

'You acted very naturally,' said he. He seemed thoughtful, and after a few moments added: 'All the same, I don't think much harm would have come of accepting.'

'No *harm*, of course. But we could not be put under an obligation.'

'He is rather a peculiar man.' Again he hesitated, and then said gently: 'I think he would not take advantage of your acceptance, nor expect you to show gratitude . . . He has rooms he does not value, and he thinks you would value them. He no more thought of putting you under an obligation than he thought of being polite . . .'

E. M. Forster, *A Room with a View*

People relate to each other in a variety of ways: father and daughter, consumer and producer, lovers, king and subjects, professional colleagues, fellow-employees, doctor and patient, bully and victim, just to give a few examples. All of these relationships are different from each other, and all are expressed differently. Furthermore, the differences in the kinds of relationships are both socially and culturally determined, and can even vary enormously within the same culture over relatively short periods of time.

In every society there are a number of relationships (although not all) between individuals which operate on the basis of exchange of one kind or another, and just as there are many kinds of relationship, there are also many kinds of exchange.<sup>1</sup> Typical Greek examples of exchange-relationships (some being different from our own) include master and slave, men and gods, lover (*erastes*) and beloved (*eromenos*), patron and client, master and pupil, buyer and seller, and so on.

<sup>1</sup> For the following, see Davis (1992) esp. ch. 3. Compare the work of Marshall Sahlins on pre-state tribal cultures which he sees as being dominated by reciprocity ((1968) 81–95; (1972) 185–275). Sahlins' work has had a great deal of influence on a number of recent studies of reciprocity and exchange in ancient Greece (cf. esp. Millett (1991) 110), but, while this has had an influence upon my own work, when applied to classical Greek society the broad bands of reciprocity which he describes (generalised, balanced and, negative reciprocity) raise a number of interesting questions, but are too crude to do more than that for this complex society, and there are too many difficulties to import his model of reciprocity wholesale into the classical Greek experience.

Each society also has what have been termed different 'repertoires' of exchange, that is, the collection of kinds of exchange which that society commonly uses and understands. As a corollary of this, different societies have different understandings of exchange depending upon their social, political, religious and economic condition. Consequently, different people because of their distinct situations view exchanges in various and divergent ways, and this can be as much a matter of class as of culture, although one would expect those within the same culture to have approximately similar repertoires of exchange.

And since each society has its own repertoire of exchanges, the interpretation of exchange is therefore open to ambiguity and manipulation.<sup>2</sup> Persians, Thracians and Macedonians, for example, did not necessarily have the same view of exchange-relationships or the same repertoire of exchanges as Greeks did.<sup>3</sup> The results of an exchange 'only have meaning in relation to the intentions of the exchangers, which they generally frame in terms of a named kind of exchange, between people in an identified social relationship, using appropriate commodities'.<sup>4</sup> Even among the Greek states themselves, there was no guarantee that the same repertoires prevailed, or that a kind of exchange which predominated in one community was equally important in another.

So what happened if the intentions of the exchangers conflicted, if the expectations and assumptions underpinning their exchange were different, if the social status of one or both of the partners was ambiguous, or if the exchange was not the same in the repertoire for each? If we are to come to an understanding of Greek society and its relations with others, we first need to come to terms with the way in which it thought about itself and how it conceived its own relationships on its own terms. To do this we need to explore the societies' own categories of relationship, and to use the categories of other societies (including our own) to highlight the differences.<sup>5</sup>

In classical Greece personal relationships belonged to the repertoire of exchanges encapsulated by *philia*, commonly translated as friendship (although the inadequacies of this as a translation will be discussed below), and it is with types of *philia* relationships that we shall primarily

<sup>2</sup> Davis (1992) 28–64.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Wolf (1966) 20.

<sup>4</sup> Davis (1992) 39.

<sup>5</sup> Moses Finley in *The World of Odysseus* was the first to consider the role of reciprocity and economic systems of exchange for the ancient Greek world, and since then there has been an increasing interest in interpreting and understanding the economics, literature, religion and early history of the Greeks in terms of exchange and reciprocity. See, e.g., Finley (1977) esp. 64–6, 95–105; (1981a); (1981b); (1983) esp. 24–49; Hands (1968); Donlan (1981/2) 137–75; Herman (1987); Blundell (1989); Gould (1989); Millett (1991); Seaford (1994); von Reden (1995); Konstan (1996); Burkert (1996) 129–55 as well as a number of books and articles dealing with the interpretation of *philia* in fifth-century tragedy: e.g., Greenberg (1962); Scodel (1979); Konstan (1985); Goldhill (1986) 79–106; Schein (1988); Stanton (1990); Schein (1990); Goldfarb (1992); Roth (1993); Stanton (1995).

be concerned. The complication is that *philia* both was a kind of exchange itself, and also on another level characterised a number of kinds of exchange.<sup>6</sup> As a result, we need to look first at the general features of *philia*, before turning to three more specific kinds of relationship which could be said to share in *philia*: kinship, companionship and ritualised-friendship (*xenia*).

### 1.1 *Philia*

The qualities which constitute *philia* itself are difficult to define. Just as our own ideas of friendship can be quite vague (we all *know* who our friends are, but can we so readily say what friendship *is*?),<sup>7</sup> *philia* is a subtle and complex abstraction which cannot easily be pinned down to a set of rigid parameters. Nevertheless, in the ancient world there was a keen interest in coming to terms with what defined *philia* and the proper relations between *philoï*, and this was reflected no less in Greek tragedy than it was in the philosophical treatises of Plato and Aristotle.<sup>8</sup>

Aristotle has given us the most extended ancient discussion of the kinds of *philia*.<sup>9</sup> When he introduces the subject in the *Nicomachean Ethics* he says that *philia* is a virtue (*arete*), or at least it involved virtue, that it is similar to concord (*homonoia*) and more important than justice (in fact those who are just need *philia* as well), that it was not only necessary but also noble (*kalon*), that those who love their friends (*philophiloi*) are praised, and that some think *philoï* must also be good men (*agathoi*).<sup>10</sup>

Aristotle also makes it quite clear that there are three different types of friendship: *philia* based on virtue; *philia* based on pleasure; and *philia* based on utility.<sup>11</sup> The purest and best form of *philia* is of course the friendship based on virtue, and this is the friendship of the good.<sup>12</sup> Such friends wish another good for his own sake, and it is among friends of this kind that *philia* and virtue find their highest forms.<sup>13</sup> Aristotle admits that, although enduring, this sort of friendship is rare and requires time and intimacy (*synetheia*), and that one cannot be accepted as a friend until it

<sup>6</sup> See Price (1989) 131–61.

<sup>7</sup> For one survey of modern western notions of friendship, see Allan (1979) 34–45.

<sup>8</sup> E.g., Sophocles' *Ajax*, *Antigone*, and *Philoctetes*, and Euripides' *Alcestis*, *Orestes*, and *Electra*, Plato's *Lysis* and the *Symposion*, and a total of three chapters in Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. For *philia* in Homer and the Homeric world, see Adkins (1963); (1972); Karavites (1986); Hooker (1987).

<sup>9</sup> For other attempts to define a classification for *philia* relationships (both ancient and modern): Hierocles in Stobaeus 4.671–3 (Wachsmuth and Hense); Earp (1929) 32–3; Dover (1974) 273–8; Blundell (1989) 39–49. <sup>10</sup> *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1155a1–31.

<sup>11</sup> *Arist., Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156a6–10; *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1236a15–33. See also Price (1989) 103–30; Osborne (1994) 139–52. <sup>12</sup> *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156b6–7.

<sup>13</sup> *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156b9–10, 1156b23–4.

has been shown that one is worthy of being loved (*philetos*) and trusted.<sup>14</sup> This perfect form of friendship seems to be based in large part on what we might call affection: that is, wishing someone good for their own sake with intimacy, commitment and trust.<sup>15</sup>

As well as this affective element, Aristotle also discusses another ingredient in *philia*: reciprocity, or giving for a return, whether the exchange takes the form of goods or services.<sup>16</sup> He says ‘a man becomes a *philos* whenever he is loved (*philoumenos*) and loves in return (*antiphilei*) and this is known to both’,<sup>17</sup> and elsewhere that goodwill (*eunoia*) can only become *philia* when it is reciprocated.<sup>18</sup>

In the non-philosophical texts as well, the Greeks were not coy about the emphasis placed on reciprocity, even in relationships between kin. Xenophon’s Socrates, mediating in a quarrel between Chaerecrates and his brother, points to this in disturbingly explicit terms:

‘Tell me,’ Socrates said, ‘If you wished to prevail upon one of your acquaintances to invite you for dinner when he is sacrificing, what would you do?’

‘Of course I would begin by inviting him myself when I sacrificed.’

‘And if you wished to persuade one of your *philo*i to take care of your property when you were away, what would you do?’

‘Of course I would first undertake to look after his property when he was away.’

‘And if you wished a foreign friend (*xenos*) to entertain you when you came to his city, what would you do?’

‘Of course I would entertain him first when he came to Athens; and if I wished him to be eager to negotiate in the business I had come for on my behalf, of course it would be necessary to do this first for him also.’

‘Can it be that you have long kept your knowledge of the magic spells of men a secret?’ Socrates said, ‘Or are you afraid that you might disgrace yourself if you do your brother a good turn first? Indeed a man who anticipates his enemies (*echthro*i) in doing harm and his *philo*i in doing benefactions seems to be worthy of the highest praise.’<sup>19</sup>

Not only was the giving of a service the surest way of making the return certain but also it was one’s duty to make a return if a service was given.

Euripides, in his rather sinister tragedy the *Orestes*, plays with the themes of friendship and the morality of repayment of debts.<sup>20</sup> At one

<sup>14</sup> *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156b24–9.

<sup>15</sup> On the role of affection in personal relationships, see esp. Foxhall (forthcoming), *contra* Osborne (1994) 139–52. <sup>16</sup> E.g., see Finley (1977) 64; Easterling (1989) 12.

<sup>17</sup> *Arist., Eud. Eth.* 7, 1236a14–15. See also *Arist., Nic. Eth.* 8, 1155b27–1156a5; cf. *Xen., Mem.* 2.6.28; *Arist., Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156a8, 1157b30. The assumption that giving for a return is the foundation of *philia* is also scrutinised in Plato’s *Lysis* (e.g. 212d).

<sup>18</sup> *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1155b32–4. <sup>19</sup> *Xen., Mem.* 2.3.11–14.

<sup>20</sup> The morally depraved Pylades, the faithful *philos* (*Eur., Or.* 725–8, 1403–6), is contrasted with Menelaus, the bad *philos* (717–21), who chooses the pious deed over the impious (627–8, 704–5).

point in the play, Orestes demands repayment from Menelaus for the debt incurred by the pursuit of Helen in terms which highlight the constant back-and-forth motion of action and reaction, and debt and repayment in (although here somewhat exaggerated) social relations. Orestes argues that although the mustering of Greece was in itself an evil, it was done to right the evil of Helen's flight, and in turn incurred a debt which must now be repaid. He says to Menelaus:

Give to me, Menelaus, not of that which is your own,  
 but give back to me what you have received, since you received it from  
 my father –  
 I am not talking about possessions. If you save  
 my life, you save my dearest possession.  
 Am I unjust? I ought to receive some unjust thing from you for this evil.  
 For even my father, Agamemnon,  
 having mustered Greece unjustly, went under the walls of Ilium,  
 not having done wrong himself, but healing  
 the wrong deed and injustice of your wife.  
 You must give me this: one for one.  
 He risked his life truly, as *philoï* ought for *philoï*,  
 labouring beside your shield,  
 so that you might get back your wife.  
 Since you received this there, pay back the same to me:  
 you will only have laboured and stood as a saviour  
 on my behalf for one day, not filled out ten years.<sup>21</sup>

Not only must wrong deeds receive retribution, but also favours must be repaid. Orestes sees this as his right, for he claims the gift remains the possession of the giver, and he would only be receiving back what is his own already.<sup>22</sup>

Trust (*pistis*) that gifts would be repaid was also fundamental to the relationship.<sup>23</sup> Often the first step in an exchange was a step in the dark and one always took the risk that the gift would not be returned. It was part of the emotive packaging of *philia* that *philoï* were trustworthy. Dercylidas said to the people of Abydus in 394:

<sup>21</sup> Eur., *Or.* 642–57.

<sup>22</sup> Morris ((1986) 13 n. 2) in his discussion of gift-exchange in the archaic period is right in discarding the anthropological notion of the gift as an extension of the person in the Greek context. Contrast Mauss ((1990) 12, 47–80) who describes the donor as merging with the gift so that each becomes part of the other. The donor then participates himself in the value of the gift and it is this aspect which makes the most powerful obligation to return; see also von Reden (1995) 45.

<sup>23</sup> On a suggested etymological connection between the noun *philotes* and the adjective *pistos*, see Taillardat (1982) 1–14. Note also the importance of timing in the exchange. As Bourdieu has shown ((1977) 3–9) the temporality of the exchange of gift and counter-gift adds to the meaning of the exchange: a gift cannot be given too soon or too late without altering its meaning within the relationship.

Men, now it is possible for you, although you were formerly *philoï* of our city, to seem benefactors (*euergetai*) of the Spartans. For being faithful (*pistoi*) in good fortune is not wonderful, but whenever people remain steadfast in the misfortunes of their *philoï*, this is remembered for all time.<sup>24</sup>

In the same vein Xenophon's Hieron laments the fact that a tyrant has few *philoï*, that is few people he can trust.<sup>25</sup> The return to a large degree depended upon the moral force of the exchange,<sup>26</sup> but in some relationships, particularly those of a more impersonal nature, an exchange of oaths could act as a guarantee of trust. Alcibiades exchanged oaths with the Persian Pharnabazus to seal their private friendship, and Curtius has the Scythians tell Alexander that oaths are a precaution of the Greeks, while Scythians simply keep faith.<sup>27</sup>

The tensions of giving and receiving were also eased to a certain extent by the fact that *philia* was also fundamentally an equal relationship, where individuals of roughly equal status exchanged gifts of roughly equal value. Aristotle says that 'friendship (*philotes*) is said to be equality (*isotes*), and this is particularly true in friendships among the good', but even among 'less perfect' *philoï*, the relationship was based on equality.<sup>28</sup>

Nevertheless, Aristotle recognises that there are relationships which are unequal in status such as that between father and child, husband and wife, ruler and ruled.<sup>29</sup> In these relationships he says the inequalities are based on a different kind of justice, for it is equal according to proportion but not according to quantity.<sup>30</sup> Although what each party is entitled to receive from the other is not the same, a sense of equality is still maintained: the superior partner should be befriended more than he befriends, 'for whenever the "befriending" (*philesis*) is according to worth, then somehow there is a sense of equality (*isotes*), and equality seems to be a part of *philia*'.<sup>31</sup>

A further complication is found in the practice of incremental giving, where a relationship was maintained by giving a return greater in value than the original gift. This in turn placed the recipient (the original giver) in debt and put him under an obligation to return the favour. Hesiod says that if you pay back a neighbour well, and give him more than he gave, then you have something to rely on later when you are in need.<sup>32</sup> As

<sup>24</sup> Xen., *Hell.* 4.8.4; cf. Xen., *Hell.* 3.1.1.

<sup>25</sup> Xen., *Hieron* 3 esp. 7-9; see also Easterling (1989) 23-4.

<sup>26</sup> See esp. Gouldner (1977) 35.

<sup>27</sup> Alcibiades: Xen., *Hell.* 1.3.12; Scythians: Q. C. 7.8.29. Compare also the *synomosiiai* at Athens in 411: literally those who swore together (see ch. 3).

<sup>28</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1157b33-1158a1, 1158b1; cf. 1163a1-2; *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1238b14-16.

<sup>29</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1158b11-19. <sup>30</sup> Arist., *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1238b20-1.

<sup>31</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1158b20-1, 23-8; cf. 1159b1-3; 1162a34-1162b4.

<sup>32</sup> Hesiod, *WD* 349-51.

Gregory points out: 'The formal difference between [balanced and incremental gift-giving] comes about because the gift in an incremental gift-giving sequence combines the two gifts: one part of the return-gift cancels the original debt, the other part creates a new debt.'<sup>33</sup> This new debt must also be requited by an equal payment and perhaps also by an increment which in turn creates a new debt, and so the relationship continues.

In recent years a great deal of emphasis has been placed upon the part of reciprocity in *philia* and the part of affection has been undermined. Goldhill, for example, has argued that *philia* was relational: that is, it expressed the relation between an individual and his society and 'is used to mark not just affection but overridingly a series of complex obligations, duties and claims'.<sup>34</sup> Millett too, while discussing Aristotle's three kinds of friendship, has stressed the instrumentality within relationships on the grounds that the *philia* of utility and mutual interest is by far the commonest kind of friendship.<sup>35</sup>

The importance of instrumental relationships is clear. Aristotle writes that 'all *philia* involves *koinonia* (association)',<sup>36</sup> and that while the friendships (*philiai*) of kin and comrades can be set apart, the *philiai* of citizens and tribesmen and fellow-sailors are more like the *philiai* between associates (*koinonikai*), 'for these seem to be, as it were, according to some agreement'.<sup>37</sup> The basis of such *koinoniai* is common advantage:

All *koinoniai* seem to be parts of the political *koinonia*; since people journey together for some advantage and for procuring some of the commodities necessary for life. The political *koinonia* seems to have originally come together and to have kept going for the sake of advantage; law-givers also aim at this and say that the common advantage is just. So other *koinoniai* aim at particular aspects of what is advantageous, like sailors aiming at the advantage in sailing for earning money, or some such thing, or comrades-in-arms aiming at the advantage in war in loot or victory or the conquest of a city, and similarly also tribesmen and demesmen. Some *koinoniai* seem to exist for pleasure, like religious groups and dinner clubs. These exist for the sake of sacrifices and company. All these seem to be subordinate to the political *koinonia*; for the political *koinonia* aims not at an advantage in the present, but at an advantage for the whole of life . . . Indeed all *koinoniai* seem to be portions of the political *koinonia*, and such *philiai* go with such *koinoniai*.<sup>38</sup>

Elsewhere, Aristotle defines these kinds of *philiai* as those of utility.<sup>39</sup> Such *philoï*, he says, are in relationship with each other not for themselves

<sup>33</sup> Gregory (1982) 54.

<sup>34</sup> Goldhill (1986) 82 following Benveniste (1973) 273–88, esp. 275–82; cf. Millett (1991) 114. <sup>35</sup> Millett (1991) 113–26.

<sup>36</sup> On the difficulties of translating *koinonia* see Millett (1991) 39, 114–15.

<sup>37</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1161b11 (see also 1159b31–2), 14–15.

<sup>38</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1160a9–30.

<sup>39</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156a14–30; *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1236a33–4.

but because of the good that may accrue to them because of each other.<sup>40</sup> As a corollary of this, these relationships are also easily broken off: the partners might cease being of use to each other if the relationship changes or the motive for the *philia* ceases to exist. As a result the *philia* comes to an end since it only existed for this reason.<sup>41</sup>

Such *philoï* could be selected for the partners' ability to make an adequate or desirable return, although this motive could be hidden behind a polite veneer.<sup>42</sup> The crucial factor in this sort of association is that it is based on an implicit 'agreement' for the exchange, whether this is a moral or legal obligation.<sup>43</sup> Even when the gift itself is difficult to value, the giver expects to receive either an equal or a greater return;<sup>44</sup> so, Aristotle warns, one must take care at the outset from whom one receives a benefaction, for whom one performs one, and on what conditions, so that on this basis one may accept these conditions or not.<sup>45</sup>

Recently Foxhall has reacted against the tendency to see friendship as a relationship in which affection had only a minimal part, and has tried to redress the balance by looking at the place of affection in a number of intimate relationships.<sup>46</sup> While still recognising the importance of reciprocity in many relationships, and realising that at one level affection acts itself as a medium of exchange, she explores the importance of what she has termed the 'limits of trust' (which she loosely defines as the household) for establishing trust, confidence and certainty in relationships in which there was no medium- or long-term expectation of a return.<sup>47</sup>

There is no doubt that Aristotle envisages his perfect *philia* as combining both reciprocity and affection. In a similar way, Roman *amicitia* also contained an affective element which could become politicised, rather than being a relationship which was purely instrumental in character.<sup>48</sup> The fact of the matter is that some friendships were more affectionate and some less so, and that friendships worked on a sliding scale of affection and utility with some inclining more towards the affective (and altruistic?) end, and some towards the side of simple advantage. Indeed, there was often no distinction between affective and

<sup>40</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156a14-19.

<sup>41</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156a19-24; see also Foxhall (forthcoming).

<sup>42</sup> Millett (1991) 118-21; see also Bourdieu (1990) 105-6.

<sup>43</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1162b27-8. <sup>44</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1162b31-3.

<sup>45</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1163a1-8.

<sup>46</sup> Foxhall (forthcoming); cf. (1989). She also does not want to define 'friendships' by *philia*, arguing that there is a whole range of other relationships which are not encompassed by this term. See also Konstan (1996a).

<sup>47</sup> Foxhall (forthcoming). Although Foxhall admits that intimate personal relationships extended beyond the boundaries of the household, she argues that 'metaphorically and pragmatically, close relationships with outsiders tended to collapse into the ideology of the close-knit connections of the household'. <sup>48</sup> See Brunt (1965a) (= (1988) 351-81).

utilitarian relationships, or at least for the most part this kind of distinction was inconsequential.<sup>49</sup> This was particularly true for political friends, who could also be kin and close companions. For example, Alcibiades on his return to Athens came on deck to look for his supporters (*epitedeioi*) because he was afraid of his enemies (*echthroï*), and was reassured when he saw his cousin Eurypolemus and the rest of his family (*oikeioi*) and *philoï*.<sup>50</sup>

There was also a sense in which the reciprocal exchange itself was forced to imitate the features of affection and to generate loyalty, commitment, obligation and durability out of the exchange. This in turn set up contradictions in purely utilitarian relationships which, because of their affective associations, could be overlaid with potent emotive connotations, and, as we shall see in the following chapters, many of the strategies for interstate relations were built on the premise that relationships worked as much from a desire to reciprocate as from the moral force of the exchange, and this ambiguity and inconsistency could be exploited and manipulated for political ends.

## 1.2 Kinds of *philia*

But as well as being a kind of exchange in its own right, *philia* and its cognate *philos* also referred to subsets of relationships which displayed these general characteristics, although in varying degrees.<sup>51</sup> As well as the modern western idea of friends as companions and associates, *philoï* included family (mother, father, brothers, sisters, grandparents, children),<sup>52</sup> and a broader range of less 'personal' relationships. Aristotle remarks that soldiers and sailors address their companions as *philoï*.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Compare also Wolf (1966) 13.

<sup>50</sup> Xen., *Hell.* 1.4.18–19. Compare *amicitia* where private friends could be public enemies (see Brunt (1965a) [= (1988) 351–81]). Such a situation is derided as disgraceful in [Dem.] 58.40.

<sup>51</sup> See, for example, Strauss (1986) 21; Blundell (1989) 39–49; Easterling (1989) 11; Millett (1991) 113–16; Osborne (1994) 139–40.

<sup>52</sup> In Euripides' *Orestes* Helen numbers her sister, Clytemnestra, among her *philoï* (97); Helen accuses Electra of not talking in a manner befitting a *philos* (100); Electra addresses Orestes as *philtate* (217, 1045); Tyndareus, the father of Clytemnestra, and Menelaus are *philoï* (475); and Menelaus is a *philos* of Orestes (449–50; cf. 371–2), as he was to Agamemnon (482). Orestes and Pylades: Pylades says that the affairs of *philoï* are common to *philoï* and that he can only show he is a *philos* by helping Orestes (Eur., *Or.* 735, 802–3) *contra* Konstan (1996a). Although Konstan is right to emphasise the importance of affection in *philia* (see below), his argument that *philia* is not the objective relationship between *philoï* seems to depend too much on the relative dates of the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, and sometimes becomes rather strained. Konstan (1996b) and (1997), where he sets out his position more fully, were published after this book was submitted for publication, so have not been taken into account.

<sup>53</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1159b27–9.

Within the framework of the three types of *philia* (based on virtue, pleasure and utility), Aristotle discusses different groups of *philoï* and says that the claims upon these groups are not all the same.<sup>54</sup> In the *Eudemian Ethics*, he says that the different groupings are kinship (*syngenike*), comradeship or intimacy (*hetairike*), partnership or association (*koinonike*), and civic friendship (*politike*).<sup>55</sup> In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle himself refines and changes these categories and says, as we saw, that associations (*koinoniai*) are elements of the state (*politike koinonia*), making a general category for all political associations based on 'utility' and adding ritualised-friendship (*xenia*) as another category because it is a similar kind of relationship to political *koinonia*.<sup>56</sup> These all amount to different kinds of relationship with their own permutations of the exchange pattern, which need to be explored separately.

### 1.2.1 *Kin*

Kin were one's closest *philoï* and those to whom one owed the greatest obligation. As Blundell writes: 'One is tied to other family members by a presumptive bond of natural affection, arising from blood ties and common interests.'<sup>57</sup> Euripides' Admetus claims it is his due that his parents should give their life for his, and when they refuse says that 'in word but not in deed they were *philoï*'.<sup>58</sup> One has a natural duty to one's family because they are family.

Different kinds of kinship each had different levels of closeness.<sup>59</sup> Aristotle recognises the special relationship between parents and children and the part affection has to play in the relationship.<sup>60</sup> He says that this kind of *philia* 'seems to be more in befriending, than in being befriended' and gives as an example the mothers who send their children out to be nursed, and though they love (*philousi*), do not seek love in return (*antiphileisthai*).<sup>61</sup> This is an extreme and altruistic relationship, but in the common order of things Aristotle says that 'whenever children assign to parents what is necessary for those who have given them life, and parents to sons what is necessary for children, the *philia* of such as these will be fitting'.<sup>62</sup>

And yet, having said this, a son is also always in his father's debt as there is nothing he can do which is worthy of what has been done for him.<sup>63</sup> Xenophon's Socrates asks:

<sup>54</sup> See Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1157b1-5, 1159b31-1160a8, 1165a14-16; *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1241b32-4; cf. *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1159b35-1160a3. <sup>55</sup> Arist., *Eud. Eth.* 7, 1242a1-2.

<sup>56</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1160a8-14, 1161b11-16; cf. 1156a10-12.

<sup>57</sup> Blundell (1989) 40. <sup>58</sup> Eur., *Alc.* 339. <sup>59</sup> Cf. Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1161b16-17.

<sup>60</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1161b16-30, 1162a4-15. <sup>61</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1159a27-33.

<sup>62</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1158b21-3. <sup>63</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1163b18-21.

Whom could we find receiving benefits from others more than children from their parents? From being non-existent, parents made them to exist and to see all the beautiful things and to share in all the good things which the gods provide for men.<sup>64</sup>

The relationship between parents and children is the closest and most profound of all *philia* relationships: while the child will always be indebted to the parent for giving him life, so the parent is also capable of the 'pure gift' and acting in absolute altruism for the child.

On the other hand, the relationship between brothers, according to Aristotle, is like that between a group of comrades. Brothers, like comrades, are of similar age and rank and for the most part similar in feeling and temperament,<sup>65</sup> but these features are stronger between brothers than between comrades, since, Aristotle says, they love each other because they come from the same source.<sup>66</sup> Cousins and other relatives also derive their relationship from their descent from a common source, but 'some are more intimate, and some are more distant according to whether the ancestor is near or more remote'.<sup>67</sup> Not all kin have the same claim, but among one's closest kin there is no accounting for services which have been given or paid back. In fact the giving and receiving are often dissimilar, for such *philia*, Aristotle says, seeks what is possible not what is due.<sup>68</sup>

### 1.2.2 Comrades

In addition to kin, *philoï* also included companions and intimates, designated more specifically by words like *hetairoi* or *epitedeios*.<sup>69</sup> *Hetairoi* were fundamentally intimates of the same age and status, and in epic *hetairoi* referred to the close relationship between members of the elite.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Xen., *Mem.* 2.2.3.      <sup>65</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1161a25-7, 1161b33-1162a1, 1162a9-15.

<sup>66</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1161b30-2.      <sup>67</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1162a1-4; cf. 15-16.

<sup>68</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1163b15; cf. Sahlin (1968) 83.

<sup>69</sup> For the range of meaning of *philos*, *hetairoi*, *epitedeios* and *oikeios*, see Ernstman (1932), noting especially that *oikeios* refers to family and can include most intimate friends, while *epitedeios* refers to friends and may include the occasional relative (e.g., Th. 2.49.8, 7.75.3; Xen., *Hell.* 1.4.12, 18-19), and that *philos* itself can be the general name for all friends (e.g., Xen., *Cyr.* 8.4.33; Xen., *Mem.* 2.6.15-16), but that it can also have a more particular meaning as a close personal friend (e.g., Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156b7-24).

There is also a collection of significant words which can indicate 'friendly' activity. *Therapeuein* ('to look after') is one of these, and often relates to the activities which precede a *philia* relationship, that is, those activities that one hopes will be recognised as a *charis*. Of course this refers to less personal, and probably more unequal relationships. *Charizesthai* ('to perform a *charis*', 'to gratify') is also significant and indicates, as one would expect, that the *charis* is being performed, and that the relationship is being entered into. The context must always determine the meaning, but these are important pointers to 'friendship texts'.      <sup>70</sup> Calhoun (1913) 15.

Aristotle, as we have already seen, compares *hetairoi* to brothers since they are of equal age and rank and share all things in common.<sup>71</sup> In tragedy, Pylades is presented as the *hetairos par excellence* to Orestes, and the emphasis is on his 'brother-like' qualities. In *Iphigeneia in Tauris* Orestes tells Iphigeneia that he and Pylades, although not of the same mother, are brothers in friendship (*philotes*),<sup>72</sup> and in the *Orestes* he says:

The saying goes: obtain *hetairoi*, not family alone.  
As a man who is welded in your ways, though he is outside the family,  
is of more worth as a *philos* than countless brothers.<sup>73</sup>

So a *hetairos* was ideally a man 'welded in the ways' of his *philos*.<sup>74</sup> Pylades claims that the affairs of *philoï* are of common concern to *philoï*,<sup>75</sup> and says to Orestes:

How will I show that I am a *philos*,  
if I don't help you now when you are in terrible trouble?<sup>76</sup>

There is a strong resemblance here to Aristotle's analysis of intimate *philoï* whose first concern is to look after the best interests of their *philos* and who share all things in common.<sup>77</sup>

### 1.2.3 *Ritualised-friendship (xenia)*

*Xenia* ('guest-friendship' or 'ritualised-friendship') was a specialised and institutionalised relationship following a pattern of balanced exchanges, and was often, although not always, at the utilitarian end of the scale.<sup>78</sup> It originally belonged to the Homeric world of aristocratic heroes, and the Homeric epics are peppered with references to *xenoi*.<sup>79</sup> In the *Iliad* Homer describes the meeting of Diomedes son of Tydeus and Glaucus son of Hippolochus and the renewal of the *xenia* that had existed between their fathers:

[Diomedes] planted his spear on the bounteous earth  
and said with gentle words to the shepherd of the people,  
'Indeed you are the ancient *xenoi* of my fathers;

<sup>71</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1161a25-7, 1161b33-1162a1. <sup>72</sup> Eur., *IT* 497-8.

<sup>73</sup> Eur., *Or.* 804-6. <sup>74</sup> Eur., *Or.* 805; see Price (1989) 110-20. <sup>75</sup> Eur., *Or.* 735.

<sup>76</sup> Eur., *Or.* 802-3; cf. 1093-6.

<sup>77</sup> See esp. Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1156b7-24, see also 8, 1159a33-1159b1, which emphasises τὸ φιλεῖν (befriending) as a virtue and the essential part of a lasting *philia*. For *hetairoi* and political groups, see ch. 3.

<sup>78</sup> Compare Hooker (1989) 81 (for a critique of Hooker, see Seaford (1994) 14-15 n. 59).

<sup>79</sup> E.g., Antenor and Odysseus; Antenor and Menelaus (*Il.* 3.205-8); Phyleus, Meges and Euphetes of Ephyra (*Il.* 15.530-7); Sarpedon and Hector (*Il.* 17.149-53); Odysseus, Telemachus and Mentis (*Od.* 1.104-5, 119-24, 187-8); Odysseus and Leodamas (*Od.* 8.208).

for divine Oeneus once entertained blameless Bellerophon in his halls,  
 keeping him twenty days.  
 And they gave to each other beautiful gifts of *xenia* (*xénia*).  
 Oeneus gave a belt splendid with scarlet,  
 while Bellerophon gave him a double cup of gold  
 and I left it in my halls when I came here.  
 I do not remember Tydeus, since he left when I was still a child,  
 when the people of the Achaeans were destroyed in Thebes.  
 So now I am your dear *xeinos* in the middle of Argos,  
 and you are mine in Lycia, whenever I go to the people of that land.  
 And let us avoid the spears of each other even through the crowd.  
 For there are many famous Trojans and allies for me  
 to kill, whoever a god should give me or I overtake with my feet;  
 and there are many Achaeans for you to kill, whoever you can.  
 But let us exchange armour with each other, so that even these may know  
 that we claim to be *xeinoi* of our fathers' house.<sup>80</sup>

*Xenoi* could be expected to provide hospitality for *xenoi*, just as Oeneus did for Bellerophon, but they could also be expected to look after the welfare of their *xenoi* in a wider sense by providing political or military support. In many ways *xenia* resembled kinship because of the expectations placed upon *xenoi* and the hereditary nature of the relationship,<sup>81</sup> and yet it was fundamentally a relationship which depended on a general exchange of like for like.

The institution of *xenia* persisted into the fifth and fourth centuries – Endius son of Alcibiades the Spartan and Alcibiades son of Cleinias the Athenian are among the better known of the fifth century *xenoi*<sup>82</sup> – and remained substantially unaltered in the ritual that surrounded it and the expectations that arose from it.

As with other kinds of friendship, the assumption underpinning the relationship was equality: traditionally it existed between individuals of equal social rank, and an equal or better return for any gift or service was expected.<sup>83</sup> This equality could be represented at the initiation of the relationship by the presentation of the gift and counter-gift.<sup>84</sup> In the fourth

<sup>80</sup> Homer, *Il.* 6.213–31. <sup>81</sup> See Herman (1987) 18.

<sup>82</sup> Th. 8.6.3. On name-exchange between *xenoi*, see also Herman (1987) 19–22; (1989) 83–93 (although here Herman pushes the principle rather too far). On Alcibiades and Endius see also chs. 3 and 10. <sup>83</sup> Cartledge (1993) 47.

<sup>84</sup> On the ritual which traditionally established a *xenia* relationship, see Herman (1987) 58–69. On the inequality of the gifts of Glaucus and Diomedes, see Donlan (1989–90). Compare Roman *hospitium* which was originally an institution which, Badian says ((1958a) 11–12), implied ‘an equivalence and near equality between the hospitable arrangements awaiting each party . . . However, these relations of equality did not long continue. As Rome increased in importance, the Roman *hospes* increased in stature as against his foreign partner. In public *hospitia*, where formal engagements are recorded, we have formal proof that *hospitium* merged into *clientela*.’

century Xenophon tells the charming story of the *xenia* between Agesilaus and the son of Pharnabazus.<sup>85</sup> Agesilaus the Spartan king had been involved in negotiations for a friendship with the Persian satrap Pharnabazus at Dascyleium in 395, but after the talks had ended unsuccessfully Xenophon continues:

Pharnabazus mounted his horse and rode away, but his son by Parapita, who was still in the bloom of youth, having been left behind, ran up to Agesilaus and said, 'I make you my *xenos*.' 'And I accept,' Agesilaus replied. 'Remember then,' he said. And at once he gave Agesilaus his javelin – he had a lovely one – and Agesilaus accepted it and, taking the beautiful trappings which his secretary Idaeus had about his horse, he gave them to him. So then the boy leaped on his horse and went after his father.

And afterwards, Xenophon says, when the boy had been robbed of his state and driven into exile, Agesilaus continued to look after him, even to the point of attending to his love affairs.

Yet despite its similarities to the Homeric version, the relationship in the classical period was made problematic by social developments that accompanied political change. Equality of status, for instance, became increasingly difficult to evaluate and accommodate. Aeschines became the *xenos* of Philip II of Macedon,<sup>86</sup> but Aeschines, although a relatively important politician in Athens, was of anything but noble birth, and who was to assess the changing social value of this particular Macedonian king?

### 1.3 Friends and enemies, insiders and outsiders, positive and negative reciprocities

*Philoï*, whether kin or *xenoi*, were bound to each other by varying degrees of reciprocity and affection, but there was also another side to the equation which places these relationships in sharper focus. Society was defined in Greek thought according to a number of oppositions: Greek and barbarian; slave and free; friend and enemy.<sup>87</sup> The flip side of the *philia* coin was enmity (*echthra*), and popular concepts of justice were founded on the belief that one should help friends and harm enemies (*echthroï*).<sup>88</sup> Solon wrote in the sixth century:

Grant that I may always have happiness at the hands of the blessed gods  
and a good reputation at the hands of all men;  
and thus that I may be sweet to *philoï* and bitter to *echthroï*,  
and respected by the former, but for the others terrible to behold.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>85</sup> Xen., *Hell.* 4.1.39–40.      <sup>86</sup> See ch. 10.      <sup>87</sup> See Cartledge (1993) esp. 8–17.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Lys. 9.20, 15.12; Dem. 21.118; Mitchell and Rhodes (1996) 12–14. On this principle of helping friends/harming enemies, see also, for example, Dover (1974) 180–4; Blundell (1989) esp. 26–31; Goldhill (1986) 79–106.

<sup>89</sup> Solon 13.3–6 (West); cf. Homer, *Od.* 4.691–2; Hesiod, *WD* 342, 349–56.

Xenophon's Socrates says that doing good to one's friends and harm to one's enemies is the mark of a virtuous man,<sup>90</sup> and Isocrates moralistically declares:

consider it disgraceful to be beaten by your enemies in doing evil, and surpassed by your friends in benefactions.<sup>91</sup>

Just as one repaid a friend good for good, so one paid back one's enemy bad for bad.<sup>92</sup> Blundell writes: 'The question of who started a quarrel is crucial. It is common to argue that one's opponent is responsible for initiating hostilities, thus giving oneself the right to retaliate.'<sup>93</sup> In a poem of the Theognidean corpus, the poet prays he may give grief in return for grief to the men who stole his property.<sup>94</sup> One of the worst positions that one could find oneself in was to be humiliated at the hands of one's enemies; conversely, to vanquish them was one's greatest triumph. Medea crows as she plans the death of Glauce and Creon: 'Now, *philoï*, I will be triumphant over my *echthroï*, and am on the way to it, now there is hope that *echthroï* will pay the penalty.'<sup>95</sup>

The friends-enemies polarisation was one way of organising the world into two camps, and this division had a real consequence as a determinant of social behaviour: those inside the friendship network received good for good, or what we might term a positive reciprocity, while those outside received bad for bad, or a negative reciprocity.<sup>96</sup> There was also a category for those who were neither *philoï* nor *echthroï* but could potentially belong to either group. In his third speech against his guardian, Aphobus, Demosthenes presented three witnesses: Aphobus' brother; Phanus, who was the friend (*epitedeios*) and fellow-tribesman of Aphobus; and Philip, who was neither his friend nor his enemy.<sup>97</sup> In general, to lay an indictment against someone who was not one's enemy was to lay oneself open to accusations of sycophancy.<sup>98</sup>

On a private level this division between friends and enemies could cut across barriers of social distance. We have already seen the breadth of relationship that *philia* encompassed, and, despite the agony and upheaval that it could cause, an *echthros* could as easily be a kinsman or

<sup>90</sup> Xen., *Mem.* 2.6.35.      <sup>91</sup> Isoc. I.26.

<sup>92</sup> See Easterling (1989) 12-13; Seaford (1994) 25-9.      <sup>93</sup> Blundell (1989) 37.

<sup>94</sup> [Theognis] 341-50.      <sup>95</sup> Eur., *Med.* 765-7; cf. Soph., *Ajax* 79.

<sup>96</sup> Although Davis ((1992) 23-4) objects to the term 'negative reciprocity' on methodological grounds, we are dealing with a system in classical Greece where harm is exchanged for harm, that is true reciprocity. For positive and negative reciprocities, compare Sahlins' model (see n. 1 above).      <sup>97</sup> Dem. 29.23.

<sup>98</sup> [Dem.] 53.1. On sycophancy see Osborne (1990); cf. the reply by Harvey in the same volume. Note, however, that in cases of murder enmity became a motive to be denied: Carey (1989) 65-6.

fellow citizen as anyone else.<sup>99</sup> In the mythical world of tragedy, although he is Menelaus' nephew, Orestes calls his uncle a bad *philos* because he refuses to repay the debt Orestes believes he owes, and therefore Orestes responds to him in a hostile manner by killing Helen and taking Hermione hostage.<sup>100</sup> Even in the real world those who *had* been *philoï* could become *echthroï*. For example, the speaker of [Lysias] 8 complains of the treatment meted out to him by fellow-members of a religious society, saying that it is impossible not to speak when one has been badly treated contrary to expectation and discovers one has been wronged by those who seemed to be one's *philoï*.<sup>101</sup> In Lysias 4, the speaker asserts that he and his accuser are friends – the proof of this is the favours he has done the man<sup>102</sup> – although his accuser insists they are enemies.<sup>103</sup> The speaker of Isaeus 1 (*On the Estate of Cleonymus*) says:

My opponents and I, gentlemen, do not have the same feelings towards one another, for I think that the worst part of my present troubles is not that I am unjustly in danger, but that I am contesting against kinsmen (*oikeioi*), against whom it is not 'nice' to defend oneself. For I would not think it was less of a misfortune to harm them in defending myself, since they are kinsmen, than to have originally suffered harm at their hands. But these men do not hold such an opinion, but they have come against us, having summoned their *philoï*, prepared orators and spared none of their resources as though, gentlemen, they were punishing *echthroï* and not doing harm to relatives and kinsmen.<sup>104</sup>

It was possible for anyone to become an *echthros*, just as anyone could become a *philos*.

But as well as his private friendships and enmities, there was also a sense in which the individual had a public self. In his role as the citizen of the *polis*, he was required to give his primary loyalty to the *polis*, and that meant to all the members of the *polis*, his fellow citizens. As a result, whatever his private relationships, at a *polis* level fellow citizens were insiders, while non-citizens were outsiders.

*Xenia* provided at once a resolution for this crux, while at the same time creating fresh problems of its own.<sup>105</sup> The *xenos* was fundamentally the

<sup>99</sup> See Earp (1929) 34. There is an important distinction between a private enemy (*echthros*) and a public enemy (*polemios*). A private enmity could carry over into the public sphere (see Rhodes (forthcoming a)), but one could have personal friends among the public enemies of one's state: see ch. 10.

<sup>100</sup> Eur., *Or.* 740 (cf. 748), 1129–30, 1143–5, 1191–3, 1296–310, 1323–48.

<sup>101</sup> [Lys.] 8.2; cf. 8.1. The speaker ultimately left the association ([Lys.] 8.19).

<sup>102</sup> Lys. 4.3–4. <sup>103</sup> Lys. 4.5; see also Rhodes (forthcoming a). <sup>104</sup> Isaeus 1.6–7.

<sup>105</sup> *Xenia* was both personal and political, subjective (in that it imitated intimate relationships) and objective (in that it was calculated and balanced). There were many deeply entrenched difficulties with the intrusion of this kind of friendship into public affairs (see the following chapters), but these tended to be glossed by the ideology which allowed *xenia* relationships to coexist with other more *polis*-based loyalties (see ch. 10).

stranger, the outsider, who stood beyond social and religious boundaries.<sup>106</sup> Yet, through the mediation and protection of Zeus *xenios*,<sup>107</sup> the *xenos*/stranger had the right to be drawn into someone else's community as the *xenos*/guest.<sup>108</sup> The outsider also had the potential to become the *xenos*/ritualised-friend and so a permanent member of a *philia* network through the ritualised exchange of tokens (*xénia*),<sup>109</sup> and ritualised-friends are sometimes distinguished from other types of *xenoi* by the label '*philos* and *xenos*'.<sup>110</sup> Consequently, through the institution of *xenia*, at least to the Greek mind, the non-Greek, the barbarian, the archetypal *outsider*, could become an *insider*, and was treated – and was expected to react – as one of those *inside* the friendship network by both giving and receiving in positively reciprocal ways.<sup>111</sup> The trouble began when, with his own understandings and expectations, he did not.

So the ritualised-friend was the outsider who had been brought in, the *xenos* who had become *philos* and become part of the *philia* network. Thus a *xenos* could mediate for his foreign *xenos*, and provide for him a

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Cartledge (1993) 47. See also, e.g., Hdt. 5.72.3, 6.81; Sourvinou-Inwood (1988) 268–70; (1990) 297. Note also a grave inscription from Attica dating to the early sixth century, in which passers-by whether *astoi* or *xenoi* are called on to grieve for the young hero (IG I<sup>3</sup> 1194 bis; cf. Jeffery (1962) 113 no. 34; Guarducci (1961) 158–9). Frost ((1994) 50–1) may be right in claiming that here *xenos* does not mean foreigner outside Attica but simply someone not from the city. On the different meanings of *xenos* (guest-friend, mercenary soldier, ally, foreigner, metic, non-resident foreigner unconnected with Athens, *parepidemos*), see Whitehead (1977) 10–11.

<sup>107</sup> Note that Odysseus sought the protection of 'Zeus *xeinios*, the avenger of suppliants and *xeinoi*' (Homer, *Od.* 9.270–1) when he met Polyphemus (though the Cyclops respected neither aegis-bearing Zeus nor the blessed gods (*Od.* 275–6)). For Zeus' role as the protector of *xenoi*, see Lloyd-Jones (1983) 5, 7, 27; Herman (1987) 124–5.

<sup>108</sup> So there was always a positive discrimination towards someone becoming a *philos*: the stranger can *choose* to be *echthros*, but there is a sense in which he can be a *philos* by right; cf. Gould (1973) 90–1. Note also Gauthier ((1972) 19) who compares the *xenos* of the archaic period who stood outside the *oikos* with the *xenos* of the classical period who was outside the political community.

<sup>109</sup> This word also refers to the meal of hospitality given to strangers: it is no accident that non-Athenians visiting Athens were invited to the *prytaneion* for *xénia*, while Athenians were given *deipnon* (dinner). Note the inscription honouring Arybbas of Molossia (IG ii<sup>2</sup> 226 (Tod 173)). Arybbas' grandfather was a naturalised Athenian citizen, and this decree confirms Arybbas' own citizenship. Arybbas is invited to the *prytaneion* for *deipnon* (as a citizen), while those with him (Molossians, so non-Athenians) are invited for *xénia*: see Rhodes (1984b) 193–9.

<sup>110</sup> E.g., Eur., *El.* 82–3; *Phoen.* 402; Lys. 19.19. On the close connection between *xenos* and *philos* see also Benveniste (1973) 278–9.

<sup>111</sup> This is not to disregard or diminish the Greek polarity between Greek and barbarian, but there is an element of personal identification with the barbarian *xenos* which transcends this distinction. As Cartledge ((1993) 45) writes: 'is it not of the nature of "othering" that the "other" group may be treated categorically and normatively as an undifferentiated mass, while individual members with whom ego has a personal relationship that contradicts the stereotyped image are treated as being by definition exceptions who prove the rule?' (cf. 47–9).

legitimate point of entry when he visited the community. On the other hand, the *xenos* also posed a potential threat to the *polis* as a competing loyalty, presenting a problem which the Greeks had difficulty resolving and for which there was no single solution.<sup>112</sup>

#### 1.4 *Dora, charites and commodities*

Finally, a word needs to be said about the medium of the exchange, the gifts themselves. Up to this point we have only spoken generally about reciprocity as an exchange of gifts, which encompassed exchanges of services and honours as well.<sup>113</sup> The 'gifts' in an exchange are often, although not exclusively, designated by two terms: *dora* (gifts) or *charites* (favours). These two types of exchange objects, their differences and their relationship to another important kind of exchange in the classical world, commodity-exchange, need to be investigated further.<sup>114</sup>

*Dora* were the tangible representations of the exchange and the relationship that was created, so that, for example, the *xenia* relationship was initiated by the exchange of *dora* (here equal to the specialised gifts of *xenia*, *xénia*). For example, Xenophon says that some men who wanted to make a *philia* with Medocus the king of the Odrysians brought *dora* (and note here the exchange of the intangible – goodwill – in return for the tangible),<sup>115</sup> and elsewhere says (about another Thracian) that it is necessary to show goodwill (*eunoia*) to the man from whom one has received *dora*.<sup>116</sup>

Gifts could also take the form of favours (*charites*). *Charis* was a word whose meaning could range from simply 'joy' or 'pleasure' and 'gratification' to 'favour',<sup>117</sup> but always implied a return. Orestes says to Menelaus:

Give a share of your good fortune to your *philoí*,  
since you have come as one who is fortunate,  
and having received what is good, do not keep it to yourself,  
but also take your fair share of troubles,

<sup>112</sup> See chs. 3 and 10.

<sup>113</sup> On gifts, services, and honours as 'gifts' involved in exchanges, see Finley (1977) 64.

<sup>114</sup> Gregory ((1982) 12) follows Marx ((1954) 1.91) in viewing commodity-exchange as an exchange of inalienable things between transactors who are in a state of reciprocal independence, and says that 'the corollary of this is that non-commodity (gift) exchange is an exchange of alienable things between transactors who are in a state of reciprocal dependence'. Gregory also claims (based on the assumption that gift-exchange is the exclusive preserve of clan-based societies which hold all property in common and commodity-exchange of class-based societies) that the distinction between alienability and inalienability 'is just another way of talking about the presence or absence of private property' (44; cf. 19). But as Morris (1986) points out, this model is too simple: in archaic Greece (which Morris discusses) clan and class are both evident (esp. 4–5) and yet gift-exchange still persists alongside commodity-exchange (7; cf. Seaford (1994) 14).

<sup>115</sup> Xen., *Anab.* 7.3.16. <sup>116</sup> Xen., *Anab.* 7.7.46.

<sup>117</sup> Hewitt (1927) 142–61; Blundell (1989) 33–4; von Bergson (1985) 14–16.

paying back the *charites* of my father to those whom you ought.  
 For they are *philoï* in name, not in deed,  
 who are not *philoï* in times of misfortune.<sup>118</sup>

A *charis* produced gratitude and so induced the favour in return, so that *charites* could be both the thing given and the thing returned.<sup>119</sup> Aristotle says that the reason why men set up shrines to the Graces (*Charites*) in public places was so that a repayment (*apodosis*) of *charites* might occur, and that this is the thing that makes *charis* distinctive: that it is necessary both to do a service in return to the man who did a favour (*charis*) and also to be the initiator oneself in doing a favour (*charis*) again.<sup>120</sup>

As well as these embedded forms of exchange other exchange processes included the disembedded exchange of commodities. Not surprisingly, the relationship between gifts (whether *dora* or *charites*) and commodities is complex and has been variously interpreted by anthropologists and political economists. According to Gregory the gift 'refers to the *personal relations* between people that the exchange of things in certain social contexts creates'.<sup>121</sup> Its value is subjective and lies only in the social relations it produces.<sup>122</sup> Gregory contrasts this with the commodity, which he defines as something which creates a relationship between the things exchanged and has an objective value.<sup>123</sup> Von Reden (following Kopytoff) defines gifts and commodities as cultural constructs, and argues that, while gifts are things which in their cultural context are special and have a history, commodities are things which have become objectified, that 'are no longer singular or unique but become commonly available', and whose biography and history have become irrelevant.<sup>124</sup> As a result, things that could be interpreted as gifts in one context may be interpreted as commodities in another.<sup>125</sup>

However, gifts can also have a latent objective value (that is they can be given an economic value apart from their social value) just as commodities can have a latent subjective and symbolic value (that is they can transcend or add to their economic value by their symbolic value). In addition there can be room for a great deal of ambiguity about the status of particular objects at particular times, which could all lead to the

<sup>118</sup> Eur., *Or.* 449–55.

<sup>119</sup> See Hands (1968) 26–49; Millett (1991) 123–6; Kurke (1991) esp. 66–70.

<sup>120</sup> Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 5, 1133a3–5. On this passage, and *charis* in general, see Millett (1991) 123–6. <sup>121</sup> Gregory (1982) 8. <sup>122</sup> Von Reden (1995) 17.

<sup>123</sup> Gregory (1982) 8–10, 42; Seaford (1994) 14; cf. Marx (1954) 1.54–75.

<sup>124</sup> Von Reden (1995) 60; cf. Kopytoff (1986). Although there are problems with this as a general definition of commodities, since, as Robin Osborne has pointed out to me, supply and demand pricing depend upon things not being not too commonly available.

<sup>125</sup> See esp. Bourdieu (1977) 194–5; (1990) 112–18 on 'symbolic capital'; cf. Kopytoff (1986).

misinterpretation and social havoc that could be caused if the meaning of an object was read in the wrong way.<sup>126</sup> This became a particular problem for ambassadors who received gifts from foreign courts as part of the normal diplomatic protocol, but then found them being reinterpreted as bribes on their return home.<sup>127</sup>

To complicate matters even further, some gifts could in fact have an economically calculable value which was intrinsic to their status as gifts. Although Gregory has argued<sup>128</sup> that the emphasis in gift-exchange is on 'quality, subjects and superiority' and in commodity-exchange on 'quantity, objects and equivalence', gift-exchange in its balanced forms as we have seen can be dependent on equivalence (or near equivalence) of value in the exchange, and this is particularly true of *xenia*. This meant that some sort of objective assessment had to be made about the economic value of the gifts exchanged, as Homer makes clear. At the end of the passage concerning Glaucus and Diomedes cited above, Homer adds this note:

Then indeed Zeus son of Cronus took away Glaucus' wits,  
since he exchanged his armour with Diomedes son of Tydeus,  
gold for bronze, a hundred oxen worth for nine oxen worth.<sup>129</sup>

As Seaford points out, the gifts exchanged by Diomedes and Glaucus 'both confirm the inherited relation of *xenia* and are evaluated against each other by means of a common measure'.<sup>130</sup> But more than this, the poet makes a joke out of the fact that the gifts are unequal, the point being that they *should* have been equal; in order to determine their non-equivalence an economic value was assigned to them.

These factors also create further difficulties for the relationship between *dora* and *charites*. As *dora* are tangible and *charites* are more abstract, so *dora* are more quantifiable and the value of a *charis* is more ambiguous and more open to interpretation.<sup>131</sup> *Dora* could be interpreted as having a specific and recognised economic value whereas *charites*, being more abstract, were more difficult to assign a 'real' value.<sup>132</sup> Further, while the value of any gift could come under threat under different conditions, *charites* in particular were even more vulnerable to revaluation. A service performed in good faith in one context might depreciate in value (or be wilfully depreciated) because of changed circumstances or needs, and so produce a different response to the one expected. A corollary of this is the requirement of a greater moral force to

<sup>126</sup> On meaning, history and disjunction, see Sahlins (1985) esp. 136–56.

<sup>127</sup> See chs. 6 and 10. <sup>128</sup> Gregory (1982) 50–1. <sup>129</sup> Homer, *Il.* 6.234–6.

<sup>130</sup> Seaford (1994) 199. The economic value of a gift can sometimes even add force to the relationship. <sup>131</sup> See Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1163a10–21.

<sup>132</sup> For a similar kind of argument, see Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 8, 1162b21–1163a23.

propel the return as the exchange becomes more abstract in character and quantity; in this way the relationship becomes more vulnerable to corruption or to complete dysfunction.

To sum up: *philia* was a complex exchange-relationship which blended elements of instrumentality and affection in differing measures. It was also conceptually an equal relationship, although in some cases the equality may have been more qualitative than quantitative. *Philia* was also integral to a number of other kinds of exchange-relationship, including kinship, companionship and ritualised-friendship. These all formed part of the repertoire of *philiai* relationships, although each expressed the relationship in a different way.

However, non-Greeks did not necessarily have the same repertoires of exchange as the Greeks did. They did not always divide their societies into friends and enemies in the same way or by the same criteria. Nor did they necessarily include *xenia*, for example, among their exchange-repertoires, or have the same understanding of gift-giving. Barbarian *xenoi* did not necessarily understand (or perhaps chose not to understand) the obligation they were put under when entering a *xenia* relationship. Similarly not all Greeks in their relationships with their non-Greek *philo*i allowed for or could cope with different assumptions and expectations of the relationship. These difficulties gave enormous scope for misinterpretation and exploitation in interstate relationships and resulted on many occasions in misunderstanding, disappointment and often failure in Greek/non-Greek affairs.

In the chapters that follow, we shall consider the role of *philia* in both domestic and interstate politics. In chapter two we shall consider what happened when states tried to form relationships with other states as well as with individuals. Chapter three will look at the role of individuals and their friends in forming and implementing foreign policy, while chapters four and five will consider the importance of foreign connections for magisterial appointments. In chapters six, seven and eight, we shall turn specifically to relations between the Greek states and Persia, Thrace and Macedon, and scrutinise in detail the reasons why relations between Greeks and non-Greeks and those on the fringes of their world often went so disastrously wrong. Chapter nine, on the other hand, concentrates on Alexander, and looks forward to a world where a Greco-Macedonian elite was to dominate its non-Greek subjects. Finally, chapter ten looks inward, and takes stock of the problems of ideology and the conflict of interests.

Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.

I fear the Greeks even when they bear gifts. (Virgil, *Aeneid* 2.49)