And now for something completely different?

The impact of group membership on perceptions of creativity

Inmaculada Adarves-Yorno¹, S. Alexander Haslam¹ & Tom Postmes¹,²

¹ University of Exeter, ² University of Groningen

*Social Influence*, in press

Addresses for correspondence:

Inmaculada Adarves-Yorno: University of Exeter, Centre for Leadership Studies, XFI

Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4ST, UK. e-mail: I.Adarves-Yorno@exeter.ac.uk, tel.: (+44) (0)1392 262588, fax: (+44) (0)1392 262559.

Alex Haslam: School of Psychology, University of Exeter, Exeter, Devon, EX4 4QG, UK.

e-mail: A.Haslam@exeter.ac.uk; tel.: (+44) (0)1392 264618, fax: (+44) (0)1392 264623

Tom Postmes: School of Psychology, University of Exeter, Exeter, Devon, EX4 4QG, UK.

e-mail: T.Postmes@exeter.ac.uk; tel.: (+44) (0)1392 264688, fax: (+44) (0)1392 264623

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*Acknowledgements*: This research was supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (RES-062-23-0135). The comments of the editors and several anonymous reviewers on previous versions of this paper are gratefully acknowledged.
Abstract

A wealth of historical, cultural and biographical evidence points to the fact that there is considerable variation in different people’s judgements of creative products. What is creative to one person is deviant to another, and creative efforts often fail to be given the enthusiastic reception that their creators anticipate and think they deserve. Unpacking the roots of these discrepancies, this paper develops an analysis of creativity that is informed by the social identity approach. This analysis is supported by a review of previous research that points to the way in which perceptions of creativity are structured by both self-categorization and social norms (and their interaction). Further support for the analysis is provided by two experiments (Ns =100,125) which support the hypothesis that ingroup products are perceived to be more creative than those of outgroups independently of other factors with which group membership is typically correlated in the world at large (e.g., quality). The studies also indicate that this pattern is not simply a manifestation of generic ingroup bias since judgements of creativity diverge from those of both likeability (Exp. 1) and beauty (Exp. 2). The theoretical and practical significance of these findings is discussed with particular reference to innovation resistance and the “not invented here” syndrome.
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The impact of group membership on perceptions of creativity

“In 1971 a park keeper at an outdoor exhibition at Arnhem in the Netherlands cleared away a sculpture by the minimalist artist Carl Andre thinking it was rubbish” (Cooper, 2005, p. 23)

This amusing anecdote is actually a reflection a commonplace reality. Specifically, it speaks to the fact that there is no universal agreement about what creativity is, how it should be recognized, and how it should be evaluated. One musician’s symphony is another’s cacophony, one theorist’s genius is another’s idiocy, one artist’s masterpiece is another person’s garbage.

Generally, this inconstancy is considered to be one of the most problematic features of creativity because it appears to stand in the way of fully appreciating both its nature and its psychological underpinnings. After all, if we cannot agree about what is creative, how can we hope to understand either what motivates and engenders creativity or how people react to it? However, arguing against this objectivist position, in this paper we take the view that disagreement about creativity — while it can often be a source of social conflict — is not scientifically problematic but rather tells us something interesting and informative about creativity as a social psychological process.

Something wondrous strange: The paradox of creativity

According to the billing it receives in the social and organizational world, creativity is an extremely valued commodity. Indeed, a range of influential economic and management commentators (e.g. Peter Drucker and Julian Simon) have argued that innovation, and by implication creativity, is the single most important economic resource that an organization or a society can cultivate and have access to (King & Anderson, 1995; Weiner, 2000). Yet
when people are exposed to creativity, they rarely welcome it with open arms, and not infrequently regard it with suspicion if not overt hostility (Klein & Sorra, 1996; Ram & Sheth, 1989). As the art critic Robert Hughes (1989) has noted, the new is often greeted more with shock and disgust than with gratitude and appreciation.

The disjunction here points to an apparent paradox surrounding creativity — for while it is recommended, imposed, and even ‘sold’ as a panacea capable of driving positive forms of social and organizational change, in reality many scientists, artists and business people claim that ‘when push comes to shove’ creativity is not valued much at all (Weiner, 2000). Thus while people claim to value mould-breaking idiosyncrasy, in fact what they display and react positively towards is conformity (Asch, 1951; Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002; but see also Moscovici, 1976; Turner, 2006).

This sense of something contradictory in the dynamics of innovation is consolidated by a sense that it is not unusual for the spoils of creativity to go to imitators while those who are truly creative are rarely honoured for their endeavour (Weiner, 2000). In science, for example, there is a long list of creators for whom this has proved true, including Lobachevski (who invented non-Euclidean geometry before Gauss), Semmelweis (who discovered a method for avoiding puerperal fever before Pasteur), Matthew (who proposed the principle of natural selection nearly 30 years before Darwin or Wallace, and Franklin (who identified DNA before Crick and Watson). Moreover, while the genius of these individuals was at least acknowledged subsequently, it is clearly the case that there are a great many others whose creativity has gone unheralded and whose efforts lie forgotten in unmarked graves (e.g., see Howe, 2002; Pizer, 1978).

A simple and superficial analysis of these contradictions and injustices might seem to paint a rather poignant picture in which the business of creativity is dominated by hypocrisy, deceit and double standards. Moreover, if as Einstein said, “the secret of genius is knowing
how to hide your sources” then it is the fate of true creativity to be forever hidden. In the present paper however, we argue that a solution to this apparent paradox is made possible by rethinking the nature of the creativity and abandoning the illusion that it is a single and unified construct. Instead, we argue that creativity is always grounded in the relativity of social life, reflecting the fact that it occurs in social contexts (Stein, 1974) and is embedded in social systems (Csikszentmihalyi, 1998) upon which perceivers can have many differing perspectives (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994).

For this reason, as we have argued elsewhere (Adarves-Yorno, Postmes & Haslam, 2006, 2007), conceptions of creativity need to recognize the importance of perceivers, and of the wider group context within which their evaluations take place (Csikszentmihalyi, 1998). Consequently, to understand perceptions of creativity we need to channel our energies away from a quest to discover the universal properties of objects and acts that make them creative, and move instead towards an appreciation of ways in which the dynamics of creativity are structured by the social psychological interplay between creators, perceivers and their proximate and distal social context.

In this regard one of the key relational factors which is seen to structure evaluations of creativity in real-life settings is group membership (Simonton, 1984; Stein, 2003) — in particular, those group memberships that furnish both creators and perceivers with a sense of social identity in any given context (Tajfel, 1972). Moreover, when attending to the role of group memberships in structuring perceptions and acts of creativity, the social identity approach (incorporating both social identity and self-categorization theories; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) provides a comprehensive framework within which relational factors (e.g., group membership) and other group-related factors can be understood.
In line with this perspective, this paper reviews the social identity approach to creativity, summarizes two empirical lines of research, and goes on to report two experiments that explore the impact of group membership on perceptions of creativity. The core point that these studies make is that perceptions of creativity are grounded in shared social identity — so that in order to be seen (and valued) as creative a given artefact needs to be seen as emanating from ‘us’ rather than ‘them’.

The social identity approach to creativity

One basic premise of the social identity approach is that there is not one unique self underlying all our actions and responses. Instead the self is comprised of personal identity and as many social identities as there are groups to which we perceive ourselves as belonging (e.g., Turner, 1982). On this basis, individuals can categorize themselves either as individual persons or as members of particular groups. For example, a British minimalist artist, Mary, can categorize herself as an individual (i.e., Mary), as a member of her artistic group (i.e., a minimalist sculptor), as a citizen of her country (i.e., British), or as a woman. Importantly too, whether she categorizes herself as an individual or as a member of a given group will have important consequences for both her perceptions and her behavior (Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994).

As an individual, Mary will define herself in terms of a personal identity and her own idiosyncratic characteristics (Turner, 1982). Consequently, when personal identity is salient (such that Mary defines herself as “I”), personal style and preferences will have an impact on her creations and her perceptions of creativity. Here, then, individuals’ creations are (a) more likely to reflect their own idiosyncratic style, and (b) their evaluations of other creations are likely to be guided by their personal preferences (unless the context determines otherwise).

In contrast, when a given social identity is salient, individuals internalize relevant
group characteristics and in turn, derive significant aspects of their sense of self from the group (defining the self as “we”). So, for example, when Mary’s social identity as a minimalist is salient she is interested in keeping things minimal. Put slightly differently, when a given social identity becomes salient, individuals perceive themselves more in terms of the shared attributes that define their social category and less in terms of their unique individuating characteristics (Turner, 1982, 1991). Consequently, when social identity is salient, creative behavior and perceptions of creativity are more likely to be informed by group values, preferences and norms. For example, when Mary defines herself as a minimalist, she will be more likely to create and evaluate other creations with reference to the preferences, tastes, norms, values, rules and guidelines of minimalism.

This distinction between personal and social identity has proved to be tremendously useful in predicting and understanding people’s perceptions and behavior in a range of social and organizational contexts (e.g., see Haslam, 2001). Along the lines of previous work which shows that leadership is a product of social identity and self-categorization processes (e.g., Haslam & Platow, 2001; Hogg, 2001; Turner & Haslam, 2001), it clearly also has relevance to perceptions and actions associated with displays of creativity. Accordingly, in order to understand the dynamics of creativity, we need to understand not only what makes a given social identity salient but also what it is that defines social identity content (e.g., norms, tastes etc.), in any given setting (e.g., Stein, 2003).

Identification

Social identification can be defined as the extent to which a given group is valued and self-involving such that an individual considers membership of it to be an important part of their self definition (e.g. Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Doosje, Ellemers & Spears, 1995; Turner, 1999). When someone identifies strongly with a given group, he or she will be more likely to interpret reality and behave in a manner consistent with that group’s values,
ideology and norms (Turner, 1991). Social identification is closely associated with commitment to the group and involvement in its efforts and products (Ellemers, de Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999). As a result, identification (like social identity salience) should be associated with the degree to which a person is willing and able to recognize the creativity of a novel proposal that emerges from, and is endorsed by, the group, and is seen to reflect and promote its values. As with social identity salience, then, to the extent that Mary identifies with minimalist artists (a) her creations are more likely to follow minimalist conventions and (b) she is more likely to perceive other minimalist creations to be creative and superior.

To test these ideas, we conducted a study to explore the prediction that social identification would be positively correlated with the recognition of creativity (Adarves-Yorno, 2005). Here undergraduate students evaluated the novel ideas of a student representative (e.g. giving students the power to design academic courses) and their identification with other students from the university was also measured. As predicted, perceptions of creativity increased as a function of identification: the higher students’ ingroup identification, the more they perceived the ingroup representative’s ideas to be creative (Adarves-Yorno, 2005, also see Adarves-Yorno et al., 2006).

Social identity salience and group norms

We noted above that one of the core predictions of self-categorization theory is that when personal identity is salient, individuals’ perceptions will be informed more by their idiosyncratic preferences than when social identity is salient and they are more likely to see the world and act in a manner consistent with group norms (Reicher, 1984; Spears, Lea & Lee, 1990; Wilder & Shapiro, 1984; Turner et al., 1994). When it comes to perceptions of creativity, one implication of this is that when personal identity is salient and a particular group norm is made explicit, people will tend either to ignore the norm or to deviate from it
as a means of expressing their individuality (Jetten et al., 2002). Accordingly, these individuals should consider an idea to be more creative if it deviates from the norm. However, when a given social identity is salient people’s perceptions are more likely to be informed by relevant group norms and they will tend to consider ideas and products to be more creative if they fall within the relevant normative boundaries of the ingroup.

Two studies were conducted to test these arguments (Adarves-Yorno et al., 2006). The first explored the impact of identity salience (personal vs. social) and group norm (conservative vs. progressive) on the evaluation of a conservative proposal. To make personal identity salient, participants were asked to list three things that distinguished themselves as unique individuals. To make social identity salient participants were asked to list three things that they had in common with others in their group (after Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999). The group norm was manipulated using a fictitious research report which informed participants that students at their university were either conservative or progressive. Subsequently, participants were asked to rate a conservative proposal in terms of its creativity.

In line with predictions, results indicated that when personal identity was salient participants used the norm as a reference point from which they sought to deviate. That is, when thinking of themselves as individuals they perceived the conservative idea to be relatively less creative when the group norm was conservative than when the norm was progressive. On the other hand, when social identity was salient, participants’ perceptions of creativity were much more aligned with the group norm. That is, here they perceived the conservative idea to be more creative when it was congruent with the ingroup norm (to be conservative) than when it was incongruent. Put slightly differently, participants whose personal identity was salient perceived ideas to be relatively more creative when they fell outside the group’s normative boundaries, whereas participants whose social identity was
made salient perceived ideas to be creative when they fell *within* the boundaries of group norms.

This study provides support for the argument that perceptions of creativity are structured by normative context in interaction with self-categorization processes. However, the study does not distinguish creativity from other forms of positive judgement. Accordingly, a second study (Adarves-Yorno et al., 2006, Study 2) was conducted to replicate Study 1 and disentangle perceptions of creativity from other forms of positive reaction. Theoretically, we argue that the two constructs should indeed be different — with creativity judgments being a question of social value that is grounded in group norms (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Martindale, 1990) while assessments of positivity are more likely to be shaped by other (non-normative) factors. One of these other factors is personal relevance. In general, we would expect that when good ideas are relevant for someone, then they will tend to evaluate those ideas as being more *positive* but not necessarily more *creative*.

To test this idea, in a second study, participants’ social identity as students at their University was made salient throughout the study. Two factors were then manipulated: the social norms of the superordinate category (suggesting that students at the University were pro-technology vs. pro-culture), and the personal relevance of the proposals (selecting students from technology-focused or culture-focused faculties). As in the previous study, group norms were manipulated by providing participants with conclusions from a fictitious research report. In the pro-culture condition, the conclusions of the report led participants to think that students were in favor of cultural activities (e.g., wanting more culture, music, and art at the university). In the pro-technology condition, the conclusions of the report led participants to think that students were more in favor of technological advance (e.g., wanting more on-line resources, greater access to computer facilities, and on-line contact with teaching staff).
After having gone through the norm-induction procedure, participants then had to evaluate ideas which proposed using technology as a basis for taking the University forward (i.e., a proposal congruent with the pro-technology norm but not with the pro-culture norm). Participants evaluated these ideas on two dimensions: creativity (i.e., as being creative and innovative) and positivity (i.e., as being good and appropriate). Results confirmed our predictions: group norms had a significant bearing on perceptions of creativity but had far less impact on positive evaluations. On the other hand, the positivity of participants’ reactions varied significantly as a function of the proposals’ personal relevance but this factor did not have as much impact on perceptions of creativity.

These results replicated those of Study 1 and also showed that although perceptions of creativity and positivity are related, they are independently affected by different factors, and therefore both conceptually and empirically distinguishable. In this way, the findings support the argument that evaluations of creativity are dependent on normative criteria (as argued by Amabile, 1996). However, beyond this, they suggest that these social and normative processes interact with self-categorization processes that serve to make particular norms more or less relevant in different contexts.

In reflecting on the broader significance of the results of the foregoing studies, one important note of caution is warranted. This is because a simple interpretation of the findings might lead one to the conclusion that groups place much greater stock in conformity than in creativity (typically understood as “doing things differently”). This inference is consistent with a range of arguments presented in the social psychological literature on groups (e.g., Janis’s, 1972, groupthink hypothesis; Deutsch & Gerard’s, 1955, model of normative influence), as well as with a great deal of popular thinking about creativity (as epitomized by Bernice Fitz-Gibbon’s dictum that “creativity varies inversely with the number of cooks involved in the broth”). However, such a conclusion ignores the
fact that when the norm is to do things differently, more conformity to the norm is
automatically translated into more creativity (at least as it is commonly understood; for a
similar argument about the impact of norms of individualism and collectivism, see Jetten et
al., 2002). This, in turn, alerts us two important points. First, that creativity and conformity
are neither independent nor mutually exclusive, as is commonly claimed. Second, that there
are grounds for revisiting the idea that groups and group members are less creative than
individuals. For ultimately it is neither groups nor individuals’ self-categorization that
determines perceptions and acts of creativity, but rather the interaction of these with the
content of salient group norms.

The present research

As a means of testing ideas at the heart of the social identity approach, the present
research explores the impact of group membership on perceptions of creativity. Self-
categorization theory (Turner, et al., 1987, 1994) argues that the recognition of shared group
membership (i.e., belonging to the same ingroup) is a key determinant of people’s
willingness to engage with others (Turner, 1991). That is, when people consider others to be
ingroup members (so that they define those others and themselves as “us”), they should be
more positively inclined towards them and more persuaded of the value of what they say
and do (see also Mackie & Cooper, 1984). Specifically, ingroup members expect to have
shared understandings and perceptions of issues that are important to their group
membership (Turner, 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1989; see also Haslam, McGarty, Brown,
Eggins, Morrison, & Reynolds, 1998; Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). In other words, a
sense of shared social self-categorization leads people to anticipate that ingroup perceptions
on group-relevant dimensions will converge (see also Asch, 1951, p. 484).

In relation to creativity, a direct implication of this argument is that products and
ideas are more likely to be perceived as creative and regarded favorably when they emerge
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from an ingroup than when they emerge from an outgroup. Specifically, it can be argued that one basic requirement for products and ideas to be perceived and accepted as creative is that their creators should be considered a member of a psychological ingroup — that is, they need to be considered “one of us” (Haslam et al., 2001).

This phenomenon can be observed in a range of real-life settings. For example, in artistic domains, people often display ethnocentric bias when evaluating other people’s creations (see Simonton, 1984). Furthermore, in organizational domains, insiders are often found to reject, outsiders’ contributions by displaying what is referred to as an “NIH” attitude — so that if they are "not invented here" by one of us, they are seen as no good (Katz & Allen, 1991; Ragatz, Handfield, & Scannell, 1993; Stein, 2003). Here we report two studies that explore this phenomenon experimentally.

Experiment 1

This first study tests the assertion that people will perceive ideas to be more creative when those ideas are proposed by an ingroup rather than by an outgroup. In line with the arguments developed above, the study is designed to demonstrate the point that shared group membership is implicated in the recognition of creativity and is a potentially significant determinant of whether or not people willing to respond positively to innovation.

In the study we assessed participants’ evaluation of ideas that supposedly emanated from ingroup and outgroup sources on dimensions of creativity and liking. Our primary hypothesis was that the ideas of an ingroup would be seen as more creative than those of outgroup. We also expected that the ingroup’s ideas would be liked more than those of the outgroup. However, following Adarves-Yorno et al. (2005, 2006), our secondary hypothesis was that the effects of group membership on perceived creativity would reflect more than liking alone — and hence would not simply reflect of ingroup bias.
Method

Participants and Design

British participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions in which they evaluated the creativity of ideas which ostensibly originated either from an ingroup source (other British people) or from an outgroup source (Dutch people). Participants were 100 British respondents who visited the BBC Science web pages, and who chose to take part in an online experiment. Prior to responding on the main dependent measures participants’ British identity was made salient by asking them to identify three things that they liked about being British and that they had in common with other British people (after Haslam et al., 1999).

Procedure

The study was conducted in 2002 shortly after the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) had broadcast “The Experiment” (Koppel & Mirsky, 2002) — a series of four one-hour documentaries covering events in the BBC Prison Study (Reicher & Haslam, 2006). Using the same paradigm as the Stanford Prison Experiment (Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, 1973), the study’s primary goal was to examine the contribution of group membership and social identification to processes of tyranny and resistance (e.g., see Haslam & Reicher, 2006, 2007).

Having seen the television programmes, on-line participants were presented with three novel (fictitious) proposals for following up this programme: “To repeat ‘The Experiment’ with the same participants, but with the guards in the position of the prisoners and vice versa”; “To conduct the ‘The Experiment’ with participants from different cultures (Asian, European, Africans)”; “To run ‘The Experiment’ using real-life groups, such as bosses and employees in an organization”. In different conditions they were told that these proposals originated from an ingroup source (a discussion group on a British website) or an
outgroup source (a discussion group on a Dutch website). The order of presentation of the proposals was counterbalanced.

Participants were presented with each proposal one at a time, and were then simply asked to indicate to what extent they considered each proposal to be creative and to what extent they liked the proposal. Responses were made on seven-point scales ranging from “not at all” (1) to “very much” (7).

Results and Discussion

There was reasonably high degree of correspondence in evaluation of the three proposals (for creativity $\alpha = .58$, for liking $\alpha = .55$). Accordingly, responses to the separate proposals were aggregated to provide single measures of perceived creativity and liking.

Results of a $t$-test provided support for the hypothesis that proposals would be seen to be more creative when their source was an ingroup ($M=4.46$, $SD=.90$) rather than an outgroup ($M=3.76$, $SD=1.23$), $t(97)=3.24$, $p=.002$. As expected, it was also found that participants liked ingroup ideas more ($M=4.47$, $SD=.86$) than outgroup ideas ($M=4.01$, $SD=1.25$) $t(97)=2.11$, $p=.037$.

There was also a significant correlation between ratings of creativity and liking, $r=.70$, $p<.01$ — a finding which suggests that perceptions of creativity correspond to patterns of ingroup bias generally observed when ingroup and outgroup products are evaluated (e.g., Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Indeed, one potential explanation of these results is that they simply constitute another example of ingroup bias. To address this point, supplementary ANCOVA was performed in order to control for the effects of likeability when estimating the impact of group membership on perceptions of creativity. Against the idea that the observed patterns were simply a product of ingroup favoritism, this analysis indicated that, when correcting for likeability, the effect of group membership on creativity perceptions still remained strong, $F(1,96)=5.86$, $p=.017$. This supports our
secondary hypothesis in suggesting that group membership structures perceptions of creativity over-and-above its impact on likeability (along lines suggested by Adarves-Yorno, 2005, see also Adarves-Yorno et al., 2006).

In summary, this first study shows quite straightforwardly that group membership determines how people respond to creative products (in this case ideas) generated by others. Furthermore, the results suggest that perceptions of creativity are underpinned by more than mere likeability. It remains true, however, that creativity may be a product of forms of bias other than those associated with liking per se. In order to address this possibility a second study was conducted.

Experiment 2

The design and rationale for this experiment was very similar to that of Experiment 1, but it incorporated three small differences. First, to lend further support to the claim that perceptions of creativity are not simply a product of ingroup bias, this study explored the impact of group membership not only on evaluations of creativity but also on perceptions of beauty. Second, here participants did not evaluate ideas (as in Study 1) but rather tangible creations: a university promotional leaflet. Third, the study employed a within-subjects design in order to reduce experimental complexities and confounds.

As in Study 1, our primary hypothesis was that perceptions of creativity would be structured by group membership — with ingroup products being seen as more creative than outgroup products. It was also expected that group membership might also impact on perceptions of beauty (with ingroup products seen as more beautiful than outgroup ones; see Sherrard, 1995). However, as with judgments of liking in the previous study, our secondary hypothesis was that evaluations of creativity and beauty would be empirically distinct — so that perceptions of creativity would reflect more than merely the positive evaluation of the ingroup and its output (Adarves-Yorno et al., 2005, 2006).
Method

Participants and design

In a two-condition within-subjects design, students at the University of Exeter evaluated the creativity and beauty of university leaflets ostensibly created by an ingroup member (a student from the University of Exeter) and an outgroup member (a student from Bristol University). Participants were 125 first-year undergraduate students (99 women and 26 men) who were taking part in a Team Development Day.

Procedure

Prior to taking part in the main study (and ostensibly as part of a different exercise) participants’ identity as Exeter students was made salient by asking them to identify three things that they had in common with and liked about other Exeter students (after Haslam et al., 1999). After this, each student was individually presented with a black and white photocopy of two promotional leaflets both describing the attractions of university life.

One leaflet was supposedly created by an Exeter student (an ingroup member) and one supposedly created by a Bristol student (an outgroup member). The main part of each leaflet was composed of four images and around ten words (9 for Exeter’s leaflet and 12 for Bristol’s leaflet). The images were taken from university prospectuses and were equivalent in terms of (a) size, (b) composition and (c) content: two of the images for each leaflet were related to academic aspects of university life (e.g., showing people working with computers) and two were related to more social aspects (e.g., showing people laughing at a social event). The words of each leaflet were equivalent in terms of (a) size, (b) the space they occupied on the leaflet and (c) content (containing words typically used in material of this form — e.g., indicating that university life is ‘stimulating’ and ‘good fun’). Both leaflets were composed of 90% images and 10% words and were carefully created so as to be
aesthetically equivalent (an equivalence subsequently confirmed by participants’ ratings of their beauty; see below).

Participants evaluated leaflets on the dimensions of creativity and beauty. Creativity was measured with the single item “How creative do you consider the leaflet to be?” Beauty was measured with the single item “How beautiful do you consider the leaflet to be?” Participants responded to both items using nine-point rating scales ranging from “not at all” (1) to “very much” (9).

Results and Discussion

Preliminary analysis indicated that there were no effects for leaflet content or order of presentation. Accordingly, participants’ responses were collapsed across these factors with evaluations of ingroup and outgroup leaflets analysed by means of paired t-tests. Here a comparison of ratings of the leaflets’ perceived creativity provided strong support for our primary hypothesis — with leaflets being seen to be more creative when they were said to have been designed by an ingroup (M=3.92, SD=1.67) rather than from an outgroup (M=3.54, SD=1.58), t(124)=2.93, p<.001.

Although perceptions of the leaflets’ creativity were correlated with perceptions of beauty (for one leaflet r=.63, for the other r=.64, both ps<.01), the ingroup leaflet was considered no more beautiful (M=3.05, SD=1.45) than the outgroup leaflet (M=3.03, SD=1.43), t(123)=0.19, p=.85. This null effect was unexpected, but nevertheless it is in line with our secondary hypothesis, in suggesting that judgements of creativity are theoretically and empirically distinguishable disentangled from judgements of positivity per se. This result thus provides further support for the claim that perceptions of creativity are more than simply a reflection of ingroup bias.
General Discussion

The results of the above studies provide consistent evidence that creators’ group membership impacts substantially on other people’s perceptions of their creativity, and, as a corollary, that perceivers’ group membership impacts substantially on their evaluations of other people’s creativity. In this, the findings resonate with assertions made in previous work which point to the patterning of judgements of creativity in artistic domains (Sherrard, 1995; Simonton, 1984) and the so-called NIH phenomenon whereby innovative ideas are responded to far less enthusiastically if they are “not invented here” (Katz & Allen, 1991; Ragatz et al., 1993; Stein, 2003). In these real-life examples, however, it is unclear whether the outcomes that are observed represent specific judgments of creativity or reflect more generic forms of ingroup favoritism (along lines observed by Tajfel, 1970; see also Doise et al., 1972) or indeed whether they are a reflection of real differences (e.g., in quality).

Perhaps people see novel ingroup products to be more creative because they simply like the ingroup more than outgroups, or because ingroup products in fact are more creative than those of outgroups.

In this regard, the present findings make two simple but nonetheless important contributions to the literature on creativity. First, they show through controlled experimentation that group membership (and not the factors with which it is routinely correlated in the world at large — e.g., quality, status, power, experience) is an important determinant of the perceived creativity of ideas (Experiment 1) and objects (Experiment 2). Second, they show that the influence of this factor is not simply a manifestation of generic ingroup bias since judgements of creativity diverge from those of both likeability (Experiment 1) and beauty (Experiment 2).

In line with the body of research reviewed earlier in this paper, the findings also point to the way in which social (group-based) factors are central to the dynamics of
creativity. An interesting case study of such dynamics is provided by the professional trajectory of Paul Cézanne — an artist whose work in the late 19th century is credited with having paved the way for the shift from impressionism to cubism (e.g., Lindsay, 1969). For the first five years that Cézanne submitted his work to the official Paris Salon (from 1864-9) it was consistently rejected because it did not comply with the norms of contemporary impressionism. Commenting on his work, those who reviewed his work saw it not as creative but as simply bad.

The present and previous work in the social identity tradition suggests two interrelated reasons for this — both of which appear to be borne out by biographical analysis (e.g., see Lindsay, 1969). First, and most straightforwardly, Cézanne’s work was rejected because his art failed to live up to (i.e., did not conform to) the prevailing artistic standards of the day. Related to this, though, social identity theorizing also suggests that, in his painting (as well as in his life more generally), Cézanne (in common with other artists like Van Gogh) had failed to demonstrate to those in positions of influence at the time (i.e., traditional impressionists) that he was “one of us”. And because he was an outsider (or at least not clearly an ingroup member) those assessors were less willing (or able) to see the value in the new forms of representation that his art championed.

Consideration of these points allows us to explain some of the apparent contradictions and paradoxes that surround the treatment meted out to creators when they attempt to launch their products on the world. As we noted at the start of this paper, those individuals typically (and understandably) react with dismay, first, when their own acts of creativity are rejected, and second, when those same ideas are subsequently proposed by someone else and are received favourably. The biography of Rosalind Franklin provides another interesting case study that speaks to these issues (Sayre, 1975). As a female, suffragette and socialist her pioneering work generating X-ray images of the structure of
DNA (e.g., Franklin & Gosling, 1953) met with only faint acclaim in the male-dominated world of conservative scientists, and was massively overshadowed by the subsequent work of Watson and Crick (e.g., 1953). Indeed, Franklin’s work only gained general recognition once a community of other female scientists had developed in the 1980s — by which time there (a) had been changes to the nature of the scientific community and its norms and (b) there was a group of other non-conservative, non-male scientists explicitly championing both her and her contribution.

Had Franklin consulted the literature on creativity it is unlikely that she would have found much there to console or aid her in her quest for recognition. Illustrative of this point, a trawl through quotations relating to the basis of creativity (e.g., Thomas Tripp, 1973) provides would-be creators with hundreds of practical recommendations (e.g., suggesting that they consult their “inner child”, forgo wealth and worldly possession, have no children, undergo suffering and torment, or find someone to argue with and be despised by). It is undoubtedly the case that such processes may have a role to play in prompting people to be creative; however, they have precious little to say about how the fruits of any labour will be received, and this is a subject on which these same sources are curiously silent.

To the extent that others’ reactions are likely to have a significant bearing on the ramifications of creative acts (Csikszentmihalyi, 1998; Howe, 2002) and their capacity to bring about social change, this oversight seems glaring. One major contribution of the social identity approach is to place such considerations centre-stage in the process of encouraging a properly social psychological theory of creativity. This sees both the drive to create and the form of creation to be grounded in social identity (e.g., Ellemers et al., 2004), but also sees others’ social identities as a determinant both of how such acts are received, and of what impact they ultimately have.
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Significantly too, as Franklin’s contribution to science shows, it is clear that we need to understand this impact, like social identity itself, as not only dynamic but also ongoing — about *becoming* not just being (Reicher, 2000). In this regard, the most powerful forms of creativity may well be those that change the way we see ourselves and which promote social change because they create a new audience to appreciate and act upon them (Reicher, Haslam & Platow, 2007). Indeed, by this logic, successful creators are not necessarily those who have the best or the most novel ideas, but rather those who help create new forms of community to recognize and celebrate their greatness.
References


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Footnote

1. The Team Development Day was comprised of a number of group activities. Within these activities several related creativity experiments were conducted. Using the same students as participants, one of the between-subjects experiments explored the impact of group norms and team identity salience on (a) creative behavior and (b) perceptions of creativity (see Adarves-Yorno et al., 2007, Study 1). However, the fact that the same participants were used had no impact on the present experiment. The present study has a within-subjects design and university student identity was made salient to all participants. To ensure that we could safely analyse the impact of group membership (as a within-subject factor) independently of the between-subjects manipulation, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using group norm and team identity salience as between-subject factors. Results showed that norm and team identity salience had no impact on perceptions of creativity (creativity X norm $p = .856$, creativity X salience, $p = .257$; creativity X norm X salience, $p = .973$) or perceptions of beauty (beauty X norm $p = .317$, beauty X salience $p = .795$; beauty X norm X salience, $p = .596$). For the purposes of this paper, and aiming for clarity and parsimony, we have decided to treat the within-subjects data as belonging to an unrelated experiment. For this reason, only details of the within-subjects manipulation are reported here.