Creating Animal Experience in Late Eighteenth-Century Narrative

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Animals abound in eighteenth-century fiction. Many, like Betsy Thoughtless’s pet squirrel, killed by her cruel husband, or Sophia Western’s bird, maliciously freed by Master Blifil, make brief appearances to point a human moral. Some, like Yorick’s trapped starling, prompt reflection on the human fates that parallel their own.¹ Sometimes they narrate the story themselves, like the lap-dog Pompey, who records his satirical observations of human society from the vantage-point of a pet passed from owner to owner.² In the last two decades of the century, familiar domestic and work animals, and small wild animals and birds, featured increasingly as fictional protagonists. Dogs, cats, horses, robins, swallows, goldcrests, canaries, sparrows, squirrels, hares and mice became heroes and heroines. Dorothy Kilner’s *Life and Perambulations of a Mouse* (1783), in which a human narrator transmits the tale told her by the rodent, was followed by Sarah Trimmer’s immensely popular *Fabulous Histories* (1786), which focalises its narrative alternately through the robin family and the family of humans who feed them.³ In the 1790s and at the turn of the century, Edward Augustus Kendall specialised in fiction starring small birds, but his best-known story was *Keeper’s Travels*, the adventures of a dog based on the author’s own.⁴ John Aikin and Anna Letitia Barbauld included a number of animal stories, such as ‘The Discontented Squirrel’, ‘The Young Mouse’, ‘The History and Adventures of a Cat’ and ‘The Little Dog. A fable’, in their 1790s collection *Evenings at Home*.⁵ A hare narrated an anonymous anti-hunting story of 1799, while the same year saw the first, serial publication of *The Adventures of Dick, the little poney*, a horse autobiography that in many respects anticipates Anna Sewell’s *Black Beauty*.⁶
The trend continued in the early years of the nineteenth century with further cat and
dog autobiographies. Because this flowering of animal narrative took place within children’s fiction,
these stories and others like them have generally been discussed within the context of
the history of children’s and educational literature. Descended from Aesop’s fables,
which were several times adapted for children in the eighteenth century, many of
them attempted to teach moral lessons via metaphorical application of animals’
activities to human children. By no means all the lessons animals gave were taught
through allegory. Children, perceived as less rational and closer to nature than adults,
were thought to have a special affinity with animals. Animal stories were intended to
educate children into their full humanity, both through natural history lessons teaching
them animals’ and their own places in God’s creation, and through the anti-cruelty
message that educational theorists from John Locke onwards agreed was crucial to the
production of humane citizens. The stories have therefore been understood as
performing the ideological work of early children’s writing, whether by politically
progressive rationalists like Aikin and Barbauld or conservative Evangelicals like
Trimmer, to further middle-class hegemony through spreading domestic ideology and
values such as thrift, sobriety, and ‘charity, obedience, kindness to animals, and an
appreciation of the natural world’. But the period’s stories about animals should not
be seen only as a subset of children’s literature. They regularly drew on works of
natural history that disseminated new observations of animals’ forms and habits and
sometimes upheld, sometimes questioned, the line dividing ‘man’ from the beasts.
They took their place alongside a growing literature of poems, sermons, essays and
letters that, starting from the principle that non-human animals could feel as people
did, advocated the compassionate treatment of creatures from elephants to insects.\textsuperscript{10} An examination of these children’s animal narratives suggests that they played a role in the period’s re-thinking of animal—human relations. They entered the debate about animals’ mental capacities then being conducted in terms of animals as machines versus animals as sentient beings and instinct versus capacity for reason, and replayed in our own time by behaviourists and mentalists discussing the question of animal cognition.\textsuperscript{11} They took part in the incomplete but significant shift in animal representation from the fabular, the allegorical and the satirical to the naturalistic, the empathetic, and the inwardly focused. In particular, they pioneered narrative attempts to imagine the subjective experience of non-human animals. Drawing on the various techniques being developed by novelists from Henry Fielding and Samuel Richardson onwards to represent ‘fictional minds’,\textsuperscript{12} they applied them to the narrative creation of animal minds.

The stories’ descent from Aesop has encouraged an allegorical reading of these new animal fables. In the Aesopian tradition, animals stand for something else, usually some aspect of human behaviour, and their fables are the vehicle for moral warnings or political satire. The children’s stories often invite a metaphorical reading of their animal characters’ behaviour. Sarah Trimmer, who announces her Aesopian credentials in the title of her \textit{Fabulous Histories}, and warns her readers that her anthropomorphic birds exist only in a fable ‘in which the sentiments and affections of a good Father and Mother, and a Family of Children, are supposed to be possessed by a \textit{Nest of Redbreasts}; and others of the feathered race are, by the force of imagination, endued with the same qualities’, often uses her robins metaphorically.\textsuperscript{13} When the mother bird, wanting to share the task of providing for the nestlings, leaves their
father in charge of them while she hunts for food (he encourages her to go because the exercise will do her good, but fears he may prove an awkward nurse to the babies), he sings to entertain his children:

Robin now remarked, that [the song] was very pretty indeed, and expressed his desire to learn it also. By all means, said his father, I shall sing it very often, so you may learn it if you please. For my part, said Flapsy, I do not think I could have patience to learn it, it will take so much time. – Nothing, my dear Flapsy, answered the father, can be acquired without patience, and I am sorry to find your’s [sic] begin to fail you already: But I hope, if you have no taste for music, that you will give the greater application to things that may be of more importance to you. Well, said Pecky, I would apply to music with all my heart, but I do not believe it possible for me to attain it. Perhaps not, replied her father, but I do not doubt your application to whatever your mother requires of you, and she is an excellent judge both of your talents, and of what is suitable to your station in life. She is no songster herself, and yet she is very clever, I assure you.¹⁴

The scene of instruction in the robin family parallels that in the story’s human family, the Bensons. Trimmer recommends the virtues of patience and application, and reinforces gender roles by adapting natural historians’ observation of bird life (male birds do the singing) to imply an application to human culture (a girl should stick to the female tasks taught by her mother, who has her own talents and does not encroach on masculine ones). Another technique often used to point a moral in the animal stories is to make the animal protagonist the author’s surrogate, taking the satirical stance of the outsider whose naïve response to the behaviour he witnesses exposes its absurdity. The fiction of the animal viewpoint is used to create a satire centred on human concerns. Dick the pony muses on humanity’s odd attitude to time:

my master, who had now grown a tall stripling, frequently exercised me himself, trying how fast I could go for a short distance, and then a longer one, pressing me with such vivacity, that I could not forbear fancying he was
training me to outstrip the winged inhabitants of the air. Every time I got to the end of the space in which he rode me, he pulled something very pretty out of his pocket, and, as far as I can judge, it told him how far I had gone in a certain time. I have heard this toy called a watch, and, as time is so valuable to mankind, they seem universally to wear it, and, no doubt, use it to warn them against the misapplication of the most precious of all things; yet, without any trouble or expense, the rising of the sun might tell them when to commence the duties of the day, and its setting, to retire to rest. For my own part, I wanted no other monitor; but the human race appear to be governed by other maxims, or to be inevitably subject to other laws; many of them never stir abroad till the splendid orb, that lights the earth, has reached the meridian, nor seek repose till the noon of night.  

As in the example from Trimmer, the idea of animal nature is used primarily to comment on humanity: here the ‘natural’ wisdom of the horse, whose life follows circadian rhythms, is employed to satirize ‘unnatural’ human culture. 

However, not all uses of animal fable are metaphorical. As Frank Palmeri has shown, some of Aesop’s fables, and those of later imitators Jean de la Fontaine, Swift, and Gay, can be read as ‘auto-critical’: in these ‘anti-allegorical narratives’, animals stand for – and speak for -- themselves, and their complaints of human cruelty to beasts can be taken on a literal level. In the animal stories of late eighteenth-century children’s fiction, this tendency is taken further. When Dick the pony, relating the harsh treatment he receives from one rider, reports, ‘I was tempted to assert the rights of nature, and to retaliate the injuries I had received’, and warns that ‘[t]he most
stupid animal is not insensible to kindness, but revolts from oppression’; or when a persecuted hare, observing that the woman who tries to help him is beaten by her husband, reflects that ‘the same disposition that prompts a man to behave savagely towards his beast, will render him, whenever opportunity offers, a tyrant in his own family’; their message extends by implication into the politics of human social arrangements, but retains as primary its literal emphasis on human treatment of animals. The anti-cruelty message preached by the animal coincides with the moral of its fable.\footnote{17} In addition, the project of teaching natural history through animal stories, while it certainly did not preclude moral meanings such as Trimmer’s ideas about proper gender roles being drawn from animal behaviour, was coloured by eighteenth-century naturalists’ ‘new concern for grounding moral truths in nature’,\footnote{18} and encouraged connections to be made between animals within the fiction and outside it, ‘allowing issues of animal protection, conservation and what was later called ecology to be raised in a child-friendly manner’\footnote{19}. Figurative and literal meanings were mixed together in the animal stories, and their authors were sometimes explicit about their dual purpose. Trimmer’s introduction to \textit{Fabulous Histories} promises stories that provide ‘moral instruction applicable to [the children in her frame story, and by extension her child audience], at the same time that they excite compassion and tenderness for those interesting and delightful creatures, on which such wanton cruelties are frequently inflicted, and recommend \textit{universal Benevolence’}.\footnote{20} Edward Augustus Kendall explains that his fables have a ‘natural’ meaning, teaching the reader to understand animal behaviour and not to judge it by inappropriate human standards. \textit{The Canary Bird} features discussions among birds and a beetle about the ethics of predation. The swallow considers beetles to be created only as its food; the beetle thinks the same of the tiny insects it eats; and a wagtail points out that a hawk
could offer the same reason for eating swallows. Part of the aim here is to satirize human pride, absurd as the swallow’s; but part, the narrator explains, is ‘to point out a natural, as well as a moral, truth. I wished to show you that a prejudice against particular creatures, for fancied acts of cruelty is absurd’.

Learning natural history was believed to lead to greater imaginative sympathy with animals. Kendall, a keen student of natural history, distinguished between the fantastic and naturalistic elements of his animal fables in the introduction to *The Swallow*. ‘For the sake of miscellaneous instruction and entertainment’ he anthropomorphized his animals, giving them faculties, such as human speech, which they did not possess, and admittedly here ‘physical veracity is violated’; but it was on the more truthful parts of his representation that he claimed to depend for the reader’s emotional response:

it is chiefly … by bringing animals forward in their real character, (a character possessed of certain portions of perception and memory, and the capacity of comparing ideas and acting in consequence) [,] by becoming a voice to the dumb, that the author hopes to promote *their* benefit … By presenting animals in this manner, a principal difficulty is obviated: that of leading the mind to remember that, beings of different species have, in part, the same views and interests: when this is once established, Nature which, till then, was not permitted to act, will assist the moralist in claiming the sympathy of the heart: The scale to measure other’s wants by thine.

Kendall here looks to natural history to demonstrate the similarities between humans and other species: talking animals were a fiction but animals with some form of thinking powers were not. Later in the text he takes from Buffon’s work on birds the description of sparrows protecting their nests with a cover when building out in the open, and dispensing with the protection when building in a hole. He gives Buffon’s comment as: “Instinct is manifested in this case in a manner nearly analogous to
reason, as it supposes, at least, the comparing together of two ideas.'  

He also uses William Smellie’s *Philosophy of Natural History* (1790) to argue that ‘though man is unquestionably the chief of the animal creation, the other animals, according to the mental powers with which nature has endowed them, comparatively approach to or recede from the sagacity and genius of the human species. *The whole is a graduated scale of intelligence.*’ The anti-Cartesianism of the natural historians fed into the positive view of animals’ mental powers generally given in animal narratives. This appreciation of animals’ mental capacities is a quality shared with the earlier tradition of theriophily, in which Montaigne was prominent. But where theriophilic writing tended to use the idea of animal wisdom and superiority as a satiric tool to expose human folly, late eighteenth-century animal narratives were more serious in their suggestion that animals had a natural intelligence that made them, certainly not superior nor even equal to humans, but significantly like them.  

The incorporation of naturalistic elements into the animal fable encouraged reader empathy with animal characters because the discourse of natural history suggested significant likenesses between human and animal; and recognised likeness between self and other was understood as the basis for the ‘sympathy of the heart’ praised by Kendall. The idea of sympathy developed in eighteenth-century science and philosophy, and especially in the work of David Hume and Adam Smith, strongly influenced the animal stories as it did other literature of the period. Sympathy was often understood as a physical communication of feeling. In 1711 Shaftesbury had described panic as a feeling spreading through a crowd, ‘rais’d in a Multitude, and convey’d by Aspect, or as it were by Contact or Sympathy’. In medical works, it denoted the internal communication between bodily organs.  

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sympathy as a physical process, belonging to corporeal or ‘animal’ nature, associated it with non-human animals. Hume, in particular, whose Treatise of Human Nature rooted emotions in somatic bases, as he ‘tried to reduce benevolence to something which was neither selfish nor unselfish, but rather physical’, often located sympathy among animals. In the Treatise he argues:

'Tis evident, that sympathy, or the communication of passions, takes place among animals, no less than among men. Fear, anger, courage and other affections are frequently communicated from one animal to another, without their knowledge of that cause, which produc’d the original passion. Grief likewise is receiv’d by sympathy; and produces almost all the same consequences, and excites the same emotions as in our species. The howlings and lamentations of a dog produce a sensible concern in his fellows.

As well as sympathy between fellow dogs, Hume recognises sympathy between human and animal. In the Treatise he uses this idea to combat the notion of a universal benevolence or love of mankind:

there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself. ‘Tis true, there is no human, and indeed no sensible, creature, whose happiness or misery does not, in some measure, affect us, when brought near to us, and represented in lively colours: But this proceeds merely from sympathy, and is no proof of such an universal affection to mankind, since this concern extends itself beyond our own species.

In this passage, cross-species sympathy comes in as it were by the back door. Hume wants to limit the notion of feeling: by saying it that it proceeds merely from sympathy, he defines it as a response mechanism, rather than an active virtue. But this
limitation in one direction becomes an extension in the other: such a response mechanism operates blindly in relation to all creatures that can feel. The writers of eighteenth-century animal narratives, then, are operating on a Humean principle: that an animal’s happiness or misery will ‘affect us, when brought near to us, and represented in lively colours’.

Adam Smith, by contrast, who sees sympathy not as directly shared bodily sensation, but as a mental act that simulates such sharing, has little to say about non-human animals. For him, sympathy is a matter between humans. Nevertheless his conception of sympathy is important for the development of a literature of cross-species sympathy. Sympathy’s corporeal aspect is the basis for its strong association with animals in the first place: but the understanding of sympathy as an act of imaginative identification underpins the development of literary techniques to extend its boundaries across species. The literature of sensibility aimed to encourage in its readers that imaginative projection of the self into another’s sufferings that Smith saw as the indispensable condition for sympathy:

Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. … By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.32

As Markman Ellis has shown, the late eighteenth-century understanding of narrative art ‘reproduced the logic’ of Smith’s theory. In Clara Reeve’s formulation, the novel described things ‘such as may happen to our friend, or to ourselves’, and it should
temporarily persuade its readers ‘that all is real, until we are affected by the joys or
distresses, of the persons in the story, as if they were our own’. In *Tristram Shandy*,
Sterne aimed both to illustrate and invoke Smithian sympathy through a fictional
example that echoes Smith’s own. Corporal Trim, asked to read aloud a sermon that
invites us to imagine the experience of a hypothetical sufferer on the rack, breaks
down because the words bring to mind the experience of his own brother, imprisoned
by the Inquisition: ‘Oh! ‘tis my brother, cried poor Trim in a most passionate
exclamation, dropping the sermon upon the Ground’. Late eighteenth-century
animal stories extended the narrative evocation of Smithian sympathy across the
species barrier. They repeatedly opposed cruelty by urging child readers to recognise
that animals had feelings similar to their own, and to consider how they themselves
would suffer under ill-treatment. Dorothy Kilner’s *The Life and Perambulations of a
Mouse* is typical, with its condemnation of the little boy Charles for hanging a mouse
up by its tail for the cat to jump at: ‘I beg you will consider’, says his father, ‘how you
would like, that either myself, or some great giant, as much larger than you as you are
bigger than the mouse, should hurt and torment you? And I promise you, the smallest
creature can feel as acutely as you can’. Like Smith and Sterne, Kilner uses the idea
of a brother’s pain to illustrate the process of sympathy. The mouse protagonist,
Nimble, tells the human narrator the story of his life. In one episode, he witnesses the
torture and death of his brother, Softdown. Softdown, caught in a trap in the nursery,
is held up by the nurse to show to the baby, an act of cruelty depicted in one of the
book’s illustrations (fig. 1). Nimble comments:

What were the actions or sensations of poor Softdown at that dreadful moment
I know not, but my own anguish, which it is impossible to describe, was
augmented every moment by seeing her shake the trap almost topsy-turvy, then blow through the trap at one end, at which times I saw the dear creature’s tail come out between the wires on the contrary sides, as he was striving, I suppose, to retreat from her. At length, after she had tortured him for some time, she set the trap on the table, so close to a large fire, that I am sure he must have been much incommode by the heat…

The servant John comes in, takes Softdown by tail, and crushes him on hearth with his foot. Nimble comments: ‘My very blood runs cold within me at the recollection of seeing Softdown’s as it spirted from beneath the monster’s foot; whilst the craunch of his bones almost petrified me with horror’. At length, ‘with trembling feet, and a palpitating heart’ he returns, to tell his other brothers, whose anguish he can’t describe. As Smith’s theory would predict, Nimble does not ‘know’ Softdown’s sensations directly, but forms an idea of them through an imaginative projection of himself into his brother’s experience, a projection that his description in turn encourages the reader to share. It is through the narrator’s sympathetic identification with his brother’s feelings that the suffering of a mouse is made significant, while the child reader is encouraged through a similar act of imagination to respond both to Softdown and Nimble as if they were brothers, by extension of the concept of kin to the mouse.

Writers of animal narratives made it clear that children’s sympathy for animals was expected to lead to better treatment of them. Their subtitles were often explicit on this: Trimmer’s *Fabulous Histories* was ‘Designed for the Instruction of Children, Respecting their Treatment of Animals’, while the anonymous *Hare* was ‘Written as
a Stimulus to Youth Towards a Proper Treatment of Animals’. Kendall’s *The Sparrow* and *Keeper’s Travels*, and a compilation from Samuel Jackson Pratt entitled *Pity’s Gift* were advertised together in newspapers as being ‘intended to excite the compassion of youth to the animal creation’. Kilner gave her animal fable *The Rational Brutes* a verse epigraph:

> If tender sorrow melt thy youthful heart,
> Hear what BEASTS, BIRDS, and suff'ring FISH impart;
> Nor for thy transient sport, or lasting joy,
> The bliss of any thing that lives, annoy;
> But always recollect this wise decree,
> “Do, as thou wouldst it should be done to thee.”

Kendall concluded *The Crested Wren* with a plea from the goldcrest protagonist to the reader: ‘You, reader, if you have condescended to follow my pages regularly, have already “listened to my lore”. – May I hope that you will grant my other request? – Will you guard my golden head from harm? At least, will you refrain from harming it yourself, if we should happen to meet.’ Evidently these writers, like many others of their time, theorized fiction through what is now called the ‘empathy-altruism’ hypothesis. The view that eighteenth-century narrative, with its concentration on encouraging the reader to identify with another’s sensations, was instrumental in the development of fundamental changes to social attitudes is expressed by the historian Lynn Hunt, who goes so far as to credit new mental habits induced by reading Richardson and Rousseau with paving the way for the concept of human rights. The children’s narratives of the late eighteenth century, encouraging their readers to
identify with animals’ feelings, were part of the changing climate of opinion that led to the beginnings of animal welfare legislation in the early years of the following century. ⁴³

Hunt’s optimistic reading of the social effects of sentimental writing is currently unfashionable among critics. An anti-sentimental attitude predominates, especially among postcolonial scholars, who indict the anti-slavery writing of this period for encouraging readers, safe in the comfort of their own superior subject-position, to objectify the victims of slavery and indulge in the self-congratulatory pleasures of pitying them. The depiction of suffering others, they argue, becomes pornographic. ⁴⁴ The charge of self-indulgent emotionalism might be brought against some of the animal writing surveyed here. One of the stories in *Pity’s Gift* offers a classic example of the fault that critics from the eighteenth century onwards have found in the writing of sensibility: that it displays suffering as an enjoyable spectacle and shows no will to change the conditions that produce it. In ‘The Bird-Catcher and his Canary’, the performing bird is killed by a cat while its owner’s attention is distracted. The reader is similarly distracted: first from the bird’s fate to the sensibility of the bird-catcher as he cries ‘O Bijou! My dearest, only Bijou! Would I were dead also!’; then to the tearful musicians who offer him charity, and whose delightful sympathy is presented as a ‘banquet’ to the viewer; and then to the even more delightful blushes of the modest young lady who tries to hide her own act of charity, but reveals her benevolence ‘on every feature of her enchanting face’. ⁴⁵ The sub-Sternean thrills of Pratt’s writing are not typical of the children’s animal stories, which are generally too committed to the cause of rational education to indulge in the excesses of sentiment. But the stories do often invoke sympathy for animals as a way
of underlining human superiority. Mary Wollstonecraft, for example, does this explicitly in *Original Stories*, where children are advised to be kind to animals as the only creatures over whom they have power, and where that kindness will itself separate them from the objects of it. The governess Mrs Mason, having taught her charges to be kind to larks, lectures them on man’s superiority to the animals. Animals only have involuntary affections and emotions, whereas man is capable of a friendship founded on knowledge and virtue. At this, ‘[t]he children eagerly enquired in what manner they were to behave, to prove that they were superior to animals? The answer was short – be tender-hearted; and let your superior endowments ward off the evils which they cannot foresee’.

Here we have sympathy as pity for an object, the feeling for that is now defined within psychology and philosophy in contradistinction to empathy, a feeling with another with whom the subject has a strong sense of identification.

For all their benevolent actions towards animals, Wollstonecraft’s protagonists show little sense of fellowship with them.

The debate as to whether sympathetic feelings and benevolent actions should be seen as selfish or altruistic responses was of course live throughout the eighteenth century, with adherents of Hobbes on the one side, and those of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson on the other. Anxiety about the charge of sympathy’s selfishness appears to have led to an inconsistency in Smith’s *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Early in the text Smith emphasizes that switching places in sympathy with another does not entail a dissolution of the self in the other: quite the contrary – we import our own knowledge into the other person’s situation and feel as we would feel, not as they feel. He gives the example of the loss of reason. We might feel deep commiseration with someone who has gone mad, but the sufferer is ‘insensible of his own misery’:
The compassion of the spectator must arise from altogether from the consideration of what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation, and, what perhaps is impossible, was at the same time able to regard it with his present reason and judgement.49

Later in the text, though, where he is answering Hobbes’ arguments about the essential selfishness of sympathetic reactions, he insists that sympathy is not a self-centred act but a movement from the self:

When I sympathise with your sorrow or your indignation it may be pretended indeed that my emotion is founded in self-love … yet this imaginary change is not supposed to happen in my own person and character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathise. When I condole with you for the loss of your only son, in order to enter into your grief I do not consider what I, a person of such a character and profession, should suffer, if I had a son, and that son were unfortunately to die, but I consider what I would suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters.50

This inconsistency over the extent to which we can enter into the experience of another indicates an unsolved question in the discourse of sensibility – a question around which novelists of the period organised their narrative experiments.

In some of the children’s animal narratives there are attempts, sometimes sporadic and occasionally sustained, to create reader identification with the experience
of animal characters. These attempts can be fruitfully considered not only in the light of Smith’s theory, but also in the recent context of Suzanne Keen’s work on the relationship between novel-reading and empathy. Keen is sceptical as to the existence of the kind of moral and political leverage sometimes attributed to novel-readers’ feelings, but her review of the neurological studies of empathy and her researches in reader response lend new support to a commonplace of eighteenth-century criticism: that sympathetic identification with fictional characters is a strong if not readily controllable effect. Particularly interesting in relation to the animal narratives are her suggestions that awareness of a narrative’s fictionality encourages empathy because it releases readers from the self-protective suspicion they adopt when dealing with writing that makes truth-claims; that empathy can be created for characters who differ from the reader in all sorts of ways; and that fictional empathy can be created with minimal narrative detail and without complex or realistic characterization.51 In that case the educational writers’ insistence that their rational animals are only fictional would have encouraged rather than discouraged children from identifying with them, and the animal characters’ species difference and the slightness of their characterization need have been no bars to empathy.

To consider these animal narratives as exercises in the extension of narrative empathy across the species divide is to suggest that they anticipate still-live debates about the subjective experience of non-human animals. Thomas Nagel’s famous question ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ has prompted a variety of answers.52 Nagel’s conclusion, that there is some subjective experience attributable to the bat but that we have no way of knowing what it is, has roused opposition among writers keener than he is on what Adam Smith saw as the imagination’s power to transport us into
another’s perspective. Notable here is the novelist J. M. Coetzee, whose Elizabeth Costello sets herself against Nagel’s ideas and identifies so strongly with the suffering of non-human animals that she is alienated from her human identity. Jonathan Lamb suggests an eighteenth-century parallel to this in Gulliver’s final self-identification as a Houhynhm, but the late eighteenth-century animal narratives do not take this radical leap away from humanity. Their attempts at understanding animal experience have more in common with the phenomenological method of Kenneth J. Shapiro, who counters Nagel by arguing that we can gain valuable insight into a non-human animal’s experience by trying to adopt its perspective and observing the details of its embodied orientation. His description of the importance of place in his pet dog’s experience can be seen as part of a long tradition of empathetic exploration of the world inhabited by companion animals. *Keeper’s Travels in Search of his Master* is its forerunner. Kendall describes his lost and injured dog taking shelter:

> His sufferings increased his weariness, and overcome by their acuteness, he lay down under a hay-rick, and folded up his legs, curling his body round to protect himself from the blast. He would have slept, but the anguish he endured, denied him even a short respite from his sorrows. He lay pondering his condition: and if he anticipated no evils to come, the same ignorance of future events, which men sometimes inconsiderately envy, shut from him the hope of deliverance, from those he already experienced. He did not espy death in the gloomy rear of his disasters, “making night hideous:” but he thought himself confined for ever to his present bleak and unsheltered abode.

The narrative attends to the details of the dog’s posture to suggest the specificity of a dog’s bodily experience, and then moves to analysis of his mental life, revisiting an old saw about animals’ freedom from future fears so as to encourage empathy with a different way of understanding the world. Kendall’s adoption of a canine perspective is limited – throughout the narrative Keeper seems to depend, like humans, very
heavily on visual sensations, and there’s no attempt to render his world in smells – but it is sufficient to prompt reader empathy.

The children’s animal narratives, some to a greater and some to a lesser extent, shared the project of creating animal experience. They attempted an empathetic rendering of life in different kinds of body. To do so, they needed to depict animal minds. Alan Palmer suggests that ‘narrative fiction is, in essence, the presentation of fictional mental functioning’; that is, even where novels are not directly presenting thoughts and feelings they are constructing mental worlds, offering readers the pleasure of imaginative access to others’ minds. The animal stories employed a variety of narrative techniques to create this access. First-person narrative was commonly used. The animal autobiography did not always or necessarily offer insights into the otherness of non-human experience: often the anthropomorphized animal narrator was used to comic effect through his or her expression of all-too-human foibles. But it did sometimes ‘invit[e] the reader to experience life from an animal’s perspective’. The Hare’s breathless, moment-by-moment account of the protagonist’s feelings when in danger applies the techniques of contemporary gothic narratives to animal experience:

The sounds approached still nearer and nearer, but by slow degrees; my agitation was inconceivable: at last they stopped all at once … they seemed to be the steps of a man; I listened again; they had totally ceased. I kept my broad eyes extended upon each side in fixed attention, eager to receive any impression; but the abundance of fern by which I was now surrounded, prevented me from observing so accurately as I wished …. presently I heard a creeping which approached the spot, a sound as if the breath were drawn with difficulty: to my great surprise I discerned the shadow of a man, and was ready to sink into the earth with affright, it stopped, and appeared to hold its arm up in the attitude of striking with a stick, which was grasped in the hand . . .
The close description of the hare’s position, low on the ground with obscured vision, and its characteristic sensory experience – wide angle of vision and acute hearing – work towards the creation of a non-human perspective.

Third-person narrative techniques were also used to create animal minds, most notably by Edward Augustus Kendall, who of all the writers discussed here is the most interested in exploring animals’ difference of view. In *Keeper’s Travels*, he makes extensive use of thought report, a method that, while inviting the reader to feel close to the character’s inner life, makes use of the narrator’s superior awareness to construct a detached perspective on the mind, and to describe mental states of which the characters themselves may not be conscious. Thought report allows for an analysis of psychic life and a representation of non-verbal mental events. The advantage of this technique to a sympathetic naturalist like Kendall is far-reaching: he does not need to make his dog speak a human language in order to give it interiority. In one episode, he explores Keeper’s sensations when he is trapped in the snow:

His murmurs became fainter, and less incessant. His body grew stiff; and the last remaining warmth of life was about to leave him. Even the recollection of his master became indistinct and lifeless, as the view before him had been: but now his eyes were closed. One look, one short and little look, he wished for; and his wildered fancy cheered his expiring moments with the form, and features of his master. He fancied that this friend of his life was endeavouring to rescue him from his misery. He thought that his warm hand was on his neck. He thought that he dug away the perishing snow. The idea became still less distinct: he even thought himself relieved from his misery. He fancied himself in the arms of his master. He was happy. He was insensible. …

In fact, Keeper has been rescued by a passing peasant, and, the narrator explains, ‘[i]t was this reality that had been distorted, by Keeper’s imagination, into a vision of his master’. The use of thought report allows Kendall to create reader empathy with
Keeper’s suffering and to attribute to him the disordered imagination of delirium, all without violating the naturalist’s observation that dogs lack human language. The selection of this episode for the frontispiece illustration to the story suggests that it was expected to be especially appealing to readers (fig 2). In the passage cited earlier, when Keeper is shot and wounded, the narrative mingle's a close physical description calculated to arouse a physiological sympathy in the reader, with detached comment on the difference between dog and human consciousness that emphasizes the need to appreciate the kind of mental suffering specific to the non-human animal, whose ‘ignorance of future events … shut from him the hope of deliverance’. In another passage, where Keeper has a narrow escape from a herd of aggressive oxen, Kendall uses thought report to give a close moment-by-moment account of the dog’s sensations. The dramatic immediacy, the references to the dog’s body, and the confinement of the perspective, much of the time, to sights and feelings awareness of which can be plausibly attributed to a dog, enable a remarkable degree of reader identification with the animal protagonist:

He looked about for a by-way, that might enable him to avoid [the oxen]. It was in vain: summoning, therefore, all his fortitude, he crept, cowering, slouching his ears, and hanging his tail, for they had already left the herbage, and menaced his approach. The humility with which he advanced did not reconcile his opponents. They rushed furiously toward him. They lowered their heads as in the act of butting.

Keeper was now surrounded. Death seemed inevitable. … In this moment of danger, bewildered, and almost terrified to stupefaction; encompassed on every side, and on the point of surrendering without hope, and without capability of resistance, Keeper, as the last effort, made a desperate sortie:
…he leaped on a frozen pool, hoping to cross it, and thus escape his pursuers. Unfortunately, the ice was too slight to bear him. He sunk half way into the water, and was much hurt by the edges of the ice that surrounded him, in his struggles to escape. … he worked his way to another edge of the pool, and leaping over a gate, gained an extensive meadow. He had not time to felicitate himself on his deliverance, before he perceived other cattle coming towards him … Keeper ran: but he presently found himself meeting one who was driving furiously at him. …He perceived a gap which led to an adjoining field… He made toward this, and creeping through it in a moment, fancied himself safe.65

We are invited to feel with Keeper. The short sentences ‘Keeper was now surrounded. Death seemed inevitable’ verge on free indirect discourse, in that they represent in indirect form Keeper’s perceptions, though we need not imagine that he thinks in those (or any) words. Thought report lets us believe that a dog might ‘felicitate himself on his deliverance’ without human language. At the same time it creates ironic distance between narrative and character’s perspective: at the end of this passage Keeper ‘fancied himself safe’, but it soon transpires that he is not: he meets more cattle. Kendall’s dog biography, then, uses the narrative techniques being developed in this period to create a protagonist whose thoughts and sensations readers can both share and regard with a degree of detachment. While I would not claim that Kendall is Austen or that Keeper is Emma, this children’s story does contain in simplified form an Austenian amalgamation of feeling for and ironic awareness of the character’s mental processes. Kendall’s application of these techniques to his canine protagonist marks a significant moment in the history of animal representation. His narrative strategies capture the processes of Smithian sympathy: that close bonding of the sympathizer with a consciousness that yet remains clearly other.

The animal narratives of the end of the eighteenth century are pioneers in the attempt to represent in fiction what it is like to be another animal. In effect, their
readers were invited to occupy in imagination the position of Indur, the hero of one of John Aikin’s tales, who undergoes a series of transmigrations allowing him to experience life in many forms. Indur lives in country of the ‘Brachmans’, and is ‘distinguished, not only for that gentleness of disposition and humanity towards all living creatures, which are so much cultivated among those people, but for an insatiable curiosity respecting the nature and way of life of all animals’. In saving a monkey from a snake, he is fatally bitten himself; but the monkey turns into the potent fairy Perezinda, who allows him a wish concerning his future state of existence: he chooses reincarnation, on these terms: ‘In all my transmigrations may I retain a rational soul, with the memory of the adventures I have gone through; and when death sets me free from one body, may I instantly animate another in the prime of its powers and faculties, without passing through the helpless state of infancy’. This framework allows for an imaginative engagement with the sensations and viewpoint of various animals while accounting for the rational consciousness of the animal subject. In Smithian terms Indur has entered imaginatively into his brother’s sensations, but retained his ability to ‘regard’ the other’s situation ‘with his present reason and judgement’. However, in the detail of his experiences in a series of transmigrations, there are some hints of the movement out of one’s ‘own person and character’ posited in the later part of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. As an antelope, Indur is ‘highly delighted with the ease and rapidity of his motions; and snuffing the keen air of the desart, bounded away, scarcely deigning to touch the ground with his feet’. As a wild goose, ‘With vast delight he sprung forward on easy wing through the immense fields of air, and surveyed beneath him extensive tracts of earth’, and ‘with great pleasure exercised his various powers, of swimming, diving, and flying; sailing round the islands, penetrating into every creek and bay, and visiting
the deepest recesses of the woods’. As a whale, ‘[w]hen he opened his immense jaws, he drew in a flood of brine, which, on rising to the surface, he spouted out again in a rushing fountain that rose high in the air with the noise of a mighty cataract. All the other inhabitants of the ocean seemed as nothing to him’. Late eighteenth-century animal narratives may have inculcated the duties of human morality, but they also offered their readers the pleasures of animal empathy. Shifting between trying to imagine animal experience as animal, and offering human analysis of animal minds, they brought the resources of eighteenth-century philosophy and narrative to a problem that has been defined in the twenty-first century as ‘the impossible necessity of giving voice to the interests of [other] animals’.


3 [Dorothy Kilner], *The Life and Perambulations of a Mouse* [1783] (London: John Marshall, 1790); Sarah Trimmer, *Fabulous Histories. Designed for the instruction of children, respecting their treatment of animals* (London: T. Longman, and G.G.J. and J. Robinson; and J. Johnson, 1786). It was reprinted many times through the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, sometimes as *The History of the Robins*.


5 *Evenings at Home; or, the Juvenile Budget Opened*, 6 vols. (London: J. Johnson, 1792—8). The stories named here all appear in the first volume, published 1792.

6 The *Hare: Or, Hunting incompatible with Humanity. Written as a stimulus to youth towards a proper treatment of animals* (London: Vernor and Hood, 1799); *Memoirs of Dick, the little poney, supposed to have been written by himself* (London: J.Walker and E. Newbery, 1800), originally serialised in volumes 1 and 2 of *The Young Gentleman’s and Lady’s Magazine* (London, 1799-1800). The author of *Dick, the little poney* followed it with *Bob, the Spotted Terrier; or, Memoirs of the Dog of Knowledge. Supposed to be written by himself* [1801][London: Printed for Whittingham and Arliss, Juvenile Library, Paternoster Row, n.d.). See also Mary Pilkington, *Marvellous Adventures; or, The Vicissitudes of a Cat* (London: Vernor and Hood, and J. Harris, 1802), and the anonymous *Felissa: or,
the Life and Opinions of a Kitten of Sentiment (London: J. Harris, 1811). Pompey the Little was revised for children as Little Juba; or, the Adventures and Vicissitudes of a Lap Dog (London: J. Harris, 1807).


9 Andrew O’Malley, The Making of the Modern Child: Children’s Literature and Childhood in the Late Eighteenth Century (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 11. For O’Malley’s discussion of children’s literature as part of the project of creating middle-class hegemony see 4—11.


13 Fabulous Histories, x.

14 Fabulous Histories, 14–15.

15 Memoirs of Dick, the little poney, 148—9.

16 Frank Palmeri, ‘The Autocritique of Fables’, in Humans and Other Animals in Eighteenth-Century Culture: Representation, Hybridity, Ethics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 83—100: 83. One of Palmeri’s examples is the fable of the wolf condemned by shepherds for eating sheep, who points out their hypocrisy – they eat sheep too. In Aesop and in La Fontaine’s later version, this story ‘short-circuits most of the conventional workings of fable’: the animal’s critique of human hypocrisy about animals stands in itself, and does not have to be read as a substitute for something else (86).

17 Memoirs of Dick, the little poney, 47; The Hare, 135.

18 Louise E. Robbins, Elephant Slaves and Pampered Parrots: Exotic Animals in Eighteenth-Century Paris (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 160. Robbins discusses the persistence within eighteenth-century natural history of moral lessons based on attaching values to animal characteristics such as dogs’ ‘loyalty or wolves’ ‘violence (179—83), and considers Buffon as creating a new form of ‘naturalistic fable’ (182).

19 Cosslett, Talking Animals, 1.

20 Fabulous Histories, xi.

21 The Canary Bird, 49.

22 The Swallow, xv—xvi. The quotation is from Pope’s Essay on Man Epistle II: ‘Ev’n mean self-love becomes, by force divine, / The scale to measure others’ wants by thine’ (ll. 274-275).


25 For a discussion of Renaissance and eighteenth-century theriophily see Rod Preece, Brute Souls, Happy Beast and Evolution: The Historical Status of Animals (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2005), 233—270. The contrast between theriophilic satire and the later animal narratives should not be too starkly understood: Preece argues that while Montaigne’s theriophilic satire is ‘written as much as to denigrate human hubris as to elevate the status of animals’ (252), he does seriously advocate ‘greater respect for the animals as the beings that they are’ (250).


Eighteenth-century views of physical sympathy are very close to the communication of emotion analysed by psychologists today: see Elaine Hatfield, John T. Cacioppo and Richard L. Rapson, Emotional Contagion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). The difference between Hume and Smith as to the location of sympathy (as somatic response or as mental act) is replicated in current discussions of empathy. As in the eighteenth century, those considering empathy as a physical response (contagious empathy) are more likely to attribute it to non-human animals than those considering it a function of high-level mental activity (cognitive empathy). For an overview of different views, and an argument for the ‘Perception-Action Model’ of empathy, which among other things allows for links between contagious and cognitive forms, see Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B. M. de Waal, ‘Empathy: Its Ultimate and proximate bases’, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 25 (2002), 1—72 (incorporating open peer commentary and authors’ response).


Hume, Treatise, Book II Part II Section II.


Markman Ellis, The Politics of Sensibility: Clara Reeve, The Progress of Romance (Colchester, 1785), I, 111.


The Life and Perambulations of a Mouse, I, 45. The father’s moral that to give pain ‘to any living creature is wicked’ does not, however, extend to a parents’ treatment of a child: the anti-cruelty lesson is enforced here with a severe whipping, 47.

Life and Perambulations, I, 34.

Life and Perambulations, I, 37—8, 38.

See eg., The Times, Friday December 21, 1798. The wording also appeared in notices of Newbery’s new publications inserted at the back of his other published volumes. It was derived from the title-page of the Pratt anthology: Pity’s Gift: A Collection of Interesting Tales, to excite the compassion of youth for the animal creation. Ornamented with vignettes. From the writings of Mr. Pratt. Selected by a Lady (London: T. Longman and E. Newbery, 1798).

The verse appears on the title-page of The Rational Brutes; or, Talking Animals. By M. Pelham [Dorothy Kilner] (London: Vernor and Hood, 1799).

The Crested Wren, 152.

See Suzanne Keen, Empathy and the Novel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Keen defines the hypothesis, held by many psychologists, as ‘empathic emotion motivates altruistic action’, and examines the common view that reading fiction encourages altruism through training emotional responsiveness, an ‘attractive and consoling case’ that she finds ‘inconclusive at best and nearly always exaggerated’ (vii).


For this view see Marcus Wood, Slavery, Empathy and Pornography (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). See also Karen Halttunen, ‘Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture’, The American Historical Review 100/2 (April, 1995), 303—34.

Pity’s Gift, 100, 101, 106.


Wollstonecraft, Original Stories, 327.

Keen, Empathy, 5. The term empathy dates from the early twentieth-century and derives from German Einfühlung: see Keen, 4. In the eighteenth century the term sympathy is used for both kinds of feeling.

Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, 10.

Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, 496.
Keen’s proposals about narrative empathy are explored throughout Empathy and summarized in an appendix, 169—71.

52 Thomas Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 165—80.


55 Kenneth J. Shapiro, ‘A Phenomenological Approach to the Study of Nonhuman Animals’, in Mitxhell, Thompson and Miles, eds, Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, 277—95. Shapiro defines his approach as ‘an empirical phenomenological method designed for the investigation of nonhuman animals. It keys on an investigatory posture of bodily sensibility adopted to promote empathic access to the meaning implicit in an animal’s postures, gestures, and behavior’ (292). For a discussion of the philosophical problems involved in the idea of gaining insight into non-human mind, see John Dupre, Humans and Other Animals (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002). Dupre considers access to non-human mind difficult but in principle open to empirical investigation (234—5).

56 Keeper’s Travels, 39—40.


58 See, for example, the motif of the animal protagonist’s pride in its illustrious ancestry, derived from the mock-heroic account of the hero in Pompey the Little and found in Bob, the Spotted Terrier, 3—6, and Felissa, or the Life and Opinions of a Kitten of Sentiment, 2—3.

59 Cosslett, Talking Animals, 5.

60 The Hare, 10—12.

61 On thought report see Palmer, Fictional Minds, 76—80. See also Dorrit Cohn, Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 11—14, where the term used for the same technique is psycho-narration.

62 Keeper’s Travels, 135—6.

63 Keeper’s Travels, 137.

64 Keeper’s Travels, 39—40.

65 Keeper’s Travels, 81—5.


68 ‘Transmigrations’, 5.

69 ‘Transmigrations’, 8, 9.
