THE EVOLUTION OF PLACE MARKETING

: Focusing on Korean Place Marketing and
Its Changing Political Context

Submitted by MYUNG-SEOP LEE to the University of Exeter
as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Geography
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Abstract

Over the last three decades, within the context of globalisation and intensified inter-urban competition, we have observed the growing use of market-centred strategy such as ‘marketing or branding places’. Despite the worsening of the economic situation since the 2008 global financial crisis, the overall trend of expansion of place marketing based on marketing science keeps going further in many cities in South Korea. Why does this phenomenon happen? How can we interpret it at this time? What does this mean for the cities and their residents? In order to answer these questions, this thesis attempts to understand the process of place marketing projects, and analyse how they were politically formed and what their actual effects were for residents. In addition, it develops a critical understanding of the evolution of urban place marketing projects from the political perspective in Gwangju, South Korea: the Gwangju Biennale, the Asian Culture Complex, the Dome Baseball Stadium, the Urban Folly, and the Gwangju Universiade 2015. Through a nation-wide Korean expert survey and a case study of Gwangju, this research shows that Korean place marketing shares common trends with Western cities as well as having some specifically Korean characteristics. In particular, it tries to reveal the evolving nature of Korean place marketing by employing a combination of multi-scalar and cultural politics approaches. The thesis concludes that some Korean cities such as Gwangju have moved toward neo-liberalisation by employing entrepreneurial strategies of place marketing.
# CONTENTS

Abstract ................................................................................................................................................ II

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... VII

Dedication ................................................................................................................................................ VIII

List of Tables .......................................................................................................................................... IX

List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................... XI

List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. XIII

## Chapter 1  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1

1.2 Research aims and topics .................................................................................................................. 7

1.3 Structure of the thesis ...................................................................................................................... 12

## Chapter 2  Place, Marketing, and Place Marketing ............................................................................. 17

2.1 Introduction: two different perspectives on place marketing ....................................................... 17

2.2 What is place marketing? ............................................................................................................... 19

2.3 History of place marketing: new phenomenon? .......................................................................... 28

2.4 The politics of reimagining a city .................................................................................................. 45

2.5 Summary ......................................................................................................................................... 49
Chapter 3  Theoretical Background to Place Marketing  
(From the Political Perspective) ........................................................................ 51  
3.1 Introduction........................................................................................................... 51  
3.2 Political context of Western place marketing...................................................... 52  
3.3 Transfer of place marketing policies.................................................................... 74  
3.4 Political theories on local economic development.............................................. 82  
3.5 Summary................................................................................................................ 93  

Chapter 4  Methodology............................................................................................. 95  
4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................ 95  
4.2 Establishing Framework......................................................................................... 96  
4.3 Extensive expert Survey......................................................................................... 107  
4.4 Intensive case Study............................................................................................. 119  
4.5 Keeping some ethical issues in mind...................................................................... 126  
4.6 Summary................................................................................................................ 129  

Chapter 5  Documentary Analysis on the Evolution of Place  
Marketing in the Korean Context.............................................................................. 131  
5.1 Introduction............................................................................................................ 131  
5.2 Concerns about a marketing science approach................................................... 131  
5.3 Korean prejudice on place marketing in advanced cities..................................... 136  
5.4 The possibility of evolving place marketing by policy transfer............................ 141  
5.5 Examination on applying limits of local-centred political theories to South  
Korea......................................................................................................................... 144  
5.6 Summary................................................................................................................ 145
# Chapter 6  Understanding General Korean Context of Urban Politics and Overall Trends in Place Marketing

6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 147
6.2 Some general contexts about Korean urban politics .............................................. 147
6.3 Identifying overall trends in Korean place marketing ............................................ 154
6.4 Summary ............................................................................................................... 166

# Chapter 7  The Gwangju Democratisation Movement and the Gwangju Biennale

7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 168
7.2 Gwangju Overview .............................................................................................. 168
7.3 Gwangju Democratisation Movement and ‘city of resistance’ ............................... 179
7.4 City image of Gwangju ....................................................................................... 191
7.5 Gwangju Biennale ............................................................................................... 204
7.6 Multi-scale actors and contested visions .............................................................. 211
7.7 Conflict: Biennale vs. Anti-Biennale .................................................................. 215
7.8 Conflict co-ordination and consequences of Gwangju Biennale ......................... 221
7.9 Summary ............................................................................................................... 234

# Chapter 8  Asian Culture Complex

8.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 237
8.2 Background .......................................................................................................... 238
8.3 Multi-scale actors and contested visions .............................................................. 261
8.4 First conflict: Landmark Controversy ................................................................. 266
Chapter 9  Dome Baseball Stadium and Other Marketing Projects ................................................................. 300
  9.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 300
  9.2 Dome Baseball Stadium......................................................................................................................... 300
  9.3 Other marketing projects in Gwangju and their implications.............................................................. 320
  9.4 Summary................................................................................................................................................. 330

Chapter 10  Conclusions and Way Forward ............................................................................................... 332
  10.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 332
  10.2 Main study results on research topics................................................................................................ 334
  10.3 Discussion............................................................................................................................................. 342
  10.4 Key contributions to knowledge.......................................................................................................... 347
  10.5 Policy suggestions for South Korea..................................................................................................... 351
  10.6 Direction of future research................................................................................................................. 353

Appendix 1: Research consent form................................................................. 356
Appendix 2: Survey questions...................................................................................... 357
Appendix 3: Survey results.......................................................................................... 366
Appendix 4: Interview offer....................................................................................... 376
Appendix 5: Interview schedule................................................................................... 377

Bibliography.................................................................................................................................................. 384
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Dedication

This is dedicated to my wife, Eun-Jung Song, for her endless love, patience and encouragement during the time of writing. Without her precious help, I would never have completed this hard work. And I really want to express my deep love again and gratitude by saying ‘I love you’ in this page.
List of Tables

Table 2.1 Concerning terms marketing of places in the West.............................. 20

Table 4.1 Advantages and disadvantages of email survey method..................... 107
Table 4.2 Structure of survey questions.......................................................... 112
Table 4.3 Survey research schedule............................................................... 116
Table 4.4 Response rates by sample population groups..................................... 119
Table 4.5 Key group's participants for my interview........................................... 122
Table 4.6 Common interviewing mistakes....................................................... 125

Table 6.1 Important Background to the emergence of place marketing.............. 155
Table 6.2 Degree of concern for cultural tools in place marketing...................... 158
Table 6.3 Most influential actor within urban place marketing.......................... 160
Table 6.4 Origin of ideas for place marketing activities are from....................... 162
Table 6.5 Frequency in applying other country's place marketing policy.......... 163
Table 6.6 Which country is usually examined by Korean cities......................... 164
Table 6.7 The effect of the application of other country's success case.............. 164
Table 6.8 Experience of hearing about the failure of Western place marketing.. 165
Table 6.9 Experience of introducing failures of Western place marketing.......... 165

Table 7.1 Changing population in Gwangju.................................................... 176
Table 7.2 Changing population in city centre and non-city centre in Gwangju... 177
Table 7.3 Economic comparison of Korean core cities..................................... 178
Table 7.4 Overview of the Gwangju Biennale .................................................. 210

Table 8.1 Changing plans of using the old JPH .............................................. 243
Table 8.2 Changing ratio of Gu’s population in Gwangju .............................. 248
Table 8.3 The ACC facilities and their functions ......................................... 260
List of Figures

Figure 4.1 A conceptual framework for PM (Place Marketing) case study........ 107

Figure 7.1 Location of Gwangju................................................................. 169
Figure 7.2 Map of Gwangju and case sites............................................. 170
Figure 7.3 Map of Gwangju and case sites............................................. 171
Figure 7.4 Confrontation between citizens and military............................ 183
Figure 7.5 Suppression and bloody killing............................................. 183
Figure 7.6 Arrested and murdered citizen............................................. 184
Figure 7.7 Bereaved family and burying the dead in Mangwol cemetery....... 184
Figure 7.8 Anti-Biennale pictures............................................................ 218
Figure 7.9 Conflicting meanings of the Gwangju Biennale......................... 219
Figure 7.10 Biennale Bridge and Street of Art.......................................... 228

Figure 8.1 The Old JPH, Democratic Square, and Geumnam Boulevard......... 240
Figure 8.2 Design and facility plan of the ACC....................................... 259
Figure 8.3 Pictures of protesters............................................................. 270
Figure 8.4 Conflicting meanings of the ACC........................................... 274
Figure 8.5 An individual demonstration and Ochetuji protest..................... 283
Figure 8.6 Under construction of the ACC.............................................. 284
Figure 8.7 Memories about the ‘Daedong’ Spirit....................................... 291
Figure 9.1 Conflicting meanings of the Dome Baseball project.......................... 309
Figure 9.2 Design of Dome Stadium and protesting citizens.......................... 310
Figure 9.3 A banner to mobilise opinion for the Dome.................................... 312
Figure 9.4 Old baseball stadium and new one.................................................. 316
Figure 9.5 Urban Folly in Gwangju................................................................. 321
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Asian Culture Complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BID</td>
<td>Business Improvement Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCBS</td>
<td>Citizen Committee for Constructing Baseball Stadium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Citizen Supporting Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Executive Agency for Culture Cities</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDI</td>
<td>Gwangju Development Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gigaehyeop</td>
<td>Committee of Gwangju-Jeonnam Local Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVO</td>
<td>Gwangju Democratisation Movement Victims Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCAC</td>
<td>Gwangju Hub City of Asia Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Civic Committee for old JPH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPH</td>
<td>Jeonnam Provincial Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAPM</td>
<td>Korea Alliance of Progressive Movements in Gwangju &amp; Jeonnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDI</td>
<td>Korea Development Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFAA</td>
<td>Korean Fine Arts Association</td>
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<td>KHPR</td>
<td>Korean Housing Provision Rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIEP</td>
<td>Korea Institute International Economic Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>KTX</td>
<td>Korean Express Train</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDDC</td>
<td>London Dockland Development Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Light-Emitting Diode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LH</td>
<td>Korea Land and Housing Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCS</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture and Sports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCT</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCST</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLTM</td>
<td>Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOCT</td>
<td>Ministry of Construction and Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSCO</td>
<td>POSCO Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMR</td>
<td>Seoul Metropolitan Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Urban Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>WBC</td>
<td>World Baseball Classic</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Background

1.1.1 Background to the research

Over the last three decades, as the influence of neo-liberalism has grown in the world, it appears cities increasingly think and act like businesses (Harvey, 2005; Kalandides, 2006; Theodore, Peck and Brenner, 2011). Within the context of global restructuring and intensified inter-urban competition, we have observed the growing use of market-centred and managerial strategies like ‘marketing or branding places’ to achieve local economic development in contemporary cities. They have become more ubiquitous in both developed countries in North America and West Europe and developing ones in Asia (Miles and Paddison, 2005; Harvey, 2005; Yeoh, 2005). For example, under the context of global economic restructuring, a number of European cities have taken advantage of place marketing techniques in an attempt to revitalize their depressed inner cities since 1980s.

Place marketing as an entrepreneurial local development strategy has become especially widespread in the UK, and recently, some developing or less-developed countries such as South Korea have increasingly paid attention to place marketing or branding in order to develop their urban economies. The strategy of place marketing is probably one of the fastest growing fields of urban policy in South Korea. In this regard, there is a very worrying sign in the practice of place marketing in South
Korea in more recent years. Many local politicians and policy makers in South Korea tend to consider place marketing and branding as a ‘panacea’ to boost their weakened economies, to improve citizens’ (including disadvantaged groups) quality of life and to change their ambiguous local identity into more clear one. They have a passion for learning and imitating advanced (Western and Japanese) cities’ place marketing and branding without considering its applicability, or whether their cities can follow those cities’ successful myths.

Recently, with the worsening of the economic situation since 2008 global financial crisis, large-scale marketing projects might be put on hold in some Western cities. Nonetheless, the overall trend of expansion of ‘marketing or branding places’ still keeps going in less-developed cities in East Asia such as in South Korea. Why does this phenomenon happen? How can we interpret it at this time? These questions are closely connected with the topic of this thesis. Throughout this thesis, I argue that the expansion of place marketing based on market-centred ideas is inseparably intertwined with a political shift towards neo-liberalisation in contemporary cities. That is, place marketing policies have been employed as a driving force for the neo-liberal city, and in this sense, I argue they are very political.

The perspectives of literature on place marketing or branding can be divided into two groups. One is the proponent’s view which usually comes from Marketing Science and the other is the critic’s, one often originates from more diverse academic backgrounds such as Geography, Urban Planning and Cultural Studies, etc. The former is to see place marketing and branding policies as very useful and beneficial
to urban development. Proponents typically focus on their economic benefits. In contrast, people who are in the latter position are usually critical about them since they often pay attention to their negative consequences. They typically worry about not only socially negative effects but even have doubts as to the long-term economic effect of them.

I will critically examine the evolving political process of Korean place marketing by adopting the latter perspective. In relation to the general evolution of place marketing, Kavaratzis (2007) divides the process of the historical development of place marketing into three stages within the context of marketing science. The first stage consisted of the fragmented or transitory place promotional activities composed of simple advertisements attracting factories and the selling of industrial cities. In the second stage, city marketing progressed into systematic place marketing, based on management science, such as targeting specific markets and establishing strategy, which includes conventional place promotions, financial incentives and tools for place products. Finally, he argues that city marketing has developed city branding which emphasizes the importance of place image and identity.

However, his argument seems too superficial, technical and value-free. Even if it is meaningful as an attempt to show a trajectory of marketing science terms regarding place marketing strategies, it rarely describe the wider political contexts of inter-related changes toward neo-liberalisation at global, national and local scales or indeed the micro political interactions and conflicts of many urban actors within the place marketing process. The thesis will argue that while such a perspective might
show an academic fashion in marketing science over time, it cannot depict the changing nature and political mechanisms of urban place marketing. It will be argued here that there are many political and social aspects not understood by economic over-simplification about place marketing. Furthermore, such a marketing science approach cannot link to wider political and economic conditions such as globalisation and neo-liberalisation.

Thus, the thesis will approach the evolution of place marketing on a basis of the changing political context under wider political and economic conditions. In doing so, Gwangju in South Korea was selected as a case city in the thesis. The reason why I chose Gwangju is that it is a relatively early city to launch place marketing policy compared to others in South Korea, though its background of initiatives is somewhat different from that of Western cities. Since the 1960s, the city has been established as a political base of the opposition party and has experienced uneven economic development on a national scale, and as a severe consequence, the city has been politically and economically alienated in the country. In addition, its image as a sacred democratic ground of resistance was further confirmed by the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 1980. However, since the 1990s, such a historic image has been rapidly transformed into a cultural one by a variety of marketing projects by Gwangju city authorities. As a result, currently, Gwangju is more aggressively reshaping itself towards the more ambitious goal of acting as cultural

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1 Many Western industrial cities have endeavoured to reimagine their cities from bad images such as dereliction, economic decline, and pollution to new post-industrial ones (Short, 1996). By contrast, Gwangju has attempted to overcome the image of a city of resistance generated from The Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 1980.
hub city in Asia. Thus, for me, it offers an appropriate city to examine evolving place marketing policy in terms of the political context in South Korea.

1.1.2 Gwangju as a case city and me

I am very involved in this city, Gwangju, in terms of my personal history. Yet, the thesis will not employ a phenomenological approach to the research topic. Nonetheless, I would start with a very brief story of my personal experiences since they are closely connected with my research topic. Thus, I begin my writing with a short biography.

Firstly, I was born in Gwangju and grew up in the city until I moved to Seoul for my enrolment at Sungkyunkwan University. In addition, I was a policy maker in charge of some urban departments in South Korea such as town and community development, place marketing, and urban housing provision both in central and local government over ten years. These have given me some changing insights into the context of Gwangju politics.

Secondly, I saw and felt the important historic event in South Korea, the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 1980. The place where I lived was located in the city centre and not far from the historic site. At that time, I thought it was like a war. Of course, I was a student in elementary school and the school was closed then. I saw a group of protesters standing their ground against martial troops at the site. However, I could not go there because of my parents’ restraint. A few days later, a
number of citizens provided the civil militia in an armed car with something to eat and
drink and happily cheered and supported them. Though they were armed with guns,
I did not feel they used violence for bad aims.

Thirdly, I was shocked by broadcast news media at that time. Actually, when I was
young, I thought TV news reporters always broadcasted the truth. However, they told
me different stories from the scenes that I saw and heard at that time in the city. For
example, they described protesters as very dangerous and violent rioters who were
friendly to North Korea. However, it seemed that they were very kind to local citizens.
Contrary to usual pro-Pyongyang activists, they always waved a national flag. In
addition, they warned North Korea shouting ‘North Korea, do not misjudge’. Thus, I
could easily find out they were not a pro-North Korean communist force. The
government authorities delivered news about the Gwangju Democratisation
Movement through major broadcasters and newspapers, while the protesters
distributed printed material in order to report the circumstances of the event. In one
of the materials which I saw, there were arguments that the new Military leader, Jeon
Doo-hwan would be the next President and he would be in succession to the
previous President’s authoritative dictatorship. Then, after several months, the
arguments came true.

Finally, I heard new stories about Gwangju marketing in my interviews. In 2011, I
visited Gwangju to investigate and collect empirical data for around two months.
During that time, I heard some ‘behind the scenes’ stories. Sometimes, they were
completely different from something that I already knew about Gwangju marketing
usually through formal documents, reports, and articles. In the process of investigating Gwangju marketing, these experiences led to me a scalar and cultural political approach on a basis of social constructivism. These methods enabled me to review all the knowledge about place marketing policies in Gwangju that I had.

1.2 Research aims and topics

1.2.1 Aims of the research

Many Korean cities have invested heavily in place marketing strategies such as mega-events and international festivals, cultural flagship projects and city brands in recent years. These strategies are continuously evolving ones within their changing urban environments through a variety of political actors’ interaction. Sometimes, they seemed successful in giving life to their inner cities and revitalising local economies while others contributed to a failure which can be an economic burden to inhabitants. Nonetheless, there are a number of rosy views of place marketing or branding in municipal authorities in South Korea. It appears a myth of successful place marketing or branding (especially related to cities in advanced capitalist countries such as North America, Europe, and Japan) is shared between many Korean city leaders and policy makers. In this respect, specific questions arise: Where does this optimism about place marketing or branding in Korean cities come from? Can a successful example in one place secure the same result in other place? What does this mean for the cities and their residents?
To answer these questions, it is important to consider how we understand the policy-making process of place marketing. The thesis attempted to recognise the process of place marketing projects how they, indeed, were politically formed and what their actual effects were for resident’s daily life rather than to list some programmatic recommendations and strategies for shaping slick places and brands as just a selling and marketing technique. Moreover, the research tried to reveal the essential nature and trend of the evolution of place marketing by tracing contextual changes in urban politics – specifically in Gwangju within South Korea. In particular, they were examined within the wider waves towards a neo-liberal shift. In the process, related issues like globalisation, the role of cultural instruments, and policy transfer were explored together.

In this context, five research topics are set out as follows: the reason why Korean city leaders have a passion for place marketing projects; the characteristics of Korean place marketing and its Western- and Japanese-biased view; the existence of other people’s perspectives differentiated from dominant people’s on place marketing policy; the evolving process of place marketing policy within a political context; and the social and political implications of this research for changing Gwangju marketing.
1.2.2 Research questions

Drawing on these objectives of the research, I want to suggest several research questions. The questions, which I will strive to answer throughout the study, can be listed as follows:

1. Why is the optimistic view of the capabilities of place marketing projects widespread in South Korea? Why do Korean city leaders and policy markers ardently follow Western place marketing?

2. What are the characteristics of Korean place marketing policy in relation to Western place marketing ones?

3. Is there any other view which is different from the formal (or dominant) one in place marketing in Gwangju?

4. How has place marketing policy evolved within the political context? What is the evolutionary process of place marketing strategy in the context of urban politics?

5. What are the social and political implications of evolving marketing policies in Gwangju within South Korea?

---

2 In the thesis, Western cities include cities in North America and Europe.
1.2.3 Significance of the research

This thesis has two wider important meanings.

Firstly, it will enable us to broaden the width of research and diversify approaches on place marketing policy. Despite the growing academic attention to place marketing, there are few critical studies about ‘its evolution’ of place marketing. Moreover, there are fewer attempts to link the issue with the political topic of neo-liberalisation in order to critically investigate the relationship between them. Much literature has dealt with neo-liberalisation through a global-oriented approach; yet, this thesis will attempt to examine the macro phenomenon of neo-liberalisation in connection with an individual city’s marketing policies and its economic and spatial restructuring. It is very important for us, in an academic sense, to recognise the implications of political context within the wider transforming neo-liberalisation by analysing the evolving process of place marketing policy. This may enable us to identify whether there is a trajectory in the historical development of place marketing policies, given local environments. If the past place marketing experiences of advanced cities become the present of Korean cities’ marketing policy, we need to explore what the common or different features are between them. Less-advanced countries like South Korea can avoid various problems by learning from Western experiences and preparing expected tasks in the future. In addition, a number of studies, especially in Korea, have usually focused on the tangible effects of place marketing such as its economic influence.
However, this research will also pay much attention to the practical effects of place marketing projects from the resident's perspective beyond such trends. Currently, while there is a lot of literature on place marketing or branding available in South Korea, what is insufficient or even lacking – and this is the gap I want to fill in the thesis – are critical interpretations and explanations of evolving place marketing from the political context. The thesis aims to widen the dimension of the evolution of place marketing, as there are few studies of this type of approach in South Korea. Ultimately, I hope this study will contribute to an expanded discussion of evolving place marketing not only empirically, but also methodologically.

Secondly, another application of the study is its actual use for policy professionals. Most studies on place marketing or branding in South Korea tend to look on the bright side. However, this research will suggest some questions about the practical effect and seek to be more critical. I will critically examine the policy practices of Korean place marketing which politicians and policy practitioners readily import from advanced cities. By doing so, I seek to explore the use of place marketing or branding not as a managerial and programmed instrument but rather as something to improve citizen's daily life. In particular, the evaluating criteria of place marketing and branding tends to be limited to the economic area. I expect that this thesis might help Korean policy makers to adopt a more balanced view, since it should enable them to recognise the importance of cultural, social and political criteria. Hence, in spite of some concern with the public relevance of human geography (Peck, 1999), the empirical studies of the thesis, especially in respect of policy transfer and
searching for a recommendable direction for future place marketing, will have a strong connection with the urban public policy.

1.3 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is constructed of ten chapters. It can be divided into three parts: (1) introduction and literature review, (2) methodology, (3) analyses of Korean place marketing and conclusion.

Introduction and literature review (Chapter 1 to 3)

Chapter one is an introduction to this research. It introduces the background and aims of the research. The importance of the study is discussed based on the worldwide phenomenon of place marketing strategies within the wider context of transforming neo-liberalisation. The chapter outlines research topics and questions that lead to subsequent analyses in later chapters.

In chapter two, the literature of place and place marketing is reviewed. Before examining the evolution of place marketing, it attempts to approach the essence of evolving place marketing by focusing on the meaning of basic words such as place and place marketing. Such terms will be compared and examined from the views of marketing- and place-centred approaches. Then, the history of place marketing will be explored by questioning whether it is new or not. This chapter will suggest the
need of a political approach in order to reveal the essential nature of evolving place marketing policy.

Chapter three will explore the theoretical backgrounds of place marketing strategy – in particular, urban or local political theories. It will concentrate on investigating political relations between neo-liberalism and place marketing policy. In the process of examining their relation, I will explore not only some issues like uneven development and gentrification but also other items such as globalisation, the role of cultural means and policy transfer within the context of neo-liberalisation. Through this theoretical examination, I will present several crucial factors such as the expansion of market, neo-liberal transformation, and global transfer of policy for deeper understanding of the evolution of place marketing policy. I will suggest that there might be a place marketing which can best be situated at the intersecting point between these factors.

**Methodology (Chapters 4)**

Chapter four will describe the methodology of the research. This study collected data related to the research topics in a variety of ways. First was a national expert panel survey, which was a preliminary phase for more intensive study of practical place marketing projects in Gwangju. It was conducted in order to briefly understand the contours of Korean marketing and to map out a way forward - investigating the Gwangju case. Secondly, in-depth interviews with many people who were very involved in Gwangju marketing projects (such as politicians, central and city officials, citizens, and news reporters, etc.) were the main source for my analysis. Third were
documentary studies, which were based on national and local press articles, formal
documents, and the publications of local groups. Finally, internet homepages
provided me with useful amounts of information. In particular, I gained valuable data
from the formal sites of Gwangju city government, Biennale Foundation, central
government’s Asian Culture Complex, and 5.18 (the Gwangju Democratisation
Movement) Memorial Foundation.

Analyses of Korean place marketing and conclusion (Chapter 5 to 10)

In Chapter five, drawing on the theoretical inquiry of previous chapters, some critical
discussions specifically associated with the Korean context will be suggested
through documentary analysis. Firstly, a few worries about the marketing science
approach to place marketing policy will be expressed. These are homogenisation,
intensified competition, and polarisation. Secondly, I will examine Korean attitudes to
advanced (e.g. Western or Japanese) city’s place marketing based on Harvey’s
insights on neo-liberalism. Thirdly, the global transfer of place marketing policy will
be discussed in connection with the evolution of place marketing. Likewise, this topic
will be explored along with neo-liberalising urban practices. Finally, the limit of local-
centred theories of urban or local politics will be considered within the Korean
context. Here, I will discuss the need for a multi-scale approach and inquiries into the
relation between central government and local one.

In chapter six, the results of the nation-wide expert panel survey are considered as a
preliminary research for Gwangju marketing in South Korea. This survey will enable
us to get a picture of the overall tendency of Korean place marketing in comparison
with Western place marketing. Another benefit of this investigation is to identify whether there is a phenomenon of the transfer of place marketing policy or not. The ultimate aim is to gain a broad outline of Korean place marketing. It will provide the wider context for the more intensive study of the Gwangju case (chapter 7 to 9).

Chapter seven will describe a brief story of the the Gwangju Democratisation Movement as an essential historic event in the thesis. Above all, the meaning of collective values like ‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit will be carefully examined in relation to the significance of the Movement. Then, I will depict the process of how local business elites and authorities have tried to dilute or cover the original image of ‘a city of resistance’ and ‘a sacred ground for democracy’, and as a consequence, transformed it into a modern cultural one through ‘Yehayang’ (tranditional art of town) and cultural city discourses, and the international cultural festival, Gwangju Biennale.

Chapter eight will examine the conflicts and struggles around building the Asian Culture Complex as the second example. There were two big disputes. One was the conflict about whether the central authorities should make the building a landmark like the Pompidou in Paris or the Guggenheim museum in Bilbao or not, and the other was the controversy of whether they demolished the old Jenonnam Provincial Hall (to make the site of the Asian Culture Complex) or not. It will be suggested that the conflict of the varied actor’s can be interpreted as the contestation of different visions and meanings or the politics of memory.
In chapter nine, a domed indoor stadium project will be explored as the third case in Gwangju. In this example, a corporate-led partnership between a pure private company, the POSCO and city government was established. In spite of its failure, it will allow us to make sense of the nature of evolving governance in Gwangju. Moreover, this chapter very briefly depicts other small examples (the Urban Folly and Gwangju Universiade 2015). Ultimately, I will argue that these marketing projects imply negative symptoms as a result of transformation towards neo-liberalisation in terms of the evolution of place marketing in Gwangju.

Finally, in chapter ten, an overview of these research findings will be provided and some implications will be suggested. The political approach adopted in the thesis can uncover a politically intrinsic attribute of evolving place marketing policy, which creates a synergetic effect with neo-liberalism. It also enables us to recognise the changing governing structure in Gwangju towards entrepreneurial governance. The chapter will suggest that, in the evolving process, employing cultural instruments and transferring advanced city marketing partly contributed to neo-liberalisation of Gwangju marketing policy. Then, I will summarise the academic contribution of the research before making some policy recommendations for Korean policy makers in the place marketing field.
Chapter Two: Place, Marketing, and Place Marketing

2.1 Introduction: two different perspectives on place marketing

The market is increasingly expanding and permeating into the public sphere of states and cities. The operation of many public parts such as rail, airline and communication services has turned to the principle of the market since the 1980s in association with the diffusion of neo-liberal political ideology (Stigel and Frimann, 2006). In addition, the mind-concept of public organisations has been more and more affected by the trend. Due to this, faced with growing competitive pressures, cities have a challenge in keeping their locations more progressive and attractive. Increasingly, urban authorities have striven to improve their economies. The activities that rejuvenate urban and regional economies through urban regeneration, especially property- and culture-led regeneration, have become widespread in the West. In particular, the improvement of the image of cities such as Baltimore, Liverpool, Glasgow or Halifax, through the construction of retail and entertainment centres has attempted to renew the whole metropolitan region (Harvey, 1989b). In the process of inter-urban competition, localities have also been encouraged to become more ‘entrepreneurial’ (Harvey, 1989) since the 1970s as part of a competitive pursuit of local revitalization. Simultaneously, urban governance in many cities has become far more focused on the provision of a so-called good business climate or spectacular tour attraction in order to increase local prosperity.
The notion of place marketing lies at the centre of these diverse phenomena in contemporary cities. Broadly speaking, there was much discussion of the phenomena of place marketing, yet fundamental perspectives on this can be classified by two types of literatures (Bitterman, 2008; Braun, 2008; Kavaratzis, 2007). The first is that on Geography, Architecture and Urban Planning. Basically previous discussions on place marketing began in these disciplines, and they have concentrated on the differentiation of places (regions and cities) and the regeneration of places through cultural strategies. Within this view, the uses of place marketing are often examined critically. The second perspective comes from Marketing Science and is more recent. These have paid much more attention to the aspect of business management such as tourism, marketing and branding. In addition, this perspective has usually been devoted to marketing techniques, searching for a ‘unique selling point’ like in corporate marketing (Julier 2005:869). In relation to this, this chapter’s major concern is to critically examine this latter viewpoint of place marketing.

Some authors in South Korea distinguish place marketing from city marketing. However, since the place marketing I am discussing is limited to urban areas, the term ‘place marketing’ is compatible with ‘city marketing’. Thus, both will be used together in the thesis. In the next section, the definition of place marketing will be examined, paying very critical attention to marketing science concepts.
2.2 What is place marketing?

2.2.1 The changing terms of place marketing

As shown in Table 2.1, many terms have developed to cover the marketing or selling of places. Authors of marketing science rather than non-marketing science researchers (such as Geography and Urban Planning) are likely to consider the terminological phenomenon very important (Kavaratzis, 2007; Braun, 2008). From the perspective of marketing science, such evolving terminology of place marketing might mean the evolving policies of place marketing in practice. However, despite often changes in related language, the thesis seeks to give attention to the fact that fundamental characteristics of such terms have been changed much less.

According to Braun (2008), even if the term of city marketing is English, its origin is Dutch. He suggests Peelen’s claim (1987) that city marketing first appeared in 1981 in a study of the Dutch city of Apeldoorn as proof. In relation to the term of place marketing, the ‘selling of places’ and ‘place promotion’ has been used in the UK to cover diverse marketing activities of cities or to warn of problems that might result from the phenomenon of place as a commodity (for example Burgess, 1982; Philo and Kearns, 1993; Ward, 1998). However, since the 1990s when Kotler used the term ‘place marketing’ in his publication (Kotler, Haider and Rein, 1993) it has frequently been used to concern the marketing of places in the UK and US (Braun 2008). In addition to ‘place marketing’, the term of ‘city marketing’ is also commonly employed in related literature of western cities. In many cases, ‘place marketing’ is
usually different from ‘place promotion’ in that it is a more systematic strategy based on consumer oriented marketing concepts. In this context, many authors in the field of marketing science tend to use this term, considering the expansion of the conventional marketing domain to non-marketing fields such as social marketing. However, scholars critical of marketing or selling places have often used the term ‘place marketing’ and ‘city marketing’ (for instance Goodwin, 1993; Paddison, 1993; Griffiths, 1998; Murray, 2001). As described in Table 2.1, another popular term in the field of tourism is ‘destination marketing’ or ‘destination branding’ which emphasises the meaning of the tourism destination as a visitor-centred approach.

Table 2.1 Concerning Terms for Marketing of Places in the West

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Usually used terms</th>
<th>Frequently used field</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980s – 1990s</td>
<td>• Selling of places  • Place promotion</td>
<td>Geography, Urban planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s – 2000s</td>
<td>• Place marketing  • City marketing</td>
<td>Marketing discipline, Geography, Urban planning, Cultural studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Destination marketing  • Destination branding</td>
<td>Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s –</td>
<td>• Place branding  • City branding</td>
<td>Marketing discipline, Urban planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the 2000s, a very frequent mentioned term in the field of place marketing changed to the term ‘place branding’ or ‘city branding’ in which places or cities try to have positive emotional associations with their customers (Braun 2008). The term first came from the British academic Simon Anholt in the early 2000s. His early
conceptualisation of it was to apply corporate-style branding to a place such as a nation, state, city and parts of a city like a business district or neighbourhood (Bitterman, 2008:5-6). Concerning this, Kavaratzis (2004) considers ‘city branding’ as the more evolved stage in the development of city marketing and he argues that a well made city brand should be the conclusive goal of city marketing. In this respect, he believes that ‘city marketing’ should be replaced by ‘city branding’ in the near future.

In spite of these evolving terms of place marketing, however, policy practice has not always been coincident with theoretical fashion; changes of only the related terms do not secure real evolution of policies. Although such terminologies of place marketing have been changed, they might not be transformed in their intrinsic qualities. It is arguable that their objective such as attracting inward investments and firms is little different from that of urban policies in the end (Paddison, 1993). In addition, academic trends often reflect theoretical fashion rather than represent actual policy practice due to the gap between theory and practice. Furthermore, policy practice is much more complicated than theory and it might be different in different cities according to their political, economic and societal environment. For instance, in the case city of Gwangju in this thesis, many city officials and practitioners often mixedly-used the marketing terms (such as place marketing, place branding, tourism marketing, city branding, branding marketing, and city advertisement, etc) in the process of explaining Gwangju marketing projects. They also confused the terms in spite of their frequent use of the terms. In this respect, the evolution of marketing terms based on marketing science view might not be applied to Korean cities. Thus,
it can be argued that mere changes of marketing techniques and terminological rhetoric do not mean the evolution of place marketing policy.

Throughout the thesis, I argue that place marketing policy has politically evolved within the context of social and power relations between diverse actors. This political evolution of place marketing can be identified by the case study of Gwangju marketing projects from chapter seven to nine.

2.2.2 The definition of place marketing

To discuss the definition of place marketing in respect to marketing science easily, as a working definition for this section, it will be helpful to select one of the most frequently quoted.

“Place marketing means designing a place to satisfy the needs of its target markets. To succeed in this issue, citizens and business have to be pleased with their community and the expectations of visitors and investors have to be met (Kotler and Gertner, 2002:57, Cited in Rainisto 2003:11).”

According to Kotler’s perspective, the aspect of place marketing can be divided into two parts: ‘place’ and ‘marketing’ (Borg, 2008). The former is related to the trend what the city sells as a product. The latter means the programmed management process responsible for identifying, anticipating and satisfying customer requirements (ibid). Thus, urban place marketing can be recognised as the promotional activities of local governments that develop their spaces or improve a city’s image in order to meet the demands of tourists and investors. Thus, basically
this is an attempt to apply a product marketing approach from companies to places in cities. According to this perspective, place marketers have to depend on marketing science tools like ‘product life-cycles’, ‘buyer-behaviour’ and ‘brand asset management’ (Murray, 2001).

However, as the place marketing policies are more significant in our urban life, we need to think carefully whether the above definition of place marketing is desirable in terms of the citizen’s view. A product marketing approach starts from the basic premise that a place or a city is similar to a product of a company. However, a fact that should not be easily overlooked is that the object of corporate marketing is quite different from that of a city. Products can disappear if they fail in market competition. Yet, places cannot vanish from sight, though they do not succeed in inter-place competition. This is the most different thing. From the view of citizens, places in cities should not suffer from market failure because they are the economic and social bases of people’s lives and attachments. Even though places fail, people still live there and the failure only becomes a new history of the place. In addition, places of a city are cared for and people feel a sense of intimateness and psychological affection for them (Relph, 1976). In this sense, places where we live are not just properties for economic profit but are places that are worth caring about for a citizen’s daily life. Thus, a product marketing approach has its limit in application to cities.

Furthermore, Murray (2001) argues that the difficulties that product marketing techniques pose to place marketing override the merits they provide. He argues that
The central dilemma is that places are multiform, cultural entities and the limited product based mindset to marketing them cannot be successfully sustained over time. The communicators seem unable to grasp and convey complexity in the iconic sense.’ In this respect, city marketing or branding should be arranged along with sustainability for the citizen. In other words, if we accept that a city as a cultural and complex entity differs from a product, we should take a different approach, which is more sustainable, in comparison with product marketing. A company can manipulate its product image and sometimes also hide the gritty points of its product to gain a temporary rise in a market share. However, a city should not be recommended to behave like this as its marketing failure might prove a big burden for people. An approach that considers a citizen’s life space as only a tool for money making seems to be irresponsible for residents in a city. Thus, to have a more comprehensive perception of a city for its inhabitants, we need to consider a city as a cultural and sustainable entity, as opposed to a marketing science view of cities as products or machines.

On the other hand, there is another definition of place marketing. It is an opinion indicating that place marketing is not only an entrepreneurial activity through such marketing strategies and techniques but also a cultural approach to improve a city’s image in selling places of public organisation. For example, Philo and Kearns (1993:2-3) describe place marketing as ‘[t]he practice of selling places entails the various ways in which public and private agencies – local authorities and local entrepreneurs, often working collaboratively – strive to ‘sell’ the image of a particular geographically-defined ‘place’, usually a town or city, so as to make it attractive to
economic enterprises, to tourists and even to inhabitants of that place……selling places is often a conscious and deliberate manipulation of culture in an effort to enhance the appeal and interest of places, especially to the relatively well-off and well-educated workforces of high-technology industry, but also to ‘up-market’ tourists and to the organisers of conferences and other money-spinning exercises.’ Kavaratzis (2004:58) also argues that the practical application of city marketing is concerned with the activities of forming, communicating and managing a city image. In addition, according to him, ‘the object of city marketing is the city’s image, which in turn is the starting point for developing the city’s brand.’

These opinions appear similar with respect to emphasising the cultural in defining the concept of place marketing. However, Philo and Kearn’s view is very different from Kavaratzis’ because the former is critical of place marketing while the latter considers place marketing to be essential in urban policy. Thus, the viewpoint of Kavaratzis which is willing to utilise marketing science techniques is much closer to Kotler’s one, even though Kavaratzis prefers place branding to place marketing and he thinks it more evolved. Philo and Keams argue that selling the ‘post-modern’ city is only to contribute to the economic logic of capital by consciously manipulating and creating cultural or historical packages (ibid). Moreover, they add that practices of place marketing have been employed in order to reaffirm ideological commitments that society’s dominant groups want to be hegemonic by conflating cultural components like history and memory to meet customer’s desire and needs (ibid:26). It is a very political interpretation of place marketing. Basically, I agree with this position since urban place marketing practices have been very often used for the
spatial strategy of authority or city elite in demanding a shift to a market-oriented world. Indeed, contemporary policies of place marketing have been deployed towards broader neo-liberal transformation of cities. This view underpins the critical topic of the thesis and will be used to examine multiple examples of place marketing in Gwangju in South Korea (see chapter 7, 8 and 9).

Furthermore, one of the most serious problems about the definition of place marketing from the perspective of a marketing-centred approach is its view of considering place marketing or branding as only a pragmatic tool. For instance, Kavaratzis (2007:709) states that “[c]ity marketing and branding do not have an inherent ideology,” and Anholt (2006:2) also argues that “branding, like any other tool, is itself ethically neutral.” These originated from an idea that a city or its local spaces should be developed and managed well by the way of corporate-style marketing rather than that of the democratic and collective. Recently, for many marketing and tourism professionals, city leaders and, marketing practitioners, it is possible to say that the idea has developed into a theoretical belief (as a fundamental faith of market-orientation) like a religion far from the city’s reality. Taking the view of marketing science, it can be argued that a place is constructed by programmed principles and organised techniques regardless of ideology. Thus, such a marketing science perception of place marketing is seemingly value-free and non-political.

Its practices, however, are typically represented by very political processes because of its intrinsic selectivity. For example, even Kavaratzis (ibid:707) who has strongly denied the ideological character of place marketing strategy express his favouritism
to firms and investments - which contradicts his previous argument, saying that “*the main task of urban governance...... is the creation of urban conditions sufficiently attractive to lure prospective firms, to attract investment and to safeguard and enhance the city’s development prospects.*” Indeed, many city authorities have often set their aims of place marketing as a ‘good climate for businesses and investors’ and a ‘good place for tourism and shopping’ in order to entice prosperous companies, well-off visitors, and upscale people as potential residents. It has resulted in political activities and consequences to include values and meanings preferred by such customers, at the same time, to exclude those which they were unpleasant. Likewise, the behaviour of city authorities to set up a certain city brand image or identity as a city’s objective is, itself, political. In the process, people who are incongruous with such an image, value, and meaning or, according to Philo and Kearns (1993), the ‘city’s other peoples’ (such as homeless people, beggars, poor workers and minorities, and vendors) frequently tend to be marginalised or segregated.

In a broader sense, the political nature of place marketing might have a thread of connection with some commentator’s argument that the process of constructing a place or a space is political and social (Cresswell, 1996; Lefebvre, 1974; Pred, 1984). For instance, according to Pred (ibid:279), place is not only fleetingly observed landscape, locale or setting for social interaction but also historically contingent process interwoven by time-space specific activities and power relations. We will see this clearly in chapter seven, when we examine the Gwangju Democratisation Movement.
Similarly, Cresswell (ibid) believes that the meaning or image of place is not naturally given but formed by the political decision-making process, which means actors with more power judge what is appropriate or not for the place. Thus, he interprets the place that the game of in place/out of place is deployed is always a political realm where ‘geography and ideology intersect (ibid:5)’. In this context, place marketing might be considered as a strategic process of certain groups that deliberately shape or manufacture meanings and images of a city or parts of it – typically in a direction for political and economic city elites, which force other peoples to follow or conform. As a result, such strategy tends to bring about complaints and the resistance of other peoples. In this regard, therefore, the formation and change of place marketing policy might be a variety of political processes in which meanings, images and discourses of place are contested, conflicted and compromised between the dominant and the others. I will examine whether such conflicts have taken place in South Korea.

2.3 History of place marketing: new phenomenon?

In this section, the historical roots of contemporary place marketing or branding will be explored mainly with relation to the US and UK. Here, I attempt to reveal how they are very similar in terms of their promotional nature between the roots and contemporary practice of place marketing or branding. Then, the history of UK place marketing as a Western country and the less-advanced one of South Korea will be briefly examined, and finally, the history of place marketing and branding from the political perspective will more briefly be considered.
The idea of selling or promoting places such as cities is not completely novel. In fact, the phenomenon of selling places has a long history. For example, what Leif Ericson named ‘Green’ land to attract new settlers, despite its bad climate is suggested by Ashworth and Voogd (1994:34 Citied in Kavaratzis 2007:696) as an origin of place marketing. Additionally, Harvey (1989) traces the original case of selling of places back to the civic boosterism of the Hanseatic League and the Italian City States in Medieval Europe. Murray (2001) even considers the original Olympic Games as the beginning of promoting places. In relation to the history of place marketing, Ward (1998) argues that these cases lack the legitimacy as an origin of place marketing since they are quite different from the current place marketing in terms of methods and techniques. However, he shows that place marketing started from the promotion of waterfront resort developments in the era of Queen Victoria in the UK and he dates the earliest place marketing in North America through selling large real estate developments, suburban estates and some early industrial cities back to the nineteenth century. As a result, we might acknowledge the fact that recent activities for place marketing in terms of selling places are nothing new.

Since the late nineteenth century, many cases of selling places could be discovered in the US. This was because of an imperative promotional need to settle so much frontier land in the West and to draw investments and settlers into US cities. It was selling the frontier farmlands and towns and also became a tradition of civic boosterism in the US. However, in Britain there was no such tradition. Concerning this, Ward (1998) concludes that such background was not required in the UK.
because there was a longer history of settled land and much earlier developed industry and infrastructure in the UK.

In this context, Ward (1998) argues that place marketing in the post-industrial society was invented in the US. According to him, though more examined in later chapter (chapter 3), urban decline in Western cities due to global economic restructuring also started in the US. Namely, the tradition of place boosterism, which almost disappeared, was revived, in order to counteract urban decline that was caused by the economic recession and global changes. Then, British cities followed the entrepreneurial strategies of cities like Baltimore and Pittsburgh facing similar crisis. As a result, some cases of cities in the UK such as Glasgow were as successful in place marketing terms as US cities' (ibid). Thus, it is evident that the phenomenon of selling places or promoting places for economic purposes in cities has a long history. There were similar activities in the past and they are increasing in many countries today. Moreover, there are many types and strategies of city marketing because city marketing activities, fitted with their surroundings and scales, are needed in urban policy every day.

2.3.1 Place selling, place marketing and civic boosterism

As observed in the former section, place selling and promotional activities can be identified easily from the past. What is the difference between this previous place selling and recent city marketing? Much marketing-science literature has paid attention to this question. Rainisto (2003) argues that place selling is more
operational, distinguishing it from place marketing. Kavaratzis (2007) distinguishes various past promotional activities from city marketing and names them ‘fragmented promotional activities’. Therefore, place marketing might be set apart from the mere place selling and promotional activities in that it is a little more comprehensive and systematic. In addition, while early promotional activities are persuasive actions based on the seller’s view, place marketing is a consumer-oriented approach, emphasising clients’ demand and need. Fretter (1993:163) argues “[place marketing] aims to ensure that urban activities and facilities are related as closely as possible to the demands and desires of targeted customers and clients. It involves the establishment of a new relationship between the local authority… and its customers. It calls for a demand-oriented approach rather than the supply-led approach of traditional urban planning.” Thus, place marketing might not be a mere fragmented blend of advertising and publicity designed for selling places. It may be recognised an organised and systematic effort to meet the needs and demand of clients. Why is place marketing more organised and systematic than selling and promotion of places? This might be understood by considering the process of place marketing based on the marketing science approach. Briefly speaking, such place marketing is the process that works out a STP (Segmentation-Targeting-Positioning) marketing strategy through scientific marketing research, and the selling of a place product by the 4P marketing mix (Product, Price, Place, Promotion). Thus, from the perspective of marketing science, place marketing is likely to be a strategic and organised activity whilst place promotional activity is a temporal and fragmented selling activity.
However, in spite of making a strict distinction from the marketing science authors, I think that place selling and marketing have many common traits in terms of their promotional nature. Firstly, both of them are activities which originated from corporate-style marketing and they are operational instruments to attract investment and consumption. It is a very important point that the thesis focus on the relationship between two. But, there is just a slight difference in their approach: whether we concentrate on persuasion or the demands of the customer. Secondly, their aims are similar. In the end, they are only managerial activities for economic interest. For example, in terms of attracting firms and tourism, they are instrumental tools to increase inward investments and tourism income, which both lead to more local economic gain. In the case of limiting their promotional qualities, therefore, we might conclude they are very much alike.

Meanwhile, civic boosterism, as shown in the previous section, stemmed from the US classical boosterism such as for the West frontier. Regarding this, Short (1993) argues that it means conventional promotional activities for the positive image and the name of a city in order to boost external consumption (Short, Benton, Luce and Walton, 1993). According to Short et. al. (ibid), it has played a key part not only in urban development but also in urban hierarchy and politics. Firstly, the much wider territory of the US in comparison with European countries has resulted in more opportunities for cities to move up or down the urban hierarchy. As a result, cities intensified advertising and publicity to win the inter-urban competition. Secondly, leading actors in cities such as estate agents, local banks, politicians and business leaders formed an economic growth coalition in terms of politics and promoted
business-friendly policies in order to stimulate investment and economic growth (ibid). Thus, civic boosterism is a publicity of places, usually used in US cities. In addition, it is a little different from place marketing because its approach tends to raise the product value (especially estate) of certain place and to emphasise only the merits of the city.

2.3.2 Place marketing and place branding

Since the 2000s, place branding (or city branding) has been paid more attention by both practitioners and the academic circle in the field of place marketing (Bitterman, 2008; Braun, 2008; Julier, 2005), specifically in connection with tourism marketing. The reason might be that the differences among cities have increasingly disappeared. Many cities have become similar in terms of cityscapes. Here, place marketing activities have maybe contributed to this phenomenon. For example, whichever city you go to, you might have the same type of accommodation facilities, food services and something to see for the tourist. For business leaders and investors, cities commonly provide a number of incentives for investment. Accordingly, they now inevitably seek to create something distinctive and valuable which other cities have difficulties in following (Morgan, Pritchard and Piggot, 2003). From this respect, a city brand might be a unique and inimitable asset for a city, while certain architecture or a specific district tends to be easily reproduced. Thus, it might be judged from the marketing science perspective that a city brand is widely sought after because it is a powerful marketing tool enabling city marketers to differentiate their city from others. However, Bitterman (2008:244) argues, “place brands have become merely a delivery mechanism for artificial, and contrived
identities that may over time do more harm than good." According to him, indeed, many place brands in contemporary cities in the US have resembled corporate brand counterparts and their transitory differences have thinned by beginning to overlap many other cities’ branding activities (ibid:250).

What are place branding activities for a city comprised of? Place branding for a city starts from drawing the essential values of a city and establishing brand identity. Then, to take a distinctive and competitive brand position, city marketers frequently employ three instruments: brand architecture, hard-branding and brand marketing communication: firstly, to make brands (representative brand, tourism brand, investment brand and local product brand, etc) by using logos and slogans, then, to build inter-related hierarchical brand architecture; secondly, to implement a hard-branding strategy which reflects brand identity into diverse tangible and physical landscapes through symbolic architecture, art flagships, and public design activities in order to raise the city brand value; thirdly, to enhance relationships with customers by doing promotions and holding festivals, events and exhibitions. Thus, we might conclude the tools of place branding and marketing for cities are very similar.

However, some authors who are in the marketing science field strictly seek to separate city branding from city marketing since they consider the former more effective or evolved than the latter (Kavaratzis, 2007; Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2005; Morgan, et, al., 2003). From this perspective, city branding is a more holistic approach to managing a city and its image as a whole through a logo and slogan,
while city marketing is a strategy that seeks to change the image of a city utilising a marketing mix technique to develop specific places or some parts of the area. Hence, proponents of city branding explain that city marketing tends to deliver multiple messages to the audience, yet city branding usually emphasises one message under a brand leadership system. Thus, city branding requires a consistency of message more firmly. In addition, proponents of city branding argue that it enables us to measure the intangible effect of marketing by employing a brand equity index whilst the social effect of city marketing is often not measurable.

Despite these arguments from proponents to city branding, most of the essential factors of city marketing are used for city branding and both strategies have many common characteristics. By the same token, some authors consider ‘branding’ as a main subdivision of the marketing tool set such as segmentation, targeting, product development, marketing communication and marketing (Braun, 2008; Kotler and Gertner, 2002).

What essential factors of city marketing are used in city branding? In association with this, at first, Fretter (1993:165-173) suggests seven essential elements of city marketing: firstly, to set up a vision or mission in order to clearly describe the goals and achievements which city authorities want to attain in the future; secondly, to know yourself (which means to clearly understand that what the advantages and disadvantages of your city are and what the city provides for your audience); thirdly, to define who your customers are in order to formulate a successful marketing strategy; fourthly, to fit and develop your product to customer demands and needs;
fifthly, to comprehend your rival cities to win the competition; sixthly, to look for a unique selling point; seventhly, to control and manage opinions for one consistent message.

Here, the crucial items arise in connection with the common features of city marketing and city branding. Among Fretter’s elements, at first, vision is necessary for all strategies and it is not exclusive to only city marketing and branding. In addition, the fourth and the sixth are similar in that both are linked to handling products and images in a skilful way. Thus, from Fretter’s elements, five similarities can be suggested, as follows.

Firstly, city marketing and city branding are common in their origin; both borrowed the main methods and techniques from corporate marketing theory. However, cities are different from companies. Consequently, there are several critical problems when using marketing theory from a basis of corporate marketing to apply to the city. For example, a place is not a singular commercial product or a corporate organisation, but a collection of identities and human activities (Bianchini and Ghilardi, 2007; Julier, 2005; Murray, 2001). Accordingly, it is very difficult to unify the diverse identities of a place. A city is also an even more complicated entity than a corporate organisation. Thus, drawing and defining only one identity from varied qualities for a city is painful and, sometimes impossible (Murray, 2001; Stigel and Frimann, 2006).
Secondly, they are common in the view of the customer. They tend to regard the human being not so much as a citizen rather as a consumer to buy and use up products. In fact, however, a number of city inhabitants seek to engage and participate in the process of urban policy with a sense of responsibility since they have a key stance in the future of the city.

Thirdly, they are similar in a context of competition strategy. Both are strategies which attempt not to have a cost advantage but to differentiate themselves from competitors. According to Boisen’s study (2007), however, city practitioners tend not to consider their competitors as much as they concentrate on their own advantages. Thus, the recognition of inter-urban competition in the context of competing private companies might be only a theoretical assumption.

Fourthly, both tend to deliberately contrive a way of exploiting authenticity about the urban place. In other words, marketed values and images through place marketing and branding do not necessarily reflect the city residents’ real cultures and lives. They might not be suitable for their customers’ requirements, sometimes impressing by authenticity in terms of a long-term perspective, exaggeratedly speaking, because they are often connected to fake or manipulated real values.

Fifthly, they are managerial activities. City authorities often want to control a city as a business manager operates their organisation. However, such an approach which makes citizens follow the basic values and images forged by brand experts could be problematic. The reason is that such values and images come not from a basis of
complete consensus. In addition, the concept that urban authorities seek to manage citizen as firms handle their employees is not congruent with the principle of democracy. I will therefore not so much divide city marketing and city branding as emphasise their common features in the thesis because they are very similar in terms of their intrinsic qualities. However, it will be interesting to explore empirically how these terms are used by Korean practitioners and policy makers.

2.3.3 Place marketing experiences from the UK

This section shows the historical experience of place marketing in the UK. The place marketing experiences of some cities such as London Docklands, Birmingham and South Wales since the 1970s are described because this was the period when the prevailing adoption and prosperous use of place marketing began in earnest.

While, in the US, local governments fostered the place promotion of private capital, and they only played a minimal role, in the UK, place marketing projects were launched normally by the support of public agencies (Millington, 2002:12). However, it is noticeable that since the mid-1970s British place marketing rapidly grew in cities (Fretter, 1993). Many British cities underwent unprecedented difficulty carried by the overlapping of a severe recession, deindustrialisation and a government financial crisis, especially in the traditional manufacturing and mining areas that had played a major part in the urban economy. For instance, Leicester’s foot-wear industry, Birmingham’s vehicle industry and South Wales’ mining and steel industries were all devastated from the late 1970s to the early 1980s.
However, according to Millington (2002), even in this severe crisis, the first response of local authorities was the provision of sites for the development of industrial estates, which was a limited and unrefined trial for local economic development. The reason for this initial response of localities being unsophisticated was a lack of experience. In contrast, when Mrs Thatcher came to power in 1979, she launched the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act to create the UDCs (Urban Development Corporations) and drove many projects like the London Dockland project without the active participation of local authorities. However, lots of urban authorities came into the competition of place marketing for tourists and inward investors in earnest. In association with these attempts, Loftman and Nevin (1995) points out that many city politicians and policy makers have visited US cities such as Baltimore, Boston and Pittsburgh to learn how to revitalise urban centres by employing place marketing projects during the 1980s. They argue that many political leaders and public officials were favourably impressed by such experience and it led to the rolling out of flagship schemes in British cities. In addition, according to Fretter (1993), cities were forced by the 1989 Local Government and Housing Act to make programmes for local economic development activity and central government consulted them. The effect of such consulting was a market-led approach and a more direct response to consumers’ demand. This increased the momentum of city marketing to grow in scale and be more sophisticated in marketing techniques.

In recent years, Millington (2002) concludes through a nation-wide survey and interview that most local governments use city marketing methods as a local economic strategy. However, he claims that city marketing as a strategic
management approach is still not established at a small-sized city level, while larger cities' marketing is already relatively fixed.

However, there has been criticism of city marketing policies based on this marketing and entrepreneurial management. Even though some authors from a marketing science perspective argue that city marketing practice has been elaborated in terms of method and technique, others feel concern about it. Murray (2001), in his study analysing a sample of 77 marketing brochures criticises that many cities in the UK tend to represent places as culturally uniform and to promote a similar marketing mix (facilities, events and tourism attractions). Moreover, he argues that practice needs to reflect more authentic messages from the perspective of urban regeneration for residents, criticising that even some cities' marketing creates fictitious images that lack a sense of reality.

In summarising these arguments, the use of place marketing strategies has constantly increased since the late 1970s. In the process of developing place marketing, a number of British cities have been affected by the experience of US cities. Recently, some concerns might be suggested about the tendency of urban practitioners mainly using marketing science approaches towards entrepreneurial governance.

2.3.4 Place marketing experiences of South Korea
The history of place marketing in South Korea is much shorter than that of western cities'. American and British cities began place marketing to revitalise their urban economy after experiencing the phenomenon of deindustrialisation over three decades ago. Yet, the phenomenon was started much more recently in South Korea, with the same late initiation. The process of deindustrialisation was faced just after the industrialisation was over. Thus, it is dominant in Korean academic circles that the starting point of place marketing in South Korea is not a localities' attempt for getting over the crisis of industrialisation but the introduction of a local self-government system in 1995 (Kim 2006, Shin 1998, Lee 2006). Therefore, the experience of place marketing is not as abundant as in the UK.

Since the mid 1990s, there was huge change in the way of regional and urban development. Though the range of devolved powers was limited, central government devolved authorities of budget, personnel and land development in virtue of introducing of a local self-government. As a result, mid and small-sized projects without central government’s support were diffused in many cities, while most urban and regional developments were launched and implemented, in the same way as large centre-oriented project, under the control of central officials in the past. Cities have competed with each other in an attempt to induce firms, investments and visitors, simultaneously building up their local identities. The most utilised means in such competition were local cultural festivals. The number of local cultural festivals increased extraordinarily from 105 in 1980 to 1,176 in 2006 (MCST, 2006).
Numerous city slogans and brands have been made in most cities in recent years. For example, 16 metropolitan regional governments already have 8,987 brands which took out a patent (Lee, 2008). Most of them are comprised of city brands, images and slogans, tourism brands and local product brands. As ‘Weekly Korea’ puts it, (as a crucial tool for city branding) “design is described as an omnipotent key to achieving urban competitiveness and economic value. Design is required by the structural expectations in order to overcome urban growth stagnation since the establishment of the local self-governing system.” However, regarding this flooding of public brands, Park (2009) positively points out that ‘the era of the city brand’ is opening up by arguing that city brands can play a major role in promoting the local economy and improving residents’ satisfaction of their localities. In this respect, if this trend of city marketing keeps growing, place marketing and branding could be one of the largest industries in South Korea in the near future.

However, in terms of the level of place marketing in South Korea, Kim (2002) argues that it lacks the comprehensive recognition of place promotion. He indicates that it uses a partial and fragmented promotion such as cultural tourism, ecological tourism and local regeneration without organised connections. In addition, he argues that many Korean cities are copying other cities’ successful cases and points out that many Korean cities focus on excessively physical development. For example, according to Hwang and You (2006), many local authorities made their CI (corporate Identity: which originated from private corporate organisation and is a symbol, made for establishing of the companies’ image, reflecting their mission and vision), yet these were very similar due to using the same images like sun, mountain and water.
In addition, their slogans were centred on the same themes. Most cities in Gyeonggi regional province advertised themselves as a site of ‘cultural tourism’ and as a ‘high-tech city’ through their similar slogans. Regarding this phenomenon, Hwang and You (2006) interpret that it is because many localities follow best practice without reflecting their own unique vision and meanings. Lee (2007) argues that it is still rudimentary. According to him, while the place marketing strategies of western cities have developed from simply fragmented advertisings and festivals to city branding and attracting investments and companies for substantial urban growth, most Korean cities have still focused on short-term fragmented promotional activities. Thus, it can be judged that the quality of place marketing strategy still remains low and a little crude.

In addition, Korean city marketing has not always been regarded as a tool in order to revitalise de-industrialised urban space whilst, in the West, place marketing has often been employed as a strategy for regenerating urban decaying areas. Instead, place marketing activities in Korea have rapidly increased to boost tourism through festivals and events launching self-government, particularly in the mid and late 1990s. Then, urban regeneration for declining city centres (which considers social, cultural and environmental components except physical redevelopment) has usually been brought into play in urban policy since the new millennium. Even though many cities exploit city marketing policies, they often do not connect with the regeneration for derelict urban areas. Thus, in the 1990s, a number of urban redevelopments in Korean cities might have had few links with place marketing activities. Hence, in the survey study in Chapter 6, some experts argued that urban regeneration and city
marketing would be separately discussed because they were different from each other in South Korea.

2.3.5 The history of place marketing from a political perspective

As described in the previous section, marketing science authors distinguish place marketing from place selling since they think the former is more customer-oriented and systematic than the latter. However, if we discuss it only from a promotional aspect, they might not be significantly different. Furthermore, I argue that both place marketing and place branding are similar in their promotional nature, especially their market-centred and managerial qualities: firstly, they are all originated from a corporate-style method, and adhere to corporate principles like competition, growth, and managerial efficiency; secondly, their goals are similar such as maximisation of attracting investments and tourists, thus, they are outward firms and visitor-oriented rather than inward resident-oriented; thirdly, they tend to treat people as economic consumers rather than political and social citizens; fourthly, they often deliberately manufacture place identity. In relation to these promotional characteristics, Bitterman also acutely criticise their distinction, saying:

“Unfortunately, few of these [in the field of place branding] scholars are examining place branding through a critical lens. When place branding is examined more closely and objectively, it is readily apparent that in too many cases it is simply a sleek whitewash on an amalgamation of some very old ideas about selling and commodifying product (2008:246).”
However, if we approach this issue from the basis of a political view, the interpretation might be partly different. I think that place selling and place marketing can be divided by a political perspective. Since the 1970s, due to the global economic crisis, neo-liberalism can be seen as globally dominant and promotional activities such as place selling were strongly influenced by it. Such promotional strategies have transformed into more market-fundamental ones along with neo-liberalism and their role also changed to the aggressive driving force for certain political groups. In other words, place marketing strategy has played a major role in diffusing and implementing neo-liberal doctrine as its politically faithful friend whilst the precedents of place marketing relatively were not imbued with politics. In this respect, as Hall (2006:85) notes, “it would be true to say that prior to the 1970s cities were largely ‘sold’. It is now truer to say that they are ‘marketed’.” From the political viewpoint, therefore, the evolution of place marketing can be recognized in the relational context of a neo-liberal political shift. The detailed relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing policy shall be scrutinised in the next chapter.

2.4 The politics of reimagining a city

Contemporary cities are the places which the culture and modes of life in human society have been integrated. People are prone to construct political relations around significant city spaces since changes of urban landscape are shaped by residents (Till, 2004). Of course, urban place is a physical area, yet it is multi-dimensionally linked with citizen’s daily life and social relations (Short, 1996). Moreover, a place can serve the feeling of a sense of belonging and solidarity, and form collective
memory and shared identity. Sometimes, shared emotion and a similar cognitive world view from a certain place played a major role in developing a social movement and political coalition around the place. For instance, as described in chapter seven, the historic event of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement produced a unique historical memory and spatial identity for the Gwangju population which only existed in the city. In this respect, urban landscapes and city places are sites where different meanings are contesting and conflicting. Thus, they are political places. Additionally, urban landscape is a dynamic entity which is very difficult to define at a fixed time. As Mitchell (1996:30) puts it, “[s]ocial struggle makes the landscape, and the landscape is always in a state of becoming: it is never entirely stable.... Landscape is thus best understood as a kind of produced, lived, and represented space constructed out of struggles, compromises, and temporarily settled relations of competing and co-operating social actors: it is both a thing..... and a social process, at once solidly material and ever changing.” Thus, we need to approach it with a political context in order to track its changing process since this approach enables us to trace a trajectory of political relations around a certain place constructed in a variety of ways on a multiple scale.

How are place images formed? Drawing on Boulding’s (1959) theory of national place image, the image of a place might be an impression and perception that creates mental pictures in our brain about that place which are highly structured through a process of imbuing our subjective knowledge and meanings. Then, the image changes and grows mixed with subsequent received messages and inputs.
However, images of a city might be formed through a varied channels and ways. Regarding this, Tim Hall (2006:78-9) suggests several examples as follows:

- News reports of events in a place like riots in British inner cities during 1980s and in Los Angeles in 1992
- Satirical words, jokes and artistic works about places
- Direct personal experiences as a visitor or tourist and other indirect experiences
- Rumour and reputation as unverified account or explanation about places, which forms an important component of our impression of places

In addition to this, we can include diverse promotional campaigns and place marketing activities led by urban authorities and organisations. In other words, city images can be not only naturally formed but also deliberately manipulated. Though there are many different images of a place, place marketers and city authorities regressively simplify them (Hall, 2006; Murray, 2001). Additionally, they tend to develop promotional strategies on a basis of unrealistically manipulated images about the place. As Hall (ibid:78) notes, therefore, “place images typically exaggerate certain features, be they physical, social, cultural, economic, political or some combination of these, while reducing or even excluding others.”

When a city landscape and its residents have something unique, they can be distinctive from others. People of a certain city or locality tend to have different social practices and emotional feelings like friendliness or hostility, differentiated from other
people. We can say that identities of the local people are situated in the context of their own ‘social relation’ within the places they live. Some people seek to construct a certain identity of their city with their own meaning, thought and perception. As described in the Gwangju case within a later chapter (Chapter 7), those attempts often appear through local economic interest or political aim of elites. Thus, we need an approach through a political context to catch an intrinsic base since local image or identity tends to be decorated by economic rhetoric and cultural instruments with a certain ideological orientation (Mitchell, 2004). In particular, economic relations that are reflected in a symbolic landscape or place to form a certain image or identity are often hidden from the dominant ‘ways of seeing’ the landscape or place (Mitchell, 1996:353). For example, Short (Short et. al., 1993; Short, 1996) describes the process in the case of place marketing in Syracuse in the US that civic leaders transformed the city image from industrial to post-industrial through the rhetoric of economic renaissance and revival and various cultural built environments (such as a convention centre, Carousel shopping and entertainment centre, and galleries). The city was depicted as a ‘places of profit and sources of benefit to capital’, at the same time, marginalising its alternative images like those ‘cities as places where all people can lead dignified and creative lives’ (Short et. al, 1993:222).

In historical aspects, the city’s images or meanings of place have been shaped by many sorts of social, economic, and political activities over time. City images are formed not only in the arena of urban politics but also in relation to various spatial scales around the city. Within the multi-dimensional spaces, a variety of political forces seek to suggest and achieve developmental visions, identities and meanings
with a certain political purpose and ideology (Cochrane and Jonas, 1999). Then, those visions, identities and meanings have been shaped in the complicated process of contestation, conflict, and compromise with each other through time within the context of social relations. In relation to this, Till (2004:358) argues that “geographers should treat political landscapes as everyday practice, an approach that would pay attention to the particular contexts in which social relations are contextually situated and multiple positions of identity are performed, enacted, challenged, and negotiated.” In this sense, I would like to consider the formation of social meaning about a place and its changes within the contesting, conflicting and compromising process between the dominant discourse, identity, and image and alternative ones. As such, we need to approach the evolution of place marketing policy from its political context since the approach enables us to apprehend its changing structural nature and social and political implications.

2.5 Summary

Place marketing can be broadly grouped into two different perspectives: place-centred and marketing science-centred views. This thesis adopted the former, especially from the political viewpoint in order to examine changing political context of Korean place marketing. From the perspective of politics, place marketing might be understood as both a strategy where a certain political group forces others to allow a deliberately contrived identity and image of a place according to its own interest and a political process in association with that strategy.
In the aspect of promotion, place marketing might be little different from its precedent – place selling – over the course of its history. This is similar in recent place branding even though some marketing scientists regard it as a more sophisticated and evolved version than place marketing. However, if we take a political look at its history, previous place selling and place marketing might be quite distinct from each other. Contemporary place marketing can be differentiated from place selling since it has politically experienced radical transformation along with the emergence of neo-liberal ideology.

Images and meanings of a place (or a city) have been formed by diverse social, economic, and political activities through time. They might be influenced by not only internal urban or local politics but also its outward power relations on various spatial scales. They are often suggested with a certain political purpose or ideology, and they tend to be shaped in the complicated process of contestation, conflict, and compromise with each other. Thus, when we adopt a political lens, we are able to scrutinise its political nature. In the next chapter, we will widely examine the theoretical backgrounds about Western local economic development, place marketing, and policy transfer in order to gain a theoretical framework for the understanding of evolving Korean place marketing.
Chapter Three: Theoretical Background to Place Marketing
(From the Political Perspective)

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we broadly explored two main perspectives: place-centred and marketing science centred. In this chapter, I narrow down my focus to the former, in particular the political perspective. This chapter will examine diverse theories that are helpful to understand the changing political context of place marketing.

The aim of this chapter is to study the relations between key terms for a political perspective and to acquire their theoretical and insightful implications in order to approach thesis topics more closely. In the next section, the main features of Western place marketing, the concept of neo-liberalism and its material and social consequences will be discussed. These will also be a foundation to examine the implications of Gwangju marketing cases. With a closer look to neo-liberal qualities of western place marketing, it might enable us to recognise the intrinsic nature of evolving place marketing by understanding the relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing. It might be a useful lens to investigate the transforming policies of Korean place marketing. The fourth section examines the transfer of place marketing policy. The main intention of this section is to explore overlapping areas of three issues: place marketing, policy transfer, and neo-liberalism bearing the political
evolution of place marketing in mind. The next section examines urban theories from the West around local economic development since it can be a theoretical base from which to investigate the local political context. Through this process, I attempt to search for the best methodological approach for place marketing of the Korean local context. Moreover, theories of the politics of local growth will be helpful to deeply understand the role of place marketing as a major instrument for local economic development. The process of forming a growth coalition in a locality is important in making sense of the evolving political context of place marketing since it could provide us with a cognitive basis for a framework for exploring the internal dynamic of urban development and the territorialisation of local economic interest. Then, finally, a brief summary of above discussions will be suggested.

3.2 Political context of Western place marketing

The marketing of places cannot be understood without reference to the economic, political and social context within which they are set out. This section outlines the nature and main features of place marketing within wider national and global scales of political and economic conditions in the West. In particular, it will describe three processes: the policy response of local states to the global economic restructuring in 1970s; transformation to the postmodern society based on consumption and symbolic value; and the proliferation of urban entrepreneurialism. In order to analyse and explore these processes this study will draw on three interrelated concepts: 1) global restructuring; 2) postmodern society; 3) entrepreneurial urban governance in
association with neo-liberal political ideology. The thesis will then examine the relationship between these three concepts and place marketing.

Goodwin (1993: 147-148) indicates some points for the emergence of place marketing in urban policy in the UK. On the one hand, it resulted from the reduction of tax revenue and government spending triggered by the deindustrialisation of Western cities since the early 1970s, including neo-liberal privatisation and the deregulation of new conservatism. On the other hand, it was associated with the rise in recognition of the importance of style and image in postmodern society. From this viewpoint, place marketing can be understood as a local response to global restructuring in the international economy. In relation to social aspects, it can also be understood as an urban change to the emergence of postmodern society. Moreover, in terms of outcome it can be said to reflect the introduction of entrepreneurial governance to urban policy.

3.2.1 Main features of Western place marketing

*Place marketing as a local response to global restructuring*

As Harvey (1989b) points out, many difficulties such as deindustrialisation, prevailing unemployment, budget curtailment of central and local governments threatened the advanced capitalist economies following the severe recessions and oil shocks of the 1970s. In the process of restructuring of global economy from Fordism to flexible accumulation system, many British cities faced various economic and social
problems. Fordism is characterised by the development of mass production (Harvey, 1989b). The connection of ‘Taylorism’ emphasised a detailed labour division and automated assembly-line facilities which resulted in standardised mass production. The role of the nation-state is focused on preventing a crisis of overproduction under a regime of Fordism. To avoid this crisis, governments seek to ensure effective demand leading to mass consumption. From the perspective of Keynesian ideas, public expenditure such as welfare service is grown and the government’s intervention is expanded. However, the triple crisis of oil shocks, stagflation and the rapid change of the global economic environment (for instance, fast technology innovation, diversification of market needs, intensified international competition) caused overproduction and withered consumption. Thus, Fordism converted to the more flexible accumulation system through the crisis of overproduction.

The trend of deindustrialisation brought a relative decline of the manufacturing industry and an expansion of the service sector in small cities. However, more traditional manufacturing companies in larger cities often transferred their production to low-labour cost countries ensuring more profit. Thus, the divide between successful cities and unsuccessful ones in response to restructuring pressure arose in the restructuring process of the global economy. Moreover, as Pacione (2001) points out, urban crises such as the loss of industries and jobs and a reduction of population emerged with deindustrialisation. As these problems were accelerated, cities underwent severe decline. In this context, for example, Ward (1998:187) describes a situation in “…. Britain, where decline began in the late 1960s, becoming serious after 1974. Two decades later, in 1994, there were 3.6 million fewer
manufacturing jobs, a decline of 45 per cent. All the big cities in Britain .... were affected by this decline, experiencing devastating losses in very short periods.”

To overcome these crises, local authorities implemented urban development policies for local economic revitalisation. It was usually through place marketing that cities sought out new means of wealth creation and of replacing their traditional industry. Thus, it might be recognised as a response by and a challenge of local governments to counteract a drastic crisis in the globalised economic environment. From the spatial perspective, it could also be a kind of a re-territorialisation of localities to de-territorialisation pressure resulting from the global economic restructuring. In other words, place marketing might be re-territorialisation which cities seek to commodify their own place assets in order to develop their areas, against the de-territorialisation of a capitalist spatial economy due to the globalised economy and the increased mobility of capital.

**Postmodernism in place marketing as a cultural server for the logic of capital**

According to Harvey (1989b), a postmodern city might be a cultural and aesthetic reflection into urban space in response to transforming global political economic conditions (from Fordism to flexible accumulation). Cities that have seen the loss of their manufacturing industry in the West, have sought to obtain vitality again through a conversion to immense consumption spaces. For example, the building and design of new consumption spaces has become the basis of many place marketing activities and urban regeneration programmes since the 1980s in the UK (Raco,
2003). If the basic function of cities is the provision of jobs and an attractive environment for their residents' cultural needs, this has been more required in postmodern society. In connection with this respect, even though financial incentives such as tax benefit were still primary strategies to attract firms, environmental and cultural amenities for residents and tourists were newly recognised key factors to place marketing in the post-industrial city.

What are the features of postmodern society and how they are linked with contemporary cities? As Harvey (1989b) indicates, in Western Europe, mechanical rationality and efficiency of modern functional planning played a major role to reconstruct urban system after the Second World War, building a number of modular housing estates, schools, hospitals and factories very quickly. However, the extremely strict history of deindustrialisation and restructuring lead to a new style of architecture and urban spaces such as an eclectic ‘collage’, historical excerpts and ornamental design along with a series of economic and political transition since the 1970s (see ibid). New cultural flows which are fictional, ambiguous and fragmented have increasingly been diffused in urban spaces. This is postmodernism in the city.

Postmodern society is a consumption-friendly society. Consumption in postmodern life puts cultural tastes and aesthetic compliment beyond simple economic needs. Urban landscapes have been changed rapidly for more visual, imagery and spectacle in contemporary cities. The reason for changing urban landscapes like this is because of the conversion from city spaces being used for production to consumption with diversified consumers' taste and need in a capitalist economy.
(Zukin, 1991). The main methods of stimulating consumption desire are commercial advertisements and visual images. The effect of advertisements that provoke consumer desire, starting by a commodity in a commercial, to a window display, to a facade of a store, to a mall or department store, and to a shopping district, is expanded and eventually the city spaces become a simulated space and accumulation of spectacles. Many contemporary city authorities have attempted to implement urban regeneration strategies which are focused on visual attractiveness in order to promote shopping and to appeal to visitors (Zukin, 2003). As a result, most attempts at the reimagining of industrial cities in place marketing have been closely connected to postmodern culture, which promotes entertainment and ornamentation for more consumption. These days, cities keep investing funds in postmodern and festive landscape as a place marketing to entice more investors and tourists, even if they face a difficult choice between museums or gambling casinos (ibid).

In association with this trend, Philo and Kearns (1993) criticise that place marketing plays a role of an advance guard for urban elites, who are able to utilise cultural resources for their economic interest and control society in an era of neo-liberalism. They argue that postmodernism only manipulates culture to support the accumulation of capital by beautifying consumption and selling places. In addition, Harvey (1989) indicates that postmodernism is just a cultural partner of the flexible accumulation mode which is made by capital for creating more consumption. In this respect, postmodernism might be considered a cultural logic with a bias for capital.
Postmodern society, related to place marketing, greatly affects the formation of images of cities. Place marketing policies changed urban landscapes rapidly by revitalising shopping districts, gentrifying slum zones and constructing large-scale buildings. Short (1996) argues that cities based on an old manufacturing industry legacy in an advanced capitalist economy replaced their old images with whole new images such as the fun city, green city and culture city through various physical reconstructions like leisure districts and postmodern business parks. In addition, Boyer (1992) and Crawford (1992) indicate that theme park type of fictitious place marketing has fuelled the development of manufactured post-industrial city spaces in order to stimulate more consumption. As a consequence, many cities in advanced capitalist countries have created homogeneous spaces as a series of panoramic spectacles by depending on promotional place marketing tools. These physical changes often result in the remaking of a city image. In this respect, postmodern urban design is used to pursue the delivery of beautiful and vivid images of cities for people like tourists and residents. Then, such images and landscapes might contribute to attracting tourists, new inward residents and investments together with other place marketing policies. However, city images tend to be chosen for the economic interests of certain city elite groups or local growth coalitions in many cities. Thus, it becomes a crucial matter that selected images are for whom and for what (Griffiths, 1998). Moreover, a new image formed by city marketing strategy can hide, as a carnival mask, negative facts of the city such as expelled people due to prestige projects (Harvey, 1989). In this respect, diverse marketing policies like events, advertisings and brands might be a symbolic and cultural cover of some resident’s opposition and struggle which resulted from those marketing programmes. As
Harvey (ibid) points out, we should recognise that there are serious economic and social problems behind the successful myth of place marketing projects.

Urban entrepreneurialism as neo-liberal city governance

The conversion of political ideology from a social democratic welfare state to Neo-liberalism was one of the key factors for the emergence of urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989). As observed in the previous section, the West has experienced extremely serious recession, unemployment and stagflation since the 1970s. It was recognised that Keynesian economic policies, emphasising active government intervention, were not successful in dealing with the depression and creating a sustainable business cycle. Furthermore, it was felt that the economic and financial crisis had been partly caused by excessive public intervention in the market and extravagant welfare expenditure. In 1979 the newly elected Thatcher administration, in the UK considered the expansion of the welfare state and government failure as the chief source of crisis. As a result, her government introduced new policies curtailing public spending. In addition, the Conservatives cut down on grants for urban development, and local authorities acted in an entrepreneurial manner seeking to maximise corporate investment (Logan and Swanstrom, 1990).

Basically, entrepreneurialism is an essential thing in place marketing. Place marketing can often be mentioned as one of the means of urban entrepreneurialism because it is rooted firmly in the corporate marketing of products. Regarding the main features of urban entrepreneurialism, Harvey (1989:8) points out that ‘[t]he new
urban entrepreneurialism typically rests on a public–private partnership focusing on investment and economic development with the speculative construction of place rather than amelioration of conditions within a particular territory as its immediate political and economic goal. In particular, entrepreneurial urban governments are inclined to take adventurous risks. Accordingly, huge projects, often used in place marketing strategy, such as the constructing of a hallmark cultural infrastructure and hosting a mega-event are heavily favoured. For example, the Bilbao Guggenheim museum and the 1992 Olympic Games in Spain were frequently exemplified as successful cases mixing a large scale project with the cultural marketing of cities (Garcia, 2004). Another characteristic of urban entrepreneurialism, as Harvey (1989) noted, is that it is market-oriented. This is usually expressed by public-private partnerships and the privatisation of public services in terms of their organisational aspect. This also involves the increase of inter-urban competition and external orientation promotion (Paddison, 1993). For instance, Millington (2002) argues that inter-city competition in the UK intensified in the 1990s introducing a few competitive ingredients into the distribution of regeneration funds. Thus, place marketing can be understood as market-centred various activities seeking to improve urban competitiveness in order to win inter-city competition through public-private partnerships and an entrepreneurial approach.

However, there are several criticisms of urban entrepreneurial place marketing. Firstly, it is an excessively economic growth-oriented strategy. It tends to exclude disadvantaged groups in cities and its benefits which resulted from projects often do not reach the main public interest. Many place marketing projects tend to contribute
the benefit of a small number of urban elites such as political leaders, corporate chairpersons and realtors and urban authorities often disregard opposition and any sense of alienation felt by disadvantaged residents. In relation to this, Harvey (1989) argues that this entrepreneurial turn has been affected by the transition of the urban political emphasis from welfare to creation of wealth. For example, according to Loftman and Nevin (1995), large-scale investment for place marketing projects made the City Council appropriate some welfare-related resources (such as social and education services and social housing) for city centre prestige projects, and accumulated an operational deficit. They indicate that the project, the World Student Games 1991, have aggravated the financial crisis of Sheffield City Council in Sheffield. Secondly, place marketing and branding make inter-city competition more intense and superheated. In this respect, Harvey implies that urban entrepreneurialism may lead to zero-sum games in inter-city competition, as follows;

“If … urban entrepreneurialism (in broadest sense) is embedded in a framework of zero-sum inter-urban competition for resources, jobs, and capital, then even the most resolute and avant-garde municipal socialists will find themselves, in the end, playing the capitalist game and performing as agents of discipline for the very processes they are trying to resist. … Given the right circumstances, however, urban entrepreneurialism and even inter-urban competition may open the way to a non zero-sum pattern of development (1989:5 ).”

In addition, entrepreneurial place marketing can deteriorate the interests of inter-city cooperation by virtue of its promotion of more intensified competition. Thirdly, entrepreneurial place marketing tends to be speculative and thus risky (Harvey, 1989; Griffiths, 1998). As a result, once a high-risk large-scale project is launched, it
is likely to fail. Loftman et al., (1995) point out that prestige projects as a means of place marketing are often dangerous with respect to finance. They notice that a number of city marketing projects start at the time of a real estate boom. However, most large scale prestige projects can be exposed to any financial crisis because of their long-term nature. Loftman et al., (ibid) warn of the possibility that an exaggerated optimism and wrong insight formed in a boom season can lead to an abandoned project.

3.2.2 Neo-liberalism and place marketing

In the above section, we observed that place marketing, which has emerged since the 1980s (influenced by neo-liberal ideology), has represented a new type of urban landscape and entrepreneurial governance along with globalisation and post-modernism. This section seeks to provide understanding on the nature of changing place marketing under the wider political and economic conditions like globalised neo-liberalisation by investigating the inter-relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing. In so doing, it examines the definition of neo-liberalism and its implication for place marketing. Then, it considers the mutual synergetic relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing strategies. Finally, I will explore uneven development and its impact for class settlement, and discuss David Harvey’s argument that such a result should be interpreted as a ‘restoration of ruling-class power (Harvey, 2005:203)’. 
Understanding neo-liberalisation, neo-liberalism and the implication of its emergence for place marketing

The literature of neo-liberalism and neo-liberalisation enables us to recognise a new geography of changing political and economic relationships between nation state, market, and local state within the wider context of globalisation and state and urban restructuring (Eisenschitz, 2010). As described in the previous section, from the perspective of urban governance, place marketing policy newly redefines the role of urban government in post-industrial cities from a social democratic settlement to a market-centred neo-liberalised one along with the contextual impacts of globalisation, postmodernism, and urban entrepreneurialism. Brenner, Peck and Theodore suggests the development process of neo-liberalisation as three regulatory dimensions: 1) prototypical and disarticulated neo-liberalisation in association with regulatory experiment in the 1970s; 2) more mobilised neo-liberalisation in diverse policy arenas by system of inter-jurisdictional policy transfer during the 1980s; 3) deepening formulation of neo-liberalisation as a global rule regime since the 1990s (Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010:336-8). In the thesis, the evolution of place marketing also is correlated to the degree of the neo-liberalisation process.

As Harvey (2005) points out, however, neo-liberal shifts have not been played out in the same way. They were different on a national and urban scale although we can capture a common trend of transformation towards neo-liberalisation widely in many cities. In contrast with the ideology of theoretical neo-liberalism, ‘actually existing neo-liberalism’ has been deployed with very complicated, contradictory and
variegated forms (Peck, 2002; Peck, Theodore and Brenner, 2005), since the transformation process of neo-liberalisation has been politically shaped and mediated within different historical, economic, political, and spatial contexts (ibid). The reason why existing neo-liberalisation has been different from the theoretical ideology of neo-liberalism is its feature of being contextually embedded (Peck, 2002). Locally embedded mutations of neo-liberalism, as Peck et al. (2005) suggests, have the following three qualities: firstly, they are path-dependent; secondly, they usually entail creative destruction; thirdly, they are going forward through neo-liberal urbanisation. In this chapter, I seek to focus on the neo-liberalisation of Western countries as advanced capitalist states since it appears their own common qualities have been more articulated and salient than others. They were growing a dependence upon entrepreneurial tools, business-centred rhetoric, and business-led governance (Jessop, Peck and Tickell, 1999).

As to the conceptualisation of neo-liberalism, Harvey (2005) does not regard it as a revival or extension of old liberalism. Rather, he argues it is a political theory discussed over time in order to displace the embedded liberalism of social democratic settlement. As we have noted, over the last three decades, many Western cities have been transformed from post-war settlements of the Keynesian welfare state to market-centred neo-liberal ones, and this conversion is profoundly linked to evolving political strategies like place marketing. In recent years, it appears this phenomenon is firmly diffused and reinforced, coupled with deepening neo-liberalisation, as Western neo-liberal ideas and models, defended and supported by super-powers like the US, are incrementally gaining dominance (Hall, 2011).
However, as Mudge (2008:723) points out, the concept of neo-liberalism tends to be recognised as somewhat narrow in meaning. Politically, it has been often understood as Anglo-American politics. In other words, it has been typically conceptualised as neo-liberalism equals Anglo-American ‘right’ politics: Thatcherism in the UK and Reaganomics in the US (ibid). However, such dualism of right-left politics might interrupt precise understanding of neo-liberalism. For example, the recognition based on the dualism enables us not to explain the emergence of market-friendly left parties and policies such as Tony Blair’s The Third Way. Also in geographical aspects, neo-liberal politics has been often perceived as a narrow area like Anglo-American (specifically US and UK) politics, and it might contribute to a false recognition that there is no neo-liberal politics elsewhere (ibid). In this respect, therefore, I argue we should have a broader concept of neo-liberalism. In this thesis, neo-liberalism is not suggested as confined into Anglo-American area. It is not only a dominant political regime which is widely pervasive in many countries and cities but also an idea for consecrating the market and competition like in market-fundamentalism. Through this thesis, I argue that neo-liberal ideologies and projects are diffusing to less advanced Korean cities as well as advanced Western cities, and in the process, place marketing strategies have played a key role in establishing neo-liberal urban politics through their mutual support.

Broad conceptualisation about neo-liberalism also enables us to precisely grasp the nature of the phenomenon that marketing science authors and researchers suggest that the scope of marketing concepts have broadened in relation to the definition of place marketing. For example, according to Kotler, Roberto and Lee (2002),
marketing principles, tools and strategies can be applied to the public realm and non-profit organisations such as schools, foundations, and city governments through the terms of social marketing and place marketing. They also suggest the possible fields of social marketing include health, safety, environment, and community (ibid:4). However, I argue that such a broadening of marketing concepts by marketing scientists should be understood within the wider political and economic context of ‘neo-liberalisation’ and ‘expansion of the market’. As Harvey points out, “[t]he corporatization, commodification, and privatization of hitherto public assets has been a signal feature of the neoliberal project. Its primary aim has been to open up new fields for capital accumulation in domains hitherto regarded off-limits to the calculus of profitability (2005:160).” Thus, the application of city marketing to public organisations should be recognised within the macro political and economic conditions of political transformation towards neo-liberalisation.

**The relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing**

As noted in the above section, neo-liberal political ideology influenced the rise of place marketing. However, their relationship is not unilateral from neo-liberalism toward place marketing. There might be some explanations about the relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing. However, I argue we should concentrate on their political relation in the thesis. There have been political forces which mutually work together in their relationship. On the one hand, place marketing strategies have been strongly affected by market-centred neo-liberalism since the early 1980s, and on the other hand, they have worked as a vehicle and catalyst of
neo-liberal politics in urban space. It ultimately tends to result in uneven material outcomes in social and spatial aspects.

Drawing on Eisenschitz’s (2010) argument, I argue that the relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing is synergetic. He describes that neo-liberalism is the politics which provides a consistency for the revival of promotional activities like place marketing policies. He also argues that place marketing strategies have strengthened neo-liberalism by various means. He indicates that place marketing policies have changed not only the local physical landscapes but also the political perception of local inhabitants. On the basis of Booth and Boyle’s study on Glasgow, Eisenschitz (ibid) explains that the Glasgow authorities changed people’s political perception on Glasgow from ‘a city of working class’ (Booth and Boyle, 1993:38) to ‘a postmodern culture city’ by employing the designation of ‘European City of Culture’ and as a result, socialists in the city were marginalised to the edge of municipal political realm. Furthermore, urban authorities and city elites created sentimental interpretations of the socialist tradition in Glasgow for city tourism and economic growth rather than critically understanding it in terms of the political aspect (ibid). As such, place marketing strategies used historical components in order to hide or mutate original social relations between labour and capital and related meanings and images. Moreover, inter-urban competitive marketing policies which come from the elevation of urban entrepreneurialism also have contributed to the diffusion of neo-liberalism. It was usually deployed by inter-city competition for attracting mobile capital deepening the geographical expansion of neo-liberalism. For instance, David Harvey indicated in his lecture at KRIHS (Korea Research Institute for Human
Settlements) in 16th November 2005 that Charlotte city government in North Carolina, USA attracted corporate investments through providing a set of hosting conditions of a minimum environmental regulation, week labour unions and, free or cheap public services like electricity and water (Ji, 2012).

Even if overall urban economies in some cities grow by virtue of place marketing policies, cities still have or have more inequality and social divide. Within a city or even a district, there is often a clear divide between affluent neighbourhoods and deprived ones. In association with this, much of the literature tends to see place marketing as aggravating class and racial inequalities and, as a result, they criticise urban development by property-led regeneration for leading to gentrification and displacement. Griffiths (1998) points out one of the significant problems of place marketing is that it invests much financial support in flagship projects ignoring the social and economic inequality within a city. In addition, policy makers for place marketing tend to have little interest in the issue of distribution of growth benefit. One of the main problems for place marketing projects is the neglected periphery which is not marketed and the city authorities only focus on a part of the urban centre and waterfront for marketing projects. Disadvantaged people tend to live on the periphery of marketed places. As a result, they can feel a sense of alienation and be deprived. Many regeneration programmes develop inner-city areas into a gated luxury residence and they often expel the poor who lived there (Davis, 1990; Harvey, 1989).

According to Eisenschitz (2010), place marketing strategies have been ultimately in accordance with the dynamic of certain class settlements. Over the last few decades,
industrial cities in advanced capitalist countries have transformed into post-industrial ones, and in the process, place marketing strategies led the way to displace old working class residences with places for the middle or upper affluent classes through gentrification. It was not an easy process since it often entails political conflicts and struggles. Nonetheless, place marketing strategies have cleverly performed the work in that they took the working class places and situated affluent people there (like yuppies) by mobilising cultural instruments and through political rhetoric. As he notes, “[a]s resistance to neo-liberalism was so strong in the cities, the very activity of place marketing was part of the politics of this transition from social democracy (ibid:79-80).” He argues, in the process, gentrification has been significantly associated with it, saying as follows:

“In order to create successful cities, place marketing has had to spell out some elements of the new settlement to convince its target market. In particular, it has been closely associated with the gentrification of the old industrial cities, which has been a way in which neo-liberalism quelled political resistance to its project (ibid:80).”

Short (1989) describes gentrification as an economic and spatial restructuring process based on place marketing projects in Dockland, London, and he argues that such a process brought about changes in social relations such as bifurcation of employment opportunities and class war between yuppies and yuffies. Smith (2002) also indicates that the process of gentrification has been a way for Western city authorities coupled with private capital to suppress political resistances and movements and to consolidate class settlement. He argues that urban regeneration and renaissance merely cover class politics since they often entail displacement
through a gentrification process. He sharply criticises their intention, saying that “[t]he language of regeneration sugarcoats gentrification (ibid:445).”

Upon further examination of the relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing, we can recognise that they have created a synergy effect by mutually reinforcing each other and have co-evolved over time. And as Harvey (2005; 2006) argues, we can also understand it might cause deepening uneven development and bifurcation of class rather than creation of wealth.

**Uneven development and re-emergence of class politics?**

As aforementioned, over three decades, the political aggression of neo-liberalism in advanced capitalist cities, on the one hand, has torn down urban policy system based on social democratic class consensus, and it led to a new entrepreneurial governing system which is usually dependent upon place marketing strategies (Harvey, 1989). On the other hand, place marketing projects based on market-centred ideas have contributed to the consolidation of neo-liberalism by creating uneven development through a variety of means such as property-led urban regeneration, commodification of culture (or economic instrumentalisation of culture), rhetoric and discourse of growth, gentrification and displacement (Eisenschitz, 2010). Particularly, in aspects of urban space, the most salient result from the reciprocal relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing is gentrification (ibid). As Smith (2002) points out, it was sociologist, Ruth Glass who vividly described the political character of the gentrification process in advanced Western cities. He
represented the process of gentrification, stating that “[o]ne by one, many of the working-class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle class – upper and lower….. Once this process of ‘gentrification’ starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is changed” (Glass, 1964:xvii Cited in Smith, 2002:438).” Here, what is important is the class nature of the process.

According to Smith (2002), the process of gentrification has grown since the 1950s and 1960s, and at that time, it was sporadic. However, contemporary gentrification has been upgraded in terms of politics. It has been closely bound up with entrepreneurial governance and has been more globalised. Its political methods have been also skilfully evolved by running parallel with both soft and sophisticated tools and coercive means. In the 1980s, while the role of state was to take authority from local government in order to give it to the private sector, both states and local governments have sought to meet private demands and needs since the 1990s (ibid). States and city authorities also endeavoured to hide the political partiality and class nature of marketing projects by mobilising cultural, symbolic and rhetorical components. On the one hand, they legitimised displacement in the name of economic development through architectural values and amenities for the preference of a new middle class (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005). On the other hand, they forcefully implemented gentrification policy through coercive and revanchist measures such as zero tolerance programmes against homeless in New York (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005; Smith, 1996).
The gentrification of contemporary cities, according to Smith (2002:443), has developed into a political medium for large-scale transformation of inner-city landscapes and class resettlement by driving a ‘comprehensive class-inflected urban remake’. Currently, this new landscape became a set of multiple presents for a new affluent urban elite class since it was a mixture of residence and other functional components like cafes and restaurants, leisure, shopping, recreation and cultural facilities (ibid). Regarding class character of gentrification, Atkinson and Bridge calls it a ‘new urban colonialism’ (2005:1). For them, the process of gentrification means that elites take and occupy the urban core from vulnerable city natives, and they point to its result, in the end: displacement of the poor working class. They argue that the new residents usually have similar qualities to an elite class in a colony, since these new elite class people tend to live in exclusive and gated communities and are served by local service people (ibid:3).

Since the 1990s, this phenomenon of gentrification might be globally observed along with the political transformation of neo-liberalisation (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005; Smith, 2002; Taylor, 2008), though its typology is not the same in different cities. Smith (2002) indicates that the phenomenon is seen in other cities outside West Europe and North America. According to him, it had already spread out from old industrial cities like Cleveland and Glasgow to less advanced ones such as Sao Paulo, Cape Town, and Seoul. Recently, Beijing authorities displaced over 2 million people in order to host the global mega sports-event: the Summer Olympic (Eisenschitz, 2010). Mike Davis also shows that neo-liberal uneven development such as gated residences and shopping malls only for the affluent have been
globally diffused in many cities (e.g. Dubai, Johannesburg, Budapest, Nueva Managua, Dreamland in Egypt, etc.). As such, it appears that the phenomenon of neo-liberal uneven developments is increasingly expanding and it might globally exacerbate the class divide (Davis and Monk, 2007).

As mentioned above, the mutually reinforcing relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing might have resulted in uneven developments and unequal class settlement in contemporary urban society. Regarding this issue, Harvey (2005; 2006) interprets it as the restoration of ruling class power. How can we understand it? Who is the ruling class? Will it lead to a revival of old class politics or class war? In this thesis, I think we should need more discussion of such a possibility although it has some similar aspects with old class conflict. If we call it class politics, I want to indicate what the term of class means, and then we should be clearer. For example, it seems Harvey’s (2005) term of class in his book, ‘A Brief History of Neoliberalism’, is somewhat lacking in theoretical rigidity. In the book, he denotes class as “[the] disparate group of individuals embedded in the corporate, financial, trading, and developer worlds (ibid:36)” or “[some people or groups who] possess a certain accordance of interests that generally recognizes the advantages (and now some of the dangers) to be derived from neoliberalization (ibid).” However, I think, in the aspect of theoretical terminology, this use of the term class is not clear and the division of classes is also ambiguous.

Then, will the restoration of ruling class power lead to a revival of old class politics or class war? Currently, it is uncertain whether the increase of unevenness and
inequality in cities causes class political issues like the revival of aggressive labour unions and organised class resistance or not. In contemporary cities, it is true that there is growing unevenness and inequality partly by virtue of the reciprocal impact of neo-liberalism and place marketing. However, I think there might be more empirical evidence about whether deepening inequalities from a neo-liberal shift can directly result in class political issues. For instance, even the US with a serious income polarisation between classes has not been characterised by class politics based on labour movements. Nonetheless, I agree with the intention of Harvey’s argument that such political transformation has greatly contributed to forming a new small number of privileged elite groups since such practices have been increased in many cities. Consequently, over the last three decades, neo-liberalism and the entrepreneurial strategy of place marketing have driven the neo-liberalisation of urban policy with a synergetic inter-relationship by mutually reinforcing them. Then, its effects of uneven development and unequal outcomes have been witnessed in many cities. However, it is not yet clear that it could cause a revival of class politics.

3.3 Transfer of place marketing policies

3.3.1 The definition and type of policy transfer

Current many urban studies have been approached through the context of globalisation, and the research on policy transfer between countries and cities is alike. This issue is also connected with the arena of political decision making which
involve a number of policy actors. It appears many policy makers – both at the level of contemporary countries or cities – have had increasing competitive pressures to see more tangible outcomes. They are commended to update and keep the latest trends and ideas. Thus, this tendency places city policy makers in the context of ‘fast policy transfer’ within the policy process (Peck and Theodore, 2001:429), and it makes urban politics globally relational as well as locally and inwardly territorial (McCann, 2011). On the other hand, if we consider it in terms of local politics, policy transferring and learning from other countries and cities in such a competitive environment might be one of the essential concerns of pro-growth local politics (Cox and Mair, 1988; Cook and Ward, 2010), since certain types of policy models known to be successful tend to be a mechanism which stimulates local identity and patriotism based on place-specific interests. Through the thesis, therefore, the main focus in regard to policy transfer is on how transferring policy models influence urban politics (in particular, the politics of growth) within wider political and economic conditions such as globalisation, and I will examine in the empirical chapters (chapter 7, 8 and 9) how Western policies on place marketing has influenced urban policy development in South Korea. For instance, I will consider whether such a transfer have contributed to the neo-liberalisation of Gwangju’s urban marketing policy.

According to Dolowitz and Marsh (2000:13-4), policy transfer can be seen on a continuum from a voluntary situation with perfect rationality to a coercive one by direct imposition of policy models, programmes or administrative arrangements. For them, the transfer of place marketing strategies can be classified in a similar way to
the lessons drawn from voluntary situation. They also divide the number of policy actors involved in the process of policy transfer into 9 groups: politicians as elected officials, political parties, non-elected civil officials and techno-bureaucrats, interest groups, policy entrepreneurs and experts, transnational or multinational corporations, think tanks, supra-national governmental and non-governmental institutions and consultants (ibid:10). As noted in their study, what is transferred by policy actors is a variety of things such as policy goals, policy content, policy instruments and programmes, institutions, ideologies and attitudes, and lessons (ibid:12). In regard to the initial establishment of policy transfer study, McCann (2011) positively evaluates the contribution of policy transfer literature in political science and administration disciplines (Dolowitz, 1998; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2004; James and Lodge, 2003; Stone, 1999). Indeed, the literature, as he acknowledges, has helped us to systematically observe and understand the various actors and the types of things transferred around the complicated process of policy transfer. Additionally, most of the literature has concentrated on searching for successful conditions and factors in the process of policy transfer and policy lesson-drawing, and in the narrow perspective of public organisation management its outcome might be arguably useful for further study.

From the perspective of urban politics, however, as McCann properly indicates, the literature from political science has a few significant limits (2011). First, it might be bound in a narrow issue like the typology of policy transfer actors and organisational mechanisms (ibid). It has seldom paid attention to the broader issues such as the influence of policy transfer on general outcomes in local politics or ideological
transformation. It is not concerned with the social and political background either with reference to why policy transfer takes place in the politics of local growth. Secondly, it seems political science literature focuses on only ‘the behaviour of transfer’ of policy neglecting political and social situations in the process (ibid). However, actual policies in cites tend to include policy assemblage which comes from different learning points, and transferred policy models as best practices are often modified and mutated within the embedding political situation and context. (Cook and Ward, 2010; McCann, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2012)

### 3.3.2 Baltimore’s formula in place marketing

In general, the Baltimore development model has often been stated as a representative flagship place marketing project in the West (Hall, 2006). As Harvey (see 1989b:89-98) described, it was place promotional policies, as an entrepreneurial and cultural project, that Baltimore authorities and city elites had created together as a series of various and spectacular cityscapes including Harbour Place, Science Centre, Convention Centre, Aquarium, hotels, other leisure and pleasure facilities in order to stimulate local growth. Here, what is interesting is the reason why this pro-business place marketing strategy, launched at that time, was very political. It was planned to pacify strong resistant movements like riots, burning and looting which had often taken place in inner cities within the US in the late 1960s, of course coupled with an aim of city economic development. Harvey describes this situation as follow:
“Spawned by the necessity to arrest the fear and disuse of downtown areas caused by the civic unrest in the late 1960s,’ said a later Department of Housing Urban Development report, ‘the Baltimore City Fair was originated..... as way to promote urban development (ibid:89).’”

Then, the projects including the Baltimore City Fair were positively evaluated by many people at that time by drawing over 2 million visitors in 1973. Harvey, however, points out that they actually resulted in the city authority’s neglecting and disregarding urban ills such as urban poverty, homelessness, and health care and education problems (ibid:90). However, such a place marketing model was not accomplished only in Baltimore. The entrepreneurial, spectacular and cultural model of remaking urban spaces has rapidly been copied and emulated by other cities like Boston, San Francisco, and New York. In relation to this entrepreneurial phenomenon, Harvey expresses a concern about its actually forceful effect in the urban context, saying that as “inter-urban competition becomes more potent, it will almost certainly operate as an ‘external coercive power’ over individual cities to bring them closer into line with the discipline and logic of capitalist development. It may even force repetitive and serial reproduction of certain patterns of development.... (1989:10)” Moreover, its meaningful impact on cities was not just confined to a physical fad. The best practice for place marketing in Baltimore could help urban theorists like Harvey to observe a structural shift in the nature of an urban governing system and a policy maker’s mind-set – ‘re-orientation of urban governance (Wood, 1998:120)’. Drawing on the case of Baltimore marketing, Harvey suggested the main characteristics of urban entrepreneurialism: the structure of public and private partnership, speculative character of projects, and its non-public outcomes (Harvey,
Since the 1980s, these qualities of entrepreneurial urban governance have been consistently diffused and reinforced at a global level. However, as Jessop and his colleagues (Jessop, Peck, and Tickell, 1999:142) indicate, “[s]tructures and strategies of urban governance may be copied not so much because they demonstrably ‘work’ but because their advocates have won out in the battle for ideas in response to shared problems.” In the empirical chapters, I will examine how this battle for ideas has been played out in Gwangju over several different place marketing policies.

3.3.3 British marketing policy transferred from the US

As Dolowitz (1998) points out, there was quite a long history of policy transfer between the US and the UK. It appears there was a mutual consonance of ideological orientation and political strategies between Reagan-Thatcher in the 1980s and the Clinton-Blair relationship of the 1990s. In particular, the transfer of policies for urban regeneration and place marketing was active (Peck and Theodore, 2001). Loftman and Nevin depict the transferred process of prestige projects for place marketing from US cities to British ones, saying: “[d]uring the 1980s numerous British policy makers and politicians, in search of potential solutions to the nation’s pressing urban problems, visited and were impressed by the apparent success of US cities such as Baltimore and Boston which had..... seemingly, turned around their economic fortunes through the development of prestige projects (1995:302). Evans (2001:213) also indicates many British cities like Glasgow, Huddersfield, Manchester and Sheffield have imported place marketing strategies mainly drawing on the methods of US cities’ marketing through their waterfront and downtown
developments. He describes the transferred process from US cities by emphasising the role of transfer agents like BAAA (British American Arts Association) which simulated importing activities through a series of conferences and publications about cultural place marketing policies (ibid). In the process, specifically Baltimore’s development model greatly influenced British place marketing projects (Hall, 2006). For example, the outcomes of its impact were Brindleyplace in Broad Street Redevelopment Area in Birmingham, London’s Covent Garden and Docklands, and Gateshead’s Metro centre (ibid). Keating criticised such an emulative fad of marketing policies, stating that “Cities have rushed into the economic development role under the impetus of events with little knowledge or understanding. They have ridden the latest fashions, imitated each other in often highly inappropriate ways. The perceived imperative of economic competition in a homogeneous world market has led to a homogenization of space as all cities strive for the same things, convention centres and shopping malls one year, science parks and waterfro...
Peck and Theodore (2001) notes that British cities borrowed policies related to place marketing in the 1980s, and workfare regime policies in the 1990s from the US. They indicate that the attempts of UK cities which tried to emulate or merely copy US models have faced apparent limits since such attempts easily absorb administrative and managerial inputs, but it is nearly impossible to reproduce the original achievements. Peck (2001) argues that professional, but bureaucratic policy transfer and learning systems often led by technocrats have usually contributed to global diffusion of neoliberal political aims. They have strengthened the tendency of market-orientation and increasing competitiveness in local government, and it led to a global expansion of neo-liberal hegemony in many cities. Harvey (2005:117) also points out the importance of complex interaction between internal dynamic and external forces in the spread of neo-liberal programmes and mind-set. According to him, public officials educated and trained in the US played a key role in applying US type neo-liberal policies in order to restructure national and local states in Chile. However, as McCann (2011) suggests, many neo-liberal urban policies have produced only local-centred outcomes even though they have expressed the internationalisation and globalisation of their cities. In addition, their achievements tend to be ephemeral, anything but sustainable.

In summary, this thesis’s main attention to policy transfer is how it influences urban politics, which is quite different from the perspective of political science that has paid attention to typologies of transfer actors and transferred content. Within the wider conditions of globalisation and neo-liberalisation, it seems contemporary city leaders and technocrats related to political decision-making have been situated in a context
of intensified inter-urban competition and fast policy transfer. Thus, it might lead the majority of policy makers to be dependent on rapid copying or emulation of policies rather than sincere consideration of them. In the UK, place marketing policies in many cities have often been quickly transferred from US cities. Due to globalisation, such a phenomenon can be true in many other cities beyond the UK. For instance, there has been several western type of place marketing projects in Gwangju such as the Gwangju Biennale (transferred from the Venice), the Asian Culture Complex (from the Pompidou Centre), and the Dome Baseball Project (from the Tokyo Dome and the Chase Field in the US) in case studies of the thesis. I will argue that these projects have been introduced and developed by a combination of local political leaders’ ambition, economic elites’ interests, and the wider ‘macro-necessity’ (Jessop, Peck, and Tickell, 1999) such as globalisation and competition pressure between Korean cities. In addition, currently many cities – whether advanced capitalist cities or not – tend to include policy assemblage of diverse learning points from different cities (McCann, 2011). However, they have often contributed to the homogenisation of place marketing policies by rapid copying or emulating best practice like the Baltimore formula within the wider structural forces of globalisation and neo-liberalisation. Moreover, they have actively served the diffusion of market-oriented ideas.

3.4 Political theories on local economic development

Place marketing is a strategy used as a representative tool for local economic development. Thus, to examine political theories on local economic development
might present a basic theoretical frame from which to explore the process of place marketing policy within the context of urban (or local) politics.

3.4.1 The rise of the politics of local growth

New theory tends to emerge to describe changed reality. Likely, this is true in the rise of the politics of local growth. Since the mid-1980s, mobility of capital has been increased along with world economy restructuring and globalisation, and it has led to more fierce inter-local competition for footloose capital. Many local authorities in advanced capitalist cities have paid attention to revitalising local economies by attracting firms and investments, and pro-growth urban policies have been popular. In the process, place marketing strategy as a growth-centred policy has been conspicuously salient. Due to this transformation of political and economic environments, the main focus of urban politics rapidly moved from collective consumption and the crisis of social reproduction of the previous Keynesian Welfare state to a new politics of economic growth and development (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Smith, 2002).

Some scholars called this new politics of growth a ‘new urban politics’ (Cox, 1993, Cited in MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999:507) or the ‘building wave of a new urban theory’ (Marston, 1990 Cited in ibid). This section considers Molotch’s growth machine thesis, urban regime theory suggested by Stone, Elkin and Stoker, and the local dependence approach of Cox and Mair as the political theories of local growth and development. All of these have roots in the United States. In terms of the US context, this new urban politics greatly contrasted with old community power
approaches (Cox, 1995). During the 1950s and 1960s, the urban political issue actively discussed in the US was the problem of who governs the local community. It was made concret by debates of community power between pluralists (who thought of community power as widely dispersed among pressure groups) such as Robert Dahl and elite theorists (who argued power was concentrated on small number of power elites in the community) like Floyd Hunter. In new urban politics, however, the process of structuring local internal economic interests is usually significant. Some indicate that those new theories might partly help the attention of politics to be situated in a relatively broader political and economic context (Cox, 1995; Jonas and Wilson, 1999; Ward, 1997), even though the theory’s result of growth machines and urban regimes of attempting to reveal the role of politics was questionable (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Yet, they clearly have partly contributed to urban political theories in that they endeavoured to extend the theoretical focus to inter-urban competition for mobile capital between locales rather than simply to investigate dominant power groups among local community organisations, despite theories on growth machines and regimes still concentrating on somewhat narrow political process around coalitions between local internal agents. This section firstly examines how they explain the process by which local internal economic interests are structured and then, considers what theoretical basis they can give us.

3.4.2 Growth machine thesis

Molotch’s thesis in 1976, ‘The City as a Growth Machine’ was a simple but important insight that a growth machine based on land interests forms a political coalition of
local business and the political elite and it led to local authorities concentrating on improving local growth (Jonas and Wilson, 1999). In spite of the simplicity of its logic, this argument well described the US context of urban politics then (ibid). The key point of the thesis was that economic interests and social relations from a basis of land and building property make related elites to construct a coalition for growth. Molotch (1976:309-10) argues that the “political and economic essence of virtually any given locality, in the present American context, is growth. I further argue that the desire for growth provides the key operative motivation toward consensus for members of politically mobilized local elites.” For him, the most important goal of capitalist cities is a continual growth and the agenda of city elites to acquire the various conditions for growth. Local growth coalitions produce various ideological discourses of development in order to gain popular support for local growth policies (Cox and Mair, 1988; Jonas and Wilson, 1999; McCann, 2002). They achieve the hegemony of development discourse through a co-operation with a variety of auxiliary actors such as media, universities, cultural institutions, the chamber of commerce, and professional sports franchises (Jonas and Wilson, 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). As Jonas and Wilson describe, “growth machine interventions – often subtle and nuanced – penetrate far corners of local life that tie growth stratagems to common-sense thought and taken-for-granted practices. Thus, power becomes wielded not through contextless articulations that foist power and a new way of seeing on an unsuspecting mainstream but through cultivating prevailing beliefs and values in an ongoing political intervention (1999:9).” But, Jonas and Wilson assess Molotch’s argument of forming discourse as somewhat superficial, as the process of constructing development discourses in reality is more complex. In
summary, it is possible to say that the ultimate argument of the thesis can be summarised as an elite coalition based on economic interests related to land property make local authorities implement growth-centred policies in a varied ways.

In the book of ‘Urban Fortunes (Logan and Molotch, 1987)’, Molotch later upgraded some explanations of the thesis with Logan. For example, he depicts ‘rentier’ class in detail. It becomes a group of community growth leadership which includes land developers, utilities, banks, and other place entrepreneurs who can gain economic interests from the exchange of properties and the development of urban infrastructure (Jonas and Wilson, 1999). They are closely connected with the economic interests of local places, and it enables them to have shared interests for the continuous growth of local economy. In the end, it leads to a growth-centred coalition of city elites who influence local government to do pro-growth policies like place marketing projects by employing their power and social class.

Thus, local politics by growth coalition tend to show a strong inclination towards the interests of property owners, developers, and firms related to land development, thus, it leads to possible conflicts and struggles around land development in the local community. In association with this, Logan and Molotch also indicate the possibility of conflicts between exchange value and use value of land (1987). For example, a conflict between a growth coalition including property rentiers and a counter growth coalition of residents can take place in a certain land development project.
3.4.3 Urban regime theory

Urban regime theory also is a new theoretical attempt to explain the decision making process of local economic development in association with institutional linkages beyond the community power approach from the 1950s and 1960s in the US. It was suggested by several authors such as Clarence Stone, Stephen Elkin, and Gerry Stoker.

Among them, many commentators often note Stone’s theory. According to him, the term of regime can be defined as “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions” (Stone, 1989:6 Cited in Digaetano and Klemanski, 1999:14).” About the features of regime, he adds that a city “regime involves not just any informal group that comes together to make a decision but an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enables it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions” (ibid:4 Cited in 1999:14).” Thus, for him, “[w]hat makes [it]….. effective is not the formal machinery of government, but rather the City Hall and the downtown business elite” (ibid:3 Cited in MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999:507).” In addition, regime theorists paid attention to the governing capacity or political influence in regard to the problem of how a project is developed rather than a ruling community by the way of command and control (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Drawing on the conceptualisation of power by Foucauldian way, they attempted to focus on not who is a dominant power group but who influences important development policies (Ward, 1997). In their perspective, power is not
simply to control society but is shaped by a complicated political process through coalition and bargaining among diverse actors (Stone, 1993). Regime theorists consider, in this process, the qualities of urban regimes are formed by chance. Cities have their own different regimes since their political process in which a coalition’s governing capacity is shaped are different each other. Thus, from this perspective, we might regard a political actor’s internal local politics more important than the wider macro economic and political forces and context (Jessop, Peck, and Tickell, 1999).

3.4.4 Critiques on growth machines and regimes and local dependence approach

It appears some authors give a generous evaluation of the advantages of growth machine and regime theories. For example, regarding Molotch’s growth machine thesis, Jonas and Wilson (1999:4) evaluates it by saying “many researchers continue to draw inspiration from the growth machine thesis,” and Digaetano and Klemanski (1999:15) argues that “[r]egime theory has gained great currency as an explanation for coalition building in urban politics.”

However, there are many critical comments on these theories. Here, I suggest three points: 1) limited application of US-centred theories to other countries; 2) voluntarism of their analytical schema; 3) narrow focus on internal locality.
Firstly, they might be relatively appropriate for the local politics of the US context as they were born from that country. However, they have some considerable limit to their application in other countries when we apply them to the local politics of those countries. In general, the national governing system of the US is more decentralised than that of Western European countries and the degree of local government's authority and autonomy is relatively high. For example, Ward (1996) argues that there is a difficulty in theoretical transfer since US style urban regimes might not be generalised in the centralised urban planning system of the UK. Likewise, in terms of the American context-specific nature of the original formulation, Wood (2004:2103) concludes that the ‘value of US theories is decidedly limited’ in a British application of them.

Secondly, both ways of explanation of growth machine and regime theories rely on too much voluntarism (Jessop, Peck, and Tickell, 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). These are agency-centred theories. They tend to emphasise the autonomy of local elites in urban politics. For instance, Molotch (1993:31) argues by saying that “there is plenty of human agency in this version of political economy. Where there is similarity across places, it derives from shared institutional contexts and parallel patterns of volition, rather than iron-like determinisms of internal hidden hands or exogenous constraints.” For him, it means that the politics of growth and development derives from voluntary agents and institutional components rather than the wider context of economic and political structural conditions.
Finally, the theories have the limit of localism in the way that they explain urban politics. They tend to focus on local internal political process rather than extra-local factors such as structural changes of governance towards neo-liberalism. However, such local-centred explanations might overlook the wider economic and political influences which work beyond the local and through the various scales of global, national, regional and local ones (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). In addition, it seems they neglect the relationship between central and local government. However, it is very significant, specifically in a relatively centralised country like the Britain. Harding (1997:308 Cited in MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999:508) concludes in his comparative study about European urban regime “little can happen sub-nationally without [the national state’s] cooperation, acquiescence or benign ignorance.” Jessop et al. also emphasise the importance of extra-local factors such as the national impact or context in the analysis of local politics. They claim that Manchester’s Olympic bidding strategy cannot be explained as only an interaction among local internal actors: they stress that it was also shaped by the national and international context set by the rules of UK central government and the IOC.

In association with this, Cox (2004) argues that we have to pay attention to not only territorial structuring of the locality but also the relationship with global and national actors beyond the local in order to understand the politics of local economic development. As Cox (ibid) suggests, the essential point in conceptualising the politics of local development might be the relationship between state and local interests in a certain geographical scale. In this respect, we should concentrate on
wider national and global actors and the shared contexts of growth and development politics where they are connected with the local beyond the simple local territory.

Moreover, Cox proposes a concept of ‘local dependence’, which is a more abstract term beyond the ‘interest based on land’ of growth coalition or machine theory (Cox and Mair, 1988). This term means the locally dependent tendency of place-specific interests which certain individuals and firms have in a certain localised space for their production and reproduction (ibid). He argues, furthermore, that the capitalist system inherently has a contradiction between mobility and fixity and this leads to the forming of a new urban politics of growth and development. Firms and workers tend to be dependent upon locally shaped social relations in a capitalist economy. Locally dependent actors expect such ‘structured consistency’ to be sustainable, but the mobility of capital and labour in a capitalist economy tend to be increased. For example, as Harvey says, “[a]ccumulation provides [capitalists] with the wherewithal for expansion, and the options are always to expand in situ or to set up a branch plant elsewhere. The incentive to go for the latter increases over time simply by virtue of the congestion costs associated with expansion on original sites (1989b:234-5).” Additionally, the capitalists often pursue a spatial fix to overcome a crisis of accumulation through spatial displacement during the time of economic recession (ibid). By contrast, individuals and groups with economic interests based on local dependence have political incentives to protect or increase locally place-specific interests. Thus, conflicts between local dependent fixity and mobility can become a condition for the local politics of growth and development.
However, Cox’s argument is not perfect. As MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) indicate, his scalar approach based on local dependence has paid insufficient attention to cultural practices like discourse and ideology since it might mainly be founded on material relations. In particular, in order to analyse the changing political context, we might need to have political analysis on conflicts of city reimagining. As McCann (2002) argues, the process of place-making like place marketing projects is often associated with such politics of image-making and meaning-making. Thus, we might need to approach the understanding of the changing politics of place marketing through a cultural analysis of political actors’ discourses and meanings around place-making process.

In conclusion, through this examination, we can gain two implications from political theories of local growth and development with an American tradition. Firstly, if we consider the evolution of place marketing as the politics of local growth and development, we need to examine wider political and economic conditions of multi-dimensional scales beyond the local scale. For example, the growth machine and regime approach might not trace wider macro and contextual impacts such as structural transformation to neo-liberalisation since they tend to narrowly focus on internal dynamic of local politics. In association with Korean urban politics, since the mid-1990s, there was a rapid increasing of place marketing policies in many Korean cities. I will suggest that this phenomenon was caused not only by the concerted local elites’ interests in many cities but also the wider conditions of central government’s policy of globalisation (see Chapter 6, 7, 8, and 9). Thus, we should understand not only local internal structuring of place-specific interests but also the
broader scale of national and global context, and also dialectically recognise their relationship. Secondly, we might need analysis not only on actors’ material relations but also on cultural aspects like discourses, meanings, and ideologies for understanding evolving place marketing policies as local economic development. As Jonas and Wilson (1999) indicate, to analyse a complicated process of forming discourses in practice might need a new approach which investigates a political actor’s visions and meanings for places rather than US style theories of growth politics. In relation to this, an approach of cultural politics, conducted by McCann (2002:396) in his study on Lexington and Kentucky in the US, might provide important implications for forming a research framework since it enables us to have a ‘culturally enriched understanding’ about the politics of local economic development, which has been neglected in many political economy approaches. In particular, in the case city of the thesis, Gwangju, unique values and meanings of Gwangju local residents such as ‘Daedong (distribution and solidarity)’ spirit born from the Gwangju Democratisation Movement should be carefully treated. Thus, the cultural politics to local place marketing is very important in the case study of the thesis.

3.5 Summary

In this chapter, diverse examinations were implemented in order to closely approach essential topics of the thesis. First, we considered the main features of place marketing strategy in Western cities. There were three points: 1) place marketing as a local response to global restructuring; 2) postmodernism as a cultural partner for capital accumulation and place marketing which actively employ it; 3) urban
entrepreneurialism as neo-liberal governance. In the next section, we explored the relationship between neo-liberalism and place marketing strategy. They have driven the neo-liberalisation of urban policy in cities with a synergy by mutually reinforcing them together. Then, its effects were uneven development and unequal outcomes through gentrification and displacements which have been deployed in many cities. The third section treated policy transfer of place marketing by focusing on intersecting areas of place marketing, policy transfer, and neo-liberalism. In the fourth section, we examined urban political theories for local economic development. The forming process of local growth and governing coalitions is important in the recognition of an evolving political context of place marketing since it might give us the basis for a theoretical framework to understand the territorialisation of local economic interests. In this section, we acquired the following two significant implications from political theories of local growth such as growth machine and urban regime. Firstly, if we consider the evolution of place marketing under the wider political and economic conditions, we might need to examine in multi-dimensional scales beyond the local. Secondly, we might also need to analyse not only material social relations but also cultural aspects like discourses, meanings, and ideologies for deeper understanding of evolving place marketing policies. I expect, ultimately, these implications will contribute to the formation of methodology later examined in chapter four.
Chapter Four: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

To undertake research successfully, the researcher needs to be clear about the strategy for data collection, analysis method, and the associated research processes. The quality of the research often depends on how the researcher properly collects and analyses data in association with essential topics, and the process, of course, should be ethical. This chapter describes the methodology of the research by examining the establishment of a methodological framework and diverse techniques applied to the research.

The next section of the chapter begins with an explanation of the theoretical framework to explore the research topics outlined in chapter one. In so doing, the benefits of structure- and agent-centred approach will be compared and the alternative approach of Jessop and his colleagues (Jessop, Peck and Tickell, 1999) which can incorporate these two will be briefly explored. My approach is based on the alternative approach, and at the same time I seek to elaborate it by employing a combination of extensive survey and intensive case study, and a mixture of multi-scalar and cultural politics approaches.

In the thesis, the streams of detailed investigation are divided into two parts. First is to understand the outline of national and urban contexts in terms of the political
aspects in Korean cities and to inquire into the general trend of changing place marketing practices. It will be conducted in the next chapter through documentary analysis of Korean urban politics and Korean expert survey. The second part is a case study of Gwangju, South Korea. Several research methods are employed to examine a series of place marketing projects in the city. In the thesis, it will be conducted from chapter seven to nine.

The third section of the chapter outlines the detailed survey methods used in conducting in the research. Here, I will consider some issues such as response rate, the expert as an investigation object, and construction of survey items. Then, the fourth is an intensive case study. It introduces reasons why a case study is most significant in the thesis, and interview techniques for close encounter are examined. In the fifth section, the chapter briefly discuss ethical issues related to the research. Then, it concludes with a short summary of these sections.

4.2 Establishing framework

4.2.1 Dualism of structure and agency approach

Approaches of analyzing urban politics can be divided into structure- and agent-centred analyses. The former is a very macro approach with a Marxist tradition, and the latter, as examined in detail in chapter 3, is found in approaches linked with New Urban Politics, like growth machines and urban regimes. The former has been criticised for its reductionism and neglecting of extra-class components (Hall, 2006)
whilst the latter have faced criticisms since they are typically local-centred and excessively dependent upon actors’ voluntarism (Jessop et. al., 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999).

In regard to this structure-agent dualism, Jessop and his colleagues suggest the strategic-relational approach as an alternative to analyse the politics of urban growth. Basically, this approach is based on the combining of regulation theory and neo-Gramscian state theory (ibid). Jessop and his colleagues believe that the approach is very useful to overcome an antipathy about structural analysis, at the same time, retaining its emphasis on political dynamics which are working in the changing structural context, because it can explain the importance of local individual actors’ political leadership, values, and discourses (Jessop et. al., 1999; Wood, 2004). According to this approach, we can consider that individual political actors act depending upon structurally oriented reflexive calculations with their own capacities, values, and world views. Thus, the approach might enable us to understand why local actors are seemingly viewed as acting voluntarily. However, it is more important that the action context of actor’s is dependent on structurally inscribed ‘strategic selectivity’ in this approach (Wood, 2004). Hence, as Jessop et. al. argues, “These structural contexts provide more than the scenic backdrop for local growth machines to act out petty dramas – they are ‘structuring’ in complex yet significant ways (1999:148)."

4.2.2 Two approach streams of the research
Basically, this thesis agrees with the opinion of Jessop et. al. (1999) in that it suggests re-conceptualising the relationship between structure and agent in urban politics. To transcend the dualism of structure-agent (Hay and Richards, 2000; Jessop et. al., 1999; Wood, 2004), I attempt to employ Jessop’s strategic-relational approach as the theoretical ground in my research. As Jessop et. al.(1999:148) explains, on the one hand, urban political actors do possess agency, and on the other hand, they are often constrained to select their actions within the networks, meaning systems, and conditions in which they are situated. Regarding these structural forces, they indicate that “there is a general emphasis [in contemporary cities] nowadays on enhancing the role for business, a growing reliance on place marketing, rhetorics of urban entrepreneurialism, and so on (ibid:149).” They call this contextual coercive force ‘macro-necessity’ (ibid). Yet, they also acknowledge that the types and situations of city politics are different, and they name it ‘micro-diversity’. They argue that we have to investigate the relationship between macro-necessity and micro-diversity. Likewise, I think we need to dialectically consider it in a similar way to Jessop’s approach.

However, as Wood (2004:2115) suggests, it appears that there are no detailed explanations in Jessop’s alternative approach. Just, to explore the relation of macro-necessity and micro-diversity, the approach suggests the following four aspects would be closely inter-connected: 1) the structural constraints placed on actors; 2) the strategic context; 3) the strategic capacities of the various actors concerned; 4) the actual strategies and tactics they pursue (Jessop et. al., 1999:149). It is probably too difficult to consider all these aspects at one time, since this research has to
analyse a series of diverse marketing projects in Gwangju. Thus, I seek to simplify these components for analysis in the thesis. I want to approach my topics through two flows of analysis. Firstly, in order to understand the structural constraints and context placed on actors, I will examine the national and urban context and general trends of place marketing in Korean cities. It could enable us to consider the wider conditions and situational context for Korean urban politics. In the thesis, it can be achieved by examining the changing historical process of political conditions in national and urban dimensions through Korean literature of politics. Then, the general marketing tendency of Korean cities might be a superficial phenomenon. In order to identify this, extensive survey on Korean experts will be conducted in the next chapter. The second approach is to examine detailed interactions of various political actors in Gwangju politics and to consider this by dialectically linking with the broader structural constraints and context. In so doing, this research investigates the diverse interplay of political actors through case study by employing a multi-scalar and cultural politics approach. It is this very case study that my research concentrates on, and in particular, I want to focus on the interview method in the thesis.

**Why is a case study (as a qualitative method) significant?**

The thesis does not depend upon only quantity methods like surveys. Rather, in this thesis, the most important method is a case study as a qualititative one. Why is the case study more significant?
Firstly, according to Yin (1994), case study as a qualitative method has the advantage to acquire answers for questions of contemporary social phenomenon that the researcher cannot manipulate or control. In particular, case study or interview is more valid (rather than quantitative methods) for research questions of the thesis such as ‘why is there the optimistic view of place marketing in Korea’ or ‘how has place marketing policy been evolved’ because these questions are not for mere fact finding but for digging out the nature behind the phenomenon (Hoggart et al, 2002; Yin, 1994).

Secondly, qualitative methods are usually much more useful in examining political and social phenomenon based on various human power relationships while, as Hoggart and his colleagues (2002: 180) suggest, survey could only provide a ‘thin description’ of social phenomenon. The urban as the main object in the research is the place which consists of the many dynamics of individual lives and, simultaneously entails complicated, multi-dimensional political and social implications. Marketing science approaches could not identify the relationship between city place and lived experience in detail, since positive analysis tends to simplify a phenomenon by setting some limits and conditions. It might be quite difficult or, even impossible, to measure political phenomena based on power relationships such as contested marketing visions for urban development. As Bassett and his colleagues point out, “detailed case studies are useful as windows onto local governance, helping to illuminate deeper aspects of local politics and power structures” (Bassett, Griffiths and Smith, 2002:1773), case studies might enable us
to recognise such political phenomena. Further, in the aspect of analysis depth, an intensive case study of one city might be better than superficial quantitative analysis of over ten cities. The reason is that to critically scrutinize the evolving marketing of a specific city might allow us to have better understanding such as acute insight for revealing facts at their root. Hence, the case study in the research will consider the ‘depth’ more salient than the ‘width’ of the research. In doing so, the case study selected a few relevant marketing projects in Gwangju and intensively examined them through diverse methods such as documentary analysis, in-depth interviews and field visits.

**Employing scalar and cultural politics approach for case study**

Aforementioned, Jessop’s alternative approach to the politics of local growth might transcend the gap between structural and agent-centred analysis by dialectically exploring both wider contextual conditions and diverse actors’ strategic actions. In this respect, I attempt to apply it to the politics of local economic development (including place marketing policy) by suggesting a combination of multi-scalar approaches based on Jessop’s alternative perspective and cultural politics approach in my case study.

Firstly, multi-scalar approach on the basis of Jessop’s idea is needed in order to examine the inter-relationship between micro-diversity and macro-necessity and relationally understand the politics of local economic development beyond the local by linking it to the national and global. Traditionally, many political geographers have...
treated national scale as significant in general. However, in urban politics, urban scale has been usually regarded as important and its main analytical unit was urban government (Martin, McCann and Purcell, 2003). Within the arena of local politics, local political actors’ visions often have discourses or discursive frames and such discourses tend to be connected to the local scale to create certain visions for special local places (McCann, 2003). However, over the last a few decades, scale has been associated with restructuring of contemporary states in capitalist economies through the rescaling process of state and capital (Brenner, 2004; 2009; McCann, 2003). Hitherto states’ political and economic power based on a national scale has increasingly changed into a supra-national and a sub-national one (Martin et. al., 2003). This mobilisation of scales has been connected with new expressions such as ‘glocalisation (Swyngedouw, 2004)’ or ‘relativisation of scale (Jessop, 2003)’ by some authors.

Many geographers have studied how the scale is materially and discursively constructed on the basis of the discussion of social production of scale (Marston, 2000). This thesis regards the scale as a mobile context and product of power relations based on a social constructionist perspective where the scale is socially constructed rather than ontologically pre-given. As McCann (2003) points out, this perspective pays attention to the political approach in which the scales operate where they are differentiated from and contested with each other within a series of scales. Thus, Marston (2000:228) suggests, “the multiplicity of scale involved in the socio-spatial organization of capitalism also enables multiple opportunities for resistance or opportunities to create linkages across and among scales.”
From this perspective, the territorial demands of urban business’s growth politics such as place marketing, on the one hand, stimulate expansion of power, and open up diverse new scales of resisting against the power of growth politics on the other. Smith (1982) argues that there is an intrinsic contradiction in capitalist economies since capitalist production on a global scale tends to be ‘equalisation’ whilst its production frequently results in the tendency of ‘differentiation’. It might be connected with Jessop’s argument about inter-relation between micro-diversity and macro-necessity in the politics of local growth. In this respect, I seek to explore the macro context to stimulate the equalisation of cities in their pro-growth restructuring and at the same time to shed light on the local inward diversities of cities through a multi-scalar approach from the basis of Jessop’s perspective. In particular, as Smith indicates, this approach might enable us to examine the politics of the local scale emergence of resistance by various social groups against the capital-centred dominant scale in cities (ibid). In this context, the politics of scale can be political activities and processes related to the production and modification of scale to acquire power in urban politics. Here, what we have to pay attention to is the term of jumping scale. It is a strategy that is used by certain social groups to reorganise existing power relation by creating a new broader or narrower scale than the existing one within the process of power conflict. Therefore, this research seeks to multi-dimensionally examine the mobile power relations of local political actors linking the wider national and global contexts at a multi-level scale.
Secondly, why is an approach of cultural politics needed in the case study of this thesis? First, the approach might make us investigate the changing political context of place marketing with a balanced view of both material analysis and cultural one on local actors’ conflicts. Growth-first policies led by local business elites often bring about material effects such as displacement and unemployment of disadvantaged people. Furthermore, pro-growth marketing policies also tend to be implemented by discursive language and rhetoric. Thus, the cultural politics approach can help us to interpret the nature of discursive frames and their related political conflicts by analysing meanings of political agents’ actions and languages. As Jonas and Wilson suggest,

“[P]olitical agendas [of local economic growth] always become activated through constellations of representations about people, places, and processes that circulate through daily life. People come to understand the world of growth – its prospects, possibilities, who gains, who loses – through significations rather than by interacting with a ‘brute reality’, debunking the notion of an always revealing preinterpreted reality (1999:8).”

Particularly, the approach is useful to deeply understand the conflicting actors’ world view and ideologies by analytically comparing them.

The second merit of a cultural politics approach is that it enables us to reveal the role of non-elitist or marginalised perspectives in the politics of place marketing, since analyses of different meanings (including human attachments to ideal images about certain places) highlight a terrain of contradiction, tension and difference in urban development politics (Martin, McCann and Purcell, 2003:114). In contrast with this,
the approach of urban growth politics such as growth machines or urban regimes might have some benefits in exploring the role of city elites in the politics of place marketing. But in this approach, “because the focus of attention is on the elites, the significance is likely to be understated, and – at best – they may be incorporated as spear carriers for locally dependent business (Cochrane, 1999:118).” However, the process of place-making in local economic development, as McCann (2003:396) suggests, tends to be associated with the daily life of people who are situated outside of the policy process which is led by dominant elites, and it frequently raises conflicting political issues of meaning-making between elites and non-elite people. Therefore, this politics of urban economic development (including place marketing) cannot be explained as only pro-growth policies led by city elites as it is often mutated or as abandoned by the opposition or resistance of other civic groups and people who have different meanings.

Thus, as seen in Figure 4.1, the case study of the thesis seeks to analyse the process of place marketing policy by employing multi-scalar analysis based upon Jessop’s idea (which transcends the structure-agent dualism) and cultural politics analysis. This approach will regard city government, business, and citizen as key actors, and it will describe and analyse their interactions. It will also examine the process of tension, conflict and co-ordination in detail. This provides the broad methodological context and I will now turn to examine the specific method used within the thesis.
Figure 4.1 A conceptual framework for PM (Place Marketing) case study
4.3 Extensive expert survey

4.3.1 Types and methods of survey

The questionnaire survey can take a number of forms. There are usually five types of survey that are frequently employed by human geographers (Gray and Guppy, 1994): the personal survey, the intercept survey, the postal survey, the telephone survey and, the online survey. The questionnaire surveys can be either oral or written. In the thesis, an email survey of Korean policy-makers and experts was adopted as a variety of the postal survey, especially when by considering time and cost. As shown in Table 4.1, the advantages and disadvantages of adopting an email survey method were carefully deliberated. Despite their high response rates, the personal survey was not employed in this study, since it would have necessitated heavy travel and time costs. Moreover, the potential of ‘interviewer effect’ (respondents often express their opinions differently according to interviewer) was also considered in not selecting a face-to-face survey method (Hoggart et al, 2002).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quickness</td>
<td>Relatively low response rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low cost</td>
<td>Sample limitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Easy to send and reply</td>
<td>Concern of spam mail</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 hours use (no time differential)</td>
<td>Easy rejection</td>
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<tr>
<td>No ‘interviewer effect’</td>
<td>No list of mail address</td>
</tr>
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[I made this table by revising some source. (Source: A Literature Review on the Email Survey Response. Kim, J.H., Ryu, J.H. 2002. Study and Research)]
4.3.2 Some issues in survey

**Raising response rate**

However, as many authors note, the biggest disadvantage of a post or mail survey is usually low response or non-response (Hoggart et al., 2002; Millington, 2002; Sheehan, 2001). Although some authors claim that there is no evidence that research with a lower response is less valid than a study with a higher one (Krosnick, 1999), an appropriate level of response rate is required in survey research since too low a response of a sample might result in poor representation of that population.

Thus, in order to raise the response rate of the email survey, a number of measures were attempted in the study. Firstly, I sought to express my special attention to all respondents in the process of survey. Hence, I did not send a blanket email to all the sample population at the same time. Instead, I sent an email to each of them reflecting their individual status and characteristics. This personalisation could counter classifying the mail as spam and enables respondents to feel the belief in the researcher (Kim and Ryu, 2002). Secondly, I tried to give them sense of the importance of the research since many commentators regard it as a significant incentive for respondents (Hoggart et al, 2002). I persuaded them by writing that this study was very scarce and valuable in this field. Thirdly, the fact that the success of this investigation might depend on the response rate was also written in the email. In doing so, I recommended indirectly the active participation of respondents. Fourthly, I treated respondents as high level experts as much as possible and sometimes I expressed respect for their career or qualification. This might enable them to feel a
sense of pride as experts. Fifthly, in general, follow-up mails could increase the response rate (Millington, 2002). Thus, I sent a reminder mail to non-respondents asking for their eager participation of the research before a 5 day deadline.

**Expert as sample population**

In the study, the sample population was a set of experts rather than the general population. However, on the whole, if we seek to make data from a survey easy to analyse, we would be better to design a survey study to focus on collecting less complicated and factual materials (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). One of the aims of the thesis is to examine general trends of Korean urban place marketing and its evolution.

However, this might be too difficult for the general population to describe since they usually have no interest in it, while expert groups might be sensitive to the changes of place marketing policy and commonly have special interest about them. In addition, it might be difficult for normal people to clearly understand place marketing policies, since the introduction and implementation of such policies are relatively more recent. In the study, many points that should be identified through the survey might also be comfortable only for professionals who deal with and study place marketing strategies. Hence, the experts of place marketing as a sample population were selected in the research, even though they have some limitations of representing the whole population. To examine groups with more accurate understanding and information about Korean place marketing might increase the validity and reliability of the study results.
Designing a questionnaire: identifying general trends

As already noted, the primary purpose of survey study is to recognise the general features of Korean urban place marketing and its evolutionary process (including policy transfer from advanced cities) in the thesis. The key advantage of the survey method is to identify general trends. Thus, to make survey results more useful, they should express an overall tendency of social phenomena. Despite its capacity of obtaining more information, an excessively complicated questionnaire is often not helpful in emphasising the strengths of a survey method. Therefore, special attention was paid to the process of questionnaire design in order to maximise such advantage. Relatively simple questionnaire items such as closed questions usually were employed in the survey. In particular, multiple choice and scaling questions were often used because many people tend to feel them easily due to frequent encounters. Although points that I want to find in the study might have some expertise, I sought to simplify the response of place marketing specialists through the structured questionnaire. The reason is that the objective of the study is to identify experts’ common views on the characteristics and evolution of Korean place marketing and the current situation of its transfer rather than to investigate whole opinions of Korean professionals. Many questionnaire studies tend to mix descriptive and analytical questions (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). However, I did not do so in the survey. Descriptive questions were used in the study. As already mentioned, the investigative focus of the research is identifying current trends and situations in South Korea. Thus, as seen in Table 4.2, the survey questionnaire usually employed questions that tell us ‘what’ rather than ‘why’.
As also seen in Table 4.2, the questionnaire items are divided into four parts and the total number of question is 28 (including background questions about respondents). The first part is to investigate the cultural aspects of evolving place marketing. Questions on preferable marketing tools, important background to the emergence of place marketing and the primary purpose of place marketing were set in this part. To examine the changes of place marketing in a cultural respect, questions on the concern for and utilisation of cultural tools within urban place marketing, the relationship between place marketing and cultural tools, and the change of the concept of culture within place marketing. The second is to identify the evolution of place marketing from the aspects of the politics. In this part, questionnaires consist of asking about the influential actors, the changing role of central government, city government and partnership organisations within urban place marketing, the degree of citizens' participation and the most celebrated marketing activities by citizens. The third is about the transfer of place marketing policy. Sources of policy ideas, the need, frequency and effect of application of other countries' policies in place marketing were asked. In this part, questions such as which country is usually examined, what parts are most helpful to Korean cities, what is the most difficult thing in the application of another country's policy and the experience of visiting Western cities were placed. In addition, questions on whether they have any experience of hearing about the failure of case in Western or Japanese place marketing and formally introducing it were included. Then, the last part is composed of background questions about respondents like their occupation, years working, career field and level of degree. The results of the survey of Korean experts will be considered in chapter 6.
### Table 4.2 Structure of survey questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part (question numbers)</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Question type&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General features and cultural aspects of Korean place marketing (7)</td>
<td>Change of preferable marketing tool</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Background to the emergence of place marketing</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change of primary purpose of place marketing</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concern for cultural tools within place marketing</td>
<td>Scaling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Utilisation of cultural tools within place marketing</td>
<td>Scaling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relationship between place marketing and cultural tools</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change of the concept of culture</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political aspects of Korean place marketing (6)</td>
<td>Most influential actor within place marketing</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change of role of central government</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change of role of city government</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change of role of partnership</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of citizen’s participation</td>
<td>Scaling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change of most celebrated marketing activity by citizens</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of place marketing policy into Korea and the problem of Korean place marketing (11)</td>
<td>Sources of place marketing policy idea</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need for application of another country’s policy</td>
<td>Scaling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency of application of another country’s policy</td>
<td>Scaling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effect of application of another country’s policy</td>
<td>Scaling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Which countries’ marketing is usually examined</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Which parts are most helpful to Korean cities</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difficulty in the application of another country’s policy</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experience of visiting western cities</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experience of hearing failure of western marketing</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experience of introducing or indicating failure of western marketing</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Biggest problem of Korean place marketing</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background questions about respondents (4)</td>
<td>Occupation, working year, career field and level of degree</td>
<td>Choice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Korean expert survey)

---

<sup>3</sup> Choice is a multiple choice question which requires the selection of one or two answers among 2-8 answers and scaling means a question which expresses the degree along 5 scales in the thesis.
4.3.3 Conducting a nationwide Korean expert survey

The implementing procedure of survey research includes four stages: i) sampling Korean experts, ii) making a questionnaire draft, iii) piloting the questionnaire, iv) confirming the final questionnaire, and v) implementing the final survey. In this section, I consider sampling, piloting, and implementing the final survey as key procedures in turn.

**Sampling**

There are a number of sampling methods in social sciences. However, the usually employed methods in human geography are judgemental, snowball, quota and random sampling (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). Judgemental sampling was employed in the research, since the study is targeting Korean experts whose number is very limited.

However, such sampling might have a few limits, despite its capability of gathering high level expertise and relatively thoughtful description. If the number of the sample is too small or the sample population represents specific groups, it might reflect only a restricted representation of the whole population. Thus, various attempts to counter such a possibility were made in the study. Many efforts to make the sample size bigger were put into the research by gaining more expert lists. In addition, a larger geographical area from where the survey sample population comes might be relatively comparable with the whole population (Hoggart et al., 2002). To do this, the
list of national experts on place marketing and urban regeneration was collected through a number of routes. Firstly, the experts name list of urban regeneration policy was collected from the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime affairs (MLTM), for whom I work. Secondly, the expert list on culture-led regeneration was gathered from the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST). Thirdly, practical professionals in urban policy and place marketing were identified from the biggest public agency in Korea - the Korea Land and Housing Corporation (LH). Fourthly, related names of private marketing professionals were acquired from companies with whom I worked several years ago. Finally, other current lists of central and local public officials were collected from the internet (homepages of governments). However, some contacts were not clear in their phone number and email address. Thus, such lists were deleted, and the total number of names on the list of experts was 102. These almost cover both the practitioners and researchers who are experts in urban place marketing in South Korea.

However, there were a few items which were needed to be considered in terms of the representation of the sample list. First is the allocation of occupationally balanced professionals. The top sub-group of the population sample was ‘professors’ and the bottom was ‘agency members’. In other words, these lists were not balanced in occupation. Thus, sub-sample groups were re-allocated in order to make informants more representative. In this process, many names of professor were filtered. In selection, priorities lay on professors whom have practical experiences like being a committee member in urban place marketing or regeneration policy. Despite having such experience, the list of engineering professors who might relatively have less
interest in place marketing policy was removed. The second point in sampling the list was geographical representation. Too many names of experts were from the Seoul metropolitan region (including Seoul). To secure a more representative sample population geographically, the list was reduced in size to balance SMR\(^4\) and non-SMR respondents. A serious gap between the SMR and the non-SMR area is one of the biggest problems in Korea. However, the centralisation of experts to SMR area in urban place marketing might be natural in Korea. In addition, there was another imbalance of population between local cities within the non-SMR area. Under such intrinsic unevenness, strictly coercive sampling in terms of geography might not represent whole population. In the national allocation of the sample population, the balance between the SMR and the non-SMR could be more sensible than the balance in all provincial areas. Thus, a half of the expert lists were distributed in each the SMR and the non-SMR since the distribution of the whole population was similar to this. All sample groups (five occupational groups: professors, institute researchers, public officials, agency people and marketing company workers) were sets of 10 through these a little complicated allotments and their geographical distribution was 25 to each of the areas (SMR and non-SMR).

So far, a series of procedures from the examination of the need of survey method to designing the survey study has been described. Additional implementation of the survey and analysis its results should follow this process. Due to the great content of them, however, the rest of the procedures such as piloting and establishing the questionnaire and analysing findings will be suggested in the next chapter.

\(^4\) SMR denotes Seoul Metropolitan Region which means the area of Seoul and its surrounding in Korea.
Piloting and confirming the questionnaire

Why do I need a pilot study in the survey? Concerning this, Hoggart and his colleagues (2002) explain that it could help a researcher to check the effectiveness and credibility of an instrument in the survey. Fink and Kosecoff (1985:1998, cited in Hoggart et al., 2002: 181-182) suggest useful guidelines for a survey pilot as follows: firstly, ‘the researcher should try to anticipate the circumstances under which the survey will be conducted and make plans to handle them,’ secondly, ‘select pilot informants who will be similar to those in the full survey.’

Thus, drawing on such guidelines, I conducted a pilot of the survey draft questionnaire to 5 Korean experts (non-participants for the full survey) on place marketing policy during 7 days from 11th February to 17th in 2011 (see Table 4.3). Through this process, I tried to find out the problems of the draft questionnaire and adjust them for better effect in the real survey.

Table 4.3 Survey research schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparing questionnaire draft</td>
<td>November 2010 ~ January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piloting the questionnaire</td>
<td>11(^{th}) February 2011 ~ 17(^{th}) February 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5 people, 7 days)</td>
<td>18(^{th}) February 2011 ~ 21th February 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amending the questionnaire</td>
<td>22(^{nd}) February 2011 ~ 2(^{nd}) March 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3 days)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing survey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(50 people, 9 days)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to increase the validity and reliability of the questionnaire, according to Kitchin and Tate’s (2000:53) recommendation for pilot tests, emphasis for examination was laid on the following six points in pilot study: first, the clarity and interpretation of questions; the difficulty of response; the appropriate number of questions; the right sequence and structure of the questionnaire; the pattern of the questionnaire; the length of completion time.

Regarding these check points, a number of opinions suggested by pilot informants were reflected in the final questionnaire. Firstly, some obscure words in draft questions were replaced by more clear expressions. In addition, ambiguous parts were deleted for more clarity. Complicated questions with dual inquiry in a sentence were divided into two questions. Secondly, in order to avoid the difficulty of making a response, a couple of questions indicated by informants as difficult to answer were erased. According to the pilot respondents’ proposals, a brief description on the definition, main instruments and examples of place marketing (one of common views in Korea) were added into the questionnaire in an attempt to help respondents’ understanding. However, a comment that such explanation was not relevant to my opinion was included. Thirdly, the draft questionnaire consisted of 28 questions and all pilot informants judged it appropriate. After the pilot test, although some questions were removed or added, the number of questions in the final questionnaire was the same as 28. Fourthly, one of the pilot respondents noted the need for adjusting the order of some questions. Reflecting his proposal in the survey questionnaire, they were logically arranged. Fifthly, there was an indication that the questionnaire was
likely to be lacking a few questions\(^5\) on policy transfer and respondent background. Thus, I complemented the questionnaire just as they propose. Sixthly, most reports at the pilot test were satisfied with the necessary time (approximately 20 minutes) for answering. Finally, after the correction of some miswritten words, the questionnaire was confirmed.

**Implementing the final survey**

Each place marketing expert in Korea, as respondents of the full survey identified, was sent the final questionnaire 22\(^{nd}\) February 2011. They were given 9 days to respond (see the detailed survey schedule in Table 4.3). The questionnaire was made into two versions (MS word and Hangul word processor programme\(^6\)), since it would be a responding vehicle for Korean experts. As discussed in the previous section, non-respondents were sent a second email 5 days before the deadline in order to raise the response rate. Most replies arrived back with in 6 days of sending the questionnaire.

There were no illegible and insincere replies and enough to select as a valid response. However, one report was rejected as a valid survey response as it was received beyond the time of the deadline which I had promised to keep as the term of collecting replies on the questionnaire. 36 respondents of 50 submitted their

\(^5\) One of the informants at the pilot test recommended a few questions about whether Korean experts had heard any example of failure of western city marketing and they had experience to formally introduce or discuss them. Another reporter demanded an additional background question about the final respondent’s career field in order to identify their expertise area.

\(^6\) A number of Koreans often use the Hangul word programme which is produced by a Korean company (Hangul and Computer Ltd) instead of MS word in Korea.
answers to me, and thus, the final response rate was 68% (see Table 4.2), which is very high for a postal email survey.

Table 4.4 Response rates by sample population groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample group</th>
<th>No. of returns</th>
<th>Response rate(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>7(10)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute researchers</td>
<td>9(10)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public officials</td>
<td>7(10)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency people</td>
<td>6(10)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City marketing company people</td>
<td>5(10)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34(50)</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Korean expert survey)

4.4 Intensive case study

4.4.1 Selection of case city

In this research, as already suggested, the evolutionary process of place marketing in South Korea will be examined through the case study of Gwangju. The city has held the Gwangju Biennale which has spent the largest money for an art event in South Korea since 1995. In addition, Gwangju was the first in creating a city marketing bureau in the country and the city authorities have implemented active policies such as attracting firms (Samsung electricity and Kia motors) and hosting mega-sports events (The 88th National Sports Festival, 2015 Summer Gwangju Universiade). As a result, they won the first prize for city marketing from the KMMA (Korean Marketing Management Association) in 2007. Thus, Gwangju presents an
interesting case of a Korean city which has applied urban place marketing examples across the last twenty years.

4.4.2 Methods of case study

This case study has been chosen in the thesis in order to analyse the evolving process of urban place marketing. Case studies can often be conducted by using only official information such as published and documentary\(^7\) data. However, a range of diverse methods were used in the thesis. As Hoggart and his colleagues (2002:92) point out, even ‘seemingly objective’ formal statistics are often socially structured by reflecting their producer’s value and mindset. Thus, concentrating on formally published data might impose some limit in investigating the true story of events. In addition, research questions of the thesis involved the social and political context of policies which were selected and implemented.

Thus, in this thesis, three forms of research methods were employed together for collecting data for the case study: related literature and documentary analysis (including newspaper articles and informal publications), face-to-face in-depth interviews with key persons, and observation, including data from related organisation’s internet homepages and photos of project sites. This qualitative and intensive case study which mixed various methods might enable us to observe and understand the detailed process of place marketing policy and related events.

\(^7\) Here, according to Yin (1994)’s opinion, documentary data usually include administrative reports, official proposals, announcements, minutes of formal meetings and newspaper articles.
4.4.3 The importance of interviews for a close encounter

One of most important things for the case study in this thesis is the intensive interview. The interview was conducted not as a quantitative one to collect superficial or general information, for instance by using a completely structured questionnaire, but a qualitative one to help deeply understand the context of social behaviours within place marketing policy. Patton (1990:196 cited in Lee 2010:43) reminds us of the importance of interview as a qualitative method stating that “We interview people to find out from them those things we cannot directly observe….. The purpose of interviewing, then, is to allow us enter into the other person’s perspective.” Although some critics indicate the weakness of the interview method such as researchers’ prejudice, subjectivity and credibility, the method could be appropriate for finding out meanings and implications of such behaviours (Hoggart, Lees, and Davies, 2002). In particular, as Hoggart (ibid) and his colleagues point out, the intensive interview could be more valid to reveal complex relationships or gradually evolving events.

The selection of participants is very important for an intensive interview since researchers need to have conversations with the appropriate people who have experiences in connection with research topics (Polkinghorne, 2005). Thus, I chose 18 key people as my interviewees belonging to organisations and groups deeply involved in my topics (see Table 4.5). They provided me with a vivid and valuable description about Gwangju place marketing projects, and as a result their vigourous explanations allowed me to gain deeper understanding and more detailed
appreciation about the projects beyond superficial knowledge of formal information sources.

Table 4.5 Key group’s participants for my interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant</th>
<th>date</th>
<th>venue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MLTM (Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs)</td>
<td>6th Sep 2011</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCST (Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism)</td>
<td>8th Sep 2011</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju City Government (Tourism Promotion Div.)</td>
<td>9th Sep 2011</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju PBC</td>
<td>13th Sep 2011</td>
<td>House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biennale Foundation</td>
<td>14th Sep 2011</td>
<td>Cafe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju Dream Newspaper(2 person)</td>
<td>15th Sep 2011</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>16th Sep 2011</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseball Stadium Civic Committee</td>
<td>16th Sep 2011</td>
<td>Research room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju City Government (2 person, Sports Promotion Div.)</td>
<td>19th Sep 2011</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju City Government (Urban Design Div.)</td>
<td>20th Sep 2011</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju City Councillor</td>
<td>21st Sep 2011</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.18(Gwangju Democratisation Movement) Bereaved Family (2 person)</td>
<td>23rd Sep 2011</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Government (Cultural Policy Planning Div.)</td>
<td>5th Oct 2011</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju Minyechong (Artist Group)</td>
<td>14th Oct 2011</td>
<td>Gallery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice</td>
<td>18th Oct 2011</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source : Interview Data)

As Weiss (1994) argues, one critical point for productive interviewing is to establish a collaborative partnership between researcher and informants. The reason is that an interview is formed by social interaction and communication between them (Dunn, 2005; Hoggart et al., 2002). Weiss (ibid) emphasises the importance of a research
partnership, which enables them (the researcher and respondents) to keep a sustainable relationship which can lead to good study performance.

In order to build a good partnership, a couple of measures were taken in this research. First is the use of a consent form. It included the title of the project, the aim of study, the procedures of using interview, and observance of university ethical guidelines related to research informants. In particular, words about observing university ethical advice might enable informants to feel at ease to answer and encourage them to give more candid responses. Secondly, a brief explanation of how participants had been recruited was served before getting started with the interviews. It might increase the informants’ belief in the researcher. In general, as respondents tend to be curious about the procedure of their engagement with the study, the investigator needs to resolve such curiosity.

Getting the most from an interview usually requires from respondents’ a vigorous attitude. In other words, to make intensive and productive interviews, the interviewer needs to help the interviewee’s willingness to comment on their experiences. Thus, to encourage interviewees in the research some careful considerations were given to the interviews.

Firstly, more motivated interviewees (of key people appropriate for this research), who felt my study would be worthwhile project, were selected. Those who had little time or no readiness to participate in the study were eliminated. Priorities lay on

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8 For example, it includes that the researcher will strictly observe the University ethical guidelines to protect informant’s confidentiality and privacy.
people who felt enthusiasm for participating or, at least, precisely understood the aims of the study.

Secondly, places with which interviewees felt comfortable were chosen (see Table 4.5). To make a close encounter between the investigator and respondents, spaces that interviewees prefer were chosen. Noisy places where the interviewer and interviewee could not concentrate on their dialogue were excluded.

Thirdly, to keep the basic structure and focus of the interview, semi-structured or informal conversational interviews were conducted. According to Dunn (2005)’s recommendation in which an interview (or question) schedule is advisable for a first-time interviewer, carefully worded interview schedules were used in interviews. When needed to gain more depth, regardless of prepared ‘question routes’ (Krueger, 1994 Cited in ibid), eliciting questions which draw and extend respondent’s further experiences were actively conducted.

Fourthly, according to interviewee reaction, flexibility was given to the length of interview. Interview time usually was over an hour. Whenever the respondent showed willingness to add comments or explain something, it exceeded the expected time.

Finally, each interview was carefully prepared to prevent potential errors, specifically by remembering common mistakes which are suggested by Kitchin and Tate (2000, see Table 4.6).
Table 4.6 Common interviewing mistakes

- Failing to listen carefully.
- Repeating the questions.
- Helping the interviewee to give an answer (e.g., ‘You mean like when …’).
- Asking vague questions and insensitive questions.
- Failing to judge an answer.
- Failing to explore an interesting answer.
- Asking leading questions (e.g., ‘Do you not think that …’).
- Letting the interview go on too long.
- Boring the interviewee.
- Failing to adequately record the interview.

(Source: Kitchin and Tate, 2000:217)

4.4.4 Analysing the interview data

The analysing procedure of interview data in this thesis includes three main stages: i) transcription, ii) coding, and iii) selection of quotes for the thesis.

All recorded interview data were fully transcribed in Korean language. Then, some of them were translated into English when it is quoted. In the analysis of interview information, the most important procedure was a coding. Coding is an established basic analytic process in qualitative research to aid researchers in dealing with huge raw data into meaningful units (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Millington, 2002). As Cope (2005) points out, the coding in this research was very useful since it enabled me to easily index, analyse data and build a conceptual structure by reducing and organising large amounts of textual information.
Drawing on some ideas of grounded theory (see Corbin and Strauss, 1990), I divided the coding process of this research into two stages. The first step was open coding, which was the categorising process by breaking down and labelling data (ibid). For example, I categorised lots of meaningful units from interview transcripts by labelling words or phrases such as city image, Gwangju Democratisation Movement, city tourism, art festival, landmark, and urban design. Then, the next was axial and selective coding (ibid). At this stage, I classified categories and unified them around core category (e.g. background, conflict, vision, meaning and neo-liberalisation), and also explored structures and processes between categories (including sub-categories) in association with research questions of my thesis. In this process, I examined the reasons and processes of interactions between political actors of Gwangju marketing projects, which enabled me to make an abstraction of the evolution of place marketing at a higher level.

Many quotes in this thesis were used to support my key arguments and interpretations about Gwangju and Korean place marketing. By employing them, I was able to illuminate interviewees’ experiences, ultimately which led to illustrating my conceptual ideas of the evolution of place marketing.

4.5 Keeping some ethical issues in mind

Qualitative research typically tends to inter-relate between society, the researcher, and the research project (Dowling, 2005). For instance, in the case of an interview,
the behaviour of interviewing may influence the interviewee’s personal daily schedule. In addition, after the completion of the research, the result of the interview (including interviewee’s name and personal data) can be released to the public, and it might lead to the interviewee’s disadvantage. Or by contrast, research findings might contribute to societal development by communicating with related organisations. Thus, research behaviours of social science (in particular, qualitative research such as interview) can be associated with socially ethical issues in the process of its design and conduct. This research also employed such methods of social science. For example, interviews as qualitative research on politicians, public officials, news presspeople and residents were conducted in Gwangju of South Korea.

Thus, this thesis sought to attentively conduct the application of such research methods reminding some ethical points of the present research. The university ethical guidelines are closely followed in the process of the whole research. Drawing on Dowling (2005:20-22), in particular, the following three points were focused on: protecting the informants’ privacy and confidentiality; informed consent; preventing harmful activities for the investigator and informants.

**Protecting informant’s privacy and confidentiality**

Huge attention was paid to data from not only survey responses but also interview results. Firstly, all survey answers were received by email and then saved in my
personal computer with passwords in order not to be exposed to other people. After completing an analysis of them, I deleted all data with personal names. Likewise, all interview sound files and transcripts were saved with none of the informants’ personal information such as their names and positions. All interview data was anonymised and it has been identified only by its identification code. Through my thesis, such personal information of all interview informants is never open in order to protect their privacy and confidentiality. In the thesis, only the informants’ organisation is exposed since it enables us to understand the diverse actors’ interactions and conflicts.

**Pre-informed consent**

I identified whether all research participants wanted to take part in my study through email and formal research consents (see Appendix 1). The research consent form includes the topic, purpose and, procedures of the study. Whenever some of my informants asked for additional explanation of my study, I sincerely provided them with more depth about my intention and process of research. I distributed and collected research consent forms to all interviewees. All consents were safely kept in my personal desk which has completely no risk in being exposed. After the final completion of my study, I will delete all raw data to thoroughly protect my informants.

**Avoiding harmful activities to research participants**

This thesis might have some critical content on place marketing policy (particularly, in the case of Gwangju in South Korea). Thus, I thoroughly paid attention to
protecting my informants in order not to place any negative effects on the research participants.

4.6 Summary

This chapter started with establishing a framework for study. The research has two streams of approach. The first approach is to examine the wider and general political context of Korean urban politics through literature analysis on Korean politics and to identify general trends of Korean place marketing by a Korean nationwide expert survey. The second is to dialectically understand Gwangju place marketing through a case study by a framework combining multi-scalar analysis based on Jessop’s alternative approach about urban growth politics and cultural politics approach. It might allow us to deeply understand the political evolution of Gwangju marketing beyond the dualism of structure and agent urban political theories. In addition, it probably enables us to interpret the nature of political actors’ actions, discourses and language about place marketing projects within their contesting and conflicting political interactions. The third section of this chapter examined issues about the conducting of a survey such as raising the response rate, selecting experts, and constructing survey questions. Then, in the next section, we recognised the significance of case study in the thesis and examined the importance of the intensive interview for close encounter. In the final section, we examined several ethical issues like protecting research participant’s privacy and confidentiality, pre-informed
consent, and avoiding harmful activities to informants. As noted, we consider how this research was fully prepared and conducted to prevent ethical problems.
Chapter Five: Documentary Analysis on the Evolution of Place Marketing in the Korean Context

5.1 Introduction

We have politically examined the evolution of place marketing policy by focusing on that of advanced Western cities and attempted to establish the methodology for the study. In this chapter, we attempt to move our attention to the analyses of evolving policy context of Korean place marketing as the start of the empirical work. In other words, I will critically analyse the Korean place marketing within the Korean (non-Western) context since Korean cities have evolved in different political and economic situations and conditions. To do this, this section will discuss: 1) concerns about a marketing science approach, 2) Korean prejudice on place marketing in advanced cities, 3) possibility of evolving place marketing by policy transfer, and 4) applying limits of local-centred political theories to South Korea within the non-Western context.

5.2 Concerns about a marketing science approach

A marketing science approach has some limits in that it cannot investigate human relation networks in depth. In particular, it is difficult for social, economic and political relations between a number of actors and stakeholders and the engaged changing
process of place marketing strategy to be understood by the approach within an arena of urban politics and policy. Rather, there might be a little concern that duplication of place among cities tends to be easier under this approach. This is basically because of its product-centric marketing. The product-centric approach which usually depends on a reductionist method can show some big weaknesses for drawing out cultural values and identities, due to its excessive simplification and forging an authenticity, while it has advantages for enhancing the promotional message (Murray, 2001). The reductionist method is to simplify and reduce a complicated phenomenon. However, if a city marketer relies on the approach, diverse and multi-faceted qualities of place can be damaged. Thus, city marketing, based on the approach, might badly affect the evolution of itself. In this respect, Harvey (1989) argues as follows:

“Many of the innovations and investments designed to make particular cities more attractive as cultural and consumer centres have quickly been imitated elsewhere, thus rendering any competitive advantage within a system of cities ephemeral (Harvey, 1989: 12).”

If Harvey’s indication is right, the value and effect of place marketing will inevitably decrease in urban policy. Moreover, it is problematic that the contribution of marketing science to urban place marketing resulting in the rapid diffusion of place imitation might be quite little in practice. Particularly in Korean cities, city authorities tend to heavily rely on marketing agencies which usually deal with corporate marketing and branding (Lee, 2008).
Even though examined in terms of place branding, there are also similar limits. As more and more cities use logos and slogans based on corporate branding techniques and skills, they might understand the narrowness of branding strategy. Externally, short bland words for city branding are restricted and a pool of symbolic logos which the human can memorise is also confined (Julier, 2005). Concerning this, it is not difficult to find examples in South Korea. For instance, ‘Happy Suwon’ and ‘Happy 700’ (Pyeongchang) are similar. ‘Your Partner Gwangju’ (this is the slogan of Gwangju, case city in the thesis), ‘Your World Yeongwol’ and ‘Your Okcheon’ are also alike. In addition, ‘Yes! Uiwang’ and ‘Yes Gumi’ are the same, and ‘Gimhae for you’ and ‘Ulsan for you’ are almost the same. Thus, as Harvey indicates, if every city depends on urban place marketing based on marketing science, the effect of place marketing may be ephemeral. As a large amount of duplication of places and brand values is wide spread, the principle of manipulation for homogeneous space and image already works in contemporary cities. Place marketing and branding armed with marketing science skills could make urban practitioners strongly feel like copying other famous cases.

In addition, the thesis has huge concern about the expansion of the market-mind in urban management. Just from a perspective of marketability, the humanistic meaning and value of various activities in our daily life such as sweat, pain and impression might be covered over or removed with programmed manipulation of image and brand. Then, only fictitious images from the view of marketing might be left in the real world, ultimately they can shape a ‘hyper-real’ place where the boundary between the ‘real’ and the ‘simulacrum’ is blurred (Baudrillard, 1983;
Goodwin, 1993). Under such an environment, while some consumers backed up by abundant money to spend and a small number of the well-paid knowledge-workers in high-tech and creative sector are treated better, the majority of others such as disadvantaged people might be disregarded in the process of scientific and managerial city marketing (Boisen, 2007).

There are a few more concerning phenomena in place branding. Firstly, it is its holistic approach by the top-down method. Actually, a holistic approach might not be necessarily bad. However, a serious problem in place branding is its top-down approach which seeks to manage an extreme variety of city spaces and residents’ activities for only one place brand or identity. It has a risk of the uniformity for many components in a city. As Bitterman (2008:249) says, “[p]aradoxically place brands ultimately suppress rather than encourage multiplicity and choice.” Extremely uniform and controlling policies for places, architecture and human behaviours by the top-down approach in place branding, as Hagen and Ostergen (2006) criticises in the case of Nuremberg of Nazi Germany, might be a tool only for celebrating and advertising the current political regime and its leaders. In this respect, sometimes cultures and histories, for place marketing or branding, might be thoroughly manufactured just for a political purpose.

Secondly, as shown in Anholt’s brand index, which is a ranking of cities based on city brand value, it could probably intensify the inter-city competition. In association with this phenomenon, McCann’s study (2004) is full of suggestions. He analyses that the effect of ranking announcements in popular publications such as ‘Money’
and ‘Fortune’ on urban growth coalitions in US cities. He argues that such rankings strongly affect the activities of local business and political leaders. Moreover, he also indicates that urban economic and political elites are making urban policies which are dependent on the evaluating criteria of powerful media, and in the process of making policies, there is little room for considering other alternatives or counterproposals. Similarly, these problems might be applied to place branding. For example, the Local Brand Competitiveness Index created by one of popular media in South Korea (Jungang Daily Newspaper) and a private group (Korean Local Brand Forum) has ranked every regional and local brand in South Korea since 2009. A number of cities and the mass media are increasingly paying attention to this ranking. If the competition for ranking between cities is intensified further, priorities of urban policy might also be uniform as they copy best practice in South Korea.

If cities seek to pursue a unique marketing which is different from marketing science ones, at first, they should explore something locally cultural and distinctive. Places which we live in do not exist only with physical architecture and landscape: places of cities lie in the social and political interaction and relational network of the human (Lefebvre, 1974). According to his opinion, urban places for everyday life might be social and political rather than scientific not related to ideology or politics.

In this respect, Goodwin (1993:150) indicates that all meaning of city places for residents are not congruent with that of a city manager or marketer through the following examples. “A closed steel works, or an abandoned dockyard, means something completely different to a redundant worker than it does to a property
developer or to a local politician.” Neo-liberal activities for the production and domination of space could deeply affect citizens’ daily life. In addition, as Paddison (1993) notes, marketing projects tend to emphasise positive images, intentionally excluding negative ones. Place-making often expresses the features of cultural politics involving conflicts among different groups, due to their conflicting intentions and meanings for place-making, within the process of selection and exclusion of such place marketing policy (McCann, 2002). Thus, as examined in the previous section, many changes resulting from urban place marketing policies and flagship projects such as increasing spatial polarisation, disadvantage groups’ alienation and blurred city identities can be recognised only by the political and cultural approach to urban places. As Bianchini and Ghilardi (2007:6) point out, place marketing and branding policies based on marketing science should be “seen as a truly creative rather than mechanical, formulaic processes.” City marketers and policy makers need more political efforts to discuss and coordinate conflicting interests in the process of making and implementing place marketing policy. Moreover, they should consider city places as cultural and daily spaces filled with residents’ needs, desires and emotions in order to have them feel a high cultural quality of life. However, due to lack of this approach in the literature of marketing science approaches, despite its advantage of rapid dispersion of forging a contrived sense of place and values, it is likely to present little help for developing the creative evolution of place marketing policy.

5.3 Korean prejudice on place marketing in advanced cities
As observed in the previous chapters (2.3.4), it took only 10 years for approximately 1,100 local cultural festivals to be held annually in Korean cities after the introduction of place marketing. In recent years, most Korean city authorities have earnestly imported place marketing policies without critical analysis under the reckless belief that they will guarantee success. Thus, there seems a firm belief that place marketing will lead to successful urban growth and wealth. In particular, it is no wonder that place marketing and branding is almost taken as common sense among Korean city leaders and urban policy practitioners. Why has inter-urban competition of a western-centric view of place marketing between cities been so popular since the late 1990s? What makes it considered as the ‘only alternative’ for local economic development or a ‘panacea’ for a variety of urban ills?

Regarding this passion of Korean city leaders and policy makers for place marketing, Harvey’s (2005) argument about the problems of neo-liberalism presents a keen insight to us in his book, ‘A Brief History of Neo-liberalisation’. He suggests two reasons about ‘why neo-liberalisation has been so successful’ even though it has showed us (ibid:156) a poor outcome in terms of overall economic growth and social welfare in the world. First is “the fact that ‘success’ was to be had somewhere obscured the fact that neo-liberalisation was generally failing to stimulate growth or improve well-being. Secondly, neo-liberalisation….. has been a huge success from the standpoint of the upper classes (ibid).” He also indicates that media dominated by ruling class interests have consistently diffused and reproduced myth for neo-liberal reforms.
I think we can apply Harvey’s insight to Korean political leaders’ passion for advanced cities’ place marketing and branding.

First, cases of failure in terms of the marketing of places have not been made known to the public while a few successful cases have been well recognised. For example, some cases like Glasgow and Bilbao are recognised as ‘successful’ (yet, how much these are successful is arguable) while other disappointing place marketing policies have rarely been circulated by the media. In particular, though some cities invested as many resources as Glasgow or Bilbao, they are not as prominent in the literature due to their poor or negative results. In addition, Prestige projects like mega-events, flagship museums and large-scale international festivals often face financial crises in a time of recession. Sometimes, successful stories of cities might be inflated or exaggerated by the political leader and public officials. The estimates of projects in terms of economic effect tend to grow larger because they are probably used for supporting data. The similar logic might also be applied to the process of evaluating them. Ambiguous indexes might be employed for defending the validity of projects through many intangible figures such as the improvement of image or brand value and the degree of tourists’ understanding. For instance, the Jeonnam Provincial government in South Korea hosted a Formula One Grand Prix in 2007, arguing that it will be a growth engine for Jeonnam Province. Drawing on three agency’s preliminary validity evaluations chosen by the government, the Jeonnam authorities expected its operational profit would be over 60 million pounds over seven years. They pushed for the project, and in the end, the first game was held in Youngam within the Jeonnam Province October in 2010. Recently, however, according to BAI’s (Board of Audit and Inspection) audit result about it, its actual result was terrible. In
2011, BAI announced that “if the Provincial government keep it to 2016 (over 7 years), it will bring about over 271 million pounds of operational loss and become a double burden on the regional financial system (Newsis newspaper, 28th July 2011).

Regarding official statistics and information, Hoggart (2002:111) and his associates note that they might be manipulated by politicians or government officials, because they can be a tool for measuring their personal performance. In addition, as their sources are from their own perspectives, they argue that official figures are often biased (ibid). This tendency can be identified in Korean urban place marketing projects. For instance, Jung (2008) indicates that the impact of mega-events in many Korean cities has frequently been inflated. He suggests that many institutes and research agencies in South Korea tended to fabricate statistics or distort interpretations about the economic impact of mega-events in order to meet end user’s demand. According to him, nonetheless, such study results and interpretations were diffused by media without appropriate filtering processes and criticisms, which led the public to believe them.

Second, from an urban elite’s standpoint, the fact that they push ahead such large projects is a success for their own class. The reason is that such projects are usually fitted with their economic and political interest (Philo and Kearns, 1993). In particular, many city leaders made a variety of festivals and events in an attempt to produce visible achievements for the next election (Kim, 2008). However, it is likely that some flagship projects have little positive effect on the daily life of many city dwellers. On the contrary, sometimes they have to endure disadvantages such as increased tax
and the reduction of public services and welfare which result from the implementing projects. In addition, city elites tend to disregard other people’s meaning of place and sometimes, even get rid of its historical character and practices that have continued in a place for years and the history of the people who lived, worked, struggled, and dreamed in there. As Hudson says, “[t]he point is that for these people [who actually lived there] the locality is not just a space in which to work for a wage but a place where they were born, went to school, have friends and relations.; places where they are socialised human beings rather than just the commodity labour-power and, as a result, places to which they have become deeply attached (Hudson, 1988:493-4, Cited in Philo and Kearns, 1993:17).” Marketing policies preferred by city ruling elites have often diluted and erased historical, social and political meanings of urban places in Korean cities. Thus, a recklessly optimistic view of Korean place marketing practitioners and literature should be modified towards a more comprehensive and balanced view. When policy makers attempt to make a decision on place marketing policies, they should consider thoroughly possible problems such as increasing gap between advantaged groups and disadvantaged ones, the spatial divide between the project area and the rest of the region, the loss of historical meaning of places and the difficulty of financing in economic crises by virtue of reckless marketing projects.

Myth tends to be made by showing a part of the fact and, hiding the rest. As we have seen, the myth of Western place marketing in South Korea is likewise. Many Korean experts and media have not often shown its failures and disadvantages while still introducing its best practices. Thus, it seems the advanced place marketing strategy
has been partially recognised as an ideal destination for many Korean political leaders and policy makers to follow in South Korea.

5.4 The possibility of evolving place marketing by policy transfer

In South Korea, there are no studies on the evolution of place marketing from the view of policy transfer yet. Many Korean cities have followed famous examples of advanced cities’ place marketing policies, just as many British cities had learned from the US and particularly from Baltimore’s example. As such, the phenomenon of policy transfer might have an effect on the evolution of place marketing. This involves the relationship between the mobility of urban policy and the place marketing policy development in a city where they are importing the policy. Thus, I think it is possible to investigate the embedding process of foreign examples into Korean cities in association with policy transfer. Regarding this, two critical things can be suggested in the context of Korean politics and economy.

Firstly, the main attention tends to be paid to only ‘transfer’ in relating literature while other things such as modification and conflict are relatively disregarded in the process of policy moves (Cook and Ward, 2010). However, Cook et al., who studied the case of Manchester’s Commonwealth and Olympic Games projects conclude this is not true. According to their research, many people who visited Manchester from other countries do not copy the case of Manchester but synthesise a number of examples (including Manchester) comparing and adjusting their strategies to their own national and urban situation. Thus, some foreign examples might be similarly modified and involved in the struggles in the evolving process of Korean place
marketing. Furthermore, the literature of policy transfer from political science tends to neglect the political background or reasons. It is required to examine how the phenomenon of policy transfer can be connected with the urban political situation, since large-scale marketing projects in Korean cities have often been launched for certain political purposes of city leaders. The process of policy transfer might be linked to a politician’s interests rather than merely a rational formation of policy and lesson-drawing from the perspective of political science, as much power is typically concentrated on the political leader of the city like the mayor in Korean urban politics.

Secondly, many Korean researchers and experts have introduced the diverse place marketing policies of advanced capitalist cities through Korean literature of urban policy. In particular, they have suggested only a selection of cases which they think successful while neglecting their (specifically social and political) problems. In addition, there was little literature to introduce or suggest examples from abroad which were experiencing difficulty or failure. This researcher and expert behaviour may urge Korean city leaders and policy makers to rush enthusiastically to follow foreign best practices. For example, Lee (2006) suggests marketing campaigns such as I Love NY and Glasgow’s Miles Better and large-scale development like Docklands in London and Minato Mirai 21 in Yokohama as successful ones. Seo and Bae (2005) argue that I Love NY, the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, Tate Modern in London, and the Pompidou in France were all successful and we have to learn from their success factors. Chang and Park (2005) also suggest London, Tokyo, New York and Singapore as successful branding cities in their book of ‘Reinventing Places’. Uhr (2011) cites Docklands (in London), Minato Mirai 21 (in Yokohama),
Battery Park City (in New York) as successful waterfront developments. As such, most researchers and experts seem to suggest similar successful cases. In addition, none of them consider the problems (including possible ones) in detail.

However, these often cited cases do also have some negative points. For example, if we examine the case of the London Dockland development and Glasgow's European City of Culture which are well known as successes in South Korea, due to this development the property prices of the site and neighbouring areas were rose highly. Then, many native residents and workers who lived there were forced to be displaced (Short, 1996). Thus, many allied groups like ‘Dockland Forum’ which represented over 60 small local groups struggled against the vision of LDDC (London Dockland Development Corporations), and alternative citizen groups such as ‘Worker's City in Glasgow’ conflicted with city authorities in Glasgow (Boyle and Hughes, 1991; Goodwin, 1993). Nonetheless, there was little Korean literature about these social and political problems in the cities.

Thus, the partial introduction and suggestion of Korean place marketing researchers and experts who use these examples might build prejudice in support of or create a success myth for place marketing policies in the example cities. As Peck (2001) points out, this tendency might not only be associated with internal domestic dynamics such as market-friendly public officials and policy (expert) networks but also, ultimately, contribute to the cause of a neo-liberal transformation of many Korean cities.
5.5 Examination on applying limits of local-centred political theories to South Korea

Local political theories such as growth machine and urban regime might be useful to explain the internal dynamic of the politics of local growth, whilst structural approaches have faced criticisms of its economic determinism or reductionism which deal with human agents as passive ones (Hall, 2006:26) in economic structures. However, as observed in the previous chapter (3.4), they cannot adequately provide an explanation about the fundamental macro mechanism relationship between local and national governments, and the local and the global as they tend to focus on only narrow human actions for economic development within the local.

Contemporary cities are experiencing many political, economic, cultural, and social changes within the transformation of globalisation and neo-liberalisation. Thus, we need to situate the politics of local economic development in the wider context of transforming conditions. However, the narrow scale of local-centred and sub-national perspectives might not enable us to explore such broad conditions. Moreover, current neo-liberalism is not operated only in a spatial scale like the local. It deploys in and through multiple scales though the most important scale is the urban. Furthermore, the evolving context of Korean urban politics might be deeply understood when it is explored and investigated in relationship with the nation state since local states have traditionally low levels of political autonomy in South Korea in comparison with the US where urban theories on New Urban Politics was born, and
they don’t have enough experiences of local politics by virtue of the late introduction of the local self-governing system. Additionally, a number of city governments are heavily dependent upon central support in terms of financial funds.

In conclusion, I think a multi-scalar approach should be applied in the thesis in order to explore the changing political context of place marketing policy under the wider condition of globalisation (for example, the ‘Segyehwa’ policy of Kim Young-sam Government, see 7.4.3) and neo-liberal transformation, as well as examining it in relationship with central government since macro and structural forces like neo-liberalisation do not work only on one spatial scale but are deployed in and through diverse scales (Brenner and Theodore, 2002).

5.6 Summary

In this chapter, I sought to generally and critically analyse the evolution of place marketing policies within the Korean (non-Western) context as the start of the empirical work. Firstly, there are some concerns about the marketing science approach. The approach might bring about homogenisation of city places and other urban components, and its effect is typically transitory. Recently, the emerging strategy of place branding also has serious problems, which are its top-down approach and city brand index. The former possibly contributes to uniformity in cities, and the latter could stimulate inter-urban competition. Second is the possible prejudice or blind belief of city leaders and policy makers for the success myth of
place marketing in advanced capitalist cities - in particular, Western and Japanese cities. The reason why such myths can be made in South Korea was examined drawing on Harvey’s insight upon neo-liberalism. Thirdly, we explored the possibility of the evolution of place marketing by policy transfer in connection with the Korean urban context. I suggested a possible idea that policy transfer in the context of Korean urban politics might be caused by political interests of city leaders or politicians. Finally, in order to overcome the limits of local-centric political theories of urban growth, I indicated that we need to explore the wider political and economic conditions or structural forces. In so doing, I re-suggested the need of a new approach such as a multi-scalar one.
Chapter Six: Understanding General Korean Context of Urban Politics and Overall Trends in Place Marketing

6.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a discussion of the results of the first approach to understand the evolution of Korean place marketing in the thesis. As already noted in chapter 4 (4.2), we examine the general contexts of national and urban aspects, and identifies the overall tendency of Korean place marketing. The next section examines the Korean context of urban politics such as a transitional urban society, the legacy of a developmental state, and the late introduction of a local autonomy system. The third analyses the implications of the survey findings. I expect the survey will enable us to identify and understand the overall trends and general contour of Korean place marketing in comparison with that of older industrialised countries. The final section suggests a brief summary. The ultimate intention of this chapter is to deeply understand the case study, thus it can be regarded as preliminary research for the case study.

6.2 Some general contexts about Korean urban politics

After Japan’s colonial rule (1910-48) and the Korean War (1950-53), South Korea was left as a very poor agricultural society. However, it has quickly transformed into
a late industrial country since the 1960s. It was the military coup of Park Jung-hee from which such transformation starts because he established the political and economic basis of South Korea as an authoritarian developmental and centrally-concentrated state. Drawing on Korean literature of politics and political geography (Ahn, 2006; Cho, 1999; Choi, 2007; Sonn, 2010), I summarise the characteristics of Korean society and politics from the 1960s to the 1980s in the following three points: 1) authoritarian military autocracy; 2) developmental state’s rapid industrialisation; and 3) centrally-concentrated political and administrative system. However, these have also transformed into a democratic, less industrialised (than Western countries and Japan), and (developmental) neo-liberalising state within the process of historical events such as democratisation in 1987; the introduction of local self-governing system in 1995; and the Asian economic crisis in 1997.

**Transitional urban society (influenced by rapid industrialisation and democratisation)**

As Bae and Sellers (2007) indicates, South Korea has experienced extremely rapid industrialisation by authoritarian military regime. Consequently, as Harvey (2005:107) suggests, South Korea’s “per capita income was less than $ 100 in 1960 but now stands at more than $ 12,000. This astonishing economic performance is often cited as the perfect example of what any developmental state might do.” This very fast industrialisation has been accompanied by rapid urbanisation. These political and economic conditions have meant that Korean cities represent a very transitional society. In addition, since democratisation in 1987 (see 7.3.3 for more
depth), another essential dynamic change in urban politics was the growing power of civic society. In the 1990s, it resulted in a number of civic movements in diverse fields like labour and the environment. For example, there were 1,026 conflicts between labour and management from 1981 to 1986, but in just 1987, 3,749 labour conflicts took place (Park, 2005). Additionally, this expansion of labour movements in cities greatly influenced the establishment of a national labour union (Korean Confederation of Trade Union) in 1995 and labour’s political party in 2000 (Democratic Labour Party).

However, this trend of civic society gradually comes into conflict with increasing pro-growth activities of the local elite who usually are based on landed proprietors in urban politics since the introduction of the local autonomy system in 1995. As Bae and Sellers (ibid) argue, this transitional Korean urban society might make Korean urban politics have different qualities as well as similar ones in comparison with that of Western cities. One similar aspect is to allow the emergence of elite coalitions based on local proprietors which resemble local growth coalitions in some Western cities. By contrast, a distinctive quality of Korean cities is that the coalition is usually a Mayor-centred one rather than business-led one (ibid). Cho (1999) argues that ‘Korean urban politics’ has been open along with state restructuring (from authoritarian developmental to democratic state) since the democratisation of 1987. He also claims that there remains the influence of state-centred politics in cities on the one hand, while (somewhat rudimentary) Western components of ‘New Urban Politics’ have been increasingly unfolded with globalisation in city politics on the other (ibid:45). As such, Korean urban politics has shown a transitional quality partly
similar and partly different from that of Western cities by virtue of the mixture of rapid industrialisation, democratisation and localisation (introduction of the local self-governing system).

**Remaining legacy of the developmental state: growth-first and Statist policy**

In terms of politics, since the 1960s, South Korea has been a developmental state which was characterised by a growth-first policy led by the state and authoritarian regime. Authoritarianism was transformed into democracy in 1987 (Sonn, 2010). In the mid-1990s, the developmental state increasingly experienced another change due to the wider political and economic conditions of globalisation which resulted from growing pressure of the US on South Korea for liberalisation of trade and the voluntary globalisation policy of the Kim Young-sam government. In 1997, South Korea experienced additional fundamental change through the Asian economic crisis. In terms of the economic system, it was a crucial background for South Korea as a developmental state to be restructured into neo-liberal economic mechanisms (ibid). In particular, it has rapidly transformed towards neo-liberalism since the economic crisis (1997-8). Ji (2011) also argues that the neo-liberalisation of the Korean political economy system as an authoritative developmental state has been achieved through the Asian economic crisis of 1998. However, he claims that the origin of Korean neo-liberalism was senior public officials acting as market-fundamentalists in the central government economic organisation who had studied Economics in the US. He points out that they tried to launch the globalisation policy of the Kim Young-sam administration, yet they failed to achieve a more flexible labour market. He argues that it meant the failure of the nation state’s effort for voluntary neo-liberalisation.
However, according to him, they actively accepted and pushed neo-liberal reform measures (like financial liberalisation, opening the financial services market, and the deregulation of labour relations, etc) forced by the IMF and the US Treasury. He asserts that the neo-liberalisation of Korean economy has been gradually accomplished not only by the coercive reform pressure of the IMF and the US Treasury but also by active collusion of Korean economic officials with market fundamentalism.

Recently, Jang Ha-jun, a professor in the University of Cambridge criticised the phenomenon of neo-liberalisation in South Korea which emerged about 10 years ago, describing:

“As our country abandoned previous policies and embraced neo-liberalism since the Asian economic crisis, all Koreans thought ‘now, we also gain qualifications and get advantage for competition.’ Even though they made every effort to get qualifications for competition as much as the word of ‘be wealthy’ was popular in the society, the result was the reverse after 10 years. Rather, economic growth deteriorated, and the gap between the rich and poor was expanded….. Most people were dry and tough to live only except the 5% of top upper class (Hangyre-Sinmun [Newspaper], 6th March 2011).”

Likewise, Harvey (2005) indicates developmental countries in East Asia like South Korea have quickly joined the transformation toward neo-liberalisation since the Asian economic crisis of 1997.

Globalisation has influenced the radical change of advanced Western countries from the Keynesian Welfare National State to a Schumpeterian Workfare State as the
accumulation system of capital has conversed from Fordism to more flexible accumulation systems (Jessop, 2002). However, an attempt to make this political and economic transformation of Western countries to apply directly to South Korea might create some mistakes since there were few qualities of a welfare state in the country. From this view, the important aspect in Korean politics might be the authoritative developmental character, which is dependent upon a growth-first policy that only pursues growth at the expense of other values like human rights, democracy and concern for the environment (Sonn, 2011). As such, the traditional base of a developmental state with recently added neo-liberal components has influenced the Korean urban economy and its politics. In recent years, Bae and Sellers (2007) concluded in their case study on Goyang city in South Korea that a Mayor-centred growth coalition (in contrast to the US business-led growth coalition) has emerged in the city due to the tradition of the developmental state (excessive state intervention). Under the legacy of the developmental state, the recognition that the state should lead local development and that local development typically means the economy was established in Korean cities. Thus, we can assume the legacy of the developmental state has strongly affected the evolution of place marketing policy in Korean cities.

**Late introduction of Local Autonomy**

In South Korea, the introduction of a local self-governing system was relatively late compared to advanced Western countries because there was an old tradition of highly centralised government and the institutional establishment of a
decentralisation system was completed in 1995. As Kang points out regarding this situation,

“States such as our country which have a strongly embedded tradition of centralism needs localisation..... However, though we have experienced it [over 15 years], there is still a tendency of centralism by virtue of central government and politician’s will for vested interest, local politics’ dependency upon central one, and citizens’ lack of attention to localisation and local self-governing, etc (2011:29).”

Thus, it appears local governments are still dependent upon central government. Local finance has had a dependent structure as local government’s revenue has usually been increased by subsidy from central government. In general, the degree of local government’s self-reliance was not high yet. According to Seo (2005), in South Korea the proportion of national and local tax is 80 and 20 per cent while the ratio is 60 and 40 per cent in many advanced countries like the US, Japan and Germany. Additionally, under the old tradition of central concentration, Korean central authorities have been inactive in the devolution of financial authority.

It is difficult for many Korean cities to push large-scale marketing projects without central government’s support. Thus, many local governments have made great efforts to secure grants from the nation state. In the process, city leaders tend to launch local economic development projects in combination with local proprietors who have close relations with central politicians and government officials. Many Korean city leaders have run decision making on development projects since they were too powerful in the local politics. Sometimes, they have power because they
have close relations with key central politicians and government officials. And also, they have enough financial power and institutional network with local economic elite groups in order to expand their own political interests such as election. Thus, for example, Kim criticises Korean local politics and economic development policies, saying that

“Local political leaders tend to employ [a local self-governing system] in order to enlarge their politics rather than to improve community development by mobilising pro-corporation policies and marketing projects with certain a political purpose (2011:276).”

Therefore, we can regard the majority of city governments in South Korea as situated under the influence of powerful central government. In addition, despite central government-dependent local finance, many city leaders have frequently pushed place marketing projects which might be considered as being a mere display for their own political interests.

6.3 Overall trends of place marketing from survey findings

I will now analyse the key findings by discussing the results from the most pertinent questions. The data from other questions not considered here was used to inform the wider contextual material on Korean place marketing.
The emergence of Korean place marketing within the context of the local self-governing system and globalisation

As shown in Table 6.1, most respondents (70.6%) stated that the introduction of a local self-government system and the expansion of autonomy in local government are the most important background factors to the emergence of place marketing in Korean cities.

Table 6.1 Background to the emergence of place marketing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expert response</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The introduction of a local self-governing system and the expansion of autonomy</td>
<td>24 (70.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in local government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The response of local government in order to overcome deindustrialisation and</td>
<td>5 (14.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inner city decline due to global economic restructuring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The effect of urban entrepreneurialism in which local authorities behave like</td>
<td>3 (8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In order to make achievement of city leaders since the introduction of local</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-governing system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The postmodern socialisation and the increasing effect of visual media and</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advertising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Korean expert survey)

Then, relatively fewer experts (14.7%) indicated the response of local government to overcome deindustrialisation and inner city decline due to global economic restructuring.

This result can be interpreted as follows. The characteristic of authoritarianism in a regime of an authoritarian developmental state has been weakened by the democratisation of the 1980s. Then, the Kim Young-sam administration which took power pushed globalisation (in Korean, ‘Segyehwa’) policies in a coalition with the
previous military groups from the mid-1990s. For instance, the Korean government endeavoured to brashly join the OECD, and achieved it in spite of the resistance of many labour organisations and social movement activists. At that time, Korean central authorities greatly influenced urban politics in two manners. One was the introduction of the local self-governing system, and the other was to push ahead the policy of globalisation. The former was to provide political autonomy to city governments, and the latter was the early neo-liberal direction of the nation state to make cities become entrepreneurial. Due to these, promotional place marketing policies rapidly diffused into many cities, and the Gwangju Biennale (which will be observed in Chapter 7) was also launched in this period. However, some market-friendly measures of the Kim’s administration (such as deregulation of employment protection and privatisation of public corporations, etc) were frustrated by strong labour unions. Nonetheless, this time (when globalisation policies were launched by the Kim Young-sam government) can be regarded as a rudimentary stage for neo-liberalisation (Choi, 2012), since a different style of accumulation regime from previous developmental state had been attempted by mobilising neo-liberal policies like globalisation, dissolution of chaebols [Korean conglomerates], deregulation of labour protection, and financial liberalisation (Ahn and Ryu, 2010).

In particular, the introduction of self-governing system strongly influenced many local governments in two ways (politically and economically) since it brought out the shift of much part of political and economic power from the central government to local government.
Firstly, in terms of politics, the introduction of the new local autonomy system resulted in the rise of very strong city mayors in local politics because we Koreans never have experienced local autonomy in our long history. It might be understood as the unique Korean (non-Western type of) transformation from a central-led political and administrative statistic system to a new oligarchical system which political and administrative power excessively centered on the City Mayor. Because City Mayor had much power in the arena of local politics after introducing local autonomy whilst related democratic processes and mechanisms like City Council and civic organisations had not enough capacity to keep checks and balances. For example, following Yoon’s (2011) study results (interviews with some local journalists in Gwangju) can show us the relationship between City Mayor as a very powerful leader and City Councillors as its inadequate checking rivals.

“[City Mayor] is the President. He/She is like a local President. I think it is natural. Political power is inevitably concentrated in the hands of City Mayor because he/she is elected person [who is quite different from the previous appointed Mayors by central government] (Yoon, 2011:26).”

“Some people openly say that ‘Even 000, the chair of the City Parliament is a secretary of 000, the City Mayor’. Most City Councillors belongs to the same [Political] Party. The City Mayor, 000 is an elder statesman in the Party. Many City Councillors have to read his countenance, so they have to be the yes person for the City Mayor’s policy (Yoon, 2011:28).”

Secondly, since the new system of local autonomy, local authorities have much economic power in using financial resources independently, which it means that City Mayor have a wide range of discretion on how to spend funds of local government.
As a result, it has led to rapidly increasing local marketing projects in many Korean cities.

**Increasing use of cultural instruments in place marketing policy**

Respondents of the survey were asked to ascertain how they understand changing degrees of concern for cultural means within urban place marketing between the 1990s and the present. Most respondents (64.7%) stated that cultural instruments have sharply increased (see Table 6.2). Then, the response of ‘gradually increased’ was 35.3%. However, there were no answers for ‘no change’ or a ‘decrease’. This might show a trend that the importance of cultural components has expanded within the practical policy field of place marketing in South Korea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expert response</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharply increased</td>
<td>22 (64.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradually increased</td>
<td>12 (35.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steadily no changed</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradually decreased</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharply decreased</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Korean expert survey)

Furthermore, growing attention to cultural tools for place marketing might have contributed to the increase of inter-city competition and city authorities’ entrepreneurial activities. In association with this, Kim Gyuwon indicates as follows:

“Lately, when I took part in a forum in Gwangju, I heard that an urban planning expert announced [something about place marketing]. It was the
fact that currently, city centres of all large core cities in our country were quickly declining. The conclusion was only for ‘culture’ to revitalise and boost these urban centres and the task was very urgent in urban policy..... Many cities started to pursue making ‘money’ employing a showy culture. So, large concert halls and museums were built, sometimes they were not fitted with local residents’ demands and situations..... Sometimes, large-scale expenditure started popular as they were called ‘prestige plan’ or ‘flagship project’ (2005:25-6)."

Thus, through these results, we can recognise that Korean cities have increasingly paid attention to and employed cultural instruments for place marketing, and it has led to competitive consuming of money by local governments.

**Characteristics of power relations in place marketing policy**

One of the ways to deeply understand the mechanism of local governance is to examine power relations among local policy actors. All survey results about this topic might show the diverse qualities of Korean place marketing. In this section, however, I briefly suggest two points which differentiated the Korean situation from the business-led growth coalitions of many US cities.

Firstly, the role of city leaders such as mayors might be bigger than that of Western city leaders in place marketing policy. The survey results (see Table 6.3) revealed that the most important actor has been the city mayor and government since the 1990s. In terms of place marketing policy, a majority of Korean experts chose them as the most influential people or organisation between the 1990s (67.6%) and 2011
(50.0%). This might result from the different structure of local government in Korean. Korean city administrative governments have ultimate responsibility for local administration (and the city council only have power to audit and check it in South Korea) such as in the presidential system, while British city councils usually have such responsibility. In addition, another interesting thing is that the second influential actor was central government in the 1990s. Recently, however, it was converted to a partnership organisation. Thus, we can see a trend that the most important player has been the city government and mayor within an arena of urban policy over less than 20 years, and partnership organisations and civic groups have been gaining an influence in recent years.

Table 6.3 Most influential actor within urban place marketing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1990s)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor and City Government</td>
<td>23 (67.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>9 (26.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic organisation such as Board of Commerce</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artist groups</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership organisation</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic groups</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(The present, 2011)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor and City Government</td>
<td>17 (50.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership organisation</td>
<td>15 (44.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic groups</td>
<td>2 (5.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic organisation such as Board of Commerce</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artist groups</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Korean expert survey)
Many authors on urban politics in South Korea (Park, 2004; Park, et. al., 1999; Ji and Ryu, 2005; Lee, 2011) have suggested that the city mayor is an influential actor. Then, they have suggested the central government or city elites as the next influential actor. Similarly, my survey result showed us that the city mayor and government has been the most important player in the arena of urban politics. Many Korean authors argue that highly concentrated centralised administrative and financial systems resulted in such a phenomenon. For example, Park et. al. (1999) analyses the power structure of local communities (Cheongju, Pyeongtaek, Sungnam, Jinju, and Bucheon city) through interview and survey methods. They conclude that the most influential group in Korean city politics was the city leader rather than the city’s economic elites. Park (2004) also concludes that the city mayor and by-mayor were very powerful, and the next most powerful group were central government officials and politicians. Thus, drawing on these results, we might assume that political city leaders and government officials rather than local economic elites have influence on the process of urban place marketing.

The second distinct feature is that the relationship with central government is very important in the politics of local economic development such as place marketing projects because central authorities are still very powerful in planning regulation and allocating financial resources even since the introduction of local self-governing system. As already observed in the previous section, the late local self-governing system and highly centralised administrative tradition might result in much regulative power remaining in central government. Additionally, the local finance base is usually vulnerable to large-scale projects such as international sport events or flagship
projects, and thus, it has led to a central government-dependent financial structure in many cities. Therefore, the evolving process of Korean place marketing policy should be analysed within the relational context with central government.

**Transfer of place marketing policy into Korea**

At first, in terms of policy ideas of urban place marketing in Korea, most Korean experts (see Table 6.4, 76.5%) stated that city authorities and agencies obtained the ideas from other cities or other advanced countries’ examples. Respondents expressed that the second source (11.8%) of ideas was research findings of institutes. However, support of the rest of the opinions such as a private economic group or company suggestion (5.9%) and citizens’ idea challenge (2.9%) was relatively little. Thus, according to this result, we can see that Korean city authorities tend to utilise other cities’ successful cases rather than to make creative alternatives by themselves when they examine policy alternatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expert response</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other cities’ (including other countries) successful case</td>
<td>26 (76.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The result of institute research</td>
<td>4 (11.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private economic group or company suggestion</td>
<td>2 (5.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s suggestion such as idea challenge</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Korean expert survey)

In addition, according to the survey, it was identified that many Korean experts thought Korean cities has often considered and applied other countries’ place
marketing policies. As seen in Table 6.5, most respondents stated that Korean city authorities very often (47.1%) or often (47.1%) utilise other country’s marketing policies. In addition, of their responses, ‘occasionally’ had only 5.9 per cent and there was no negative reply of ‘rarely’ and ‘never’. This confirms our earlier conclusion of the policy transfer literature which pointed out that the adoption of examples from other countries is widespread.

Table 6.5 Frequency in applying other country’s place marketing policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expert response</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>16 (47.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>16 (47.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>2 (5.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Korean expert survey)

Which country is usually examined by Korean cities? As suggested in Table 6.6, a majority of Korean experts chose ‘Japan’ (55.9%) as a popular benchmarking object for city marketing policy. Then, the second and third response was ‘UK’ (23.5%) and ‘USA’ (17.6%).

For the South Korea, Japan was was the dictatorial authority during the time of colonial rule (1910-1945) and it was the precedent country of Westernisation in the Asia. This table can provide us the evidence of Korean marketing policy transferred from advanced (Western or early Westernised [like Japan]) countries. In addition, through this table, we can understand that Korean cities might have diverse learning points such as Japan, UK, and US within the unique Korean (non-Western) context.
Moreover, according to Table 6.7, we can identify how much the effect of the application of other country’s success example in Korean cities. The largest number of respondents (58.8%) stated other country’s cases were much effect of application to Korean cities. Then, the response of ‘a large effect’ (35.3%) followed. However, negative answers were scarce because the response of ‘not very much effect’ and ‘very little effect’ was only 2.9% and 0.0%. Thus, we can recognise that the majority of Korean experts acknowledge the effect of application of other country’s success examples.

Table 6.7 The effect of the application of other country’s success case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expert response</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some effect</td>
<td>20 (58.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A large effect</td>
<td>12 (35.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very large effect</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much effect</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very little effect</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Korean expert survey)
What I would like to say in this part as another important point is that we can recognise the fact about what makes city leaders in South Korea favour and ardently follow Western cities’ place marketing policies.

**Table 6.8 Experience of hearing about the failure of Western place marketing**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21 (61.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13 (38.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Korean expert survey)

According to the survey result, most Korean experts actively introduced or suggested successful cases while they usually did not mention failed ones (85.3%, see Table 6.9) even though most of them had experiences of hearing about them (61.8%, see Table 6.8).

**Table 6.9 Experience of introducing failures of Western place marketing**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>29 (85.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5 (14.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Korean expert survey)

Many Korean experts did not raise bad examples or problems to others although most of them already knew them. Consequently, it might be an empirical proof for us to identify their biased favour towards examples of place marketing from advanced countries. Thus, it might influence many Korean city leaders and policy makers to have a Western- and Japanese-biased perception, this again confirming the earlier discussion on policy transfer.
6.4 Summary

In this chapter, we sought to understand the general political context and overall trend of Korean place marketing. In the second section, we examined the Korean national context of urban politics. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Korean political economy can be characterised as a dictatorial military regime, rapid industrialisation by a developmental state, and a highly centralised administrative system. However, since then, the evolution of Korean place marketing might be situated within the diverse transitional waves such as democratisation, globalisation, and localisation (due to the introduction of local self-governing) and it might be contextualised as a rapidly democratised, but less advanced, increasingly neo-liberalising developmental state. Thus, as Harvey (2005:72) points out, it appears that “[n]eoliberalization….. opens up possibilities for development states [like South Korea] to enhance their position in international competition by developing new structures of state intervention” within this transitional context.

The third section suggested the conducting process of the survey and its several implications. Firstly, many Korean experts responded that the introduction of the local self-governing system and global economic restricting were key backgrounds for the emergence of Korean place marketing policies. Thus, the evolution of Korean place marketing might be identified within inter-relations between the Korean context of new local autonomy and the wider transitional wave of globalisation. Secondly, we could recognise that growing attention to cultural means in place marketing policy has contributed to the intensified inter-urban competition and expanding entrepreneurial municipal activities in Korean cities. Thirdly, we might identify that
the influence of city leaders and central government officials have been powerful in the political arena of local growth like place marketing under the inertia of the developmental and statistic tradition. Finally, it seems many Korean experts (composed of professors, researchers, public officials, public agency and marketing company professionals) have not usually introduced or suggested examples of failure or problems in advanced countries’ place marketing whilst they ardently introduce successful cases. This might have influenced Korean city leaders and policy makers to get a favourable biased view of advanced countries’ (like the US, Japan, and Western European countries) place marketing.

Having discussed these broad findings, the thesis will now turn to the local study of Gwangju. Chapter 7 will discuss the Democratisation Movement, which as we shall see provides the context for successive place marketing policies. This chapter also discusses the rationale for, and outcomes of, establishing an Art Biennale in Gwangju. Chapter 8 then looks at the recent development of the Gwangju Hub City of Asia Culutre and the Asian Culture Complex, as major attempts to foster cultural economic growth. But as we shall find these have been contested and the policies contain many tensions. Finally, in these case study sections, chapter 9 will look at the defeat of a proposal to build a domed sports stadium, and other recent cultural and marketing policies. Taken together these next three chapters provide a detailed case study of urban place marketing and cultural development in one of South Korea’s major cities.
Chapter Seven: The Gwangju Democratisation Movement and the Gwangju Biennale

7.1 Introduction

The next three chapters are derived from the second approach to understanding the evolution of Korean place marketing in the thesis and each will present different place marketing policies used in Gwangju. In this Chapter, the Gwangju Biennale will be introduced as a first case, and the evolving political context of Korean place marketing will also be examined. The second section will provide a geographical, administrative overview, the history of urban landscape and economic and political conditions of Gwangju. Then, the third will present the Gwangju Democratisation Movement which has been influential in the creation of the image of the city. The fourth and fifth will explore the image of Gwangju and the conflicting local scale of actors around the Gwangju Biennale. In particular, the fourth will intensively examine the series of processes of making the ‘Yehang (traditional town of art)’ discourse which led to the Gwangju Biennale. And then, the sixth and seventh will examine the political dynamic of the Gwangju Biennale through highlighting the conflicts and coordination between the Gwangju Biennale and Anti-Biennale. The final section will suggest a brief summary of these discussions.

7.2 Gwangju Overview
Gwangju is the only metropolitan city in the Honam region which is located in the south western part of South Korea. The Honam region is divided into two provinces; Jella-namdo and Jella-bukdo. Gwangju is a leading city in that it plays an economic, social and cultural major role in the province of Jella-namdo (see Figure 7.1). Gwangju is one of six metropolitan cities as the 6th largest city in South Korea, and it has approximately 1.4 million people (Gwangju Metropolitan City, 2012). It has five Gus; Dong-gu, Nam-gu, Seo-gu, Buk-gu, and Gwangsan-gu. While Dong-gu and Nam-gu of the five Gus are somewhat declining as traditional urban centres, others have had more land development of housing, retail and manufacturing industry since the 1980s.

Figure 7.1 Location of Gwangju

(Source: CIA, 2012, modified by author)

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9 Their abbreviated forms are Jeonnam (Jella-namdo) and Jeonbuk (Jella-bukdo).
10 Gu is a name of administrative boundary such as British Borough in South Korea.
The Provincial Hall of Jella-namdo was located in the central site of Dong-gu in Gwangju until 2005, and then it was moved to Muan city, one of cities in the Southern extremity (Lee, 2010). On the map of Gwangju (see Figure 7.2 and 7.3), we can identify the locations of the three case projects in the thesis.

**Figure 7.2 Map of Gwangju and case sites**

(Source: Lee, 2010:55, modified by author)
Figure 7.3 Case sites on city planning map

(Source: Gwangju Metropolitan City, 2007:1, modified by author)

7.2.1 The history of urban landscape in Gwangju

Urban built environments are closely connected with the historical context of the city. As in many other cities in South Korea, Gwangju was also established with its current basic frame of city centre in terms of spatial structure during Japan’s imperial regime (Jo, 2002; Kim, 2009). The Gwangju Eupseong (Gwangju’s
traditional town wall), which had symbolized the city of Gwangju for over 1,000 years, and other traditional architecture of the Chosun Dynasty was removed by the Japanese colonial rulers. In their place, Japanese residences, banks, companies, retail shops and new boulevards occupied the same places in order to help Japanese capital accumulation. Geumnam Boulevard\textsuperscript{11} and Jella-namdo Provincial Hall\textsuperscript{12}, which are major places in the thesis case study, were also built by Japanese within the process of such colonialisation (Shin and Chun, 2001). Under the Japanese imperial rule, there was a big event known as the ‘\textit{Gwangju Student Independence Movement}’, which was very influential to the forming of the image of Gwangju. It became a nationwide Movement starting from Gwangju students’ resistance where Korean middle and high school students protested over 3 months in 1929 against Japanese imperialists’ national discrimination and colonized education. It was the biggest independence movement and nationwide struggle for Korea’s freedom since the Samil Independence Movement in 1919. Due to this event, the name of Gwangju developed a reputation for being ‘a city of resistance’ against the Japanese for freedom in Korea.

In 1945, with the collapse of the Japanese imperial regime, Korea was liberated. Five years later, however, there was a Korean War in 1950, in which most of the urban infrastructure in Gwangju was destroyed. Fortunately, however, a part of the central architecture and roads like Jella-namdo Provincial Hall and Geumnam Boulevard avoided the mass destruction of the War. During the 1960s and 1970s,

\textsuperscript{11} Geumnam Boulevard, which located in front of Jella-namdo Provincial Hall, was a large street where citizen and student used to be gathered and protested for democracy. It was also the place where the Gwangju Democratisation Movement took place.

\textsuperscript{12} The area of the place and Geumnam Boulevard is the site of the Asian Culture Complex in the next Chapter.
South Korea achieved rapid economic growth which led to radical sprawl and changes in the urban area of Korean cities. Most cities broadened their streets and provided a number of houses through large scale urban development and sprawl. In addition, there was the phenomenon of massive population transfer from agricultural villages to cities in order to access jobs, more money and better education. The phenomenon exacerbated the situation of urban problems such as the shortage of housings and it was not easy to solve. However, in Gwangju, even though many people moved from the agricultural villages around Gwangju, those things were not a relatively big problem. Since the industrialisation of Gwangju was late in relation to other cities such as Seoul, Incheon, Daegu, Busan and Ulsan, the need for urbanisation was not so immediate in Gwangju. For example, the Gwangju street system established by Japanese colonial rule was kept to the early of 1970s because there was little large scale of industrial complex and housing town in Gwangju during the time. Thus, it means that the image of Gwangju at that time was a poor developed and backward in industrialisation than other cities in South Korea.

Since the late 1990s, however, urban landscape of Gwangju was rapidly changed, which was characterised by the declining city centre area and quickly growing non-city centre (sub-urban) area. This transformation has been influenced by political and industrial factors like an opposition party-led regime change and financial support of new (Kim Dae-joong) government. As a result, some giant conglomerate (Korean Chaebol) like Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motor were established in the city in 1990s. In addition, Gwangju authorities built a cluster of photonic industry under the political patronage of Kim Dae-joong Government in sub-urban area. These series of
factors have accelerated the urban and industrial transformation of Gwangju landscape. I think this can be understood as a transitional urban society – for example, coexistence of industrial and early post-industrial landscape - in many Korean cities which we already discussed in Chapter 6 (6.2).

7.2.2 The history of Gwangju’s economic and political background

Due to the strategic uneven development by Park Jung-hee’s Government, Gwangju had fallen behind other cities in terms of industrialisation during the 1960s and 1970s. One of the reasons for such underdevelopment of the Honam region and its central city, Gwangju is that intensive investment in and development of specific regions like Capital\textsuperscript{13}, Youngnam\textsuperscript{14}, and their connecting regions, simultaneously led to the disregarding of other ones (Kim, 2003). As a result, the economic gap between developing and other regions was greatly increased and Gwangju was little favoured by Park’s economic policy.

In particular, Park’s uneven economic development was definitely expressed in his selection of infrastructure and manufacturing complexes. The first express motorway was Gyeongbu (Seoul-Busan) in South Korea. Since the 1970s, most of the heavy industry complexes were built in Capital and Youngnam region such as Incheon, Gumi, Ulsan, Pohang and, Changwon city. In this process, many Korean Chaebols (such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, Posco, SK, Doosan, Daewoo), which was settled down in Capital and Youngnam region at that time, quickly grew up by receiving

\textsuperscript{13} Capital region is composed of Seoul, Incheon and their neighbouring cities.

\textsuperscript{14} Youngnam region includes Daegu, Busan, Gumi (Park Jung-hee’s hometown) and other cities adjacent to them.
special benefits of cheap land property for factories and long-term low interest funds from the authoritarian State. These policies expanded the gap between not only large and small companies but also regions. Thus, for example, when we compare the GRDP\textsuperscript{15} of Capital, Youngnam and Honam, we can easily see the consequences. In the early 1960s, their GRDP was similar (all of them were 28%). However, in 1980, their figures had diverged; Capital: 40\%, Youngnam: 30\%, and Honam: 15\%. Furthermore, in 2000, the gaps had expanded further; Capital: 50\%, Youngnam: 30\%, and Honam: 10\% (Seo, 2008).

Some local business people did not sit idly by and watch these discriminating policies of Park’s central government. They gathered together and made requests to central government for supporting money in order to build an industrial complex in Gwangju. This was a discourse of ‘making a manufacturing city’ to overcome local economic difficulty resulting from the industrial weakness of consumption-orientation without manufacturing production. However, Park’s regime which was mainly composed of Youngnam political elites disregarded the suggestion and then such industrial and economic difficulty had continued in Gwangju since the 1960s. This economic discrimination made a unique feeling of political and social discrimination for the Honam region and its central city, Gwangju with a political check to Kim Dae-joong, opposition party leader who was the most likely election competitor to Park in South Korea because the Honam and Gwangju people strongly supported Kim.

\textsuperscript{15}GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic Products) refers to the market value of all final goods and services produced within a region in a given period.
In terms of general economic condition, since the 1970s, the population of Gwangju has quickly increased along with a rapid urbanisation process under the national context, just like other Korean cities. As shown in Table 7.1, the population of the city in 2000 (about 1.4 million) has been more than double of 1970 (634 thousand).

Table 7.1 Changing population in Gwangju

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>31,435</td>
<td>37,407</td>
<td>43,390</td>
<td>45,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>1,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju and Jeonnam</td>
<td>4,005</td>
<td>3,741</td>
<td>3,646</td>
<td>3,345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: National Statistical Office, 2002)

However, the increasing population may not secure the interpretation of every urban place in Gwangju has continuously and evenly developed. Firstly, in recent years, the growing trend of Gwangju population is slowing down. According to Hyung’s (2004) study, the increasing rate of population in Gwangju has decreased from 26.3 per cent in 1990 to 6.8 per cent in 2000. Secondly, as observed in Table 7.2, the population of non-city centre (sub-urban) area in Gwangju rapidly increased due to attracting new industrial facilities like potonic cluster whilst the area of city centre have greatly lost its residents (see more detail in 8.2.2).

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Before 1990, the population of Gwangju equals the populational sum of Gwangju city and Gwangsan-Gun, because the two areas were integrated.
In other words, the population of city centre has decreased from 343 thousands people in 1990 to 192 thousands in 2000. However, the population of non-city centre (sub-urban area) has rapidly increased from 801 to 1,209 thousands people during the same time.

**Table 7.2 Changing population in city centre and non-city centre in Gwangju**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of population (A)</th>
<th>Number of household (B)</th>
<th>A/B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990 (thousand persons)</td>
<td>2000 (thousand persons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangju</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>1,402</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City centre</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-city centre</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>1,209</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Gwangju City, 1999 and 2003)

In terms of economic aspects, due to the uneven development policies of Park Jung-hee Government, relatively late industrialisation of Gwangju might still negatively influence on the lives of residents’ in Gwangju. According to recent some statistics about Korean core cities, Gwangju population may be economically disadvantaged rather than people in other cities from the legacies of such uneven measures. As observed in Table 7.3, economic living standard and asset of Gwangju residents lags behind people in other core cities in South Korea.
### Table 7.3 Economic comparison of Korean core cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Seoul</th>
<th>Busan</th>
<th>Daegu</th>
<th>Incheon</th>
<th>Gwangju</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average housing price</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(thousand pound)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household net asset(^{17})</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(thousand pound)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household monthly</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>1,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income (pound)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active</td>
<td>4,861</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population (thousand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour-force participation rate (%)</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: MOCT, 2005 and National Statistical Office, 2002)

[I made this table by combining < MOCT (Ministry of Construction and Transportation), the report of Housing Demand Research 2005 (estimate) > and < National Statistical Office, the Report of Economically Active Population 2002 >]

Thus, according to Table 7.3, we can recognise that the major factor of the economic gap between Gwangju and other city residents is property value. In addition, Gwangju’s rate of labour-force economic participation is also behind other core cities’. In terms of economic aspects, therefore, late industrialisation of Gwangju (due to nationally uneven development policies since the 1970s) has still influenced the

\(^{17}\) Household net asset = housing asset + financial asset - debt
current daily lives of Gwangju residents, though such trend of regional discrimination has been weakened during the time of Kim Dae-joong Government of the 2000s.

Some scholars pointed out the regional discrimination and economic gap made Gwangju socially and politically isolated from other regions. They also argued that such discrimination was one of the influential factors in the creation of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement (Jung, 1997).

7.3 The Gwangju Democratisation Movement and ‘city of resistance’

7.3.1 Story of the Movement in 18th May of 1980

Before examining the historical and political background of place marketing policy in Gwangju, the story of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement will be outlined in this section. The story will provide us with the important background to the next parts of the section and the next chapter. The reason is that we could not deeply recognise place marketing policies in Gwangju without understanding the historical

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18 There are some other representative terms for the ‘Gwangju Democratisation Movement’ such as ‘Gwangju Riot’, ‘Gwangju Incident’, ‘Gwangju People’s Uprising’, and ‘5.18’. Of these terms, ‘Gwangju Riot’ or ‘Gwangju Incident’ stemmed from the announcement of Lee Hee-sung, the chief martial law administrator as follow. He stated the movement, at that time, that a “violent incident of rioting has occurred in Gwangju” and since then, some right wing groups have used the term in order to decry the historical meaning of the movement. On the contrary, liberal politicians and civic groups preferred the ‘Gwangju People’s Uprising’ to others because they want to emphasise the spirit of resistance for democracy. Finally, ‘5.18’ means the date of the movement. Each term reflects diverse historical perspectives on the Movement. Throughout this thesis, I have chosen to use the term the ‘Gwangju Democratisation Movement’ as the name is a formal one employed by the Korean government within formal activities like compensation for victims and commemorative ceremony.
event – as we will see a lot of subsequent policy was concerned with either challenging or commemorating what happened.

The former President Park Chung-hee who rapidly industrialised the country during his eighteen-year dictatorship from 1963 to 1979 was murdered by his one of close henchmen, Kim Chae-gyu (the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency) at their secret private meeting on 26th October, 1979. This event led to the collapse of Park’s autocratic government. Many Koreans believed that the military authorities had come to an end with his death, and most citizens expanded their desire for democracy.

Unfortunately, however, things unfolded differently. After the assassination of the autocratic leader Park Jung-hee, two months later, another dictatorial junta was established by a new military leader Chun Doo-hwan’s coup\(^{19}\). This was a retrogressive event which Korean people expected. They had a strong desire to reach the creation of a democratic regime. In the spring of 1980, many university students demonstrated against the military junta all over the country. They asked for the complete clearing of military authorities. They also strongly required the citizens’ direct vote for a new president and the retirement of old politician who supported Park’s military regime with lifting the martial law. In May 1980, the demand for democracy was vastly increasing and conflicts between the military junta and students expanded to a decisive situation. At that time, in the aspects of geography, it was in Seoul and Gwangju that the desire for democracy was most strongly expressed. Gwangju is a city embedded in the influence of the opposition party,

\(^{19}\) Since 1950s, authoritarian military regime which seized political power and established military rule by coup can be divided into ‘Old Military Authorities’ and ‘New Military Authorities’. If Park Jung-hee is the ‘Old Military Authorities’, Chun Doo-hwan and Rho Tae-woo are the ‘New Military Authorities’.
while Seoul is the central city of Korean politics. In particular, Gwangju was the hometown of Kim Dae-joong who could be a political threat to the New Military Authorities as a leader of the opposition party.

On 15th May, a crowd of students numbering more than 20 thousand marched toward the Jella-namdo Provincial Hall and many citizens cheered them on. The next day, more than 50 thousand demonstrators gathered near the fountain in front of the Provincial Hall and on Geumnam Boulevard and they prayed for the realization of democracy with torches. However, the military regime implemented martial law with all its effect over all parts of South Korea on 17th May, 1980 and the situation was quite different. Against the martial law, many university students demonstrated in city centre of Gwangju (near the previous Jella-namdo Provincial Hall) yelling out ‘remove the martial law’ and ‘down with the Chun Doo-hwan’s military junta’ on 18th May (Yoo, 2008). Armed martial troops (special warfare forces and paratroop regiments) with heavy weapons, guns, swords and sticks were deployed to Gwangju. They attempted to brutally crush down the demonstration. However, the demonstrating crowd quickly increased since lots of citizens in sympathy, actively joined the group. The headquarters of the military authorities were embarrassed by the situation and they tried more powerfully to subdue the people. In the end on the morning of 21st May, soldiers fired on them, which resulted in many casualties.

However, it made the situation worse. Even more ordinary people who had previously just observed the event participated in the demonstration and they attacked police stations and munition factories (Park, 2009). They armed themselves
with guns, military truck and armoured vehicles. Many women supported them with food and water, and some people voluntarily contributed their blood to help the injured at hospital (Yoo, 2008). In the afternoon of that day, martial troops battled with the civil militia, which caused more casualties. As the matter had grown more serious, the Martial Law Enforcement Headquarters temporarily withdrew forces.

Over the night, the peaceful rule by the citizens was launched. Citizens organised the Settle Committee, at the Jeonnam (Jella-namdo) Provincial Hall, which took measures such as preparing the dead for burial, clearing streets, providing electricity and water to citizens and keeping the public peace and security. In addition, it implemented citywide rallies asking for the establishment of a democratic government five times from 23rd to 24th May (Yoo, 2008).

However, such peaceful control by the people was too short. On 27th May, the military junta attacked with a large scale unit using tanks to cruelly quell citizen army. As a result, the Martial Law Command retook the Jeonnam Provincial Hall (the headquarters of the civil militia) resulting in heavy casualties for the democratic movement. According to statistics from UNESCO’s record (2011:1-2), “During 10 days of resistance, 165 citizens died in and around Gwangju. 76 people went missing, 3,383 were injured, and 1,476 were arrested, affecting 5,100 in total. In addition, 102 people later died from injuries incurred during the siege. Survivors were far from unscathed with many reporting mental health problems such as auditory hallucinations, somnambulism, obsessive-compulsive behaviours, etc.”
Figure 7.4 Confrontation between citizens and military

(Source: The May 18 Memorial Foundation)

Figure 7.5 Suppression and bloody killing

(Source: The May 18 Memorial Foundation)
Figure 7.6 Arrested and murdered citizens

(Source: The May 18 Memorial Foundation)

Figure 7.7 Bereaved family and burying the dead in Mangwol cemetery

(Source: The May 18 Memorial Foundation)
7.3.2 The Gwangju Democratisation Movement within the context of Korean politics

In relation to the historic meaning of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, Katsiaficas (2003) considers both the Paris Commune in 1871 and the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 1980 as events that showed us the voluntary governing capability of people during the last two hundred years. He pointed out in both their commons citizens had waged war against the government and had peacefully dominated their cities. By accident, both civil militias were suppressed by the government army on the same date, 27th May (Jo, 2010).

The Gwangju Democratisation Movement has some important meanings within the context of Korean politics. First, the Movement was a symbolic event that showed us that the political aspiration of Koreans for democracy had been expanding at that time. On the other hand, it informed people that the New Military Authorities had little democratic legitimacy as it had political power based only on forces. Since the event, many students and citizens remembered the Movement and protested against the military government every year asking for disclosure of the truth about the event and the punishment of related criminals. Consequently, seven years later, a large scale of nationwide opposition to the military regime exploded in 1987 and it led to the wave of democratisation in all societies within South Korea.

Second, the Gwangju Democratisation Movement resulted in the transformation of Koreans’ perception and attitude toward the US. Drawing on the Armistice
Agreement, the Commander of ROK\textsuperscript{20}-US Combined Forces has had Operational Control of South Korea’s Armed Forces since the Korean War\textsuperscript{21}. On the 16\textsuperscript{th} May 1980 (before the outbreak of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement), the Chief of Staff in the South Korean Army, Lee Hee-sung demanded the Operational Control in order to keep national security for a while. The US Commander agreed with this after he discussed the issue with his boss in Washington. Then, in spite of no symptoms of a likely North’s invasion, the US military warned the Korean people that the Gwangju Movement might bring about a return of the North’s southward invasion. That was very influential in making the New Military’s brutal suppression of the Movement legitimised at that time (Gwangju city, 1997). Thus, many Korean people haven’t considered the US as an allied nation since the Movement. Rather, it made a number of intellectuals and progressive citizens in South Korea hold an antipathy against the US even though over 30,000 American troops have maintained their stay in South Korea to defend aggression from North Korea since 1953.

Third, even though the Gwangju Democratisation Movement was one of the most fierce protests, not all Korean people have the same memory of it. Most remembered it as a great resistance in support of democracy, but others considered it as a violent event of rioters who were friendly to North Korea (Jung, 2002). The event resulted in a number of sacrificed lives and it gave serious trauma and mental wounds to surviving victims and their families. Then, the truth of the event was intentionally

\textsuperscript{20} It stands for Republic of Korea, which is a formal name of South Korea.

\textsuperscript{21} The Korean War was a war erupted by sudden southward invasion of the North Communist country between South Korea (supported by UN) and North Korea (supported by Communist China and Soviet Union) from 25 June 1950 to 27 July 1953. The first President in South Korea, Lee Seungmann took over the Operational Control of South Korea’s Armed Forces to the Commander of ROK-US Combined Forces during the War. Due to this war, Korea has been divided into the South and North.
distorted by the military authorities which further damaged survivors. In addition, the perversion of such historic truths resulted in political discrimination of Honam region and its leading city, Gwangju beyond the previous unjustifiably different economic treatment of the region and city. The new military authorities led by Chun Doo-hwan and Rho Tae-woo twisted the truth of the Movement by designating it as a brutal riot simply due to regional emotion of discrimination. At that time, the Movement was described as ‘an armed riot of violent rebels’ by the announcement of the Commander under martial law. They also cut off all sources of information about the event in order to block and distort the truth. All newspapers reported it as ‘an armed riot of violent rebels’ following the direction of the military authorities. It made many Koreans have a distorted perception of the Movement. After the event, during the next seven years, the formal discourse of ‘Gwangju’s violent riot’ which was shaped by the military junta kept it in people’s mind as if it were common sense. Thus, many Koreans misunderstood the political uprising in support of democracy as just a regional conflict. Furthermore, many people considered Gwangju had a bad image such as ‘a city of violent riots’. As a result, the Honam region and Gwangju were alienated from other areas socially and politically until the truths were revealed with the collapse of the military authorities.

Finally, there emerged a positive evaluation that the Movement was a temporal accomplishment of democracy by civic republicanism and it was very valuable event in terms of national democratisation from the early 1990s. With the rise of the
Munmin\textsuperscript{22} Government led by Kim Young-sam, historic re-evaluation of the Movement was quite different than before. As a result, most Koreans recognised that the formal discourse of ‘Gwangju’s violent riot’ by the military regime was completely wrong adding a number of research papers and academic examinations of the Movement. Indeed, many researchers discovered the real political value of the event by vividly representing the historic truths through a series of citizens’ verbal evidence, related historical data and reports of the foreign media. Some scholars compared it to France’s Revolution or the Paris Commune (Jung, 2007; Jo, 2010).

Many foreign scholars and activists have attached some significance to the political value of the Movement. In 2005, Bruce Cummings, a professor at the university of Chicago pointed out in a BBC news report that “through the experience of Gwangju, Koreans escaped the firm grasp of dictatorship and this can be related to a release from the restrictive measures of the United States (Lee, 2010:66).” Edward Baker, former Vice Director of Harvard-Yenching Institute considered it as a historic turning point at which the Korean people changed their attitude on dictatorship and the US at a symposium held in Kim Dae-joong Library in December 2005 (UNESCO, 2011:8). At the 20\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 2007, George Katsiaficas of the Wentworth Institute of Technology in the US noted that the Gwangju Democratisation Movement was a historic lever which pushed South Korea from the dictatorship era to democracy (Lee, 2010). A recipient of the 2005 Gwangju Human Rights Award, Vardah Hafidz (Secretary General of the Urban Poor Consortium in Indonesia) stated that “the human rights advancement post 5.18 (the

\textsuperscript{22} Munmin means that the political regime which was dominated by non-military authorities. Despite coming from the ruling party, Kim Young-sam was one of opposition party leaders until he joined the coalition party with military authorities.
Gwangju Democratisation Movement in Korea is Asian civil rights activists’ prime model and goal (ibid:67).” Moreover, Dandeniya Gamage Jayanthi (Leader of the Monument for the Disappeared in Sri Lanka) emphasised that the Movement was an important fountain of inspiration for human rights conflict (UNESCO, 2011). In this context, we might evaluate that the Gwangju Democratisation Movement was not only a historic and political turning point from authoritarian dictatorship to securing democracy and human rights but also a good example for developing countries which still have not established democratic politics and defended human rights for their people.

7.3.3 The Movement and Gwangju citizens

Despite the failure of the Movement, most citizens in Gwangju take pride in the event. Firstly, since 1980, there were demonstrations asking for democracy by remembering of the Gwangju Movement in May every year. In the end, seven years later, the Korean people won practical measures for democracy such as a direct vote for a new president by the people through a nationwide democratic uprising in June 1987. Gwangju citizens believe that the Gwangju Democratisation Movement of May 1980 was a significant base for the national uprising of June 198723 (briefly called ‘June Uprising’). In fact, the Gwangju Movement stood at the centre of all Korean civic movements for democracy during the 1980s and many people saw a series of democratic protests and movements between May 1980 and June 1987. Much

23 Many citizens and students protested against autocratic and violent governing of military regime led by Chun Doohwan nationwide June in 1987. They argued that stepping down military regime and the amendment of constitution for democratic government. Such strong protests expanded to all over the country. As a result, military authorities were forced to announce the constitutional improvement for people’s direct selection of the next President and amnesty for Kim Dae-joong.
literature argues that the June Uprising was strongly influenced by the Gwangju Democratisation Movement (Yoon, 2006; Jung, 2007; Jung, 2006; Choi, 2005). Secondly, although only for a week, Gwangju citizens remember that there were any serious crimes such as robbing a bank or mall during the peaceful rule of the citizen army. As soon as the military authorities, which were in charge of social security and keeping public peace retreated, then rather, real peace was accomplished. Ironically, crime and violence disappeared and people helped and co-operated with each other. Taxi drivers joined the protest against the military junta; housewives distributed their own home made lunch (rice balls) and food to the citizen militia; and many citizens and students gave their blood to hospital for treating the wounded. They all set up a few barricades together in order to prepare for the military junta’s assault. Then, even if it was for a really short time, they enjoyed peaceful self-governance which they had dreamed about for a long time by themselves.

A Korean professor, Han Hong-gu in Seunggonghei University, stated in his lecture that the Movement “[I]t was an event not easy to witness in human history. It really was marvellous. Despite the release of thousands of weapons, there was no robbery or riots of any sort. Even with the lack of supplies, not one person claimed a store as their own. This, in fact, is Utopia. I have met numerous people in Gwangju who have said to me that they can die in peace, knowing that they lived through it (Lee, 2010:68).” Similarly, a famous painter from Gwangju, Hong Seong-dam mentioned the Movement in an interview with Korean news media saying that “I saw the most perfect world for the 10 days of the uprising. We can live happily with only the ten day’s memory even though we face great suffering. But, others never understand it
(Ohmy-news [Newspaper], 3rd November 2007). The Gwangju Democratisation Movement showed us an exemplary model of a culture based on humanity, compassion and resilience. Even while being confronted with terror from military forces, isolation from other regions and economic difficulty resulting from supply cuts, Gwangju citizens did not resort to violence and instead, mutually co-operated with each other during the movement. They called it ‘Daedong’ (solidarity and distribution) spirit or ‘Owol’ (May) spirit and most of them were very proud of it as a unique identity of Gwangju.

In terms of place marketing, the Gwangju Democratisation Movement has greatly influenced key places for creation of the city image of Gwangju. For instance, some historic sites of the Movement such as Geumnam Boulevard, old Jeonnam Provincial Hall, and Mangwol cemetery of victim’s have became major spaces for tourist destination and a cultural museum within the political process of place making.

7.4 City image of Gwangju

In this section, I explore how the image of resistance formed by the Gwangju Democratisation Movement has been changed for economic development. In particular, the focus of the section is to take a closer look at the process of transformation from the strong and tough city image of democratic uprising to a soft artistic one by manipulative and intentional discourses and activities of political and economic elites. Then, how such an image can be expanded to encompass the
international cultural event, Gwangju Biennale for local economic growth will be considered at the next section.

7.4.1 Gwangju images and the city image as a sacred democratic ground

There have been multiple images symbolising Gwangju. Traditionally, the important components of Gwangju images are the Mudeung Mountain and town of light. The former is the huge mountain (at an elevation of 1,187m above sea level) which is located in the area of Gwangju. The mountain is a place closely connected with citizens’ lives and currently employed as a public park for climbing, hiking and leisure activity. The name of the mountain originated from one of the Buddhist scriptures, Banyasimgyeung means a completely equal world so much that we don’t need the word equality any more (Kim, 2009). The latter has the same meaning of its Chinese letter. Precisely speaking, Gwangju which consists of the Chinese letter which correlated to the Korean word Bitgoeul, a town of light. Currently, the formal symbolic character of Gwangju is ‘Bitdori’ in order to announce Gwangju as a city of light. In addition, the architectural concept of the Asian Culture Complex, one of the most important cases in the thesis is ‘the forest of light’. Gwangju usually has 20 per cent more sunshine than the national average (Kim, 2006), and has attempted to develop photonic industry as a key local industry since the late 1990s. Like so, Gwangju has many symbols and meanings of light within the cityscape. Another element of the Gwangju image is the Gwangju Student’s Independence Movement. As observed in 7.2.1, it was the historic event that demonstrated the Korean people’s resistance to the Japanese imperialism.
However, any images of them had not been dominant in expressing Gwangju identity until the Gwangju Democratisation Movement took place. In addition, negative images of Gwangju as a city of deprived places have emerged since the 1960s. During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of the Gwangju population moved to Seoul and its surrounding region, Gyeonggi to find jobs as there was little industrial base in Gwangju. Thus, there were many poor people from Gwangju within the Seoul metropolitan area. For example, according to the KDI’s (Korea Development Institute) work investigating Seoul residents’ hometown in 1981, twice as many people came from Gwangju and its surrounding region, Jella-namdo than residents from other regions. As a result, Gwangju has increasingly had an image of a place where the poor lived or the hometown of the needy.

To overcome such unfair feelings that people disregard the Honam region and its central city, Gwangju, researchers of this region have attempted to discover the unique good qualities of Honam’s regional culture, art, and history since the 1970s. They have usually investigated the traditional arts and excellent figures. As a consequence, the argument that there were a number of brilliant artists in Honam region and Gwangju emerged, yet it was not resonant with the rest of the regions in South Korea. In addition, such an unfair situation was exacerbated by the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. The Honam region and Gwangju were also suppressed by the New Military regime because the Honam population still supported Kim Dae-joong (the leader of opposition party), a political threat to the New Military authorities. Thus, Honam and Gwangju were more alienated from other regions in terms of
politics while the political identity of this region increasingly differentiated from others after the Movement. It led to a politically evident divergence in Presidential and National Assembly election between regions.

However, the Gwangju Democratisation Movement left many historic assets to city. As examined in the former section (7.2.1), a number of traditional heritages such as Gwangju Eupsung (traditional town wall) were demolished by the Imperial Japanese regime and thus, currently, most Gwangju citizens know little about the traditional appearance of Gwangju. However, new historical sites in relation to the Gwangju Democratisation Movement were shaped by the Movement. Persistent efforts to succeed such sacred historical sites and sprit of Gwangju to next generation have enabled us to conserve the historical value of the Movement through some sort of cherishing event and voluntary artistic display. Despite being held only in Gwangju, 5.18 memorial events, the Geumnan Boulevard art display and the citizen art school were such examples. Yet, these endeavours were often disturbed by the oppression of the military authorities at that time, so distorted reports and images were expressed by formal media to most other regions. Some truths of the Movement, however, secretly and slowly spread into a part of the progressive groups and intellectual circles through informal channels like university clubs, church and civic groups. Although, in particular, university students played a major role in circulating historic facts, many of the rest of the people in South Korea still believed that the Movement was a riot of violent people who were friendly to North Korea according to the formal discourse of ‘Gwangju’s Violent Riot’ manipulated by the military junta.
Since the June Uprising in 1987, however, many truths were revealed and broadly diffused among public people. In 1989, the ‘Gwangju’s Violent Riot’ was officially renamed the ‘Gwangju Democratization Movement’ by the government and then, victims of the Movement began to get national compensation for their losses in 1990. Diverse cultural works such as paint, poetry, fiction, movie and TV drama were made under the theme of the Movement. This series of processes brought about the transformation of people’s perception from a city of violent riot to a holy place of resistance and uprising in support of democracy. Therefore, the most prevailing image of Gwangju was as a city of the ‘Sacred Democratic Ground’ after 1980.

However, for city leaders and business elites, such an image was not good since in terms of place marketing strategy that they would drive for local growth, a city image of resistance was not helpful or possibly even harmful for attracting inward investment. In relation to this, many advanced capitalist cities had negative images such as economic decline and dilapidation, smokestacks, and pollution in the process of world economic restructuring. For instance, as some authors note, one have might imagined the examples of Syracuse’s image of pollution, Glasgow’s of excessive drink and slum (Short, 1996), Liverpool’s of crime, Manchester’s of drug problems, and Birmingham’s of being a cultural wasteland (Hall, 2006:79) during the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, these cities have tried to transform such ‘industrial’ images into ‘post-industrial’ ones through diverse place marketing projects. By contrast in South Korea, Gwangju’s bad images usually came from the different reason of an historic movement. In spite of citizens’ pride for the Movement, a selection of Gwangju city elites must have thought it not useful for their economic
interests, and in the end, it led to consistent pro-growth marketing projects focused toward becoming a global cultural city. As observed in later sections, Gwangju marketing projects have continued to push their activities sponsored by secret central political authorities since the early-1980s.

7.4.2 Forming ‘Yehyang’ discourse for image conversion

As noted in the above section, the Gwangju Democratisation Movement of May 1980 completely changed people’s perception of the Gwangju image to a city of democratic uprising and resistance against the autocratic military regime. However, a part of the business community in Gwangju sought to have other frames of meaning within the Gwangju image. They thought that such ‘a city of resistance’ image little helped local economic development. Accordingly, they have attempted to take away or erase the resistance elements from varied images of Gwangju.

In so doing, what they attempted was the transmutation from ‘a city of resistance’ to ‘a city of Yehyang (a town of traditional art)’. They want to spread out a frame that Gwangju has had abundant traditional cultural assets for a long time. Indeed, Honam region and its leading city, Gwangju had enough cultural resources like Namjonghwa\(^24\), Pansori\(^25\), and calligraphy and many artists such as Hur Baek-ryeon\(^26\), Im Bang-wool\(^27\) and Jung Youl-sung\(^28\). However, Gwangju might not have

\(^{24}\) It is a field of Chinese art which mainly use a black and white drawing and light colouring. Traditionally, Korean art has influenced by China, but it has been developed uniquely.

\(^{25}\) Pansori is a traditional Korean narrative song, which is similar to solo opera or a long epic song.

\(^{26}\) He was a great master of Chinese painting and Uijae Art Museum was established to commemorate him.
been a leading city of traditional culture since there were many other cities of
traditional culture like Gyeongju, Andong, Jeonju and Buyeo in South Korea. In
addition, many Korean people may not agree with the argument that Gwangju was ‘a
city of Yehyang’ and there are a lot of cities which want to be called Yehyang instead
of Gwangju.\textsuperscript{29} Despite such truth, city business elites sought to diffuse their own
frame, Yehyang into Gwangju citizens’ mindset in order to cover the city image of
resistance and fighting for democratisation.

Their making of ‘Gwangju as a Yehyang’ was launched after the Gwangju
Democratisation Movement (Kim, 2008; Kim, 1999). They thought that the Gwangju
image as ‘a city of resistance’ was an obstacle to drawing foreign investments\textsuperscript{30} and
private companies into Gwangju. Thus, they established a committee of Gwangju-
Jeonnam Local Development (briefly called ‘Gigaehyeop’\textsuperscript{31}) and implemented
diverse efforts to block the formation of the image of Gwangju as a city of resistance.
They locally acted a range of dimensional policies of control and appeasement
toward the Gwangju Democratisation Movement for the military regime.
‘Gigaehyeop’ expressed its purpose through its establishment announcement as
following “we, Jeonnam region lamented our poor industry and low income … but
fortunately, the President supported us giving an enormous budget, 344 billion won

\textsuperscript{27} He was a great singer who lamented for the loss of a nation and its people. Im Bangwool Korean
Traditional Music Festival was made to keep traditional music and encourage new Korean classical
music performers.
\textsuperscript{28} A native of Gwangju, Jung Youlsung is one of East Asia’s best musicians. He delivered freedom
and democracy to people through many compositions in China. Every year, Jung Youlsung
International Music Festival is held in Gwangju.
\textsuperscript{29} Such cities are Sangju, Tongyong, Jeonju, Mokpo, Seguipo, Namwon, Iksan, Gochang, Jindo.
\textsuperscript{30} At that time, some Gwangju business groups intended to attract an IBRD loan in order to build the
Hanam Industrial Complex in Gwangju.
\textsuperscript{31} People who participated in ‘Gigaehyeop’ included local business leaders (CEOs of local
newspapers, local bus transportation, alcohol retailers and leather producers) and intellectuals (the
head of the general hospital and graduate school in the university).
[approximately 0.2 billion pounds]… agreed some projects like Yeocheon chemical and Gwangyang steel complexes, as a result, our future is going to be bright. In this context, we local elites gathered and erected a new committee in an attempt to make a base for local economic development and social inclusion (Ji, 2001:184).” The committee pushed Jeonnam authorities to make the committee of attracting manufacturers in November 1985 and held some forums about the investment climate of the region together.

Members of ‘Gigaehyeop’ had a sense of considerable discomfort from people’s perception of Gwangju as a holy place of democracy. For example, on 18th May in 1982, they suddenly made an event, ‘Jeonnam Residents Cohesion Contest’ and mobilised many local people to Mudeung Stadium in order to obstruct the citizens’ ceremony for cherishing the memory of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in Mangwol cemetery. Furthermore, they won some bereaved families of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement over to their side through consolation money or even forced others to move graves out of Mangwol cemetery by threatening them. In other words, they induced victims’ families to bastardly support them saying that they would give some money donated from local businesses to the families if they transferred the victims’ tombs to other places. As a result, 26 graves were exhumed and buried elsewhere since most bereaved family suffered from extreme poverty without any compensation from the military authorities at the time. In response to this behaviour, some of the victims’ families came to the head of ‘Gigaehyeop’s’ house and protested by shouting ‘stop moving graves’ in front of his house. Nonetheless,

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32 This place was a cemetery for the dead in Gwangju Democretisation Movement.
the organisation didn’t stop such wrongdoing. Members of ‘Gigaehyeop’ disturbed the making of a unitary group by Gwangju Movement victims’ through creating groups for military government use. In the end, Victims could not form a unitary organisation (Ji, 2001).

In this process, it appears that ‘Gigaehyeop’ was a sort of growth coalition. However, it was quite different from the US style of growth coalition suggested by Logan and Molotch (1987). Local and urban political conditions were not mature enough to organise voluntary local economic development like the US since Korean cities didn’t have a self-governing system in those days. According to the evidence I gained from my field trip to South Korea, it is likely that the military regime had the Gwangju business elites establish ‘Gigaehyeop’. In an interview with the Hangyre-Sinmun [Newspaper] in South Korea, a member of ‘Gigaehyeop’ noted that “I know….when the Committee [Gigaehyeop] was launched, because public authorities [like Jeonnam and Gwangju governemtn] could not manage the Gwangju Uprising by themselves…. Jeonnam government and National Security Planning Agency established ‘Gigaehyeop’ together under their mutual co-operation (11th Dec 1988, Hangyre-Sinmun [Newspaper])."

In this context, ‘Gigaehyeop’ might be a fictional growth coalition contrived by the central military regime for its political purpose (i.e. distorting the meaning of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and blocking its formation of a sacred history) rather than as a growth machine for purely local economic development. At that time, 33

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33 The organisation was the most national intelligence agency such as US CIA and played a major role to manipulate political election and control local media.
the military authorities very carefully approached the Movement by mobilising a private local organisation because their mobilising of local government could bring about a bigger problem such as civic protest and resistance regarding the Movement. Thus, ‘Gigaehyeop’ did not have voluntary features in its formation within the context of the local political economy. Therefore, it might not be a local growth coalition voluntarily generated from within the area, rather it is likely to have been a political construction body shaped by the New Military authorities (central government) and local business in the process of diluting the Gwangju Movement image of the city as a sacred resistance for democracy.

In addition, ‘Gigaehyeop’ as a local business group have attempted to hide the strong and resistant image of Gwangju with a city image of ‘Yehyang’ (Jung, 1996). In so doing, some people of the organisation in ‘Gwangju-Ilbo’ (newspaper) founded the magazine ‘Monthly Yehyang’ in 1984 and the rest of them established a magazine, ‘Jeonnam Gaebal (development)’. ‘Gwangju-Ilbo’ was the monopolistic press in Gwangju, which was organised by the military junta’s coercive integration of the press in 1980. The local press formally declared that it respects economic development in the local community through its companies’ goal. Its members diffused a discourse of Yehyang (a town of traditional art), which led to the making of ‘Gwangju as a Yehyang’ employing its dominant position within local press society. For instance, ‘Monthly Yehyang’ specifically repeated ‘Gwangju = Yehyang’ by often inserting diverse texts such as ‘why Yehyang?’, ‘shameful Yehyang’ and ‘discourse of Yehyang’. Such activity increasingly formed a public opinion of why Gwangju

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34 Two persons of 14 ‘Gigaehyeop’ organisers belonged to Gwangju Ilbo. They were Kim Jongtae (president of Gwangju Ilbo) and Park Jindong (former vice president of the local newspaper).
should be the Yehyang and how the citizens achieved it. Consequently, it led to the implementation of local authorities. There were two representative policy actions. One was the shaping a ‘Street of Art’ after 1987 and the other was hosting an international art festival, the Gwangju Biennale in 1995. In particular, the Gwangju Biennale was an endeavour to transform the city image from ‘a holy place for uprising and resistance’ to a ‘modern Yehyang (a town of traditional art)’ through the Gwangju marketing strategy for economic growth (Jung, 1996). In addition, <Monthly Yehyang> which represented the perspective of local business and the military authorities employed the public expression that there was a Chinese painting on the wall in a noodle restaurant even within a poor neighbourhood (Park, 2006). Such a frame of Yehyang was increasingly diffused and absorbed into the public consciousness. For example, a member of the Gwangju officials who was interviewed by me explained the formula of Gwangju = Yehyang like it is popular common sense.

“Several decades ago, Gwangju was well known as a city of Yehyang. There were few cafes which had no Chinese painting or calligraphy in Gwangju. At that time, if there was no such thing in those places, people ignored the owners as rude people. Now, Gwangju has become a modern art city through the Gwangju Biennale, in the near future, it will be a cultural hub city of Asia, specifically in the modern art and design field (author interview, interviewed on 9th September 2011).”

35 It is 300meters of street houses galleries, art studios and small theaters. If you walk about 5 minutes from the Asian Culture Complex, you will find it.
In this manner, the discourse of Yehyang was presented not only through some physical spaces and art festivals but also common expressions that general people could easily understand and use.

7.4.3 When ‘Yehyang’ meets ‘Segyehwa’

In the mid 1990s, a meeting forged between the discourse of ‘Yehyang’ and a new political goal of ‘Segyehwa’ of Kim Young-sam’s central government resulted in the Gwangju Biennale which was unfamiliar to local citizens at that time. The two dominant images of sacred democratic grounds and ‘Yehyang’ (a town of traditional art) played a major role in forming Gwangju identity, even though Gwangju had other components of images such as Bitgoeul (a town of light) and Mudeung mount. Considering different periods of history, however, the more powerful elements of Gwangju's image have increasingly changed. There was a certain time marked by the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and then, the image of Yehyang was intentionally emphasised by a local business group. In the process, people’s perception of Gwangju has gradually moved to a soft and artistic image. In particular, an opportunity to accelerate such a trend happened in November 1994. It was President Kim Young-sam’s announcement of ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’. At a later date, the President’s office explained that it meant “a national development strategy in which all of us should be the best in our own field in order to advance national development under the epochal situation that the world is reorganised as a

36 It means globalisation as a governing goal of the Kim Young-sam Government in South Korea in 1995.
borderless global village and the intercourse of locals, firms and peoples as well as that of nations are rapidly increasing (Presidential office, 25th January 1995, cited in Lee, 1995).” When the new policy directions were established towards globalisation in central government, Gwangju authorities launched the ‘internationalisation of Gwangju culture and sports’ as a local growth strategy. Kang Un-tae, City Mayor noted the Gwangju Biennale when announcing the internationalisation strategy in November 1994. One of the local newspapers, Mudeung-Ilbo reported “Large scale international events such as <Pacific Gateball Game> and <Asia-Pacific International Art Festival> [its name was changed to the Gwangju Biennale, author adds] will be held in next year… Mayor, Kang Un-tae told us that I will advance the time of the Honam region’s internationalisation by hosting many international events like these (Mudeung newspaper, 5th November, 1994).” Such an intention of Gwangju City can be identified in an interview with a member of the Gwangju Biennale Foundation as follows.

“From the 1980s to mid-1990s, many 5.18(Gwangju Democratisation Movement)-themed art works and programmes were conducted in Gwangju. However, at that time, it usually appears that the atmosphere of Gwangju was dark and heavy. Thus, there was a need to break or overcome such a city image like that of a city of resistance and darkness by employing an urban tradition like Yehyang…..It [the Biennale, author adds] can cure the wound of the Movement, and such a possibility and capability was very persuasive. In particular, then, it was relevant to the governing goal of Kim Young-sam Government. At that time, central government was implementing Segyehwa (globalisation) and Gibanghwa (localisation). Then, the Biennale was launched as the President really liked it. Under such political background, the Biennale was established, and it became a backdrop and starting point of transforming the city image in terms of city culture and image within Gwangju
(author interview, interviewed on 14th September 2011, a member of the Biennale Foundation).”

To summarise, the Gwangju Biennale started from upgrading ‘Yehyang’ (a town of traditional art) based on a discourse of Yehyang purposely contrived by local business group like ‘Gigaehyup’. Furthermore, it was an intentional attempt to hide the strong and tough image as a city of uprising and resistance and to convert those into a soft and sophisticated image such as ‘Yehyang within the world’ and ‘city of modern art’ through an international art festival.

7.5 Gwangju Biennale

7.5.1 Background

In 1995, Gwangju city government founded the Gwangju Biennale under the aims of ‘image improvement and economic development of Gwangju through a large scale global cultural art event’. The term of ‘Biennale’ was derived from an Italian word. It can be used for all sorts of biennial events, yet it usually tends to be used for international modern art exhibitions and accompanying events held every second year. The first Biennale was held in Venice in 1893, and then such Italian became a usual term in public use (Gwangju Biennale Foundation, 1995:25). Since then, Venice has been well known for its Biennale and international film festival as a city of art and tourism. Following the success in Venice, a number of similar Biennales such as Lyon in France, San Paulo in Brazil, Whitney in the US, Istanbul in Turkey, and
Johannesburg in South Africa have been established. Since the 1990s, globalisation and increasing place marketing of cities have deepened such imitating phenomena of the international art festival. As a result, more and more people have criticised the problems of the Biennale as a global business suggesting it has an indifferent pattern, a repetition of famous artists, and similar display planning (Lee, 2000).

Korean central government formally announced that the festival was organised to commemorate 50 years of Korean Independence and celebrate the Year of Art in 1995. However, it would be a nominal purpose. Rather, it might be shaped to transform the traditional cultural value of Gwangju, Yehyang to a modern city of culture and uplift the Gwangju sprit. In this respect, the historical and political background of the Gwangju Biennale except the formal reasons could be explained as follows.

First, it appears that there was a political consideration to select Gwangju as a hosting city (Chun, 2002; Shin, 2006). At first, Gwangju was not a candidate city on the list of the Ministry of Culture and Sports for the Biennale. Only Seoul, Gyeonggi, and Jeju were candidate cities placed upon the table by the Ministry and the Korean Fine Arts Association (KFAA) (Kuk, 1999). However, Kim Young-sam and his presidential office might have had an influence on Gwangju becoming the nation's first international Biennale city. At that time, much of the Gwangju population demanded rapid resolution measures for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement like revealing the truth of the event, compensating victims, punishing related military officers and launching commemoration projects. Particularly, many citizens strongly
required the establishment of a special law on the Movement rigorously criticising the government’s inactive attitude towards it. The situation was politically a considerable burden to the Kim Young-sam Government since his Government was proud of its identity as a democratic Munmin (non-military or civilian) Government. In this complicated process, Kim’s Government might have intended to pacify Gwangju public opinion by agreeing to the Gwangju Biennale in terms of compensation for the Movement. Indeed, such an intention came true and kept successive measures after the Biennale Festival. Kim Young-sam continued his Government from former Military regimes through ‘Rightly Erecting History’ projects and there was the Gwangju Democratisation Movement within the centre of them. Thus, Munmin Government made efforts to compensate the Movement in order to strengthen such differentiation from previous authoritarian military governments. His Government continued other programmes such as the establishment of a special law for compensating victims and the designation of the date (18th May) as a national commemoration day.

Second, the political autonomy of local and urban government had been increased more and more before the complete implementation of the self-governing system in 1995. In relation to this, Kang Un-tae, the former city Mayor of Gwnagju stated in a related episode in his autobiography that he persuaded the President (Kim Young-sam) as follows. At that time, Kim Young-sam visited Gwangju for an annual tour of

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37 ‘Rightly Erecting History’ was already announced by Kim Young-sam through his special statement 13th May in 1993. In this announcement, he noted the The Gwangju Democratisation Movement as a base of his Munmin Government. Major projects for ‘Rightly Erecting History’ included the demolition of Governor-General Building of colonial Chosun Dynasty in Seoul and Punishment of military officers about Gwangju Movement including former Presidents like Chun Doo-whan and Rho Tae-woo.

38 Self-governing system was partially implemented by the election of city and local councilors in 1991, but it was fully launched by the election vote for city and local mayors in 1995.
inspection. The Mayor said to the President that “Are you emphasising globalisation and localisation in these days? According to your policy direction, I think locals should expand their own unique competitive edges and extend them toward the global market. Such types of measures for globalisation and localisation could be highly relevant to your concept. Thus, I would host an international art festival like a Biennale in Gwangju because, you know, Gwangju is Yehyang and we have many assets and public ethos of traditional art. Then, he added that the President agreed with him saying ‘Right, I think so. Now, our cities have to make an effort by themselves.’” (Donga-Ilbo [newspaper], 4th October 2010).” Through this conversation, we can recognise that the President’s governing guidance toward globalisation and localisation influenced the hosting of the Biennale in Gwangju.

Thirdly, Gwangju city government intended to improve the city’s image and expand local growth based on a discourse of Yehyang, and it might be the most important background to the hosting of the Biennale. In other words, as observed in the above conversation between Kang (Mayor) and Kim (President), the Biennale was an achievement of Gwangju marketing policy based on the ‘Yehyang (a town of traditional art)’ discourse which was connected with the ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’ of central government, and ultimately led to local economic development through the commodification of art. Indeed, within the dialogue, Kang, the Mayor, emphasised Gwangju’s image as that of a city of ‘Yehyang’ and he persuaded the President noting the logic of global competition among cities. In addition, the argument that Gwangju’s image should be improved for local economic development was
persuasively suggested in a panel discussion\textsuperscript{39} in Gwangju. The discussion was held with the university institute’s study results\textsuperscript{40} of Jeonnam (including Gwangju) image. In particular, the assertions that many firms tended to avoid investment due to the bad image of Gwangju and that to overcome it, Gwangju would have to create a new image employing cultural instruments like the Biennale, as an international event were strongly raised from participants of media and business groups (Shin, 1998). In this context, we can recognise that the Gwangju Biennale was organised with an intention to reshape the poor city image into an international and modern one by city government along with local media and business people. It can also be identified in an interview given by Kang, City Mayor to a local newspaper.

“At that time, I created the Gwangju Biennale with a view to making a global cultural product by using the local merit and characteristic of Yehyang….I drew promises to support us totalling 40 billion won [approximately 2.5 million pounds] from local companies like Nasan (CEO An Byung-kyun) and Duksan (CEO Park Sung-sup) and announced the event plan to press and media. Then, in spite of much opposition, I won the hosting of the event from central government [Ministry of Culture and Sports] defeating the Seoul Biennale…. Then, I did my best to produce a successful event (Goodnews people, 6th October 2010).”

However, it was not just an attempt to improve city image for city tourism. It extended its territory to the culture industry beyond cultural tourism. Kang Un-tae, City Mayor who created the Biennale revealed the ultimate intention in establishing the event in

\textsuperscript{39} The discussion on ‘The Future of Gwangju and Jeonnam in 21C’ was held in Gwangju March in 1995. Here, some political and economic experts participated in the meeting.

\textsuperscript{40} According to the findings of the research institute (Jeonnam, Seoul and Busan National University social science institute), many respondents indicated ‘the lack of central government support’ and noted ‘political environment (30.7%)’, ‘business leaders’ prejudice (27.1%)’, ‘economic underdevelopment (19.3%)’, and ‘labour or student movements (12.1%)’ as the reasons for low company investment.
a lecture given in June 2007 noting “The reason why I set up the Gwangju Biennale was not only to hold an international art festival every other year but also to boost the culture industry based on the design industry (Yeonhap news, 8th June 2007).” Thus, Gwangju might be created through the reimaging of city toward local economic growth. Indeed, Gwangju branched into a Design Biennale which blatantly expresses its aim as to boost the culture industry and the local economic growth matched up with the creator’s intention. This will be further examined in a later section.

7.5.2 Brief overview of the Gwangju Biennale

The Gwangju Biennale is usually held over about 3 months. It consists of international modern art, festival performances, an international academic symposium, and other events. City authorities newly built the Biennale hall with 3.7acres of space for display, an art museum and a folk museum. They employed Jungoi Park (580 acre) as a location for the festival. The Gwangju Biennale started in 1995 and the 8th event was in 2010. It is the biggest cultural festival yet in Gwangju. As seen in Table 7.1, it has been held in every second year and over 100 artists from 30-40 countries participate. Since 2005, however, Biennales have been held in Gwangju every year by the creation of the more commercialised Design Biennale. In relation to a selecting theme of display of the Gwangju Biennale, the international and western oriented ‘Beyond the Boundary’ from the first contest was not relevant to the local character and spirit. Thus, it led to intense opposition like the Anti-Biennale from local groups and artists. Then, it has been gradually changed toward a local character joining with some people involved in the Anti-Biennale, even though it
still lacks the Gwangju spirit and a local quality. In addition, the Gwangju Biennale had difficulty in differentiating itself from other ones such as Yokohama, Taipei, Shanghai, and other domestic festivals. As a result, to choose a unique theme connected with Gwangju became more difficult than before.

**Table 7.1 Overview of the Gwangju Biennale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Participants (country/artist)</th>
<th>Visitor (ten thousand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>20 May ~ 20 Nov 1995 ‘Beyond the Borders’</td>
<td>50 / 249</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>1 Sep ~ 27 Nov 1997 ‘Unmapping the Earth’</td>
<td>35 / 257</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>29 Feb ~ 7 Jun 2000 ‘Man + Space’</td>
<td>46 / 245</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>29 Mar ~ 29 Jun 2002 ‘Pause’</td>
<td>31 / 325</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>10 Sep ~ 13 Nov 2004 ‘Grain of Dust, A Drop of Water’</td>
<td>41 / 237</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>8 Sep ~ 11 Nov 2006 ‘Fever Variations’</td>
<td>32 / 127</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>5 Sep ~ 9 Nov 2008 ‘Annual Report: A year in Exhibitions’</td>
<td>36 / 127</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>3 Sep ~ 11 Nov 2010 ‘10000 Lives’</td>
<td>31 / 134</td>
<td>49(^{41}) (estimate)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A number of audiences have visited the Biennale. Particularly, over 1.6 million people visited the first time. The reason is that the city government forced and mobilised many school (elementary, middle and high) students to see the event.

\(^{41}\) This is an estimate from newspaper (News Town, 2010.11.8)
Then, however, the figure decreased to half or below half this first audience since mobilising students was changed from ‘by coercion’ to a ‘strongly recommended’.

7.6 Multi-scale actors and contested visions

7.6.1 Diverse actors in the Biennale

In terms of spatial scale, the Gwangju Biennale was limited to a local scale. It was suggested in connection to the ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’ of the Kim Young-sam government and it was one of the important projects on a local scale to support the policy direction of on the national scale. However, some artists had concern about the success of the cultural festival since the Tokyo Biennale failed in 1952 and there was had been no further Biennales in Asia since that time (Kim, 2001). Nonetheless, as we can see from the figures in Table 7.1, the first Biennale in Gwangju attracted huge visitors. And then, the city authorities have managed to hold it eight times. In addition, global influence made an impact on the transfer of policy for the Gwangju Biennale. At the time of its establishment, the Gwangju Biennale was greatly influenced by Venice. On 15\textsuperscript{th} October 1994, the planning director of the Venice Biennale visited Gwangju and introduced their overview to city officials and Biennale Foundation members. Then, they transferred Venice’s know-how to them while taking a look around the sites of the Gwangju Biennale (ibid). Thus, we can guess that the Gwangju Biennale members learned much from the Venice team.
In this project, the city authorities, the Biennale Foundation, and the Organising Committee played leading roles. Central government organisations (the Presidential Office and the Ministry of Culture and Sports) were also involved in and made the final decision of whether the project would be launched or not. Some organisations such as the Chamber of Commerce and the Citizen Supporting Committee (thereafter refer to as ‘CSC’) stressed the economic importance of the project in order to support the city authorities’ policy to host the Biennale. Meanwhile, the other party composed of a number of cultural groups and civil organisations like the Gwangju Minyechong (Democratic artist organisation), the Biennale Citizen Emergency Committee, and the Gwangmigong (Gwang and Jeonnam artist community) planned and drove the Anti-Biennale.

However, central government was not favourable to the Gwangju Biennale from the start. In 1994, public officials in the Ministry of Culture and Sports examined other places like Seoul, Gyeonggi, and Jeju as possible host cities. Particularly, they prepared it having Seoul in mind. Nonetheless, the Gwangju City Mayor, Kang Un-tae, pushed to host the Biennale obtaining the acknowledgment of the Presidential Office in advance. In the process, he persuaded them of the need for Gwangju winning the Biennale bid by emphasising the possible healing of the wounded mind left from the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and the city’s identity as a Yehyang. Then, this caused a conflict between the MCS and the Gwangju city government. Regarding this, the local newspaper Gwangju-Ilbo described that “at that time, the Minister Lee Min-seop verbally abused the Gwangju City Mayor, Kang Un-tae ‘Do whatever you want [without my help]’ throwing down his notebook (21st
November 1995).” However, after the visit of the President, Kim Young-sam to Gwangju in February 1995, such conflict was dramatically resolved. The City Mayor, Kang persuaded him to support Gwangju explaining his will to promote Kim’s policy direction, ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’ through the Gwangju Biennale.

The President agreed it at a luncheon meeting in the city, saying that “Gwangju citizen! I think the Gwangju Biennale should be a national event as a cultural art Olympic which would be comparable to the Daejeon Expo, but I heard that central government didn’t acknowledge the related budget and personnel to implement it. I will fully support it right now and hope you will make it a success with pride (Donga-Ilbo [Newspaper], 4th October 2010). With this momentum, the conflict between the MCS and the city government was completely cleared up and was followed by diverse supports from the central Ministries. In particular, the Minister of Education commanded schools nationwide to visit the Gwangju Biennale as a required site of a school trip aiming for a number of 1.2 million student visitors (Kim, 1999). As a result, the first Biennale welcomed over 1.6 million people and such mobilising of students might have played a major role in the event.

The first Biennale in Gwangju was not achieved only by the support of central government. Many local business people contributed to it. They occupied many seats in the Biennale Foundation and the CSC (Citizen Supporting Committee) and actively backed up the festival. For instance, the CSC (304 people) consisted of 165 business and financial people, 99 local councillors, other public organisation managers, and military chief officers. In addition, Duksan and Nasan business firms
promised to donate property for the Biennale Exhibition Hall and after the event, city authorities received 3.5 million pounds from many local companies (ibid).

7.6.2 Forming tensions between parties

Policy is a serial process of agenda setting, decision making, implementation and evaluation. Various actors and stakeholders are involved and the process tends to be a complicated process. Within such a complicated process, diverse actors contest, conflict and co-operate with each other often having different perspectives and views. Thus, such a policy process naturally leads to some tensions among actors and the knots of these tensions tend to be expressed when a policy is constructed through contestations and conflicts of actors’ interests.

Also in the Gwangju Biennale, two parties formed a sharp tension. There was competition between the party which was for the festival and the other party against it.

The former attempted to transform the city image from one of resistance into an internationally polished one. They endeavoured to attract more tourists and refined tough image. For example, the Chief Executive of the Chamber of Commerce represented this position, saying that “to hold the event, it will cause the improvement of citizens’ pride and relationships with international society and our economy will be revitalised. If one million tourists came and spent 5.5 pounds per individual here, we could make a total of 550 million pounds (Kim, 1999:81).”
However, their economic trial sparked the strong opposition of some local and artists groups since they thought of the resistant spirit of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement as a local symbolic quality. The major criticisms of the party against the Gwangju Biennale were these two. First, they thought the goal of event should be changed from promoting economic growth in the city to reflecting the ‘Daedong (solidarity and distribution)’ spirit of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. Second, they made the criticism that there were few open discussions about the international festival. They thought that pure artistic groups and people should be the hosts of the event rather than city the authorities. Thus, the marketing policy of the city government evolved in an unexpected direction conflicting their visions and values between the two parties. The Biennale was an arena for conflicts about Gwangju's images and the democratic decision making between them (Shin, 1998).

7.7 Conflict: Biennale vs. Anti-Biennale

7.7.1 Local marketing toward event nationalism

In the context of relationship between central and city government, the Gwangju Biennale could have been a common interest. Nationally, the Presidential Office and MCS (Ministry of Culture and Sports) wanted to make it a success in order to promote the globalising of local cities. The MCS had a five year-plan which was established in 1992 to create an international art event. Then, after the President's suggestion for ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’, many cities like Seoul, Jeju, and Gwangju
were putting themselves forward in the competition for the winning of the Biennale bid. Meanwhile, Gwangju city government, the Biennale Foundation and local business groups tried to use the event as an opportunity to change the city image for local economic growth. Within this context, the city authorities needed central government’s support such as mobilising student visitors, and central public leaders and officials also wanted local authorities’ aid against the local pressure of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. This contextual situation might have enabled them to co-operate around the Biennale. In addition, the city authorities ardently upgraded ‘Yehyang (a town of traditional art)’ into the international and modern ‘Culture and Art Olympics’ and such Gwangju marketing was greatly suited to the Presidents’ governing suggestion, ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’. Thus, even though its space was limited to a city, they attempted to jump up the scale from local place marketing to the nationalism of ‘Culture and Art Olympics’.

7.7.2 Conflicting meanings in local scale

Against the international Biennale marketing of the city authorities, some radical groups and local artists scathingly criticised it. For them, a desirable art event in Gwangju should be one in which they could keep and sublimate the values of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement such as the protection of human rights and the ‘Daedong (solidarity and distribution)’ spirit. Thus, they hosted the Anti-Biennale in Mangwol cemetery during the time of the Gwangju Biennale in 1995. A member of the Biennale Foundation described the situation as follows:

42 They called it ‘Tongil Misulje (Unification Art Event)’ in Korean, but they formally announced it as the Anti-Biennale in English.
“This Biennale was a very unfamiliar western event and on the other hand, through the emerging Munmin government, Gwang citizens highly expected a thorough investigation about what happened in the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. But such activities were not going well and suddenly strange Biennale was launched..... So, there are many people who suspected whether it had a real motives such as hiding the 5.18 [Gwangju Democratisation Movement] issue. But we don’t have enough time to prepare a large-scale international art event in 6 months. So, whether they criticised us or not, we had no option but to push it. Anyway, we thought it possible because we had a cultural tradition of and pride in Yehyang (author interview, 14th September 2011)."

Even though Yehyang was an intentionally shaped tradition by the government and local business elites, the host people of the Gwangju Biennale thought it could be a cultural base from which they deserved to hold the event.

By contrast, a member of the Gwangmigong which had participated in the Anti-Biennale criticised the lack of local identity in the Gwangju Biennale of the city authorities, saying that “Once they hold the Biennale in Gwangju, we suggested them to do a ‘Human Rights Biennale’. And we told them that they should need more time and citizen participation to prepare it in order to emphasise Gwangju’s unique image, because it’s a sacred democratic place. But, they just pushed it [the Gwangju Biennale].... And also, due to the sudden introduction of the Biennale, many citizens had doubts about it. For example, they very much questioned whether the city authorities were attempting to dilute out Gwangju’s spirit and values. There were quite a few people who were angry because of it (author interview, 14th October 2011).” They also criticised the formal event in that it became a non-historical one
with no connection to the Gwangju Democratisation Movement since the city authorities only pursued internationalisation and promoting tourism. In the Anti-Biennale, they staged a Korean traditional type of opening ceremony (Madang-nori) which included delivering a Korean coffin, playing the Korean flute, and other folk performances to express a meaning opposite to the Western type of Gwangju Biennale. Particularly, their ceremony of the Korean coffin also meant to pacify victims of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. They displayed a number of paintings and sculptures themed on the Movement around Mangwol cemetery. It seemed that the response of local residents was not bad. For example, according to the Donga-Ilbo [newspaper], there were many visitors (over 200 thousand in two weeks) and they left some memos like ‘if someone asks about the future of the nation, let them see Gwangju’, ‘Segyehwa [globalisation] without resolving the Gwangju issue is false’, and ‘Demand to investigate the Gwangju Democratisation Movement’ (Donga-Ilbo, 11th October 1995).

**Figure 7.8 Anti-Biennale pictures**

![Anti-Biennale pictures](source: Kim, 2001:212(left, Sangyeo ceremony), 217(right, display))
However, in relation to the formal Gwangju Biennale, the people hosting Anti-Biennale could not sustain the energy to keep its resources, personnel running the Anti-Biennale, and scale. Regarding this, an interviewee explained to me the difficulty they faced, saying that “money was the most important problem, there was a money problem. And also, we shaped the exhibition space around Mangwol cemetery by ourselves..... We couldn’t draw pictures during the time and we had to protect our work from possible robbery and damage. If it was rainy, we had to remove them. So, we couldn’t continue our artistic activity (author interview, a member of Gwangmigong, 14th October 2011).” As a result, the situation was more favourable to the formal Biennale festival rather than the Anti-Biennale since the city authorities, the Biennale Foundation and business groups had much more resources. In addition, it might have influenced the rising visitor numbers to the event that the
city authorities nationally appealed to people to support this as a ‘Culture Olympics’. There were a number of placards which were written with the slogan: ‘Establishment of the Gwangju Biennale, the World Culture and Art Olympics’ everywhere in the city and the city authorities selected the theme of the first formal Biennale, ‘Beyond the Borders’ for the internationalisation of the city. Through this series of behaviours, they attempted to gain support for the event by manipulating it as a nationally mobilised international event far beyond just a local marketing one. In other words, they overcame the opposition of the Anti-Biennale party through scale jumping from the local issue of a Biennale to the nationwide issue of a ‘Culture Olympics’ = Biennale.

By contrast, the people who hosted the Anti-Biennale failed to effectively expand the scale of their event from an art event based on local history to a more universal one such as the Biennale for human rights, peace and democracy. They did not try to appeal to other people who lived in other cities. Rather, they were busy in keeping Mangwol cemetery which was only a place in the local area. Thus, the Anti-Biennale was not expanded to encompass national or global visions and values since its host people failed to diffuse its broader meanings and values such as the ‘Daedong (solidarity and distribution)’ spirit, human rights, and peace to many other citizens.

In addition, this case can be examined in term of the relationship between ‘macro-necessity’ and ‘micro-diversity’ (Jessop, Peck, and Tickell, 1999:149) which suggested by Jessop’s alternative approach (see 5.2) related to local growth politics. The Gwangju Biennale as a representative place marketing policy of Gwangju was
created by a combination of ‘Yehyang (a town of traditional art)’ discourse (manipulated by pseudo- or quasi-local growth coalition in the name of ‘Gigaehyup’) and neo-liberal ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’ of the Kim Young-sam Government. Accordingly, the Gwangju Biennale might be recognised as a westernised cultural festival led by the economic interests of local business elites within the wider context of globalisation. Thus, I suggest that this example should be understood within the dialectic context between the broader phenomenon of globalisation and ‘Yehayang’ discourse as locally mobilised economic interests.

7.8 Conflict co-ordination and consequences of the Gwangju Biennale

7.8.1 Conflict co-ordination in the Gwangju Biennale

Co-ordination or co-optation?

The Gwangju Biennale absorbed Kang Yeon-kyun, the head of the Anti-Biennale who had planned and actively led opposition activities in one of the key positions at the 2nd Biennale. Some of the people who supported his vision with a negative attitude toward the Gwangju Biennale followed his route, and subsequently joined in the government festival of Gwangju Biennale. The Anti-Biennale became one of the special events in the 2nd Gwangju Biennale. Its English name was also changed from the Anti- Gwangju Biennale to the Gwangju Reunification Art Festival. In regard to this situation, a member of the Biennale Foundation stated that “while many people in Minjoong [people] Art rejected and opposed the 1st Gwangju Biennale, some of
them participated in the 2nd…. I presume that they thought that only by their efforts, they could not change anything in the Biennale. So, instead, they joined the festival in order to reflect their legitimacy and artistic mind in the formal festival. In particular, it was decisive that Kang yeon-kyun, the head of Minjoong Art in Gwangju changed his role and position as a major supporter for the second Biennale. In other words, he became the head of the Gwangju Museum of Art and the secretary-general in the Gwangju Biennale. Then, due to his new position within the Biennale, conflicts between the Biennale and Anti-Biennale were co-ordinated (author interview, interviewed on 14th September 2011, a member of the Biennale Foundation).”

In contrast to this, a person who belonged to the Gwangmigong had a different interpretation of the situation. “The expression of ‘was co-ordinated’ is completely wrong, they conciliated opposite opinions by throwing some money at us. So, after the first Gwangju Reunification Art Festival [Anti-Biennale], we didn’t like to resist against them any more without a head person….. And also we didn’t have the willpower to stick at it. What can we use it for? What is its meaning?” And, he added that “When we were preparing the second, a suggestion was received. OK. Let us see it. Then, we argued that you [the city government] should treat us as formal artists and if you don’t want to let the Mangwol cemetery be vacant, you should support us as we want. The 2nd Reunification Art Festival was shaped by us to toughly express our thinking that the Biennale should be like this. However, it was hard to stick it within the formal Biennale. And citizens and the media also lost their attention to our activity. Consequently, we could be placated by their money (author interview, interviewed on 14th October 2011, a member of the Gwangmigong).
argued it was not a co-ordination but only a co-optation made by money and a formal position. Co-ordination or co-optation by absorbing the local Anti-Biennale into the international Biennale was a critical opportunity to dilute the symbolic meaning and image of a city dedicated to democracy. Since then, Gwangju’s image as a Yehyang and modern culture city has been increasingly naturalised within Gwangju and South Korea.

**Relationship between the Yehyang discourse and Gwangju Biennale**

It is an interesting fact that even though the nickname of Yehyang Gwangju was contrived by a small number of local businesses and press groups (supported by military government), most Gwangju citizens do not oppose it now. Furthermore, the term of Yehyang Gwangju is often used by the national media and people as well as by the local newspapers and population. To my surprise, however, I discovered the fact that some Gwangju citizens still don’t agree with it or actually doubt it during my field visit to Gwangju. According to Song (2007) and my following interview results of Gwangju residents, such arguments might be acknowledged.

“Actually, is there a traditional culture in Gwangju? Gossaum in Gwangsangu… It is a thing of expanded boundary in Gwangju. There is no palace and…. I don’t know how the watermelon becomes a symbolic thing of Gwangju (Song’s interview, 2007, 42 year old woman).”

“I think Gwangju is an irony and strange all the time. It is ironic. People call it Yehyang Gwangju, but there is little Yehyang [traditional art and culture] and such mind in the city (Song’s interview, 2007, 32 year old woman).”
“Unexpectedly, when my colleague soldiers asked me about tour attraction sites in Gwangju during my military service, I couldn’t actually answer them. It is a problem. We often call our city as one of culture and art city, but there are few things here about culture and art. All Gwangju people know the street of art is not really one and Gwangju has no unique cultural thing. Yet, it is not desirable to suggest how about going to Mangwol cemetery (Song’s interview, 2007, 32 year old man).”

“In terms of city marketing, I am not sure that it is a good city [as a tourist attraction] for people coming to Gwangju… In this regard, I think that when most people come in here, they tend to be disappointed. Additionally, I don’t have any sites to recommend to others in my mind. Why do you think the city is Yehyang and a culture city? (author interview, interviewed on 21th September 2011, a city councillor)”

These interview answers might be evidence of the fact that the Yehyang (a town of traditional art and culture) image of Gwangju is just a shaped truth and so it could not reflect the reality of the city. In addition, the discourse of Yehyang discloses a few real meanings about Gwangju. First, it was an attempt to divert the association: Gwangju = the Democratisation Movement or bleeding uprising for democracy into another theme like culture. Its ultimate goal was economic growth. The discourse played an intermediary role to draw a new issue of local development whilst hiding the image of sacred place for democracy. As a result, many historic sites like Mangwol cemetery and the old Jeonnam Provincial Hall have degenerated into one of the tour sites to attract visitors rather than a place for historic education and memory. Secondly, the Yehayang discourse supported by the military junta had a very political aim and led to the international Biennale as a form of political marketing of Gwangju for local political and business interests. Proponents for the Yehyang
Gwangju asserted the Gwangju Movement should not be a hot issue any more in the city through their inaction about responding to revealing 5.18 truths and making a special law. Their logic of Yehyang discourse seemed to keep people paying attention to the Biennale. Therefore, it appears the discourse of Yehyang influenced holding the Biennale and the Gwangju Biennale played a major role in producing an upgraded version of Yehyang, a discourse of culture city.

7.8.2 Diverse results of the Gwangju Biennale

Changing city image

The Gwangju Biennale was a key catalyst within the transforming process from a ‘city image of resistance’ symbolising Korean democracy and collective justice toward a ‘city image of contemporary and global art’. Its final goal was urban economic development employing a cultural art festival. A Korean newspaper noted the impact and meaning the Gwangju Biennale had on the city image as follows.

"<The 95 Gwangju Biennale> was very meaningful because it positioned Yehyang Gwangju as an international cultural city and displayed our cultural capacity to the world..... We had already advertised our level of sports and science to all countries through the Seoul Olympics in 1988 and the Expo in 1993. Thus, the Gwangju Biennale was not an event of only Gwangju citizens but an opportunity to inform the international society of our cultural capacity (Kyunghyang Shinmun [newspaper], 20th November 1995)."

As observed in the press news at that time, however, the Biennale was not just such a meaning. Another huge result was the marching for a new discourse of the culture
city. On the one hand, it produced the Gwangju Design Biennale like a brother of the Gwangju Biennale. On the other hand, it also influenced the creation of the Asian Cultural Hub City, which was a larger scale cultural project shaped by the State and city government. The former blatantly emphasised the local economy and culture industry, and the latter caused bigger controversies in Gwangju society. Here, I explore the relationship between the Design Biennale and the design industry and the latter will be examined in the next chapter.

*The Gwangju Design Biennale, the design industry and marketing employing design*

It seems that the Gwangju Biennale has focused on promoting tourism rather than boosting the cultural industry. However, it was complemented by the creation of more industry-oriented Design Biennale. Gwangju city authorities went forward to the cultural industry by establishing the Design Biennale. This Biennale blatantly emphasised its connection with the design industry. In 2002, Park Gwang-tae, the former city Mayor stated that “In order to boost the design industry, I will launch the building of a design centre, a design business incubator, a specialised design street and a design biennale by investing 80 million pounds (Hangook Gyungje newspaper, 14th July 2001).” The Design Biennale was started in 2005. Despite its artistic character, city authorities employed the Kim Dae-joong Convention Centre which usually hosted industrial exhibitions for private firms as its main display. Its focus of display was industry and advertisement design. Furthermore, in 2007, the Art Director asserted the importance of design industry within the Design Biennale as follows. “The aim of this 2nd Design Biennale is to make a new opportunity for design
convergence industry (ibid).” In addition, many commercialised displays like ‘premier design products’ and ‘industry design exhibition’ were conducted at the event.

In contemporary cities, the popularity of design is not bounded by the area of an industry and product. In many Western cities, design is closely connected with the marketing of public spaces. Design is one of the urban make-up strategies of neoliberal place marketing. That is to say, design tends to be used not only as a promoting tool for increasing consumption but also an urban discourse of neo-liberalism.

In cities like New York, public design has often been used for building aesthetic landmarks displacing dirty homeless people and street stalls. For example, as Zukin (1995:135) described in her book of <The Cultures of Cities>, 42nd Street of Times Square in New York has been transformed by an art themed-redevelopment plan of UDC (Urban Development Corporation) from a low-income class area with pornographic movie houses into a commercialised culture with tourist facilities. Smith (1992) noted that fierce battles occurred between the police and homeless people because of the commercial development (for developers) which was part of the process of gentrifying the area around Tompkins Square Park in New York. In recent years, such phenomena have increasingly taken place in Korean cities. In Seoul, city authorities expelled many street booths into and around Dongdaemun stadium when shaping the artificial Chunggye River (a restored city watercourse) as a large-scale urban spectacle. A few years later, the Seoul government moved them out again from the stadium in order to transform it into a Design Museum during the campaign:
Design Capital Seoul. As such, neo-liberal place marketing based on public design often results in the spatial politics of exclusion and selectivity for small numbers of city elites. Many other cities have followed Seoul’s urban design and Gwangju has also done so. In the context of urban design, improvement project signboards have been implemented in city centre and special lighting was established in some streets like the Street of Art (see Figure 7.10). However, some citizens have a negative opinion about them since they considered them a waste of tax. According to a Korean newspaper, most merchants and dealers (82%) in the Street of Art wanted the removal of the special lighting (Newsis, 22nd December 2010). As a result, the Dong-gu government decided to get rid of it very recently (December 2010) since they could not endure the resident’s endless complaints.

**Figure 7.10 Biennale Bridge (left) and Street of Art (right)**

[Source: http://www.gb.or.kr (left), Newsis, 22nd December 2010 (right)]
Increasing Biennales and their effects

In the aspects of scale and visitors, the Gwangju Biennale might be considered somewhat successful. So, many other cities imitated and emulated it. According to Ju Yoon-sil’s study (2008), there are Biennales in as many as 11 cities in South Korea including Gwangju. However, it is uncertain whether they have delivered good effects for their local residents. In relation to this, Noh Hyeong-suk criticised the increasing of Biennales in a forum of the Korean Art Magazine, Art Management saying that the “political desire of city governments is joining a desire of the art market. Recently, a Korean Biennale showed this boldly. Many well-known collectors and directors of the US and Europe came together at the Gwangju Biennale. As a result, I think the host of the Biennale and the major galleries were busy making a place for their social meeting. I felt that it was ‘only their party and festival’. It was not a place for communicating with domestic artists and critics. I felt that the event was a like the ebb and flow of the sea unconnected with us (Weekly Art Magazine, 26th November 2010).” Thus, if his argument is true, Korean Biennale festivals might be conducted for only certain groups and city governments rather than for the general local people.

In this context, the diverse results of the Gwangju Biennale are critically examined although some authors in South Korea evaluated its effect positively. Firstly, some interviewees of mine noted, as a positive consequence, that the city image had

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43 They are the Gwangju Biennale and Design Biennale, the Busan Biennale, the Chungju International Crafts Biennale, the Seoul International Media Biennale, the International Print Biennale, the Gyeonggi International Ceramics Biennale, the International Calligraphy Jeonbuk Biennale, the International Woman Art Biennale, the Pochun Asia Biennale, the Keumgang Nature Art Biennale.
increasingly changed from the resistant and dark to the soft. They argued that
Gwangju had transformed its image into modern and international city beyond
traditional Yehyang along with the Biennale. However, it might be a naive evaluation
to interpret only this change of image as a success since it may hide the Gwangju
spirit and symbolic image of sacred place of democracy, in connection with the
active involvement of State power agencies and local government. In addition, many
spontaneously generated festivals from the Gwangju Democratisation Movement
have increasingly disappeared during the process of international Gwangju
marketing projects focused on local growth. Furthermore, as a local reporter noted,
citizens’ collective values and civic historic pride have faded.

“There is a changed landscape in comparison with the past of over ten years
ago. Every May, a large number of workers, farmers, students and disabled
men and women voluntarily gathered in the Geumnam Boulevard in Gwangju.
It was an evening of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. They put
many placards into the streets and distributed prints to express and appeal
about their unfairness and sadness…. But this landscape has disappeared
now. I think the spatial characteristics of Gwangju enabled such meetings
every year….. Now, people have become spectators of not participants in the
festivals of Gwangju. Manipulated and shaped stages are left in here, now
we don’t have our previous voluntary events that many citizens willingly
wanted to join in with. Now, those festivals are left only in my memory (author
interview, interviewed on 15th September 2011).”

Second, the Gwangju Biennale as a modern and international upgrade of Yehyang
might little influence upon citizen’s daily life while some people argued it was a base
for city branding and a future culture industry to promote the local economy in
Gwangju. Rather, it was an opportunity for the city authorities to expand a series of
more international events: the Design Biennale, the International Light Expo, the Jung Youl-sung International Music Festival, the Im Bang-wool Korean Traditional Music Festival, and the International Culture Creative Industry Exhibition. However, most interviewees of mine were sceptical about the effect of the Biennale on citizens’ economic life. For example, a local newswoman stressed there was little impact of the Biennale on residents’ lives, saying:

“As one of the citizens, I don’t think the effect of the Biennale has been positive over the last 15 years in Gwangju. Rather, it has not had a good impact on citizens’ daily life, in particular the economic aspect….. Staging such cultural festivals and events haven’t made our economic and cultural life better….. The size of the Biennale organisation has been smaller, even if the scale of event has been larger. Due to the economic recession, professional staff and personnel related to the event were dismissed and even the overall organisation has been downsized. In contrast, work has been increased constantly. Now, the city government added the Design Biennale onto the previous Biennale, so Biennales are held in Gwangju in every year….. So, in my opinion, Biennale has had little influence on employment and tourism in our city in spite of its increasing scale. Rather, its economic impact might be relatively decreasing more and more over time. That is, it seems such cultural projects like the Biennale have little effect on the economic life of residents (author interview, interviewed on 15th September 2011).”

In addition, even though the Gwangju Biennale has large number of visitors, these might be exaggerated. Particularly, the number of visitors in the first year was over 1.6 million and drawing on this figure some Korean authors consider the Biennale successful. However, as we observed in the previous section, a great part of those visitors were students coercively mobilised by the government. In the first Biennale, the proportion of foreign visitor was just 1.5% of audience while the host had
expressed it as an international festival and even a cultural art Olympics (Kim, 2001). In this respect, my interviewee criticised it as a wasteful festival for obtaining international prestige saying that “for example, if we turned the money for the Biennale, with no smell of Gwangju, to making just 50 working studios for poor artists, it would have a much more productive effect on our cultural industry (author interview, a local artist, 14th October, 2011).” Rather, he argued it would be much better if the city government used the expenditure given to the consuming festival of the Biennale (over 10 million pounds every two years) to other creative cultural facilities like artist studios and welfare services for supporting deprived or disabled people.

Third, some people regarded increasing the opportunity and local art facilities for enjoying modern art as one of the Biennale’s positive effects. However, others criticised the Biennale’s cultural impact. They argued that the Biennale made the art activity of local artists sink into atrophy and decrease support for other cultural fields such as music and dance in Gwangju (Kim, 2001). In the Biennale, there were few works from Gwangju artists, and rather, during the time of the Biennale local artists’ individual displays disappeared. In addition, local artists who belong to other genres like dance, literature and Korean traditional music attempted to argue for the ‘removal of the Gwangju Biennale’ since they felt it was relatively unfair that so much public funds for culture were invested into modern art based at the Biennale and that city officials often neglect their fields. Accordingly, some local media outlets suggested that funds for the Biennale should be evenly used overall cultural fields in Gwangju (ibid).
Finally, as in Gramsci’s logic about ideology, it is likely that the dominant class ideology on place marketing around the Biennale had already penetrated into public common sense in Gwangju. In other words, the neoliberal logic of the political and business elite is that Gwangju needs to transform its image into a global and modern one through aggressive cultural marketing projects like the Biennale to make a competitive and growing city. Such a perception might naturally be accepted by local people without a doubt about its ultimate goal. To my surprise, both interviewees from between the Gwangju Chamber of Commerce and a local group resisting the commodification of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement had a similar logic in their answer about the Biennale.

“I think marketing activities like the cultural convention, expo and festival have contributed to the improvement of Gwangju’s image and the city’s competitiveness. For example, Gwangju has attempted to advance its image by staging the international art festival of Biennale. And it led to the development of a culture industry….. In recent years, the World Championships in Athletics were held in Daegu and I think it influenced the improvement of local economy and the civic pride of Daegu’s citizens. Such large scale events tend to completely change a city’s image. So I think such sort of sport marketing is very important for a city because marketing events and festivals can transform the negative image of Gwangju to a positive and hopeful one (author interview, interviewed on 16th September 2011, a member of Chamber of Commerce in Gwangju).”

“We need attempts to market the city if it enables our Gwangju to be more competitive than other cities. It will inform more people about Gwangju and attract more tourists into Gwangju. So I don’t oppose events like the Biennale and Universiade because such things could advance our city’s standing.
They brought us roads, transport infrastructure, and cultural facilities and the name of Gwangju can be well known within the process of holding events. Probably they raise Gwangju’s status in the world (author interview, interviewed on 23th September 201, a member of the Bereaved Family Group of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement).

As Harvey says, currently, “neoliberalism has ..... become hegemonic as a mode of discourse. It has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world (Harvey, 2005:3).” This argument might be identified from this empirical evidence.

7.9 Summary

Diverse images of Gwangju have been expressed as many colours over time. However, the thickest colour was that of resistance for democracy which resulted from the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 1980 since it was a significant historical event of the country as well as the city. Local business groups wanted to dilute and hide such an image by shaping a discourse of ‘Yehyang (a town of traditional art)’ under the support of the military regime and local government. In the 1980s, the representative image of Gwangju was not a Yehyang but of a sacred place of democracy. However, local business developed a strategy for local economic development based on Yehyang, it led to the international marketing event: the Gwangju Biennale configured with central government’s new policy.
direction, so called ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’ in the mid 1990s. Then, in the end, these became a foundation for the recent development strategy of Gwangju: a commercial discourse of a cultural city. If we take a look at this example in terms of Jessop’s alternative approach beyond the dualism of structure and agent, the Gwangju Biennale can be recognised as a combination which is created by both the ‘Yehyang’ discourse manipulated by ‘Gigaehyup’ (psedo-local growth coalition) and the neo-liberal ‘Segyehwa’ policy of the Kim Young-sam Government. In other words, this case can be understood within the dialectic context between the broader phenomenon of globalisation and ‘Yehayang’ discourse for local economic interests. Through this case, I suggest, however, it is more important that local political leaders and economic elites’ strategies and activities related to the Gwangju Biennale were dependent on wider condition of globalisation.

At the first Gwangju Biennale, the hosting group launched it as an ‘international and western Biennale’. However, many citizens and artists resisted this since it didn’t reflect the local identity. They emphasised local characteristics like the succession of the ‘Gwangju (or Daedong) Spirit’ generated by the Gwangju Democratisation Movement within the event. As a result, there was a conflict between the ‘international Gwangju Biennale’ and the ‘Anti-Biennale for Human Rights’. However, the host didn’t stop their march towards neoliberal local growth by pacifying opposition groups through a co-optation strategy. The Gwangju Biennale resulted in the commercialised Design Biennale created for blatantly promoting the design industry, and then, led to a number of international marketing events and festivals little connected with the local qualities of Gwangju. A series of changes in the
historical and political context of Gwangju marketing examined within the case of the Gwangju Biennale is a transforming process from the distinctive locality of a democratic city image to the international and modern cultural, but not unique, one. Thus, some authors criticise the Biennale arguing that there is no Gwangju art in the Gwangju Biennale.

The meaning of art around the Gwangju Biennale is various. It started from a traditional art manipulated by business groups and the military regime to the western art of the Biennale, then extends to the commercial design industry and slick urban design in order to emphasise local economic growth. According to my investigation, however, many citizens might have felt little economic benefit from such international art festivals. Rather, it seems such art festivals attenuate the local collective value of ‘Gwangju or Daedong’ spirit and civic pride born from the Gwangju Democratisation Movement along with the penetration of the political and business elite’s artful marketing discourse for local growth into the normal citizens’ common sense.
Chapter Eight: Asian Culture Complex

8.1 Introduction

This chapter examines a series of political processes within the ‘Asian Culture Complex’ (thereafter refer to as ‘ACC’) which is the key part of ‘Gwangju Hub City of Asia Culture’ (thereafter refer to as ‘HCAC’) national project. Gwangju city government has attempted to employ this project as a marketing policy and local economic strategy rather than as part of a national development strategy. Like the Gwangju Biennale in the previous chapter (Chapter 7), this case is also connected with the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in aspects of the place for the ACC. The next section examines the background of the ACC project in association with the memorial project of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, the decline of the city centre and the presidential commitment for a capital of culture. The third explores multi-scale actors and their conflicting visions around the ACC. The fourth and fifth treat the Landmark Controversy which emerged from local government and citizens and its co-ordination. Then, the sixth looks at the local controversy of the removal/conservation of the Jeonnam Provincial Hall as a historical site since its location is in the construction field of the ACC, and the seventh discuss its temporal co-ordination and the politics of memory about the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. The last concludes the chapter summarising the political and social implications of the ACC project.
8.2 Background

8.2.1 Memorial project of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and Jeonnam Provincial Hall

Historical meaning of the Jeonnam Provincial Hall site

The site on which the government is currently building the ACC was the location of old ‘Jeonnam Provincial Hall’ (thereafter refer to as ‘JPH’) is closely connected with memorial project for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. The reason is that this site was first examined by central government as a place for memorializing the Movement, and, it led the government to move the JPH to another place. In other words, while many Koreans think that the transfer of the JPH led to the problem of urban centre decline and thus the ACC are building there in order to resolve the problem and to specially treat Gwangju city in a political sense, the truth is not so. Actually, the start of these changes was associated with the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. The place was examined for a memorial project since it was the most essential space during the democratic uprising and to implement a memorial, the government transferred the JPH. Consequently, the site of the ACC took the place of the memorial space for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, helping to underline the importance of the place and why these policies have been so contested.

However, the meaning of the place is not simple because it is a space containing diverse historical events and complicated meanings. At first, as deeply observed in 7.3, it was the key space for the citizen uprising for democracy against the dictatorial
military junta. That is to say, there were the headquarters of the citizen militia and it was the place where the democratic uprising of Gwangju people was begun and ended. In particular, focused on the historical context of the site, the place has been the space for not only the power elites’ densely aggregated domination of agencies but also the mass of people’s resistance constantly resisting against repressive regimes since Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945).

The JPH was built in the September of 1910. It was rebuilt by the Japanese regime as a two story building in 1930, and then expanded to three stories by enlarging its width in 1975. Through this process, it has acquired its current appearance (Song, 2008). There were many political power offices and agencies in the surrounding area of the JPH: the HQ of Japan’s military police, the Jeonnam Police Bureau, Gwangju police station, Gwangju district court and the public prosecutor’s office. After the Second World War, those agencies were still there ruling the Jeonnam region and its leading city, Gwangju during the American military regime (1945-48) too (Han, 2010). Jeonnam was one of the most fertile regions for rice and barley crops in South Korea and was a main target of plundering by the Japanese colonial regime. Gwangju played a role as the base city for collecting the crops. It might have lead to the city being a righteous one by persistently resisting these power organisations. Thus, since the Japanese imperialism, the place has been clustered with domination agencies altogether in the same place and was considered by the people, on the one hand, as a centre of power, and on the other, as a place that should be overthrown by the deprived Korean people (ibid).
In this context, we can understand why the historical event of the Gwangju Student’s Independence Movement took place in the city. Even since the restoration of independence, such tendency has kept going and there were often democratic uprisings against the dictatorship like the 19th of April Revolution in 1960 and the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 1980. Above all, during the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, the JPH became the symbolic space to rigorously express anger and resentment towards military dictatorship. It can be easily identified in a slogan of citizens like ‘Go to Dochung (JPH)!’ for the Movement (Han, 2010:89).

**Figure 8.1 The old JPH, Democratic Square, and Geumnam Boulevard**


[Source: (upper left: Song, 2008:65), (rest pictures: The 18th May Memorial Foundation, 2008:214, 279, 289)]
During the Movement, the place was the historic spot of slaughter of hundreds of people, the achievement of a fully self-governing community for real democracy by citizens for the first time in South Korea, and the dying of a glorious death in the final battle with the powerful martial troops of the military junta. To sum up, the old JPH has been one of our cultural assets over the time since Japan’s colonial rule. In addition, the site was the symbolic space of the imperialist country and the dictatorial power used to suppress the masses and, simultaneously, was the historical space of the Gwangju people’s uprising for democracy, liberty and human rights.

**JPH as a memorial space for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement**

It was under the Munmin (non-military) Government of Kim-Youngsam that the national memorial project for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement was launched in earnest. The former President, Kim Young-sam, announced a discourse about the Movement on 13th May 1993. The essential bones of the announcement were 1) expanding and consecrating the Mangwol cemetery, 2) transferring JPH and building memorial park and tower at the site of JPH, and 3) making Sangmudae (name of the Gwangju military base) land available to the city government making a citizen park at the site of the Sangmudae (Jung, 2002).

The Munmin Government (Kim Young-sam Government) carried out three symbolic measures for the Movement. First, the President, himself, apologized for the Nation state’s brutal violence to Gwangju citizens in 1980. Second, the Munmin Government transformed the meaning of the Movement from that of a ‘violent riot of an armed mob’ to a ‘righteous citizens’ uprising for democracy’. Finally, the Kim
Young-sam Government upgraded the political significance of the Movement within the historical context of Korean democracy. These, later, became essential components (the designation of national commemoration day, the establishment of a special law and the construction of memorial spaces) of the memorial project for the Movement (Han, 2010:72). As examined in 7.5.1, both the designation of a national commemoration day and the establishment of a special law were finished by the Munmin Government by the late 1990s. However, representation of the memory of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement through constructing various memorial buildings, towers, and parks etc. and the conserving of historical sites is not yet completed.

Memorial spaces were divided into three types: memorial cemetery, park and building (ibid). Firstly, the memorial cemetery as a space for cherishing the people who sacrificed is Mangwol Cemetery district. Even though some of the missing and unidentified bodies of victims are still in Mangwol, the place was expanded and upgraded to the 5.18 Democracy Cemetery. Second is the Sangmudae military jail in which many citizens were imprisoned and tortured during the Movement. Its neighbouring area was developed into a large-scale town including a citizen park in which the Gwangju City Hall and other public and commercial buildings are located. Finally, the third is the JPH as a space for understanding history. It was the most essential space of all the memorial spaces of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. Currently, it (the memorial building) has not been transformed to a memorial space while the two former spaces (the memorial cemetery and park) have been shaped by central government.
Although plans for using the JPH have been gradually changing over time, the bare skeleton of the plans did not so. The gist of them was to construct a memorial building or human rights museum about the democratic movement and build a democracy square (or park) on the neighbouring site.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of plan</th>
<th>Old Jeonnam Provincial Hall</th>
<th>Surrounding area</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995 5.18 Memorial Project Comprehensive Plan</td>
<td>Memorial Hall of the Democratisation Movement</td>
<td>Public square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 Culture Gwangju of Light and Life 2020</td>
<td>International Human Rights Museum</td>
<td>International Cultural and Artistic History Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 A study on Gwangju Development Strategy Preparing for Transfer of Jeonnam Provincial Hall</td>
<td>Human Rights Museum</td>
<td>Public square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 A study on Revitalisation of City Centre of Gwangju</td>
<td>Memorial Hall of Democratic Uprising</td>
<td>Democracy Plaza and Park</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Han, 2010:74)

As seen in Table 8.1, Gwangju city government planned to transform the JPH building into a 5.18 Memorial Building for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement improving the surrounding area into a large public square through 5.18 Memorial Project Comprehensive Plan in 1995. In 2000, the Gwangju government established another general plan about using JPH. It was < Culture Gwangju of Light and Life 2020 >. The new plan was quite different from the former one of 1995. It focused on suggesting a city development and economic revitalisation strategy towards developing a cultural city while the former plan maintained the city’s democratic
image. It included various programmes for developing Gwangju as a cultural city such as forming 8 cultural districts and fostering a culture and tourism industry. It became an important motive for central government to later launch the HCAC project.

Anyway, the plan suggested that the old JPH building should be upgraded to a Museum of International Human Rights after transferring the JPH. However, public opinion which is opposed to it has gradually increased in Gwangju since President Kim Young-sam announced the move of the JPH which led to bringing about some concerns of urban decline. In particular, the opposition to the move of the JPH rapidly expanded arguing that the integration of Gwangju City and Jeonnam Province in Gwangju when the Munmin Administration announced the reorganisation plan of local administrative districts. There was a conflict between Gwangju city government and Jeonnam Provincial government because Gwangju city government opposed the transfer of the JPH and Jeonnam Provincial government supported it at that time. Due to the continuation of this conflict between them, the commemorating project of the JPH was also delayed constantly and there was no progress. In 2001, Gwangju city set up the Gwangju Development Strategy preparing for the JPH-moving to Muan city. JPH was planned as a Human Rights Museum or Memorial Building which would play the role of symbolic landmark to revitalise the city centre around the JPH. Likewise, this trend toward economic tourism and a cultural industry was kept in the new plan, a study on the Revitalisation of the City Centre of Gwangju in 2003.
Relocation of the JPH and response of the Gwangju city government

In 2002, the final decision about the relocation of the JPH to Muan city was confirmed. It was achieved by the ordinance of Jeonnam provincial government and the support of central government while Gwangju city government opposed it. In a response to the decision, Gwangju city government prepared for the JPH-moving out by examining diverse place marketing strategies for urban regeneration. It announced the construction of the ‘Human Rights Tower’ and the ‘Bell of Democracy’ as tourist attractions neighbouring the JPH in 2003. The ‘Human Rights Tower’ was planned to be built as a high and spectacular tower for a city landmark on the site of 24.5 acres and the ‘Bell of Democracy’ was designed to be made and set as the largest bell in South Korea by raising money from citizens and local companies. A number of local groups and 5.18 victims groups, however, strongly criticised these strategies of the city government since they could commercialise the holy places of the democratic uprising. For instance, a member of the May 18 Memorial Foundation complained about such marketing strategies of the city government in an interview with the Hangyere newspaper, saying “I’m so embarrassed by the city authorities’ plans like a tower of 518 metre. That definitely threw me for a serious loop. The city government should rationally launch a memorial project for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement since there was a master plan to build a city for democracy, human rights and peace in Gwangju. It should not do things incoherently” (Hangyere newspaper, 13th January 2005).” In addition, even central government (MCT: Ministry of Culture and Tourism) expressed a negative perspective on such plans.
Consequently, both the ‘Human Rights Tower’ and the ‘Bell of Democracy’ were not successful. The former was refused because of the opposition of many citizens and the latter was built by 75 million pounds of citizen donations and city finance in front of the old JPH. Moreover, the ‘Bell of Democracy’ was removed from the site during the launch of the HCAC project of central government in 2008 and currently it is stored at a warehouse. Thus, many citizens remember it as a bad case of wasting money.

To briefly sum up Section 8.2.1, the relocation of the JPH was discussed in the process of planning a commemoration project for the Gwagngju Democratisation Movement. It has been examined through the promise of former President Kim Young-sam that the site of the JPH will be used as a space of remembering the Gwagngju Democratisation Movement for a long time. However, the vision of the site has been transformed into a place for economic regeneration and city marketing rather than for remembering democratic resistance and uprising due to a growing concern of urban decline since 2002 when the JPH’s moving was confirmed to Muan city.

8.2.2 Urban centre decline and launching a regeneration strategy

As examined in the section immediately above, the JPH-moving mainly raised discussion about the problem of decreasing population in the city centre within the arena of the urban policy of Gwangju in the early 2000s. In addition, the deterioration of infrastructure and declining function of facilities in the urban centre has been
suggested as another reason for the shrinking population. Thus, Gwangju city government has driven an economic regeneration policy focusing on the physical improvement of the downtown in the city, combined with opposing the relocation of the JPH. However, those might not be the most important factors for the missing population. In other words, what Gwangju city authorities paid attention to such as the movement of the JPH might have not be the most salient reasons of the decreasing number of people in Dong-gu (the old central area of Gwangju city) because the population of Dong-gu had already rapidly decreased in advance of the confirmation of the JPH-moving to another place.

According to Han's (2010) study, some large-scale developments in the outskirts of the city might rather have influence the shrinking population of Dong-gu. As she argues, the outflow of Dong-gu’s population to newly-developed residential towns such as Keumho, Sangmu, Chumdan and Songjung districts with their modern apartment complexes and commercial malls resulted in a strong decline of the city centre.

According to Table 8.2, 60 per cent of Dong-gu population has been continuously decreasing over the last 20 years while Seo-, Buk- and Gwangsan-gus have grown in terms of their residents from 51 to 130 per cent. Yet, the total population in the city has gradually increased due to the inflow of people from rural areas even though the urban centre experienced a serious shrinking population.
Table 8.2 Changing ratio of Gu’s population in Gwangju

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dong-gu</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>-20%</td>
<td>-19%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seo-gu</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nam-gu</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buk-gu</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwangsang-</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>130%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>127%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Han, 2010:70)

Consequently, it might be considered that the decline in the centre of Gwangju mainly comes from several large-scale residential developments in the suburbs of the city. In addition, it seems that the changing political environment like the decision of the JPH-moving exacerbated such trends of declining Dong-gu (Bae et al., 2010).

In terms of the city’s spatial structure, the mono-centric urban system of Gwangju which was built after Japan’s colonial rule was maintained in the 1960-70s (Lim, 2011). However, it has been reorganised to a multi-core city through newly developed residential areas such as Sangmu, Keumho and Chumdan. We can identify such trends in the changing urban planning of Gwangju. The < 2020 Gwangju Urban Master Plan > established by the city government in 2004 acknowledged the Sangmu area as a new urban centre apart from the previous city centre, the JPH area in Dong-gu. It suggests a multi-core city setting with 2 CBDs and 2 sub-centres (Chumdan and Songjung residential areas) as major urban spaces in the Gwangju city region (ibid). According to this plan, in terms of urban
centres, the city authorities are implementing culture-led urban regeneration in the original CBD in order to rejuvenate its urban vitality and are improving the newly-emerged city centre, the Sangmu area by accumulating pivotal management (i.e. public administration and office) and commercial (i.e. shopping and convention) functions. They are developing two axes of sub-cores: the Songjung and Chumdan areas. The Songjung district has been developed toward a node of transportation intertwined with the KTX (Korean Express Train), the express motorway and Gwangju Airport, and the Chumdan has been built as a high-tech industry cluster such as the Samsung Electronics factory, many other many photonics and LED companies (ibid).

Within the Gwangju urban landscape, on the one hand, there is a rapid urbanisation based on industrialisation, on the other hand, there is cultural and post-industrial regeneration in the city centre. Likewise in Gwangju, many Korean cities have similar trends that show a mixed state of compact industrialisation and post-industrialisation in terms of urban landscape. In the short term, as industrial urbanisation has been achieved and simultaneously moved onto post-industrial urbanisation, many cities have a mixture of industrial and post-industrial landscape. This trend of Korean cities might also be identified in the population pattern of Gwangju. The population of suburb areas has increased while the city centre is missing its people. In response to this, the Gwangju authorities have developed diverse urban regeneration strategies. As observed in the previous section, city government suggested a master plan for reorganising the whole area of the city centre through a plan of the < Cultural Gwangju of Light and Life 2020 > published in 2000. Furthermore, they conducted <
A Study on Gwangju Development Strategy Preparing for Transfer of JPH > in 2001 and < A Study on Revitalisation of the City Centre of Gwangju > in 2003 in order to economically regenerate the urban core area, Dong-gu. These became an important ground\(^4\) for moving toward the later cultural development strategy of Gwangju city. However, it is a ‘discourse of the culture city’ suggested by central government that Gwangju city government actively examined the radical reimagining the city beyond marketing strategies based on the urban scale, and this will be explored in the next section.

8.2.3 Noh’s presidential election commitment for a cultural capital of South Korea

‘Cultural Capital’ and Gwangju

The commitment of ‘Cultural Capital’ in Noh’s campaign was connected with the problem of why Gwangju should be selected when there were already many cities pursuing the title of cultural city such as Busan, Jeonju, Andong, Bucheon, and Gyeongju. On 14th December 2002, the former President Noh Mu-hyeon visited Gwangju and said that “I will develop a capital of public administration in the Chungcheong region, a capital of maritime in Busan, and a capital of culture in Yehyang Gwangju (Shin, 2005:35),” when he had been designated as a Democratic

\(^{4}\) Kim Man-gon (who belonged to the Presidential Committee for the HCAC as an organisation of central government) emphasized the contribution of Gwangju’s development strategy on the HCAC (Hub City of Asian Culture) project, saying: “Basically, we obtained a clue from the locally prepared < Cultural Gwangju of Light and Life 2020 > project in the process of making the HCAC strategy (Hangyre 21, 23\(^{rd}\) September 2004).”
Candidate. In relation to this, the Kang Un-tae, Gwangju city Mayor represented the situation in an interview with Pressian newspaper, saying:

“When the former President Noh Mu-hyeon came to Gwangju as a candidate, the project of HCAC was improved in a detailed promise as he travelled together in a car with me. At that time, he asked me ‘what is necessary for Gwangju?’ so, I answered that ‘as you promised Daejeon to be an administrative capital, now how about you suggest Gwangju as a cultural capital in order to generalise the meaning of capital over the country?’ Then, as he hit my knee, he said ‘Right. Cultural city based on the Gwangju identity of democracy, human rights, peace, and Yehyang tradition! That’s a good idea.’ The concept of HCAC was begun like that (Pressian [newspaper], 3rd November 2011).”

And also, Park Gwang-tae, the former Mayor of Gwangju argued that the commitment to establishing a cultural capital was started by his suggestion, noting: “Mr. Noh asked me ‘what suggestion is good for Gwangju as a campaign promise?’ and I said that ‘cultural capital and Light Expo will be good in Gwangju’ and he agreed with me (Nocut-news [newspaper], 9th June 2005).”

According to these interviews, we can recognise that politicians tend to advertise their achievements regarding local development commitments such as the project of ‘Cultural Capital’. In addition, if such interviews are true, the commitment to ‘Cultural Capital’ might be shaped by complicated components like the Yehyang identity as contrived by Gwangju elites and the national balancing policy which meant over cities were concerned as capitals of public administration and maritime.
However, there was an important component in addition to those. That is Noh’s politically biased preference to the city of Gwangju and he probably had to treat the city in a special manner due to the contribution of the Gwangju citizens to his political success. At first his rating was very low. However, he suddenly received public attention after winning the candidate campaign in Gwangju and then, became the final candidate of Democratic Party. In addition, Gwangju was a politically significant city because it was a supporting ground for the Democratic Party and was a sacred place of democracy in South Korea. Thus, the Gwangju contest might have been a turning point for him in terms of politics. At last, he won the presidential election against Lee hye-chang, the first dominant counterpart of the New Korean Party (Conservative Party) and also in the process, was fully supported by the Honam region and its leading city, Gwangju. Thus, whenever he visited Gwangju as the President, he called the city a ‘second hometown’. Then, he endeavoured to keep his promise of ‘Cultural Capital’ to specially treat Gwangju.

In this context, many Koreans often considered the project of HCAC as his political reward or special favour to the city. For example, Choi Jung-gi, Professor of Jeonnam University said that “HCAC is a result of a political process that originated from the President’s mind (Lee, 2010:124).” Dr. Lee Young-hun (2010) also interpreted the project as a sort of compensation for the political debt of Participation government (Noh’s administration) in his paper. Other similar evidence was identified in statements of Lee Hyeong-seok, secretary of managing social policy in the Presidential Office. In 2008, when the Presidential transition committee of Lee

45 Noh Mu-hyeon was born in Busan. The city was located in Youngnam which usually considered as a friendly region of New Korean Party (Conservative).
Myung-bak (the next President after Noh) attempted to remove the Presidential committee of HCAC, Lee Hyeong-seok strongly resisted, saying that the “projects of Cultural Capital in Gwangju and the Joint Innovation City in Naju were the biggest political rewards to the Honam region under the Participation government (Noh’s administration). Such measures which will ruin the future of the Honam region must be political revenge to these specific cities (Yeonhapnews, 4th February 2008).”

To sum up, the former President Noh’s campaign commitment was the result of complicated factors such as the Yehyang image, the strategy of national balanced development, and Noh’s individual political emotion towards Gwangju. Among them, the last factor might be the most influential for the Participation government’s selection of the city as a capital of culture.

*From ‘Cultural Capital’ in South Korea to an ‘Asian Mecca of Culture and Art’*

It was not easy for the HCAC project of Gwangju to maintain its good trend of presidential commitment since there were excessive demands from Gwangju city government and other cities’ opposition to the special treatment for Gwangju. It was Gwangju city government that put into action the ‘Cultural Capital’ after Noh’s success at the election and local press supported their government. The Gwangju authorities suggested a ‘Basic Promotion Plan of Cultural Capital’ composed of 25 sub-projects within 6 categories in January 2003. The plan included many items like expanding the cultural infrastructure and national budget, promoting the cultural content industry, and building symbolic artworks from the plan < Cultural Gwangju of Light and Life 2020 > already established by the city government. It also includes
other proposals such as moving the MCT (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, currently transformed into MCST: Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism), cultural research institutes, and public organisations to Gwangju and building a democracy tower over 500m tall, an international scale facility for bungee jumping and shaping beautiful exterior lighting. These might have been a burden for central government.

In addition, opposition from other cities’ about the special favours for Gwangju continuously increased at that time. For instance, Jung Jung-bok, a Member of the National Parliament from Gyeongju argued that “to promote the HCAC only focusing on a specific city through a special law does not fit with policies of national balanced development and decentralisation (Lee, 2009:161),” in a public hearing for the establishment of a special law for HCAC project. Lee Jung-duk, a Professor of Jeonbuk National University located in Jeonju, refuted the HCAC for Gwangju, arguing:

“The Gwangju HCAC project can’t be made successful. The reason is that there is no connection between Gwangju and Asia culture. As far as regarding Gwangju, the key image is 5.18 (the Gwangju Democratisation Movement). However, is Gwangju the only city of resisting against dictatorship? There are many other resisting cities for democracy like Manila and Bangkok….. Rather, Jeonju is superior to Gwangju in terms of conserving Korean traditional culture, art and food. So, I think Jeonju has a more competitive edge as a city of culture than Gwangju (Lee, 2010:118-9).”

Central authorities had to break through these oppositions from other cultural cities. And also, they had to implement the President’s command which he intended to grant to Gwangju citizens a present as a political reward. Thus, there was a scale-up
(jumping scale) strategy from the national ‘Cultural Capital’ to the global ‘Asian Mecca of Culture and Art’ that central government employed in order to overcome the difficult hurdles of the President’s pressure and other domestic cities’ opposition at that time.

It took a shape through Noh’s announcement at the anniversary of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement on 18th May in 2003. The President suggested that he would promote Gwangju toward being an ‘Asian Mecca of Culture and Art’ by building a large-scale culture complex like Pompidou in France on a basis of MCT (Ministry of Culture and Tourism) task force’s report. Four months later, the strategy took a more concrete shape at a meeting with the local press. President Noh made a basic plan of the HCAC known publicly as follows: central authorities would build the ACC (investing a national budget of 2.5\(^{46}\) billion pounds) by 2010 and investing 7.5 billion pounds additionally to make Gwangju the Hub of Asian Culture by 2023. It was a tremendously large-scale project in South Korea since there were no cultural facilities with this much money invested in them. Currently, the biggest investments had been just 2 billion pounds for the National Central Museum and 0.8 billion pounds for the National Art Palace.

8.2.4 Overview of the HCAC and the ACC

\(^{46}\) In the process of establishing comprehensive HCAC plan, the budget rose to 3.9 billion pounds later.
Overview of the HCAC

The goal of the HCAC is to be a national development strategy to improve national competitive power by employing culture. Such an intention can be easily identified in any government documents, books and government official’s rhetoric. Jung Dong-chea, the Minister of Culture and Tourism begins “Now, culture is part of national competitiveness,” in his statement for the preface of, <The ‘Culture of Light’ Project Asian Culture Hub, Gwangju: Concept, Vision and Strategy> published by the MCT in 2005 (MCT, 2005:4). Then, he concludes by emphasising the importance of the project as a national development strategy, noting:

“The project originates in Gwangju, but will be nurtured with the hopes of fostering local as well as national growth and translating cultural value into economic value by new understanding and interpretation of Asian culture. Hence, let us not forget that the success of the project is directly linked to the elevation of national competitiveness and to the parallel growth of the Asian continent. To this end, I sincerely look forward to the best-effort for cooperation of the national government, Gwangju city, the people of Gwangju, and all those involved in this historical endeavour (ibid:7)."

In addition, according to the HCAC Comprehensive Plan (MCT, 2007:22), the project of the HCAC is to make Gwangju city a ‘Window of Asian Culture to the World’. It means that central and city government would develop Gwagnju towards a cultural city enabling Asian cities to exchange their cultural assets for cultural industry and art in order to improve national competitiveness (ibid). In the same context, Kim Ho-kyun, the director of the citizen culture team in the Executive Agency for Culture Cities (thereafter refer to as ‘EA’) belonging to the MCT, emphasised the ultimate
goal of the project, saying that “What is the reason of building the HCAC….. The level of this national project is not just to make an exhibition or performance hall. In the near future, we Koreans need a new cultural concept and its enabling facilities, and then it will lead to a new era of culture convergence mixing culture and industry in order that culture can make money and livelihoods. It means that culture should be a new ‘growth dynamic power’ in our country (Lee, 2007:54).” Thus, central government’s perception of the HCAC in Gwangju might be that is a national economic development strategy employing cultural components for promoting local and national competitiveness.

The HCAC project has taken an institutional grounding since 2004. Central authorities made a special law and presidential decree in February 2004. They launched the Presidential Committee for the HCAC (thereafter refer to as ‘Presidential Committee’) and the Executive Agency for the project (thereafter refer to as ‘EA’) in March in the same year. Then, in 2007, they established the Comprehensive Plan as a master plan for the HCAC. The HCAC project has four top-priority tasks in Gwangju: building and operating the ACC, promoting the cultural and tourism industry, setting the cultural urban environment, and improving the brand image of a cultural city. Among them, central government has considered the first (building and operating the ACC) as a top-priority agenda because President Noh announced that a large-scale cultural complex like Pompidou would enable Gwangju to promote itself as an ‘Asian Mecca of Culture and Art’. The rest of the tasks are regarded as less important projects that the Gwangju authorities have to lead since national budget support is mainly focused on the first rather than the rest.
In association with this, a public official in Gwangju city government emphasised the importance of the ACC within the HCAC project, saying:

“The cost of building the ACC will be charged to the nation state. So its leader is the central authorities. But they should accept public opinion in Gwangju because the site is in Gwangju. It makes central and city government co-operate with each other. Otherwise, the ACC will not be built in the city. By contrast, regarding the remaining three tasks, we are leading them and central government just support us. However, to make the ACC is the most important thing in the project of the HCAC, because the ACC will play a key role in improving Gwangju toward beung a real cultural hub of Asia (author interview, 5 October 2011).”

Additionally, the HCAC might be influenced by the changing political environment since it will take a long time – up to 2023. Indeed, its national budget was decreased by the new government of Lee Myung-bak. The presidential committee of the HCAC was also nearly abolished by the new administration, but it is maintained by the strong resistance of the Gwnagju people. Thus, currently, the main concern of the city government is only to obtain the project budget from central government without any loss as financial support from the MCST has been decreased.

Overview of the ACC

The main facility of the HCAC, the ACC will be situated at the site of the former JPH with a total area of 44 acres. It will be an up-to-date postmodern architectural style building where most agencies will occupy it under the ground such as in the Louvre Museum in Paris and the World Trade Centre Memorial Park in New York. It will
have 5 agencies and 13 facilities: the Cultural Promotion Agency (Cultural Contents Development Centre, Cultural Contents Production centre, Multi-Functional Exhibition Hall), the Asian Arts Theatre (Grand Performance Hall, Multi-Functional Auditorium), the Cultural Exchange Agency (The May 18 Memorial Hall, Asian Cultural Exchange Centre, Business Strategy Centre), the Asian Culture Information Agency (Asian Culture Research Institute, Asian Culture Resource Centre, Asian Culture Academy), and the Edu-Culture Agency for Children (Edu-Culture Contents Development Centre, Children’s Edu-Culture Museum). The ACC’s detailed function is outlined in Table 8.3.

**Figure 8.2 Design and facility plan of the ACC**

(Source: Gwangju Hub City of Asia, http://www.cct.go.kr/index.do)
Table 8.3 ACC facilities and their functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Facilities</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Exchange Agency</td>
<td>The May 18 Memorial Hall</td>
<td>Consist of various spaces including an exhibition hall, a resources centre, and a conference room, all representing the ideals of democracy, human rights, and peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian Cultural Exchange Centre</td>
<td>Supervises the ACC’s cultural exchange functions, including visitor’s centre and online services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business Strategy Centre</td>
<td>Manage profit-generating businesses of cultural contents produced by the ACC, and provides business strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Culture Information Agency</td>
<td>Asian Culture Research Institute</td>
<td>Provides source materials for the arts and the cultural industry upon research on Asian cultures by regions and themes. Supports productions of cultural maps of Asian food, colour, religion, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian Cultural Resource Centre</td>
<td>Conducts collection, classification, preservation, and archiving of Asian cultural resources. Operates an open library (Library Park) for the citizen’s as well as professionals’ convenience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian Culture Academy</td>
<td>Conducts training for experts in Asian cultures and provides cultural education for the public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Promotion Agency</td>
<td>Cultural Contents Development Centre</td>
<td>Provides facility support for the planning and creation of cultural contents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural Contents Production Centre</td>
<td>Provides production support to translate creative ideas into cultural contents using the up-to-date digital technologies and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-Functional Exhibition Hall</td>
<td>Consists of a multi-functional space for performance and special exhibitions of the arts and cultural contents produces by Cultural Contents Development and Production Centres. Also operates a ubiquitous user experience centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Arts Theatre</td>
<td>Grand Performance Hall</td>
<td>A 2000-seat hybrid theatre with cutting-edge technologies enabling the multi-division of the space. A ‘factory shop’-type art complex where the production, performance, distribution and sales of Asian performing arts are taking place year-round.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-Functional Auditorium</td>
<td>A 500-seat multi-functional theatre with a proscenium stage, accommodating most of the existing genres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edu-Culture Agency for Children</td>
<td>Edu-Culture Contents Development Centre</td>
<td>Plans and develops edu-culture contents that enable learning of the fundamental principles of knowledge through aesthetic experiences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children’s Edu-Culture Museum</td>
<td>Helps children learn the fundamentals of languages, mathematics, social sciences, natural sciences, and arts through exhibitions and diverse hands-on activities in an educational museum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Common facilities, auxiliary facilities, common area, parking facilities, machine rooms, outdoor parking annex, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total floor area</td>
<td>44.03 acre (site area: 31.78 acre)</td>
<td>(Source: MST, 2007:46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At a glance, the ACC’s design appears to consider the importance of the history of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. However, if we see it in detail, we can recognise that most facilities of the ACC are focused on the commercialisation of cultural products and the development of cultural contents rather than to conserve and support an historic function in association with the Gwangju Movement. In the aspect of the Movement, even the Cultural Exchange Agency only has The May 18 Memorial Hall, and the rest of the facilities are an Asian Cultural Exchange Centre for the internalisation of Gwangju and a Business Strategy Centre for promoting cultural industry (Jang, 2011).

8.3 Multi-scale actors and contested visions

8.3.1 Multi-scaled diverse actors

Drawing on spatial scales, different actors in the ACC project might be easily recognised. National scales of actors are led by the Presidential Committee, the EA in the MCST (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism), and other ministries in central government. Most essential organisations are the Committee and the EA. The Committee consists of under 30 people and they are ministers and other civilians designated by the President. The Committee has discussed an important agenda about the HCAC: its basic direction and regulations, the establishment of a Comprehensive Plan, supporting the required budget, and designating Investment Promotion Districts, etc. Another key actor is the EA belongs to the MCST. It has
implemented all the significant items of the HCAC. Many other central ministries have supported the HCAC’s 20 sub-projects. It was launched with 44 people in March 2004, but it was downsized to 41 people in 2008.

Actors on an urban scale are the Gwangju city government, the city council, business groups like the Chamber of Commerce, and local groups such as ones related to the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, cultural ones, environmental ones. The most important actor of these is the city government. City authorities launched an organisation about the HCAC project, Cultural Capital Supporting Agency (2 divisions, 31 people) in 2004. Even though there was a struggle for control of the HCAC between the EA and Gwangju city government at the initial stages, now Gwangju authorities mainly support central government adjusting their role to central-led projects. In addition, there were some proponents of the city government’s position such as the Gwangju City Council and Chamber of Commerce. However, their role was very limited in the political process of the HCAC and the ACC project. The City Council only made formal acknowledgements after the city authorities had made decision for local growth and the Chamber of Commerce was also inactive in its response to the marketing position of city government. By contrast, local groups like the cultural and environmental ones have vigorously attempted to express their opinions. They have also actively participated in the process of making detailed annual plans for Gwangju city government. In particular, their role stood out

47 They are MLTM (Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs), MOD (Ministry of National Defense), PCRD (Presidential Committee on Regional Development), MEST (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology), MOJ (Ministry of Justice), MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), MOKE (Ministry of Knowledge Economy), MHWF (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs), MOE (Ministry of Environment) and MPA (Ministry of Public Administration and Security).
in the Landmark and Conservation/Removal Controversies in the city which will be explored in later sections (8.4 and 8.5).

Finally, there were local scaled actors. They were the District Office, Council and resident groups such as the Emergency Measure Committee in Dong-gu. They pressed together central and city government for the local interest of Dong-gu supported by Dong-gu District Office. Sometimes, their opinions were not in harmony with that of other Gwangju local groups due to their different scales.

8.3.2 Different scaled visions and values

Visions and values from diverse actors were different each other. Firstly, their scales of recognition were different. Central authorities based on the Asian scale considered the project as a means of promoting the cultural industry and culture-led place marketing to compete with Japan and China. In particular, as observed in the previous section (8.2.3), they have expanded their perspective from the national to the global. At first, the project was expressed on the basis of a ‘Cultural Capital’ commitment of national scale in the 2002 Presidential Election since it was an endeavour to promote Gwangju as an advanced city in terms of cultural industry in South Korea. However, central government scaled up in order to overcome other cities’ opposition.

It was also exposed in the HCAC Comprehensive Plan (MCT, 2007) of central government. According to the Plan, central authorities argued that the project could
not implemented by one city’s capacity since it was on the basis of a global scale project. They added that “Gwangju has to develop the Asian community rather than compete with other domestic cities for national cultural dominance (ibid:29).”

However, there might be some other reasons for such scaling up. Firstly, ‘Hanryu’ (Korean wave or fever in pop-culture) mainly diffused in Asian countries such as Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, Hongkong, Vietnam, and China might be a reason since the popularity of Korean pop-songs, dramas and films resulted in much economic value (Lee, 2010). Central authorities wanted to expand this phenomenon in Asia (ibid). Therefore, they might want to establish such ‘Hanryu’ as a sustainable trend in Asia by developing the cultural industry through the ACC project in Gwangju. Secondly, both Japan and China might have similar weak points about being a cultural hub in terms of how other Asians view them. Historically, Chinese people had a sort of mentality, ‘Joonghwa’ which means that ‘China is the centre of the world’ and it led them to reign over other Asian countries many centuries ago. Due to this painful history, many neighbouring countries are alert to China’s rapid economic development (ibid). Japan also has a history of being an imperial invader during the Second World War. Thus, many people in Asian countries such as Korea, China, Vietnam, Thailand and Philippines still have an antipathy towards the Japanese (ibid). However, they might have a favourable feeling toward South Korea in relation to them since South Korea has no such history. In this respect, such a friendly attitude of Asian people toward South Korea might enable the Korean central government to pursue the HCAC project in Gwangju. In short, central government has changed its

48 According to Korean Bank’s statistics, export income related cultural industry like films, TV programmes, music records was approximately 0.5 billion pounds (Hangyre newspaper, 6 February 2012).
scale from national ‘Cultural Capital’ to global ‘Cultural Hub of Asian Culture’ in order to drive national development and there might be some reasons for this such as overcoming the opposition of other domestic other cities, expanding the Korean Wave in Asia, and employing relatively favourable attitudes toward South Korea in relation to Japan and China.

However, Gwangju city government recognised the HCAC and ACC as the means of occupying a dominant position as a cultural capital competing with other cities like Gyeongju, Busan and Jeonju in the country. Thus, city authorities wanted to have a title of ‘Cultural Capital in South Korea’ since they thought it would be a warranty securing national support for developing the local cultural industry. However, Gwangju people’s visions and values were not the same. A number of local groups have had slightly different visions and values for the HCAC and ACC. Some considered it as an opportunity to encourage the cultural industry for local growth while some thought it should be a catalyst to change the local cultural environment for improving citizens’ quality of life. In addition, the District Office, Council and residents in Dong-gu recognised it should be a tool to promote tourism and economic development for revitalisation of the declining urban centre. As seen in the following two sections, these diverse actors have shown tensions and conflicts between each other.

Likewise, actors around the ACC project have emerged with their own diverse visions and values under their different scales. Their different visions and values
about the project realign with citizens’ opinions for and against the ACC as a Landmark through the ‘Landmark Controversy’ in the next section.

8.4 First Conflict: the Landmark Controversy

8.4.1 Conflicting main actors around ‘Forest of Light’

Conflicts and struggles between the EA in central government and Gwangju city government were intensely expressed in the process of the Land Controversy. It began with the result of a design contest about the ACC. When the result was announced in December 2005, Gwangju city government, Dong-gu District Office and Dong-gu residents resisted it. The reason was that they thought it was not enough to improve Gwangju’s image in terms of economic development. In other words, they might have thought that it should be an enormous architectural structure like the Pompidou Centre and the Bilbao Museum in order to market Gwangju. However, a more important factor might be the race for dominance in the project between the related parties since both the EA and Gwangju city government endeavoured to control it. At last, the Landmark Controversy brought their tension and conflict to public notice.

Gwangju city authorities attempted and challenged to gain the dominant position arguing the need for their landmark. Regarding this, the central authorities rejected the city’s Landmark suggestion in order to protect their hegemony of the project. They argued that they should respect the architect’s philosophy and want the project
to be implemented on the basis of a broader – Asia or global- scale. However, if their visions of the ACC are dealt with in greater detail, both the visions of the EA and city government might have little difference. They were similar strategies in employing economic means to promote economic growth, whether it was for South Korea or Gwangju. Thus, they could both be judged as place marketing strategies since they were attempts to economically develop a nation or city by utilising culture as an economic instrument. However, both had different points. There was the difference of scale. Even though the central authorities could not give the title of ‘Cultural Capital in South Korea’ to a specific city (Gwangju) due to many other cities’ opposition, they had an ambition to improve and extend ‘Hanryu (Korean wave)’ to the ‘Cultural Hub of Asia’. Thus, they overcame domestic cities’ resistance by suggesting a new broader scale of ‘the centre of Asian Culture’, even though it was quite far from the city’s existing image of a city of resistance, democracy, and human rights. As a result, they might occupy the political dominance of cultural city policy since no city could challenge the strategy which had a global scale far beyond the urban or local scale.

In addition, I want to suggest that these conflicts should be understood within the wider context such as a national development strategy based on global scale of expanding ‘Korean Wave’ and the competition for being a cultural capital or a dominant cultural city of South Korea between many Korean cities rather than narrow local issue around the ACC in Gwangju.
8.4.2 Conflicting meanings: the political process around the ACC design

‘Arguments for a landmark’ can be represented by some of the following statements: ‘We should be citizens who can make a living through culture (Dong-gu resident)’, ‘We do not need underground glittering jewels (City Mayor, Park)’ and ‘Make a large-scale landmark like the Pompidou Centre in France or the Bilbao Museum in Spain’. If we see the ‘argument for a landmark’ in detail, we could recognise that it corresponded with the place marketing strategy of the city government and local business group.

For example, on 20th January 2005, Gwangju City Mayor, Park Gwang-tae said at a lecture that “I will promote Gwangju as a place of an international cultural industry and make the whole area of Gwangju have the best companies, housing, arts, and science as a tourism city.” And also, he expressed his perspective of economic place marketing in the city arguing in an interview with the Gwangju-Ilbo (newspaper) that “I think Gwangju needs to create employment by promoting a cultural industry and needs to establish the infrastructure for attracting tourists. To do this, I am investing in the cultural contents industry and CGI (Computer Generated Image) industry in harmony with our tradition of ‘Yehyang Gwangju’ (17th April 2006).” Thus, the ‘argument for a landmark’ and the marketing strategy of city government was the same in that the ACC should be a representative product of tourism and culture and should be a catalyst for local growth in Gwangju.
Similar opinions came from some residents. On 3rd November 2006, a local citizen from the city centre emphasised the economic function of the ACC in a conference for the success of the HCAC project in Gwangju, saying that “when the President presents us with 0.35 billion pounds, its meaning is to make the Gwangju citizen economically affluent and happy through culture. But some people have pushed the project while disregarding this meaning. What do citizens like me know about that? Culture? Yes, it would make us being, playing and living well. Art? I know that. However, we do not know the words that the professors discussed before. But you have to follow the President’s meaning, so when he will visit us, we ought to be able to say ‘we are very happy because of your present’ (a resident from Hakdong)."

An inhabitant belonging to the Emergency Measure Committee in Dong-gu remembered fierce protests against central government, noting that “I have actively participated in and suggested my opinion about the ACC design since the beginning of the project. What the most critical point was the Dong-gu residents’ strong opposition since they thought it should be an international landmark, but it was just an underground building. They thought it would be a luxurious architectural building but it was a something normal. So Dong-gu residents made the Emergency Measure Committee and argued for a re-design because there was no landmark….. [They were] very serious. We had two protests in front of the JPH. There were some people whose shaved their heads and wrote protesting letters in their blood. And we threw our signatures ….. (Han, 2010:92-3)."
Consequently, the meaning of a landmark might be as an international luxurious architectural building drawing greater local growth for them. The protesters expressed their argument by shouting some slogans like ‘reinforce the function of the ACC’, ‘why build an underground building at the site of the ACC’, ‘build a cultural tourism belt’, ‘we don’t need a cultural complex like a basement bunker’. Among them, the most effective phrase was ‘basement bunker’. The term contributed to degrading the historic concept of the ACC from the up-to-date architectural style and eco-friendly meaning of central government, to being something just for local growth symbolised by a landmark.

Regarding this, however, a member of the EA in central government refuted the ‘argument for a landmark’ emphasising the historic and Asian value of the site as follows:
“We should express periodic ideology and value by a landmark. I do not think that a very lofty building can be automatically a landmark. What is 21st century? I think we have to express the Gwangju identity in the traditional context of Asia and Gwangju (Lee, 2007:59).”

In addition, most local groups including cultural, environmental and related the Gwangju Democratisation Movement ones announced the ‘argument against a landmark’, saying: “these days, some people argue that the design of the ACC should be amended since it does not have the function and beauty of a landmark, but we cannot agree with them. Simply a large building cannot by itself be a landmark of the city. We think the underground Cultural Complex, plenty of green space, and the conserved JPH would be a new type of landmark and symbol. How we can make a lofty giant of a building on the site of the old JPH regarding its history. We are sure that the underground Cultural Complex and historic architecture such as the old JPH and fountain would be a good landmark in Gwangju (Lee, 2009:170).” This controversy might be a conflict for dominance of the ACC project between related parties. Particularly, the clash between the EA in central government and Gwangju city government was the most salient issue. At first, Gwangju city pushed the EA demanding budget support from central government as a ‘Cultural Capital in South Korea’. At last, however, the central authorities took the dominant position in the project. Since the argument of the global scaled ACC, they firmly occupied the hegemony of the project.

49 The number of these groups was 18. They were 5.18 Bereaved Family, 5.18 Wounded Group, 5.18 Persons of National Merit, 5.18 Memorial Foundation, Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice, Cultural Coalition, Minyechong (Democratic cultural group), Democratic Woman’s Group, Education Coalition, Writer’s Meeting, Environmental Movement Coalition, Heungsadan, YMCA, YWCA, A Group of Architect Planted Tree, Nuri Culture Foundation, Artist Coalition, The Korean Teachers & Education Workers’ Union, Participation Autonomy 21.
Nevertheless, Gwangju city government challenged the EA with the help of the District Office, the Council, and some residents in Dong-gu. At a glance, it looked like a serious protest of residents since they were shaving their heads and writing some letters with their blood as a sign of protest. However, these behaviours might be different from most citizens’ opinions, indeed because there was empirical evidence of fabrication.

On 14th April 2007, a member of the Minyechong (Democratic Artist Group) sharply criticised the manufactured protest of the landmark in a forum, saying that “since the 1980s, I think the mental mainstream of Gwangju was May (the Gwangju Democratization Movement). Related local groups including ‘The 18th May Memorial Foundation’ have often suggested the conservation of the JPH and other historical places as spaces of memory..... Even though most people in Gwangju agree with this, only a small part of the local press and others oppose [don’t agree with] the argument describing the ACC design as a ‘basement bunker’ and simultaneously demand the alteration of the design for a landmark. We have to see who suggests it because it is very political issue. These days, there has been an Emergency Measure Committee and a fabricated protest in Dong-gu. A local journalist asked the old people who were mobilised by Dong-gu District Office and to participate in the meeting ‘Do you know what the landmark is?’ and they said ‘Landmark? What’s that?’ (Cha and Lee, 2007:65-6).” Through this interview, we can recognise that the very key factor of the Landmark Controversy might be the mobilisation of citizens by local authorities for their own interests. The argument was supported by my interviewee’s response. A local newspaper reporter, stated “Landmark Controversy?...
It was forged by the city mayor and the Chief of Dong-gu District Office, by mobilising some residents. The problem was that it resulted in a loud dispute in our Gwangju society because of the discussion about the ACC design (author interview, 15th September 2011).” According to this evidence, we can conclude that the local authorities attempted to manipulate public opinion by mobilising local people and they thought this could make local style marketing of places and promote a local-led cultural industry. As a result, the manufactured protest for a landmark brought about a broader discussion in civil society in Gwangju. This led to over ten meetings among many local groups and citizen organisations. They finally concluded that the ACC should have a design representing the historic meaning of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement combined with the growing cultural industry and artistic activity.

In the controversy, both central and local government intended to use culture for economic development. The former attempted to improve national competitiveness and economic growth and the latter endeavoured to develop the local economy through a cultural strategy. However, the central authorities emphasised the global scale of Asia rather than a national or urban one in order to differentiate their strategy from the local one beautifying Gwangju as a sacred place of Asian democracy. For example, according to the MCT’s report (2005), central authorities argued that many Asian countries share similar experiences with Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippine, and Miyanmar in the course of their modernisation history such as colonial rule and dictatorship. They emphasised Gwangju as a city that symbolises Asian suffering, noting:
“Gwangju is the very place where the commonality of oppression imprinted in the memories of Asians each in their own ways – oppression in action and reaction against the oppression – is most evident and clear. The struggles of that month of May in Gwangju demonstrate the prototype of pain suffered by Asia as a continent (MCT, 2005:13).”

**Figure 8.4 Conflicting meanings of the ACC**

![Diagram showing the conflicting meanings of the ACC]

In summary, the intention of central government (the EA) in the project of the ACC was similar to that of local government’s since both of them endeavoured to employ culture as an economic promotion strategy. However, central authorities argued that building a towering giant landmark in the site of the JPH would deteriorate the history of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, and it appealed to citizen groups. Though both side’s purpose for the ACC was very much alike, central government won the fight to dominate the project by emphasising the Asian scale of Gwangju being an Asian holy place of democratic uprising related to the historic identity of the
JPH. After the controversy, the local authorities had to be satisfied with their limited role of supporting the project. Thus, this might be the most important factor of the ‘Landmark Controversy’: who was able to substantially dominate the project. Through this conflict for occupying political dominance, we can recognise that scale is a product of fluid and situational power relations (McCann, 2003).

8.4.3 Co-ordination by an alternative landmark

The Landmark Controversy around the ACC was over and a co-ordination plan was established by the EA. The key content of the plan was to build a symbolic architectural structure as a landmark on another site not far from the JPH. To implement this, the central authorities announced a back-up plan that they would launch a study for a new architecture as an alternative landmark in 2008 and confirm the implementation of plan through a public hearing. This ended the controversy that had lasted for two years. Then, central authorities formalised the co-ordination plan (an alternative landmark), putting it into the HCAC Comprehensive Plan in October 2007.

In the process of the Landmark Controversy, drawing on an Asian scale, the EA members belonging to central government argued against a landmark while local politicians, city officials and Dong-gu District Office on a basis of urban or local scale insisted on the landmark. In spite of drawing on the local scale, however, most local groups and citizens supported the argument against a landmark since they thought the prize design of the ACC contest enabled residents to conserve the history of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and gain eco-friendly green space. As a result,
the ACC could keep its original design. However, another problem was raised later possibly which might have been because of the differences of scale, recognition and visions among the actors of the ACC project. The central authorities considered it a national developmental strategy in the competition with other Asian countries such as Japan and China while some local people thought it an essential place of local history and identity. Then, this changed into a big controversy as large as the landmark one.

8.5 Second Conflict: Removal or Preservation Controversy

8.5.1 Conflicting visions around the removal/preservation of old JPH

The dispute of whether the old JPH building should be demolished or preserved in Gwangju was started by questioning of some victims of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement right after the groundbreaking ceremony of the ACC in June 2008. It had been unfolded mainly by the conflicts and struggles between the EA and local groups (including victims’ organisations of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement) over two and half a years (from June 2008 to December 2010). However, according to some of my interviewees, symptoms of the Controversy might have been emerging from a time before June 2008. That is, in January 2008, when a study on the utilisation of historic conserved spaces related to the Gwangju Movement in the ACC was launched by the MCST, the issue was raised by some people from local groups. Then, tension between the central authorities and local citizens was forming and growing. Therefore, we can recognise
that the conflict between the two parties did not suddenly explode, but gradually expanded and developed into severe battles.

The most important reason for the Removal/Preservation Controversy is that the central authorities did not properly inform the public of the fact that a part (approximately 60%) of the old JPH would be demolished within the process of the ACC project. They announced that they would preserve all historic buildings and sites\(^{50}\) related to the Gwangju Democratisation Movement through a press release in May 2005. However, they had different plans. Indeed, they had already planned to tear down all the previously expanded parts of the old JPH (approximately 80 per cent of all the old JPH building). Such a fact could be identified in the English directive of the EA to the 480 participating architects in the design contest for the ACC in June 2005. In addition, the Minister of the MCT, Jung Dong-chae promised to some members of local groups that he would save all historic buildings and sites from possible damage in the process of the ACC construction in July 2005. Nonetheless, the central authorities pushed their original plan without changing the design guide. The reason might be that the old JPH was an obstacle rather than aid to accomplish their ambitious vision for the ACC.

The arguments of removal/preservation of the old JPH was spread out across diverse actors and each of these visions could offer a different interpretation of the place.

\(^{50}\) These included the old JPH, the public service centre, the National Police Agency, the Sangmugwan building and the public square and fountain.
Firstly, the argument of removal was suggested by central government (the EA), the city authorities and council, local business groups, and many local journalists. For them, the ACC was the latest fashion in architecture which it could be a catalyst for national or local growth. Thus, they wanted to shape it very attractively since it should be a driving force for economic development and the cultural industry.

In contrast, the argument for preservation was raised by some local groups such as victims’ organisation of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement (5.18 groups), the Joint Civic Committee for the old JPH (JCC), the Korea Alliance of Progressive Movements in Gwangju & Jeonnam (KAPM). For them, the old JPH was the most symbolic place in Gwangju as a sacred democratic space where their family members and neighbours had resisted, fought, and sacrificed their lives against the military dictatorship. Thus, they endeavoured to make the space a place to remember the meanings of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and the best way was to conserve the old JPH. Additionally, they wanted to add some spaces such as a Human Rights Museum and Peace Memorial in order to encourage the next generation to learn and practice the Movement’s values like human rights, peace, freedom, and democracy. In terms of the interrelationship between actors, what we have to pay attention to here is that their relations are situational. In the previous Landmark Controversy, the EA and city government had a clash with each other. However, in this controversy, they united against the people who argued for the preservation of the old JPH. It shows us that the relations between actors were not static but dynamic depending on their situation within the politics of place marketing.
8.5.2 Conflicting meanings: political process around the old JPH

“This building will be torn down. Do you remember the scream of blood shed in the May of 1980? Now, you citizens protect it, please (from the placard of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement victims on the wall of old JPH)”

[Source: GVO (the Gwangju Democratisation Movement Victims Organisation), 2009:1]

The issue of removal/preservation of the old JPH was closely connected with the fact that the place had been the most significant space for the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. Thus, this section deals with how the different meanings of the various actors were contested and conflicted within the process of the political controversy.

From the argument for removal

The central authorities (the EA) argued that one of the ACC’s future values is the “spirit of democracy, human rights, and peace through the ‘Gwangju Student Independence Movement’ and the ‘Gwangju Democratisation Movement’ (MCST, 2007:44)” by noting the architectural meaning of the ACC as an “emphasis of the historical characteristics of Gwangju as the main place of the democratisation movement (ibid:41)”. Despite the fact that the design of the ACC would demolish much of the old JPH, Woo Kyu-seung, the international architect (American Korean) of the ACC, who was selected by the central authorities, stressed that his work, ‘Forest of Light’ intended to reflect the memory of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, saying that “well preserved memories of the democratic uprising will make the ACC an internationally famous site (MCT, 2005:132).” However, the
central authorities’ activity for the representation of the ACC was quite different from their remarks. They destroyed many parts of the old JPH as a key vehicle for the memory of the historic event (the Gwangju Democratisation Movement), while their rhetoric was used to emphasise the historic importance of the site or to preserve memories of the Movement. We can feel and learn the values of democracy, human rights, and peace which was only rhetorically emphasised by them only when they conserve the old JPH as a key reservoir of memories. Thus, their rhetoric might be fictitious since their language and action were not consistent. For them, it seems memories of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement were some decorations for the success of their ambitious marketing project.

*From the argument for preservation*

In contrast to the argument for removal, a number of people in 5.18 (the Gwangju Democratisation Movement) victims’ organisations and other local groups considered the meaning of the Movement as a precious one. For them, it was far beyond one of the simple historic sites. For instance, it was a ‘battle field of the citizen army against dictatorship (GVO, 2009:67)’ and a ‘lamentable site where many 5.18 victims fought and were killed, wounded, and jailed in order to protect the old JPH and democracy (ibid:38)’. Thus, from the scalar perspective, it was a precious place and memory of personal body (the individuals involved) or on the family scale. However, for many residents in Gwangju, it was a place for the collective memory of ‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit. A member of a local group, as one of my interviewees, argued that such an ACC which is irrelevant to the citizens’ memory and values cannot produce Gwangju development, strongly refuting the need for it
as follows: “indeed, we can’t explain Gwangju except through 5.18 [the Gwangju Democratisation Movement]. Can we? If someone says Gwangju or 5.18, we naturally recall the old JPH. Because, in May 1980, it was the place where the military junta’s soldiers fired onto citizens and many people were hurt and killed. It was where we people struggled against them to the end. So it is our pride and the most symbolic place of democracy, freedom and peace in our country. So it’s the landmark of city…. But now, what they are building is no such thing. Both the EA and city government advertise it as if it will make many employment opportunities and attract tourists. However, we don’t trust them. Do you think it [the ACC] will bring prosperity to Gwangju? No way….. If we want to be wealthy, we must attract huge factories like POSCO steel or Hyundai automobile (author interview, 23rd September 2011).” As we can see, for them, the old JPH was the most precious location in the city. Thus, they cannot agree the demolition since that behaviour is to deny the key value of Gwangju. They also distrust the authorities’ vision about and the economic effects from the ACC as being only for local growth. There were lots of artists who had similar views. For instance, Ju Ro-mi, the film director acutely criticised the issue in an interview with the national media.

“In the case of youth, they can’t pay attention to socio-political problems due to their unemployment or finding a job. I heard, recently, most middle and high school students answered ‘money’ when asked the question of ‘what is the condition necessary for happiness?’. This State [Nation state of South Korea] makes us bet all the things we have for more money. In this respect, authorities let our old JPH be destroyed at any time. Indeed, they control our atmosphere and environment like that. But if we remind ourselves of the value of May [the Gwangju Democratic Movement] of 1980… during the period of ten days, we had the happiest collective society even in the worst
violence and isolation...... I hope people have a mind for collective value rather than only an economic one (Ohmystar, 13th May 2011)."

The disputes and conflicts between actors for and against the removal of the old JPH continued in a number of different ways over two and a half years (from June 2008 to December 2010). At first, 5.18 (the Gwangju Democratisation Movement) victims and local groups argued about the injustice of the demolition of the building through news conferences and rallies. Against it, the authorities (the EA) criticised them by arguing it would result in delay of and more expenditure on the project through some press releases, news conferences, and advertisements. However, the argument against the removal of old JPH increasingly gained the support of many citizens. For example, according to a joint survey by eight\textsuperscript{51} local press agencies covering one thousand residents in Gwangju, the proportion of those supporting the argument for preservation (62\%) was almost two times higher than the argument for removal (32\%). In addition, a part of the nation-wide netizens\textsuperscript{52} and artists joined in the campaign and they held a candlelight vigil together to save the old JPH building. Specifically, 5.18 victims strongly resisted with the slogan: “no touch, even one brick in the old JPH (Lee, 2009:175).” They variously expressed their antipathy through a series of print distributions, individual demonstrations, a Ochetuji protest\textsuperscript{53}, a sit-in with tents, and a hunger protest (see Figure 8.5). They established a committee for conserving the old JPH with other local citizens and pressed the EA by beginning a

\textsuperscript{51} They were Mudeung Ilbo (newspaper), Gwangju Ilbo, Jeonnam Ilbo, Gwangju Maeil, Jeonnam Maeil, Namdo Ilbo, Gwangju MBC (Munwha Broadcasting Corporation), and KBS (Korea Broadcasting System).

\textsuperscript{52} It means people who are actively involved in online communities and internet users.

\textsuperscript{53} It is a performance where protesters express their strong opposition by marching and giving a buddistic bow in every three steps. It has often been employed by environmental activists in South Korea since it can acquire mass media interest in spite of its physical suffering.
sit-in tent protest in front of the EA branch office in Gwangju in June 2009. Then, they gave the authorities more pressure with a hunger protest in September of the same year. However, it made the situation worse. The central authorities were embarrassed by it, and violently suppressed them by coercing dispersion and arrests (Han, 2010). In addition, the city government and council, business groups, and much of the local press supported the argument for removal because the delay of the project could bring about a budget cut from the central authorities. Then, due to several national politicians’ arbitration, the central authorities reluctantly gave an alternative of partly preserving the old JPH (from complete removal to less than 40 per cent preservation). Despite the fact that 5.18 victims and some local groups still opposed the plans, the authorities pushed forward with their decision. More than half of the building was demolished and now, it is being replaced with a large-scale cultural complex (see Figure 8.6).

Figure 8.5 An individual demonstration (left) and Ochetuji protest (right)

![Figure 8.5](source: Jang, 2011:33)

Figure 8.6 Under construction of the ACC (22nd Dec 2011)

283
In the previous Landmark Controversy, the EA people argued that the site should not be the place for a giant building since it was a historic site of democratic uprising by suggesting it should become an Asian mecca of culture to commemorate the historic event. However, it is very doubtful that they really wanted to preserve historical meaning of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement because they, in the end, destroyed much of the old JPH. Some researchers assert that the central authorities, from the start, had no interest in preserving the building since they only focused on the economic gain which would be accomplished by the ACC rather than any historic value (Jang, 2011; Jung, 2007; Han, 2010).

In particular, Jung Ho-gi argued that they had a negative attitude about accommodating commemorating facilities in the ACC. He suggested several reasons: firstly, they suppressed the movement which supported the preservation of the old JPH; secondly, they persistently avoided giving detailed responses to questions from local groups about commemorating the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in the project; and finally, they did not examine the historic meanings and
qualities of the site in their various publications, reports, and studies (Jung, 2007:194-5).

In relation to this, an interviewee of mine cynically criticised the injustice of removing the old JPH, noting that “both central and urban authorities should have preserved it, of course, with the original form. No matter how much they need, they must conserve the lively field of 5.18 [Gwangju Democratization Movement]. Because, when someone comes to Gwangju, probably he [/she] comes to see it. So, also in the Landmark battle, we concluded its type as an underground building. But, now they destroyed it..... It’s funny. It would have rather supported a giant landmark than the current ACC at first. The goal and means were changed each other. It [the old JPH] should be demolished because of the ACC and it should be cut because of the ACC, all of them because of the ACC (author interview, a member of Minyechong, 14th October 2011). Furthermore, many people worried about its negative effect on residents. Kim Min-su, a famous architect in South Korea pointed out that “most residents have concerns about the ACC plan because it possibly results in severely changing the urban systems of transportation and retail and it would lead to great damage to the sense of place and memory of ‘Owol’ [May 1980] around the old JPH (Gwangjuin, 8th February 2010).” He added that “the problem of city design in Gwangju is over-flowing design (ibid).” According to him, over-flowing design means excessive urban make-up with no connection to historical and cultural assets like the Gwangju Democratization Movement. He argued that the authorities should not to spend citizens’ taxes on projects unnecessary for residents’ lives, and should not sell the ‘Uihyang’ (a righteous town) for an exotic city of culture any more. Consequently,
we can observe an irony that the more political leaders and government officials endeavoured to develop cultural projects, the worse it became in terms of preserving cultural assets such as the old JPH. Values like ‘Daedong (distribution and solidarity)’ spirit increasingly disappeared because of the growing commercialisation of the ACC project.

8.6 Unfinished resistance and politics of memory

“[P]laces are never merely backdrops for action or containers for the past. They are fluid mosaics and moments of memory, matter, metaphor, scene, and experience that create and mediate social spaces and temporalities. Through place making, people mark social spaces as haunted sites where they can return, make contact with their loss, contain unwanted presences, or confront past injustices (Till, 2005:8).”

This section, firstly, examines the meaning of blending alternatives suggested by the authorities to related actors. Then, it explores the politics of memory around the old JPH in association with the meaning of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and the changing image of Gwangju.

8.6.1 Fixing up by blending alternative?

Central and city authorities are, currently, implementing the ACC project together. They have removed much (approximately 60 per cent) of the old JPH building in order to make a large exit to the underground facilities of the ACC.
However, many victims of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and local citizens still oppose the ACC plan which has been partly modified by blending alternatives. For example, an interviewee stated that “the goal of the ACC is to make Gwangju a lively cultural city embedded with the 5.18 [the Gwangju Democratisation Movement] spirit. If so, we have to preserve the Dochung [old JPH]. If they want to build the ACC, they can easily find other, better places. There is also such cheap land for the ACC in the suburbs of the city. They can build it at any time. Even now, I don’t know why they are building it in this place (author interview, a member of 5.18 Bereaved Family Organisation, 23rd September 2011).” Though many people in Gwangju still oppose it, all officials of the central and urban government told me that the problem was completely resolved by their alternative plan. It is doubtful whether the issue was cleared up or not. Even one city councillor argued that it was not resolved, saying that “I don’t think the conflict [around the ACC project] was solved, although it looks like it is co-ordinated. I think that the conflict is hidden. But when the time comes, it can break out in any form (author interview, a city councillor in Gwangju, 21st September 2011).” Though one party pushed it arguing that all problems were resolved, another party is still against it. Thus, it seems the removal/preservation dispute is not yet finished since a precarious state exists with tensions between the two parties that keep going on. In addition, we can recognise that there might be another conflict which could come back between them at any time.

8.6.2 The Gwangju Democratisation Movement and politics of memory
Even though studies on memory have been abundant for a long time, it is Maurice Halbwachs who began to approach it in association with groups or society (Assman, 1995). However, he did not deal with the theme of ‘mnemonic functions of objectivised culture’ well (ibid:128). By contrast, Assman (1995) comprehensively examines the relationship between memory, group, and culture by using ‘cultural memory’. He emphasised its transmission of ‘objectivised meaning’ beyond the collective memory of a group. For example, the Gwangju Democratisation Movement gave many Gwangju citizens common experiences and memories and it became a collective memory of the Gwangju people. Drawing on Assman’s theory, however, this thesis argues that it has been developed into a cultural memory through the people of Gwangju’s diverse activities to transmit the objectivised meaning of ‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit beyond simple collective memory. In this section, the politics of memory around the old JPH will be discussed from this perspective.

The past in the present is formed by historical re-interpretation and re-forming of memory. Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s idea, Till stated that “memory is the self-reflexive act of…. continuously digging for the past through place. It is a process of continually remaking and remembering the past in the present rather than a process of discovering objective historical ‘facts’ (2005:11).” In relation to the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, the most active behaviours of the nation state in creating a memory of the Movement were authoritative activities such as establishing a national commemoration day and constructing memorial parks. In addition, in terms of the historical aspect, central authorities changed one of the stock names of
the event from a ‘violent riot of the mob’ into a ‘righteous democratic movement’ in the 1990s. However, the politics of memory around the Movement have kept happening in Gwangju over the past 30 years. In the process, the dominant view is to consider it as ‘one of the democratic movements in South Korea’ and to use it for boosting tourism and the cultural industry. In contrast to this, an informal view is to transmit the memory of the Movement as a proud historic asset. The Movement, from this view, can be understood as the precious values of ‘courageous resistance’ against national violence for a completely democratic regime and self-governing by the people, and the ‘Daedong (distribution and solidarity)’ spirit which leads people to distribute rice balls and blood and co-operate with each other. These two views have continually struggled against each other within the policy arena of Gwangju marketing. We observed similar conflicts such as the ‘Yehyang’ discourse and the Biennale vs. Anti-Biennale in the previous chapter (Chapter 7).

One of the most important things in Gwangju marketing is to confirm and reflect whose memory as the major image of the city. History is a reconstructed memory through the present rather than a simple memory of the past. Thus, what is important is, in the context of the present, to decide whose and what memory we employ for marketing places. The Gwangju Democratisation Movement as a collective memory was a dominant image of the city during the 1980s. The memory of citizens about on the Movement is still being constructed now. However, it has been increasingly threatened and damaged mainly by the political and economic elites’ commercial marketing. For example, a member of the 5.18 Bereaved Family Organisation as an interviewee indicated the commercial trend of the ACC, saying that “many tourists in
Gwangju may have been interested in 5.18 [the Gwangju Democratisation Movement] rather than the ACC. At that time, the ‘Dochung’ [old JPH] was the place where our sons and daughters, husbands, and neighbours died. It was the uprising HQ. It was the space for them to hide, eat, sleep, and fight. Without that place, we would never feel the historical facts….. I’m sure it’s an attempt to make money by commercialising 5.18 [the Gwangju Democratisation Movement] through the ACC. It’s so lamentable that the ACC covers and damages the history of 5.18. In the end, it will go toward more commercialisation (author interview, 23rd September 2011).” As a result, it seems the memories and sprits of many citizens about the Gwangju Democratisation Movement have increasingly been covered by commercialised discourses and the latest architectural trends of cultural complex.

However, a number of residents still have great memories about the Gwangju Democratisation Movement which enabled us to experience the first purely democratic self-governing by the people in South Korea and feel the ‘Daedong (distribute and solidarity)’ sprit. These memories have persistently challenged the dominant one shaped by the government. For example, as shown in Figure 8.7, such memories were expressed in a variety of art works and activities. Additionally, every May, victims’ families of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and some civil organisation members voluntarily attempt to hold small ceremonies in which citizens could be reminded of the Movement such as distributing rice balls and blood. They have helped disadvantaged people and donated to hospitals with money and blood obtained by through those events.
Another example was the documentary movie, ‘Owolyea’ (sad memory of May) which dealt with normal people’s stories about the Movement. It came out in May 2011. It described the disappearing memories of ‘the others’ about the Movement in comparison with the formal history of government. The co-producer of the movie, Ju Ro-mi stated “it was the Presidential commitment of the Noh Mu-hyeon Government that they would make Gwangju a historic city by building the ACC at the site of the old JPH…. But I heard authorities didn’t notify citizens of design plans for removing the old JPH. To put it plainly, they gave considerable thought to the economic value rather than the historic one of the ACC….. Though it was linked to an economic aspect, I want to solve a question of what matters more between these two values (Ohmystar, 13th May 2011).” And she also added that “for the State, the May [the Gwangju Democratisation Movement] is a history which they want to erase. At the national ceremony for the Movement last year, indeed, they prevented people from

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54 The print is Hong Seong-dam’s work that has a title of Daedong-sesang to express ‘Daedong’ world. Hong is one of the most famous painters from Gwangju in South Korea.
singing ‘A March for Them’, and there was no historic site of 5.18 [the Gwangju Democratisation Movement] with original form. They have destroyed them one by one. I think they can make the ACC without the removal of the ‘Dochung’ [old JPH]…. (ibid.)” In relation to the old JPH, what is evident is that the first vision of the central authorities was to make it into a very historic place like a 5.18 Memorial Museum preserving the building. However, currently, much of the building was destroyed with a sophisticated rhetoric of the ACC through which they will modernistically interpret and represent a memory of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. Furthermore, it has been discussed as a promotional tool for national and local growth rather than as a place for historical and collective values.

‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit was an unprecedented collective value in South Korea constructed by the purely voluntary participations and sacrifices of the Gwangju people. However, its precious values and meanings have just been kept alive covered by diverse pro-growth discourses like the Yehyang, Cultural Mecca in Asia, the Landmark, and Removal argument, etc. of city authorities and business elites. Thus, to some extent, it appears those pro-growth frames are beginning to resemble the market-led ideologies and values of Western leaders such as Reagan of the US and Thatcher of the UK in that their emphasis lies on the value of the market rather than historical, social, or political values. Against it, quite a few people in Gwangju have resisted and expressed their own visions and meanings through a variety of ways. Their attempts, however, were limited in that they were all discourses and activities based on much narrower framed scales of the local or

55 It is a popular song on the theme of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, which has usually been sung by grass-roots activists and University students.
community. If they wanted to appeal to our society, they should have expanded the scale of their meanings. They might need to discuss and suggest the broader collective values of Gwangju Democratisaiton Movement like the ‘Daedong (distribution and solidarity)’ spirit, human rights, and peace beyond just locally remembering the Movement.

8.6.3 The damaged old JPH within transforming Gwangju’s image

Gwangju has long been the breeding ground for strong resistance against the violence and injustice of imperialism and dictatorship such as Gwangju Student’s Independence Movement under Japan’s colonial rule and the Gwangju Democratisation Movement in 1980. Such an image has been regarded as a very significant component to explain and understand Gwangju. As examined in Chapter 7, in spite of diluting the image with pro-growth ones, it seems that it still holds a somewhat influential power for people outside Gwangju. As an interesting example, according to a study by GDI (Gwangju Development Institute), a majority of foreign residents (37.5%) in Gwangju chose the Gwangju Democratisation Movement as a key image of the city (Min, 2008). Most of them (45.2%) also suggested a human rights-themed festival as the most fitting one for the Gwangju image (ibid). By contrast, their response about a city of culture and art which the city authorities strongly hope to be the city image was only 4.8% (ibid). Indeed, quite a few Asians have perceived the city as a city of democratic uprising. It can be identified in my interviewee’s statement as follow:

293
“If someone asks me how Gwangju is recognised from an outsider’s perspective, I can say that, at least for people in the Third world, they feel it is a city of human rights and democracy because the Gwangju people\textsuperscript{56} in non-governmental organisations endeavoured for it. They gave 5.18 prizes to South East Asians every year and brought them into Gwangju, then, they presented them with various experiences through the learning programmes of democracy in the Gwangju Human Rights School. They have made great exertions towards it (author interview, a professor in Chosun University, 16\textsuperscript{th} September 2011).”

However, Gwangju’s image as a sacred ground of democracy is increasingly obscured by the international cultural hub city. The symbolic places for the democratic uprising have been transformed into one of the travel products where we can go by a tour bus operated by city government. The old JPH where citizens resisted against the dictatorship as the location of their HQ has been changed to the luxurious space of the ACC as a Cultural Mecca of Asia. According to Till (2005), similarly in terms of the politics of memory, Berlin has also experienced contradictory tensions and conflicts in the process of making places with social memory. However, memorial projects for intentional forgetting of dark pasts like the National Socialist Party and the Holocaust, and ornamental marketing representations has gone hand-in-hand and promoted the ‘New Berlin’ as a global city within negotiations and co-ordinations led by the dominant interests of places (ibid). For another example, Harvey (2005) notes that the place marketing strategy around the financial crisis of New York in the 1970s as a crucial point for neo-liberalism, nationally and transnationally, to take hegemonic power within the arena of politics. He argues that city

\textsuperscript{56} Gwangju people here means non-governmental and voluntary organisations in Gwangju such as Gwangju Citizen Solidarity and The 18\textsuperscript{th} May Memorial Foundation. Since the mid 1990s, they have established and implemented the 5.18 prize, the Gwangju Human Rights School, the Gwangju International Peace Forum, and the International Intern (voluntary activist) Intercourse Project.
government, the municipal labour movement, and working class New Yorkers were deprived of the social democratic infrastructure which they had accumulated over the previous three decades (ibid:46). In particular, he asserts that cultural instruments played a major role in the process of marketing the city, saying:

“New York investment bankers….. seized the opportunity to restructure it [the city] in ways that suited their agenda. The creation of a ‘good business climate’ was a priority….. The city’s elite institutions were mobilised to sell the image of the city as a cultural centre and tourist destination (inventing the famous logo ‘I Love New York’). The ruling elites moved, often fractiously, to support the opening up of the cultural field to all manner of diverse cosmopolitan currents….. Artistic freedom and artistic licence, promoted by the city’s powerful cultural institutions, led, in effect, to the neoliberalization of culture. ‘Delirious New York’ (to use Rem Koolhaas’s memorable phrase) erased the collective memory of democratic New York (ibid:46-7).”

Then, according to Harvey (ibid), the Reagan Administration of the 1980s just expanded New York’s neoliberal model to a national scale. Thus, taking a close look into these complicated politics of memory around places allows us to have deeper understanding of the evolving political context of city marketing policies in connection with those places.

From the perspective of urban landscape, the Gwangju ‘Eupsung’ (traditional town wall) was a representative cultural asset of the city for over 1,000 years. Currently, however, most Gwangju citizens don’t know much about it since it was completely demolished by the Japanese. In recent years, central and city authorities pushed the growth-oriented ACC design and it led to a damage of another important historic building (the old JPH). Now, we have only two sites for remembering the Gwangju
Democratisation Movement: the greatly damaged old JPH and Mangwol Cemetery. A publication from the 5.18 victims’ organisation points out the responsibility of Gwangju citizens, saying: “we think our neglecting of the removal of this place will be a bigger crime in our history…. Once a historic site has disappeared, we cannot reverse it. So, we have the responsibility to remember and transmit historical value and meaning…. We hope this problem will be solved not through ‘resolution of forgetting’ but through ‘one of remembering’ (GVO, 2009:preface).” Nonetheless, over 60 per cent of the old JPH was demolished in order to transfigure itself to a deluxe cultural centre of Asia.

Furthermore, in this chapter, we have focused on the changes of intangible ideologies, images and meanings, rather than tangible transformation like the physical environment and landscape in order to explain the political process of neo-liberalising place marketing. In other words, what is matter in the thesis is disappearing collective values and meanings which were formed in process of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. Most interviewees who I met in Gwangju had some shared values like democratic experience and voluntary distribution, sacrifice and solidarity during the time of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and they are proud of them. For instance, a local news-woman answered my question (what is the meaning of Gwangju Democratisaiton Movement for you?) as follows.

“Well, what have I to say? I think, just we survivors should have and keep like a principle. 5.18 [the Gwangju Democratisaiton Movement] left us a spirit of resistance and the Daedong [distribution and solidarity] against dictatorship. What is the Daedong spirit? It is not the term about only my happiness. It is for our happiness and we should live well together because people with no
power are always driven over the edge. It is like a principle we have to embrace those people (author interview, 15th September 2011)."

For some elites in the city, however, those memories and values were only negative things which should be hidden and erased since they thought that those would be an obstacle to attracting investments and firms. For them, such resistant and tough images were not applicable to advanced and post-modern ones which Gwangju want to resemble; while, for others, they were precious memories about their family members and historical experiences. Nonetheless, such crucial meanings and values were not dealt with within the policy process of Gwangju marketing. Those mental values have disappeared from the mind of Gwangju people through the diluting by a neo-liberal pro-growth frame of dominant discourse contrived by city elites. Through this case, we can trace not only the transformation of the physical landscape but also the changing mental memory, value and meaning towards neo-liberalisation of contemporary cities.

8.7 Summary

Gwangju's image has been constructed by the conflicting and contesting visions and values of diverse actors with the geography of multi-scales around the ACC. In the process, the space of the old JPH was a vehicle for forming inter-relationship of various actors and they politically acted for their own interests based on different geographical scales. Through this complex process, multi-dimensional and -scaled politics of place have socially been constructed and re-constructed around the ACC.
project. In conclusion, as leading politicians and economic elites have expanded their ‘Yehyang (town of art)’ discourse mixed with ‘Segyehwa (globalisation)’ and a Culture Olympics into the international festival of the Biennale in the previous chapter. In this chapter, the dominant groups of the ACC project have created a new image of a cultural hub city covered by an Asian scale on a basis of Yehyang and the Biennale. And also, I attempted to illustrate how Gwangju places can serve as a material manifestation of competing ideologies and meanings about visions of ‘urban growth and development’. In the process, we could observe that the historic meaning and value of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement such as the ‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit, democracy, human rights and peace have been transformed into commercial ornament for development strategies. In addition, through this chapter, I have attempted to describe and understand this case within the wider context such as a global strategy of central government (Asian Mecca of Culture and Art) and the competition towards dominant cultural city between Korean cities rather than within the narrow scale of conflicts between the local authorities and residents around the ACC.

Currently, a part of the old JPH as a historic site of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement was torn down by the authorities in order to build a lavish symbol of a cultural hub city in Asia. Initially, politicians labelled the site as a place for commemorating the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. Now, however, much of the historic JPH building was demolished, even though it was the most significant place for remembering the Movement. For victims of the Movement, the place was their usual haunt for remembering their missing family members. The place gave
them energy to sustain their hard lives. In addition, it was a vehicle for many citizens to feel the precious values of the ‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit, human rights, peace and democracy. Now, however, much of old JPH was destroyed by the authorities and the site is rapidly changing into a space for a glossy cultural complex contributing toward the creation of the city as a cultural hub in Asia. The history of Gwangju as a ‘Sacred Democratic Ground’, which consisted of place identity of Gwangju in South Korea becomes an aesthetic ornament of a cultural city for local tourism and growth. Therefore, for local political and economic elites, the Gwangju image was a bad one that they should hide and erase by their contrived discourses like ‘Yehyang (a traditional town of art)’ and cultural hub city. However, for others in the city, it was a valuable image that they should preserve and develop into cherished values such as the ‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity) spirit, human rights and peace.
Chapter Nine: Dome Baseball Stadium and Other Marketing Projects

9.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the Dome Baseball project as a third case in order to investigate the evolving political context of Gwangju place marketing. However, it will be less deeply examined in relation to the previous cases since this case might be seen as much more recent and a bit too earlier for judging its implications. The Dome case has a different point from the prior ones. It has the symptom of western place marketing that has often been driven by private-led governance. Thus, this is especially the focal point in the next section. And then, other marketing projects in Gwangju are very briefly explored, focussing specifically on their social and political implications. The last section concludes with a brief summary of these discussions.

9.2 Dome Baseball Stadium

9.2.1 Background of the project

Just as in other Korean core cities, there was chronic shortage of housing stock because of rapid urbanisation in Gwangju during the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the population of Gwangju increasing from 370,000 in 1965 to 610,000 in 1975, the figure of the KHPR (Korean Housing Provision Rate) in Gwangju decreased from 63
per cent to 57 per cent (Han, 2010). To solve this problem, city authorities preferred large-scale residencial complexes since it would enable them to rapidly build a number of housings. In particular, the former City Mayor, Park Gwang-tae endeavoured to build a huge new town rather than focus on city centre regeneration as a major way of solving the problem of housing provision. By contrast, many residents in the Dong-gu area politically demanded revitalisation of the declining urban centre. Thus, there was a lot of tension between the sprawl-centred urban policy of city government and the inward-looking re-development that local citizens demanded at that time.

Around that time, a domed stadium boom began to emerge in Korean cities since the Korean national baseball team put up a good fight against the USA, Canada, Japan, Mexico and Venezuela and took second place in the first WBC (World Baseball Classic\textsuperscript{57}) competition. Additionally, that year the KIA Tigers (Gwangju-based professional baseball team) finally won the championship of the Korean series ten years after their previous success, and it made people in Gwangju have more civic enthusiasm than ever. These events might be good grounds for why the city authorities embarked on a large-scale sports project for local growth. As Molotch puts it:

\begin{quote}
“The athletic teams in particular are an extraordinary mechanism for instilling a spirit of civic jingoism regarding the ‘progress’ of the locality. A stadium filled with thousands (joined by thousands more at home the TV) screaming for Cleveland or Baltimore (or whatever) is a scene difficult to fashion
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{57} It is an international professional-baseball tournament just like World Cup in soccer. The first WBC was held in the US in 2009.
otherwise. This enthusiasm can be drawn upon..... in order to gain general acceptance for local growth-oriented programs (1976:315)."

As Molotch (ibid) argues, also in Gwangju, many residents’ enthusiasm towards the KIA Tigers naturally attracted the attention of politicians. Then in effect, it greatly contributed to a political decision on local growth-centred strategy for a giant sporting stadium. Many cities like Seoul, Ansan, Daegu and Busan, meanwhile, got in on the race for a domed stadium. Then the city leader of Gwangju made a decision without carefully considering the economic situation and also went in for the competition of constructing a domed stadium along with heated atmosphere between different cities. Regarding the background of the Dome Stadium, one of the public officials in charge argued that “the project did not stem from one reason but from somewhat complicated factors (author interview, 19th September 2011).” He added some more about the background, saying: “at first, there were many people who were interested in a domed stadium. At that time, we won the second prize in the first WBC, and our KIA Tigers (Gwangju-based professional baseball team) captured the championship of the Korean series. So many baseball fans and citizens asked to take this opportunity to build a new ballpark. And, they told us that as long as we are making it, let’s build a Dome like the Tokyo Dome. And, competition among other cities played a role. Other cities like Seoul and Daegu also considered building a Dome. So some people denounced us, saying that ‘all cities have attempted to build one but what you are doing’. Therefore, bearing in mind these complicated factors, our City Mayor made a decision to do it (ibid).”
This formal opinion, on the face of it, might lead us to a conclusion that most citizens wanted to build a domed stadium. According to some of my study results, however, general public opinion seemed to be incongruent with the interpretation of city government.

A local newspaper reported, “in the case of ‘Horangyi Sarangbang [tigers fan’s internet chatroom]’ on the KIA Tigers’s Homepage where many local baseball fans communicate each other, most of them wanted to have an open stadium instead of a domed one (Gwangju-dream, 29th October 2009).” Furthermore, the following answers to my questions in interviews show a different interpretation from the formal one, since they indicate that the major reason for the Dome Stadium project in Gwangju was because of City Mayor, Park Gwang-tae’s personal interest on his election rather than citizens’ demand.

“It [Dome Stadium project] was a crazy thing. We didn’t need it. The Dome was impossible due to the population scale or urban situation in city….. To be honest, it was begun for Park’s third election of City Mayor….. He argued that he would make the Dome as a landmark and representative tourist commodity for Gwangju. But most people opposed it. We didn’t need to build it wasting huge money. Actually, we, the city of Gwangju, didn’t have enough money to do, and once we built it, we couldn’t afford to keep it (author interview, a local newsman, 15th September 2011).

“We didn’t say ‘we want to see baseball in a Dome’. But, he [City Mayor] promised it to us for his election; to make it up for his own achievement: ‘I did it during my term of office’; to demonstrate visibly. It’s a so-called display
administration (author interview, a member of Gwangju-Gyeongsilryeon58, 18th October 2011).”

In addition, the Dome New Town project was announced by City Mayor, Park without any public hearing or open forum, even without the agreement of City Council.

However, was such a big project indeed launched only for his personal achievement? This might be not true. I gained another hint about how we can approach an answer to this question through an interview with a policy maker in the Gwangju authorities. He pointed out that the pressure of the media’s ranking of city marketing results played a role for them to push entrepreneurial marketing policies, saying that “evaluating agencies like Anholt or the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences internationally have announced a city brand index and ranking these days. And also, domestically, the KMA (Korean Marketing Association) and some major newspapers have assessed rankings. We local authorities have to keep an eye on the results because the impact of a low ranking is severe. But, once we have a good result, it’s very good. Especially, the City Mayor likes it. In 2007, when we had a grand prize for city marketing from the KMA, he really liked it. We aggressively conducted marketing campaign. He made the first City Marketing Bureau in South Korea and held the Design Biennale. Due to the prize, he received a media spotlight and had a number of interviews celebrating the achievement with the media. That’s important for him because he is a politician (author interview, a public official in City Government, 20th September 2011).” He also indicated that the ranking behaviour of

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58 It is an abbreviation word of Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice in Gwangju which is a progressive civic organisation to be formed in response to the unjust structure of Korean economic life.
the media and academic circle has contributed to entrepreneurial policies between cities, adding that “because of frequent rankings, the former City Mayor [Park Gwang-tae] paid great attention to it. So he made a Samsung-street and KIA-street, and cut taxes for Samsung Electronics and KIA Motors because they have invested much in our local economy - because such actions influence the rankings. This year we are making a by-law for promoting city competitiveness and our own index to improve those rankings (ibid).”

In association with this, McCann (2004) criticises the media’s rankings for ‘liveable cities’ and ‘best places’ in that they have ultimately strengthened the transformation towards the neo-liberalisation of cities. He believes that the rankings produced by some major media publications like Fortune and Money impose high pressure on cities and can lead to the city elite’s greatly intensified marketing activities for winning high results. He criticises that those rankings enable urban growth coalitions shaped by an alliance between local business and political elites to easily frame urban policies which suit their own interests. The reason is that such mainstream publications simplify the criteria of city success as both ‘liveability for the middle and more affluent class’ and a ‘good economic climate for businesses’ and as a result, it nearly corresponds with the urban growth coalition’s own interests and tastes. Similarly, we can identify the phenomenon of ranking cities that has emerged in South Korea through this interview. It might be a contributing factor to the change of behaviour of city leaders and marketing policy led by them towards a more entrepreneurial one.
To sum up, diverse factors could be seen as background for the Dome Stadium and New Town project in Gwangju. These were the city authorities’ sprawl-oriented urban policy, a Dome boom between Korean cities, and the increasing pressure of ranking cities for competitiveness. Most of all, however, the most significant factor might be the increasing pressure and imperatives of competition between Korean cities because not only Gwangju but also other Korean cities eagerly endeavoured to construct domed baseball stadium, to host mega-sporting events, and to gain higher city brand ranking. Such entrepreneurial marketing policies were not only led by Park Gwang-tae’s leadership of Gwangju. In this respect, Park’s political ambition should be related to the wider political context of competition pressure between Korean cities as an ‘external coercive power’ (Harvey, 1989:10).

9.2.2 Contested visions and conflict: Dome new town vs. normal ballpark

On 29th October in 2009, Gwangju city authorities signed a MOU (memorandum of understanding) with the POSCO Corporation59 (thereafter refer to as ‘POSCO’) about the Dome Stadium project. The city government promised POSCO that they would hand over land and administrative power and the POSCO was supposed to plan and implement the project by encouraging some financial investors such as banks, security and insurance companies. According to the press release on that day, they did not approach the project in the manner of building only a domed baseball stadium. In addition to building it, they intended to construct a large scale

59 It is one of representative chaebols (Korean giant business groups) and multinational steel-making and construction company (world’s fourth largest steel-maker), which it headquartered in South Korea. It has subsidiaries in many countries like China, India, US, Mexico, Poland, Vietnam, Venezuela, etc.
new town (estimated for over 50,000 residents) which could accommodate diverse facilities such as an international food village, a cultural industry complex, residential apartments, and a theme park. They predicted that the 30,000-seat Dome would be a landmark and symbolic tourist attraction for Gwangju. Moreover, they argued that “many people in other cities like Seoul and Incheon would come to see baseball games by KTX [Korean Express Train] and metropolitan train (Gwangju Metropolitan City, 2009:3).” They suggested their vision of it as “spaces for multi-use sports and leisure for performances, concerts, events, which we can access at any time (ibid).”

The City Mayor, Park emphasised the importance of the domed stadium in an interview with Goodnews-people (a national level media outlet), suggesting a few overseas examples as follows:

“The Dome is not just a baseball stadium. If we use it as a culture and art complex, it is the best project that will play a role as a landmark and will make Gwangju to be the Gwangju in the world. For example, the ‘Tokyo Dome’ in Japan made a profit on sales of around 1,000 billion Won [approximately 560 million pounds] shaping theirs spaces for various amusement facilities, a hot-spring, hotel, and racetrack, etc. In the case of Chase Field in the US, it provides a huge restaurant which can accommodate 4 thousand people in the domed stadium, and the city authorities receive stadium fees of 3.3 billion Won [approximately 1.8 million pounds] from Chase Field Corporation every year (23rd January 2010).”

The city authorities were not active only in the dome stadium project. They were also involved in constructing a new town. They had a favourable attitude for a new town in the past. For instance, when the relocation of the old JPH to another place was confirmed by Central Government, they tried to suggest a new town with the theme
of a cultural industry complex to the MCT, and then the proposal was rejected. In particular, the former City Mayor, Park supported the Dome Stadium and New Town project, saying that “we should build 100 new towns, once we have the need for them (Prime economy [Newspaper], 19th November 2009)”, and “as cities have been fiercely competing with each other in fields of culture and economy within the global village, the 21C became the era of the theme park (Gwangnam-Ilbo [Newspaper], 24th February 2010).”

There, however, were a number of opposing voices against the government’s vision. Most of them had concerns about damage to the residents in the city centre, the lack of economic validity for the Dome project, and unilateral pushing of the project. On 29th October in 2009, the Democratic Labour Party as one of the smaller opposition parties criticised the plans through the official comment: “considering the scale of population of Gwangju, we really doubt that the Dome Stadium can attract enough people, and it will probably result in a huge operating deficit like the World Cup Stadium (Prime economy [Newspaper], 29th October 2009).” A City Councillor, Yoo Jae-shin was also critical about city’s vision, pointing out that “there is no validity for the Dome Stadium and the 50,000-New Town since the government has no detailed solutions for the decline in the urban centre (ibid, 12th November 2009).” In addition, on 25th of same month, over 500 residents in Dong-gu and some citizens in the Redevelopment Housing Coalition held a rally opposing the project. They shouted slogans like ‘the Dome Stadium kills redevelopment’, ‘the urban centre is becoming a lettuce and cabbage field’, and ‘absolutely oppose the 50,000 New Town’. Most slogans were about the redevelopment in association with their economic interests.
In terms of scale, Gwangju city government and the POSCO pushed the project on the basis of public and private partnership at a local scale in order to build a large scale new town with a domed stadium which would be situated at a site far from the city centre.

By contrast, many civic and environment groups tried to be satisfied with only a small repair or remodelling of the old baseball stadium [Mudeung Stadium] since they assumed the cost of the Dome Stadium would be too high. In particular, environmental local groups such as Participation Autonomy 21 and the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement fiercely opposed the city authorities’ cancellation of the Green Belt for the project. Based on their community scale, a part of the residents related to housing redevelopment in Dong-gu worried about the negative effects (e.g. oversupply in the housing market) on their own projects resulting from the Dome Stadium and New Town and they were partly opposed to it.
Figure 9.2 Design of the Dome Stadium and protesting citizens

[Source: Left (Money-today, 19th Nov 2009), Right (Newsis, 25th Nov 2009)]

They did not argue about the Dome Stadium and only resisted about the New Town since it could be harmful for their redevelopment investments. Their interests were a little different to each other. Nonetheless, they could all, ultimately, ally together to oppose the city’s project at a local level.

In this case, policy actors had different interpretations and meanings of the Dome Stadium and New Town because of both their economic interests and spatial scales. Yet, they easily formed an allied party. How could they make this alliance? The reason might be that the two intertwined issues of the Dome and New Town should be embarked on together. The city government needs a domed stadium but did not have enough funds. The POSCO wanted to create profit from a New Town rather than the Dome. Thus, city authorities must provide the private company, as a project partner, with a large scale for residential development. As a result, they could not
split the two connected items. Such a situation enabled different opposing groups to unite their positions.

Through this example we can recognise that political actor’s interpretations and visions vary from their scalar positions (difference between local and community scale) as well as economic situations. In addition, as observed on some community residents’ scale in Dong-gu, we might identify the term of scale based on a social constructive approach is a contingent concept dependent upon situated interpretation. Increasingly, due to the alliance of the opposition forces, there was a groundswell of public opinion against the Dome Stadium and New Town.

The city authorities did not stand back against the opinion. Rather, they pushed their original plan artfully mobilising various methods. Firstly, high-level government officials asserted the need for a domed stadium through a series of contributions and interviews with local press and broadcasting media. Secondly, they tried to manipulate public opinion along with government-controlled organisations and some local businesses. The city authorities allowed them to hang banners celebrating and supporting the Dome project in the streets (see Figure 9.3). Then, these banners were all over the streets in Gwangju. Thirdly, they trained public officials and actively encouraged them to diffuse arguments for the Dome. Through these activities, they persistently attempted to forge ‘fictitious opinion’ such as ‘we desire to have a Dome and giant scale of leisure town like Tokyo’.
The negative aspect of the project did not stop there. It led to an endeavour to bid and host international sporting mega-events like the Summer Universiade, which will be examined in a later section. The Dome was only one of the sports marketing projects of City Mayor, Park. After his success in being re-elected as City Mayor of Gwangju in 2006, he already noted several sporting mega-events which he wanted to host in the near future: the East Asian Games 2013, the WBC (World Baseball Classic) 2013, and the Summer Universiade 2015. Of course, explanations about their likely enormous economic effects and improving city status always followed them. In addition, there was emerging private-led governance through the project. It was found that the POSCO demanded considerable benefits such as permission to build thousands of houses and some golf courses, and operation for a Water Park. However, it has an important implication on the evolving nature of urban governance.

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It said ‘Soccer is the World Cup Stadium, baseball is the Dome Stadium’. It might be a sentence which appealed to sports nationalism in connection with Korean’s special attention to the World Cup after 2002.
beyond just providing some economic benefits to a private company as a project partner. As Harvey argues, “in many of the instances of public-private partnerships, particularly at the municipal level, the state assumes much of the risk while the private sector takes most of the profits (2005:77).” Thus, despite market-led governance usually takes the form of partnership; it tends to have an inclination towards private interest. There was a similar indication in Gwangju society. The Participation Autonomy 21, a progressive local group, criticised the city authorities’ plan, by commenting: “when it comes to Private Investment Projects, without good arrangements, it might bring us problems such as privileged profit for specific companies and economic burden for citizens (Prime-economy news, 29th October 2009).”

Such a partnership might not be consistent with the principle of local democracy and public involvement (Hall, 2006). For example, Goodwin (1993) points out in a study on the marketing projects of Sheffield’s Don Valley and London’s Docklands in the UK that Development Corporations as non-elected agencies took the place of the city authorities even though they were not representative of nor had any accountability to citizens. According to him, “an appointed agency is, in each case, replacing the power of local government in order to carry out a market-led regeneration of each inner city (ibid: 161).” Such appointed agencies implement speculative development programmes in order to make a good climate for business rather than for residents like the industrial workers in the Don Valley and Docklands. He adds that such regeneration on a basis of partnership “is bolstered by the type of cultural speculation which promotes mythical landscapes and new images of each
place in order to build speculative confidence (ibid: 161-2)." If the original plan of the Dome Stadium and New Town were actualised in Gwangju, it would be a new town for the POSCO rather than for Gwangju citizens. The reason is that the city authorities attempted to fully authorize a purely private company [the POSCO] to conduct the project. Behind this political effort of government lies a symptom of the important shift to market-centred ideology. Harvey (2005) also suggests that one of the significant vehicles for a neo-liberal state is becoming increasingly dependent upon public-private partnership along with a flexible labour market, privatisation and commodification, deregulation in financial systems, and a minimum level of social safety net, etc. Despite its failure, the case of the Dome project is important from this contextual perspective. It implies the changing political nature of governance towards neo-liberalisation.

9.2.3 Death of the Dome to participatory civic stadium

Fortunately, the Dome Stadium and New Town project foundered. A deepening economic recession since 2008 global financial crisis contributed to its death. There was an increase of unsold housing in Korean cities at that time. The same story was in Gwangju and there were over 7 thousand units of unsold apartment housing. In addition, many residents in the inner city opposed the new town and most civic organisations criticised the City Mayor’s dogmatic behaviour. As the economic and political situation worsened, the POSCO rejected participation in the project. It meant the failure of the plan since it would cost too much and the city authorities could not afford it. Then, they inevitably established the Citizen Committee for Constructing a Baseball Stadium (thereafter refer to as ‘CCBS’) accepting the citizens' participation.
Largely, people from civic and community organisations took the lead in discussing the issue in the CCBS. Initially, some of the Committee members still had some intention for a new domed stadium. After a tour of inspection abroad (in the US and Japan), however, their opinions easily converged on a non-domed design. One of the members accounted for the reason, saying that “in Japan, we looked around stadiums such as Hokkaido Dome and Hiroshima, and we heard some explanations from stadium personnel. At the end of the trip, we recognised whether the Dome could or could not be applied to Gwangju (author interview, 16th September 2011).” The most important reason is economic feasibility. He added, “The cost of the Dome Stadium was three times more than that of normal one. If a normal one is 10 billion won [about 56 million pounds], a domed one is 30 to 40 billion won. It is beyond Gwangju’s finance. In addition, the maintenance cost is also enormous. So the answer came right out…. One of the Hiroshima personnel said to me, ‘recently, there was no domed baseball stadium being built in the world.’ I deserve to carefully listen to it (ibid).”

However, some Korean cities like Seoul, Busan, and Ansan are still constructing or having a debate over plans for a giant scale domed stadium with civic organisations. By contrast, now, Gwangju city authorities are building a non-domed stadium within their budget following the majority of public opinion. In my interviewing process, many interviewees were proud of such a policy switch, even city officials. A professor of the CCBS argued that this issue would be a clue for future urban policy in Gwangju, saying as follows:
“In spite of not securing complete success, I think we have solved major problems in the baseball project through communication with citizens. So I thought it was a great exemplar which we have achieved by actually guaranteeing and encouraging local people’s participation on municipal policy-making.... This implies to us that, at least forming an agreement with local people is indispensable to make a creative and good city (author interview, 16th September 2011)”

Currently, as seen in Figure 9.4, the Gwangju authorities are constructing a stadium which most local people want to have by remodelling the current stadium into a bigger one with an athletics track located at the side of old baseball ground. They are shaping a resident-friendly-stadium rather than a domed one with new town for private capital investors like the POSCO. Additionally, they gained a precious experience in how they can encourage actual participation of the city’s population and reach a consensus through collaborative policy-making.

**Figure 9.4 Old baseball stadium (left) and new one (right)**

(Source: Aju-economy news, 7th June 2011)
We can draw a few implications from this case.

Firstly, it appears that company-led public-private partnerships which can be often found in western place marketing have emerged in Gwangju marketing. The Gwangju Dome project was an attempt of the city government to develop a large-scale new town by drawing on a private company (the POSCO), on condition that the city authorities will secure economic benefits for the company. Fortunately, it failed because of severe economic recession and growing numbers of unsold new houses. However, if it had been implemented, we cannot anticipate the negative results of not only the economic effects for citizens’ lives but also for the overall change of governance in urban planning in Gwangju.

Secondly, we have observed that Gwangju authorities’ efforts for hosting a series of mega-sporting events were caused not only by City Mayor’s (Park Gwang-tae) personal ambition and leadership but also by the wider context of ‘macro-necessity’ (Jessop, Peck, and Tickell, 1999:149) towards entrepreneurial competition such as Dome Stadium construction boom and city brand ranking competition between many Korean cities. In particular, we could recognise a tendency that the neo-liberal phenomenon of ranking cities by the media and academic associations has been a (contextually) coercive influence in Korean cities. Thus, I want to suggest the phenomenon that Korean city authorities’ zero-sum competition for higher reputations and rankings by actively hosting promotional events and aggressively attracting companies and investments should be understood within the broader context of neo-liberalisation of cities.
Thirdly, like in the Yehyang (a town of traditional art) discourse (7.4) and the argument for a landmark (8.4) in the previous chapters, we could discover evidence of the city authorities’ endeavour to manipulate or mobilise public opinion in this case too. This is just one method of neo-liberal politicians’ and marketeers’ diverse tactics used when they are trying to evade conflicts in advance that might arise from their marketing policy. Thus, we need to accurately recognise the essence of hidden political power behind the rhetoric of ‘citizen’ or ‘public opinion’ within the politics of place marketing. Furthermore, we should understand whose interests the place marketing activities of government actually often help and support and to do this, we should know for what the political authorities have tried to manage citizens’ opinion in a skilful way.

9.2.4 Transfer of marketing policy: process and interpretation

In the process of the Dome project, City Mayor Park asserted its need by suggesting advanced capitalist cities’ examples such as the Tokyo Dome in Japan and Chase Field in the US. This sort of city leader’s behaviour is frequently observed in other marketing cases. In the previous chapters (chapter 7 and 8), City Mayor Kang Un-tae suggested Venice’s case for the Gwangju Biennale, and President Noh Mu-hyun noted the Pompidou Centre of France in association with the ACC. Thus, we can recognise that Korean city authorities in charge of place marketing projects have been typically influenced by advanced city marketing examples (whether its effect has been great or not). In fact, it had been already assumed by survey results since most Korean experts responded that Korean cities tend to acquire marketing ideas
from successful examples in other cities (including domestic and overseas cases). Seemingly, this policy transfer can be seen as a process of rational decision-making. However, it might be a superficial recognition about Korean policy transfer of place marketing since many political leaders like city mayor often suggest famous foreign examples merely because they rhetorically emphasise or legitimise marketing projects as their political commitment. Thus, such political suggestions have been frequently lacking in economic feasibility and social validity.

Its effect might be suggested in following two points. Firstly, policy transfers in Gwangju marketing projects (the Gwangju Biennale, the Asian Culture Complex, and the Dome Baseball Stadium) in the thesis have been attempted in order to legitimise a politician’s commitment and rhetoric for their own political interest rather than to learn lessons for rational decision-making. In three cases, politicians just used famous foreign examples for their personal interests because policy makers visited those example cities after the politician’s political commitment. Secondly, such transfer might have contributed to the neo-liberalisation of Korean cities. For example, though many students were coercively mobilised in the Gwangju Biennale, it obtained the reputation of being a successful event in South Korea. Then, many cities have emulated the Gwangju Biennale, leading to a spring up of over 11 competing biennales in Korean cities. In the end, it has contributed to the increase of entrepreneurial marketing in many cities.
9.3 Other marketing projects in Gwangju and their implications

In addition to the previous three major projects, this section briefly explores the more recent and smaller scale marketing projects in Gwangju. It examines in turn the Urban Folly project as an architectural project and Gwangju Universiade 2015 as an international sports marketing event, and concludes with some of the implications of these current development trajectories.

9.3.1 Urban Folly project

In recent years, there has been a number of architectural structure designed by international architects here and there in the city centre within Gwangju. This is the Urban Folly that the Gwangju authorities launched in 2010 as a special project of the Design Biennale and subsequently, they have expanded it for urban regeneration since 2011. The Urban Folly in Gwangju has been made along the site of the Gwangju Eupsung (traditional town wall) which was built by the Chosun Dynasty. As seen in a prior section (7.2), the Gwangju Eupsoung was a representative traditional asset in Gwangju before Japan’s colonial regime. It was completely destroyed by the Japanese for their control of the local market in 1909. Like in many other examples of the marketing of places, the aims of the Urban Folly were not only to decorate the urban landscape for encouraging more visitors to come but also to internationalise the city’s image. To do this, the city authorities have employed world class architects and designers investing several million pounds into the project. However, these
architectural structure might not really help to beautify the cityscape since they are not truly congruent with local identity.

**Figure 9.5 Urban Folly in Gwangju**

(Source: author's picture, 24th September 2011)

Additionally, even though they were constructed along the site of traditional town wall, they are never connected with its history. It seems that they are only exotic structures. For example, an artist criticised the project as having no connection with Gwangju identity and history, saying:

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These are the structures of designers Peter Eisenman (USA, upper left), Nader Tehrani (USA, upper right), Dominique Perrault (France, lower left), Alejandro Zaera Polo (Spain, lower right). Among them, Peter Eisenman’s work is still not completed because of shopkeeper’s opposition.
“The Urban Folly, it has many problems..... For instance, there are some artists who want to join in and gain some benefits, but it is just similar to the Street of Sculpture in Geumnam Boulevard. Of course, current things are not going well because neighbouring shopkeepers protest due to its covering of the shop’s signboards. So I don’t know why they build foreign works in narrow alleys like that because they don’t have Gwangju’s smell and quality, and don’t have any smell of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and Eupsung. Why do they want to do it? (author interview, a member of Gwangju MinYechong [Democratic Artists Group], 14th October 2011)”

As observed in Figure 9.5, many Gwangju citizens are complaining that the Urban Folly has little harmony with city identity. However, the city authorities are enthusiastically absorbed in making a post-modern and international city through somewhat strange and exotic sculptures rather than listening to the criticisms of local residents. In addition, the structures directly caused some residents economic harm even though they were built for local economic growth and development. For instance, some shopkeepers in Choongjang Boulevard protested in front of the City Hall demanding the removal of part of the Urban Folly since the structure covered their signboards and led to some damage to their business. A member of a local broadcaster criticised the city authorities’ urban regeneration policy, sharply indicating its tendency for a mere display as an international city:

“The Urban Folly is for urban revitalisation and they are constructing some structures. The city authorities told us it would improve the city’s image and character. But the people who sell in those places opposed it because it hid their shops. They said ‘Hey! Move out and go away’. So the structure in Choongjang Boulevard is still not completed. The purpose of it was not bad, but they failed to gain support from retail shop owners who were related to
the place of the Urban Folly. As they did it like that, they just caused some damage to salespeople. I think they are all Gwangju citizens, either they are two, or ten. So if they planned to do it, they should have considered such detailed things and listened to people affected by the project. But they didn’t do so; it was a problem. Salespeople argued that ‘if it’s not helpful for us, we don’t need such international sculpture or city’. For them, selling is more important than the policy of the ‘international cultural city of Gwangju’ since it is their means for earning a living (author interview, 13th September 2011)."

For salespeople, they thought the project of the Urban Folly might be completely harmful for their economic life since it just caused their business losses. Furthermore, it is difficult to maintain a number of sculptures such as the Urban Folly since they have the possibility of damage at any time and need continuous cleaning. An interviewee as a city councillor in Gwangju argued that the maintenance cost of the Urban Folly would be much higher than that of other sculptures shaped by domestic artists because the Urban Folly works were made by worldwide architects. Thus, the international structures of the Urban Folly need much more cost and care. However, it is not apparent what positive effects they caused in Gwangju citizens’ lives. By contrast, it seems more clear what problems they brought in.

9.3.2 Gwangju Universiade 2015

The Summer Universiade 2015 will be held in Gwangju. Regarding the economic effect of the games, according to the KIEP’s (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy) study, the effect on production and employment inducement was expected to be 535 million pounds and 12,000 people. In addition, the study result suggested that other economically immeasurable effects such as the improvement of
the national and city brands and image would be enormous. A public official managing city marketing affairs in Gwangju emphasised the significance of the games in an interview with the Donga-Ilbo (newspaper), stating “Gwangju Universiade 2015 will be a turning point toward a bright future and taking this opportunity, we will show you a growing possibility of the ‘global city Gwangju’ as a cultural hub of the Asian continent (25th October 2010).” In this way, optimism for the mega-event has been overflowing among political and economic elites in Gwangju. Indeed, this mega-event sports game and the Dome stadium have been regularly items of Gwangju marketing for the City Mayor elections in Gwangju. During the former City Mayor, Park Gwang-tae’s government, the city authorities applied to bid for hosting the games, but they failed. When the bidding failed they were severely criticised by many citizens for their reckless decision to participate in the bidding without consideration of the city’s financial situation and citizens’ opinion. In particular, there were a number of criticisms about ambiguous expenditure related to hosting activities and unilaterally pushing the project. Nonetheless, the city authorities pushed it again several months later. A local news reporter, Hwang Hye-yoon in Gwangju-dream described the situation as follows:

“When the challenge of hosting the U game failed and led to many criticisms of the city authorities, they became such a wimp saying ‘we will decide a re-challenge or not depending on the citizens’ command’. But then, they are attempting to shape public opinion for the re-challenge by mobilising local press and government-controlled organisations. Suddenly, contributions arguing the need for re-bidding to host the U games from personnel in such groups are increasing in most local papers these days (Mediaus, 26th May 2009).”
She added that she opposed it since the benefits of winning the bid, in the end, would only be a trophy for the politicians, construction contractors and developers (ibid). And then, Gwangju City Council and the Chamber of Commerce supported the city government. They hosted a conference to explain and persuade the necessity of re-bidding for the U games gathering panels for it. After such complications, the re-bidding for the event was successful for Gwangju under the current City Mayor’s regime, and now, Gwangju city authorities are endeavouring to prepare for it.

However, their attempts might be not easy to make the games a success because they are facing a few serious problems. First, they might pour a large amount of money, so much that they cannot finance it, for hosting the successful international event. According to the KDI (Korea Development Institute)’s study on the economic validity of the games, the total cost is expected to be 465 million pounds and the city authorities have to input 251 million pounds at least. The money is expected to be a huge burden for city finances since the annual revenue of the city is only 630 million pounds and its local self-reliance ratio is the lowest among 6 core cities in South Korea62. Regarding this study result, a public official in city government explained in an interview with the Donga-Ilbo (newspaper) that “[due to the Summer Universiade 2015,] probably we will be forced to downsize other fields of local budget such as social welfare, construction and transportation (Donga-Ilbo, 25th October 2011)”, and added “so, we have to expand national supporting money and create more self-revenue from the U-games Organising Committee through selling insignia and improving advertisement income.” Drawing on this interview, we can understand the

62 Fiscal self-reliance ratio is a Korean index to measure the proportion of self-source revenues to total budget income.
financial situation of Gwangju city government. There is a high possibility that the city authorities have no choice but to cut large amounts of money from social welfare services, transportation and infrastructure construction in order to host the Summer Universiade 2015 as an international city.

This might be not only a problem for Gwangju since there are more serious symptoms and problems emerging in other Korean cities. For example, Incheon will host the Summer Asian Games in 2014. Since 2008, however, the city government’s deficit has grown so they could not recoup their initial investments to Free Economic Zones like Pudong’s Zone in Shanghai due to the recent economic recession. Additionally, investing much expenditure in sporting facilities and transport infrastructure in order to successfully host the Asian Games exacerbates the situation. As a result, the city authorities are facing a severe financial crisis. Then, many local groups in Incheon have demanded that the city authorities have to return the right to host the Games, which are expected to cost around 1.7 billion pounds. In the end, since 2011, the authorities have embarked on a variety of measures such as partly cutting public officials’ salaries and welfare expenditure, selling municipal properties, and raising public rates in order to avoid a default (Joongang-ilbo [newspaper], 3rd October 2011).

For another example, the Winter Olympic Games will be held in Pyeongchang in Kangwon province. In terms of economic resources, however, local governments involved in the Games are supported by central government (75% of the total Olympic budget) since they are short of funds to host it (Jung, 2008). Nonetheless,
they have invested much money to build ski facilities, golf courses, and resorts through their Development Corporations (ibid). Then, similarly in Incheon, they also face financial crises and it keeps getting worse. Since the beginning of 2012, they have sold their public assets. Very recently, some Korean cities including Gwangju are undergoing these financial difficulties from hosting mega-sports event without thoroughly considering the cost implications.

As often observed in place marketing examples in advanced countries such as the US and the UK, the second problem of the U games in Gwangju is a change in the old areas of low income classes are being gentrified and it leads to a displacement of poor native dwellers. At first, the idea does not seem bad. The city authorities attempted to reconstruct old apartments and employed them as an athletes’ village, then, after the games, they intended to return them to the original apartment owners in order to successfully prepare athletes’ housing and simultaneously to revitalise the declining city centre. However, many dwellers cannot move back there because of the high housing price and increased rent. Rather, they are moving out to other poorer residences. A member of the local broadcaster criticised it in my interview, indicating as follows:

“I think the attempt to internationalise the city by hosting the U games is a bit reckless. It seems that the City Mayor and officials are pushing the project without sincere consideration as if they are crazy for ‘internationalisation’. Many residents who live in the city centre were displaced out of their home areas by their reckless international projects. One example is an athletes’ village for the U games. The village is being built by the way of reconstructing old apartments in the urban centre and its problem is the expensive housing
price. At first, residents were pleased to hear the winning of the bid for the games because they think that they can get new housing through the reconstruction project. But they are disappointed now. The compensation money for their old property is so low while the price of new ones is very high. So, many of them cannot move back to their previous locations after the games. In addition, tenants are more serious than house owners because they were forced to move out with a very small amount of transition money. As a result, they have changed their minds and oppose the reconstruction project (author interview, 13th September 2011).”

Currently, as the project is kept to its original plan, some low-income residents who live in old apartments might be expelled from their old homes. In other words, the international project of the city authorities started to discharge and marginalise people who lived peacefully in their places.

We can find other examples of gentrifying phenomenon in Gwangju in recent years. As examined in Chapter 7, the Gwangju Biennale was a representative marketing activity in the city. To host the festival, city authorities built a new large-scale culture belt composed of the Biennale Exhibition Hall, the Folk Museum, the Gwangju Culture and Art Centre, the Art Museum, and Jungoe Park. It might be a catalyst for gentrification. For example, there was an old apartment complex (Jugong Apt in Unam-dong) in front of the culture belt. Now, the apartment complex has been rebuilt and the price of neighbouring houses rose. Probably, most low-income residents moved out to the area of poorer neighbourhood or to the edge of the city-region. According to Ki Woo-yil’s study (2008), the first block of the complex was built into
Lotte Nakcheondae\textsuperscript{63} apartments, but its resettlement ratio of dwellers was only 13 per cent. In addition, 75 per cent of the previous old apartments (900/1,200) were small-sized (below 42 square metres) units which low-income people can afford to live in. After the reconstruction, however, all new apartments (1,490) were above 76 square metres and among them 569 units turned into very large (148 square metres) and were expensive for Gwangju. Subsequently, their prices dramatically rose from 28,000 pounds to 150,000 pounds and the prices of neighbouring houses also highly rose.

In short, recently, many old apartments around the area of the Biennale Exhibition Hall and its culture belt have been transformed into more luxurious residences appropriate for affluent migrants. As a result, many native people who had lived in there might have to move out to look for cheaper houses on the edge or in niche area of the city-region.

As seen in these examples, mega-projects for place marketing tend to entail creative destruction of landscapes. Here, as Harvey (2010:176) argues, the problem is that such creative destruction towards neo-liberalisation of cities and its subsequent urban restructuring usually have a class dimension. In other words, the neo-liberal diverse marketing of places to create an international and fashionable city is often attended with the sacrifice and suffering of the poor. It is not clear whether the effect of marketing projects for the ‘global city’ is economically good or not to its residents. However, we can find out that such projects resulted in soaring housing prices and

\textsuperscript{63} It is a brand name composed of Chinese characters, which means that it is the highest place with a happy and cozy paradise. Judging by its meaning, we can guess the apartments targeted middle and higher-income classes as consumers.
displacement of low-income dwellers through the previous examples. We can identify that more luxurious residences for affluent classes replace their old places even though such a process is not the same as that in the gentrification of Western cities. Additionally, as observed in the U games in Gwangju, we can recognise mega-events might cause budget cuts to social services and welfare for local residents.

9.4 Summary

It seems that the Dome Baseball Stadium was planned because of a city leader’s political ambition (the City Mayor’s re-election). However, it was not caused only by City Mayor’s personal interest. Rather, I suggest that such city political leader’s strategy and leadership should be examined within the wider context such as Dome boom and inter-urban competition for gaining a higher city reputation. Thus, we might conclude that the Dome Baseball project was caused mainly by the context of the increasing pressure and imperatives of competition between Korean cities because not only Gwagnju but also other Korean cities made efforts to construct domed baseball stadium, to host mega-sporting events, and to obtain a higher city brand ranking.

The city authorities needed a large amount of money since the aim of the project was to build a mega-scale new town with the Dome Stadium. It led them into a partnership with a private company (the POSCO). In the face of the economic recession due to the global financial crisis of 2008, the project was defeated because
of POSCO’s rejection of it. It resulted in Park’s failure at re-election as City Mayor. By examining this case, we might recognise that Gwangju marketing projects have been often shaped and influenced by political elites’ interests rather than by some of the critical issues related to the improvement of resident’s quality of life. Another important point of this example was to emerge as a recent symptom of Western marketing such as a private-led partnership between the city authorities and the POSCO which we have never seen in Gwangju marketing policies. There are other projects like the Urban Folly and the Summer Universiade 2015 in Gwangju which slightly resemble the characteristics of Western marketing. These could enable us to find out some of the social and political implications for place marketing. Firstly, local historic components are often employed as urban decoration within the context of the city marketing strategy. In the Urban Folly, though world class architecture was built along with the site of the Gwangju traditional town wall, they were only global artistic ornaments with no association to local place identity. As Kearns and Philo (1993:5) argue, the meaning of history in selling places led by a small number of city elites in neo-liberalised contemporary cities is very restricted and is quite different from that of other peoples. Secondly, we can identify a gentrified city centre for the international U games in Gwangju. As a result, some low-income residents were forced to move out of the area into other poorer residences and it might lead to a symptom of social and spatial polarisation in the city.
Chapter Ten: Conclusions and Way Forward

10.1 Introduction

It seems that urban place marketing lies at an intersecting point of urban economic development and growth; the revitalisation of declining localities; cultural and historical components of such places; and the daily life of residents. There are two different perspectives on how policies of place marketing are evolving – place-based place marketing and marketing science-based. Every place has its own meaning drawn from culture and history, and interests around such places are also various. As in many local development projects, the meanings of place marketing are the product of a very complicated political process. However, a marketing science-based approach is a pragmatic way through which we focus on identifying the mental state of consumers who have purchasing power, and make an attempt to build an emotional relationship with them for their further consumption. Thus, such an approach has inherent limits in understanding the characteristics of Korean place marketing and the changing political context of it. Therefore, in the thesis, the perspective of emphasising aspects of place within place marketing was adopted to examine the evolving political context of urban place marketing in South Korea. Within the process, discourses and meaning-making of diverse actors were intensively analysed by a mixed use of multi-scalar and cultural politics approach as
we might assume that place is socially constructed and can be interpreted in a number of ways depending upon its related actors’ world views.

The thesis investigated the changing political process of some marketing projects which are currently unfolding in Gwangju, South Korea. Specifically, the thesis sought to shed some light on this issue by analysing the evolving political context of place marketing within the broad transformation to neo-liberalisation in contemporary Korean cities. As observed in the case study of Gwangju from chapter seven to nine, employing a multi-scalar approach together with cultural politics one discloses the dynamics of the political context around its diverse dimensions and levels. In addition, as discussed, the political context of South Korea and its changing terrain of urban policy process are not same as those of Western cities. However, through the empirical evidence of the thesis, a more important finding, which we should take a careful look at, is that there might be a specific common trend between Western and Korean cities - an increasing deepening of uneven development in the process of place marketing policies. Within the context of this macro-level, now, Korean cities and their residents are facing a critical time that they have to choose whether to follow the way that Western cities went or not.

Some essential arguments on research topics which were discussed in the previous 9 chapters are very briefly summarised in the next section. Then, the third section examines the contribution of the thesis to academic knowledge. In the fourth one, I make a few suggestions to Korean politicians and policy makers for their improvement of urban policy, because it may be a social responsibility of mine as an
intellectual and public policy marker in South Korea. Finally, there is a brief evaluation and the limitation of the research, and a discussion of the direction for further research within this area of study.

10.2 Main study results on research topics

The thesis has dealt with the following five research topics through an expert survey and case study in South Korea: the reason why Korean city leaders have passion for place marketing projects; the characteristics of Korean place marketing and its Western- and Japanese-biased view; the existence of other people’s perspectives differentiated from dominant people’s on place marketing in Gwangju; the evolving process of Korean place marketing within the political context; and the social and political implications of this research for changing Korean place marketing.

The reason why Korean city leaders have a passion for place marketing projects

There might be various explanations about the reasons for Korean city leaders’ love for place marketing. However, the phenomenon is not only in South Korea, we can easily find it in many contemporary cities. Thus, one of the most important reasons suggested in the thesis is the globally neo-liberalised urban policy environment in contemporary cities. That might be closely connected with the essential characteristics of place marketing since, as Kearns and Philo’s (1993) argue, place marketing policies are often harmonious with the interests of political and economic elites. Indeed, during the last three decades, we have identified, in particular, the
process by which neoliberal marketing has been persistently diffused into the public sphere beyond market field. As already known in our society, one of the most important missions in the neo-liberal state is to build a good climate for business. Thus, the nation states have endeavoured to create the economic, social and cultural conditions for capital accumulation rather than for historic value, employment, housing, and social inclusion. In the field of urban policy, place marketing projects have been politically influenced by neo-liberal ideology and on the contrary, they have played a major role in the spreading of neo-liberal material effects, specifically more in urban space, such as gentrification, displacement, and spatial polarisation (Eisenschitz, 2010). The thesis suggested that an early symptom of such phenomenon might be discovered in Korean cities. In many examples, it has resulted from municipal political elites’ interests like Mayoral re-election.

**The characteristics of Korean place marketing**

Within the macro-context of place marketing, we might feel that Korean city marketing is little different from that of advanced cities’ since Korean marketing has rapidly moved toward entrepreneurial one. However, if we take a close look it, we could find a few distinctive characteristics. A few different features of Korean place marketing examined in the study are as follows. Firstly, Korean city marketing is less private-led than Western projects. Particularly in Gwangju, such a type of marketing has been introduced in recent years. Rather, some political city leaders such as the mayor are more active in employing the strategy of place marketing than business groups because of their political aims. The second point is related to the first in that Korean place marketing has often been much more influenced by political leaders’
interests. In the thesis, we could identify the fact in some examples such as the Asian Culture Complex, the Dome Baseball Project, and Gwangju Universiade 2015.

With regard to this, we can identify some facts about what makes city leaders in South Korea favour and ardently follow Western-biased place marketing in the thesis. According to my expert survey about Korean place marketing, most of the respondents thought political leaders actively introduced and referred to successful cases while they usually did not do this with failures. Many numbers of experts did not formally inform the public about bad examples and problems even though they knew of them. As a result, it might be evidence to express their biased behaviour to advanced examples of place marketing. Furthermore, it might influence many city leaders and policy makers in Korean cities to have Western- and Japanese-biased thought.

In addition, for city leaders in Korean cities, they might be good models within the wider context of coercive force such as increased pressure of inter-urban competition by which to persuade citizens who oppose place marketing projects. Consequently, it seems connected to a tendency for homogeneity in the marketing of cities. As Eisenshitz (2010:84) argues, ‘a successful example inevitably breeds clones’ in place marketing. Many British cities have learned some of the law of success and growth myth in culture-led urban regeneration and place marketing from American cities (Evans, 2001; Hall, 2006). Likewise, Gwangju city leaders have endeavoured to follow and imitate the ‘success formula’ of advanced Western and Japanese cities shaping a cultural mix of concert halls and museums, domed stadia,
conference centres, and international aesthetic architecture in the city. Such copying behaviours have been endemic to urban places under a simplified global frame of ‘to compete with other cities in a global era’ and could be currently witnessed in many cities in South Korea. Thus, they might make diverse places into undifferentiated ones since they would apply very similar ways of promotion from principles in marketing science.

**The existence of other people’s visions and meanings in Gwangju marketing**

Within the process of Gwangju marketing, the rosy view on place marketing is usually dominant, however, also in Gwangju, we can identify other views on cultural marketing of places in city centre. In general, marketing science studies tend to assume the fact that place marketing strategies result in local economic development and growth through ardently attempting “to identify, articulate and mediate the ‘unique selling propositions’ of locations (Julier, 2005:869)”. However, in reality, such marketing and branding programmes automatically cannot bring local economic growth. Rather, in the thesis, I argue that there is little definite evidence for such an assumption.

Additionally, in many cases, governments (whether they are central or urban) often tried to hide or dilute the ‘real’ values and meanings of many residents’ on place marketing projects. City authorities tend to situate other peoples’ visions on the city at the margin or outside of the discussion, simultaneously, creating a dominant, but manipulative, discursive frame on the reality. These dominant frames exclude other visions and meanings, strategically and rhetorically emphasising only specific
aspects of places (McCann, 2003). As a result, the politics of place can be understood within a process of conflicting and compromising various actor's political frames and meanings. And also, we can clearly recognise a specific actor's frames and meanings through inter-relation with other actors' ones (Marston, 2000; McCann, 2003). In addition, as McCann (2002:379) suggests, analyses of the cultural politics of local economic development, whether in the visions of dominants' or others', provide us with the opportunity to better recognise 'strategies of power' (Mitchell, 1995:110) around the production of local space economies. It is the same in the politics of place marketing in which different scaled actors are involved since representing a place image within multi-scaled spaces is also the arena of conflicting power and social relations. However, it is so difficult for marketing science-oriented place marketers to find out such as political context.

**The evolving process of place marketing policy within the political context**

With regard to the evolution of place marketing, drawing on the perspective of marketing science, Kavaratzis (2007) argues that it has been changed from simple fragmented promotion activities of places to systematic place marketing strategies based on management science, and then to more holistic place branding techniques in recent years. However, such a change of promotional activities might not be essential since their promotional and entrepreneurial nature is very similar. They have changed a bit in their names and business techniques, but they all have a key common inclination for a specific class or group such as the city's political leaders, business elites, and high income individuals. From this view, place marketing can be only a pragmatic and technical one to induce affluent customers to spend and to
serve the political and economic elite’s interests. Thus, I argue that place marketing is political since it is often inseparably associated with neo-liberal political settlement replacing places of the working or low-income classes with ones of new middle classes or affluent people (Eisenschitz, 2010). Therefore, its evolution should be also examined through changes of the political context rather than by manipulative improvements of marketing technique.

Indeed, in the thesis, we can identify a few examples in Gwangju marketing policies that differently scaled actors have socially constructed and reconstructed within diverse power relations. In particular, we can recognise that Gwangju images have been politically formed by not only local inward relations but also broader relations with different scales.

*The socio-political implications of place marketing in Gwangju*

Korean place marketing does not share all the same features as that of post-industrial cities in advanced countries. However, several similar signs were discovered in recent attempts at marketing Gwangju. In other words, even though Gwangju had different experiences of industrialisation and urbanisation, Western type neo-liberal symptoms of uneven development have gradually emerged in Gwangju marketing policy. These days, many city authorities are investing their citizens’ taxes in order to create spectacular landmarks. Of course, the iconic Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao is already acknowledged as a well-known success case in Gwangju. As examined in Chapters 8 to 10, some symptoms of neo-liberal place marketing such as commercialised historic values, gentrification and
displacement, diffusing ornamental city architecture, and social polarisation has also gradually emerged in Gwangju. Thus, we might conclude some Korean cities like Gwangju have moved toward neo-liberalisation through place marketing strategies. We can recognise that, in the process, some phenomena such as increased urban competitiveness under globalisation, the active use of cultural means, and westernised policy transfer from advanced cities have also contributed to the neo-liberalisation of Gwangju in association with place marketing policies. It would, however, be a major concern if the Gwangju city authorities give little attention to the wide-ranging negative effects that neo-liberal marketing projects of places have on the local residents since it can lead to a huge inequality and disintegration in the city (Eisenschitz, 2010).

Original ‘real’ history and culture which comprise the place identity of Gwangju have been transformed into aesthetic ornaments for local growth and urban regeneration. To shape an international cultural hub city, authorities demolished the historic JPH (even though not completely) as a symbol of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement. For the Movement’s victims, the building was the place where their missing husbands and sons struggled and died against military dictatorship. And also, for them, the place was a space for memory which had reminded them of their dead family members in daily life, but it was torn down. Many shopkeepers might still endure strange architectural structures within which we cannot recognise their local place identity, in the name of local growth. For them, the places where the Urban Folly was established were spaces which they had employed as signboards to make a living. To be an international city, many low-income people who lived in Jugong
apartments (to be transformed into an athlete’s village for Summer Universiade 2015) in Hwajung-dong are marginalised to the edge or out of town. For the residents, the places were shelters where they peacefully lived, enjoyed and slept with their family. These places were once spaces for their everyday lives.

However, they are rapidly being reshaped for the global, tourism hub, and icon of cultural industry: Gwangju in Asia. In addition, some symptoms of neo-liberal Western marketing such as the private capital-led governance in the Dome Baseball project, have emerged in Gwangju, and many place marketing projects in Gwangju have developed to resemble Western marketing. Though they often promoted the interests of political and economic elites, they were rhetorically described as strategies for all residents. Thus, now, as we observe the material results of Western place marketing projects during the last two or three decades, Korean city leaders and policy makers should be given ‘real’ lessons rather than simply be transferred a programmed, often speculative and transitory principle of success. We also should re-consider the success stories of advanced cities as to whether they really create positive effects for all their population.

What conclusions can be drawn to contribute to improving the place-marketing policies of Korean cities? To briefly sum up, this thesis suggested that Korean place marketing policies have moved towards neo-liberalisation, typically seen in Western advanced cities, and it is a very worrying sign for Korean cities. In addition, the thesis suggested that an approach from the perspective of politics can be more effective than a marketing-centred one in order to trace such evolving power relations.
Through this approach, I revealed the fact that there has been a tendency for Korean place marketing policies to often strongly depend on the political elite’s interest. Thus, most conclusions that I have found or inferred about place marketing projects suggest they might have negative effects.

However, there may be some doubts in relation to these critical conclusions. For example, some people might trust the positive function of place marketing strategies since they are sensitive to success stories. It might enable them to argue the future of place marketing will never be negative. Someone might criticise the political approach on the evolution of place marketing which the thesis has employed because it is not useful to suggest pragmatic alternatives. The next section will deal with a discussion about these issues.

10.3 Discussion

_Evaluation on the impacts of place marketing projects_

There is an argument for an appropriate place marketing strategy as some cities successfully seek to revitalise their declining inner cities. These proponents tend to concretise one or more of the following terms: pro-growth, pro-globalism, pro-corporate, business-friendly governance, privatisation and anti-government regulation (Bitterman, 2008:11). They typically argue for place marketing help for city leaders and policy makers in order for them to form and suggest successful future visions of the city. For instance, in relation to the ACC case in chapter 8, some might
argue that Gwangju citizens must have a landmark cultural facility like the Gugennheim Museum in Bilbao, Spain to ensure urban economic development.

However, drawing on the findings of the thesis, success should not only be evaluated by economic value.

Firstly, it seems there is little need for the city authority to situate the ACC where they have, at the great sacrifice of destroying the old JPH as the historic site of the Gwangju Democratisisation Movement. We can think of other possible alternatives that would enable the central and city governments to construct the ACC elsewhere, thus conserving the historic site of democratic resistance. If not, they should have modified the ACC’s architectural design scheme along with completely preserving the old JPH.

Secondly, the economic effect of the ACC suggested by politicians and public officials is very uncertain and suspicious in terms of its long-term results; its impact tends to just be ephemeral. Regarding state’s economic projects towards neo-liberalisation, Harvey (2005:156) indicates that a few successful cases like Japan and the Asian ‘tigers’ (such as Hong-Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) of the 1980s and West Germany of the 1990s might hide a general failure for improving economic growth and welfare. Likewise, it seems place marketing policies in cities have often accomplished very unsatisfactory outcomes rather than secured economic success as the rhetoric suggested since its success might be transitory due to other cities’ rapid replication or emulation. Rather, some prestige projects
have shown negative effects on their cities by virtue of their excessive scale and speculative financing. Some of them have resulted in the financial poverty of city authorities and growing taxes for the city population.

Thirdly, another important point of the thesis is that neo-liberal place marketing projects tend to severely erode the precious spiritual values, meanings, ideologies, and world views of city residents. According to Gramscian expression, neo-liberal place marketing policies have been diffused into the public’s cultural common-sense through slogans, language, and meanings. Then, their results might be to protect and strengthen the political and economic interests of city elites. The intention of the thesis is not to argue that there is no need for place marketing policies but to indicate that place marketing policies may not be universally successful. And also, the thesis sought to suggest some empirical evidence that they have often been employed in an uncritical manner. Consequently, we might recognise that place marketing strategies typically work as a significant catalyst for the neo-liberalisation of Korean cities like Gwangju.

**Usefulness of the political approach on the evolution of place marketing**

This thesis argues the character of place marketing policy and its evolving process is political rather than pragmatic. Regarding this argument, some may criticise it since the political approach is weak in suggesting practical tools and techniques for place marketing and branding. However, I want to suggest that a political approach’s effort to comprehensively understand the political context is much more important than
such a pragmatic approach, as it can closely scrutinise the nature of the marketing problems in cities. If we concentrate on only the efficiency of marketing projects, outside the social and political relations in urban places, it could ultimately reinforce the currently dominant interests of political city leaders and business elites. Recently, even though some authors from a marketing science perspective assert that place branding is now a more evolved area of knowledge and not just concerned with catchy slogans and new logos (Kavaratzis, 2007:703), Bitterman (2008:266) says that, “[c]ontemporary place brands are simply a concerted effort of place-making activities framed by a ‘slick’ logo, colore[ur] scheme, and promoted aggressively, and are not in fact, anything new.” Thus, a purely theoretical examination of marketing science as to how strategies of place marketing have evolved apart from social practices and contexts in reality might be an empty and fictitious interpretation. In this context, Chomsky’s following argument on the intellectual’s social responsibility is worthy of keeping in mind.

“It is not difficult for members of the university community to delude themselves into believing that they are maintaining a ‘neutral-value-free’ position when they are simply responding to demands set elsewhere. In fact to do so is a political decision, namely to ratify the existing distribution of power, authority and privilege in the society at large and to take on a commitment to reinforce it (Chomsky, 1969 [This version is excerpted out of Chomsky, ‘For Reasons of State (1972)’])."

In this respect, thus, I argue that the literature of place marketing has more social relevance. A similar argument might be that neo-classical economists barely capture and suggest to us the fundamental reason for the global financial crisis, since they are absorbed in market principle-centred theory in Economics. As Brenner and
Theodore (2002) emphasize to examine ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, in contrast with theoretical ideology, I argue that we should look at and investigate ‘actually existing place marketing’ rather than superficial place marketing as a thoroughly scientific theory. In doing so, I hope the political approach to the evolution of place marketing in this thesis will be a contribution in this regard by developing socially relevant theories of place marketing.

Another issue is whether the political approach can provide pragmatic tools and techniques for solving urban ills by offering advice to place marketing practitioners. During the 1980s and 1990s, it seemed the many city authorities and marketing professionals in Western advanced countries viewed place marketing as a panacea for all urban problems at once. However, it might not be possible to invent tools as complete solutions for city problems since those problems are interconnected and interwoven with each other and are continually changing over time. In addition, we are not sure contemporary cities have enough resources to solve them. Furthermore, as observed in the above chapters, neo-liberal ideology is not restricted to city elites. It has permeated into our daily life and thus, many city policy makers and even some residents have been affected by the mind-set of neo-liberalism. Providing solutions for urban problems can be drawn by precisely recognizing their nature. This might be a starting point for Korean policy makers to understand the serious urban situation within their own evolving political context. I sincerely hope that my endeavour to search for the changing political nature of place marketing might be a small help for Korean cities increasingly facing diverse problems from the wider political and economic conditions like neo-liberal transformation.
10.4 Key contribution to knowledge

Concerning this thesis’s major contribution, five points can be suggested.

Firstly, this thesis added a contribution to the literature of critical research about place marketing by undertaking a detailed examination of several Korean place marketing policies from a critical perspective. The existing Korean literature of place marketing has usually paid attention to a programmed success principle or to superficial economic effects since it was typically on the basis of pragmatic marketing science and behavioural approaches. There are few studies from a critical perspective in South Korea. Against the backdrop of a dominant technocratic and instrumentalist policy in South Korea, I have tried to offer a more critical and deeper interrogation of the causes and consequences of the place marketing policies. In addition, this study suggested some problems about marketing science approaches related to not only its methodological problems like pragmatic and value-free but also its exacerbating role of the zero-sum game between cities and homogenisation of places, its ephemeral results. Thus, this thesis contributed to enrich the critical literature of place marketing not only in the UK but also in South Korea, by carefully indicating a neo-liberal tendency of place marketing in contemporary cities.

Secondly, this research examines a Western urban policy agenda at work in an Asian (specifically Korean) context and in so doing might contribute new sights into West to Asia policy transfers and mutations. The thesis introduced Korean urban
marketing to a Western-based academy. Even though some marketing projects of Asian countries such as Singapore, Japan and Malaysia have been introduced to the UK, there have been very few studies about the evolution of Korean urban place marketing policy. In particular, the case of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement and the Gwangju marketing projects has been rarely introduced in the UK.

Furthermore, this thesis might give new insights into the Western-base academy since it is the first critical attempt to deeply investigate the political evolution of Gwangju marketing policies in a Korean (Gwangju) context. The perspective of ‘others’ represented by Koreans might give some criticisms on the literature of Western-oriented place marketing since Gwangju marketing has evolved within the context of complicated legacies of colonial and authoritarian developmental state. Thus, some examples in Gwangju marketing (such as pseudo-local growth coalition of ‘Gigaehyeop’) might be used to make a broader argument in line with the emerging postcolonial critiques of urban theory and can also be used as an example of ‘variegated capitalism’. As a result, this research might provide a useful basis from which to address the gap in understanding non-Western place marketing policies.

Thirdly, the thesis also added a contribution to the literature on the neo-liberal shift in urban politics at diverse scales and in diverse places. It has attempted to confirm the fact that the phenomenon of neo-liberalisation has influenced not just specific countries or areas, but has had a global reach. We could trace such neo-liberal tendency not only in Western countries but also in East-Asian countries like South Korea through the case study of Gwangju. The existing Western perspectives on
neo-liberalisation of urban place marketing are not sufficient to comprehensively understand the changing context of non-Western city marketing projects. In addition, there have been abundant studies usually employing a global-oriented approach on neo-liberalisation in the existing literature, however, this thesis deeply examined such macro phenomena in association with the process of an individual city’s spatial restructuring and evolving place marketing projects.

Fourthly, in terms of methodology, this study operationalises a strategic relational methodology in a way which stimulates reflection on how relational methodologies might be operationalised in contemporary urban geography more generally. It was conducted by an operational using of nationwide expert panel survey and a detailed case study based on a mixture of multi-scalar and cultural politics approaches. Through this relational approach, this research might present the possibilities of using expert surveys as a means of being able to operationalise calls for more relational understandings of urban politics, and mixed the two approaches of multi-scalar and cultural politics, which enabled me to multi-dimensionally examine the changing political context of marketing policies in detail. These approaches might be helpful to gain a relational understanding and deeply investigate diverse interactions of local political actors in the thesis.

Particularly, regarding the mixture of two approaches, multi-scalar approach was useful to relationally investigate the changing process of local growth politics at a multi-level, since the urban politics of place marketing is not confined to a certain single scale such as a local one but is expressed as a complicated consequence of
interplay among different scales, including related national contexts and global processes. In addition, it offered a helpful means to explore contingent and situational relations and discursive frames within political conflict, co-ordination and power distribution between diverse policy actors. For the thesis, the cultural politics approach was also valuable, particularly from the perspective of non-elites, to understand contested meanings, which were not often uncovered by a superficial examination, around place marketing projects in Gwangju. A mixture of those two approaches can offer a way of investigating the dynamic of contestation, conflict, and struggle between diverse actors’ strategies, images, and meanings. As such it presents a useful lens through which to deeply understand the actual political context of diverse urban marketing strategies.

The fifth major contribution of this empirical study is linking place marketing in South Korea with an urban political approach, in order to provide us with a deeper explanation and understanding for the evolution of place marketing in Korean cities. Indeed, most previous work on place marketing in South Korea has a narrow perspective since it has tended to be based on marketing science. Understanding the changing political context of urban place marketing is a long neglected area in South Korea. Thus, I think my study will be useful for Korean researchers who have an intention to politically explore Korean place marketing. In addition, I think many Korean authors still have a broadly positive interpretation of advanced cities’ place marketing, especially in the US, the UK, and Japan. However, this research might give them an opportunity to review Korean literature from a purely Korean perspective, and it is critical about Western place marketing.
Sixthly, the discussion on memory of politics in chapter 8 was rich, and it might have some potential to bring something new to the literature on place marketing. Drawing on Assman’s theory of cultural memory (transmission of ‘objectivized meaning beyond simple collective memory of a group), I argue that Gwangju Democratisation Movement’s collective memory has gradually developed into a cultural memory through citizens’ and artists’ diverse activities such as ‘Daedong’ (distribution and solidarity)-themed artistic works, pictures, films, and some informal ceremonies. Through unfinished resistant activities of Gwangju marketing example, I suggested the potential of how we can examine place marketing in association with the politics of memory.

10.5 Policy suggestion for South Korea

Some may argue that, over the last 30 years, Western place marketing projects in advanced capitalist countries have been successful in transforming their industrial image to post-industrial one. Nonetheless, it is very doubtful that the material and social results of such marketing projects in the long term have been successful for all their residents. Rather, they could be seen to have stimulated a further uneven development and social inequality in the city. Since the global economic crisis of 2008, there has been an argument as to whether the Western neo-liberal model of place marketing will develop or not (Eisenschitz, 2010). Thus, it is a good time for Korean policy makers to critically review and reconsider their orientation towards using marketing examples from advanced capitalist cities as best practice.
Since the 1970s, South Korea has been often cited as a good example of a developmental state in terms of economic growth (Harvey, 2005). As we have seen, in urban marketing terms it has been greatly dependent upon foreign examples from advanced capitalist countries. We could even term this a catch-up strategy in the field of urban policy. However, now, it appears that this strategy has reached a limit in the pursuit of economic growth. Hitherto, Korean city policy makers might expect good performance to imitate or emulate the successful examples of advanced cities’, and this approach has led to the very rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of South Korea. However, now, I think such practice in urban policy should be changed since it might result in a transformation which typically exacerbates social inequalities. I want to suggest in the thesis that Korean policy makers should consider how neo-liberal (market-centred) place marketing projects really help to make their citizens’ daily lives better, and they have to reflect on them further and create new alternatives for more democratic and collective urban society in the policy process. In a sense, it appears that many Korean city authorities find themselves challenged with balancing their need to learn from real implications and lessons of cities in advanced countries while avoiding reckless emulation of managerial success principles.

The evolution of place marketing might have different features in different cities and countries. However, I have also found commonality within the wider transformation towards neo-liberalisation. We need to firmly recognise that neo-liberal place marketing policies frequently promote uneven and contradictive urban development
such as gentrification at the expense of low-income and working class people. One of my intentions is to draw some attention to this for policy makers in South Korea, and I hope it will lead to a thorough reconsideration of current place marketing strategies in their cities. Many Korean policy makers in cities have still paid attention to place marketing based on marketing science approach. Unfortunately, however, this will lead to the pitfall of homogenisation, and polarisation in its social effect. If Harvey’s argument, in his book <A Brief History of Neo-liberalism>, that ‘ neo-liberalism is recognised as a failed utopian rhetoric masking a successful project for the restoration of ruling-class power (Harvey, 2005:203)’ is true in the contemporary urban policies of Korean cities, Korean city leaders and policy makers should rapidly turn their marketing policies to more egalitarian and collective political values.

Therefore, in relation to Gwangju’s case in the thesis, Korean policy makers need to excavate and expand their citizens’ collective values like the ‘Daedong (distribution and solidarity)’ spirit, which meant voluntarily distributing their food and blood and mutually co-operating with each other at a difficult time within the city. In so doing, Korean city leaders and policy makers should approach local issues with an open mind. Then, I suggest that they need to democratically make more collective urban policies linked to their residents’ daily lives and encourage citizen participation.

10.6 Direction of future research
The thesis has shown how Korean place marketing has evolved especially focused on Gwangju, and how the policies of Korean place marketing has increasingly moved towards the features of Western neo-liberal ones, albeit within a Korean context. However, the approach of my study cannot explain all practices of evolving place marketing in Korean cities. It just offers one lens to investigate the politics of the place marketing process. Thus, despite my earnest endeavour in the process of the research, this study still has some gaps which future research should fill in.

Firstly, the limit of the expert survey can be indicated. In other words, there might be a problem caused from using a certain sample population for the survey since the survey in the thesis was confined to a Korean expert group from the area of place marketing policy. The perception of an expert is often not the same as that of the general population. Thus, future survey studies on Korean place marketing need a broader range of sample. For instance, possible future research on Korean place marketing might include general people such as residents. It might provide us with more trustworthy results in order to identify overall trends of Korean place marketing. Secondly, there is a difficulty in the generalisation of my findings from Gwangju. This is always a weak point of any case study, although Gwangju has offered an extensive example of urban place marketing. However, it might be not enough and other case studies from across South Korea would be beneficial.

Nonetheless, this study has presented a national-scale expert survey, an extensive case study and varied documentary analysis. Findings from this research have enabled us to identify overall and common trends within Korean place marketing.
Through these mixed methods, the thesis has provided empirical insights into the political context of evolving urban marketing policies in South Korea.
Appendix 1. Research Consent Form

TITLE OF PROJECT: The Evolution of Place Marketing

PURPOSE OF STUDY: The purpose of this study is to explore how Korean place marketing is distinct from that in western cities and examine whether there are evolutionary processes of place marketing strategy. In particular, the researcher wants to investigate the changing structures and nature of urban governance in order to see how this has affected place marketing. In addition, the investigator wants to examine how western policies relating to place marketing are transferred to South Korea and what their effects are. The thesis will critically examine policy practices of Korean city marketing in which politicians and policy practitioners import western experiences. It could improve academic understanding of urban place marketing by comparative study between countries. Further, it could help Korean policy makers to have more balanced views of the nature and effect of place marketing.

PROCEDURES: This study will require short interviews from key persons involved in place marketing and urban development in Gwangju in South Korea. The interviews will be recorded by a digital voice recorder. Recorded files will be heard by the investigator to assist in analysing information for the purpose of the study described. All identifying information will be deleted from files. Furthermore, the files will be used solely for the purposes above in accordance with the ethical standards of confidentiality that govern geographical research. All files will be destroyed within two years of completion of the study.

CONFIDENTIALITY: The information participants provide which is recorded will be anonymised. All information will be identified by an identification code, not by their name. The participants name or other identifying information will never be associated with any research reports or publications that use the results of the interviews.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RISKS: The researcher will strictly observe the University ethical guidelines to protect informant’s confidentiality and privacy. No risks are known to the investigator at this time.

WITHDRAWAL / INVITATION TO ASK FURTHER QUESTIONS: All participants are voluntary, they may discontinue at any time. Participants should ask any questions they have concerning this study before they sign the consent form.

CONSENT: I provide my informed consent to participate in this study. I have read and understood the consent form. Upon signing below, I will receive a copy of the consent form from the study investigator.

(Name)             (Signature)                      (Date)
(Name)             (Supervisor)                     (Date)
Appendix 2. Survey Questions

Expert survey for a study on the evolution of Urban place marketing in South Korea

Dear respondent,

Hello, my name is Myungseop LEE. I am currently undertaking research for a PhD at the University of Exeter. My research is investigating ‘The evolution of urban place marketing policy’, and is supervised by Prof. Mark Goodwin in the Geography Department.

This expert survey aims to examine the overall trends of the evolutionary process of Korean urban place marketing. I would like to focus on identifying broad changes during last a few decades in South Korea and exploring the characteristics of Korean urban place marketing.

All your answers will be only used for this academic research and I will absolutely promise not to utilize them for other purpose. I really express my gratitude to your consideration and time in advance.

February 2011

Researcher: Myungseop LEE (Supervisor: Mark Goodwin)
1. What do you think of the most preferable activity in each time as urban place marketing tool during the 1990s and the present (2011), please write answers in each blank.

(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       )

A. Developing large scale and flagship buildings such as museum
B. Active promotion and advertising city
C. Holding festivals and events
D. Developing and selling local product
E. City branding (e.g. High Seoul)
F. Attracting companies and inward investments

2. What do you think about the most important background to the emergence of place marketing in Korea? (       )

A. The response of local government in order to overcome deindustrialisation and inner city decline due to global economic restructuring
B. The introduction of a local self-governing system and the expansion of autonomy in local government
C. The postmodern socialisation and the increasing effect of visual media and advertising
D. The effect of urban entrepreneurialism
E. other, please specify (                                        )

3. What are the most primary purpose of urban place marketing during the 1990s and the present, please write answers in each blank.

(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       )

A. Revitalisation of local economy
B. Improving physical redevelopment and infrastructure
C. Improving the city image and city brand value
D. Raising local identity
E. Improving citizen’s quality of life
4. How have the degree of the utilisation of cultural tools in urban place marketing been changed during 1990s and the present? (       )

A. Sharply increase
B. Gradually increase
C. Steadily no change
D. Gradually decrease
E. Sharply decrease

5. How have the degree of the attention of cultural tools in urban place marketing been changed during 1990s and the present? (       )

A. Sharply increase
B. Gradually increase
C. Steadily no change
D. Gradually decrease
E. Sharply decrease

6. How has the relationship between urban place marketing and cultural tools been changed in urban policy during 1990s and the present? Please write in each blank.

(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       )

A. Cultural tools have no connection with urban regeneration (and urban place marketing)
B. Cultural tools are taken account for urban regeneration (and urban place marketing) as a part of strategies
C. Cultural tools lead the urban regeneration (and urban place marketing)
D. Cultural tools are the most important component in all urban policy

7. How are differently defined the concept of culture within urban place marketing between the 1990s and the present? Please write in each blank.

(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       )
A. Culture = only art  
B. Culture = art + cultural economy(only tourism)  
C. Culture = art + cultural economy(tourism, film, media. etc)  
D. Culture = art + cultural economy(tourism, film, media. etc) + cultural welfare

8. Which actor is most influential within urban place marketing policy area during 1990s and the present? Please write answer in each blank.  
(1990s :         )                   (the present, 2011 :       )  
A. Central Government  
B. Mayor and City Government  
C. City Council  
D. Partnership organisation  
E. Economic organisation such as Board of Commerce  
F. Civic groups  
G. Artist groups  
H. other, please specify (         )

9. How is the role of Central government within urban place marketing policy area during 1990s and the present? Please write answer in each blank.  
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       )  
A. Central government lead actively whole parts of place marketing policy  
B. Central government is involved in only some parts of place marketing policy together with financial support to local government  
C. Central government don’t care about place marketing policy except giving some financial support to local government  
D. Central government never care about whole place marketing policy  
E. Other, please specify (         )

10. How is the role of city government within urban place marketing policy area during 1990s and the present? Please write answer in each blank.  
(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       )  

A. City government lead actively whole parts of place marketing policy
B. City government is involved in some parts of place marketing policy together with financial support to partnership organisation or agency
C. City government don’t care about place marketing policy except giving some financial support partnership organisation or agency
D. Central government never care about whole place marketing policy
E. Other, please specify (                                      )

11. How is the role of partnership organisation within urban place marketing policy area during 1990s and the present? Please write answer in each blank.

(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       )

A. Partnership organisation lead actively whole parts of place marketing policy
B. Partnership organisation is involved in some parts of place marketing policy
C. Partnership organisation do not involved with place marketing policy except following command and control of city government
D. Other, please specify (                                      )

12. How are the degree of citizen’s participation changed differently within urban place marketing between the 1990s and the present? Please write in each blank.

(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       )

A. Sharply increase
B. Gradually increase
C. Steadily no change
D. Gradually decrease
E. Sharply decrease

13. What activity is the most celebrated and positively echoed by citizen in urban place marketing during 1990s and the present? Please write answer in each blank.

(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       )
A. Developing large scale and flagship buildings such as museum
B. Active promotion and advertising city
C. Holding festivals and events
D. Developing and selling local product
E. City branding (e.g. High Seoul)
F. Attracting companies and inward investments

14. Where are the ideas of place marketing activities from during 1990s and the present? Please write answer in each blank.

(1990s :       )                   (the present, 2011 :       )

A. Other city’s (including other countries) successful case
B. Citizen’s suggestion such as idea challenge
C. The result of institute research
D. Private economic group or company suggestion
E. Other, please specify (                                      )

15. Do you think how often Korean cities consider and apply other country’s city marketing policies to their policy?

A. Very often   B. Often   C. Occasionally   D. Rarely   E. Never

16. If they (Korean cities) consider and apply other country’s city marketing policies, do you think which country is usually examined by them?

A. US     B. Japan      C. UK     D. Germany     E. Other

17. If they (Korean cities) consider and apply other country’s city marketing policies, how much we need those examples?

A. Very much   B. Much   C. Not much   D. A little   E. Never
18. If they (Korean cities) consider and apply other country’s city marketing policies, which part is most helpful for us?

A. Gaining new policy ideas  
B. Learning from good case (e.g. imitating best practice)  
A. Learning from bad case (e.g. preventing mistakes)  
B. Checking the feasibility of place marketing policies  
C. Other, please specify (  )

19. How much effects of the application of other countries’ urban place marketing policies and examples to Korean cities?

A. Very much  
B. Much  
C. Normal  
D. A little  
E. Tiny  
F. Nothing

20. What’s the most difficult point in the application of other country’s policies to South Korea?

A. The difference of Policy makers’ marketing capability  
B. The difference of policy customers  
C. The difference of Policy conditions (e.g. finance)  
D. The difference of policy network  
E. Other (  )

21. Do you have experience of visit to West European cities for field visit related place marketing and urban development?

A. Yes, I have  
B. No, but I have experience of visit to other Western cities  
C. No, but I have other advanced cities like Japanese ones  
D. No, I haven’t
22. Do you have experience of hearing failure of Western place marketing?
   A. Yes (       )
   B. No (       )

23. Do you have experience of introducing or indicating failure of Western place marketing?
   A. Yes (       )
   B. No (       )

24. Please select two biggest problems which Korean cities are facing related urban place marketing policy.

   (       )

   A. Emulating or copying other example
   B. Focused on large-scale projects without considering finance
   C. Focused on short-term performance rather than long-term one
   D. Authoritative decision making procedure
   E. The lack of citizen’s participation
   D. The lack of marketing mind-set of policy makers
   E. The lack of co-operation between policy actors and stakeholders
   F. Other (       )
< Background Questions >

25-1. [Occupation] What is your job?
   A. professor and lecturer
   B. researcher
   C. politician
   D. government official
   E. office worker (private company and agency)
   F. artist
   G. voluntary and civic group
   H. other, please specify (                                       )

25-2. [Working Year] How many years did you work in this field (city marketing, urban development and cultural policy)?
   A. Less than 5 years
   B. 5~10 years
   C. More than 10 years

25-3. [Career field] What is your career field?
   A. Urban development and regeneration
   B. Marketing
   C. Cultural policy and strategy
   D. Other, please specify (                                       )

25-4. [Level of Degree] Your highest level of education and qualification is __________.
   A. Bachelor’s degree or equal qualification
   B. Master’s degree or equal qualification
   C. Doctorate degree or equal qualification
Appendix 3. Survey Results

1. The most preferable activity in urban place marketing tool

(1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holding local festivals and events</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing large scale and flagship buildings such as museum</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing and selling local products</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attracting companies and inward investments</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active promotion and advertising city</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing city brands and slogans (e.g. Hi Seoul)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The present, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing city brands and slogans (e.g. Hi Seoul)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attracting companies and inward investments</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing and selling local products</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active promotion and advertising city</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding local festivals and events</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing large scale and flagship buildings such as museum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The most important background to the emergence of place marketing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The introduction of a local self-governing system and the expansion of autonomy in local government</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The response of local government in order to overcome deindustrialisation and inner city decline due to global economic restructuring</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The effect of urban entrepreneurialism which local authorities behave like private companies</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In order to make achievement of city leaders since the introduction of local self-governing system</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The postmodern socialisation and the increasing effect of visual media and advertising</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. The most primary purpose of urban place marketing

(1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Count (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revitalisation of local economy</td>
<td>14 (41.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving physical redevelopment and infrastructure</td>
<td>7 (20.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the city image and city brand value</td>
<td>6 (17.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raising local identity</td>
<td>6 (17.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving citizen’s quality of life</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The present, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Count (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improving the city image and city brand value</td>
<td>21 (61.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revitalisation of local economy</td>
<td>9 (26.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving citizen’s quality of life</td>
<td>4 (11.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving physical redevelopment and infrastructure</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raising local identity</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The degree of concern for cultural tools in urban place marketing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concern</th>
<th>Count (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharply increase</td>
<td>22 (64.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradually increase</td>
<td>12 (35.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steadily no change</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradually decrease</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharply decrease</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The degree of utilisation of cultural tools in urban place marketing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utilisation</th>
<th>Count (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gradually increase</td>
<td>23 (67.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharply increase</td>
<td>11 (32.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steadily no change</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradually decrease</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharply decrease</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. The relationship between place marketing policy and cultural tools

(1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural tools are taken account for urban place marketing as a part of strategies</th>
<th>24 (70.6%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural tools have no connection with urban place marketing</td>
<td>9 (26.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural tools lead the urban place marketing</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural tools are the most important component in all urban policy</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The present, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural tools lead the urban place marketing</th>
<th>24 (70.6%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural tools are taken account for urban place marketing as a part of strategies</td>
<td>7 (20.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural tools are the most important component in all urban policy</td>
<td>2 (5.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural tools have no connection with urban place marketing</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. The concept of culture within urban place marketing

(1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture = art + cultural economy(only tourism)</th>
<th>20 (58.8%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture = only art</td>
<td>14 (41.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture = art + cultural economy(tourism, film, media. etc)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture = art + cultural economy(tourism, film, media. etc) + cultural welfare</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The present, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture = art + cultural economy(tourism, film, media. etc)</th>
<th>18 (51.5%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture = art + cultural economy(tourism, film, media. etc) + cultural welfare</td>
<td>16 (47.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture = only art</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture = art + cultural economy(only tourism)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. The most influential actor within urban place marketing
(1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor and City Government</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic organisation such as Board of Commerce</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artist groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership organisation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The present, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor and City Government</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership organisation</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic organisation such as Board of Commerce</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artist groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. The role of Central Government within urban place marketing
(1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government don’t care about place marketing policy (except giving some financial support to local government)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government lead actively whole parts of place marketing policy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government is involved in only some parts of place marketing policy (together with financial support to local government)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government never care about whole place marketing policy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The present, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government is involved in only some parts of place marketing policy (together with financial support to local government)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>94.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government lead actively whole parts of place marketing policy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government don’t care about place marketing policy (except giving some financial support to local government)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government never care about whole place marketing policy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. The role of City Government within urban place marketing

(1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Description</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City government is involved in some parts of place marketing policy (together with financial support to partnership organisation or agency)</td>
<td>14 (41.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City government lead actively whole parts of place marketing policy</td>
<td>13 (38.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City government don’t care about place marketing policy (except giving some financial support partnership organisation or agency)</td>
<td>7 (20.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government never care about whole place marketing policy</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The present, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Description</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City government lead actively whole parts of place marketing policy</td>
<td>22 (64.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City government is involved in some parts of place marketing policy (together with financial support to partnership organisation or agency)</td>
<td>12 (35.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City government don’t care about place marketing policy (except giving some financial support partnership organisation or agency)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government never care about whole place marketing policy</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. The role of partnership organisation within urban place marketing

(1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Description</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership organisation is involved in some parts of place marketing policy</td>
<td>17 (50.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership organisation do not involved with place marketing policy except following command and control of city government</td>
<td>17 (50.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership organisation lead actively whole parts of place marketing policy</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The present, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Description</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership organisation lead actively whole parts of place marketing policy</td>
<td>20 (58.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership organisation is involved in some parts of place marketing policy</td>
<td>14 (41.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership organisation do not involved with place marketing policy except following command and control of city government</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. The degree of citizen’s participation within urban place marketing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gradually increase</th>
<th>18 (52.9%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharply increase</td>
<td>15 (44.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steadily no change</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradually decrease</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharply decrease</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. The most celebrated and positively echoed by citizen in urban place marketing

**(1990s)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holding local festivals and events</th>
<th>18 (52.9%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing large scale and flagship buildings such as museum</td>
<td>8 (23.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing and selling local products</td>
<td>3 (8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attracting companies and inward investments</td>
<td>3 (8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active promotion and advertising city</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing city brands and slogans (e.g. Hi Seoul)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**(The present, 2011)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attracting companies and inward investments</th>
<th>16 (47.1%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing and selling local products</td>
<td>7 (20.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing city brands and slogans (e.g. Hi Seoul)</td>
<td>4 (11.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active promotion and advertising city</td>
<td>3 (8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding local festivals and events</td>
<td>3 (8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing large scale and flagship buildings such as museum</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. The ideas of place marketing activities are from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other city’s (including other countries) successful case</th>
<th>26 (76.5%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The result of institute research</td>
<td>4 (11.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private economic group or company suggestion</td>
<td>2 (5.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s suggestion such as idea challenge</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. How often Korean cities consider and apply other country’s city marketing policies to their policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. The country is usually examined by Korean cities for the application to their place marketing policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other country</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. How much need other country’s success case for Korean cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need Level</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much need</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very much need</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some need</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little need</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very little need</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. If Korean cities consider and apply other country’s city marketing policies, which part is most helpful

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learning from good case</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining new policy ideas</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checking the feasibility of place marketing policies</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning from bad case</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19. How much the effect of the application of other country’s success case for Korean cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Count (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some effect</td>
<td>20 (58.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A large effect</td>
<td>12 (35.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very large effect</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much effect</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very little effect</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. The most difficult thing in the application of other country’s urban place marketing policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difficulty</th>
<th>Count (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The difference of political, economic and social situation</td>
<td>22 (64.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The lack of marketing mind and policy capacity of public official</td>
<td>8 (23.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The difference of citizen’s (or customer’s) culture and taste</td>
<td>3 (8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The difference of processing and organising related policy network</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Any experience of visiting Western cities to look at their urban place marketing policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Count (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I have been to another Western city outside Britain</td>
<td>18 (52.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have been to a British city</td>
<td>12 (35.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have no experience of visiting a Western city, but I have been to cities in other developed countries like Japan</td>
<td>3 (8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have no experience of visiting cities in a developed country</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. Any experience of hearing failure case of Western city marketing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Count (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21 (61.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13 (38.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Any experience of formally introducing or indicating failure case of Western city marketing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Count (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>29 (85.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5 (14.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
24. The two biggest problems in developing urban place marketing policies in Korea

(The first)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excessive focusing on short-term outcomes like increasing the number of tourists rather than on long-term goals like improvement of citizen’s quality of life</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no creativity, just imitation, in place marketing policy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inefficiency in the allocation of financial resources</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritative and non-transparent policy formation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The lack of a collaborative network between policy actors like politicians, public officials, citizen and related stakeholders</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The lack of citizen participation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The lack of citizen support</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The lack of a marketing mindset in policy makers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The second)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The lack of a collaborative network between policy actors like politicians, public officials, citizen and related stakeholders</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>There is no creativity, just imitation, in place marketing policy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive focusing on short-term outcomes like increasing the number of tourists rather than on long-term goals like improvement of citizen’s quality of life</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>The lack of a marketing mindset in policy makers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritative and non-transparent policy formation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The lack of citizen participation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The lack of citizen support</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inefficiency in the allocation of financial resources</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
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</table>
< Background questions about respondents >

25-1. Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institute researcher</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public official</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency people</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City marketing company people</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25-2. Working years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
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<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5~10 years</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25-3. Career field

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban development and regeneration</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural policy and strategy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25-4. Level of degree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate degree</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s degree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4. Interview Offer (example)

Name
Organisation

Sending date

Dear Mr/Mrs 0000,

I work at the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs in the South Korean Government and am currently doing research for a PhD at the University of Exeter. My research investigates the political changes of Gwangju marketing projects and policies, and is supervised by Prof. 0000 and Prof. 0000.

I am studying the evolution of place marketing in South Korea, and I have selected Gwangju as a case study in South Korea. I would be very grateful if you could spare an hour or so to discuss the involvement of your organisation in this activity, with particular reference to the Gwangju Biennale (or the Asian Culture Complex or the Dome Baseball Stadium). I would be happy to travel to your office (or place) to meet at a time of your convenience.

I look forward to hearing from you soon through my email and thank you in anticipation.

Yours sincerely

Name of researcher
----------------------------------
PhD candidate

Address
Email address
Contact number
Appendix 5. Interview Schedule (example)

1. Common questions

[These general questions aim to identify how an interviewee understands place marketing and branding in Gwangju and why does the interviewee think like that.]

First of all, I want to ask some general questions about Gwangju place marketing and branding.

------------------------------------

1.1 What’s the image of Gwangju presented through place marketing? How has this changed over the past 15 years?

1.2 Do you think place marketing and branding is important? If so, why cultural activities like staging art festivals and building flagship museums become important in Gwangju?

1.3 Who mainly takes decision on Gwangju’s image-making?

1.4 Would you change anything about current place marketing Gwangju, if you could?

1.5 Do you think that place marketing policies have been successful in Gwangju? If so, why? Could you explain the reason?
1.6 What was the contribution of your organisation to Gwangju marketing and urban development?

1.7 How do you think local history and distinctiveness should be handled in terms of place marketing?
2. Place vision of the Gwangju Place Marketing Projects

[These questions aim to recognise how an interviewee thinks the vision of Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, Dome Project) in Gwangju.]

Now, I want to ask about the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, and then I am going to ask about the Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, Dome) project.

------------------------------------

2.1 What’s meaning of the Gwangju Democratisation Movement to you?

2.2 What’s the vision of Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, Dome) project?

2.3 So far, do you feel it has been successful?

2.4 What’s the vision of the project from the view of your organisation?
3. Related organisations, partnership and power

[These questions aim to ascertain related organisations, the role of partnership and governance in association with Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, Dome) project.]

Let me ask some questions about organisations and partnership for Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, Dome) project.

------------------------------------

3.1 What has been the position and role of your organisation within the project? And how has this changed?

3.2 What are the key organisations involved in the project?

3.3 How do these organisations work well together within the project? I mean they have regular meetings, steering group and administrative persons.

3.4 How do you make decisions on the project?

3.5 Who are the key agencies or individuals in your organisation?
4. Conflicts and co-ordination process

[These questions aim to find out the process of conflicts and co-ordination within the Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, Dome) project.]

Let me ask some questions about the process of conflicts and co-ordination within Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex, Dome) project.

-----------------------------

4.1 Have there been any disagreements and major conflicts in the process of doing the project?

4.2 Where do you see the conflicts coming from? What’s caused them and who was involved?

4.3 How were disagreements and conflicts resolved and who contributed to co-ordinate them?

4.4 Have there any changes in the relationship between city authorities, business and local groups as the project has developed?
5. Policy transfer of place marketing

[These questions aim to identify how an interviewee understands the policy transfer of place marketing and branding, especially from other country into Korea.]

I want to ask questions about the policy transfer of place marketing and branding.

-------------------------------

5.1 In Gwangju, where do you think are the ideas about place marketing policies are coming from?

5.2 Do you think Gwangju often considers and applies other country’s city marketing policies to their policy?

5.3 When you consider and apply other country’s city marketing policies, which country is usually examined? Can you tell me a few examples?

5.4 When you apply them to Gwangju, how much do you feel they are necessary and actually how much has other experiences been helpful for Gwangju?

5.5 Have you had the opportunity to visit other countries in association with urban regeneration and place marketing?
6. Results of the project and Gwangju’s future

[These questions aim to identify how an interviewee understands the result of the Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex) project and think Gwangju’s future marketing and branding.]

I want to ask questions about the result of the Gwangju Biennale (or Asian Culture Complex) project and the future of Gwangju place marketing and branding.

-----------------------------

6.1 So far, what have been the major changes for local residents as a result of such projects?

6.2 Do you think these projects have been successful in helping to change Gwangju’s image? If so, why?

6.3 In general terms, what have been the biggest problems for marketing a city like Gwangju? And what are the main challenges facing Gwangju marketing now?
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