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JAMES JOSEPH HALL
Despite the wealth of interest in South Mexico’s Ejercito Zapatista Liberacion Nacional (EZLN), few studies have attempted to deconstruct the discourse of the Zapatistas according to its component parts. Most scholars have so far addressed the Zapatistas from the standpoint of political theory, international relations or anthropology, and in so doing have tended to engage primarily with broader polemical agendas. Furthermore, in their determination to typologise the Zapatistas as ‘this’ or ‘that’ sort of movement, scholars have overlooked the nuances and shades of meaning that exist within the Zapatista discourse, as well as the evolution of those meanings over time. As a result, the content and ongoing construction of the Zapatistas’ message has been eclipsed by a more encompassing, contested, and ultimately chimeric quest to reify the movement’s ‘essence’ or ‘truth’. This thesis represents an empirical analysis of the EZLN’s collective discourse that focuses on the content and constructed nature of their collective action frames. Combining three strands of social movement frame analysis, it avers to draw-out the ever-changing detail of the EZLN’s discursive output and so add value to the debates that surround the Zapatistas. It also makes several theoretical contributions to social movement frame analysis.
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INTRODUCTION

Despite the wealth of interest in South Mexico’s Ejercito Zapatista Liberacion Nacional (EZLN), few studies have attempted to deconstruct the discourse of the Zapatista movement according to its component parts. The majority of inquiries have addressed the Zapatistas from the standpoint of political theory, international relations or anthropology, and have tended to use the movement to bolster broader polemical agendas. Moreover, in making their arguments scholars have quarrelled leading to a discernible polarisation of interpretations that typologise the Zapatistas as ‘this’ or ‘that’ sort of movement. An unfortunate consequence of this is that the nuances and shades of meaning in the Zapatista discourse, as well as the evolution of those meanings over time, have been lost, and the ongoing construction of the Zapatistas’ message has been eclipsed by a more encompassing, contested, and ultimately chimeric quest to reify the movement’s ‘essence’ or ‘truth’.

Existing interpretations have tended to impose rigid definitions with the result that the Zapatistas’ message has been variously pigeonholed as ‘socialist’, ‘nationalist’, ‘ethnic’, and ‘postmodern’. These labels, I argue, belie the complexities of the Zapatistas’ rebellious discourse and locate the movement in distracting polemical disputes. For example, studies that ascribe a ‘postmodern’ label use the Zapatistas to make more general statements regarding the post-Soviet era and the faultline between Marxist and postmodernist thought (Burbach, 1994, 2001; Pelaez, 2004; Carrigan, 2001). Conversely, those that root the EZLN in socialism exaggerate the relative deprivation of Mexico’s indigenous population as an indicator of the traditional class relations that underpin the Zapatistas’ rebellion (Veltmeyer, 2000; Rajchenberg and Heau-Lambert, 1998). Although engaging, these analyses fail to appreciate the intricate nature of the Zapatistas’ discourse, either by shying away from aspects of that discourse that are difficult to explain or by exaggerating apparent anomalies as indicative of novelty. Moreover, by ascribing such
fixed labels current readings do not address the Zapatistas’ reflexive responses to perceived mistakes, victories, opportunities, misunderstandings and the counter-discourses of opponents, all of which impact upon the movement’s discourse by inspiring change, progression and adaptation. In all cases, we lack a detailed analysis of the Zapatistas’ message as an ongoing construction.

The aims of my thesis are twofold, being primarily empirical and, to a lesser extent, theoretical. Empirically, I intend to provide a different interpretation of the Zapatistas, one that does not consign them to a particular category and which can supplement existing studies by focusing on the detail and constructed nature of their discourse. In order to make this empirical contribution, I propose an interpretive investigation of the Zapatistas’ ‘collective action frames’. The second aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the vitality of frame analysis through empirical application. In this theoretical endeavour, my goal is to revisit frame analysis and overcome several shortcomings associated with the model.

In terms of my primary aim, I intend to gain insight into the complexities of the Zapatistas’ discourse, and offer a useful supplement to current interpretations that tend to conflict over their characterisation of the movement. To date, few scholars have truly engaged with Zapatista discourse, and those that have are hampered by poor methodology (Amparan, 2003) or are preoccupied with more specific commentaries on the nature and role of the Zapatistas’ white spokesman, Subcomandante Marcos (Bruhn, 1998). The many interpretations delivered from other theoretical standpoints fail to capture the detail, much less plot the changing nature, of the movement’s collective message. Instead they compete to subsume the Zapatistas according to absolute categories, so that for Burbach (2001) and others Zapatismo is a postmodern phenomenon, for Veltmeyer (2000) it is a socialist rearguard, for Gossen (1994, 1996) it is an expression of the indigenous soul, and so on. Because these scholars cannot all be correct, I suggest that their analyses are straightjacketed, either by their political leanings or their academic genres, and I maintain
that a systematic, longitudinal deconstruction of the Zapatistas’ discourse can expose the shifting detail of that discourse in a way that none has yet achieved. Such an analysis will, I argue, bring much-needed clarity to the debates that currently surround the movement’s meaning.

As for my theoretical aim, I will develop a synthesis between three existing frame analytic approaches: Johnston (1995), Gamson (1992, 1995) and Snow et al (1986). Frame analysis grew out of social movement theories in the 1980s and 1990s, and is indicative of scholars’ renewed interest in movements’ cultural production\(^1\). The chief discursive unit for analysis in this approach is the *collective action frame*, which captures the collective efforts of social movement organisations (SMOs) to project their collective identity, portray a sense of injustice, and make their case for collective action. The imperatives and terminology of frame analysis, while not without imperfections, represent a concerted effort to get to the heart of social movements’ discursive production (Snow et al, 2004). And, while some critics argue that the language of ‘frames’ has had its day and recommend an entirely new approach to movement discourse (Steinberg, 2002), I maintain that frame analysis still has much to offer. Indeed, I intend to overcome some of the weaknesses levelled by critics\(^2\) and add value to frame analysis by drawing together the strengths of Johnston, Gamson and Snow et al, whose methodological guidelines and consensual, conceptual vocabulary is, I argue, tailored specifically to social movement discourse analysis. In this thesis I combine their approaches to deconstruct the EZLN’s discourse according to its component parts. In doing so, moreover, I intend to demonstrate the value of frame analysis as a hermeneutic device tailored to the exposition of the contingent and changing content of SMOs’ collective discourse.

\(^1\) The shift to the ‘cultural dimension’ marked a change from earlier tendencies to privilege *resources* (Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1977) and *political opportunities* (Eisinger, 1973; McAdam, 1982, 1986).

\(^2\) These weaknesses are addressed in full in Chapter Two, *Theoretical Framework*, but may be prefaced here as the tendency to exaggerate frames’ instrumental function (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999, 2003), the narrow conception of culture in much frame analysis (Poletta, 1999; Steinberg, 1998, 2002), the lack of focus on frames’ substantive content, and the reification of frames as ‘fixed packages’ of meaning (Steinberg, 2002).
Turning to the methodology that underpins this thesis: this is, naturally, taken from the frame analysis school. Hank Johnston is one of the three frame theorists whose work I draw on. His *Methodology for Frame Analysis* (1995) bestows a set of research guidelines which, I will argue, though largely ignored in empirical interpretations of collective action frames, is of great use. Most importantly, Johnston advises the researcher to focus attention on *key texts*, to be aware that these possess specific *pragmatic intents* and *speech situations*, to remain sensitive to the particular *role of the author*, and to treat texts as *holistic constructs* or products of contemporaneous events and influences. Following Johnston, my primary research data comprises seven key texts, specially selected for their capacity to reflect similar speech situations and pragmatic intents, and to represent important developments in the EZLN’s discourse. Among them are two which predate the 1994 rebellion: The *Estatutos de Las Fuerzas de Liberacion Nacional* (1980) and Subcomandante Marcos’s letter to northern socialists, *The Southeast in Two Winds* (1992). Of the five that were issued after the rebellion, I have restricted my analysis to the *First* (January 1st, 1994), *Second* (June 12th, 1994), *Third* (January 1st, 1995), *Fourth* (January 1st, 1996) and *Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle* (July 19th, 1998). In each case, the focus of empirical interest is the

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3 I offer a more complete discussion of these imperatives in Chapter Two, *Theoretical Framework*. It is worth adding, however, that Johnston also advises researchers to remain aware of unwritten cues, such as body language or changes in tone of voice, but this is not applicable to the written texts that make up the data of my own research. Johnston also recommends that frames be visually represented in order that the connections between the various interrelated features may be brought into greater relief.
discourse of the EZLN as the dominant social movement organisation (SMO) of what has been called the ‘Zapatista movement’.

Of the seven key texts, the five Declarations are the most similar. They are particularly enlightening because they were propounded by the Zapatistas at key historic junctures and were intended to indicate new directions. As public texts, they represent weathervanes in the EZLN’s discursive evolution and may be considered extended manifestos in which the Zapatistas take stock of previous achievements and failures and point the way to new objectives. Unlike the two earlier texts, the five Declarations share the same speech situation, pragmatic intent and authorial role. In terms of their speech situation, for example, they represent a series of collective dialogues with the general public, encompassing political leaders, ordinary people and the media; in terms of pragmatic intent they all reflect the EZLN’s determination to make common cause with outsiders by reminding them of their achievements, identity, objectives, and the reasons behind their struggle; finally, they all speak with the collective voice of the EZLN rather than a single component of that organisation, such as the military leader and spokesman Marcos, or the political leadership of the Clandestine Indigenous Revolutionary Committee (CCRI). The Declarations represent, therefore, the discursive output of the EZLN, which is not to be confused with the communiqués of later Zapatista structures such as the Frente Zapatista Liberacion Nacional (FZLN) or the Autonomous Independent Municipalities (AIMs). Holding the speech situation, pragmatic intent and authorial role constant across these texts makes the identification of discursive shifts more valid, as differences between them cannot be attributed to, for example, the personal or intimate speech situation seen in Marcos’s own communiqués that ridicule Mexico’s leaders. In other words, according to Johnston’s methodological imperatives, these texts

* I make this distinction between SMOs and the social movements to which they cater, following McCarthy and Zald’s resource mobilisation theory (1977). However, owing to the EZLN’s discursive pragmatism, I find it difficult to conceive of a broad ‘Zapatista movement’; indeed, over the years the EZLN has, I argue, affiliated itself with the socialist ‘movement’, the nationalist ‘movement’, and a pan-American indigenous movement. Nonetheless, throughout the thesis I treat the EZLN as a discrete SMO and consider its collective discourse accordingly.
are embedded in a wider field of discursive change and share important discursive features that render them conducive to longitudinal comparison.

That said, the two texts that predate the Declarations do stand slightly apart in that they have been taken from the Zapatistas’ ‘clandestine phase’ (1980-1993). During this time, secrecy was paramount to the EZLN and no public discourse with government, media and civil society existed. As such, the clandestine phase is characterised by a relative dearth of texts for analysis, and so the researcher is obliged to make do with what is available. In both the Estatutos (1980) and The Southeast in Two Winds (1992) the speech situations, pragmatic intents and roles of the respective authors differ unavoidably, making discursive comparisons less reliable: the Estatutos was written for EZLN operatives, while The Southeast in Two Winds was written by Marcos for socialist allies in northern Mexico; neither was aimed at the general public. Nevertheless, provided that these differences are kept in mind there is no reason that certain inferences cannot be made regarding the prevailing discourses of collective identity, injustice and agency. Moreover, in spite of the limited number of texts available, I believe that it is vital to include texts from the clandestine phase. Too many scholars begin their analyses in 1994, immediately overriding the fourteen years of discursive development and change that preceded the famous rebellion in Chiapas. Ignoring the discourses of the clandestine phase contributes to the myth that Zapatismo entered the world-stage in January 1994 as a fully formed ‘philosophy’, a myth that precludes any interest in its evolutionary or constructed nature. On the contrary, I argue that the two key clandestine texts demonstrate the pragmatic nature of the EZLN discourse even before it entered the public domain.

Notwithstanding these caveats, all seven key texts have been read as holistic constructs (Johnston, 1995: 221), by which I mean they have been analysed in broader webs of meaning that take account of cultural influences and political factors at multiple layers. Although Johnston insists that the integrity of primary key texts be preserved, he is equally adamant that the analyst challenge vague and unclear references that may require
further information. Often, he suggests, such information is gathered from ‘factual material from outside the immediate text’ in order to ‘shed light on knowledge that is tacitly understood between the interlocutors, yet necessary for full interpretation by a third party,’ (Ibid.). My exposition of the seven key Zapatista texts has led me to draw on, amongst other things, anthropological theses that debate indigenous cultural schemas, biographical data on individual Zapatista insurgents, interviews with participants, a broad back-catalogue of EZLN communiqués, academic texts on the political structures and history of Mexico and Chiapas, and newspaper articles addressing contemporaneous political and economic affairs in Mexico and the world. Importantly, all of these searches were prompted by gaps in my knowledge exposed during the frame analysis of key texts, not – in contrast to other analyses of the EZLN – by broader theoretical concerns. Put simply, the seven key texts form the backbone of my empirical analysis, and my interpretation is informed by their holistic evaluation in relation to each other, contemporaneous events, cultural and political structures, and the interpretations and perceptions of protagonists.

Turning to the structure of the thesis, I have arranged the chapters in such a way as to reinforce the longitudinal nature of my argument. In Chapter One, Review of Zapatista Literature, I provide a deeper evaluation of ‘the problem’, by which I mean the tendency of existing studies to override the EZLN’s discursive complexities by labelling the Zapatistas according to preconceived movement types, as well as their habit of inferring rigid and immovable meanings from a limited range of cherry-picked statements. Here, I make plain the need for an analysis that is capable of drawing-out the content of the Zapatistas’ discourse and plotting its evolving nature.

In Chapter Two, Theoretical Framework, I provide a detailed review of frame analysis, beginning with the fundamental unit of the collective action frame (Gamson, 1992, 1995) and supporting terms such as master frame (Snow and Benford, 1992), misframes (Suh, 2001) and counterframes (Benford, 2000). I move onto a discussion of
the evolutionary nature of frames and then address the criticisms of frame analysis that have led some to reject its terminology altogether. I end the chapter by linking the work of the three frame theorists mentioned earlier: Johnston (1995), Gamson (1992) and Snow et al (1986), whose conceptual vocabulary and precepts can, I argue, overcome the weaknesses identified by critics and provide a useful way-in to the complexities of the Zapatistas’ discourse.

The next seven chapters are given over to the frame analysis of my seven key texts, which are arranged chronologically. For ease of analysis, however, and to impose some order on these seven chapters, I arrange them according to three parts, which I describe here in turn. Part One, entitled The Clandestine Phase, consists of Chapters Three and Four, where each chapter focuses on one of the two key texts from the EZLN’s pre-rebellion or ‘clandestine’ period. Thus Chapter One, The Estatutos de Las Fuerzas de Liberacion Nacional (1980), deconstructs the collective action frame contained within the first key text, to which I refer henceforth as the Estatutos. In this chapter I present overwhelming evidence to suggest that the EZLN’s initial discourse reflected that of a rural socialist vanguard, and that the major influences at this time were ideological. Chapter Four, The Southeast in Two Winds (1992), deals with the second key text, written by the EZLN’s then-leader, Subcomandante Marcos. Immediately I find evidence of discursive change, and argue that, although the Zapatistas’ discourse retained many socialistic features in 1992, it also revealed a growing complexity and pragmatism shaped by the leadership’s interaction with local cultural pressures and national political needs.

Part Two, entitled The Nationalist Phase, consists of Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Here, I leave the clandestine phase behind and move on to assess the Zapatistas’ new public discourse, which began with their spectacular declaration of war in January 1994. In Chapter Five, First Declaration (EZLN, January 1st, 1994), I present the Zapatistas’ move away from socialism towards nationalist rhetoric as evidence of radical frame alignment. This I explain as a consequence of perceived constraints associated with
socialist doctrine at the national level and the perceived need to align with the bystander public through the patriotic political culture of Mexico. In Chapter Six, *Second Declaration* (EZLN, June 12th, 1994), I observe the subtle alteration of this nationalistic discourse as a reaction to the misframes of bystanders and the propaganda and counterframes of opponents. Finally, Chapter Seven addresses the further realignment of the nationalist discourse in the *Third Declaration* (EZLN, January 1st 1995), in which I argue that increased national and international political pressures were manifest in the EZLN’s radicalisation and renewed militancy.

Part Three is entitled *The Indigenous Phase*. Here I examine the EZLN’s shift to an avowedly indigenous discourse, and argue that this began to overshadow the nationalistic bent of the first three Declarations. In Chapter Eight, *Fourth Declaration* (EZLN, January 1st 1996), I present evidence that this text marked the indigenisation of the Zapatistas’ identity, injustice and agency discourses, and I situate this shift in the context of political opportunities and constraints at the national and international level, as well as local and cultural pressures internal to the EZLN in Chiapas. In Chapter Nine, *Fifth Declaration* (July 19th 1998), I present evidence of the subtle alignment of this indigenous discourse, and argue that the collective action frame of the *Fifth Declaration* betrays the Zapatistas’ frustration at the failure of earlier political initiatives that cost them their civil society support base and restricted their political agenda to the indigenous issue.

In a final concluding chapter, Chapter Ten, I defend my thesis as one that provides a more complete and detailed understanding of the Zapatistas’ evolving discourse between 1980 and 1998. I argue that by distilling the collective action frames of key texts taken from key periods, my thesis identifies the complex and changing content of the Zapatista discourse and its relation to wider, shifting contexts in ways that no other interpretation has yet achieved. I put forward a nuanced interpretation of the Zapatistas’ message as continually emergent and irreducible to static labels, and argue that this marks
a contribution capable of bridging existing analyses that tend to conflict over their ascription of divergent and fixed meanings. I also remark on the theoretical contribution of the thesis in combining and applying the methods and concepts of frame analysis, and end by suggesting areas for future research, both empirically in connection with the Zapatistas after 1998, and theoretically with regard to the future of frame analysis.
CHAPTER ONE

Review of Zapatista Literature

‘Instead of the EZLN’s issues being seen in the discourse of the movement participants, a ready-made modernity-postmodernity debate is transcribed on to the situation… To put it simply, our theories of such movements are underdeveloped, overly abstract, oriented away from praxis, oblivious to Western biases and generally inadequate for a full comprehension of struggles in the global South.’

(Couch, 2001: 259)

INTRODUCTION

As the above quotation suggests, the large body of empirical work that surrounds the EZLN has generated more heat than light. Scholars, often biased by broader polemical agendas, have clashed over their ascription of ‘postmodern’, ‘socialist’ and ‘indigenous’ labels, and while at times insightful, these existing studies remain partial. With their ‘top-down’ imposition of preconceived theoretical arguments, they paint generalised and static pictures of the Zapatistas that lack a focus on the protagonists’ own variable discourse. This chapter offers a detailed critique of this literature in order to strengthen my argument for a more discourse-focused corrective. I emphasise the need for an analysis capable of capturing the complex content and mutability of the Zapatistas’ message, which has been developed over time and in dialogue with the movement’s changing fortunes.
CONCEPTUALISING THE EZLN

In November 1983 the first cadre of the clandestine EZLN entered the rural state of Chiapas, the most southerly province of Mexico, and began working towards revolution among the poorest of Mexico’s indigenous peasantry (Tello, 1995). After ten years of clandestine work the tiny guerrilla force launched simultaneous attacks on several centres of municipal authority on January 1st 1994. Twelve days of war against the vastly superior federal army saw the surviving EZLN militants retreat into the Lacandon cañadas, but the Mexican government had already lost the stomach for violence and offered a unilateral ceasefire. The EZLN has since been locked in a ‘low intensity war’ with the government that has survived three presidents and cycled between negotiation, red alerts and media blackouts. During this time, the EZLN and its spin-offs have continued to receive academic interest from a variety of antagonistic schools as scholars have used them to engage in broader theoretical arguments or comment on structural changes occurring in Mexico and across the world. To give some flavour of these debates, analysts have variously labelled the EZLN the first postmodern revolution (Burbach, 1994; Carrigan, 2001), the last gasp of nineteenth century national socialism (Rajchenberg and Heaul-Lambert, 1998), and the defender of the indigenous ‘enchanted world’ (Gilly, 1998). Yet the tendency to override the complexity of the Zapatista discourse is evident and so the layers and fluctuating content of the rebels’ message have not, as yet, been adequately mapped out.

The most incendiary claim is that the EZLN is ‘postmodern’, a label which, above all, situates the Zapatistas in the post-Soviet global context. Indeed, Roger Burbach (1994, 2001), probably the most prominent purveyor of the postmodern Zapatista thesis, locates the EZLN’s postmodernism ‘in the wake of the collapse of the modern bi-polar world of the post Second World War and the ideological exhaustion of most of the national liberation movements,’ (1994: 113). Todd May (1994), however, finds postmodern political activity in the realm of the tactical, and it is through observation of
the EZLN’s actions that several studies have adumbrated its supposed postmodernism. For James Rochlin (1995) and Ana Carrigan (2001), for example, the most notably postmodern feature of the EZLN is its combination of violent revolutionary imagery, willingness to negotiate, and ability to listen to others:

‘Who had ever heard a revolutionary movement announce that it had no interest in power? Or met a guerrilla leader who insisted that the rebels had “neither the desire nor the capacity” to impose their own program… Such pronouncements disclosed a dramatic break with the dogmas and romantic machismo of all previous Latin American guerrillas and it soon emerged that these masked descendents of the ancient Mayan culture had produced the first postmodern revolution.’

(2001: 417)

Postmodern politics, in this reading, is found in the Zapatistas’ avoidance of the trappings of power, and their insistence that theirs is simply one voice among many. Jeffrey Popke’s post-structuralist interpretation rests on a similar conclusion, but emphasises the Zapatistas’ creation of a new form of open-ended politics:

‘the vision of the EZLN embodies a deconstructionist ethos, one that recognises the always open and negotiable nature of politics, ‘where foundations or norms or universal prescriptions only exist to be put into question as a permanent feature of the process of democratisation’ (Slater, 1997: 69)… the writings [of the EZLN]… suggest new ways of thinking about subjects, politics and the space of democracy.’

(Popke, 2004: 312)
The crux of the EZLN’s postmodernism, therefore, is in their concern for the creation of radical democratic spaces rather than the founding of a socialist state. Such spaces will allow for the free expression of diversity through which the EZLN hopes to displace the anachronistic state apparatus:

‘Overall, the emergence of a diversity of groups with an assortment of political agendas parallels a central argument of some veins of postmodern conceptual approaches – one that emphasises the increasing significance of the “many voices” that are speaking more loudly.’

(Rochlin, 1995: 387)

On a slightly different note, Cleaver (1994) and Burbach (1994, 2001) also see postmodern politics reflected in the EZLN’s decentralised structure. Burbach maintains that the EZLN’s ‘leader’, Subcomandante Marcos, uses the prefix ‘sub’ in an ironic way to denote his commitment to lead by obeying the wishes of the people, and to exemplify the EZLN’s ‘new’ radical democratic structure as indicative of postmodern modes of leadership (Harvey, 1989: 45-7). Indeed, he describes the ‘Zapatismo’ sentiment that has radiated out from Chiapas as ‘a test case of radical democratic communications against global capitalism and for humanity,’ (Burbach, 2001: 129).

These arguments lend weight to the ‘post-Marxist’ idea that the EZLN is engaged in a global reinvention of revolution for the post-Cold War era (Holloway and Pelaez, 1998; Holloway, 2002). Indeed, the postmodern thesis shares much with other efforts to render post-Soviet insurgencies in the new clothes of postmodern politics (Burbach, 1998; Rengger and Hoffman, 1992; Munck and Purnaka, 2000). Nonetheless, these arguments rest heavily on generalised ideas of the international post-Soviet context rather than detailed knowledge of the nuances of the EZLN’s self-perception, sense of injustice and
the reasoning behind their methods. In short, these studies tend to override the complex content and evolving nature of movement discourses.

In fairness, some postmodern readings do touch on the Zapatistas’ discourse, although they tend to elide content in favour of the form that that discourse takes. John Gray (1997), Oliver Froehling (1998), Garrido and Alexander (2003) and Cason and Brooks (1999), for example, all explore the EZLN’s manipulation of new media. They see the ‘war of ink and internet’ (Froehling, 1998) or ‘cyberactivism’ (Garrido and Alexander, 2003) as a major departure, through which the Zapatista rebels ‘use the internet and the tabloid press with the shamelessness of athletic shoe companies,’ (Gray, 1997: 5-6). Elsewhere, Schulz and Wagner (1995) and Ronaldo Munck (2000) address the Zapatistas’ ‘symbolic warfare’, which replaced their initial military campaign early in 1994. Such activity, these authors suggest, reflects ‘current abstruse theories of culture’ in the deployment of ‘weapons of imitation, parody and pastiche,’ (Munck, 2000: 11), and is reminiscent of postmodern theories that delimit the so-called cultural logic of late capitalism.

Even here, however, conclusions that emphasise the supposed ‘newness’ of the EZLN’s discursive practices appear cursory without in-depth analysis of what is actually being said. For example, attempts by social movements to manipulate public opinion are far from novel: social movement theorists have, for years, insisted that political challengers generate new meanings from old discourses and turn these to the recruitment of new members and supporters⁴. Indeed, the use of pastiche in movements’ cultural construction has been shown to be a staple of ‘frame alignment’ since the French Revolution (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001; Clemens, 1996). Yet postmodern interpretations portray the Zapatistas’ ‘symbolic warfare’ as indicative of something altogether unheard of, while their use of ‘new’ media seems reason enough for some to celebrate the supposed postmodernism behind the ‘electronic fabric of struggle’ (Cleaver,

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⁴ For excellent reviews of the development of social movement theory, see Byrne (1997), Goodwin and Jasper (2003), and Crossley (2001).
Further, even though several analysts purport a focus on discourse they still fail to map out the meanings within the EZLN’s message, and continue to depict that message as constant and unchanging. Any claim that the EZLN represents a radical postmodern departure from what went before is founded on limited observations construed in the context of thawing international relations and innovations in media and communications.

Critics of the postmodern thesis have already suggested that it was submitted with a more encompassing theoretical agenda in mind (Couch, 2001: 243-259). Daniel Nugent (1995) believes that authors offering postmodern readings exploit the EZLN to propound their own view that the left should take postmodernism more seriously. As he says, this is,

‘symptomatic of what can happen when Northern intellectuals, even those on the left, become enchanted by a sort of postmodern identity politics. This adoption of postmodern vocabulary and categories of analysis winds up revealing more about academic politics in the North than it does about the situations these analyses are meant to explain.’

Nugent himself errs on the side of ‘pre-modern’ rather than postmodern politics. Indeed, he asks what, if anything, is post-modern about rural indigenas resisting capitalism, and maintains that the Zapatistas of today are no more postmodern than their predecessors that rode with Emiliano Zapata in the wars of 1910-20 (1995: 124-37). Certainly, if the postmodernists’ intention was to stir debate they have been successful. The unpopularity of postmodernism among the intellectual left has ensured that a lively discourse has ensued as Marxists and neo-Marxists have responded with their own interpretations. However, as I will show, analyses undertaken from a Marxist bent betray their own preoccupation with general theoretical arguments, and so do little to steer the debate towards the Zapatistas’ own collective discourse.
Marxist readings tend to emphasise the rebels’ grievance base and the ideational input of socialist organisers entering rural-indigenous Chiapas from northern states in the years preceding the 1994 rebellion. For Henry Veltmeyer, for example, the EZLN are unequivocally a class-based social movement that arose in response to the ‘objective conditions… faced by indigenous peoples and peasants across the country:’

‘Despite the efforts of postmodernists and poststructuralists to dissolve these conditions in thought and to deny the workings of any intelligible process, these conditions and their underlying structures are very real and objective in their effects. Moreover, they are generally experienced in terms of a specific social organisation of production, which is to say, under class conditions.’

(2000: 94)

Veltmeyer (2000) submitted his analysis a full six years after the 1994 rebellion and uses a Marxist inflection deliberately to undermine postmodern readings. He borrows from James Petras’s idea of a reconstituted class analysis in Latin America (1997), through which he identifies the ‘regional spread and fundamental similarity of structurally determined conditions that are lived and experienced and reacted to politically in class terms,’ (Veltmeyer, 2000: 91). Veltmeyer goes on to identify these ‘structurally determined conditions’ in the social and economic deprivation faced by the majority of Chiapas’s rural indigenas, ‘located as they are in an officially defined “marginal zone” characterised by an exceedingly high rate of impoverishment and exclusion, deprivation of basic human needs, and a lack of access to public services, not to speak of the denial of fundamental human rights and the absence of democracy and social justice,’ (2000: 92). Other studies have also examined the socio-economic ramifications of land reform, rural proletarianisation, and overpopulation in the Chiapas countryside, and have used these to draw parallels with the socialist insurgencies of rural Guatemala and Peru:
‘there should be little doubt that the underlying dynamics of the Zapatista struggle are like that of the Shining Path or the Guatemalan Army of the Poor. It is a combined indigenous and agrarian struggle against capitalist oppression which is centred on a fight for land.’

(Proyect, 1998)

These analyses say little or nothing about the EZLN discourse, and infer Marxist meanings simply from the structural conditions that apparently gave rise to the 1994 rebellion. The greatest energy, in fact, is expended on uncovering the socio-economic and political ‘causes’ of the rebellion, which in these analyses are located in the class antagonisms of the capitalist system, and are all too often presented as though they contain some objective, universally structuring truth.

A second train of Marxist analysis draws out the ‘subjective conditions of political organisation and ideology’, and draws attention to the influx of non-indigenous, mainly socialist, organisers that came to Chiapas from the north in the 1970s and ‘80s. Veltmeyer credits these norteneros with channelling indigenas’ attitudes to their relative deprivation and thereby generating the necessary class-consciousness that is the precondition for socialist revolution (2000: 95). Luis Hernandez Navarro twins this development with the recent history of government intervention in Chiapas, and concludes that there ‘the current incarnation of a tradition of cyclic Indian revolts, grew out of nearly 20 years of political agitation in the countryside, primarily over land,’ (1994: 44); an allusion to the arrival of Maoist organisers in Chiapas in the 1970s (Harvey, 1998).

Such Marxist arguments aim to refute the postmodern thesis, and do a grand job of countering the view that the EZLN represents a radical break with the past. However, they suffer the same preoccupation with a broader theoretical premise, and so replicate the reluctance to engage with the Zapatistas’ own discourse. Their readiness, for example, to
focus on the structural conditions that ‘cause’ rebellions leads to deterministic conclusions that elide the understandings of protagonists. Indeed, for many it seems that the presence of northerners pedalling socialist ideas combined with the undeniable poverty of Chiapas’s rural population is sufficient grounds to conclude that the EZLN is a socialist movement organisation. Even studies like Rajchenberg and Heau-Lambert’s, which explores certain facets of the Zapatista discourse, are oriented to a broader theoretical polemic. The result is the inference of meanings from observations of the EZLN in its macro-historical context, and the depiction of those meanings as fixed and unchanging. Such analyses cannot capture the twists, turns, blind alleys and mistakes involved in the ongoing construction of the EZLN’s message.

From a Gramscian perspective, however, two studies do stand out as particularly illuminating. First, Adam David Morton (2002) evaluates the postmodern interpretation and is prepared to accept the presence of some postmodern traits in what otherwise amounts to the Zapatistas’ ‘(neo)Gramscian’ resistance to hegemony. As well as offering a balanced verdict on the Marxist versus postmodern polemic, Morton is refreshingly mindful of the peculiarities of the Mexican regime’s transformista style, and manages to locate the EZLN’s counterhegemonic discourse in its local opposition to national and global structures following the government’s imposition of rural structural adjustment programmes. This is a worthy analysis in the Gramscian tradition, and it provides a cautious and badly needed counterweight to the postmodern and Marxist readings that say more about theory than the Zapatistas. Indeed, Morton is particularly circumspect in his conclusion that ‘the form the EZLN struggle has taken may be understood as postmodern although the content may not have been designed with this explicit aim,’ (2002: 267, emphasis in original). That said, after making this distinction Morton himself engages more with the form of the EZLN struggle, and we are still bereft of systematic analyses that grapple with the content of the Zapatistas’ discourse.
Perhaps, therefore, the most intriguing study from a Gramscian perspective is that offered by Kathleen Bruhn (1999), who, interestingly, uses concepts derived from frame analysis. Although she provides only a very limited application of these concepts and uses them to support a more recognisably Gramscian thesis, it is nonetheless encouraging to find a genuine interest in the Zapatistas’ collective action frame. Bruhn is refreshingly engaged with some elements of the Zapatista discourse, and finds the Zapatistas to be subtler in their counterhegemonic discourse than their revolutionary contemporaries in the *Ejercito Populari Revolucionario* (EPR), a militant organisation that appeared in Guerrero in 1996 and immediately invoked a discernibly socialist agenda. Bruhn addresses the ways in which the Zapatistas frame their movement, and describes this according to Gramscian concepts. She is particularly impressed by Subcomandante Marcos’s awareness of socialism’s declining currency in the post-Soviet era. Notwithstanding her insightful appraisal of Marcos’s Gramscian traits, however, the spectre of orientalism looms over Bruhn’s tendency to favour the discourse of the EZLN’s white spokesman, to whom she gives particular credit as ‘the very model of a Gramscian intellectual’ and a ‘transmitter of ideas within civil society,’ (1999: 42). Again, this reflects an unsystematic approach to discourse that cannot help but obscure ‘the material, human, and historical substance of this rebellion: the indigenous communities and the Indian leadership of the movement,’ (Gilly, 1998: 312). Ultimately, therefore, Bruhn’s interpretation of the Zapatista discourse is partial: it is an analysis of Subcomandante Marcos’s writings rather than those of the EZLN collective, a distinction that Marcos himself makes (EZLN, 1994). Furthermore, her application of frame analysis is inadequate as there is no discernible methodology, nor any reference to the shades of meaning that occur within and between texts. As a consequence, the ‘frame’ Bruhn presents is a static portrayal heavily weighted towards one facet of the Zapatista discourse, and so lacks the finer deconstruction afforded by more sophisticated frame analysis.
Seeking, in part, to correct the ethnocentrism of many western interpretations, a final broad category of analyses breaks with the debates articulated above. Where Marxian and post-structuralist readings elide indigenous culture, or at best ascribe to it some new significance within or beyond traditional class dialectics, a loose collection of studies share a desire to tease out the supposed cultural foundations of the EZLN. Drawing on the political process model, Yashar (1998) and Munoz (2006) recognise the indigenous values and beliefs that seem to underpin the Zapatistas’ ‘ethnic identity’, and attempt to articulate these with ruptures in the political superstructure of Mexico. These are macro-socio economic and political perspectives based on the political process school of social movement analysis, in which common themes of political liberalisation, state reforms and dormant Indian kinship networks are the key to understanding expressions of ethnic identity, not just in Mexico, but across Latin America. As with Morton, for example, Yashar’s awareness of Mexico’s unique political culture helps her to ground the EZLN’s indigenous demands in the faultline between global neoliberalism and domestic structural adjustment. However, both Yashar’s and Munoz’s accounts are far removed from the true site of cultural production: the discourse of the EZLN itself. The Zapatistas’ indigenous identity is taken for granted without any attempt to locate its boundaries and relations with other features of the Zapatistas’ message. Indeed, Yashar’s primary concern is with the pan-American fallout from neoliberal structural adjustment, and its coincidence with what seems like a rash of ethnic social movements on the continent, while Munoz is more interested in teasing out the national political ruptures that served as the backdrop to the EZLN’s rebellion in 1994. In succumbing to the political-structural prejudices inherent to political process inquiry, these studies fail to capture the multi-layered content and mutable nature of the EZLN’s discourse.

In contrast, Gary H. Gossen’s determination to identify the Indian ‘essence’ or ‘soul’ of the Zapatistas leads him to overstate the indigenous character of their discourse.
Gossen begins promisingly, recognising that meaning is not to be found in political and economic structures alone, and he criticises the tendency to privilege such factors:

‘while this prevailing opinion may be defensible and accurate with regard to the proximate causes of the rebellion, it nevertheless proves to be somewhat myopic when it is examined in light of the deep cultural history of the region as a whole, including both Mexico and Guatemala.’

(Gossen, 1996: 529)

Instead, Gossen attempts to locate the EZLN’s resonance with Mexico’s ‘collective Indian soul,’ and finds this in the Zapatistas’ cultural make-up. He uncovers several cultural traits specific to the Maya of Chiapas and Guatemala, which he believes reflect the EZLN’s true indigenous heart. These include the cosmological beliefs and practices that lead the Maya to fear caudillismo (charismatic leadership), construct new ‘syncretised’ identities by drawing freely from diverse symbolic and ideological forms, and support the appointment of a white man, in this case Marcos, to act as their spokesman and titular head. Gossen pricks interest in the inescapable alterity of the Maya worldview and acts as a counterweight to politically and economically deterministic interpretations that elide the cultural dynamic behind broad socio-economic grievances and political discontinuities. However, in my view Gossen goes too far in his emphasis of indigenous cultural beliefs, and so ends up depicting culture as equally deterministic. In his analysis, the indigenous Zapatistas are presented as automatons programmed and directed by the invisible schemas of their worldview. Moreover, Gossen is almost as guilty of ignoring the Zapatistas’ own discourse as the ‘structuralist’ analyses he critiques. While he does assess key Zapatista phrases and relates them to Maya beliefs, he has no time for the systematic interpretation of the EZLN’s collective texts, which, as the sites of dialogic exchange, reveal greater complexities and alteration over time.
Two much more sophisticated cultural analyses are provided by Adolfo Gilly (1998) and Josefina Saldana-Portillo (2001). Like Gossen, they recognise the EZLN’s inescapable indigenousness, but root this in the complex and ambivalent coexistence of Mexico’s white ladino, mixed mestizo and indigena populations. Saldana-Portillo finds the EZLN’s greatest weapon to be its challenge to the dominant mestizaje culture. Mestizaje, in simple terms, translates as Mexicans’ paradoxical ‘veneration of noble Indian ancestors but general amnesia about the living Indian peoples of Mexico.’ The Zapatistas’ innovation, she argues, is found in their determination to oppose mestizaje, not from the position of humble Indians, but ‘as guardians of the nation, defenders of the 1917 Constitution, and radical democrats,’ (2001: 409). For Saldana-Portillo, the EZLN constructs a discourse of Mexican nationalism that is rooted in the perspective of the marginalized Indian, and which demands specific cultural rights for the indigenous within the existing political vessel of the Mexican state. While insightful, however, Saldana-Portillo is steadfast in her pursuit of what she sees as the EZLN’s indigenous defence of Mexican nationhood, and so misses the opportunity to map-out this discourse through its component parts and observe its alteration over time.

Adolfo Gilly shares Saldana-Portillo’s interest in mestizaje relations, but maintains that the Zapatista rebellion is best conceived as indigenas’ last ditch defence of their separate ‘enchanted world’ against encroaching modernity, which Gilly sees as characterised by ‘mercantile exchanges’ on one side and the ‘juridical order’ on the other (1998: 261). Honing in on Indians’ unique position in the Mexican national imaginary, he sees the Maya rebels as a people who refuse to accept themselves ‘as “the past” of Mexican society’s present,’ and who are determined to preserve the otherness of their different ‘life with its own modes of defining the world and society,’ (1998: 315-6). Gilly recognises recent political changes: for years Maya cultural otherness was indirectly

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* Nash (1993, 1995) defines the term *ladino* as used by Maya Indians to describe Mexicans of European descent. It is, she suggests, often used pejoratively by indigenas. The term *mestizo*, on the other hand, denotes Mexicans of mixed indigenous and European descent. Today it is synonymous with the post-Revolutionary cultural label designed to unify *ladino* and indigenous cultures in a shared *mestizaje* culture.
preserved by constitutional guarantees of communal farming rights, until neoliberal structural adjustment demanded their removal. For him, the EZLN’s indigenous discourse is deliberately constructed in full awareness of the juridical and mercantilist threat posed by the encroaching neoliberal order and free market. Yet Gilly is particularly notable for his recognition of the multiple ‘voices’ at play in the Zapatista discourse, and is aware that these speak to different audiences for different purposes (1998: 322). Disappointingly, however, he offers little in terms of analysing these different discourses. His concern is with the ‘obsidian mirror’ that that the EZLN holds up to Mexican society, and he is content to adumbrate the indigenous face that reflects the lost innocence of Mexico’s revolutionary heritage. As a result, he comes tantalisingly close but ultimately misses the chance to get to grips with the layers, twists, turns, progressions and backslides of the meanings contained within the Zapatistas’ discourse.

A highly informative and circumspect attempt to deconstruct the EZLN’s discourse comes from Lisa Poggilia. Poggilia, unlike so many others, recognises the fluidity of the Zapatistas’ discourse and deliberately eschews any interest in distilling the ‘truth’ or essence of the movement:

‘My aim in this paper is not to discover or uncover what the Zapatistas ‘really think’ about their struggle and the subsequent engagement of Mexican civil society and the international community. I contend that searching for the ‘true thoughts’ of a particular community is nearly always a fruitless exercise, as thought processes continuously (re)formulate themselves on the shaky and always shifting terrain on which the battle between desire, meaning, and interpretation is waged. (2005: 4)
Poggilia’s methodological approach to the Zapatista texts is sound, and she succeeds in her aim of presenting a historically and contextually specific interpretation of the EZLN’s presentation of themselves to the national and international community. Moreover, although it is not her aim to chart discursive flexibility and change, she nonetheless acknowledges certain discursive changes (2005: 8). However, Poggilia’s concern is with the Zapatistas’ manipulation of broader human rights discourses. As such, she is not concerned with the detail of the EZLN’s discourse with regard to its component parts, nor does she seek out evidence of discursive change over time.

One final study foreshadows my own research interests in its intention to deconstruct the Zapatistas’ collective action frames. Aquiles Chihu Amparan (2003) foregrounds his interest in the discursive patterns through which the EZLN constructs its identity, defines its problems, and posits solutions. He claims to expose what he calls the organisation’s ‘discourse strategies’, and identifies the ways in which the EZLN construct their identities, grievances and objectives (2003: 2). Like me, he believes such discursive ‘frame components’ may be distilled from key EZLN texts. Amparan begins promisingly, selecting key texts from different periods and offers a convincing rationale for his selection. Deconstructing these texts, he outlines five frame components, which he labels ‘the protagonist, the problem, the antagonist, the goals and the audience,’ (2003: 3). However, Amparan’s actual analysis is disappointingly descriptive. There is no effort to explain either the inspiration or the constraints that lie behind the discursive twists and turns of the Zapatistas’ discourse, nor is there any exposition of the rebels’ dialogic exchanges with third parties. Further, there is no discernible methodological system for the extraction of meanings from texts, such as that provided by Johnston (1995), which I address in more detail in the next chapter. What begins by promising a similar analysis to my own ends by delivering an interesting but ultimately descriptive account of features of the EZLN’s discourse. In sum, Amparan offers a promising start-point for the frame analysis of Zapatista texts, yet I believe his interpretation lacks depth. While he succeeds
in describing some of the contours of the Zapatistas’ discourse, he fails to plot the complex and shifting meanings of that discourse in interaction with structures, dialogic exchanges and cultural preferences.

CONCLUSION

Having weighed existing interpretations and found them wanting, I believe that there is a genuine need for a more systematic analysis of the Zapatistas’ discourse. Readings that attach Marxian and postmodern labels too often commit themselves to a broader polemic, and end up saying more about their own theoretical positions than the discourse offered by the Zapatistas themselves (Burbach, 1994, 2001; Carrigan, 2000; Veltmeyer, 2000; Nugent, 1995). Even less partisan analyses tend towards determinism: Yashar’s application of political process logic overlooks discourse by emphasising socio-economic and political structures (Yashar, 1998), while Gossen depicts agents as somehow led by an invisible cultural leash (Gossen, 1994, 1996). Disappointingly, those few studies that do succeed in finding the dialogue between political, economic and cultural contexts on the one hand and the Zapatistas’ discursive production on the other shy away from the methodical analysis of texts in order to pursue more specific agendas (Morton, 2003; Bruhn, 1999; Saldana-Portillo, 2001; Gilly, 1998). Finally, the one study that avers to dissect the Zapatistas’ discourse according to its collective action frames does so without system or recourse to the strategies, structures and dialogues that inform them (Chihu Amparan, 2003). In short, existing studies provide partial interpretations of the Zapatistas that tend to impose meanings without adequate, in-depth analysis of the rebels’ own discourse. Moreover, they lack methodological rigour to the extent that even those that do draw on the Zapatistas’ discourse do so with little systematisation or justification for their selection of particular texts. In light of this, I believe that there is a gap in the literature for a reliable, replicable and thorough exploration of the EZLN’s collective discourse, a study capable of capturing the content of that discourse along with its fluid and dialogic
interaction with contexts. In the following chapter I outline the theoretical framework that, I believe, is capable of supporting such a study.
CHAPTER TWO

Theoretical Framework

‘In social movement analysis, the framing perspective has been at the forefront of renewed interest in cultural and ideational processes. But several persistent problems remain: how to do it systematically, for example, and how to verify the content and relationships between the concepts within frames that have been identified.’

(Johnston, 1995: 217)

INTRODUCTION

As the above quotation from Johnston suggests, frame analysis has developed from theories of social movements. Social movements are defined in this literature through the following traits: they incorporate voluntary ‘collective enterprises seeking to establish a new order of life,’ (Blumer, 1969: 99); they engage in an ‘organised, sustained, and non-institutional challenge to authorities, powerholders, or cultural beliefs and practices,’ (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003: 3); and they tend to be ‘backed by dense social networks and galvanised by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols,’ (Tarrow, 1998: 2). In sum, social movements are collective, contentious and comprised of multiple social movement organisations (SMOs) that reproduce, repackage and disseminate their discourses in order to recruit, orientate, and make political gains. Interest in the ways in which SMOs construct their discourses has grown steadily since the 1960s\(^7\), and reached its apogee in the frame analysis model.

However, the quotation from Johnston also alludes to the problems associated with frame analysis. While I am not blind to the weaknesses and criticisms levelled at frame analysis in recent years, I maintain that frame analysis offers useful methods and

\(^7\) From the behaviourists (Blumer, 1969; Smelser, 1963; Gurr, 1970) to resource mobilisation theories (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973) to the new social movements school (Touraine, 1982; Melucci, 1989), social movement scholars have wrestled with movements’ cultural production processes.
conceptual tools capable of drawing out the evolving content of the Zapatistas’ collective discourse. With this in mind, I revisit the fundamental concepts and criticisms of frame analysis in this chapter, beginning with the base units of the ‘collective action frame’ and ‘frame alignment’. From here, I address the ways in which these ideas have been appropriated by the political process model that has come to dominate empirical analyses, and respond to four major criticisms levelled at the theory and practise of frame analysis in this tradition. Finally, I offer my own corrective approach based on a return to the imperatives and terminology of three early frame theorists: Johnston (1995), Gamson (1992) and Snow et al (1986).

COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES
The terminology of ‘frames’ was first applied to social movements by David Snow et al, who lifted the phrase from Erving Goffman’s (1974) analysis of psycho-sociological relations. Their initial thesis was subsequently developed by several scholars who problematised the analysis of social movements’ collective discourses through the concept of the ‘collective action frame’ (Gamson, 1992). A useful definition of the collective action frame is provided by David Benford, who describes them as ‘action-oriented sets of beliefs that inspire meaning and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns,’ (1997: 416). Benford’s characterization informs us of two fundamental attributes of collective action frames. Firstly, that they are made up of ideational elements that range from cultural beliefs to values to ideology; secondly, that they are ‘action-oriented’, meaning that they have an instrumental purpose. The ideational nature of collective action frames is generally uncontested, but their instrumental function has been the source of much debate and criticism. In the following discussion I expand on each of these attributes in turn.

Gamson has perhaps done most to capture the ideational composition of collective action frames. He conceives of the collective action frame as made up of three intrinsic
‘frame components’: identity, injustice and agency. It is through these components, he argues, that SMOs construct their discourses, declaring who ‘we’ are, what ‘we’ are fighting for, and how ‘we’ are going to achieve our aims. In order to render these claims in languages and symbols that are familiar to bystanders, opponents and the media, SMOs actively draw on and alter the landscape of ideational meanings that exist within a society. Commenting on SMOs’ capacity to reformulate ideational meanings, for example, Elisabeth S. Clemens conceives of movement organisations as bricoleurs and their frames as ‘catalysts for the rearrangement and possible transformation of the array of organisational models that characterises a society’ (1996: 209). Certainly, collective action frames demonstrate the capacity of SMOs to transpose and alter the meanings behind existing ideational symbols and discourses. In order to theorise the pre-existent ideational elements that SMOs draw on in their construction of collective action frames, Snow and Benford develop the concept of the ‘master frame’ (1992). Religion, for example, can serve as a master frame and so bestow a wealth of symbols and emotive terms by which a SMO may define its identity, injustice and agency frames. Nationalism can serve social movements in a similar capacity (Tarrow, 1998). To the extent that such master frames provide the ideational repository for collective action frames, Snow and Benford comment that ‘master frames are to movement-specific collective action frames as paradigms are to finely tuned theories,’ (Snow and Benford, 1992: 138)\(^8\).

That collective action frames are comprised of ideational elements located in and borrowed from broader cultural, ideological and religious themes is not contested in the empirical and theoretical literature. Doug McAdam has argued, for instance, that the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) and Martin

\(^8\) The definition of ‘master frame’ has not always been so broad. Originally, Snow and Benford viewed master frames as the creations of ‘early risers’ or ‘initiator movements’, a common example being the civil rights master frame, variants of which were subsequently appropriated by Amerindian groups and gay rights networks among others. Later theorists applied the term to looser, less specific ‘umbrella’ frames under which coalitions and alliances of organisations might unite (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992). It was felt, however, that these applications awarded too much creative agency to early risers, whose collective discourses were themselves often inspired by broader cultural values and/or ideologies (Benford, 1997). Consequently, empirical studies reinvented master frames to reflect ‘cultural themes’ or pre-existent worldviews that provide a cultural stock of symbols and rituals from which SMOs may borrow (Gamson, 1995).
Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) drew on pre-existent master frames of American liberal democracy and Christian belief in their construction of the civil rights collective action frame (1996: 338-355). Sidney Tarrow, meanwhile, has explored the cyclical nature of social protest more generally, and has underlined the emotive potential of religious and nationalist master frames that provide challengers with cultural symbols linked to unifying metanarratives. Such teleological master frames, he argues, serve an instrumental purpose in that they allow SMOs to construct collective action frames that justify their struggles, ground them in utopian ideals of progress or conservatism, and appeal to popular sympathies (1998: 192). In this way, the ideational make-up of collective action frames is necessarily linked to their instrumental function.

Describing the instrumental function, Creed et al (2002) consider the frame as both a window and a scaffold: a window that enables the SMO to focus on and draw out the relevant details of a particular issue, and a scaffold that allows other arguments and new discourses to be attached. This instrumental aspect can be traced back to Snow et al’s original ‘frame alignment’ thesis (1986: 464-76). Snow et al characterise frame alignment as the strategic process by which a SMO attempts to align its collective action frame with a view to achieving a particular end: to encourage support, for example, or win political or cultural concessions from powerholders. Frame alignment is, therefore, an instrumental activity that implies SMOs’ awareness of – or at least belief in – the cultural preferences of a target audience. In cognisance of bystander preferences, Snow et al suggest that SMOs can align and realign their collective action frames via one of four frame alignment processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, or frame transformation. Although slightly different, each framing process requires the strategic reconstruction of the collective action frame as the SMO seeks ‘narrative fidelity’ with the preferences, values and beliefs of potential adherents (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989: 5; Oberschall, 1996: 99).
While this view has drawn criticism, I maintain that there is great value in recognising the instrumental dimension of collective action frames. SMOs are, after all, instrumental phenomena: they arise to serve a particular purpose, even if that purpose is, in some cases, purely expressive (Calhoun, 1994: 53), and they are often oriented toward clearly defined goals (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Moreover, as William Sewell (1992) points out, discourse itself is inherently instrumental inasmuch as it is construed to convey meanings between parties. Collective action frames, insofar as they embody SMO discourses, must therefore be acknowledged as, at least in part, instrumental. Nevertheless, the instrumental view of movement discourse implied in the frame alignment thesis has led to frame analysis becoming absorbed into the political process model of social movement activity. In this model frames represent strategic responses to objective political opportunities alone, an assumption that is, at once, politically deterministic and founded upon the belief that SMOs can stand outside the constraints of culture and discourse. I maintain that it is in association with this politically deterministic premise that frame analysis has come under attack.

**POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY**

In recent years, frame analysis has been portrayed as an adjunct to the political process model of social movement behaviour. The political process model is less a theory and more an attempt to unite the disparate field of social movement inquiry. It was developed in the mid-1990s by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald, and was offered as the ‘synthetic approach’\(^9\): fruit of theoretical collaboration between European and American movement scholars\(^10\). Inspired by the culturalist bent of European theories of

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\(^9\) It is noteworthy that the authors of *Comparative Perspectives* did not call their model the ‘Political Process’ approach but the ‘Synthetic Approach’; a sobriquet intended to underline the model’s foundation in several theoretical traditions. It was only when critics looked beneath the terminology of the model and pointed out the striking similarities between the supposed ‘Synthetic Approach’ and McAdam’s (1982) earlier framework used in his analysis of the political processes of the US civil rights movement that the new name was forced (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999a).

\(^10\) McAdam, McCarthy and Zald claim that the political process model originated from transatlantic collaboration, describing it as a universally applicable paradigm that draws together the strengths of existing social movement theories. The concept of ‘political opportunities’, for example, is borrowed from the political opportunity structure developed by Eisinger (1973: 25). Political opportunity is defined as ‘the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political
New Social Movements, McAdam et al (1996) drew on the language of ‘frames’ as a means of ‘bringing culture back in’ to the study of social movements. Frames, in their model, became the discursive products of social movement agents (‘mobilising structures’) in their responses to objective ‘political opportunities’ (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996: 2). As the political process model gained popularity, political opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing processes became the three main components of empirical interest in social movements, and the relationship between them is summed up in McAdam’s diagram (2003: 131):

![Figure 1. The Political Process of Emergent Mobilisation](image)

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system’ (Eisinger, 1973: 25). In his earlier work, Doug McAdam melded his analysis of black civil rights networks with a sophisticated awareness of political opportunities, clarifying the latter as systemic changes (McAdam, 1982: 41). Mobilising structures, by the same token, is a concept borrowed from a separate branch of social movement analysis: resource mobilisation theory, proponents of which include John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977). Mobilising structures refers to the organisations, networks and other, looser groups that comprise or contribute to the structural make-up of a social movement.
In this model structural change creates political opportunities and/or constraints, which are perceived by ‘mobilising structures’ such as SMOs and movement networks, which mobilise and appropriate available cultural resources in their generation of innovative collective action frames. These collective action frames are then promulgated for consumption by media, opponents and the bystander public in pursuit of specific political objectives.

Variously described as the ‘dominant’, ‘common sense’, and ‘classical’ approach to social movements (McAdam, 2003; Koopmans, 2003), the political process model inspired a wave of empirical analyses and has had a lasting effect on the study of movement action frames. Indeed, European and American scholars continue to defend its provision of ‘a well-specified model that allows us to identify where the errors and problems are and where we need to focus our attention to arrive at better explanations in future work,’ (Koopmans, 2003: 119). Nevertheless, the model’s popularity has had a negative effect on the analysis of discursive frames. For all their claims of theoretical synthesis, the original political process theorists betray their political-structural biases. The political process model is grounded in the rational actor problem (Olson, 1965) and declares frames, and by extension discourses, to be purely strategic responses to purely political opportunities. Political opportunities are defined narrowly by McAdam (1996) as new political alignments, elites’ reduced propensity for repression, and the displacement of traditional power holders, while the reduction of frames to rational reactions to these is demonstrated in the confession of a ‘rather narrow’ conception of frame alignment as a purely strategic act:

‘In this volume we want to return to David Snow’s original conception and define framing rather narrowly as referring to the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.’
In this way, the political process model acknowledges social movements’ ideational production but offers a highly voluntarist conception of the SMO actor that ignores wider cultural influences. Frames, and by extension discourses, are reduced to mere strategic constructs: they become rationally generated packages of meaning constructed and propounded by disembedded, acultural agents in response to ‘objective’ political opportunities. I argue that it is this purely ‘strategic’ conception that is responsible for the weaknesses identified in empirical applications, and it is to these weaknesses that I now turn.

EVALUATING PREVAILING APPLICATIONS OF FRAME ANALYSIS

I suggest that the criticisms levelled at frame analysis be characterised as four-fold: the exaggeration of instrumentalism, the narrow conception of culture, the elision of frame content, and the tendency to reify frames as ordered and immutable packages of meaning. In reviewing these criticisms I do not mean to disparage frame analysis per se; rather I mean to show that the political emphasis of the dominant political process approach has displaced cultural and contextual factors and discouraged the interpretive investigation of the content and fluidity of collective action frames.

Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper (1999) first identified the tendency to exaggerate the instrumental dimension of framing when they argued that frame analysis biases research towards physical political structures. Because frames tend to be understood as strategic responses to political opportunities, they argue, frame analysis tends to reduce culture to a mere reservoir of possible symbols to be appropriated and applied strategically. Such analyses misrepresent SMOs as apparently omniscient and somehow able to step beyond the trappings of their members’ lifeworlds, whilst remaining strangely at the mercy of deterministic political structures. Goodwin and Jasper are especially
critical of McAdam’s argument that tactical thought lay behind Martin Luther King’s ‘unusually compelling, yet accessible frame’ of Christian belief and democratic values (McAdam, 1996: 347). Left implicit, they argue, is ‘the possibility that King employed Christian themes because, as a Baptist minister with a doctorate in theology, he actually believed that those “themes” were true or valuable for their own sake,’ (1999: 49). The more circumspect do not deny that there is an inherently instrumental element to framing, but maintain that effective discourse analysis should be capable of drawing out the genuine emotions, closely held cultural beliefs and values that guide agents in their construction of frames (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003).

This leads to the second, related criticism that frame analysis tends towards an overly narrow conception of culture as a resource, thereby ignoring culture’s structuring dimension. Critics attack the ‘assumption that activists simply spin words and images in search of donations,’ arguing that this is misleading because it exaggerates the liberty of SMOs to pick and choose cultural symbols at will (Wall, 1999: 144). Marc Steinberg, for example, addresses what he describes as the ‘excessive voluntarism’ that lies behind the tendency to present culture as a mere resource. For Steinberg, movement agents are every bit as constrained by culture as they are enabled by it:

‘…frames, movement discourse, identities, and other cultural practices are deemed parallel to other material resources vital to collective action. However, such parallels suggest an excessive voluntarism – that people can control, create, and distribute meanings much as they do material resources – and thus pay insufficient attention to cultural meanings’ structural characteristics independent of actors’ control.’

(Steinberg, 2002: 210)
Francesca Poletta (1999) also recognises the tendency to overlook cultural constraints. She argues that many empirical studies carry a false distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘structure’, and she agrees with Steinberg that this misrepresents culture as non-structural because it denies the constraining and structuring influence that culture has over movement agents. Poletta adds, however, that the same distinction also misrepresents structures as somehow non-cultural (1999: 66). Basing her critique on William Sewell’s theory of structure and agency (1992), Poletta maintains that so-called physical structures actually have an inherently cultural presence in the form of the abstract schemas or codes that inform agents’ interaction with them. Structures, she maintains, are therefore ‘dual’: they consist at once of both tangible resources and virtual schemas. Poletta argues that the tendency of frame analysis to portray SMOs as somehow beyond the influence of cultural schemas and the limited and varied access to cultural resources obscures the cultural constraints associated with framing. Effective frame analysis, she suggests, needs to remain sensitive to the schemas that inhibit the appropriation and application of cultural resources in an infinite array of contexts, as well as the inevitability that agents will be differentially placed with regard to their access.

The observations of Goodwin and Jasper, Wall, Steinberg and Poletta are valid and relevant to many empirical applications of frame analysis. However, I would take them a stage further and add a third criticism: that the exaggeration of instrumentalism and narrow conception of culture have discouraged the investigation of the discursive content of collective action frames. Crossley characterises this as the preoccupation with

\[11\] For example, the exaggeration of instrumentalism and narrow conception of culture are evident in the case studies offered by Elena Zdravomyslova (1996) and Lorraine Bayard de Volo’s (2000). In an early application of political process frame analysis, Zdravomyslova explores the collective identity frames of the Democratic Union (DU) and the Leningrad Peoples Front (LPF) during Russia’s democratisation. She notes that in the earlier DU, an expanding discourse of democratic participation led the organisation to present itself as a political party in opposition to the Communist Party (CPSU), while the later localisation of the struggle encouraged the LPF to champion democracy as a return to ‘genuine’ socialism. Throughout, however, she emphasises the importance of expanding and contracting opportunities for institutional participation rather than local and national attitudes to socialist values. In a more recent example, Lorraine Bayard de Volo assesses the Mothers of the Heroes and Martyrs of Matagalpa (2000: 129), an organisation of the Nicaraguan peace movement whose collective identity amplifies its members’ social location as bereaved parents. Bayard de Volo’s emphasis of political dynamics overrides the genuine emotions, sense of bereavement, and culturally specific attitudes to grief and maternal obligation that may have led the Mothers of Matagalpa to orient their organisation in such a way.
the rational action theory (RAT) model of agency, by which frame analysis tends to focus on the ‘rational’, strategic process of frame construction rather than the meanings contained within frames themselves (Crossley, 2002: 56-77, 140-42). I would add that the empirical tendency to privilege the strategy of framing has led analysts to overlook not only the cultural constraints and schemas that provide the contextual and discursive ‘rules of the game’, but also the discursive components of frames themselves (Gamson, 1992, 1995). Indeed, so broad and vague is the conception of the collective action frame in many empirical studies that there is no direction for the deconstruction of discourse at all. This is because the political process model takes the ‘bottom-up’ concept of the collective action frame and applies it in a ‘top-down’ analysis that begins with political structures and works down towards the discourse of the subject. Stretched and divested of its conceptual integrity, the interpretive value of the collective action frame is weakened while its strategic relationship with political structural change is exaggerated.

Accordingly, many frame analyses miss the content and meaning of a collective action frame because they begin by ‘looking first at states, political alignments, and policies’, and only ‘then at patterns of collective action,’ including framing processes (Meyer, 2002: 4). Deborah Yashar’s study of the Zapatistas’ ‘ethnic’ frame provides a relevant case in point. Like all political process analysts, Yashar begins with macro-political structures and works down towards the Zapatistas’ discourse, thereby missing many of the cultural and temporal nuances that award meaning to that discourse. Because the Zapatistas’ ethnic frame coincided with broad political changes for indigenas in Latin America, Yashar concludes that it was these new political opportunities that led to that frame. Yet she does not mention the cultural beliefs that underpin that frame, nor the ambiguous status of indigenas in the Mexican national imaginary, nor even the federal government’s tendency to borrow from Indian cultural practices in order to reinforce its own legitimacy. Such cultural beliefs and schemas, I argue, cannot help but influence the content of the Zapatistas’ collective action frame, and render it a much more contentious,
interactive and complex discourse than Yashar’s top-down approach to frame analysis permits. The danger of imposing inferences based on structural analyses alone demonstrates the need for a model of frame analysis that is, essentially, ‘bottom-up’, and founded on the explication of frames’ complex and layered content.

This leads to the fourth and final criticism levelled at frame analysis: the empirical tendency to further obscure discursive complexity by reifying frames as ‘fixed’ and ‘static’ packages of meaning. All too often SMO collective action frames are assumed to be neutral bearers of universal meanings between addresser and addressee. Yet, as Steinberg points out, SMOs are incapable of controlling discursive resources as they control material resources like money and manpower because symbols and rituals do not carry the same meanings in different contexts nor mean the same thing to all people (1998: 850). Furthermore, despite their supposed interest in the alignment of frames, most analysts betray a tendency to misrepresent frames as more or less permanent expressions of a SMO’s identity and philosophy. The meanings behind discourses are, in other words, contentious and fluid rather than universal and fixed, and analyses that portray discourses as absolute can only ever produce partial interpretations:

‘the metaphorical use of analytic terms such as “frame” and “package” often suggests that meanings assume a more or less orderly structure that can endure past their situational use. Language in this sense has an implied, self-evident fixity.’

(Steinberg, 1998: 850; also Steinberg, 2002: 211)

For Steinberg, discourses are essentially ‘multivocal’ and ‘dialogic’: they speak to people differently, betray or conceal a multitude of contentious voices within collectives, take on new meanings and reject old ones in the face of misunderstandings and competitions. Indeed, he argues that the terminology of ‘frames’ does not capture the historically
emergent nature of movement discourses, and so he rejects it outright, claiming that ‘the framing perspective is deficient because it lacks a critical perspective on the stuff of framing itself – discourse,’ (Steinberg, 1998: 862).

The tendency to elide multivocality and reify frames is apparent in the empirical literature, and I agree with Steinberg that there is a need to find ways to draw out the shifting and dialogically constructed content of social movement discourses. However, unlike Steinberg, I do not see the need to reject the terminology of frames altogether. Instead, I identify new and existing terms that can capture the contentious, fluid, and dialogic nature of frames. Firstly, I acknowledge the uncertainty of outcomes in agency (Sewell, 1992: 18), and recognise that frames are not fixed and immovable as many examples of frame analysis imply, but are subject to constant alteration as SMOs contend with their own mistakes and the countermovement activities of their competitors and opponents (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003: 132). Crossley makes the point that such mistakes and contests are often, to varying degrees, anticipated by SMOs, and that they respond by gradually aligning their discourses dialogically:

‘The construction of a discursive repertoire entails proleptic anticipation of objections and a targeted focus upon the vulnerable areas of one’s opponent’s beliefs. And… these repertoires emerge gradually in the course of a conflict, constantly evolving to keep up with dialogical exchanges between activists, their constituents and their opponents.’

(Crossley, 2002: 140)

I offer the term counterframes to describe the countermovement discourses of SMOs’ opponents. Acknowledging these discourses as discretely opposed to a SMO’s collective action frames will, I argue, allow us to observe the dialogic interaction between them, and identify the reactive changes made to their frame by SMO agents. Secondly, I also agree with Steinberg that an empirical problem arises when the inferences of bystanders and/or
media do not match the intended meanings behind a frame (1999: 742). Doowon Suh (2005) offers the term *misframes* to explain agents’ interpretation or indeed misinterpretation of political opportunities; I define *misframes* slightly differently to mean frames that are misinterpreted by third parties, or frames that, for whatever reason, fail to achieve narrative fidelity with their target audience. As *misframes* are retrospectively identified by SMOs, the latter may respond to rectify the problem via frame alignment processes. Further, *misframes* may be compounded by *counterframes*: opponents may, for example, seize the opportunity to engage the SMO in a discursive *frame contest* (McAdam et al, 1996), say over popular symbols associated with the national imaginary. In this way, the concepts of *misframe* and *counterframe* can help us to observe how discursive mismatches between activists, opponents and third parties can encourage the dialogic alignment of collective action frames over time. Such terms retain the empirical focus on frames but allow the analyst to identify the fluidity that comes with dialogic interaction.

**FRAME ANALYSIS**

Without denying the instrumentality of frames, the future of frame analysis lies with methodological guidelines and concepts that predate the collaborative efforts of political process theorists. Frame analysis needs to capture the value of multiple structural factors as perceived by agents; it needs to delineate the content of collective action frames; and it must identify the discursive twists and turns that are inherent to movements’ discursive evolution. Approaching frame analysis with the emphasis squarely on interpretation rather than conformity with deterministic models of behaviour, can, I argue, counter the criticisms detailed above. In reorienting frame analysis thus, I propose to combine Hank Johnston’s methodology for frame analysis (1995), William Gamson’s layered conception of the collective action frame (1992, 1995), and David Snow et al’s original frame alignment thesis (1986).
Johnston’s Methodology of Micro-Frame Analysis

The crux of Hank Johnston’s methodology is that it posits discourse as the starting point in any analysis of frames. Fundamentally, Johnston requires that the researcher pay utmost attention to what he calls texts, which are the vehicles of movement discourse and may take the form of conversations, press conferences and interviews as well as written documents. His methodology, which he labels micro-frame analysis, is, therefore, ‘bottom-up’ inasmuch as it is the discourse of the text that determines the direction of the investigation rather than macro-political trends and changes. Indeed, Johnston offers his methodology in contradistinction to ‘top-down’ studies whose direction he sees as determined by the privileging of political structures and ruptures and which impose meanings on discourses by approaching them from above. These ‘macro-discursive’ analyses, Johnston argues, ‘make two inappropriate assumptions in this regard: first, that what the text means is self-evident; and second, that what the text apparently means is all that is important,’ (1995: 241). Micro-frame analysis is, by contrast,

‘predicated on the view that there is an inextricable link between discourse and frames: it is through intensive discursive analysis that the mental structures of social movement participants are best reconstructed – from the bottom up, from the text to the frame.’

(Johnston, 1995: 219)

Thus, even before frame analysis was absorbed into the political process model, Johnston was struggling to preserve the analytic focus on discourse through the ‘bottom-up’ analysis of texts (Johnston, 1995: 217). Immediately, therefore, the discursive premise of Johnston’s micro-frame analysis directs the researcher towards the discursive content of frames and thus addresses one of the four criticisms identified above.
Empirically, moreover, Johnston argues that the discursive premise is essential because it reduces the temptation to bypass seemingly opaque passages in the quest to support preconceived conclusions. Indeed, the first of Johnston’s methodological imperatives is that all texts be read as holistic constructs, by which the researcher must preserve the integrity of the text whilst remaining open to information from other sources. In making sense of the Zapatista discourse, for example, I have drawn on many sources including ethnographies of Maya society, interviews with EZLN leaders and participants, newspaper reports, analyses of Mexican politics and society, and many Zapatista communiqués. In each case, inquiries were stimulated by questions raised by the primary analysis of key texts rather than, as with Yashar (1998), observations of macro-political changes. In making these inquiries, moreover, I had to be prepared to have my expectations of a text challenged, and was obliged to consider all factors with regard to the inspiration and meanings behind the frame. Thus, inasmuch as it reduces the risk of ignoring cultural and other factors, the holistic analysis of texts helps redress another of the criticisms identified above.

Johnston’s second recommendation is that the researcher pays particular attention to each text’s speech situation. The speech situation, he writes, is ‘a bounded episode of interaction in which there are specific social rules for what should and should not be said,’ (Johnston, 1995: 222). As such, the nature of the speech situation has the potential to affect the meanings contained within a text to the extent that the researcher cannot take discursive references at face value. Johnston demonstrates this point by contrasting the rules of deference and respect that bound the private correspondence of eighteenth century French courtesans with the discursive rules of SMO collective frame alignment. The latter, he suggests, are influenced by specific type of speech situation:

‘speech situations that are pertinent to social movements are media announcements, announcements to potential participants, and speech appropriate
to organisational settings such as meetings, strategy planning sessions, and recruitment activities. These examples suggest a public-private continuum in which the audience and the scope of diffusion are important determinants of what gets said. Public situations mean wider diffusion and suggest constraints that derive from persuasion, recruitment, and countermovement strategy.’

(1995: 223)

In other words, Johnston’s micro-frame analysis advocates sensitivity to the ‘culturally appropriate forms of argumentation’ and the demands of discursive contexts that may constrain and guide agents in their construction of collective action frames. The concept of speech situation foreshadows Poletta’s (1999) and Goodwin and Jasper’s (1999a) criticism that so much frame analysis appears to divorce texts from their cultural dimensions. Indeed, it highlights the need for sensitivity to the discursive parameters that bind the construction of frames to cultural rules in an infinite array of structural situations. This, I maintain, offers a means of countering the empirical tendency to exaggerate the ability of movement agents to stand somehow beyond the inhibiting reach of cultural schemas.

Johnston, however, does not deny the instrumental dimension of collective action frames. Indeed, his micro-frame analysis methodology directs the researcher to uncover the implicit and/or explicit objectives behind a text. Johnston describes these objectives as the text’s pragmatic intent:

‘Proselytising, for example, is a goal behind many social movement texts… The concepts of frame alignment, frame bridging, and frame extension can be found as pragmatic goals in some speech situations.’

(1995: 227)
By acknowledging pragmatic intent, Johnston preserves analytic interest in movement discourse as both deliberate, constructed, and instrumental, and so guards against the kind of cultural determinism seen, for example, in Gossen’s interpretation of the Zapatistas’ so-called ‘Indian soul’ (1994, 1996). Yet Johnston also grants equal weight to speech situations, thereby reinforcing the importance of cultural constraints alongside more instrumental objectives. In this way, his micro-frame analysis allows the researcher to recognise the instrumentalism behind a text while remaining sensitive to the social rules and cultural schemas of speech situations, which by necessity limit the extent of an author’s autonomy.

Finally, Johnston recommends that the frame analyst acknowledge the variable capabilities of agents. His focus on the texts of movement discourse prompts the researcher to remain aware of what he calls the role of the author, and to look for evidence of different authorial perspectives; that is, to be mindful of who is saying or writing what, how they are saying it, and in what capacity (e.g. as a leader, spokesman, follower, critic, etc.). Frame analysis must, Johnston argues, take account of the potential for different authorial ‘voices’ within and across texts, and be aware that different agents perceive, rationalise and respond differently to the same structures. Reminiscent of Bourdieu’s notion of the doxa and cultural capital, Johnston writes that ‘Structural factors find their way into the analysis insofar as they are perceived and interpreted by social actors,’ (1995: 242). In arguing this point, Johnston anticipates later critics who attack frame analysis for its tendency to ignore the variable ability of agents to first perceive and then react to different structural stimuli:

‘Perceptions are not only necessary for potential protestors to recognise opportunities, but in many cases perceptions can create opportunities… Certain individuals are especially adept at knowing how to do what when, how to invent new tactics, how to time an action or response.’
It is inevitable that different agents will be differentially equipped and placed to respond to structures, be it because of their access to cultural resources or their innate or learned ability to navigate and comprehend schematic ‘rules’ (Sewell, 1992). For Johnston, sensitivity to different authorial roles, as well as awareness of the potential for multiple and perhaps culturally alternative interpretations of, and responses to structural stimuli, are intrinsic to the bottom-up analysis of frames. More importantly for the present thesis, however, these imperatives dissuade the researcher from reifying frames as fixed and universal. Discursive meanings are dependent upon the role and intentions of the author as well as his/her/their capacity to perceive and attribute significance to contexts and structures.

Through these guidelines, I argue, Johnston’s micro-frame analysis provides an entirely adequate methodology for the discourse analysis of SMO texts. Not only does he offer a clear and replicable research methodology centred on the key principles of holistic textual analysis, speech situation, pragmatic intent and authorial role, he also bases his methodology on a sophisticated conception of structure and agency, one that acknowledges discursive constraints as well as instrumentalism, and which goes much further than the simplistic rational action premise of the political process model. In this way, Johnston anticipates the criticisms of those such as Steinberg who would abandon frame analysis entirely, and instead offers solutions to the empirical tendency to elide discursive content, ignore cultural influences and exaggerate instrumentalism. Put simply, his recommendation that frame analysis begin with the text and work upwards promises a more valid method of interpreting discursive meaning than frame analysis that begins with structures and works down.

The empirical value of his micro-frame analysis notwithstanding, however, Johnston cannot overcome the weaknesses of frame analysis alone. This is because his
interests lie with what he calls ‘the black box’ of interpretive frames, rather than the collective action frames that are of interest to the present thesis\textsuperscript{12}. A subtle but important distinction, Johnston betrays his preoccupation with interpretive frames when he uses his methodology to deconstruct the discourse of a lone participant, ‘a nationalist activist who attended two mass demonstrations in the mid-1970s and participated in some dissident organisations,’ (1995: 238). Johnston claims, however, that his methods can be applied to the analysis of collective action frames; indeed, he ends his chapter by presaging the unification of his micro-frame analysis with what he calls the ‘organisational insights of Gamson (1992a), Snow and Benford (1992), and others’:

‘There exist no contradictions between this and the kind of micro-frame analysis I have discussed, only differences in focus and the kinds of evidence needed for a convincing argument… I think that the microanalysis of member speech is an important test for several macroscopic perspectives on social and political movements.’

(1995: 244; emphasis in original)

Nevertheless, Johnston’s pursuit of interpretive frames has meant that his micro-frame analysis has never been applied to the empirical interpretation of collective action frames. Micro-frame analysis, in short, needs to be combined with a suitably sophisticated definition of the collective action frame.

Gamson’s Collective Action Frame

William Gamson’s model (1992) goes beyond other conceptions of the collective action frame (see, for example, Benford, 1992; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). Gamson

\textsuperscript{12} The distinction between interpretive frames and collective action frames has been the source of empirical confusion (Snow, 2004; Gamson, 1992; Snow and Benford, 1992). While the collective action frames of movement groups, organisations and networks denote their collective construction, the psychosociological frames of individual movement participants are termed interpretive frames, and exist within ‘the black box of mental life,’ (Johnston, 1995: 218).
offers, first and foremost, an unambiguous focus on the content rather than the process of collective action frames, thus rendering his collective action frame more suitable to Johnston’s micro-frame analysis in that both authors take discourse as the start-point for their approaches. Unlike Johnston, however, Gamson appears unconcerned with methodology, and simply offers a framework for the deconstruction of SMO collective discourse. He distils what he calls the three frame components of collective action frames, and labels these injustice, agency and identity. Through these frame components, I argue, Gamson provides a practicable conceptual vocabulary through which to delimit and plot the key features of social movement discourse (see fig. 2). Those familiar with Gamson’s model will observe that I reverse the order of his components, addressing them in the following order: identity, injustice and agency. This is merely because my own interest in the layers of the EZLN’s identity has meant that the greater weight of my analysis deals with this component.

Thus, the first of Gamson’s frame components I will address here is collective identity, which gives shape and form to a SMO’s collective ‘we’ (Gamson, 1992: 84-85). Collective identities may be oppositional and therefore ‘antagonistic’, or consensual and therefore ‘agonistic’. For Gamson, SMO collective identity may be further dissected according to three interconnected ‘layers’: the organisational layer, movement layer, and the solidarity-group layer. Gamson himself is not so clear about the distinctions between the three layers, stating that ‘sometimes these different layers are so closely integrated that they become a single amalgam,’ (1995: 100). I, however, have taken them to represent distinct facets of SMOs’ collective identity discourses. The organisational layer offers a case in point: Gamson states that organisational identities are constructed around the SMO’s own participants, such as ‘the union maid or the party loyalist, for example,’ (Gamson, 1995: 100). I, however, expand this definition and interpret organisational identities as representative of the particular way in which the SMO’s organisational structure is framed. Thus my analysis of the EZLN’s organisational identity discourse
includes observation of structural relations, decision-making processes, leadership roles and the characterisation of participants and constituents. In the present thesis, therefore, the organisational layer of collective identity reinforces a particular image of the SMO’s organisational structure and/or internal rules, such that leadership roles and the responsibilities of rank-and-file participants are ascribed according to consensual values and/or beliefs.

Beyond the organisational identity layer, Gamson posits the movement identity. Although a useful conceptual category, Gamson is equally vague as to what actually constitutes a movement identity (Gamson, 1992: 84; 1995: 100). In my own analysis I conceive of the social movement as a broad, loose network of SMOs, and the movement identity as the identity that corresponds to this network. I offer my own examples, including socialism, nationalism and indigenism, which I consider to be mobilised entities that are structurally broader and more amorphous than the SMOs that serve them. SMOs may claim to serve one or more social movements, and so may lay claim to these movement identities in their collective discourses. Notably, I remain unconvinced of the existence of a ‘Zapatista movement’ per se, and argue that the EZLN and its substructures have, at different times, attached themselves to the pre-existent movement identities outlined above. This does not mean, however, that I consider the movement identity to be unimportant; on the contrary, I agree with Gamson that ‘the movement layer is especially critical because it is a necessary catalyst in fusing solidary and organisational identification in an integrated movement identity,’ (1995: 100). Rather, I suggest that the EZLN’s flexibility in framing its movement identity makes this a particularly interesting feature of its collective action frame.

At the third layer of collective identity, Gamson suggests that a SMO may lay claim to what he calls a particular solidary-group. The solidary-group identity is that which is ‘constructed around people’s social location – for example, as workers or as black women,’ (1992: 84). Gamson claims, for example, that the solidary-group identities
of environmental groups may be overwhelmingly ‘white and professional-managerial class,’ but that their collective action frames are ‘likely to decry the narrowness of their base,’ (Gamson, 1995: 101). I suggest that solidary-group identities may range from the relatively exclusive: homosexuals, black women, or, in the case of the Mothers of Matagalpa, the bereaved parents of missing political dissidents (Bayard de Volo, 2000); to the broadly inclusive, as in the appeal to all humankind made by many environmentalist SMOs. In any case, I conceive the solidary-group layer of identity as that which delimits the socio-cultural background of participants. There may be a good deal of crossover between this and other layers: a nationalist movement identity may, for example, go hand-in-hand with a nationalist solidary-group identity; but for analytic purposes it is helpful to consider them as discrete facets of the collective identity discourse.

Deconstructing collective identity according to these layers can, I maintain, offer the analyst a different and enlightening perspective on the complex and multiple meanings that may be present even within a movement discourse. David Snow (2001) has recently championed this idea and has provided a useful summary of the identity layers, albeit in reverse order:

‘Three such layers have been noted with respect to social movements (Gamson 1991; Stoecker 1995). They include, beginning with the broadest and potentially most inclusive layer: the social movement community or solidary group, which can be thought of as the constituent layer, as in the case of black Americans in relation to the civil rights movement; the social movement layer as in the case of the civil rights movement; and the organizational layer, as represented by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in the context of the civil rights movement. In principle, each successive layer
may be embedded in the larger more inclusive layer, giving rise to a generalized, cohesive collective identity at the community or national level.’

Understanding the interconnectedness of such layers can provide a window on the ways in which SMO discourses can imbue old categories, symbols and language with new meanings. The framing of one identity layer, Gamson argues, often influences the framing of other layers, along with other features of the discourse associated with agency and injustice. Trade unionists, for example, are usually embedded in the movement identity of the labour movement and tend to align with the solidary-group identity of the working class whose most effective weapon is industrial action. Consequently, trade unions, labour and the working class are usually associated with the strike (Hartmann and Lau, 1990). Nonetheless, in view of the myriad cultural, social and political influences that contentious SMOs must contend with over time, it is not uncommon to see variations and even outright departures from such ‘expected’ themes. Deconstructing SMO identities according to their layered content can expose these variations and provide the analyst with the opportunity to understand and explain them.

In addition to identity, the second of Gamson’s frame components is injustice. The injustice component gives meat to the bones of the grievances experienced and expressed by the SMO’s constituents. It is through this component, claims Gamson, that a SMO persuades bystanders of the wrongs committed against those on whose behalf it acts. The injustice component may be briefly summarised in a text or it may run throughout its length; it may be relatively subtle in more diplomatic texts and times of détente between a SMO and its opposition, or it may be emotive and laden with accusations that decry a

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1Elisabeth Clemens, for example, explores early exponents of the American labour movement, which were organised around familiar modes of militarism based on recent experiences of the US civil war (1996: 219). Similarly, Elena Zdravomyslova (1996) assesses the importance of democratic organisation in the collective identity of pro-democracy groups during Glasnost. In both cases, while there is no explicit discussion of the ‘organisational layer’ as such, it is apparent that the construction of an organisational identity impacted on other areas of the organisations’ discourses. For instance, it appears to have affected the ways in which the organisations made decisions, the kind of actions they undertook, and the ways in which their agency or actions were framed.
culpable enemy. In instrumental terms, the framing of injustice enables a SMO to curry sympathy and direct antipathy towards the enemy deemed responsible for grievances.

Yet, without denying the instrumentalism of the injustice component, Gamson adds that injustice is often a ‘hot cognition’ and, as such, bound up with very real and righteous anger, emotion and moral indignation. Indeed, in one of the few reliable applications of Gamson’s collective action frame, Klandermans and Goslinga lend weight to the idea of injustice frames as both instrumental and fuelled by emotion when they argue that Dutch trade unions’ defence of disability allowances (DA) was filled with genuine emotion whilst being ‘aimed at evoking compassion for disabled workers and anger about villainous politicians,’ (1996: 326). They observe, for instance, that the portrayal of the culpable party was constructed to chime with unpopular political decisions, and concede that ‘No mention is made of possible abuse of DA, nor of budgetarian problems,’ which might have detracted from the attack on the government (1996: 326). For the present thesis, Gamson’s sensitivity to both emotions and purpose can help ameliorate the empirical tendency to exaggerate the instrumentalism of frames over the genuinely felt grievances and beliefs that underpin them (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003).

The third and final frame component is agency, through which a SMO delineates, justifies and rationalises its objectives and the methods selected to achieve them. Acknowledging instrumental concerns once again, Gamson maintains that the agency component must make the case that the action the SMO advocates is at once necessary and can achieve success. In constructing an agency frame, therefore, Gamson concedes that SMOs need to take account of political opportunity structures. For example, if political elites are strong and exhibit a willingness to use repression then armed revolution may be inadvisable, and indeed any SMO positing a revolutionary agency frame must be mindful of the difficulties of ‘selling’ this course of action to bystanders. In this way, Gamson accepts that an overwhelming array of structural constraints discourages the
support and participation of many potential bystanders, and that this renders the framing of a realistic and honourable objective imperative if a SMO is to convince others of the movement’s worth.

As with the ‘hot cognition’ of injustice, however, Gamson adds that there is more to the construction of agency than instrumentalism alone. The meanings a SMO ascribes to its actions are necessarily influenced by the beliefs and cultural baggage of its collective identity. Such beliefs are vital to the wider interpretation of the agency component and can help the researcher to make sense of broader webs of interconnected meanings that exist simultaneously within a collective action frame. For example, the Mothers of Matagalpa did not use strikes, riots or revolution, but constructed an agency frame that relied on public acts of mourning that befitted their solidary-group identity as the grieving mothers of ‘disappeared’ dissidents (Bayard de Volo, 2000). Similarly, the peaceful non-cooperation tactics employed by Martin Luther King’s SCLC were not selected in a vacuum, but were directly related to their devout belief in non-violence and their solidary-group identity as Christian pacifists (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999a). Today, by the same token, the annual ‘gay pride’ march makes use of rhetoric and symbolism reclaimed on behalf of the marginalized gay community (Gamson, J., 1997). I agree with Gamson that the most potent agency frames are not selected in light of political opportunities alone, and so must be analysed and understood alongside other frame components, cultural and social factors, and evidence of important and genuinely held beliefs.

In sum, Gamson provides an original conception of the collective action frame that is undeniably concerned with the content of collective discourse rather than the political processes behind its construction. While I have been required to fill-in some of the gaps in his definitions of the various layers of collective identity, Gamson alerts us to the shades of meaning that may exist within a collective action frame, and provides the rubric to dissect this for closer analysis according to distinct frame components.
Furthermore, and perhaps because of his concern with discursive content, Gamson is sensitive to the affective elements of belief and passion that may influence and constrain content in addition to the instrumental concerns that are an undeniable feature of frame alignment. In this way, the application of Gamson’s content-led collective action frame can assist the researcher in overcoming the tendency to exaggerate instrumentalism in frame analysis.

That said, Gamson offers little in the way of research methodology, and this is exemplified in the weaknesses of those few empirical applications that do make use of his frame components\textsuperscript{14}. The collective action frame, I argue, needs to be married with the clear methodological guidelines provided by Johnston. By combining Gamson with Johnston’s micro-frame analysis we see how they may complement one another: Gamson bestows the much needed focus on collective discourses that is lacking in Johnston’s otherwise excellent micro-frame analysis, while Johnston prescribes the methodological approach that Gamson’s framework lacks.

\textbf{Snow et al’s Frame Alignment Thesis}

Having refocused frame analysis on the content of SMOs’ collective discourses and offered the means of improving analytic awareness of cultural factors, there is still the need to defeat the tendency to reify frames as fixed packages of meaning. I suggest that the frame alignment thesis of David Snow and his colleagues (1986) offers the original and best method of capturing the shifting nature of discursive frames. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Snow et al offer four types of frame alignment process: frame amplification, frame bridging, frame extension and frame transformation. Here, I offer a more detailed description of these types, and highlight the ways in which they may facilitate analysis of SMOs’ discourses as inherently fluid.

\textsuperscript{14} Chihu Amparan (2003: 3) explores five components of the Zapatistas’ discourse, while Klandermans and Goslinga (1996: 312-37) and Lorainne Bayard de Volo (2000: 129-143) make concerted efforts to uncover the identity, injustice and agency frame components of their respective case studies. All, however, lack clear methodological guidelines and so cannot offer reliable and replicable results.
Perhaps the most straightforward alignment process is frame amplification, which simply demands that an organisation emphasise a particular value or set of values that is already present in, or at least implicit to, its discourse. The Black Panthers, for example, usurped the initiative of the civil rights movement in the 1960s by amplifying the distinction between black and white Americans (Jones, 1998). Frame amplification may also take the form of exaggerating a particular aspect of an issue or movement. The Greenham Common Women of the CND amplified their own femininity in order to caricature the absurd machismo of the nuclear arms race: first and foremost the protesters objected to the installation of Trident missiles in Britain, but the fact that they allowed only women to join them made more universal statements that added both novelty and media interest to their cause (Byrne, 1997: 23).

The second frame alignment process is frame bridging. This requires a SMO to demonstrate its relevance to a target group of unmobilised bystanders who, as yet, lack the organisational basis for pursuing their interests. To bridge its discourse with such potential adherents, an organisation must cast an issue or feature of its collective action frame in such a way as to achieve narrative fidelity with the preferences or values of the target group (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989: 5). One recent example of frame bridging is the rebranding of the British Labour Party under Tony Blair: as New Labour, the party was able to augment its working class image and reach out to the amorphous and disenfranchised middle class majority. Another example may be found in the efforts of the Leningrad People’s Front in the 1980s to link communist values with emergent but as yet unmobilised preferences for democratic change in Russia. In this case, Leninist imagery and values were bridged with local preference to construct a roadmap to ‘genuine’ democracy (Zdravomyslova, 1996).

Frame extension, the third of Snow et al’s frame alignment processes, seems to share much with frame bridging, but where the latter involves reaching out to unmobilised bystanders, frame extension represents the act of making common cause
with already mobilised SMOs, perhaps even those belonging to competing social movements. For Snow et al, frame extension indicates a more general broadening of the SMO’s action frame to incorporate ‘interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but of considerable salience to potential adherents,’ (Snow et al, 1986: 459-467). Thus, in simple terms, frame extension describes an organisation’s efforts to reach out to groups and constituencies that are already engaged in struggles that may be of incidental interest. When, for example, in May 1970, a member of the Gay Liberation Front addressed a rally in support of the imprisoned Black Panthers Bobby Seale and Ericka Huggins, the GLF attempted to extend its collective action frame to draw on the support of another oppressed minority. Similarly, the coalition that held sway in the 1990s as the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement was in large measure the product of the frame extension efforts of several green, peace, development, and socialist SMOs, which put aside ideological and other differences to unite against the common capitalist enemy. Chronicles of this international movement have invariably remarked on the capacity of its numerous organisational actors to take on the grievances of their allies in the fortification of a broad opposition to the corporate bête noire (Giugni, 2002: 13-30; Starr, 2000; Bircham and Charlton, 2001). Paul Kingsnorth (2003) has even gone so far as to suggest that anti-globalisation was less a movement and more a ‘movement of movements’. When compared to frame bridging, frame extension appears much less permanent, suggesting that extended frames represent something of a marriage of convenience often founded on shared opposition to a third party.

Finally, the most radical process is frame transformation, which demands that a SMO repudiate old features, values or beliefs that once made up the bricks and mortar of its collective action frame, and replace them with an entirely new set (Snow et al, 1986: 467-476). While Snow et al cite several instances of individuals transforming their own interpretive frames in order to justify their participation in new forms of collective action they might once have found abhorrent, there are very few examples of groups or
organisations transforming their collective action frames. It could, perhaps, be argued that the Chinese Communist Party has reneged on the values and beliefs of socialism in order to embrace capitalist modes and practices, and that this could be cited as evidence of frame transformation. Yet it is more accurate to say that the CCP has fostered the emergence of a new Chinese business class and has framed this as compatible with traditional communist principles; a process that indicates frame bridging rather than frame transformation. Further analytic work is, therefore, necessary to uncover evidence of frame transformation at the level of collective action frames.

While groundbreaking, I do not believe that Snow et al’s frame alignment thesis is complete. For one thing, it does not provide an exhaustive list of frame alignment processes, and I propose to augment their typology with further processes identified in the course of my own research into the Zapatistas. These include frame reduction, frame concretisation and frame blurring, which I describe at relevant points in the thesis. Furthermore, Snow et al conceive of frame alignment as something which occurs at the level of the whole frame, and make no effort to break frame content down to its component features. Consequently, the possibility that one frame component, such as collective identity, may be aligned independently of the rest is overlooked. In this thesis, therefore, I explore the independent frame alignment of separate frame components in the Zapatista discourse.

CONCLUSION

In Chapter One I argued that significant gaps exist in our understanding of the Zapatistas’ collective discourse, and that what is lacking in this literature is a consistent focus on the complex content and contingent fluidity of the EZLN’s collective action frame. In this Chapter, I have defended frame analysis as the best method of achieving such a study. Acknowledging four major weaknesses associated with frame analysis, I have advocated a fusion of the methods and tools provided by Johnston (1995), Gamson (1992), and
Snow et al (1986) as the best means of overcoming these and capturing the complexities of social movement collective discourse. Johnston’s micro-frame analysis, for example, offers a context-sensitive approach to frame analysis that places discourse at its very centre and overcomes the narrow conception of culture by orienting the researcher towards cultural and social contexts of speech situation, authorial role and pragmatic intent. Gamson focuses analytic attention squarely on the content of collective action frames and provides the rubric for their deconstruction, thereby countering the empirical tendency to bypass content in favour of the strategic process of framing. Gamson also limits the importance of instrumentalism and directs the researcher towards the genuine feelings, emotions and expectations that are equally influential. Finally, Snow et al’s conception of frame alignment processes may be used with Gamson and Johnston to shed light on the fluidity and contingency of frame components, thereby reducing the temptation to reify frames as fixed and universal.

Together, these imperatives and concepts offer the means by which to deconstruct the Zapatistas’ discourse longitudinally and at the level of its frame components. The observation and explication of frame components, their interconnectedness, their micro-frame alignment over time, and their interaction with political, cultural and social contexts at the national, local and international levels will shed valuable light on the contingent, complex and multi-layered content of the Zapatistas’ discourse, and add depth to analyses that pigeonhole the EZLN according to a single movement category. In short, the longitudinal micro-frame analysis of frame components offers a real opportunity to deconstruct, map-out, and plot the changing content of the EZLN’s discourse, and promises to augment the partial and static analyses that comprise the current body of work on this fascinating movement phenomenon.

Having delineated the theoretical framework that underpins this thesis, the following seven chapters deconstruct the collective action frames of seven key texts. These chapters are arrayed in three parts, with each part corresponding to a broader
‘moment’ in the EZLN’s discursive evolution: the *clandestine phase*, the *nationalist phase*, and the *indigenous phase*. The chapters themselves are structured around the frame components of the texts they address; in each case I draw out the layers of *identity*, followed by *injustice*, and finally *agency*. For each component I infer meanings from the close analysis of the text in its historical, discursive, political and cultural contexts, and remain sensitive to influences operational at local, national and international levels. Longitudinally, I identify points of discursive continuity and change and seek to understand them in relation to these factors.
‘We can expect the initial framing processes to be less consciously strategic than later efforts. In fact, at the outset, participants may not even be fully aware that they are engaged in an interpretive process of any real significance. This is certainly not the case later on as various factions and figures within the movement struggle endlessly to determine the most compelling and effective way to bring the movement’s “message” to the “people”.’

(McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996: 16)

The EZLN was formulated in 1980 as the rural vanguard for the Mexico City based revolutionary group Fuerzas de Liberacion Nacional (FLN), and in November 1983 its six-man guerrilla foco was sent to the southernmost rural state of Chiapas to build a peasant army. Until the end of 1993 the EZLN operated clandestinely, slowly gaining access and winning supporters among Chiapas’s impoverished indigenous communities. Here, in Part One, I present evidence to suggest that the EZLN’s initial frame, which is found in the Estatutos, adhered mainly to socialist doctrine, and that this lacked narrative fidelity with the predominantly indigenous peasants that were its target audience. I develop this argument by examining the realignment of the initial frame in 1992 with The Southeast in Two Winds, a time when the EZLN’s leaders were encouraged to adapt frame components in dialogue with local indigenous realities and national political exigencies. Thus, while I acknowledge the doctrinal fidelity of the Zapatistas’ initial frame, I argue...
that their later, realigned collective action frame infused their discourse with indigenous cultural features that marked the beginnings of their discursive pragmatism. On a theoretical level, I find evidence to support McAdam et al’s theory, as posited in the above quotation, that ‘initial frames’ are less consciously strategic than later frames, and I make further observations on the nature of frame components and alignment processes.

In order to render this case I deconstruct two key texts from different ends of what has become known as the EZLN’s ‘clandestine phase’, a period that ran from August 1980 to January 1994. Using the methods and concepts of frame analysis, I identify and explain the changing meanings associated with the collective action frames expressed within these texts. In Chapter Three I deconstruct the Estatutos de Las Fuerzas de Liberacion Nacional, henceforth known simply as the Estatutos (1980), an official organisational document which describes the EZLN and its revolutionary purpose at the time of its birth, and so provides us with the Zapatistas’ initial frame. In Chapter Four, I deconstruct a letter, The Southeast in Two Winds: A Storm and a Prophecy (Marcos, 1992), in which the Zapatista leader addresses socialist allies in northern states at a critical juncture in the EZLN’s relationship with its parent, the FLN. Frame analysis of these texts provides snapshots of the Zapatistas’ discourse at both ends of its clandestine career. It also prompts investigation of the many possible cultural, ideational, political and socio-economic factors that inspired and encouraged the EZLN in the construction of their initial frame and its subsequent frame alignment.
INTRODUCTION

All SMOs begin their discursive existence with what might be termed their ‘initial frame’ (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). I suggest that the EZLN’s initial frame was heavily influenced by Marxism-Leninism and Guevarist ideas of rural revolution, along with lesser tactical and opportunistic considerations that were skewed by leaders’ preoccupation with national political and cultural contexts (see fig. 3). The initial frame was promulgated in a document known as the FLN Estatutos, a 25-page statement of the FLN’s revolutionary identity and objectives that described the EZLN as its integrated rural military wing (FLN, 1980: 8). The speech situation of this text, which was authored by an anonymous FLN-EZLN leadership, was that of an organisational manifesto, and the authors’ aim was clearly to give direction to the organisation’s operatives. As such, the text provides extraordinarily candid insight into the EZLN’s initial revolutionary character and role, as well as its function within the broader structure of the FLN. However, there are caveats that the frame analyst must heed: the Estatutos is an orientational text and was intended for internal consumption by FLN and EZLN militants. Because of this it does not constitute an example of the Zapatistas’ external dialogue with bystanders and potential adherents, examples of which are simply not available from this period. Nonetheless, the Estatutos is valuable in that it details the organisation’s structure, the purpose of political officers, and the importance of doctrinal propaganda in the EZLN’s discourse. It also provides a full description of the Zapatistas’ collective perception of self, grievances, and objectives as a Marxist rural vanguard. Furthermore, when deconstructed holistically (Johnston, 1995), that is with an eye for valuable information from other sources – such as later interviews in which protagonists reflect
openly on the clandestine phase – the Estatutos reveals the acute naivety of the EZLN’s founders. In this sense, the FLN Estatutos provides a solid foundation from which to assess the extent of the Zapatistas’ discursive progression.

IDENTITY

When it came to framing the organisational layer of their collective identity, the early EZLN exhibited a clear military hierarchy. An inflexible chain of military command suffuses the Estatutos, and one of the text’s most striking features is that it repeatedly awards the organisational identity of ‘militant’ to all its members. Militants, we learn, were expected to follow a strict set of guidelines that included the obligation ‘To struggle against democracy inside the political-military organisation,’ (FLN, 1980: 14). Article 6, for instance, describes the EZLN as a ‘popular army’ (1980: 10) and articles 26, 33 and 35 delineate a hierarchical structure based on a small but committed guerrilla nucleus:

‘[An] organism of command integrated by professional militants designated by the National Command, which are determined by the military hierarchy and the succession of command…. The decisions, official statements and appointments that the National Command emits will have the character of a military order and as such they should be accepted.’

(FLN, 1980: 21-2)

This military hierarchy, I suggest, indicates the EZLN’s early preoccupation with previous manifestations of socialist movements in Latin America, particularly Guevarism. It mirrors, for example, Guevara’s recommendation that, ‘Under the commander-in-chief there will be the zone commanders; under them several columns of varying size, each with a column commander; under the column commanders there will be captains and lieutenants,’ (Guevara, 1961: 112). Both the Estatutos and Guevara’s manual, moreover,
issue guidelines on the pecuniary procedure for insubordination, with execution being the ultimate penalty. In fact, within this hierarchy, the *Estatutos* also makes a distinction between full-time and part-time militants through the designations *professional* and *urban*:

‘We consider as *professional* the militant who has made the socialist revolution his reason for living, dedicating himself full time to the tasks that the organisation assigns him... The *urban* is the militant who keeps his family, work, position, etc., because this suits the purposes of the organisation, and who is disposed to carry out commissions entrusted to him... The step from urban to professional militant constitutes a recognition of the militant’s degree of development and of the needs of the organisation.’

(FLN, 1980: 12)

This hierarchy of commitment was, it seems, based on the extent of an individual’s immersion in the organisation and separation from ‘family, work, position etc.’, and reflects Guevara’s own separation of military and civil organisational roles (1961: 86-7). Finally, the *Estatutos* makes provision for designated ‘Commissions of political work’ whose declared role was to accompany units of professional militants and disseminate propaganda within and without the organisation and captured territory: ‘Their function will be to raise the political level of all combatants in their unit and to present revolutionary demands and positions to the inhabitants of the zone where their unit operates,’ (FLN, 1980: 20). Again, this follows the advice laid down in Guevara’s manual, which states:

‘A corps to take charge of sowing the new truths of the Revolution among all the units of the army should immediately be created. It should explain to the soldiers,
peasants, and workers, who have come out of the mass of the people, the justice and the truth of each revolutionary act, the aspirations of the Revolution, why there is a fight, why so many companions have died without seeing the victory.’

(Guevara, 1961: 121)

For the EZLN, this corps would be the Political Bureau of the FLN, and its representatives in the ranks of the EZLN would be known as political officers. Overall, the rigid chain of command and exalted position of political officers indicates that the EZLN’s initial frame was based heavily on socialist guerrilla precedents. These features also indicate that the organisation’s founders failed to acknowledge even the possibility that Guevarist organisational identities might lack narrative fidelity with the lived experience of the predominantly indigenous target audience. Indeed, it would later become apparent that the political officers were not equal to the mammoth task of converting Chiapas’s indigenous peasantry to socialism (Harvey, 1998: 166), and that the very labels ‘urban’, ‘professional’ and ‘militant’ betrayed the authors’ ignorance of socio-cultural specificities in Mexico’s indigenous rural south.

Slightly more circumspect, however, was the movement layer of the collective identity. Here, the EZLN’s strict adherence to socialist doctrine was moulded to fit what was believed and hoped to be the popular image of noble rebellion that was specific to Mexico. Undoubtedly, the EZLN was created as a socialist social movement organisation, and the aforementioned organisational identities were firmly embedded in something of a doctrinal straightjacket. Indeed, Article 12 of the Estatutos lists several of the duties of the militant as,

‘d) To be qualified in Marxism-Leninism, as well as to study and to constantly apply the political-military lines of the FLN, paying special attention to the norms
that govern clandestine work… n) To practise proletarian internationalism, acting in the interest of the world working class.’

(FLN, 1980: 13-14)

Similarly, the flag of the EZLN is featured as ‘a red star of five tips on a black background. Traditional colours of the workers in struggle,’ (FLN, 1980: 7). Elsewhere the Estatutos describes the ‘ideological struggle’ by unequivocally aligning the EZLN with socialist doctrine as an organisation that fights against the imperialistic ideology through ‘the science of history and society: Marxism-Leninism that has demonstrated its validity in all the triumphant revolutions in this century,’ (FLN, 1980: 6).

There were, nevertheless, some pragmatic exceptions to doctrinal orthodoxy, even at this initial stage. Article 12n, for instance, suggests that though the early Zapatistas were well versed in the relativism of geo-political borders and the false consciousnesses these can foster as barriers to proletarian internationalism, their socialist movement identity was carefully constructed to accommodate the specific patriotism of the Mexican audience. Nationalism, even for leftwing Mexicans, was arguably a more emotive rallying cry than class conflict. Almond and Verba (1963) found a greater sense of national pride in Mexico than in Italy and Germany, and Turner (1968) considered Mexicans’ fervent nationalism to be the underlying factor in the country’s post-Revolutionary stability. Contemporary studies of Mexican politics and society reinforce these findings and reveal the perennial importance of national historical heroes in the common national imaginary (Stephen, 2002; Martin, 1993; Morris, 1995; Bantjes, 1997; and Bartra, 2002). Conceding this, the EZLN’s founders conscientiously fused their socialism with embedded nationalist values through recognisable symbols, most evidently in the organisation’s name, which commemorates the nationalist hero and martyr Emiliano Zapata:
‘The Zapatista Army of National Liberation is denominated this way because Emiliano Zapata is the hero that best symbolises the traditions of revolutionary struggle of the Mexican people.’

(FLN, 1980: 20)

Yet even the amalgamation of socialism and nationalism through Zapata bore the ideational imprint of Che Guevara. Guevara’s *Guerrilla Warfare* advises militants to pander to national ideals in the construction and dissemination of socialist propaganda, and he maintains that propaganda ‘should be of a national, orienting type’ (Guevara, 1961: 90) in order to take advantage of the popular nationalist sentiments that are ‘the main cultural mechanism of integration, and therefore, construction’ (Greenfeld, 1999: 39). Identifying the totemic import of national heroes, Guevara writes:

‘We consider it useful that the principal newspaper of the movement bear a name that recalls something great and unifying, perhaps a national hero or something similar… It ought to create a consciousness of the great national problems…’

(Guevara, 1961:106-7)

As pragmatic Guevarists, it is arguable that the EZLN’s founders deliberately extended the new organisation’s socialist movement identity to incorporate the accessible and unifying symbology of the 1910-20 Mexican Revolution, and that they elected to do so through Zapata.

This does, however, beg the question: why Zapata? Why not Villa, Carranza, Cardenas, or Hidalgo for that matter? I argue that it was no accident that Zapata was selected from the pantheon of Mexico’s Revolutionary fathers, for two reasons. Firstly, for the socialists of the initial EZLN, Zapata’s peculiarly communalist brand of nationalism made him the perfect national hero through which to achieve the frame
extension of socialist identities. An undeniably iconic revolutionary, Zapata had also advocated shared land ownership as the best and fairest method of organising agricultural relations. His celebrated Plan de Ayala, which he submitted to a coalition of revolutionary forces in 1911, was a sophisticated proposal for social reform that ‘generated a radical class-based and coherent political plan for the global transformation of a complex society,’ (Warman, 1988: 322). Indeed, many of Zapata’s contemporaries were socialist intellectuals attracted by his advocacy of land redistribution and seduced by his rallying cry of ‘Land and Freedom!’ (Ibid.). It is also worth adding that Zapata’s untimely assassination at the hands of the supporters of his revolutionary rival, Venustiano Carranza, rendered his personal history that of the noble martyr who died untainted by the corruption of the modern Mexican state.

The second reason for Zapata’s selection in 1980 was his political potency at that time. I suggest that the very availability of his image was the consequence of a cultural opportunity created by recent political activism. In 1979 Zapata’s memory was popularised by nationally coordinated political activity that aimed to preserve his remains in Morelos, his home state. The PRI government had planned to mark the 100th anniversary of Zapata’s birth by disinterring and removing his body to the seat of government in Mexico City as part of a broader strategy to legitimate a new programme of agricultural reform. The state-level peasant associations that came together to prevent Zapata’s exhumation took their collective name from his own Plan de Ayala, calling themselves the Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala (CNPA). Consequently 1979 and 1980 saw Zapata’s very public dissociation from the PRI, the party in which his own son had carved a political career, and his alignment instead with a new national and independent coalition of peasant associations. Indeed, the Chiapas affiliate of the CNPA, the Casa del Pueblo, which had represented local agrarian interests since the 1960s, renamed itself the Organizacion Campesino Emiliano Zapata (OCEZ) in honour of the great man. Galvanising local affection for Zapata’s memory, OCEZ even hosted the
CNPA national conference in 1982 (Harvey, 1998: 108-9). Neil Harvey describes the resurgent importance of Zapata’s image in the early 1980s:

‘This struggle to retain popular control over the symbolic importance of Zapata was supported by students, teachers, and peasants who blockaded the central square of Cuautla to prevent the removal of the remains. The struggle also helped to unify the independent peasant movement. Representatives from over forty groups from sixteen states met again in June at the National Peasant Meeting organised by the Autonomous University of Chapingo, where they called for the formation of a united front.’

(Harvey, 1998: 132)

In short, it wasn’t just Zapata’s association with national heroism that made him an appealing figure to the Guevarist EZLN, whose propagandist approach to iconography demanded that they attach the organisation to a great and nationally unifying figure. Micro-frame analysis indicates that Zapata was also strategically selected because of the socialistic overtures of his Plan de Ayala and his recent popularisation as a symbol of nationalised resistance to the PRI, both of which presented the socialist EZLN with a natural point of convergence with his unfulfilled revolutionary project.

This leads to the third but most complex layer of collective identity: the solidary-group layer. Through its numerous references to the peasantry and ‘rural workers’, the Estatutos awards the initial frame a solidary-group identity firmly embedded in the rural peasantry. Just as Marx’s Communist Manifesto entreats the workers of the world to unite, so does the Estatutos implore ‘the workers in the fields’ to do the same (FLN, 1980: 5-7). The text declares, for example, that the immediate function of the EZLN is ‘To integrate the struggles of the urban proletariat with the struggles of peasants and Indians in the most exploited zones of our country,’ (Ibid.), and there are repeated suggestions that
EZLN is to be the vehicle that will ‘link the FLN with the working masses in the countryside,’ (FLN, 1980: 8). I argue that such insipid references to an unspecified peasant collective represent an unsophisticated attempt to create a ‘frame bridge’ between the EZLN’s socialistic movement identity and an ill-conceived peasant solidary-group. This frame bridge, I maintain, was based on a naïve conception of the Mexican peasantry as homogenous and unified, which overrode the lived reality and cultural complexity of Mexico’s rural populations. To this day, in fact, cultural identities in Chiapas depend more on an individual’s membership of one of the many Mayan linguistic communities than they do on a broader affinity with the ‘Mexican peasantry’ (Nash, 1995; Fisher, 1999). I suggest, therefore, that the EZLN’s initial solidary-group identity lacked narrative fidelity with the intricate cultural make-up of its primary target audience. Indeed, the frame alignment of the solidary-group layer of the identity component in later texts reinforces the ill-conceived nature of this feature in the initial frame (Marcos, 1992).

This does not mean, however, that alignment with the peasant solidary-group was in no way instrumental, only that it was ethnocentric and overly generalised. The Estatutos betrays both ethnocentrism and opportunism in equal parts, particularly its allusion to circumstances that, from an urban-Mexican perspective, seemed to render the peasantry more receptive to the tenets of socialist revolution:

‘[Our] fundamental strategy is to… sustain a long revolutionary struggle to shake capitalist dominance, considering the armed fight as an extension and the superior expression of the political struggle of the masses, intending to begin it in those places where the masses’ irredentism are willing to seize the weapons taking advantage of the geographical and strategic determinations properly valued by our controls…’

(FLN, 1980: 6)
Responding, in other words, to their own geographical and strategic intelligence network, the early EZLN perceived opportunities to foment revolution by capitalising on apparent political, economic and cultural features of ‘the peasantry’.

Certainly, this evaluation obscured the cultural complexity and heterogeneity of the peasantry, yet there may have been good reasons for urban ladinos’ general level of confidence in rural militancy. Indeed, micro-frame analysis reveals several structural factors that could have influenced the EZLN’s initial alignment with the so-called ‘unredeemed masses the countryside’. Agricultural modernisation, for example, created new political opportunities for peasants and may have encouraged the EZLN to align with what they perceived to be a newly empowered and increasingly independent force. The PRI’s traditional patronage of loyalist peasant associations had tended to encourage
rural populations to make claims on the government through an avowedly ‘peasant’ discourse that emphasised their status as peasants. The party’s national peasant umbrella, the Confederacion Nacional Campesina (CNC), had provided preferential treatment and a level of political inclusion that was not afforded to the persecuted independent associations. This was equally true in the rural state of Chiapas where the peasant political identity was founded on the ejido system of small communal farms organised and run according to indigenous practices. These had been enshrined in constitutional Article 27 whereby peasants could occupy unused land before applying to the Secretaria de la Reforma Agraria (SRA) for state recognition as a legitimate ejido (Harvey, 1998: 174-6). Obviously, applications from CNC affiliates were looked on more favourably. As far as the increasingly technocratic PRI was concerned, however, ejidos were little more than relics of the 1910 Revolution and a barrier to modernisation that had to be reformed. President Echeverria (1970-76) kickstarted modernisation in 1971 with his Federal Agrarian Reform Law, which created institutional structures and avenues for peasant participation via new collective organisations known as Unions de Ejidos (UE). The Federal Agrarian Reform Law stipulated that those ejidos that joined together in the larger and more productive UEs would be eligible for increased state support through subsidies and higher credit (Pastor and Wise, 1997; Davis and Brachet-Marquez, 1997; Lindau, 1996).

In some states, however, collectivisation had unexpected effects. In Chiapas, for example, where the EZLN would be operating, the Federal Agrarian Reform Law

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15 In 1936 President Cardenas instituted the model of bureaucratic authoritarianism that came to characterise Mexican ‘democracy’, whereby the state party, the PRI, would rule through three corporate sectors: the bureaucracy, military, middle classes and teachers were represented by the Confederacion Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (CNOP), the workers by the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM), and the peasantry by the Confederacion Nacional Campesina (CNC). Originally, there were only two corporate sectors: for workers and peasants; the CNOP was not formalised until 1943, and since then groups such as the military and teachers have been moved between sectors ‘depending on the political climate of the time,’ (Davis and Brachet-Marquez, 1997: 93).

16 Echeverria’s successor, president de la Madrid (1982-88), built on these reforms with a further collectivisation programme that led to the creation of larger collectives, known as Rural Collective Interest Associations (ARICs); and local level community food committees (CCAs), which were designed to make food distribution more efficient. As with the UEs, the ARICs were often turned against the government in pursuit of concessions, a prime example being the ARIC Union de Uniones, which would later collude with the EZLN.
liberated peasant associations from their subordination to the CNC. Bishop Samuel Ruiz Garcia, celebrated exponent of liberation theology, looked to protect and preserve the independence of the new UEs from PRI cooptation (Harvey, 1998; Stephen, 2002). With his support, the UEs provided the foundations for an independent peasant network that managed to exert political pressure from beyond the corporatist structures of the PRI state. Ruiz even invited capable socialist organisers to Chiapas, men like Arturo Albores Velasco, who came to educate the indigenous peasantry and show them how to campaign effectively using Maoist mass line tactics\textsuperscript{17}. The *Union del Pueblo*, for example, a Maoist group, was invited to Chiapas in 1973, and immediately began constructing ‘bases of support’ in the Lacandon (Womack, 1999; Harvey, 1998). In 1976, probably because he wanted to increase the pace of the organisational work being done by Union del Pueblo, Ruiz invited a second group, *Linea Proletaria*, to Chiapas (Womack, 1999: 174). The nascent independent network was given a structural presence in 1974 with the first indigenous conference, an annual event organised by Ruiz along with his catechists and Maoist allies.

Ruiz’s efforts, moreover, were inadvertently aided by increased federal interest in the state. Government initiatives to prevent the Guatemalan war from spilling into Mexican territory led the US to provide financial assistance for two development programmes: the *Plan del Sureste* and the *Plan Chiapas*. These programmes focused federal attention on Chiapas as a region hitherto overlooked in the national development project. *Plan Chiapas* had a budget of 83 million pesos and its stated goal was to ‘unify the actions of federal and state government to rapidly improve the living standards of the chiapanecos and to strengthen the social and cultural integration of the state,’ (Harvey, 1998: 151). The close involvement of government agencies like the SRA and the *Convenio de Cooperacion Agricola* (CODECOA) only served to help peasant

\textsuperscript{17} Arturo Albores began by teaching Spanish to indigenas whose Mayan tongue prevented their effective participation in institutional politics. He went on to help mobilise the Casa del Pueblo organisation, which became the OCEZ in 1982 (Harvey, 1998: 104-117). Albores’s ‘mass line’ tactics eventually brought him into conflict with radicalised elements within the OCEZ, and he was assassinated in April 1989 (1998: 145).
organisations bypass local bosses, known as *caciques*, and deal directly with the government. This increased independent organisations’ control of production and trade and empowered them to further undermine politico-economic barriers. Piecemeal victories and concessions followed, and identification with the independent peasantry came to be a proven and effective tool for mobilisation in rural zones.

It is certain that the EZLN’s founders were aware of the potential to disseminate revolutionary ideas among the newly politicised independent peasant network. Throughout the 1970s and ’80s the FLN had a solid link with the state through its own contact in Chiapas, Comandante ‘Jacobo’ (Tello, 1995). Jacobo lived and worked clandestinely amongst indigenous peasants as a social worker, and on Ruiz’s invitation he had acted as an advisor to the Indigenous Congress in 1974. Along with the bishop’s catechists, Jacobo helped to mobilise peasant associations and maintain their independence from the PRI (Womack, 1999; Tello, 1995). Most importantly, however, Jacobo gave the Mexico City-based FLN a direct point of contact, both with the independent peasant networks in Chiapas and the increasingly overcrowded peasant communities of the Lacandon and Los Altos. It is reasonable to argue, therefore, that the decision to align the EZLN with the peasantry was, at least in part, a response to the political opportunities perceived and reported by Jacobo.

Equally important, however, were socio-economic disparities endemic to Mexico’s rural populations. Indeed, although it is often frowned on for movement scholars to depict grievances as opportunities (Crossley, 2001), Chiapas presented the Marxist-Leninist FLN-EZLN with what must have seemed like an impoverished and exploited peasantry ripe for liberation from its false consciousness. John Ross captures the bubbling revolutionary potential of the state when he describes the rural population as ‘straw just waiting to burn’, a peasantry waiting to be fashioned into the frontline troops for a new crusade against capitalism (1994: 63). Chiapas was, after all, Mexico’s poorest state, a predominantly rural area where poverty and inequality were ubiquitous and most
prevalent among the peasantry. Even as late as 1994 Chiapas produced 20% of national energy although 63% of homes there did not have electricity; 9.7% of national rainfall fell on Chiapas yet 90% of indigenous homes did not have potable water; Chiapas produced 28% of the nation’s meat supply even though 90% of indigenous communities surveyed rarely ate meat; 30% of people were illiterate, the largest state percentage in the country; salaries were three times lower than the national average, and 40% of farmers earned only US$1.74 per day, half the Mexican minimum wage (Ross, 1994: 72-3). According to census figures only 11% of adults earned what the government considered a moderate income ($3,450 per annum), compared to 24% nationally; and only 14% of households had televisions, compared to 45% nationally (Collier, 1994: 16). In addition, more people died in Chiapas in 1994 than in any other state: infant mortality was double the national average at 66 deaths for every 1000 children, and most adult deaths were from curable infectious diseases (Ross, 1994: 72-3). Though largely circumstantial, this evidence corroborates Henry Veltmeyer’s conclusion that the EZLN was an urban socialist network that effectively ‘shopped around’ to locate its militant wing among Mexico’s most economically deprived citizens (2000: 95). I agree that this is largely true of the early EZLN, though I would point out that the EZLN’s founders were as yet ignorant of indigenous Chiapas’s cultural complexity, and simply attempted to make common cause with what they perceived to be one of the most disadvantaged demographic groups in the country. Later texts reveal the extent to which the EZLN’s solidarity-group identity was developed in dialogue with the indigenous communities themselves.

Finally, ideational influences also shaped the EZLN’s alignment with the peasant solidarity-group. Guevarist teachings encourage Latin American socialists to view the peasantry as a potential force for revolution, albeit one that lacks the political orientation and organisation that can be provided by socialist doctrine. Guevara writes, for instance, that in ‘underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting,’ and
he repeatedly situates the peasant as the protagonist of the Latin American socialist revolution:

‘We have also already said that in the conditions that prevail, at least in America and in almost all countries with deficient economic development, it is the countryside that offers ideal conditions for the fight. Therefore, the foundation of the social structure that the guerrilla fighter will build begins with changes in the ownership of agrarian property… The peasant must always be helped technically, economically, morally, and culturally. The guerrilla fighter will be a sort of guiding angel who has fallen into the zone…’

(Guevara, 1961: 38)

Arturo Warman (1988) suggests that Guevara’s evaluation actually reflects the more generalised belief in the violent nature of the peasant in Latin America, as one prone to spontaneous acts of rebellion but who lacks the ability to coordinate and channel that rebelliousness in a sustained campaign. Mexican political culture, he argues, idealises peasant militancy but also denigrates it as uncoordinated and disorganised:

‘A bourgeois pronouncement made in 1780 is a vision of the future, while Zapatismo is the relic of the past, as are Indians and rebellions of colonial times and the peasants’ demands today. The defeats of other social movements are explained by the brutal disproportion of their numbers in relation to enemy forces, while those of peasants are due to their intrinsic weakness.’

(Warman, 1988: 321)

I agree with Warman, and suggest that by 1980 the apparent frequency and inchoateness of rural insurrection, together with the absence of communication and lack of
understanding between indigenous and ladino communities, had fostered a mythic conception of the indigenous peasantry as a people relatively detached from mainstream society and given to bouts of sporadic violence. Local histories reinforced such attitudes. In Chiapas, for example, regular but isolated land invasions by peasants seeking ejido grants were punctuated by several notable rebellions, most famously against colonial rule in 1712, against the porfirista government in 1874 (Gosner, 1992), and most recently in 1974 when Tzotziles from San Andres Larrainzar murdered and chased ladino ranchers from their larger, more salubrious plots (Ross, 1994: 72). The EZLN’s initial solidarity-group identity betrays this same mythologised vision of the peasantry, aligning the organisation with a flawed history of peasant insurrection while prescribing ‘the science of history and society: Marxism-Leninism’ as a more cohesive, logical, and ‘scientific’ successor to the disjointed peasant rebellions of the past.

In sum, the layers of the initial collective identity strongly reflect Guevara’s model of a socialist revolutionary foco. Organisational identities amplified Guevara’s rigid military hierarchies and discipline, the extended nationalist-socialist movement identity mirrored Guevara’s thoughts on socialist propaganda in national contexts, and the solidarity-group built on Guevara’s uniquely Latin American variant of socialism in that it was bridged with a popular, if ethnocentric, conception of the rebellious peasant. This supports some existing interpretations, not least Veltmeyer’s (2000) insistence that the EZLN is fundamentally a socialist organisation. John Womack, in fact, describes the men and women who founded the EZLN as ‘passionately anti-Soviet’ and ‘passionately pro-Cuban and Che-Guevarist,’ (Womack, 1999: 190), and he recognises that the authors of the Estatutos modelled the EZLN on the Guevarist ideal of a militant guerrilla foco. That said, micro-frame analysis reveals some concessions to certain factors that may be more accurately described as perceived cultural, socio-economic and political opportunities. The recent availability of Zapata, for example, along with endemic socio-economic disparities and a newly politicised independent peasant network also played their part in
helping the EZLN to forge its initial collective identity, though the EZLN’s amplification of socialist doctrine may obscure these.

**INJUSTICE**

Beyond identity, the injustice component of the initial collective action frame was, I argue, more orthodox in its fidelity to Marxist-Leninist precepts. Although the particular grievances of the peasantry were amplified to reinforce the Zapatistas’ alignment with the peasant solidary-group, such grievances were framed in purely Marxist-Leninist terms as socio-economic and material. Peasant injustices were portrayed as the consequences of the capitalist system of exploitation, which fundamentally alienates the peasant worker from the production process:

‘Despoiled of the means of production, the people own only their labour power, which they have to sell to be able to subsist. But the worker receives less than what he himself produces with his work: the capitalist appropriates the difference… And working people, manacled by the laws that their exploiters elaborate, lacking a political-military vanguard, and violently suppressed by repressive forces (police and army), fund as their only alternative the struggle
for economic and political conquests limited to the bourgeois legal framework.’

(FLN, 1980: 4)

Put simply, the *Estatutos* emphasises material inequalities and locates injustice in the economic base and infrastructure of the capitalist system. There is no room in this analysis for the cultural grievances implied by the encroachment of modernity on the cosmological otherness of Maya society. Only economic disparities are amplified as the same economic laws that govern the commodification of labour in towns and cities are applied to the rural peasantry without thought for their narrative fidelity.

I maintain, however, that even within these doctrinal parameters there was a limited degree of frame alignment. It is notable, for example, that the authors of the *Estatutos* abstain from naming any single individuals as the culpable enemy, and rely exclusively on the broader language of Marxism-Leninism to condemn much more elusive bogeys like ‘US imperialism’, the ‘Mexican bourgeoisie’, and the agents of the capitalist state:

‘The enemies who oppress and exploit the Mexican people are: imperialism, above all U.S. imperialism, its partners in Mexico, the Mexican bourgeoisie and its puppets who form the bourgeois Mexican state and its armed agents, the police, the army, and the various paramilitary corps.’

(FLN, 1980: 3)

While vague on detail, this is undoubtedly what Gamson would call an ‘adversarial’ injustice frame that clearly posits the EZLN’s “we” in opposition to some “they”,’ (Gamson, 1995: 101), and we can make two inferences from its content. Firstly, by targeting capitalism and anti-nationalism, the injustice component dovetailed with other features of the EZLN’s initial frame, notably their socialist-nationalist movement identity.
As such, it is likely that it was influenced by similar considerations of national and international political contexts. The attack on US imperialism, for example, was not only influenced by traditionally socialist attitudes to America as the most recognisable bastion of capitalism, it was also a function of Mexico’s famously isolationist brand of popular patriotism, which tended to denigrate the USA above all other states. Anti-American sentiments were also conditioned by recent trends in Latin American socialist theory, particularly those that stressed the dependent position of peripheral states in the US-dominated world system (Gunder Frank, 1983; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Wallerstein, 1979). It is arguable, therefore, that the socialistic injustice component of the EZLN’s initial frame was tailored to fit not only the peculiarities of popular nationalism in Mexico, but also global political realities and new developments in socialist thought.

Secondly, and in contrast to later injustice frames, there is no mention in the Estatutos of specific individuals who must be unseated, or government decisions that must be overturned. Rather, the authors insist that it is the entire economic system and infrastructure that is at fault. While this indicates that the Zapatistas were, like any good socialists, determined to orient antipathy toward the economic base, it also demonstrates their awareness of the dangers of misdirecting hostility towards ‘easy and inappropriate targets’ (Gamson, 1995: 101). As Gamson points out, the risks associated with concretising enemies are considerable for all SMOs:

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18 McPherson and Baudendistel (2006) explore the roots of popular anti-Americanism in Latin America, tracing its roots in the 19th century and the role of ordinary people in its legitimisation. They suggest that much of the national identity of Latin American states, including Mexico, has been negatively constructed against American culture and through popular political campaigns.
'In concretising the targets of an injustice frame, there is a danger that people will miss the underlying structural conditions that produce hardship and inequality. They may exaggerate the role of human actors, failing to understand broader structural constraints, and misdirect their anger at easy and inappropriate targets.' (1995: 92)

SMOs, therefore, particularly nascent ones, may deliberately eschew the delimitation of enemies in order to avoid diverting attention away from deep-rooted structural problems. Indeed, I argue that this was a particularly clear and present danger for the early EZLN in Mexico, where the peculiarities of the political structure meant that the construction of a concrete and removable enemy would have played into the hands of the ruling party’s flexible accommodation tactics. Flexible accommodation is the term often used to describe the ideological adaptability of the PRI’s so-called ‘perfect dictatorship’ between 1920 and 2000 (Cothran, 1994: 89; Centeno, 1994: 7-9). Through the six-year presidential term, known as the sexenio, and the incumbent’s ability to name his own successor through the destape tradition, the PRI had been able to withstand and absorb even the most coordinated attacks over the decades:

‘Encapsuling (sic.) strands of syndicalism, Marxism, Anglo-Saxon democracy, indigenous communalism, and even French egalitarianism, the ideology of the Mexican Revolution has been highly malleable over the years and...[has]’

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enabled presidents to bend the ideology as crisis demanded without undermining
the legitimacy the ideology nurtures.’

(Morris, 1995: 189)

The *henriquista* movement in 1952 was perhaps the most notable victim of flexible
accommodation, and this was later superseded by the 1988 *cardenista* crisis (Morris,
1995: 176-80). Both movements enjoyed widespread popular support, but were defeated
by the timely removal of unpopular scapegoats within the government, the
marginalisation of popular opponents, and the populist manipulation of ideology. In light
of this political history, it is likely that the EZLN’s lack of precision in framing their
enemy was deliberate, and that it was intended to address systemic concerns and avoid
tying the Zapatistas to a particular and expendable incumbent. I suggest, in fact, that the
Zapatistas’ initial injustice frame relied on what Gamson cheerfully calls a ‘blurry “they”’
(1995: 101), and I recommend that Snow et al’s typology of frame alignment processes be
augmented to accommodate this process of deliberate frame blurring.

In sum, although the overriding influence in the framing of the injustice
component was undoubtedly Marxism-Leninism, there is evidence that the EZLN tailored
this feature of its initial frame to suit the features and inherent threats posed by the
Mexican political culture. Popular anti-USA feeling was incorporated, as were elements
of dependency theory, revealing once again the peculiarly Latin American character of the
EZLN’s early socialism. I also maintain that, in light of Mexico’s history of PRI flexible
accommodation, the construction of an indistinct or blurry enemy was deliberate and
intended to minimise the risk of misdirecting antipathy towards transient political
officials, and also to orient militants towards the structural causes of inequality rather than
its features; towards, in short, the capitalist infrastructure that underpinned the vested
interests of the political elite rather than the ephemeral political actors themselves.
In terms of the final frame component, agency, the EZLN followed a rigidly socialist agenda, though, again, the content of that discourse was developed in cognisance of certain structural constraints. First and foremost, the *Estatutos* gives precedence to the long-term objective of socialist revolution, and frames this as necessary, practicable and just through loyal appeals to the ‘logic’ of Marxism-Leninism. Revolution is rationalised, for example, according to the so-called ‘scientific’ foundations of Marxism-Leninism as a more cohesive and logical ideological foundation than the apparently chaotic, isolated and unsystematic land invasions of peasant groups – reflecting Warman’s belief that peasant rebellions were popularly considered to be doomed to failure. The authors also portray socialist revolution as practicable by drawing on historical precedent and claiming that Marxism-Leninism is infallible and has already ‘demonstrated its validity in all the victorious revolutions of this century,’ (FLN, 1980: 6). Above all, however, they frame socialist revolution as justifiable in Mexico because of the dire condition of the country’s poorest people and the fact that the PRI’s flexible accommodation has rendered genuine reform impossible:

‘Facing the failure of democratic means and the barbarism of bourgeois repression, …[our organisation] confronts imperialism and its puppets, because the state only allows legally the activities of political organisations that do not seriously propose – in theory or in practice – to end capitalist exploitation, but
support it, directly and indirectly, justifying the repression of true revolutionaries.’

(Ibid.)

That said, however, the detail of the agency component is more complex, and may be lost if we focus solely on its ideological foundations. Indeed, national and local political constraints as well as divisions among the left led the authors of the Estatutos to concede that the conditions were not, as yet, quite right for socialist revolution in Mexico. Thus, although the text amplifies the long-term objective of revolution, it nonetheless distinguishes this from the more immediate ‘ideological struggle’ against endemic reformism in Mexico and the need to indoctrinate the rural population. The authors appear to acknowledge the pragmatism behind this agenda when they denounce the more moderate activities of other campaigners:

‘…besides fighting against the ideological domain of capital we also fight against those, infiltrated in the labour movement and peasant and in the breast of the left, who renounce the revolutionary essence of Marxism and proclaim reformism and the collaboration of classes, instead of the fight to the death of the exploited against their exploiters.’

(FLN, 1980: 6)

This draws our attention to the constraints imposed by internecine differences, and it is significant that the EZLN were moved to defend their long-term objectives against what they called the ‘indirect’ opposition of reformers. Certainly, Mexican resistance to revolution was vociferous even among the left, mostly because of the proximity of the United States and the latter’s sponsorship and armament of narcotics agents in Latin America (Marcos, Salazar Deveraux et al, 1994). Indeed, Subcomandante Marcos would later explain that the EZLN’s initial revolutionary objectives made them ‘heretics among
the left,’ (Ibid.). At the very least, this shows how the EZLN were moved to engage with and refute the reformism of Mexico’s leftwing in order to justify their own revolutionary agenda:

‘The FLN promotes the creative application of scientific socialism to the national reality, appropriating the victorious experiences of other peoples, but assuming the Mexican reality as a specific complexity that should be transformed by the own Mexican people in agreement with our history, our resources and our capacity.’

(FLN, 1980: 7, sic.)

Locally, moreover, recent trends in peasant politics meant that the struggle against reformism was particularly important in rural areas. Under the patronage of Bishop Ruiz, Chiapas’s peasant associations had developed a degree of political power that had enabled them to exploit institutional avenues. While formal applications to the SRA were often preceded by armed land invasions (Harvey, 1998), this institutional bent was seen as a dangerous distraction for true revolutionaries, and one, it appears, that the EZLN were determined to meet head on. Their initial frame therefore promised a programme of sustained indoctrination in rural areas that was to be directed by designated political officers. Nevertheless, while conditioned by perceived local constraints, this programme reflected the early EZLN’s broader attachment to Guevarist ideas, particularly the latter’s recommendation of a lengthy indoctrination process designed to harness peasants’ revolutionary potential:

‘The important thing, that which must never be neglected in a school for recruits, is indoctrination; this is important because the men arrive without a clear conception as to why they come, with nothing more than very diffuse concepts about liberty, freedom of the press, etc., without any clear foundation whatever.
Therefore, the indoctrination should be carried out with maximum dedication and for the maximum amount of time possible.’

(Guevara, 1961: 108)

In sum, there is no denying that the agency component of the EZLN’s initial frame was revolutionary and relied heavily on the so-called logic and proven track record of Marxism-Leninism. Certainly, the frame’s ultimate objective lends further weight to Veltmeyer’s (2000) and other Marxist interpretations that ground the EZLN in the struggle against capitalist society’s economic base. That said, micro-frame analysis provides a deeper analysis and reveals the content of this agency component in the separation of long-term and short-term goals in the face of structural constraints. Thus I argue that the socialist discourse of agency was shaped in consideration of structural constraints: revolution was justified in terms of the state-party’s tendency to neutralise reformist opponents through cooptation, and an immediate, Guevarist programme of indoctrination was declared necessary to preserve the ‘revolutionary essence of Marxism’ against the rising tide of reformism among the Mexican left and the peasantry’s tendency towards institutional avenues.
CONCLUSION

To conclude this analysis, I suggest that the major discursive theme of the EZLN’s initial frame was socialism. Undeniably, therefore, there is some truth in Veltmeyer’s interpretation of the Zapatistas as fundamentally socialist, at least at their inception: the authors’ preoccupation with Marxist-Leninist tenets is evident, and there is no denying the practical influence of Guevara’s experiences in the Latin American theatre. I would add, however, that the detail of the initial collective action frame was more complex than the straightforward Marxist interpretation allows. Within the discursive parameters of socialist doctrine and precedent there is clear evidence of concessions to perceived cultural, socio-economic and political contexts, such that the EZLN were encouraged to fuse socialist and nationalist movement identities through the image of Zapata, who was selected from the pantheon of Mexican Revolutionary heroes for discursive and opportunistic reasons that Veltmeyer (2000) and Proyect’s (1998) analyses fail to address. Additionally, the frame’s solidary-group identity was influenced by perceived tendencies towards violence and recently improved politicisation in rural areas. Its injustice component blurred the EZLN’s enemy to avoid binding the organisation to a single and removable presidential incumbent, and its agency component was tempered by constraints imposed by the government’s flexible accommodation tactics and the schism within the left over the appropriateness of violence in Mexico (see fig. 3). Thus, while socialist precepts were of paramount importance, the detail of key discursive features was undeniably shaped by the authors’ perception of local and national contexts. Moreover, I have so far analysed only the Zapatistas’ initial frame, which, owing to its ‘monological’ dissemination, I would expect to be less complex than later collective action frames, which are the product of dialogic frame alignment executed in interaction with third parties (McAdam et al, 1996: 16).

This leads me to summarise the two theoretical observations made so far. The first is that of a new frame alignment process, frame blurring, which I offer as an addition to
Snow et al’s existing typology. *Frame blurring* is based on Gamson’s idea that authors may deliberately obscure the portrayal of enemies in their injustice component, although in later discussions I will show that frame blurring may be observed in other frame components as well. The second, more general observation is that the *Estatutos* lives up to the expectations and shortcomings of a monologically constructed and disseminated initial frame. Notwithstanding some concessions to context and circumstance, the simple fact of the EZLN’s overriding fidelity to ideological doctrine reinforces the argument that initial frames are ‘less strategic’, as McAdam et al put it (1996), more tentative, and predominantly influenced by ideas. The next chapter develops this idea in the analysis of the second key text, in which I examine the extent of frame components’ pragmatic alignment in light of the Zapatistas’ interaction with local, national and global contexts.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Southeast in Two Winds:

A Storm and A Prophecy (Marcos, 1992)

INTRODUCTION

The second text for analysis is the now-famous letter written to northern socialist allies in 1992 by the EZLN’s then-new leader in Chiapas, Subcomandante Marcos20. I argue that this text, entitled The Southeast in Two Winds, reveals the extent to which the EZLN aligned their identity, injustice and agency components to fit the exigencies of their local and national obligations towards the end of their clandestine phase. As I noted earlier, however, this text does not share the same speech situation, pragmatic intent or authorial role as other key texts. In order to understand its speech situation it is important to explain that in 1992 the EZLN was caught between its radicalising grassroots and an institutionalising FLN Supreme Command. In view of this, the pragmatic intent behind The Southeast in Two Winds was to encourage support for militant grassroots activity and engender a debate on the relevance of revolution in the post-Soviet era. It should also be remembered that Marcos’s role as the author of the text was that of leader and spokesman, and he was obliged in this capacity to obey both the wishes of his organisation and the relevant discursive rules imposed by his FLN superiors. At the same time, however, Marcos’s role was also that of a comrade conversing with fellow socialists in parts of Mexico that were far removed from the reality of indigenous, rural Chiapas. Notwithstanding these complexities, Marcos’s letter provides another fascinating window on the Zapatistas’ discourse, this time at the end of the clandestine phase when the EZLN was caught between its institutionalising parent and an increasingly belligerent rank and file.

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20 Marcos became the EZLN’s leader in 1988 when the previous leader, Comandante Elisa, became pregnant (Tello, 1995).
IDENTITY

In a marked change from the military hierarchies framed in the Estatutos, The Southeast in Two Winds saw the EZLN align their organisational identity with indigenous governance structures. This is evinced in their adoption of the radically democratic practice known as mandar obedeciendo or ‘command obedience’, which means to command by obeying the popular will. Throughout the text Marcos emphasises the EZLN’s radically democratic nature and implicitly recognises the authority of the new Comite Clandestino Revolucionario Indigena (CCRI), made up of eighteen representatives of four Mayan linguistic groups.21 Gone are the political officers, ‘urbans’ and ‘professionals’ of the initial frame, and in their place we find indigenous principles of collectivism and democratic thinking:

‘Collective work, democratic thinking, and subjection to the decisions of the majority are more than just traditions in Indigenous zones. They have been the only means of survival, resistance, dignity, and defiance. These “evil ideas,” as they are seen by landholders and businessmen, go against the capitalist precept of “a lot in the hands of a few”.

(1992, in Marcos, 2001: 33)

Some scholars have celebrated the EZLN’s radical democracy as postmodern (Burbach, 2001; Carrigan, 2000; Pelaez, 1996). Roger Burbach, for instance, finds postmodernism in the fact that the EZLN ‘goes to great lengths to involve the local communities in the organisation’s decision-making process,’ and argues that the ‘very structure of the EZLN is fluid, with a clandestine committee in charge of day-to-day operations that is consultative and has a policy of rotating members,’ (2001: 116). Yet in making this case Burbach ignores the EZLN’s own discourse, which, as the text shows, grounds their

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21 While Gilly writes that the CCRI was not created until January 1993 and therefore after the publication of Marcos’s letter (1998: 301), Shapiro informs us that the CCRI had been created much earlier to locally ratify decisions taken by the FLN at the national level (Shapiro, 2000).
radical democratic organisational identity in indigenous traditions that are culturally antithetical to the capitalist enemy. The indigenous roots of command obedience are well documented; Carlos Lenkersdorf argues that the Mayan Tojolabal language emphasises intersubjectivity, that leaders must always respect the wishes of the many or face deposal, and that local leaders ‘articulate community sentiments and in this sense they obey the community,’ (Lenkersdorf, 1996: 80-1; see also Mattiace, 1998: 178). Indeed, the Mexican Revolutionary political culture of mestizaje, which asserts that all Mexicans, be they of European or indigenous background, share a common indigenous heritage as mestizos, has meant that command obedience is eulogised and celebrated as a political ideal rooted in the national indigenous heritage (Gilly, 1998: 274). Thus the decentralised organisational identity framed in The Southeast in Two Winds is founded on ante-modern traditions of indigenous governance and the popularisation of command obedience in the modern Mexican political culture, rather than postmodern methods of organisation. It evinces a process of frame transformation that enabled the Zapatistas to deny the rigid, Guevarist military structure of the Estatutos, and imbue their internal structure with a recognisably indigenous schema that would have been accessible to Mexicans familiar with mestizaje.

I argue, therefore, that the meaning and significance of this frame transformation is found in the mestizaje political culture that facilitated it, and in the local and national structures that inspired it. Firstly, Mexican political culture celebrates command obedience as the ideal type of organisational and political leadership. It was lifted from indigenous practices in the nineteenth century when Mexico’s political elite engineered direct links to Quetzacoatl in their efforts to construct a preordained or ‘natural’ Mexican nation distinct from European rule (Bonfil, 1996, and Lenkersdorf, 1996), and was cemented as Mexico’s political culture in the aftermath of the 1910 Revolution. Today, even the Mexican president must pay lip service to the principles of governing by obeying the popular will (Knight, 1994; Joseph and Nugent, 1994), while the common or shared
mestizaje political culture that has grown from this has integrated and subordinated indigenous culture within a ‘Spanish and Indian binary,’ (Saldana-Portillo, 2001: 407). Thus, in assuming an organisational identity based on command obedience, the EZLN would have been acknowledging their internal command structure as one founded upon indigenous modes of leadership and organisation, whilst affirming their links with the traditions of the Mexican Revolution.

It is likely, however, that the EZLN’s frame transformation of organisational identity reflected very real internal reorganisation that took place over the course of their clandestine operations in Chiapas. The testimonies of Subcomandante Marcos and Comandante Tacho of the CCRI support this view: indigenous communities pay more than just lip service to command obedience, and in several interviews Marcos has reflected on that the difficulties he and the other early EZLN members experienced in penetrating the Maya ‘closed corporate communities’, whose reticence and suspicion of outsiders is well documented (Fisher, 1999; Gilly, 1998; Stephen, 2002; Wolf, 1957; Nash, 1963, 1993). In adapting to this context, Marcos describes the EZLN’s democratisation as an organic, gradual process that occurred in dialogue with the local communities:

‘So, on one hand there is this [democratic] form of organization… In the case of the indigenous communities, it is a way of life. On the other hand we have the authoritarian form of the army, of a political-military organization, but a military organization after all. One began to see a confrontation between these modes of decision-making until people from the communities began to join the EZLN and the indigenous form of decision-making began to take precedence.

(Marcos and Salazar Deveraux et al, 1994)

22 Failure to command by obeying is considered a clear indication of ‘bad government’ and is often regarded as legitimate grounds for the removal of leaders (Nash, 1995; Gilly, 1998).
Yet even on making contact the first EZLN operatives found that their initial short-term objective to indoctrinate the locals had been ill conceived, and they were repeatedly told that ‘your word is very hard, we do not understand it,’ (Harvey, 1998: 166). In this sense, the EZLN’s initial frame lacked narrative fidelity with the indigenous communities, as culturally ingrained beliefs and democratic structures rendered the hierarchical and dogmatic EZLN incapable of winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Faced with this situation, there was nothing the Zapatistas could do but adapt. As Shapiro writes: ‘The FLN-EZLN leadership and its very concept of revolutionary struggle were being fundamentally altered from below as the indigenous communities established control over the military preparations,’ (Shapiro, 2000).

The change, however, came slowly. By 1986, after more than three years in Chiapas, the EZLN had only managed to double its membership from six to twelve militants (Tello, 1995). In fact, efforts to politicise and recruit from the peasantry would not bear any real fruit until after the national political crisis of 1988, when civil unrest surrounded the election of President Salinas de Goratari and provided the EZLN with mixed opportunities. In that year, President de la Madrid’s destape fingered the unremarkable technocrat Salinas to be his successor23, despite a poll by the Monterrey newspaper, El Norte, that showed just 7% of PRI voters supported his nomination. The major challenger to PRI rule came in the form of the populist leader of the Partidos Revolucionario Democratico (PRD), Cuauhtemoc Cardenas24 (New York Times, October 5th, 1987). Cardenas’s campaign drew massive support, particularly in Mexico City and the countryside, but the controversial ballot in August returned Salinas as the next president of Mexico. Figures circulated by the PRD suggested that Cardenas won the

23 The majority of PRI party members preferred Salinas’s rivals Manuel Bartlett and Alfredo del Mazo, though this did not prevent de la Madrid from nominating fellow neoliberal technocrat Salinas as his heir (New York Times, October 5th, 1987).
24 Cardenas had been a pillar of the PRI but was more famous as the son of the Revolutionary hero and peasant champion Lazaro Cardenas. As the leader of the Democratic Tendency faction within the PRI, for whom de la Madrid’s internal reforms were not extensive enough, Cardenas had been a thorn in the side of the PRI leadership for years. Upon being unceremoniously ousted from the party he founded the independent Frente Democratico Nacional (FDN), and went on to fight the 1988 election at the head of the Partidos Revolucionario Democratico (PRD), a coalition of leftist opposition parties and SMOs united around a popular anti-PRI ticket.
ballot, and that rather than the official vote count of 50.4% for the PRI, Salinas had actually received only 36% compared to Cardenas’s 42% (Centeno, 1994: 15). Thousands voiced their suspicion of electoral fraud, especially over the computer systems shutdown that occurred at a crucial point in the vote count (Middlebrooks, 1995). Civil unrest reached such a level that some predominantly rural states teetered on the brink of all-out insurgency (Gilly, 1989: 54-6). Cardenas himself, however, rejected violence. He thanked those who wrote letters of support, quelled the obstreperous crowd in Mexico City, and sent everyone home without a fight. Meanwhile, reeling from internal divisions and lumbered with an unpopular leader whose mandate to rule had been seriously undermined before he had even taken office, the PRI was faced with a nation crying out for decisive opposition.

In August 1988, therefore, there was a definite gap in the market for strong, perhaps even revolutionary leadership (Marcos and Libra, 1995). Elite divisions and the suddenly imposed grievance of public corruption offered would-be revolutionary groups like the EZLN classic ‘objective political opportunities’ (McAdam et al, 1996), not only to recruit militants from the pool of disaffected voters but perhaps even to lend weight to calls for civil insurgency. The EZLN was in a particularly strong position to capitalise because the loudest calls for direct action came from rural Chiapas, where the election fiasco was viewed as a flagrant contravention of the sacred revolutionary pact of command obedience and thus legitimate grounds for rebellion. The political credo of command obedience had underpinned the PRI’s own claim to the national leadership for almost seventy years, and it was in the tradition of lawful removal that indigenous peasants offered their guns to the defeated Cardenas in 1988:

‘In this way, rural rebellion ended up establishing itself, over the long run, as one of the modes of confrontation and existence of the Mexican state community; in other words, as one of the elements with a potential for constituting the very
relationship between rulers and ruled, between those who govern and those who are governed… And for the same reason, when peasants who voted for Cuauhetemoc Cardenas in 1988 felt that the electoral results had been, or would be, fraudulently altered by the government, they turned to the ancient image of armed rebellion in order to make known the depths of their determination.’

(Gilly, 1998: 268)

Moreover, insult was added to the injury of electoral fraud by the fact that the victim, in this instance, was the son of peasant hero Lazaro Cardenas. Rus (1994) and Collier (1994) explain that the 1930s Cardenas administration is still remembered as the ‘revolution of the Indians,’ a time when the promises of the 1910 revolution were finally made real to indigenous peasants in a state that had been bypassed by its dictates:

‘In Chiapas, Cardenas’s policies firmly established the government as an ally of Indians and peasants against the landowners in the central highlands.’

(Collier, 1994: 30-4)

Given this attachment, both to command obedience and the memory of Cardenas, it is not surprising that Chiapas’s indigenous communities ‘lived and breathed cardenismo and registered it as part of their experience, in their familial and social contacts, in their everyday lives, in the specific forms of their imaginary, even if they did not translate it perhaps into the words of politics,’ (Gilly, 1998: 302). Salinas’s fraudulent victory over Cardenas represented not just the PRI’s contravention of the national agreement to govern by obeying, it was also registered as a direct attack on the Cardenista alliance between the state and the peasantry.

25 The social and economic imbalances of the pre-revolutionary porfirista dictatorship had been preserved in Chiapas by the Mapaches (raccoons), armies recruited by landowners to keep out the revolutionary brigades and protect the assets of the local oligarchy. It was not until Lazaro Cardenas began to enforce the policies of the reforma agraria that many isolated Chiapanecos even learnt of the revolution.
Yet, despite all this, the EZLN failed to capitalise on cardenista insurgency in 1988, and only came to realise its import some months later. Annotating her own interview with Marcos, Carmen Libra writes that,

‘Marcos admitted the lack of capacity of his organization to ‘read’ what was happening in 1988 with Cardenismo; he regrets it because he says that perhaps, they, the Zapatistas, could have done something to help so that as a result at that time the country could have taken another direction.’
(Marcos and Libra, 1995)

Marcos, it must be remembered, only assumed command of the EZLN in 1988, and he has blamed his own inexperience for the organisation’s inability ‘to listen to what was going on around them’ at that time (Marcos and Gallegos, 1998). Gilly, however, looks deeper and finds ‘an unexplained difference of perception’ founded on different attitudes to electoral politics: Where Chiapas’s indigenous communities ‘lived and breathed’ cardenismo, ‘The [EZLN] leaders, as a natural result of the mode of thinking necessary for their own struggle, perceived cardenismo as a new but predictable failure of ‘the electoral route,’ their perception being confirmed by their vocation: after electoral cardenismo, insurrectional zapatismo would follow,’ (Gilly, 1998: 302-3). The testimonies of key Zapatistas lend weight to Gilly’s argument. They indicate that the EZLN leadership came to blame the missed opportunity of cardenismo on the restrictions imposed by their internal structure and ideological preconceptions. Marcos claims, for example, that while he perceived an increased level of insurgency in 1988, he could not comprehend the depth of popular feeling that surrounded Cardenas’s defeat, nor ‘what an impact it had had in people’s consciousness,’ (Marcos and Le Bot, 1997: 170-2). He laments that ‘we did not know how to view [cardenismo] as an opportunity, and thus let go by what we now consider was an historic opportunity,’ (Marcos and Libra, 1995).
For present purposes, the significance of the cardenista insurgency is found in the EZLN’s retrospective identification of a ‘missed opportunity’ (Meyer, 1999, 2002) and the efforts they made to redress this. The bitter realisation that more could have been done to exploit the political crisis of 1988 prompted EZLN leaders to realise the narrative infidelity of their original Guevarist hierarchies and organisational identities, and they began a bold divergence away from the initial frame that saw the EZLN slowly align with local indigenous modes of command obedience. In an effort to bridge the epistemic and ontological differences that cardenismo exposed, Marcos and the EZLN leaders set about new strategies designed to integrate their organisation with the communities. By the end of 1989 the EZLN’s membership had risen from 12 to over 1300 (Tello, 1995; Gilly, 1998). With large numbers of disaffected indigenas joining their ranks and forcing leaders to listen to their views, the Guevarist militants of the EZLN were encouraged to learn from them rather than stubbornly enforce the ill-fitting organisational identities of the initial frame. The EZLN ‘began to adopt some of the characteristics of indigenous social organizations,’ (Aquilla and Ronfeldt, 1998: 32), and as the organisation grew and became more embedded in community life, the distinctions between ‘urbans’ and ‘professionals’ posited in the initial frame were increasingly exposed as inappropriate to the Chiapas context. Indeed, it became more and more difficult to disguise the EZLN’s indigenous composition and newfound democracy:

‘Our army made itself bigger, made itself more Indian, and definitively contaminated itself with communitarian forms, including indigenous cultural forms. The civilian population, the civilian authorities, in this case zapatistas, had total control of the territory. They are part of our organisation, but they are civilians.’

(Marcos, in Gilly, 1998: 300).
By the time Marcos composed *The Southeast in Two Winds*, the EZLN’s new communitarian structure of command obedience had been fully implemented, and in communication with northern allies Marcos was obliged to defend internal changes. This indicates that ‘missed opportunities’ can play a significant role in stimulating frame alignment *post hoc*.

Though the frame transformation of organisational identities was perhaps the most radical departure from the initial frame, the fallout from this process also impacted on the portrayal of the remaining layers of the EZLN’s collective identity. Notably, the solidary-group identity was realigned as Marcos moved away from the initial, homogenous conception of ‘the peasantry’ to accommodate the *indigenous* cultural identities of the thousands of indigenas that had joined the EZLN since 1988. In contrast to the *Estatutos*, for example, *The Southeast in Two Winds* embraces indigenousness and acknowledges the specific histories of Mayan communities such as Tzotziles, Tzeltales, Choles, Tojolabales, and Zoques. Indeed, the text situates these above and before the Mexican state, whose post-Revolutionary policy of *mestizaje* had deliberately overridden cultural otherness in order to Mexicanise the rural population as ‘peasants’:

> ‘These people were born dignified and rebellious. They are not just the product of the annexation act of 1824, but of a long chain of ignominious acts and rebellions. From the time when cassocks and armour conquered this land, dignity and defiance have lived and spread under these rains.’

(Marcos, 1992)²⁶

Simple content analysis reveals that the text contains the word ‘indigenous’ a total of thirty-four times, as Marcos’s letter jettisons the EZLN’s earlier alignment with ‘peasants’ and ‘rural workers’ and positions the indigenous as the protagonists of the socialist struggle. The structures and attitudes of Maya communities had, after all, inspired the

²⁶ In 1824, Chiapas voted to become part of Mexico rather than Guatemala.
EZLN’s adoption of command obedience, and the thousands that now made up their rank and file considered themselves Tzeltal or Chol before anything else. It was meet, therefore, that Marcos’s letter acknowledge indigenas in the detail of the Zapatistas’ solidary-group identity, and I see this frame transformation as a corollary of the frame transformation of organisational identities.

Furthermore, frame transformation also threatened to undermine the movement layer of collective identity, prompting Marcos to reduce the EZLN’s reliance on socialist discourse. Both the radical democracy of command obedience and the otherness of indigenous cultural identities ran counter to the ideological orthodoxy of the Zapatistas’ initial movement identity. Marcos has conceded as much himself, and has commented on his gradual realisation that orthodox socialism was unsuitable to the Chiapan context:

‘Who would have thought that it would be the indigenous peoples who would provoke all of this? Not even in the Leninist conception of the weakest link was it thought that it might be the indigenous people, right? I told you that there was a learning process at the beginning of our work here, albeit a forced one. It's not like we said, Well, we are going to learn and see what happens. No! We were close-minded, like any other orthodox leftist, like any other theoretician who believes that he knows the truth.’

(Marcos and Salazar Deveraux et al, 1994)

As the organisation democratised and indigenised, so it gradually moved beyond the orbit of ‘the science of history and society,’ yet EZLN leaders, Marcos included, remained subordinate to the FLN Supreme Command in Mexico City and perceived a real need for the EZLN to retain the support of its socialist commanders and allies in northern states. This situation was complicated by global political events and national electoral changes. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the uneven democratisation of Mexico, which
favoured electorates in northerly states (Lindau, 1996; Centeno, 1994), the FLN was gravitating towards institutionalisation as a socialist political party. The EZLN’s indigenous rank and file, on the other hand, were faced with neoliberal restructuring programmes that threatened their very cultural and economic existence, and so were radicalising. The EZLN leaders in Chiapas were caught in the middle as the EZLN was on the cusp of an ideological crisis.

The movement identity constructed in *The Southeast in Two Winds* was, I argue, contrived to bridge the growing chasm between the EZLN’s democratising and radicalising indigenous solidarity-group on one hand, and the socialism and institutional bent of the FLN Supreme Command on the other. The letter was disseminated among northern socialists in anticipation of the Prado summit, a clandestine meeting of high-ranking FLN representatives scheduled for January 1993. That this meeting was being planned at all owed much to the fact that 1992 was a tumultuous year for both the EZLN in Chiapas and the FLN in Mexico. Recognising political constraints from both below and above, Marcos made a conscientious effort to retain the EZLN’s fidelity to the socialist movement whilst adapting the movement identity to fit the EZLN’s internal changes. He acknowledges, for example, the weaknesses of socialism but posits the indigenous as a ‘wind from below’ capable of revitalising the movement in Mexico:

‘Not everyone is carried away by hopelessness. There are millions of people who continue on without hearing the voices of the powerful and the indifferent… They don’t hear the voice that comes from above; they hear the voice that is carried to them by the wind from below, a voice that is born in the Indigenous heart of the mountains. This voice speaks to them about justice and freedom, *it speaks to them about socialism.*’

(Marcos, 1992, my emphasis)
Content analysis reveals that the terms ‘socialist’ and ‘socialism’ are used on just four occasions, and it is a highly bowdlerised form of socialist rhetoric that pervades *The Southeast in Two Winds*. This indicates that socialist doctrine was no longer as vital to the EZLN and its mission in Chiapas as it had been in 1980. Marcos mocks the idea that ‘socialism is dead’, but breaks with the orthodoxy of the initial frame by admitting the flaws of Marxism-Leninism, particularly its failure to allow for radical inclusiveness and the role of the indigenous. Instead, his letter situates the EZLN in a broader, more malleable conception of socialism in which expressions of explicit alignment with Marxism-Leninism are reduced. I suggest that this evinces the *frame reduction* of orthodox socialism to construct a conceptual *frame bridge* between the newly democratic, indigenous EZLN and the socialist metanarrative that was its last link with northern allies. This frame bridge provided an innovative indigenous-socialist fusion, and brings to mind Clemens (1996) and Poletta’s (1999) belief that SMOs act as catalysts for the rearrangement and transposition of a society’s resources and schemas.

**INJUSTICE**

In contrast to the radical frame transformation of aspects of collective identity, the framing of injustice was only slightly altered from the *Estatutos*. Grievances in *The Southeast in Two Winds* were framed from the perspective of outsiders looking into Chiapas from more affluent parts of Mexico, and so continued to focus exclusively on material-economic and political deprivation. For example, the first and by far the largest chapter of the text deals exclusively with these grievances and grounds them in the unequal exchanges inherent to the capitalist system, which Marcos labels ‘the beast’. He describes vividly the beast’s extraction of oil, coffee, beef, hydroelectric energy, wood, honey and corn, and derides the lack of democracy, sanitation, health care, education, communication and industry:
‘A handful of businesses, one of which is the Mexican State, take all the wealth out of Chiapas and in exchange leave behind their mortal and pestilent mark: in
1989 these businesses took 1,222,669,000,000 pesos from Chiapas and only left behind 616,340,000,000 pesos worth of credit and public works. More than 600,000,000,000 pesos went to the belly of the beast.’

(Marcos, 1992)

The economic focus and neglect of cultural issues expressed here is surprising in view of the EZLN’s recently indigenised solidarity-group. Though the indigenous are undoubtedly the aggrieved group, there is no attempt to render cultural grievances or even portray material grievances from the indigenous perspective. This is a valid point given that later texts and interviews portray injustice from an explicitly culturalist point of view. Marcos’s letter to John Berger, for example, depicts the same injustices in cultural terms as modernity eclipsing the very lifeworld of the Maya:

‘Neoliberalism, the doctrine that makes it possible for stupidity and cynicism to govern in diverse parts of the earth, does not allow participation other than to hold on by disappearing. “Die as a social group, as a culture, and above all as a resistance. Then you can be part of modernity,” say the great capitalists, from their seats of government, to the indigenous campesinos.’

(Marcos’s letter to John Berger, 1995; in Ponce de Leon, 2001: 260)

*The Southeast in Two Winds* deliberately elides such cultural sentiments in order to amplify the quantifiable facts of material deprivation in Chiapas. And while Marcos employs unorthodox rhetorical flourishes that are absent from the *Estatutos*, the narrow focus on material-economic and political injustices represents continuity with the initial socialistic frame. Indeed I argue that the sustained amplification of socio-economic injustice was deliberate, and designed to add depth to the EZLN’s socialist movement identity. It must be remembered that Marcos’s letter was aimed at northern socialists
whose own ideas of injustice were rooted in the inequalities of the capitalist infrastructure.

Elsewhere in the text, however, there is evidence of more subtle frame alignment; namely in what I call the frame concretisation of the EZLN’s enemies. In contrast to the blurred enemies of the initial injustice component, which were framed in deliberately vague terms to counter the threat of flexible accommodation, *The Southeast in Two Winds* channels antipathy more directly by laying the blame for economic injustice squarely at the door of the country’s two most influential and recognisable political officers: President Salinas de Gortari and Interior Secretary Gonzalez Garrido, caricatured by Marcos as the viceroy and his apprentice:

‘Once upon a time there was a viceroy made of chocolate with a peanut for a nose. The viceroy’s apprentice, Governor Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido, in the manner of the old monarchs who were put in power by the Spanish crown during the Conquest, has reorganised the geography of Chiapas… During Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido’s four-year term more than 60,000 Chiapanecos have died, most of them poor.’

(Marcos, 1992)

The frame concretisation of these enemies was, I argue, designed to orient antipathy toward recognisable and removable targets, and also to root the causes of Chiapas’s poverty in uneven development in the north. There were good reasons for this endeavour.

First, the text vilifies Mexico’s top politician, president Salinas de Gortari (1988-94), primarily for his imposition of market deregulation. He is mentioned a total of twenty-nine times and, as ‘the viceroy’, is characterised as the representative and champion of the faceless ‘Empire’ of neoliberal capitalism. As the ultimate arbiter of power in Mexico, Salinas was framed as the ultimate enemy; a removable target famously
associated with capitalism’s most hated neoliberal variant. Salinas’s populist policy of ‘social liberalism’ was also targeted. Having been created ostensibly to ameliorate the worst effects of neoliberalisation, in practise those who needed the greatest assistance received the least, and evidence suggests that far from resolving neoliberalism’s socio-economic disparities, the provisions of social liberalism actually widened the poverty gap between those in the north and those in southern states (Harvey, 1998: 178-189; Gates, 1996: 54). Marcos’s letter attacks Salinas’s social liberalism as nothing more than political spin that obscured the abject poverty faced by those in the south:

‘The programme to improve the conditions of poverty, a small bit of social democracy which the Mexican state throws about and which, under the regime of Salinas de Gortari carries the name Pronasol, are a joke (sic.) that brings bloody tears to those who live under the rain and the sun.’

(Marcos, 1992)

Salinas’s concretisation in The Southeast in Two Winds suggests that the EZLN was finally looking to mobilise against its enemies. Having recruited a powerful support base in Chiapas, the time for action was upon them. Militancy was already apparent in the south, and Marcos’s letter looked to galvanise action in the north by identifying a clear and removable target.

However, the socialists in northern states would need convincing, and it is for this reason that the text also channels righteous anger towards the second most powerful politician in Mexico: Interior Secretary Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido. A former governor of Chiapas and wealthy landowner in the state, Gonzalez Garrido linked Chiapas’s

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27 Social liberalism consisted of the Programme of National Solidarity (PRONASOL) in cities and the Programme for Direct Assistance in Agriculture (PROCAMPO) in the countryside (Lindau, 1996; Davis and Brachet-Marquez, 1997). Although PROCAMPO carried provision to compensate farmers of maize and wheat for 15 years to ease the transition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in practise it distorted the transition by encouraging *minifundio* smallholders of less than two hectares to farm compensation rather than alternative crops. Moreover, while there were some genuine benefits for the urban poor, PROCAMPO actively divided rural communities as local officials withheld payouts for peasants allied to independent political associations (Harvey, 1998: 185).
impoverishment with the neoliberal interests of Mexico’s political elite. He was plucked from his gubernatorial post in 1991 and catapulted to national office on the strength of his reputation for curtailing peasant insurrections against private landowners. His promotion,

‘strengthened the alliance of the federal government with the Chiapan oligarchy, whose most distinguished political figure would assume the important post of secretary of the interior, responsible both for gearing up the machinery to win the presidential election of 1994 and for looking after internal affairs in Mexico.’

(Gilly, 1998: 292)

Gonzalez Garrido’s ascent has been described as ‘a politico-financial integration of the Chiapan oligarchy and...large financial and economic interests related to the policies of the government of Carlos Salinas,’ (Gilly, 1998: 299). Undoubtedly, it tied the valuable natural resources of Chiapas to Salinas’s neoliberal administration, and Marcos’s letter sought to amplify the fusion of local and national interests it implied by amplying the former governor’s role as an enforcer parachuted in to safeguard the neoliberalisation of the south’s natural wealth. Indeed, it has been suggested that his elevation was intended to help ensure the smooth implementation of Salinas’s market deregulation in southern states, where his famously hard-line approach and influence with law enforcement agencies and cattle ranchers would be a valuable asset.

28 Garrido’s brutality was infamous and Gilly describes him as the ‘outstanding exemplar of one of the ancestral lineages of the “familia chiapaneca”,’ who reportedly boasted of having at his disposal his own FBI: ““the state police: la Fuerza Bruta Indigena”,’ (Gilly, 1998: 111). It is reported that during his tenure as Chiapas governor he created ‘a state-level fund directly under his control,’ which ‘favoured political allies in the PRI and CNC, strengthening the control exercised by municipal presidents and marginalizing independent organisations,’ (Harvey, 1998: 185-6). His complicity with local business interests in Chiapas was encapsulated in Marcos’s characterisation of his Committee for Citizen Defence as an institutionalised paramilitary force against indigenous land invasions (1992; in Marcos, 2001: 30).

29 It is argued that Gonzalez Garrido sponsored the persecution of independent leaders, and dismissed officials who sympathised with their demands. For example, in 1989, in Apas in the municipality of Zinacantan a group of local families applied for funds to repair their irrigation system and plant orchards. However, this group had offered support to opposition candidate Cuahetemoc Cardenas in the 1988 presidential elections so their application was rejected, and funds were redirected to a ‘hastily cobbled together’ competing project put forward by a PRI group in Apas (Rus and Collier, 2003: 49). Meanwhile, Gonzales’s efforts to stir divisions among peasant groups even extended to punishing officials who
I argue that, in concretising these two enemies for the EZLN, Marcos’s intention was twofold. On one hand he hoped to break with the initial frame by identifying removable politicians; clear targets for armed revolution that would reignite debate on the relevance of revolution in Mexico. On the other hand, he looked to prick the consciences of the EZLN’s allies in the north, where increasing affluence came at the price of misery and brutal repression in Chiapas, most of which went unreported (Lindau, 1996; Harvey, 1998). By delimiting Salinas and Gonzalez Garrido, and using them to amplify the direct link between national affluence and Chiapan misery, Marcos framed material inequalities in Chiapas as the unseen consequences of economic growth and democratisation in the north. He constructed, in other words, what Bayard de Volo calls an ‘obligation frame’ capable of stirring feelings of guilt among socialist recipients and articulating the affluence of northern states with Chiapas’s increasing impoverishment.

**AGENCY**

To read The Southeast in Two Winds is to be in no doubt that the EZLN was ready to begin armed rebellion. Marcos’s letter repeatedly implies the necessity of violence by pointing out the futility of recent efforts to redress grievances through both institutional and insurrectional means (Marcos, 1992). However, the EZLN leadership was aware of the unpopularity of this stance, and Marcos’s immediate aim was simply to stir debate among socialists on the relevance of revolution in 1992. His letter offers no concrete proposals on the timeframe of the revolution or the course it should take. Indeed, so deliberately imprecise is it that only vague revolutionary objectives are couched in a portentous, quasi-indigenous ‘prophecy’ that is itself drenched in the metaphor of a dream:

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assisted independent associations; as the regional director of the INI found to his cost, losing his job after advising the UE de la Selva in 1990 in its efforts to purchase a coffee-processing plant (Harvey, 1998: 186).
‘Everyone is dreaming in this country. Now it is time to wake up… The storm is here. From the clash of these two winds a storm will be born. Its time has arrived. Now the wind from above rules, but the wind from below is coming. The prophecy is here: When the storm calms, when rain and fire again leave the country in peace, the world will no longer be the world, but something better.’

(Marcos, 1992)

The one constant in this blurred agency frame is that Marcos positions the indigenous as the revolution’s protagonists: they are ‘the wind from below’ that will lead the new socialist revolution (Ibid.). Marcos personifies the indigenous will to rebel in the character Antonio, who, on hearing the wind from below, picks up his machete and ‘walks to meet others. Something has told him that his dream is that of many, and he goes to find them,’ (Ibid.). Almost losing himself in metaphor, Marcos describes how the warrior Antonio dreams a wind that will liberate the indigenous and complete the socialist revolution. The viceroy, by contrast, the enemy of Antonio, the indigenous and socialists, dreams the same wind, but for him it is a nightmare that ‘keeps him tossing and turning and unable to sleep,’ (Ibid.).

Notwithstanding the vagueness of this agency component, Marcos’s letter must have shocked those in northern states where Salinas’s neoliberal policies were having positive effects for middle income Mexicans, and where national revolution seemed the last thing that Mexicans wanted (Pastor and Wise, 1997; Centeno, 1994). In most of Mexico Salinas was very popular, having overcome the stain of illegitimacy that marred his election in 1988. With NAFTA just around the corner the USA was now a powerful financial and military ally (Purcell, 1997), while domestic divisions among elites appeared to be mending as social and political reforms heralded the beginning of an uneven but nonetheless real process of democratisation:
‘…Carlos Salinas remained perhaps the most popular president in decades. According to a Los Angeles Times survey over 60% of the population approved of his performance. The mid-term elections of 1991 indicated that the ruling PRI had staged a dramatic comeback from the political debacle of 1988.’

(Centeno, 1994: 19)

All this, it seemed, was about to render guerrilla vanguards anachronistic and unnecessary in Mexico. Indeed, FLN leaders in Mexico City, including Comandante Elisa, the EZLN’s ex-leader now removed to the Capital, were firmly against war, and they would make their case at the Prado meeting in January. They argued that FLN forces in other parts of Mexico were not ready, that rebellion was not necessary, and that a lone Chiapas insurgency would face the full force of the Mexican army (Tello 1995; Shapiro, 2000). Even Subcomandante Marcos had his own reservations about the advisability of armed rebellion, and he has suggested in interviews that he warned the indigenas of the CCRI that the national and international situation ‘was not favourable to any attempt at revolution,’ (Marcos in Gilly, 1998: 301).

Nevertheless, the CCRI’s response to Marcos’s caveat had been simple: ‘we don’t want to know what’s happening in the rest of the world, we are dying,’ (Ibid.). The Southeast in Two Winds was, it seems, the culmination of years of radicalising activity in Chiapas that had begun in 1988. In 1991, for example, EZLN militants had participated in the creation of a new indigenous organisation: the Asociacion Nacional de Campesinos Indigenas Emiliano Zapata (ANCIEZ). This became a semi-clandestine avatar for the EZLN, through which militants engaged in bouts of direct action over indigenous cultural issues (Benjamin, 1995: 62; Marcos, 1992; Shapiro, 2000). When, in January 1992, the PRI announced the reform of constitutional Article 27, ANCIEZ became the focal point for Chiapas’s militant community. Constitutional reform signalled the end of the provision for communal farming and provoked violent reactions throughout the state as
ingrained modes of existence were trampled and the 1930s revolutionary pact between the PRI and the peasantry eroded. In response, Ocosingo and San Cristobal witnessed armed demonstration on April 10th and October 12th 1992. In these events ANCIEZ declared symbolic war on the markers of imperial domination, and activists marching in military formation with face paint and holding indigenous weapons attacked and butchered a statue of conquistador Diego de Mazariegos. Some scholars have over-egged the pudding by waxing lyrically about the ANCIEZ marches being the Zapatistas’ ‘first, sensational public appearance’ and a sign of their growing independence from the FLN (Schulz and Wager, 1995: 6-7; Shapiro, 2000). Nevertheless, they were certainly signs that the indigenous grassroots were radicalising, and that the Zapatista communities were letting their military leaders know that “the people want to fight” (Marcos, in Gilly, 1998: 301). Thus Marcos, ‘representing the communities’ decision, argued that the situation demanded imminent military action,’ (Shapiro, 2000), and The Southeast in Two Winds makes this case.

In sum, as deception and violence in the south contrasted with increasing liberalism and economic growth in the north, the needs of FLN cadre in different states of the republic began to conflict. As the EZLN grassroots radicalised, the FLN Supreme Command was beginning to leave armed rebellion behind as a serious option, and Marcos, as the EZLN commander, was caught in the middle of this dialogue. In constructing a radical but blurred agency frame infused with indigenous imagery, Marcos signalled that rebelliousness was fomenting in the ranks of the EZLN without putting forward a clear and potentially contentious agenda. Instead, he simply invited socialist allies in northern states to engage on a polemic level with the future of revolution in the post-Soviet era.

**CONCLUSION**
The frame alignment processes of *The Southeast in Two Winds* demonstrate the EZLN’s discursive pragmatism and reflect their dialogic interaction with local preferences and national constraints even before they declared war in 1994. The frame reduction of socialist doctrine in the layers of identity, for example, shows the extent to which leaders had been forced to adapt internal organisation to fit the realities of indigenous governance structures. Unable to deny indigenous influences, moreover, the outright recognition of indigenous identities represented a deliberate attempt to replace the ‘peasantry’ at the solidary-group layer. At the same time, however, the doctrinal conservatism of northern socialist allies led Marcos to construct a conceptual frame bridge between the indigenous and the EZLN’s movement identity as a socialist guerrilla vanguard. In the injustice component, the frame concretisation of enemies gave clear focus to the new indigenous-socialist alliance and drew northerners’ attention to the fact that many southern grievances were rooted in uneven development in northern states. Finally, in the agency component, the frame blurring of revolutionary methods indicates that the EZLN leaders were cognisant of constraints at both the national and local levels. Despite the pressure exerted by their rank and file, the leadership were more circumspect in their efforts to instigate debate on the issue of coordinated insurrection.

Thus, whereas the EZLN’s initial frame was unashamedly Marxist-Leninist, the appellation does not sit quite so well with the indigenous-socialist collective action frame of *The Southeast in Two Winds*. There were, admittedly, some constants, not least the retention of a generally socialistic mien, the emphasis of material injustices and the denial of socialism’s demise. Yet the EZLN undoubtedly became less concerned with dogma and Guevarist precedent and more pragmatic in their efforts to bind socialists and indigenas in a shared revolutionary future. I argue that, by 1992, the EZLN had become, at its core, an indigenous Chiapan SMO; it was, after all, inspired to undertake the alignment of frame components following its absorption into local community structures and by the exacerbation of indigenous grievances that accompanied structural adjustment.
Nonetheless, EZLN leaders still cleaved to reduced socialist tenets in the hope of retaining the support of the national socialist network.

On a more theoretical note, I offer four observations. First of all I suggest that the frame alignment of frame components in *The Southeast in Two Winds* reinforces the argument that initial frames are less strategic and more faithful to doctrinal influences than later collective action frames (McAdam et al, 1996: 16). I add to this observation, however, by drawing on Steinberg’s (1999) belief in the *dialogism* of social movement discourse. In *The Southeast in Two Winds* it is evident that discursive alignment was undertaken in response to dialogic interaction rather than ‘objective structures’. Secondly, I concur with Gamson’s belief that ‘the movement layer [of the identity component] is especially critical because it is a necessary catalyst in fusing solidary and organisational identification in an integrated movement identity,’ (Gamson, 1995: 100). This is shown in the EZLN’s heavy reliance on their movement identity: Socialism in *The Southeast in Two Winds* was the doctrinal glue that bound the EZLN to their superiors in the FLN on the one hand, and obligated them to act in the interests of the impoverished indigenas on the other. Thirdly, the fused indigenous-socialist identity that resulted from this was, in 1992, a novel invention, and Marcos has conceded its innovation (Marcos and Salazar Deveraux et al, 1994). I suggest, therefore, that this lends weight to the argument that SMOs regularly generate new organisational modes and meanings through frame alignment processes (Clemens, 1996). Finally, I submit a further frame alignment process as an addition to Snow et al’s (1986) typology: *frame concretisation*. This term represents the opposite of *frame blurring*, which I identified in Chapter Three, and is seen in the EZLN’s concretisation of their enemies – Secretary Gonzales Garrido and President Salinas. As with *frame blurring*, the term *frame concretisation* is inspired by Gamson, who recognises the situational constraints and opportunities associated with galvanising and orienting antipathy towards identifiable and removable opponents (1995: 92).
‘the development of collective action discourses is both facilitated and limited by the ways in which claims and alternative visions can be represented within a larger discursive field… The multivocality of messages that actors (both powerholders and challengers) circulate leaves opportunity for claims and visions to be understood in ways that may be different from (and not necessarily congruent with) what they intend.’

(Steinberg, 1999: 740)
The clandestine phase came to an abrupt end on January 1st 1994 when the EZLN declared war on President Salinas and the PRI. At that moment the Zapatistas became embroiled in a much more public discourse that would see them exploit and struggle with the inherent ‘multivocality’ of the public domain (Steinberg, 1999). In Part Two, I explore this discourse during the Zapatistas’ first full year in open rebellion, and observe the mistakes, idealism and opportunism that led them to construct and realign what was, essentially, a nationalistic collective action frame. I argue, for instance, that the rebels were aware of the need to accommodate the patriotism of the national audience but were unable to gauge the constraints of the public arena before entering it; I explore how they disavowed socialism in order to frame their grievances and revolutionary intentions through a populist discourse of nationalism; and I address the dialogism of the public arena, which led the EZLN to adapt their discourse to contest the government counterframes and unforeseen bystander misframes that threatened to localise and marginalise them in Mexico.

Part Two contains three chapters: Chapters Five, Six and Seven, in which I deconstruct the collective action frames from key texts taken from different stages of the period – roughly from January 1994 to December 1995. In this case the texts share the same speech situation, pragmatic intent and authorial role. In terms of their speech situation, they represent episodes of frame alignment prompted by periods of political crisis or opportunity. They are also of the same pragmatic intent in that they serve to review previous events and actions, reinforce the EZLN’s identity, and prescribe future activities and goals. Finally, they were all authored collectively, with no single actor’s voice standing out above the collective. I have argued that being able to hold these factors constant facilitates more reasoned analysis of the discursive shifts between them. The first text is *The First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle* (January 1st 1994), the EZLN’s earliest public statement, through which they hoped to win the support and gain the
momentum they needed to overthrow the Salinas administration by force. This text ended the EZLN’s clandestine phase and thrust the Zapatistas into a dialogic relationship with the government, the public and the media. It did not, however, produce the revolution they desired. The second text is *The Second Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle* (June 12th 1994), which was written and disseminated six months later following the failure of the initial rebellion and much correspondence with the PRI, fellow challengers, and civil society. The third text is *The Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle* (January 1st 1995), which betrays a level of desperation and frustration with civil society and heralded the beginning of the end for the nationalist phase. By mapping the development of the frame components in these texts I look to reinforce my argument that the Zapatistas’ discourse is complex, dialogic and pragmatic, and I seek to expose its ongoing construction in the face of perceived constraints and opportunities. Notwithstanding this pragmatism, however, I also begin to draw out the mainstays of the Zapatistas’ discourse, whilst continuing to take issue with the conclusions of others and offering further observations on the theory and practice of frame analysis.
CHAPTER FIVE

First Declaration

(January 1st 1994)

INTRODUCTION

The First Declaration was the first of six ‘Declarations’ issued by the EZLN, each of which has been constructed at a critical stage in the organisation’s discursive relationship with civil society and the government. The First Declaration, however, is particularly noteworthy as the EZLN’s first public statement. Until it was disseminated to the national press on the morning of January 1st, nobody but the FLN and an alleged handful of shadowy government agents were aware of the EZLN’s existence\(^\text{30}\). I suggest, therefore, that the First Declaration was disseminated monologically, without the benefit of what Steinberg (1999) calls dialogic feedback from external parties. Perhaps it is for this reason that the collective action frame it propounds is at times ambiguous when compared with later Declarations. Nonetheless, the First Declaration does betray the EZLN’s determination to appeal to a national audience, and it was constructed in the hope of encouraging support and assistance from parts of the government, ordinary Mexicans, and the international community. It exhibits, therefore, a deliberately composite collective action frame designed to maximise popular appeal. Moreover, when juxtaposed with the socialistic discourses of the Zapatistas’ clandestine phase, it reveals the further frame alignment of frame components.

\(^{30}\) Evidence suggests that the Mexican military authorities had gathered intelligence on the EZLN well before January 1994. Police had reported a mysterious influx of weapons into the Lacandon as early as December 1992, but most intriguing is the confrontation on May 22nd 1993 when the Mexican military stumbled on a fully equipped EZLN training camp. Rather than pressing home its advantage, the Mexican army’s 83rd Infantry battalion was ordered to retreat, and was pulled out of the area entirely on May 26th. The official excuse for failing to remove the unidentified paramilitary threat is that they thought the jungle guerrillas were simply drug traffickers. John Ross (1994: 23-35), however, believes Subcomandante Marcos who maintains that the retreat was ordered as part of a whitewash operation designed to protect the NAFTA, which was due to go to a Congressional vote in the US House of Representatives in November. Ross quotes an anonymous US official who stated that questions were asked in Washington about unreported guerrilla activity inside Mexico, but that “‘The Mexicans told us that it wasn’t happening,’” (Ross, 1994: 38).
IDENTITY

In *The Southeast in Two Winds* (1992), the organisational layer of the EZLN’s identity component borrowed from local governance structures in which sovereignty was awarded through the indigenous principles of command obedience. In the *First Declaration*, command obedience was retained but subtly bridged with the Mexican constitution and national political structures. Through references to Article 39, for example, the text amplifies the *mestizaje* foundations of the national political culture as one founded on the appropriation of indigenous governance structures in the aftermath of the 1910 Revolution:

‘… as a last hope we invoke that same document, our Constitution, Article 39, which says: “National sovereignty resides, essentially and originally, in the people. All public power emanates from the people, and is constituted for the benefit of the same. The people have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter or modify the form of their government,”… Congruent with this Declaration of War, we ask other *Powers of the Nation* to take up the fight to depose the dictator and restore legitimacy and stability to this nation.’

(January 1st, 1994)

In these terms the *First Declaration* posited a nationalised version of the EZLN’s organisational identity, one that rested on indigenous modes of command obedience whilst being bound by the same constitutional laws that governed the legislative and judicial branches of government. Through these constitutional precedents, the Zapatistas’ rebellion was framed as legal. John Womack does not dissect frame alignment processes per se, but he stands apart from most Zapatista scholars in his recognition of the *First Declaration* as a ‘deliberate statement of radical national popular sovereignty’:
‘…shifting from Mexican history and patriotism for justification, [the First
Declaration] at once claimed constitutional protection under Article 39, the
people’s sovereign right to change the form of the country’s government… it was
a declaration of war, but not against the entire government, only against its army
acting in defence of the then chief (illegitimately so, in its judgement) of the
executive branch, Carlos Salinas; it appealed to the other, unchallenged legislative
and judicial branches of government to exercise their constitutional authority to
remove Salinas and “restore” the rule of law.’

(Womack, 1999: 247)

I suggest that, through the First Declaration, a frame bridge was constructed between the
EZLN’s command obedience, which provided for the removal of ineffective or unreliable
leaders, and the Mexican constitution. It was a clear attempt by the Zapatistas to align
their organisational identity with that of potential allies in the legislature and judiciary.

There were, I contend, several strategic reasons for the frame bridging of
organisational identity. First, the sensitive political climate and President Salinas’s
international obligations allowed the Zapatistas a degree of political opportunity. The
combined effect of local officials’ proclivity for suppressing Indian and peasant groups
(Harvey, 1998: 171-3) and the federal government’s desire to rein-in obvious acts of
repression in order to bolster Mexico’s claim to membership of the First World through
NAFTA, provided an opportunity for the EZLN to shame the PRI by exposing the
repressive acts of landlords carried out in the name of the ruling party and its agents
(Purcell, 1997). The very date of the rebellion was chosen to coincide with the
implementation of NAFTA, a time when the gaze of the international press would be
focused on the continent anyway, and as long as the Zapatistas were able to amplify their
connection with constitutional law all acts of violence committed against them would
publicly undermine the PRI’s own claim to federal authority. Violence itself would
weaken the confidence of international investors who sought a peaceful, stable environment for economic growth, and cause untold problems for Salinas who had prescribed tough economic reforms as a painful but profitable way to a better standard of living. Further, the portrayal of their rebellion as congruent with federal law would maximise the Zapatistas’ chances of winning institutional support both nationally and internationally. The First Declaration was, after all, a declaration of war, and declarations of war are not only required to direct insurgents against a clearly defined enemy, they must also mark out potential allies lest followers’ antipathy be misdirected (Gamson, 1995). Nationally, the bridging of organisational identity allowed the Zapatistas to draw up clear lines of engagement, concretising both the enemy – the executive branch of government, embodied in Salinas and his supporters – and potentially influential allies among the legislature and judiciary. Finally, aligning with constitutional structures also allowed the EZLN to claim protection from the international community as a legitimate ‘belligerent force’. The First Declaration states, for instance, that it was the Zapatistas’ intention to ‘always be subject to the Laws of War of the Geneva Convention’, and it appeals directly to the International Red Cross to ‘regulate any combat involving our forces so as to protect the civilian population,’ (January 1st, 1994). If the EZLN was to secure political allies the bridging of the organisational layer of their identity component was invaluable, for without it the claim to belligerent status would lack gravity, open the EZLN to accusations of terrorism, and increase the risk for those who agreed with the end to support the means.

Frame alignment at the movement layer of identity was more radical. Here, rather than refining and bridging features of the socialist-nationalist movement identity, the EZLN completely rejected socialism in order to amplify a nationalist movement identity instead:
'We did not learn our military tactics from Central American [socialist] insurgent movements, but rather from Mexican military history: from Hidalgo, Morelos, Guerrero, Mena; from the resistance to the Yankee invasion in 1847-1847; from the popular response to the French intervention; from the great heroic feats of Villa and Zapata; and finally, from the indigenous struggles of resistance throughout the history of our country.'

(January 1st, 1994)

When juxtaposed with earlier texts, this indicates a twin process of frame transformation and frame amplification. Where the *Estatutos* (1980) and *The Southeast in Two Winds* (1992), couched the EZLN’s movement identity in the inevitability of a socialist utopia, and drew on national icons like Zapata purely for propaganda purposes, the *First Declaration* made no mention of socialism, its variants or terminology. Moreover, where *The Southeast in Two Winds* (1992) conscientiously integrated a reduced socialist rhetoric with an indigenous solidary-group to construct an indigenous ‘voice from below [that] speaks of socialism’ (Marcos, 1992), the *First Declaration* rejected socialism outright, and made common cause with mainstream nationalist values as the ideological bedrock of the Zapatistas’ struggle. Socialist teleology was fully disavowed and the meaning of the EZLN’s revolution was transformed through a process of ‘value amplification’ (Snow et al, 1986: 469), in which nationalist values and icons were raised from their previously understated role as the tacit foundations of socialist propaganda in the Latin American context, to become the guiding principles of the rebellion itself:

‘Mexican brothers and sisters, we are the product of five hundred years of struggle: first against slavery; then in the insurgent-led war of independence against Spain; later in the fight to avoid being absorbed by North American expansion; next to proclaim our Constitution and expel the French from our soil;
and finally, after the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz refused to apply the reform laws, in the rebellion where the people created their own leaders. In that rebellion, Villa and Zapata emerged – poor men, like us.’

(EZLN, 1994)

By amplifying themselves as ‘the product’ of righteous and venerated leaders and struggles from the Mexican past, the EZLN positioned themselves squarely in the teleological tradition of nationalist, rather than socialist, movements. Thus the First Declaration constructed an entirely different metanarrative for the Zapatista revolution, one in which the Zapatistas stood as the inheritors of the nationalist legacy.

In order to understand the frame transformation of the movement layer we need to account for the ‘specific events or processes that are likely to stimulate the kind of collective framing efforts mentioned above,’ (McAdam, 1994: 39). Perhaps most important was the fact that the EZLN had recently broken away from the FLN in September 1993. As of this date the EZLN was under the direct command of the CCRI, and so would have felt no obligation to align its indigenous rank and file with socialist ideals, which were not, as Marcos has admitted, especially congruent with the EZLN’s recently acquired radical democracy and indigenous composition. Indeed, to reject socialism was a useful means of distancing the EZLN from its former parent, which, although lately institutionalised as a legal political party, continued to frame its own movement identity in conspicuously socialist terms:

‘The Party’s aims are to organise, lead and guide the workers’ revolutionary fight in order to remove power from the bourgeoisie, free our fatherland from foreign domination and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, understood as a government of workers able to impede the counter-revolution and begin the construction of socialism in Mexico.’
In many ways, therefore, the EZLN’s rejection of socialism in the *First Declaration* was a rejection of the FLN’s suzerainty and socialism’s increasing inapplicability to the EZLN’s organisational and solidary-group identity layers.

I would add, however, that frame transformation was also a way of casting aside dead ideological weight, and that the conscious decision to abjure socialism in the *First Declaration* was made in recognition of socialism’s declining currency and limited mobilising potential in the last decade of the twentieth century (Marcos, Salazar Deveraux et al, 1994). In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s demise traditional political cleavages were healing. Socialist organisations were cast adrift, resistance came to replace revolution, and it became evident that the ideological rug had been pulled from under the feet of the Mexican leftwing. The media trumpeted that ‘in the face of democracy’s growing popularity, Marxism has all but disappeared,’ (Nash, New York Times, November 13th 1991), and the Mexican academic Roger Bartra captured his country’s ambivalent attitude to the socialist master frame perfectly when he wrote:

‘I cannot imagine a better example in politics of the postmodern condition than the situation the Left is living through now. To use Lyotard’s terms, the skepticism of metadiscourses is not an ideological malaise due to a passing fashion but a condition of helplessness before the moral and material ruin of socialist mechanisms of legitimization. Various groups have tried to save themselves from this shipwreck by swimming toward what seems to be firmer land. In the midst of the storm of century’s end, nationalism, populism, and even the Polish Solidarity movement have seemed like life vests.’

(Bartra, 2002: 186)
For Mexicans as well as Europeans, the halcyon days of the socialist revolutionary were gone. Indeed, at the risk of overplaying Bartra’s analogy, we might say that in the 1990s the EZLN was one of a number of Mexican socialist organisations that jumped the socialist ship and appropriated the ‘life vest’ offered by another movement master frame: nationalism.

Such explanations account for the EZLN’s rejection of socialism, but to explain their replacement of socialism with nationalism we need also to look at the ideological opportunities by which the nationalist discourse was made available to political challengers. In simple terms, the unparalleled emotive potential of nationalism in Mexico has been acknowledged in numerous studies of the national political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963; Turner, 1968; Martin, 1993; Bantjes, 1997). We must remember, moreover, that the Zapatistas’ First Declaration was not only a declaration of war, it was also the act of a local SMO attempting to present itself on the national stage for the first time, and social movement theorists have underscored the wide appeal of the nationalist master frame for those SMOs that ‘seek to redefine their public image as a movement serving the best interests of their country,’ (Snow et al, 1986: 469). Sidney Tarrow compares nationalism favourably with socialism and finds that nationalism lacks ‘the fine mechanical metaphors of class dialectics’ and so ‘possesses a much greater emotional potential’ than socialism (1998: 112). At face value, therefore, the EZLN’s alignment with the nationalist master frame was a sound tactical decision, and was engineered to align the rebellion with popular cultural and political ideas.

However, critics of simplistic frame analysis remind us to be wary of the assumption that master frames are universally accessible to all political actors. Rather, we are told that the availability of a master frame is variable, and often dependent on structural shifts elsewhere in political, economic and cultural fields (McAdam, 1994; Crossley, 2003). Indeed, I argue that the opportunity to challenge the PRI through the nationalist master frame coincided with the state party’s abuse of the deeply held
protocols of *mestizaje* and ‘revolutionary nationalism’. The paternalistic protection offered by the *Partidos Revolucionario Institucional* (in English, the Party of the Institutionalised Revolution party), which claimed to govern by obeying the will of the people, was rooted in the *mestizaje* deal struck in the aftermath of the 1910 Revolution. Under President Salinas (1988-94), however, serious cracks had begun to appear in the PRI’s representation of political interests in Mexico, and this created genuine opportunities for challengers, like the EZLN, to appropriate the mantle of Mexican nationalism for themselves.

Firstly, Salinas’s administration could never cleanse itself of the stain of *cardenista* illegitimacy. Efforts to reorient the economy and democratise the party, for example, which were designed ‘to reinvigorate the regime so that it could actually win a relatively competitive election’ next time around (Cothran, 1994: 210), created genuine opportunities for opponents. The drive for neoliberalism, for example, ‘imposed an ideological hegemony on what had always been a philosophically heterogeneous political apparatus,’ (Centeno, 1994: 18), while political reform impinged on the president’s *destape* and curbed the party’s traditional use of flexible accommodation. Indeed, though the backing of the USA and the lack of a clearly defined rule of law meant that the PRI was relatively free to manipulate the transition to neoliberalism (Purcell, 1998; Gilly, 1998; Rubio, 1998), financial deregulation forced the party to renge on the clientelist and corporatist conventions that had traditionally provided it with support. From 7000 CTM-approved applications for industrial strike action in 1993 only 136 were sanctioned as Salinas put the needs of international capital above the interests of even his own PRIista workers, while in the countryside the end of CNC protectionism saw loyalist and independent farmers alike competing with US agribusiness and losing badly (Pastor and Wise, 1997). Put simply, the party’s ability to present itself at the head of a revolutionary coalition of workers, peasants and the middle-classes was irreparably damaged by Salinas’s commitment to the rules of neoliberal structural adjustment (Davis and Brachet-
Marquez, 1997; Lindau, 1996; Morris, 1995; Russel, 1994; Centeno, 1994). There arose an increasingly apparent ideological contradiction between the party’s mythic Revolutionary birthright as the embodiment of paternalistic protection and its new reality as the enforcer of an outward-looking neoliberal philosophy that actively undermined Revolutionary principles (Nash, November 13\textsuperscript{th} 1991). While Salinas’s reforms were popular with many in the north, his progressive policies only served to exaggerate the injustices and contradictions in the south. Democratisation, for example, favoured right wing victories in northern industrial states – partly because ‘the peasantry was the easiest sector for the PRI to control’ and partly because of the wealth of natural resources in southern states. Thus the economic disparity between north and south was compounded with a new political disparity (Cothran, 1994: 210). Moreover, official propaganda designed to counteract the political fallout from economic reform only served to exaggerate it. The controversial reform of Article 27, for example, which overturned Lazaro Cardenas’s 1934 reforma agraria, was actually sold to the peasantry using the very same image of Emiliano Zapata that Cardenas himself had employed almost sixty years earlier:

‘The most extreme change is probably President Salinas de Gortari’s use of Emiliano Zapata to market the end of agrarian reform – a message distinctly different from that of Cardenas, who used the same symbol to actively promote land redistribution, the formation of ejidos, and the building of a government-sponsored national peasant organisation.’

(Stephen, 2002: xxxv; see also 32-82)

Peasants, however, clung stoically to the earlier meaning of the Revolution: Adolfo Gilly (1998: 303) recounts that aging Chiapanecos continued to carry photographs of Zapata in memory of the ‘revolution of the Indians,’ while Rus (1994: 272-80) tells us that the
image of Zapata and the Revolution pedalled by Cardenas in 1934 remained the one that Chiapanecos continued to identify with in 1994. The PRI’s attempt to alter the meaning of revolutionary nationalism foundered, and the ruling party’s subsequent departure from Revolutionary values was viewed by many as antithetical to the mestizaje foundations of the nation state.

Secondly, the effect of such ideological contradictions was undoubtedly exacerbated by Salinas’s obligation to protect the increasingly free press, which attacked neoliberal reform and uneven democratisation as contraventions of the nationalist credo. It is notable that previous administrations had abused the values associated with Mexico’s national imaginary without suffering the same widespread criticism (Morris, 1995; Russel, 1994; Davis and Brachet-Marquez 1997). However, following de la Madrid’s administration (1982-88) friendly relations with the USA, the move towards liberalisation, and Salinas’s personal hunger for First World status had all required the Mexican government to commit to a more liberal relationship with the press. Although there were continued examples of intimidation and obstruction31, academics agree that the media was given a freer hand in highlighting and passing comment on the abuses committed by the PRI (Lindau, 1996: 308-310; see also Davis and Brachet Marquez, 1997; Centeno, 1994). By 1994 the weekly magazine Proceso had a respectable readership of approximately 100 000 in every capital and provincial city in Mexico, despite the government’s withholding of advertising privileges since the 1970s. Equally important was the national daily La Jornada, which began in 1984, and other independents such as Tiempo, El Financiero, and El Sur. Some reporters actively sought out stories that undermined the dominant polity. Both Proceso and La Jornada had, for example, caught wind of possible guerrilla activity in the Lacandon canadas as early as April 1993, and La Jornada even sent a correspondent into the mountains to find the

31 Lindau observes the paying of journalists for favourable articles, harassment through invasive tax audits, the withholding of government advertising, and the infamous intimidation of the journalist Jorge Castaneda (1996: 310). He also notes that Salinas muzzled the publisher of the progressive Unomasuno, although he allowed La Jornada and Proceso to continue publishing.
insurgents (Ross, 1994). Throughout the decade leading up to the First Declaration, the harassed and under-resourced independent press nurtured a critical attitude toward government policy, and maintained a running critique of the PRI’s abuse of human rights, the Constitution, and nationalist values. Independent publications provided the EZLN with a ready-made readership of astute and critical thinkers, to the extent that Subcomandante Marcos was moved to comment on the value of the independent press early in the rebellion (EZLN, February 11th 1994).

I argue, therefore, that a blend of constraints and opportunities encouraged the Zapatistas to transform the movement layer of their collective identity component. Given the constraints and risks associated with applying the socialist discourse to a national rebellion, not to mention the EZLN’s recent split from its FLN parent, the socialist movement identity was rejected. At the same time, ideological contradictions exaggerated by a freer press provided opportunities for would-be challengers to present themselves as the true champions of Mexico’s revolutionary imaginary. Indeed, Marcos has admitted that no matter how emotive, simplistic, universally appealing or tactically attractive nationalism might have been, the EZLN would not have been able to lay convincing claim to its ideational repertoire had it not been for the contradictions imposed by the PRI and the publicity they received:

‘In that struggle of symbols, we were able to recover words which had been completely prostituted: patria, nation, flag, country, Mexico,’

(Marcos and Monsivais and Bellinghausen, 2001).

In sum, the popular appeal of nationalism and the liberation of the nationalist master frame encouraged the Zapatistas to transform their movement identity and cloak their declaration of war in the mythology of Mexico’s revolutionary past.
In realigning their solidary-group layer, the EZLN undertook framing processes of frame reduction and frame bridging. Firstly, they retained but reduced their association with the indigenous solidary-group; the frame reduction of indigenous otherness is made particularly apparent when the First Declaration is compared with later communiqués that actively amplify indigenous beliefs (EZLN, January 9th 1996). Secondly, the EZLN bridged their reduced indigenous solidary-group with an amplified nationalist movement identity, using the same Revolutionary imagery seen elsewhere in the text. The claim, for example, that “we” are the product of five hundred years of struggle ‘against slavery’ is an unmistakable confession of the organisation’s overwhelmingly indigenous rank and file, but one that is sufficiently vague to facilitate the bridging of this indigenous solidary-group with the nationalist master frame. After all, the myth of mestizaje emphasises the shared indigenous past of all Mexicans, regardless of race:

‘Mexicans have united with us, more will do so in the future because our struggle is national and not limited to the state of Chiapas. Currently, the political leadership of our struggle is completely indigenous. One hundred percent of the members of the indigenous revolutionary clandestine committees in the combat zones belong to Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Chol, Tojolaba, and other ethnic groups.’

(EZLN, January 6th 1994: 57)

In this way the EZLN admitted the same indigenous composition that Marcos’s letter conceded in 1992, but they reduced indigenous imagery in order to emphasise the shared ‘national struggle’. Indeed, the First Declaration frames the indigenous as ‘the heirs of the people who truly forged our nation’, whilst calling on all Mexicans and describing them as ‘our brothers and sisters’ in the shared struggle against the PRI (EZLN, January 1st 1994). Therefore, just as solidary-group layer of The Southeast in Two Winds linked the
indigenous with the socialist movement, so the solidary-group layer of the *First Declaration* linked the indigenous with the nationalist movement.

A broad set of constraints imposed themselves on the Zapatistas in their *First Declaration*, and I argue that the frame reduction of the indigenous solidary-group had more to do with perceived risks of marginalization associated with indigenous politics in 1994. I agree with Aaron Pollack (1999: 42), who suggests that the Zapatistas felt it too risky to fully embrace the full extent of their indigenous solidary-group at that time:

‘At the time of the uprising in 1994, the Zapatistas claimed the indigenous nature of the movement (EZLN 1994), but did not assume the full epistemological implications of that recognition until later. The Zapatistas claim that this postponement was made in order to avoid having the movement pigeonholed by the Mexican State and people as ‘Indigenous’ and not representing broader, national problems.’

(Pollack, 1999: 42)

Given the high level of publicity that was anticipated, and which indeed followed the 1994 rebellion, it would have been impossible for the Zapatistas to *deny* that their rank and file were anything but indigenous. The diminutive insurgents were dwarfed by their apparent commander, Marcos, and the earliest reportage caricatured the physical disparities between them (Golden, New York Times, January 3rd 1994). That said, the profound differences between national values and indigenous cosmology and values was deliberately downplayed as the rebels feared their marginalization as a narrowly indigenous uprising. These were well founded, for although the PRI’s capacity to co-opt and coerce was waning, its long and successful history of flexible accommodation was still fresh in the minds of indigenous activists. The recent fate of the *Frente Independiente de Pueblos Indios* (FIPI) was proof enough of the PRI’s ability to manipulate indigenous
discourse in the state’s favour (NACLA, 1996). The FIPI had demanded specific cultural rights for indigenas within the Mexican Constitution, but for Salinas to acknowledge indigenous difference would have accorded indigenas specific and inalienable communal rights under Convention 169 of the International Labour Organisation, which recognises the collective social, economic, political and cultural rights of indigenous peoples (Hindley, 1996). Such an agreement would have tied the president to the ‘anachronistic’ communal land rights guaranteed under Article 27, which safeguarded the ejido sector and barred neoliberal structural adjustment. Through ‘Governmental Non-Governmental Organisations’ (GNGOs) the PRI gradually co-opted and then marginalized the FIPI, offering a paltry amendment to constitutional Article 4, which merely recognised the pluricultural nature of the Mexican nation (Fox, 1994: 188). This effectively neutralised the indigenous movement’s demands by absorbing indigenous culture rather than acknowledging claims to difference and distinction before the law, and Salinas was free to overrule the culturally specific interests of indigenous Mexicans and amend Article 27. It appears that, fearing a similar fate, Zapatista leaders chose to reduce their use of indigenous identities in the First Declaration. Indeed, Marcos would later speak plainly of the conscious, strategic decision to reduce the rebellion’s indigenous character:

‘When we came out, on January 1, many companeros from the Committee said:

‘We don’t want people to think we're only interested in the indigenous issue.’ We intentionally wanted to downplay the indigenous demands in order to engage the question in a great national issue.’

(Marcos, Monsivais and Bellinghausen, 2001)

When evaluating the restricted application of indigenousness in the identity discourse of the First Declaration it is important, I suggest, to remember the local and national context. The First Declaration was the first public statement of an
overwhelmingly indigenous SMO based entirely within the most marginalised and indigenous state of a country whose oligarchic leaders were famous for dealing with challengers through cooptation and repression, and where recent indigenous movements had proven particularly susceptible to state sponsored flexible accommodation. Even though the physical appearance and geographic location of the insurgents demanded the tacit acknowledgement of the EZLN’s indigenous solidary-group, it was considered unwise, as yet, to amplify features of that solidary-group. Thus the EZLN’s indigenousness was reduced and, in an effort to reach out to Mexican society, bridged with a more encompassing nationalist movement discourse.

**INJUSTICE**

The injustice component of the *First Declaration* shares much with that of *The Southeast in Two Winds* in that the text describes the same economic and political grievances and couches injustice in the same materialistic terms. However, a fundamental difference evinces a process of frame transformation, for instead of attributing causality to the intrinsic inequalities of the capitalist system, as did the *Estatutos* (1980), or attacking specific agents of capitalism like President Salinas and Interior Minister Gonzalez Garrido as did *The Southeast in Two Winds*, the *First Declaration* singles out the executive branch of government as a tyrannical and institutionalised dictatorship that has abused the values and principles of the 1910 Revolution:

‘…as per the terms of our Constitution, we send this declaration to the Mexican Federal Army, one of the basic pillars of the dictatorship under which we suffer. This army is controlled exclusively by the party in power, headed by the federal executive office, which is today unlawfully held by the illegitimate head of state, Carlos Salinas de Gortari.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1994)
As if to reinforce this, the Zapatistas’ second communiqué, *Here We Are, The Forever Dead* (January 6th 1994), framed an even clearer bridge between material grievances and the government’s constitutional abuses by declaring that ‘The serious poverty that we share with our fellow citizens has a common cause: the lack of freedom and democracy.’ The emphasis, in short, was on Salinas’s illegitimacy and the unconstitutional and anti-nationalist nature of his administration, rather than systemic inequalities of the capitalist infrastructure.

Thus, even though the material nature of grievances and the identity of the PRI enemy remained constant, the meanings attached to them were transformed as the EZLN drew on the historical imaginary in place of socialist logic to frame them in nationalist terms:

‘They are the same people who opposed Hidalgo and Morelos, those who betrayed Vicente Guerrero, those who sold more than half of our country to the foreign invader, those who brought a European prince to govern us, those who formed a dictatorship of *científicos porfiristas*, those who opposed the Petroleum Expropriation, and those who massacred the railroad workers in 1958 and the students in 1968 – they are all the very same ones who today take everything from us, absolutely everything.’

(EZLN, January 1st, 1994)

In this extract, the history of material grievances and the oppressive government forces that perpetuate them are framed together as, above all else, traitorous, un-Mexican and antithetical to national values and law. I suggest that this framing of injustice and the enemy evinces a process of frame transformation that complemented the transformation of the EZLN’s movement identity from socialist SMO to nationalist SMO.
The same strategic considerations influenced the frame alignment of injustice as influenced the alignment of the movement identity. To have cast injustice in socialistic terms would have been inappropriate considering socialism’s global decline and the EZLN’s recent rejection of FLN control. On the other hand, the policies and actions of the president continued to contradict the paternalist pretensions of the state party and helped challengers, particularly those in the south where democratisation was slow to come and where exploitation and repression remained the norm, to brand the PRI responsible for the apparent absence of freedom and democracy in Mexico (Marcos and Monsivais and Bellinghausen, 2001). It made sense, therefore, to align the EZLN’s injustice frame to reflect the rebels’ new nationalist movement identity, and in doing so exploit opportunities to amplify the ideologically contradictory activities of the PRI. As the EZLN assumed the mantle of Mexican nationalism, so its grievances were portrayed through the language of constitutional law while its enemy was framed as the enemy of the same Mexican values.

It is noteworthy that in decrying the PRI’s crimes on the very date that NAFTA came into effect, the Zapatistas ostensibly placed their rebellion in direct opposition to a government policy that had incontrovertibly national, rather than local, ramifications. Unlike the reform of Article 27, which dominated the discussion of injustices in The Southeast in Two Winds, NAFTA was not the exclusive grievance of indigenous peasants, in fact NAFTA threatened the livelihoods of small businesses, industrial workers and others in Mexico’s cities and barrios, and had already inspired national networks of opposition that could be tapped for support (Stephen, 2002). Furthermore, NAFTA offered another opportunity to loot Mexican history’s prêt-a-porter stock of iconic villains by aligning its architect, Salinas, with the unpatriotic activities of the ignoble porfirista dictatorship, which had famously sold the rights to Mexican land and resources to private commercial interests. This is implied in the First Declaration’s portrayal of the federal executive as ‘científicos porfiristas’ and a ‘clique of traitors... ready to sell out our
country’. In this way, the EZLN took advantage of Salinas’s imposition of neoliberal orthodoxy, which, along with constitutional reform and uneven democratisation, put the ruling party at odds with both the hallowed Constitution and popular nationalist culture, ideological contradictions that were not lost on the increasingly independent media (Lindau, 1996; Rubio, 1998; Centeno, 1994; Cothran, 1994). Put simply, by ostensibly coming out in opposition to NAFTA the EZLN helped align itself with the fears of Mexicans across the country; not just socialists, indigenas or peasants, but ordinary Mexicans who feared the loss of Mexico’s economic, territorial and cultural sovereignty to their powerful northern neighbours.

Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that the concretisation of a slightly different enemy – the executive branch of government – helped the EZLN to exonerate the legislative and judicial branches, whose support was sought unabashedly by aligning the EZLN’s organisation with constitutional values. In attacking the executive alone the EZLN was able to separate the ‘bad’ Salinas and the PRI from the ‘good’ Congress and the magistrates, who were invited under the rubric ‘Powers of the Nation’ to usurp the illegitimate dictator Salinas and lead an interim government for the transition to democracy.

AGENCY

In framing the EZLN’s agency the First Declaration conformed to the accepted speech codes of a declaration of war by directing insurgents and potential supporters towards a clear and unambiguous military goal, in this case the revolutionary overthrow of the federal executive and the imposition of a government of democratic transition headed by the Mexican Congress (EZLN, January 1st 1994). Attached to this primary objective were eleven ‘basic demands’: ‘work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace.’ When compared with the blurred agency component of The Southeast in Two Winds (1992), in which some form of change was
undoubtedly desirous but left deliberately undefined, the clear directives of the *First Declaration* mark a clear process of frame concretisation. Gone are the vague references to Antonio and his machete, in their place is the formal and succinct discourse of military command, exemplified in this list of ‘orders’:

‘First. Advance to the capital of the country, defeat the Mexican Federal Army, protecting and liberating the civilian population along your liberating march, and permit the liberated peoples to elect, freely and democratically, their own administrative authorities. Second. Respect the life of all prisoners and turn over any wounded to the International Red Cross for medical attention. ‘Third. Initiate summary judgements against the soldiers of the Mexican Federal Army and the political police who have taken courses or have been advised, or trained, or paid by foreigners either inside or outside our country; those who are accused of treason; and those who repress or mistreat the civilian population or assault the public welfare…’

These revolutionary methods were justified through alignment with nationalist values and historical precedent. The text states, for example, that ‘Our struggle is in accordance with our constitutional rights and our goal is justice and equality,’ (EZLN, January 1st 1994). Further, the Zapatistas made the appeal for international recognition as a legitimate ‘belligerent force’, a label which would ‘oblige the Mexican army and the EZLN to abide by international laws on war [and] assume a government de facto responsible for the EZLN,’ (Womack, 1999: 246). In short, the *First Declaration* gave clear direction and purpose to the Zapatistas’ methods of war while amplifying their nationalism and legitimacy by aligning them with the laws of the Mexican Constitution and international conventions.
Given what we know of grassroots radicalisation in 1992, we can be fairly confident of the impetus behind this militaristic agency frame. The risks and constraints that discouraged the FLN from violent action were not a strong enough deterrent for the Zapatistas’ indigenous rank and file, for whom structural adjustment posed a greater and more immediate risk than war. There is little dispute that Salinas’s modernisation programme worsened living conditions and prospects for Chiapas’s indigenas, and it is certain that the reforms closed down institutional channels of peasant redress (Harvey, 1998; Yashar, 1998; Stephen, 2002; Nash, 1993). Miguel Centeno’s characterisation of Salinastroika describes the PRI’s liberalisation programme as ‘economic efficiency before social justice, international support before national sovereignty,’ (Centeno, 1994: 20). In view of these structural closures, the EZLN’s Comandante Tacho has insisted that the First Declaration’s revolutionary objective was justified simply because all other options had been closed down:

‘We demonstrated, we tried all this… that is how we really didn’t have any other path left than to integrate into filas armadas (armed struggle)... In the organisations, we couldn’t get anything. The only thing was that we learned how the government worked, how it deceives people.’

(Reza, 1995; in Stephen, 2002: 120)

We can infer from this that the Zapatistas’ revolutionary declaration of war was a last resort, issued in exasperation and outright disregard for the absence of political opportunities (Marcos in Gilly, 1998: 301). Indeed, Marcos has actually described the EZLN as an organisation for whom ‘“political opportunity’ carries little weight compared to political ethics,’ (July 19th 1999: in Ponce de Leon, 2001: 195), a sentiment that poses problems for political process theorists, particularly in view of the fact that the structure of political opportunities was actually ranged against the military option.
Given the lack of political opportunities, some scholars have interpreted the Zapatistas’ revolutionary objectives as ‘irrational’, and, placing the rebellion in the context of overwhelming odds, have attempted to rationalise the apparently suicidal act by arguing that the militaristic objectives and methods were never intended to be anything more than ‘symbolic’. With hindsight, they recognise that the rebellion opened doors for the EZLN to negotiate with the government, and infer from this that the EZLN somehow knew that a symbolic show of violence would have this effect. Certainly, those that present the EZLN as the first ‘postmodern’ rebellion are fond of claiming that the First Declaration’s revolutionary objective was engineered to grab media headlines, and that the Zapatistas never really believed they could overthrow the PRI (Burbach, 2001; Carrigan, 2000; Pelaez, 1996). They point out that the small EZLN force went to war without air support, with few military vehicles, and with an eclectic array of weaponry that included Second World War carbines and wooden replica guns, while the Federal Army, by contrast, was in receipt of US military aid to combat drug trafficking and possessed a terrifying arsenal that included Humvees and Apache helicopter gunships. These impossible odds and the fact that the massive public outcry quickly turned a brief 12 day war into a protracted period of negotiation have convinced some that the EZLN’s declaration of war was nothing more than a ‘political statement’, a ‘publicity stunt’ designed to draw national and international attention to the plight of Chiapas’s indigenous population and draw the government into negotiation.

However, while this conclusion helps to explain the apparently ‘irrational’ mobilisation of a tiny indigenous force against the seemingly unassailable Federal Army, it is based on a relatively superficial appraisal of the political situation in Mexico, and is upheld by little more than the unsubstantiated belief that the EZLN simply could not have been serious in declaring war. Moreover, the idea of war as a ‘statement’ simply does not take account of the culturally conditioned interpretations of individual Zapatista insurgents, such as Comandante Tacho and Major Ana Maria, for whom revolution was a
legitimate last resort in their struggle for survival. Major Ana Maria, for example, offers her own rationale for the declaration of war, which corroborates that of Comandante Tacho in its insistence that the *First Declaration* was genuine and was justified by the closure of alternative routes:

‘[War] was already necessary, because we could not find any other way out of this situation. We had spent years struggling peacefully, we held marches, we had meetings, we went to the municipal palaces and the Government Palace, and we went to Mexico [City] to the National Palace of Mexico to shout, to ask, to agitate in front of the government. They never paid attention to us. They always gave us papers full of promises. Then, what good is a piece of paper, filled with promises, to us?’

(Major Ana Maria, February 28th 1994)

We might shed even more light on the *First Declaration*’s agency frame by placing the text in the context of indigenous cultural values in Chiapas. Chiapas was, and is, an overwhelmingly indigenous state, and perhaps second only to Guerrero and Oaxaca in its tradition of indigenous insurrection. Adolfo Gilly (1998: 261) has explored the cultural roots of rural rebellion among the indigenas of Chiapas:

‘…these rebellions appear as movements defending a traditional society and its communal links with the land against the irruption of modernity – a modernity fleshed out on one side in the world of mercantile exchanges… and on the other side in the modern national state with its juridical order guaranteeing the universality of those exchanges.’
In cultural terms, therefore, rebellion in rural Mexico was a natural and legitimate extension of politics for indigenous peasants, and it was most widely deployed in those instances where modernity encroached on the otherness of the indigenous lifeworld. Such a situation, I argue, occurred in the 1990s, as PRI neoliberalism threatened deeply held constitutional tenets that had indirectly preserved indigenas’ separate existence within the modern Mexican nation. Given Chiapas’s tradition of armed defence against cultural intrusion, it is reasonable to suppose that the First Declaration’s revolutionary objective was constructed, not only as a last resort, but also as a course of action legitimated by political precedent. Unsubstantiated claims of a ‘postmodern’ publicity stunt – a stunt which, incidentally, claimed the lives of 16 Federal Army soldiers, 38 civilian security guards, 67 non-police civilians and 38 unidentified Chiapanecos\(^\text{32}\) – simply uphold an orientalist conception of social movement activity as reducible to western standards of rationality.

**CONCLUSION**

Amid the alignment of frame components in the First Declaration, we can discern some constants, which may help us to identify the core of the Zapatista discourse. The indigenous solidary-group, while reduced, was nonetheless retained; the inequality of Mexican state and society, particularly the suffering of the southern indigenous, remained a steady feature of the injustice component, as did the PRI enemy; and, although the objectives were altered, the revolutionary methods of the agency component were also preserved. That said, the detail of these features was realigned, and the First Declaration marks several points of discursive departure from the clandestine phase. What had been a predominantly socialist SMO in 1992, albeit one that had become infused with indigenous characteristics and modes of decision-making, was redefined in the First Declaration to amplify the indigenous rebels’ fidelity to the principles and ethos of revolutionary

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\(^{32}\) These figures are taken from the Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH) Annual Report, 1993-4 (Ross, 2000: 33).
nationalism and the *mestizaje* constitution. Similarly, the injustice component underwent frame transformation as the same material grievances and PRI enemy were imbued with national – rather than socialist – significance. Finally, the agency component was concretised in an effort to galvanise anti-PRI sentiment and orchestrate a national rebellion against the state party. Moreover, although the *First Declaration* included eleven ‘basic demands’ alongside quasi-socialistic ‘revolutionary laws’, the primary objective was the transition to national democracy rather than a socialist state. I conclude, therefore, that frame components were aligned away from socialism, and that the collective action frame of January 1994 was, above all else, nationalist.

In this sense, the *First Declaration* poses several problems for existing analyses that have attempted to categorise the EZLN. The idea that the Zapatistas are socialists is immediately challenged by their final and outright rejection of socialist terminology, and yet the argument that they are somehow ‘postmodern’ is equally problematic given the materialism of their demands and what I believe to be the genuinely revolutionary intentions that lay behind their agency discourse. Marcos himself has scoffed, ‘Ya we’re the first postmodern rebels fighting the old enemies of hunger, exploitation and poverty,’ (Marcos in Couch, 2001: 259). I argue, then, that the core impetus behind the Zapatista rebellion was the same indigenous inequality and material injustice that had encouraged Marcos to seek socialist support in 1992, and that the frame alignment evinced in the *First Declaration* reinforces my argument that the EZLN had assumed a pragmatic attitude towards its discourse. In this way, the alignment of frame components was undertaken strategically to adapt indigenous identities, injustices and rebelliousness to the perceived exigencies and preferences of the national political arena, and the need to win support on a national and international scale.

On a theoretical note, there are only two observations to make. Firstly, that the EZLN’s adoption of a nationalist discourse appears to reinforce Tarrow’s belief that SMOs perceive the nationalist master frame to have a greater emotive potential than
socialism (1998: 112). That said, the peculiarities of the Mexican context in 1994 require a more context-specific analysis: both the global decline of socialism in the early 1990s and the ideological contradictions that accompanied structural adjustment influenced the EZLN’s frame alignment in the *First Declaration*. Therefore, I continue to recommend the holistic deconstruction of texts over the generation of universal ‘rules’ of framing. Secondly, frame analysis of the *First Declaration* provides further evidence of the ‘new’ frame alignment process of *frame concretisation*, as the EZLN posited a clearly defined revolutionary action agenda for the removal of the executive branch of government. Not only did this concretise the EZLN’s agency, it also continued to concretise the enemy in the person of the ‘bad’ President Salinas, distinguishing him from potential allies in Congress.
INTRODUCTION

The Second Declaration was published some six months after the First, during which time the Zapatistas were able to adapt their discourse to fit the reality, rather than the expectation, of the national political arena. By June much had changed for the rebels: the First Declaration had not had the desired effect and, rather than leading a coup d’etat, Congress had sided with Salinas and condemned the Zapatista rebellion as a threat to national security. Yet the rebellion had not exactly failed either. Although few Mexicans supported the EZLN, they had provoked a nationwide peace movement, which, in an election year, had been enough to force Salinas to offer a unilateral ceasefire after only twelve days of fighting. The CCRI and EZLN leaders claim that they were taken completely by surprise by the sudden cessation of hostilities:

‘The EZLN was prepared for the 1st of January, but not for the 2nd… [our expectations] were at one extreme or the other: either the annihilation of the first line – like we said – or the uprising of all the people to defeat to tyrant.’

(Marcos, Monsivais and Bellinghausen, 2001)

On January 12th, faced with neither annihilation nor revolution, the rebels were thrust into an unexpected and prolonged public discourse that saw them dialoguing with the bystander public, elite decision makers and the media (Marcos, Salazar Deveraux et al, 1994). After almost six months of their newfound and uncertain political status, the Zapatistas offered their Second Declaration as a revised statement of their collective identity and objectives that was designed to justify and rationalise their actions and future
goals to a watchful and concerned public. I argue that the Second Declaration betrays several frame alignment processes that indicate a new discursive agenda for the EZLN and reflect pragmatic adaptation to the new dialogic context.

IDENTITY
At the organisational identity layer, the most striking and far-reaching example of frame alignment was the framing of a union between the EZLN – as a military organisation – and the loose collection of peaceful organisations and individuals that comprise Mexican civil society. Squaring the circle of a paramilitary organisation in league with non-violent civil society, the Second Declaration frames a new organisational role for the EZLN as the protector of the Mexican people, and offers the Zapatista Army as the guarantor of the popular will:

‘The Zapatista National Liberation Army, which now can be found throughout the national territory, is in a position to offer itself to the Mexican people as an army to guarantee that the people’s will is carried out.’

(EZLN, June 12th 1994)

This new organisational identity marks a profound change. Whereas the First Declaration bridged the EZLN’s organisational identity with constitutional precedents to align with Congress and the ‘Powers of the Nation’, the Second Declaration dismisses the legislature and judiciary altogether and allies the EZLN directly with the people of Mexico instead. In short, a process of frame bridging saw the EZLN’s militarism bridged with civil society rather than constitutional arbiters of political legitimacy:

‘Today we do not call on the failed powers of the Union who didn’t know how to fulfil their constitutional duty, thus allowing the federal executive to control them.'
The legislature and the magistrates had no dignity, so others will come forward who do understand that they must serve the people and not one individual… Our sovereignty resides in civil society. It is the people who can, at any time, alter or modify our form of government, and who have already assumed this responsibility. We now make a call to the people, in this Second Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle,’

(EZLN, June 12th 1994: emphases in original)

In this very public submission to the popular will the EZLN declared itself the people’s army, and offered itself as a protective force, putting the onus squarely on the men and women of civil society to bring about change. And so it was with this new actor, rather than the treacherous Powers of the Union, that the Zapatista Army bridged its organisational identity in its Second Declaration.

The construction of this civil-military partnership was far from straightforward, however. The EZLN was a militant group whose war against the Federal Army was only officially suspended for the duration of peace talks, which were themselves on hold since March following the assassination of presidential candidate Donaldo Colosio. Ordinary Mexicans, moreover, had made their opposition to violence very clear to both rebels and government, and the EZLN’s refusal to lay down their arms conflicted with the pacifistic sentiment of their Second Declaration. In order to marry their militarism with civil society, therefore, the EZLN relied on their organisational commitment to command obedience, recasting themselves as the armed guardian of a peaceful democratisation movement whose head was not to be found in the EZLN high command, but in the actions of ordinary Mexicans:

‘We order our regular and irregular forces everywhere… to carry out a unilateral extension of the offensive ceasefire. We will continue to respect the ceasefire in
order to permit civil society to organise in whatever forms it considers necessary in order to achieve the transition to democracy in our country.’

(EZLN, June 12th 1994)

Furthermore, in aligning with civil society the Second Declaration drew on concepts pioneered by Antonio Gramsci, who defined ‘civil society’ as the amorphous collection of organisations and individuals outside the institutions of government, such as the Church, universities, NGOs, political parties etc. Yet it is noteworthy that, in the Mexico of 1994, popular conceptions of civil society had a different connotation that was rooted in the effectiveness of the independent, private and voluntary organisations that mobilised in the aftermath of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, and which succeeded in bringing relief where ineffective government structures failed (EZLN, March 1st 1994). Because of this, and owing to the pervasive, corporatist nature of the Mexican state party, the Zapatistas defined civil society more broadly in their Second Declaration as ‘All honest Mexicans of good faith, the civil society.’

I argue, moreover, that the organisational alignment with civil society was a reaction to several political developments; particularly the ostensible failure of the January rebellion and the imminence of the national presidential election planned for August. Following the January 12th rebellion, and under pressure from several quarters, the PRI had been moved to offer a surprise peace treaty, even as the Federal Army’s tanks and helicopter gunships were bearing down on the last EZLN stronghold. While military chiefs of staff and leading PRI politicos like Fidel Velazquez and Carlos Hank Gonzales wanted to press on and quash the uprising by force (DePalma, New York Times, January 21st 1994; see also Golden, New York Times, January 18th 1994), diverse elements within civil society had mobilised against the hawks, and Mexico saw several non-violent demonstrations demanding an immediate ceasefire. Peace rallies were held in Morelia, Puebla, Cuernevaca, Acapulco and Durango, with the objective of collecting sacks of
grains and rice for transportation to the Lacandon. Most notably, in Mexico City a large demonstration headed by Rigoberta Menchu and Cuauhtemoc Cardenas called on both sides to issue a ceasefire (Golden, New York Times, January 9th 1994). Not all of these demonstrations were in support of the rebellion, but they were at least united in their calls for negotiation to replace open warfare. In addition, there were some sporadic acts of violent support for the Zapatistas, mostly from increasingly marginalized socialist organisations. Mexico City suffered a car bomb attack on the 9th January, and communications facilities were sabotaged in Michoacan and Puebla on January 6th (Ibid.).

Understandably, Salinas’s economic allies in the USA and Canada were concerned that Mexico might not be the safe haven for investors they had hoped for. The rebellion had, after all, occurred on the very day of NAFTA’s birth, and in an election year these popular mobilisations and the portentous leakage of violence beyond Chiapas represented a major threat to PRI hegemony:

‘Television shots of dead rebels are a public relations nightmare for Mr. Salinas, who has spent much of the last five years building a new image of Mexico as a modern, free country. But more important is what image prevails on Aug. 21 when the governing party, the Institutional revolutionary Party, tries to retain the presidency it has controlled since 1929.’

(DePalma, January 21st 1994)

For Salinas, continuing the war might embroil the government in a lengthy, costly and messy guerrilla war that would ruin the free trade pact with the USA. It might also cost the PRI traditional support and tip the scales in favour of its electoral rivals, among whom the popular loser of 1988, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, was planning to run for president for

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33 There were, in fact, civil actions throughout Mexico. In Michoacan, for example, 1100 striking sugar workers spontaneously declared themselves members of the EZLN; in Chihuahua indebted farmers and small businesses of the organisation El Barzon blocked roads with tractors; in the capital the Ruta 100 bus drivers union sent their old uniforms to Chiapas to clothe the insurgents, and a permanent peace rally was set up in the zocalo.
the second time. A peaceful solution, on the other hand, could win the approval of both the international community and progressive elements within Mexico. And if the truce could be portrayed as a public act of commanding by obeying the popular will, then it might bestow some vestige of legitimacy upon Salinas’s last months in office. So on January 10th, in the same public statement that ended the career of Interior Minister and ex-governor of Chiapas Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido, whom Salinas conveniently scapegoated for the conflict, the president laid out plans for a unilateral and benevolent cessation of hostilities to take effect on January 12th.

For the Zapatistas, however, there was no escaping the fact that their rebellion had failed, and they found themselves at the centre of a political discourse for which they were ill prepared, and which forced their leaders to stop and listen:

‘The EZLN came out on January 1, it began the war, and it met the world, not the one it had imagined, but something else. In any case, the virtue, if we can so call it, of the EZLN has been, since then, to have known how to listen… At that moment, the EZLN said: “here's something we don't understand, something new.” And with the intuition of the EZLN leadership, the companeros from the Committee, we said: “We're going to stop, here's something we don't understand, which we hadn't predicted, and for which we hadn't prepared. The main thing is talking and listening more.”’

(Marcos, Monsivais and Bellinghausen, 2001)

As Marcos has said, ‘We hadn't prepared to talk, we weren't in the mountains for ten years in order to talk. We had prepared to make war,’ (Ibid.). Nevertheless, while peace negotiations brought new and unexpected constraints for the Zapatistas, they opened new doors as well. Seizing an opportunity that they neither planned for nor fully understood, the Zapatistas accepted the ceasefire as, ostensibly, ‘a first step toward initiating the
dialogue between the warring parties,’ (EZLN, January 12th 1994: 65). While the ceasefire held, the EZLN and the communities they purported to represent could continue their struggle through more conventional methods.

Yet, despite the unprecedented opening of new avenues with the government, the Zapatistas remained wary of PRI flexible accommodation. Instead of pursuing political objectives over the negotiating table, they exploited the ceasefire to reach out to those ‘aggregates of individuals who share common grievances and attributional orientations, but who lack the organisational base for expressing their discontent and for acting in pursuit of their interests,’ (Snow et al, 1986: 467). Identifying those that mobilised to stop the war, the EZLN issued a series of personalised letters that addressed the attitudes, values, interests, goals, practices and language of targeted recipients, relating their grievances back to the fundamental injustice that was the absence of freedom, democracy and justice in Mexico. One such missive was addressed ‘To all the indigenous peoples cast out of their lands and their history,’ and made common cause with the struggle for ‘the unconditional return of all displaced peoples,’ (EZLN, February 17th 1994). Another was addressed to schoolchildren and was written in a plainly pedagogical style that compared northern schools with the provision for indigenous children in parts of Chiapas (February 8th, 1994). A batch of letters was dispatched on February 8th to the Supreme Council of the National Coordinating Committee of Indian Peoples (CNPI), the University Student Council (CEU) of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the National Coordinating Committee of the Plan de Ayala (CNPA), the Association of Regional Liberation in Favour of Human, Economical, Social and Political Rights, and the Mapastepec Civic Front. Marcos has since reflected on that early dialogue with what the EZLN was beginning to call ‘civil society’:

‘It wasn't what we had been thinking, it was something else, something new. We weren't sure of anything... we needed a portal in order to understand what was
going on and to understand this other actor, which we generically call civil society... They didn't join in with the lynching campaign that was already underway, especially in the electronic media. They took on a new role, and they put themselves in the middle of the war in such a way that it made it impossible for one or the other sides to continue. In the midst of that uncertainty, we started to see what was happening. We did so sincerely; it wasn't even a political calculation. We should listen, and that's how we got to the first dialogue and what was built around it.

(Marcos, Monsivais and Bellinghausen, 2001)

In this way, Marcos explains that the alignment with civil society was not planned or calculated, but was instead developed and nurtured through dialogic correspondence with specific individuals and organisations.

Nevertheless, the imminence of the presidential election meant that this new alliance quickly took on a greater significance. Following the debacle of 1988, the August election promised to be the most openly democratic in Mexican history. Mistrustful of the PRI government, the Zapatista leaders now poured their resources into developing the alternative discourse with those they now considered their true allies: not the Congress or magistrates that had failed them in January, but the ordinary men and women that had mobilised across the country to prevent their annihilation. For five months the Zapatistas fostered their new relationship with civil activists, embedding the EZLN as an organisation committed to commanding by obeying, and whose demand for freedom, democracy and justice broadly represented the interests of a range of otherwise disparate associations, social groups and individuals. In the political climate of early summer 1994, the Second Declaration both strengthened this bridge with civil society and oriented that union toward the upcoming electoral contest. Indeed, it is notable that the EZLN subordinated itself as the armed guarantor of electoral freedom. This organisational role
was stated in the Second Declaration and reiterated in a statement made a few weeks later to the National Democratic Convention (CND) – the media-saturated meeting of civil society that the Zapatistas hosted in rebel territory immediately before the election.

‘It has been said, incorrectly, that the Zapatistas have put a deadline for a new beginning of war; that if things don’t come out like the Zapatistas want them to on August 21, the war will begin again. They lie. They lie to the people of Mexico. No one, no one, not even the EZLN, can impose deadlines and ultimatums on the Mexican people. The only deadlines for the EZLN are the ones that are determined by the peaceful, civic mobilizations. We subordinate ourselves to them, and if called upon to do so, we will even disappear as an alternative.’

(EZLN, August 1994: 250)

Thus the Second Declaration legitimated and explained the EZLN’s new organisational role as civil society’s defenders. It amplified their commitment to command obedience and their belief in the sovereignty of civil society, and it oriented civil activism toward what was widely expected to be the fairest election in Mexico’s history.

In order to bolster their organisational bridge with civil society, however, the Zapatistas were obliged to extend the movement layer of their collective identity. The nationalism that infused their First Declaration hinged on their historical claim that they were the heirs of military heroes of the Revolution – an overtly belligerent interpretation of the revolutionary nationalist master frame. With their Second Declaration, however, they needed to accommodate within this imaginary the great mass of civil society, most of whom had rejected armed revolution in January. It is, I suggest, with this aim that the Second Declaration opens with a long citation from Emiliano Zapata designed to extend revolutionary nationalism to non-combatants by acknowledging the important contribution of non-violent actors in the historic national struggle:
“…It is not only those who carry the swords that make blood flow and shoot out fleeting rays of military glory, who are privileged to choose the personnel of the government of a people who want democracy; it is a right as well of the citizens who have fought in the press and in the tribunals, who are identified with the ideals of the revolution and have combated the despotism that fouls our laws.”

(EZLN, June 12th 1994)

Originally delivered by Zapata’s emissary to the Supreme Revolutionary Convention in October 1914, the quotation was well chosen to incorporate non-violent elements within the EZLN’s revolutionary movement identity. It grants equal weight to the actions of sympathetic press agents and institutional campaigners alongside those of the more glorified armed revolutionaries. For the EZLN, it legitimated and justified their organisational union with civil society by embedding this union in the mythic teleology of the national imaginary.

The nationalist movement identity was not only extended in the Second Declaration, it was also amplified in anticipation of impending but as yet uncertain changes in the political structure. Emphasising their commitment to commanding by obeying, the Second Declaration frames the EZLN as the champion of a national democratisation movement, and celebrates the ‘political maturity’ that is their submission to the national interest:

‘…the political maturity of the EZLN, its coming of age as a representative part of the nation’s sensibilities, depends on the fact that it doesn’t want to impose its idea on the country. The EZLN hereby declares what is already evident: Mexico has come of age and has the right to decide, freely and democratically, the direction it will take. From this historic entryway will emerge not only a new Mexico, but a
new Mexican as well. On this we bet our lives, so that the next generation will have a country in which it is not a disgrace to live.’

Thus the Zapatistas amplified their role in the nation’s future; specifically, they emphasised their organisational role as the defenders of the nation’s civil liberties. Through the words of Emiliano Zapata, they claimed legitimacy as the armed protectors of a non-violent nationalist coalition, whose common bond was the shared national imaginary and whose strength was its diversity under the Mexican flag.

The impetus to the frame amplification of nationalist credentials was the apparent inability of politicians, media and elements of civil society to accept the Zapatistas’ claim to the nationalist movement identity. Indeed, it had become apparent to the EZLN that they were the victims of what Doowon Suh calls bystander misframes (2005). Misframes denied the rebels their claim to the symbology of revolutionary nationalism and led Marcos to lament the fact that even sympathetic Mexicans refused to recognise the authenticity of the EZLN’s nationalism:

‘Brilliant writers have found some valuable parts in the Zapatista movement. Nevertheless, they have denied us our fundamental essence: the national struggle. For them we continue to be provincial citizens, capable of a consciousness of our own origins and everything relative to it, but incapable… of understanding and making ours concepts like ‘nation,’ ‘motherland,’ and ‘Mexico.’”

(Marcos, December 1994: 219; see also March 17th 1995)

The threat of marginalisation that this situation implied was exacerbated by the PRI’s counterframes, which are evinced in the government’s determination to actively undermine the EZLN’s nationalist identity. In fact, since January 1st the ruling party had done everything possible to localise the rebels. The first round of peace talks, for
example, known as the Cathedral Dialogue, was held under the auspices of Bishop Samuel Ruiz Garcia in Chiapas between February 22nd and March 1st. The government’s chief negotiator was Camacho Solis, a popular and charismatic politician who insisted that the talks be held in Chiapas lest the rebellion contaminate other states of the federation. Indeed, he is quoted as saying that “The key is to respond to social needs and to not mix a general political discussion with the pressure of a localized armed rebellion,” (in Golden, New York Times, January 19th 1994).

Given the difficulties posed by misframes and counterframes, it is not surprising that the two sides contested one another’s claims to the representation of the national good. In one notable example from the Cathedral Dialogue, the Zapatistas attempted to drape their rebellion in the Mexican flag, literally: the EZLN’s Comandante Ramona tried to spread the Republican tricolour across the negotiating table, but when she could not reach, Camacho Solis was able to retrieve the flag for the PRI and present the ruling party at the head of a unifying nationalist dialogue instead:

“We are all here before the only flag that those of us present have,’ Mr Camacho said, a red, white and green Mexican flag hanging on the podium behind him,’ (New York Times, February 22nd, 1994).

The following day, when Marcos retaliated with a speech that embedded indigenous grievances in the absence of genuine national democracy, government officials only responded ‘generously to the rebels’ local demands in hopes of persuading them to step back from their insistence on broad changes in the political system,’ (New York Times, February 28th 1994). Official efforts to localise the Zapatista rebellion were aided in March when the EZLN began to lose column inches to the shocking assassination of the PRI’s presidential candidate Donaldo Colosio. Meanwhile, in the national and international press the PRI condemned the Zapatista insurgency as a danger to Mexican
democracy, and Camacho continued to insist that the government ‘could not bargain over changes in the political system with a small guerrilla force,’ (Ibid.). Certainly, the government’s unwillingness to recognise the national implications of the rebellion, and many impartial Mexicans’ inability to accept the EZLN’s nationalist claims, encouraged the Zapatistas to sustain the amplification of their nationalist movement identity in the Second Declaration.

Beyond both the organisational and movement layers of identity, a similar set of constraints influenced the frame alignment of the solidary-group layer. Here, however, and despite the inherent threat of exacerbating their marginalisation on the Mexican political scene, the Zapatistas were encouraged to amplify, rather than reduce, the indigenous character of their rank-and-file. While most of the Second Declaration was written, as John Womack points out, in Marcos’s rhetorical style (Womack, 1999: 278), there is a final section that jars noticeably with the rest of the text and contrasts sharply with the First Declaration. Herein, the narrative is unquestionably indigenous, demonstrated by the idiomatic invocation of dead ancestors who guide the EZLN from beyond the grave:

‘With our face to the mountain we spoke with our dead so that in their word might come the good path for our muffled face to go.

‘The drums sounded, and in the voice of our land our pain spoke, and our history spoke our pain and our history spoke.

‘“ For everyone, everything,” our dead say. So long as this is not so, there will be nothing for us...

‘Thus spoke the word from the heart of our ever dead. We saw that the word of our dead is good. We saw that there is truth and dignity in their advice.’

(EZLN, June 12th 1994)
This passage, indeed the whole final section of the *Second Declaration*, amplifies indigenous beliefs and leadership. It insists that it was in accordance with the wishes of their indigenous dead that the Zapatistas agreed to suspend the rebellion and begin their correspondence with civil society. It legitimates the alignment of the organisational and movement identities, not just as the will of the Mexican people, but also as the will of exalted indigenous ancestors. Such invocation provides evidence of ‘belief amplification’ (Snow et al, 1986: 469-70), which, I argue, was designed in this instance to reinforce the Zapatistas’ claim to an indigenous solidary-group. Although this frame amplification was tentative and undertaken carefully so as not to eclipse the amplification of nationalist values, it was nonetheless significant, particularly in view of the fact that the *First Declaration* had deliberately downplayed the Zapatistas’ indigenousness for fear of having the EZLN ‘pigeonholed’ as an indigenous movement (Pollack, 1999).

I argue that there were good reasons for the amplification of indigenous beliefs, as government counterframes and bystander misframes denied not only the rebels’ nationalist credentials, but also their claims of an indigenous leadership. Firstly, counterframes were particularly worrying because they threatened to traduce the EZLN as under the influence of white socialist agent provocateurs. The PRI leaked press reports that claimed the EZLN was controlled by a hardcore of socialist infiltrators from Mexico City and abroad. As one government report put it, the Zapatistas are “a radical group directed by professionals who are tricking and even forcing the participation of Indians by press-ganging them” (in Golden, New York Times, January 8th 1994). The same report claimed the EZLN’s leaders to be socialist insurgents from Nicaragua and Guatemala. Undeterred by the apparent contradiction, the PRI also revealed the EZLN to be the offspring of home-grown socialist organisations from Monterrey and Mexico City. Government hawks wheeled out Emiliano Zapata’s 77-year old son, Matteo, a stalwart of the PRI, to tell reporters that he did not think the rebels were ‘truly Zapatistas’ because his father had stood for peace and harmony (De Palma, New York Times, January 27th 1994).
Secondly, the EZLN were also obliged to wrestle with the dialogic fallout from their *First Declaration*, as media misframes misdiagnosed their rebellion as a foreign socialist conspiracy. Indeed, much of the PRI counterframing strategy exploited the confusion that surrounded the EZLN in those first months of 1994.

On reflection, such misframes were understandable given that the uprising occurred in the Chiapas badlands that bordered the troubled civil war-ridden state of Guatemala. Popular fears of Guatemalan communists infiltrating Chiapas were very real and had informed much of the government’s policy there for years (Harvey, 1998). The Zapatistas also continued to fly a red five-pointed star on their flag, a lingering anachronism from their previous association with the socialist FLN. The rebels have since claimed that, reflecting the Maya proclivity for cultural syncretism (Jones, 1974; Watanabe, 1990), the five-pointed star has found a new *indigenous* meaning as a representation of the peoples of the five continents (EZLN, January 9th 1996). Nonetheless, in 1994 it was a confusing signifier for bystanders, who instantly and understandably associated it with socialism. Equally confusing were the Zapatistas’ Revolutionary Laws, which they promulgated immediately in January and which possessed singularly socialistic overtures34. Finally, despite the ski-masks, Marcos’s physical appearance and cultural authority set him apart from those in the indigenous CCRI whom he claimed were his superiors. At the televised Cathedral Dialogue in February, for example, the PRI’s chief negotiator, Camacho Solis, played on the obvious physical and cultural differences between the indigenous rebels and their *ladino* spokesman, who stood over a foot taller than many of his indigenous comrades and spoke eloquently on their behalf. In the first months of the insurgency Marcos was presented as the socialist puppetmaster pulling the strings of the credulous indigenas of Chiapas.

34 The Urban Reform Law, for example, stated that people were to stop paying taxes and would pay rent of no more than 10% of their salary; the Revolutionary Agrarian Law altered the reform to Article 27 and ordered the redistribution of land and the expropriation of the means of production; the Labour Law and Industry Document stipulated that wages should have parity with those outside of Chiapas with a monthly increase, free medical care and a pensions system; and the Revolutionary Law on Justice planned to release all prisoners except murderers and rapists, and provided for autonomous control of municipalities.
‘His skin is bleached, whiter than that of his compañeros. He speaks with palpable erudition. The sword and the pen: he is a rebel, yes, but also an intellectual, a mind perpetually alert.’

(Stavans, 1996: 50)

Given the rebels’ inability to delete the memory of socialism and what appeared to be indigenas’ subordination to the non-indigenous Marcos, it is hardly surprising that witnesses and journalists identified the insurgency with the conceptual and interpretive parameters of previous insurrections in Latin America. It was this unfortunate resonance with socialist precedent that allowed misframes to develop and enabled the PRI to counterframe the Zapatistas as non-indigenous and a threat to national security.

Perhaps even more sinister, however, were the PRI’s flexible accommodation tactics, which were designed to further isolate the Zapatistas by cutting them off from potential allies among the indigenous peasantry. While communicating with the EZLN to arrange the Dialogue, the PRI’s Camacho Solis began to foster relations with other peasant associations by offering promises of concessions on agrarian issues. A major target, probably because of its influence in Chiapas, was the Chiapas State Congress of Indian and Peasant Organisations (CEOIC). On January 25th President Salinas himself made the long trip to Chiapas solely to speak with the CEOIC. Winning over these organisations would, it was hoped, isolate the Zapatistas from potentially sympathetic groups on their own doorstep and ultimately localise the EZLN as the radical socialist fringe of Chiapas’s peasant movement. In cultivating such alliances, the PRI attempted to weaken the Zapatistas’ hand and force them to accept a restricted settlement based on local material improvements rather than the far-reaching national issues listed in the First Declaration. These sentiments were echoed by government officials who,
'…described a government strategy that appears to be aimed at undercutting the rebels’ sudden role as the voice of impoverished Indians… The government has also moved quickly to establish wider contact with legal Indian and peasant groups in Chiapas… One official said the legal groups might be invited to talks to dilute the rebels’ strength. Another said their positions could simply help to narrow the focus of talks in which the rebels might seek broad changes in the political system.’

(Golden, New York Times, January 18th 1994)

Throughout the Cathedral Dialogue and beyond, the PRI undermined the Zapatistas’ local support base, dividing Chiapas into ‘Zapatistas’ and ‘non-Zapatistas’ and building relations with competing peasant organisations.

In pursuing this policy, the PRI was undoubtedly following ingrained political practices of flexible accommodation, but it was also reacting to its own set of political opportunities created by the Zapatistas themselves. By publicly committing themselves to the path of war in January, the Zapatista Army had set itself apart from more institutional peasant organisations, but it had also inspired the latter to become more vociferous in their own campaigns. I argue that, in this way, the EZLN acted as an ‘initiator movement’, and that the January 1st rebellion and subsequent peace talks encouraged so-called ‘latecomers’35 to impress their own agendas and demands upon an apparently weakened PRI state. For example, when questioned by reporters over his involvement in the takeover of his rural municipal authority, one Teopisca corn farmer replied:

‘By grace, the Zapatistas have opened our eyes… We do not know them but we must thank them. Before, we did not have the valour to do this.’


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35 The category of latecomers may include extant but dormant movement organisations that are suddenly awakened and prompted into action by the arrival of a dynamic new movement phenomenon (McAdam et al, 1996).
Further, Jenaro Dominguez, advisor to the National Coordinating Body of Indian Peoples (CNPI), pointed out that ‘The lesson from [the ceasefire] for the Indians is that if you pick up the gun, the government will finally listen to you,’ (Ross, 2000: 39). Such latecomers, one might think, would have posed a significant political threat to the PRI inasmuch as their demands echoed the Zapatistas’ and lent the latter tacit and sometimes open support. Yet they actually awakened the PRI to the possible advantages of co-opting the many indigenous and peasant organisations that, from a resource mobilisation perspective, rivalled the Zapatistas for support, resources and political concessions (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). In this sense, Camacho’s exploitation of the CEOIC and other latecomers challenges the zero-sum hypothesis that an opportunity for a SMO equals a constraint for its institutional opponents (Byrne, 1997): both the Zapatistas and the PRI identified a potential opportunity in the reanimation of independent peasant groups.

It is almost certain, in view of these constraints, that the EZLN amplified their indigenous solidary-group identity as a means of contesting their misrepresentation as socialist relics of the Cold War, and in order to reinforce links with potential allies among Mexico’s indigenous. In a communiqué issued just after the ceasefire, for example, Marcos revealed his awareness of bystanders’ misframes and signalled the Zapatistas’ determination to correct these by emphasising their indigenous credentials:

‘Well, I finally got a few hours to read just a few of the publications that someone was good enough to send me…I now realise – from way up here – that the ski-masks and the ‘obscure’ intentions of the Zapatistas have provoked great anguish among you… I have the honour to have as my superiors the best men and women of the various ethnic groups: Tzeltal, Tzotzil, Chol, Tojolabal, Mam, and Zoque. I have lived with them for ten years and I am proud to serve them with my arms and
Thus I argue that the limited amplification of indigenous belief seen in the Second Declaration was a reaction to misframes and counterframes, as the EZLN and the PRI locked horns in a frame contest over their indigenous solidary-group.

That said, however, I also believe that the EZLN’s determination to contest misframes and counterframes was due to more than mere political strategy alone. Indeed, the EZLN was an indigenous SMO governed by an indigenous committee, and in this sense the decision-making process was almost certainly subject to an alternative Maya cultural logic. Indeed, Marcos tells us that it was the Maya leaders in the CCRI that actually bade him contest government counterframes:

‘the CCRI-CG of the EZLN called me and said: ‘We need to say our word and for others to listen. If we don’t do it now, others will take our voices and unwanted lies will come out of our mouths. Find out how our truth can get to those who want to hear it.”

(Marcos, February 11th 1994)

It is important, therefore, in explaining the Zapatistas’ contestation of misframes and counterframes, to consider the culturally specific attitudes of indigenous leaders and insurgents. For example, numerous EZLN communiqués reiterate the need for the Zapatistas’ to have their truth heard (EZLN, March 1st 1994, April 10th 1994; June 12th 1994), suggesting that the amplification of the indigenous solidary-group may have been motivated by more than just the straightforward threat of political marginalisation. Recent inquiries into Maya cultural logic point to the cultural significance of truth and the true
Indeed, the centrality of the concept of ‘truth’ is well documented and dates back to the Popol Vuh: the Book of the Ancient Maya (Goetz and Morley, 2003: 13-17; Gilly, 1998; Marcos, July 31st 1999). Edward Fischer traces the roots and relative importance of the concepts of truth and heart in Maya discourse by advocating extreme sensitivity to ingrained metaphors. He follows fellow anthropologists Anna Wierzbicka (1997) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in applying the linguistic relativity principle or Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Duranti, 2001), which posits that certain linguistic structures predispose individuals and groups to see the world in particular ways that subsequently influence their actions. Fischer uses the linguistic relativity thesis to suggest that the word we recognise as ‘heart’, along with similar words like ‘truth’, ‘essence’ and ‘soul’, cannot be so easily translated from their original Mayan36. He argues that this forces us to explore their relative meanings and, interestingly, that they offer an effective way of comprehending the ways in which actions are influenced by beliefs (1999: 481). To this end he identifies the Kaqchikel word k’u’x, which has been translated into Spanish and English as ‘heart’ and/or ‘soul’37 but which is actually a Mayan metaphor that betrays the cosmological belief in destiny and the natural order (Fischer, 2001: 106). As an indicator of self and identity, k’u’x is imbued with much greater significance and is more keenly felt and fervently protected by the Maya than the straightforward western term ‘heart’ implies. K’u’x, Fischer suggests, provides a window on the vitality of the Maya sense of self and identity as a continually emergent yet fiercely protected construct that is engaged in a perpetual balancing act with cosmic forces38. Moreover, it is not only humans that possess a k’u’x, but animals, the sky, mountains and also organisations, all of which are interconnected in the natural order. As Fischer says,

36 Fischer tells us that the prefix ‘Mayan’ is reserved for discussing language, but that in all other instances the Maya themselves prefer the word ‘Maya’ (2001: 101).
37 Gary H. Gossen (1996) also uses the word ‘soul’ to uncover the truth of the Zapatista movement. However, he overlooks the strategic element of framing processes as dialogically constructed in interaction with political structures. He thus relies solely on Maya culture to identify meanings, reifying the image of a purely indigenous movement whose identity construction is guided, not by any interaction with external structures, but by Maya belief systems alone.
38 See Fischer’s work on the Maya of Tecpan in Guatemala (2001), which explores the cultural reproduction of the Maya heart or essence in syncretism with western cultural influences. See also Watanabe (1991), Carlsen and Prechtel (1991).
the ‘k’u’x is closely tied to the sacred covenant between Mesoamerican peoples and cosmic forces,’ where to misrepresent another person’s or thing’s k’u’x is a heinous crime that is still associated with malevolent, supernatural attacks upon the ‘natural order’ (Fischer, 1999: 482-3).

I argue, therefore, that PRI counterframes that denied indigenous truths and depicted the EZLN as a foreign-led socialist insurgency may have been perceived through cultural lenses that rendered them an attack upon the fundamental k’u’x of the rebellion, and made their contestation a priority for the indigenous Zapatistas. Certainly, many indigenous rebels were incensed at their misrepresentation as unthinking followers of non-Mexican ideologues, and as a people who were somehow unable to develop their own critique of Mexican government and society. As one indigenous insurgent declared in disgust, “‘Perhaps intelligence only drops into the head of a ladino!’” (Marcos, January 26th 1994). In sum, for Maya Zapatistas the danger posed by PRI counterframes and misframes may have been more than just political, and it is likely that it was also experienced by the Maya as a cosmological threat to their collective k’u’x. Such a threat would have demanded the frame amplification of indigenous beliefs to reinforce the rebellion’s true indigenous identity. While this does not make the political threat of marginalisation any less relevant, it does reinforce the need to deepen the analysis by remaining sensitive to culturally alternative standards of rational action.

INJUSTICE

Notwithstanding the amplification of their indigenous solidarity-group identity, the Zapatistas were at pains to reinforce the national character of their grievances. As such, the injustice component of the Second Declaration amplifies the more encompassing national injustices that underpinned their cause. Indeed, in this sense the text mirrors the First Declaration in its subordination of local concerns to the overriding national injustice that was ‘the lack of justice, freedom, and democracy in Mexican territory’. In raising,
once again, the national above the indigenous, the Second Declaration built on a comprehensive list of 34 demands that had been put forward at the Cathedral Dialogue in March, and which comprehensively subordinated indigenous interests. The injustice component, therefore, continued to perform the necessary ‘attribution function’ of articulating grievances with systemic problems of national importance:

‘This system is what has made it possible for another power to thrive and override constitutional law in rural Mexico, a power whose roots, in turn, make it possible for that same party to stay in power. It is the system of complicity which makes possible the existence and belligerence of cacicazgos.’

(EZLN, June 12th 1994)

*Cacicazgos* is the system of boss rule through which the PRI ruled indigenous parts of Chiapas, rewarding local *caciques* for their mediation and management of closed corporate communities (Wolf, 1957; Nash, 1985; Knight, 1997). Acknowledging this, the Second Declaration reified the inextricability of local grievances from the profound absence of democracy throughout the Republic, and so concretised the systemic links between them.

I suggest that the frame amplification of national injustices was, in part, reactive, and was undertaken in response to the activities and counterframes of the Zapatistas’ PRI opponents. Undoubtedly, it helped the rebels to contest government counterframes that misrepresented their rebellion as a local affair disconnected from national issues:

‘We denounce all the manipulation and the attempts to dissociate our just demands from those of the people of Mexico. We are Mexicans and we will not lay aside

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39 Ironically, it was only with the rise of the free market and Salinas’s imposition of neoliberal political relations that the power of the *caciques* began to wane.
our demands nor our arms until democracy, freedom, and justice are achieved by everyone.’

(EZLN, June 12th 1994)

Zermeno recognises the Zapatistas’ determination to show that ‘Mexicans function according to paradigms that do not enable us to separate the local from the national,’ (1997: 196-7), and the frame amplification of national injustices was intended, I argue, to enhance the indigenous Zapatistas’ movement identity as the champions of the nationalist movement. Furthermore, the concretisation of links between local and national grievances also helped to reinforce the frame bridge with civil society. Since the ceasefire, EZLN correspondence had sought to convince NGOs, SMOs and other interest groups that the root of their own specific and local grievances lay in the same fundamental lack of democracy that affected all Mexicans. The common theme of this correspondence was the linking of disparate, specific grievances beneath a common ‘roof’: the encompassing national absence of freedom, democracy and justice.

‘Take your voice to other dispossessed ears, take your struggle to other struggles. There is another roof of injustice over the one that covers our pain.’ So said the oldest of the old of our peoples. We saw in these words that if our struggle was alone again, once again it would be useless.’

(EZLN, February 14th 1994)

Zapatista communiqués, therefore, fostered a common bond of shared national injustice, and this was amplified in the Second Declaration’s invitation to elements of civil society to identify their own specific grievances with overriding political and economic structures at the national level.
A further feature of the *Second Declaration*’s injustice component was the frame extension and blurring of the EZLN’s enemy. Unlike the *First Declaration*, the *Second Declaration* did not attack the person of Salinas, nor did it vilify the executive branch of government alone. Rather, the enemy was extended and blurred as the lumpen *mal gobierno* or bad government. In the *mal gobierno*, the Zapatistas targeted Mexico’s system and structures of government as a whole, including features that were notably absent from the *First Declaration*: Congress and the judiciary. The frame extension of the ‘bad’ government was justified through recourse to Congress’s inglorious alignment with the ruling party in January, and mutually reinforced the EZLN’s alignment with the ‘good’ civil society. In simple terms, therefore, the EZLN redrew the line of engagement, with the good people of civil society on one side and the bad government on the other.

Explaining the frame extension and frame blurring of the enemy is relatively straightforward given the context of the *Second Declaration*. Firstly, as far as the EZLN were concerned, the failure of Congress to support the January uprising confirmed their complicity with the PRI executive and the single party system, and so obliged the Zapatistas to extend their conception of the enemy to include them. Second, with their *Second Declaration* the EZLN claimed that their sovereignty resided in civil society rather than constitutional structures, which were being abused by those in office. In other words, the rebels’ alliance with civil society awarded them a popular mandate that removed the need for legal and constitutional legitimacy, and so rendered an alliance with the legislative and judicial arms of government redundant. Third, it may have been that a blurry enemy was integral to the EZLN’s strategy for the impending election and post-election. The *Second Declaration* assiduously avoids the denigration of President Salinas – the closest it comes to a personal attack is its unfavourable appraisal of presidentialism, and even here the EZLN refrain from naming specific individuals – which, I believe, was deliberate given the immediacy of the presidential contest. The notoriety of PRI flexible accommodation meant that the risk of concentrating antipathy against one man alone was
very real, and so the *Second Declaration* entreated Mexicans to look beyond individual politicians and redress more deep-rooted injustices. Indeed, the text proclaims that ‘Our call transcends one single presidential term or an upcoming presidential election.’

**AGENCY**

That the Zapatistas’ *Second Declaration* was written with one eye on the August election is reinforced by the frame reduction of the agency component. By June 1994, the eleven ‘basic demands’ of the *First Declaration* had become abbreviated to just three: freedom, justice, and democracy. Many of the original eleven – ‘work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace’ – were more relevant to rural areas and could have been construed as specific to the indigenous solidarity-group; fewer and broader concepts, however, made for more universal appeal. Ostensibly, moreover, these three objectives were to be achieved not by force, but through the non-violent methods preferred by the civil society. Indeed, where the *First Declaration* had framed armed revolution as congruent with the constitution and in conformity with historical precedent, the *Second Declaration* boldly renounced not only violence but also the very constitution that had legitimated it. The Mexican constitution, the rebels argued, no longer held any bearing on modern Mexico. It should be the people alone who sanction revolution, and since the people have denounced violence, so the transition to democracy, freedom and justice would have to be achieved peaceably. I argue, therefore, that the Zapatistas reduced their agency frame, and that this can be seen in the fact that they reined-in their earlier demands and tempered their call to arms in order to propose a new, peaceful initiative for democratisation.

The imminence of the presidential election at this time helps us to make sense of this frame reduction. By reducing their insurrectionary emphasis the EZLN was able to reinforce their frame bridge with civil society. In fact they were able to flatter civil society as the collective architect of a new peaceful approach to revolution, framing their own
suspension of hostilities, not as a grateful response to the pardon offered by the PRI and the instigation of peace talks, but as a consequence of their innate radical democracy and adherence to command obedience:

‘[Civil society], a force superior to any political or military power, imposed its will on the parties involved in the conflict. Civil society assumed the duty of preserving our country. It showed its disapproval of the massacre and it obliged us to dialogue with the government.’

(EZLN, June 12th 1994)

Yet, in deferring to the popular will, the Second Declaration asked nothing less of civil society than the ousting of the PRI through the ballot. To this end a national campaign would be coordinated by a new civil-Zapatista partnership, the Convencion Nacional Democratico (CND). The CND was offered as a civil space, protected by the EZLN, for preparing the next stage in the transition to democracy:

‘We call for a Democratic National Convention, supreme and revolutionary, from which must emerge the proposals for a transitional government and a new national law, a new constitution that guarantees the legal implementation of the popular will.’

(EZLN, June 12th 1994)

Even though they hosted the CND’s inaugural event in early August, the Zapatistas declared that they would take no part in its leadership. Indeed, Marcos’s opening message stated that ‘this is the convention for the peaceful search for change, and should in no way be presided over by armed people,’ (EZLN, August 6th 1994). Instead, the CND was framed as the very embodiment of the popular will: national in both scope and
membership and represented by all states, sexes, races, ages and religions, it would conform to deeply held mestizaje values of pluralism and democracy, and would be organised consultatively according to the principles of command obedience. Its meeting place would be called ‘Aguascalientes’ after the site of the 1917 Constitutional Convention, thereby marrying change with continuity in the proud tradition of revolutionary nationalism and reinforcing the frame extension of the nationalist movement identity explored earlier. The message in the Second Declaration was loud and clear: the rebels would continue peaceably because the people, not the government, wanted them to, and they would follow and defend the peaceful path forged for them by civil society. This was command-obedience in action, and it reified the Zapatistas’ commitment to embedded notions of popular sovereignty in Mexico (Bonfil, 1980; Knight, 1994; Gilly, 1998).

Unequivocally, therefore, the Second Declaration appeared to reduce the EZLN’s agency and place the onus on civil society and the electorate. Indeed, Javier Eloriaga, himself a leader in the Zapatistas’ civil society project, has intimated that the Second Declaration anticipated the August election by placing ‘the political struggle baton squarely in the hands of civil society,’ (Eloriaga, 1997). Yet what Eloriaga doesn’t say is that the reduction of agency belied the rebels’ determination to prepare the ground for whatever might come after the election. While born of a pragmatic acceptance of the impracticality of force at that time, the reduced agency component reflected the expectation that a brand new set of political opportunities would follow what was shaping up to be a turbulent presidential contest. Frame reduction was, in this sense, part of the EZLN’s watch and listen approach. Marcos has admitted that, following the breakdown of the Cathedral Dialogue in March, the EZLN was without strategy: ‘we found ourselves in a completely unforeseen situation, and we didn’t know what to do,’ (Marcos and Le Bot, 1997: 201). He has described the few options available to the rebels: they could either ally with socialist revolutionaries elsewhere, which would have the advantage of bestowing
national importance on their activities but would add fuel to the fire of government counterframes and open them to renewed military onslaught; or they could attempt to shape the activities of ‘the most important and only national uprising so far,’ that of the non-violent civil society, which had expressed sympathy with the Zapatistas’ demands but deep opposition to their violent methods (Womack, 1999: 278).

Thus, given the imminence of the August election and the popular expectation that the PRI would be unable to refrain from the corruption that would precipitate its own demise (De Palma, New York Times, July 17th 1994), the EZLN threw all available resources into a new and ostensibly peaceful civil society campaign. I say ‘ostensibly peaceful’ because I believe that the EZLN manipulated and reduced their agency component to hide their true intentions. As John Womack writes:

‘[the EZLN] would rally Mexican “civil society” to organise and demand “democratic” elections, and then when the PRI won and “civil society” took to the streets in massive national protests, forcing a political crisis that the government could not resolve, it would join “civil society” in constituting a transitional government for “liberty and democracy.”’

(Womack, 1999: 278-9)

If democracy was not observed and upheld in August then the EZLN, as the defender of civil society, would be able to claim that civil liberties had been abused and justifiably return to more confrontational methods. Certainly, in view of the widespread expectation that the presidential election would be corrupted, Marcos has explained the true hopes that were pinned on the ‘great protest movement’ that would follow the election. That is why the call was sent to all independent political parties, civil society groups and individuals to ‘declare themselves ready to form a government capable of the political transition to democracy,’ (EZLN, June 12th 1994). Marcos has claimed, in fact, that the CND was
actually intended as the platform from which the EZLN might orchestrate a second insurrection when electoral channels were shown to have failed (Marcos and Le Bot, 1997: 201-3). While it is true, therefore, that the EZLN reduced their agency component in their *Second Declaration* and promised to uphold civil society’s preference for non-violence, the qualifier is that non-violence was only guaranteed as long as democracy was upheld, and it was widely expected not to be.

**CONCLUSION**

Although the nationalistic essence is preserved in the *Second Declaration*, particularly in the three familiar objectives, the subtle alignment of frame components provides further evidence of the Zapatistas’ discursive adaptation to changing contexts. The failure of the legislature and judiciary to support the January rebellion encouraged the EZLN to bridge their radically democratic organisational identity, not with the constitutional Powers of the Union, but with the recently mobilised civil society, marking the EZLN as the people’s army and committing them to the defence of the popular will. With this new organisational identity, however, came the obligation to align other features of their collective identity. The frame extension of the movement layer, for example, was required to incorporate the peaceful preferences of civil society within their movement identity as revolutionary nationalists. The dialogism of this discourse also encouraged the EZLN to contest the public misframes and government counterframes that denied their claim to both the nationalist movement and indigenous solidary-group. The frame amplification of nationalist values was also apparent in the injustice component, where national grievances were amplified above indigenous grievances in order to avert the EZLN's marginalisation. The framing of the enemy underwent a process of frame blurring as the Congress and judiciary were lumped in with the executive in the new conception of the vaguely sinister *mal gobierno*. Finally, while national objectives of democracy, freedom and justice were carried over from the *First Declaration*, the EZLN put forward what was essentially a
reduced agency component that catered to the pacifistic sentiments of the civil majority by looking ahead to the August election.

In contrast to the relatively extensive frame transformation processes evinced in the *First Declaration*, frame alignment was much more subtle in the *Second*, and there is a good deal of continuity. The EZLN remained committed to the same nationalistic agenda and retained a predominantly nationalist discourse. The dominant frame alignment processes were affirmative (frame amplification) and enhancing (frame bridging and frame extension) and thus did not seek to replace nationalism as the dominant master frame. Frame alignment was designed, I argue, to fine-tune the EZLN’s nationalism to fit the sentiments and preferences of the popular national civil movement that had emerged, not in outright support of the Zapatistas, but in sympathy with their nationally democratising objectives. In this sense, frame alignment was dialogic; the product of months of discursive exchange with bystanders, media and the government.

In theoretical terms, there are three main observations. Firstly, the frame analysis of the *Second Declaration* underlines the importance of cultural specificities. The Zapatistas’ ‘need’, for example, to ‘say our word’ in order to correct misframes and counterframes probably ran much deeper than simple political exigency, and may have been inspired by the cosmological importance of true self or *heart* in the Maya natural order. While this does not replace the importance attached to political threats in most analyses, it certainly adds a new dimension that may be lost in the rush to articulate the EZLN’s discourse with political opportunities and threats. Secondly, I reiterate a point raised in Chapter Two: that the dialogism that Steinberg describes (1999, 2002) is adequately catered for in the concepts of *counterframes* and *misframes*. The *Second Declaration* shows how these two terms delimit bystanders’ misinterpretations of collective action frames from the efforts of powerholders and opponents to undermine them. Together, they draw analytic attention to the potential for different interpretations of signifiers and so enable the analyst to avoid reifying frames as fixed and universal.
packages, and they allow for the analysis of SMOs’ ability to react to dialogic exchange through their recognition and contestation of counterframes and misframes. Thirdly, the Second Declaration demonstrates the potential for frame alignment of one frame component to impact on the frame alignment of others. The frame bridging of the organisational layer of identity, for example, saw the EZLN position themselves as the defenders of civil society’s freedoms. This then obligated them to extend their movement identity to incorporate the pacifistic activities of civil society, extend their conception of the enemy to incorporate the now vilified Congress and judiciary, and reduce their agency component by suspending their association with violent revolution. This suggests that even the subtle frame alignment of just one frame component can, in certain instances, have discursive ramifications that run throughout the collective action frame.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Third Declaration

(January 1st 1995)

INTRODUCTION

The Second Declaration had anticipated the August ’94 presidential election to end in national protest, which the EZLN had expected to be in a strong position to manipulate thanks to their unofficial influence in the CND. In the event, however, the election did not provide the desired outcomes, and the decline of the civil movement that followed was compounded by national economic collapse and a local political crisis in Chiapas that immediately coloured the Zapatistas’ relationship with Salinas’s successor, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon. In what remained of 1994 the EZLN were forced to reconsider their collective action frame once again. As their first year in rebellion drew to close the EZLN promulgated their Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, which proposed to reinvigorate the stagnating civil movement with a new Movement for National Liberation (MLN). The Third Declaration, I argue, retains many of the features and objectives of the Second Declaration, but evinces the EZLN’s exasperation with civil society, their bold return to militancy, and their bid to draw more violent elements into their campaign.

IDENTITY

At the organisational layer the Third Declaration bestows a more proactive role for the EZLN alongside civil society, and extends organisational involvement to all groups, peaceful or otherwise, who oppose the PRI government. Where, for example, the Second Declaration looked to bridge the Zapatistas with peaceful civil society by downplaying their militaristic leadership and recasting the EZLN as nothing more than the armed defender of an electoral democratisation movement, the Third Declaration awards the EZLN a direct role in an indiscriminate coalition of oppositional forces:
‘We call upon all social and political forces of the country, to all honest Mexicans, to all of those who struggle for the democratisation of the national reality, to form a NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT, including the National Democratic Convention and ALL forces, without distinction by religious creed, race or political ideology, who are against the system of the State party. This National Liberation Movement will struggle from a common accord, by all means, at all levels, for the installation of a transitional government, a new constitutional body, a new constitution, and the destruction of the system of the Party-State.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1995)

This frame extension not only allowed the EZLN to take charge of the dithering CND, it also enabled them to invite radical and institutional elements which had been deliberately omitted from the Second Declaration for their violent and schismatic tendencies. The message was clear: political differences must be put aside in order to bring about the end of the PRI state. A new organisational unit, the Movimentos Liberacion Nacional (MLN), was to incorporate those willing to make this happen by any means necessary. The MLN would not replace the self-consciously intellectual and pacifistic CND, which had reconvened several times since its inception at the Aguascalientes in August, but would, it was hoped, add new life to the stagnant civil movement by embracing radicals that had previously been forbidden entry. In the MLN, serious doctrinal and methodological differences would be suspended in the face of a greater enemy: the PRI.

The impetus to the frame extension of the EZLN’s organisational identity was, I suggest, the CND’s failure to deliver the popular post-electoral insurrection that had been expected in August and September. Problems began during the run up to the election when the CND became divided over the issue of directly endorsing Cardenas’s campaign. The resulting denial of support for Cardenas was to prove a fatal blow to the EZLN’s
post-electoral plans. As expected, the election saw Cardenas suffer another defeat, yet, having denied him their support, the CND could hardly rally to him as the aggrieved victim in the post-election, and without a CND-cardenista coalition the EZLN’s capacity to foment national discontent was undermined. Moreover, August 1994 provided the first presidential contest monitored by an independent electoral commission (the IFE). This body confirmed the return of the PRI candidate with 48% of the popular vote and Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon was proclaimed the next PRI President of Mexico with what, in contrast to his predecessor, appeared to be a genuinely popular mandate. The IFE awarded the elections a degree of democratic legitimacy that had been lacking in previous contests, and the anticipated wave of civil protest that the EZLN hoped to capitalise never materialised. As Marcos had predicted, Cardenas came in not second but third, behind the PAN’s free market candidate Fernandez de Cevallos. The cardenistas that gathered in the zocalo in Mexico City were far fewer in number than they had been in 1988, and Cardenas, probably with one eye on the elections for mayor of Mexico City in 1997, sent them home without a fight.

Without the unifying immediacy of an impending presidential election, the CND began to lose momentum, and by December it was riddled with divisions. In one of his earlier poetic excursions Marcos had optimistically described the CND as a pirate ship, with civil society at the helm (Marcos, August 6th 1994), but in January 1995 he returned to this metaphor to lament what he calls the ‘ghost-ship’ of Aguascalientes, run aground and scuttled by a mutinous and divided crew (Marcos, January 16th 1995). For the EZLN, the fracture of the civil movement, which had ‘become weaker due to internal wear and tear or because they bet on banners which had no future,’ was one of the most disillusioning events of the year (Ibarra, December 9th 1994). Indeed, Marcos declared outright that ‘civil society abandoned us in the convocation of the Democratic National Convention, as well as in the help they were giving us,’ (Marcos, in Ibarra, 1994). I argue

40 According to the official count Cardenas received less than 17% of the vote
41 Aguascalientes was the name given to the jungle convention centre that had been built by the Zapatistas for the CND.
that the Zapatistas realised that the civil movement required something of a structural shake-up, and that their conception of the broader MLN, whose only membership criterion was that members opposed themselves to the single party state, was an attempt to reinvigorate a civil society that had lost its way in the aftermath of the election.

At the movement layer of identity, by contrast, the *Third Declaration* continued the amplification of nationalism seen in the First and Second Declarations. It is noteworthy, for example, that the Zapatistas’ new *Movimentos Liberacion Nacional* was named in memory of the revolutionary bands that liberated Mexico from Spanish imperialism and later from the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz. Indeed, the *Third Declaration* is subtitled *The EZLN Calls For the Formation of a National Liberation Movement*, evoking the movement of the same name that was led by the popular nationalist Lazaro Cardenas, ex-president and father of the wrong PRD candidate Cuauhnetemoc Cardenas. Further, the text opens with a poignant quotation from another patriot, Benito Juarez, from 1865:

‘We have been disgraced, it is true; our luck has been bad many times, but the cause of Mexico, which is the cause of the people’s rights and justice, has not succumbed; it has not died and it will not die because there still exist committed Mexicans, in whose hearts burns the sacred fire of patriotism. Wherever in the Republic weapons are clenched and the national banner flies, there, as well as here, will exist, with vitality and energy, the protest of Right against Force.’

(Juarez, 1865; in EZLN, January 1st 1995)

Juarez’s appeal went out to Mexican patriots not to capitulate in the face of recent defeat at the hands of French interventionists, and was used by the EZLN to counter the disillusionment of defeat felt among civil society. The reference to weapons ‘clenched’ intimates the need for a more militant turn to replace the failed electoral route, while
numerous mentions of the ‘Republic’ and ‘patriotism’ underscore the EZLN’s own fidelity to the Mexican nation. Such frame amplification indicates the Zapatistas’ determination to reignite the dormant democratisation movement through a renewed discourse of historical revolutionary nationalism.

The amplification of nationalism was carried through to the identity component’s solidary-group layer. Here the indigenous solidary-group that was amplified in the Second Declaration was reduced to enable the EZLN to magnify their nationalist credentials even further:

‘Today we repeat: OUR STRUGGLE IS NATIONAL. We have been criticized for asking for too much. We, the Zapatistas, it is said, should be satisfied with the handouts that the bad government offers us. Those who are willing to die for a just and legitimate cause have the right to ask for everything. We Zapatistas are willing to give up the only thing we have, life, to demand democracy, liberty and justice for all Mexicans. Today we reaffirm: FOR EVERYONE, EVERYTHING, NOTHING FOR US!’

(EZLN, January 1st 1995)

In demanding ‘for everyone, everything, nothing for us,’ the Zapatistas’ identification with indigenous culture was reduced to amplify their overriding commitment to the national movement. The reduction of the indigenous solidary-group was further reinforced by the removal of indigenous cultural markers and language. For example, in contrast to the lengthy, quasi-mystical ‘indigenous section’ that concludes the Second Declaration, the Third Declaration concludes with just two lines written in the Mayan linguistic style – the only place in which references to ‘our dead’ justify the EZLN’s activities. Thus, in something of a return to the discourse of the First Declaration, the
EZLN’s indigenous identity was not denied but was reduced to facilitate the amplification of their nationalist movement identity.

Analysing these frame alignment processes in context, I maintain that the amplification of the nationalist movement identity and the reduction of the indigenous solidarity-group were a consequence of the EZLN’s determination to reassert themselves on the national political scene, and that they were led to this course of action by their thwarted national ambitions, their recent experience of localisation in Chiapas, and unexpected political opportunities created by a national economic crisis. Firstly, because the presidential election was hailed as the most democratic in living memory, and because the greatly anticipated national protest never occurred, the CND had begun to unravel. The EZLN was thus left without an effective national presence, and Marcos has since admitted that they were without a clear way forward for their national movement:

‘There we fooled ourselves yet again. Like in January ’94. And the same question came up again: now what? There was no massive protest, and the National Convention, which was our bridge to the outside, enters a period of internal crisis after the electoral setback. There was nothing else to do but wait for Salinas to leave and see what the new president proposed. That’s what the [CCRI] decides.’

(Marcos and Le Bot, 1997: 204)

Without direction, the CND’s internal crisis threatened to marginalise the EZLN as a national force. Moreover, this threat was exacerbated by the Zapatistas’ involvement in local Chiapan politics, where the unfavourable result of the gubernatorial election – held on the same day as the presidential contest – demanded their immediate attention. The new governor elect, Eduardo Robledo Rincon, was a man closely connected with the infamous ex-governor and ex-interior minister, Gonzalez Garrido. Robledo was a PRIista whom many claim actually lost to the opposition candidate Amado Avendano, who stood
for a broad coalition of PRDistas, Zapatista sympathisers and other independent groups that called themselves the State Democratic Assembly (Ross, 2000; Henck, 2002). Amado’s defeat was not accepted with the same grace displayed by the cardenistas after the presidential contest. As Womack writes, ‘Unlike the opposition nationally, the State Democratic Assembly denounced “electoral fraud” and proclaimed its candidate triumphant.’ (1999: 288). The EZLN were quick to throw their support behind Amado and his followers. After the national CND initiative ground to a halt in September, the campaign against Robledo began to steal the EZLN’s energies, diluting their national profile. The danger of being sidelined as a local indigenous affair was not lost on the EZLN, yet the pressing demands of supporting Amado as ‘governor-in-exile’ took precedence.

Months of gunboat diplomacy preceded Robledo’s official inauguration in Tuxtla Gutierrez on December 8th, during which the EZLN threatened war in a vain effort to reinvigorate the stalled CND and galvanise Mexican civil society around the Chiapas crisis. The PRI defused the threat, however, by offering Amado a ritual inauguration in San Cristobal and a parallel government for the several so-called ‘autonomous districts’ that supported him. Fearing the PRI’s flexible accommodation tactics, the EZLN leadership decided on a radical course of action that combined institutional alliance building at the national level with localised militancy in Chiapas. Members of the EZLN’s governing CCRI met with the PRD leader Cuauhtemoc Cardenas for the second time in rebel territory, this time hoping for a new fusion of PRD, civil society and Zapatista forces. As Robledo was sworn in at Tuxtla, a united EZLN-PRD front publicly recognised Amado Avendano’s authority in San Cristobal. Ten days later, on December 19th, the Zapatistas protested Robledo’s inauguration by orchestrating a daring but bloodless demonstration of their influence in Chiapas, emerging from the cover of darkness to establish military positions in 38 municipalities, well beyond the military cordon imposed
by the January 12th ceasefire. Marcos has explained the December break out as the EZLN’s determination to reassert themselves on the national political scene:

‘We had to do something to remind them that we were still here. We decided then to break the army’s encirclement, in December ’94. The objective was to tell Zedillo, as we told Salinas, “Remember, you’ve got guerrillas in the southeast, and you’re going to be obliged to find a solution, military or political.”’
(Marcos and Le Bot. 1997: 204)

Notwithstanding this and several other national appeals, civil society failed to rally to the Amado campaign. The EZLN had been drawn into what appeared to many to be a local squabble, and civil society’s inaction only served to exaggerate the EZLN’s localisation (Womack, 1999: 289).

Almost immediately, however, the Zapatistas were able to seize a new opportunity to reassert their national presence. Ex-president Salinas, it transpired, had been staving off financial crisis with heavy borrowing, and as Zedillo took office a crippling economic downturn struck. In desperation, the peso was devalued by 15% and was then allowed to ‘float freely on world markets,’ (Ross, 2000: 97). Analysts have placed responsibility squarely at the door of Salinas for his determination to secure Mexico’s status as a First World country, which led him stubbornly to refuse devaluation during his own sexenio (Morris, 1995: 230). Although it was Salinas that was publicly shamed, Zedillo was his nominated successor and so he too was unavoidably tainted along with his ministers:

‘…the economic crisis undermined Zedillo’s and the regime’s legitimacy, straining the alliances and agreements that had allowed Salinas to muddle through his own term, and overshadowing the prospects of political reform. Weary of austerity and feeling betrayed by the economic wizardry of Salinas, thousands
turned out to protest the government’s economic policy and its seeming capitulation to the demands of the U.S. government.’

(Ibid.)

Zedillo inherited a hopeless economic situation that exposed his government’s weaknesses early on. So calamitous was the inevitable recession that thousands starved and the promised political reforms that had helped secure his election were postponed.

The political instability that was the fallout of the recession was, in itself, something of an opportunity for critics of the single party state. The Zapatistas, however, were better placed than most to capitalise. Indeed, it was somewhat convenient that Zedillo’s new interior minister, Jaime Serra Puche, admitted Mexico’s economic crisis the very day after the EZLN’s bloodless takeover of 38 Chiapan municipalities. It was even more convenient that he laid the blame squarely at the door of the Zapatistas and their stubborn refusal to recognise federal and local election results in Chiapas (Ross, 2000: 97). While designed to engender popular resentment of the EZLN, Serra Puche’s words only lent credibility to the EZLN’s constant insistence that their rebellion had national ramifications. Marcos has scoffed at Serra Puche’s claim that the Zapatistas were responsible for the recession, but he has admitted that they played their part. In doing so, he has also acknowledged the economic crisis as an opportunity that allowed the Zapatistas to reassert the national importance of their struggle:

‘I believe our action poked a hole in a boiler under pressure, and it all exploded. In a shot the misery of the Indians was all of a sudden generalized to millions of Mexicans. That changes everything. The government, facing a real source of agitation, decides to liquidate it. It chooses betrayal. You understand, this wasn’t anymore a struggle of Indians that they can keep at a distance. A lot of people who
found themselves in a shot in the same situation of misery were now maybe going to see us as eventual *companeros* in the struggle.’

(Marcos and Le Bot, 1997: 206)

For good or ill, the EZLN was back in the national spotlight. It became, once again, the government’s main domestic enemy and was awarded a means of reasserting its solidarity with the Mexican people, who now faced the full threat of financial recession.

In sum, I suggest that the economic emergency pointed out the hubris and treachery of the PRI as a party that had sacrificed Mexico’s economic sovereignty to the free market. Aided by the PRI’s efforts to scapegoat them, the Zapatistas used their *Third Declaration* to try and revive the dormant nationalist movement that had stagnated in the wake of the election. They did this by extending their organisational dimensions to ‘all Mexicans’, militant, radical or otherwise; by reducing their indigenous solidary-group, which threatened to bind them to Chiapan politics; and by amplifying their nationalist movement identity as millions of Mexicans began to suffer the effects of recession.

**INJUSTICE**

The *Third Declaration*’s injustice component mirrored those of the previous Declarations inasmuch as the same material grievances were retained and articulated with systemic contradictions that exposed the instabilities and injustices of the federal government. As before, the framing of these grievances capitalised on recent events at the national level. As people from all walks of life were affected by December’s financial crisis the EZLN made common cause with them by articulating these economic grievances with the more encompassing political injustice of state party tyranny which, they claimed, lay at the root of the crisis. For example, the *Third Declaration* includes this retrospective assessment:

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42 Ross claims that ‘the Mexico City subway was slowed almost daily as a record number of suicides threw themselves before the bright orange trains,’ (Ross, 1997: 98).
‘At the end of 1994 the economic farce with which Salinas had deceived the Nation and the international economy exploded. The nation of money called the grand gentlemen of power and arrogance to dinner, and they did not hesitate in betraying the soil and sky in which they prospered with Mexican blood [and] awoke Mexicans from the sweet and stupefying dream of entry into the first world. The nightmare of unemployment, scarcity and misery will be even more wearing for the majority of Mexicans.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1995)

In this way, the Zapatistas’ injustice discourse continued to amplify the same conceptual frame bridge that linked local and specific grievances with the national political injustices inflicted on all Mexico by the tyranny of the ‘bad government’.

It is also noteworthy that, in conformity with the Second Declaration, the political injustices perpetrated by the bad government were again paralleled with the ignoble activities of traitors from Mexican history. This helped the EZLN to reinforce their amplified movement identity as revolutionary nationalists. Much emphasis was placed, for example, on allegations of well-concealed corruption during the presidential election, which the Zapatistas claimed echoed infamous acts of treachery from the nineteenth century:

‘Reports from the National Democratic Convention, the Civic Alliance, and the Commission for Truth brought to light what the mass media had hidden, with shameful complicity: a gigantic fraud. The multitude of irregularities, the inequity, the corruption, the cheating, the intimidation, the robbery and the lying – they made the elections the dirtiest ones in Mexico’s history… As at the end of the 19th century, when traitors held “elections” to justify the French intervention, today it
is said that the nation greets with approval the continuation of an authoritarian imposition."

(EZLN, January 1st 1995)

Such comparisons strengthened the EZLN’s movement identity as the ageless champions of Mexican nationalism, and helped range them against the perfidious activities of ‘traitors’ in government. In the context of Chiapas’s contested gubernatorial contest, they also bolstered the Zapatistas’ insistence that local grievances, such as their own in Chiapas, were ‘only one of the consequences of this political system’.

The reassertion of national grievances was, I argue, both necessary and made possible by recent events. The Zapatistas’ need to consolidate their national presence after the localisation caused by their involvement in the Robledo affair was apparent. Even a stage-managed media circus in November, which aimed to celebrate the EZLN’s eleventh year in Chiapas, had failed to recapture the level of national interest that the rebels had enjoyed in January (Henck, 2002:17-18). In December, however, an opportunity to amplify shared national grievances was created by the economic crisis. The national notoriety that came with Serra Puche’s condemnation of the EZLN as the harbingers of financial doom was an added bonus. Having already examined these factors, there is little to add except that this combination of threat and opportunity encouraged the EZLN to amplify the frame bridge of shared national injustices that bound their local grievances to those of ordinary Mexicans across the country.

**AGENCY**

Further evidence of continuity is apparent in the agency component. For example, the same three fundamental objectives from the *Second Declaration* were reiterated, albeit with an edge that affirmed the rebels’ readiness to die in pursuit of them:
‘Those who are willing to die for a just and legitimate cause have the right to ask for everything. We Zapatistas are willing to give up the only thing we have, life, to demand democracy, freedom and justice for all Mexicans.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1995)

Notwithstanding this, however, frame alignment is evident in the framing of the Zapatistas’ methods. Here, I argue, the EZLN began to make oblique references to civil society’s shortcomings as an ally, and in this way justified their renewed commitment to a more militant path. The text attacks, for instance, the ‘cynicism and laziness [that] returned to the Nation’ in the aftermath of the election, and claims that this led the EZLN to grow ‘tired of the peaceful means’ and re-evaluate their commitment to the civil society. Instead, the Third Declaration prescribes a new way forward for the failing civic coalition, which I have acknowledged as the Movimentos Liberacion Nacional.

The conception of the MLN, I argue, required the frame extension of the agency component to include militant groups and activities alongside the pacifistic CND. Unlike the Second Declaration, which barred militant groups from the CND, the Third Declaration welcomes the ‘militants of the different political organisations, to take up the means and forms that they consider possible and necessary,’ (January 1st 1995). While the details of these ‘means’ were omitted, marking this as a ‘blurry’ agency frame, there is no doubt as to the implicit threat of a return to violence. Indeed, the very formulation of the MLN marked a return to the language of militarism, as the Third Declaration included a series of ‘orders’ for the new structure:

‘FIRST – that from the federal government custody of the motherland be taken. The Mexican flag, the justice system of the Nation, the Mexican hymn, and the
National Emblem will now be under the care of the resistance forces until legality, legitimacy and sovereignty are restored to all of the national territory.

SECOND – the original Political Constitution of the United Mexican States is declared valid, as written on the 5th of February of 1917, with the incorporation of the Revolutionary Laws of 1993 and inclusion of the Statutes of Autonomy for the indigenous regions, and will be held as valid until a new constitutional body is installed and a new constitution is written.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1995)

It is noteworthy that the constitution, which was dismissed in the Second Declaration as the EZLN claimed authority directly from civil society, is once again apparent in the Third Declaration. I suggest that this was designed to regain the historical and political legitimacy awarded to revolutionary methods in the constitution. Finally, and notwithstanding the apparent shift toward militancy, the EZLN was careful to retain its link with mainstream civil society, and achieved this through Cuauhetemoc Cardenas. The populist leader of the PRD and defeated presidential candidate was asked to act as the figurehead for the MLN’s ‘broad opposition front’. In this way, the link with institutional politics was preserved, and it is for this reason that I recommend that this process of frame alignment be characterised as frame extension rather than frame transformation. Put simply, civil society agency was extended to include the activities of militants previously excluded from the peaceful agency component framed in the Second Declaration.

To understand frame extension we must appreciate the EZLN’s frustration at the ineffectiveness of the CND, which was defeated by its own weaknesses as much as PRI social control. The text laments the divisive effects of flexible accommodation whilst initiating a creeping criticism of civil society for its gullibility in succumbing to government promises. Assurances of free and fair elections had, the Zapatistas claimed,
helped discourage the CND from supporting Cardenas in August, and it was as a consequence of this that the CND now wandered without anchor in the uncertain waters of Mexico’s post-electoral malaise. Stung by the CND’s failure, the Zapatistas attacked what they saw as the ‘gradualism and hesitation [that] appear in the lines of the opposition who accept a perception of this great fraud as a series of small “irregularities”,’ and which ‘only prolongs the agony,’ (EZLN, January 1st 1995). From this we can infer the beginnings of the EZLN’s frustration with civil society’s lack of resolve, tendency towards division, and inability to recognise the futility of the electoral route.

I argue that it was this situation that prompted the Third Declaration’s more vigorous method of campaign. Javier Eloriaga, a participant in both the CND and the MLN, has commented on the shift:

‘If in the First Declaration the message was “join the insurgent forces,” and in the Second; “civil society organise yourself and demonstrate to us that there is another road than armed struggle,” in the Third [Declaration] it was acknowledged that the movement was not able to make the advances planned and hoped for and that now the EZLN was searching for a place in the organisation of the political struggle together with all that which comprised Cardenismo and with the National Democratic Convention. The idea was: Cardenismo + CND + EZLN = National Liberation Movement.’

(Eloriaga, 1997)

I agree with Eloriaga to a degree. Certainly, the EZLN was demanding a role alongside the CND and the cardenistas, which Eloriaga describes as ‘the two other movements which [the EZLN] considered of a non-party nature,’ (Eloriaga, 1997). However, what Eloriaga does not observe – probably because of his close association with the EZLN and the fact that he was writing later, at a time of negotiation with the government rather than
hostility – is that the EZLN were also inviting more militant elements to join the MLN, elements that had been deliberately excluded from the First and Second Declaration for their violent tendencies. The militancy of their new agency frame was underscored by the Zapatistas’ recent ‘capture’ of 38 Chiapas municipalities, an event that was little more than a week old at the time of the Third Declaration. While no shots had been fired in this action, the EZLN had claimed a sphere of influence that stretched well beyond the boundaries of the January 12th ceasefire agreement. The takeover was a thinly veiled reminder that the EZLN was a guerrilla army. Indeed, Subcomandate Marcos took the opportunity to reissue the declaration of war, albeit in less inflammatory terms (Womack, 1999: 290). That Chiapas was teetering on the brink of renewed warfare is highlighted by Bishop Ruiz’s hunger strike, which he began in late December and out of which he could only be coaxed by a fragile truce which the EZLN announced as part of their Third Declaration along with the creation of a new Commission for National Intermediation (CONAI) with Ruiz himself as chairman.

CONCLUSION

The Third Declaration, I argue, represents the Zapatistas’ last earnest appeal to national civil society. There is continuity in the frame amplification of the nationalist movement identity and shared national injustices and objectives, yet the frame components reveal altered shades of meaning that break with the Second Declaration in subtle but important ways. The frame extension of the organisational identity layer, for example, threw the Zapatistas’ civil society alliance open to all Mexicans, even those excluded from the Second Declaration for their violent ways, while the frame amplification of nationalist history was complemented by the frame reduction of indigenous imagery, as the EZLN looked to ameliorate the marginalisation caused by several months of immersion in local Chiapan politics. Finally, the frame extension of agency allowed the EZLN to propose a new way forward that expressed frustration at the peaceful preferences of civil society...
and incorporated alongside these the militant activities of radicals. Needless to say, this action agenda dovetailed with the frame extension of the Zapatistas’ organisational identity, and cast the MLN as an ‘anything goes’ coalition of anti-PRI groups.

Characterising the EZLN’s *Third Declaration*, I maintain that it fits with the nationalistic collective action frames pioneered in their *First* and *Second Declarations*. That said, the alignment of frame components reinforces my argument that the detail of the EZLN’s discourse is evolutionary and formed in dialogue with political, economic and cultural contexts. Indeed, the *Third Declaration* marks the last of the Zapatistas’ nationalistic collective action frames. As their fortunes changed in early 1995 the ill-fated MLN failed, highlighting the limitations of the EZLN’s partnership with civil society. Mexico would wait almost a full year for their *Fourth Declaration*, a text which was to signal an entirely new direction for the Zapatista discourse.
PART THREE

The Indigenous Phase

January 1st 1996 to July 19th 1998

‘The flower of the word will not die. The masked face which today has a name may die, but the flower which came from the depth of history and the earth can no longer be cut by the arrogance of the powerful. We were born of the night. We live in the night. We will die in her. But the light will be tomorrow for others.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1996)

The MLN succumbed to internal divisions in February 1995. Later that month, the federal army and police renewed hostilities in Chiapas, and only pressure from civil society prevented them from apprehending leaders. As peace talks renewed in March, and throughout the rest of the year, the discourse of patriotism that marked the Zapatistas’ first three Declarations waned significantly. Instead, the EZLN consolidated a new discursive strategy with their Fourth Declaration in January 1996. The most notable feature of this Declaration was the amplification of indigenous cultural traits through language and symbolism, a trend that continued, with advantages, in their Fifth Declaration in July 1998. Here, in Part Three, I examine the frame components and framing processes of these ‘indigenous’ texts, and identify elements of truth in analyses that present the EZLN as in possession of an ‘indigenous soul’ (Gossen, 1996; Gilly, 1998). Unlike these analyses, however, I explain discursive progression in relation to changing contexts, and argue that it was the reality of civil society’s divisiveness, the need to negotiate with the PRI, the constraints of a new national dialogue, and pressures internal to the EZLN’s
support communities that led the Zapatistas to infuse their collective action frame with indigenous symbols and beliefs.

Part Three follows the same structure seen previously, whereby, in separate chapters, I deconstruct key texts according to their frame components and identify points of discursive alteration as evidence of the EZLN’s fluid discourse. Here, I deconstruct two texts over two chapters: the Zapatistas’ *Fourth Declaration* (January 1st 1996) and their *Fifth Declaration* (EZLN, July 19th 1998). As with the other *Declarations*, the role of the author and pragmatic intent are those of a contentious collective actor making known its collective self, enemy, grievances, and action agenda to an external audience; the speech situation is that of an SMO aligning its collective action frame to secure support from bystanders and potential adherents. As before, the deconstruction of these texts according to their frame components will facilitate valid comparisons, and allow me to demonstrate the changing nature of the Zapatistas’ discourse in dialogue with their changing circumstances.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Fourth Declaration

(January 1st 1996)

INTRODUCTION

While I argue that it marks a discursive rupture with the nationalistic Declarations of Part Two, I recognise that the Fourth Declaration was not the first Zapatista communiqué to utilise indigenous imagery and language\textsuperscript{43}. What the Fourth Declaration did do, however, was consolidate an avowedly indigenous discourse for the EZLN by drawing its various strands together in a succinct and unified statement of the rebellion’s indigenous flavour. It is certainly significant, for example, that the Fourth Declaration was the first EZLN communiqué to be published in Nahuatl, the romanticised indigenous language spoken by thousands of indigenous Mexicans, including Emiliano Zapata himself. Within the text, frame alignment processes differ from component to component, although the overall effect, I argue, is the transformation of the EZLN’s collective action frame from nationalism to indigenism. I argue that there were multiple strategic reasons for frame alignment of components, and that these counter the belief that the Zapatistas’ indigenous discourse was the product of an innate Indian essence or soul, as some have suggested (Gossen, 1996).

IDENTITY

Deconstruction of the identity component reveals a process of frame amplification at the organisational layer, as the Zapatistas looked to emphasise their organisation’s indigenous leadership. Partly, this was intended to downplay the importance of the high profile

\textsuperscript{43}In 1992, for example, Marcos’s letter, The Southeast in Two Winds, had sought to carve out a new role for the EZLN as an indigenous army within the declining socialist movement, while in July 1994 the Second Declaration ended with a distinctively Mayan appeal to ‘our dead’. Moreover, a brief return to armed conflict in February 1995 saw the EZLN and the PRI engage in a new round of peace negotiations known as the San Andres dialogue, the circumstances of which led Zapatista representatives to rely more and more on an indigenous discourse that emphasised the cultural differences between themselves and their corrupt and predominantly ladino opponents in the PRI government.
ladino, Marcos, who had become a celebrity in Latin America, but it was also a reaction against the apparent inability of Mexicans to recognise the ability of indigenas to think for themselves. This point is demonstrated in statements which emphasise indigenous autonomy:

‘The indigenous Mexicans, the ones always forced to listen, to obey, to accept, to resign themselves, took the word and spoke the wisdom which is in their walk. The image of the ignorant Indian, pusillanimous and ridiculous, the image which the Powerful had decreed for national consumption, was shattered, and the indigenous pride and dignity returned to history in order to take the place it deserves.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1996)

Such declarations were reinforced by the decision to publish the Fourth Declaration in the indigenous Nahuatl language. Indeed, it was this that produced the distinctive incantations that structure the Fourth Declaration in its translated form. I have included the following extract at length because it typifies the chant-like quality of the Nahuatl language:

‘The flower of the word will not die. The masked face which today has a name may die, but the word which came from the depth of history and the earth can no longer be cut by the arrogance of the powerful. We were born of the night. We live in the night. We will die in her. But the light will be tomorrow for others, for all those who today weep at the night, for those who have been denied the day, for those for whom death is a gift, for those who are denied life. The light will be for all of them. For everyone everything. For us pain and anguish, for us the joy of rebellion, for us a future denied, for us the dignity of insurrection. For us nothing.
Our fight has been to make ourselves heard, and the bad government screams arrogance and closes its ears with its cannons.

Our fight is caused by hunger, and the gifts of the bad government are lead and paper for the stomachs of our children.

Our fight is for a roof over our heads which has dignity, and the bad government destroys our homes and our history.

Our fight is for knowledge, and the bad government distributes ignorance and disdain.

Our fight is for the land, and the bad government gives us cementaries.

Our fight is for a job which is just and dignified, and the bad government buys and sells our bodies and our shames.

Our fight is for life, and the bad government offers death as our future.

Our fight is for respect for our right to sovereignty and self-government, and the bad government imposes laws of the few on the many.

Our fight is for liberty of thought and walk, and the bad government builds jails and graves.

Our fight is for justice, and the bad government consists of criminals and assassins.

Our fight is for history and the bad government proposes to erase history.

Our fight is for the homeland, and the bad government dreams with the flag and the language of foreigners.

Our fight is for peace, and the bad government announces war and destruction.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1996)

Short, almost repetitive sentences contrast sharply with the First, Second and Third Declarations, which were more flowing and recognisably ‘in Marcos’s intellectual style,’ (Womack, 1999: 279). On a final note, it is significant that Nahuatl is not spoken by the
Maya, but is popularly seen by Mexicans as the language of the country’s indigenous people. As such, we can infer that its use in the *Fourth Declaration* was symbolic, and marked the affirmation of the EZLN’s indigenous constitution. It was, in short, intended to drive home the point that Marcos and other high profile *ladino* Zapatistas were in fact subordinate to the true leaders of the EZLN’s indigenous governing body, the CCRI.

The frame amplification of indigenous authorship and authority was, I argue, stimulated by the continuing problem of PRI counterframes, which attempted to paint the EZLN as an organisation under the clandestine control of shadowy socialist forces. The PRI had always denied the rebellion’s indigenous leadership, and even as early as January 6th 1994 the EZLN had been obliged to hit back at such accusations, insisting that,

‘Currently, the political leadership of our struggle is completely indigenous. One hundred percent of the members of the indigenous revolutionary clandestine committees in the combat zones belong to Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Chol, Tojolaba, and other ethnic groups.’


Adolfo Gilly has argued that the Zapatistas’ determination to emphasise their indigenous leadership was a reaction to the perennial ethnocentricity of the Mexican government, for whom independent indigenous resistance was ‘always assimilated only with difficulty by the dominant regime, which interminably searches for outside agitators to explain rebellions by the dominated, who are presumed to have neither thoughts of their own nor a capacity to take the initiative,’ (1998: 266). However, while astute, Gilly fails to account for the ebb and flow of PRI counterframes, which, I have argued, were themselves inspired by the opportunities and constraints perceived by powerholders. During 1995, I argue, government counterframes that denied the Zapatistas’ indigenous leadership

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44 Of all Mexico’s indigenous languages, *Nahuatl* has long been romanticised in poetry and song (Campbell, 1997). This is probably because it was the language of the Aztecs and because it is the indigenous language of central Mexico, close to the capital.
became intolerable for the EZLN-CCRI. The problem began in early 1995 when the PRI uncovered the EZLN’s genesis in the socialist and non-indigenous FLN. Though these links had long been severed, the government had begun to exaggerate them by targeting Marcos and ‘unmasking’ him as ex-socialist and one-time university lecturer Rafael Sebastian Guillen Vicente (Stavans, 1996). Indeed, Marcos’s ladino identity provided the federal government with the excuse it needed to break the ceasefire and invade Zapatista territory. On February 9th the army and police passed into Zapatista territory in what proved to be a grossly misjudged coup that only served to reanimate the dormant civil society and force the PRI to inaugurate a second round of peace talks[45]. The renewed negotiations were named for the community of San Andreas in which they were held. The San Andreas Dialogue dominated the rest of 1995 and, for several reasons, would prove instrumental in encouraging the EZLN to amplify their indigenous organisational identity in the Fourth Declaration.

Events surrounding San Andres threatened both the EZLN’s indigenous supreme command and high-ranking non-indigenous officers in much more insidious ways than the government’s clumsy invasion. Even in the midst of the negotiations the government would not relax its insistence that the EZLN’s protestations of indigenous leadership were disingenuous. Marco Antonio Bernal Gutierrez was the PRI’s chief negotiator through most of the process, and he was determined to expose the EZLN’s true leaders as a small core of predominantly white ex-socialists. The implicit racism in Bernal’s attitude was not lost on the EZLN, and I argue that the Fourth Declaration’s amplification of indigenous

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[45] Spurred on by the economic crisis and the need to appease the international banking community, the new president, Zedillo, reneged on the 1994 January 12th ceasefire and called on the federal army to bring down the Zapatistas’ high command. Ostensibly the incursion was executed in pursuit of Marcos and other high-ranking ladino Zapatistas, whom the PRI had finally accepted were Mexican but whom they continued to disparage as ‘bad Mexicans’ responsible for leading the peaceable indigenas of Chiapas astray (Ross, 2000). Civil society, though it had been inactive and divided for so long, was finally galvanised and on March 11th the president’s military campaign was brought to an abrupt and unsuccessful end when thousands of Mexicans voiced their objection to the renewed civil war. Realising his mistake, Zedillo sued for peace and publicly recognised Bishop Ruiz’s Commission for National Intermediation (CONAI) as the mediating body for the conflict. He also accepted the input of a new independent advisory group made up of legislators and constitutionalists from Mexico’s political parties: the Commission for Concordance and Pacification (COCOPA). In March 1995, the CONAI and COCOPA took their seats alongside the EZLN and the PRI at the negotiating table of San Andres.
authority was, in part, an attack on the hubris of the PRI government that continued to traduce indigenous citizens as incapable of independent thought. Yet there was a more immediate and implicit threat in Bernal’s opposition. The federal army’s invasion had been justified by the public ‘unmasking’ of Subcomandante Marcos and, in order to legitimate the use of violence, the federal police had issued a warrant for his arrest. Although, under the terms of the March 11th protocol that ended the invasion, the warrant was suspended for the duration of the Dialogue, Marcos made no secret of his belief that he would face immediate arrest if he himself came out of hiding to take part at San Andres (Marcos, May 5th 1995). This danger was made even more apparent to Marcos when, in October of 1995, federal police detained Fernando Yanez Munoz in Mexico City, claiming that Yanez was none other than ‘Comandante German’, a high-ranking EZLN officer from the days when the organisation was still answerable to the FLN. While the EZLN did not confirm or deny its links with Yanez, they vociferously decried his arrest as a contravention of the March 11th protocols and an indicator of the continuing threat of arrest posed to current Zapatista officers such as Marcos (Marcos, October 27th 1995). Eventually, under pressure from members of the multiparty Commission for Concordance and Pacification (COCOPA), which was convened to oversee and advise at San Andres, and whose members feared the talks might be derailed if compromise was not reached, the federal police agreed to release Yanez. Nonetheless, his high profile arrest and Marcos’s own suspended status as a felon added to the Zapatistas’ fears of a government conspiracy aimed at portraying a non-indigenous socialist core at the heart of the EZLN (Preston, New York Times, October 25th 1995).

It should also be noted, on a practical level, that the threat of Marcos’s arrest actually prevented his physical participation in the San Andres dialogue, and so obliged the EZLN to send indigenous representatives to the talks alone. Indigenous Comandantes had been encouraged to speak at the earlier Cathedral Dialogue in San Cristobal in March 1994, but the CCRI’s fears of PRI manipulation and their awareness of
their own relative lack of cultural capital led them to leave much of the direct negotiation to their nominated spokesman, Marcos (Bellinghausen, *La Jornada*, June 13th 1995). At San Andres, by contrast, the COCOPA, the PRI, and the mediating body of Bishop Ruiz’s Commission for National Intermediation (CONAI) were introduced to a wholly indigenous team, led by CCRI Comandantes David and Zebedeo without the dominant presence of the white man:

‘Because of military considerations and the bounty on his head, Subcomandante Marcos would not be in attendance [at San Andres] – his physical absence throughout 18 subsequent months of on-and-off negotiations would encourage a whole new echelon of public spokespersons to rise from the ranks,’

(Ross, 2000: 120)

By allowing indigenous officers to lead their delegation at the talks, the Zapatistas could not help but reify their indigenous organisational character, and lend credence to their claim that the small number of ladinos in the EZLN – including Marcos – were in fact subordinate to their Indian superiors in the CCRI. The *Fourth Declaration* was issued in the midst of the San Andres process, and I maintain that its amplification of an indigenous organisational leadership and identity must be understood in this context. Indeed, I suggest that the Zapatistas built on the growing media profile of their indigenous negotiating team in order to discredit official reports that denied them their indigenous leadership and authenticity, blamed the insurgency on ex-socialist agitators, and threatened their credibility as representatives of indigenous and national interests.

It was, however, the realignment of the movement and solidary-group layers of the identity component that truly broke with the past. Seemingly innocuous, the publication of the *Fourth Declaration* in the Indian language Nahuatl immediately amplified the Zapatistas’ indigenous solidary-group, and, in so doing, aligned the rebels
with myriad struggles that had raged for centuries to protect the cultural alterity of indigenous groups. This single discursive act displaced the EZLN’s movement identity, moving away from their prior association with the nationalist teleology of the Mexican Revolution and embedding them in a new teleology of indigenous survival and resistance. The new alignment with the history of strictly indigenous struggle was made clear in the text itself:

‘…the rebellion that today has a dark face and a true language was not born today. It spoke before and in other languages and in other lands. In many mountains and many histories rebellion has taken its path against injustice. It has already spoken in nahuatl, paipai, kiliwa, cucapa, cochimi, kumiai, yuma, seri, chontal, chinanteco, pame, chichimeca, otomi, mazahua, matlatzinca, ocuilteco, zapoteco, solteco, chatino, papabuco, mixteco, cucateco, triqui, amuzzgo, mazateco, chocho, ixcaateco, huave, tlapaneco, totonaca, tepehua, populuca, mixe, zoque, huasteco, lacandon, mayo, chol, tzeltal, tzotzil, tojolabal, mame, teco, ixil, aguacateco, motocintleco, chicomucelteco.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1996)

I argue that this marked the frame transformation of the EZLN’s movement identity, as, in contrast to earlier Declarations, the Fourth Declaration cast the rebellion in the mantle of the indigenous movement. It is significant, for example, that until the Fourth Declaration the insurgents’ own indigenousness had always been subordinated to or grounded in dominant movement identities that stressed first socialist (Marcos, 1992) and then nationalist values (EZLN, January 1994; June 1994; January 1995). Indeed, it could be said that by allowing their indigenous selves to be absorbed within superordinate political identities that denied indigenas their political independence and credibility, the EZLN had always adhered to the same *mestizaje* practices that underpinned the Mexican state itself.
With the *Fourth Declaration*, however, the Zapatistas’ indigenousness, long acknowledged but always controlled, was finally allowed to infuse their cause. Their struggle was no longer justified by its place in the nationalist grand narrative, where the quest for freedom, democracy and justice had been legitimated by its roots in the Mexican constitution, Mexican civil society or the actions and/or words of dead Mexican revolutionaries, but by its consanguinity with the history of indigenous resistance and defiance across Latin America.

The frame transformation of the movement layer was only made possible by a complementary process of frame amplification at the solidary-group layer, whereby the Zapatistas emphasised the peculiarities of their own Mayan discourse through the imagery of the ‘flowering mountain earth’. This is most apparent in the EZLN’s efforts to position their rebellion in a perpetual cycle of indigenous resistance:

‘Word’s flower does not die, even though silence walks our steps. The word is seeded in silence. So that it blooms with a shout, it is silent. The word becomes soldier so as not to die in oblivion. In order to live the word dies, forever seeded in the world’s belly. By being born and living, we die. We will always live. Only those who give up their history will return to oblivion.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1996)

Carlsen and Prechtel (1991) insist that the agricultural metaphor is ubiquitous and multidimensional in Maya belief, and that it refers to more than mere vegetation alone. ‘Flowering Mountain Earth,’ they argue, is a unifying concept that is inextricably linked to the human life cycle, kinship, modes of production, religious and political hierarchy, concepts of time and even celestial movement (Carlsen and Prechtel, 1991: 27; see also Fischer, 1999, 2002; Nash, 1985, 1995). The Atiteco Maya refer to this universal point of origin as *Kotsej Juyu Ruchiliew*, a Quichean term that describes the centre of the
flowering mountain earth, which is usually represented as a maize plant or cieba tree, at which point all life begins and ends. Moreover, as well as being the seed from which all life grows, Kotsej Juyu Ruchiliew is also the site to which the body or ‘husk’ returns after death. Thus, the image of the flowering mountain denotes the Maya belief in regeneration, or Jaloj-K’exoj, ‘the flowering of the dead,’ which Carlsen and Prechtel also deconstruct:

‘Traditionally, Mayans have believed that life arises from death. Consistent with this belief, beginning in death, jal is the change manifested in the transition to life through birth, through youth and old age, and finally back into death. Symbolically, jal is change on the outside, at the ‘husk.’ By contrast, k’ex occurs at the ‘seed,’ and refers to generational change… to the transfer, hence the continuity, of life.’

(Carlsen and Prechtel, 1991: 26)

The very fact that parts of the Fourth Declaration remain almost incomprehensible to western audiences without the interpretive work of anthropologists only serves to underline the Zapatistas’ efforts to amplify their indigenous otherness. By amplifying the cultural beliefs of their rank-and-file, the EZLN were able to frame their struggle as part of an unbroken chain of indigenous resistance, and I maintain that this reinforced the transformation of their movement identity as they became the vanguard for Mexico’s indigenous movement.

Elsewhere in the text, the frame transformation of the movement identity was reinforced by the alteration of many existing features of the Zapatista discourse, such as civil society and the image of Zapata, which were retained but repackaged to fit with indigenous ideas. Much is made, in the Fourth Declaration, of the ‘brothers and sisters of other races’, an ethnically sensitive categorisation that is analogous to ‘civil society’ but which replaces the latter as the repository of the EZLN’s sovereignty. In this way the
Fourth Declaration framed the EZLN’s solidarity with ordinary Mexicans, not through the nationalistic claim to Mexico’s Revolutionary history, but through ethnic signifiers that emphasised the shared ‘same heart’ that is rooted in mestizaje:

‘Our blood and our word have lit a small fire in the mountain, and we walk a path against the house of money and the powerful. Brothers and sisters of other races and languages, of other colours, but with the same heart, now protect our light, and in it they drink of the same fire.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1996)

By the same token, the image of Zapata also began to assume a more indigenous pallor. The civil movement was described as a ‘political force that calls itself Zapatista because it is born with the indigenous hope and heart that, together with the EZLN, again descended from the Mexican mountains,’ (EZLN, January 1st 1996). Zapata was transformed, through the subtle transference of emphasis, from a symbol of peasant nationalism to a symbol of Mexican indigenousness. Power and legitimacy continued to be conferred upon civil movement through his memory, but not through his legacy of revolutionary nationalism, rather by his social location as a man of indigenous ancestry.

In order to understand this process of frame transformation in context, it is necessary to raise a point of theoretical interest. Frame theorists David Snow and his colleagues describe ‘frame transformation’ as the rejection of old meanings and understandings and their replacement with new values and/or beliefs (1986: 473). I argue, however, that the frame transformation of the EZLN’s movement identity was more

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46 In their efforts to bolster their indigenous organisational credentials prior to the Second Declaration, the Zapatistas had already begun to exploit mestizaje and local traditions in order to fuse Zapata-the-nationalist with an indigenous deity known as Votan. The demi-god Votan Zapata was offered as the guardian and heart of the people as early as April 1994 (EZLN, April 10th, 1994; Stephen, 2002). The EZLN were aided in this discursive fusion by Maya tendencies towards religious and cultural syncretism, which recombine deities with historical facts to mould ‘the Maya cultural and social landscape into ethnic enclaves of community and country, neighbour and stranger, Maya and ladino,’ (Watanabe, 1990: 145). In their Fourth Declaration, the EZLN played on these same ambiguities to reduce Zapata’s alignment with nationalism and amplify the Zapatistas’ solidarity with ordinary Mexicans as a thing founded on indigenous beliefs.
subtle than Snow et al’s blanket definition allows. Steinberg reminds us that ‘discourse is both enabling and constraining,’ (Steinberg, 2002: 213), and in this case the Zapatistas’ shift to an indigenous movement identity was enabled by the nationalist discourse that had underpinned their earlier Declarations. The assimilatory nature of Mexico’s mestizaje political culture had always meant that any alignment with nationalism carried an unavoidable if implicit alignment with a ‘shared’ indigenous heritage (Bonfil, 1980; Knight, 1994; Bantjes, 1997). From their very First Declaration, moreover, the EZLN had acknowledged the indigenous nature of their rank and file, and had positioned the indigenous struggle ‘against slavery’ as just one facet of their broader nationalist movement (EZLN, January 1st, 1994). In fact, indigenas’ place in the Zapatistas’ nationalist movement identity had been reaffirmed time and again:

‘The noble Mexican nation rests on our bones. If they destroy us, the entire country will plummet and begin to wander without direction or roots. A prisoner of the shadows, Mexico would negate its tomorrow by denying its yesterday.’

(EZLN, October 12th 1995)

Indigenousness, therefore, had always been implicit to the nationalist movement identity that the EZLN had propounded in their First, Second and Third Declarations. Consequently, their alignment with indigenous identities in the Fourth Declaration did not require them to renounce nationalist values entirely; rather, nationalist values were simply subordinated to indigenous beliefs as the Fourth Declaration played on the ambiguities of mestizaje to construct a more indigenous movement identity. In short, frame transformation in this instance was underpinned not by wholesale rejection of earlier discursive features as Snow et al would have it, but by a more delicate transference of emphasis that exploited the fluidity of meanings inherent to the Mexican national imaginary.
While this helps to explain how the EZLN were able to transform their movement identity in the *Fourth Declaration*, it does not explain why they were moved to do so. For this we must place frame transformation in the context of the tumultuous events that followed the federal army’s attack on February 9th 1995. It was, I argue, a combination of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that drew the Zapatistas away from their explicit alignment with nationalism towards an avowedly indigenous movement identity. First, ‘push’ factors surrounded the decline of revolutionary nationalism as a unifying discourse in the wake of Mexico’s economic crisis. As a political ideology, nationalism had been on the decline ever since President Salinas’s neoliberal doctrine began to erode the corporatist structures that enabled diverse political communities to identify with the patria (Pansters, 1997; Zermeno, 1997; Bartra, 2002). Even before the depression that began in early 1995, challengers were encouraged to object to what they perceived to be unpatriotic government policy. Indeed, it was the unravelling of ideological uniformity that had enabled challengers like the EZLN to turn the nationalist discourse against the government in the first place (Stephen, 2002). Foreign investment, the erosion of traditional corporate sectors, the failure of replacement initiatives like PRONASOL and PROCAMPO, constitutional reform and the cultural effects of globalised mass culture had been steadily undermining the traditional corporatist teepee of CTM workers, CNC peasants and CNOP bureaucrats. As the country began a long dark period of recession, however, the fallout from this became apparent. The inability of the new Zedillo administration to contain the economic crisis exposed weaknesses, not only in the regime, but also in the ideology that supported its unifying social control mechanisms:

‘To keep the PRI ideologically in sync with the profound policy changes wrought under de la Madrid and Salinas, the PRI… abandoned revolutionary nationalism as its policy guide and adopted “social liberalism,” a neoliberalism that was supposed to be softened by social programs such as PRONASOL (Salinas *et al.*
In important ways, this ideological shift moved the PRI into the ideological space that the PAN had occupied at least from the early 1980s.’

(Klesner, 1998)

In a Mexico where workers, peasants and the petit bourgeoisie were all losing out to market forces, and where the PRI’s marriage to neoliberalism limited the party’s ability to shuttle between populism and vested interests, the system of corporatism and clientelism that upheld the state collapsed, and revolutionary nationalism’s potential as the unifying discourse that bound Mexicans together was severely compromised (Aitken et al, 1996; Zermeno, 1997; Cornelius et al, 1987; Klesner, 1987; Morris, 1995). Indeed, as the PRI moved itself away from revolutionary nationalism, Latin American Scholars began to ask probing questions regarding the future of a nationalist ideology so closely allied to increasingly redundant corporatist structures, and what this might mean for the future of ‘Mexicanness’:

‘…we could wonder whether revolutionary nationalism – hegemonic official ideology – still remains one of the bases of the Mexican system. The political thinking that sustained the authoritarian system is fatally wounded, and this is something we should celebrate, since it helps accelerate the democratic transition. And yet this has other dramatic consequences: the cultural structures that symbolically bound Mexicanness to authoritarian forms of government are also breaking apart. This has meant that part of the population is experiencing the political crisis as a true existential problem.’

(Bartra, 2002: 62)

Any master frame or discursive repertoire that, for whatever reasons of structural change, falls from favour or becomes riddled with contradictions, will impose constraints on those
political organisations that draw from it (McAdam, 1994; Steinberg, 1999). So it was, I argue, with nationalism. The Zapatistas’ efforts to mobilise civil society had, until now, rested on reaching out to other parts and constituencies of Mexico through nationalist values and interests, but the existential problem of Mexico’s national identity and the subsequent fragmentation of civil society threatened to derail this initiative. In the course of 1995, political activity was transformed into a ‘concern with the restricted identities of movements organized around the urban setting, human rights, ecclesiastic communities, trade unions, youth and women,’ (Zermeno, 1997: 188). Traditionally nationalist political identities were gradually replaced with local concerns and single issues as the new bases of political identity in what Habermas calls the ‘postnational state’ (1998). It was clear that nationalism was not the unifying ideology it had once been. Indeed, on February 3rd 1995, just one month after its conceptual birth in the Third Declaration and a mere six days after it was created, the Zapatistas’ new Movimentos Liberacion Nacional failed to unite civil society behind the Mexican flag and collapsed under the weight of internal divisions. The EZLN was only saved from the embarrassment of this failure by the federal army invasion just days later on February 9th, which had the effect of rallying civil society to the Zapatistas’ defence once more. Nonetheless, the MLN had been a disaster, one that Commandante Tacho ascribed to the difficulty of overcoming civil society’s preoccupation with individual and fragmented interests:

‘In action, they are accustomed to being divided, each one wants to be proud, to say they are the best. But that’s not what it’s about… A leader has to show how to organize again in new ways, because Mexican society is not organized right now.’

47 It is worth footnoting Bantjes (1997) and Stephen (2002), who both argue that ‘Mexicanness’ was experienced differently by region, race, religion and indeed gender. Nonetheless, while I do not dispute the idea that nationalism was (and is) felt and expressed with great diversity, my argument is that the unifying potential of revolutionary nationalism, bound with historic ideas of the Constitutional Convention, as the umbrella under which Mexicans came to identify with one of three broad sectors - ‘workers’ (CTM), ‘peasants’ (CNC) and the middle-classes (CNOP) - was weakened after neoliberal restructuration. The result, according to Zermeno (1997) and Bartra (2002), was the fracture of traditional civil identities and the rise of what European analysts might describe as ‘new social movement’ identities (Melucci, 1988) concerned with cultural, religious and other issues detached from the national imaginary.
In much the same way that the decline of the socialist master frame had narrowed the options for the EZLN in 1994, the inability of Mexican nationalism to defeat the fragmentation of civil society brought about a similar identity crisis in 1995. I suggest that, as traditional conceptions of national unity were eroded and cast adrift, the EZLN was encouraged to move away from overt declarations of nationalism and searched instead for new discursive fields through which to frame its movement identity.

Coincidental to this ‘push’ factor were several ‘pull’ factors, which encouraged the EZLN to finally ‘assume the full epistemological implications’ of their indigenous interests (Pollack, 1999: 42). The most influential of these was the rise of an emergent but increasingly potent indigenous movement master frame in Latin America. Although marginalized in Mexico itself, indigenous SMOs had made their presence felt in other parts of the continent and were instrumental in the assertion and separation of ‘indigenous’ histories from ‘national’ histories. For example, after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize for her work in Guatemala, the indigenous activist Rigoberta Menchu dedicated the Vicente Menchu Foundation to the worldwide defence of indigenous peoples. In Nicaragua, the socialist-indigenous alliance successfully negotiated Indian rights and cultural protections under the Sandinista government of the 1980s and 1990s. Aaron Pollack (1998, 1999) notes the rise of what he calls indigenous ‘livelihood movements’ in the 1990s. These movements, he suggests, took advantage of new media and international sympathies to engineer ‘the boomerang effect’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), enlisting external agents and international advocacy groups to help them halt the expansion of capitalism and state-sponsored ‘development projects’ that threatened their cultural survival. Similar observations have been made by Mejía and Sarmiento (1987), Harvey (1998), and Mattiace (2003). Equally, from the western perspective, Womack observes the sharp rise in international interest in indigenous affairs since the early 1980s.
It was around this time that a UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations began annual discussions towards a Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This body promoted the recognition of specific cultural rights before the law, and demystified indigenous otherness for a non-Indian audience. Together, the UN working group and the social movement organisations it succoured helped to make indigenous political identities more mainstream, more accessible, and less frightening to the non-Indian majority. Indeed, far from being alienated by expressions of indigenous otherness, many on the political left began to see indigenism as a new way to wage war on capitalism in the post-Cold War age:

‘While democratisation has opened up new spaces for civil organising, the near-universal embrace of neoliberalism poses lethal dangers to rural indigenous economies. With the traditional left in decline, indigenous groups have stepped into the breach in many countries, becoming the protagonists in the struggle against the neoliberal onslaught.’

(McFadyen et al, 1996)

Put simply, the early 1990s witnessed a pan-American rise in mobilisations that sought social justice through the unabashed promotion and preservation of explicitly indigenous cultural differences. Indeed, it was these groups’ amplification of their constituents’ cultural differences – a process that Ranajit Guha (1997) calls the retrieval of subaltern histories – that was most effective in creating openings for other indigenous groups. The growth of this indigenous movement network is shown by McFadyen et al (1996) when they chart the rise of indigenous associations and note their progression from isolation and fragmentation to coordinated coalitions. We are told, for example, that indigenous politics in the 1980s ‘was largely confined to local communities’ and rarely included any form of unification between different indigenous groups. By 1995, however,
overtly indigenous networks were able to block neoliberal initiatives in Ecuador and Chile, and managed to secure guarantees of separate indigenous rights in Brazil and Columbia. The broadly conceived indigenous movement became officially global when 1993 was declared the United Nations Year of Indigenous Peoples. In spite of the inherent heterogeneity of their members, indigenous solidarity networks helped construct a new international master frame through which new and existing challengers might make claims on their opponents.

Admittedly, however, in Mexico the growth of indigenous politics was a more gradual and fragmented process, largely because of the peculiarities of PRI corporatism and flexible accommodation and the ambivalent position of the Indian in the *mestizaje* imaginary (Bonfil. 1980; Zimmerman, 2001). It was not, I argue, until the corporatist structures that underpinned PRI flexible accommodation began to fail that indigenousness was allowed to develop into a viable political identity. Since the foundation of the modern Mexican state, ‘*Mestizaje* has served as the biological metaphor for the corporativist government policies of the PRI,’ (Saldana-Portillo, 2001: 407). Through the logic *mestizaje*, indigenous differences were subsumed beneath three shared mestizo identities based on social position: for the middle-class the CNOP, for the workers the CTM, and for the peasants the CNC. Deborah Yashar (1998) has argued convincingly that this tradition of tripartite corporatism negated the mobilisation of indigenous movement identities by persuading rural indigenas to pursue their objectives through institutional channels as peasants rather than Indians. Nevertheless, as neoliberalism began to erode the corporatist state, the *mestizaje* appropriation and integration of indigenous histories was increasingly exposed, and subsequently opposed (Knight, 1994, 1997; Bantjes, 1997). For example, the closure of political channels for once-loyal CNC affiliates saw

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48 Certainly, there was and still is a great deal of diversity across the field of indigenous social movements. Kay B. Warren has undertaken extensive comparative study of the so-called ‘Pan-Maya’ indigenous movement and uncovered internal and external structural determinants regarding relative unity and effectiveness across time and location (1998). Indeed, the unique cultural histories, relations and belief systems that local indigenous campaigns draw on gives the broadly defined indigenous movement a rainbow-like quality. The fact that indigenous movements are united by their very otherness is not lost on the Zapatistas in their own call for a movement united by internal differences: a world of many worlds (EZLN, August 3rd 1996).
peasants frozen out by the reform of Article 27, forbidden the right to strike by the collusion of high-ranking CNC representatives, and forced to suffer the combined effects of international competition and recession. While this must have seemed an unfavourable turn of events, it nonetheless weakened corporatist structures as a viable option for peasant activists. In September 1989, over a hundred indigenous representatives met in Oaxaca to coordinate the defence of their cultural rights as unique and separate from those of ladino Mexico (Harvey, 1998), while a similar initiative was ordained in Chiapas, known as the Indigenous People’s Independent Front (FIPI). Perhaps most importantly, these mobilisations coincided with the 500 year anniversary of Columbus’s ‘discovery’ of the Americas, providing the cultural backdrop for a new wave of indigenous mobilisations in October 1992. After these demonstrations, indigenous peasants and economic migrants continued to proclaim their indigenousness in national alliances like the National Council of Indigenous Peoples (CNPI):

‘By the 1990s, multi-cultural politics had replaced assimilationism and participatory indigenismo. In 1990, Mexico was the second country in the world to ratify the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169, which was the most comprehensive single piece of international legislation on Indian rights in the world at the time. The ratification of Convention 169 was followed in 1992 by an amendment to Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution, which recognized Indians’ distinct cultural contribution to the nation.’

(Mattiace, 2003: 123)

Such treaties, along with NAFTA, also forced the reduction of state-sanctioned violence against indigenas as the actions of government agencies came under closer international scrutiny (Harvey, 1998). Thus, while Mexico lagged behind the rest of Latin America, it was slowly developing an indigenous movement that was growing beyond the state’s
corporate control. Where the EZLN had been dissuaded from mobilising as Indians in 1994, by 1995 the corporatist constraints associated with mestizaje were removed.

To this list of opportunities, we might well add the cultural cleavage rent by the Zapatistas’ own rebellion since January 1994. Even though the EZLN rebels had begun by amplifying nationalist values over their indigenous solidarity-group, it was their insistence that they were staffed and governed by Indians that led to their reluctant propulsion to the frontline of indigenous politics in Mexico, and indeed Latin America. Moreover, with its successful resistance to a second military onslaught in February ’95, the EZLN was portrayed among sympathetic media as an indigenous David to the PRI’s neoliberal Goliath. Media coverage, in fact, ‘provoked notable pro-Zapatista demonstrations in the United States and across Western Europe (two in Paris), making Marcos an international pop idol and the Indians of Chiapas globally famous and fantastically attractive,’ (Womack, 1999: 295). By the middle of 1995 Mexico had gone ‘Indian Nuts,’ to the point where ‘many mestizos had become Indians too,’ (Ross, 2000: 156). For social movement activists, the indigenous master frame offered an alternative to the moribund master frame of nationalism, which continued to buckle under the weight of a ‘crisis of identity… where ethnic frontiers do not match political ones’ (Zermeno, 1997: 188). An Indian ancestry became something of which to be proud rather than ashamed, and the EZLN began finally to capitalise on its indigenous solidarity-group. In August 1995, for example, EZLN spokespersons let slip their pragmatic attitude to nationalism by describing this as ‘merely a circumstantial accident for struggle,’ (Marcos, August 7th 1995). Elsewhere, the Zapatistas’ communiqués began to make ever more references to ‘our dead,’ ‘our ancestors’ and ‘the first ones’ as the source of their political inspiration (October 12th 1995). Indeed, in positing an unambiguously indigenous movement identity for the EZLN, the Fourth Declaration simply affirmed a process of indigenous belief amplification and nationalist value reduction that had actually begun some months earlier in response to these new opportunities.
INJUSTICE

The injustice frame of the Fourth Declaration was, I suggest, similarly altered in order to prioritise indigenous grievances and enemies. For the very first time, indigenous grievances were given top billing ahead of universal injustices like the absence of national democracy. A long list of complaints, for example, invokes the indigenous chant to emphasises indigenas’ fear of cultural erosion and the suffering associated with the marginalisation of local practices. The substance of this list gives greater weight to perceived cultural threats:

‘Our struggle is to make ourselves heard, and the bad government shouts arrogance and closes its ears with cannon.
Our struggle is because of hunger, and the bad government gives us lead and paper for our children’s stomachs.
Our struggle is for a decent roof over our heads, and the bad government destroys our houses and our history.
Our struggle is for knowledge, and the bad government spreads ignorance and contempt.
Our struggle is for land, and the bad government offers us cemeteries…
Our struggle is for the right to govern, and to govern ourselves, and the bad government imposes the laws of the minority on the majority…
Our struggle is for history, and the bad government proposes oblivion.
Our struggle is for the Fatherland, and the bad government dreams of a foreign flag and language.’
(EZLN, January 1st 1996)

As the final sentence shows, the national struggle was not entirely rejected, but it was reduced to make way for the amplification of indigenous grievances. The full gamut of
the national grievances is reduced to a single sentence that describes the shared threat facing the fatherland, while twelve others are devoted to the specific grievances of the indigenous. Contrast this with previous Declarations, which subordinated local indigenous grievances and devoted greater attention to the absence of democracy felt by all Mexicans. The Fourth Declaration, moreover, dwells on more abstract cultural grievances to emphasise the threat of community erosion and the loss of history, and contrasts sharply with the material and economic deprivations that dominated earlier Declarations:

‘They do not want us Indians. They want us dead. For the mighty one our silence was his desire... We struggle to speak against oblivion, against death, for memory and for life...’

(EZLN, January 1st 1996)

This struggle for history over ‘oblivion’ magnifies the EZLN’s fears of cultural extinction and draws again on the agricultural metaphor where the only ‘true death’ is to be dead in memory and history, and in which to forget one’s history is to allow one’s ancestors to move beyond the reach of Jaloj-K’exo (Carlsen and Prechtel, 1991). By this same logic, to be forgotten by one’s own progeny is to die eternally, and in prioritising separate indigenous rights, the Fourth Declaration amplifies the threat of cultural negation perceived by the Maya, who were facing cultural extinction at the hands of a receding state that no longer offered protection from the encroaching free market.

Notwithstanding the amplification of indigenous grievances, however, the Fourth Declaration lays the blame for these injustices squarely at the door of the same enemy: the ‘bad government’. Indigenous modes of being, belief and commerce have seldom fitted into the developmental model of the PRI’s modernising project; a fact demonstrated successively by the Mexicanisation programmes of the 1950s and 60s, the assimilationist
agenda of *mestizaje*, and latterly by Salinas’s constitutional reforms of 1992, which abandoned the indigenous to their fate in the free market. The *Fourth Declaration* claims that, in sanctioning these processes, the bad government has ever been determined to negate the otherness of Mexico’s indigenous:

‘They kill us for working, they kill us for living. There is no place for us in the world of power. They will kill us for struggling… They want to take the land away from us so that there is no ground under our feet. They want to take our history away from us so that in oblivion our word will die.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1996)

The text therefore characterises neoliberalism as the latest stage in the bad government’s inexorable drive to modernise ‘backward’ indigenous regions. While it acknowledges shared national injustices, like the loss of national sovereignty and identity that are the common fruits of economic deregulation, these are subordinated to the specific grievances felt by the indigenous community. Therefore, although the bad government’s culpability for indigenous cultural grievances is amplified above its abuse of national democracy, the identity of the enemy is held constant. I argue that the nuances of this injustice frame fit the trend of indigenous belief amplification and nationalist value reduction that runs throughout the *Fourth Declaration*.

In the context of January 1996, the alignment of the injustice component in this way makes sense. Until September of 1995 the threat of localisation and marginalisation that hung over the EZLN had prevented them from prioritising anything other than shared national grievances, lest they be severed from their urban and northern supporters. Indeed, repeated government attempts to deny the Zapatistas’ claim to national importance had ever dissuaded the EZLN from straying too far from the defence of national interests. In September, however, the government was pressured into accepting
the Zapatistas as national players. Indeed, by autumn 1995 the EZLN seemed to be safely ensconced in a renewed peace dialogue whose national implications the PRI had been forced to acknowledge, albeit reluctantly.

Following a hasty climb-down from the brief return to war in February, the PRI quickly reinitiated negotiations with the Zapatistas. By June, however, the so-called San Andres dialogue was threatening to stall over the government’s refusal to negotiate anything on a national level. Gustavo Iruegas and Antonio Bernal, the PRI’s chief representatives, argued that the EZLN’s presence and influence was limited to no more than ‘four Chiapas municipalities’ (Ross, 2000: 122-139). Recognising, once again, the threat of localisation and containment, the EZLN decreed an unprecedented public relations exercise: the great consulta, a nationwide referendum held in August 1995 that conclusively proved the rhizomatic national importance of the Zapatista demands. The consulta was too great a job for the increasingly divided CND and so, in the event, was orchestrated by the Alianza Civica, a national organisation of independent election observers. Alianza civica ensured that 10,000 polling places were organised, and volunteers succeeded in reaching 24 out of the 31 Mexican states. People could even vote online, and 40,000 helpers collected 1,200,000 electronic votes. According to Henck, 1.3 million Mexicans and 55,000 non-Mexicans took part, each answering five simple questions (2002: 20):

1) Do you support the EZLN’s 11 basic demands (work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace)?
2) Should the democratic forces in the country work together to achieve these demands?
3) Does the Mexican state require a profound political reform to achieve democracy?
4) Should the EZLN transform itself into a political force?
5) Should the EZLN join with other democratic forces to form a new opposition alliance?

The results were made public on August 27th: 97.7% in favour of the EZLN’s 11 basic demands; 92.9% in favour of the formation of a broad opposition front; 94.5% demanded ‘profound political reform,’ while 57%, a ‘slim majority,’ wanted the EZLN to convert itself into a new independent political force to achieve these changes (Womack, 1999: 49, and Ross, 2000: 137-8).

The participation of so many Mexicans demonstrated to the Zedillo government, civil society, and the world just how far-reaching the EZLN had become. The independent Alianza cívica bestowed valuable national legitimacy on the results and, although only around 5% of voting Mexicans had taken part, the national reach of the consulta made it difficult for the PRI to deny the EZLN’s influence as a national movement phenomenon. In September, the President’s annual Informe speech was conciliatory and apologetic: under pressure from international investors as well as an increasingly disaffected electorate, Zedillo publicly accepted the Zapatistas’ input in a national dialogue. Consequently, San Andres was officially recognised as a peace process with national ramifications, and on September 10th – just two weeks after the publication of the consulta results – the four parties at San Andres broke the five-month stalemate to reach agreement on four separate tables, all of which would have implications for the entire country. The four tables would be: Indian Rights and Culture, Democracy and Justice, Development and Welfare, and the Rights of Women. Each table was to be discussed in turn over the course of the San Andres process, and in accordance with the platform proposed by the EZLN: dialogue first, followed by negotiation, then accord, and finally commitment. With the Zapatistas finally ensconced in what was now explicitly a national dialogue, the threat of their containment and localisation to Chiapas was significantly reduced. The EZLN could, therefore, afford to relax their reiteration and amplification of
nationalist sentiment, and were able, moreover, to champion the interests of their immediate constituents: the indigenous.

There were, nonetheless, other factors internal to the EZLN that also influenced the indigenisation of their injustice frame. These became apparent during the process of negotiating the parameters for the San Andrés national dialogue. The Zapatista delegates had originally pushed for the Democracy and Justice table to be the launch pad for serious negotiations, probably because this was the most far-reaching and constitutional issue. However, determined to steer the dialogue away from such a controversial issue, the PRI’s chief negotiator, Antonio Bernal, insisted that the table for Indian Rights and Culture be addressed first, ‘because for all its symbolic importance it seemed at once the least important materially, involving only about eight percent of the country’s population, and the most provincial, the easiest to confine to Chiapas,’ (Womack, 1999: 304). Under pressure from their own indigenous rank-and-file, the Zapatista leaders agreed. The Indian Rights and Culture table seemed to offer the greatest chance of achieving real concessions for the besieged and bitterly suspicious indigenous troops and their families. Indeed, Womack has suggested that, for all the Zapatistas’ talk of ‘for everyone, everything, for us, nothing’, the indigenous Zapatista communities were finally looking for some payback on their investment in the EZLN. Speaking on behalf of the EZLN, Marcos had already hinted that the high command’s preoccupation with national constitutional matters was taking it further away from its immediate constituents in Chiapas’s Lacandon and Los Altos regions (Marcos, August 25th 1995). Although the national democratisation issue remained a key concern of high-ranking Zapatistas, the high command pursued the dialogue with a firm eye on destabilising the beleaguered and unpopular Zedillo administration, possibly with a view to reigniting the potential for a coup at some later date, and moving the dialogue forward on any issue was favourable to allowing the talks to falter once more (Marcos and Le Bot, 1997). Under this internal
pressure, and sensing the opportunity for genuine political change, the CCRI leadership agreed to allow Indian Rights and Culture to be the first table at San Andres.

This decision virtually obliged the EZLN to reduce their emphasis of nationally shared injustices. Not only was nationalism losing its attractiveness as a unifying discourse, but its *mestizaje* foundation was entirely unsuitable to the Zapatistas’ promotion of *separate* and distinct Indian rights at San Andres. *Mestizaje*, remember, had seen ‘the Indian majority…unevenly assimilated to the category of “citizens”; only as individuals did they enjoy the supposed “legal equality” that is the recognised right of every citizen,’ (Gilly, 1998: 277; see also Bonfil, 1980; Bantjes, 1997). Thus, under a traditionally nationalist discourse there could be no advocacy of indigenous cultural difference. Rebel delegates at San Andres quickly found that their prior emphasis of shared national injustices and the amplification of universal democratic and libertarian values was now wholly inappropriate. With the first round of Indian Rights discussions due to commence on October 18th, they began to shift the emphasis to reflect more specifically indigenous grievances (see Marcos, August 7th and October 12th 1995). By the time the *Fourth Declaration* was published in January 1996, the threat of cultural oblivion had become a priority for the EZLN, and the portrayal of this injustice through indigenous language and metaphor had become a staple of their collective action frame.

**AGENCY**

The agency component of the Zapatistas’ collective action frame was only half realigned in the *Fourth Declaration*. On one hand, inasmuch as the text stresses the same three demands of ‘democracy, freedom and justice in Mexico’, the objectives remain ostensibly unchanged from the *Second* and *Third Declarations*. Indeed, the text emphasises the very fact of this continuity:
‘Housing, land, employment, food, education, independence, democracy, liberty, justice and peace. These were our banners during the dawn of 1994. These were our demands during that long night of 500 years. Today, these are our necessities.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1996)

From this we might infer that the EZLN were determined to amplify the constancy of their objectives, lest, perhaps, they be labelled irresolute or vacillating. Certainly, the relative permanence of their objectives is marked when contrasted with the dynamic processes of frame alignment observed in the identity and injustice components. I suggest, therefore, that although a SMO may manipulate the language used to couch its goals, and in so doing may align with new allies and even cultural and/or political identities, it would be unwise for that SMO to alter its objectives, at least until original objectives have been met. Indeed, the constancy of the Zapatistas’ objectives provides something of a discursive anchor in their efforts to realign their collective action frame.

Nevertheless, the constancy of the Zapatistas’ goals was offset by the radical alteration of the methods that they prescribed to achieve them. In a break with the united popular fronts advocated in the First, Second and Third Declarations (respectively, the popular revolution, the CND and the MLN) the Fourth Declaration offers two discrete fronts, one indigenous, the other national: the Convencion Nacional Indigenista (CNI) for the indigenous struggle, and the Frente Zapatista Liberacion Nacional (FZLN) for the non-indigenous civil society. Through these two fronts the same rhetorical objectives are awarded nuanced meanings according to their location in the indigenous and national discourses. In short, the pursuit of democracy, freedom and justice was effectively dualised, as ‘democracy, freedom and justice’ took on subtly different meanings for different constituents, linked nonetheless by a conceptual frame bridge of shared objectives.
Firstly, the *Fourth Declaration* offers the CNI as a national indigenous forum to unite Mexico’s indigenous populations behind the negotiation of Indian Rights and Culture, which, as the first table at San Andres, was an immediate and topical concern:

‘Independently of what arises as a result of the first negotiation of the agreements of San Andres, the dialogue begun by the different ethnic groups and their representatives will continue now within the INDIGENOUS NATIONAL CONVENTION, and it will have its rhythm and achievements which the indigenous people themselves will agree upon and decide.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1996)

The CNI, therefore, was to be a new organisation that would bring indigenas together from across Mexico and sustain pressure on the government during the negotiation of Indian Rights and Culture. Accordingly, and unsurprisingly, the justification for the CNI is imbued with indigenous meaning. The indigenous organisers, for example, are described as ‘h-men’ (Marcos, January 9th 1996), a Mayan term that denotes the ‘daykeepers’ or *rezadores*, whose role in present-day Maya communities is to say prayers and oversee rituals (Tedlock, 1995: 21-33). In the CNI, the role of these h-men would be to ‘seed the word’ so that reason might grow in the hearts of others (EZLN, January 9th 1996). Through these guardians, the objectives of democracy, freedom and justice are couched in the rhetoric of cultural autonomy and separate indigenous rights within Mexico. ‘Democracy’, for example, equates to indigenas’ right to choose leaders in accordance with ingrained cultural practices of command obedience; ‘freedom’ means being granted the dignity and liberty to live according to culturally alternative beliefs and practices; and ‘justice’ is access to designated legal structures for the redress for cultural and material marginalisation. That the Zapatistas awarded these objectives specific
indigenous resonance is shown in this excerpt from the final draft of the Indian Rights and Culture agreement itself:

‘1. The government must promote the recognition, as a constitutional guarantee, of the right to free determination of the indigenous peoples… 2. The government must press for juridical and legislative changes that broaden the local and national participation and representation of indigenous peoples, respecting their diverse situations and traditions and strengthening a new federalism in the Mexican republic… 3. The government must guarantee [indigenous] peoples
full access to Mexican courts, with recognition and respect for cultural specificities and their internal normative systems…’

(Womack 1999: 309-10)

In short, in the hands of the CNI the pursuit of democracy, freedom and justice was to become an indigenous crusade, which would operate independently of ‘the national political scene’, which was the reserve of the FZLN.

The nationally oriented FZLN was to be much broader in scope than the CNI. It is framed in the Fourth Declaration as a national, legitimate and institutional political presence for the Zapatistas and their followers in Mexico. Indeed, it is defined as a popular, non-partisan way forward for civil society’s stalled democratisation movement, to which the Fourth Declaration ascribes the same ostensible objectives of democracy, freedom and justice. For the FZLN, however, these objectives are couched in more universal, more recognisably western meanings:

‘…through this Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle in which we call upon all honest men and women to participate in the new national political force which is born today: the Zapatista Front of National Liberation (FZLN) – a civic and peaceful organisation, independent and democratic, Mexican and national, which will struggle for democracy, freedom and justice in Mexico.’

(EZLN, January 1st 1996)

Nonetheless, reflecting the indigenous timbre of the text, the national focus of the FZLN is bridged with indigenous cultural values. Its very foundation, for example, is justified through recourse to nationally revered mestizaje principles of command obedience: a public submission to the popular will expressed in the August ’95 consulta in which 57% of voters indicated their preference for the EZLN to institutionalise itself as a legitimate,
national political organisation (EZLN, August 27th 1995). Command obedience, rightly or erroneously, is a leadership culture popularly perceived as being of indigenous origin (Nash, 1985; Gilly, 1998; Stephen, 2002), and, inasmuch as the FZLN submits to this indigenous code, has been described as ‘traditionally Indian’ in its offer of authority (Womack, 1999: 298). Thus, though structurally distinct, the political culture of the new national front was framed as entirely congruent with the Zapatistas’ recently indigenised movement identity, and was to some extent bridged with the avowedly indigenous focus of both the CNI and the Zapatista delegation at San Andres.

In this way the Zapatistas’ agency was split: two separate structures would pursue the same objectives, but would ascribe to them different meanings according to their location in the indigenous and national discourses. One would struggle for separate indigenous rights and culture, while the other would pursue democratisation for the entire nation, yet both would exploit the vaguely indigenous/nationalist values of mestizaje. I argue that this represents another radical departure for the EZLN’s discourse, though it is one that makes sense when analysed against the backdrop of contemporaneous events in Mexico and Chiapas. First of all, the pressure to indigenise objectives was inherent to the San Andres dialogue, where the indigenous content of talks required the EZLN to accentuate their indigenous objectives. One way of demonstrating the indigenous merit of their demands was to submit them for approval to a discretely indigenous forum, as only an avowedly indigenous body could reinforce the distinction between indigenous interests and those of common mestizo and ladino ‘citizens’ (Bonfil, 1980; Saldana-Portillo, 2001). Unfortunately, few such structures existed beyond the insidious influence of the PRI’s indigenous umbrella, the INI. Moreover, the need for an independent indigenous forum became even more apparent during the course of the Indian Rights negotiations themselves. At the first session in October, Bernal and his team brought no indigenous advisors to the meeting, whereas the Zapatistas drew from a large delegation of indigenous counsellors including politicians and academics. The rebels were thus able to
present a much stronger case for specific Indian rights than the unprepared government team could muster against it. At the next session in November, however, the government hit back in true *transformista* style, questioning the EZLN’s right to represent Mexico’s indigenous population and offering the opinions of its own indigenous advisory groups, which were rooted in universal values rather than specific Indian rights (Ross, 2000). Before there could be another meeting, the Zapatistas took the opportunity to announce the creation of the CNI as a new independent forum for indigenas to convene and discuss the indigenous agenda:

‘Between the second and third rounds [of San Andres] the EZLN, to consolidate the results of the first and counteract the worrisome reluctance of the government in the second, convened the country’s ethnic groups (with some five hundred representatives) in a National Indigenous Forum in San Cristobal…’

(Aubry, 2003: 224)

In other words, the EZLN used their *Fourth Declaration* as a platform from which to launch a uniquely indigenous national structure that could legitimise their representation of Mexico’s indigenous population. The creation of a discrete indigenous front in the CNI must, I argue, be understood in the context of the San Andres dialogue.

Understanding the construction of the FZLN, however, is more difficult, and we are obliged to return to the EZLN’s increasingly ambivalent attitude towards Mexican civil society. The Zapatistas were revolutionaries, but they were also realists and barely concealed their frustration and readiness to institutionalise the civil movement in order to afford their rebellion some measure of legal protection. A review of civil society’s fortunes since the *Third Declaration* sheds light on the EZLN’s willingness to gravitate towards institutionalisation. Just one month after the MLN was announced in the *Third Declaration* the inherent fractiousness of the civil movement was confirmed when
Cardenas, having been appointed its titular head, was heckled offstage by leftwing radicals chanting ideological slogans (Ross, 2000). The EZLN’s last call to mass insurgency had fallen at its very first hurdle in a debacle that amplified the insurmountable divisions within civil society. Had it not been for the Federal Army’s unexpected invasion of Zapatista territory, which eclipsed the MLN’s stillbirth and reinvigorated national and international support for the embattled EZLN, the MLN fiasco might have been more injurious to the Zapatista campaign.

Nevertheless, the EZLN was forced to confront the reality of its relationship with civil society. As vehicles for national political change, both the CND and MLN had been rendered impotent, yet the national and global demonstrations that followed the federal army’s incursion had proven civil society to be the Zapatistas’ main protector. By mobilising against the invasion, civil society had saved the EZLN from certain death for the second time in just thirteen months. Moreover, in August civil society’s participation in the national consulta had forced the PRI to accept the national importance of the EZLN and admit the Zapatistas as protagonists in a new national dialogue. Thus, howsoever the Zapatistas might portray themselves as the defenders of civil society (EZLN, June 12th 1994), it had become clear that the reality was the reverse: that civil society was actually defending the EZLN. Now, while apparently safely ensconced in a national dialogue, the EZLN was nonetheless pursuing a uniquely indigenous agenda at San Andres, which, should it fail and the talks collapse, might expose the Zapatistas to the risks of marginalisation once again. I argue, therefore, that with their Fourth Declaration the EZLN offered, ostensibly, to reinvigorate the civil movement by taking a direct approach to its organisation. They would respond positively to the consulta and calls for them to institutionalise, and offer the FZLN as a legitimate political force to continue the struggle for democracy, freedom and justice in Mexico. In reality, however, I believe that the offer to institutionalise the FZLN had more to do with the EZLN’s need to insure their safety:
by securing the national protection afforded by civil society, they would be able to focus their resources on securing Indian Rights and Culture at San Andres.

**CONCLUSION**

With their *Fourth Declaration* the Zapatistas indigenised their collective action frame to contend with new political and cultural contexts. They achieved this, primarily, through the frame reduction of nationalist values and the frame amplification of indigenous beliefs. They were aided in this endeavour by the peculiarities of the Mexican political culture, in which *mestizaje* nationalism contains supposedly shared indigenous features. The net effect was an affirmed indigenous discourse that contrasted sharply with the nationalistic collective action frames of the *First, Second and Third Declarations*.

This would appear to support those analyses that see in the Zapatistas some indigenous heart, soul or truth. However, authors that have observed indigenous themes in the EZLN discourse have tended to present these as constants, and have thus failed to account for the Zapatistas’ transition from what was a predominantly nationalist discourse. Gossen (1996), for example, identifies the EZLN’s indigenous soul and posits a permanent ‘indigenous essence’ that is above discursive manipulation. Gilly (1998) offers a similar discussion of what he calls the EZLN’s indigenous ‘enchanted world’, and while he recognises this as contingent upon the external threat posed by the law of mercantile exchange implied by the spread of neoliberalism, he too fails to observe the dynamism of the Zapatistas’ indigenous discourse. Both authors, moreover, cannot adequately grasp the variety of emphases contained within *Fourth Declaration*, and which entailed the alignment of separate frame components according to different framing processes. While I recognise the influence of indigenous cultural logic and alternative standards of rational activity, I maintain that the discursive departures evinced in the *Fourth Declaration* were not the products of cultural determinism but were contingent upon the new structural context perceived by the Zapatistas in 1995. Chief among these were the opportunities
and constraints that surrounded the discussion of Indian Rights and Culture at San Andres.

Two theoretical observations may be made with regard to the Fourth Declaration. Firstly, what seemed to be the frame transformation of the movement layer of identity – from nationalism to indigenism – was achieved, not by the wholesale rejection of one master frame in favour of another, but by the subtle change in emphasis of the frame’s existing features. The subtlety of the change counters Snow et al’s characterisation of frame transformation as extensive and traumatic for the SMO (1986: 467-476). For the EZLN, the adoption of an indigenous movement identity was undertaken via the simple frame reduction of nationalist values and the frame amplification of indigenous beliefs, both of which were already inherent features of mestizaje nationalism. I contend, therefore, that frame transformation, like any frame alignment process, is contingent on the cultural specificities of discourse, and that, thanks to the malleability of mestizaje, the Zapatistas were able to achieve an effective transformation in their movement identity without reneging on earlier nationalist affiliations. This would have been important to the EZLN because no SMO wishes to appear too willing to cast off values that it once claimed to hold so dear. Indeed, this leads to my second observation: that the EZLN were at pains to highlight points of discursive continuity, evinced in their amplification of such discursive constants as their solidarity-group, their enemies and their objectives. This fact suggests that some SMOs recognise the dangers of being labelled indecisive or irresolute. Certainly, should frame components be realigned too much or too often, a SMO may lose the sympathy of even its most stalwart supporters and so achieve little of what it set out to do. That the Zapatistas amplified the very constancy of their indigenous base, their objectives (‘democracy, freedom and justice’) and their enemy (the ‘bad government’) indicates that they recognised their discourse as one that had undergone significant change over the years, and that it might, therefore, be prudent to identify discursive anchors. Furthermore, it may also indicate that the EZLN’s solidarity-group, objectives and
enemies were constants, and that the Zapatistas truly believed in these features of their discourse. This reinforces points raised by Goodwin and Jasper (1999, 2003) regarding the importance of genuine, immutable beliefs that are not so readily realigned in pursuit of immediate goals.
CHAPTER NINE

Fifth Declaration

(July 19th 1998)

INTRODUCTION

In spite of the optimism of the Fourth Declaration, the initiatives therein would bear little fruit for the EZLN. Two and a half years passed before they issued their Fifth Declaration, and this period was filled with disappointments, missed opportunities and mistakes. Indeed, the Fifth Declaration was disseminated because of the desperate situation facing the Zapatistas in July 1998, who were in dire need of international and national assistance to prevent their annihilation in the federal army’s renewed ‘low intensity’ onslaught. The level of pessimism evinced in the Fifth Declaration has not escaped the attention of some commentators:

‘The hope inspiring the Fourth Declaration is here forced and thin… Even in advertising, the same message too often loses its meaning. “We resist!” had a power and meaning in the Second Declaration, in June 1994, that “We resist!” does not have here, where, although in bold print, it feels more like (what it may also mean in Spanish) “We endure!” which is impressive, but not rousing.’

(Womack, 1999: 364)

I argue that the Fifth Declaration signalled the EZLN’s resignation to a narrowly indigenous agenda, and that it was disseminated at a time when the Zapatistas needed the protection of their international support base. The frame alignment of frame components was undertaken in grave awareness of the unfavourable political climate in Mexico and Chiapas following several political failures and the isolation and repression that came with the gradual breakdown of the San Andres dialogue.
IDENTITY

Arguably, the most profound discursive changes in the *Fifth Declaration* were those that attempted to reach out and make common cause with the Zapatistas’ new international support base. This is particularly apparent at the organisational layer of the identity component. Here the *Fifth Declaration* builds bridges to international supporters by embedding the Zapatistas’ organisational identities in an ascending network of mutual otherness and difference. The text begins, for example, by reiterating the indigenous nature of the EZLN’s core before linking these with networks of Zapatista supporters in other countries and continents:

‘We Zapatistas have extended a bridge to other social and political organisations, and to thousands of people without party, and we have received respect from all of them, and we have corresponded with them all. And we have also, together with others, extended bridges to the entire world and we have contributed to the creation (alongside men and women of the 5 continents) of a great network.’

(EZLN, July 19th 1998)

I argue that this process of frame bridging was intended to strengthen recent but significant changes to the EZLN’s alliance network since 1996. The twin indigenous and national ‘fronts’ of the *Fourth Declaration* were only the beginning of the Zapatistas’ efforts to construct a networked organisational structure whose very foundation was the mutual otherness of its many affiliates. April 1996 had seen the Zapatistas initiate their *Encuentros* programme, which pioneered the idea of a global front of individuals united by their shared differences, and gave the EZLN an international profile and a stake in what would later become the anti-globalisation movement:
‘We have also contributed something to the creation of a new and fresh cultural movement which struggles for a new man and new worlds… International civil society has been sensitive and has kept ears and eyes attentive so that the responses of to the demands would not be more deaths or prisons.’

(Ibid.)

Marcos had already acknowledged the Zapatistas’ popularity among ‘people from abroad’, and attributed this to western peoples’ need for a focal point to recharge their contentious spirit. As Maurice Najman put it: ‘after 15 years of crisis on the left, of decomposition, people find [in ‘international Zapatismo’] a point of departure for their recomposition,’ (in Le Bot, 1997: 210). With this level of diversification, it is perhaps not surprising that the EZLN’s *Fifth Declaration* reassessed their organisational identity in a bid to accommodate the rhizomatic international network that had grown around them.

There was, however, much more to the bridging of an international organisational identity in the *Fifth Declaration* than just the opportunities presented by international support networks alone. I argue that the bridge with what Marcos calls ‘international Zapatismo’ was also inspired by the EZLN’s need to augment its support base after political failures on the national scene in 1996 and 1997. Indeed, throughout these years the Zapatistas became gradually estranged from Mexican civil society, partly because in pursuing Indian Rights and Culture at San Andres and lavishing attention on the indigenous CNI they rather neglected their relations with ordinary Mexicans in civil society. Yet, in many ways it was also government recalcitrance that led the EZLN away from civil society. Throughout 1996, for example, Zedillo’s government quietly reneged on a seminal agreement on Indian Rights and Culture that will forever be known as the San Andres accords.

The San Andres accords had been signed by all four parties at San Andres on February 16th of that year, and marked the first and only time that the PRI had conceded
the hubris and insensitivity of their state policy of cultural integration. Moreover, the San
Andres accords offered to replace integrationism with a new acceptance of indigenous
cultural difference, the creation of autonomous indigenous municipalities (AIMs), and the
protection of unique legal rights for indigenous populations:

‘This new relationship must go beyond the proposition of cultural integrationism
to recognise indigenous peoples as new legal subjects with inherent rights derived
from their historical origin and the nature of the Mexican nation.’

(San Andres Accords, in Womack, 1999: 309-314)

In short, the San Andres accords affirmed the right of Indian peoples to free determination
defined as an expression of autonomy within the state, conceded indigenous local
governance in majority Indian municipalities, and agreed the right to Indian-controlled
media⁴⁹. Marcos prophesied, however, that the accords represented ‘Punto y Seguido’, the
end of the sentence but not the paragraph, and the government’s reluctance to submit the
accords for congressional debate soon became apparent. Zedillo first promised an Indian
Rights bill in March, then he offered April, and when April came and went and the
COCOPA was finally moved to press him on the matter, Zedillo admitted that both the
president’s office and Congress were more concerned with the detail of an electoral
reform bill, and that Indian Rights would have to wait (Womack, 1999).

⁴⁹ For these reasons, the San Andres accords are still celebrated by the EZLN as something of a pyrrhic
achievement in their history. To date, the February 16th accords have never resulted in a congressional bill,
much less real legislation. Although the Zapatistas had registered disapproval of Zedillo’s refusal to
overturn Salinas’s reform of Article 27 in 1992, the San Andres accords were approved by 97% of
Mexico’s indigenous peoples as a first step on the road to indigenous autonomy (Preston, New York
Times, February 15th 1996). The very wording of the Indian Rights and Culture agreement was heavily
influenced by an earlier Zapatista text known as the Declaration of the Guerrero Highlands (August,
1994), which was produced by an indigenous offshoot of the EZLN’s ill-fated CND. This text was
subsequently put forward in the name of the CNI in 1996, and declared the indigenous belief in the
Mexican nation as a ‘matrix’ with a ‘pluricultural’ foundation (Juan Pablos, 1996: 22, 27, 35, in Aubry,
2003: 219-241). The Guerrero declaration delivered the original consensus that indigenas are not
‘percentages of poverty’ or ‘indexes of marginalisation’, or even ‘ethnicities’, ‘minorities’ or ‘living
artefacts’. Rather they are peoples, a category borrowed from ILO article 169, of which the Mexican
government was a signatory and which recognises aboriginal populations and credits them with
inalienable collective rights.
For the remainder of 1996, the government’s reluctance to implement the accords encouraged the EZLN to respond in kind by withholding their inauguration of the much-anticipated FZLN. Knowing that the presence of the FZLN would signify the institutionalisation of the rebellion and so bolster Zedillo’s projection of a stabilised domestic situation, the Zapatistas’ decision to suspend the FZLN’s inauguration seemed logical, particularly in the run up to the mid-term elections scheduled to take place in July of the following year. Yet it was a risky strategy: the FZLN had been promised to civil society in the Fourth Declaration, and the EZLN stood to lose the support of Mexican activists who had voted for a popular Zapatista front in the national consulta the previous year. This political standoff was complicated, moreover, in August with the emergence of a new guerrilla group: the Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (EPR). Sporting red face masks in place of the Zapatistas’ black ones, the EPR staged a show of defiance at a memorial service for 17 local farmers killed in struggles with government forces in the state of Guerrero. The EZLN was quick to dissociate itself from the socialistic overtones of the new guerrilla group50 (EZLN, August 29th 1996; Preston, New York Times, September 14th 1996; Dillon, New York Times, August 30th 1996), but in the tradition of flexible accommodation the PRI exploited the EPR insurgency for all its worth, isolating the newcomers by creating a ‘good guerrilla / bad guerrilla’ dichotomy, with the EZLN cast in the role of the good guerrilla. With the San Andres dialogue temporarily suspended over the non-implementation of the accords, Zedillo tabled a secret deal with the EZLN through the COCOPA51: if the EZLN would play along and become the ‘good guerrilla’ by inaugurating the FZLN, then they would implement the San Andres accords in return. Ignoring the Zapatistas’ protestations, Zedillo used his second annual Informe speech to

50 According to Ross (2000: 185), the EPR linked itself to the old socialist organisation PROCUP, which had claimed responsibility for terrorist actions in Mexico City in January 1994. Indeed, at a press conference in a secret hideout deep in the Guerrero jungle, EPR Comandante Jose Arturo presented a self-consciously socialist agenda to assembled journalists (Bruhn, 1996), who had been blindfolded on their nocturnal journey to the heart of Guerrero’s Sierra Meastra.

51 Although the dialogue was publicly suspended, the EZLN continued to work secretly with the COCOPA and CONAI to seek a peaceful end to the deadlock, and both the EZLN and the PRI were still using the COCOPA for clandestine communication (Ross, 2000). This clandestine communication continued until January 1997.
play down domestic insurgencies and portray the EZLN as little short of an ally against the ‘evil’ EPR, which the Zapatistas denounced

‘Mr. Zedillo described the Zapatistas as guerrillas with genuine support among the Indian poor, while he called the Popular Revolutionary Army terrorists. [But] In Chiapas, Marcos wrote, “there are no good guerrillas or bad guerrillas, only armed rebel citizens whose followers are tired of hearing declarations about economic recovery and bonanza while living a reality of misery.”

(Preston, New York Times, September 4th 1996)

The EZLN remained defiant, refusing to ‘play the “good guerrilla” so soon, so cheap,’ (Womack, 1999: 330). Through COCOPA they repeated their earlier offer: if the PRI would implement the San Andres accords, then the Zapatistas would create the FZLN. By this time, however, the president was under pressure from within his own party to take a hard line against the San Andres accords. The year ended in stalemate when, in December, the government made twenty-seven unsolicited changes to an already amended COCOPA redraft of original agreement. The EZLN’s rejection of this document in January 1997 punctuated their withdrawal from both the San Andres process and the public eye. With no FZLN planned for the foreseeable future, the Zapatistas turned away from both the government and civil society in order to implement the San Andres accords unilaterally. Focusing their resources on the creation of AIMs in rebel territory, they would not be heard from again for several months.

The EZLN’s preoccupation with Indian Rights and their subsequent departure from public discourse was damaging, but their popular decline was further accelerated by Mexico’s gradual but apparent democratisation, which discouraged public support for the rebel movement. Throughout 1997, as the EZLN remained absent from national politics, the expectation that electoral liberties would be upheld at the mid-term elections
dissuaded many liberals from overt expressions of support for the Zapatistas, who were now refusing to communicate with anyone outside Chiapas. The left-leaning PRD leader, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, whose fortunes seemed somehow entwined with those of the EZLN, was standing for election again, this time for the office of Mayor of Mexico City – perhaps the third most influential political post in the country. Although many of Cardenas’s followers sympathised with the Zapatistas’ call for an Indian Rights law, it was widely believed that their ‘vote of fear’ had been responsible for Cardenas’s poor performance in the 1994 presidential contest, and they could ill afford to risk Cardenas’s chances again by offering or encouraging outright public support for what was still very much an outlawed rebel movement. Indeed, as the people looked to the polling booths ‘they correspondingly lost interest in Zapatistas, army or front,’ (Womack, 1999: 331).

The situation worsened for the EZLN when, in July 1997, the results of the elections seemed to fulfil voters’ expectations: Cardenas was installed as Mayor of Mexico City and PRD Deputies sympathetic to the San Andres cause were returned to Congress. Yet EZLN supporters in Chiapas, disgusted and frustrated with the absence of an Indian Rights bill and appalled by what they saw as continued corruption in the Chiapas elections, demonstrated their disdain by burning ballot boxes (Preston, New York Times, July 7th 1997). Certainly, for the EZLN this ‘display of bad humour July 6th did not do much for its weakened image,’ (Ross, 2000: 224).

The damage caused by these actions cannot be underestimated. From January 1997 throughout much of the next eighteen months, the EZLN maintained a media blackout punctuated by isolated communiqués. They have since claimed that this was to allow their unilateral implementation of the accords in rebel territory to speak all the more loudly. The COCOPA, however, worked tirelessly through 1997 to draft proposals that would end the deadlock, and when the Zapatistas turned their backs on the San Andres dialogue they opened the door to counterframes that accused them of opposing moves to secure a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In remaining silent, moreover, the EZLN
forewent the opportunity to defend themselves against government counterframes, a fact that they acknowledge in their *Fifth Declaration*:

> ‘during the time our remaining quiet lasted, we kept away from direct participation in the primary national problems with our position and proposals; although our silence allowed the powerful to create and to spread rumours and lies about our internal divisions and ruptures within the Zapatistas, and they tried to dress us in the cloth of intolerance, intransigence, weakness and renunciation…’

(EZLN, July 19th 1998)

A brief détente in September 1997 saw the Zapatistas exploit the goodwill of the new PRD mayor of Mexico City, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, and they finally agreed to inaugurate the FZLN in Mexico City (Preston, New York Times, September 14th 1997). However, in the eighteen months since the FZLN was promised bridges with civil society, while not entirely burned, had fallen into serious disrepair, and the FZLN’s reception was less than the EZLN might have hoped. Furthermore, the FZLN itself proved to be too little too late to reinvigorate the Zapatistas’ fading profile in Mexico. Its affiliates voted to exclude partisans and members of existing political organisations, thereby weakening the FZLN’s political presence still further. As a consequence, the Zapatistas all but abandoned the FZLN and became detached from national political alliances to an extent that would threaten their very survival in 1998.

Yet while the Zapatistas became increasingly isolated in their own country, they became international celebrities in others. The Continental and Intergalactic *Encuentros* were two international conventions hosted by the EZLN between April and August of 1996, at which they professed their solidarity with ‘all those who are others like us’ around the world. Indeed, the very nomenclature of their ‘Continental’ and ‘Intercontinental’ *Encuentros* amplified geographical boundaries in place of national ones.
Snubbed as a blatant media stunt (La Grange and Rico, 1998), the Encuentros saw political and media stars descend on the Chiapas jungle to show solidarity with the indigenous rebels. The EZLN’s amplification of their indigenous identity and specifically Indian injustices was evident at these gatherings, but it was aimed at an international audience of largely middle class activists (Poggilia, 2005). In his opening address, for instance, Subcomandante Marcos introduced the EZLN through indigenous imagery as the Macehualob embattled against the evil Kaz-Dzul and Aluxob, sating the middle class appetite for indigenous culture. The western participants responded positively, though some of their papers only underlined the cultural differences that separated them from the Zapatistas. Many became bogged down in the Marxian versus post-Marxian polemic, while the American academic Harry Cleaver, who has since written about the ‘electronic fabric of struggle’ (1997), delivered a paper on the importance of cyberspace to an audience partly comprised of rural indigenas who rarely saw a television set let alone an Internet portal.

Neverthless, the two early Encuentros were a great success on several levels: the number of participants alone swelled the EZLN coffers, as each of the 3000 attendees paid $100 to be there. Moreover, the presence of so many internationals in Chiapas bought the Zapatistas valuable time in which to harvest crops (Marcos, in Ross, 2000: 168). Perhaps the major victory, though, was the instigation of a permanent global movement against neoliberalism in solidarity with the Zapatistas (Garrido and Alexander, 2003). It seemed that the massive cultural and ideological differences mattered little in the face of the greater enemy. The Encuentros inspired the arrival of thousands of people from western countries to populate permanent ‘peace camps’ in Chiapas to protect the EZLN from a recurrence of the February 1995 army incursion. These camps also sustained international interest in the Zapatistas’ struggle and added global pressure to

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32 On April 3rd 1996, the community of La Realidad hosted the first Continental Encuentro. Among the high profile guests were Noam Chomsky, Robert Redford, Oliver Stone, Francis Ford Coppola, Jane Fonda and Kevin Costner. Later, on July 27th, the Zapatistas welcomed some 3000 guests, including Danielle Mitterand, to the Intergalactic.
Zedillo to live up to his government’s agreement at San Andres. The Encuentros initiative would itself gather momentum with a second Intergalactic held in Madrid the following year. With EZLN representatives in attendance, this gathering produced the Peoples Global Action network (PGA), which would be a major coordinator of the Seattle demonstration in 1999. Thus, in the years before 1998 the Zapatistas saw their declining national civil support base augmented with new global networks whose strength, it seemed, was their very diversity. And so in the midst of national constraints they were provided with opportunities to foster a new base of support beyond Mexico. I argue that the EZLN looked to consolidate these links in July 1998, and that they did so by bridging their organisational identity to include ‘all those who are others like us.’

Frame alignment was perhaps less extensive at the movement and solidary-group layers of the Fifth Declaration’s collective identity. In terms of movement identity, for example, the text continues to amplify the EZLN’s consanguinity with the indigenous resistance movements listed in the Fourth Declaration. Indeed, the very same ethnic alliance is reiterated, albeit with some additions:

‘The zapatistas were, and are, next to and behind the Indian peoples. Like now, then we were only a small part of the great history with face, word and heart of the nahuatl, paipai, kiliwa, cucapa, cochimi, kumiai, yuma, seri, chontal, chinanteco, pame, chichimeca, otomi, mazahua, matlatzinca, ocuilteco, zapoteco, solteco, chatino, papabuco, mixteco, cucateco, triqui, amuzzgo, mazateco, chocho, ixcaateco, huave, tlapaneco, totonaca, tepehua, populuca, mixe, zoque, huasteco, lacandon, maya, chol, tzeltal, tzotzil, tojolabal, mame, teco, ixil, aguacateco, motocintleco, chicomucelteco, kanjobal, jalcateco, quiche, cachiquel, ketchi, pima, tepehuan, tarahumara, mayo, yaqui, cahita, opata, cora, huichol, purepecha y kikapu.’

(Ibid.)
By amplifying their association with ethnic resistances, the *Fifth Declaration* consolidated the Zapatistas’ claim that they are part of an unbroken cycle of indigenous struggle that has existed in Mexico since the arrival of the Spanish conquistadors. In the *Fourth Declaration* this claim was reinforced through a discourse of indigenous cultural belief that amplified the EZLN’s indigenous solidary-group; in the *Fifth Declaration* Mayan language and beliefs were again enlisted to bolster the Zapatistas’ identification with the same indigenous movement:

“‘We are the avengers of death. Our lineage will never be extinguished as long as There is light in the morning star.’

*Popol Vuh*’

(EZLN, July 19th 1998)

This passage, which opens the *Fifth Declaration*, was taken from the *Popol Vuh*, popularly revered as the word of the ancient Maya. It immediately amplified the cultural underpinnings of the EZLN’s indigenous solidary-group and was used to reify their indigenous movement identity.

It is interesting to note, however, that this culturally specific indigenous identity does not appear to marry with the internationalisation of the EZLN’s organisational identity. Indeed, where the organisational layer is bridged to make it as inclusive as possible, the movement and solidary-group layers are rooted in a deliberately exclusive indigenous cultural identity. The ability of the EZLN to overcome the potential for contradiction here is important, for it has been erroneously attributed to the Zapatistas’

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33 Dennis Tedlock has done more than most to unlock the secrets held within the *Popol Vuh*. He describes this ancient work as ‘the most important text in the native languages of the Americas,’ (1995). Goetz and Morley describe the source of the text as a Quichean Maya, who, having learned to read and write Spanish, wrote his people’s history shortly after the Conquest. They maintain that ‘it contains the cosmological concepts and ancient traditions of this aboriginal American people, the history of their origin, and the chronology of their kings down to the year 1550,’ (2003: xi).
supposed postmodernism. Lowy and Betto, for example, suggest that the EZLN are ‘profundly original’ in their articulation of difference at the local, national and international levels (2003: 332-333); John Holloway has described the EZLN as ‘anti-identitarian’ (2002: 64) while Michael Pelaez (1996) finds the Zapatistas’ postmodernism in their rejection of absolute truths and ‘openness to other worldviews’. I disagree, however, and argue that the Zapatistas’ efforts to retain and indeed amplify their own indigenous solidary-group and movement identities were made possible by their indigenous cultural logic, the roots of which are ante-modern rather than ‘profundly original’, ‘anti-identitarian’ or postmodern. Maya ontology, for example, insists that mutual otherness and cultural diversity mark points of convergence between different peoples; a cultural logic that resonates with the postmodernist rejection of absolutes. Indeed, without losing sight of its roots in indigenous notions of self and other, the anthropologist Edward Fischer notes the appeal of unity-in-diversity to the western audience:

‘The Maya penchant for seeing unity in apparent (to us) diversity is characteristic of their cultural logic, a logic diffuse enough to be transposable into various cultural domains while adhering to internal generative rules that render its instantiations intelligible to (even if not sanctioned by) others.’

(Fischer, 1999: 480)

Political analysts John Burke and Virgilio Elizondo find similar attitudes to unity-in-diversity in their efforts to outline the burgeoning ‘mestizo democracy’ that is the product of America’s ethnically diversifying population. They too suggest that the Zapatistas’ indigenous rights campaign was founded on mestizaje principles of indigenous origin (Burke and Elizondo, 2002: 49-50). Thus, while it resonates with postmodern cultural relativism, the idea of being united by mutual otherness is actually a keystone of Maya
cultural logic. I argue that the collective identity that the Zapatistas constructed in their *Fifth Declaration* was grounded in this cultural logic, and that it enabled them to posit ‘otherness’ as a point of universal communion. Through this logic the Zapatista were able to amplify their own indigenousness as their ‘otherness’ while overcoming the massive physical, cultural and linguistic differences that separated them from their international allies:

‘We saw all of those who are others like us, look to themselves and look for other forms for the peace to return to the lands of possible hopes... We saw men and women born in other lands join the struggle for peace. We saw some extend the long bridge of "you are not alone" from their own countries, we saw them mobilize and repeat "Ya basta!"... We saw all of those sparks bounce across the heavens and arrive in our lands with all the names that Joseph had named, with all the faces of all who in all the worlds want aplace for all.’

(EZLN, July 19th 1998)

Seemingly contradictory soundbites like ‘you who are others like us,’ (Ibid.) mirror those seen elsewhere in the EZLN’s communiqués of 1996, such as ‘one world with room for many worlds,’ (EZLN, August 3rd 1996), and:

‘That a people is five peoples.
That a people who are a star are all people.
That the people who are humanity are all the world's people’

(EZLN, July 27th 1996)

Through such messages the *Fifth Declaration* asserts that it is no longer necessary to be affiliated directly with the EZLN, it is not even necessary to be Mexican; all that is
required is the shared bond of otherness or difference that unites all the peoples of the five continents. It is a sentiment that is perhaps best summed up in another Zapatista communiqué originally written in response to a newspaper article that debated Marcos’s sexual orientation:

‘Marcos is gay in San Francisco, black in South Africa, an Asian in Europe, a Chicano in San Ysidro, an anarchist in Spain, a Palestinian in Israel, a Mayan Indian in the streets of San Cristobal, a gang member in Neza, a rocker in the National University, a Jew in Germany, an ombudsman in the Defence Ministry, a communist in the post-Cold War era, an artist without gallery or portfolio.... A pacifist in Bosnia, a housewife alone on Saturday night in any neighbourhood in any city in Mexico, a striker in the CTM, a reporter writing filler stories for the back pages, a single woman on the subway at 10 pm, a peasant without land, an unemployed worker... an unhappy student, a dissident amid free market economics, a writer without books or readers, and, of course, a Zapatista in the mountains of southeast Mexico. So Marcos is a human being, any human being, in this world. Marcos is all the exploited, marginalized and oppressed minorities, resisting and saying, 'Enough'!’

(Marcos, in Klein, 2002: 211-212)

Thus the logic of unity in diversity not only facilitated the EZLN’s shift from a bounded conception of organisational identity to a much more diffuse conception based on mutual difference, its foundation in Maya cultural logic also served to reinforce their identification with both Maya culture and belief and the indigenous movement.

While Maya cultural logic explains how the Zapatistas were able to retain their exclusive indigenous solidary-group and movement identities, it does not explain why they were moved to do so. I maintain, however, that the EZLN had good reason to affirm
their identification with the indigenous movement. Firstly, the fact that the government stolidly refused to implement the San Andres accords actively limited the Zapatistas’ ability to manipulate their movement identity. The political impasse with the PRI prevented the Zapatistas from moving forward with the second table of San Andres: Democracy and Justice, and virtually obliged them to retain the indigenous emphasis of their discourse. In this way the EZLN were effectively straightjacketed until such time as their demand for an Indian Rights law was realised. More than this, however, a recent return to violence in Chiapas exacerbated the suffering of indigenous communities in the state and encouraged the Zapatistas to do their utmost to draw attention to what they perceived to be a war against the indigenous communities there. The violence, which has been characterised as Chiapas’s ‘low-intensity war’, began in spring 1997 soon after the EZLN resolved to enact the articles of the San Andres accords without congressional sanction. Chief among the San Andres accords had been the provision for community autonomy in Indian majority municipalities, and when they left the dialogue in January 1997 the EZLN set about the unilateral creation of AIMs. After failing to co-opt the AIMs, the PRI declared them to be illegal and initiated procedures for their forced dismantlement. In amplifying their indigenous political identity with their *Fifth Declaration*, the EZLN attempted to draw the media spotlight towards indigenous suffering in the region. There is much more to be said about the return to armed conflict in Chiapas, although the ramifications of the low intensity war were more influential in encouraging the realignment of the EZLN’s injustice component.

**INJUSTICE**

The framing of injustice in the *Fifth Declaration* orbited the fallout from the unfulfilled San Andres accords and the resumption of hostilities in Chiapas. It is unsurprising, therefore, to find that most of the text’s injustice discourse is given over to these indigenous grievances. This is seen throughout the text in multiple references to the...
violence endured daily by the embattled indigenas of the AIMs. Indeed, the *Fifth Declaration* portrays the forced dismantlement of AIM communities and the evictions, arrests and deaths that came with them, as a war perpetrated by the government against the indigenous:

‘the assassins were unmasked who were hiding behind the robes that they call the “state of law.” The veil was torn away from what they were hiding, the half-hearted and the faint-hearted were revealed, those who play with death for profit… And the government’s ultimate and hypocritical robe was removed. “The war is not against the indigenous,” they said while persecuting, imprisoning and assassinating indigenous’

(EZLN, July 19th 1998)

From March 1997 the indigenous residents of the autonomous communities, known as *autonomias*, had faced the ever-present threat of injury, eviction, disease and death. The *Fifth Declaration* recognises this fact, and acknowledges that ‘the greatest weight of our struggle has fallen on them, and they have confronted it with firmness, decision and heroism,’ (Ibid.).

I argue that, in amplifying the injustices of the government’s war against the indigenous, the EZLN aimed to draw global attention to the fact that for almost eighteen months the indigenas of the *autonomias* had been their frontline troops. Indeed, they had become the only voice of the Zapatistas since the newspaper *La Jornada* began to publish letters from the AIMs in place of the EZLN communiqués, which had stopped arriving at the journal’s office in January 1997. The people of the AIMs had endured government efforts to first control and then scupper the programme of autonomisation in Zapatista territory, and the low intensity war had developed from the failure of government co-optation tactics that began when PRI commissioners were sent to Chiapas to ‘direct’ the
autonomisation process. When the Zapatista communities refused to negotiate with commissioners until the San Andres agreement was implemented, the PRI pressed ahead with a rival programme of municipalisation that grafted new ‘official’ municipalities on top of the ‘illegal’ AIMs. As part of this policy, loyalist municipal leaders were sponsored in competition with the renegade autonomias, a practice that simply exploited and exacerbated existing tensions and local rivalries. PRI caciques like Jacinto Arias in Chenalho received increased funds and support in their clashes with Zapatista communities over territory and resources.\(^{54}\) They were, moreover, supported in their efforts by the police and suspiciously well armed paramilitary organisations, the most prolific being the Movimentos Indigenista Revolucionario Anti-Zapatista (MIRA) and Paz y Justicia \(^{55}\). Many of the local politicians and paramilitaries had been recipients of PRI pay-outs made under the PROCAMPO scheme of 1989, or beneficiaries of Zedillo’s own efforts to divide and rule Chiapas through the land-sale scheme known as El Finiquito.\(^{56}\)

However, not only did the AIMs have to contend with obstructive rival politicians and paramilitaries, they also faced an increasing number of federal troops in the state. It has been argued that the government’s support for local loyalists was actually engineered to sustain a guerra sucia (dirty war) that was designed to impede autonomisation, ‘make the Army look good’, and legitimate its presence as a ‘peacekeeping’ force in the state (Ross, 2000: 220). It was this peacekeeping force that the government used to dismantle

\(^{54}\) In September 1999, Jacinto Arias was sentenced to 35 years in prison for his role in the Acteal massacre. More than 100 suspects were arrested in the case-including 12 police officers and a soldier. However, in January 2000, Arias and 23 co-conspirators had their sentences unexpectedly overturned, hardening local perceptions that Arias and other PRI loyalists had official support in their hard line against the autonomias (Weinberg, February 2000)

\(^{55}\) Officially considered to be a phenomena separate from the Zapatista conflict, the conflicts involving Paz y Justicia were viewed as religious confrontations between Catholics and Protestants, or the product of inter-community rivalries. Secretary of State Emilio Chuayffet labelled the battles ‘the priest’s war’ (in reference to Bishop Samuel Ruiz García). Yet Bellinghausen insists that ‘all, absolutely all, of the actors in that escalation belonged, and do belong, to the PRI.’ (2002). Indeed, it is no coincidence that while the activities of the EZLN were characterised as terrorism, Paz y Justicia was defended by the governments of Ernesto Zedillo and the interim Chiapas governments of Julio César Ruiz Ferro and Roberto Albores Guillén.

\(^{56}\) This programme, initiated in 1996, extended credits to farmers for the purchase of lands as a means of accelerating the demise of the troublesome ejido system. The government offered compensation totalling $120 million USD to landowning oligarchs who stood to lose land to the campesinos. However, it is alleged that ranchers paid-off campesinos to occupy unwanted land in order that the government might pay them to relinquish it to the invaders (Ross, 2000: 164).
the autonomies. Forced dismantlements at Nichtalacum (March 11th 1997), Yaxhemil (May 24th 1997), Acteal (December 22nd 1997), Ricardo Flores Magon (April 10th 1998) and San Juan de la Libertad, known as the battle for El Bosque (June 10th 1998), were only the most incidents in a period characterised by extreme and perpetual tension in Chiapas (New York Times, April 5th & September 24th 1997; Preston, New York Times, November 8th & December 24th 1997; May 7th, May 17th & June 28th 1998). In acknowledging the heroism of indigenas in their everyday battles against their political, military and paramilitary persecutors, the Fifth Declaration amplified indigenous suffering in Chiapas. I maintain that this focus marks continuity with the Fourth Declaration, which also amplified indigenous injustices.

Yet a more profound discursive change can be seen in efforts to bridge these indigenous injustices, not with national grievances as in the Fourth Declaration, but with the sacrifices made by the activists of the new ‘international Zapatismo’, who were also persecuted in Mexico and particularly Chiapas:

‘We saw our powerful government… turn against others and strike out against those who do not walk our same path but who raised the same banners: honest indigenous leaders, independent social organisations, mediators, like-minded non-governmental organisations, international observers, any citizens who wanted peace.’

(EZLN, July 19th 1998)

The reference is made here to ‘international observers’, the volunteers who came to Chiapas to populate the peace camps and prevent atrocities by their very presence (Preston, New York Times, March 1st 1998). These men and women also suffered persecution, particularly in early 1998 when the government began to clamp down on foreign ‘interference’ (Preston, New York Times, May 17th 1998). The Fifth Declaration
reveals a concerted effort to render the government’s war on the indigenous in terms that incorporate the contribution of these international Zapatistas:

‘We saw others cross the long bridge and, from their lands, arrive in ours after crossing borders and oceans, to observe and condemn the war. We saw them come to us to let us know that we are not alone. We saw them being persecuted and harassed like us. We saw them being beaten like us. We saw them being vilified like us. We saw them resisting like us. We saw them staying even when they left. We saw them in their lands speaking of what their eyes had seen and showing what their ears had heard.’

(EZLN, July 19th 1998)

In this way, I suggest, the text frames the bad government as the enemy of all who ‘walk our same path’, and the often-violent expulsion of international extranjeros is identified as a point of shared injustice between the Zapatista autonomias and foreign observers.

I maintain that the EZLN had good reason to bridge indigenous injustice in this way. Not only did it reinforce the international bridging of organisational identities in the identity component, it also drew attention to the EZLN’s growing isolation in Chiapas. It has been suggested that this isolation was part of a deliberate government policy implemented soon after the massacre of 46 indigenas in the tiny autonomous community of Acteal on December 22nd 1997. While the government was not directly involved, the paramilitary forces responsible were indirectly funded by the PRI, and the tragedy inspired a wave of international condemnation. The UN labelled the killings ‘a repugnant crime’; in France Lionel Jospin denounced the murders; the European Parliament debated suspending Mexico’s interim membership of the EU, and there was fury ‘in the street outside Mexican embassies and consulates, from Tokyo to Togo,’ (Ross, 2000: 254; Marcos, January 21st 1998). Yet the somewhat surprising response of the PRI was to begin
1998 by instigating a wave of officially sanctioned xenophobia that saw the extradition of thousands of inconvenient foreign nationals:

‘Frustrated with the lack of results from peace negotiations that started more than three years ago, the authorities have moved to isolate the Zapatistas in national public opinion and weaken their support from foreign groups. At the same time, they have dispatched troops to besiege pro-Zapatista villages and hamper the activities of rights monitors in the area. At least 60 foreigners have been deported, and Chiapas jails have filled with dozens of prisoners facing political charges.’


A group of Canadian observers were expelled for demanding that the PRI end the evictions that were swelling the overcrowded refugee camp at X’oyep, while 141 members of the European group Ya Basta! were returned to Italy when some of their number entered Zapatista territory without government permission, even though there were five MEPs and at least one ordained priest among them. New laws were passed to limit the movement of foreigners, permits were restricted to UN affiliated NGOs, their numbers were limited to ten per group, and their stay reduced to a maximum of ten days. President Zedillo approved the policy in a speech in January ’98:

‘The extranjeros who allege human rights violations are directly involved in the conflict in Chiapas – those who are spreading the lies are taking advantage of the government’s tolerance – many of those who interfere in our affairs do so not to resolve the problems but to take up a (partisan) flag – these people are breaking our laws even if they hide behind humanitarian causes…’

(Quoted in Ross, 2000: 257)
While the expulsions only served to intensify the chorus of disapproval from outside Mexico, they succeeded in purging the country of the Zapatistas’ international support base and isolating the rebels in Chiapas. This marked a serious threat for the EZLN. Marcos had already described the protective value of what he described as ‘international Zapatismo’, and ranked this much higher than the efforts of national civil society:

‘…you have to understand that the contact with this “international Zapatismo” represents especially a protection that allows [the communities] to resist. This protection is more effective than the EZLN, the civilian organisation, or national Zapatismo because in the logic of Mexican neoliberalism, the international image is an enormous stake. There’s a kind of tacit accord: people from abroad find here this point of support, this recall they need to regain their spirit, and the communities get the support that allows them to survive.’

(Marcos and Le Bot, 1997: 210)

As official dismantlements and the hostile expatriation of foreigners continued, the fortunes of indigenous Chiapanecos and the persecuted *extranjeros* became entwined. Without the protection of the peace camps the EZLN would be unable to protect the *autonomias* against federal troops; without the EZLN, international Zapatismo would lose one of its most important focal points. A communiqué issued by the EZLN just three days prior to their *Fifth Declaration* amplifies the shared nature of the threat posed to nationals and foreigners in Chiapas:

‘There is nothing more uncomfortable for the criminals than to have witnesses of their extermination laboratory which they have set up on Indian grounds; and so the ineffable Department of Government brings the double recipe: for the
nationals, jail, and for those from other countries, expulsion (with a prior xenophobic campaign in the press, radio and television). Suddenly, with equally stupid explanations, the primary peddler of the National Sovereignty has a fit of patriotism and, to the cry of "a good foreigner is a dumb and blind foreigner!" he sets to persecuting, harassing and expelling all those born in other lands who join their hearts to the struggle for peace with justice and dignity.’

(EZLN, July 16th 1998)

This shared threat grew rapidly throughout the first half of 1998. On June 3rd Bishop Ruiz publicly resigned as peace commissioner and chair of intermediary CONAI. Ruiz had been instrumental in organising the protective peace camps, and, as one of the few officials trusted by the EZLN, would have been a major loss to the peace process. His resignation came amid government accusations that his activities had convoked ‘an international movement to intervene in our domestic affairs,’ (Interior Minister Labastida, in Ross, 2000: 273), though Ruiz himself ‘accused the Government of “abandoning the path of dialogue” and promoting a “constant and growing aggression” against him and his diocese,’ (Preston, New York Times, June 9th 1998). On June 7th, moreover, without Ruiz the CONAI was dissolved, killing one of the few remaining lines of communication between the rebel communities and the government. Most precipitately, on June 10th came the confrontation between EZLN regulars and federal forces at El Bosque, when EZLN forces defended the autonomia of San Juan de Libertad against an overwhelming force of federal troops and police. The actions of federal forces were condemned by Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright (Preston, New York Times, June 28th 1998).

Yet where the EZLN had remained passive during previous dismantlements, content to let their ‘dignified silence’ highlight the injustice of the evictions, the El Bosque raid stands out as the one in which EZLN troops finally fought back. In their
defence of San Juan de Libertad, just one month before the publication of the *Fifth Declaration*, the EZLN were forced to break the ceasefire for the first time in over three years (Preston, New York Times, July 9th 1998). This, I suggest, demonstrates the level of desperation felt among the Zapatistas and the local communities. With Ruiz and the CONAI gone and foreign observers either constrained or driven away, the EZLN and the AIMs were in danger of becoming completely isolated in Chiapas, and they were so desperate that they were moved to open fire on a vastly superior force. It was because of this highly uncertain and unpromising political context that the Zapatistas were encouraged to reach out once more, through their *Fifth Declaration*. I maintain that the frame bridging of indigenous and international injustices in this text was oriented toward international observers and media, in the hope that it might encourage sustained international pressure and force the PRI to desist from its policy of dismantlement and reopen the dialogue. Indeed, I argue that it was a return to dialogue that the EZLN truly sought with the *Fifth Declaration*, and this is evinced in the agency component.

**AGENCY**

In contrast to the frame bridging of identity and injustice, the EZLN’s agency component underwent a process of frame reduction in the *Fifth Declaration*. The ultimate indigenous objective of an Indian Rights law was reduced to a watered-down reinterpretation of the San Andres accords. Abandoning the original agreement on Indian Rights and Culture signed on February 16th 1996, the *Fifth Declaration* focuses attention on the diluted replacement initiative that had been drafted by the COCOPA in December of that year:

‘We call on: … The brothers and sisters of the National Indigenous Congress to participate, together with the Zapatistas, in the work of consulting with all Mexican men and women on the initiative of the COCOPA law.’

(EZLN, July 19th 1998)
The COCOPA’s legislative team of judges and congressmen had brokered the original San
Andres accords, but when the government demonstrated its unwillingness to implement
the agreement they offered a second draft that contained 27 alterations. The EZLN’s
rejection of the amended COCOPA law in January 1997 preceded their unilateral
implementation of the accords. In their *Fifth Declaration*, however, the Zapatistas return
to this draft, and it is difficult not to identify this as the reining-in of their political
horizons. Indeed, in real terms all the COCOPA draft requested was an addition to Article
4 of the Mexican Constitution: a sentence guaranteeing the indigenous ‘respect and the
possibility of struggling for what belongs to them’. Such things were already the
constitutional birthright of all Mexican citizens, regardless of ethnicity. Thus, the only
real demand of the *Fifth Declaration* ‘is actually a strategic surrender, amazingly simple
and easy to honour,’ (Womack, 1999: 364).

A similar level of frame reduction is apparent in the methods by which the EZLN
hoped to achieve this demand. No mention is made, for example, of the FZLN or separate
national fronts struggling simultaneously for indigenous rights and national democracy.
Instead, the equally weighted dual fronts promised in the *Fourth Declaration* are replaced
with the offer of a second national consulta to engage all Mexicans on the one issue of the
COCOPA law for Indian Rights. With typical Zapatista effusiveness, this is hailed as ‘The
National Consulta Concerning the Initiative of the Indigenous Law of the Commission for
Concordance and Pacification and for an End to the War of extermination.’ However, the
lengthy title could not obscure the modesty of this new agenda, and the EZLN were
encouraged to play down the fact that civil society was now reduced to a supporting role:

‘For the commitment made since the first day of our uprising, today again we put
in first place… the demand that the rights of the indigenous be recognised with a
change in the Political Constitution of the Mexican United States.’
‘In spite of the war which we are suffering, of our death and prisoners, the Zapatistas do not forget why we are struggling or the nature of our primary flag in the struggle for democracy, liberty and justice in Mexico: that of the recognition of the rights of the Indian peoples.’

These extracts reinterpret the grand objectives of earlier Declarations, as the deliberately malleable goals of ‘democracy, freedom and justice’ are narrowed to the ‘primary flag’ of Indian rights. They attempt to deny the reduction of the EZLN’s action agenda by implying continuity with the First Declaration. Yet I argue that such efforts elide the shifting precedence awarded to national and indigenous objectives at different points in the EZLN’s revolutionary career: the reduced indigenous objective of a COCOPA Law on Indian Rights, for example, contrasts sharply with the dualised fronts and objectives of the Fourth Declaration, in which the CNI and FZLN were to struggle for ‘democracy, freedom and justice’ broadly conceived; it is, moreover, completely unrecognisable from the prioritisation of national democracy in the First, Second and Third Declarations. That said, the very fact that the Zapatistas were encouraged to disguise frame reduction reinforces a hypothesis offered earlier in this chapter: that the frame alignment of agency is a sensitive matter, which increases the risk of a SMO being charged with indecisiveness and vacillation. I reiterate, therefore, that a SMO will avoid aligning objectives where possible, and, where alignment is necessary, it will attempt to obscure discursive changes by reinterpreting them to reflect continuity.

I argue that it was sheer political exigency that encouraged the EZLN to reduce the agency component of their Fifth Declaration. Their extended periods of self-imposed silence in 1997 and 1998 had seen the suppression of autonomous communities and the
expulsion of peace observers, and with the AIMs now on the defensive in Chiapas the
Zapatistas had little option but to attempt to re-enter the national political arena or face
destruction. Sensibly, they elected to use their *Fifth Declaration* to posit realistic
objectives and methods that would simultaneously reengage with existing legal structures
– the COCOPA – and revisit the success of their first national *consulta*. However, in order
both to secure COCOPA cooperation and encourage popular participation in a second
*consulta*, the EZLN would be required to overcome the damage caused by what they
called ‘The Silence’.

The Silence had enabled the EZLN’s detractors to besmirch their name with
uncontested counterframes, but it had also led them to effectively abandon those within
the polity that were working towards compromise. Bishop Ruiz and the CONAI were
significant casualties (EZLN, July 16th 1998), but another was the COCOPA. The
COCOPA had not yet been dissolved, but its integrity and efficacy had been seriously
undermined, not only by Zedillo’s refusal to live up to the original San Andres accords,
but also by the EZLN. Indeed, the last time the EZLN had communicated with the
COCOPA was in March 1997 when they effectively accused its members of complicity
with the PRI:

‘You have taken almost two months to establish your position *vis-a-vis* the
governmental refusal to honour the San Andres accords. You do not respond until
now, when the last rains disappear from the forest, when the government troops
have the best climatological conditions for a military attack… The government
pretends to use the COCOPA as a helpful means to war.’

(Marcos, March 14th 1997)
The ensuing Zapatista silence left the COCOPA marooned between a recalcitrant PRI and an uncommunicative EZLN\(^{57}\). The lack of Zapatista support impeded the efforts of PRD deputies in Congress who stood by the COCOPA draft and demanded that no law be carried without EZLN approval, and by April the government became preoccupied with more pressing matters linked to the FOBAPROA banking scandal\(^{58}\). When, in early 1998, the PRI attempted to ameliorate the fallout from the Acteal massacre by enacting a unilateral Indian Rights law without COCOPA approval, the Commission appeared to be finished. According to Ross, ‘The legislative commission had been effectively neutralised by the spring of 1998, and its seal of approval was not essential to the success of Zedillo’s Indian Rights bill in the Senate,’ (Ross, 2000: 264).

By July 1998, however, the increasingly isolated Zapatistas were in a grave predicament, and were looking for potential allies in the polity once again. When the CONAI was dissolved in June, the COCOPA became the Zapatistas last beachhead in institutional political channels, and their determination to reopen communications is evinced in their flattery of the Commission that they had previously dismissed. Apparently aware of the reversal this entailed, the EZLN used their *Fifth Declaration* to explain their return to the COCOPA as a function of their eighteen-month silence. The text claims, for example, that it was only by being silent that the EZLN could identify true allies, among them members of the COCOPA:

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\(^{57}\) In early 1997 the COCOPA came under attack from the PRI for overstepping its mandate by drafting the alternative proposal without government input. On March 4\(^{5}\), under pressure and with no word from the EZLN since January, the COCOPA withdrew its proposal and called for a new dialogue. Five days later the EZLN attacked the COCOPA for failing to stand by its own amended draft. Thus from March 1997 the COCOPA was out of favour with both sides, and was reduced to denouncing the activities of paramilitaries in Chiapas and demanding official investigations into assassination attempts against CONAI representatives.

\(^{58}\) FOBAPROA is a Spanish acronym for the Bank Fund to Protect Savings, which was established to relieve banks of problem loans. After banker Carlos Cabal embezzled 700 million dollars from the fund, President Zedillo proposed that FOBAPROA be dismantled and that its portfolio of bank debt be absorbed by the state. The payment of this debt, plus interest, would require about 8 percent of GDP for a minimum of 10 years, and would be paid through increases in the Value Added Tax and cuts in social programmes. Zedillo’s opponents in Congress argued that, in effect, the bank rescue would curtail social spending, raise taxes on the middle class, and replace subsidies for the 42 million Mexican poor with subsidies to the banking community.
‘We saw that the government is not one, nor is the vocation of death, which their chief flaunts, unanimous. We saw that within it there are people who want peace, who understand it, who see it as necessary, who see it as essential. Being quiet, we saw other voices from within the war machine speaking to say no to its path.’

(EZLN, July 19th 1998)

Not only was this an attempt to explain the Zapatistas’ unpopular silence and detachment from both civil society and mainstream politics, it was also an olive branch held out to the COCOPA. The *Fifth Declaration* frames the COCOPA as the linchpin of the EZLN’s agency, and it is with an air of anxiety and contrition that the text requests that the Commission ‘smooth the path for the realisation of the national *consulta*’:

‘This is the hour of the Commission for Concordance and Pacification. In their hands and competence is the stopping of the war, the completing of what the Executive refuses to carry out, the opening of hope for a just and dignified peace… It is the hour to respond to the confidence which has been invested in this Commission…’

(EZLN, July 19th 1998)

To some degree, therefore, the frame reduction of agency must be seen as an apology to the COCOPA, an attempt to repair political bridges whose foundations had been seriously damaged by months of self-imposed exile. Above all, however, in light of the timing of the proposed *consulta* and its modest restriction to the COCOPA law, I argue that the Zapatistas’ return to the COCOPA demonstrates their desire to re-engage with the peace process at any price in order to prevent the further dismantlement of AIM communities.

**CONCLUSION**
The *Fifth Declaration*, perhaps more than any other Zapatista text, exemplifies the EZLN’s pragmatic approach to its collective action frame. With it the Zapatistas brought an end to months of intermittent silence, during which the political landscape had altered considerably from the optimistic outlook that was the backdrop to their *Fourth Declaration*. Overall, the EZLN remained wedded to a predominantly indigenous discourse, reinforced by their amplification of an indigenous movement identity, solidarity-group culture and the injustices suffered by the indigenas of the AIMs. Yet, in the midst of this, the *Fifth Declaration* also proves the Zapatistas’ willingness to adapt components of their discourse to fit their immediate needs. Their organisational identity, for example, was bridged along with features of their injustice discourse in an effort to reinforce valuable protective relations recently garnered with the diverse ‘rainbow’ of ‘international Zapatismo’ (Marcos, in Le Bot, 1997: 210), while their agency component was reduced to reflect achievable ends and means that might enable them to reinitiate the stalled dialogue, enlist the help of civil society in a more realistic capacity, and hopefully stave off the total destruction of *autonomías* by the federal army.

That said, however, I do recognise the genuinely held beliefs that underpin the indigenous frame, and as such refute the argument that the Zapatistas’ willingness to bridge their identity with ‘those who are other’ makes them somehow ‘postmodern’ (Burbach, 2001). Indeed, I suggest that it was Maya cultural logic, which sees no contradiction in the concept of unity in diversity (Fischer, 1999), which allowed the EZLN to make sense of their broad alliance with ‘international Zapatismo’. For while it may be acceptable to consider Marcos – the white, former university lecturer and product of modernity – a ‘postmodern’ warrior, politician or poet, it is more problematic to make the same claims of the EZLN’s indigenous leaders in the CCRI. These men and women, indigenous peasants who have been able to preserve their internal logics and relations in Chiapas’s closed corporate communities (Wolf, 1957; Nash, 1993, 1995), are the ones that dictate the course of the EZLN’s collective discourse (Marcos, 1994), and they are far
more likely to rationalise that discourse according to ingrained cultural logic than any abstract postmodernism.

In sum, there is no denying the EZLN’s determination to secure the indigenas’ right to otherness: this became their main objective in January 1996 once their position in the national dialogue was assured, and it remains their ‘primary flag’ to this day. Yet the subtle alignment of frame components in the *Fifth Declaration* demonstrates their willingness to manipulate their indigenous discourse, as they sought to end their silence, prevent further dismantlements, and re-engage with peace process. The net effect of these changes was a decidedly less ambitious collective action frame in the *Fifth Declaration*, which, although still attuned to the indigenous master frame, bridged the Zapatistas’ collective identity with protective international networks and reined-in their goals. In view of this, I argue that the *Fifth Declaration* reveals the ‘truth’ – as Gossen refers to it (1994, 1996) – of the Zapatistas’ indigenous logic in their collective identity and objectives, but that its expression in the text was influenced by more immediate constraints and threats. In short, I recognise the value of those analyses that identify the EZLN’s grounding in the indigenous ‘enchanted world’ (Gilly, 1998), but take issue with the argument that their indigenous discourse is the straightforward reflection of some innate Indian ‘essence’ or ‘soul’ (Gossen, 1996). Rather, while I agree that the EZLN value the truth of their indigenous roots, I maintain that it was political exigency that influenced the contours of the *Fifth Declaration’s* indigenous frame.
CHAPTER TEN

Summary and Conclusion

This thesis has charted the evolution of the EZLN’s collective discourse by deconstructing the collective action frames of seven key texts and identifying points of discursive frame alignment and continuity between them. The texts were selected to represent key stages in the EZLN’s political career, and to provide valuable insight into the meanings of the Zapatistas’ discourse at different times. The application of specific frame analytic methods has been aimed at drawing out the most subtle discursive alignments, even at the level of individual frame components, in the hope of demonstrating the fluidity, continuity, and complexity of the Zapatistas’ discourse. This final chapter details specific and original contributions to knowledge made in this endeavour, and offers several conclusions that are relevant both to current understandings of the EZLN and background theories of frame analysis.

EMPIRICAL ARGUMENTS

Empirically, the originality of this thesis is found in the fact that I have taken already-known data – in this case, key EZLN documents – and reinterpreted them in such a way as to draw out the nuances and shades of meaning contained within and between them. Though many have sought to comprehend the meaning of the Zapatista rebellion (Bruhn, 1997; Burbach, 2001; Carrigan, 2000; Gossen, 1996; Nugent, 1995; Veltmeyer, 2000), few have begun their analyses with the discourse of the protagonists themselves, and none has combined the particular methods and concepts of frame analysis used herein. In this first section, I offer three conclusions based on my findings. The first is that the Zapatistas’ discourse is inherently fluid, changeable and pragmatic. This argument stands in opposition to current analyses that seek to subsume the EZLN according to discursive or movement categories. The second is that, in spite of this fluidity, the longitudinal frame
analysis of texts also draws out stable features of the EZLN’s discourse. This observation adds depth to existing studies that tend to essentialise the EZLN while countering those analyses that portray features of the EZLN’s discourse as mere political strategy. The third is that, taken together, fluidity with stability renders the EZLN’s discourse more complex than existing interpretations allow.

Fluidity

I argue that the Zapatistas’ discursive fluidity may be observed in ongoing frame alignment processes (Snow et al, 1986) at the level of frame components (Gamson, 1992, 1995). These frame alignment processes are delineated in Parts One, Two and Three, and reproduced in diagrams that map-out the changing components of the texts’ collective action frames (see figs. 3-9). This mapping of the EZLN’s discursive changes refutes those analyses that reduce the EZLN to a single social movement or ‘type’ of SMO (Burbach, 2002; Gossen, 1994, 1996; Veltmeyer, 2000; Rajchenberg and Heau-Lambert, 1998), and also acts as a counterweight to analyses that pay little attention to the content of the EZLN’s own discourse (Gray, 1997; Froehling, 1998; Munoz, 2005; Yashar, 1998; Veltmeyer, 2000). The separate instances of frame alignment are too numerous to restate here, although even in broad terms the seven key texts betray the Zapatistas’ readiness and ability to align themselves with different belief structures, ideologies and master frames. During their clandestine phase, for example, which ran from the EZLN’s inception in 1980 to the eve of rebellion in January 1994, the Zapatistas sustained a socialistic collective action frame, while with their First Declaration all mention of this was rejected as the EZLN aligned their rebellion with nationalist ideology (January 1st 1994), and in their Fourth Declaration the EZLN transformed their movement identity once more, this time framing their collective identity and injustice components through a master frame of Latin American indigenous politics (January 1st 1996). In all cases, these
broad changes were accompanied by what we might call micro-discursive frame alignment at the level of individual frame components.

For the Zapatistas, I suggest, frame alignment has often been contingent upon myriad perceived factors, ranging from political opportunities and constraints to cultural opportunities to cognitive constraints imposed by belief structures. When, for example, the *Fourth Declaration* (January 1st 1996) is placed in its wider context we can find numerous reasons for the Zapatistas’ consolidation of a more indigenous collective action frame at that time. Indeed, the government’s acceptance of the EZLN as an organisation of national rather than mere local importance lessened the threat of marginalisation and created the opportunity for the Zapatistas to reduce their amplification of nationalist values; equally, the fact that Indian Rights and Culture was the first table to be held at the San Andres dialogue encouraged the EZLN to amplify their claim to the representation of indigenous interests; and finally, the declining relevance of nationalism as a unifying discourse in Post-Salinas Mexico, and the rise of a new and potent master frame of Latin American indigenous politics, also played their part in encouraging the Zapatistas to realign their collective action frame to reflect indigenous priorities. Such ‘instrumental’ frame alignment is in evidence throughout the key texts, and its observation, I argue, marks a progression from any analysis that seeks to reduce the EZLN’s discourse to a particular and constant ‘truth’ (Burbach, 2002; Gossen, 1996; Holloway and Pelaez, 1998; Nugent, 1995; Rajchenberg and Heau-Lambert, 1998; Veltmeyer, 2000).

The danger, however, in stressing the instrumental function of frame alignment, is that it risks exaggerating the Zapatistas’ cultural autonomy. Such an analysis would raise the EZLN beyond the reach of the cultural and situational constraints that limit discursive alignment. However, I argue that the strength of Johnston’s bottom-up methodology is that it allows the researcher to differentiate between instrumental frame alignment inspired by political opportunities, and frame alignment structured by cultural and discursive constraints. Indeed, I maintain that several instances of frame alignment were,
in effect, either forced upon the Zapatistas by discursive constraints, or were the product of cultural logics inherent to their discourse. Until September 1993, for example, the EZLN’s subordination to the FLN Supreme Command in Mexico City effectively obliged them to retain their socialist movement identity, as seen in The Southeast in Two Winds (1992). Later, in their Second Declaration (June 12th 1994), indigenous cultural logic encouraged the Zapatistas to amplify their indigenous leadership as they struggled to correct misframes and counterframes that misrepresented their k’u’x. Even the shift to a broadly indigenous frame in their Fourth Declaration (January 1st 1996) was, indirectly, the result of discursive constraints that stemmed from the Zapatistas’ indigenous support base as it lobbied the CCRI for genuine return on their investment at San Andres. In all three cases the EZLN were led to align features of their collective action frame because of constraints imposed by their prior engagement with a particular discursive master frame, ideology or belief system. This not only reinforces Steinberg’s (2002) argument that discourse can be every bit as constraining as it is enabling, it also adds weight to those empirical analyses that already recognise the importance of cultural and discursive constraints: Gilly, for example, identifies the influence of the ‘enchanted realm’ of the Maya (1998), while Nugent (1995) observes the importance of genuinely held nationalist values. Where the present thesis builds on these, however, is in its evaluation of such discursive and cultural constraints alongside local, national and international political opportunities and threats, thereby providing a more rounded interpretation of discursive fluidity as both instrumental and constrained.

Thus, I suggest, the mapping of discursive fluidity represents a contribution to current empirical understandings of the Zapatistas. Comprehending discursive change according to frame alignment processes and dialogic interaction with misframes and counterframes has enabled me to go beyond the ‘static’ portrayal of the EZLN as a particular ‘type’ of SMO, be it socialist (Veltmeyer, 2000), indigenous (Gossen, 1994, 1996) or postmodern (Burbach, 1994, 2001). In this way, I argue that the current thesis
lends weight to those analyses that identify in the Zapatista discourse elements of different discursive themes (Morton, 2002; Pelaez, 1996; Poggilia, 2005), but succeeds where these studies have so far failed to map the changes longitudinally.

Stability

Attention to the fluidities of frame alignment alone, however, risks depicting the EZLN as the ultimate political pragmatists without genuine principles, core values or aims. This leads to my second empirical conclusion: that the Zapatistas’ discourse, while fluid, nonetheless contains certain immovable or ‘stable’ features. For example, discursive continuity is seen in the Zapatistas’ retention of their indigenous solidary-group, which first appeared in *The Southeast in Two Winds* (1992), and which has remained a constant feature ever since. Indeed, while their indigenous solidary-group has undergone varying degrees of frame amplification and reduction, it has never been denied, and so we can safely conclude that even before the January 1994 rebellion the Zapatistas had come to identify themselves as an organisation peopled by and led by indigenas. Another area of relative continuity is the EZLN’s consistent restatement of their primary objectives as ‘democracy, freedom and justice’. Discounting their initial frame (FLN 1980), in which their objective was the foundation of a socialist state, the Zapatistas’ recognisable demand for ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’ was first made in *The Southeast in Two Winds*, even though the socialist emphasis of this clandestine text precluded the inclusion of ‘democracy’ until the *First Declaration*. Nonetheless, we can safely conclude that since 1994 the EZLN has remained an indigenous organisation that has struggled for real political change in the areas of democratic representation and civil rights.

59 With their *First Declaration* the EZLN augmented these objectives to include ‘work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace’, and in the *Second Declaration* these were condensed to the now staple demand for ‘democracy, freedom and justice’. It is noteworthy that these objectives can be interpreted in different ways, and that this has enabled the EZLN to attach them to separate agendas at different times. In the *First, Second* and *Third Declarations*, for example, ‘democracy, freedom and justice’ were couched in the coordination of a broad national front for democratisation (see figs. 5, 6 and 7); in the *Fourth Declaration* they were dualised to reflect twin indigenous and national objectives (fig. 8); and by the *Fifth Declaration* they were restricted to the more realistic goal of a COCOPA Law on Indian Rights (fig. 9).
I argue that longitudinal deconstruction of texts according to Gamson’s frame components (1992, 1995) has enabled me to identify the stable features of the EZLN’s discourse between 1980 and 1998, and to distinguish these from the more fluid frame alignment of components inspired by instrumental concerns and discursive constraints. Identifying these stable features does not essentialise the EZLN as some have attempted to do, but it does direct the analysis towards the genuine or core identities, values and aims that often underpin a collective action frame. This, I suggest, goes some way towards correcting the tendency of some scholars to reduce the EZLN’s discourse to simple strategy alone (Munoz, 2006; Yashar, 1998). I hypothesise that similar examples of frame continuity will be found alongside instances of frame alignment in most, if not all, social movement discourses, and that the longitudinal analysis of Gamson’s frame components offers the best method of drawing out these ‘stable’ discursive features.

Complex Content
The fact of continuity with change demands that, over time, a SMO will be required to detach and reattach ‘stable’ frame components to more ‘fluid’ and changing components, and that this will necessitate the implementation of several frame alignment processes. This, I suggest, reinforces my third empirical argument: that the content of the EZLN’s discourse is extremely complex. The Southeast in Two Winds, for example, evinces several frame alignment processes at the level of separate frame components (see fig. 4); here the EZLN simultaneously transformed their organisational and solidary-group identities to reflect their indigenous structure and composition, reduced their application of socialist dogma in their movement identity, amplified material and economic grievances in their injustice component, concretised their enemy in readiness for a major political campaign against the PRI executive, and blurred their agency discourse in order to facilitate debate on what form action should take. Discursive complexity has also been demonstrated in the Zapatistas’ efforts to link together what might otherwise appear ill-
fitting or even contradictory discursive fields, including ideologies, master frames, cultural logics. A perfect example is found in the bridging of indigenous organisational and solidary-group identities: these were bridged with a reduced socialist movement identity in *The Southeast in Two Winds* (see fig. 4), but were later bridged with the nationalist movement in the *First Declaration* (fig. 5).

Less circumspect scholars have overlooked discursive complexity in their reduction of the EZLN to a single category; be it ‘socialist’ (Veltmeyer, 2000), ‘nationalist’ (Nugent, 1995; Rajchenberg and Heau-Lambert, 1998), ‘indigenous’ (Gossen, 1994, 1996) or ‘postmodern’ (Burbach, 2001; Carrigan, 2000). While I do not refute these claims entirely, I do draw attention to the fact that the intricacy of the EZLN’s discourse means that it cannot be easily categorised. Rather, by orienting the analysis towards the interpretation of frame components, the present thesis adumbrates the EZLN’s involvement with various discursive fields and plots this within and between key texts.

Thus, where Veltmeyer (2000) recognises only what he sees as the Zapatistas’ fundamental Marxism-Leninism, I acknowledge the Marxist beginnings of the EZLN as evinced in their initial frame (FLN, 1980), but also chart the discursive progression of EZLN’s relationship with socialist thought in Marcos’s *The Southeast in Two Winds* (1992), through to their final rejection of the socialist master frame with their *First Declaration*\(^6\)\(^6\). Similarly, I find evidence to support Nugent (1995) and Rajchenberg and Heau-Lambert (1998) who identify the EZLN’s discursive alignment with nineteenth and twentieth century revolutionary nationalism. Again, however, using longitudinal micro-frame analysis I insist that this be viewed in context, so that, for example, the initial adoption of Emiliano Zapata as the organisation’s figurehead in the *Estatutos* (1980) was, at that time, a function of the EZLN’s Guevarist approach to socialist indoctrination in

\(^6\)\(^6\) Indeed, I argue that socialism was only truly important to the EZLN in their initial frame, for even *The Southeast in Two Winds* indicates their efforts to move beyond its doctrinal constraints by articulating socialist principles with the idea of an indigenous vanguard. I have suggested that the reduced socialist movement identity of *The Southeast in Two Winds* may only have been retained because of the EZLN’s subordination to the FLN in Mexico City at that time.
Latin American states; in the First, Second and Third Declarations, by contrast, it had nothing to do with socialism, but was part of a broader effort to embed the EZLN in a nationalist civil democratisation movement. Finally, I also find some truth in Gossen’s (1994, 1996) interpretation of the EZLN’s indigenous ‘heart’ and Gilly’s (1998) argument that much of the EZLN’s discourse is oriented toward defending the ‘enchanted realm’ of the Maya. Nonetheless, I also maintain that this indigenous emphasis was not allowed to come to the fore of the Zapatistas’ discourse until January 1996, when the risk of marginalisation had abated and the political and cultural climate was conducive to a more indigenous movement identity and agenda. Furthermore, I point out that the EZLN’s efforts to amplify their so-called ‘indigenous soul’ proved harmful, and contributed to that which they had struggled against for so long: their marginalisation in Mexican politics. Indeed, I suggest that the Zapatistas’ willingness to make massive compromises in their Fifth Declaration (July 19th 1998) was part of an effort to reengage with institutional channels following their reduction to the fringes of Mexican politics.

However, the fact of the EZLN’s discursive complexity raises the issue of their alleged ‘postmodernism’. I have acknowledged that there is an element of truth in those interpretations that identify the EZLN’s socialist, nationalist and indigenous traits, and that longitudinal micro-frame analysis is able to link these interpretations together, but I find it more difficult to find common ground with those analyses that have posited the EZLN as ‘the first postmodern movement’ (Carrigan, 2000). The postmodern interpretation is a broad church, and exponents have found evidence of the EZLN’s postmodernism in the rebels’ reluctance to seek power (Burbach, 1994, 2001; Carrigan, 2000; Pelaez, 1996), their creation of new democratic spaces for civil discussion (Popke, 2004), the radical democracy of their internal relations and structure (Cleaver, 1994; Burbach, 1994, 2001), their manipulation of new media such as the Internet (Gray, 1997; 

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This changing relationship with nationalist iconography is also evinced in the EZLN’s different uses of Zapata: first as the hero whose revolutionary Plan de Ayala reflected socialist precepts (FLN, 1980), and later as the modest nationalist revolutionary whose own words paid homage to the peaceful activities of Mexican civilians (EZLN, June 12th 1994). Indeed, by the Fifth Declaration the EZLN’s alignment with nationalist values had become very minimal, owing to their preoccupation with indigenous issues and their new alliance with international civil society.
Froehling, 1998; Cason and Brooks, 1999), and their use of parody and satire in place of dogma (Schulz and Wagner, 1995). In themselves, these are valid observations, yet their interpretation as indicators of postmodernism is ill conceived. They are based on analyses that tend to skirt around the EZLN’s own discourse and so are rendered partial and unable to locate the shades of meaning that can only be divined through in-depth discursive inquiry.

This is demonstrated by some of the erroneous assumptions they make, many of which have been exposed in this thesis. For example, the EZLN have described their creation of ‘democratic spaces’ in national and international civil society (the CND, MLN, FZLN and the Encuentros) as pragmatic responses to the failure of the ‘traditional’ route of armed revolution in January 1994 (Marcos, in Le Bot, 1997: 75). There is, therefore, no evidence to support Burbach’s claim that these initiatives were born of the Zapatistas’ innate awareness of postmodern ‘changes occurring on the world scene’ (Burbach, 2001: 117). Equally, the label of ‘postmodern movement’ sits particularly uneasily alongside the fact of the EZLN’s overwhelmingly indigenous solidary-group. In Chiapas, the Zapatista rank and file is predominantly Maya Indian and thus comprised of people who have existed in near complete detachment from the modern world for centuries due to Chiapas’s arrested development in the closed corporate community network (Wolf, 1957). Thus the EZLN’s radically democratic organisational identities have less to do with postmodern decentralised leadership and more to do with the antemodern political culture of command obedience that predominates in local indigenous communities. Finally, the idea that the Zapatistas’ postmodernism can be found in their Internet activism does not live up to their indigenous reality, for the canadas and indigenous communities of Chiapas’s Lacandon and Los Altos regions were not on-line in 1994. The EZLN used a basic system of couriers and runners to deliver their communiqués to sympathetic newspapers (Marcos, 1994), and expressed no wish to engage in ‘Internet war’ (Froehling, 1997). To assume, therefore, without recourse to the
Zapatistas’ own discourse, that these activities correspond to the western global dichotomy between modernity and postmodernity is bordering on orientalism, and analyses that apply this label ignore the indigenous participants’ own words in order to impose an entirely unrelated polemic.

Empirically, therefore, I maintain that the tendency to compartmentalise the EZLN has only served to obscure its discursive complexity. By beginning with the content of the EZLN’s discourse in key texts, and then placing these texts in their wider contexts to identify and explain instances of frame alignment and continuity between them, this thesis offers a corrective to this trend that has attempted to draw out and interpret the detail of the Zapatistas’ discourse at different points in their career. I conclude that the content of the EZLN’s discourse is more intricate and delicately balanced than many existing analyses allow, and that the complexity of this content is evinced in the Zapatistas’ ongoing interweaving and justification of their realigned and stable frame components. I do concede, however, that several scholars have alluded to the EZLN’s discursive complexity by asserting that the EZLN has recombined elements of indigenous, nationalist and postmodern discourses, although I argue that they have so far failed to map the components of this discursive pastiche (Morton, 2002; Pelaez, 1996; Saldana-Portillo, 2002). Others, meanwhile, have begun to map frame components but have not gone far enough in their efforts to understand their meanings in particular historical contexts (Amparan, 2004). The present thesis adds to these interpretations by mapping discourse longitudinally according to frame components, and by deepening the analysis to tackle the different meanings and contexts that lie behind frame components at different times.

Research Agenda

I end this summary of empirical contributions by offering a future research agenda. First of all, the present thesis ends with the Fifth Declaration of July 1998, and since I began
my PhD the Zapatistas have published a *Sixth Declaration* (July 2005). Although this text appears to reify and indeed amplify the EZLN’s indigenous identity and continues to build on their international links, it proves that the discourse of the EZLN is still evolving. Indeed, this and other key Zapatista texts have been, and continue to be, disseminated since 1998, and offer a worthwhile and obvious area in which to extend the interests of the present thesis and thereby deepen our understanding of a worthy, exciting, and groundbreaking social movement phenomenon.

Furthermore, as I have been careful to point out, the present thesis deals only with the authors’ own selection of ‘key texts’. While I have defended this selection, arguing for the need to draw comparisons between the same type of text where possible and including in my analysis available texts from the EZLN’s clandestine phase, I realise that these seven texts comprise only a very small sample of the EZLN’s total discursive output. For this reason another potential area in which to develop the conclusions and arguments of this thesis is through the frame analysis of other types of Zapatista text; say, for example, the documents of the FZLN or AIMs, or Marcos’s humorous epistles that relay his conversations with Old Antonio and Don Durito the Quixotic beetle. It would be fascinating to deconstruct the components of such texts, to observe the twists and turns they evince, and to draw comparisons with the EZLN *Declarations*.

**THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS**

Theoretically, the originality of this thesis is found in its combination of three specific approaches to frame analysis: Johnston (1995), Gamson (1992, 1995), and Snow et al (1986). In 1995 Johnston intimated that his micro-frame analytic methodology might be applicable to the collective discourses of SMOs, yet this thesis represents the first concerted application of his imperatives in concert with the categories and components of Gamson’s collective action frame (1992) and Snow et al’s frame alignment thesis (1986). I have labelled this combination ‘longitudinal micro-frame analysis’. Thus it is in the
combination and application of these frame analytic methods that this thesis is able to make four specific contributions to social movement theory. The first of these demonstrates the applicability of Johnston’s methodology to the collective discourses of social movements and organisations. The second confirms Johnston’s approach as an effective means of identifying cultural and discursive constraints. The third posits the importance of deconstructing the content of movement discourses according to Gamson’s frame components. Finally, a fourth contribution identifies Snow et al’s frame alignment processes as the conceptual tools that enable the researcher to map discursive fluidity.

Micro-frame analysis of Collective Discourse

Primarily, this thesis shows that Johnston’s micro-frame analytic methodology can be used to deconstruct collective movement discourses. Although Johnston designed his set of methodological imperatives for the analysis of participant ‘interpretive frames’, he hypothesised that they may also be used to draw out the detail of what he calls the ‘macrodiscursive’ frames of SMO collectives (1995: 244). This thesis proves that Johnston was correct; indeed, I submit the fruits of my research as evidence that, through Johnston, frame analysis can be rescued from the political process model and applied heuristically in a bottom-up interpretation of discursive meaning. By taking collective texts, analysing them as holistic constructs and remaining sensitive their speech situation, pragmatic intent and authorial role, the thesis demonstrates the merits of Johnston’s micro-frame analysis in the interpretation of collective texts. It can, I suggest, defeat the empirical tendency to impose meanings on collective discourses by favouring political opportunity structures (Munoz, 2006; Yashar, 1998), or, for that matter, macro-political theories (Burbach, 2001), cultural belief structures (Gossen, 1996) and ideologies (Veltmeyer, 2000).

Cultural and Discursive Constraints
I also argue that Johnston’s text-centred, bottom-up approach to frame analysis can defeat the empirical tendency to exaggerate the instrumental dimension of frames (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999, 2003) and overlook cultural influences (Steinberg, 2002; Poletta, 1999). By taking the text as the point of analysis, and neither privileging nor denying political opportunities, I have been able to include cultural-cognitive factors alongside political influences in my analysis. As a result, I have been able to uncover ways in which cultural logic and belief have impacted on the meaning of the Zapatistas’ frame components. I have argued, for example, that Maya cultural logic played a central role in enabling the EZLN to overcome potential contradictions that might have arisen from their efforts to bridge their indigenous identities with a diverse international network of ‘others’ (EZLN, July 19th 1998). Further, the inclusion of such cultural-cognitive factors has also allowed me to engage with empirical arguments that identify the Zapatistas with postmodernism. Indeed, I have argued that the Zapatistas’ cry of ‘one world with room for many worlds’ was founded on indigenous and mestizaje ideas of unity-in-diversity rather than postmodern ideas of cultural relativism inspired by socialism’s global defeat (Burbach, 2001). Equally, I have argued that the EZLN’s radical-democratic organisational identity from 1992 was attributable to schemas of command obedience that prevail in local indigenous governance structures, rather than postmodern ideas of decentred leadership (Burbach, 2001; Pelaez, 1996).

These conclusions were reached by interpreting EZLN texts holistically: by taking account of their speech situation and pragmatic intent, placing them in a web of contextual fields from the political to the cultural-cognitive, and working outwards: from the text to the field. The implications for the analysis of collective movement discourses are far-reaching. Indeed, we need not, I argue, abandon frame analysis simply because of the tendency of some frame analysts to focus solely on political opportunity structures. Rather, by applying Johnston’s methodology we can infer meanings from texts according to a range of discursive, cultural, political and other ‘fields’.
Discursive Content

In combination with Gamson’s layered conception of the collective action frame (1992, 1995), I argue that Johnston’s methodology can also focus attention on the content of collective action frames, and thereby overcome the tendency to elide the substance of frames. Indeed, by deconstructing frames according to their separate frame components, this thesis has oriented the analysis toward the contents of the Zapatistas’ collective action frames. This, I maintain, marks a change from the tendency to focus on ‘rational’ reactions to political structural change in explaining the causes of frame alignment, and answers Crossley’s recommendations for frame analysis:

‘The general conclusion to be drawn from this argument is that we must abandon the commitment to the RAT [rational action theory] model and embrace rather a perspective which puts interpretive schemas and dispositions at its very heart. This is not to deny that social agents act purposively in pursuit of goals but it suggests that we cannot take for granted the ways in which they make sense of their environments, what their goals are, how they reflect upon their situations, etc.’ (Crossley, 2002: 142)

In mapping out the content of the EZLN’s discourse, I have chosen to remain true to Gamson’s model, which consists of the identity, injustice and agency frame components. I do, however, concede that further frame components may be added in order to broaden the analysis of frame content (Chihu Amparan, 2003). Again, the implications for frame analysis are important. Indeed, I argue that, having begun the analysis from the text itself, effective frame analysis must deconstruct its discourse according to an accepted and consistent framework of discursive components. Only by
delimiting such components can they be placed in the wider cultural-cognitive, discursive
and political contexts through which meanings can be inferred.
Discursive Fluidity

Finally, in deconstructing the content of key texts at nodal points in the EZLN’s historical development, I have shown that frame analysis can be used to map instances of what Snow et al first described as *frame alignment* (1986). By plotting the evolving content of the EZLN’s collective action frame longitudinally, I have answered Steinberg and avoided the reification of discourse as fixed and immovable (Steinberg, 2002). Furthermore, by accepting Steinberg’s insights but retaining the focus on discursive frames, I have identified the dialogism of the EZLN’s discourse as expressed in the *counterframes* and *misframes* (Suh, 2001) of opponents and bystanders, and the frame alignment processes undertaken to redress them. Indeed, the fact that frame alignment occurs by degrees in interaction with misframes and counterframes\(^{62}\) reinforces the dialogic nature of movement discourses, as SMOs tweak their frame components to secure a better ‘fit’ with their intended audience or to meet some slightly different objective. By returning to and applying Snow et al’s original frame alignment thesis, I argue that the analysis of movement discourses must remain especially mindful of such discourses as continually emergent and mutable, and I make the case for Snow et al as one means of ‘capturing’ movements’ discursive fluidity.

Moreover, in charting the dynamics of frame alignment I have also been able to add value to Snow et al’s frame alignment thesis. Firstly, I have used frame analytic tools to differentiate instances of frame alignment from frame *continuity*, and have shown that longitudinal micro-frame analysis can also be used to expose the more stable components of collective action frames. Secondly, by observing change with continuity I have also been able to observe frame alignment as a process enacted at the level of frame *components* rather than whole frames. For example, within a single text we may find that one component is amplified while another may undergo frame extension or transformation, and so on. This may seem a rather obvious point, yet it is one not

\(^{62}\) Such gradual frame alignment is best observed in the alignment of the EZLN’s nationalist frame between January 1994 and January 1995. See Chapters Five, Six and Seven (also figs. 5, 6 and 7).
mentioned in the empirical and theoretical literature. Thirdly, I argue that Snow et al’s original typology of four framing processes – frame amplification, bridging, extension and transformation – is not exhaustive. Indeed, I have identified three further alignment processes: frame concretisation, seen, for example, in the concretisation of the EZLN’s enemy in *The Southeast in Two Winds* (1992) and revolutionary methods in the *First Declaration* (January 1st 1994); frame blurring, seen in the blurring of the enemy in the *Estatutos* (FLN, 1980) and objectives in *The Southeast in Two Winds*; and frame reduction, seen in the reduction of the socialist movement identity in *The Southeast in Two Winds*, the reduction of indigenous culture in the *First Declaration*, the reduction of the nationalist discourse in the *Fourth Declaration* (January 1st 1996), and the reduced scope of objectives and methods in the *Fifth Declaration* (July 19th 1998). Finally, I suggest that in certain instances and where cultural contexts allow, framing processes may be combined to effect a more profound overall change. This can be seen in the *Fourth Declaration* where the simultaneous reduction of nationalist values and amplification of indigenous beliefs combined to transform the EZLN’s movement identity from that of a nationalist SMO to an indigenous SMO (see fig. 8).

**Research Agenda**

In Chapter Two I mentioned that the weaknesses and shortcomings associated with frame analysis have encouraged several scholars to abandon its precepts and terminology altogether (Steinberg, 1999, 2002; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2003). Steinberg, for example, argues that there is little to be gained from frame analysis that simply reifies discourse, ignores multivocality, and so elides discursive constraints. Others, like McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), have followed Steinberg in abandoning frame analysis.

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63 Instead, Steinberg advocates replacing frame analysis with a language of ‘discursive fields’ and ‘speech genres’ borrowed from Bakhtinian psychology (Steinberg, 1998, 1999, 2002).
along with political process theory in pursuit of models that, they say, are capable of capturing the dialogic and fluid nature of discourse.⁶⁴

Against such moves, I offer this thesis as a means of reorienting frame analytic methods and concepts. Social movement frame analysis should, I argue, be just that: the interpretive analysis of the discursive frames of social movements and organisations. This, I argue, lends support to those who defend the integrity of frame analysis as a cultural-cognitive interpretive approach distinct from political process theory (Brulle, 1994; Caniglia and Carmin, 2005; Carmin and Balser, 2002; Dalton, 1994; Hewitt and McCammon, 2004; Poletta, 2002; Zald, 2000). While I accept that Steinberg and McAdam et al have gone beyond the narrow interest in political structures and have undoubtedly stimulated interest in the fluidity of discourse, I agree with those who argue that they have imposed difficult new terminologies where perfectly good theoretical concepts and methods already existed (Koopmans, 2003; Rucht, 2003; Oliver, 2003; Diani, 2003). Moreover, I suggest that their new directions fail to provide guidance for the deconstruction of the content of movement discourse, and so detract from more worthwhile attempts to refine our understanding of movement discourses through shared and recognisable themes (Meyer, Whittier and Robnett, 2002; Guidry, Kennedy and Zald, 2000). I maintain, therefore, that we need to preserve the fundamental interest in the ways that SMOs ‘frame’ their discourses, and that, with this in mind, frame analysis be reoriented towards the interpretation of social movements’ collective meanings. By taking the text, rather than political structural change, as the start-point of the analysis, we might work towards a more contingent conception of the collective action frame as an expression of meaning that is perpetually both under siege and under review in relation to changing social, political, economic and cultural contexts that operate at local, national

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⁶⁴ Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly have sought to encourage interest in the mutability of discourse by suggesting that we examine what they call the ‘arrows between the boxes’ of the political process model (see fig. 1) While they recognise that political process theory worked ‘well by stimulating much empirical work,’ they have come to realise that it also imposed an ‘overly structural and static, baseline model of social movements,’ and so they now advocate a new focus on the dynamism of the ‘mechanisms’ that make up the ‘processes’ of contentious action (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001: 24).
and global levels. Only in this way can we award equal weight to cultural-cognitive and
discursive factors, and deconstruct movement discourses according to their substantive
content.

In terms of developing frame analysis, therefore, my own approach is perhaps
closest to that of Nick Crossley. Crossley does not abandon the concept of frames but
draws on Bourdieu’s ideas of the *habitus* and the *doxa* as interpretive filters for collective
agents’ perceptions of and reactions to structural change in various *fields* (Crossley, 2001,
2003). I have tried, where possible, to avoid burdening the reader by peppering this thesis
with a melting pot of analytic terminologies, and so have resisted the temptation to
incorporate *doxa, habitus* and *field* alongside *frames, master frames, frame components*
and *frame alignment processes*. Indeed, this would have been a conceptual bridge too far.
Yet, I see the potential for Bourdieu’s concepts to impose some order on the array of
structural ‘fields’ that may be interpreted and acted on in different ways by different
agents. I therefore submit the unification of longitudinal micro-frame analysis and
Bourdieu’s theory of practice as one potential area of future theoretical inquiry.

Less ambitiously, however, I propose the empirical application of longitudinal
micro-frame analysis to further case studies of collective movement discourses. Because I
have attempted to remain true the methodological guidelines laid down by Johnston
(1995), as well as the conceptual categories and processes of Gamson (1992) and Snow et
al (1986), I believe that longitudinal micro-frame analysis should be relatively easy to
reproduce. Nevertheless, in the EZLN this model has been applied to what is essentially a
highly instrumental and political SMO, and so longitudinal micro-frame analysis would
be best tested in application to a more expressive SMO, say the gay rights movement
(Rimmerman, 2008) whose major objective is arguably to normalise a specific lifestyle
among western society. Alternatively, micro-frame analysis of IRA discourses before and
after 9/11 could be enlightening, or the changing discourse of the alter-globalisation
movement in the wake of the war on terror (Hadden and Tarrow, 2007: 359-376). Further,
because the EZLN is embedded in an extremely narrow indigenous solidary-group, the model could be tested by applying it to a case study of an environmental SMO that claims all of humanity as its solidary-group (Haluza-Dlay, 2008: 205-218). The possibilities and permutations of future empirical applications are literally as great as the number of social movement organisations themselves.
Figure 2. Gamson’s Collective Action Frame
Figure 3. The EZLN’s initial collective action frame, deconstructed from the *Estatutos* (FLN, August 1980)

![Diagram]

- **Collective Identity**: Militant organisational identity comprising urban, professionals and political officers. Socialist movement identity bridged with available nationalist symbols (Emiliano Zapata).
- **Alignment with peasantry/rural worker solidarity group identity**.
- **Injustice**: Socio-economic and material grievances; no mention of Indians’ cultural marginalisation.
- **Adversarial**: Targets US imperialism based on patriotic values and world systems theories.
- **Long-term goal**: Of socialist revolution and creation of proletarian state.
- **Agency**: Methods focus on protracted programme of indoctrination: the ‘ideological struggle’.

Blurry “they” to direct antipathy towards economic base rather than specific leaders.

NB. *Italics* specify the frame alignment processes involved.
The EZLN’s collective action frame, deconstructed from *The Southeast in Two Winds* (Marcos, 1992)

![Diagram](Image)

**Collective Identity**
- Transformed organisational identity based on command obedience
- Transformed solidary-group identity based on ‘indigenous’ rank and file rather than ‘peasants’
- Reduced socialist movement identity

**Injustice**
- Continued amplification of material grievances. Still no mention of cultural grievances identified as the enemy
- Adversarial frame: concretised as President Salinas and Interior Secretary Gonzalez Garrido are the state party, but no direction or clear argument, only use of metaphors as in the “wind from below”

**Agency**
- Blurring of objectives and methods: implied preference for armed rebellion against targeted enemies within the state party, but no direction or clear argument, only use of metaphors as in the “wind from below”
- Concretisation of enemy contrasts with blurring of agency, allowing Marcos to demand that something be done without committing the EZLN to action

NB. *Italics* specify the frame alignment processes involved
Figure 5. The EZLN’s collective action frame, deconstructed from the First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (EZLN, January 1st 1994)

Collective Identity

Command obedience extended to align EZLN with Mexican Congress and constitution: the ‘Powers of the Union’

Indigenous solidarity-group sustained, but with the reduction of overtly indigenous cultural indicators

Transformed movement identity to distance EZLN from FLN and break with socialism, and align instead with nationalism

Frame bridge: the reduction of indigenous otherness and the innate malleability of mestizaje nationalism facilitates the bridging of these layers in a cohesive nationalist collective identity frame

Injustice

Continued amplification of material grievances, but transformation of causality: contradictions of Salinas Exec.

Injustice no longer framed as systemic, but is attributed to the abuses of revolutionary nationalism perpetrated by the PRI. This amplifies the EZLN’s own claim to the ideals of revolutionary nationalism

Agency

Concretised adversary: continued targeting of Salinas & the PRI, along with deliberate exoneration of legislature & judiciary, both powerful potential allies

Concretised agency frame: declaration of war gives clear instructions to insurgents and potential supporters to pressure the Congress to dissolve the executive & lead a transitional government to manage democratisation

Concretisation of enemy mirrors concretisation of agency to provide clear target and method of mobilisation, essential to any declaration of war

NB. Italics specify the frame alignment processes involved
Figure 6. The EZLN’s collective action frame, deconstructed from the Second Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (EZLN, June 12th 1994)

Collective Identity

Bridged organisational identity aligns EZLN’s command obedience with civil society rather than ‘Powers of the Union’

Frame extension of movement layer sees pacific civil society incorporated in revolutionary nationalism. Also, frame amplification sees EZLN contest misframes and counterframes that denied their national scope

Frame bridge: again, the malleability of mestizaje nationalism facilitates the manipulation of meaning, allowing the EZLN to remain a revolutionary nationalist SMO, but one now embedded in civil society rather than the Mexican constitution

Injustice

Frame amplification of indigenous solidarity-group to contest misframes and counterframes that depict their leaders as socialist agents

Frame amplification of national grievances of democracy to contest misframes and counterframes. Also, frame concretisation of links between local and national injustice to consolidate bond with diverse civil society groups

Frame extension of enemy as ‘mal gobierno’ – part of the effort to incorporate the ‘Powers of the Union’ alongside the executive branch, and to ensure electoral antipathy endures beyond Salinas’s exit

Agency

Frame reduction of objectives to just three broader and more universal ideals

Frame reduction of revolutionary methods to accommodate civil society’s preference for electoral route

Frame alignment of all frame components geared towards allying the EZLN with civil society, whose mobilisation against the war in Chiapas prevented the EZLN’s annihilation and enabled them to look to the election and, perhaps, the post-election

NB. Italics specify the frame alignment processes involved
Figure 7. The EZLN’s collective action frame, deconstructed from the *Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle* (January 1st, 1995)

Collective Identity  
- Frame amplification of movement layer in order to continue struggle against counter frames and reassert EZLN on the national scene after months of immersion in local politics over the Robledo affair

Injustice  
- Frame reductio-n of indigeno-us solidary-group in order to further amplify the nationalism of the EZLN’s cause. Part of the same effort to reassert the EZLN nationally following the Robledo affair

Agency  
- Frame amplification of same three objectiv-es, marking continuity with the Second Declaration and amplifying the shared national intere-ts of the injust-tice component

Radical nationalist SMO  
- Frame amplification of nationalist identities and national interests coupled with frame extension of organisational identities and methods to include radical elements

*NB. Italics specify the frame alignment processes involved*
Figure 8. The EZLN’s collective action frame, deconstructed from the *Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle* (January 1st, 1996)

Collective Identity

- **Frame amplification** of indigenous solidarity-group in order to reinforce the frame transformation of the movement layer, to move away from the nationalist identity hampered by loss of direction and ideological contradiction, and take advantage of the new Latin American indigenous movement

Injustice

- **Frame amplification** of indigenous grievances in place of national grievances. A response to the needs of the Indian Rights discussions at the San Andres dialogue.

- Retention of the same enemy: the *mal gobierno* or bad government. Marks continuity with the previous Declarations and sustained campaign for change against the government

Agency

- **Frame amplification** of agency between two distinct structures: CNI and FZLN. CNI to pursue democarcy, freedom and justice for indigenas; FZLN to pursue the national democratisation and provide EZLN with civil protection

- **Frame transformation** of frame components to resonate with indigenous cultural beliefs and therefore support the negotiation of Indian Rights and Culture. Achieved via the frame reduction of nationalist values and the frame amplification of supposedly ‘shared’ indigenous traits latent in *mestizaje* political culture.

Indigenous SMO

**NB. Italics** specify the frame alignment processes involved
Figure 9. The EZLN’s collective action frame, deconstructed from the *Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle* (January 1st, 1996)

Collective Identity

- Organisational identity *bridged* with ‘international Zapatismo’, deemed a more effective protective force than national civil society
- Indigenous movement identity maintained in the absence of acceptable Indian Rights legislation

Indigenous solidary-group identity maintained to bolster claim to indigenous movement identity

Injustice

- Indigenous grievances maintained to *amplify* the absence of an acceptable Indian Rights law

Bad government retained as EZLN enemy, but with some attempt to acknowledge efforts of some within the polity working towards peace; e.g. COCOPA

Agency

- Objectives *reduced* to the more achievable goal of the COCOPA law on Indian Rights
- Methods *reduced* to the organisation of a national *consulta* on the COCOPA law in an effort to bring the EZLN back within the institutional channels of the peace process

These components reinforce the EZLN’s continued focus on the unfulfilled Indian Rights law

Mutually reinforces *bridge* with ‘international Zapatismo’ to afford greater protection in the face of AIM forced dismantlements

NB. *Italics* specify the frame alignment processes involved
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