Changing Ethnic Boundaries:

Politics and Identity in Bolivia, 2000–2010

Submitted by Anaïd Flesken to the University of Exeter
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Ethno–Political Studies
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Abstract

The politicization of ethnic diversity has long been regarded as perilous to ethnic peace and national unity, its detrimental impact memorably illustrated in Northern Ireland, former Yugoslavia or Rwanda. The process of indigenous mobilization followed by regional mobilizations in Bolivia over the past decade has hence been seen with some concern by observers in policy and academia alike. Yet these assessments are based on assumptions as to the nature of the causal mechanisms between politicization and ethnic tensions; few studies have examined them directly. This thesis systematically analyzes the impact of ethnic mobilizations in Bolivia: to what extent did they affect ethnic identification, ethnic relations, and national unity? I answer this question through a time-series analysis of indigenous and regional identification in political discourse and citizens’ attitudes in Bolivia and its department of Santa Cruz from 2000 to 2010. Bringing together literature on ethnicity from across the social sciences, my thesis first develops a framework for the analysis of ethnic change, arguing that changes in the attributes, meanings, and actions associated with an ethnic category need to be analyzed separately, as do changes in dynamics within an in-group and towards an out-group and supra-group, the nation. Based on this framework, it examines the development of the two discourses through a qualitative analysis of anthropological accounts, news reports, and expert interviews. In both discourses, the unity of the respective in-group is increasingly stressed, before diverging conceptions become ever more prominent. Finally, my thesis quantitatively examines changes in in-group identification, out-group perception, and national unity, using survey data collected by the Latin American Public Opinion Project over the decade. It finds changes in identification that can be clearly linked to political mobilization. More citizens identify as indigenous and Cruceno, respectively, and do so more strongly than before. Yet identification then decreases again, concomitant with the growing divisions in discourse. Moreover, the rise in identification is not associated with a rise in out-group antagonism or a drop in national unity. On the contrary, the latter has increased steadily among all Bolivians. Besides shedding light on ethnic relations in Bolivia, this analysis thus also contributes to the wider debate on the effects of ethnic politics. It shows that identifications do indeed change in response to mobilizations, that they do so more quickly than expected and not necessarily in the manner as expected, demonstrating that it is necessary to carefully distinguish different elements of ethnicity.
List of Contents

Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................... 2
List of Tables.............................................................................................................................................. 5
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................ 7
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................................... 10

1. Introduction: From Ethnic Mobilization to Political Polarization? ............................................. 11
   1.1 Research design: Bolivia as case study of changing ethnic relations .................. 13
   1.2 Gaps in the literature on Bolivia and Santa Cruz .................................................. 17
   1.3 Research questions and methods ................................................................. 23
   1.4 Thesis structure and contributions ............................................................... 27

2. Analyzing Ethnic Change: Ontology, Epistemology, Methodology ................................ 33
   2.1 Theory: Towards a framework for the analysis of ethnic change .................... 34
   2.2 An analytical framework ............................................................................... 42
   2.3 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 58

3. The Rise and Decline of Indigenousness in Bolivia .......................................................... 61
   3.1 Before 2000: From divided society to mestizaje to pluriculturality .................. 62
   3.2 2000–2005: The emergence of a people ......................................................... 68
   3.3 2006–2010: Refounding Bolivia ...................................................................... 76
   3.4 Discussion and conclusions ............................................................................ 87

4. Indigenous Identification and Groupness ........................................................................ 93
   4.1 Changes in indigenous identification ............................................................ 95
   4.2 Changes in indigenous cohesion ................................................................. 108
   4.3 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 114

5. Consequences of Identification for Groupness, Otherness, and Nationness .......... 119
   5.1 Indigenous mobilization: Action based on identification .............................. 121
   5.2 Otherness: Prejudice, discrimination, and their political relevance .............. 129
   5.3 Nationness: Bolivian political and social community .................................... 139
5.4 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 144

6. The Rise and Decline of Cruceñoness in Santa Cruz .......................................................... 147
6.1 Before 2000: The construction of a regional identity ....................................................... 148
6.2 2000–2005: From a positive in-group to a negative out-group ........................................... 154
6.3 2006–2010: The polarization and depolarization of discourse and action ...................... 161
6.4 Discussion and conclusions ............................................................................................... 169

7. Regional and National Identification in Santa Cruz .......................................................... 173
7.1 Groupness: Meaning and political mobilization ............................................................... 174
7.2 Otherness: Prejudice and political tolerance ..................................................................... 187
7.3 Nationness: Being part of the Bolivian political and social community ......................... 193
7.4 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 198

8. Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 201

Appendix I: Map of Bolivia ...................................................................................................... 207
Appendix II: Interview Questions ........................................................................................ 208
Appendix III: Survey Items ................................................................................................... 211
Appendix IV: Results ............................................................................................................. 216
List of Interviews ................................................................................................................... 225
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 226
List of Tables

Main text

Table 1.1: Overview of LAPOP surveys in Bolivia, 1998–2010 ......................................................... 26
Table 4.1: Overview of major events and survey rounds in Bolivia, 1998–2010 .......................... 100
Table 5.1: Mean approval for language rights according to indigenous assertiveness a,b .................. 125
Table 7.1: Results of binary logistic regressions for high levels of feeling/belonging ................. 177
Table 7.2: Feeling Cruceño in 2001, 2009, and 2011 ................................................................. 178
Table 7.3: Overview of major events and survey rounds in Santa Cruz, 1998–2010 ................... 181
Table 7.4: Approval for indigenous rights according to department and regional identification ................................................................................................................................................................. 191

Appendix

Table A1: List of survey items used .................................................................................................... 211
Table A2: Categorical measure of ethnic self-categorization, 1998–2010’ ..................................... 215
Table A3: Self-categorization (indigenous) with year and control variables: Significance of change (Figure 4.1a) ................................................................................................................................................................. 216
Table A4: Belonging (indigenous) with year and control variables: Significance of change (Figure 4.1b) ................................................................................................................................................................. 216
Table A5: Assertiveness with year and control variables: Significance of change (Figure 4.2a) 217
Table A6: Attachment to Aymara and Quechua culture according to assertiveness: Significance of change (Figure 4.5 a–b) ................................................................................................................................................................. 218
Table A7: Attachment to Aymara and Quechua culture according to location: Significance of change (Figure 4.7a–b) ................................................................................................................................................................. 218
Table A8: Attachment to Aymara and Quechua culture according to belonging (disaggr.): Significance of change (Figure 4.9 a–b) ................................................................................................................................................................. 219
Table A9: Confidence in traditional indigenous institutions according to identification: Significance of change (Figure 5.1 a–b) ................................................................................................................................................................. 220
Table A10: Pride in and support for the political system according to self-categorization: Significance of change (Figure 5.10a–b) ................................................................................................................................................................. 220
Table A11: Feeling as and pride in being Bolivian as well as approval for unity despite diversity according to self-categorization: Significance of change (Figure 5.11a–c) ................................................................................................................................................................. 221
Table A12: Indigenous right towards territory, with control variables ......................................... 221
Table A13: Identification as Cruceño and with Camba culture and the media luna according to department: Significance of change (Figure 7.1a–c) ................................................................................................................................................................. 222
Table A14: Identification as Cruceño and with Camba culture and the media luna according to indigenous belonging: Significance of change (Figure 7.2a–c) ................................................................. 222
Table A15: Camba as the most trustworthy ethnic category, with control variables .................. 223
Table A16: Distrust of Aymaras and Quechuas according to regional identification, with control variables .................................................................................................................. 223
Table A17: ‘Some few’ contributors to Bolivian development according to regional identification, with controls variables ........................................................................................................ 224
Table A18: Pride in and support for the political system according to department: Significance of change (Figure 7.10a–b) ........................................................................................................ 224
List of Figures

Figure 2.1: Framework for the analysis of ethnic change ................................................................. 43
Figure 2.2: Analytical framework for nationness .............................................................................. 56
Figure 4.1: Ethnic identification according to self-categorization and belonging ......................... 98
Figure 4.2: Indigenous assertiveness and dress according to self-categorization and belonging ... 103
Figure 4.3: Indigenous self-categorization and belonging according to language category ....... 105
Figure 4.4: Indigenous assertiveness according to skin tone, 2010 ............................................... 107
Figure 4.5: Attachment to Aymara and Quechua cultures according to indigenous assertiveness ................................................................................................................................. 109
Figure 4.6: Indigenous self-categorization and belonging in the highlands and lowlands .......... 110
Figure 4.7: Attachment to Aymara and Quechua culture according to location ......................... 112
Figure 4.8: Indigenous self-categorization according to belonging (disaggregated) ................. 113
Figure 4.9: Attachment to Aymara and Quechua culture according to belonging (disaggregated) ........................................................................................................................................ 113
Figure 5.1: Confidence in traditional indigenous institutions ........................................................ 123
Figure 5.2: Positive perception of indigenous autonomy according to indigenous assertiveness ................................................................................................................................................. 126
Figure 5.3: Perceived influence of indigenous groups according to indigenous assertiveness... 127
Figure 5.4: Attitudes towards indigenous Bolivians according to indigenous assertiveness, 2004 and 2010 ................................................................................................................................. 131
Figure 5.5: Trust in and acceptance of an ethnic category by the respective other ................. 132
Figure 5.6: Perception of indigenous discrimination and racism according to self-categorization ................................................................................................................................................. 133
Figure 5.7: Perceived discrimination according to indigenous assertiveness ............................. 134
Figure 5.8: Perceived discrimination on the basis of skin colour, economic situation, and manner of speech according to self-categorization, 2010: often or sometimes in the previous five years ............................................................... 135
Figure 5.9: Perceived treatment of whites according to self-categorization as white ............. 138
Figure 5.10: Pride in and support for the Bolivian political system according to self-categorization .................................................................................................................................................. 141
Figure 5.11: Individual- and group-level identification with the Bolivian social community according to self-categorization ......................................................................................................................... 143
Figure 6.1: Map of the Camba Nation as proposed by the MNC–L (2001c) ................................. 156
Figure 7.1: Identification as Cruceño and with Camba culture and the media luna ............... 175
Figure 7.2: Identification as Cruceño and with Camba culture and the media luna according to belonging ........................................................................................................................................ 179
Figure 7.3: Association between political ideology and identification: Linear trendlines

Figure 7.4: Trust in Cambas among Santa Cruceños, 2006

Figure 7.5: Support for greater departmental self-determination according to department

Figure 7.6: Support for departmental autonomy according to regional identification in Santa Cruz

Figure 7.7: Character traits and trustworthiness of Santa Cruceño out-groups

Figure 7.8: Reasons for uneven development according to department, 2004

Figure 7.9: Attitudes towards indigenous Bolivians in politics, 2004 and 2010

Figure 7.10: Pride in and support for political system according to department and regional identification

Figure 7.11: Political unity of Bolivia according to department and regional identification

Figure 7.12: Attachment to the social national community according to department

Figure 7.13: National attachment among strong regional identifiers in Santa Cruz
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABI</td>
<td>Agencia Boliviana de Información; Bolivian Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIN</td>
<td>Andean Information Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIF</td>
<td>Bolivia Information Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Constituent Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERD</td>
<td>Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COB</td>
<td>Central Obrero Boliviano; Bolivian Workers’ Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAMAQ</td>
<td>Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu; National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSC</td>
<td>Comité pro Santa Cruz; Santa Cruz Civic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSUTCB</td>
<td>Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia; Unique Confederation of Rural Labourers of Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fBDM</td>
<td>Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia Multipartidaria; Bolivian Foundation for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Friedrich Ebert Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>INE</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Estadística; National Institute of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>indígena originario campesino; indigenous original peasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPOP</td>
<td>Latin American Public Opinion Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Movimiento al Socialismo; Movement toward Socialism, also ‘more’ in Spanish</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC–L</td>
<td>Movimiento Nación Camba de Liberación; Camba Nation Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>Movimiento Nacionalismo Revolucionario; National Revolutionary Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PODEMOS</td>
<td>Poder Democrático y Social; Social and Democratic Power, also ‘we can’ in Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIPNIS</td>
<td>Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro–Securé, Indigenous Territory and National Park Isiboro–Securé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJC</td>
<td>Unión Juvenil Cruceñista; Cruceño Youth League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIR</td>
<td>Universidad Internacional de la Rioja; International University of Rioja</td>
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1. Introduction: From Ethnic Mobilization to Political Polarization?

Since Mill’s observation in his seminal essay *Considerations on Representative Government* that ‘free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities’ (1862: 131), ethnic diversity has long been regarded perilous to the stability of democratic regimes. In their influential book *Politics in Plural Societies*, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 66) argue that ethnic divisions polarize politics to the point where the interests of the different communities seem incompatible. This often leads non-dominant ethnic communities to exit the democratic political arena, possibly resorting to violence. Hence, they conclude, ‘democratic stability and cultural diversity are often incompatible in the postindependence politics of many plural societies’ (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972: 207). Dahl (1971: 108), too, argues that ethnic differences are likely to polarize society, thereby undermining values such as tolerance and trust required for peaceful coexistence and a stable democratic system. Similarly, Horowitz (2000: 12; 193) holds that ethnic divisions ‘pose challenges to the cohesion of states’ and are ‘often at the root of violence’, as they seed distrust and feelings of insecurity.

What accounts for this association between ethnicity and conflict? Instances of ethnic conflict, from Northern Ireland to Rwanda, the Åland Islands to Iraq, have numerous causes (for example, Wolff, 2006: 58–88). Yet what they – by definition – all have in common is the presence of ethnic identities. Ethnic identities, so the common assertion, may be the basis of political mobilization of their group members, resulting in ever more entrenched hatred for members of the out-group and, potentially, in conflict. As a result, national identification and thus the basis for
peaceful coexistence is undermined (see also Davis and Brown, 2002: 239; Gibson, 2006: 667–668). One important mechanism for political mobilization is said to be the machinations of ethnic entrepreneurs, in particular through ethnic outbidding (for example, Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972: 66; Lake and Rothchild, 1997: 109–111; Horowitz, 2000: 318–319). In the struggle for popular support of their ethnic in-group, political leaders take on an ever more radical stance towards the out-group, thus inciting fear and hostility between the members of the different communities. An often cited case of ethnic outbidding is Sri Lanka, where such fierce competition for popular vote resulted in civil war (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972: Ch. 5; DeVotta, 2005: 141). But it fomented ethnic conflict also in such diverse countries as Guyana, Moldova, and Trinidad, to name but a few (Horowitz, 2000: 319). Hence, political mobilization of ethnicity is said to lead to ‘a vicious cycle of ethnic fear and violence’ (Lake and Rothchild, 1997: 109).

However, the causal processes as such – from ethnic mobilization to polarization – have rarely been studied directly (see also Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 847–850; Green and Seher, 2003: 510). Instead, inferences about individuals – those who purportedly harbour ethnic hatred – are often made on the basis of observations at the aggregate level, such as the occurrence of violence within a country (for example, Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Gurr, 1993; Cederman et al., 2010; see also Joras and Schetter, 2004: 318–319). Such analyses may not only lead to ecological fallacies, overestimating the relationship at the individual level (Landman, 2008: 41–43), but also to biases in theories on the causal mechanisms linking ethnicity and conflict.

This tendency for macro-level analysis is facilitated by two methodological biases in the literature. The first is a selection bias. The literature on the link between the politicization of ethnicity, the ‘independent variable’, and the worsening of ethnic relations, the ‘dependent variable’, is almost exclusively built on observations selected on the dependent variable – on the observation of cases with high degrees of ethnic tensions, if not violence. That is, this literature is not informed by potential instances of politicization which have not led to a worsening of ethnic relations. Declining levels of tensions in particular have rarely been covered (see also Brubaker, 2002: 167–177; Hug, 2003: 257–259). Such selection bias may thus lead to erroneous generalizations to all instances of ethnic mobilizations. Second, the literature is marked by what Brubaker and colleagues (2004: 31–32) refer to as ‘groupism’; the tendency to see ethnic identities as

ontologically real, ‘to treat ethnic groups as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed’ (see also Brubaker, 2002: 164; Banton, 2012: 7). Consequently, the individuals making up these ethnic groups are rarely paid heed, particularly so if they do not belong to the elite.

It is the objective of this thesis to address these issues, conducting a systematic analysis into the link between the ethnic mobilization in political discourse and in-group identification, out-group hatred, as well as national identification. The remainder of this chapter introduces the case study – developments in Bolivia between 2000 and 2010 – and the methods employed before concluding with the thesis’ structure and its contributions to the wider literature.

1.1 Research design: Bolivia as case study of changing ethnic relations

The Latin American country Bolivia provides an insightful case for studying the link between ethnic mobilization and ethnic relations. Bolivia provides the setting for a particularly interesting development of a process of ‘reindianization’ which has recently swept Latin America; the emergence and evolution of new cultural and political indigenous discourses (Jackson and Warren, 2005: 549). The 1990s witnessed a series of indigenous uprisings across Latin America, from the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico’s Chiapas (Benjamin, 2000) and the toppling of the Ecuadorian government in 2000 (MacDonald, 2002) to the mobilization of indigenous activists in Argentina (Gordillo and Hirsch, 2003), to name but a few. In Bolivia, indigenous mobilizations since the 1970s have given rise to indigenous-based parties in the 1990s, which successfully contested in local, regional, and national elections and today support the first indigenous president of the country, Evo Morales Ayma. His presidency saw the introduction of policies designed to end indigenous marginalization, including the nationalization of the country’s gas resources, the passing of an anti-discrimination law, and, perhaps most importantly, the passing of a new constitution in 2009. This constitution formally established Bolivia as Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia (Plurinational State of Bolivia), in special recognition of the country’s thirty-six indigenous nations as well as its Afro-descendant population.

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2 The ontology and epistemology of the study of ethnicity is discussed in Chapter 2.
But the country has not only seen the mobilization of indigeneity but also of regional identity categories, particularly in the south-eastern department of Santa Cruz. Here, a regionalist autonomy movement has emerged which not only opposes the nationalization of the country’s natural resources – of which the largest share is located in the south-east – but also indigenous autonomy for fear of a de facto discrimination of non-indigenous Bolivians. In its discourse, the movement draws on the construction of regional identities that are increasingly contrasted with indigeneity and implicitly, or even explicitly, racist.

Bolivia thus represents two recent cases of ethnic mobilizations in different settings: a nationwide mobilization of a previously marginalized population category, and a regional mobilization of a territorially-bounded, relatively privileged population situated far from the central government. The following outlines the research design, more fully presents the case under study, identifies a gap in the existing area studies literature on Bolivia and Santa Cruz, and states the research questions of this thesis.

The case study

This thesis presents a case study as defined by Gerring (2004: 342): ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units’. The analysis thereby contributes to the correction of the selection bias in ethnopolitical studies. The case was selected on the basis of changes in the independent variable of observed politicization, with the aim of exploring their consequences. It represents a natural experiment which allows for a close analysis of the link between politicization and ethnic relations and hence constitutes a ‘plausibility probe’ (Eckstein, 2000: 94) or hypothesis-testing study (Landman, 2008: 6–10).

While the case study lacks the ability for wide generalizations, the analysis is able to contribute to the identification of a causal mechanism: an in-depth study of a single unit provides the opportunity for careful diachronic analysis in which pace and timing of change are matters of empirical investigation rather than either ignored or assumed, as is often the case in cross-sectional analyses (Hay, 2002: 148–150; Gerring, 2004: 348–349).

For all locations, refer to the map in Appendix I.
Moreover, the in-depth analysis of the Bolivia corrects another bias in the ethnopolitics literature, which has so far largely ignored Latin America. In contrast to Europe, Africa, Asia, as well as North America, the continent long evidenced little ethnicity-based mobilization let alone violence. Class differences were seen as the most salient cleavage and hence not worth studying from an ethnopolitics perspective (see also Maíz, 2004: 326; Postero and Zamosc, 2004: 1; Guelke, 2010: 5–6). But even today, Latin American cases are virtually absent from British scholarship of ethnicity and nationalism; for example, of the 105 contributions at the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism’s 2012 conference on ‘Nationalism, Ethnicity and Boundaries’, only two considered Latin American cases, Brazil and Mexico. It hence remains to be seen whether ethnopolitical theory extends to or may be informed by the Latin American region.

Bolivia

Bolivia is regarded as one of the most ethnically diverse countries of Latin America. Although the estimations of the national census office following the census of 2001 are contested, they provide an indication of this diversity (INE, 2001).4 Of the then 8.2 million Bolivians, about 62 percent are categorized as indigenous and today the government recognizes thirty-seven ethnic groups, most with their own languages. The majority of indigenous Bolivians are either Quechuas (30.7 percent) or Aymaras (25.2 percent), traditionally settled in the western Andean highlands of the country. Around 6 percent of Bolivians belong to any of the other, smaller indigenous peoples who, with the exception of the Urus, live mainly in the eastern lowlands. The largest categories here are the Chiquitanos (2.2 percent), Guaraníes (1.5 percent), and Mojeños (0.8 percent). Non-indigenous Bolivians identify either as white or mestizo, that is, of mixed European and indigenous descent.5 Afro-Bolivians comprise only around 0.6 percent of the population.

Bolivia is also one of the continent’s countries with the highest degrees of poverty and economic inequality. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2011), its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averages to just above US$4,000 per person, with 14 percent of the

4 The census is further discussed in Chapter 4.

5 For the sake of readability, I refrain from writing both the female and the male version when using the original Spanish terms.
population living below the poverty line of US$1.25 a day. In the latest Human Development Index, Bolivia is ranked 108 of 187 surveyed states worldwide, just overtaking the Maldives and Mongolia in terms of development. And with a Gini coefficient of 58.2, it is among the top ten countries of income inequality worldwide (CIA, 2012).

Ethnic belonging and socio-economic status are thereby closely linked. Due to both structural and direct discrimination, the Afro-Bolivian and the indigenous populations fare consistently and considerably worse in developmental indicators, such as literacy rates, land ownership, poverty, malnutrition, urbanization, or infant mortality. The populations are thus not only marginalized in the cultural and political but also in the economic sphere, mutually reinforcing (UNDP, 2004: 108–109; CERD, 2006: 76–92; ECLAC, 2006: 25–32).

Bolivia does have natural resources, in particular large swaths of arable land, timber, as well as oil and gas deposits. However, these are unevenly distributed, with most resources found in the lowlands. For example, of Bolivia’s nine departments, the south-eastern departments of Tarija and Santa Cruz together produce 82.3 percent of the country’s gas output and 41 percent of its GDP. With 28.2 percent, Santa Cruz is thereby the single largest contributor to Bolivia’s GDP (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2008: 8; Centellas and Buitrago, 2009: 4).

Its situation as Bolivia’s economic powerhouse has bestowed upon the department a steady stream of immigration. Santa Cruz is, after La Paz, the country’s most populous department. Of its around two million inhabitants, 1.1 million live in the departmental capital Santa Cruz de la Sierra alone, making it the largest city of the country. According to the census, about 25 percent of the department’s population were born elsewhere in Bolivia, and some rural areas of the department as well as the periphery of the capital are mainly inhabited by immigrants from the Andean highlands (INE, 2001; Kirshner, 2010: 109–110).

Just as in Bolivia as a whole, in Santa Cruz, too, the distribution of wealth is uneven. The profits of the agricultural industry are produced by only a few large landholdings, and those generated in the hydrocarbon industries concentrated in the urban middle and upper classes of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. The rural as well as the peripheral areas of the city, on the other hand, are marked

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6 To compare, the GDP is about US$14,500 in neighbouring Argentina and US$33,000 in the United Kingdom. Values in power purchasing parity.
by rapid population growth in precarious circumstances (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2008: 5; Kirshner, 2010: 110). The economic elites are at the same the political elites. Organized in the Comité Pro Santa Cruz (CPSC, Santa Cruz Civic Committee), they have long been an influential force in the defence of the department’s interests. It was principally from this organization that the demand for greater autonomy from the centralized state originated.

### 1.2 Gaps in the literature on Bolivia and Santa Cruz

Although the Santa Cruceño autonomy movement is sometimes interpreted as a ‘backlash’ against the indigenous mobilization (for example, Eaton, 2007), rarely have the consequence of either identity mobilization been addressed. This section outlines the existing literature on Bolivia and Santa Cruz.

*Indigenous mobilization in Bolivia*

Despite a growing number of publications concerning themselves with indigenous movements in Latin America in general and Bolivia in particular since the 1990s, most publications set out to explain the why and how of the emergence of indigenous movements, not its effects on inter-ethnic relations. For example, in a comparative study of Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, Yashar (2005) finds that the introduction of a neoliberal citizenship regime in the 1960s and 1970s challenged local autonomies largely gone unnoticed by the state before, thus politicizing indigenous identity. Transcommunity networks with peasant unions and church networks provided the capacity for indigenous organization while the political opening beginning with Bolivia’s redemocratization in 1982 and decentralization reforms in the 1990s presented the political opportunity. In her study on the reasons for the emergence of indigenous-based political parties, Van Cott (2005) makes a similar observation. Comparing Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, she finds that, in Bolivia, political decentralization in the mid-1990s and the decline of leftist parties opened up space for indigenous parties and their viability. Similar conclusions are drawn by Korovkin (2006).

Webber’s (2009) thesis discusses and explains the radical character of left-indigenous mobilizations in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, while other authors focus on the emergence, strategies, and performance of particular organizations. For example, Albro (2005a) and Lucero (2006) examine how Morales’ party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS, Movement toward Socialism),
and the organization Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ, National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu), respectively, managed to establish themselves as legitimate representatives of indigenous constituencies. By far the most attention has been paid to the MAS. Webber (2010) examines the role of Morales and the MAS during Mesa’s administration from 2003 to 2005. A number of studies focus on Morales and the MAS in government: Postero (2010) describes the core agenda as one of ‘indigenous nationalism’, while Albro (2010a) notes the emergence of particular conceptions of indigeneity. Regalsky (2010) examines the antagonism between indigenous peoples organizations’ call for territorial autonomy and self-government on the one hand and Morales’ nationalist politics on the other, and Kohl (2010) points to the antagonists Morales has in the regional right-wing parties. Howard (2010) shows that the opposing ideologies are expressed in a discursive struggle in language, dress, symbolism and ritual. Oviedo Obarrio’s (2010) spatial-analytical description of MAS’s electoral results leads him to predict no immediate threat to its hegemony.

In this literature on the emergence and evolution of the indigenous movement in general and the MAS in particular, the consequences of indigenous mobilization are mentioned only shortly and, when done, focus on democratic consolidation. From a structural perspective, Yashar (2005: 298) argues that indigenous mobilization will lead to a redefinition of democratic institutions as the movements challenge the existing regimes by demanding a different form of citizenship, one that is compatible with communal rights. Nonetheless, Van Cott (2005: 228) concludes that, contrary to the prevalent literature on ethnic conflict, indigenous-based parties are unlikely to exacerbate conflict as they have realized that their success depends on support from the non-indigenous electorate. Madrid’s (2008; 2012: Ch. 2) analysis of Bolivian survey data supports this argument: he shows that MAS voters are from a variety of ethnic categories, which he explains with the party’s moderate and inclusive ethnic, or ‘ethnopopulist’, appeal.

In an earlier study, Madrid (2005) concludes that indigenous parties in Latin America may not only be not detrimental to democratic consolidation but may actually contribute to it, as they increase representativeness, participation, and the acceptance of democracy among indigenous while decreasing political violence as well as electoral volatility and thus party system fragmentation. However, the use of aggregate data makes the results resemble anecdotal evidence more than a systematic analysis of mass beliefs over time and space, and he implicitly admits the tentative nature of his conclusions (Madrid, 2005: 174–175). Critically, while arguing explicitly
against prevalent literature on ethnic conflict, which posits that ethnic parties provoke polarization, he does not empirically examine ethnic polarization as such.

Wolff (2004) devotes more space to the analysis of the indigenous movement’s impact on the democratic systems of Bolivia and Ecuador, yet also does so mainly from a structural perspective. He concludes that, while (or because) the movements improve the quality of democracy through increased representation, they destabilize the political systems as they challenge the existing institutional and moral frameworks. According to Wolff, there are two dimensions to this destabilization potential: first, indigenous movements may come into power and change the system from within. With the benefit of hindsight, this part of his analysis seems to be validated in Bolivia. Second, Wolff argues that indigenous political mobilization was and is often achieved with protests and uprisings, which can become – and already became – violent. While the indigenous movement thus has some blocking potential, it does not translate into proactive policies. The failure to achieve this may, again, lead to two potential reactions. First, the indigenous movement may demobilize, depoliticize, and de-organize. Wolff argues that this is partially observable in Ecuador. Second, it may lead to a radicalization of the indigenous movement that is no longer compatible with democratic norms. Wolff holds that this radicalization is visible in Bolivia. Similarly, Kemlein (2009) sees in the Bolivian indigenous mobilization a driver for democratization but also destabilization, pointing to the potential for violence that has shown itself in events since 2000.

Particularly in recent years, the issue of ethnic tensions has been taken into consideration by area studies scholars, if mainly in passing. Some express fears that ethnic polarization might be under way in Bolivia as well – regardless of the intentions of the movements’ leaders. For instance, Van Cott (2007: 138) argues that indigenous mobilization ‘has raised awareness of ethnic inequality, while also emphasizing difference and generating a more extreme and racist discourse on both sides of the ethnic divide’. Birnir (2007: 2) reports evidence pointing towards a deterioration of ethnic relations in Bolivia, purportedly provoked by the political discourse of the MAS. Similarly, Larson (2009: 191) warns that the party might have contributed to a rise in ethnic fundamentalism. Yet a systematic analysis of the consequences of indigenous mobilization is missing to date; those who have paid attention to the issue have done so from a structural perspective or rather superficially, arriving at conflicting conclusions.
Another strand of the areas studies literature is concerned with indigenous identification and political attitudes, looking more closely at individual-level data. Toranzo Roca (2008) compares self-identification and mother tongue in census and survey results over time, from the census of 1900 to public opinion surveys in 2006. While he observes a decrease in the proportion of Bolivians defining themselves as whites and an increase in those defining themselves as indigenous, he also finds that ‘being indigenous is no longer a categorical distinction’ (Toranzo Roca, 2008: 38) given that the proportion of monolingual speakers of indigenous languages is considerably smaller than that of self-identified indigenous. Similarly, in a descriptive analysis of census data from 2001 and household surveys from 1999 and 2002, Klein (2009) finds that a decline in indigenous monolingualism and a rise in bilingualism have not affected indigenous self-identification. On the contrary, he argues, ethnic identity and self-awareness seems to have been growing. In response to such quantitative descriptions, Zavaleta Reyles (2008) reconsiders the data and criticizes that it homogenizes groups; does not allow judging the strength of commonality among members of such groups; and assumes the centrality of ethnic identification over other aspects of identities. The issue is further complicated by the physical and cultural proximity of groups.

Beyond such descriptive analyses of univariate data, other studies consider mother tongue and self-identification in the light of multivariate analyses. Most recently, Inguanzo (2011) compares political concerns, attitudes, and participation according to ethnic self-identification in Bolivia and Guatemala. She finds that there are indeed differences in political concerns and participation between indigenous and non-indigenous respondents; that indigenous respondents place themselves on the ideology scale to the left of non-indigenous respondents; that indigenous respondents have a more direct notion of democracy; and that, counter-intuitively, they are more satisfied with democracy than non-indigenous respondents.

More closely related to the present research question, Madrid (2006) considers self-identification as dependent variable and examines what determines it. In an analysis of survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) from 1998 to 2002, he finds, amongst others, that identification may not only be shaped by demographic or socio-economic factors such as mother tongue or income but also by political factors such as trade union participation. Finally, in an interesting analysis of the effect of ethnicity on the strength of political
attachment to the state in Bolivia and Guatemala in 2004, Moreno Morales (2008a) concludes that socio-economic factors are stronger determinants than ethnic identity per se. While these analyses provide interesting insights into the link between identification and attitudes, few use identification as the dependent rather independent variable, and where they do, they do not link them systematically to the recent developments in Bolivia.

Regionalist mobilization in Santa Cruz

Whereas the emergence of the indigenous movement and its political breakthrough with the election of Morales as president has been monitored relatively closely, much less attention has been paid to the evolving regional autonomy movement in the south-eastern department of Santa Cruz.

A couple of studies focus on the regionalist autonomy movements in other Bolivian departments. For example, Bebbington and Bebbington (2010) are concerned with the autonomy demands in Tarija, arguing that it is a mistake to consider them as mere repercussions of Morales’ policies. They point out that the conflict does not only have class, but also ethnic and geographic dimensions. Centellas’ (2010a) article on Savina Cuellar’s election as first indigenous prefect of Chuquisaca highlights the complex and changing nature of political identities in Bolivia, contrasting regional with ethnic and class identities.

The few existing political analyses of Santa Cruz aim to describe and explain the evolution of the autonomy movement. Assies (2006) outlines how the growing strength of the indigenous movement at the local and national level has threatened the privileged position of the Santa Cruz entrepreneurial elites. Eaton (2007) goes on to show that, in a backlash against this development, the elites adopted several strategies: they closed ranks across business sectors within Santa Cruz in the defence of property rights and, on the other hand, broke ranks with business association at the national level, as they suspected them to be too closely involved with the MAS government. This also bolstered their claim within the department that they are defending Santa Cruz’s interests against those of the state. In addition, Eaton argues, business elites sought non-elite allies within the department, including among the lowland indigenous peoples.

Part of this latter strategy is the construction of a regional identity, the Cruceño, which is discussed in another group of work, mainly anthropological and sociological studies by Bolivian scholars. Peña Claros and Jordán Bazán (2006) analyze how Santa Cruz’s elites responded to the
severe social upheavals that shook the country in October 2003 and led to the resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada. Schilling–Vacaflor (2009) extends this study of the elites with an examination of regionalist discourse surrounding the drafting process for the new constitution. Her analysis of drafts for the departmental autonomy constitution shows a remarkably high emphasis on departmental identity, culture, and history as well as the implicit, if not explicit, subordination of indigenous political and cultural structures to those of the global West. Similarly, Espósito Guevara (2008) demonstrates the existence of an implicit racism in the discourse of the autonomist movement, depicting the highland immigrants as the ‘new internal enemy’.

The construction of the departmental identity Cruceño is based on the historic construction of the regional, lowland identity Camba. Peña Hasbún et al. (2011) document this process from the colonial epoch until today, highlighting the crucial role played by political and entrepreneurial elites. Pruden (2003) focuses more closely on the history of identity construction in the 1930s and 1950s, while Lowrey (2006) expands this documentation to the twenty-first century. Gustafson (2006) and Fabricant (2009) illustrate the role of performative politics in the construction of the self and the other, ranging from parades and protests to outright violence. Other works mention a variety of tactics used in the construction of ethnic distinction but do not examine these systematically (for example, Peña Hasbún et al., 2011; Lowrey, 2006; Espósito Guevara, 2008; Peña Claros and Boschetti, 2008; Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009).

Such considerations have caused other scholars to debate the nature of the civic movement. Peña Claros (2010) suggests approaching it from a populist perspective, interpreting the apparent polarization as the result of a deliberate simplification of the political space. For Centellas (2010b), on the other hand, the conceptualization of the movement as populist does not go far enough. He argues that in directly appealing to Cruceño identity the movement advances the idea of cultural commonality and distinctiveness, which he sees as a key characteristic of ethnic movements. Thus, while area studies scholars have examined the reasons for and strategies of regionalist mobilization, few, if any, have systematically analyzed its consequences for ethnic relations and political inequalities within Bolivia.

In summary, this short review shows that the existing literature on Bolivia’s socio-political movements focuses mainly on their emergence and performance. While some studies allude to the consequences of indigenous mobilization, these are limited to considerations of democratic
consolidation. Moreover, these studies largely focus at the structural or institutional level and neglect the study of elite and mass beliefs of democracy, although widely regarded to be the ‘essence’ of democratic consolidation (Diamond, 1999: 21). Ethnic identification in general and ethnic relations in particular have rarely been considered. Where done, studies have been limited to single points in time and to the analysis of indigenous identification, neither providing evidence of the development of indigenousness, nor of non-indigenous Bolivian or of other relevant ethnic identifications. For the study of changing ethnic relations, however, both issues are important.

1.3 Research questions and methods

In view of the missing or diverging assessments on the consequences of identity mobilization on ethnic relations and of the recent political developments in Bolivia, this thesis seeks to examine this issue systematically. The following details the research questions and the methods employed to answer them.

Research questions

Following the ethnopolitics literature, the central research question asks: Has the mobilization of ethnic and regional identity categories led to changes in ethnic relations? Informed by the hypotheses on the link between the two variables put forward in the literature, this question is subdivided, resulting in four questions on every ‘step’ of the hypothesized causal mechanism:

i) What exactly is the nature of the indigenous and regionalist discourses?
ii) Did ethnic relations worsen with the increasing salience of these discourses?
iii) Did indigenous and regionalist mobilizations decrease national unity?
iv) In fact, are there indigenous and regionalist ‘groups’ to speak of?

Methods

In seeking to answer these questions, this thesis employs two principal research methods: qualitative methods for the study of the nature of the indigenous and regional identity discourses, the independent variable, and quantitative methods for the study of its consequences. First, this thesis establishes a theoretically informed historical narrative of the politicization of ethnic categories in Bolivia and Santa Cruz through the study of the indigenous and regionalist identity
discourses. The term ‘discourse’ here denotes what Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 1) have called ‘a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)’, specifically the ways in which political actors talk about indigeneity or Cruceñidad, respectively. The discourses are studied over time through the qualitative analysis and novel synthesis of relevant existing research as well as of news reports to complement the latter.

To triangulate the data gathered from these sources, I conducted selected, exploratory, and systematizing expert interviews during fieldwork in Cochabamba, La Paz, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, as well as in Hamburg, Germany, and London, UK, in September and October 2011. For the purposes of this research, experts were defined as those who had dealt extensively with the topic of indigenous and/or Cruceño identity and thus are ‘informants who dispose of knowledge the researcher cannot obtain through other sources’ (Littig, 2008: para. 8; see also Dexter, 2006). The experts were identified from previous research of primary and secondary sources and contacted directly via email or telephone. In total, fifteen interviews were conducted. They lasted from around twenty-five minutes to an hour and were conducted in Spanish, English, or German, depending on the preference of the interviewee. Unfortunately for this thesis, fieldwork fell in the period of the indigenous protest march in the defence of the Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro–Sécure (TIPNIS, Isiboro–Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory) against the construction of a road leading through the park. While this occurrence gave valuable insights into both the political culture of Bolivia in general and the issue of indigenous politics in particular (see Chapter 3), it was not possible to conduct interviews with representatives of indigenous organizations.

Second, this study of processes at the macro-level is followed by an analysis of their potential consequences directly at the micro-level in order to avoid the ecological fallacy as outlined above. I employ quantitative methods to analyze attitudes toward the respective ethnic categories and political support held in the Bolivian society at large. Attitudes are usually measured through in-depth interviews or surveys. While interviews tend to be better able to capture the process of attitude formation and a multitude of differences in attitudes, their scope restricts the analysis to only a few respondents. Surveys, on the other hand, make it possible to gather and analyze information on a large-n scale. This ensures that not only the attitudes of the more

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7 For a list of questions, see Appendix II. Ethics approval was obtained before the beginning of the fieldwork.
visible political elites, but also those of ‘rank-and-file’ group members are tapped. Moreover, the greater comparability of answers compensate for the limited answering possibilities (May, 1993: 86–87; Elkins and Sides, 2007: 695).

The LAPOP surveys

Public opinion in Bolivia is measured in several surveys, most notably in the Latinobarómetro and the LAPOP data from the University of Pittsburgh and later Vanderbilt University. While both are conducted in regular intervals and would thus be suitable for a time-series analysis, the former is ill-suited for the research at hand because, with the exception of questions for mother tongue and religious affiliation, it covers ethnicity only from 2007 onwards (see various questionnaires at Latinobarómetro, 2012). LAPOP, on the other hand, covers this information since the beginning of data collection in Bolivia in 1998.

Since then, LAPOP surveys have been carried out in Bolivia on a bi-yearly basis and all seven data sets available to date, including the 2010 survey, are used in this thesis. Per survey, around 3,000 respondents are sampled from a sampling frame of all adult citizens by multi-stage stratified, random, and quota sampling. Rather than drawing a random sample from the national population, the sample was designed such that all nine departments are represented by at least 300 respondents. An additional one hundred respondents were drawn from the most populous departments Santa Cruz, La Paz, and Cochabamba. This stratification has two advantages: first, it deals with the problem of wide population dispersal and a multi-lingual population. Second, it balances data across departments and thus enables intra- as well as inter-departmental analyses (see also May, 1993: 69–70).

The departmental sample was further stratified into four degrees of urbanization, in order to ensure the representation of Bolivians from both urban and rural backgrounds. To reduce travel costs, respondents were then sampled from clusters of households. While the clustering may introduce a bias into the data analysis, as respondents from the same location may share common background characteristics, it does enable the inclusion of some respondents in remote parts of Bolivia. The LAPOP team holds that the clustering increases the sampling error by a

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8 The data sets of 1998, 2000, and 2002 include additional 500–900 respondents sampled from six to nine selected municipalities.
maximum of 0.2% to +/-2.0%. Finally, at the level of household the respondents were sampled according to quota in order to avoid the overrepresentation of female, younger, and older respondents, who are more likely to be at home during the day. The final sample closely resembles the Bolivian population in basic demographic characteristics (Seligson, 1998: 18–42). The accuracy of the sample ensures a high level of representativeness and since the same design was used for every survey round, it also enables comparisons over time. Table 1.1 provides a short overview of survey characteristics.

Table 1.1: Overview of LAPOP surveys in Bolivia, 1998–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>conducted</th>
<th>sample size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>August</td>
<td>2,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>August</td>
<td>3,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>3,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>3,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>February–April</td>
<td>3,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>February–March</td>
<td>3,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>February–March</td>
<td>3,018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The LAPOP surveys record ethnicity in a number of ways, including the respondents’ mother tongue, in which language the survey was conducted, and whether the respondents are wearing a western or indigenous dress. In addition, they ask for the respondents’ ethnic self-identification, with item responses specific to Bolivia, based on pre-tests conducted in the country (Seligson, 1998: 37). From 2004 onwards, the surveys also include an alternative measure of ethnic self-identification, equal to and thus comparable with that used in the national census of 2001. These and other items are further discussed and analyzed from Chapter 4 onwards. The findings resulting from the LAPOP data are complemented by several one-time and/or smaller surveys in the respective chapters, such as the national census of 2001 or those described in Peña Claros (2011) or Peña Hasbún et al. (2011).

Bolivian LAPOP data have been used in a number of analyses. The LAPOP reports of the individual data sets include mainly bivariate as well as some multivariate regression analyses of topics such as political tolerance, civil society, system support, and local governance. In these analyses, ethnic and regional identity is included mainly as independent variable, and while the

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9 The surveys were conducted in Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara, depending on the preference of the respondent, thus ensuring the inclusion of mono-lingual Quechua and Aymara speakers. While mono-lingual speakers of any other indigenous language, such as Guarani, remain excluded, their numbers are rather low.
2004 and 2006 reports point out changes in ethnic self-identification; the 2008 report includes an analysis of regionalism; and the 2010 report one of racism and discrimination in Bolivia, the analyses remain mostly descriptive (see various by Seligson and colleagues, 1998–2010). The surveys were also used in a number of studies already outlined above (Madrid, 2006; Madrid, 2008; Moreno Morales, 2008a; Inguanzo, 2011) yet these neither considered changes in identification or attitudes in a time-series analysis.

1.4 Thesis structure and contributions

The thesis is organized as followed. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical and analytical framework for this thesis, disentangling the term ‘ethnicity’ for research practice. I argue that the literature’s concern with the debate between primordialism and constructivism is misleading because virtually every participant in this discussion agrees, in principle, on constructivist ontology. Disagreements persist, rather, in the potential for change of ethnicities once constructed. For the purposes of this thesis, it is more fruitful to focus on this potential for change. For this aim, I first focus on the agreements within the literature with regard to the definition of ethnicity and argue that most people agree that ethnic identities are based on a number of attributes, to which meaning is attached, and according to which members act. Whereas both attributes and actions are relatively easily observable, meaning is more difficult to grasp. It is for this reason – and the reason that ideas play a central role in constructivism – that it is the focus of this chapter. Building on psychological theory, which underlies the cognitive framework to ethnicity, I argue that it is necessary to distinguish between meanings regarding groupness and otherness: one’s attachment to the own group does not necessarily imply one’s rejection of the out-group. Moreover, I argue that changes in sub-state groupness do not necessarily reflect changes in state-wide nationness. The individual elements of this analytical framework are applied in the following chapters.

Chapter 3 serves two purposes. First, it gives an overview of the issue of indigeneity in Bolivia in order to set the scene for the data analysis in the following chapters. Second, it serves as analysis in its own right, examining the independent variable of this thesis, the political identity discourse, over time, with particular reference to the attributes, meanings, and actions associated with indigeneity. Following the analysis of the development of indigeneity from Spanish colonization to today, I argue that the Bolivian case shows that ethnic categories do not necessarily
need to have clearly defined attributes in order to be invested with meaning. Today, being indigenous is not clearly delineated from being mestizo or even from being white. But despite this ambiguity of attributes, the concept resonates with many Bolivians, which was particularly visible in the events and discourses surrounding the election of Morales and the writing of the new constitution. Moreover, while indigenous mobilization increased the salience of the category, it did nothing to achieve a clearer demarcation. On the contrary, its newly-found political relevance for, for example, language rights or autonomy increased contestation; any official definition of indigeneity would exclude some Bolivians self-identifying as indigenous.

Chapters 4 and 5 quantitatively examine the potential consequences of indigenous mobilization for ethnicity and ethnic relations in the country. Chapter 4 focuses on indigenous groupness; whether and, if so, among whom there have been changes in indigenous identification as well as in the cohesion of those identifying. The results confirm and complement the findings of the qualitative analysis in Chapter 3, establishing four changes in indigenous groupness that can be clearly linked to the indigenous mobilization. First, the results show that attributes varyingly associated with indigeneity are not clear indicators of indigenous identification; if anything, their predictive powers have actually decreased over the past decade as increasingly Bolivians of all language backgrounds and skin tones identify as indigenous. Second, while there has been indeed an increase in the number of Bolivians identifying as indigenous, this happened already in the first half of the 2000s, before the election of Morales. The latter, instead, has given rise to more confident indigenous identification: to the extent someone identifies as indigenous or not. Moreover, third, the election has given rise to an increased sense of cohesion among members of the diverse indigenous peoples as one wider, pan-indigenous community. Forth, this sense of cohesion declined again following a row of disputes surrounding the writing and implementation of the new constitution. The chapter thus shows not only that political processes affect ethnic identification and that they do so relatively quickly, but also that ethnic identification is multi-faceted and that it is therefore important to distinguish between its different elements when examining the effects of ethnopolitics.

Chapter 5 continues the analysis in three parts. The first part focuses on the action component of indigenous groupness: has indigenous mobilization led to increased awareness and support for a collective political agenda? It finds that political action in Bolivia is only to some extent affected by identification and that few, if any, significant changes have occurred over the past
decade, despite changes in identification. The finding thus supports the argument made in Chapter 2 that an analytic distinction between the attributes, meaning, and action associated with an ethnic category can lead to more nuanced insights. The second part examines changes in otherness, or the relations between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians. While it finds some evidence for mutual mistrust and even a worsening, though short-lived, of relations during the negotiations for the new constitution, these attitudes are not consequential for the political sphere. Groupness is thus not unequivocally linked to otherness. Finally, the third part of this chapter analyzes Bolivian nationness, that is, whether and to what extent national identification has been affected by the developments of the past years. Despite the increase in indigenous identification, national identification has not decreased. On the contrary, it has increased for indigenous self-identifiers as well as non-indigenous identifiers, showing that nationness is neither negatively associated with groupness, nor finite.

In the following two chapters, I extend this analysis to a regional identity category, the Cruceño. Chapter 6 follows Chapter 3 in purpose, presenting and examining the political identity discourse with regard to the Cruceño category in Santa Cruz over time. I argue that, similar to the indigenous category, the regional identity category, too, is not unambiguously defined yet invested with meaning. The productive and orderly Cruceño presents a role model for other Bolivians. However, the regional identity discourse changed over the decade from a focus on the positive in-group to one on the negative out-group, that is, the lazy and chaotic Bolivian. Whereas the former drew support from the population for a regional political agenda, the latter was increasingly rejected. The regional identity discourse had not been able to establish the Cruceño and the non-Cruceño other as something beyond the classic non-indigenous–indigenous distinction, such that the ever more radical out-group centred discourse became increasingly explicitly racist against indigenous, and in particular highland indigenous, Bolivians. But instead of polarizing the population, the discourse was stopped in its tracks as it did not resonate. Again, this analysis thus suggests a clear distinction between processes of groupness and otherness.

These conclusions are supported by the quantitative analysis in Chapter 7. The chapter shows that, first, identification with the department increases and spreads to all social spheres, in line with the positive in-group discourse of the first half of the decade. However, the following negative out-group discourse has a repelling effect not only on highland indigenous immigrants.
to Santa Cruz but also on the inhabitants of other Bolivian departments. But this discourse does not increase otherness nor decrease nationness among Santa Cruceños themselves.\(^1\) On the contrary, they are not particularly chauvinist, and strong regional identifiers are in fact more likely to report tolerance towards the indigenous population as well as strong attachments to the Bolivian community. This chapter thus once more confirms the importance of distinguishing elements of ethnic identification in the rigorous analysis of ethnopolitics. Chapter 8 draws together the findings of the individual chapters of this thesis and relates these to the theoretical literature discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. It concludes with an outlook for future research both in theory and practice.

In summary, this thesis makes three principal contributions to the study of ethnopolitics. First, the research design as such extends the literature to previously largely ignored areas of study. Geographically, the study of Latin American cases can offer new insights to the field as ethnic boundaries here are not clearly dichotomizing, but rather are fluid and malleable (for example, Wade, 1997), and thus are interesting cases for the analysis of the dynamics of ethnic change. Methodologically, the research design and the methods employed bridge the macro- and micro-levels of ethnopolitical analysis and thus contribute to the development of a theory on the causal mechanism between ethnic mobilization and ethnic relations.

Second, this thesis puts forward an analytical framework for the study of ethnic change, bringing together insights from scholarship in anthropology, philosophy, politics, social psychology, and sociology. The framework goes beyond the theoretical debates on the ontology and terminology of ethnicity, disentangling the term to provide a means for the empirical analysis, rather than theoretical assumptions as to the dynamics of ethnic change. The framework can be employed for cases other than Bolivia and Santa Cruz.

Third, the thesis tests the hypotheses on the causal mechanisms between mobilization and relations in the ethnopolitics literature, thereby demonstrating the utility of the analytical framework. Attributes, meaning, and action associated with an ethnic category are indeed not necessarily linked, nor are instances of groupness, otherness, and nationness. These findings for

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\(^1\) I use *Cruceño* for the category and those who identify with the category and *Santa Cruceño* to denote the population of Santa Cruz (all those who could potentially identify with the category).
the Bolivian and Santa Cruceño case may give rise to renewed efforts into understanding causal mechanisms and effects in other instances, too.
2. Analyzing Ethnic Change: Ontology, Epistemology, Methodology

The analysis of ethnic change in Bolivia as elsewhere – whether and, if so, how ethnicity and ethnic relations have changed in response to political changes – requires a clear understanding of the object of analysis; of what it is that is changing. So what is ethnicity? Even a cursory look at book, journal, and article titles over the past few years demonstrates that the term has become ubiquitous, used in a variety of contexts for a variety of purposes (see also Cohen, 1978: 379; Brubaker, 2009: 22). It is thus at risk of being too crude a term, particularly for comparative analyses across time and space. Indeed, Weber (1978: 394–395, as cited in Brubaker et al., 2006: 357) already remarked almost a century ago that ethnicity is not an accurate analytical concept; it is, he argued, ‘entirely unusable’ for any ‘truly rigorous investigation’. In response, calls for a disaggregation of the term have emerged and grew louder in recent years (for example, Wimmer, 2008b: 972; Brubaker, 2009: 26–29).

It is the purpose of this chapter to provide such a disaggregation. Section 2.1 presents the theoretical basis for the remainder of the thesis. Bringing together theoretical literature on ethnicity from anthropology, sociology, psychology, philosophy, as well as politics, I outline agreements reached so far in the conceptual discussion: that ethnicity is a collective identity, a deeper meaning attached to seemingly primordial attributes; that it only exists in relation to an other; and that it may be the basis for collective action. The section then presents the dominant ontological approach following from this definition, constructivism, as well as the epistemological approach of modern constructivism adopted in this thesis. Constructivist ontology assigns ideas a consti-
tutive role; the analysis of ideas should therefore be at the forefront in the study of ethnicity. The section further details the cognitive approach espoused here.

Section 2.2 then builds on this theoretical basis to develop a framework for the analysis of ethnic change. I disentangle the term ethnicity and discuss the nature of its elements as well as their interrelations. My framework distinguishes two dimensions. One dimension concerns the components of ethnicity: the attributes, meaning, and actions associated with a belief in primordial commonality. The other dimension concerns the perspective of looking at ethnicity, either as category or in relation to other categories or as boundary. The matrix blocks of the dimensions are then discussed as groupness and otherness – the extent to which a sense of community or difference, respectively, exists. A final step extends the framework to nationness as groupness on a bigger scale. I thereby do not dispute the interdependence of the elements but posit that the nature of this interdependence should be empirically examined rather than defined and assumed, as is too often done in ethnopoli
tical scholarship.

2.1 Theory: Towards a framework for the analysis of ethnic change

This first section lays out the theoretical basis for the argument in this thesis. It defines, first, the concept of ethnicity as such, arguing that the vast literature on the term sees more agreement than disagreement. In particular, virtually all scholars agree on the constructed, rather than primordial, nature of ethnicity. The section then discusses constructivist ontology and epistemology in greater detail, followed by a presentation of the cognitive approach as methodological framework, suggesting the causal mechanism behind ethnic change.

Ethnicity: A definition

The vast, and rapidly growing, literature on ethnicity bears testimony to the contested character of this concept. The conceptual literature usually identifies two ostensibly opposing ontological positions. The primordialist approach is said to explain the existence of ethnic communities with extended kinship relations; they are based on ancient, fundamental categories and thus are fixed (for example, Eller and Coughlan, 1996). The constructivist approach, on the other hand, asserts that ethnic categories are socially constructed entities and thus changeable and contingent (for example, Brass, 1996: 89; Eriksen, 1993: 12; Cornell and Hartmann, 2007: 75–76).
However, this distinction is inapt for two reasons. First, few scholars, if any, fully subscribe to the primordialist view. Van den Berghe (1996: 58) and Vanhanen (1999: 57) are virtually alone in their conception that biological descent in itself, and not the perception of a common descent, is the basis of ethnic identity. Thus, proclaimed primordialist Geertz (1996: 40, emphasis added) writes of ‘some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself’. Grosby (1996: 55, emphasis added) similarly defines ethnic identity as ‘the significance which human beings attribute to relations of descent’. Geertz, Grosby, and many other primordialists therefore describe an ‘everyday primordialism’ (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 857), rather than advocate analytical primordialism. The former concerns the perceptions of the individuals and groups on the ground, of the units of analysis, while the latter concerns the ontological views of students of ethnicity, of those analyzing (see also Gil–White, 1999: 803; Brubaker, 2002: 166).

Second, the distinction is inapt because most primordialists agree with constructivists that ethnic categories were created at some distinguishable period in time (Eriksen, 1993: 58). And many constructivists agree with primordialists that once ethnic categories are created they are relatively stable (for example, Horowitz, 2000: 12; Van Evera, 2001: 20); for the individual then, and for analytical purposes in the research of ethnic relations, ethnic identity may be treated as if it was stable. Other constructivists, however, assert that both ethnic attachments and categories are relatively flexible and thus may change in the short term.11 Therefore, virtually all analysts agree on constructivism as approach to ethnicity, with the main difference being the potential for change ascribed to ethnic identities and thus ethnic relations (see also H. Hale, 2004: 460–461). Because this thesis is interested in these very changes, the following discussion goes beyond the primordialism–constructivism dichotomy in order to address the finer points of the debate. I will focus on exactly what it is that changes (or not) in order to be able to develop a framework for analysis.

To this end, it is useful to first define ethnicity. Despite the vast literature on the concept, most scholars agree on some fundamental characteristics of ethnicity. First, they agree on its description (see also Scott, 1990: 15; Gil–White, 1999: 792, 813). An ethnic category is commonly defined as an aggregation of individuals sharing the perception of a common origin, based on a set

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11 This potential for change is qualified, as it is constrained through a set of fixed attributes, such as skin colour, language, or religious denomination (for example, Okamura, 1981: 456; Chandra, 2006: 399). Yet again, it is debatable to what extent these attributes are constructed themselves.
of common attributes such as a common language, culture, history, locality, and/or physical appearance (for example, Weber, 1996: 35; Geertz, 1996: 43–44; Connor, 1978: 386; Horowitz, 2000: 17–18, 50; Cornell, 1996: 269; Hutchinson and Smith, 1996: 6). For conceptual clarity in the following discussion, it is helpful to deconstruct this statement. Categories, in this case human categories, are aggregations of individuals on the basis of one or more common attributes. Categories thus include, for example, women, academics, or right-handers. Ethnic categories are those categories that elicit a perception of common origin, such as language or physical appearance.\textsuperscript{12}

Second, most scholars agree that this perceived commonality may, to a greater or lesser extent, develop into a sense of community or solidarity and ethnic categories thus into \textit{ethnic groups}.\textsuperscript{13} While the ethnic category may be assigned from the outside to a certain collective, an ethnic group is internally defined and asserted (for example, Jenkins, 1994: 200; Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008: 519–520). Deeper meaning is attached to the common attribute. Third, this sense of community, or ‘groupness’ (Brubaker, 2002: 167–168), presents a basis for collective action (for example, Smith, 1991: 21; Hutchinson and Smith, 1996: 6; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 7). Glazer and Moynihan (1975: 18), for instance, make collective action part of their definition of ethnicity:

‘forms of identification based on social realities as different as religion, language, and national origin all have something in common, such that a new term is coined to refer to all of them – ‘ethnicity’. What they have in common is that they have all become effective foci for group mobilization for concrete political ends’.

\textsuperscript{12} Note that with the inclusion of physical appearance, such as skin colour or facial features, this definition encompasses what is commonly called ‘race’. Here I would like to note that, according to the biological definition, ‘races, in the sense of genetically homogenous populations, do not exist in the human species today, nor is there any evidence that they have ever existed in the past’ (American Association of Physical Anthropologists, 1998: 714; see also Hirschfeld, 1996: 3–6). Where the term is used in this thesis, it is done to describe ethnic categories on the basis of physical appearance. Noteworthy is also that, due to the visibility of race, some authors regard it as fundamentally different to (other forms of) ethnicity (for example, Hooker, 2009: 99; see also Eriksen, 1993: 4–5).

\textsuperscript{13} I am aware that the term ethnic group is considered inadequate in the study of evolving ethnic relations, since groups tend to evoke images of small, bounded units to which an agenda, and an agency to pursue this agenda, can be attributed (Brubaker, 2002: 164). While I fully agree with this criticism, I will use the term here for the sake of readability, as this also allows me to use compound words like inter- and intra-group.
Such action may range from the collective mobilization in the pursuit of common interests, as possibly in the case of the indigenous and Cruceño mobilizations in Bolivia, to the creation of a nation state.

Finally, following Barth’s influential observation that it is ‘the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses’ (1969: 15; emphasis in original), it is also widely accepted that ethnies are not based on commonalities in themselves, but on a shared difference to others (Gil–White, 1999: 792; see also Brass, 1996: 85; Chandra, 2006: 411). For example, Eriksen (1993: 12) maintains that ‘there is no ethnicity, for ethnicity is essentially an aspect of a relationship, not a property of a group’. Thus, depending on the ontological view of the researcher, the ‘other’ ethnie affects the gestalt of the own ethnic category, its meaning, and/or its action – and is itself affected by it. That is, ‘ethnic groups and identities form an interaction between assignment, what others say we are, and assertion, who or what we claim to be’ (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007: 75).

Overall then, scholars in the field agree on at least four interdependent though analytically distinct characteristics of ethnicity: that it is based on a certain set of attributes common to an aggregation of individuals; that this commonality is infused with deeper meaning; that this meaning may give rise to individual and collective action; but that the commonality of attributes exists only due to a commonality of difference to others without these attributes. I will take up these characteristics again further below. Before, however, in order to further disentangle this multitude of interdependencies, a closer look at constructivist ontology is helpful.

**Constructivism**

Constructivism holds that social reality does not exist independently of our experience of it; it is not ontologically objective but ontologically subjective. Social facts, in contrast to ‘brute’ facts, exist only in the way they do because there is a collective human agreement that they do (Searle, 1995: 1–13; see also Durkheim, 1938: 1–13). Social facts include things like restaurants, tables, or money (Searle, 1995: 3), but also those not directly based on physical phenomena, such as marriage and sovereignty, nation and indigeneity (or, for that matter, non-indigeneity).

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14 The necessity of relationality does not mean, however, that ethnies only exist as sub-categories in states, as was a common assumption in the social sciences (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975: 4); ethnies encompass all categories meeting the above definition, regardless of their proportional size to their political community (for example, Connor, 1978: 386; Eriksen, 1993: 4).
From this definition follow several points about the nature of social facts within constructivist ontology: social facts are constituted, contingent, intersubjective, and reified. First, social facts are constituted, not simply caused, by ideational structures. Ideas, norms, or culture are not usually independent and temporally prior to social facts but define how we perceive social facts to be (Wendt, 1998: 105–106; see also Parsons, 2010: 86). Thus Wendt (1998: 106) argues that those factors constituting, for example, a Cold War do neither precede nor exist apart from a Cold War. Both have a static identity rather than a causal relationship: ‘Social order is [...] an ongoing human production’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 69). Similarly, one might argue that factors constituting ethnic identities do not exist independently of the concept of specific ethnic identities in themselves.

Second, social facts are contingent. They are not determined by a structure internal or essential to them; they are not inevitable (Hacking, 1999: 6; Parsons, 2010: 88–89). Ethnic categories and the groups growing out of these categories are not primordial or essential. Third, social facts are intersubjective. They come into being in social interaction (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 69) as individual facts are combined to something different than the sum of these individual facts. As Durkheim (1938: xlvii) puts it, ‘[w]henever certain elements combine and thereby produce, by the fact of their combination, new phenomena, it is plain that these new phenomena reside not in the original elements but in the totality formed by their union’. Social facts are also intersubjective in that they are shared within a collective and cannot be reduced to ideas held by individuals (Searle, 1995: 23–26).

Fourth, social facts are reified structures. Although they are contingent, they appear to be inevitable; the institutional reality is experienced as the objective reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 77, Hacking, 1999: 12). Here it is necessary to distinguish more clearly between social facts and institutional facts. Searle’s examples of restaurants, tables, or money given above are actu-

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15 Constructivists hold different opinions as to whether ideas cause and/or constitute social facts and behaviour. See, for example, Searle (1995), Ruggie (1998), and Parsons (2010). For the purposes of this thesis, the question whether certain social facts exist is more important than why they do.

16 To compare this with non-constructivist perspectives: while these also concede a role to ideas, this role is limited to a representation of the ‘real’ world. Ideas do not constitute anything in themselves but are only by-products of social and political action (Parsons, 2010: 87). However, this does not mean that constructivism ignores the role of material factors for social interaction. On the contrary, one of the biggest advances of constructivism is seen in the combination of material and ideational factors. For example, Wendt (2000: 166) sees material factors as enabling or constraining the constitution of social facts.
ally institutional facts, that is, facts involving human institutions (Searle, 1995: 2). Although they are constructed in social processes they are strictly speaking not socially constructed, given that no one disputes their ontological subjectivity (see also Hacking, 1999: 12). Ethnic categories, on the other hand, are perceived to be objective. The appearance of objectivity may further reify the structure as it affects social behaviour.

The nature of social facts makes it challenging to empirically capture them. Constructivist ontology is open to a variety of epistemological stances, with the most common distinction being that between modern and post-modern constructivism (for example, Ruggie, 1998: 880–881; Hay, 2002: 205–208; Parsons, 2010: 89–91). The latter questions whether researchers are not themselves subject to a subjective understanding of the world and thus incapable of arriving at ‘true’ insights into their topic. This stance is connected to an interpretivist epistemology. The former stance, on the other hand, assumes some minimal foundationalism (Hopf, 1998: 183) and thus that it is possible to arrive at some tentative findings when research is undertaken carefully and reflectively: ‘how much the world is socially constructed is something we can document’ (Parsons, 2010: 91). This view is adopted in this thesis. I hold that it may be possible to account for a change in social facts by examining its manifestations.

Based on this discussion of constructivist ontology and epistemology, I take two methodological decisions for the analysis of ethnic change in this thesis. First, a recurrent theme in the discussion so far is the realm of the ideational: people think that they have a common origin, they infuse it with meaning. An analysis of ethnic change thus requires an analysis of ideas. Second, the active voice of the penultimate sentence hints towards the second methodological decision: this thesis adopts a ‘pragmatic individualism’ (Jenkins, 2008a: 58), focusing on individual and collective actors rather than structures as the units of analysis. While constructivism is concerned with ideational structures as outcome, it leaves room for agency in the construction and reconstruction of these outcomes. Agents – the individual and the collective, the self and the other – construct and reconstruct identifications, whether intentionally or not, through external assignment and internal assertion, or acknowledgement of this assignment. Both the ideational and the agential are combined in the cognitive approach. 17

17 Hopf (1998: 181–185) sees in the cognitive explanation of identity one of the main difference between conventional, or modern, and critical, or post-modern, constructivism (see above).
The cognitive approach

Cognitive approaches to inter-group relations support the constructivist ontology through theorization as to the causal mechanisms at work. They are based on social psychological theories. The underlying cognitive process is thought to be the phenomenon of social categorization (for example, Turner, 1982: 16–20; Brewer, 2001: 19–20). In this process, the human brain is considered to simplify the complex social world by which it is surrounded by, first, classifying specific objects and events together as functional equivalents and, second, developing schemas that serve to distinguish one category from another. In other words, social categories develop into stereotypes (Brewer, 2001: 20). In a further process, these categorizations are accentuated.

These theories are supported by empirical findings. In both laboratory experiments and sociological studies, people are shown to be more likely to perceive information relevant to existing categories as well as recall such information more quickly and accurately (DiMaggio, 1997: 269–270). In effect, people tend to lessen within-category differences and heighten between-category differences (Park and Judd, 2005: 111). Moreover, members of the ‘other’ category are perceived to be more homogenous than members of one’s own category (Turner, 1982: 28; Turner et al., 1994: 455; Park and Judd, 2005: 111). In short, once stereotypic social facts are in place, they may work to reproduce or recombine themselves; boundaries between categories may become thicker.

This means that cognitive self-categorization not only leads to the classification of social information into distinct categories, based on specific attributes, but also that this social information is viewed through a cognitive model shared with other members of one’s social category. These models act as lens through which to see the world; as a ‘group’s ontology and epistemology’ (Abdelal et al., 2006: 699; see also Cornell, 1996: 278–279). People do not perceive their surroundings as individual or universal actors but as members of a thought community, of a specific social context (Brekhus et al., 2010: 62). This in turn may further the perception of a group itself, or of groupness.

Such cognitive lenses may have behavioural consequences. They may, for example, bias choice through a logic of appropriateness, common sense, or habituation (Abdelal et al., 2006: 697–698) or increase cooperative behaviour within one category and reduce it across the boundary (Barth, 1969: 15). The clarity of boundaries may thus increase (DiMaggio, 1997: 269–270;
Brubaker et al., 2004: 74), leading to a further self-perpetuation of the cognitive frameworks in question.

In cognitive perspectives of ethnicity, specifically elite manipulation is widely seen as potential causal mechanism in the development and change of cognitive frameworks. For example, Rydgren (2007: 230–232) discusses the powers of analogies and narrativization as elite strategies to foster cognitive processes. Similarly, on-the-ground mechanisms may also be at work (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 855). Indigenous and Cruceño political mobilizations thus might have worked as a ‘trigger’ for categorization or the accentuation of categories.

A cognitive approach toward ethnic change is therefore suitable as it is based on ideas, that is, opinions and attitudes, but also allows for agency. In addition, a cognitive approach suggests causal mechanisms and as such is able to take care of the (often artificial) distinction between emotion and interest as basis of ethnic categorization (for example, Fenton, 2003: 75; see also Wimmer, 2008b: 971). Examining cognitive, affective, and behavioural dimensions of ethnic identity allows the view that both emotion and interest act interdependently. Identities may arise out of similar interests, without having to assume an instrumental basis of ethnicity, or interests may become similar among people of the same ethnicity. In fact, social psychological work finds that with ‘high levels of social identification, the group’s outcomes and welfare become closely connected to one’s own sense of well-being’ (Brewer, 2001: 21). Similarly, Cono-

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18 Some scholars, usually bunched together as primordialists, assert that ethnic ties are affective; ethnic identity is a deep-seated psychological phenomenon (Connor, 1996: 70). While this view might be able to explain ethnic conflict, it cannot explain the origins of ethnic attachments as such. Others reverse the argumentation. Ethnic attachments and categories are not independent but dependent variables; not affective but reactive (Nagata, 1981: 89). They form in response to circumstances and are thus relatively flexible. The most radical constructivist view, instrumentalism, states that these circumstances consist of individuals’ momentary interests: individuals identify themselves with an ethnic category, whether already existent or salient or not, to attain a material or political end (Brass, 1996: 89; Fenton, 2003: 84). This view has been criticized for defining interests mainly in material terms and for disregarding the wider social context in which actors find themselves (for example, Hutchinson and Smith, 1996: 8–9). Here, I would like to emphasize the distinction between emotions or interests as basis for categorization or as basis for behaviour. If ethnic categories are based on affective ties, it does not preclude that ethnic actors deploy these ties to attain their interests (for example, McKay, 1982: 400; Fenton, 2003: 84). Just as the constructivist approach, the primordialist approach employs the notion of interest to explain ethnic conflict: in-group favouritism, and thus out-group discrimination, arises in order to preserve the ‘national soul’ (Connor, 1984: 349). Ethnic identity can be deployed for political mobilization; van den Berghe (1996: 58) concedes that ‘[e]thnicity is both primordial and instrumental’. The difference between these approaches, however, is that instrumentalists in particular assume that these interests are based on rational choice (see also Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 853), whereas so called primordialists assume that members of one ethnie have the same basic interests, flowing from their ethnic attachment in itself. For example, they are said to desire ‘to be recognized as responsible agents’ and ‘to build an efficient, dynamic and modern state’ (Geertz, 1996: 40–41).
ver (1984: 764) emphasizes that individual and collective interest do not need to be equivalent, but that collective interests may seem to be more significant in the perception and assessment of social and political interactions.

In summary, the study of ethnic identity and ethnic relations is too often based on assumptions as to the nature of ethnicity: whether it is fluid or stable, based on interest or emotions. But while students of ethnicity differ in their assumptions, they widely agree on certain characteristics of ethnic categories: that they were constructed at some point in time, when one or several attributes were infused with meaning for the conduct of social relations. A closer examination of the constructivist ontology and epistemology and of theories explaining the causal mechanism of construction served here as the basis of a discussion of the object(s) of empirical analysis as such. Once decided what ethnicity is and how it should be approached, it is necessary to decide on what it is that is actually examined.

2.2 An analytical framework

From the discussion so far, we can distinguish two dimensions of ethnicity as object of analysis: the components of ethnicity, on the one hand, and the perspective taken, on the other hand. With regard to the components of ethnicity, three distinctive concepts have emerged repeatedly in the definition of ethnicity as well as the in the discussions of constructivism and the cognitive approach: first, the existence of a certain set of ‘objective’ attributes common to an aggregation of individuals; second, the ‘subjective’ meaning attached to this set of attributes; and third, individual and collective action structured by this meaning.19 I argue that any analysis of ethnic change, while realizing that the three parts are interdependent in the social realm, needs to consider them distinct in the analytical realm (see Figure 2.1).

The interdependence between these three concepts is so far an assumed one; knowledge of how and why they relate to each other is scarce (for example, Ashmore et al., 2004; Jenkins, 2008b: 5–6). It is thus possible that, for instance, the attributes of an ethnic category change over time, while the meaning attached to it remains the same, or vice versa. This distinction between

19 Part of the primordialism–constructivism debate concerns the question whether meaning leads to action or vice versa. Instrumentalism, the most radical form of constructivism, claims that ethnic identity is not identity as such, that is, it is devoid of deeper meaning, but rather based on action.
attribute and meaning may also help with the issue of analytical, rather than everyday, primordialism. If we are required to distinguish attributes from what people make of them, it may become easier to regard, for example, race as the second-order abstraction it is rather than the first-order abstraction we perceive it to be (see also Jenkins, 2008a: 80; Banton, 2012: 7) and thus to avoid ‘groupism’ (Brubaker, 2002: 164).

Similarly, action should be distinguished from both attributes and meaning, given that there are doubts about whether identification as such actually causes behaviour (for example, Ashmore et al., 2004: 101; Jenkins, 2008b: 5, 44). Attributes may change, the meaning of attributes may change, but that does not mean that the behavioural consequences change as well, and vice versa. For example, Desrosiers (2011: 10–12) builds on the distinction between consensus mobilization, the identification and mobilization of consensus around a problem, and action mobilization, moving from consensus to concrete action, in order to understand situations in which ethnic issues are salient but not acted upon. Conversely, observed action classifiable as ethnic may not necessarily be motivated by ethnic belonging or hostility. Brubaker (2002: 173, emphases in the original) cautions researchers that, for instance, ethnic conflict is not intrinsically ethnic: ‘Violence becomes “ethnic” […] through the meanings attributed to it […] Such acts of framing and narrative encoding do not simply interpret the violence; they constitute it as ethnic’.

The second dimension of analysis identified here is based on perspective, whether the ethnic category as such or the boundary between categories is examined. Following Barth’s concern with boundaries – the fourth agreement in the conceptual literature on ethnicity set out in the beginning – I argue that we should distinguish between what happens in the inside of the
boundary, that is, within the category, and what happens across the boundary. Meaning and action towards the in-group, here called groupness, may be distinct to meaning and actions toward the out-group, here called otherness. There may be a clear association between groupness and otherness, but whether that is the case and what this association looks like should be observed rather than presumed.

Two further distinctions, not explicitly incorporated in the framework but nevertheless important to consider during analysis, are that between the internal and the external and between the individual and the collective (for example, Jenkins, 2008a: 14). An externally assigned but not internally asserted category may, even though devoid of intrinsic meaning for the individual, have consequences for everyday life. Similarly, the attributes of, meanings for, and actions of an individual may differ from those of the collective, both in nature and degree. In fact, while this thesis adopts a pragmatic individualism, I also argue that it is necessary to look at the collective level for the context of the individual and thus consider history and discourse. The following two sub-sections discuss groupness and otherness in further detail. Both sub-sections discuss the origins and use of the concepts in the literature before detailing their relation to attributes, meaning, and action. The framework is then extended to nationness.

**Groupness: Attributes, meaning, and action attached to a category**

Once the category is defined, either externally, internally, or both – that is, once it exists – it may be linked to varying levels of groupness, based on the meaning attached to the category and the actions arising from it. In general, not necessarily ethnic, terms, these issues can be linked back to discussions of collective identity in classical sociology, such as Tönnies’ community, Durkheim’s common conscience, or Weber’s communal relationships (Cerulo, 1997: 386; Hunt and Benford, 2004: 434). Tönnies (2001: 17, 247), for example, speaks of community (*Gemeinschaft*) as a social bond based on a mutual understanding between members of a social entity, which arises from and is sustained through common customs. It is ‘affirmed through love or affection, or because it has become dear through custom and habit or in the line of duty’ (Tönnies, 1971: 67). That is, it is affirmed through the link between the individual and the collective. The social bond may not only exist between close friends or relatives, but also between individuals in larger social entities. Commonality of attributes in itself, however, does not constitute community; only if this commonality ‘rises into consciousness as an element constituting a bond of minds and as a value which is held in common’ (Tönnies, 1971: 67–68) can we speak of a community.
Tönnies hence also emphasizes both the intersubjective nature as well as the ideational dimension of collective identity.

Weber (1947: 136–139) raises similar points throughout his discussion of communal social relationships. He stresses the subjectivity of such a relationship by defining it as ‘based on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong’ (1947: 136). Moreover, Weber adds a behavioural to this ideational element, arguing that a social relationship needs ‘a mutual orientation of [the parties’] behaviour to each other’ (1947: 138). Durkheim (1964: 109) also emphasizes ideas about the collective held by individuals as constituting social solidarity. He maintains that solidarity within a society is the result of a common conscience (conscience collective), that is, ‘the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society’ (Durkheim, 1964: 79).

In sociological theory, then, collective identity or community may be said to be based on the (re)cognition of and affection to a social entity grounded in a commonality, whereby this commonality itself may be subjective. Indeed, similar definitions can be found in contemporary discussions of collective identity (for example, McMillan and Chavis, 1986: 9; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 19; Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 285). Other than that, however, conceptualizations of collective identity differ as it is adapted to fit the needs of the research question at hand. In social movement theory, for example, a behavioural dimension is added when it is argued that collective identity is constituted by a potential for collective action (for example, Melluci, 1995: 44; Snow, 2001: 2). The similarity to the conceptual discussion of ethnicity is apparent.

Although the literature on collective identity is not new, few authors have written about the possibility of variation within a collectivity (Snow, 2001: 9; Brubaker, 2002: 168), let alone about its operationalization for empirical analyses. Rather, variation between collectivities is discussed. Nevertheless, this literature may be a good starting point for time-series analyses. It often goes back to Durkheim (1964: 152), who suggests that social solidarity changes with variations in three characteristics of common conscience: its volume, intensity, and determination. First, volume refers to the degree to which common conscience has enveloped the personal or individual conscience of members and hence their individuality. Social solidarity is thus positively related to the volume of common conscience and inversely related to the volume of individual conscience. Second, intensity describes the influence that collective beliefs and sentiments of
common conscience have on individuals, whether it is powerful or only weak. Third, determination refers to the specificity of collective beliefs or, inversely, to their openness to interpretation by individuals. The better they are defined, the less prone they are to change. However, Durkheim neither specifies how they may relate to each other nor how they may be observed.

More recently, those who aim for the analysis of variation in collective identity neither have set out an explicit and comprehensive analytical framework. Brubaker (2002: 177–185) assesses levels of groupness among Romanians and Hungarians in a Romanian town by pointing towards observations of (perceived) ethnic conflict, protest behaviour, and expressions of solidarity with group members. He thereby focuses mostly on action, and specifically political action at that. Together with his colleagues, Brubaker later emphasizes the cognitive dimension of groupness (Brubaker et al., 2004: 46–47). They suggest that groupness might be captured by looking at the perceived unity and coherence of the collective as well as the distribution, accessibility, and salience of shared representations within the population. This suggestion shows a focus on the category and the meaning of the category to individuals as such. Schlenker–Fischer (2009: 47–48) also focuses mainly on meaning attached to the category. She discusses variation in the intensity of collective identification between individuals within a collectivity, ranging from passive identification, active participation, and ideology to fanaticism. Not only do these texts differ in their foci of analysis – the basis of the category as such, the meaning attached to the category, and the action associated with the category – but also in their level of analysis, whether the collective, the individual, or their interrelation. I aim to bring these issues together into one framework.

With regard to the category as such, its content – or set of attributes – needs to be distinguished from levels of contestation of that content (see also Abdelal et al., 2006: 696–697). The content is proposed and shaped by its members and either widely agreed on or not. If there is a high degree of contestation, the category content is not well defined and its boundaries therefore permeable. If there is little contestation, on the other hand, category boundaries and content may be seen as ‘natural’ or primordial. The degree of collectivity or groupness may hence be gauged by looking at the levels of internal contestation of the content (Abdelal et al., 2006: 700–701) or, as Durkheim has called it, its determination: do individuals agree on the attribute basis of the category? It is here where the ‘cultural stuff’, as Barth (1969: 15) has termed it, is again impor-
tant. A focus on content and contestation concerns the intersubjective nature of ethnicity and thus the interrelationship between individual and collective.

The meaning attached to the category, on the other hand, is situated and may be observed at the individual level, often studied in social psychology under the term social identity. Although social identity is not less contested in social psychology than collective identity in sociology or political analysis, virtually everyone agrees with the ‘founding father’ of social identity theory, Tajfel, that it is ‘that part of the individuals’ self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’ (Tajfel, 1982: 2; emphases added). That is, when looking at degrees of groupness, a distinction needs to be made between cognitive self-categorization on the one hand and affective attachment to the category on the other hand or, as Citrin and colleagues (2001: 73–74) phrase it, between identification as and identification with. Individuals may recognize themselves as member of a specific category without attaching any value to this self-categorization. Conversely, it may be possible to feel attached to a specific category without being a member oneself (Citrin et al., 2001: 74). In sociological and political analyses of collective identity, too, self-categorization, as opposed to external categorization based on ‘objective’ attributes, is becoming increasingly popular (for example, Burton et al., 2010: 1337–1338). In this thesis, I focus on self-categorization as ‘identification as’, the degree or assertiveness as ‘identification with’ at the individual level, and on a sense of communality or cohesion as ‘identification with’ on the collective level.

Finally, a category may be defined and individuals may recognize themselves as belonging to this category, yet they may or may not act on the basis of this categorization. Individuals may have different degrees of social embeddedness, to what extent a particularly collective identity affects their social relationships. They may also differ in their behavioural involvement, in their participation in the collective’s cultural practices, the display of membership through the wear-

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20 Social identity is here used to denote that part of an individual’s identity that is linked to a collectivity, whereas collective identity is used to refer to the intersubjective level.

21 However, Social Identity Theory has also been interpreted in different ways (see, for example, Huddy, 2001; Oakes, 2002; Reicher, 2004).

22 A comprehensive paper by Ashmore et al. (2004) on the term collective identity in social psychology identifies, in addition to self-categorization, four elements of meaning which have been distinguished in some and conflated in other works: evaluation, emotional attachment, and importance. Unfortunately, such nuanced analysis of identification is not possible in a state-wide, time-series analysis.
ing of specific clothes or a flag, or social activities furthering the definition of collective content or boundaries (Ashmore et al., 2004: 92). In the political realm, such involvement may be expressed in terms of support for a political agenda benefitting the category, such as for collective land or language rights. It is the latter this thesis focuses on.

**Otherness: Boundary location, salience, and relevance**

If the construction of an ethnic category necessitates an other, as agreed upon in the constructivist literature, the construction of an ethnic group, with positive in-group biases and solidary actions, may necessitate the construction of an out-group in negative terms. High levels of groupness would thus mean high levels of otherness, with the propensity for violence across ethnic boundaries. This assumption is widespread in constructivist literature on ethnic conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 851–852). However, there is mounting empirical evidence that one does not necessarily follow from the other. For example, Brewer (2001: 17–19) challenges the implicit assumption in social psychological research that in-group favouritism and out-group prejudice are necessarily linked. Instead, she argues, social categorization and in-group positivity may be necessary but, importantly, not sufficient for the development of out-group antagonism. Similarly, Park and Judd (2005: 118) conclude their comprehensive review of the literature with the statement that no unequivocal empirical evidence exists for a causal link between the strength of categorization and inter-group bias. Both Brewer (2001: 33–34) and Reicher (2004: 932–934) conclude that the link is contingent on a number of other factors such as, for example, the cultures, interests, or power politics of the groups involved.

In political analyses, too, the validity of the link is increasingly put into doubt. For example, in a review of six books on case studies of interethnic conflict from Sri Lanka to Sudan, Fearon and Laitin (2000: 857) conclude that evidence for a causal link between discourse and ethnic violence is ‘at best ambiguous’. On the contrary, ethnic identification and polarization may be driven through interethnic violence and other on-the-ground interactions. Gibson’s (2006: 694) study on South Africa supports their first conclusion: it finds that strong in-group identities neither lead to political nor racial intolerance. There is also support for Fearon and Laitin’s second conclusion that causality may work the other way around. Henry Hale (2004: 469) concludes his review of the psychology of ethnicity with the statement that ‘the preponderance of evidence suggests that [...] situations of intergroup conflict can [but not necessarily do] promote the
cohesion of the groups involved’. Due to this ambiguity of the link between within- and between-group processes, it is necessary to conceptualize and operationalize both separately.

Between-group processes, or ethnic relations, may be captured best through a focus on the boundary between groups. Yet while the vast conceptual literature agrees on the importance of the boundary in the study of ethnicity, it is rarely explicit with regard to a definition and even more rarely agrees on one, but certain similarities can be found which link to the distinction between attributes, meaning, and action made throughout this chapter. In his pioneering work on ethnic boundaries, Barth (1969: 15) ascribes them a categorical as well as a behavioural dimension. The former refers to criteria for determining and signalling membership within one category; the latter to the implications such criteria have for social interaction within and across categories: an ‘ethnic boundary canalizes social life’. According to Barth, members of the same category share normative and evaluative criteria which allows for a diversification and expansion of their relationship. Social relations between members of different categories, on the other hand, are restricted in as far as their criteria for evaluation and judgement differ.

Similar definitions are employed in current research on ethnic boundaries. Wimmer (2008b: 975), too, defines boundaries as consisting of social classifications as well as ‘everyday networks of relationships’ resulting from these classification. Sanders (2002: 327–328) emphasizes the interdependence between ethnic categorization and ethnic relations: categories give rise to behavioural patterns which, in turn, give rise to or reinforce categories. Lamont and Molnar (2002: 168–169) add a discussion of degree. They distinguish between symbolic boundaries – categorizing objects, people, and practices – and social boundaries, which are not only manifested in stable behavioural patterns but also in unequal access to resources and opportunities. Others emphasize the different elements of such social boundaries: they are defined by distinctive relations on either side of a boundary, distinctive relations across a boundary, and a shared representation of the boundary (Tilly, 2004: 214–215; see also Wallman, 1979: 206–207).

From these definitions alone it is apparent that ethnic boundaries have a variety of properties that may be more or less relevant for the empirical analysis of ethnic boundaries and their change, depending on the research question asked. For example, even such a minimal definition as Chai’s (1996: 281; 2005: 376) of ethnic boundary as salient ascriptive attributes includes at least two dimensions (ascription and salience). Yet all definitions follow Barth in that they emphasize a categorical as well as behavioural dimension of boundaries.
While, again, the different dimensions of ethnic boundaries are interdependent, I argue that it is worth to maintain this analytical distinction and, in accordance with the analytical framework set out above, make a further one. Barth’s categorical dimension is divided into two dimensions: attributes or, rather, differences in attributes or the boundary location on the one hand, and the meaning attached to this difference or the boundary salience on the other hand. The behavioural dimension, or my ‘action’, is here called the boundary relevance. Each boundary property deserves further discussion.

**Boundary location**

Just as the internal homogeneity of a collective, the external boundedness may also be contested (for example, Brubaker et al., 2004: 46). External boundedness denotes the boundary’s location, that is, its scope of inclusion or exclusion. Location determines the composition of each side of the boundary – those who possess an attribute or a combination of attributes, and those who do not. Boundary location therefore primarily refers to ‘objective’, observable attributes.

The boundary location may change in a variety of ways. For example, a change in boundary location may occur either through a recombination of attributes that constitute the membership rules (Chandra and Boulet, 2005: 5) or a change in the attributes themselves (Chandra and Laitin, 2002: 11–12). A recombination, in turn, may mean a change in the number of existing categories through the creation or dissolution of boundaries or an emphasis shift from one tier of boundary to another (Wimmer, 2008a: 1031). Together, these processes are varyingly summarized as the fission or fusion of ethnic categories (Horowitz, 2000: 65), or the contraction and expansion (Wimmer, 2008a: 1031), shifting (Zolberg and Long, 1999: 9), or relocation (Tilly, 2004: 225) of ethnic boundaries.

Abdelal and colleagues (2006: 696) make a similar distinction, denoting the elements constitutive norms, or membership rules, and relational comparisons, respectively. They add two more types of content: social purposes, or the goals shared by group members, and cognitive models, or the worldview or understandings shaped by the collective identity. Since the different kinds of content overlap and cognitive models in particular are difficult to examine empirically, I will not further distinguish between those but include them in internal homogeneity.

A ‘commonality of beliefs, attitudes, norms, and values’ and a ‘perception of uniqueness of the collective and its distinction from other collectives’ also feature among David and Bar–Tal’s (2009; 361–365) six fundamental features of what they call the macro level of collective identity. The other four elements are sense of common fate; coordinated activity of the collective’s members; concern for the welfare of the collective and mobilization and sacrifice for its sake; and continuity and consecutiveness over time. Again, these are not easily distinguishable from a content or boundary of collective identity and hence already included.
Similar to the contestation of ethnic content, the contestation of ethnic boundaries may also be examined. Tilly (2004: 214) counts a shared representation across sides to the definitional criteria of active, social boundaries. Similarly, Wimmer (2008b: 1001–1002) argues that low degrees of between-category contestation imply a low degree of political salience and thus of stability. Changes in contestation, in turn, may be caused by endogenous or exogenous processes (for example, Wimmer, 2008b: 1004–1005). In the examination of boundary contestation, the focus should be on the definition of ethnic content relative to the other as well as definition of ethnic content of the other.

Moreover, the valence of categories may change. If the valence individuals have towards categories is uncontested in a society, it establishes a hierarchy, both with regard to status and possibly, in conjunction with the relevance of categories, to power. A change in valence may be called transvaluation (Wimmer, 2008a: 1037), site transfer (Tilly, 2004: 225), or particularization (Lamont and Bail, 2005). It may result in the reversal of the existing rank order (normative inversion) and the establishment of equality in both power and status (equalization) (Wimmer, 2008a: 1037; see also Horowitz, 2000: 34–35). Changes to the attributes, contestation, or valence of the boundary may affect boundary salience and relevance.

**Boundary salience**

Lamont and Molnar’s symbolic boundary or Tilly’s shared representation of the boundary may be discussed as the boundary salience, referring to its prominence or conspicuousness in society. In the sociology of immigrant societies, this has been called the brightness or blurriness of boundaries (Alba, 2005: 21–22). Boundaries can become more or less salient; they can be blurred (Zolberg and Long, 1999: 8; Wimmer, 2008a: 1041) or brightened, deactivated or activated (Tilly, 2004: 223).

The degree of salience determines the permeability, or closure, of boundaries. This denotes the ease with which individuals can cross boundaries and be accepted by others as fellow category members (Lamont and Molnar, 2002: 170; Wimmer, 2008b: 979). A more prominent boundary makes unconscious shifts less likely and conscious, active crossings more difficult. While the existence of boundaries depends partly on the degree of permeability – they cannot be maintained if there is too high a flux across them (Wimmer, 2008a: 1040) – it is not synonymous with it. As Barth (1969: 9) points out, ‘boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them. ...
categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information.\textsuperscript{24}

\textit{Boundary relevance}

The properties of boundaries outlined so far refer to Barth’s categorical dimension. The third property, \textit{relevance}, denotes the importance of ethnic boundaries for social interaction and thus refers to their behavioural dimension. Examples may clarify the distinction between boundary location and its relevance: Protestant and Catholic categories exist today in most Christian societies, but while one’s denomination does not seem to make a difference for social interactions in, say, France, this is the case in Northern Ireland (see also Reicher, 2004: 923). While the relationship between members of the Chewas and Tumbukas is defined by antagonism in Malawi, it is amicable in Zambia (Posner, 2004: 530–531). Hence, although both concepts may certainly be related in many cases, ethnic conflict should not be assumed to follow necessarily from location or salience and vice versa. Methodologically speaking, the presence of conflict across ethnic boundaries should not be taken as a sign of boundary salience (see also Eifert et al., 2010: 496–497). Chandra and Wilkinson (2008: 523–525) refer to this distinction as ethnic structure and ethnic practice, respectively.\textsuperscript{25}

The relevance of ethnic boundaries not only differs between societies but also within societies: they can become more or less central as organizers of social relations. This can be equated with Tilly’s (2004: 222) process of inscription or erasure, which respectively heightens or lowers the differentiation of social relations between the sides.

While a change in relevance often comes hand in hand with boundary relocation, it is nevertheless helpful to distinguish both mechanisms, since the latter only captures \textit{whether} ethnic boundaries are relevant, not the \textit{degree} of relevance. The above-mentioned example of the boundary between Catholics and Protestants may illustrate this as well: whereas it is virtually irrelevant for social relations in today’s France, it was the basis of a civil war in sixteenth-century

\textsuperscript{24} While salience is already included in within-group processes, given that people must be aware of a potential common origin for them to develop a sense of groupness; and while changes in groupness may come hand in hand with changes in salience, it is nevertheless helpful to distinguish both concepts since groupness only captures \textit{whether} ethnic boundaries are salient, not the \textit{degree} of salience.

\textsuperscript{25} Cornell and Hartmann (2007: 77) call this ‘degree to which [ethnic and racial identities] organize social life and collective action’ their comprehensiveness, or also thickness. They, too, distinguish comprehensiveness from the identity’s significance or importance for the holder.
France (Reicher, 2004: 923). Just as for groupness, then, the analytical distinction between attributes (location), meaning (salience), and action (relevance) may be helpful in the analysis of ethnic dynamics.

In summary, for the interpretation of all empirical evidence, a distinction between in-group favouritism and out-group antagonism must be kept in mind. Discrimination may not be the result of negative attitudes towards out-group members but of a reservation of positive attitudes such as trust and sympathy for in-group members. For example, prejudice research in the Europe and United States shows that ‘subtle racism’ is characterized by the absence of positive rather than, as often assumed, the presence of negative attitudes toward the respective out-group (Brewer, 2001: 22–23; Hewstone et al., 2002: 578–579). Such a distinction may seem like splitting hairs to some political analysts, given that the political outcome is the same: worsening inter-group relations, to the point of inter-ethnic violence. However, this distinction is still worthwhile as it may indicate a degree of inter-ethnic tensions. On the one hand, out-group derogation and even aggression may be a means of protecting or enhancing the in-group; on the other hand, it may be an end in itself (Brewer, 2001: 26–28). To justify such denigration of, or aggression against, out-groups, their very existence, values, or goals, must be seen as posing a threat to the in-group, whether threat be defined in realistic or symbolic terms (Hewstone et al., 2002: 586).

An analysis of groupness and otherness can answer two of the stated research questions: Have there been changes to indigenous and Cruceño groups? Have there been changes to ethnic relations? The following aims to extend the analytical framework for the third research question: Have the indigenous and Cruceño mobilizations undermined national and thus political unity?

**Nationness: State-wide social and political groupness**

Ethnic diversity has long been thought to be hardly, if at all, compatible with democratic stability (for example, Mill, 1862: 131; Dahl, 1971: 108; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972: 207; Horowitz, 2000: 12; 193); ethnic loyalties are assumed to be incompatible with the national loyalty needed for political stability (for example, Easton, 1965: 242; Connor, 1972: 354; Lijphart, 1977: 233; 1995: 861–862; see also Dowley and Silver, 2000: 358; Schlenker–Fischer, 2009: 174). This claim may be opposed with the (very good) argument that less than 10 percent of states are ethnically homogeneous (Connor, 1972: 320). However, it may be argued that in the remaining 90 percent
of states, ethnic loyalties are countered by strong overarching loyalties or cross-cutting cleavages (for example, Lijphart 1977: 10–11; Horowitz, 2000: 18–19). The question is then whether both ethnic and overarching loyalties may exist and be salient at the same time.

In fact, the generality of the former claims is disputed by empirical evidence from sociological and social psychological studies: ethnic and national identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, in the United States, de la Garza and colleagues (1996: 346) find that Mexican–American citizens are equally or even more patriotic than Anglo–American citizens. Davis and Brown (2002: 251) argue that the attachment of African–American citizens to the United States depend on their strength of black nationalism and not on their black self-identification per se, while Citrin et al. (2001: 85–86) conclude that ethnic and national identities are generally complementary rather than competing. In multi-country studies, Dowley and Silver (2000: 369–370) only get mixed results and admit that more work on the relationship between sub-national and national identities is needed. Elkins and Sides (2007: 698) find that minorities can feel attached to both the ethnie and the nation at once. Finally, Moreno Morales (2008a: 84) concludes that differences in national attachment in Bolivia and Guatemala result from socio-economic rather than ethnic differences.

These findings suggest that the nature of the relationship between ethnic and national identity may depend on exogenous variables. Sidanius and colleagues (1997: 131) thus conclude that this relationship ‘varies somewhat depending on exactly which ethnic group and dimension of national attachment one is examining’ (see also Sidanius and Petrocik, 2001: 124). On different levels of measurement, Phinney and Ong (2007: 274) argue that the relationship varies across individuals, while empirical evidence from the European Union suggests that national and European identity are either positively or negatively related depending on the way national identities are constructed and mobilized by political elites (Hooghe and Marks, 2004: 418; Duchesne and Frognier, 2008: 163). It is therefore important to avoid drawing inferences on political stability from the strength of ethnic collective identities or the nature of ethnic relations. Instead, national unity needs to be analyzed directly.
What is a nation? The literature on nation and nationalism largely parallels, and informs, that of ethnicity and hence the same elements can be found. Just as definitions of ethnicity, modern definitions of the nation are based on a set of ‘objective’ attributes. As a minimum, these include a common history, historic territory, and public culture, as well as, importantly, common laws and customs (Smith, 2002: 17–18). In contrast to ethnicity, this set therefore not only includes ‘ethnic’ attributes such as a common history, but also political or ‘civic’ attributes (Smith, 1991: 8–12, see also Hobsbawm, 1992: 18–19).

People’s attachment to the nation is also often described with reference to both social and political dimensions. For instance, Mill (1862: 308) defines a nationality as ‘a portion of mankind [...] united among themselves by common sympathies [...] and the] desire to be under the same government’. Anderson (1983: 6–7, emphasis added) famously called the nation an ‘imagined political community, [...] conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’, and for Smith (1991: 13–14), the nation ‘signifies a cultural and political bond, uniting in a single political community all who share an historic culture and homeland’. For the examination of national unity it is therefore necessary to look at both, the social national community as well as the political national community.

Figure 2.2 relates nationness to the analytical framework outlined above: a nation is a collective of individuals based on civic or ethnic attributes, to which meaning and action is attached, resulting in a social and/or a political community. The social dimension of national community – Mill’s common sympathies or Anderson’s comradeship – may thus be analyzed empirically similarly to groupness, above, albeit on a larger scale. Since the focus of this thesis is on developments in identifications and relations between collectives originating from within Bolivia, rather than, as the majority of the literature on social cohesion, on developments following immigration, otherness with regard to other national communities is less relevant. The social

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26 That is, just as ethnicity above, nation is here seen as contingent and changeable (see also, Hobsbawm, 1992: 9–10). For an elaboration of the concept of nation in the light of social constructivism, see Ting (2008). For a discussion of the debate nation vs. nationalism see, for example, Calhoun (1999: 216).

27 I am concerned here only with the modern definition of nation. Hobsbawm (1992) provides a detailed history of the term since 1780.

28 In this discussion of national attachment, the distinction between ethnic and civic advanced by Smith (1991: 8–12) does not hold. National attachment may be of both a social (‘emotional’) and political (‘rational’) nature. That is, members of a nation based on a rather civic conception also may have social ties, just as members of a nation based on a rather ethnic conception also may have political ties.
national community, or national groupness, thus concerns the individuals’ self-categorization as a member and identification with this membership as well as their identification with other members of this community.

Figure 2.2: Analytical framework for nationness

In addition, however, this collective national identity or social community needs to be distinguished from the political community; Mill’s desire to be under the same government or Smith’s political bond in the above definitions. The distinction is most famously elaborated by Easton (1965: 176–187). According to Easton, the political community is defined as a group of people bound together through a will for the political division of labour – and not, as in the social community, through a sense of belonging. The political community is an object toward which support may or may not flow, while the social community can be seen as the extent of this support. Social community is thus desirable but not necessary for the existence of a political community, and both therefore need to be analyzed individually.

Although the existence of a political community is judged to be the ‘ultimate conditioner of political stability and peace’ (Juvelier and Stroschein, 1999: 439), it is rarely discussed, examined, and thus operationalized in its own right. Rather, it is often handled as a by-product of other

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29 Indeed, the political definition of nation, ‘the concrete political community of a state’, is the one most often used outside the discourse of nationalism literature (Ting, 2008: 453).

30 Similar definitions are put forward by MacIver (1920), Deutsch and Burrell (1957), and Kelman (1969: 280–283), stressing a commitment to social institutions, to social roles, and to law and order. For a review, see Juvelier and Stroschein (1999).

The distinction between social and political community reminds of the distinction between Tönnies’ (2001: 17–19) Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, Weber’s (1947: 136) communal or associative relationships, or Durkheim’s (1964) organic or mechanic solidarity. Yet in these classical sociological theories, the concepts were seen as consecutive and incompatible. In contemporary sociological and political analyses, on the other hand, they are simultaneous phenomena that are only analytically distinct.
existing forms of political support (for example, Kornberg and Clarke, 1992: 29). Only recently has the distinction between political and social community been picked up again, first in discussions of political support in the European Union (for example, Scheuer, 1999: 29–31) and later directly applied to ethnically diverse societies (for example, Moreno Morales, 2008a: 55–58; Elkins and Sides, 2007: 694). Aughey (2010: 335–340), for instance, distinguishes between national identity and constitutional allegiance, or political commitment to the multinational state. Stepan et al. (2010) coin the term state-nation:

‘states that “are multicultural, and [which] sometimes even have significant multinational components, [but] which nonetheless still manage to engender strong identification and loyalty from their citizens, an identification and loyalty that proponents of homogeneous nation states perceive that only nation states can engender”’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 34, as cited in Stepan et al., 2010: 52).

While Stepan et al. (2010: 53) are primarily concerned with the political–institutional approach of state-nations, they also incorporate citizen orientation into their definition. This includes ‘a high degree of positive identification with the state and pride in being a citizen of that state’, as well as feelings of obedience and loyalty (Stepan et al., 2010: 54–55, emphasis in original). Thus, in contrast to the social community, where the relationship between the people(s) and the whole of the population is examined, for the political community the focus is on the relationship between the people and the state as their rightful administrator. This includes both one’s own relation to the state in its current form as well as reactions to others’ relation to the state.

In summary, in addition to groupness and otherness, changes in nationness may also be usefully examined based on the distinction of attributes, meaning, and action: the attributes concern the basis of the national category, often described as the ‘founding myth’ of the state, which may be reconstructed in political discourse. The meaning attached and the actions following from the category, on the other hand, determine whether national identification and even commitment for a shared polity persists.

31 This long silence is doubly astonishing, considering the importance assigned to public political support for democratic stability in the literature on democratic consolidation (for example, Schedler, 1998: 96; Diamond, 1999: 21; Klingemann, 1999: 32): If there is no agreement on the boundaries of state administration, how can a democratic government govern legitimately? Rustow (1970: 350–352) thus names a clearly defined and supported political community as the single background condition for the development of democracy. As Mill (1862: 7) put it long ago: ‘The people for whom the government is intended must be willing to accept it; or at least not so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to its establishment’.
2.3 Conclusions

By way of conclusion, I summarize and clarify the relevance and relationships of the multitude of distinctions made by establishing a series of (informal) hypotheses for the Bolivian, and the Santa Cruceño, case.

Although theorists of ethnopolitics do agree on the constructed nature of ethnicity, there is considerable disagreement with regard to the potential for reconstruction of ethnic categories and, if there is, in what way it takes place and which consequences it has. For present purposes, the diverse views are divided into two camps. On the one hand, the view inherent in most empirical literature on ethnopolitics (hereafter called ‘conventional’) assumes that ethnic attributes as such are relatively stable but that associated meanings and actions may change if prompted – mainly to the worse. On the other hand, recent perspectives developing particularly in psychology and sociology question these assumptions; changes in one element of ethnicity do not necessarily lead to changes in, let alone to the worsening of, other elements of ethnicity. In the following chapters, both views are balanced against each other in the analysis of groupness, otherness, and nationness.

According to the conventional approach, the politicization of ethnicity, as ostensibly the case in Bolivia and Santa Cruz, increases the salience of the ethnic category in question; people are now more aware of its existence. With regard to groupness, salience is thought to increase identification. In the following, identification is examined in three different ways, summarized above under the term ‘meaning’. First, identification as member of the specific category may increase. Not only may people now be (more) aware of the existence of the ethnic category and recognize themselves in it, but, through a revaluation of the category may be more likely to do so. In other words, self-categorization as member of this category may increase in number within the population. Second, individual identification with the category may increase, that is, the extent to which someone is attached to it. Third, identification with the collective may increase among the individual members; the cohesion within the category as one community may increase, which may lead, for instance, to heightened trust in fellow members.

The politicization of ethnicity may be intentional or accidental, malevolent or benevolent. The underlying reasons shall not concern us here, only that this politicization may lead to the construction and reconstruction of an ethnic category or its contents (above summarized under the term attributes); how quickly this may happen; and which consequences it may have.
The politicization may not only affect the meaning but also the relevance of the category for everyday life. Members may now be more aware or increasingly supportive of a collective political agenda which, for example, promises the introduction of language rights or the allocation of resources to members of the collective. To this end, members may also be more willing than before to support fellow category members as political representatives; members of the out-group may be seen to be incapable of representing one’s own category sufficiently.

The politicization of ethnicity thus also affects the boundary of the category to the respective other, increasing its salience and relevance, and thus otherness. Conventionally, the politicization of the boundary is thought of as heightening prejudice against the respective other. While members of the in-group are stereotyped with positive characteristics, members of the out-group are stereotyped with negative characteristics, increasing distrust. As a consequence, the boundary becomes increasingly relevant to everyday life, with a growing number of acts of discrimination and intolerance across the boundary. This, in turn, leads to the perceived verification of the prejudice, and so on. Thus, politicization may trigger a self-perpetuating process of the worsening of ethnic relations.

Finally, the politicization of ethnicity is feared to affect attachment to the national community, or nationness. In the conventional literature, ethnic and national identification tend to be seen as zero-sum games in two ways: first, ethnic and national identification are thought of as mutually exclusive; even if considered to be a matter of degree rather than absolutes, someone with a high degree of ethnic identification is considered to have a low degree of national identification and vice versa. Second, and linked to the former, national identification is seen to be zero-sum with regard to the ethnic categories on either side of the boundary: if members of one category are reporting a high degree of national identification, members of the other category do not. As a consequence of these assumptions, the politicization of ethnicity may weaken national identification in general or at least weaken it among members of one category and strengthen it among the others. Moreover, the loss of the common feeling of a social community may be followed by desires to also end the political community.

All these hypotheses appear time and again in the following chapters. Chapters 3 and 6 discuss the politicization of the indigenous and Cruceño identity categories, respectively. Chapters 4, 5, and 7 then examine the potential effects of the politicization of the respective categories with regard to groupness, otherness, and nationness.
3. The Rise and Decline of Indigenousness in Bolivia

Over the past decade, Bolivia has experienced upheavals in the social as well as political sphere, beginning with mass mobilizations against the state in a protest cycle from 2000 to 2005, leading to the election of the country’s first indigenous president, and culminating in the writing and implementation of a constitution for the new Plurinational State of Bolivia. These events were accompanied, or even caused, by an increasing politicization of identity discourses of both the national as well as sub-national identities, in particular of notions of indigeneity. This chapter documents the developments of the past decade and presents an analysis of discourses on nationhood and indigeneity over time to illustrate whether and how they have changed, focusing on the attributes of and meanings attached to these identities.

I argue that the Bolivian case shows that boundaries do not necessarily need to be clearly defined before meaning is attached to the discursively bound categories. Neither the indigenous, nor the mestizo, nor the white category are clearly defined: indigeneity, for example, is varyingely based on attributes such as physiology, dress, language or other cultural denominators, territory, or class and thus susceptible to situational changes. Despite the ambiguity of the content of indigeneity, however, the concept seems to resonate with many Bolivians as it has been increasingly used in political discourse, contributing to the recent drastic changes in the state’s social and political spheres. It may be argued that this evidences Barth’s (1969: 15) claim that a shared similarity is not as important as a shared difference; as will become clear, this shared similarity lies in socio-economic status rather than any form of ethnic attributes. The politicization of indigeneity and its consequences, however, imply a belief in its primordiality, if not necessarily by political actors then at least by their audience.
But the Bolivian case also shows that clearly defined boundaries are necessary for any measures of affirmative action: who should be the subject of collective rights? In Bolivia, this question remains unanswered. In contrast to what would have been expected from reviewing the theoretical literature, the politicization of indigeneity has not achieved a clearer demarcation of ethnic categories; if anything, their newly-found political relevance may have increased, rather than decreased, the contestation of boundaries and thus obviated the process of ethnic outbidding. Any official definition of indigeneity would exclude some Bolivians self-identifying as indigenous. In particular, a biological or cultural definition would stand in conflict with boundary definitions according to location, rurality, and/or class.

In order to provide a historical and sociological background for the following chapters and to illustrate changes in identity discourses over time, the chapter proceeds in chronological order. It is divided into four parts: Section 3.1 shortly presents and analyzes identity discourses from the sixteenth to the twentieth century; Section 3.2 covers the so-called protest cycle in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005; while Section 3.3 covers the presidency of Morales from 2006 to 2010. Finally, Section 3.4 discusses the developments in light of the theory outlined in Chapter 2.

3.1 **Before 2000: From divided society to mestizaje to pluriculturalty**

Bolivian society was divided along ethnic lines since Spanish colonization and only since the 1950s saw itself the object of a state-sponsored process of nation building, which aimed at assimilating the indigenous populations into one Bolivian nation and thus at solving the 'indigenous question'. But this process of mestizaje was not crowned by success and indigenous peoples organizations from both the highlands and lowlands began to mobilize around identity-based issues from the 1970s. The mobilizations led to changes in state discourse on Bolivian nationhood in the 1990s, now defining it as a multiethnic and pluricultural state.

*The integral race, made of [...] the blood of all peoples*[^33]: Mestizaje nationalism

Since their colonization of Upper Peru in the sixteenth century, the Spanish elite and their descendants drew a distinction between themselves and the region's native population, as the latter were considered uncivilized and thus inferior in social status. This distinction was en-

[^33]: Former parliamentarian Andrés Solíz Rada (21.05.2011) in a recent commentary in defence of mestizaje.
forced in policy and practice through systems of servitude and taxation; and while servitude was officially abolished after Bolivian independence in 1825, the introduction of laws such as the qualified vote, a restriction of suffrage to those able to read and write and earn an income, in practice reproduced the divide (Albó, 2008: 14–18; Loayza Bueno, 2011: 30–32). The state thus constructed an ethnic boundary as it attached meaning to the difference between the Spanish and the so-called indigenous population, first according to biological and later socio-economic attributes. With this boundary it assigned and reified the category ‘indigenous’, a category previously inexist...
shift in Bolivian politics and society and led to the emergence of a national consciousness (Harten, 2011: 18). The Chaco War thus resulted in a ‘fundamental rethinking of the nature of Bolivian society’ (Klein, 2003: 177) and paved the way for the national revolution of 1952.

One of the emerging political actors was the party Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, Nationalist Revolutionary Movement). When denied its electoral win in the 1951 presidential elections, the MNR, with the support of the middle class and virtually all organized labour, entered government by force through the armed revolt of April 1952 (Klein, 2003: 197–208). Once in power, the MNR aimed to ‘refound the nation’ with its political programme of nacionalismo revolucionario, defined as a national, anti-feudal, and anti-colonial (Harten, 2011: 19–20). To achieve this, the MNR implemented an array of agrarian, educational, and citizenship reforms intended to integrate the indigenous populations and to build a national community. However, this integration took place through a process of assimilation. While the abolition of literacy requirements to vote introduced universal adult suffrage and thus included indigenous Bolivians into the national political community, the agrarian reforms redefined indigenous communities as peasant unions and the educational system instructed them in Spanish language and ‘Bolivian’ culture. The construction of a Bolivian national identity thus took place through a mestizo nationalism that deprived the indigenous populations of ways to express their cultural background (Canessa, 2006: 245; Albó, 2008: 18–21; Albro, 2010a: 74–75).

If the aim of mestizaje was assimilation, it was also based on the celebration of its indigenous origins. Yet this constituted a folkloric idealization of indigeneity as something distant, whether this distance was temporal, such as the portrayal of Andean indigenous cultures as national heritage, or spatial, such as the representation of lowland indigenous cultures as remote and exotic (C. Hale, 2004: 17; Albro, 2010b: 151–152). At the same time, mestizaje created new forms of discrimination against the social category of campesinos (peasants) and, through this redefinition of indigenous in class terms as rural and poor, reproduced the inequality between the countryside and the city (Albó, 2008: 21). As in other Latin American countries (Wade, 2004: 364), then, Bolivian mestizo nationalism reconstituted indigenousness and ethnic discrimination while trying to overcome it.
'Enough of integration and cultural homogenization': Indigenous mobilizations

The failure to effectively integrate the indigenous populations led, in the late 1960s and 1970s, to a process of ‘reindianization’ (Jackson and Warren, 2005: 549). Poverty in the countryside and losses in the mining industry induced internal migration towards cities, which caused more frequent interaction and emphasized structural inequalities (Loayza Bueno, 2011: 47–49). In the highlands of the country, Aymara- and Quechua-activist began to integrate identity-based demands into the agendas of peasant and labour unions. Inspired by Aymara activist Fausto Reinaga’s writings on ‘La Revolución India’, they claimed that their oppression was not only economic and political but also ideological and reclaimed the ascription ‘india’ for themselves (Assies and Salman, 2005: 273; Van Cott, 2005: 54). Discursively uniting the indigenous populations of Bolivia into one pan-indigenous collectivity, this assertion evidences a belief in the reality of the category. Through their discourse, the highland activists both emphasized the boundary location and increased its salience.

The movement itself, however, was divided. The literature usually distinguishes two main factions: while indianism highlights ethnicity as the basis of indigenous subordination and aims to found a separate indigenous state, katarism blends ethnicity with class consciousness and aims to reconstruct Bolivia as a pluricultural state, which recognizes its cultural diversity (Van Cott, 2005: 53). The factions thus attached different levels of relevance to the boundary drawn between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians, with the former equating ethnic with political boundaries.

In the 1990s, these two factions were embodied by Felipe Quispe Huanca and Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, respectively. While katarist Cárdenas emphasized a pluricultural discourse of unity in diversity, Quispe revived the indianist faction towards the end of the 1990s and continued Reinaga’s separatist discourse, calling for self-determination in a distinct indigenous state (Klein, 2009: 151–152). More particularly, this state was envisaged to be the reincarnation of the Incan empire. This ‘indian nationalism’ therefore largely excluded lowland indigenous peoples, who had never been part of this empire (Albro, 2010a: 76). If support for the indianist move-
ment was growing, the sectarian nature of the demands as well as divisions within the movement prevented it from political impact on the national level (Klein, 2009: 151–152). This, in fact, came about through indigenous mobilizations in the lowlands.

In 1990, lowland indigenous peoples united for the March for Territory and Dignity. Marching more than 600 km from Trinidad, the capital of the department of Beni, to La Paz, hundreds of indigenous protesters defined territorial rights and self-defence as common attributes and central political issues, asserting unity and strengthening collective identity among them (Van Cott, 2005: 60–61; Yashar, 2005: 214). Similar marches took place during the 1990s, but only in 1996 did both lowland and highland indigenous peoples organizations mobilize for a joint march and attempt to articulate common interests and an inclusive definition of the indigenous. While lowland indigenous organizations have since largely become silent at the national level, the mobilizations were successful in that they influenced the political agenda of highland organizations and generally broadened the ethnic basis of demands from local particularities to a broader pan-indigenous agenda (Yashar, 2005: 211, 216; Canessa, 2006: 245–248). From the 1960s to the 1990s, Bolivia’s political discourse thus shifted from an emphasis on class to an emphasis on ethnicity.

‘Bolivia, [... ] multiethnic and pluricultural’

The marches had an impact on national level politics. As they were watched closely by the international press, the government quickly (but sloppily) implemented indigenous land right reforms. The MNR adopted an agenda of multiculturalism and campaigned with promises of a ‘New Bolivia’ in the 1993 elections. Presidential candidate Gonzalez Sánchez de Lozada chose katarist Cárdenas as vice-presidential running mate, who linked his discourse of unity in diversity to the MNR’s political agenda (Canessa, 2006: 245–248; Webber, 2009: 168–169).

Driven by fear of the ‘resurgent Indian’ (Albó, 2008: 27), the new government under Sánchez de Lozada deepened the neoliberal reforms that had taken place during the 1980s but, at the same time, also introduced an array of multiculturalist reforms. The constitutional reform in 1994 for the first time recognized Bolivia’s multiethnic and pluricultural nature as well as indigenous land rights. Educational reforms introduced bilingual education. The Popular Participation Law

of 1994 helped to establish and strengthened municipal government, changing the structure of local politics while recognizing a variety of local, grassroots organizations and effectively the validity of customary law (usos y costumbres) (Klein, 2003: 261–262; Albro, 2006: 414; Albó, 2008: 25–26). However, the reforms have been criticized by some indigenous activists as instruments of oppression: the municipality-based law undermined indigenous community structures; bilingual education was only applied to indigenous communities; and constitutional reform took place in a highly top-down fashion (ICG, 2007b: 7).

But if the multiculturalist reforms and constitutional recognition were at best symbolic and at worst oppressive, they also strengthened sub-national identity discourses. The reforms opened up opportunities for indigenous political participation at the local level, which then acted as ‘training grounds’ for participation in departmental and national politics. The establishment of regional constituencies in 1996 further increased the representation of local, indigenous interests at the national level and campaigns calling Bolivians to apply for proofs of identity, needed to vote, gave many indigenous de facto suffrage (Van Cott, 2005: 85–95). While ‘indigenous issues qua indigenous issues’ did not seem to attract particular interest (Canessa, 2006: 247), the rhetoric of multiculturalism gave incentives for mobilization in cultural terms as it systematically privatized heritage and created a discourse of indigenous citizenship (Albro, 2006: 414; Postero, 2010: 22).

One emerging actor presenting itself in increasingly cultural terms was the federation of coca growers, the cocaleros. The cocaleros framed their defence of coca fields against government drug eradication programmes as the defence of Bolivian tradition and cultural and religious freedom. Their protests and participations in marches, such as the March for Territory and Sovereignty in 1994, earned them support from diverse sections of the population, both indigenous and non-indigenous. The march of 1994 made Evo Morales Ayma, a cocalero from Oruro with Aymara and Quechua origins, a national political figure (Van Cott, 2005: 58–59, Yashar, 2005: 181–182). In the national elections of 1997 Morales’ political party, which would later become the MAS, attained four seats in congress and since then has experienced a sharp rise in support (Albó, 2008: 27–28). The MAS is thereby neither narrowly class- or ethnicity-oriented

38 Coca is a crop cultivated in much of Western South America and plays a prominent role in traditional Andean cultures. It contains small amounts of alkaloids, which, through complex chemical processing, can be turned into cocaine.
but relies on a strategy of ethnopopulism (Madrid, 2012: 38) or, in the words of Albro (2006: 420), on ‘tactical flexibility, [...] extra-political sources of legitimacy, successful cross-sector alliances, [...] and the use of Andean cultural frames’.

The second half of the twentieth century thus saw the politicization of both a national as well as of a sub-national, indigenous identity discourse. Yet both discourses appear to lack a clearly defined object of collective identity: the Bolivian nation was officially refounded twice within forty years, first as a homogenous, mestizo nation and then as heterogeneous, pluricultural one. Whereas the contestation in the national discourse concerns its boundary’s content, in the indigenous discourse the boundary itself is unclear. For some, it includes only highland indigenous, for others all indigenous; some define indigeneity according to biological attributes, others according to class. Nonetheless, in the 1990s and 2000s, the indigenous discourse gained currency while Bolivianhood remained highly contested and was redefined once again. Both developments were exacerbated by a growing, state-wide dissatisfaction with the status quo, due in part to an economic crisis. From 2000, this dissatisfaction was discharged in a protest cycle, with increasingly strong sub-national actors and discourses.

3.2 2000–2005: The emergence of a people

The years 2000 to 2005 marked the so-called protest cycle in Bolivia. During this cycle, three developments with regard to nationness and indigenousness are observable. First, the protest cycle, and in particular the Gas War of 2003, acted as constituting moment of a Bolivian ‘plebeian nation’ (Stefanoni, 2003: 63–64), Bolivians from poor, humble backgrounds. This nation is defined in opposition to an internal enemy in the form of the neoliberal oligarchy, as well as to an external enemy in the form of imperialism. This plebeian nation mobilized repeatedly in order to recover its patrimony, in the form of resources like water or gas, from its enemies.

Second, the protest cycle also marks the integration of indigeneity in this newly developing notion of nationhood. On the one hand, diverse groups of protesters used the discourse of indigeneity to emphasize their cause and reached out to indigenous communities. On the other hand, indigenous people were the mainstay of most protests. Through the use of Aymara lan-
guage, the wiphala flag, and similar symbols of indigeneity, its salience increased. However, third, different trajectories of the protests discussed also reveal the situationality of indigeneity and the emergence of new exclusions, depending on the hegemonic conception of indigeneity.

‘Long live the unity of the people against the servants of neoliberalism’: The Cochabamba Water War, 2000

The protest cycle began with the so-called Water War (Guerra del Agua) in the city of Cochabamba in 2000. Following pressures from the World Bank to privatize the local water supply system, the administration under President Banzer Suárez had signed a contract with the international consortium Aguas del Tunari which, in order to finance an expansion and renovation of the system, increased water rates by an average of US$30 per month – in a city where the minimum wage was around US$60 per month (Vargas and Kruse, 2000: 8–11).

Beginning in early January 2000, the local population reacted to these increases with marches, roadblocks, and general strikes, effectively shutting down the city’s economy for several days. When Banzer declared a state of emergency, the situation aggravated further. Violent clashes between protesters and the military led to the death of six people and the wounding and detention of hundreds nationwide (Albro, 2005b: 252). Faced with growing insecurity, the Aguas del Tunari managers fled Cochabamba, leaving the management of the city’s water supply system in local hands (Laserna, 2001: 70–73).

The protesters in this water war did not exhibit any clear-cut identity, as they came from all walks of life from the city and its surrounding population (Vargas and Kruse, 2000: 11). Rather, the protests ignited a process of identification among Cochabamba’s population and thus worked as a uniting force. The privatization of water supply highlighted shared grievances among the population as well as a shared disenchantment with the state. The ‘people’ were united against a common enemy, the neoliberalist state, as expressed in slogans such as in this sub-section’s headline. The protests articulated the goal of restoring the rights of a Bolivian people to a Bolivian patrimony, that of water (Albro, 2005b: 251–256).

The wiphala is a square flag consisting of forty-nine squares in seven rainbow colours. It is originally Aymara but, until the beginning of the 2000s, had been adopted as political symbol of all highland indigenous peoples in Bolivia.

This unification of the Cochabamba population also led to a contestation of local notions of indigeneity, reconstructed as 'neither completely urban nor rural' (Laurie et al., 2002: 253). The mobilization against the privatization of the city’s water supply system was led by the Coordinadora de Defensa de Agua y de la Vida (Coalition for the Defence of Water and Life) whose leadership, as Canessa (2006: 248) notes, consisted predominantly of urban middle-class whites and mestizos. The Coordinadora articulated the main demand of control over water supply as springing from indigenous heritage, citing usos y costumbres. In this way, it was not only able to spark the interest of the international press\textsuperscript{41} and to build a viable political discourse,\textsuperscript{42} but also to engage the Quechua-speaking population of Cochabamba and thus to unite urban and rural interests (Laurie et al., 2002: 265–267; Albro, 2005b: 251, 260–264; Canessa, 2006: 248). Hence, while the incorporation of indigenous issues and identity politics increased the salience of indigeneity, it served here to advance a shared goal and, in effect, blurred the lines between the indigenous and non-indigenous populations.

However, the Coordinadora’s indigenous–rural discourse also had exclusionary effects. The focus on usos y costumbres ignored those who could not appeal to this concept. The interests of recent immigrants to the city, without existing access to water, for example, could be linked neither to rurality nor to heritage. In addition, the Coordinadora’s support for the construction of a dam in the nearby Misicuni valley in order to expand the water system ignored the rights and needs of those Quechua-speaking peasant communities whose land the dam would flood (Laurie et al., 2002: 267–269).

While the Water War in Cochabamba was primarily a regional struggle, it rapidly became an issue of national importance. Protests soon spread to other regions (including La Paz, Oruro, or Potosí), interest groups (including teachers, police, students, or peasants), and issues (including salary increase, land rights, or coca eradication) (Laserna, 2001: 70–73; Perreault, 2006: 160). Besides strengthening the role of social mobilizations as extra-parliamentary form of political participation, the Water War thus also played an important role in increasing the salience of ‘fellow Bolivians’ similarly affected by neoliberal politics.

\textsuperscript{41} Albro (2005b: 256–264) describes the attention the Cochabamba Water War has received from the international anti-globalization movement and how it has been framed in indigenous–environmentalist terms.

\textsuperscript{42} A new water and sewage law from 1999 (Law 2029) had recognized the importance of traditions and customs for water governance (Laurie et al., 2002: 259).
‘I will return and I will be millions’: Aymara–Peasant insurrections, 2000–2001

The spirit of protest also moved to the Western highlands, around La Paz, where the years 2000 and 2001 saw the largest peasant mobilizations in two decades. Led by the national peasant union CSUTCB, the mobilizations aimed to enforce demands made in 1998, so far not attended to by the Banzer administration. Water rights were also a key demand on this list, together with a joint plan on coca production, a peasant bank, an agrarian university, as well as immediate titling of indigenous territories and direct administration of protected areas by their indigenous inhabitants. During three waves of mobilizations, in April and September 2000 as well as June and July 2001, peasants organized marches, put up road blockades, and – in response to increasing repression by the Banzer government – attacked and destroyed state institutions. Additional mobilizations by the cocaleros and other sectors of the population increased pressure on the government (Assies and Salman, 2005: 279–283; Webber, 2009: 207–212).

In the course of the protests, both the protesters’ discourses as well as their demands became ever more militarized and ethnicized, pitting the highland indigenous community against the white–mestizo state. June 2001 saw the official pronouncement of the General Headquarters at Qalachaka, where over 20,000 indigenous activists gathered, armed with clubs, rocks, and old rifles. The wiphala was increasingly used as political symbol, representing resistance against the Bolivian state (Webber, 2009: 212, 217), while the 1998 demands were expanded with demands for an indigenous university and the recognition of the Andean new year *Inti Raymi* as national holiday (Assies and Salman, 2005: 283).

The ethnic elements were most prominently expressed by indianist Quispe, then-secretary general of the CSUTCB. Quispe’s political discourse is characterized by an explicit aversion against the white–mestizo elite as well as by calls for a return to pre-colonial forms of government (ICG, 2004: 16). During the protests, Quispe (as cited in Gray Molina, 2007: 9) spoke of ‘two Bolivias, one Indian, one *q’ara*’ (white) that existed in the Andes ever since the Spanish colonization. This discourse of ‘two Bolivias’ brought down the previously hegemonic katarist

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43 The quote is a reference to the last words of indigenous rebel leader Túpac Katari, spoken before his execution through the Spanish in 1781 and repeated by Morales when he was expelled from congress in 2002 (Albro, 2006: 412).

44 For CSUTCB, see Footnote 35.

45 For example, Quispe stated repeatedly that, if he was president, he would install a Ministry for White Affairs (Assies, 2006: 103), referring to the Ministry of Indigenous Affairs that until recently had existed in various forms.
discourse of multiculturality articulated by Cárdenas. Thus, the Aymara–Peasant insurrections, too, led to new exclusions. Both the pictures of Qalachaka activists circulating in the national media and Quispe’s discourse fuelled perceptions particularly in the lowland departments of a ‘socialist–Aymara takeover’. And while Quispe’s discourse at times made reference to indigenous peoples from the lowlands, his conception of indigeneity was mainly influenced by highland, that is, Aymara and Quechua, indigeneity (Assies and Salman, 2005: 280–281, 293).

At the same time, President Jorge Quiroga Ramírez’ coca eradication policy led to clashes with cocaleros, with deaths on both sides. Morales, then member of congress for the MAS, was accused of inciting the protests and killings, which provided the Chamber of Deputies with sufficient reason to lift his parliamentary immunity and expel him from congress. The expulsion fuelled resentment among large parts of the population, partly stoked because it was felt that ‘they had dared to do this because Morales was an Indian’ (Assies and Salman, 2005: 285). Highlands and valleys erupted in protests, staging roadblocks, marches, and hunger strikes. An agreement reached between congress and Morales two days later ended the protests, sharpened Morales’ political profile, and contributed largely to his unprecedented performance in the 2002 presidential elections, where he came second with 20.9 percent of the vote (Singer and Morrison, 2004: 177).

The different trajectories of the Water War and the insurrections show the heterogeneous character of indigeneity in Bolivia; indigenous identities do not only differ according to location but also according to the situation. While the mobilizations in Cochabamba acted as unifying force even beyond the city’s borders, in the highlands they increased the salience of an indigenous–non-indigenous and a highland–lowland divide.

46 Important is thereby not so much the actual events as the perceptions of these events. For example, while Quispe’s discourse is relatively radical, he also notes that he does not ‘speak only of the indigenous, but of all the people. […] We cannot confront white racism with Indian racism’ (interview with Narco News, 2002).

47 Banzer had resigned in August 2001 due to ill-health and vice-president Quiroga continued his term (Singer and Morrison, 2004: 173).

48 The MNR’s candidate Sánchez de Lozada was elected to his second term with only a small margin, attaining 22.5 percent of votes (Singer and Morrison, 2004: 177). Another factor credited for Morales’ surprising electoral performance was the warning of US Ambassador Manuel Rocha that the election of Morales, being ‘aligned with drug dealers and terrorists’, could lead to the loss of US aid (as cited in Singer and Morrison, 2004: 176). This statement unwittingly underlined the viability of Morales’ candidacy and triggered resentment against ‘imperialist’ interferences in the Bolivian population.
'Gas for Bolivians': The Gas War of 2003

The year 2003 saw the eruption of further protests with increasingly anti-neoliberal sentiments among the population, culminating in the resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada. He had been faced with popular opposition from the beginning of his term but protests began to escalate in September and October 2003, in response to the president’s announcement of government plans to export natural gas resources to Mexico and the United States of America, via a port in Chile. That gas was to be exported through a Chilean port was already perceived as provocation, given Bolivians’ sustained apathy toward Chile after its annexation of Bolivia’s coastline during the War of the Pacific (1879–1883). More important, however, was the perception that Bolivian patrimony was exploited by transnational, and in particular US American, corporations. Re-gaining control over gas resources was perceived to be the only way to stop a repetition of historical resource exploitations such as of tin or silver (Postero, 2005: 75–76; Webber, 2009: 252).

In late September, the national trade union confederation Central Obrero Boliviano (COB, Bolivian Workers’ Centre) called for an unlimited general strike, demanding the renationalization of gas resources. The mobilizations were met with increasingly violent police action, resulting in numerous deaths and wounded in this so-called Guerra del Gas (Gas War). Shocked by the government’s use of violence, the middle class joined the protest efforts as well as calls for Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation; miners and peasants were joined by entrepreneurs, teachers, and students. The president’s political allies withdrew support. On 17 October, Sánchez de Lozada fled the country, and vice-president Carlos Mesa Gisbert took over the presidency (ICG, 2004: 5; Postero, 2005: 74–75; Webber, 2009: 252).

Again, the protesters did not exhibit any one clear-cut identity, comprising a diverse array of movements, demographics, and visions. During the Gas War, Bolivian national identity seemed to be more important than sub-national identities: protesters were united both by a common goal, the recovery of Bolivian resources, as well as by a common enemy, the neoliberal elite at home and abroad. Demands for greater representation and participation, recognition of rights,

49 Demands expressed by protesters in the Gas War (for example, Peña Claros, 2010: 131).

50 It is estimated that, in total, eighty people died and several hundred were severely injured during the Gas War (Postero, 2005: 75).
and a better standard of living were all articulated in the core demand for ‘Gas for Bolivians’ (Peña Claros, 2010: 131). The government plans and the ensuing Gas War thus fuelled Bolivian nationalism, emphasizing the existence of a ‘people’ with a common history and a common destiny (see also Harten, 2011: 155–156).

While the issues at hand were not indigenous issues per se, indigeneity became a main feature of the protests. Protests originated in La Paz’ satellite city El Alto, with its mainly indigenous inhabitants, and spread in the highlands, and most protesters had indigenous backgrounds. Leaders emphasized indigenous heritage, referring to Andean warriors in order to mobilize protesters (Albro, 2005a: 443; Postero, 2005: 83). The use of the Aymara language took over on El Alto’s streets during the protests: ‘we’re speaking Aymara. Power speaks Spanish’ (Gonzálvez, 2005, as cited in Webber, 2009: 240). This not only represented indigeneity to the outside, but also increased the salience of a shared background among speakers of Aymara.

This time, however, representations of indigeneity were used in a more inclusive manner than during the insurrections of 2000 and 2001. Mamani Ramírez (2004: 18) reports the joint waving of the wiphala and the Bolivian flag as a sign of rejection of gas export through Chile. Indeed, as Albro (2005a: 443) argues, these symbols helped to ‘differentiate the diverse causes of popular dissatisfaction from government policy’. Thus, during the Gas War of 2003, indigeneity was increasingly integrated into the national discourse.

On the other hand, indigenous discourse, especially in and around El Alto, also took a more exclusionary stance. Peasant protesters throughout the highlands were unified and radicalized when heavy police and military presence, sent to free tourists from the blockaded city Sorata, clashed with peasant protesters in the nearby town Warisata. Six people died in this confrontation, increasing the perception within the population that the government put foreign over national interests (Perreault and Valdivia, 2010: 695). In El Alto, calls emerged to declare the deceased protesters as ‘indigenous–popular heroes’, especially given the growing sense that these Andean, indigenous protesters were killed by lowland ‘Camba’; the soldiers deployed in the
repressive government action stemmed mostly from lowland departments and some have been heard shouting racist insults at the El Alto population (Mamani Ramírez, 2004: 21).  

The outcome of the Gas War was celebrated by both Quispe and Morales as a victory for indigenous Bolivia. Quispe asserted that the goal of self-determination for Bolivia’s indigenous nation has come closer, while Morales proclaimed that ‘after more than 500 years, we, the Quechuas and Aymaras, are still the rightful owners of this land’ (as cited in Albro, 2005a: 436). Although such assertions further incorporate indigeneity into Bolivian national discourse, they again emphasize highland indigeneity and disregard lowland indigenous and non-indigenous protesters. As Perreault (2006: 167) notes, the Gas War took place, both discursively and physically, in the highlands, far away from the centres of gas extraction in the lowlands. Those directly affected, mainly Guarani communities in the lowlands, were largely ignored in the struggles, as were non-indigenous protesters in the discourse.  

The newly articulated notion of the Bolivian people continued to play a role in national politics and ultimately in the presidential elections of December 2005, as did the demands articulated during the 2003 protests; the so-called October Agenda included a new hydrocarbons law, a national referendum on gas, and a constituent assembly (CA) to rewrite the constitution. Although neither the MAS nor Morales had taken on a lead role in the protests of 2000 and 2003, the demands and discourses were soon included into his political campaign for the 2005 elections, constructing a decentralized notion of the people as those being oppressed and marginalized, in opposition to the traditional elite as oppressors. Hence, the 1950s MNR’s antagonism of the people as the nation and the oligarchy as the anti-nation is also present in MAS’ discourse. This time, however, the people is no longer constructed as mestizo but as indigenous and anti-colonial. With the slogan ‘Somos MAS, somos pueblo’ – that is, ‘We are MAS (or: We are MORE), we are the people’ – Morales claimed to represent the Bolivian people, the majority, against elite, minority interests (Stefanoni, 2003: 63–64; see also Postero, 2010: 23–24; Harten, 2011: 158, 164).  

The term Camba will be further explored in Chapter 6.  

Demands for a CA had been voiced repeatedly since the early 1990s but was pushed by indigenous peoples’ mobilization for the 2002 general elections.
Similarly, President Mesa recognized this newly articulated people in his inaugural speech in 2003, calling for ‘unity in diversity’ within Bolivia, a nation with ‘more equity, more justice’ (as cited in Postero, 2005: 85), which he promised to achieve through the implementation of the October Agenda. However, six months after Mesa’s assumption of office, few felt that he was addressing these issues satisfactorily (ICG, 2004: 11). Mesa’s inability (or unwillingness) to do so as well as his pacifying stance toward the neoliberal elite, mainly located in the lowlands, were met with discontent in the highlands, where protesters mobilized for the full nationalization of hydrocarbons as well as a CA, exceeding the October 2003 protests both in geographical scope and numbers (ICG, 2005: 10; Webber, 2009: 274–275, 288). However, in comparison to the Gas War in 2003, the 2005 protests showed not only a polarization according to region but also according to class. Whereas the middle classes had mobilized against Sánchez de Lozada in 2003, they now supported Mesa and even actively mobilized against the protesters. This change in allegiances demonstrates again the situationality of Bolivian collective identities and the lasting importance of region and class.

While the protest cycle had begun with local protests, unifying the Bolivian population against the neoliberal enemy both at home and abroad by emphasizing shared grievances and integrating indigeneity into the notion of nationhood, it thus ended with rising polarization within the Bolivian population. This polarization would become increasingly pronounced with the presidential elections of 2005, which made cocalero Morales president, and the constitution writing process from 2006 to 2009.

3.3 2006–2010: Refounding Bolivia

The protest cycle culminated in the election of Morales in December 2005 as the first indigenous president of the continent, reinforcing a change in Bolivian politics from the exclusion to the inclusion of indigenous peoples, both discursively and politically. With Morales in power, a new era seems to have begun for many. During the constitution writing process from 2006 to 2008, Morales and the MAS stuck to their discourse of the people but, at the same time, executed a politics of recognition and redistribution to end indigenous marginalization.

This period shows that despite its implicitly contested nature, indigeneity is charged with meaning for many Bolivians. But it also shows that, once ethnic categories become relevant for political practice, a clear definition is essential. As it is, the institutionalization of ethnic boundaries
through the new constitution has led to more, rather than less, contestation of indigeneity in the social and political sphere. On the other hand, the period clarifies that the hegemonic indigenous identity discourse was not formulated in opposition to but as a redefinition of national Bolivian identity. This new Bolivian identity is plurinational, that is, it consists of one nation made up of many different nations. Different levels of identities or national allegiances are thus not seen as mutually exclusive.

‘For the first time we are the president’: Morales becomes president

Morales’ election campaign, unifying Bolivians against the neoliberal oligarchy, was successful: in the presidential elections of December 2005, he gathered 53.7 percent of the vote and thus became the country’s first indigenous president. Both Morales’ performance and the turnout rate, at 84.5 percent, were unprecedented in the history of Bolivian presidential elections. With an absolute majority of votes, Morales was the first candidate to be voted into office by the public rather than in a parliamentary runoff vote (Singer, 2007: 203). In addition, the MAS won with 55 percent the majority of seats in parliament as well as two of the nine departmental governments (Singer, 2007: 203–204). For many, Morales’ election seemed to be the beginning of pachakuti, the return of the indigenous era. For example, newly-appointed foreign minister David Choquehuanca Céspedes considered Morales’ election as the return of Túpac Katari, declaring ‘we are now in the era of pachakuti’ (as cited in Albro, 2006: 412). In a similar, if less esoteric, vein, vice-president Álvaro García Linera noted that ‘when [indios] can see themselves as president, the symbolic order of this world has turned upside down’ (as cited in Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 132).

This spirit was also reflected in Morales’ first, unofficial, inauguration ceremony, which took place at the archaeological site of Tiwanaku, monumental structures of pre-Incan origin. Here, Morales received the staff of command and blessings for his presidency from Aymara authori-

53 Morales on election night (Shultz, 2005).
54 While widely held to be the first indigenous president of the continent, some question the ‘purity’ of Morales’ indigenous origins (ICG, 2006: 4). This will be further discussed in Section 3.4.
55 Andean understandings of time are based on cycles of time and space, separated by defining moments of transition. Pachakuti is a Quechua term composed of pacha (world, state of being, time and space) and cuti (turn, change, something repeating itself) (Steele and Allen, 2004: 226).
56 For Túpac Katari, see Footnote 36.
ties. While Kojan (2008: 72–73) describes a narrative of Tiwanaku as symbol of Bolivian nationalism, representing ‘the primordial roots of the Bolivian nation’, for many, the ceremony is an explicit sign to Bolivia’s indigenous populations: it is seen to endow Morales’ presidency with symbolic legitimacy and to highlight his historic role as first indigenous president (ICG, 2006: 4; Kojan, 2008: 73). The inauguration was attended by indigenous representatives from across Latin America as well as by several thousand Bolivians, many waving wiphalas or carrying placards with the words ‘We have returned and we are millions’ (Albro, 2006: 411–412). Despite the ambiguity in the definition of ‘the indigenous’, then, the category is filled with meaning for many.

The spirit of pachakuti is also reflected in Morales’ official inauguration speech on the following day, in which he noted that Bolivia is embarking on ‘a cultural and democratic revolution’. The speech’s first part was dedicated to the country’s indigenous peoples, to whom he counts himself: ‘historically, we have been marginalized, humiliated, hated, despised, convicted to extinction. This is our history’. However, Morales also continued to underline ‘unity in diversity’ of the people versus the oligarchy. And while he emphasized that ‘now we need to find a way to resolve this historical problem’, he assured the political opposition that this will be done ‘not with revenge’, and that laws regarding specific sectors or regions will not be blocked by the MAS (Morales Ayma, 2006).

In his first years in office, Morales implemented an array of policies designed to remedy the marginal situation of the indigenous populations: his administration saw the appointment of candidates with indigenous background to the cabinet; the merger of the Ministry of Indigenous Affairs into the newly-founded Ministry of Justice (Albro, 2006: 410); and, from 2006 to 2009, the transfer of 28.4 million hectares of agricultural land to indigenous communities (Kohl, 2010: 111).

But Morales also moved swiftly on the gas issue and with it emphasized his concern for the Bolivian nation state as such. On 1 May 2006, he began the nationalization of Bolivia’s resources

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57 Some continued to question the MAS’ dedication to indigenous concerns. While Quispe maintained that ‘Evo is not an Indian. He’s a socialist’, CONAMAQ even declared him an ‘enemy of the indigenous movement’ (as cited in Albro, 2006: 416). However, most social movement leaders saw a bigger threat to their agendas in the right-wing parties and movements than in Morales’ policies, even if these were perceived as not drastic enough (Kohl, 2010: 116).
with the ‘Heroes of the Chaco’ decree. The name of the decree draws explicitly on nationalist memories as it refers to the numerous soldiers who fell during the 1930s Chaco War with Paraguay in defence of national resources (see above). The decree declares that ‘[t]he state reclaims the property, the possession and the total and absolute control of these resources’ (as cited in Perreault and Valdivia, 2010: 696, emphasis added). In this view, the nationalization does not represent the seizure of property but the recovery of national patrimony (Perreault and Valdivia, 2010: 696) – as a first step towards refounding Bolivia.

‘Refounding Bolivia, ... a project of national unity’: Notions of nationhood within the constituent assembly

Another step towards refounding Bolivia was the instatement of a CA to revise the constitution. Generally speaking, Bolivians agreed on the necessity for change, seeing the existing constitution as too centralist. However, organizations and civil groups proposed different versions of change. On the one hand, there were those, such as the MAS, who demanded drastic changes in state institutions in order to integrate the indigenous populations. Such changes were seen as the only legitimate way to end the crisis. On the other hand, the opposition was, save demands for departmental autonomy, mostly content with the existing institutions (Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 114) and argued that such changes as demanded by the MAS would undermine Bolivian unity. These two opposing factions were found in the CA after the elections. For lack of better terms, I am going to call them ‘refounders’ on the one hand, led by Morales’ MAS party and including most indigenous representatives, and ‘opposition’ on the other hand, led by the main opposition party Poder Democrático y Social (PODEMOS, Social and Democratic Power).

58 It has hence become somewhat of a tradition to announce the nationalization of one or the other economic sector on 1 May. However, as Artaraz (2012: 134) notes, these nationalizations can be more aptly described as market buyouts, as they are based on negotiations with and compensations of affected companies.

59 While the causes of the Chaco War are to be found in domestic conflicts, it quickly became accepted in Bolivian popular belief that the war was fought over oil resources (Klein, 2003: 175–176).

60 MAS (2006: 1) on the CA.

61 According to the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2005: 18), 67 percent of the population were in favour of a CA in June and July 2005, while LAPOP data shows that 85.1 percent of the population in 2004 agreed that it is necessary to change the constitution, up from 68.5 percent in 2002. Not surprisingly, in the election campaigns towards the elections of December 2005, all presidential candidates supported calls for a CA (Singer, 2007: 202).

62 The issue of departmental autonomy will be further discussed in Chapter 6.

63 The elections resulted in 53.7 percent of seats for MAS candidates and 33.7 percent for candidates of the main opposition parties and thus impeded swift decision making (ICG, 2007b: 3).
The refounder faction stuck relatively closely to the suggestion drafted by the *Pacto de Unidad*, a unity pact of indigenous peoples’ organizations, which redefined both the Bolivian nation as well as the Bolivian state. The draft recognized Bolivia as multinational, replacing the relatively weak notion of Bolivia as ‘multicultural and pluriethnic’ in the 1994 constitution with a stronger, more symbolic term expressing the equality of societies (Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 163–164). The demands for plurinationalism had emerged out of grass-root indigenous organizations; the MAS took up this issue only with the beginning of the CA. In fact, grass-root organizations had to fight against opposition from within the MAS (Gustafson, 2009: 1003). Thus, the MAS’ focus on ‘the people’, if diverse, was only recently transformed into one on ‘a plurinational people’.

The draft also included the recognition of interculturality, again stressing the country’s unity in diversity (MAS, 2006: 2, 4; see also Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 163). The MAS envisaged the CA to be a ‘collective ritual to form a political community’ (García Linera, as cited in Harten, 2011: 216–217): the refounders’ draft constitution defined the CA as ‘the starting point for a new Bolivia for all. [...] It is a project of national unity and the rebirth of our fatherland’ (MAS, 2006: 1). The new pluralistic state model included the recognition of municipal, indigenous, and departmental autonomies; the inclusion of indigenous symbols, such as the wiphala, as state symbols; as well as the addition of indigenous languages to the official state or regional languages. In particular, the draft constitution recognized ‘rights of the peoples’, granting indigenous peoples the right for self-determination and territoriality, the recognition of usos y costumbres in decision-making and juridical processes, and the management of their collective resources (MAS, 2006: 2–6).

In contrast to the refounders, the opposition strongly opposed such pluralism as this, they argued, would foster sub-national identities at the expense of national unity (for example, ICG,

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64 The Unity Pact is a coalition of Bolivia’s major indigenous organizations, which, during the constitution writing process, sought to facilitate the formulation of demands and the coordination of political strategies. The MAS presented the draft as its own (MAS, 2006: 1–2; Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 137). The formation of such coalition as well as its naming again emphasize a pan-indigenous identity collective.

65 The refounder faction was not unitary block but consisted of different currents. While all Unity Pact organizations agreed on plurinationality, it was never established who these nations were. Moreover, the division between moderate and radical indigenous discourse was visible in the CA as well. Among the latter was the CONAMAQ, which demanded during the preparation stage to rename Bolivia into *Quisquisuyu Bolivia*, after the Incan Empire. Other organizations objected to the demand as they considered it ethno- and Andean-centric (Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 163–164).
Commentators on the new constitution feared that it would lead to the ‘disappearance’ of the Bolivian nation as such (for example, de Chazal, 2008: 180; Prats, 2008: 221; Chaparro Amaya, 2011: 188). The MNR (2006, as cited in Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 140) claimed that the changes proposed by the MAS and indigenous organizations would ‘destroy the existing and poison the basis of a civilized common life, which we have built together in almost two centuries’. The opposition’s preferred option was the ‘normal’, current state model where cultural diversity was recognized only at a subordinate level – not realizing that the current model is an expression of a particular culture as well. In the PODEMOS proposal, Bolivia was to maintain its status as multiethnic and pluricultural state, rather than being recognized as plurinational, and indigenous rights were not recognized to such a degree as in the MAS proposal. Other opposition proposals also put considerably less emphasis on cultural diversity (Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 136–140).

The demands and discourses of both factions reveal diverging notions of nationhood. Re-founders seemed to believe that Bolivian national identity can be consolidated through the recognition and strengthening of sub-national identities. Multiple ‘national’ identities were not seen as mutually exclusive. On the other hand, the opposition seemed to believe that Bolivian national identity will disappear with a strengthening of sub-national identities; a view strongly grounded in the assimilationist approach of mestizaje.

Such differences often slowed down or completely stopped the negotiations. They were further prolonged by a lack of preparation on part of the delegates and their tendency to digress on secondary issues, but also by the failure of the MAS to lead the CA in an inclusive manner, if its discourse had suggested otherwise. Negotiations came to a halt in November 2006 when MAS delegates attempted to replace the previously stipulated two-third majority decision rule with a simple majority rule. Within individual committees, procedural rules were repeatedly broken to the disadvantage of opposition reports (ICG, 2007b: 2–6). From autumn 2007, the MAS rushed the approval process in order to deliver a full text before the (already extended) deadline in December. When the text was approved on 8 December, it was done so within hours and without considerable debate – the assembly had been moved from Sucre to Oruro for secu-

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66 For example, the first six months of the CA process were taken up by debates on procedural issues, such as the election of the directive board (ICG, 2007b: 2).
rity reasons, without due notice to opposition delegates (ICG, 2008: 2–3). These issues led to increasing polarization not only within the CA, as members of opposition and minority parties questioned the legality and legitimacy of the process, but also in congress, where a deadlock over the new constitution ensued.

And the process also led to polarization in the streets, discharged in violent clashes with increasingly explicit racist motivations. In the first half of 2007 alone, 156 social conflicts were reported, 16 percent of which turned violent (Harten, 2011: 181–182). In clashes between pro- and anti-government protesters in Cochabamba in January of the same year, two died and dozens were severely injured (ICG, 2007b: 1). In Sucre, CA delegates from MAS and La Paz were attacked; wiphala
as were burned and offices of indigenous organizations destroyed; and Bolivians in traditional dresses and MAS supporters insulted and attacked (Calla and Muruchi, 2008: 51; Nuñez Reguerin, 2008: 143).67 Violence escalated in May 2008, when rural MAS delegations gathered in Sucre to attend a speech by Morales. An enraged student mob chased, beat, stripped, and publicly humiliated MAS supporters, especially those with indigenous hairstyle, dress, or skin colour (Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 293–294). For many, the ‘two Bolivias’ were taking shape.

‘Plurinational State of Bolivia’: The new constitution

In response to the violence and to resolve the deadlock in congress, the Morales administration became more moderate and decided to revise the Oruro constitution together with opposition parties in order to include their criticisms and visions. This change is attributed to the increasing influence of vice-president García Linera’s line, which advocated a less radical discourse in order to move forward and win back the middle class (Fuentes, 2007). Indeed, in speeches in 2007 to 2009, Morales refrained from speaking of ‘us indigenous’ as he did in 2006; only spoke of ‘the Bolivian people’ in the singular; and further united the Bolivian people in discourse by attributing common values and goals. For example, he called on the opposition to ‘respect Bolivian norms’ or claimed that Bolivia fights for ‘its dignity, its unity, its identity’ (Morales Ayma, 2007, 2008, 2009).

67 Assailants and victims showed similar phenotypic attributes but differed in dress and behaviour (Coria Nina, 2008: 20).
The revision process, under protest from a number of social and indigenous organizations, led to changes in over a hundred articles (Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 312). While grievances persisted on both sides, the new constitution was passed in congress in November 2008 and ultimately approved in a referendum in January 2009 with 61.4 percent of the vote. In this new constitution, rights of indigenous peoples are strengthened considerably; departmental, regional, municipal, and indigenous autonomies introduced; and greater control given to the state regarding the use and exploitation of resources (República de Bolivia, 2009; Assies, 2011: 115).

The sections on the basic definitions of the political community and the state are strongly coloured by the suggestions of the refounders. For example, Article 1 defines Bolivia as plurinational state, based on plurality and political, economic, juridical, cultural, as well as linguistic pluralism. But the constitution also emphasizes national unity: the preamble speaks of the ‘unity and integrity of the country’ and the ‘unitary state’ and describes both the Bolivian as well as the indigenous communities as peoples (‘the Bolivian people’ and ‘our peoples’) (República de Bolivia, 2009). However, some disapprove of the constitution for misrepresenting Bolivianhood. For example, Quiroga Trigo (2008: 58) criticizes that the preamble does not include ‘defining moments’, such as the national revolution of 1952 or the reestablishment of democracy in 1982. The conception of the Bolivian nation thus remains disputed.

The constitution may also be interpreted as disputing Bolivian unity itself. Article 30 defines a nation or people being indígena originario campesino (IOC, indigenous original peasant) as ‘any human collective that shares a cultural identity, language, historical tradition, institutions, territoriality and cosmovision, whose existence is prior to the Spanish colonial invasion’ (República de Bolivia, 2009). This definition has a number of implications: first, it draws a boundary between a pre- and a post-colonial population and, second, may strengthen this boundary by homogenizing the population on each side. The article further strengthens this boundary by attributing collective rights to IOCs. Such a definition, and endowment with collective rights, seems to reveal a primordial notion of indigeneity on part of the refounders, with certain attributes and characteristics inherent to indigenous people, never changing. The ‘others’, on the

68 One demand for the passing of the constitution was the conduct of a recall referendum for Morales’ government. In this referendum, national support rose to 67 percent (Kohl, 2010: 109–111; Oviedo Obarrio, 2010: 102–103).

69 Note that the term ‘indigenous original peasant’ is written without commas.
other hand, do not seem to have any collective identity other than Bolivianhood and thus no collective rights. For example, Morales (as cited in Chaparro Amaya, 2011: 187) insists that, while indigenous autonomies are ‘a demand of indigenous peoples for self-determination’, departmental autonomies are merely part of decentralization, that is, administrative processes.70

The constitution indeed has fuelled fears of ‘reversed racism’. Some non-indigenous Bolivians feel discriminated against, both in form and content of the constitution, deeming that indigenous peoples are overrepresented. This criticism is shared even by some MAS representatives (Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 269–270, see also ICG, 2008: 10). Critics argue that the constitution creates the two Bolivias Quispe had talked about: a rural Bolivia made up of ostensibly homogenous indigenous peoples and nations on the one hand, and an urban, non-indigenous Bolivia on the other (for example, Quiroga Trigo, 2008: 60; Prats, 2008: 221). The perception of reversed racism may be further strengthened as Afro-Bolivians are also defined as a people and receive the same economic, social, political, and cultural rights as the IOCs (República de Bolivia, 2009: Art. 32).

In addition, criticism of Andean-centrism is increasing: Some forms of indigeneity are claimed to be rendered ‘more legible’ than others because the constitution, as well as other policies implemented by the Morales administration, discriminates among collective identities as more or less indigenous, authentic, or imposed (Albro, 2010a: 72–73, 79). Through a prioritization of rural and collective forms of indigeneity, urban and individual forms of indigeneity are increasingly excluded (see also Albro, 2008: 4; Moscoso, 07.05.2009). For example, Schilling–Vacaflor (2009: 190) reports that indigenous autonomy demands within the CA process were focused on rural areas, whereas suggestions for urban areas were far less concrete.

Thus, although the new constitution recognizes that multiple national affiliations are not mutually exclusive and hence has a more inclusive outlook, it may also result in new exclusions of non-indigenous Bolivians and of those asserting but not being assigned an indigenous identity. The criticism of Andean-centrism already shows a decline in the levels of attachment and be-

70 While the MAS may have a relatively primordial notion of indigenous identities, this is both criticized and shared by the opposition. Some opposed the recognition of indigenous peoples with the argument, that they were not ‘pure’ enough anymore (Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 246–248, 272).
longing to the overall, pan-indigenous category. Whether the fears of new exclusions are justified is to be seen in the implementation of the individual clauses.

‘Once we accept that we are a racist country, we have to change the situation’: Implementing the new constitution

The implementation process of the new constitution reveals difficulties with the definition of ethnic categories in Bolivia and their institutionalization through laws. Debates surrounding the passing of new electoral, autonomy, or anti-discrimination laws, amongst others, emphasize the exclusionary potential of ethnopolitics. For example, the electoral law had to be revised in order to comply with the constitution, which stipulates the inclusion of reserved congressional seats for indigenous representatives where indigenous Bolivians are in a numerical minority (República de Bolivia, 2009: Art. 146). The opposition disputed this stipulation as, it argued, it would violate the principle of the equality of votes (Albó, 13.04.2009). A resulting compromise between government and opposition decreased the number of indigenous seats significantly, from a planned fourteen to seven seats (Alpert et al., 2010: 758). This reduction hit the thirty-four lowland peoples hardest as they, in contrast to the Aymaras and Quechuas, are a numerical minority. This has led some to doubt the government’s dedication to the cause of all, and not just the Andean, indigenous peoples (for example, López, 14.04.2009), again showing a decrease in the belief in an overall indigenous collective identity.

A gap between discourse and practice also occurred in the implementation of indigenous autonomy, but this time not enacted from above but from below. The December 2009 general elections included the opportunity for municipalities to vote for indigenous autonomy. In these elections, only eleven out of the 311 municipalities opted for autonomy (Albó and Romero, 2009: 22; Albó, 20.12.2009). There may be several reasons for this low number. The indigenous municipalities may simply be too diverse as to be able to decide on one autonomy framework. Some may have decided against autonomy because, in practice, it is a Western conception of indigenous autonomy that does not comply with their own conception. Others may have been unfamiliar with and thus shied away from setting up an official autonomy statute. In fact, some

71 Bolivian Human Rights Ombudsman Rolando Villena, commenting on the proposed Law against Racism and all Forms of Discrimination (as cited in AIN, 15.10.2010).

72 Albó and Romero calculated on the basis of languages spoken that 163 of Bolivia’s 311 municipalities are indigenous and thus potential candidates for indigenous autonomy.
of the communities having opted for autonomy and written a statute received help from domestic and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Albó, 20.12.2009; Heins, 17.10.2011). In addition, and somewhat contrary to the reasons already listed, many Bolivians may not want to live in indigenous autonomous communities because this would imply being governed by indigenous customary law. Women expressed concern that it is discriminatory against them as, for example, they are often excluded from leadership positions. Men, in turn, feel restricted: In order to take on said leadership roles they would be required to serve the community for several years in different positions while what they actually want is to leave their home town in order to study at university (Loayza Bueno, 12.10.2011; Heins, 17.10.2011). Whatever the underlying reasons, the issue of indigenous autonomy shows a disjunction between the collective IOC defined in the constitution and the sociological reality, and re-emphasizes differences among those constituting the indigenous category previously heralded as united collective.

Another dispute arose regarding the government’s plan for the adoption of a Law against Racism and all Forms of Discrimination. While the previous examples mainly concerned the relation among indigenous, this dispute demonstrates the relation between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians. Of particular concern here were Articles 16 and 23, which foresee potential punishments for members of the media publishing racist or otherwise discriminatory ideas and are thus seen to limit freedom of speech. The government defended the law with examples of racist reporting and media-incited racial hatred, unfortunately all too easily found in the opposition-dominated media (AIN, 15.10.2010; BIF, 2010b: 2–3; see also Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 302–303; Howard, 2010: 186–190). Although the law was eventually passed without changes to said articles, the dispute shows the growing awareness of discrimination in Bolivia, on the one hand, but also an inability or unwillingness of some actors to recognize racism, on the other hand.

In the effort to agree on laws to implement the constitution, the Morales administration continued its more moderate stance, which contributed to a decrease in the politicization of indigeneity (see also Moreno Morales, 03.10.2011). However, it also led to a growing gap between the government’s discourse and political action, as can be seen in terms of indigenous language,

\[73\] This issue is further discussed in Chapter 6.
land rights, or religion (Buitrago Bascopé, 13.09.2011; Zegada Claure, 04.10.2011). Indigeneity may have changed politically and sociologically, but not with regard to the economic reality. This may lead to a growing disillusionment among Morales' constituency, which, following campaign promises, expected to see rapid results. While the MAS experienced significant support in the presidential and congressional elections of December 2009 as well as the regional elections of April 2010,\textsuperscript{74} it suffered some defeats at the local level. Its loss of important municipalities such as La Paz as well as decreasing vote shares in rural and mainly indigenous constituencies may indicate declining support for the MAS in its core electorate (Flesken, 2010: 7–8).

To conclude, the first five years in office of an indigenous Bolivian president, celebrated as a new era for the country’s indigenous populations, on the one hand further increased the visibility of discrimination across ethnic boundaries and led to steps to remedy this situation. On the other hand, it also increased the salience and relevance of these boundaries and may thus have led to new exclusions, not only of Bolivia’s non-indigenous population but also of those not fitting the official conception of indigeneity. This may have left many dissatisfied with the slow progress made and shows that Bolivia is still in the first steps of its refoundation.

3.4 Discussion and conclusions

Within the last sixty years, Bolivianhood has been redefined three times: first, in the 1950s through a discourse of mestizaje which aimed to assimilate all Bolivians into a mestizo nation but which, paradoxically, reconstituted indigeneity in class terms and reproduced ethnic discrimination; second, during the 1990s as a pluricultural nation which, at least discursively, aimed at levelling the playing field for Bolivians of all backgrounds. However, incongruities between discourse and political practice rather resulted in a strengthening of sub-national, indigenous discourses. Thus, third, the protest cycle, the election of Morales, and the new constitution in the 2000s led to the redefinition of Bolivia as plurinational, if united in a plebeian nationhood. With the exception of radical fringes, indigenous movements had mobilized for a

\textsuperscript{74}In December 2009, Morales was re-elected with 64.2 percent of the vote and the MAS won a two-third majority of seats in both legislative chambers. The approval is linked to the growth in Bolivia’s economy and pro-poor policies, largely financed by hydrocarbon nationalization. These issues, rather than identity politics, were also emphasized in Morales’ election campaign. Main opponent Manfred Reyes Villa (Plan Progreso para Bolivia–Convergencia Nacional), on the other hand, focused on themes such as restoring national unity and expanding regional autonomy (Alpert et al., 2010: 758–760). In April 2010, MAS candidates won six of the nine departments and thus bolstered the movement’s representation at the departmental level (see Flesken, 2010: 4–8).
new, inclusive definition of the content of Bolivianhood rather than for a new definition of its boundary to exclude non-indigenous Bolivians.

While the events of the past decade have led to the revaluation of indigeneity, they have not contributed to a sharpening of the indigenous–non-indigenous boundary; if anything, they may have blurred it further. In the analyzed texts and interviews, indigeneity was variably defined as being based in physiology, dress, language, and/or work relations. Contemporary conceptions of indigeneity in Bolivia thus include and confound elements of previous hegemonic discourses on the topic, evidencing the path dependency of identity construction. This becomes particularly clear in attempts to define Morales’ ethnicity. Many interviewees agreed that, in cultural terms, Morales cannot be defined as indigenous: his last name is Spanish, he has not carried out the community service traditionally required to assume a leadership position, and he does not speak Quechua or Aymara (Schilling–Vacaflor, 20.09.2011; Moreno Morales, 03.10.2011; Zuazo Oblitas, 11.10.2011; Loayza Bueno, 12.10.2011). In phenotypic terms, however, he may be defined as indigenous.

Similarly, some opposed the recognition of indigenous peoples with the argument that they in general and Morales in particular were not ‘pure’ enough anymore (Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 246–248, 272). And even within the indigenous bloc, Morales’ dedication to indigenous concerns is questioned. While Quispe maintained that ‘Evo is not an Indian. He’s a socialist’, the traditional highland indigenous organisation CONAMAQ even declared him an ‘enemy of the indigenous movement’ (as cited in Albro, 2006: 416).  

On the other hand, Morales is a symbol for indigeneity. As we could see from the extensive use of indigenous symbolism both during the election campaigns and inauguration ceremonies, the indigenous is filled with meaning for many Bolivians. And although the Morales administration has aimed to become more moderate and appeal to Bolivia as a whole, the importance of indigeneity in political discourse is still given, as could be seen, for example, during the election campaigns for the judiciary in October 2011, when advertisements introduced candidates with their name, occupation, and ethnic background (fieldwork notes, September–October 2011; see also Salazar de la Torre, 17.10.2011).

75 See also Footnotes 57 and 70.
But while this blurriness has not caught much attention previously, there is now an increasingly open contestation of indigeneity as its definition has become relevant for political practice. The collective rights set out in the new constitution cannot be attributed without a clearly defined collective subject. Several interviewees have remarked that the concept of IOC is rather a philosophical than sociological one; three categories, in themselves hardly homogeneous, grouped together to an even bigger category (for example, Zuazo Oblitas, 11.10.2011; Salazar de la Torre, 17.10.2011). Divisions may be seen in the issue of indigenous autonomy, so far only declared by eleven communities. While some communities may still declare autonomy in the future, many explicitly voted against autonomy as what is perceived to be a hurdle to modernity.

The institutionalization of the IOC category may also lead to new exclusions. First, non-IOC Bolivians are excluded. This does not only apply to their lack of collective rights which, one could argue, they do not even desire, but also to their lack of symbolic recognition. A heterogeneous group of non-indigenous Bolivians is defined through their absence of an attribute, indigeneity; their sub-national identities are not taken into consideration. The constitution thus reified the distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians which, in reality, does not exist as such. This sense of exclusion and the perception of reversed racism against whites may be even stronger as Afro-Bolivians were also recognized as a nation and a subject to collective rights. Afro-Bolivians are not indigenous to Bolivia but were brought there by Spanish colonizers; their only similarity with the indigenous peoples is the shared difference to Spanish-descendent Bolivians, both in skin colour as well as political and social marginalization. From a class perspective, their inclusion may make sense as a policy aimed at levelling the playing field for discriminated actors. However, it blatantly confounds issues of ethnicity and class and furthers the contestation of ethnic boundaries.

Second, the institutionalization of IOC may also lead to exclusion among those who may consider themselves belonging to this category. As outlined above, a clear definition of indigenous, or IOC in general, is missing. Due to the territorial notion of autonomy, collective rights may be linked to a territorial understanding of indigeneity and attributed to those who can prove a connection to the land (see Schilling–Vacaflor, 20.09.2011; Zuazo Oblitas, 11.10.2011; Loayza Bueno, 12.10.2011). Yet social and demographic developments have forced many to migrate either to other arable lands, especially in the valleys in Cochabamba and the lowlands, or to the
city, who thus have lost any such basis for collective rights claims. Urban Aymaras, for example, do not easily fit the bill and may have difficulties attaining collective rights.

Third, the redefinition is based on a particular notion of indigeneity, anchored in the Andes. While all interviewees agreed that the government’s alleged Andean centrism is based on electoral rather than cultural affinity (for example, Buitrago Bascopé, 13.09.2011; Loayza Bueno, 12.10.2011), there are also charges that the government does not really understand lowland indigenous ways of living and that lowland indigenous people are included only discursively (Prado Salmón, 21.10.2011), if at all (Peña Hasbún, 24.10.2011). The disillusionment with current government practice may lead many to question the existence of an overarching, pan-indigenous community per se.

However, rather than being a division between highland and lowland indigenous peoples, it is one between katarist and indianist understandings of indigeneity, which may also be described as one between campesinos and indigenous (see also Tilley, 07.09.2011; Schilling–Vacaflor, 20.09.2011). The latter includes traditional organizations such as the CONAMAQ, the former syndicalist organizations such as the MAS. Both have different understandings of territory: while campesinos have an individualist understanding of territorial ownership, indigenous have a collective understanding (Zegada Claure, 04.10.2011; Salazar de la Torre, 17.10.2011). A renewed focus on this distinction, rather than on one between highland and lowland indigenous, helps to analyze the current political situation. While the MAS’ base is situated in the Andes (Oviedo Obarrio, 2010), this has not led to a preferential treatment of highland indigenous populations as such (Tilley, 07.09.2011). The Morales’ administration benefits campesinos more than indigenous, in particular coca growers (see also Buitrago Bascopé, 13.09.2011; Schilling–Vacaflor, 20.09.2011). This campesino outlook, in turn, influences the government’s definition of indigenous to mean rural and from the highlands. On the other hand, it leads to a re-ethnicization of campesino organizations, at least in discursive term. For example, the Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia (Syndicalist Confederation of Settlers of Bolivia), a union of landless peasants settled in the lowlands, now rejects the term colonizador (settler) and renamed itself Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia (Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia), incorporating the renewed emphasis on ethnic identity in its narrative (Artaraz, 2012: 199, see also Moreno Morales, 03.10.2011; Zegada Claure, 04.10.2011).
As such, events beginning to unfold in 2010 and 2011 should be seen as an outcome of an unclear government position regarding indigeneity. In particular, the government’s discourse of indigenous empowerment was unhinged in the debate surrounding the construction of a road through the indigenous territory and national park TIPNIS. A march from Trinidad to La Paz, organized by inhabitants of the park in protest of these plans, was met with incomprehension by government officials and violent action by the police. This reaction increased public support for the protesters and the lowland indigenous marchers were joined by other organizations, such as the highland CONAMAQ or environmental NGOs (see BIF, 2011). Although the TIPNIS crisis was resolved in favour of the protesters, the Morales administration lost legitimacy as the defender of both indigenous rights and the environment (for example, Salazar de la Torre, 17.10.2011).

The march itself was not driven by sectarian aspirations but done in the name of the Bolivian people: flags flown were predominantly the Bolivian tricolour, not that of individual departments or indigenous groups. On the other hand, the march was also symbolically directed against the current government’s understanding of the nation: the wiphala has not been adopted by lowland indigenous groups as a national symbol and was not flown during the march (except by the CONAMAQ) (fieldwork notes, September–October 2011). It is here interesting to note that government opponents do use the ‘indigenous card’ but they do not do so in the classic sense of ethnic outbidding. Instead, they refocus the conception of indigeneity on the image of the environmentally friendly (see also Salazar de la Torre, 17.10.2011) and thus confirm an international stereotype as the ‘ecological savage’ (Hames, 2007: 177).

In conclusion, rather than sharpening ethnic boundaries, the politicization of indigeneity has led to a questioning of the basis of indigeneity and with it to a decline in levels of indigenousness as intra-indigenous divisions come to the fore. To remedy the situation, demands for a clear definition of IOC on the basis of either culture or biology have been voiced increasingly (for example,  

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76 The highland, traditional organization CONAMAQ is divided over the issue as to whether support lowland indigenous organizations or the MAS government (Tilley, 07.09.2011).

77 The Morales administration had distinguished itself as defender of the environment. The new constitution is the first worldwide to recognize and protect the rights of Mother Nature. In April 2010, the Morales administration had organized a ‘Climate Change Conference of the People’, in order to protest against the outcome of the climate change summit in Copenhagen in 2009, perceived to be insufficient and unfair (BIF, 2010a: 1).

78 See Chapter 1.
Zuazo Oblitas, 11.10.2011). The question whether such ethnic basis for affirmative action is more appropriate than a socio-economic basis shall be the topic of another work.
4. Indigenous Identification and Groupness

The emergence and evolution of cultural and political indigenous discourses in the new millennium has spurred changes in the political sphere, such as the inauguration of Bolivia’s first indigenous president and the authorization of a new constitution recognizing indigenous rights. But has the politicization of indigeneity led to the stabilization of ethnic boundaries, as feared by some students of ethnic conflict (see Chapter 1)? It is the aim of this chapter to analyze indigenous groupness; whether and, if so, among whom, there have been changes in indigenous and non-indigenous identification.

The discussion of the identity discourse in Chapter 3 showed that indigeneity was used often and variedly, but three main developments and their potential consequences for indigenous identification stand out. First, during the protest cycle from 2000 to 2005, indigeneity became increasingly salient and integrated into the changing notion of Bolivianhood as belonging to a plebeian people. Second, the events surrounding the December 2005 elections and Morales’ first years in office marked an increase in assertiveness of indigenous identity and of one wider indigenous community. Both developments point to a growing awareness and valuation of indigeneity in the public sphere and may thus have led to an increasing, or increasingly open, identification as indigenous among individual Bolivians. However, third, the overstatement of community contributed to rising tensions between different conceptions of indigeneity, particularly towards the adoption and implementation of the new constitution at the end of the decade. The growing contestation may have led to the stagnation if not weakening of indigenous identification. In particular, ensuing perceptions of Andean centrism may have led to a consolidation of boundaries between Andean and non-Andean Bolivians, reflected in a spatial distinction
between highland and lowland inhabitants as well as a cultural distinction between the Andean peoples Aymara and Quechua and other indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{79}

This chapter examines these hypotheses in two parts, taking up the distinction established in Chapter 2 between attributes and meaning as identification and cohesion. It does so through a quantitative analysis of LAPOP survey data collected bi-yearly between 1998 and 2010. For all analyses, controls were conducted, including demographic and socio-economic control variables, in order to ensure that the findings are not spurious. Details are reported where suitable. Although the analysis, due to its comparative nature, also allows inferences about the attitudes of those who identify as non-indigenous, I am here concerned with indigenous groupness, that is, with phenomena within the indigenous category. Otherness and nationness, on the other hand, will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Section 4.1 establishes whether there have been changes in the proportions as well as assertiveness of indigenous identification, and whether this differs according to ethnic attributes such as language or skin colour. It finds that such attributes are indeed indicators of identification but that in themselves they are not deterministic. Moreover, the section finds changes in ethnic identification that can be directly linked to the political identity discourse. There has been indeed an increase in the number of people who identify as indigenous, yet this increase may be due more to the inclusive discourse during the protest cycle, rather than due to the assertive discourse of Morales’ first years in presidency. Instead, the latter has given rise to more confident indigenous identification: to the extent someone identifies as indigenous or not. The results thus underline the importance of distinguishing between the attribute basis as well as ‘identification as’ and ‘identification with’ in the analysis of ethnic identification.

Section 4.2 examines the meaning attached to the indigenous category at the collective level by looking at indigenous cohesion: do self-identified indigenous Bolivians attach meaning to the wider, pan-indigenous community as such or are there clear boundaries between the respective members of different indigenous peoples? The section shows that the events surrounding

\textsuperscript{79} Chapter 3 also notes a distinction between peasant and traditional conceptions of indigeneity. With the present data, it is not possible to distinguish between these two dimensions, given that they strongly overlap in most characteristics reported. Moreover, analyses of ethnic identification according to occupation show that the peasant–non-peasant distinction is not significant when including controls and is therefore here not further considered. Besides Aymaras and Quechuas, the highland indigenous populations also include Urus. However, this population is relatively small and has not been separately considered in the surveys.
Morales’ election has not only given rise to more confident indigenous identification but also to an increased sense of cohesion among members of the diverse indigenous peoples as one community. Quarrels during the writing and implementation of the new constitution reversed this process, however, if they did not even further lessen this sense of community. Yet this development did not result in a highland–lowland indigenous division but rather in a stronger division between all indigenous peoples. The section thus lends support to the conclusions of Chapter 3 that the mobilization of indigenous identity may have backfired when it came to following promises with actions.

Last, Section 4.3 discusses the findings in the light of the theoretical and empirical literature on and beyond Bolivia. The analyses in this chapter contribute to the wider debate on the effects of ethnic politics: it shows that ethnic identifications do indeed change with changing political discourses; that they do so quicker than expected; and not necessarily in the manner as expected. This chapter thus demonstrates that it is not only valuable to examine identification as an outcome rather than to work on the basis of assumptions as to its stability or fluidity, but also that it is necessary to carefully distinguish different elements of identification in the process.

### 4.1 Changes in indigenous identification

The politicization of indigeneity as such but perhaps also the electoral success of one candidate with indigenous origins against the white–mestizo politicians of the traditional elite may have prompted changes in ethnic identification, putting an end to the marginalization of indigeneity. Now more Bolivians than before may identify (publicly) as indigenous and they may do so more assertively than before. In particular, following the discussions in Chapters 1 and 2, such changes may have been most prevalent among those possessing indigenous attributes, such as indigenous mother tongue or a darker skin colour. Each proposition is discussed in turn.

**Indigenous self-categorization**

One dimension, if not the precondition, of ethnic identification is self-categorization; counting oneself a member of a certain ethnic collective. Fittingly, the LAPOP surveys do not gauge ethnic identification according to ‘objective’ observation based on the interviewers’ judgements, but according to subjective membership based on self-categorization; not as it is assigned but as it is asserted. One question included in every survey round asked respondents whether they
consider themselves to be a member of one of the prevalent ethnic categories in Bolivia: ‘Do you consider yourself to be a racially white, mestizo, indigenous, or black person?’ In addition to the response possibilities offered in the question wording itself, respondents could also answer with cholo, other, or don’t know/no reply.\(^{80}\) The proportion of respondents in the latter category with 3.7 percent over all years is relatively small, indicating that the categories used indeed make sense to respondents (see also Burton et al., 2010: 1340). Yet it is also interesting to see that a small proportion of respondents is either unwilling or unable to categorize themselves.

The question’s advantages aside, it is necessary to recognize that its categorical nature describes ethnic identification in either/or terms and thus excludes the possibility that respondents may identify as a member of two or more categories (Burton et al., 2010: 1337; see also Moreno Morales, 2008b: 29–30). While it is not possible to test whether a reformulation would have led to different results, it is still feasible to arrive at conclusions of change over time based on this measure of ethnic identification. Moreover, a comparison with other measures used, described below, provides a suitable overview of ethnic identification in Bolivia. In this chapter, I will focus either on the three ethnic categories mestizo, white, and indigenous or on the distinction between non-indigenous (including mestizo and white) and indigenous.\(^{81}\)

LAPOP reports were criticized with regard to the proportions of ‘indigenous’ Bolivians found as they deviated considerably from the numbers attained during the official census of 2001; as we will see below, the proportions in LAPOP are smaller than the 62 percent gauged in the census (INE, 2001). In response, the team decided to replicate the census question in the surveys (Seligson, Moreno Morales, and Schwarz Blum, 2004: 36) – and found an even higher number of Bolivians identifying as indigenous than before. The difference between the LAPOP and the census measure thus cannot be explained through different population coverage but rather through differences in question wording.

The wording of the census question – ‘Do you consider yourself to belong to any of the following indigenous or original peoples?’ – has been a matter of debate, often with the background of disputing its outcome. Madrid (2006: 6) summarizes the criticisms made. First, he argues, the

\(^{80}\) Cholo refers to an ‘upwardly mobile urban Indian’ (Albro, 2010b: 153), although often used in a pejorative manner.

\(^{81}\) All survey items are listed in Table A1, Appendix III. For further details on the self-categorization variable, see Table A2, Appendix III.
question does not ask whether respondents identify as indigenous per se, but whether they identify with certain categories which are often clustered together as indigenous peoples, and Bolivians may be more willing to identify in such specific terms than as indigenous in general. This may be especially the case since the term indigenous often was and continues to be used in a pejorative manner (Albó, 2008: 14). Second, the response categories do not offer the option of identifying as mestizo which, Madrid speculates, may affect the outcome because Bolivians tend to choose this option if provided (see also Toranzo Roca, 2008: 38). Third, the only alternative to a number of specific indigenous peoples provided was the option ‘none’, which may have further encouraged respondents to choose one of the indigenous peoples if they could not deny their affiliation entirely (see also Moreno Morales, 03.10.2011; Zegada Claure, 04.10.2011). But this also means that the question does assess some feeling of belonging and, while keeping in mind that it captures a different aspect of ethnic identification than the self-categorization measure, above, it is thus possible to identify changes over time.

The following analyses consider ethnic identification according to both, self-categorization as indigenous (LAPOP question) and self-proclaimed belonging to an indigenous people (census question). Figure 4.1a presents the results of a frequency analysis for all available survey rounds. It shows that there have indeed been changes in ethnic identification, confirming the findings by Seligson et al. (2008) and Moreno Morales (2008b). Out of 22,201 valid responses over all seven survey rounds, about two-thirds of respondents identify themselves as mestizo. From 1998 to 2004, this value oscillates slightly between 59.8 and 65.8 percent and from 2004, it steadily increases to 72.7 percent in 2010. Contrary to what may have been expected from the political identity discourse – stressing indigeneity over mestizaje – then, the events of the last

82 This and all following graphs, if not stated differently, are elaborated by me on the basis of the LAPOP data, using SPSS 13; represent the date of the survey round as the x-axis; and, where error bars are depicted, represent a confidence level of 95 percent (or two standard errors), based on binomial probability distribution. The error bars make it possible to see at a glance whether differences between categories in the same year or differences within categories in different years are due to chance (overlapping error bars) or likely to be a true reflection of societal differences (non-overlapping error bars). For percentages, where error bars are missing they were omitted because they were very small. For means, exact values are given in a designated table in Appendix IV.

83 Results displayed are based on weighted samples to consider departmental stratification in the sampling design when making generalizations to the whole Bolivian population. As I have used different weightings than Seligson et al. and Moreno Morales, the exact numbers may differ slightly. Weightings were based on the nearest official population numbers from the National Statistics Institute for the survey rounds of 1998 to 2002, on the projected numbers for 2005 for the rounds of 2004 and 2006, and on the projected numbers for 2010 for the rounds of 2008 and 2010 (see INE, 1998, as cited in Seligson, 1998: 25; INE, 2001; INE, 2011).
decade did not result in a decreasing importance of the concept of mestizo; if anything, its importance seems to have increased.

Figure 4.1: Ethnic identification according to self-categorization and belonging

On the other hand, the proportion of self-categorizing white Bolivians has decreased over the last decade. Although this category constitutes with 24 percent nearly a quarter of respondents in 1998 and even experiences a small increase to 26.9 percent in 2000, the proportion then steadily decreases to 7.2 percent in 2010. This data indicates that, in Bolivia, the political and social mobilization of a marginalized ethnic category did not lead to a backlash in the form of a reinforcement of the historically opposite category. On the contrary, it has led to the rejection of the latter, at least by a sizeable proportion of the population.

This downward trend is opposed by an upward trend, though less steep, within the indigenous category. The proportion of self-categorizing indigenous Bolivians first oscillates around 12.5 percent between 1998 and 2002 but then increases considerably to 19.2 percent in 2004 and further to 21.1 percent in 2008. This overall trend in indigenous identification is confirmed when comparing the results of the census measure in the surveys with those of the official census in 2001: the reported feeling of belonging increases by about 10 percentage points until 2004.

The changes are more pronounced and statistically significant when controlling for demographic and socio-economic variation between samples in a series of binary logistic regressions (see Table A3, Appendix IV).
but then remains relatively stable (Figure 4.1b). The changes remain statistically significant when controlling for demographic and socio-economic variables in a series of binary logistic regressions.

Two main findings emerge. First, the increase in indigenous identification occurred relatively early on, between the rounds in 2002 and 2004. Referring back to the events of the decade, summarized in Table 4.1, the increase seems therefore more likely to be due to the inclusive discourse during the protest cycle in general and the Gas War in particular, than to the more assertive discourse surrounding the election of Morales to the presidency and the CA from 2006 onwards. That is, external acceptance of difference seems at least as, if not more, important for ‘recruitment’ to indigenous identification than internal assertion: barriers for identification may be lower. This holds both for belonging to a specific indigenous people as well as for self-categorization into a pan-indigenous identity category.

That external approval, here through the inclusive discourse, seems to be more important than internal assertion is all the more likely given the second finding: although the relative strength of assertion of indigeneity in the political discourse until at least 2008 suggested otherwise, the increase in indigenous self-categorization is not as sustained or clearly visible as the decrease in white self-categorization. The political discourse focused on the valuation of the indigenous led to the devaluation of its historical opposite, the white. Several interviewees report similar observations: whether whiteness is regarded as skin colour or based on cultural attributes, such as proximity to Spanish culture, identification as white has decreased (for example, Zuazo Oblitas, 11.10.2011; Loayza Bueno, 12.10.2011; Salazar de la Torre, 17.10.2011). The conception of being white has changed from being positively to negatively charged; a depreciation of one’s mestizo, if not indigenous, heritage is increasingly perceived to be racist (Schilling–Vacalflor, 20.09.2011). Indeed, those who still identify as white may do so more as a statement of political opposition to the Morales administration rather than as appreciation of one’s white biological and/or cultural heritage (Moreno Morales, 03.10.2011; Heins, 17.10.2011). In summary, then, the propensity to identify as indigenous (or not) or as white (or not) seems to depend more on what is perceived

85 While we cannot be certain that the difference is due to a change in feeling of belonging rather than due to differences in coverage, the former is more likely given that the sample of the official census equates to the population and that the sample of the LAPOP surveys is representative of the population. The changes remain statistically significant when including controls but are very small (see Table A4, Appendix IV).
to be acceptable by others rather than on high levels of assertion in political discourse, as was the case in the first years of Morales’ administration.

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<tr>
<th>events</th>
<th>time line</th>
<th>survey</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>August</td>
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<td>law for constituent assembly (CA)</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>survey 2006</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morales decrees state control of hydrocarbon industry</td>
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<td>elections for CA</td>
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<td>inauguration of CA in Sucre</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>begin of <em>Capitalía</em> protests in Sucre</td>
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<td>CA moves to Oruro, approves draft</td>
<td>December</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>indigenous government supporters attacked by anti-government protesters, Sucre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuellar elected as prefect of Chuquisaca</td>
<td>June</td>
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<tr>
<td>violent pro- and anti-government protests, Morales’ recall referendum</td>
<td>August</td>
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<tr>
<td>Massacre of Pando, declaration of state of emergency</td>
<td>September</td>
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<tr>
<td>congress approves modified constitutional draft</td>
<td>October</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>constitution approved in referendum</td>
<td>January</td>
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<tr>
<td>alleged assassination attempt on Morales, new electoral law passed</td>
<td>April</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morales decrees referendum on indigenous autonomy</td>
<td>August</td>
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<tr>
<td>presidential elections, sanctioned autonomy referenda</td>
<td>December</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Morales inaugurated for second term, autonomy law</td>
<td>January</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>local and departmental elections</td>
<td>April</td>
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<tr>
<td>indigenous community law</td>
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<td>law against racism and all forms of discrimination</td>
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Indigenous assertiveness

If assertiveness in the political discourse on indigeneity did not lead to an increase in the proportion of Bolivians self-identifying as indigenous, perhaps it increased the extent of identification among those who did. So far, both questions recorded only a yes/no response with regard to self-identification. A combination of both the self-categorization and the belonging measure may provide evidence of ‘graded indigeneity’ or assertiveness, with respondents falling into the indigenous category according to both question being the most assertively indigenous; those according to only one question moderately indigenous; and those according to neither question not at all indigenous (or, in the following, non-indigenous).

‘Moderate indigenous’ have also been referred to by some scholars as ‘indigenous mestizos’ (see Madrid, 2008: 420), yet interestingly, the graded distinction used here does not overlap completely with the indigenous–mestizo–white distinction from the self-categorization question: a comparison shows that while the majority of mestizos in all years do indeed consider themselves to belong to an indigenous people, and could thus be considered moderately indigenous, about one-third of mestizos do not. On the other hand, there are also whites who report feeling belonging to an indigenous people. In 2004, these are almost half of all white respondents. The balance tips in favour of no belonging in 2006 before returning to an equal distribution in 2008.\footnote{Details not reported.} Overall, this confirms that there is considerable heterogeneity not only among indigenous but also among mestizo and white Bolivians. Toranzo Roca (2008: 35) arrives at a similar conclusion, arguing for the use of the term ‘mestizajes’, in the plural.

In contrast to the self-categorization and belonging items as binary measure of identification, their combination into indigenous assertiveness introduces a means to assess a degree of identification. A depiction of proportions of Bolivians identifying either most, moderately, or not at all as indigenous shows that there are hardly any differences within categories across time (Figure 4.2a).\footnote{Changes are more pronounced when controlling for between-sample variation in background variables (see Table A5, Appendix IV). Since between-sample variation does not affect the variables of interest, further controls are not reported.} The only significant change is a decrease among moderately assertive indigenous
between 2004 and 2006, with people seeming to have moved to either most or not indigenous as both categories show a slight but significant increase; this suggests a short polarization of identifications before the trend reverses again in 2008 and 2010. In other words, although admittedly without data from before 2004, it seems that the more assertive indigenous discourse surrounding Morales’ election had an effect beyond that of the inclusive discourse of the protest cycle: some Bolivians are now more assertively indigenous than before, while others are now more assertively non-indigenous than before. Besides having a reassuring effect on indigenous-inclined Bolivians, it thus also seems to have had an exclusive effect on others.

**Figure 4.2: Indigenous assertiveness and dress according to self-categorization and belonging**

- **a) indigenous assertiveness**
  - 2004: 20%
  - 2006: 22%

- **b) indigenous dress according to self-categorization**
  - 1998: 10%
  - 2000: 12%
  - 2002: 15%
  - 2004: 18%
  - 2006: 20%

- **c) indigenous dress according to belonging**
  - 2004: 10%
  - 2006: 12%

Another means of assessing individual indigenous assertion is the respondent’s manner of dress. The surveys from 1998 to 2006 include the interviewers’ categorization of the respondents’ dress as either Western or indigenous. The results of a crosstabulation of dress and indigenous identification show that, unsurprisingly, indigenous identifiers are at all times more likely than non-indigenous identifiers to wear indigenous dress, yet even among the latter a small proportion does so. Dress thus seems an unreliable indicator of ethnic identification, particularly among
those expressing a feeling of belonging to an indigenous people (Figure 4.2c) as opposed to those categorizing themselves as indigenous (Figure 4.2b) (see also Seligson, 2000: 18).

Over time, however, the trends for self-categorization as indigenous and non-indigenous are similar, with no sign of a rise in assertiveness in either category. When distinguishing according to belonging, on the other hand, it becomes clear that there is a widening gap between the numbers of those who do report a feeling of belonging and those who do not. That is, at least in 2006 the former increasingly asserted their indigenous identification through the wearing of indigenous dress, whereas the latter seemed unaffected by the current political context. However, even the assertion among the former may well be a rather superficial one: Schilling–Vacaflor (20.09.2011) notes the increasing adoption of folkloric elements of the various indigenous cultures such as dress, music, or dances, as opposed to, for example, more profound political or economic elements.

Overall, the relatively high levels of indigenous assertiveness in the political discourse surrounding the general elections in 2005 are thus indeed associated with changes in individual assertiveness of one’s indigenous identification. Some are now more and some less assertively indigenous than before, suggesting that the discourse had a slightly polarizing effect on Bolivians. Yet the polarization is much smaller than what would have been expected from the rather pessimistic accounts discussed in Chapter 1, and the effect did not extend beyond 2006.

*Indigenous identification: Among whom?*

In addition to examining whether there have been changes in indigenous identification, it is interesting to see among whom these changes occurred. If contestation of indigenous content and thus boundary permeability is reduced, as arguably happens through the politicization of ethnicity (see Chapter 1), this should become evident when looking at attributes associated with the ethnic distinction: indigenous identification should have increased among those who possess said attributes, such as language or skin tone, and decreased among those who do not. Unfortunately, the LAPOP surveys only record as attributes the respondents’ native language over several rounds. They do so by asking which language has been spoken at home during child-
Figure 4.3: Indigenous self-categorization and belonging according to language category

Figure 4.3 depicts the proportions of indigenous identification within each language category for the years for which the combined data is available. Four findings emerge from this figure. First, the differences between the language categories within a single year for both the self-categorization and the belonging measure show that language does play a role in determining identification in Bolivia: the proportion of indigenous identification is highest among monolingual indigenous-language speakers and lowest among monolingual Spanish speakers. However, language itself is not a sufficient determinant, given that some Spanish speakers identify as indigenous, too.

Second, the proportion of indigenous identifiers is much higher in all language categories according to belonging than according to self-categorization. Indeed, almost all of those who grew up speaking an indigenous language, whether mono- or multilingual, report a feeling of belong-

88 In 2004 and 2010, only one answer was permitted, not allowing a distinction between multilingual speakers and monolingual Spanish or indigenous-language speakers.
ing to an indigenous people, suggesting that this measure of identification may capture a cultural dimension of indigeneity.

Third, the overall trend shows that the proportion of indigenous self-categorization increases in all three language categories, even if the year-to-year change among monolingual indigenous-language speakers seems rather unsystematic. The political discourse does not seem to have had a differential effect on members of the different language categories; there is no decrease in the contestation of the category’s content, but also no increase.

In contrast, fourth, according to belonging, the proportion of indigenous identification only changes significantly among monolingual Spanish speakers. The increase within this category suggests that, at least between 2006 and 2008, the discourse has had an inclusive effect among Spanish speakers, leading them to reconsider their heritage. This in turn suggests a rising contestation of indigeneity: it is not as necessary anymore to speak an indigenous language in order to identify as indigenous. This result mirrors those by Toranzo Roca (2008: 38) and Klein (2009: 149–150) who argue that indigenous identification seem to have become increasingly decoupled from language. In summary, then, language in Bolivia is an important but not sufficient determinant for cultural indigenous identification, and its importance has decreased in the last years.

Besides the linguistic–cultural dimension, indigeneity also has a racial dimension, resulting from the distinction between the light-skinned Spanish colonial elite and the darker-skinned colonized population. A comparison of identification according to skin tone can tell us whether, and to what extent, this attribute is of import for indigenous identification. Unfortunately, skin tone was only recorded in the survey round of 2010 but while an analysis over time is thus not possible, the data allows inferences on the importance of skin tone most recently. It was recorded as observed by the interviewer on a scale from 1 (light-skinned) to 11 (dark-skinned).

Figure 4.4 depicts the proportions of most, moderately, and non-indigenous according to skin tone. Clear trends are discernable, confirming that indigenous identification is indeed associated with skin tone. A majority of respondents with light skin (1 and 2) identifies as non-indigenous, and with darkening of skin tone, this proportion is steadily decreasing. For the medium tones (3

89 For the present analysis, the values 10 and 11 are omitted as they are occupied by Afro-Bolivians, who are not considered in this thesis.
to 7), the majority of respondents identifies moderately assertively as indigenous, whereas for the darker skin tones (8 and 9), the majority identifies most assertively as indigenous. However, Figure 4.4 also shows that there are some light-skinned Bolivians identifying as indigenous and some dark-skinned Bolivians who do not; ethnic boundaries are relatively porous.

Thus, identification according to language and skin tone shows that both classes of attributes are indeed indicators of indigenous identification but that they are not deterministic of it. In addition, members of the distinct language categories do not seem to have been affected differently by the political context; ethnic boundaries are thus not only porous but also do not seem to have become stronger with the politicization of indigeneity.

![Figure 4.4: Indigenous assertiveness according to skin tone, 2010](image)

In conclusion, while the inclusive discourse during the protest cycle helped to activate indigenous identification for more Bolivians, the more assertive indigenous discourse surrounding Morales’ election helped to raise the assertiveness of identification. However, these changes are not bound to specific ethnic attributes. Linking these results back to the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, we can make at least three observations: politics does matter for ethnic identification; ethnic identification can or should indeed be distinguished according to ‘identification as’ and ‘identification with’; and both types of identification may be distinct responses to different discourses.

At the same time as the identity discourses seemed to have a reassuring and/or conducive effect on indigenous identification, they appear to have had an exclusive effect on those not identify-
ing as indigenous. Less Bolivians identify as white, although it is not clear whether this is in response to decreasing levels of acceptance to do so or rather due to increasing levels of acceptance to identify as non-white. On the other hand, those who identify as non-indigenous do so more assertively in 2006 than in 2004, suggesting a growing gap between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians. All in all, however, the exclusionary effect is different to and much smaller than what would have been expected from some reports of, for instance, a white backlash (for example, Fuentes, 29.04.2008; Ross, 01.10.2008). Chapter 5 investigates the consequences of both indigenous and non-indigenous identification further but before that, a closer look at collective identification is called for.

4.2 Changes in indigenous cohesion

Just as the political events over the last decade have changed patterns of ethnic identification in Bolivia, they may also have affected cohesion among self-identified indigenous Bolivians. In particular, the events surrounding the general elections in 2005 and the inauguration of the CA may have increased any feeling of indigenous community among its members, whereas the disputes ensuing during and in the wake of the CA may have affected it adversely. The following analyses support these hypotheses. However, the latter years do not seem to have led to a highland–lowland polarization, as the charges of Andean centrism would have suggested, but to a general factionalism among the distinct indigenous peoples.

Indigenous community

Above, I have examined categorical measures of identification, establishing whether or not respondents identify as indigenous and whether or not they do so in different circumstances. While these measures tap individual assertiveness of indigeneity, that is, whether and to what extent somebody is willing to publicly identify as indigenous in one way or another, they do not reveal to what extent he or she identifies as indigenous, that is, as a member of a wider, indigenous community. This can be achieved by gauging the affiliation to indigenous peoples potentially different of one’s own.

In 2004 to 2010, the LAPOP surveys asked all respondents to which extent they feel attachment to Aymara and Quechua cultures (but unfortunately not lowland indigenous peoples’ cultures). With responses recorded on a seven-point Likert scale, from 1 denoting ‘not at all’ to 7 denoting
‘very much’, these questions go beyond the either/or conception of ethnicity (see also Moreno Morales, 2008b: 33–34). The following analysis examines attachment to Aymara and Quechua cultures according to indigenous assertiveness in order to determine, if only tentatively, whether there have been changes in the level of cohesion among the members of different indigenous peoples as one indigenous community. To ascertain that attachment, and changes in attachment, to the respective cultures is not a Bolivian-wide phenomenon, this is compared to the extent to which self-identified non-indigenous Bolivians are reporting attachment.

![Figure 4.5: Attachment to Aymara and Quechua cultures according to indigenous assertiveness](image)

Between 2004 and 2006, there has been an increase in attachment to Aymara and Quechua culture among the most and moderately assertive indigenous, whereas levels of cultural attachment remained roughly the same among non-indigenous Bolivians during the this period (Figure 4.5a–b).\(^90\) Although the changes are rather small and we lack information on cultural attachment before 2004, most increases are statically significant and suggest that the events surrounding the general elections of December 2005 may indeed have created a common feeling of indigenousness.

However, this feeling of indigenousness did not endure. With the exception of attachment to Aymara culture among the most assertively indigenous, levels of attachment dropped consid-

\(^{90}\) The standard errors are very small and the error bars thus omitted. For significance values, see Table A6, Appendix IV.
erably within all three categories between 2006 and 2008 and only within the two indigenous categories recovered somewhat until 2010. In other words, the disputes within and outside the CA towards the end of 2007 seem not only to have led to disillusionment but indeed to have weakened indigenous cohesion more fundamentally. What is more, they seem to have further estranged non-indigenous Bolivians from Aymara and Quechua culture.

**Andean centrism: Identification according to location**

Yet what if the above analysis does not gauge indigenous cohesiveness as such but only attachment to Aymara and Quechua peoples in particular? This is likely, given that Chapter 3 had found that the discourse surrounding indigeneity, particularly in the later years, was or at least was perceived to be influenced by an Andean conception of it. If there is resentment against Andean conceptions of indigeneity, attachment to the cultures of the Andean peoples Aymara and Quechua would be affected. The following analysis determines whether this is reflected in patterns of self-categorization as indigenous and attachment to the Andean indigenous cultures: were highland Bolivians more strongly, or differently, affected by the political discourse than lowland Bolivians? Were those feeling belonging to the Aymara or Quechua peoples more strongly, or differently, affected by the political discourse than those feeling belonging to other peoples? Before ascertaining whether attachment to these cultures differs according to indigenous people, let’s begin with an analysis of patterns of identification according to location of residence.

![Figure 4.6: Indigenous self-categorization and belonging in the highlands and lowlands](image-url)
b) self-categorization

If we accept the analyses above as evidencing an effect of the indigenous political discourse on ethnic identification and if the discourse was indeed perceived to be Andean-centric by parts of the Bolivian population, trends of indigenous identification should differ between the highlands and lowlands. Figure 4.6b shows that according to self-categorization, while in every survey round the proportion of Bolivians identifying as indigenous is significantly higher in the highlands than in the lowlands, the trend over time is similar, not supporting the hypothesis that the discourse has affected the highland and lowland population differently. That is, this holds with the exception of the year 2010, where the error bars show that the proportion in indigenous identification in the lowlands experiences a significant decrease while that in the highlands remains roughly the same. The widened gap suggests that in particular the more recent debates surrounding the passing as well as implementation of the new constitution have disillusioned the lowland population. In other words, in the lowlands there is not only less cohesion among the members of different indigenous peoples towards the wider indigenous community, but also less ‘interest’ into identifying as indigenous according to self-categorization.

However, this development is not mirrored for belonging, where there are no changes in the differences between the highland and lowland populations (Figure 4.6a).\footnote{Instead, the proportion of the population reporting a feeling of belonging to an indigenous people plummets earlier, between 2004 and 2006. A repetition of the analysis with the category indigenous disaggregated into four peoples shows that this is most likely the result of lowlanders switching from ‘other native’ to ‘no indigenous people’.} Thus, the analysis shows a small decline in self-categorization as indigenous in the lowland departments, which is however not enough to renounce completely some feeling of belonging.\footnote{The analysis of indigenous assertiveness according to location is omitted, as it does not add any new information.}

\footnotetext[1]{Instead, the proportion of the population reporting a feeling of belonging to an indigenous people plummets earlier, between 2004 and 2006. A repetition of the analysis with the category indigenous disaggregated into four peoples shows that this is most likely the result of lowlanders switching from ‘other native’ to ‘no indigenous people’.}

\footnotetext[2]{The analysis of indigenous assertiveness according to location is omitted, as it does not add any new information.}
If there are only small differences between highlands and lowlands in the identification as member of the overall indigenous category, there are perhaps differences in the identification with the specific highland indigenous cultures. Figure 4.7a–b depicts the association between highland and lowland residence and attachment to Aymara and Quechua culture. For both, it shows a slight increase in 2006 and a drop in 2008, much more pronounced among the residents of the lowlands. And although attachment in the lowland increases again in 2010, this increase is only very small and the gap between highland and lowland remains wider than before. That is, the latter years have indeed seen a decreasing attachment to Andean indigenous culture within the lowland population.

*Figure 4.7: Attachment to Aymara and Quechua culture according to location*

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**Andean centrism: Indigenous community**

Another way to assess potential effects of perception of Andean centrism is to examine whether changes in the proportions of self-categorization as indigenous per se differ between Bolivians reporting a feeling of belonging to typically Andean peoples, like the Aymaras or Quechuas, versus non-Andean peoples like the Guarani. Figure 4.8a–b shows the results. After an increase in indigenous identification among all but the Quechuas between 2004 and 2006, there has indeed been a decrease among Guaranís (and a less marked one among other natives) until 2010, while the proportions of indigenous remained relatively stable among both Quechuas and

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93 See Table A7, Appendix IV.
Aymaras. That is, while the sense of an indigenous community indeed increased within all categories around the time of Morales’ election, confirming the finding of increased cohesion (above), in the later years it seems that more highland indigenous, and in particular Aymaras, are more assertive and attach meaning to the overall category indigenous than lowland indigenous.

Figure 4.8: Indigenous self-categorization according to belonging (disaggregated)

a) belonging to highland peoples

b) belonging to lowland peoples

Figure 4.9: Attachment to Aymara and Quechua culture according to belonging (disaggregated)

a) Aymara culture

b) Quechua culture

94 The low-level stability among the Quechuas suggests that there is a relatively low level of ‘indigenousness’ among them, matching Moreno Morales’ (03.10.2011) suspicions that they are a loose linguistic rather than a ‘proper’ ethnic category.
Similarly, a comparison of the associations between feeling of belonging to the diverse indigenous peoples and attachment to Aymara and Quechua culture shows a slight increase in 2006 and a clear decrease among all but Aymaras and Quechuas, respectively, in 2008 (Figure 4.9a–b). These last two analyses lend further support to the hypothesis that the events surrounding Morales’ election increased a sense of community among all indigenous, which however decreased again following the quarrels in the CA. The later analysis suggests, however, that this was not necessarily due to a perception of Andean centrism among lowland Bolivians but rather due to a more general increase in factionalism: attachment to Aymara culture decreases also among Quechuas and vice versa.

In summary, the events of the last four years may not have led to a decline in identification as indigenous but they did lead to a decline in the perception of one wider indigenous community. The sense of community among indigenous, strengthened with Morales’ electoral success, was weakened again following the debates surrounding the passing and implementation of the new constitution, lending support to the considerations of Chapter 3 that the mobilization of indigenous identity in the first half of the decade may have backfired when it came to following promises with actions. Yet the latter years did not pit highland versus lowland indigenous but rather resulted in a stronger division between all indigenous peoples. What is more, they seem to have further estranged non-indigenous Bolivians, particularly in the lowlands, from Aymara and Quechua culture.

4.3 Conclusions

The politicization of ethnicity is often linked to the activation of ethnic identification and with it of in-group favouritism, if not also of out-group discrimination. It was the aim of this chapter to examine the first of these consequences; whether the political discourse on indigeneity in Bolivia has had an effect on indigenous groupness. Following the analytical framework set out in Chapter 2, I quantitatively examined two main facets of indigenousness. First, I looked at changes in indigenous identification at the individual level. Here I distinguished between attributes as the basis of indigenous identification and (the extent of) identification as such; in other words, whether individual Bolivians attach any meaning to the indigenous category and whether this is

95 See Table A8, Appendix IV.
based on the characteristics attributed to the category. Second, I analyzed changes in indigenous identification at the collective level, probing whether and to what extent Bolivians have a sense of a wider indigenous community.

The results confirm and complement the findings of the qualitative analysis in Chapter 3. Section 4.1 on individual indigenous identification affirms that the attributes of indigeneity are not clearly defined but that nevertheless a considerable share of the Bolivian population identify as such: language and skin tone may, on average, indicate but do not completely determine identification. Some monolingual Spanish speakers and light-skinned Bolivians identify as indigenous, some monolingual indigenous-language speakers and dark-skinned Bolivians do not. The politicization of indigeneity has not led to a sharpening of the boundary; if anything, it has become even more blurred as Bolivians with traditionally non-indigenous attributes increasingly identify as indigenous. However, unlike Chapter 3 may have led to conclude, indigenous identification did not increase following the election of Morales and the more assertive discourse of indigeneity during his first term, but already during the more inclusive discourse of the protest cycle leading up to the election. The assertive discourse, in contrast, increased the extent to which individual Bolivians identified as indigenous as well as non-indigenous. ‘Identification as’ and ‘identification with’ thus indeed follow different dynamics.

The analysis of indigenous cohesion in Section 4.2 also links with the findings from Chapter 3. The election of Morales had indeed led to a small increase in a sense of a wider, pan-indigenous community. Yet this sense weakened again from at least 2008 onwards, during the disputes surrounding the passing and implementation of the new constitution and the accompanying increase in contestation regarding indigeneity. The sense of community did not only weaken among lowland indigenous, who may have felt excluded by what was perceived to be increasingly Andean-centrist politics, but also among highland indigenous Bolivians. The emphasis on indigeneity thus has not led to the blurring but the sharpening of internal heterogeneity.

The findings may be criticized on three grounds: the quality of the data, the interpretation of the data, and the inferences made regarding the relationship between political context and identification. First, there may be problems with the measurement of indigenous identification as such. Most of this chapter’s work is based on survey questions which allow for identification only in fixed and categorical terms. Questions which allow for multiple and graded responses would be
better suited to examine the contingent nature of identification (see also Lee, 2012). Unfortunately, such data is not available for Bolivia.

In addition, it may be argued that both question and response wording changed over time, adversely affecting the comparability of the outcomes in time. Yet changes in indigenous identification were not only found in the LAPOP data. The UNIR Foundation (Fundación Universidad Internacional de la Rioja; UNIR, 2008a: 8) conducted its own surveys of 1,800 respondents each in 2006 and 2008, including questions on self-categorization and belonging similar, but not identical, to those used in the LAPOP surveys. Although the UNIR question on self-categorization neither explicitly referred to race in either year, as LAPOP had done in 2006, nor included categories such as cholo or mulatto, as LAPOP had done varying, the overall results are similar: in 2006, 68.9 percent self-categorized as mestizo, 18.1 percent as indigenous, and 11.1 percent as white, shifting to 73.3 percent, 17 percent, and 9.4 percent, respectively, in 2008. The percentage of Bolivians feeling belonging to an indigenous people is slightly lower in the UNIR than the LAPOP surveys (65.5 and 67 percent in 2006 and 2008, respectively), yet this may be due to the exclusively urban coverage of the former.

Second, other objections may be based on the interpretation of the data used. Towards the beginning of this chapter, I considered the differences between self-categorization and belonging which, amongst others, may result from the different uses of the term indigenous in the question: the self-categorization question asked for categorization as indigenous as such, whereas the belonging question only asked about belonging to specific peoples, then often clustered together by the researcher as indigenous. In other words, we may say that the latter refers to specific indigenous identity categories, such as Aymara or Guaraní, whereas the former may be perceived as asking for a pan-indigenous identity category and thus as referring to a differently bound collective. In this case, self-categorization would be a measure of cohesion. However, two observations make this interpretation less likely. First, self-categorization and cohesion as measured here develop differently over time, with an earlier increase in the former and a subsequent decrease in the latter while the former remains stable. Second, the proportion in belonging increases at about the same time as that in self-categorization. It is therefore less

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96 Thanks to the participants of the conference ‘Ethnic Politics and Electoral Democracy’, University of Zurich, June 2012, for nudging me to clarify this point.
likely that self-categorization is perceived to refer to a pan-indigenous collective than to an individual identification.

Finally, it may be argued that the changes in indigenous identification may not be the result of the political context, as posited here, but instead of other unobserved causes. Given that neither the political context nor, for example, economic factors were quantified and included in the data analysis this may indeed be the case, but is highly unlikely. The qualitative analysis did not give rise to any alternative explanations for the wide-spread changes in identification and, on the contrary, complements the inferences drawn from the quantitative data very well. While, as always, a more nuanced and detailed analysis may be desirable, the existing qualitative and quantitative data, if limited, indicate differences and trends in indigenous identification over time that can be clearly linked to the political discourses of the decade.

From this analysis of Bolivia, two wider conclusions can be drawn for the study of ethnopolitics. First, the chapter shows not only that political processes affect ethnic identification but also that they do so relatively quickly, at least in the Latin American context. While the fluidity of ethnic identification here has long been recognized (see Chapter 1), the speed and extent of change is remarkable and should serve as incentive to empirically examine ethnic identification as outcome, and not only as cause, of political and social processes in other contexts as well.

Second, the chapter suggests that ethnic identification is multi-faceted and that it is important to distinguish between its different elements when examining the effects of ethnic politics, given that the (limited) facets considered here reacted differently to changing discourses. In particular, the findings confirm the theoretical considerations of Chapter 2 that ethnic attributes; meaning attached to these attributes, whether at the individual or collective level; and action based on these meanings are not necessarily as clearly linked as sometimes suggested. The latter claim will be further examined with regard to otherness and nationness in Chapter 5.
5. Consequences of Identification for Groupness, Otherness, and Nationness

Indigenous mobilization may not only have had cognitive consequences, changing how Bolivians see themselves. Indeed, the long-lasting success of Morales and the MAS and the refounding of the country through a new constitution, on the one hand, and the increasingly frequent and violent clashes between government supporters and opponents, on the other hand, signal more far-reaching consequences in both the social and the political sphere. First, increased ethnic awareness may have affected citizens’ political choices, now coloured by communal considerations: support for indigenous collective rights as well as indigenous representation may have increased.

Second, with in-group mobilization of indigenous inhabitants, a discourse on the out-group – the non-indigenous population – became salient. While Quispe’s rather radical indianist narrative of the ‘two Bolivias’ did not seem to attract many followers, it did gain some currency, and – at the latest during the negotiations towards the new constitution – charges of ‘reversed racism’ became louder. The non-indigenous population may thus perceive the political mobilization of indigenous Bolivians to mark not only the emancipation of a previously marginalized population but, at the same time, as a threat to themselves, worsening ethnic relations.

Third, critics of the developments in the country repeatedly voiced concerns that the politicization of identification undermines the feeling of belonging to an overall national community as Bolivians. Both indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians may therefore feel less attached to the Bolivian community, if they support a continued political alliance at all.

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This chapter analyzes these three potential consequences consecutively. Section 5.1 extends the analysis of groupness in Chapter 4, which covered attributes and meaning, to the element of action. It examines the extent to which self-identified indigenous Bolivians back an indigenous political agenda, supporting the indigenous movement as well as the introduction of collective rights. It finds that political action in Bolivia is only to some extent affected by indigenous identification. Echoing the findings of the previous chapter, this section shows that, while ethnic biases do persist in political opinion, they are by no means as pronounced as may have been expected from the observations of political violence particularly during the second half of the decade.

Section 5.2 then moves to the analysis of otherness, examining whether in-group identification and cohesion affect perceptions of the respective out-group. The analysis suggests that racist attitudes are alive and well in Bolivia, especially among Bolivians identifying themselves as non-indigenous. But the negative perception of the other is mutual: self-identified indigenous Bolivians trust members of non-indigenous categories less than others. In addition, there is some evidence that these reciprocal feelings of otherness have increased somewhat during 2008, concomitant with the tensions that came with the protracted negotiations for the new constitution and the violent episodes on the streets. Overall, however, these attitudes do not seem to be consequential for the political sphere, as they are not widely reflected in political opinion and electoral choice.

Finally, Section 5.3 examines Bolivian nationness: whether and to what extent national identification has been affected by the developments of the past years. This section finds that, despite an increase in indigenous identification over the years, identification as Bolivian did not decrease. On the contrary, it increased among indigenous Bolivians, which strongly suggests that national and sub-national identification are not mutually exclusive. Neither did national identification decrease among the non-indigenous population, which offers additional support for this conclusion and further shows that national identification is not necessarily a zero-sum game.

Overall then, the political indigenous identity discourse has not had a considerable and lasting effect on ethnic relations, despite the noticeable changes in self-identification as described in Chapter 4. The sections in the present chapter thus demonstrate once more the importance of conceptually and analytically disaggregating the notion of ethnicity and ethnic relations: identification is not necessarily connected with in-group favouritism, nor does out-group prejudice
necessarily result in political discrimination. And contrary to conventional convictions, subnational and national identifications may be strong at the same time. These issues are discussed further in Section 5.4, which concludes this chapter.

5.1 Indigenous mobilization: Action based on identification

The first set of consequences of indigenous identification considered here still concerns groupness. Besides attributes of an ethnic category and the meanings attached to it, as examined in Chapter 4, the analytical framework of Chapter 2 also includes action based on this meaning, moving from the psychological or sociological to the political: to what extent does identification motivate behaviour? Here, behaviour is not examined directly. Instead, I analyze support for traditional indigenous institutions, for indigenous community rights, as well as for the political indigenous movement. Such an analysis allows inferences as to whether Bolivians support only the cultural or ‘folkloric’ side of indigeneity, as suggested in Chapter 4, or whether they indeed support a more profound version of indigeneity.

In the analysis, each dependent variable is examined for differences according to indigenous self-categorization and/or assertiveness in general, depending on the availability of data. Note that the respective questions did not specify certain traditions or peoples; the surveys used the collective term ‘indigenous’, confirming that it has some currency in Bolivia. With few exceptions, none of the questions were asked in more than one or two rounds. The following analyses thus attempt to extract a trend from this episodical data. They show that political opinion is indeed guided by ethnic identification, but more so in the perception of the indigenous movements’ impact than with regard to indigenous rights as such.

Traditional indigenous institutions

An individual’s extent of ethnic groupness is reflected in the confidence had in and the actual use made of traditional institutions. Three survey questions enquired about the respondents’ relations to traditional indigenous institutions: they asked for the extent of their confidence in indigenous authorities; whether they had ever asked an indigenous authority for help; and to what extent they have confidence in indigenous community justice. The first question – confi-

97 Due to the limited scope of this work, distinctions within the indigenous populations are no longer considered.
dence in indigenous authorities – was asked in all survey rounds from 1998 to 2008 and is here analyzed according to indigenous assertiveness as well as to self-categorization, given that the former variable is only available from 2004 onwards.

Figure 5.1a displays mean levels of confidence in indigenous authorities. It shows that, in general, indigenous and non-indigenous identifiers are relatively close to each other but that from around 2004 onwards the gap is widening, primarily due to a rise in confidence among indigenous respondents. This is confirmed by a comparison of confidence levels according to assertiveness (Figure 5.1b): there is a steady rise among the most assertively indigenous, while the moderately and non-indigenous, closer to each other than to the most indigenous, experience a rise only between 2004 and 2006, followed by a decrease between 2006 and 2008. These developments suggest that the events surrounding the inauguration of Morales in 2006 affected not only indigenous but all Bolivians’ confidence in indigenous authorities positively but that only among the former this effect persisted. Moreover, this only holds for those being assertive of their indigenous identification, not for those mainly reporting some form of feeling of belonging to an indigenous people.

From 1998 to 2006, the surveys also asked the respondents whether they have ever requested help from an indigenous authority. Figure 5.1c compares the responses according to indigenous self-categorization. It shows a relatively large and consistent gap between the proportions of indigenous and non-indigenous identifiers who have asked for help, with the former, unsurprisingly, displaying a higher proportion than the latter; on average, around 10 percent more indigenous have asked an indigenous authority for help. Requests increased between 2000 and 2002 among both indigenous and non-indigenous identifiers, but the number decreases again to former levels in 2004. Over time, there is a slight decrease in requests, and while more indigenous than non-indigenous identifiers have asked for help, between 9 and 16.6 percent of non-indigenous identifiers did so too, showing that boundaries do exist but remain porous with regard to action as well with regard to attributes (Chapter 4).

98 The differences hold when controlling for education, income, political ideology, highland–lowland, and urbanization. Since background variables do not considerably affect the outcomes in question, these and further controls are not detailed.

99 See Table A9, Appendix IV.

100 The nature of these requests was not specified.
Finally, Figure 5.1d displays mean levels of confidence in indigenous community justice, only asked in 2010, according to indigenous assertiveness. In general, Bolivians are moderately confident in indigenous community justice, with an overall mean of 3.53 on a seven-point scale. However, among the most assertively indigenous the mean is significantly higher than that

101 Similar to the other Likert scales used in the survey, 1 denotes 'none' and 7 denotes 'very much'.
among the moderately assertive and non-indigenous Bolivians. The latter do not differ significantly from each other. That the levels of moderately indigenous are closer to non- than to most indigenous supports Schilling-Vacaflor’s (20.09.2011) suggestion that for many the adoption of indigenous culture is more of a folkloristic rather than substantial nature, a suggestion further supported by the attitudinal differences with regard to indigenous authorities, as seen above. Overall, then, when it comes to support for indigenous traditions, the distinction lies between those with a strong sense of indigenous identification and all others, although the boundary here is neither strict, nor does it seem to have changed considerably over time.

Support for indigenous rights

Besides support for traditional indigenous institutions, an analysis of attitudes towards indigenous rights can provide further information on support for political action among indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians. The surveys questioned respondents about different sets of collective rights from 2004 onwards, yet again rarely were the same questions asked more than once. The questions concerned territorial, language, and autonomy rights, each of which will be discussed in turn.

The 2004 survey asked the respondents whether they think that the Bolivian territory belongs to indigenous peoples or whether everybody has the same right to it. A minority of respondents believe that the Bolivian territory belongs to indigenous peoples; in total only 8.3 percent of respondents approve of this statement. When controlling for demographic and socio-economic variables, the most assertively indigenous respondents are significantly and quite considerably more likely to say that Bolivian territory belongs to indigenous peoples than non-indigenous respondents, suggesting some in-group favouritism. Yet this relationship is affected by residence: everything else constant, the odds of lowland Bolivians to approve of the above statement are more than three times as high as those of highland Bolivians. The bias is hence less likely to be a response to indigenous mobilization (in 2004 more prevalent in the highlands) than to economic struggle about land rights (more prevalent in the lowlands).

In 2004 and 2006, the surveys also asked a series of questions about language rights: whether the number of radio and TV programmes in indigenous languages should be raised; whether in-

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102 See Table A12, Appendix IV.
indigenous languages should be taught at school; and whether civil servants should be required to speak an indigenous language. This last question has only been asked in 2004. When comparing mean approval according to levels of indigenous assertiveness, the means are very high within all three categories, although that among the most assertively indigenous Bolivians is significantly but only slightly higher than that among non-indigenous Bolivians. There are also no significant changes between 2004 and 2006 (see Table 5.1). Thus, indigenous levels of support for language rights are neither extraordinarily high, nor have they increased with the election of Morales, not showing any signs of heightened indigenous groupness with regard to communal mobilization. It is worth noting here that in March 2012, a bill has been passed stipulating that every civil servant has to be able to speak an official language, in addition to Spanish (ABI, 06.04.2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>radio and TV</th>
<th>teaching</th>
<th>civil service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>most</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>5.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>5.50*</td>
<td>5.59*</td>
<td>5.73*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not at all</td>
<td>5.20**</td>
<td>5.18**</td>
<td>5.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>5.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. difference to category ‘most’: * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.001, “ not significant
b. differences between 2004 and 2006 within categories not significant

Last, in both 2008 and 2010, the surveys included questions on indigenous autonomy, though in different formats and hence not directly comparable. The 2008 question asked whether respondents thought that indigenous autonomy will be something positive. The proportions of most, moderately, and non-indigenous differ clearly and significantly, with 45.5 percent of most indigenous versus 23.9 percent of non-indigenous seeing indigenous autonomy as a positive development (Figure 5.2a). In 2010, the question was reworded to ask for the extent to which indigenous autonomies will be positive for the country. Here, too, we can see a significant difference between the most assertively indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians, with the former leaning more towards ‘very positive’ (mean=4.59) and the latter more towards a neutral stance

103 When including controls in a binary logistic regression, the change from 2004 to 2006 within moderate and non-indigenous becomes significant, but remains very small (results not shown).
(mean=3.78) (Figure 5.2b). When including controls, the differences remain but are less pronounced. Thus, some differences with regard to attitudes to collective rights according to ethnic category are identifiable, with indigenous respondents being more supportive. Although these findings support the theoretical claims associating the politicization of ethnicity with mobilization for communal rights, the effect sizes are fairly small; by far not all indigenous Bolivians back an indigenous political agenda and not all non-indigenous Bolivians oppose it.

Figure 5.2: Positive perception of indigenous autonomy according to indigenous assertiveness

Confidence in the indigenous movement

Even more than support for traditional indigenous institutions and collective rights, support for actions or behaviour based on indigeneity can be examined by looking at respondents’ attitudes towards the indigenous movement as representative of an indigenous political agenda. In the following, I examine levels of confidence in the indigenous movement; answers to the questions how much influence indigenous groups should have and have had; and whether this influence affected Bolivian democracy. Again, these questions were only asked once; the analysis represents thus more a snapshot rather than a trend. Nevertheless, these snapshots are able to tell us whether and to what extent support for the indigenous movement is stratified according to ethnic identification.

104 Results not shown.
The survey of 2008 recorded levels of confidence in the indigenous movement, here reported according to indigenous assertiveness. Within all three categories, respondents are distributed over all ratings: some indigenous Bolivians have no confidence whatsoever, whereas some non-indigenous Bolivians report a lot of confidence in the indigenous movement. Yet the means for each category are significantly and fairly different from each other, with higher means associated
with higher assertiveness.\textsuperscript{105} While the data does not enable a comparison over time in order to see whether indigenous groupness has changed, this snapshot illustrates that Bolivians identifying as indigenous are more likely to be confident in the indigenous movement and thus, possibly, more likely to support an indigenous political agenda. As with other attitudes before, however, there is no hard boundary.

The survey of 2010 asked further questions about the respondents’ attitudes toward the indigenous movement. First, it asked whether they think that indigenous groups have made Bolivia more democratic, less democratic, or have had no impact. Figure 5.3a shows clear differences in the proportions of most, moderately, or non-indigenous; among the two former categories the majority thinks that the movement made Bolivia more democratic. Among the non-indigenous population, on the other hand, the answers are approximately tied with around a third each believing in more and less democratic. The remaining third responded that the indigenous movement had no impact on democracy.

Another question asked respondent how much influence they think indigenous groups have and have had in creating new laws. Here, too, we see significant differences according to indigenous assertiveness (Figure 5.3b). The most and moderately indigenous Bolivians agree on this issue, with over 40 percent of respondents replying ‘a lot’ and around 6 percent replying ‘no’ influence. Yet only 30.6 percent and with 14.7 percent more than twice the number of non-indigenous respondents replied in these ways, respectively.

From this question alone, however, we cannot see whether this influence was regarded as positive or negative. Figure 5.3c shows a crosstabulation of responses of ‘a lot’ and ‘some influence’ with impact on democracy according to indigenous assertiveness. Again, there are clear and significant differences between the categories. Among the most assertively indigenous, those who said that the indigenous movement had ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ influence were overwhelmingly of the opinion that it had contributed towards an increase in democracy. Among the non-indigenous, on the other hand, judgement on whether the country is now more or less democ-

\textsuperscript{105} The means are most=4.78, moderate=3.82, not at all=3.25. Both most and moderate assertively indigenous differ significantly from the non-indigenous category at $p<0.001$. Assertiveness remains a significant factor for confidence in the indigenous movement when controlling for income, education, political ideology, highland–lowlands residence, and urbanization (results not shown).
ratic as the result of indigenous mobilization is tied. The analyses thus show that within the Bolivian population, political attitudes and opinions are indeed affected by an ethnic distinction surrounding indigeneity, with self-identifying indigenous more likely to see the indigenous movement as a positive political actor.

In summary, support for collective political action in Bolivia is only to some extent affected by indigenous identification. While support for indigenous traditions seems to be stratified according to assertiveness, the boundaries remain porous. Moreover, Bolivians’ attitudes towards indigenous collective rights as such are relatively similar, in particular when it comes to somewhat hypothetic and cultural rights such as language policy. Differences between most and moderate assertively indigenous as well as non-indigenous Bolivians become more pronounced with more concrete instances of indigenous politics, such as the new autonomy arrangements or the indigenous movements’ impact on Bolivian democracy as a whole. While these differences show the persistence of ethnic biases, they are by no means as pronounced as may have been expected from the observations of political violence particularly during the second half of the decade. This finding confirms once more the importance of conceptually and analytically disaggregating the notion of ethnic relations, distinguishing between attitudes to and observations of behaviour.

5.2 Otherness: Prejudice, discrimination, and their political relevance

An at times more radical discourse or events such as the just mentioned violence may not only have had an effect on in-group identification and favouritism. Following the existing literature on ethnic relations, both on the societal and the psychological scale (see Chapter 2), they could or should have resulted in worsened relations between self-identified indigenous and others, furthering a self-perpetuating cycle of prejudice in attitude and discrimination in behaviour.

The above analyses already present some insights into otherness between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians. Overall, there are some differences in support for an indigenous political agenda, yet little evidence for an increased antipathy between categories. Approval for language

\footnote{106 A series of binary logistic regressions shows that indigenous assertiveness, here to be interpreted as the difference to non-indigenous, remains a significant factor both with regards to perceived impact on democracy as well as perceived influence on laws after including controls (results not shown).}
rights are high within all categories and show no signs of a decrease (Table 5.1); the widened gap in confidence in indigenous authorities is due to an increase among indigenous, not to a decrease among non-indigenous respondents (Figure 5.1a–b); and requests for help from indigenous authorities for both categories are progressing in parallel rather than diverging (Figure 5.1c). It is mainly in the political realm where differences are more pronounced, with non-indigenous Bolivians being significantly less positive about the impact of the indigenous movement in general (Figure 5.3), and about indigenous autonomy in particular (Figure 5.2). Yet either result could signify simply a lack of enthusiasm rather than opposition to the indigenous cause.

This section considers ethnic relations in more depth, analyzing prejudice as well as discrimination between the categories and their import in the political sphere, before looking more closely at ‘reversed racism’ against white Bolivians. As the previous section, this section, too, is hampered by the absence of time-series data but although most of the points discussed are based on episodical observations, a general trend can be deduced.

**Prejudice: Attitudes toward the other**

Inter-ethnic relations are frequently reinforced by prevailing sets of preconceived notions of the other, which are often, but not always, negative. With the visibilization and politicization of ethnicity, these prejudices may be strengthened and inter-ethnic distrust heightened.

In Bolivia, despite efforts in favour of indigenous emancipation over the last decade, discriminatory attitudes towards indigenous inhabitants do not seem to have changed considerably between 2004 and 2010, particularly among the non-indigenous population. When asked in 2004 about their opinion of the potential appointment of an indigenous president after the following elections, 47.1 percent of non-indigenous respondents replied that that would be a cause of concern for them (as opposed to the response option that the ethnic origin of a president would be of no importance); significantly more than the percentage of moderate and the most assertively indigenous Bolivians (Figure 5.4a).

Six years later, the image of the indigenous Bolivia remains rather negative. Significantly more non-indigenous than most or moderate indigenous respondents argue that indigenous poverty is self-inflicted rather than structural, for example because they do not work enough or because they do not want to change their culture – though it is worth pointing out that, overall, Bolivians
tend to agree on the relative importance of reasons for indigenous poverty (Figure 5.4b). Nonindigenous respondents are also on average significantly and fairly less positive than most or moderate indigenous when it comes to a potential marriage of their children to an indigenous spouse.\footnote{Means on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): non-indigenous 4.32, moderate indigenous 5.16, most indigenous 5.74.}

The latter result is corroborated in a survey by the UNIR Foundation (2008a: 8) in 2006 and 2008, with only 77 and 72 percent, respectively, of non-indigenous accepting such a marriage of their offspring. Moreover, as is apparent from these numbers, acceptance rates have slightly decreased between 2006 and 2008, in everything from adopting an indigenous child to having an indigenous colleague (see also Figure 5.5b, below). That is, among non-indigenous Bolivians, prejudice against indigenous Bolivians does exist and while there is only limited evidence for an increase, it is unlikely to have decreased over the last decade.

Prejudices against the other are harboured not only by non-indigenous, but also indigenous Bolivians. When asked in 2006 about the trustworthiness of different ethnic categories, significantly and considerably more most assertively indigenous than others reply that mestizos, white, and in particular Camba are not at all trustworthy (Figure 5.5a).\footnote{The category Camba is further discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.} In the same year, 9 percent of

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5_4.png}
\caption{Attitudes towards indigenous Bolivians according to indigenous assertiveness, 2004 and 2010}
\end{figure}
indigenous respondents in the UNIR survey would not accept a non-indigenous colleague and 28 percent would not adopt a non-indigenous child, although in 2008 acceptance rates of the other are slightly higher (Figure 5.5b). Thus, throughout the last decade, we can observe instances of otherness in attitudes on both sides of the indigenous–non-indigenous boundary with only small, if any, changes – not pointing towards a worsening of ethnic relations.

Figure 5.5: Trust in and acceptance of an ethnic category by the respective other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>adopt indigenous child</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accept child’s marriage to ind.</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>live in same house as indigenous</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work with indigenous</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have indigenous friend</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adopt non-indigenous child</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>+6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accept child’s marriage to non-ind.</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>+3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>live in same house as non-ind.</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>+2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work with non-indigenous</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>+0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have non-indigenous friend</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If prejudices have not changed much, perhaps they have become more salient in the population. Interviewees mentioned repeatedly how, a couple of years ago, the discrimination of indigenous Bolivians was perceived to be normal (for example, Schilling–Vacaflor, 20.09.2012), but has now been made visible through the politicization of indigeneity (Moreno Morales, 03.10.2011; Zegada Claure, 04.10.2011; Zuazo Oblitas, 11.10.2011; Loayza Bueno, 12.10.2011). Has awareness of prejudice and discrimination increased together with salience of indigeneity?

In 1998 and 2010, respondents were asked whether indigenous Bolivians are treated better or worse than white Bolivians by the police, army, courts, or teachers or, in 2010, in general. Figure 5.6a presents the results of a summary measure of both years. In 1998, Bolivians generally agree that indigenous Bolivians are treated worse than white Bolivians. In 2010, on the other hand, the responses are more evenly distributed around the 'equal' response category, suggesting a perceived emancipation of indigenous with white Bolivians. While the tendency is the same for
both observed ethnic categories, significantly more non-indigenous than indigenous Bolivians think that indigenous are treated equally, and significantly less that they are treated worse. Similarly, in 2010 less non-indigenous than indigenous Bolivians think that racism is an important issue (Figure 5.6b). That is, non-indigenous respondents seem to be less perceptive of indigenous discrimination than those who would be affected directly or indirectly. If the politicization of indigeneity has made indigenous discrimination more visible, it did so only among indigenous Bolivians themselves.

Figure 5.6: Perception of indigenous discrimination and racism according to self-categorization

Discrimination: Treatment of the other

If prejudices have not changed, perhaps action based on them has, resulting in a rise in discriminatory behaviour. In all three LAPOP survey years from 2006 to 2010, respondents were asked whether they had been discriminated by fellow Bolivians in social events or in the public

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109 This emancipation may also have been the result of a now worse treatment of whites but although being white is perceived to be less fashionable than before (see Chapter 4), this seems rather unlikely (see also the sub-section on ‘reversed racism’, below). In any case, the difference between indigenous and non-indigenous remains.

110 Curiously, significantly more indigenous than non-indigenous think that racism does not exist in Bolivia. Following Beck, Mijeski, and Stark’s (2011: 116) study on race and racism awareness in Ecuador, this result may be due to lower education levels among indigenous Bolivians; they are simply less likely to know what ‘racism’ means. Had the question asked for maltreatment or similar instead, less indigenous may have denounced its existence. Yet this is not something we can determine satisfactorily with the data at hand.
sphere. While there are no significant differences between categories, which signals that both indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians at times feel discriminated against, the perception of discrimination increases for all three categories between 2006 and 2008 before it decreases again between 2008 and 2010. However, perceived discrimination among most indigenous remains at a higher level than that of 2006 (Figure 5.7a–b). These results suggest indeed rising tensions between ethnic categories concomitant with the heated debate surrounding the writing of the new constitution, tensions which eased again in the aftermath. It may be argued that these developments, and in particular the increase of reported discrimination by most and moderate indigenous, are not so much due to an increase – or the absence of a decrease – of acts of discrimination but to a heightened awareness of ethnic origin and thus of behaviour based upon it (see Seligson et al., 2006: 33–34). In either case, relations between the categories would have worsened, or at the very least not improved.

Figure 5.7: Perceived discrimination according to indigenous assertiveness

When asking more specifically for the perceived reasons for discrimination, being poor, being indigenous, and having dark skin are named most often, each receiving more than 20 percent of responses (UNIR, 2008a: 10). In the 2010 LAPOP survey, significantly and considerably more indigenous than non-indigenous Bolivians report having often or sometimes been discriminated because of their skin colour, economic situation, or manner of speech (Figure 5.8a). And while the gap is narrower when considering being a witness to, rather than victim of, discrimination, it is still statistically significant (Figure 5.8b). Together with the data presented on discrimination at social events and public places (Figure 5.7a–b), this confirms not only that indigenous dis-
crimination does exist but also that it is based on a range of attributes and happens in a range of spheres.\textsuperscript{111}

Overall then, although indigenous Bolivians are now seen to be treated more or less equal to white Bolivians, acts of discrimination do not seem to have decreased and indigenous Bolivians remain disadvantaged on a number of accounts. Political mobilization and success may thus have affected indigenous emancipation somewhat adversely, leading non-indigenous Bolivians to think that they are more emancipated than actually is the case.

\textit{Figure 5.8: Perceived discrimination on the basis of skin colour, economic situation, and manner of speech according to self-categorization, 2010: often or sometimes in the previous five years}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.8.png}
\end{figure}

\textit{Importance of ethnic differences in the political sphere}

Although a certain level of otherness within the Bolivian population with regard to ethnic identification thus exists, this seems to be rather inconsequential when considering political opinion. On the first question described above, whether the election of an indigenous president would be cause for concern, not only 47.1 percent of non-indigenous but also 28.2 percent of most and 35 percent moderate indigenous replied that this would be the case (Figure 5.4a, above). The answer to this question may therefore reflect a rather deep-seated prejudice towards indigenous

\textsuperscript{111} That there are differences between indigenous and non-indigenous according to this but not to the former analysis may be because the discrimination of indigenous is higher elsewhere than in the public sphere or at social events and/or because the discrimination of non-indigenous is based on reasons other than skin colour, socio-economic background, or manner of speech, such as gender or age.
inhabitants as less capable politicians among all Bolivians, rather than a fear of being governed by the ‘other’ among non-indigenous Bolivians.

In addition, although significantly more most than moderate or non-indigenous respondents would prefer to be represented by someone of a shared ethnic origin, these constitute only 29.6 percent of their category. That is, over two thirds of indigenous Bolivians do not attach much significance to ethnic origin in the political sphere, nor do almost four fifths of moderate or non-indigenous Bolivians.\footnote{The discrepancy between these two questions – harbouring prejudice against an indigenous president versus declaring that the ethnic origin of a representative is not important – may be explained either by the passing of time, which presented indigenous representatives in the interim as more competent than expected, or by the different question wording; the second question asks for ethnic origin in general rather than indigenous origin in particular.} Attitudes and behaviour then seem to be mainly due to deep-seated prejudices about indigenous Bolivians and not due to fears of the other. This also fits with the results of Section 5.1: indigenous rights and culture as such are not opposed, only issues that are perceived to have potentially negative effects for all Bolivians. Although there is no data on the issue of ethnic origin in the political sphere for 2008, arguably the worst year for ethnic relations, we may say that ethnic boundaries do not seem to be very important.

It may be argued that this result is due to social desirability bias on part of the respondent, not wanting to be seen in a bad light by the interviewer. However, the results are confirmed when considering national election outcomes: of all non- and moderately indigenous, 29.2 and 57.9 percent, respectively, reported having voted for the MAS in the 2005 elections, proportions which grew to 43.9 and 67.5 percent, respectively, in the 2009 elections.\footnote{Post-electoral self-reporting of votes tends to be biased towards the winning candidate or party yet the general trend can be corroborated through aggregate analysis of the original electoral data: Madrid (2012: 57) calculated the MAS vote per majority Aymara-, Quechua-, and Spanish-speaking municipalities, estimating that the MAS gained 39 percent of those municipalities in which the majority of the population grew up speaking Spanish rather than an indigenous language in the 2005 elections, and 59 percent in the 2009 elections.} From this data, no non-indigenous opposition against indigenous politicians or agendas can be discerned. Interviewees, too, repeatedly mentioned that, while identities may be politicized and divisive in discourse, they are not relevant for everyday decision-making (for example, Buitrago Bascopé, 13.09.2011). And while tolerance towards cultural difference may be desired to be higher,\footnote{When asked what Bolivians would need for a more brotherly coexistence, respect for different cultures was mentioned most often (29.6 percent), followed by general democratic values such as respect for rights and duties (25.1 percent) (UNIR, 2008b: 6).} only 8 percent of the population see cultural differences as such as fuelling the political polarization
in the country. More important are perceived to be political differences (36.9 percent), income inequality (25.8 percent), as well as differences between the east and the west of the country (22.6 percent) (UNIR, 2008a: 7; UNIR, 2008b: 6).

Thus, racism in Bolivia seems to be based more on a negative view of indigenous Bolivians and a negative view of non-indigenous Bolivians as exploiters of indigenous, than on fear of the other as such. Here, the distinction between attributes, or perceived attributes, of a category and out-group hatred as set out in Chapter 2 is visible and shows that a distinction is indeed necessary and fruitful when analyzing ethnic relations.

‘Reversed racism’: Prejudice and discrimination against white Bolivians

So far, this chapter has looked mainly at indigenous Bolivians, both with regard to groupness and as the subject of otherness. Yet the political developments have also resulted in claims of reversed racism; that non-indigenous, and in particular white, Bolivians are now discriminated against (for example, Heins, 17.10.2011). We have already seen in Chapter 4 that self-identification as white has declined, but this does not allow any inferences as to the reasons for this decline: was it because now more Bolivians recognize their indigenous roots and identify as mestizo, if not indigenous, or because they are pressured into denying their European roots?

In the UNIR survey of 2008, the majority of Bolivians agree that being poor, being indigenous, and having dark skin are the most likely bases for discrimination, but 5 percent of respondents also think that having light skin provokes discrimination (UNIR, 2008a: 10). Moreover, 11 percent of the population think that indigenous Bolivians are those who discriminate most; these respondents are mainly situated in Chuquisaca and in Santa Cruz (UNIR, 2008a: 13).

From the LAPOP data, however, there is no evidence for a perceived racism against whites in Bolivia when repeating the above analysis according to self-categorization as white. In 1998, significantly more white than non-white respondents think that indigenous are treated equally to whites by police, army, courts, and teachers; they are not more likely to think that indigenous are treated better than whites. This situation has not changed in 2010. In this year, there are no significant differences whatsoever (Figure 5.9a). Similarly, in 2006, significantly more whites than non-whites think that they have been discriminated against at social events and in public places. Yet these values are decreasing, rather than increasing, in the following years (Figure
5.9b–c). Notwithstanding the absence of data from before 2006, it seems that, at most, the perception of reversed racism was highest in 2006, possibly as a result of the election of Morales.

**Figure 5.9: Perceived treatment of whites according to self-categorization as white**

- **a)** perceived treatment of indigenous compared to white Bolivians, 1998 and 2010
- **b)** perceived discrimination at social events
- **c)** perceived discrimination in public sphere
- **d)** perceived discrimination due to skin colour, 2010

Finally, when asked in 2010 whether they have been discriminated against on the basis of their skin colour, significantly less white than non-white report this to have been the case, although 13.2 percent of all white respondents report to have been discriminated often, sometimes, or rarely in the last year (Figure 5.8d). And on the question whether racism is an important issue in Bolivia, there are no significant differences, as there are not on the question whether racism has increased or decreased in the past five years (results not shown).
Thus, although whites are more likely to feel discriminated in 2006, this trend does not continue and beyond this statistic, there is little evidence for perceived or actual racism against whites, despite repeated warnings by politicians and media outlets. Otherness has therefore not increased in this regard either, showing that the political indigenous identity discourse has not had an adverse impact on ethnic relations. This may be because the MAS administration has not led to perceivable disadvantages for non-indigenous Bolivians, perhaps not the least due to the rather inconsequential government politics already described as a reason for a decline in indigenous groupness (see Chapter 4). The strategic alliance between the MAS and actors from a rather right-wing political fraction may have supported the decrease in fears of reversed racism (see also Moreno Morales, 03.10.2011), as may have the absence of a rise in court cases following the passing of the law against discrimination (for example, Zegada Claure, 04.10.2011).

To conclude, although prejudices persist between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians, these have not led to an observable degree of otherness or its worsening over the last years. Whites may have felt temporarily threatened in 2006 and some tension between the categories may have been arising between 2006 and 2008, yet neither trend continued. The politicization of indigeneity thus had no lasting, much less polarizing, effect on ethnic relations in Bolivia.

### 5.3 Nationness: Bolivian political and social community

Finally, another consequence of indigenous mobilization could be an adverse effect on attachment to the Bolivian national community. Bolivia is often said to be an ill-defined nation to begin with: it does not have a positive, internal identity but instead is defined by a mutual, external enemy (Loayza Bueno, 12.10.2011; Peña Hasbún, 24.10.2011) – whether in the form of Chile since the War of the Pacific in the nineteenth century, costing Bolivia its access to the sea; in the form of Paraguay after the Chaco War in the beginning of the twentieth century, shrinking Bolivia’s oil resources; or, perhaps, nowadays in the form of what are perceived to be imperialist powers, such as the USA. Successive governments have tried to define and redefine the Bolivian nation, first as a mestizo nation, then as a pluricultural one, and most recently as a plurinational one. This last redefinition was particularly hotly debated; any form of Bolivianness there was, so the argument, would be diminished by the focus on sub-national entities (see Chapter 3).
This section examines the development of Bolivianness over the past decade: whether it exists, whether it has changed, and whether the changes can be associated with the recent political discourse and events. The section analyzes, first, the Bolivian will for the division of political labour – whether the existing state is seen as the rightful administrator of the population – and second, the Bolivian sense of belonging as one social community. If the opposition to the plurinational constitution is right, the political identity discourse should have led to a decrease in both the political as well as social community among Bolivians of the indigenous category and, given that now Bolivianhood is defined in plurinational rather than mestizaje terms, also among Bolivians of the non-indigenous category.\footnote{I distinguish between ‘Bolivianhood’ as the definition of the nation, the characteristics attributed to it, and ‘Bolivianness’ as the identification as and with this nation definition.}

The political community: Pride in and support for the political system

According to Mill (1862: 7), a unified state necessitates citizen satisfaction with and support for the political community, or at least not enough opposition that it would undermine citizens’ willingness for political cooperation. Ethnic loyalties, so the widespread argument, undermine this satisfaction and support and are thus incompatible with political stability (for example, Lijphart, 1995: 861–862; see also Chapter 2). Following this hypothesis, Bolivians’ opposition to the political system should have increased over the last years, both among the indigenous populations as an act, perhaps, of liberation, and among the non-indigenous population for fears of future suppression.

However, even a cursory look at the survey data shows that this has not been the case. Figure 5.10a–b presents Bolivian pride in and support for the political system.\footnote{See Table A10, Appendix IV. The data are presented according to indigenous self-categorization and not assertiveness in order to be able to show the results for all survey years, which would not be available otherwise. For the available years, assertiveness does not add any new information and is therefore not reported. The same holds for the following analyses in this chapter.} While developments from 1998 to 2010 for both measures are compatible with the events and discourses of the decade, they are not exactly so in the manner hypothesized. The graphs show that indigenous Bolivians, having had historically lower levels of pride and support than non-indigenous Bolivians, now sport increasingly high levels, in line with the rise of indigenous mobilization and particularly with the election of Morales in 2006. Thus, indigenous mobilization has not led to a resistance against the existing state structures but instead seems to have increased their legiti-
macy. As Mansbridge (1999: 650) argues, seeing members of one’s own, historically marginalized group in positions of influence may enhance the legitimacy of the polity by creating a feeling of inclusion.

When keeping with the conventional framework, which tends to see ethnic relations more often than not as a zero-sum game, non-indigenous Bolivians should now feel excluded. But while the gap between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians in the extent of their pride in and support for the Bolivian political system is growing, this results only from an increase within the indigenous populations – and not from a decrease among the non-indigenous population. The politicization of indigeneity thus does not seem to have affected the out-group’s sense of political community either.

![Figure 5.10: Pride in and support for the Bolivian political system according to self-categorization](image)

Instead, non-indigenous pride and support actually increased with the election of Morales, too, and then stagnated. The parallel increase of the two measures among both indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians suggests that the heightened legitimacy is not (only) due to ethnic representation but to representation as such: Morales was the first candidate in the twenty-three years since return to democracy in 1982 who was voted into office by the public. His predecessors, on the other hand, were elected in a parliamentary runoff vote, all too often leading to the election of the candidate not with most public votes but with most allies in parliament (Singer, 2007: 203; see also Artaraz, 2012: 37). This finding confirms the suggestion, above, that ethnicity as such is of rather limited importance for political decision-making among Bolivians.
Social community as one Bolivian nation

The heightened legitimacy of the political system as such, however, does not yet conclusively show that indigenous mobilization has not affected Bolivianness adversely. After all, the power of habit is said to be strong. Instead, an analysis of the social community among Bolivians is necessary. The following analyzes the population’s identification as Bolivians at the individual level as well as its perception of Bolivians as one community at the collective level.

From 2004 onwards, the LAPOP surveys asked respondents to what extent they feel as Bolivian citizen and to what extent they are proud of being Bolivian (Figure 5.11a–b).\textsuperscript{117} For both questions, not only are the mean ratings very high, they are also increasing over the last years, again for indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians. Indeed, there are hardly any differences between the two categories; the biggest difference is that in pride in being Bolivian in 2010, of 0.2 on a scale of 1 to 7. Thus, at the individual level, Bolivians identify strongly as Bolivians, regardless of their ethnic self-categorization, and this identification has even increased over the past years.

Three other questions gauged group-level identification, whether Bolivians see themselves as part of one wider social community. Here, too, the levels of groupness are relatively high and rising for both the indigenous and the non-indigenous population. Bolivians agree that, despite their differences, they have many things and values in common which unite them as a country (Figure 5.11c). Conversely, only about 15 percent of the population favour a single national culture over the maintenance of the values, cultures, and languages of indigenous cultures in 2004 and 2006 and over the maintenance of cultural diversity in general in 2008 (Figure 5.11d).\textsuperscript{118} Finally, when asked whether Bolivia should be divided or remain united, the vast majority opts for the latter response, regardless of ethnic self-categorization (results not shown). That is, the indigenous identity discourse has not detracted from a common sense of Bolivian-ness, despite some distrust between the members of the respective ethnic categories (see Section 5.2).

\textsuperscript{117} For Figure 5.11a–c, see Table A11, Appendix IV.

\textsuperscript{118} The difference between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians in 2008 cannot be directly compared to those in the previous years, given that the response options provided differed.
In conclusion, the ostensible lack of a common positive identity does not seem to have hindered the development of a strong identification of Bolivians as Bolivians and with fellow Bolivians as one national community. This identification has increased over the last years, too, thus, given an increase in indigenous identification, strongly suggesting that ethnic and national identifications are not mutually exclusive in Bolivia. This conclusion is supported by the findings of a smaller survey conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES, Friedrich Ebert Foundation) within rural Aymara communities in the highlands. Although presumably the least likely category to evidence a strong national identification due to their tightly-knit and conservative community structures, among the Aymaras 48 percent identify more strongly as Bolivian citizen than as Aymara and 9 percent identify equally with either category (FES, 2007: 7; see also Zuazo Oblitas, 11.10.2011). Overall, then, the indigenous mobilization has not adversely affected Bolivianness.
and, through its participation in the protest cycle which united Bolivians in a ‘plebeian nation’, may even have positively contributed to it.

5.4 Conclusions

The violently racist events of 2007 and 2008 shocked the Bolivian population and led, both nationally as well as internationally, to speculations of future communal violence if not a civil war. The data in this chapter, however, suggests that said events were the result of isolated individuals, if not purely instrumental in nature. Whereas one may have expected higher degrees of in-group favouritism (particularly among indigenous) and prejudice and discrimination (particularly by non-indigenous) in light of the discourses and clashes, the survey results analyzed here suggest differently.

Section 5.1, looking more closely on in-group bias and out-group discrimination through an examination of support for action based on indigeneity, confirms the overall conclusion of the previous chapter: the boundary between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians remains porous. Ethnic distinctions in attitudes are discernable but small. It is particularly noteworthy that non-indigenous Bolivians generally have a rather positive outlook on indigenous rights. The political identity discourse thus does not seem to have had a considerable effect on indigenous mobilization for, let alone non-indigenous political mobilization against indigenous rights. On the contrary, the discourse may even have had a positive effect on support for indigenous rights among all Bolivians, raising the salience of this issue. According to the UNIR surveys, the knowledge of indigenous peoples has increased considerably between 2006 and 2008: whereas in 2006, the average respondent could name only 3.9 different indigenous peoples, they named 6.9 peoples in 2008 (UNIR, 2008a: 7).

Similarly, the findings with regard to otherness in Section 5.2 neither matched the results hypothesized by conventional ethnic relations theory. The analyses of both the indigenous–non-indigenous as well as the white–non-white boundary have shown that, while prejudices and discrimination do persist, they have not considerably worsened let alone spiralled out of control. The increase in perceived discrimination in 2008 was small and short-lived.

For the country as a whole, too, the events and discourses of the last decade may have had a positive, rather than negative, effect: Section 5.3 found that nationness among Bolivians did not
decrease but increase, both with regard to the political system as well as the national social community as Bolivians. From this analysis itself it is not clear whether nationness increased because or in spite of the assertive indigenous discourse during the first Morales administration; what is clear, however, is that Bolivian national cohesion is not directly linked to indigenous cohesion. While the latter rose and fell over the last years, the former has been steadily rising.

In all, ethnicity in Bolivia is not as consequential for social and political life as expected. In particular, the election of Morales has led to an increase in legitimacy among Bolivians on either side of the indigenous–non-indigenous boundary. Rather than explaining the increase among the latter with their ethnic link as mainly mestizos to their indigenous heritage, it is more likely that they finally saw their chosen political candidate represented in power. After all, the MAS did not only emphasize its connection to indigenous grass-roots movements or its indigenous political agenda, but also reached out to Bolivians in general; to the poorer sectors of the population, particularly with anti-elite as well as nationalist and interventionist rhetoric.

The inferences made here may be criticized based on three arguments. First, with the exception of the section on nationness, few if any time-series data is available, potentially weakening the inferences made with regard to political mobilization and otherness. But while the lack of data is unfortunate, the inferences made are equivalent to accepting the null hypothesis of no difference, which would be done in the absence of significant results, too.

Second, Section 5.1 examines support for an indigenous political agenda and actors, rather than in-group bias as expressed in action as such. However, given that thresholds for acting should be higher than for having and expressing an opinion, any differences between ethnic categories should be more evident for the latter and thus show more clearly in survey than observational data.

This is, third, always assuming that the survey replies are not tainted by social desirability bias. This may have encouraged respondents to report, for example, a higher support for indigenous rights than they actually hold. Yet, social desirability did not seem to have stopped respondents from expressing racist attitudes with regard to indigenous Bolivians either, nor do referendum and election results indicate an opposition to indigenous rights. On the contrary, the TIPNIS marchers in the still ongoing dispute with the Morales government received support from
throughout the population. With the usual caveat that more detailed data would be advantageous, then, the above analyses do allow some inferences on ethnic relations in Bolivia.

The conclusions of ‘no difference’ do not, at first sight, seem very exciting. They do, however, not only contribute to the clarification of ethnic relations in Bolivia but also to the theoretical literature on the topic. First, they emphasize the value in distinguishing between in-group meaning, as laid out in Chapter 4, and action based on this meaning. While indigenous identification has increased in both number and extent until 2006, support for indigenous language rights did not change during the same time. Second, the results show a difference between perceptions of an out-group, its evaluation, and action towards the out-group: although many non-indigenous have prejudices against indigenous Bolivians, few are actively opposed to indigenous rights. Finally, the results confirm the findings of other recent studies (see Chapter 2) which found that sub-national and national identification are not, in fact, negatively associated with each other. The following two chapters ascertain whether these conclusions are particular to the indigenous case or whether they hold for other sub-national identities in Bolivia, too.
6. The Rise and Decline of Cruceñoness in Santa Cruz

The indigenous was not the only sub-national identity category in Bolivia that was politicized over the last years. The south-eastern department of Santa Cruz also experienced a mobilization of the regional Cruceño category, driven mainly by the department’s economic and political elites in support of demands for departmental autonomy. This chapter examines the construction and reconstruction of the Cruceño identity category chronologically in three parts. Section 6.1 covers the construction of identity categories from Santa Cruz’ colonization in the sixteenth century until the end of the twentieth century; Section 6.2 presents and analyzes the events and discourses of the protest cycle between 2000 and 2005 from the perspective of Santa Cruz; and Section 6.3 examines the departmental elites’ struggle against the new constitution and the discourses and actions filed in support. The final Section 6.4 discusses the developments, focusing particularly on the contestation of identity categories and their relation to the Bolivian nation as a whole.

I argue that the construction and reconstruction of the Cruceño and thus the attributes the category is based on depend in large part on the department’s position vis-à-vis the state and with it on the nationally hegemonic identity discourse. The Cruceño elites sought to distinguish themselves from the Bolivian state and nation; more often than not, the Cruceño was defined by that which it was not, than by an own clear set of attributes. First the Cruceño was defined as the only population in Bolivia which has never spoken anything but Spanish and the only one of pure Spanish race, in contrast to the Colla in the rest of the country. From the 1950s onwards, it developed into its own mestizaje, distinguished from the ‘bad’ mestizaje of the Colla. And finally, when the national identity discourse emphasized indigeneity, the Cruceño identity dis-
course increasingly focused on the indigenous, Andean Colla. Hence, while in theory the Cruceño category is clearly delineated by the department’s territorial borders, in practice it is at least as contested as the indigenous category.

For each of these dichotomies, the discourse first focused on the positive depiction of the in-group but soon, particularly in times of crises, shifted to a focus on the negative out-group. But in the past decade, this focus on the out-group backfired. Large parts of the department’s population did support the elite’s political agenda through protest marches, petitions, successful referenda, or in elections – a support which may have been strengthened through the positive Cruceño identity discourse – but it did not tolerate direct action against the out-group in the form of violent crackdowns on mainly indigenous pro-government protesters. The political elite lost its support and the regional opposition has hence not recovered. Linking this back to the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2, the analysis confirms the importance of distinguishing between in- and out-group dynamics: meaning and action towards the in-group may be distinct to those toward the out-group and there does not need to be a clear association.

Another distinction becomes prevalent when examining the discourse with regard to the relation between the Cruceño and Bolivia as a whole: that between a social and a political community, both in discourse and practice. Although the discourse was marked by regional chauvinism, it was articulated as an alternative vision for the country and, while this was portrayed differently in the international press, secession was never seriously considered nor supported by the vast majority of Santa Cruceños. Thus, whereas the social community of Bolivians was doubted, the political community was not.

6.1 Before 2000: The construction of a regional identity

The geographic and political marginalization of the department of Santa Cruz until the 1950s led to the emergence and persistence of a traditional system of power in which the economic and social elite was at the same time the political elite. These regional elites often stood in opposition to the central state and used their power to construct an identity which would unify the regional population against it; the result was the construction of the regional Camba identity, opposed by the political enemy in the form of the state, run by Collas. However, this discourse was, and still is, not entirely based on spatial differences but also has acquired a biological di-
mension, based on differences seen in Camba and Colla mestizaje. Over time, the Colla was increasingly equated with the highland indigenous. These developments are discussed in turn.

‘The enemies of the soul are threefold: the Camba, the Colla, and the Portuguese’\(^{119}\): A divided and isolated society in Bolivia’s lowlands

Although long isolated from the rest of Bolivia, the colonial population of the lowland, southeastern territory known today as the department of Santa Cruz was marked by a similar social structure, with overlapping and mutually reinforcing ethnic and class boundaries. The departmental elites tended to emphasize their Spanish heritage and thus their ‘inherent rights to [...] resources as the direct heirs of the conquistadores’ (Fabricant, 2009: 771; see also Peña Hasbún et al., 2011: 4). These white Cruceños distinguished themselves from the Camba, a pejorative designation of the indigenous lowland populations (Peña Hasbún et al., 2011: 4; Plata Quispe, 2008: 106–113, 134). The distinction manifested itself openly in a feudal social order up until the middle of the twentieth century (Waldmann, 2008: 56).

Another distinction was made to the Colla population of the Bolivian highlands, those in control of the centralist but distant and indifferent state. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Bolivia’s political as well as economic power was situated in the Andean cities of La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí, the centres of commerce, agriculture, and mining. Santa Cruz, on the other hand, was an isolated region without visible resources, long seen mainly as buffer zone to the Portuguese colony of Brazil (Klein, 2003: 254; Peña Claros and Boschetti, 2008: 20–21). By that time, Santa Cruz’ landholders had taken to arms twice against the central state, in 1876 and 1891, but both rebellions failed, fomenting feelings of contempt for the Collas among the local elites (Sivak, 2007: 15–16). These feelings may have become even stronger when, during the Chaco War against Paraguay in the 1930s, mainly fought on Santa Cruceño soil, the government entrusted all important military positions to men from the highlands, for fear of desertions if not an alliance between Santa Cruceños and Paraguayans (Waldmann, 2008: 25). Meanwhile, local campaigns for a connection of the region to the main markets of the country were ignored (Peña Claros and Boschetti, 2008: 29).

\(^{119}\) Historian and writer Gabriel René Moreno in 1885, as cited in Jordán Bazan (2011: 42). Santa Cruz borders Brazil, at the time colonized by the Portuguese.
It was only after the national revolution of 1952 (see Section 3.1) that the central government, in the form of the newly empowered MNR, took a sustained interest in the region, following the discovery of hydrocarbon resources. But the party’s national, anti-feudal, and anti-colonial political programme was perceived as overpowering and authoritarian, against the economic and political interests of the department. By then, the local landholders had long mobilized politically in interest groups. In 1950, they founded the interest group CPSC, which would later become the most influential civic institution of the region (Klein, 1992: 215; Assies, 2006: 94). Over the years, the CPSC established its standing through a string of successful interest representations: it averted the implementation of the MNR’s agrarian reform in Santa Cruz, which would have redistributed land from large landholdings to indigenous workers’ unions and communities (Klein, 1992: 234–237), and attained higher shares of hydrocarbon royalties for the department later in the 1950s. It took the CPSC more than two years of conflict with the central government to secure these shares, not always by peaceful means (Roca, 2008: 67). The ‘Massacre of Terebinto’, which ensued when the government dispatched the army to quell the unrest, is today an important cornerstone of the regionalist discourse in Santa Cruz (for example, CPSC, 19.05.2009).

The events of the first half of the twentieth century thus constituted not only the central, Colla government as the opponent of the region but also the CPSC as the legitimate defender of its rights, turning it into the ‘moral government’ of the citizens of Santa Cruz. The CPSC retains this position until today, further bolstered by a general distrust in traditional political parties and state institutions (Peña Claros and Boschetti, 2008: 37–38, 43).

‘Camba is a mixture of the warrior blood of the Chiriguano, refined with the blood of the Spanish’\textsuperscript{121}: The development of a social and political collective identity in Santa Cruz

Part of the CPSC’s legitimization process was also its capability, at least discursively, to reach out to the non-elite population. From the 1950s, the CPSC recuperated the previously pejorative term Camba to now denominate the outcome of mestizaje between the white Cruceños and the

\footnote{120 For CPSC, see page 16.}

\footnote{121 Historian Humberto Vásquez Machicado (1958) in an article in \textit{Revista de Etnología}, as cited in Waldmann (2008: 154).}
lowland indigenous inhabitants. With the introduction of universal suffrage, the regional elite’s claim to supremacy based on its Hispanic racial purity had lost its appeal; what was needed was an inclusive discourse capable of creating a collective identity beyond class differences and against the MNR government (Jordán Bazán, 2011: 41). Indeed, the discourse did not only remove the stigma associated with being indigenous but actively included the indigenous roots of the population into the founding myth of Santa Cruz: the brave and fearsome lowland warriors of the Chiriguano had defended the region from the intruding Incas from the highlands (Waldmann, 2008: 154–156). The CPSC thus both expanded the boundary and redefined the content of the term Camba to construct a common biological heritage; Camba became a positive collective identity that could not only be assigned but also asserted.

But although the discourse took on an assimilating stance, it also maintained or even emphasized boundaries. The Camba mestizaje was distinguished from that of Colla mestizaje: whereas the Colla contained the ‘inferior’ characteristics of Hispanics and indigenous, the Camba was a mixture of only the best of both groups (Lowrey, 2006: 66; Plata Quispe, 2008: 136). The discourse thus further ethnicized the difference between Cambas and Collas. And it did little to overcome racism among the Camba: the difference in Camba and Colla mestizaje was attributed to the ‘whitening’ (blanqueamiento) of the population in the lowlands (Waldmann, 2008: 158; Peña Hasbún et al., 2011: 9). This assimilationist discourse did not break down completely the distinction to those lowland indigenous who remained ‘unwilling’ to be assimilated. As at the national level in Bolivia and indeed in other parts of Latin America, this ‘undeserving, dysfunctional’ ‘Other Indian’ remained condemned to ‘racialized spaces of poverty and exclusion’ (C. Hale, 2004: 19; see also Assies, 2006: 98). Just as the mestizaje discourse at the national level, then, the regional Camba discourse reconstituted ethnic discrimination against Collas and lowland indigenous.

This regional, lowland biological and cultural commonality was complemented through the articulation of a political commonality, that is, a shared past and a shared fate, among the citizens (and not just elites) of Santa Cruz. But following the 1950s, the political other in the form of the central state was only evoked when local elites where unable to attain their interests directly. For example, they supported the 1964 military coup by General René Barrientos Ortuño against the MNR government as well as the 1971 coup by Santa Cruz-born Colonel Hugo Banzer Suárez against the leftist government of Juan José Torres González. Santa Cruz benefitted
from Banzer’s dictatorship not only politically but also economically. Members of the CPSC held influential positions and the region’s agricultural industry and budding drug business profited from subsidies (Assies, 2006: 94). The introduction of neoliberalist economic policies in the 1980s benefitted the department further and, together with the collapse of the mining industry in the western departments, made Santa Cruz the economic powerhouse of Bolivia (Sivak, 2007: 21–22).

‘The Cruceños never belonged to Upper Peru’

It was in the 1980s that the CPSC took a renewed interest in the regional identity. With Bolivia’s return to democracy in 1982, the regional elite’s national political influence became less certain. They responded with a change in course, exchanging the demand for increased integration for that of departmental decentralization, which would give them more autonomy in decisions concerning the department’s fiscal and resource policies (Sivak, 2007: 21–22). The calls for decentralization were supported by a process of reflection on Cruceño identity in order to accentuate a social and political commonality (Peña Hasbún et al., 2011: 121–131).

A number of tactics used in the reconstruction of the Cruceño can be distinguished. The discourse of a common biological background was supported through a process of historic reconstruction, whereby a meaningful past was created. Thus, Peña Claros and Boschetti (2008: 50–51) argue that regionalist historians rediscovered and reinterpreted regional history, choosing myths and stories that make the past seem meaningful and glorious and the regionalist claims of the present seem authentic and natural. This history confirms the isolation, abandonment, and marginalization the region suffered on part of the central government and attests to ‘Colla attacks’ in the form of state suppression of regional revolts. At the same time, it glorifies Cruceño heroes who have fought for the defence of regional interests. Another more recent example is the emphasis on the CPSC’s efforts in the 1970s to provide Santa Cruz de la Sierra


123 For the purposes of this thesis it is secondary whether these tactics were purely instrumentalist or the product of everyday primordialism.
with public services, such as a canalization system, without the assistance of the central state (Sivak, 2007: 19).

Additionally, cultural elements such as traditions and language were constructed or emphasized. While the creation of the departmental flag dates back to the nineteenth century, it was not until 1980 that it was recovered from its state of oblivion for the thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of the CPSC. Today, the green and white colours of the flag are omnipresent in the department, decorating taxis, buses, or business logos. In 1989, the CPSC invented the Día de la Tradición (Day of Tradition) to celebrate an apparently long-forgotten cultural identity, often accompanied by opinion-forming slogans alluding to issues of local or national reality (Peña Claros and Boschetti, 2008: 185–187; Peña Hasbún et al., 2011: 119–120).

The CPSC’s efforts were supported by an ever more salient distinction to the Collas. The department’s increasing integration had not only meant its economic development but also the beginning of a, partly state-sponsored, influx of migrants from the highlands to the lowlands. The migrants were mainly impoverished peasant with indigenous background and, although Santa Cruz’ businesses benefitted from this influx of cheap labour, quickly perceived as endangering the relative prosperity of the department. This ‘March to the Orient’ strengthened perceptions of a subjugating state and its local representatives, with different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds, underlined the commonalities among lowland Camba and their difference to the Colla other, soon virtually synonymous with highland indigenous Bolivians (Sivak, 2007: 17; Peña Claros and Boschetti, 2008: 33–43; Peña Claros, 2011: 15–29).

By the turn of the century, then, ‘being Cruceño’ had emerged as a regional, political collective identity in opposition to the central state. But this regional identity was ethnicized as it was linked to a biological and cultural difference between the lowland Camba, to which the Cruceños belonged, and the highland Colla, who governed the central state and were perceived

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124 However, this historic reconstruction still did not overcome racist conceptions of the Cruceño. Espósito Guevara (2008: 6) finds that a ‘whitening’ of regional history took place, resulting in ‘an almost mythological history, full of Homeric feats starring “white” heroes and where the indigenous are barely mentioned other than as subjects or murderers of white, “civilizing” missionaries’.

125 The colours green and white stand for natural abundance as in the region’s rural resources as well as for purity and nobility, respectively, the latter being a ‘rather transparent invocation of racial distinction inherited from Spanish colonialism’. Other often recurring symbols such as the cross potent (for Christianity) or the crown (for royalty) depicted on the department’s coat of arms also invoke nobility and conquest (Gustafson, 2006: 356).
as subjugating the Cruceños. Due to the presence of highland indigenous immigrants in Santa Cruz and their discursive connection to the central state, the maximum expression of the Colla became the Aymara or Quechua. At the same time, while the lowland indigenous populations were discursively included into the Camba and Cruceño categories, the racial hierarchy persisted.

The CPSC’s identity politics were largely successful and able to mobilize the department’s population for pro-decentralization protests in the early 1990s (Sivak, 2007: 22; Peña Hasbún et al., 2011: 111–112). When from 1994 onwards several decentralization measures were passed, however, they threatened rather than secured the position of Santa Cruz’ elites. The Law of Popular Participation of 1994 redistributed power away from the departments towards newly-created 311 municipal governments. The Law of Administrative Decentralization of 1995, in turn, strengthened the administrative competences of departments, but it also removed from the constitution the possibility of direct elections for departmental government. An additional cause for concern for regional elites was that the municipalization introduced new political actors, bringing about indigenous-based political movements and parties which differed strongly in their ideological basis from that of the traditional parties. The return of Banzer to the office of president in 1997, this time as the result of elections, promised alleviation, constraining municipal powers (Klein, 2003: 261; Eaton, 2007: 80–82). Yet as the protest cycle will show, the Banzer administration was incapable of containing nationwide popular protest against the neoliberal regime, leaving the regional elite alarmed and ready to once again resort to its regional identity discourse to support political claims.

6.2 2000–2005: From a positive in-group to a negative out-group

The protest cycle, which had began in the valleys and spread in the highlands in 2000, only reached the department of Santa Cruz in 2003. Here, the resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada turned initial ambivalence into stern opposition to the growing protest movement and the departmental elite into advocates of autonomy. In support of an agenda which sees Santa Cruz as a model for the whole of Bolivia, the autonomy discourse reconstructed the Cruceño as a pan-ethnic, regional identity based on a common ideology which could be acquired by choice by any of the department’s inhabitants. However, this civic depiction of the in-group was increasingly contradicted by an ethnic depiction of the out-group by emphasizing the biological
and cultural attributes of the Colla. In the following, the events of the protest cycle as seen from Santa Cruz are outlined before the discourse is analyzed in more detail.

‘The time has come to govern ourselves!’\textsuperscript{126}: The autonomy movement in Santa Cruz

The events of the protest cycle in Cochabamba or La Paz affected the majority of Santa Cruceños mainly to the extent to which they were covered on radio or television. The mostly conservative and government-affiliated media highly simplified the situation, often portraying the protesters as anarchist or irrational. The protests were thus widely perceived as temporary outbreaks rather than as the consequences of profound contradictions between state and nation (Peña Claros, 2011: 21). For others, the Water War in 2000, the Aymara–Peasant insurrections in 2000–2001, the success of indigenous-based social movements during the general elections in 2002, and in particular Quispe’s indigenist discourse fuelled perceptions that the creation of an Aymara Nation was imminent (for example, Antelo Gutierrez, 2003: 75–79; Zegarra Siles, 2011: 681; see Chapter 3).

It was in this context that, in 2001, the \textit{Movimiento Nación Camba de Liberación} (MNC–L, Camba Nation Liberation Movement) was founded. Emphasizing the difference of the lowland Cambas from the Andean Bolivian population, the movement proposed (and still does) the breakaway of the departments Beni, Pando, and Santa Cruz to form the Camba Nation (see Figure 6.1; MNC–L, 2001c). The Andean population, in turn, ‘underdeveloped and miserable’, which ‘practices an execrable colonial centralism […] and imposes its culture of underdevelopment’ (MNC–L, 2001a: para. 2), may form the Aymara–Quechua Nation.\textsuperscript{127} The cultural nation of the Cambas, they say, ‘is the result of a common history, language and the legacy of our heroes and ancestors […] which declares its right to difference but reaffirms its commitment to integration, to its ethnic democracy, and cultural pluralism as part of its national essence’ (MNC–L, 2001b). While the movement thus emphasized a discourse of unity in diversity among the lowland population – the main unifying factors being a common history as well as a common enemy – it drew a clear boundary between the lowland and highland population on explic-

\textsuperscript{126}Rubén Costas, then president of the CPSC, during an assembly in June 2004 (as cited in Plata Quispe, 2008: 152).

\textsuperscript{127}Note that the map suggests that the Aymara–Quechua Nation, or \textit{Alto Peru}, includes parts of Peru, while the department of Tarija is connected to the Argentinean province Salta.
itly racist grounds. What is more, the movement declared its unwillingness to remain within the same political community.

Although the pro-secession stance of the MNC–L is not supported by many (see for example, Peña Hasbún, 24.10.2011), its political discourse presented the intellectual underpinnings of a wider political current, which soon demanded departmental autonomy (Jordán Bazán, 21.10.2011). The protest cycle had also alarmed the CPSC. The Water War and now the Gas War caused concerns over the forced eviction of a major international investor as well as the loss of revenues from gas exports. President Sánchez de Lozada’s fall and Mesa’s assumption of the post meant that, for the first time since re-democratization, the presidency was not in the hands of any of the traditional parties Bolivia’s, which had done well in representing the region’s (elites’) interests. What is more, Mesa took a more accommodating stance vis-à-vis the social movements and promised to fulfil their October Agenda, including the nationalization of hydrocarbon resources (Eaton, 2007: 82–84; see also Assies, 2006: 92). The protest cycle, and in particular the events leading up to the Gas War in 2003, led the CPSC, which had mainly oper-
ated in the background before, to now take on an explicit role as government opposition (Zapata Rioja, 20.10.2011).

In February 2003, the CPSC met with its counterparts of the departments Beni, Chuquisaca, Pando, and Tarija – the departments of the south and east of Bolivia forming the *media luna* (half moon) – to debate their stance on gas exports to Mexico and the USA. Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, and Tarija alone account for 88.2 percent of the country’s gas production (the remaining 11.8 percent are extracted in Cochabamba); the stakes in the Gas War were thus particularly high for them. While Beni and Pando would not have gained as much from a gas export deal, the increasing influence of indigenous-based social movements and emerging nationalization tendencies also threatened the departments’ large landholders who, together with those in Santa Cruz, own the vast majority of arable land in Bolivia (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2008: 6–8). The meeting of the civic committees concluded with the declaration that, should the national government not consult with the departments on the issue, they would declare regional autonomy (Assies, 2006: 89).

The events of October 2003 radicalized the civic committees of the media luna departments, and that of Santa Cruz in particular. On 14 October, the CPSC and affiliated associations declared their support for the rule of law and announced that it ‘would not permit any blockades or subjugations’; three days later, members of CPSC, MNC–L, and of the youth organization *Unión Juvenil Cruceñista* (UJC, Cruceño Youth League) intercepted anti-government protesters on their way to the main square in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, leaving seven injured and four detained. The shock troops celebrated their victory hoisting the department’s flag and singing its anthem (Peña Claros and Jordán Bazán, 2006: 60, 66–71).

At a *cabildo* (public, deliberative assembly) in June 2004, CPSC president Rubén Costas directly attacked the October Agenda as one of ‘blockade, imposition, violence, repression, and centralism’, going on to proclaim an alternative, the June Agenda: the agenda ‘of all peoples. The agenda for a new Bolivia. The agenda of autonomy. […] Our own agenda!’ (as cited in Assies, 2006: 90). In December, the CPSC, in response to the government’s reduction in petrol subsidies, organized hunger strikes, boycotts, and at times violent occupations of state institutions through the UJC, resulting in what Gustafson (2006: 354) has called ‘essentially a regional coup’. At a second cabildo on 28 January 2005, the CPSC expanded the June Agenda to the January
Agenda, arguing that ‘Santa Cruz was “not being taken into consideration in the decisions being made over the country’s future”’ and that it stood ‘in complete opposition to the radically distinct vision that dominates the western part of the country’. Some even expressed separatist considerations should the hydrocarbon law demanded in the October Agenda be passed and property rights and investments be threatened (Webber, 2010: 59–60; see also Assies, 2006: 90; Eaton, 2007: 80–81).

The main source of contention was thus the difference in ideological visions held by the social movements, expressed in the October Agenda in 2003, on the one hand, and the traditional business elites, expressed in the January Agenda in 2005, on the other hand, rather than an ethnopolitical conflict as such. Proponents of the former can also be found in Santa Cruz, proponents of the latter also in the highlands (for example, Gustafson, 2008: 22). And in contrast to the MNC–L’s secessionist stance, the CPSC presented its autonomy agenda as a national agenda for a new Bolivia and only threatened with secession as a last resort. However, the issue is not (only) about competing visions of the state but also of the nation – and is marked by a high degree of regional chauvinism (ICG, 2004: 13; Tilley, 07.09.2011). Indeed, in its actions and discourse, the CPSC and affiliate associations took after the MNC–L and territorialized the ideological division, pitting the west against the east.

‘Now we can orientalize the occidentals’:

A regional in-group, an ethnic out-group

In support and legitimation of its political discourse, easily interpreted as a strategic step to defend elite economic interests, the CPSC and other organizations again reached out to the non-elite population by re-emphasizing the Cruceño regional identity and unity as well as its distinction to the western, highland population of Bolivia. The official discourse thereby focused on the territory and ideology shared by the inhabitants of Santa Cruz. For example, in their analysis of discourses during the Gas War in Santa Cruz, Peña Claros and Jordán Bazán (2006: 74–86) find that pro-autonomy actors repeatedly referred to positive characteristics ascribed to Santa Cruz and its inhabitants, in particular the department’s productivity. They also discursively united its population by emphasizing that statements are made in the name of all Cruceños. And the latter

128 The MNC–L’s radical discourse allows the CPSC to present its calls for autonomy as moderate demands (Gustafson, 2006: 364). Yet the distinction between the two organizations is not always clear-cut: both discourse as well as membership at times overlap. Assies (2006: 103) therefore refers to the MNC–L as the ‘radical wing’ of the CPSC.

129 CPSC President Costas in October 2003 (as cited in Peña Claros and Jordán Bazán, 2006: 63).
the CPSC now defined as everyone living, rather than being born in, Santa Cruz, including the department’s immigrant population (Eaton, 2007: 91). In this way, the autonomy movement changed the definition of the Cruceño from one of territorial or even biological roots to one of choice and thus de-ethnicized the category as well as considerably broadened the boundary, making it possible for more to assert the identity.

This collective identity, seen to be necessary for the articulation of a collective demand (Schilling–Vacaflor, 20.09.2011; Jordán Bazán, 21.10.2011), was strategically politicized: political demands were directly linked to expressions of identity. Public festivities in the department, for example, turned into celebrations of autonomy demands (Gustafson, 2006: 354–355, 365–370). But while the Cruceño festivities were inclusive in that they showcased ‘their’ ethnics and traditions, the represented versions of Guaraní and Guarayos – taken to stand for the entire lowland indigenous population (Lowrey, 2006: 75) – as well as their music and dances were stylized and folkloristic. Autonomy demands, on the other hand, were directly linked to the presentation of white beauty queens and of manly, mainly white defenders of the productive and prosperous department (Gustafson, 2006: 354–355, 365–370). Thus, while the autonomy movement’s discourse broadened the boundary, its actions suggested the appropriate content of this boundary.

In this way, the movement’s discourse and behaviour also led to an increasingly clear definition of the other. Peña Claros and Jordán Bazán (2006: 83) argue that in October 2003, the other to Santa Cruz is not yet clearly articulated; instead, the texts refer to the ‘chaos and convulsion’ taking place in present Bolivia, which should be kept out of the department. In effect, they argue, the other is all that which is not Santa Cruz. The positive in-group identity seems to be more important than the negative out-group identity. By the end of 2005, however, both discourse and action re-emphasize two out-groups in particular. The first other is the ‘unruly’ lowland indigenous. Gustafson (2006: 370) describes how the movement’s shock troops were sent to break up a Guaraní blockade in the department’s poorer, southern periphery, set up in demands of higher shares of gas royalties. The discursive inclusion and folkloric use of lowland indigenous customs, on the one hand, and their active discrimination, on the other hand, may not even seem to be contradictory to the movement’s agents: the latter may simply be perceived as unwilling to be assimilated.
The second other are the highland immigrants, who, according to newspaper representations, threaten the department’s prosperity, which is defended with violence if deemed necessary. Since 1999, and more markedly since 2003, assaults by elite-led, armed thugs such as the UJC on peasant and indigenous activists as well as on sympathetic NGO lawyers increased. The thugs thereby claimed to ‘defend their city’ against ‘invaders’ (Peña Claros and Jordán Bazán, 2006: 67, 146; see also Gustafson, 2006: 354; Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 291). Again, the violent actions may be reconciled with the inclusive discourse by arguing that the immigrants in questions harbour ideological, rather than ethnic, differences. This reading is supported by the actions of Santa Cruz’ sectorial business association which, in 2004, withdrew from their nation-wide counterparts (Eaton, 2007: 88–89) and thus, arguably, underlined their opposition against all Collas, regardless their biological or cultural background.\footnote{Eaton (2007: 89), however, links the break to the rise of a new economic elite of Aymaras.} However, both the actions by the UJC and the business associations did little to disperse racist conceptions of the highland population.

This was shown, for example, in May 2004 when, in this now infamous quote, the Bolivian Miss Universe-contender from Santa Cruz said about her country:

unfortunately, people that don’t know Bolivia very much think that we are all just Indian people […] poor people and very short people and Indian people … I’m from the other side of the country, […] we are tall and we are white people and we know English […] (Oviedo, as cited in ICG, 2004: 14).

Similar, if less explicitly racist sentiments were expressed by representatives of the autonomy movement themselves. Santa Cruz and its January Agenda were repeatedly presented as a role model for the whole of Bolivia, superior to the model presented by the primitive, indigenous Bolivia (ICG, 2004: 14; see also Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 299–301). Being Cruceño was based on the antagonism between a failed and chaotic Bolivia, represented by the west, and a successful Bolivia represented by Santa Cruz, and the January Agenda was seen as a chance to ‘orientalize the occidentals’ (Costas, as cited in Peña Claros and Jordán Bazán, 2006: 63).

In summary, the autonomy movement’s agenda, in contrast to that of the MNC–L, was not separatist but national in scope. Its identity discourse established a non-ethnic, regional conception of the in-group, a discourse which enabled the elites to evade explicitly racist, pro-white and
anti-indigenous, rhetoric (Lowrey, 2006: 72; Eaton, 2007: 91) and which allowed for an expansion of the boundary to include the whole of Bolivia. However, just as the MNC–L, the discourse continued to construct the out-group in ethnic terms by emphasizing the biological and cultural attributes of the boundary, showing that racist conceptions of social relations prevailed.

The autonomy movement seemed to be successful. High turn-out for pro-autonomy protests shows that the elite’s demands were supported by Santa Cruz’ population: at the second cabildo in January 2005, the CPSC presented a list of more than 450,000 signatures for a petition for departmental autonomy (Assies, 2006: 90–91; Centellas, 2010b: 10). The scope and force of the autonomy demonstrations weakened Mesa’s determination to take steps toward gas nationalization and, instead, led him to agree to a referendum on departmental autonomy. In addition, Mesa pronounced a decree for the popular election of departmental prefects. Held together with the presidential and legislative elections in December 2005, Santa Cruz saw the election of former CPSC president Costas as prefect. And with presidential candidate Quiroga from the conservative, pro-business party PODEMOS, regional elite interest promised to be represented at the national level soon again (ICG, 2005: 10–16). The relatively weak performance of Quiroga and the election of Morales to the presidency, however, once more changed the balance of power, entrenching political opposition in the regions and on the streets.

6.3 2006–2010: The polarization and depolarization of discourse and action

The December 2005 elections had turned Bolivia’s political sphere upside down. An indigenous–peasant based social movement was now in government and the traditional national political parties were severely weakened. In response to both developments, an oppositional regional power bloc began to consolidate in the media luna departments and particularly in Santa Cruz. From 2006 to 2008, political relations between the government and opposition would become increasingly polarized, culminating in the use of violence. The period also saw an increasing politicization of regional identity and a move from the construction of an in-group around a positive identity to the construction of an out-group around a negative identity, with both discourse and action turning from implicit to explicit racism. The polarization of in-group

131 The petition showed almost 500,000 signatures but the number was reduced in a verification process by the National Electoral Court (Centellas, 2010b: 10). Some suspect that not all signatures were collected without the threat of violence (for example, Waldmann, 2008: 120–121).
and out-group as well as the equation of out-group with the state also led to the territorialization of politics, not only with regards to government and opposition, but also with regards to political allegiance: a Cruceño cannot be left-wing. The following first sets out the events during the period of highest polarization, 2006 to 2008, and then analyzes the discourse.

‘What this nation should do is to work. We won’t live from the CA, we’ll live from our work’\textsuperscript{132}: Diverging views on Bolivian refoundation

With the election of Morales and the establishment of the MAS government in 2006, the previous power parity of both the indigenous-based and the regional movements in opposition to the government was broken. The polarization continued instead within the institutional framework (see also Yaffar de la Fuente, 2011: 14), and in particular in the CA. Both traditional political parties and civic leaders of the lowland departments opposed the government’s project for a new constitution; apart from departmental autonomy, they were mostly content with the existing institutional framework and certainly preferred it over that proposed by the MAS and affiliated social movements. The constitution writing process began with a consolidation of these two poles, the opposition on the one hand and refounders on the other, both within and external to the CA (see Section 3.3).

Congressional opposition to the MAS’ bill for the formation of a CA led to drastic changes to the bill, including the holding of a referendum on departmental autonomy together with the elections for the CA as well as departmental representation within the CA itself.\textsuperscript{133} The resulting bill stipulated an autonomous CA, free from influence from state institutions; it was to convene in (the nominal capital) Sucre for at least six to a maximum of twelve months; candidates could be proposed by parties, civic groups, as well as indigenous peoples; forty-five of the 255 delegates were elected in the nine regional departments. The text of the new constitution had to be approved by two-thirds of the delegates present and ratified by an absolute majority of the population in a referendum. Finally, departmental autonomy was to be enacted after the promulgation of the new constitution in those departments were the autonomy referendum received

\textsuperscript{132} Dabdoub, as representative of the MNC–L, in a television interview shortly before the election for the CA, as cited in Schilling–Vacaflor (2009: 114).

\textsuperscript{133} The MAS had to concede these points in order to pass the bill. Civic leaders from the departments Beni, Pando, and Tarija had threatened to boycott the CA if no changes were made to the MAS proposal while civic leaders from Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, and Santa Cruz had demanded the inclusion of departmental representation (ICG, 2006: 16).
an absolute majority (ICG, 2006: 15–17). This bill would be the first and last instance of cooperation between the regional opposition and the MAS government for a while (Prado Salmón, 2009: 146).

The inclusion of departmental representation strengthened the participation of opposition parties. The CA elections resulted in 53.7 percent of seats for MAS candidates and 33.7 percent for candidates of the main opposition parties and thus, as neither bloc sported a two-third majority, impeded swift decision making (ICG, 2007b: 3). The split between refounders and opposition mirrored the country’s political regional division: while the MAS was mainly elected in the highlands and Cochabamba, the main opposition party PODEMOS was mainly elected in Beni, Pando, and Santa Cruz (Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 123–124). These results show that the PODEMOS’ political agenda was not only supported by the departments’ elites but also by vast parts of the lowland population. The referendum similarly reflected the regional division as it decided in favour of departmental autonomy in Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, and Tarija, whereas in Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí more than 60 percent of the population voted against autonomy. On the basis of the overall ‘no’ on the national level (57.6 percent), the CA decided to discuss the question of departmental autonomy as part of its deliberations on the new constitution; a decision which would lead to polarization both within and outside the CA (ICG, 2007a: 9; Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 116).

The convention of the CA brought further polarization. The first issue concerned the interpretation of the decision rule set out in the CA bill: the MAS proposed that the two-third majority rule should apply only to sensitive matters and the approval of the whole constitution, whereas the opposition demanded a two-third majority for every article. But also outside the CA polarization increased: lowland prefects and civic committees opposed the proposal of the government to extend land reforms to media luna departments, where implementation had been obstructed earlier, as this would imply restrictions on the use of land or even its redistribution (ICG, 2007a: 3–7; Prado Salmón, 2009: 149).

On 8 September 2006, the CPSC organized a general strike in support of the opposition’s demands. However, for the first time, not everyone in Santa Cruz was supportive; especially around the markets, in the suburb Plan 3000, as well as in the towns San Julián and Yapacani, all areas mainly inhabited by highland immigrants, people resisted and clashes occurred between the latter and UJC troops trying to enforce the strike. Throughout November and December, the
prefects and middle classes of the media luna departments and Cochabamba as well as in the cities La Paz and Sucre called for hunger strikes and protest marches against what they perceived as an illegal takeover by the MAS. In mid-December, cabildos held in all four media luna departments (without Chuquisaca) demanded the two-third majority rule as well as careful consideration of departmental autonomy and threatened with secession should the demands not be met. The increasing polarization discharged in several clashes between government-supporters and -opponents on the streets which, in Cochabamba in January 2007, left two dead and dozens severely injured. It was only after this incident that CA delegates could agree on a compromise, which provided that a referendum would have to decide on those articles which did not achieve a two-third majority in the CA itself. Land reform, on the other hand, was pushed through (ICG, 2007a: 4, 11; 2007b: 4; Prado Salmón, 2009: 148–151).

With the debate on the decision rule solved and the land reform decided, the regional opposition resorted to another issue of contention to, arguably, further obstruct CA negotiations and win over the department of Chuquisaca to rejoin them: departmental delegates in the CA as well as social movements in the department had demanded to transfer the seat of government to the country’s de jure capital Sucre and thus to reconstitute its full capital status, and this demand was now taken up by the media luna civic committees and CA delegates (ICG, 2007a: 12; 2008: 6; Prado Salmón, 2009: 153). When the issue was nonetheless deferred by the CA for fear of further divisions within the population, it was taken to the streets. Large-scale capitalía protests prevented CA meetings until November 2007 and led to re-elections in Chuquisaca, which then actively supported the media luna departments in its opposition to the central government (Centellas, 2010a: 168–169).134

Departmental autonomy, however, remained the main issue of contention. The CA’s decision to discuss it as part of its deliberations on the new constitution was protested in the media luna departments, especially as it was seen that no progress was being made. By May 2008, Santa Cruz’s departmental council had taken matters into its own hands and devised an autonomy statute and convoked a referendum – unsanctioned but not actively prevented by the Bolivian

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134 In these elections, the Chuquisaca population elected as prefect Savina Cuéllar, an indigenous CA member who had previously split with the MAS over Sucre’s capital status. Her new government’s call for autonomy exacerbated the divide between urban and rural Chuquisaca, where most still supported the MAS. This episode further demonstrates that identity politics in Bolivia cannot be reduced to an indigenous–non-indigenous dimension (Centellas, 2010a: 162, 165–169).
government – in which it was soon followed by the other media luna departments. The referen-
dum in Santa Cruz showed high levels of support for autonomy (85.6 percent), but also exhib-
ited a relatively high rate of abstentions (37.9 percent), both with regard to non-voters and
invalid votes. In mid-May, Santa Cruz took the first step in the implementation of its autonomy
statute with the convention of a new departmental legislative assembly (ICG, 2008: 4).

‘Shitty kolla’135: The depiction of an inferior and hostile out-group

The CA elections as well as the autonomy referendum in 2006 considerably contributed to
political polarization: election campaigns were not led with the dissemination of information
but with emotional messages towards either ‘refounding’ or ‘destroying’ Bolivia. This was com-
ounded as the MAS, which had agreed to departmental autonomy in the beginning, changed
course shortly before the referendum and campaigned against it. In the campaign, as well as
within social movement organizations, autonomy proponents were often described as ‘oligarchs,
egoists, secessionists, racists, exploiters, colonizers, foreigners’ and similar (Schilling–Vacaflor,
2009: 116, 136). The MAS called on the population to vote ‘no’ in order to avoid fragmentation
of the country which, Morales argued, was promoted by ‘small conservative and fascists groups’
(ICG, 2008: 10). ‘True Bolivians’ rejected departmental autonomy (de Reinke Buitrago and
Buitrago, 2008: 167). Nationhood discourses of refounders and opposition were thus basically
reversed in the disputes over indigenous and departmental autonomy: while refounders had
argued in favour of pluralism and indigenous autonomy with the argument that it would
strengthen, rather than fragment, Bolivia, they now warned of fragmentation or even secession
in the wake of departmental autonomies. In contrast, advocates of autonomy argued that de-
partmental autonomy would not destroy Bolivia but, on the contrary, guarantee its unity (see de
Reinke Buitrago and Buitrago, 2008: 166).

But just as the central government spoke of ‘true Bolivians’, the Santa Cruz departmental gov-
ernment spoke of ‘true Cruceños’. In mid-2007, the secretary for departmental autonomy of the
prefecture, Carlos Dabdoub Arrien, publicly talked of the ‘civil death’ of ‘enemies of the auton-
omy’, which triggered the circulation of black lists with names of ‘ex-Cruceños’ seen to have
betrayed their people and who now should be punished (Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 291; see also

135 Insults levelled at pro-government protesters during the Massacre of Pando in September 2008 (as cited in Gustaf-
son, 2009: 3).
The autonomy statutes prepared for the referenda continued this radical discourse. Schilling–Vacaflor (2009: 284–287) notes the disproportionate emphasis on identity, culture, and history in all departmental drafts compared to the national draft for the constitution. The indigenous peoples mentioned in the statutes are those native to the region. The presence or rights of the highland indigenous immigrants, although a relatively large group, is not recognized in either statute. The autonomy statute of Santa Cruz, however, seems particularly radical to her.\textsuperscript{137}

While the cultural content of the Cruceño was further emphasized, with attention being paid to the use of the Cruceño speaking style in advertising or the permanent hoisting of the departmental flag (Peña Claros, 2010: 134), the discourse now focused more on the out-group and became increasingly hostile. Besides such threats against enemies of autonomy, disseminated together with misinformation and provocations through conservative print, radio, and television media (Gustafson, 2008: 22; Howard, 2010: 187–190), the autonomy movement’s repertoire of performative politics was ever more extended to violence, such as the burning of effigies and armed assaults. Fabricant (2009: 779), for example, describes how carnival celebrations portrayed the Colla, and especially Morales as stereotypical representative of the Colla, as the enemy by joking about or conducting mock lynchings of Morales. In the wake of the illegal autonomy referenda in September 2008, several buildings were occupied and robbed, with the proclaimed goal to bring state institutions under departmental control. The offices of indigenous organizations as well as those of several NGOs were attacked and destroyed and in the poorer, mostly migrant quarters of the capital Santa Cruz de la Sierra, numerous people were victims of violence. In the aftermath, the attacks were justified as having been ‘provoked by the government’ (Schilling–Vacaflor, 2009: 291).

While the two-thirds, the land reform, as well as the capitalia issue were certainly used by the regional opposition to rally against the MAS, the latter played no small part in the polarization. In the run-up to the December 2006 cabildos, Morales’ call to the military to defend national

\textsuperscript{136} It should be noted that not everyone in the department supports the position of the CPSC, the prefect, or other more radical organizations. In July 2007, a group of Santa Cruceño intellectuals and members of the middle class published a press manifesto criticizing the way in which the department’s institutions had been taken over by ‘people with hidden interests and intolerant attitudes’ (BIF, 2007: 8).

\textsuperscript{137} Prado Salmón (2009: 158), on the other hand, argues that the statute is only as radical as it is thought of as bargaining chip when negotiating the constitution.
unity was perceived in the lowlands as threat of armed repression. Similarly, the military’s
decision to hold its annual parade in August 2007 in Santa Cruz and to invite groups like the
Aymara militants Ponchos Rojos (Red Ponchos) to participate was seen as provocation, espe-
cially as the same group had previously attacked the Supreme Court in Sucre. The situation was
further exacerbated by the militant stance of hard core MAS supporters who repeatedly an-
nounced that they would march on Santa Cruz if national unity was threatened. In summer
2007, a videotape apparently showing civilians in the highlands drilling with assault rifles fur-

It may thus come as little surprise that the political polarization would lead to further clashes in
the streets. The already mentioned deadly clashes in Cochabamba were an attempt of ‘citizens of
Cochabamba’ to ‘free their city’ from indigenous and rural pro-government protesters (Schil-
ling-Vacaflor, 2009: 295; see also ICG, 2007a: 2). Capitalia protests in Sucre in summer 2007
and again in 2008 quickly became overtly racist as well when CA delegates from and supporters
of the MAS as well as Bolivians in traditional dresses were insulted and attacked (Calla and
Muruchi, 2008: 51; Nuñez Reguerin, 2008: 143), with the perpetrators demanding apologies for
actions ‘against the capital’ (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2009: 293–294; see also Section 3.3). The most
violent days, however, happened in the department of Pando when at least eighteen unarmed
pro-government protesters were killed in a departmental-government incensed act of violence
against ‘shitty kolla’ (as cited in Gustafson, 2009: 3; see also Prado Salmón, 2009: 162–163).

From 2006 onwards, then, both the political discourse as well as relations on the street became
ever more polarized and while issues such as the land reform or status of the capital city cer-
cainly played a role, they were current catalysts of long-term processes. The discourses and, in
particular, the violent clashes all may be interpreted varyingly as based on regional, class, or
ideological divides, but racist components cannot be dismissed. Victims of violence were over-
whelmingly of different skin colour or dress, which shows that the Camba–Colla distinction was
again ethnicized or racialized: there were no victims among white or mestizo Collas.

This Massacre of Pando acted as a wake-up call as it shocked the country and led many to reject
the confrontational discourse of the right. The government declared a state of emergency in the
department and oppositional prefects and civic committees accepted Morales’ invitation for a
dialogue for peace, thereby suspending all protest measures. The CA draft was renegotiated
between the refounders and the national, traditional parties and, although more than one hundred articles were changed, approved in both congress and referendum (Prado Salmón, 2009: 162–163; Bebbington and Bebbington, 2010: 152–153).

Taking advantage of its new-found strength, the MAS government initiated a counter-offensive against the regional opposition, including the strategic suing of politicians who were seen to have had promoted the violence (Prado Salmón, 2009: 164; Schilling–Vacaflor, 20.09.2011). The regional opposition was, however, already weakened. The violence in September 2008 led moderate politicians and business leaders to withdraw support. The opposition was further weakened with the great majority of pro-constitution votes in the January 2009 referendum. A final blow was dealt by terrorism charges against regional elites after the army had killed three foreign mercenaries in April 2009, who had allegedly attempted the assassination of Morales. Various local politicians and businessmen implicated in this affair fled into auto-exile. Although the exact course of events remains unclear, they represented the final moment of bifurcation of the opposition. Businesses opted to work with the government, leaving a radical political sector in the form of, for example, the MNC–L behind (Jordán Bazán, 2011; see also Zegada Claure, 04.10.2011; Peña Hasbún, 24.10.2011).138

The decline of the regional opposition went hand in hand with a change in the identity discourse on the Cruceño. While the CPSC and MNC–L mainly maintain their version of both self and other (including the Colla state) – the constitution is argued to be discriminatory, the wiphala flag is not raised, and the so-called Massacre of Terebinto against Cruceños in the 1950s repeatedly recalled (for example, CPSC, 19.05.2009) – the debate is now more open (Zapata Rioja, 20.10.2011; Prado Salmón, 21.10.2011; Jordán Bazán, 21.10.2011). Illustrative here is not only the hosting of an essay competition entitled ‘Unravelling the Cruceño Identity’, but also that one of the winning essays asked whether there is one Cruceño identity to begin with (see Olivares, 28.03.2011). Whether this new debate leads to a re-definition of the Cruceño identity or, more importantly, of regional politics, is another question.

138 Another reason for this new-found cooperation was that businesses profited, rather than lost, from the new government’s policies.
6.4 Discussion and conclusions

The Cruceño, or Camba, identity discourse has seen at least four changes since its conception: in its boundary location, in the categories emphasized, and in the attributes of both the in-group as well as the out-group. First, it has seen changes in its boundary location. It was first defined on the basis of Hispanic attributes, then on the basis of territorial boundaries, and after 2003 on the basis of ideology. With these changes in attributes, the category also changed from being based on biology and perceived as primordial to being based on and perceived of as choice. Second, the discourse changed with regard to which of the two categories was emphasized: first it was the Cruceño (versus the Camba as indigenous), then the Camba as the whole lowland population, and then both in different contexts, with the Cruceño being seen as the inclusive, moderate category.

As hopefully became clear in this chapter, Camba thereby includes all the lowland population, including that of Beni and Pando, while the Cruceño includes the population of Santa Cruz (and, depending on which attributes either category is based, they overlap in part or in whole). However, this distinction does not become clear immediately as both terms are often used synonymously in texts, expert interviews, and within the population. Both terms are also somewhat disputed. For example, Zapata Rioja (20.10.2011) maintains that Cruceño is anyone born in Santa Cruz and that it is thus a regional identity while Camba is a cultural or even ethnic identity. Similarly, Peña Hasbún (24.10.2011) says that everyone in the department is a Cruceño, but that Camba is a more rooted identity. And Moreno Morales (03.10.2012) maintains that the Cruceño is an open identity; open for immigrants, both from the Bolivian highlands and from as far away as Croatia.\(^{139}\) On the other hand, Waldmann (2008: 39–41) recounts a definition of Camba as ‘someone whose great-grandparents are Cruceño and who has social, cultural, and religious roots in Santa Cruz’, or hears that ‘the term Camba refers to all inhabitants of this region’. And a 2001 survey in the department showed that ‘all Cruceños feel Camba but not all Camba feel Cruceño’ (Peña Hasbún et al., 2011: 140).

Neither do interviewees agree on the characteristics of the Camba identity: is it an ethnic and cultural (Zapata Rioja, 20.10.2011), regional (Prado Salmón, 21.10.2011), or indeed a national

\(^{139}\) Brano Marinkovic Jovicevic, president of the CPSC from 2007 to 2009, is the son of a Croatian father and Montenegrin mother. Dabdoub has Lebanese roots.
identity (Peña Hasbún, 24.10.2011)? There is also disagreement about whether the Cruceño is
an ethnic identity. While this can be partly said to be based in different definitions of ethnicity
as such (see also Chapter 2), some disagreement goes beyond this. Some maintain that the
Cruceño is not an ethnic but a regional identity (for example, Zapata Rioja, 20.10.2011; Prado
Salmón, 21.10.2011). Others argue that there is indeed an ethnic component to it (for example,
Estremadoiro Rioja, 04.10.2011; Jordán Bazán, 21.10.2011). Hence, contestation about the
categories Cruceño and Camba is at least as high as for the indigenous category, particularly so
as their constructed nature is often acknowledged and their meaning thus discounted.

Third, the regional identity discourse changed over time in its focus on the in- or the out-group:
in times of crisis, the positive identity discourse focused on the attributes of the in-group
changed towards a focus on the out-group, mainly the Collas, and thus from a discourse of in-
group preference to out-group hostility. Fourth, and related to the former, was the change in the
attributes of the out-group. Until 2003 and, if pressed for a clear definition even today, the Colla
is defined by most as being everyone from the highlands, no matter their skin colour or other
ethnic attributes (Moreno Morales, 03.10.2011; Loayza Bueno, 12.10.2011; Zapata Rioja,
20.10.2011; Prado Salmón, 21.10.2011). It is equated with Andean or Western culture and with
centralism. That is, the Colla identity is seen both as a regional–territorial identity and as a
property of the state (Estremadoiro Rioja, 04.10.2011).

However, there is a clear distinction in the meaning of being a Colla, depending both on social-
economic status and skin colour. On the one hand, a distinction is made between ‘good Colla’
and ‘indian Colla’ (Zapata Rioja, 20.10.2011); whereby the latter are also denoted as ‘kolla shits’
(Achtenberg, 19.09.2011: 3; see also Gustafson, 2009: 3). White Collas are accepted (Loayza
Bueno, 12.10.2011). Thus, although the distinction Colla–Camba is portrayed as regional, it is
(also) racial, taking up once more the distinction between indigenous and white. On the other
hand, there is a distinction according to socio-economic class: ‘Collas con plata’ (Collas with
silver, that is, money), no matter the skin colour, are recognized as partners in business negotia-
tions or marriage (Prado Salmón, 21.10.2011; see also Waldmann, 2008: 53–55). This distinc-
tion, however, is in sociological reality again linked to skin colour. While the Camba–Colla
distinction was always charged with racial chauvinism, it was since 2003 and particularly since
the beginning of Morales’ presidency in 2006 that Colla was increasingly explicitly equated with
highland indigenous.
The regional identity discourse hence highly depends on the hegemonic national identity discourse: it was not capable to establish the Camba or the Cruceño identity as something beyond the classic white–indigenous distinction. And although the discourse gave rise to violent conflict, the violence did not lead to a spiralling out of control but stopped the conflict, and the discourse, in its tracks; the distinction between the Cruceño as better and the other as worse was not anchored strongly enough in society. Neither was this ethnic distinction important enough for the political elites. Once the Morales administration appropriated the discourse on departmental autonomy, there was nothing to fight for anymore, the grievances not strong enough. Overall then, the regional identity discourse thus sees several parallels to that of the indigenous identity discourse: although the bases of both categories are highly contested, the discourses grew in the second half of the twentieth century and were increasingly taking up again during the last decade, but then lost their appeal when the consequences of the stylized and polarized discourses became prevalent.

The regional and indigenous identity discourses also have similarities with regards to their positioning towards state and nation. Both were directed against the state as agent of ‘internal colonization’ and both ethnicized the state; the indigenous discourse portrayed it as white–mestizo, the regional discourse as Colla/highland elite. The latter definition of the state allowed the regional discourse to continue even after the election of Morales, who is now the ‘maximum expression of the Colla’ (Estremadoiro Rioja, 04.10.2011). But despite all this, the Santa Cruz discourse was nationalist. Similar to the indigenous discourse, it was initially not pitched against the nation but put forward as a redefinition. The Cruceño way of life was seen as a model for the whole of Bolivia and it may have been exactly for this reason that, from 2003 onwards, the Cruceño identity was equated with a certain ideological stance and thus to an identity of choice: in this way, the identity was open for Bolivians from other regions and backgrounds. This only changed when, in the elections of 2005 and the constituent assembly, the regional opposition noticed that its vision for the country received little support and it entrenched itself in the media luna. The consequences for regional identification and ethnic relations are examined in the following chapter.
7. Regional and National Identification in Santa Cruz

In the past decade, the Santa Cruceño elite discourse was focused, first, on the positive in-group and on Santa Cruz as a role model for the whole of Bolivia. Later, it became increasingly intensified and focused on the out-group in the form of the Colla and the Bolivian central state. However, all the while neither the in-group nor the out-group was unambiguously defined; the definitions of the Cruceño, the Camba, and even the Colla remain contested (Chapter 6). This suggests that, even if regional identification is widely spread and strong in Santa Cruz, it has relatively little importance for everyday social and political life. This conclusion is supported by the survey analysis conducted in this chapter. If the regional identity discourse affected ethnic identification and relations within and beyond Santa Cruz, we may expect it to raise in-group identification and mobilization, out-group bias, and opposition against the nation both as social as well as political community. However, the hypotheses are only partly confirmed.

Section 7.1 considers Santa Cruceño groupness, examining changing levels of regional identification in the department over time. The findings match well the patterns identified in Chapter 6: identification increases and spreads to all social spheres but, from around 2008 onwards, has an exclusionary effect on those with weaker historic ties to the department, namely highland indigenous immigrants. However, the analysis of otherness and nationness in Sections 7.2 and 7.3, respectively, do not show any evidence of polarizing out-group hatred or rejection of nation and state. On the contrary, Santa Cruceños are not particularly chauvinist, and strong regional identifiers are in fact more likely to report strong attachments to the Bolivian community. This chapter thus confirms once more the importance of distinguishing elements of ethnic identification.
7.1 Groupness: Meaning and political mobilization

The identity discourse by the Santa Cruceño elite meant to raise regional identification in support of demands for departmental autonomy. But has groupness indeed increased in Santa Cruz? Among whom? This section aims to answer these questions in four parts. First, it examines whether Santa Cruceños identify individually as members of the region, if as Cruceño or Camba or with the media luna and, second, who does so to what extent. Third, the section then examines whether Santa Cruceños identify with fellow members of the region as one community. And fourth, it analyzes whether identification translates to support for a regional political agenda.

Unfortunately, these regional identity categories did not receive as much coverage in the LAPOP surveys as the indigenous category; the survey data is therefore at times supplemented with the results of three smaller surveys conducted by local groups of researchers in 2001, 2009, and 2011 (Peña Hasbún et al., 2011; Peña Claros, 2011; fBMD, 2011, respectively). Although all four surveys focused on different issues and, partly, on different identity categories, general trends are apparent.

Changes in regional identification: Identification as Cruceño, Camba, and media luna

As illustrated in Chapter 6, the categories Cruceño and Camba are often used interchangeably and where they are distinguished, there is not always agreement on the basis on which to do so. Another category, media luna, was often used with regard to the political discourse surrounding departmental autonomy. Given that all three categories are included in the LAPOP surveys, it is interesting to compare their appeal and development over time; whether and if so how they differ.

Like those for the other two categories, the question on Cruceño identification was included from 2004 onwards. It was phrased as feeling as member of the department and is here compared to results from all other departments in Bolivia in order to see whether the degree of identification in Santa Cruz is unusually high or low (Figure 7.1a). In Santa Cruz, feeling as

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140 The question asked ‘To what extent do you feel Cruceño?’, with Cruceño exchanged for the respective appellations of the communities in other departments (Paceño in La Paz, Cochabambino in Cochabamba, and so on). The responses for this as to the following questions were recorded on a seven-point Likert scale with 1 meaning ‘not at all’ and 7 meaning ‘very much’. For Figure 7.1a–c, see Table A13, Appendix IV.
member of the departmental community is relatively high, with a mean of 5.63 in 2004 as the lowest over all four survey years. The value increased to 5.95 in 2006 and further to 6.19 in 2008, suggesting a clear association with the political identity discourse of the departmental elite. In 2010, the value decreased again to 5.95, possibly in reaction to the reduced salience of the Cruceño discourse since the fall of the opposition in 2009 (see Chapter 6, also Table 4.1).

But while the values are generally high in Santa Cruz, this is no exception in Bolivia. In fact, feelings of departmental membership in Santa Cruz are always significantly lower than those in the other departments in the country. This departmental difference may be due to individual differences between natives of and immigrants to the departments: as we shall see below, the former display consistently higher feelings of Cruceñoness than the latter. And Santa Cruz is, together with Cochabamba, the department with the highest internal immigration levels in Bolivia (Heins, 2011: 24).

![Figure 7.1: Identification as Cruceño and with Camba culture and the media luna](image)

Moreover, the temporal development is the same in the other departments as in Santa Cruz, with an increase in identification until 2008 and a slight decrease in 2010. This trend remains even when excluding the other media luna departments Beni, Pando, and Tarija, where the identity discourse may have paralleled or been affected by that of Santa Cruz (results not shown). Thus, given the similarity of trends in all of Bolivia, feeling as a member of the departmental community may actually not be the result of the regional identity discourse (alone) but
rather a consequence of the debate surrounding departmental autonomy in general. In any case, the data does exhibit changes in regional identification and strongly suggests that politics does have an effect on something presumably primordial.

For belonging to the Camba culture as well as to the media luna, the impact of the regional identity discourse seems clearer. First, belonging to the Camba culture is spatially constrained: Santa Cruceños report indeed a significantly higher mean belonging to Camba culture than the inhabitants of other departments, including those of the other media luna or lowland departments Beni, Pando, and Tarija, whose population is also sometimes categorized as being Camba. Moreover, in Santa Cruz this attachment slightly increases over time, whereas in all other departments it decreases after 2006 (Figure 7.1b). Second, although belonging to the media luna is more uniform among the lowland departments, it increases more strongly in Santa Cruz until 2008 than in the others, before it levels off again in 2010. Here, too, the low levels of mean belonging among the highland population decrease further after 2006 (Figure 7.1c). Both the increase within the designated in-group as well as the decrease in the out-group suggest a considerable impact of the regional identity discourse, more clearly delineating the boundaries, embracing those on the inside and repelling those on the outside.

Regional identification: Among whom?

Has the change in regional identification been uniform in Santa Cruz or limited to certain sectors of society? If the identity discourse was successful in reducing boundary permeability, as suggested above, this should also be visible within the department itself, with those possessing the respective attributes of each category more likely to identify than those who do not. Since the attributes of each category are not completely clear in themselves, I examine this issue through a series of binary regression analyses, including general demographic and socio-economic variables; political ideology; self-categorization as either indigenous, mestizo, or white; and belonging as either highland indigenous, lowland indigenous, or non-indigenous. The outcome or ‘success’ here refers to high levels of identification, that is, a rating of 6 or 7 on the seven-point scale.

The results show differentiation in high versus average or low levels of identification according to a handful of recurring factors only (Table 7.1): gender and income; indigenous belonging;
and political ideology. Of all demographic and socio-economic factors, only gender and income have a significant if uneven effect. Men are more likely than women to report high levels of feeling as Cruceño and belonging to Camba culture in 2004 and of belonging to the media luna in 2006. And while poorer Santa Cruceños are more likely to identify highly as Cruceño in 2004, richer Santa Cruceños are more likely to identify with the media luna in 2006 and the Camba culture in 2010. That gender ceases to be a significant factor after 2006 and that income neither is a significant factor in 2008 suggests that all three forms of regional identification spread more evenly within the population, particularly in 2008. In other words, in the year of the most pronounced polarization between the national government and the regional opposition, high levels of identification were relatively uniformly distributed throughout the department.

Table 7.1: Results of binary logistic regressions for high levels of feeling/belonging

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cruceño</th>
<th>Camba</th>
<th>media luna</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>1.934 (0.473)**</td>
<td>0.988 (1.379)</td>
<td>-0.520 (0.269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>-0.385 (0.110)**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men</td>
<td>0.549 (0.270)*</td>
<td>0.804 (0.267)**</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belonging</td>
<td>highlands</td>
<td>-1.227 (0.378)**</td>
<td>-1.597 (0.411)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lowlands</td>
<td>0.109 (0.301)</td>
<td>-0.133 (0.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>0.426 (0.351)</td>
<td>2.303 (0.742)**</td>
<td>-3.14 (0.675)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.459 (0.144)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.976 (0.393)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belonging</td>
<td>highlands</td>
<td>-0.923 (0.368)*</td>
<td>-1.418 (0.409)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lowlands</td>
<td>0.362 (0.357)</td>
<td>0.731 (0.350)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-categorization</td>
<td>indigenous</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-1.776 (0.890)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mestizo</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-1.988 (0.770)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>0.176 (0.560)</td>
<td>0.762 (0.810)</td>
<td>-0.408 (0.460)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political ideology</td>
<td>belonging</td>
<td>highlands</td>
<td>-1.083 (0.462)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lowlands</td>
<td>0.194 (0.351)</td>
<td>1.098 (0.352)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-categorization</td>
<td>indigenous</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-2.038 (0.779)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mestizo</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-1.008 (0.669)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

141 For belonging to Camba culture, there also are significant differences according to self-categorization, with indigenous Santa Cruceños being significantly less likely than white Santa Cruceños to identify highly with Camba culture in 2006 and 2008 and mestizo Santa Cruceños in 2006. This suggests that the term Camba has mainly overcome its definition as pejorative denomination for lowland indigenous and is now positively asserted.
### Table 7.2: Feeling Cruceño in 2001, 2009, and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>born in Santa Cruz</td>
<td>91.8%</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>born elsewhere</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>84.0%</td>
<td>93.3%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The gaps between mean levels of identification of highland indigenous and others in the LAPOP data are visualized in Figure 7.2a–c. The gap is bigger for belonging to both Camba culture and the media luna than for feeling as Cruceño, suggesting that the latter is perceived to be a

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142 See Table A14, Appendix IV.
somewhat more inclusive identity category than the former. This conclusion also matches the results in Table 7.2, above: although immigrants are less likely than natives to feel Cruceño, more than two thirds do so. Feeling Cruceño thus seems indeed to be perceived as a category of choice rather than biology.

The figures do not only show a gap between highland indigenous and others but they also show that among highland indigenous, too, there is an increase in regional identification. This reflects an inclusive effect and the power of the positive regional identity which promises success and welfare to those adhering to it (see also Peña Claros, 2011: 15). After 2008, however, and with regard to the media luna already after 2006, this effect declines: among highland indigenous, regional identification decreases noticeably, possibly in response to the ever more radical, out-group emphasizing discourse of the Santa Cruceño elite and the subsequent racial violence. This shows again that, contrary to Barth (1969: 15), not only the boundary but also the content enclosed by the boundary is important.

**Figure 7.2: Identification as Cruceño and with Camba culture and the media luna according to belonging**

- **a) feeling as Cruceño**
  - Mean feeling by year and group

- **b) belonging to Camba culture**
  - Mean belonging by year and group

- **c) belonging to media luna**
  - Mean belonging by year and group

Last, the regressions show that political ideology becomes an important factor for feeling as Cruceño in 2008 and for belonging to the media luna in 2010 (Table 7.1, above). In both cases, more conservative inhabitants are more likely to report high levels of identification than left-wing inhabitants. When taking a closer look at the association between political ideology and identification, it becomes apparent that for all three modes of identification, a positive association with political ideology develops over time, from a nearly horizontal, that is, neutral, linear association in 2004 to a positive one in 2008 and 2010 (Figure 7.3a–c). The development is
existent but relatively weak for the feeling as Cruceño and strongest for belonging to media luna, confirming that the Cruceño category has a broader appeal and has been less politicized than the media luna category, which seems to be mainly based on the distinction of the region to the central state.

In summary, there is not much evidence of an effect of the discourse on individual identification when only comparing departmental identification in Santa Cruz to the rest of Bolivia, even though the increase in Santa Cruz is slightly more pronounced. But there certainly is evidence of a discursive effect when looking more closely at regional identification itself, whether as Cruceño, Camba, or media luna: first, identification has more evenly spread throughout all demographic and socio-economic spheres, even to those feeling belonging to highland indigenous peoples. Second, among the latter the feeling of belonging did not last once the discourse slid from a focus on the positive in-group to one on the negative out-group. And third, at the same time, identification has become somewhat politicized.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>events</th>
<th>time line</th>
<th>survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August survey 1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water War, Cochabamba</td>
<td>August survey 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara–Peasant insurrections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foundation of Camba Nation Liberation Movement</td>
<td>June–July survey 2001</td>
<td>survey by Peña Hasbún et al. (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July survey 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meeting of civic committees of media luna departments; warning of autonomy declaration</td>
<td>February</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas War, Sánchez de Lozada resigns</td>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clashes between UJC and anti-government protesters in Santa Cruz de la Sierra</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miss Universe competition</td>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>first cabildo, proclamation of June Agenda</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>October survey 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hunger strikes, boycotts, and occupations in protest of Mesa government</td>
<td>December</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>second cabildo, proclamation of January Agenda</td>
<td>January</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and presentation of petition for autonomy</td>
<td>June</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesa resigns</td>
<td>December</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legislative and presidential elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March survey 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elections for CA</td>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSC-organized strike supporting CA opposition; clashes between UCJ and pro-government protesters</td>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third cabildo; threats of secession</td>
<td>December</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deadly clashes between pro- and anti-government protesters in Cochabamba</td>
<td>January</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>events</strong></td>
<td><strong>time line</strong></td>
<td><strong>survey</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>begin of <em>Capitalia</em> protests in Sucre, supported by CPSC</td>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circulation of black lists of ‘enemies of autonomy’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-government protesters in Santa Cruz seize airport</td>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>convocation of illegal autonomy referendum; convention of autonomous legislative assembly in Santa Cruz</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>survey 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violent pro- and anti-government protests</td>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occupations of state institutions in Santa Cruz</td>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massacre of Pando, declaration of state of emergency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2009</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constitution approved in referendum</td>
<td>January</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alleged assassination attempt on Morales, terrorism charges against Santa Cruceño elites</td>
<td>April</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>FES survey (Peña Claros, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>presidential elections, sanctioned autonomy referenda</td>
<td>December</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local and departmental elections</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>survey 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law against racism and all forms of discrimination</td>
<td>April</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011</strong></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>fBDM survey (2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Santa Cruceño community: Trust and cohesion

The changes in individual identification as Cruceño, Camba, or media luna may be the result of rising salience of these categories through the intensification of the departmental autonomy discourse. An examination of mutual trust can show whether it remained an individual-level identification – an identification as – or whether it also extended to the group level – an identification with other members. Unfortunately, the LAPOP surveys asked for trust into different categories in 2006 only, so merely a snapshot analysis is possible. Moreover, the questions were limited to the Camba category, not providing information for the Cruceño or media luna category.

One question asked about the trustworthiness of Cambas. With 61.2 percent of all Santa Cruceños, the majority thinks that Cambas are either very or somewhat trustworthy, while only 7.9 percent perceive them to be not at all trustworthy. Within the department as a whole, Cambas thus enjoy reasonable levels of trust: by way of comparison, in the same year only 55.6 percent of the departmental population think that people in general are very or somewhat trustworthy, while 12.8 percent think that they are not at all trustworthy. But trust is stratified according to levels of regional identification (Figure 7.4a). Santa Cruceños with high levels of identification, whether as Cruceño or with Camba culture or the media luna, are significantly
more likely to say that Cambas are very trustworthy than those with lower levels of identification. The difference in trust is largest for belonging to Camba culture. These data suggest that for high identifiers, Cambaness is indeed not only an individual- but also a group-level identification.

When asked which category of people Santa Cruceños deem most trustworthy, Cambas again feature prominently (Figure 7.4b). With 31.8 percent of responses, the Camba category is named significantly more often than any other category, with the exception of ‘all equally’, which was chosen by 38.3 percent of all respondents. The 2009 survey by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Peña Claros, 2011: 66–67) similarly found that Santa Cruceños trust Cambas considerably more than Collas or even mestizos.

Moreover, a binary logistic regression of the LAPOP data for the outcome Camba supports the conclusion that Cambaness is an identification not only at the individual but also the group level: the likelihood of deeming Camba the most trustworthy ethnic category increases by a factor of 1.78 per increase in identification rating. The only other significant factor is belonging to an indigenous people, with lowland indigenous being circa 2.5 times more likely to name Camba than non-indigenous Santa Cruceños, again suggesting that the term Camba is now a positively asserted term by the indigenous inhabitants in the lowlands.  

The limited data on interpersonal trust thus shows relatively high levels of cohesion among those who identify as Camba. But there is also some indication for group-level identification among Cruceños: in a survey of characteristics attributed to Cruceños in 2009, those chosen most often are positive, namely hospitable, cheerful, lavish, solidary, and tolerant (Peña Claros, 2011: 74; see also Figure 7.7a, below).

Regional mobilization: Action based on identification

Finally, is groupness among Santa Cruceños transferred into support for political action for collective benefit? During the past decade, the main concern in this regard was that of departmental autonomy. The LAPOP surveys included questions on that issue, albeit limited to single survey rounds.

143 See Footnote 141. See Table A15, Appendix IV.
In Santa Cruz, support for greater regional say is, not surprisingly, significantly higher than in the rest of the country, mirroring the results of the autonomy referendum in 2006 (see Section 6.3). In 2004, when asked about the desired influence of civic committees and regional representatives in order to improve the situation of the country, significantly more inhabitants of Santa Cruz would hand them a lot of influence than the inhabitants of the other media luna departments or the highland departments (Figure 7.5a).

In 2008, one question asked whether respondents think that departmental autonomy will be positive or will give rise to other problems. In Santa Cruz, 69.1 percent of the population respond with ‘positive’, significantly more than the 50.7 percent in the media luna and the 30.3 percent in the highlands (Figure 7.5b). The question was changed in 2010 from a binary to a rated response. Now, Santa Cruceños are similarly significantly more positive about departmental autonomy than others, although the differences are less pronounced than in 2008 (Figure 7.5c) – either due to changes in public opinion or due to changes in the question format.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{144}The difference between Santa Cruceños and all others is significant at p<0.001.
Overall, then, support for greater self-determination is relatively high in Santa Cruz compared to the other departments.

Within Santa Cruz, support for increased self-determination seems to have become determined by regional identification over time. In 2004, there are no significant differences according to identification when considering desired influence of civic committees and regional representatives (results not shown). In 2008 and 2010, on the other hand, positive opinion of departmental autonomy is significantly more likely among high identifiers, no matter whether as Cruceño–Camba or with the media luna (Figure 7.6a–b). While around 50 percent of average or low identifiers, too, are positive about departmental autonomy and while this does not determine the direction of causation – whether high identifiers grew fonder of departmental autonomy or autonomists identified higher with the region – a link between politics and identification cannot be completely denied.

In conclusion, although there is not much data available on regional identification, the data there is indicates some effect of the discourses and events of the past decade on Santa Cruceño groupness. Increases in identification are slightly higher in Santa Cruz than in other depart-

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145 For the survey year 2010, ‘positive’ consists of all ratings of 6 or 7 on the seven-point scale. For both years, I created a summary measure for Cruceño and Camba identification, indicating whether respondents rate consistently high for both, because the correlation between the individual measures was relatively high ($\rho_{2008}=0.654, \rho_{2010}=0.616$).
ments; identification has more evenly spread to all demographic and socio-economic spheres; and identification has been politicized, particularly in 2008, the year of the most pronounced polarization between the national government and the regional-based opposition. The latter is also noticeable in support for political rights for the departments, which became linked to regional identification. Finally, the effect of the discourse may also be seen when looking at those inhabitants with weaker historical ties to the region: while the rather positive, inward-looking discourse beginning in 2003 had an inclusive effect on all Santa Cruceños, the more negative, outward-looking discourse led to a decrease in identification among those Santa Cruceño inhabitants linked to the out-group, both by geographic origin and political ideology.

7.2 Otherness: Prejudice and political tolerance

Following the 2005 national elections, the opposition barricaded itself in the regions, accompanied by a discourse which focused on the negative traits of the out-group. The out-group included mainly the highland, and in particular the indigenous highland, population and, linked to this population, the central state. The latter is examined in the following section, as the rightful administrator of the citizenry (Section 7.3); here, attitudes toward the Colla and highland indigenous other are analyzed. The section finds that indeed some prejudice against and political intolerance towards these out-groups exists, but that this is not directly linked to levels of regional groupness.

Prejudice: Attitudes toward the ethnic other

Following the identity discourse, the Santa Cruceño population would be expected to harbour prejudices against the so-called Colla population. Indeed, the study by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in 2009 found that Collas, however defined, are mainly associated with somewhat unfavourable character traits, such as being thrifty, business-minded, aggressive, as well as distrustful and unkempt (Peña Claros, 2011: 66–67; Figure 7.7a). The positive image of the in-group (see above) is thus contrasted with a rather negative image of the out-group, which suggests that the boundary between Cruceños and Collas is perceived to be relatively strict. The study also found that Collas are trusted least of all Bolivians, followed only by non-Bolivians such as Brazilians, Argentineans, and Peruvians, which supports this suggestion.
A similar picture emerges from the LAPOP data when asking about the trustworthiness of Aymaras and Quechuas – as highland indigenous the ‘maximum expression’ of the Colla (see Chapter 6). Figure 7.7b shows the percentage of identifiers distrusting Aymaras and Quechuas, compared to the percentage of those distrusting people in general. Among consistently high Cruceño–Camba identifiers, distrust in Aymaras and Quechuas is both significantly higher than their general distrust and higher than that of the inconsistent/low identifiers. A series of binary logistic regressions confirms that distrust is indeed and, of the included variables, only determined by Cruceño–Camba identification. For both Aymaras and Quechuas, the likelihood of distrust increases by a factor of around 2 with every increase in identification. In Santa Cruz, then, high identification with the in-group is indeed linked to low levels of trust to an out-group, in this case, members of highland indigenous peoples.

Figure 7.7: Character traits and trustworthiness of Santa Cruceño out-groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character Trait</th>
<th>Cruceños</th>
<th>Collas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospitable</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheerful</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generous</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidary</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business-minded</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrustful</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unkempt/dirty</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrifty</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shy</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

adapted from: Peña Claros (2011: 74).

Yet according to other indicators, the in-group–out-group boundary is not as strict. When the questions asked for indigenous people in general, rather than for Aymaras and Quechuas in particular, a mixed picture emerges. High and low identifiers do not differ significantly in their explanations for indigenous poverty, given the choice between more or less discriminating

146 See Table A16, Appendix IV.
Agreement to a marriage of a child to an indigenous spouse, in turn, in 2010 does not differ according to Cruceño–Camba identification but is negatively correlated with media luna identification ($\rho=0.170$); those with higher levels of belonging to the media luna are on average less inclined to agree to a marriage.

Other surveys further blur the picture. On the one hand, a majority of Santa Cruceños (52.2 percent) deem the department the most racist one in the country (UNIR, 2008a: 12). On the other hand, an even bigger majority (83.9 percent) thinks that Santa Cruz is an open society (Peña Claros, 2011: 75) and, according to a survey conducted by the Fundación Boliviana por la Democracia Multipartidaria (Bolivian Foundation for Multiparty Democracy, fBDM; fBDM, 2011: 26), only 2 percent of all Santa Cruceños consider ethno–cultural belonging to be very important when choosing their circle of friends. As all these survey questions used different formulations, let alone different samples at different points in time, they are not directly comparable. Yet they do show that, although the items on Colla and Aymara and Quechua trust, above, may seem to indicate otherwise, otherness in Santa Cruz is flexible and situational.

Prejudice: Attitudes toward the regional other

The analyses so far have considered ‘ethnic’ rather than regional otherness as such. A couple of questions in the LAPOP 2004 survey addressed regional chauvinism, the conviction that some departments are better than others. Based on the political discourse, which depicted Santa Cruz as a role model for the whole of Bolivia, regional chauvinism may be expected to be relatively widespread in the department. However, this is not the case. One question asked whether the development of the country is due to only a couple of departments or based on the efforts of all Bolivians. In Santa Cruz, those who advocate the former represented a larger proportion (22.9 percent) than in the other media luna departments (19.4 percent) or the highland departments (12.7 percent); but this also means that still the vast majority of Santa Cruceños rated the efforts of all Bolivians equally. Moreover, a series of binary logistic regressions for this response outcome shows that education and belonging are the only two significant factors at play: the more highly educated, the more likely individuals are to think that the development is only due to a couple of departments. And lowland and non-indigenous are more likely to think so than high-

147 Results not shown. For details on the question, see Section 5.2.
land indigenous. Neither form of regional identification, whether Cruceño, Camba, or media luna, is a significant factor.\textsuperscript{148}

Another question followed up with explanations for why some departments are richer than others (Figure 7.8). Among all Bolivians, there is more or less agreement that this is the case because some departments have more resources than others and because the state-wide economic policies are not conducive to development. The biggest proportion of the media luna department blames the centralism of La Paz, which does not allow other departments to develop. Yet they do not, for the most part, think that some departments are richer because people in these departments work more, and those in the poorer departments less. On the contrary, this thought is more prevalent in the highland departments than in Santa Cruz or the other media luna departments. Regional chauvinism is thus not as widely spread in Santa Cruz as may have been expected, and neither is otherness towards the indigenous populations in general.

\textbf{Figure 7.8: Reasons for uneven development according to department, 2004}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7.8.png}
\end{figure}

\begin{description}
\item[] some departments have more resources than others
\item[] in some departments people work more
\item[] centralism in La Paz stifles development of other departments
\item[] economic policies do not allow development
\item[] none of the above
\end{description}

\begin{itemize}
\item Santa Cruz
\item Beni, Pando, Tarija
\item highland departments
\end{itemize}

\textit{Political tolerance toward the other}

If attitudes toward the Colla or highland indigenous other in general are mixed rather than unambiguously negative, this may be due to a sense of security; the other is tolerated because its members do not as such threaten the generally privileged position of Santa Cruceños. But what if the status quo of the collective power relationship is threatened? This sub-section examines

\textsuperscript{148} See Table A17, Appendix IV.
the political tolerance of Santa Cruceños toward the other, looking at attitudes towards indigenous collective rights such as to language rights or autonomy, as well as toward the indigenous as political actor. For every analysis, the population of Santa Cruz is compared to that of Bolivia in general before the composition of the Santa Cruz response is examined.

Table 7.4 shows approval for indigenous collective rights according to department and regional identification. In both 2004 and 2006, approval of language rights is generally fairly high: on a seven-point scale, Santa Cruceños report an average rate of around 5. For all realms – indigenous languages in radio and TV emissions, teaching, and civil service – the average rating in Santa Cruz is significantly lower than in the other departments. But while the regional political discourse seemed to suggest a drop in approval ratings between 2004 and 2006, the opposite is the case: in Santa Cruz, approval for language rights in radio and TV as well as education increased (Table 7.4a). Moreover, the approval ratings in 2006 are now positively associated with the degree of Cruceño and Camba identification (Table 7.4b). Thus, not only are strong regional identifiers not opposed to indigenous language rights, they are actually more likely to be supportive of them. This finding corroborates the suggestion of Chapter 2 that in-group identification and out-group hatred are not necessarily linked; on the contrary, identification may even be associated with higher levels of tolerance for the other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.4: Approval for indigenous rights according to department and regional identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a) mean approval for indigenous collective rights according to department</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all other departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. difference between 2004 and 2006: * p≤0.01, ** p≤0.001, * not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. difference to Santa Cruz: * p≤0.01, ** p≤0.001, * not significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>b) Spearman’s ρ correlation of approval for indigenous language rights with degree of regional identification, Santa Cruz</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The question on civil service has only been asked in 2004.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>radio and TV</th>
<th>teaching</th>
<th>civil service</th>
<th>omy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
<td>0.264**</td>
<td>0.012**</td>
<td>-0.029*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.312**</td>
<td>0.066*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruceño</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camba</td>
<td>-0.083*</td>
<td>0.111*</td>
<td>0.092*</td>
<td>-0.019*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>media luna</td>
<td>-0.059*</td>
<td>-0.020*</td>
<td>-0.092*</td>
<td>-0.082*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.015*</td>
<td>-0.208**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[c. \* p \leq 0.05, \** p \leq 0.001, \text{not significant}\]

In 2010, approval for indigenous autonomy is positive too, but to a lesser extent. Again, it is significantly higher in other departments than in Santa Cruz (Table 7.4a). However, here approval has no correlation with Cruceño or Camba identification but a negative one with media luna identification; those who identify stronger with the media luna approve less of indigenous autonomy (Table 7.4b). The results mirror those of Chapter 5 for the Bolivian population as a whole: Bolivians are more opposed to political than cultural rights, particularly if those are perceived to potentially affect all (other) Bolivians adversely. The results also support the conclusion above that the media luna category is more politicized than the other two.

**Figure 7.9: Attitudes towards indigenous Bolivians in politics, 2004 and 2010**

\(a)\) indigenous president worrisome, 2004  \(b)\) indigenous movement’s perceived impact on democracy, 2010

Finally, two LAPOP questions concerned the indigenous as political actor. In 2004, one question asked whether the respondent is worried that the next president may be of indigenous origin. Within Santa Cruz, there are no significant differences in the responses according to identification, but there are between Santa Cruz and the rest of Bolivia. In Santa Cruz, 48.6 percent of the population are concerned, compared to 32.7 percent in the other departments (Figure 7.9a).
similar picture emerges towards the end of the decade, with no differences according to identification, but between Santa Cruz and Bolivia. In 2008, Santa Cruceños report lower levels of confidence in the indigenous movement than others. And in 2010, they are significantly less likely to say that the indigenous movement has improved Bolivian democracy (Figure 7.9b). Taking both questions on the indigenous as political actor together, then, it seems that levels of political intolerance against indigenous Bolivians in Santa Cruz are elevated in general, independent of one’s regional identification.

In summary, some prejudice against the other exists in Santa Cruz, although this depends on the other specified. Prejudice does not directly link to political intolerance, however, at least not with regard to identification. On the contrary, those who identify highly with a regional collective are more likely to be politically tolerant of the indigenous populations. There is limited time-series data but what there is does not indicate a detrimental impact of the discourse on otherness: support for language rights actually increased rather than decreased in Santa Cruz between 2004 and 2006.

7.3 Nationness: Being part of the Bolivian political and social community

Opponents of departmental autonomy expressed concern that its instatement would lead to a strengthening of ties to the region and as a consequence to a weakening of ties to the Bolivian nation (Section 6.3). With its focus on the Santa Cruceño versus the other, the regional identity discourse indeed seemed to undermine Bolivian unity as one social community, and a Bolivian political community was only desired within a political system following the Santa Cruceño model. This section examines national attachment both with regard to the political community and the social community. It finds that the regional identity discourse likely did not have a considerable impact on national identification, as there are no significant changes over time which would fit the discourse as hypothesized. On the contrary, it is more likely that national identification in Santa Cruz, too, has been affected by the national discourses and events instead. The results corroborate the findings of Chapter 5: sub-national and national identification are not mutually exclusive, be they ethnic or regional, but possibly even reinforcing.

150 Means: Santa Cruz=3.64, all other departments=3.95, p<0.001.
Political community

Following the regional identity discourse, support for the Bolivian political community should have decreased over the past years as opposition against the centralist state and the new constitution grew. However, levels of national identification in Santa Cruz are very similar to those in the other departments. Santa Crueños even exhibit higher levels of pride in the political system in 2006, and although these level decrease somewhat until 2008, they are now comparable to those in the other departments, not considerably lower (Figure 7.10a). Similarly, levels of political system support vary over time together with those in other departments, with a considerable increase in 2006, followed only by a small decrease (Figure 7.10b).

Figure 7.10: Pride in and support for political system according to department and regional identification

a) pride according to department

b) support according to department

c) pride according to regional identification

d) support according to regional identification

151 For Figure 7.10a–b, see Table A18, Appendix IV.
When considering both pride and support with regard to regional identification, there are hardly any differences either (Figure 7.10c–d).²² Strong media luna identifiers are significantly but only slightly less proud and supportive than others in the year 2010 alone. Among Cruceño–Camba identifiers, too, the differences are very small. Consistently high Cruceño–Camba identifiers differ from others in their levels of pride in 2006 and of support in 2006 and 2008, but for both measures, they exhibit higher levels than others. Thus, in the year of the most pronounced polarization between region and state, the national allegiance of strong regional identifiers did not lessen, if anything it increased. That media luna identification differs from Cruceño–Camba identification in this regard supports the conclusions inferred above that it is a more political than social identification. And that strong media luna identifiers are less proud and supportive than others in 2010 suggests that some grievances persist.

Perhaps with the exception of high media luna identifiers in 2010, there thus seems to be little desire in Santa Cruz to depart from the Bolivian political community. This conclusion is supported by the responses to another set of questions. When asked whether the country should be divided or remain united, the vast majority of respondents in all years replied with ‘remain united’. Moreover, in Santa Cruz, this proportion actually increases, rather than decreases, over time (Figure 7.11a). Stratified according to regional identification, there are hardly any differences (results not shown).

Another question in 2008 asked what respondents mean when they talk about departmental autonomy: the deepening of the decentralization process, the introduction of decision-making capacities for the departments, or the division of the country. In the media luna departments, the majority refers to either a deepening of decentralization or greater decision-making capacities. In the highlands, on the other hand, 52.7 percent of the population refers to the division of the country. In other words, those accused of secessionism do not actually have that in mind (Figure 7.11b).

Figure 7.11: Political unity of Bolivia according to department and regional identification

a) Bolivia ‘should remain united’  b) meaning of departmental autonomy, 2008

²² Because the magnitude of difference is visibly very small, significant values are not reported in detail.
This is further supported when looking at the make-up of those who refer to ‘division of the country’ in Santa Cruz: a series of binary logistic regressions shows that, beside age, identification with the media luna is the only factor affecting the response.\(^{153}\) Moreover, the latter association is negative, that is, the more respondents identify with the media luna the less likely they are to vote for division. Again, responses to this question do not show a supremacist Cruceño minority. With regard to the Bolivian political community, then, the regional identity discourse did not seem to have an adverse, much less lasting, effect.

**Social community**

The regional identity discourse did not have an adverse effect on the Bolivian social community either, despite its emphasis on the productive and successful Santa Cruz versus the chaotic and failed Bolivia. In Santa Cruz, feeling as Bolivian citizen is generally very high, with a minimum mean of 6.23 on a seven-point scale. The departmental mean is slightly lower than that in other Bolivian departments but increases from 2006 onwards too, closing the gap (Figure 7.12a).\(^{154}\) Similarly, pride in being Bolivian is, until 2008, weaker than in other departments but the smallest mean pride is 5.9 on a seven-point scale, that is, still relatively high. Neither do levels of pride decrease over time. On the contrary, they increase quite considerably in 2008, the year of the most pronounced polarization between the department and the central state (Figure 7.12b). Finally, the opinion that Bolivians are a community despite their differences also gains, rather

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\(^{153}\) Results not shown. Age has a slight but nevertheless significant impact. This may be due to several issues: the younger may be more polarized or simply less informed than the older.

\(^{154}\) Because the effect size, that is, the magnitude of differences, is visibly very small, the significance values for this and the following analyses are not reported in detail.
than loses, currency over time. In Santa Cruz, there is a small decrease between 2004 and 2006 but a more considerable increase until 2008, almost in parallel with that of the other departments (Figure 7.12c).

According to regional identification, this time strong identifiers of all three regional identifications are, if anything, significantly more likely to feel a sense of Bolivian social community. Feeling as Bolivian citizen is not only very high everywhere in Bolivia, but it is also positively associated with regional identification. In all years, identification as Cruceño and Camba is significantly positively correlated, and identification with the media luna in 2006, too. Figure 7.13a shows the mean feeling for high identifiers according to all categories, compared to the average Santa Cruceño feeling as Bolivian. For all categories, high identifiers feel more strongly Bolivian than others. Similarly, high regional identifiers are more likely to be more proud of being Bolivian, particularly for Cruceño and Camba identification. For media luna identification, strong identifiers are less likely to be proud of being Bolivian in 2004, yet this changes as average pride among them also increases (Figure 7.13b).

Figure 7.12: Attachment to the social national community according to department

- feeling as Bolivian citizen
- pride in being Bolivian
- unity despite diversity

Figure 7.13: National attachment among strong regional identifiers in Santa Cruz

- feeling as citizen
- pride in being Bolivian
Finally, there are no differences between identifiers with regard to the opinion that, despite their differences, Bolivians form a community (Figure 7.13c). Thus, overall, there is no association between the intensity and direction of the regional identity discourse and pride in being Bolivian. These results are confirmed by the fBDM (2011: 27) survey. Although 87% of all respondents said they do identify as Cruceño, 47.5% of all respondents also said that they identify most as Bolivian – regional and national identifications are not mutually exclusive.

### 7.4 Conclusions

In her 2006 analysis of ethnic relations in Bolivia, Lowrey (2006: 64) described the autonomy movement of Santa Cruz as the one ‘most immediately threatening to the integrity of any nation-state in the Americas’. Although this conclusion follows straightforwardly from the elite discourse, it is contradicted by the results of a survey analysis of the department’s population: while the salience of regional identification increased and was politicized, and while relatively high levels of out-group prejudice and political intolerance do exist, Santa Cruceños do not exhibit unusually high levels of regional chauvinism, nor do they desire a break-up of the existing Bolivian state.
As discussed in Section 7.1, the regional identity discourse did seem to have an effect on Santa Cruceño groupness. Identification with the department, the lowlands, and the media luna increased more rapidly in Santa Cruz than in any other department and it did so within all social spheres. Moreover, identification, particularly with the media luna, was increasingly politicized and later had an exclusionary rather than inclusionary effect on Santa Cruceños originating in the highlands. Higher levels of identification were linked to higher trust and cohesion as well as to stronger support for departmental autonomy. Yet in 2010, following the fall of the regional opposition and the normalization of the political sphere, levels of identification decreased again somewhat.

Moreover, Section 7.2 showed that Santa Cruceños do harbour prejudices and political intolerance against the diverse other targeted by the regional identity discourse: the Colla and, in particular, the highland indigenous Bolivian. However, this seems to be a latent state in Santa Cruz as it is not linked to the strength of regional identification as such. On the contrary, strong identifiers seem more politically tolerant than others. Nor is the strength of regional identification linked to regional chauvinism; in general, few Santa Cruceños seem to judge their department to be inherently better than others. A general positive view of the in-group thus does not necessarily link to a negative, or not as positive, view of the out-group.

Finally, as shown in Section 7.3, Santa Cruceños in general and high identifiers in particular are not considerably less attached to the Bolivian social and political community, nor did their attachment decrease with the intensification of the regional identity discourse. This section demonstrated not only that sub-national and national identification are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but also that they may be positively associated: those who identify strongly with a region also identify strongly with the state and the nation. It would be interesting to discern, in future research, whether there is a direct, causal link between the two forms of identification or whether it depends on another, hitherto unobserved character trait.
8. Conclusions

Bolivia’s politicization of indigenous and, later on, regional identity categories has been met with some concern by observers in academia and policy alike. They feared that this politicization may cause the deterioration of ethnic relations, a process repeatedly observed in other countries around the world. It was the aim of this thesis to systematically analyze the consequences of the politicization of identity categories over time. In particular, its aim was to analyze i) the nature of the indigenous and regionalist identity discourses (politicization of ethnicity); ii) whether indigenous and regionalist groups exist and to what extent they have changed in response to the discourses (groupness); iii) whether and to what extent relations to the respective other have changed (otherness); and iv) whether and to what extent national unity has been affected by the discourses (nationness).

First, both the hegemonous indigenous and the regionalist identity discourses changed over the decade. During the protest cycle from 2000 to 2005, indigeneity was often invoked to delineate the Bolivian citizenry from the neoliberalist, elitist regime and thus increasingly included in the changing notion of Bolivianhood. The discourse became ever more assertive surrounding the general elections of 2005 and the Morales’ first years in office, when the marginalized position of the indigenous populations as well as their unity in the goal of refounding the nation was repeatedly stressed. Yet during the refoundation process, while writing and implementing the new constitution, a diversity of conceptions of indigeneity became apparent. These led to still-ongoing disputes on the nature of indigenous rights and a delegitimization of Morales as representative of the indigenous populations of Bolivia as a whole.
The regionalist Cruceño identity discourse similarly changed over time. Focused first on a positive in-group image of the orderly and productive Santa Cruceño, the discourse radicalized soon, shifting to a focus on a negative out-group image of the chaotic and lazy Bolivian. Yet this latter discourse did not meet with resonance in the population and here, too, diverging views on the content of the Cruceño emerged with the marginalization of the regional opposition.

The developments of both discourses met the predictions of the prevailing literature only in parts. The mobilization of indigenous and regional identity categories did not lead to a clearer definition of the ethnic boundary. On the contrary, the in-group attributes are now more contested, its boundaries more blurry than before. Moreover, although both discourses became more radical over time, the radicalization did not last as neither discourse met with resonance in the population. Finally, with the exception of some radical fringe groups, neither discourse was aimed to replace the nation but to redefine it. Advocates of both the indigenous as well as the Cruceño considered their empowerment as simultaneously strengthening Bolivian national unity. Interestingly, this view changed once the respective other category was considered; their empowerment, so the argument, would weaken national unity. Thus, while both identity discourses changed and shortly radicalized over time, they did not spiral out of control.

Second, the thesis examined the effects of the political identity discourses on indigenous and Cruceño groupness. It found changes in self-categorization, identification, and cohesion that can be clearly linked to the development of the discourses. With regard to indigenous groupness, the inclusive discourse of the protest cycle was linked with an increase in the number of Bolivians categorizing themselves as indigenous. The assertive discourse during Morales’ first term was linked to an increase in the extent to which individuals identify as indigenous as well as in the sense of cohesion among indigenous Bolivians as one community. However, this sense of cohesion decreased with the rising salience of diverging conceptions of indigeneity in the later years.

The Cruceño identity discourse, too, was linked to changes in Cruceño groupness. During the positive in-group discourse of the first half of the decade, identification with the region increased and spread to all social spheres within the department. Moreover, higher levels of identification were linked to higher degrees of trust and cohesion and stronger support for collective rights in the form of departmental autonomy. The following negative out-group discourse, however, repelled Bolivians in other departments as well as highland indigenous immigrants in
Santa Cruz itself. With the fall of the regional opposition and the normalization of the political sphere, levels of identification decreased among all Santa Cruceños.

That is, the thesis has shown that both political identity discourses had a direct effect on individuals’ identification as and with the respective ethnic category, confirming the prevalent literature’s hypothesis on this matter. But not only has it shown that ethnopoltics increases groupness, as hypothesized, it has also demonstrated the decline of groupness, a development rarely considered in the literature. Moreover, the thesis suggests that different facets of groupness – self-categorization, assertiveness, and cohesion – react differently to different discourses. Future research may examine this link between the nature of the discourse and groupness more closely. For example, does a rise in cohesion depend on a rise in assertiveness or does it follow directly from the discourse? In which contexts? When are the dynamics self-perpetuating, when do they subside?

Third, this thesis examined the effect of the political identity discourses on ethnic relations, that is, on attitudes towards the other. The findings for both indigenous and Cruceño otherness did not match the predictions of the prevalent literature, which would expect the deterioration of ethnic relations. Although prejudices and discrimination across the respective boundaries persist, they have not considerably worsened over the decade, let alone spiralled out of control. The link between groupness and otherness, if it exists, is thus not a straightforward one. Increased groupness is not necessarily associated with increasingly negative perceptions of the other or even with support for their political repression. On the contrary, few Bolivians oppose indigenous collective rights, and in Santa Cruz in particular, those who identify strongly with the region are actually more supportive of indigenous collective rights than others. That groupness and otherness are not necessarily linked can also be seen in the political discourse: discourses with an exclusive stance toward the other, such as Quispe’s indianism, the MNC–L Camba nationalism, or the Cruceñista discourse later on, did not resonate with the population. In light of these findings, future research projects may be interested in exploring the link between in-group identification and out-group aversion more closely. The ubiquitous question in ethnopoltics – ‘Why do people follow?’ – may be more usefully rephrased into ‘When do people follow?’, which also necessitates a careful analysis of when people do not follow.
Finally, this thesis examined the effect of the political identity discourses on Bolivian national unity. Although, as already pointed out above, neither discourse was conceived as a challenge to the Bolivian nation but rather as a redefinition, both emphasized the contested nature of Bolivianhood. Yet despite this contestation of Bolivianhood, Bolivianness is strong and became even stronger over the past years. Attachment to both the social and the political Bolivian community increased among Bolivians of all backgrounds. Moreover, the attachment is particularly strong among those who strongly identify with their sub-national category. This thesis thus puts in doubt the validity of the prevalent hypotheses on the matter, which suggest that sub-national and national identification are mutually exclusive. Future research may discern whether there is a direct, causal link between the two forms of identification or whether this depends on the specific political and sociological context.

This thesis is not without its limitations. In particular, the survey method used here may be criticized on several grounds. While the surveys enabled the analysis of the attitudes and opinions of a vast number of Bolivians over several years, the kind of information offered is necessarily restricted. Questions on ethnic identification offered only limited and, moreover, mutually exclusive response opportunities which may have affected the responses recorded. The comparison of different questions showed clearly that the responses differed with the questions asked. Open-ended questions may offer deeper insights into individuals’ self-identification.

The survey method itself may also affect the answers given. Social desirability bias in particular – respondents’ tendency to answer in such a way as to be favourably perceived by the interviewer – may skew the results and thus inferences as to the dynamics of ethnic change. For example, the rise in indigenous assertiveness observed during Morales’ first term may not actually be an increase in assertiveness but only in its reporting. Of course, this in itself is a finding but pertains more to the outside pressures an individual faces than to changes in identification as such.

Last, it may be criticized that, although the data covers several time points over the last decade, the distances between the time points is relatively large, and that not for all analyzed aspects all time points were available. Moreover, the survey years cover different individuals and thus do not provide longitudinal data, which may be more clearly able to chart changes in ethnic identification. In this thesis, I attempted to take these issues into consideration when interpreting the findings but, as always, more nuanced data would provide greater robustness.
Another ground for criticism may be the case study approach taken in this thesis, given that the results may be due to a ‘Bolivian exceptionalism’ and not readily generalized to other contexts. But while the analysis itself is based on the Bolivian case, it has raised several issues with regard to ethnicity and ethnic change that may be taken as incentive to similarly analyze other cases. Even if Bolivia proves exceptional, why is that the case?

One thing the analysis of Bolivia certainly has shown is that ethnicity is multi-faceted and changing. Bolivia is thus a good example of what Weber already stated nearly a hundred years ago: that ‘ethnicity’ is an inadequate analytical term. Beyond the Bolivian case, this inadequacy and the need for further research is perhaps most illustratively seen in the findings of a recent study in the United Kingdom (ISER News, 2012): ethnic minorities in Great Britain, it found, identify more strongly with Britishness than white citizens. With the illumination of this issue and the development of an analytical framework, this thesis hopefully contributed a first step towards an alternative, more disaggregated approach to ethnopolitical studies. •
Appendix I: Map of Bolivia

http://mapsof.net/uploads/static-maps/un_bolivia.png
Appendix II: Interview Questions

The semi-structured expert interviews were based on the following questions, adopted and adapted as suitable. A Spanish version is available on request.

The Morales Administration

1. The international press often emphasizes Evo Morales’ indigenous background. Briefly, from your observations, do Bolivians perceive his administration as an indigenous government or rather as a Bolivian government presided over by an indigenous person?
2. Some people claim that Morales’ policies are Andean-centric, that is, more beneficial for highland than lowland indigenous people(s). What do you think about this claim?
3. Another interpretation of Andean-centricity is that the Morales administration does not take into account the needs and perspectives of the lowland departments in general. Would you agree with this claim?
4. During the writing and passing of the new constitution, some observers have expressed concerns that its distinction between a pre- and a post-colonial population and the ascription of collective rights to the former may spark conflicts between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians. Almost three years after its promulgation, do you think these concerns were justified?

The Santa Cruz Autonomy Movement

1. Another topic during and after the constituent assembly was that of departmental autonomy. The Santa Cruz autonomy movement has been one of the most active (and most scrutinized) movements during the constituent assembly.
   a. In your opinion, who have been the most important actors in this movement?
   b. In your opinion, was the movement representative of the population in Santa Cruz?
   c. In your opinion, why did the movement enjoy such large scale of support as in the cabildos in 2004 to 2006 or the autonomy referendum?
   d. Some have described the autonomy movement as a conservative movement of economic elites trying to protect their interests, while some have described it as ethnic
movement looking to defend the interests of the Cruceños against the highland Bolivian majority. Which of these description to do you think more apt and why?

e. The autonomy movement has used the 'ethnic card' itself. Do you think the movement would have been successful without this line of argumentation and mobilization?

2. In general, what do you think Cruceños refer to when claiming autonomy? (For example, more say about tax revenues are spent, or a greater independence from decisions made at the national level of governance.)

**Ethnic Identities in Bolivia**

1. We have already touched the topic of ethnic or community identities, such as identifications as indigenous or as Cruceño. I would like to focus on indigeneity now. In your opinion, have the events of the last decade affected the way indigeneity is perceived in Bolivia?

2. While identities have been politicized in political discourse, do you think that the ethnic identification of individual Bolivians affect their political participation? In other words, would you say that ethnic affiliations affect social relations or political participation, such as religious affiliations in Northern Ireland, or that they are a personal matter, such as, for example, religious affiliation in Great Britain?

a. Census and opinion surveys give respondents the opportunity to define themselves as white. From your observations, is there something like a We-feeling or solidarity among those describing themselves as white? That is, whiteness more than simply the reflection of an attribute (in this case, skin colour)?

b. How about mestizos? From your observations, is there something like a We-feeling or solidarity among those describing themselves as mestizo?

3. In the literature, mestizo identity is often described as a huge 'middle bloc' that is blurring the boundaries between indigenous and white Bolivians and thus averting ethnic conflict between these two groups. In your opinion, does this hold true?

4. Especially during the constitution writing process, regional identities such as in Sucre or in Santa Cruz became apparent. In your opinion, are such regional identities more or less important in Bolivia than ethnic identities like indigenous, white, or mestizo? That is, do you think regional identities are able to cross-cut ethnic identities?
5. I would like to go back to the national level. In your opinion, did the events of the last decade affect how Bolivians define themselves as a nation?

6. In your opinion, how well is this understanding of Bolivian national identity represented in the new constitution?

7. Until the beginning of this decade, the national discourse was described in terms of mestizaje or multicultural mestizaje. In your opinion, can it now be described as multicultural indigenism in the sense that the ‘typical’ Bolivian is now seen as indigenous, albeit with some degree of mestizaje?

8. Bolivia is sometimes compared to South Africa, where the formerly subdued majority came to power through a process of democratic deepening. In your opinion, did the change in Bolivia occur in a similar process, that is, through an empowerment of a previously disempowered numerical majority, or rather because indigenous organizations succeeded in convincing a previously neutral or bystanding majority of the necessity for change?
Appendix III: Survey Items

The following table lists the survey items used in this thesis in their English form, translated from Spanish by the author. For all answers, the responses provided included a ‘don’t know/no reply’ option, not listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>section</th>
<th>name</th>
<th>question</th>
<th>response provided</th>
<th>surveys</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>self-categorization</td>
<td>Do you consider yourself to be a racially white, mestizo, indigenous, or black person? a</td>
<td>o white&lt;br&gt; o cholo&lt;br&gt; o mestizo&lt;br&gt; o indigenous&lt;br&gt; o black&lt;br&gt; o other</td>
<td>1998–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>belonging</td>
<td>Do you consider yourself to belong to any of the following indigenous or original peoples?</td>
<td>o Quechua&lt;br&gt; o Aymara&lt;br&gt; o Guaraní&lt;br&gt; o Chiquitano&lt;br&gt; o Mojeño&lt;br&gt; o other native b</td>
<td>2004–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>indigenous dress</td>
<td>directed at interviewer: Did the interviewee wear indigenous/native or modern/occidental dress?</td>
<td>o indigenous/native&lt;br&gt; o modern/occidental</td>
<td>1998–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>language</td>
<td>Which language has been spoken at home since childhood?</td>
<td>o Spanish&lt;br&gt; o Quechua&lt;br&gt; o Aymara&lt;br&gt; o Guaraní (2008/10)&lt;br&gt; o other native&lt;br&gt; o other foreign</td>
<td>1998–2010 c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>skin tone</td>
<td>directed at interviewer: Skin tone of the interviewee’s face.</td>
<td>colour palette from 1 (light) to 11 (dark)</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>attachment to Aymara/Quechua culture</td>
<td>To what extent do you feel part of the Aymara/Quechua culture? a</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2004–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>location</td>
<td>automatically recorded: department of residence</td>
<td>recoded to: o highlands (Ch, Co, LP, Or, Po)&lt;br&gt; o lowlands (Be, Pa, Ta, SC) c</td>
<td>1998–2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>confidence in ind. authority</td>
<td>To what extent do you have confidence in the original authority?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>1998–2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>help from ind. authority</td>
<td>Have you ever asked for help or cooperation from the original authority or the authority of an indigenous community?</td>
<td>o yes&lt;br&gt; o no</td>
<td>1998–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>confidence in ind. community justice</td>
<td>To what extent do you have confidence in communitarian justice?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>section</td>
<td>name</td>
<td>question</td>
<td>response provided</td>
<td>surveys</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>territory</td>
<td>Bolivia’s territory belongs to the indigenous peoples of the country, or all Bolivians have the same right to land</td>
<td>see question</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>language rights</td>
<td>To what extent do you agree that radio and television stations should increase the amount of programmes in original languages?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2004–2006</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>o an original language should be taught in school?</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o any government official serving the public should speak an original language?</td>
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<td>5.1</td>
<td>indigenous autonomy</td>
<td>Do you believe that indigenous autonomies will be positive for the country or that they will generate more problems for Bolivia?</td>
<td>see question</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent do you agree that indigenous autonomies will be positive for the country?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>confidence in ind. movement</td>
<td>To what extent do you have confidence in the indigenous movements?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>influence of ind. groups</td>
<td>How much influence do you think the indigenous groups have had enacting or passing new laws in this country?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>ind. groups’ effect on democracy</td>
<td>Do you think that indigenous groups are helping to make our country more democratic, less democratic, or are not having any impact on our democracy?</td>
<td>see question</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>ind. president worrisome</td>
<td>Some people say that they worry that in the next national elections an indigenous citizen is elected president, while others say that the identity of an individual is not important in politics. With which of these opinions do you agree?</td>
<td>see question</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>reasons for indigenous poverty</td>
<td>According to census data, original people are generally poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?</td>
<td>Indigenous people</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>o don’t work enough</td>
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<td>o are less intelligent</td>
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<td>o are treated unjustly</td>
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<td>o have low education levels</td>
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<td>o don’t want to change their culture</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>trustworthiness of ethnic categories</td>
<td>Speaking of different groups of people, who seem generally more trustworthy?</td>
<td>o Aymara</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o Quechua</td>
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<td>o Camba</td>
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<td>o white</td>
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<td>o mestizo</td>
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<td>o all equally</td>
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<td></td>
<td>o none</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>treatment of indigenous Bolivians</td>
<td>Do you believe that the people or institutions listed treat indigenous better, same, or worse than whites?</td>
<td>o much better&lt;br&gt;o better&lt;br&gt;o equally&lt;br&gt;o worse&lt;br&gt;o much worse</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do you believe that indigenous people are treated much better, better, equally, worse, or much worse than white people?</td>
<td>see question</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>importance of racism</td>
<td>Some people say that racism is a major problem in Bolivia, while others think that racism does not exist or that it does exist but that it is not important. With which of these options do you agree?</td>
<td>see question</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>perceived discrimination I</td>
<td>Have you ever felt discriminated against or treated unfairly on the basis of your physical appearance or manner of speech&lt;br&gt;o in social meetings or events?&lt;br&gt;o in public places?</td>
<td>o yes&lt;br&gt;o no</td>
<td>2006–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>perceived discrimination II</td>
<td>In the last five years, have you ever felt discriminated against or treated badly or unfairly&lt;br&gt;o because of your skin colour?&lt;br&gt;o because of your economic situation?&lt;br&gt;o because of your manner of speech?</td>
<td>o often&lt;br&gt;o sometimes&lt;br&gt;o rarely&lt;br&gt;o never</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>ethnic representation</td>
<td>Would you feel better represented in government and parliament by leaders of your own ethnic origin, or does the origin of the leader not matter, but only his ability?</td>
<td>see question</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>pride in political system</td>
<td>To what extent do you feel proud of living in the Bolivian political system?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>1998–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>support for political system</td>
<td>To what extent do you think one should support the Bolivian political system?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>1998–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>feeling as Bolivian citizen</td>
<td>To what extent do you feel Bolivian citizen?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2004–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>pride in being Bolivian</td>
<td>To what extent do you feel proud of being Bolivian?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2004–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>unity despite diversity</td>
<td>To what extent do you agree that despite differences, Bolivians have many things and values that unite us as a country?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2004–2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>national culture vs cultural diversity</td>
<td>Would it be better for the country to establish a single national culture, or should indigenous peoples maintain their values, culture, and language? (2004/2006) to maintain the country’s cultural diversity? (2010)</td>
<td>see questions</td>
<td>2004–2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>section</td>
<td>name</td>
<td>question</td>
<td>response provided</td>
<td>surveys</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>feeling as member of departmental community</td>
<td>To what extent do you feel Cruceño/Paceño/Cochabambino...?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2004–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>belonging to Camba culture</td>
<td>To what extent do you feel part of the Camba culture?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2004–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>belonging to media luna</td>
<td>To what extent do you feel part of the 'Media Luna'?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2004–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>political ideology</td>
<td>When talking about political tendencies, it is said that a person is left or right. ... On this scale, where would you situate yourself politically?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (left) to 10 (right)</td>
<td>1998–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>trust in Cambas</td>
<td>Would you say that in general, Cambas are very, somewhat, little, or not at all trustworthy?</td>
<td>see question</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>desired influence of regional representatives</td>
<td>For the country’s situation to improve, how much influence should civic committees and regional representatives have?</td>
<td>o a lot o little o none</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>departmental autonomy</td>
<td>Do you believe that departmental autonomies will be positive for the country or that they will generate more problems for Bolivia? To what extent do you agree that departmental autonomies will be positive for the country?</td>
<td>see question o rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2008 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>inter-ethnic marriage</td>
<td>'I would agree that my daughter or son marries an indigenous person'. To what extent do you agree with this statement?</td>
<td>rating from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>departmental contribution to development</td>
<td>In Bolivia, the efforts of a few departments support the development of the country, or the country’s development is the result of all Bolivians.</td>
<td>see question</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>reasons for uneven development</td>
<td>In Bolivia there are some regions or departments that are richer than others. I will read a number of possible causes of this inequality. I’d like you to tell me which of these factors is the main cause of the differences in wealth.</td>
<td>o more resources o people work more o centralism stifles development o economic policies stifle development o none of the above</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>political unity</td>
<td>Whatever happens, the country must remain united, or the differences in the country are very large and the country should be divided.</td>
<td>see question</td>
<td>2004–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>meaning of departmental autonomy</td>
<td>For you, departmental autonomies mean a) further decentralization to the regions, b) greater decision-making capacities for the departments, or c) a division of the country.</td>
<td>see question</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The formulation of the question and the responses provided changed over time. For details, see Table A2.*
'Other native' is varyingly itemized into up to seventeen indigenous peoples denominations, not listed here.

The formulation of the question and the responses provided changed over time; in all survey rounds but 2004 and 2010 were multiple responses recorded.

Questions were asked separately.

Ch=Chuquisaca, Co=Cochabamba, LP=La Paz, Or=Oruro, Po=Potosi, Be=Beni, Pa=Pando, Ta=Tarija, SC=Santa Cruz.

Table A2: Categorical measure of ethnic self-categorization, 1998–2010*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>survey round</th>
<th>formulation of question</th>
<th>responses provided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998–2002</td>
<td>Do you consider yourself to be a racially white, mestizo, indigenous, or black person?</td>
<td>o white</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o cholo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o mestizo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o indigenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004–2006</td>
<td>Do you consider yourself to be a racially white, cholo, mestizo, indigenous, black, or original person?</td>
<td>o white</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o cholo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o mestizo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o indigenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cholo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008–2010</td>
<td>Do you consider yourself a racially white, cholo, mestizo, indigenous or original, black or Afro-Bolivian, mulatto or other person?</td>
<td>o white</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cholo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mestizo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>indigenous/original</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>black/Afro-Bolivian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mulatto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Additions are highlighted in bold, removals are crossed-out.
Appendix IV: Results

Chapter 4

Tables A3 to A5 present the results of a series of binary logistic regressions for self-categorization, belonging, and assertiveness, respectively, with year ($x_1$), contrasted to previous year, and income (continuous), highland–lowland distinction (binary, contrast: indicator), and urbanization (categorical with four categories, contrast: indicator). These control variables were included as the samples varied in these respects over time; their parameters are not reported here. The parameter $\beta_1$ presents the change in the likelihood of identifying respectively in comparison to the previous survey round; a positive $\beta_1$ signifies an increase, a negative $\beta_1$ a decrease. Significance values are as follows: * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table A3: Self-categorization (indigenous) with year and control variables: Significance of change (Figure 4.1a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>$\beta_0$ (se)</th>
<th>exp($\beta_0$)</th>
<th>$\beta_1$ (se)</th>
<th>exp($\beta_1$)</th>
<th>95% CI for exp($\beta_1$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5474</td>
<td>-1.983 (0.059)***</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>-0.086 (0.084)</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.778 1.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.198 (0.171)***</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.056 (0.087)</td>
<td>1.058</td>
<td>0.891 1.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5659</td>
<td>-2.070 (0.060)***</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.116 (0.083)</td>
<td>1.123</td>
<td>0.955 1.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.763 (0.162)***</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.068 (0.088)</td>
<td>1.070</td>
<td>0.901 1.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5588</td>
<td>-1.953 (0.058)***</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.477 (0.076)***</td>
<td>1.612</td>
<td>1.390 1.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.798 (0.143)***</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.650 (0.080)***</td>
<td>1.916</td>
<td>1.637 2.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5369</td>
<td>-1.476 (0.049)***</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.013 (0.070)</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>0.883 1.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.992 (0.136)***</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.038 (0.073)</td>
<td>1.038</td>
<td>0.900 1.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5236</td>
<td>-1.463 (0.050)***</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.040 (0.066)</td>
<td>1.041</td>
<td>0.914 1.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.062 (0.127)***</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.201 (0.070)**</td>
<td>1.222</td>
<td>1.065 1.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5137</td>
<td>-1.423 (0.043)***</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>-0.033 (0.062)</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.857 1.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.159 (0.128)***</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.082 (0.066)</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td>0.953 1.236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A4: Belonging (indigenous) with year and control variables: Significance of change (Figure 4.1b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>$\beta_0$ (se)</th>
<th>exp($\beta_0$)</th>
<th>$\beta_1$ (se)</th>
<th>exp($\beta_1$)</th>
<th>95% CI for exp($\beta_1$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5369</td>
<td>1.089 (0.044)***</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>-0.212 (0.062)***</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>0.883 1.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.575 (0.119)***</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>-0.255 (0.067)***</td>
<td>1.038</td>
<td>0.900 1.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5236</td>
<td>0.878 (0.044)***</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.245 (0.059)***</td>
<td>1.041</td>
<td>0.914 1.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.459 (0.111)***</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.512 (0.069)***</td>
<td>1.222</td>
<td>1.065 1.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5137</td>
<td>1.122 (0.040)***</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.057)</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.857 1.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.969 (0.117)***</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>-0.018 (0.064)</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td>0.953 1.236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A5: Assertiveness with year and control variables: Significance of change (Figure 4.2a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>n</th>
<th>$\hat{\beta}_0$ (se)</th>
<th>$\exp(\hat{\beta}_0)$</th>
<th>$\hat{\beta}_1$ (se)</th>
<th>$\exp(\hat{\beta}_1)$</th>
<th>lower</th>
<th>upper</th>
<th>95% CI for $\exp(\hat{\beta}_1)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>most assertive indigenous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 before controls</td>
<td>5369</td>
<td>-1.595 (0.051)**</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.082 (0.073)</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>1.163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.251 (0.145)**</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.114 (0.077)</td>
<td>1.038</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>1.198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5236</td>
<td>-1.513 (0.052)**</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.031 (0.068)</td>
<td>1.041</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>1.185</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.257 (0.134)**</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.194 (0.073)**</td>
<td>1.222</td>
<td>1.065</td>
<td>1.403</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5137</td>
<td>-1.482 (0.044)**</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.044 (0.063)</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>1.093</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.306 (0.132)**</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.149 (0.068)*</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>1.236</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>moderately assertive indigenous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5369</td>
<td>0.321 (0.039)**</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>-0.218 (0.056)**</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>1.163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.563 (0.104)**</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>-0.234 (0.057)**</td>
<td>1.038</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>1.198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5236</td>
<td>0.103 (0.040)**</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.176 (0.053)**</td>
<td>1.041</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>1.185</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.688 (0.097)**</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.194 (0.056)**</td>
<td>1.222</td>
<td>1.065</td>
<td>1.403</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5137</td>
<td>0.279 (0.035)**</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>-0.036 (0.050)</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>1.093</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.391 (0.096)**</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>-0.105 (0.051)*</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>1.236</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>not indigenous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5369</td>
<td>-1.185 (0.045)**</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.241 (0.063)**</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>1.163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.754 (0.121)**</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.287 (0.068)**</td>
<td>1.038</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>1.198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5236</td>
<td>-0.945 (0.044)**</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>-0.216 (0.060)**</td>
<td>1.041</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>1.185</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.595 (0.112)**</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>-0.484 (0.070)**</td>
<td>1.222</td>
<td>1.065</td>
<td>1.403</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5137</td>
<td>-1.161 (0.040)**</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.042 (0.057)</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>1.093</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.037 (0.117)**</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.053 (0.064)</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>1.236</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tables A6 to A8 compare the respective mean outcome of the present to that of the previous year. The value \( p \) presents the statistical significance of the change, derived from a series of Mann–Whitney U tests. Changes are significant when \( p \leq 0.05 \).

**Table A6: Attachment to Aymara and Quechua culture according to assertiveness: Significance of change (Figure 4.5 a–b)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aymara culture</th>
<th>Quechua culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( n )</td>
<td>mean (se)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>most assertive indigenous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>4.020 (0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>4.490 (0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>4.420 (0.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>4.630 (0.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>moderately assertive indigenous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1761</td>
<td>3.670 (0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1487</td>
<td>3.850 (0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2167</td>
<td>2.970 (0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2147</td>
<td>3.160 (0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>not indigenous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>2.810 (0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>2.730 (0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>1.970 (0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>2.030 (0.049)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table A7: Attachment to Aymara and Quechua culture according to location: Significance of change (Figure 4.7a–b)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aymara culture</th>
<th>Quechua culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( n )</td>
<td>mean (se)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>highlands</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>3.990 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>4.110 (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2502</td>
<td>3.690 (0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2545</td>
<td>3.760 (0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>lowlands</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>2.640 (0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>2.820 (0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1459</td>
<td>1.790 (0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1487</td>
<td>1.990 (0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aymara culture</td>
<td>Quechua culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>mean (se)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>2.970 (0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>3.120 (0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1272</td>
<td>2.150 (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1289</td>
<td>2.270 (0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>5.690 (0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>5.940 (0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>5.900 (0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>6.120 (0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guaraní</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2.180 (0.155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2.670 (0.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>2.160 (0.155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1.970 (0.143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other native</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>2.660 (0.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>2.840 (0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>1.730 (0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>1.820 (0.074)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5

Tables A9 to A11 compare the respective mean outcome of the present to that of the previous year. The value p presents the statistical significance of the change, derived from a series of Mann–Whitney U tests. Changes are significant when \( p \leq 0.05 \).

Table A9: Confidence in traditional indigenous institutions according to identification: Significance of change
(Figure 5.1 a–b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>self-categorization</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>assertiveness</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>indigenous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>most</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>3.990 (0.092)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>3.940 (0.091)</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>3.920 (0.096)</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>4.130 (0.076)</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>4.590 (0.072)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>4.960 (0.058)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>non-indigenous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>moderately</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2171</td>
<td>3.770 (0.034)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2312</td>
<td>3.720 (0.033)</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2198</td>
<td>3.840 (0.035)</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>3.710 (0.034)</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4.140 (0.034)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2645</td>
<td>3.900 (0.034)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>593</td>
<td>3.490 (0.065)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>645</td>
<td>4.020 (0.059)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>801</td>
<td>3.530 (0.060)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A10: Pride in and support for the political system according to self-categorization: Significance of change
(Figure 5.10a–b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>pride</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>support</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>indigenous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>most</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>3.690 (0.089)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>3.290 (0.085)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>3.640 (0.090)</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>3.720 (0.071)</td>
<td>0.654</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>4.170 (0.069)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>4.500 (0.057)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>4.750 (0.059)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>non-indigenous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>moderately</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2516</td>
<td>3.780 (0.030)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2547</td>
<td>3.660 (0.031)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2513</td>
<td>3.980 (0.033)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2467</td>
<td>3.860 (0.033)</td>
<td>0.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2508</td>
<td>3.860 (0.033)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2491</td>
<td>4.210 (0.033)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

cont.
Table A11: Feeling as and pride in being Bolivian as well as approval for unity despite diversity according to self-categorization: Significance of change (Figure 5.11a–c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>indigenous</th>
<th>non-indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>mean (se)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pride</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| approval for unity despite diversity | 2004 | 551  | 4.94 (0.064) | <0.001  | 2495 | 6.280 (0.020) |
|                                      | 2006 | 555  | 5.23 (0.056) | 0.003  | 2387 | 6.340 (0.021) | 0.02  |
|                                      | 2008 | 775  | 5.52 (0.044) | <0.001 | 3195 | 6.540 (0.016) | <0.001 |
|                                      | 2010 | 731  | 6.600 (0.033) | 0.117  | 3284 | 6.530 (0.016) | 0.259 |

*significance of change over time

Table A12: Indigenous right towards territory, with control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>constant assertiveness</th>
<th>β (se)</th>
<th>exp(β)</th>
<th>95% CI for exp(β)</th>
<th>95% CI for exp(β)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lower</td>
<td>upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2.307 (0.149)**</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.94 (0.155)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assertiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>most</td>
<td>0.072 (0.228)</td>
<td>1.075</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>1.681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.574 (0.244)*</td>
<td>1.775</td>
<td>1.099</td>
<td>2.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>-0.416 (0.186)*</td>
<td>0.660</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.112 (0.193)</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>1.304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>highlands</td>
<td>-1.121 (0.17)**</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=2268</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 7

Tables A13 to A14 compare the respective mean outcome of the present to that of the previous year. The value p presents the statistical significance of the change, derived from a series of Mann–Whitney U tests. Changes are significant when p≤0.05.

Table A13: Identification as Cruceño and with Camba culture and the media luna according to department: Significance of change (Figure 7.1a–c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
<th>all other departments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>mean (se)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruceño</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>5.630 (0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>5.950 (0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1071</td>
<td>6.190 (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1082</td>
<td>5.950 (0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>5.270 (0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>5.670 (0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1065</td>
<td>5.740 (0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1082</td>
<td>5.620 (0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>media luna</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>5.270 (0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>5.670 (0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1065</td>
<td>5.740 (0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1082</td>
<td>5.620 (0.050)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significance of change over time
^significance of difference to all other departments within year, after controlling for income, education, and political ideology

Table A14: Identification as Cruceño and with Camba culture and the media luna according to indigenous belonging: Significance of change (Figure 7.2a–c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>highland indigenous</th>
<th>all others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>mean (se)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruceño</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>4.790 (0.211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>4.990 (0.201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5.600 (0.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>5.190 (0.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>4.020 (0.244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4.180 (0.195)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4.470 (0.267)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4.000 (0.230)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

cont.
Tables A15 to A17 present the results of a series of binary logistic regressions for the respective mean outcome with identification as Cruceño and with Camba culture and the media luna, age, income, education, political ideology (all continuous), urbanization (categorical: rural), gender (categorical: men), as well as highland–lowland distinction (categorical: highland) and self-categorization (categorical: indigenous). Only significant parameters are reported here. Significance values are as follows: * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001.

Table A15: Camba as the most trustworthy ethnic category, with control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>β (se)</th>
<th>exp(β)</th>
<th>lower</th>
<th>upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-4.293 (1.097)**</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camba belonging</td>
<td>0.577 (0.170)**</td>
<td>1.781</td>
<td>1.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>highland</td>
<td>-1.351 (0.795)</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lowland</td>
<td>0.944 (0.412)*</td>
<td>2.570</td>
<td>1.146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=156

Table A16: Distrust of Aymaras and Quechuas according to regional identification, with control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>β (se)</th>
<th>exp(β)</th>
<th>lower</th>
<th>upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-4.184 (1.501)**</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruceño /Camba</td>
<td>0.700 (0.317)*</td>
<td>2.014</td>
<td>1.081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aymara not at all trustworthy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>β (se)</th>
<th>exp(β)</th>
<th>lower</th>
<th>upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-5.534 (1.916)**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruceño /Camba</td>
<td>0.779 (0.373)*</td>
<td>2.180</td>
<td>1.049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

nAymara=128, nQuechua=130
Table A17: ‘Some few’ contributors to Bolivian development according to regional identification, with controls variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \beta ) (se)</th>
<th>exp(( \beta ))</th>
<th>lower</th>
<th>upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-1.663 (0.666)*</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>0.102 (0.050)*</td>
<td>1.107</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>1.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belonging</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>highland indigenous</td>
<td>-1.316 (0.618)*</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lowland indigenous</td>
<td>-0.644 (0.391)</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>1.129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=157

Table A18 compares the respective mean outcome of Santa Cruz to that of all other departments. The value p presents the statistical significance of the difference, derived from a series of Mann–Whitney U tests. Changes are significant when p \( \leq 0.05 \).

Table A18: Pride in and support for the political system according to department: Significance of change (Figure 7.10a–b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>n</th>
<th>mean (se)</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>mean (se)</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pride</td>
<td></td>
<td>support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Santa Cruz</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>4.100 (0.057)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>4.24 (0.06)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>3.760 (0.068)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>3.84 (0.073)</td>
<td>0.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>4.150 (0.057)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>4.26 (0.053)</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>4.020 (0.055)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>3.95 (0.054)</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>4.430 (0.055)</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>4.64 (0.051)</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>4.130 (0.046)</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>4.4 (0.049)</td>
<td>0.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1048</td>
<td>4.370 (0.044)</td>
<td>0.895</td>
<td>1016</td>
<td>4.43 (0.043)</td>
<td>0.617</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                 | n   | mean (se) | p       | n   | mean (se) | p       |
| **all other departments** |     |           |         |     |           |         |
| 1998            | 2893 | 3.72 (0.029) | 2849   | 3.83 (0.031) |
| 2000            | 2271 | 3.58 (0.033) | 2253   | 3.82 (0.035) |
| 2002            | 2139 | 3.87 (0.037) | 2119   | 4.15 (0.037) |
| 2004            | 2234 | 3.7 (0.034)  | 2205   | 3.85 (0.036) |
| 2006            | 2119 | 4.15 (0.035) | 2043   | 4.47 (0.036) |
| 2008            | 2780 | 4.26 (0.031) | 2750   | 4.4 (0.032)  |
| 2010            | 2880 | 4.35 (0.028) | 2829   | 4.45 (0.028) |
List of Interviews

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