings of other researchers; highlight the gaps in the literature, support the findings of the data analysis presented in Chapters Seven and Eight, and provide us with fresh insights that might be considered in the field of studying military expenditure in the Middle East.

The discussion below starts with a definition of the key terms used in this chapter such as military expenditure and arms transfer, and provides justification for choosing the data resources. It also presents the trends in world military expenditure and arms transfers in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. For example, it examines military expenditure and arms transfers by region, country, and income group in constant dollars, and as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). The last section exhibits the top arms spender countries and inspects their military expenditure in constant dollars and as a share of their GDP. It also shows the top arms supplier and recipient countries and describes the changes in regional trends.

The references in this chapter relate directly to the focus of this study which is the impact of military expenditure and arms transfer on development and conflict. Therefore, information is based on chronological order, starting from cold war era up-to-present. Choosing references such as SIPRI among others serves the objectives of the thesis and presents comparable data and as accurate results as possible (see 2.1). Finally, it is hoped that the literature review in this thesis will provide a foreground for the data analysis.

This chapter presents answers to RQ2 (If the main conventional rationale for military expenditure is related to international security, then has the end of the Cold War brought about a reduction in military expenditure and arms transfers?) and RQ3 (Why do the UN Security Council permanent members continue to be the top spender countries and the top arms sellers to developing countries and areas of conflict?).

2.1 Definition, Data Sources and Methods

Data on military expenditure and arms transfers may vary from one source to another. This is due to discrepancies both in the definitions of the terms and what they cover and how the actual values of many figures related to them are determined. The International Monetary Fund's *Government Financial Statistics Yearbook* (GFSY) collects expenditure data according to functional classification, and therefore, its definition of military expenditure is different from that of the NATO which is somehow similar to the SIPRI's definition. However, the NATO changed its definition of military expenditure in 2004 to exclude expenditure on paramilitary forces if they are not realistically deployable. Moreover, countries have also different definitions of military expenditure. Some of them follow the functional classification as the GFSY and others, of which the UK was the first, 'have moved to a system of 'Resource Account Budgeting' across all areas of government, which involves accounting for expenditure on an accrual rather than a cash basis whereby costs are accounted for when they are incurred rather than when they are paid-and including items such as a charge for capital employed' (SIPRI website, [www](http://www.sipri.org)).

According to SIPRI, military expenditure includes 'the armed forces, together with peacekeeping forces, defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects, paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations and military space activities'. SIPRI includes all current and capital expenditure on military and civil personnel including: retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, military research and development, and military aid in the military expenditure of the donor country. However, SIPRI does not include in the definition of military expenditure civil defence, current expenditure for previous military activities such as for veterans benefits, demobilization, conversion of arms production of weapons and destruction of weapon (Ibid).

Berk (2004) considers data selection and collection the most critical elements of analysis and that the rationale for selecting a certain data source varies according to the purpose of each study. I have come across different data sources for military expenditure and arms transfers: SIPRI, the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. This research

relies on the SIPRI data because I found SIPRI sufficient for the purpose of my research as it provides the most complete data about the countries in the region and the time of study.

I have done my best to use the data on military expenditure from the same resource to avoid reaching wrong results when making comparisons between countries or regions. The same applies for data on arms sales. I have used some data from other sources, and have done my best to deal with them with caution to avoid giving misleading results.

The uncertainty of the figures is also due to the lack of official and detailed data on military expenditure for some countries, especially developing and non-democratic ones, as they tend to keep the actual figures of their military expenditure confidential (Brzoska 1981, p.261, 1995; Ball, 1984). Developing countries may also differ in the way in which they treat or define military-related aid and the way in which arms sales are financed (Brzoska 1994, pp. 67–80). Omitoogun (2006) confirms the existence of some evidence that arms imports may not be included in military spending figures in many countries (pp. 1-3).

Moreover, figures on arms transfer are not available for all countries because publishing data on arms sales and acquisitions is a sensitive issue for nearly all states. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), which was set up in the 1990s to establish an international mechanism for official transparency on arms transfer, has not yet proven efficient, as many countries do not report their arms sales. Although public transparency in arms transfers has increased in recent years, actual figures may stand far beyond these figures due to the secrecy that covers them. And since the volume of deliveries of arms may differ from one year to the next, SIPRI, the Congressional Research Service and other institutions issue their figures using a many-year moving average to give a more stable measure of the trends in transfers.

Another reason that prevents accurate figures about arms transfers being stated is that most of the countries that do report do not do so during the same year as the sales. According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2011, by 31st December 2009 only seventy-nine states had submitted reports in arms transfers for 2008. For example, in 2009 only three of the five largest arms exporters in terms of officially reported financial values – France, Russia and the United

States – reported their arms export figures for 2008, whereas the other two countries – Israel and the United Kingdom – did not.

There are also continuing methodological and data-gathering problems with respect to the trade in major conventional weapons (Hartung 2000). Moreover, conversions from local currencies to US dollars may lead to misleading comparisons of the military spending of different countries. Currency conversions can be done using official exchange rates or with purchasing power parity (PPP).² In addition, data from the same source for the same countries and years may vary from one year to another, because this is subject to the exchange rate used to calculate the figures (Bureau of Verification and Compliance 2002, pp.193–200). For example, figures on world military expenditure in each year of the period 2004 to 2010 in the SIPRI Yearbook 2011 are different from those for the same period in SIPRI Yearbook 2010. This is because the figures in each Yearbook are calculated according to the constant prices and exchange rates of a different year.

2.2 Trends in World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers

Global military spending continues to rise even at a time when almost all international communities are grappling with a disturbing financial crisis which threatens to undermine the poverty-reduction goals of the world. The world ‘is over-armed and peace is underfunded’ as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon says (UN Secretary-General, 2009). In addition, while over three billion people live on less than \$2.50 a day (United Nations 2007), and the amount required to fulfil the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) lifetime is estimated at \$760 billion (MDGs 2000), world military expenditure totalled \$1630 billion in 2010 (SIPRI 2011). Moreover, the approved budget of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for education, natural sciences, social and human sciences, culture, communication and information, general policy and direction and programme execution and administration in 2010–11 is \$653 million, a budget that represents less than one day of the Iraq War (UNESCO 2010). Furthermore, the approved budget of the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) for 2009–10 was \$3.26 billion, equal to the cost of about five days of war in Iraq (UNICEF 2009).

² PPP is an alternative exchange rate that attempts to reflect the actual value of a currency more realistically in terms of the goods and services that it can purchase.

High levels of military expenditure are not just a 2010 phenomenon. Military spending has been the largest expenditure in both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. The increase in world military expenditure slowed down considerably in 2010 over 2009 due to the financial crisis and the resulting global recession, yet world military expenditure in 2010 remained very high, reaching unprecedented figures.

World arms transfers have continuously followed the trend of world military expenditure. The relationship between the two has been widely highlighted, discussed and criticized, especially because the biggest share of arms sales go to developing countries. These continuously increasing figures, combined with the failure to reach strict regulations and the impact of this on development, especially in developing countries, raise many questions about the economy of arms sales and the impact of this on development. However, arms transfers have changed hugely between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, because the relationships between arms suppliers and recipients have been subject to the changing political, military, and economic circumstances. In the Cold War era, arms transfers were stimulated by the confrontation between the two superpowers. In the post-Cold War era, arms production for export has increasingly been dominated by commercial rather than security interests (Randall 1994, pp.269-290). The opportunity offered by the end of the Cold War to reduce arms transfers was soon gone. On the contrary, new threats have come to justify bigger arms industries and arms transfers. After September 11th, arms transfers have become more linked to the war on terrorism by the US and its allies, yet commercial motives remain behind many arms transfers to other countries that do not support the US in its war on terrorism. The financial crisis did not mean a lot to the arms business, which continued its rising trend and destination to the developing countries. Global arms transfers in 2010 account for \$24.987 billion at constant 1990 prices and exchange rates, with an increase of \$967 million over 2009 (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2011), the biggest share of which goes to developing countries.

2.2.1 World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers in the Cold War Era

The Cold War era starts with the end of World War II and ends with the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. This period witnessed the beginning of the arms race, and the growth in defence spending among those nations belonging to NATO and the Warsaw Pact in general, and to the US and the Soviet Union in particular. During this period, world

military expenditure grew rapidly and reached an unprecedentedly high level, with the US accounting for 36% of total world military expenditure, and the USSR for 23%. The power struggle between the two military superpowers provided a continuing stimulus to both of them to develop conventional arms. It also provided the two allies with a spur to develop or acquire conventional arms, either in the international arms markets or through Western and former Soviet Union sponsored military aid programmes (Sköns *et al.* 1999, 269-271).

World military expenditure increased consistently throughout the Cold War era. However, its increase was not constant over the period: there were sharp increases during periods of wars followed by periods of decline and stability. It peaked during World War II because each superpower of the time was using all its economic resources to pay for the war. It reached its second-highest level in 1987 due to the heavy military build-up.

In the Cold War era military expenditure was a priority in the two opposing blocs and had a harsh effect on countries of both blocs. But the effect was much harsher on the countries belonging to Warsaw Pact, where military expenditure in most cases replaced spending on the basic needs in these countries.

World arms transfers have continuously followed the trend of world military expenditure. The relationship between the two has been widely highlighted, discussed and criticized, especially because the biggest share of arms transfer go to developing countries. These continuously increasing figures, combined with the failure to reach strict regulations and the impact of this on development, especially in developing countries, raise many questions about the economy of arms transfer and the impact of this on development.

During the Cold War era, conventional arms transfer policies were motivated by the confrontation between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. For most of the period, conventional weapons were used by the two superpowers and their allies as a means of supporting foreign policy objectives (Grimmett 2010, p.1). Prior to the final years of the Cold War, arms companies were often state-owned, and were regarded as national assets that were related to the country's own armed forces, and strategically connected to its international, national, and military enterprises (Burrows 2002. pp.14-18). Consequently, the majority of overseas arms transfers that took place in this period were either sales or donations to strategic partners drawn along Cold War lines, because each of

the superpowers sought through their arms transfers to spread their influence in an attempt to counter the military influence of the other. During this period, the global arms trade was dominated by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council: the US, France, the UK, Russia, and China. After the Gulf War, the US emerged as the top arms supplier with 35–50% of the total global arms trade in any given year (Sköns 2000. p. 80), as shown in **Figure 2.1**.

Figure 2.1: Arms transfers worldwide 1950–1991



Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011

Figure 2.1 shows that the value of arms transfers worldwide in the Cold War era increased in most of the years between 1955 and 1982, from \$7675 million in 1955 to \$45,858 million in 1982, to start a continuous fall in the years after, reaching \$28,017 million in 1991.³ The peaks of arms transfer during the late 1970s to the mid 1980s are principally due to the Iraq–Iran war and the petrodollar, which fuelled a heavy arms demand. The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s slowed arms demand and noticeably decreased the value of arms transfers.

2.2.2 World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers in the Post-Cold War Era


The post-Cold War period starts with the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The first years of this period showed a strong downward trend in the levels of military spending compared to Cold War levels. Over the first decade following the end of the Cold War, world military

³ Figures are in US \$million at constant 1991 prices and exchange rates.

expenditure fell in real terms more than one-third (Omitoogun and Sköns 2006, p.280). In 1998, world military expenditure fell for the eleventh successive year, from \$1441 billion in 1988 to \$962 billion in 1998, recording its lowest level in thirty-two years since 1967. It started an increase in the following years reaching \$1540 billion in 2009, which is higher in real terms than that of the 1987–88 peak of the Cold War. In 2010, military expenditure showed a slight increase, recording \$1559 billion in constant 2009 prices and exchange rates (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed in April 2010).

An illustration of the levels of world military expenditure for the period 1988 to 2010 is presented in **Figure 2.2** below. This figure shows the downward trend from 1988 to 1998, and the moderate increase from 1999 to 2001, and the sharp increase in the years after.

Figure 2.2: World military expenditure 1988–2010




Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, April 2010.

The downward trend in world military expenditure in the 1990s was due primarily to the deep cuts in the levels of spending of Russia and other Central and East European countries. By 1998, military expenditure had declined in Eastern Europe to only 7% of that recorded in 1989, to 36% in Central Europe, and 70% in North America. The only regions in which expenditure continued to rise during the post-Cold War period were Asia, which recorded 27%, and the Middle East, with 17%. However, the military expenditure of Western European and the neutral countries in the same period remained stable despite the fact that international tension in Europe was more profound, while the European NATO countries increased their expenditures slightly (Sköns 2000. pp. 80-82).

The main conventional rationale for military expenditure is related to international security; to protect state and people against external aggression. The threat environment in the post-Cold War era is considerably less severe. The collapse of the Soviet Union has removed the only serious threat to the vital interests of the US. Moreover, the number of global conflicts decreased dramatically. (Sollenberg *et al.* 1999. Chapt. 1). Yet the increase in military expenditure that started in 1999 took place in almost all major geographic regions. But the rate of increase varied greatly between regions. The strongest increase took place in North America, followed by East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

The changing political, military, and economic circumstances that had resulted from the end of Cold War tensions and the collapse of the USSR created new global patterns of conventional arms transfers. This era introduced different relationships between arms suppliers and recipients that brought about a reduction in the global demand for military equipment and, consequently, in international arms transfers. The first years of the post-Cold War era showed lower levels of arms transfers, averaging around \$24,000 million. In 1997 and 1998 the levels of arms transfer showed a sharp increase to reach \$28,554 million in 1997 and \$28,278 million in 1998. In the years after that, it started a sharp decrease to \$24,843 million in 1999, \$18,503 million in 2000, \$19,402 million in 2001, \$17,906 million in 2002, and \$19,269 million in 2003. The level of arms transfers started a moderate increase in the years after 2003, reaching \$26,384 million in 2007, to come back again to lower levels in 2008, 2009 and 2010. The average volume of worldwide arms transfers in 2006 to 2010 was 24 per cent higher than in 2001 to 2005 (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database), as shown in **Figure 2.3**.

Figure 2.3: Arms transfers worldwide 1992–2010



Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

Figure 2.3 shows the value of arms transfers between 1992 and 2010. We can note the roughly stable years in the early 1990s and the sharp fall in the last years of that decade due to the end of the Cold War. We can also note the rising trend since 2000 due to the so-called war on terrorism. The effect of the financial crisis is somehow clear after 2008, but this does not reflect the real effect of this crisis on world economy.

The value of arms transfers worldwide in the post-Cold War era is well below that of the Cold War era, and the average of the value in the post-Cold War era is also much below that of the Cold War era. Moreover, the first years of the post-Cold War era recorded over 45 per cent reduction from the 1982 peak in the Cold War. This sharp drop in the global arms trade is due primarily to the easing of the conflict long driven by the Cold War's superpower rivalry on the one hand, and to the economic slowdown and the consequent austerity policies adopted by leading arms buyers around the world, on the other.

We can notice from **Figures 2.2** and **2.3** that while world military spending decreased in 1997 and 1998 to its lowest level in the post-Cold War era, arms transfers worldwide reached their highest level in the post-war era in the same years. It seems that in the face of declining domestic demand, arms producers tried to seek out new markets for their products, largely in the developing world. However, if military expenditure in the Cold War era was due to the ideological confrontation between the two blocs, and the wars that took place, or to wars that might take place in the future, what would then be the determinants and justifications for the continuing rise in world military expenditure since 1991? Why was the strongest increase in North America, East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa? These are some of the questions that this thesis will try to find answers to.


2.2.3 World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers after September 11th 2001

The steady and accelerating increase in world military expenditure since 2002 is primarily due to the US's response to the events of September 11th 2001 and the so-called 'war on terrorism' in Afghanistan and Iraq, which expanded to include other countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The US has also established military bases in new countries and expanded others that it already had.

The strong increase in US military expenditure has resulted in a strong tendency for several major countries to also increase their military spending. However, not all countries have

been able to continue their strong upward trends established in 2002 and 2003, because they could not afford to follow the US's increasing trend of military expenditure. Nevertheless, the increase in military expenditure in some European countries after the events of September 11th is the outcome of the transatlantic relationship between the EU and US, on the one hand, and the increased pressure on Europe to improve its military capabilities in both the EU and NATO, on the other (Sköns *et al.* 2004, pp. 305-39; Deen 2004). **Figure 2.4** shows the increase in World and US military expenditure after September 11th.

Figure 2.4: World and US military expenditure after Sept. 11th 2001



Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2010, Appendix 5A, table 5A.2 and SIPRI Database.

Figure 2.4 shows that while world military expenditure increased by 50% between 2001 and 2010, US military expenditure increased 81.23% over the same period. However, was the high military expenditure after September 11th really meant to combat terrorism? In addition, did it really contribute to that cause in both Iraq and Afghanistan, to which huge defence budget was allocated? This will be another point of interest in my thesis.

2.2.4 Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers after the Global Financial Crisis

Despite the global financial crisis and economic recession that broke in 2008, and the resulting fall in the global economy and government revenues, military expenditure continued its upward trend in 2009. According to SIPRI, two-thirds of the countries for which data about military expenditure is available increased their military expenditure in

2009, including fourteen of the fifteen top spenders (Perlo-Freeman *et al.* 2010, p.177). The increase is primarily due to the US's spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the aspirations of some countries to become regional or global powers. Moreover, sixteen out of the twenty leading developed and developing economies forming the G20 have also increased their military spending, according to a leading think-tank.⁴

The impact of the global financial crisis and economic recession began to be felt in 2010. According to a SIPRI think-tank, increases in world military spending slowed down considerably in 2010 from 5.9% in 2009 to 1.3% in real terms, recording the lowest growth rate since 2001. However, the fall varied from one region to another; the lowest was in the European countries, which decreased their military spending in 2010 by 2.8% in real terms compared to 2009.

The fall in military spending also varied between Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. Most of the major spenders showed relatively small cuts, whereas in many of the smaller and more vulnerable economies of Central and Eastern Europe, the cuts were more substantial: France 8.4%, Germany 1.3%, Bulgaria about 28%, Estonia 23%, Latvia 26%, Albania, Hungary, Greece, and Slovakia by 10%.

In Asia, most countries tried to rebalance their military spending growth with their economic growth rates, which had slowed after the economic crisis. China slowed its rate of increase in military spending in 2010 to 3.8% in real terms after an average increase of 9.3% from 2001 to 2009.

In South America and Africa, military expenditure continued to increase rapidly after the financial crisis, recording 5.8% in 2010. This increase in South America reflects the strong economic growth in most South American countries, and the geopolitics of countries such as Brazil, which is playing a more active role in world affairs to support its quest for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. However, the increase in military spending in South America remains surprising given the general lack of military threats

⁴ The G20 includes 19 states: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, and the USA, plus the European Union. Of the 19 states, only Argentina, Indonesia, and Italy did not increase their military spending.

(apart from Colombia and Peru which are suffering internal conflicts), the positive inter-state relations, and pressing social and economic needs (SIPRI 2011).

Military spending in Africa is estimated to have increased by 5.4% in real terms in 2010. The bulk of the increases came from four countries: Algeria, Angola, Morocco, and Nigeria, and was driven by increases in oil revenues, except for Morocco where it was driven by the high military spending of its neighbour Algeria. There was a small fall in South Africa and a further large drop in Chad from the oil-fuelled heights of 2008.⁵

In the United States, the increase in military spending in 2010 also represents a considerable slowing of the rate of increase, from 8% in 2009 to 2.8% in 2010. Yet the United States' military spending remains exceptional worldwide, accounting for nearly 44% of world military spending, leading to the global surge since 2001.

I can say that the financial crisis had severe impacts on the United States, and almost all of the top arms spender countries in Europe, yet these countries did not make sharp cuts in their military spending that would help rebalance their requirements. The decrease in military spending was more noticeable in Europe, whereas the US continues to record new high figures in military expenditure. This fact highlights the importance of the role military spending plays in politics, and the impact of this on the Middle East, the focus of this research.

2.2.5 Future Trends in World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers

The increase in world military expenditure (see **Figure 2.4**) is mostly due to the increase in the military expenditure of the United States. In his presidential campaign, President Obama spoke about cuts in the military budget, but figures show that the military expenditure of the United States has risen continuously during his years in power. It was increased from \$782 billion in FY 2009 to \$855 billion in 2010, and to \$895 in 2011 (US Office of Management and Budget 2011). The requested figure for 2012 is \$14 billion less than that of 2011, yet this does not mean there is a real change in the military expenditure

⁵ Figures are highly uncertain due to missing data for many countries, most critically Sudan, Libya, and Eritrea.

of the United States. This figure also does not include the \$118 billion to fund operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (US Office of Management and Budget 2012).

The United States, the biggest spender, is expected to continue to suffer from the financial crisis in the coming years. Its debt is expected to exceed 90 per cent of its GDP, yet it is expected to continue to record high levels of military spending. This is due on the one hand to the interests of the military lobby in the US, which will justify the military budget and arms sales under different names, and to the US's ambition to keep its position as the number one superpower, on the other.

The US is also expected to increase its military sales to other countries under different titles. When his administration formally notified Congress of his intention to sell weapons worth \$60 billion to Saudi Arabia, President Obama mentioned that this sale was designed to boost the US arms industry and help counter growing Iranian power. Andrew Shapiro, the assistant secretary of state for political and military affairs said about the deal: 'This proposed sale has tremendous significance from a strategic regional perspective' (MacAskill 2010). The strategic perspective of the US will also make it approve deals with other countries in the Middle East, and other regions in the world such as Japan and Taiwan.

Moreover, there are no indications that there will be any significant reduction in the total value of world arms transfers. China has already reduced its military imports from \$3536 million in 2005 to \$559 million in 2010. This reduction is due to the EU's arms embargo imposed on China after 1989 following the repression of demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, which made China change its policy from being an absolute recipient of weapons to a buyer of the necessary components and technology for use in Chinese weapon platforms (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database). However, China, which records very high levels of military expenditure, would definitely be interested in increasing its high-technology military imports if the embargo was lifted. The US, on the other hand, will strongly continue its strong opposition to the lifting of the embargo against China in order to prevent a Chinese military build-up. It has threatened the EU with sanctions if the embargo is lifted.

India, which has increased its arms imports from \$1095 million in 2005 to \$3337 in 2010, is expected to keep high levels of arms imports, supported by its high economic growth. This also applies to other countries in East Asia and South America which have achieved high economic growth in recent years. Oil-rich countries are also expected to make big arms imports, benefiting from high oil prices (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database).

Similar to the US, the Middle East records the highest military burden, which is mostly going to keep it on the increase. Many factors may contribute to this rise, including: foreign policy objectives, armed conflicts, oil resources, real or perceived threats, state formation in Iraq and its military requirements, the rising temperature between Turkey and Israel, Israeli threats to Lebanon, Syria and Iran, Israeli threats to Hamas in Gaza, the situations in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, and events that might arise in the near future. Dictatorships in the region add an important factor, as any of them might go for an arms deal without the approval of the concerned authorities in his country, and he might also go to war against any neighbouring country for unjustified reasons.

The situation in the Gulf is thought to be different due to the fear of Iran's dominance in the area. High oil revenue will help these countries to make high levels of arms imports. Frost and Sullivan, a leading growth strategy consultancy, expects the Middle East defence spending to grow further in the coming years as Gulf Arab nations embark on military modernization programmes. It anticipates the main increase to take place in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are expected to spend \$62.9 billion over the current decade to build up and modernize their power and air-defence capabilities. Furthermore, Forecast International expects the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to increase their military imports from 68 billion in 2010 to \$82.5 billion by 2015, and the greater Middle East defence market to grow, reaching nearly \$120 billion by 2014 (Darling 2010).

However, military expenditure in Tunisia and Egypt are expected to decline sharply in the next few years. The expected coming regimes will most probably be more democratic, and this will make processing any arms purchase in these two countries more complicated, as it will have to be approved by the parliament, and all the more so because these countries are already suffering financial problems due to the cost of the two revolutions. The same applies to other Middle-East regimes, which will find it more urgent to channel their revenue into economic reconstruction to raise living standards in their countries instead of

spending it on weapons in the hope of minimizing civil unrest. However, Libya is expected to increase its military spending because of the war, which has resulted in the destruction of its military capabilities as a result of the NATO attacks.

However, for many decades these countries have been the biggest market for arms that they have not used, even in times of crisis. Similarly, Iraq, which had dropped out of the market for so many years, is expected to increase its arms imports in the coming years. It has already increased imports in the last few years but it is expected to increase much more in the coming years with the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by the end of 2011 as scheduled. Iraq has to rebuild its national army to meet its perceived internal and external security needs, and this will necessitate huge arms imports. Iraq is an oil-rich country and high oil prices would facilitate high levels of arms imports, and this will be facilitated by the US, which is seeking a way out of Iraq (Holtom *et al.* 2011). Algeria and Morocco are also engaged in an arms race due to the rivalry between the two countries. According to SIPRI, the majority of arms transfers to North Africa for the period 2005 to 2009 were made to Algeria and this has pushed Morocco to place significant orders for arms (Holtom *et al.* 2011). The arms race between Algeria and Morocco will continue to increase arms imports by the two countries.

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, the situation in Libya, which has also dropped out of the market for years, is also very promising for the arms market. The Libyan national army has been destroyed and, I think, in the best scenario, if Libya is not divided, the coming Libya will need new arms equipment. If Libya is divided, however, then the two coming states will need to import arms for their national armies and this will lead to high levels of arms imports, which will be supported by oil revenue, as Libya is an oil-rich country. This will also be supported through the frozen money of the current Libyan president and officials.

Israel has also reached very low figures in arms imports, as it is becoming an arms-manufacturing country. However, figures about Israel are not accurate, because Israel does not provide information about its military imports and exports, and does not include the military aid it receives from the US.

Future trends in world military expenditure are also connected to the way the international regime will be shaped. For example, will the United States continue to remain the only

superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union? Will it be able to continue to do so after the financial crisis?

China is looked at as a strong potential competitor to the US. It is the world's largest economy and has political and military aspirations. Supported by a strong economy, China will continue the reformation of its military doctrine to extend its influence and become a superpower and this will require high levels of military spending. On the other hand, Japan and India will not be happy with China as a superpower, as this will lead to disruption in the balance of powers in Asia, and this will motivate these countries to spend more on their military programmes.

It is also most probable that Brazil will continue to increase its military spending to support its objective to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Oil-rich countries are also expected to continue with their high figures of military spending, benefiting from the high prices of oil. The Libyan army has been destroyed, and the coming Libya has to rebuild its military capabilities; and if Libya is divided, the figures will be doubled. South Sudan has also to build its military after it has become an independent country. All these elements show that the coming figures for military expenditure will be much higher than those of previous years

In the Western European countries, the change from territorial defence forces to forces for military action in conflicts abroad requires new equipment for peacekeeping forces. Many of these countries have failed to make the modernization necessary during the last few years because of the financial crisis, but some will now modernize as they come out of the financial crisis. However, this emerging demand will be met by both domestic production and imports.


2.3 Regional Distribution of Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers

North America, Western Europe, and East Asia have continuously been the biggest arms spenders in the post-Cold War era. North America has always been the top spender region despite the drop in its military spending in the years leading to 1998, before it started a sharp increase to reach \$707.3 billion in 2010. The military expenditure of North America

has ranged from \$549 billion in 1988 down to \$382 billion in 1997 and up again to \$707.3 billion in 2010 (SIPRI 2011).

Western Europe comes second in military spending but with much lower values than those of North America, and more stable ones. The military expenditure of this region has ranged between \$317 billion in 1988, down to \$278 billion in 1995 and up again to \$306 billion in 2009. But it showed a slight decrease in 2010, recording \$297 billion. East Asia comes third with a continuously rising trend from \$88.4 billion in 1988 to \$222 billion in 2010. The sharp increase in the region’s military expenditure has come in the last decades from the economic growth of both China and India. Eastern Europe shows a sharp drop from \$339 billion in 1988 to \$67.6 in 1992, to make a moderate increase in the years after, reaching \$94.1 billion in 2009. **Figure 2.5** shows the top regions in military expenditure in the period 1988 to 2009. It demonstrates that the increase in world military expenditure is uneven and that it varies from one region to another and from one year to the next. The sharpest increase occurred in North America in the last decade. Western Europe is almost stable and there has been a moderate increase in East Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe (Perlo-Freeman *et al.* 2010, chap. 5).

Figure 2.5: Military expenditure by region 1988–2010




Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, April, 2011.

The Middle East also shows a rising trend after the fall that followed the high figures in 1990 and 1991 because of the invasion of Kuwait. After a decrease from 1992 to 1996 it

started a continuous rising trend, apart from a slight decrease in 2002 and another one in 2008. This drop seems temporary as many countries in the region plan major arms purchases. **Figure 2.6** shows the trend in military spending of the Middle East. There is a sharp increase in 1991 and 1992 followed by a decrease to 1995, then starting a continuous increase in most of the years after.

Figure 2.6: Military expenditure in the Middle East 1988–2010



Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, April 2011.

Moreover, **Table 2.1** shows that some regions have made more rapid increases in military expenditure than others. We can see that over the ten-year period from 2000 to 2009 Central Asia showed the fastest increase, at 175%, with Eastern Europe next at 100.1%, then North America at 75%, East Asia at 72%, and South Asia at 57%. However, regional trends in military expenditure are strongly influenced by a few major spenders in these regions.

Table 2.1: Regional distribution of military expenditure 2000–2009

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Change % 2000–2009
North America	391	394	441	500	545	571	580	596	635	684	75%
Central America and the Caribbean	4.9	5.0	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.7	5.1	5.7	5.8	6.3	29%
South America	35.6	39.1	39.1	35.7	37.9	41.4	45.2	46.8	49.2	53	49%
East Asia	122	131	139	146	152	159	170	183	192	209	72%
Central Asia	0.8	0.9	1	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.6	2.2	2.2	..	175%
South Asia	35.6	39.1	39.1	35.7	37.9	41.4	45.2	46.8	49.2	53.0	52%
Western and Central Europe	333	332	341	342	342	339	342	342	346	355	1%
Eastern Europe	33.1	36.1	40	42.8	44.8	49.6	55.3	61	67.1	68.8	100.1%
Oceania	14.7	15.3	15.8	16.3	16.9	15.7	18.5	19.5	20	21.6	47%
Africa	17.1	17.6	18.6	18.5	20.8	21.6	22.6	(23.6)	(26)	(27.7)	62%
Middle East	71.3	77.2	73.4	75.4	80.2	87.9	95.5	101	(101)	(100)	40%
World	1053	1078	1142	1213	1279	1329	1371	1418	1484	1572	49%

■ Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2010, Appendix 5A, table 5A.2
 ■ -- = data not available or not applicable, () = uncertain figure

The major recipient region for the period 2006 to 2010 is Asia and Oceania. Europe comes second and the Middle East follows third (Holtom *et al.* 2010). States in Asia and Oceania account for 43% of imports of major conventional weapons, Europe for 21%, the Middle East for 17%, the Americas for 12%, and Africa 7%. The US exports for the same period account for 44% of its total arms exports to Asia and Oceania, 28% to the Middle East, and 19% to Europe. Russia accounted for 67% to Asia and Oceania and 14% to Africa (Holtom *et al.* 2011). Arms imports of Middle-Eastern states for the period are 4% less than those for the 2001–2005 period.

2.4 Global Distribution of Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers

The distribution of world military expenditure is uneven. Developed countries, oil-rich countries, and growing economies record the highest percentage of world military


expenditure and the top fifteen spender countries have continuously recorded more than 75% of world military expenditure.

2.4.1 Top Arms Spender Countries

The top ten spender countries in 2010 in order are: the US, China, France, the UK, Russia, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Italy, and India. The value of military expenditure of these countries amounts to \$1186 billion, an increase of about 59.4% over 2001 (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database).

The biggest share of global military spending is made by just a few countries. The top ten spender countries in 2010 account for 76.1% of world military spending. Moreover, the US alone has a much bigger share than the next nine spender countries, which together account for 31.8%. **Figure 2.7** illustrates the top ten spender countries in 2010 and their shares of world military expenditure.

Figure 2.7: Global distribution of military expenditure in 2010




Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, April 2011.

There has not been any change in the names of the top ten spender countries in the last five years. Moreover, there have been only very slight changes in the ranking of these countries: the US has continuously kept its position as the top spender country, China has been the second top spender in five years, France has also come third for five years; the UK has also come fourth for four years and second and third for the other years; Russia has

also come fifth for five years and seventh for one year. Japan, Germany, Italy, and Saudi Arabia have ranged between sixth and ninth, and India has maintained its position as the tenth. **Figures 2.8A–F** illustrate the top 10 spender countries in the years from 2005 to 2010. We can note that the top spender countries are the same in the five years and there is very little change in the ranking of these countries.

Figure 2.8: Top 10 spender countries 2005–2010




Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, April 2011.

Figures 2.8A–F also show that the top five spender countries have continuously been permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These countries together account for a significant percentage of global military expenditure. However, these high levels of military expenditure raise questions regarding their responsibilities as Security Council permanent members to work for the purposes of the United Nations: ‘to maintain international peace and security ... by peaceful means’ (Charter of the UN), and about how high levels of military spending can help ‘to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples’ (Charter of the UN).

Some of the top spender countries have continuously increased their military spending in the post-Cold War era. China records the highest increase with 284%, from \$29.8 billion in 1999 to \$114.3 billion in 2010. Russia follows with 176%, Saudi Arabia with 91%, the US with 90%, and India with 65%. **Figure 2.9** shows the increase in military expenditure for five of the top spender countries over the period 1999 to 2010. We can note that the US has not recorded the highest percentage increase, yet it is still the biggest spender country with much higher figures than other countries in this list.


Figure 2.9: Military expenditure increase 1999–2010



Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, April 2011.

Other top spender countries have had roughly the same budget for the military for each year of the same period, except for the UK, where it reached 27%, but they kept their position as the top military spenders. **Figure 2.10** shows that the increase in military expenditure of Germany is -5.8%, for Italy and Japan it is 0%, for France, 1.8% and for the UK, 27%.

Figure 2.10: Military expenditure increases in top spender countries, 1999–2010



Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, April 2011.

More countries have recently increased their military spending for different reasons. Some have increased it because of the existence of real or perceived threats, others to contribute to multilateral peacekeeping operations in armed conflicts, others due to the availability of economic resources, and others for foreign policy objectives.

The high military spending of China, India, and Brazil is due to the rapid economic growth of these countries, which is expected to remain reasonably stable as it is fuelled by the domestic markets of these countries. However, despite their self-generated economies, they have not been able to shield themselves completely from the effects of the global financial crisis. Data show that the economic growth of these countries slowed down in 2009, and a further slowdown is expected. However, they are still at very high levels and most probably these countries will continue to record high levels in their future military spending.

The military spending of Algeria, Azerbaijan, and Saudi Arabia was also high in some years due to the increase in oil and gas revenues. The military spending of Chile and Peru


has also shown high levels because their military spending is linked by law to profits from the exploitation of key natural resources.

Perlo-Freeman finds that oil discovery often increases military spending, because – unlike taxes – the revenues carry little political cost, the oil and gas infrastructure justifies increased protection, and the development of natural resources tends to create tension and make conflict more possible (Perlo-Freeman 2010). Chad, for example, has increased its military spending over the period 2000–2009 by about 663% in an attempt to suppress domestic conflict. Azerbaijan has used oil revenues and increased its military spending by 471% over the same period to strengthen its military forces along its border with Armenia, which has traditionally had a stronger army and enjoys strategic terrain advantages. But Perlo-Freeman finds that both countries have failed in their strategies. Chad lost the trust of the World Bank, which had supported it to build its oil infrastructure with cheap loans. The World Bank pulled out of the project when it found out that the government was spending oil revenues on defence. Azerbaijan's stronger military could put the fragile truce with Armenia under threat because high levels of military spending create potential dangers, as noted by the International Crisis Group in its report about the military build-up of Azerbaijan (Perlo-Freeman 2010).

The high military spending of oil-rich countries from 2000 to 2008 is due to the large budget increases over the same period. The fall in oil prices in 2009 slowed the rising trend of military budgets in oil-dependent economies. Iraq decreased its military spending by about 28%, Venezuela by 25%, and Oman by 16%, but the long-term trend of these economies shows that military spending in many developing countries continues to increase (Perlo-Freeman *et al.* 2009).

Georgia had one of the world's most rapid increases of military spending in the decade leading up to the conflict with Russia in South Ossetia, but in 2009, its military spending fell 39%. Perlo-Freeman *et al.* find that this big decrease in military spending is due to the fact that, having failed in the war, Georgia discovered that the military option did not work, and so has decided to drop its military spending sharply (Perlo-Freeman *et al.* 2010, chap. 5). **Figure 2.11** shows selected top spender countries in different parts of the world. The blue lines refer to the increase in billion dollars, whereas the red graphs show the percentage of this increase.

Figure 2.11: Military expenditure increase 1999–2008, selected countries




Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure

2.4.2 Top Arms-Supplier Countries

Despite the financial crisis and the resulting economic recession, the largest hundred arms-producing companies, seventy-eight of which are based in the US and Western Europe, increased their arms sales by \$14.8 billion since 2008 to reach \$401 billion in 2010, a real increase of 8 per cent. Moreover, this increase is 59 per cent in real terms since 2002 (Jackson 2011). The US continued in 2010 to keep its position as the top arms-supplier country, recording \$8641 million, and Russia comes second with \$6039 million. Germany comes third, recording \$2340 million, China fourth with \$1423 million, and the UK fifth with \$1054 million, and France sixth with \$834 million (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2011).

The top fifteen supplier countries in 2010 are the same as in 2009, apart from the last two countries, Belgium and Canada, which gave their positions in 2010 to Norway and Brazil. Moreover, similar to 2009, five out of the top six supplier countries are permanent Security Council members. Most of the top fifteen countries recorded an increase in 2010, namely: the US 30%, Russia 8%, China 42%, France 124%, Sweden 110%, Italy 22%, and Canada 53%. Some countries which reduced their arms exports are Spain 49%, Israel 42%, and Ukraine 37%, whereas there was not much change in the figures of Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2011). **Figure 2.12** shows the top fifteen supplier countries in 2010 and the value of their exports. We can notice the big difference between the top two suppliers, the US and Russia, and the other top suppliers.


Figure 2.12: The top 15 arms suppliers in 2010



Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

However, as I clarified in the introduction of this chapter, these figures cannot be taken as accurate because a single-year figure does not give an accurate picture, given that some countries, such as Israel, have not reported their figures for the mentioned years. **Figure 2.13** shows the share of the top suppliers for the period 2006 to 2010. It shows that the US and Russia exported more than the rest of the world. Together they were responsible for 54 per cent of global arms transfers. Germany also accounts for a high share of 11 per cent. We can also see that only nine countries account for 89 per cent of global arms transfers (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2011).

Figure 2.13: The top suppliers 2006–2010




Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

Figures 2.12 and **2.13** show that there is no change in the top suppliers, only in their ranking. This is partly due to the fact that these countries are the top arms-producing

countries, yet many other countries may find markets for their less sophisticated weapons. **Figure 2.14** shows the top supplier countries and their customers for the period 2005 to 2009 and their customers. We can note that the highest sales are to allies and oil-rich countries. We can see that the US's highest exports are to its ally Israel, as well as to South Korea and UAE, which are both allies and good customers in the arms markets. The same applies to Russia, which records its highest sales with China, India, and Algeria. Germany's highest sales go mainly within the NATO countries and this comes within the scope of strengthening European military power. However, Turkey and Greece have many points of dispute that might turn into conflict any time. Taking into consideration Greece's financial crisis and France's objection to Turkey entering the European Union, we can put a big question mark on France's arms sales to Greece. The UK's sales, like those of the US and Russia, are based on financial and political considerations, while in France the considerations are financial.

Figure 2.14: Top suppliers and their customers 2005–2009




Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

Taking into consideration that arms should not be given to areas of conflict or to countries which abuse human rights, we would raise a question about why the top supplier countries sell arms to these countries, disregarding international and national codes of conduct. Noting that four out of the five top suppliers are Security Council permanent members, we wonder how arms sales have become a foreign policy through which they can protect their strategic and financial interests, regardless of any human consideration.

The global arms market in both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras was dominated by just a few countries: the United States, Russia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and China. However, some changes happened in the ranking of the countries between the two eras. In the Cold War era the USSR led the total value of arms transfers worldwide, followed by the US, France, the UK, Germany, and China. Moreover, other top arms-supplier countries over the Cold War era continued to be the same over the post-Cold War era and the only change was the emergence of Russia and Belarus after the collapse of the USSR (SIPRI 2006), as shown in **Figure 2.15**.

Figure 2.15: The top 20 exporters 1955–1991




Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

Figure 2.15 shows the top twenty arms exporters over the period 1955 to 1991. The top supplier country over the period was the USSR, which totalled at \$459,569 million. The US comes second with \$428,405 million, and far behind comes the UK with \$103,804 million. France comes fourth with \$76,899 million, followed by Germany with \$33,967 million, and China with \$31,236 million.

Competition between the two biggest arms suppliers, the US and the USSR, was going on during the Cold War era. However, arms transfers in this era were made to allies and were linked to the ideological conflict between the two superpowers. **Figure 2.16** shows the trend of the top six exporters in the Cold War era and their competition throughout the whole period, apart from the end of the period, where the USSR shows a sharp drop due to the changes that were starting to emerge in Eastern Europe countries.


Figure 2.16: The top six exporters in the Cold War era 1950–1991



Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

In the post-Cold War era, the US took the lead and was followed by Russia, France, Germany, the UK, and China. **Figure 2.17** shows the values of arms transfers worldwide of the top supplier countries in the period 1992 to 2010. It shows that the US is the top supplier country over the period, with \$180,177 million, followed by Russia with \$84,221 million, Germany with \$35,050 million, France with \$31,552 million, the UK with \$24,529 million, and China with \$12,916 million (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2011).

Figure 2.17: Top 20 exporters in the post-Cold War era 1992–2010




Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

The competition between the US and Russia, which replaced the USSR, continues in the post-Cold War era. Russia has adopted more flexible payment arrangements for its prospective customers in the developing world in order to secure new arms purchases.

These arrangements include forgiving outstanding debts of prospective clients and granting loans to make Russian weaponry more attractive and competitive. This new strategy in the post-Cold War era has enabled Russia to expand its arms sales in many developing countries. The United States developed an especially large and diverse base of arms equipment clients globally, with whom it is able to conclude a continuing series of arms agreements annually. In recent years US decisions to provide more advanced weapons systems to allies have been justified on the grounds that this will enable these states to meet their own security needs more effectively and in turn reduce the number of US troops stationed overseas (Holtom *et al.* 2010).

France and the UK have been most successful in concluding significant orders with developing countries from 2002 to 2009, based on either long-term supply relationships or their having specialized weapons systems available for sale. The volume of France’s arms exports increased by almost 10% between the periods 2001–2005 and 2006–10; however, the share of French arms exports in the global arms trade decreased from 8% to 7%. **Figure 2.18** shows that the US moved to rank first in most of the post-Cold War era, apart from years from 2001 to 2003. The following top four arms-supplier countries, France, the UK, Germany, and China, have exchanged positions throughout the period. **Figure 2.18** also shows that Russia ranks second in most years of the period, apart from 1994, when it ranked third after Germany, and 1998, when it ranked third after France, in addition to the years from 2001 to 2003, when it replaced the US.

Figure 2.18: The top six arms exporters in the post-Cold War era 1992–2010



Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

The world's six largest arms-supplier countries in both the Cold War era and the post-Cold War era have continuously been the US, Russia, France, the UK, China, and Germany, apart from a very few years when the list of the top six is broken. Moreover, five out of the top six arms-supplier countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council, one of whose objectives is to promote peace and international security. The world's leading countries of peace are the world's leading suppliers of arms. This calls to mind the former US president Jimmy Carter's saying: 'We can't have it both ways. We can't be both' (Carter 1978, 266–75). It also highlights the relationship between arms transfers and security that will be discussed in Chapter 4.

Despite the financial crisis and the resulting economic recession, the largest hundred arms-producing companies, seventy-eight of which are based in the US and Western Europe, increased their arms sales by \$14.8 billion since 2008 to reach \$401 billion in 2010, a real increase of 8 per cent. Moreover, this increase is 59 per cent in real terms since 2002 (Jackson 2011). The US continued in 2010 to keep its position as the top arms-supplier country, recording \$8641 million, and Russia comes second with \$6039 million. Germany comes third, recording \$2340 million, China fourth with \$1423 million, and the UK fifth with \$1054 million, and France sixth with \$834 million (SIPRI A.T. Database 2011).

However, advanced arms production is an industrial process that relies to a degree on a variety of factors in any economy. Such factors include the presence of an adequate economic infrastructure; plenty of financial resources; the overall level of industrialisation in the country; scientific and technical development; the supply of skilled labour, the existence of linkages with other industries, and finally the existence of the market for the goods (Krause, 1995, p.13). The success or failure of arms production depends also on political will that may have urged the initiation of arms production.

The production of advanced arms is regarded as a leading sector for industrialisation because it is associated with the central segment such as metal-working, iron-and steel making, transportation and electronics, naval engineering, "heavy industrial machinery manufacture, transportation and electronics, which has made it a clear adjunct to civilian technological advancement" (Krause, 1995, p.14). The benefits of arms industrialisation are enormous among which we can talk about its attribution to modern economy. Besides, it is capable of employing huge labour force, and endorsing countries trade.


Like any other commodity, the advanced weapon industry requires a market demand to stimulate production. Therefore, it is essential to find the suitable environment, and legitimate reasons to sell weapons. Creating wars and finding excuses to maintain countries security are the stakeholder to transfer arms or, to put it in Leon Trotsky's words, "war is the locomotive of history". "War is the proving ground of military technology, and the pursuit of victory in war provides a stimulus to arms transfers, arms skills needed simply to operate the weapons (or weapons systems) and their related technological artifact" (Krause, 1995, pp.18-19).

Nowadays we can see that the UN permanent members are the top producers and sellers of advanced arms. Their commodities are very well sold as they are very advanced and vastly wanted. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries are always keen on having the latest advanced weapons devoting annually huge sums of money for that. However, advanced arms production and sales are a controversial issue. On the one hand, we can see that advanced weapons producers such as Canada, Germany and Switzerland are subject to strict sales rules which forbid selling advanced technology easily, on the other hand, the foreign policy plays a decisive role in breaking arms control. For example, US facilitates the process of selling advanced arms to serve its political and foreign agenda. As such, we find that the international arms trade is dangerously out of control. It could be true that such advanced weapons are highly necessary for countries' national security, however irresponsible arms flood to areas of dispute result in lethal conflicts. The best example can be given about Iraq when Saddam Hussein went into a war against Iran and then Kuwait because of his possession of very advanced weapons. It is equally important to consider the immense human cost of using such weapons in conflicts.

2.4.3 Top Arms-Recipient Countries

The conflict between India and Pakistan continues to fuel an arms race between the two countries. However, India's high economic growth has helped it to rank as the top recipient country in the arms market in 2010, recording \$3337 million. Pakistan comes second with \$2580 million and Australia third with \$1677 million. These figures show that India's arms imports are 29% more than the second big importer, Pakistan, and 99% more than the third, Australia (Holtom *et al.* 2011). **Figure 2.19** shows the top fifteen arms importers in 2010 and the value of their imports.

Figure 2.19: The top 15 arms importers in 2010




Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

The figure shows India as a top arms recipient, far above Pakistan and Australia. It is also noticeable that the top arms import countries are either conflict-ridden ones such as India, Pakistan, South Korea, Algeria, Greece, and Egypt, or countries rich with natural resources such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, or countries with high levels of economic growth, such as India, South Korea, Singapore, and China.

Four-year values for arms transfers show a more realistic picture of the top arms recipient countries. **Figure 2.20** shows the share of the top ten recipient countries of global arms transfers over the period 2005 to 2009 and the value of their arms imports.

Figure 2.20: The top recipients 2006–2010 as share of global arms transfers




Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

Figure 2.20 shows that the major recipient countries over the period were: China, India, South Korea, the UAE, and Greece. India has been the top arms recipient country with 9% of global arms transfers. China and South Korea follow with 6%, and Pakistan with 5%, Greece, UAE, and Singapore with 4%, and Algeria, Australia, and the US with 3% (Holtom *et al.* 2011). We can also notice that ten countries import 47% of global arms transfers.

Furthermore, arms transfers reflect the current alliances between arms-supplier countries and arms recipients and this reflects to a large extent the Cold War situation. China receives 89% of its arms imports from Russia, as does India, which receives 77%. South Korea receives 66%, and the UAE receives 69% of its arms imports from the US. Greece's 35% imports from Germany reflect Germany's commitment to support EU countries and strengthen their military capabilities (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2011). **Figure 2.21** shows the top five recipient countries and their suppliers, and the share of their arms imports from these suppliers.

Figure 2.21: The top arms recipients and their suppliers 2005–2009



Source SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

However, the relationship between suppliers and recipients in the post-Cold War era is different from that in the Cold War era. In the Cold War era, arms transfers were mainly to countries on the lines of confrontation between the two blocs (West Germany, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Turkey) and to countries of conflicts (India, Japan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia). Moreover, conflict in some countries had a regional impact and contributed to the high levels of arms imports in the whole region. The first Gulf War, between Iraq and Iran, for example, increased arms imports not only to the two countries in conflict, but also to most countries in the region.

However, unlike supplier countries, there was a change in the names of recipient countries between the Cold War era and post-Cold War one. **Figure 2.22** illustrates the top twenty arms recipient countries in the Cold War era and the value of their arms imports.


Figure 2.22: Top 20 arms recipient countries 1950–1991



Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

Figure 2.22 shows that India comes in the lead over the 1950–1991 period and that its arms imports account for \$64,771 million. West Germany comes second with \$52,782 million, and Iraq third with \$45,490 million. It also shows that the majority of the countries are on lines of confrontation between the two blocs of conflict-ridden countries. However, the trend in arms purchases of these countries has not been stable and has swung strongly during the period. **Figure 2.23** shows the top eight recipient countries over the same period (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2011).

Figure 2.23: The top 8 arms recipients 1950–2010




Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, May 2011.

Figure 2.23 shows that India’s arms imports have been high in many years throughout the period, as have those of West Germany, the second top arms recipient. Iraq, the third top arms recipient, increased its arms imports when Saddam came to power and peaked in 1984 during the Iraq–Iran war. It kept high levels of arms imports till the end of the war in 1988. Iran, the fifth top arms importer, reached very high levels of arms imports during the 1970s. Other Middle-Eastern countries also show a sharp increase, and this is also due to the war as well as to the Arab–Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Libya shows a sharply decreasing trend, which is due to the sanctions imposed on it after the Lockerbie event.

Figures 2.22 and **2.23** clearly show that conflict has a direct impact on a country’s arms purchases. They show that the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran not only increased arms purchases to the two countries but also to most countries in the area. Countries that face a conflict are also keen to maintain high levels of arms purchases: India, because of its conflict with Pakistan; South Korea, because of its conflict with North Korea; Turkey because of its conflict with Greece; Japan, because of the conflict in the Korean peninsula; and Algeria, because of its internal conflict. Further discussion about the relationship between conflict and armament will be demonstrated in Chapter 4.

In the post-Cold War era, some other countries emerged as top recipients in arms purchases and this was due to the change in the relationship between the suppliers and the recipients, and to other motives such as high oil revenue or high economic growth. **Figure 2.24** shows the top twenty arms importers in the post-Cold War era.


Figure 2.24: Tops arms recipient countries 1992–2010



Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.

Figure 2.24 illustrates that China ranks first with \$32,441 million. India is second, with \$29,749 million, followed by South Korea with \$23,885 million. Turkey comes fourth with \$22,135 million, Greece fifth with \$19,561 million, Taiwan sixth with \$19,390 million, Saudi Arabia seventh with \$18,443 million, Japan eighth with \$16,390 million, Egypt ninth with \$15,623 million, and Pakistan tenth with \$13,739 million. Like the top arms-supplier countries, the top recipient countries are almost the same in both the Cold and post-Cold War eras. However, the ranking of the countries has largely changed, not only between the two eras but also from one year to another (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2011). **Figure 2.25** illustrates the change in arms imports of the top eight arms recipient countries over the period 1992 to 2010. China, the top importers, shows many peaks during the period, the highest of which are in 2001 and 2006, and this is due to its high economic growth in the last decade. The same applies to India, which shows its highest peaks in 2003, 2007, and 2010. South Korea also shows some peaks. However, they are not as sharp as the already-mentioned countries. Turkey shows two high peaks in 1993 and 1998 and some minor ones in other years and the same applies to its opponent, Greece. Saudi Arabia shows one very high peak in the years between 1996 and 1998 to level off thereafter.

Figure 2.25: The top 8 arms recipients 1991–2010



Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, May 2011.


Reviewing the list of the main purchasers of weapons highlights a very important issue, namely the accessibility of arms to countries that are listed as human rights abusing states, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and China, and to countries in military tension with another,

such as South Korea, India, Greece, Israel, and Pakistan. Different countries do, of course, have traditional suppliers, mainly as a hangover from Cold War alliances.

2.4.4 US Military Expenditure

The increase in world military expenditure comes mainly from the increase in the military expenditure of the US. But in 2010, figures show that the US, unlike previous years, does not completely account for the rising figures in world military expenditure, although it continues to record very high levels. **Figure 2.26** shows US military expenditure compared to world military expenditure over the period 1999 to 2010. It demonstrates that, apart from in 2010, there has been a direct relationship between the two, and that the increase in the military expenditure of the US has had a direct impact on world military expenditure.

Figure 2.26: US and world military expenditure 1999–2010



Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, May 2011.

However, the military expenditure of the United States is a matter of debate between different parties in the United States itself. In their letter to the House Budget Committee, twenty-nine Republican committee members expressed their fear that broad cuts to the national defence budget without regard to the inherent strategic risk would jeopardize the security of the nation. Others believe that the strength of the national defence is related to the strength of the American economy.

Despite the ‘Change’ of his presidential campaign, President Obama did not bring in any reduction in the military expenditure of the US. On the contrary, there has been a

continuous increase since he came to power, making it clear that military expenditure in the US is not under the control of any one president, but rather is a US phenomenon.

Obama's requested defence budget for the fiscal year (FY) 2012 is \$881 billion. Although this is less than the \$891 billion for 2011, it does not mean any real reduction in the military expenditure, as it is the result of the planned withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan by the end of 2012 (US Office of Management and Budget 2012).

The US continues to lead the global surge in world military spending to maintain its overwhelming military power as the basis of its security and status. This puts pressure on other countries to increase their military spending, or at least not to reduce it. This will also make the world vulnerable to military solutions that will have devastating effects on civilians, as happened in Iraq, and as is happening in Libya now.

However, members of the Senate house expressed their worries and concerns about the dramatic increase in US military expenditure. In an article published in *The Huffington Post* on 6th July 2010, Republicans Barney Frank and Ron Paul found that if the United States does not make substantial cuts in the projected levels of spending, it will do substantial damage to its economy and dramatically reduce the quality of life in the United States.

2.4.5 Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers to Developing Countries

During the Cold War era, military spending in the developing world was mainly affected by the rivalry between the two superpowers because each bloc supported its allies in other regions and supplied them with weapons. The developing world's demand for arms was mostly fuelled by conflicts and the aspirations of some countries to become regional powers (Brzoska *et al.*, 1987). It was also affected by the will of many countries to achieve independence from occupation, and later by the demand to build their national armies and military capabilities. Consequently, total arms imports of developing countries increased greatly during the Cold War era, in general, and in the 1970s in particular.

Military expenditure increased five-fold between 1960 and 1988 and grew twice as fast as income per capita (McNamara 1991). The final years of the Cold War record 7% of military equipment and supplies of total imports in developing countries. The total military

expenditure in the developing countries also grew from \$104.2 billion in 1970 to \$180 billion in 1982, recording 73% real growth over the twelve years. Military spending also increased in the poorest region in the world, Sub-Saharan Africa, to 100%. But these trends slowed after the 1982 world recession (McKinlay 1989).

The high military expenditure of many developing countries during the 1960s and the 1970s was also due to these countries gaining their independence and their tendency to build their military forces to reflect their new status. Consequently, the military expenditure of these countries grew at a much higher rate than that of industrialized countries. Between 1960 and 1987, military expenditure in the developing countries recorded 7.5%, whereas industrialized countries recorded just 2.8% (UNDP 1994), and most of the money spent on arms by developing countries went to the major powers.

Almost all newly independent countries build their military capabilities as a way to confirm their independent status, on the one hand, and to defend themselves against any external threat, on the other. However, high levels of military expenditure for many developing countries severely affected the economies of these countries, and made it very difficult for them to face their developmental challenges as newly independent states.

Developing countries in the Cold War era committed themselves to military expenditure at a time when they were faced with many important developmental challenges, and the major powers in the developed world did not support them in a positive way. However, one step in a positive direction was made in 1961 when the US Foreign Assistance Act was amended to make it mandatory for the US president to consider a country's level of military expenditure and amount spent on military acquisitions before granting economic assistance (USAID 1985). However, this Act remains insufficient, as the concerned authority receives its data from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which builds its information on the figures that developing countries include in their military budgets and this rarely happens (Ball 1988, pp. 107–8).

In Africa, there is a severe lack of official reporting of defence budgets by African governments. Yet the data available reveal that military expenditure in Africa has increased 60.23% over the period 1993 to 2002 (Perlo-Freeman *et al.* 2010, chap. 5). The excessive spending on arms has contributed to making African countries feature among the


bottom 25 of the 175 countries ranked by the 2003 UNDP Human Development Report (UNDP 2003).

Developing countries contribute to a large share of world arms transfers. Between 1978 and 1988, developing countries accounted for more than three-quarters of all arms traded internationally (McNamara 1991). In the years between 1989 and 1998, developing countries cut their imports of major weapons by one-quarter. This resulted in a change in their import shares from around 40% of the world total at the beginning of the period to 30–35% at the end of that period (Hagelin *et al* 2002).

The latest report from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) Conventional ‘Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2002–2009’ states that ‘nations in the developing world continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by conventional weapons suppliers’ (Grimmett 2010, p.1). Figures in this report show that conventional arms transfers for developing countries in the period 2002 to 2009 have accounted for 68.3% of the value of all international arms transfer agreements and that the percentage in the last years of the period from 2006 to 2009 has reached 72.8%.

Arms transfers to developing countries showed a continuous increase from \$20,153 million in 2003 to \$48,802 million in 2008, to show a little increase in 2009, recording \$45,071 million (Grimmett 2010, p.35). **Figure 2.27** shows arms transfers to developing countries in each year between 2002 and 2009.

Figure 2.27: Arms transfer agreements with developing countries 2002–2009




Source: CRS 2010, table 4, p. 35.

Figure 2.27 shows that there was a gradual increase in arms transfer in the developing countries that peaked in 2008.

In terms of suppliers, most arms transfer agreements to developing countries from 2002 to 2009 were made by two suppliers: the US and Russia. The USA ranked first over the period, recording \$100,590 million, and Russia was second with \$72,281 million, whereas other arms-exporting countries stand far behind these figures. **Figure 2.28** shows the value of arms transfer agreements to developing countries over the period 2002 to 2009. It shows the top arms supplier countries to the developing world and the values of their exports (Grimmett 2010. p.35).


Figure 2.28: Arms transfer agreements with developing countries 2002–2009



Source: CRS 2010, table 4, p. 35.

We can notice in **Figure 2.28** the high values of arms exports of the US and Russia compared to other countries. However, the US has not been the top supplier country in every year of the period, but it has exchanged position with Russia from 2004 to 2007. The same applies to the other top suppliers, which have also exchanged positions. This is likely to be due to a particular contract that a country has made in that year. **Figure 2.29** shows the change in the ranking of the top supplier countries between 2002 and 2009.


Figure 2.29: Arms transfer agreements with developing countries 2002–2009



Source: CRS 2010, table 4, p. 35.

We can notice in **Figure 2.29** the sharp peak of France in 2005, Russia in 2006, the UK in 2007, and the very sharp peak of the US in 2008. Moreover, **Figure 2.30** shows worldwide arms transfer agreements between 2002 and 2009 and suppliers' shares to developing countries.

Figure 2.30: Suppliers' share with developing nations 2002–2009



Source: CRS 2010, table 1, p. 27.

Figure 2.30 shows that all of Russia's exports over the period were to developing countries, followed by France with 96%, and Italy with 88.9%. China comes fourth with 88.2%, US fifth with 76%, the UK seventh with 66.7%, and Germany eighth with just 2.3% (Grimmett 2010. p.27).

The figures presented above show clearly that developing countries contribute to a bigger share of arms transfer agreements worldwide. This highlights the importance of examining the impact of arms transfers on developing countries. Figures also show that Russia, the

US, and major Western countries are the biggest suppliers of arms to developing countries and this also highlights another issue, which is whether these countries contribute to a more violent or more secure developing world. These issues will be tackled more deeply in next chapters.

Arms continue to reach developing countries and has strongly affected development in these countries. Arms-manufacturing countries also continue to facilitate arms exports to developing countries through credit financing facilities and other means, and this enables many developing countries to make large arms deals that burden their economies.

2.4.6 Military Expenditure in the Middle East

As mentioned in the introduction (see 1.1) the Middle East is classified as the most violent region and the biggest market for arms trade which drained its financial resources. However, there is little public opinion research in the Middle East which reflects the real figures of military expenditure and its impact on growth and development. As such, the following review attempts to shed light on this particular area in this chapter and in the following ones.


The Middle East has ranked first in military expenditure. During the Cold War era, the Middle East became a large and expanding arms market largely due to the rise in oil incomes after 1973–74, the many conflicts in the region, and the strong interest and increased involvement of both the Soviet Union and the US in the region (Brzoska *at al.*, 1987).

The military expenditure of the Middle East increased sharply in the first two years of the post-Cold War era from \$49.3 billion in 1989 to \$69.4 billion in 1990 and to \$78.5 billion in 1991. It started a moderate decrease in the years leading to 1996, when it recorded \$51.4 billion, to restart a steady increase in the following years, apart from 2002 and 2008 when it showed a very slight decrease. However, the increase in military expenditure was due to the tension in the region. The first increase in 1990 and 1992 was due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the war on Iraq to end this invasion. This increase was limited to and mainly caused by two neighbouring countries to Iraq: Iran and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia – the region's biggest spender – showed only a marginal increase, and Israel – the region's strongest military power – cut its military expenditure. The second steady increase is due

to the American war on Iraq in 2003, and its ‘war on terrorism’ (Sköns *et al.* 2004, pp. 305-39).

Middle Eastern countries received 18 per cent of international arms transfers for the period 2004-2008. Transfers to the region were 38 percent higher in this period than the 1999-2003 one. In the period 2004-2008, 34 per cent of all transfers to the Middle East went to the UAE, while Israel received 22 per cent and Egypt 14 per cent (Bromley *et al.* 2009). **Figure 2.31** shows the rising trend in the military expenditure of the Middle East over the period 1988 to 2010.

Figure 2.31: Middle East military expenditure 1988–2010




Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, April 2011.

The increase in military expenditure in Middle-Eastern countries can be attributed to a number of causes. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait increased their military expenditure in 1991 and 1992 due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the war to liberate it. However, Saudi Arabia’s military expenditure decreased also between 1993 and 1996, before starting a slight increase in the years to 2003, and a sharp increase in the years after that, due to the ‘war on terrorism’ and the high oil revenues during these years. However, the military expenditure of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and other oil- and gas-rich countries raises many questions regarding the role of arms sales in the conflicts that took place or might take place in the region in the future.

Israel’s military expenditure has been high and has remained almost steady over the whole period. Even so, the figures do not reflect the actual military expenditure of Israel as it receives huge military aid from other countries that might be diverted to other sectors. The

same applies to Egypt, which also receives military aid. Turkey has had high levels of military spending over the period 1988 to 2009, but it was not steady. Its military expenditure increased between 1994 and 1999, and in the years after started a slow decrease towards 2007, before it started another increase towards 2009. Turkey's military spending is related not only to the conflict that might arise in the region, but also to its being a NATO member. According to SIPRI Yearbook 2010, military expenditure has increased in all Middle Eastern countries between 1988 and 2009. This increase is due to many reasons among of which the outstanding conflict in the Middle East, the security challenges resulting from the American war on Iraq and the possible vacuum after the American withdrawal from Iraq, the sharp increase in oil revenue in oil rich, and the fear of uprising in the undemocratic governments determinants of military expenditure in the Middle East will be further discussed in chapter 3). Oman increased its military expenditure from \$2.4 to \$4.7 billion, Kuwait from \$3.36 to \$4.48, Saudi Arabia from \$19.73 to \$43.48, Bahrain from \$243 million to \$777 Million, Iran from \$1.78 billion to \$9.17 billion, Israel from \$12.66 billion to \$14.73 billion, Lebanon from \$278 million to \$ 1.5 billion, Syria from \$1.17 billion to \$2.29 billion and Turkey from \$9.92 to \$17.97 billion. However, military expenditure decreases for the same period in countries with better economies such as Germany from \$63.63 billion to \$45.77 billion, France from 65.27 to 64.75 billion, UK from 53.76 billion to 59.34 billion, Argentina from 3.4 to 3.15 billion and South Africa from 6.33 to 4.77 billion (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed June 2012). **Figure 2.32** shows the military expenditure of each country in the Middle East over the period from 1988 to 2009.

Figure 2.32: Military expenditure in Middle-Eastern countries 1988–2009



Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, May 2011.

Arms exporters regard the oil-rich countries as potentially lucrative markets because of rising oil and gas revenues in recent years. Moreover, external conflicts or inter-state and internal tensions in some oil-rich countries provide drivers for these countries to buy arms. This has made the Middle East the number one client in the arms market for many decades and, as seen in section 2.2.5, arms transfer to the Middle East is expected to maintain very high figures. The major defence market of the Middle East is dominated by the US, with the only exceptions being Syria and Yemen, which are equipped by Russia, and Iran, which is more likely to turn to China after Russia banned the supply of a range of Russian armaments to Iran.

During 2006 to 2010, arms imports were particularly high in the UAE, Egypt, and Israel. The UAE's high level of arms imports was due to concerns regarding its conflict with Iran about the three islands. Israel justifies its high levels of arms imports with the principle that its military capabilities should be stronger than all Arab countries combined. Egypt still has concerns about Israel's military build-up and is trying to make a military balance with it (Holtom *et al.* 2011).

Between 2006 and 2010, the UAE received about 23% of all major arms transfers to the Middle East, whereas 14% went to Israel and 13% to Egypt. SIPRI expects the UAE to remain a top arms importer in the coming years based on the country's plans to set up contracts for advanced weapons to support its military capabilities. Saudi Arabia is also expected to increase its arms imports significantly in the coming years and it agreed a \$60 billion deal with the US in October 2010 (MacAskill 2010). Another Saudi deal with Germany is in process and is expected to be the biggest in the history of arms transfer between the two countries (Chelsom-Pill 2011).

2.5 Military Expenditure and GDP

Global military expenditure in 2010 corresponds to approximately 2.6 per cent of global GDP. However, there have been continuous changes in the ranks of the top spender countries as a share of their GDP. This might be because GDP is related to a special purchase that a country makes in a certain year, or a crisis that a country might pass through which necessitates high levels of military spending.

In the period 1985 to 1990, world military spending declined in both industrial and developing countries by 1.3% of the world's gross domestic product. This downward trend continued during 1991 to 1995 and showed a widespread decline from 3.6% of world GDP in 1990 to 2.4% in 1995 (International Monetary Fund 1996). The most remarkable decline was in the former Soviet Union, where it fell from 8.4% to 3.1%.

From 1972 to 1988, the states of the Middle East spent 11.6% of their GDP on the military, more than any other region in the world (SIPRI Yearbook 1989, p.164-171). During the 1980's, about one-third of the value all weapons trades internationally were destined for the Middle East (World Military Expenditures 1989, pp. 7-15). Levels of military expenditure and indicators of militarization were higher in the Middle East, by all means, than any region of the world. The military burden in the Middle East was 30.8 in 1974, up to 36.2 in 1989 and down to 21.4 in 1999.

In the period 1998 to 2003, military expenditure as a share of GDP shows a sharp trend in some countries, whereas it is roughly stable in others. In Eritrea, which recorded the highest military expenditure as a share of GDP in this period, it increased from 35.3% in 1998 to 37.7% in 1999, and decreased thereafter to 36.4% in 2000, 24.8% in 2001, 23.9% in 2002, and 19.4% in 2003. There was also a sharp trend in Angola where military expenditure increased from 11.3% in 1998 to 21.4% in 1999, to decrease to 4.8% in 2000, and average thereafter at around 4%. In Saudi Arabia, it shows a moderate decrease from 14.3% in 1999 to 8.7% in 2003. However, some countries showed roughly stable figures over the period, such as Oman, 12%, Israel, 8.5%, Turkey, 5%, Greece, 4.5%, Pakistan, 4.5%, Iran, 4%, and Morocco, 4% (Stalenheim *et al.* 2005, pp.262-267).

In the period 2004 to 2009, military expenditure as a share of GDP also shows a sharp trend in some countries, whereas it is roughly stable in others. **Table 2.2** shows the countries which recorded the highest military expenditure as a share of GDP. Saudi Arabia records the highest increase in military expenditure as a share of GDP in this period, from 1.1% in 2003 to 8.5% in 2008. Other developing countries also show high increases over the period: Chad from 1.5% in 2003 to 6.6% in 2008, Iraq from 1.9% in 2004 to 5.4% in 2008. The table also shows that Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Israel record the highest percentage over the period, and these figures are almost stable. Oman's figures ranged between 10.4% in 2007 and 12.2% in 2003, Saudi Arabia between 8% in 2005 and 9.2% in

2007, Israel between 7% in 2008 and 8.6% in 2003. Some other countries also show an almost stable percentage, such as the US, Brunei, Singapore, and Jordan, whereas other show a decreasing trend, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria, UAE, and Yemen (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database).

Table 2.2: Regional distribution of military expenditure (% of GDP 2004–09)

Figures are shares (%) of gross domestic product (GDP)

	Country	Income Group	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Africa	Angola	Lower Middle	4.1	4.5	4.4	3.4	2.9	4.2
	Burundi	Low	6.6	6.2	4.9	4.7	3.8	..
	Chad	Low	1.1	0.9	..	5.5	7.1	6.2
	Djibouti	Lower Middle	5.6	6.3	[6.4]	4.1	3.7	..
	Mauritania	Low	4.9	3.7	3.3	..	3.4	3.8
	Sudan	Lower Middle	4.7	3.3	3.4
	Zimbabwe	Low	5.5	2.3	2.1
America	USA	High	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.0	4.3	4.7
	Singapore	High	4.6	4.4	4.0	3.7	3.9	4.3
	Timor Leste	Lower Middle	1.0	2.5	5.2	6.6	5.3	5.8
Europe	Georgia	Lower Middle	1.4	3.3	5.2	9.2	8.5	5.6
	Russia	Upper Middle	[3.8]	[3.7]	[3.6]	[3.5]	[3.5]	[4.3]
Middle East	Bahrain	High	4.3	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.0	3.7
	Iraq	Lower Middle	1.9	2.6	2.7	2.9	5.3	5.4
	Israel	High	7.7	7.6	7.6	7.1	6.9	6.3
	Jordan	Lower Middle	5.1	4.8	4.8	6.1	6.3	6.1
	Kuwait	High	5.8	4.3	3.6	3.6	3.0	4.4
	Lebanon	Upper middle	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.6	3.9	4.1
	Oman	High	12.1	11.8	11.0	10.3	7.7	9.7
	Qatar	High	4.0	2.9	2.5	2.2	2.5	..
	Saudi Arabia	High	8.4	8.0	8.3	9.2	8.0	11.2
	Syria	Lower Middle	5.6	5.1	4.4	4.1	3.8	4.0
	UAE	High	7.4	5.6	5.1	5.0	5.5	7.3
	Yemen	Lower Middle	4.7	4.3	3.6	4.1	3.9	..


■ Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, World Development Indicators 2010.

... = data not available or not applicable, [] = uncertain figure

Figure 2.33 illustrates the military expenditure of the top fifteen countries in 2009 as a share of GDP. We can note that the majority are developing countries, and are either

conflict-ridden countries or oil-rich. There are other countries where military expenditure represents a high percentage of their GDP, but these countries are not listed as there are no exact figures for the year.

Figure 2.33: The top 15 spender countries as share of GDP, 2010




Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, May, 2011.

Calculating defence spending as a percentage of GDP has the implication that wealthier countries are entitled to spend more in defence than poorer countries. A comparison between **Figure 2.7** and **Figure 2.33** shows that the top spender countries in 2010 are not the same as the top spender countries in 2010 in terms of their GDP, except for Saudi Arabia, the US, and Russia.

The developing countries, particularly those in Africa and the Middle East have the heaviest economic burden in terms of their share of GDP. In 2010, the Middle East spent an estimated 6% of its GDP on the military, compared to a global average of 2.3%. In all other regions, the burden was much lighter. **Figure 2.34** illustrates military expenditure in the Middle East countries as a share of their GDP between 2000 and 2009. Oil-rich countries Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait have continuously been on top, though they have not been involved in any conflict in the region. This raises a very important question that I am trying to find an answer to in my research: why do Gulf state countries buy arms?

Figure 2.34: Military expenditure in the M. East countries (% of GDP 2000–09)




Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, May, 2011.

The value of military expenditure in rich countries is much higher than that in developing ones, yet these countries still account for the greatest share of global military spending. On the contrary, military spending in many developing countries amounts to a heavy burden on the economy and government budget, yet it is almost invisible in the context of global military expenditure. The US, for example, is the highest spender and it spends about 44% of world military expenditure, yet it ranks tenth on the top spender countries as share of their GDP.

2.6 Military Expenditure Per Capita

World military expenditure in 2010 corresponded to \$236 per capita worldwide. Some countries, however, allocated ten times that amount. **Figure 2.35** illustrates the fifteen top spender countries in per capita terms in 2008. It shows that Israel was the top country with a total of \$2300. The US comes second with \$1950, and Oman third with \$1650. The value decreases slightly to France at tenth with \$1025, showing after that a sharp drop to Australia with \$575.


Figure 2.35: Top 15 countries in terms of military expenditure per capita 2008



Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, May, 2011 and SIPRI Yearbook 2009.

There were some changes in the identities of the top fifteen countries in 2009. This was due to some purchase that the new top countries have made in this year. The UAE comes at the top with \$2653, and the US comes second with \$2141, and Israel third with \$1882. The value decreases slightly for the other top countries, reaching \$804 with Denmark. **Figure 2.36** illustrates the top fifteen spender countries per capita in 2009.

Figure 2.36: Top 15 countries in terms of military expenditure per capita 2009



Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, May, 2011 and SIPRI Yearbook 2010.

We can also observe that top spender countries in per capita terms are not necessarily the same as the top spender countries. Some countries show high figures because they have relatively small populations. The US, for example, is the top spender country and accounts for 47% of world military expenditure, yet it comes third, whereas Israel, which ranks thirteenth in the same year and accounts for just 1% of world military expenditure, comes first with the highest spending per capita. Other countries like China and India are not included in the top fifteen per capita list, though they are among the top spenders, and this is due to their large populations.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter presented a survey of world military expenditure and arms transfers. It reviewed the history of military expenditure and arms transfers, the trends in world military expenditure and arms transfers in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, and the global distribution of military expenditure and arms transfers by region, country, and income group. Finally, the chapter listed the world top spender countries, the top arms-supplier and the top arms-recipient countries, and inspected their military expenditure and arms transfers in constant dollars and as a share of GDP.

The results of the literature summary reveal that world military expenditure reached very high levels in the Cold War era and this was entirely due to the military expenditure of the US during the Korean War, Vietnam War and the Reagan build-up period. Moreover, the average military expenditure throughout the period was also high due to the confrontation between the two superpowers and their allies. The end of the Cold War in 1991 offered hopes of reduction in the military expenditure of the two superpowers and, consequently, in world military expenditure.

The early years of the post-Cold War era showed a decreasing trend in world military expenditure and this was mainly due to the reduction in the military expenditure of the USSR. However, the optimistic prediction that the end of the Cold War would put an end to high levels of military expenditure soon vanished. The reduction in military expenditure ceased, and towards the end of the decade military expenditure showed an increase that accelerated sharply thereafter, to reach unprecedented figures in 2004. That rising trend in

world military expenditure was entirely due to the rising trend in the military expenditure of the US. Moreover, the future trend in world military expenditure is expected to show a rise because of the requested budgets of the US Congress for the following years.

The review above also showed that world arms transfers have followed the trend of world military expenditure during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. It also showed that the current high level in world military expenditure does not seem to be entirely the result of September 11th and the 'war on terrorism', because the rise started a few years earlier. Moreover, the increasing figure in world military expenditure is due mainly to the military expenditure of just one state: the United States.

The review showed that, in general, most of the time the global arms trade was dominated, consecutively, by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council: the US, France, the UK, Russia, and China. The same countries were in the lead during the Cold War era, but it was shown that after the Gulf War, the US emerged as the top arms supplier with 35–50% of the total global arms trade in any given year. Contrary to what was expected, arms transfers worldwide increased during that period between 1955 and 1982, and then dropped in the years after. The peaks of arms transfers were in 1980s due to the Iraq–Iran war, and at the end of the war the arms demand slowed, decreasing the value of arms transfers.

The literature also indicates that the value of arms transfers worldwide in the post-Cold War era slowed down in comparison to that of the Cold War era, recording a reduction of more than 45% from that of 1982, due to the reduction of conflicts in many areas. However, an increase in arms transfers occurred during the 2000s due to the war on terrorism, and despite the effect of the financial crisis, though the figures do not reflect the real effect of this crisis on the world economy.

Arms transfers to developing countries appeared to be highest during the years 2002 to 2009, and were mostly made by two main suppliers: the US and Russia. Arms transfer in the Middle East, on the other hand, has risen due to external conflicts and internal tensions in some oil-rich countries, which provide motives for these countries to purchase arms. The above review also showed that UAE, Egypt, and Israel scored the highest arms transfers during the years 2006 to 2010.

It has been shown that seventy-eight out of the hundred largest arms-producing companies are based in the US and Western Europe and, despite the financial crisis, they increased their arms sales with an average of 8%. The top arms suppliers which recorded an increase in 2010 are: the US, Russia, China, France, Sweden, Italy, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Canada. However, the statistics showed that some countries such as Spain, Israel, and Ukraine reduced their arms exports. The top recipient countries from the US are: Israel, South Korea, and UAE, and from Russia are: China, India, and Algeria, and from Germany are the NATO countries, and finally Greece from France. However, China has been the top arms recipient country with an average of 9% of global arms transfers.

The review above also showed that the current level of military expenditure of the US does not seem to be justified. The US not only spends more than any potential enemy, but also more than the other top fourteen countries combined.

This review has also revealed that low-income countries account for a small percentage of world military expenditure because they spend much less on their military than high-income ones. Yet the highest defence burden is found in low-income countries because the proportion of their military expenditure to GDP is much higher than that of high-income ones. Military expenditure in many developing countries, as shown above, is not in line with their economic circumstances, because these countries devote a high share of their GDP to military expenditure, whereas developed countries do not devote a large fraction of their total budgets to the military.

The questions that remain unanswered are: why have the five permanent members of UN Security Council always been among the top arms exporters and the biggest arms sellers? Why are most of their arms deals to areas of disputes, or to countries that have long been criticized for violating human rights? Would this not violate the basic rules of human rights and fuel the wars? Of course, these are very legitimate questions that none of the UN Security Council members felt the need to find answers for, nor did they commit themselves to signing any treaty to regulate traditional weapons or arms transfers.

The Charter of the UN recognizes the legitimate right of every country to self-defence (1945, article 51), and this cannot be done without maintaining a strong and well-equipped

army. However, the issues discussed in this chapter raise some questions that need to be answered:

- Does a high level of military expenditure bring about a safer world or a more dangerous one?
- Does military expenditure promote security and development or does it lead to more conflict and misery?
- Does military expenditure burden the economy and hinder growth or does it create an atmosphere suitable for business and investment?
- Moreover, does military expenditure affect high- and low-income countries equally?

These questions will be tackled in Chapter 4 by examining the relationship between military expenditure, conflict, and development.

Chapter 3

Military Expenditure and Arms transfers in the Middle East Determinants and Justifications

3.0 Introduction

Chapter Two has shown that world military expenditure and arms transfer are on the increase and that huge amounts of money are spent on weapons. Moreover, military expenditure and arms transfer are expected to keep their rising trend in the coming years despite the world financial crisis. The figures shown in Chapter Two raise some questions about the determinants and justifications of world military expenditure and arms sales to the Middle East which has in return shown rising trends in military expenditure during both the Cold and post-Cold eras, and which is also expected to keep rising in the coming years.

As shown in section 2.4.6, the Middle East has been the biggest market for arms for many decades. Moreover, military expenditure in the region is expected to double in the next ten years. However, the Middle East would not have been the biggest market had it not had underlying reasons. This chapter tries first to extend the argument started in Chapter 2 by focusing on determinants and justifications of military expenditure and military transfer in the Middle East. It also aims at foregrounding the theoretical basis for Chapters 7 and 8, and finding answers, along with Chapters 7 and 8, to the following research questions: RQ3: Why do the UN Security Council permanent members continue to be the top spender countries and the top arms sellers to developing countries and areas of conflict? And why have they not looked for other, peaceful, means to solve the outstanding conflicts in the region? RQ4 and its sub-divisions: Does the level of democracy in the Middle East affect the level of armament or vice versa? RQ4.1: What is the impact of the level of democracy on regional cooperation, military spending, and development? RQ 4.2 Do arms exports to the region help promote democracy or fortify dictatorships? RQ5.3: Does conflict in the Middle East contribute to the increase in its military expenditure? RQ 5.4: Can high military expenditure in the Middle East help these countries defend themselves? RQ 5.6 Who is paying for and benefiting from military expenditure and arms transfers? And RQ 6. What is the relationship between the US's policy towards the region and the growth of public hostility to the US and the rise of extremism?

In the first part of this chapter, I will examine the determinants of military expenditure in the Middle East and the impact of the outstanding conflicts, disputes and threats in the region on the level on its military expenditure and how Middle Eastern countries justify their military spending and the impact of that on the region. In the second part, however, I shall study the determinants of arms transfers to the Middle East and examine who is benefiting and who is paying the price.

3.1 Determinants of Military Expenditure

There are many factors that may contribute to the rise of military expenditure, including: occupation, border disputes, religious antagonism, foreign policy objectives, armed conflicts, oil resources, real or perceived threats and others. Dictatorships in the region add an important factor, not only in terms of making an arms deal without the approval of the concerned authorities in the country, but also in terms of going to war against any neighbouring country for unjustified reasons or in terms of building military power for internal oppression or even in increasing military expenditure for unjustified reasons that serve the dictators' rule. The following sections provide answers to RQs. 4, 4.1, 4.2. 5, 5.3 5.4 and 6.

3.1.1 Occupation

The Israeli occupation of Arab territories is an important cause of military expenditure in the Middle East. The ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict has already produced three major wars and many other minor ones, and continues to threaten the region with the outbreak of war at any time. All countries in the region, and especially the frontline ones, have recorded high levels of military expenditure since the Israeli occupation in 1948 as shown in section 2.4.3 Egypt, Syria and Israel were among the top 15 arms recipient countries between 1950 and 1991. Moreover, the charts in that section show the very sharp rising trend of arms purchases of both Syria and Egypt during the 1967 and 1973 wars between Syria and Egypt on the one side and Israel on the other. The Arab–Israeli conflict has also increased military expenditure in many other Arab countries, and this is due to the public opinion that Palestine is the Arabs' central issue and Muslims' holy duty because of the Islamic shrines in Jerusalem. The Arab–Israeli conflict has been used by some countries to justify their high military spending, where in reality it has been for other internal reasons and for

defending their regimes. This has resulted in the militarization of many countries, deterioration of democracy and violation of human rights.

The cost of the Israeli occupation has been very high on both Israel and the Arab countries in the region, mainly the neighbouring ones. However, the Arabs believe that the US and the West are responsible for the creation of Israel in the region and that it was the outcome of the colonial period of France and the UK to the region. Pappé (1994) finds that the creation of Israel started with the British mandate of Palestine and the Balfour Declaration in 1917. At a later stage, the Zionist movement played a role in forcing the British out of Palestine because of their objection to the immigration of Jews to Palestine. It also committed a series of ethnic cleansings against the Palestinians to force them to flee the country, opening the door to the illegal immigration of Jews from Europe to Palestine (pp.4-7).

Moreover, the Arabs believe that the West and the US have contributed to the continuation and expansion of the Israeli occupation. Pappé (2007) writes that the West was supportive of Israel because of its 'guilt complex' about the Holocaust and the oppression of the Jews in the West. He mentions that 'the Nazi movement and the Holocaust were not just German phenomena but a part of European history. The Western countries thought they can bury this chapter forever by creating a Jewish state in Palestine'. He also believes that there has been a non-stop Zionist ethnic cleansing against the Palestinians that has resulted in the current Israel and Palestine (Pappé 2006, pp.6-20). Similarly, Finkelstein (2001) expresses disappointment at the exploitation of the tragic Holocaust to justify the current atrocities towards the Palestinians or to justify political and financial gains. He finds that the Holocaust is an issue that relates to its victims, but the Israeli lobby has exploited it to receive support for its illegal expansion and practices in Palestine. However, why does the Middle East have to pay for the price of others' mistakes and interests (pp.3-8)?

The Israeli occupation continues to burden the region with arms. Israel believes that it has to be stronger than all Arab countries combined, because if it loses any war with the Arabs it is going to lose its existence. The Arabs also believe that they have paid that price of the West's mistakes and 'guilt complex' with the creation of Israel, and they continue to pay the price of the special relationship between the US and Israel. Hinnebusch (2007) believes

that Americans, and especially the neo-conservatives, 'were intimately tied to Israel's right-wing Likud party and supported Israel's policy of colonization in the occupied territories' (p. 15).

The literature overviewed demonstrates that the Israeli occupation has been the most important determinant for the military expenditure of the region. It has, since the creation of Israel in 1948, caused many wars between the Arabs and Israel and it continues to threaten with the outbreak of wars. Moreover, the possibility of the outbreak of war is increasing with revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt which have brought to power more representative regimes.

3.1.2 Oil and Foreign Interests

Amin (1978) thinks that oil 'has been a source of misfortunes, miseries and importance for the Arab people'. It is the key to the strategic significance of the Middle East and a very important factor in the United States' and the West's policy in the region. The Middle East holds two-thirds of the world's oil reserves, the importance of which has become increasingly critical to the expanding industrial economy of Western Europe (p.112).

Britain and France pioneered the exploitation of the resources of the Middle East. Until the 1940s, Great Britain was the dominant power in the Middle East with overwhelming military force and political influence. The United States' role in the area began when 'Britain could no longer maintain full responsibility for the protection of Western interests in the area' (Lewis 1964, p. 141). In the 1950s the United States came to supersede Britain and France and became an influential power in the region. Leffler (1992) confirms that 'since the late 1930's American corporations, with the help of the US government, had been consolidating their control over Arabian oil. US defence officials wanted to increase the use of Middle-Eastern oil in order to preserve Western Hemisphere petroleum reserves so that the latter would be available in plentiful quantity in case of another war. Saudi Arabian oil, the state department emphasized to President Truman, constituted 'a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history' (pp. 80-81).

Oil is regarded as an important determinant for the military expenditure of the region. Sadowski (1993) believes that 'oil revenue is the real foundation of the arms race in the

Middle East'. He thinks that oil has been the main reason for flooding the area with arms and that without petrodollars most of the conflicts in the Middle East would be resolved easily and quickly with simple weapons. It is the petrodollar that has brought conflicts and wars to the Middle East and made it the number one client in arms sales (pp.6-8).

Maass (2010) finds that 'one of the ironies of oil-rich countries is that most are not rich, that their oil brings trouble rather than prosperity' (p. 3). Donald Rumsfeld, the former defence secretary, insisted on an Infinity Radio call-in- Program in 2003 that the American war on Iraq had 'nothing to do with oil' and that it was 'about weapons of mass destruction' (Rumsfeld 2003). However, Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman, mentioned that the attention given by developed nations to the political situation in the Middle East is directly tied to oil security, and that the Iraq war was largely about oil. A 2008 study by Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard University budget expert Linda Bilmes found the total cost of the war would exceed \$3 trillion (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2008).

Robert Fisk, the specialist in Middle East affairs, wrote to the Independent in January 2003 that the looming war wasn't about chemical warheads or human rights but about oil (Fisk 2003). Moreover, the report delivered to Vice-President Dick Cheney in 2002 on the Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century from the Baker Institute for Public Policy confirms the motives behind the war on Iraq. The report states that 'the United States remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma. Iraq remains a de-stabilizing influence to... the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East. Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets. Therefore the US should conduct an immediate policy review toward Iraq including military, energy, economic and political/ diplomatic assessments' (Mackay 2002).

Moreover, Hinnebusch (2007), finds that the US claimed that it needed to defend its national security by launching a war against Saddam Hussein because of his possession of weapons of mass destruction. The American military and political leaders exaggerated and falsified facts to justify the quick decision to go to war. Hinnebusch finds that there were other real motives behind the war:

Bush saw an attack on Iraq as the solution to US problems, [require] we ... shift the focus from security threats to the US, per se, toward threats to its strategic situation in the Middle East and its hegemony over the oil market. First, US oil vulnerability was on the rise. US import dependence was rising in an ever-tighter oil market with global production seemingly peaking, hence shifting the balance of power to oil producers. These conditions could make the US and the world capitalist economy vulnerable to an oil shock historically fatal for US presidents. Iraq was a solution to these potential threats for it had the world's second largest oil reserves and very low production cost. (pp. 11–12)

Similarly, Said (1992) argues that orientalism has created unequal relations between the West and the Middle East, as a part of the developing world. These unequal relations have turned the Middle East into no more than a satellite to the core West. He finds in this relation ‘a new imperialism’ that has caused the Arab as a majority in the Middle East to be completely ‘hooked’ into the West. In this colonial relationship the core has deprived the periphery from all his abilities and as a result of this policy we find that ‘oil, the region’s greatest resource has been totally absorbed into the United States economy’ (p. 324). David Mark, a former Deputy Assistant US Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, wrote in his article in the *Observer* that ‘the conspiracy theory prevalent in the Arab world and among Iraqis everywhere is that the real US goal is to keep Iraq weak and the Arab world divided. To accomplish this, it is useful to keep Saddam Hussein in power. The theory concludes that this allows Israel to pursue its objectives without interference, while enabling US arms suppliers to grow rich on Middle East sales’ (Mark 2001).

Similarly, Wahid (2009) finds that ‘the sparsely populated oil-exporting countries of the region have mainly ‘recycled’ most of their oil revenues in the West, while the relatively highly populated oil-exporting countries used their oil windfall for inflated government apparatus, lavish subsidies and high military expenditure’ (p. 4). He also finds that ‘the Middle East has also been afflicted by political instability, across border conflict and devastating wars. There is no doubt that in addition to the destructive outcomes of the conflicts, the prolonged lack of stability has also severely reduced the region’s economic and human potential’ (p. 4).

The literature presented shows that the region has mainly meant to the West and other big economies only oil and recycling petrodollars in arms deals. As a result, the region has been a theatre for foreign policies that have contributed to the creation of conflict and the outbreak of wars. These factors have flooded the region with arms and drove Middle Eastern countries to an arms race. As seen in Section 2.4.3, oil-rich countries have been the biggest arms spenders and the arms imports of the oil-rich countries have mainly been based on oil prices and revenue. Even the heavy military spending of some other Arab countries were covered in some years by oil-rich countries such as Syria and Egypt war against Israel 1973, and Iraq's war against Iran and for eight years.

3.1.3 Self-Defence against Internal and External Threats

All Middle Eastern countries justify their military expenditure. Israel possesses the most advanced conventional military capabilities in the region, and has moved from being just a recipient of conventional arms to be a big exporter of arms and high military technology. It receives the most advanced weapons from the US and some European countries, and the last deal was in May 2012 when it received the third submarine with nuclear capability from Germany. Israel believes that it has to be the strongest power in the region, not only in comparison to any other Arab country, but over all the Arab countries together to survive. Israel justifies this on the basis that if its military has not been stronger than the militaries of the Arab countries combined, it will not be able to survive among Arab countries. It also believes that if it loses any war with the Arabs, it will lose its existence. However, Israel is not regarded as a particularly good client in the arms market for two reasons: Firstly, Israel receives military aid from the US and other European countries. Secondly, Israel has become an arms manufacturing and exporting country itself. Nevertheless, Israel military build-up is good for the arms market as it provokes adverse Arab reaction to buy arms to balance Israel's military capability.

The military capability of Hezbollah is not advanced and can't be compared with that of Israel, yet Israel failed to achieve a victory on Hezbollah in 2006. A report from the US Army College warned that the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah showed that there is a shift in the nature of wars and that Hezbollah, with limited military capabilities, fought Israel better than any Arab army. The reports indicated that, after the War with Hezbollah and the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, no army can be ideally prepared and that serious challenges confront military planners (Biddle *et al.*, 2008, pp.1-9). However,

the impact of this war on the infrastructure of Lebanon and development in the region was very high.

The Israeli occupation of Palestine and the failure to reach a peace treaty with the Palestinian has also contributed to the creation of the Islamic movement of Hamas which is also developing new tactics of war. Gaza Strip had to pay many times the price of Hamas' primitive missiles on Israel and the price of the Israeli occupation. However, Israeli occupation of Palestine is not only a Palestinian issue rather an Arab and Islamic and Christian one due to the religious status of Jerusalem for both religions. This fact contributes to the destabilization of the region and justifies military expenditure, fundamentalism, anti- Americanism. The many wars that took place in the region have proved that the Israeli military capability cannot bring security to Israel, and as president Sarkozy said in February 10th, 2012 during a dinner hosted by the representatives Council of Jewish Institutions of France (CRIF), 'there will be no definitive security for Israel as long as there isn't, at its border a democratic, viable and modern Palestinian state. This is the only definitive guarantee of Israel's security'.

Arab countries bordering Israel also justify their military expenditure. The military expenditure of both Syria and Egypt have been for many years linked to the Israeli occupation of Palestine and Arab land in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Syria and Egypt, the major bordering countries with Israel, have been looked at to defend Arab lands and liberate Palestine. Despite the Camp David peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1987, Egypt continued to build up its military capability. Jordan has also signed a peace treaty with Israel, and it has become, along with Egypt, a recipient of military aid from the US. Being the recipients of military aid from the same supplier, Israel, Egypt and Jordan are allies to the US and are supposed not to go to war one against another. This is what Betros Ghali, the then Egyptian foreign minister, confirmed after Egypt signed the Camp David Agreement saying that water is the only issue that Egypt might go to war for.

According to a report issued by the Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in 2010 entitled 'The Arab-Israeli Military Balance: Conventional Realities and Asymmetric Challenges,' Syria's conventional military capabilities have declined steadily due to the lack of arms imports and modernization of the Syrian forces structure and training methods. In contrast, Israel has benefited from Egyptian and Jordanian adherence to their

peace treaties, the disappearance of Iraq as a potential source of outside military aid to the Arab forces, and the continuing weakness of Lebanon's regular military forces. Palestinian Authority paramilitary security forces do not threaten Israel's security. The report also shows that Israel has also benefited from continuing US aid and arms transfers of the most advanced US military technology which Israel has integrated into its own advanced military industrial base. However, the report finds that Iran and Syria have also shown they are able to achieve gains by exploiting their support of anti-Israeli non-state actors at little cost or risk. Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas continue to pose a growing threat to Israel as they deny Israel's right to exist. In addition, Hezbollah has empowered itself militarily and politically in Lebanon. Moreover, Syria has steadily reasserted its influence in Lebanon through its ties to Hezbollah and other Lebanese allies (Cordesman *et al.* 2010).

According to another report issued by the Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in 2010 entitled 'The Gulf Military Balance in 2010: An Overview, the Southern Gulf states are trying to find an effective collective alternative to dependence on the US. They have many security challenges the most important of which are the disappearance of Iraq as a major regional threat, Iran's growing missile forces and the threat Iran will become a nuclear power, and the decisive influence of Iran over Shiite- dominated Iraq as a result of a power vacuum in Iraq. However, the report finds that these countries have upgraded their military capabilities but have not succeeded in building a collective security force. They continue to have closer military cooperation with the US than with each other. Moreover, Gulf countries disagree about the external threat: while some consider Iran the main external threat, others find Iraq the external threat (Cordesman *et al.* 2010a, p.2).

In the conference held in Bahrain in January 2012 by the Bahraini Centre for Strategic Studies under the title 'National and Regional Security of the Gulf Cooperative Council: overview from inside' General Khalafan, the general director of Dubai Police referred that the main threat to the region is the US foreign policy. He continues saying that the US supports regimes that serve its own interests. It first wanted to do that through its project to democratize the region, but when it failed in Afghanistan and Iraq, it turned to do it through the revolutions that are taking place in the Arab World. He said that if the US is really honest in its objectives to liberate the peoples of the region, it has to start with the Palestinian people who are deprived from freedom more than any other people. But we find that the US puts instead all efforts to hinder the Palestinian efforts to recognize the

Palestinian independent state. General Khalafan also thinks that the US has brought to Iran what Iran itself failed to achieve. It knocked down Saddam and made Iran the biggest power in Iraq. He also thinks that there are other security concerns in the region that are arising from Iran's Nuclear programme, the dominance of Iran in Iraq, the ideological organizations and the situation in Yemen (Khalafan's Speech, 2012). We can say that in response to RQ6 the previous discussion indicates that the presence of Israel and the US policy in the Middle East, increased public hostility and encouraged public hostility against it.

According to Abdulla (2010), Gulf countries buy arms for many reasons, the most important of which is Iran which they find unfriendly and has expansion ambitions in the Arab Gulf. Gulf countries believe that Iran's nuclear program and military arsenal pose a real threat to their countries and that they have to respond to this external threat by upgrading their military capabilities to balance the Iran's one. However, Abdulla finds that Iran's regional ambition does not justify those high levels of military expenditure in the Gulf countries. He thinks that the \$120 billion five-year arms deals that the Gulf countries signed in 2010 are not because of the Iranian threat but because the US wants the Gulf countries to be tied to the military strategy of the US to defend its interests in this oil-rich region after the its withdrawal from Iraq. He thinks that the US, as usual, exaggerates the Iranian threat in order to justify its military sales to the Gulf countries, on the one hand, and to guarantee that these countries will strongly accept to be involved in the American military strategy in the region, on the other hand. Abdulla also finds that the Gulf countries are aware that, despite the depth of the American-Gulf relationships, the US is financially exhausted and might become less willing to get involved in the security of the Gulf and other international issues in the future. The Gulf countries are also aware that the US's foreign policy is affected by the Israeli lobby in Washington and that this might change its policy towards the region or make a deal with Iran on this ground. Moreover, the Gulf countries believe that the US of 2010 is not as strong as the US of 2000, and it is more probably to be less strong in 2020. This necessitates that the Gulf countries build their own collective defence strategy in this conflict-ridden region.

As seen in section 2.2.5, the Gulf countries have many security challenges that would push many countries in the region to continue to upgrade their military capabilities. Bin Saker (2011), the director of the Gulf Research Centre, believes that Saudi Arabia will continue

to depend on the US as an arms supplier till 2035. Saudi Arabia is planned to be a strategic ally to the US and the policeman of the Gulf who has the military capability to deter any Iranian expansion in the region, to fight the terrorist groups in Yemen, and to protect its long sea and land border with Iraq and Yemen from drug and human trafficking and arms smuggling to preserve the security of Saudi oil fields. This strategy can be described as sharing the burdens with the US after the costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

To conclude, we can say that in response to RQ5.3 and RQ5.4 (see 3.0), it can be said that all Middle Eastern countries justify their military expenditure on the basis of self-defence against external threat. The Arab-Israeli conflict justifies the military expenditure of Israel and its neighbouring countries. Power vacuum in Iraq and the interference of Iran justify the military expenditure of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The threat of Iran justifies the military expenditure of Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Moreover, Iran justifies its military expenditure with the Israeli and American threat. However, the high military expenditure of the Gulf countries can be read as 'sharing the burden' with the US after the heavy cost of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. It looks that the US wants the Gulf countries to take the responsibilities of defending themselves against external threats that might come from Iran, Iraq and to share the US in its war on terrorism.

The Gulf has been a big importer of arms for seven decades, but, as the literature shows, this military expenditure does not seem to reflect the security concerns of Gulf countries. Moreover, it did not help these countries to defend themselves. Otherwise there would not be that much of American military bases in the region. However, in response to RQ 4.2 (Do arms exports to the region help promote democracy or fortify dictatorships?), it was found that the undeclared determinant of military expenditure in all Middle Eastern countries is internal, because all Middle Eastern countries are undemocratic ones and they have to show the opposition that they are not easy target, and there are a lot of examples where the military was used to oppress internal opposition, the last of which were in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Syria. However, I can conclude that military expenditure cannot guarantee self defence against external or internal threat. The military expenditure of Israel could not help her win its war against Hezbollah, neither did the military spending of the Gulf States help in defending Kuwait.

3.1.4 Inter-Arab Relationship

Most of the countries of the Middle East are isolated from one another. Each country has been absorbed in its own dialogue with the West, and has minimal relations with its neighbouring countries or other Arab countries. This is due to the many disputes that the region is plagued with over ideology, religion, sectarianism, ethnicity and borders. However, though many of these disputes resulted from the colonial era, yet they have been crystallized by the authoritarian regimes which are always interested in creating internal and external threats to justify their dictatorships. This situation has increased military expenditure in the region and led to many conflicts and is creating a tense Middle East that is ready to outbreak at any time.

3.1.4.1 Border Disputes

There are border disputes among almost all Arab and Middle Eastern countries. There are border disputes between Egypt and Libya, Morocco and Mauritania, Jordan and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Syria, Syria and Lebanon, Iraq and Kuwait, Iran and Iraq, Iran and UAE, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Bahrain and Qatar. Most of these disputes resulted from the colonial-inspired or crafted state formation from the turn of the twentieth century to the 1970s. The carve-up of much of the Middle East was determined by the strategic objectives of the former colonial powers. The peoples of the regions were obliged to live within the boundaries of new artificial states that they themselves had taken no part in shaping. Moreover, most of the Gulf States were not able to understand what boundaries meant at that time as their rule is based on tribal bases.

Findlay (1994) finds that the basis on which the colonial powers partitioned the Middle East created many 'inherently unstable political territories for the post-colonial era' (pp. 41–43). He finds that most boundaries in the Middle East are 'straight lines' drawn up by colonial powers in relation to external interests and perceptions of the resources of the Arab territories.

The literature reviewed shows that border disputes have been one important reason for conflicts in the region. The border dispute between Iraq and Iran resulted in the first Gulf War and border disputes between Iraq and Kuwait resulted in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. There are also many other border disputes between other Middle-Eastern countries that may develop into an armed conflict at any time. The dispute over the three island between

Iran and the UAE comes to the fore now and then pushing these two countries to an arms race. Section 2.4.6 shows that the military spending of UAE has been very high and this is due mainly to its border dispute with Iran.

3.1.4.2 Religious and Sectarian Hostility

Sectarian hostility is strongly threatening the Middle East, and that the US and the West have an important role in feeding this hostility. Jones (2007) finds that 'enmity for the Shi'a in Saudi Arabia, never entirely absent, has become increasingly strident in 2006 and early 2007. The empowerment of the Iraqi Shi'a and the bloody escalation of Sunni-Shi'i violence in Iraq have intensified sectarian animosity around the Middle East, but in Saudi Arabia the hostility runs particularly deep. Recent anti-Shi'i rhetoric recalls the 1980s, the most vituperative period of sectarian rancour, when the country's leaders vilified Shi'ism as part of a domestic and regional political program to counter the revolutionary message of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini' (p. 29).

The religious hostility in the Middle East is due partly to the legacy of the colonial era. The Lebanon is the outcome of the French civilizing mission to offer protection to the Christian community in Lebanon. Moreover, during the French occupation, Syria was divided into five sectarian regions. This is regarded by the majority of Middle-Eastern countries as promoting religious hostility. The impact of the French role instituted an on going religious and sectarian conflict that has resulted in a long civil war in Lebanon, and an internal conflict in Syria in the 1980s, and it continues to threaten Syria.

Furthermore, the Iraqi war against Iran had a religious element and received support from Sunni countries in the Middle East on religious grounds. The Shiite Iran is considered a threat by many Sunni Middle-Eastern countries, and the US and some Western countries play a role in focusing on this threat to justify the ways that these countries follow to protect their interests in the region. Even after the invasion of Iraq, the US played the same role.

After his capture, Saddam Hussein was put on trial for certain charges related to sectarian and ethnic issues whereas more serious and important charges were overlooked. Moreover, the timing and the way in which Saddam Hussein was executed fuelled a sectarian conflict, not only inside Iraq, but also across the region. Saddam Hussein was executed on the first

day of a Muslim religious occasion. Moreover, unauthorized video recordings of the event revealed that the majority of those who attended belonged to Al-Sader's militia, who raised provocative religious slogans during the execution and assaulted Saddam Hussein's dead body after he had been hanged. What happened showed the scene as a Shi'i revenge upon the Sunni. The current Iraq looks like a Shiite regime and a Sunni opposition which receives support from Sunni Arab countries. This situation is the outcome of the American occupation and after the country was declared a democracy by the American President.

I can read the last accusation of the US to Iran about the assassination of the Saudi ambassador in the US in this frame. I can also read the quick statements from the Saudi on the issue before any legal confirmation as a pre-agreed matter between the US and Saudi Arabia in order to create hostility towards the Shi'i Iran, and consequently prevent Iran from supporting the uprisings in the Gulf countries which are mainly being conducted by the Shi'a. Based on this sectarian hostility, the US is gaining the support of the Sunni Gulf states in any military action that it or Israel might take against Iran. This environment has resulted in what the President of Egypt said during his last visit to Saudi Arabia in July 2012: 'if Saudi Arabia is a guardian to the Sunni Project....., Egypt will be its defender.'

3.2 Determinants of Arms Transfers

Many researchers agreed that there were grand theories that applied to foreign policy (Gaddis 1982; Mingst 1995; Herring 2002), but none of these theories (Domino, Dependency, Game, Modernization and Schema) has helped fully understand the motives behind arms transfer in the US foreign policy. Arms transfer can be seen in either of these theories but none of them could separately explain it. Gerner (1995) finds that there was a shift from the grand theories that used to cover all aspects of foreign policy. Moreover, researchers found that none of the leadership theories could explain arms transfer, despite the fact that every American President had a different policy regarding the role of arms transfer in US foreign policy (pp. 17-32). Labrie *et al.* (1982) mention that while President Carter used arms transfer as the last resort, President Reagan considered it a priority and promoted it to meet the objectives of the US foreign policy.

Many researchers (Pierre, 1982; Labrie *et al.*, 1982, Hammond *et al.*, 1983, Siegel *et al.*, 1986, and Spitzer, 1996) find that the US's arms transfer is used as an instrument of

foreign policy to serve the country's strategic interests(the security of the US and its friends and allies, economic gains, provide influence in the internal and external affairs of arms-importing countries, countering opponent ideologies, war on terrorism, and help the US to avoid direct military involvement in overseas conflicts. However, Labrie *et al.* (1982) finds that the US in arms sales should based on principles. He writes:

Arms sales guided by an enlightened process of review, have served important foreign policy and security objectives. As a policy tool, they are not immune to error or risk. US policy should be based on principle yet also be pragmatic. Policy must address, in practical terms, the legitimate security needs of the US and reflect economic reality. A policy of overbearing restraint - unilaterally imposed - is unworkable and ultimately undermines the security of the American people. (p. 79)

However, have arms sales served the strategic interests of the biggest arms- exporting countries? Moreover, have the arms sales of these countries, which are UN Security Council permanent members, reflected their responsibilities in maintaining international peace and Security? This part will mainly focus on the US's determinants of arms sales to the region as it is the biggest exporter to the region which I am focusing on in my study. The following sections provide answers to RQs. 3 and 5.6

3.2.1 US Strategic interests and the Security of Israel

3.2.1.1 Supporting Dictators

Deger and West (1987) find that the political process is essential to address sources of domestic security threats and this cannot be done without establishing and strengthening democratic institutions. If people know that a particular government is not going to last forever, they will have less incentive to use violence to change it.

The US foreign policy in the Middle East is regarded as a strong determinant of the region's military expenditure. Chomsky (2011) finds that the US policy in the region was to support dictators as long as they could control their populations and maintain US policy in the region. He says:

Saudi Arabia is ... the most repressive, extremist, strongest centre of Islamic fundamentalism, missionaries who spread ultra-radical Islamism from jihadists and so on. But they're obedient, they're reliable, so they can do what they like ... The same in Kuwait ... But when you have a favoured dictator ... and he's getting into trouble, support him as long as possible, full support as long as possible. When it becomes impossible to support him ... then send him off somewhere, issue ringing declarations about your love of democracy, and then try to restore the old regime, maybe with new names ... And that's exactly what's going on in Egypt and Tunisia ... The other category is an oil-rich dictator who's not reliable, who's a loose cannon. That's Libya. And there, there's a different policy: try to get a more reliable dictator...It's kind of like democracy.

What Chomsky says here is confirmed by the long relationship between the US and both President Ben Ali of Tunisia and President Mubarak of Egypt. Both these men have long been close allies to the US and the West and were repeatedly received in the West and given prestigious forums in many international occasions. Moreover, the documents released lately from the Libyan intelligence centre in Tripoli reveal a similar scenario. According to these documents, at a meeting between the US Assistant Secretary David Welch and Gaddafi's officials on 2 August 2011 in Cairo Welch advised Gaddafi's team on how to win the propaganda war and suggested several 'confidence-building measures'. The documents also indicate that an influential US political personality was advising Gaddafi on how to beat the US and NATO. Minutes of this meeting record his advice on how to undermine Libya's rebel movement with the potential assistance of foreign intelligence agencies, including Israel (Aljazeera, 31 August 2011).

Dickey and Thomas (2002) find that 'the history of America's relations with Saddam is one of the sorrier tales in American foreign policy' (p. 212). They report that in his speech to the UN, President Bush described Saddam Hussein as the 'grave and gathering danger' (p. 213), but at the same time the US found in Saddam Hussein a means to bleed the radical mullahs who had seized control of Iran from the pro-American shah. The US feared that the Iranian revolutionaries who had overthrown the shah would overrun the Middle East, and its vital oilfields, and so it sought to support Iraq in a long and bloody war against Iran. When the US found that the Iraqi war against Iran was going badly by 1982, threatening to overrun Saddam Hussein's armies, it decided to give Iraq a helping hand.

President Ronald Reagan sent his Defence Secretary Rumsfeld to visit Saddam Hussein as a special envoy. Rumsfeld met Saddam Hussein and 'conveyed the President's greetings and expressed his pleasure at being in Baghdad', then the two men talked about 'the need to improve relations between their two countries' (p. 212). After Rumsfeld's visit, according to confidential Commerce Department export-control documents, the US facilitated the supply to Saddam Hussein of weaponry, sensitive technology, and equipment and materials of dual use that could be used to produce biological and chemical weapons (pp. 214–15). Moreover, the US knowingly permitted the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission to import bacterial cultures that might be used to build biological weapons (p. 212) and it almost certainly knew that Saddam Hussein was using chemical weapons against Iran and his people (p. 216).

Iraq experienced huge financial problem due to the very heavy costs of the eight-year war with Iran. Under this pressure, Iraq had to look for oil revenue to solve its financial problems, but soon found that Kuwait was preventing that. A State Department cable released by Wikileaks showed that in a meeting between Saddam Hussein and April Glaspie, the American Ambassador to Iraq, Saddam Hussein explained his worries that Kuwait was flooding the oil market, pushing down the price of oil and depriving Iraq of the means to repay his loans. He also complained of Kuwait stealing Iraqi oil, referring to the border disputes between the two countries (Glaspie 1990; Lewis 1990).

Glaspie told Saddam Hussein that the US would be neutral in any conflict between Iraq and Kuwait and that it had no opinion on Arab–Arab conflicts like the border disagreement between Iraq and Kuwait. All that the US hoped for was that these issues would be solved quickly. Saddam Hussein read Glaspie's remarks as a go-ahead to take military action. In August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The US launched a war to liberate Kuwait but it did not want the war to topple Saddam Hussein's regime. On the contrary, Saddam Hussein was effectively given his army back so he could put down these revolts and restore law and order in the country (Lewis 1990; Marshal 2003).

The US contributed to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the way that it handled the issue. On the one hand, Kuwait would never have taken an aggressive and provocative stance towards Saddam Hussein without the US being behind it. On the other hand, Glaspie's silence in the meeting encouraged Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait. The US did not

denounce Iraq's intended military action against Kuwait, and Glaspie defended herself by saying that she 'didn't think – and nobody else did – that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait' (Lewis 1990). Moreover, the US did not want to push very hard to topple Saddam Hussein, and American officials repeatedly pointed out that the US wanted to liberate Kuwait, but not to oust Saddam Hussein. It allowed Saddam Hussein's Republican Guards to find their way back to Baghdad after they surrendered.

Moreover, what cannot be taken neutrally is that in January 1990, the Bush administration issued a National Security Directive stating that 'normal relations between the US and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and Middle East'. Moreover, in January 1990, the Bush administration signed a directive authorizing the Export-Import Bank to advance Iraq \$200 million in loan credits. However, Muttitt (2011) finds that oil was in fact one of the US Government's most important strategic considerations, and it secretly colluded with oil companies to give them access to that huge prize (p.314).

Newsweek's Evan Thomas claimed that the US went to war on Iraq not because of weapons of mass destruction but because after September 11 it 'wanted to teach the Arabs a lesson' and show the world, particularly the Arabs, how tough the Americans are. It was a demonstration of American force (Hardball Programme 2006).

This discussion can provide extra answer to RQ6. (What is the relationship between the US's policy towards the region and the growth of public hostility to the US and the rise of extremism?). It is quite clear that the US policy in supporting Arab dictators and then abandoning them aggravates hostility against it.

3.2.1.2 The Security of Israel

Hinnebusch (2007) believes that the security of Israel has always been a priority in the US foreign policy in the region He writes:

In his magisterial account, George Packer (2005) concludes that the one thing the neo-cons had in common was 'an obsession with Israel' and a belief that the removal of Saddam Hussein would be very good for Israel'. According to Joe Klein (Time, 5 February 2003): 'Israel is very much embedded in the rationale for war with Iraq. It is part of the argument that dare not speak its name, a fantasy

quietly cherished by the neo-conservative faction in the Bush administration and by many leaders of the American Jewish Community... 'the worst-kept secret in Washington ... According to Philip Zelikow, a neo-con member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board at the time of the attack on Iraq, the 'real threat' of Saddam's WMDs was not to America: 'I'll tell you what I think the real threat (is) and actually has been since 1990 – it's the threat against Israel' (Guardian, 30 November 2003; Daily Star , 10 April 2004).

This quote shows that the war was not mainly in the US's interest but was for the benefit of Israel, which saw in Saddam Hussein a real threat and wanted to get rid of him. This idea is also confirmed by Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) who find that the Israeli lobby has also contributed to making the Middle East more violent, as it has shaped US foreign policy to serve Israel's objectives of occupation and destroying other regional powers that might be a threat to them. They mention that 'the activities of the Israeli Lobby have shaped America's actions in this critical region' (p. 1). They also find that

The Lobby's influence causes trouble on several fronts. It increases the terrorist danger that all states face—including America's European allies. By preventing US leaders from pressuring Israel to make peace, the Lobby has also made it impossible to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This situation gives extremists a powerful recruiting tool, increases the pool of potential terrorists and sympathizers, and contributes to Islamic radicalism around the world ... Furthermore, the Lobby's campaign for regime change in Iran and Syria could lead the United States to attack those countries, with potentially disastrous effects. We do not need another Iraq. At a minimum, the Lobby's hostility toward these countries makes it especially difficult for Washington to enlist them against al-Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgency, where their help is badly needed. (p.41)

Supporting the same views, Baker *et al.* (2010) maintain that one of the main objectives of the war on Iraq was to destroy a country that is classified as hostile to Israel. They mention that with the destruction of Iraq 'America's most important regional ally, Israel, would be freed of the one Arab power that had supported the Palestinian resistance in a regional context of ever increasing accommodation and defeatism' (p. 8). They think that the US and its allies destroyed Iraq 'because a strong Iraq was an impediment to American

imperial designs and Israeli insistence on unimpeded regional hegemony' (p. xi). However, if there is a widespread belief that Saddam Hussein's regime did not pose any threat to the US, that the American war on Iraq was unjustified and that only 10% believe that the US has benefited, then why did the US go for this war?

Baker *et al.* (2010) think that 'student of history will recognize in the occupation of Iraq the time-honoured technique of imperial divide and rule, used to fracture and subdue culturally cohesive regions. The regimes installed by occupation forces in Iraq reshaped the country along divisive sectarian lines, dissolving the hard-won unity of a long state-building project' (p. 5). They think that this war was deliberately waged to protect the interests of the US and its allies, including Israel. They state that 'the ideological driven aim of state-ending derived from a confluence of influences that included American neo-conservatism and its imperial ambition, Israel expansionism and its drive for regional domination, and Western multinationals and their relentless quest to regain control of Iraqi oil' (p. 7). Moreover, 'in the wake of state-ending, the American and their British allies would create a massive regional base in the very heart of the Arab Islamic world to guarantee that Western hegemony in this crucial region would be permanent military bases' (p. 8), and to 'dismantle the Iraqi state in order to remake it as a client regime' (p. 302).

3.2.1.3 Fundamentalism, Terrorism and Anti-Americanism

Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) find that the US's foreign policy in the region does not serve its strategic interests, but rather the interests of Israel. They think that the activities of the Israeli lobby 'have shaped America's actions in this critical region ... The combination of unwavering US support for Israel and the related effort to spread democracy throughout the region has inflamed Arab and Islamic opinion and jeopardized US security' (p. 1). Huntington (1996) finds the US's double standard has also contributed to the growing of fundamental movements and terrorist groups. He believes that 'the West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion, but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do' (p. 51). He also argues that 'hypocrisy, double standards, and 'but nots' are the price of universalist pretensions. Democracy is promoted, but not if it brings Islamic fundamentalists to power; non-proliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq, but not for Israel; free trade is the elixir of economic growth, but not for agriculture; human rights are an issue for China, but not with

Saudi Arabia; aggression against oil-owning Kuwaitis is massively repulsed, but not against non-oil-owning Bosnians. Double standards in practice are the unavoidable price of universal standards of principle' (p. 184).

I can conclude that the different arguments presented show clearly that the US foreign policy towards the Middle East has contributed to the creation of a destabilized region with many dictators whose lust for power has allowed the arms market to flourish, making the Middle East the biggest market for arms for many decades. This environment has also created public anti-Americanism and fundamentalist movements that are threatening the social fabric in the region. The latest consequences of this environment are the revolts which are spreading across the Arab world and which have so far resulted in the change of regime in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, threatening almost all Arab countries, unless the US and its allies interfere to protect their allies whose collapse would be costly to the interests of Israel, on the one hand, and the US and the West, on the other.

3.2.2 Economic and Political Gains of Arms Sales

Arms sale is a good business for arms-manufacturing companies, not only for its economic gains but also for its political and strategic ones. Arms sellers believe that this business has come to stay regardless of the cost on others. For Howe (1980), the arms dollar is the 'Doomsday Dollar', since there are no morals in arms sales. Arms merchants are ready to sell weapons to the enemies of their countries to increase their profits. The policy of the United States and the arms-manufacturing countries is that the 'arms sales industry had come to stay'. Firstly, it helped create millions of defence-related jobs; secondly, it fuelled the interests of these countries in recycling the petrodollar. This policy has made the military attachés in most of these countries mere salesmen for their governments. To encourage its arms sales to the developing world, the United States pioneered a new policy in guaranteeing arms-purchase export loans, an example that most Western European governments followed later (pp. 514, 515). He also finds that arms sale is like a game: supplying a state with arms will provoke other states to balance that state. This will make the state do the same, and so on (p. 676).

Pierre (1982) supports Howe's point of view that arms sales are of great importance for foreign exchange and the balance of payments. They provide defence-related jobs and reduce the per-unit cost of arms. The suppliers use the argument that 'if we do not sell,

someone else will' (p. 43) as an excuse not to adopt restraints on arms sales. The transfer of weapons is a key element of the continuing competition among arms exporters in the Middle East. Kemp and Stahl (1991) also insist on role of the United States' economic motives in arms sales to the Middle East. Successive administrations of the United States have always had the fear that the oil-rich resources in the region might fall under the control of countries hostile to America and Western interests. They have always been interested in a continuous flow of reasonably priced oil. This means maintaining good military relations with key Arab countries. Another important reason is the security of Israel, which has always been regarded as a key element in the United States' policy in the Middle East ever since the founding of the State of Israel (p. 47).

Miller (1996), believes that the Iraq–Iran war was important for the United States and the West economically and strategically, because it was a good market for their arms. As Henry Kissinger said, the United States hoped that 'both sides would lose', because this would create the conditions for the future reliance of both countries on the major arms suppliers. Miller believes that arms sales to the Gulf have nothing to do with regional stability; on the contrary, they make any war more violent. Arms sales have only to do with the economy of the suppliers who are interested in the petrodollar and job opportunities. Rivalry among the arms-exporting countries also fed the Iran–Iraq war and made it last for eight years. Each supplier found that it was a kind of hypocrisy to see other countries exporting arms and earning money while it did not, regardless of which country would get those arms. This made those countries interested in producing and selling arms. Furthermore, the United Kingdom supplied both countries with arms (pp. 132-34). Gresh and Vidal (1990) also insisted on the importance of economic factors and the role of the war in weakening the military abilities of both countries and accelerating and diversifying the escalation in arms purchases (p. 14).

Pierre (1982) finds that ' Arms sales are far more than an economic occurrence, a military relationships, or an arms control challenge- arms sales are foreign policy writ large' (Pierre 1982, p. 73). By selling arms, the supplier country acquires political influence, friendship and bases of influence. For the Carter administration, arms transfers could be seen as 'an exceptional foreign policy implement' (Kemp and Stahl 1991, p. 4) that would contribute to the national security interests of the United States, with emphasis on the 'historical responsibilities to assure the security of the state of Israel' (p. 4). For the Reagan

administration, the primary emphasis was on military cooperation, military assistance and arms sales to friendly countries because the US was interested in seeing its friends strong and armed (p. 5). Furthermore, the United States has used military assistance as a means of achieving political settlements. It promised both Egypt and Israel with military aid to encourage them to sign the Camp David agreement in 1978. It raised the total amount to be given for these purchases several times during the negotiations (Pierre 1982, p. 137). From 1979, the year of the peace agreement, Egypt received annual military aid and so did Israel and Jordan. Sharp (2010) finds that ‘the promise of US assistance to Israel and Egypt during peace negotiations in the late 1970s helped to enable both countries to take the risks needed for peace, and may have helped convince both countries that the United States was committed to supporting their peace efforts’. However, I find that the United States’ policy in military assistance also contributes to its economic interests. Giving military aid to its strategic allies will provoke other countries in the region to upgrade their defence capabilities to maintain the balance. This policy has led to an arms race in the region and affected its development.

Insisting on the economic and political factors of arms sales Hartung (2004) says that the high military budget is also due to the neo-Reaganite Project for a New American Century (PNAC) which was founded in 1997. This project adopted the ‘peace through strength’ policy and its foundation statement was signed by Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams and other key members of the first Bush foreign policy team, and in later stages it included key neo-conservative hawks and former senior officials in arms companies. Hartung mentions that ‘regime change’ in Iraq was one of the points included in the Project’s report in the run-up to the 2000 election (pp. 79-118). Similarly, Esposito (1999) finds that what the United States wanted from the Gulf War was more than defending Saudi Arabia and liberating Kuwait; it wanted to destroy the military abilities of the Iraqi army to the point where it would not be able to threaten Israel’s security and ‘to establish its hegemony in the region’. The United States had strategic as well as economic reasons for its involvement in the Gulf War, and it showed that it could and would fight for its interests (p. 255).

However, a study by the Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts revealed that investment in clean energy, health care, and education would create more jobs than spending on the military does. The report mentions that ‘\$1 billion

spent on each of the domestic spending priorities will create substantially more jobs within the US economy than would the same \$1 billion spent on the military' (Pollin and Garrett-Peltier 2011, p.3).

3.2.3 Oil, Arms and construction Companies

Oil, arms and construction companies play an important role in arms-manufacturing countries to facilitate the procedures of arms exports to those who can pay, regardless whether they are eligible to buy arms or not. Moreover, there is a causal relationship between oil, arms and construction companies: Oil revenue means more arms sales, more arms sales means more war and destruction, more distraction means more business to the construction companies. There are many arguments about the relationships between the three, especially in the US which is the biggest exporter to the oil-rich Arab Gulf.

Hinnebusch (2007) states that 'the oil/arms lobbies had more particular interests than they thought a war might serve. Conflict in the Middle East leads to high oil company profits and renewed arms spending and sales; the war was also seen by some oil men as a chance to restore the direct ownership of high oil prices and to curtail the rise of OPEC through the privatization of Iraqi oil. And the prospect was good that the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq would mean very good pickings for companies, such as Halliburton, associated with the ruling coalition-as indeed it did' (pp. 14–15).

The strategic importance of oil has made the Middle East subject to different foreign policies that have aimed at recycling the petrodollar in arms sales. Arms companies spend money in the election cycles to support candidates to the Congress and these companies are rewarded later with strong support to regulations that facilitate arms sales. American weapons contractors sponsor many politicians' activities in an attempt to influence them. In return, some of those politicians help the contractors to receive defence projects that will profit them by billions of dollars. Arms companies have also played an important role in the expansion of NATO. They have put extraordinary efforts into promoting NATO expansion and posting US subsidies for military sales (Hartung 1996, pp. 51–58).

Hartung (2000) mentions the first President Bush had strong ties to Lockheed Martin from his service as Governor of Texas and that his presidential campaign was financed by the company vice-president. Furthermore, Dick Cheney, who controlled the war on Iraq, had

been running the oil-service giant Halliburton before joining the Bush administration, earning \$26.7 million in one year, and his wife serves on Lockheed Martin's board. Furthermore, Hartung *et al.* (2004) noted that the massive growth in the US's defence spending during the first Bush administration was due to the fact that over 32 administration appointees had ties to the arms industry. Hartung believes that 'every major element of the Bush administration's national security strategy was developed in significant part before Bush took office, and before the September 11th terror attacks'.

Arms sales have been facilitated in the US through many programmes and devices. The Pentagon has many grant and loan programmes that support the arms trade. The Pentagon's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) fund offers grants and loans to support US military equipment. Moreover, the Pentagon's Defence Export Loan Guarantee programme (DELG) is authorized to provide US government guarantees for up to \$15 billion in loans for the export of US military equipment. This programme was created in 1995–96 after a seven-year lobbying campaign and contributions to key members of Congress by major military contractors (Opall 1997, pp. 16–22). In addition to these two programmes, the Pentagon gives massive quantities of US military equipment that has been declared 'surplus' (Pineo and Lumpe 1996, pp. 16–17).

Furthermore, the US has other indirect subsidies for arms exports, such as the Agency for International Development's Economic Support Funds (ESF) programme (Hartung 1996, pp. 37–39). In addition, the Defence Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) in the Pentagon is involved in promoting, brokering, administering, and financing billions of dollars' worth of US arms sales annually under the Foreign Military Sales programme (Hartung 1996, pp. 12–16). The Bush and Clinton administrations gave extra support for arms sales in the State Department. The Department's Office of Defence Trade Control was put in charge of promoting arms sales and giving advice to arms companies (Hartung 1996, pp. 16–18). The Commerce Department has also played an important role in promoting arms sales. The Department's Office of Strategic Industries also published a series of 'defence market assessments' to help US companies find weapons buyers in Europe, Asia, and Latin America (Hartung 1997). Moreover, the Clinton administration appointed top officials to advertise arms sales, and President Clinton and the Vice-President Gore intervened to support arms sales to the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. The US government has always made efforts to promote weapons and the Pentagon participated during 1996/97 in

more than six major weapons exhibitions (Hartung 1996, pp. 25–32). Washburn (1997) explains that ‘the arms industry, dominated by a few mega-corporations like Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas, and Boeing, is one of the most powerful of US special interest groups. Using its formidable financial and political clout, the industry has grown expert in slanting US policy decisions for its own financial gain-often to the detriment of human rights and global security’ (p. 38). Lora Lumpe of the Federation of American Scientists confirms that saying that ‘increasingly, US foreign policy and arms sales decisions have become captive to the narrow economic interests of the weapons industry’ (in Washburn 1997, p38).

Commenting on the role of arms companies in the American war on Iraq, Chatterjee (2009) finds that without Halliburton there could be no war or occupation. He says that this big arms company received support from its former employees Vice-President Dick Cheney and Defence Minister Donald Rumsfeld. He mentions that the company’s share value was \$10 in 2001 when Cheney joined the Bush administration and it jumped to \$80 in January 2006. He believes that the company’s fortunes are linked to the American war on Iraq and the support the company received from senior American officials due to their close ties.

Stockman (2011) refers to the fact that cuts in the defence budget are not a new issue. He mentions that he told President Reagan in the early 1980s that he must cut the defence budget in order to balance the budget, but President Reagan responded: ‘Defense is not a budget issue. You spend what you need’. In an article published in *The Huffington Post* on 6 July 2010, Republicans Barney Frank and Ron Paul proposed more than \$100 billion in cuts in the US’s defence budget for each of the next ten years; otherwise it would do substantial damage to its economy and dramatically reduce the quality of life in the United States. They argue that the defence spending of the US no longer fulfils a defensive need for protecting American citizens and the US does not need to continue to take on the responsibility of protecting every country that asked for it, the responsibility that started immediately after the World War II (The Huffington Post, 2010).

Arms would not reach the Middle East without the lobbying of oil, arms and manufacturing companies. In the US the biggest exporter of arms, these companies lobby in the congress and other political circles to facilitate, through different means, arms sales.

These companies have most benefited from the Middle East because it is an oil-rich region which has drained a big percentage of its oil revenues in arms sales and wars that have resulted in big destruction that needed reconstruction companies.

The policy of the US and the West in supporting Israel and dictatorial governments in the Middle East, or in adopting policies that take into account the interests of oil and arms companies have contributed not only to the continuation of violence in the region, but also to the emergence and expansion of diverse forms of violence as fundamentalism and terrorism. This situation has largely contributed to the increase in arms sales to the region and has severely affected its development. The Arab Human Development Report (UNDP 2009) refers to the Israeli occupation as one of the most important threats to the security and development of the region (pp. 14–15). It also refers to the high military spending in the region as another important factor and finds that this has resulted from the Israeli occupation and foreign interference that has made the region a theatre for regional and international powers (pp. 132–33). The report finds that this situation highlights the importance of the role of the UN, which has been marginalized by the big powers. Moreover, the report of the Strategic Foresight Group of Mumbai⁶ points out that ‘the overall standard of living in the Middle East would have doubled had comprehensive peace been available from 1991’. The opportunity cost of conflict in the region is estimated at \$12 trillion between 1991 and 2009, and Iraq has been the biggest loser due to the three wars, and ‘its opportunity loss since the first Gulf War of 1991 has been \$2.3 trillion’. It also saw that people in every country in the region have lost out as a result of conflict and ‘it should have been possible for all countries to grow at average rate of at least 8% per annum in the last two decades’ (Waslekar *et al.* 2009).

3.3 Conclusion

The literature presented in this chapter illustrates that the Middle East has many reasons to buy arms, and arms manufacturing countries also have their reasons for selling arms. Middle Eastern countries have varying security reasons, and arms-manufacturing countries have also their economic, political and strategic motives. As a result of these determinants, the Middle East has been the biggest market for arms and the most violent region for many

⁶ This Report was prepared in cooperation with AK Party, Turkey, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway and Qatar Foundation, Qatar.

decades by now. However, have these arms purchases helped eliminate the need for arms or the number of conflicts in the region? The Arab-Israeli conflict is still outstanding despite the many wars between the two sides and none of the existing conflicts have been settled. The security of Israel has not been achieved. The Gulf countries still need the American military forces to defend their lands. Moreover, the Middle East continues to be the most violent region.

On the other side, the literature presented in this chapter shows that the US has been the biggest arms exporter to the Middle East despite the regulations that prevent selling arms to developing countries, violators of human rights and areas of conflict. Instead of exerting efforts to promote democracy in the region, the US supported undemocratic regimes and supported them with arms and held best relations with violators of human rights. Moreover, the US foreign policy towards the region in arms sales, supporting regimes, the unjustified war on Iraq, and the support of Israel, have strongly contributed to the growing of fundamentalism and anti-Americanism in the region.

The US, as the only superpower, could contribute to the security of the region by giving economic instead of military aid, stopping arms sales to areas of conflict in the Middle East, ending the Israeli occupation and supporting the creation of Palestine, dealing with the roots of conflicts in the region and the factors that lie behind its military expenditure, encouraging regional cooperation instead of feeding anti-Americanism and fundamentalism through its bias to Israel and support to undemocratic regimes and unnecessary wars in the region.

I can conclude that the horizon of peace in the Middle East is very cloudy for many reasons and this leaves no place for much optimism about lower military expenditure. But, the region would not be violent without the availability of arms. This raise a very important question about the impact of military expenditure on conflict and development and national and international efforts made to stop the flow of arms to developing countries, area of conflicts and violators of human rights. Chapter 4 will look at the relationship between armament, conflict and development and chapter five will look at all the efforts made to regulate military expenditure and arms sales and examine if these efforts have been serious to reach their aim.

Chapter 4

Armament, Conflict, and Development

4.0 Introduction

In Chapter 2, I have looked at military expenditure and arms transfer and presented some figures that reflect the impact of each on a country's gross domestic product. The points discussed in those chapters raise a couple of questions that need to be handled in this chapter. Particularly, this chapter aims at finding answers to RQ5: Do military expenditure and arms sales contribute to world development and international security? And, do they have the same impact on developed and developing countries?

This chapter also tries to examine the impact of military expenditure and arms transfers on both development and conflict. I shall look at the relationship between military expenditure and development, military expenditure and conflict, and conflict and development. In the first part of this chapter, I will examine the relationship between military expenditure and development, highlighting the economic and social consequences of higher and lower military expenditure on both developed and developing countries. In the second part, however, I shall study the relationship between military expenditure and conflict, and examine whether there is any causal or reciprocal relationship between the two. In the third part, I will look at the relationship between conflict and development, and illustrate how each can affect the other. I will also give an overview of the economic, social, military, environmental, and political costs of conflict. In the final part of this chapter, I will round off with my conclusions about the triangular relationship between armament, conflict, and development.

4.1 General Overview

On 2nd June 2011, Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, urged all ministers from around the world to 'act boldly and urgently' to meet the social and economic targets of the Millennium Development Goals, which were agreed in a General Assembly Summit in 2000. The agreed deadline for achieving the goals is 2015 and the goals are still far away and 'greater strides' are needed to reach the goals (UN News Centre 2011). James Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, finds that there is a 'ludicrous'

gap between the billions of dollars of world military expenditure and the sum spent on trying to reduce world poverty (Wolfensohn 2004). World military expenditure is thirty times larger than the amount spent trying to give hope to people. Moreover, world military expenditure is on the increase and military expenditure in developing countries accounts for high percentages of their GDPs, yet these countries continue to record a high percentage of world arms transfers.

In the Cold War era, military expenditure was a world phenomenon and was related to many factors, the most important of which was the conflict between the superpowers. Between the years 1963 and 1991, more than three-quarters of a trillion dollars was spent on armament. Military expenditure in this era had a negative impact on developing countries, especially the newly independent ones. Between 1987 and 1991, more than 176 billion dollars' worth of weapons flowed into the developing world (Krause 1996, pp.173-96). The first years following the end of the Cold War showed a strong downward trend in the levels of military spending compared to Cold War levels. However, the hopes that accompanied the end of the Cold War soon vanished. In 1999, world military expenditure started a continuous increase from \$699 billion in 1999 to reach \$1630 billion in 2010 (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database). The high levels of military expenditure have been the subject of many studies. Theorists have focused in their studies on the impact of military expenditure on development and whether military expenditure creates a suitable environment for development or leads to conflict.

The relationship between military expenditure, conflict, and development has been highlighted by many theorists, but they have disagreed about the contributing factors between them. Some theorists would argue that there is a causal relationship between military expenditure, development, and conflict: military expenditure has a negative impact on development and makes conflict more possible. In addition, when a conflict takes place, more military expenditure is needed and this makes the impact of military expenditure on development more devastating. Other theorists argue that military expenditure has a positive impact on development and prevents the outbreak of wars.

4.2 Military Expenditure and Development

Ram (1995) finds that the connection between defence economy and economic development is a seldom-acknowledged and long-neglected issue (p. 251). Dunne (2011)

explains that the relation between military spending and development has not been analysed because of the problem of defining and measuring development. Therefore, most of the available literature focuses on the relation between military spending and economic growth (p.2).

Prior to Benoit's study in 1973, literature focused on the political and strategic dimensions of military spending and excluded the economic ones. Moreover, most of the research conducted on the economic impacts of military expenditure neglected developing countries. Even when focusing on developing countries, discussion and research have been framed in the context of the strategic realities of the Cold War, rather than the economic and political realities of development. However, the economic effects of military spending have received more focus in recent years with the high figures military expenditure has attained, but literature on the issue remains limited.

In the literature, scholars are divided as to whether a state's military expenditure impacts development levels and vice versa. Chan (1985) finds that literature on the relationship between defence spending and economic growth is 'as likely to bewilder as it is to enlighten' (p.405). He notes that to 'tackle questions such as the impact of military spending on economic performance, we need dynamic analysis to determine temporal leads and lags, the reciprocal influences among the variables, and the over-time changes in the empirical parameters' (p. 407). Mintz and Stevenson (1995) support Chan's first idea (p.283). They also find that 'the literature has failed to provide any meaningful consensus on the question of whether defence spending encourages or hinders economic growth' (p. 85). Many other theorists also find that the relationship between military spending and economic growth has been plagued by several methodological and theoretical problems (Dunne *et al* 2005, pp. 449–461; Heo 2010, pp. 760–770). Moreover, Dunne *et al.* (2005) note that there is no theoretical reasoning underlying the models construction and that little has been done to rectify the theoretical background acknowledge in Literature.

Studies on the relationship between military spending and economic growth has shown differences and has come up with contradictory and divergent results, due either to the different methodologies used in these studies, or to the different groupings of sample countries studied. Studies on a single country or a single region have shown similar results, whereas studies on different countries or regions have shown different results (Dunne,

1997). Furthermore, variation in the effect of military spending on economic growth is dependent upon the level of development of the state in question and the level of military spending. In the very least-developed countries (LDCs), military expenditure has a very negative effect on growth rates. In moderately developed countries, military spending may have a more positive effect, whereas it has a positive effect in the advanced industrial states.

Benoit (1972) recognised the possible negative effects of defence spending (pp.2-10). In latter studies (1973, 1978) he suggests that defence spending might have a positive effect on economic growth. Benoit (1978) conducts a study on 44 developing countries to examine the relationship between the two. In his findings, Benoit states that in the countries studied 'higher defence burdens stimulate growth' (p.276). He argues that defence programs provide education and medical care. It also encourages the utilization of ideal capital and production facilities, and engages in a variety of public works and scientific and technical innovations that help achieve higher employment and profits and higher investment. Benoit also argues that military spending represents a direct demand by the government for products and services (p.275).

Benoit's hypothesis has led to many research activities to reveal the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth. One group of scholars supports Benoit's findings that defence spending has a positive impact on economic growth (Atesoglu *et al.*, 1990; Atesoglu, 2009; Kaldor, 1976; Kennedy, 1983; Weede, 1983, 1986; Blomberg 1996). The standard argument of the researchers of this group is that defence spending directly stimulates economic growth by increasing purchasing power and aggregate demand. A second group of scholars find that there is a negative relationship between defence spending and economic growth (DeGrasse, 1983; Deger & Smith, 1983; Deger, 1986; Mintz and Huang, 1990, 1991; Hewitt, 1991; FitzGerald, 2001; Thomas and Glass, 1993; Smith, 1995; Kennedy, 1989). The researchers of this group argue that military spending has harmful effects on the economic growth and development process. Military spending has a crowding-out effect in terms of private investment, thereby lowering investment and negatively impacting economic performance. A third group of scholars do not find any relationship between defence spending and economic growth (Biswas & Ram, 1986; Alexander, 1990; De Rouen, 1993; Smith, 2000). A fourth group of scholars argue that the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth varies, as it

might be positive or negative, depending on the countries studied and whether they are conflict or non-conflict prone countries, high or low-growth, developed or developing, poor or rich, and arms producer or importer countries (Frederiksen and Lonney, 1983, 1985; Heckelman and Stroup, 2001; Ruttan, 2006; Brauer, 1996; Smith and Georgiou 1983; Gleditsch *et al.*, 1994)

In the first group, Weede (1986) finds that military spending has a positive impact on development and that higher military participation ratios correlate positively with higher levels of economic growth (p.301). Similarly, Blomberg (1996) argues that military spending has social and economic consequences that positively influence economic growth. Military spending provides people with modern skills and attitudes, and offers human capital, educational, vocational, and training opportunities that cannot be provided by the civilian sector (pp. 649–72).

In the second group, early classical economists, Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1817) argued that economic growth is slowed when resources are diverted into unproductive military activities. They refer to Britain's very high levels of military expenditure in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the harmful effects on the growth prospects of its economy (Oden, 1988. pp.36–42). Similarly, Deger and Smith (1983) argue that military expenditure diverts resources from other uses and so have direct opportunity costs in terms of investment and consumption. There is also a balance of payment costs because the weapon systems require a great amount of import. Likewise, Smith (1995) argues that high levels of military spending are associated with low rates of economic growth. After analysing data for the United States and other advanced capitalist countries, he concludes that there is a direct effect between the two, and that those countries which maintain large military establishments have low rates of investment as military spending may push civilian investment aside. Military industry firms outbid civilian companies for engineers, skilled workers, key materials, and even loans. Military firms use these resources less efficiently than civilian ones do, because they are less concerned about controlling their costs. They know the Pentagon will foot the bill (pp. 71–87).

DeGrasse (1983) also examines the relationship between defence and growth in seventeen industrialized countries in the period 1967–80 and reaches the conclusion that defence

spending has a significantly negative effect on growth. He states that countries with a high military burden have lower investments and slower growth. He also points out that the defence burden retards growth through the inefficient utilization of labour resources resulting from the military sector's employment of skilled labour, which then causes scarcity of skilled labour in the civilian sector. Similarly, Hewitt (1991) finds that military spending is a non-productive economic activity. It decreases social expenditure and negatively affects a country's development and economic growth (p.15). Thomas and Glass (1993) also observe that military spending generates fewer jobs than spending the same amount of money on a wide range of alternatives. They state that every \$10 billion spent on weapons generates 40,000 fewer jobs than the same amount spent on civilian programmes. Similarly, Mintz and Huang (1990) find that military spending crowds out private investment hindering economic growth (pp.1283–1293). Furthermore, FitzGerald (2001) finds that increased military expenditure will inevitably increase total expenditure, which will both enlarge the fiscal deficit and reduce social expenditure. To accommodate increased military expenditure, a government turns to taxation or borrowing, on the one hand, and reductions in social expenditure, on the other. Consequently, a country is left under a huge post-conflict debt burden.

In the third group, Kinsella (1990) investigated the relationship between defence spending and economic performance in the United States between 1943 and 1989 and found that there is not any causal relation between defence spending and price level, unemployment rate, or interest rate. He concludes that arguments which link defence spending to economic performance receive little empirical support. Moreover, Biswas and Ram (1986) find that Benoit's analysis came up with the results it found because her sample did not include the least-developed LDCs. They mention that out of the forty-four countries Benoit included in her analysis, only seven states would probably be classified as low-income LDCs. They made a study on a different sample that included 58 LDCs from 1960 to 1970 and from 1970 to 1977 and came up with the finding that the correlation between military spending and growth is consistently negative. They concluded that there is no evidence of statistically significant impact of defence spending on growth of total output (pp.361-72). Moreover, Smith (2000) finds that the large literature about the relationship between the two does not show any strong positive or negative evidence, but he argues that a small negative effect in the long run is more likely (pp.15–24).

In the fourth group, Frederiksen and Looney (1983 and 1985) argue that the relationship between defence spending and economic growth depends on the country's financial resources. Military spending in countries with limited financial resources will affect development, whereas defence spending in the richer countries may play an important and positive role in increasing growth (1983, p. 643). Moreover, Heckelman and Stroup (2001) argue that increasing military spending would have a positive net effect on economic growth up to certain point, but continued expansion beyond this point would cause economic growth to decline and turn negative (pp.335–6). Ruttan (2006) also finds that military procurement has been 'a major source of technology development across a broad spectrum of industries that account for an important share of US industrial production' (p. vii). Brauer (1996) finds that the statistical relationship between military and human development is uncertain, except in industrialized nations. In developing countries, military expenditure has a curious nature, as it appears to yield positive effects on economic growth and human development in just some cases. He finds that this depends on many factors, such as the country or region studied, the income level, the availability of domestic arms production, and others (pp.106–24). Smith and Georgiou's observation (1983), that 'if there can be any single conclusion about the effects of military expenditures on the economy, it must be that it depends on the nature of the expenditure, the prevailing circumstances, and the concurrent government policies' (p.15).

Dunne (2011) claims that the economic impact of military spending goes beyond the resources that military spending takes up, especially when it leads to conflict or makes conflict more possible. In his analysis of the military spending and economic growth for 170 countries for the period 1988–2006, Dunne found that all countries had short-run negative effects, whereas long-run effects varied between countries. When he divided the countries into four income groups based on World Bank list of economies in January 2011, Dunne found that military spending had been more damaging to the lower-income countries over the studied period. Dividing the lower-income countries into countries that have experienced major conflicts and countries that have not, Dunne found that there was no effect of military spending on growth in these countries (pp. 1-11). Moreover, Gleditsch *et al.* (1994) state that high military spending delays economic growth, because it diverts resources away from civilian research and development (R&D) resources and impedes non-military innovation and growth. They investigate a number of countries for the period 1970–79 and conclude that the countries with the highest military R&D such as the US,

UK, and USSR recorded the slowest growth in productivity, and those with the lower military R&D (Japan, France, and West Germany) record higher productivity growth.

Furthermore, Smaldone (2006) argues that the effects can be both positive and negative, but he believes that the negative effects are more severe in Africa and countries that experience legitimacy or security crises, or budgetary or economic constraints (p.18-32). Dunne and Uye (2009) conducted a survey of 102 studies on the effects of military spending on economic growth and conclude that almost 39% of the cross-country studies and 35% of the case studies find a negative effect, whereas around 20% find positive effects for both types of study. He finds that military expenditure may have negative effects because it crowds out investment, unless some reallocation to other forms of government spending is made.

The international community has also had its say about the relationship between military expenditure and development. In a series of reports the UN regarded military spending as unproductive and advised that reallocation of resources to the civilian sector was likely to improve the performance of the economy. This view developed in later years into a general consensus in the international community and all the agencies about the negative impact of military expenditure on development. The UN has passed many resolutions and issued many statements and documents on the economic and social consequences of military expenditure and the arms race. It has also continuously published many studies (such as *Study on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures, the United Nations* (United Nations 2003), *Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development* (United Nations 1979), *Study on Conventional Disarmament* (United Nations 1985) to highlight the devastating impact of armament on development.

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) has repeatedly called in its annual reports for lowering the levels of military spending, particularly in developing countries. The 1992 Human Development Report (HDR) concentrated on the impact of disarmament on human development. The report advises that most developing countries could finance their essential human-development goals if they had the political will to lower their military expenditure, privatize their inefficient public enterprises, correct their distorted development priorities, and improve their national governance. It also predicted that if

military spending was reduced globally by 5% annually, the freed resources would result in a total saving of over \$2 trillion from 1990 to the year 2000 (UNDP 1992). HDR 1994 introduced a new concept of human security based on development rather than arms. It considered military spending a major obstacle to human development, because some governments spend on the military more than they spend on social development, communications infrastructure, and health combined (UNDP 1994). Moreover, the UNDP finds that the amount of economic resources used for military activities is significant both from a global perspective and in individual regions and countries. HDR 2005 finds that military spending in developing countries continues to represent a massive diversion of public resources, because these countries spend on the military much more than they spend on education and health combined (UNDP 2005).

Military spending annually absorbs economic resources parallel to the annual income of half of the world population. Accordingly, there is a 'ludicrous' gap between the billions of dollars spent on arms and the sums spent to reduce world poverty. While world military spending amounts to around \$900 billion a year, two billion people live on less than \$2 per day. Moreover, the amount spent on military expenditure is twenty times the amount spent on trying to give hope to people. James Wolfensohn, World Bank President, states that pouring money into the root causes of poverty would help prevent conflicts: if we spent \$900 billion on development we probably wouldn't need to spend more than \$50 billion on defence (Wolfensohn 2004). Sergio Duarte, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, marked the Global Day of Action on Military Spending in April 2011 by calling on governments to reorient their spending and thinking and devote more resources towards the Millennium Development Goals. He called on all governments 'to consider the full possibilities of creating security through non-military means'. He noted that 'less than one-tenth of annual military expenditures would be enough to achieve our agreed development goals, lifting all people out of extreme poverty by 2015' (UN News Centre 2011).

Likewise, a survey conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the period 1993–97, which covers sixty-one countries shows that reductions in military spending in some countries have been accompanied by increases in public expenditure on health and education, both as a share of GDP, and of total government expenditures, while the shares of military expenditure have declined (IMF 1999, pp. 186–8). The Human Security

Reports have continuously stressed the impact of military expenditure on the insecurity of human beings.

The previous arguments demonstrate the pros and the cons of the issue under investigation. In my opinion, military expenditure has a negative impact on both developed and developing countries, but its impact on developing ones is more harmful. Developed countries can maintain high levels of military spending with their large budgets, whereas developing countries may divert much-needed resources away from development programmes. Military expenditure may be a characteristic of the economic prosperity and social opulence of developed countries. Military expenditure in industrial economies may have some positive effects since it usually has a natural bias towards heavily industrial and capital-intensive activities, but it might also hinder growth through the inefficient utilization of labour resources resulting from the military sector's employment of skilled labour, which negatively affects the civilian sector. More-developed countries such as Britain, France, and the US have economic links to military development, with defence spending on arms deals accounting for large portions of government budgets, in addition to influencing foreign policies. In LDCs military expenditure has negative effects because of the lack of a sufficient infrastructure to support the military; therefore it only bleeds resources away from the civilian economy and stunts growth.

Minimum levels of military spending may be necessary to preserve social order and safeguard against perceived threats to national security, creating the appropriate atmosphere for economic growth, but the recent figures for world military expenditure cannot be read positively. World military expenditure exceeded \$16300 billion in 2011, whereas the United Nations and all its agencies and funds, which are committed to preserving peace, spend only \$30 billion. If just a small fraction of this amount was spent on development in developing countries, many conflicts would disappear and consequently more development would prevail.

4.3 Military Expenditure and Conflict

There are different arguments about the relationship between armament and conflict. Some researchers argue that there is no relationship between the two because there is little similarity between the patterns in global military expenditure and those in armed conflict.

They find that military expenditure is concentrated in the industrial world, while the majority of armed conflicts are located in the developing world. Others argue that the first argument is not always true at the regional and national level. They find that if the level of military expenditure is compared with national output, it would be clear that most of the countries with the highest ratio of military expenditure to national output (GDP) are countries involved in major armed conflict. Other researchers argue that there is a relation between armament and conflict, but armament does not necessarily result in war.

Knight *et al.* (1996) argue that military spending increases the risk of conflict through its adverse effect on economic growth. Peace and economic stability go together, and violence, tension, and international terrorism exist only where poverty, unemployment, misery, and lack of hope are present (pp. 1-37). Similarly, Krause (1992, p. 127) states that both armament and conflict lead to each other: 'increased levels of armaments under conditions of the security dilemma lead to an upward spiral of armaments and military spending, the exacerbation of conflicts by worst-case thinking, and a concomitant decline in interstate security', and tensions generate high levels of military expenditure. Moreover, Krause (1996) finds that availability of increasingly sophisticated arms adds to the destructiveness of war when it breaks out, and makes cooperative solutions to regional conflicts less viable (pp.173-96). Moreover, Muni (1981) argues that there is a direct causal link between armament and conflicts. Increased armament can directly exacerbate the security dilemma, increase the potential for misperception, and thus eventually can lead to war. For example, the arms build-up in Iraq resulted in the Gulf War. Thus, he finds that post-Cold War security is challenged by the massive availability of small arms and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He calls for a universal and non-discriminatory approach towards non-proliferation. Similarly, Amnesty International also confirms that the unchecked flow of arms into both areas of conflict and peaceful regions escalates violence and grave violations and abuse of international human rights, and humanitarian law abuses (Amnesty International 2004).

Van de Goor *et al.* (1996) mention that the 'Third World' has experienced increasing arms build-up and growing militarization since 1945. They add that during this period, the Third World has been the stage for most conflicts. They raise the question about the role that military factors have played in the origins of these conflicts and about the easy availability of weapons, despite the fact that they influence the pace and direction of conflict in

developing countries. That is to say, military expenditure in poor countries can, unfortunately, be used for intra-state armed conflicts rather than as a means of deterring internal armed conflict and ensuring the country's security. Confirming this, Murdoch and Sandler (2002) argue that civil war is a regional public bad. They argue that civil war in one country reduces the growth rate across an entire region. Governments respond to the objective risk of civil war by increasing their military expenditure. If this expenditure is effective in reducing the risk of civil war, then there is an offsetting positive externality (pp. 91–110). Collier (2007) and Murdoch and Sandler (2004) find that military spending and arms races do not certainly lead to conflict and they are not necessarily the underlying causes of conflict. They mention that some of the most damaging and bloody wars have been achieved with relatively little in the way of funds or arms transfers (pp.138–51).

Intrilligator and Brito (1984) believe that most studies fail to show that all arms build-ups result in war, although they found that an arms build-up by at least one of the parties has preceded nearly all wars during the last two centuries. Moreover, wars end if neither side has weapons, even if the underlying political conflicts have not been resolved (pp.63–84). Gasteyger (1985, p. 11) argues that armament does not certainly lead to war, but it 'can increase regional instabilities and sharpen existing conflicts'. Omitoogun (2001), in a case study about Africa, finds that it is not possible to establish a direct causal linkage between military expenditure and conflict, but once a conflict is underway the relationship between them becomes very strong, as all the state resources will be diverted to the war effort. He mentions that there has always been a rising military expenditure level prior to the outbreak of any war. However, Omitoogun finds that military expenditure could still help to build confidence and security if all countries in the region agree to exchange information.

From the above arguments, we can say that there is a causal and interactive relationship between armament and conflict and each can act as a catalyst for the other: the availability of armaments increases the risk of war, and war itself directly raises a country's military expenditure, as well as the expenditure of neighbouring countries. If Iraq, for example, had not had an arsenal of weapons in the 1980s and 1990s it would probably not have launched its war against Iran or invaded Kuwait. The Iraqi–Iranian war would not have lasted for eight years if both countries had not found arms suppliers. Another example is the Syrian and Egyptian war against Israel in 1973: without the military build-up prior to the war,

Syria and Egypt would not have taken the decision to go to war against Israel to liberate their occupied territories. Moreover, armament gives more life to war when it breaks out and becomes a necessity, not only to win the war, but also to have a strong position in any negotiations that may take place to stop it.

However, it is difficult to argue that arms are an absolute evil. The UN Charter legitimizes the right of individual and collective self-defence against occupation, aggression, and oppression. Moreover, well-timed arms shipments can tip the scales in favour of one side, leading to negotiated settlement rather than escalating warfare, especially if the weaker side realizes that further fighting would be futile. This highlights the importance of a controlled flow of arms to constrain when arms are shipped, where arms are going to, who is going to use them and what the arms will be used for. However, in developing countries, armament, which is perceived as a security measure against any external armed attack, is used to devour the country's national resources and consequently a country becomes an atmosphere ripe for conflict. People in such an atmosphere become desperate, with no hopes to be concerned about or to live for.

4.4 Conflict and Development

Armed conflicts are widely regarded as both originating in and contributing to the condition of underdevelopment or 'economic regress' (Sen 1994). War in general, and civil war in particular, is one of the main causes of human suffering and economic underdevelopment. It is very costly on the human level and it hinders social and economic development (Stewart *et al.* 2001c). Yet studies seem to have little to say about the relationship between armed conflicts and development. Even in the broader field of 'development studies', with a few notable exceptions, armed conflicts are out of focus (Keen 1997, pp.67-75). Moreover, analysis of the economic and social development of countries at war has been largely neglected by development economists (Stewart *et al.* 2001b).

Van de Goor *et al.* (1996) find that the relationship "the relationship between development and (political) violence can thus be characterized as curvilinear; violence will decrease only once a certain level of development has been reached." (p.10). The twentieth century has witnessed many violent conflicts, most of which took place in the 'Third World'.

These conflicts were initially wars against colonialism and drifted to become internal conflicts within states for control over power, territory, and resources. These conflicts have claimed millions of lives, mostly civilians, since the World War II (Migdal 1996; Van de Goor *et al.* 1996). According to the 1993 and 1994 UNDP Reports, most of the wars are taking place in the south: out of seventy-nine countries experiencing war and political violence, 65 were in the south (UNDP 1993, 2004). Moreover, 186 wars can be counted between the years 1945 and 1994, 90% of which took place in 'Third World' countries. Half of the forty-eight poor countries classified by the United Nations as 'least developed' have experienced significant wars in the last quarter of the twentieth century, while most of the others exhibit the signs of economic and social fragility, which seem to worsen the effects of conflict (FitzGerald 2001). Furthermore, the UN Refugee Agency report issued in June 2009 shows that the number of people forcibly uprooted by conflict and persecution worldwide stood at 42 million at the end of 2008, 80% of which are in developing countries (UNHCR 2009).

Justino (2009) argues that 'armed civil conflicts carry various direct and indirect costs which strongly affect the living conditions of households at the time of the conflict and for many years thereafter. Civil wars and violent insurrections kill and injure millions of people every year. They destroy infrastructure, services, assets and livelihoods, displace populations, break social cohesion, institutions and norms and create fear and distrust'(p.1). Ghani *et al.* (2010) finds that conflict is both a cause and a result of underdevelopment: reducing poverty minimizes the possibility of the outbreak of conflict, and restraining conflict creates the atmosphere needed for economic growth. In his study on South Asia, Ghani finds that countries which have low per capita income have a higher conflict rate. This finding is consistent with that of Collier *et al.* (2003) that low-income countries have higher conflict rates. However, Ghani finds that the relationship between conflict and per capita income is not very tight, as high income does not necessarily guarantee stability (pp.1-7). Harrison *et al.* (2011) find that productivity growth, democracy, and trading opportunities are supposed to make politicians less likely to want war. But they think that the same things that have made war cheaper have also made it more possible. With economic growth, war has also become cheaper and even developing countries can afford the cost of committing aggression. They find that the experience that people have got from the two world wars suggests that no one can be quite sure that a little

conflict might not suddenly develop into a much wider and more deadly struggle (pp. 1055-1076).

The opportunity costs of conflict in the Middle East are very devastating. The region could have achieved many economic benefits if there had not been conflicts. According to the reports, Middle-Eastern countries that are directly involved in or affected by the Arab–Israeli conflict, the US invasion of Iraq, or the internal conflict in Lebanon have lost a whopping \$12 trillion dollars (in 2006 dollar value) in opportunity costs from 1991 to 2010. Moreover, the comparative advantages enjoyed by many countries of the region in terms of strategic location, infrastructure, resources, and level of education, have been annulled by political uncertainties and violent struggle.

Despite the many books, articles and studies written about the cost of war in Iraq, Hartley (2006) finds that there is not yet a proper costing and economic evaluation. What limited analysis there has been has concentrated mainly on the substantial costs of the war for the US and the benefits of the war for the Iraqi people, the region, and the entire world. Moreover, these analyses have ignored to a large extent the direct and indirect costs of this war on all levels.

Baker *et al.* (2010) find that the purpose of the war on Iraq was not for regime change but it carried the full meaning of what they call ‘ending states’, ‘state-destruction’ and ‘de-development’. They argue that ‘the war planners quite consciously and deliberately aimed for the destruction of the Iraqi state’ (p. xi). They point out that the human and cultural consequences of the destruction of Iraq have been enormous. The war has resulted in ‘the deaths of over 1 million civilians; the degradation in social infrastructure, including electricity, potable water, and sewage systems; the targeted assassination of over 400 academics and professionals and the displacement of approximately 4 million refugees and internally displaced people. All these terrible losses are compounded by unprecedented levels of cultural devastation, attacks on national archives and monuments that represent the historical identity of the Iraqi people’ (p. 4). Moreover, they think that ‘the cultural cleansing of Iraq was achieved in large part by inaction. The occupiers fostered and legitimated a climate of lawlessness with the wholly predictable consequences of weakening a unifying culture and eliminating an intelligentsia that had staffed Iraq’s public institutions’ (p. 6).

Conflict in the Middle East has also had a negative impact on development in the US and other European countries. James Carville, a Democratic Party strategist, wrote to the *Financial Times*: ‘It was under Mr Bush that the deficit spiralled out of control as we fought an unnecessary and endless \$3,000bn war in Iraq’ (Carville 2010). Linda Bilmes, a member of Harvard’s faculty, and economist Joseph Stiglitz wrote to the *Washington Post*: ‘The Iraq adventure has seriously weakened the US economy, whose woes now go far beyond loose mortgage lending. You can’t spend \$3 trillion — yes, \$3 trillion — on a failed war abroad and not feel the pain at home’ (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2008). Christopher Hayes also wrote to *The Nation* (Hayes 2010): ‘First, the facts. Nearly the entire deficit for this year and those projected into the near and medium terms are the result of three things: the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush tax cuts and the recession. The solution to our fiscal situation is: end the wars’.

Thus, the relationship between conflict and development is a controversial one and is largely determined by whether the country under investigation is a developed or a developing country. However, in almost all the cases and studies demonstrated in this section, it is clear that war has a negative impact on all sides. It bleeds the resources of the invaded country such as Iraq, and exhausts the human and financial resources of the invaders such as the US and UK.

4.5 Gains and Costs of Conflict

4.5.1 Gains of Conflict

For Keen (2001), not all wars have negative consequences: war may be costly to some people and beneficial to others. He finds that those benefiting economically from violence may often be relatively immune to its costs. It may be relatively easy for those with money to reap large profits from dangerous trade in wartime and avoid the potential costs of fighting and trading. He also argues that war may lead to more violence or to peace. In some cases, the costs of war provide a powerful impetus for peace and have a number of positive effects on the economy and society. In others, however, they encourage further conflict. During wartime, many people are likely to become increasingly disillusioned with violence. Moreover, economic disruption and destruction during a war may also encourage young men in particular to turn to the military option in pursuit of an income. It is also possible that some of the costs of war may later turn into benefits if widespread destruction

(as in Germany and Japan during the World War II) prompts a major restructuring of the economy along more 'modern' lines. For example, after World War II, the military sanctions on both Germany and Japan pushed these two countries to concentrate on civil industries and this has helped both countries to make large strides in development.

Likewise, Marwick (1991) argues that war may improve the entitlements of particular social groups in a state. Perhaps by war and systems of rationing, the welfare of broad sections of the population can be improved. He mentions that World War I improved the living standards of the British working class and empowered the position of women in Britain. Winter (1986) finds that World War I transformed the underpaid and underemployed labourers into full working partners in the war effort, and consequently increased wages, reduced economic disparities, and improved welfare provision. He also finds that World War I improved the position of women and extended their participation in the labour force, as they had to take up the responsibilities of men who left to fight. This dependence of the war economy on women unveiled their abilities and enhanced their bargaining power. Moreover, Winter argues that the 'Great War' helped to enhance freedom for women, reduce class differences, and improve living standards among underprivileged classes.

In fact, it is hard to generalize rules based on anecdotal evidence. Maybe Winter's (1986) study based its results on revolutions against dictatorships, or wars of liberation. Wars usually claim the lives of innocent people, destroy the infrastructure of the country, bleed its resources by spending on weapons to win the war, and postpone all economic plans. As seen in section 4.5.2.2, women and children are badly damaged during wars, especially when raped or prostituted, such as in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Cambodia, Angola, Iraq, and Palestine, and most African wars. Hence, a comprehensive study about the direct and indirect costs and gains of war in both the short and long term will probably show different results. Moreover, real results about the gains of conflict should cover different geographical countries with different rates of economic growth and different levels of development.

4.5.2 Costs of Conflict

The establishment of the United Nations after World War II raised hopes of a new era of peace. However, this over-optimistic view was crashed by the non-stop conflicts that took

place in the years after. Between 1945 and 1992, there were 149 major wars that resulted in the killing of more than 23 million people (Sivard 1993, p. 20). Armed conflict have struck many countries – Bosnia, Herzegovina, Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Libya – affecting the lives of entire generations who have had to grow up in the midst of brutal armed conflicts.

The greater part of the human cost of war does not result directly from battle deaths and injuries, but rather ‘indirectly’ from the loss of livelihood caused by the dislocation of economy and society resulting from conflict. In most cases, civilian deaths are far greater than military losses. The human cost of conflict has not been due principally to direct violence, but rather to hunger, forced migration, and the collapse of public services. These issues arise from the wider effects of protracted conflict on the economic and administrative structure of the economy as a whole, which lead to the greater part of misery and death (Stewart *et al.* 2001b).

The human costs of conflict arise from the destruction of entitlement. The destruction of infrastructure or declining exports are among other causes of human suffering, such as worsened nutrition and education. A strong correlation has been made between infant mortality rates and the level of GNP devoted to military expenditure (Zwi and Ugalde 1989, pp. 633–42). Moreover, conflict leads to a fall in the share of health and education. The unwillingness of teachers to work in insecure areas leads to the loss of education for children on a massive scale. Also, insecurity disrupts health services. It causes severe deterioration in calorie and doctor availability per head, especially in the poorest countries (Stewart *et al.* 2001a).

4.5.2.1 Economic Costs of Conflict

Stewart *et al.* (2001b) argue that in conflicts, national income and government revenue are strongly affected. To protect current expenditure, a government looks for foreign borrowing. The resulting rising budget deficit, if not covered by foreign aid, leads to inflationary pressures and lack of confidence in the national currency, and consequently to sharp increases in prices. It also results in supply constraints which switch the economy away from manufacturing. FitzGerald (2001) also agrees with Stewart that conflict leads to a fall in national income and, consequently, to a decline in government revenue at a time

when public expenditure is rising due to the increase in spending on the military. To pay for the war, poor governments resort to foreign borrowing or grant aid.

Stewart *et al.* (2001b) also find that conflict frightens away foreign investors. Conflicts lead to budgetary restrictions and increased uncertainty, which cause a sharp fall in foreign and private investment. As a result, a government's possibilities for recovery become much more limited. Similarly, Adams *et al.* (1995) argue that insecurity and conflict has been an important factor in the collapse of direct foreign investment since the 1970s. They mention that direct foreign investment in industry in many developing countries is weak due to lack of infrastructure and high production costs, because conflicts make governments concentrate on military expenditure to the detriment of other services. Likewise, Brzoska (1983) argues that conflict requires high military expenditure, which has a negative impact on the economy as it leads to reduced economic growth. As a result, a government allocates all its resources to the military, and if the domestic resources of a country are not enough, it turns to external borrowing (pp. 271–7). Hewitt (1991) confirms that military expenditure and foreign debt have been closely connected to each other in developing countries, and that more than a third of the total foreign debt to these countries is obtained to buy military equipment. Moreover, the availability of external loans increases the propensity of governments to spend on the military. Once a country is under debt another problem arises, that of debt servicing, which accounts for a high percentage of spending in developing countries. In this case, foreign aid does not contribute to the development but rather to the underdevelopment of the countries debited (p.15). Deger and Somnath (1990) reveal that military expenditure and payments on the foreign debt absorb between 40% and 80% of government revenue. They also mention that in 1987 these two items accounted for 55% of government revenue in Sri Lanka, 61% in Pakistan, 64% in the Philippines, 65% in Colombia, and 85% in Jordan (pp.142–3).

Exports are also negatively affected as a result of the direct destruction of export capacity, lack of production inputs and transport systems and reduced producer profitability due to increased costs and reduced productivity. On the other hand, import capacity usually grows even though exports often fall. This is due to the availability of aid and foreign debt that most poor countries depend on to sustain import requirements. Foreign exchange tends to be diverted towards military expenditure and essential consumption goods, leading to a shortage of foreign exchange for economic inputs. Consequently, a shift from tradable to

non-tradable sectors happens as a consequence of market disruption, including undermining of formal organizations such as banks, reduced trust, and failure of the transport system (Stewart *et al.* 2001b; FitzGerald 2001).

Inequality figures prominently in classical conflict theories. Economic inequality breeds conflict and that all major theories of conflict believe that economic inequality leads to some kind of dispute (Gurr 1970). Likewise, Popper (1965) finds that economic inequality breeds political conflict. He mentions that nations with unequal distribution of income and wealth are more subject to violent means of change in the form of revolution, demonstration, coups, and civil wars.

Unbalanced economic growth and disparities in the distribution of its benefits increase tensions. This can interrupt the established patterns of production and distribution of wealth. The allocation of resources and benefits sometimes reaches only those groups that control the state mechanism. This can result in the marginalization of vulnerable groups and the neglect of less dynamic regions (World Bank 1999). The disparities in income or wealth can be vertical between classes and lead to class conflict. They can also be horizontal between territorial, ethnic or religious groups, and cause regional conflict. In both cases the creation of a collective sense of injustice and resentment on the part of prejudiced groups undermines the legitimacy of existing institutions, and makes violence appear the only solution (FitzGerald 2001).

One of the important direct results of conflict is that it causes people to lose the few assets they have in the form of land, cattle, or housing. Moreover, the mining of agricultural land and roads and the destruction of infrastructure such as power supplies and bridges, when combined with human flight, result in severe disruptions to production. Landmines can also make farming unviable for years (Stewart *et al.* 2001c). In an analysis of sixteen countries, Stewart discovers that all the countries experienced a rise in external debt and a fall in gross investment with rising uncertainty. He also finds a fall in export earnings, a fall in government revenue and government expenditure, an increase in the budget deficit, a rise in inflation as the budget deficit increases, falling output per head and food availability per capita. Moreover, he concludes that fifteen of the sixteen countries had falling GDP per capita during the conflict, as well as falling exports and rising imports in the majority of cases. Almost all countries showed negative effects on per capita income

growth, food production, investment, savings, and exports. Most countries also showed worsening budget deficits and accelerating inflation. Low-income countries were more severely affected than other developing nations (Stewart *et al.* 2001c).

From the previous arguments it looks quite clear that conflict has very harmful consequences on all aspects of the economy, spreading from the individual to the government. It affects the lives of people as well as the government's capabilities to care about the infrastructure and other social services.

4.5.2.2 Social and Cultural Costs of Conflict

4.5.2.2.1 Poverty

Poverty is one of the many costs of conflict. In conflicts, the poverty rate rises very sharply. In the Occupied Palestine Territories, for example, the poverty rate jumped from 20% before September 2000 to 55% in 2003. In Southern Sudan, as well, 40% of households lost their cattle in the 20-year civil war (UNDP 2005). Poverty is also regarded as a main cause of conflict. Adams *et al.* (1995) find that poverty must be singled out as a significant force and explanation for many conflicts because the majority of violent conflicts take place in some of the poorest countries of the world. In contrast, for Galtung (1990) poverty is not a necessary condition for armed conflict, but rather an act of 'structural violence', a manifestation of structural inequalities and unequal distribution of power, from which armed conflict is a possible outcome. Moreover, he argues that injustice, exploitation, and the denial of human rights provide a fertile ground for violence.

Almost all the studies and research conducted on the relationship between conflict and poverty reveal a strong causal link between the two. For example, figures from the UNDP show that twenty-two out of 32 countries with a low human development indicator (HDI) ranking, and nine of the ten lowest HDI countries have experienced conflict at some point since 1990. Figures also show that nine out of the eighteen countries that have had a decline in their HDI in the 1990s have experienced conflict at some point since 1990 (UNDP 2005). On the other side, poverty is an appropriate atmosphere for conflict, as poor people have not a lot to worry about.

4.5.2.2.2 Migration of Intellectuals

Migration of intellectuals is another negative cost of conflict, since conflict and what it might result in – lack of opportunity, political instability, or health risks – leads to a large emigration of individuals with technical skills or knowledge. A brain drain is usually regarded as an economic cost, since emigrants usually take with them the fraction of value of their training sponsored by the government. It is a parallel of capital flight, which refers to the same movement of financial capital.

Once conflict breaks out, people in the area of conflict start searching for a safe haven. In such circumstances the intellectuals and most skilled and educated people have better opportunities than ordinary people to flee the country to places where they can continue their lives. Hosting countries gladly consider receiving these qualified people to live and work in their land. This will have a negative effect not only on the present development of the country in conflict, but also on its future development after war has ended.

Some theorists find that a brain drain is not always such a bleak situation, where one nation wins and another loses. They find that some migrants return home with greater skills and that would allow them to help develop their countries in the post-conflict reconstruction. However, the issue remains debatable because there is no consensus about the nature in which brain drain might contribute to the post-conflict landscape as a significant factor within the reconstruction of the nation state.

I think that conflict is the most important reason for brain drain. Countries that are in conflict cannot allocate the budget necessary for higher studies and scientific research. In such environments the most distinguished and skilled students tend to look for universities and research centres in developed countries that would help them fulfil their scientific ambitions. The gap between these persons and their countries widens with the progress of their studies and they discover that their return home is becoming more difficult day by day, as there are no research centres or appropriate environments in their countries that would allow them to be productive or continue their scientific progress or research. Moreover, these skilled persons are paid a lot better in their new countries, and insofar as the low currency value in their country of origin makes the difference between what they are getting and what they might get when they go back home very big, and this hinders taking any decision to back to their countries.

In many developed countries, there are special facilities for the immigration of skilled people. Applicants to these programmes are almost all from conflict-ridden countries and are keen, for academic and financial reasons, to be granted residence permits or nationalities of these countries. For developed countries brain drain is positive as they receive already skilled workers. The gap between developed and developing countries is becoming wider and there are expectations in LDCs that in the few coming years these countries will be empty.

Similarly, conflicts in the Middle East have contributed to the emigration of many intellectuals and to the loss of many students from these countries to developed ones. The number of migrants from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Palestine come as a result of the continuous conflict in this area and the problems that have resulted from the many wars that have taken place in the region and the high levels of military budgets and the impact of that on other sectors.

4.5.2.2.3 Social Fabric (family, women and Children)

Armed conflicts often disrupt family life, community support and social norms. They transform social relations and cause demographic changes which affect people's economic livelihoods. The disruption of family life reduces parental supervision of children and school attendance and increases crime. It also leads to the breakdown of community institutions and a rise in sectarian tensions. Moreover, the dehumanizing acts of torture and rape carried out against families, communities, and ethnic groups destroy the social fabric of society and community-level organizations and make survival and recovery more difficult (Macrae *et al.* 1993).

Internal war has a devastating impact on family, generational and gender relations. In wartime, women become subject to rape and abuse. The social, economic, and political inequalities between women and men explain why war affects women and men differently. Women are more vulnerable to sexual violence. This threat of violence constrains women's mobility and affects their roles, with consequences for household food security. Conflict leaves women shouldering increased responsibilities. Women may be required to take over new economic responsibilities and tasks previously carried out by men to support the family in the absence of men. They also carry the burden of protecting children in

difficult circumstances and are often the victims of mass rape, while it is men and boys who do most of the direct fighting (Stewart *et al.* 2001b).

The different capacities and vulnerabilities of men and women determine their ability to cope with, and survive, conflicts (El Bushra and Piza-Lopez 1994). For example, where women's mobility is culturally constrained they may be less able than men to flee from conflict. Wars increase the number of female-headed households, and women often have to fulfil their own men's responsibilities for family provision. In Somalia, some women have resorted to marrying gunmen for protection. Conflict exacerbates the trend worldwide towards the 'feminization of poverty'.

At times of war, women's cultural roles may be used to reinforce and reconstruct ethnic identities. This can mean that women are the targets of sexual violence, as a means of symbolically disempowering whole communities (Adams *et al.* 1995). Sexual violence and abuse also tend to increase during wartime and are commonly used to humiliate and degrade, instil terror, and promote social division. In Rwanda and Yugoslavia, mass and public rape were employed as instruments of terror in an attempt to destroy the fundamental social fabric and to shatter people's sense of security, self-esteem, and identity (Cairns 1997). In Sierra Leone, as well, more than half of the women have faced sexual violence during the civil war (UNDP 2005).

Armed conflicts in recent decades have been more deadly for civilians in general, and children in particular, than many earlier wars (Greitens 2001). In World War II two-thirds of the total victims were civilians, whereas the figure increased to 90 per cent in the 1980s (Ahlstrum 1991, pp. 8, 19). In conflicts, especially in many contemporary struggles between ethnic groups in the same country, families and children become specific targets. In Rwanda, the conflicting parties believed that killing adults was not enough and that the real enemy was the future generation and this resulted in the killing of 300,000 children during the war in 1994. Moreover, when a conflict takes place it is children who are hardest hit when food runs short or water supplies are contaminated or diseases spread. Aggregate estimates of child casualties due to conflict indicate that in the decade 1985–95, over 2 million children were killed, 6 million disabled, 12 million made homeless, and over 1 million orphaned or separated from their parents (UNICEF 2009). Large populations of children who are displaced and isolated from humanitarian assistance live

clandestinely, or in destitution, working in exploitative jobs as illegal immigrants in bordering countries (Boyden 2003).

Child casualties are sometimes the direct result of being in the line of fire, but often occur after intensive combat has ceased. Children make up a significant proportion of the people maimed or killed throughout the world each month by landmines (Red Cross 1999). Moreover, large numbers of children affected by conflict have serious psychological problems and develop serious forms of psychopathology. Moreover, in wartime health care becomes very poor as budget for health care is reallocated, infrastructure is destroyed, medical workers come under threat, medical supplies are disrupted, and diseases like AIDS spread more rapidly (Richman 1993). Furthermore, Tamashiro (2010) argues that – in addition to the deaths that result from the war itself – many children die from the bad conditions they are forced to live in during wartime. Poor conditions such as lack of food, shelter, and health care increase the number of deaths among children and increase diseases, mental health disturbances, psychological disability and morbidity. Moreover, in conflicts, children, and especially girls, become subject to sexual violence and this also causes long-term mental and physical damage. Furthermore, children who witness violence can undergo physical and mental suffering.

The majority of mental and physical damage suffered by children as a result of conflict comes not from weapons, but from the secondary effects of disease and deprivation. Wars, armed conflicts, persecution and displacement remain an unacceptable reality for millions of children. During wartime, children are often required to take greater responsibility, and in most cases, to replace adults who have been killed in the war. According to the UNDP, the number of child soldiers worldwide is about 250,000 (UNDP 2005). Changes in the demographic structure of households can also lead to the collapse of informal mechanisms for shared childcare, deterioration in intra-familial relations, and changes in the age-thresholds for marriage, childbearing, work, and decision making (Boyden *et al.* 2004). Moreover, the increased vulnerability of girls in camp situations means that many may have to trade sexual favours for food, shelter, or physical protection (World Vision 1996).

Children are among the worst victims of wars, partly because the effects of deprivation of food, health services, education, and family stability in childhood can last a lifetime in the form of physical, intellectual, and psychological trauma. Wars disrupt the socialization of

children, and can cause trauma and exacerbate tensions between age groups that create long-term problems for social reconstruction. Moreover, children who grow up in the midst of conflict become more familiar with guns than with education, which does not show the horizon of any promising future, on the one hand, and gives more life to conflict, on the other, as it introduces the child soldier whose culture is war. In Iraq, for example, more than one million people – mainly young children – died as a direct result of the US-led blockade, which caused severe lack of food and medicine and the deteriorating sanitary conditions. The use of 350 tons of depleted uranium during the war will also have its impact on future generations in Iraq. Moreover, according to the UN FAO report 1995, four million Iraqis were starving to death and up to 95% of pregnant women suffer from anaemia and are expected to give birth to weak and malnourished infants. Furthermore, a study published in February 2007 by the Association of Iraqi psychologists reveals that violence in Iraq had affected millions of children, raising serious concerns for future generations. The study found that ‘children in Iraq are seriously suffering psychologically with all the insecurity, especially with the fear of kidnapping and explosions’ (Howard 2007).

4.5.2.2.4 Refugees

An increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced people is one of the most visible and harmful outcomes of armed conflicts. The shift from inter-state wars to intra-state ones has increased the displacement of people because during intra-state wars people are usually more vulnerable, due to the loss of their livelihoods and assets and even their psychological and cultural foundation.

The increase in internal wars is reflected in a further increase in displaced persons. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the total number of refugees and displaced persons rose from 17 million in 2004 to 19.2 million in 2005, an increase of 13%. Moreover, more than 80 per cent of the refugees are women and children. Furthermore, in some countries, like Chechnya, for example, half of the population is internally displaced (UNDP 2005).

Conflict, instability and insecurity in the ‘Third World’ can be expected to lead not only to refugee flows to neighbouring states but to migration to developed countries as well, thus creating racial tensions within the industrialized democracies. Despite their efforts,

industrialized democracies cannot insulate themselves from the conflicts and instabilities in the global periphery (Weiner 1992–1993, pp. 91–126).

Wars cost countries dearly. Sometimes developed countries have to pay a heavy financial bill that if spent on their economic growth would reap a great deal of benefit. For example, President Bush's fiscal year 2007 budget requested \$441.6 billion for the Department of Defence and an additional \$49.1 billion for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, whereas he requested \$833 million for the State Department Migration and Refugee Assistance account, \$615 million for the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement, and \$55 million to respond to unforeseen refugee crises. These figures may give some hope when they are compared with those of 2006 (US FY 2007 budget).

4.5.2.2.5 Democracy and Human Rights

According to the 'democratic peace theory' democracies don't go to war with one another. Advocates of this theory believe that democratic leaders must answer to the voters for war and should not go to war over issues that might be settled legally or peacefully. Babst (1972) reports that 'no wars have been fought between independent nations with elective governments between 1789 and 1941' (p. 55). Similarly, Ray (1998) agrees that disputes between democratic states are resolved quickly and peacefully, yet he finds that this is conditioned on the level of democracy in these states, or on whether one of the states involved in the dispute is undemocratic, as democratic states are more likely to accept third-party mediation in the dispute (pp.27–46). Likewise, Russett (1993) mentions that the major powerful democracies seem never to have launched preventive war against another major power, whereas 'leaders of non-democracies are not constrained as leaders of democracies are, so they can more easily, rapidly, and secretly initiate large-scale violence' (Russett 1993, p.40). Democratic governments can respond to sudden attack by using emergency powers; however, in normal times they are hesitant to launch surprise attacks. Moreover, in democracies people are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest at the hands of their governments (Huntington 1991, pp. 28–29), or die in internal violence (Rummel 1997, pp. 87–88).

Moreover, advocates of the 'democratic peace theory' find that democracy produces better patterns of economic relationships between countries, provides more space for internal and

international problems. Olson (1993) finds that democracy enhances long-run economic performance and that 'the highest levels of economic performance across generations were all stable democracies' (pp. 572–73). Huntington (1991) finds that the spread of democracy in different parts of the world from the late 1970s to the early 1990s provided people with optimism that they will be more able to tackle their domestic and international problems.

On the other hand, Harrison *et al.* (2011) find that the widespread belief among people that democracy helps reduce the possibilities of conflict is not vindicated. They believe that democracy increases the number of wars through taxes and cheaper weapons (pp.1055-1076). Stewart and O'Sullivan (1998) also find that there is no connection between democracy, conflict, and development. In their study on three cases, they find that there are no simple or universal explanations for whether democratic institutions in the countries studied played any significant role in preventing conflict. Moreover, Ghosn *et al.* (2004) argue that democracies initiated more conflicts than non-democracies. She mentions that 'Israel initiated about 97% (382/393) of the incidents in which it was involved; the United States initiated 82% (278/338) of its incidents, Turkey about 76% (172/226), and Britain almost 93% (126/136) of its incidents, while Iraq initiated just 19% (58/300) of its incidents' (p. 150). Yiftachel (1998) believes that democracy has been used by some countries to achieve and maintain their own interests. He mentions that Israel is classified as a democracy, yet it is 'without clear boundaries...based on pervasive and uneven ethnic segregation...maintains a regime which structurally discriminates against non-Jews' (pp. 25–26).

I can say that democracy and internal security often go hand in hand and that it is not possible in many countries to reduce expenditure on internal security unless democratic practices are introduced throughout the political life of the country. The relationship might be more clear in the Middle East, where war and military spending are the leader's decision. However, studies on the impact of lack of democracy in the Middle East on military expenditure, conflict, and development are still limited. The level of democracy and human rights in the region is very low and this is combined with very high levels of military expenditure and violence and low levels of economic growth and development. Moreover, during war there is a tendency to suppress human rights, political opposition and democratic freedom, not only in poor democracies but also in countries with a relatively strong democratic tradition.

4.5.2.2.6 Environmental Costs of Conflict

Rogers (2002) finds that the environmental effects of war are limited compared with those on people and on economies. But he finds that some wars may have severe environmental impacts. He also finds that war has both short- and long-term environmental effects. Short-term effects are those resulting from the violent actions in the field and the environmental consequences of war and destruction that might reach cities, dams, irrigation systems, and many other features, and this kind of destruction is remedied quickly. Long-term effects are more serious and dangerous and they result from war industries at times of major conflicts, the nuclear weapon industry and landmines.

Wars cause serious damage to the environment. Landmines planted in their millions across the world killed many citizens and wiped out whole herds of cattle and animals after the wars were over. Mines also prevent the agricultural use of land in which they are planted. The testing and the manufacturing of the nuclear bomb have caused serious environmental disaster. Radiation problems resulting from the waste from plants are also serious damage to the environment. The use of nuclear weapons remains the most profound and persistent environmental damage to life on earth.

Between 1962 and 1971 the US military sprayed 72 million litres of chemicals to defoliate the forests which provided cover to the Vietnamese soldiers. This killed not only the trees but also the animals, and affected human health for generations. Furthermore, during its invasion of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq spilt about 55 million barrels of oil in the desert and the sea. This affected water resources, destroyed land surface, and polluted the whole area in a way that affected human and natural life in Kuwait very seriously. Moreover, since the war on Iraq in 2003, over 300 000 tons of raw sewage have been dumped into the Tigris daily (Blajchman 2009). Furthermore, the civil war in Sudan caused the 1988 famine, as fighting prevented them from working their land and caused displacement, hunger, and ignorance.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has tried to show the impact of military expenditure and conflict on development. It also provides answers to the following questions: does spending on the military positively or negatively affect development? Is the increase in military

expenditure and arms transfer an indication of a deteriorating or of an increasing security environment?

The arguments presented in this chapter reveal that there is causal relationship between military expenditure, conflict, and development. Military expenditure is the major obstacle to development. It burdens a country's budget and diverts resources that could be put to public services and infrastructure. It also reduces the growth rate and the level of income and affects its other economic and social sectors. Military expenditure may be necessary for security when it is considered in terms of lost entitlements and capabilities, but even a modest defence force consumes a significant share of national resources and consequently has a negative impact in both developing and developed countries. However, the effects of a given level of military expenditure in a developing country are more significant than for the global average. In developed countries, military expenditure contributes to scientific and technical development and is partly covered by providing subsidies to the military-industrial complex, and it is paid for by increased debt or taxation, or by diversion of funds from other sectors. In developing countries, military equipment is imported rather than produced domestically and so does not offer any side-benefits to technical progress, and it is paid for by increased inequality and a reduction in the provision of basic needs for the poor, and through the illegal and forcible appropriation of resources.

Moreover, there is also a causal and reciprocal relationship between armament and conflict: easy access to arms makes the outbreak of war more possible; at the same time, conflict requires more armament. This relation is much clearer in developing countries which wage armed wars to solve their problems, whereas it is a more political issue in most developed countries, where armament is used to practise political pressure on less developed countries.

There is also a causal and reciprocal relationship between conflict and development. Some of the arguments presented in this chapter have shown that conflict may cause development. However, these arguments have been restricted to particular experiences in developed countries, whereas the majority in developing countries have experienced very hard conditions under conflict. In developing countries, conflict has been the most brutal suppression of human development. It reduces the potential for future economic growth and social improvements, both by destroying installed capital and reducing new

investment. It has a direct outcome on the physical capital as infrastructure, and a direct and indirect outcome on human capital. In addition to the deaths and injuries from the war itself, war worsens infant mortality rates, disrupts public services such as power distribution, communication systems, sanitation facilities, and transport networks, and health, and educational services, leading to the immigration of the intellectuals. It also reduces economic growth: it affects the existing physical, financial, and human capital and causes capital flight, labour migration, routine replacement, and long-term expansion of the stock. However, the cost of war is different from one country to another, and this is related to differences in the economy, the nature of the war, how a government responds, and the people themselves. In economies with a large subsistence sector, people are able to protect their basic nutrition by retreating into subsistence, while in countries heavily dependent on exchange for their food people are more vulnerable to trade disruptions.

I find that studies on the costs of conflict have not been fair enough to present a comprehensive and balanced analysis of the real costs. Most of the studies on the war in Iraq, for example, are done in the United States. These studies have mainly focused on the American costs of this war: the number of casualties and deaths of American soldiers, the financial costs, and the strategic costs. Moreover, most of the political debates and media coverage have also focused on this aspect. The same also applies to other allies that joined the United States in the war in Iraq. However, the other face of the issue is the human cost to the Iraqis themselves, who are almost ignored in political discourse, the news media, and intellectual circles. The 'war on terror' is another example of a war that in the United States has also meant a presidential campaign, and political debate about its financial and physical costs, whereas the huge costs of this war on Afghanistan are neglected.

The Middle East, which is the focus of my studies, is considered the most violent region in the world and has also been the biggest market for arms for six decades, and many Middle Eastern countries have continuously been among the top spender countries for many years. The region also has the highest number of military personnel per million people in the world. Furthermore, the first Gulf War in 1990 emitted CO₂ that was equivalent to 1.5% of the world's annual emissions. Despite all these facts about the Middle East, military expenditure in the region is expected to double in the next ten years.

In Chapter 5, I give an overview of the different efforts that have been made to put legislation on military expenditure, armament, and arms sales, and examine how much these efforts have been serious and to what extent they have succeeded in putting an end to this destructive issue.

Chapter 5

Conventional Arms Regulations

5.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I examined the relationship between armament and conflict, armament and development, and conflict and development. I concluded that there is a causal relationship between them, and that armament has mostly had a massive impact on development and has contributed to creating conflict in many cases. This highlights the question of why to date there is no treaty or international law that directly controls conventional arms. This chapter presents answers to RQ1: If conventional weapons have been used in most wars and have cost humanity a high price, why has a binding comprehensive treaty on the production and stockpiling of this kind of weapon not yet been reached? Are the current arms exports regulations and codes of conduct enough to control military expenditure and arms transfer? Have the efforts to control arms export been effective in regulating military expenditure and arms transfer?

In this chapter, I will try to overview the development of conventional arms regulations representing the different legislations, provisions, agreements, arrangements and codes of conduct that have dealt with arms. In the first part, I will give a brief history of the early attempts to control arms. In the second part, I will present the development of the international regulation of arms in modern times, starting from the League of Nations, and going on to the United Nations and other codes of conduct. I will also try to examine the strengths and weaknesses of these regulations. In part three, I will overview the instruments that have been used to achieve transparency, as well as other unilateral and multilateral initiatives that have been made to develop arms control. In the last part, I will round off with my conclusion.

5.1 General Overview

From the dawn of humanity up to our modern times, security, protection, and power have been Man's main concerns. These concerns have led Man to invent and develop weapons as a means to greater power and protection. Since then, weapons have been an extension of Man's strength and a facet of human development, and their development has accelerated

along with other areas of technology. The holy books have also recognized Man's right to defend himself against enemies. The League of Nations and the UN Charter also legitimize a country's right to armed self-defence. Amnesty International and other human rights organizations have also recognized the legitimacy of states to purchase weapons for the defence of their citizens and their territorial integrity.

Weapons are regarded as means to greater security, protection, and power, but are also horrifying when used by opponents to threaten each other, leading to arms races and destabilizing world politics. The Charter of the United Nations recognizes the right of all member to armed self-defence, yet it calls in Article 2 upon all states 'to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state' and to settle disputes by peaceful means. There have also been other calls from the United Nations to establish and maintain international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, by putting restraints on weapons acquisition and movement.

Military expenditure on conventional weapons accounts for about 80–90 per cent of the world's military expenditure, whereas only 10–20 per cent is spent on weapon of mass destruction. This means that cutting back on military expenditure requires focusing on conventional weapons. However, weapons have not been treated equally: while weapons of mass destruction have been of great concern, conventional ones have been neglected and hardly considered problematic. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed in April 1972 and entered into force in March 1975. The Convention bans biological weapons under strict and effective international control (Biological Weapons Convention 1972). The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed in 1993 and entered into force in April 1997. The Convention bans chemical weapons and conducts inspection of military and industrial plants in all of the member nations as well as working with stockpile countries (Chemical Weapons Convention 1993). Nuclear weapons have also been regulated by various nuclear arms reduction treaties: the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996. These treaties have been strengthened by geophysical and technological instruments to monitor for compliance. Moreover, there have been a number of other regional treaties: the Treaty of Tlatelolco in April 1969, which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, The Treaty of

Rarotonga in August 1985, which declares the South Pacific a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the Treaty of Bangkok in 1995, which declares South East Asia a nuclear-free zone, and the Treaty of Pelindaba in 1996, which calls for an African nuclear-free zone (Cirincione *et al.* 2005, pp. 421-451, Graham, 2002).

Strategic arms have also been subject to marathon discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union: the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I) from 1969 to 1972, and (SALT II) from 1972 to 1979. These treaties have frozen the number of strategic ballistic missiles in both countries. Moreover, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed in 1991, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) signed in January 1993, have placed limits of the number of various types of vehicles and attributed warheads that could be deployed by either side and reduce the effectiveness of an anti-ballistic missile system that relies on intercepting individual warheads (Ibid).

Conventional weapons have become of great concern not only because of the share of budget they drain but also because modern technology has increasingly meant that conventional warfare has acquired new dimensions that it did not have in earlier ages, the most important of which is that it might escalate into nuclear war. This fact is widely agreed on in the literature and the international community and institutions concerned, yet to date no initiatives or solutions have been adopted that are adequate for the dimensions of this issue. Despite their devastating impact on human lives, conventional weapons have been left out of control because there have been no serious efforts to reach a binding, comprehensive, international treaty to control the production, acquisition, and export of these weapons.

After the Gulf War, there have been considerable discussions and activities by various national governments to combat the problem of arms proliferation. Since then, the term 'proliferation', which for a long time had been reserved largely for the spread of nuclear weapons, has been extended to include the spread of all forms of weaponry and associated technology, including conventional weapons, which had long been considered qualitatively different from weapons of mass destruction (Mutimer 1998, p. 111). States were expected to re-create the practices which controlled nuclear proliferation or to develop a global treaty containing measures in order to guarantee a full implementation of proliferation. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, which are also the five

largest arms exporters, met for the first time in July 1991 in Paris to discuss restrictions on arms. The governments of the member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) suggested implementing tighter arms controls. The European Community and G7 also made similar proposals. The discussions and activities to combat the problem of arms proliferation have largely focused on developing similar measures to the ones that have been used to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons technologies (Mutimer 1998, pp. 99–129).

However, the reality of armament and arms trade has not yet changed, because most of the attempts made and decisions taken have not been enough to put an end to this global problem. Rather than a comprehensive ban on the production, stockpiling, and trade in weapons, there have been only attempts to monitor whether there is an excessive and destabilizing accumulation of weapons or if there are irresponsible, unreasonable, and unregulated exports and handling that make weapons go to areas of conflict or to repressive regimes to affect human lives negatively. However, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, while discussing restrictions, continue to supply arms to many regions of conflict. Though these countries are committed to working individually and collectively to reach an international legal regime, they continue their irresponsible arms transfers, fuelling violent conflict and undermining sustainable development. Traditional practices continue to work and the lessons learned from the Gulf War are soon forgotten. As a result, to date, there has been a tragic lack of urgency on the part of most governments around the world to address the problem of conventional weapons in order to reach a conventional-arms treaty.

After the terrorist attacks that hit the United States on 11th September 2001, there has been a special focus on small weapons and certain kinds of technology that might be used by terrorists, while conventional weapons, which are regarded the main reason for conflict, misery and underdevelopment, have still been neglected.

5.2 Arms Control Attempts

War is very old in history and there have always been attempts to make it subject to as many moral principles as possible. These attempts have included rules about how, when

and where wars can be waged, the means of warfare, and how breaches of these rules could be punished.

The industrial revolution led to the increasing mechanization of warfare and consequently an increased potential for devastation. This led to the First Hague Conference, resulting in the signing of the Hague Convention of 1899 and the Hague Convention of 1907, which set the rules of declaring and conducting warfare as well as the use of modern weaponry.

The development of international regulation of armaments began in modern times with the foundation of the League of Nations in 1919 after World War I, and later with the United Nations. The old philosophy that regards Europe as a balance of power maintained by strong armies and secret agreements has been changed by a new philosophy that regulates international arms and prevents war through collective security, and settles disputes between countries through negotiation and diplomacy.

5.2.1 Arms Control in the League of Nations

The Covenant of the League of Nations states in the preface that international peace and security can be promoted by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war. It also states in Article 8 that ‘the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations’. Moreover, the Covenant states in Article 23 that the members of the League ‘will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest’ (League of Nations 1919).

Moreover, in 1923, the League of Nations adopted a resolution that demanded the establishment of the *Statistical Yearbook of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition*. The registry, which remained active till 1938, was designed to list major arms deals, armaments and programmes and industries that could be adapted to war-like purposes (SIPRI 1971).

However, although the League of Nations managed to institute this registry, and although it has voted arms embargoes against certain states as a form of sanction against international aggression, these measures failed to prevent continued arms shipments, violations of the law, or World War II.

One of the reasons for this is that the Covenant of the League of Nations has many deficiencies: some of its articles are ambiguous or contradict others, and the crucial provisions for collective security are full of loopholes. The League's attempt to promote general disarmament measures, under Article 8 of the Covenant, encountered fundamental problems of a technical and political nature that prevented it fulfilling this objective. By the end of the 1920s, the League had developed a number of techniques to deal with conflicts. These techniques showed varying degrees of success, but they failed to respond to the major crisis that arose in the 1930s, because efforts were always too little or too late (Armstrong *et al.* 1996). In my opinion, the League failed because it lacked an armed force of its own to prevent aggression or avoid any future world war. It depended on the great powers to enforce its resolutions, but these powers were often very reluctant to do that.

5.2.2 Arms Control in the United Nations

The United Nations was founded after World War II to be committed to preserving peace through international cooperation and collective security. The UN Charter legitimates a country's right to armed self-defence and applies principles of sustainable development to the use of arms, calling for the 'establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources'. As enshrined in Article 51 in the 1945 Charter of the UN, all states have 'the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and Security'. However, the Charter calls in Article 2 on all members to 'settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered' and to 'refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any state'. It also asserts in Article 26 the importance of the regulation of armaments for the maintenance of international peace and security with 'the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources'. The Charter also states that arms transfers should be addressed in conjunction with the question of reducing regional and international tensions, preventing and resolving conflicts and disputes, building and enhancing confidence, and promoting disarmament as well as social and economic development. It also states that limitations on arms transfers can be found in international treaties, binding decisions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the

Charter of the United Nations, and the principles and purposes of the Charter. Moreover, Article 11 of the UN Charter gives the United Nations the right to recommend principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments to the General Assembly (GA), to the Security Council or to both. Articles 26 and 47 of the Charter give the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council the task of advising and assisting on all questions relating to the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament (United Nations 1945).

Military expenditure and arms transfers have been debated continuously in the GA and tens of resolutions and documents have been issued on the importance of regional disarmament, conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels, the relationship between disarmament and development, the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, national legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology and objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures. Since the foundation of the UN, armament has been a main issue in the international community. The first resolution of the first meeting of the GA in 1946 was entitled ‘The Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy’. The resolution calls on the commission to make precise proposals for ‘the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction’. The UN has also established several forums, such as the First Committee of the GA and the UN Disarmament Commission, to address multilateral disarmament issues.

The resolutions of the GA have included different ideas that contribute to the limitation of military expenditure. Some resolutions noted that arms transfers not only have potential effects in areas where tension and regional conflict threaten international peace and security and national security, but they also have potentially negative effects on the process of the peaceful social and economic development of all peoples. They warned that armament deserves serious consideration by the international community and put forward a number of recommendations on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.⁷ Other resolutions stressed the link between armament, disarmament, and development, and

⁷ GA Resolutions 43/75 I of Dec. 1988, 48/75 J of 16 Dec. 1993, 49/75 O of Dec. 1994, 50/70 L of Dec. 1995, 51/45 Q of Dec. 1996, 52/38 Q of Dec. 1997, 53/77 P of Dec. 1998, 54/54 M of Dec. 1999, 55/33 P of Nov. 2000, 56/24 I of Nov. 2001, 57/77 of Nov. 2002, 58/39 of Dec. 2003, 59/88 of Dec. 2004, 60/75 of Dec. 2005, 61/82 of Dec. 2006, 62/44 of Dec. 2007, 63/44 of Dec. 2008 64/42 of 2 Dec. 2009, 65/46 of Jan. 2011.

the importance of reducing military expenditure in order to achieve development.⁸ Still others recognized that arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation are essential for the maintenance of international peace and security. Other resolutions called upon member states to exercise effective control over their weapons and military equipment and their arms imports and exports. They also urged member states to ensure that they adopt an adequate body of laws and administrative machinery, as well as their enforcement measures, for regulating and monitoring effectively their transfer of arms with the goal of preventing them from getting into the hands of parties engaged in illicit arms trafficking.⁹ These resolutions also called upon all member states to provide data on imports and exports of arms and any other available background information on military holdings, procurement through national production, and relevant policies.

To enhance the level of transparency in military matters and contribute to confidence building and security among states, in December 1973, the GA set up in its resolution 3093 B (XXVIII) the UN Standardized Reporting Instrument for Military Expenditures. In December 1980, the GA approved in resolution 35/142B the UN system for the standardized reporting of detailed data of military expenditure, and insisted in many later resolutions on the importance of participating in this reporting system.¹⁰ Moreover, the UN established the Conventional Arms Branch of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs. This Branch operates two transparency measures, the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures. It also provides secretariat services to the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, which was established by the General Assembly to promote arms restraint, disarmament, and confidence-building measures in the central African sub-region. In addition, the Branch provides substantive service in the field of disarmament and development, and at the working level serves as the focal point for the high-level Steering

⁸ 49/75 J of Dec. 1994, 50/70 G of Dec. 1995, 51/45 D of Dec. 1996, 52/38 D of Dec. 1997, 53/77 K of Dec. 1998, 54/54 T of Dec. 1999, 55/33 L of Nov. 2000, 56/24 E of Nov. 2001, 57/65 of Nov. 2002, 58/520 of Dec. 2003, 59/78 of Dec. 2004, 60/61 of Dec. 2005, 61/64 Dec. 2006, 62/48 of Dec. 2007, 63/52 of Dec. 2008 64/32 of Dec. 2009.

⁹ GA Resolutions 46/36 H of 6, 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, 48/75 F of 16 December 1993, Resolution 50/70 B of 12 December 1995.

¹⁰ GA Resolutions 35/142B of Dec. 1980, 47/54 B of Dec. 1992, 48/62 of Dec. 1993, 49/66 of Dec. 1994, 51/38 of Dec. 1996, 52/32 of Dec. 1997, 53/72 of 4 Dec. 1998, 54/43 of 1 December 1999, 56/14 of 29 November 2001, 58/28 of 8 December 2003, 60/44 of 8 December 2005, 62/13 of 5 December 2007, 64/22 January 2010, and others.

Group established by the Secretary-General on the relationship between disarmament and development.

The Register of Conventional Arms which was established in 1991 with GA Resolution 46/36 L entitled 'Transparency in Armaments' is the only global security regime dealing with the transfer and accumulation of major conventional weapons. It is an important tool for increased openness and transparency in armaments, because it establishes a global norm for transparency in arms transfers and enjoys wide international support. The number of states which report to the Register has increased, and almost all major producers, exporters, and importers of major conventional weapons have participated in the Register on a regular basis. Moreover, there have been continuous efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the Register. In 2002, the UN expressed its hope that the Register would serve as a significant early-warning mechanism and contribute to the prevention of conflict and to restraint in arms acquisition. Moreover, in 2003 the UN appointed a group of governmental experts to further improve the operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and enhance its role as a global confidence-building measure (Wezeman 2003).

However, despite the increase in the number of states that have participated in the Register, it has failed in making any real headway on its original goals. Transparency in the international arms trade is still very limited, and key arms importers and exporters do not report, though they are participants in the Register. Moreover, the Register provides little detail on the items reported, and small arms and weapons of mass destruction are not included at all, neither are technology transfers for the manufacture of weapons. Furthermore, the Register requests states to submit their imports and exports of major weapons systems, whereas it is voluntary for states to offer information on domestic procurement and holdings.

The Charter of the UN finds that weapons cannot help solve problems and calls on all members to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources. The United Nations has also issued many resolutions, documents and statements affirming the impact of armament on human development. Yet the issue of conventional arms control remains out of control. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, the UN is not a

legislative body and it cannot pass laws regulating arms exports. It has made policy recommendations to the governments of the member states and passed some resolutions in the General Assembly or by the Security Council that require compliance by all members. Moreover, member countries have differing opinions on how to distinguish between legitimate supplies of weapons to defend against or deter potential aggression or to assist in a liberation struggle and illegitimate supplies that are or could be used in wars of aggression. The 1996 UN Guidelines for International Arms Transfers, for example, offer a set of recommended global norms for national transfer controls and call on states to establish import and export licensing, but it does not explicitly refer to transit controls (United Nations General Assembly 1991). Furthermore, the recommendations made and the efforts taken are fairly general, and no recommendations have been made to control or restrict the arms trade in any particular manner. Moreover, no limited goals have been set in order to achieve consensus on any measures. Secondly, the UN has not the appropriate mechanisms or the necessary instruments and means to work towards its objectives. The entire budget of the United Nations and all its agencies and funds is about \$10 billion a year.

The loopholes and insufficiency of the resolutions and measures taken in the international community have required a consensus among the majority of governments that a binding treaty on the import, export, and transfer of conventional arms in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other existing international obligations is needed. The active campaign of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to regulate the arms trade resulted in GA Resolution 61/89 in December 2006 entitled 'Arms Trade Treaty', which calls for a comprehensive, legally binding treaty that regulates conventional weapons. The resolution also assigned the matter to a Preparatory Committee, which has held many sessions to define the structure, objective, scope, and implementation of the treaty at the national and international levels. In October 2009, the General Assembly Committee on Disarmament and International Security adopted resolution 64/48, which sets the stage for common international standards for the import, export, and transfer of conventional arms.

The proposed treaty is supposed to be ready for a UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in 2012 and it is hoped that this treaty will establish common global rules for controlling arms transfers. The treaty is also expected to be adopted by all member states

because all the GA Resolutions were passed by an overwhelming majority, among which were the five permanent members of the Security Council, after it had long been opposed by the US under the presidency of President George Bush. Moreover, all discussion of the treaty included representatives from North and South, civil society and organizations from around the world. This creates hopes that the resolutions of the 2012 UN Conference will be accepted and adopted by all member states.

The UN resolutions regarding the Arms Trade Treaty are regarded as a historical breakthrough, but there are concerns that the treaty will not be effective, as consensus is needed to reach any final decision. There are also concerns that the treaty does not receive a strong contribution from key countries. The US, for example, which produces six billion bullets a year and is the world top arms seller, does not want ammunition sales to be included in the treaty. China also does not want small arms and light weapons to be included (France Press 2011). Moreover, the administration of the treaty does not support using strong language that prevents arms exporters from supplying arms to governments that violate international humanitarian law, abuse human rights, or fail to control arms from affecting human security.

The US realizes that conventional arms have received much less attention, despite the fact that more people have been killed with them than with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Yet the US finds that conventional weapons cannot be banned because it would jeopardize its financial status, and that a similar treaty to those on weapons of mass destruction is not possible. The US finds that ‘arms transfers are a legitimate commercial enterprise and support global stability,’ and the strong commitment of the US is only to the irresistible transfers of conventional weapons¹¹ (Tauscher 2010, pp. 110-112).

5.2.3 Other Arms Control Attempts

5.2.3.1 Wassenaar Arrangement

Throughout the Cold War period, the term ‘proliferation’ was used to refer to the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five accepted nuclear powers. Concerns about nuclear proliferations were addressed through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of

¹¹ The following are excerpts from Under Secretary Tauscher’s remarks delivered by Special Negotiator Donald Mahley at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., February 18, 2010

1968, which was designed explicitly to prevent states, other than the five which had tested nuclear weapons by then, from acquiring them. Non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT foreswore nuclear weapons and agreed to place their peaceful nuclear programmes under an international regime called the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the later stages of the 1980s, particularly because of the growing arsenals of the Middle East, concern began to be expressed about the spread of chemical and biological weapons and missile systems. During the Cold War, NATO members and a few other countries controlled the movement of high technology to the East through The Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).

At the Vancouver Summit of April 1993, President Clinton of the United States and President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation recognized that, in the light of the end of the Cold War, COCOM was no longer the appropriate basis for export controls. They found that there was an urgent need for a new approach to controls on exports of sensitive items in order to ensure that they would be focused on post-Cold War security concerns. In November 1993, high-level representatives of the seventeen member countries of the former COCOM discussed in Wassenaar the post-Cold War security situation raised in the Summit. The members agreed that there was a need to replace COCOM by a new multilateral arrangement that would establish new measures to deal with risks to regional and international security and stability related to the spread of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. Accordingly, they terminated COCOM and established a new multilateral arrangement. At this time, the former COCOM cooperating countries were included as participating states in the 'New Forum' (Greene 1996).

After several negotiations in 1994 and 1995, the 'New Forum' reached an agreement in December 1995 to establish the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Weapons and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, with a small secretariat servicing the Arrangement located in Vienna, Austria. A Final Declaration was issued at the Peace Palace in the Hague on 19th December 1995. In July 1996, the thirty-three founding members reached a consensus on the basic document of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), and agreed that the new Control Lists and Information Exchange would be implemented from 1st November 1996.¹² In 1998, the Wassenaar Arrangement

¹² The member countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea,

Plenary approved a paper entitled 'Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning Potentially Destabilising Accumulations of Conventional Weapons'. However, the paper is of a non-binding character and leaves decisions on export licensing under national control of each participating state (Wassenaar Arrangement 1996).

The Wassenaar Arrangement is the first global multilateral arrangement on transfers of conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. According to the Arrangement, the participating states seek through their national legislation and policies to ensure that transfers of arms and dual-use goods and technologies do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that undermine international and regional security and stability and are not diverted to support such capabilities. The participating countries also agree to promote transparency and greater responsibility with regard to transfers and to meet periodically to exchange views and information on sensitive transfers in order to ensure that transfers of controlled goods are carried out responsibly. They also agree to develop common understandings of the risks associated with their transfer and assess the scope for coordinating national control policies to combat these risks (*Ibid.*).

The Arrangement requires the member countries to maintain effective export controls for the items on the agreed lists. It also requires these countries to report their arms transfers or denials of transfers twice a year, and to meet periodically to review the items on the agreed lists (Wassenaar Arrangement 1996). I can say that this Arrangement is important as one of the multilateral efforts towards peace and stability. It is considered a sign of progress, because it is a regular forum in which most of the major suppliers discuss the concepts of restraint, transparency, and consultation on arms sales. It could also help in promoting responsible national export-control policies for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, and thus preventing destabilizing weapons build-ups and the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use items for military uses by states whose behaviour poses serious international security concerns.

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

However, the Arrangement is a voluntary, consensus-building effort rather than a binding agreement. It does not put strict rules on the transfers of arms but leaves the decision to transfer or to deny a transfer of any item as the sole responsibility of each participating state. It states that all measures undertaken with respect to the arrangement will be in accordance with national legislation and policies and will be implemented on the basis of national discretion. Moreover, although the member countries hold the responsibility of the 'destabilizing accumulations' of arms, it does not put more strict restraints on the transfer of arms to areas of conflict or to areas that are suffering from poverty and famine.

Furthermore, although many underdeveloped countries have been subject to terrorist attacks, before September 11th there was no concern to put restraints on arms transfer. The participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement felt the need to prevent the acquisition of conventional arms by terrorist groups and organizations, as well as by individual terrorists only after the terrorist attack that hit the US in 2001. Furthermore, restraints have been applied on small arms as they can be used by terrorists in developed countries, whereas regulations on conventional arms have been left loose to reach developing countries more easily.

5.2.3.2 Codes of Conduct and Other Attempts

Since the early 1990s there have been efforts to create a code of conduct in arms sales. Many codes of conduct on arms transfers have been proposed in the United Nations, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the United States, and South Africa. In 1993, the US Congress introduced in successive sessions the US Code of Conduct Bill. Later, in 1995, a group of Nobel Peace Laureates, led by former Costa Rican President Dr Oscar Arias, proposed a comprehensive International Code of Conduct. In 1998, the European Union accepted a regional Code of Conduct. In 1999, the US Congress passed the International Code of Conduct Act. In 2000, the US and the EU agreed at the US–EU Summit to work together on this type of agreement.

Codes of conduct have been supported by national and regional campaigns undertaken by hundreds of non-governmental organizations all over the world. This international network of NGOs has made all efforts to promote the codes of conduct at national, regional, and international levels to assure that communities demand that their governments adopt the

greatest possible restrictions on arms transfer to those recipients who violate human rights and international rights.

Codes of conduct on arms transfers bring together a set of regulatory principles based on the respect of international human rights. These principles can prevent the export of weapons to repressive and non-democratic governments, non-governmental groups and regimes that will use the weapons to commit human rights abuses. They also halt sales to countries involved in regional tension or where internal or external conflicts may be fuelled and where weapons could undermine development and increase poverty.

The objectives of these codes represent an encouraging first step in international attempts to restrain the arms trade. Yet the world's major arms dealers have continued to sell arms to human rights violators because of the various loopholes and weaknesses in the codes, as well as due to corruption and pressure to dilute codes.

5.2.3.2.1 International Code of Conduct

Dr Oscar Arias, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and former president of Costa Rica, regards military spending 'the single most significant perversion of global priorities'. In 1995, Dr Arias and other winners of the Nobel Peace Prize created an initiative that permitted the development of the International Code of Conduct about Arms Transfers, and on 29 May 1997, they met in New York to announce the official launch of the International Code of Conduct. The Code requires arms suppliers to certify that all recipients meet certain democracy and human rights standards.

The Code seeks to prevent exports to regions of instability, human rights abusers, dictators and military aggressors, by laying out criteria that governments should meet in order to be eligible for arms transfers. The Code also requires all countries that adopt the Code to introduce national legislation and regulations to ensure its implementation and enforcement at the national level, in order to promote greater transparency and accountability in the arms trade.

The initiative found wide support from different countries, politicians, and organizations. The former US president Jimmy Carter found that the initiative was 'critical in this time of continuing instability' and considered it 'a critically important step toward defining moral

benchmarks which all countries in the world can and should strive to meet'. Many other politicians and individuals have also spoken out in favour of codes of conduct, including Robin Cook, former UK Foreign Secretary, Michel Rocard, former French Prime Minister, Patricia Derian, former US Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, David Lange, former Prime Minister of New Zealand, Sir Brian Urquhart, former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Barber Conable, former president of the World Bank (UNESCO, 1998).

5.2.3.2.2 US Arms Transfer Code of Conduct

Legislation to enact a US Code of Conduct has been introduced in successive sessions of Congress since 1993. The Code prohibits arms exports to any government that does not meet the criteria set out in the law unless the President exempts a country, and Congress does not overturn the waiver. The Code requires the President to submit to Congress, once a year, a list of countries that meet certain eligibility criteria in order to import American weapons. In order to be eligible for US weapons or military assistance, countries need to have democratic and non-aggressive governments. Moreover, they have to respect the human rights of citizens and fully participate in the UN Register of Conventional Arms. However, the Code does not necessarily prevent any given sale, but it requires the administration to publicly acknowledge instances in which it decides that closing an arms deal is more important than democratic principles. The burden of proof therefore shifts toward those who wish to export (US Arms Transfer Code of Conduct).

The US Arms Transfer Code of Conduct is positive in that it prohibits military assistance and arms transfers to countries that do not promote democracy or respect human rights, or to countries that are engaged in acts of armed aggression, or to those that do not fully participate in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. On the other hand, the Code is negative because it allows the President to make exemptions if US national security interests require it, or if there is an emergency that necessitates that the United States transfers arms or provides military assistance. Although Congress can block any presidential waiver with a two-thirds majority vote, the possibility remains. Moreover, the Code contains primary foreign policy tenets of past and present US administrations. It does not ban all arms sales: the government and US contractors may continue to export arms to countries that meet the Code's criteria. Furthermore, exports may continue to those that do not meet the criteria if the President submits a national security waiver to Congress. The

United States continues to be the world's undisputed leader in arms exports. Moreover, more than 70% of US arms transfers go to states that do not meet the Code's criteria. The Center for Defense Information (CDI) finds that there have been efforts in the US to weaken the Code by making it apply to other countries but not to the US, because there have always been commercial interests in arms sales that have prevented reaching a code of conduct to prevent a free flow of deadly weapons.

Furthermore, the leading human rights organization, Amnesty International, finds that the Code still has many problems, and that the review of the Code over the years has not been deep enough to address its very serious flaws. It agrees with the Control Arms Campaign that the Code lacks transparency and accountability and that it allows arms transfers to human right abusers, thus undermining global security (Amnesty International 2004).

5.2.3.2.3 EU Code of Conduct

The European Union Code of Conduct is built upon a number of pre-existing national and international measures. These include the eight common criteria agreed among EU members after the 1991 Gulf War, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) 'Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers' of 1993, and the UK government's guidelines on arms exports, which were introduced in July 1997 (Lloyd 1997).

On 11 June 1998, the Foreign Ministers of the fifteen European Union member states adopted an EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The EU Code, which is the first regional code, is a politically binding agreement that seeks to create 'high common standards' for all EU members to use when making arms exports or granting arms-export licences (EU 1998).

Significant progress on regulating the arms trade has been made since the EU member states agreed its principles. The Code has already been effective in denying certain exports and has attracted the support of a number of countries outside the EU. According to the Code, member states agree to refuse any export if it violates the exporting state's commitments under the UN Charter or specific arms control agreements. They also agree to respect human rights in the country of final destination and not to export weapons 'if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression'. They

also commit themselves to preserving regional peace, security, and stability by not exporting weapons to regions of tension or to any country that may use weapons, in the near future, for aggression or to threaten the national security of EU members, friends, and allies. Furthermore, member countries agree, when issuing a licence, to take into account a country's attitude to terrorism, international law, and non-proliferation. They also agree to take into account the risk of diversion and re-export in granting export licences to recipient countries (*Ibid.*).

The European Code of Conduct has found a favourable reaction. The US administration has indicated a willingness to work more closely with the European Union on arms transfers. It also expressed its hopes that the 'Wassenaar Arrangement would be strengthened and recognized as the institution where responsible nations take practical steps to prevent and address the dangers arising from irresponsible arms exports'.¹³ Other international organizations, including the United Nations Secretary-General and OSCE have also indicated their support for the EU Code.

We can say that the Code has been effective in denying certain exports and has attracted the support of a number of countries outside the EU. It obligates all governments to uphold internationally recognized standards of democracy, human rights, and peaceful international relations. It also requires arms suppliers to certify that all arms recipients should comply with international human rights standards and international humanitarian law. Moreover, it requires them to respect democratic rights, international arms embargoes, and military sanctions, and to participate in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, as well as to commit themselves to promoting regional peace, security, and stability, and to oppose terrorism and promote human development.

One of the strengths of the EU Code is that it works through consultation and information exchange. If a member state denies an export licence on the basis of one or more of the criteria, the denial notification is circulated to the other member states with an explanation of the refusal. If another government wishes to go ahead with that order, it must then enter into consultations with the government that originally denied the export. Moreover, the Code requires member states to submit yearly reports on their arms exports and their implementation of the Code, and calls for an annual review of its operation to strengthen it.

¹³ Speech by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright at the Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 10 June 1998.

However, the EU Code has many significant loopholes that have put it under criticism by many parliamentarians and NGOs in the EU. As it was agreed in 1998, the leading NGOs in this field (Oxfam, Amnesty International, Christian Aid, Safer World, BASIC, and the World Development Movement) issued a joint statement criticizing many points in the Code that make it ineffective. Firstly, the Code does not establish effective monitoring of sales and transfers by a member state. A number of European Union states have weak or non-existent controls on the activities of arms brokering agents (Wood and Clegg 1999). German law, for example, can control the activities of arms brokers working on their soil, but fails to control those who step outside of the country to conclude their arms deals. Secondly, according to the EU Code, EU members have the potential to circumvent the regulations of the EU Code by setting up licensed co-production agreements allowing the production of military equipment in countries which would fall foul of the Code's criteria. Thirdly, the Code includes vague phrases and criteria that lead to different interpretations and loopholes. Fourthly, the Code is binding politically but not legally and this makes it insufficient to ensure full adherence to the eight common criteria agreed by the Council of Ministers. It does not help put an end to irresponsible arms sales that threaten lives and freedom for the sake of profit, nor does it lay out a specific list of 'don'ts' or any operative provisions to close loopholes and increase transparency and accountability. It has some weak provisions such as that countries need to 'take into account' the level of human rights in a receiving country, and that any exporting country has to take into account that the importing state achieves its defence and security needs with the 'least diversion of human and economic resources' (Amnesty International 2004). Sixthly, the Code does not have a mechanism strong enough to ensure that no arms will be exported to regimes that may use them to violate international humanitarian law. Seventhly, the Code does not include stricter criteria, multilateral consultations on undercutting, controls on arms brokering agents and on licensed production agreements, and an explicit commitment to transparency and accountability (Amnesty International 1998a).

Moreover, the parliamentarians found that the Code does not have any explicit obligation to prohibit transfers to forces which would most likely use them to seriously violate international humanitarian law. Furthermore, they find that the Code does not have provisions to address the current deficiencies in most EU members states' arms control regimes, such as the failure to strictly regulate international arms brokering and licensed

production agreements, or to adopt rigorous systems of certifying and monitoring end-use. Also, the Code contains no provision for parliamentary or public scrutiny over arms exports from the EU and thus does little to foster greater transparency and accountability over the arms trade across Europe as a whole (Amnesty International 1998a).

The EU Code of Conduct also contains no reference to the need to control the activities of international arms brokering agents, the need to control licensed production of military, paramilitary, and security equipment, or the need for common EU controls governing end-use. The absence of even a reference to these issues is a major disappointment. The lack of EU controls in these areas means that significant loopholes will continue to exist through which the controls set out in the Code of Conduct may be circumvented.

5.2.3.3 US–EU Declaration of Responsibility in Arms Exports

After the European Union agreed to its own Code of Conduct, the US began working with the European countries to reach mutual arrangement on arms. Talks between the two parties led to the issue of a declaration on ‘The Responsibilities of States and on Transparency Regarding Arms Exports’ during their Summit in December 2000. While the Declaration recognizes the right of states to acquire ‘the means of self-defence, consistent with the UN Charter’, it expresses its concerns towards arms transfers ‘when there is reason to believe that it will be used for internal repression or violation of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms’, contribute to or result in ‘excessive or destabilizing arms accumulations, regional instability, armed aggression, the precipitation, escalation or aggravation of internal or interstate conflicts, contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles capable of delivering them or international terrorism’ (EU–US Summit 2000).

Although the parties agreed to uphold certain principles and controls in this document, the Declaration does not satisfy the requirements of US law, which calls for commitment to a specific set of arms export criteria. Therefore, the Declaration can be seen as a positive first step – but first step only – toward implementation of the US requirement.

5.2.3.4 Control Arms Campaign

Concerns over arms proliferation have led three non-governmental organizations to launch a campaign seeking to limit arms trade. In October 2003, Amnesty International, Oxfam,

and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and several other organizations worldwide launched the Control Arms Campaign (Amnesty International 2003a).

The Control Arms Campaign noted that there are legal loopholes in arms control laws that allow dealers to easily bypass these controls. Those loopholes included lack of accountability and financial transparency, bypassing end-use limitations, and bypassing national laws by manufacturing in another country. Moreover, the Control Arms Campaign finds that arms trade ‘suffers from widespread corruption and bribes’ and that ‘it makes its profits on the back of machines designed to kill and maim human beings’. Therefore, it requires all governments to find a vital mechanism to restrict the end-user country that arms are going to, and to ensure that the arms are not going to be diverted or misused for human rights violations. It also finds that a stronger mechanism to control arms sales is needed to stop arms dealers using corrupt means and channels to get the weapons to their clients. Moreover, it calls for the establishment a binding arms trade treaty to reduce arms proliferation and misuse (Control Arms Campaign 2004). In fact, all that has been mentioned above, especially in the case of the US and EU Codes of Conduct, confirms that countries and agencies are very much aware of the need for the presence of conventional arm sales controls, but every treaty has its own limitations, or governments do not want a strict application of them.

5.2.4 Arms Control after 11th September 2001

The impact of the widespread proliferation and misuse of arms became critical after the terrorist attacks that hit the US on 11th September 2001. Many arms suppliers have relaxed the provisions that regulate the availability of arms in order to arm new-found allies against ‘terrorism’, irrespective of their disregard for international human rights and humanitarian law, and regardless of these countries’ records of human rights. The US has considerably increased military sales and aid to many countries, including those classified as human rights abusers (Hiller and Wood 2003).

On the other hand, the Wassenaar Arrangement was amended three times after the terrorist attacks because the participating states felt the need to ‘apply strict national controls on the export of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), as well as on transfers of technology related to their design, production, testing and upgrading’. The participating states also

insisted on ‘the need to avoid destabilising accumulations of arms’, taking into consideration the internal and regional situation in and around the recipient country in the light of existing tensions or armed conflicts, the legitimate security and defence needs, and the effect of armament on the human and economic resources of the country.

The participating countries also agreed to make sure that arms transfers will not ‘create an excessive and destabilising accumulation of small arms’, ‘prolong or aggravate an existing armed conflict’, ‘endanger peace or contribute to regional instability’. Moreover, they agreed to make sure that arms transfers will not ‘threaten compliance with international law governing the conduct of armed conflict taking into account the legitimate requirement for self-defence’ in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. They also agreed that arms will not be used ‘for the purpose of repression’ or ‘for the violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ or any purpose other than ‘the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient country’ (Wassenaar Arrangement 2006).

In 2003, the Wassenaar participating states agreed the elements for Effective Legislation on Arms Brokering. The aim of this legislation is ‘controls of arms brokering’ by limiting the number of brokers and setting up a register to control their work. According to the legislation, a broker needs to obtain a licence or written approval from the competent authorities of the participating state where these activities take place before arranging any transfer of arms (Wassenaar Arrangement 1996).

All the work done after 11th September has nothing to do with arms control. It has not to put restraints on conventional arms but aims to prevent arms and technologies from reaching the hands of terrorists, on the one hand, and to arm the allies who support the United States in its war on terrorism, on the other.

5.2.5 Unilateral and Regional Initiatives

In addition to the multilateral initiatives on arms control, there have also been a number of unilateral ones. Most major arms suppliers have declared during debates at the UN General Assembly that they operate restraint on arms exports and that further restraint is also needed (SIPRI 1991). In 1977, President Jimmy Carter announced a programme for unilateral arms export restraints. He stressed that ‘because we dominate the world market

to such a degree, I believe that the United States can, and should, take the first step'. He placed annual ceilings of the value of US arms exports and he suggested strong congressional regulations to guarantee that any American arms exports should be done through governmental channels. Each proposed arms transfer was to be accompanied by an 'arms control impact statement', complete with reasons for the sale and its expected implications for US interests and peace. However, Carter found that without cooperation from other suppliers 'it will be difficult to sustain unilateral US restraint over the longer term' (US Senate 1977, p. 14). Consequently, he opened the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks with the Soviets on limiting arms exports. However, commercial sales were excluded from the arms ceilings, and new and rather deceptive accounting methods were used to calculate the yearly totals (Pearson 1981). Carter's policy facilitated transfers that promote the security of the United States and its allies and restrained those transfers that 'promote regional arms races or increase instability or otherwise do not advance U.S. interests' (US Department of State 1980, p. 2).

Many debates place less emphasis on supplier responsibilities and favour a regional approach to the regulation and reduction of arms transfers in which both suppliers and recipients have a responsibility (Corradini 1990, pp. 131, 142). Regional agreements were seen as a possible means for enhancing stability in specific conflict-ridden regions, but not as a broad goal for the UN.

Latin America pioneered regional efforts to control the importation of conventional arms. In July 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower first proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union allow aerial inspection flights over each other's territory, but the Soviet Union rejected the proposal. In May 1989, President George Bush revived the idea and in February 1990 negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact started (Anderson 1992, p. 767).

The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, signed in November 1990, is often referred to as the 'cornerstone of European security', because it set equal limits on the amount of conventional weapons that NATO and the former Warsaw Pact could deploy between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. The treaty includes 30 states-parties and it has helped reduce the arsenals in Europe (Crawford 2009, p.2).

The Open Skies Treaty was signed in March 1992 by twenty-seven countries and entered into force in January 2002. According to the Treaty, each state-party has a right to conduct equal short-notice, unarmed observation flights over the others' entire territories to collect data on military forces and activities. The treaty lays out standards for aircraft used for observation flights, and requires a state-party to supply a copy of all data collected to the host country (The Open Sky Treaty 1992).

However, these efforts represent aspirations rather than a binding treaty. Regional approaches to disarmament and arms transfer limitations cannot be effective: while some regions disarm themselves unilaterally, other regions may exploit this for their own purposes.

5.3 Conclusion

The previous review has tried to shed light on the most important attempts to date to regulate conventional weapons exports and sales. It was shown that conventional weapons cause great damage and are regarded as the main drain of economic and human resources in areas of conflicts. The United Nations estimates that in the 1990s conventional weapons were used to kill more than 5 million people and forced 50 million to flee their homes (UNDP 2000). Around the world, conventional arms kill more than 500,000 people on average every year, approximately 1,300 people each day, while many more are unlawfully tortured, raped, displaced, abused, and injured. The main victims are the poor. There are 300,000 child soldiers involved in conflicts and nearly 60 per cent of small arms are in civilian hands. In World War I, 14 per cent of total casualties were civilian. In World War II, the number of casualties grew to 67 per cent. All the wars that have taken place in the last century depended completely on conventional weapons, apart from the two nuclear bombs that the US used against Japan in 1945.

In fact, many of the weapons and ammunition used in wars were obtained through international arms transfers. There are 639 million small arms in the world, produced by over 1,000 companies in at least ninety-eight countries (Small Arms Survey 2001). This devastating fact about weapons and their impact on human lives highlights the issue of arms trade as 'a global problem with horrific local consequences'. However, though there is a constant need to deal seriously with the mounting toll of death, destruction, and human

suffering inflicted by the use of conventional weapons in conflicts around the world, there is still no binding, comprehensive, international law to control the production and export of conventional arms. On the contrary, we are witnessing not only the spread of highly sophisticated weaponry but also the growing use of such weapons in conflict areas. The many binding agreements developed by the international community in the last five decades concerning human rights, humanitarian law, and peaceful co-existence have been completely neglected when it comes to armament and the international arms trade. Arms remain dangerously out of control and arms sales proliferation continues to be a global business, fuelling human rights violations, poverty, and conflict. Arms transfers also continue to contribute to serious violations of the standards of human rights, regardless of any other considerations.

It was shown that the many efforts made to put restraints on arms have been incomplete and insufficient to reach their goals. Some efforts have focused on transparency in arms sales and the movement of arms. Others have focused on the issue of human rights and the belief that arms should not go to countries that violate human rights. Still others have focused on national legislations to combat the arms trade, while others have focused on the importance of enforcement to limit arms sales. However, these efforts have been riddled with loopholes. They have failed to curb the activities of arms brokers. They have also failed to regulate arms transporters, tighten controls over where weapons end up, and effectively regulate licensed production. On the contrary, these loopholes have facilitated means of trafficking and brokering, and have eased the availability of arms and brought weapons into the hands of killers, repressive governments, human rights abusers, and criminals, and, consequently, have increased the incidence of armed violence, triggered conflicts, and have prolonged wars once they have broken out.

The current laws, arrangements, and agreements still lack an effective system of monitoring the movement of arms and what they are used for. There are no strict regulations on arms movements or the activities of private international arms dealers, or cooperation to prevent such dealers from engaging in illicit arms trafficking. National legislation and international controls and enforcements have also proved insufficient to stop arms dealers from selling weapons to the wrong hands in war zones. If a country fails to complete an arms purchase because of its local laws, it arranges to make it through a third country. Moreover, the current international laws do not put strict restraints on arms

manufacturing. The number of countries producing arms is increasing and the quantities of arms that each country produces are also increasing.

Having no international treaty to control conventional arms, the responsibility is completely left to a state's national laws. However, states have not scrutinized their national arms control systems or developed and enhanced the application of compatible standards in their legislative and administrative procedures in order to make them effective enough to prevent the illegal production, possession, and trading in arms in their territory. Moreover, they have also not set a legal obligation to comply strictly with sanctions and arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. This means that if a supplier refuses to arm a country another supplier will do it. Moreover, some arms companies have shifted their production to another country to avoid national laws. Many countries have permitted their national arms companies to license their production in other countries that have weaker arms-export controls. This practice allows arms exporters to effectively bypass controls prohibiting arms sales there (Control Arms Campaign 2004).

All members of the United Nations are bound by Article 2.5 in the UN Charter 'to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action' (United Nations 1945). According to this article, all UN member states are obliged to comply with any arms embargoes that the United Nations takes against any country. However, when we review the UN arms embargoes and states' compliance with these embargoes we find that most countries have not complied. Moreover, we find that the UN has not taken any action against these countries.

Governments have also not made enough efforts to prevent corruption and bribery in connection with the transfer of arms, which has led to brokering and illicit arms trafficking. Moreover, there is no evidence that states have made enough efforts to identify, apprehend, and bring to justice those involved in brokering and illicit arms trafficking. Some countries do not care about the end-use certificate of arms sales, and this means that arms reach countries and armed groups who use them for torture, repression, and crimes against humanity.

Governments have also not planned between them to develop and strengthen the necessary regional arms control agreements and arrangements to reduce the possibility of diversion of arms to unauthorized destinations and persons. They have also not cooperated appropriately at the bilateral and multilateral levels to share relevant customs information on trafficking and detection of illicit arms, and to coordinate intelligence efforts. Moreover, they have not endeavoured to ensure effective control of borders with a view to preventing illicit arms trafficking. We still find that states have not intensified international cooperation to develop and enforce effective national controls to curb the evasion of justice by illicit arms traffickers. They have also not ensured strong and effective supervision of all aspects of trade in small arms and light weapons to stop the illicit transfer of such weapons when they pose serious threat to stability.

The arms trade not only suffers from lack of law but also lack of an international mechanism to prevent the merchants of death from profiting from the misery of others by selling arms and fuelling conflicts. While perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious human rights violations may be taken to the International Criminal Court, there is no equivalent international mechanism to deal with the merchants of death.

Enforcement of arms control agreements has also proven insufficient. One can observe that most agreements presented in this chapter rely on the continued desire of the participants to abide by the terms to remain effective. Moreover, when a nation no longer desires to abide by the terms, they seek to either secretly circumvent the terms or to simply end their participation in the treaty. Furthermore, nations which violate the terms of the treaty do not suffer great consequences for their actions. Many nations have violated arms control treaties at will when they have felt the need. Enforcement has been haphazard, with measures more a matter of politics than adherence to the terms. This meant that sanctions and other measures tended to be advocated against violators primarily by their natural political enemies, while violations have been ignored or given only token measures by their political allies (Den Dekker 2001).

Chapter 6

Data Collection and Methods of Analysis

6.0 Introduction

In the previous chapters I provided an overview of the literature published in relation to the reciprocal relationships between armament, conflict, and development and the impact of each on the other two, with particular focus on the Middle East. In this chapter, I describe the methodology followed and the data collected to explore the aims of the research and answer the research questions. This chapter presents a theoretical background about the value of the methodological approaches, the methods of data collection, the nature of the data and the analytical procedures. It also outlines the limitations of the methodology.

Considering the security challenges mentioned in chapter one (see 1.1), and military expenditure in the Middle East (see 2.4.6), and the influence of this armament on conflict and development in Chapter Four, it can be said that further empirical evidence is needed. As such, a questionnaire is designed to infer the public opinion about the role of armaments and the impact of the absence of an arms treaty that regulates arms selling in the Middle East. Very little opinion is available in this field about the Middle East, therefore the questionnaire concentrates on people's opinion of the relationships between Arab-neighbouring countries, how oil revenues improves their life quality, and most importantly their opinion about the role of their governments in using arms to defend their borders. Other important issues are raised in this questionnaire such as the level of democracy granted in the Middle East and the people's opinion about the US project of democratizing the Middle East. In addition, it is important to elicit some information from Arab participants about the reality of the fears the US and the West try to impose in the area about Iran, so direct questions were asked to participants to know whether Iran or Israel are considered a more threat to the Arab World. The questionnaire also investigates the relationships between increasing armament in the Middle East and the creation of conflict in this area. Further, it sheds light on people's opinions concerning the US foreign policy in creating an unsafe and unstable Middle East, and in providing suitable environments for the growth of fundamentalists, and Islamic movements.

The second research method used in this study is the interviews. In total, six interviews with senior diplomats and politicians in the Middle East covering two sets of questions have been conducted. All the interviewees are experienced diplomats who are in direct contact with political decision-making quarters. The questions have been designed to parallel those in the questionnaire so the findings of the data analysis can be compared. The first set of questions was designed to cover the factors that lead to high military expenditure, consequently increase the number of conflicts, and hinder development in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. Among the main topics the interviewees responded to were: oil, Iraq, democracy, and inter-Arab relationships. These topics are considered as the main security challenges in the Middle East. At the end, it was found that reducing arms expenditure and military spending can contribute to, or at the very least, provide the opportunity for improving economic performance in the Middle East.

The second set of interviews included four questions. The questions covered the reasons behind the lack of binding international treaty that prohibits or regulates military expenditure and arms transfer. They also aimed at getting responses to the serious attempts in the United Nations to reach such treaties, or put restraints on arms transfers. At the end, it was found that most arm-seller countries are not interested in a settled Middle East, and their policies are not reliable (see also 6.3.5, 6.3.6 & chapter 8).

6.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods

The differences between qualitative and quantitative research methods have been the subject of long discussions in academic circles. Supporters of each view claim that the method they follow is able to isolate and discriminate the research-analytical categories as accurately as possible. For example, supporters of the quantitative method argue that the purpose of the quantitative research is to ‘find answers to questions through the application of scientific procedures’ (Davies 2007, p. 9). The information gathered will then be relevant to the questions asked, reliable and unbiased. Quantitative research methods, in fact, imply two methodologically different approaches, survey research and experimental research, as Davies (2007) argues. A survey research can take many forms, such as a ‘10-year National Census targeting the entire population to projects that involve a series of brief interviews’ (p. 7). Furthermore, the findings of the quantitative research ‘have certain ‘definiteness’ ... which make it possible for conclusions to be drawn to a specifiable level

of probability' (p. 11). Analysis of quantitative data has much benefited from the development of computer software programs; therefore the results can be neat and allow the researcher to feel that a rounded task has been done.

Qualitative methods, on the other hand, consist of 'a set of interpretative, material practices that make the world visible ... They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos to the self' (p.10). In that sense, supporters of the qualitative approach argue that this process defines and isolates categories throughout the process of the research (McCracken 1988, p. 17). Researchers using qualitative methods are able to manage their data and results in a limited time scale. They are offered the temptations not 'to do sums or learn about statistics' (Davies 2007, p 11).

The debates between the two advocates continue, but the task of the researcher is to choose one route or to combine both methods to answer the research questions. For this research, I blend both qualitative and quantitative methods because this enables me to investigate the aims of my research and answer my research questions. However, the focus is more on qualitative approaches than on quantitative methods. A questionnaire and interviews are used as research methods.

6.2 The Questionnaire as a Method of Data Collection

A questionnaire is one of the tools that can be used to carry out a survey. It is a reliable method to gather data from a potentially large number of respondents. The responses to a questionnaire provide the researcher with sufficient raw material for the statistical analysis of the results. According to Weir and Roberts (1994, p. 154) and Oppenheim (1992, p. 102), questionnaires have their advantages and disadvantages. The advantages can be highlighted in the following points:

- a. They are not high in costs in terms of distribution and processing.
- b. They allow sampling.
- c. They ask everybody the same questions.
- d. They are able to reach respondents at widely dispersed addresses or abroad.
- e. Unlike interviews, there is no chance of interviewer bias.

An important matter that needs to be considered seriously is the confidentiality of the respondents in a questionnaire. The researcher should replace the name of the participants with codes to ensure anonymity, and in so doing he guarantees that the participants will respond honestly to the questionnaire. Examples of such cases would include questionnaires that seek embarrassing information about political issues or private and personal behaviour.

However, the disadvantages of the questionnaires can be reviewed in the following points:

- a. In general they have a low response rate.
- b. The researcher has no control over unanswered questions or incomplete answers.
- c. There is no opportunity to correct 'misunderstandings, or to probe, or to offer explanations or help' (Oppenheim 1992, p. 102).
- d. There is no control over the giving of questionnaires to others.

The design of the questionnaire can be of open or closed format. By open format, I mean that there is no predetermined set of responses and the respondents are free to answer whatever they choose. Open-format questions are good for soliciting subjective data, as the responses can reflect the views of the respondents more truly. However, open-format questionnaires make it impossible to predict the full range of opinions. Their very nature requires the researcher to treat the responses individually. Therefore it is not possible to tabulate responses automatically to perform statistical analysis on them. This means that open-format questionnaires are costly in both time and money.

On the other hand, closed-format questions mean that 'respondents are offered the choice of alternative replies. They may be asked to tick or underline their chosen answer(s) in a written questionnaire' (Oppenheim 1992, p. 112). The respondents' task is then to choose from the given options the most suitable answer. The number of the options given is not subject to clear consensus. What is clear is that there should be sufficient choices to cover fully the range of answers. Closed-format questionnaires are good for soliciting large surveys such as ethnographic studies, information management, travel industry, or political opinions. Variables such as gender, age, employment, and other specialized topics are important aspects that have to be considered in the questionnaire design (pp. 111–12).

Closed-format questions enable researchers to track opinions over time by administering the same questionnaire to different groups of participants. Participants in return do not waste time writing because the answers are already there. Closed questions also give the researcher the chance to tabulate responses, track and compare opinions, correlate variables, and perform objective statistical analysis on them. However, closed-format questionnaires have their disadvantages: they allow neutral or no-opinion responses. This means that some researchers may over-utilize the neutral answer to serve their arguments and this, in my opinion, could bias the results. To prevent such bias, researchers are invited to add more choices to reduce the chances of neutral answers. Adding to this is the loss of the spontaneity and expressiveness which prevent us from knowing ‘what the respondents said or thought of their own accord and perhaps the introduction of bias by ‘forcing’ them to choose between given alternatives and making them focus on alternatives that might have not occurred to them’ (p.112).

6.2.1 Designing the Questionnaire for this Research

As mentioned in 6.1, a questionnaire is used as a method of data collection for this study. The questionnaire design was viewed as a multi-stage process that requires the following steps:

1. Defining the rationale behind this questionnaire.
2. Determining the sampling groups.
3. Designing the questionnaire.
4. Piloting it.
5. Administrating the questionnaire.
6. Interpreting the results.

To that end, a closed-format questionnaire has been designed. I restricted the answers to a set of alternatives so it would be easy to calculate percentages and other statistical data for the whole group of participants.

The aim of the questionnaire is to elicit data and collect responses about the triangular relationship between armament, conflict, and development in the Middle East. More specifically, it concentrates on the reasons that contribute to the increase of armament and conflict in the Middle East, and Iraq in particular. Iraq is focused on because it best exemplifies the relationship between high armament and conflicts on one side, and the lack of development and economic growth on the other.

The questionnaire also focuses on the reactions of Arab people to the foreign policy of the United States in the region and the influence of this policy on development and conflict. Generally speaking, the questionnaire is divided into two main sections: background information on the respondent, such as age, gender, religion, nationality, and education, and a politically oriented section. The focus of the politically oriented questions are on topics such as: democracy in the Middle East, Arab–Arab relationships, Arab–US relationships, the rise of fundamentalism, colonial heritage, occupation, conflict, arms sales, military spending, development, and oil revenue.

6.2.2 Piloting the Questionnaire

Before administrating the questionnaire, it was important to ask some colleagues and experts from the field of politics to try it to get their responses about the categories included. The basic aim of piloting the questionnaire was

- to check the clarity of the questions and that there were no ambiguous words,
- to know how easily respondents from different educational ranges could answer each question,
- to check the balance of the questions, and
- to identify any procedural problems.

The participants in the piloting procedure were from three educational levels: four postgraduate students, four graduates and four without university qualification. The following covering letter was prepared and enclosed with a copy of the questionnaire to the twelve participants.

Dear participant,

Thank you for helping me in piloting this questionnaire. Please find enclosed a copy of the questionnaire I intend to distribute to participants from different Middle East and different Arab countries as part of my PhD project. The aim of the questionnaire is to shed light on some important issues such as the relation between the US and the Arab world, democracy in the Arab world, Arab-Arab relations, Arab-neighbouring countries relations, the role of arms in defending homeland, and the role of oil in supporting the economical growth, besides some other interesting issues. As part of piloting this questionnaire, I would really appreciate it if you could read it carefully,

fill it in, and then answer the following questions. Please feel free to add any suggestions.

Lay out

1. Do you think that the lay out of the questionnaire is easy to read?

Yes Needs modification

2. If you think that it needs modification, do you have any suggestions?

.....
.....

Content

1. Do you have any reservations about any question? If yes, please state your reasons?

.....
.....

2. Do you think the questions mentioned are:

Enough Not enough Too much

3. Do you find the language of the questionnaire clear and suitable for different educational levels of the participants?

.....
.....

4. Do you think that the use of some political terms such as the 'colonial heritage' is difficult to understand?

I agree it is difficult I disagree it is clear It needs more explanation

5. How long did it take you to answer the questionnaire?

Less than 20 minutes 20–30 minutes More than 30 minutes

6. Do you find overlap between the questions? If yes, please specify.

.....
.....

Thanks for your help

Ayman Alloush

The final design of the questionnaire benefited largely from the comments received after piloting it. In general, there was a common consensus that the questionnaire was interesting, and not difficult to understand. However, minor changes were suggested and can be summarized in the following points:


- The three groups agreed that there were overlaps between some questions, therefore I adjusted some questions and deleted others.
- The third group suggested using simple terms instead of specialized political terminology, so I changed some words to be easily understood, and added more clarification and definitions to the terminologies that serve certain purposes in my research.
- It was suggested that I add *abstain* among the multi answers, and in fact I added that.
- Finally, they mentioned that the time for completing the questionnaire varied from 20 minutes to 25 minutes. I think this is not too much time to complete the questionnaire.

The questionnaire was revised in light of these suggestions and administrated to participants in different Middle-Eastern countries. Two versions were prepared: English and Arabic versions. They were completely identical.

6.2.3 The Questionnaire

In total, the questionnaire consists of forty-four closed questions. Each group of questions serves a particular theme, as shown in **Figure 6.1**.

Figure 6.2: Questions of the questionnaire sorted by the main themes



Here is an English hard-copy of the questionnaire. There is also another Arabic hard-copy and two Arabic and English e-copies of the questionnaire.

The Questionnaire

Introduction

The questionnaire is designed to shed some light on the anticipation and reaction of people in Middle-Eastern countries in respect of the relationship between armament, conflict and development in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. It focuses mainly on the United States' determinants of arms transfers as well as the deterrents of military expenditure in Middle-Eastern countries and the impact of both on conflict and development on the Middle East and Iraq.

The responses to this questionnaire will be used in my doctoral research at the University of Exeter. All the information given will be treated anonymously and confidentially, and will be used for research purposes only. To enable me process the information in the questionnaire, it is important that you either sign the copy you fill it in or write the word 'accept'.

I would be grateful if you could possibly complete this questionnaire and return it back in the enclosed stamped and addressed envelope within ten days. Should you require any further clarification, please do not hesitate to call me or email me on the following email address: a.alloush@exeter.ac.uk

Questionnaire

❖ Gender:

Male

Female

❖ Age:

18–30

30–50

50 & over

❖ Country of origin:

❖ **Current nationality:**

❖ **Country of residence:**

❖ **Educational background:**

 None School College, University Higher Education (PhD, MA, etc.) Abstain

❖ **Cultural background:**

- Religion

(Muslim, Christian, etc...)

 Abstain

- Sect

(Sunni, Shi'a, Catholic, etc...)

 Abstain

- Ethnicity

(Arab, Kurd, etc...)

 Abstain

1. Which is your favourite movie?

 Syrian movie Egyptian movie British movie French movie American movie Abstain

2. Do you prefer American products to Arabic ones?

 Yes No Abstain

3. Do you like fast food (e.g. McDonalds, Pizza Hut, KFC and Burger King)?

 Yes No Abstain

4. Do you think the US is a nice place to live in?

 Yes No Abstain

5. To what extent do you think your country is democratic?

(Less than 40 %, between 40–60%, 60–80%, 80% and over)

 Abstain

6. To what extent do Arab regimes represent their peoples?

(Less than 40 %, between 40–60%, 60–80%, 80% and over)

 Abstain

7. Do you support the American project of democratization in the Arab world?

 Yes No Abstain

8. A real process of democratization in the Arab world bring to power:

Anti- American government Pro-American government Abstain

9. A real process of democratization in the Arab world bring to power:

Secular regimes Islamic regimes Abstain

10. Which do you think would work better for the Arab world?

Arab unity Islamic rule Democratic regimes Abstain

11. Would you support an Islamic government in your country?

Yes No Abstain

12. Which of the following does Saudi Arabia have the strongest relationship with?

Jordan Iran Iraq
 Yemen UK USA Abstain

13. Which of the following does Kuwait have the strongest relationship with?

Iran Iraq Qatar
 Syria UK USA Abstain

14. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to the Arab countries?

Iran Israel Turkey
 UK USA Abstain

15. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to your country?

Iran Israel Turkey
 UK USA Abstain

16. Did you support Iraq's war against Iran?

Yes No Abstain

17. Which country won the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?

Iraq Iran None Abstain

18. Which countries most benefited from the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?

- China Russia Turkey Saudi Arabia
 Syria UK USA Abstain

19. Did you support Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait?

- Yes No Abstain

20. Which countries most benefited from the second Gulf War (Liberation of Kuwait)?

- China Russia Turkey Saudi Arabia
 Syria UK USA Abstain

21. The Iraqi regime stayed in power despite its defeat in the Gulf War and a decade of sanctions. Did the USA want that?

- Yes No Abstain

22. Did the USA attempt to end the 12-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN through peaceful diplomacy?

- Yes No Abstain

23. Did Saddam Hussein's regime pose a 'mortal threat' to the USA?

- Yes No Abstain

24. How do you regard the third Gulf War (War on Iraq)?

- Liberation war Occupation war War on terrorism Abstain

25. Who has most benefited from this war?

- Iraqi people US arms and oil companies USA
 Israel Fanatical and terrorist groups Abstain

26. Which is more secure and stable?

- Iraq under Saddam Iraq after Saddam Abstain

27. Which poses more threat to the Middle East countries?

- Iraq under Saddam Iraq after Saddam Abstain

28. Did the trial and the execution of Saddam aim to ?

- Achieve justice Fuel sects' conflict Disgrace Arab feelings Abstain

- 29. To what extent do you think that the colonial heritage in the Middle East contributes to the outstanding conflicts?**
(Less than 40 %, between 40–60%, 60–80%, 80% and over) Abstain
- 30. To what extent do you think that the Israeli occupation of Arab land has contributed to the armament and underdevelopment of the Middle East?**
(Less than 40 %, between 40–60%, 60–80%, 80% and over) Abstain
- 31. Did the existing borders between Middle-Eastern countries contribute to conflict between them?**
 Yes No Abstain
- 32. Do you think that the ‘divide and rule’ policy is working in the Arab Middle East?**
 Yes No Abstain
- 33. Do you support your country’s military spending?**
 Yes No Abstain
- 34. Gulf states have spent billions of dollars on arms in the last five decades. Have these arms purchases helped these countries defend themselves?**
 Yes No Abstain
- 35. Most Gulf countries buy arms to**
 Defend themselves against external threats
 Please arms-manufacturing countries Abstain
- 36. Did military spending in Middle-Eastern countries contribute to the development of these countries?** Yes No Abstain
- 37. Did military spending in Iraq contribute to the development or underdevelopment of Iraq?**
 Development of Iraq Underdevelopment of Iraq Abstain
- 38. Did military spending in the Middle East prevent or increase the possibility of conflict?**
 Prevent the possibility of conflict Increase the possibility of conflict Abstain
- 39. The USA has good relations with most of the Gulf countries, because...**
 These states are rich with oil. There are mutual interests for both Abstain
- 40. Does the United State’s foreign policy in the Middle East serve its strategic interests in the region?** Yes No Abstain
- 41. To what extent do you think the Arab countries have benefited from oil revenue?**
(Less than 40%, between 40–60%, 60–80%, 80% and over) Abstain

42. Which would you support: the USA or Al-Qaeda?

USA Al-Qaeda None Abstain

43. Which is the appropriate description for each of the following?

(Arrogant, democratic, terrorist, evil, revolutionary)

USA:	<input type="checkbox"/> democratic	<input type="checkbox"/> terrorist	<input type="checkbox"/> evil	<input type="checkbox"/> arrogant	
Hezbollah	<input type="checkbox"/> sectarian	<input type="checkbox"/> terrorist	<input type="checkbox"/> evil	<input type="checkbox"/> revolutionary	
Hamas	<input type="checkbox"/> democratic	<input type="checkbox"/> terrorist	<input type="checkbox"/> evil	<input type="checkbox"/> revolutionary	
Al-Qaeda	<input type="checkbox"/> fundamental	<input type="checkbox"/> terrorist	<input type="checkbox"/> evil	<input type="checkbox"/> revolutionary	<input type="checkbox"/> Abstain

44. Do you agree that I use your responses in my research and in any future publication hereafter?

Yes No

- Divide and rule means fostering enmity and distrust between people, or local rulers so conflicts start between them, consequently they become weak and easy to be controlled by others.
- Colonial heritage refers to the impact of the colonial period on the occupied land after this occupation.
- The American project of democratization means the American's attempts to make differences in the civic life of the people, their values, motivations and if necessary their regimes. This project justifies using power or launching wars against others to justify their end.

6.2.4 Profiling the Participants

The questionnaire was administrated to people from Middle-Eastern countries. These countries include Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen. As the main focus of my research is on Iraq, 110 responses were gathered from Iraqi people, 40 responses from Egypt, 30 from each of the following countries: Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, and 20 from each of the following countries: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, and UAE. The total number of the collected responses is 400.

It was impossible to profile the participants because names were not given in order to maintain anonymity. However, the final 400 responses were collected from different educational backgrounds, and from both genders. All the participants were over 18 years old. The following table represents the distribution of the responses of the questionnaire:

Table 6.1: Participants according to their gender and educational level

No.	Gender		
	Male	Female	
400	260	140	
	Age		
	18-30	30-50	50&Over
	145	182	73
	Educational level		
	Postgraduate	Graduate	Without University Qualification
	35	200	165

Table 6.1 represents the distribution of the sample. It is clear that the number of the male participants is higher than the females, and the responses obtained from graduates are higher than the other two groups.

Moreover, the final 400 responses were collected from different religious, sectarian, and ethnic backgrounds. Table 6.2 represents the distribution of the responses according to their religion and sect, and Table 6.3 shows their ethnicity.

Table 6.2: Participants according to their religion and sect

No.	Religion									
	Muslim				Christian				Others	Abstain
400	218				42				25	115
	Sunni	Shi'a	Others	Abstain	Orthodox	Catholics	Others	Abstain		
	76	32	9	101	8	5	2	27		

Table 6.3: Participants according to their ethnicity

No.	Ethnicity			
	Arab	Kurd	Others	Abstain
400	342	11	23	24

6.2.5 Methods of Administering the Questionnaire

Administration of the questionnaire was done in three ways. First, I travelled to some countries and, with the help of friends, distributed the questionnaire and got responses. Among these countries, I visited and obtained direct responses from Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, and UAE, besides the UK. Second, I posted copies to a second group of participants, some of whom were living in their mother countries and others who were living outside. All the posted copies included stamped-addressed envelopes, my phone number and my email address. Third, for the Arab countries that I could not visit because of political or visa restrictions, I managed, with the help of the Syrian embassies in these countries and other colleagues, to distribute the questionnaire and get responses. I tried my best to distribute the questionnaire to participants from different genders, ages, educational, and religious backgrounds. I also tried to distribute it to a parallel number of respondents living in their Arab home countries and abroad. To avoid misunderstanding or misinterpretation, certain political terms used in the questionnaire like ‘divide and rule’, ‘colonial heritage’, ‘the American project of democratization’ and others were defined and explained at the end of the questionnaire (see 6.2.3).

6.2.6 Preparing the Questionnaire for Analysis

All the collected samples were coded and typed as part of the data analysis. The typed version of the questionnaire reproduced the answers exactly as they were written by the participants. Every typed response was checked twice by me and a colleague to compare the original scripts with the typed ones. Consequently, all the samples were coded and input into SPSS, a quantitative statistical package, to allow for a descriptive analysis. The outcomes of this descriptive analysis ‘have certain ‘definiteness’ about them, which make it possible for conclusions to be drawn’ (Davies 2007, p. 11). Hence more in-depth qualitative analysis took place.

In Chapter 7, I present a detailed analysis of the responses to the questionnaire. The qualitative analysis aggregates the responses into categories of information and interprets the significance of the quantitative findings.

6.2.7 Field Problems

As Oppenheim (1992) explains, questionnaires require many weeks of ‘planning, reading, design and exploratory pilot work will be needed before any sort of specification for a questionnaire can be determined’ (p. 100). What Oppenheim suggests seems very true in my case. Designing and adjusting the questionnaire for this study required weeks of work before it was finally ready to be administrated. Adding to this, analysis of questionnaires with a large amount of data, as Denscombe (1998) argues, can be difficult. Respondents might also not cooperate and answer the questions, which in turn might bias the researcher’s findings, as we find in the following discussion.

Collecting responses from different Arab countries, I have to admit, was not an easy task. My focus was mainly on time and collecting as many responses as possible so that the sample was reflexive and representative. Although I stated at the beginning of the questionnaire that all the responses would be used only for the research and would be confidential, a lot of people refused to respond. A group of people seemed to be afraid to respond to a political questionnaire where some questions addressed sensitive issues such as democracy and Arab regimes. In their opinion, the questionnaire might be designed for an intelligence agency, as someone stated, and their responses might lead to unpredictable troubles. This negative attitude, which I like to call the policy of avoidance to warrant safety, is a common approach followed by most Arab citizens so they will not be classified as opponents. Accordingly, convincing people to respond to the questionnaire was a real challenge.

Furthermore, travelling to many countries was costly and time consuming and this contradicts what was mentioned in 6.2. Many participants agreed to participate in the questionnaire and asked me for copies to fill in later, but when the time came to travel, I did not receive all the expected responses. In total, I distributed 680 samples, but I received only 470 responses. Seventy samples were excluded from the data analysis for technical reasons. Some respondents did not sign their consent at the end to enable me to process their responses, others responded with *Abstain* to most of the questions. This reflected their

desire not to express an honest opinion. Thus, it was felt that using these responses could bias the results.

6.3 Interviews

The second method of data collection for this research is the interviews. The use of interviews as a research tool marks a move away from regarding a person's thoughts as simply measurable data to considering knowledge as generated between humans through conversations. It is fundamental therefore to keep uppermost in one's mind the fact that an interview is 'a social, interpersonal encounter, not merely a data collection exercise' (Cohen *et al.* 2000, p. 279). The interview, in that sense, is considered as a qualitative research technique which engages gathering data 'through direct verbal interaction between individuals' (Cohen and Manion 1994, pp. 272–3). It can be used as the primary means to test hypotheses, propose new ones, support claims, gather information, and, 'having direct bearing on the research objectives' (p. 273), it can be also used as an explanatory device to help identify variables and relationships in association with other methods in the research. An interview then, as Cohen and Manion (1994) suggest, is a method of data collection that can be viewed as the sequence of verbal questions by the interviewer and verbalized responses by the interviewees. Its aim is to gain data from participants that will help in theorizing a hypothesis, clarifying some points in the research, and discovering new insights that might be useful to the research project.

Kvale (1996) confirms these views and adds that the interview is an inter-subjective venture of two people talking about common themes of interest. The interviewer does not only gather statements, but his/her questions lead up to 'what aspects of a topic the subject will address, and the interviewer's active listening and following up on the answers co-determines the course of the conversation' (p. 183).

6.3.1 Factors That Affect the Interview

There are many factors that affect the nature of any interview, such as the social distance between the interviewer and the interviewee, the degree of interviewer's control, mutual trust, and time and location factors. The questions asked in the interview can also affect its nature. Questions can range from predetermined, strictly controlled questions (closed questions) to informal conversational questions (open questions). Other crucial factors that

affect interviews are: research time, financial research resources, research participants, and ethical considerations.

6.3.2 Types of Interview

There are many types of interview, but the purpose of the interview and the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee determine the type and the nature of the interview. Among the different types, I am going to discuss the structured or formal, and semi-structured or open-ended interview for their relevance to my research.

A structured interview may also be called a formal interview. A formal interview, according to Weir and Roberts (1994), is 'highly structured, with a standardized question sequence and with answers recorded from a set of limited response options' (p. 144). According to Freebody (2003) the formal interview tries to keep the focal point of the talk tight, 'the data collection focused and efficient and the compilation of data straightforward' (p. 133). It restricts the domains of relevance of the talk to predetermined questions and thus, by inference, it provides a set of possible answers. This type of interview enables researchers to collect systematic and comparable data. And it provides a reliable source of quantitative data analysis because the interviewer can create fixed codes taken from the interviewees' answers. Qualitatively, structured interviews allow researchers to compare responses because interviewees answer the same questions. However, the value of the information depends highly on the type of questions asked, and on the interviewees' answers to these questions. Another problematic area of structured interviews appears when anticipated information may be missed because the interviewer cannot trigger the interviewees' spontaneous responses. Accordingly, the interviewer has to substantially pre-plan his questions because he is required to use the literal responses without addition or subtraction. This means that the researcher has to decide before collecting the data what aspects are more or less important, which might bias the results of the analysis.

Semi-structured or open-ended interviews, on the other hand, aim to make the procedure less artificial along this continuum. Interviewers establish a core of issues to be covered during the interview, 'leaving the sequence and relevances of the interviewee free to vary, around and out from that core' (Freebody 2003, p. 133). The questions of semi-structured interviews are predetermined and emerge from the immediate context because the interviewer's goal 'is to stimulate the subject to talk freely about the area under study'

(Weir and Roberts 1994, p. 145). This indicates that the interviewer can predict answers and reasons for the answers. He is also able to transcribe the talk in full and then decide what to analyse and use in his research. Cohen and Manion (1994) stress the advantages of the open-ended interview because it allows the interviewer to probe the discussion and enables him to clear any misunderstanding.

However, this procedure means that the interview data is less directly comparable across the group of interviewees. It is also time consuming for both interviewers and interviewees. Interviewees spend more time talking about the different issues that turn out to be important during the interview, and the interviewer spends extra time analysing the semi-structured interviews.

For this research, semi-structured and open-ended interviews were conducted with diplomats from different Middle-Eastern countries.

6.3.3 Limitations of the Interviews

As a research technique, interviews have their own limitations if compared to other methods of data collection. One of the disadvantages of the interview is that it is prone to subjectivity and bias on the part of the interviewer, which might affect the required objectivity of the research. Cohen and Manion (1994) argue that this bias may arise from

- the tendency of the interviewer to seek answers that support his preconceived notions,
- misperceptions on the part of the interviewer of what the respondent is saying,
- misunderstandings on the part of the respondent of what is being asked,
- the content and the style of the questions,
- the unwillingness and the lack of full knowledge of the interviewee to give a true response to the interview question (Cohen and Manion 1994, p. 282).

Another important limitation of the interview involves the time needed to transcribe the tapes and analyse the data. For instance, the transcription of an interview that lasts for more than an hour can take as much as a day. The power status between the interviewer and the interviewees can also be a source of difficulty, especially if one side is much senior in age or position to the other.

6.3.4 Ethical Considerations

Issues pertaining to ethics run throughout different kinds of social research. Homan (1991) believes an interviewer must explain clearly the purpose and role of the participants in his project. He has to be very positive towards the interviewees and to treat them with respect. According to Cohen *et al.* (2000, p. 157), there are certain ethical issues that should be considered, such as:

- a. Informed consent of the participants to contribute to the research, to be recorded, and to use their names must be given.
- b. The interview should remain confidential until interviewees have given permission for their use.
- c. Protection of the anonymity of the participants where all participants' names in the transcripts should change if interviewees choose so.
- d. The interviewees must know who will access their information and how the data will be used.

In the present research, the following ethical principles were adhered to: respect for others, fair treatment and protection from discomfort (Brink 1996, p. 39–46; Burns and Grove 1997, p. 204–7). By respect for others, I mean that the participants have the right to participate voluntarily in the research and the right to withdraw without discrimination. They also have the right to clarity about the purpose of the research (Brink 1996, p. 40).

By fair treatment, I mean the freedom of the participants to determine the extent of the information they wish to provide and withhold before the data is collected (Brink 1996, p. 40–2). Protection from discomfort, however, refers to the rights of the participants to anonymity and privacy during the data collection and thereafter if they so desire. Confidentiality was upheld by destroying the recording tapes on which all the interviews were recorded.

All these ethical considerations were regarded during the interviews. Each interviewee was given the following paper to sign:

The data from this interview will be used to form the basis of my PhD project. Your anonymity will be protected and all responses will be confidential. You have the

right to withdraw without discrimination. Your informed consent is requested to be given by either a signature or writing the word 'accept'.

6.3.5 Interviews as Design and Focus

To explore the aims of my research stated in 6.0 and 6.2.3, structured interviews were used as a method of data collection. The reason for choosing structured interviews was to be able to compare the responses of the interviews; besides this, it was the preference of the interviewees so that they would not be surprised by unexpected questions. The interviews varied in length between 50 and 70 minutes.

In total, eight interviews were conducted with diplomats and politicians from different Middle-Eastern countries. Two of these were conducted with diplomats working in the UN and these followed a different layout.

It was important to get answers to certain structured questions (see 1.6) that support the objectives of the research (see 1.3). Therefore, 12 structured questions were carefully designed and distributed to four diplomats and politicians. Their focus was similar to that of the questionnaire in order to be able to compare the responses between the two methods of data collection. The following are the questions of the first set of interviews.

Interview Type 1

Introduction:

The aim of the following questions is to illustrate the opinions of politicians and experts from Middle-Eastern countries in respect to the relationship between armament, conflict and development in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular.

The information given in response to these questions will be treated anonymously and confidentially and will be used solely for my doctoral research at the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom. The names of the interviewees will only be disclosed to the examination board if requested.

For further information please email me at aymanalloush@hotmail.com

Ayman Alloush

Questions for Interview Type 1

Democracy

- 1. All Middle-Eastern countries are classified, in accordance with more than one criterion of democracy, as states of absolute rule, or states of limited subjection of the individuals. Do you see a link between the deterioration of the level of democracy in this region and the conflicts that erupted in it on the one hand, and the high level of armament, on the other? What, in your opinion, is the impact of this on progress and development of the Middle East?*
- 2. What are the causes of the growing Islamic movements in the Middle East? Is there a relationship between them and democracy in the Arab world or the Israeli occupation or American policy towards the region? Do you think that a real democracy in the Arab world will bring to power secular governments or Islamic governments? Governments that are loyal to the United States or opposed to it?*
- 3. How do you look at the American project of democratization in the Arab world? What credibility it has and how do you see the interaction of the Arab street with it?*

Inter-Arab relationship

- 4. Inter-Arab relationships are plagued by many disputes, especially between neighbouring countries. In many cases, the relationship between Arab countries and foreign ones is stronger than their relation with neighbouring Arab countries. What are the reasons for this? Is it related to the colonial period, or 'the divide and rule' policy or the theory of 'conspiracy'? What is the impact of this reality on of strained relations, armaments, and development in the region?*

Occupation

- 5. The Israeli occupation of the Arab territories was the cause of many wars in the region. What is the impact of the Israeli occupation on armaments and development in the region?*
- 6. Iraq has become after the US war an arena of violence and a gathering of numerous terrorist and fundamentalist groups. What is the impact of the US occupation of Iraq on the ongoing violence, and the future prospects of development?*

Oil

- 7. There are those who say that oil is not only the reason for the emergence of some crises in the Middle East in the past decades, but also the cause of the failure to reach a quick and lasting settlement to these crises. Do you think that the Iraqi-Iranian war would have lasted for eight years hadn't some countries and oil and arms companies benefited from that?*
- 8. The military spending of Gulf countries increases dramatically with the increase of oil prices and oil revenue. It is argued that this is due to the policy of arms-manufacturing countries in recycling petrodollar in the form of arms deals and the rich Gulf countries sign these contracts not because they need these deals but to*

please arms-manufacturing countries. Those who defend this argument believe that there is no relationship between arms purchases that Gulf countries made and self-defence as none of the arms purchased have been used in wars that took place in the area. In your opinion, what are the reasons behind the dramatic increase of arms-sales to Gulf countries? Have these arms purchases decreased the number of conflicts in the region or created appropriate environment for development in the area? Or have they further burdened the economies of these countries?

Iraq

9. Despite the destructive results of its war against Iran and its defeat in the war to liberate Kuwait, as well as many years of sanctions imposed on it, the Iraqi regime stayed in power. What do you think are the real reasons behind this? Does it relate to the power of the regime, or to the interests of some great powers to keep it in place?

10. Different justifications were given to the American war on Iraq. While the early titles of the war were 'Iraq's weapons of mass destruction', and 'the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda', the late title was 'toppling the authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein which the US and its allies considered a real threat to Iraq, the region and to international peace and security. This war had diverse consequences on the internal policy of the United States and has become a main slogan for the opponents of the American presidential candidates. It was also the reason behind the ousting of Tony Blair from his office. In your opinion, did the US resort to peaceful diplomacy in dealing with the Iraqi crisis? Which is more secure for Iraq, the region and international peace and security: Iraq under Saddam Hussein or Iraq after Saddam? Accordingly, what do you think the real motives that stand behind this war and who has most benefited from it: the Iraqi people, the neighbouring countries to Iraq, the superpowers, oil and arms-manufacturing countries, or reconstruction companies?

Armament, Conflicts and foreign Interests

11. The Middle East has witnessed a number of armed conflicts such as: Arab-Israeli wars, first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war), the second Gulf War (Kuwait liberation war), war on Iraq and others. Do you think that there were enough diplomatic efforts to reach peaceful settlements for these conflicts? What is the impact of these conflicts on democracy, armament, and development in the area? Who benefited most from these conflicts? Are they the repressive regimes, US, Israel, oil companies, arm-sales companies, or reconstruction companies?

12. Conventional arm sales stand as the biggest reason behind the bleeding of the Middle East economic resources. In your opinion, what are the reasons that prevent reaching an agreement on conventional arms control similar to those of mass destruction weapons? Who, in your opinion, benefited from the absence of such agreements, is it the arm exporting countries, arm-sales companies or other parties?

Figure 6.2 thematizes each group of questions.

Figure 6.3: Questions of Interview Type 1 sorted by the main themes



The second set of interviews, which were conducted with two UN former diplomats, were designed differently. They mainly aimed at obtaining information concerning the lack of conventional arm treaties: have conventional weapons been taken seriously in the UN? Who is responsible for the lack of a binding treaty which prohibits military transfer to certain areas? What were the justifications for objecting to such an international treaty? To that end, another set of four questions were prepared, and two interviews were conducted with two former senior diplomats who had long experience in the United Nations (see 1.6). The questions structured for the interviewees were as follows:

Questions for Interview Type 2

1. With the exception of the two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all the wars that took place in the modern era occurred using conventional weapons. They had a disastrous impact on human life and their direct and indirect results left millions of victims and destroyed the infrastructure, cultural and social structures of

the warring countries wasted billions of dollars in the purchase of weapons or in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of what the war damaged. This highlights the importance of reaching an agreement on conventional weapons. Through your experience at the United Nations, what is in your opinion the reasons for the failure to reach an agreement that prohibits the use of traditional arms as it was the case with WMD (Weapons of mass destruction)?

2. The International Organization passed several resolutions calling for transparency in armaments and approved the bodies that document the size of military spending, armaments, and arms sales for each state. It also issued more than one statement on the relationship between armament and development and called for a reduction of military budget of all states and the exchange of information on military spending and arms deals that would help to reduce international tension incidence of crises. Do you think that the issue of conventional weapons has received sufficient attention at the international organization? Were the decisions and statements released by the United Nations and its organs and different agencies sufficient to control the production, use, trafficking, and spending on conventional weapons? What, in your view are the reason for the continuous arrival of weapons to many developing countries and crisis areas in the world?

3. Has the fact that the Security Council permanent members are the top exporters of conventional weapon impeded efforts to reach an agreement on conventional weapons?

6.3.6 Analysis of the Interviews

The interviews varied in duration but not in channel. They were all conducted by audio recording. They were transcribed in full with the permission of the markers (see Appendix 2). The interviewees' names were changed to maintain anonymity and the transcript of every tape was approved by each interviewee before being used in this project.

All the interviews were analysed qualitatively in Chapter 8.

6.3.7 Field Problems

Obviously, conducting interviews is not an easy task because it requires the efforts of both the interviewer and the interviewees. The rewards for the interviewer are obvious because he/she is collecting data to complete their research, but in most cases there are no rewards for the interviewees. Therefore, it is not always easy to convince the interviewee to repeat something because it does not serve the purpose of the research. It is equally difficult for the interviewer to be in control of the situation and at the same time to make his/her

interviewees feel that they are in charge of what they say. I faced these difficulties when conducting the interviews. The nature of the topic, the personality of the participants in the interviews, and their positions, made my task hard to accomplish.

Because the participants were diplomats, it was not easy to find time to conduct the interviews. It was equally difficult to ask any of them to repeat an answer if it was not clear, or to stop them when they were speaking about something that was not quite relevant to my research.

In the process of the interviews, it was also clear that a number of the interviewees were tense and influenced by the political situation in the Middle East at that time. For example, it was hard to ignore the American military actions against the Iraqi people, the Lebanese conflict and the presidential crisis in 2008–2009, the shattering Israeli siege of the Gaza strip, and Bush's visit to Israel to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of their state, ignoring the Palestinian division. Finally, it was also the time of the eruption of what is called the spring of Arabic revolutions, that affected all the Arab countries. All these incidents, no doubt, throw their shadows on the ideas and the opinions of the interviewees. It might be the case that Arab countries did not have a unified stand against what was happening in the area, hence the diplomats were cautious about giving forthright answers to most of the questions. It might also be the case that some diplomats and politicians did not wish to make personal statements which might jeopardize their careers, even if they were going to be used only for research purposes. Whatever the case, I had to wait for things to cool down, as happened in Lebanon in May 2008, and then to resume the interviews.

However, at the beginning of this research, I had thought that the interviewees would be willing to help me conduct the interviews, but by days my hypothesis turned out to be wrong. Many politicians and diplomats apologized politely after keeping me waiting for a long time, others asked me not to use the interviews at all after conducting them, so, painfully, I had to destroy the recordings, and one interviewee allowed me to use the data, but not to reveal his ID. These field problems affected my study progress enormously and, in my opinion, reflected the fear of the interviewees of making any political stand that might not be in accord with the general policy of their countries. It may also be related to the lack of democracy in the Arab world in general, which makes issuing any political

statements, even for academic purposes, a kind of delinquency. Accordingly, when I managed to conduct six interviews, I felt relieved to continue my research.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the research methods used to explore the aims of this study. It provided information about the process of data collection and data analysis. This study employed different methods, namely questionnaires and structured interviews to explore the impact of armament on conflict and development in the Middle East in general and in Iraq in particular. It also aimed at exploring the reasons behind the lack of international treaties that control conventional arms sales. The rationale behind using both a questionnaire and interviews to explore the aims of the research and address the research questions was to provide checks and balances for each other so that the results would be more valid and reliable.

In the next two chapters, I present the results of the analysis of the questionnaire followed by that of the interviews.

Chapter 7

Analysis of the Questionnaire

7.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the questionnaire analysis, which in turn is designed to shed light on the reciprocal relationship between armament, conflict, and development in the Middle East. The analysis of the questionnaire focuses on what might have contributed to armament and conflict in the Middle East in general, and Iraq in particular. The focus is on Iraq because it is a good example of the relationship between armament, conflict, and development. For many years it has recorded high levels of armament that have not only burdened its economy, but also made it easy to justify many wars that had a devastating impact on it and the whole region.

The questionnaire also focuses on the US as the most dominant power and the top arms seller. It examines some of the Middle-Eastern Arab anticipation and reaction to the US's foreign policy in the region, and the impact of this policy on both conflict and development. To that end, the questionnaire sets questions about certain issues in the Middle East such as democracy, Arab–Arab relationships, Arab–US relationships, the rise of fundamentalism, colonial heritage, occupation, arms sales, military spending, conflict, development, and oil revenue.

As mentioned in Section 6.2.4, the questionnaire was distributed to people from the Middle East countries. These countries include Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen. As the main focus of my research is on Iraq, 110 copies were collected from Iraqi people, while 40 copies came from Egypt, 30 copies from smaller countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, and 20 copies from each of the other eight smaller countries. The total number of the collected responses is 400.

The collected responses cover people who live inside their mother Arab countries and abroad. I tried my best to distribute the questionnaire to people from different genders, ages, educational and cultural backgrounds for results to be more reliable and representative. However, while all the respondents to this questionnaire answered the

questions about their gender and educational level, and 94% mentioned their ethnicities, only 71.25% mentioned their religions and 50.77% mentioned their sects (see tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3). This indicates that some people do not like their opinion to be viewed in light of their religion or sect, or they are afraid to mention it for political consideration, or do consider it a private issue that should not be revealed.

Special terms used in the questionnaire like ‘divide and rule’, ‘colonial heritage’, ‘the American project of democratization’ and others were explained to respondents before they answered the questionnaire to avoid any misunderstanding or misinterpretation (for more details see 6.2.5).

Along with the interviews described in the next chapter, the aim of the questionnaire is to find answers to the following research questions:

RQ4. Does the level of democracy in the Middle East affect the level of armament or vice versa?

4.1 What is the impact of the level of democracy on regional cooperation, military spending and development?

4.2 Do arms exports to the region help promote democracy or fortify dictatorships?

RQ5. Do military expenditure and arms sales contribute to world development and international security?

5.1 Does military expenditure have the same impact on developed and developing countries?

5.2 Does high military expenditure in the Middle East contribute to the stability and development of the region?

5.3 Could high military expenditure in the Middle East help these countries defend themselves?

5.4 Did the arms sales to the Middle East prevent the outbreak of wars or contribute to that?

5.5 Who is paying for and benefiting from military expenditure and arms transfers?

RQ6. What is the relationship between the US’s policy towards the region and the growing of public hostility to the US and the rise of extremism?

In the following sections, I shall discuss the main ideas the questionnaire concentrated on, namely the ideas of democracy, occupation, oil and foreign interests, the US, Anti-Americanism, and fundamentalism. Finally, the ideas of armament, conflict, and development are also investigated.

7.1 Democracy

Middle East countries are widely characterized as undemocratic. Questions 5 and 6 of the questionnaire are designed to elicit some information about the extent to which those who participated believe that their countries or other Arab countries are democratic.

5- To what extent do you think your country is democratic?

(Less than 40%, between 40–60%, 60–80%, 80% and over)

Abstain

6- To what extent do Arab regimes represent their peoples?

(Less than 40%, between 40–60%, 60–80%, 80% and over)

Abstain

Responses to question 5 show that 38% of respondents believe that the level of democracy in their country is more than 80%, while 18% think it is between 60 and 80%, 10% believe it is between 40-60% and 7% believe it is less than 40%, and 27% abstained. Respondents living inside their countries gave much higher percentages about the level of democracy in their countries than those living abroad. This is due, in my opinion, to two main reasons: first, the majority of respondents from abroad are from high educational backgrounds, and thus more able to evaluate the level of democracy. For example, the data analysis shows that 20 out of the 26 postgraduates who live abroad find that the level of democracy in their countries is less than 40%. Secondly, respondents living inside their countries feel less free to express their opinions about the level of democracy in their countries, and this might be regarded as another indication of the level of democracy at the country in question.

Moreover, responses to question 6 about the level of democracy in the Arab world show that only 13% believe that the level of democracy in the Arab world is more than 80%, whereas 29% believe it is between 60 and 80%, 17% believe it is between 40-60%, 30% believe it is less than 40%, and 11% abstained. We can notice that while 43% of

respondents to question 5 believe that the level of democracy in their own country is 80% or more, only 13% of respondents believe that it is 80% and more in the Arab world in general. This is also another indication of the poor level of democracy in the Arab world, because it shows that respondents felt more free to give lower percentages about the level of democracy in the Arab world than they did about their own countries. However, the postgraduates and graduates respondents have been more critical when answering about the level of democracy in their countries than the respondents who have no university qualification. The results have shown similarity in opinions between groups from different sections, religions and ethnicity; however some respondents such as Kurds in Syria and Iraq, and Shi'a in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia viewed democracy from a different perspective (see 7.1.1, 7.1.2, & 7.1.3). Moreover, the results have not shown a notable difference in percentage according to gender

The previous figures show that the Middle-Eastern countries suffer from a low level of democracy. However, if, as we have seen in the literature review in (see 4.5.2.2.5), lack of democracy has a direct impact on armament, conflict, and development, then what is the impact of poor democracy in the Middle East on conflict, armament, regional cooperation, and development? To illustrate the impact of poor democracy in the Arab world on these issues, certain questions were included in the questionnaire.

7.1.1 Democracy and Conflict

A global survey of armed conflicts and democracy indicates that wars and political conflicts are more frequent in undemocratic regimes (Gurr *et al.* 2001, p.20). Lack of democracy increases the possibility of internal and external conflict, because in undemocratic regimes the leader feels free to take the decision of launching an unjustified war at any time, ignoring the constitutional institutions of the country, or without fully considering the consequences of that war on his country. Questions 16 and 19 are designed to examine if Saddam Hussein received enough public support to launch his war against Iran and his invasion of Kuwait.

16- Did you support Iraq's war against Iran?

Yes No Abstain

19- Did you support Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait?

Yes No Abstain

Data collected from question 16 show that about 71% of the Iraqi respondents did not support Iraq's war against Iran, whereas only 16% of them supported it, and 13% abstained. Responses to question 19 also show that 86% of the Iraqi respondents did not support Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, whereas 7% of them supported it, and 7% abstained. However, responses to question 16 showed a higher percentage of support and abstentions to Iraq's war against Iran than to that of question 19 about Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Moreover, the data collected from the responses to question 16 show that 98% of the respondents who belong to Iraqi Shi'a did not support Iraq's war against Iran, whereas the percentage was much less from the Sunni Iraqis. In my opinion, this is due to the fact that the responses of both the Sunni and Shi'a Iraqis were based on a sectarian basis. Furthermore, the data show that the percentage of the postgraduates and graduates who did not support both wars is higher than that of those without university qualification. It is noted in the results that almost all female who answered these two questions did not support the two wars and this reflects the severe impact of these war on woman in Iraq

In the data presented above, it is quite obvious that the majority of Iraqi people did not support Saddam Hussein's war against Iran nor his invasion of Kuwait. It was entirely Saddam Hussein's decision to go to both wars without the necessary consultation from the concerned institutions and the approval of the parliament or the constitutional authorities.

I can conclude that conflicts are more possible between dictatorial regimes because the decision for war is taken by the leaders and does not take into consideration the public opinion in the country or the country's financial or economic situation.

7.1.2 Democracy, Armament, and Self-Defence

In a democracy, the military is accountable to the parliament and other democratic institutions to approve defence policies, establish and spend the defence budget, and review military performance and expenditure. A democratic country also reviews and balances a society's human security and social development needs with its military security requirements. Moreover, democratic institutions make a strong contribution by interrogating arms transfers or procurement arguments if these are based on ambiguous threat assessments, power ambitions, commercial motivations or opportunities for corruption. Questions 33, 34, and 35 are designed to examine if the respondents support

the military expenditure of their countries and the relationship between military expenditure and self-defence.

33- Do you support your country's military spending?

Yes No Abstain

34- Gulf states have spent billions of dollars on arms in the last five decades. Have these arms purchases helped these countries defend themselves?

Yes No Abstain

35- Most Gulf countries buy arms to

Defend themselves against external threats
 Please arms-manufacturing countries Abstain

Responses to question 33 showed that 68% of respondents didn't support their country's military spending, whereas only 26% did, and 6% abstained. Data collected from question 34 showed that 77% of respondents believed that the billions of dollars that Gulf countries spent on arms in the last five decades had not helped those countries defend themselves, whereas 12% believed they had, and 11% abstained. Moreover, data collected from question 35 showed that 51% of respondents believed that most Gulf countries bought arms to please arms-manufacturing countries, whereas 17% believed that they bought arms to defend themselves against external threats, and 32% abstained. The majority of the respondents who believed that Gulf countries spent on arms to defend their countries or those who abstained from answering this question were either from Gulf countries or had a poor educational background, and were perhaps not able to understand properly what the question meant. Moreover, it is noted that 94% of Iraqi female respondents to question 33 did not support their countries' military spending. This reflects, in my opinion, the social consequences of conflict in Iraq and the impact of that on women. This goes in line with the discussion mentioned in section 4.5.2.2.

I can say that accountability in undemocratic countries is rather weak and this allows the diversion of resources from social development to the security sector. Low levels of public accountability and high levels of corruption in public sectors are frequently coupled with

relatively high levels of arms procurement and military expenditure. This diversion of resources impairs the mobility of economic factors and impedes socio-economic activity.

Moreover, in undemocratic countries leaders buy arms not necessarily to defend their lands or deter aggression, but to establish themselves as regional powers, oppress any opposition that might rise, or for other political or private calculations. The billions spent on arms purchases do not reflect the public's opinion about the importance and necessity of arms. The majority in Middle-Eastern countries shows much more concern about development than armaments, and believes that democracy can positively contribute to a Middle East that can prioritize the public's concerns. However, the US's policy in selling arms to oppressive regimes in the region hinders the majority concerns about development and democracy. These results confirm Amnesty International's 1998 report that the US has supplied arms, security equipment, and training to governments and armed groups that have committed torture, political killings, and other human rights abuses in countries around the world (Amnesty International 1998b).

I can conclude that in most Middle-Eastern countries the level of armament does not reflect the actual needs of those countries. Due to the dictatorial nature of the regime in almost all these countries, leaders do not feel that the decision to buy arms should be approved by any authority in the country. Moreover, the answers to the previous questions show that the majority of respondents do not support their country's military spending, yet these countries continue to spend billions of US dollars on arms that, most likely, would not be used in future wars, as history tells. Gulf countries spent billions of US dollars on arms, yet they needed the assistance and protection of the US and the West when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. These purchases are intended to please arms-producing countries rather than to defend their own countries. In return, arms-producing countries offer Gulf countries protection and political support.

7.1.3 Democracy, Regional Cooperation, and Development

Regional cooperation creates the appropriate atmosphere for peace and development. However, regional cooperation is not possible among undemocratic regimes, as they are subject to the leaders rather than to the interests of the people. Questions 12 and 13 are set to examine the level of cooperation among Middle East countries.

12- Which of the following does Saudi Arabia have the strongest relationship with?

<input type="checkbox"/> Jordan	<input type="checkbox"/> Iran	<input type="checkbox"/> Iraq	
<input type="checkbox"/> Yemen	<input type="checkbox"/> UK	<input type="checkbox"/> USA	<input type="checkbox"/> Abstain

13- Which of the following does Kuwait have the strongest relationship with?

<input type="checkbox"/> Iran	<input type="checkbox"/> Iraq	<input type="checkbox"/> Qatar	
<input type="checkbox"/> Syria	<input type="checkbox"/> UK	<input type="checkbox"/> USA	<input type="checkbox"/> Abstain

Replying to question 12, 63% of respondents ranked the relationships between Saudi Arabia and the US, and Saudi Arabia and the UK as stronger than the relationship between Saudi Arabia and any of its neighbouring countries: Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, and Iran. Moreover, in question 13, 56% of the respondents ranked the relationship between Kuwait and the US, and Kuwait and the UK as stronger than Kuwait's relationship with its neighbouring countries Iraq, Qatar, Iran, and Syria. However, the relationship of both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with Iran ranked last, and I think that this is because of religious reasons, such as the clashes between Sunni and Shi'a.

It can be seen that the majority of respondents agreed that regional relationships in the Middle East are at a low level. Most of the countries of the Middle East are isolated from one another, and for a long time each has been absorbed in its own dialogue with the West, and has minimal relations with other countries, mainly neighbouring ones. This is due, largely, to the absence of democracy in most Middle-Eastern countries. This atmosphere makes regional cooperation subject to the interests of leaders of these countries rather than to the interests of their countries and peoples. The gas agreement between Egypt and Israel is a good example of a leader's decision that does not prioritize the interests of his people. The agreement does not take into consideration the interests of Egypt in terms of gas price and Egypt's local energy needs. The revolution in Egypt showed that the agreement was widely criticized for three reasons. Firstly, because it allowed Israel to buy arms at lower than international market prices. Secondly, it did not take into account the Egyptian needs and strategic interests. Thirdly, the agreement was against the majority who opposed selling gas to Israel, which continues to occupy Arab lands (Aljazeera 2010).

I can say that the ousted undemocratic regime in Egypt increased the level of corruption in the country and this resulted in the unbalanced gas agreement between Egypt and Israel that made Egypt lose billions of dollars. Moreover, the stop of the flow of Egyptian gas to Israel after the revolution has caused great losses in Israel. However, this would not have happened had there been a democratic government in Egypt, or hostility to Israel due to its occupation to Arab lands. This shows clearly how occupation and undemocratic regimes hinder efficient regional cooperation and deter development.

7.2 Colonial Heritage and Occupation

The current situation in the Middle East is the outcome of the policies of the colonial era. Questions 29 and 32 are set to examine how the respondents to this questionnaire regard the role of the colonial era in the outstanding conflicts in the region.

29- To what extent do you think that the colonial heritage in the Middle East contributes to the outstanding conflicts?

(Less than 40 %, between 40–60%, 60–80%, 80% and over)

Abstain

32- Do you think that the ‘divide and rule’ policy is working in the Arab Middle East?

Yes

No

Abstain

Responses to question 29 revealed that 43% of the respondents thought that the colonial period had contributed with the average of more than 80% to the outstanding conflicts in the region. 33% thought it contributed with an average of 60 to 80%, 12% thought it contributed with an average of 40 to 60%, 4% thought it contributed to less than 40% to the current conflict, and 8% abstained. Moreover, responses to the question 32 showed that 67% of respondents believed that the colonial policy of ‘divide and rule’ continued to work in the Middle East. 21% believed it did not, and 12% abstained. It was noted from the responses to these two questions that a higher percentage of the respondents aged 50 and over believed that the colonial heritage in the Middle East contributed to a great deal in the outstanding conflicts and the ‘divide and rule’ policy in the Middle East. This can be related to the fact that elderly people were aware of the Arab states before the plantation of Israel and the Western-American attempts to create border’s dispute between Arab-Arab countries (see 3.1.4.1 and 7.2.2).

the majority believes, continues to push the region to the edge of explosion at any time, not only with the Arab countries in direct confrontation with Israel, but possibly with other Arab or even Islamic countries because of the religious reputation and importance of Jerusalem. The results shown above explain the high figures in the military expenditure of Israel and its neighbouring countries (see 2.4.6, and 3.1.1).

The heavy costs of the Israeli occupation highlight the importance of terminating it by reaching a just and comprehensive settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict based on international law in the related Security Council resolutions. However, the US, as the only superpower, and other powers allied to the US do not contribute to this end. Israel continues its occupation and expansion through building new settlements on occupied land with the support of these countries. This support can be seen in the US’s failure to recognize the Palestinian state in the UN and its threat to veto any resolution to recognize it in the Security Council. Negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, which have been running for more than twenty years, have failed due to Israel’s lack of seriousness to end its occupation, on the one hand, and the lack of commitment of the US and other powers to put enough pressure on Israel to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinian and other opponent parties.

The respondents believe that Arab countries have paid a heavy price because of the West’s ‘guilt complex’ after the Holocaust that made them create Israel in Palestine as a homeland the thing that fuelled the Middle East Area. After that Arab in the Middle East had to pay a high price because of the American unconditional support to Israel (see 7.4 & 3.2.1.2) especially the neo-conservatives who ‘supported Israel’s policy of colonization in the occupied territories. But this obstructed a peace settlement and endangered the Arab relations on which oil access depended (particularly with Saudi Arabia); their nightmare was that the US would subordinate Israel’s expansionist ambitions to appeasement of the Arab oil producers, especially Saudi Arabia (as Bush Sr. had done)’ (Hinnebusch, 2007, p. 15, see 3.1.1). Therefore it can be said that all the disputes and the continuous attempts to aggravate clashes in the region and consolidate the Israeli position in occupying and violating human rights are predetermined by the US power to maintain the oil resources in the area.

7.2.2 Border Disputes

Border disputes are also regarded as outcomes of the colonial era. The former colonial powers Britain and France partitioned much of the Middle East and invented and promoted new Arab rulers and monarchs presiding over newly created states within artificial boundaries according to their strategic objectives. Many in the region still perceive Arthur Balfour and the British as the architects of conflicts which continue to the present day. Question 31 is designed to examine the role of border disputes in the wars that have erupted in the Middle East (see the accompanying video).

31- Did the existing borders between Middle-Eastern countries contribute to conflict between them?

Yes

No

Abstain

Responses to question 31 showed that 66% of respondents find that the existing borders between Middle-Eastern countries contribute to conflict between them, while 15% of respondents believe they do not, and 19% abstained. This indicates that Arabs still do not believe in the existing borders as they are the results of colonial heritage and occupation (see 7.2). Most of the respondents believe that there are no geographical borders to separate between the Arab countries besides Arabs have mutual aspects such as Islamic religion, Arabic language, mutual history, similar ambitions and aspirations. Therefore the presence of borders contributes a great deal to disputes that drain the financial resources of the Middle East.

As mentioned above (7.2), after Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declaration, borders were created between the countries in the Arab world. They were only lines in the sand that have plagued the region with fundamental conflicts as mentioned by Sadowski (1993, p. 5). But after that, border disputes started everywhere such as between Egypt and Libya, Morocco and Mauritania, Jordan and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Syria, Syria and Lebanon, Iraq and Kuwait, Iran and Iraq, Iran and UAE, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Bahrain and Qatar. The existing disputes over borders between most of the states in the Middle East have absorbed a massive amount of the Arab attention and resources, because they have pushed these countries to look for arms to defend themselves (see 3.1.4.1).

7.2.3 Religious and Sectarian Hostility

Religious and sectarian hostility is regarded as one of the most important factors that endanger social co-existence and heighten the threat of conflict in many Middle-Eastern countries. This tension can be seen within many Arab countries which have people of different religions or sects, such as Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, and Syria. It can also be seen between countries that follow different religious sects, such as between Sunni and Shiite countries in many Moslem regions of the Middle East. Questions 14 and 15 are set to examine the religious dimension of the external threat for the respondents.

14- Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to the Arab countries?

<input type="checkbox"/> Iran	<input type="checkbox"/> Israel	<input type="checkbox"/> Turkey	
<input type="checkbox"/> UK	<input type="checkbox"/> USA		<input type="checkbox"/> Abstain

15- Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to your country?

<input type="checkbox"/> Iran	<input type="checkbox"/> Israel	<input type="checkbox"/> Turkey	
<input type="checkbox"/> UK	<input type="checkbox"/> USA		<input type="checkbox"/> Abstain

Responses to question 14 show that 37% of respondents believe that the US poses the biggest threat to the Arab countries, and 32% report that Israel poses the biggest threat. Responses to question 15 show that 20 out of 30 Saudi respondents, and 8 out of 20 of the Kuwaiti, 10 out 20 in Jordanian, 8 out of 20 in Omani, 8 out of 20 of UAE, 6 out 20 in Qatari, 10 out of 20 Lebanese, and 28 out 110 of Iraqi believe that Iran poses more threat to their country than the US.

We can notice that answers to question 15 show different results from those to question 14. Responses to question 15 were to a large extent based on religious, educational, and political factors. While the majority of the respondents to question 14 agreed that the US and Israel pose the biggest threat to the Arab countries, the majority of the respondents to question 15 in some countries (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait) considered Iran the biggest threat. Those who mentioned that Iran is the biggest threat based their answers on religious grounds and their answers represented, to a large extent, the proportion of their

sect in those countries. The results show that more than 90% of the Sunni in these countries believe that Iran is the biggest threat, whereas more than 90% of Shiite respondents believe that the US poses the highest threat to their country (see 3.1.4.2).

Respondents with poor educational backgrounds showed a higher percentage in responding to the question than educated respondents. The results also show that political factors are more apparent than religious or educational ones, with the majority of the respondents from countries that are not on good terms with the US, such as Syria and the occupied territories in Palestine, believing that the US and Israel pose the real threat to the Middle East.

Moreover, question 28 is set to examine whether external powers play a role in triggering sectarian conflict.

28- Did the trial and the execution of Saddam aim to ?

Achieve justice Fuel sects' conflict Disgrace Arab feelings [Abstain](#)

Responses to question 28 show that 43% of the respondents believe that the trial and the execution of Saddam Hussein aimed to fuel a sectarian conflict, and 32% believe that it aimed to disgrace Arab feelings. Only 16% of the respondents believe that the aim was to achieve justice, and 9% abstained. Unlike answers to question 15 where respondents based their answers on religious and sectarian grounds, the answers to these questions were based on belief and personal opinion. This can be justified by studying the religion, sect, ethnicity, and gender of the respondents. Most of the respondents from different countries, gender and sects believed that Saddam's trial and execution did not achieve justice, the opposite they ridiculed Arab and Islamic feelings. In fact, the American claims to launch the war against Saddam were proved false (see 3.1.4.2). Mark Dunlea, chair of the Green Party of New York State, finds that oil is a major reason behind President Bush's plans to launch an invasion on Iraq. The White House has regularly denied this fact, but the evidence is clear: this war came about because the 'Bush Administration and American oil companies are trying to win control over the world's second largest source of oil' (Green Party of the US 2003).

In fact, the presence of some Shi'a leaders around Saddam Hussien at the moment of his execution and calling him bad names (for more details see 3.1.4.2), then carrying

Saddam's dead body to AlMalki's office to celebrate, and in the evening Al-Malki's the Iraqi prime minister, who belongs to Shi'a sect, celebrated the marriage ceremony of his son. This proves without any shred of doubt that the American claims in liberating Iraq and bringing into power a democratic government can be easily twisted. Democracy and tolerance in a country stem from practices within that country and cannot be imposed or imported from outside.

7.3 Oil and Foreign Interests

The Middle East is very rich in oil, which is increasingly becoming an expensive commodity. However, how much have Middle-Eastern countries benefited from oil revenue? Question 41 is set to examine whether the respondents to this questionnaire believe that Middle-Eastern countries have properly benefited from oil.

41- To what extent do you think the Arab countries have benefited from oil revenue?

(Less than 40%, between 40–60%, 60–80%, 80% and over)

Abstain

Data collected from question 41 show that 41% of respondents believe that the Arab countries have benefited between 40 and 60% of oil revenue, and 32% think that they have benefited less than 40% from oil revenue. In comparison, only 16% believe that they have benefited with the average between 60 and 80%, only 7% believe that they have benefited from more 80%, and 4% abstain. It is noticeable that the majority in the Middle East believe that countries in the region have not benefited properly from oil revenue, which has been wasted in wars and military expenditure, and lately, in the financial crisis and the stock market, whereas it could have been used in other ways that could have contributed to a more developed and stable Middle East. Also, the low percentage of respondents who believe that Arab benefited from Oil revenue in a good way raise the question about the ways oil revenues are being spent (see 3.1.2).

Oil has been the main reason for the many problems and wars that exist in the region. The Iraqi–Iranian war would not have taken place if those countries had not had enough money to pay for its financial costs. The USA and the international community would also not have been interested in toppling the regime in Iraq if the country was not so rich with oil. Moreover, the US and the West would not support dictatorial regimes in the region if they

did not have strategic interests due to the importance of oil. As shown in section 2.2.4, the biggest arms spender countries in the Middle East are oil-rich countries and, as shown also in section 2.3 the military expenditure of oil-rich countries has continuously been linked to oil prices.

Arab oil has almost been a curse on the Arab peoples, not only because it contributes to the financing of wars and to making them more violent, but also because it is a reason behind the interference of foreign powers in the region and their support of dictatorial regimes and violators of human rights. Furthermore, oil revenue has almost been a drain because it was spent by the Gulf states on arms that they have not used. The recently agreed Russian arms deal to Bahrain in September 2011 shows that arms sale is a foreign policy rather than a necessity. Bahrain declared that this deal will promote the relationship between the two countries, whereas I believe that it is a kind of bribery to Russia in return for its support in the Security Council. Similar arms deals to repressive regimes can also be seen in the US's \$67 billion contract with Saudi Arabia, Russia's \$3.8 billion contract with Gaddafi, and other arms contracts with other oil-rich countries.

The continued supply of weapons to repressive regimes is nothing new, but it highlights the need for a globally binding arms trade treaty that restricts arms transfers to areas of conflict and human rights abusers.

7.4 The US, Anti-Americanism, and Fundamentalism

The Middle East is regarded as an area of interest for the US and other Western countries for being an oil-rich region. With its rise as a superpower in the Cold War era, and later as the only superpower in the post-Cold War era, the USA has become the most influential power in the region. Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 are set to examine Arabs' attitudes towards the US.

1- Which is your favourite movie?

<input type="checkbox"/> Syrian movie	<input type="checkbox"/> Egyptian movie	<input type="checkbox"/> British movie	
<input type="checkbox"/> French Movie	<input type="checkbox"/> American Movie	<input type="checkbox"/>	Abstain

2- Do you prefer American products to Arabic ones?

Yes

No

Abstain

3- Do you like fast food (e.g. McDonalds, Pizza Hut, KFC and Burger King)?

Yes

No

Abstain

4- Do you think the USA is a nice place to live in?

Yes

No

Abstain

Responses from questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 indicate that 76.5% of the respondents prefer American movies to French, British or Arab ones, 59% prefer American products to Arabic ones, 61% like American fast food, while 74% think that the US is a nice place to live.

In their answers to these questions we can notice that the majority in the Arab world regards the US a nice place to live and likes its movies, food, and products. However, how do people in the Gulf countries regard the relationship between their countries and the US? Question 39 is set to examine whether this relation is based on equal interests.

39- The USA has good relations with most of the Gulf countries, because...

These states are rich with oil.

There are mutual interests for both

Abstain

Responses to question 39 reveal that 58% of respondents believe that the US has good relations with most of the Gulf countries because these countries are rich in oil, 28% believe that it is because of the mutual interests between the two sides, and 14% abstained. However, 104 out of the 112 who believed that mutual interests stand behind the good relations between the two sides were from Gulf countries.

The answers to the previous question clearly show that a large percentage of the respondents believe that the relationships between the US and most Gulf countries are not based on equal interests. The US's orientation towards the Middle East, in my opinion, depends mainly on its interest in oil and finding solutions for their problems after 9/11.

Inquiring about the reaction of people in the region to this unbalanced relationship and the US policy of supporting Israel and undemocratic regimes, questions 7, 8, 9, and 43 are set to examine how people in Middle-Eastern countries regard the US policy towards that region and if they believe in its project of democratization.

7- Do you support the American project of democratization in the Arab world?

Yes No Abstain

8- A real process of democratization in the Arab world bring to power:

Anti-American government Pro-American government Abstain

9- A real process of democratization in the Arab world brings to power:

Secular regimes Islamic regimes Abstain

43- Which is the appropriate description for each of the following?

(Arrogant, democratic, terrorist, evil, revolutionary)

USA	<input type="checkbox"/> democratic	<input type="checkbox"/> terrorist	<input type="checkbox"/> evil	<input type="checkbox"/> arrogant	
Hezbollah	<input type="checkbox"/> sectarian	<input type="checkbox"/> terrorist	<input type="checkbox"/> evil	<input type="checkbox"/> revolutionary	
Hamas	<input type="checkbox"/> democratic	<input type="checkbox"/> terrorist	<input type="checkbox"/> evil	<input type="checkbox"/> revolutionary	
Al-Qaeda	<input type="checkbox"/> fundamental	<input type="checkbox"/> terrorist	<input type="checkbox"/> evil	<input type="checkbox"/> revolutionary	<input type="checkbox"/> Abstain

Responses to question 8 show that there is strong anti-Americanism in the countries mentioned in the study. The majority (78%) of the respondents believe that any real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power anti-American governments in the countries of study, whereas 9% believe that this process would bring pro-American ones, and 13% abstained. Moreover, responses to question 9 showed that 63% of the respondents believe that a real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring in Islamic regimes, whereas 23% believe that it would bring secular regimes, and 14% abstained. However, the responses to questions 8 and 9 have varied slightly according to the countries of the respondents. The majority of the respondents to question 8 who believed that a real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power pro-American governments were from Gulf countries. Moreover, the lowest percentage of the respondents to question 9 who believed that a real process of

democratization in the Arab world would bring Islamic regimes was from Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.

We can notice that the majority expect that regime change will bring to power Islamic regimes. I find that these results are reasonable due to the long absence of real opposition parties that could take over in the case of any regime change. Middle-Eastern authoritarian regimes have brutally oppressed any real opposition, and the only available forums that these authoritarian regimes could not completely control were the mosques. We have seen that the demonstrations that took place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria in 2011 have mostly been on Fridays following the prayer. This is supposed to reveal the Islamists as the most organized power in the coming elections. Al-Nahda, the Islamist party, which was forbidden during the Bin Ali rule, has now got 41% of Tunisia's Constituent Assembly and I expect similar results in the other boiling countries in the Middle East. The US, Israel, and the West are thought to be interfering to tailor these revolutions to match their interests in the region, exactly as they did before when they supported the regimes of Mubarak in Egypt, Bin Ali in Tunis, and Gaddafi in Libya. However, the Arab revolutions will anyway create a democratic atmosphere that would bring secular parties to the fore in later stages.

Furthermore, data collected from question 43 show that 41% of respondents describe the US as an arrogant country, 33% label it an evil country, and 11% consider it a terrorist country, whereas 9% regard it as a democracy and 6% abstain. As a result, and as responses from question 7 reveal, we find that 87% of respondents reject the American project of democratization in the Middle East, whereas 3% trust it and 10% abstained. They criticize the United States for not recognizing the democratically elected Hamas Movement and Hezbollah, which are described by more than 76% of respondents as democratic and revolutionary.

Question 42 is set to examine to what extent fundamentalism and anti-Americanism would make respondents support al-Qaeda.

42- Which would you support: the USA or Al-Qaeda?

USA

Al-Qaeda

None

[Abstain](#)

Responses to this question show that 64% would support neither the US nor al-Qaeda, whereas 7% would support the US and 2% would support al-Qaeda, and 27% abstained.

This widespread anti-Americanism in the Arab world is partly due to the US's bias towards Israel. People in the Middle-Eastern countries believe that the US exploits every opportunity to support Israel, which occupies Arab territories. This is confirmed in what General David Petraeus, who heads the US Central Command in Iraq and Afghanistan, said in a written statement to the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 17 March 2010. General Petraeus warned that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is damaging the image of Washington in the eyes of Arabs that the situation ‘fosters anti-American sentiment due to a perception of US favoritism for Israel... Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of US partnerships with governments and peoples... Clearly the tensions, the issues and so forth have an enormous effect... They set the strategic context within which we operate’. Moreover, Petraeus finds that the worsening conflict ‘weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab world’. He adds that al-Qaeda and other groups sought to ‘exploit’ Arab anger over the issue and that the conflict ‘gives Iran influence in the Arab world’ through its ‘clients’ Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon (Petraeus 2010, pp. 175–76). Similarly, Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) think that the ‘US support for Israel is not the only source of anti-American terrorism, but it is an important one, and it makes winning the war on terror more difficult... Equally important, unconditional U.S. support for Israel makes it easier for extremists like bin Laden to rally popular support and to attract recruits. Public opinion polls confirm that Arab populations are deeply hostile to American support for Israel, and the U.S. State Department’s Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim world found that ‘citizens in these countries are genuinely distressed at the plight of the Palestinians and at the role they perceive the United States to be playing’ (p. 5).

Anti-Americanism is also the result of the American war on Iraq and the great losses that this war caused to Iraq and the Iraqi people, the US's support of repressive regimes and abusers of human rights, the growing anti-Islamism in the US and the West, and the US's foreign policy which has, to a large extent, recycled the petrodollar in arms and wars. All these factors have widely fed an anti-American attitude in most of the countries of the Middle East. Both Noam Chomsky and Paul Wolfowitz agree on the reality of the existence of the American Empire, but they disagree about the essence of this empire.

While Chomsky regards the American Empire as a monstrosity, Wolfowitz regards it as the saviour of humanity (Schlesinger 2005). However, the responses to the questions related to the role of the US in the Middle East and the impact of that on the region reflect what they disagree on.

Some of these dangers had been perceived decades earlier. Indeed, no less a figure than President Eisenhower, in his Farewell Address of 1961, warned about the danger of a 'military-industrial complex' dominating the formation of US foreign and security policy. If we add the oil interest and the pro-Israel lobby and the impact of both on the US foreign policy towards the Middle East, we can understand the reasons behind the growing anti-Americanism in the region.

The strong anti-Americanism phenomenon has created the atmosphere suitable for the spread of many Islamic fundamental movements across the Arab world. Questions 10 and 11 are set to examine whether there is a tendency to Islamic governments in Middle-Eastern countries or whether it is just a reaction to the political situation.

10- Which do you think would work better for the Arab world?

Arab unity Islamic rule Democratic regimes Abstain

11- Would you support an Islamic government in your country?

Yes No Abstain

Responses to question 10 show that 59% of the respondents think that democratic regimes would work better for the Arab world, whereas 27% believe that Islamic rule would work better, 12% think that Arab unity would work better, and 2% abstained. Moreover, responses to question 11 show that 43% would not support an Islamic government in their country, whereas 38% would support it and 19% abstained. The responses to question 10 showed that Christians and other Muslim minorities did not support Islamic rule in their answers to question 10 and did not support Islamic governments in answering question 11. This reflects the fear of minorities from Islamic rule, and the fact that Islamic rule might reduce their freedom or expose them to prejudice.

I can say that the majority in the Arab world believe that fundamentalism is the outcome of their authoritarian regimes. They believe that these regimes care only about their own

interests and the interest of the US more than they care for the interests of their peoples. In return, these regimes receive support from the US to stay in power. This in turn creates another kind of conflict in the Middle-East countries between fanatic Islamists and secular parties.

Drain of oil revenue is also regarded as another reason for the creation of an anti-American trend among these countries, which regard the US as the top beneficiary from the three Gulf Wars because it has been the top arms seller during the period, as data collected from questions 18, 20, and 41 show.

7.5 Armament, Conflict, and Development

The Middle East has seen many wars that have wasted a lot of its capabilities. The Arabs and Israelis have entered many wars but none could bring an end to any of the outstanding conflicts between the two opponents. The eight-year war between Iraq and Iran ended and the roots of the conflict are also still outstanding. Questions 17 and 18 are set to examine who the respondents think won the Iraqi–Iranian war and benefited from it.

17- Which country won the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?

Iraq Iran None Abstain

18- Which countries most benefited from the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?

China Russia Turkey Saudi Arabia
 Syria UK USA Abstain

Data collected from question 17 show that 22% of respondents believe that Iraq won, 10% believe Iran won, whereas 57% believe neither of them won, and 11% abstained. Moreover, responses to question 18 showed that 45% believe that the US was the biggest beneficiary of this war.

Question 20 is also set to examine who the respondents believe to have had benefited from the invasion of Kuwait and the American-led war to liberate Kuwait.

20- Which countries most benefited from the second Gulf War (Liberation of Kuwait)?

<input type="checkbox"/> China	<input type="checkbox"/> Russia	<input type="checkbox"/> Turkey	<input type="checkbox"/> Saudi Arabia
<input type="checkbox"/> Syria	<input type="checkbox"/> UK	<input type="checkbox"/> USA	<input type="checkbox"/> Abstain

Responses to question 20 also reveal that 51% of respondents believe that the US also benefited more from the second Gulf War (Liberation of Kuwait) than the other above-mentioned countries did.

These results reflect the figures mentioned in sections 2.4 and 2.5 that the countries involved in the two wars recorded very high figures in military expenditure and that the US was the top supplier to the region prior to and during the wars. Moreover, the second Gulf War justified the establishment of US military bases in the region.

The majority of respondents did not define a winner but rather a beneficiary. Moreover, all the wars that have taken place in the region have not brought an end to any of the conflicts there. These conflicts continue to drain the resources of Middle-Eastern countries with arms purchases that have benefited those who have interests in the region. The results shown in the answers to the above two questions confirm what has been mentioned in the literature review about the US's support to Saddam Hussein in his war with Iran in order to reach a no-winner-no loser end to this war, which made the US the top beneficiary, and again later in his invasion of Kuwait for the same reasons.

This raises a question about the relationship between the US and Saddam Hussein's regime. Question 21 is designed to examine if the US wanted Saddam Hussein to stay in power after his defeat in the war to liberate Kuwait.

21- The Iraqi regime stayed in power despite its defeat in the Gulf War and a decade of sanctions. Did the USA want that?

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Abstain
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Responses to question 21 reveal that the 71% of respondents believed that the Iraqi regime stayed in power despite its defeat in the Gulf War, and a decade of sanctions because that was what the US wanted (for more information see 3.2.1 and 3.2.1.1).

The US's decision to topple Saddam Hussein's regime was only taken after twelve years of confrontation between Iraq and the UN, during which very heavy sanctions were imposed on Iraq, resulting in the deaths of millions of Iraqi people. Question 22 is designed to examine if the respondents believe that the US followed peaceful diplomacy to end the twelve-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN.

22- Did the USA attempt to end the 12-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN through peaceful diplomacy?

Yes

No

Abstain

Responses to question 22 show that 81% of respondents to the question believe that the US did not attempt to end the twelve-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN through peaceful diplomacy, 10% believed it did, and 9% abstained. The war on Iraq was very costly and this raises the very important question of whether this war was necessary. Question 23 is designed to examine if Saddam Hussein really posed a mortal threat to the US and international society that necessitated taking the decision to launch this costly war.

23- Did Saddam Hussein's regime pose a 'mortal threat' to the USA?

Yes

No

Abstain

Responses to question 23 show that 77% of respondents don't believe that Saddam Hussein's regime posed a mortal threat to the US and the West. Even Iraqi people who have suffered a lot at the hands of Saddam Hussein don't believe that this war was justified. Furthermore, 60% of the Iraqi respondents to this question don't believe that Iraq poses any threat to the US and the West.

The responses to the previous question show clearly that the majority in Middle-Eastern countries believe that the American war on Iraq was unjustified and that there were other motives behind it. This confirms what Scott Ritter, who resigned from the UN weapons inspection team in 1998, explained in his speech to the Iraqi parliament in Baghdad on 8 September 2002. Ritter clarified that the US's war against Iraq was 'built upon fear and ignorance, as opposed to the reality of truth and fact'. He pointed out that Iraq had no part in the attacks of September 11th and it 'has not been shown to possess weapons of mass

destruction...The truth of the matter is that Iraq today is not a threat to its neighbours and is not acting in a manner which threatens anyone outside of its own borders' (BBC News 2002). Similarly, George Tenet, the then CIA director confirmed in his letter to Congress in 2002 that Saddam Hussein posed little threat to the US and warned before the war that the cost of attacking him would be very high (Borger 2002).

Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) think that there are no real threats to the US's interests in the Middle East, but rather there are other reasons that contributed to the conflicts that have taken place in the region. They find that 'the so-called rogue states in the Middle East... are not a dire threat to vital US interests, apart from the US commitment to Israel itself' (p. 5). Moreover, they think that the Israeli lobby contributed to the American war to liberate Kuwait and the American war on Iraq. They mention that Israel supported military action against Iraq following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and that it was 'the only country in the world where both the politicians and the public enthusiastically favored war' (p. 31). Moreover, the American war on Iraq in 2003 'was motivated in good part by a desire to make Israel more secure' (p. 30) because 'within the United States, the main driving force behind the Iraq war was a small band of neoconservatives, many with close ties to Israel's Likud Party' (p. 31) and that 'without the Lobby's efforts, the United States would have been far less likely to have gone to war' (p. 35).

Question 24 is designed to examine how the respondents to this questionnaire regard this war.

24- How do you regard the third Gulf War (War on Iraq)?

Liberation war War on terrorism War for oil Abstain

Responses to this question show that 72% of respondents believe that this war on Iraq was neither a war of liberation nor a war on terrorism, as it was advertised, but it was to gain access to Iraq's oil, whereas 21% believed it was to liberate Iraq from Saddam Hussein's regime and 4% thought it was war on terrorism, and 3% abstained (see 3.1.2 & 3.2.1).

Saddam Hussein has always recognized the US's interests in the region and the US has also long benefited from Saddam Hussein's costly wars, which have both increased arms sales to the region and decreased oil prices, because conflict in the region pushed many

countries to increase their oil production to cover their arms purchases. However, the US decided that it would benefit more from the oil of the region if it had military bases there, especially after the long years of sanctions on Iraq that had kept most of the Iraqi oil off the market. Moreover, the risk was increased by Saddam Hussein's use of Iraq's oil for political advantage, and specifically by his trying to make access to oil contingent on US policy in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

As a result of the responses to this question, I can say that the majority of the respondents do not believe that there is any link between the war on Iraq and the global war on terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, instead it was fuelled by the US's and the UK's interests in Iraq's oil. This is confirmed by the recent disclosure that the war on Iraq was agreed between the US and the UK six months before the Security Council resolution was issued. This explains that the decision to go to war was based on their own interests.

Questions 26 and 27 are designed to examine whether the American war on Iraq has made Iraq a safer place for the Iraqis and a more stable country in the region.

26- Which is more secure and stable?

Iraq under Saddam

Iraq after Saddam

Abstain

27- Which poses more threat to the Middle East countries?

Iraq under Saddam

Iraq after Saddam

Abstain

Responses to question 26 show that 72% of respondents believe that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was more secure and stable than Iraq after Saddam, whereas only 19% believe it is more stable and secure after Saddam and 9% abstained. Furthermore, responses to question 27 show that 58% of respondents believe that Iraq after Saddam posed a greater threat to Middle-Eastern countries than Iraq under Saddam. This confirms what Chomsky (2011) mentions about the way US brings up dictators and supports them to warrant its interest even if they belong to fanatic fundamentalists who fight US such as Saudi Arabia. At the same time the US tries to get rid of its dictator allies if they violate its expectations. It tries to create names to reschedule its presence in the area especially in oil rich countries. For example, under the name of democratization and stability it launched and supported wars in many Middle Eastern countries. For the US government stability “means conformity to our interests. So, for example, when Iran tries to expand its influence in Afghanistan and

Iraq, neighbouring countries, that's called 'destabilizing' ... It's part of the threat of Iran. It's destabilizing the region. On the other hand, when the US invades those countries, occupies them, half destroys them, that's to achieve stability" (p.11).

Based on these responses, it is apparent that the American war on Iraq has contributed to making Iraq a place for violence and terrorist groups, thus meaning that it now poses more of a threat to the Middle East countries. These results confirm what David Mark (2001) wrote in his article in the *Observer*. Mark stated that 'America's policy towards Iraq is failing, because it doesn't provide a positive vision of a post-Saddam future. That just leaves the question of how to help get rid of the current dangerous regime' (Mark 2001). However, if the Iraqi people have not benefited from this war, then who has? Question 25 is designed to examine this question.

25- Who has most benefited from this war?

<input type="checkbox"/> Iraqi people	<input type="checkbox"/> US arms and oil companies	<input type="checkbox"/> US
<input type="checkbox"/> Israel	<input type="checkbox"/> Fanatical and terrorist groups	<input type="checkbox"/> Abstain

Responses to question 25 show that 33% of respondents believe that Israel has most benefited from this war, 22% believe that it is US arms and oil companies that have benefited most, 16% believe it is fanatical and terrorist groups, 13% believe the US is the main beneficiary, 10% believe the Iraqi people are, and 6% abstained.

Question 40 is designed to examine whether respondents to this questionnaire believe that the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East serves its strategic interests in the region.

40- Does the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East serve its strategic interests in the region?

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Abstain
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Responses to this question show that 42% of respondents believe it does not, 21% believe it does, and 37% abstained. However, the number of respondents who abstained from

responding to this question was high and figures showed that 114 out of the 148 who abstained were from poor educational backgrounds and might not have been able to respond to this question properly (see 3.2.1.1 & 3.2.1.3).

The majority of the respondents believe that the United States contributed to the three Gulf Wars: it took some measures that facilitated Saddam Hussein receiving arms during his war against Iran; it also supported Iraq in the period leading to the second Gulf War; and it did not follow a peaceful diplomacy that might have prevented the third Gulf War and launched a war that has destroyed the past, present, and the future of Iraq. Moreover, the US has contributed, through its full support to Israel, to other conflicts between the Arabs and Israelis. These wars have burdened the region with arms purchases.

The views of the respondents about the war on Iraq and the intention of the US and its allies confirm what was discussed in the literature review about the war (see 4.4), in Chapter Three (see 3.2.2).

In most democracies, military expenditure contributes to the development of the country through the scientific research it supports, and the economic opportunities it creates. When military expenditure turns to burden domestic social and economic factors in these democracies, the demands of the security sector are balanced by internally driven domestic capacities for arms restraint. However, in undemocratic countries, military expenditure is prioritized, in most cases over other social, economic, and development issues, whatever the cost. Questions 36 and 37 are set to examine if the respondents to this questionnaire believe that the military expenditure of Iraq and the Middle East has contributed to the development of Iraq and the region.

36- Did military spending in Middle-Eastern countries contribute to the development of these countries?

Yes

No

Abstain

37- Did military spending in Iraq contribute to the development or underdevelopment of Iraq?

Development of Iraq

Underdevelopment of Iraq

Abstain

Data collected from question 36 show that 84% of respondents believe that military spending in the Middle East contributes to the underdevelopment of the region, whereas 7% believe that it contributes to its development and 9% abstained. Moreover, data collected from question 37 shows that 85% of respondents believe that Iraq's military spending hinders its development, whereas 3% believe it does not, and 12% abstained. Although such issues need the opinion of experts in different agencies and organizations who can provide us with real statistics and numbers, I believe that even normal people can see the controversial relationship between armament and development.

Moreover, the impact of high military expenditure in the region is not only in the money drained on buying arms and the impact of that on the economic and social sectors, but also in making the decision to go to war easier. Question 38 is designed to examine whether military spending in the Middle East prevented or increased the possibility of conflict.

38- Did military spending in the Middle East prevent or increase the possibility of conflict?

Prevent the possibility of conflict Increase the possibility of conflict Abstain

Responses to question 38 revealed that 73% of respondents believe that high military spending in the Middle East increased the possibility of conflict, whereas 18% believe that it decreased it and 9% abstained.

The figures presented above show a widespread belief that there is a detrimental relationship between armament, conflict, and development. However, Iraq's military spending had a more devastating impact on that country than on other Middle-Eastern countries. While the harmful impact of military spending on other Middle-Eastern countries resulted mainly from the diversion of their budgets to weapons that they did not need or use, in Iraq, it also resulted from the direct and indirect consequences of the wars that Iraq was part of. The responses showed that while 73% of the respondents believe that military expenditure did not contribute to the development of the Middle East, 89% believe that it did not contribute to the development of Iraq.

I can conclude that the majority of respondents believe that military spending increased the potential for conflict. Without the availability of arms most of the wars in the Middle East

would not have happened. These arms sales have only burdened the economies of these countries and hindered their further development.

The majority of people in the Middle East believe that military spending has hindered development in the region, yet many countries continue to spend billions of US dollars on arms. However, these billions would not be drained on weapons if countries considered their arms purchases more responsibly. What can be mentioned and noted nowadays is that the flood of arms to dictatorships has remained constant. It has drained these countries' resources, but has not been used to defend their homeland. Instead these arms have been used against civilians. This violates the international human rights and arm sales conditions. According to the Code of Conduct of the Central American States, 'Transfers of arms, ammunition, explosives and other related material shall not be carried out from or to States which (...) commit and/or sponsor crimes against humanity or human rights violations' (2 December 2005). It is also against the article which states that 'A transfer shall not be authorised if the arms are destined to be used: a) for the violation of international humanitarian law or infringement of human and peoples' rights and freedoms, or for the purpose of oppression' (ECOWAS Convention, 14 June 2006). So who is responsible for selling arms to oppressive regimes, and who is preventing the establishment of a global arms trade treaty? This is the question that this thesis attempts to answer by the evidence it provides.

7.6 Conclusion

Data collected from this questionnaire show that people in Middle-Eastern countries believe that the determinants of military expenditure of many countries in the region are very strong, though they find that this expenditure is not justified, especially in the Gulf countries, which spend billions of dollars on arms that they don't use or even need. The outstanding disputes resulting from the existence of Israel and its occupation of Arab lands, border disputes, religious and sectarian hostility, and ideological tensions, combined with lack of democracy, huge oil revenue and the external political and economic foreign interests in the region have contributed to the militarization of the region and have made it the number one client for arms sales.

The many wars that have taken place in the Middle East during the last five decades have drained billions of US dollars. Data analysis has shown that the majority of Middle-Eastern countries believe that while they have had to pay the costs of these wars, the oil and arms companies and building contractors have reaped the outcome. This atmosphere has plagued the region with fundamentalism, terrorism, and anti-Americanism which have put many countries in the Middle East on the edge of internal conflicts. This has led many governments to perpetrate more violation of human rights and more oppression of political activities, and in such a situation having a strong and well-equipped army becomes of great importance.

Moreover, the data collected show that arms purchases have failed to end any of the outstanding disputes, and may even have helped some of the leaders stay in power, either, because of the support they have received from arms-manufacturing countries in return for the big arms purchases made to please these countries. Arms sales have had a devastating impact on Middle-Eastern countries: they have not only burdened the economies of these countries, but also facilitated the wars that have taken place in the region, with disastrous direct and indirect effects on all Middle-Eastern countries. These wars can simply be described as meaningless conflicts with uncountable costs.

I can conclude that the data collected from the questionnaire strongly supports the literature reviewed in Chapter Three about determinants of military expenditure and arms transfers in the Middle East and the literature reviewed in Chapter Four about the causal relationship between conflict, military expenditure and development in the region.

In the next chapter, I shall try to shed light on the role of traditional arms sales in creating conflict and instability by analysing the interviews conducted for the sake of this study. It will also shed light on the reasons behind the lack of an international treaty to restrict arms sales, especially to areas of conflict.

Chapter 8

Analysis of the Interviews

8.0 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the interviews conducted to shed light on the reasons behind the lack of an international treaty that organizes conventional arms sales. The interviews with a number of diplomats and politicians allow examination of the impact of military expenditure on economic growth, development, and conflict in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. The lack of exact figures and data continues to hamper studies in this field, especially in the Middle East, so this chapter attempts to provide some genuine information about the impact of arms deals on the area.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: first, the interviews are divided into two types (see 6.3.5). The questions of the first type (Type 1) were answered by six interviewees, and their analysis will be presented first. They all focus on the ideas of democracy, inter-Arab relationships, occupation, Iraq, oil, and armament, conflict and foreign interests. The second type interviews (Type 2) were answered by two interviewees, and their analysis will be presented second. They concentrate on obtaining information concerning the lack of conventional arms treaties, and the reasons behind that. The aim of the two types is to draw attention to linkages between the arms trade in the Arab world and the larger debate about how Arab countries might become more economically developed and democratic.

The Type 1 interviews will try to find answers to RQ4 and RQ5 and their sub-divisions through the analysis of the answers provided by the interviewees.

RQ4. Does the level of democracy in the Middle East affect the level of armament or vice versa?

4.1 What is the impact of the level of democracy on regional cooperation, military spending and development?

4.2 Do arms exports to the region help promote democracy or fortify dictatorships?

RQ5. Do military expenditure and arms sales contribute to world development and international security?

5.1 Does military expenditure have the same impact on developed and developing countries?

5.2 Does high military expenditure in the Middle East contribute to the stability and development of the region?

5.3 Does conflict in the Middle East contribute to the increase in its military expenditure?

5.4 Could high military expenditure in the Middle East help these countries defend themselves?

5.5 Do the arms sales to the Middle East prevent the outbreak of wars or contribute to them?

5.6 Who is paying for and benefiting from military expenditure and arms transfers?

The Type 2 interviews will attempt to find answers to RQ1 and its sub-divisions 1.1 and 1.2 through the analysis of the answers provided by the interviewees

RQ1. If conventional weapons have been used in most wars and cost humanity a dear price, so why a binding comprehensive treaty on the production and stockpiling of this kind of weapons has not been reached yet?

1.1 Are the current arms exports regulations and code of conduct enough to control military expenditure and arms transfer?

1.2 Have the efforts to control arms export been effective in regulating military expenditure and arms transfer?

8.1 Analysis of the Interviews

As mentioned in Chapter 6 (see 6.3.6), the interviews varied in duration, but not in channel because they were all conducted by audio recording and transcribed in full. The transcript of the tapes received the permission of the interviewees before being used (see Appendix 2). Finally, the interviewees' names were changed to maintain anonymity.

8.1.1 Analysis and Discussion of Interviews Type 1

The Type 1 interviews include twelve questions that were answered by six high-ranked politicians and intellectuals. These questions cover the following points.

8.1.1.1 Democracy

The first set of interviews studies the nexus between democracy, armament, conflict, and development in the Middle East. The researcher believes that low levels of democracy increase the level of armament and the number of conflicts, and hamper development. The interview focuses in its first part on the issue of democracy, and three questions have been tailored to get extra information from diplomats and high-ranking politicians about this issue, so that answers for RQ4 and its sub-divisions 4.1 and 4.2 can be obtained. Here are the questions that serve the first point, followed by the interviewee's answers to them one by one, and my analysis to their responses in the light of the literature available.

1. All Middle-Eastern countries are classified, in accordance with more than one criterion of democracy, as states of absolute rule, or states of limited subjection of the individuals. Do you see a link between the deterioration of the level of democracy in this region and the conflicts that erupted in it on the one hand, and the high level of armament, on the other? What, in your opinion, is the impact of this on progress and development of the Middle East?

2. What are the causes of the growing Islamic movements in the Middle East? Is there a relationship between them and democracy in the Arab world or the Israeli occupation or American policy towards the region? Do you think that a real democracy in the Arab world will bring to power secular governments or Islamic governments? Governments that are loyal to the United States or opposed to it?

3. How do you look at the American project of democratization in the Arab world? What credibility it has and how do you see the interaction of the Arab street with it?

In his reply to question (1) about the impact of low levels of democracy in the Middle East, on the level of armament, erupted conflicts, and the low level of development, interviewee (A), a leader in the Kurdish Alliance and an independent Kurdish member of the Iraqi Parliament, who was in London when the interview was conducted, declared that 'democracy does not exist in its real meaning in the region' (lines 12–13). He believes that governments 'are authoritarian or dictatorial ones and elections are in fact not as they should be' (lines 13–14). He further believes that there is a reciprocal relationship between democracy, conflict and armament because 'conflicts in the region affect democracy...

Democracy needs political stability and social independence... armament takes a large amount of the budget and this affects development' (lines 14–16, 21–23). At the same time, he believes that 'development is only possible in the presence of democracy. When priority is given to matters of concern to citizens such as reform, education, environment and social development will occur' (lines 90–92).

Interviewee (B), a leader in the Baath Party opposition who lives in London, agrees with interviewee (A) that there is a relationship between democracy, conflict, and development. He says that 'the absence of democracy in any region results in a state of chaos and imbalance, consequently, this helps in the spread of financial and administrative corruption which leaves its mark on society, and leads to a feeling of injustice that, if increased, may result in crises and conflicts' (lines 257–60). What interviewee (B) finds is clearly seen in the uprisings that have recently taken place in the Middle East. Interviewee (B) also agrees with interviewee (A) that conflict increases military spending because in time of conflict some countries 'allocate a large part of its budget to enhance military capabilities to face internal or external threats , and this in turn will exhaust the state treasury and affect the welfare of the individual and society' (lines 261–63).

Likewise, interviewee (C), the general secretary of an Iraqi Party, agrees with interviewees (A) and (B) that 'there is a definite relationship' between the level of democracy, conflict, and development. He says that 'the deterioration of the level of democracy or the lack of it, and thereby the absolute authority of one-man rule would unleash the whims of the ruler, especially the whim of armament, which often exceeds the capacity of national income; leads to a disruption of development; reduces its rates, and consumes cash reserves and pawns its future for a long time' (lines 417–21). He also finds that in these countries the decision to declare war is not the last solution or the most difficult decision as it is in democratic parliamentary countries, rather it is a one-man decision that is taken to 'achieve unbalanced wrong aspirations, or to escape from problems of the individual ruler and his inefficiency as was the case of Iraq in the Iranian and Kuwaiti wars' (lines 425–26).

Interviewee (D), a professor of Economics in a Gulf state, also finds that 'there is a relationship between the absence of democracy... and wars and underdevelopment' (lines 667–68). He finds that elected governments, being accountable to their people, 'allocate their resources more efficiently in projects that are productive to development' (lines 669–

70). He further finds that there is another reason that prevents European countries from going to war, namely the experience they have from World War II. He concludes his answer to this question by saying that his answer is a broad one and any explanation of the mechanics of the relationship between democracy, armament, and development needs a broader answer (lines 670–73).

Interviewee (E), general director of a centre for human rights and international law, also believes that ‘there is certainly a relationship between democracy and crisis’ (lines 806–07). He finds that ‘the Israeli occupation and Israeli-Palestinian conflict were obstacles in the way of democratic development and human rights, because you cannot practice democracy in the centre of continued violent conflict’ (lines 807–09). He says that there is popular support for democracy in Palestine and that this was expressed in many elections, yet ‘democracy is almost absent because the development of institutions collide with occupation as an external factor, in addition to other factors that are related in one way or another to occupation or result from it’ (lines 812–15). He finds that ‘genuine democracy cannot be established under occupation, [and] it is difficult to hold any political reform in the midst of ongoing conflicts’ (lines 815–16).

Similarly, interviewee (E) also finds that development is an important factor in the process of democracy. He believes that the economic situation of people improves their feelings of freedom and safety. Consequently, they will be more able to consolidate the democratic process. He finds that ‘most of the countries in the Middle East are classified as developing countries which suffer from many developmental needs that have serious impacts on the level of human rights and democracy and their priority in these countries. Moreover, the Middle East is the most violent region in the world and this also greatly affects the level of democracy’ (lines 829–33).

It can be seen from the above answers that the interviewees have responded differently to the question about democracy. Interviewee (A) and interviewee (B) felt free to give answers to almost all points in the question, and this might be related to the fact that the interviews with them were conducted in the UK at the time they belonged to the Iraqi opposition. However, despite their different political backgrounds we find that they gave almost similar answers to the question. The same also applies to interviewee (E) as the interview with him was conducted in Sweden. The case is different with interviewee (D),

who was located in a Middle-Eastern country, because talking freely about democracy and military expenditure in such countries may be regarded as conspiracy. Therefore, we find that he gave a general answer to the question. The same applies to interviewee (F), an ambassador of a Gulf state, who failed to answer Q1 about the level of democracy as he considered this a sensitive issue that might be taken against him by the regime of his country. He preferred not to give an answer to this question due to his belief that it would serve neither his professional career nor his country's relationship with other Middle-Eastern countries.

In their answers to the first question interviewees agreed that democracy is very poor in almost all Middle-Eastern countries. They think that these undemocratic regimes have played a major role in increasing the number of conflicts in the region. These conflicts have also contributed to the increase in arms sales, which have been funded by oil revenue in oil-rich countries and by development funds in other Middle-Eastern countries. The answers given to this question strongly support the results shown in the analysis of the questionnaire in section 6.1 about the level of democracy in the Middle-Eastern countries and section 6.1.1 about the impact of democracy on conflict and section 6.1.2 about the impact of democracy on armament.

Moreover, according to the 'democratic peace theory' discussed in section 4.5.2.2, were there democracies in Middle-Eastern countries, Saddam Hussein would not have launched his war against Iran, and if war had started it would not have lasted for eight years. Saddam would not also have invaded Kuwait and contributed in one way or another to the American war on his country. Furthermore, were there democratic regimes in the Middle East, the current uprisings in the region would not have been so costly socially, culturally, economically, and physically. Moreover, there are expectations that the boiling situation in these countries will spread to almost all Middle-Eastern countries because the internal situation that resulted in the internal conflicts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria is a Middle-East phenomenon and is not restricted to these countries.

Dictators did not only cause the wars that broke out in the region but they also created an atmosphere of mistrust that contributed to the high levels of armament, because in dictatorial regimes the leader takes the decision of war without considering public opinion about its necessity and short- and long-terms costs. Moreover, once a country enters a war

it diverts all its resources to support its military capabilities, and this strongly hits its economy and affects its development. (Section 2.3.6 shows the sharp rising trend in military expenditure and arms sales to Middle-Eastern countries during times of war. Moreover, section 3.2 shows the impact of military expenditure on development, section 4.3 shows the impact of military expenditure on conflict, and sections 4.4 and 4.5 and its sub-divisions show the impact of conflict on development.)

The Middle East has witnessed widespread growth of Islamic movements that threaten the cultural fabric and increase the possibility of a change in the nature of the regime in many countries. Q2 is set to examine the reasons behind the growth of Islamic movements in the Middle East and whether democracy will bring to power secular governments or Islamic ones, pro-US governments or anti-US ones. Moreover, Q3 is set to examine the interviewees' points of view regarding the American project of democratization in the region and the interaction of the Arab public with it.

Interviewee (A) believes that there are many reasons that contribute to the growing of Islamic movements in the Middle East, among which he mentions 'the lack of democracy and the failure of other political parties that made people turn towards Islamic extremist movements' (lines 32–33). He also states that 'Israeli occupation has a substantial influence' (line 34) and that 'the Israeli practices against the people of the region plays a role in the growth of Islamic movements in many places' and mentions the ongoing situation in the Gaza strip as an example (lines 34–36). In addition, he believes that the US's policy towards the region and its 'unlimited support' to Israel, along with the other factors, has created negative reactions among Middle-Eastern and Islamic people. These factors have also pushed people to 'believe that the Islamic movements may, to a large extent, meet their wishes... [and] that Islamic policies may succeed in solving their problems' (lines 36–42).

Answering the second part of the question (if any election would bring to power pro- or anti-US governments), interviewee (A) reckons that any real and democratic elections will bring to power anti-American governments. He finds that 'the problem of the United States in the region is that its policies are wrong' and he adds 'the policy of the United States in the region cares mainly for the Israeli interests and this makes it negative because of the

Arab–Israeli conflict’. Therefore, he thinks that ‘democratic elections would bring to power governments that are opposed to the United States’ (lines 42–48).

However, in his answer to Q3, interviewee (A) does not think that the aim of the American project to spread democracy in the Arab world is a success and he gives as an example what happened in Iraq and the sufferings, problems, and casualties that the Americans have brought instead. Moreover, interviewee (A) does not believe that the US cares about democracy and human rights. He considers that the American project in the Arab world is a ‘political issue’ (lines 51–57) and ‘the US establishes its relationships with these governments not on how good, democratic or humane to their people, but on how good allies they are’ (lines 58–60). He also thinks that ‘the American alliance is based on political consideration and not on the level of democracy and observation of human rights in these countries’ (lines 62–64). Therefore, he thinks that ‘the interaction of the Arab countries and people with the American project, as I think, will be negative and people will not believe in it’ (lines 64–65).

Interviewee (B) considers that lack of democracy is the main reason for most of the problems in the Middle East and thinks that democracy is the only solution to its problems. He finds that the growth of Islamic movements is due to the ‘the failure of the national trend (secular), which took power in various forms since the independence of the Middle-East countries, and its inability to provide solutions to the problems facing society, whether economic or social or even to achieve the slogans it adopts for defending the homeland and liberating the territories’ (lines 269–72). He adds that the Islamic forces took advantage of the clear failure and tried to present themselves as saviours, arguing that the solution lies only in Islam. These forces have also adopted slogans that oppose the Israeli and American projects and these slogans were well received by the public (lines 272–75). However, he considers that this failure has resulted from the lack of democracy. He insists that ‘true democracy is the best solution’ (lines 275–276) for the running problems in the Middle East. He believes that ‘the Islamists might win in the first stage in reaction to current regimes, but they are not equipped to cope with the running development in the world’ (lines 276–78). But he thinks that the ‘possibility of the victory of the secularist trend in the second stage is very likely after the fall of the holiness of the Islamic trend and its apparent inability to keep pace with development and solve the problems facing society, especially if the secularist trend tries to benefit from past mistakes and put forward a

democratic program and adopted the rotation of power peacefully' (lines 278–82). He further adds that 'true democracy does not necessarily bring anti-Western governments because the interests of the West intersect in many areas with Arabic interests' (lines 282–284).

Moreover, interviewee (B), in his answer to Q3, finds that 'democracy is not a recipe imported from abroad. It's a gradual evolution and depends on a variety of circumstances and factors that are commensurate with the requirements of each state with a belief in the importance of the democratic way to solve society's problems' (lines 288–291). In addition, he believes that 'the American project has lost its credibility and doesn't possess the support of the Arab Street because of its double standard' (lines 291–92). He finds that the reason for this is that 'at the time of promoting democracy, the US supports dictatorial, royal and hereditary regimes' (lines 292–93).

Interviewee (C) agrees with interviewees (A) and (B) on the role of lack of democracy in the growth of Islamic movements. However, he believes that other factors have also contributed, such as the 'failure to achieve democracy, solid economic development and waging wars' (lines 432–34). He also finds that there is another major reason for the growth of the Islamic thoughts and movements, 'the creation of Israel in the region by the US and the failure of secular governments to overcome it' (lines 436–38). However, in his answer to Q3 he finds that the US has not set a good example of democracy in Iraq because it has built the Iraqi regime on power sharing and sectarianism which have resulted in corruption. He also believes that the American idea of democracy is a changing one and that it varies from one country to another according to the requirements of their interests. However, he finds that the Arab world is lost between this American democracy and the dictatorial and fascist governments (lines 441–54).

Interviewee (D) agrees with interviewees (A) and (B) about the role of failure of governments in what he prefers to call the Islamic revival, and the Israeli practices in Palestine. He says 'the Islamic revival in the Middle East is partly a result of the failures of other paradigms to deliver on both security and development ... it is also a way of resisting all forms of injustice be it in Palestine or in any other Arab or Moslem countries' (lines 679–82). As for the question about the nature of the regime a democratic election might

bring to power, interviewee (C) thinks that ‘this depends on the integrity of elections as well as the credibility of competing programs’ (lines 683–84).

Interviewee (D) also agrees with interviewee (B) in his answer to Q3 that democracy ‘has to come as a result of internal forces and efforts, otherwise it will either be geared to external interests or it will not be lasting’ (lines 688–90). Similarly, interviewee (E) finds that ‘democracy is not a Western product and not exclusive to the West... and great super powers must avoid imposing their model on other societies... Democracy must be in support of the values and mechanisms in any society... and the product of the cultural character of the people, there should be a theory of democracy that can recognize its contents domestic context’ (lines 857–65). He rejects the notion that there is ‘fundamental conflict between democracy and the Arab world, or between democracy and Islam’ (lines 858–859) and calls upon great power ‘to stop hiding behind the mask of democracy to achieve its national interests to avoid associating democracy with Western imperialism’ (lines 861–62). However, he believes that the West can play a positive role through encouraging the Arab world ‘to develop democracy in the local environment’ (line 860).

Interviewee (E) agrees with interviewees (A), (B), (C), and (D) about the failure of governments to meet the expectations of their peoples. He mentions that ‘the reasons for the growing Islamic movements in the Middle East is the frustration that the Arab citizens feel towards their governments because of the policies of these governments in disabling the democratic institutions that can reflect their concerns and sufferings and express their goals and aspirations’ (lines 839–42). He also agrees with interviewees (A), (B), and (C) about the role of the Israeli occupation in the growth of the Islamic movements. He says that ‘the Israeli occupation of Arab land is certainly the most important factor for frustration from Arab governments’ (lines 845–46). He also agrees with other interviewees about the role of US policy towards the region and he thinks that this has created an atmosphere hostile to the US in the Middle East. He says that: ‘The Arab citizen believes that the Arab governments have become under the hegemony of the United States which in turn is subject to the Zionist lobby which practices occupation and repressive policies in the occupied territories. The United States used Veto in the Security Council about 50 times against any resolution that condemns Israel or even its practices. This is enough to say that any healthy atmosphere of democracy will bring about anti-American governments’ (lines 846–51). He also declares that there is one more reason that

contributes to the anti-America sentiment, 'the US's support for governments that violate human rights and the destiny of their peoples in return of caring for the interests of the United States politically or militarily or economically' (lines 852–55).

It can be seen from the answers to questions 2 and 3 that all interviewees agree that the growth of the Islamic movements in the Middle East is mainly due to the failure of Middle-Eastern governments to establish real democratic institutions that would help defend human rights and fulfil the hopes, regards, and ambitions of people. In this atmosphere of poor democracy, a leader feels free to take any decision, regardless of its effects. He might change the constitution, agree an arms deal, launch a war, sign an unbalanced treaty, violate human rights, and so on. Failing to find any hope of political change, people in Middle-Eastern countries turn to look at Islam as a resort for a better life, recalling how Muslims were under the rule of Islam. What the interviewees agree on has been clear in the uprisings that have recently taken place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria where the biggest demonstrations were on Fridays after prayer. Moreover, in the three countries that succeeded in changing their regime – Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya – the Islamic movements are more powerful than other secular or national parties in the country. In fact the results of the first democratic elections in Tunisia showed the success of the Al-Nahda Party, which has an Islamic orientation, in this election. It is also expected that similar results will be achieved in Egypt. And when the new Libyan leadership is announced it will undoubtedly be the Islamic doctrine that will constitute the articles of the new constitution.

However, these internal conflicts which have erupted in many countries in the Middle East are the result of many years of lack of democracy and violation of human rights. No real political parties have been permitted, and those that are recognized in these countries have not been representative and have been used just as a political cover for the regime. Moreover, firm restrictions have been applied to any political activities, and activists of the opposition have been under constant close control and subject to arrest and long years of prison without a trial. In such an atmosphere, where any meeting for political purposes is a crime for which an activist may lose his civil rights, the mosque becomes what might be called a political forum that a government cannot fully control for many reasons. Firstly, prayer for five times a day is one of the duties of Islam, and the government cannot prevent the worshippers from gathering in the mosques which have been spreading quickly all over

the country. Secondly, mosques are considered holy places whose sanctity cannot easily be violated by the security forces. Thirdly, these security forces cannot put enough control on clerics, who, equipped with their reputation among the people, feel more free to talk about issues that political activists in the opposition cannot do.

Moreover, governments have not only put restraints on the freedom of the opposition but they have also failed to provide in their policies any kind of welfare to their peoples because of corruption, which has become an issue in almost all Middle-Eastern countries. In addition, the West has continuously been of great support to dictatorships in the region, including the regimes which have already been changed in Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Furthermore, people have also become disillusioned with the stances of their government regarding the Israeli occupation of Palestine and Arab lands and Israel's practices against their Muslim brothers on occupied lands. As a result of this, anti-Americanism has spread in the Muslim street because of the unlimited support the US provided to these actions. This feeling has also increased, on the one hand, because of what Muslims have been subject to in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and on the other, because of the anti-Islamism in the West that has become stronger after the terrorist attack in the US, which Muslims don't consider themselves to be responsible for. After September 11th, Islam has been accused and put in a difficult corner although Muslims have nothing to do with it. There is a growing hatred in the West towards Islam that has resulted from an unfair and unjustified connection between the terrorist attacks in the US and Islam. On the other side, Muslims have felt unhappy about this growing hostility to Islam in the West as well as to the link made between terrorism and Islam which has resulted in wars on Afghanistan and Iraq.

One might think that promoting democracy would be beneficial and would directly serve the national interests of the US. Democracies will not go to war with the US, will not support terrorism against the US, will not produce refugees seeking asylum in the US, will ally with the US and adopt the American ideals which would help them flourish. However, the US efforts to promote democracy have been subject to severe criticism. One of the most important arguments against US efforts to promote democracy is that the democratization process increases the risk of war (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, pp. 5–38). Lynn-Jones (1998) argues that this criticism has not presented a convincing case that spreading democracy is a bad idea. Likewise, Richard Hass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, who worked at the State Department during Bush's first period in

office, finds that 'in many ways, you can argue that the Iraq war set back the cause of democracy in the Middle East... It's more legitimate in Arab eyes when it happens from within than when it's externally driven' (Dowd 2011).

Hroub, the director of Cambridge University's Arab Media Project, finds that 'the US and allies would do anything they can to prevent democracy in the Arab world. The reason is very simple. Across the region overwhelming majority of population regards the US as the main threat to their interests'. Chomsky (2011) offers a similar argument, adding 'Well, plainly, the U.S. and its allies are not going to want governments which are responsive to the will of the people. If that happens, not only will the US not control the region, but it will be thrown out.' As for oil-rich countries such as Libya, the US and its allies are more inclined to 'get a more reliable dictator' and banish an 'oil-rich dictator who's not reliable, who's a loose cannon. That's Libya.' He concludes that 'stability' of the Middle East, as the US means it, is 'kind of like democracy. Moreover, Smith (2011) finds that 'the 'Arab Spring' is a series of civil wars, sectarian and tribal conflicts, and divisions not only between the political elites and the people but also within certain regimes themselves...the additional power of the street and its ability to bring down rulers will come at the expense of actual democratic reform' (pp. 5–6). He believes that the 'US policymakers were less concerned with the desires and aspirations of Arab peoples than with those of their authoritarian regimes' (pp. 6–7).

If we accept the fact that it is democracy that has led to the change of regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, we have to question the intention of the US and the West in promoting this democracy. Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali, the ex-president of Tunisia, was a very close friend to the US and the West, which have continuously turned a blind eye to his dictatorial regime and violation of human rights. The same applies to Muhammad Hosni Mubarak, the ex-president of Egypt. He was an ally to the US, was received many times in the White House, and Egypt under his rule was included in military aids of the US. He was also invited by President Sarkozy to chair the Joint Mediterranean Partnership from the Arab side. It was definitely not a spontaneous realization when the US and the West discovered that both presidents were unwanted in their countries and violators of human rights. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the now-dead president of Libya, leads the other two ex-presidents as a dictator because of the 42 years he stayed in power, the way he ruled the country, and the money he drained without bringing development to his country. Yet the

US and the West resumed their relations and exchanged visits with him after he paid for the Lockerbie disaster and opened Libya for their investments. The war that NATO launched on Libya has been very costly and will be paid out of Libyan money, and this will affect the development in the country. Moreover, Iraq under the rule of its ex-president Saddam Hussein had been an ideal example of an authoritarian regime that had affected regional cooperation because of his war against Iran and invasion of Kuwait and the impact of the latter war on Arab–Arab relations. Yet Saddam Hussein had continuous relations with the US and the West, and was visited by American officials in the 1980s despite reports about his use of gas and chemical weapons against the Iranian and Iraqi people. However, things changed in 2002 when he was portrayed as an immediate threat for information that had been well known to the US for so many years.

The interviewees agree on the importance of democracy in avoiding conflict, spending less on armament, and achieving development, yet they don't think that the US can, or even wants to, spread democracy in the region. They agree that democracy is not a recipe or a Western product that should be imposed on other people but it should be developed in the local environment. Legters and Burke (1994) argue that the failure of democracy in the Middle East was due to the fact that democracies were imposed on countries against their will and contrary to their cultural beliefs. He finds that democracy in the Middle East does not work effectively in the way it is adopted in the West, because the populations in the region are historically used to top-down political management approaches and look to their leaders in their search for an answer.

As shown in the answers to the first three questions, democracy in the Middle East is very poor, and this situation has contributed to conflict in the region and affected its development. There is agreement among the interviewees about the importance of promoting democracy as a solution for a settled and developed Middle East. However, interviewees think that the US and its allies do not care about democracy in the region, but rather about the interests of its ally in the region, Israel. (This idea was discussed and supported in the literature review in section 4.5.2.2.5, and 7.1) The US continues to support dictatorial regimes and equip them with arms, making the region the most violent region in the world. Moreover, some of the interviewees find that US foreign policy towards the region does not serve US strategic interests but those of the arms and oil companies. The

results reached in the analysis of this question therefore support the results of the questionnaire discussed in section 7.1.

8.1.1.2 Inter-Arab Relationships

Inter-Arab relationships are plagued by many disputes, especially between neighbouring countries, and in many cases the relationship between Arab countries and foreign ones is stronger than their relationship with neighbouring Arab countries. Q4 of the interview is designed to examine the reasons behind the unstable relationship between Arab countries. It also inspects the impact of this relationship on conflict, armament and development in the region. This question tries to answer to the RQ.4.1.

4. Inter-Arab relationships are plagued by many disputes, especially between neighbouring countries. In many cases, the relationship between Arab countries and foreign ones is stronger than their relation with neighbouring Arab countries. What are the reasons for this? Is it related to the colonial period, or 'the divide and rule' policy or the theory of 'conspiracy'? What is the impact of this reality on of strained relations, armaments, and development in the region?

Interviewee (A) thinks 'the Arab-Arab relations are strained due to the absence of democracy' (line 85). He finds that Arab governments cannot be representative of their peoples because they have not come to power through democratic means (lines 81–84). 'These governments care only about how to stay in power by all means and how to strengthen their positions. As a result, many conflicts and disputes arise between Arab countries which become subject to disagreements between one leader and another and this regime and that one, over affairs that have nothing to do with the interests of their peoples' (lines 75–79). He also believes that there is another, external, factor which is a legacy from the colonial era and the policy of 'divide and rule' that some colonial countries followed. However, he finds that the internal factors are more important because 'if there are Arab governments that take into account the interests of their peoples, and if these governments are democratically elected, they would find a way to reach an understanding and solve their problems by dialogue' (lines 81–83).

Interviewee (B) focuses only on the external factor. He finds that the weak Arab–Arab relationships are due to the influence of the West and the US, which have strategic interests

in this rich region, and whose interests would be hindered by friendly relationships between Middle-Eastern countries. He finds that 'the Middle East occupies a key position and possesses enormous wealth, and there is no interest for the West in general and America in particular for establishment of friendly relations between the countries of the region. As any coordination or agreement between these countries poses a threat to Israel and limits the looting of their wealth, therefore, the atmosphere must always be tense among these countries' (lines 303–07). Interviewee (C) also focuses on the external factor. He finds that the Middle East has been and continues to be subject 'to the theory of 'divide and rule' or the theory of 'threat and protection' which means to create threat and grant protection if paid' (lines 462–63). He finds that 'the creation of crises and stirring local conflicts is a clear and prominent US policy which is not far from the Iran-Iraq war, and the Iraq-Kuwait war, and the continued tension among the Gulf countries' (lines 465–67).

Similar to interviewee (A), interviewee (D) finds that the internal factor is more important than the external one. He thinks that there is an active 'divide and rule' policy and 'theory of conspiracy' that affects Arab–Arab relationships, yet he believes that the internal factor more important. He believes that the weak Arab–Arab relationships are due to the fact that 'governments do not represent the interests of the majority of their people and they are not accountable to them otherwise they will take the same route taken by the European community since none of these countries can realize their development goals without regional cooperation' (lines 698–701). Being unaccountable, the leading elite feels free to make their relations with foreign companies and powers 'leaving the majority of their population and the region in general in abject poverty and backwardness' (lines 703–04).

Interviewee (E) believes that the main heading for Arab–Arab relations is 'differences, division, failure and continued aggression' (lines 873–74). He also finds that Arab leaders have failed to apply any agreed convention in the Arab summits and, instead of promoting Arab cooperation, the Arab countries 'have preoccupied [themselves] with conflicts and differences sparking the interests of the peoples in the region' (lines 879–880). He believes that 'many of the region's problems have resulted from colonial times' (lines 881–83), yet he finds that 'this does not mean we cannot remove the roots and proceed toward the future as Europe launched itself after two world wars and fundamental problems' (lines 882–85).

Interviewee (F) focuses in his reply to this question on the absence of economic interests between Arabs as the main factor for the weak Arab–Arab relationships. He says that ‘Arab–Arab relationships have not been at the required level due to the absence of economic interests among the Arab countries. Once such interests exist, they will contribute to a rapid settlement of any political dispute’ (lines 1095–97).

Some of the interviewees find that the poor Arab–Arab relations are a result of the colonial times when the roots of conflict were established that are still working in the Arab world. (This idea was supported by literature in section 3.1.1, 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.4, 7.21, 7.2.2 and 7.2.3) This idea supports the findings from a large part of the questionnaire regarding the poor Arab–Arab relations and the impact of that on development (see 3.1.4). However, most of the interviewees believe that in a democratic atmosphere, Arab governments would be able to deal with these roots and establish a suitable environment that would prioritize peoples and not regimes. At this stage, regional cooperation would be a necessity for the role it plays in strengthening economic ties and consequently reducing the possibility of armed conflicts. Nevertheless, they think that the US and the West are not interested in supporting regional cooperation as this will affect their interests in the region.

I can conclude that democracy is a determinant of regional cooperation, which creates the appropriate atmosphere for economic exchange, minimizing the possibility of conflict and arms purchases while maximizing the opportunities for development in the region. However, if democracy has this important role, then why does the US and the West maintain good relations with undemocratic regimes, support dictators and violators of human rights and sell weapons to them? All Arab regimes, with no exception, are undemocratic and the situation that resulted in the uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya is common in all other Arab countries. Yet these countries continue to receive arms from the main arms-supplier countries, and until a democratic change takes place in these countries, the availability of arms will play a negative role and fuel conflicts. The incidents we have seen do not show that there have been any efforts in this direction. On the contrary, there have been many incidents that prove that the West has established close relations with dictators and violators of human rights. The literature presented in the previous section about US policy in supporting dictatorships shows that the US meant to prevent any efforts towards regional cooperation. Moreover, in both the Iran–Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi ex-president, had the support of the US and the West

(see 3.2.1.1 on how the US supported Saddam in his war against Iran and how it encouraged him to invade Kuwait).

8.1.1.3 Occupation

As seen in the answers to question 4, the Israeli occupation of Arab lands is agreed among many interviewees to be one of the main reasons that hinder democracy and regional occupation. Question 5 is designed to investigate the other impacts of the Israeli occupation on armament and development in the region. This question tries to find answers to RQ 5.3, 5.4, 5.5.

5. The Israeli occupation of the Arab territories was the cause of many wars in the region. What is the impact of the Israeli occupation on armaments and development in the region?

6. Iraq has become after the US war an arena of violence and a gathering of numerous terrorist and fundamentalist groups. What is the impact of the US occupation of Iraq on the ongoing violence, and the future prospects of development?

Interviewee (A) finds that ‘colonialism increases militarization and leads to lack of development’ (lines 98–99). However, he thinks that ‘many Arab countries find Arab-Israeli conflict and Israeli occupation an excuse for great arms deals’ (lines 99–100). Nevertheless, he believes that ‘whether the Israeli occupation is taken seriously or used as an excuse, it will increase budget expenditure on armaments and on increasing crises and problems instead of spending them on development’ (lines 105–07). Moreover, he finds that the Israeli occupation of Arab lands ‘create[s] a permanent crisis and constant tension, political stability will be weak and the democratic situation in the country also weak’ (lines 108–09), and ‘when the stability and democracy in the country are weak, development is affected negatively’ (lines 109–110).

Interviewee (B) agrees with interviewee (A) that ‘the continuing Israeli occupation is a major burden on the budgets of the frontline states because a large portion of their resources is spent on armament and affects their development projects’ (lines 311–13). Similarly, interviewee (C) finds that the Arab–Israeli wars have contributed to increased

armament which have destroyed the Arab economy and hindered development on the one hand, and reinforced dictatorial regimes and emergency laws, on the other (lines 471–74). Interviewee (D) did not answer the question.

Interviewee (E) finds that ‘the Israeli occupation and Israeli–Palestinian conflict were obstacles in the way of democratic development and human rights, because you cannot practice democracy in the centre of continued violent conflict’ (lines 807–09). Interviewee (F) finds the Arabs are paying for the European complex towards the Jews. He mentions that it has repeatedly been said to his government by European officials that they ‘have a guilt complex about the Nazi Holocaust issue; [they] could not take a stand against them’ (lines 1087–88). He thinks that Israel is benefiting from the existence of the Islamic resistance of both Hamas and Hezbollah to justify its expansion and the external financial and military support it receives (lines 1089–94).

In their answers to this question, the interviewees support the results shown in section 3.1.1 and the figures shown in 2.3 and 3.2.1.2 about the impact of the Israeli occupation. I can conclude that the Israeli occupation of Arab lands has been very costly, not only in terms of the money drained on military expenditure and the direct losses of the wars that took place between the Arab countries and Israel, but also in terms of the opportunity cost of the conflict. The ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict has been the one of the main reason for the high figures in military expenditure of Middle-Eastern countries, especially Israel and its neighbouring countries Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. It has also resulted in the high military expenditure of other Arab and Islamic countries, who feel, under the pressure of their peoples, that military expenditure means support to Palestine as an Arab country and is a holy Islamic issue. This military expenditure has resulted in bribery, corruption, brokerage, and illicit trafficking of arms and this has hindered reaching an effective agreement to regulate arms transfers, since there are different parties that are benefiting from this business. The Al Yamamah arms deal between the UK and Saudi Arabia in 1985, which totalled \$86 billion, is regarded as the best example of bribery, corruption, and brokerage in arms deals, not only in Saudi Arabia and the UK but also in the US. The Saudi Prince Bandar confessed as much in his interview with *The Guardian* (Leigh and Evans 2007), saying ‘Yes. So what?’ I can conclude by saying that there are many beneficiaries in the arms market who lobby to hinder the achievement of strict regulations on arms transfers.

Moreover, if it is agreed that the Israeli occupation of Arab land hinders regional cooperation and development, why do the US and the West hold the strongest relationship with an occupier and ignore its expansion in occupied land? The US has used its veto in the Security Council 49 times to prevent passing any solution that condemns Israeli occupation and its illegal practices in these occupied lands. Moreover, why did the US cut its funding to UNESCO after the agency's approval of Palestine membership in late October 2011? This might be a result of the powerful Jewish lobby in the US and the West, along with the West's complex towards the Jews, as they feel responsible for the Holocaust and the mistreatment the Jews received (for more details see 3.1.1).

The Israeli occupation of Arab lands has been very costly to Middle-Eastern countries as discussed in 7.2.1, not only in terms of the wars between Israel and the Arabs, but also in terms of the role of the Israeli lobby in affecting US foreign policy towards the region as seen in 3.1.2 & 3.2.1.2. Moreover, this role has been costly not only to the Middle-Eastern countries, but also to the strategic interests of the US in the region and Israel itself. The financial cost of conflict in the Middle East from 1991–2010 as estimated by the Strategic Foresight Group Report reached around \$12 trillion. At the same time, the number of Palestinians living in poverty soared from 23% in 1998 to 35% in 2005. The estimates also showed that had there been peace and cooperation between Israel and Arab League nations since 1991, the average Israeli citizen would be earning over \$44,000 instead of \$23,000 in 2010 (Waslekar *et al.* 2009).

The American occupation of Iraq also provides a good example of the impact on development. Since the US war, Iraq has become an arena of violence and a gathering place for numerous terrorist and fundamentalist groups. Q6 is set to examine the interviewees' point of view about the impact of the US occupation of Iraq on the ongoing violence and the future prospects of development. Interviewee (A) finds that 'the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime was in favour of the Iraqi people because Saddam's regime was a radical, and a bloody one' (lines 115–16). However, he finds that 'the problem is that this change was done by war... The American occupation and the war led to an increase in violence and in the number of terrorists coming to Iraq' (lines 118–21). He clarifies that 'before the US occupation there was a state terrorism against its people, but after the

occupation, we have seen terrorists from Al-Qaida and many others flooding into Iraq under the pretext of fighting the Americans and others. This also led to an increase in violence and to extreme violence in Iraq, and also to an increase of the suffering of Iraqi citizens' (lines 121–25). As a result of this violence, he certifies that regime change 'happened at the expense of development, stability and the Iraqi citizens. This had very negative implications that Iraq is still suffering from. Hundreds of thousands of victims were killed by terrorism, war or many other forms, and this had negative impacts on Iraq' (lines 125–28).

Interviewee (B) agrees with interviewee (A) that 'violence in Iraq was there before the US occupation, but it was state-led violence against citizens and against the neighbouring countries... Then, after the occupation, violence moved to several destinations and what used to be practiced secretly came out into the open' (lines 318–22). However, he finds that despite the murder and oppression exercised by Saddam Hussein, he was supported by the US administration and the West in general (lines 320–21). Interviewee (C) finds that violence in Iraq is the outcome of 'the policy of 'threat and protection' among Iraq and its neighbours'. He also finds that there are regional and internal factors that contribute to the violence in Iraq as 'fear of many Iraq's neighbouring regimes from a potential success of democracy and its impact on their regimes', 'sectarianism' and 'failure of the growing Iraqi governments to reduce the sectarianism, poverty and the spread of administrative and economic corruption' (lines 479–86).

Interviewee (D) did not answer the question, rather he gave his point of view of how it would be possible for the Iraqis to get rid of violence and find their way ahead. He says that 'regardless to who is responsible for the mess in Iraq, Iraqis will have first to get tired of fighting each... then and only then, will they reach some compromise to build their new Iraq without being subordinates of regional and international powers' (lines 713–16).

Interviewee (E) finds that the US, as an occupation force, has not complied with the duties stated in the relevant conventions. Taking into consideration that Article 8 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does not even allow people under occupation to waive their rights of protection, we find that 'this was not the case in Iraq, whether in terms of respect for existing laws or in restoring order and security, providing public health, food and medical care, taking of hostages, or destroying private property' (lines 899–908). He mentions that

all the scenarios developed before the war on Iraq were optimistic, and neither ‘talked about the material and human losses or the financial costs of the war on the US economy and the countries of the region or the feelings of hostility towards the US presence because of the long stay of US forces in Iraq and turning Iraq into an arena of violence and terrorism’ (lines 909–17).

The interviewees agree that there was a general belief in Iraq that the removal of Saddam Hussein would be in favour of the Iraqi people, because of his dictatorial and bloody regime. But they find that his removal did not have the outcome they were hoping for, for two reasons. Firstly, the change of regime was done by war and had a disastrous impact on Iraq. Secondly, the US did not fulfil its duties as an occupier and left Iraq a place of violence and terrorism. However, regardless of what the intentions of the US were, I can say that the American war and occupation of Iraq has had a catastrophic impact on Iraq and the whole region.

The war on Iraq has taken different names, starting with Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and passing through many different ones. However, on 30 November 2005, two years after declaring ‘mission accomplished’ in Iraq, President Bush said, referring to the Jihadist terrorists: ‘If we were not fighting and destroying this enemy in Iraq, they would not be idle. They would be plotting and killing Americans across the world and within our own borders. By fighting these terrorists in Iraq, Americans in uniform are defeating a direct threat to the American people’ (in *The Independent* 2007). President Bush and Prime Minister Blair have repeatedly denied any link between the war on Iraq and the growth of terrorism. However, the US National Intelligence on ‘Trends in Global Terrorism: implications for the United States’¹⁴, circulated within the government in April 2006 and declassified in October, states that ‘the Iraq War has become the ‘cause celebre’ for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement... and is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives’. Moreover, in May 2003, Amnesty International reported war on terrorism as ‘far from making the world a safer place, has made it more dangerous by curtailing human rights, undermining the rule of international law and shielding governments from scrutiny. It has deepened divisions among people of different

¹⁴ A report issued by the entire US intelligence community in April 2006 about the the spread of terrorism <http://zfacts.com/metaPage/lib/ODNI-2006-04-key-judgments-NI-estimate.pdf>

faiths and origins, sowing the seeds for more conflict. The overwhelming impact of all this is genuine fear—among the affluent as well as the poor’ (Amnesty International 2003b).

However, regardless whether the war on Iraq has been in the interests of the US or not, or whether US foreign policy towards the region is affected by the Israeli lobby or not, I can say that this war has been very costly to Iraq and the region and has strongly affected democracy and development in the region. Probably the best explanation for this is that there is an arms bazaar going on, the issue that President Eisenhower warned about 58 years ago, and what Stockman (2011), who was appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 to run the Office of Management and Budget, confirmed by saying: ‘very few, if anyone, in Congress, the National Security Council, the State or Defence Departments have even dared to publicly raise the prospect of reducing the military establishment and its spending to offset the national debt’.

8.1.1.4 Oil

The conclusion reached from the answers to the previous questions leads us to another question. Did the US really fail to accomplish its target of bringing democracy and development to the new Iraq, or did it succeed through leaving Iraq in a state of chaos that would serve its national interests in the region, which has the biggest share of world’s oil reserves? Qs 7 and 8 are designed to explore the role of oil in increasing the number of conflicts in the region and prolonging their durations. Q7 examines the reasons that caused the Iraqi–Iranian war to last for eight years, and whether there was any relation between this costly war and the interests of oil and arms companies. Q8 examines the relationship between the oil revenue of Gulf countries and their military spending, the reasons behind the dramatic increase of arms sales to the Gulf countries, and whether this has contributed or delayed the development of these countries. This section provides answers to RQ 4.2 and RQ5 and its sub-divisions.

7. There are those who say that oil is not only the reason for the emergence of some crises in the Middle East in the past decades, but also the cause of the failure to reach a quick and lasting settlement to these crises. Do you think that the Iraqi–Iranian war would have lasted for eight years if some countries and oil and arms companies hadn’t benefited from that?

8. *The military spending of Gulf countries increases dramatically with the increase of oil prices and oil revenue. It is argued that this is due to the policy of arms-manufacturing countries in recycling the petrodollar in the form of arms deals and the rich Gulf countries sign these contracts, not because they need these deals but to please arms-manufacturing countries. Those who defend this argument believe that there is no relationship between arms purchases that Gulf countries made and self-defence as none of the arms purchased have been used in wars that took place in the area. In your opinion, what are the reasons behind the dramatic increase of arms sales to Gulf countries? Have these arms purchases decreased the number of conflicts in the region or created appropriate environment for development in the area? Or have they further burdened the economies of these countries?*

Interviewee (A) confirms ‘that oil has a role in the emergence of some crises in the region’ (lines 138–39). He finds that the Middle East means mainly oil to some countries, and because of the importance of oil, conflicts between these countries have arisen in the region. He also believes that these crises, along with other ‘artificially-made crises that intimidate these countries have drained these revenues into unnecessary big and incredible arms deals’ (lines 157–58). He also thinks that ‘there is no connection between these arms purchases and self-defence’ because some Arab countries buy arms in great deals but have never used them to defend their land against any external threat (lines 158–61). He mentions that some countries have used arms against their own people, as Saddam Hussein did when he used his weapons against the Iraqi people (lines 86–89). Moreover, interviewee (A) believes that armament ‘affects development as armament takes a large amount of the budget’ (lines 21–22). He thinks ‘that the money spent to purchase arms could have been spent on development or on assisting other non-oil Arab countries’, but we find that it was spent on high levels of armament, putting an additional burden on the development of these countries and the region in general (lines 163–67).

Moreover, interviewee (A) thinks that ‘oil was an important factor in the Iranian-Iraqi war’ and it ‘fed crisis and wars in the region’ (lines 141–42). He also thinks that ‘the high levels of armament in the Gulf states has contributed to the outbreak of crises and created an appropriate climate for crisis in the region’ (lines 161–63). He believes that ‘this high level

of armament, which has not been used in the right way put an additional burden on the development of these countries and the region in general' (lines 165–67).

Interviewee (B) agrees with interviewee (A) about the role of oil in the outbreak and nature of conflict in the region. He finds, with no doubt, that 'conflict could have been less severe, had the oil not been there' (line 330). However, he finds that oil contributed to the end of the war and did not extend it. He says that 'the continuation of war for eight years and its impact on oil supplies, rise in prices as a result, and the failure to topple the regime in Iran as they had expected, all of these played an important role to intervene to stop the war and secure oil supplies' (lines 333–36). Moreover, interviewee (B) finds that the Gulf states buy arms not because they need them but because they are forced to do so as it is a condition in order to receive protection from the US and Western countries (lines 350–52). He mentions that the weapons that these countries buy are not commensurate with the extent of their need and that 'the stockpiling of such weapons in the Gulf region is no more than backup storage for Western forces to be used in the event of any conflict in the region' (lines 352–54).

Interviewee (C) finds that Iraq and Iran possess the second and third largest oil reserves in the world, and because of the strategic importance of oil, the US and Western countries wanted to contain these two oil-rich countries through a long war with no winner and no loser (lines 493–98). He believes that the Iraqi–Iranian war 'was the outcome of the policy of 'threat and protection' played by the United States' (lines 499–500). He thinks that this war lasted for eight years 'because of the interests of oil companies, and weapons companies which exhausted the two sides economically and militarily putting them under the entire control of the US, whose influence existed during the war' (lines 500–03). He also thinks that oil and weapon companies in Western countries have benefited not only from the eight-year war but also from the way the war ended (lines 504–06). Moreover, interviewee (C) agrees with interviewee (B) that 'there's no need for the Gulf countries to that high pace of armaments... It is well known that most of these countries do not use all their complex weapons properly. Instead, these weapons are stacked in warehouses in order to satisfy and please the United States and other weapon-producing countries' (lines 517–21).

Interviewee (D) finds that 'it is not oil per se which leads to wars but the way it is used and the quality of institutions that a country has in place' (lines 726–27). He thinks that 'whether oil is a blessing or a curse depends on the way it is being managed and the nature of the governments in place. Nobody can deny that while oil in most developing countries was a cause of corruption, wars, inertia, and violence, the same cannot be said about oil in Norway' (lines 723–26). Interviewee (D) agrees with the argument that arms-manufacturing countries sell arms to oil-rich countries to recycle the petrodollar. However, he finds that 'these governments tend to do that because they are not elected by their people so their legitimacy is in question and they try to legitimize themselves through the purchase of weapons thinking that external powers will protect them against internal and regional threats' (lines 741–742). He mentions that this might 'be true to some extent but in the long run the security of any society starts from within' (lines 752–743).

Interviewee (E) thinks that Arab oil has played an important role in supporting the Arab and Islamic countries and the Palestinian cause. It has also supported the passing of resolutions in the UN and the non-Aligned Movement. Arab oil was also used as a means of political and economic pressure during the Arab–Israeli war in 1973 to pass a Security Council resolution that condemned the Israeli occupation (lines 884–91). However, he finds that 'the importance of oil began to emerge gradually from the hands of the Arabs to become a curse after it made the Arab countries an arena of conflicts between the major international political forces' (lines 891–93). Interviewee (E) refers to the principle of Jimmy Carter in 1980, which considers the Gulf a strategic region to the US for its oil and states that no country hostile to the US should be allowed to be there (lines 954–57). He also refers to a speech of the US vice-President Dick Cheney, in which he warned that Saddam Hussein had a military power and 'could seek to control the entire Middle East and a large part of the global energy supply and thus threaten America's friends in the region directly' (lines 964–67). Interviewee (E) finds that the US did not think of overthrowing Saddam's regime until it became a threat to US access to the oil of the Gulf (lines 961–63).

Interviewee (E) also finds that it is the strategic importance of the Middle East and the interests of other powers in it that made the Iraq–Iran War last for eight years. He refers to US President Reagan, who said that 'the supply of Iraq with arms at times and Iran at another, is a matter of a higher state policy' (lines 1031–33). He also refers to the US

Foreign Minister Henry Kissinger, who says that the Iran–Iraq war is ‘the first war in history we hoped that no one would come out victorious, but that the two parties would be losers’ (lines 1033–35). He adds that ‘there have been throughout the eight years of war, no attempt by the United States nor the international community to stop it, and the two parties agreed to stop the war because they reached the satisfaction that the United States will not allow any party to achieve victory on the other side’ (lines 1042–1045). During the eight-year war, the US ignored all the information it had about the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein and facilitated the equipping of Iraq with arms through removing the name of Iraq from the list of states that sponsor terrorism and giving it a loan guarantee to buy arms. It also supplied Iraq with intelligence information that helped it attack Iran. But, with the end of Iraq’s war against the enemy of the US, Iraq was shown again as a repressive regime (lines 936–948).

Interviewee (F) finds that many arms contracts are made to please arms-manufacturing countries. He says that ‘one of the reasons why Kuwait purchased weapons from China, France, Britain, and the states which contributed to the passing of the UN resolutions or participated in the liberation of Kuwait, was that the purchase was some kind of consolation prize. For example, the cannon purchase from China was a consolation prize for its stance’ (lines 1107–10). Moreover, he believes that wars in the Middle East were tailored to justify selling arms. He conveys a statement from a senior German general that most of the ammunitions stored in Germany since World War II have become useless. The solution, according to the General, was to ‘throw them all on the heads of those crazy men in the Middle East: Al Kaddafi or Saddam’. Interviewee (F) comments on this, saying that this explains why ‘many of these weapons and missiles didn't explode’, suggesting it was because they were stored for a long time (lines 1111–19). Furthermore, he thinks that part of the reason for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the war that followed was to ‘despoil all the Saudi and Emirate surpluses of oil revenue ... The other part was due to Kuwait’s strong commitments to Arab and national issues. I believe there were those who were angry for those reasons as well’ (lines 1120–23).

From the answers that the interviewees have given to Qs7 and 8, I can conclude that there is an agreement among almost all interviewees that the strategic importance of oil has contributed to the outbreak of many conflicts in the Middle East which holds the biggest reserves of world oil. They find that many of the conflicts that exploded in the Middle East

would not have taken place had the region not been rich with oil, and they would not have lasted for so long had foreign powers not had interests in this oil-rich region. It is also agreed that the main superpowers have followed different means to guarantee the flow of oil. Two interviewees mention that they use oil as part of a 'threat and protection' policy and another finds it in supporting undemocratic regimes to stay in power in exchange for keeping the interests of the foreign powers in the region. A third interviewee finds that arms-manufacturing countries are interested in selling arms to recycle the petrodollar, regardless of whether these arms are used for interior oppression and violating human rights, for aggression and threatening regional peace, or are stocked in stores.

Oil is a strategic product, the importance of which has made the Middle East a key factor in the US's and the West's policies in the region (see 3.1.2).

It can be concluded that the situation in the Middle East can be seen as an outcome of the importance of oil and of foreign strategies to keep control of this oil-rich region; if the region was not rich with oil many of the conflicts that have taken place would not have happened, and those that did happen would not have lasted so long. The eight-year war between Iran and Iraq would not have started without the Iraqi military build-up, and the Gulf States would not have supported Iraq in this war if they had not believed that Iran was a threat to them. The US and other large powers would not have supported both Iran and Iraq with arms if they were not interested in prolonging the war, which was paid for by all the oil-rich countries in the region. Moreover, the US and other foreign powers would not have worked for a no-winner–no-loser end to this war if they had not been interested in keeping the seeds of conflict between the two countries. During the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq there were no international efforts to stop it and reach a permanent agreement. As a result, the war has been very costly, not only to Iraq and Iran but also to other Gulf States (see 3.1.2, 3.2.2 and 7.3). However, it was beneficial to arms companies, which have made huge arms deals, and to oil companies, which benefited from the increase in oil production to cover the cost of the war.

Furthermore, the Iraq–Iran War was one of the main reasons for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The war burdened the Iraqi economy very heavily and left it facing unbearable economic challenges. As a way out of the financial problem, Saddam Hussein thought of invading Kuwait in the hope that this would increase his oil exports and put him in a better

economic situation. Relying on the positive interpretation he received from the American ambassador in Iraq regarding his intention to annex Kuwait, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, putting Iraq under a further economic burden, and international sanctions. Kuwait was liberated with a US-led international war, but Saddam was allowed to come out of the war with enough military power to allow him to remain a threat to his people and the region. This point will be covered more in later questions.

Moreover, some of the interviewees find that there is a connection between oil revenue and military expenditure. Countries with higher oil revenue have made bigger arms deals than other countries with less oil revenue. However, they find that these countries were obliged to make these deals in return of protection from the US and other large powers. In order to justify this protection, an external threat, undemocratic regimes and violation of human rights, should always be there.

8.1.1.5 Iraq

In the case of Iraq we notice that despite the destructive results of its war against Iran and its defeat in the war to liberate Kuwait, as well as the many years of sanctions imposed on it, the Iraqi regime has remained in power. Q9 is designed to examine the real reasons behind this. These questions try to find answers to RQ5 and its sub-divisions.

9. Despite the destructive results of its war against Iran and its defeat in the war to liberate Kuwait, as well as many years of sanctions imposed on it, the Iraqi regime stayed in power. What do you think are the real reasons behind this? Does it relate to the power of the regime, or to the interests of some great powers to keep it in place?

10. Different justifications were given to the American war on Iraq. While the early titles of the war were 'Iraq's weapons of mass destruction,' and 'the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda', the late title was 'toppling the authoritarian regime of Saddam' which the USA and its allies considered a real threat to Iraq, the region and to international peace and security. This war had diverse consequences on the internal policy of the United States and has become a main slogan for the opponents of the American presidential candidates. It was also the reason behind the ousting of Tony Blair from his office. In your opinion, did the US resort to peaceful diplomacy

in dealing with the Iraqi crisis? Which is more secure for Iraq, the region and international peace and security: Iraq under Saddam or Iraq after Saddam? Accordingly, what do you think the real motives that stand behind this war and who has most benefited from it: the Iraqi people, the neighbouring countries to Iraq, the superpowers, oil and arms-manufacturing countries, or reconstruction companies?

In his reply to question 9, interviewee (A) considers that the Iraqi regime stayed in power despite the incitements it faced for two reasons. He says, 'in part it is due to oppression, brutality and dictatorship of the regime, and in another it is due to the interests of major powers' (lines 173–74). He believes that 'the war to [liberate Kuwait] was supposed to knock down the Iraqi regime which launched the invasion' (lines 175–76). He thinks that 'the Americans and other countries in the region had interest not to topple Saddam's regime so the Shiites and Iran will not be in power' (lines 177–78). Moreover, he thinks that because of their interests, the US and other great powers play a significant role in '[knocking] a regime down, to weaken another and to maintain a third' (lines 180–81).

Interviewee (B) agrees with interviewee (A) that without the support of the West Saddam's regime would not have continued to exist. He says that 'the regime of Saddam Hussein, after all the wars it waged and crises it provoked would not have been strong without the support of the West. When that support was lifted, the true strength of that regime appeared' (lines 360–62). He believes that the West decided to topple Saddam's regime after the end of the Cold War but 'what delayed that was the absence of an alternative which has the confidence of the West... because Saddam during his reign adopted the policy of abolishing the alternative, thus making the change take a longer time' (lines 364–67). Similarly, interviewee (C) believes that the continuation of Saddam's regime 'is due to the interests of powerful countries because the US was not with the collapse of the Iraqi regime unless it had a complete control of the way of change, selecting the alternative, and its continuing influence on the alternative regime' (lines 527–30).

Interviewee (D) also agrees with the other interviewees about the role of external factors in the change of Saddam Hussein's regime. However, he finds that this factor is important only where there are undemocratic regimes. He mentions that 'almost all governments of the region, which are not elected, have to depend on external powers to fill their legitimacy gap. The magnitude of this dependency, however, varies with time, the strength of the

regime, and the country location' (lines 750–53). He also agrees with interviewee (A) that Saddam 'crossed some red lines when [he] invaded Kuwait' (lines 753–54). Similarly, interviewee (E) believes that Saddam crossed some red lines with the invasion of Kuwait. He refers to what Dick Cheney said before the Armed Forces Commission of the US Senate following the invasion of Kuwait: 'Iraq controlled ten percent of the oil reserves of the world before the invasion of Kuwait, on the capture of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein has doubled the share of up to twenty percent of the known petrol reserves' (lines 970–44). However, he thinks that there was a plot running behind the scenes and refers to what Robert Fisk wrote in an article in the *Independent*, that he does not 'understand the reasons for the American bombing of bridges, electricity and oil in Iraq which led to significant casualties, rather than going for the liberation of Kuwait' (lines 1047–48). The US bombed Iraq for forty days, and in just one night it dropped eighty thousand tons of explosives on it (lines 1051–52). He believes that the US meant to make the war very costly and make 'Kuwait and Gulf states pay the bill until the weapon industry produces new weapons and offer jobs to their workers' (lines 1053–54).

Interviewee (F) also agrees with the other interviewees that the United States did not want to topple Saddam Hussein's regime. He tells a story that he heard from a Kuwaiti soldier who participated in the war to liberate Kuwait. He says that during the battles the American-led forces did not want to destroy the Iraqi military capabilities and they permitted the Iraqi Republican Guard who surrendered to go back to Iraq with their weapons (lines 1073–84).

From the answers given to question 9, I can conclude that there is a consensus about the role of the US and the West in supporting Saddam Hussein's regime. Some of the interviewees agree that the brutality of the regime also played a role in its continuation, but they think that this would not have been enough without the support of external powers. The relationship between the US and Saddam did not stop and there continued to be meetings between American and Iraqi officials. The eventual decision to go to war and topple the regime in Iraq was an American one, supported by the UK, and recently revealed documents showed that this war was agreed on between the US and the UK five months before the war, regardless of whether a second Security Council Resolution that allowed this war was passed or not (*Ames et al.* 2011). Different justifications were given for this war. While the early names of the war were 'Iraq's weapons of mass destruction',

and ‘the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda’, it was later referred to as ‘toppling the authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein’, which the US and its allies considered a real threat to Iraq, the region, and to international peace and security. These results strongly support the results of the questionnaire and the literature (see 7.5). Smith (2011) finds that ‘U.S. policymakers were less concerned with the desires and aspirations of Arab peoples than with those of their authoritarian regimes’ (p. 6).

The cost of the war on Iraq, on both the US and its allies, and on the Iraqi people, makes it very important to examine whether enough diplomatic efforts were made to deal with the Iraqi crisis, the motives behind the war, the sides that benefited from it, and whether the war has contributed to a safer Iraq or a more violent one. Question 10 is designed to examine the interviewees’ opinions on this issue.

Interviewee (A) finds that the war on Iraq was made under different titles. It was well known to the US and the West that Saddam had chemical weapons and he used them against Iran and his people long before the war, but there was no proof of any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Interviewee (A) also does not think that Saddam had any relationship with the al-Qaeda organization (lines 199–200). He also believes that the majority of the Iraqi people wanted to change Saddam’s regime, but unfortunately, the change did not happen the way it should have and did not bring about the results expected. He thinks that the ‘US succeeded to topple Saddam’s regime in the war, but after the war it did not have good diplomacy and right policy to address the crisis in Iraq and did not know how to handle the crisis or allow the people of Iraq to govern themselves. The US committed many mistakes and the Americans themselves are talking about these mistakes’ (lines 205–209). Moreover, interviewee (A) believes that ‘the beneficiaries of this war are certainly not the Iraqi people ... [but] neighbouring countries, major countries and arms and oil companies’ (lines 212–13).

Interviewee (B) does not believe in any of the titles raised for the war on Iraq. He thinks that the war was the result of the emergence of the US as the only superpower and its desire ‘to restructure the world ... [through] placing hands on the sources of oil as a strategic commodity and not as a commercial one’, and he finds that the invasion of Iraq comes under this scenario (lines 381–85). He also agrees with interviewee (A) that the

suffering of the Iraqi people did not end with the fall of Saddam Hussein because the war brought a bitter life to the Iraqi people and the region (lines 387–87).

Interviewee (C) considers that diplomatic efforts would not work with Saddam Hussein because he did not understand diplomatic language and ignored international policies. He finds that Saddam believes only in the predominance of the military solution. Interviewee (C) refers to how Saddam refused all the diplomatic efforts exerted to convince him to withdraw from Kuwait and kept insisting on the military solution. He did not even listen to any of the political figures and friends who advised him to withdraw from Kuwait, among whom the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, which was an ally and the biggest supplier of arms to Iraq (lines 550–565). Interviewee (C) finds that neither Iraq under Saddam nor Iraq after Saddam is safe. He mentions that ‘Saddam destroyed Iraq's military machine and re-construction was no longer possible because of the devastation of the Iraqi economy undergoing heavy debts’ (lines 572–76). Moreover, ‘the role of the post-Saddam Iraq is full of negatives and shortcomings. Sectarianism spread everywhere and sharing has become semi-official. The financial and administrative corruption has spread like an epidemic. Terrorism, in the illusion of fighting the US occupation, has also spread and has become a justification for occupation and an impediment to any development, killing unarmed Iraqis, including women, children and the elderly, which gave a justification for extending occupation longer and destroying the Iraqi economy and deepening sectarianism and corruption’ (lines 582–589).

Interviewee (D) believes that oil is the main reason for the American war on Iraq. He finds that the Americans failed to accomplish their job because of their limited experience of the region. As a result, ‘the countries of the region are the major losers from this war, as well as the US which lost its credibility in the region’ (lines 768–772).

In his answer to this question, interviewee (E) refers to the question of the US writer Michael Clary, who asked why the US went to war and about the motives of George Bush and his top advisors in facing such risks. He believes that if the US wants to fight terrorism, stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction or promote democracy, it has to go to other countries which are more important in terms of these goals. Iraq does not pose a nuclear threat to the US: there is no evidence of any connection between Saddam Hussein's regime and terrorists and fanatic groups, and there are more dictatorial

governments than Saddam's (lines 917–26). Interviewee (E) considers that the greatest losers from the American war on Iraq are the US and the Iraqi people. The removal of Saddam has enhanced the strength of terrorist and fanatic groups in Iraq and increased the anti-American sentiment all over the Arab and Muslim worlds (lines 927–935). He concludes that 'there are several reasons behind Bush's decision to go to war in Iraq. Certainly, it is not weapons of mass destruction or the threat of terrorism nor love of democracy. For Americans, the war will provide many jobs in the military, weapon factories or as representatives of US multinational companies and security companies. But this in turn will have a price for the United States, because it will impose a high military spending at the expense of other aspects and generate feelings of hostility to America' (lines 998–1004).

It is agreed among interviewees that reasons for the American war on Iraq bear no relation to the stated justifications. Saddam Hussein's regime has not been proved to have any relationship with al-Qaeda or to have weapons of mass destruction as the concerned committee declared before the war. As for the title of democracy, we have seen from the interviewees' answers to the questions on democracy that the US does not care about democracy and all it thinks about is its interests in the region. It supported Saddam when it had interests in supporting him, turned a blind eye to his use of chemical weapons against Iran and his people, and continued to have relationships with other more dictatorial regimes in the region (This point was discussed and supported with enough literature in section 6.3, following question 23)

The decision to attack Iraq was motivated by considerations of national interest and, as stated earlier in this chapter, it was agreed between the US and the UK five months before the war and before reaching a second UN Resolution to allow the war. Not enough time was given to attempts to negotiate a peaceful democracy or to make sure of the reasons for which the war was launched. The result was a heavy economic cost on the US and a disastrous economic, social, cultural, environmental, and developmental cost on Iraq. If there are benefits to be mentioned from this war it would be those that have been made by oil, arms-manufacturing and reconstruction companies. Through this war the US has also aimed to have control over Iraq's oil and to establish military bases in this oil-rich region, as well as to make huge arms sales deals with Iraq and the region.

It can also be said that this answer provides more supporting material to answer RQs, 5.4 and 5.5, because the arms sales to the Middle East have not stopped and are mainly provided by the US and European countries, and this contributed to the outbreak of most of the wars in the area. Iraq is the best example of this case. It was also found that the US and Europe benefited mostly from military expenditure and arms transfers.

8.1.1.6 Armament, Conflict, and Foreign Interests

If wars are very costly and have economic, social, cultural, environmental, and developmental impacts in the Middle East, why do wars continue to take place in the region and why aren't there enough diplomatic efforts to reach peaceful settlements to these conflicts? And who is benefiting from the continuation of these conflicts? Questions 11 and 12 are designed to examine the reasons behind the failure to reach a solution to the outstanding conflicts and disputes in the Middle East, and to reveal the countries that have benefited from the continuation of these conflicts and disputes. They also probe the factors that prevent an agreement from being reached on conventional arms similar to those on weapons of mass destruction, and examine the beneficiaries of the absence of such agreements. These questions try to find answers to RQ5 and its sub-divisions.

11. The Middle East has witnessed a number of armed conflicts such as: Arab-Israeli wars, first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war), the second Gulf War (Kuwait liberation war), war on Iraq and others. Do you think that there were enough diplomatic efforts to reach peaceful settlements for these conflicts? What is the impact of these conflicts on democracy, armament, and development in the area? Who benefited most from these conflicts? Are they the repressive regimes, USA, Israel, oil companies, arm-sales companies, or reconstruction companies?

12. Conventional arms sales stand as the biggest reason behind the bleeding of the Middle East economic resources. In your opinion, what are the reasons that prevent reaching an agreement on conventional arms control similar to those of mass destruction weapons? Who, in your opinion, benefited from the absence of such agreements, is it the arms-exporting countries, arms-sales companies or other parties?

In his answer to question 11, interviewee (A) finds that the crises and wars that took place in the Middle East '[did not receive] enough diplomatic efforts to prevent them or to reach peaceful solutions, because some powers benefitted from them' (lines 225–26). He thinks that the reason behind this is that 'these powers had interests in armament, wars, and creating crises or maintaining this dictatorial regime' (lines 226–27). Moreover, he finds that Israel is always at the top of the agenda of any foreign policy in the Middle East. The Iraqi–Iranian war, the war to liberate Kuwait, and the war on Iraq have all contributed to weakening countries that are considered opponents to Israel, as does the Camp David agreement which aimed at neutralizing the Egyptian army (lines 227–32). He concludes that 'arms and construction companies, Israel, regional countries and great powers have all benefited from this war on the expense of the people of the region and on the expense of development and real progress in the region in terms of economic, social and political stability' (lines 232–35).

Interviewee (B) finds that crises and wars have been 'used by dictatorships for decades to disable any real effort for the establishment of a democratic civilian regime in order to ensure their survival in power for the longest possible time' (lines 396–99). He agrees also that there are many beneficiaries from wars and conflicts, among which are repressive regimes, the US, Israel, oil companies, arms-sales companies and reconstruction companies, but the biggest loser is the people (lines 399–400).

Interviewee (C) agrees with interviewee (A) that neither of the wars that took place in the region received any diplomatic efforts to solve the problem peacefully. He also believes that future wars will not receive the necessary diplomatic efforts. He refers to what French President Charles de Gaulle said: 'if France would remain great as it is, it must find for itself oil that can be under its full control'. He finds that the same can also be applied to the US and other powers which have interests in oil. As a result, the oil-rich Middle East will be subject to the interests of many foreign powers and this will result in conflicts in the region (lines 600–30).

Interviewee (D) agrees with interviewee (B) that lack of democracy remains the main reason for conflicts and their consequences. He believes that when we 'do not have a government that represents the people as the case is in most of the Middle East, there is no

national interest to protect but a theft to be divided among the gang members both domestic and external' (lines 781–83).

Interviewee (E) believes that the conflict in the region is made to serve the strategic interests of the US and the West. He finds that the Iraqi–Iranian war came after the deterioration of Iran's relations with the US. 'Iraq and Iran are powerful states in the Gulf region and possess enormous economic potential and their rulers have aspirations outside of their borders' (lines 1023–25). Therefore, the US 'sought to ignite a war between them and make it stretch for the longest possible period and end without any one of them victorious and both countries come out exhausted after draining all their resources and destroying their economies' (lines 1025–1027). This situation 'will provide for the United States the right conditions to remain in the Gulf safe' (lines 1027–1028). Moreover, he finds that the war on Iraq came as a result 'of the repeated calls from Zionism, under the pressure of the US Zionist lobby to weaken the Arab situation and the position of the Palestinian resistance' (lines 1011–1013). Its purpose was also 'to promote a new US strategy which calls for the replacement of the international legitimacy and the will of the international community and with the US legitimacy and unilateralism in the world and achieve its national interests at the expense of other countries' (lines 1014–17) and 'to turn Iraq into a US base'.

Furthermore, interviewee (E) finds that the decrease in weapons sales after the Cold War disrupted the arms dealers. As a result, the 'Big Five' in the world (the permanent members of the Security Council), which are the largest producers and sellers of weapons, turned to developing countries to increase their arms sales (lines 1060–65). They found in the second Gulf War 'a golden opportunity for companies to dispose of a large stock of weapons and ammunition, and try new types of arms, aircraft and equipment, these companies achieved more arms sales after the war. Then came the US war on Afghanistan in which the United States disposed of the old weapons that were stored, this was a war cemetery in which these companies buried their wastes' (lines 1067–72). However, he finds that 'despite the Gulf armaments and huge arms expenditures, Gulf states still do not have any ability to deter any aggression without US help' (lines 1075–77).

From their answers to question 11, I can conclude that there is a general belief among all interviewees that the strategic importance of the oil-rich Middle East has made the region

subject to foreign policies that would guarantee control over oil resources, on the one hand, and help to recycle petrodollars through wars and what they require in the way of arms and reconstruction, on the other. However, two of the interviewees argue that this would not happen if the region had democratic regimes that prioritized the interests of their people. As a result, interviewees find that none of the wars that took place in the region received enough diplomatic efforts either to prevent them or to stop them quickly to minimize the losses. On the contrary, the US and some other Western countries have played an important role in nurturing the seeds of conflict in the region. In the case of the Arab–Israeli conflict, for example, they have continuously supported Israel, not only in the UN but also through weakening regimes that are regarded as hostile to Israel and putting pressure on some Arab regimes to have relations with Israel. The aim was to serve the strategic interest of their countries, and arms manufacturing countries. Hartung, the director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, rejects the arms lobby’s claims that ‘military expenditure is an incredible job creator’. He thinks that ‘preserving high levels of Pentagon spending at the expense of other programs results in a net reduction in jobs, not an increase’ and that the arms lobby puts ‘effort to scare us into spending more on the military than is needed to defend the country’. He mentions that the funds used in the military would create many more jobs were they used in other sectors. (Hartung 2011)

If the US was really interested in ending this conflict it would support efforts to reach a just agreement according to international law and the related Security Council resolutions. Moreover, it would not support dictatorial regimes. Interviewees also find that the strategy of weakening regimes that are hostile to Israel can be seen in the Iraq–Iran war, which weakened both Iraq and Iran, and later in the two wars on Iraq, which destroyed all its capabilities.

However, disputes and conflicts in the Middle East would not result in violent wars without the availability of weapons. There has been a non-stop transfer of arms to this region despite the national regulations in all arms-manufacturing countries not to transfer arms to areas of conflict.

Interviewee (A) finds that both arms-exporting countries and arms companies have interests in selling arms and that ‘one cannot separate significantly between the interests of

arms companies and the interests of arms-exporting countries' (lines 241–242). He has no doubt that both have interests to keep crises running 'in order to continue selling arms to these countries ... It is not in their interest to reach agreements to prevent or reduce arms purchases or to reach a genuine peace between these countries' (lines 244–46). Interviewee (B) has a different opinion. He finds that 'all countries need conventional weapons to defend themselves against any aggression, and the issue here is different from weapons of mass destruction' (lines 406–07).

Interviewee (C) finds that the implementation of Henry Kissinger's project in the region requires a continuous flow of arms and consequently hinders reaching an agreement on conventional arms. He believes that Kissinger's project aims at having control over the oil resources in the Middle East and absorbing the surpluses generated by the increased prices of oil in conflicts and unproductive patterns of consumption. The project relies on Israel as a strategic ally that should be supported to abort any efforts that might affect the full control of the US and the West on oil resources (lines 636–657). Interviewee (D) finds it is the absence of democracy that leads countries to buy arms. He mentions that 'when countries are ruled by thugs, looters, and illiterates, then we are not talking about nations whose decisions are in accordance to the needs and objectives of their people and therefore any external power can take advantage of these governments and share the bounties with them ... Corrupted regimes are subject to extortion by big powers, oil companies, and international institutions' (lines 789–94).

Interviewee (E) finds that easy flow of weapons is important for arms-manufacturing countries and arms companies. Any regulations or restraints on conventional arms would decrease arms sales and this would not be accepted by arms companies. He mentions that 'during the eight years of war, the arms market flourished, achieving imaginary profits for arms traders' (lines 1035–36). Moreover, he finds that the availability of arms plays an important role in the US's strategic interests in the region. He believes that Saddam Hussein's war against Iran was planned by the US and its partners, and, without the availability of arms, Saddam would not have been able to launch that war (lines 1038–39).

Interviewees find that arms companies and arms-manufacturing countries have interests in not reaching a comprehensive treaty on conventional arms sales. The strategic importance

of the oil-rich Middle East has made it subject to different foreign policies that have aimed at recycling the petrodollar in arms sales.

We have seen in section 2.4.2 that the US is the top arms-supplier country to developing countries and that five out of the top six arms-supplier countries to developing countries are permanent members in the UN Security Council. Moreover, section 2.4.6 show the increase in arms sales to Middle-East countries due to the wars that took place in the region: the Arab–Israeli war in 1973, the Iraqi–Iranian war 1980–1988, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the American war on Iraq in 2003. These wars necessitated not only the arms used in these wars, but also the military build-up that followed them. However, arms would not reach this region were there strict arms regulations or an effective global treaty that dealt with the international arms trade.

The negative impact of military expenditure and what it might lead to in terms of conflicts and wars have repeatedly been referred to by American presidents and officials. President Madison noted that war is the worst enemy to public liberty and warned of its impact on the economy of the US. President Eisenhower also expressed his fear about the impact of military spending on the US's economic strength and the role of military spending in creating wars. President Carter also referred to the contradiction in the US's policy in military expenditure and arms sales on the one side and its ideals of liberty, democracy, and peace, on the other, noting that the US's unrestrained spread of conventional weapons 'threaten stability in every region of the world' and that the US bears 'special responsibilities' and should take the lead in restraining its military sales (see 4.1). President Obama also promised in his presidential campaign a cut in the military expenditure of the US and to rewrite the rules that govern arms exports. However, nothing has been done and the US is still leading the world in military expenditure, world arms transfers and arms transfers to developing countries. As mentioned earlier, in section 4.1, Jeff Abramson, deputy director of the Arms Control Association, finds that 'there is an Obama arms bazaar going on' (quoted in Kimes 2011). Moreover, Loren Thomson, a veteran defence consultant, finds that 'Obama is much more favourably disposed to arms exports than any of the previous Democratic administrations' (quoted in Kimes 2011). Furthermore, Stockman (2011), who was appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 to run the Office of Management and Budget, finds 'very few, if anyone, in Congress, the National Security Council, the State or Defence Departments have even dared to publicly raise the

prospect of reducing the military establishment and its spending to offset the national debt'. He thinks that the possibility of a radical change in defence spending is not going to be available unless there is a profound change in foreign policy. He expresses his pessimism as 'profound disappointment' because of the lack of any 'serious debate about dramatic change in (US) imperialist foreign policy and war-making establishment in this'.

The globalization of arms production has made the existing arms regulations out of date, and made arms companies feel free to produce and sell weapons and military equipment to areas of conflict and governments that violate human rights without holding any responsibility. Moreover, some arms companies plan production facilities in other countries so that their exports will not be subject to any Code of Conduct. Chapter 5 shows that there have been always loopholes in the procedures taken to put stricter regulations on arms transfer, on the national and international levels and in the international community. As a result, conventional arms continue to go to areas of conflict and violators of human rights to feed conflict (see 4.3).

8.1.2 Analysis and Discussion of Interviews Type 2

The use of conventional arms has had catastrophic effects on human life and has left, through its direct and indirect results, millions of victims. In addition, it has ruined the infrastructure, and destroyed the cultural and social structures of the warring countries and wasted billions of dollars on purchasing weapons and for reconstruction and rehabilitation of what the war has damaged. Despite the fact that all the wars that have taken place in modern times, with the exception of the two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were waged using conventional weapons, conventional arms continue to reach areas of conflict. To further examine the points tackled in question 12, another set of questions was designed and asked of two senior diplomats who had experience in the UN. The aim of the following questions and the discussion that follows is to find answers to RQ1 and its subdivisions 1.1 and 1.2.

1. With the exception of the two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all the wars that took place in the modern era occurred using conventional weapons. They had a disastrous impact on human life and their direct and indirect results left millions of victims and destroyed the infrastructure, cultural and social structures of the warring countries wasted billions of dollars in the purchase of weapons or in the

reconstruction and rehabilitation of what the war damaged. This highlights the importance of reaching an agreement on conventional weapons. Through your experience at the United Nations, what is in your opinion the reasons for the failure to reach an agreement that prohibits the use of traditional arms as was the case with WMD (Weapons of mass destruction)?

2. The International Organization passed several resolutions calling for transparency in armaments and approved the bodies that document the size of military spending, armaments, and arms sales for each state. It also issued more than one statement on the relationship between armament and development and called for a reduction of military budget of all states and the exchange of information on military spending and arms deals that would help to reduce international tension incidence of crises. Do you think that the issue of conventional weapons has received sufficient attention at the international organization? Were the decisions and statements released by the United Nations and its organs and different agencies sufficient to control the production, use, trafficking, and spending on conventional weapons? What, in your view are the reason for the continuous arrival of weapons to many developing countries and crisis areas in the world?

3. Has the fact that the Security Council permanent members are the top exporters of conventional weapon impeded efforts to reach an agreement on conventional weapons?

The first question of the interview examines the reasons behind the failure to reach an agreement or a treaty that prohibits the use of conventional arms similar to that on weapons of mass destruction. In his reply to this question, interviewee (A) says that reaching an agreement that prohibits conventional arms has not been discussed in the UN because Article 51 of the Charter of the International Organization affirms the right of states to defend themselves. He mentions that there have been efforts to reach an agreement on the use of weapons. These efforts started in 2006 and were aimed at fighting the spread of conventional weapons, but he finds that these efforts are still in their early stages and need intensified efforts to be translated into an agreement in the UN that controls and regulates the production and use of these weapons (lines 1137–48). Interviewee (B) finds that conventional weapons have limited effects compared to weapons of mass destruction. He

thinks that the destructive effects of the two atomic bombs pushed the international community into reaching agreements that ban weapons of mass destruction. However, he finds that conventional weapons include a large range of weapons that have led to many wars and resulted in short- and long-term human and financial losses. He thinks that the impact of conventional weapons on development, particularly in developing countries, has been great, and this necessitates paying more attention to conventional weapons (lines 1241–45). Interviewee (B) also finds that there have been continuous efforts in the UN to control arms, but these efforts have not been sufficient to control the negative impact of weapons. He believes that ‘the agreements on conventional weapons contain gaps that allow weapons to reach any country in the world, whether it is a poor country or in violation of human rights, and in most cases this does not help any part to resolve the battle for its side’ (lines 1253–56). Moreover, he thinks that because ‘the main arms exporters are mainly the permanent member states of the Security Council ... therefore it is not expected for any agreement limiting the sale of conventional weapons or prohibiting their sale to crisis regions, poor countries, or developing countries to receive the required support’ (lines 1257–60). He thinks that this is due to the influence of arms companies in these countries, which lobby to issue national laws and regulations that facilitate and support the export of arms, regardless of whether they are to regions of crisis or countries that violate human rights (lines 1260–1263).

It is agreed by the two interviewees that conventional arms have destructive results on human life and that more efforts should be exerted to control the selling of arms to regions where they may feed conflict or affect development. However, while interviewee (A) believes that the efforts are still in their early stages, interviewee (B) thinks that it is difficult to reach any binding treaty that limits conventional arms sales. He believes that this is due to the fact that the top arms exporters are the permanent members in the UN Security Council, who are in most cases under pressure from their national arms-producing companies which lobby to have their business facilitated. As a result, we find that the UN has passed several resolutions calling for transparency in armaments and approved the bodies that document the size of military spending, armaments, and arms sales for each state. It has also issued more than one statement on the relationship between armament and development and called for a reduction of military budget of all states and the exchange of information on military spending and arms deals that would help to reduce international tension and the incidence of crises.

Yet we find that conventional arms have not stopped fuelling conflict and draining resources. Q2 is set to examine if conventional weapons have received sufficient attention in the international community and whether the decisions and statements released by the United Nations and its organs and different agencies are sufficient to control the production, use, trafficking, and spending on conventional weapons. It also examines the reasons for the continuous arrival of weapons in many developing countries and crisis areas in the world.

Interviewee (A) finds that 'conventional weapons received great interest by the international community, as their wide spread constitutes a major threat to international peace and security, and adversely affects the stability and sustainable development at local, national, regional and international levels' (lines 1161–64). The UN has had a great deal of discussion about conventional weapons, which resulted in a General Assembly Resolution in 2008 entitled 'General and Complete Disarmament: Transparency in Armament'. Four of the permanent members of the Security Council (Russia, France, the UK, and the US) voted in favour of this (lines 1164–1171). The resolution is regarded as a good contribution towards building confidence and enhancing transparency in military expenditure and arms sales, and consequently, establishing international peace and security (lines 1172–85). However, interviewee (A) finds that the continued flow of arms is due to the unending supply and demand for weapons, the illicit trafficking and brokering of weapons, and the lack of comprehensive global commitment to enforcing arms embargoes or preventing trafficking (lines 1188–1208). Unlike interviewee (A), interviewee (B) believes that conventional weapons have not received sufficient attention by the UN. He finds that the UN has issued many statements, documents and resolutions that highlighted the bad impact of military expenditure and arms sales on development and the outbreak of conflicts, but it did not deal with the essence of the problem. He believes that what is needed is a strict agreement that all countries are obliged to abide to. However, he thinks that failing to reach this agreement is due to the influence of arms companies and arms-manufacturing countries, which have interests in supporting arms companies because of the evolution in scientific research they introduce. He finds that military spending serves the military superiority of the country and supports its civil industry. Moreover, arms sales support the continuation of arms companies in their research without straining their governments with higher budgets (lines 1276–89).

Question 3 is designed to examine if there is any link between the top arms exporter countries being permanent members of the UN Security Council and the failure to reach an agreement on conventional weapons.

Interviewee (A) mentions that the United States of America, the largest arms exporter in the world, opposed the draft Convention. It is also the only country to vote against Resolutions No. 61/89 and 63/240 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, entitled 'Towards An Arms Trade Treaty: Development of International Standards for the Import of Conventional Weapons, Export and Transfer'. China and Russia abstained, whereas France and Britain voted for the resolution (lines 1212–17). Interviewee (A) also mentions that 'the seven countries that export most of the weapons belong to all of the Group of Eight most industrialized (G8)', and comments on this, saying that 'this spread of arms trade may explain the challenges facing the international community in order to reach agreement on the arms trade' (lines 1219–1223). Interviewee (B) finds that 'it has not reached the degree of disrupting any treaty because efforts have not been sufficient so far as to bring this issue to the International Organization' (lines 1293–95). However, he thinks that other factors have contributed to countries not reaching a treaty. He mentions that 'many countries considered armament legal after the prominence of the principle of force because of the absence of the role of the International Organization in maintaining international peace and security and leaving countries to resolve their disputes by weapons. Armament has become the title of the club of the big states or regional powers or countries which aspire to become permanent members in the UN Security Council' (lines 1295–1300).

In fact, the top spender and seller countries especially the US always try to find justifications for arms spending. Bergen (2011) confirms these views when stating that it is not a war on terror, but rather a long American war. In its military adventures, the US has created more terror at home and abroad. He argues that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US turned to its military to ensure full spectrum dominance and the neo-cons were waiting for the opportunity to put in place their global desires and they took advantage of the terrorist attacks of September 11th to create a new paradigm of fear within the US that would allow its military spending and military operations abroad.

International efforts and organizations such as the UN always failed to control armaments and arms sales despite the fact that this issue has always been present in the UN. The UN, passed many resolutions about the impact of military expenditure and arms transfers on development and international security, and set different devices and reporting instruments to achieve transparency in military expenditure and arms transfers (see 5.2.2, 5.2.3.2.1 and 5.2.4). However, the treaties reached have mainly concerned weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other particular types of conventional weapon. The result of this is that conventional weapons have been left unregulated and continue to find their way to undemocratic regimes, violators of human rights and areas of conflict in developing countries, igniting wars and draining human resources. There is not, to this date, any treaty that strictly regulates conventional arms and this is considered a serious problem due to the impact of military expenditure and arms transfers on human life, especially in developing countries. The many UN statements, documents and resolutions have lacked efficient instruments that could control military expenditure and arms transfers. The legally binding global agreements – the UN Firearms Protocol and the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime – both have their limitations.

Moreover, the national legislations and regulations, codes of conduct, and regional and international agreements have failed to put restraints on conventional weapons because they have been selective and subject to the strategic and economic interests of arms-manufacturing countries and arms-manufacturing companies. These efforts have been insufficient and riddled with loopholes and have consequently failed to reduce the figures in military expenditure and arms transfers despite the global financial crisis (see 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.5 and chapter 5), and to prevent the outbreak of conflicts and to curb the activities of trafficking and brokering arms.

Arms-producing countries have national laws that regulate arms transfers, the strongest and most comprehensive of which are those of the US. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 states that US arms transfers are to be used only for legitimate self-defence, internal security purposes and involvement in operations consistent with the UN Charter (Lumpe 1994). Moreover, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 bars military aid and arms sales to countries that demonstrate gross and consistent patterns of human rights abuses. Furthermore, the Export Administration Act of 1979 regulates the sale of items that could have civilian or military application. However, the SIPRI database reveals that the US has

transferred arms over the past decades to over 50 countries that do not comply with these Acts (SIPRI Database, accessed November, 2011). These arms transfers indicate that the US has played a major role in fuelling conflict in many parts of the world. Moreover, after September 11th President Bush offered military aid to allies in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan through the Foreign Military Financing Fund of 1961, despite the fact that many of these countries had previously been barred from receiving military aid because of nuclear testing, human rights abuses, or harbouring terrorists.

The end of the Cold War created hope that US government subsidies for arms exports would decline. On the contrary, the Clinton administration supported arms sales through taxpayer-backed grants, loans, and promotional activities on behalf of major arms-trading corporations, justifying this on strategic and economic grounds. He claimed that selling arms would foster military cooperation with potential allies, improve the balance of trade, create jobs, and keep arms production lines up and running. However, Hartung (1995) finds that the economic benefits of government-financed arms sales are greatly exaggerated and hold security risks such as arming potential adversaries, fuelling repression, and making wars more possible. In May of 1996, President Clinton's Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy suggested reducing or eliminating subsidies on a global basis, but instead of reducing it, the Clinton administration increased it (Nolan 1996, p.16; Hartung 1996).

Military expenditure in the US is strongly influenced by the arms companies, which have always lobbied to increase the defence budget. US military budgets have continuously been under the thumb of these companies, a situation that President Eisenhower warned about fifty years ago and which Stockman (2011) confirmed, as stated above. Moreover, many US presidents have adopted defence policies that increased military expenditure and facilitated arms sales. The increase in US military budget during the presidency of the first President Bush created an environment ripe for arms companies to make big money from both US military projects and arms sales abroad. 'The Big Three' military contractors – Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman – received the biggest share of the Pentagon's contracts during 2003. The biggest of these was Lockheed Martin, which received \$21.9 billion, an increase of \$4.9 billion from 2002 and \$7.2 billion from 2001. Boeing maintained its second place with \$17.3, up from \$4 billion in 2001. Northrop Grumman more than doubled its contracts in 2003 to reach \$11.1 billion, up from \$5.2

billion in 2001. However, the fastest growth in contracts during 2003 was achieved by Halliburton and Computer Sciences Corporation due to their involvement in Iraq and the war on terror. These companies, among other US arms companies, have been corporate contributors to the Centre of Security Policy, founded in 1998, which believes in 'peace through strength,' opposing international arms control agreements and promoting the deployment of an extensive missile defence system (Hartung 2004). Hartung finds that the high level of military expenditure during the Bush administration was due to the very extensive and longstanding ties between the policy makers in the Bush administration and the arms manufacturers, which have benefited from the security policy of a 'war without end' approach to foreign policy, the development of a missile defence 'shield', and a new generation of nuclear weapons.

8.2 Conclusion

Analysis of the interviews showed that undemocratic regimes in the region have contributed to its high military spending in many ways. Firstly, undemocratic regimes increase their military spending for internal and external reasons. Secondly, undemocratic regimes prefer to go to war, as President Saddam Hussein did, to solve existing problems rather than enter into negotiations or find peaceful solutions. Thirdly, undemocratic regimes care more about their rule than the interests of their people, and for this reason many make large arms deals with the top arms-exporting countries, especially the US, to guarantee their support. These arms deals are just to please these supplier countries, which benefit from the sales.

However, interviewees believe that the US would not support undemocratic regimes in the Middle East if it did not have interests in the region. Oil is a strategic commodity and it is very important for the US to have control over this resource-rich region. However, some interviewees find that the US's foreign policy in the region has not served its economic and strategic interests, but rather those of Israel and arms and oil companies in the US. They think that the US's foreign policy in the region has been strongly affected by the lobbies of these parties, and while these parties have benefited from the US's wars and support to dictatorships, the US has lost its credibility in the region, which is showing strong anti-Americanism and a growing movement of fundamentalism and terrorism as a result.

Interviewees also believe that the Israel occupation of Arab lands is a main reason for conflict in the Middle East. They believe that the Israeli occupation would not continue to exist if the US does not support Israel. This occupation has largely increased the military expenditure of many countries in the region, had a disastrous impact due to the number of wars, the number of people killed, orphaned or displaced, the resources wasted and the human rights violated. Instead of tackling the main reasons for conflict in the region, arms-producing countries flooded it with arms, making it more violent. However, interviewees believe that that this would not happen was not the region rich with oil.

Analysis of the interviews also shows that conventional weapons have been very costly, yet they continue to bleed the global economy. Interviewees believe that there has been no lack of national, regional, and international initiatives to control military expenditure and arms transfer, but there has been a lack of seriousness to reach a binding treaty that would strictly regulate conventional arms. All the initiatives produced had loopholes and deficiencies that caused them to fail to prevent weapons reaching areas of conflict and violators of human rights. On the contrary, arms transfer has been used by top arms-producing countries as a foreign policy to foster better relations with arms clients and to maintain their strategic and economic interests worldwide. Interviewees believe that the US's policy in arms sales reflects the interests of arms companies in benefiting from the military budget and the business they do in arms sales. These companies have continuously lobbied in the US presidential campaigns and in Congress and have invested good money to keep US military spending on the rise and justified, on the one hand, and to keep the business of arms transfer easy and profitable. For this reason, the initiatives to control arms were left weak, many policies that facilitate arms sales were adopted, different programmes that facilitate arms sales were approved, and the perfect conditions to ignite wars were created in different regions, especially in the oil-rich Middle East.

Finally, it can be said that the results of the analysis of the interviews support the results of the questionnaire analysis presented in Chapter Seven, and the literature reviewed in Chapter Three about the determinants of military expenditure and arms transfer. The also support the literature reviewed in Chapter Four about the reciprocal relationship between conflict, armament and development, and the literature in Chapter Five about the lack of serious international efforts to regulate conventional weapons.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

9.0 Introduction

We will also read again and again what Amnesty International said in 2006 after so many years of initiatives to put restraint on arms sales. It said:

‘Those who suffer the daily effects of armed violence need a tough Arms Trade Treaty. And they need it as swiftly as humanly possible. Worldwide, the hundreds of thousands of members of civil society groups who are supporting the call for an Arms Trade Treaty through the Control Arms campaign are expecting governments to act. The time has come to do so.’ (Amnesty International 2006)

Conventional arms are a long-discussed issue. There is no lack of initiatives and calls to regulate conventional arms, but there are interests in keeping conventional arms unregulated. The ruinous impacts of conventional weapons, especially in developing countries, urge the international community to reach an international arms trade treaty on conventional weapons.

Bearing this in mind, this PhD project was launched with the aim of showing the consequences of the lack of an international arms trade treaty on conventional weapons by shedding light on the increase in world military expenditure and the role of arms transfers to the Middle East and the policies adopted to facilitate these sales in creating the proper atmosphere for conflict and wars in the region. Furthermore, this research tries to support the international calls for the application of a strict international treaty on conventional weapons to control arms sales. Such a treaty would help not only to improve the lives of those suffering from armed aggression but also to realize democracy in a region where democracy, armament, wars, and development are so closely linked.

In this final chapter, I conclude the thesis by emphasizing the important issues discussed in it, summarizing the findings in terms of their relations to the research questions, and finally, recommending steps for developing a universal arms trade treaty.

9.1 Summary of the Findings in Relation to the Research Questions

The aim of this study, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is to investigate the reasons behind the lack of international treaties that regulate and strictly control arms sales. It also investigates the impact of the lack of arms sales regulation on conflict and development. It further attempts to show the relationship between the level of democracy and rate of arms sales in the Middle East, with particular reference to Iraq.

The extensive review of the literature showed that weapons continue to reach all the areas of conflict regardless of the kind of regime. Arms sales have become a kind of foreign policy, a business, and a means of prolonging the outstanding conflicts in the region, the biggest beneficiaries of which are the arms-manufacturing countries. It was also found that the Middle East has come to be the most violent region that has witnessed many wars, and now many revolutions, where conventional arms have been used widely. The Middle East is also the biggest market for conventional arms, but arms and wars have contributed negatively to the militarization of the region, lack of democracy, violation of human rights, and poverty.

In Chapters 2 research questions 2 and 3 are answered (see 1.7). Chapter 2 reveals that world military expenditure is on the increase despite the end of the Cold War, and shows that the top spender countries in different periods are the US, Russia, France, the UK, China, Germany, Japan, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and India (see 2.4.1). It also shows that military expenditure is expected to maintain its increasing trend despite the financial crises that have hit the world economy (see 2.2.4 and 2.2.5). Chapter 2 also reveals that there is not much difference between the names of the top spender countries and the top supplier ones (see 2.4.2). It also shows that the top supplier countries to developing countries are the US, Russia, France, the UK, China, and Germany, and that arms sales to these countries were on the increase throughout the last decade, apart from 2009 (see 2.4.2 and 2.4.5). The recognizable findings are: the US is the top spender country and it accounts for about 50% of world military expenditure (see 2.4. 4); the US spends more than the other top spender countries and more than the countries that are classified as hostile to the US (see 2.4.4); five out of the top six arms spenders and exporters to developing countries are the permanent members of the UN Security Council (see 2.4.3); the US constantly urges the other NATO and European countries to increase their military spending.

The findings in relation to RQ2 (If the main conventional rationale for military expenditure is related to international security, then has the end of the Cold War brought about a reduction in military expenditure and arms transfers?) indicate that world military expenditure increased consistently throughout the Cold War era. Nevertheless, its increase was unbalanced over the period: there were sharp increases during periods of wars followed by periods of decline and stability. It peaked in 1987 due to the heavy military accumulation. Furthermore, the findings also indicate that military expenditure in the Cold War era was a main concern for the two opposing blocs that had severe consequences on countries of both sides. However, the biggest effect was on the countries that belong to the Warsaw Pact where military expenditure replaced, in most cases, spending on the basic needs in these countries.

The discussion presented in Chapter 2 provided statistics and numbers that answered RQ3 and RQ 5.5. It was shown that UN Security Council permanent members continue to be the top spender countries, and the top arms sellers to developing countries, areas of conflict and oppressive regimes. This is done for the benefit of the economy of the seller countries, and not for the benefit of the recipient countries. Therefore, the UN Security Council permanent members stood against all the efforts made by the international organizations and societies to control conventional arms sales worldwide (see 5.2.1 and 5.2.2).

The results of the review in Chapter 4 answered RQ5 (Do military expenditure and arms sales contribute to world development and international security?). It was found that military expenditure and arms sales might contribute to world development and international security, however, they have a different impact on developed and developing countries (RQ 5.1 Does military expenditure have the same impact on developed and developing countries?). For example, low-income countries spend much less on the military than high-income ones, yet the highest defence burden is found in low-income countries. This was related to the fact that military machines are imported and not produced domestically, so financial resources are used to sponsor military expenditure, resulting in a reduction in provision for the basic needs of the country. The case was found to be different for developed countries because military expenditure participates in the scientific and technical development of the country. It also provides a partial subsidy to the military industry, and is paid for by increased taxation or diversion of funds from other sectors. In general, it can be concluded that military expenditure is a major obstacle to

development and welfare which burdens a country's budget, and diverts resources that could be used for developmental purposes.

It was also found that high military expenditure in developed countries has led to high costs of wars, financial problems, human capital, labour migration, and long-term expansion of the stock. The cost of war, on the other hand, varied from one country to another, and this is related to differences in the nature of the war and the way governments respond to it (see 4.3 and 4.4). In economies with a large subsistence sector, people are able to keep their necessary nourishment by retreating into subsistence, while in countries that are heavily dependent on exchange for their food, people are more susceptible to trade troubles.

The first and main research question with its sub-questions was answered in Chapter 5 (RQ1 If conventional weapons have been used in most wars and cost humanity a high price, why has a binding comprehensive treaty on the production and stockpiling of this kind of weapon not been reached yet? RQ 1.1 Are the current arms exports regulations and codes of conduct enough to control military expenditure and arms transfer? RQ1.2 Have the efforts to control arms export been effective in regulating military expenditure and arms transfer?). An extensive review of almost all the international attempts, agreements, and codes of conduct that have taken place so far was undertaken in Chapter 5 in an attempt to study their efficiency. The chapter also presented arguments which demonstrate the consequences of the lack of a comprehensive conventional arms transfer treaty. Chapter 8 also studied the impact of the lack of an international treaty regulating arms sales on development and democracy in the Middle East.

In general, it was found that despite the use of conventional weapons in most wars, which have cost humanity a high price, a binding comprehensive treaty on the production, transfer and stockpiling of conventional weapons has not yet been reached. Instead of a comprehensive ban on the production, stockpiling and trade of weapons, weak attempts have been made to watch cases of excessive accumulation of arms, or unregulated exports to areas of conflict and repressive regimes, the main issue that negatively affects human lives. The biggest obstacle to a comprehensive treaty was posed by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These are the major exporters, who believe that the presence of such a treaty would jeopardize their economic and strategic

interests. Therefore, in the process of discussing restrictions, they continued to supply arms to many regions of conflict (see 5.2 and 8.1.2). It was expected that these countries would be committed to working individually and jointly to reach an international treaty, but instead they continued their immature arms transfers, fuelling violent conflict and destabilizing sustainable development. Subsequently, there was a tragic lack of urgency on the part of most governments around the world to address the problem of conventional weapons in order to reach a conventional-arms treaty.

According to UNDP (2000), conventional weapons were used in the 1990s to kill more than 5 million people and force 50 million to flee their homes. The report estimated that 500,000 people are killed on average every year, approximately 1,300 people each day, not to mention the number of people who are unlawfully tortured, displaced, raped, injured, and abused. The main victims are the poor, and over 300,000 child soldiers are involved in conflicts. Therefore, it can be said that the loss resulting from the lack of an international treaty that strictly controls and regulates conventional arms sales is huge.

It was shown in Chapters 5 and 8 (see 5.2.3.2 and 8.1.2) that all the efforts made to put restraints on conventional arms sales are incomplete and insufficient to reach an effective conclusion. There have been many attempts at the national, regional, and international levels to regulate the arms trade. The national legalizations, codes of conduct, unilateral and regional initiatives, treaties and the UN resolutions, documents and statements have all failed to stop arms from reaching areas of conflict, violators of human rights and terrorist groups. This is due to the fact that all these efforts have not been obligatory, have been riddled with loopholes, and lacked the enforcement tools that would make them effective. That is to say, that effectiveness of most of the agreements (see Chapter 5) depends on the countries' continued desire to abide by the terms. If a country no longer wishes to adhere to the terms, they seek either to avoid them secretly or end the country's participation in the treaty. This can be done without fear of consequences, because the whole issue is a matter of politics rather than adherence to the terms. Such loopholes in the law have facilitated the trafficking arms to governments and areas of conflict, consequently increasing the chances of armed violence, and prolonging the life of wars. Enforcement of arms control agreements has also proven insufficient.

The determinants and justifications of military expenditure and military transfer in the Middle East are presented in Chapter 3. The Chapter offers justification for the data analysis presented in Chapters 7 and 8. It also provides answers to RQ3: Why do the UN Security Council permanent members continue to be the top spender countries, and the top arm sellers to developing countries and areas of conflict? And why have they not looked for other, peaceful means to solve the outstanding conflicts in the region? The results support the answers reached in Chapter two to this question.

Chapters 3, 7 and 8 also provide answers to RQ4 and its sub-divisions: Does the level of democracy in the Middle East affect the level of armament or vice versa? RQ4.1: What is the impact of the level of democracy on regional cooperation, military spending, and development? RQ 4.2 Do arms exports to the region help promote democracy or fortify dictatorships? It is shown that poor democracy in the Middle East has contributed to the high levels of armament in the region. In return, this has negatively affected the regional cooperation, increased military spending, and had a bad impact on development in the region (see sections 3.2.1.1, 3.1.4, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.1.3, 7.2.2, 8.1.1.1 and 8.1.1.2).

Chapters 3, 7 and 8 also provide answers to RQ5.3: Does conflict in the Middle East contribute to the increase in its military expenditure? RQ 5.4: Can high military expenditure in the Middle East help these countries defend themselves? and RQ 5.6 Who is paying for and benefiting from military expenditure and arms transfers? Results of the data analysis provided answers to these questions and showed that conflict in the Middle East has increased military expenditure in the region (see sections 3.1.1, 3.1.4.1, 2.4.1.2, 7.5 and 8.1.1.6). It has also shown that arms seller countries, and arms companies have benefited from selling arms, whereas the economy and development of the arms-buyer countries have to pay the price (see sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 7.3, 8.1.1.4 and 8.1.1.5).

Chapters 3, 7 and 8 also give answers to RQ 6, and its sub-divisions. The findings showed that the US's policy towards that region has contributed to the growth of hostility and extremism in the region (see 3.1.4.2, 7.2.3 and 8.1.1.1). It has also shown that democracy is considered to be very important and essential in the process of armament, development, and conflict in the Middle East.

It was found that almost all Gulf countries buy arms not because they need them but to please arms-manufacturing countries and receive their protection. The huge military expenditure of the Gulf countries did not help them defend Kuwait when Iraq invaded it and also did not help to liberate it from Iraq. The huge oil revenue has contributed to a great extent to the militarization of the Middle East and to making it the number one client of arms for many decades. The important question that was raised during the discussions throughout the thesis, but especially in Chapter 7, was: did any of these arms purchases succeed in ending any of the outstanding disputes in the area such as the Iranian–Iraqi war or Israeli–Palestinian conflicts? The answer did not give this fact any credit; it was simply no. The biggest beneficiaries were some leaders who used the weapons to stay in power, repress internal oppositions and suppress uprisings which sought more freedom and democracy, such as those in Iraq under Saddam, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria.

The principal arms-manufacturing countries, which are the five permanent members of the Security Council, gained a lot from the large arms deals that reached millions of dollars. Thus, as mentioned above, these countries fuelled conflicts and prolonged them. The presence of Israel, and its occupation of Arab lands, made the Middle East a case of permanent outstanding disputes. This established an excuse for bleeding Middle-Eastern resources to pile up arms to defend their lands against Israel. In general, most of the wars and conflicts that took place in the area ended with no winner or loser. The only winners were the oil companies and building contractors who have reaped the outcome of these wars.

Lack of democracy, religious antagonism, the existence of the Israeli occupation, the US's unlimited and unconditional support for Israel against Arabs, all these had devastating impacts on Middle-Eastern countries: their resources were bled for military arms sales, and the decision of going to war was easy to take, as we can see in the case of Saddam Hussein when he decided to go to war against Iran, and then to invade Kuwait. This atmosphere resulted in widespread anti-Americanism and public sympathy with Islamic fundamental movements, which were looked on as saviours. The new Arab revolutions the Arab Spring against many regimes indicate that people will no longer accept the current situation. They will no longer accept the dictatorships supported by US and Western powers, which work most of the time to achieve an agenda that opposes the aspirations and national benefit of the country. It might be the case that these regimes will be banned and in some countries

ousted by Islamic movements. Therefore, and as a reaction, people have supported these movements and brought them to power, as in Tunisia. It is expected that the newly achieved political power will work almost in the opposite direction of the previous regimes, but the future is still cloudy and hard to predict. Had the previous regimes been democratic, they would have allowed multi-party systems and allowed people to express their opinions without fear. This would not have led to the chaos the Arab area witnesses now. Had the US and most Western countries not supported all the rights and wrongs of Israel, denying Palestinian and Arab rights, there would not be this anti-Americanism in the Arab and Islamic world, and consequently, Islamic and fundamentalists would not have received public support and sympathy.

9.2 Arms without Borders: On the Way to a Comprehensive Conventional Weapons Convention

This thesis describes the irresponsible and poorly regulated conventional arms trade. By demonstrating cases in the Middle East and presenting figures it shows how this trade contributes to serious violations of human rights. In particular, this thesis seeks to demonstrate why the establishment of a Comprehensive Conventional Weapons Convention (CCWC) is an urgent obligation, and how such a treaty could save lives, preserve economies, and enhance respect for human rights. The previous chapters show that the protracted delay, or even failure to establish this agreement with conditions that demand respect for human rights will, conversely, have dire outcomes for the lives of millions all around the world. Each year, 'at least a third of a million people are killed directly with conventional weapons and many more die, are injured, abused, forcibly displaced and bereaved as a result of armed violence. Rapidly widening loopholes in national controls demonstrate how this globalised trade also needs global rules. The time for an effective International Arms Trade Treaty is now' (Amnesty International 2006, p.1).

Trade in conventional arms continues to work in an illegal and immoral vacuum and this would not happen if the superpowers did not benefit from it. Globalization has altered the arms trade, and now arms can move easily and swiftly to areas of conflict. Arms companies, functioning from a growing number of locations, now source elements from across the world. Their products are gathered in countries with lax controls, weapons get

into the wrong hands. The reasons are related to the lack of effective measures or a binding treaty restricting conventional arms sales, similar to those for weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the responsibility is completely left to the national laws of each state to prevent the illegal production, possession, and trading in arms on their territory.

The current laws, agreements, and initiatives still lack effective mechanisms to supervise the movement of arms and what they are used for. There are no strict regulations on arms movements, or cooperation, or supervision of private international arms sales to prevent dealers from engaging in unlawful arms trafficking. International controls, enforcement, and national legislations have shown that they are inadequate to stop arms flooding into war zones. Therefore, some countries have allowed their national arms companies to license their products in countries that have weaker control on arms sales. This practice allows arms exporters effectively to avoid controls prohibiting arms sales there.

In May 2006, a report was published by Amnesty International and Trans Arms US with the title *Dead on Time – Arms Transportation, Brokering and the Threat to Human Rights*, which demonstrated the irregularities in the supply of arms to Iraq by US private contractors. In this report it was mentioned that a major Pentagon arms supplier in the US used an overseas airline company which had been previously cited by UN investigators for being involved in illegal arms trafficking to Liberia. The airline company ‘was used with a chain of other foreign subcontractors in the delivery of large quantities of small arms, light weapons and ammunition from the Balkans to Iraq, and especially from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Iraq between 31 July 2004 and 30 June 2005’ (Amnesty International 2008, p. 44). The US Department of Defense has yet to reply satisfactorily to these concerns. Other deals have since been made and no justifications were presented.

9.3 Conclusion: Towards an International Binding Treaty

Arriving at this stage of my thesis, I can say that the discussion and the examples presented show that an international arms control treaty on conventional weapons is desperately needed. On 6 December 2006, the majority of United Nations member states voted in the General Assembly to start working on the elaboration of a universal arms trade treaty (UATT). Resolution 61/89, ‘adopted by the UN General Assembly with the support of 153 States and only one State against, is a landmark step towards a more effective regulation of

the international arms trade' (Amnesty International 2008, p. 5). The vote indicates that a global political tendency exists to address the poorly regulated trade in arms, a trade which contributed greatly to serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Recently, a treaty to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons was negotiated in a global conference under the auspices of the UN during the period July 2–27, 2012 in New York, but did not materialise. Members failed to reach an agreement, and the Executive Director of Amnesty International US considered Obama's Administration responsible for the scuttling of the progress made at the conference.

In general, what is needed is a conventional arms control treaty with the following essential terms:

- There are temporary binding prohibitions on arms transfers to certain countries under UN embargoes. However, impartial arms embargoes have rarely succeeded in stopping a sufficient re-supply of arms to conflict parties to sustain the embargoed conflict. Unless a significant change in the military dynamics occurs, there will hardly ever be amendments in the status quo political calculations of the combatants. Cases of conflicts demonstrated in the literature review (see Chapters Two and Three), and the results of the data analyses (see Chapters Seven and Eight) show that impartial arms embargoes do prolong conflicts. Therefore, what is needed is an international arms control treaty that should be enforced sufficiently to reduce the supply of weapons to the belligerent parties.
- Arms control treaties so far enclose ambiguities and loopholes, and in some places regional controls do not exist. Therefore, arms manufacturers and traders succeed in transferring legally and illegally weapons to the weakest combatants exploiting weaknesses in national controls. Thus, the treaty should be based on international law and the principles of human rights, and have the instruments that guarantee the commitment of all countries to it regardless of their national legislations.
- Arms trade is international by its very nature; therefore, to be successful, the arms treaty must be introduced and enforced at the international level. National, regional and international efforts should be integrated to stop illicit transfer of weapons because

currently they are not mutually consistent. As such this treaty should be implemented and recognized by domestic laws and international policies. Current activities of controlling conventional weapons transfer is woefully low, so the minimal obligation on governments is to raise the number of reports to the UN about cases of arms transfer.

- I think that the UN Security Council (UNSC) is the best platform for this treaty, and that it should take the initiative by passing a binding resolution calling on all countries to agree on a blanket treaty on conventional arms. The importance of the role of the Security Council arises from the fact that the permanent members of the Council are the top arms spender and supplier countries on the one hand, and from the role entrusted to the Security Council in preserving international peace and security on the other. Such an initiative would represent the reliability of the UNSC permanent members to find an end to the risks involved in arms trade; especially as they are the top spender countries. However, the UN permanent members are still far away from achieving an international arms control treaty on conventional weapons which is particularly important for civil societies in Africa, the Middle East and Central America, among other regions, which are facing armed conflicts, wasted resources and human crises.
- Finally, such a treaty should insist on the role allocated to the Security Council to solve the outstanding conflicts by peaceful means and according to the international law. This, of course, would bring to mind a sensitive issue about the necessity to reform the UN to make decision making a moral issue that is built on a common interest rather than personal benefits. Otherwise, as long it has oil and as long as oil remains a strategic commodity, the Middle East will continue to be a place of continuous wars and the biggest market for arms. In a review in the *Sunday Times Culture Magazine* on 30 October 2011, remembering a conversation he had more than thirty years ago, Max Hastings said: ‘Back in the 1970s after the first big oil crunch, I met the then head of British defence sales, who urged me to stop criticising in print our big weapon deliveries to Arab states. “This is by far the best means we shall ever find of recycling petro-dollars,” he said. “We are creating in the Middle East the biggest arms junkyard the world will ever see – but that’s their problem, not ours”’ (Hamilton 2011, p. 46).

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Appendix 1

Arabic and English Versions of the Questionnaire

Introduction

The questionnaire is designed to shed some light on the anticipation and reaction of people in Middle Eastern countries in respect of the relationship between armament, conflict and development in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. It focuses mainly on the United States' deterrents of arms transfers as well as the deterrents of military expenditure in Middle Eastern countries and the impact of both on conflict and development on the Middle East and Iraq.

The responses to this questionnaire will be used in my doctoral research at the University of Exeter. All the information given will be treated anonymously and confidentially, and will be used for research purposes only. To enable me process the information in the questionnaire, it is important that you either sign the copy you fill it in or write the word 'accept'.

I would be grateful if you could possibly complete this questionnaire and return it back in the enclosed stamped and addressed envelope within ten days. Should you require any further clarification, please do not hesitate to call me or email me on the following email address: a.alloush@exeter.ac.uk

Questionnaire

- ❖ **Gender:** Male Female
- ❖ **Age:** 18-30 30-50 50 & over
- ❖ **Country of origin:**
- ❖ **Current nationality:**
- ❖ **Country of residence:**
- ❖ **Educational background:**
- None School Abstain
- College, University Higher Education (PhD, MA, etc) Abstain
- ❖ **Cultural background:**
- Religion (Muslim, Christian, etc...) Abstain
 - Sect (Sunni, Shi'a, Catholic, etc...) Abstain
 - Ethnicity (Arab, Kurd, etc...) Abstain
1. **Which is your favourite movie?**
- Syrian movie Egyptian movie British movie Abstain
- French movie American movie Abstain
2. **Do you prefer American products to Arabic ones?**
- Yes No Abstain
3. **Do you like fast food (eg. McDonalds, Pizza Hut, KFC and Burger King)?**
- Yes No Abstain
4. **Do you think the USA is a nice place to live in?**
- Yes No Abstain

5. To what extent do you think your country is democratic?

(Less than 40 %, between 40-60%, 60-80%, 80% and over) Abstain

6. To what extent do Arab regimes represent their peoples?

(Less than 40 %, between 40-60%, 60-80%, 80% and over) Abstain

7. Do you support the American project of democratization in the Arab world?

Yes No Abstain

8. A real process of democratization in the Arab world bring to power:

Anti- American government Pro-American government Abstain

9. A real process of democratization in the Arab world bring to power:

Secular regimes Islamic regimes Abstain

10. Which do you think would work better for the Arab world?

Arab unity Islamic rule Democratic regimes Abstain

11. Would you support an Islamic government in your country?

Yes No Abstain

12. Which of the following does Saudi Arabia have the strongest relationship with?

Jordan Iran Iraq
 Yemen UK USA Abstain

13. Which of the following does Kuwait have the strongest relationship with?

Iran Iraq Qatar
 Syria UK USA Abstain

14. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to the Arab countries?

Iran Israel Turkey
 UK USA Abstain

15. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to your country?

- Iran Israel Turkey
 UK USA Abstain

16. Did you support Iraq's war against Iran?

- Yes No Abstain

17. Which country won the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?

- Iraq Iran None Abstain

18. Which countries most benefited from the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?

- China Russia Turkey Saudi Arabia
 Syria UK USA Abstain

19. Did you support Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait?

- Yes No Abstain

20. Which countries most benefited from the second Gulf War (Liberation of Kuwait)?

- China Russia Turkey Saudi Arabia
 Syria UK USA Abstain

21. The Iraqi regime stayed in power despite its defeat in the Gulf War and a decade of sanctions. Did the USA want that?

- Yes No Abstain

22. Did the USA attempt to end the 12-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN through peaceful diplomacy?

- Yes No Abstain

23. Did Saddam Hussein's regime pose a 'mortal threat' to the USA?

- Yes No Abstain

24. How do you regard the third Gulf War (War on Iraq)?

- Liberation war Occupation war War on terrorism Abstain

25. Who has most benefited from this war?

Iraqi people US arms and oil companies USA
 Israel Fanatical and terrorist groups Abstain

26. Which is more secure and stable?

Iraq under Saddam Iraq after Saddam Abstain

27. Which poses more threat to the Middle East countries?

Iraq under Saddam Iraq after Saddam Abstain

28. Did the trial and the execution of Saddam aim to ?

Achieve justice Fuel sects' conflict Disgrace Arab feelings Abstain

29. To what extent do you think that the colonial heritage in the Middle East contributes to the outstanding conflicts?

(Less than 40 %, between 40-60%, 60-80%, 80% and over) Abstain

30. To what extent do you think that the Israeli occupation of Arab land has contributed to the armament and underdevelopment of the Middle East?

(Less than 40 %, between 40-60%, 60-80%, 80% and over) Abstain

31. Did the existing borders between Middle Eastern countries contribute to conflict between them?

Yes No Abstain

32. Do you think that the 'divide and rule' policy is working in the Arab Middle East?

Yes No Abstain

33. Do you support your country's military spending?

Yes No Abstain

34. Gulf states have spent billions of dollars on arms in the last five decades. Have these arms purchases helped these countries defend themselves?

Yes No Abstain

35. Most Gulf countries buy arms to

- Defend themselves against external threats
- Please arms-manufacturing countries Abstain

36. Did military spending in Middle Eastern countries contribute to the development of these countries?

- Yes No Abstain

37. Did military spending in Iraq contribute to the development or underdevelopment of Iraq?

- Development of Iraq Underdevelopment of Iraq Abstain

38. Did military spending in the Middle East prevent or increase the possibility of conflict?

- Prevent the possibility of conflict Increase the possibility of conflict Abstain

39. The USA has good relations with most of the Gulf countries, because...

- These states are rich with oil. There are mutual interests for both Abstain

40. Does the United State's foreign policy in the Middle East serve its strategic interests in the region?

- Yes No Abstain

41. To what extent do you think the Arab countries have benefited from oil revenue?

- (Less than 40%, between 40-60%, 60-80%, 80% and over) Abstain

42. Which would you support: the USA or Al Qaeda?

- USA Al Qaeda None Abstain

43. Which is the appropriate description for each of the following?

(Arrogant, democratic, terrorist, evil, revolutionary)

USA: democratic terrorist evil arrogant

Hezbollah sectarian terrorist evil revolutionary

Hamas democratic terrorist evil revolutionary

Al-Qaeda fundamental terrorist evil revolutionary Abstain

44. Do you agree that I use your responses in my research and in any future publication hereafter?

Yes

No

- Divide and rule means fostering enmity and distrust between people, or local rulers so conflicts start between them, consequently they become weak and easy to be controlled by others.
- Colonial heritage refers to the impact of the colonial period on the occupied land after this occupation.
- The American project of democratization means the American's attempts to make differences in the civic life of the people, their values, motivations and if necessary their regimes. This project justifies using power or launching wars against others to justify their end.

----- **Thank you** -----

:
الاستبيان إلى إلقاء بعض الضوء على توقعات وردود فعل العرب تجاه السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية وتأثير يهدف هذا الإنفاق العسكري والإتجار بالسلح على الصراعات والتنمية في الشرق الأوسط. وهو جزء من بحث دكتوراه في جامعة اكستر البريطانية. ستعتبر المعلومات المقدمة في هذا الاستبيان خاصة وستستخدم لأغراض البحث حصراً وسيتم التعامل معها بغض النظر عن اسماء المشاركين ، وستستخدم لأغراض البحث حصراً.
هذا الإستبيان وإعادته إلى العنوان الإلكتروني التالي خلال 10 أيام a.alloush@exeter.ac.uk

الإستبيان:

- ❖ : يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
 - ❖ : يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
 - ❖ : يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
 - ❖ الجنسية الحالية : يرجى تحديد الحقل وكتابة الجواب
 - ❖ بلد الإقامة الحالية: يرجى تحديد الحقل وكتابة الجواب
 - ❖ الخلفية العلمية: يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
 - ❖ الخلفية الثقافية :
 - الديانة: يرجى تحديد الحقل وكتـ
 - المذهب: (مسلم، مسيحي، الخ)
 - القومية: يرجى تحديد الحقل وكتابة الجواب (سني، شيعي، كاثوليك، الخ)
 - العربية، كردية، أرمنية، الخ) يرجى تحديد الحقل وكتابة الجواب
1. ما هي السينما المفضلة لك ؟
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
2. هل تفضل السلع الامركية على السلع العربية ؟
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

3. هل تحب الوجبات السريعة (مثل ماكدونالد، بيتزا هوت، بيرغر كنغ، الخ)

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

4. هل تظن ان امريكا مكان جيد للعيش؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

5. إلى اي درجة تعتبر أن بلدك ديمقراطي؟

6. إلى اي درجة تعتبر أن الأنظمة العربية تمثل شعوبها؟

7. هل تؤيد المشروع الأمريكي لنشر الديمقراطية في العالم العربي؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

8. هل تعتقد أن ديمقراطية حقيقية في العالم العربي ستجلب إلى السلطة

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

9. هل تعتقد أن ديمقراطية حقيقية في العالم العربي ستجلب إلى السلطة

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

10. ما هو الخيار الأفضل للعالم

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

11. هل تؤيد قيام نظام حكم اسلامي في بلدك؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

12. اي الدول التالية ترتبط بعلاقات أقوى مع السعودية ؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

13. أي الدول التالية ترتبط بعلاقات أقوى مع الكويت ؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

14. أي الدول التالية تشكل خطراً أكبر على الدول العربية ؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

15. أي الدول التالية تشكل خطراً أكبر على بلدك ؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

16. هل أيدت حرب العراق على ايران ؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

17. من هي الدولة التي كسبت الحرب (الحرب العراقية الايرانية)

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

18. اي الدول كانت اكثر استفادة من حرب الخليج الاولى

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

19. هل أيدت الغزو العراقي للكويت ؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

20. اي الدول التالية حققت اكبر استفادة من حرب تحرير الكويت ؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

21. استمر النظام العراقي في السلطة بالرغم من الهزيمة في حرب الخليج الثانية وعشر سنوات من العقوبات. هل

كان هذا بإرادة من الولايات المتحدة؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

22. هل حاولت الولايات المتحدة إنهاء 12 سنة من المواجهة بين العراق والأمم المتحدة عبر الدبلوماسية السلمية ؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

23. هل كان يشكل نظام صدام حسين خطراً حقيقياً على الولايات المتحدة؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

24. هل تنظر إلى حرب الخليج الثالثة () على أنها

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

25. من هو المستفيد من حرب الخليج الثالثة؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

26. أيهما أكثر أماناً واستقراراً ؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

27. أيهما يشكل تهديدا اكبر لدول الشرق الاوسط؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

28. هل محاكمة صدام حسين كان بهدف

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

29. في الشرق الأوسط علاقة بالأزمات القائمة حالياً فيه؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

30. ان الاحتلال الاسرائيلي للاراضي العربية قد ساهم في تسليح وتخلف الشرق الأوسط ؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

31. هل تساهم الحدود القائمة بين دول الشرق الاوسط في نشوء نزاعات بين هذه الدول ؟
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
32. هل تعتقد أن سياسة ،
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
33. هل تؤيد سياسة الانفاق العسكري
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
34. انفقت دول الخليج العربي مليارات الدولارات على السلاح في العقود الخمسة الماضية. هل ساعدت صفقات الاسلحة هذه دول الخليج في الدفاع عن نفسها؟
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
35. الكثير من دول الخليج تشتري السلاح
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
36. هل ساهم الانفاق العسكري في دول الشرق الاوسط في تنمية دوله ؟
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
37. هل ساهم الانفاق العسكري المرتفع في العراق في تنمية العراق ام عاق تقدمه ؟
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
38. هل ساهم الإنفاق العسكري في الشرق الأوسط في التقليل أم زيادة احتمال حصول الأزمات ؟
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
39. للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية علاقات جيدة مع معظم دول الخليج. هل سبب ذلك
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
40. هل تخدم السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط مصالحها الاستراتيجية في المنطقة؟
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
41. ما هي نسبة استفادة الأنظمة العربية من عائدات النفط؟
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب
42. أيهما تدعم: الولايات المتحدة أم تنظيم القاعدة ؟
يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

43. ما هي الصفة الأنسب لكل من التالي؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب الولايات المتحدة :

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب حزب الله :

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب :

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب :

44. هل توافق على استخدام أجوبتك في بحثي وفي منشورات مستقبلية؟

يرجى الضغط هنا لاختيار الجواب

1 **Appendix 2**

2 **Transcripts of the Interviews**

3 **I- Interviews Type One**

4 **An Interview with A**

5 **Democracy**

6 **Q. 1: All Middle Eastern countries are classified, in accordance with more than one**
7 **criterion of democracy, as states of absolute rule, or states of limited subjection of the**
8 **individuals. Do you see a link between the deterioration of the level of democracy in**
9 **this region and the conflicts that erupted in it on the one hand, and the high level of**
10 **armament, on the other? What, in your opinion, is the impact of this on progress and**
11 **development of the Middle East?**

12 **Answer to question 1:** I believe that democracy does not exist in its real meaning in the
13 region. As you know, they are authoritarian governments or dictatorial ones and elections
14 are in fact not as they should be. But, at the same time, I think that conflicts in the region
15 affect democracy. Democracy needs political stability and social independence in general,
16 but on the other hand, high levels of armaments affect democracy. We see that the Arab
17 Gulf states and other countries buy weapons. But, why do they buy these weapons if they
18 do not use them. The increasing levels of armaments and the huge arms deals with the
19 major arms exporters have their political influence. I think that all the factors included in
20 your question affect the question of democracy negatively in general, and this, in turn,
21 affects development as armament takes a large amount of the budget and this affects
22 development. A good percentage of the budget is supposed to go for development and
23 when this does not happen, development is affected. We find that large part of the budget
24 goes to armament, security sector, and the army and this affects development, education,
25 health, education and the environment.

26 **Q. 2: What are the causes of the growing of Islamic movements in the Middle East? Is**
27 **there a relationship between them and democracy in the Arab world or the Israeli**
28 **occupation or American policy towards the region? Do you think that a real**
29 **democracy in the Arab world will bring to power secular governments or Islamic**
30 **ones? Governments that are loyal to the United States or opposed to it?**

31 **Answer to question 2:** The growing of the Islamic movements in the Middle East has a
32 relation with all the factors mentioned in the question. The lack of democracy and the
33 failure of other political parties made people turn towards Islamic extremist movements.

34 In addition, the Israeli occupation has a substantial influence because the Israeli practices
35 against the people of the region plays role in the growth of Islamic movements in many
36 places, and Gaza is an example. The American policy in the region, with regret, supports
37 the Israeli's point of view. The Israeli's point of view creates negative reactions and a lot of
38 people believe that the Islamic movements may, to a large extent, meet their wishes. They
39 believe that Islamic policies may succeed in solving their problems. So, the Israeli policy
40 on the one hand, and the American policy and its unlimited support to Israel, on the other
41 hand, in addition to the lack of real democracy in this region, all these things play a role in
42 the growth of Islamic movements. I think that real and democratic elections in the Arab
43 countries will bring to power, I reckon, anti- American governments because the problem
44 of the United States in the region is that its policies are wrong. I do not know how this
45 policy will be in the era of Obama. The policy of the United States in the region cares
46 mainly for the Israeli interests and this makes it negative because of the Arab- Israeli
47 conflict. Therefore, I think that democratic elections would bring to power governments
48 that are opposed to the United States and not loyal ones.

49 **Q 3: How do you look at the American project of democratization in the Arab world?**
50 **What credibility it has and how do you see the interaction of the Arab street with it?**

51 **Answer to question 3:** I think that the American project to spread democracy in the Arab
52 world is not successful. We have seen what happened in Iraq. The Americans said that they
53 would spread democracy in the area and Iraq will be set as an example, but what we have
54 seen during the past six years in Iraqi was just suffering, problems and more casualties.
55 The situation in Iraq has affected the American credibility. Generally speaking, I believe
56 that the American project and stance of human rights and Arab is a political question. For
57 example, the United States supports a certain Arab government regardless how corrupt or
58 bad if it is an ally of it, and we have many governments of this kind in the area. The US
59 establishes its relationships with these governments not on how good, democratic or
60 humane to their people, but on how good allies they are, so I think the American alliance is
61 based on political consideration and not on the level of democracy and observation of
62 human rights in these countries. Therefore, the interaction of the Arab countries and people
63 with the American project, as I think, will be negative and people will not believe in it. The

64 credibility of the American project to spread democracy in the Arab world is very weak in
65 my opinion.

66 **Inter-Arab relationships**

67 **Q 4: Inter-Arab relationships are plagued by many disputes, especially between**
68 **neighbouring countries. In many cases, the relationship between Arab countries and**
69 **foreign ones is stronger than their relation with neighbouring Arab countries. What**
70 **are the reasons for this? Is it related to the colonial period, or ‘the divide and rule’**
71 **policy or the theory of ‘conspiracy’? What is the impact of this reality on of strained**
72 **relations, armaments, and development in the region?**

73 **Answer to question 4:** I think that Arab- Arab relations are weak, due to the fact that
74 governments in the Arab countries are not representative of their peoples because they did
75 not come to power through democratic means. These governments care only about how to
76 stay in power by all means and how to strengthen their positions. As a result, many
77 conflicts and disputes arise between Arab countries which become subject to disagreements
78 between one leader and another and this regime and that one, over affaires that have
79 nothing to do with the interests of their peoples. The colonial era, of course, has one a role
80 and the ‘divide and rule’ policy has another. Of course the external influence plays a role
81 but the greater importance is internal. If there are Arab governments that take into accounts
82 the interests of their peoples, and if these governments are democratically elected, they
83 would find a way to reach an understanding and solve their problems by dialogue. The
84 external influence is present, but the internal one may be stronger than it.

85 The Arab-Arab relations are strained due to the absence of democracy. Some Arab
86 countries buy weapons in great deals that amount to billions of dollars, but they have not
87 used them to defend their lands. They might have used them against their own peoples. We
88 saw that Saddam Hussein used all his weapons against the Iraqi people.

89 I think that armaments, conflicts and crises, and spending the budget on armaments,
90 conflicts and crises affect development, because development is only possible in the
91 presence of democracy. When priority is given to matters of concern to citizens such as
92 reform, education, environment and social development will occur. So, armament has a
93 negative impact on development.

94 **Occupation:**

95 **Q. 5: The Israeli occupation of the Arab territories was the cause of many wars in the**
96 **region. What is the impact of the Israeli occupation on armaments and development**
97 **in the region?**

98 **Answer to question 5:** Colonialism increases militarization and leads to lack of
99 development because many Arab countries find Israeli-Arabic conflict and Israeli
100 occupation an excuse for great arm deals from America and other countries.

101 So, I think that the Israeli occupation increases armament although these weapons are not
102 used against Israel. In return this affects development negatively, because when armament
103 is on the increase, budgets will be spent in this field more than in others...I mean it affects
104 development negatively therefore, armament agitates or increases the exiting conflict.
105 Whether the Israeli occupation is taken seriously or used as an excuse, it will increase
106 budget expenditure on armaments and on increasing crises and problems instead of
107 spending them on development. Above all, this occupation and these conflicts between the
108 Arabs and the Israelis create a permanent crisis and constant tension, political stability will
109 be weak and the democratic situation in the country also weak. Therefore, when the
110 stability and democracy in the country are weak, development is affected negatively.

111 **Q. 6: Iraq has become after the US war an arena of violence and a gathering of**
112 **numerous terrorist and fundamentalist groups. What is the impact of the US**
113 **occupation of Iraq on the ongoing violence, and the future prospects of development?**

114 **Answer to question 6:** The US occupation of Iraq and the war that took place in Iraq in
115 general and the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime was in favour of the Iraqi people because
116 Saddam's regime was a radical, and a bloody one. It was a regime that did not
117 communicate with his people and fought them. This reality has made the vast majority of
118 Iraqi work to get rid of this regime. But the problem is that this change was done by war,
119 and every war, without doubt, has its obligations and consequences. The American
120 occupation and the war led to an increase in violence and in the number of terrorists coming
121 to Iraq. Before the US occupation there was a state terrorism against its people, but after the
122 occupation, we have seen terrorists from Al-Qaida and many others flooding into Iraq
123 under the pretext of fighting the Americans and others. This also led to an increase in
124 violence and to extreme violence in Iraq, and also to an increase of the suffering of Iraqi
125 citizens. This of course happened at the expense of development, stability and the Iraqi
126 citizens. This had very negative implications that Iraq is still suffering from. Hundreds of
127 thousands of victims were killed by terrorism, war or many other forms, and this had
128 negative impacts on Iraq. Iraq is suffering and we are looking for salvation with the help of
129 others, and with the unity of the Iraqi forces ...we hope to get rid of this tragic situation
130 which was created by the policies of Saddam Hussein's regime and by the war on Iraq after
131 the collapse of the regime.

132 **Oil**

133 **Q. 7: There are those who say that oil is not only the reason for the emergence of some**
134 **crises in the Middle East in the past decades, but also the cause of the failure to reach**
135 **a quick and lasting settlement to these crises. Do you think that the Iraqi-Iranian war**
136 **would have lasted for eight years hadn't some countries and oil and arms companies**
137 **benefited from that?**

138 **Answer to question 7:** I think, without any doubt, that oil has a role in the emergence of
139 some crises in the region. Many countries and parties showed that oil is the main reason for
140 their interest in our region. Conflicts between countries move to this area for this reason. I
141 think that oil was an important factor in the Iranian-Iraqi war. Moreover, conflicts over
142 interest have fed crises and wars in the region. The same interests sometimes meet and this
143 lead to a cease of these conflicts.

144 **Q. 8: The military spending of Gulf countries increases dramatically with the increase**
145 **of oil prices and oil revenue. It is argued that this is due to the policy of arms-**
146 **manufacturing countries in recycling petrodollar in the form of arms deals and the**
147 **rich Gulf countries sign these contracts not because they need these deals but to please**
148 **arms-manufacturing countries. Those who defend this argument believe that there is**
149 **no relationship between arms purchases that Gulf countries made and self-defence as**
150 **none of the arms purchased have been used in wars that took place in the area. In**
151 **your opinion, what are the reasons behind the dramatic increase of arms- sales to Gulf**
152 **countries? Have theses arms purchases decreased the number of conflicts in the**
153 **region or created appropriate environment for development in the area? Or have**
154 **they further burdened the economies of these countries?**

155 **Answer to question 8:** The price of oil has increased and great strides happened. Oil
156 revenues in the Gulf States and oil-producing countries have increased substantially, but at
157 the same time we find that the crises or the artificially-made crises that intimidate these
158 countries have drained these revenues into unnecessary big and incredible arms deals.
159 These arms have not even been used, neither against Iran nor against Israel, or other parties
160 that might threaten these countries. So, I think there is no connection between these arm
161 purchases and self-defence. I think that the high levels of armament in the Gulf States has
162 contributed to the outbreak of crises and created an appropriate climate for crisis in the
163 region. I believe that the money spent to purchase arms could have been spent on
164 development or on assisting other non-oil Arab countries which are vulnerable and in need
165 of assistance. Generally speaking, this high level of armament, which has not been used in

166 the right way put an additional burden on the development of these countries and the region
167 in general.

168 **Iraq**

169 **Q. 9: Despite the destructive results of its war against Iran and its defeat in the war to**
170 **liberate Kuwait, as well as many years of sanctions imposed on it, the Iraqi regime**
171 **stayed in power. What do you think are the real reasons behind this? Does it relate to**
172 **the power of the regime, or to the interests of some great powers to keep it in place?**

173 **Answer to question 9:** In part it is due to oppression, brutality and dictatorship of the
174 regime, and in another it is due to the interests of major powers. For example, in 1991 when
175 Iraq entered Kuwait, many countries took part in the war to liberate Kuwait, and this war
176 was supposed to knock down the Iraqi regime which launched the invasion. But at the end
177 we found that the Americans and other countries in the region had interest not to topple
178 Saddam's regime so the Shiites and Iran will not be in power, as they say, but there may be
179 other reasons. The interests of great power play a significant role in this issue. They might
180 find that it is in their interest to knock a regime down, to weaken another and to maintain a
181 third. These interests have played a role without any doubt.

182 **Q. 10: Different justifications were given to the American War on Iraq. While the**
183 **early titles of the war were 'Iraq's weapons of mass destruction,' and 'the relationship**
184 **between Iraq and al-Qaeda', the late title was 'toppling the authoritarian regime of**
185 **Saddam which the US and its allies considered a real threat to Iraq, the region and to**
186 **international peace and security. This war had diverse consequences on the internal**
187 **policy of the United States and has become a main slogan for the opponents of the**
188 **American presidential candidates. It was also the reason behind the ousting of Tony**
189 **Blair from his office. In your opinion, did the US resort to peaceful diplomacy in**
190 **dealing with the Iraqi crisis? Which is more secure for Iraq, the region and**
191 **international peace and security: Iraq under Saddam or Iraq after Saddam?**
192 **Accordingly, what do you think the real motives that stand behind this war and who**
193 **has most benefited from it: the Iraqi people, the neighbouring countries to Iraq, the**
194 **superpowers, oil and arms-manufacturing countries, or reconstruction companies?**

195 **Answer to question 10:** The term justifications of the U.S. war on Iraq varied. They spoke
196 about weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had chemical weapons and used them against his
197 own people and other countries: against Iran and against Kurdish people in Iraq. But when
198 they said that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq they have not been able to find
199 these weapons. However, I don't think that Iraq during Saddam Hussein's time had a

200 relationship with the terrorist Al-Qaida organization. After the fall of Saddam's regime al-
201 Qaeda came to Iraq, but we did not hear that the Iraqi regime had a relationship with al
202 Qaeda before that. Iraqi oppositions wanted to overthrow the regime and the majority the
203 Iraqi people wanted that, still the regime did not change its policies for to cater for the
204 interests of its people which suffered a lot. This led to the war which had its repercussions
205 on the internal policy of the US, on Iraq and the region in general. I think that the US
206 succeeded to topple Saddam's regime in the war, but after the war it did not have good
207 diplomacy and right policy to address the crisis in Iraq and did not know how to handle the
208 crisis or allow the people of Iraq to govern themselves. The US committed many mistakes
209 and the Americans themselves are talking about these mistakes in the present time. In my
210 opinion ... the Iraqi people suffered from Saddam Hussein's regime, from Iraq under
211 Saddam and Iraq after Saddam and they are still suffering. Therefore, I believe that the
212 beneficiaries of this war are certainly not the Iraqi people. They are the neighbouring
213 countries, major countries, and arms and oil companies. All those benefited from this war,
214 but certainly not the Iraqi people.

215 Armament, the break out of conflicts, and foreign interests

216 **Q. 11: The Middle East has witnessed a number of armed conflicts such as: Arab-**
217 **Israeli wars, first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war), the second Gulf War (Kuwait**
218 **liberation war), war on Iraq and others. Do you think that there were enough**
219 **diplomatic efforts to reach peaceful settlements for these conflicts? What is the impact**
220 **of these conflicts on democracy, armament, and development in the area? Who**
221 **benefited most from these conflicts? Are they the repressive regimes, US, Israel, oil**
222 **companies, arm-sales companies, or reconstruction companies?**

223 **Answer to question 11:** I think that the Middle East had witnessed many conflicts such as
224 the wars between the Arabs and Israel, and the first and second Gulf Wars. However, these
225 crises and wars had not received enough diplomatic efforts to prevent them or to reach
226 peaceful solutions because some powers benefitted from them. These powers had interests
227 in armament, wars, and creating crises or maintaining this dictatorial regime. Israel also
228 benefitted greatly from the Iraqi war on Kuwait and the Iranian-Iraqi war and the recent
229 American war on Iraq. Israel was also afraid of the Egyptian regime and the Egyptian army,
230 but it managed to neutralize the army at Camp David. The Iraqi army is very weak now
231 after the recent war. So I think that Israel benefitted from the crises in the region because it
232 doesn't want the region to be united or to be strong. Arms and construction companies,
233 Israel, regional countries and great powers have all benefited from this war on the expense

234 of the people of the region and on the expense of development and real progress in the
235 region in terms of economical, social and political stability.

236 **Q. 12: Conventional arm-sales stand as the biggest reason behind the bleeding of the**
237 **Middle East economic resources. In your opinion, what are the reasons that prevent**
238 **reaching an agreement on conventional arms similar to those on weapons of mass**
239 **destruction? Who, in your opinion, benefited from the absence of such an agreement?**
240 **Is it arms-exporting countries, arms companies or other parties?**

241 **Answer to question 12:** In my opinion, one cannot separate significantly between the
242 interests of arms companies and the interests of arms exporting countries, because the
243 interests of these countries overlapped to a large extent and they have, no doubt, an interest
244 to keep these crises in order to continue selling arms to these countries. So it is not in their
245 interest to reach agreements to prevent or reduce arms purchases or to reach a genuine
246 peace between these countries. Arms-exporting countries and companies have interests in
247 this, and I do not distinguish between their interests.

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249 **An Interview with B**

250 **Democracy**

251 **Q. 1: All Middle Eastern countries are classified, in accordance with more than one**
252 **criterion of democracy, as states of absolute rule, or states of limited subjection of the**
253 **individuals. Do you see a link between the deterioration of the level of democracy in**
254 **this region and the conflicts that erupted in it on the one hand, and the high level of**
255 **armament, on the other? What, in your opinion, is the impact of this on progress and**
256 **development of the Middle East?**

257 **Answer to question 1:** I believe that the absence of democracy in any region results in a
258 state of chaos and imbalance and helps the spread of financial and administrative corruption
259 which leaves its mark on society and leads to a feeling of injustice that, if increased, may
260 result in crises and conflicts which affect the development process, especially in some
261 countries which allocate a large part of its budget to enhance military capabilities to face
262 internal or external threats, and this in turn will exhaust the State Treasury and affect the
263 welfare of the individual and society.

264 **Q. 2: What are the causes of the growing of Islamic movements in the Middle East? Is**
265 **there a relationship between them and democracy in the Arab world or the Israeli**
266 **occupation or American policy towards the region? Do you think that a real**

267 **democracy in the Arab world will bring to power secular governments or Islamic**
268 **governments? Governments that are loyal to the United States or opposed to it?**

269 **Answer to question 2:** The failure of the national trend (secular), which took power in
270 various forms since the independence of the Middle East countries, and its inability to
271 provide solutions to the problems facing society, whether economic or social or even to
272 achieve the slogans it adopts for defending the homeland and liberating the territories, all
273 these helped the Islamic forces to take advantage of the clear failure and tried to present
274 themselves as savior and argue that the solution lies only in Islam. And its adoption of
275 slogans that face the Israeli and American projects was well received by the public. True
276 democracy is the best solution, whatever the results are. The Islamists might win in the first
277 stage in reaction to current regimes, but they are not equipped to cope with the running
278 development in the world. The possibility of the victory of the secularist trend in the second
279 stage is very likely after the fall of the holiness of the Islamic trend and its apparent
280 inability to keep pace with development and solve the problems facing society, especially if
281 the secularist trend tries to benefit from past mistakes and put forward a democratic
282 program and adopted the rotation of power peacefully. True democracy does not
283 necessarily bring anti-Western governments because the interests of the West intersect in
284 many areas with Arabic interests.

285 **Q. 3: How do you look at the American project of democratization in the Arab world?**
286 **What credibility has it got and how do you see the interaction of the Arab street with**
287 **it?**

288 **Answer to question 3:** Democracy is not a recipe imported from abroad. It's a gradual
289 evolution and depends on a variety of circumstances and factors that are commensurate
290 with the requirements of each state with a belief in the importance of the democratic way to
291 solve society's problems. The American project has lost its credibility and does not possess
292 the support of the Arab street because of its double stands. At the time of promoting
293 democracy, the US supports dictatorial, royal and hereditary regimes which oppress people
294 and lack the most basic elements of a modern state, let alone democracy.

295 **Arab-Arab relations**

296 **Q. 4: In the relations between the Arab Middle Eastern countries there is a lot of**
297 **differences, especially between neighbouring countries. In many cases, the**
298 **relationship between an Arab country with a foreign country is stronger than its**
299 **relations with a neighbouring country. What are the reasons for this? Is this related to**
300 **the colonial epoch and 'divide and rule' policy? or to the theory of 'conspiracy'? What**

301 **is the impact of this reality on the strained relations, armaments and development in**
302 **the region?**

303 **Answer to question 4:** The Middle East occupies a key position and possesses enormous
304 wealth, and there is no interest for the West in general and America in particular for
305 establishment friendly relations between the countries of the region. As any coordination or
306 agreement between these countries poses a threat to Israel and limits the looting of their
307 wealth, therefore, the atmosphere must always be tense among these countries.

308 **Occupation**

309 **Q. 5: The Israeli occupation of Arab lands was the cause of many wars in the region.**
310 **What is the impact of Israeli occupation on armament and development in the region?**

311 **Answer to question 5:** The continuing Israeli occupation is a major burden on the budgets
312 of the frontline states because a large portion of their resources is spent on armament and
313 affects their development projects.

314 **Q. 6: Iraq has become after the war by the U.S. into an arena of violence and a**
315 **gathering place for many terrorist groups and fundamentalists. What is the impact of**
316 **the U.S. occupation of Iraq on the ongoing violence in Iraq and the prospects of**
317 **development?**

318 **Answer to question 6:** Violence in Iraq was there before the US occupation, but it was
319 state-led violence against citizens and against the neighbouring countries. And the regime
320 of Saddam Hussein, despite the murder and oppression it exercised, was supported by the
321 US administration and the West in general. Then, after the occupation, violence moved to
322 several destinations and what used to be practiced secretly came out into the open.

323 **Oil**

324 **Q. 7: There are those who say that oil is not only reason behind the breakout of some**
325 **crises in the Middle East in the past decades, but also the failure to reach a quick and**
326 **lasting settlements to these crises. Do you think that the Iran-Iraq could have**
327 **continued for a long time without the interference of the oil countries and arms**
328 **companies and their interests?**

329 **Answer to question 7:** Wealth and power are the most important causes of the conflict. No
330 doubt, the conflict could have been less severe, had the oil not been there. When the Iran-
331 Iraq war began, it was believed by the circles which planned it that it will be a quick war to
332 topple the new Islamic regime of anti-West Iran which, according to their belief, constitutes
333 a threat to the stability of the region. But the continuation of war for eight years and its
334 impact on oil supplies, rise in prices as a result, and the failure to topple the regime in Iran

335 as they had expected, all of these played an important role to intervene to stop the war and
336 secure oil supplies.

337 **Q. 8: With higher prices of oil and increased revenues, military spending of the Gulf**
338 **States increased. There are those who find that it is the policy of the arms producing**
339 **countries to use the petrodollars in arms transactions in the region, and the Gulf's oil**
340 **countries may be forced to hold weapons deals with the major powers, not because of**
341 **the need for such deals, but to please them. In their view, there is no connection**
342 **between these transactions and the self-defence of these countries, as the weapons in**
343 **the Gulf, the weapons were not used in any of the crises in the region. In your opinion,**
344 **what are the justifications of the huge arms deals of the Gulf States? Do you see that**
345 **these arms contributed to the reduction of crises and created a suitable climate for**
346 **development in the region, or they were extra burden on them?**

347 **Answer to question 8:** The small Gulf States, some of which do not exceed the number of
348 a military division cannot play any military role in the region. And because the region is
349 very important and vital to Western interests and because of the need of Western countries
350 to ensure their protection without incurring excessive military expenditures, these countries
351 force these states to buy weapons that are not commensurate with their size or need. The
352 stockpiling of such weapons in the Gulf region is no more than backup storage for Western
353 forces to be used in the event of any conflict in the region, and this saves them time to
354 transfer these arms and saves time and cuts expenditures.

355 **Iraq**

356 **Q. 9: Despite the destructive results of its war against Iran and its defeat in the war to**
357 **liberate Kuwait, as well as many years of sanctions imposed on it, the Iraqi regime**
358 **stayed in power. What do you think are the real reasons behind this? Does it relate to**
359 **the power of the regime, or to the interests of some great powers to keep it in place?**

360 **Answer to question 1:** The regime of Saddam Hussein, after all the wars it waged and
361 crises it provoked would not have been strong without the support of the West. When that
362 support was lifted, the true strength of that regime appeared. It was decided to topple this
363 regime in 1991, having exhausted its raison d'être and its role ended after the end of the
364 Cold War. What delayed that was the absence of an alternative which has the confidence of
365 the West. The years between 1991-2003 were the stage of the preparation of the alternative
366 because Saddam during his reign adopted the policy of abolishing the alternative, thus
367 making the change take a longer time.

368 **Q. 10: Different justifications were given to the American War on Iraq. While the**
369 **early titles of the war were ‘Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction,’ and ‘the relationship**
370 **between Iraq and al-Qaeda’, the late title was ‘toppling the authoritarian regime of**
371 **Saddam which the US and its allies considered a real threat to Iraq, the region and to**
372 **international peace and security. This war had diverse consequences on the internal**
373 **policy of the United States and has become a main slogan for the opponents of the**
374 **American presidential candidates. It was also the reason behind the ousting of Tony**
375 **Blair from his office. In your opinion, did the US resort to peaceful diplomacy in**
376 **dealing with the Iraqi crisis? Which is more secure for Iraq, the region and**
377 **international peace and security: Iraq under Saddam or Iraq after Saddam?**
378 **Accordingly, what do you think the real motives that stand behind this war and who**
379 **has most benefited from it: the Iraqi people, the neighbouring countries to Iraq, the**
380 **superpowers, oil and arms-manufacturing countries, or reconstruction companies?**

381 **Answer to question 10:** After the emergence of the United States as a single power to lead
382 the world following the fall of the Soviet Union, it became necessary to restructure the
383 world in proportion to the new stage. This required placing hands on the sources of oil as a
384 strategic commodity and not as a commercial one. This can only be achieved by placing
385 hand directly upon it and the invasion of Iraq came under this scenario. As for what is best,
386 ‘Saddam Hussein's Iraq’ or ‘post-Saddam Iraq?’ ‘ I think it is unjust to put the Iraqi people
387 and the countries of the region in front of two bitter options.

388 **Arms and the Outbreak of crises and Foreign Interests:**

389 **Q. 11: The Middle East has witnessed a number of armed conflicts such as: Arab-**
390 **Israeli wars, first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war), the second Gulf War (Kuwait**
391 **liberation war), war on Iraq and others. Do you think that there were enough**
392 **diplomatic efforts to reach peaceful settlements for these conflicts? What is the impact**
393 **of these conflicts on democracy, armament, and development in the area? Who**
394 **benefited most from these conflicts? Are they the repressive regimes, US, Israel, oil**
395 **companies, arm-sales companies, or reconstruction companies?**

396 **Answer to question 11:** The logo (no voice louder than the voice of the battle), which was
397 used by dictatorships for decades to disable any real effort for the establishment of a
398 democratic civilian regime in order to ensure their survival in power for the longest
399 possible time. In addition the list of beneficiaries contained in the question, there are other
400 beneficiaries but the biggest loser is the people.

401 **Q. 12: Conventional arm-sales stand as the biggest reason behind the bleeding of the**
402 **Middle East economic resources. In your opinion, what are the reasons that prevent**
403 **reaching an agreement on conventional arms similar to those on weapons of mass**
404 **destruction? Who, in your opinion, benefited from the absence of such an agreement?**
405 **Is it arms-exporting countries, arms companies or other parties?**

406 **Answer to question 12:** All countries need conventional weapons to defend themselves
407 against any aggression, and the issue here is different from weapons of mass destruction.

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409 **An Interview with C**

410 **Democracy**

411 **Q. 1: All Middle Eastern countries are classified, in accordance with more than one**
412 **criterion of democracy, as states of absolute rule, or states of limited subjection of the**
413 **individuals. Do you see a link between the deterioration of the level of democracy in**
414 **this region and the conflicts that erupted in it on the one hand, and the high level of**
415 **armament, on the other? What, in your opinion, is the impact of this on progress and**
416 **development of the Middle East?**

417 **Answer to question 1:** Yes, there is a definite relationship, as the deterioration of the level
418 of democracy or the lack of it, and thereby the absolute authority of one-man rule would
419 unleash the whims of the ruler, especially the whim of armament, which often exceeds the
420 capacity of national income and leads to a disruption of development and reduces its rates,
421 and consumes cash reserves and pawns its future for a long time.

422 It is well known that the decision to declare war is one of the most difficult decisions
423 adopted by the democratic parliamentary countries due to its seriousness, It is the last
424 solution for democratic countries, but in contrast to undemocratic countries such a decision
425 is taken to achieve unbalanced wrong aspirations, or to escape from problems of the
426 individual ruler and his inefficiency as was the case of Iraq in the Iranian and Kuwaiti wars.

427 **Q. 2: What are the causes of the growing of Islamic movements in the Middle East? Is**
428 **there a relationship between them and democracy in the Arab world or the Israeli**
429 **occupation or American policy towards the region? Do you think that a real**
430 **democracy in the Arab world will bring to power secular governments or Islamic**
431 **governments? Governments that are loyal to the United States or opposed to it?**

432 **Answer to question 2:** The failures of the movements, leftism and national ideology which
433 are considered to be the core of secularism, and their failure to achieve democracy, solid

434 economic development, and waging wars, were the most important factors in the growth of
435 Islamic Thoughts and rigid regimes.

436 One of the major reasons for the growth of the Islamic Thoughts and Movements was the
437 creation of Israel in the region by the USA and the failure of secular governments to
438 overcome it.

439 **Q. 3: How do you look at the American project of democratization in the Arab world?**
440 **What credibility it has and how do you see the interaction of the Arab street with it?**

441 **Answer to question 3:** The basics of the foundations the current Iraqi regime are the same
442 basics followed by the United States in the formation of the Iraqi National Congress:
443 sharing and sectarianism and the consequences of their adoption; namely corruption. We
444 cannot go over the fact that Saddam Hussein has deliberately displaced large numbers of
445 Iraqis because of their sectarian belonging and beliefs, and that the outbreak of corruption
446 resulted from wars, cruelty, war costs and their consequences on development and the
447 formation of the individual Iraqi personality.

448 The American democracy adopted by America is a selective changing democracy that
449 varies and changes from one country to another according to the requirements of their
450 interests. Therefore, the Iraq Democracy is different from that in the Gulf, the Japanese and
451 German, for instance. The Middle East region is controlled by the American interests in oil
452 and trade. Japanese or German democracy was then needed to stand against communism.
453 The Arab world has no choice as it sees itself between the American democracy and the
454 dictatorial and fascist governments in the absence of Free Elections.

455 **Inter-Arab relationships**

456 **Q. 4: Inter-Arab relationships are plagued by many disputes, especially between**
457 **neighbouring countries. In many cases, the relationship between Arab countries and**
458 **foreign ones is stronger than their relation with neighbouring Arab countries. What**
459 **are the reasons for this? Is it related to the colonial period, or ‘the divide and rule’**
460 **policy or the theory of ‘conspiracy’? What is the impact of this reality on of strained**
461 **relations, armaments, and development in the region?**

462 **Answer to question 4:** The theory of ‘divide and rule’ or theory of ‘threat and protection’
463 which means to create threat and grant protection if paid, as expressed by Kissinger after
464 blocking of the Middle East oil in 1973 and then launching it as done by Sadat to lift the
465 siege of the Third Egyptian Army. The Creation of crises and stirring local conflicts is a
466 clear and prominent US policy which is not far from the Iran-Iraq war, and the Iraq-Kuwait
467 war, and the continued tension among the Gulf countries.

468 **Occupation**

469 **Q. 5: The Israeli occupation of Arab lands was the cause of many wars in the region.**

470 **What is the impact of Israeli occupation on armament and development in the region?**

471 **Answer to question 5:** Arab-Israel wars achieved two things:1- Exhaustion of the Arab
472 wealth via destroying economy and failure of economic development. The increased
473 armament has exhausted the Arab economies without having the ability to use them.2 -
474 Reinforcing dictatorial regimes and the emergency laws.

475 **Q. 6: Iraq has become after the war by the US into an arena of violence and a**
476 **gathering place for many terrorist groups and fundamentalists. What is the impact of**
477 **the US occupation of Iraq on the ongoing violence in Iraq and the prospects of**
478 **development?**

479 **Answer to question 6:** Violence in Iraq is the outcome of several factors:

- 480 - Success of the policy of 'threat and protection' among Iraq and its neighbours.
- 481 - Fear of many Iraq's neighbouring regimes from a potential success of democracy and its
482 impact on their regimes, and therefore its inability to cooperate with successive Iraqi
483 governments.
- 484 - Sectarianism.
- 485 - Failure of the growing Iraqi governments to reduce the sectarianism, poverty and the
486 spread of administrative and economic corruption.

487 **Oil**

488 **Q. 7: There are those who say that oil is not only reason behind the breakout of some**
489 **crises in the Middle East in the past decades, but also the failure to reach a quick and**
490 **lasting settlements to these crises. Do you think that the Iran-Iraq could have**
491 **continued for a long time without the interference of the oil countries and arms**
492 **companies and their interests?**

493 **Answer to question 7:** Both militarily and economically, Iraq and Iran are the most
494 powerful Middle East countries regarding oil; as they possess the second and third largest
495 oil reserves in the world, and some experts believe that Iraq possess the largest oil reserve
496 in the world as most areas are still undiscovered especially the Western side.

497 It is not beneficial to the U.S. policy the existence of such two oil productive countries in
498 the region outside its entire control, and therefore comes the war of no loser and no winner.
499 This war was the outcome of the policy of 'threat and protection' played by the United
500 States. The real question is why this war lasted for more than eight years? It was because of
501 the interests of oil companies, and weapons companies which exhausted the two sides

502 economically and militarily putting them under the entire control of the U.S., whose
503 influence existed during the war.

504 But the end of war was not far from the interests of the western countries, and oil and
505 weapons companies. That is, they achieved what was required by continuing it during that
506 period and did not go beyond the interest of those countries and companies as well.

507 **Q. 8: With higher prices of oil and increased revenues, military spending of the Gulf**
508 **States increased. There are those who find that it is the policy of the arms producing**
509 **countries to use the petrodollars in arms transactions in the region, and the Gulf's oil**
510 **countries may be forced to hold weapons deals with the major powers, not because of**
511 **the need for such deals, but to please them. In their view, there is no connection**
512 **between these transactions and the self-defence of these countries, as the weapons in**
513 **the Gulf, the weapons were not used in any of the crises in the region. In your opinion,**
514 **what are the justifications of the huge arms deals of the Gulf States? Do you see that**
515 **these arms contributed to the reduction of crises and created a suitable climate for**
516 **development in the region, or they were extra burden on them?**

517 **Answer to question 8:** Yes, I do agree with the question and support it as there's no need
518 for the Gulf countries to that high pace of armaments. It is well known that most of these
519 countries do not use all their complex weapons properly. Instead, these weapons are stacked
520 in warehouses in order to satisfy and please the United States and other weapon- producing
521 countries.

522 **Iraq**

523 **Q. 9: Despite the destructive results of its war against Iran and its defeat in the war to**
524 **liberate Kuwait, as well as many years of sanctions imposed on it, the Iraqi regime**
525 **stayed in power. What do you think are the real reasons behind this? Does it relate to**
526 **the power of the regime, or to the interests of some great powers to keep it in place?**

527 **Answer to question 9:** Its continuation, I believe, is due to the interests of powerful
528 countries because the US was not with the collapse of the Iraqi regime unless it had a
529 complete control of the way of change, selecting the alternative, and its continuing
530 influence on the alternative regime, as it led the uprising revolution of the war of Kuwait
531 into a failure due to the consequences of that disastrous war which were not meeting their
532 interests. It also led to the failure of many of the military coup attempts, as the palace coup
533 done by Saddam's brother-in-law; Hussein Kamel. Bringing down the Iraqi regime using
534 US military war was the most consistent with its interests despite its promises to take care

535 of the American interests as was shown in the interview with the US charge d'affaires after
536 the invasion of Kuwait.

537 **Q. 10: Different justifications were given to the American War on Iraq. While the**
538 **early titles of the war were ‘Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction,’ and ‘the relationship**
539 **between Iraq and al-Qaeda’, the late title was ‘toppling the authoritarian regime of**
540 **Saddam which the US and its allies considered a real threat to Iraq, the region and to**
541 **international peace and security. This war had diverse consequences on the internal**
542 **policy of the United States and has become a main slogan for the opponents of the**
543 **American presidential candidates. It was also the reason behind the ousting of Tony**
544 **Blair from his office. In your opinion, did the US resort to peaceful diplomacy in**
545 **dealing with the Iraqi crisis? Which is more secure for Iraq, the region and**
546 **international peace and security: Iraq under Saddam or Iraq after Saddam?**
547 **Accordingly, what do you think the real motives that stand behind this war and who**
548 **has most benefited from it: the Iraqi people, the neighbouring countries to Iraq, the**
549 **superpowers, oil and arms-manufacturing countries, or reconstruction companies?**

550 **Answer to question 10:** The United States of America did not follow diplomatic routes
551 with Saddam. If pursued, the culture of Saddam Hussein does not allow him to understand
552 diplomatic language and his ignorance of international policies prevented him from doing
553 so. Until the collapse of his regime, Saddam believed in the predominance of military
554 solutions (Almakadn) as called by the people of his village.

555 The experience of Kuwait invasion proved that, and it was apparent in the meeting between
556 Baker and former Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva that the failure of Iraq's
557 withdrawal from Kuwait would bring it back to the pre-industrial age. Saying that, ‘If our
558 fears come true, and in case you’re not obeying the decisions taken by the Security Council,
559 the future of Iraq will not be in the hands of the government we represent ...’. Different
560 political figures from around the world, including the Secretary General of the UN, have
561 advised Saddam to withdraw, and warned him against the disastrous consequences of such
562 an act. At that time, the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union pledged to cover the
563 withdrawal of the Iraqi army and to work to find out a peaceful solution, but it was all in
564 vain. Finally, the Iraqi army was defeated, humiliated, lost its military mechanisms, and
565 confidence in its political leadership, which had an impact on its defeat in 2003.

566 Saddam became a burden on America and the whole region as he no longer benefited the
567 American policy. He disturbed the region and destroyed Iraq politically, militarily and
568 economically, so that the decision of getting rid of him was taken just in the same manner

569 like other rulers who exhausted their roles. In addition, America was concerned about his
570 reign against its interests, as evident in some actual attempts that resulted in the failure of
571 US intervention.

572 The question, whichever is safer for Iraq, Middle East countries, peace and security..... etc.
573 The role of Saddam, I believe, was no longer of benefit to Iraq or any other country, but it
574 offered invaluable services to Israel, America and Iran whether intended or not. Saddam
575 destroyed Iraq's military machine and re-construction was no longer possible because of the
576 devastation of the Iraqi economy undergoing heavy debts, and was straining under its
577 burden so far, and the famous saying of Napoleon 'that who wins the war is not the one
578 who owns the last shot but who owns the last ounce, applied well to Saddam for he spent
579 both the last ounce and the last shot, and he abused Iraqis in unplanned wars.

580 Due to its location and cultural, economic, and military civilization, Iraq could have been a
581 factor for the construction of the Arab entity and could have played a major role to
582 strengthen and increase its cohesion, rather than be an agent of destruction and division.

583 The role of the post-Saddam Iraq is full of negatives and shortcomings. Sectarianism spread
584 everywhere and sharing has become semi-official. The financial and administrative
585 corruption has spread like an epidemic. Terrorism, in the illusion of fighting the US
586 occupation, has also spread and has become a justification for occupation and an
587 impediment to any development, killing unarmed Iraqis, including women, children and the
588 elderly, which gave a justification for extending occupation longer and destroying the Iraqi
589 economy and deepening sectarianism and corruption.

590 It is evident that disbanding the Iraqi army by the notorious US 'Bremer' was a great
591 disaster that gave strength and control to terrorism and justified the aforementioned.

592 **Arms and the Outbreak of crises and Foreign Interests:**

593 **Q. 11: The Middle East has witnessed a number of armed conflicts such as: Arab-**
594 **Israeli wars, first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war), the second Gulf War (Kuwait**
595 **liberation war), war on Iraq and others. Do you think that there were enough**
596 **diplomatic efforts to reach peaceful settlements for these conflicts? What is the impact**
597 **of these conflicts on democracy, armament, and development in the area? Who**
598 **benefited most from these conflicts? Are they the repressive regimes, US, Israel, oil**
599 **companies, arm-sales companies, or reconstruction companies?**

600 **Answer to question 11:** Those wars did not gain any diplomatic efforts before they broke
601 out except resolutions by the United Nations and the Security Council which remained as a
602 dead letter as in the case of the Arab-Israeli wars, because the outbreak of such wars came

603 in line with U.S. and the big powers' interests. Israel was created to take the role as the safe
604 guard. This guard was meant to be very close to the Arab treasure, and the one who fulfils,
605 in a semi-permanent way, the policy of threat and protection the United States and the West
606 want as long as the Arab land keeps providing them with black gold.

607 Other conflicts that occur and will occur in the future will not get the necessary diplomatic
608 efforts. The saying of French President Charles de Gaulle explains and justifies it as 'if
609 France would remain great as it is, it must find for itself oil that can be under its full
610 control...'

611 The control over the oil markets along with its production and distribution is a major
612 concern for America in Iraq in order to remain the decision-maker and the most influential
613 party in the conflicting world since the Marchall project in 1946 till the present and the
614 future. Even that does t not guarantee them the military, political and economic stability in
615 the Middle East region.

616 Henry Kissinger described US policy in relation to oil and its producing countries in a
617 comprehensive way at Paris Conference in 1974 after the withholding Arab oil from the
618 world as an attempt from AL Sadat to dissolve the clash and besiege the Egyptian army in
619 the 1973 war against Israel. He launched a program of seven points as follows:

- 620 - Rationalization of energy consumption.
- 621 - Finding alternative oil sources.
- 622 - Investing \$ 12.5 billion in research and exploration of alternative energy sources.
- 623 - Establishing a system for distributing oil in time of emergency.
- 624 - Establishing a system of financial cooperation to confront rising prices.
- 625 - Finding a way to ease the burden of energy costs on poor countries.
- 626 - Finding a form of relationship between oil producers and consumers.

627 Kissinger's project is attached in this message.

628 What I have mentioned above portrays the alienation and subordination to which the Arab
629 region has been subjected by the United States of America in the past, present and in the
630 future, at least in the short- term perspective.

631 **Q. 12: Conventional arm-sales stand as the biggest reason behind the bleeding of the**
632 **Middle East economic resources. In your opinion, what are the reasons that prevent**
633 **reaching an agreement on conventional arms similar to those on weapons of mass**
634 **destruction? Who, in your opinion, benefited from the absence of such an agreement?**
635 **Is it arms-exporting countries, arms companies or other parties?**

636 **Answer to question 12:** The Henry Kissinger project explains what withholds reaching
637 agreement in order to prevent the spread of conventional weapons, particularly the third and
638 sixth items. Kissinger Project:

639 – Controlling the search for a solution to the crisis in the Middle East on the policy of step
640 by step, to match pace with the restoration of control over energy resources.

641 - Considering Israel as the primary deterrent in the Middle East and upgrading the relations
642 with it so as to become at the level of strategic relationship. This is simply because Israel is
643 considered to be the party that urges the Arabs into accepting the U.S. solution to the crisis,
644 and the continuing sense of threatening by Arabs is always the guarantee to be the slaves of
645 the White House.

646 - Accepting high oil prices and working to absorb the surpluses generated by increased
647 prices and changing them by large US banks, and the remaining funds in hands of the
648 Arabs on the patterns of consumption in which wealth is all wasted , and not kept.

649 - Breaking the alliance of October which, in unprecedented way, joined the Arab armies
650 capable of fighting and the sources of Arab oil.

651 - Using part of the surpluses of the Arab funds to be the same as the investment that is
652 intended to provide alternatives to energy competitive to the Arab oil.

653 - Working on creating conflicts between Arabs and the third world especially Africa, as
654 Arabs succeeded during the October Crisis in persuading the majority of African countries
655 to cut ties with Israel.

656 - Encouraging President Al Sadat to go on with his plan to completely exclude the Soviets
657 from the Middle East, whether they were of political influence or as a source of peace.

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An Interview with D

Democracy:

661 **Q. 1: All Middle Eastern countries are classified, in accordance with more than one**
662 **criterion of democracy, as states of absolute rule, or states of limited subjection of the**
663 **individuals. Do you see a link between the deterioration of the level of democracy in**
664 **this region and the conflicts that erupted in it on the one hand, and the high level of**
665 **armament, on the other? What, in your opinion, is the impact of this on progress and**
666 **development of the Middle East?**

667 **Answer to question 1:** Yes, there is a relationship between the absence of democracy on
668 the one hand, and wars and underdevelopment on the other. This is because elected
669 governments are accountable to their people and as such they tend to allocate their

670 resources more efficiently and in projects that are productive to development. They also
671 avoid going to wars as the experience of western countries since World War II shows. This
672 is a broad answer to this question but explanation of the mechanics of this relationship is
673 beyond the scope of this brief answer.

674 **Q. 2: What are the causes of the growing of Islamic movements in the Middle East? Is**
675 **there a relationship between them and democracy in the Arab world or the Israeli**
676 **occupation or American policy towards the region? Do you think that a real**
677 **democracy in the Arab world will bring to power secular governments or Islamic**
678 **governments? Governments that are loyal to the United States or opposed to it?**

679 **Answer to question 2:** The Islamic revival in the Middle East is partly a result of the
680 failures of other paradigms to deliver on both security and development. It is also a way of
681 defining one's identity vis-à-vis others and it is also a way of resisting all forms of injustice
682 be it in Palestine or in any other Arab or Moslem countries. As for who will be brought to
683 power, I think that depends on the integrity of elections as well as the credibility of
684 competing programs

685 **Q. 3: How do you look at the American project of democratization in the Arab**
686 **world? What credibility has it got and how do you see the interaction of the Arab**
687 **street with it?**

688 **Answer to question 3:** I appreciate any genuine project of democratization in the Arab
689 world, but I believe that it has to come as a result of internal forces and efforts otherwise it
690 will either be geared to external interests or it will not be lasting.

691 **Inter-Arab relationships**

692 **Q. 4: Inter-Arab relationships are plagued by many disputes, especially between**
693 **neighbouring countries. In many cases, the relationship between Arab countries and**
694 **foreign ones is stronger than their relation with neighbouring Arab countries. What**
695 **are the reasons for this? Is it related to the colonial period, or 'the divide and rule'**
696 **policy or the theory of 'conspiracy'? What is the impact of this reality on of strained**
697 **relations, armaments, and development in the region?**

698 **Answer to question 4:** All of the above but most importantly because these governments
699 do not represent the interests of the majority of their people and they are not accountable to
700 them otherwise they will take the same route taken by the European community since none
701 of these countries can realize their development goals without regional cooperation. So
702 what we have here is a small leadership that is sharing the wealth with foreign companies

703 and foreign powers leaving the majority of their population and the region in general in
704 abject poverty and backwardness, a thing that no elected government can do.

705 **Occupation**

706 **Q. 5: The Israeli occupation of the Arab territories was the cause of many wars in the**
707 **region. What is the impact of the Israeli occupation on armaments and development**
708 **in the region?**

709 **Answer to question 1: No answer**

710 **Q. 6: Iraq has become after the US war an arena of violence and a gathering of**
711 **numerous terrorist and fundamentalist groups. What is the impact of the US**
712 **Occupation of Iraq on the ongoing violence, and the future prospects of development?**

713 **Answer to question 6:** Regardless to who is responsible for the mess in Iraq, Iraqis will
714 have first to get tired of fighting each other just as the Lebanese did , then and only then,
715 will they reach some compromise to build their new Iraq without being subordinates of
716 regional and international powers .

717 **Oil**

718 **Q. 7: There are those who say that oil is not only the reason for the emergence of some**
719 **crises in the Middle East in the past decades, but also the cause of the failure to reach**
720 **a quick and lasting settlement to these crises. Do you think that the Iraqi-Iranian war**
721 **would have lasted for eight years hadn't some countries and oil and arms companies**
722 **benefited from that?**

723 **Answer to question 7:** whether oil is, a blessing or a curse depends on the way it is being
724 managed and the nature of the governments in place. Nobody can deny that while Oil in
725 most developing countries was a cause of corruption, wars, inertia, and violence, the same
726 cannot be said about oil in Norway. So it is not oil per se which leads to wars but the way it
727 is used and the quality of institutions that a country has in place.

728 **Q. 8: The military spending of Gulf countries increases dramatically with the increase**
729 **of oil prices and oil revenue. It is argued that this is due to the policy of arms-**
730 **manufacturing countries in recycling petrodollar in the form of arms deals and the**
731 **rich Gulf countries sign these contracts not because they need these deals but to please**
732 **arms-manufacturing countries. Those who defend this argument believe that there is**
733 **no relationship between arms purchases that Gulf countries made and self-defence as**
734 **none of the arms purchased have been used in wars that took place in the area. In**
735 **your opinion, what are the reasons behind the dramatic increase of arms- sales to Gulf**
736 **countries? Have these arms purchases decreased the number of conflicts in the**

737 **region or created appropriate environment for development in the area? Or have**
738 **they further burdened the economies of these countries?**

739 **Answer to question 8:** The premise of your question is correct. Remember these
740 governments are not elected by their people so their legitimacy is in question and they try to
741 legitimize themselves through the purchase of weapons thinking that external powers will
742 protect them against internal and regional threats. This assumption is true to some extent
743 but in the long-run the security of any society starts from within and this has been proved
744 by developments in the region over the last thirty years or so.

745 **Iraq**

746 **Q. 9: Despite the destructive results of its war against Iran and its defeat in the war to**
747 **liberate Kuwait, as well as many years of sanctions imposed on it, the Iraqi regime**
748 **stayed in power. What do you think are the real reasons behind this? Does it relate to**
749 **the power of the regime, or to the interests of some great powers to keep it in place?**

750 **Answer to question 9:** It is both. In my view almost all governments of the region which
751 are not elected have to depend on external powers to fill their legitimacy gap. The
752 magnitude of this dependency, however, varies with time, the strength of the regime, and
753 the country location. As for the Iraqi regime, I think it has served its purpose and also
754 crossed some red lines when it invaded Kuwait.

755 **Q. 10: Different justifications were given to the American War on Iraq. While the**
756 **early titles of the war were ‘Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction,’ and ‘the relationship**
757 **between Iraq and al-Qaeda’, the late title was ‘toppling the authoritarian regime of**
758 **Saddam which the US and its allies considered a real threat to Iraq, the region and to**
759 **international peace and security. This war had diverse consequences on the internal**
760 **policy of the United States and has become a main slogan for the opponents of the**
761 **American presidential candidates. It was also the reason behind the ousting of Tony**
762 **Blair from his office. In your opinion, did the US resort to peaceful diplomacy in**
763 **dealing with the Iraqi crisis? Which is more secure for Iraq, the region and**
764 **international peace and security: Iraq under Saddam or Iraq after Saddam?**
765 **Accordingly, what do you think the real motives that stand behind this war and who**
766 **has most benefited from it: the Iraqi people, the neighbouring countries to Iraq, the**
767 **superpowers, oil and arms-manufacturing countries, or reconstruction companies?**

768 **Answer to question 10:** Its oil first and foremost and an American Administration that has
769 the ‘neo-cons’ Agenda but with little grasp of history of the region, and a cooperation of
770 some parties in the region. The countries of the region are the major losers from this war

771 but definitely not the only ones and just think about the lost credibility of the US in the
772 region.

773 **Arms and the Outbreak of crises and Foreign Interests:**

774 **Q. 11: The Middle East has witnessed a number of armed conflicts such as: Arab-**
775 **Israeli wars, first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war), the second Gulf War (Kuwait**
776 **liberation war), war on Iraq and others. Do you think that there were enough**
777 **diplomatic efforts to reach peaceful settlements for these conflicts? What is the impact**
778 **of these conflicts on democracy, armament, and development in the area? Who**
779 **benefited most from these conflicts? Are they the repressive regimes, US, Israel, oil**
780 **companies, arm-sales companies, or reconstruction companies?**

781 **Answer to question 11:** When you do not have a government that represent the people as
782 the case is in most of the Middle East, there is no national interest to protect but a theft to
783 be divided among the gang members both domestic and external.

784 **Q. 12: Conventional arm-sales stand as the biggest reason behind the bleeding of the**
785 **Middle East economic resources. In your opinion, what are the reasons that prevent**
786 **reaching an agreement on conventional arms similar to those on weapons of mass**
787 **destruction? Who, in your opinion, benefited from the absence of such an agreement?**
788 **Is it arms-exporting countries, arms companies or other parties?**

789 **Answer to question 12:** When countries are ruled by thugs, looters, and illiterates, then
790 we are not talking about nations whose decisions are in accordance to the needs and
791 objectives of their people and therefore any external power can take advantage of these
792 governments and share the bounties with them. So, corrupted regimes are subject to
793 extortion by big powers, oil companies, international institutions, and even the Gambini
794 clan or the Mafia for that matter.

795 -----

796 **An Interview with E**

797 **Q. 1: All Middle Eastern countries are classified, in accordance with more than one**
798 **criterion of democracy, as states of absolute rule, or states of limited subjection of the**
799 **individuals. Do you see a link between the deterioration of the level of democracy in**
800 **this region and the conflicts that erupted in it on the one hand, and the high level of**
801 **armament, on the other? What, in your opinion, is the impact of this on progress and**
802 **development of the Middle East?**

803 **Q. 5 The Israeli occupation of the Arab territories was the cause of many wars in the**
804 **region. What is the impact of the Israeli occupation on armaments and development**
805 **in the region?**

806 **Answer to Q. 1 and Q. 5:** There is certainly a relationship between democracy and the
807 crisis, the Israeli occupation and Israeli-Palestinian conflict were obstacles in the way of
808 democratic development and human rights, because you cannot practice democracy in the
809 center of continued violent conflict.

810 Israeli occupation of Palestine, for example, remains the most prominent obstacle for
811 Palestinian democracy. Despite the proliferation of popular support for democracy in
812 Palestine, which was expressed in many elections, we find that democracy is almost absent
813 because the development of institutions collide with occupation as an external factor, in
814 addition to other factors that are related in one way or another to occupation or result from
815 it. Genuine democracy cannot be established under occupation, it is difficult to hold any
816 political reform in the midst of ongoing conflicts.

817 The existence of democracy in Palestine requires the existence of the state and here lies the
818 responsibility of the international community in supporting the establishment of a
819 Palestinian state to be able to exercise democracy. Here human rights framework must be
820 applied because of the mutual relationship between human rights and democracy in order to
821 overcome the obstacles that prevent the establishment of a, Palestinian state, and I think
822 that the international community which defends human rights must assume its
823 responsibilities to force Israel to stop violating human rights by preventing the
824 establishment of the state Palestinian.

825 On the other hand, human rights include human security, according to United Nations
826 report on development in 1994, the human security includes not only political rights but
827 also economic, social and humanitarian rights which lead to human safety, when the
828 economic situation of the people improves their feelings of freedom and safety grow.
829 Consequently, they will be more able to consolidate the democratic process. Most of the
830 countries in the Middle East are classified as developing countries which suffer from many
831 developmental needs that have serious impact on the level of human rights and democracy
832 and their priority in these countries. Moreover, the Middle East is the most violent region in
833 the world and this also greatly affects the level of democracy.

834 **Q. 2: What are the causes of the growing of Islamic movements in the Middle East? Is**
835 **there a relationship between them and democracy in the Arab world or the Israeli**
836 **occupation or American policy towards the region? Do you think that a real**

837 **democracy in the Arab world will bring to power secular governments or Islamic**
838 **governments? Governments that are loyal to the United States or opposed to it?**

839 **Answer to question 2:** The reasons for the growing Islamic movements in the Middle East
840 is the frustration that the Arab citizens feel towards their governments because of the
841 policies of these governments in disabling the democratic institutions that can reflect
842 their concerns and sufferings and express their goals and aspirations. A Middle Eastern
843 citizen has lost, to a large extent, most of the human rights, whether economic, political or
844 social.

845 The Israeli occupation of Arab land is certainly the most important factor for frustration
846 from Arab governments. The Arab citizen believes the Arab governments have become
847 under the hegemony of the United States which in turn is subject to the Zionist lobby which
848 practices occupation and repressive policies in the occupied territories. The United States
849 used Veto in the Security Council about 50 times against any resolution that
850 condemns Israel or even its practices. This is enough to say that any healthy atmosphere of
851 democracy will bring about anti-American governments.

852 Another reason is the US's support for governments that violate human rights and the
853 destiny of their peoples in return of caring for the interests of the United States politically
854 or militarily or economically.

855 **Q. 3: How do you look at the American project of democratization in the Arab world?**

856 **What credibility it has and how do you see the interaction of the Arab street with it?**

857 **Answer to question No. 3:** Democracy is not a Western product and not exclusive to the
858 West, there is no fundamental conflict between democracy and the Arab world, or between
859 democracy and Islam. Great super powers must avoid imposing their model on other
860 societies and encourage them to develop democracy in the local environment. Great super
861 powers must also stop hiding behind the mask of democracy to achieve its national interests
862 to avoid associating democracy with Western imperialism. Democracy must be in support
863 of the values and mechanisms in any society. Democracy must be the product of the
864 cultural character of the people, there should be a theory of democracy that can recognize
865 its contents domestic context.

866 **Inter-Arab relationships**

867 **Q.4: Inter-Arab relationships are plagued by many disputes, especially between**
868 **neighbouring countries. In many cases, the relationship between Arab countries and**
869 **foreign ones is stronger than their relation with neighbouring Arab countries. What**
870 **are the reasons for this? Is it related to the colonial period, or 'the divide and rule'**

871 **policy or the theory of ‘conspiracy’? What is the impact of this reality on of strained**
872 **relations, armaments, and development in the region?**

873 **Answer to question 4:** Arab-Arab relations are clear ... differences, division, failure and
874 continued aggression. Failure in the application of conventions that are agreed on in the
875 Arab summits under the umbrella of the Arab League. These relationships failed to achieve
876 Arab cooperation or promote common interests among Arab countries and beyond the
877 hopes of the Arab peoples.

878 Western countries want their interests, and we are not looking for our interests, just the
879 opposite, we have preoccupied ourselves with conflicts and differences, sparking the
880 interests of the peoples in this region.

881 The colonial era has its impact, because many of the region's problems have resulted from
882 colonial times, but this does not mean we cannot remove the roots and proceed toward the
883 future as Europe launched itself after two world wars and fundamental problems.

884 **Answer to questions 6, 7.8, 9, 10.11, 12:** The Arab oil has played an important role and
885 was one of the most important sources of Arab power in support of the Arab and Islamic
886 countries, the Palestinian cause, the issuance of resolutions at the United Nations or the
887 Organization non-Aligned Movement, or against plots of the Islamic and African countries.
888 Arab oil was also used as a means of political and economic pressure, as happened during
889 the Arab Israeli war in 1973 when it was used against the United States and Europe for
890 their support of Israel which contributed to the Security Council adopting resolutions that
891 support the Arab rights and condemns the Israeli occupation. But the importance of oil
892 began to emerge gradually from the hands of the Arabs to become a curse after it made the
893 Arab countries an arena of conflicts between the major international political forces. Also it
894 turned to be used in some cases as a tool of sanctions, as happened in 1991 when it was
895 used against Iraq when the decision to stop the export of Iraqi oil, causing severe damage to
896 the Iraqi people and Iraq's relations with many Arab and foreign countries. Moreover, it is
897 well used and exported as a raw material to be imported after processing with double
898 prices.

899 US forces were occupation forces and the duties it owes are enunciated in articles 42 and 56
900 of the Hague Convention of 1907 and in Articles 27-34 and articles 47-78 of the Fourth
901 Geneva Convention and in some provisions of the first additional protocol, and the
902 conventions held by the occupying power with local authorities, may not deny the
903 residents of the occupied territories of the protection afforded by international humanitarian
904 law according to Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and, the people protected

905 cannot waive their rights under Article 8 of the Fourth Convention. But this was not the
906 case in Iraq, whether in terms of respect for existing laws or in restoring order and security,
907 providing public health, food and medical care, taking of hostages, or destroying private
908 property.

909 All the scenarios developed before the war were that the war on Iraq would be short term
910 and that the resistance of the Iraqi army will be weak and it will end by the arrest of
911 Saddam Hussein or his killing and U.S. troops would withdraw within a year at the latest,
912 and there would be neither fighting between ethnic or religious groups in Iraq nor any
913 manifestations of anti-war US streets in the Arab and Islamic world. No less optimistic
914 scenarios were developed which talk about the material and human losses or the financial
915 costs of the war on the US economy and the countries of the region or the feelings of
916 hostility towards the US presence because of the long stay of US forces in Iraq and turning
917 Iraq into an arena of violence and terrorism. The important question is what the US writer
918 Michael Clary said 'why do we go to war in Iraq, what are the motives of US President
919 George W. Bush and his top advisers to face such risks'?

920 If the goals, as President Bush and his top aides, said, were to get rid of the arsenal of
921 weapons of mass destruction, and the elimination of international terrorism and promotion
922 of democracy in Iraq, where are these goals?. Clary doubts the motives. He sees that there
923 are other countries which are more important in terms of these goals, Iraq does not pose a
924 nuclear threat to the United States and its Baathist regime was far from any connection with
925 terrorism and religious extremism, and America's battle with terror did not end after the
926 war on Saddam as there are dictatorships ahead of the Iraq.

927 The US removal of Saddam and the installation of another government backed by military
928 force will enhance the strength of terrorist groups, extremist, and whatever the view the
929 majority of Arabs and Muslims, Saddam Hussein, the United States from the point of view
930 is the power of Baath because they tolerate, but it supports Israel's use of state terrorism
931 against the Palestinians

932 The US invasion has increased the anti-American sentiment all over the Arab and Muslim
933 worlds so it's hard to imagine that the US invasion of Iraq is a victory in the war against
934 terrorism, and if left a little bit, it will result in a new round of violence against the United
935 States, and cannot be put of Iraq as part of continuing US war against terrorism.

936 As for the goal of the war to spread democracy, there are many reasons that make us doubt
937 the truth of this motivation and the first of these reasons is what is the reason? Many senior
938 officials in the US administration and the US Vice President Dick Cheney and Defence

939 Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were perfectly happy in collaboration with the dictatorship of
940 Saddam Hussein during the eighties of the last century, when Iraq was an enemy of Iran,
941 and the US did not hesitate to help Iraq in its war against Iran. The Reagan administration
942 raised the name of Iraq from the list of state that sponsor terrorism and gave Iraq loan
943 guarantees for the importation of American farm products worth several billions of dollars.
944 America, which fought Saddam, supplied the information on Iranian military sites and it
945 was also aware that Saddam was using chemical weapons 'on a daily basis often' in his war
946 against Iran, and the U.S. State Department had informed the Ministry of Defence so in the
947 first of November 1983 and that the information provided by the US to Saddam was
948 helping Baghdad strike with Iranian sites with chemical weapons. But America ignored all
949 that and continued US support for Saddam's regime at the time. But when Saddam became
950 a source of threat to America and not to the enemies of America, the spotlight was directed
951 to the behaviour of this repressive regime. The motive of the US war against Iraq is a
952 combination of these three elements, along with the desire to control Iraq's oil which is the
953 second-largest in the world

954 The United States imports 55% of its oil needs and it is expected to increase this
955 percentage, and it is known that the principle of Jimmy Carter, which was released in
956 January 23, 1980, stipulates the need to prevent any country hostile to America from the
957 occupation of sites to enable it to prevent the arrival of the Gulf oil, to America, and this is
958 the reason for the US warships escort o the oil tankers of Kuwait in 1987 during sailing the
959 Gulf region, which is also the cause of the 'Desert Storm', out of which the United States
960 did not want to overthrow the regime, but on the contrary, adopted the concept of
961 'containment' and imposed a naval blockade and air blockade of Iraq for many years. But
962 when Iraq became under the leadership of Saddam Hussein a threat for the arrival of the US
963 to the oil of the Persian Gulf he was overthrown.

964 Vice President Dick Cheney himself pointed in a speech to a group of American soldiers
965 that Saddam Hussein has these weapons and control over one tenth of the world reserves of
966 oil and could seek to control the entire Middle East and a large part of the global energy
967 supply and thus threaten America's friends in the region directly and exercise the nuclear
968 blackmail against America or any country in the world, this is a translation of the Carter
969 Doctrine. Cheney had said before the armed forces Commission of US Senates after the
970 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 'Iraq controlled ten percent of the oil reserves the world before the
971 invasion of Kuwait, on the capture of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein has doubled the share of up
972 to twenty percent of the known petrol reserves'.

973 The policy of the United States and its desire to dominate the world economy drove it to
974 maintain U.S. military superiority to all the countries of the world and prevent the
975 emergence of serious competitor and this is the reason for increasing its military budget.
976 Moreover, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime falls within its strategy to control the
977 world.

978 Donald Rumsfeld stated that 'the problem with Iraq is not just in the oil and chemical and
979 biological weapons today, and the nuclear weapons tomorrow.'

980 The reason for US interest in Iraq instead of Pakistan or North Korea nuclear threat is that
981 Iraq's oil will pay the bill for the war. Terence Taylor, a chief inspector of former UN
982 weapons work in Iraq and the head then the London office of the International Institute for
983 Strategic Studies US says that he does not have any doubt that Saddam continued secretly
984 to arm himself, but we did not try and stop even in the times of our intervention. ' Mangos
985 Ranstorp, deputy director of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at
986 the University of St. Andrew in Scotland, says there is no evidence to justify military action
987 against Iraq, and if the US wants to go to war against Iraq it is not a war on Baghdad's ties
988 with al Qaeda. Howard Zinn, author of 'History of the People of the United States says
989 'The history of American foreign policy was a history of continuous expansion since the
990 end of the Revolutionary War to the present time, it is an extension of the American
991 military and economic and political power.

992 Again, is the goal of research to find out the cause of the US war on Iraq? and whether
993 America provided Saddam with weapons, in accordance with any agreements?

994 Talking about the establishment of democracy, freedoms and the development of the
995 oppressed is just a talk. After the Iran-Iraq war, the Kurdish in the north and Shiites in the
996 south up carried arms against the Iraqi government but the United States chose the
997 dictatorship of Saddam over chaos and, rebellion,

998 It can be said that there are several reasons behind Bush's decision to go to war in Iraq.
999 Certainly it is not weapons of mass destruction or the threat of terrorism nor love of
1000 democracy. For Americans, the war will provide a lot of jobs both in the military or in
1001 weapon factories or as representatives of US multinational companies or security
1002 companies. But this in turn will have a price for the United States, because it will impose a
1003 high military spending at the expense of other aspects and generates feelings of hostility to
1004 America.

1005 the United States has been led by George W. Bush to warn countries in the world,
1006 especially Arab ones of the consequences of supporting terrorism or providing the suitable

1007 environment for it, and the United States undertook to the charge of accusing and charging
1008 those who do not conform to its strategy and new ideology calling to fight the new enemy
1009 called terrorism.

1010 **Goal of the war on Iraq**

1011 The strike against Iraq is consistent with repeated calls from Zionism, under the pressure
1012 of the US Zionist lobby to weaken the Arab situation and the position of the Palestinian
1013 resistance.

1014 The other goal of the Iraq war is to promote a new US strategy which calls for the
1015 replacement of the international legitimacy and the will of the international community and
1016 with the U.S. legitimacy and unilateralism in the world and achieve its national interests at
1017 the expense of other countries.

1018 The aim of the war to turn Iraq into a US base is also important.

1019 The United States had to choose between two bad options: either the rule of Khomeini or
1020 the option of a left-wing secular trend close to Moscow, the religious option was the lesser
1021 of two evils. But after the deterioration of Iran's relations with the United States and Iran
1022 turned into an enemy, the United States began to look for a solution, and the solution was
1023 Saddam Hussein. They see that Iraq and Iran are powerful states in the Gulf region and
1024 possess enormous economic potential and their rulers have aspirations outside of their
1025 borders, therefore it sought to ignite a war between them and make it stretch for the longest
1026 possible period and end without any one of them victorious, and both countries come out
1027 exhausted after draining all their resources and destroying their economies and this will
1028 provide for the United States the right conditions to remain in the Gulf safe. It instructed to
1029 Saddam to attack Iran.

1030 **Arms**

1031 The United States efforts to drag out the war was clear in a statement by US President
1032 Reagan, who said that 'the supply of Iraq with arms at times and providing Iran at other
1033 another time is a matter of a higher state policy: and Kissinger said that 'this is the first war
1034 in history we hoped that no one would come came out victorious, but that the two parties
1035 would be losers. During the eight years of war, the arms market flourished achieving
1036 imaginary profits for arms traders and drained the wealth and the material and human
1037 resources the two countries and did not leave a family in Iraq and Iran without a victim.
1038 The war was planned by the US imperialists and their partners, and Saddam had fought on
1039 their behalf and not for the interest of the Iraqi in an unjustifiable. War. The United States
1040 supplied Saddam Hussein with weapons during the war and military intelligence to both

1041 sides and supplied Saddam's with weapons of mass destruction technology, when the Iraqi
1042 army was weak. There have been throughout the eight years of war, no attempt by the
1043 United States nor the international community to stop it, and the two parties agreed to stop
1044 the war because they reached the satisfaction that the United States will not allow any party
1045 to achieve victory on the other side.

1046 Robert Fisk could not, in an article in the Independent Newspaper about the Iraqi invasion
1047 of Kuwait, understand the reasons for the Americans bombing of bridges, electricity and oil
1048 in Iraq which led to significant casualties, rather than going for the liberation of Kuwait,
1049 and when he asked, the response of the Americans to his inquiry was that the more the
1050 beatings inside Iraq the less casualties of Coalition forces when they enter Kuwait. Kuwait
1051 was liberated in four days, but the American bombing of Iraq lasted forty days and in one
1052 night the United States dropped eighty thousand tons of explosives on Iraq, in our analysis
1053 we can say that they used the weapons they had and made the Kuwait and Gulf states pay
1054 the bill until the weapon industry produces new weapons and offer jobs to their workers.

1055 The United States has modified the old slogan 'power for the right' to 'might is right.' He
1056 who has the force has the right to do what he wants with others.

1057 Global and regional conflict have many causes, most important among which is arms trade.
1058 The sole beneficiary behind the Iraq war was the arms dealers who control the fate of the
1059 world and ignite wars in order to serve their own interests.

1060 The low numbers of weapons sales after the Cold War disrupted the arms dealers, and a
1061 search for an alternative enemy for the Soviet Union began so that this trade would not be
1062 lost. And the enormous benefits would not be lost. It is regrettable that the Big Five in the
1063 world the permanent members of the Security Council, are the largest producer and seller of
1064 the weapon. Thus, these countries turned to be the largest exporters of arms and the poor
1065 third world countries turned to be the buyers of these weapons.

1066 The military organization in the Pentagon implements the instruction of arms producing
1067 companies; it plans to ignite regional wars in different parts of the world. The second Gulf
1068 War was a golden opportunity for companies to dispose of a large stock of weapons and
1069 ammunition, and try new types of arms, aircraft and equipment, these companies achieved
1070 more arms sales after the war. Then came the US war on Afghanistan in which the United
1071 States disposed of the old weapons that were stored, this was a war cemetery which these
1072 companies buried their wastes.

1073 Confrontation between major countries is prohibited, but allowed among developing
1074 countries to the benefit to the super powers which and makes these countries stand in

1075 queues to buy arms instead of wheat. Despite the Gulf armaments and huge arms
1076 expenditures, Gulf States still do not have any ability to deter any aggression without the
1077 US help. The United States considers that its interests are not confined to the territory of the
1078 United States, but to the whole world and it should have the military force to enable it to
1079 protect its interests all over the world. George W. Bush made that clear in his election
1080 campaign when he said he would seek to protect America and its allies, by all means, and
1081 will not be stopped by arms control agreements signed by the United States. The main goal
1082 of America's war against Iraq was the arms trade and control over oil resources. The
1083 division of Iraq would open the door for each country that has got divergent races to divide
1084 itself and the militias will buy small arms and turn to small states.

1085

1086 **An Interview with F**

1087 ▪ All the Europeans we talk to say: *'We have a guilt complex about the Nazi Holocaust*
1088 *issue; we could not take a stand against them.'*

1089 ▪ I am not questioning the struggle motives of *Hezbollah* or *Hamas Movement*, but I
1090 believe Israel has interest in the existence of both. Hamas grew greater under Israeli
1091 occupation. Israel deliberately retained *Shab'a Farms* and some internees in order to have
1092 justifications for confrontation with *Hezbollah* and *Hamas*. The elimination of external
1093 threat would stop both the external financial and military support Israel receives. Thus, I
1094 see that Israel is the side benefiting from keeping things the way they are.

1095 ▪ Arab-Arab relationships have not been at the required level due to the absence of
1096 economic interests among the Arab countries. Once such interests exist, they will contribute
1097 to a rapid settlement of any political dispute.

1098 ▪ Following the surrender of the Iraqi army, the allies' forces were given orders to
1099 withdraw. When one of the Kuwaiti participants in war on the allies' side wondered: 'Why
1100 should we withdraw since there no risk is involved, and we are cutting off their logistic
1101 route,' the answer was 'You are a soldier, and a soldier must follow orders.' After
1102 withdrawing for several kilometres, the officer returned on his motorbike and happened to
1103 witness Iraqi Republican Guard troops withdrawing back to their position in Iraq. Being
1104 provoked at the sight, he fired his gun, in protest at what had happened and accused the
1105 Americans of treason. Commenting on the incident, Kuwaiti ambassador says: 'American
1106 forces permitted the besieged Iraqi Republican Guard to go back with their arms.'

1107 ▪ One of the reasons why Kuwait purchased weapons from China, France, Britain, and
1108 the states which contributed to the passing of the UN resolutions or participated in the

1109 liberation of Kuwait, was that the purchase was some kind of consolation prize. For
1110 example, the cannon purchase from China was a consolation prize for its stance.

1111 ▪ A German friend of mine who works for a Transport Firm which delivered all the
1112 ammunitions from Germany to Saudi Arabia. He told me that he met a German General in
1113 the army, and when he asked the General ‘what are we going to do with all these
1114 ammunitions which have been stored in Germany since the Second World War. There are
1115 no wars for them, and they are already expired!’ The General answered:’ We sell them.’
1116 ‘There is not enough money in the world that can buy them!’, replied the German. The
1117 General replies:’ We throw them all on the heads of those crazy men in the Middle East: Al
1118 Kaddafi or Saddam.!’ After the liberation, we have seen that many of these weapons and
1119 missiles didn't explode because they were stored for too long a time.

1120 ▪ Part of the war was to despoil all the Saudi and Emirate surpluses of oil revenue. They
1121 might also take the present surpluses, God Forbid! The other part was due to Kuwait’s
1122 strong commitments to Arab and national issues. I believe there were those who were
1123 angry for those reasons as well.

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1125 **II- Interview Type B**

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An Interview with A

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Q. 1: With the exception of the two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all the wars that took place in the modern era occurred using conventional weapons. They had catastrophic effects on human life and left, through their direct and indirect results, millions of victims and destroyed the infrastructure, cultural and social structures of the warring countries and wasted billions of dollars in the purchase of weapons or in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of what the war damaged. This highlights the importance of reaching an agreement on conventional weapons. Through your experience at the United Nations, what is in your opinion the reasons for the failure to reach an agreement that prohibits the use of traditional arms like that on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)?

Answer to question 1: The issue of illicit trafficking in weapons, especially small and light, requires a concerted effort at the national, regional and international levels in order to prevent their manufacture, transfer and circulation illegally.

Efforts to reach an agreement on conventional weapons is not aimed at a total ban on the use of such weapons, because Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations affirms the ‘inherent right of States, individually and collectively, to defend themselves’.

1143 The reason for the failure to reach agreement on the use of weapons is that it began in 2006
1144 in the fight against the spread of these weapons. The documented programmes to achieve
1145 that end are still in their earlier stages, therefore, the course of action in order to reach
1146 agreement among Member States of the United Nations on the use of conventional
1147 weapons requires intensified efforts to control and regulate the production and use of these
1148 weapons.

1149 **Q. 2: The International Organization passed several resolutions calling for**
1150 **transparency in armaments and approved the bodies that document the size**
1151 **of military spending, armaments, and arms sales for each state. It also issued more**
1152 **than one statement on the relationship between armament and development and**
1153 **called for a reduction of military budget of all states and the exchange of information**
1154 **on military spending and arms deals that would help to reduce international tension**
1155 **incidence of crises. Do you think that the issue of conventional weapons has**
1156 **received sufficient attention at the international organization? Were the decisions and**
1157 **statements released by the United Nations and its organs and different agencies**
1158 **sufficient to control the production, use, trafficking, and spending on conventional**
1159 **weapons? What, in your view are the reason for the continuous arrival of weapons**
1160 **to many developing countries and crisis areas in the world?**

1161 **Answer to question 2:** Conventional weapons received great interest by the international
1162 community, as their wide spread constitutes a major threat to international peace and
1163 security, and adversely affects the stability and sustainable development at local, national,
1164 regional and international levels.

1165 Therefore, the United Nations focused on this dilemma, and has committed a great deal of
1166 discussion of the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations. In this
1167 regard, the Assembly adopted a resolution, No. A/C.1/63/L.51, issued on October 20, 2008,
1168 under the title '**general and complete disarmament: transparency in**
1169 **armaments.**' Several countries have made this decision, including four permanent
1170 members of the Security Council, the Russian Federation, France, Britain, and the United
1171 States of America.

1172 This decision indicates that to raise the level of transparency in armaments would
1173 contribute greatly to confidence building among nations and establishes international peace
1174 and security, as establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms would
1175 be an important step forward towards the promotion of transparency in military issues. In
1176 this regard, the resolution calls on Member States 'which can provide additional

1177 information on purchases of the national production and military holdings and to do so,
1178 pending further development of the record'

1179 The resolution also emphasizes 'the need to review the continuing operation of the Register
1180 and its further development in order to secure a Register that is capable of attracting the
1181 widest possible participation'

1182 In this regard, it should be noted that the creation of the appropriate conditions for creating
1183 a kind of cooperation between Member States of the Organization of the United Nations
1184 to give effect to the Conference on Disarmament which would contribute to the promotion
1185 of openness and transparency in armaments.

1186 **Reasons for the continuing flow of arms to many developing countries and crisis**
1187 **areas in the world**

1188 •The most important reasons for the continued flow of arms to areas of crisis lies in the
1189 continued availability of supply and demand for weapons, as the growing severity of
1190 international conflicts and internal crises fuel of the demand for buying weapons and
1191 promoting them in the market.

1192 •The second reason is reflected in the **illicit brokering**, which constitutes a serious
1193 dilemma which the international community should address urgently. There is a close
1194 link between terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking on the one hand, and illicit
1195 trafficking in arms, especially small and light.

1196 •The United Nations has developed a **work program in June 2001, then followed by a**
1197 **system to support the implementation of this program.** On the initiative of the United
1198 Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, a database was established for matching needs
1199 and resources. However, the successful and effective implementation of this work-program
1200 requires the building of national capacities of the Member States of the UN.

1201 •The United Nations imposed more than a ban on weapons to some countries or
1202 some areas which have live crises and armed conflicts. It was not easy to find successful
1203 means to enforce the arms embargo, by the proliferation of black markets and lack of
1204 commitment of all Member States of the Organization's ban on the spread of
1205 these weapons.

1206 •There is a firm conviction of the urgent need for a comprehensive global commitment to
1207 promote the prevention of trafficking in conventional arms at all levels to contribute to
1208 building peace and security.

1209 **Q. 3: Has the fact that the Security Council permanent members are the top exporters**
1210 **of conventional weapon impeded efforts to reach an agreement on conventional**
1211 **weapons?**

1212 **Answer to question 3:** The United States of America, the largest arms exporter in the
1213 world has opposed the draft Convention. It is also the only country to vote against the
1214 resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations No. 61/89 and 63/240 entitled
1215 'Towards an arms trade treaty: development of international standards for the import of
1216 conventional weapons, export and transfer'. China and Russia abstained, whereas France
1217 and Britain voted on behalf of the resolution.

1218 ■ 35 countries export 90 % of arms in the world and developing countries attract 68.5% of
1219 imports of arms in the world (statistics pertaining to the period 1997-2005). The seven
1220 countries that export most of the weapons belong to all of the Group of Eight most
1221 industrialized G8.

1222 ■ This spread of arms trade may explain the challenges facing the international
1223 community in order to reach agreement on the arms trade.

1224 ■ The advertising in the month of last July last about the readiness of the United States to
1225 participate in these negotiations on the agreement, which will continue in the month
1226 of October 2009, formed a significant shift which suggests the possibility of positive
1227 developments in this area.

1228 -----

1229 **An Interview with B**

1230 **Q. 1: With the exception of the two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all the**
1231 **wars that took place in the modern era occurred using conventional weapons. They**
1232 **had catastrophic effects on human life and left, through their direct and indirect**
1233 **results, millions of victims and destroyed the infrastructure, cultural and social**
1234 **structures of the warring countries and wasted billions of dollars in the purchase of**
1235 **weapons or in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of what the war damaged. This**
1236 **highlights the importance of reaching an agreement on conventional weapons.**
1237 **Through your experience at the United Nations, what is in your opinion the reasons**
1238 **for the failure to reach an agreement that prohibits the use of traditional arms like**
1239 **that on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)?**

1240
1241 **Answer to question 1:** Although the use of the atomic bomb happened only twice during
1242 World War II, the destructive effects of these two large bombs, pushed the international

1243 community to reach agreements which ban all nuclear weapons of mass destruction,
1244 biological and chemical weapons. Compared with the weapons of mass destruction,
1245 conventional weapons have limited effects.

1246 But if we look at the general framework of what comes under the label of conventional
1247 weapons including mines and individual light weapons, and count the number of conflicts
1248 that took place by these weapons, and the human and financial losses in the short term and
1249 long-term and the impact of this on development, particularly in developing countries, we
1250 realize that conventional weapons should receive more attention because their impact over
1251 the past decades was great.

1252 Efforts in the International Organization continue for control on conventional arms, but I
1253 cannot say that these efforts are parallel to the negative impacts of these weapons. The
1254 agreements on conventional weapons contain gaps that allow weapons to reach any country
1255 in the world, whether it is a poor country or in violation of human rights, and in most cases
1256 this does not help any part to resolve the battle for its side.

1257 It is known that the states that are considered as the main arms exporters are mainly the
1258 permanent member states of the Security Council, and therefore it is not expected for any
1259 agreement limiting the sale of conventional weapons or prohibiting their sale to crisis
1260 regions, poor countries, or developing countries to receive the required support. These
1261 countries suffer from the influence of arms companies on their domestic laws which govern
1262 the sale or arrival of arms in crisis regions, but on the contrary, they, through some internal
1263 laws, supported the sale of arms by granting loans.

1264 **Q. 2: The International Organization passed several resolutions calling for**
1265 **transparency in armaments and approved the bodies that document the size**
1266 **of military spending, armaments, and arms sales for each state. It also issued more**
1267 **than one statement on the relationship between armament and development and**
1268 **called for a reduction of military budget of all states and the exchange of information**
1269 **on military spending and arms deals that would help to reduce international tension**
1270 **incidence of crises. Do you think that the issue of conventional weapons has**
1271 **received sufficient attention at the international organization? Were the decisions and**
1272 **statements released by the United Nations and its organs and different agencies**
1273 **sufficient to control the production, use, trafficking, and spending on conventional**
1274 **weapons? What, in your view are the reason for the continuous arrival of weapons**
1275 **to many developing countries and crisis areas in the world?**

1276 **Answer to question 2:** I have already answered part of this question in my answer to the
1277 first question. Certainly, the issue of conventional weapons has not received sufficient
1278 attention by the UN, especially after these weapons began to utilize radioactive materials,
1279 or some of them acquired destructive impacts on civilians, such as cluster bombs or mines,
1280 and others. In the United Nations, many statements were issued on conventional arms and
1281 the relationship between armament and development, but so far the essence of the problem
1282 has not been dealt with, which lies in the fact that that the negative effects of conventional
1283 weapons had become very serious and that reaching a strict agreement on this issue had
1284 become a necessity. As for not reaching an agreement, it could said that it is because of the
1285 interests of the arms companies, and sometimes the interests of the countries themselves in
1286 keeping the arms companies strong because of the new techniques and the evolution in
1287 scientific research they introduce which serves their military superiority and civil uses and
1288 the role of arms sales in supporting the continuation of these companies in their research
1289 without straining their governments with budget of high costs.

1290 **Q. 3: Has the fact that the Security Council permanent members are the top exporters**
1291 **of conventional weapon impeded efforts to reach an agreement on conventional**
1292 **weapons?**

1293 **Answer to question 3:** Perhaps it has not reached the degree of disrupting any treaty
1294 because efforts have not been sufficient so far as to bring this issue to the International
1295 Organization. It can be said that many countries considered armament legal after the
1296 prominence of the principle of force because of the absence of the role of the International
1297 Organization in maintaining international peace and security and leaving countries to
1298 resolve their disputes by weapons. Armament has become the title of the club of the big
1299 states or regional powers or countries which aspire to become permanent members in the
1300 UN Security Council.

Appendix 3

Samples of Answered Questionnaires

Introduction

This questionnaire is designed to shed some light on the anticipation and reaction of people in Middle Eastern countries in respect of the relationship between armament, conflict and development in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. It focuses mainly on the United States' deterrents of arms transfers as well as the deterrents of military expenditure in Middle Eastern countries and the impact of both on conflict and development on the Middle East and Iraq.

The responses to this questionnaire will be used in my doctoral research at the University of Exeter. All the information given will be treated anonymously and confidentially, and will be used for research purposes only. To enable me process the information in the questionnaire, it is important that you either sign the copy you fill it in or write the word 'accept'.

I would be grateful if you could possibly complete this questionnaire and return it to the following email address within ten days a.alloush@exeter.ac.uk

Sample 1

Questionnaire

- ❖ **Gender** Male
- ❖ **Age:** 30-50
- ❖ **Country of origin:** Iraq
- ❖ **Current nationality:** British
- ❖ **Country of residence:** UK
- ❖ **Educational background:** Higher Education (PhD, MA..)
- ❖ **Cultural background:**
 - **Religion**
(Muslim, Christian, etc...) Muslim Abstain
 - **Sect**
(Sunni, Shi'i, Catholic, etc...) Sunni Abstain
 - **Ethnicity**
(Arab, Kurd, etc...) Arab Abstain

1. **Which is your favourite movie?**
American movie
2. **Do you prefer American products to Arabic ones?**
Yes
3. **Do you like fast food (e.g. McDonalds, Pizza Hut, KFC and Burger King)?**
Yes
4. **Do you think the USA is a nice place to live in?**
No
5. **To what extent do you think your country is democratic?**
Less than 40%
6. **To what extent do Arab regimes represent their peoples?**
Less than 40%
7. **Do you support the American project of democratization in the Arab world?**
No
8. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Anti-American government
9. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Islamic regimes
10. **Which do you think would work better for the Arab world?**
Democratic regimes
11. **Would you support an Islamic government in your country?**
No

12. Which of the following does Saudi Arabia have the strongest relationship with?
USA
13. Which of the following does Kuwait have the strongest relationship with?
USA
14. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to the Arab countries?
Israel
15. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to your country?
Abstain
16. Did you support Iraq's war against Iran?
No
17. Which country won the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
None
18. Which countries most benefited from the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
United States
19. Did you support Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait?
No
20. Which countries most benefited from the second Gulf War (Liberation of Kuwait)?
United States
21. The Iraqi regime stayed in power despite its defeat in the second Gulf War and a decade of sanctions. Did the USA want that?
Yes
22. Did the USA attempt to end the 12-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN through peaceful diplomacy?
No
23. Did Saddam Hussein's regime pose a 'mortal threat' to the USA and the West?
No
24. How do you regard the third Gulf War (War on Iraq)?
Occupation war
25. Who has most benefited from this war?
Israel
26. Which is more secure and stable ?
Iraq under Saddam
27. Which poses more threat to Middle Eastern countries ?
Iraq after Saddam
28. Did the trial and the execution of Saddam aim to ...
Fuel sects' conflict
29. To what extent do you think that the colonial heritage in the Middle East contributes to the outstanding conflicts?
Between 40-60%
30. To what extent do you think that the Israeli occupation of Arab land has contributed to the armament and underdevelopment of the Middle East?
Between 60-80%
31. Did the existing borders between Middle Eastern countries contribute to conflict between them? Yes

32. Do you think that the ‘divide and rule’ policy is working in the Arab Middle East? Yes
33. Do you support your country’s militay spending?
No
34. Gulf states have spent billions of dollars on arms in the last five decades. Have these arms purchases helped these countries defend themsleves?
No
35. Most Gulf countries buy arms to:
Please arms-manufacturing countries
36. Did military expenditure in Middle Eastern countries contribute to the development of these countries?
No
37. Did military spending in Iraq contribute to the development or underdevelopment of Iraq ?
Underdevelopment of Iraq
38. Did military spending in the Middle East prevent or increase the possibility of conflict?
Increase the possibility of conflict
39. The USA has good relations with most of the Gulf countries, because ...
These countries are rich with oil
40. Does the United States’ forgein policy in the Middle East serve its strategic interests in the region?
Yes
41. To what extent do you think the Arab countries have benefited from oil revenue?
Less than 40%
42. Which would you support: the USA or Al Qaeda?
None
43. Which is the appropriate discretion for each of the following?
USA: Democratic Hezbollah: Abstain
Hamas: Revolutionary Al-Qaeda: Terrorist
44. Do you agree that I use your responses in my research and in any future publication hereafter? Yes

- Divide and rule means fostering enmity and distrust between people, or local rulers so conflicts start between them, consequently they become weak and easy to be controlled by others.
- Colonial heritage refers to the impact of the colonial period on the occupied land after this occupation.
- The American project of democratization means the American’s attempts to make differences in the civic life of the people, their values, motivations and if necessary their regimes. This project justifies using power or lurching wars against others to justify their end.

----- Thank you----

Sample 2

Questionnaire

- ❖ **Gender** Male
- ❖ **Age:** 30-50
- ❖ **Country of origin:** Iraq
- ❖ **Current nationality:** Iraqi
- ❖ **Country of residence:** UK
- ❖ **Educational background:** College, University
- ❖ **Cultural background:**
 - **Religion**
(Muslim, Christian, etc...) Muslim Abstain
 - **Sect**
(Sunni, Shi'i, Catholic, etc...) Shi'i Abstain
 - **Ethnicity**
(Arab, Kurd, etc...) Arab Abstain

1. **Which is your favourite movie?**
Syrian movie
2. **Do you prefer American products to Arabic ones?**
Yes
3. **Do you like fast food (e.g. McDonalds, Pizza Hut, KFC and Burger King)?**
Yes
4. **Do you think the USA is a nice place to live in?**
No
5. **To what extent do you think your country is democratic?**
Less than 40%
6. **To what extent do Arab regimes represent their peoples?**
Less than 40%
7. **Do you support the American project of democratization in the Arab world?**
No
8. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Anti-American government
9. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Islamic regimes
10. **Which do you think would work better for the Arab world?**
Democratic regimes
11. **Would you support an Islamic government in your country?**
No
12. **Which of the following does Saudi Arabia have the strongest relationship with?**
USA

13. Which of the following does Kuwait have the strongest relationship with?
UK
14. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to the Arab countries?
Israel
15. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to your country?
USA
16. Did you support Iraq's war against Iran?
No
17. Which country won the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
None
18. Which countries most benefited from the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
United States
19. Did you support Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait?
No
20. Which countries most benefited from the second Gulf War (Liberation of Kuwait)?
United States
21. The Iraqi regime stayed in power despite its defeat in the second Gulf War and a decade of sanctions. Did the USA want that?
Yes
22. Did the USA attempt to end the 12-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN through peaceful diplomacy?
No
23. Did Saddam Hussein's regime pose a 'mortal threat' to the USA and the West?
No
24. How do you regard the third Gulf War (War on Iraq)?
Occupation war
25. Who has most benefited from this war?
Fanatical and terrorist groups
26. Which is more secure and stable ?
Iraq under Saddam
27. Which poses more threat to Middle Eastern countries ?
Iraq after Saddam
28. Did the trial and the execution of Saddam aim to ...
Disgrace Arab feeling
29. To what extent do you think that the colonial heritage in the Middle East contributes to the outstanding conflicts?
Please, click here to choose
30. To what extent do you think that the Israeli occupation of Arab land has contributed to the armament and underdevelopment of the Middle East?
80% and over
31. Did the existing borders between Middle Eastern countries contribute to conflict between them? Yes

32. Do you think that the ‘divide and rule’ policy is working in the Arab Middle East? Yes

33. Do you support your country’s militay spending?

No

34. Gulf states have spent billions of dollars on arms in the last five decades. Have these arms purchases helped these countries defend themsleves?

No

35. Most Gulf countries buy arms to:

Please arms-manufacturing countries

36. Did military expenditure in Middle Eastern countries contribute to the development of these countries?

No

37. Did military spending in Iraq contribute to the development or underdevelopment of Iraq ?

Underdevelopment of Iraq

38. Did military spending in the Middle East prevent or increase the possibility of conflict?

Increase the possibility of conflict

39. The USA has good relations with most of the Gulf countries, because ...

There are mutual interests for both sides

40. Does the United States’ forgein policy in the Middle East serve its strategic interests in the region?

Yes

41. To what extent do you think the Arab countries have benefited from oil revenue? Between 40-60%

42. Which would you support: the USA or Al Qaeda?

None

43. Which is the appropriate discretion for each of the following?

USA: Evil Hezbollah: Revolutionary

Hamas: Revolutionary Al-Qaeda: Terrorist

44. Do you agree that I use your responses in my research and in any future publication hereafter? Yes

- Divide and rule means fostering enmity and distrust between people, or local rulers so conflicts start between them, consequently they become weak and easy to be controlled by others.
- Colonial heritage refers to the impact of the colonial period on the occupied land after this occupation.
- The American project of democratization means the American’s attempts to make differences in the civic life of the people, their values, motivations and if necessary their regimes. This project justifies using power or lurching wars against others to justify their end.

----- Thank you----

Sample 3

Questionnaire

- ❖ **Gender** Male
- ❖ **Age:** 30-50
- ❖ **Country of origin:** Iraq
- ❖ **Current nationality:** Iraq
- ❖ **Country of residence:** Jordan
- ❖ **Educational background:** College, University
- ❖ **Cultural background:**

- **Religion**
(Muslim, Christian, etc...) Muslim Abstain
- **Sect**
(Sunni, Shi'i, Catholic, etc...) Sunni Abstain
- **Ethnicity**
(Arab, Kurd, etc...) Arab Abstain

1. **Which is your favourite movie?**
Syrian movie
2. **Do you prefer American products to Arabic ones?**
No
3. **Do you like fast food (e.g. McDonalds, Pizza Hut, KFC and Burger King)?**
No
4. **Do you think the USA is a nice place to live in?**
No
5. **To what extent do you think your country is democratic?**
Between 40-60%
6. **To what extent do Arab regimes represent their peoples?**
Less than 40%
7. **Do you support the American project of democratization in the Arab world?**
No
8. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Anti-American government
9. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Secular regimes
10. **Which do you think would work better for the Arab world?**
Arab unity
11. **Would you support an Islamic government in your country?**
No
12. **Which of the following does Saudi Arabia have the strongest relationship with?**
USA

- 13. Which of the following does Kuwait have the strongest relationship with?**
USA
- 14. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to the Arab countries?**
Israel
- 15. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to your country?**
USA
- 16. Did you support Iraq's war against Iran?**
No
- 17. Which country won the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?**
None
- 18. Which countries most benefited from the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?**
Abstain
- 19. Did you support Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait?**
Yes
- 20. Which countries most benefited from the second Gulf War (Liberation of Kuwait)?**
United States
- 21. The Iraqi regime stayed in power despite its defeat in the second Gulf War and a decade of sanctions. Did the USA want that?**
Yes
- 22. Did the USA attempt to end the 12-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN through peaceful diplomacy?**
No
- 23. Did Saddam Hussein's regime pose a 'mortal threat' to the USA and the West?**
Yes
- 24. How do you regard the third Gulf War (War on Iraq)?**
Occupation war
- 25. Who has most benefited from this war?**
US
- 26. Which is more secure and stable ?**
Iraq under Saddam
- 27. Which poses more threat to Middle Eastern countries ?**
Iraq after Saddam
- 28. Did the trial and the execution of Saddam aim to ...**
Fuel sects' conflict
- 29. To what extent do you think that the colonial heritage in the Middle East contributes to the outstanding conflicts?**
Between 60-80%
- 30. To what extent do you think that the Israeli occupation of Arab land has contributed to the armament and underdevelopment of the Middle East?**
80% and over
- 31. Did the existing borders between Middle Eastern countries contribute to conflict between them?**
Yes

32. Do you think that the ‘divide and rule’ policy is working in the Arab Middle East? Yes

33. Do you support your country’s militay spending?
Yes

34. Gulf states have spent billions of dollars on arms in the last five decades. Have these arms purchases helped these countries defend themsleves?
No

35. Most Gulf countries buy arms to:
Please arms-manufacturing countries

36. Did military expenditure in Middle Eastern countries contribute to the development of these countries?
No

37. Did military spending in Iraq contribute to the development or underdevelopment of Iraq ?
Development of Iraq

38. Did military spending in the Middle East prevent or increase the possibility of conflict?
Increase the possibility of conflict

39. The USA has good relations with most of the Gulf countries, because ...
There are mutual interests for both sides

40. Does the United States’ forgein policy in the Middle East serve its strategic interests in the region? Yes

41. To what extent do you think the Arab countries have benefited from oil revenue?
Between 40-60%

42. Which would you support: the USA or Al Qaeda?
Abstain

43. Which is the appropriate discretion for each of the following?
USA: Terrorist Hezbollah: Abstain
Hamass: Revolutionary Al-Qaeda: Terrorist

44. Do you agree that I use your responses in my research and in any future publication hereafter? Yes

- Divide and rule means fostering enmity and distrust between people, or local rulers so conflicts start between them, consequently they become weak and easy to be controlled by others.
- Colonial heritage refers to the impact of the colonial period on the occupied land after this occupation.
- The American project of democratization means the American’s attempts to make differences in the civic life of the people, their values, motivations and if necessary their regimes. This project justifies using power or lurching wars against others to justify their end.

----- Thank you----

Sample 4

Questionnaire

- ❖ **Gender** Female
- ❖ **Age:** 18-30
- ❖ **Country of origin:** Iraq
- ❖ **Current nationality:** Iraq
- ❖ **Country of residence:** Syria
- ❖ **Educational background:** College, University
- ❖ **Cultural background:**

- **Religion**
(Muslim, Christian, etc...) Christian Abstain

- **Sect**
(Sunni, Shi'i, Catholic, etc...) Abstain

- **Ethnicity**
(Arab, Kurd, etc...) Arab Abstain

1. **Which is your favourite movie?**
American movie
2. **Do you prefer American products to Arabic ones?**
Yes
3. **Do you like fast food (e.g. McDonalds, Pizza Hut, KFC and Burger King)?**
Yes
4. **Do you think the USA is a nice place to live in?**
Yes
5. **To what extent do you think your country is democratic?**
Less than 40%
6. **To what extent do Arab regimes represent their peoples?**
Less than 40%
7. **Do you support the American project of democratization in the Arab world?**
No
8. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Anti-American government
9. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Islamic regimes
10. **Which do you think would work better for the Arab world?**
Democratic regimes
11. **Would you support an Islamic government in your country?**
No
12. **Which of the following does Saudi Arabia have the strongest relationship with?**
Jordan

13. Which of the following does Kuwait have the strongest relationship with?
UK
14. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to the Arab countries?
Israel
15. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to your country?
Israel
16. Did you support Iraq's war against Iran?
No
17. Which country won the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
None
18. Which countries most benefited from the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
United States
19. Did you support Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait?
No
20. Which countries most benefited from the second Gulf War (Liberation of Kuwait)?
United States
21. The Iraqi regime stayed in power despite its defeat in the second Gulf War and a decade of sanctions. Did the USA want that?
Yes
22. Did the USA attempt to end the 12-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN through peaceful diplomacy?
No
23. Did Saddam Hussein's regime pose a 'mortal threat' to the USA and the West?
No
24. How do you regard the third Gulf War (War on Iraq)?
Occupation war
25. Who has most benefited from this war?
US
26. Which is more secure and stable ?
Iraq under Saddam
27. Which poses more threat to Middle Eastern countries ?
Iraq after Saddam
28. Did the trial and the execution of Saddam aim to ...
Fuel sects' conflict
29. To what extent do you think that the colonial heritage in the Middle East contributes to the outstanding conflicts?
Between 40-60%
30. To what extent do you think that the Israeli occupation of Arab land has contributed to the armament and underdevelopment of the Middle East?
Between 40-60%
31. Did the existing borders between Middle Eastern countries contribute to conflict between them?
Yes

32. Do you think that the ‘divide and rule’ policy is working in the Arab Middle East?

Yes

33. Do you support your country’s militay spending?

No

34. Gulf states have spent billions of dollars on arms in the last five decades. Have these arms purchases helped these countries defend themsleves?

No

35. Most Gulf countries buy arms to: Abstain

36. Did military expenditure in Middle Eastern countries contribute to the development of these countries? Yes

37. Did military spending in Iraq contribute to the development or underdevelopment of Iraq ?

Underdevelopment of Iraq

38. Did military spending in the Middle East prevent or increase the possibility of conflict?

Increase the possibility of conflict

39. The USA has good relations with most of the Gulf countries, because ...

These countries are rich with oil

40. Does the United States’ forgein policy in the Middle East serve its strategic interests in the region?

Yes

41. To what extent do you think the Arab countries have benefited from oil revenue? Between 40-60%

42. Which would you support: the USA or Al Qaeda?

None

43. Which is the appropriate discretion for each of the following?

USA: Democratic Hezbollah: Revolutionary

Hamas: Revolutionary Al-Qaeda: Terrorist

44. Do you agree that I use your responses in my research and in any future publication hereafter? Yes

- Divide and rule means fostering enmity and distrust between people, or local rulers so conflicts start between them, consequently they become weak and easy to be controlled by others.
- Colonial heritage refers to the impact of the colonial period on the occupied land after this occupation.
- The American project of democratization means the American’s attempts to make differences in the civic life of the people, their values, motivations and if necessary their regimes. This project justifies using power or lurching wars against others to justify their end.

----- Thank you----

Sample 5

Questionnaire

- ❖ **Gender** Male
- ❖ **Age:** 18-30
- ❖ **Country of origin:** Kuwait
- ❖ **Current nationality:** Kuwaiti
- ❖ **Country of residence:** Kuwait
- ❖ **Educational background:** College, University
- ❖ **Cultural background:**
 - **Religion**
(Muslim, Christian, etc...) Muslim Abstain
 - **Sect**
(Sunni, Shi'i, Catholic, etc...) Sunni Abstain
 - **Ethnicity**
(Arab, Kurd, etc...) Arab Abstain

1. **Which is your favourite movie?**
American movie
2. **Do you prefer American products to Arabic ones?**
Yes
3. **Do you like fast food (e.g. McDonalds, Pizza Hut, KFC and Burger King)?**
Yes
4. **Do you think the USA is a nice place to live in?**
No
5. **To what extent do you think your country is democratic?**
Between 60-80%
6. **To what extent do Arab regimes represent their peoples?**
Less than 40%
7. **Do you support the American project of democratization in the Arab world?**
Yes
8. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Pro-American government
9. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Islamic regimes
10. **Which do you think would work better for the Arab world?**
Islamic rule
11. **Would you support an Islamic government in your country?**
Yes
12. **Which of the following does Saudi Arabia have the strongest relationship with?**
USA

13. Which of the following does Kuwait have the strongest relationship with?
UK
14. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to the Arab countries?
Iran
15. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to your country?
Iran
16. Did you support Iraq's war against Iran?
Yes
17. Which country won the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
Iraq
18. Which countries most benefited from the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
Abstain
19. Did you support Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait?
No
20. Which countries most benefited from the second Gulf War (Liberation of Kuwait)?
Abstain
21. The Iraqi regime stayed in power despite its defeat in the second Gulf War and a decade of sanctions. Did the USA want that?
Yes
22. Did the USA attempt to end the 12-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN through peaceful diplomacy?
Yes
23. Did Saddam Hussein's regime pose a "mortal threat" to the US and the West?
Yes
24. How do you regard the third Gulf War (War on Iraq)?
Liberation war
25. Who has most benefited from this war?
Iraqi people
26. Which is more secure and stable ?
Iraq after Saddam
27. Which poses more threat to Middle Eastern countries ?
Iraq under Saddam
28. Did the trial and the execution of Saddam aim to ...
Achieve justice
29. To what extent do you think that the colonial heritage in the Middle East contributes to the outstanding conflicts?
Between 60-80%
30. To what extent do you think that the Israeli occupation of Arab land has contributed to the armament and underdevelopment of the Middle East?
Between 40-60%
31. Did the existing borders between Middle Eastern countries contribute to conflict between them?
Yes

32. Do you think that the ‘divide and rule’ policy is working in the Arab Middle East? Yes

33. Do you support your country’s militay spending?
Yes

34. Gulf states have spent billions of dollars on arms in the last five decades. Have these arms purchases helped these countries defend themsleves?
Yes

35. Most Gulf countries buy arms to:
Defend themselves against external threats

36. Did military expenditure in Middle Eastern countries contribute to the development of these countries?
No

37. Did military spending in Iraq contribute to the development or underdevelopment of Iraq ?
Underdevelopment of Iraq

38. Did military spending in the Middle East prevent or increase the possibility of conflict?
Increase the possibility of conflict

39. The US has good relations with most of the Gulf countries, because ...
There are mutual interests for both sides

40. Does the United States’ forgein policy in the Middle East serve its strategic interests in the region?
Yes

41. To what extent do you think the Arab countries have benefited from oil revenue?
Between 40-60%

42. Which would you support: the US or Al Qaeda?
None

43. Which is the appropriate discretion for each of the following?
USA: Arrogant Hezbollah: Terrorist
Hamam: Revolutionary Al-Qaeda: Abstain

44. Do you agree that I use your responses in my research and in any future publication hereafter? Yes

- Divide and rule means fostering enmity and distrust between people, or local rulers so conflicts start between them, consequently they become weak and easy to be controlled by others.
- Colonial heritage refers to the impact of the colonial period on the occupied land after this occupation.
- The American project of democratization means the American’s attempts to make differences in the civic life of the people, their values, motivations and if necessary their regimes. This project justifies using power or lurching wars against others to justify their end.

----- Thank you----

Sample 6

Questionnaire

- ❖ **Gender** Male
- ❖ **Age:** 30-50
- ❖ **Country of origin:** Egypt
- ❖ **Current nationality:** Egyptian
- ❖ **Country of residence:** UAE
- ❖ **Educational background:** Higher Education (PhD, MA..)
- ❖ **Cultural background:**
 - **Religion**
(Muslim, Christian, etc...) Muslim Abstain
 - **Sect**
(Sunni, Shi'i, Catholic, etc...) Sunni Abstain
 - **Ethnicity**
(Arab, Kurd, etc...) Arab Abstain

1. **Which is your favourite movie?**
Egyptian movie
2. **Do you prefer American products to Arabic ones?**
Yes
3. **Do you like fast food (e.g. McDonalds, Pizza Hut, KFC and Burger King)?**
No
4. **Do you think the USA is a nice place to live in?**
Yes
5. **To what extent do you think your country is democratic?**
Between 40-60%
6. **To what extent do Arab regimes represent their peoples?**
Less than 40%
7. **Do you support the American project of democratization in the Arab world?**
No
8. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Anti-American government
9. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Islamic regimes
10. **Which do you think would work better for the Arab world?**
Arab unity
11. **Would you support an Islamic government in your country?**
Yes
12. **Which of the following does Saudi Arabia have the strongest relationship with?**
USA

13. Which of the following does Kuwait have the strongest relationship with?
UK
14. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to the Arab countries?
Israel
15. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to your country?
Israel
16. Did you support Iraq's war against Iran?
No
17. Which country won the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
None
18. Which countries most benefited from the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
United States
19. Did you support Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait?
No
20. Which countries most benefited from the second Gulf War (Liberation of Kuwait)?
United States
21. The Iraqi regime stayed in power despite its defeat in the second Gulf War and a decade of sanctions. Did the USA want that?
Yes
22. Did the USA attempt to end the 12-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN through peaceful diplomacy?
No
23. Did Saddam Hussein's regime pose a "mortal threat" to the USA and the West?
No
24. How do you regard the third Gulf War (War on Iraq)?
Occupation war
25. Who has most benefited from this war? Israel
26. Which is more secure and stable ?
Iraq under Saddam
27. Which poses more threat to Middle Eastern countries ?
Iraq after Saddam
28. Did the trial and the execution of Saddam aim to ...
Disgrace Arab feeling
29. To what extent do you think that the colonial heritage in the Middle East contributes to the outstanding conflicts?
Between 60-80%
30. To what extent do you think that the Israeli occupation of Arab land has contributed to the armament and underdevelopment of the Middle East?
Between 60-80%
31. Did the existing borders between Middle Eastern countries contribute to conflict between them?
Yes

32. Do you think that the ‘divide and rule’ policy is working in the Arab Middle East?

Yes

33. Do you support your country’s militay spending?

Yes

34. Gulf states have spent billions of dollars on arms in the last five decades. Have these arms purchases helped these countries defend themsleves?

No

35. Most Gulf countries buy arms to:

Defend themselves against external threats

36. Did military expenditure in Middle Eastern countries contribute to the development of these countries?

No

37. Did military spending in Iraq contribute to the development or underdevelopment of Iraq ?

Underdevelopment of Iraq

38. Did military spending in the Middle East prevent or increase the possibility of conflict?

Increase the possibility of conflict

39. The USA has good relations with most of the Gulf countries, because ...

These countries are rich with oil

40. Does the United States’ forgein policy in the Middle East serve its strategic interests in the region?

Yes

41. To what extent do you think the Arab countries have benefited from oil revenue?

Less than 40%

42. Which would you support: the USA or Al Qaeda?

None

43. Which is the appropriate discretion for each of the following?

USA: Arrogant Hezbollah: Revolutionary

Hamas: Revolutionary Al-Qaeda: Terrorist

44. Do you agree that I use your responses in my research and in any future publication hereafter? Yes

- Divide and rule means fostering enmity and distrust between people, or local rulers so conflicts start between them, consequently they become weak and easy to be controlled by others.
- Colonial heritage refers to the impact of the colonial period on the occupied land after this occupation.
- The American project of democratization means the American’s attempts to make differences in the civic life of the people, their values, motivations and if necessary their regimes. This project justifies using power or lunching wars against others to justify their end.

----- Thank you----

Sample 7

Questionnaire

- ❖ **Gender** Male
- ❖ **Age:** 30-50
- ❖ **Country of origin:** Saudi Arabia
- ❖ **Current nationality:** Saudi
- ❖ **Country of residence:** UK
- ❖ **Educational background:** Higher Education (PhD, MA..)
- ❖ **Cultural background:**
 - **Religion**
(Muslim, Christian, etc...) Muslim Abstain
 - **Sect**
(Sunni, Shi'i, Catholic, etc...) Sunni Abstain
 - **Ethnicity**
(Arab, Kurd, etc...) Arab Abstain

1. **Which is your favourite movie?**
American movie
2. **Do you prefer American products to Arabic ones?**
Yes
3. **Do you like fast food (e.g. McDonalds, Pizza Hut, KFC and Burger King)?**
Yes
4. **Do you think the USA is a nice place to live in?**
Yes
5. **To what extent do you think your country is democratic?**
Between 40-60%
6. **To what extent do Arab regimes represent their peoples?**
Less than 40%
7. **Do you support the American project of democratization in the Arab world?**
No
8. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Anti-American government
9. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Islamic regimes
10. **Which do you think would work better for the Arab world?**
Democratic regimes
11. **Would you support an Islamic government in your country?**
Yes
12. **Which of the following does Saudi Arabia have the strongest relationship with?**
USA

13. Which of the following does Kuwait have the strongest relationship with?
UK
14. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to the Arab countries?
Israel
15. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to your country?
Iran
16. Did you support Iraq's war against Iran?
Yes
17. Which country won the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
None
18. Which countries most benefited from the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
Abstain
19. Did you support Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait?
No
20. Which countries most benefited from the second Gulf War (Liberation of Kuwait)?
Abstain
21. The Iraqi regime stayed in power despite its defeat in the second Gulf War and a decade of sanctions. Did the USA want that?
Yes
22. Did the USA attempt to end the 12-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN through peaceful diplomacy?
No
23. Did Saddam Hussein's regime pose a "mortal threat" to the USA and the West?
Yes
24. How do you regard the third Gulf War (War on Iraq)?
Occupation war
25. Who has most benefited from this war?
Israel
26. Which is more secure and stable ?
Iraq under Saddam
27. Which poses more threat to Middle Eastern countries ?
Iraq after Saddam
28. Did the trial and the execution of Saddam aim to ...
Fuel sects' conflict
29. To what extent do you think that the colonial heritage in the Middle East contributes to the outstanding conflicts?
Between 40-60%
30. To what extent do you think that the Israeli occupation of Arab land has contributed to the armament and underdevelopment of the Middle East?
Between 60-80%
31. Did the existing borders between Middle Eastern countries contribute to conflict between them?
Yes

32. Do you think that the ‘divide and rule’ policy is working in the Arab Middle East?

Yes

33. Do you support your country’s militay spending?

Yes

34. Gulf states have spent billions of dollars on arms in the last five decades. Have these arms purchases helped these countries defend themsleves?

Yes

35. Most Gulf countries buy arms to:

Abstain

36. Did military expenditure in Middle Eastern countries contribute to the development of these countries?

No

37. Did military spending in Iraq contribute to the development or underdevelopment of Iraq ?

Underdevelopment of Iraq

38. Did military spending in the Middle East prevent or increase the possibility of conflict?

Increase the possibility of conflict

39. The USA has good relations with most of the Gulf countries, because ...

There are mutual interests for both sides

40. Does the United States’ forgein policy in the Middle East serve its strategic interests in the region?

Yes

41. To what extent do you think the Arab countries have benefited from oil revenue?

Between 60-80%

42. Which would you support: the USA or Al Qaeda?

None

43. Which is the appropriate discretion for each of the following?

USA: Democratic Hezbollah: Abstain

Hamas: Revolutionary Al-Qaeda: Terrorist

44. Do you agree that I use your responses in my research and in any future publication hereafter?

Yes

- Divide and rule means fostering enmity and distrust between people, or local rulers so conflicts start between them, consequently they become weak and easy to be controlled by others.
- Colonial heritage refers to the impact of the colonial period on the occupied land after this occupation.
- The American project of democratization means the American’s attempts to make differences in the civic life of the people, their values, motivations and if necessary their regimes. This project justifies using power or lunching wars against others to justify their end.

-----Thank you----

Sample 8

Questionnaire

- ❖ **Gender** Male
- ❖ **Age:** 18-30
- ❖ **Country of origin:** Saudi Arabia
- ❖ **Current nationality:** Saudi
- ❖ **Country of residence:** Saudi Arabia
- ❖ **Educational background:** College, University
- ❖ **Cultural background:**

- **Religion**
(Muslim, Christian, etc...) Muslim Abstain
- **Sect**
(Sunni, Shi'i, Catholic, etc...) Sunni Abstain
- **Ethnicity**
(Arab, Kurd, etc...) Arab Abstain

1. **Which is your favourite movie?**
Egyptian movie
2. **Do you prefer American products to Arabic ones?**
Yes
3. **Do you like fast food (e.g. McDonalds, Pizza Hut, KFC and Burger King)?**
Yes
4. **Do you think the US is a nice place to live in?**
No
5. **To what extent do you think your country is democratic?**
Between 60-80%
6. **To what extent do Arab regimes represent their peoples?**
Less than 40%
7. **Do you support the American project of democratization in the Arab world?**
No
8. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Anti-American government
9. **A real process of democratization in the Arab world would bring to power...**
Islamic regimes
10. **Which do you think would work better for the Arab world?**
Islamic rule
11. **Would you support an Islamic government in your country?**
Yes
12. **Which of the following does Saudi Arabia have the strongest relationship with?**
Abstain

13. Which of the following does Kuwait have the strongest relationship with?
Abstain
14. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to the Arab countries?
Iran
15. Which of the following poses the highest level of threat to your country?
Iran
16. Did you support Iraq's war against Iran?
Yes
17. Which country won the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
Iraq
18. Which countries most benefited from the first Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian war)?
Abstain
19. Did you support Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait?
No
20. Which countries most benefited from the second Gulf War (Liberation of Kuwait)?
Abstain
21. The Iraqi regime stayed in power despite its defeat in the second Gulf War and a decade of sanctions. Did the USA want that?
Yes
22. Did the USA attempt to end the 12-year confrontation between Iraq and the UN through peaceful diplomacy?
No
23. Did Saddam Hussein's regime pose a "mortal threat" to the USA and the West?
Yes
24. How do you regard the third Gulf War (War on Iraq)?
Occupation war
25. Who has most benefited from this war?
Israel
26. Which is more secure and stable ?
Iraq under Saddam
27. Which poses more threat to Middle Eastern countries ?
Iraq after Saddam
28. Did the trial and the execution of Saddam aim to ...
Abstain
29. To what extent do you think that the colonial heritage in the Middle East contributes to the outstanding conflicts?
Between 60-80%
30. To what extent do you think that the Israeli occupation of Arab land has contributed to the armament and underdevelopment of the Middle East?
Between 60-80%
31. Did the existing borders between Middle Eastern countries contribute to conflict between them?
Yes

32. Do you think that the ‘divide and rule’ policy is working in the Arab Middle East? Yes

33. Do you support your country’s militay spending?

Yes

34. Gulf states have spent billions of dollars on arms in the last five decades. Have these arms purchases helped these countries defend themsleves?

Yes

35. Most Gulf countries buy arms to:

Defend themselves against external threats

36. Did military expenditure in Middle Eastern countries contribute to the development of these countries?

Yes

37. Did military spending in Iraq contribute to the development or underdevelopment of Iraq ?

Underdevelopment of Iraq

38. Did military spending in the Middle East prevent or increase the possibility of conflict?

Increase the possibility of conflict

39. The USA has good relations with most of the Gulf countries, because ...

There are mutual interests for both sides

40. Does the United States’ forgein policy in the Middle East serve its strategic interests in the region?

Yes

41. To what extent do you think the Arab countries have benefited from oil revenue? Between 60-80%

42. Which would you support: the USA or Al Qaeda?

Abstain

43. Which is the appropriate discretion for each of the following?

USA: Arrogant Hezbollah: Terrorist

Hamas: Revolutionary Al-Qaeda: Abstain

44. Do you agree that I use your responses in my research and in any future publication hereafter? Yes

- Divide and rule means fostering enmity and distrust between people, or local rulers so conflicts start between them, consequently they become weak and easy to be controlled by others.
- Colonial heritage refers to the impact of the colonial period on the occupied land after this occupation.
- The American project of democratization means the American’s attempts to make differences in the civic life of the people, their values, motivations and if necessary their regimes. This project justifies using power or lurching wars against others to justify their end.

----- Thank you----

Sample 9

يهدف هذا الاستبيان إلى إلقاء بعض الضوء على توقعات وردود فعل العرب تجاه السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية وتأثير الإنفاق العسكري والإتجار بالسلاح على الصراعات والتنمية في الشرق الأوسط. وهو جزء من بحث دكتوراه في جامعة اكستر البريطانية. ستعتبر المعلومات المقدمة في هذا الاستبيان خاصة وستستخدم البحث حصراً وسيتم التعامل معها بغض النظر عن اسماء المشاركين ، وستستخدم لأغراض البحث حصراً. ممتناً لمساعدتك بإملاء هذا الإستبيان وإعادته إلى العنوان الالكتروني التالي خلال 10 أيام

a.alloush@exeter.ac.uk

الإستبيان:

- ❖ :
 - ❖ : 50-30
 - ❖ : السعودية
 - ❖ : الجنسية الحالية : السعودية
 - ❖ : بلد الإقامة الحالية: السعودية
 - ❖ : الخلفية العلمية: كلية أو جامعة
 - ❖ : الخلفية الثقافية :
 - الديانة:
(مسلم، مسيحي، الخ)
 - المذهب:
(سني، شيعي، كاثوليك، الخ)
 - القومية:
(عربية، كردية، أرمنية، الخ)
-
-
-

1. ما هي السينما

السينما المصرية

2. هل تفضل السلع الامركية على السلع العربية ؟

3. هل تحب الوجبات السريعة (مثل ماكдонаلد، بيتزا هوت، بيرغر كنغ، الخ)

4. هل تظن ان امريكا مكان جيد للعيش؟

5. إلى اي درجة تعتبر أن بلدك ديمقراطي؟ بين 60-80 %

6. إلى اي درجة تعتبر أن الأنظمة العربية تمثل شعوبها؟ بين 40-60 %

7. هل تؤيد المشروع الأمريكي لنشر الديمقراطية في العالم العربي؟
8. هل تعتقد أن ديمقراطية حقيقية في العالم العربي ستجلب إلى السلطة حكومات مناهضة للولايات المتحدة
9. هل تعتقد أن ديمقراطية حقيقية في العالم العربي ستجلب إلى السلطة حكومات اسلامية
10. ما هو الخيار الأفضل للع
11. هل تؤيد قيام نظام حكم اسلامي في بلدك؟
12. اي الدول التالية ترتبط بعلاقات أقوى مع السعودية ؟
13. أي الدول التالية ترتبط بعلاقات أقوى مع الكويت ؟
بريطانيا
14. أي الدول التالية تشكل خطراً أكبر على الدول العربية ؟
ايران
15. أي الدول التالية تشكل خطراً أكبر على بلدك ؟
ايران
16. هل أيدت حرب الحرب العراقية على ايران ؟
17. من هي الدولة التي كسبت الحرب (الحرب العراقية الايرانية)
18. الدول كانت اكثر استفادة من حرب الخليج الاولى
19. هل أيدت الغزو العراقي للكويت ؟
20. اي الدول التالية حققت اكبر استفادة من حرب تحرير الكويت ؟
21. استمر النظام العراقي في السلطة بالرغم من الهزيمة في حرب الخليج الثانية وعشر سنوات من العقوبات.
هل كان هذا بارادة من الولايات المتحدة؟
22. هل حاولت الولايات المتحدة إنهاء 12 سنة من المواجهة بين العراق والأمم المتحدة عبر الدبلوماسية السلمية ؟

40. هل تخدم السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط مصالحها الاستراتيجية في

41. ما هي نسبة استفاة الأنظمة العربية من عائدات النفط؟

بين 60-80 %

42. أيهما تدعم: الولايات المتحدة أم تنظيم القاعدة ؟

43. ما هي الصفة الأنسب لكل من التالي؟

يات المتحدة : شريعة

حزب الله : ارهابية

تحرية :

:

44. هل توافق على استخدام أجوبتك في بحثي وفي منشورات مستقبلية ؟

Sample 10

:

يهدف هذا الاستبيان إلى إلقاء بعض الضوء على توقعات وردود فعل العرب تجاه السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية وتأثير الإنفاق العسكري والإتجار بالسلح على الصراعات والتنمية في الشرق الأوسط. وهو جزء من بحث دكتوراه في جامعة اكستر البريطانية. ستعتبر المعلومات المقدمة في هذا الاستبيان خاصة وستستخدم البحث حصراً وسيتم التعامل معها بغض النظر عن اسماء المشاركين ، وستستخدم لأغراض البحث حصراً. ممتناً لمساعدتك بإملاء هذا الإستبيان وإعادته إلى العنوان الالكتروني التالي خلال 10 أيام

a.alloush@exeter.ac.uk

الإستبيان:

- ❖ :
- ❖ : 30-18
- ❖ : سوريا
- ❖ الجنسية الحالية : السورية
- ❖ بلد الإقامة الحالية: سوريا
- ❖ الخلفية العلمية: كلية أو جامعة
- ❖ الخلفية الثقافية :
- الديانة:
 (مسلم، مسيحي، الخ)
- المذهب:
 (سني، شيعي، كاثوليك، الخ)
- القومية:
 (عربية، كردية، أرمنية، الخ)

1. ما هي السينما المفضلة لك ؟

السينما السورية

2. هل تفضل السلع الامركية على السلع العربية ؟

3. هل تحب الوجبات السريعة (مثل ماكдонаلد، بيتزا هوت، بيرغر كنج، الخ)

4. هل تظن ان امريكا مكان جيد للعيش؟
5. إلى اي درجة تعتبر أن بلدك ديمقراطي؟ بين 40-60 %
6. إلى اي درجة تعتبر أن الأنظمة العربية تمثل شعوبها؟ 40 %
7. هل تؤيد المشروع الأمريكي لنشر الديمقراطية في العالم العربي؟
8. هل تعتقد أن ديمقراطية حقيقية في العالم العربي ستجلب إلى السلطة حكومات مناهضة للولايات المتحدة
9. هل تعتقد أن ديمقراطية حقيقية في العالم العربي ستجلب إلى السلطة حكومات اسلامية
10. ما هو الخيار الأفضل للعالم العربي؟
الوحدة العربية
11. هل تؤيد قيام نظام حكم اسلامي في بلدك؟
12. اي الدول التالية ترتبط بعلاقات أقوى مع السعودية ؟
أمريكا
13. أي الدول التالية ترتبط بعلاقات أقوى مع الكويت ؟
بريطانيا
14. أي الدول التالية تشكل خطراً أكبر على الدول العربية ؟
اسرائيل
15. أي الدول التالية تشكل خطراً أكبر على بلدك ؟
اسرائيل
16. هل أيدت حرب الحرب العراقية على ايران ؟
17. من هي الدولة التي كسبت الحرب (الحرب العراقية الايرانية)
18. اي الدول كانت اكثر استفادة من حرب الخليج الاولى
أمريكا
19. هل أيدت الغزو العراقي للكويت ؟
20. اي الدول التالية حققت اكبر استفادة من حرب تحرير الكويت ؟
أمريكا

21. استمر النظام العراقي في السلطة بالرغم من الهزيمة في حرب الخليج الثانية وعشر سنوات من العقوبات.
هل كان هذا بإرادة من الولايات المتحدة؟

22. هل حاولت الولايات المتحدة إنهاء 12 سنة من المواجهة بين العراق والأمم المتحدة عبر الدبلوماسية السلمية ؟

23. هل كان يشكل نظام صدام حسين خطراً حقيقياً على الولايات المتحدة؟

24. هل تنظر إلى حرب الخليج الثالثة () على أنها

25. من هو المستفيد من حرب الخليج الثالثة؟

إسرائيل

26. أيهما أكثر أماناً واستقراراً ؟

27. أيهما يشكل تهديدا أكبر لدول الشرق الأوسط؟

28. هل محاكمة صدام حسين كان بهدف

تغذية الصراع الطائفي

29. في الشرق الأوسط علاقة بالأزمات القائمة حالياً فيه؟

بين 40-60 %

30. إلى أي حد تعتقد ان الاحتلال الاسرائيلي للاراضي العربية قد ساهم في تسليح وتخلف الشرق الأوسط ؟

بين 60-80 %

31. هل تساهم الحدود القائمة بين دول الشرق الأوسط في نشوء نزاعات بين هذه الدول ؟

32. هل تعتقد أن سياسة " "

33. هل تؤيد سياسة الانفاق العسكري لدولتك ؟

34. انفقت دول الخليج العربي مليارات الدولارات على السلاح في العقود الخمسة الماضية. هل ساعدت صفقات

الاسلحة هذه دول الخليج في الدفاع عن نفسها؟

35. الكثير من دول الخليج تشتري السلاح

36. هل ساهم الاتفاق العسكري في دول الشرق الاوسط في تنمية دوله ؟

37. هل ساهم الاتفاق العسكري المرتفع في العراق في تنمية العراق ام عاق تقدمه ؟

عاق تقدمه

38. هل ساهم الإتفاق العسكري في الشرق الأوسط في التقليل أم زيادة احتمال حصول الأزمات ؟

يزيد من احتمالات حدوثها

39. للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية علاقات جيدة مع معظم دول الخليج. هل سبب ذلك

غنى هذه الدول بالنفط

40. هل تخدم السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط مصالحها الاستراتيجية في

41. ما هي نسبة استفادة الأنظمة العربية من عائدات النفط؟

40 %

42. أيهما تدعم: الولايات المتحدة أم تنظيم القاعدة ؟

43. ما هي الصفة الأنسب لكل من التالي؟

الولايات المتحدة :

حزب الله : تحررية

: تحررية

: ارهابية

44. هل توافق على استخدام أجوبتك في بحثي وفي منشورات مستقبلية ؟
