

Euro-Mediterranean Securitization and EU Foreign and
Defence Policy:
Challenges for Mediterranean Regional Security

Submitted by
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Abstract

The emergence of the European Union (EU) as an international actor is an important development for Europeans, but also for the international community. The EU constitutes a new actor in international affairs. It goes beyond the nation state and seeks to construct a new international order based on rules. This new international actor must deal with a complex security environment, in particular in the Mediterranean region. This thesis seeks to determine how security perceptions in the region will influence the EU's roles and responsibilities in the Mediterranean region as a new security actor.

A detailed analysis of security discourse from both the EU and Southern Mediterranean shows that there are similar security concerns throughout the Mediterranean. Issues like terrorism or illegal immigration are securitised across the region, whereas issues like regional conflicts or weapons of mass destruction are considered security threats in specific areas, in particular the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, security discourse also coexists with strong references to a common Mediterranean identity. This sharing of security perceptions and references to a common identity allows us to conclude that there is indeed a regional security complex in the Mediterranean.

After determining the existence of a regional security complex in the Mediterranean, an analysis of the individual actors participating in the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, at different levels, was conducted. This analysis shows that the EU occupies a central role in the region as a global great power. Moreover, an analysis of

the RSC in the Mediterranean region shows that it is an unstable security complex, susceptible to internal and external transformation in the medium to long term. As such, the EU could play a more substantial role in the Mediterranean, exercising greater influence to stabilise the region; leading the region away from instability and moving it towards a more institutional framework for conflict resolution. In this role, the EU will need to be more active throughout the region, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. It must assume its position as a great power but with its particular capabilities and characteristics. The EU must then emphasise mediation and regional integration, including south-south integration in its policies towards the Southern Mediterranean.

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Abbreviations

ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CEPOL	European Police College
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIREFI	Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COPS	Comité Politique et de Sécurité (Political and Security Committee)
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECC	European Economic Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUCPN	EU Crime Prevention Network
Eurocorps	European multinational army corps
Eurojust	The European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit
Euromarfor	European Naval Force
EuroMeSco	Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission
Europol	European Police Office
Fatah	Ḥarakat al-Taḥrīr al-Waṭanī al-Filasṭīnī (Palestinian National Liberation Movement)
FRONTEX	Frontières Extérieures (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union)
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council

Hamas	Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamat al-Islāmiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement)
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDF	Israeli Defence Force
IR	International Relations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIS	International Security Information Service Europe
MEDA	The partner states of the EU in the Mediterranean: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
Mercosul	Mercado Comum do Sul (Southern Common Market)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PA	Palestinian Authority
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
POLISARIO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro
RSC	Regional Security Complex
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
UMA	Union du Maghreb Arabe (Arab Maghreb Union)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

“It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”
- Yogi Berra -

Introduction

Recent scholarship and political practice has changed how security is defined, adding increased complexity to the study of international relations. Since the early 1990s a new security agenda has emerged. Moving beyond military matters, state and non-state actors have begun to address a multitude of issues from a security perspective. One region where the new security agenda is of extreme importance is the Mediterranean. The appearance of unconventional security threats have transformed the region into one which could export instability and insecurity into Europe. The Southern Mediterranean region is seen as vulnerable to extremist ideologies that lead to terrorism, as well as a source of illegal immigration that can destabilise both shores of the region. Other issues of concern are also present in the region, such as organised crime, and more traditional ones like regional conflicts and weapons of mass destruction.

In this context a variety of actors are now attempting to deal with these issues, by employing diverse means that encompass political, military, social, economic and cultural aspects. One such actor, the European Union (EU), is becoming an ever-growing presence in the international arena, in particular in what is becoming known as its 'neighbourhood' which includes the Southern Mediterranean¹. The Mediterranean is therefore a target of European policy initiatives; as the EU seeks to stabilise the region

1. The EU's 2003 policy framework for Europe's bordering regions, which includes Russia and Southern Mediterranean, is called the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

and address the security issues present therein. As a result, a strong and complex security interaction has developed between both shores of the Mediterranean.

An examination of the interaction between security issues in the Mediterranean and the EU as a regional security actor, raises questions that force us to rethink Euro-Mediterranean relations, *i.e.* what roles and responsibilities must the EU assume as a new security actor in the Mediterranean? Which issues are effectively seen as security concerns and how should the EU deal with them? This thesis aims to address these questions. In the following, the aims and motives of this study, the statement of the problem, and the focus and scope of the study will be introduced. We will conclude by summarising the proposed structure of the research.

1. Aims and Motives of the Study

This project seeks to provide a detailed account, based on a coherent theoretical framework, of the geopolitical situation of the Mediterranean and in particular of Euro-Mediterranean security relations. Furthermore, we intend to go beyond mere description of Euro-Mediterranean relations in order to analyse and advance possible outcomes for the European Union (EU) that are emanating from the current geopolitical situation.

This is a region fraught with both national and transnational security issues. With this dynamic reality, and especially after the recent European enlargement in the area, this research project aims to fulfil an academic need for setting Euro-Mediterranean

anean relations in a proper theoretical context². The undertaking should be beneficial not only to policymakers in the European Union, but also to the various national governments engaged in the Mediterranean.

At the European level there are ever growing efforts to address security concerns in the region, from the creation of a Battlegroup, to efforts to increase border security and to combat organised crime and terrorism. It is hoped that this project will provide an accurate representation of the current geopolitical situation of the region and that this will help guide all the main actors in their decision-making processes, regarding security in the Mediterranean area by ascertaining the roles and responsibilities of the EU as a security actor in the Mediterranean.

2. Statement of the Problem

The European Union has been engaged in a prolonged dialogue with the Southern Mediterranean, funding several important initiatives, of which the most important began in 1995. The 1995 Barcelona Process incorporates economic, political and cultural objectives aimed at stabilizing a region that impacts directly on European security, and also at creating a larger area of peace, prosperity and democracy (Pace, 2004, p. 295). In the last few years, new policies and instruments have gradually been introduced by the EU, notably the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU's new Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the recent announcement of the creation of European Union Battlegroups show an increasing attention to international affairs and

2. In 2005 Malta and Cyprus joined the EU.

specifically to the South Mediterranean as a region, as it directly affects Europe's security (The Council of the European Union, 2003b; Commission of the European Communities, 2003b; The Council of the European Union, 2004d). Last year, Cyprus and Malta joined the European Union, thereby increasing Europe's territory and presence in the Mediterranean. There is a need to determine which responsibilities the European Union is willing to assume with regard to security issues in the Mediterranean region, in particular when considering the EU's new global role (Shahram Chubin, 2004, p. 29). This challenge requires a new level of research to be conducted in the Euro-Mediterranean region as it acknowledges the European Union as a growing influence in security issues, most notably within the Mediterranean region.

By assuming this challenge several important theoretical and practical issues need to be addressed in order to present a coherent and useful work. As a starting point, the issue of the European Union as a security actor needs to be addressed since we will not be examining national policies and discourse from individual European States. Questions on whether the EU operates as an international and security actor or can even be considered to operate as one, are still being contested in both academic and governmental circles. Nonetheless, even if the nation state remains an important international and security actor, sufficient research exists in order to address this question within the framework of this study, and thereby consider the EU as a security actor. The definition of who constitutes a political/security actor has changed, it now includes various non-state units that can now include the EU. Secondly, the question of roles or responsibilities poses another difficulty. How does one clearly define what the roles and responsibilities of an international actor should constitute in a specific region? In order to ad-

dress this question, a clearly defined theoretical framework is required in order to define these elements. Moreover, the prospective aim of this study calls for the development of scenarios that will further contribute in determining possible European roles and responsibilities in the region.

3. Focus and Scope of the Study

In order to answer the above questions and achieve the aims of this study, Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) will be applied and tested in this study. By applying RSCT to the Mediterranean it will determine if RSCT can offer a detailed account of regional security interaction and how the theory can be improved if required. Although elements of the theory have been applied in other analyses of Euro-Mediterranean relations, RSCT as a whole still needs to be fully tested in the region. Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) allows for the Mediterranean to be analysed as a whole, as it not only accounts for security issues present in the region, but also includes a scenario-building element and non-state actors like the EU. By applying RSCT to Euro-Mediterranean relations it is hoped not only to achieve a greater understanding of the Mediterranean region and its evolution, but also of RSCT and, more broadly of region building.

Throughout this study the goals pursued are twofold: i) to determine the existence of regional security complex and its characteristics, *i.e.* to present the contemporary geopolitical situation of the region; ii) to put forward possible scenarios for the European Union as a security actor in the region. This last objective aims at going beyond

a descriptive analysis of the region and forecast the evolution of the region, in particular the European Union as a security actor in the Mediterranean.

Traditionally regions are viewed as a geographical area sharing common physical characteristics. In addition, state interaction can further the notion that a particular area can be termed a 'region'. However, geopolitics can provide a new approach to defining a region based not only on geographical aspects, but also on common concerns notably security concerns (Bilgin, 2004).

As a first step, in order to determine the units in the region and its characteristics, we must establish the existence of a regional security complex in the Mediterranean. We must examine which issues are being securitized in the Mediterranean and by whom. Security here is not perceived in a traditional fashion, any issue can be securitized, as according to Buzan and Wæver, paraphrasing Alexander Wendt (1992), "'security' is what actors make it" (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 48). Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames issues either as a special kind of politics, or as above politics (Buzan, Wilde & Wæver, 1997, p. 23).

When we think of the Mediterranean we think of past history, and of the region as the cradle of western civilisation. But there is a new vigour within the Mediterranean region. This new impulse is the result of security concerns surrounding the region as these concerns are mutual. However, history, society and culture may still influence contemporary Mediterranean relations. In analysing Euro-Mediterranean security discourse, references to identity also need to be identified in order to determine the level of regional awareness and subsequently how this influences cooperation or conflict in the

region. From a theoretical stand-point, it is important to determine the role of this interaction between security and identity in region building.

In the second phase of our work we will examine the specific geopolitical situation in the region, taking into account both internal and external factors. Each factor can have an influence on the evolution of the region and in the position occupied by the EU. We will study the current geopolitical situation in the Mediterranean and determine the state of the region. This exercise is essential in order to achieve our final objective. We must look at polarity in the region and where the centres of power are situated. This allows us to categorize the region forecasting its geopolitical situation. Various scenarios are possible, *e.g.* there could be a standard regional security complex where the polarity is determined by the regional powers, or a centred complex (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 62). Or there could be a great power complex, or supercomplexes where strong interregional dynamics are present (Ibid., p. 62).

Finally, based on this current geopolitical situation we intend to present possible projections of how the Mediterranean region could develop. These projections will not be speculative assumptions, but based on the information gathered in the previous section. By looking at certain elements, such as interregional dynamics, patterns of amity/enmity, discursive or polarity, we can present possible outcomes for the Mediterranean region.

Through this study it is hoped to add to the existing body of knowledge pertaining to this subject, to contribute to the larger debate on Europe's role in the world and establish a new framework for analysing Euro-Mediterranean relations. We will endeav-

our to determine the existence of a regional security complex in the Mediterranean, something that has not been addressed by the existing literature³. This aims to fill a gap in current International Relations (IR) literature on the Mediterranean by going beyond factual and historical accounts of developments in this vital region and relate them to a coherent theoretical model.

4. Structure of the Study

This thesis consists of six chapters, covering our theoretical framework and methodology, discourse and geopolitical (constellation) analysis and finally scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Chapter one, “Theoretical framework and Methodology”, is divided into two sections. The first section deals with our theoretical framework, notably the larger field of regionalism and more specifically with Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). It will also present the main elements of debate surrounding regionalism and region building. In addition, this first section will highlight the main elements associated with RSCT and how they relate to our study, thus allowing us to subsequently determine what type of Regional Security Complex (RSC) is present in the Mediterranean. The second section will present the methodology utilised throughout this study, in particular the main sources of analysed discourse.

3. Biscop has stated that the Euro-Mediterranean can be considered an RSC Biscop, 2005, p. 35. See also Biscop, 2003.

Chapter two, “Euro-Mediterranean Securitisation: Terrorism and Illegal Immigration”, begins our analysis of Euro-Mediterranean security discourse with the two main regional issues. In this chapter, we will examine how terrorism and illegal immigration are viewed and the reason actors in the region believe these issues pose a threat to security both nationally and regionally. The chapter is divided in two main sections: Terrorism and Illegal Immigration. Each section has identical sub-sections: Rhetorical Structure comprising of referent objects, urgency and finally extraordinary measures. These identical sub-sections are employed in chapter three as well.

Chapter three, “Euro-Mediterranean Securitisation: Regional Conflicts, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Organised Crime and National Issues”, continues our analysis of the security discourse pertaining to both shores of the Mediterranean. It will utilise the same method of division utilised in the previous chapter for three security issues: Regional Conflicts, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Organised Crime. The last section, National Issues, will introduced issues that have only been securitised nationally by some actors, and not the entire Mediterranean region. However, these issues have regional implications and could eventually be securitised in the entire Mediterranean. Both chapter two and chapter three are similar since they will provide a detailed account of securitisation in the Mediterranean.

Chapter four, “Security Discourse and Intertextualizing: A Mediterranean Identity”, will address the presence of references to a Mediterranean identity in Euro-Mediterranean security discourse. This section will show that there is an awareness on both sides of the Mediterranean of a common identity that is based on a common history and a rejection of the concept of a ‘clash of civilisations’ in the Mediterranean. Moreover,

this identity is linked with security, and endorsing regional cooperation to deal with security issues in the region. The actors in the Mediterranean recognise who shares similar security concerns and can therefore be their partners, and thus resolve these concerns. Chapter four, provides an invaluable contribution to the understanding of not only RSC's but of regionalism in general.

Chapter five, "A Euro-Mediterranean Security Complex: Constellation and Structure", adds to our analysis of discourse by identifying geopolitical elements that can influence Euro-Mediterranean relations. Furthermore, this chapter identifies the characteristics of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex. As such, in this chapter, the first section will deal with the interaction between Constellation and Structure. An analysis of the Euro-Mediterranean Constellation will follow, this is mainly a geopolitical analysis covering the domestic, national, regional and global. In consequence, the structure of the RSC will be discernible: its boundaries, units, polarity and patterns of amity and enmity. Finally, chapter five will finally allow us to determine exactly the type of RSC present in the Mediterranean.

Chapter six, "Scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex", will end our analysis of Euro-Mediterranean relations not only by advancing possible scenarios for the Mediterranean, but also for the EU as a security actor in the region. Taking into account the discourse and geopolitical analysis of the previous chapters we will be able to discern the options available for the Mediterranean as an RSC. There are three main possibilities for us to explore: status quo, internal transformation and external transformation. Therefore, we will look at the likelihood of each of

these possibilities consecutively. The final section will set-out the EU's future roles and responsibilities in the region given the scenarios previously outlined.

I. Theoretical Framework and Methodology

1. Theoretical Framework

This project seeks to provide a detailed account, based on a coherent theoretical framework, of the geopolitical situation in the Mediterranean and in particular of Euro-Mediterranean security relations. Intending to go beyond a mere descriptive analysis, this project aims to advance possible outcomes emanating from the current geopolitical situation. The study will then be able to determine the future responsibilities of the European Union in the Mediterranean regarding security issues. In order to achieve our goal we must look at the Mediterranean area and determine its characteristics, *i.e.* what and who makes it the Mediterranean. We can approach the Mediterranean from a traditional perspective, meaning the geographical definition of the Mediterranean, or we can move beyond this and look at what the Mediterranean represents from a security point of view. In other words we must determine how we define the concept of region and, therefore, how we define the Mediterranean.

Regions can be defined as geographical areas sharing common physical characteristics, such as having a common body of water or a mountain range. Additionally, state interaction can further the notion that a particular area can be called a 'region', that is, if two or more states are in constant interaction, then they would be considered part of the same region. State interaction can be strictly defined as war and peace between

states. This is the traditional definition of a region, based on geography and/or state interaction.

The traditional view of regions is now being redefined and their importance increasingly acknowledged (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 3). We are no longer talking about a collection of warring states, but entities whose organisation varies from simple treaties to fully-fledged cooperation and institution building. With the emergence of critical geopolitics, regions can now not only be defined based on geographical aspects, but can also be constructed by common perceptions, including, security concerns (Bilgin, 2004)⁴. In this context the Mediterranean has yet to be explored and defined as a region. Researchers have started to move away from a classical geographical perspective when studying the Mediterranean region, that is, all the countries that border the Mediterranean Sea. Nonetheless, studies tend to generalise, taking into account only a few states and then extending the conclusions to the entire region (See for example Pace, 2007; Calleya, 2005). But what does it mean to be part of the Mediterranean? Moreover, what role can the EU play security-wise in the Mediterranean?

Before setting out to answer these questions we will examine the concept of ‘region’, and how the study of this concept has evolved. Firstly, we will examine what is termed ‘Old Regionalism’, and then compare and contrast it to ‘New Regionalism’. We will then be able to interpret how the interaction between the concepts of region, security and Mediterranean have been approached in the past. Following this overview of the concept of ‘region’ and of regionalism, Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) will

4. More on the definition of Security and how it has evolved in section 1.2.1.

be introduced as a result of this linking between regions and security. RSCT explores how security links different actors into a regional security complex and how this complex can evolve over time. As such, changes in a regional security complex can be predicted, allowing us to determine how Europe's role and responsibilities in the Mediterranean can evolve regarding security matters. Finally, in section two of this chapter the methodology of this study will be presented, detailing the concrete steps taken during this research.

1.1. Regions and Regionalism

The concept of regions has been gaining importance and relevance with researchers and the place and importance of regions in world affairs is being acknowledged, not only by researchers, but also by politicians and citizens. In addition, several authors have touched, directly or indirectly, on the importance of regions⁵. The term 'region' traditionally designated the rule of a delimited space or territory (Söderbaum, 2003, p. 6). Therefore there is both a spatial dimension associated with the term and one of power. Regions can exist inside a state (micro-regions), across many states (macro-regions), or even in between states (meso-regions) (Ibid., p. 6). However, for the purpose of this study when we refer to region or regions, it is to macro-regions that we will be referring. It is from this perspective that the Mediterranean will be analysed, which will be examined in greater detail in section 1.1.3 of this chapter.

5. See: Neumann, 1992; Katzenstein, 2005; Shaw & Soderbaum, 2003; Huntington, 2002; Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Cooper, 2003; Kagan, 2003; Kupchan, 2003; McCormick, 2006; Reid, 2005; Adler & Barnett, 1998; Wriggins, 1992.

It is the process by which these regions are created that brings us to regionalism which, as Söderbaum points out, usually denotes “the *ideas, identities and ideologies* related to a regional project, whereas regionalization is most often defined as the *process* of regional interaction creating a regional space (or the outcome)” (Ibid., p. 7). In other words, “Regionalism shall, therefore, be approached as the *theory* that investigates the *process* of regionalization” (Tavares, 2004, p. 7). It is only in the last 20 years that regionalism has emerged as an increasingly consolidated field of study in International Relations (IR).

Historically, the first regional constructions referred to the dominion of a certain area by military power through the historical process of empire-building. This domination relied on a set of criteria such as: force, decision-making by a restricted set of people, a core political power, no other legitimization but force and narrow in its outlook, dividing camps into us/them (Ibid., p. 7). Economic concerns became part of the equation during the Nineteenth century as more and more customs unions and preferential trade agreements were signed, particularly in Europe (Ibid., pp. 7-8). The states that were to later form the larger German state were first amalgamated through specific trade agreements. However, it is important to note that even if economic concerns dominated regionalism, and have continued to do so for several more decades, in the nineteenth century there were already political preoccupations along with the economic ones. Spheres of influence were being created in the European continent in which economics were a pretext for political goals (Mansfield & Milner, 1999, p. 611). This same pattern occurred between World War I and World War II. It was at the beginning of the Cold War that regionalism began to be theorised and developed as an independent field of re-

search, particularly since the start of European integration in the 1950s. Since then, regional integration has seen an increase in research specifically dedicated to its study viewed from all perspectives and an ever increasing number of scholars are studying the European Union exclusively (Flulvio, 2001). The beginning of the Cold War and European integration marked the start of the modern theorisation of regionalism.

1.1.1. Old Regionalism

Modern theoretical thinking regarding the process of regionalisation began to develop in a world dominated by the Cold War. It is therefore normal that regionalisation was integrated into this larger context of confrontation between the two superpowers at all levels, with a multitude of superpower-lead regional alliances being formed (NATO, Warsaw Pact and ANZUS among others). Simultaneously, burgeoning European integration and the process of decolonisation allowed some initial attempts at regionalisation, and attracted attention to the process of regional integration (Breslin & Higgott, 2000, p. 334). Between 1960 and the late 1980s regionalism theory developed in this context and became known as Old Regionalism.

Old Regionalism, as an attempt to explain the process of regionalisation during the Cold War, was based on theories used at that time: functionalism, neo-functionalism, liberal institutionalism, intergovernmentalism, regional economic integration and neo-realism. However, the dominant approach was neo-functionalism as it began to take the analysis of regionalisation “beyond simple realist understandings of inter-state relations” (Ibid., p. 334). Neo-functionalism “essentially considered the impact of spillovers from economic integration to political unity” (Hettne, 2002, p. 326). Furthermore, func-

tionalist and neo-functionalist theory stated that political spillovers would come from “practical and technical cooperation in non-political spheres (as functionalists would have it) or would be an elite-led process (according to neo-functionalists)” (Marchand, Bøås & Shaw, 1999, p. 901). Therefore, as economic integration was progressing further integration would happen in other sectors including the political. This would, according to theory, create an unstoppable momentum towards complete integration, where new regional institutions would supersede national ones. Moreover, within this theoretical approach the starting point of a region was the state. Regions were therefore collections of states who had joined together in specific organisations. As such the region was a more formal creation “defined by the list of member states” in an organisation (Hettne, 2002, p. 326). These states would often cooperate on the lines of physical criteria. Physical regions “refer to territorial, military, and economic spaces controlled primarily by states” (Väyrynen, 2003, p. 27).

When looking at both the theoretical and historical background, Old Regionalism mainly addressed the creation and study of “region-based free trade regimes or security alliances” that were predominant during the Cold War period (Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel, 1999, p. xvi). As such, Old Regionalism can be identified by a series of characteristics :

- Old regionalism was formed in a bipolar Cold War context.
- It saw regions as created ‘from above’, often imposed through superpower engagement, and not as a voluntary process in order to face global challenges.
- In economic terms Old Regionalism was inward-oriented and protectionist, as it looked at how national economies integrated with each other.

- It was specific with regard to its objectives (some organisations being primarily security motivated, others more economically oriented).
- Old regionalism was only concerned with relations between nation states (Hettne, 2002, p. 326).

1.1.2. New Regionalism

The end of the Cold War created important structural changes that are still influencing regionalisation today. With the end of the Cold War a series of factors contributed to the rise of New Regionalism theory:

(i) the move from bipolarity towards a multipolar or perhaps tripolar structure, with a new division of power and new division of labour; (ii) the relative decline of American hegemony in combination with a more permissive attitude on the part of the USA towards regionalism; (iii) the erosion of the Westphalian nation-state system and the growth of interdependence and 'globalisation'; and (iv) the changed attitudes towards (neoliberal) economic development and associated political system in the developing countries, as well as in the post-communist countries (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2000, p. 457).

Old Regionalism could no longer depict reality. Regional matters became increasingly important and complex, as they were not limited to spillover effects from the superpower conflict that dominated international relations until the late 1980s.

The development of New Regionalism as a distinct approach also coincided with the emergence of new theoretical approaches, namely constructivism. At the most basic level, this new constructivist approach is important for regionalism as it allows to redefine the concept of region. As such, regions could now be:

defined by nonterritorial factors such as culture and the market that are often the purview of nonstate actors. [...] In the global system, economic regions are constructed by transnational capitalist processes, environmental regions by the interplay between human actions and the biosphere, and cultural regions by identity communities (Väyrynen, 2003, p. 27).

This new awareness allowed for the concept of region to expand and be viewed from different perspectives. No longer is a region limited within realist ideals of states and anarchy. The concept of region can be reinterpreted with the appearance of new theoretical approaches, including approaching regions from a discursive angle.

New Regionalism links national and international factors, political and economic influences, state and non-state actors and is no longer limited to the study of European integration but is applied to the various regional projects evolving all over the world. Today region building is viewed as a more complex process, “regional interactions and organizations focus not only on states but on continuing linkages among a heterogeneous set of actors and realms, including states, economies/companies and societies/civil societies” (Marchand, Bøås & Shaw, 1999, p. 897). Regionalisation is a process emerging from different actors and levels, and is no longer under the strict control of the two superpowers, as it incorporates different aspects such as economic, political and even cultural dimensions. As such, New Regionalism can be defined, according to Björn Hettne, as:

a multidimensional form of integration which includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects and thus goes beyond the goal of creating a region-based free trade regimes or security alliances. Rather, the political ambition of establishing regional coherence and identity seems to be of primary importance” (Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel, 1999, p. xvi).

New Regionalism does not represent a single approach or theory, as there are many New Regionalisms and all of them seek to explain regionalists projects in today’s context by using new theoretical tools.

1.1.3. Regionalism Theory and the Study Euro-Mediterranean Relations

The Mediterranean region has been the subject of regionalist interest through both approaches: old regionalism and new regionalism. Recent studies have concentrated on the Euro-Mediterranean process and have endeavoured to determine its success. These studies have gone beyond the traditional old regionalism, tackling issues of identity, culture, economy, security and politics (Bilgin, 2004; Calleya, 2005; Fabre & Cassia, 2007; Malmvig, 2004; Pace, 2007; Panebianco, 2003b).

When employing a regionalist approach, emphasis can not only be given to different aspects, but also at different levels. As such, one can look at regions from the inter-regionalist, sub-regionalist and regionalist viewpoint. In other words, this involves concentrating on the dynamics between separate regions (inter-regionalist), inside a specifically defined region (sub-regionalist) or looking at a defined region only (regionalist).

One relevant approach is the sub-regional approach. This implies that in regards to regions there are various possible levels of analysis. Fredrik Söderbaum (2003, p. 6) identifies micro, meso and macro regions. Micro-regions exist within a state or are cross border, *e.g.* the Catalan region or the Basque region. Macro-regions are situated between the national and world system levels, and are usually studied in IR. Meso-Regions are situated between the micro and macro regions, and are defined as “mid-range state or non-state arrangements and processes” (Ibid., p. 6). The *micro* and *meso* regions are what are referred to as sub-regions.

In the case of the Mediterranean, or Euro-Mediterranean relations, sub-regionalism states that European goals in the region would be better achieved by fostering co-operation with specific sub-regions of the Mediterranean. Calleya identifies four sub-regions in the Mediterranean: Southern Europe, the Balkans, the Maghreb, and the Mashreq (2003, p. 12). Calleya argues that to achieve region building in the Mediterranean sub-regionalism must be considered as a strategy. This emphasis on sub-regionalism stems from a perceived failure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (which was an EU led initiative). Sub-regionalism is seen as a response to the failure of such regional initiatives and as a motor for integration. In this case, co-operation between Southern European countries and the Maghreb was seen as a first step for re-launching the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

Finally, inter-regionalism is a recent approach that has been developing for the past 15 years; one whose focus is the study of relations between different regions or regional institutions that operate in the international system. However, due to the low regional integration in the Southern Mediterranean, this approach has been so far neglected in the Mediterranean context. One example of an inter-regionalist study would be an analysis of relations between the EU and the AMU. Such an approach poses two main problems: firstly the AMU has been stagnant as a regional organisation since 1994 and secondly this would only allow us to study a specified part of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, regional organisations tend to simply end up replacing states on a theoretical level, following the same logic as states within realist theory. Thus, applying this approach to Euro-Mediterranean relations is problematic as regional integration in the region is very limited, so that aside from the EU, the rest of the Mediterranean is still very

much divided. Despite some efforts at integration there is no equivalent to the EU in the region, notably in the Maghreb region (but also in the entire Middle East and North Africa). The region is still far from achieving the levels of integration of the EU or of other regions. Consequently, there is no inter-regional interaction in the Mediterranean in the sense that there are no meaningful relations between the EU on one side, and a Southern Mediterranean equivalent of the EU on the other. Furthermore, unlike the EU and Mercosul who are separated by an ocean, both shores of the Mediterranean are in close proximity and, as we will see in the following chapters, share similar security concerns as well as recognising a common identity. However, inter-regionalism could however be present in the dynamics of the Mediterranean region as a whole since it is a point of contact between several regions, for example Sub-Saharan Africa and the Gulf, but not at a deep institutional level. As we will see in chapter five there are some exchanges between regions, even if the majority of this interaction is at the regional level.

This research aims to highlight integration, interaction and interdependence in the Mediterranean, with particular emphasis on security and defence issues. Detaching sub-regions from the Mediterranean or including them in a wider region will not facilitate an accurate analysis. Therefore, this study will favour a more complete approach, one that takes into account the entire Mediterranean region, facilitating the study of all actors in the region in order to determine possible changes in the region. In this case the regional level might predominate, but the other levels of analysis, inter-regionalism and sub-regionalism, should not be excluded as, on the contrary, they can contribute to a better understanding of a region.

1.2. Regional Security Complex Theory

Regional Security Complex Theory is one of many new theories associated with New Regionalism and it offers the advantage of being specifically directed at security questions. It combines the old and the new in its approach, while at the same time not abandoning geography. Therefore, Fredrik Söderbaum (2003, pp. 15-16) raises the question of how to best define Buzan's theory: neorealist, English school or constructivist? Regional Security Complex theory has evolved and developed since 1983, and although it adapted to the post-Cold War environment, it is still very much centred on security. RSCT will allow for a comprehensive study of regional security interactions in the Mediterranean at all levels of analysis. Through RSCT we will be able to determine if the Mediterranean exists as a region, where security concerns are shared by both the Northern and Southern shores.

Barry Buzan describes the basis of his theory as being "rooted in the fact that all these states in the system are enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence. But because most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, insecurity is often associated with proximity." (Buzan, 2003, p. 141). In the case of regional security, interdependence brings a higher intensity in relations between units in a region that is shaped by the distribution of power, history and perceptions of amity and enmity. All this creates a Regional Security Complex (RSC), which Buzan and Wæver define as: "a set of units whose major process of securitization, desecuritization, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 44). These in-

terlinked sets of units define the RSC. Within the region they occupy we can observe defined and durable patterns of amity and enmity, leading to geographical coherent patterns of security interdependence (Ibid., p. 45).

RSCs are centred around security, or rather around security practices of actors (units), and this affects the RSC depending on what, or whom, they view as a security concern⁶. When examining the security practices of actors, and if there is interdependence, one is looking for the existence of an RSC as opposed to a region. These have two different meanings (Ibid., p. 76). An RSC must fulfill the conditions of RSCT because it does not exist arbitrarily, and the same criteria can be applied to a region (Ibid., p. 48). As such, a Mediterranean RSC might not correspond to the borders we assign to the Mediterranean region. This contradicts other post-structuralist approaches, such as that of Iver B. Neumann's region-building approach (2003), which states that:

The existence of regions is preceded by the existence of region-builders. They are political actors who, as part of some political project, see it in their interest to imagine a certain spatial and chronological identity for a region, and to disseminate this imagination to a maximum number of other people (Ibid., p. 161).

Neumann critiques Buzan for not clearly identifying “*whose region* he is talking about”, and for not explaining who defines the region (Ibid., p. 166). Buzan and Wæver state that an RSC exists when it fulfils their analytical criteria, and this contradicts the region-building approach of Neumann since it is a conclusion reached by a “allegedly sovereign author” and not a cognitive construct shared by actors in the region themselves (Ibid., p. 165).

6. Security here being a speech act, it is what actors make it. It is these practices that are of importance. More details in the next section.

RSCT objectives and analytical criteria seek to understand today's post-Cold War world by focusing on the regional level as the predominant level, but not in isolation. RSCT is useful for the study of regions for three main reasons (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 45). Firstly, it tells us that in international relations the regional level is of great importance in order to understand the post-Cold War period. In addition, it suggests that smaller powers have more freedom of action, especially to intervene outside their borders without the fear of being sanctioned by a superpower. This is the starting premise of the theory and the reason it considers the regional level the most important in comparison to other levels of analysis, *i.e.* the domestic, national and global levels.

Secondly, RSCT organises empirical studies of regional security and it tells what to look for in the four levels of security analysis, this is what is called the security constellation (Ibid., p. 51). This constellation represents the four levels of analysis that influence and delimit a regional security complex (RSC). The constellation is composed of the domestic, national, regional and global levels. For each of these levels one must pay attention to certain elements in order to have a complete picture of the RSC:

- Domestic level: looking at the vulnerability of states, what security threats they fear the most.
- The state to state relations which generate the region.
- The region's interaction with neighbouring regions. This could be important if there are changes in the patterns of interdependence.
- The role of global powers in the region. (Ibid., p. 51)

Once we have looked at the constellation we can start to construct the RSC, thereby identifying its limits and features. According to Buzan and Wæver an RSC has its own basic structure composed of four elements:

- Boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours.

- Anarchic structure, which means that the RSC must be composed of two or more autonomous units.
- Polarity, which covers the distribution of power among units.
- Social construction, which covers patterns of amity and enmity among units (Ibid., p. 53).

These four elements illustrate the organisation and uniqueness of the RSC. Empirically, in order to find an RSC one looks at the patterns of security by following three steps (Ibid., p. 73). Firstly, one needs to look whether issues are being securitized successfully and if so, by which actors. Secondly, one must track the links and interactions from this instance and determine how the security action in this case impinges on the security of others, and “where does this echo significantly” (Ibid., p. 73)? Finally, when there is interaction and the security of one affects the security of others, these interactions can be collected as a cluster of interconnected security concerns, and thus we have an RSC (Ibid., p. 73).

Thirdly, the RSCT allows for the establishment of theory-based scenarios, based on three possibilities: maintenance of the status quo, internal transformation, and external transformation⁷. This is something that sets RSCT apart, unlike Hans Mouritzen’s and Anders Wivel’s (2005) Constellation Theory which lacks a strong predictive ability. In comparison, RSCT allows researchers to generate predictive scenarios in order to structure empirical research.

7. These different possibilities will be detailed in section 1.2.2.

1.2.1. Securitization

So how does one determine what is being considered as a security threat, and which practices regarding these issues are being established? This is an important question if one wants to determine the constellation and structure of an RSC. Buzan *et al.* argue that today security has gone beyond military questions, even if they are still part of what forms security (Buzan, Wilde & Wæver, 1997). Other areas are now considered important to security, and one such area which he easily identifies is the economy. Security is no longer a fixed value in international relations, which is only applied to military matters, but is viewed instead as a constructed variable. Within the RSC there are several possible actors, including states and NGOs, who can securitise issues. Buzan and Wæver state that something constitutes a security threat when an actor declares that an issue threatens the survival of a referent object, which could technically be anything, for example, the state, peace and/or world order, the environment (2003, p. 71). When an issue is securitized, or being securitized, it is possible to follow this process through political discourse in the media and/or in literature.

This part of RSCT draws its inspiration from post-structuralist discourse theory, as this is increasingly popular among social sciences researchers, both in Political Science and IR. Post-structuralism emerged in the 1970s and early 1980s both as a critique of traditional ideologies and of Marxism, and it left behind the deterministic essence of structuralism. Consequently, researchers wished to study the interaction between structure and agency, and according to Jacob Torfing arrived at the conclusion that both discourse and politics matter (2005, pp. 5, 13). Therefore, there is no fixed meaning or

identity, on the contrary, meaning and identity are now to be found within a relational system that is ever changing (Foucault, 2002). This relational dimension is at the centre of post-structuralist theory, as meaning and identity can only be shaped through their relation with other meanings and identities (Torfing, 2005, p. 14)⁸.

Nonetheless, according to Wæver, these basic ideas challenge the traditional progressive notion of security as they question its traditional meaning. Traditional progressive notions of security state that:

security is a reality prior to language, is out there (irrespective of whether the conceptions is “objective” or “subjective”, is measures in terms of threat or fear), and that the more security, the better; and to argue why security should encompass *more* than is currently the case, including not only “XX” but also “YY,” where the latter is environment, welfare, immigration and refugees, etc (Wæver, 1995, pp. 46-47).

For Buzan and Wæver, security is not approached in a traditional progressive fashion as any issue can be securitized. Accordingly, to them, paraphrasing Alexander Wendt (1992), security “is what actors make it” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 48). Security actors do not simply decide which issue is a security threat, or make an issue a security threat, as we have previously seen, because relational dynamics come into play. Interacting actors and interconnecting security worries form security perceptions, “Security actors speak and act in the name of referent objects and they generally see threats emanating from other referent objects. There is thus a real sense in which India and Pakistan, Turkey and the Kurds, or Chile and ITT interact” (Buzan, Wilde & Wæver, 1997, p. 43; See also Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 72-73). Furthermore, we can speak of security when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object,

8. For other works where this relationship between meaning and identity is explored refer to: Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Hansen, 2006; Campbell, 1998; Said, 2003.

justifying the use of extraordinary means, or a break in the normal political rules. Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames issues either as a special kind of politics or as above politics (Buzan, Wilde & Wæver, 1997, pp. 23-24). In this approach, the meaning of a concept lies in its usage, *i.e.* how it is implicitly used in some ways and not in others. Textual analysis suggests that something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority (Ibid., p. 24). This means that security is always being redefined, constructed and is not a set list of issues that conform within a the same 'core' meaning (Wæver, 1995, p. 47).

This approach to security requires a proper framework in order for it to be studied empirically and directly, the units of security analysis being:

- Referent Objects: things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival

- Securitizing actors: actors who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened.

- Functional actors: actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. Without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security. A polluting company, for example, can be a central actor in the environmental sector – it is not a referent object and is not trying to securitize environmental issues (quite the contrary).

- Issues: anything that threatens the existence of a referent object, it can be any issue, if it threatens the existence of a referent object and extraordinary measures are being taken to deal with this issue or are being considered (Buzan, Wilde & Wæver, 1997, p. 36).

When we have identified the actors and the referent object(s) we can determine if there is a specific rhetorical structure linking the two, *i.e.* survival, priority of action “because

if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure” (Ibid., p. 24). This rhetorical structure will assist us in determining if there is in reality a security dimension to an issue. This process requires several steps:

- An issue is brought to public attention by a securitizing actor.
- The securitizing actor claims that this issue poses a existential threat to a referent object. By looking at discourse dealing with this issue we see signs of urgency, demands for action etc.
- Subsequently, we must see if the target audience (population) accepts the claims being made by the securitizing actor, and we will see this by either extraordinary measure being taken, or by the possibility of extraordinary measures that would be acceptable if they were to be taken (Ibid., p. 25).

Securitization is an important concept within the framework, as it identifies issues that are definite security threats. Therefore, when an issue becomes securitized it is considered to pose a threat to the actor. In everyday life several issues appear to have security implications, but by subjecting them to an analytical framework we can determine specific issues that do in fact affect the security of an actor.

(1) Security and Defence

Defining Security and Defence has been a challenge for most IR theorists since the end of the Cold War. Until recently, these two terms were used interchangeably. We often see these two terms referred to as one and the same, creating confusion when one hopes to differentiate between security and defence. Security and defence are related so when discussing one, the other should be kept in mind. But security is a wider concept and defence should be discussed in the context of security.

In essence the difference between these two terms can be summarized by the following: security is a much broader concept than defence. Security is a state of being, one feels secure or we as a society feel secure. Defence by its very nature is an action not a state. The meaning of security has evolved over the years, so that what constitutes a threat to security and thus what can be threatened has also evolved. In other words, the elements that are part of that state of security have increased (*e.g.* not only sovereignty, but economy, society and identity), and consequently so have the elements that affect a state of security (*e.g.* oil spill, American culture or the spread of Islam).

When speaking of security one refers to threats and challenges faced by society as a whole, and not solely the state. Security is as much internal as external; for example writers such as Ken Booth tend to define security as freedom from fear. Booth also mentions how security today has been dissociated from statism (the idea that the sovereign state is, and should be, the highest focus of loyalty and decision-making), strategy (the manipulation of military power and force) and stability (the promotion of ‘order’ in the ‘anarchical society’) (Booth, 2004). It is only since the late 1980s, that there has been a sustained challenge to the orthodox view that the theory and practice of security in world politics should be synonymous with the trinity of statism, strategy and stability. Views on what type of actors are present in today’s world, on the importance of military power and of the status of international society have changed. When Buzan *et al.* talk about security they refer not only to the military, but also to the economy, to society and to the environment (Buzan, Wilde & Wæver, 1997). According to Cooper and Kagan, the emergence of a post-modern world, where cooperation, the free flow of goods and services, the rule of law, institutions and negotiation are important is changing the in-

ternational systems itself (Cooper, 2003; Kagan, 2003). It is in this post-modern world world that EU is most comfortable; a world where disputes are handled through dialogue, negotiations and the rule of law. However, a modern world still exists where power, military power, the pursuit of national interests and anarchy are still present and influence decision-making. It is then normal that these two worlds will have different notions of what constitutes security, with defence being more important in the modern world than in the post-modern one.

Defence still means protection from military threats, but the lines between security and defence can sometimes be blurred. Examining different documentation from NATO ministries of defence illustrates how the nature of defence is changing. For example, Canada sees its operations in Afghanistan through what is known as a 3D strategy: Defence, Diplomacy and Development. This concept of a 3D strategy derives from the 'Three Block War' concept conceived by United States Marines Corps General Charles Krulak in the late 1990s. This is where troops could be engaged in combat operations in a part of a city, a stabilisation operation in another part of the city, and a humanitarian one in a third part of the same city (Department of National Defence, 2005, pp. 8, 26-8, 27; The Ruxted Group, 2007). Previously, security seemed only to be attained through defence, but today that is no longer true. Security is a broader concept which requires many objectives to be achieved. The UK's Ministry of Defence White Paper of 2003 entitled *Delivering Security in a Changing World* shows how missions for the Armed Forces are changing, as they move from a strictly confrontational posture of opposing an enemy, to a proactive approach that deals with humanitarian crises and other "civil security" missions (Ministry of Defence, 2003, p. 20). Defence is a means

to achieve that state of being, *i.e.* of feeling secure. Defence today has gone beyond military confrontation and deterrence. It now involves a whole series of missions that have nothing, or very little, to do with pure military threats. Therefore, defence becomes one aspect of security along with, for example immigration control, fighting organized crime and disaster relief. Some of these aspects can be realised with the help of military forces, but not exclusively.

However, defence and its associated military capabilities are associated with power and status in world politics. In his landmark article about the capability-expectation gap, Christopher Hill (1993, p. 306), referred to the EU's military weakness as a factor that can still determine Europe's influence and effectiveness in world affairs and, in consequence, its security. Nonetheless, the international context has changed since the end of the Cold War, therefore, the EU's current military shortcomings are less crucial to its security than in the Cold War scenario.

1.2.2. Security as a Speech Act

If the meaning of security has changed, then where we look to find security threats must also change. In this framework security is then “a *speech act*”, because when an issue is linked to security this moves it into a specific area where an actor can claim the right to use extraordinary means to deal with the threat (Wæver, 1995, p. 55). Therefore, discourse becomes the primary source of data for the researcher, in order to facilitate a clearer notion of what issues constitute security issues.

In their book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* Buzan and his colleagues go into detail about the role of discourse analysis and how it interacts with security.

They start by explaining how they study their cases:

The obvious method is discourse analysis, since we are interested in when and how something is established by whom as a security threat. The defining criterion of security is textual: a specific rhetorical structure that has to be located in discourse. We will not use any sophisticated linguistic or quantitative techniques. What follows is discourse analysis simply in the sense that discourse is studied as a subject in its own right, not as an indicator of something else. By this method we will not find underlying motives, hidden agenda, or such (Buzan, Wilde & Wæver, 1997, p. 176).

Discourse analysis for Buzan and his colleagues is very restrictive and simple, and only wishes to draw upon that rhetorical structure (referent object-urgency) within discourse.

Buzan *et al.* continue by saying:

Discourse analysis can uncover one thing: discourse. Whenever discourse and the structures thereof are interesting in themselves, discourse analysis makes sense. This is the case if one has reason to believe discourse has structures that are sufficiently rigid to shape possible policy lines or if one wants to locate a phenomenon that is defined by a characteristic discursive move (e.g., this book) (Ibid., p. 177).

Buzan's approach to discourse is quite limited compared to more critical approaches of discourse analysis, which are mainly interested in the power relationships present in discourse. Although Buzan *et al.* use the term discourse analysis this is a bit misleading, because other facets of discourse could be later used in order to help establish the kind of regional complex and its associated power relations. However, this is not the case as within RSCT pure discourse analysis is not seen as the only means of analysis:

Discourse analysis is not the exclusive method of securitization studies. A complete analysis will also include more traditional political analysis of units interacting, facilitating conditions, and all of the other dimensions of security complex theory. But to see whether securitizations are separate or are defined by each other, a study of the actual phrasing of the securitizing moves seems appropriate (Ibid., p. 177).

Discourse is always linked to action or actions, it is never independent. As Jäger reminds us, “discourses are not interesting as mere expressions of social practice, but because they serve certain ends, namely to exercise power with all its effects. They do this because they are institutionalised and regulated, because they are linked to action.” (2001, p. 34). It is exactly at the point of interaction between discourse and action that theory reveals some shortcomings, and therefore, the need to complement discourse analysis becomes apparent. In the case of RSCT it manifests itself in the form of extraordinary measures that are taken following discourse. According to Jäger, these extraordinary measures allow us to determine the ends and the intent. However, this is not an easy task, on the contrary it is the main problem facing discourse analysis as utilised by

Buzan *et al.*:

Often, it will therefore be easier to find the first part of the securitization move – arguing for existential threats and urgency – and less clear whether this points to specific emergency measures and violation of normal politics or established rules. Therefore, an aftercheck is carried out in the form of reading a wide selection of texts that relate specifically to the different sector subjects (Buzan, Wilde & Wæver, 1997, pp. 177-178).

The question of extraordinary measures, or what in Foucault’s approach can be called manifestations\materialisations, is a main source of concern due to the vagueness of the concept. In discourse analysis a dispositive is created by the interaction between discourse, non-discourse and manifestations\materialisations. This dispositive, according to Foucault, emerges or responds to an urgency. Jäger explains this by referring to

Foucault and Deluze:

Evidently Foucault sees the emergences of dispositive as follows: an urgency emerges and an existing dispositive becomes precarious; for this reason a need to act results and the social and hegemonical forces which are confronted with it assemble the elements which they can obtain in order to encounter this urgency, that is speech, people, knives, cannons, in-

stitutions, and so on in order to mend the ‘leaks’ – the urgency – which has arisen, as Deluze says (2001, p. 41).

In RSCT extraordinary measures are the ‘physical’ manifestation of urgency, in that, they are required to achieve full securitization and they influence both the unit that is applying them and its neighbours. Securitization itself is difficult to achieve completely because it is normal to expect that the conditions to fully achieve securitization are high and that the extraordinary measures need to be indeed extraordinary. It is therefore possible for a securitization move to be incomplete due to the lack of extraordinary measures, and in this case, partial securitization becomes easier to achieve.

Buzan and his colleagues give us a few examples of extraordinary measures when dealing with securitized issues, “in the form of secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights, or focusing society’s energy and resources on a specific task” (Buzan, Wilde & Wæver, 1997, p. 24). In addition to the measures that are listed above, two more can be added that reflect the place of the EU in this research. As such, if there is evidence that suggested that due to specific issue being securitized, the EU has acquired new powers this then would constitute an extraordinary measure. Equally, if powers from the national level were transferred to the European level due to an issue being securitized, this transfer should also constitute an extraordinary measure. In the context of the European Union a case could be made that these measures constitute an extraordinary event, namely altering normal politics. This reinforces the position of the European Union as an actor and the focal point of European security.

Keeping what Buzan identifies as extraordinary measures, and adding to these those that are specific to the EU, will help identify which issues have been fully securitized. As mentioned earlier some issues are easier and politically more viable to securitize than others. So it is to be expected that only major issues are securitized in the region, however, some assumptions regarding which issues are important to the region might not materialise when confronted with empirical data.

1.2.3. Scenario Building

Regional Security Complex Theory uses scenarios as a predictive tool, allowing the researcher to narrow possible scenarios for a region. Scenario-building remains a rather unpopular approach, but scenario-planning has had success in the military and private sector, and more precisely in the managerial world. However, in the social science community, including the IR one, scenario-building has been subject to a great deal of scepticism and resistance (Neumann & Øverland, 2004).

In RSCT there are three possible scenarios for an RSC: it can maintain the status quo, or it may undergo internal transformation, or external transformation. From these three scenarios the least likely possibilities are eliminated. It is a simple principal that starts with the basic structure of the RSC and the constellation. Using discourse analysis we determine the boundaries of the RSC by establishing which issues are common to the region, or rather, which actors share security concerns. We are then able to determine which units are included in the RSC. Following this, a more traditional analysis will explore the regional constellation:

- The domestic situation of each unit, *i.e.* is it a strong or weak State?

- State to State relations
- The region's interaction with neighbouring regions
- The role of global powers in the region (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 51)⁹.

This analysis of the constellation will determine the power distribution in the RSC, the patterns of enmity and amity and the role of global powers in the region. After going through these steps the basic structure of the RSC remains which consists, as noted in section 1.2, of boundaries, an anarchic structure, polarity and social construction (Ibid., p. 53).

With the basic structure of the RSC established it is then possible to determine exactly what kind of RSC exists in the region by referring to the following classification:

- Standard RSC: Polarity determined by regional powers
- Centred RSC: Unipolar, where polarity is centred on a single powerful actor
 - Superpower: Unipolar centred on a superpower
 - Great Power: Unipolar centred on a great power
 - Regional Power: Unipolar centred on a regional power
 - Institutional: Region acquires actor quality through institutions
- Great power: Bi- or multipolar with great powers as the regional poles
- Supercomplex: Strong interregional level of security dynamics arising from great power spillover into adjacent regions
- Pre-complex: a set of bilateral relations that have the potential to bind together into an RSC, but lacks sufficient cross-linkage among units to

9. Buzan and Wæver explain that additional elements could be taken into account: "To these main elements others might be considered for example: interaction capacity, power differentials and system polarity" Ibid., p. 67. However, we will be concentrating the main elements identified by the authors.

do so

- Proto-complex: when there is security interdependence to delineate a region but regional dynamics are still low, with time it can evolve into a RSC (Ibid., pp. 62-64).

Having placed the RSC in one of the previous categories we can now start to determine which scenarios are more likely to happen by looking at how the structure of the RSC might change. To determine which are the most likely scenarios, one must start by looking at the constellation in which the RSC exists. This constellation represents the four levels of analysis that can affect an RSC, the domestic, the national, the regional and the global. These four levels are important not only to determine the present structure of an RSC, but also to establish how it may change.

Internal transformation can be monitored by checking material conditions for possible change of polarity and discursively for possible changes in amity/enmity. Internal transformation occurs when an RSC's essential structure changes within the context of its existing boundary. Such change can come about as a result either of decisive shifts in the distribution of power, or due to major alterations in the patterns of hostility. The first option entails a change from a multipolar system, to a bipolar system and finally to a unipolar system or *vice-versa*. Transformation in the patterns of hostility could see a region move from conflict formation, to security regime. Basically anything that affects interrelations in the systems constitutes internal transformation. For example, having the EU base its policy on hard power would affect the system, in that it would affect both the polarity and patterns of hostility in the RSC. In this extreme case the system could move to a unipolar system and hostility patterns could facilitate conflict formation, or in a more extreme case, overlay, where local patterns of security relations cease to exist.

Therefore, how do we best monitor for internal transformations? First we must examine the distribution of power in the region, its location and direction? This must not be understood in a strict military sense, although military factors are part of the analysis. So power must be taken into account at a general level, including all sectors from the economic to the diplomatic. Looking at the domestic level one can see the basis of power, but one must then look at the regional and interregional level to see the effects of domestic decisions. A second element that needs to be taken into account are patterns of hostility and/or cooperation. Are relations heading towards cooperation or confrontation? This can be evaluated through discourse analysis.

External transformation can be monitored by looking at the intensity of interregional security dynamics as the more intense the interactions the bigger the possibility of change. Here we must look at interactions that are happening outside the borders of our RSC, as these can have an affect on our region. These interactions could come from bordering regions, or from greater superpower involvement in the region, which could stifle any independent interaction in the RSC.

An RSC does not randomly change. For example, it is rare to find a case where an RSC reverted back to an unstructured region (Ibid., p. 66). Moreover, a standard RSC could possibly evolve into a centred one, additionally, the latter could evolve into an empire at an extreme level. Therefore, determining which scenario, or scenarios, from the three discussed previously is the most likely to occur is not an arbitrary process. There is a logic to how an RSC evolves, as it is based on internal and external factors. Once we have determined the characteristics of a possible Euro-Mediterranean

RSC we will see which levels are the most active, and therefore, how the RSC is likely to change.

2. Methodology

The first part of our research will utilise discourse analysis (chapters 2, 3 and 4), this will allow us to determine which issues have been identified and accepted as security threats to the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean countries. In the second part of our study we will utilise a more traditional geopolitical approach, not only highlighting the power distribution within the region and between the different actors, but also relations with neighbouring regions and superpowers. These factors all influence how the RSC is ultimately structured and how it could evolve.

2.1. Discourse Analysis

In the case of security, textual analysis suggests that something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues, and therefore, should take absolute priority. For this reason, we will determine if an issue has been securitised by following the rhetorical structure laid out in section 1.2.1. This is necessary in order to determine the boundaries of the region, and we will follow the issues in order to see if they are present throughout the Mediterranean region. At the end of this process we will have defined the geographical limits of the Mediterranean using the security discourse produced by the European Union and Southern Mediterranean countries. This will be achieved by a textual analysis of Eu-

roMed documents starting in 1991 (with the birth of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)) to 2007. This is so we may examine Europe's security discourse from its early stages to more recent communications, in order to have up to date information that provides an accurate and current account of the regional geopolitical situation. The textual analysis will include both official documents and speeches given by EU officials. The same will be done for the Southern Mediterranean countries, taking into account as many publicly available documents as possible¹⁰. For the Southern Mediterranean, the lack of available official documents will be supplemented by various news articles, notably from searching the *BBC Monitoring* service. Some interviews/fieldwork will also be conducted, in particular with European Union officials. We will then concentrate on the linguist data of both the non-reactive (documents) and the reactive (interviews) (Howarth, 2005, p. 335).

With regard to the number of texts analysed, the scope of this study covers 16 years of discourse, and despite attempts to limit the total number of texts read there is no set theoretical and methodological guideline to define, or limit, the relevant texts that need to be analysed (Ibid., p. 337). Nonetheless, Buzan *et al.* talk about the quantity of discourse needed and how it influences the level of detail we can expect:

It is better to have a limited set of texts and a complete representation of securitization instances than a large set from which the authors pick at liberty. In each document, a search for security arguments is carried out, and each finding is investigated as to its context, the referent object, the threat, and – not least – its connection to other sectors, that is, whether the security nature of the issue is derived from the fact that the source of the threat is

10. When available, documents were consulted and analysed in their English version. However, in some cases only a French or Arabic version was available. In such cases, the French version was analysed. Quotations in French are included without translation, but have been edited for grammar and spelling.

already securitized in another sector. If this were a case study of a region, of a security complex, it would have to include several referent objects, their securitizations, and – not least – the interaction among them. [...] Will security complex analysis always have to involve that much discourse analysis, that much close reading of texts? No! It is simply a question of the level of detail in a case study (Buzan, Wilde & Wæver, 1997, p. 178).

Moreover, they provide us with some details on how to conduct discourse analysis in the context of regional security complex theories:

The analysis should be conducted on texts that are central in the sense that if security discourse is operative in this community, it should be expected to materialize in this text because this occasion is sufficiently important [...] Since the security argument is a powerful instrument, it is against its nature to be hidden. Therefore, if one takes important debates, the major instances of securitization should appear on the scene to battle each other for primacy; thus, one does not need to read everything, particularly not obscure texts (Ibid., p. 177).

Taking into account these comments, the criteria used in the selection of discourse, dictated a maximum amount of text will be analysed. This mean an analysis of as many speeches from government officials and official policy documents as possible from both shores of the Mediterranean, as this allows for greater detail. Official documents were preferred due to the lack of a totally free and independent press in the Southern Mediterranean. This was done in order to ensure that the type of texts analysed for the EU and the Southern Mediterranean were similar. Finally, it is quite difficult to obtain government policy papers from the Southern Mediterranean, even more so in English and/or French. Fortunately speeches, and some press releases, were easily available in both languages, hence they constituted the bulk of the official documents referenced from the Southern Mediterranean. When official documents were lacking, as was the case for Libya and Syria, these were substituted by press articles obtained for the most part from *BBC Monitoring*. Furthermore, it is important to note that

not all Southern Mediterranean states had official documents dating from 1992 up to 2007 available for consultation online Tunisia, Turkey and Egypt were the exceptions to this situation. Finally, all documents were in English and/or French and have been found by visiting official websites from each country, these included, wherever available, the official website of the Head of State, Head of Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Interior Ministry.

We will complete our analysis with a series of interviews. In using a different method and type of data triangulation is achieved (Howarth, 2005, p. 339). In our case, we will complement our primary and secondary qualitative data, for which we will use a textual analysis, with interviews to support the former. These interviews were conducted with Members of the European Parliament and Commission, in order to complement the official texts, speeches and news reports analysed.

2.1.1. Research Sample

The first step in this process was the selection of the participants, and the size of the sample. Having already analysed the European Union as an actor, the choice was made to look at all the Southern Mediterranean countries that participate in the Barcelona Process. Therefore, for this section Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey are all part of the sample analysed, in addition to the Palestinian Authority and Libya. Together they represent the Southern Mediterranean and we will ascertain how they collectively view the region from a security stand point.

Turkey presents an interesting case as it is a potential EU member, and as such, is not usually considered Southern Mediterranean. In contrast to Morocco, which saw its membership request denied, Turkey is an official candidate for EU membership. However, it is not yet a member and therefore, it will be included with the Southern Mediterranean countries. In addition, Albania and countries from the ex-Yugoslavia will not feature as part of this analysis. They are not part of the Barcelona Process, and they are going through a period of reconstruction, which includes the presence of EU led forces. It is also to be expected that these countries will join the EU when permanent peace and stability are achieved in the region. This will facilitate and simplify our research, thus keeping it within manageable parameters.

Our objective will be to determine the general trends for the entire Southern Mediterranean region, as such we will look at the main issues being securitized in the region, rather than looking at individual countries. It is hoped to advance a truly regional analysis of the main trends, rather than a study akin to country studies. This is why our main focus will be on the security issues themselves, rather than on individual countries. Regarding these issues, it will be through discourse analysis that we will determine the number of security issues common to the region.

2.2. Geopolitical Analysis

In the second phase of our work, starting in chapter 5, we will be partially leaving discourse for a more traditional geopolitical analysis of the region, taking into account both internal and external factors. Each factor can have an influence on the evolution of the region and in the place the European Union occupies. We will look at the

current geopolitical situation in the Mediterranean, that is, the internal situation of each actor, patterns of amity and enmity, interregional relations and superpower influence, so as to determine the state of the region. This exercise is essential in order to achieve our final objective of determining the EU's future role in the Mediterranean.

After conducting a discourse analysis, we must then determine the situation of the RSC regarding the four levels of analysis, domestic, regional, interregional and global. The questions that need to be raised include: are we in the presence of strong or weak states? What are their security agendas? Are we in the presence of state to state relations based on interdependence or relations based on amity/enmity dynamics? What is the level of interregional dialogue? What is the role of the US in the region? Answering these questions will give us an overview of the constellation that can affect the RSC and its evolution.

Socio-political instability affects how a state sees security, while strong stability will highlight other concerns (Buzan, 1991, pp. 96-107). States with low socio-political cohesion will be concerned with eliminating, or controlling that weakness, which in turn can affect not only internal policy, but also relations with neighbouring countries. One can also classify states within the premodern, modern and postmodern classification (Cooper, 2003, pp. 16-54). So a state being considered weak or strong, modern or post-modern is not a simply a case of looking at policy. However, interpreting certain policies could provide helpful insight.

State to state relations present their own challenges, and can have a strong influence on regional security perceptions. As such, we must determine if state to state rela-

tions are now built on partnership or confrontation. Moreover, with increasing capability on the European side, is there still a will to compromise? How will the European Union balance its traditional soft power approach with a growing hard power capability? What will be the impact of these hard power capabilities on Euro-Mediterranean relations? As the EU evolves its capabilities as an international actor this will affect the relations with other units. State to State relations can also be measured by policy actions, as the intensity of relations can be judged by indicators including the number of treaties, ministerial or other regional meetings and joint exercises or peacekeeping missions.

Regarding the interregional and global levels some of the elements mentioned earlier can be used here. In the case of interregional relations, they are usually associated with change in the RSC. Therefore, one should not only look at relations with the Gulf and Middle Eastern countries, but also with Africa and Eastern Europe to see if there are signs of increasing interaction between the different regions that could indicate a shift in regional dynamics. This also applies to the global level whereby a significant role on the part of the United States or Russia could signify change in the system. Global level dynamics will revolve around the role of the US and Russia in the region, in addition to how much influence they still wield in the region.

Having determined the characteristics of the regional security environment one will be able to place the Euro-Mediterranean region in one of the categories proposed by Buzan and Wæver (chapter 5). Subsequently, it will be possible to determine which scenarios, from those identified in section 1.2.3., are the most likely to occur in the short, medium and long term. In the case of this research project the medium term refers

to a 15-20 years time-frame. Within this time-frame there “is a realistic perspective in which to detect fundamental shifts in the security environment and [...] deal with those shifts” (Howorth, 2007, p. 242). As such, a 2-15 years time-frame refers to the short-term, while the long-term denotes a 20+ years time-frame. Finally, after establishing the possible scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, it will be possible to determine the future responsibilities of the European Union in the Mediterranean regarding security issues (chapter six).

II. Euro-Mediterranean Security Discourse Part I: Terrorism and Illegal Immigration

This chapter will begin our analysis of Euro-Mediterranean security discourse with the final objective of determining the characteristics of a Mediterranean Security Complex. This analysis will span three chapters. The first two chapters will look at different security issues in order to determine if they have been securitized in the Mediterranean. The European Security Strategy which identifies the key threats to Europe is used as an indicator of which issues could already be securitised in Europe and which issues might be securitised in the Southern Mediterranean. However, our analysis will continue with other official documents and speeches so as to gain a complete overview of security discourse throughout the Mediterranean region. Chapter four will then analyse discourse through the process of intertextualising in order to determine how other texts have helped to shape official discourse throughout the years, with the purpose of uncovering a narrative. In chapter five, the characteristics of a Euro-Mediterranean regional security complex will be determined using the previous discourse analysis in addition to some geopolitical elements. This involves determining the boundaries that the securitization of issues establishes for a Euro-Mediterranean RSC, the units that constitute the region and the polarity in the region. At the end of chapter five, we will be

able to discern the type of Regional Security Complex present in the Mediterranean and its characteristics.

At this first stage of analysis, it is necessary to determine which issues are being perceived in the region through a security lens and if security perceptions are shared between the two shores. The first step entails an analysis of official discourse in order to determine which issues are being securitized in general and which issues relate to the Mediterranean in particular. This can be done by ‘following’ discourse and the issues it raises across the Mediterranean, based on the European Security Strategy. Furthermore, we will determine which issues have gone through the full securitization process, thereby identifying if any extraordinary measures have been taken, or if they could be taken, regarding the various security issues identified in the official discourse. Combining these two elements, *i.e.* the discourse and the measures, will allow for a full representation of what constitutes security in the Mediterranean.

In this chapter we will be examining the issues of terrorism and illegal immigration, and how they are perceived throughout the region. We will identify which referent objects are being threatened by these two issues and if extraordinary measures are being taken, or considered. In the following chapters we will examine regional conflicts, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), organised crime and national issues.

1. Terrorism

Although Europe and the Southern Mediterranean have been confronting terrorist groups for several decades, it was not until the attacks of 9/11 that terrorism entered

our collective consciousness as a major threat. These Al-Qaida attacks, by their scope and the nature of their ideology, made terrorism a security priority worldwide. More than the actual attacks that threatened the security and stability of countries, the ideology that fuelled these attacks is perhaps of greater concern for authorities. Terrorist organisations with their rejection of modern values and the acceptance of violence as a means to an end ushered in a climate of insecurity throughout the Mediterranean. Under the leadership of Al-Qaida, or by example, a resurgence of attacks has occurred.

Following major attacks in London and Madrid, EU territory became a target for terrorist groups. Furthermore, the continued situation in Palestine and Israel and the resurgence of extremists organisations in the Southern Mediterranean shows that the situation remains uncertain in the region. Despite earlier progress in the Maghreb, notably in Algeria where the civil war seemed to have ceased, the situation has again changed in the region. Presently, there are serious concerns over the resurgence of terrorism in the region, and that once again the security and stability of these countries will be destroyed (Guidère, 2007)¹¹. For the EU, any long term terrorist campaign could jeopardise stability in the Mediterranean and have direct consequences for Europe. For this reason the fight against terrorism has been called “a problem whose solution is one of the greatest challenges facing humankind in the 21st century” (The European Parliament, 2001d). In an interview conducted in 2007 with MEP Carlos Carnero (2007), Carnero stated that terrorism constituted the most immediate threat to the EU emanating from the Mediterranean.

11. See also: Beaugé, 2008b; Beaugé, 2008a; Fernandes, 2007; Prado Coelho, 2007; Sousa, 2007.

Discourse analysed shows how terrorism threatens peace in the region, how it is not only a threat to the EU, but more importantly the Southern Mediterranean. It is not only a threat to security in a material and human sense, but it also threatens the basis of society, including the political, in the region.

1.1. Rhetorical Structure of Terrorism

Terrorism constitutes the most serious candidate for full securitization. In several documents terrorism is clearly referred to as an existential threat to the EU and in addition it is also perceived as a threat in the Southern Mediterranean. Discourse shows terrorism as a threat to several referent objects, namely to the values of a society, to society itself and its citizens, and to stability and security. Furthermore, on both shores of the Mediterranean, terrorism is a threat to reforms and development. These referent objects call for a sense of urgency in dealing with terrorism, in particular protecting ‘the values of civilised society’. To tackle this threat, a multitude of extraordinary measures have been taken across the Mediterranean.

1.1.1. Referent Objects

In the security discourse from both shores of the Mediterranean the same rhetorical structure is present. Discourse states that terrorism is a threat to all of the Mediterranean region, specifically to its values, the life of its citizens, and to peace and stability. On the European side this sentiment was expressed as early as 1995, thus during the Madrid Council the Gomera Declaration on terrorism was adopted which declares that terrorism “constitutes a threat to democracy, to the free exercise of human rights and to

the economic and social development, from which no member State of the European Union can be regarded as exempt” (The Council of the European Union, 1995). Officials responsible for both the internal and external security of the EU have also commented on terrorism advocating similar arguments. Gijs de Vries former EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator (2004-2007) declared, “Terrorism constitutes an attack on mankind’s most fundamental values: the right to a life lived in peace, freedom and dignity” (Gijs de Vries European Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism, 2005, p. 2)¹². In a 2004 article published in the Jordan Times, Javier Solana remarked that “Terrorism is an existential threat [...] we are using all instruments at our disposal” (Solana, 2004).

In addition, several EU policy documents address the specific issue of terrorism. The December 2003 European Security Strategy described terrorism “as putting lives at risk [...] it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe” (The Council of the European Union, 2003b, p. 3). In 2005, the EU developed its Counter-Terrorism Strategy stating that “Terrorism is a threat to all States and to all peoples. It poses a serious threat to our security, to the values of our democratic societies and to the rights and freedoms of our citizens, especially through the indiscriminate targeting of innocent people. Terrorism is criminal and unjustifiable under any circumstances” (The Council of the European Union, 2005d, p. 6).

12. This idea is also given expression in: The Council of the European Union, 2005d; The Council of the European Union, 2004f; de Vries, 2004.

Terrorism has been a problem since the very beginning of the EU led Barcelona process, and it gained additional importance after the terrorist attacks in the US, Madrid and London. Moreover, during the Barcelona conference it was agreed to strengthen co-operation in preventing and combating terrorism. This commitment was repeated in a 1997 meeting, but under the social partnership section. At the Euromed *ad hoc* ministerial meeting of 1998 in Palermo, it was recognised that terrorism represents a “serious threat [...] to many of the objectives of the process” (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1998). In Brussels in 2001 terrorism was given substantial attention due to the attacks of 9/11. There the ministers issued the following statement:

The Ministers reiterated their utter condemnation of the terrorist attacks committed in the United States on 11 September 2001. In this connection they expressed their total condemnation of terrorism everywhere in the world and their solidarity with the peoples who are the victims thereof. They regard these acts as an attack against the entire international community, against all its members, all religions and all cultures together. The Ministers formally rejected as both dangerous and unfounded any equating of terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world. In this connection the importance of the Barcelona Process as a relevant and recognised instrument for promoting a dialogue of equals between cultures and civilisations was emphasised by all. The Ministers agreed to work on deepening the existing dialogue between cultures and civilisations, focusing on youth, education and the media (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2001, p. 1)¹³.

This same rhetorical structure is reflected in the Southern Mediterranean, where terrorism is seen as, first and foremost, a threat to peace, security and stability, *i.e.* these three issues are often jointly mentioned when discussing terrorism. For example, the Moroccan Foreign Minister states, “combattre le fanatisme qui sape la stabilité et la paix mondiales” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume

13. Recently, under the Portuguese presidency of the EU, the issue of terrorism was raised with the Southern Mediterranean partners, notably Morocco Almeida, 2007; LUSA/AFP, 2007; Prado Coelho, 2007; Correia, 2007.

du Maroc, 2001b). In 1993 President Ben Ali of Tunisia stated that terrorism represents “un péril réel pour le progrès, la sécurité et la stabilité de nos sociétés et pour leur expérience toute naissante en matière de développement et de démocratie” (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1993e). This was raised again after the 9/11 attacks by President Ben Ali (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2001b). Libya, Algeria, Egypt and Syria also recognise terrorism as a threat to security and stability (SWB, 2000a; Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2002a; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2000c; SWB, 2001b). Turkey believes that until the fight against terrorism is won, peace and stability cannot be fully maintained in the world and that this struggle against terrorism is the responsibility of all nations. In this sense, Turkey will continue to support the international community and exert all possible efforts in the fight against terrorism that is a calamity that recognises no boundaries and is considered one of the biggest threats against world peace in the 21st century (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005c).

Consequently, some Southern Mediterranean countries are concerned that terrorism can be used as a excuse for armed intervention by regional and/or global powers in this context of an international war on terrorism. The Syrian authorities are faced with a paradox, *i.e.* the definition of terrorism *versus* a people’s right to self-determination. What exactly constitutes terrorism, which Syria condemns, and what constitutes a peoples struggle for liberation, which Syria supports. According to Syria, this continued confusion between these two issues risks undermining international law, conventions

and institutions, as in the end it legitimises state terrorism (Hani, 2002, pp. 23, 130-133). For Lebanon, the war on terrorism has perverse effects, especially as the war on terrorism can be used for ulterior motives, as it has been used to justify unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, thus putting their security at risk:

Second: All Arab states had unanimously denounced terrorism. As a matter of fact, Arab states were twice victims of terrorism. At first, when some western countries were a close ally and a friend of fundamentalist movements, and then, when they became their main enemy.

[...]

Fifth: The Arab stand regarding terrorism was faced with another form of war, “a war of slogans on terrorism”, which after getting over with Afghanistan, this war was launched in Iraq under a new alibi: “Possession of weapons of mass destruction”. We anticipated that the war would be launched against those who have hostile feelings towards the west in the region of the Middle East. In other words, we anticipated that it would be the turn of Israel, which continued its aggressions and occupation, ignored all UN resolutions, possessed arms of weapons destruction. All this, has been done with some kind of international blessing and protection. (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2004).

Terrorism can also impact on peace and security due to its impact on the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. For Israel, the peace process is compromised with each terrorist attack:

By maintaining a comprehensive campaign against the terrorist organizations and the states which sponsor them, the international community will send a message that the world is united in its struggle to isolate the extremists.

The actions of these extremists constitute one of the main obstacles to progress on the Palestinian track. It was the Damascus office of Hamas which gave the orders to carry out the recent appalling terrorist attack in Rafah. We must fight the extremists, if we are to grasp the present opportunity for peace (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004a)¹⁴.

14. See also: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003a; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994d; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001a; Israel Ministry of

Another referent object is universal human values, which concerns both the EU, and its Southern Mediterranean neighbours. In the Southern Mediterranean the discursive link between terrorism and universal human values was made on 9/11 by the Moroccan King (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2001a), Jordan's King (2001) and several other Southern Mediterranean states including Syria:

However, this noble and humanitarian image, which we are certain will continue to be bright, is an image that contradicts with the very serious international circumstances that threaten not only our region but the entire world as well. These circumstances are now threatening civilization, history, values and humanity. The makers and promoters of terrorism are now calling for combating it. And, those who keep terrorism away from themselves and their nations are accused of terrorism. Applause [*sic*] (SWB, 2004h).

In Turkey this notion has also been expressed since 1996 (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b). Perhaps an even clearer example of Turkish perceptions on terrorism can be found in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs paper on the concepts and ideology of terrorism:

Terrorism can be considered as an extreme form of expression, which is most contrary to the values of democracy, civilization and humanity. Terrorist acts, methods and practices seem to be adopted by movements which are of an exclusionist nature, which refuses *a priori* the responsibility of living together with "the other", who is thought to be different.

Racism, religious fundamentalism and ethno-nationalism are such exclusionist movements which adopt terrorist methods. The followers of these movements practically accuse the target groups of being the source of all evil. In the case of religious fanatics, the members of "the others" are qualified as infidels and are perceived as the main obstacle to the restoration of the felicitous order of the initial phase of the religion. The ethno-nationalists are obsessed by the real or imagined historical victimization

Foreign Affairs, 2004b; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005g; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005f; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005a.

incurred to them by the majority and fight to separate their group from the rest of the society.

Terrorist groups project all sorts of pejorative attributes onto their target groups in a way to dehumanize them. Thus, violence can be directed without much remorse against the dehumanized members of the target group. Terrorism is the preferred form of violence which acquires in this context a conscious and systematic nature, serving a specific “political” goal. They perversely feel justified to employ any means to that end.

Terrorism, moreover, is a major violation of one of the most fundamental human rights, the right to life. By creating a climate of fear terrorism also violates every individual’s right to live free from fear as stated in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By recruiting and using minors as combatants, terrorists also violate the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. As terrorism grossly and systematically violates human rights, it is only natural to consider it as a crime against humanity (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.a)¹⁵.

What is perhaps more interesting is that Israel also shares the same position with Turkey and the rest of the Southern Mediterranean. For Israel the democratic and universal values of Israeli society are threatened by terrorism (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005j)¹⁶.

This referent object of basic human values is expressed both in a universal manner and in a more specific context. Islamic values are also threatened by terrorism as stated in a 1992 speech by Ben Ali. The President of Tunisia affirms that terrorists and their objectives are “fondamentalement en contradiction avec les nobles principes et

15. This has been reiterated in: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006b; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003c; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2003f; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004c.

16. Further examples of how values, notably, values of democracy and freedom and other human rights are being threatened can be found in many texts. For some examples refer to: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004c; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003b; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003a; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005k.

les hautes valeurs prônés par notre sublime religion” (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1992c). In 1994 Ben Ali states that this perversion of Islamic values by terrorists endangers “la stabilité, la sécurité et le développement de ces mêmes sociétés” (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1994b). But perhaps the best example of how terrorism endangers Islamic values comes from the Libyan leader Ghadhafi. On his official website he strongly condemns terrorism and extremist groups:

Those groups came back to wreak havoc in our countries. They went on a rampage of killing all those who crossed their path. Even women and children were not spared. They wanted to advocate a call that subverts the Muslim faith, and spreads a wave of destructive behavior.

They brand all who do not share their beliefs as apostate. This, despite their indulgence in all manner of cardinal sins. All they want is to go inexorably towards the unknown. They have no doctrine and no well-defined objective. All they know is the insane torture and murder. All they can do is to parrot meaningless words that they do not understand such as the word “Taghoot”.

It is a vague word that means worshipping an entity other than God. They use it to describe persons while it cannot be used in this way in Arabic. They also use the words “Islamic Sharia”. It is yet another vague word. It is a signifier without a signified.

We are against those groups. We will fight them like they fight us.

We are stronger than them, because we are defending the civilized society and because we are defending the religion against the wave heresy and destruction they have unleashed. This is a necessary and legitimate act of self-defense (Al Gathafi Speaks. The Official Site of Muammar Al Gathafi, n.d.)¹⁷.

17. Another example by Qadhafi: “They attribute this terrorism, lightly and falsely, to Islam and Islamist extremism. I went to fight terrorism; I reject terrorism, encircle terrorism, isolate and condemn terrorism and I call for the elimination of terrorism because terrorism has nothing to do with Islam, or with fundamentalism, the Arabs or the Muslims [applause]. When Qadhafi condemns terrorism, which is attributed to Islam, this condemnation is priceless” SWB, 1997a. See also: King Abdullah II

In the region, the impact of terrorism on the reform process is also a major concern. In 2004 the King of Maroc stated that terrorism “s’en prend à la voie que nous avons empruntée, celle des reformes tous azimuts” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2004a). In 2005 he went further, stating, “N’avaient, en fait, d’autre dessein que de mettre à mal notre identité et notre projet de société démocratique et moderne” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005a). Aboubakr Jamai, editor of the *Journal-Hebdomadaire* in Casablanca, reiterates this view, stating that conservative forces in the country are fomenting a “Green Danger” in order to stop democratic reforms in the Kingdom (Jamai, 2006, pp. 61-62). Egyptian authorities are also concerned about the influence terrorism has on development efforts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2004b), President Mubarak stated that terrorism “threatens our countries and peoples on both sides of the Mediterranean” (President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2005). Jordan is another regional actor who expresses concern over the consequences of terrorism on development, “The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan knows about terrorism from bitter experience. We have ourselves been among its victims, and we have at times been besieged by it. We have lost some of our finest sons to it, and our national development has been ravaged by it” (King Hussein I of Jordan, 1996; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2001). Furthermore, both Lebanon and Israel are concerned about the impact of terrorism on the world economy (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon,

King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005h; Foreign Ministry The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2004.

2001b; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995b). Finally, the EU's Gomera Declaration echoes Southern concerns over the affect of terrorism on regional development (The Council of the European Union, 1995).

In the specific case of Algeria, terrorism is perceived as being capable of destroying Algerian society, as was expressed by the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in a speech to the European Parliament in 2003, "Le monde développé a mis longtemps à comprendre la menace représentée par ce phénomène usurpant une respectabilité idéologique et se réclamant de la démocratie auprès de l'opinion européenne pour se donner le droit de détruire la société algérienne" (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003d). For Egypt terrorism is a threat to all societies, and this is a concern also shared by Algeria (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2005e; Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003d). Both Turkey and Israel take this line of reasoning further, as from their perspective terrorism is a threat to the existence of their respective states. From an Israeli perspective, terrorism is a threat because the groups they are facing have but one objective, "Their ideology is to destroy the State of Israel" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003e)¹⁸. The Israeli government collected various pieces of information, from direct and indirect sources, concerning the objectives of extremists terrorist groups, and these were then compiled in a document entitled: *The Threat of Islamic Fundamentalism. Background Material*, dating from 1993 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993b). In this docu-

18. This idea is also given expression in: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001c; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005a and especially in Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004e.

ment examples of calls for jihad and the destruction of Israel are presented. The following is a small excerpt, “Ibrahim Ghousha, HAMAS Spokesman (Dec. 1991): ‘I am in favor of true peace and justice which will return to the Palestinian people its land and honor. This can only take place after the foreign conquerors [the Jews] return to the countries from which they came’” (Ibid.). In the case of Turkey, terrorism also threatens the continued existence of the Turkish State. As such, the Turkish Prime Minister stated that the 2003 Istanbul attacks “were not only perpetrated against the Turkish nation” (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2003d). Therefore, Kurdish terrorism in the name of independence is also a threat. When talking about the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)¹⁹ the Turkish Foreign Minister states: “Despite atrocious massacres and assassinations, not only once did terrorists seize political power, overthrow a regime and replace it with their own” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.a) and also:

Unitary state is defined as a state that has singularity in terms of country, nation and sovereignty elements alongside legislative, executive and judicial organs. Thus, there is a single country, single sovereignty and a single nation in the unitary state. The goal of the terror organization against which we struggled for so many years is to change the unitary nature of the Turkish Republic, which means the disintegration of the country. However, they were not able to achieve this with armed struggle. Today, they try to reach their aim indirectly by politicizing the issue. Especially, their greatest effort is to create a public opinion in and outside the country in favor of them and to put the article 3 of the Constitution into discussion (General Hilmi Özkök Turkish General Staff, 2005)²⁰.

19. In Kurdish the Kurdistan Workers’ Party is know as Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK).

20. This idea is also given expression in: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005b; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b.

Moreover, in the case of Turkey and Israel, both countries view terrorism as a direct threat to the lives of their citizens. Turkey clearly states in terms of lives lost to terrorism:

PKK terrorists have killed 30,000 people including women, children and infants, 3,834 soldiers, 247 policemen, 1,218 village guards in addition to 153 teachers. Furthermore, 343 primary schools have been completely destroyed...

If we can stop terrorism, we can also stop this calamity (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1998c).

The same sentiment is expressed in Morocco (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005a) and in Israel, as demonstrated by this statement:

There can be no compromise or negotiations with terror. It must be fought vigorously. But it must be made clear. Although terror is used mostly by radical Islamic elements, the war against terror is not a war against Islam.

In our region, Israel continues to face Arab and Palestinian terror, as we have for 120 years. Since the current wave of terror began in September 2000, almost 900 Israelis have been killed and 6,000 more have been wounded. In European terms, this would correspond to over 67,000 dead and over 450,000 wounded. No country can be asked to accept such casualties.

Terror has affected almost every family in Israel. Entire families have been wiped out, but our people remain strong and determined, and we have made it clear to the Palestinians that we will not be broken by terror. Israel is a peace-seeking country (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003e)²¹.

In Syria other references are made regarding terrorism that relate it to other dangers to society, such as crime. Therefore, terrorism is considered a criminal act (SWB,

21. For more examples of Turkish and Israeli discourse on this matter see: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003c; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2003d; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006c; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001e; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998.

1995b). This link between terrorism and crime is also expressed in Israel and in Turkey. In Turkey, in addition to terrorism being considered a crime, local authorities are also concerned about the criminal activities that are needed to finance terrorism (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1998e). Finally, terrorism is often mentioned as synonym for extremism, or any type of fundamentalism that disrupts society. For example in December 2001, the Moroccan Foreign Minister delivered a speech on behalf of the King where he stated, “La nécessité d’œuvrer à l’apaisement de tous les foyers de tension et de combattre le fanatisme” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2001b)²².

Although terrorism did not constitute a new concern for the European Union, the events of September 11th in New York, of London and Madrid brought the issue of terrorism to the forefront of European security concerns. Nonetheless, prior to these events, terrorism constituted a threat to the European Union. Early EU discourse already presented some of the discursive elements of later communications. The level of urgency in the discourse regarding terrorism increased after the New York and Madrid attacks. Following these attacks, the discourse assumes a new urgency as it considers terrorism a threat not only to Europe but to the larger international community. An identical observation can be made when analysing the Southern Mediterranean since the region had been dealing with terrorism before 9/11. Obviously, the issue received in-

22. President Ben Ali has been making this link since 1993 *Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1993e*; *Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1994f*; *Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1996b*; *Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2001a*; *Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2002b*; *Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2003d*.

creased attention after the September 11th terrorists attacks, but even before 9/11 terrorism was of concern for the Southern Mediterranean. Examples include: the Libyan links with the Lockerbie attack, the unrest in Algeria and the link between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and terrorism. As such, terrorism is perceived as a threat to a referent object which can be summarised as the values of a society, to society itself and its citizens, and to stability and security. In addition, both sides of the Mediterranean recognise the threat of terrorism to reforms and development. These referent objects call for urgency in dealing with terrorism, in particular, protecting the values of civilised society.

1.1.2. Urgency

Urgency is present throughout discourse both in the Northern and Southern shore of the Mediterranean. For the EU terrorism is an issue that requires its utmost attention. For example, the “EU Declaration on Combating Terrorism” clearly states European concern over the issue:

The Union and its Member States pledge to do everything within their power to combat all forms of terrorism in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Union, the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligations set out under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).

The threat of terrorism affects us all. A terrorist act against one country concerns the international community as a whole. There will be neither weakness nor compromise of any kind when dealing with terrorists. No country in the world can consider itself immune. Terrorism will only be defeated by solidarity and collective action (The Council of the European Union, 2004f, p. 1).

Furthermore, the EU states, “that combating terrorism, one of the most serious forms of crime, has been established in the Treaty on European Union as a priority objective among the matters of common interest” (The Council of the European Union, 1995).

Other examples of the resolve on the part of the European Union can be found in a speech given by Gijs de Vries to the hearing by the *Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives*. In his speech former EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator stated:

Terrorism is a global scourge. It must be countered globally. The European Union is fully committed to do so, and to act in close concertation with the United States. [...] On March 11 of this year, as you know, Spain was rocked by the biggest terrorist attack ever to have hit Europe. Europe's 3/11 has strengthened the EU's resolve to combat terrorism (de Vries, 2004, pp. 1-2).

In another speech in the United States, de Vries affirms, "As an all-out attack on the essence of a free society, terrorism requires an all-out response. This means we have to do everything in our power to stop the terrorist and their supporters and to put them in jail" (Gijs de Vries European Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism, 2004c, p. 1). A final example of the EU's resolve is found in another speech given in The Hague on September 3rd, 2004, there Mr. de Vries stated:

Terrorists respect neither life nor liberty. In the tape claiming responsibility for the Madrid attacks a spokesman of Al Qaeda summed up the terrorist world view in chillingly clear terms: "You love life; we love death". This is why the fight against terrorism is a fight for the right to live, and the right to live free from fear. [...] In essence, the fight against terrorism is a fight for the dignity of humanity. That is why it must be won (Gijs de Vries European Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism, 2004b, p. 9).

The European Parliament also strongly condemns terrorism, and therefore, as MEP Souchet stated the EU's position on terrorism should be "unambiguous, unequivocal and show no complacency on this point", while during the same debates, then Commissioner Patten, stated that EU failure to stop suicide bombings is "simply inexcusable" (The European Parliament, 2002e).

In the Euro-Mediterranean Process, during the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Crete in 2003, terrorism was expressly included in the agenda due to the terrorist attacks in Morocco, “The Ministers also expressed their full solidarity with Morocco which was hit on May 16 by terrorist attacks. These abhorrent acts can only reinforce their will to strengthen international cooperation to fight against terrorism” (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2003b, p. 2). In 2004 in Dublin, terrorism constituted an important element of the meeting:

Ministers deplored the recent terrorist attacks which have demonstrated that the fight against terrorism must be a priority objective. Ministers therefore took this opportunity to stress that progress in cooperation on the fight against terrorism should be stepped up. The need to move to the stage of concrete operational joint activities has been heightened by these attacks.

The EU, in the European Security Strategy adopted at the European Council in December 2003, identified terrorism as one of the key threats to EU interests. The European Council on 25/26 March 2004 adopted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism. The European Council urged full implementation of measures to combat terrorism as a matter of urgency and called for the development of an EU long-term strategy to address all the factors contributing to terrorism. It also agreed updated Strategic Objectives to enhance the EU Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism which was adopted in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks and subsequently supplemented by many important initiatives (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2004a, p. 8).

In the Southern Mediterranean a strong sense of urgency is also present in the security discourse of the region. In December 2003 the President of Algeria called for the definitive eradication of terrorism (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003e). In June 2003 the Algerian President stated:

Ce n'est qu'après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 aux États-unis, que la perception du monde a changé et que le terrorisme a pu être envisagé comme un fléau international contre lequel il fallait engager une lutte sans merci et à l'échelle mondiale, je crois pouvoir dire que, du même coup, la

situation en Algérie a été mieux comprise et les sacrifices supportés par le peuple algérien appréciés à leur juste mesure (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003d).

In Egypt on June 5th 2001, President Mubarak stated that terrorism was more dangerous than war, and later in September he argued there was no other way to eliminate terrorism other than fighting it (President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2001f). In addition, in Morocco, the Government is calling for “une action commune, énergique et organisée” (Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc, 2005). Jordan’s King also expressed a sense of urgency in fighting terrorism:

The urgent need for development - Combatting the evils of terrorism and extremist thinking - Creating broader, deeper global access to technology and education - Ending the occupation of Palestine - These and other serious challenges face us all. And it will take all our efforts, in partnership, to solve them (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2002c).

In Lebanon urgency is also present:

A ce stade, il devient logique de nous demander si le climat mondial est le responsable principal de la création d’un terreau fertile pour le développement de l’extrémisme et de la violence injustifiée contre les innocents ! Face à l’accroissement du problème du terrorisme et sa transformation en un phénomène mondial préoccupant l’univers et le terrorisant, nous avons le sentiment que l’approche internationale pour atténuer l’acuité du problème en vue de l’annihiler, reste superficielle et immature, à cause de sa préoccupation à combattre les symptômes du terrorisme, sans parvenir jusqu’à ce jour à élaborer des plans clairs pour extirper les racines de ce problème.

Il devient claire au monde que le Liban condamne avec force, tout acte terroriste en n’importe quelle partie du globe. Bien plus, nous avons combattu sur notre territoire les groupes terroristes dont notre société a pâti de leurs graves retombées (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2005c).

In Turkey terrorism has been described by the Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül in these terms, “Terrorism is a crime against humanity. We are dutybound to eradicate this evil from the face of earth. And soon” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

2003f). Furthermore, the Minister declared that: “International terrorism is widening its reach and increasing in ferocity. It continues to claim lives and hopes around the world. Terrorism has no religion, ethnicity or culture. It is an affront to the humanity. Therefore, it must be fought back resolutely” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004b)²³. While in Israel urgency is clearly established:

Since September 11th, it has become clear to all that terror is not the exclusive problem of Israel, but that it threatens the entire free world. Only the combined action of all our countries can succeed in defeating terror. Terror is terror. There is no good terror or bad terror, and no distinction can be made between acceptable terror and unacceptable terror. There can be no compromise or negotiations with terror. It must be fought vigorously (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003e)²⁴.

1.2. Extraordinary Measures Regarding Terrorism

Discourse from the early 1990s to the present has increasingly and consistently considered terrorism as a security issue. Firstly, it threatens a limited referent object of European values, but later becomes a threat to the larger international community and therefore, basic human values. There is also urgency in the discourse in that, the fight against terrorism must be won or our modern society and its values will not survive. This rhetorical structure (referent object and urgency) represents the first half of securitization. In this sections we will examine the presence or possibility of emergency measures, representing the second half of the securitization process.

23. For more examples of urgency in Turkish discourse see: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003c; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002i; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2003d; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005c.

24. For more examples of urgency in Israeli discourse see: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005b; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004c; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999a; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004g.

In the case of the EU, several measures were progressively approved in order to address the threat posed by terrorism. The EU takes the threat of terrorism seriously, and therefore, when considering the particular nature of this threat EU measures incorporate a wide spectrum of options. For this reason, the events of New York, London and Madrid set in motion several policy initiatives regarding terrorism. The EU is committed to the eradication of terrorism by all available means as stated in the EU Parliament resolution, that declares, “that the fight against international terrorism should not be based only on military action but should use all available diplomatic and political instruments” (The European Parliament, 2002c)²⁵.

Defining terrorism may appear simplistic, but is in reality quite contentious. In 2002, the EU adopted the “Council Framework Decision of the 13th of June 2002 on Combating Terrorism”, which included in Article 1 the following definition of terrorism:

1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts referred to below in points (a) to (i), as defined as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of:

— seriously intimidating a population, or

— unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or

— seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation,

25. MEP Ana Gomes also shares this point of view, which she shared during an interview Gomes, 2007.

shall be deemed to be terrorist offences:

- (a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;
- (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
- (c) kidnapping or hostage taking;
- (d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
- (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
- (f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons;
- (g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;
- (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;
- (i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h) (Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, 2002, s. 1(1)).

Another measure taken by the EU was the creation of the position of Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. This new post within the Council Secretariat is responsible for the coordination of all Council counter-terrorism actions. The Counter-Terrorism Coordinator will be responsible for:

The Co-ordinator, who will work within the Council Secretariat, will co-ordinate the work of the Council in combating terrorism and, with due regard to the responsibilities of the Commission, maintain an overview of all the instruments at the Union's disposal with a view to regular reporting to the Council and effective follow-up of Council decisions (The Council of the European Union, 2004f, p. 13).

The EU is fostering ever growing cooperation between member states and the various national law enforcement agencies. In November 2005, the European Counter-Terrorism Strategy was presented which not only included several measures to reinforce cooperation, but also new IT systems for visa and border controls, wider access to data for authorities and a common approach for the sharing of information (The Council of the European Union, 2005d, p. 13). On accessing information by law enforcement agencies, the EU has made provisions to allow access to personal data when public interest justifies this and the EU has agreed to provide *Passenger Name Record* data to the US (Gijs de Vries European Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism, 2004a, p. 6). Furthermore, the EU is pushing for the implementation of biometric identifiers in several identity documents such as, for national identity cards and residence permits (The Council of the European Union, 2005d, p. 5). This is part of a larger initiative to grant EU institutions greater power to combat terrorism. The European Police Office (Europol) will see its budget grow from €68 million to €334 million in 2010-2013 (Kubosova, 2006). Another institution is Eurojust. Eurojust will see its powers strengthened and this could lead to the appearance of a single European prosecution bureau (Goldirova, 2007a; Goldirova, 2007b). Other measures include: data-sharing of DNA profiles, the creation of the world's biggest bio-data pool, planning an air passenger exchange system, the possible creation of a EU telecoms agency charged with fighting cyber-terrorism, a EU-wide

rapid alert system on lost and stolen explosives and a proposal to criminalise the use of the internet for terrorist purposes (Goldirova, 2007c; Goldirova, 2007d; Goldirova, 2007f; Goldirova, 2007e; Mallinder, 2007). An EU anti-terror list has also been established, that contains groups, or individuals, that are suspected of terrorist activity. Nonetheless, the EU's anti-terror list, which is reviewed by national secret services, denies suspects the right to reply and clear their names. This situation has been criticised by human rights advocacy groups, and for this reason, according to an investigator working for the Council of Europe, the EU's anti-terror list violates basic human rights (Mahony, 2007a)²⁶.

Possibly the most important development in fighting terrorism was the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant. As Gijs de Vries asserts, a prosecutor in Sweden can now issue an arrest warrant that is valid for the entire European Union. As a result, any member country can now arrest a suspect and extradite him back to Sweden (Gijs de Vries European Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism, 2004c, p. 3). Several other measures have been introduced, these include, joint investigation teams, a new law enforcement agency (Eurojust) to help the coordination of European law enforcement activities, and the adoption of legislation on terrorist financing. In addition, Europol has been given new powers in collection, sharing and information analysis regarding international terrorism, and it also assesses the performance of EU member states in fighting terrorism (Ibid., pp. 3-4).

26. See also Goldirova 2007d for more information on the debate between security versus privacy facing EU lawmakers.

Throughout the EU led Euro-Mediterranean process, there are numerous examples of measures addressing terrorism. The Valencia meeting introduced a specific framework, or action plan, to approach terrorism that recognises the role of the United Nations in fighting terrorism, and favours a multilateral and multilevel approach in order to strengthen the Euro-Mediterranean counter-terrorism framework (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2002, p. 3). This sentiment was re-iterated in Naples, and called for cooperation, training and technical assistance in order to improve counter-terrorism capabilities (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2003a, p. 7). Moreover, this call for greater cooperation was reiterated in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Dublin:

Cooperation should be intensified both at regional level and bilaterally. In the latter context, Ministers mandated the Justice and Security sub-committees existing or currently being established under the Association Agreements to take forward such joint activities at expert level with the aim of improving and assisting the development of counter-terrorism standards and capabilities. The fight against terrorism should also be pursued in the framework of the Action Plans to be agreed under the ENP.

Ministers also noted that the informal Ad Hoc Senior Officials and experts' meeting on Terrorism on 21 April concentrated on an exchange of views on the possibility of engaging in operational joint activities (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2004a, p. 8).

In Luxembourg, the need was recognised to agree on a comprehensive convention on combating terrorism so as to help define terrorism. This issue is important for the Southern Mediterranean due of the Palestinian conflict and the need to clearly denote the definition between so-called 'terrorism' and resistance against an occupier (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2005, p. 7). In addition, the EU Parliament also recom-

mended that an anti-terrorism clause be included in the agreements the EU signs with third countries (The European Parliament, 2002d, p. 7).

In the Southern Mediterranean, Egypt offers the most blatant example of extraordinary measures being taken regarding terrorism. An emergency law has been in place for several decades, since the assassination of President Sadat in 1982, however more recently the justification for retaining the law has been to use the law to counter terrorism: “We were criticized by the whole world for imposing the emergency law. We used the emergency law only for fighting terrorism”, said Mubarak during a interview to the Washington Times (President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2002c). Recently (21 June 2006) the government considered replacing the emergency law, however this did not happen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006c). Additionally, Egypt has been pushing for international cooperation on this issue, advocating since 1986 for an international agreement on terrorism (President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2002d). Across the Southern Mediterranean other extraordinary measures have been taken. For example, in Morocco following the Casablanca attacks 2000 individuals were arrested (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005e). In Morocco, religious reforms were also undertaken by the civil authorities so as to preserve religion from extremist leanings (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005a).

In Libya several actions have also been taken to tackle terrorism²⁷. For example:

27. Of note, Libya was the first country to issue a international warrant for Bin Laden’s arrest Fernández, 2006, p. 2.

Libyan secret services have discovered a desert operations camp belonging to a hardline Algerian Islamic militant group linked to al-Qaeda. The French newspaper *Le Journal du Dimanche*, quoting a source close to the counter-espionage services of a European country, said Libyan agents found the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat camp 10 days ago in the mountainous region of Tibesti, which spans Libya's southern border with Chad (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2004h).

As noted, Libya is fighting terrorism not only by actively dismantling terrorist groups and operations, but also by extraditing suspected terrorists, this includes the Lockerbie suspects (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2004d; Libya our Home: News and Views, 1999a; Libya our Home: News and Views, 1999b). Perhaps the most important measure was the agreement by which Libya paid compensation for the Lockerbie bombings and the 1986 Berlin nightclub bombings:

Libya signed a deal on Friday to pay \$35 million in compensation to more than 160 victims of a Berlin nightclub bombing in 1986, taking another major step toward ending its international isolation. The agreement, which was struck last month and is likely to further improve relations between Libya and the European Union, was signed by the head of the Libyan leader Qadhafi's charity foundation and German lawyers representing the victims. The money will be distributed among 168 claimants: Germans who were wounded or suffered psychological damage and the family of a Turkish woman killed in the blast (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2004f).

Libya also paid ransom money for the release of terrorist hostages, most notably in 2000, for the release of hostages held by Muslim rebels in the Philippines (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2000c).

In Tunisia several measures established prior to 9/11 were put in place: a definition of terrorism was agreed upon, religious matters were transferred to the exclusive control of the state (Versi, 2001). Furthermore, Tunisia has constantly supported increased cooperation with its neighbours and international partners including the United

Nations in order to fight terrorism, as well as calling for dialogue between disparate peoples and cultures:

Profondément enracinée dans son identité islamique, la Tunisie s'est employée à contribuer efficacement à cet effort. Elle a ainsi organisé, durant le mois d'avril dernier, en coopération avec l'Organisation de la Conférence islamique, le colloque : "l'Islam et la paix" dont les travaux ont été couronnés par l'adoption de la "Déclaration de Tunis" et la création du "Forum de Tunis pour la paix".

Les conclusions de ce colloque sont venues conforter les nombreuses mesures et initiatives que notre pays a sans cesse préconisées en faveur de la promotion du dialogue entre les civilisations, les cultures et les religions. Dès 1995, en effet, la Tunisie avait élaboré la "Charte de Carthage sur la Tolérance", avant de créer en 2001 "la Chaire Ben Ali pour le dialogue des civilisations et des cultures" et d'accueillir, durant la même année, le "colloque international sur le dialogue des civilisations" (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2003b)²⁸.

Despite the fact that terrorism would appear to be on the decline in Tunisia, the government is still committed to eliminating terrorism, for example limiting the freedom of movement of anyone associated with terrorism (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2002d).

In Algeria the government has been combating terrorism and extremism, and this has lead to numerous human rights abuses as reported in the western media. However, in Algerian discourse it is the "Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation" that takes centre stage. When we consider extraordinary measures, we associate them with restrictive measures. In the case of Algeria there is an attempt to overstep national laws in order to move passed the recent trauma of the civil war. Although there are restrictive

28. For more examples of Tunisian calls for international dialogue on terrorism see: Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2003d; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2004b; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2006.

elements in the “Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation”, such as marginalizing the Islamic Salvation Front, and restricting discussion on the past situation in Algeria, the charter also offers amnesty for members of armed movements, bypassing the normal procedures and rule of law (Human Rights Watch, 2005). In a statement the Algerian President said, “La loi sur la Concorde civile a été une phase décisive pour le processus de réconciliation nationale. Des milliers d’éléments impliqués dans des activités terroristes en ont bénéficié et on repris une vie normale dans la société” (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2005a). Despite this the Algerian President insists that, “La plus grande fermeté devrait s’appliquer à ceux qui encouragent, soutiennent le terrorisme, font sont apologie ou le financement et, d’une manière plus générale, à ceux qui assistent ou donne refuge à des individus ayant un lien avec ces groupes” (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2005f). Lebanon, another country which established an inquiry commission, following the assassination of Hariri, although in this case the inquiry commission was established under pressure from the international community (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2005c).

Jordan put all the resources of the state behind its strategy for fighting terrorism as can be stated here:

Jordan takes the view that resorting to military means will not be enough to uproot international terrorism. Economic and social factors and other root causes for this abhorrent phenomenon need to be taken into consideration and to be sufficiently addressed in order to fully eradicate the terrorism.

An amended penal law emphasized and increased the punishment on any act deemed to be an act of terrorism. It penalized individuals that seek to establish groups and gangs with the aim of conducting criminal and terror-

ist acts. It also emphasized, that those who assist these groups financially or with weaponry will receive the same sentence and punishment by law.

Furthermore, stricter border controls were introduced, and the Jordanian customs law granted custom officers new authority to investigate and handle any illicit trafficking.

Instructions were delivered to all banks operating in the Kingdom to comply with UNSC resolutions pertaining to combating terrorism, and specifically to freeze funds of terrorist organizations and transactions. Instructions were also issued to check suspicious bank accounts and freeze them according to the request of the government and in compliance with U.N Security Council resolution no. 1373. Additional instructions were issued to combat money laundering.

New passports and national identity cards were issued in line with international standards in order to prevent fraud.

The security apparatus in Jordan is following closely all activities in the country that may relate to terrorism. It maintains a high degree of transparency and cooperation with friendly states including the Interpol. Intelligence data is constantly being exchanged with many countries to facilitate combating terrorism. There are also several bilateral security cooperation agreements in force. Strict measures have been introduced to monitor any transactions that include the purchase of materials used in the making of explosives and bombs.

Jordan takes all necessary measures to prevent the entry of terrorists and those affiliated with terrorist organizations into its territory (Foreign Ministry The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, n.d.)²⁹.

In this respect King Hussein was already concerned with combating terrorism with means that went beyond military hardware. The King was concerned about the power of the media, stating:

29. There are several other statements that attest to this resolve to put all resources of the state and civil society at the disposal of this war on terrorism and not just rely on military means, see: King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005a; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2002d and King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005b.

Fighting terrorism in Jordan also means keeping a watchful eye over the media: The media must play their role in the fight against terror. Just as terrorist organizations cannot be allowed to establish, control or run any media platforms, the mass media's coverage of acts of terror must be balanced and responsible. It must not encourage terrorism and its institutions (King Hussein I of Jordan, 1996).

Lebanon shares the same global view, "Security challenges to our World stand out as particularly imminent. The Global Reach of terror makes it imperative for us to look carefully at the core roots of this plague, and not be satisfied with merely fighting its symptoms" (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2005b)³⁰. Syria, another of Jordan's neighbours, also recognises the need for a global approach, dealing with the causes of terrorism not just the symptoms. Additionally, in Syria there are calls for international co-operation and a global approach: "Development and terrorism do not meet, and terrorism is not a phenomenon without a cause. Fighting this phenomenon requires removing its causes and treating its roots. Syria has realized the dangers of this phenomenon since 1986 by calling for an international conference on terrorism" (SWB, 2004d; SWB, 2004e).

Jordan also places importance in resolving the Palestinian question in order to combat terrorism, "Our goal must be nothing less than a just and comprehensive resolution, with the state of Palestine and the state of Israel co-existing side by side" (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2001). Resolving the Palestinian question also means agreeing on a definition of terrorism by all parties, this is some-

30. For more examples of Lebanese discourse calling for a global approach against terrorism see: Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2005c; Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2001d.

thing being advocated by both Syria and Lebanon (SWB, 2001b; Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2002c).

In Turkey there has been a long battle between the PKK, the Kurdish militant group that the Turkish authorities consider a terrorist group, and government forces. In this context there have been a series of measures established which deal with the Kurdish issue, from military operations to outlawing the Kurdish language. As previously mentioned, Kurdish nationalism, and specifically the PKK, has been the principal concern for the Turkish authorities. In order to deal with this threat several measures have established, from legal measures to a more muscular approach. The legal measures have focused on curbing the PKK's ability to finance its activities, notably by getting the PKK listed as a terrorist organisation by the EU (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002i). Another aspect of this issue of concern to Turkey is the situation in Iraq, and in particular Northern Iraq. According to Turkish authorities, it is from this region of Iraq that terrorists operate and cross into Turkey. As a result, several Turkish military operations into Northern Iraq have been undertaken. In order to achieve security against Kurdish terrorists, Turkish military operations are always under consideration, including the setting up of a permanent security zone (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1996e). Following the last Iraq war there were worries that another operation would be undertaken by the Turkish military. However, another extraordinary step was taken as stated by then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül:

Turkey is considering take a major step that I think will contribute to the stability in Iraq. A project of law facilitating the return of members of the terrorist organization PKK KADEK ~ a group on the US list of terrorist organizations - from Iraq to Turkey has been initiated. We will provide the

conditions for those who have not involved in direct terrorist activities to immediately return to their homes. They will have the chance to reintegrate into the society. Those who were sought for terrorism charges will be tried, under the special provisions of a more lenient new law, if they surrender. I hope this will further contribute to the US efforts to eliminate terrorism in Iraq (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003e).

Terrorism still constitutes one of the main areas of security for Turkey, so much so, that in 1996 Turkish Foreign Minister Ciller expressed her country's refusal in having any relations with countries that support terrorism (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1996f). In 2005 Turkey continues to reiterate its willingness to "exert all possible efforts in the fight against terrorism" (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005c). On a final note, Turkey also sent troops to fight in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002e).

For Syria border control has been an important concern since the start of the war in Iraq, as it has been under pressure to control border movements more closely due to terrorist infiltration into Iraq. This has put a strain on Syrian resources, and although arrests have increased, authorities are asking for more outside help, mainly in the form of sophisticated equipment used for border control:

[Al-Khaymi] Syria is exerting efforts to secure the borders and prevent infiltration's from crossing them. More than 1,200 persons were arrested but preventing infiltration across desert borders extending for hundreds of kilometres is extremely difficult. It is not fair to ask Syria to station its entire army on such borders, thus exposing areas that are vital for its security and stability. Therefore, Syria asked to be provided with advanced equipment to help control the borders. We have also asked to run joint patrols with the Iraqi side to make sure no infiltrations occur. We have asked the Iraqi brothers to provide us with information about the sources of accusation and whether these sources are Iraqi or American. Once this is done, Syria must be helped to locate the area from which infiltration takes place or the point organizing infiltration so that it will be completely neutralized.

[Humaydi] What sort of border control equipment do you want from London?

[Al-Khaymi] These include some electronic monitoring equipment, night goggles, illumination devices and portable towers. We are still waiting to receive this equipment. We are given insufficient reasons for the delay in sending this equipment (SWB, 2005e).

For Israel, terrorism is being fought using several extraordinary measures. Stating that Israelis consider themselves as being in a permanent state of siege is not an understatement, as this has led the local authorities to establish several extraordinary measures, which do not include the numerous military/security raids into Palestinian territory that are conducted on a regular basis. However, we will start by examining other extraordinary measures that are being taken in Israel. Firstly, with regards to Israel's security discourse an important measure is the fence being built around Palestinian territory. This measure is meant to isolate the Palestinian territory by making it extremely difficult for suicide bombers to cross into Israeli territory (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004d; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005i). This has the opposite goal of the Berlin wall, as it is attempting to keep the 'Other' out, whilst in Berlin the regime was trying to keep its own people in. This is an important measure with grave consequences for the every day life of Palestinians, as it restricts their freedom of movement (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003e; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004g). Nonetheless, the Israeli government considers this a worth while measure and will continue to implement it for the foreseeable future (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004e).

In 2002 Israel was not only building a fence around Palestinian territory, but it also placed PLO Chairman Arafat under siege at his own compound in Ramallah. The reason given by the Israeli authorities for such action was Arafat's continued support of terror operations, "hence the need to isolate him" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002e). Despite conciliatory remarks by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres regarding the fact that Arafat had not lost freedom of movement, he still needed permission to travel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002c).

Along with these measures, there have also been a multitude of military/security operations. Starting with the constant check points and roadblocks ever present at the Israeli Palestinian border, to Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 which hoped to damage terrorist infrastructure, onto previous blockades of Lebanese ports under the pretext of stopping terrorists and finally the 2006 war in Lebanon when Israeli forces fought against Hezbollah forces (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995b; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002b; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005e). These military/security operations range from the quite small to the very large. In 2002, Israeli officials admitted to arresting 4,564 suspects and searching Palestinian authority computers and documents, right up to and including the filing cabinets as stated by IDF Intelligence Officer Colonel Miri Eisin:

I'll add that I've consistently said things that I'd have to eat my hat for as we go more thoroughly into the computers. At the beginning I said, "no Arafat" and then we had Arafat. The documents that we exposed until now were found inside filing cabinets. It takes a long time to understand the information that you find, for instance, in Marwan Barghouti's computer, or in Fuad Shubaki, the chief financial adviser's, computer. The bottom line is money. We did not go only into cities, we went into rural areas around the cities, and what we focused on was terrorism: ideology, people, weapons and money. In military terms, you have to translate that into something which you can go and capture. And we went in and captured

people, weapons, places where they make weapons, and documents, which I will connect afterwards to both ideology and to funding. I'm going to talk about the people, the 4,564, let's say 4,500, people who were detained. 1,450 people admitted to having participated in terrorist acts against Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002a).

There is no doubt that terrorism is considered a serious threat to Israel and that the Israeli government will do all that is necessary to fight terrorists and terrorism. This was made clear in 1996 by President Weizman:

11.The Government will exercise its right to use the IDF and security forces to act against the threat of terrorism everywhere, to ensure the well-being of the country's residents and the Jewish people.

12.The Government will act to remove the threat to the northern border and will ensure economic development to residents in the north.

[...]

20.The Government will initiate and cooperate in international efforts against terrorist organizations and those countries which shelter and aid such organizations (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996).

In the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement of 1995 there are provisions to outlaw parties who are racist or violent and both parties agreed to take all the necessary measure to prevent terrorists acts (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995d). Again in 2005, it was made clear that this was a war, a war against terrorism, which Israel could not afford to lose and that no effort would be spared to ensure success (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005k).

1.3. Terrorism: Conclusion

Discourse shows that terrorism threatens peace, stability and security. Moreover, terrorism takes lives and its continued presence in the region goes against the moral

values of the modern Mediterranean. Terrorism undermines the bases of civilisation in the region, and it seeks to reverse the progress of the reforms undertaken particularly in the South. In a way, terrorism represents a break from continuity in the region. In the South, regimes have been trying to maintain power, not only through repression but also, albeit slowly, through economic and political reforms. On the part of the EU, any drastic regime changes in the Southern Mediterranean are not particularly welcome. A sustained dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean has therefore been established, ensuring that the Mediterranean is a stable region. Terrorism is a threat to Southern Mediterranean regimes, and, more generally, to Mediterranean stability. Discourse shows an increasing awareness of the dangers of terrorism, with urgent calls to combat terrorism following 9/11 and safeguarding the above mentioned referent objects. To respond to this threat we have seen a multitude of extraordinary measures being applied throughout the Mediterranean. The EU has acquired more powers and plans to gather more information on its citizens. With these new powers some feel that restrictions to personal freedoms are already in place, in particular the issue of privacy (Alexander, 2007). In this context, and with the concern surrounding terrorism, personal freedoms could be further compromised, and this is due in part to the lack of oversight of Europol and of the 3rd Pillar in General (Ibid.). All Southern Mediterranean countries have deployed draconian measures to deal with terrorism, in most cases overriding basic human rights. Indeed, Extraordinary measures have been taken throughout the region.

2. Illegal Immigration

Concerns over migration and especially illegal immigration were an early fixture of Euro-Mediterranean relations. At the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona the question of illegal immigration was debated, with all participants agreeing on closer cooperation (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995). Later in 2005, still in the context of what became known as the Barcelona process, the importance of migration issues was reiterated (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2005, p. 13)³¹. Overall there is a strong emphasis in dealing with migration issues, including illegal immigration, and this means trying to resolve the root causes of the this phenomenon and not only some of the symptoms (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2003a, p. 14; Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2004b, p. 11). Moreover, EU discourse on immigration is very much a conciliatory one, but there is a sense that in the official discourse securitization is being avoided. In virtually all documents where immigration is mentioned there is a passage explaining the benefits of immigration, *i.e.* how it is a necessary phenomenon for the EU, most notably for its labour market. Here is an example from The Hague ministerial conference, “The Hague: Ministers confirmed the importance of an integrated approach recognising both that migration is a positive factor for socio-economic development and integration of the whole region” (Ibid., p. 11). This sentiment was echoed by former EU Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner António Vitorino in a 2001 speech, “une attitude ouverte à une migration considérée comme un facteur

31. Migration issues were also addressed in: Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2000; Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2001.

d'enrichissement, tant pour les pays d'accueil, que pour les pays d'origine" (António Vitorino European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, 2001c, p. 5)³². Furthermore, despite the attention that illegal immigration has received within the framework of the Barcelona Process it is not an issue present in the 2003 European Security Strategy.

Positive aspects of legal immigration are presented in EU discourse, but illegal immigration is clearly perceived as a negative phenomenon in discourse. EU discourse on immigration tries to balance the positive aspects of legal immigration with the negative consequences of illegal immigration. This attempt at presenting both positive and negative aspects of immigration contrasts with the numerous measures established to deal with the different aspects of illegal immigration. As such, this attempt at a balanced discourse has not hindered illegal immigration from having a strong security dimension attached to this issue.

Looking at the Southern Mediterranean discourse, immigration is a bigger pre-occupation for countries from the Maghreb than for countries from the rest of the Mediterranean. For example, in Libya for example it has become an important issue that increasingly concerns government authorities (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2002a). Within the discourse we can clearly identify that immigration is a major concern for Morocco and Libya, whereas in Egypt, terrorism or the Israeli-Palestine conflict constitute the major concerns. From Egypt to Turkey the issue of Illegal Immigra-

32. For more examples of this discursive practice see: Vice-President Franco Frattini European Commissioner responsible for Justice Freedom and Security, 2005b, p. 2 and Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2004a

tion is secondary, with the exception being Turkey itself. Nevertheless, the question of immigration is present in all the countries of the South Mediterranean to some degree. To be more specific, immigration is seen from two different perspectives in the Southern Mediterranean: immigration in the sense of the many nationals that are resident in Europe and illegal immigration. The former is not securitised, although there are concerns for the well-being of those expatriates, in that they should be free from discrimination and/or racism in their daily lives. However, Illegal Immigration this issue is being securitized.

2.1. Rhetorical Structure of Illegal Immigration

There are elements of a securitization discourse surrounding immigration, and these are centred around two referent objects: illegal immigration is a dangerous activity, putting at risk human lives, and is an activity from which organised crime profits and that immigration without proper controls can affect social cohesion of states. Both themes are present in the Mediterranean. However, the first dimension of securitizing immigration is the most popular in EU discourse, and so documents relating to EU policy on the matter mention the inherent dangerous to human life posed by illegal immigration. In addition, its connections to organised crime are perceived as a security concern for the EU and its citizens. The second aspect of securitizing immigration is more prominent in the Southern Mediterranean where it is linked to organised crime, but the threat to internal security is highlighted.

2.1.1. Referent Objects

The first dimension of the securitizing discourse that surrounds illegal immigration addresses the exploitation of human beings by organised crime. This dimension is always associated with illegal immigration, and this is usually described in the following way:

In light of the common problem of illegal migration to the EU, characterised by human suffering and tragedy, there is a need for intensified co-operation that addresses root causes as well as negative effects of illegal migration, including transit migration. This co-operation should involve all aspects of illegal migration, such as the negotiation of re-admission agreements, the fight against human trafficking and related networks as well as other forms of illegal migration, border management and migration related capacity building (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2005, p. 13).

One can find similar phrasing from the Dublin ministerial conference onwards, whilst the formulation used in Luxembourg is quite similar to the formulation used in previous conferences. This dimension is also present in speeches given notably by the Commissioners responsible for the Justice and Home Affairs portfolio. The various Commissioners responsible for Justice and Home Affairs agreed that illegal immigration is an attack on human decency and that this needs to be stopped. This position was well-argued in a speech given by former Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner, António Vitorino, in 2001:

This well-known local phenomenon is an illustration of a major European problem: the smuggling of human beings into the Union. These illegal activities are mostly conducted by criminal networks and often lead to the trafficking of those involved, and the exploitation of innocent people in modern forms of slavery after their arrival in the EU.

There is a clear need to fight - and to fight effectively - the criminal activities relating to illegal Immigration. In order to cope adequately with this phenomenon we must make use of the powers of the EU set out in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Commission plans, therefore, to present to the Council and the European Parliament a Communication on a common

fight against illegal immigration in the near future. This communication will be a structured outline of future measures and forms of co-operation which we believe are vital (António Vitorino European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, 2001a, p. 2).

In 2005, Commissioner Frattini also identified the inhumane dimension of illegal immigration and its assault on Human Rights (Vice-President Franco Frattini European Commissioner responsible for Justice Freedom and Security, 2005c, p. 4). MEPs also remark on the need to combat illegal immigration and the mafias which profit and exploit migrants. In one such debate in January 2001, MEPs from both centre-right and centre-left expressed concern (The European Parliament, 2001c).

This notion of human exploitation in relation to illegal immigration is also present in the South Mediterranean. Regarding illegal immigration the King of Morocco had this to say during the 5+5 Summit held in Tunis, “Conscients de la gravité de ce phénomène, qui fait violence à la dignité humaine et qui a des effets pervers sur nos relations de coopération et de bon voisinage” (Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc, 2003). Here we see two referent objects, human dignity and relations between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean. These same points were repeated at the following 5+5 Summit (Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc, 2004). The Moroccan Foreign Minister noted “une migration clandestine qui met des personnes dans la précarité, en dehors de l’État de droit et de la protection de la loi” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006d). In Libya the issue of immigration has become of great importance for the authorities, as this issue has forced local authorities to express concern over the safety of immigrants in transit from Libya to Europe³³:

33. Another country in the region that is tackling a grave problem with immigration is Libya. It is estimated that between 700 000 to one million immigrants are in Libya waiting to cross to Italy

As for movement between continents, we are not against human integration otherwise we will be racists. Now, however, we are against the risks that can be caused by it movement between continents.

As an example, in Libya we carried out strategic projects in the desert which in a few years have absorbed all those who immigrated to Libya. However, the immigrants who wanted to come to Libya now they want to go to Europe. The projects now are beyond Libya's capabilities and Europe must be involved in such projects (SWB, 2004g).

The other aspect of securitizing immigration deals with the social consequences of immigration, or as it is sometimes referred to, social cohesion. MEP João de Deus Pinheiro (2007) remarked on the effects of increased immigration on European culture. One of the most direct allusions to this aspect of immigration came during the Greek European Union Presidency:

The Greek European Union presidency on Tuesday warned about the great dangers that the uncontrolled movement of immigrants entailed for internal cohesion and security in the Union.

Addressing the assembly of the EU's national parliaments that convened on Monday and Tuesday in Athens, Greek Public Order Minister Michalis Chrysohoidis said that uncontrolled movement, and trafficking, of immigrants allowed rings of organised crime to enter the EU along with the flow of economic immigrants (Hellenic Republic Embassy of Greece Washington DC, 2003).

Another example of the concern over social cohesion, this time in a more extensive manner, was delivered by the European Commission in 2003:

Recent changes in national legislation on immigration legislation in several Member States, together with wide-spread concerns relating to security and the need for greater social cohesion, have already led to renewed debate on the strategies needed to ensure the integration of migrants.

[...]

Fernández, 2006, p. 5.

The successful integration of immigrants is both a matter of social cohesion and a prerequisite for economic efficiency. In the context of the Tampere and Lisbon agendas, and in the light of the challenges highlighted above, it is crucial to ensure successful integration of both established and future immigrants. Persisting issues in relation to existing populations of immigrants demonstrate that greater efforts are needed⁴⁷. Low employment and high unemployment rates even among 2nd generation immigrants are a characteristic example of these difficulties.

[...]

At the same time illegal immigrants are excluded from full participation in society, both as contributors and as beneficiaries, which contributes to their marginalisation and fuels negative attitudes to them from local people.

While policies to combat illegal immigration must remain vigorous, integration policies cannot be fully successful unless the issues arising from the presence of this group of people are adequately and reasonably addressed. Some Member States have implemented regularisation measures for illegal residents. Such procedures may be seen as a factor which enables the integration process to develop but also as an encouragement to further illegal immigration. This must however be balanced against the problems arising when large numbers of illegal residents are present in Member States. It should be remembered that illegal immigrants are protected by universal human rights standards and should enjoy some basic rights e.g. emergency healthcare and primary school education for their children.

[...]

Finland mentions that the attitude of the population has a strong impact on how welcome the immigrants feel as members of Finnish society and that racism and discrimination plays an important role when it comes to integration. Austria mentions that religion may also constitute a barrier to integration, particularly for women (Commission of the European Communities, 2003c, pp. 4, 17, 26, 45; See also Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2004a, p. 16).

Other references to the influence of immigration on social cohesion are more indirect (António Vitorino European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, 2002, pp. 3,

5-3, 6; Commission of the European Communities, 2005a, p. 13). Romano Prodi in 2002 talks about the reasoning behind this concern over the social impact of immigration:

I have already expressed my support for the Presidency's decision to put the issue of immigration high on the Seville agenda. In the eyes of most of our citizens, immigration is becoming increasingly linked with the issue of their protection in the area of freedom, security and justice we are trying to build. There are a variety of reasons for this, but they have been triggered to some extent by the events of September 11.

We must deal with these issues without looking for culprits (Romano Prodi President of the European Commission, 2002a, p. 4).

While MEP García-Margallo y Marfil remarks that, "Our internal security will also be compromised, due to the increased flow of illegal immigration" (The European Parliament, 2002a). Most of the time however, MEPs stress the importance of integration and of fighting racism and xenophobia³⁴.

In addition, in the South Mediterranean there are societal costs to illegal immigration, most notably dealing with the internal security and stability of societies in the region. This concern stems mostly from associated activities of illegal immigration, such as organised crime, but illegal immigration can also lead to extremism and fundamentalism. There are also economic costs associated with receiving immigrants and monitoring borders, and as a result, this hinders development. In Algeria, the government has identified the immigration of Algerians as a cause of brain drain, subsequently, Algerian society is losing its best and brightest. In order to respond to this threat,

34. There are many examples of this line of discourse from EU Parliament reports and debates, see for example: The European Parliament, 2002b; The European Parliament, 2002c; The European Parliament, 2001a; The European Parliament, 2000c; The European Parliament, 2003.

Southern Mediterranean countries believe in a global approach that deals with the root causes of illegal immigration, and they have also been actively trying to control migrations, by using technical and law enforcement measures.

Morocco considers itself “la première victime en Afrique de la problématique de l’immigration clandestine” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005g)³⁵. In Morocco the problem is so grave that it is considered a threat to internal security, “il y a une forte concentration d’immigrants clandestins qui restent dans le pays en attente de pouvoir gagner l’Europe soulignant que le Royaume ne peut recevoir, intégrer ou trouver du travail pour ces personnes. ‘Comme tous les états, le Maroc se doit d’assurer sa sécurité intérieure et de combattre les activités de clandestins qui prennent différentes formes, aux impacts négatifs sur la société marocaine’” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005d). Taïb Fassi Fihri *Ministre Délégué aux Affaires Etrangères et à la Coopération*, acknowledged not only the threat to interior security, but also to Moroccan society, “le Maroc ne saurait tolérer le développement, sur son sol, d’actions clandestines, aux multiples impacts négatifs, menées dans l’attente d’un hypothétique accès à l’Europe” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005c)³⁶. While, Nouzha Chekrouni *Ministre Déléguée Chargée de la Communauté Marocaine à l’Étranger* also recognised “l’impérieuse nécessité de la l’élaboration

35. In May 2006 a statement by the government of Morocco stated “La question de la migration est au centre des préoccupations nationales et internationales” Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006f.

36. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

d'une stratégie d'ensemble, claire et précise de la migration dans le monde" (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006f)³⁷. Furthermore, Nouzha Chekrouni called for "réponses globales et urgentes à la problématique de l'immigration clandestine" (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006b). Of particular interest is Jordan's situation, where the state has had to deal with an influx of Palestinian refugees and settlers, and this has been to the detriment of Jordanian society. King Hussein commented in a speech in front of the EU Parliament:

Into the former cohesion of our social, economic and cultural life was introduced a new element. Growing tensions between the incoming settlers and the indigenous population led to war, the mass displacement of the Palestinian people and the festering of political and ideological extremism which has plagued the entire Middle East for decades (King Hussein I of Jordan, 1995).

In Turkey there is concern over immigration, illegal immigration, in particular due to its association with organised crime, but illegal immigration also becomes a financial burden and a destabilising element in society. According to Turkish discourse, Turkey became a transit point on the route of illegal immigrants. Turkish perceptions of illegal immigration identify a series of activities surrounding this issue, activities that not only put in danger the immigrants themselves, but also Turkey:

The spread of international irregular migration movements derived from globalization has created an appropriate atmosphere for crimes of **immigrant trafficking** and **human trade**. Immigrant trafficking or human trade activities, whether done on a regular or irregular basis, which is carried out under migration movements due to economic, social or political reasons and for such aims as finding employment or seeking asylum, adversely affect a great many countries both as a target and transit country

37. Deputy Minister for Expatriates Affairs.

today. These activities are generally directed by organized crime networks on the international level.

Criminal organizations have been using complex methods and transboundary means which require the adoption of effective, determined, national and international measures have led to the acceleration of organized **immigrant trafficking** and **human trade**. However, the journey from developing countries or countries where there is a chaotic atmosphere and disorder towards hope end in developed or target countries via transit countries and with the help of smugglers of immigrants fall short of expectations due to such reasons as material loss, problems, disease or death.

The reasons for these activities which occur by violating the law and which become the problem of not only one country, but also of many countries on the regional level are in general similar to each other (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005h; See also Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006a).

Turkish authorities have to take into account the geographical position of their country as it has become a transit route for illegal immigrants, and this not only generates a series of activities that are not beneficial to Turkish society, but also adds the economic burden of dealing with ever increasing influx of migrants (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005b). On a final note, internal immigration, notably from rural areas to the cities also poses several challenges to Turkey; challenges that threaten internal security and the stability of Turkish society. These large scale movements to the cities, assist in the disintegration of social union and can lead to growing fundamentalism and extremism that threaten national security (General Hilmi Özkök Turkish General Staff, 2005).

In Tunisia good management of migration is necessary in order to guarantee security, stability and the development of the two shores of the Mediterranean (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1994e). Failure to tack-

le migration will be the cause of “extrémisme, de fanatisme et de racisme, des deux côtés” (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1993c). Illegal immigration is a concern for the Southern Mediterranean countries that have to deal with this issue. In Algeria, a coordinated and comprehensive approach is necessary in order to maintain security in the region (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003e). Finally for Algeria immigration is a threat to development, as it is causing a brain drain from the country. The Algerian President states:

Toutefois, force est de constater depuis notre indépendance, en 1962, que la relation, entre le Nord avancé et le sud, en voie de développement, est ainsi établie : nous exportons, en plus de la grande partie de nos recettes en devise forte qui va aux pays industrialisés pour le paiement de nos dettes — et vous savez ce que cela représente pour nous — de la matière grise. J'évoque cette question car le problème de l'émigration se pose aujourd'hui entre nous et le continent européen. Existe-t-il une place au soleil pour toutes ces compétences alors qu'il n'y en a aucune pour ceux qui n'ont pas eu la chance de décrocher un diplôme universitaire. Ce n'est point un reproche mais une réalité dont nous devons tenir compte dans nos analyses et nos rapports ainsi que pour l'optimisation de nos relations bilatérales et multilatérales (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003a).

EU discourses differentiates between immigration and illegal immigration. Discourse on immigration mentions the need to fill the skilled labour shortages that Europe is facing. The new key message is:

Europe will need more migration, since labour and skills shortages are already noticeable in a number of sectors and they will tend to increase. Demographic projections indicate that a decline in employment in the order of 20 million workers for the EU-25 can be expected between 2010 and 2030 as a result of demographic change. This phenomenon will affect some Member States more than others. Nevertheless, it is a common trend (Vice-President Franco Frattini European Commissioner responsible for Justice Freedom and Security, 2005b, p. 2).

On the other hand, the EU talks about the dangers of illegal immigration both to society and to immigrants who try to cross the Mediterranean in hazardous conditions. There are two conflicting discourses regarding immigration currently being expressed by the EU, one negative and one positive, and these two discourses indicate that great care is being taken in tackling the issue of immigration.

2.1.2. Urgency

In the context of European failure to stop the death of migrants at sea, Commissioner Frattini stated it was a “matter of urgency” to put into practice the cooperation agreed between EU members within Frontex so as to avoid further deaths in the Mediterranean (Goldirova, 2007g). While official discourse from the Commission and Council is silent on the issue of urgency, MEPs seem more concerned about this issue. During an interview with MEP Alvaro Alexander (2007), he stated that there was already an urgency regarding illegal immigration, due to the catastrophic number of deaths in the last few years. MEP Fiori clearly states, “In fact, the issue of immigration, which is one of the greatest challenges, must be tackled in respect for cultural and historical differences and itself become a means of development” (The European Parliament, 2001c). His colleague Morillon adds:

We have furthermore become aware that it is now impossible for Europe to enclose itself in a fortress, which is certain to be attacked, as all fortresses are – and which has, in fact, already started to be attacked with the growing phenomenon of illegal immigration. Consequently, there is also a need, as you have said, to relaunch the Barcelona Process (The European Parliament, 2002a).

A parliamentary report on a Euro-Mediterranean agreement with Morocco describes illegal immigration as a “potentially explosive issue” (The European Parliament, 1996a).

In the Southern Mediterranean there are also some examples of urgency. In Morocco a feeling of urgency is attached to migrations, “Les phénomènes migratoires constituent également une grave source de préoccupation, croissante et commune. Il est, dès lors, grand temps d’engager un débat sincère et responsable sur les causes profondes de l’immigration” (Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc, 2005; See also Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2006; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2003c). Finally the Foreign Minister asked that, “de toute urgence et dans un esprit de responsabilité partagée, les différents aspects et les diverses phases du processus migratoire” be examined (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006a)³⁸.

Jordan is another example where official discourse expresses some sense of urgency. Since 1948, Jordan has had to assume extraordinary burdens including three sudden and massive waves of refugees, that repeatedly disrupted its economy. This had serious consequences King Hussein stated, “These have severely strained our limited financial, social and institutional resources” (King Hussein I of Jordan, 1995). Migration must be dealt with in order to better distribute the country’s resources, if not life in Jordan will continue to be disrupted. Lebanon also expressed a sense of urgency in deal-

38. Morocco has publicised the various meetings it has participated in or organised: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005i; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005h; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006i; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006h; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006e; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006d.

ing with migrations, as continued mass movements will not only affect wealthy countries, but poorer countries as well (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2005a).

Although these are clear examples of urgency, Euro-Mediterranean discourse is careful not to be alarmist. On one hand, there is a clear idea of the negative impacts of illegal immigration, while on the other hand, great care is being taken to refute the negative aspects of immigration and to highlight its positive effects whilst stressing long-term solutions. It is clear from the previous section, as well as from what we will study in the next section, that illegal immigration is considered a serious threat which warrants extraordinary measures. Consequently, there is an escalation in the discourse that could lead to further urgency.

2.2. Extraordinary Measures Regarding Illegal Immigration

Illegal immigration is certainly an area of policy in which the EU is very active. There are an incredible amount of EU measures dealing with illegal immigration. EU policies on immigration aim at addressing three aspects: legal immigration, illegal immigration and integration. These policies include protecting immigrants from exploitation by organised crime during the immigrants' attempts to enter Europe either legally or illegally. Furthermore, the EU is initiating a process whereby legitimate asylum seekers and refugees can be identified. Integration constitutes another aspect of EU immigration policy as this policy aims at integrating all legal immigrants, including asylum seekers and refugees, into European society, thus making them active participants in their local and national communities.

Immigration has long been a national domain, but in today's Europe with free movement between member states, national immigration policies, or lack of thereof, have an influence on all other member states; a point reiterated by Commissioner Frattini in June 2005 in Dublin. This new reality has made it necessary for immigration policy to be discussed at the European level, and one has only to remind oneself of the recent Spanish policy of legalising thousands of immigrants. These immigrants are now free to travel to all member states, as legal residents in the EU are free to travel throughout the Union. Consequently, in the framework of a European single market that involves the free circulation of goods, capital, people and services, the place of the EU became paramount. This concern is evident in a Commission paper stating that, although these measures have a positive side, they also encourage further illegal immigration (Commission of the European Communities, 2003c, p. 26). Calls for a common EU immigration policy were again made by Portugal and Spain in 2007 (Spongenberg, 2007b)³⁹. There have also been suggestions from the European Parliament for a "Charter of Immigrants' Rights, governing all aspects of immigration" (The European Parliament, 1999; The European Parliament, 1997). In this context the EU is set to gain new powers in managing entries to the European territory and in the regularization of new arrivals. This can be understood in new visa policies being adopted, new border controls being put into place and the administration of the return of illegal immigrants to their homelands.

39. MEP Napoletano has also been an advocate of an EU-wide policy regarding immigration, see: The European Parliament, 2001c.

The visa policy is one area in which the EU is concentrating, and greater cooperation has already been achieved between member states. However, greater cooperation is being planned or at least advocated:

The European Council underlines the need for further development of the common visa policy as part of a multi-layered system aimed at facilitating legitimate travel and tackling illegal immigration through further harmonisation of national legislation and handling practices at local consular missions. Common visa offices should be established in the long term, taking into account discussions on the establishment of an European External Action Service. The European Council welcomes initiatives by individual Member States which, on a voluntary basis, cooperate at pooling of staff and means for visa issuance (The Council of the European Union, 2004c, p. 26).

In addition, in recent years there has also been talk of instituting a European “green card” in order to better regulate the movement of economic migrants, in particular, those migrants that possess specific skills required by the European labour market (Vice-President Franco Frattini European Commissioner responsible for Justice Freedom and Security, 2006, p. 4). This legislative cooperation has also been extended to technological cooperation, as various electronic systems are being installed in order to help monitor illegal immigration trying to enter the EU, and also attempt to identify those illegal immigrants already in Europe. As we can see from the following excerpt there are already a few established systems and among them cooperation is growing:

The European Council requests the Council to examine how to maximise the effectiveness and interoperability of EU information systems in tackling illegal immigration and improving border controls as well as the management of these systems on the basis of a communication by the Commission on the interoperability between the Schengen Information System (SIS II), the Visa Information System (VIS) and EURODAC to be released in 2005 (The Council of the European Union, 2004b, p. 25).

All these measure are part of a larger attempt to better monitor and securitize the borders of the European Union and can be categorised under the larger term of border

control. In this aspect of border control, there are new initiatives being considered that will dramatically increase Europe's role in border control. In a article published in the Sunday Times we learn that plans are being created to setup a Mediterranean naval task-force in order to control the flow of illegal immigrants to the EU. Under the name of *European maritime border guard corps*, although not under direct control of Brussels, members of this force could wear the EU flag (Smith, 2005b). Furthermore, Commissioner Frattini believes this could be the first step towards creating a European border guard corps (Ibid.). Additionally, there is also talk of creating a satellite system to help monitor immigrants boats leaving North Africa. In a related matter the EU has setup a border control agency based in Warsaw called FRONTEX, in order to achieve better cooperation at the European level regarding illegal immigration (Vice-President Franco Frattini European Commissioner responsible for Justice Freedom and Security, 2005a, p. 2). Under the auspices of FRONTEX the Nautilus II mission was launched, and it operated off the Maltase coast covering the shorelines of Sicily and Libya. Its mission to limit illegal immigration was a success, as the number of arrivals to Malta dropped by 50% as a result this put pressure on the EU to restart the mission (Spongenberg, 2007a).

In order to better control the South-North flow of people, the EU seems ready to place the entry points into its territory not on European soil, but in Southern Mediterranean soil, notably in Libya and/in Morocco. In 2003, the British Prime Minister was the first to suggest setting up holding camps on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean, in order to process immigrants and asylum seekers wishing to come to Europe. The development of this idea seems to have stagnated for the moment. However, in 2004 the first steps towards the implementation of this idea were taken, with Italian offi-

cials being sent to Libya. It was thought that this would be a first step in setting up these camps, so materials and equipment were also awaiting the go-ahead from the Italian Parliament in order to setup in Libya (Johnston & Evans-Pritchard, 2004). This idea was criticised by different Human Rights organisations, although some organisations, including Amnesty International, were not completely opposed to the idea, and were waiting for more details in order assess the idea of holding camps (Lobjakas, 2004).

Controlling the flow of immigration into EU territory seems to be of great importance to Europe, but in addition to the previously proposed measure there are other measures that might ensure that adequate immigration control is done in North Africa, before the immigrants begin to arrive on Europe's shores. This means upgrading Southern Mediterranean states surveillance capabilities. As we will see, Libya has agreed to receive Italian officials to help border patrols, most specifically to patrol ports. However, in Libya, newspaper reports suggest that some deportations of illegal immigrants are performed at the request of the EU, thus stopping them from reaching any European border. In Morocco, the EU has financed over €40 million in efforts to ensure improved border controls in order to stop illegal immigrants reaching Spain (Shrivastava, 2006).

Another facet to the EU's migration policy is its return policy. This applies to illegal immigrants that are already in European territory or that try to enter illegally. This is another area where member states are in close cooperation, "Ministers agreed that the dialogue aims to ensure concrete and operational cooperation by all the relevant partners and their authorities in the region. Ministers renewed their commitment to the conclusion of re-admission agreements" (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2004a, p. 16). Commissioner Frattini expressed the importance of a common return policy, based on

common standards and the respect of human dignity. In his words the Commission, “sets out clear, transparent and fair common rules concerning return, removal, use of coercive force, detention and re-entry. It should be noted that the proposal also takes into account special concerns as regards safeguarding public order and security” (Vice-President Franco Frattini European Commissioner responsible for Justice Freedom and Security, 2005b, p. 5). In order to implement this policy, steps are now being taken to build a proper framework for the EU. As a result, the Council and Commission is leading in developing a return and re-admission policy. As such they have identified several areas that need to be developed:

The European Council calls for:

- closer cooperation and mutual technical assistance.

- launching of the preparatory phase of a European return fund.

- common integrated country and region specific return programmes.

- the establishment of a European Return Fund by 2007 taking into account the evaluation of the preparatory phase.

- the timely conclusion of Community readmission agreements.

- the prompt appointment by the Commission of a Special Representative for a common readmission policy (The Council of the European Union, 2004e, p. 14).

Although the EU wants to stop illegal immigration, it does not want to stop accepting legitimate refugees and asylum requests. Since the inception of The Hague Programme there has been a renewed push towards a European Asylum System (Commission of the European Communities, n.d.e). Already since the Tampere Council Meeting of 1999 a first phase of a common asylum policy has been put in place (Ibid.).

While the EU has been given additional powers to deal with illegal immigration, the Southern Mediterranean countries have on the one hand asked for a global approach in dealing with illegal immigration; one that attacks the root causes of the phenomenon, especially the economic aspect. On the other hand, the Southern Mediterranean has also implemented concrete policies in order to fight illegal immigration, and these include repatriation.

In the region, there are several calls for a comprehensive approach to stopping illegal immigration. This includes tackling not only the security aspect, monitoring of borders, and the return of illegal immigrants, but also the economic and social aspects. It is therefore necessary to create the proper economic, social, and political conditions so that people are able to decide as to whether to stay in their villages, cities and countries, “Concernant la lutte contre l’immigration clandestine, M. Fassi Fihri a indiqué que la gestion de ce phénomène passe par l’adoption d’une approche globale qui lutte contre la source de ce problème” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005h)⁴⁰. This theme is repeated throughout the South Mediterranean, in Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003e; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2005; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006c). In Libya this idea of a global approach is also present, as it

40. This idea is also given expression in: Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc, 2005; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006i.

focuses specifically on the economic conditions of source countries in order to properly address the issue of illegal immigration (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2003e).

Regarding more specific measures, perhaps the most telling case is the Libyan one. Through media reports we can get an idea of what precise measures are being taken by the authorities. In several reports there are not only mentions of repatriation and in some cases expulsion, but also of accepting foreign authorities. It is possible to find a few examples of such measures and their scale in the media, for example in 2003, over one hundred Ghanaians were repatriated from Libya (SWB, 2003e)⁴¹. Furthermore, mass expulsions of Sudanese and Egyptian workers were already being reported in 1995 (SWB, 1995a). In this particular case, some Egyptian workers were said to have decided to leave after Libyan officials tried to confiscate their passports and work permits. It seemed officials began expelling foreign workers after incidents in Benghazi where 20 extremists and 10 policeman died (Ibid.). Other mass deportations occurred in 2004 and 2006, notably of immigrants trying to make their way to Europe (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2004a)⁴². Furthermore, these deportation and expulsions were sometimes due to European requests (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2006a). As part of this, it would appear that Libya is closely monitoring its border with Egypt, in order to stop illegal immigration crossing into Libya and then continuing on to Europe. In one instance in 2004, the border operation seems to have been co-ordinated with Egyptian authorities (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2004e).

41. See also Libya our Home: News and Views, 2006d where similar concerns and measures are raised by Libyan authorities this time in regards to Nigerian immigrants.

42. See also Libya our Home: News and Views, 2006b and Libya our Home: News and Views, 2006c.

Readmission is another measure being taken to help tackle illegal immigration and has begun to be implemented by Southern Mediterranean countries. Libya has notably been negotiating with Malta, in order to re-accept Libyan nationals that entered Maltese territory illegally:

Libyan Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem (photo) declined to comment whether an agreement has been reached between Malta and Libya for the repatriation to Libya of illegal immigrants, who would have left from the Libyan territory. On the contrary, he is not convinced that Libya should accept back migrants leaving from Libya: “If Malta is facing the problem of thousands of illegal immigrants hitting its shores, we are facing millions of immigrants,” he said. Dr. Ghanem was speaking during a joint press conference with his Maltese counterpart Dr. Eddie Fenech Adami (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2003d).

In October 2007, Libya agreed to re-accept 50 immigrants rescued at sea by a Portuguese ship (LUSA, 2005). In Morocco a framework for the readmission of illegal immigrants is also in place, “le Royaume appliqué ‘la réadmission de manière systématique’ dans le cadre bilatéral avec l’Espagne en ce qui concerne les ressortissants marocains” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005g)⁴³. Readmission requires an exchange of information between the two sides, in this case the two shores of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, in Morocco *ad hoc* instances have been established in order to deal with immigration and border control (Ibid.). This includes a permanent bi-national group (Spanish-Moroccan) to deal with immigration (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006c)⁴⁴.

43. See also Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc, 2003 for calls for a future common approach to combat illegal immigration to include border control and a regulation on legal migration.

44. See also: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2004b; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2004c.

In Turkey, a readmission system has been established with a series of countries as a result of bilateral negotiations undertaken between 2001 and 2005, these negotiations included Syria, Greece, Kyrgyzstan, Romania and Ukraine (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006a). Further negotiations and consultations are being held with other countries, so that readmission can occur more easily and within a legal framework⁴⁵. On top of these bilateral agreements there is also a special procedure that has been put in place for the readmission of Northern Iraqis whose asylum request had been refused through Turkey (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002d). In Israel as well, readmission has been implemented, with special facilities being built to hold candidates for deportation (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001b).

This has led to greater cooperation with Europe not just from Morocco but also from other countries in the region, most notably Libya. This cooperation has not been limited to readmission treaties. In Morocco this cooperation has seen its principal law enforcement agencies develop greater interoperability with Spain's *Guarda Civil*, and this includes joint patrols (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005e). In the case of Libya, the flood of illegal immigrants trying to reach Europe through Libyan territory has forced government authorities to cooperate with Maltese and Italian officials, as after leaving Libya these two countries constitute the first European destination for the many illegals making the journey (Libya our

45. Countries with which Turkey is proposing readmission agreements are: Belarus, Jordan, Macedonia, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, China, Morocco, Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Libya, Lebanon, Mongolia, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan and Tunisia. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.f.

Home: News and Views, 2005c). Cooperation with Italy as reached unprecedented levels, with Italian officials being allowed to patrol Libyan ports, and for Italians ships to help patrol Libyan waters (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2003c; Libya our Home: News and Views, 2003a). In September 2004 Italy ended up sending 150 police officers and equipment to Libya to help control illegal immigration and to eventually assist in the setting up of holding camps for immigrants (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2004c).

Another interesting case is that of Turkey, whose cooperation efforts are not limited to the European Union, but in fact stretch throughout the region. The nature of cooperation with the EU and other countries involves exchanges of intelligence information. Specifically for the EU there are contacts within the framework of the Early Warning System of the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI). In addition, there are extradition agreements with Greece and Syria (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002d).

Turkey has also setup an impressive law enforcement and intelligence apparatus for the monitoring of land and sea lanes used for illegal immigration:

In order to prevent the use of old, privately-owned ships whose names have been changed after being sold or rented and old ships which have been maintained in our shipyards for a long time, these ships have been put under surveillance.

Through frequent checks on highways and secondary roads, illegal immigrants are caught before they can reach ships. Ships are also identified and halted before they leave the country. In 2000, 29,390 illegal immigrants were caught in coastal regions using this method and in 2001, 24,314 were caught.

Control points have been established on highways and secondary roads and checks have been increased in order to stop illegal immigrants to our country (Ibid; See also Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006a).

In addition, there are stiff penalties regarding migrant smuggling and these range from fines to three to eight years of imprisonment. These measures are present in the new Turkish penal code set to be in effect starting the 1st June 2005 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.f). Lastly, Israeli policy also recognises this aspect of the fight against illegal immigration, and has put forward a series of control and surveillance measures, as well as long prison sentences (16 years) for anyone caught in human-trafficking (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001b). These measures were followed in 2004 by new immigration policies that restrict citizenship rights to those individuals whose rights come under the Law of Return (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004f).

2.3. Illegal Immigration: Conclusion

In conclusion, a security discourse exists that surrounds illegal immigration. Through this security discourse illegal immigration is perceived as a threat to society, and to the human condition. Moreover, there is also some sense of urgency in the discourse, even if actors in the region recognise the need for a long-term approach. However, the European Union is very active in the field of migration and this is evident through the number of measures and initiatives being put into place. There is a strong movement for ever growing EU involvement in migration issues, as the allowance of free movement within the European Union has made it necessary to tackle migration issues, most notably illegal immigration at a European level. Therefore, plans for a Euro-

pean naval taskforce, or a common asylum policy, are directed to increasing EU powers regarding this issue.

There are additional measures being implemented by the EU that indicate the seriousness of illegal immigration for Europeans. The EU is actively financing the development of better border control in the South Mediterranean, and this financial support is through direct financing of the respective governments in the region. As a result, they are able to purchase state-of-the-art monitoring equipment and generally improve training and infrastructure for proper border control. Additionally, some EU states have sent officials to Southern Mediterranean countries in order to help their colleagues and monitor movements north. Perhaps a logical consequence of this was the proposal for setting up holding camps in several countries in the south. Although the proposal appears to be on-hold, it was being seriously considered until recently. During this period there were accusations, notably from some NGO's, who compared the implementation of this measure to the setting up of concentration camps.

In the Southern Mediterranean, in particular the South-western Mediterranean, the problem of immigration is being taken seriously even if most countries only constitute staging areas towards EU territory. It is no longer immigrants from North Africa that are the majority of illegals, but instead a large number of Sub-Saharan Africans are arriving in the Southern Mediterranean and are waiting for the opportunity to continue on to Europe. This brings its own challenges, one of these challenges being the parallel criminal activities which have resulted from the new arrivals in North Africa. These activities threaten the internal security of the state and the security of the immigrants themselves, in addition to the actual trip itself. As such, measures which include halting

these parallel activities have as much to do with law enforcement, as with border control. This is necessary because illegal immigration has a social cost so it must be controlled. Immigration from the South Mediterranean also has a social cost, and Algerian authorities mention Brain Drain as a consequence, but whatever the specific consequence, society suffers. As a result, Southern Mediterranean countries are willing to increase cooperation with the EU, by accepting funding and the presence of officials from the EU and its member States. The issue of Palestinian and now Iraqi refugees is also seen through the perspective of migration and has negative side-effects associated with it. Countries such as Jordan and Lebanon, have received a massive influxes of refugees, this has had important economic and societal consequences.

Another interesting aspect of Southern Mediterranean discourse surrounding illegal immigration is the emphasis on a global approach, as this means treating the causes not only the symptoms. In most cases this means economic development, *i.e.* getting people out of poverty and creating peace. Therefore, Southern Mediterranean countries, particularly in the Maghreb, are willing to cooperate with the larger effort in order to tackle these conditions in their respective countries and in the rest of Africa as well. It is unclear what measures are necessary, but the Southern Mediterranean states seem willing to accept that extensive measures are needed in order to better manage migrations.

Migrations in general are a delicate issue and discourse on both sides of the Mediterranean reflects this fact. Furthermore, this is an issue with complex causes and countries in the Mediterranean appear to understand that a comprehensive long term approach is needed to deal with migrations in general, and illegal immigration in particular. This in turn has affected discourse, in which urgency is counter-balanced by calls

for a comprehensive approach to the issue. The discourse contains information on what is threatened and the abundant measures being considered and taken to tackle this issue. Despite this, illegal immigration has had an affect on cooperation between the two shores, forcing the North and South Mediterranean to work together in order to address increasing migratory movements.

III. A Euro-Mediterranean Securitization part 2: Regional Conflicts, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Organised Crime and National Issues

This chapter will continue the discourse analysis of the various security issues present throughout the region, determining which issues have been securitised. After analysing the security discourse pertaining to terrorism and illegal immigration, this chapter will address the issues of regional conflicts, weapons of mass destruction and organised crime. These issues are present at various degrees throughout both shores of the Mediterranean, but are not securitised throughout the region.

To conclude our security discourse analysis in the Mediterranean, in the final section of this chapter, we will examine several issues that have not attained a regional dimension, but have been the subject of a security discourse, and in some cases have been securitised. These issues are limited to a national level and therefore hold a degree of importance at that level. However, their development can have an impact on any RSC in the Mediterranean, either by becoming securitised in other countries in the region or as a result of their affect on the foreign policy of an actor.

1. Regional Conflicts

In this section we will determine whether the issue of regional conflicts is securitised in the Mediterranean region. We will analyse how specific conflicts, or potential conflicts, are perceived and how the issue as a whole is viewed. This highlights what measures have been taken regarding regional conflicts and if these measures can be considered extraordinary measures, therefore, securitising the issue.

Regarding the EU, attention to regional conflicts has been constant despite the lukewarm character of the discourse; indeed, security discourse surrounding this issue seems somewhat limited and lacking in urgency. This is perhaps a case when the old adage, “actions not words applies”, since despite the lack of an alarmist discourse there have been various actions and initiatives supported by the EU addressing tensions in the Mediterranean, but no extraordinary measures. From a discursive perspective, these observations indicate that only a partial first move towards securitization has been attempted, hence, full securitisation has not been achieved.

On the other side of the Mediterranean one can refer to a ‘capabilities gap’ regarding the securitisation of regional conflicts. There is a clear recognition that the issue of regional conflicts is an urgent security threat, but in some cases there are no capabilities to properly address this issue, and this leads to radical changes in how some actors approach regional conflicts. The first half of securitization is well established, as discourse clearly establishes the referent object(s) and communicates a sense of urgency. Securitisation of the issue is completed by the presence of extraordinary measures. It is

in the Eastern Mediterranean where extraordinary measures are clearly evident, as the region continues to securitise the issues, while in the Western Mediterranean there are ongoing attempts at desecuritisation.

1.1. Rhetorical Structure of Regional Conflicts

European discourse on regional conflicts is mostly presented from two angles. The arguments for the securitization of regional conflicts for the EU revolve around the ideas that regional conflicts represent a threat to Europe's interests, or that regional conflicts facilitate the appearance of other threats, most notably large scale migrations and terrorism. Furthermore, for the EU regional conflicts in the Mediterranean are perceived as potential exporters of instability that can have serious consequences throughout the region. One can amalgamate these ideas with the need for stability, since any conflict in the region could have repercussions for others in the Mediterranean and put in peril the stability, development and prosperity of societies and countries in the region. Despite the seriousness of the issue, EU discourse on the matter lacks urgency and this excludes regional conflicts from a securitisation move.

In contrast to EU discourse, Southern Mediterranean discourse surrounding regional conflicts is well-developed and possess a sense of urgency. There is a strong discourse relating to regional conflicts from Morocco to Turkey, and this can be explained by the 'proximity' that countries of the region have with regional conflicts. Several conflicts are occurring in the Southern Mediterranean, the most serious and the most discussed in the security discourse of these countries is the Israeli/Palestinian conflict which is present throughout Southern Mediterranean security discourse. Other regional

conflicts that received particular attention were the dispute over the Western Sahara and the war in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, both the Southern Mediterranean states and the EU carefully monitor other conflicts outside the Mediterranean such as the conflict in Iraq and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. All of these conflicts represent a threat to stability in the region as they have the potential to escalate or spread, thereby affecting the Mediterranean region. As with the EU, regional conflicts in the Southern Mediterranean are associated with other dangerous activities such as extremism and terrorism.

1.1.1. Referent Objects

The most comprehensive expression of how the EU perceives regional conflicts can be found in the 2003 European Security Strategy. This EU policy paper was written in order to give a clear indication of EU security perceptions and contains the general framework by which regional conflicts are viewed by EU officials:

Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD (The Council of the European Union, 2003b, p. 4).

This passage informs us that regional conflicts pose a threat to Europe, and more specifically to EU interests and to regional stability. We can also see that regional conflicts are associated with other issues such as terrorism and state failure. Regional conflicts are a threat to Europe's interests, to human lives and more importantly to regional sta-

bility. Their potential to facilitate the appearance of other security issues also worries the EU.

There are several examples of discourse that allude to regional conflicts as being disruptive to European stability. A joint EU-US declaration on the 20th of June 2005 agreed that, “In today’s globalised world, developments in one continent often have immediate and far-reaching repercussions on life in other continents. Peace, stability and better economic prospects for all people in Africa are therefore in the interest of Americans and Europeans alike” (The Council of the European Union, 2005b, p. 4). This was reiterated by the EU’s policy towards the US, “Regional Conflicts such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to Europe, above all in the Middle East” (Commission of the European Communities, n.d.b). As a result, Javier Solana, prior to the adoption of the European Security Strategy, reaffirmed the threat of regional conflicts to Europe by stating, “Regional conflicts continue to rage, and, as in the case of the Middle-East, their proximity threatens the stability of our neighbourhood” (2003a).

EU policy, as voiced by Javier Solana, states that any regional conflict is a potential threat to Europe, thereby to its stability, and here geography plays its part as we can see that specific mention is made of the Middle East conflict. It is also important to note that the Middle East peace process has been acknowledged within the Euro-

Mediterranean framework since the time of the Barcelona Conference in 1995 (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995)⁴⁶.

Discourse also addresses the dangers of conflict between the Southern Mediterranean States, *e.g.* the dispute between Algeria and Morocco. In the 1995 Barcelona declaration there was an initial objective to promote good relations between all partners in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership:

respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners;

settle their disputes by peaceful means, call upon all participants to renounce recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another participant, including the acquisition of territory by force, and reaffirm the right to fully exercise sovereignty by legitimate means in accordance with the UN Charter and international law.

[...]

Refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW.

Promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and subregional cooperation.

consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an “area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean”, including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end (Ibid.).

46. In fact the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been touched upon in every single meeting since 1995. The European Parliament also monitors the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, viewing it as the chief cause of instability in the Mediterranean and as having a substantial negative impact on the Barcelona Process SWB, 2001a; The European Parliament, 2002a.

Regarding the danger of war between states in the South Mediterranean, from the start of the Barcelona Process, EU discourse reflects European concern over these matters. The EU calls for a serious effort in resolving whatever issues are the causes of tensions and makes specific reference to the region and the countries involved in the Barcelona Process.

However, the main argument when considering regional conflicts as a security issue for the EU is its ‘secondary’ effects that also affect regional stability. A recent speech given by Javier Solana (2005, p. 5) highlighted the place of regional conflicts in Europe’s security strategy:

The ESS rightly highlighted regional conflicts as one of the ‘old threats’ that have not gone away. We all know that frozen conflicts threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. And they are often interconnected with the so-called new threats such as terrorism, state failure and WMD proliferation.

Here the links that are being made in EU discourse regarding regional conflicts are clearly evident. These are not necessarily ‘hot’ conflicts, as most conflicts are ‘simmering’ and only reach the ‘boiling point’ sporadically, as was evident this May with a heightening of tensions at the Algerian-Moroccan border (EUX.TV, 2007). However, maintaining these conflicts in a ‘frozen’ state requires much effort, and one can only imagine the consequences of these conflicts becoming ‘hot’. Furthermore, these conflicts threaten stability, and more specifically they, “destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. And they are often interconnected with the so-called new threats such as terrorism, state failure and WMD proliferation” (2005, p. 5). This point is also echoed by the European Commission (Commission of the European Communities, n.d.b). According

to the European Commission, in order to prevent other threats appearing, which could signify greater instability, regional conflicts need to be addressed effectively. The European Parliament also shares this view that regional conflicts need to be addressed, or other issues will develop from this, “if Europe does not become more involved and establish policies addressing the root causes of the region’s instability and lack of development, well then, we will be unable to prevent either real or potential conflict or its uncontrollable consequences such as illegal immigration” (The European Parliament, 2002a).

This relationship between stability and instability is central to the discourse surrounding regional conflicts. Current stability can be disrupted at any point by regional conflicts and even by spillover effects from inactive conflicts. For the EU, regional conflicts, as noted, can lead to terrorism or an influx of refugees into Europe which would cause instability. Even in the case of ‘frozen’ conflicts, these can affect stability in the region due to their links to other security threats.

In the Southern Mediterranean this relationship between regional conflicts and stability/instability is also present. This is specifically true when discourse focuses, directly or indirectly, on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. From a direct perspective, recognising that it is a source of tension between states in the region: “Aujourd’hui que le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient a été amorcé en dépit des difficultés qui continuent de l’entourer et de la persistance des sources de tension qui mettent en péril la stabilité dans la région” (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République

Tunisienne, 1995b)⁴⁷. From an indirect perspective, the narrative usually centres around concerns over security, peace in addition to mentioning tensions in the region: “De leur côté, les graves développements de la situation au Moyen-Orient sont une source de profonde préoccupation pour nous tous, car ils constituent de lourdes menaces pour la stabilité, la sécurité et la paix dans la région et dans le monde” (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003c)⁴⁸. These concerns are not limited to the region, and this means that countries in the region not only view conflicts as a threat to a specific part of the Southern Mediterranean, but also to all the Mediterranean and even to world security. In Jordan, Lebanon and Syria this same pattern is present, and of particular concern is the conflict in Iraq and their re-

47. This idea is also given expression in: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2002; Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003d; Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2005b; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2002f; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1993d; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2000a; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2000b; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2001b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2005c.

48. This idea is also given expression in: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2002; Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003d; Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2005c; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2002f; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1993b; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2001d; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1993e; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1995b; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1997; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2000; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1993c; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2002h; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2000b; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2001b; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2001c; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2002f; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2005c; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2002e.

lationship with Israel within the framework of the peace process (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1999a)⁴⁹.

There is also a concern over the cost that these conflicts entail, most notably the damage to the region's development, "Nous sommes profondément soucieux d'épargner à notre région les dangers d'une confrontation de quelque nature qu'elle soit, afin que les efforts de nos peuples soient entièrement voués à l'édification, au développement et au progrès" (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1992b; See also Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005f; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2001d). This includes regional integration (SWB, 1998a). In Jordan there is also concern over the costs of regional conflicts, as according to their analysis, regional development is being held hostage due to the regional situation:

In fact, despite my country's bold steps and considerable success, another reality continues to endanger our efforts, namely, the absence of peace in the region. Last year, Jordan succeeded in achieving 4.2 percent growth in GDP. However, the regional situation, costs us at least, one percent per year, in growth. That drain impacts a whole range of national priorities. And ours is not the only country so affected. (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2002a)⁵⁰.

49. This idea is also given expression in: King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1999b; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2000b; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2002c; Foreign Ministry The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2003; Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2005c; Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2001a; Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 1999; SWB, 2005b; SWB, 2005a; SWB, 2004f; SWB, 2004h; SWB, 2004b; SWB, 2003d; SWB, 2003a; SWB, 1999b; SWB, 1996b; SWB, 1999a; SWB, 2002; SWB, 1998b.

50. This idea is also given expression in: King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2002c; Foreign Ministry The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2003; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2003c; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2004a; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005d; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005g.

Lebanon and Syria are also concerned (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2005c; Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2005a; SWB, 2003c).

Another aspect of discourse on regional security is its perceived affect on the emergence of extremism and terrorism that leads in some cases to an inability to solve conflicts in the region, thus letting them continue unchecked, which ultimately leads to the creation of extremist movements and an escalation in violence. This discursive theme is often referred to with regard to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, as it is charged with political and religious elements. This concern over extremism and terrorism is found throughout the Southern Mediterranean (Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc, 2003)⁵¹. In Lebanon, there is not only mention of Arab or Islamic extremism and/or terrorism, but the actions of the Israeli government are also perceived as terrorism (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2002c)⁵². In addition, Syria voices concern over the effects of regional conflicts on the causes of extremism and terrorism (SWB, 2004f; SWB, 2003c; SWB, 2005d; SWB, 2002).

51. This idea is also given expression in: Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2005d; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1996a; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2000a; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2000b; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2001b; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2002a; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2002f; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2001g; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2005c; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2001d; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006c; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2002c; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2003c; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2003b; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005e.

52. Regarding a more general link between extremism and regional conflicts see: Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2005d.

There are also more specific concerns relating to regional conflicts. In the case of Algeria, Morocco and the dispute over Western Sahara, these specific issues relate to the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and national unity of each country. In Morocco these concerns were addressed at the 5+5 meetings, notably in 2004, where the need for a settlement was reiterated, in as much as it continued to respect the integrity of the Kingdom's territory (Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc, 2004). In Algeria, the conflict is perceived as a cause of instability along its borders (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2005d). These concerns over sovereignty exist in Lebanon as well, in particular as parts of the country are still occupied by Israel, rather, or not under the direct control of the Lebanese central government, thereby affecting national unity (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2006b; Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2003; Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2002b; Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2002a). Syria and Lebanon share the same concerns regarding sovereignty and national unity (SWB, 2005c; SWB, 1998b; SWB, 1996c).

In Turkey, discourse adheres to the major trends in the Mediterranean regarding referent objects. However, the main difference being Turkey's larger sphere of influence, as it encompasses such conflicts as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Cyprus and Palestine (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005a). Turkish authorities see conflicts in these areas affecting peace, stability, security and the prosperity of Turkey and the Mediterranean (Republic of Turkey

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e)⁵³. Additionally, another referent object present in most Mediterranean countries, are the activities associated with regional conflicts, specifically terrorism. For example, the situation in Iraq is of concern to Turkey since Turkey claims terrorist activities emanating from Iraq threaten the region, in addition to the PKK activities in Northern Iraq (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2004c; General Hilmi Özkök Turkish General Staff, 2005). Turkey is also concerned with Syria and the Black Sea where in addition to terrorism, authorities are worried about drug trafficking (General Ilker Basbug Turkish General Staff, n.d; General Hilmi Özkök Turkish General Staff, 2005).

Desecuritization with regard to Greece constitutes the other element of Turkish discourse on regional conflicts. In recent years, what once had the potential to constitute a major regional conflict is now handled outside the realm of security, with an emphasis on dialogue, people-to-people contacts and other grass-roots confidence building measures (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e; General Hilmi Özkök Turkish General Staff, 2005).

53. This idea is also given expression in: Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2004a; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2004b; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005a; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002e; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005d; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2004c; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2001b; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006c; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006g; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005b; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004c; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003f; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003d; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2001d; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004d.

Israeli discourse follows some of the same patterns found throughout the region, as it emphasises both peace and stability as referent objects and also the creation and support of terrorism and terrorists groups. An additional element with regard to the rest of the region is the mention of regional conflicts as an existential threat to Israel, as this refers to countries such as Iran who do not simply want to achieve certain limited objectives, but rather, desire the removal of the state of Israel from the region. This line of discourse, referring to the removal of the state of Israel, is secondary when compared to the Israeli discourse on the consequences of regional conflicts for both peace and stability.

As previously mentioned, discourse centres around the need for peace and stability in the region in addition to conflicts in the region that must be addressed in order to achieve this objective. There is also a mention of this continued instability exacerbating the arms race in the region (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999d). Israel identifies Syria and Iran as responsible for instability in the region, especially due to the latter's pursuit of nuclear energy and its suspected military usage (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003d; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005k). In the context of regional conflict, Iran represents the main threat to Israel, as it is identified as an existential threat to the State of Israel as stated by the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Silvan Shalom:

Iran is today the clearest threat to the existence of the State of Israel.

Iran is striving consistently to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran has been funding and supporting terrorist groups in the region, thus damaging stability not only in this region but throughout the world. More than any other actor, Iran is working to undermine the moderates of the region. Teheran has become the core problem and danger. Nor can I identify any softening

in the extremist position of the Iranian theocracy, which rejects the existence of the State of Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004a).

Another interesting quote from 2003 confirms Israel's concern over Iran as a threat to its existence, "Iran constitutes the main strategic threat to Israel. Iran is a hub of international terror and publicly calls for the destruction of the State of Israel. To achieve this end - and now it is clear to everyone - Iran is making efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003e)⁵⁴.

The final element of regional conflict discourse referred to by Israel is related to terrorism, or rather the support given by Syria and Iran to terrorist organisations. This is a major concern for Israel as it perceives this support by Syria, Iran, and to a lesser extent the Palestinian Authority, as attempts to destabilise the state of Israel and the region (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003b; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005k)⁵⁵.

Israel takes the threat posed by Syria and Iran very seriously as is evident from this analysis released by the Israeli government:

1. Iran and Syria, two states which are defined by the US State Department as terror-supporting states, pursue a consistent strategy of encouraging and inflaming the Palestinian Intifada, of providing political-propaganda back-up and support, and practical assistance to the carrying out of murderous terrorist attacks inside Israel. This strategy is designed to achieve several goals: to strengthen the radical Iranian-Syrian axis in the Middle East, to weaken Israel by creating splits in its society and damaging its economy, to strengthen the radical Islamic forces in the Palestinian Authority (PA) and to disrupt any chance of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and the reactivation of the political process. This in the framework of the comprehen-

54. These discursive references to Israel will be further developed in chapter six when we analyse interregional interaction.

55. This link between regional conflicts and terrorism is also present in: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004a; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003e; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004b; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993b; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005d; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004e.

sive employment of the “terrorism weapon” by these two countries as a tool for promoting their national interests.

2. This Iranian and Syrian strategy combines well with Arafat’s employment of violence and the “terrorism weapon” as levers for promoting his strategic goals, especially since the beginning of the recent confrontation. For this reason no real disagreement has been created so far between Iran, Syria and the radical Islamic opposition supported by them, and the PA. On the contrary, during the confrontation the Iranians provided direct aid to the PA (the Karine-A arms ship) and indirect aid to the Fatah and to the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades which are subordinate to Arafat (via Munir Al Maqdah, a Fatah dissident operating from Lebanon) (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002d).

Peace in its neighbourhood is a constant theme in Israel’s discourse, as beyond Syria and Iran, Israel wishes to achieve stability in the region with all Arab countries (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004a; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998). However, Israel recognises it exists in a dangerous neighbourhood, one where its neighbours threaten peace by financing terrorism or pursuing the development of nuclear weapons (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003c).

With regard to Syria, its occupation and influence over Lebanon is of concern for the Israeli government, but for the most part, what particularly concerns Israel is Syria’s alleged support of terrorism. Achieving peace with Syria is an important objective for Israel as stated by then Foreign Minister Ehud Barak: “Peace between us is of strategic importance to Israel and, I believe of strategic importance to Syria, too. It could become a major and lasting contribution towards the achievement of stable and comprehensive peace in the Middle East” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995c; see also Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999c). However, the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon is a source of instability for Israel “These policies, as well as Syria’s contin-

ued occupation of Lebanon, are a source of great instability in our region” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004b).

1.1.2. Urgency

Although urgency is weak in EU discourse, in the Southern Mediterranean urgency is quite strong. EU discourse, specifically from the EU Parliament, shows a concern over certain regional conflicts, notably the Israeli/Palestinian and the Western Sahara conflicts. The EU Parliament also sees an opportunity for the EU to play a bigger role in Mediterranean politics, “using all means available” to help solve these previously mentioned conflicts (The European Parliament, 2002e)⁵⁶.

A sense of urgency is conveyed in the discourse of Southern Mediterranean countries, because it emphasises that these regional disputes could lead to greater instability and insecurity if they are not addressed effectively, which in turn would lead to less prosperity and potential loss of sovereignty. The King of Morocco states that it is imperative to go beyond the boundary dispute between Morocco and Algeria in order to achieve national unity (Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc, 2004). Furthermore, in 2003 Morocco considered this conflict to be the most serious threat to regional security in the region: “En effet, ce litige fait peser la plus grande menace sur la sécurité de toute la région, et constitue même un terreau fertile pour le terrorisme, que récusent, du reste, les religions révélées, et qui est incompatible avec les valeurs culturelles que nous parta-

56. See also The European Parliament, 2001a and The European Parliament, 2002e for calls made by the EU Parliament for greater involvement by the EU in Mediterranean regional matters.

geons” (Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc, 2003). The Israeli/Palestinian conflict also warrants urgency:

Aussi adressons-nous, en votre nom à tous, un appel à toutes les consciences vives de la communauté humaine, les engageant à prendre la mesure de la gravité de la situation explosive et des responsabilités qui en découlent ; car ce qui se passe au Moyen-Orient a des répercussions directes sur la paix et la stabilité dans le monde entier. C’est dire avec quelle urgence s’impose l’intervention immédiate et ferme de la communauté internationale - surtout le Conseil de Sécurité et les co-parrains de la paix - pour sauver toute la région, voire le monde entier, et leur épargner des drames qu’il est, malgré tout, possible d’éviter en œuvrant pour amener Israël à se plier à la légalité internationale (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2002).

The same concern over the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is present in Algeria where urgency is expressed in order to avoid greater instability in the region (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003d)⁵⁷. Urgency is also present in Tunisia, but if there is to be peace in the Mediterranean then Israel and Palestine must exist in peace according to the Tunisian President: “Nous considérons, quant à nous, que la réussite du processus de paix au Moyen Orient, sa préservation, ainsi que l’action en faveur de la sécurité et de la stabilité des peuples de la région, sont un impératif fondamental et urgent pour la paix en Méditerranée et dans le monde” (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1996b)⁵⁸. Egypt also comprehends the dangers of inaction with regard to this conflict, and states that no actor, no matter how powerful, will be spared from the consequences

57. Urgency regarding this issue is also present in: Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2005d; Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003c.

58. Urgency regarding this issues is also present in: Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1993a; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2001d.

of continued violence between Arabs and Israelis (President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2000a; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2001e).

In Jordan, both the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the Iraq conflict preoccupy the Kingdom of Jordan, and moreover, the situation in Iraq has many national and regional implications for Jordan, as it is concerned with developments in Iraq including the “suffering of the brotherly Iraqi people” (King Hussein I of Jordan, 1997). Both the Iraqi people and the Palestinians are addressed as brotherly people and Jordan “shall never languish or save any effort until justice has been achieved in Palestine and Iraq (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2003a). These two conflicts warrant urgency in the Kingdom’s discourse because they constitute an obstacle to peace, security and development in the region, “Global support for peace is more than a moral obligation. The Arab-Israeli conflict remains the region’s central crisis, causing immense suffering and destruction, and holding back regional development” (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005f)⁵⁹.

In Lebanon the peace process and the situation of the Palestinian people receives great attention as we can see from this statement from former Lebanese President Lahoud:

Facing this sad reality, the region finds itself on the brink of an all-out conflagration as a direct consequence of Israel’s intransigence, we believe that the world community needs to instill a sense of renewed activism and undertake a major reassessment of the peace process. This should first and

59. This idea is also given expression in: King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2004b; Foreign Ministry The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005h; King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2006.

foremost, sternly demand a halt in over half a century of Israeli aggression. However, and while this review takes place, and due to the volatility of the situation, it behooves us to retain the resistance and steadfastness as the weapons of choice facing Israeli aggression (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2001e).

Tackling the peace process and the Palestinian issue, notably the right of return, is the only way to achieve peace and stability in the region (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 1999)⁶⁰. In the case of Syria both the peace process and the situation in Iraq need to be urgently addressed (SWB, 1996b; SWB, 2004b).

For Turkey, the situation in Iraq is urgent and needs to be addressed in order to achieve peace and stability, not only in Iraq, but throughout the entire region. The same can be said for the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and the tensions in the Caucasus, Afghanistan and Cyprus (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e). We can see that regional conflicts that occur in Turkey's neighbourhood are a concern for the Turkish government (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002e; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1998d)⁶¹. The Caucasus represents another major source of concern for Turkey as it is an area of historical importance for Turkey. For this reason, the recent conflict in the region has preoccupied Ankara (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005a). Furthermore, Cyprus constitutes another area of concern. Since 1974 it has been the theatre to a bloody conflict between the Greek and Turkish populations, al-

60. This idea is also given expression in: Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2006a; Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2001c; Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2001d.

61. In regards to the Middle East conflict see also: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003f; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2004a; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003g.

though there have been several proposals advanced with the aim of solving this dispute. As such, Turkey considers this issue of extreme importance, to the degree that it has become a national priority and all available resources are employed in order to resolve the Cyprus problem:

Finding a lasting and peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem is a national matter for Turkey. Turkey will not allow any actions, which may threaten the Turkish-Cypriot existence on the island. The Turkish-Cypriot people want a solution, which will both protect the peaceful atmosphere on the island supported by Turkey's position as a guarantor and at the same time recognize the sovereignty of the two nations equally. Turkey believes that a partnership state based on consensus should be formed on Cyprus. Therefore new methods of communication and proposals for a solution should be found to prevent the Cyprus peace process from reaching a deadlock (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2003a).

Israel is also very concerned with the issue of regional conflicts, and especially with the behaviour of Syria and Iran. In this context, it faces extremists and terrorist groups supported by both these countries, as well as the development of nuclear weapons by Iran and in the past, the occupation of Lebanon by Syria. In consequence, urgency is therefore present in Israel's discourse regarding these situations. The Israelis are clearly concerned about Iran, "Iran must not be allowed to enrich uranium. Any mistake or miscalculation in this matter will have disastrous effects for us all" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003c). The Israeli authorities would like measures to be taken sooner rather than later, stating, "We must act on this matter as soon as possible" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003d)⁶². The Palestinian issue also leads to calls for

62. Urgency regarding this issue is also present in: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004a and Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003e.

urgent measures to be taken in order to stop terrorism and violence in the Palestinian territories as well as in Israel itself (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005k).

1.2. Extraordinary Measures

In terms of the EU, there have been several initiatives that have been focused solely on regional dynamics, and these have been extremely important for the European Union both in economic, political and social terms. From 1991 to 2007 there were many situations in the Mediterranean that called for EU intervention, and these ranged from general all encompassing frameworks, such as the Barcelona Process to peacekeeping operations in Lebanon. Additionally, the EU has faced crises in the ex-Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Macedonia. The EU also joined the Quartet in the Middle East peace process.

The EU's approach to the Mediterranean is usually wide ranging, and incorporates several dimensions simultaneously. For example, in Bosnia a military and political component exists in addition to a economic one, as this is necessary for reconstruction. If we examine the Barcelona Process, and the more recent ENP, we can see that these initiatives encompass a wide array of sectors, including the economic, social and academic. The EU does not view regional conflicts as having their roots in one factor, but rather as a result of several factors, and these can be either economic or social as Javier Solana (2003a) states:

None of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. This illustrates Europe's approach. Therefore, sometimes the best way to tackle difficult situations will imply responding to earlier problems, such as helping to solve a regional conflict, sometimes it will imply dealing at the root with problems that may feed the threats that we have identified. Fighting against extreme poverty and pandemics in de-

veloping countries, preventing dangerous competition for natural or energy resources, contributing for a better distribution of the benefits of globalisation, these are all, among others, real security challenges for Europe.

Recognising the origins of regional conflicts, the EU has engaged in several regional dialogues, the most notable encompassing the Euro-Mediterranean region and this has helped to avoid potential conflicts through substantial investment in several areas: social, economic and technological (Commission of the European Communities, n.d.b). The approach chosen by the EU seems to be a more comprehensive long term approach, rather than a short term approach based on extraordinary measures (The European Parliament, 2004). Therefore, the EU is implicated in several regions and hopes to address the underlying reasons for regional conflicts, whilst attempting to deter old threats in order to avoid the emergence of new threats; this is the reason the EU is working to achieve peace in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean (Javier Solana European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 2005, p. 5).

In the Mediterranean, through the Barcelona framework, the EU has chosen two main options to promote peace and stability in the region. Firstly, the development of confidence building measures. Secondly, the EU tried to put in place a charter for peace and stability in the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, agreeing upon a charter for peace and stability proved rather difficult and an agreement has yet to be reached. In fact, it would appear that this idea of a charter has been abandoned (Motahari, 2007). The charter called for the setting up of appropriate and specific decision making mechanisms in order to foster cooperation, help create partnership and confidence building measures and

achieve an environment favouring preventive diplomacy. In essence the charter could have established an advance framework for:

an enhanced political dialogue as well as the evolutionary and progressive development of partnership-building measures, good-neighbourly relations, regional cooperation and preventive diplomacy. The primary function of the enhanced political dialogue will be to prevent tensions and crises and to maintain peace and stability by means of cooperative security (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1999).

Moreover, confidence building measures have been achieved through a myriad of programs encompassing social, political and economic reform objectives. Many of these have been financed by the EU and directed at the Mediterranean under the MEDA program. One program worthy of mention is the EuroMeSCo network of foreign policy institutes that serves to deepen dialogue and exchange between experts and diplomats in the Mediterranean (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2003b; Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2005, p. 7; Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2002, pp. 3-4). The EuroMeSCo network has been particularly active in organising seminars, joint studies and publications relating to the Mediterranean region and in engaging the academic and diplomatic community on both shores of the Mediterranean. These exchanges could one day produce a common regional security language (Ibid., pp. 3-4).

With specific regard to the Middle East peace process, the EU is part of the Quartet that leads and coordinates the peace talks. But beyond this, in 2008 the EU actively supported the Palestinian Authority financially to the amount of approximately €500million (Commission of the European Communities, 2009)⁶³. Despite the debate around EU capabilities, the EU itself and its partners call for more involvement by the

63. According to an article published in the online edition of the Spiegel newsmagazine “Aid accounts for 25 percent of Palestinians’ incomes” Spiegel Online, 2006.

Union, as witnessed during the 2000 Euro-Mediterranean meeting in Marseilles (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2000, p. 3). This call is perhaps slowly being answered, and the EU involvement after the recent war in Lebanon shows renewed willingness to intervene in order to stabilise regional conflicts. Lending troops to the UN mission to Lebanon and offering assistance during the conflict whilst actively seeking an end to the fighting, showed the EU's willingness to be closer to the front line. In fact, even if EU member countries were involved, the EU was essential for the coordination and decision-making process, as this was in fact an EU mission missing only the EU flag on the soldier's shoulders (Gomes, 2007).

In the Southern Mediterranean, during the time period analysed, efforts to deal with regional conflicts have mostly concentrated on negotiation and cooperation, in contrast to past decades of war. However, in the Eastern Mediterranean more traditional extraordinary measures are still used. Peaceful means have been employed throughout the Southern Mediterranean in order to address the serious unresolved conflicts in the region. These peaceful measures, such as bilateral negotiations and, so far, limited regional cooperation, involve substantial risks to the legitimacy and stability of regimes in the Southern Mediterranean because such measures could go against national or regional public opinion.

The Western Sahara represents one such example of a change in approach. In the last few years, sometimes secret negotiations have been held between Algeria and Morocco (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2001c). This was part of an effort to settle the status of the Western Sahara, which also included granting autonomy to the region (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères

et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005e). Algeria has also been willing to cooperate in order to solve regional conflicts, including the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 1999b). Tunisia also focused its energies on cooperation and negotiation, including hosting the PLO until 1994 (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1994a; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1994c). Since then, Tunisia has advocated for a settlement to be reached by negotiation and cooperation. According to the Tunisian President, the Euro-Mediterranean framework could also be used for conflict prevention in the region (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1995d)⁶⁴.

Many countries in the region have also started to develop relations with Israel. After denials concerning the first reports of meetings in 2000 between Israelis and Libyans, these meetings were confirmed in 2004 (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2000d; Libya our Home: News and Views, 2004g). Tunisia had previously also advocated negotiation and normalisation of relations with Israel in order to push the peace process forward (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1996a). It has continued to support the Palestinian Authority after 1994, including setting up liaison offices in Gaza and Jericho (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1995a; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2002e). Following its recognition of Israel,

64. This link between the Euro-Mediterranean framework and conflict prevention is also present in: Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2004b; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2002a; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1993f.

Egypt pushed Israel and other Arab countries to accept the 2002 Saudi peace plan, which offers full normalisation of relations with Israel (President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2002g). However, Egypt is still suspicious of Israeli intentions and therefore, continues to arm himself with expensive weapons systems in preparation for a possible Israeli attack (President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2001a). In the summer of 2001 there were reports that Egypt was planning to deploy its army to the Sinai in response to an Israeli incursion into Palestinian territory (Mahnaiimi, 2001).

With regard to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, the first element to take into account are their relationships with Israel and the Palestinian Authority and people. These actors are all linked by the history of territorial conflict in the region and the subsequent existence of Israel. Of these three countries, only Syria is still officially at war with Israel, and Lebanon has received more than 400 000 Palestinian refugees over the years (SWB, 2004a; Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 1999). Jordan signed Peace Treaty with Israel in 1994 (King Hussein I of Jordan, 1995). All these measures are extraordinary in their own way, as keeping Syria in a state of war entails large sacrifices both from a human point of view and from a development standpoint. Conversely, Jordan's Peace Treaty with Israel marked a bold step in regional politics, and Jordan also accepted large number of refugees who posed a risk not only to national unity, but also represented an enormous drain on national resources.

In Jordan, despite a Peace Treaty with Israel, many refugees from the Palestinian territories are still arriving and settling in in Jordan. According to King Abdullah, these refugees are welcomed (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,

2000a). Moreover, the support given to the Palestinians, according to King Abdullah II, has been above and beyond the capabilities of the Kingdom:

Since day one of the Israeli attack on Palestinian cities, villages and camps, my government, you, and I, have taken the initiative on all fronts, to support our Palestinian brethren, and to put an end to what they are enduring, which has exceeded all limits.

Our efforts have focused during this period, on contacting influential countries in this world, in the forefront of which are the USA, Russia, the European Union and China, to use all our relations with them, to stop this attack, and to urge Israel to fulfill its agreements with our Palestinian brethren, and to return to the negotiations and the peace process. We have re-affirmed to all these states that the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories is the main cause of conflict in the region, and that peace cannot prevail until the occupied Arab lands are returned to the Palestinians on the bases of UN resolutions 242, 338 and 1397, the Arab initiative and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian soil, that a specific time frame should be set up for the establishment of this state, and that the Palestinian Authority is the only legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people, and that the Palestinian people only can choose their leadership and take their national decisions.

On the Arab front, we have endeavored to provide moral and financial support, to our Palestinian brethren. Jordan has been the only outlet from which all aid and donations to the Palestinian territories went through, severely needed by our brethren, especially medical aid. Our field hospitals are still serving in the Palestinian territories (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2002b).

Jordan is also willing to participate in large regional reforms in order to achieve a more stable neighbourhood (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005b).

In Lebanon, as in Jordan, support for the Palestinian people is an important theme in the discourse which shows a willingness to help assist with all available resources at hand:

This reality urges us to provide full support to the requirements of the Palestinian people's resistance and steadfastness in the Intifada, as well as to Lebanon and Syria in the face of occupation and its consequences. This

support ought to entail the economic, social, development and humanitarian situation in the face of international pressures exerted on us economically and politically, aiming to undermine Lebanon's immunity towards Israel (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2001f).

In Lebanon, the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Southern Lebanon was seen by the government as a great undertaking and victory (Emile Jamil Lahoud President of the Republic of Lebanon, 2000; Ibid.). While at the same time, in Syria discourse continues to show the government's support for Lebanon and Hezbollah (SWB, 2002; Ibid.). For Syria the situation in Iraq is also very important, in a recent (2003) interview it was made clear that Syrian officials were following the situation carefully and willing to act if needed:

Ferrari: Despite the United States' accusations, your country has voiced a desire to make a contribution to the reconstruction process in Iraq. What would you respond if you were asked to dispatch a military contingent?

Al-Asad: We must make a distinction between sending troops and taking part in the reconstruction process. And we must make a distinction also between the reconstruction process and the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty. Some people talk about the reconstruction of Iraq as though it were a free zone for investment projects. The primary role that Syria could play is precisely to help in reestablishing Iraq's independence. But our involvement will have to reflect the wishes and the will of the Iraqi people. If that is the case, then we are ready. With every means.

Ferrari: Including the dispatch of a military contingent?

Al-Asad: Everything (SWB, 2003d).

Moving beyond specific regional conflicts, regional cooperation has increasingly been on the agenda, including the delicate area of military cooperation. Libya has played an important role in championing regional cooperation. Paradoxically, this began with Libya's announced, but not fully implemented, withdrawal from the Arab League as a result of the perceived failure of the League to deal appropriately with different re-

gional issues faced by member states (SWB, 1997b), which led to the Libyan Government becoming instrumental in the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2000b). In addition, Libya agreed on a memorandum regarding the formation of a joint military force with four other North African countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Western Sahara Republic) affiliated with the OAU (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2005b).

Turkey is located at an important crossroads between Asia and Europe and over the years it has witnessed and participated in several conflicts. Since 1974, when the last major operation in Cyprus was undertaken, there have been few unilateral Turkish operations in the region. The exception being the limited Turkish intervention in Northern Iraq. Moreover, Cyprus remains an important issue for Turkish policymakers. However, several conciliatory measures have been introduced in order to help resolve the issue. Although Turkey does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus, and this was made explicit during the adaptation of the Ankara agreement, Turkey planned on opening its seaports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels and planes, including ports and airports in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by May/June 2006 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2001a; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006h). However, this has not happened yet, and Turkish officials have proposed instead to only open only their own ports. Turkey is hoping European ports will be open to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus before opening all ports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes. Despite important measures that have been taken regarding the Cyprus issues, Turkish discourse, within the analysed period, shows an

emphasis on regional cooperation rather than direct intervention. The other major issue for Turkish foreign policy had been its relation with Greece, but in the last few years there have been significant measures taken to desecuritize the issue, including the construction of border crossings, the setting up of a hotline between the air commands of the two countries, and the realization of joint military exercises (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006i). These measures have helped to reduce the tension between the two rivals, and as a result, this facilitated the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister to Greece (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002g).

In general, current Turkish policy dealing with regional conflicts seems to focus on encouraging regional cooperation by creating, or helping to create, various regional organisations. For example, Turkey has been the main driving force behind the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, the Economic Cooperation Organization and the Naval Task Force for the Black Sea. The member countries of these organisations include: Iran, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006c). In the Black Sea region Turkey has supported NATO membership for Bulgaria, and both countries deciding to remove anti-personnel land mines from their respective borders (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002c). Turkish regional cooperation efforts also extend to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, Ankara, under the auspices of the Ankara forum is helping to promote economic relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, in addition to the humanitarian and technical assistance being offered to the

Palestinian Authority (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005d). These types of regional initiatives enjoy strong backing in Turkey, and are being actively encouraged as they may help create peace between Israel and Palestine, *e.g.* a proposal for a Water Peace Pipeline (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003e; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003g). Turkish policy is also focusing on Southeast Europe in general, and the Balkans in particular. In the Balkans, Turkey participated in the development of the “Good-Neighbourly Relations, Security, Stability and Cooperation Charter”, which was the first document signed by the countries in the region since the Balkan Pact of 1934 (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2000; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1998b). Furthermore, Turkey also participated in the Bucharest Declaration which outlines the basis for cooperation in the region, and Turkey has also supported peace keeping operations in the region, including the creation of a multinational peace force (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2000; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1998b; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1999)⁶⁵. These initiatives demonstrate the importance of regional conflicts for Turkey, leading it to undertake sustained indepen-

65. In addition to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, Turkey has participated in several peacekeeping missions, including the Temporary International Presence in Hebron Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1997b, as well as participating in missions in Albania and Bosnia Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2001e; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006b; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a, in all these cases helping in the reconstruction of war torn cities and villages.

dent actions with several actors in order to resolve disputes that require great commitment and resources.

Afghanistan and Iraq are two other issues that require extraordinary measures from Turkey. In both cases, Turkey has been involved in supporting, directly and/or indirectly, military operations in these countries. With regards to Afghanistan, Turkey is an active participant within the NATO ISAF force, and has according to the planned rotation assumed command several times (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005d). The ISAF force marks the first NATO out-of-the-area deployment. Moreover, Turkey allowed foreign troops to be stationed in the country within the scope of operation Enduring Freedom. These measures complement the humanitarian and financial aid given by Turkey, *e.g.* establishing a regional construction team in the Vardak region, and increasing aid from 10 to 100 million dollars (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006d; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006g). Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there was strong speculation by the international community on whether Turkey would play an active role in the invasion launched by US and UK forces. This proved not to be the case. However, in 2003 Turkey approved a motion for troops to be deployed in Northern Iraq, as well as opening its air space to foreign military units (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2003a). Furthermore, Turkey claims to have been protecting Iraqis for 12 years through operation Northern Watch (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003e). It also claims to have contributed to a quick ending of the Iraq war by

giving over-flight permission during the 2003 invasion and immediately after the war by contributing humanitarian supplies to the Iraqi people.

In Israel, concern and measures are aimed in particular at Syria and Iran and their alleged support of terrorism. Israel is also concerned about Iran's nuclear program, and this issue will be addressed in greater detail in the next section on WMD, and this illustrates the integrated and overlapping nature of security. Another significant issue is the Palestinian situation which is of urgent concern for Israel. Israel is primarily concerned with its own security, as it faces a hostile regional environment that forces Israel to seek peace as a matter of survival as stated by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ariel Sharon:

I have not come here to argue, debate or prove to you Israel's desire for peace: Israel has demonstrated time and again its willingness to make painful compromises on behalf of peace, and move the peace process forward. It is the only known country that has voluntarily given up territory which is part of its historical homeland - the cradle of the Jewish people - in order to achieve peace with its Arab and Palestinian neighbors. But one thing we will not do: we will not initiate action that will compromise in any way the security and survival of Jews in their homeland or elsewhere around the world. Security for our people is our prime responsibility. Without it, true peace will never materialize (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999b).

One of the main elements present in Israeli discourse relevant to the Palestinian issue is that of disengagement. Disengagement requires pulling out of certain areas, and handing them over the Palestinian people and their representatives, so that it is hoped that this measure will eventually lead to peaceful relations between the Israeli and Palestinians (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995a; Silvan Shalom Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, n.d; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005i; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005c). In addition to disengagement, additional measures

such as facilitating the Palestinian election, the release of prisoners, and the ongoing peace process have occurred (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004h; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995d). Israeli officials seem to be willing to search for a long term solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict such as accepting the setup of the equivalent of a Marshall Plan for the Middle East in order to create development and stability, as well as any other settlement that will ensure a permanent solution to the conflict (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003c; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996). In 2001, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres showed eagerness advancing with the peace process, this time in reference to the 2001 Mitchell Report (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001d).

Peaceful relations with its Arab neighbours are also an objective for Israel. It is hoped that formal diplomatic relations can exist, as in the case of Jordan or Egypt, with other Arab countries in the region including with Syria, (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995e). As such, overtures have been made to states from North Africa to the Gulf, that offers full normalisation of relations between Israel and Arab countries (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005k; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994b). Israel is also willing to negotiate with Lebanon and Syria, and is willing to accept no preconditions in order to start negotiations with the latter (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995a; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). Despite a conciliatory discourse, counter-terrorism operations aimed at stopping and identifying terrorist support, which according to the reports are for the most part under Syrian patronage, continue in Southern Lebanon or in the Palestinian Territories (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002d).

Although there have been Israeli concessions, the Israeli military constitutes one of the largest and best equipped armed forces in the region.

Another element of Israeli policy is arms control. In the 1994 Middle East Peace negotiations there were provisions for setting up an arms control framework that would cover conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, in addition to confidence building measures such as information exchange on budgets and personnel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994a). This was a follow-up proposal after the 1993 fourth round negotiations that tackled the issues of verification by listening to proposals from Europe and Russia (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993c). This round of negotiations also tackled the question of the return of Palestinian refugees and regional economic development by proposing a list of joint projects (Ibid.).

1.3. Regional Conflicts: Conclusion

In conclusion, the EU recognises the dangers of regional conflicts, as a result has made regional conflicts a priority by including them in its security strategy. However, this issue is far from being securitised either in the first phase of discourse or in the second phase regarding extraordinary measures. In the first phase we see how regional conflicts affect the EU, as they affect Europe's stability and perhaps most importantly they lead to other threats such as terrorism or the proliferations of weapons of mass destruction. However, EU discourse lacks urgency. In regards to measures being taken, there seem to be no traditional extraordinary measures being applied to this issue. However, there are several regional initiatives that are underway, notably within the framework of the Barcelona Process. These initiatives represent a considerable effort both financially

and politically on the part of the EU, resulting in the EU taking a leading role in European policy towards the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, due to the intensity of regional conflicts in the Mediterranean, and because these conflicts cause extraordinary measures to be taken, in particular military or violent measures, the EU may be choosing to avoid securitization of the issue, whilst recognising the importance of regional conflicts for European security as well as regional security. This contrasts with the Southern Mediterranean where a series of more traditional extraordinary measures, including military measures, have been taken. Regional conflicts are an important security issue for the EU, but the European approach seems to stop the issue from being securitised. Subsequently, the EU addresses regional conflicts from various aspects, dealing with the social, political and economical causes of conflicts rather than using an approach entirely based on traditional security means. This could explain the lack of urgency in the EU's discourse, as regional conflicts are clear security concern, but have not been securitised. As such, it is important to remember that a security issue does not have to be securitised in order to be fully addressed. Security does not automatically mean securitization, as full securitization can represent a failure in dealing with an issue. Furthermore, unlike some issues which are at first securitised and later de-securitised, the issue of regional conflicts does not appear to be undergoing de-securitization, but rather 'non-securitisation'. European policymakers seem intent on avoiding any further escalation of the issue as it might jeopardise long-term efforts to settle the various conflicts plaguing the region.

In Southern Mediterranean security discourse great importance is given to regional conflicts. This can be attributed to the ongoing conflicts in the region, notably the Is-

raeli/Palestinian conflict. Indeed, for Southern Mediterranean states regional conflicts are perceived as an urgent concern, and there are several extraordinary measures that have been implemented in the region. However, it is in the Eastern Mediterranean where the issue has a greater influence. In Egypt, the military, one of the largest and most modern in the region, continues to be heavily funded by the Egyptian government and through US military assistance. Moreover, Egypt, although having signed a peace treaty with Israel, remains uneasy regarding Israeli actions in the region, in particular in Palestinian territory, and does not exclude the possibility of future military confrontation. Syria remains officially at war with Israel, and supports Lebanon and Hezbollah. In the case of Lebanon, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon is considered to constitute a national (government) victory, even if militant groups were responsible for this victory. For its part, Israel continues to employ military means when it feels they are required. As such, the Israeli military is not only one of the largest in the region, but it is also equipped with the latest technologies, making it one, if not the most capable military in the region. Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean region is ongoing and has caused thousands of refugees to flee their homes, notably to Lebanon and Jordan. According to Jordanian authorities, they have gone above and beyond what was required in their support for the Palestinian cause. With regard to Turkey, it has been active in Afghanistan where it has sent troops as part of the NATO led mission. In Iraq, Turkey allowed troops to use Turkish air space to reach Iraq, and it has also launched several military operations into Northern Iraq in order to tackle Kurdish insurgents. The situation in Iraq is being monitored by all actors in the Eastern Mediterranean, as continued instability in the country has repercussion for states throughout the region.

Along with traditional military measures, many unpopular concessions have been made for peace to be achieved, and these have required strong will and commitment from states, notably regarding the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Although previous decades have been marked by regional conflicts such as Arab-Israeli wars, Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, and war with the Polisario, more recently cooperation between various regional actors has been favoured in order to address conflicts throughout the Mediterranean region. In the case of Israel, this has meant some disengagement from the Palestinian territories, whilst at the same time Israel considers full normalisation of relations with Arab countries and continued negotiations in the framework of the peace process. Regarding the Western Sahara, Morocco has decided to grant autonomy to the region. Finally, Turkey has made significant efforts in the Balkans in order to solidify regional cooperation and resolve the many conflicts in the Balkan region. With this in mind, Turkey has made several conciliatory gestures with regard to the Cyprus issue. Although there is securitisation of the issue in the Eastern Mediterranean, discourse also shows a Mediterranean-wide willingness to desecuritize the issue of regional conflicts.

2. Weapons of Mass Destruction

This section will analyse security discourse in the Mediterranean relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This is an issue that has been present in the Mediterranean for several decades starting with the Israeli nuclear program in the 1960s. Since then, countries in the region have been concerned by an Israeli state armed

with nuclear weapons. This situation has led to instability in the region regarding this issue, with the danger of a nuclear arms race looming over the entire Mediterranean.

The issue of WMD is present in EU security thinking, but lacks urgency and extraordinary measures. However, in recent years the EU has been particularly active in this field, and the European quartet of France, Britain, Germany and the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy have played an important role in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. However, this is only one example of how the EU approaches proliferation of WMDs.

In the Southern Mediterranean this issue is of extreme importance even though it is not often referred to directly. Israel's unofficial but well known possession of nuclear weapons and the Libyan and Iranian nuclear programmes are of great concern to the region. Much has been happening in the region regarding WMDs, and the main event was the recent announcement by Libya that it was renouncing its WMD program. In a general sense, nuclear weapons are still perceived as a threat to security, although when compared to other issues WMDs are not considered a priority in the Southern Mediterranean.

2.1. Rhetorical Structure of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Discourse on WMDs identifies many referent objects affected by this issue, as they are a threat to both regional and international stability. Moreover, their possession by a state becomes a threat to the national security and the continued existence of neighbouring countries. However, the presence of urgency is scarce. The exception is Israel's

concern regarding the Iran's nuclear program which represents an immediate and urgent threat to the state of Israel. In part due to the nature of the issue, since the development of these weapons often occurs in secret and requires a long development period, in the rest of the Mediterranean region urgency is lacking throughout the security discourse. The non-securitization of this issue could also be due to the massive destruction these weapons can cause, whereas securitisation could lead to increased proliferation.

2.1.1. Referent Objects

For the EU, WMDs, be they nuclear, chemical, biological and/or missile proliferation, pose a credible threat to European security. In fact the European Security Strategy states that proliferation of WMDs is potentially the greatest threat to European security and it goes on to affirm the dangers to European stability that these weapons create especially if they were to fall into the hands of terrorists (The Council of the European Union, 2003b, pp. 3-4). While preparing its strategy against the proliferation of WMDs the EU states as a basic principle that WMDs constitute a threat to international peace and security (Council Secretariat and European Commission, 2003). This basic principle was repeated in a joint statement on the 25th of June 2003 by the European Council President, the European Commission President and the US President (The Council of the European Union, 2003c, p. 1). A strategy against the proliferation of WMDs was later adopted by the EU. Specifically, the EU views WMDs as a security threat to "our states, our peoples and our interests around the world [...] All such weapons could directly or indirectly threaten the European Union and its wider interests" (The Council of the European Union, 2003a, pp. 2, 4). This concern over Euro-

pean interests expressed in the EU strategy against the proliferation of WMDs remains within the basic EU principle that WMDs constitute a threat to international peace and security. This basic principle continued to be used in other communications such as, the EU-US declaration on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction of the 26th of June 2004 at Dormoland Castle or the joint communique of 15th GCC-EU Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting in Manama of April 5th 2005 (The Council of the European Union, 2004g, p. 1; 15th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, 2005).

There are two more elements that concern EU policy on weapons of mass destruction and these can also be interpreted as referent objects. To the EU, weapons of mass destruction represent a threat in themselves, but this threat is heightened by the association of weapons of mass destruction with terrorism. When putting together its basic principles for a common strategy on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction the EU stated, “The acquisition of WMD or related materials by terrorists would represent an additional threat to the international system with potentially uncontrollable consequences” (Council Secretariat and European Commission, 2003, p. 1). This idea was repeated in the joint statement by the European Council President, the European Commission President and the US President, where they stated that, “The threat is compounded by the interest of terrorists in acquiring WMD” (The Council of the European Union, 2003c, p. 1). Finally, in the European Security Strategy, the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is referred to as the “most frightening scenario” (The Council of the European Union, 2003b, p. 4). In this same document we find another element of a possible referent object, *i.e.* the level of damage that these weapons are capa-

ble of inflicting. In the European Security Strategy, the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and in the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction the level of damage that these weapons could cause is highlighted. The Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction clearly highlights their enormous destructive potential, stating, “Armed with weapons or materials of mass destruction terrorists could inflict damage that in the past only states with large armies could achieve” (Council Secretariat and European Commission, 2003, p. 1).

In the Southern Mediterranean weapons of mass destruction, which include chemical, biological and particularly nuclear weapons are considered a threat in of themselves and when linked to terrorism. Moreover, they can be considered as destabilising force in the region, or for a country such as Israel, WMDs are viewed as a threat to a state’s existence.

For Libya, WMDs did not ultimately constitute a guarantor of national security. On the contrary, WMDs became generators of insecurity, therefore possession of WMDs can constitute a threat to the security of a country (SWB, 2004g)⁶⁶. In Egypt, when the President was asked about the possibility of widening the war on terror to encompass states that seek WMDs he stated, “We stand against mass destruction weapons being in the hands of many countries in the world. That’ll be destructive for all”

66. This idea is also given expression in: Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1996b.

(President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2002g). For countries in the region the mere possession of WMDs constitutes an element of insecurity.

WMDs also represent a threat to regional security, and discourse points to the insecurity caused by the possession of WMDs by countries in the region. In this case, discourse identifies Israel as an offender. Southern Mediterranean Arab states perceive a double standard in the international community's position to allow Israel to possess WMDs while actively trying to stop other states who feel threatened by Israel to develop their own weapons. As such, Egypt, aware of this double standard, calls for the dismantling of Israeli nuclear weapons and the setting up of a WMD free zone in the region (President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2002b). For President Mubarak a weapons of mass destruction free zone is necessary because, "The region will be destroyed either by nuclear, chemical or biological weapons,' Mubarak warned, adding that no one would be immune to this danger" (President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2001d). This opinion is shared by both Syria and Israel, and the latter shares similar views with regard to Iran and previously Libya, as a result of their potential to develop WMD and their hostility to Israel (SWB, 2003d; SWB, 2000b; SWB, 2003b; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004c). There is also a mention by Israel of the threat of nuclear weapons, particularly Iranian nuclear weapons, to the entire international community (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005i).

Another way security discourse attempts to securitise WMDs is by linking them with terrorism. In Turkish foreign policy this link is made by stating that WMDs in the light of terrorism and proliferation are a threat to all societies (Republic of Turkey

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e). In Israel the link is established by highlighting Iran's sponsorship of terrorism which constitutes a threat to Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005h; Will Israel Bomb Iran?, 2006).

However, on Israel's part the threat of weapons of mass destruction is taken extremely seriously not only because it affects national security, but also because it threatens the existence of the Israeli state. For Israel, Iran's quest for nuclear weapons and its discourse regarding Israel make it a threat to Israel's existence (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995b). In a recent BBC Two programme *This World* entitled "Will Israel Bomb Iran?", the case was made that the acquisition by Iran of nuclear weapons poses a direct threat to Israel, thereby requiring extraordinary measures to be taken. During this BBC programme after listening to the numerous references made by the Iranian Government regarding the destruction of Israel, several leaders and experts discussed their perceptions of these declarations and more importantly these declarations in the context of Iran's nuclear programme. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that Iran's nuclear weapons are a threat to the very existence of Israel, whilst former Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, compared eventual Iranian nuclear weapons to Nazi concentration camps, by referring to them as flying camps (Will Israel Bomb Iran?, 2006). Perhaps the most compelling quote comes from Avi Dichter, "For the first time since the establishment of Israel, 58 years ago, we are viewing in front of us an existential threat against Israel" (Ibid.).

2.1.2. Urgency

EU security discourse on WMDs has only a limited sense of urgency that completes the rhetorical structure of EU discourse. This urgency is clearly expressed in the EU's "Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction". Throughout this text one can identify several examples:

As the European Security Strategy makes clear, the European Union cannot ignore these dangers. WMD and missile proliferation puts at risk the security of our states, our peoples and our interests around the world. Meeting this challenge must be a central element in the EU's external action. The EU must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its disposal. Our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide.

The European Union must make use of all its instruments to prevent, deter, halt, and if possible eliminate proliferation programmes that cause concern at a global level (The Council of the European Union, 2003a, pp. 2, 8).

In the joint statement by the European Council President Costas Simitis, the European Commission President Romano Prodi and the US President George W. Bush, "pledge to use all means available to avert WMD proliferation and the calamities that would follow" (The Council of the European Union, 2003c, p. 1). However, as we can see, examples of urgency are limited, having little expression in discourse.

In the Southern Mediterranean there also elements of urgency, notably in Israel, and in Egypt and in Turkey we also find some elements of urgency. In Egypt there is concern regarding additional nuclear military power in the region, and in this context arms control and disarmament constitutes a high priority (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006e; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e).

In Israel there is a grave concern over nuclear weapons in the region. Moshe Yaalon a former Chief of Staff who rarely gives interviews, discussed Iran's nuclear ca-

pabilities and explained, “we should prevent the know-how” (Will Israel Bomb Iran?, 2006). This was reiterated by Foreign Minister Livni as she was reported to state, “that Iran is trying to win time to continue its weapons effort and that this is to the world’s detriment. She said that the deadline for Israel is not the date Iran obtains a bomb, but the date it obtains the know-how to make one” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006b). Moreover, Moshe Yaalon clearly indicates that action should be taken to tackle this issue “something should be done to stop these extremists [...] Israel should be ready to deal with this kind of threat if anyone doesn’t” (Will Israel Bomb Iran?, 2006). Minister Avi Richter also indicates that measures will be taken by Israel if the crisis with Iran escalates, “Israel is not going to wait until the first nuclear bomb is going to be dropped on Israel” (Ibid.). There is an urgency in taking action, “Let us progress quickly, for threats to peace will grow with time. Nuclear proliferation and a spiralling arms race cast long shadows over the Middle East” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993a). This urgency is linked with the establishment of measures to deal with nuclear weapons development in Iran.

2.2. Extraordinary Measures

The final element of the securitization process relates to extraordinary measures being taken, and/or the possibility of extraordinary measures being taken. In European discourse there is a element of urgency relating to WMDs, and it is clearly stated that all instruments and policies will be used to stop the proliferation of WMDs. One element of this final part of securitization is the possibility of extraordinary measures being taken. The events surrounding the Iranian nuclear program offer us some important insights

into this final stage of securitization. Firstly, the role that the EU has played, and secondly, the evolution of the entire process. With regard to the first element, the EU is also involved by delegating the representation of European interests in this matter to France, Britain and Germany, along with the European Council in the person of the High Representative for the CFSP. Regarding the second element, the EU is pushing for the matter of Iranian nuclear program to go before the UN Security Council, where the possibility of sanctions will be considered. This constitutes an increase in the role of the EU in international politics, making the EU the centre for European foreign policy on the matter, and it also shows that the EU is willing to consider extraordinary measures in order to resolve this crisis. However, for now EU efforts are centred on referring the issue of Iran's nuclear program to the UN Security Council with the possibility of sanctions being eventually applied to Iran. The EU is also committed to non-proliferation efforts in other regions of the world. For example, in the Mediterranean, for example, there was strong diplomatic pressure on Libya to abandon its nuclear program as well as continued engagement regarding halting the North Korean nuclear program.

Weapons of mass destruction were also discussed at the Barcelona conference in 1995. This concern regarding weapons of mass destruction was clearly stated in the Barcelona Declaration:

promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons free zones including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions.

The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.

Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995).

This idea of a Middle East as a zone free of WMDs is something that is being pushed by the EU, and was discussed in the 2004 Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Dublin (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2004a, p. 7). In order to achieve this objective a series of ongoing consultations and *ad-hoc* meetings with officials and ministers hope to foster dialogue on non-proliferation and elimination of WMDs in the region (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2004b, p. 7; Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2005, p. 7).

Another dimension of EU action regarding WMDs concerns the EU's relations with third parties. In this respect there is an EU policy of considering non-proliferation of WMDs when entering into negotiations with a third country. The EU is also helping third countries to collect, secure and/or eliminate nuclear or radioactive material (Commission of the European Communities, 2005b). Finally, the adoption of a European strategy on WMDs is also an important measure. Previously, only terrorism had been the object of a specific strategy.

In the Southern Mediterranean extraordinary measures have been limited to a few locations, notably to Libya, Syria and Israel. With regard to Libya's attempts to develop WMDs, there are several stages. Firstly, WMDs were actively sought by the Libyan authorities. In 2000, Scud missile parts were smuggled into Libya (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2000a; Libya our Home: News and Views, 2003b). Secondly,

in 2003 after cooperation with North Korea it emerged that Libya possessed missiles capable of reaching Europe and Israel (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2000a; Libya our Home: News and Views, 2003b). These measures could themselves be considered extraordinary measures, as they needed considerable resources and organisation as well as desire to confront the international community which did not want Libya to develop WMDs. Thirdly, this was followed by another extraordinary measure, in 2004 Libya's leader announced that they would abandon plans to develop WMDs (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2004b).

With regard to WMDs, Egypt has showed the most concern over this issue, and Egypt has been consistently calling (since 1990) for the Middle East to become a nuclear weapons free-zone, and opposes the emergence of any nuclear power in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006d; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006c; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2000c). This desire was repeated in 2004, 2005 and on several occasion in 2006⁶⁷. This idea of creating a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East has been the most popular measure proposed in the Southern Mediterranean. In Syria, the government supports the setting up such a zone and appears willing to increase the diplomatic efforts in order to achieve this goal (SWB, 2004a; SWB, 2004c). In regard to Israel, Syria proposed a conference, "to take the appropriate deci-

67. For more texts regarding the Middle East becoming a nuclear weapons free-zone see: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2004a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2005b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006d; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2006c; President Hosny Mubarak President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2005.

sion on Israel's nuclear capabilities and their danger in such a manner that will reflect regional and international concern over Israel's exclusive possession of nuclear weapons in the Middle East region" (SWB, 2003b).

Finally we must consider Israel, perhaps the most active power in the region regarding WMDs and specifically nuclear weapons. Although there has been some discourse calling for arms control and confidence building measures (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994c), most of Israel's measures have been more muscular. Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity, is a policy that poses a dilemma to any nation that considers an attack on Israel and therefore, constitutes a pillar of Israel's security:

Q: Why are you maintaining the famous secret about the number of nuclear bombs that Israel has?

FM PERES: Our secret has nothing to do with mathematics. We said that we are not going to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, and that was the end of the story. I don't know anybody who counted bombs that may exist and may not exist. Amre Moussa told me: Look, why do you object that I shall come and visit Dimona? I told him: It's very dangerous. He said: Why? I said: What if you will come and you will discover there is nothing there, and you will spread the story. What are we going to do then? (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995b).

Israel is also proactive in the region regarding the development of WMDs by any other country Israel considers hostile. As such, Israel pursues a policy of pre-emptive action in order to destroy any infrastructure that would allow its enemies to develop WMDs. One of the most spectacular being the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor by the Israeli Air Force. It was assumed that by bombing Iraq's nuclear reactor Iraqi capability to develop nuclear weapons would be crippled for 8 years (Will Israel Bomb Iran?, 2006). Instead, as was evident following the US/UK invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iraq's capability to develop nuclear weapons was crippled forever (Ibid.). We will now analyse

the measures being taken or being considered by Israel regarding the development of nuclear weapons by Iran. Israel has been developing a powerful anti-missile system, named the Arrow (Ibid.), as a means of defence. The Arrow system is a Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System, a very sophisticated piece of hardware that is possessed by only a few countries in the world. In addition to this missile system there are other options available to Israel, one of them is the possibility of a pre-emptive strike on Iranian installations. During the BBC programme *This World* there were several quotes from officials alluding to this possibility, and one of them by Moshe Yaalon a former Chief of Staff explains, “something should be done to stop these extremists” and, “Israel should be ready to deal with this kind of threat if anyone doesn’t” (Ibid.). Finally, Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity could be reconsidered if Iran tests a nuclear device, as alluded to by Benjamin Netanyahu when he states that there will be a re-alignment in the Middle East in addition to certain Israeli policies if Iran develops nuclear weapons (Ibid.). This view was reinforced by Professor Isaac Ben-Israel former head of the Israeli Defence Force Research and Defence (Ibid.). Israel seems ready to take all measures necessary including a pre-emptive strike to stop Iran acquiring nuclear weapons (Ibid.). Therefore, it can be clearly stated this issue has been securitized by Israel. This securitization by Israel is clearly demonstrated at the start of the BBC programme *This World* when a reporter states that, “Israel will go after its enemies no matter what the consequences” (Ibid.).

2.3. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Conclusion

Weapons of mass destruction are a concern for the Mediterranean, but this concern is spread unevenly throughout the region. In Europe there are indications that the issue is being taken seriously, despite a lack of urgency. However, the issue constitutes a threat to the EU, and notably to stability in the region. There have been some measures taken by the EU, but perhaps the most striking measure is the ever greater role of the EU with regard to the Iran situation. Despite this greater EU role regarding non-proliferation of WMDs, the lack of urgency prevents the issue from being securitised. In the Southern Mediterranean, there is an obvious securitization of WMDs by Israel. Regarding other countries in the region, there is a lack of relevant discourse, but there are those that have recognised the dangers for the region and the dangers of having nuclear weapons so consequently view WMDs as a threat. However, there is a lack of urgency and measures. Israel is an exception as it appears ready to take extraordinary actions regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. In addition, Libya has completely abandoned its WMDs programme.

3. Organised Crime

Organised crime is the final issue that is consistently present throughout Mediterranean security discourse, but this issue is of particular concern for the EU. The EU has produced several documents and speeches related specifically to organised crime, and this is not entirely surprising since Justice and Home Affairs dossiers have gained increasing importance as an area of intervention for the EU. Nonetheless,

urgency is absent from European discourse, this despite the EU implementing an impressive set of measures and gaining new powers. In the Southern Mediterranean organised crime is referred to throughout the region, except in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In Israel and Egypt there is some mention of organised crime. However, when the issue of organised crime is present in Southern Mediterranean security discourse, urgency is absent. At the same time, any measures that have been taken have been subdued, as they have been limited to cooperation with countries in the region and the EU.

3.1. Rhetorical Structure of Organised Crime

This issue not only has an important internal dimension, but it also an important external dimension. Organised crime is considered a danger to European security in the same way as regional conflicts, not only for its inherent dangers but because organised crime can be associated with other security issues (The Council of the European Union, 2003b, pp. 4-5).

Although organised crime is mentioned as a specific threat, most of the time it is associated with previously mentioned issues such as terrorism and illegal immigration. These three issues, terrorism, illegal immigration and organised crime, are seen as being intertwined, and therefore in order to combat one issue effectively the others must also be dealt with at the same time. So it should not come as a surprise that when we begin to analyse discourse regarding organised crime from the Southern Mediterranean, we see references to terrorism and illegal immigration as both the causes and consequences of organised crime. In a sense, the threat from organised crime manifests itself through a possible contribution to the proliferation of terrorism and people-trafficking, which in

turn is linked to illegal immigration. This link refers to a loss of stability caused by organised crime through its connection to other activities, so that these have a negative impact on the countries in the region as previously noted. Organised crime is also perceived as affecting security and in some other cases the development of a country. This link is direct, as it means that organised crime is not associated with other activities, but directly affects these referent objects.

3.1.1. Referent Objects

In the EU, a strong security discourse surrounding organised crime with defined referent objects appears to exist. Organised crime is perceived as a threat to the rule of law and social order and secondly the effects of criminal activity are also of concern:

Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade world wide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy (Ibid., pp. 4-5).

Prior to 2001, the European Union Strategy for the Prevention of Organised Crime mentioned organised crime as a threat to the freedom and legal rights of European citizens (The Prevention and Control of Organised Crime: a European Union Strategy for the Beginning of the New Millennium, 2000). In a speech by António Vitorino organised crime is said to be “diametrically opposed to the common values we defend” (António Vitorino European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, 2001b, p. 3). The Tam-

pere European Council affirms that organised crime is a threat to the freedom of European citizens (The Council of the European Union, 1999). Finally the 1998 Council resolution on the prevention of organised crime states, “Considering the importance of a greater awareness of the dangers of organised crime to democracy and the rule of law, for freedom, human rights and self-determination, values which are the *raison d’être* of any fight against organised crime” (Council Resolution of 21 December 1998 on the prevention of organised crime with reference to the establishment of a comprehensive strategy for combating it, 1998).

It is after 9/11, that a link is established between organised crime, terrorism, and/or other threats. Therefore, it would appear that the EU’s policy is to have the security issues continuously linked, if possible, rather than keeping them isolated. Nonetheless, as referent objects, even after September 11th, we have the rule of law, freedom and the social order as recurring themes.

The issue of organised crime has been discussed in the various Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meetings; it is clearly another preoccupation for both shores of the Mediterranean. Once again, the 1995 Barcelona conference set the stage for further discussions on this issue. At that meeting all parties present agreed to “fight together against the expansion and diversification of organized crime and combat the drugs problem in all its aspects” (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995). We can also find mentions of organised crime in several others Euro-Mediterranean Conferences: Stuttgart (1999), Brussels (2001) and in Crete the issue was again on the agenda (2003a).

Turning to the Southern Mediterranean. In Morocco and Libya, organised crime is linked with illegal immigration. As Moroccan minister Taib Fassi Fihri stated, “l’émigration clandestine est un problème complexe dans lequel sont impliqués des réseaux mafieux et dont sont victimes nos frères et sœurs africains qui traversent plusieurs pays avec l’objectif d’atteindre le territoire européen” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005b). Again Minister Fihri linked illegal immigration and the organised crime networks who exploit these immigrants, “Les itinéraires empruntés par les candidats à l’émigration, dont le désarroi est exploité abusivement par des réseaux criminels, sont également connus” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005c). Furthermore, this link is perceived as having a negative impact on Morocco:

Première victime africaine de cette problématique, le Maroc est arrivé aujourd’hui, à démanteler plusieurs réseaux et à contenir ce phénomène [...] le Maroc ne saurait tolérer le développement, sur son sol, d’actions clandestines, aux multiples impacts négatifs, menées dans l’attente d’un hypothétique accès à l’Europe (Ibid.).

In addition, for the Moroccan government organised crime hinders the control of illegal immigration as today’s Mafia is extremely powerful and well equipped:

Qu’il y ait des mafias au Maroc qui vivent de l’émigration clandestine et du trafic de drogue, c’est vrai. Mais en Espagne, il y a aussi des mafias et elles sont plus riches qu’au Maroc. Les bateaux qui embarquent les clandestins sont équipés de moteurs hyper puissants qui rendent ces bateaux bien plus rapides que les vedettes de notre Marine. Quant aux trafiquants de drogues Marocains, ils ont des passeports espagnols et des comptes bancaires en Espagne. Ce n’est pas nous qui leur avons accordé la double nationalité. Disons que la responsabilité est partagée (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2001c).

The government of Morocco considers the link between illegal immigration and organised crime as explicit (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005g). In Libya this link is also recognised (Libya our Home:

News and Views, 2005a). In Turkey organised crime and illegal immigration are also linked, thus highlighting the threat to human rights and human lives, “Human trafficking, which mostly affects women, results in common human rights violations due to pressure and violence. It has become a serious problem at the national as well as the international level. It is considered a crime which endangers the lives of people” (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006a).

Organised crime is also linked with terrorism which in turn affects society, most notably in Turkey and Morocco, as this excerpt from a speech by the King of Morocco demonstrates, “Il s’agit, à la fois, de combattre les bandes et les réseaux criminels du terrorisme et d’en extirper les racines, en protégeant l’État et la société par la démocratie et le développement” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2004a). In this last quote the direct link that organised crime has with terrorism is self-evident. In Turkey, this linking of terrorism and organised crime is very important, especially since the Turkish authorities consider that this is method by which terrorism is partially financed, with particular reference to the PKK’s drug smuggling activities (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.d; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.c; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.b; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.g).

In Tunisia the link between terrorism and organised crime is also self-evident, in the case of Tunisia organised crime and terrorism threaten world security, “Les phénomènes de l’extrémisme et du fanatisme, dans leurs différentes formes, ainsi que la violence et le terrorisme qu’ils génèrent, font désormais partie, avec la criminalité organisée et transnationale, des périls et défis majeurs menaçant la sécurité et la stabilité

dans le monde” (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2003d; See also Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.g).

Organised crime in Algerian discourse is seen as a threat to the development of the region, “Qu’il s’agisse de trafic d’armes et de drogue, de blanchiment d’argent, de corruption, ou de traite d’êtres humains, la criminalité transnationale contribue à l’aggravation des conflits dans notre continent. Elle porte atteinte à l’intégrité et la dignité des Africains, fragilise nos institutions et hypothèque par la même notre développement” (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2002d). This link by the Algerian authorities is made in the local context but also, in this case, in the larger African context. Therefore, throughout the continent a serious reform effort is underway and organised crime can undermine the current stability and future development of country and region (Ibid.).

In the Mediterranean context, Algeria perceives organised crime as constituting a danger to Euro-Mediterranean security and stability, “de mesurer à sa juste valeur la menace que le terrorisme et la criminalité organisée internationale font peser sur le partenariat et le rapprochement entre les cultures et les peuples qui est au coeur du projet de Barcelone” (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2002c). Organised crime is a threat to Mediterranean security as stated in the association agreement between the EU and Algeria, “Conscients que le terrorisme et la criminalité organisée internationale constituent une menace pour la réalisation des objectifs du partenariat et la stabilité dans la région” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003).

In Tunisia the main referent object being threatened by organised crime is society itself. Tunisia, once protected from organised crime due to strong family ties and the values of Muslim society, is no longer considered safe from criminal networks which undermine the values and ideals of today's society:

De par la nature même et les valeurs de notre société musulmane, et grâce à la solidité des liens familiaux, nos Etats arabes sont sains et prémunis contre les risques du crime organisé. Cependant, le monde assiste, aujourd'hui, à des progrès vertigineux des communications, de leurs moyens et de leurs contenus, à un débordement tout aussi rapide des frontières économiques, à une déliquescence des valeurs sociales et à une régression des idéaux, qui sont autant de facteurs qui imposent à nos Etats le devoir de veiller au renforcement de l'action préventive, de consolider la coopération existante et de déployer un regain d'efforts et de labeur pour conforter et consacrer la coopération horizontale entre les structures sécuritaires et éducatives, pour que notre région reste à l'abri des dangers de la criminalité organisée et des nouvelles formes de criminalité (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1995c)⁶⁸.

Another country where the societal implications of organised crime are important is Turkey. In 2006 Justice Minister Cemil Çiçek stated that organised crime is threat to humanity because, "these crimes harm economic and political stability of countries, and lead to the deterioration of public order" (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006f). This echoes an earlier statement by Abdullah Gül concerning corruption:

We emphasize at every opportunity the need to define common rules and principles and to realize international cooperation and collaboration on combating corruption which in our times has transformed into a transnational phenomenon and has become an element threatening democracy and the stability of countries (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003a; See also Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.g; Ibid.).

68. This idea is also given expression in: Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1993f; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1992c.

3.1.2. Urgency

Does organised crime constitute an urgent matter for both the EU or the Southern Mediterranean? The answer must be an unequivocal no. Because elements of urgency are few and far between, in the EU's discourse they are absent, and in the Southern Mediterranean discourse relating to urgency is limited. As such, we have only a few examples of urgency in the security discourse originating in the Southern Mediterranean.

The Algerian President recognises that preventive measures are urgent in order to fight organised crime, "Il reste que la dimension préventive de cette lutte relève toujours de l'urgence et de la nécessité. Elle pourrait être assurée à travers le renforcement du centre des nations unies de Vienne" (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2002d). Organised crime increases the suffering of the poor and its prevention is a necessity and an urgency. Furthermore, in Algeria discourse identifies a societal need to defend itself against organised crime, "Nous aspirons aussi à la reconnaissance de nos droits collectifs comme le droit de la société à se défendre contre les syndicats du crime internationaux et le terrorisme" (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 1999c; See also Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003e). Finally, organised crime is a conflict in which Algeria is engaged, "Le terrorisme est aujourd'hui vaincu chez nous, mais nous devons poursuivre le combat global contre toutes les formes de criminalité organisée, la violence politique et l'extrémisme, y compris religieux qui constitue une pathologie au sens

plein du terme” (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2005a).

In Egypt, Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit recognised that organised crime requires special attention since it does not stop at national borders (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2005a). Another source of urgency, a rather unlikely source when one keeps in mind the small quantity of discourse that organised crime generates, is from the Israeli authorities. After the murder of a judge, Prime Minister Sharon, commented on the urgency of fighting organised crime:

The war against crime must continue without respite. You have made major achievements. But we must not relax our grip. We must fight crime, and criminal organizations with the utmost intensity. You deal with a large number of fields, but your success will definitely be measured by these achievements. You made a major achievement here, I thank you and would like to thank all those involved - I understand there were hundreds. Please thank them in our name, and continue with your efforts and be successful. You have much work to do. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004j).

In Turkey, organised crime is considered a major challenge to the international community (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.g). Therefore, it is necessary to give no concessions when fighting organised crime including terrorism (Ibid.).

3.2. Extraordinary Measures

In regard to measures, this issue, as mentioned before, has an internal and external dimension. The EU has been quite active, both internally and externally, with regard to organised crime and we see ever growing European cooperation emerging in order to tackle this issue. Externally, the problem of organised crime is a concern for Europe, especially in the Balkan region, where it is seen as disruptive and constitutes an obstacle

to stability in that particular region. Additionally, there are fears that whatever problems are generated by organised crime in that region will spillover into EU territory (The Council of the European Union, 2004a, p. 8; Chris Patten, 2002). Russia is another region that has received attention because of organised crime (European Union action plan on common action for the Russian Federation on combating organised crime, 2000). The Mediterranean is also an area where organised crime constitutes a concern for the EU. Therefore, greater cooperation with partner states in the region is desirable in order to address this issue. In addition, participants in Euro-Mediterranean conferences have also asked for greater cooperation in the field of justice (The Council of the European Union, 2000; Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2003a, p. 13; Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2004a, p. 14; Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 2005, p. 16). Agreement on fighting organised crime reached within the framework of the Barcelona Process, “was a significant success because these are all difficult and sensitive issues” (The European Parliament, 2002e). In the European Parliament organised crime is a reason given when demanding stronger border controls, so as to assist in halting the free movement, “of those who make a way of life out of organised crime, the trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings and particularly terrorism, a way of life that is condemned by all civilised countries” (The European Parliament, 2000a). In addition, the European Parliament has also been calling for the creation of “a Euro-Mediterranean Court of Human Rights modelled on the Court in Strasbourg, and also to set up mutual consultation mechanisms to facilitate applications for peaceful solutions to conflicts and the fight against organised crime” (The European Parliament, 2000b).

Within the EU, organised crime has been an important issue, and article 30.1(d) of the Treaty of the European Union states that common action in the field of police cooperation includes, “the common evaluation of particular investigative techniques in relation to the detection of serious forms of organised crime” (Treaty on the European Union (Consolidated Version), 2006). The 1999 Tampere Council marked an important milestone for addressing organised crime, when it was recognised that, “A balanced development of unionwide measures against crime should be achieved while protecting the freedom and legal rights of individuals and economic operators” (The Council of the European Union, 1999). The EU is currently implementing the Hague Programme which calls for greater cooperation between national police forces in order to tackle organised crime, as well as:

the development of a strategic concept with regard to tackling cross-border organised crime at EU-level and asks the Council and the Commission to develop this concept further and make it operational, in conjunction with other partners such as Europol, Eurojust, the Police Chiefs Task Force, EUCPN and CEPOL (The Council of the European Union, 2004e, p. 26).

Prior to this, the EU had undertaken the setup of a complete strategy to combat organised crime. A working paper was produced in 2001 which stated the need for a greater EU role in tackling transnational organised crime, specifically taking up “information exchange, analysis, diagnosis, and co-ordination” (Commission of the European Communities, 2001b, p. 4).

Finally, Europol, which was created to support law enforcement activities of member states and to aid in cooperation between member states has a particularly important role to play as it monitors serious forms of organised crime. In addition to these general tasks, Europol has produced a yearly threat assessment on organised crime since

January 2006, and previously a crime situation report was produced. For now Europol only has a supporting role, but this will slowly change:

the Protocol of the 28 November 2002 amending the Europol convention, which has not entered into force yet, allows Europol to request the competent authorities of the Member States to investigate. Article 3 b) of the Protocol states that “Member States should deal with any request from Europol to initiate, conduct or co-ordinate investigations in specific cases and should give such requests due consideration. Europol should be informed whether the requested investigation will be initiated (Europol, n.d.).

Recent events have highlighted a need for stronger cooperation, as we are not only referring to the Madrid and London bombings, but also to increased activity in money laundering and drug trafficking. In 2006, the European Commission boosted the powers of Europol by transforming it into a proper EU institution, whilst at the same time increasing its budget from €68 million in 2007 to €334 million in 2010-2013 (Kubosova, 2006). Moreover, it is imperative to remember that the Europol mandate applies only when two states are affected, when the crime is illegal in all member states so that its mandate focuses on fighting organised crime (Ibid.; Jones-Jeffreys, 2006). Other measures introduced by the EU followed the negotiation of the Prüm Treaty, and included data sharing of genetic records, fingerprints and traffic offences, as well as national police operating across national borders while carrying service weapons and wearing national uniforms (Goldirova, 2007c). The objective is not only to track down terror groups, but also apprehend serious crime suspects. Even the UK is willing to accept some of these measures through the indirect “general approach” mechanism instead of the direct “political agreement” (Ibid.). Finally there is the creation of a large biometric database being used to boost border security and apprehend criminals (Goldirova, 2007f).

The Southern shore of the Mediterranean presents a weaker ensemble of measures aimed at organised crime. This contrasts with the EU, as the EU has been gaining new powers in the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. Besides normal policing activities, very little has been done to tackle organised crime, although most discourse highlights several cooperative agreements signed between countries in the region.

In Morocco, a National Strategy to combat organised crime and human trafficking was developed, in addition to cooperation with the EU regarding organised crime (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006d; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2006g). Moreover, in the association accord between Morocco and the EU, articles 61 and 62 deal with money laundering, drug trafficking and consumption respectively (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, n.d.). Both articles call for increased cooperation in these two areas, as in this case both issues are linked. As a result, there is a call to stop money laundering, since this money comes in part from drug trafficking and finances further criminal activity (Ibid.). In an interview given to *El País*, the King of Morocco talked about a new unit within the Interior Ministry that was created to fight illegal immigration and human and drug trafficking, “on a procédé à la creation d’une nouvelle direction au Ministère de l’Intérieur chargée exclusivement de la lutte contre l’émigration illégale et les trafics des êtres humains et de drogue qui en découlent etc” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération du Royaume du Maroc, 2005e).

Cooperation between countries and shores is the most popular measure being taken to fight organised crime. From Morocco to Turkey, countries are establishing

agreements with each other and with the EU or other European countries. For example, in Libya, cooperation regarding organised crime has been discussed with Greece, Algeria and an accord has been signed with Italy, cooperation with Italy might even be extended to joint teams to tackle human-trafficking gangs (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2002b; SWB, 1996a; Libya our Home: News and Views, 2003f; Libya our Home: News and Views, 2005e). The 5+5 Summit saw participating countries pledge to work jointly so as to fight organised crime. Indeed, Italian, Libyan and Egyptian officials have cracked down on people smugglers (Libya our Home: News and Views, 2003g; Libya our Home: News and Views, 2005d). Algeria has also considered further bilateral and multilateral cooperation (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 1999c)⁶⁹. Tunisia has also favoured cooperation notably through the *Conseil des Ministres Arabes de l'Intérieur* (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1994d; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1992c; Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2001c). Egypt has been particularly interested in pursuing cooperation with the EU, notably:

to the exchange of expertise and experiences, enhancing human resources capacity, and implementation of existing international obligations in this regard. Egypt also looks forward to enhancing the existing judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters, particularly through supporting the Egyptian judicial infrastructure, strengthening the capacity of law enforcement and assistant bodies as well as through the training of judges and prosecutors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt,

69. This idea is also given expression in: Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2004; Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2005a; Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2002d; Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2004.

2006c; See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt, 2005d).

Another government that favours cooperation is the Turkish government, either through the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, or with Security Cooperation Agreements signed with several neighbouring countries, including Belarus, Romania, Russia, Bulgaria and Italy (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005h; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006a; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1999). In addition to cooperating with these countries, Turkey has established cooperation agreements with several regional organisations in the Balkans and Black Sea region, as well as an agreement on cooperation with Europol (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.g). Turkey is also signatory of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003a).

Additional measures mentioned include: in Tunisia, the modernisation of the entire security apparatus and in Algeria, helping economic development as a solution to terrorism and other forms of transnational crime (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2002c; Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2005f).

3.3. Organised Crime: Conclusion

In summary, organised crime has not yet been securitized by the European Union. Paradoxically, this is due to the discourse which presents no urgency and some elements of a referent object. However on the measures side of the securitization

process, the EU has seen its powers increase, and it is leading the way in bringing attention to organised crime and playing a role in overseeing law enforcement activities concerning this issue. There has also been the establishment of a series of information databases, allowing for the crosschecking and storage of information on criminals and organised crime. The EU functions as a bridge between the different national police forces, with Europol coordinating the information. In consequence, this establishes the EU as a central figure in fighting organised crime. The EU has also engaged in tackling organised crime outside its borders by soliciting the cooperation of other states in this matter. The role of the EU regarding this issue has been an important one and one that is growing. Europol has been gaining new powers and further developments, including the development of a European strategy on preventing organised crime, are occurring.

There has been increasing cooperation within the European Union in order to tackle organised crime and in the Southern Mediterranean there are continued calls for cooperation between countries in the region and between the two shores. But as previously noted since the conference in 2005, some cooperation between north and south seems to be occurring, but this is rather small in scale, and the same can be said for cooperation between countries in the region. Urgency is also absent from the discourse in the region, aside from a few mentions in some countries. Additionally, in the Southern Mediterranean, organised crime has not been securitised.

4. National Issues

In the following section we will conclude our analysis of securitisation in the Mediterranean with an overview of various issues that are also viewed through a security perspective, but unlike the issues we have previously analysed, do not have a regional dimension. Some issues are present in only one actor, while others are present in two or three countries and some are securitised, while others are not. These issues are often specific to a national context, and are sometimes linked to Mediterranean security. Nonetheless, these issues might eventually acquire a regional dimension, influencing any RSC in the Mediterranean and as such should be closely monitored. We will briefly look at issues such as State Failure, Anti-Semitism, EU Membership for Turkey and Water Scarcity.

4.1. State Failure

State failure is identified in the European Security Strategy as a threat to European Security. Nonetheless, it has only been the object of a securitization move and not fully securitized. A European discourse on state failure and the reason it represents a security threat exists, but even this discourse is quite limited, and for this reason, and because of the lack of any extraordinary measures, this issue has not been securitized by

the EU so far⁷⁰. Moreover, state failure as a security issue has not been recognised by other actors in the region.

State failure, like weapons of mass destruction, is considered a security issue due to its association with other phenomenon. The European Security Strategy concludes that, “Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability” (The Council of the European Union, 2003b, p. 4). Searching for relevant EU documents on state failure can be a difficult task, as most relevant documents were written between 2001 and 2003. In 2001 and 2002 Chris Patten delivered two speeches in which he addressed state failure. In 2001 he linked state failure with other security issues stating, “In some cases we are not talking about state-backed terrorism but of terrorist-backed states. Crime, drugs, mayhem spread from the collapsed state to infect its neighbours, a national calamity turns into a regional threat and a global problem” (The Rt Hon Chris Patten External Relations Commissioner, 2001). In 2002, Chris Patten, former EU External Relations Commissioner, highlighted the need for world leaders to concentrate on new security threats including state failure (The Rt Hon Chris Patten External Relations Commissioner, 2002). In 2003 Javier Solana also acknowledged the problems caused by state failure in Africa and that these problems cannot be ignored since their resolution is a precondition for development (Javier Solana European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 2003c; Prof. Dr Javier Solana EU High

70. Contrary to other issues there is no specific strategic program adopted by the EU on this matter of state failure.

Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 2003). In Paris in 2003,

Javier Solana made the clearest reference to state failure and its impact:

L'effondrement des structures étatiques laisse le champ libre au crime organisé. Il provoque l'afflux massif de drogues et une immigration incontrôlée vers l'Europe. Toutes ces menaces sont en elles-mêmes problématiques, mais c'est leur combinaison qui représente un défi majeur pour notre sécurité (Javier Solana European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 2003b).

As we can see there has been some effort made towards a securitizing move on failed states, however, it can be considered as a weak move. Despite state failure constituting an element in the European Security Strategy it is not seen as a priority for the European Union. The EU's weak attempts at securitising state failure is paradoxical, since there have been several measures aimed at bordering states, including the Balkan and African states. According to the International Security Information Service Europe (ISIS), the EU's action in this domain, from enlargement to the new ENP, has been successful, and has contributed to the stability in the bordering regions of the EU (Nino-Perez & Schnitger, 2005, p. 6). A possible explanation for this lack of securitization would be that the issue of state failure is, for now, deliberately not being securitised and addressed without the controversy that securitization would bring.

4.2. Anti-Semitism

In Israel, anti-Semitism is an issue that shows signs of securitization. Here the issue has been specifically targeted because it has unique consequences for Israel. There is a referent object present in the discourse, that is, the safety of Israel and the lives of

Israelis are threatened by anti-Semitism. Moreover, there is a sense of urgency present, in addition to strong measures being taken in order to deal with anti-Semitism.

For Israel, anti-Semitism is a danger to Jewish communities around the world and the Israeli state itself as stated by then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Silvan Shalom:

This anti-Semitism is a grave danger to the well-being of Jews and their communities around the world.

It also fosters the hostility towards the State of Israel which fuels the suicide bombers, while also undermining our diplomatic efforts to bring peace and security to our citizens.

Israel is committed to doing everything we can to combat this common enemy. We are determined that Jews whether they live in Jerusalem or Paris or Stockholm, in Djerba or Haifa or Istanbul should be able to live their lives, free of the fear of verbal or physical attack.

But I would say something more. This wave of hostility to Jews - and their basic rights as individuals and as a nation - does not only present a challenge to Israel and the Jewish world. It presents a grave challenge to the international community as a whole. When Jews cannot pray in their synagogues without fear, European society itself is in danger (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004d)⁷¹.

According to the Israeli authorities, anti-Semitism is also linked to terrorism, “The link between this terrorism, anti-Israeli and anti-Western incitement, and anti-Semitism, is direct and it is strong” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004i). Israeli authorities are taking this issue seriously, taking as many measures as possible since they not only affect Israeli citizens but, the entire Jewish Diaspora all over the world (Ibid.).

71. This idea is also given expression in: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004c and Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004g.

Measures taken by the Israeli government are at a very high level. Its Foreign

Ministry constitutes:

a central role in our national effort to combat this enemy. Through our network of embassies and consulates worldwide, we maintain ongoing contacts at the governmental level and with key organizations and audiences to promote and coordinate action against anti-Semitism, to raise awareness and to defend against it (Ibid.).

In addition, the Israeli government is calling for the creation of a joint Israeli-European Ministerial Council (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003b). It also commends, “the OSCE for holding its first conference on anti-Semitism this past June, and trusts that this Ministerial Meeting will endorse the recommendation of ODIHR to hold a second conference in Berlin in 2004” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003a).

Securitisation of anti-Semitism is limited, and the quantity of discourse dedicated to this issue is small as well as the presence of urgency. The measures taken cannot be considered extraordinary, as they do not engage all of the state resources, but instead they rely on cooperation. The issue of anti-Semitism, although not fully securitised, is certainly a major concern for Israel. Israel believes this issue poses a threat to the State and its citizens, as it fuels terrorism and aggression towards Israel and Israelis, including those living abroad. Israel has been working through international cooperation and international organisations to raise awareness of this issue, thereby keeping it from being securitised.

4.3. EU Membership for Turkey

EU Membership has been securitised by the Turkish authorities. For Turkey, EU membership is an urgent matter, as they consider it vital for not only their own security,

but also for regional security (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2001c; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2003b). In fact, EU membership for Turkey affects security beyond the region, “In the midst of efforts to prevent conflict among civilizations, Turkey’s opening of EU membership talks has been qualified as an important development which will benefit not only Turkey and its region, but will also help maintain global stability” (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005g)⁷². For Turkey, EU membership means that the EU will be better equipped to deal with a series of security issues, from the Israeli/Palestinian conflict to terrorism (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003g; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004e). Moreover, EU membership represents a positive step towards peace and harmony between religions and civilisations, as it offers an example that democratic principles are universal (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002h; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004e; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004c).

In this quest for EU membership there is urgency for Turkey, as EU membership constitutes a priority that demands strong decisive measures in order to be achieved. Because EU membership is a priority, no effort will be spared to achieve it, “EU accession will continue to be one our basic political and strategic goals,’ added the premier,

72. This idea is also given expression in: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005d; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1998a; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1996d; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1996c; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005f; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003d; General Hilmi Özkök Turkish General Staff, 2005.

‘We will ceaselessly work to fully meet the Copenhagen political criteria. We are determined to transform the Copenhagen criteria into Ankara criteria’” (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2003c; See also Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003d). Indeed, for Turkey, being barred from the EU is like building another “Berlin Wall based on cultural discrimination” (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1997a).

To achieve its objective, extraordinary measures have been taken by Turkey. An entire constitutional and judicial order has been altered, and a free market economy is being established (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2001d). An impressive reform programme has been launched in Turkey, laws have been harmonised with EU legislation, and agriculture reform and the Turkish Constitution have been amended (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002f; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2001f; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2004e; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2003e)⁷³. Since 2001, the Turkish Constitution has undergone a major reform process, thereby extending rights and liberties enjoyed by citizens. These reforms have also sought to protect individuals from abuses such as torture and also seek to increase civilian control over the Armed Forces (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2001h; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002b; Directorate General of Press and

73. Turkey has enacted at least 9 harmonisation packages Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006c.

Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2001g). Other concrete measures such as abolishing the death penalty and allowing broadcasts in Kurdish were taken by Turkey (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004c). After taking into consideration EU concerns the penal code was modified, this included removing adultery as a criminal offence (Ibid.)⁷⁴. This reform process, *i.e.* changing Turkish institutions and policies in order to better present itself as a candidate for EU membership, also brought about changes in Turkish foreign policy as stated by then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül: “At this point I would like to note that in the past five months, Turkey’s alignment to EU common positions, statements and draft resolutions on Common Foreign and Security Policy has increased to 94 percent” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005d).

These reforms have been necessary for Turkey in order for Turkey to meet the Copenhagen criteria, thereby becoming more transparent, democratic and respectful of human rights, and this involves thousands of judges, security officials and other states officials (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2004d; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004c). Moreover, it has led to the securitisation of EU membership by Turkey. In order to achieve this goal of EU membership, radical changes have taken place within the internal legal order of the Turkish Republic. Changing laws, policies and committing the entire governmental apparatus to this objective of EU membership can be considered extraordinary measures.

74. See also: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004e; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004a; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003b; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004d.

4.4. Water Resources

Water is a crucial resource for the region, without it there cannot be any agriculture, life and peace in the region. It is peace that Israel refers to when it speaks about water, as the lack of it is considered a crucial problem not only for Israel, but for the whole region (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999c). The lack of water in the region makes whatever reserves that exist extremely important, making them not only a cause of conflict, but also an important element for peace (Ronnie Shaked, 1995; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992). The issue of water scarcity was important enough to be raised during the Barcelona Conference in November 1995 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995c). That same year, the Israeli Prime Minister talked about the need to resolve the water issue in order for peace negotiations to go forward and that the Israeli government was ready to cooperate with the Palestinians in order to develop other sources of water (Ronnie Shaked, 1995).

Taking into account the seriousness of the issue, several measures have been proposed by Israel, including the joint development of “Regional Seawater Desalination Projects” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999b). Additionally, Israel is currently supplying water to Jordan and Palestine, and this includes giving Jordan 50 million cubic meters from Israel’s own sources (Ibid; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995b). Several other cooperation projects are proposed including the, “establishment of an eastern Mediterranean center for the prevention of pollution of the sea and a forecasting and communications network to combat sea pollution” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992). In addition, a proposal was made for establishing “mechanisms of regio-

nal cooperation in technology, research and training in the fields of grazing, afforestation, use of marginal waters, and preservation of propagating material” (Silvan Shalom Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). The “repair and overhaul [of] water systems in small-sized communities in the region” has also been proposed (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994a). During the Fourth Round of the Multilateral Middle East Peace Talks in Beijing and Cairo in 1993, measures on water and the environment were discussed, and these included tackling desertification and water management cooperation (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993c).

Israel dedicates a substantial amount of discourse to this issue of water scarcity and management. It is clearly an important issue for Israel, but limited measures have been taken by the Israeli government. As such, the issue is far from being fully securitised.

4.5. National Issues: Conclusion

In conclusion, there are several issues that are specific to individual actors and have not acquired a security dimension throughout the Mediterranean. Most of these issues have not been fully securitised, although some securitization happened at the first stage of the referent object. The only exception being EU membership for Turkey which can be described as being fully securitised. Perhaps, with time, these issues will cease to incorporate a security dimension, or conversely they will spread to other countries and acquire a Mediterranean dimension in addition to developing a security aspect.

IV. Security Discourse and Intertextualizing: A Mediterranean Identity

In this chapter, we will end our discourse analysis by looking at how Mediterranean security discourse, which we have been using in the previous two chapters, approaches the matter of regional identity and belonging. We will highlight how the themes of a clash of civilisations and of a common Mediterranean history, present throughout security discourse in the Mediterranean, help form a regional awareness, despite the presence of competing discourses of identity in the Mediterranean. We will see that in addition to securitisation, the articulation of these two themes contributes to the formation of an RSC in the Mediterranean, this, setting it apart from other regions. Both shores of the Mediterranean acknowledge that security for them has a regional dimension, that all actors in the Mediterranean need to work together to address these issues. Leaders in the region recognise there is interdependence in the Mediterranean regarding security matters. The RSC in the Mediterranean possesses a conscious dimension, the product of identity building by different actors in the region. Therefore, we will show that there is a Mediterranean identity and an awareness of it in the security discourse of the region. This affects policy through an interaction between security (securitisation) and identity.

Our analysis of official security discourse showed that security perceptions are for the most part viewed through a specific historical perspective, while simultaneously referencing a contemporary concern (clash of civilisations) for the region. This additional layer of discourse complements Euro-Mediterranean security discourse. Although present in the same official texts analysed in the previous chapters, the themes of a common history and clash of civilisations are raised through the referencing in-text of other key texts, notably Huntington's book and Braudel's work on the Mediterranean. Perceptions of security are set within intertextuality. It presents the Mediterranean as a common civilisational space populated by many cultures, but it also solidifies identity allowing the Mediterranean region to be clearly defined and as such to be separated from other regional groupings or identities.

Nonetheless, this construction is not unique; it must compete with other local constructions of identity. The region is no stranger to identity competition; as Arab, Muslim, Jewish, Mediterranean and European identities, among others, are present or have been present throughout. Despite these competing identities, the idea of a developing Mediterranean identity places the various security issues in a specific regional context, identifying a common area of action.

This intertextual discourse helps shape the Euro-Mediterranean region as a common space, thus, creating a sense of belonging. As such, the Mediterranean is referenced as a concrete entity, as it amalgamates different actors thereby influencing security cooperation and securitisation. Cooperation in the Mediterranean, and in particular the Barcelona Process, then becomes a justified project that can oppose a divided region, conflict or isolation of the two shores. The notion of a Mediterranean identity is

touched upon throughout the region and, as we will see, this continues to have a strong influence on the policies of the different actors in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Indeed, several researchers have already analysed this relationship; the construction of identity and policy are linked, subsequently influencing each other (Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 2006; Katzenstein, 2005; McSweeney, 1999). This construction has consequences for policy in the region; and legitimises cooperation between the shores and opposes other more extremist views of North-South relations in the Mediterranean. However, beyond influencing foreign policy, this parallel discourse on identity confirms that there is a unique regional - i.e. Mediterranean - dimension to security and certain security issues; although terrorism, for example, affects states and citizens in all corners of the world, certain regional groups have a particular interest in opposing it. In this sense, this is a 'positive' construction of the Mediterranean emphasising dialogue over confrontation.

There are two main concepts that interact with security discourse: the rejection of a clash of civilisations and a shared Mediterranean history. These two concepts are sometimes associated with specific authors or books. With regards to a 'clash of civilisations' this obviously refers to Samuel Huntington's book *The Clash of the Civilisations* (2002), while the concept of a common history is sometimes associated with Braudel's work on the Mediterranean. These important scholarly contributions are given enhanced credibility owing to the academic credentials of the authors in question (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 55, 56, 68-55, 72, 77). Both *The Clash of Civilisations* and Braudel's work on the Mediterranean, notably *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, can be considered classics that have influenced the

way we perceived the world. Through these works, either in agreement or in opposition, discourse on both shores stresses not only the common interests but also common heritage (Del Sarto, 2003, p. 29). This section will explore these two main concepts present in Euro-Mediterranean discourse and how they create a regional identity. Before proceeding with the main discourse analysis, we will first examine intertextualising, and how this process is generated.

1. Inter-Textual Discourse and Identity: Theoretical Basis

Through the reading and analysis of security discourse, it became clear that securitization in the Mediterranean does not exist in isolation, but rather within a larger discursive environment. Beyond the merely “mutually constitutive” relationship of security and regions, security discourse analysed presents a wider view of the Mediterranean, and its identity and history, thus, it tells us how the different units perceive the region (Bilgin, 2004, p. 273). It also identifies who, in the regional context of the Mediterranean, represents the ‘Other’ and the ‘Self’. This establishes the existence of regional awareness, a realisation of a possible Mediterranean identity, which supports the argument that identity comprises the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ (Stetter, 2005, p. 339).

Identity is “produced through and constitutive of foreign policy, and it is relationally and discursively constituted” (Hansen, 2006, p. 37). Both identity and policy are related as identity is a precondition to foreign policy, but identity is also constructed through foreign policy (Ibid., p. 23; Campbell, 1998; Katzenstein, 2005; McSweeney,

1999; Tuathail, 1997). This Identity-Policy combination is “ontologically inseparable and this inseparability is enacted through discourse” (Hansen, 2006, p. 27). Discourse shows this relational link through the formation of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ identities and the policies that are underpinned by this (Ibid., p. 37). Whilst a national or regional ‘Self’ identity is being constructed, resulting in specific policies, an ‘Other’ also emerges subjected to those policies and attributed an identity by the ‘Self’. This construction of the ‘Other’ is produced in opposition to the ‘Self’ and *vice versa*. Within discourse it is possible to differentiate, for example: civilised *vs* uncivilised, ‘true’ Muslim *vs* ‘false’ Muslim, national *vs* foreign, modern *vs* backward.

This differentiation and linking is visible throughout discourse both in general and key texts. General texts can be composed of policy papers and official speeches (Ibid., pp. 82-87). In the previous chapters we have seen, through discourse analysis of general texts, which issues are perceived as security threats and if extraordinary measures have been taken. These issues and measures are presented in reference to other texts and concepts, building a larger context. These are key texts, specifically quoted or their concepts mentioned in the general texts (Ibid., pp. 82-87). In this case, the key texts and concepts represent major works related to the political science and history of the Mediterranean. Either the key texts themselves or related concepts are abundantly mentioned throughout official discourse. This means that general texts are set within a “shared textual space” with others texts that help shape and create meaning (Ibid., p. 55). Meaning is created by this interaction between current political discourse, present in general texts, and previous key texts, such as academic texts for example. Old texts are placed in new contexts sometimes very different from the one at the time of their

publication. Through cross-referencing, or as Lene Hansen puts it, intertextualizing⁷⁵ (Ibid., p. 55), discourse is essential in constructing and understanding identity and foreign policy. This discursive interaction informs us that there is a conscious regional dimension to security in the Mediterranean that also affects policy (Wæver, 2000, p. 266). Actors understand that they are part of the same region. Therefore, these actors realise the importance of certain regional security issues, and that they can be affected by them. In addition, solving these problems is also dependent on their neighbours.

Throughout Euro-Mediterranean discourses, an awareness of the region, that is, of the Mediterranean as an entity with its own history and facing its own challenges is present. The articulation of the 'Self-Other' division in the Mediterranean creates an identity with spatial, temporal and ethical characteristics (Hansen, 2006, p. 46). Euro-Mediterranean discourse constructs a region that is identified as being the cradle of western civilisation, while others seek to disregard this legacy (spatial), the region has also a common history as opposed to independent histories (temporal) and specifically regarding the Southern Mediterranean a notion of preserving a 'true' peaceful Islam as opposed to a 'false' Islam that preaches confrontation (ethical). Therefore, in Euro-Mediterranean discourse, the 'Other' is not the opposite shore of the Mediterranean or an external invader, but instead those voices or groups that seek to undermine regional construction. Discourse shows a reference to the idea of a Mediterranean history that is shared by both shores, referencing in particular Fernand Braudel and his extensive work on the Mediterranean. In addition, the concept of a 'clash of civilisations' popularised

75. As Lene Hansen clarifies, intertextualizing was first introduced by Julia Kristeva Ibid., p. 55.

by Samuel Huntington is also present in Euro-Mediterranean discourse and is identified as a risk to regional identity. These two elements in the discourse help formulate a Mediterranean identity centred around a common history; one where the region experienced periods of peace and intense interchange (economic, political, cultural and social), and a rejection of those actors who would seek to undermine this past historical experience, by supporting the theory of a clash of civilisation. This realisation of ‘past history’, or as McSweeney would say past choices, helps in determining regional interaction by building the limits within which action is possible or accepted (1999, pp. 11, 214-219).

Therefore, at this stage an analysis of the two important aspects present throughout Euro-Mediterranean security discourse, the notion of a ‘clash of civilisations’ and how this affects the perceptions and identity, is required. Additionally, references to a common history within discourse, featured more prominently in Southern Mediterranean discourse, will be examined.

2. Clash of Civilisations

Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilisations* became an instant classic, its influence went beyond the specific sphere of International Relations departments as it became part of daily culture, and some argue into the sphere of pop culture. Huntington’s book was widely discussed in the media and subsequent to the attacks of September 11th 2001 when it appeared that a clash of civilisations was possible. At the time it seemed not a question of whether a clash of civilisations would happen, but how to prevent it.

This state of mind was not helped by the war in Afghanistan and more importantly the invasion of Iraq. Both operations cemented the concept of the ‘clash of civilisations’ into everyday life, turning Huntington into a common household name and his book into the subject of discussion outside the academic world. It may appear ironic to analyse Huntington in reference to the Mediterranean as he himself did not address the region in his work. The region is absent from his analysis of civilisational conflict, but Braudel’s work is featured by Huntington in order to give greater credibility to his thesis of a ‘clash of civilisations’ (2002; Barbé, 2006, pp. 110-111)⁷⁶. Despite Huntington’s *lapsus memoriae*, his concept of a ‘clash of civilisations’ garnered great attention in the Mediterranean region as it became the object of concern and discourse on the part of regional leaders as we will see in this section. Firstly, we will examine Huntington’s main arguments. Secondly, we will look at how Huntington’s book and the concept of ‘clash of civilisations’ is present in the discourse previously studied and how it affects Euro-Mediterranean identity and policy.

Huntington’s book central theme is “that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post–Cold War world” (Huntington, 2002, p. 20)⁷⁷. Huntington’s book was published shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union at the end of the

76. For an in-depth critique of Huntington’s analysis see Barbé’s *L’Anti-Choc des Civilisations. Médiations Méditerranéennes* Ibid.. In particular Barbé’s criticism of Huntington’s dismissal of the study of ‘Civilisation’ as opposed to ‘Civilisations’.

77. Samuel Huntington’s book is actually the result of an article he wrote and published in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1993 titled *The Clash of Civilisations* 1993. Only later did he publish his book *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*.

Cold War and it marked the end of one world order and the search for the contours of the next. This next world order, according to Huntington, would be marked by potential conflict between civilisations, Islamic, Sinic, Buddhist, Hindu and Western among others (Huntington, 2002, pp. 40-55). Western civilisation will have to face competition from other civilisations that no longer accept the West's dominant position. Relations between these civilisations would be far from peaceful. Huntington describes relations as "troubled, uneasy peace, intense rivalry and cold war", adding that "Trust and friendship will be rare" (Ibid., p. 207). Conflicts in this new world order will occur along fault lines, where civilisations meet, these would usually be low intensity or global high intensity conflicts involving "*core states*" which constitute the major representatives of each civilisation (Ibid., pp. 207-208).

Paradoxically, Huntington sees this renewed importance of civilisations as extremely dangerous, but simultaneously he believes that a civilisation based world order offers the best possibility for world peace. Despite the possibility of war between states, there is an even worst case scenario, that is, the continued expansion of lawlessness throughout the world. This represents barbarism which is the enemy of civilisation, and it is this clash between barbarism and civilisation, not between civilisations, that represents the true threat to world security and peace (Ibid., p. 321). Any civilisation then, protects us from lawlessness and barbarism, regardless of whether it is Western, Orthodox, Sinic, *et al.* Moreover, civilisation offers a structured environment as they are able to achieve an understanding between them. Despite a real danger of a 'clash of civilisations', Huntington argues, that it is these same civilisations that offer the best protection against a future world war (Ibid., p. 321).

In Euro-Mediterranean discourse a ‘clash of civilisation’ is seen as something to be avoided one that would have catastrophic consequences for the Mediterranean. For this reason, it is an important element of discourse and concern for many leaders in the region. Discourse tells us that a ‘clash of civilisations’ must be avoided because the region is indeed at risk of becoming a fault line with all the negative consequences that this would bring. The Mediterranean represents civilisation, in certain cases it is referred to as the cradle of Western civilisation and the birthplace of the three main monotheistic religions, still there are those that see the Mediterranean in terms of conflict, which seeks to undermine Mediterranean civilisation.

2.1. The Clash of Civilisations in Southern Mediterranean Discourse

In Southern Mediterranean discourse, the concept of a ‘clash of civilisations’ clearly helps to shape the ‘Self/Other’ dynamic. More precisely, the rejection of a world view based on a ‘clash of civilisations’ and of those that wish for this clash to makeup the ‘Self/Other’ construction in the Southern Mediterranean. The ‘Other’ actively wishes for a ‘clash of civilisations’, not recognising the common values shared by cultures and societies, ‘he’ is in essence uncivilised. Southern Mediterranean leaders are also concerned by how religion is being distorted, notably Islam, thus becoming violent and incompatible with other religions and modernity. As such, the ‘Self/Other’ construction opposes two views of religion, a moderate view *versus* an extremist one.

As such, the ‘Other’ seeks to create mistrust and hatred as we can see in this excerpt from a speech from the Algerian President:

La convergence méditerranéenne lui offre des possibilités immenses. Construire des passerelles de compréhension et de convivialité, de coopération et d'échanges féconds entre nos deux rives. J'encourage les jeunes de nos pays à devenir les acteurs actifs, attentifs et inventifs pour développer les complémentarités et les convergences qui pourront nous rapprocher et nous unir dans les valeurs universelles de notre patrimoine commun ; pour lutter contre la méfiance et la haine, les frustrations et les atteintes à la dignité (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 1999a).

The Algerian President refers to cooperation, a common legacy and indirectly to peace opposing hatred and conflict. The 'Other' in the Mediterranean is not an enemy state or region, but an extremist ideology that seeks to turn political science 'fiction' into reality. This 'Other' believes in a clash of civilisations and will actively pursue this goal: "They would capitalize on our lack of understanding about each other, to set off an earthquake of anger, resentment, and fear. This applies not only between East and West, but within Eastern and Western cultures" (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2006). Moreover, extremists groups, according to Jordanian discourse, seek to undermine modern society, by creating walls and divisions (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005g). The 'Self' believes that civilisations are based on certain values that are shared, more so in the Mediterranean where there is a common history, and these shared values naturally create an environment for peace, understanding and tolerance. The 'Other' seeks to artificially create conflict, by exploiting a lack of understanding, by creating division and by ignoring the common and universal.

In addition, the concept of a 'clash of civilisations' has an important religious dimension, specifically to the Southern Mediterranean, that also shapes the 'Self/Other' relation. In the Southern Mediterranean differing conceptions of Islam add to this divi-

sion of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. There is a ‘true’ peaceful, modern Islam and a violent, extremist ‘false’ Islam as was argued by the King of Jordan at the Catholic University of America:

[the] ultimate goal is to take back our religion from the vocal, violent, and ignorant extremists who have tried to hijack Islam over the last hundred years. They do not speak for Islam any more than a Christian terrorist speaks for Christianity. And the real voices of our faiths will be, must be, heard (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005c).

In Huntington’s book what he calls Islamic civilisation occupies a central place, and he states that we are witnessing an “Islamic Resurgence”, based on a return to the ‘fundamental’ tenants of the religion in response to encroaching westernisation (Huntington, 2002, pp. 109-110). Within this framework of a ‘clash of civilisations’, religious principles are sometimes used to justify violence against other religions. This realisation was in part responsible for the release of the Amman Message by King Abdullah II:

In November 2004, we in Jordan released the Amman Message. It is an explanation of the true nature of Islam and a call to peaceful coexistence among all human beings. I believe this initiative provides a program for moving forward: to speak boldly against hatred and ignorance ... to work together for the common good ... and to avert a clash that will harm us all (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2006, pp. 1- 2).

This concern over misperceptions between peoples and religions has led Turkey to advance with several initiatives in order to address this issue such as: the ‘Alliance of Civilisations’ project, jointly with Spain, and under the auspices of the UN (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006e; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2005e). The distinction between ‘true’ Islam and the ‘distorted’ views of Islam highlights the majority ‘Self’

and the minority ‘Other’. The Algerian President clearly illustrates this point in one of his speeches:

C’est dans ce cadre, et dans ce cadre seulement, que son action trouvera sa légitimité. Mais, on ne le redira jamais assez, il faut se prémunir des amalgames dangereux, et ne pas se tromper d’adversaires. Les peuples ne sont jamais coupables et ne peuvent porter la responsabilité de la folie meurtrière d’une poignée d’hommes, quelles que soient leurs origines ou leurs nationalités.

L’Islam interdit le crime et lui réserve le châtimeut le plus sévère. Les peuples musulmans n’aspirent qu’à vivre en paix avec leurs voisins en partageant, avec les fidèles d’autres croyances, l’adoration de Dieu, l’Unique et Miséricordieux (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2002a).

We see that there is a minority (‘Other’) that seeks to realise a clash of civilisations in the name of Islam, while the majority wishes merely to live in peace with their neighbours of all religious persuasions.

There is another consequence that this idea of a ‘clash of civilisations’ has in regards to religion, that is, an increasingly negative misperception of Islam from a western perspective and from Europe in particular. The danger of creating false perceptions between religions and peoples is part of Turkish discourse, most notably after the events of September 11th:

The tragic events of September 11 and their repercussions have shown the need to strengthen tolerance and understanding among different cultures to avoid reappearance of deeply rooted prejudices that can surface. The horrifying attacks of September 11 are purely brutal acts of terrorism and they cannot be explained or justified by religious, cultural or any other reasons whatsoever. On the other hand, September 11 has also sparked a growing consciousness of the need for all sides to discuss and attempt to better understand the differences in perceptions, values and interests, as well as to promote tolerance and appreciation for cultural diversity among them. We jointly have a responsibility to address and resolve issues which can lead to divisions within and between our communities, to embrace and value our diversities, and to promote and uphold the values we all share

(Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2002a)⁷⁸.

A manifestation of this threat is present in what Turkey calls “Islamophobia”, as it constitutes a new ill affecting societies, including European society, increasing intolerance and spreading false perceptions about Islam and Muslims in general (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005c; Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006j). This is an issue that is of utmost concern and urgency for Turkey, in the context of the Danish cartoon controversy, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated:

These unfortunate events have created tension almost amounting to a polarization of East and West, and of the Islamic and Christian worlds as never seen before in recent times. For the sake of global peace and safeguarding our commonly held values, I believe it has now become essential that statesmen and politicians act with wisdom and common sense and display leadership in taking the joint actions expected from them (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 2006e).

The Clash of Civilisations influenced Southern Mediterranean discourse. Security discourse contains a backlash against the analysis and conclusions reached by Samuel Huntington. Huntington’s conclusions support confrontation instead of the cooperation that is currently taking place between the two shores of the Mediterranean. In this supposedly natural ‘fault line’ that is the Mediterranean region, Southern Mediterranean security discourse clearly states that a ‘clash of civilisations’ is unwelcome. Discourse shows that the ‘Other’ that seeks to spread hatred and conflict will be opposed by a ‘Self’ that believes in peace and cooperation:

[There are those] who believe that there is, or will be, a “clash of civilizations.” Indeed, opinion polls tell us that this idea, at some level, is held by far too many people in both Western and Muslim countries. What is

78. This idea is also given expression in: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006b.

worse, there are those who want conflict to occur, and are actively working to that end.

For all our sakes, for our common future, we must turn the world's footsteps away from such a path. We need dialogue; a dialogue of deeds, as well as words. That means re-affirming our common interests and values - making sure that all people, especially young people, can share in the great promise of this century - and giving a new voice to the quiet majority: the people of good will across the world (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005c).

The 'Other' also uses religion to justify violence, and takes advantage of tensions between religions to instil division between them; in particular between Islam and the west. This particular concern was echoed by the Chairman of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz: "Unless peace among religions is ensured, world peace will remain a dream" (Directorate General of Press and Information Office of the Prime Minister, 1999). In this context the 'clash of civilisations' is an everyday reality that endangers our global society and through fanaticism threatens the basic value of humanity (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006a). In the Southern Mediterranean national policy will then work to reinforce the 'Self' and cooperation with Europe in the Barcelona Process is part of this policy, as well as fighting terrorism or extremism:

It is because extremists understand the power of our cooperation that they are working so hard to divide the world into hostile camps. We must defeat their strategy. [...] To create the peace and prosperity our citizens need. And together, in partnership, to bring justice, understanding - and a new era of hope (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005h)⁷⁹.

79. This excerpt was taken from a speech given during the 2005 Euro-Mediterranean Summit in Barcelona.

In section 3 this ‘Self-Other’ identity and how it is strengthened by other discursive elements will be examined, notably how the reference to a common and shared history contributes to regional identity creation.

2.2. The Clash of Civilisations and European Union Discourse

European Union discourse also identifies a ‘clash of civilisations’ as something to be avoided or rejected. Subsequently, there is a strong emphasis on creating dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean:

Despite the shocking events in the Middle East, the Mediterranean dialogue has probably never been as necessary as it is today, for we face today the great danger of a real clash of civilisations breaking out. It will do that once our own heads become the places where we wall the cultures off from one another. That is why our task, in these days and in the future, must be to carry on this dialogue between cultures. That must be right at the top of our agenda (The European Parliament, 2002e).

In EU official discourse the term ‘dialogue’ is used quite often, including in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. To Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ the EU opposes dialogue between cultures (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995; Commission of the European Communities, 2003a). The EU sees a clash of civilisations as a serious issue, and different security issues can take a civilisational dimension in the Mediterranean region. For this reason, dialogue between culture is so imperative, not merely an “optional extra”, it is necessary so that other policy initiatives can achieve their desired results (The European Parliament, 2002a). This dialogue has become of increased importance since September 11th 2001 and in 2002 the EU Parliament re-affirmed its importance:

Reaffirms its commitment to helping to strengthen all arrangements for intercultural dialogue and to promote inter-religious dialogue between the partner countries to enable the Euro-Mediterranean peoples to consolidate the mutual respect, understanding and tolerance which they feel (The European Parliament, 2002c).

The presence of racism, xenophobia, intolerance and extremism encourage violence and hatred, dividing the Mediterranean, and these must be fought by promoting a common cultural heritage (The Council of the European Union, 2005c). Beyond discourse, several measures have been taken to facilitate this dialogue, from the funding of the Euromed Heritage Program for the preservation of Mediterranean culture and historic sites to the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean foundation working for dialogue in the region. The European Parliament has taken the lead in recognising common Mediterranean values, throughout the parliamentary debates there are calls to give greater importance to the cultural aspects of Euro-Mediterranean relations in order for the region to be an area of unity, not division (The European Parliament, 2002a; The European Parliament, 2001b).

As with Southern Mediterranean discourse, the EU considers the Mediterranean as the “cradle and vehicle of our [European] civilisation” (The European Parliament, 2001c). In fact, the Mediterranean is seen as essential in developing modern European culture and values, as it references a shared civilisational past (Holm, 2002, 2004, quoted in Malmvig, 2004, p. 10). European discourse recognises the Mediterranean as the birthplace of Western civilisation and of the three main monotheistic religions. Although the region is home to different cultures, the Mediterranean has forged shared values and a common civilisation as stated by MEP Philippe Morillon:

I hope that they will also bring restoration, throughout the Mediterranean region, of this dimension of understanding and mutual respect which, once the difficult phase of decolonisation has been completed and the wounds accompanying this stage have begun to heal, must restore to the Mediterranean that sense of *Mare Nostrum*, that sense that we have of sharing with our colleagues values which are the basis of our civilisation (The European Parliament, 2002a).

The Mediterranean is seen as having the potential to divide or bring together its two shores. Although the Mediterranean was rarely a border, there were times when it divided and today there is a choice to make: either it becomes a shared space that benefits all or it becomes home to division and conflict (The European Parliament, 1996a). The idea of Europe and the Mediterranean as two separate entities, although present, only reinforces the views of those actors who wish for a ‘clash of civilisations’. As was noted in the European Parliament, a European outlook must favour a unified view of the two regions, remembering that:

The European Union itself must take initiatives – development, cultural and, most importantly, peace initiatives – so that the two sides of Europe can stand opposite each other without our again hearing echoes of “Hannibal ante portas” or “Delenda est Carthago” or a modern version of Scipio. There are Europeans on the other side of the Mediterranean and we would do well to remember that (The European Parliament, 2001c).

For the EU, there is considerable concern about preventing a North-South divide in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the ‘Other’ in this case has more to do with culture misunderstanding leading to division in the region. Unlike Southern Mediterranean discourse, EU discourse recognises the sometimes turbulent history of the Mediterranean, but it also believes that whatever differences are present between the shores can be overcome with dialogue.

3. Common Mediterranean History

This second discursive element complements the discourse surrounding the ‘clash of civilisations’. It makes explicit references to a Mediterranean that did not divide, where both shores throughout the centuries created ‘civilisation’, hence calling the

Mediterranean the cradle of civilisation (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1995d). Although not as present as Samuel Huntington's book throughout Euro-Mediterranean security discourse, Fernand Braudel's work on the Mediterranean is brought up on a few occasions. For Braudel, whatever events are currently happening in the Mediterranean, they are seen as merely the indication of slower 'times' that have shaped the region and its 'history'. Behind the current events in the Mediterranean there are larger forces at work, geography and its effect on populations the social history and finally a chronological history of events (Braudel, 1996, pp. 20-21). In Euro-Mediterranean discourse we find a similar argumentation. Behind the events of today and past clashes, there is much more that is shared, that goes beyond specific events, there are other 'times' to be considered as President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali reminds us quoting Braudel:

La Méditerranée a constitué, à travers les âges, un espace unifié et une entité économique et culturelle riche de la diversité de ses composantes. Malgré les différends et les conflits que cette région a connus depuis l'antiquité, l'unité de cette entité méditerranéenne est demeurée intacte. Fernand Braudel l'a si bien exprimé en ces termes : "La Méditerranée, avec son vide créateur, la liberté étonnante de ses routes d'eau, son libre échange automatique, ses terres diverses et semblables, ses villes nées du mouvement, ses humanités complémentaires, est une oeuvre reprise sans cesse par les hommes" (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1993c)⁸⁰.

The discourse studied showed great importance awarded to security but it also showed that this concern was placed in a Mediterranean context including Mediterranean history. In other words, whatever current security concerns are being discussed in the

80. The Algerian President also expresses this idea in Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2005e. Tunisian President Ben Ali also shares this idea in: Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1992a.

Mediterranean region, one needs to remember the continuity provided to the region by these other ‘times’. Making reference to Mediterranean history invokes memories of past unity between the shores, either memories of the glorious Roman Empire which spanned the entire Mediterranean or more tragic memories of European colonialism⁸¹. Furthermore, Braudel’s work represents the opposite of Huntington’s conclusions despite the latter’s use of the former. Whereas Huntington clearly defined, essentialised and attributed geographical limits to his civilisations, Braudel is more cautious notably in regards to the Mediterranean as a space of civilisation(s) (Barbé, 2006, pp. 47, 111-116, 126). Braudel consciously avoids creating boundaries between civilisations, even in the Mediterranean he recognises its place at the crossroads of various influences.

3.1. Mediterranean History and Southern Mediterranean Discourse

In general, beyond specific individual events, the view of Mediterranean history is a positive one. There exists a great Mediterranean religious, philosophical, scientific and social heritage:

Pourrais-je manquer d’évoquer à cet égard, tous ces hauts lieux en Algérie qui, de Cherchell, l’antique Césarée, Timgad, Tipasa, Djemila, Hippone, Theveste, Lambèse, Milev, Madaure et autre Sitifis, gardent la mémoire d’une époque où la Méditerranée unissait, au lieu de diviser, enrichissait

81. It is of interest to note that colonialism, although present in Southern and Northern Mediterranean discourse, features more prominently in EU discourse. In most of the interviews conducted colonialism was brought up. While in Southern Mediterranean discourse colonialism is largely absent, when it is mentioned it is not the only historical period referenced, the crusades or the Arab occupation of the Iberian Peninsula are also mentioned.

au lieu de confronter (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 1999a)⁸².

The Tunisian President also shares this view of a common civilisation. On a visit to Italy he informs the Italian President that the relations between the two countries result from “l’héritage historique et civilisationnel commun et dans l’appartenance au même espace méditerranéen” (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2004a). For Turkey, which always played an important role in the Mediterranean, the Ottoman period is synonymous with a period of harmony between peoples and that this precedent needs to be recognised today: “The peoples of this region could live together in peace and harmony also during the Ottoman centuries. [...] This is not only based on economic and political interests. There is also a humanitarian and moral imperative rooted in history” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003g). In the Southern Mediterranean there is a growing insistence on this common history in the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations:

There are deep and historic ties between our peoples. My region is the birthplace of our common history. For millennia, goods and ideas have crossed the sea between us. The truth is that there is far more to tie us, than to divide us. Together, we can expand and strengthen that middle ground.

In Arabic, the Mediterranean is named al bahr al abyad al mutwasset - the White Middle Sea. The name evokes the white-capped waves of this great waterway - and its central position in our peoples’ history. In European languages, too, the Med has long been named for its role at the middle of the region’s life (King Abdullah II King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2005h).

82. See Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2002b for a speech given by the President of Algeria on Saint Augustine.

Even in Syria this understanding is present, despite the more confrontational view of a former Syrian diplomat at the Barcelona Conference in 1995 (Hani, 2002), but Foreign Minister Al-Shar'a in 2004 shared a more optimistic view:

The historic and cultural framework within which our people have prospered across the shores of the Mediterranean, will become a rich source for the success of this partnership. Syria has continuously worked for seeing an effective European role in our region which would contribute to finding just solutions to the problems we face (SWB, 2004e).

This historic and cultural framework is made up of a past where cultures, religions and languages interacted and coexisted peacefully, resulting in a familiarity with different views and what Tunisian President calls a “brassage culturel” (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2001e).

These past historic experiences of the Mediterranean are present in the discourse analysed, they are used to reassert the shared identity of the region, to show that there is already proof that the ‘clash of civilisations’ is not a worthwhile concept, and that it is based on erroneous facts:

J'ai pensé, Mesdames et Messieurs, qu'à l'heure de la clôture de cette belle manifestation, il n'était pas sans intérêt de procéder avec vous à une halte méditative sur un phénomène capital du monde contemporain, celui du contact entre les civilisations que certains présentent sous forme d'un «choc», voulant ainsi parler du professeur Huntington et de son «clash» des civilisations.

[...]

De fait, mon pays jouit d'une véritable «rente historique de situation», dans cette Méditerranée «berceau de la civilisation de l'homme». Elle fut jadis le centre du monde, et même tout simplement le monde. Cette Méditerranée est, comme le dit un ambassadeur poète, le «carrefour des enchantements sombres et des naufrages clairs» j'ajouterai, pour expliciter ces images, qu'elle est celui des tragédies de l'histoire et de la légende, de la confrontation des cultures et de l'affrontement des idées, ainsi que le lieu géométrique privilégié du surgissement éblouissant des civilisations

berbère, hellénique, romaine, arabe et ottomane. C'est la civilisation de l'olivier et de la vigne, du blé et de l'anis.

[...]

Mais la richesse de la Méditerranée réside dans les cultures et dans les valeurs morales des peuples qui l'entourent et lui donnent vie (Abdelaziz Bouteflika Président de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2003b).

This common civilisation of the olive and the vineyards sets it outside this clash of civilisations, even if it is composed of different cultures and religions. In a different speech, the Tunisian President reminded his audience that the Mediterranean throughout its history has always been a place shared by different cultures, which have peacefully influenced each other (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 2003a). Moreover, according to Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, this Mediterranean civilisational narrative must be taught if the region is to play a role in a globalised world (Président Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Président de la République Tunisienne, 1996c). This Mediterranean civilisation is not one of one culture, but a civilisation of many cultures. The Mediterranean is uniquely located as a 'border' between cultures and civilisations, which allows for civilisation.

3.2. Mediterranean History and European Union Discourse

In European discourse the realisation that a common history unites the two shores is also present although in a more limited manner when compared to the Southern Mediterranean. The 1995 Barcelona Declaration recognises the "links forged by neighbourhood and history" (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995). Despite this, other Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial conferences from 1995 onward make no mention of

these links forged through history, concentrating instead on the dialogue between cultures and the different initiatives designed to foster such dialogue. It is again in the European Parliament debates that the mention of a common history re-appears. In general there is agreement in the European Parliament on a common history, that Europe could not have come into existence without the Mediterranean as stated by MEP Christopher Beazley:

Mr President, the Mediterranean is the cradle of European civilisation. The legacy of ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome shaped our culture, our literature, our very understanding of the common European heritage. Around the Mediterranean the three monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity, Islam – were founded and fostered and spread throughout the known world (The European Parliament, 2001c).

This common history serves as a reminder to the EU of the links that exist between the two shores of the Mediterranean sea. These links go back to the very origins of Europe, they show that both shores have a conjoined history as stated by MEP Ioannis Souladakis:

A few months ago, we had a entire debate because the President of the Commission, Mr Prodi, said that European history dates from the time of Charlemagne. The very name Europe which, as Europeans, we all bear, derives from the name Europa, the daughter of Libya and Poseidon, the God of the Sea. Europa was Zeus's wife, the mother of Minos, Sarpedon and Radamanthe. Why am I telling you all this? Because mythology itself, which is a narrative record of history, highlights the relations which exist between Europe and North Africa (Ibid.).

In addition to discourse highlighting these historic links, there are also references to a more troubled past in Mediterranean history. Even when referring to Braudel, who studied the common and shared history of the Mediterranean, some Members of the European Parliament speak instead of years of hostility between civilisations in the region as stated by MEP Franz Turchi:

Braudel's 'Mediterranean of a thousand things', the ancient civilisations which, for years, have regarded each other with hostility across the Basin,

now have the opportunity to start afresh, setting off along a common path which, through political will and the power of dialogue, will lay the foundations for genuine progress and economic and social development (The European Parliament, 2000a).

European discourse on Mediterranean history, although admitting that it is shared, tends to focus more on the differences and conflicts of the past (The European Parliament, 1996b; Romano Prodi President of the European Commission, 2002b). Thus, in many cases EU discourse differentiates culturally or geographically between Europe and the Mediterranean. Indeed, Romano Prodi refers to “- Europeans and Mediterraneans -” and this separation sets European discourse apart from that of the Southern Mediterranean (Ibid.)⁸³. Furthermore, for the EU, concentrating on the dangerous prospect of a clash of civilisations, as opposed to a past shared history, allows for a discussion to take place on common values in order to work towards peace and stability in the Mediterranean, while still enabling different identities to coexist within the region (Panebianco, 2003a, pp. 180-183).

In summary, for the Southern Mediterranean, this discourse of identity permeates security discourse. The identity of the region is partially based on the rejection of a ‘clash of civilisations’, it being contrary to the values and history of the region. In addition, discourse recognises that there is a common history to the Mediterranean, that the people living in both shores of this middle sea share a past that goes beyond mere historical events, that is the result of geography, population movements and exchange of ideas. This means that there is a Mediterranean identity being built based on the rejec-

83. This idea is also given expression in: The European Parliament, 2001c; The European Parliament, 2000b.

tion of the ‘clash of civilisations’ and the notion of a shared past. Calling upon a Mediterranean identity through discourse affects the policy of Southern Mediterranean states. As such, cooperation between shores is not only desirable but natural; whatever problems the region is facing they can be jointly resolved. A discourse calling on a notion of a Mediterranean identity facilitates a policy that attempts to reconstruct a past image of the region, to uphold its imagined values and vaunt its achievements. For the South Mediterranean, this identity construction complements its participation in the wider European lead Barcelona Process and ENP.

For the European Union, discourse tackles the dangers of a ‘clash of civilisation’ by focusing on dialogue. Simultaneously, discourse acknowledges the role of the Mediterranean in forging European civilisation; it shows that the European Union has a Mediterranean aspect, that its identity was in part forged in the region. Still, throughout EU discourse there is always an ambiguity with its link to the Mediterranean. In regards to the dangers of a clash of civilisations, EU discourse is very clear, but when it comes to a common or shared history of the region it tends to differentiate between European history and Mediterranean history. There are elements of past historical and cultural unity at the basis of EU discourse, but paraphrasing the words of Stefania Panebianco, present Mediterranean identity is being constructed with the help of other elements beyond history (Ibid., pp. 184-185). EU discourse tends to separate the two: Europe and Mediterranean. This discourse will mention that the latter is home to conflict, highlighting that it is an area that needs to be monitored⁸⁴. Policy-wise this allows the EU to en-

84. See also Helle Malmvig and her analysis of security through liberal reforms discourse. She also identifies an EU discourse that sees the Mediterranean as an unstable region, home to conflict that

gage the Mediterranean without bringing the Southern Mediterranean countries into the EU as members, or including the whole region as part of its identity. While for the Southern Mediterranean states a Mediterranean identity is easier to embrace, for the EU, this is still very much a work in progress, as the development of a European identity takes precedence over any other identity.

4. RSC and Common Identity

In the previous sections we have seen how elements of identity are present in Euro-Mediterranean security discourse through intertextualizing. However, both in the EU and in the Southern Mediterranean, the concept of Mediterranean identity is a contested one. Moreover, we will see that this link between security and identity is not exclusive to the Mediterranean. In this section we will start by briefly looking at the ASEAN region as another example of this interaction between security, identity and region building. Finally, we will address contesting identities in the Euro-Mediterranean region and how they affect the construction of a regional identity and policy in the Mediterranean. This will conclude our analysis of security discourse and identity in the region.

4.1. Security and Common Identity: The ASEAN Example

A similar phenomenon is occurring in Asia and in particular in Southeast Asia. In the ASEAN region, the idea that certain ‘Asian values’ are an integral part of region-

threatens Europe 2004, pp. 14-18.

al construction, that there is an ‘ASEAN way’ to deal with security issues, has now become an object of study, “As noted, the ASEAN approach to conflict has been based on certain principles, among them consensus, consultation, an informal and bilateral style, and nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other members. These norms underpin the “ASEAN way” of dispute management” (Nishikawa, 2007, p. 50).

In addition to these values forming an ASEAN way of regional integration and security, there is also an identity dimension present in the different treaties signed by the member countries. In these official documents there is recognition of historical, geographical and cultural ties throughout the ASEAN members (ASEAN, 1976b; ASEAN, 1976a; ASEAN, 2003). Regional leaders have been calling for the promotion of a regional identity, the 1976 “Declaration of Asian Concord” and the “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)” both call upon scholars, writers and artists to foster a regional identity (ASEAN, 1976a; ASEAN, 2003). Despite the lack of progress in some areas - notably economic integration - there are elements that suggest an awareness of the importance of identity (Jones & Smith, 2007, p. 176). In their critical analysis of ASEAN region building, Jones and Smith recognised that despite lack of progress in certain areas, the region is able to construct a ‘Self-Other’ dynamic. Perhaps unintentionally they highlight how the 1997 regional economic crisis created a discourse that opposed ASEAN regional cultures to insensitive western and US dominated international financial institutions (Ibid., pp. 169-172). As with other community building endeavours, the emergence of a “shared set of values” is necessary for the continuation and success of such regional construction (Levine, 2007, p. 102). In the ASEAN region, as

in the Mediterranean, there is an awareness of common values-identity that beyond security, which initially brought them together, furthers integration.

4.2. Contesting Identities

In the Mediterranean region the notion of common identity, although present, has not been fully achieved. In the EU and in the Southern Mediterranean, the idea of a common Mediterranean identity is being contested and must overcome other identities. As we have seen for the EU there is a concern over a clash of civilisations in the Mediterranean, but regarding the idea of a common Mediterranean history there is a much more cautious approach. When dealing with the question of a common history the EU tends to separate between European and Mediterranean history, emphasising in the latter the chronic presence of conflict and instability. For the EU this ambiguity between European and Mediterranean has led to it being involved in a process of construction or reconstruction of the Mediterranean, turning the region into a geopolitical area of concern for Europe and marking what Bilgin calls a return to civilisational geopolitics (2004, pp. 270-273). This concept of civilisational geopolitics, first introduced by John Agnew, refers to a division of the world based on the concept of civilisation. Each civilisation being different from the other. In the Europe of the early nineteenth century this meant the recognition of European distinctiveness and superiority (Agnew p.88). For the EU, and keeping with our own discourse analysis, this civilisational geopolitics is reflected in a vision of a stable Europe as opposed to a Southern Mediterranean from where conflict and threats emanate (Stetter, 2005, pp. 336, 340). The EU perceives the Mediterranean as an area of insecurity from which threats emanate, posing a challenge

to European and regional security. According to Michelle Pace, “the Mediterranean becomes more ‘real’ on the EU agenda when issues are conceived as a threat to Europe’s security [...] Thus, what unifies the Mediterranean in European eyes and the issues that make discourse of the Mediterranean ‘effective’ [...] are security matters” (Pace, 2002, pp. 203-204). Security concerns and the policies associated with them form a substantial part of EU regional creation in the Mediterranean, creating an ‘Other’, which is characterised by elements of insecurity and by boundaries reflecting the discourse. Still, this is not necessarily a case of ‘societal security’, where one’s identity is threatened (Buzan, Wilde & Wæver, 1997, p. 119)⁸⁵. Some specific issues threaten society as we have seen in Chapters 2 and 3. Instead there is a real attempt within this world of security at building a Mediterranean or Euro-Mediterranean identity. The EU must decide if it belongs to this partial European creation or continue with civilisational geopolitics. The EU assigned, almost unilaterally, a Mediterranean identity to a number of states. However, will the EU’s discourse show reluctance to include itself in the Mediterranean and acquire a Mediterranean identity?

While in Europe the concept of a Mediterranean identity is still problematic, this is also the case in some states, most specifically Turkey and Israel. Turkey and Israel are weary of the EU Euro-Mediterranean partnership as both seek closer ties with Europe, and for Turkey EU membership. In the Turkish case it is important to show that it is part of Europe, even if it must separate itself, in terms of discourse, from its Islamic, Arab or other neighbours (Bilgin, 2004, p. 271). Turkish weariness of a Mediterranean

85. Societal security was defined in an earlier work as, “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” Weaver et al., 1993, p. 23.

identity comes from what it perceives as attempts to place it in a Mediterranean space and excluding it from a European one (Ibid., pp. 276-277). For Israel, internal debate on its identity also challenges the notion of a Mediterranean identity for the country. Although there are those in Israel that advocate a stronger commitment to a Mediterranean identity for the country, Israeli identity themes still resist such integration, which runs contrary to a Mediterranean identity (Del Sarto, 2003, pp. 47-49). According to Del Sarto, "Israel's dominating identity themes imply a strong tendency to underline difference" (Ibid., p. 50)⁸⁶. Thus, Israel seems to prefer an isolated position instead of becoming a regional partner engaging its neighbours and the Mediterranean as a whole. This situation is not only limited to Turkey and Israel. For the different actors in the region the question of a Mediterranean identity must balance with other regional identities: Arab, Islamic, Christian, African among others. Although some of these identities have been getting increased media exposure, Mediterranean identity is not a completely new idea. In countries like Egypt and Lebanon the idea favouring a Mediterranean identity was popular among intellectuals in the 1950s, as they saw their countries as not entirely Arab-Islamic, with some links to Europe but not entirely western either (Bilgin, 2004, pp. 272-273). In consequence, each country appears to carefully navigate through the currents of regional identity. This affects policy and ultimately cooperation, not only because of mistrust of European intentions as Malmvig (2004, p. 19) remarked, but also because each actor must decide how much integration is justified given its national identity. As mentioned, in Turkey for example, increase Euro-Mediterranean coopera-

86. Del Sarto identifies the following themes in Israeli identity: Zionism, the Holocaust, the 'Jewish State', the principle of self-reliance and identification with the US Ibid., p. 34.

tion must not come at the expense of its claim to EU membership and European identity.

It would appear that shared security concerns incorporate an awareness of a common identity. This is not to say that in the Mediterranean all actors have accepted this common identity. As we have noted this is still the focus of discussion. Moreover, there is a clear link between culture/identity and the creation of security institutions. This issue is, according to Williams, only the tip of the iceberg as culture endows actors with certain resources and allows the usage of specific strategies, to have a legitimacy or power to deal with security issues (2007, pp. 2-3, 120-124). The question is then if culture/identity is being used strategically in the Mediterranean, as a means for power? Beyond the obvious considerations of power between North and South in the region, one must also consider the power struggle between regional visions (cultural visions). Elements of identity are necessary to cement the region, in our case the Mediterranean, and although there may not be agreement on the issue of Mediterranean identity the fact that it is present throughout the security discourse is indicative of its importance. Moreover, elements of identity also form the basis of power in the region, enabling an appropriate security strategy to develop. We do not ask for identity but merely the recognition of regionness beyond security discourse - but linked to security discourse nonetheless.

In conclusion, by referencing both the 'clash of civilisations' and Mediterranean history the different actors in the region build an awareness of the Mediterranean region. An identity is built within the security discourse through intertextualizing, it sees the Mediterranean as a common space, rejecting a clash of civilisations. Both shores know they are linked, that security issues involve the entire region and that all actors in

the Mediterranean need to work together to address these issues. There is a self-awareness regarding the presence of a Regional Security Complex, causing a willingness to work within the Mediterranean. Cooperation in the region is seen as natural as previously analysed security issues are viewed as existing in a specific regional context. A Mediterranean RSC is then more than a label being given by a researcher, it is also the product of identity building by different actors. As such, policies are not the object of only securitisation but also of constructing a 'Self' and 'Other'. These same mechanisms can be seen in action in the ASEAN region for example, as the interaction between security, identity and region building is crucial for our understanding of the various regional blocs being created around the world today.

V. A Euro-Mediterranean Security Complex: Constellation and Structure

After determining the presence of an Regional Security Complex (RSC) in the Mediterranean region, through the shared security perceptions and the presence of an awareness of a shared identity, we will now set out the characteristics of the RSC in place in the region. This will allow us to establish a complete picture of the present state of Euro-Mediterranean relations. More importantly, it will enable us to determine possible scenarios for future EU action in the region in chapter six.

To determine the exact structure of the RSC in the region requires that we add to our previous discourse analysis a more geopolitical analysis centred on four levels of analysis: domestic, regional, interregional and global (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 51). This discourse analysis leads to the conclusion that there is a RSC in the Euro-Mediterranean region, due to shared securitisation of certain regional issues. The units in the RSC are, however, affected by other concerns, each of which may affect their security perceptions, in other words: their domestic political situation, their relations with non-regional states or regions and superpowers. Through the interactions of the different levels of activity, the RSC gains a specific configuration, that is, its own structure.


In this first section we will examine the four levels of activity that are mentioned above and that constitute the constellation in which the RSC exists, “reflecting as it does

the totality of possible security interrelationships at all levels” (Buzan, Wilde & Wæver, 1997, p. 201). Although as previously mentioned, the regional level tends to be the most active, other levels can affect the structure of an RSC. Consequently, “Each level must be understood both in itself and in how it interplays with the other” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 44). By looking at this constellation we can see possible trends for the future evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, as each level can affect the regional level, changing the RSC’s structure so as to move it towards internal or external transformation, or even maintaining the status quo. For example, the stability of regional states can affect security perceptions and even the power structure inside the RSC. Increased cooperation in the RSC could solidify it, while strong interregional interaction and global power presence could weaken the RSC, possibly changing the RSC’s boundaries.

In the second section of this chapter, utilising the data and analysis from the previous section and also the previous chapters (two and four), we will determine the structure of the RSC, meaning its boundaries, the units that are part of it, and the polarity and the patterns of amity and enmity in the region (Ibid., p. 53). Finally, in the third section, by combining all these elements we will be able to establish the type of RSC present in the Mediterranean referring to different types identified in Buzan and Wæver’s framework (Ibid., pp. 53-64)⁸⁷. With this stage complete, we will then be able to assess, in chapter six, how the evolution of the RSC present in the region may proceed, in particular the roles and responsibilities present for the EU as a Mediterranean security actor.

87. The different types of RSCs are detailed in section 1.2.3 of the first chapter.

Figure 1: Security Constellation



1. Euro-Mediterranean Constellation

Through the analysis of the constellation we will have at the end of this section a picture of the security interrelationships at all levels, and therefore a conception of the factors determining which type of RSC is present in the Mediterranean region. There are four levels of analysis that require our attention: the domestic level, the regional level, the interregional level and finally the global level. Firstly, we will examine the inter-

nal cohesion of each actor: is it a strong actor with what Buzan calls socio-political cohesion (Buzan, 1991, pp. 154, 225)? Secondly, we will examine the relationship between the actors, any conflicts or grievances that might sour relations, as well as examples of cooperation. Thirdly, we will examine the intensity, if any, of interregional relations, notably whether units in the Euro-Mediterranean RSC interact with other regions or *vice-versa*. Finally, we will examine the role of global powers and superpowers in the region, so as to determine the level of their involvement in the Mediterranean region.

1.1. Domestic level

Domestically we are dealing with two different sets of units. On one side we have the EU, neither a superstate nor simply an international organisation. On the other side we have classic nation states with the exception of the Palestinian Authority that is not a sovereign state, as it only represents the Palestinian people in what is now termed the occupied territories. Each of these units has its own internal situation that affects whatever issues are considered a threat. Here the objective is not to achieve a comprehensive analysis of the internal situation of each actor, but to determine their internal cohesion. Of particular interest to our research is to examine which actors are either strong or weak internally, or even failed states, and how this can influence an actor's security perceptions and priorities. For example, a weak internal cohesion of an actor can highlight specific vulnerabilities, notably its concern for the survival or legitimisation of the regime in place, this in turn can influence not only the internal, but also its external

security actions and perceptions. We will start by analysing the EU and its internal dynamics, followed by the Southern Mediterranean units.

1.1.1. The European Union

In this section we will examine the EU as an actor, not only in world affairs, but also internally, so as to hope to determine if it is a weak or strong actor. One of the comments most often made about the EU, is that it is powerless. Regardless of what is decided at the EU level member countries do what they want. This is especially true when debating the EU's capability as an international actor. On the other hand there are also those who perceive in the EU the end of the nation state, and as such see an increasingly powerful Brussels legislating for increasingly weak states; what has been referred to as a 'hollowing out' of the traditional nation states (Laffan, O'Donnell & Smith, 2000, p. 31). As Kelstrup and Williams remark:

In both scholarly and public debate these discussions continue unabated. They are echoed in discussions of whether the governments of the European states are 'gaining' or 'losing' power to the EU, or whether the Union is declining in power *vis-à-vis* its constituent members or other international actors (2000, p. 8).

This debate has had surprising affects relating to questions of foreign policy. In the case of Britain it has made for a strong debate between what Rathbun calls unilateralists and multilateralists, whilst in Germany an image of a strong Europe with an independent ESDP/CFSP helped forged an agreement between the left and the Christian Democrats (2004, pp. 158-178).

Firstly, EU member states are what we can call strong states, as they provide security to their citizens and have stable political systems and institutions. The EU is com-

prised of its member states plus its specific institutions. Moreover, there is also a common currency covering almost all the EU territory, as well as a common space for goods, services and people. Despite the need for unanimity regarding foreign policy decision, the EU manages to have strong influence on member states leading them to consult each other on important foreign policy decision, thus becoming “joint maximizers” (Soetendorp, 1994, p. 118). Member states have also “gradually transferred most of their sovereignty in the field of foreign trade policy to the Community” (Ibid., p. 113). In this context, is the EU as an institution, strong or weak when compared to its member states? A strong EU means a secondary role for its member states, but on the other hand a weak EU would mean the dissolution of the EU or becoming a mere international organisation. International organisations are often criticised for not having any real influence on their members. For Wæver, this is indeed a false debate. It is simply not a question of member states winning over the EU or *vice versa*, but in what he terms a post-sovereign security order, both constitute units in this “quasi-imperial” system, as it is possible to consider the EU as an additional layer of sovereignty, one that does not replace Nation-States (2000, pp. 254-265; Ibid., p. 266; See also Soetendorp, 1994, p. 119).

While the EU can be considered a successful experiment that has existed for 50 years, it is now facing serious challenges that can affect its development as a political entity. European integration has gone through many phases, for example in the 1980’s there was stagnation, while in the late 1990’s great strides were taken regarding European integration, but today, European integration is going through another slow period. The debate over the Constitutional Treaty is one example, as it marked a step forward in

European integration, but after two failed referendums alarm bells were sounded out over the EU's capability to evolve institutionally. The situation seemed to have been rectified by the agreement on the new Lisbon Treaty which was only to be ratified by referendum by a few countries, the remainder resorting to parliamentary ratification. The Irish 'no' vote called into question once more the model of European integration as proposed by the political leaders of member states. Therefore, some differences are then possible between citizens and leaders in reference to the speed of integration (de Vries, 2007, p. 364). This manifests itself as a second obstacle facing the EU, that is, the so called 'democratic deficit'. This means that the EU is not fulfilling its obligations to its democratic ideals and that too much power is in the hands of non elected officials or experts who decide in secret. The argument that the EU has a democratic deficit is one of the most used arguments against the EU. There are certainly improvements that can be made to EU institutions and how they operate, however, as Diez comments the way EU institutions operate is not that different from the how national institutions operate (2006, p. 429).

Despite these challenges, the EU now plays a preeminent role in the lives of European citizens and in the affairs of its member states. National policies and politics are now undergoing "Europeanisation", as it refers to how national institutions and behaviour have altered due to interaction with EU institutions (Checkel, 2006, pp. 406-497; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006, p. 397). This 'Europeanisation' affects how member states conduct their affairs both internally and externally. Internally, it is important to note that EU law has primacy over national law, and European courts can overrule national laws and court decisions. In some cases becoming the equivalent of a 'Supreme Court', being

the last appeal court a state or a citizen can address regarding certain legal matters (Temple-Lang, 1996 quoted in Laffan, O'Donnell & Smith, 2000, p. 16). While national parliaments legislate in almost every area, they must take into consideration EU guidelines that set the legal parameters for different fields; because if they overlook and/or ignore European legislation they risk having to modify their legislation or seeing it rendered null and void, therefore, having no legal force. Moreover, there is an increasing push to allow certain areas to be the exclusive domain of the EU, mostly in economic matters that have a high EU dependence. Other areas that are also becoming increasingly 'europeanised', include Justice and Home Affairs, which have seen increasing cooperation in border control and law enforcement (Laffan, O'Donnell & Smith, 2000, p. 17). Foreign policy, constitutes another area where the EU has gained new powers and responsibilities. In summary, all member states, the European Commission and the European Council have been developing a common foreign and security policy and common defence policy mechanisms (Ibid., pp. 172-178). In this new European system, nation states must compete with civil society in general, and partisan political groups in particular, for influence on European issues (Jensen, Slapin & Köning, 2007, pp. 404-405; See also Hix, Noury & Roland, 2005, p. 210).

These achievements in European cooperation have not always been unanimous and without setbacks. Some member states withdraw and/or abstain from certain treaty clauses or agreements. As such, not all 27 member states adopted the Euro as their currency, although new members had to comply with EU requirements and adopt the single currency. Britain negotiated an exclusion from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

and with regard to the CFSP, the Balkans crisis and the more recent Iraq war showed that there is still much to do in order to harmonise EU policies.

At present, the EU's power is not complete, even regarding internal affairs within its territory, and not all member states agree with greater integration. Indeed, at times certain member states can perceive the EU as a threat to their national interests. However, most of the time only marginal sectors of civil society in EU member states wish to abolish the European Union. According to Laffan *et al.*, in today's Europe, official nationalism (as advocated by states) has for the most part been re-imagined in order to place the idea of the nation and national interests within the European project, while political nationalism, centred on the nation state and often associated with right wing political parties, has diminished since the end of Second World War, and is only present in certain social classes (Laffan, O'Donnell & Smith, 2000, pp. 19-21). Simultaneously, a new European regionalism has emerged that calls for a greater say in European integration by the local and regional communities (Ibid., pp. 19-21). The EU and its institutions are at the centre of a complex network of interactions where by member states still have a crucial role to play in the functioning of EU institutions (Walker, 2000, p. 28; Laffan, O'Donnell & Smith, 2000, p. 15).

Wæver went further regarding the EU's place in the security organisation of the region; he sees it as an 'Empire' centred around Brussels with other concentric circles of varying influence surrounding the core (Wæver, 2000, pp. 254-265). The EU's influence is strongest at the core, but as we move away from the core the autonomy of individual units increases. In this context, the EU views security from a consensus building perspective that is dependent on other actors. Therefore, in order to consolidate itself as

an actor it looks at areas of security that single members alone cannot deal with appropriately, as these are often non-classical cross-borders threats that could affect all its members states. Issues such as terrorism or illegal immigration cannot be pinpointed to one specific location, as they have components both outside and inside Europe. In their case, the EU as a supranational actor can facilitate the fight against these threats by organising pan-European efforts. The EU has put in place a set of impressive regional cooperative initiatives, and complex frameworks have been setup for countries that border the EU, not only in the Mediterranean but also those that border with Russia, Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

Is the EU a strong or weak actor? Currently, the EU is weak, although it is not about to disintegrate as an actor. How does this fact influence its security perceptions? The EU's authority is still developing and uneven, this despite having a degree of power over its member states and the presence in certain sectors of civil society of a desire for greater integration, with more power and responsibilities being transferred to specific EU institutions. However, regarding security and foreign policy, the EU is still dependant on its member states. Furthermore, the linking of nation and state in the European project has still not been achieved, despite the inclusion into official nationalism of a European dimension. Nonetheless, the EU can certainly become a strong actor, and is perhaps at the threshold of doing so as it advances further into this post-modern era as we will see in section three of this chapter.

1.1.2. The Southern Mediterranean States

The Southern Mediterranean comprises of 11 classical Nation-States in addition to the Palestinian Authority and these constitute the 12 units of the region. Internally, we can divide them into two sperate categories: Turkey and Israel which are considered as democracies or as close to the ‘liberal’ definition of democracy in the West as is possible, i.e. the existence of multiparty elections, with freedoms guaranteed by the constitution and an independent judiciary. With regard to Turkey and Israel there continue to be questions regarding certain practices, for example Turkey has frequently been accused of violating human rights, most notably by the use of torture and by arresting anyone who speaks ill of the country and its institutions. For its part, Israel continues to face questions regarding its treatment of the Palestinians living and working in its territory. As for the other Southern Mediterranean actors, while most have constitutions that appear democratic, the actual system can be far from democratic. In most cases a one party system exists, where a ruling party has been in power for several years, if not decades, and any opposition is highly controlled at best, or actively repressed in the worst case scenarios. In Morocco and Jordan, the monarchy plays an important role, as the King is responsible for governing, controlling the Armed Forces and exercising direct power despite the election and the nomination of a prime minister who represents a party loyal to the King. In this context, the legitimacy of state institutions is contested, in the words of Joffé “few people in the Middle East would deny that the Middle Eastern state has long been in crisis. The simple fact is that few, if any, governments in the

Middle East are considered legitimate or legitimized by the populations over whom they rule (Joffé, 1998, p. 61).

With the exception of Turkey, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the regimes in the rest of the Southern Mediterranean, whether republics or monarchies, have been in place since the independence of these countries after the Second World War. Prior to independence, they were either colonies or protectorates of European powers. As for Turkey and Israel, the former evolved from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, and the latter was created in 1948 as the Jewish homeland. In the case of the Palestinian Authority, it was formed after the 1993 Oslo Accords, as the national state of the Palestinian people, representing the “first politically autonomous entity on Palestinian soil following [the accords]” (Jamal, 2001, p. 1). The rest of the countries in the Southern Mediterranean emerged as modern nation states after the withdrawal of the colonial powers from the region. Some of these countries had a strong historical and geographical past from which they established both their borders and legitimacy, such as Egypt or Morocco, whilst others had few references points from having been part of the multinational, multiethnic Ottoman Empire. The modern nation state, as opposed to the multiethnic empire, in theory offered a direct link to those governing the state, abolishing any intermediary level of decision making and mediation (Mutin, 2005, p. 54). However, the internal makeup of these new states made this direct link difficult to achieve and justify. These new nation states were a nation only in name, having to balance sometimes several communities within one state. The leaders of these countries had the difficult task of creating a nation where there was none before, while using a model that was not entirely suited to the situation (Hinnebusch, 2006, pp. 377-378; Joffé, 1998, p. 62). This situa-

tion of utilising the western concept of the Nation-State throughout the Southern Mediterranean has contributed to creating problems of legitimacy for states in the region *vis-a-vis* their populations (Joffé, 1994, p. 5). The many dimensions of the modern Southern Mediterranean state, the ethnic, religious and cultural comprise a complex puzzle that resisted the creation of a singular nation state. The replacement of ancient structures while at the same time creating modern ones created problems of legitimacy for governments, ultimately the Nation they hoped to create became contested (Mutin, 2005, p. 54). This situation is exacerbated by the fact that governments in the region hailed from the same party or elite since independence, this situation has not helped the creation of a national identity. Participation in the nations' political matters is a closed affair, as authoritarian regimes are unwilling to open the political arena to other voices for fear of losing power (Chourou, 2002, p. 31; Albrecht, 2005, p. 389). Instead elites promised development and modernisation, as well as a strong brand of nationalism that opposed their nation against its neighbours in the hopes of sustaining their rule (Leveau, 1993, pp. 254-255).

Established after the end of colonialism, the current regimes had to fight for their survival, having been challenged not necessarily by other states, but by other ideologies that sought to replace the national regimes (Hinnebusch, 2006, p. 378). Both Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism present opposite views of the region, based either on Arab or religious Islamic heritage. Pan-Arabism saw its peak in the 60's and 70's, calling for the construction of an Arab Nation, based on a common Arab culture. This was the official ideology of several states in the region, leading Egypt and Syria to form a short-lived union the United Arab Republic between 1958 and 1961. It represented a

revolutionary ideology, that helped to legitimise newly independent Arab regimes, but only had that initial success in Egypt and Syria. This attempt at an Arab Nation suffered innumerable setbacks, Egypt tried to take over Syria during the short-lived Union, and within the Baath party there were often violent divisions. There was also a division between the so-called revolutionary Republics and the conservative Monarchies. In addition to these difficulties, constant Arab defeats in wars against Israel helped to discredit the ideology and the regimes that promoted it. Another ideology that contests the nation state is Pan-Islamism. It calls for the unity of all Muslims and the application of Islamic principles as a political ideology, as a guide to organising civil society, including the application of *sharia* Law. Proponents of Pan-Islamism advocate the unification of all Muslims under one regime, a Caliphate, thereby abolishing all borders between Muslim States (Mutin, 2005, p. 61). Islamists gained their support due to the failure of modernity, and they are strong critics of what they see has an alien western system of government. Modernity, and by association, the nation states have not delivered on their promises of prosperity, security and equality, instead they have lead to poverty, corruption and insecurity (Ibid., pp. 58-59). While Southern Mediterranean regimes were trying to achieve westernisation, their failures became the breeding-ground for anti-western sentiment. This situation has given rise to several violent extremists movements. The struggle for the hearts and minds of a disenfranchised well-educated youth, both in rural and urban areas, who feel they have no place in the current regime is ongoing. Presently, more than Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism is a source of concern for the Southern Mediterranean states.

In this attempt to create a nation and a national identity, the previous arrangement between communities and more importantly their relationship with the governing power changed. During the colonial period the different communities had some influence in the decision-making process and were able to organise their lives with relative independence⁸⁸. However, following colonial administration European drawn borders were kept and the building of the nation state began. This meant that privileges previously enjoyed by certain minorities were abolished, mediation of disputes and other issues were no longer addressed by the local community but were dealt with at the top by the head of state (Mutin, 2005, p. 54). As such, expectations were high, but as results were not meeting expectations the legitimacy of these regimes and their leaders began to be questioned. The promises of the modern world were never achieved, thus the field was left open for new forces to try and reclaim legitimacy from the nation states of the Southern Mediterranean. Even conservative monarchies, such as Morocco and Jordan, have not escaped criticism from Islamist forces despite the fact that Islamic principles have been included in family law. Despite efforts from all states in the region to appease these forces, the nation states of the Southern Mediterranean have not been strengthened enough so as not to feel threatened by these opposition forces.

This has consequences for the security perceptions of these states. As opposition forces started to contest the regime's stranglehold on power, greater measures were taken to quell any unrest. Repression and co-optation have been the methods of choice, the

88. Algeria being an exception as it was considered part of French national territory, which meant that French administrative structures were in place, and the territory was administered by French nationals almost exclusively Leveau, 1993, pp. 248-250.

latter being quite common in Egypt, allowing for the illusion of a multi-party system, while in fact facilitating control over the opposition in exchange for resources and political appointments (Albrecht, 2005, p. 384). These regimes have been faced with an organised and sometimes armed opposition, not only from the left, but more recently from extremist Islamists groups that have called for the abolishment of the current regimes and replacing them with structures that reflect their ideology. In most cases Islamist organisations not only denounce government oppression and lack of freedom, but they also substitute the states' authority by providing basic services, such as tackling poverty, hunger and providing medical care (Chourou, 2002, p. 27; Leveau, 1993, p. 257). In this way they act as competitors to the State, further delegitimising it. Internal stability is then extremely important for the Southern Mediterranean countries, as the continuity of the regimes is at stake, so any activity that disturbs the internal stability of the state is immediately opposed by the security forces using all means at their disposal. Issues such as terrorism that influence the existing regime are obviously considered a threat to national security. For example, countries like Egypt and Algeria have been fighting veritable civil wars against terrorist organisations. With no other means of mediating the demands of society, violence can become a route of expressing grievances. Concern over internal stability also extends to migratory movements and therefore illegal immigration. Migratory movements from Sub-Saharan Africa have the potential to destabilise the country. With thousands of immigrants waiting in the Southern Mediterranean to cross into Europe, the strain on resources and society can trouble existing regimes. Other issues such as regional conflicts, including the Israel/Palestinian conflict, gain an internal dimension and are not only being presented as a threat to the existence

of the nation, but also has means to justify the continuation of the regime (Hinnebusch, 2006, p. 378). Therefore, internal security and stability is of extreme importance to the Southern Mediterranean, as the weakness of these regimes dictates that attention be given to opposing any movement or organisation that calls for a change of leadership in national institutions.

These same dynamics and conflicts are also present in the Palestinian Authority (PA). Formed as the result of a long struggle for independence, the PA is not yet the nation state desired by the Palestinians. Instead, it offers autonomy under the watchful eye of the Israeli government and the international community. Additionally, it must deal with incursions from the Israeli military and internally it faces many of the same challenges and difficulties as its Arab Southern Mediterranean neighbours. There are problems relating to legitimacy, undemocratic practices, corruption and extremist Islamic ideology (Jamal, 2001, pp. 5-10, 13; Frisch & Hofnung, 2007, p. 340). Although independence is very much desired, the PA has not been able to establish itself as a legitimate representative of the Palestinians. The Fatah dominated PA “is caught between its endeavours towards independence on the one hand, and the establishment of a stable and legitimate regime on the other” (Jamal, 2001, p. 5). It has achieved neither democracy and prosperity, nor independence. With the Hamas victory in the 2006 elections, the already weak PA was further weakened by the withdrawal of western financing and the Fatah-Hamas conflict that saw the Fatah party lose control of Gaza to Hamas⁸⁹. Afterwards, a new government was formed without Hamas which was recognised by the

89. Western powers refused to support a government headed by the Hamas movement since they consider Hamas a terrorist organisation.

western powers and Israel. Currently, Palestinian territory is divided in two, with Fatah controlling the West Bank and Hamas controlling Gaza. In consequence, further progress towards independence is now stalled.

In Turkey, the current system is also perceived to be under threat, as issues like terrorism are of extreme importance. The creation of a modern secular state was not without difficulties, and even today the state of Turkish democracy often hangs by a thread. In Israel, regular elections and changes of government provide for a relatively stable state despite the complex Palestinian situation which has important internal consequences for the Israeli state. Whilst the Palestinian territories had no self government or autonomy this was very much an internal problem, however, the situation presently is more complex, with autonomy and the creation of Palestinian institutions one could argue that it is no longer Israel's problem. The violence, notably the terrorism that Israeli society faces, is presented as coming from external enemies that seek to destroy the state of Israel. However, the final status of Jerusalem, the creation of a Palestinian state and the fact that thousands of Palestinians still depend on Israel for work are issues that still dominate Israeli state-society debate. Nonetheless, Israel's own citizens do not question the existence the of the state, and wish for it to continue. In Israel, nationalism and the nation state have flourished and fulfilled at least some of the expectations of Israelis.

After independence, the Southern Mediterranean saw the emergence of the nation state throughout the region determined by pre-colonial period borders. However, the concept of a singular unified Nation based on national dimensions had to compete with other identities. A Tunisian or Egyptian identities had to compete with an Arab or

Muslim identity. In the case of Jordan it must juggle two nations, the local tribes and the Palestinian population (Joffé, 1994, p. 13). Even in Turkey, identity is not clearly defined, as Turkish nationalism is confronted by a Kurdish minority, a Muslim dimension and European aspirations. However, in Israel the coming together of a nation state seems to have achieved far greater success than in its Arab neighbours. That is, Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people, *i.e.* Jewish State, ultimately becomes home to the Jewish Nation. In Israel, nation and state seem to be in unison despite encompassing an Arab population and a Christian minority. In general, the internal dimension occupies a very important place in the security perceptions of the Southern Mediterranean states. This is due to the fragility of most regimes that have to contend with alternate ideologies, especially Islamism, that seek to undermine the nation states in the region. This situation calls for extraordinary measures to be taken to protect the state and its leaders as the sole authority in their respective countries, as has been demonstrated in Egypt and its ongoing post-1981 State of Emergency (Albrecht, 2005, p. 382). The stability of the state, and the safety of those who govern it, is of paramount concern in most of the Southern Mediterranean. Consequently, terrorism remains of concern to these countries along with immigration as these issues could unbalance an already delicate socio-political environment. In addition, in order to bolster national belonging, Southern Mediterranean states have in the past resorted to instigation of a perceived threat from neighbouring states. Therefore, security for the region is not simply a matter of protecting national territory. It is also ensuring the survival of the incumbent regime, thereby protecting the benefits enjoyed by the privileged few, while controlling the many underprivileged with a fabricated notion of national identity.

1.2. State to State relations (Regional Level)

This section will examine the levels of security interaction and interdependence in the region. In other words, it will examine major developments that affect the region and push actors to interact in the Mediterranean. This section complements the discourse analysis completed in chapters two and three by looking at the type of interaction between states, and its intensity, that has occurred in the region, albeit from a more historical and political perspective. Examining regional security interaction and interdependence will be useful not only to determine the strength of the region, but also to help ascertain the polarity and the patterns of amity and enmity in the Mediterranean⁹⁰.

In order to ascertain a clear picture of the importance of the regional level, the number of issues that are interstate and their intensity will be considered. Interaction can then be of the Westphalian-style where states balance against each other and perhaps engage in armed conflict over territory. On the other hand, interaction could be more institutionalised and peaceful, but still quite active. Regional interaction could, theoretically, also be non-existent, as states can, for various reasons, concentrate their actions internally and only have limited contact with their neighbours. By referring to the previous discourse analysis, and bringing in additional political developments, we will be able to measure the level of regional activity in the Mediterranean context. As a

90. Buzan and Wæver consider that while the regional level is not necessarily the most active in a RSC or the dominant level, it is important that it be active for an RSC to exist 2003, p. 52.

starting point, an examination of the EU's relations with its neighbours in the region, followed by a similar analysis of interaction in the Southern Mediterranean is required.

As we will see in the Mediterranean, inter-state dynamics still dominate the region. Throughout most of the Southern Mediterranean a Westphalian mind-set still prevails despite changes that are occurring throughout most of the international system (Dris, 2008, pp. 252-253; Behrendt & Hanelt, 1996, p. 123; Wæver & Buzan, 2000, pp. 77-78; Hinnebusch, 2002a, p. 1). However, components of a system based more on co-operation and multilateralism can be identified, although it would appear that this is happening slowly.

1.2.1. The European Union and Inter-State Relations

Security in the Mediterranean has been an important factor for regional 'unity'. Already in 1975 the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Helsinki Act recognised the "indivisibility of security in Europe and the Mediterranean" (Calleya, 2005, p. 61). As Calleya further illustrates, the case was made in 1975 that for Europe to ignore the Mediterranean would mean ignoring its own history and identity (Ibid., p. 61). Furthermore, Europe also needed to participate in Mediterranean affairs in order to have any influence in this region, and that instability in or near the Mediterranean, notably in Iraq, called for regional crises prevention mechanisms (Ibid., p. 61). However, the first substantial initiatives appeared in the late 1980s early 1990s. One such initiative was the 5+5 Mediterranean dialogue that deals with transnational security matters. This was launched in 1990, involving France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania and Malta. In the 1990s, the former colo-

nial powers of France and Italy still maintained strong economic and social links to the region. As such, other initiatives such as the Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean were also set-up to further enhance political and economic cooperation. While European and Southern Mediterranean states worked on greater cooperation, a number of events, including the Madrid Peace talks (1992), brought this situation to fruition and culminated in the 1995 Barcelona Process. Another step leading up to the Barcelona Conference was established by the enlargement of the EU southwards in the 1980s that included Greece, Portugal and Spain as full members of the then European Economic Community (EEC). These three countries, along with France and Italy, started to lobby for Mediterranean security to be tackled within the EU. In the early 1990s, geopolitical conditions started to change and a growing awareness by the EU and some of its member states of the importance of their southern border was enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration. As Thierry Fabre states, the Barcelona Process was an European idea, an answer to the changing reality in the region due to:

- The need to ensure good relations with the Arab World after the first Gulf War, notably Europe's neighbourhood.
- The Civil War in Algeria and the fears of an Islamist take-over.
- Europe needed to ensure the success of future Israeli/Palestinian negotiations after the Madrid Conference since it was affected by this long-standing conflict. Peace seemed finally within reach between Israelis and Palestinians.
- To counterbalance the influence of eastward expansion after the fall of the Berlin Wall on EU policymakers, Southern Mediterranean countries believed a Mediterranean initiative was crucial to the EU (Fabre, 2007, pp. 219-220).

At the invitation of the European Commission, all Southern Mediterranean countries including Israel gathered in Barcelona. The declaration that was signed by all participants established the three areas of cooperation: political, economic and social.

In 1995 the EU was already a formidable economic powerhouse, but it had given its first steps in becoming an international actor earlier. With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 the road was open to a common foreign and security policy. European economic power transformed the EU into an important actor in the Mediterranean, but security-wise it was the 1991 Maastricht Treaty that laid the foundations for greater European intervention in the Mediterranean region. Since 1995, the EU has had to intervene in a multitude of crises with mixed results. The EU had to deal with instability in the Balkans, first with the break-up of the Yugoslav Republic and afterwards with the crisis in Kosovo. At first it tried to handle both situations on its own, but unable to do so, it had to accept an American intervention. Since then, it has been more successful in peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts, and with regards to Kosovo the EU agreed on a common policy in order to address the recent Kosovar declaration of independence. Furthermore, the EU is part of the Quartet attempting to achieve a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. In addition to these efforts, there was an attempt to establish a Charter for Peace and Stability for the Mediterranean. Despite initial enthusiasm, the project seems to have been put on the back-burner for the time being with no hints of when it might re-appear as a priority in the Euro-Mediterranean region (Motahari, 2007). Parallel to these developments, the EU has also been at work on the defence front: a European naval task force (Euromarfor) has become operational in the Mediterranean, as well as the Eurocorps that has been active in peacekeeping in

the Balkans. In 2004 the concept of EU Battlegroups was approved and become operational in January 2007⁹¹. They consist of approximately 1500 soldiers who can intervene in peacekeeping or conflict prevention missions,.

Regionally, the EU has been trying to become a more relevant international and Mediterranean actor, while at the same time it has been institutionalising relations with its Southern Mediterranean partners. The EU is slowly acquiring both material and institutional means to act in the region. It was only after the Cold War that Europe started to interest itself in Mediterranean affairs, as European attentions were not only refocused towards the East, but also southwards. Instability in the Mediterranean became an important concern for Southern Europe in particular, but it is through the EU that efforts to ensure a peaceful and prosperous region are being channelled. While member states still enjoy great independence and some have strong links to Southern Mediterranean countries, they now work within the EU institutional framework in order to set out their respective foreign policy priorities.

1.2.2. Southern Mediterranean and Inter-State Relations

Southern Mediterranean countries seem to have remained spectators to region building, although they participated in the Barcelona Process and the following Euro-Mediterranean initiatives, they have not fulfilled their own expectations in regards to regional integration. Instead, many inter-state conflicts still need to be resolved, and as Wæver and Buzan recognise, there is an important Arab versus ‘Other’ dimension,

91. One Battlegroup in particular is composed of forces from Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal and seems to be tailor-made for operations in the Mediterranean if the need arises.

Arab/Israeli or even Arab/Iranian conflict for example, but there is also a very strong Arab versus Arab dimension, fuelled by feelings of domestic and regional insecurity (Wæver & Buzan, 2000, pp. 76-80). Although the Arab/Israeli conflict has created solidarity among Arab countries it is not enough to deter disagreements, distrust and conflict between them (Lebovic, 2004, pp. 183-185).

The Southern Mediterranean has been witness to several conflict flashpoints, the longest and most destructive being the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. However, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey and Tunisia have been, or are still involved, in conflicts with their neighbours (Said Aly, 2000, pp. 47-48). In the Maghreb the issue of the Western Sahara has led to fighting with the POLISARIO independence movement. Although no agreement has been reached on the future of the territory, currently tensions have eased. However, this issue has also led to tensions with Algeria, with Rabat accusing Algeria of supporting the Polisario (Hernando de Larramendi, 2008, p. 181). This stalemate has kept strained Moroccan-Algerian relations, and this has had severe consequences not, only because of the heavy burden military expenditures represent in both countries' budget, but it has also hindered the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) project of regional integration from going forward (Ibid., pp. 177, 193).

Egypt and Jordan have fought two major wars against Israel and are still very much concerned over the situation in their region despite having signed peace treaties with Israel. Israel, has fought nearly all its neighbours in addition to the Palestinian population, and is still concerned over its security, especially as Syria and Lebanon still remain hostile towards Israel. Indeed, Syria is still technically at war with Israel over the Golan Heights and Syria has been accused of actively supporting terrorist organisations

in Lebanon and Palestine. Lebanon's Southern region, which Israel previously invaded in 1982, was controlled by the Hezbollah movement until recently, and this region was used to launch attacks on Israel. In the summer of 2006, following the capture of Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah, Israel launched military operations in the area, which by almost all accounts were judged to be a failure. This led to Hezbollah becoming a bigger player in Lebanese politics, as its reputation was enhanced by the 'victory' over Israel.

Finally, in regards to Turkey, its situation is unique in the region. It is a candidate country for EU membership, and it enjoys good relations with Israel. Its main regional security issues concerns its Kurdish minority that lives across Turkish, Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian territory. This has led Turkey to conduct military operations in Northern Iraq and threaten Syria with military action if it not did expel PKK fighters from its territory (El-Shazly & Hinnebusch, 2002, p. 79). As we can see, territory and boundaries are still a major source of tension and conflict in the region, in part because of how borders were established after independence (Tétreault, 2004, pp. 135-136).

Terrorism constitutes an additional concern. In the last decades, there have been a number of terrorist attacks in Morocco, notably in Casablanca. Terrorism has also been a problem in Algeria leading to a civil war between Islamists and Government forces. Egypt has been the target of several terrorist bombings most notably in tourist locations. Israel and the Palestinian territories face terrorist attacks and constant military operations. Lebanon has also had several terrorist attacks notably aimed at political leaders. Terrorism in the region is not limited to state borders, it moves across them affecting relations between states in the region, adding to the already complex geopolitics in the region. Countries like Libya and Syria have been accused of actively supporting

terrorist organisations. Libya has had to deal with a severe economic embargo after the Lockerbie Bombing suspects were found to be Libyan citizens. The government in Tripoli refusing to hand the suspects over was excluded from the Barcelona Process.

Interstate tension and terrorism have created an environment fraught with instability and not conducive towards cooperation. Unlike the Northern Mediterranean which is part of the EU, southern efforts for regional integration have thus far left much to be desired by not achieving the objectives set out during previous regional summits⁹². Attempts at regional integration have not managed to overcome the difficulties and animosities present in the region. Organisations such as the Arab League, the UMA or the African Union (AU) have not managed to usher in a new, more cooperative environment (Fawcett, 2005, pp. 183-184; Dris, 2008, pp. 253-257). In the case of the UMA, its objective was the creation of a common market by 2000⁹³. Instead countries such as Tunisia, Morocco, and more recently Algeria, have negotiated treaties with the EU making them better integrated with the European common market than with the economies of their Southern Mediterranean neighbours, and it is expected that Libya will follow this trend (Calleja, 2005, p. 34)⁹⁴. In the case of Libya, since handing over the Lockerbie bombing suspects it has been making a slow comeback into world affairs and with the embargo lifted, companies are now free to invest in Libya's vast oil and gas reserves. Following the end of sanctions, Libya, with EU encouragement, has been

92. One such objective was a Mediterranean free trade area by 2010, it now seems rather unlikely at this stage that a free trade area will be achieved.

93. The UMA was founded in 1989 and it includes: Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania.

94. Egypt formally applied to join the UMA in November 1994 at the Algiers Summit.

taking small steps to integrate into the Barcelona Process. However, Libya still must accept the Barcelona *acquis* which so far has not happened. For the Southern Mediterranean countries it seems much easier to accept and participate in European-led regionalist initiatives than Southern-led ones. When Egypt was excluded from the 5+5 meetings it immediately put forward a proposal for a Mediterranean Forum which, “was designed to slow down the momentum of the 5 + 5 formula and replace it with a pan-Mediterranean formula. Fortunately for the Egyptians, the Libyan-western crisis broke out in 1992 and the Europeans decided to postpone the Euro-Maghreb summit indefinitely” (Selim, 1997, p. 71).

In the Eastern Mediterranean, relations are marked by intense activity and conflict (Calleya, 2005, p. 25). This tension centres around Israel, its existence and geographical dimension being the main reason for conflict with its neighbours. Despite Egypt and Jordan signing peace treaties with Israel, cooperation in the region is virtually non-existent. The Barcelona Process has so far been able to keep Israel and its neighbours at the same table, but there has been no similar Arab initiative, bringing together the Arab countries of the Eastern Mediterranean with Israel. Although relations have improved, further developments have not happened and the Palestinian situation still remains to be solved in a way that would be acceptable to all parties. Like Libya, Syria has withdrawn from regional affairs, and is still technically at war with Israel. It has not signed a peace treaty and it has also to contend with an unstable Iraq as its neighbour. Syria did however sign a bilateral agreement with the EU and has participated in the Barcelona Process.

Unlike its Northern counterpart, the Southern Mediterranean still relies on the idea of national identity and interests, with regional cooperation between states being a low priority. With several conflicts still unresolved, albeit rather subdued for the moment, the Southern Mediterranean still has difficulty in finding a permanent solution to these⁹⁵. However it seems easier to integrate into the European economic and security framework rather than strengthen South-South cooperation.

Relations between actors in the Mediterranean are quite active. The EU's relations with southern states take place mainly in an institutional framework based on the Barcelona process, with a series of economic incentives coupled with political and cultural aspects. In the Southern Mediterranean, states still view each other with suspicion, fearful of the other's intentions and doing everything to protect their interests. Regional initiatives in the Southern Mediterranean have not yet met expectations since disagreements between states still dominate the governmental agenda, therefore, blocking progress on other areas. With the EU there have been some attempts at exploring other areas, notably economic, however, the southern states have not moved into so-called 'geo-economics', guaranteeing the "well being of citizens and ensuring that they can be competitive on the global markets (Behrendt & Hanelt, 1996, p. 123). The prospect of a uniquely Mediterranean intergovernmental institution seems low (Šabič & Bolinović, 2007, p. 333). For now, there is still a reluctance at the Southern Mediterranean level to share sovereignty, each actor preferring instead to protect its own interests. But in the

95. The last major confrontations date back to summer of 2006 and winter 2008. In 2006 the Israeli army launched a major military operation into Southern Lebanon, but, despite the intensity of the conflict neighbouring states did not intervene. More recently, in December 2008, Israeli forces moved into Gaza with the intent of destroying Hamas infrastructure in particular their rocket making capabilities.

future there could also be a shift from what Coskun calls a Hobbesian logic in the region, centred on the “enemy”, to a more Lockean or even Kantian model that includes both Arab states and Israel (2008, p. 97). Such a shift could profoundly transform the RSC in the Mediterranean, as will be explained in the conclusion to this research project.

1.3. Interregional interaction

The Euro-Mediterranean acts as a corridor to other regions such as the Gulf, Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe. These regions constitute direct geographical neighbours to the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, therefore, security concerns can easily travel between them⁹⁶. How other regions interact with the Mediterranean as a whole, or with single units in the region, can either impact on the type of RSC that is present, or eventually lead to transformations that completely changes a specific type of security complex. An intense interaction between regions affects boundaries, the number of units in the RSC, the character of their relations and the power structure of the security complex. In this section we will evaluate the level of interregional interaction between the Euro-Mediterranean and the neighbouring regions.

96. Interaction between the EU and NAFTA is quite limited despite some attempts during the Clinton administration in setting up the New Transatlantic Agenda and in 1998 the Transatlantic Economic Partnership. Relations are still mostly bilateral (EU-Mexico, EU-US and EU-Canada) according to Aggarwal and Fogarty’s research Aggarwal & Fogarty, 2005.

1.3.1. The Gulf⁹⁷

The EU's relationship with the Gulf States dates back to the early 1970s when Europe had to deal with both oil price shocks and in 1979 the Iranian revolution. All these events helped European countries realize the need for an independent European policy towards the region. This realisation resulted in the "Venice Declaration" of 1980, where the ancestor of the EU, the ECC, established its basic position on the Middle East that called for the Palestinians right to self-determination, exchange of territories and security for all states in the region (Schmid et al., 2006, p. 9). However, until recently there was no call for setting up a comprehensive framework encompassing the Gulf, as only the Mediterranean became the object of a regional initiative. EU security discourse towards the Gulf has evolved slowly. At first bilateral, but later recognizing the importance of the region, the EU recently called for the adoption of a regional framework. In addition, despite the bilateral nature of discourse, security concerns have been present, and thus, are not a new addition for the EU with regards to the region. The change is in the realization of the impact that security issues emerging from this region could have for the EU. Within what is traditionally recognized as the Gulf, the EU maintains relations with several local actors, notably cooperation agreements with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)⁹⁸, in addition to relations with Iraq, Yemen and Iran.

97. This section is based on the following article published by the author "EU Security Discourse: Creating New Regional Boundaries in the Mediterranean and Gulf Regions" Vieira, 2006.

98. The GCC was founded in 1981 by Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates with the basic objectives of coordinating, integrating and inter-connecting members states in all fields.

The interactions present between the Southern Mediterranean and the Gulf region are also of interest, but as we will see, from a geographical and discursive viewpoint, it is the Eastern Mediterranean which is closer to the Gulf and therefore enjoys stronger links. Issues such as Weapons of Mass Destruction, continued instability in Iraq and the Israeli/Palestine conflict ensure that Eastern Mediterranean officials are closely monitoring events happening in their neighbourhood.

We will start by examining EU-Gulf interaction. The EU has had a long relationship with the GCC, having followed its evolution since the late 1980s. The *raison d'être* of the GCC incorporates a strong and important security dimension that has to deal with both external and internal threats to regional security. In regards to security discourse, there are certain issues that seem to preoccupy both actors. For example, the conflict in the Middle East, proliferation of WMDs, the nuclear standoff with Iran, the war in Iraq and terrorism.⁹⁹ Within this context, the EU favours a two-part strategy: continuing the dialogue with the GCC on various security issues and pushing for further integration in the region, specifically for the GCC, as a means for long term security for the GCC members themselves. The GCC and its member states will remain important for any EU initiative in the Gulf. As some foundations have already been established, both the EU and the GCC can continue to work for security in the entire region.

With regards to Iran, European involvement has been constant concerning the current nuclear crisis, and the EU is pushing for dialogue and a compromise solution

99. See the GCC – EU Joint Council and Ministerial Meetings between 2000 and 2005, available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=398&lang=en&mode=g> for the 15th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting (2005) consult: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/gulf_cooperation/intro/finaldecl_050405.pdf

through diplomacy. The EU's major security concern regarding Iran is its possible nuclear weapons program, although the question of human rights and support for radical groups also constitute areas of concern. However, these last two issues are not included under the security heading of the 2001 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on EU-Iran relations, which is clearly dominated by Iran's nuclear program (Commission of the European Communities, 2001a). These issues, human rights and support of radical groups, are traditionally approached by the EU from a security perspective. With reference to Iran, the EU has put forward a series of issues that guide bilateral dialogue:

- Global issues (terrorism, human rights and proliferation)
- Regional issues (Iraq, Gulf, Central Asia, the Middle East Peace Process)
- Areas of cooperation (drugs, refugees, energy, trade and investment) (Ibid.).

In addition, Iraq and Yemen are engaged with the EU through cooperation agreements, and in the case of Iraq, this also includes assistance programmes. Regarding Iraq, the EU and notably the Commission have supported reconstruction efforts in the country, despite a rift between member states caused by the invasion of Iraq. The reconstruction efforts are part of EU policy with three main objectives:

- The development of a secure, stable and democratic Iraq.
- The establishment of an open, stable, sustainable and diversified market economy.
- Iraq's political and economic integration into its region and the international system (Commission of the European Communities, 2004).

Stability and security in Iraq are a concern for the EU, as it commits funds not only for the reconstruction of infrastructures, but the EU also supports the Iraqi political reconstruction that is now being attempted. The EU is looking to intensify its relations with Iraq, preparing the framework for formalised contractual relations (Commission of the European Communities, n.d.c). The EU will continue its mainly political and economical engagement, as well as working with all parties involved in order to achieve its main objective, that is, security and stability in Iraq.

In the case of Yemen, there are concerns over terrorism, as according to the European Commission “Security remains a major problem for Yemen; the country is a target for terrorist attacks, but even more a potential safe haven for terrorist groups as a logistical base for arms-smuggling, training and recruiting of terrorists” (Commission of the European Communities, n.d.d). In addition to the economic aid received by Yemen, a political dialogue was initiated between the EU and Yemen in 2004. This dialogue focuses on democratisation and human rights, in addition to terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, the aim being the enhancement of regional security and stability (Commission of the European Communities, n.d.a).

As was noted, there is no overarching policy regarding the Gulf that directs EU efforts; rather the discourse shows that several independent initiatives are in place and that dialogue has been mostly bilateral, through agreements with Yemen, Iran, Iraq, and the GCC. This complex region with important security issues is the subject of a weak EU security discourse. Moreover, the absence of energy security in the security discourse is of interest, it is perhaps unexpected when taking into account the energy re-

serves present in the different states in the Gulf (Commission of the European Communities, 2006)¹⁰⁰.

With reference to Southern Mediterranean countries, particularly Eastern Mediterranean countries, we will see that this particular region of the Mediterranean looks towards the Gulf with particular concern. There is some interaction between the two regions, in particular concerning the Arab/Israeli conflict and its implications for the Palestinian people, in addition to the situation in Iraq that has spillover effects for the Eastern Mediterranean. Another issue linking the two regions centres on the Iranian nuclear program, as this issue is of extreme importance to Israel as we have noted in chapter three. Therefore, events in the Gulf can affect Eastern Mediterranean countries, while the unresolved Israeli/Palestinian conflict influences the public opinion within Gulf regimes.

As previously mentioned, WMD is an issues that concerns both regions, in particular the Iranian nuclear program. For Israel, any regional nuclear program is a potential threat to its security and continued existence as a state. Israel's operation aimed at destroying the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear reactor at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre constitutes a well-documented Israeli military success. The possibility of a similar Israeli attack, this time aimed Iranian nuclear installations remains (Will Israel Bomb Iran?, 2006; Bahgat, 2005, p. 29). Israeli security discourse clearly identifies the Iranian nuclear program as an existential threat that must be addressed, including using military

100. In the recent European Green Paper on Energy Security there is little mention of the Gulf region, only two passing references to the region, in contrast with the growing attention being given to Russia Commission of the European Communities, 2006.

means if necessary (Will Israel Bomb Iran?, 2006). Among all the countries in the Mediterranean region, Israel shows the most concern regarding the development of nuclear weapons; it sees itself surrounded by enemies and has developed its own nuclear weapons along with a policy of nuclear ambiguity (Bahgat, 2005, pp. 35-41). In contrast, most countries in the Southern Mediterranean, notably Egypt and Syria, have been calling for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the region as we have noted in chapter three.

The situation in Iraq is another issue that concerns the Eastern Mediterranean. Neighbouring countries such as Syria, Jordan and Turkey are concerned over continued instability in the country, and this instability spills over into neighbouring countries leading to greater emphasis on border security as weapons and fighters can be smuggled in and out of Iraq. For these countries there is a sense of urgency regarding the situation in Iraq that needs to be rapidly addressed (SWB, 1996b; SWB, 2004b; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.e; King Hussein I of Jordan, 1997).

The final issue influencing both regions is the Israeli/Palestinian/Arab conflict. In the past, Arab unity required that Gulf countries support their fellow Arab States against Israel. In the years leading up to the 1973 war, what Hinnebusch terms the Arab triangle was formed. This triangle included Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, in order to liberate Israeli occupied territories, specifically the Sinai (Hinnebusch, 2002b, p. 41). However the triangle collapsed when Egypt signed a separate peace agreement with Israel, abandoning Syria and Saudi Arabia (Hinnebusch, 2003, pp. 178-179). More recently, Iran has been an increasingly important actor in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and this was also true of Iraq before the US invasion in 2003 (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p.

212). Although Gulf countries have always given moral and financial support to the Arab/Palestinian struggle against Israel, they also act directly in the region through a network of small groups, such as Hizbollah and Hamas (Ibid., p. 210). However, the present trend has moved towards normalisation rather than confrontation, as for most of the smaller Arab Gulf states the Arab-Israeli conflict is not foremost amongst their foreign policy priorities (Rosman-Stollman, 2004, pp. 194, 204). Following the Oslo agreements, the situation between the Arab world in general and Israel seemed to improve. Regarding the Gulf, despite Arab/Israeli tensions, relations between states continue varying in intensity, and more importantly in visibility, as Rosman-Stollman puts it “weak Gulf states continued to maintain secret trade ties with Israel. The opening of the tunnel [Western Wall tunnel in Jerusalem] and the developments that followed strengthened the tendency to keep these relations secret, but did not change the inclination towards Israel” (Ibid., p. 203). There is always a need to consider Arab solidarity, however, this is one of many factors dictating the policy of smaller Arab Gulf states:

The weak Gulf states attempt to manoeuvre between regional and sub-regional pressure on the one hand, and personal interests and internal pressure on the other. Because of this, foreign relations between them and geographically distant entities, such as the Middle East, are not given top priority. That said, diplomatic relations between the Gulf states and Israel are treated according to their relevance to other spheres, closer to home. These foreign relations have little meaning beyond their impact on high-priority issues (Ibid., p. 203).

In conclusion, security has begun to take a greater role in the EU’s perception of the region, as was made evident by the 2003 EU communication on “Strengthening the EU’s partnership with the Arab World” (The Secretariat General of the Council of the European Union, 2003). Perhaps more than in any other region, security issues seem to permeate the Gulf at all levels, and the EU seems to believe that any further develop-

ments in the Arab World are dependent on the resolution of these issues. In this respect, terrorism constitutes an important issue for the EU, exemplified by the joint GCC-EU countries seminars on Combating Terrorist Financing, whose second meeting was held in Abu Dhabi in March 2005. The issue of terrorism is at the centre of EU security discourse throughout the region, but the broader question of regional security is also present in the dialogues between the EU and the different local actors, demonstrating that there are certain issues affecting the region as a whole. This idea of common regional security issues has been further solidified by the EU, following up its earlier communication regarding a partnership with the Arab world with its 2004 “EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and Middle East”, the latter putting forward a policy agenda which includes several issues considered essential to the EU and countries ‘East of Jordan’. Issues such as: the Middle East Peace Process, Non-Proliferation, Security Dialogue and Counter Terrorism were included¹⁰¹. Although there is a lack of any discourse on immigration, legal or illegal, to the EU from the Gulf, the EU recognizes that the security issues present in the region, notably terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, “have a direct impact in Europe” (The Secretariat General of the Council of the European Union, 2003).

Regarding the Southern Mediterranean, there are already shared concerns between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf, specifically the Iranian nuclear program and the continued instability in Iraq and the peace process between Israel and Palestine.

101. Additionally, the EU called on countries ‘East of Jordan’ to consider confidence building measures and to tackle the question of financing of terrorism. See: Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2004, pp. 10-12.

Israel is particularly concerned about the Iranian nuclear program, while Jordan Syria and Turkey are monitoring the situation in Iraq. These concerns allow for interregional interaction. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict also allows for such interaction to occur, although it has mainly domestic implications in the Gulf that can manifest themselves at the regional level, especially now in the context of the ‘war on terrorism’ and radical Islamist ideology (El-Shazly & Hinnebusch, 2002, p. 87).

Potential for further interregional interaction is high, however a strong US presence in the region will be a barrier to any EU regional framework, forcing the EU to adopt specific frameworks for the Mediterranean and the Gulf. Such an EU-Gulf framework would also be limited to specific issues, as EU discourse on the Gulf does not see the region as part of its identity. The Eastern Mediterranean is concerned with the situation in Iraq which directly shares a border with most of the countries in the region. Israel is concerned about Iran’s nuclear program even though it does not share a mutual border.

1.3.2. Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa has the greatest potential to transform the current Euro-Mediterranean RSC, extending its reach further south. For both the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean states, illegal immigrants arriving from Sub-Saharan are an increasing concern. With an increase in migration flows northward comes increased media and government attention, therefore, securitisation of illegal immigration in Sub-Sa-

haran Africa will lead to increased cooperation with the Mediterranean. This in turn might change the current boundaries of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC.

Africa is a region that is treated unequally by the EU. Whilst Mediterranean North Africa is included in an extensive partnership with the the EU, the rest of Africa does not enjoy the same attention. In fact, it can be argued that presently Africa does not constitute a top priority for the EU (Olsen, 2002, pp. 91-92; Olsen, 2004, pp. 425, 430, 435). This is evident by the drop in financing being allocated to the region (Olsen, 2002, pp. 96-97). Nonetheless there is a strong historical and institutional link between the EU and Africa. One of the first foreign policies implemented by the EU was a preferential trade agreement with the post-colonial African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. The Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions formed the basis of cooperation between the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa, and were later replaced by the Cotonou agreement (Sicurelli, 2008, p. 222)¹⁰². In addition, the first EU independent military action took place in Sub-Saharan Africa, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Ståle, Gourlay & Mace, 2004, p. 508; Olsen, 2004, p. 432). The Sahara thus marks a boundary, it marks the Southern end of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC. The possibility of merger with any other RSC in Africa seems problematic as regionalism is still very much in its infancy in Africa. Firstly, there is no equivalent to the EU in Africa and integration projects are at the moment stalled. Secondly, and more importantly, the securitization of issues does not extend further into Africa, with the possible exception of illegal immigration.

102. Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions cover a timeframe from 1964 to 2000.

The EU's relationship with Africa has been one of cooperation in order to foster economic development in the continent, and in part to stop illegal immigration from reaching Europe (Olsen, 2002, p. 93). Another element of EU policy has been the relative willingness to use its military assets for peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operations, in particular after the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Ståle, Gourlay & Mace, 2004, pp. 509, 522). In this sense, Sub-Saharan Africa is perceived as a possible zone where the EU can build its international actor credibility (Olsen, 2004, p. 426; Ståle, Gourlay & Mace, 2004, p. 523). However, EU policy towards the continent is not uniform. As we have seen North Africa is part of the Barcelona initiative, but it does not extend further south. North Africa falls within the EU's neighbourhood, but the rest of Africa, while receiving financial aid, has a different set of policies being applied by the EU. African governments face many challenges, and perhaps the most important of these is their own survival, as civil unrest, massive corruption and war have ravaged most of the continent (Gebrewold, 2007, pp. 9, 13). Despite the urgency of the situation, these previously mentioned issues have not been the object of extraordinary measures by the EU. Although the EU sent a military force to ensure stable and fair election in the DRC, there has been no permanent framework joining the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa, nor has there been any mention of including Sub-Saharan countries in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Illegal immigration is of concern for both the Euro-Mediterranean RSC and Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite European developmental aid, an increasing number of immigrants is arriving from Sub-Saharan Africa (Kohnert, 2007, pp. 38-39). These migrants come from a multitude of countries in Sub-Saharan African and remain in

North Africa waiting to make their way to Europe (Betts, 2006, pp. 656-659). In order to address this issue bilateral agreements have been signed between EU member states and Southern Mediterranean transition states regarding readmission, border surveillance and control. In addition, the EU has also financed the same types of agreements in the Mediterranean (Ibid., pp. 660-662). While focusing on North Africa, the EU has also put forward some measures aimed at 'origin' countries. For example, the Cotonou agreement requires signatory countries to accept the return of nationals residing illegally in the EU (Olsen, 2004, p. 430). Moreover, measures have been financed to ensure protection for migrants in third countries, but the level of funding of these projects remains insignificant compared to that of other measures in the Southern Mediterranean (Betts, 2006, p. 664). There is also growing disillusion on the part of the EU regarding the use of aid in Africa, as its effectiveness has been limited, being unable to reduce poverty, or encourage economic development and political stability in the region (Olsen, 2002, pp. 95-97). These represent the 'push' factors of migration, including illegal immigration (Betts, 2006, pp. 657-659; Gebrewold, 2007, p. 3). This realisation is leading the EU to lend increased attention to military capabilities for crisis management in Sub-Saharan Africa (Olsen, 2002, p. 95). Therefore, regional conflicts constitute an additional concern that could bring both regions closer. Nevertheless, common or bilateral policy initiatives regarding these issues are still weak, despite the fact that the EU has organised patrols of some African countries' territorial waters and has recently been involved in sending peacekeepers to the Darfur region and to the DRC. Therefore, further EU involvement is increasingly possible due to the success of operation *Artemis* and continued instability in the region, Olsen remarks:

A number of crucial preconditions for making decisions on deployment of the rapid reaction force in sub-Saharan Africa are fulfilled already. Ultimately, however, it will be the political interests of the EU that will be decisive regarding the deployment of force in sub-Saharan Africa. There is no doubt that there exists a strong interests in developing 'Europe' into a significant foreign policy actor (Ibid., p. 97).

For the time being, there are no plans to include Sub-Saharan African in the Barcelona Process, the ENP or even an eventual Mediterranean Union¹⁰³. Distance here plays a role as well as mutual security concerns. Regional conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa are also a major concern for the region, but are not the object of a specific EU policy. While other issues such as failed states or organised crime could also concern the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa, they have not been securitised by the EU. Although a great number of illegal immigrants arriving in Europe originate from Sub-Saharan Africa, most set out on the final leg of their voyage from North Africa, thus it is in these neighbouring countries that the EU is concentrating its efforts to stop or at least control illegal immigration (Betts, 2006, p. 653). For if there is to be an expansion of an Euro-Mediterranean RSC into Sub-Saharan Africa, it will be the issue of Illegal Immigration that will allow for such change. In order to stem the influx of illegal migrants, the EU must decide how to help the countries of origin, by supporting local development, both politically and economically, so as to avoid mass migration, brain drain and the spread of organised crime that takes advantage of those who seek a better life in Europe. As Kohnert states, there are an increasing number of migrants 'in transit' in North Africa who are turning to organised crime to try and 'sail' to Europe at an ever increasing risk to their lives in the hopes of escaping detection (2007, pp. 42-43). This situation, where

103. Mauritania being the exception as it was invited to the Mediterranean Union meeting in Paris.

organised criminal networks operate in the Mediterranean region, could eventually lead to instability in the region when combined with the hundreds of thousands of migrants waiting in North Africa. The consequences of this situation in North Africa could be serious for the EU and the Mediterranean region. Indeed, if the EU wishes to help control mass migration to the north then it must work closer with Sub-Saharan Africa, and therein lies the root of the issue:

Indeed, it is clear that a comprehensive approach to resolving, rather than simply mitigating, the issue of transit migration from Sub-Saharan Africa via the Mediterranean will need to have major implications for the region of origin in terms of engaging with root causes in countries of origin, ensuring access to 'effective protection' in first states of asylum, and ensuring access to asylum processing and refugee protection in transit states (Betts, 2006, p. 676).

This also means closer cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa on matters of regional security and conflict prevention, as is already envisioned in the EU-Africa Partnership (The Council of the European Union, 2005a, p. 2). From a Southern Mediterranean perspective there is also a desire in controlling migration at the point of origin. Foreign nationals can lead to popular local resentment, as is the case in Libya, while also constituting a drain on an already fragile economy, notable because of remittances to the migrants' home countries (Huliaras, 2001, p. 19). The possibility exists for a joint initiative between the North and South Mediterranean to improve conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Therefore, how could a Euro-Mediterranean RSC move into Sub-Saharan Africa? Some countries, such as Cape Verde, are already collaborating with the EU, allowing patrols in their territorial waters. Will others follow and would they securitise illegal immigration? If the EU continues to securitise illegal immigration, how will the

question of identity be handled as it moves into Sub-Saharan Africa? Perhaps we will continue to witness sporadic measures, while simultaneously fortress Europe is being built jointly at the border between Mediterranean North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.

1.3.3. Eastern Europe

After the end of the Cold War a major preoccupation for Europe was the situation in Eastern Europe, namely, how to build a new Europe bridging the divide that existed during the Cold War. It was not only important to foster democracy and bolster the economies of the region, but also to integrate Eastern Europe into the institutions and organisations of Western Europe. Therefore, it was agreed that Eastern European States would become EU members. NATO membership was also important to the newly democratic Eastern Europe. This objective of EU membership was achieved in 2004 with 15 new members joining the EU, most from Eastern Europe, and in 2007 Romania and Bulgaria also joined. The EU border now reaches Ukraine and Russia and includes countries that belonged to the old Warsaw Pact and were previously considered to be in Russia's sphere of influence¹⁰⁴. NATO membership has also been expanding and also includes most of the old Warsaw pact countries. While most ex-Warsaw Pact countries are now EU members, the question raised as to what type of relationship the EU will have with both Russia and the ex-Soviet republics now bordering the EU, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan¹⁰⁵.

104. The EU already had a border with Russia when Finland joined the EU in 1995.

105. This section will mainly focus on the ex-Soviet republics now bordering the EU and how they must balance strong relations with the EU while keeping strong links with Russia. In section

The new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) constitutes an attempt to form a stable relationship with the countries along the Eastern border of the EU including Russia which was initially part in this new policy framework (Averre, 2005, p. 175). Although there has been speculation about Russia eventually joining the EU, currently this possibility seems remote. Russia is not content with simply being another partner in the ENP, as it is assuming the position of a global power and wishes to cooperate on an equal basis with the EU (Rontoyanni, 2002, pp. 813-814, 820). Furthermore, EU membership for ex-Soviet republics remains problematic. While in the late 1990s there seemed to be no objection to further EU expansion into Eastern Europe, as Russia began to re-assert itself, EU expansion became a thorny issue to Moscow as Russia witnessed Western encroachment in its backyard, particular that represented by the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Wagnsson, 2006, p. 111). This situation was evident during the last presidential elections in Ukraine when Moscow supported the pro-Russia candidate and most recently during Russian intervention in Georgia.

The EU is actively encouraging democratic and market reforms in these ex-Republics, and EU membership represents the ultimate incentive in this case. While the EU has promised partnership to Ukraine, Moldova and possibly Belarus it has so far not guaranteed membership. Instead the EU has launched the ENP whose objective is: to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations. In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the *acquis*, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU (Commission of the European Communities, 2003b, p. 4).

1.4.2 we will examine more closely the EU’s relationship with Russia at the global level.

This poses a problem: will the EU accept these countries as members over Russian objections? Or will these countries accept something less than membership? In the case of Ukraine it has been actively pushing to become a EU member, a position that contradicts the objectives of the ENP, and if accepted in principle it could once more affect Europe's neighbourhood (Averre, 2005, pp. 186-187).

Another thorny issue revolves around energy. Russia has become a main exporter of natural gas to Europe, whose households depend on Russian gas for winter heating. This gas passes through ex-Soviet republics most notably the Ukraine. When a crisis looms the Russian authorities can stop the supply of gas at the source, thus leaving millions with no heating and driving up the price of gas. This situation illustrates that the EU's energy concerns are centred around its Eastern border, not in the EU's Southern border. The winter of 2006 showed Russia's willingness to use gas as a political and economic tool when Ukraine protested against a hike in the price of gas, Russia subsequently cut the supply to Ukraine for three days. Furthermore, Russia also threatened to cut gas supplies to the Ukraine during a political power struggle between pro-Western forces and pro-Moscow forces.

Further EU expansion eastwards involves membership for Ukraine and Belarus and risks Russian anger and energy cuts, in addition to leaving Russia without its own area of influence. Countries in the region will have to decide on a westwards bias and acknowledging the EU as their main supporter or maintaining an eastwards bias towards Russia. For these ex-Soviet republics it is like being in a no-man's land between the security concerns of the EU and Russia. Countries such as the Ukraine are between these two blocs and fear becoming isolated (Light, White & Löwenhardt, 2000, p. 87). While

Russia seeks to consolidate the CIS, the question for these Eastern European countries and the EU, is as Averre states, “how the EU could accommodate countries like Ukraine and Moldova in the case of their integration in a CIS strongly influenced by Moscow—which rejects the wholesale imposition of EU norms and values” (Averre, 2005, p. 190)? The EU has specific security issues in the East, energy being the main one. Recent events have proven that gas supplies from Russia are not as secure as previously thought, since the political situation in the region remains uncertain and could affect the living conditions of some Europeans. Achieving this stability remains the priority of the ENP, regardless of whether some of these ex-Soviet republics eventually join the EU, this is secondary to ensuring security in this border region, and energy security in particular.

In summary, the last three sections have shown that interregional interaction is significant with regards to the Euro-Mediterranean RSC. The Eastern Mediterranean has strong security links with the Gulf, although the Israeli/Palestinian conflict affects both regions. Moreover, the EU is also making some inroads into the Gulf, albeit slowly. With the war in Iraq and tension over Iran’s nuclear programme, there is also the potential for disengagement of the Eastern Mediterranean from the Gulf. Along the Euro-Mediterranean RSC’s southern border, the issue of illegal immigration has the potential to further interregional interactions between the Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa. These two regions, the Gulf and Sub-Saharan Africa, offer the greatest opportunities for interregional interaction and change. This transformation could manifest itself as an extension of the current RSC or, in the case of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf, through the strengthening of its boundaries. In the case of further interaction regarding

illegal immigration with Sub-Saharan Africa, the current Euro-Mediterranean RSC could possibly disappear and either give way and be replaced with a larger RSC or two smaller ones. In the Eastern Mediterranean the trend favours disengagement from the Gulf, therefore strengthening the Euro-Mediterranean RSC.

1.4. Global level

We will now address the global level and the role that both global powers and superpowers play in the Mediterranean region. Global powers can have a profound impact in a region, that is, suppressing regional security interaction with their own security priorities, through what is termed overlay. During the Cold War, the US and Soviet confrontation and presence in Europe dominated the security environment of the continent; this led to the East-West conflict representing the primary security issue throughout the region. As global powers penetrate a region, security perceptions are modified and any RSC undergoes transformations and can eventually disappear. We will examine the role of the United States and Russia in the region, as they are both global powers that are active in the region, and through them we shall note how global players interact with the Mediterranean region.

1.4.1. The United States

The beginning and end of the Cold War marked important milestones for American presence in the Euro-Mediterranean region. With the start of the Cold War the United States became 'the' dominant or hegemonic player in Western European politics for it protected the region against a possible Soviet invasion (Nexon & Wright, 2007, pp.

266-267; Miller, 2001, pp. 200, 202). Through its nuclear deterrence and military presence in the region it served as the main security guarantor (Sens, 2007, p. 7; Gowan, 2003, p. 221). In addition to its military presence, the United States through NATO assured a constant and strong institutional presence in Western Europe by which it guided security policy in the region. This security guidance allowed and even nurtured what eventually would become the EU. Later in this section, we will note that there are differences of opinion between the US and the EU regarding world affairs, and these disagreements are creating an unease in transatlantic relations. This has, however, not always been the case.

In the 1950s when European integration began, through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the EEC, the US offered not only ideal conditions for integration to happen, but it also actively encouraged Europeans to seek greater integration and this became the official policy of several administrations (Lundestad, 1998, pp. 5-9)¹⁰⁶. During this period, according to Maull, Europe, served as “America’s junior partner in the Euro-Atlantic alliance, it provided vital economic and military support for the US in its efforts to contain Soviet Power and thus constituted a key part of the Cold War global order”, but it also provided a new successful model of regional integration (Maull, 2005, p. 776). Throughout the duration of the Cold War, European integration progressed, but always with NATO as the primary security organisation in Europe, while simultaneously the EU’s ancestors (ECSC and ECC) helped economic develop-

106. American military presence in the continent ensured the safety of Europe from external attack and from potential military conflict between European states.

ment and prosperity¹⁰⁷. It was only in the late 1980s and early 1990s that security questions began to be considered within an exclusive European institutional framework, in other words, moving outside the institutional framework of NATO. The Cold War marked a period of strong American penetration in the region, and in Western Europe it gave way to overlay by the United States (Calleya, 2005, p. 35; Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 351). This meant that regional dynamics in Western Europe ceased to exist, only to be superseded by superpower interests (Ibid., pp. 61, 62).

In the Southern Mediterranean the United States tried to recruit as many allies as possible, with the aim of containing Soviet influence in the region. As such, it had several allies in the region, notably Israel and NATO member Turkey. In addition, the United States stationed its VIth Fleet in the Mediterranean, thus further marking the presence of American power in the region. However, several countries in the region would attempt to benefit from the presence of both superpowers. For example, Egypt invited Soviet advisors into the country only to expel and replace them with American ones.

It was believed that after a 50 year long Cold War, a new beginning for Europe and for peace in the Eastern Mediterranean was achievable. The United States, as the sole remaining superpower, desired to extend NATO to Eastern Europe, and initially Russia and the United States began the post-Cold War period in a spirit of cooperation (Sens, 2007, pp. 9-10). The United States also organised the Madrid conference as it

107. The Marshall plan was also an important contributor to European economic development in the early years after the Second World War.

hoped for a lasting settlement to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. However, new security priorities for the US, notably post 9/11, and increasing European integration ended superpower overlay by the United States. As we will see, although the US still continues to enjoy some influence in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe where it is hoping to install some military bases, including a controversial missile defence radar station, this influence has been diminishing (Nexon & Wright, 2007, p. 267). According to Claire Demesmay's research, by the time of the second Gulf War European public opinion reflected a very different position from that of the US government, as European citizens, and even some governments, were publicly hostile towards the invasion of Iraq (2006). September 11th 2001 changed American security perceptions. Homeland security and the war against terror constituted top priorities, and this meant a redeployment of American forces and a focus on other regions, notably the Gulf and Afghanistan (Sens, 2007, pp. 5, 26). In the Southern Mediterranean, the United States is still an important player in the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, a conflict that has security implications outside its region. As for Europe and more precisely the EU, questions are being asked regarding its relationship with the US. The idea that in this new post-Cold War era the EU could challenge or balance the US-lead unipolar world started to become a factor in the debate concerning Europe's role in the world (Posen, 2006, pp. 150-151; Cooper, 2003; Kagan, 2003; Maull, 2005). The US has also been re-evaluating its support of ESDP due to its position in the international system after the end of the Cold War and post-9/11. Posen states that the ESDP project "annoys the United States because, however diplomatically deferential the project is to the United States and NATO, it challenges U.S. hegemony" (2006, p. 184; Gowan, 2003, p. 226). As we will see, this

idea of a EU challenge or counter-balance needs to be addressed in a more nuanced fashion, as there is still much cooperative interaction with the US.

Within the European security architecture the US has ceased to overlay as the EU has been developing its foreign policy capabilities. The EU has been more reluctant to follow American policy since the end of the Cold War. Divergence between the US and EU was evident during the last Iraq war, when the EU did not support intervention. Paradoxically, the Iraq invasion also highlighted differences within the EU, as several Eastern European EU member countries supported the US and its invasion of Iraq alongside the United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal. In the 1990s, European leaders had to call on US military might to intervene during the Bosnian conflict and in 1999 against Serbia during the fighting in the Kosovo province. This occurred at a time when the US government and European leaders were working towards a Europe capable of dealing with such crises. Here to, disagreements between EU members interfered with an eventual European-only solution to stabilising the Balkan region (Sens, 2007, pp. 12-13). The later years of the war in the Balkans, coupled with internal difficulties surrounding the implementation of the single market, contributed to a period of increasing self doubt inside the EU (Guay, 1999, p. 93). Initially, there were great expectations for the EU, however it was unable to fulfil these expectations at the time. Even today, the split between EU members over the second Gulf War led to questions over the future of a common EU foreign policy. This split occurred despite greater integration regarding foreign and defence policy, which occurred through the Amsterdam and Nice treaties. However, as Michael Smith notes, European response varies depending on the position of respective US administrations. Depending on the situation the official EU position can be

coalitional in nature (as was the case regarding Iraq), the result of a negotiated order (as was the case regarding the International Criminal Court (ICC)), or a result of integrative politics as is the case in economic matters (Smith, 2006, pp. 48-51).

In the Euro-Mediterranean region a strong European presence exists. The Barcelona Process is a EU initiative that does not include the United States despite a US desire to join (Fabre, 2007, p. 220). The US will not allow a Euro-Mediterranean region to exist that does not include a US presence, and that is why the US has launched a Greater Middle East Initiative that does not take into account the configuration of the Euro-Mediterranean region (Ibid., p. 222). In addition, the US has also signed free trade agreements with Morocco and Tunisia (Ibid., p. 222). This situation manifests itself as a contest between the two powers, through the EU developing its foreign policy and the US trying to maintain its influence in the region. The two actors utilise widely different approaches, as the US tries to isolate the ‘troublemakers’, while the EU prefers to engage in dialogue and trade with all states. Europe’s proximity and large trade relations with the Southern Mediterranean are three times larger than that of the US, and enables the EU to freely engage with all states in the Southern Mediterranean (Guay, 1999, pp. 94, 107). Consequently, the EU enjoys a positive regional image with regard to conflict resolution. The US faces increasingly negative public opinion from the Arab and Muslim world, due to the war in Iraq and due to its “blanket support for the Israeli occupation which negates the Palestinian’s right to self-rule” (Everts, 2004, p. 683).

Over the years the EU and the US have developed different but parallel world views, with this trend accelerating since the end of the Cold War (Haass, 1999, pp. 1-2). Events such as the wars in Iraq, the Balkan wars and 9/11, all uniquely shaped each ac-

tor. Although they share similarities in political or economic values, the EU and the US developed different approaches towards problem states or regions (Guay, 1999, p. 104). These differences cause some friction between the two and have led the EU to search for greater independence in world affairs. According to Maull, the US must still provide “military security, leadership and politico-military capacity for crisis management”, leading Maull to the conclusion that “the EU has a power portfolio that is both selective and incomplete” (Maull, 2005, p. 782). However, as Allen G. Sens remarks, there will surely be less America in Europe in the future (Sens, 2007, p. 5).

1.4.2. Russia

The ex-Soviet Union constituted the second half of the superpower overlay in Europe, with most of Eastern Europe under its control. Through the Warsaw Pact, its influence stretched all the way into Germany (White, Korosteleva & Allison, 2006, p. 165). In Eastern Europe overlay was due to the presence of the Soviet Union, as all foreign policy of these satellite countries was controlled from Moscow and was dominated by the East-West confrontation. As such, most regimes in Eastern Europe were modelled after the Soviet one party political system, and were established after World War II with Soviet backing. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union also maintained a sizeable military presence in Eastern Europe in order to counter-balance NATO forces in the West, with each side dissuading the other from military action. While in the Southern Mediterranean, the Soviet Union recruited allies in some newly independent states, such as Libya or Syria, it was also seeking a permanently accessible sea port with routes to the Mediterranean and Atlantic Ocean. This led to a regional struggle for influ-

ence whereby the US and Russia attempted to recruit as many countries in North Africa and the Middle East to their respective sides as possible.

The end of the Cold War marked the retreat of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe, and furthermore, it marked the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of the old Soviet republics including Russia. Consequently, Russia became the 'heir' to the Soviet Union, but the end of the Cold War left Russia much weakened and unable to exert its influence on Eastern Europe (Sakwa, 2008, pp. 241-242). Russian influence was now limited to its direct neighbours, former Soviet Republics, through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)¹⁰⁸. Founded in 1991, the CIS allows for cooperation in foreign policy, security and economics.

This retreat from world affairs also affected the Southern Mediterranean. Although many states in the region are still clients of Russian arms manufacturers, Russia no longer has the same influence in the region. For example, the Russian Navy only returned to the Mediterranean in 2007. Nonetheless, Russia is still a member of the Quartet responsible for advancing the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians.

Through development of its natural resources, Russia has achieved an economic resurgence and it is now reasserting itself on the world stage (Wagnsson, 2006, p. 106; Sakwa, 2008, p. 246). Russia is not without attributes, its natural resources are abundant, and its defence industry has established itself as an important economic sector (Sánchez-Andrés, 2004, pp. 689-691). Its natural resources constitute a major bargain-

108. The member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

ing chip when dealing with the EU, since millions of EU households depend on Russia gas. According to Spanjer, “Russian exports account for 38% of EU imports and 26% of EU consumption”, roughly 80% of these exports pass through Ukraine (Spanjer, 2007, p. 2890). Moreover, the Russian defence industry can sell quality hardware below western prices which keeps Russia on good terms with many developing countries, including Algeria which recently bought MIG fighters, or with Syria, as this state wishes to improve its Air-Defence Systems (Sánchez-Andrés, 2004, pp. 691-693).

This Russian re-emergence into world affairs also means that Russia is looking to play a greater role in international affairs, whilst simultaneously protecting its own interests. These interests are not the result of some linear process, but the result of a struggle between “Liberal Westernizers” and “Fundamentalist Nationalists”, as the former seeks good relations with the West, while the latter yearns for the Soviet past (Light, White & Löwenhardt, 2000, p. 79)¹⁰⁹. This has resulted in a consolidation of the ‘near abroad’, specifically the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe and in particular, Ukraine and Belarus (Nygren, 2006, p. 126). While Russia has been reasserting itself, others have been expanding eastward, at least according to Russian perceptions. Moscow views NATO expansion eastward with alarm, opposing expansion of what it still considers a US dominated hostile alliance (Rontoyanni, 2002, p. 825; Light, White & Löwenhardt, 2000, p. 81; Wagnsson, 2006, p. 109; Nygren, 2006, p. 127). Russia must also contend with an expanding EU, and consequently, a loss of in-

109. These Fundamentalist Nationalist are not only made up of right-wing politicians but also of left-wing sympathisers who wish for the return of the Soviet Union White, Korosteleva & Allison, 2006, p. 166.

fluence over most of Eastern Europe. Contrary to NATO expansion, EU expansion is mostly considered a positive development, although currently in Russian opinion it appears EU enlargement has lost momentum. Indeed, although most Warsaw Pact countries are now EU members, a process that happened without major Russian objections, the situation regarding Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus remains uncertain. In the last few years Russia and the EU have been at odds in Ukraine, each throwing their support behind pro-Russia or pro-Western forces respectively (Wagnsson, 2006, p. 111). In the Caucasus Russia continues to re-assert its influence. During the war in Chechnya it stopped a territory from seceding and continues to have influence in Azerbaijan and in Georgia as witnessed in the summer of 2008.

EU-Russia relations have evolved since the end of the Cold War. As Russia's regional role has changed, the EU has had to readjust its policy to incorporate a growing Russian role not only in international affairs, but in this wider Europe to which Russia is part. Russia is now becoming an increasingly important European partner to the EU, enjoying unique privileges, *e.g.* it became the "first non-member state to gain monthly consultations with the EU's Political and Security Committee (COPS), the main decision-making body of the ESDP" along with appointing a "contact officer with the EU's military staff" (Rontoyanni, 2002, pp. 814, 822). Russia is willing to lend diplomatic support to EU positions as long as these are agreed during the course of bilateral negotiations, and has showed an interest in participating in EU-led military operations (Ibid., pp. 820, 822). Despite the good nature of relations between the EU and Russia, there are many issues that need resolving and more importantly, an understanding between the two must exist with regards to mutual values (Averre, 2005, p. 195). Several issues are

of special concerns for Russia in the framework of its relations with Europe, such as “the lack of consultation prior to the May 2004 enlargement and over Schengen visa regimes, the future of Kaliningrad and the position of Russian minorities in the Baltic states, as well as Brussels’ criticism of Russia’s policy in Chechnya” (Ibid., p. 176). These issues are symptoms of a larger ailment that still afflicts East-West relations, namely, differences in values. For example, the Yukos affair highlighted differences regarding media freedom and civil rights. The EU’s insistence on criticising Russian governance and human rights, all the while wishing to impose EU norms and values on its partners including Russia is not well received in Moscow (Ibid., pp. 176, 178-179)¹¹⁰. Moreover, as Wagnsson explains the EU and Russia might agree on the major threats to world security, but disagree on the roots and the solution to these threats, stating: “The EU frames liberal values, stability and absence of threats as densely interlinked. The Union’s policy of preventing engagement using non-military means stands in stark contrast to Russia’s readiness to use extraordinary, military means in order to curb instability” (Wagnsson, 2006, p. 114).

During the Cold War the global level dominated politics in Europe, as the two superpowers were able to maintain a divided Europe where the two camps jostled for influence. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited much of the Soviet infrastructure and hardware. Moreover, Russia also took the Soviet Union’s place in the UN

110. The Yukos affair refers to the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky the owner of Yukos, which is one of the biggest oil and gas companies in Russia on fraud charges. Khodorkovsky’s arrest was seen as politically motivated, as he was linked with opposition parties and suspected of having political ambitions of its own. Furthermore, Yukos was charged and convicted with failing to pay billions in back taxes. This was seen as a move to eliminate Yukos as a viable competitor to the state-owned Gazprom, marking a sharp shift in Russian economic orientation.

Security Council. In the years immediately following the end of the Cold War, Russian relations with the West were at their best. Nonetheless, Russia saw itself as a global power and wished to be considered as such. NATO and EU enlargement, as well as western intervention in the Balkans, gave Russia the necessary incentives to start to re-assert itself, and promote its interests and influence at both the global and regional level.

Through its dealings with the EU, Russia had to adapt, so it began using a more 'geo-economic' approach rather than 'geo-political' in order to maintain its influence in Ukraine, Belarus and other neighbouring territories, trying to show that it can be a viable economic and security alternative to the EU (Nygren, 2006, p. 142). As Russia began re-asserting its influence in its neighbourhood, it had to contend with NATO and EU expansion. While NATO expansion was considered negative, *i.e.* a threat to Russian interests, EU enlargement was seen in a more positive light, that is, until the point when it reached the Russian border.

Although Russia and the EU have developed a security relationship, that includes agreeing on potential threats, they do not share the same understanding of these issues. As Averre states, "With both leading actors in the wider Europe struggling to articulate their security interest and wary of the intentions of the other, there is a scope for substantial political dispute" (2005, p. 184). Russian greatest impact will manifest itself at the EU's eastern border, as this region constitutes a major concern for Moscow. While Russia seeks to prove itself as a world power in its 'near abroad', in the Mediterranean region, most notably the Southern Mediterranean, its influence has greatly diminished. Russian relations with the Southern Mediterranean are more subdued, as it is no longer able or willing to be an alternative 'fundamental' partner. However, Russia

still enjoys some economic links, notably exporting armaments. But these links are not enough to ensure a viable role for Russia in the Southern Mediterranean for it does not enjoy an entirely favourable image in the Arab World. In Furia's and Lucas study of determinants of Arab public opinion on foreign relations, the researchers found that attitudes towards Russia are quite negative, stating that¹¹¹:

the merely cool feelings toward Russia found among Arab respondents do seem consistent with its mixed foreign policy record in the region. Russia is likely resented for its membership in the unpopular "Quartet" of powers—seen by many Arabs as dictating a pro-Israel resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict—but we also suspect that many Arabs are aware that Russian cooperation with U.S. policies in regard to Iraq has been less enthusiastic than that of countries such as the United Kingdom (Ibid., p. 599).

This situation makes Russia more susceptible to cooperation, as it emphasises dialogue with the EU regarding Mediterranean regional matters. This is demonstrated by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Damilov, 2007, p. 141). Consequently, Russia's approach to the Southern Mediterranean does not threaten the current Euro-Mediterranean RSC. Although, Russia is a member of the Quartet, it is not a member of the Barcelona Process or the America led Greater Middle East Initiative. Russia's current position in the region poses no significant threat to continued integration between the two shores.

2. Structure of the Regional Security Complex

With an overview of the security constellation in the Mediterranean complete, the structure of the RSC in the region can now be determined. An RSC, as noted in

111. Only Turkey, the UK, the US and Israel enjoy a lower rating, while France, Iran, Japan and China are the top four in that order Furia & Lucas, 2006, p. 592 Table 1.

chapter one, is constructed by similar patterns of securitisation across an area, however, its structure is shaped by all levels of the constellation. Despite the RSC being located at the regional level, as Buzan and Wæver remark, regional polarity can influence the policy of global powers in any given region, there is then interaction across the different levels analysis (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 52). This interaction between levels shapes relations within the discourse-constructed RSC. The structure reflects the RSC's organisation and this can be used to monitor any changes that might occur (Ibid., p. 53). An RSC has external boundaries and is composed of units, but there is also polarity and patterns of amity and enmity within the security complex, all of which are shaped by the constellation (Ibid., p. 53). Changes in any of these can lead to internal or external transformations of the RSC (Ibid., p. 53).

In order to determine, in section three, the type of RSC we will examine each consecutive element of the structure. Therefore, we will follow the accounted securitization in the official discourse of the different units in the Mediterranean, and establish the boundaries of the RSC and establish which states belong to the Mediterranean RSC. Moreover, as power distribution is also of importance, we will attribute levels of power to an actor, or actors, and establish if there are outside global powers or superpowers influencing the region. Finally the patterns of amity and enmity between units in the regional security complex must be determined, as it is imperative to identify fault lines, regional cooperation or interregional interaction.

2.1. Boundaries of the Euro-Mediterranean

After analysing the security discourse in the Mediterranean in chapters two and three we can now determine the boundaries of the RSC in the Euro-Mediterranean region. In this section, we will recap on those issues that have been securitised and by whom, and it is hoped that the result of this summary will establish the boundaries of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC.

Securitisation of terrorism is happening throughout the Mediterranean. The EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries have both identified this issue as an existential threat and have taken extraordinary measures to deal with it. In most cases, this concern with terrorism pre-dates September 11th 2001, as most Southern Mediterranean countries have had to deal with ongoing terrorism and post 9/11, dormant terrorist activity reappeared in places such as Algeria and even in Europe (Beaugé, 2008b; Fernandes, 2007; Guidère, 2007).

Regarding illegal immigration, on the part of the EU there are clearly defined referent objects and urgency seems to come mainly from the EU Parliament. Moreover, this issue has been the object of extraordinary measures, as noted in chapter two. In the Southern Mediterranean the issue has received some attention, as it is securitised in most countries, despite a low sense of urgency in others. Securitisation is stronger in North Africa and in Turkey. In the area from Egypt to Lebanon the issue appears to attract less importance, most notably in Egypt and in Israel. Syria, Jordan and Lebanon have all had to deal with Palestinian migration, and in these countries state resources have been diverted to accommodate the influx of Palestinian refugees who were fleeing

their homeland in order to find better and safer living conditions. Furthermore, their presence continues to affect these countries. This confirms the perception that immigration today is perceived increasingly through a security lens; not only because of the immigrants themselves, but also due to illegal activities surrounding illegal immigration (Wihtol de Wenden, 2007, p. 29; Bicchi, 2007, pp. 140-141). Moreover, this issue may become further securitised, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is a growing awareness of increased migration from Sub-Saharan states, which not only affects them, but also affects both shores of the Mediterranean. With increased concern, and the subsequent measures being taken in the Euro-Mediterranean region, this might also influence the securitisation of the issue in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Regional conflicts are another issue that preoccupies most of the Mediterranean, in particular the Southern Mediterranean countries; as it is necessary to note that regional tensions have in the past hindered the success of the Barcelona process (Gomez & Christou, 2004, p. 192). In the Southern Mediterranean, regional conflicts have been disrupting the region for several decades now, so it is normal that extraordinary measures have been taken to tackle this issue. While the issue has been securitised in most of the Southern Mediterranean, in EU terms, this issue seems less relevant, as most regional conflicts in Europe have ceased, even though not all have been resolved. Currently, open warfare is none existent, or at least extremely limited.

Other issues such as WMDs, or organised crime, have not been securitised or have had only a limited amount of countries securitising these issues. For example, only Israel securitises WMDs, while Libya seems to have desecuritised WMDs by announcing that it would abandon any attempt to acquire WMDs, namely nuclear weapons. For

the EU, the issue of WMDs is an important one, but it is not fully securitized. Despite the EU's involvement in the Iran crisis, European discourse lacks urgency when dealing with this issue. Organised crime appears to be a priority in certain countries, but it is not yet securitised. In the EU organised crime has been the object of important measures and in the Southern Mediterranean there is increasing willingness to cooperate with the EU on this issue. However, on both shores the issues itself lacks urgency, as mentioned in chapter three organised crime in itself is not a threat, but when associated with terrorism it reinforces the latter.

In summary, all units in the Mediterranean region, north and south, are securitising terrorism and most units are also securitising regional conflicts. Moreover, the EU, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Jordan and Lebanon and Turkey are taking extraordinary measures regarding illegal immigration. The issue of regional conflicts concerns most of the Southern Mediterranean, with the Palestinian/Israeli and the Moroccan/Algerian conflicts constituting the main concerns. It is possible to denote several boundaries: the main one being the boundary that encompasses all of the Mediterranean, North and South, from Morocco to Turkey, is produced by the securitization of terrorism. In addition to these boundaries, the securitization of illegal immigration produces another boundary that includes the EU, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Turkey. Regarding regional conflicts, the Southern Mediterranean, and in particular the Eastern Mediterranean, have securitised the issue, but this has not happened in the case of the EU. While WMDs seem to concern Israel specifically.

Picture 1: Euro-Mediterranean RSC



2.2. Units in the Structure

We began our analysis in the previous chapters by focusing on the discourse from government officials and heads of state, and we were able to comprehend how this type of actor is at the forefront of the Mediterranean security discourse. Moreover, we have seen that security discourse and securitisation is being produced by both the EU and the Southern Mediterranean nation states. These two have not only been involved in producing similar security discourse, but also discourse on regional identity and they have been associated with a myriad of mostly EU led regional initiatives.

With regards to a Euro-Mediterranean RSC the EU constitutes an important actor and leads security interaction in the region, as the EU is a unique actor, with a

unique approach to international affairs. The question of the “actorness” of the EU is a complicated one, as “The EU is neither a state nor a non-state actor, and neither a conventional international organization nor an international regime” (Ginsberg, 1999, p. 432). Identifying the constituent components and actions of the the EU is not an aim of this research project, but it is necessary to establish that the EU is acting on the international scene and that there is significant cooperation between member states, therefore it is unlikely that this cooperation will cease and inter-state competition in Europe returns (Jones, 2003, p. 151). Member states have joined together in what has become more than simply an alliance of states, as their sovereignty in certain matters has been transferred to another level. With regard to foreign policy, member states are well aware of individual positions and more often than not, develop their own national positions in accordance with those of their EU colleagues (Sandholtz, 1996; Smith, 2004, p. 741). The EU is no longer a simple alliance or international organisation, it has become a security community and can be considered a great power, as it is very much engaged in the region, notably in the Maghreb (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 214-215, 259, 375). The EU’s major framework has guided policy from the Northern Mediterranean towards the Southern Mediterranean. There are numerous independent EU policies and programmes aimed at the Mediterranean, from financing border patrols to multimedia production.

On the opposite side of the Mediterranean sea there is no equivalent to the EU, as here the units operate as traditional states. The states are responsible for policy-making and interaction with each other and the EU. More often than not, these states control all discourse concerning policy, in particular, security related matters. The head

of state, and sometimes ministers, speak on behalf of the nation on matters of security and also on co-operation with the European Union.

So the units that constitute the Euro-Mediterranean RSC are the EU and in the Southern Mediterranean a series of autonomous nation states. Both types of units lead the security discourse and securitisation of issues in the region, being able to undertake or suggest extraordinary measures when necessary.

2.3. Polarity of the Region

In this section we will be examining the polarity in the region. This refers to its distribution, the location of power in the region and who wields it. The definition of power has changed over the years, so that it now includes a larger array of indicators and instruments, as opposed to the traditional military centred approach (Nye, 2005). Therefore, we will examine both soft and hard power and determine which actors have influence throughout the region.

The obvious starting point is the EU, although its limitations as an actor and its capability to act internationally are a subject of heated debate (Hill, 1993). Since the end of the Cold War and the US the remaining sole superpower, there has been a vigorous discussion regarding the EU as a power, and how this power may manifest itself (Kagan, 2003; Cooper, 2003; Kupchan, 2003). In the specific context of the Mediterranean we shall see that the EU is a regional pole despite some limitations.

The EU is an economic power house, representing the largest trading bloc in the world. As Stephen Calleya (2005, p. 4) states, in 2010 EU GDP will reach US \$12,000

billion, which he contends is an almost unimaginable figure. However, in 2005 the EU GDP reached \$15 trillion , and in 2008 it is forecasted to reach €12874944.4 million (market prices), which is over \$16 trillion (Eurostat, 2009). These indicators confirm the EU as the top economic power in the world. In the Mediterranean, the Southern Mediterranean countries, excluding Turkey, represent about 5% of total EU external trade, *i.e.* about €120 billion in 2006 (European Commission, 2007a). This is in stark contrast to the Southern Mediterranean-EU trade volume, as it represents almost half of their total trade: 48.7% of exports went to the EU and 45.1% of imports in 2004 came from the EU (Bouzerger, 2007, p. 3)¹¹². For example, Tunisian exports to the EU represent 83.3% of all its exports (Ibid., p. 4).

Direct financial support from the EU is another aspect of EU economic power. Although the direct impact of these measures is less than what was expected, this also involves the financing available to the Southern Mediterranean countries. The Commission allocated \$7.8 billion from 2000 to 2006 for development (Calleya, 2005, p. 95), for the next budget cycle of 2007-13, €12 billion is planned for the entire ENP framework, and €5,6 billion from 2007-10 (European Commission, 2007b, p. 1). Of this €5.6 billion, €2962 million will go directly to Southern Mediterranean countries¹¹³. If we include the funding for the Regional Programme – South, Cross-border Cooperation Pro-

112. Southern Mediterranean here includes: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey. Palestine is also included.

113. They will be split as follows: Algeria 220, Egypt 558, Israel 8, Jordan 265, Lebanon 187, Libya 8, Morocco 654, Palestinian Authority 632, Syria 130, Tunisia 300 (€ million) Ibid., p. 1.

grammes and the Governance Facility & Neighbourhood Investment Fund, the number rises to €3982,4 million in direct and indirect funding (Ibid., p. 2). In comparison with the trade figures, the EU's development funding is perhaps the weakest point of its economic power, especially if we take into account only the direct country funding to the Southern Mediterranean (€2962 million) for four years. With this level of funding we arrive at an yearly average sum of €740.5 million per year for the whole region, which is roughly the same as in 2000-6 (Calleya, 2005, p. xiii). As Calleya notes, no country changes policy for €100 – 150 million of grant assistance (Ibid., p. 90). In addition, there have been numerous reports of mismanagement and corruption surrounding these funds. If the EU manages to efficiently distribute these funds throughout the region, these could have positive long term impacts on civil society. Furthermore, continued trade relations, and more importantly the successful establishment of a free trade zone in the region, should increase the EU's influence in the region.

Politically, the EU's CFSP has already influenced the Mediterranean region, and future coordination will only increase Europe's role in the region. The development of a European CFSP has had its problems, and many thought the disagreement over Iraq would lead to the end of an effective EU foreign Policy, however that did not transpire. The EU and its member states are currently engaged in the delicate case of Iran's nuclear programme. However, although there is a need to consider the EU's political power in world affairs carefully, much work is still needed to develop a truly coherent and unified EU foreign policy, as this situation hampers European efforts to produce a consistent and credible international role. Nevertheless, the idea, or concept of the EU

as a global or superpower has been gaining ground in public opinion as well as in academic and political circles (McCormick, 2006).

Several terms have been utilised to classify the EU as a power; post-modern power (Cooper, 2003; Kagan, 2003), civilian power (Telò, 2006; Duchêne, 1973; Maull, 1990), a normative power (Laïdi, 2005; Rosecrance, 1987) or a soft power (Nye, 2003, p. 30). All of these refer to the capability of the EU to be a power operating without the traditional (i.e. military force, and statehood) tools of power. The EU can still wield power as the largest commercial power in the world. It does this, firstly by implementing a monetarily generous foreign policy, secondly by acting within the boundaries of international law and relevant institutions, and thirdly by campaigning for greater rules to be applied in the international arena and favouring cooperation and conflict resolution within a legal framework. By following the three previously mentioned steps the EU is perceived as an upstanding international citizen. However, in the case of soft power, as Telò notes, it is only a compliment to hard power (2006, p. 2), and as Nye himself stated the best usage of power is always to have both options at one's disposal (Nye, 2005, p. XIII). In contrast, concepts of normative and civilian power, do away with the need for hard power, and approach power from a different perspective, *i.e.* different from the classic nation state centric approach (Laïdi, 2005, p. 50), see also Ian Mannners (2007, p. 33).

According to Laïdi, the concepts of normative and civilian power are similar, so he defines a normative power as follows:

Une puissance normative est donc une puissance dont l'identité et la stratégie reposent sur une préférence pour la généralisation de règles comportementales applicables – largement mais non exclusivement – aux États et présentant trois caractéristiques essentielles : d'être négociées – et non

imposées ; d'être également légitimées pas des instances internationales représentatives ; enfin d'être opposables à tous les acteurs du système international indépendamment de leur position hiérarchique au sein de celui-ci (Laïdi, 2005, pp. 54-55).

While Hanns Maull defines a civilian power as including:

the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; b) the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management (Maull, 1990, pp. 92-93).

Thus, it is possible to understand how the EU can be a power even through non-military means, and how it can influence its neighbourhood. As Adam states, it is perhaps time to let go of the notion that Europe has no power, Europe does have power, and embrace its own unique brand of it (Adam, 2007, p. 25).

Although military power is no longer the only measure of power, it is still considered an aspect of power and the EU itself has started to address military issues through the development of a Common Security and Defence Policy. Currently, this is the EU's weakest point, as the means of funding defence remain in the hands of the member states. In the context of the Mediterranean, most EU member states have superior military capabilities to most of the Southern Mediterranean countries. If one were to combine all the separate European military forces into one force, then we would indeed have a global military power, but this is not the case at the moment. Presently, military policy aims are more humble, however, after a long period of discussion small steps have been taken to give some independent military capability to the EU. Starting with the Maastricht Treaty, then the setting up of the Petersberg Tasks, through the Saint-Malo Declaration and now with a European Security Strategy, the EU has slowly been

given some means in the military field. Recently, the EU called on member states to cooperate in setting up Battlegroups of about 1000-1500 soldiers who are to be rapidly deployed for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions that will rotate every six months, and so far 15 have been planned. Previously the EU also called for the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force capable of deploying up to 60 000 troops. Accordingly, as capabilities increase, so do the missions. There have now been EU missions in the former Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Congo and recently it was announced that EU troops would be deploying in Darfur.

In summary, the EU is not simply an economic or political power, it is a sum of its parts, as Kupchan states a coming together of impressive resources (2003, p. 119). Moreover, its power comes not only from its material attributes, but from the expectations and demands others place upon her, to play its part in manner consistent with its core values (Telò, 2006, p. 60).

In the case of the Southern Mediterranean there are several possible centres of power. One is Turkey, as it possess one of the most developed economies in the region and one of the largest standing armies in NATO. Historically, Turkey's influence in the region was on account of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey certainly has the capabilities to become a regional power, but it exercises its influence sparingly, although it participates in EU led regional initiatives and encourages Israeli/Palestinian negotiations. Turkey mostly concentrates on the Kurdish issue, where it often acts unilaterally, and this occasionally puts it at odds with Syria, Iran, Iraq and the EU.

Another centre of power revolves around Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. Egypt and Israel are both capable of influencing the entire Southern Mediterranean; Israel because of its military power and Egypt due to its central role in the Arab World and as a military power in its own right. Israel's actions in Palestine frequently impact on governments and public opinion throughout the Mediterranean, so this often put it at odds with states from the Eastern and Western Mediterranean (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 191). Therefore, Israel seeks to solve its security dilemma and is concerned with overall relations with all Arab countries, but specifically with its neighbours. Of particular concern to Israel are Syrian ambitions. Although Israel signed peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, Syria remains officially at war with Israel. Nonetheless, Israel has also been developing its relations with Morocco and Tunisia (Calleya, 2005, p. 26). Egypt still wields a great deal of influence in the Mediterranean, and as noted in the Maghreb it can be called-upon to favour either Morocco or Algeria in their dispute over the Western Sahara. Egypt has played an important role as the spokesman for the Arab World, but its influence diminished in the 1980s, and it is now trying to regain its lost power by adopting a more Mediterranean posture (Joffé, 1998, pp. 48-49, 59). Syria on the other hand, has suffered important setbacks in the region. Syria still has not recovered the Golan Heights, it withdrew from Lebanon and is considered a rogue state and is facing possible international sanctions (Harders, 2008, p. 44).

Algeria, had to overcome a civil war that severely weakened its regional standing, a situation that was exploited by Morocco and Egypt (Zoubir, 2005, p. 169). Since then, it has started to pay closer attention to its neighbours, and recently acquired large

quantities of Russian military equipment. Algeria may seek to consolidate its position in the region, helped by the revenue generated by its oil and gas exports. Countries such as Algeria and Libya have been stable suppliers of natural gas, allowing foreign firms, including European, to exploit their gas fields. Supply has been constant in contrast to other suppliers such as Russia. Polarity in the Maghreb revolves around Algeria and its direct competitor Morocco. Morocco enjoys good relations with the EU and the U.S, and receives military assistance from the latter (Dris, 2008, p. 251). However, both Algeria and Morocco are at odds over the final status of the Western Sahara, and this issue dominates Maghreb politics thus limiting the prospects of regional union (Zoubir, 2005, p. 171).

Polarity in the region is characterised by a strong concentration of power in the Northern Mediterranean:

- economic: the EU is an economic superpower overshadowing any of its regional neighbours.
- political: The EU is seen as an increasingly reliable actor in world and regional affairs, as it respects international law and is willing to work for peaceful conflict resolution.
- military: increasing cooperation between member states will lead to increased EU operations, several EU members states are already regional military powers.

Europe represents a crucial pole in the Mediterranean and therefore, is being increasingly drawn into the affairs of the region (Joffé, 1998, p. 46). However, in the Southern Mediterranean the situation is more complex. Power in the Southern Mediterranean is distributed throughout the region, with some actors, Egypt, Israel and Turkey, possessing a measure of regional influence. In the case of these three countries, they possess

great military power, whilst Turkey and Israel also possess strong economies. Egypt is the most populous and has been at the ideological forefront of the Arab World since its independence in the 1950s. Algeria has aspirations of re-entering the regional scene, especially since the end of the civil war and the resumption of oil and gas exports to Europe. However, it must contend with Morocco as a political and military challenger as long as the Western Sahara question remains unsettled. Morocco and Algeria have focused their attention on the situation in the Western Sahara, therefore, they have had little impact on Eastern Mediterranean politics; in fact both countries, plus Libya, seem more interested in their involvement with Africa and/or Europe than with the rest of the Southern Mediterranean (Dris, 2008, p. 251). Both in the Western and Eastern Mediterranean there have been power struggles and true regional power is limited (Said Aly, 2000, pp. 47-48). Units in the Southern Mediterranean are primarily concerned with specific issues limited to their surrounding environment and only rarely take regional actions that impact the whole Mediterranean. From a polarity point of view, the Southern Mediterranean tends to be viewed as two separate entities, one to the East centred on Israel and Egypt with Jordan, Syria and Lebanon as secondary units, and a second one to the West, centred on Algeria and Morocco, with Tunisia and Libya as secondary units (Calleja, 2005, pp. 24-34). Due to its position and capabilities, the EU has a wider global view of the region and can operate in both Eastern and Western Mediterranean.

2.4. Patterns of Amity and Enmity

In this section we will identify possible zones of conflict and stability in the region. In the words of Buzan and Wæver:

The pattern of amity and enmity is normally best understood by starting the analysis from the regional level, and extending it towards inclusion of the global actors on the one side and domestic factors on the other. The specific pattern of who fears or likes whom is generally not imported from the system level, but generated internally in the region by a mixture of history, politics, and material conditions (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 47).

With an overview of the patterns of amity and enmity we will finish our tour of the RSC structure in the Mediterranean, and can then proceed out to determine its type.

It can be argued that in the Mediterranean region there are two major fault lines, the first surrounding Israel and its neighbours, the second situated around Morocco and Algeria. We can also highlight past tensions between EU member state Spain with Morocco over the Spanish enclaves in North Africa. In essence, despite institutionalising attempts the region is still very much marked by intra-state and inter-state violence, or indeed, the possibility of it (Harders, 2008, p. 47). With Pan-Arabism at its lowest, and despite the rise of Islamism, inter-state relations are still the mainstay of regional politics, inter-Arab disputes still continue to brand the region as one of instability (Hinnebusch, 2002b, p. 32; El-Shazly & Hinnebusch, 2002, pp. 86-87).

The most unstable point in the Mediterranean is centred around Israel, as the unresolved Palestinian issue also threatens Jordan and Lebanon. To this we can add the unsettled border dispute between Syria and Israel, which is another major source of tension. Due to these unresolved conflicts the region suffers from instability. In addition, Israel mounted large scale military operation in Southern Lebanon in the summer of 2006 and more recently in Gaza. Two important actors have stabilised their relations with Israel, Egypt and Jordan. Although the possibility of all-out war remains, it is very low as countries in the region have to deal with internal threats from extremists, both

the rise of extremism and regional conflicts are still unresolved. In fact, as we will see, these two situations, the Israeli/Arab conflict and the rise of extremism, are intertwined and constitute a major source of tension in the region (Smith, 2005a, p. 218; Joffé, 1998, p. 49).

On the one hand, we have the issue surrounding Israel itself, namely, its relations with its neighbours and the Arab world in general, as they do not accept the Israeli state, or more specifically its boundaries. On the other hand, we have the Palestinian issue. The Palestinians were displaced after the creation of the Israeli state and have since been fighting to return to their homeland, recently in the hope of founding a Palestinian state neighbouring Israel. This remains an important issue for Arab leaders and especially for Arab public opinion. This concern over the situation of the Palestinians extends to the Gulf, where the issue garners some attention, although individual state interest have not always coincided with Palestinian interest (Smith, 2005a, p. 223). These two issues, the Arab/Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question, have helped in part to fuel extremist ideology. The situation in the Mediterranean is further complicated by what El-Shazly and Hinnebusch call the Turkish-Israeli Pact, which impacts on Syrian regional policy due to disagreements between the former and Turkey on the Kurdish issue (El-Shazly & Hinnebusch, 2002, p. 78). Additionally, the situation in Iraq is also of concern to the Eastern Mediterranean, both the continued civil strife and the American presence in the region worry regional actors.

The other major area of enmity, the status of the Western Sahara, revolves around Morocco and Algeria. Tensions between the two periodically flare up, as in May 2007, when military tensions occurred along the border (EUX.TV, 2007). Morocco has

been fighting the Polisario in the Western Sahara since Spain abandoned the region in 1975, in this context Morocco has always fought against Algerian involvement in the region, especially as Algeria supported Western Sahara independence (Hernando de Larramendi, 2008, p. 181). This potential conflict affects the entire Maghreb, as the two main protagonists maintain, in part, the balance of power by involving the other countries in the region, including Egypt (Leveau, 1993, p. 102; Dris, 2008, pp. 248, 252-255). The instability caused by this dispute has had severe consequences for continued regional integration in the Maghreb (Hernando de Larramendi, 2008, p. 189; Joffé, 1998, p. 48).

Another possible area of enmity revolves around the Spanish enclaves in North Africa (Ceuta and Mellila) which Morocco claims as part of its territory (Calleya, 2005, p. 19)¹¹⁴. In 2002 Morocco occupied the small inhabited island of Perejil (Parsley Island) a few hundred yards from the Moroccan mainland. This operation placed the Spanish military on high alert, and ended in the removal of the Moroccan personnel by Spanish troops. Since then, relations have been calm and friendly, with the two countries cooperating on several matters including, illegal immigration and organised crime as was noted in chapters two and three.

With regards to the EU, since the end of the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia there have been no major active conflicts in that area, but the situation in the Balkans is being monitored by the EU, and there are still no guarantees that stability will continue in the region, despite ongoing reconstruction efforts (Ibid., p. 46). Another possible zone of en-

114. According to Calleya, the Canary Islands could also be the subject of dispute Ibid., p. 19.

mity in the EU is in the Basque region, where ETA continue to be active and has not renounced violence as a means of achieving its goals. However, ETA is under heavy pressure from Spanish, French and European law enforcement authorities.

In summary, there are two majors flash points in the Mediterranean. With the war in the ex-Yugoslavia now over and the region moving ever closer to stability, with eventual EU membership for the Balkan countries, the Israeli/Palestinian issue (in which we can include the larger Arab/Israeli conflict) and the dispute over Western Sahara remain the principal flash points. The Israeli/Palestinian issue remains the most problematic and explosive of the two in its current unresolved status, and it also has an impact well beyond its immediate region.

3. The Type of Regional Security Complex in the Euro-Mediterranean Region

There have been some attempts to classify the Mediterranean using the RSCT framework. For example, Biscop (2003, p. 191) sees the possibility of one RSC in the region, while Heijl sees two RSCs, one in Europe and one in the Middle East, which contains a sub-complex in North Africa (2007, p. 2). Calleya on the other hand, sees two main regions in the Mediterranean, a European and Middle Eastern region, divided into three sub-groups: Southern Europe, the Maghreb and the Mashreq (2005, p. 16). Finally, Šabič and Bolinović came to the conclusion that no security complex exists in the Mediterranean due to differences in economic and political institutional regimes (2007, p. 322).

This research has shown, through rigorous discourse analysis, that the Mediterranean does form a security complex, composed of the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries. However, we must still determine which type of security complex is present in the region and if there are any subcomplexes in the larger Euro-Mediterranean RSC. This requires careful attention to polarity in the region and the patterns of amity and enmity (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 53-55). Consequently, in the end we are able to fit the Euro-Mediterranean RSC to Buzan and Wæver's classification¹¹⁵:

1. Standard
2. Centred
 - (a) Superpower
 - (b) Great Power
 - (c) Regional Power
 - (d) Institutional
3. Great power
4. Supercomplexes (Ibid., pp. 53-64).

As a starting point, we can determine the types of powers present in the Mediterranean. We have seen in section 2.3. that Turkey, Israel and Egypt are the main regional powers. Buzan and Wæver define regional powers as a power whose "capabilities loom large in their region, but do not register much in a broad-spectrum way at the global level" (Ibid., p. 37). Turkey, Israel and Egypt are essential for stability in the region, both in the Eastern and Western Mediterranean. Turning our attention to the EU, we have, also in section 2.3., determined that the EU possess power, but we must now classify it as either a Superpower, a Great Power or a Regional Power. Buzan and Wæver define a

115. The different types of RSCs are detailed in section 1.2.3. of the first chapter.

superpower as possessing first-class military-political capabilities, and the economy to support such capabilities. In addition, it must be capable of exercising global military and political reach, and superpowers must also be present in the securitisation and desecuritisation of all, or nearly all regions (Ibid., pp. 34-35). Although the EU possess economic power, it does not possess first class military capabilities and global reach needed to be considered a superpower. Here the benchmark is the US, and from a strict military standpoint the EU does not compare (McCormick, 2006, pp. 61-78). Therefore, the EU is either a regional or great power.

We have previously seen that a regional power's capabilities do not register at the global level, meaning they have no influence on shaping the broad lines of the international system. On the other hand, a great power is recognised through one characteristic, "they are responded to by others on the basis of system level calculations about the present and near-future distribution of power" (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 35). This means, that a great power is included in the calculations of other powers "as if it has the economic, military and political potential to bid for superpower status in the short or medium term" (Ibid., p. 35). From a military standpoint the EU is not yet a great power, but viewed from a economic or political perspective the issue becomes more problematic. Buzan and Wæver both think that the EU qualifies as a great power, in the same league as Japan, China and Russia, since they consider these states to represent potential challengers to the USA (Ibid., p. 36). If we were to split the EU into three different categories, economic, political and military, we could say that the EU is an economic superpower having the largest GDP in the world, a political great power being talked by most as so and considered a competitor to the US, but a minor military power as it does not

possess a strong independent military structure with its own equipment. However, if individual EU member states decided to pool their resources together into an 'EU military', then its military capabilities would increase dramatically.

Taking in consideration the above, the EU can be considered to be a great power. However, in the RSC its influence is uneven as was evident from the discourse analysis. When examining securitization, the political influence of the EU in the region seems variable, as it changes according to specific issues. Whereas terrorism is an important issue for all the units in the Mediterranean, other issues such as regional conflicts or WMDs have gaps in their securitization which in turn affects the EU's influence on the region. For example, the issues of regional conflicts and of illegal immigration are of unequal concern throughout the region. The issue of regional conflicts is of primary importance to the Southern Mediterranean, but seems secondary to the EU, as it lacks extraordinary measures or the possibility of extraordinary measures. Attempts by the EU to deal with conflicts in the region, notably a proposal for a Charter for Peace and Security, have produced negative reactions. In addition, calls for a greater EU role in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict have not been answered by the EU itself. Following securitisation throughout the region we can see that the EU's influence varies. For example, the area comprising Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Turkey is much closer to the EU in security terms. There is a strong confluence in the issues securitised, plus Turkey wishes to join the EU. While further east we can argue that the EU's influence is diluted due to the role of regional powers and strong interregional interaction in addition to some superpower influence.

In the Maghreb, it can be argued that the EU has reached great power level, while in the Mashreq, stronger regional powers and superpower penetration is slowing greater EU impact in the region (Calleya, 2005, p. 14). Furthermore, while in the Western Mediterranean the main issues remain terrorism and illegal immigration, in the Eastern Mediterranean terrorism and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict dominate government agendas in that area, an issue that the EU seems reluctant to tackle directly. Currently, in the Eastern Mediterranean there seems to be a lack of involvement by the EU on the major issue affecting this part of the Mediterranean, that is, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. However, this does not mean that the EU is absent from the region, on the contrary, there have been some inroads made by the EU. For example, it is a major donor to the Palestinian Authority and participated in the 2006 Lebanese-Israeli ceasefire operation.

Therefore, we can identify a Great Power centred RSC comprising the EU, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, with the Eastern part of the Mediterranean forming a subcomplex. Buzan and Wæver define subcomplexes as “distinctive patterns of security interdependence that are nonetheless caught up in a wider pattern that defines the RSC as a whole” (2003, p. 51). Consequently, in contrast to the Western Mediterranean, the Eastern Mediterranean is absorbed by inter-state tensions within the area and also outside involvement, notably US superpower involvement. Moreover, the situation in Iraq and Iran has had repercussions for the Eastern Mediterranean, as it has facilitated security interactions with the neighbouring region and, more importantly, the continuing Israeli/Palestinian/Arab conflict also influences the Gulf. However, the EU is not a complete outsider, as there is growing awareness of the EU’s importance to sta-

bility in the region and, therefore, some states are calling for greater involvement from the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean, most notably in helping resolve the Israeli/Palestinian issue. There is talk of the EU becoming a counterbalance to the US in the area and becoming a more impartial mediator in the different regional conflicts. Hence, this recognition indicates that the EU is perceived as a great power. Finally, the issue of illegal immigration, although not yet a major concern, is present in Eastern Mediterranean security discourse, not in all countries in the area, but in a few, which means that the issue is being considered from a security perspective. This moves us away from Buzan and Wæver's analysis of a single independent RSC in the Middle East, stretching from Morocco to the Gulf (Ibid., pp. 187-188).

In conclusion, in the Mediterranean we have a great power centred RSC comprising the EU and the Southern Mediterranean, the former constitutes a great power. However, the Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt, Syria, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon, is not fully integrated into this complex, but forms a subcomplex. This subcomplex is part of the larger Euro-Mediterranean Great Power Centred RSC. Indeed, there are signs that the area is moving towards greater integration in the Great Power RSC in the Mediterranean, *e.g.* acknowledging the role the EU can play in solving regional conflicts threatening the region and the increasing awareness of the importance of illegal immigration, viewed from a security perspective. Security perceptions of the Eastern Mediterranean are slowly aligning with those of the Maghreb and the EU as described by the discourse analysis of individual issues. Moreover, there is a clear awareness of a Mediterranean identity throughout the region. Greater EU intervention in the region could help sever Eastern Mediterranean security ties with the Gulf region which would end the presence

of a sub-complex in the larger Euro-Mediterranean RSC. This means that EU security perceptions and actions must also move closer to those of the Eastern Mediterranean.

VI. Scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex

After identifying and analysing Mediterranean security discourse, this was followed by a level-by-level analysis of the Mediterranean region, and finally, a characterisation of the Mediterranean within the RSC framework was achieved. The challenge is now to take the analysis further, by determining how the Euro-Mediterranean RSC will evolve, and to determine the EU's role within various possible scenarios. Hence, the first section of this chapter will establish the likely scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, taking into account all the data previously gathered. The scenarios presented are seen as actual possibilities within the context of the current geopolitical conditions. The most unlikely scenarios will be eliminated, leaving only those most likely. These scenarios serve as indicators of manoeuvrability within the political space in the region (Ibid., p. 70).

After identifying the most likely scenarios for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, the second section of this chapter will look specifically at the EU. Within the likely scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean, the roles and responsibilities of the EU as a security actor can now be determined. Through the scenarios presented in the previous section, a clear picture will emerge concerning the EU's place in the Mediterranean

security architecture. This will conclude our analysis of the Euro-Mediterranean region and in particular of the EU as a regional security actor.

1. Scenarios for the Current Euro-Mediterranean RSC

There are five main options for the evolution of an RSC: overlay, disintegration, status quo, internal transformation and external transformation. Before looking at the more likely options the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, the two unlikely possibilities will be briefly considered. These are overlay and disintegration, both of which are extreme cases, and could lead to the end of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC.

Overlay would produce a similar situation as during the Cold War, *i.e.* that of superpower interests dominating regional security interests, most notably US interests. Although the US and its European allies share many common interests, there is an increasing independent decision making capability on the part of the EU (Telò, 2006, pp. 210-214). One such example is the continuing political situation in Kosovo, where the EU has assumed a leading role. While a more consensual future US administration may assume power, there is no guarantee that it would not promote its own framework and interest in the Mediterranean region to the detriment of other 'national' agendas. On the contrary, a new US administration might seek to re-assert its influence in international affairs, thus overriding and under-minding EU efforts. Furthermore, there is a genuine desire on the part of the EU to develop independent capabilities for foreign policy action (as we will see in the next sections) (Gomes, 2007; Carnero, 2007). This will con-

tinue to create tensions between the EU and the US, including in the Mediterranean region where the US may not readily accept a growing EU role (Fabre, 2007, p. 222; Biscop, 2005, pp. 51-52). On the other hand, Russia's position is not currently strong enough to have the same prominent posture as during the Cold War (as noted in chapter five). Moreover, most Eastern European states are wary of any Russian initiative that involves them. Thus, the Mediterranean is still very much a contested region at the global level, and this fact rules out any immediate overlay by the US or Russia. In the case of the EU, European overlay in the short or medium term is unlikely, and also dependent upon the EU achieving superpower status. As we will see in section 1.2.2., this is an extreme case, as in the long term, this would require an initial internal transformation in the Euro-Mediterranean RSC.

Disintegration would mirror a situation similar to that of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, which resulted in the disappearance of the USSR as a unit in the bipolar international system, thus freeing Eastern Europe from Moscow's influence. In the Mediterranean context it could involve the dissolution of the EU, thereby abolishing the Euro-Mediterranean RSC in its current form. Despite many difficulties, EU integration has been moving forward towards even greater integration and coordination, and therefore, there is no sign that disintegration is occurring. The existence of certain *acquis* like monetary union and free circulation of peoples and goods, in addition to institutional ones such as the European Parliament, or even more simply regular ministerial meetings, are unlikely to disappear. As Telò states, paraphrasing Galileo Galilei, ““nevertheless, it does move”” (Telò, 2006, p. 201). Other units in the region are also unlikely to undergo profound changes that would lead to the disintegration of the RSC. More-

over, security discourse clearly shows shared concerns that have been in place for several years and are unlikely to disappear. Even, in the very unlikely possibility, of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC losing one or two actors, security interaction would still continue, and consequently, so would the RSC.

After putting aside these two possibilities, overlay and disintegration, we can now concentrate on the more realistic options for the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, these are: status quo, internal transformation and external transformation. Buzan and Wæver (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 53) explain these possibilities open to a RSC as follows:

- Status quo: there are no significant changes in its essential structure.
- Internal transformation: changes in essential structure occur *within* the the context of its existing outer boundary.
- External transformation: the outer boundary expands or contracts, changing the membership of the RSC and most probably transforming its essential structure in other ways.

To recap, internal transformation happens inside the RSC, with changes affecting one or several members of the RSC changing its nature. For example, the members of the RSC can move towards greater integration, or an existing member can gain or lose power, or enemies become friends or *vice versa*. External transformation changes the boundaries of the RSC; mainly through a merger with another region or a new unit joining the RSC. This can have both internal and external sources, notably changes in security perceptions inside or outside the RSC.

Firstly, we will examine the ways in which the status quo is to be maintained in the Mediterranean. In other words, a Great Power RSC centred around the EU, the Maghreb and Turkey, with the Mashreq remaining a subcomplex. Secondly, we will explore the options surrounding the possibilities of internal transformation. The analysis will focus on whether, within the Great Power Euro-Mediterranean RSC, there will be any changes that can be predicted, or are possible given the current conditions of the complex. Finally, the possibility of external transformation in the Euro-Mediterranean RSC will be established. This particularly concerns the Mashreq, due to its status as a subcomplex of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC. There are links between Eastern Mediterranean states and the Gulf region, that so far have prevented the region from fully joining the Euro-Mediterranean RSC. Furthermore, interaction between Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa merits some attention, especially due to the number of illegal immigrants trying to reach Europe. This migratory push northwards affects not only the EU, but increasingly North African states that have to deal with large populations of illegal immigrants that end up staying, and living in shanty towns. This not only generates civil unrest, but is also a breeding ground for organised crime (as noted in chapter five). Therefore, room for external transformation in the Great Power centred RSC in the Mediterranean exists, from the southern border of the RSC, from Sub-Saharan Africa, and additionally, in the east there is also a possibility for change.

1.1. Status Quo

Status quo would mean the Great Power RSC centred on the EU maintains its current configuration, with the Mashreq remaining as a subcomplex. Maintaining the

status quo will depend on internal and external factors that could affect the basic structure of the RSC. One However, must accept that the status quo is the least likely option for the Mediterranean as there are strong indicators pointing towards change, notably external transformation. Nonetheless, we will explore a few possibilities as to how and why the status quo may continue.

1.1.1. The EU and the Status Quo

This section will address how internal factors in the EU can favour the status quo. Presently, there are two EU related factors that can prolong the status quo. Firstly, the EU is concerned with the adoption of the new Lisbon Treaty and the institutional reform needed to ensure that an enlarged EU works efficiently. The second factor is due to an ongoing re-evaluation of the Barcelona Process.

Institutional reform is presently high on the EU agenda. The EU's decision-making process makes account for 15 members, and not the current figure of 27 member states. As such, consensus between the 27 member states, and between member states and EU institutions is harder to achieve, especially if unanimity is required, particularly in the case of foreign and defence policy. The need to integrate 12 new member states into the EU, in addition to managing differences between current members is putting a strain on the EU and diminishing its capacity to intervene internationally. The Constitutional Treaty, and later the Lisbon Treaty, were aimed at resolving this issue. With the Lisbon Treaty still to be adopted by all member states, the EU is finding it dif-

difficult to project its power abroad. This situation precludes any groundbreaking initiatives on the part of EU for the foreseeable future.

An additional obstacle involves the recently undertaken the re-assessment of the Barcelona Process. French President Nicolas Sarkozy's new proposal for a Mediterranean Union is creating some disquiet, even uncertainty, and is causing concern in Brussels and other European capitals (Mahony, 2007b). Pressure from the EU and its member states forced President Sarkozy to abandon his idea of a Mediterranean Union comprised of seven EU countries plus the countries of the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, further regional initiatives that include only Southern EU member states are unlikely, especially as the debate concerning the EU's role in the region continues. Ultimately, the French President's idea met, not only resistance from EU member states, but also from EU institutions fearing that this Mediterranean Union initiative would undermine the progress achieved since 1995 through the Barcelona Process (Ibid.). Nonetheless, the EU and some of its member states are looking at Euro-Mediterranean relations in order to determine how to overcome the shortcomings of the Barcelona Process. This EU 'introspection' regarding its role in the Mediterranean will hinder any attempts at renewing Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Both of these factors, the concern with internal consolidation and debate on the future of the Euro-Mediterranean framework, appeared as the future of the EU became a contentious issues post-Constitutional Treaty rejection. Moving forward will require that all these issues be addressed, thus the status quo might remain the only option for the foreseeable future (2-15 year timeframe).

1.1.2. EU-Maghreb Rapprochement

By making the Maghreb a priority for EU policy in the Mediterranean region, the status quo will be maintained. This situation is possible due to the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC and the strong interaction between the EU and the Maghreb. By taking advantage of already great interdependence between the Maghreb countries and the EU, future initiatives could help to institutionalise and stabilise relations between the two shores, thus solidifying the current framework. This would maintain the current Great Power centred RSC and simultaneously develop it along different vectors, *e.g.* improving cooperation in order to deal with illegal immigration or the creation of a better law enforcement partnership to help fight terrorism. It is through this region that a large percentage of illegal immigration traverses on route to Europe. In addition, concern over the return of terrorism to the region, notably Al-Qaeda led operations, is leading to increased interest in developing law enforcement cooperation (Guidère, 2007; Fernandes, 2007). Any progress made by extremists groups will undoubtedly impact security in the EU, as well as the entire Southern Mediterranean. Moreover, in the Maghreb the EU has willing economic partners who are working to develop their economies in concert with Europe, including Algeria and Libya - the two main exporters of gas and oil in the Mediterranean. Instability in these countries coupled with an equally unstable supply from Russia could seriously affect European energy security.

The Maghreb region seems willing to develop its relations with the EU, by adapting to EU regulations and integrating into the EU market. While there are still unresolved issues in the region, they do not seem to adversely affect relations with the EU

as they affect relations between Maghreb countries. Also economic development and stability is of interest for the Maghreb countries, and this also entails fighting terrorism and extremists movements. These movements clash with local elites in a constant struggle for legitimacy. It is therefore in the interest of the current regimes to strive for economic development and political stability.

Prioritising the Maghreb is then a sensible choice as conditions are favourable for continued EU involvement in the area. Nonetheless, this approach has its drawbacks and would only be temporary (2-15 years). While prioritising the Maghreb would bring the two regions even closer, it would surely alienate the Eastern Mediterranean thus causing it to move away from the EU. In the end, such a policy of prioritising the Maghreb would maintain the status quo for only a short period, and might lead to external transformation. Such a policy would be viable if the EU were to seek short-term stability in the Maghreb, so as to concentrate its attention in the Mashreq at a later stage, therefore, avoiding losing influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. This in turn would ultimately lead to an internal transformation, and end the status of subcomplex for the Eastern Mediterranean (as we will see in section 1.2.2.).

1.1.3. The Eastern Mediterranean and the Status Quo

The Eastern Mediterranean represents a more problematic area for the EU. The main issue to resolve is an ongoing conflict that dates back to the late 1940s, namely the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is a significant issue that affects the whole region as it causes armed conflict, instability and terrorism. This situation affects the status quo in so far as the EU is unable to take a greater role in settling

this conflict, whilst at the same time, the Eastern Mediterranean continues to depend on European markets. This creates and perpetuates the status quo, as the EU, unable to deal with the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, remains a weak actor in the region. The Eastern Mediterranean states, although calling for greater EU political intervention in the region, can only expect instead EU economic intervention which they also desperately require. As such, the Eastern Mediterranean, due to this unresolved regional conflict, continues to have a security 'footprint' that influences its neighbours in the Gulf and results in the maintenance of the US as a viable regional actor.

In the current context the EU maintains the status quo by limiting itself to the role of economic partner, but it must go beyond this economic role if it is to prove that it can be a valuable partner for peace and stability in the region. The Arab world recognises and supports further EU intervention in the peace process, however European measures on this issue have not been decisive. Indeed, the issue is far from being securitised by the EU, and perhaps this is intentional, as the EU may expect better results through the non-securitisation of the issue. Such an approach may be interpreted as a lack of commitment on the part of the EU with regard to this area of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, it highlights the EU's inability in addressing the central regional security issue in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict (Biscop, 2003, pp. 38, 45-38, 46; Telò, 2006, pp. 206, 254; Fabre, 2007, p. 222; Henry, 2007, p. 217). Although issues such as terrorism and the migration of Palestinian refugees are important issues, they more often than not are linked with the regional Israel and Palestine conflict. Within this context, the EU for the short term at least, will have difficulty in achieving diplomatic inroads. Maintaining the status quo in the region is an unrealistic

proposition, as politically the EU appears unable to take charge, despite the need for a greater role, economically and politically, the Eastern Mediterranean needs the EU. The Eastern Mediterranean states may want to move away from the EU but economically are incapable of doing so. In addition, the status quo in this region is not only due to the EU's inability to play a bigger role in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, but this situation also facilitates a strong US presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (Fabre, 2007, p. 224). Other issues are often tied to the conflict in the Palestinian territories, and the protracted nature of the conflict hampers negotiations for a lasting solution and in consequence, any EU initiative.

The resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict remains central to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean, and as long as it remains unresolved the conflict occupies centre stage in the region as well as keeping the US engaged in the Euro-Mediterranean. Furthermore, security perceptions of the region will prioritise 'hard' security and not the 'soft' security issues that are closer to those of the EU. By not addressing this issue, the EU will continue to maintain the status quo in the region, keeping the Eastern Mediterranean security perceptions apart from those of Europe.

1.1.4. Conclusion: Maintaining the Status Quo

The status quo can only be maintained in the Euro-Mediterranean RSC in the short term (2-15 years). This is due to two main elements, the first relating to the EU's institutions and policies, and the second regarding its role in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. With the EU still undergoing institutional reform as well as re-evaluating its Euro-Mediterranean policies, its ability to engage its neighbours is diminished. In addition, its

failure in decisively engaging the Eastern Mediterranean's main security concern contributes to perpetuating the situation. To these elements we must add EU-Maghreb relations. The Maghreb is a relatively stable region when compared to the Eastern Mediterranean. The EU could decide to concentrate efforts and resources on the region in order to further develop and stabilise the Maghreb. This would also maintain the status quo in the short term.

As such, maintaining the status quo is a short term prospect that leaves the Eastern Mediterranean at the margins of an area of prosperity and peace. This situation could lead to increased instability, and these effects could spillover into the rest of the Mediterranean if the situation is left unattended. This could also see the EU's influence in the region diminish even further. Adoption of any policy by the EU that favours maintaining the status quo, such as prioritising the Maghreb region, would not further European aspirations for greater international influence. This scenario will not show the development of the EU as the power player it aspires to become. However, as we will see in the next sections, recent developments have the potential to change the structure of the RSC in the Mediterranean and force the EU to make important decisions about its international role.

1.2. Internal Transformation

Internal transformation is dependent upon changes within the Great Power Centred Euro-Mediterranean RSC. In this case the boundaries would tend to remain constant, but the type of RSC could change to reflect events within the RSC. Changes would most likely revolve around modifications in the patterns of enmity and amity, or

in changes that affect the units of the RSC itself. Internal transformation mainly depends on the first two levels of analysis, *i.e.* the domestic situation of the actors and state to state relations in the region. Alterations in the domestic sphere of a unit leads to new perceptions of security and to new securitizations. This is also true when changes occur in the relations between units in the region. Military confrontation, or other types of conflict, can lead to power shifts within the RSC. We will then examine what changes are likely to occur, or what changes can be made, within the RSC that would affect the Euro-Mediterranean RSC.

Possible changes include the RSC transforming from a Great Power Centred RSC to a Superpower Centred RSC. This would entail not only greater European integration and a quantum leap in capabilities, notably military capabilities, but also more political cooperation and coherence in the area of foreign affairs. Greater EU integration, especially in foreign policy, will consolidate its leadership position in the Mediterranean RSC. In the extreme scenario of the EU becoming a superpower we could eventually see superpower overlay within the RSC which would in effect render it dormant. In the southern zone of the RSC, polarity would also be modified by one or more units, by increasing their militaries and leading a more visible foreign policy. Economic and political conditions permitting, there could be pronounced growth that could enable another important player to have a greater role in the Euro-Mediterranean RSC. Nonetheless, to be a great power would require influence at the regional, and global levels, which is unlikely for any Southern Mediterranean actor. However, competition for the status of regional power could intensify if Algeria and Libya begin to take a more active role in the Mediterranean.

Another possibility is change in the patterns of amity and enmity in the southern area of the RSC. If relations between states in the south worsen, we could witness active confrontations or an arms race that could upset the balance of power in the entire RSC, and maybe even the emergence of a regional power. On the other hand, if relations improve, integration will become easier and we could witness the RSC moving into the territory of a security community. Regime change in the region is another factor that could cause changes in the RSC. If one or more regimes are replaced by an extremist regime this will affect relations with other units in the RSC. Changes in the patterns of amity and enmity in any part of the RSC, including the subcomplex, affect the region in its entirety, as actors adjust to a new context.

1.2.1. The Balance of Power in the Mediterranean

In these past sections we have examined general possibilities for internal transformation. Now let us examine specific possibilities. The possibilities for internal transformation are quite limited, as the Great Power centred RSC is stable from an internal perspective, although several unresolved conflicts between units remain.

Patterns of amity and enmity have remained largely untouched, but in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in 2006 polarity in the Eastern Mediterranean subcomplex was affected. With an Israeli Defence Force (IDF) incapable of achieving its objectives in the face of organised resistance, the reputation of the once invincible Israeli army was tarnished. The conflict in Southern Lebanon showed that it is possible to resist Israel by military means, albeit unconventional ones. Could we then see a reversal of roles, an Israeli government favourable to a permanent settlement of

the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, while its enemies, emboldened by the recent setbacks of the IDF, will be less likely to negotiate? In this case polarity would shift as Israel sees its status of regional power challenged.

Polarity could also change as the economic and political situation in the Western Mediterranean changes. Within the current Great Power Centred RSC Algeria and Libya have natural resources, namely natural gas and oil, and can use these as a steady source of revenue. This increased revenue could facilitate a more independent and assertive diplomacy by these two countries. However, before any Maghreb countries can begin to exert greater influence in the region they must deal with their difficult internal situation. Current regimes in the Southern Mediterranean are fragile and susceptible to internal unrest, which sometimes manifests itself in the form of terrorism. There are also concerns over the movement of populations, not only from the Maghreb to Europe, but also from Sub-Saharan Africa to the Maghreb and onward to Europe. These tend to stretch already limited resources in the Southern area of the RSC. Most migrants can not proceed immediately to Europe and so remain in the Maghreb, usually in harsh conditions while they wait for an opportunity to cross the Mediterranean. This entry into Europe sometimes never arrives, making the stay of these illegal immigrants permanent, or at least long term. Nonetheless, while Algeria and Libya are unable to vie for great power status, they could challenge Egypt's and Israel's pre-eminence as regional powers, particularly when taking into account their revenues from natural gas and oil.

1.2.2. The EU's Policy Towards the Mediterranean

At moment, and in the short term (as noted in section 1.1.1.), the EU is struggling with institutional reform and uncertainty over the future of the Euro-Mediterranean framework which undermines Europe's ability to act in the region. However, in the medium to long-term, the first hurdle of institutional reform will be overcome, resulting in renewed attention to foreign affairs. Greater EU integration, especially in foreign policy, will consolidate its leadership position in the Mediterranean, thereby changing the nature of the RSC. Possible transformations include the RSC changing from a Great Power Centred RSC to a Superpower Centred RSC. In the extreme scenario of the EU becoming a superpower we could eventually see superpower overlay within the RSC, which would in effect render it dormant. Another element that will favour such transformation is eventual EU membership for Turkey, as this will increase the EU's influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In recent years, questions have been raised regarding the future of the EU and the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Firstly, the failure of the EU in adopting the Constitutional Treaty sent shockwaves through the EU and its supporters, paralysing ongoing political/institutional reform. However, the situation improved as renewed efforts were made in order to solve the institutional crisis left in the wake of the French and Dutch 'no' vote to the European Constitution Treaty. As of December 2007, the Lisbon Treaty, which reuses much of what had been previously included in the Constitutional Treaty, was signed by the EU heads of state. The ratification of the treaty, which unlike its predecessor was expected to be more successful, constituted the final

hurdle to be overcome. The Irish 'no' vote has once more stalled EU institutional reform, and EU leaders have therefore temporarily retreated and regrouped in order to overcome this new setback. Secondly, questions have been raised regarding the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations. When French President Sarkozy first mentioned his desire to create a Mediterranean Union, no one had any idea regarding the exact nature of the proposed plan. His plan of creating a union between the Southern European countries and the Southern Mediterranean countries has been criticised as a way of blocking Turkey's EU membership and as a way of increasing France's prestige in the region. In any case, Sarkozy's plan was neither appreciated by some member states nor by the EU itself. The 2008 Paris Summit showed that national French ambitions had to account for EU regional policy, as such, the due to pressure from EU member states (namely Germany) and the EU itself, the summit included EU member states and the President of the European Commission.

The EU is moving forward regarding institutional reform, albeit slowly and with less media attention than with the Constitutional Treaty. However, while questions regarding institutional reform remain unresolved the status quo will be maintained. Once this reform process finally moves forward the EU will start to re-assert itself regionally. Regarding Euro-Mediterranean issues, it is clearly important to determine whether the proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean Union will have any lasting effects on the current framework. Looking at the short-term, one can say that the EU has re-asserted itself with the help of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel who defended European interests. Internal consolidation, both institutional, and policy-wise, will undoubtedly mean a more powerful EU in the Euro-Mediterranean RSC.

Another element of importance is EU membership for Turkey as it would empower European policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and facilitate engaging with security issues in that region of the Mediterranean, notably the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. If this happens, the boundaries of the current RSC will firmly incorporate the Eastern Mediterranean, so that it will no longer remain a subcomplex. From a discursive perspective there are already synergies between the EU and the Eastern Mediterranean. Here part of the RSC will prioritise issues such as illegal immigration and terrorism, while another will prioritise regional conflicts and terrorism. Ultimately, Turkish membership will change the EU's strategic outlook, forcing it to look to the Eastern Mediterranean and perhaps beyond (Telò, 2006, pp. 232-237; Vieira, 2006, pp. 15-16).

1.2.3. Conclusion: The Possibilities of Internal Transformation

Presently, both regional security discourse and the security constellation show that internal transformation is possible. Security perceptions in the RSC allow for greater integration in the region, as opposed to division or conflict, as most issues are transnational, thus requiring a coordinated approach. In the case of the EU, greater integration will eventually mean more power projection and influence, further consolidating the EU's position at the centre of the RSC. Greater foreign policy integration is also the key to integrate the Eastern Mediterranean completely in the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, in addition to Turkish membership in the EU. However, Turkish membership is not a forgone conclusion, and may not occur, if at all, until 2020. In the Southern area of the RSC there are a few border disputes to resolve, but these have not intensified in the last

decade. Patterns of amity and enmity have not radically changed. Only the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has the potential to ignite again. Additionally, Libya has recently been re-asserting itself into regional and international affairs. However, there is still much to do regarding regional cooperation in the Maghreb. Moreover, the biggest concern revolves around internal domestic situation, whereby in recent years countries in the region have been facing the threat of extremism from terrorist groups who wish to overthrow the incumbent regimes. The Maghreb countries also have to deal with the destabilising affects of illegal immigration, as not only are their own nationals emigrating, but there are also significant population movements from sub-Saharan Africa towards the Maghreb. It is through these two domestic issues that internal transformation of the RSC could occur in the Maghreb as these issues can change patterns of amity and enmity in the region.

Internal transformation caused by conflict or domestic upheaval could lead to region-wide instability, therefore, attention must be paid to the domestic situation in the Southern Mediterranean, as well as to polarity and the patterns of amity and enmity. On the other hand, increased EU integration will also produce internal transformation of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC; it will facilitate coordination of European foreign policy leading to a greater role in the region, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, eventual Turkish membership will also help the Eastern Mediterranean to fully join the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, further increasing the stability of the RSC. This would continue the process already underway through the implementation of the Barcelona Process, which brought the EU, its members states, and most Southern Mediterranean countries, with the exception of Libya, to the same negotiating table. These changes

could take several years, decades perhaps, and if so, we will see that events outside of the RSC are more likely to cause change in the short-term.

1.3. External Transformation

External transformation is the most likely option for the Great Power Centred RSC. Many developments can cause external transformation, so the current boundaries of the RSC are bound to change. In this section we will examine which developments could cause external transformation in the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, *i.e.* changing the current boundaries.

External transformation changes the boundaries of an RSC, and this happens when units join or withdraw from the RSC. Boundaries are changed when one or more units are no longer part of a RSC or other units join. External transformation is somewhat dependent on state to state relations, as it can cause one unit to shift from one RSC to another, or simply to join an already existing one. Interregional interaction is another indicator of possible external transformation, usually of merging RSCs. When security discourse suggests that perceptions are shared it indicates that separate RSCs might merge into one entity. Superpower penetration or the role of global powers is an additional factor that can cause external transformation, a most extreme example of this being overlay.

In the case of the current RSC in the Mediterranean external transformation is the most likely option due to all three factors mentioned above. Unit to unit relations can affect the boundaries of the RSC, interregional relations also indicate several possi-

bilities for change in the RSC and superpower and especially great power penetration will also reshape the Great Power centred RSC. There are discursive links being made to regions outside of what is traditionally considered the Mediterranean. Places such as Mauritania, the Gulf and Sub-Saharan Africa are on the discursive map of the EU.

There are three different factors that can significantly contribute to external transformation. The first is eventual Turkish EU membership, the second concerns the security discourses of neighbouring regions and finally we will examine at how Sub-Saharan Africa can influence the Euro-Mediterranean RSC. External transformation will result from any of these three factors coming into play, which are happening at the state-to-state, interregional and global levels.

1.3.1. The East of Jordan and Turkish EU Membership

The first factor we will examine at is eventual Turkish EU membership and how it will favour external transformation by bringing the Gulf, or as the EU sometimes refers to it 'the East of Jordan', closer to the Euro-Mediterranean RSC. Although the issue of Turkish EU membership is a controversial one, accession negotiations are underway. However, full membership remains a long term goal, and the year 2020 is given as a possible target date. EU membership for Turkey would have significant implications from both an economic and security point of view, whilst the same is true for the EU, in particular with regards to security. Turkey borders several regions, and most notably it shares a border with Iran, Iraq and Syria. Turkey also has strong ties further eastward into the Caucasus. Turkey as a EU member would mean that issues beyond the Eastern Mediterranean and even in Central Asia, would assume greater importance due to

Turkey's proximity and historical links to the region. This would necessarily include the Kurdish question as it would directly affect an EU member. Although, Turkish EU membership would open Central Asia and the Caucasus to European influence, the EU would have to deal with a resurgent Russia that seeks to extend its regional influence (as noted in chapter five). Conversely in the Gulf there is a situation where a weakened US is committed to Iraq, and is attempting to stabilise the country. It is this region, after Turkish EU membership, that could see stronger links with the Euro-Mediterranean RSC.

Turkish membership might make the Gulf countries more susceptible to possible EU influence. Already, concerns over terrorism and regional instability are shared by the EU and the Gulf countries as we noted in the previous chapter. Although the idea of extending the Mediterranean RSC further east all the way to Gulf seems unrealistic, there are common security concerns although they have not been addressed adequately. However, this idea of a merger between the Mediterranean and Gulf is a plausible one, so much so that Iraq requested partnership in the Euro-Mediterranean process (Motahari, 2007). However, unlike in the Mediterranean, where there is a common identity that perceives a Mediterranean with a common past, no such discourse has yet appeared in the Gulf. In addition, the EU is limited in its influence in the Gulf, as a sizeable US presence hinders any other foreign involvement. However, with greater EU integration, coupled with Turkish EU membership, the Eastern Mediterranean would firmly belong to the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, as noted in section 1.2. With an EU firmly linked to the Eastern Mediterranean the Gulf becomes a direct neighbour to the

Euro-Mediterranean RSC, and with some discursive links already present the creation of a subcomplex is certainly possible, replacing the one in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In summary, pressure for external transformation will intensify with EU membership for Turkey. With regards to the current RSC, Turkey is already a member, but not a member of the EU and if that were to change the EU would divert more resources eastward. Therefore, EU territory would border Iran and Iraq as well as the Caucasus, leading to even stronger interregional relations between the EU and the Euro-Mediterranean RSC with the Gulf region¹¹⁶.

1.3.2. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Euro-Mediterranean RSC

Finally, another region that will be of increasing importance is Sub-Saharan Africa. As previously mentioned, migratory movements from this region are having a great impact not only in Europe, but also in North Africa, and this can fundamentally influence not only the boundaries of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, but its existence as well. Illegal immigration brings with it a series of social and political difficulties for Southern Mediterranean states, such as organised crime, corruption, social exclusion, poverty and overcrowding in cities. One can say that Europe's borders are no longer in

116. Turkish EU membership would reinforce the existing EU-GCC dialogue which, as we have seen in section 1.3.1. of chapter five, has expanded and intensified since its creation in the 1980s. Although current EU-GCC dialogue is centred on economic, political and security issues (Free Trade, the Middle East Peace Process, Non-Proliferation, Security Dialogue and Counter Terrorism), cultural interaction has also been advocated albeit with less success. More broadly, a greater EU role in the region, through its dialogue with the GCC, would have wider consequences for Europe's role in the Gulf region. For an in-depth analysis of EU-GCC relations and how Turkish EU membership could strengthened these relations see: Vieira, 2006, pp. 10-16.

Southern Europe, but in North Africa. In fact we have witnessed a series of EU measures aimed directly at North African states, and these were taken in order for North African states to better monitor their southern borders. In addition, the EU has organised naval patrols along the African coast to deter human traffickers. As such, the EU wishes to control illegal immigration into its territory, and North African states wish to improve border control and as a result, the flow of immigrants.

This concern over illegal immigration highlights two possibilities for external transformation; a first possibility involves the Euro-Mediterranean RSC extending its borders south, a second possibility and a more long-term one, involves closer North African and Sub-Saharan African collaboration on the issue of illegal immigration. This second option would see North Africa distance itself from the Euro-Mediterranean, perhaps becoming more of a subcomplex, or in an extreme case forming a new RSC with Sub-Saharan African countries centred initially around illegal immigration and involving some form of common identity discourse. The first option sees the Euro-Mediterranean RSC extend south, but this seems difficult to achieve from a discursive point of view. Moreover, extending Euro-Mediterranean discourse on identity will prove difficult, if not impossible, as it would designate Sub-Saharan Africa as an important area for sustained and substantial EU involvement that shares some type of communality with the EU beyond a security perspective. But if migratory pressures continue to build, the EU must address the issue by fostering regional cooperation and prosperity in Sub-Saharan Africa. This would necessarily include the Maghreb countries.

1.4. Conclusion: The Transformation of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC

In Summary, the status quo constitutes merely a short term situation, but there is every indication, as we previously noted, that the current RSC is moving towards external transformation. Security discourse in the region indicates at changes occurring in the RSC that will affect its boundaries. Internal transformation is the other option, especially with future institutional developments in the EU and eventual Turkish membership.

There are two dimensions that can influence the Euro-Mediterranean RSC internally. The first is the balance of power in the region. Despite some fluctuations due to the Israel's invasion of Southern Lebanon, the balance of power remains relatively stable. The second element to consider is EU policy towards the region. While EU policy is currently stagnant due to the stalled constitutional debate, increased coordination is a necessity in order to establish a wider international role for Europe. This was evident when the EU and its member states, faced with France's Mediterranean Union initiative, not only sought to be included in the initiative, but to incorporate this initiative into the larger Barcelona process framework. Moreover, if there is to be a re-assessment of EU policy, or a strengthening of it, then the Eastern Mediterranean becomes an imperative area of action. With a more coordinated policy that tackles the issue of regional conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean there is an opportunity for the subcomplex to fully join the RSC. EU policy towards Turkey would also influence the incorporation of the Eastern Mediterranean. With Turkey as an EU member, Europe will become even closer to the region. Internal transformation is therefore one possible outcome, however it revolves

mainly around the EU consolidating its influence and the incorporation of the Eastern Mediterranean.

External transformation is also another possible scenario, especially with regards to the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa. The border between Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa is being increasingly compromised by illegal immigrants trying to make their way to Europe. However, most immigrants end up staying in North Africa. The economic and social situation in the region makes the integration of immigrants extremely difficult, and this will eventually influence security perceptions and ultimately security policy of both the EU and the Southern Mediterranean states. They will have to address this issue, in collaboration with their Sub-Saharan neighbours. There exists a possibility that the Maghreb will move away from the Euro-Mediterranean RSC in order to address the issue of illegal immigration. Another area of interest comprises the EU termed 'East of Jordan'. The EU's expansion into this area depends not only on consolidating its role as an international actor, but more importantly on Turkey's relationship with the EU. Turkish EU membership will undoubtedly be the decisive factor in closer interregional interaction between the Euro-Mediterranean RSC and the Gulf region. However, since Turkish membership, if realised, will not occur before 2020, the prospects of any significant interaction, or even the creation of a subcomplex, is remote or at the very least a long-term prospect.

2. The EU as a Mediterranean Security Actor

If we take into account the current structure of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC and the possible scenarios for its transformation, then how will these elements influence the roles and responsibilities of the EU as an actor in the region? This section will highlight these possible roles and responsibilities for the EU resulting from the scenarios outlined in the previous section. Although the EU plays an important role economically in the Mediterranean, the previous scenarios show that politically, and especially security-wise, there are still important issues that need to be addressed. The EU is still cautious about intervening in the Mediterranean as a great power.

The EU as a Mediterranean security actor plays a prominent role in regional security, hence, its first role must be that of a great power. As previously noted, the EU possess the capabilities and it is clearly capable of influencing both global and regional systems. In addition, the Euro-Mediterranean RSC will face significant challenges in the future, and a leading role by the EU will ensure stability in the Mediterranean. The EU must seek to transform the Euro-Mediterranean RSC by moving it closer to a security community. This carries with it certain responsibilities. Therefore, as the great power at the centre of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC the EU must serve as an agent of change, if it believes that the Southern Mediterranean is crucial to its own security. Thus, the EU as a great power must be a multilateral mediator in the Mediterranean bringing to the same table the rival states of the region in order to move the Mediterranean region towards a more stable framework. In addition, if peace and stability are to be achieved in the re-

gion, regional integration must be one of the options available to the Southern Mediterranean and the EU should encourage efforts in that direction.

2.1. The EU as a Great Power

The EU's most important role is that of a great power in the Mediterranean and it must fully realise the importance that this entails. As noted in chapter five, the EU can be considered a great power, especially in the context of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the EU influences the region in many ways, even though it is still primarily an economic superpower so that prosperity for Southern Mediterranean countries depends very much on trade with the EU. However, in its neighbourhood, and indeed beyond, there are many countries that change their laws and their policies in order to access the European market (McCormick, 2006, pp. 111-112, 125). Therefore, Europe must be keenly aware of this, so that it has an impact on the region that goes beyond economic matters. The EU must then occupy a central place in the region's security architecture and the EU must become fully aware of this fact.

As such, the EU must move beyond the debate of whether it can, or should, be an international actor, as it already achieved this position (Ibid., p. 113; Charillon, 2004, p. 252). The rest of the units in the region look to the EU for leadership in helping to solve the region's security problems, including the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as will be addressed in the following section. This is especially true for the Eastern Mediterranean. As the great power of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, the EU needs to increase its efforts at fully including the region in the RSC, and this means playing a bigger role in the resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. This increased intervention in the Eastern

Mediterranean will help to stabilise the Mediterranean RSC, an RSC which can still undergo important transformations.

Thus, as a great power the EU must be willing to take the lead in addressing a variety of security threats present in the region, not only identifying them, but also actively seeking to resolve them. As John McCormick states, the EU needs to “convert its wealth into political influence” (McCormick, 2006, p. 110; Telò, 2006, p. 203). The current international context is favourable towards an independent and strong EU foreign policy, and the loss of US credibility as a result of its unilateralist policies offers the possibility for a new style of EU foreign policy (McCormick, 2006, p. 111). This new style should mostly be based on a multilateral approach, which is engaged, inclusive and emphasises diplomacy and negotiation (Ibid., p. 117; Telò, 2006, pp. 237-242). Ultimately, the notion of power must enter EU foreign policy thinking, notably with regards to the Mediterranean. Whether the evolution of the EU will move it closer to the concept of *Europe Puissance* (Ibid., p. 210), or of soft or normative power (Petiteville, 2006, p. 209), or even of civilian power (Telò, 2006, p. 222; Petiteville, 2006, p. 209; McCormick, 2006, pp. 69-71), all of these concepts see the potential for the EU to play a leading role both regionally and globally.

As a great power the EU must be willing to reshape international relations in a way more fitting its values and objectives and this will also include inter-state relations in the Mediterranean. In fact, many researchers see the EU reshaping the entire international relations structure. For example, Telò states “The EU has thus become specialised in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-war reconstruction. [...] The EU has a historical responsibility to present a reliable third way, distinct from both globalist au-

thoritarian regulation and the threats of proliferation/fragmentation” (Telò, 2006, pp. 204, 241- 242). Telò also emphasizes the importance of Europe’s internal history, notably the Franco-German reconciliation, and he suggests that this explains “why Europe not only feels globally more responsible for the world’s public welfare and global good government than, for example, the US, China or other states” (Ibid., pp. 223-224). Sven

Biscop talks about the EU building a more just global order:

Overcoming the dark side of globalization, closing the gap between the haves and have-nots in all aspects, requires the cooperation of all States. Great powers have the greatest responsibility for projecting stability in the world. By further developing its own instruments and capabilities, and working together with strategic partners, the EU can enhance the effectiveness of its contribution (Biscop, 2005, p. 128).

For McCormick, the EU’s model opposes the US model of power as it is based on positive possibilities and not negative threats:

Where the US model of power tends to focus on threats and observable power, the European model tends to focus on promise and possibility. And if we look at the lure of Europe - through enlargement, through the economic opportunities it offers, and through its magnetic attraction to immigrants and asylum seekers - we are quickly left with one irresistible conclusion: the European Union has become the most effective force in the world for the promotion of democracy and capitalism (McCormick, 2006, p. 124).

Frédéric Charillon, talks about supporting and implementing reforms in Europe’s near abroad using solely incentives:

Europe thus has the means to impose a certain amount of change in its Near Abroad through conditionality and ‘carrot and stick’ policies, based on its ability to provide support, to implement reforms and to create new norms. This constitutes intervention, at the same time as it raises the question of sovereignty (Charillon, 2004, p. 258).

The EU must then work within the old world order in order to promote a new one. Hence, Europe’s responsibilities concern “restructuring of the post-cold war world order” (Telò, 2006, p. 206). Obviously, this includes the Mediterranean, where greater ef-

forts should be made in order to create a more normative framework for regional relations.

There is certainly support for a more engaged EU. Indeed, public opinion in Europe supports a larger role for the EU in world affairs. In 2005:

83 per cent supported the EU having a common position in the event of an international crisis, 82 per cent supported the development of a European foreign policy independent of the United States, 69 percent believed that the EU should have its own seat on the UN Security Council and 67 per cent backed the idea of having a European foreign minister who could act as a voice for EU foreign policy (McCormick, 2006, p. 118; See also Petiteville, 2006, pp. 188-193).

Surprisingly, with reference to foreign affairs European public opinion is ahead of official policy. The European public does not trust American intentions, and is ready to accept an independent EU foreign policy that can be established without US input (McCormick, 2006, p. 118). Europeans see their role internationally as a positive one, working towards peace, and in contrast to the US, who they perceive as playing a negative role in international affairs (Petiteville, 2006, p. 192). In this respect, the war in Iraq represents a watershed moment, irrespective of official government positions, public opinion was clearly against the war (Ibid., pp. 192-193).

Therefore, the EU is expected to achieve great power status not only due to its resources and capabilities, but also by its citizens who see a greater role for Europe. However, in order to meet these great power expectations a more independent and coordinated policy-making on the EU's part is required, so as to restructure not only the global order, but also the Mediterranean order. The EU must show that it is a viable actor in the region utilising a unified approach that enjoys the backing of all member states. In other words it must turn potential into action, ultimately guaranteeing regional

security with all means at its disposal. In this respect the EU must have a truly independent policy-making capability that is agreed and respected by all member states. This can be summarised by the quest for coherence (Biscop, 2005, pp. 85-88). One of the major criticisms directed at the EU is its lack of coherence in foreign policy, as these objectives and goals are not clearly defined or they have not been achieved due to a failure in enforcing policies, as was the case in the Balkans crisis (McCormick, 2006, p. 115). This is mainly due to the nature of the EU itself, as it combines supranational institutions with independent nation states that still act as international actors (Ibid., p. 116). Progress has been made regarding foreign policy coordination, indeed, consultation between member countries is common place and a certain *Europeanisation* of national foreign policies has occurred in the last decade (Tonra, 2006, p. 123). While there has been progress (as noted in chapters one and five), much effort is still required in order to have a fully coherent European foreign policy. This is necessary, since ultimately Europe's objectives in the Mediterranean "involve various forms of intervention" (Charillon, 2004, p. 254).

When looking at the EU's relationship with its Southern Mediterranean neighbours there is a clear need for coordination and coherence in European foreign policy. In the Euro-Mediterranean framework, the EU's push for increased respect for human rights and democratisation by its Southern Mediterranean partners has not produced the desired results, despite the economic incentives offered (Biscop, 2005, pp. 41-43). This is a case where despite officially supporting democratisation, maintaining stability has remained a central pillar of EU actions. The EU is willing to offer financial support, but does not enforce the necessary reforms that are needed to bring about democracy in the

region. As such, the long-term incumbent non-democratic regimes continue to exercise repression in their society, but at least, from the EU's perspective, they are friendly to the EU and have not been replaced by religious extremists (Ibid., p. 43).

There must be a clear message on the EU's part concerning its objectives in the Euro-Mediterranean region and this must be supported by a clear policy. Thus, it would be in Europe's interests to clearly differentiate between economic development, promotion of democracy and security cooperation (Ibid., pp. 47-48). As such, if democratisation efforts have encountered resistance, the push for economic prosperity should take precedence. It is not a question of abandoning democratisation, but rather achieving it through other means. For Southern Mediterranean countries and their autocratic regimes who wish to trade and cooperate with the EU, significant internal political reforms could lead to the end of these regimes. However, in order to achieve economic prosperity increased economic integration is needed and this would result in more openness and transparency (McCormick, 2006, p. 125). Therefore, democratic reform would be easier to achieve if it is linked to continued prosperity. As with European integration itself, economic integration was only a means to achieve larger political goals and for this reason, the same logic should be applied to the Southern Mediterranean.

There is a need for more coherence in both foreign policy and defence policy. As a great power the EU can use military assets in a more consensual way. In the military field the EU has still much to accomplish in order to achieve a viable European defence position. However, the idea of a military aspect to EU foreign policy is a controversial one and as it could have repercussions in the Mediterranean. The EU must reassure the Southern Mediterranean states regarding any future EU military integration.

This controversy is linked to the debate surrounding the nature of the EU, *i.e.* the nature of EU power. Ian Manners and Karen Smith see the development of military capabilities by the EU a backwards move, as it would become a traditional military power rather than a true post-modern international actor (Manners, 2006; Smith, 2000). Regarding the Mediterranean, since the end of the crisis in the Balkans, there has been little need for the exercise of coercive hard power from the EU. As such, defence and military elements must remain secondary for the EU's policy in this specific region. However, secondary does not mean absent, but the use of military force should always be limited and tied to political long-term goals and international approval, notably from the UN. Military forces can be of use during crises, such as the evacuation of European citizens from Lebanon in 2006, the delivery of emergency supplies because of natural disasters or during peacekeeping or conflict prevention missions (Howorth, 2007, p. 254). Moreover, military cooperation can become an important confidence building measure in the region (Biscop, 2005, p. 49). Nonetheless, there is no need to envisage future EU military capabilities as a rival to those of the US. Unlike Hedley Bull (1982), who stated that the EU needed to develop enough military assets to rival the US in order to become a viable international actor, most experts agreed that such capabilities are not needed, but that some limited capability is necessary. Any major military build-up would be counterproductive, especially in the Mediterranean where the EU is trying to ensure stability, but some limited military operations might need to be undertaken in order to create the proper conditions for a specific political settlement. These limited military capabilities, would be based on quality of means and not their quantity, and would further help to legitimise the EU as a great power:

De ce point de vue, les attentes communément placées dans le développement des capacités européennes de défense résident non seulement dans la possibilité pour l'UE d'intégrer le recours à la force parmi ses options de gestion de crise mais aussi - en bonne dialectique aronienne du diplomate et du soldat - dans le *surcroît d'influence* que la seule existence de cette option est susceptible d'offrir à la diplomatie européenne (Petiteville, 2006, p. 209; See also Biscop, 2005, p. 88).

For Southern Mediterranean actors the question of European military power is of concern. Although military force might be needed in the region, it must be used in conjunction with political means and be inclusive of Southern Mediterranean states.

The EU must approach foreign policy from a new angle, with a coordinated foreign and defence policy that reshapes the international system closer to its image and objectives. One framework to deal with the responsibilities and roles demanded of the EU was advanced by Mario Telò, who refers to it as structural foreign policy. This framework allows the EU to conduct its foreign policy as a non-traditional actor. The EU must be a great power in the Mediterranean, but not a traditional one as it must base its influence on mediation and negotiation rather than confrontation. As such, the main idea behind structural foreign policy seeks to oppose the anarchist structure of international relations, "The definition of 'structural foreign policy' should logically focus on an international actor's capacity to consciously pursue gradual changes in this anarchic structure, firstly by making lasting cooperation and stable peace feasible between neighbouring states" (Telò, 2006, pp. 228-229). This idea of a structural foreign policy allows the EU to pursue its own brand of foreign policy as a great power, without the need to replicate US hard power based policy. A structural foreign policy would then be very different, as its aims and means would reflect this different view of power and of international relations. As Telò explains:

- The concept of a 'structural foreign policy' demands greater attention to long-term gains rather than purely utilitarian short-term cost-benefits criteria as regards international relations. Even if it welcomes assessment of its effectiveness, it provides an original answer to the question about optimal timetable for the foreign policy of a modern world power.
- a 'structural foreign policy' is expected to modify the basic structural conditions in which all actors will operate in the future, leading to an environment more favourable to peace and the values of civilian powers. According to F. Braudel, power is the capacity of creating a favourable conjunction of circumstances.
- it should also have a particular impact of the economic, social, political (democratization) and ideational components or partners: states, regions, economic actors, international organisations, etc., so as to influence their foreign policies (support for regional and interregional cooperation; the promotion of democracy and the respect for human rights; the prevention of violent conflict).
- it is implemented through peaceful and civilian means and encompasses the set of external relations of the three pillars, moving beyond the narrow CFSP field. This regards not only diplomatic relations, sanctions and political dialogue, but also policy areas such as preferential trade agreements, immigrations, development and monetary policy (Ibid., p. 228).

Structural foreign policy modifies how foreign policy is conducted, therefore, the EU must lead this new wave in international relations as it reflects not only the EU's strengths, but also wider international security perceptions and power criteria linked to civil and the knowledge society (Ibid., p. 231).

The EU needs to act as a great power, but it still remains a unique international actor. Advancing a foreign policy based on structural foreign policy would only solidify this situation. Therefore, it would not act as traditional great power, but could instead favour mediation and dialogue, as well as region building.

2.1.1. The EU as a Multilateral Mediator

There are a series of conflicts in the Euro-Mediterranean region, the most serious being the Arab/Palestinian conflict (Biscop, 2005, pp. 45-46). As a great power the EU must seek to resolve these conflicts and to eliminate the distrust still present in some areas of the Mediterranean. In dealing with these conflicts it must retain its inclusive approach, while simultaneously taking a leading role in promoting and achieving compromise between the different parties, in much the same way as it approached the issue of terrorism and the war in Iraq (Ibid., p. 111). The EU has achieved what years of war in Europe had not been able to do, that is peace throughout the continent. The previous national rivalries have now given way to a spirit of cooperation, partnership and community. As the EU continues to be an ever present actor in international affairs it will have to face various conflicts, regional, national or civil. In the same way that open dialogue and integration brought peace and stability to Europe, placing the nations of Europe under a common normative and institutional framework will ensure that the EU's external actions seek to reflect this same understanding by exporting it from the European to the international context.

This inclusiveness in its foreign policy has so far differentiated EU policy from other powers, including the US. European multilateralism is based on not only engaging as many actors as possible, but also on getting them to follow a normative framework that applies to everyone and excludes no one (Howorth, 2007, p. 244). This offers the advantage of not only having a playing field where the EU excels, but also avoids the

antagonism created by a unilateral approach. Anarchy is then overcome, or at least limited.

Therefore, the EU's engagement with its Southern Mediterranean partners should continue in an inclusive manner, further emphasising multilateralism as being central to Europe's approach to international relations. This will require including partners in implementing policy, and also discussing the issues that are of importance, and subsequently solving them. This also serves as a means of integrating various state and non-state partners into a new international framework based on the rule of law, rather than applying force. Beyond this, it means that the EU must take an immediate interest in all conflicts or security issues in the Mediterranean, not only as distant issues that may one day affect the EU, but as immediate concerns that need to be addressed. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict serves as a perfect example, as this conflict has severely hindered regional cooperation in the Mediterranean (Biscop, 2005, p. 38).

In this framework the EU takes an active role in the discussions surrounding the various security issues present in the Mediterranean, and it can also engage with the principal units related to these issues even if they are non state-actors. The EU can be a new actor that not only works with other states, but also closely collaborates with civil society, not just in Europe, but also abroad through various multilateral venues, *e.g.* conferences, international organisations and academia.

2.1.2. The EU and Regional Integration

Another foreign policy element for the EU to consider is encouraging regional integration as this will help achieve its goal of peace and stability in the Mediterranean. The ongoing European experiment of regional integration serves as an example to all parts of world. The EU has a notable influence on other regionalist projects, being actively engaged in supporting them (Telò, 2006, p. 229). The EU promotes aspects of its successful experiment, notably through the influence it has in its interregional relations (Ibid., p. 198). Thus, by encouraging other projects of regional integration, the EU is also adding to its influence worldwide. The many ongoing regional dialogues contribute to the formulation of the post-Cold War world; one in which the EU has a growing influence (Ibid., p. 206).

In the Southern Mediterranean there is no lack of regionalists projects, however, in comparison to others, the region lags far behind. The Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), holds the most promise, but as we have seen in chapter five, the project lays dormant and has virtually no impact on the member states. Although the UMA is struggling at the moment to achieve its objectives, it should nonetheless form an important element of future EU policy towards the region. As such, future EU policy must work to actively encourage the development and consolidation of the UMA as a viable regional organisation. Moreover, the EU must actively support regional integration in the Southern Mediterranean, not only in the Maghreb, but also eastwards. Notwithstanding Europe's goals for a free-trade area in the Mediterranean, it should draw lessons from its own experience and encourage regional integration between different units in the south. With

increased integration in the Southern Mediterranean there should also be greater stability in the region, as today's problems need wider regional support in order to be resolved (Biscop, 2005, p. 88). This will not be an easy task, as there is much ongoing animosity between states in the region. Supporting regional integration will involve bringing together hostile actors and helping to resolve their disputes. Nonetheless, in order to resolve these political disputes involvement is a necessary step to move towards economic and political integration in the region. It is hoped that by helping overcome political issues behind regional conflicts that have dominated regional politics for decades the right conditions will be created at the national level in order to push for integration at the regional level. Not only are external conditions needed for regional integration, but there must also be an internal push from member states and civil societies, as without balance between these dimensions no progress can be made on regional integration (Telò, 2006, p. 230). Ultimately, fostering regional integration in the Southern Mediterranean will also contribute to the strengthening of Europe's position in the region, thus giving it more leverage (Charillon, 2004, p. 259).

2.2. Conclusion: Roles and Responsibilities of the EU

How do these roles and responsibilities link with the scenarios discussed in the first section of this chapter? The previous scenarios have illustrated a Euro-Mediterranean region that is prone to change both internally and externally. In order to have significant input into these possible transformations, the EU needs to assert itself as the regional great power. It has the tools to pursue an independent and original foreign poli-

cy that is based on consensus building and multilateralism. However, it needs to increase its policy coordination and cooperation to ensure an affective foreign policy.

First and foremost, the EU must work to fully include the Eastern Mediterranean into the Euro-Mediterranean RSC. This means addressing the most significant issue in the Eastern Mediterranean region, namely, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. This will reinforce the EU's role in the region and its role as an international actor. In addition, it will also influence the security perceptions of the Eastern Mediterranean states, thus moving them closer to those of the EU. By helping to solve or desecuritize the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The EU brings to the forefront other issues such as terrorism, or illegal immigration and organised crime. This will not only lead to increasing political integration, but also to greater economic integration for the Eastern Mediterranean.

Secondly, the EU should seek to keep the Euro-Mediterranean RSC as stable as possible. With the exception of Eastern Mediterranean integration, the EU should work to maintain stability in the RSC, externally by avoiding any boundary changes and internally by looking to smooth the patterns of amity and enmity. The EU should offer a viable secure environment in the Mediterranean, not just economically, but also security-wise, thus ensuring that actors in the region do not feel threatened.

Finally, these two steps will allow the region to move towards a more normative framework. The EU should encourage the region to integrate both at the regional and sub-regional levels, in consequence, making actors across the region increasingly interconnected. The EU should ultimately work towards the construction of a security com-

munity in the region. Security in the region and for the EU in particular will depend on an increasingly integrated region, one in which confidence replaces distrust.

Conclusions

Through our analysis of security perceptions and interactions in the Euro-Mediterranean region we have sought to determine the EU's roles and responsibilities as a security actor in the region, but also more broadly as an international actor. The EU's position between statehood and international organisation represents a postmodern actor whose place in the international system is still to be determined and studied. This analysis has utilised Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) to determine not only the current status of Euro-Mediterranean relations, but also its future roles and responsibilities in the region. Through a thorough analysis of discourse and geopolitical conditions, a complete picture of Euro-Mediterranean security relations was constructed that also allowed us to extrapolate possible scenarios for the future.

Throughout this project a theoretical approach has been tested in order to understand the EU's security relationship with the Mediterranean. In fully applying RSCT to the specific case of Euro-Mediterranean relations, not only was valuable insight gained into regional security interaction in the Mediterranean, but also on the challenges in using RSCT. In this final chapter a summary of our findings will be presented, starting with an overview of Euro-Mediterranean relations and the EU's roles and responsibilities in the Euro-Mediterranean RSC followed by the implications this case study has for RSCT. Finally, we will determine how this research can influence future research into the EU as a security actor, but also into RSCT, making it a more complete model for regional analysis.

1. EU's Mediterranean Roles and Responsibilities

This study of Euro-Mediterranean relations started with a rigorous analysis of discourse from the entire region. The study was not limited to a few texts from some actors, but tried to analyse as much discourse as possible from the EU and all the Southern participants in the Barcelona Process, in addition to Libya. This was an exhaustive study of Euro-Mediterranean security discourse covering approximately eight hundred texts, mostly official discourse. Several important conclusions on security perceptions were identified through this first analysis.

Security discourse showed that there is much in common between the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean when it comes to perceptions of security. Security issues identified by the EU as threats are for the most part also securitised throughout the Southern Mediterranean. Issues like terrorism or illegal immigration are securitised across the region, whereas issues like regional conflicts or weapons of mass destruction are only considered security threats in specific areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean. Throughout the region the same security issues are mentioned in discourse, but not all of the issues are securitised. Nonetheless, the region shows great homogeneity when it comes to security discourse. The security issues that are fully securitised in the Mediterranean are terrorism and illegal immigration, terrorism being common to all of the region while illegal immigration is of particular importance for the EU and the Western Mediterranean.

This sharing of security perceptions and securitisation allows us to conclude that there is indeed a regional security complex in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, a geopolitical analysis showed that the Euro-Mediterranean RSC is centred on the EU as a great power. However, the Eastern Mediterranean, despite sharing security perceptions with the rest of the RSC, must be considered a subcomplex inside the main RSC due to its interactions with the 'East of Jordan' and the small involvement of the EU in the Israel/Palestine conflict, which constitutes the main security issue for that area of the Mediterranean.

Analysing the individual actors participating in the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, at different levels, it was determined that the EU occupies a central role in the region as a global great power. Despite this reality, the EU has been unable to make in-roads into the complex security environment of the Eastern Mediterranean, which led to the formation of a subcomplex in the region. The Eastern Mediterranean still looks west to the US for leadership regarding the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and east, since the US involvement in Iraq, for signs of instability that can influence it.

This situation led us to a series of scenarios for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC and for the EU in the region. An analysis of the RSC in the Mediterranean showed that it is an unstable complex, susceptible to internal and external transformation in the medium to long term. Pressures at the southern border of the RSC from sub-Saharan Africa could lead to transformation as could EU institutional reform and Turkish EU membership, causing internal transformation. These scenarios showed how the EU could play an increasing role in the Mediterranean, exercising greater influence to stabilise the region; leading the region away from instability and moving it towards a

more institutional framework for conflict resolution. In this role, the EU must be more active throughout the region, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. It must assume its position as a great power but with its particular capabilities and characteristics. The EU is a new type of international actor and it should produce a new kind of foreign policy based on cooperation not coercion, inclusion not exclusion. The EU must then emphasise mediation and regional integration, including south-south integration in its policies towards the Southern Mediterranean, notably by encouraging the UMA.

In summary, the EU and the Southern Mediterranean do share similar security concerns and these similarities are increasing as issues like terrorism and immigration become more prominent in the Mediterranean. The EU involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean however, is not sufficient for it to pursue the role of great power. If the EU is committed to achieving peace, prosperity and stability in the Mediterranean it, as a putative great power, must be willing to tackle all security issues in the region. Moreover, it should be setting long term objectives in order to achieve these previously mentioned goals. In essence, it should be attempting to move the Euro-Mediterranean RSC towards a more stable situation, perhaps as a security community. As the principal power in the Mediterranean, the EU must be more active in stabilising and building a durable institutional framework for the region. The roles of conflict-mediation and region-building must be of great importance for any future EU action and policy towards the Mediterranean region.

These conclusions were achieved by applying RSCT to the Euro-Mediterranean region. As a theoretical model it had to undergo the test of analysing Euro-Mediterranean relations. As such, much was learned about the strengths of the theory in

addition to its shortcomings. In the next section these strengths and shortcomings will be examined.

2. Lessons for Regional Security Complex Theory

Regional Security Complex Theory offered the possibility of not only describing the current status of Euro-Mediterranean relations, but also of constructing a viable predictive model that enabled the study of changes in the RSC. Therefore, RSCT will be examined from two different aspects. First, we will look at the methodological challenges the model presented. Second, we will assess how the theory reflected the reality of regional integration in the Mediterranean.

Regional security complex theory offers an interesting compromise between a clearly determined methodology and a more open one, where the researcher has greater liberty to determine the meaning and importance of concepts. The main element of difficulty when applying RSCT concerns the securitisation process, in particular determining if extraordinary measures have been taken or might be taken to address a specific security threat. In the past, determining if extraordinary measures were taken was easier due to the international context and also because only nation states were considered as international actors. Today, actors such as the EU are increasingly present in international relations. Moreover, the means at their disposal can be significantly different from traditional nation states. The way in which the EU acts is not entirely comparable to how a nation states acts and as such how we define extraordinary measures must adapt to the context of the EU. Furthermore, not only do non-traditional actors such as

the EU have different means at their disposal, but even traditional state actors do not act in the same way as in previous years, moving beyond the exclusive use of military force. New threats force nation states to adopt a different set of extraordinary measures, based more on economic or legal means rather than on violence. Cooperation, leading to a sharing of sovereignty between different actors, is also employed. Thus, a more precise definition of extraordinary measures needs to be elaborated, but this definition must include a broad spectrum of measures that fits the new international security context in addition to the actors that operate in it. Securitisation is more than just a breaking free of rules or going beyond the normal political practices. A starting point to a new definition of extraordinary measures would be that they should fit the context, not only the international context and the threats that are present at the time, but also the type of actor that is addressing those threats. With this new approach to a definition of extraordinary measures, a more broad spectrum of measures can be considered, moving beyond the simple breaking of rules or even the concentration of resources. For example, the issue of sovereignty and how actors relinquish part of theirs can be conceived as being an extraordinary measure. This happens not only vertically towards supranational institutions but also horizontally between states. For example, the presence of foreign officials on national territory conducting inspections for illegal immigrants.

Another important element concerns the scenario-building aspect of the theory. Scenarios should be placed in a timeframe as there may be several different possibilities in a RSC. These possibilities not only coexist, but can also follow each other. When applying RSCT to the Euro-Mediterranean region, it was evident that the RSC could undergo several successive changes, maintaining the status quo for the short term but sus-

ceptible to internal and external transformation in the medium and long term. From a methodology stand-point, it is important to show not only how multiple scenarios are possible simultaneously, but that an RSC can move from one scenario to the other as it moves forward in time.

In addition to these methodological considerations, applying RSCT to the Euro-Mediterranean has highlighted important elements of region-building and security interaction. An in-depth analysis of security discourse showed that it did not exist independently of other discourses. In fact, a discourse on identity was simultaneously present along side security discourse. The same texts can hold discourse on both security and identity. Often heads of state and government bring forth the common values and history of the Mediterranean before addressing the current security threats. Therefore, security and identity are discursively linked and this influences regional interaction, creating an awareness of the RSC or that the security perceptions of regional actors are linked.

This discourse on identity referred to a regional identity, in our case to the Mediterranean as a common space to which Northern and Southern Mediterranean actors belonged to, with its own history and customs. The presence of identity along with security discourse leads to regional policies and more importantly regional cooperation. Moreover, it is also through references to a regional identity that the boundaries of the RSC become defined. Securitisation alone is not enough to determine the boundaries of an RSC; references to a common space with its history and values are necessary to consolidate the boundaries. An RSC is more than a collection of securitisation moves, since most countries throughout the world securitised terrorism after September 11th 2001. It is also acknowledged that actors belong to a particular grouping that can or needs to ad-

dress certain security issues. In the case of the Mediterranean, discourse showed that security threats in the region must be addressed collectively, and that there is a common history and values that make neighbouring countries natural partners. A policy of cooperation within the region is then justified through an appeal to a common identity and defines possible future partners.

How regions are formed, more specifically how an RSC comes into existence, must be re-evaluated. By studying the Mediterranean region, it has been shown that actors in a region realise that others share identical security concerns. Moreover, references to identity along with similar securitisation determine who actors collaborate with to address security threats. This relationship between identity and security complexes gives new insight into regional cooperation. An awareness of identity at the regional level may eventually allow the RSC to transform itself into a more integrated regional arrangement such as a security community. In the case of the Euro-Mediterranean RSC, despite some competition, the notion of a Mediterranean identity is present throughout the region and accepted to different degrees. Could this then lead to moving beyond securitisation, to de-securitisation and eventually a-securitisation? As security issues are addressed within the RSC and cooperation intensifies, confidence is built and the RSC moves into the realm of politics and eventually, as regional institutions begin to develop, into that of a security community. Much like the EU, rules and regulations may come to oversee relations in the Mediterranean.

3. Directions for Future Research

This research has highlighted new elements regarding both Euro-Mediterranean developments and Regional Security Complex Theory which require further research. However, two elements in particular are of extreme importance in order to better understand regional security interaction, including in the Mediterranean region, and therefore require further research. The first aspect regards the influence of the EU on the securitisation of issues in the Southern Mediterranean. The second aspect deals with the influence of the current securitisation and identity discourse on region building in the Southern Mediterranean.

Regarding the influence of the EU's own securitisation on that of the Southern Mediterranean, there are two important dimensions to this element:

- What conditions trigger the securitisation process and notably can one of these conditions be outside influence by a powerful actor?
- How much influence does the EU have in the Mediterranean region?

As we have seen in chapter five, the EU is a great power despite possessing an uneven influence throughout the Mediterranean. Thus, to what extent did European concerns over illegal immigration or other issues influence security discourse in the Southern Mediterranean, or is this discourse the result of the regional context? Can securitisation be triggered by outside actors, especially if the outside actor is a regional or world power? In the case of the Mediterranean, could the EU's economic power have influenced security discourse in most units in the Southern Mediterranean? Actors in the region are 'encouraged' to match EU security concerns, showing that they could be viable partners

and access European markets. The EU as the major power in the region, especially economically, may be influencing securitisation in the various actors in the Southern Mediterranean. More than simply influencing changes in specific policies due to military pressure, outside influence from a powerful actor could lead to bandwagoning due instead to securitisation, and this seems to be occurring in the Mediterranean.

The second element touches upon the influence of the current securitisation and identity discourse upon regional integration in the Southern Mediterranean. For several decades now, regional integration in the Southern Mediterranean and in the wider Arab World has stalled. With current Southern Mediterranean discourse sharing the same security concerns, and more importantly with it recognising a common Mediterranean identity between both shores of the region, what will the future hold for south-south regional integration? We have a situation where the Southern Mediterranean, especially the Western Mediterranean, is almost totally integrated into EU economic and political space while enjoying no say over the decision-making process. On the other-hand, south-south integration is virtually non-existent, not only economically but also politically. This situation, if it continues, will only be to the detriment of the Southern Mediterranean, leaving it increasingly isolated from regional decision-making. Therefore, can a Mediterranean identity be reconciled with regional integration in the Southern Mediterranean? Can the EU favour regional integration without jeopardising the development of a stronger Mediterranean identity? Or on the other hand, will the EU be willing to integrate some or all Southern Mediterranean countries into a new Mediterranean-specific supranational organisation, perhaps resulting from the Mediterranean Union project? However, how will this possible integration into the supranational insti-

tutions of a 'Mediterranean Union' be different from overlay if we take into the account the possible influence of EU securitisation on Southern Mediterranean securitisation?

This highlights the relationship between security, identity and region-building. It is essential to take this relationship into consideration when analysing prospects for regional integration in the Southern Mediterranean. This linkage between security, identity and region-building seems quite difficult to achieve in the Southern Mediterranean, a region where the EU pursues an important security agenda and the notion of a common Mediterranean identity is present in the security discourse. As such, cooperation is more easily achieved between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean than between the different nation states in the south. Southern Mediterranean states continue, for the most part, to distrust each other, and are unwilling to cooperate. How will these states have a say over security matters in the region, if indeed there is a strong great power influence on the securitisation of the Southern Mediterranean and those same states continue to have minimal cooperation between them? Would the EU be willing to give the Southern Mediterranean a greater say in European security policy?

Future research must integrate these questions of identity into a regional framework to better understand region-building. Identity and security are mutually linked, and they shape other policies including regional integration. This study has identified an awareness of both identity and security by the units in the region, leading them to realise that they are members of an RSC and that they can move beyond it, into a more stable regional framework. Research should continue on other regions in order to understand more deeply the relationship between security (securitisation), identity and region-

al integration. Regions like Latin America, Asia or even the Gulf should be potential candidates as they are undergoing increased regional integration.

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