ON GILLIAN ROSE’S CRITICAL PROJECT,
AND HOW IT CAN BE READ CONSTRUCTIVELY IN
CONJUNCTION WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT’S METHOD
OF GENEALOGICAL PROBLEMATISATION

Submitted by Stephen Noon to the University of Exeter
as a thesis for the degree of
Masters by Research in Theology
in September 2019

This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no
quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that any material
that has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University
has been acknowledged.
ABSTRACT

In this thesis I will argue that the critical project of Gillian Rose can be read constructively in conjunction with Michel Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation. Commentators have tended to present Rose’s critical project as entailing a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. This way of presenting Rose’s critical project, while not strictly unfounded, has raised, and continues to raise, a number of unfortunate and unnecessary borders between Rose's thought and that of many of her contemporaries.

In contrast to the way commentators have tended to present Rose’s critical project, I will present it as entailing, not a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”, but a specific challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. By approaching Rose’s critical project in this specific way, I aim to afford an alternative reading of it – that is, a reading in which Rose's critical project can be, in part, clarified and supported by Foucault's method of genealogical problematisation.

My hope is that by affording this alternative reading I will open Rose’s critical project up to influence, and be influenced by, number of contemporary debates surrounding the practice of criticism. Specifically, the debates surrounding the relationship between criticism and normativity, debates in which Foucault’s method of genealogy continues to play a vital part.
CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

INTRODUCTION
0.1. INTRODUCTION 5
0.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 12
0.3. ARGUMENT / CONTRIBUTION / METHODOLOGY 28
0.4. CHAPTER OUTLINES 44

CHAPTER ONE: ON ROSE’S RENEWAL AND FOUCAULT’S TRANSFORMATION OF CRITICAL THOUGHT
1.1. INTRODUCTION 49
1.2. WHAT IS ROSE’S RENEWAL OF CRITICAL THOUGHT? 51
1.3. WHAT IS FOUCAULT’S TRANSFORMATION OF CRITICAL THOUGHT? 86
1.4. CAN ROSE’S RENEWAL AND FOUCAULT’S TRANSFORMATION OF CRITICAL THOUGHT BE COMPARED? 96
1.5. CONCLUSION 103

CHAPTER TWO: ON THE MISGUIDEDNESS AND RESOURCEFULNESS OF ROSE’S CHALLENGE TO FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY
2.1. INTRODUCTION 105
2.2. WHAT IS ROSE’S CHALLENGE TO FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY? 108
2.3. DEFENDING FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY AGAINST ROSE’S CHALLENGE 127
2.4. ASSESSING ROSE’S CHALLENGE TO FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY 142
2.5. CONCLUSION 145

CHAPTER THREE: ON READING ROSE’S CRITICAL PROJECT CONSTRUCTIVELY IN CONJUNCTION WITH FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGICAL PROBLEMATISATION
3.1. INTRODUCTION 147
3.2. IS ROSE’S CRITICAL PROJECT UNCLEAR? 149
3.3. CAN FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY CLARIFY ROSE’S CRITICAL PROJECT? 173
3.4. CONCLUSION 198

CONCLUSION 200

BIBLIOGRAPHY 205
Difficult friend, I would have preferred
You to them.¹

Look out for dread it’s your red
letter speciality, bunk of delirium day-trading. ‘External causes
are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of
change, and external causes become operative through internal causes.’
Mourning does become the law but not this one, to be is not to
become or at fault with moment practice was what can I say I saw,
darker than ever dark to be.²


² Prynne, J. H., *Kazoo Dreamboats; or, On What There Is*, in Prynne, J. H., *Poems* (Glasgow: Bloodaxe, 2015), 642. See also Prynne’s introduction to a seminar at the University of Sussex (a recording of which is available at: https://www.archiveofthenow.org/authors/?i=77&f=922#922). During this introduction Prynne speaks about reading at Rose’s funeral – saying, specifically: “I had a very brief, but remarkable and incandescent, friendship with [Rose], and when I was asked to read at her memorial service I had in my hand a copy of a book she had owned, and in which she had made markings in the margins – and I read at that occasion the passages in that book that she had marked in her own hand not more than a month before.”
INTRODUCTION

0.1. INTRODUCTION

Argument

In this thesis I will argue that the critical project of Gillian Rose can be read constructively in conjunction with Michel Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation. Commentators have tended to present Rose’s critical project as entailing a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. This

---

3 Throughout this thesis “genealogy” will be taken to denote Foucault’s method of criticism – specifically, a method of problematisation. About the term “problematisation” Colin Koopman has helpfully clarified it as playing, within the context of Foucault’s work, a dual role. See Koopman, Colin, ‘Problematisation’, in The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, edited by Leonard Lawlor and John Nale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 400: “In its first role, problematisation is a form of analytic activity, or a modality of philosophic inquiry. In this sense, “problematisation” is a verb. It denotes something that the inquirer does. [. . .] If Foucault problematised, it was because something was already in some way problematic, and yet not coherently or sensibly so. If problematisation in the first sense is a mode of the activity of inquiry, then problematisation in the second sense is the object of inquiry corollary to such activity. In this sense, “problematisation” is a noun, referring to that bundle of problematic material that we find problematic, about which we feel anxious, and over which we tend to obsess, both as individuals and at the more general level of society and culture. One way of summarising Foucault’s notion of problematisation in its two senses is to see acts of problematisation as giving coherence to the extant problematisation that is the object on which the act operates. The activity of problematisation renders an object of problematisation more coherent – but also more challenging.” Accordingly, to say that genealogy is a method of problematisation is to say that it affords the resources (i.e. the empirical / historical insights) through which the act of problematising extant problems can be achieved.

way of presenting Rose’s critical project, while not strictly unfounded (for Rose also presents her critical project in contrast to the critical projects of “postmodernity”), raises a number of unfortunate and unnecessary borders between her thought and that of many of her contemporaries. In contrast to the way commentators have tended to present Rose’s critical project, I will present it as entailing not a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” but a specific challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. By approaching Rose’s critical project in this specific way, I aim to afford an alternative reading – that is, a reading in which Rose’s critical project can be, in part, clarified and supported by Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation.

**What is Rose’s critical project?**

The critical project of Gillian Rose has at its centre a concern with the “renewal of critical thought.” The aim of this renewal is, centrally, to formulate a practice of criticism through which we can recognise, and work through, what Rose construes as the “difficulty” of reason. For Rose, this difficulty follows from reason being, in its actuality, always both unavoidable and partial – unavoidable

---


6 See esp. Rose, Gillian, *Hegel Contra Sociology* (London: Verso, 2009), preface for 1995 reprint. See also Gillian Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 211-212. Here, Rose makes reference to a "reformed Kriticismus", by which she means, specifically, Kant’s practice of criticism. I take this to be important because it suggests that Rose’s practice of criticism is a renewal of Kant’s practice of criticism – a renewal largely informed by Rose’s reading of Hegel. See section 3.2. below.


because concepts are integral to our attempts at understanding our relations to others and to ourselves,\(^9\) partial because the concepts we employ when attempting to understand these relations will, because of these relations, always entail “gaps”, “silences”, “surprises” and “misunderstandings”.\(^{10}\) For Rose, it is crucial that we recognise, and work through, the difficulty of reason – rather than “disown” or “demonise” reason on account of its difficulty\(^{11}\) – because it is through this recognition, and through this work, that we are able to, in Rose’s words: “resume reflexively what we always do: to know, to misknow and yet to grow.”\(^{12}\)

**What is the context of Rose's critical project?**

Rose’s critical project touches upon a number of different debates.\(^{13}\) Her concern with the renewal of critical thought, specifically, is best construed as a concern with negotiating between what she, writing during the late seventies into the early

---


12 Rose, Gillian, *The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 310 and ‘Shadow of Spirit’, 48-49. See also Rose, *Love’s Work*, 127-128. Or, more fully, see *The Broken Middle*, 88: This oscillation in anxiety is the education of existence which, therefore, is not prior to concept, institution, or ethic, but is the existential failing towards and away from the middle itself, for ‘education’ is the experience of concept, institution, law.”

13 See Brower Latz, *The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose*, 6: “[Rose] made interventions into many fields, including German idealism, the Frankfurt School, Marxism, postmodernism and poststructuralism, sociology, Christian theology, Jewish theology and philosophy, Holocaust studies, architecture and jurisprudence, and offered original readings of many figures including Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Arendt, Luxemburg, Varnhagen, Girard, Mann and Kafka.”
nineties,\textsuperscript{14} saw as the two predominating approaches to reason: rationalism and nihilism.\textsuperscript{15} Rose writes:

“[E]nlightenment rationalism” means the modern authority of unaided human reason, the ability of humanity to achieve unlimited progress and perfection; “postmodern [nihilism]” renounces the modern commitment to reason in view of its negative outcome — the destructive potentiality of science, the persistence of wars and holocausts. It proposes pluralism, localism and reservation as principles, when it has abandoned principles.”\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} Rose died in Coventry on 9th December 1995, aged forty-eight, after a two-year struggle with ovarian cancer.

\textsuperscript{15} It is an open question whether these approaches to reason continue to predominate. For a recent and critical account of the predominance of the former of these two approaches see e.g. Geuss, Raymond, \textit{Reality and Its Dreams} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), vii-x.

\textsuperscript{16} Rose, \textit{Love's Work}, 124-125. To render the terminology of this passage consistent with the terminology of my argument, I have replaced Rose’s use of “relativism” with “nihilism”. I should also add, to be precise, in addition to the two approaches to reason that are mentioned here, Rose also references a third approach — that is, “revealed religion”. Within this thesis, there is neither the need or space to consider Rose’s complicated references to “religion” in detail. That said, it is this aspect of Rose’s work that has proved (rightly or wrongly) the most influential. For an introduction to this aspect of Rose’s work see Shanks, \textit{Against Innocence}. See also Jay, Martin, ‘Force Fields,’ \textit{Salmagundi} 113 (1997), 41-52. In this essay, and in the light of Rose’s decision to convert to Anglicanism on her deathbed, “it is”, Jay writes, “now possible to reread her last works as containing, at least between the lines, an anticipation of her [conversion].” (42) As to why Rose decided to convert to Anglicanism, Jay offers the following suggestions: “Rose’s decision to turn to Anglicanism, not just any version of Christianity, should also be seen as of a piece with her larger intellectual project (as well, I have been told, as an echo of a choice her mother had also made some years before). Conversion to a more universalist creed like Roman Catholicism might be understood as implying an embrace of an abstraction, hovering above the world, while accepting the evangelical imperative to be born again through faith in scriptural truth could be read as seeking a kind of ahistorical immediacy. The Church of England can be more easily understood as a particular, concrete historical instantiation of the divine intervention in the world. As the Tractarian Movement at Oxford in the 1830’s had stressed, the Church, even after its break with Rome, should still be seen as an apostolic succession, a Divine Society that progressively realised revelation in its own institutional history. For a Hegelian hopeful of realising reason over time in the ethical life of community, Anglicanism would thus have an obvious appeal. For a believer in healing the diremption between public and private, a state church with little patience for the world-denying inwardness of other versions of Protestantism would also be especially attractive. For an adherent of the
For Rose, in spite of being seemingly antithetical, these two approaches to reason, and their allied critical projects, are, at base, similar. They are similar in that, through their respective overstatements of universality and particularity, they both betray a misrepresentation of the actuality of reason — an actuality in which the justice we seek to achieve with our concepts is always at risk of becoming unjust. Accordingly, these two approaches to reason result in the disempowerment of criticism — which, for Rose, is the practice through which we come to recognise, not only the ways in which reason is structured, but also the ways in which it is reconstructable. Rose writes:

---

17 See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 5. This use of “unjust” can be construed both epistemologically and ethically. To say that a concept does an injustice to its object is to say that, in using that concept, we fail to completely conceive that object. This is an epistemological construal. An ethical construal involves recognising that such failures have implications in how we think about our relationships with ourselves and with others. Central to Rose’s critical project is the contention that the relationship between ethics and epistemology is one that does not admit of rigorous distinctions. Rose’s commitment to the idea that concepts can be “unjust” (a commitment I infer from her continued appeals to the concepts “identity” and “non-identity”) is, as will be explained (see section 1.2.) one of the central respects in which she, following Adorno, distinguishes herself from Kant’s critical project. For more on how Adorno’s commitment to identity and non-identity (a commitment that I take to be comparable to Rose’s) involves a departure from Kantian epistemology see Freyenhagen, Fabian, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy: Living Less Wrongly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 43 n47.

18 See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 5: “To promise anything else, any new righteousness which will not be subject of and subject to the difficulty of actuality, which will never become unjust, is to disempower.
To destroy philosophy, to abolish or to supersede critical, self-conscious reason, would leave us resourceless to know the difference between fantasy and actuality, to discern the distortion between ideas and their realisation. It would prevent the process of learning, the corrigibility of experience. This ill-will towards philosophy misunderstands the authority of reason, which is not the mirror of the dogma of superstition, but risk. Reason, the critical criterion, is for ever without ground.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{What is Rose’s challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”?}

For Rose, the critical projects of “postmodernity” involve replacing one mistake with another.\textsuperscript{20} To disown reason in consequence of the perceived failures of a universal, authoritative account of reason to capture, and be changed by, the particulars of experience is, she argues, to continue the mistaken assumption that reason is “necessarily and incorrigibly exclusive.”\textsuperscript{21} For Rose, it is the continuation of this assumption that impedes the potential for critical thought to recognise the actual structure of reason, which, in consequence, impedes the

\textsuperscript{19} Reasons that is actual is ready for all kinds of surprises, for what cannot be anticipated, precisely because of the interference of meanings which are structured and reconstructable.” Throughout this thesis, I will be using the terms “reconstructed” and “reconfigured” (both of which are used by Rose) interchangeably.

\textsuperscript{20} See Rose, \textit{Judaism and Modernity}, 3. Rose will also employ the concept “poststructuralism”, but less so than she does the concept “postmodernism”. So far as I can tell, Rose uses these concepts interchangeably.

\textsuperscript{21} See Rose, \textit{Judaism and Modernity}, 3.
potential for critical thought to recognise the ways in which reason could actually be restructured.\(^{22}\)

What, however, are the critical projects of “postmodernity” to which Rose refers? Referencing only her works, they are the critical projects of Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault.\(^{23}\) Given this answer, the question then becomes as it became for one of Rose’s early reviewers: can one “critique” be directed at such a diverse ensemble?\(^{24}\) For Rose, it can. This conviction is repeated by a number of her commentators – commentators that consider her challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” to be “one of the great achievements” of her critical project.\(^{25}\) Consequently, these commentators have, following Rose’s own presentations, sought to present the value her critical project by contrasting it with and opposite it to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. However, in doing so, these commentators continue Rose’s, if not mistaken, then questionable assumption that “postmodernity” refers to a coherent approach to reason, that can be, in consequence, coherently challenged by her critical project.

\(^{22}\) Within this thesis I will be concerned less with the reconstructions of reason, and more with how Rose and Foucault construe criticism as playing a constitutive part in the recognition that reason is reconstructable.


\(^{25}\) See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 4.
It is this way of reading Rose’s critical project – that is, reading it as entailing a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” – that I aim, in this thesis, to contest. It is my contention that, in order to accurately account for Rose’s challenge to the “postmodern” approaches to reason, it is necessary to focus, not on her general challenge to the critical project of “postmodernity”, but on the specific challenges that comprise this general challenge.26 In this thesis, I will focus on Rose’s specific challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy.27 It will be on the basis of such specificity that I will aim to afford an alternative reading of Rose’s critical project – that is, a reading of Rose’s critical project as being, not opposed to Foucault’s method of genealogy, but as open to being read constructively in conjunction with it. To develop this contention, I will now turn to consider, in more detail, the ways in which commentators have construed the relationship between Rose’s critical project and the critical projects of “postmodernity”.

0.2. LITERATURE REVIEW

What is the aim of this section?


27 See Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, Chapter 9: Legalism and Power: Foucault.
The aim of this section is to review the secondary literature on Rose – specifically, the ways in which commentators have construed the relationship between Rose’s critical project and her challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. Following this literature review, I will argue that the ways in which commentators have construed this relationship are both helpful and unhelpful. They are helpful in that they clarify what is original and resourceful within Rose’s critical project, in contrast with the critical projects of “postmodernity”. They are unhelpful, however, in that they construe this contrast in general terms – that is, in terms of “postmodernity”. Employing the general concept “postmodernity” to describe the critical projects with which Rose’s critical project contrasts is unhelpful in that it resists engaging critically with Rose’s challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”, thereby, to repeat, perpetuating the “unfortunate and unnecessary borders [. . .] between Rose's thought and that of many of her contemporaries”.

28

It is on account of this unhelpful aspect that I take the argument of this thesis to make an original contribution to the secondary literature on Rose. As will be explained, central to this contribution is a shift away from construing Rose’s critical project in contrast with the critical projects of “postmodernity”, in general, towards construing it in contrast with Foucault’s method of genealogy, in particular. Through such specificity, I aim to call in to question some of the “unfortunate and unnecessary borders [. . .] between Rose's thought and that of many of her contemporaries” – that is, I aim to argue that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s practice of genealogy. Accordingly, within this literature review, I will follow the ways in which

commentators employ the general concept of “postmodernity” to describe the critical projects with which Rose’s critical project contrasts.

**Qualifications**

Although the secondary literature on Rose is still relatively small, it is large enough for me to have to make a decision about the commentators on which I will focus within this literature review.\(^{29}\) Since the overarching argument of this thesis concerns, centrally, the relationship between Rose’s critical project and her challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” – or, to be specific, her challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy – I have decided to focus only on the commentators that have, to varying degrees and for different reasons addressed this relationship – that is, Rowan Williams, Vincent Lloyd, Kate Schick.\(^{30}\) As will become evident within this review, while these commentators each approach Rose’s critical project with a different agenda, their presentations of her critical project each betray a similar structure. The structure being that they each present the importance of Rose’s critical project by way of the challenge it entails to the critical projects of “postmodernity”, and present this entailed challenge as a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. This structure will inform the argument of this thesis both positively and negatively. Positively in that I will also seek to present the importance of Rose’s critical project by way of the challenge it entails to the critical projects of “postmodernity”.

---

\(^{29}\) For a comprehensive bibliography of the work both by and on Rose, see Brower Latz, *The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose*, 224-256.

\(^{30}\) I here list these commentators in the order in which they will be reviewed – that is, chronologically. Although there is some overlap between them – which is inevitable given how little has been written about Rose – no argumentative weight should be given to this ordering.
Negatively in that I will not seek to present this entailed challenge as a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. Rather, as I have mentioned, I will seek to present this challenge as a specific challenge to Foucault’s critical project.

Additionally, although I have mentioned that I take the ways in which Rose and her commentators use the concept “postmodern” to work on questionable assumptions, I will continue to use it within this literature review. I do so for two reasons. First, because it is this concept that is used with the works that will be reviewed. Second, it is this aspect of the secondary literature that I aim to, within the argument of this thesis, correct. In other words, I will continue to use the concept “postmodern” within this literature review because it will be with reference to this use that I will, following this review, state the respect in which I take the argument of this thesis to make an original contribution to the secondary literature on Rose.

*Rowan Williams*\(^{31}\)

For Williams, Rose’s practice of criticism affords, centrally, a way of reading (i.e. recognising) “reality” or “actuality” as “difficult”\(^{32}\) – which, in turn, affords the resources for “discovering what it might be to exercise a *historical* freedom, a

---

\(^{31}\) Rowan Williams is a theologian – a theologian that has written widely on Arius, Teresa of Avila, Sergei Bulgakov, Dostoyevsky, Hegel, Vladimir Lossky, Wittgenstein. In this brief review, I will be focusing on his essay *Between Politics and Metaphysics* because, as I mentioned, it is within this essay that Williams explicitly accounts for Rose’s general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. See also Williams, Rowan, ‘Logic and Spirit in Hegel’, in *Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology*, edited by Phillip Blond (London: Routledge, 1998), 116-130, Williams, Rowan, “The Sadness of the King”: Gillian Rose, Hegel, and the Pathos of Reason’, *Telos* 173 (2015), 21-36.

\(^{32}\) See Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 3.
determination within constraints of how my and our life is to be shaped.” Rose’s practice of criticism does this, for Williams, through recognising both the unavoidability and partiality of “metaphysics” – that is, “the project of speaking with generality about the real or actual.” For Williams, the importance of this twofold recognition follows from, in his words, “[the] inescapable issue in the speech that is actually employed by material and temporal subjects that has to do with how what is said is appropriated, how it sustains intelligibility in the exchanges and negotiations that constitute our actuality.” This, for Williams, “is where the difficulty [of the real or actual] lies.”

For Williams, Rose’s practice of criticism contrasts, centrally, with the critical projects of “postmodernity” – critical projects that, in Williams’s words, “fail to read ‘reality’ or ‘actuality’ as difficult.” This failure, for Williams (thinking in the light of what Rose thought), is bound up with the contention that “metaphysics” inevitably results in positions (e.g. senses of “what is” and “what ought to be”) that “arrest the process of exchange” through which we learn about ourselves and others. For Williams, this belief implies a failure to read reality or actuality as difficult in the sense that fails to recognise that “there are issues of power wherever there are questions of proscription, and an intellectual style that declines to engage with matters of legitimacy, or even truthfulness, if we want to be primitive, is making a strong political bid. It rules out the question of judgement (in various

---

senses of the word); and in so doing rules out what we could call the question of recognition and thus of internal critique.”  Here Williams is restating Rose’s argument the critical projects of “postmodernity” are, in the end, “viciously circular”. Through their respective attempts at avoiding the generalities of metaphysics, the critical projects of “postmodernity” are required to make general claims.

For Williams, Rose’s practice of criticism contrasts with the critical projects of “postmodernity”, centrally, through recognising the “importance of error and the recognisability of error.” Recognise error is important for Rose because, in Williams words, “[t]o recognise is to learn; to learn is to reimagine or reconceive the self [. . .].” For Williams, Rose recognises the importance of error on account of her reading of Hegel’s idea of “phenomenology”. For Williams, “To read the Phenomenology adequately we have to enter upon a process that will show us that we have not yet understood the nature of thinking; thinking the thoughts of the Phenomenology is discovering the ways in which ‘natural consciousness’ repeatedly undermines itself and by so doing advances — not towards a conclusive theoretical reconciliation, but towards a practice of scepticism that, so far from inducing despair or withdrawal or apathy, empowers us to attempt transformative action in the clear recognition that any liberation from the

40 See Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 90-91. For my account of this aspect of Rose’s challenge, see section 2.2. below.
41 See also Caygill, ‘The Broken Hegel’, 24.
distortions of 'natural' thinking is a necessary step to the removal of those social relations that reflect and intensify untruthful consciousness."  

Vincent Lloyd

For Lloyd, Rose’s critical project affords, centrally, a way of resisting what he refers to as the “enchantment of critical reflection on the ordinary.” To understand what Lloyd means by this, it is necessary to understand, first, what he means by the “enchantment of the ordinary.” For Lloyd, the ordinary becomes enchanted when certain ways of thinking and acting are taken to be authoritative by certain people. Such “enchantment” – that is, the process through which ideas and acts are taken to be authoritative – provides such ideas and acts with a “normative force.” On this account, to be “enchanted” by the ordinary is to take certain ways of thinking and acting as ways we should think and act.

---

47 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2.
49 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 1: “The ordinary is seductive: it is enchanted, and we ourselves have a role in the magic. ‘We are the People, history is our Story, this land is our World.’”
50 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 1.
For Lloyd (thinking in the light of what Rose thought), “[w]hat is [dangerous] is not the enchantment of the ordinary but the enchantment of philosophy, the enchantment of critical reflection on the ordinary.” Lloyd recognises that normativity pervades our lives. What is dangerous, on his account, is when critical reflection regurgitates rather than interrogates the such normativity. “When this occurs, philosophy becomes [critically] impotent” – that is, impotent within the task of continually calling into question our ideas and acts that are taken to be authoritative. “This alliance of philosophy, sociology, legal theory, and conventional wisdom had devastating effects. Mass death and humiliation in colonialism, the World Wars, and genocide shook confidence in reason in the same way that reason had once shaken confidence in pre-modern enchantment.”

For Lloyd, one of the “great achievements” of Rose’s critical project is that it demonstrates how the critical projects of “postmodernity” are examples of the enchantment of critical reflection. They are examples in that they employ certain

51 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2. I have replaced “troublesome” with “dangerous”.
52 See O’Neill, ‘Introduction’ in Korsgaard, Christine, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xi: “Normativity pervades our lives. We not merely have beliefs: we claim that we and others ought to hold certain beliefs. We not merely have desires: we claim that we and others ought to act on some of them, but not on others. We assume that what somebody believes or does may be judged reasonable or unreasonable, right or wrong, good or bad, that it is answerable to standards or norms.”
53 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2. See also Raymond Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’, in Outside Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 159: “In contemporary philosophical discussion the concept of normativity (along with the now almost automatically raised question concerning the “normative implications” of every theoretical proposal) is surely the most important “self-evident” notion that must be put in question.”
55 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 3.
56 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 4.
concepts to criticise the ordinary world without subjecting these concepts to critique.\textsuperscript{57} For Lloyd, Rose demonstrates this through demonstrating that the critical projects of “postmodernity” work on the basis of Kant’s “strict separation of transcendental register from empirical world”\textsuperscript{58} – where the “content of the transcendental register is merely an elevated, sanctified aspect of the ordinary world.”\textsuperscript{59} The critical projects of “postmodernity” “ostensibly reject the transcendental register (‘metaphysics’), yet they make use of it all the same.”\textsuperscript{60} This “dialectic” results in critical projects that are impotent in the manner described above – that is, impotent within the task of continually calling into question our ideas and acts that are taken to be authoritative.

To repeat, for Lloyd, Rose’s critical project affords, centrally, a way of resisting what he refers to as the “enchantment of critical reflection on the ordinary” – that is, affords a way of resisting what renders critical thought impotent. It does this by way of what Lloyd refers to as an “immodest jurisprudence”\textsuperscript{61} – that is, a way of thinking about “law” that “does not confine itself to the courtroom,”\textsuperscript{62} but rather construes all ideas and acts as “individuated social norms”\textsuperscript{63} The aim of such an “immodest jurisprudence” is to overcome the strict distinction between the transcendental register and the empirical world. “To be able to talk about the social world in terms of law, to say that we do what we do because we are following a law, would be reassuring but not enchanting. It would help make

\textsuperscript{57} Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 4: “will to power (for Nietzsche), Being (for Heidegger), the virtual (for Deleuze), différance (for Derrida), and power (for Foucault).”
\textsuperscript{58} Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 3.
\textsuperscript{59} Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 3.
\textsuperscript{60} Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 4.
\textsuperscript{61} See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 19-28.
\textsuperscript{62} Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 24.
\textsuperscript{63} Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 5.
sense of our normative vocabulary (better: our normative phenomenology, the feeling that some actions are correct and others incorrect) and it would give us a way of talking about disquietude. Laws can be arbitrary and unfair; indeed, they always are. But laws are also debatable and revisable. Decisions made by a court can be appealed. Courts can make systematic errors, getting laws wrong. In short, the jurisprudential idiom offers bountiful resources for critical reflection on the ordinary.”

“This task [of criticism] can be accomplished only when philosophy understands itself as the study of law, of individuated social norms. The only way for philosophy to refuse to be [enchanted by the ordinary] is for philosophy to understand itself as jurisprudence.”

“It is only by understanding philosophy as jurisprudence that we can see the ordinary as it is, translucent. Law always gets it wrong; we proceed with faith but without hope that justice will be done.”

Kate Schick

For Schick, Rose’s critical project affords, centrally, a way of taking the political seriously. Taking the political seriously involves, in Schick’s words, “emphasising the need to work towards greater comprehension of socio-political

64 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 6.
65 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 5.
66 Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2. For more on what Lloyd refers to as the “necessary failures” of “norms” see Lloyd, The Problem with Grace, 211-219. See also Lloyd, ‘The Secular Faith of Gillian Rose’.
67 Kate Schick is a Lecturer in International Relations. In conjunction with her work on Rose, Schick has worked, and continues to work on issue that relate to pedagogy, recognition and vulnerability as they relate to international political theory. In this review I will be focusing on her book Gillian Rose: A Good Enough Justice. See also ‘Re-cognizing Recognition: Gillian Rose’s “Radical Hegel” and Vulnerable Recognition’, Telos 173 (Winter 2015), 87-105; Schick, Kate, Trauma and the Ethical in International Relations (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2008).
68 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 17.
realities, to see how we are implicated in the challenges we face and to take the risk of acting politically.”

Accordingly, for Schick, Rose’s critical project is important because it affords a way of retaining the possibility of political transformation – that is, the work of coming to know and risking political action in the hope that we might instantiate what Rose refers to as “a good enough justice”.

Schick construes Rose’s critical project as contrasting, centrally, with the critical projects of “Enlightenment” and “postmodernity”. According to Schick: “Rose argues that both Enlightenment and postmodern thought fall into neo-Kantian dualisms that reinforce the diremption of modern thought and practice.” Rose’s concept of “diremption”, to which Schick here refers, is, for Schick, used by Rose to refer to the “brokenness between universal and particular, law and ethics, actuality and potentiality” – a brokenness that, in Rose’s words, “draws attention to the trauma of separation of that which was, however, as in marriage, not originally united.” As Schick emphasises, such diremption (or such brokenness) is a fundamental feature of both modern social and political theory and of actual social and political life: “the dualisms pervasive in modern thought reflect the underlying antagonisms of social and political relations.”

---

69 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 17.
71 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6.
72 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 5.
73 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6. See Rose, The Broken Middle, 236.
74 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6. See also Milbank, Obituary. “For Gillian Rose this neglect of the moment of universality is tantamount to a false attempt to heal the "brokenness" of the middle. For while she denounced a facile Kantian resignation to dualisms, she equally insisted that these dualisms were essential to the modern state and modern economy, and could never be merely thought away in abstraction. To try to do so is to remain "a beautiful soul", to doom oneself always to accentuate only one side of the divide - ethics against law for example - and so to contribute to the worsening of our predicament.”
When Schick writes that, for Rose, the critical projects of “Enlightenment” and “postmodernity” reinforce the diremption of modern thought and practice she means that each overemphasises one side of the dualisms that pervade modern thought and practice. The dualism that Schick focuses on is that consisting of the relationship between universality and particularity. “Mainstream liberal thought is grounded in Enlightenment reason, which offers universal claims to authority or ‘oughts’ based on a disembedded and disembodied understanding of ethics. Such abstraction results in a profound disconnect between discourses of rights and equality on the one hand and actualities of domination and exclusion on the other. Postmodern thought, in contrast, draws attention to concrete particulars and human experience, in order to counter the abstraction and universalism of Enlightenment thought. However, it overemphasises the particular and it, too, can end up abstracting from those structures and historical processes in which the particular is embedded.”

For Schick, against such exclusive universality and exclusive particularity – that is, against the critical projects of Enlightenment and postmodernity – Rose argues for a speculative negotiating of the broken middle between universal and particular, law and ethics, Enlightenment ideals and lived experience. She maintains that political theorists must attend to particular experience, but that this cannot be thought in isolation from the socio-political structures and historical processes that facilitate particular experiences. Speculative political theory

75 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6.
76 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6.
77 Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6.
recognises that it is impossible to think a particular in isolation: even the very process of thinking one thing and not another involves relation to that Other that is not thought.\textsuperscript{78}

Schick develops this way of construing Rose’s critical project centrally (and helpfully) in terms of Rose’s concept of the “broken middle”. For Schick, Rose’s concept of the “broken middle” can be characterised in several ways: “a break between the potentiality and actuality of the world, between universal and particular, between freedom and unfreedom, between legality and morality.”\textsuperscript{79} For Schick, this concept of the “broken middle” is “a reaction to an attempt on the part of postmodern thinkers to mend this brokenness; an attempt that Rose deems doomed to failure”.\textsuperscript{80} In support of this she cites Rose:

“[Postmodern thought] would mend the diremption of law and ethics by turning the struggle between universality, particularity and singularity into a general sociology of control. Yet the security of this new spectatorship is undermined by the tension of freedom and unfreedom which it cannot acknowledge for it has disqualified the actuality of any oppositions which might initiate process and pain – any risk of coming to know.”\textsuperscript{81}

In other words, on Schick’s account, for Rose, rather than negotiating the broken middle, “postmodern” thought looks towards a premature reconciliation. In so

\textsuperscript{78} Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{79} Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 38.
\textsuperscript{80} Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 38.
\textsuperscript{81} Rose, The Broken Middle, xiii. See Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 38.
doing, however, it passes over the struggle of living in a world full of contradiction and suffering.\textsuperscript{82}

For Schick, Rose’s critical project contrast with the critical projects of “postmodernity” centrally through its attempts at “comprehending” the “broken middle”.

Not that comprehension completes or closes, but that it returns diremption to where it cannot be overcome in exclusive thought or in partial action – as long at its political history persists. The complementarity of comprehension to diremption involves reflection on what may be ventured – without mending diremption in heaven or on earth.\textsuperscript{83}

For Schick, Rose’s critical project – specifically, her “speculative negotiations of the dirempted middle” – “does not aim to fix what is broken; that would be euporia – the easy way. Instead, it works towards comprehension, however partial, or dirempted thought and actuality under modernity. It also reflects on ‘what [political action] may be ventured’, given this brokenness – knowing that any action will be flawed and result in unintended consequences, but clinging to the hope that something may be learned.”\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{82} Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 38.
\textsuperscript{83} Rose, The Broken Middle, xv. See Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 39.
\textsuperscript{84} Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 39. On the place of “hope” within the work of Rose, compare with Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2.
Assessing the secondary literature

In this section I have reviewed the ways in which certain commentators have presented the relationship between Rose’s critical project and the critical projects of “postmodernity”. According to this review, commentators have, broadly speaking, presented Rose’s critical project as entailing a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. To present Rose’s critical project in this way is to present it as recognising and redressing a mistake that underlies and unifies the critical projects of “postmodernity”.85 I take this presentation to be both helpful and unhelpful.

I take it to be helpful for two reasons. First, presenting Rose’s critical project as involving a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” is helpful, I think, because it is, in part, accurate. Rose also presents her critical project as involving a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. Second, by presenting Rose’s critical project as contrasting, in general, with the critical projects of “postmodernity”, commentators are able to emphasise (albeit often at the risk of overemphasising) what makes Rose’s work, in general, important and original.

However, I also take this presentation to be unhelpful for two reasons. First, presenting Rose’s critical project as involving a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” is unhelpful, I think, because it works on the questionable assumption that “postmodern” captures a coherent set of critical

85 See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 2-5.
projects that can be, in consequence, coherently challenged in general.\textsuperscript{86} Second, it is unhelpful, I think, because it implies a reluctance to engage critically with Rose’s challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. In other words, construing Rose’s critical project as generally contrasting with the critical projects of “postmodernity” is unhelpful, I think, because it risks hiding the specific and substantial similarities between herself and them.\textsuperscript{87} As I mentioned above, such a reluctance is a problem in that it reinforces the unfortunate and unnecessary borders between Rose’s thought and that of many of her contemporaries\textsuperscript{88} – which, as I see it, has the consequence of impeding the potential for the importance and originality of Rose’s critical project to influence, and be influenced by, the critical projects of her contemporaries.

The argument of this thesis is motivated by what I have here described as unhelpful within the ways in which commentators have presented the relationship between Rose’s critical project and the critical projects of “postmodernity”. For the two reasons that I have just given, I will, in contrast to the commentators considered above, present Rose’s critical project as involving, not a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”, but a specific challenge to

\textsuperscript{86} This is a continuation of the assumption on which Rose often, but not always, works – an assumption that was recognised as questionable within some of the reviews of \textit{Dialectic of Nihilism}. See e.g. W. T. Murphy, ‘Memorising Politics of Ancient History,’ \textit{The Modern Law Review} 50 (May 1987), 384: “Yet can one “critique” be directed at such a diverse ensemble?” For Murphy, Rose’s way of directing one “critique” at the poststructuralist/postmodern tradition within \textit{Dialectic of Nihilism} proves to be “what is most stimulating and yet most unconvincing about this book.” Just as it is questionable to think that one “critique” can be directed towards the critical projects of “postmodernity”, it is also questionable, as Raymond Geuss has argued, to think that one concept (e.g. “liberalism”) can afford a coherent and general framework for orientating political action within the contemporary world. See also Goodrich, Peter, ‘Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law by Gillian Rose’, \textit{Journal of Law and Society}, 12.2 (1985), 241: “The disciplines and thinkers included in such a designation are, however, too disparate to form a coherent group.”

\textsuperscript{87} See Brower Latz, \textit{The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose}, 12 n55.

Foucault's practice of genealogy. In doing so, it is not my aim to render redundant the commentaries considered above. Rather, it is my aim to account for some of the specifics that these commentaries do not account for, and consequently risk hiding. Given this account of the motivation behind the argument of this thesis, I will now turn to consider the details of this argument.

0.3. ARGUMENT / CONTRIBUTION / METHODOLOGY

What is the argument of this thesis?

In this thesis I will argue that Rose's critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault's method of genealogical problematisation. It is my contention that while Rose is clear about what she takes the requirement of criticism to be, she is unclear about how this requirement can be effectively achieved by the practice of criticism. Rose takes the requirement of criticism to be twofold, and continuous – that is, to continually call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for reconfiguring this authority. For Rose, effectively meeting this requirement involves, in part, criticism yielding, in her words, the experience of identity and non-identity – that is, the experience of the ways in which our concepts, when actually used, entail both successes and failures. As to how the practice of criticism yields this experience, however, Rose's account is at best ambiguous. Such ambiguity is a problem in that it makes it difficult to see how Rose's critical project does not result in the same critical blindness that she claims is the result of other critical projects. Foucault's method of genealogical problematisation, I will argue, affords a way of clarifying this pivotal, but ambiguous, part of Rose's critical project.
What contribution does the argument of this thesis make?

The argument that I have just schematised makes an original contribution to the secondary literature on Rose in that it affords an alternative way of reading Rose’s critical project – alternative in two respects. First, my approach to Rose’s critical project will be more specific than the approaches of the commentators considered above – more specific in the sense that I will not present Rose’s critical project as involving a general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. Rather, I will present it as involving a specific challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. Second, on account of such specificity, Rose’s critical project will be presented as being, not opposed to Foucault’s method of genealogy, but open to be read constructively in conjunction with it.

I recognise that approaching and presenting Rose’s critical project in this specific way risks simplifying its complexity – a complexity that many commentators appeal to when describing what makes Rose’s critical project original and important. I take this risk centrally because it is my contention that through showing the specific respect in which Rose’s critical project can benefit from being read alongside Foucault’s practice of genealogy, I will thereby afford a basis on which others might begin thinking about how Rose’s critical project could inform, and be informed by, debates from which it might have otherwise been barred. It is on account of this contention that I focus on Rose’s specific challenge to Foucault’s practice of genealogy. Foucault’s practice of genealogy has proven, and continues to prove, influential for those concerned with, broadly speaking,
the development of critical thought. The hope is that by showing how Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s genealogy I will thereby show that Rose’s critical project is open to being both informed by, and to informing, such work.

Methodology

Having now explained what the argument of this thesis is, and what contribution this argument makes to the secondary literature on Rose, I will now turn to consider some of the central methodological assumptions upon which argument of this thesis will work.

**How will I approach Rose’s work?**

The first methodological point concerns my approach to Rose’s work. Up to this point I have been describing Rose as having a “critical project” – which is to say, it is my contention that underlying and unifying Rose’s work is a practice of criticism. In other words, while the object of Rose’s practice of criticism changes throughout her work, the practice of criticism itself remains roughly the same.\(^90\)

This is a contention corroborated, I think, by Rose. For example, in her preface to the 1995 reprint of *Hegel Contra Sociology*, Rose writes:

> The speculative exposition of Hegel developed in this book [an exposition in which Rose first presents her practice of criticism] still provides the basis for a unique engagement with post-Hegelian thought, especially postmodernity [. . .]. This book, therefore, remains the core of the project to demonstrate a nonfoundational and radical Hegel, which overcomes the opposition between nihilism and rationalism. It provides the possibility for renewal of critical thought in the intellectual difficulty of our time.\(^91\)

More will be said about the claims of this preface below. I cite it here simply because it serves to corroborate my contention that underlying and unifying Rose’s work is a practice of criticism. Rose first presents this practice of criticism within her second book (*Hegel Contra Sociology*, 1981 – a book influenced by

---


This way of reading Rose’s work – that is, reading it as forming a unified whole – is not the only way. An alternative is given by Anthony Gorman. He writes: “Rose represents her oeuvre as a unified philosophical project centred around her three main texts: *Hegel contra Sociology, Dialectic of Nihilism* and *The Broken Middle*. However, this claim does not withstand critical examination.” Stating it simply – for I will be returning to the details of Gorman’s argument below – Gorman argues that Rose’s work comprises, in his words (paraphrasing Adorno), “two halves that do not add up.” “The difference is this: in *Hegel Contra Sociology*, the antinomies of sociological reason are comprehended and criticised from the standpoint of the universal (‘the Absolute’) which, though not ‘posited’ or ‘pre-judged’, is nonetheless understood to be latent or implicit within the antinomies

---

92 For more on the extent to which Adorno influenced Rose see esp. Brower Latz, *The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose*, Chapter 2: Rose’s Frankfurt Inheritance. See also Schick, *A Good Enough Justice*, 18-25; Bernstein, ‘A Work of Hard Love’: “[Rose] couldn’t distinguish between her thought and Adorno’s. This is a telling half-truth: her thought is easily distinguishable from Adorno’s but she shared with him a project: to renew the claim of Hegelian philosophy by using it as an instrument in a critique of contemporary philosophical theories and ideals.”


95 See section 3.2. below.

96 Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 35.
themselves. In *The Broken Middle*, on the other hand, the antinomies of theological reason are comprehended from the standpoint of a particular culture which is taken to *stand for or point towards* the universal.\(^97\) For Gorman, this reorientation – a reorientation that results in Rose’s critical project “relativising the relation to the universal to the fate of a particular culture and of a single individual within that culture”\(^98\) – forecloses the critical potential of her critical project.\(^99\)

I – following, in part, the work of Andrew Brower Latz and Naomi Felicity Hammond – think that Gorman’s argument is misguided. As I read it, Gorman’s argument involves reading Rose’s work as comprising two halves. The first half is oriented by Rose’s concern with thinking the particular from the standpoint of the universal. The second half is oriented by her concern with thinking the universal from the standpoint of the particular. For Gorman, whereas the first half has a critical potential to transform our social-political relations, the second half does not. I think that Gorman’s argument is misguided because I think that Rose’s critical project is, as a whole, oriented by both of these halves. In other words, I think that the practice of criticism central to Rose’s critical project is concerned with revealing the relationship between the universal and the particular – between theory and praxis – to be “equivocal”\(^100\) or, to use Foucault’s concept that will prove central in what follows, “problematic”. Explaining the critical potential of

---

\(^97\) Gorman, ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’, 54.

\(^98\) Gorman, ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’, 55.


\(^100\) See Bernstein, J. M., ‘Philosophy Among the Ruins’, *Prospect* 6 (1996): “This is the leitmotiv of Rose’s philosophy: there is an unavoidable anthropomorphism in every concept; no concept can escape equivocation and complicity.” See also Jarvis, Simon, ‘An Undeleter for Criticism’, *Diacritics* 32.1 (2002), 3-18, and Rowlands, Anna, *Practical Theology in ‘The Third City’* (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Manchester University, 2007), 130:
such equivocality / problematisation will be one of the central aims of this thesis.\textsuperscript{101}

Accordingly, for reasons that relate both to how Rose understood her work, and to how I understand her work, it is my contention that Rose’s work forms a unified whole. It is on account of this contention that I will treat all of Rose’s works as a potential resource for supporting the argument of this thesis. This is not to say that the argument of this thesis has the aim of affording an exhaustive account of Rose’s works.\textsuperscript{102} Rather, it is to say that since the argument of this thesis is concerned centrally with Rose’s practice of criticism, and since this practice is at play within all of her works, I will treat all of her works as a potential resource for developing the argument of this thesis.

That said, I must also say that there will be aspects of Rose’s work that I will not, within the argument of this thesis, deal with in detail. The aspects of Rose’s work that I will deal with in detail are those that I take to relate directly / indirectly to her challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. In consequence, I will have little to say about the influential, complicated and substantive relationships Rose’s work bears with that of the Frankfurt School and theology.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{101} Contra Gorman. See ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’, 65: “The absence of an implied extensional concept of the good in Rose’s account renders her concept of the political deeply equivocal in the pejorative sense.”

\textsuperscript{102} To date, the most comprehensive, critical and generous account of Rose’s work is given by Brower Latz, \textit{The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose}.

Rose's difficult style

The second methodological point concerns Rose's recourse to a "difficult style." As has been mentioned, and as will be developed, Rose's critical project is concerned, centrally, with affording a way for us to recognise, and work through, the “difficulty” of reason – that is, the ways in which reason is always both unavoidable and partial. One of the consequences of this concern is that Rose often writes in a way that is difficult. In his introduction to Rose's posthumously published Paradiso, Howard Caygill writes:

[Rose's] recourse to a difficult style did not arise from an incapacity to write clearly – as testified by the limpid essays that make up Judaism and Modernity (1996) and the posthumous Mourning Becomes the Law (1996) – but reflected the working through of the intrinsic difficulty of a 'trauma within reason itself'.

In other words, Rose’s recourse to a difficult style is a direct consequence of her critical project. As was partially evinced in the literature review, Rose’s work is riddled with difficult concepts (e.g. “anxiety of beginning”, “equivocation of the ethical” and “agon of authorship”, etc.) – concepts that are difficult both because

104 Caygill, Howard, 'Editors Preface', in Rose, Paradiso (London: Menard Press, 1999), 7. In this preface, Caygill also notes that Rose “enjoyed the reputation of being a difficult author.” See J. M. Bernstein, Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory (London: Routledge, 1995), 8: “A phenomenology of modern theory that works within the dialectic of ethical life rather than be about it is to be found in Gillian Rose’s exuberant and demanding The Broken Middle.”

105 See Hammond, Philosophy and the Facetious Style, 173: “The style of Rose's work is itself difficult but only as difficult as actuality or reality requires it to be.”
Rose rarely affords a clear account of what these concepts are meant to capture, and because what they are meant to capture is inherently unclear or "equivocal". Conceding this close connection between the central argument of Rose’s critical project and the difficult style in which Rose presents this argument means, among other things, that a decision needs to be made about the extent to which Rose’s recourse to a difficult style needs to be repeated when representing her critical project.

This is not a decision that can be taken lightly – at least, not without the risk of missing one of the important messages of Rose’s critical project. For Rose, as will be explained, the relationship between theory and praxis (or, in her words, between “idea and act”) is one that does not admit of any sharp distinctions. One of the ways in which theory and praxis can be sharply distinguished is “implied in the ideal that philosophy should provide demonstrations that no one could rationally deny.” Rose (arguably following Adorno) opposes the disavowal of the responsibilities and risks of authorship implied by this ideal.

“Rose’s style in The Broken Middle (and to some extent in some other works)”, Andrew Brower Latz writes, “[is] intended as a literary equivalent to legitimate authority rather than illegitimate power, because its irony, facetiousness and poeticism (its Kierkegaardian indirect communication) force the reader into doing work, undergoing an experience of thought, rather than providing ready-made

106 See Jarvis, ‘An Undeleter for Criticism’, 6: “Few things are less tolerable to modern protocol than equivocality; and since this equivocal field, the field of criticism, was first discovered, its fate has usually been to be destroyed.”
107 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 4.
109 See esp. Rose, The Broken Middle. For an exposition of Rose’s “style” see Hammond, Philosophy and the Facetious Style.
propositions.” On this account (an account with which I largely agree), failing to recognise Rose’s difficult style means, potentially, missing one of the important messages of her critical project – that is, the dual implication of theory and praxis.

However, Rose’s difficult style is not without its difficulties. For example, with reference to the style of *The Broken Middle*, Simon Jarvis writes: “the question of the truth of this work, because it aims at much more than correctness, will not be entirely separable from that of its reception. It must be too early to say yet whether the original rubrics of Rose’s work – the triple configuration of “anxiety of beginning”, “equivocation of the ethical” and “agon of authorship” – will remain an idiolect, or whether they can take the critical purchase for which they hope on the ethical and political life which they address.” In response to this difficulty, Brower Latz writes: “Twenty years on and the critical purchase is yet to emerge, despite signs of increasing interest in Rose’s work.” While it is true that the critical purchase of the rubrics of Rose’s work is yet to emerge, it does not necessarily follow from this truth that it will never emerge.


111 I am here adapting Rose’s claim that there is a “dual implication of law and ethics.” See Rose, *The Broken Middle*, xiv-xv.


114 See Bernstein, ‘Philosophy Among the Ruins’: “The fundamental task of avant-gardism is to keep culture moving and open in dark times; alas, a modernist sensibility and avant-garde aspiration are all but absent from contemporary philosophy. Her voice is not enough. Worse still, I suspect the reason why Gillian Rose’s work failed to find a wide readership in her lifetime was that she too often focused on easy, fashionable or little known “continental” targets rather than taking on the more permanent and recalcitrant philosophical
I have spent some time explaining the importance and the difficulties of Rose’s recourse to a difficult style both because I take it as an integral part of Rose’s critical project, and because the respect in which it is an integral part relates to a central concern with the argument of this thesis – that is, the relationship between theory and praxis. That said, in the argument of this thesis, I will not, insofar as I am able, repeat Rose recourse to a difficult style – that is, I will not repeat Rose’s difficult conceptuality. Rather, my concern will be making explicit what I take to be implicit within Rose’s difficult style. This approach is motivated by the overarching argument of this thesis. To repeat, in this thesis I will be concerned, centrally, with showing how Rose’s practice of critical thought can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s genealogy. Showing this will involve

mammoths of modernity: Enlightenment rationalism, naturalism, scientism, pragmatism, liberalism. None the less she is an exemplary figure, revealing in word and deed, in success and failure, how indigent our state is.”

115 One of the implications of this is that little, within what follows, will be given up to unpacking The Broken Middle – which is, as Williams writes, Rose’s “most hermetic and taxing work”. (‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 10) For anyone with any familiarity with Rose’s work, this decision will likely appear peculiar. The reason being, of all Rose’s “difficult” books, this book – the most “difficult” of them all – has proven the most influential, or, at least, the most widely discussed. However, it is precisely because of this that I have decided to resist relying on the conceptuality that pervades, and that is provoked by this book. In other words, since this book, and the concepts it introduces, have been accounted for at length by others, I have decided to resist repeating this accounts. Additionally, and this touches upon what has already been mentioned, I am of the opinion that the concepts that Rose employs within The Broken Middle (e.g. “anxiety of beginning”, “equivocation of the ethical” and “agon of authorship”, etc.) depend, to a certain extent, on the stylistic (or syntactic) structures within which they occur. Accordingly, any application of these concepts risks rendering them “lifeless” in a way comparable to the way Hegel thought Kant’s method “reduced [conceptuality] to a lifeless schema”. (See e.g. Hegel, G. W. F., The Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Terry Pinkard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), §50) In short, just as it is arguable that reading, for example, To Pollen by J. H. Prynne is the best way of working out and through the implications of this work, reading The Broken Middle is arguably the best way of working out and through its implications. It is for this reason, and those mentioned above, that I will have little to say directly about The Broken Middle. For more on Rose’s sensitivity to style see The Melancholy Science, Chapter 2: The Search for Style. See also Hammon, Philosophy and the Facetious Style. For more on The Broken Middle see esp. Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, Chapter 4: The Broken Middle; Schick, A Good Enough Justice, Chapter 2: The Broken Middle.
showing how Rose is, in part, unclear about her practice of criticism – unclear in a way that can be made clearer when combined with Foucault’s method of genealogy. Accordingly, the argument of this thesis will involve augmenting aspects of Rose’s argumentation with aspects of Foucault’s argumentation – and it is on account of this that I will not remain too tightly bound to Rose’s conceptuality.

**Discrepancy between Rose and Foucault**

The third methodological point concerns the discrepancy between my accounts of Rose and Foucault. Primarily, the argument of this thesis will be concerned with clarifying, corroborating and potentially expanding an aspect of Rose’s critical project – that is, the practice of criticism that I take to underlie and unify Rose’s work. Central to this clarification, corroboration and potential expansion is Foucault’s method of genealogy. Although Foucault’s method of genealogy will play a central part in the argument of this thesis, the part it will play will be one that is, nevertheless, subservient to my primary concern. This means that the aspects of Foucault’s method of genealogy on which I will focus will follow from my presentation of Rose’s critical project. That said, within my accounts of these aspects I will be concerned with remaining as close as possible to Foucault’s own accounts of these aspects.

**The concept of criticism**
The forth methodological point concerns Rose’s concept of criticism, which is, within the context of her critical project, a multifaceted concept.\footnote{For a resourceful account of the concept of criticism see esp. Finlayson, James Gordon, ‘Hegel, Adorno and the Origins of Immanent Criticism’, \textit{British Journal for the History of Philosophy} 22.6 (2014), 1142-1166. I take this account to be resourceful because it serves to contextualise and unpack the concept of criticism in ways that apply both directly and indirectly to Rose’s critical project. See also Ruth Sonderegger and Karin de Boer (eds.), \textit{Conceptions of Critique in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy} (London: Palgrave, 2012). See also Butler, ‘What is Critique?‘; Geuss, Raymond, ‘Must Criticism Be Constructive?’, in \textit{A World Without Why} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 68-90.} Within this thesis, the facet with which I will be centrally concerned is that in which “criticism” refers specifically to the self-reflexive practice of using reason to call into question the authority (or legitimacy or lawfulness) of reason – or, more specifically, the authority of the concepts that comprise reason.\footnote{For some, this self-reflexive form of criticism is a form of “immanent criticism”. See e.g. Karin de Boer, ‘Hegel’s Conception of Immanent Critique: its Sources, Extent and Limit’, in Ruth Sonderegger and Karin de Boer (eds.), \textit{Conceptions of Critique in Modern and Contemporary Philosophy} (London: Palgrave, 2012), 83 and Karen Ng, ‘Ideology Critique from Hegel and Marx’, \textit{Constellations} 22:3 (2015): 394. However, this is not the only way to construe this form of criticism. See e.g. Michael A. Becker, ‘On Immanent Critique in Hegel’s Phenomenology’, \textit{Hegel Bulletin} (2018), 1-2: “More concretely, a review of the literature suggests that criticism — whether philosophical, social or more broadly cultural — may be ‘immanent’ in two distinct respects: when it (1) measures an object against norms, criteria or potentialities that (somehow) ‘belong’ to that object; and when it (2) self-reflexively recognises an object as (somehow) continuous with its own standpoint, or as that standpoint’s condition of possibility. Both ideals of Immanent Critique are operative in the intellectual tradition that begins with Kant and continues through Hegel to Marx and beyond, and both are singled out — albeit for different reasons — as the radical red thread running through that tradition.” For more general accounts of this tradition, see esp. Seyla Benhabib, \textit{Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory} (New York; Columbia University Press, 1986) and Rahel Jaeggi, \textit{Critique of Forms of Life}, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018). For my account of Rose’s place within this “tradition”, see section 3.2. below.} Given this specification, as will be explained, criticism is concerned centrally with calling into question the relationship between theory and praxis – that is, the relationship between our concepts and their supposed normative force.\footnote{I take this way of framing my focus, in part, from Geuss. See Geuss, Raymond, ‘Genealogy as Critique’, in \textit{Outside Ethics} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 153-160.} I focus on this facet of Rose’s concept of criticism because it is with respect to this facet that, I will argue, Rose’s
critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy.

Within this specification, and above, I have claimed that Rose’s practice of criticism involves, centrally, calling into question the relationship between our concepts and their supposed normative force. The debates surrounding the relationship between criticism (especially as it has been construed and practiced by Frankfurt School theorists) and normativity are manifold and complicated.\textsuperscript{119}

That said, I think it is worth saying something briefly about one of these debates – if only because I think it will serve to clarify what will be in question within the argument of this thesis.

The debate stems from Nancy Fraser’s early, but influential, criticism of Foucault’s method of genealogy – specifically, as a form of critique.\textsuperscript{120} Fraser criticises Foucault’s method of genealogy for being, in her words, “normatively confused.”\textsuperscript{121} This criticism is based on an interpretation of Foucault’s use of


\textsuperscript{121} See Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’. 
genealogy according to which the “genealogist deploys carefully developed empirical insights in combination with some minimal set of other relevant considerations so as to establish the normative conclusion that certain of our practices are unjust, oppressive, or in some other way bad.”122 “But”, Fraser writes:

why? Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind could Foucault begin to answer such questions. Only with the introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it.123

In other words, Fraser interprets Foucault’s practice of genealogy as being concerned with revealing the contingency of normativity, and then, confusedly, construing such contingency to have normative implications.

I will return to this debate below.124 I mention it here because it serves to clarify what will be in question within the argument of this thesis. In the context of this thesis, Fraser’s criticism of Foucault’s method of genealogy is significant for two reasons. First, Fraser’s criticism is comparable to Rose’s criticism. As will be explained, Rose, like Fraser, criticises Foucault’s method of genealogy for, in her

123 See Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 29.
124 See section 2.2. below.
words, “[falling] into vicious circularity.” Second, Fraser’s criticism is comparable to criticisms that have been made against Rose’s own critical project. As I understand it, at the centre of these criticisms is the contention that criticism necessarily carries normative implications – that is, implications for how we should think and act. While this contention is well placed when construing certain critical projects, when construing the critical projects of Rose and Foucault, I think it is misguided. For both Rose and Foucault, I will argue, one of the central tasks of criticism is to render the relationship between theory and praxis “equivocal” / “problematic”. Such a rendering of this relationship does not necessarily imply that the normative force of certain of our concepts (or, as Robert Brandom has stated it, “the normative force of the better reason”) should be rejected, or viewed in a strictly negative light. Rather, it implies only that such normative force is corrigeable. Detailing what it means to recognise reason as corrigeable, and detailing how this recognition carries a critical potential, will be one of the central aims of this thesis.

---

125 Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism*, 190-191. However, as will be explained, the challenges of Rose and Fraser are crucially different. See section 2.2. below.

126 See esp. Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’; ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’.

127 Brandom, *Reason, Genealogy, and the Hermeneutics of Magnanimity*: “Genealogies directly challenge the very idea of the normative force of the better reason, which lies at the core of the Enlightenment rationalist successor to the traditional subordination model of authority.”

128 See Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’.

129 Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia*, 5: “What distinguishes critical social theory from positivistic sociology then is its emphatic normative dimension. The scientific analysis of the social world is not an end in itself, but a necessary step of enlightenment in the process of transforming this world into one “which satisfies the needs and powers of men.” Through this emphatic normative dimension, critical theory preserves the intentions of practical philosophy to rationally articulate a more adequate form of human existence and to enlighten them in its attainment.”
0.4. CHAPTER OUTLINES

Structure of chapters

The overarching aim of this thesis is to argue that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy. This argument makes an original contribution to the secondary literature on Rose in two respects. First, it affords a more specific way of engaging with Rose’s challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” – more specific in the sense that I will focus solely on Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. Second, and on account of such specificity, it affords an alternative way of reading Rose’s critical project – alternative in the sense that Rose’s critical project will be presented as being, not opposed to Foucault’s method of genealogy, but open to being read constructively in conjunction with it.

Achieving this aim will involve, centrally, arguing that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided, but resourcefully so. As I have explained, commentators have tended to present Rose’s critical project as being generally opposed to the critical projects of “postmodernity” on basis of her general challenge to these critical projects. While I will not be presenting Rose’s critical project as entailing such a general challenge, I still recognise that her specific challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy constitutes the central basis for reading Rose’s critical project as being opposed to Foucault’s method.

130 I write “challenge / challenges” to call attention to the fact that Rose – specifically, within Dialectic of Nihilism – can be read as advancing a general challenge to the work of Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault – a general challenge that comprises more specific challenges.
of genealogy. It is for this reason that my argument for reading this specific challenge as misguided will constitute the central chapter of this thesis – with the argument of the chapter that comes before this providing the basis for this central argument, and with the argument of the chapter that follows this working out the potential implications of this central argument.

Accordingly, the argument of this thesis will consist of three arguments – each of which will constitute a separate chapter. These three arguments will interrelate with each other in that the argument of chapter two will, in part, depend on the argument of chapter one, and the argument of chapter three will depend, in part, on the arguments of chapters one and two.

**Outline of chapter one**

In chapter one I will argue that the critical projects of Rose and Foucault have aims that are comparable. Making this comparison will involve explicating the ways in which Rose and Foucault respectively read Kant’s critical project, and have these readings inform their respective critical projects. As I will show, the critical projects of Rose and Foucault have at their centre a concern with continuing and correcting Kant’s practice of criticism – a continuation and a correction that results in both being concerned with, not the purification of reason, but the recognition of the dangers and difficulties of reason. In other words, both Rose and Foucault take the task of criticism to be twofold and continuous – to continuously call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for potentially reconfiguring that authority. The argument of this chapter contributes towards the overarching argument of this thesis in that it
affords a basis on which to begin explicating and assessing Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy – for in order to understand Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s genealogy, it is necessary to understand Rose’s reading of Kant, and in order to understand why Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s genealogy is misguided, it is necessary to understand Foucault’s reading of Kant.

**Outline of chapter two**

In chapter two I will argue that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided, but resourcefully so. Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is that it is critically blind. This challenge works on the premise that Foucault’s method of genealogy is nihilistic – that is, concerned exclusively with undermining the authority of reason by revealing it to be contingent. On this premise, Rose argues that Foucault’s method of genealogy is viciously circular in that, through revealing the authority of reason to be contingent, it is required to blindly assume that reason is authoritative. I will argue that Rose’s challenge is misguided because it recognises only one of the two integrated aspects that constitute Foucault’s method of genealogy. This method reveals both *that* and *how* the authority of reason is contingent. Recognising the integration of these two aspects is important, I will argue, because it is on account of this that Foucault’s method of genealogy can be read as problematising the authority of reason, and as having thereby a critical potential – that is, through revealing that the authority of reason is contingently configured, it reveals how such authority could potentially be reconfigured. In spite of being misguided, Rose’s challenge remains resourceful in that it encourages an account of Foucault’s method of genealogy that can help to clarify an unclear part of her own
critical project. The argument of this chapter contributes towards the overarching argument of this thesis in that it serves to remove the basis on which Rose’s critical project can be, and has been, read as opposed to Foucault’s critical project. In other words, the argument of this chapter opens up the possibility of reading Rose’s critical project constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy.

Outline of chapter three

In chapter three I will argue that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy. This argument will involve developing Rose’s renewal of critical thought by way of her reading of Hegel’s idea of phenomenology. As will be shown, Rose’s critical project requires a form of criticism that can yield the experience of identity and non-identity – that is, the experience of reason being always both unavoidable and partial. While Rose is clear about this requirement, she is not clear about how criticism can achieve this requirement. In other words, Rose’s critical project will be shown to be beset with a methodological deficit – a deficit that can be filled, I will argue, by Foucault’s method of genealogy. As will be shown, the contingency revealed by Foucault’s method of genealogy is consistent with a sense of universality – a sense in which concepts are universalised through complex, historical and contingent processes. Through revealing this, Foucault’s method of genealogy affords a way of clarifying what it is to recognise that reason is always both unavoidable and partial. It is for this reason that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy.
CHAPTER ONE

ON ROSE’S RENEWAL AND FOUCAULT’S TRANSFORMATION OF CRITICAL THOUGHT

1.1. INTRODUCTION

The argument

In this chapter I will argue that the critical projects of Rose and Foucault have aims that are comparable. Through explicating the ways in which Rose and Foucault respectively engage with Kant’s critical project, and the ways in which they have these engagements inform their respective critical projects, I will argue that the critical projects of both imply a continuation and a correction of Kant’s practice of criticism. In other words, I will argue that Rose and Foucault are both concerned with practicing a form of criticism that is able to continually call into question the authority of reason, and do so in a way that affords the resources for thinking about the potentialities and limitations of reconfiguring the authority of reason.

The argument of this chapter contributes to the overarching argument of this thesis centrally by affording a basis on which to explicate and assess Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. It is my contention that, just as Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy can only be understood in the light of her engagement with Kant, the respects in which this challenge is
misguided can only be understood in the light of Foucault’s engagement with Kant.

*The structure of the argument*

The argument of this chapter will consist of three sections. First, I will explicate how Rose engages with Kant’s critical project, and how she has this engagement inform her “renewal”\(^{131}\) of critical thought. Second, I will explicate how Foucault engages with Kant’s critical project, and how he has this engagement inform his “transformation”\(^{132}\) of critical thought. Third, I will argue that Rose’s renewal and Foucault’s transformation of critical thought are comparable in that they both imply a concern with continuing and correction Kant’s practice of criticism.

*Qualifications*

Before turning to the first of these three sections, it is necessary for me to make one qualification about the content of this chapter. Within this chapter I will be concerned with explicating the ways in which Rose and Foucault respectively read Kant, and have their readings inform their respective critical projects. Within these explications I will not be concerned (at least not explicitly) with comparing the ways in which Rose and Foucault read Kant with the ways in which others have read Kant. This is not to say that I do not think that this is, or could be, a worthwhile task. Rather, it is to recognise that, given that the central aim of this

---


chapter is to argue that Rose and Foucault read Kant in a way that is comparable, comparing the ways in which Rose and Foucault read Kant with the ways in which others have read Kant is at risk of detracting from the central aim of this chapter.

1.2. WHAT IS ROSE’S RENEWAL OF CRITICAL THOUGHT?

What is the aim of this section?

The aim of this section is to explain Rose’s reading of Kant – specifically, the aspect of this reading that informs her “renewal” of critical thought. As will be explained, Rose’s renewal of critical thought involves both a continuation and a correction of Kant’s practice of criticism – a continuation in that Rose, like Kant, thinks that the task of criticism involves calling into question the authority of reason, a correction in that Rose, unlike Kant, does not think that criticism discloses the “purification” of reason. Rather, for Rose, criticism discloses the “difficulty” of reason – that is, the ways in which reason is always both unavoidable and partial.

How has Rose’s reading of Kant been accounted for in the secondary literature?

Within the secondary literature on Rose, there has been little critical attention given to her reading of Kant.\(^{133}\) In the cases where Rose’s reading of Kant is

\(^{133}\) To date, the most comprehensive account is given by Brower Latz, *The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose*, Chapter 3: Jurisprudential Wisdom.
mentioned, Rose is almost always presented as being opposed to Kant. The reason for this way of presenting Rose relates, largely, to commentators being concerned with explicating Rose’s reading of Hegel, which has at its centre a critique of Kant. Presenting Rose in this way is understandable. Throughout her works, Rose’s references to, and engagements with, Kant are almost always oppositional. However, in spite of being understandable, such a way of presenting Rose’s reading of Kant is, I think, short-sighted – a short-sightedness that prevents, among other things, critically engaging with Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s genealogy.

How will I account for Rose’s reading of Kant?

Within this chapter I will be concerned with explicating Rose’s reading of Kant largely without reference to her reading of Hegel. For some, this approach will seem misguided. They might object, for example, that in order to understand Rose’s reading of Kant, it is necessary to understand her reading of Hegel – for it is by way of Hegel that she reads Kant. In response to this possible objection I would say that, at this stage of my argument, I am concerned centrally with affording a basis on which to explain and assess Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. An explication of Rose’s reading of Kant affords such a

---

136 See e.g. Rose, ‘Ethics and Halacha’, in Judaism and Modernity, 27: “These antinomies in the conceiving of law in Kant may be said – quite simply but dramatically – to have led to the breakdown of philosophy and the development of social theory.” See also The Broken Middle, 18.
137 An aspect of Rose’s reading of Hegel will be explicated in chapter three of this thesis.
basis because, as will be explained in the following chapter, Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy bears a similar structure to her critique of Kant.

**What is at the centre of Rose’s reading of Kant?**

With the aim of explaining Rose’s renewal of critical thought, and with the aim of affording a basis on which to explain and assess Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy, of central importance within Rose’s reading of Kant is the concept of law. It is, I will argue, with respect to this concept that Rose’s practice of criticism can be said to both converge with and diverge from Kant’s practice of criticism. To unpack this concept of law, it is helpful to contextualise Kant’s practice of criticism by considering, first, Kant’s concept of enlightenment. Considering Kant’s concept of enlightenment serves also to contextualise Rose’s own practice of criticism. As I will explain, one of the respects in which Rose’s practice of criticism involves a continuation of Kant’s practice of criticism is that it remains motivated by Kant’s concept of enlightenment – a concept that involves situating the task of criticism between reason and freedom.

---

138 See e.g. Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism*, Chapter 1: From Metaphysics to Jurisprudence.

139 Contextualising Kant’s practice of criticism by way of his concept of enlightenment is not the only way. An alternative way would be to see it as Kant attempt at affording a “third way” or “middle way” between “rationalism” and “empiricism”. See Guyer, Paul and Wood, Allen, ‘Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason’, in Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 20: “The Critique has perhaps most often been seen as marking out a third way that combines the virtues, while avoiding the pitfalls, of both the “rationalism” of Descartes and Leibniz and the “empiricism” of Locke and Hume. This way of reading the Critique, however, even though to some extent suggested Kant himself, depends on a simplified reading of the history of modern philosophy and at the very least on an incomplete assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Kant’s modern predecessors. Less controversial is the observation that the Critique’s main intention is to find a middle way between traditional metaphysics, especially its attempts to bolster a theistic view of the world with *a priori* rational arguments, and a skepticism that would undercut the claims of modern natural science along with those of religious metaphysics.”
Enlightenment and criticism

Central to Kant’s concept of enlightenment is the connection it makes between reason and freedom.\(^\text{140}\) Kant writes:

> [enlightenment requires nothing but] \emph{freedom}, and indeed the least harmful of anything that could even be called freedom: namely, freedom to make \emph{public use} of one’s reason in all matters.\(^\text{141}\)

In other words, for Kant, enlightenment refers to a certain way of thinking and acting – a certain way that follows from the “freedom to make \emph{public use} of one’s reason in all matters.” In this passage, Kant emphasises that the use of reason that is in question is “public.” This is important for a number of reasons – one of which being that it helps explain what is at stake within Kant’s practice of criticism.\(^\text{142}\) Kant contrasts “public” uses of reason with “private” uses of

\(^{140}\) See also Brandom, \textit{Reason, Genealogy, and the Hermeneutics of Magnanimity}: “What is wholly new in Enlightenment philosophy is rather its identification of reason with \textit{freedom}.” And: “This intoxicating identification of freedom and reason is the beating heart of German Idealism.”

\(^{141}\) Kant, Immanuel, ‘An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?’, in \textit{Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy}, edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 18. See also O’Neill, Onora, \textit{Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics and Interpretation in Kant’s Philosophy} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 30: “[\text{What is Enlightenment?}] has often been condemned as a shallow defence of freedom of opinion, which endorses ‘enlightened’ despotism. This focus wholly fails to face the central puzzle of the text, which is that Kant equates enlightenment not with reason but with an oddly characterised practice of reasoning publicly.”

\(^{142}\) My aim here is to specify the aspects of Kant’s concept of enlightenment that help contextualise his concept of criticism, and consequently help contextualise the critical projects of Rose and Foucault. That said, for Rose’s reading of Kant’s distinction between “public” and “private” uses of reason see \textit{Love’s Work}, 136-137. For Foucault’s account of this distinction see ‘What is Critique?’, 77-79. See also O’Neill, Onora, \textit{Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Chapter 2: The Public Use of Reason. It should also be mentioned that the distinction Kant
reason. For Kant, the speech of officers to troops, of ministers to their congregations, of officials to taxpayers are all said to be “private” uses of reason. The point is that they are incomplete uses of reason. In all such uses there is a tacit, uncriticised and unjustified premise of submission to the “authority” that power of office establishes. The antithesis to these private, partial uses of reason must be a more fully public use of reason that steadfastly renounces reliance on powerful but ungrounded “authorities” in favour of self-discipline. Accordingly, in emphasising the public over the private use of reason Kant is specifying a kind

makes between private and public uses of reason is a distinction upon which John Rawls arguably bases his “idea of public reason”. See Rawls, John, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 440-441: “The idea of public reason, as I understand it, belongs to a conception of a well-ordered constitutional democratic society. The form and content of this reason – the way it is understood by citizens and how it interprets their political relationship – are part of the idea of democracy itself. This is because a basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable pluralism – the fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical, and moral, is the normal result of its culture of free institutions.” (I write “arguably” because Rawls rejects the idea that his views entail an appropriation of Kant’s views. See e.g. Political Liberalism, 438: “Many readers got the idea that my view is Kant’s or similar to it, but that is a serious mistake.”) I mention Rawls, and cite this passage from Political Liberalism, simply to distinguish the way he (arguably) reads Kant from the ways in which Rose and Foucault read Kant. Implied by Rawls’s use of “reasonableness” is a commitment to a sense of reason that possesses a transcendental authority – that is, to put it crudely, the condition of the possibility of experiencing a democratic society. As will be explained, it is precisely this sense of reason (or “reasonableness”) that Rose and Foucault are concerned with resisting through their respective critical projects – albeit not directly. For a wonderful account of problems that pervade Rawls’s appeals to a sense of “reasonableness” see Finlayson, Lorna, The Political is Political: Conformity and the Illusion of Dissent in Contemporary Political Philosophy (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), Chapter 2: ‘Beware! Beware! The Forest of Sin!’: Reluctant Reflections on Rawls.


144 I am here following an account given by O’Neill. See O’Neill, Constructions of Reason, 17. In this book O’Neill also affords a resourceful reading of the motto with which Kant begins his Critique of Pure Reason – that is, the motto taken from the last paragraph of Bacon’s preface to his Instauratio Magna. According to O’Neill, this motto is of note because it implies an explicit contrast with the starting point of the Cartesian enterprise. “Bacon refuses to speak of himself. His undertaking is not solitary: He invites readers to join in a common task. [...] Kant too says nothing about himself.” (7) In other words, O’Neill reads Kant as beginning the Critique of Pure Reason in a way that contrasts with Descartes’s beginning in that Kant, unlike Descartes, begins with an account of reason that is already public. Robert Brandom describes this as Kant’s “normative turn” (Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 58).
of authority – a kind of authority that resides, not in institutions or individuals, but in the nature of reason itself. For Kant, “freedom in thinking signifies the subjection of reason to no laws except those which it gives itself.”

In the context of Kant’s concept of enlightenment, therefore, his practice of criticism can be said to be concerned, centrally, with ascertaining a certain kind of authority – that is, the authority that resides in the nature of reason itself. For Kant, ascertaining this kind of authority is important because it affords the possibility for enlightened / free forms of thought and action. In other words, for Kant, the kind of authority with which the practice of criticism is centrally concerned is the kind of authority that gives reason a normative force.

145 Kant, ‘What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?’, 16.
146 For an account of what followed Kant’s attempt at ascertaining the authority of reason see e.g. Beiser, Frederick C., The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1987), 1: “During the period between Kant's first Kritik and Fichte's first Wissenschaftslehre (1781-1794), philosophers devoted themselves to a single fundamental problem. They returned again and again to this problem, though it had many guises, and though its presence was not always clearly recognised. If we were to formulate this issue in a single phrase, then we might call it 'the authority of reason'. It arises as soon as we begin to question our apparently healthy and natural faith in reason. Why should I listen to reason? What reason do I have to obey it? We demand that a person's beliefs and actions be rational; to say that they are irrational is to condemn them. But why do we make such a demand? What is the justification for it? Or, in short, whence the authority of reason?"
147 See Kant, ‘What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?’; See also Guyer and Wood, ‘Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason’, 2: “The Critique of Pure Reason was the work in which Kant attempted to lay the foundations both for the certainty of modern science and for the possibility of human freedom.” See also Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science, translated by Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 155: “Still less should one expect here [in the Critique of Pure Reason] a critique of books and systems of pure reason, but of the faculty of pure reason itself. On the basis of this critique alone does one have a sure touchstone for appraising the philosophical import of old and new works in this field; otherwise, one unauthorized reporter and judge assesses the baseless assertions of another by means of his own, equally baseless, assertions.”
148 There is neither the space nor the need to go into the complexities of Kant’s account of reason as normative. That said, I have found the following accounts to be especially helpful in illuminating these complexities: Allison, Henry E., Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-Historical Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Brandom, Robert, ‘Action, Norms, and Practical Reasoning’, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 12 (1998), 127-139, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and
will be said about this kind of authority below – for it is this kind of authority that is, I think, at stake within Rose’s concept of law. Here, my aim is to simply introduce the concept of authority that will be, within what follows, considered at greater length.

Just as Kant’s concept of enlightenment motivates his practice of criticism, I think that a similar (which is not to say the same) concept motivates Rose’s practice of criticism. If by “enlightenment” we mean simply a way of thinking and acting that is founded upon a practice of criticism – specifically, a self-reflexive practice of criticism – then Rose’s critical project can be thought of as motivated by a concept of enlightenment. Thinking of Rose’s critical project in this way is helpful, I

---

Discursive Commitment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), Chapter 1: Toward a Normative Pragmatics, Reason in Philosophy, Chapter 1: Norms, Selves, and Concepts; Deligiorgi, Katerina, Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment (New York: SUNY, 2005). For a response to the objection that using the concept “normativity” to capture Kant’s account of reason is anachronistic, see Pollok, Konstantin, Kant’s Theory of Normativity: Exploring the Space of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 2: “Yet, is the title of this study not a grave anachronism? After all, Kant never uses the term ‘normativity.’ ‘Normativity,’ it may seem, is a contemporary buzzword that has its home in debates on meta-ethics and perhaps some other sub-disciplines of analytic philosophy. Historically, however, this is not correct. In eighteenth-century Germany the noun Normativ was used in legal matters for ‘bill,’ and the adjective normativ was used in the juridical sense of ‘binding.’ The noun Normativität was, presumably for the first time, used in nineteenth-century theological and juridical treatises in the sense of ‘authority,’ relating to the Scripture and the law respectively. Kant himself uses the term Norm in a number of theoretical, practical, and aesthetic contexts, meaning “a prescribed rule, or law, that one has to observe strictly and must not contravene,” as Zedler’s Universal-Lexicon defines it in 1740.” For a historical account see e.g. Beiser, Frederick C., ‘Normativity in Neo-Kantianism: Its Rise and Fall’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17:1 (2009).

149 See e.g. Love’s Work, 136-140. As these pages from Love’s Work evince, Rose is not committed to a concept of enlightenment that claims “absolute and universal authority, without awareness of history, language or locality”. (137) However, given Rose’s many references to the possibility of “something understood” (The Broken Middle, xi, see also Judaism and Modernity, 1-10), I take her to be committed to be committed to the possibility of a form of enlightenment. See also Geuss, Outside Ethics, 10: “The idea of some perfect or universal Enlightenment in which one has got everything that is important in the right perspective with the right consequences probably does not make sense, but what follows from that is that there are different degrees of enlightenment and perhaps different ways of being enlightened, not that the concept does not make any sense at all.”
think, for a number of reasons – centrally, for the reason that it serves to specify the twofold orientation of her practice of criticism. As will be explained, for Rose, similar to Kant (and Foucault), the practice of criticism has both a negative and a positive orientation – “negative” in the sense that criticism involves calling into question the authority of reason, “positive” in the sense that through calling into question the authority of reason, criticism affords the possibility for thinking and acting in ways that are enlightened. On this account, what it is, or what it could be, to think and act in ways that are enlightened depends largely on what follows from the process of calling into question the authority of reason. As will be explained, Rose’s critical project diverges from Kant’s critical project on account of a difference within what she takes as following from the practice of criticism. To begin explaining this divergence, I will now turn to explaining the relationship between criticism and law.

_Criticism and law_

About the task of criticism, Kant writes:

That [it involves] reason [taking] on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute a court of justice, by which reason may secure its rightful claims while

---

150 For Kant’s account of the positive and negative aspects of criticism see _Critique of Pure Reason_, Bxiv-Bxxv: “Hence a critique that limits the speculative use of reason is, to be sure, to that extent negative, but because it simultaneously removes an obstacle that limits or even threatens to wipe out the practical use of reason, this critique is also in fact of positive and very important utility, as soon as we have convinced ourselves that there is an absolutely necessary practical use of pure reason (the moral use), in which reason unavoidably extends itself beyond the boundaries of sensibility, without needing any assistance from speculative reason, but in which it must also be made secure against any counteraction from the latter, in order not to fall into contradiction with itself.”
dismissing all its groundless pretensions, and this not by mere
decrees but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws;
and this court is none other than the critique of pure reason itself.\textsuperscript{151}

In this passage, Kant compares the practice of criticism to a “court”\textsuperscript{152} – a court
in which reason is tasked with the investigation of itself. The aim of this
investigation is to determine the “laws” of reason.\textsuperscript{153} Although it is not explicit
within this passage, the “laws” of reason to which Kant here refers are concepts
– specifically, concepts that constitute cognition, and which have been
determined as lawful through the practice of criticism.\textsuperscript{154} For Kant, to state it

\textsuperscript{151} Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axi-Axii. See Finlayson, ‘Hegel, Adorno and the Origins of Immanent
Criticism’, 30: “Kant gave his own technical philosophical meanings to the quasi-technical term ‘Kritik’ that
he inherited, from English and French with referred to the scholarly practice of restoring and authenticating
ancient manuscripts. One of the most important of Kant’s technical meanings is to vindicate philosophical
concept or principle by demonstrating the right to its legitimate use.”

\textsuperscript{152} For Rose’s account of this comparison see Dialectic of Nihilism, Chapter 1: From Metaphysics to
Jurisprudence. Additionally, see Cutfrofello, Andrew, Discipline and Critique: Kant, Poststructuralism, and
the Problem of Resistance (New York: SUNY, 1994), 6: “In Kant’s view, the entire critique of reason must
be juridical because reason itself is inherently juridical, acting like a court even when it is not engaged in
critique. Gillian Rose calls attention to this fact, characterising the invitation to critique as an invitation to
witness a court that is always already in session.” See also Deligiorgi, Kant and the Culture of
Enlightenment, 8: “Kant starts with a conception of reason that is already normative [. . .].”

\textsuperscript{153} In other words, determine the authority of reason / the normative force of reason. See Pollok, Kant’s
Theory of Normativity, 2: “the ubiquity of concepts such as ‘law,’ ‘lawfulness,’ ‘rule,’ ‘objectivity,’ ‘validity,’
and the like in Kant’s major writings serves as a first clue to the centrality of problems of normativity [. . .
and] that Kant does have a systematic account of what it means for judgments to be normative.”

\textsuperscript{154} In other words, for Kant, concepts are “rules” / “norms”. See Wood, Allen W., Kant (Oxford: Blackwell,
2005), 173: “[For Kant] to talk about law (or right) at all is always to speak normatively, not merely to report
what will happen but to say what ought to happen according to a set of norms that conform at least minimally
to certain rational standards.” See also Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, 115: “[Kant’s] normative
notion of “universal validity” [. . . the point of] which [. . .] is that the unity produced by the rule-governed act
is taken to be not merely one that holds for a given perceiver under contingent conditions, but one that
possesses normative force because it is claimed to hold for any discursive cognizer (hence its universal
validity).” See also Longuenesse, Béatrice, Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in
the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Charles T. Wolfe (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000), Chapter 2: Concept and Object: The Concept as Rule; Neiman, Susan,
simply, to determine a concept as lawful is to determine it as necessary and universal.\textsuperscript{155} On Kant’s account, therefore, the practice of criticism ascertains the authority of reason through determining the concepts with which we think, and on the basis of which we act, as necessary and universal.

To repeat, the aim of this section is to explain how Rose’s practice of criticism implies both a continuation and a correction of Kant’s practice of criticism. Like Kant, Rose thinks that the practice of criticism involves, centrally, calling into question the authority of reason. However, unlike Kant, Rose does not think that the practice of criticism results in the ascertainment of the necessity and universality of reason.\textsuperscript{156} In other words, Rose does not think that Kant’s practice of criticism does, or could, afford the authority of reason to which it aspires. To begin explaining both why Rose does not think this, and what she does think the practice of criticism results in, I will now turn to explaining one of the central assumptions on which Kant’s practice of criticism works – that is, the assumption that there is a rigorous distinction between the empirical and the transcendental. For reasons that will be explained, Rose contests this distinction – arguing that it leaves Kant’s practice of criticism incapable of relating to, and therefore reconfiguring, the reality of reason.

\textsuperscript{155} See e.g. Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, A111: “Unity of synthesis in accordance with empirical concepts would be entirely contingent, and, were it not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it. But in that case all relation of cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appearances would lack connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws, and would thus be intuition without thought, but never cognition, and would therefore be as good as nothing for us.”

\textsuperscript{156} See esp. Rose, \textit{Judaism and Modernity}, 2-5 and \textit{Love’s Work}, 134-140.
Kant makes a rigorous distinction between, in his words, the “question of fact” and the “question of right [or question of law].” In making this distinction, Kant is, as Henry Allison writes, “alluding to the juridical sense of “deduction” as the determination of a legal right or claim to possession of some property, as opposed to the fact of possession and how it was acquired.” The “possessions” in question concern “the many concepts [. . .] that constitute the very mixed fabric of human cognition.” This distinction informs Kant’s practice of criticism in that it informs the sense of “lawfulness” that he takes the practice of criticism to be tasked with determining. For Kant, the “lawfulness” of our concepts cannot be determined by way of experience. This is because experience, for Kant, refers only to the processes through which concepts are “encountered” (or “acquired”), which is contingent. Rather, determining the “lawfulness” of our concepts demands that they be “transcendentally deduced” – that is, determined as the necessary and universal “conditions of the possibility of experience.” For my purposes, what is important here is recognising both how the “lawfulness” that Kant takes the practice of criticism to be tasked with determining bears the marks

157 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A84-A85: “Jurists, when they speak of entitlements and claims, distinguish in a legal matter between the questions about what is lawful (quid juris) and which concerns the fact and since they demand proof of both, call the first, which is to establish the entitlement or the legal claim, the deduction.”

158 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, 181.

159 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A85.

160 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A94-B127, A111 cited above n155. See also Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, 182: “By the “lawfulness” of the use of such concepts Kant means their warrant, which in their case cannot be provided by experience. Although Kant does not here specify why this is the case, we know from the Introduction to the Critique that it is because such concepts and the propositions in which they are used make a claim for strict universality and necessity, which cannot be justified empirically.”

161 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A771-B799.
of necessity and universality, and how this task works on the assumption of their being a rigorous distinction between the empirical and the transcendental.\footnote{This brief account of Kant’s construal of the relationship between criticism and law is oriented, centrally, towards accounting for Rose’s construal this relationship – or, more specifically, towards accounting for her renewal of critical thought. Given this orientation, it might be objected that I am overemphasising Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason – overemphasising because Rose’s reading of Kant involves engagements with, among other works, the Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason and Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (see esp. Dialectic of Nihilism, Chapter 1: From Metaphysics to Jurisprudence, Chapter 2: Law and the Categories). In other words, it might be objected that I am emphasising Kant’s theoretical works over his practical works. In response to this possible objection I would claim that, in the case of both his theoretical and his practical works, Kant adheres to the same rigorous distinction between the transcendental and the empirical – that is, the distinction he develops within the Critique of Pure Reason, and of which I have here given a brief account. To make this point specific to the concept of “law”, it can be said that, for Kant, the lawfulness of reason, be it theoretical or practical, derives a priori (i.e. transcendently) from pure reason. See e.g. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated and edited by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4:389, 4:409, 4:412; Critique of Practical Reason, 5:15-5:16: “It is pure reason that itself contains the standard for the critical examination of every use of it. It is therefore incumbent upon the Critique of Practical Reason as such to prevent empirically conditioned reason from presuming that it, alone and exclusively, furnishes the determining ground of the will.” For more on this common ground between Kant’s theoretical and practical works see also e.g. Ameriks, Karl, Interpreting Kant’s Critiques (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), Introduction: The Common Ground of Kant’s Critiques, Korsgaard, Christine, ‘Introduction’, in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated and edited by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), O’Neill, Constructions of Reason, Chapter 1: Reason and Politics in the Kantian Enterprise.} It is on account of this sense of “law” – that is, the sense of law that bears the marks of necessity and universality – that Rose thinks that Kant’s practice of criticism is in need of renewal.\footnote{See Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 211-212.} For Rose, Kant’s practice of criticism, on account of the sense of law that it takes itself as tasked with determining, results in what she calls an “antinomy of law.”\footnote{See esp. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 1-7, 18, 25, 32, 38. See also Rose, The Broken Middle, xiv-xv and Rose, ‘Ethics and Halacha’, 27.} In spite of the important part played by this concept – both within her reading of Kant, and within her challenge to Foucault’s genealogy – it is difficult to specify what Rose means precisely by antinomy of law. This difficulty stems from the fact that this concept plays both a
negative and a positive part within Rose’s critical project – “negative” in the sense that it is with reference to this concept that Rose contests the assumptions on which Kant’s practice of criticism works, “positive” in the sense that it is this concept that informs Rose’s renewal of critical thought. 165 To unpack these two parts, it is necessary to be clear about what Rose is attempting to conceive by way of the concept “antinomy of law”. As I understand it, and as I will explain, what Rose is concerned with conceiving by way of this concept is, for her, what results from the practice of criticism when it is tasked with determining Kant’s sense of the “lawfulness” (or authority) of reason – that is, a “lawfulness” that bears the marks of both necessity and universality. For Rose, such a practice of criticism will inevitably result in a “break” between the universality of our concepts and the particulars of experience that these concepts purport to conceive – a break that is integral to the actuality of reason, but which Kant’s practice of criticism is impotent (or blind) to recognise as such. It is roughly this “break” between universality and particularity that Rose is conceiving by way of the concept “antinomy of law”.

To substantiate this reading of Rose’s concept of the antinomy of law, I think it is helpful to consider, first, the account of cognition with which she can be read as working – that is, an account of cognition in which the concepts of “identity” and “non-identity” both play a part. As will be explained, it is in consequence of this

165 For a similar account see Beck, Anthony, ‘Review of Dialectic of Nihilism’, *British Journal of Sociology* 37.4 (1986), 597. For an alternative, more comprehensive account see Brower Latz, *The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose*, 123: “In The Dialectic of Nihilism, the ‘antinomy of law’ names the speculative unity of law and ethics in absolute ethical life, which, we have seen, is an extrapolation from the ever-shifting diremptions between law and ethics.”
account of cognition that Rose reads Kant's practice of criticism as resulting in an antinomy of law.¹⁶⁶

**Identity and non-identity**

Throughout her work Rose uses the concepts of identity and non-identity to describe her critical project and her practice of criticism. For example, Rose writes:

This is my *apologia pro vita sua*: the only way I can approach my life is by attempting to explore how the difficulties with which I engage may articulate that life. The speculative method of engaging with the new purifications whenever they occur, in order to yield their structuring but unacknowledged third, involves deployment of the resources of reason and of its crisis, of identity and lack of identity. This results in what I call the *facetious style* – the mix of severity and irony, with many facets and forms, which presents the discipline of the difficulty.¹⁶⁷

What does Rose mean by “identity” and “non-identity”? In spite of the central part these concepts play within Rose’s critical project, in general, and within her

---

¹⁶⁶ See Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism*, 5: “In turn this is part of a larger endeavour to retrieve the speculative identity of form and history which appears in these most recent works as the opposition of metaphysics and law. Just as I read Hegel's exposition of the antinomy of law as the speculative identity and non-identity of the state and religion – of 'politics' and 'ideology', as we have come to call them – so I read the antinomy in the work of our contemporaries as presenting us with a pale cousin: the nihilistic identity and non-identity of law and metaphysics. The case beyond nihilism – from Heidegger's 'magical' version to Foucault's 'administrative' version - will be shown to yield to an historical dialectic which it claims to surpass.”

practice of criticism, in particular, commentators on Rose have made little attempt at answering this question. Likewise, and this is explicit within the passage cited above, when Rose does employ the concepts of identity and non-identity, she does so largely without explaining what she means by them. Accordingly, what Rose means by identity and non-identity can only be inferred from what is largely implicit within her work.\(^\text{168}\)

One way of thinking about what Rose means by “identity” and “non-identity” is to, first, think of her as working with an account of cognition that is roughly Kantian – “roughly” on account of it being arguably influenced by her reading of Adorno.\(^\text{169}\)

According to this account, cognition\(^\text{170}\) is accounted for as a composite of concepts and sensory input, such that the latter is subsumed under the former. This process of subsumption (or, in Kant’s terminology, “synthesis”) involves bringing something particular (the “manifold” given to us by way of the senses) under something general / universal (concepts).\(^\text{171}\) On this account, cognition is,  

\(^{168}\) In other words, I recognise that my reading of what Rose’s means by these concepts – or, more specifically, what work these concepts do within Rose’s work – is open to interpretation. I should also add that my reading draws from Adorno’s account, and the accounts of his commentators, of these concepts. However, because my aim is primarily to explicate Rose’s use of “identity” and “non-identity”, the way in which I will draw from these accounts will inevitably be selective. For more substantive accounts of this aspect of Adorno see esp. Adorno, T. W., Adorno, T. W., Lectures on Negative Dialectics, translated by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), O’Connor, Brian, Adorno (London: Routledge, 2013), 76-85, O’Connor, Brian, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of Critical Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2004), Chapters 2 and 3.

\(^{169}\) As was mentioned above (see n92), while Adorno’s remained a resource for Rose, the precise points at which she appealed to this resource remain open to interpretation. For my framing of this account of cognition I am indebted to an account given by Fabian Freyenhagen in Adorno’s Practical Philosophy: Living Less Wrongly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 41-51.

\(^{170}\) For Kant, “cognition” is a technical term. See e.g. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxvi. For the sake of simplicity, I am not using “cognition” strictly as Kant used it.

\(^{171}\) See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 73-74. See also Baumann, Charlotte, ‘Adorno, Hegel and the Concrete Universal’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 37 (2011), 74: “There are two common
in effect, a process of identification – that is, a process in which particulars are identified as falling under something general / universal. One important implication of this account of cognition – especially when understanding what Rose means when she claims that conceptuality is always unavoidable – is that experience is always mediated by concepts. In other words, all thinking is “identity thinking.”

To this extent, Rose can be read as working with a roughly Kantian account of cognition. What causes Rose’s account of cognition to differ from Kant’s relates to the differing assumptions on which this accounts work. While Rose thinks, like Kant, that conceptuality is unavoidable, she also thinks, unlike Kant (and like Adorno), that the processes of subsumption that are constitutive of cognition do, or could, ever completely capture the particulars that they purport to capture.

conceptions of universal concepts: the first, one might say the subjectivist one, takes universals to be ways in which we group things together in our minds. We can arbitrarily use the general terms ‘dog’, ‘red’, ‘living’, ‘Australian’ and so on to categorise things, and each time different objects will be grouped together. The second position would claim on the contrary that universals denominate a real similarity between things; there is or are thus only one or a few universals which truly describe what something is. In Platonian terms dogs are only, however imperfect, copies of the idea of dogness; this universal is therefore essential to what they are. [. . . ] however different both accounts are, they have something in common: in both cases, the universal does unite or subsume particulars, dogs, red things, etc., but it is also something different from them. In the first conception, it is a category we have in our minds; in the other account, it is an idea or a pure form that exists in something like a heaven of ideas, beyond the world of particular things.”

For more on the distinction between describing concepts an entailing generalisations and entailing universalisations see section 3.3. below.

To be sure, Rose only uses the concept “identity thinking” within her account of Adorno, and does so in a way more complicated than I have here done. See esp. The Melancholy Science, 56-59. That said, to the extent that “identity thinking” implies that conceptuality is unavoidable, then using this concept to describe the account of cognition with which Rose works is not entirely misplaced.

I take Rose to be committed to this idea both on account of both her continued use of the concept “non-identity”, and her commitment to a “non-foundational” account of reason. As an aside, it can also be mentioned that, for Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason can be read in terms of both “identity” and “non-identity”. See Adorno, T. W., Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 66: “On the one hand, we think of the Critique of Pure Reason as a kind of identity-thinking. This means that it wishes to reduce the synthetic a priori judgements and ultimately all organised
To think that our concepts always fall short of their objects is not simply to think that we sometimes make use of inappropriate or misguided concepts. Rather, what is here in question is something more fundamental. It concerns Rose’s commitment to the idea that all concepts, even the most seemingly appropriate concepts, fail to capture something significant about the particulars that they purport to, and should, capture. It is, I think, this “something significant” that concepts fail to, and should, capture – or, as Rose writes, these “gaps and silences” of conceptuality – that she can be read as having in mind when using the concept of non-identity.

For the purposes of understanding how these two concepts contribute towards Rose’s practice of criticism, it is important to recognise that, for Rose, the concept of non-identity refers not simply to that which falls short of cognition, of our concepts, but also to the possibility for an alternative, fuller form of cognition – a form of cognition that evinces, in Rose’s words, “different ways towards the good enough justice.” It is, I think, on account of this possibility that Rose couples experience, all objectively valid experience, to an analysis of the consciousness of the subject. It wishes to do this because – to use the language of the later idealists – there is nothing in the world that is not mediated. This means that we have no knowledge apart from what we know through the medium of our reason, apart from what we know as knowing beings. On the other hand, however, this way of thinking desires to rid itself of mythology, of the illusion that man can make certain ideas absolute and hold them to be the whole truth simply because he happens to have them within himself. In this sense Kantian philosophy is one that enshrines the validity of the non-identical in the most emphatic way possible. It is a mode of thought that is not satisfied by reducing everything that exists to itself. Instead, it regards the idea that all knowledge is contained in mankind as a superstition and, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, it wishes to criticize it as it would criticize any superstition. It wishes to say that to make an absolute of everything human is not significantly different from endorsing the customs of shamans who regard their own rites as objectively valid, even though in reality they are no more than subjective abracadabra.”

175 See Freyenhagen in Adorno’s Practical Philosophy, 43.
176 See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 52. See Chapter 3 for my account of this aspect of Rose’s work.
177 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 8-9.
her use of “non-identity” with the word “should”. For Rose, to recognise that our concepts entail a lack of identity is to recognise that they entail certain injustices towards their objects – injustices that should be, and can only be corrected through the work within which we attempt to re-conceive or “re-cognise” our concepts.\(^{179}\) This is a point that Rose develops within her own explication of the concept of non-identity as Adorno understands it.

>[C]ognition of non-identity lies exactly in that it also identifies, but to a greater extent and in a different way from identity thinking. This cognition seeks to say what something is, while identity thinking says under what something falls, of what it is a specimen or representative, what it thus is not itself.\(^{180}\)

On this account, identity and non-identity are always coupled in that non-identity refers to that which identity thinking always fails to think, but which it should think,

---


\(^{180}\) Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 150. Cited and translated by Rose, *The Melancholy Science*, 57. See also Adorno, T. W., *Lectures on Negative Dialectics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 8: “Now you may well say, this discrepancy is not necessarily a contradiction. But I believe that it offers us a first insight into the necessity of dialectical thinking. Any such predicative judgement that A is B, that A = B, contains a highly emphatic claim. It is implied, firstly, that A and B are truly identical. Their non-identity not only does not become manifest; if it does manifest itself, then according to the traditional rules of logic, predicative logic, that identity is disputed. Or else we say: the proposition A = B is self-contradictory because our experience and our perception tell us that B is not A. Thus because the forms of our logic practise this coercion on identity, whatever resists this coercion necessarily assumes the character of a contradiction. If, therefore, as I observed at the outset, the concept of contradiction plays such a central role in a negative dialectics, the explanation for it is to be found in the structure of logical thought itself, which is defined by many logicians (though not in the way it operates in the various current trends in mathematical logic) by the validity of the law of contradiction. And what this means then is that everything that contradicts itself is to be excluded from logic – and, in fact, everything that does not fit in with this positing of identity does contradict itself. Thus the fact that our entire logic and hence our entire thinking is built upon this concept of contradiction or its denial is what justifies us in treating the concept of contradiction as a central concept in a dialectics, and in subjecting it to further analysis.”
and can potentially come to think through the work of “re-cognition”. The experience of identity and non-identity plays a pivotal part within Rose’s critical project in that, as will be explained, Rose takes the central task of criticism to consist in yielding the experience of identity and non-identity – that is, yielding the experience of the ways in which our concepts both succeed and fail to conceive their objects.

In this account I have claimed, among other things, that Rose associates a “should” with the experience of identity and non-identity. Having claimed this, it is important that I now qualify this – that is, explain what work this “should” is doing within Rose’s critical project. This is important because the reading of Rose’s critical project that I will, within this thesis, present is one in which Rose’s practice of criticism is concerned not with affording normative conclusions, but with calling normativity into question.181 For some commentators, to read Rose in this way is to implicate her critical project in what Fabian Freyenhagen has called the “Problem of Normativity.”182 To state it simply, this problem concerns the confusions that can arise when normative claims (e.g. claims about what we should think, do, believe, admire, etc.) are made without the foundations to do so, at least not justifiably.

Like the critical projects of Foucault and Adorno, albeit not nearly to the same extent, Rose has been challenged along these lines – that is, the normative claims of her critical project are, for some, seemingly precluded by the practice

---

181 Or, and this is to say the same thing, calling the relationship between theory and praxis into question.

182 Freyenhagen, *Adorno’s Practical Philosophy*, 7. For Freyenhagen, the Problem of Normativity refers to a set a challenges to which Adorno’s work has been subject. Accordingly, my application involves a simplification.
of criticism upon which this project is based. If Rose’s practice of criticism is, as I think it is, concerned with calling into question the authority of reason or, to be more specific, the normative force of conceptuality, then it would seem to preclude the possibility of her making normative claims. Here, to repeat, I am concerned with the “should” that Rose associates with the experience of identity and non-identity. As I read it, this “should” refers strictly to the practice of criticism as Rose construes it – not to what follows from this practice of criticism. In other words, for Rose, we should engage in a rational critique of rationality because it is through this practice of criticism that we come to recognise the “actuality of reason” – that is, the ways in which reason is always both unavoidable and partial. This is, for Rose, what it is for criticism to yield the experience of identity and non-identity.

A tension arises, however, when this construal of criticism is considered in the context of Rose’s critical project more generally. For Rose, the experience of identity and non-identity is important because it is this experience that affords the ability to reason by way of “speculative identities” – identities that stem from the experience of identity and non-identity, and which are, in her words, “uncertain and problematic, [and which] gradually [acquire] meaning as the result of a series of contradictory experiences.” For Rose, speculative identities are, in turn, important because they afford a reason for continuing to use reason – for they suggest that by continuing to use reason we will be better placed to recognise

---

183 I am here thinking in particular of Gorman, Anthony, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 35.
184 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 10. I am here echoing a passage from Adorno. See Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 85: “Today as in Kant’s time, philosophy demands a rational critique of reason, not its banishment or abolition.” See also Bernstein, Adorno, 1-4.
185 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 52.
the reconfigurations that reason undergoes, and thereby better placed to play a part in such reconfigurations. The tension is whether Rose’s critical project implies that criticism affords normative conclusions – conclusions about what we should think / do for speculative identities to acquire their meaning.

More will be said about this tension below. I make reference to it here simply to introduce a problem – that is, the problem that Rose’s critical project is implicated in the problem of normativity – that will appear and reappear through what follows. Thinking about Rose’s critical project and Foucault’s method of genealogy through the lens of this problem will prove pivotal for the overarching argument of this thesis. As will be explained, Rose’s critical project is, in part, unclear – unclear in a way that gives the impression of it falling foul of the problem of normativity. In other words, Rose appears to be making normative claims about what should follows from her practice of criticism – normative claims that her practice of criticism appears to preclude. In short, Rose’s critical project appears to be normatively confused. I do not think that this is the case. However, demonstrating that it is not the case demands a clarification of Rose’s practice of criticism – a clarification that, I will argue, is afforded by Foucault’s method of genealogy.

Having explained what Rose means by “identity” and “non-identity”, and giving an indication of the part they play within Rose’s critical project, I will now return to her reading of Kant – and explain how these concepts inform her argument that Kant’s practice of criticism results in an antinomy of law.

186 See section 3.2.
Antinomy of law

To repeat, my aim in explaining Rose’s account of cognition – an account largely inferred from Rose’s use of the concepts of identity and non-identity – is to develop her concept of the antinomy of law. I said above that this concept captures Rose’s argument that Kant’s practice of criticism inevitably results in a “break” between the universality of our concepts and the particulars that our concepts purport to conceive – a break that is integral to the actuality of reason, but which Kant’s practice of criticism is impotent to recognise as such. In the light of what has been said above about what Rose means by “identity” and “non-identity”, this argument can be developed as follows.

For Rose, to task criticism, as Kant does, with ascertaining the necessary and universal laws of reason is to assume that our concepts can adequately conceive the particulars that they purport to conceive. Rose does not assume this. Rather, as has been explained, she thinks that our concepts inevitably fail to adequately conceive the particulars that they purport to conceive. It is, I think, on account of this that Rose construes Kant’s way of conceiving law as resulting in an antinomy – specifically, an antinomy between universals and particulars. Implied by Rose’s commitment to the concepts of identity and non-identity, is the thought that both universals and particulars play a dynamic part in the actuality of reason – that is, the experience of reason actually used, be it for the purposes of

187 See e.g. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 15-16. I am here accounting for only one of the antinomies that, for Rose, result from Kant’s concept of law. Rose also references the following “oppositions”: “metaphysics and science; theory and practice; freedom and necessity; history and form” (Dialectic of Nihilism, 212). See also Rose, ‘Ethics and Halacha’, 27: “Law in Kant is split demonstrably in these two ways into four meanings: morality / legality; necessity / freedom.”
understanding or explaining why we think and act in certain ways, or why we should think and act in certain ways. For Rose, Kant’s way of conceiving law, because it works on the assumption that there is a rigorous distinction between the transcendental and the empirical, keeps universals separate from particulars. This separation — a separation in which the particulars and the contingencies of experience are kept from informing and reconfiguring the concepts we use to make sense of these particulars and these contingencies — is, broadly speaking, what Rose’s concept of the antinomy of law is concerned with capturing.\textsuperscript{188}

With the aim of explaining Rose’s renewal of critical thought, what needs to be emphasised here is that, for Rose, it is not simply that Kant’s practice of criticism results in an antinomy between universality and particularity, but also that it does so blindly.\textsuperscript{189} Such blindness is, again, a consequence of the rigorous distinction between the empirical and the transcendental on which Kant’s practice of criticism works. For Rose, through working on this assumption — that is, through working on the assumption that the contingencies and particularities of experience can in no way contribute to the task of criticism to determine the lawfulness of our concepts — Kant’s practice of criticism is blind to the ways in which our concepts inevitably fail to adequately conceive the particulars that they purport to conceive. For Rose, therefore, rather than determining the authority of reason, Kant’s transcendental approach to criticism demarcates “new areas of ignorance.” Rose writes:

\textsuperscript{188} I write “broadly speaking” because I recognise that I am passing over in silence much of Rose’s complex argument. For a fuller account see esp. Brower Latz, \textit{The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose}, Chapter 3: Jurisprudential Wisdom.

\textsuperscript{189} See Rose, \textit{Dialectic of Nihilism}, 211: “Kant’s strange way of not answering his own question".
Kant’s intention to justify cognition before practising it (method) was also intended to demonstrate that justified cognition is restricted to possible objects of experience. However, if the idea of a justification of thought prior to its employment (method) is contradictory, then thought has made a mistake. It does not know itself at the very point where its self-examination commences. The demarcation of legitimate theoretical and practical knowledge turns out to be the demarcation of new areas of ignorance [. . .].

For Rose to say that Kant’s criticism results in an antinomy of law is, therefore, for her to say two things. First, that the “lawfulness” it is tasked with ascertaining results in an antinomy between universals and particulars. Second, that it, on account of the strict separation between the empirical and the transcendental that this “lawfulness” assumes, cannot recognise this antinomy. It is on account of these two things that, for Rose, Kant’s criticism, rather than determine the authority of reason, leaves us ignorant about the actuality of this authority.

Before turning to explain how this reading of Kant’s practice of criticism informs Rose’s renewal of critical thought, it is worth considering whether Rose is correct to use the concept of antinomy in the way that I have described her as doing. On this account, antinomy describes the relationship between concepts (universals)

\[190\] Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 47. For an alternative account of the difficulties that arise as a result of Kant’s “method” see Brandom, Reason, Genealogy, and the Hermeneutics of Magnanimity. In this essay, Brandom (following Hegel) describes Kant as having a “two-stage story” and writes: “The Kantian division of semantic and epistemic labour seems unable to exclude the possibility that “whatever seems right to me is right” – in which case the issue of correctness does not get a grip (as Wittgenstein puts the point). There is nothing in the picture to confer determinate contents on concepts, nor to hold them in place as determinate.”
and what concepts purport to conceive (particulars). The question is: Does this relationship constitute an antinomy? Would it not be better, or more accurate, to describe this relationship as entailing a tension or a contradiction? While contradiction is a crucial concept within Rose’s work, it would be a mistake to equate it with her use of antinomy. In using the concept of antinomy in the way that she does, I think that Rose is gesturing towards an important aspect of her renewal of critical thought – that is, her commitment to the difficulty of reason.

For Kant, an antinomy is, in his words, “a decisive test, which must necessarily disclose to us a fault that lies hidden in the presuppositions of reason.” Rose, I think, works with a similar sense of antinomy. The difference is that, whereas

---

192 As will be explained, for Rose, the antinomies of reason are irreducible. In this respect, her critical project can be compared with Hegel. See e.g. Hegel, G. W. F., *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline: Part 1: Science of Logic*, translated by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), §48: “This thought that the contradiction posited in the realm of reason by the determinations of the understanding is essential and necessary must be regarded as one of the most important and profound advances in the philosophy of recent times. The resolution is as trivial as the view is profound.” As to why Hegel thought this view “profound” see Priest, Graham, *Beyond the Limits of Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 103-104: “Hegel thinks that the Kantian Antinomies are but the tip of an iceberg. All our concepts, and not just the generated infinities of the Antinomies, are embroiled in antinomic arguments. These are the arguments which drive forward our thinking from one category to the next, and so generate the dialectical progression of categories in the Logic.” According, to reduce (or “resolve”) the antinomies of reason would be to bring its capacity to change to a standstill. That said, for Rose, to simply recognise the antinomies of reason has a similar result. (See Rose, ‘From Speculative to Dialectical Thinking’ 60-61. Here, Rose argues that Adorno’s *Negative Dialectics* has such a result.) The task, for Rose, is to work through these antinomies, without thereby reducing them.
193 See Rose, *The Broken Middle*, 206 n217: “While ‘contradiction’ is a logical term, which, applied to social structure, implies possible resolution, ‘aporia’ is prelogical, it refers to lack of way, and implies no exit from its condition.”
194 Kant, *Prolegomena*, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, §52b.
195 See Rose, *The Melancholy Science*, 70: “An antinomy is a conflict of two arguments or doctrines, each of which taken in itself is cogent, but they cannot both be valid, and one cannot establish superiority over the other.”
for Kant these faults or errors indicate the need to “purify” reason,\textsuperscript{196} for Rose they indicate the need to recognise, and consequently work through, the “difficulty” of reason.\textsuperscript{197} As has been mentioned, and as will be developed, the difficulty of reason is, for Rose, a result of it being always both unavoidable and partial – unavoidable because we need concepts to make sense of the particulars of experience; partial because these concepts will always fail to completely capture, or make sense of, the particulars of experience.\textsuperscript{198}

\textsuperscript{196} See Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, B25: “Such a science should not be called a \textit{doctrine}, but only a \textit{critique} of pure reason, and its benefit, with respect to speculation, would actually be only negative, serving not for the expansion but only for the purification of our reason, and for keeping reason free of error, which is already a very great gain.”

\textsuperscript{197} See esp. Rose, \textit{Judaism and Modernity}, 1-10. Rose’s insistence that we “work through” difficulties – be they epistemological, social, political, ethical, or whatever – rather than attempt to dissolve them, or purify them, is one that pervade her work. Such instance is at its most exuberant in \textit{The Broken Middle}. See Bernstein, \textit{Recovering Ethical Life}, 8. See also Rose, Gillian, ‘O! untimely death. / Death!’ in \textit{Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 141: “The virtuous life involves some \textit{impure} relation between power in the human psyche and in human association.” For an account of such “impurity” see Williams, “‘The Sadness of the King’”, 31-32.

\textsuperscript{198} On my reading, the “antinomy of law”, which I have explicated in terms of the relationship between the universality (or lawfulness) of concepts and the particularities of experience is, for Rose, irreducible – “irreducible” because, for Rose, thinking about the world in which we act is irreducibly antinomical: just as our concepts can exert authority over experience, experience can exert authority over our concepts. For a different response to a similar antinomy see McDowell, John, \textit{Mind and World} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), Here McDowell describes himself as responding to “an antinomy: experience both must [. . .] and cannot [. . .] stand in judgement over our attempts to make up our minds about how things are.” (xii-xiii) He then goes on to write that this antinomy is an expression “of a deeper anxiety – an inchoately felt threat that a way of thinking we find ourselves falling into leaves mind simply out of touch with the rest of reality, not just questionably capable of getting to know about it.” (xiii) In other words, as Paul Franks notes, the threat of “post-Kantian scepticism”. (See Franks, Paul W., \textit{All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 199-200 n114) In \textit{Mind and World}, McDowell’s aim is “not to answer sceptical questions, but to begin to see how it might be intellectually respectable to ignore them, to treat them as unreal, in the way that common sense has always wanted to do.” (113) Rather, “we need to exorcize the questions rather than set about answering them.” (xxiv) Accordingly, while McDowell is working with a similar sense of “antinomy” as Rose, he, unlike Rose, is concerned with exorcising it.
**Rose’s renewal of critical thought**

Having now explained what I take to be the central aspect of Rose’s reading of Kant, I will now explain how this reading informs Rose’s renewal of critical thought. Centrally, Rose’s renewal of critical thought is motivated by a concern with avoiding the ignorance that she, as has been explained, construes as the consequence of Kant’s transcendental approach to criticism. To say that Rose’s renewal of critical thought is concerned, centrally, with avoiding this ignorance is to say it is concerned with recognising the antinomy of law.\(^{199}\) In other words, Rose’s renewal of critical thought involves tasking criticism with the “struggle” between the universality of our concepts and the particularity that they purport to conceive.\(^{200}\) For Rose, therefore, it is not through Kant’s “purification” of reason that its authority is determined. Rather, as has been suggested and as will be explained, it is through this struggle – that is, the experience of the difficulty of reason – that the authority (or “lawfulness”) of reason is determined.\(^ {201}\) Rose writes:

---

199 See e.g. Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism*, 212: “The procedure in this work has been both more implicated and more preliminary; by drawing out the legal arguments and the legal history at the heart of post-metaphysical reason, an attempt has been made to draw us back into the antinomy of culture, into the tradition which holds us, and, so, to open it again – in this aporetic way - under the title, if there must be one, of jurisprudential wisdom.”

200 Rose’s idea of “struggling” with the relationship between universality and particularity is one that I will return to below. As to the origin of Rose’s use of the word “struggle” to conceive of our relationship with, and within, this relationship, it is possible that it stems from her reading of Kierkegaard. See *The Broken Middle*, 23. Here Rose cites Kierkegaard: “The whole thing is a wrestling match in which the universal breaks with the exception, wrestles with him in conflict and strengthens him through this wrestling . . . The legitimate exception is reconciled in the universal . . .” (Kierkegaard, Søren, *Fear and Trembling / Repetition*, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, 227.) See also Rose, Gillian, ‘Hermann Cohen: Kant Among the Prophets’, in *Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 120. For more on Rose’s reading of Kierkegaard see Lloyd, ‘Gillian Rose: Making Kierkegaard Difficult Again’. See also Bernstein, Adorno, 4.

201 See also Rose, *The Broken Middle*, 155-156: “How to represent the aporia between everyone and every ‘one’ is the difficulty – difficulty of the difficulty.”
The difficulty with reason, theoretical and practical (ethical), lies not in its initial, abstract universality; the difficulty of reason rests on whether the initial, abstract universal (the meaning or idea) comes to learn: whether something can happen to it; whether (to recall the one with a difficult friend, who discovered it was a matter of friends in difficulty) one abstractly universal individual enters into substantial interaction with another abstractly universal individual.\textsuperscript{202}

The claim that Rose’s practice of criticism involves struggling with the relationship between universals and particulars is one I base on the claims of both Rose and her commentators.\textsuperscript{203} That said, what more can be said about this struggle? One way of answering this question is to think of Rose as seeking to replace the asymmetrical relationship between universals and particulars, which underpins Kant’s practice of criticism, with a symmetrical relationship. Kant’s practice of criticism is underpinned by an asymmetrical relationship between universals and particulars in the sense that it, to repeat, works on the assumption that the contingencies and particularities of experience can in no way contribute towards the universality (or lawfulness) of our concepts.\textsuperscript{204} Accordingly, to say that Rose

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{202} Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 8. See also Rose, The Broken Middle, Chapter 5: ‘Love and the State: Varnhagen, Luxemburg and Arendt’. In this chapter, through her readings of Varnhagen, Luxemburg and Arendt, Rose accounts for what it is for an individual to relate to, be excluded and changed by the “abstract universal”. For a lucid account of this aspect of Rose’s work see esp. Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 88-98.
\item \textsuperscript{203} See Rose, The Broken Middle, xiii. See Schick, A Good Enough Justice, 38.
\item \textsuperscript{204} In using the terminology of “symmetry” and “asymmetry” I am following Brandom. See esp. Reason, Genealogy, and the Hermeneutics of Magnanimity. See also Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas, 66-68.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
is seeking to replace this asymmetrical relationship with one that is symmetrical.

is to say that she is seeking a practice of criticism that works on the assumption that, just as the universality of our concepts can exert authority over the particulars of experience, the particulars of experience can exert authority over the universality of our concepts. To assume this is, in other words, to assume both that our concepts can be wrong, and that we can, with work, make them “less wrong”.

For Rose, it is this reciprocity (or “dynamic” motivated by the “unanticipated outcome of idea and act”) that constitutes the “actuality of the concept”.

For Rose, therefore, a renewal of critical thought involves, centrally, taking the practice of criticism to be that through which we struggle with (as opposed to purify) the relationship between universality and particularity – that is, struggle to recognise the respects in which our concepts are wrong and, on the basis of this recognition, work to make our concepts less wrong. Accordingly, Rose’s critique

---

205 I am here using an expression from Freyenhagen’s *Adorno’s Practical Philosophy*, and do so because I take it as an alternative to Rose’s expression “good enough justice”.

206 Rose, *Judaism and Modernity*, 6. Although I am here describing Rose in contrast with Kant, it is worth mentioning that similar description have been made of Kant. See e.g. Deligiorgi, *Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment*, 8: “Kant starts with a conception of reason that is already normative, arguing that if reason is to be authoritative, it must be autonomous, and if it is to be autonomous, it must be free. As a result, the character of a culture of enlightenment is essentially agonistic and dynamic. This is because it is through disagreement and criticism that we make clear to ourselves our implicit normative commitments and are able to stake our membership in a potentially universal culture of enlightenment. Making public use of one’s reason is always at the same time a testing of the boundaries of interpretation of the principles that shape this culture.” See also O’Neill, *Constructions of Reason*, 18: “To have a tribunal is not to have an algorithm that the tribunal follows. If that were what tribunals did, they would be redundant. Tribunals deliberate and reach verdicts; there are moves that they may not and had better not make as they move toward a verdict, but their charters and procedures do not fully determine every move. Theirs is the genuinely practical task of judging; hence the tribunal provides an appropriate image for a critique or judging of reason. If Kant depicts the authority of reason as a tribunal that judges and deliberates, then presumably he thinks that reason too does not consist of algorithms for thinking or acting, which can be formulated as abstract rules.”

of Kant’s way of conceiving law is not strictly a critique of his idea that certain of our concepts have the mark of universality. Rather, it is a critique of the idea that such universality can only be achieved transcendentally. For Rose, by contrast, the universality of our concepts, and the consequent authority of reason, can only be achieved through the continuous work of attending to the actuality of our concepts. Rose writes:

Reason in modernity cannot be said to have broken the promise of universality – unless we have not kept it; for it is only we who can keep such a promise by working our abstract potentiality into the always difficult but enriched actuality of our relation to others and to ourselves. Whether disturbing or joyful, reason is full of surprises.\(^{208}\)

On this account, Rose’s renewal of critical thought – which has here been presented as a renewal of Kant’s practice of criticism – entails a twofold and continuous task: to continually use reason to call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in way that affords the resources for reconfiguring the authority of reason.\(^{209}\) For Rose, as I read her, it is through this practice of criticism that we remain continuously attentive to the actuality of reason – an actuality in which our concepts are often wrong, but which can be made less wrong – and thereby remain attentive to the ways in which reason could

\(^{208}\) Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 9. See also Mourning Becomes the Law, 72-73.

\(^{209}\) As I mentioned above (see section 0.3.), within this thesis my concern is to make explicit what I take to be implicit within Rose’s difficult conceptuality. This description of Rose’s renewal of critical thought is, in part, implicit in the following: “To keep this work in the middle, yet risk comprehension of the broken middle, means returning beginnings to their middle and middles to their beginnings incessantly. This alertness to implication, in its facetious and suspended presentation, yields the pathos of the concept.” (Rose, The Broken Middle, 308-309)
potentially be reconfigured, transformed, enriched, enlightened on account of its actuality.

**Aporia**

Before summarising this section, it is important to relate this account of Rose’s practice of criticism to her concept “aporia”.\(^{210}\) About this concept, Rose writes:

> Philosophy as I practise it has a different orientation based on a different logic and a different story. From Plato to Marx, I would argue, it is always possible to take the claims and conceptuality of philosophical works [ . . .] *deterministically* or *aporetically* – as fixed, closed conceptual structures, colonising being with the garrison of thought; or according to the difficulty which the conceptuality represents by leaving gaps and silences in the mode of representation.\(^{211}\)

Rose’s practice of criticism – that is, as has been explained in this section, the practice in which reason is used to continually call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for reconfiguring the authority of reason – yields an *aporia*. Of this word, Liddell and Scott give the

\(^{210}\) My concern is to here adumbrate Rose’s construal of the “aporia”. For an alternative account see also Greer, Clare, *A Critical Conversation Between Gillian Rose and John Milbank and Its Implications for an Aporetic Political Theology* (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Manchester, 2011), 28-29. For a more general and detailed account of this concept – specifically, as it occurs within a genealogy of nihilism – see Cunningham, Conor, *Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of Theology* (London: Routledge, 2002), Chapter 10: Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of Theology, Sartre, Lacan, Deleuze, Badiou and Creation out of No-one.

following definitions: “without passage [. . .] I. of places, impassable, pathless, trackless [. . .]. II. Of circumstances, hard to see one’s way through, impracticable, very difficult [. . .].” Given these definitions, to claim that Rose’s practice of criticism yields an *aporia* is to claim, among other things, that it yields an account of rationality / conceptuality which, in Rose’s words, “warns against [. . .] any proscription or prescription, any imposition of ideals, imaginary communities or ‘progressive narrations’. Instead the ‘idealisations’ [or conceptualisations] of philosophy would acknowledge and recognise actuality and not force or fantasise it.”

What Rose is here, in her appeals to the concept of *aporia*, gesturing towards is an account of reason that is, in her words, “non-foundational” – non-

---


213 Rose, *The Broken Middle*, xi. See also 7: “This admitted ‘incorporation’ which is yet no ‘mastery’ may be traced to the implicit, yet astonishing, assumption that any ‘development’ could occur without stumbling blocks or ‘surprises’ – that development does not presuppose *aporia* but excludes it.” See also Rose, *Judaism and Modernity*, 10: “The dubious angel, bathetic angel, suits reason: for the angel continues to try to do good, to run the risk of idealisation, of abstract intentions, to stake itself for ideas and for others. Experience will only accrue if the angel discovers the violence in its initial idea, when that idea comes up against the actuality of others and the unanticipated meanings between them.”

214 See Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, Preface for 1995 reprint. *Judaism and Modernity*, 10; *Love’s Work*, 127-128, 138-139: “There is no rationality without uncertain grounds, without relativism of authority. Relativism of authority does not establish the authority of relativism: it opens reason to new claimants.” For more on what it means to maintain a form of “non-foundationalism” (or “anti-foundationalism”) see e.g. Dreyfus, Hubert and Taylor, Charles, *Retrieving Realism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 41-42: ‘antifoundationalism seems the received wisdom of our time. Almost everyone seems to agree that the great enterprise of Descartes, to build up certain knowledge from undeniable building blocks, is misconceived. Everyone from Quine to Heidegger, passing through various postmodernists, can sign on to this conclusion. [. . .] And yet this wide agreement hides yawning disparities in outlook. There is in fact more than one antifoundationalist argument; and the different approaches start from quite different basic ideas, and generate very different conclusions, and quite divergent anthropological and political consequences. Moreover, the different ways of conceiving the common antifoundationalist thesis account for most of the major differences in outlook. Understanding antifoundationalism as they do, each looks at the others as betraying a grievous lack of understanding of the common point.” See also Marker, William, *Philosophy*
foundational in the sense that there is nothing intrinsically unchangeable or incorrigible about reason, about the concepts by which we reason. This is not to say that Rose thinks that reason / concepts can be easily changed.215 It is precisely, and centrally, this idea that Rose’s renewal of critical thought is concerned with warning against. Rather, if there is to be such change, then it will, on her account, occur gradually through the difficult experience of coming to recognise that the concepts by which we reason inevitably entail “gaps and silences”216 – gaps and silences that demonstrate, in Rose’s words, that “[t]here is no rationality without uncertain grounds, without relativism of authority. Relativism of authority does not establish the authority of relativism: it opens reason to new claimants.”217 Criticism is crucial, for Rose, because it affords a way for us to use reason to gain some control from within this process through which authority has been, is and will continue to be arrogated to reason.218 Accordingly, when Rose refers to reason as “non-foundational”, she does so not because she thinks that there is nothing substantive underpinning it. Rather, she does so because she recognises (albeit often only implicitly / indirectly) that


215 See also n441 below.

216 See also Williams, ‘Logic and Spirit in Hegel’, 116: “To think a particular is to think ‘this, not that; here, not there; now, not then’: to map it on to a conceptual surface by way of exclusions or negations, yet in that act to affirm also its relatedness, its involvement; from empty identity, thinkable only as a kind of absence and indeterminacy, to the specific position, this not that, and by way of that ‘contradictory’ state to arrive at thinking the ‘individual’ as a convergence of the universal and the particular.”

217 Love’s Work, 138-139.

218 For more on Rose’s concept of the arrogation of authority see The Broken Middle. See also Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics, 10: “There are limits to how far one can actually succeed in reflecting and probably even more narrowly set limits to the extent to which one can gain any control. We can never absolutely free ourselves from history and attain an absolutely clear and coherent set of action-orienting views about our political world. It does not follow from this – and it seems self-evidently false – that we are no better off in any respect when we are enlightened about our concepts and theories than when we were not.”
reason has a history – a history in which the authority of reason has been successively opened to new claimants, and which, Rose infers, will continue to be so.

To say, as I have said, that Rose construes criticism as yielding an *aporia* – or, and this is to say the same thing, yields a non-foundational account of reason – is to say two things. First, that she construes it as a way for us to become aware of how the present authority of reason has been actually structured through history. Second, that she construes it as a way for us to thereby become aware of how the present authority of reason could be potentially restructured in the future. In short, criticism, for Rose, is crucial because it reveals to us the *aporia* of reason – that is, reveals to us precisely how the present authority of reason is, on account of its actual foundations, without certain or unchanging foundations.219

In the context of this thesis, relating Rose’s practice of criticism to her concept of *aporia* is important for at least two reasons. First, it serves to clarify the respect in which Rose’s practice of criticism yields a non-foundational account of reason.220 Second, and relatedly, it serves to clarify the basis on which Rose’s critical project has been challenged. For some commentators, as I mentioned briefly above (albeit with different words), that Rose’s practice of criticism should

219 See also Rowlands, *Practical Theology in ‘The Third City’*, 130: “[Criticism, for Rose,] has the power to render us attentive to ‘the broken middle’ of the relation between theory and practice, an *aporetic* relation which inaugurates, as we have seen hinted, most especially in Graham and Arendt, neither despair nor the rush to an impossible healing or transcendence.” See also Love’s *Work*, 124: “If metaphysics is the *aporia*, the perception of the difficulty of the law, the difficult way, then ethics is the development of it, the *diaporia*, being at a loss yet exploring various routes, different ways towards the good enough justice, which recognises the intrinsic and the contingent limitations in its exercise.”

yield an *aporia* seems, to them, to preclude it from having formative or constructive implications.\(^{221}\) I will return to this challenge in chapter three – arguing that it involves a misreading of Rose’s practice of criticism. For Rose, I will argue, the central task of criticism is not that should have constructive implications, but that it should encourage an ability to recognise the “vagueness, ambiguity, indeterminacy, the shifting, unbounded, amorphous nature and sheer randomness”\(^{222}\) of the reality of reason as we use it, and as we experience it being used by others. As to how this does not implicate Rose’s critical project in the aforementioned “Problem of Normativity” will involve, to repeat, clarifying Rose’s critical project by way of Foucault’s method of genealogy.

**Summary**

In this section I have explained Rose’s reading of Kant – specifically, the aspect of this reading that informs her “renewal” of critical thought. As I have explained, Rose’s renewal of critical thought involves both a continuation and a correction of Kant’s practice of criticism – a continuation in that Rose, like Kant, thinks that the task of criticism is to investigate the authority of reason, and a correction in that Rose, unlike Kant, does not think such an investigation discloses the “purity” of reason. Rather, for Rose, criticism discloses the “difficulty” of reason – that is, the ways in which reason is always both unavoidable and partial.\(^{223}\)

---

\(^{221}\) See Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’.


\(^{223}\) See Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, 8: “The crisis of confidence at the end of the eighteenth century deepened when another of the Enlightenment's most cherished convictions was thrown into question – that reason is universal and impartial.” For an alternative account of the “dangers” of thinking of reason, or “reasonableness”, as impartial in the context of political philosophy see Finlayson, *The Political is Political*, Chapter 2: ‘Beware! Beware! The Forest of Sin!’: Reluctant Reflections on Rawls.
1.3. WHAT IS FOUCAULT’S TRANSFORMATION OF CRITICAL THOUGHT?

**What is the aim of this section?**

The aim of this section is to explain how Foucault reads Kant, and how he has this reading inform his method of genealogy. As will be explained, like Rose’s practice of criticism, Foucault’s method of genealogy can be read as implying both a continuation and a correction of Kant’s practice of criticism.

**How has Foucault's reading of Kant been explicated within the secondary literature?**

Unlike Rose’s reading of Kant, much critical attention has been given to Foucault’s reading of Kant. The consequences of this critical attention can be divided roughly into three conclusions. Simplifying greatly, these conclusions can be schematised as follows.\(^224\) For some commentators, Foucault’s reading of Kant entails centrally a rejection of Kant. For other commentators, while Foucault can be read as continuing certain aspects of Kant’s critical project, his way of doing so results, ultimately, in a practice of criticism that is, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, incoherent.\(^225\) For yet others, Foucault continues certain aspects

\(^{224}\) For more detailed accounts of the debates surrounding Foucault’s reading of Kant see esp. Allen, ‘Foucault and Enlightenment’; Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*.

of Kant’s critical project, and does so in a way that is both coherent and resourceful.226

How will I approach Foucault’s reading of Kant?

In my own account of Foucault’s reading of Kant, my aim is not to adjudicate on these different readings of Foucault.227 Rather, my aim is to account for Foucault’s reading of Kant specifically as he takes it as informing his method of genealogy. On this account, an account that will be based largely on Foucault’s essay What is Enlightenment?,228 Foucault’s method of genealogy will be presented as both a continuation and a “transformation” of Kant’s practice of criticism.

What is at the centre of Foucault’s reading of Kant?

At the centre of Foucault’s reading of Kant – at least, as it relates to his method of genealogy – is what he calls the “ethos of enlightenment”.229 For Foucault, what is important within Kant’s critical project is that it is motivated by a certain

227 For a comprehensive and generous account of Foucault in this regard see Koopman, Genealogy as Critique.
229 See Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312: “I do not pretend to be summarising in these few lines either the complex historical event that was the Enlightenment, at the end of the eighteenth century, or the attitude of modernity in the various guises it may have taken on during the last two centuries.”
ethos\textsuperscript{230} or attitude that Foucault describes as “a permanent critique of our historical era.”\textsuperscript{231} Following his reading of Kant’s essay \textit{What is Enlightenment?}\textsuperscript{232} – which Foucault describes as a “minor text”\textsuperscript{233}, but one that “marks the discreet entrance into the history of thought of a question that modern philosophy has not been capable of answering but has never managed to get rid of either”\textsuperscript{234} – and relating it to Kant’s critical project more generally, Foucault writes:

I have been seeking, on the one hand, to emphasise the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation – one that simultaneously problematises man’s relation to the present, man’s historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject – is rooted in the Enlightenment. On the other hand, I have been seeking to stress that the thread which may connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements but, rather, the permanent reactivation of an attitude – that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.\textsuperscript{235}

To this ethos / attitude of “permanent critique” – which is what, to repeat, Foucault reads as motivating Kant’s practice of criticism – Foucault attributes both a “negative” and a “positive” aspect – two aspects that roughly correspond to the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{230} For more on Foucault's concept of “ethos” see e.g. Foucault, Michel, 'Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom', in \textit{Essential Works, Volume 1: Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth}, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), 286.
\item \textsuperscript{231} Foucault, 'What is Enlightenment?', 312.
\item \textsuperscript{232} Kant, ‘An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?’
\item \textsuperscript{233} Foucault, 'What is Enlightenment?', 303.
\item \textsuperscript{234} Foucault, 'What is Enlightenment?', 303.
\item \textsuperscript{235} Foucault, 'What is Enlightenment?', 312.
\end{itemize}
way in which Foucault’s method of genealogy can be said to continue and correct Kant’s practice of criticism.\textsuperscript{236} To develop this point, I will explain each aspect in turn. As will be explained, it is with respect to the negative aspect of the “ethos of enlightenment” that Foucault can be said to continue Kant’s practice of criticism, and it is with respect to the positive aspect that he can be said to transform Kant’s practice of criticism.

\textit{What is the negative aspect of the ethos of enlightenment?}

Foucault begins his account of the negative aspect of the ethos of enlightenment with what he calls the “blackmail”\textsuperscript{237} of the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{238} Foucault accepts that the Enlightenment, “as a set of political, economic, social, institutional, and cultural events”\textsuperscript{239}, is something “on which we still depend in large part”\textsuperscript{240}, and which, therefore, “constitutes a privileged domain for analysis.”\textsuperscript{241} The “blackmail” of the Enlightenment is, for Foucault, to think that this dependence means that we have to be either “for” or “against” the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{242} To think this is to miss the “negative” aspect of the ethos of enlightenment – that is, the way in

\textsuperscript{236} See also Foucault, Michel, “Omnes et Singulatim”: Toward a Critique of Political Reason’, in \textit{Essential Works, Volume 3: Power}, edited by James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2000), 298-299: “[S]ince Kant, the role of philosophy has been to prevent reason from going beyond the limits of what is given in experience; but from the same moment – that is, from the development of modern states and political management of society – the role of philosophy has also been to keep watch over the excessive powers of political rationality, which is rather a promising life expectancy.”


\textsuperscript{238} Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312.

\textsuperscript{239} Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312.

\textsuperscript{240} Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312.

\textsuperscript{241} Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312.

\textsuperscript{242} Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 313.
which Kant, within the historical period of the Enlightenment, introduced\textsuperscript{243} a “certain manner of philosophising.”\textsuperscript{244} Crucially, for Foucault, this manner of philosophising involves:

precisely that one must refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative: you either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism (this is considered a positive term by some and used by others, on the contrary, as a reproach), or else you criticise the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality (which may be seen once again as good or bad).\textsuperscript{245}

In other words, what Foucault is here claiming is that the ethos of enlightenment is negative in that it demands, precisely, the “questioning of all givens.”\textsuperscript{246} Importantly, as Raymond Geuss has pointed out with direct reference to this aspect of Foucault’s reading of Kant, “[to] question something is naturally not necessarily to reject it.”\textsuperscript{247} This point is helpful for a number reasons. Regarding the passage that is here in question, it is helpful in that it serves to clarify what Foucault means by the idea that we “must refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative.”\textsuperscript{248} In the light of

\textsuperscript{243} Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 305: “Now, the way Kant poses the question of \textit{Aufklärung} is entirely different: it is neither a world era to which one belongs, nor an event whose signs are perceived, nor the dawning of an accomplishment. Kant defines \textit{Aufklärung} in an almost entirely negative way, as an \textit{Ausgang}, an "exit," a "way out."”

\textsuperscript{244} Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 313.

\textsuperscript{245} Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 313.

\textsuperscript{246} See Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’, 155.

\textsuperscript{247} Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’, 155.

\textsuperscript{248} Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 313.
Geuss’s point, what Foucault may be understood to mean here is that the ethos of enlightenment demands not that we should necessarily reject anything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative. Rather, for Foucault, it demands that we should call it into question – to investigate the assumptions on which such simplistic and authoritarian alternatives work. This is, in short, the negative aspect of the ethos of enlightenment that Foucault takes to be underpinning Kant’s practice of criticism. It is this negative aspect that Foucault aims to continue within his method of genealogy. To explain this, it is necessary to first explain the positive aspect of the ethos of enlightenment.

**What is the positive aspect of the ethos of enlightenment?**

Foucault begins his account of the positive aspect of the ethos of enlightenment by characterising it as a “limit-attitude.” The ethos of enlightenment – that is, “a philosophical ethos consisting in a [permanent] critique of what we are saying, and doing, through a historical ontology of ourselves” – is, for Foucault, a “limit-attitude” not, as has been explained, because it entails a “gesture of rejection.”

For Foucault, “[w]e have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers.” That is, to employ the terminology used to describe Rose, we have to recognise that we are, when it comes to reason, not working with something pure, something that we can either support or reject, but something that is impure, something in which what we think and do is always both unavoidably and partially implicated, something on which what we think and do

---

249 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315.
250 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315.
251 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315.
252 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315.
is always both unavoidably and partially dependent. On this account, when Foucault insists that “we have to be at the frontiers” he can be construed as insisting that reason, while it limits what we can think and do in the present, it also has a history, a history that can potentially inform the ways in which reason might limit what we can think and how we can act in the future. It is in this respect that Foucault thinks that the ethos of enlightenment has a positive aspect, and it is on account of this positive aspect that Foucault thinks that Kant’s practice of criticism needs to be “transformed”.

Criticism indeed consists of analysing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-over.

---

253 In the context of this thesis, to say that reason can limit what we can think and do in the present is to say that reason can be normative – that is, reasons (or concepts) can function as collective rules or standards for thinking and acting. To say this, however, is not to say that reason is necessarily normative. See e.g. Geuss, Raymond, *Philosophy and Real Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 12: “Dostoyevski’s Underground Man decides he would rather be anything than a piano key or an organ stop. There is nothing unreasonable about not wanting to be fully “rational” if “rationality” is understood in a sufficiently narrow way.”


255 See Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315.

256 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315.
One of the consequences of this “transformation” of critique is that, as Foucault writes, “criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value”.\textsuperscript{257} Rather, for Foucault, it is going to be practiced “as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognise ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.”\textsuperscript{258} In other words, for Foucault, the practice of criticism is the practice of genealogy.

\textit{What is Foucault's transformation of criticism / method of genealogy?}

On this account, it is both the negative and the positive aspects of the ethos of enlightenment that contribute towards Foucault’s method of genealogy.\textsuperscript{259}

Foucault writes:

\begin{quote}
Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’; 315. See section 3.3. below.
Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’; 315.
In what follows, my concern will not be with Foucault’s concrete genealogies. Rather, my concern will be with the practice / method by which such genealogies were able to become manifest. In consequence, my explication of Foucault’s method of genealogy might appear to some to be too abstract – or, and this is to say the same thing, lacking the historical / empirical details on account of which genealogy can be said to have a critical potential. In response to this I would say that genealogy, as with all forms of criticism, “varies according to domain, according to its object, and according to its purpose” (Finlayson, 'Hegel, Adorno and the Origins of Immanent Criticism', n12), and it is for this reason that I have resisted, and will continue to resist, appealing to Foucault's concrete genealogies. In other words, my aim in this thesis is not to give a genealogical critique of something. Rather, it is to adumbrate genealogy as a method of criticising the authority of reason, and use this adumbration to clarify and support a part of Rose’s critical project. That said, for examples of Foucault’s concrete genealogies see e.g. \textit{Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison}, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995); “Omnes et Singulatim”: Toward a Critique of Political Reason’, in \textit{Essential Works, Volume 3: Power}, edited by James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2000), 298-325; \textit{The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction}, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); \textit{The History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure}, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); \textit{The History of Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care of the Self}, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).
\end{quote}
[C]ritique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.

In other words, for Foucault, the practice of genealogy has both a negative and a positive aspect. Genealogy is negative in that it involves calling into question the authority of reason – that is, the universal value that certain concepts come to acquire within the present, and which is tacitly and / or explicitly appealed to when using these concepts to understand and explain how we think and act, and how

---

260 Within this essay Foucault will speak of his sense of criticism as being "genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method." (315) The issues concerning the relationship between Foucault's genealogical and archaeological methodologies are complicated, and exceed the remit of this thesis. That said, such issues relate roughly to the question of whether, for Foucault, the method of genealogy marks a break from or a continuation of the method of archaeology. For more on the relationship between Foucault's genealogical and archaeological methodologies see e.g. Flynn, Thomas R., *Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Volume Two: A Poststructuralist Mapping of History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), Chapter One: Foucault and the Historians, Guttting, Gary, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Han, Béatrice, *Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical*, trans. Edward Pile (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). For a helpful account of these complications see e.g. Koopman, Colin, ‘Foucault’s Historiographical Expansion: Adding Genealogy to Archaeology’, *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 2 (2008), 338–362.

261 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315-316. See Dean, *Critical and Effective Histories*, 49: “What appears to interest Foucault most in these reflections on Kant is the sharpness with which the latter brings the nature of the present into focus, the open-endedness of the present as a project and an arena of individual and collective experiment, the role of contingency, of events and the play of the undefinable space of freedom in the formation of the future.” For more on this "undefined work of freedom" towards which Foucault here gestures see e.g. Hoy, *Critical Resistance*, Chapter 2: Foucault: “Essays in Refusal”; Oksala, Johanna, *Foucault on Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Prozorov, Sergei, *Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
we should think and act. The method by which it does this involves revealing the ways in which such universality is, at root, the result of various complexes of historical and contingent processes. Genealogy is positive in the sense that, for Foucault, the contingencies that it uncovers do not serve to strictly undermine the authority of reason. Rather, such contingencies serve to problematise the authority of reason – that is, serve to show that the authority of reason, because it could have had a different past, could have a different future. This positive aspect is captured, in part, by Guess when he writes:

One of the great uses of history is to show us what, because it has in the past been real, is a fortiori possible. This can give rise to various illusions. Something can be thought to be politically possible now because it actually existed in the past, but it may have been possible in the past because of circumstances that have

---

262 I am here giving a particular account of Foucault’s method of genealogy – an account that takes its focus from the focus on this thesis. More generally, genealogies can be described as follows: “Genealogies articulate problems. But not just any problems. Genealogies do not, for instance, take up those problems that come with supposed solutions readily apparent, or those problems that appear difficult to many but are simple for those few who are in the know. Genealogies are generally not targeted at problems that are themselves readily apparent to everyone or even just to everyone who ought to know them. Genealogies are concerned, rather, with submerged problems. The problems of genealogy are those problems found below the surfaces of our lives – the problems whose itches feel impenetrable, whose remedies are ever just beyond our grasp, and whose very articulations require a severe work of thought. These submerged problems are those that condition us without our fully understanding why or how. They are depth problems in that they are lodged deep inside of us all as the historical conditions of possibility of our present ways of doing, being, and thinking. Yet despite their depth, these problems are also right at the surface insofar as they condition us in our every action, our every quality, our every thought, our every sadness and smile.” (Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 1)

263 See also Butler, ’What is Critique?’: “He will be particularly interested in the problem of how that delimited field forms the subject and how, in turn, a subject comes to form and reform those reasons. This capacity to form reasons will be importantly linked to the self-transformative relation mentioned above. To be critical of an authority that poses as absolute requires a critical practice that has self-transformation at its core.” I state this schematically because it will be developed below. See section 2.3.
meanwhile changed. This is a case in which further development of
the very historical consciousness that gave rise to the problem will
contribute to clearing it away.  

Summary

In this section I have accounted for how Foucault reads Kant, and how this
reading informs his practice of genealogy. On this account, Foucault reads Kant’s
practice of criticism as being underpinned by an ethos of enlightenment – an
ethos to which he attributes both a positive and a negative aspect. The negative
aspect consists in the practice of questioning all givens. The positive aspect
consists in having the practice of questioning all givens afford the resources for
thinking about how such givens might be reconfigured. As has been explained,
within his account of the negative aspects of the ethos of enlightenment Foucault
can be read as continuing an aspect of Kant’s practice of criticism, and, within his
account of the positive aspect, Foucault can be read as transforming an aspect
of Kant’s practice of criticism. Both aspects have been explained as contributing
towards Foucault’s method of genealogy, which is to say, Foucault’s method of
genealogy is his transformation of Kant’s practice of criticism.

1.4. CAN ROSE’S RENEWAL AND FOUCALUT’S TRANSFORMATION OF
CRITICAL THOUGHT BE COMPARED?

Geuss, Raymond, ‘Neither History nor Praxis’, in Outside Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005), 39.
What is the aim of this section?

The aim of this section is to bring the accounts of the previous two sections together, and argue that the ways in which Rose and Foucault have their respective readings of Kant inform their respective critical projects are comparable. In other words, in this section I aim to argue that the critical projects of Rose and Foucault—specifically, the ways in which they are concerned with “renewing” and “transforming” Kant’s practice of criticism—have orientations that are comparable. To make this argument I will, first, briefly repeat the aims/orientations of these critical projects. Following this, I will argue that a comparison can be made between them.

What is the orientation of Rose’s renewal of critical thought?

To repeat, on the account I have given, Rose’s renewal of critical thought follows from her argument that Kant’s practice of criticism results in an antinomy of law. This argument has two parts. First, Rose thinks that the “lawfulness” that Kant’s practice of criticism is tasked with determining results in an antinomy, or a separation, between the universality of our concepts and the particulars of experience. Second, Rose thinks that Kant’s practice of criticism, on account of it working on the assumption that there is a rigorous distinction between the transcendental and the empirical, is blind to this result—which, for Rose, is tantamount to it being incapable of recognising, and consequently transforming, the actuality of reason.
Rose’s renewal of critical thought does not involve separating the universality of our concepts from the particulars of experience but instead struggling with the difficult relationship between them. This struggle involves working on the assumption that, just as the universality of our concepts can exert authority over the particulars of experience, the particulars of experience can exert authority over the universality of our concepts.\(^{265}\) To assume this is, in other words, to assume both that our concepts can be, to varying degrees, deficient, and that we can, with work, make them less so. On this account, Rose’s practice of criticism entails a twofold task: to continually call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources through which we reconfigure the authority of reason.

**What is the orientation of Foucault’s transformation of critical thought?**

To repeat, Foucault’s transformation of critical thought follows from his reading of Kant’s practice of criticism as being motivated by the ethos of enlightenment – an

---

\(^{265}\) I write “assumption”, and recognise that doing so gives rise to a potential tension. As I have explained, and as I will explain further, one of the central consequences of Rose’s construal of criticism is that it yields a “non-foundational” account of reason – non-foundational in the sense that the future of reason cannot be prejudged. Accordingly, is it not inconsistent of me to speak of Rose as working on the assumption that there is a reciprocal relationship between the universality of our concepts and the particulars of experience? It would be inconsistent – but only if I were claiming that Rose thought the result of such reciprocity could be prejudged, which I am not. To assume that there is a reciprocal relationship between the universality of our concepts and the particulars of experience is, in the context of Rose’s critical project, to assume only that there social-historical dimension to conceptuality. That said, in this regard, reference can be made to Lloyd and Milbank – specifically, to their respective claims that, for Rose, there is a close connection between reason and faith. See Milbank, ‘Obituary’: “Hence reason [for Rose] must be conjoined with faith, faith even in the rationality of an infinite which must elude our grasp, faith therefore in perhaps a full religious sense. Such reason with faith allows us to take the risk of action, which is always a risk of power and even of violence against the other. For without such risk there can be no generosity and no exercise of desire, whether for ideas or the goodness of persons.” See also Lloyd, *Law and Transcendence*, 28-32; ‘The Secular Faith of Gillian Rose’.
ethos that has both a negative and a positive orientation. The negative orientation consists in the practice of questioning all givens. The positive orientation consists in the practice of having what is revealed through such questioning contribute towards the possibility of reconfiguring such givens in the future. It is these two orientations that are at play within Foucault’s method of genealogy – which is to say, for Foucault, the method of genealogy is a transformation of Kant’s practice of criticism.

Foucault’s method of genealogy involves, in his words, asking continuously: “In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?” As has been explained with respect to the authority of reason, Foucault’s method of genealogy answers this question through uncovering the ways in which the universality of certain concepts is, at root, the result of various complexes of historical and contingent processes. For Foucault, through asking and attempting, by way of his method of genealogy, to answer such a question that we are afforded the resources for a “possible crossing-over” – that is, the resources for recognising the possibilities and the limits for thinking and acting differently.

266 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312.
267 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315.
268 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315.
269 For an account of how the ability to “think differently” can contribute towards political theory see esp. Prinz, Radicalizing Realism in Political Theory, 94-95 where Prinz cites Geuss as writing: “First of all, under current political circumstances, political theory should mainly “contribute to enabling thinking ‘differently’ (penser autrement) [. . .]. A philosophy which is true to the best of its traditions, should refrain from delivering additional ‘philosophical grounding’ for what already exists, for our contemporary liberal-democratic social order.” Following this Prinz writes: “This commitment to the resistance to the dominant (neo-liberal) political order and systems of thought unites the efforts of genealogy and criticism of ideology in the versions
Are these orientations comparable?

Given these brief restatements of the ways in which Rose and Foucault respectively read Kant, and allow these readings to inform their respective critical projects, I suggest that they can be compared in the following way. Rose’s renewal of critical thought and Foucault’s transformation of critical thought can be read as comparable on account of the way in which each construes the relationship between the universality of our concepts and the particulars of experience, and consequently construe the relationship between theory and praxis. Both Rose and Foucault, in contrast with Kant, take the task of criticism to consist in recognising the dangers and the possibilities of these relationships. In other words, they recognise that the authority arrogated to reason is real – real in the sense that we really think and act on the basis of reasons; and that it is, therefore, dangerous – dangerous in the sense that the concepts that comprise such reasons can be, to differing degrees, wrong. For both Rose and Foucault, criticism is the practice through which we come to recognise such dangers – that is, come to recognise the ways in which our

preferred by Geuss, i.e. respectively, Foucauldian genealogy and Adornian criticism of ideology [. . .].” [See below]

270 See Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 9: “The discovery of the difficult, dangerous and irrational impulses and actualities of individual and social life can only be the work of faceted and facetious reason, which – like Socratic irony equally beyond irony – is at the same time beyond its facetiousness.” It is helpful, I think, to consider the idea that reason is dangerous in the light of Rose’s accounts of “violence”. See esp. The Broken Middle, Chapter 4: Repetition in the Feast, Mann and Girard, ‘Angry Angels: Simone Weil and Emmanuel Levinas’, ‘Of Derrida’s Spirit’, ‘Søren Kierkegaard to Martin Buber: Reply from ‘the Single One’’, ‘Walter Benjamin: Out of the Sources of Modern Judaism’. I lack the space to deal with Rose’s complicated, but resourceful, account of “violence”. For helpful discussions of this aspect of Rose’s work see esp. Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose, Chapter 4: The Broken Middle, Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 10-15.

271 [wrong]
concepts are wrong – not in order to reject or disown the critical project of ascertaining the authority of reason, but in order to recognise the limits and the possibilities of reconfiguring this authority.\(^\text{272}\)

Additionally, both Rose and Foucault take the task of criticism to be continuous. For Kant, criticism constitutes a method by which we, \textit{once and for all}, ascertain the authority of reason – and thereby afford, \textit{once and for all}, a reliable way for each of us to obtain guidance for thinking and acting.\(^\text{273}\) For Rose and Foucault, by contrast, criticism is \textit{continuous}.\(^\text{274}\) The reason for this relates to the way in which their accounts of criticism imply a certain relationship between universals.

\(^{272}\) For a “realistic” account of what such reconfiguration might be, and why we might have reason to construe reason as reconfigurable see e.g. Geuss, Raymond, ‘Morality and Identity’, in Christine Korsgaard, \textit{The Sources of Normativity} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 197: “I think it is a grave mistake to run together questions of the understanding of motives, reasons, and values and questions of endorsement. We understand perfectly well why certain groups of Muslims might want to kill Rushdie - he is a threat to their identity — and we can fully appreciate that the considerations that move them are quite good reasons \textit{for them} without in the least thinking that they, or anything like them, are or would be reasons for us (and also without thinking that we stand under any obligation whatever to fail to try to protect Rushdie from their acting on their good reasons). We also assume, quite rightly I think, that the only way to change their minds would not be to present them with some new argument — they will have heard those that will occur to us and are not impressed — but to engage in some much more complicated process of restructuring [or reconfiguring] their [and our] way of life.” See also Geuss, Raymond, \textit{Philosophy and Real Politics} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1-18.

\(^{273}\) See Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, Bxxxi: “For there has always been some metaphysics or other to be met with in the world, and there will always continue to be one, and with it a dialectic of pure reason, because dialectic is natural to reason. Hence it is the first and most important occupation of philosophy to deprive dialectic \textit{once and for all} of all disadvantageous influence, by blocking off the source of the errors.” (My emphasis.) Wood, \textit{Kant}, 84: “For Kant the most essential drama of philosophy is this struggle of reason with itself, and this is why he entitles its fundamental work ‘The Critique of Pure Reason’ - in other words, it is reason’s own criticism, which \textit{triumphs over} the illusions of which reason itself is the author.” (My emphasis.) See also Geuss, Raymond, ‘Chaos and Ethics’, in \textit{Reality and Its Dreams} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 51-63.

\(^{274}\) See Rose, \textit{The Broken Middle}, 308-309. See also Rose, \textit{Judaism and Modernity}, 10: “The dubious angel, bathetic angel, suits reason: for the angel \textit{continues} to try to do good, to run the risk of idealisation, of abstract intentions, to stake itself for ideas and for others. Experience will only accrue if the angel discovers the violence in its initial idea, when that idea comes up against the actuality of others and the unanticipated meanings between them.” (My emphasis) See Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 312, 313.
and particulars – that is, to repeat, a relationship in which, just as the universality of our concepts can exert authority over the particulars of experience, the particulars of experience can exert authority over the universality of our concepts. If criticism is the practice through which we call into question the authority of reason, then it is, for Rose and Foucault, continuous – for the actualities of experience (e.g. the fact that experience happens in a specific space and through a specific time) will always potentially yield recalcitrant particulars over which the universality of our concepts will struggle to exert their authority.

It is for these reasons, therefore, that I take Rose’s renewal of critical thought and Foucault’s transformation of critical thought to be comparable. This comparison can be schematised as follows. Both Rose and Foucault take the task of criticism to be twofold and continuous – to continually call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for, not disowning the critical project of ascertaining the authority of reason, but reconfiguring this authority. At this stage, I recognise that this comparison is tenuous, and that it does not address some of the substantive differences between Rose and Foucault. As will be explained, the practice of calling into question the authority of reason assumes different forms for Rose and Foucault – for Rose, it assumes the form of phenomenology, for Foucault, it assumes the form of genealogy. This difference will prove crucial for the overarching argument of this thesis – for it will be on account of this difference that I will argue that Foucault’s genealogy can help clarify a part of Rose’s critical project.\footnote{See sections 3.2. and 3.3. below.}
Summary

In this section I have, building on the arguments of the previous two sections, argued that the critical projects of Rose and Foucault are comparable – comparable in the sense that they both understand the practice of criticism in terms of a twofold and continuous task: to continuously criticise the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for thinking about how the authority of reason could potentially be reconfigured.

1.5. CONCLUSION

What have I argued within this chapter?

In this chapter I have argued that the critical projects of Rose and Foucault are comparable. This argument has consisted of three sections. The first two sections involved explaining how Rose and Foucault read Kant, and have their readings of Kant inform their critical projects. As I explained, Rose’s “renewal” and Foucault’s “transformation” of critical thought are both a continuation and a correction of Kant’s practice of criticism. In the third section I argued that the critical projects of Rose and Foucault are comparable in that they both understand the practice of criticism in terms of a twofold and continuous task: to continuously criticise the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for thinking about how the authority of reason could potentially be reconfigured.
The overarching aim of this thesis is to argue that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy. As I have explained, this way of reading Rose is prevented centrally by her challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. The argument of this chapter contributes towards this overarching argument in two ways. First, through affording a basis on which to read the ways in which Rose and Foucault construe the task of criticism as comparable. Second, through affording a basis on which to begin explaining and assessing Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. Just as Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy can only be understood in the light of her engagement with Kant, the respects in which this challenge is misguided can only be understood in the light of Foucault’s engagement with Kant.
2.1. INTRODUCTION

The argument

In this chapter I will argue that Rose's challenge to Foucault's practice of genealogy is misguided. Rose challenges Foucault's practice of genealogy for being critically “blind”, and does so because she reads it as “nihilistic” – that is, as being concerned exclusively with undermining the authority of reason through revealing it to be contingent. This challenge is misguided, I will argue, because it acknowledges only one of the two integrated respects in which Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the authority of reason to be contingent. On the account I will give, Foucault’s method of genealogy is, specifically, a method of problematisation – that is, a method by which we come to recognise both that and how the authority of reason is contingent. It is from the integration of these two respects that the critical potential of Foucault’s practice of genealogy follows: through revealing that the authority of reason is contingent, its reveals how it has changed, and how it could potentially be changed. Rose’s challenge, by
acknowledging only one of these two integrated respects, fails to recognise the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy.

Although I will argue that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided, I will also argue that it is misguided in a way that is resourceful. As will be explained, Rose’s challenge is resourceful in that it encourages a subtler statement of Foucault’s method of genealogy – that is, a statement in which the method of genealogy is clarified as a method of problematisation. It will be on account of this clarification that I will argue that Rose’s challenge is misguided. However, as I will argue in the following chapter, this clarification will also serve to clarify a pivotal part of Rose’s critical project that is, in spite of being pivotal, largely unclear – that is, the part in Rose’s critical project requires criticism to yield the experience of identity and non-identity. Accordingly, although my central concern within this chapter is to defend Foucault’s method of genealogy against Rose’s challenge, this is my concern because I am, more generally, concerned with accounting for Foucault’s method of genealogy in a way that can serve to clarify Rose’s critical project.

The argument of this chapter contributes towards the overarching argument of this thesis by removing one of the central blocks between the critical projects of Rose and Foucault. Above I argued that Rose’s commentators have largely read her critical project as being opposed to Foucault’s critical project, in particular, and the critical projects of “postmodernity”, in general. I argued also that this way of reading Rose has as basis in Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s critical project / critical projects of “postmodernity”. Arguing that this challenge is misguided removes this block – both by opening Rose’s critical project up to the possibility
of being supported by Foucault’s practice of genealogy, and by clarifying Foucault's practice of genealogy as being of possible support for Rose’s critical project.

**The Structure of the argument**

The argument of this chapter will consist of three sections. First, I will explicate Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s’ practice of genealogy – that is, explain Rose’s reading of Foucault’s practice of genealogy as nihilistic, and how this results, for her, in it being critically blind. Second, in the light of Rose’s challenge, I will explicate Foucault’s practice of genealogy as a practice of problematisation – that is, a practice concerned not only with revealing *that* the authority of reason is contingent, but also with revealing *how* it is contingent. Third, I will return to Rose’s challenge, and argue that it is misguided. Rose only acknowledges one of the two integrated respects in which Foucault’s practice of genealogy reveals the authority of reason to be contingent, and consequently fails to recognise its critical potential.

**Qualifications**

Before beginning the first of these three sections, it is necessary to make two qualifications. First, Rose’s challenge to Foucault is broader than simply a challenge to Foucault’s practice of genealogy. This is to say, my presentation of Rose challenging specifically Foucault’s practice of genealogy is a simplification
of Rose’s broader challenge to Foucault.276 I simplify Rose’s challenge in this way because it is, I think, specifically Foucault’s practice of genealogy that can support Rose’s critical project.

Second, I aim to defend Foucault’s method of genealogy against Rose’s challenge. Accordingly, the account I will give of this method – an account in which I will be concerned with explicating Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation – is one in which the focus follows from Rose’s challenge. In other words, the aspects of Foucault’s method of genealogy on which I will focus are only those aspects that relate to Rose’s challenge. The consequence of this is that there will be a number of aspects that I will not account for – aspects that, within the secondary literature on Foucault, have been construed as central. Accordingly, as is the case with my presentation of Rose’s challenge, my account of Foucault’s method of genealogy will be a simplification – a simplification that I would defend by repeating that the overarching argument of this thesis is, centrally, concerned with clarifying and supporting an aspect of Rose’s critical project.

2.2. WHAT IS ROSE’S CHALLENGE TO FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY?

What is the aim of this section?

---

276 For Rose’s full account see Dialectic of Nihilism, Chapter 9: Legalism and Power: Foucault.
The aim of this section is to explicate Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy – that is, to explicate Rose’s argument that Foucault’s method of genealogy is nihilistic, and how she, on the basis of this argument, argues that Foucault’s method of genealogy is critically impotent. Following this exposition, I will compare Rose’s challenge to the challenge expounded by Nancy Fraser. The aim of this comparison is to argue that while Rose and Fraser both conclude that Foucault’s method of genealogy is without critical potential, they do so, crucially, by way of different criteria.

**How has Rose’s challenge been explicated within the secondary literature?**

As was explained above, within the secondary literature on Rose, commentators have almost always taken Rose’s particular challenge to Foucault to be a part of a more general challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. With the aim of understanding Rose’s challenge, such a general approach is resourceful. While Rose does offer particular challenges towards the particular representatives of her sense of “postmodernity”, the structure of these particular challenges can be generalised. The secondary literature is resourceful in that it clearly presents what this general challenge consists in. In general, according to such commentators, Rose challenges the critical projects of “postmodernity” for reasons similar to her reason for challenging Kant’s critical project – that is, for the reason that it results in a practice of criticism that is impotent to recognise the actuality of reason. For Rose, as has been explained, the implication of such impotence is, in her words, “that the world remains not only unchanged, but also unknown.”

---

277 Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism*, 1.
How will I explicate Rose's challenge to Foucault?

While the general accounts of Rose’s challenge to the critical projects of “postmodernity” afforded by the commentators considered above are resourceful for the reason just described, they are largely unhelpful when it comes to critically engaging with this challenge. By “critical engagement” I here mean the task of thinking about how, in particular, Rose’s challenge might be defended or shown to be misguided. The secondary literature is unhelpful when it comes to this task because this task demands that Rose’s challenge be assessed not simply in general terms, but also in particular terms – that is, with particular reference to the critical projects that she claims to challenge. As was explained above, it is on account of the secondary literature being unhelpful in this way that I decided to focus specifically on Rose’s challenge to Foucault.

What is the context of Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s genealogy?

To get a better sense of Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy, and of how this challenge follows from Rose’s reading of Kant, it is helpful to consider the context in which Rose presents this challenge. Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is presented most explicitly within the same book in which she engages most explicitly with Kant – that is, *Dialectic of Nihilism*. For the purposes of my argument, this is important – for it means that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s genealogy is informed largely by her engagement with Kant.
As I explained above, Rose argues that Kant’s practice of criticism results in an antinomy of law – that is, an antinomy between the universality of our concepts and the particularities of experience. On Rose’s account, one of the implications of this is that Kant’s “question of law” – that is, the question Kant tasks criticism with answering – “remains unanswered”. For Rose, “post-Kantian” describes, among other things, the attempts at answering Kant’s unanswered question of law. Within such attempts, Rose distinguishes, and schematises, two predominating approaches – approaches that she characterises in terms of “rationalism” and “nihilism”. The approach Rose characterises as a form of rationalism is Kant’s approach – that is, as was explained above, an approach that seeks to purify reason of the errors. The approach Rose characterises as a form of nihilism is, for Rose, Foucault’s approach – that is, as will be explained, an approach that seeks to show that reason is irreducibly impure, to the point of undermining the possibility that reason could ever be rendered authoritative.

---

278 Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism*, 1, 5.
282 For Rose, this approach characterises the critical projects of “postmodernity” in general. See e.g. Rose, *Love’s Work*, 125: “Modern and postmodern philosophers continue the sceptical conceit according to which philosophers affect disaffection from philosophy. Traditionally, this is the way in which philosophy reclaims its originality. Postmodern philosophers are in deadly, unironic earnest. Philosophy, they claim, is revenge for the unbridgeable distance between thought or language and concrete being; metaphysics is spleen at the diversity and difference of beings; ethics is the violent domination of the troubling otherness of the other.” However, for reasons already given, I will be focusing on this characterisation of Foucault’s critical project in particular. See also Milbank, John, ‘On the Paraethical: Gillian Rose and Political Nihilism’, *Telos* 173 (2015), 78: “Yet [Rose] also diagnosed the postmodern vaunting of difference as in reality a dialectic between univocal unity and erratic difference so extreme as always to issue in a theoretical and practical nihilism. For this outlook, every insertion of difference collapses back into the same, which once more is exhausted by its assertion of difference, with a kind of extreme Buddhist sense of illusion at either pole.”
this account, rationalism and nihilism each attempt to address Kant’s question of law by overstating one side of the antinomy of law – rationalism overstates the universality of concepts, nihilism overstates the particularities of experience.

Although these two approaches are seemingly antithetical, for Rose, they both make the same mistake – that is, they both construe the task of criticism in terms of Kant’s question of law.283 For Rose, Kant’s question of law implies a rigorous distinction between the transcendental and the empirical. Accordingly, to construe the practice of criticism in terms of Kant’s question of law is to tacitly reinforce this distinction, and thereby reinforce the same blindness that, on Rose’s reading, besets Kant’s practice of criticism. “The result of this [blindness]”, Rose writes, “is that the world remains not only unchanged, but also unknown.”284 In other words, for Rose, both the rationalistic and the nihilistic approaches to criticism fail to recognise that the antinomy of law is not something that should be reduced from reason, but something that is the result of reason accurately described, and something with which we should struggle.

It is in the context of this argument that Rose presents her challenge to Foucault’s genealogy – that is, Foucault’s genealogy is beset by the same critical blindness that, for Rose, besets Kant’s practice of criticism. Given this overview, I will now explicate the details of Rose’s challenge, beginning with her reading of Foucault’s method of genealogy as “nihilistic”.

283 See also Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, 48: “The idea of phenomenology can be seen as an alternative to Kant’s theoretical *quaestio quid juris* [i.e. the “question of law”], while the idea of absolute ethical life can be seen as an alternative to Kant’s justification of moral judgements. This, however, would be to concede the Kantian dichotomy between theoretical and practical reason.”

284 Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism*, 1.
Why does Rose read Foucault's practice of genealogy as nihilistic?

For Rose, Foucault’s method of genealogy is “nihilistic”. As I mentioned above, by “nihilism” Rose means a certain approach to Kant’s question of law. To approach this question “nihilistically” is, she argues, to read Kant’s failure to answer this question as a reason to disown his critical project – that is, the project of attempting to ascertain the authority of reason through criticism. On Rose’s account, Foucault’s practice of genealogy is concerned, not with ascertaining the authority of reason, but with undermining the authority of reason – specifically, through revealing what we construed as necessary and universal about reason to be contingent. Rose writes:

Foucault is opposed to merely turning the table which opens up the space of the court-room – on the judge. He recommends that we smash it, and he is sanguine that the end of law, the finis, can be executed.

In this passage Rose is referring to the self-reflexive moment in Kant’s critical project in which reason turns to itself to criticise itself – to determine what concepts we can claim as lawful. The “space of the court-room” is, therefore, the space in which the laws of thought and action are to be found. Accordingly, in claiming that Foucault “recommends that we smash it”, Rose is claiming that

285 See e.g. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 172, 173, 187, 188, 191, 203, 207. See also The Broken Middle, xiv-xv, ‘Beginnings of the Day’.

286 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 171.
Foucault is, as she will write elsewhere, recommending that Kant’s critical project be disowned – where that means, specifically, disowning the project through which we criticise reason with reason in an attempt at justifying reason as a guide for thought and action.\textsuperscript{287}

The basis on which Rose reads Foucault’s practice of genealogy in this way – that is, as nihilistic – is his concept of “power”.\textsuperscript{288} For Rose, Foucault’s practice of genealogy is a practice concerned centrally with the “delineation of powers”\textsuperscript{289}. The powers that genealogy delineates are, in Rose’s words, “the unjustifiable source which conforms to no regularity.”\textsuperscript{290} Although Rose never makes this explicit, Rose is here using Foucault’s concept of power to refer, in general, to the contingent processes that the practice of genealogy uncovers. Accordingly, what Rose is here saying is that, on her reading, the authority of reason is taken to have its source in the processes of power, which are unjustified and unjustifiable. In other words, Rose is here reading Foucault’s method of genealogy as a practice through which the authority of reason is undermined through being revealed as the result of contingent processes.


\textsuperscript{288} See Rose, \textit{Dialectic of Nihilism}, Chapter 9: Legalism and Power: Foucault.

\textsuperscript{289} Rose, \textit{Dialectic of Nihilism}, 172.

\textsuperscript{290} Rose, \textit{Dialectic of Nihilism}, 172. See also See Habermas, Jürgen, ‘The Critique of Reason as an Unmasking of the Human Sciences: Michel Foucault’, in \textit{Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault / Habermas Debate}, edited by Michael Kelly (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994), 64-65: “[Foucault] thinks of the transcendental practices of power as something particular that strives against all universals, and further as the lowly corporeal-sensual that undermines everything intelligible, and finally as the contingent that could also have been otherwise because it is not governed by any regulative order.”
Why does Rose read Foucault’s method of genealogy as impotent?

As was mentioned above, for Rose, it is on account of it being nihilistic that Foucault’s method of genealogy is beset by the same critical blindness that besets Kant’s practice of criticism. Such “blindness” is twofold. It refers to ways in which certain practices of criticism are blind to the antimony of law – that is, in part, the antinomy between the universality of our concepts and the particularities of experience – that structures reason. Such “blindness” also refers to the ways in which these practices of criticism are, in consequence, blind to ways in which reason could possibly be reconstructed. For Rose, to reconstruct reason requires, first, that we recognise the ways in which our concepts are both always unavoidable and partial, and therefore always at risk of failing to do justice to their objects. It is on the basis of this recognition that we can begin the work of, in her words, “being at a loss yet exploring various routes, different ways towards the good enough justice, which recognises the intrinsic and the contingent limitations in its exercise.”

Of all the accounts given of Rose’s argument for Foucault’s practice of genealogy being beset with such critical “blindness”, I find the one given by Lloyd to be the most resourceful. In the light of Lloyd’s account, Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy can be said to involve the argument that Foucault is, in claiming that the authority of reason is the result of processes of “power”, placing the concept of “power” in a “transcendental register” – that is, claiming that the

---

291 Rose, Love’s Work, 124.
292 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence.
293 See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2-3.
concept of “power” determines the conditions of possibility for the empirical world.\textsuperscript{294} In consequence, the concept of “power” becomes immune from criticism, in the sense that nothing in the empirical world can affect it.\textsuperscript{295} On this account, in arguing that the authority of reason is undermined through being revealed to be the result of contingent processes of “power”, Foucault is blindly assuming that the concept of “power” is authoritative, which, for Rose, results in Foucault’s practice of genealogy falling into “vicious circularity”\textsuperscript{296}. In other words, the nihilism of Foucault’s practice of genealogy is “dialectical” in that it remains blindly, and therefore dangerously, implicated in the oppositions which it claims to be rejecting.\textsuperscript{297} Rose writes:

From magical nihilism to this administrative nihilism which completes itself as despair, that political voluntarism erupts to affirm the equally characterless ‘beyond’, which Foucault calls the ‘until now’ and which will most surely repeat just that. The nihilism which most explicitly engages with law would most dangerously blind us to it.\textsuperscript{298}

\textsuperscript{294} See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{295} See Lloyd, Law and Transcendence, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{296} Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 191.
\textsuperscript{297} See Caygill, ‘The Broken Hegel’, 24. For additional accounts of this “dialectic of nihilism” see also Murphy, ‘Memorising Politics of Ancient History,’ 397-398; Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 3-4; Cutrofello, Discipline and Critique, 29-30.
\textsuperscript{298} Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, 207, 210: “The genealogical reconstruction of the tradition with its would-be exclusion of ‘law’ from ‘power’ cripples our reason [. . .] – for we cannot think the one without the other. Foucault sacrifices his own rule enough to apprehend us of the advent of administrative power and the demise of the civil law, but not enough to give us any space in which to relate to the ubiquitous and infinite points of power.” See also Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, 7: “This ground is therefore held in a transcendence far off the ground, where, with a mixture of naivety and cynicism, without reason and in despair, post-modernism leaves analysed and unanalysed according to its tenets the pre-conditions and rampant consequences of power. domination and authority ‘Despairing rationalism without reason’ is, I claim, the story of post-modernism. It is the story of what happens when ‘metaphysics’ is barred from ethics.”
Why compare Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy with Fraser’s challenge?

Having now explained what I take to be Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy, it is, I think, worth considering how this challenge compares with the challenge expounded by Nancy Fraser, which I mentioned briefly above. Of all the many challenges that have been made against Foucault’s method of genealogy, the one expounded by Fraser is, if not one of the most cogent, then certainly one of the most influential. In comparing these two challenges I have two aims. First, to explain the respects in which the challenges of Rose and Fraser are similar. Second, to explain the respects in which they are different. As I will explain, while both Rose and Fraser conclude that Foucault’s method of genealogy is without critical potential, they do so by way of different criteria. In other words, what it would be for Foucault’s method of genealogy to have a critical potential is different for Rose than it is for Fraser. For Fraser, such critical potential demands normative foundations. For Rose, crucially, it does not. This will prove important for the overarching argument of this thesis because it points to a further respect in which Rose and Foucault converge on how they construe the task of criticism. Both Rose and Foucault, I will argue, take the task of criticism to be that of revealing, not that certain of our concepts are normative, but that the normativity of certain of our concepts is corrigible.

See also Hammond, Philosophy and the Facetious Style, 9: “The renunciation of reason discernible in postmodernity not only signifies a lack of trust but it also intensifies the very conditions that it claims to have overcome.”
Additionally, and more generally, by considering how Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy compares with Fraser’s challenge, I hope to open Rose’s critical project up to the potential of being influenced by, and influencing, the ways in which Foucault’s method of genealogy has been construed following Fraser’s challenge. To repeat, of the many challenges that have been made against Foucault’s method of genealogy, Fraser’s challenge is one of the most influential – both in the sense that it has influenced others to challenge Foucault along the same lines, and in the sense that it has influenced others to defend Foucault against this challenge. That said, I will now turn to explain the respects in which the challenges of Rose and Fraser are similar.

**What is Fraser’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy?**

As I mentioned above, Fraser challenges Foucault’s method of genealogy for being, in her words, “normatively confused”. This challenge is based on an interpretation of Foucault’s method of genealogy in which Fraser, like Rose, focuses on Foucault’s concept of “power”. In this regard, Fraser is more charitable than Rose. Fraser writes:

> Most generally, it is my thesis that [the most valuable accomplishment of Foucault’s method of genealogy] consists of a rich empirical account of the early stages in the emergence of some distinctively modern modalities of power. This account yields important insights into the nature of modern power, and these

---

299 For an overview see Kelly (ed.), *Critique and Power.*
300 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 31.
insights, in turn, bear political significance – they suffice to rule out some rather widespread political orientations as inadequate to the complexities of power in modern societies.\(^{301}\)

For Fraser, however, what allows Foucault’s method of genealogy to yield these important insights is also what leaves it normatively confused, and therefore without critical potential. This challenge centres on the way Foucault’s genealogical method involves, in her words, a practice of “suspension” / “bracketing”.\(^{302}\)

Foucault’s genealogical method, Fraser writes, “involves, among other things, the suspension of the standard modern liberal normative framework, which distinguishes between the legitimate and illegitimate exercise of power. Foucault brackets those notions, and the questions they give rise to, and concentrates instead upon the actual ways in which power operates.”\(^{303}\) Foucault’s practice of genealogy reveals that power actually operates contingently. “Genealogy takes it as axiomatic that everything is interpretation all the way down, or, to put it less figuratively, that cultural practices are instituted historically and are therefore contingent, ungrounded except in terms of other, prior, contingent, historically instituted practices.”\(^{304}\)

\(^{301}\) Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 17-18.

\(^{302}\) See Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 20: “‘Bracketing’, of course, is not Foucault’s term; given its association with the phenomenological tradition to which he is so hostile, he would doubtless reject it. Nevertheless, the term is suggestive of the sort of studied suspension of standard categories and problematics that he practices.” See also Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’, 156: “But he does wish to preserve the second element, namely the *epoché*, in a modified form.”

\(^{303}\) Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 18.

\(^{304}\) Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 19.
It is with respect to the suspension / bracketing that Fraser takes to be involved in Foucault's genealogical method, that she directs the following sequences questions:

Is Foucault's bracketing of the normative merely a methodological strategy, a temporary heuristic aimed at making it possible to see the phenomena in fresh new ways? If so, then it would leave open the possibility of some subsequent normative assessment of power / knowledge regimes. Or, alternatively, does Foucault's bracketing of the normative represent a substantive, principled commitment to ethical cultural relativism, to the impossibility of normative justification across power / knowledge regimes?305

For Fraser, such questions “have enormous importance for the interpretation and assessment of Foucault's work.”306 The reason being, the critical potential of Foucault's method of genealogy depends in large part on how these questions are answered.

For Fraser, making reference to the “obvious politically engaged character of [Foucault's] writing,”307 the practice of suspension / bracketing involved in Foucault's method of genealogy implicates it in a number of mutually incompatible suppositions: “[either Foucault] has educed some other normative framework as an alternative to the suspended one; or, since none is readily

305 Fraser, 'Foucault on Modern Power', 21-22.
306 Fraser, 'Foucault on Modern Power', 21-22.
307 Fraser, 'Foucault on Modern Power', 18.
apparent, that he has found a way to do politically engaged critique without the use of any normative framework; or, more generally, that he has disposed altogether of the need for any normative framework to guide political practice.\textsuperscript{308} Since these suppositions are mutually incompatible, and since Foucault’s practice of genealogy “seems simultaneously to invite all of them”, it is, for Fraser, “normatively confused.”\textsuperscript{309} “As a consequence”, Fraser concludes, “the [critical] potential for a broad range of normative nuances is surrendered.”\textsuperscript{310}

Colin Koopman has restated Fraser’s challenge to Foucault’s practice of genealogy as consisting in the charge that it commits the “genetic fallacy.”\textsuperscript{311} I take this restatement to be helpful – centrally because it helps give a more precise statement of the force of Fraser’s challenge, and therefore what it might be to defend Foucault’s method of genealogy against this challenge and challenges like it.\textsuperscript{312} What is the genetic fallacy? The genetic fallacy involves genetic

\textsuperscript{308} Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 18.
\textsuperscript{309} Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 18.
\textsuperscript{310} Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 32.
\textsuperscript{311} Koopman, \textit{Genealogy as Critique}, 87.
\textsuperscript{312} Additionally, Koopman uses the lens of genetic fallacy to distinguish Foucault’s genealogy from the genealogies given by Nietzsche and Williams. See \textit{Genealogy as Critique}, Chapter 2: Three Uses of Genealogy: Subversion, Vindication and Problematisation. About this distinction Koopman writes: “By reinterpretation Foucault’s primary analytics of genealogy and archaeology in terms of his concept of problematisation, as Foucault himself proposed near the end of his life, we can distinguish Foucaultian critique from other prominent engagements with history that have proceeded under the banner of archaeology and genealogy so as to arrive at a judgment. Specifically, I shall be arguing, we can distinguish Foucault’s problematising genealogy from the vindicatory genealogy of Bernard Williams (this is perhaps predictable) as well as from the subversive genealogy of Friedrich Nietzsche (certainly this thought is a bit more provocative). Whereas Williams and Nietzsche used genealogy to cast judgments on certain concepts (truthfulness and morality, for example) and the practices instantiating them, Foucault used genealogy to critically investigate the conditions of the possibility of the practical exercise of such concepts. The purpose of Foucault’s unique conception of genealogy as problematisation is to make manifest the constitutive and regulative conditions of the present as a material for thought and action that we would need to work on if we are to transform that present. If other genealogists have aimed at vindication or subversion of the problematisation at the heart of who we are, Foucault aims at a practice that would reveal our
reasoning, which “can be understood broadly, as any attempt to support or to discredit a belief, statement, position or argument based upon its causal or historical genesis, or more broadly, the way in which it was formed.”

On this account, to charge that Foucault’s method of genealogy commits the genetic fallacy is to charge that it involves conflating the past historical development of a practice with the present justification of that practice. For example, certain of our concepts could be revealed to have histories that we, regarding them from the perspective of the present, regard as problematic and/or unproblematic.

In the case of this example, to commit the genetic fallacy is to think that the history of these concepts determines them as being legitimate or illegitimate (or, to use the terminology of the previous chapter, lawful or unlawful). For Koopman, Fraser charges Foucault’s practice of genealogy with committing the genetic fallacy insofar as she construes it as being concerned with using the empirical insights that it affords to establish normative conclusions.

Given this restatement, the force of Fraser’s challenge can be stated as follows. Fraser’s challenge is that Foucault cannot derive the normative conclusions from his genealogies that he, on her account, wishes. As Koopman has helpfully pointed out, to claim is this not the same as claiming that Foucault’s genealogies are value-laden despite a being presented as value-free. “Nobody, Foucault


Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 62.


included, ever thought of genealogical method as value-free. For instance, there are values already implicit in Foucault’s decision to focus on, say, the prison and the hospital rather than say, the university and the factory, or his methodological restriction of his analysis to the West rather than the Rest — clearly there is a normative load structuring genealogy (as is the case of any effort in social science) from the outset.” Accordingly, Fraser’s challenge must rest on the supposition that Foucault’s practice of genealogy is not only normatively loaded, but also normatively ambitious. In other words, for Fraser’s challenge to work, Foucault’s practice of genealogy needs to be construed as being concerned with both investigating the historical processes through which certain norms came to be, and deriving normative conclusions from these investigations (e.g. concluding that the normative force of certain of our concepts should be, on account their histories, accepted or rejected). On the condition that this construal is correct, Fraser’s challenge is forceful – for, if Foucault’s practice of genealogy is normatively ambitious, then it is unjustifiably (or confusedly) so, since it cannot derive normative conclusions from the empirical insights it affords, at least not without committing the genetic fallacy.\footnote{Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 88.}

\footnote{That said, see also Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 88: “Genetic reasoning is, I believe, somewhat less fallacious than is commonly presupposed by philosophers who are not inclined to take history very seriously. The impossibly strong claim that practices of logical justification are rightly conducted without the slightest concern for inquiry into the historical evolution of the objects of our judgment makes sense only by rigorously denying the counterclaim that justification itself is a temporal process that takes place both within and through time. This latter denial in turn makes sense only if one strongly affirms synchronic and therefore extremely rationalistic accounts of justification, knowledge, and truth.” A similar view is maintained by Hoy. See Hoy, Time of Our Lives, 229-230.}
Comparing Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy with Fraser’s challenge

I have spent as much time as I have explaining and clarifying Fraser’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy – an explanation and clarification in which I emphasised the part played by normativity within this challenge – because I think that it is both similar to and, crucially, different from Rose’s challenge. To repeat, I think that the challenges expounded by Rose and Fraser are both misguided. Both Rose and Fraser conclude that Foucault’s method of genealogy is without critical potential, and do so by way of misrepresentations of this method – misrepresentations that I will, in the following section, be concerned with correcting. To this extent, I take the challenges of Rose and Fraser to be similar. However, while I think that both challenges are misguided, I also think that the grounds for their respective misguidedness is, crucially, different. The difference is, to state it simply, whereas Fraser’s challenge works on the supposition that Foucault’s method of genealogy is normatively ambitious, Rose’s does not. Rose’s challenge, by contrast, works on the supposition that Foucault’s method of genealogy is nihilistic – where that means, for Rose, that it is concerned centrally with undermining the normative force of certain of our concepts, of the normative force of the better reason. In other words, both Rose and Fraser conclude that Foucault’s practice of genealogy is without critical potential. For Fraser, this conclusion follows from Foucault unjustifiably (or confusedly) attempting to derive normative conclusions from the empirical insights afforded by his practice of genealogy. For Rose, this conclusion follows from Foucault’s practice of genealogy undermining the possibility of normativity tout court.
Given the overarching argument of this thesis, I take this difference between the challenges of Rose and Fraser to be crucial. My overarching aim is, to repeat, to argue that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy. The difference between the challenges of Rose and Fraser is crucial, I think, because it points to a possible convergence between the ways in which Rose and Foucault construe the task of criticism.

Unlike Fraser’s challenge, which involves the claim that the critical potential of Foucault’s genealogical method demands normative criteria, Rose’s challenge does not – that is, Rose’s challenge does not involve her claiming that Foucault’s genealogical method is or should be normative. Rather, it involves her claiming, among other things, that Foucault’s genealogical method undermines the possibility of normativity. What I take to follow from this – or, more accurately, what I take this to suggest – is that Rose, unlike Fraser, does not construe the critical potential of Foucault’s practice of genealogy to depend on it being normative. The reason for this, I think, is that Rose is reading Foucault by way of different criteria. Like Fraser, Rose is concerned with challenging the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy. However, what it would be for Foucault’s method of genealogy to have a critical potential is different for Rose than it is for Fraser. As I explained above, the context in which Rose’s challenge occurs is one in which Rose is, broadly speaking, concerned with demonstrating how the critical projects of “postmodernity” are blind (or impotent) to recognise the antinomy of law that issues from, on her account, Kant’s critical project. In the light of this, it can be said that, for Rose, Foucault’s method of genealogy is without critical potential, not because it is without normative criteria, but because

---

319 Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, 32.
it cannot recognise the antinomy of normativity – that is, to make this more specific to the focus of this thesis, cannot recognise the corrigibility of conceptuality. For Rose, to repeat, the central task of criticism is not, at least not strictly, to afford normative conclusions. Rather, it is to encourage us to recognise the ways in which the authority of reason, or, more specifically, the normative force of our concepts, is always both unavoidable and partial – in short, reconstructable.

Given the overarching argument of this thesis, this way of restating Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is important because, as I mentioned above, it points to a possible convergence between the ways in which Rose and Foucault construe the task of criticism. It is my contention that Rose and Foucault construe the task of criticism in ways that are constructively comparable. I have already, in the previous chapter, given some basis for this contention. In the previous chapter, to repeat, I argued that both Rose and Foucault come to construe the task of criticism by way of their respective continuations and corrections of Kant. On this account, both Rose and Foucault construe the task of criticism as twofold and continuous – to continually call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for, not disowning the critical project of ascertaining the authority of reason, but reconfiguring this authority – an authority that has, in this section, been stated in terms of normativity. Rose fails to recognise this comparison, and consequently challenges Foucault’s method of genealogy as a form of critique, because she misrepresents this method. Foucault’s method of genealogy is not nihilistic in the way that Rose represents it as being. Rather, as I will argue in the following section, Foucault’s method of genealogy is correctly represented as a method of
problematisation. What I take to follow from this correct representation is that the basis on which Rose, according to her own criteria, concludes that Foucault’s method of genealogy is without critical potential is misguided, but resourcefully so. Showing Rose’s challenge to be misguided is resourceful because it encourages a subtler statement of Foucault’s method of genealogy, and thereby allows it to appear as a potential resource for Rose’s critical project.

**Summary**

In this section I have explicated Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s practice of genealogy. According to this explication, Rose argues that Foucault’s practice of genealogy is nihilistic in the sense that it is concerned with undermining the authority of reason through revealing the authority of reason to be the result of contingent processes. It is on the premise of this argument that Rose argues that Foucault’s method of genealogy is critically blind – that is, blind to ways in which reason is actually structured, and consequently blind to the ways in which reason could possibly be reconstructed. Following this, I compared Rose’s challenge with the challenge expounded by Fraser. On account of this comparison I was able to, among other things, clarify Rose’s challenge in a way that suggested a possible convergence between the ways in which Rose and Foucault construe the task of criticism.

2.3. **DEFENDING FOUCALUT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY AGAINST ROSE’S CHALLENGE**
What is the aim of this section?

The aim of this section is to explicate the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy. On the account I will give, which will take its focus from Rose’s challenge, the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy follows from its capacity to problematise the authority of reason – that is, to reveal both that and how the authority of reason is the result of complex, historical and contingent processes. To recognise the authority of reason as being always problematic is to recognise it as always open to being potentially changed.

Genealogy and contingency within the secondary literature

As was explained above, Rose reads Foucault’s practice of genealogy as nihilistic – that is, a practice of criticism concerned with undermining the authority of reason through revealing it to be the result of contingent processes. This way of reading Foucault’s method of genealogy as being centrally concerned with revealing to be contingent that which we formerly took to be necessary (what Collin Koopman calls the “anti-inevitability thesis”320) is one that is endorsed by both Foucault and a number of his commentators. However, whereas for Rose this reading results in the critical blindness of Foucault’s method of genealogy, for Foucault and a number of his commentators it results in its critical potential. Foucault writes:

What reason perceives as its necessity, or rather, what different forms of rationality offer as their necessary being, can perfectly well

---

320 See e.g. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 140.
be shown to have a history; and the network of contingencies from which it emerges can be traced. Which is not to say, however, that these forms of rationality were irrational. It means that they reside on a base of human practice and human history; and that since these things have been made, they can be unmade, as long as we know how it was that they were made.\footnote{Foucault, 'Structuralism and Post-Structuralism', 450. See also Foucault, Michel, 'Critical Theory / Intellectual History', in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984, edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman (London: Routledge, 1990), 37.}

Additionally, as Koopman has also recognised, the anti-inevitability thesis is one upheld by many of Foucault’s commentators.\footnote{See Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 140-141. For the following survey, I am indebted to Koopman’s own survey.} For example, David Couzens Hoy thinks that Foucault’s method of genealogy should be construed as suggesting that the “stultifying aspects of ourselves that we had assumed to be universal and natural might in fact be arbitrary and contingent features that could potentially be changed.”\footnote{Hoy, Critical Resistance, 72.} Additionally, Jana Sawicki writes: “Foucault brings to our attention historical transformations in practices of self-formation in order to reveal their contingency and to free us for new possibilities of self-understanding, new modes of experience, new forms of subjectivity, authority, and political identity.”\footnote{Sawicki, Jana, ‘Foucault, Feminism and Questions of Identity’, in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, edited by Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 288.} Paul Rabinow writes that Foucault’s work aims at “cultivat[ing] an attention to the conditions under which things become “evident,” ceasing to be objects of our attention and therefore seemingly fixed, necessary, and unchangeable.”\footnote{Rabinow, Paul, ‘Introduction: The History of Systems of Thought’, in Essential Works, Volume 1: Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), xix.} Nikolas Rose writes that “in showing the contingency of the
arrangements within which we are assembled, in denaturalising them, in showing the role of thought in holding them together, [Foucault’s method of genealogy shows] that thought has a part to play in contesting them.”

Wendy Brown writes that, “[f]or Foucault, the project of making the present appear as something that might not be as it is constitutes the distinctive contribution of intellectual work to political life.”

Finally, Judith Butler thinks that one of the central consequences of Foucault’s method of genealogy is “the recognition of a radical contingency in the relation between sex and gender in the face of cultural configurations of causal unities that are regularly assumed to be natural and necessary.”

For Foucault, and the commentators here briefly considered, the critical potential of the method of genealogy is construed as a consequence of its capacity to reveal as contingent that which we formerly took as necessary. It will be on account of this construal that I will, in the following section, argue that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided. To afford the means for making this argument, my concern for the remainder of this section will be with clarifying that Foucault’s method of genealogy is, specifically, a method of problematisation. I will begin this clarification by developing what it means to say that Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the authority of reason to be “contingent”.

328 Butler, Judith, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge, 1999), 175.
**How does Foucault’s method of genealogy reveal the authority of reason to be the result of contingent processes?**

Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals to be contingent that which we formerly took to be necessary. For Rose, this reading results in critical blindness. For Foucault, and a number of his commentators, it bears a critical potential. That this way of reading Foucault’s method of genealogy should provoke these two antithetical conclusions follows, in part, from the ambiguous concept of contingency. In other words, it is not immediately clear that a practice through which we reveal to be contingent that which we formerly took to be necessary is a practice of criticism.

What is it to say that Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals to be contingent that which we formerly took to be necessary? With regard to the authority of reason – or, more specifically, with regard to the authority of the concepts that comprise reason – the contingency revealed by Foucault’s method of genealogy concerns, centrally, the historical processes through which concepts come to acquire this authority. To repeat, in the context of this thesis, to say that a concept possesses an “authority” is simply to say that it possesses a normative force – that is, a potential to guide how we should think about and act within the world. What the practice of genealogy reveals is that the authority of a given concept, at a given time, in a given place implies a complex of different meanings.

---

329 For more on the ambiguity of the concept of contingency – specifically, when it is appealed to within the practice of criticism see Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 142.

330 See also Koopman, ‘Foucault’s Historiographical Expansion’, 361: “The difference between a history of contingency and a history of arbitrariness is, at least in part, the difference between a history oriented to the present and a history without any orientation at all.”
– different meanings imposed on the same concept in the past, and which have succeeded in remaining embedded within the present content of that concept.\textsuperscript{331}

On this account, the authority of a given concept is contingent because there is nothing necessary about the historical processes through which this concept came to acquire this authority. What meanings a given concept will come to contain at a given point in time, and how these meanings relate to each other will be just the result of history, and this history will be contingent in a number of ways. It will be contingent which wills encounter and try to interpret / master this given concept, and at what times and under what circumstances. It will also be contingent how much force, energy, and success will be had in imposing these meanings.\textsuperscript{332}

It is on account of such contingent processes that Foucault has, on occasion, referred to the history of rationality, less in terms of a “bifurcation”, and more in

\textsuperscript{331}See Foucault, Michel, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in\textit{Essential Works, Volume 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology}, edited by James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 1998), 369-370: “Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times. [. . .] Genealogy, consequently, requires patience and a knowledge of details, and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material. Its “cyclopean monuments” [see Nietzsche, Friedrich,\textit{The Gay Science}, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), §7] are constructed from “discreet and apparently insignificant truths and according to a rigorous method”; they cannot be the product of “large and well-meaning errors” [see Nietzsche, Friedrich,\textit{Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits}, translated by R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)]. In short, genealogy demands relentless erudition. Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for “origins.” I have not, and will not, engage with this text. My reason is that this text, while it affords a descriptive account of the demands of genealogy (both as a verb and as a noun), remains an account of Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche reading of “genealogy” – which is to say, not strictly Foucault’s reading of “genealogy”.

terms of an “endless, multiple bifurcation [. . . an] abundant ramification.” The occasion in question is an interview in which Foucault is asked about, among other things, his interpretation of Kant – specifically, the interpretation he expounds in his essay *What is Enlightenment?* – and the way this interpretation has been construed by Habermas. In this interview, Foucault is asked whether he agrees with the way certain members of the Frankfurt School have construed the “bifurcation of reason” – that is, “the dialectic of reason, [. . .] whereby reason becomes perverse under the effects of its own strength, transformed and reduced to instrumental knowledge.” In response, Foucault claims that such a construal of the bifurcation of reason betrays an instance of what he, in his essay *What is Enlightenment?*, refers to as an “intellectual blackmail” – that is, the blackmail of thinking that we must either accept rationality or fall prey to the irrational. For Foucault, it is this blackmail that has been, in his words, “at work in every critique of reason or every critical inquiry into the history of rationality”, and which has had the consequence of making a “rational critique of rationality”, a “rational history of all the ramifications and all the bifurcations [of reason]”, or “contingent history of reason” appear as if it were impossible.

---

333 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 442.
334 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 442.
335 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 441.
336 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 441. That said, for an account in which the critical projects of Adorno and Foucault are constructively compared, see e.g. Allen, ‘Adorno, Foucault, and the End of Progress’, 183-206.
337 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 314.
338 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 441.
339 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 441. However, see also Bernstein, Adorno, 4: “[Adorno] unswervingly affirmed the values of Enlightenment, and believed that modernity suffered from a deficit rather than a surplus of reason and rationality. Because one of the central places in which Adorno works through his critique of modern rationalism is in his writings on art and aesthetics, it is widely believed that his project is to displace reason with aesthetic praxis and judgement. This is a massive misunderstanding and distortion of his thought. Adorno believes that scientific and bureaucratic rationalism are, in their claim to totality, irrational in themselves, and hence that the meaning deficit caused by the disenchantment of the world is
Underpinning this response is Foucault’s insistence that “[w]e have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative”.340 This means, to add to the explanation I gave above, that we, according to Foucault, have to resist thinking about the history of reason as being marked by one bifurcation in which reason, on account of the Enlightenment, became instrumental – that is, became concerned solely with efficiency, calculability, standardisation, etc.341 Rather, we have to begin thinking about the history of reason being marked by an abundance of branchings, ramifications, breaks, and ruptures. Foucault remarks:

I would not speak about one bifurcation of reason but more about an endless, multiple bifurcation – a kind of abundant ramification. I do not speak of the point at which reason became instrumental. [. . .] In this abundance of branchings, ramifications, breaks, and ruptures, [the Enlightenment] was an important event, or episode; it had considerable consequences, but it was not a unique phenomenon.342

340 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 315.
341 Bernstein, Adorno, 10.
342 Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, 442. Compare with Rose, Love’s Work, 125-126: “Previously, modern philosophical irrationalism was seen retrospectively by philosophers and historians as the source of the racist and totalitarian movements of the twentieth century. Now, philosophical reason itself is seen by postmodern philosophers as the general scourge of Western history. To reason’s division of the real into the rational and the irrational is attributed the fatal Manichaeism and imperialism of the West.” See also Foucault, ‘What is Critique?’, 64: “Let us say, roughly, that as opposed to a genesis oriented towards the unity of some principial cause burdened with multiple descendants, what is proposed instead is a genealogy, that is, something that attempts to restore the conditions for the appearance of a singularity born
In other words, for Foucault, the way in which the authority of reason was reconfigured as a result of the Enlightenment is one reconfiguration among many. To say that Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the authority of reason to be contingent is to say that it reveals the authority of reason, at whatever time and in whatever space, to be the result of an abundance of ramifications through which this authority has been reconfigured.\(^{343}\)

_Foucault's method of genealogy as a method of problematisation_

With the aim of explaining the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy, it is important to recognise that from this account of contingency it does not follow that Foucault's method of genealogy, through revealing the authority of reason to be contingent, thereby undermines the authority of reason. Rather, what follows is that the authority of reason is called into question in a specific way – a way through which the authority of reason is not rejected, but “problematised”. Foucault remarks:

> I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the

out of multiple determining elements of which it is not the product, but rather the effect. A process of making it intelligible but with the clear understanding that this does not function according to any principle of closure. There is no principle of closure for several reasons.”

\(^{343}\) Allen, ‘Adorno, Foucault, and the End of Progress’, 197-198: “Adorno and Foucault offer a radically different way of thinking about the backward- and forward-looking conceptions of progress in relation to the project of critical theory. Both reject any vindicatory, backward-looking story of historical progress as a “fact” about what has led up to “us,” but they do so not in favour of a romantic story of decline and fall but rather in the service of a critical problematization of the present.”
history of solutions – and that's the reason why I don't accept the word *alternative*. I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of *problématiques*. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism.\(^{344}\)

In this remark Foucault is describing his method of genealogy as a method of problematisation – that is, a method through which we come to recognise the respects in which the present is, because it is the result of complex, historical and contingent processes, problematic. With regard to the authority of reason, to recognise this as problematic is, for Foucault, to recognise that it is something that demands, not rejection, but acute attention. When Foucault writes that he does not accept the word “alternative”, he is committing himself to a form of realism – “realism” in the sense that he is concerned with the authority of reason, not as it is experienced in some idealised or imagined set of circumstances, but as it is really experienced, as it is really used, in the present.\(^{345}\)


\(^{345}\) See Hoy, David Couzens, ‘The Temporality of Power’, in *Foucault’s Legacy*, edited by Carlos Prado (New York: Continuum, 2009), 11. See also Geuss, *Philosophy and Real Politics*, 10-11: “A realist can fully admit that products of the human imagination are very important in human life, provided he or she keeps a keen and unwavering eye upon the basic motto *Respice finem*, meaning in this case not “The best way to live is to keep your mind on your end: death,” but “Don’t look just at what they say, think, believe, but at what they actually do, and what actually happens as a result.” An imagined threat might be an extremely powerful motivation to action, and an aspiration, even if built on fantasy, is not nothing, provided it really moves people to action. This does not mean that it is any less important to distinguish between a correct perception of the
the authority of reason will always be problematic, for Foucault, because it will always have an actual past and a potential future.\textsuperscript{346} On this account, to recognise that the authority of reason is problematic is to recognise that it can always potentially be changed through continual work.\textsuperscript{347}

Accordingly, far from disowning reason in the way that Rose claims, Foucault’s method of genealogy, as he understood it, encourages us to pay closer attention to the actuality of reason – which, for Foucault, means attending to the “intrinsic dangers” that crisscross this actuality. Foucault remarks:

I think that the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the eighteenth century has always been, still is, and will, I hope, remain the question: What is this Reason that we use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers?

\textsuperscript{346} Compare this with the way certain commentators have characterised Rose’s concept of the “broken middle”. For example, Schick, \textit{A Good Enough Justice}, 38: “The ‘broken middle’ to which Rose refers can be characterised in several ways: a break between the potentiality and actuality of the world, between universal and particular, between freedom and unfreedom, between legality and morality.”

\textsuperscript{347} See Dean, \textit{Critical and Effective Histories}, 56: “There is also a reversal of perspective here. Rather than posing the problem of reason and freedom in terms of a necessary and universal limitation, Foucault’s writings on enlightenment, and his historical studies, start from the actual limits to forms of rationality and action. The point is not to seek the universal conditions that make it possible to speak and act, and to enshrine them in foundational moral codes and epistemologies, but to discover what it is possible to think, to say, and to do under various contingent conditions. This is not to say anything is possible in an irrationalist or libertarian fashion, but that there always remains to be determined a space of contingency and freedom within the conditions of experience and identity.”
How can we exist as rational beings, fortunately committed to practicing a rationality that is unfortunately crisscrossed by intrinsic dangers? One should remain as close to this question as possible, keeping in mind that it is both central and extremely difficult to resolve. In addition, if it is extremely dangerous to say that reason is the enemy that should be eliminated, it is just as dangerous to say that any critical questioning of this rationality risks sending us into irrationality. One should not forget – and I'm saying this not in order to criticise rationality but to show how ambiguous things are – it was on the basis of the flamboyant rationality of social Darwinism that racism was formulated, becoming one of the most enduring and powerful ingredients of Nazism. This was, of course, an irrationality, but an irrationality that was at the same time, after all, a certain form of rationality. [. . .] This is the situation we are in and must combat. If intellectuals in general are to have a function, if critical thought itself has a function – and, even more specifically, if philosophy has a function within critical thought – it is precisely to accept this sort of spiral, this sort of revolving door of rationality that refers us to its necessity, to its indispensability, and, at the same time, to its intrinsic dangers.\textsuperscript{348}

\textsuperscript{348} Foucault, Michel, ‘Space, Knowledge, and Power’, in \textit{Essential Works, Volume 3: Power}, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2000), 358. Cited, in part, by Koopman, \textit{Genealogy as Critique}, 88-89. See also Allen, \textit{The Politics of Our Selves}, 149-150.] See also Foucault, ‘What is Critique?’, 50: “Reason as much as you want, but do you really know up to what point you can reason without it becoming dangerous? Critique will say, in short, that it is not so much a matter of what we are undertaking, more or less courageously, than it is the idea we have of our knowledge and its limits.” See also Allen, \textit{The End of Progress}, 106: “Foucault’s work challenges this central assumption of contemporary Frankfurt School critical theory by asserting that rationality or normativity and power are always and necessarily entangled with each other, and that it is precisely this spiral that critical thought must ceaselessly interrogate.”
I cite this remark at length because it serves to capture both the respects in which I take Rose’s reading of Foucault’s method of genealogy to be misguided, and the respects in which Foucault’s construal of critical thought can be said to converge with Rose’s construal. In this remark Foucault, like Rose, speaks of critical thought as that through which we come to recognise both the unavoidability and the dangers of reason. For Foucault, reason is intrinsically dangerous precisely because it is unavoidable. This relates back to what was said above about the “intrinsic impurity” of reason – that is, as Thomas McCarthy describes it, “its embeddedness in culture and society, its entanglement with power and interest, the historical variability of its categories and criteria, the embodied, sensuous and practically engaged character of its bearers.”

On this account, to use reason, to think and act by way of concepts, is substantively to use something that has been used by many others in the past for many purposes – purposes that, when considered genealogically, will rarely constitute an unbroken, coherent trajectory. For Foucault, as has been explained, genealogy is a method for revealing the contingent processes through which certain of our concepts come to possess a certain authority. What follows from this is not that

---


350 See Geuss, *History and Illusion in Politics*, 2: “I will myself have certain views about the political world and how it works, how it ideally ought to work, and so on, and these will have an important influence on the way I act. Even minimal reflection will suffice to make me aware that I have not myself invented these conceptions but have taken them over from various people in my environment, who in turn had them from others. When I use ‘undemocratic’ as a reproach, part of the reason I do so is because I have been subjected to a barrage of speech and writing about ‘democracy’ and its virtues during all of my conscious life. I do not mean that I feel I have been brainwashed; rather I feel that I have been given a good opportunity to develop proper views on this topic. I also know, however, that if had lived two hundred years ago, I would almost certainly have followed the then virtually universal use of ‘democratic’ as a term of reproach.”
the authority of reason, the normativity of our concepts, is something that should be disown, but something that we have reason to recognise as problematic.\footnote{See also Geuss, Raymond, ‘Culture as Ideal and as Boundary’, in Politics and the Imagination (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 87: “The Nietzschean genealogy is a complex and devious history of certain human reactions, which gradually work themselves free from the contexts within which they are embedded, and attempt to deny their origin, in order to become normatively absolute. The claim to (normative) absoluteness which is built into the usual use of the concept is what is thrown into question by the genealogical account: how exactly can a concept with such contingent historical origins make such a strong normative claim?” Although I lack the space to address this fully, I think this idea that reason is impure could be related, in part, to Rose’s account of “anxiety”. See e.g. The Broken Middle, 90: “‘Anxiety’, a psychological concept, is to be explored in relation to ‘the dogma of hereditary sin’; but sin cannot be explored psychologically, aesthetically, metaphysically or ethically, nor by any scientific reflection, for it is not a state, ‘de potentia’, according to possibility, ‘but de actu or in actu [according to actuality or in actuality] it is again and again’.” Rose is here citing parts of Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety.}  

Given this account of “problematisation”, the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy follows from its capacity to reveal the authority of reason to be the result of complex, historical and contingent processes. Through revealing this, Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation affords the resources with which we can, potentially, reconfigure the authority of reason. To develop this point, I think it is helpful to read Foucault’s method of genealogy as Koopman reads it – that is, as having two parts, which I think map onto the negative and positive aspects that Foucault attributes to the method of genealogy through his reading of Kant. On the one hand, genealogy reveals that the present is always contingent. In this respect, the method of genealogy is negative. Starting from the present state of some concept construed as authoritative, a genealogy works its way backward in time, recounting the contingent processes through which the content of that concept was subject to a complex of interpretations.\footnote{Geuss, ‘Nietzsche and Genealogy’, 12.} On the other hand, genealogy reveals how the present is always contingent.\footnote{See Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 140.
respect, the method of genealogy is positive. Through recounting such contingent processes, a genealogy affords a sense of how the content of certain concepts have changed, and therefore a sense how they could potentially change again. Recognising both of these integrated parts is important because it is on account of their integration that Foucault’s practice of genealogy can be read as having a critical potential. Koopman writes:

By showing [that and] how the present is contingently constructed, Foucault delivered precisely those materials [we] need to reform and improve [our] present. This suggests, of course, an interpretation of Foucault as a radical reformist rather than a revolutionary whose radicalism is merely oppositional. According to such an interpretation, problematisation does not so much disrupt or denounce the present, as it opens up the present as a problem so that we may engage in the difficult work of learning how to form ourselves otherwise.\textsuperscript{354}

\textit{Summary}

\textsuperscript{354} Koopman, \textit{Genealogy as Critique}, 143. See also Allen, Amy, ‘The History of Historicity: The Critique of Reason in Foucault (and Derrida)’, in \textit{Between Foucault and Derrida}, edited by Yubraj Aryal, Vernon W. Cisney, Nicolae Morar and Christopher Penfield (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 132: “All of which suggests that just as Foucault is sceptical of the notion of a Reason in general, he is likewise sceptical of the idea that there is a historicity proper to reason in general. The most that he would say is that there is a historicity proper to our modern form of rationality — a form which, following Hegel, takes reason to be Historical, and history to be rational — and it is precisely the historicity of History that Foucault aims to reveal, as part of his critical effort to uncover the contingency of that form of knowledge, thus opening up the possibility of moving beyond it.”
The aim of this section has been to explicate the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy. On the account I have given, which took its focus from Rose’s challenge, the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy follows from its capacity to problematise the authority of reason – that is, to reveal both that and how the authority of reason is the result of complex, historical and contingent processes. To recognise the authority of reason as being always problematic is to recognise it as always open to being potentially changed.

2.4. ASSESSING ROSE’S CHALLENGE TO FOUCALUT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY

What is the aim of this section?

The aim of this section is to argue that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided. It is misguided, I will argue, because it acknowledges only one of the two integrated respects in which Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the authority of reason to be contingent, and consequently fails to acknowledge its critical potential.

Repeating Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy

To repeat, Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is that it is critically blind. Central to this challenge is her reading of Foucault’s method of genealogy as nihilistic – that is, concerned with undermining the authority of reason through revealing it to be contingent. For Rose, it is on account of it being nihilistic that Foucault’s method of genealogy is critically blind – critically blind in
the sense that it is blind to the ways in which it remains implicated in the
oppositions it claims to reject.

Assessing Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy

Given the above account of Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation,
Rose’s challenge is misguided, I think, because it acknowledges only one of the
two integrated respects in which Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the
authority of reason to be contingent. To repeat, Foucault’s method of
genealogical problematisation involves revealing both *that* and *how* the authority
of reason is contingent. These two aspects are integrated in that the latter is
informed by the former, and the former is motivated by the latter. In other words,
the further we go back into the history of a concept, the greater our sense of how
the content of that concept has changed, and, therefore, the greater our sense of
how it could potentially change again in the future. In reading Foucault’s method
of genealogy as nihilistic, Rose is, I think, acknowledging only the former of these
two aspects – that is, the negative aspect. If Foucault’s method of genealogy
were simply concerned with revealing *that* the authority of reason is contingent,
then there would be at least room for reading it as nihilistic in the way that Rose
does. For if this were the case, it would not be clear how the results of
genealogical analyses could contribute towards the positive, constructive work in
which we are concerned with the potential for restructuring the present structures
of reason. However, as I explained above, it is not the case that Foucault’s
method of genealogy is simply concerned with revealing *that* the authority of
reason is contingent – it is also concerned with revealing *how* it is contingent. It
is for this reason, therefore, that I take Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of
genealogy to be misguided. Rose acknowledges only one of the two aspects that comprise Foucault’s method of genealogy, and consequently misses its critical potential. Additionally, since these aspects are integrated, Rose misrepresents the aspect that she does acknowledge. \(^{355}\)

**Rose’s challenge is misguided, but resourcefully so**

Having now argued that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided, I think it is important to recognise the respect in which Rose’s challenge is still resourceful. In spite of it being misguided, Rose’s challenge is still resourceful, I think, because it encourages a subtler statement of Foucault’s method of genealogy. \(^{356}\) The distinction between the respects in which Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals *that* and *how* the authority of reason is contingent is subtle, but crucial – crucial because it is on account of the integration of these two aspects that Foucault’s method of genealogy can be read as having a critical potential.

In the following chapter, I will argue that Rose’s critical project is, in part, unclear, and argue that Foucault’s method of genealogy can help clarify this part. That Foucault’s method of genealogy can do this is a consequence of its critical

---

\(^{355}\) See also Cutrofello, *Discipline and Critique*, 31: “That Foucault sought to think beyond the limits of the present attests to his desire to critique the juridical as such. But to critique the juridical is not to be automatically antijuridical and certainly not to be nihilistic. For similar reasons, I would question Rose’s reading of Foucault’s relationship to Nietzsche.” Although I lack the space to develop this point, I would say, if only as a suggestion, that the misguidedness of Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is, in part, a consequence of her overstated of the relationship between the ways in which Nietzsche and Foucault construe “genealogy” – both as a something done and as something revealed. See *Dialectic of Nihilism*, Chapter 9: Legalism and Power: Foucault.

\(^{356}\) I am not claiming that only Rose’s challenge is the only challenge that does this.
potential – a critical potential that I have argued, in this chapter, follows from its capacity to problematise the authority of reason. Accordingly, Rose’s challenge is additionally (albeit indirectly) resourceful in that the subtler statement of Foucault’s method of genealogy that it encourages is also the statement that I will argue, in the following chapter, serves to clarify an unclear part of her critical project.

**Summary**

The aim of this section has been to argue that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided. It is misguided, I have argued, because it acknowledges only one of the two integrated respects in which Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the authority of reason to be contingent, and consequently fails to acknowledge its critical potential.

**2.5. CONCLUSION**

**What have I argued in this chapter?**

In this chapter I have argued that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided. Rose challenges Foucault’s method of genealogy for being critically blind, and does so because she reads it as nihilistic – that is, as being concerned exclusively with undermining the authority of reason through revealing it to be contingent. This challenge is misguided, I have argued, because it acknowledges only one of the two integrated respects in which Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the authority of reason to be contingent. On the
account I have given, Foucault’s practice of genealogy is, specifically, a practice of problematisation – that is, a practice through which we come to recognise both *that* and *how* the authority of reason is contingent. It is from the integration of these two respects that the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy follows: through revealing *that* the authority of reason is contingent, it reveals *how* it has changed, and how it could potentially be changed. Rose’s challenge, through acknowledging only one of these two integrated respects, fails to recognise the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy.
CHAPTER THREE

ON READING ROSE’S CRITICAL PROJECT
CONSTRUCTIVELY IN CONJUNCTION WITH
FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGICAL
PROBLEMATISATION

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The argument

In this chapter I will argue that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation can help clarify a part of Rose’s critical project that is unclear. As was explained in chapter one, Rose’s critical project involves a concern with avoiding the blindness, and consequent ignorance, of Kant’s critical project. As will be explained in this chapter, it is on account of this concern that Rose turns to Hegel – that is, Rose reads Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism as affording an effective alternative to Kant’s transcendental approach. According to this reading, criticism is required, in part, to yield the experience of identity and non-identity. While Rose is clear about this requirement, she is largely unclear about how criticism can achieve it. It is, I will argue, this pivotal, but unclear, part of Rose’s critical project that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation serves to clarify. It does this through affording a way of recognising both that the sense of universality that certain concepts come to possess is contingent, and
that this contingency does not undermine such universality. Rather, it shows that such universality is always problematic – that is, something that can be, on account of its actual past and possible future, continually called into question and potentially reconfigured. In other words, I will argue that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation yields the experience of identity and non-identity in the way required, but left unclear, by Rose’s critical project.

**The structure of the argument**

The argument of this chapter will consist of two sections. First, I will argue that Rose’s critical project is, in part, unclear. This argument will involve me accounting for Rose’s reading of Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism as an effective alternative to Kant’s transcendental approach. According to this account, Rose’s critical project requires, in part, that criticism yield the experience of identity and non-identity. Although Rose is clear about this requirement, she is, I will argue, unclear about how criticism can achieve this requirement. Second, I will argue that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation can serve to clarify this pivotal, but unclear, part of Rose’s critical project.

**Qualifications**

Before beginning the first of these two sections, I need to make two qualifications about the content of this chapter. First, as was the case within my account of Rose’s reading of Kant, within my account of Rose’s reading of Hegel I will not be concerned, at least not directly, with comparing this reading with the ways in
which others have read Hegel.\textsuperscript{357} Second, my account of Rose’s reading of Hegel will be partial – partial in the sense that I will be focusing on Rose’s reading of Hegel’s idea of phenomenology. While Hegel’s idea of phenomenology constitutes a pivotal part within Rose’s critical project, it remains only a part of Rose’s broader speculative exposition of Hegel.\textsuperscript{358}

3.2. IS ROSE’S CRITICAL PROJECT UNCLEAR?

\textit{What is the aim of this section?}

The aim of this section is to argue that Rose’s critical project is, in part, unclear. The part in question relates to Rose’s reading of Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism as an effective alternative to Kant’s transcendental approach to criticism. According to this reading, criticism is required to yield the experience of identity and non-identity. While Rose is clear about this requirement, she is, I will argue, unclear about how criticism can achieve this requirement.

\textit{How has Rose’s reading of Hegel been explicated within the secondary literature?}

Within the secondary literature on Rose, most commentators, when accounting for her reading of Hegel, have been concerned with explaining and applying her

\textsuperscript{357} To date, the best account of how Rose’s reading of Hegel compares with the way others have read Hegel is given by Brower Latz, \textit{The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose}. See also Brower Latz, Andrew, ‘Gillian Rose and Social Theory’, \textit{Telos} 173 (2015), 37-54.

\textsuperscript{358} See Rose, \textit{Hegel Contra Sociology}, 48.
“speculative exposition of Hegel”. For these commentators, Rose’s reading of Hegel results in a “speculative philosophy” that affords, among other things, a valuable way of comprehending, and consequently working through, the antinomies of social-political realities. For example, Andrew Brower Latz concludes his comprehensive, critical and constructive account of Rose’s reading of Hegel as follows:

Rose’s [. . .] Hegelian speculative philosophy offers a better approach to social theory than the classical and early Frankfurt sociological traditions. Rose’s main criticism was of their neo-Kantian or transcendental structure, whereby one term becomes the precondition for all others but thereby remains unknowable and unexplainable, affecting their judgments about society. Transcendental social theory is less able than speculative social theory to account for its own social determinations. Hegel’s speculative phenomenology avoids this problem by historical-phenomenological knowing and a logic that articulates the structure of that knowing in a totality. The *Phenomenology* provides the motivation and some justification for the categorial structures

---

359 Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, Preface for 1995 reprint. See also Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 28-29: “Rose is a philosophical intriguer. She is often referred to as a ‘Hegelian’, but this appellation is somewhat misleading. Rose’s ‘Hegel’ owes as much to Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno as it does to the historical Hegel. And yet it would be a mistake to conclude that the hermeneutical licence Rose adopts towards Hegel’s texts betokens a lack of method on her part; on the contrary, as we shall see, the philosophical style and terms of her presentation are progressively grounded in the course of the work itself.”

explored in the *Logic*; even if the *Logic* fails as a complete system it nevertheless has much to teach us about how reason works. Rose's social philosophy is thus its own metaphilosophy, which incorporates the meta-level into the substantive level of knowing, by considering its own logical and social preconditions. The use of speculative propositions brings into view the diremptions of society and theory so they can be speculatively handled. It relates philosophical claims about the nature of reason, phenomenology and metatheory, with sociological claims about society as permanently dirempted in various fundamental ways. Awareness of these features of philosophy and society are, for Rose, components of practical wisdom in modern society.\(^{361}\)

I cite this passage at length centrally because it serves to indicate the partiality of my own account. As this passage makes explicit, much can be read into Rose’s reading of Hegel. My own account of this reading will be partial in the sense that I will be focusing on a part of this reading – a part that I will now explain.

**How will I explicate Rose’s reading of Hegel?**

Within my own account of Rose’s reading of Hegel, my concern will be different from, and more modest than, the concern described above. My concern will be with a part of Rose’s speculative exposition of Hegel – that is, the part in which Rose reads Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism as yielding the

experience of identity and non-identity. To repeat, I am concerned with this part specifically because it is this part that I think is unclear, and which can be made clearer on account of Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation. Accordingly, the difference and modesty (or partiality) of my account, at least when considered relative to the accounts of other commentators, is a consequence of the overarching aim of this thesis – that is, to argue that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation. I will begin this account by explaining the respect in which Rose reads Hegel as affording an alternative to Kant’s transcendental approach to criticism.

**Rose’s reading of Hegel as an alternative to Kant**

It is within the work of Hegel that Rose, on her account, finds a way of avoiding the critical blindness, and consequent ignorance, that she, as was explained above, takes to be the result of Kant’s critical project. In other words, Rose reads Hegel as affording an alternative approach to criticism. Such an approach is afforded by what Rose takes to be one of the central ideas within the work of Hegel – that is, unification of theoretical and practical reason. Rose writes:

> Hegel put a trinity of ideas in place of Kant’s idea of transcendental method: the idea of phenomenology, the idea of absolute ethical life (*absolute Sittlichkeit*), and the idea of a logic. The idea of phenomenology can be seen as an alternative to Kant’s theoretical *quaestio quid juris* [the question of law], while the idea of absolute

---

ethical life can be seen as an alternative to Kant’s justification of moral judgements. This, however, would be to concede the Kantian dichotomy between theoretical and practical reason. The idea of all Hegel’s thought is to unify theoretical and practical reason. In his Logic, as in all his works, the unification is achieved by a phenomenology and the idea of absolute ethical life.\textsuperscript{363}

What, for Rose, is this unification of theoretical and practical reason? To answer this question, it is helpful to first think about what, for Rose, it is for theoretical and practical reason to be separated. One way of thinking about this is to think of this separation as being a consequence of the rigorous distinction Kant makes between the empirical and the transcendental.\textsuperscript{364} As was explained above, Kant’s rigorous distinction between the empirical and the transcendental implies an asymmetrical relationship between particulars and universals – asymmetrical in the sense that the particulars of experience play no part in determining the lawfulness / authority of the concepts that capture these particulars. Rather, to practice criticism by way of Kant’s transcendental method is to determine the lawfulness (i.e. the necessity and the universality) of concepts through determining that they are the conditions of the possibility of experience. On this account, theoretical and practical reason are separate in that the processes through which they are shown to be lawful are distinct. Consequently, for Kant, there are two “courts” (or “tribunals”) of reason: that of theoretical reason responsible for adjudicating empirical experience in general, and of the natural

\textsuperscript{363} Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 48. As I mentioned above, out this “trinity of ideas” my concern is with Rose’s reading of Hegel’s idea of phenomenology.

\textsuperscript{364} See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 3.
sciences, and that concerned with pronouncing the moral verdict of pure practical reason.

Given this way of explaining how the separation between theoretical and practical reason results from Kant’s critical project, Rose’s reading of Hegel as affording a way of unifying theoretical and practical reason can be explained as follows.\(^{365}\) In contrast with Kant’s critical project, Rose reads Hegel’s critical project as implying a relationship between particulars and universals that is symmetrical – symmetrical in the sense that the authority of reason is determined through a experiential reciprocity between particulars and universals.\(^{366}\) On this account, just as universals can have authority over particulars, particulars can have authority over universals. To say the former is to say that our concepts are capable of capturing the particulars of experience. To say the latter is to say that the particulars of experience are capable of not cooperating with the concepts we use to capture them – that is, capable of revealing our concepts to be misconceived, and demanding thereby that they be re-conceived.\(^{367}\)

---

\(^{365}\) To repeat, I am here concerned with explaining a part of Rose’s critical project. For a fuller account, see Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, 209-214.


\(^{367}\) What is here in question is the experience of “contradiction” – an experience in which an attempt at using a concept seems, as Peter Steinberger writes, “somehow not to work, and it is in such circumstances that we come to investigate – sometimes philosophically – our conceptual practices. Specifically, we often encounter in the world some reason for believing that a particular “structure of conceptualisation” is not quite
reciprocity between particulars and universals is one that revolves around the successes and failures of conceptuality. It is for this reason that Rose refers to the relationship between particulars and universals as a struggle – a struggle in which theoretical and practical reason are unified and undone (or broken) through the experience of the difficulty of reason.368

Rose’s reading of Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism

368 Accordingly, the “reciprocity” between universals and particulars should not be construed as connoting, for example, a movement that is “easy”. As will be explained, for Rose, the reciprocity that I am here describing – which is the movement of phenomenology – is a “gamble” (Hegel Contra Sociology, 168). A “gamble” that is, for Rose, less tragic than it is comic. See ‘The Comedy of Hegel’, 72: “[F]irst, spirit in the Phenomenology means the drama of misrecognition which ensues at every stage and transition of the work – a ceaseless comedy, according to which our aims and outcomes constantly mismatch each other, and provoke yet another revised aim, action and discordant outcome. Secondly. reason, therefore, is comic, full of surprises, of unanticipated happenings. so that comprehension is always provisional and preliminary. This is the meaning of Bildung, of formation or education, which is intrinsic to the phenomenological process. Thirdly, the law is no longer that of Greek ethical life; it is no longer tragic.” See also Love’s Work, 134-135: “The comical as such implies an infinite light-heartedness and confidence felt by someone raised altogether above his own inner contradiction and not bitter or miserable in it at all; this is the bliss and ease of a man who, being sure of himself, can bear the frustrations of his aims and achievements.” This is Hegel’s version of the divine comedy. [See Hegel, G. W. F., Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume II, translated by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 1200] No human being possesses sureness of self: this can only mean being bounded and unbounded, selved and unselved, “sure” only of this untiring exercise. Then, this sureness of self, which is ready to be unsure, makes the laughter at the mismatch between aim and achievement comic, not cynical; holy, not demonic.” For more on the relationship between comedy and reason see Williams, “The Sadness of the King”. Accordingly, in using “reciprocity” here I am not attributing to Rose a position like that advocated by Rawls. See his “criterion of reciprocity” in Political Liberalism, which he clarifies (again on the idealised assumption of people are inherently “reasonable”) as a criterion for cooperation (see esp. §1.2). Whereas Rawls, arguably, works with an idealised account of reason – that is, an account of reason that only works in idealised circumstances – Rose works with a realistic account of reason – that is, an account of reason riddled with errors, mistakes, failures, tragedies, injustices, successes, laughter, good enough justices.
For Rose, this struggle between particulars and universals – a struggle in which the authority of reason is configured and reconfigured\textsuperscript{369} – demands criticism. For criticism is what reveals particulars and universals to be something with which we can struggle. In other words, for Rose, the aim of criticism is to continually call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for reconfiguring this authority. This is the aim of criticism as Rose construes it. What is now in question is how she thinks criticism achieves this aim.

For Rose, this aim is achieved by way of Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism.\textsuperscript{370} On Rose’s account, Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism contrasts with Kant’s transcendental approach centrally through resisting Kant’s “method” – a method that implies Kant’s rigorous distinction between the empirical and the transcendental, and which, as has been explained, leaves criticism blind to the actual relationship between universals and particulars. For Rose:

There can be no question of changing from Kant’s method to a different method, for all ‘method’, by definition, imposes a schema

\textsuperscript{369} See also Bernstein, Adorno, 132: “The condition of being beyond dispute is achievable only by dissolving the relation between experience and reason whose synthesis alone can account for the authority of reason.”

\textsuperscript{370} See Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 48. Rose continues to make reference to Hegel’s idea of phenomenology throughout her subsequent works. See e.g. Dialectic of Nihilism, 1-7, 208-212; The Broken Middle, a work that has been described as a “phenomenology” (see Bernstein, Recovering Ethical Life, 8, cited above (n104)); ‘Of Derrida’s Spirit’; Mourning Becomes the Law, 13-14; ‘The comedy of Hegel and the Trauerspiel of Modem Philosophy’.
on its object, by making the assumptions that it is external to its object and not defining it.\(^{371}\)

Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism, as read by Rose, resists Kant’s method by shifting the part played by method from criticism to that which is being criticised.\(^ {372}\) Rose writes:

A phenomenology thus presents the forms of knowledge according to their own methodological standards as they have occurred, or, as they appear [. . .], and it presents the realm of appearance as defined by limited forms of consciousness.\(^ {373}\)

On this account, it can be said that Rose reads Hegel’s idea of phenomenology as affording a form of criticism that is immanent as opposed to being transcendent.\(^ {374}\)

\(^{371}\) Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, 48-49. See Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §51: “This method, which consists in taking the pair of determinations out of that universal schema and then plastering them onto everything in heaven and earth, onto all the natural and spiritual shapes and then organising everything in this manner, produces nothing less than a "crystal clear report on the organism of the universe." This “report” is like a tabular chart, which is itself a little bit like a skeleton with small bits of paper stuck all over it, or maybe a bit like the rows of sealed and labelled boxes in a grocer’s stall. Either of these makes just as much sense as the other, and, as in the former case, where there are only bones with the flesh and blood stripped off of them, and as in the latter case, where something equally lifeless has been hidden away in those boxes, in this “report,” the living essence of what is at stake has been omitted or concealed.” In other words, such a method (which can be specified as Kant’s “method”, although Hegel does not specify it as such) leaves its object lifeless.

\(^{372}\) Or, as Finlayson will state it: “What makes a criticism immanent is that the standard of criticism belongs to or inheres in (in a suitably specified sense) the object of criticism.” (‘Hegel, Adorno and the Origins of Immanent Criticism’, 1144-1145)

\(^{373}\) Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, 48-49.

\(^{374}\) To be sure, Rose never explicitly explicates her reading as such. However, she does so implicitly throughout her reading of Hegel. See esp. *Hegel Contra Sociology*, 159: “The *Phenomenology* does not consist solely of the presentation of the experiences of natural consciousness, but also of the *science* of that
What is it to criticise something immanently? Or, more specifically, what is it to read Hegel's idea of phenomenology as affording a form of immanent critique? There are a number of ways in which this question can be answered, and a number of ways in which the answers to this question can prove, and have proven, contentious.\textsuperscript{375} For the purposes of understanding how such a form of criticism is consistent with Rose's critical project – that is, conducive to the struggle between particulars and universals – I think it is helpful to understand experience. It consists both of a presentation of the contradictions of natural consciousness and a doctrine of that consciousness. This is the distinction between what is experienced by consciousness, 'für es', and what is experienced by us, 'für uns'. At the end of the Introduction a new object arises 'for us, behind its [natural consciousness'] back, as it were'. To natural consciousness this knowledge would appear as a 'loss of itself'. A negative experience for natural consciousness is a positive result for us, for natural consciousness has been presented as phenomenal knowledge. Natural consciousness does not know itself to be knowledge, but it experiences the contradiction between its definition and its real existence. It thus contains its own criterion of awareness, the precondition of immanent change. But this change is only a change in perspective and results in further contradictions. Natural consciousness changes its definition of itself and of its existence, but this change is itself determined. It does not abolish the determination of consciousness by substance as such, a consciousness which persists as a natural consciousness in relation to the substance which determines it. See also Brower Latz, 'Gillian Rose and Social Theory', 37-54, \textit{The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose}, 56: “Rose’s speculative social theory proceeds somewhat like Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology}: at once the immanent critique of current social forms and the historical-philosophical reconstruction of past forms: beginning in the middle.” Osborne, Peter, ‘Hegelian Phenomenology and the Critique of Reason and Society’, \textit{Radical Philosophy} 32 (1982), 14; Schick, A \textit{Good Enough justice}, 30.

\textsuperscript{375} Contentious, in part, because Hegel never used the term ‘immanent criticism’. See Finlayson, ‘Hegel, Adorno and the Origins of Immanent Criticism’, 1145: ‘It is striking, given how widely shared the story of its Hegelian origins is, that the term ‘immanent criticism’ is nowhere to be found in Hegel’s corpus (or Marx’s come to that). Hegel was methodologically self-aware, and took great care with his philosophical terminology. Not only did he not call his own philosophy or philosophical method ‘immanent criticism,’ he did not and would not call any of his mature philosophies works of ‘criticism’.” See also de Boer, ‘Hegel’s Conception of Immanent Critique’, 83. For readings of Hegel’s idea of phenomenology as affording a form of immanent criticism, see e.g. Rosen, Michael, \textit{Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticisms} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 23-54; Smith, Steven B., \textit{Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism Rights in Context} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 169-175; Benhabib, \textit{Critique, Norm, and Utopia}, Chapter 1: The Origins of Immanent Critique. See also Becker, ‘On Immanent Critique in Hegel’s Phenomenology’, 1–23.
such a form of criticism as committed to a form of “realism”. As was mentioned above, for Rose, an immanent approach to criticism involves criticising something according to its own methodological standards. When that “something” is reason itself, this approach can be restated as one in which concepts are criticised according to how they are actually used as reasons for thinking and acting within actual contexts. In other words, to immanently criticise a concept is, broadly speaking, to begin by attending to the use of that concept, not according to some external standard for how that concept should be used, but according to the present reality of its use – a reality in which the use of a concept will be bound up within a specific time and a place, and within specific institutions. For Rose, approaching conceptuality / rationality in this immanent / realistic way is what reveals the dynamic processes through which the use of concepts is experienced as entailing both successes and failures. Accordingly, for Rose, to criticise a concept immanently, is to yield the experience of both its successes and failures.

In the context of Rose’s reading of Hegel, what has here been stated as the experience of the successes and failures of conceptuality, is stated as the experience of identity and non-identity. Rose writes:

> Only when the lack of identity between subject and predicate has been experienced, can their identity be grasped. ‘Lack of identity’ does not have the formal meaning that subject and predicate must be different from each other in order to be related. It means that the

---


proposition which we have affirmed, or the concept we have devised of the nature of an object, fails to correspond to the state of affairs or object which we have also defined as the state of affairs or object to which it should correspond. This experience of lack of identity which natural consciousness undergoes is the basis for reading propositions as speculative identities.  

In the light of this passage, Rose’s reading of Hegel’s phenomenological / immanent approach to criticism can be construed as having the central aim of yielding the experience of identity and non-identity – where that means, specifically, an experience in which a concept is revealed as both succeeding and failing to correspond to the object / objects to which it should correspond. I emphasise Rose’s use of the word “should” because it points to the importance of this experience, and therefore the importance of criticism. In the context of Rose’s critical project, the experience of identity and non-identity is important because it is this experience that affords the resources for potential “re-cognition” – that is, the process through which a concept is re-conceived to bring it closer to corresponding with the object / objects to which it should correspond. In turn, and crucially for Rose’s critical project, the experience of identity and non-identity yields the ability to think by way of “speculative identities”

---

378 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 52; see also 55-63, 63-77, 78-84; Dialectic of Nihilism, 5, 7; ‘From Speculative to Dialectical Thinking’.
379 See esp. Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 64, 76-77.
380 For a constructive account of Rose’s concept of “re-cognition” see esp. Schick, ‘Re-cognizing Recognition’.
identities that are, in Rose’s words, “uncertain and problematic, gradually acquiring meaning as the result of a series of contradictory experiences.”

**Is Rose’s critical project unclear?**

With this reference to Rose’s use of the word “should” it is necessary to return to the worry referenced above – that is, the worry that Rose’s critical project is, in part, implicated in the problem of normativity. To repeat, this problem concerns the confusions that can arise when normative claims are made without the foundations to do so, at least not justifiably. Within this thesis I have been arguing that, for Rose, the aim of criticism is not to yield normative conclusions, but to call normativity into question – that is, render the relationship between theory and praxis equivocal / problematic. This is what it means to say that, for Rose, criticism yields an *aporia*, a non-foundational account of reason. However, if this is the aim of criticism, is Rose justified in claiming that anything should follow from this form of criticism? For example, is Rose justified in claiming that when we

---

381 Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, 52. Gorman helpfully restates this aspect of Rose reading of Hegel as follows: “A ‘speculative proposition’ [or the act of thinking by way of “speculative identities’] denotes both the identity and the lack of identity between subject and predicate. It is the experience of the lack of identity between what the subject takes the predicate term or object to be and what the object is in-itself that enforces the re-cognition of the object. The re-cognition of the object in turn brings about the de-position of the subject, and the transition to a new subject–object configuration, or another form of relative recognition.” (‘Gillian Rose and the project of a Critical Marxism’, 29)

382 An additional problem could be stated in terms of Rose’s reliance on the idea (or belief) that the experience of contradiction will inevitably yield change or transformation. See Geuss, *Philosophy and Real Politics*, 3-4: “Not all contradictions resolve into temporal change of belief or desire. Any attempt to think seriously about the relation between politics and ethics must remain cognitively sensitive to the fact that people’s beliefs, values, desires, moral conceptions, etc., are usually half-baked (in every sense), are almost certain to be both indeterminate and, to the extent to which they are determinate, grossly inconsistent in any but the most local, highly formalised contexts, and are constantly changing. None of this implies that it might not be of the utmost importance to aspire to ensure relative stability and consistency in certain limited domains.”
come to recognise that a concept misconceives its object / objects, we should thereby reconceive that concept? If not, does Rose’s practice of criticism preclude the possibility of transforming, reconfiguring the authority of reason. As I understand it, and as I will explain, this worry (i.e. the worry that Rose’s critical project is without critical potential) is a consequence of part of Rose’s critical project being unclear – specifically, the part in which Rose contends that a phenomenological approach to criticism yields the experience of identity and non-identity. To develop this worry, I will return to the challenge raised by Gorman.

As I mentioned briefly above, this worry is one partially addressed by Anthony Gorman. For Gorman, the worry is that Rose’s critical project, on account of the “aporetic stance” that it yields, seems to preclude “formative work”. Gorman frames this argument by way of a split that he sees within Rose’s oeuvre. He writes: “Rose represents her oeuvre as a unified philosophical project centred around her three main texts: Hegel contra Sociology, Dialectic of Nihilism and The Broken Middle. However, this claim does not withstand critical examination. The exposition of speculative experience in the late works diverges markedly from the mode of presentation adopted in the ‘first phase’ of her output.”

According to Gorman’s critical examination: “In Hegel contra Sociology, Rose presents a phenomenological account of the relation between ‘substance’ (objective ethical life) and subjectivity in which the possibilities of self-transformation are predicated upon overcoming the limitations and constraints placed on society by the continued domination of bourgeois law and private

---

383 A worry advanced by Osborne (in ‘Hegelian Phenomenology and the Critique of Reason and Society’) and Gorman (in ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’), albeit by different means.


property. In the late works, this ‘objective’ treatment of subjectivity is displaced by a contrary emphasis on faith, inwardness and an ethic of singularity. While this ethic continues to demand an engagement with the political, the terms of this engagement are no longer predicated upon a politics of revolutionary transformation.”

For Gorman, therefore, Rose’s work does not form a unified whole. Rather, it “comprises two halves that do not add up.” They do not add up, on Gorman’s account, because “The Broken Middle represents a fundamental departure from the form of speculative exposition presented in Hegel Contra Sociology. The difference is this: in Hegel Contra Sociology, the antinomies of sociological reason are comprehended and criticised from the standpoint of the universal (‘the Absolute’) which, though not ‘posited’ or ‘pre-judged’, is nonetheless understood to be latent or implicit within the antinomies themselves. In The Broken Middle, on the other hand, the antinomies of theological reason are comprehended from the standpoint of a particular culture which is taken to stand for or point towards the universal.” In other words, Gorman reads Rose’s work as involving a reorientation in which the relation to the universal is relativised. It is on the basis of this relativisation that, he argues, Rose’s later work undermines (or impedes) the critical potential of her earlier work – a consequence that leaves

---

388 Gorman, ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’, 54. Gorman continues: “In her late authorship Rose speaks entirely from within the crisis of modern subjectivity. She contends that the diremption between the universal and the particular must be comprehended, lived and transformed by the single individual, who is willing to stake and risk her identity and to make it possible for others to risk theirs, while at the same time eschewing all dogmatic and illusory certainties.” (54)
389 For Gorman, his critical assessment notwithstanding, Rose’s critical project is not a lost cause. See Gorman, Anthony, ‘Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism’, 35: “The challenge that Rose has left us with, then, is to find a way of integrating the two phases of her authorship. It is not sufficient to recover
her critical project closer to the critical projects of “postmodernity” that she continually challenged. “By relativising the relation to the universal to the fate of a particular culture and of a single individual within that culture, she is unable to prevent her own position from being assimilated to the perspectivist, relativist and agonal politics of postmodernism against which she herself so relentlessly and vociferously protests.”^390

In short, Gorman’s argument involves reading Rose’s work as comprising two halves. The first half is oriented by Rose’s concern with thinking the particular from the standpoint of the universal. The second half is oriented by her concern with thinking the universal from the standpoint of the particular. For Gorman, whereas the first half has a critical potential to transform our social-political relations, the second half does not. Within the second half of her work “Rose demands that we work with this aporia [between universality and particularity] rather than seek to resolve it. But what if the aporetic stance itself precludes formative work?”^391

---

the lost trajectory of her thought; we must also seek to complete it.” However, see Hammond, Philosophy and the Facetious Style, 172: “Gorman risks recreating the terror that Rose says Marxism recreates, and which she argues Hegel acknowledges, since his separation of Rose’s work into two phases is methodological. It is, however, purposely and necessarily staged. Gorman’s aim is “to complete” the “lost trajectory” of Rose’s authorship, or otherwise, to understand it. To simply argue that Gorman repeats the mistakes that a left wing reading of Hegel makes, therefore, is to concede the opposition between a left and right wing reading of Hegel’s thought, when Gorman, like Rose before him, acknowledges, reinforces and undermines it too. Thus it is also argued that the theologian Rowan Williams does not so much repeat the mistakes that this opposition between a left and right wing reading of Hegel repeats as it argues that he employs the very form of style that Rose is also forced to employ.”

^390 Gorman, ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’, 55. See also Milbank, ‘On the Paraethical’, 78: “Yet we have already seen that the transcendental horizon of death remained for her the non-ethical precondition of the ethical as both pagan and heroic, and equally (as today in the case of Žižek), her accurate exposition of Hegel appears uncannily close to the very nihilism that she refuses.”

As I mentioned above, I think that Gorman’s challenge is misguided. It is misguided centrally because it fails to recognise that the aim of criticism, as Rose construes it, is to yield an *aporia* – an *aporia* that implicates both of the standpoints that he sees as separate. It is, in other words, the *aporia* of recognising that reason is always both unavoidable and partial – that is, non-foundational. To recognise this is to recognise both that the universality of our concepts can succeed in capturing the particulars of experience, and that the particulars of experience can prove recalcitrant towards the universality of our concepts, and thereby encourage the transformation of such universality.

That said, I also think that Gorman’s challenge is resourceful. It is resourceful because it points to a part of Rose’s critical project that is unclear, and which needs to be made clearer in order to keep its critical potential intact. The part in question concerns Rose’s contention that a phenomenological approach to criticism yields the experience of identity and non-identity. Does Rose think that this experience follows *necessarily* from criticism? In other words, does she think that, providing we attend to the ways in which we actually use concepts as reasons for thinking and acting within certain contexts, we will *necessarily* come to recognise the respects in which these concepts simultaneously succeed and fail?

Within the secondary literature on Rose, some commentators seem to think that it will follow necessarily. For example, Rowan Williams writes:

---

That we misrecognise the character of thinking by entertaining the
deliverances of natural consciousness is all-important: entertain the
particular in its strangeness, and out of that will, properly, come the
speculative recognition of the unsustainable character of the
‘natural’. The thinking subject over against the object thought
succumbs to the contradictions of this opposition.393

With respect to this passage, my question is: What is it to “entertain the particular
in its strangeness”? If it is to recognise the ways in which the particulars of
experience and particular experiences can prove recalcitrant within our attempts
at capturing them with our concepts, then what prevents this recognition from
remaining at, what Rose calls, the “negative stage of reason”394 – that is, the

393 Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 10. See also Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian
Rose, 45: “It is by attention to particulars, beginning with immanent analysis and including ever deepening
or widening awareness of determination, that Rose’s Hegelianism avoids the crude determinism of vaguely
referring to society or capitalism (etc.) to explain phenomena.”

394 This is a part of Rose’s criticism of Adorno’s Negative Dialectics. See Rose, ‘From Speculative to
Butler and Christine Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 275-282], confines himself to
‘dialectic’, which is the second, negative stage of reason. [. . .] In passage after passage of Negative
Dialectics Adorno represents Hegel in terms of oppositions – between individual and ideal, or between
particular and universal – which Hegel is alleged to have invariably reconciled in favour of the latter term of
the opposition against the former [. . .].” However, Rose continues, “[w]hile claiming that Hegel is ‘siding with
the universal’, Adorno does not relate these oppositions to each other as they come to light in a dynamic
historical development but argues that they are frozen [. . .]. He thereby preserves them under the spell and
brings mediation to a standstill.” (61-62) In other words, for Rose, Adorno fails to recognise that the
oppositions (or antinomies) between our concepts and their objects gesture towards “speculative identities”
– that is, identities that acquire their content through the work of re-cognition. In his review of Negative
Dialectics, Geuss alludes to a comparable complaint made by Walter Benjamin: “Adorno’s early mentor,
Walter Benjamin, once wrote: “Alle entscheidenden Schläge werden mit der linken Hand geführt werden.”
Negative Dialectics shows that philosophically Adorno has no right hand.” (Geuss, Raymond, ‘Review of
Negative Dialectics’, The Journal of Philosophy, 72.6 (1975), 175) For more on the part played by “negativity”
within Adorno’s work see also Finlayson, James Gordon, ‘On Not Being Silent in the Darkness: Adorno’s
stage in which we, with reason, “recognise that we have erred”? In the context of Rose’s critical project, while such negativity, or the recognition of non-identity is integral to criticism, it always risks bringing criticism “to a standstill” – by which she means, it always risks leaving criticism one-sided, and thereby without the potential to afford the resources for potentially transforming / reconfiguring what is being criticised. For Rose, it is on account of this risk that criticism cannot simply be negative, but must also be positive – positive in the sense that this potential for transformation / reconfiguration is retained. It is these two aspects of criticism that Rose is addressing when she contends that a phenomenological approach to criticism yields the experience of identity and non-identity.

However, this is to return to a variant of the question asked above: How does Rose’s phenomenological approach to criticism yield the experience of identity and non-identity? While it is clear that Rose’s critical project requires this, I do not think that it offers a clear answer to this question – which is to say, I take this pivotal part of Rose’s critical project to be unclear, and, because it is pivotal, in need of being made clearer. In the following section I will argue that this unclear part of Rose’s critical project can be made clearer by way of Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation. Before turning to make this argument, it is necessary to address two possible objections to what I have here claimed against Rose.

---

395 See Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §256. For Rose’s uses of this citation see Hegel Contra Sociology, 143 and The Broken Middle, 66.
396 Rose, ‘From Speculative to Dialectical Thinking’, 62.
397 See Milbank, ‘On the Paraethical’: 76. See also Milbank, ‘The Double Glory, or Paradox versus Dialectics’, 117-118.
The first possible objection runs as follows. I have claimed that Rose’s critical project is, in part, unclear. The part in question concerns Rose’s contention that a phenomenological approach to criticism yields the experience of identity and non-identity. In claiming that this part is unclear I am claiming, specifically, that Rose is not clear about how such an approach to criticism has the yield that she claims and needs it to have. In other words, I am claiming that within Rose’s phenomenological approach to criticism there is a methodological deficit. However, in claiming this, someone might object that I am failing to take sufficient heed of Rose’s rejection of Kant’s “method”. In response to this objection I would make the following counter-objection.

While Rose rejects Kant’s method, it does not follow that she rejects a methodological approach to criticism *tout court*. As has been explained, Rose rejects Kant’s method because she reads it as resulting in a form of ignorance – a form of ignorance that, in her words, “prevents us from recognising, criticising, and hence from changing the social and political relations which determine us.” Accordingly, Rose’s rejection of Kant’s method can be read as a rejection of the

---

398 The ambiguity of the part played by “method” within Rose’s work is one partly present within the ways in which Hegel has been interpreted. See e.g. Finlayson, ‘Hegel, Adorno and the Origins of Immanent Criticism’, 1145-1146: “Of course, some commentators even recoil at the suggestion there is such a thing as a philosophical method in Hegel [. . .]. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Hegel had a method, the one he labels in the Science of Logic the “absolute method of knowing” [Science of Logic, 10]. And one can describe this method more or less aptly, as Michael Forster does: “it is a method of exposition in which each category in turn is shown to be implicitly self-contradictory and to develop necessarily into the next (thus forming a continuously connected hierarchical series culminating in an all-embracing category that Hegel calls the Absolute Idea).” ['Hegel's Dialectical Method', 132] Forster’s description captures the structure and movement from one shape of consciousness to the next Hegel’s Phenomenology, and the dynamic of Hegel’s Logic in the chain of transitions from one category to another.”

399 Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, 48
idea that criticism is something that is done once and for all. To read Rose in this way leaves room for the possibility of a method that is consistent with Rose’s critical project – that is, a methodological approach to criticism that is open-ended. Or, and this is to say the same thing, a methodological approach to criticism that yields an aporia. In support of this, there are points within Rose’s later work in which she explicitly concedes the possibility of a methodology that, in her words, “does not know the outcome in advance.”

To understand the second possible objection that might be made against my claim that Rose’s critical project is, in part, unclear, it is necessary to say something about her concept of the “absolute”. To this point, my references to this concept have been largely indirect. In the context of her reading of Hegel, by contrast, this concept is of central importance. Rose writes:

Hegel’s philosophy has no social import if the absolute cannot be thought. If we cannot think the absolute this means that it is therefore not our thought in the sense of not realized. The absolute is the comprehensive thinking which transcends the dichotomies

---

400 Rose, ‘Beginnings of the Day’, 58. See also Rose, The Broken Middle, xv: “Not that comprehension [i.e. the comprehension that results from criticism] completes or closes, but that it returns diremption to where it cannot be overcome in exclusive thought or in partial action – as long as its political history persists.” See also Rose, Judaism and Modernity: ix “The speculative method of engaging with the new purifications whenever they occur, in order to yield their structuring but unacknowledged third, involves deployment of the resources of reason and of its crisis, of identity and lack of identity.”

401 I lack the space to explicate this important concept sufficiently. For further accounts see e.g. Brower Latz, The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose; Gorman, ‘Gillian Rose and the project of a Critical Marxism’. 28-31, ‘Whither the Broken Middle?’, Osborne, ‘Hegelian Phenomenology and the Critique of Reason and Society’; Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’.

402 As a testament to its importance, Rose repeats the claim that Hegel’s philosophy has no social import if the absolute cannot be thought approximately 4 times within Hegel Contra Sociology. See Hegel Contra Sociology, 45, 98, 218, 223.
between concept and intuition, theoretical and practical reason. It cannot be thought (realized) because these dichotomies and their determination are not transcended. [. . .] Once we realize this we can think the absolute by acknowledging the element of *Sollen* in such a thinking, by acknowledging the subjective element, the limits on our thinking the absolute. [. . .] Thinking the absolute means recognizing actuality as *determinans* of our acting by recognizing it in our acts. Thus recognizing our transformative or productive activity has a special claim as a mode of acknowledging actuality which transcends the dichotomies between theoretical and practical reason, between positing and posited. Transformative activity acknowledges actuality in the act and does not oppose act to non-act.\(^{403}\)

In the light of this passage, Rose's concept of the absolute can be said to conceive the phenomenological process through which we (i.e. users of reason) pass through various contradictory experiences, and thereby come to recognise that reason is inherently antinomical – that is, capable of transforming, and being transformed by, social-political experiences.\(^{404}\) Or, to use the terminology that I have used throughout this thesis, Rose's concept of the absolute conceives conceptuality (or the act of, as Williams writes, “thinking about thinking”\(^{405}\)) as

\(^{403}\) Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, 218.

\(^{404}\) See Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 18: “Hegel's question – not one raised in these terms by Rose, yet insistently in the background of what she writes – is how, historically, we come to think of thinking in the framework of dispossession; and his answer is, of course, that this requires a history that can be told as the narrative of the absolute's self-loss and self-recovery.”

\(^{405}\) Williams, ‘Between Politics and Metaphysics’, 5.
always both unavoidable and partial. Accordingly, for Rose, the absolute is not something that can be know, but something that “can only become known as a result of the process of the contradictory experiences of consciousness which gradually comes to realise it.” The concept of the absolute is important, for Rose, because it brings together, and keeps together, without reducing either side of the antinomies of reason. This importance is social in the sense that, as was explained above, it is through recognising the antinomies of reason (or the antinomy of law) that we recognise that reason has changed, and therefore could potentially change again – a change that could potentially bring about transformation in our relationships with others and with ourselves.

Given this brief account of Rose’s concept of the absolute, it can be (and has been) argued that her phenomenological approach to criticism is without critical potential – that is, without the potential to afford the resources for potentially restructuring the structure of reason – if the absolute cannot be thought. Accordingly, it might be objected that my argument for Rose’s phenomenological approach to criticism being, in part, unclear is a consequence of me failing to read this approach as being informed by her concept of the absolute. In other words, according to this objection, in order to understand how Rose’s phenomenological approach to criticism yields the experience of identity and non-identity, it is

---

406 Alternatively, Rose’s concept of the absolute conceives the antinomy of law – as described above (see section 1.2.).

407 Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, 49. In other words, for Rose, the “absolute” can only be known “speculatively”. See *Hegel Contra Sociology*, 99.

408 For a similar account of what Rose means by the “absolute” see e.g. Brower Latz, *The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose*, 27.

409 For Rose’s answer to the question “How can the absolute be thought, and how does the thinking of it have social import?” see *Hegel Contra Sociology*, Chapter 3: The Philosophy of History.

necessary to construe such experiences as a part of a whole – that is, the absolute.

In response to this objection I would say the following. Evidently, in the context of Rose’s critical project, the concept of the absolute is, in her words, “not an optional extra”.\textsuperscript{411} However, as I understand it, rather than clarifying Rose’s practice of criticism (which is my current concern), her concept of the absolute presupposes this practice – for it is, on Rose’s account, the practice of criticism that affords the specific form of contradictory experiences through which we gradually come to conceive of the absolute. Rather than help explain how Rose’s phenomenological approach to criticism yields the experience of identity and non-identity, therefore, her concept of the absolute only helps to explain that this part of her critical project is important, and needs to be made clearer.

That said, introducing Rose’s concept of the absolute at this stage of my argument is not without worth. I take its worth to follow from the following passage:

\begin{quote}
If the absolute cannot be pre-judged but must be achieved, it must be always present \textit{and} have a history.\textsuperscript{412}
\end{quote}

While Rose’s concept of the absolute does not serve to fill the methodological deficit of Rose’s critical project, it does serve to clarify an additional requirement of what it might be to fill this deficit. If Rose’s critical project is to be clarified by

\textsuperscript{411} Rose, \textit{Hegel Contra Sociology}, 45.
\textsuperscript{412} Rose, \textit{Hegel Contra Sociology}, 50
way of a methodology, this method, in addition to being open-ended, is required to be open-ended on account of history. In other words, if Rose’s practice of criticism is to be clarified in the way required by her critical project, it needs to be shown how history can be brought to bear on the present form of reason such as to make the future form of reason something that cannot be pre-judged – that is, something without foundations or grounds, something that can be potentially reconfigured. In the following section, I will argue that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation affords a way of clarifying or supplementing Rose’s critical project by affording a method of criticism that meets these two requirements.

**Summary**

In this section I have argued that Rose’s critical project is, in part, unclear. Rose’s critical project requires, in part, that criticism yield the experience of identity and non-identity. It is this part of Rose’s critical project that I have argued is unclear – unclear because, while Rose is clear about this requirement, and clear about the ways in which criticism can fail to meet this requirement, she is not clear about how criticism can meet this requirement.

### 3.3. CAN FOUCAULT’S METHOD OF GENEALOGY CLARIFY ROSE’S CRITICAL PROJECT?

*What is the aim of this section?*
The aim of this section is to argue that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation clarifies the part of Rose’s critical project that, in the previous section, I argued is unclear – that is, the part in which Rose’s critical project requires criticism to yield the experience of identity and non-identity. Foucault’s method of genealogy clarifies this part of Rose’s critical project, I will argue, through affording a methodology for revealing the complex, contingent and historical processes through which reason comes to possess certain forms of authority – or, and this is to say the same thing, uncovering the complex, contingent and historical processes through which concepts come to be considered and used as universals. Through revealing this consistency between contingency and universality, Foucault’s method of genealogy does not undermine the authority of reason, but problematises it. It is such problematisation that yields the experience of identity and non-identity in the way that Rose’s critical project requires.

**Repeating what is unclear within Rose’s critical project**

To be clear about what is here in question, it is worth repeating what I have argued is unclear within Rose’s critical project. As I explained in the previous section, Rose’s critical project requires, in part, that criticism yield the experience of identity and non-identity. It is, as I have argued, this part of Rose’s critical project that is unclear – and it is, as I will argue, this part that Foucault’s method of genealogy can help to clarify.

What is this experience of identity and non-identity? Given what has been said above, by the experience of identity and non-identity Rose can be read as
referring to the experience of coming to comprehend the ways in which reason or, more specially, the concepts by which we reason are always both unavoidable and partial – “unavoidable” in the sense that we need concepts to comprehend our relationships with others and ourselves, “partial” in the sense that our concepts, on account of these relationships, always fail to correspond completely to the state of affairs or object which we have also defined as the state of affairs or object to which they should correspond. On this account, for criticism to yield the experience of identity and non-identity in the way required by Rose’s critical project, it is required to reveal the antinomy of law. On the one hand, criticism is required to reveal the ways in which our concepts have authority (or have the normative force of universals) – in the sense that they constitute a rational basis for thought and action. On the other hand, criticism is required to reveal the ways in which our concepts do not have authority – in the sense that such authority is revealed as having changed, and therefore revealed as changeable.413

In claiming that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation can help clarify Rose’s critical project, I am claiming simply that it affords a practice of criticism that can help clarify what it is, or (more modestly) what it might be, to pursue the two seeming contradictory tasks that I have just described, and which are required by Rose’s critical project. It is this claim that I will now attempt to substantiate.414

413 See also Butler, ‘What is Critique?’: “For critique to operate as part of a praxis, for Adorno, is for it to apprehend the ways in which categories are themselves instituted, how the field of knowledge is ordered, and how what it suppresses returns, as it were, as its own constitutive occlusion. Judgments operate for both thinkers as ways to subsume a particular under an already constituted category, whereas critique asks after the occlusive constitution of the field of categories themselves.”

414 That said, I am not claiming that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation is the only way in which this part of Rose’s critical project can be clarified. Rather, I am claiming that it is one possible way of clarifying this part – one possible way that has the advantage of making explicit what is often only implicit
Is the contingency revealed through Foucault's method of genealogy consistent with a sense of universality?

Central to my conviction that Foucault’s method of genealogy can help clarify Rose’s critical project – that is, specifically, help clarify how criticism can yield the experience of identity and non-identity that Rose’s critical project requires, and in the way that it requires – is the idea that the contingency revealed by this method can be thought of as consistent with a sense of “universality”. Arguing for the coherence of this seemingly incoherent idea is important for my argument – centrally because it affords a way of clarifying how Foucault’s method of genealogy can yield the experience of identity and non-identity, and thereby help fill the methodological deficit that besets Rose’s critical project.415 As has been explained, for Rose, this experience is aporetic in that it involves coming to recognise that reason is always both unavoidable and partial. Or, to say the same thing with different words, this experience is aporetic in that it involves coming to recognise universality and contingency as always both playing a part within reason.416 By arguing that the contingency revealed by Foucault’s method of

within Rose’s accounts of phenomenology – that is, her commitment to there being a close connection between genealogy and phenomenology. See e.g. The Broken Middle, 27-28: “Since the Phenomenology of Spirit is historical, genealogical and futural, once the flight into thought has occurred the conflict can never be unmediated again.”

415 A peculiar idea, but not one without its proponents. See Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 230: “An attempt to think of contingency and universality together is not wholly new on the theoretical scene, even if it still grates against many ears. One prominent context in which it has been featured in recent years is in a set of debates between the influential post-Marxist Ernesto Laclau, the post-Lacanian Slavoj Žižek, and the post-Foucaultian Judith Butler. […] Although in these debates Butler often develops arguments to the effect that universality must always be contingent, her reflective position seems to be that one of our most urgent tasks today is that of the analysis of actual contingent universals.” See Butler, Judith, Laclau, Ernesto, Žižek, Slavoj, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (London: Verso, 2000).

416 This is a further way of stating what Rose aims to capture with her concept antinomy of law.
genealogy is consistent with a sense of “universality” I aim, therefore, to clarify how it can be read as methodologically yielding the *aporia* required by Rose’s critical project.

As has been explained, Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the concepts that we formally took to be universal to be contingent. On this account, there would seem to be a basis on which to read Foucault’s method of genealogy as a part of an “anti-universalist” project. However, if “universality” is here taken to mean the ways in which certain of our concepts are capable of serving as shared norms for thinking and acting, then to read Foucault’s method genealogy as anti-universalist is to make a similar mistake as Rose makes, and others also, in reading Foucault’s method of genealogy as nihilistic. As I have explained, Foucault’s method of genealogy has both a negative and a positive aspect. To think of Foucault’s method of genealogy as anti-universalist is to recognise only the negative aspect, and therefore, because these aspects are integrated, to misunderstand this aspect.

---

417 Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 231. This is a view held by, for example, Habermas. See Habermas, Jürgen, ‘The Critique of Reason as an Unmasking of the Human Sciences: Michel Foucault’, in *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault / Habermas Debate*, edited by Michael Kelly (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994), 64-65: “[Foucault] thinks of the transcendental practices of power as something particular that strives against all universals, and further as the lowly corporeal-sensual that undermines everything intelligible, and finally as the contingent that could also have been otherwise because it is not governed by any regulative order.” See also Foucault, Michel, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79*, edited by Michel Senellart and translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 3: “So what I would like to deploy here is exactly the opposite of historicism: not, then, questioning universals by using history as a critical method, but starting from the decision that universals do not exist, asking what kind of history we can do.” However, in the context of this passage, it is important to recognise that Foucault is here deciding “that universals do not exist” as a part of his critical method, not as a product of it. For a comparable account see Hoy, *Time of Our Lives*, 235.
Although the concept of “universality” is not a dominant one within Foucault’s work, there are, as Colin Koopman has noted, points in which he does appeal to this concept. For example, in the following passage Foucault describes a form of criticism that simultaneously pursues the universal and the historical / contingent:

Posing the question in this way brings into play certain altogether general principles. Singular forms of experience may perfectly well harbour universal structures; they may well not be independent of the concrete determinations of social existence. [. . .] That [thought] should have this historicity does not mean it is deprived of all universal form but, rather, that the putting into play of these universal forms is itself historical. And that this historicity should be proper to it means not that it is independent of all the other historical determinations (of an economic, social, or political order) but that it has complex relations with them, which always leave their specificity to the forms, transformations, and events of thought.418

For my present purposes, this is an important passage. In this passage Foucault can be (and has been419) read as wanting to leave room for “universality” within his problematisations420 – at least, provided such “universality” can be construed as compatible with temporality and historicity (i.e. contingency). According to such a construal, “universality is a dynamic process of universalisability rather

419 See Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 232.
420 See n3 above.
than a static property theorised under universalism." However, that the concept of universality "is consistent with Foucault's [method of] genealogy is far from obvious. It is thus unsurprising that Foucault's commentators have almost universally decried universalism."

Colin Koopman (following, in part, the work of David Couzens Hoy) has, however, argued that the contingency revealed through Foucault's genealogy is consistent with a sense of "universality". Koopman's argument centres on a conception of universality which he calls "universalisation-in-action". For Koopman, it is this sense of "universality" that is consistent with the contingency revealed by Foucault's method of genealogy. "Taking this conception seriously helps us see that contingency and complexity contrast respectively to necessity and simplicity, but neither need contrast to universality." For Koopman, a "universalist interpretation of universality implicates necessity." As was shown above, it is this sense of "universality" that Foucault rejects – both because he rejects necessity and because he rejects our urge to simplify universals. For Koopman, "Foucault did not teach us to reject universals so much as he taught us to reject our urge to simplify universals." In other words, Foucault's method of genealogy (and his concrete genealogies) encourage us to be wary of anyone who would perpetuate a simple answer to a complicated question – for example,

---

421 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 232.
422 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 232.
423 See Hoy, ‘The Temporality of power’, The Time of Our Lives, 234: "Genealogy need not be opposed to universals. The problem is not universals per se. Although genealogy may be suspicious of claims to universality, it need not reject all appeals to universal structures or values."
424 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 234.
425 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235.
426 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235.
427 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 234.
the question about the relationship between theory and praxis. On this account – that is, an account concerned with avoiding such simplifications – “a conception of universality as universalisability [implicates] contingency rather than necessity. In so doing it inspires complexity rather than simplicity. Foucault, I think, can be profitably read as focusing much of his energy on universals in precisely these aspects of their contingency and complexity. Foucault’s [method of genealogy and his concrete] genealogies are in part a commitment to explicating the complex and contingent conditions of possibility of some of our most constraining universals.”  

On this account, to be clear, the contingency revealed by Foucault’s method of genealogy is consistent with a sense of “universality.” This is because such contingency shows, not the impossibility of certain of our concepts being universal, but the complex, historical and contingent processes through which the universality of certain of our concepts became possible. This account is a

---


429 Although this is not a connection I can pursue here, it is worth mentioning that the idea of universality implicating contingency is one that bears noticeable connections with the pragmatist tradition – particularly in the way certain representatives of this tradition construed the norms of thought and action. See e.g. Westphal, Kenneth R. (ed.), Pragmatism, Reason, and Norms: A Realistic Assessment (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), xii: “Another central theme in pragmatism [. . .] is that the norms of thought and action do not descend to us from a Platonic heaven by rational insight. Norms are culturally and historically developed, and they are embodied by and in agents who are educated in particular traditions.”

430 See Foucault, Michel, ‘Foucault’, in Essential Works, Volume 3: Power, edited by James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2000), 461-462: “In regard to human nature or the categories that may be applied to the subject, everything in our knowledge which is suggested to us as being universally valid must be tested and analysed. Refusing the universal of "madness," "delinquency," or "sexuality" does not imply that what these notions refer to is nothing, or that they are only chimeras invented for the sake of a dubious cause. Something more is involved, however, than the simple observation that their content varies with time and circumstances: It means that one must investigate the conditions that enable people, according to the rules of true and false statements, to recognise a subject as mentally ill or to arrange that a subject recognise the most essential part of himself in the modality of his sexual desire. So the first rule of method for this kind
development of the account given above in which Foucault’s method of
genealogy was said to reveal both that and how the authority of reason is
contingent. In other words, Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals not only that
the universality of certain of our concepts is contingent, but also how it is
contingent. This is important because it is through the integration of these two
aspects that Foucault’s method of genealogy can be read as having a critical
potential – that is, by revealing how the authority of reason has been configured
and reconfigured through history, Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals how it
could potentially be reconfigured further.

However, it might be objected that the sense of universality that has here been
accounted for as consistent with the contingency revealed by Foucault’s method
of genealogy is far from the sense of universality with which, for example, Kant
works – that is, a sense of university that implicates necessity. This objection
works on the assumption that “[u]niversality is a concept that does not admit of
degrees.” In response to this possible objection, Koopman makes an
important point – that is, the point that we, if we are to take seriously the critical
potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy (and, I would add, Rose’s critical
project), “need to learn to understand universality as our achievement, and to do
so we need to understand it as an ideal that guides processes that admit of
degrees. If universality is interpreted according to the traditional requirements of

---

philosophical universalism, we will be severely and rightly chastened in any search for universals that we might want to mount. The actual researches (social-scientific and philosophic) explicating our actuality can do much with a concept of universalisability but very little with a theory of universalism.\footnote{Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235. See Rabinow, Paul and Marcus, George E., Designs for an Anthropology of the Contemporary (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 110: “Science is universal, but human beings do it so that means it’s historical, and it could have been otherwise, and it’s contingent.” Cited by Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235. See also Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 9.}

In this response, Koopman makes the point that “[t]he actual researches (social-scientific and philosophic) explicating our actuality can do much with a concept of universalisability but very little with a theory of universalism.”\footnote{Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235.} This point returns my argument back to the twofold task of criticism that I have been attributing to both Rose and Foucault throughout this thesis. For Rose and Foucault, to repeat, the task of criticism is twofold and continuous in that it involves continually calling into question the authority of reason, and doing so in a way that affords the resources for potentially reconfiguring that authority. Given this twofold and continuous task, the concept of universalisability is resourceful in that it affords a way of giving some coherence to this aporetic task. For if, as has been explained, the concept of universalisabilty implicates contingency as opposed to necessity, then the task of calling into question the authority of reason without thereby undermining that authority is coherent. To call into question the authority of reason is, it can now be said, to investigate the complex, historical and contingent processes through which certain of our concepts are universalised. In turn, such investigations, through revealing the ways in which certain of our concepts have actually been universalised, afford the resources for

\footnote{Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 235. See also Rose, Judaism and Modernity, 9.}
thinking about how such universality could potentially be reconfigured. In other words, “what matters [...] is the practical universalisation of the assemblages in virtue of which standards, rights, and whatnot are instantiated in an ever-expanding set of contexts. These universals may be contestable, and we may want to unseat or entrench them, as the case may be. But the point is that we will lack practical grip on how these universals work if we treat them as abstract principles only”  

Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 241. Due to a lack of space, I have been required to heavily abbreviate Koopman’s account. For Koopman’s full account see *Genealogy as Critique*, 231-241. For further examples of what Koopman calls “contingent universals” see also Hacking, Ian, *The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Hacking, Ian, *The Taming of Chance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). About the latter Koopman writes: “In describing the contingent construction of the statistical world in which we live, Hacking helps us realize that an explication of the achievement of universality need not invoke a realist ontology according to which the universals of science are part of the fabric of an independent nature. We can affirm the achievement of universality as the culmination of long historical processes whose outcome is a portable and successful scientific procedure that no one is prepared to doubt. Probability works everywhere. That it does so is an achievement. It is something we humans have struggled to enact. That struggle was complex and full of contingencies. There is nothing that necessitated that it had to work.” (*Genealogy as Critique*, 236) Note the terminology that Koopman employs in his account of Hacking’s work — specifically, his employment of the word “struggle” — and how it corresponds to Rose’s own terminology when accounting for the relationship between universality and particularity. See esp. *The Broken Middle*. Koopman also makes reference to Benhabib, Seyla, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, edited by Robert Post (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), citing from the latter the following passage: “This book is about aspirations for global connection and how they come to life in “friction,” the grip of worldly encounter. Capitalism, science, and politics all depend on global connections. Each spreads through aspirations to fulfil universal dreams and schemes. Yet this is a particular kind of universality: It can only be charged and enacted in the sticky materiality of practical encounters. This book explores this practical, engaged universality as a guide to the yearnings and nightmares of our times.” (1) I repeat Koopman’s citation of this passage because it evinces Tsing concern with maintaining a grip on a sense of universality within the reality of practical encounters — a concern that comparable to those evinced by Rose. For a helpful account of how some of the issues introduced in this section — specifically, how they relate to the problems of “relativism” and “ultimate grounding” — see Milbank, John, *The World Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 24-32.
Clarifying Rose’s critical project with Foucault’s method of genealogy

Having now presented an argument for thinking of the complex, contingent and historical processes revealed by Foucault’s method of genealogy as being consistent with a sense of universality, I will now turn to consider how, on the basis of this argument, Foucault’s method of genealogy serves to clarify the part of Rose’s critical project that I have argued is unclear. In other words, I will now turn to consider how Foucault’s method of genealogy can be said to yield the experience of identity and non-identity in the way that Rose’s critical project requires. I will begin by explaining how this method yields the experience of non-identity and identity respectively. I will then bring these two explanations together.

As has been explained, Foucault’s method of genealogy affords a way to comprehend the complex, contingent and historical processes through which certain of our concepts come to be authoritative – that is, come to possess the normative force of universals within the present. It is, I think, on account of this that Foucault’s method of genealogy can be said to yield the experience of what Rose refers to as “non-identity”. To repeat, for Rose, non-identity refers to that which our concepts fail to comprehend, but which could / should comprehend. In claiming Foucault’s method of genealogy yields the experience of non-identity I am claiming that the complex, contingent and historical processes revealed by this method qualify as such a form of non-identity. In other words, I am claiming that the complex, contingent and historical processes through which the authority of our concepts are configured and reconfigured qualifies as that which these concepts fail to comprehend, but which could / should comprehend.
As has also been explained, Foucault’s method of genealogy, by affording a way to comprehend the complex, contingent and historical processes through which certain of our concepts come to be authoritative, affords thereby a way to begin comprehending the complex, contingent and futural processes through which the authority of certain of our concepts could potentially be configured and reconfigured further. It is, I think, on account of this that Foucault’s method of genealogy can be said to yield the experience of what Rose refers to as “identity”. To repeat, for Rose, identification refers simply to the act of using concepts to capture (or identify) the particulars of experience. While Rose thinks that our concepts can fail, she also thinks that they can also succeed – that is, as has been emphasised throughout this thesis, she thinks that conceptuality is always both unavoidable and partial. In claiming that Foucault’s method of genealogy yields the experience of identity I am claiming simply that affords a way to continue to identify the particulars of experience, and to do so in a way that is different and more encompassing – different and more encompassing on account of its capacity to bring the contingent to bear on the universal. This idea that the method of genealogy affords a different and more encompassing way of using concepts is one to which I take Foucault to be also committed when he writes:

But, then, what is philosophy today – philosophical activity, I mean – if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavour to know how and to
what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known?\textsuperscript{437}

I have now explained the ways in which I think that Foucault's method of genealogy yields a form of the experience of identity and non-identity as construed by Rose.\textsuperscript{438} For the sake of clarity, I have done so respectively. However, it would be more accurate to do so simultaneously. The reason being that Foucault's method of genealogy yields the experience of identity and non-identity, not in the sense that it affords a way of experiencing each in isolation of

\textsuperscript{437} Foucault, Michel, \textit{History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure}, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 8-9. It should be stressed that, for Foucault, this "endeavour" is anything but easy or simple. See e.g. Foucault, 'Interview with Michel Foucault', 288: "My role is to raise questions in an effective, genuine way, and to raise them with the greatest possible rigor, with the maximum complexity and difficulty so that a solution doesn't spring from the head of some reformist intellectual or suddenly appear in the head of a party's political bureau. The problems I try to pose-those tangled things that crime, madness, and sex are, and that concern everyday life-cannot easily be resolved. Years, decades, of work and political imagination will be necessary, work at the grass roots, with the people directly affected, restoring their right to speak. Only then will we succeed, perhaps, in changing a situation that, with the terms in which it is currently laid out, only leads to impasses and blockages. I take care not to dictate how things should be. I try instead to pose problems, to make them active, to display them in such a complexity that they can silence the prophets and lawgivers, all those who speak for others or to others. In this way, it will be possible for the complexity of the problem to appear in its connection with people's lives; and, consequently, through concrete questions, difficult cases, movements of rebellion, reflections, and testimonies, the legitimacy of a common creative action can also appear. It's a matter of working through things little by little, of introducing modifications that are able if not to find solutions, at least to change the given terms of the problem." For more on the critical potential of thinking "differently", specifically within the framework of identity and non-identity, see e.g. Adorno, T. W., 'Trying to Understand Endgame', \textit{New German Critique}, 26 (1982), 119-150. See also Geuss, Raymond, 'Art and Criticism in Adorno's Aesthetics', in \textit{Outside Ethics} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 161-183.

\textsuperscript{438} Again, this is not to say that I think that Foucault's method of genealogy is a necessary and sufficient condition for such experience. Rather, to repeat, I take what I have here explained to be one way of clarifying what is unclear within Rose's critical project – that is, the way in which a phenomenological approach to criticism yields the experience of identity and non-identity in precisely the way that is required by this critical project. To claim, as I have claimed, that Foucault's method of genealogy can help clarify Rose's critical project is to claim, in short, that phenomenology is best pursued in conjunction with a method of genealogy. Rose is also committed to the close connection between phenomenology and genealogy, although this commitment is rarely and unfortunately made explicit. See e.g. \textit{The Broken Middle}, 27-28 (see n414).
the other, but in the sense that it affords a way of experiencing the relationship between them both as problematic. As I have explained, to say that Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals something as being problematic is not to say that it reveals it as something that should be rejected. In other words, it does not follow from Foucault’s method of genealogy that reason, because its authority is revealed as being contingent, is therefore without authority. Rather, it is to say that it reveals the authority of reason to be a reality that is the result of complex, contingent and historical processes. In short, Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals that the authority of reason is, because of the problematic relationship between identity and non-identity that this authority implies, something that demands our continuous and acute attention.439

Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation is open-ended

Given this account of Foucault’s method of genealogy as yielding the experience of identity and non-identity – specifically through problematising the relationship between them – I will now return back to what I said above about Rose’s critical project being open to a methodological approach to criticism, provided that such a methodology is open-ended. I have explained how Foucault’s method of genealogy helps clarify what it is for a form of criticism to yields the experience of identity and non-identity in the way that Rose’s critical project requires. The question now is whether Foucault’s method of genealogy can be construed as open-ended in the way required by Rose’s critical project.

439 See Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’, 159.
As was explained above, Rose rejects Kant’s method, and reads Hegel’s idea of phenomenology as affording an alternative to Kant’s methodological approach to criticism. In the context of *Hegel Contra Sociology*, Rose appears to be rejecting wholesale the idea that criticism can be methodological – preferring, instead, the idea of criticism as a “gamble”. \(^{440}\) However, reading this rejection of Kant’s method in the light of Rose’s later works, it is possible to say that Rose is here rejecting a specific sense of “method” – that is, a sense in which “method” is taken to refer to a sequence of steps orientated towards, centrally, bringing something to a close. In the case of Kant’s method, what is brought to a close is, for Rose, the potential for comprehension, and therefore transformation. It is, to repeat, for this reason that Rose thinks of Kant’s criticism as resulting in “the demarcation of new areas of ignorance”. \(^{441}\) Accordingly, within Rose’s critical project, there is still room for thinking of criticism as methodological provided that it is that is open-ended.

The idea of an open-ended \(^{442}\) form of criticism is one that is implied by much of Rose’s work. In the context of her critical project – at least as it has been accounted for within the argument of this thesis – to think of criticism as open-ended is to think of it as being continually renewed. \(^{443}\) This continual renewal of

---

\(^{440}\) See Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, 168: “The *Phenomenology* is not the revocation of alienated externalization, nor a teleology of reconciliation, nor a dominating absolute knowledge. The *Phenomenology* is not a success, it is a gamble.”

\(^{441}\) Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, 47.

\(^{442}\) Or non-foundational (see Rose, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, Preface for 1995 reprint. See also *Judaism and Modernity*, 10; *Love’s Work*, 127-128), aporetic (See Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism*, 212; *Mourning Becomes the Law*, 7-8; *Love’s Work*, 128-129), or incessant (Rose, *The Broken Middle*, 308-309).

\(^{443}\) See Williams, *Between Politics and Metaphysics*, 10: “For it is in the continual renewal of the ‘natural’ errors of pre-speculative thinking that speculation (self-aware thinking, thinking that thinks the nature of thinking) is itself renewed. Of course we go on having determinate experiences of objects that we think of as other to the natural consciousness; it is in a continued re-engagement with these experiences that we
criticism is a consequence of the twofold task of criticism. For Rose, to repeat, the task of criticism is twofold in the sense that it is required to call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for potentially reconfiguring that authority. This twofold task makes criticism open-ended in that, for Rose, any reconfiguration of this authority will need to be, in turn, called into question – that is, the renewal of criticism. On this account, the renewal of criticism follows from the consequences of criticism itself.

Given this brief account of what it means, in the context of Rose’s critical project, for criticism to be open-ended, I will now turn back to Foucault, and argue that his method of genealogical problematisation can be read as consistent with this sense of open-endedness. Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation is open-ended for two reasons – two reasons that correlate with the negative and positive aspects of genealogy that were accounted for above. I will give these two reasons in turn.444

---

444 See Foucault, ‘What is Critique?’, 64-65: “The first is that this singular effect can be accounted for in terms of relationships which are, if not totally, at least predominantly, relationships of interactions between individuals or groups. In other words, these relationships involve subjects, types of behaviour, decisions and choices. It is not in the nature of things that we are likely to find support. Support for this network of intelligible relationships is in the logic inherent to the context of interactions with its always variable margins of non-certainty. There is also no closure because the relationships we are attempting to establish to account for a singularity as an effect, this network of relationships must not make up one plane only. These relationships are in perpetual slippage from one another. At a given level, the logic of interactions operates between individuals who are able to respect its singular effects, both its specificity and its rules, while managing along with other elements interactions operating at another level, such that, in a way, none of these interactions appear to be primary or absolutely totalising. Each interaction can be re-situated in a context that exceeds it and conversely, however local it may be, each has an effect or possible effect on the interaction to which it belongs and by which it is enveloped. Therefore, schematically speaking, we have perpetual mobility, essential fragility or rather the complex interplay between what replicates the same process and what transforms it. In short, here we would have to bring out a whole form of analyses which could be called strategies.”
The negative aspect of Foucault's method of genealogy is, to repeat, the aspect concerned with calling into question the authority of reason – where that means, specifically, revealing the complex, historical and contingent processes through which certain of our concepts come to possess a certain authority. Or, as was explained above, processes through which certain of our concepts are universalised. This negative aspect can be read as open-ended because the contingency that it is concerned with revealing is open-ended. As has been explained, the contingency revealed by Foucault’s method of genealogy is a contingency in which the emphasis falls less on the absence of necessity, and more on the presence of complexity.445 The historical processes through which certain of our concepts are universalised are contingent because they are complex – complex in the sense that they, in Geuss’s words, “arise from the historically contingent conjunction of a large number of such separate series of processes that ramify the further back one goes and present no obvious or natural single stopping place that could be designated ‘the origin’.”446 “This is”, in Foucault’s words, “a domain of very complex relations, which demand infinite reflection.”447

The positive aspect of Foucault’s method of genealogy is, to repeat, concerned with employing the contingency that it reveals within the task of thinking about the limits and potentialities of reconfiguring the authority of reason. This positive

446 Geuss, Nietzsche and Genealogy, 4.
aspect is can be read as open-ended because what is being reconfigured is the authority of reason as it is experienced within the present – that is, within a particular point in time. As has been explained, Foucault’s method of genealogy affords the resources for thinking about the limits and potentialities of reconfiguring the authority of reason through uncovering the processes through which certain of our concepts come to be universalised. The universality in question is one that is experienced within the present, and one that is the result of past processes. However, just as Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the present authority of reason to be the product of an actual past, it also shows how the present could be the beginning of a possible future – a possible future that we could potentially configure and reconfigure given ways in which the present has been configured and reconfigured in the past. Since this possible future begins with the present, and since the present is continually renewed, it is open-ended – or, it is something that cannot be, to return to Rose’s words, “pre-judged but [something that] must be achieved, it must be always present and have a history.”

It is for these two reasons, therefore, that I think that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation can be read as open-ended. In other words, it is for these two reasons, in addition to those given above, that I think that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation can be read as consistent with, and as helping to clarify, Rose’s critical project.

Foucault’s genealogy is not reducible to Rose’s critical project

---

448 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, 50.
To be clear, the argument of this section is an argument for reading Foucault’s method of genealogy as playing a constructive part within Rose’s critical project. The constructive part it plays, I have argued, consists in it serving to clarify the part of Rose’s critical project that is, as I argued above, unclear – that is, the part in which criticism, in the context of Rose’s critical project, is required to yield the experience of identity and non-identity. In this section I have argued that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation affords one way in which this pivotal part of Rose’s critical project can be clarified. Accordingly, in arguing that Foucault’s genealogy can help clarify a part of Rose’s critical project, I am not arguing that the former displaces a part of the latter. Rather, the clarification afforded by Foucault’s method of genealogy is such as to supplement Rose’s critical project, in general, and her reading of Hegel’s phenomenological approach to criticism, in particular.\textsuperscript{449}

\textit{Critical Potential / Problem of Normativity}

I have presented Rose and Foucault as construing criticism in a comparable way – a way that has been schematised as follows. Both Rose and Foucault take the

\textsuperscript{449} In spite of her challenge to Foucault’s genealogy, there are points within Rose’s work within which she seems to construe phenomenology as consistent with genealogy. See e.g. The Broken Middle, 27: “the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} is historical, genealogical and futural, once the flight into thought has occurred the conflict can never be unmediated again.” See also Brower Latz, \textit{The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose}, 58 n198: “He thinks Rose’s later work does not have this philosophy of history, whereas I am about to argue it does. He argues her later work is genealogical rather than phenomenological, but I think he ignores the way Rose assimilates genealogy to phenomenology. For the same reason I disagree with his view that Rose’s later work is perspectival.” For additional accounts of the close and constructive relationship between Foucault’s genealogy and Hegel’s phenomenology see esp. Brandom, \textit{Reason, Genealogy, and the Hermeneutics of Magnanimity} and Sembou, Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology and Foucault’s genealogy}. For a contrasting account see e.g. Brassier, Ray, \textit{Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 65.
task of criticism to be twofold and continuous – to continually call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for, neither strictly disowning the critical project of ascertaining the authority of reason, nor strictly legitimating the authority of reason, but potentially reconfiguring this authority. Having now substantiated this comparison by arguing that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy, I will conclude this section by returning to the question concerning the critical potential of this form of criticism.

Throughout this thesis a question has appeared and reappeared – that is, the question concerning the critical potential of the form of criticism practiced by Rose and Foucault. This question stems from a worry – the worry that the *aporia* or problematisation yielded by this form of criticism seems to leave it without critical potential. As has been explained, this worry works on the assumption that criticism, if it is to have a critical potential, needs to be normative (i.e. needs to afford conclusions about what we should think, do, believe, admire, etc.). Since Rose and Foucault take the task of criticism to involve, centrally, calling into question the normative force of our concepts, it seemingly cannot be normative, and therefore seems to be without critical potential. With respect to the critical projects of Rose and Foucault, I think that this worry is misguided. While I think the form of criticism upon which these projects are respectively based does not aim to afford normative conclusions, at least not ambitiously so, I do not think that this compromises its critical potential – as I will now explain.

As Gordon Finlayson has importantly (and I think rightly) noted, “the practice of criticism varies according to domain, according to its object, and according to its
purpose”. This note is important because it emphasises the need to be specific when speaking about, and assessing, practices of criticism. In this thesis, the form of criticism that I have taken to be practiced by both Rose and Foucault has been explicated as, specifically, a self-reflexive practice in which reason is used to criticise the authority of reason. Given this specificity, what would it be for this form of criticism to have critical potential? Before answering this question, it is important to note that, as has been emphasised throughout this thesis, for both Rose and Foucault this is a crucial question. It is crucial in the sense that both Rose and Foucault are, within their respective critical projects, concerned with renewing and transforming the practice of criticism precisely because they want it to retain its critical potential – that is, the potential to afford the resources for potentially reconfiguring the authority of reason.

Accordingly, for the criticism practiced by both Rose and Foucault to have critical potential is for it to be able to afford such resources. What are such resources? For Rose and Foucault, the potential to reconfigure the authority of reason follows from the recognition that such authority is reconfigurable. It is this recognition that the criticism practiced by both Rose and Foucault encourages. It does this by revealing the authority of reason to be, broadly speaking, always both unavoidable and partial – unavoidable because we always need concepts in order to make sense of our relations to others and to ourselves, partial because such relations, in their particularity and singularity, will always compromise the

450 Finlayson, ‘Hegel, Adorno and the Origins of Immanent Criticism’, 1144 n10. See also Butler, ‘What is Critique?’, 1: “What is it to offer a critique? This is something that, I would wager, most of us understand in some ordinary sense. But matters become more vexing if we attempt to distinguish between a critique of this or that position and critique as a more generalized practice, one that might be described without reference to its specific objects.”
authority of such concepts. Crucial to the criticism practiced by both Rose and Foucault is to resist construing this compromised authority as a reason for rejecting the possibility of reason being authoritative – that is, of our concepts serving to guide how we should think and act. Rather, both Rose and Foucault, within their respective and comparable critical projects, construe this compromised authority as a reason to recognise that reason is always, to use Rose’s word, “difficult” and, to use Foucault’s word, “dangerous”. The implication being that, for Rose and Foucault, reason is something in which we are always difficultly and dangerously implicated. The central aim of criticism, as they practiced it, is to encourage us to be continually and acutely aware of the difficulties and dangers of reason.451

That said, can more be said about the critical potential of this practice of criticism? Or, more specifically, given the difficulties and dangers of reason that this practice of criticism reveals, what becomes of the authority of reason, of the normative force of our concepts? To answer this question, I think it is helpful to follow Colin Koopman, and distinguish between those practices of criticism that are

451 See Foucault, Michel, ‘Question of Method’, in Essential Works, Volume 3: Power, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2000), 236: “The necessity of reform mustn't be allowed to become a form of blackmail serving to limit, reduce, or halt the exercise of criticism. Under no circumstances should one pay attention to those who tell one: "Don't criticize, since you're not capable of carrying out a reform." That's ministerial cabinet talk. Critique doesn't have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, "this, then, is what needs to be done." It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn't have to lay down the law for the law. It isn't a stage in a programming. It is a challenge directed to what is." See also Geuss, Raymond, ‘Must Criticism Be Constructive?’, in A World Without Why (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 90: “In the political realm appeals to the need for “constructive” criticism can in principle represent a (generally laudable) attempt to remind those involved in some evaluation of human action of the need to remain aware of a kind of internal demand under which such criticism operates, namely the need to keep Tschernyschevsky’s (and later Lenin’s) central question “What is to be done?” firmly in mind; in fact, however, the demand for “constructive criticism” in general functions as a repressive attempt to shift the onus probandi and divert attention from the possibility of radical criticism.”
normatively ambitious and those that are normatively modest.\textsuperscript{452} For a practice of criticism to be normatively ambitious is for it to claim that it affords conclusions about what we should think and do. The criticism practiced by Rose and Foucault is not, I have argued, normatively ambitious. However, as I have also argued, this does not imply that they took the task of criticism to reveal normativity to be impossible or of no significance to the way reason is really used. This would be to misunderstand what it means for Rose to refer to reason as “difficult” and Foucault to refer to it as “dangerous”. The point of both of these descriptors is that the present normative status of reason has an actual history, and therefore a potential future – a future in which the present normative status of reason can be potentially reconfigured.\textsuperscript{453} Herein lies the critical potential of their practice of criticism – to show that reason is configured, and thereby show how it could potentially be reconfigured.\textsuperscript{454} It is in this sense that the criticism practiced by

\textsuperscript{452} See Koopman, \textit{Genealogy as Critique}, 62.

\textsuperscript{453} See Rose, \textit{Hegel Contra Sociology}, 50: “These changes in theoretical and moral consciousness wrought by its internal contradictions, its experiences, can only take place over time, as a series of shapes of consciousness. If the absolute cannot be pre-judged but must be achieved, it must be always present and have a history.” See also Hutchings, Kimberly, \textit{International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era} (London: Sage, 1999), 150: “The Hegelian [and Rosean] / Foucauldian approach to normative theory is premised on the possibility of normative truth but without the sanitizing effect achieved by the translation of this truth to a higher, first best sphere. Normative truth is in the world, it is contested and, in the process of that contestation, it is likely to be experienced by some . . . as painful.” Cited by Sembou, Evangelia, \textit{Hegel’s Phenomenology and Foucault’s genealogy} (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 51, See Brower Latz, \textit{The Social Philosophy of Gillian Rose}, 194: “Rose like Hegel believes in free, right action as in some way universal, but that we “can formulate the content of such a universal law . . . [only] by reference to the history of ethical institutions, the history of what we have come to regard as counting as universal, as what all others would or could accept as a maxim. Just as when we attempt to ‘judge objectively’ or ‘determine the truth,’ we inherit an extensive set of rule-governed, historically concrete practices, so when we attempt to “act rightly,” and attempt to determine our action spontaneously, we must see ourselves as situated in a complex collective and historical setting.” Citing Pippin, Robert B., \textit{Modernism as a Philosophical Problem} (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 71.

\textsuperscript{454} An account comparable to the one I have given within this thesis is given, in brief, by Hoy. See Hoy, \textit{The Time of Our Lives}, 229-230: “Both critical theory and genealogy have a similar attitude toward the past, present, and future. In relation to the past, their recognition of the situatedness of the inquiry means that the so-called genetic fallacy is no longer considered fallacious. Traditional theory assumes that the question of
Rose and Foucault can be described as normatively modest. Such modesty relates to the ways in which both Rose and Foucault are, within their critical projects, concerned with calling the normativity of reason into question. The aim of this is not strictly to ascertain the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such normativity. Rather, it is to recognise how reason is, at present, and has been, in the past, structured through its actual use. Such recognition, as they construe it, does not teach us what we should think and do. However, it does teach us about the actual structure of reason, about its difficulties and its dangers, and therefore teaches us about what we need to be wary of within our always unavoidable and partial uses of reason.  

455 Or, to return to Rose’s words with which this thesis began, it teaches us to “resume reflexively what we always do: to know, to misknow and yet to grow.”  

Summary

how we acquired our beliefs and knowledge is irrelevant to the validity of those beliefs. In contrast, both critical theory and genealogy are asking precisely how we came to forget the contingency of the historical beginnings of our practices and why we persuaded ourselves that these practices were necessary and universal rather than arbitrary and contingent. In relation to the present, both critical theory and genealogy view the theory itself as part of the problem, such that if there were no problem, there would be no need for the theory. In relation to the future, they both aim at social transformation, not justification of current social arrangements, which are veiled power relations.” For a contrasting account see e.g. Honneth, The Pathologies of Reason, 21: “Critical Theory, in contrast [to genealogy] – and in a way that may be unique to it – insists on a mediation of theory and history in a concept of socially effective rationality. That is, the historical past should be understood from a practical point of view: as a process of development whose pathological deformation by capitalism may be overcome only by initiating a process of enlightenment among those involved.” However, in making this distinction, it is arguable that Honneth is working with an account of genealogy that is incapable of contributing towards a socially effective rationality – an account that I consider misguided for reasons given throughout this thesis.  

456 Rose, The Broken Middle, 310.
In this section I have argued that Foucault’s method of genealogy clarifies the part of Rose’s critical project that I argued, in the previous section, is pivotal, but unclear – that is, the part in which criticism is required by Rose’s critical project to yield the experience of identity and non-identity. This argument involved me arguing how the contingency revealed by genealogy can be read as consistent with a sense of universality. On the basis of this argument, I then argued how Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation can be read as clarifying what it might mean for criticism to yield the experience of identity and non-identity, and to do so in a way that is open-ended.

3.4. CONCLUSION

What have I argued in this chapter?

In this chapter I have argued that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation. This argument consisted of two sections. In the first section I argued that Rose’s critical project requires criticism to yield the experience of identity and non-identity – that is, the experience of reason as being always both unavoidable and partial – but that it is unclear about how criticism can achieve this two-fold task. Rose is unclear about this, I argued, because her critical project requires criticism to achieve this two-fold task in a way that is open-ended. In the second section I argued that Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation can clarify this unclear part of Rose’s critical project. This argument involved arguing, first, that Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the complex, historical and contingent processes through which certain of our concepts are universalised. On the basis
of this argument, I then argued that Foucault’s method of genealogy affords a way of clarifying what it is to yield the experience of identity and non-identity, and to do so in a way that is open-ended. According to this argument, the complex, historical and contingent processes revealed by Foucault’s method of genealogy affords the resources for reasoning in a way that is different and more encompassing. In other words, Foucault’s method of genealogy, by revealing how reason has been structured, reveals how it could potentially be restructured.
CONCLUSION

What have I argued?

The overarching aim of this thesis has been to argue that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy. The motivation behind this argument follows from my conviction that commentators on Rose are misguided in construing Rose’s critical project as being opposed to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. Such a construal is misguided, I have argued, not because it conflicts with Rose’s own claims, but because it is too general. To construe Rose’s critical project as being opposed to the critical projects of “postmodernity” is to misguidedly assume that the concept “postmodern” refers to a coherent set of commitments that can be coherently opposed. Although this way of construing Rose’s critical project has the advantage of being consistent with the way Rose construed her critical project, it has the disadvantage of furthering the unfortunate and unnecessary borders between Rose's thought and that of many of her contemporaries.

On account of the argument I have here recounted, I have in, this thesis, avoided contrasting Rose’s critical project with the critical projects of “postmodernity”. Instead, I have focused specifically on Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy. I did so with the conviction that a critical engagement with Rose’s challenge to “postmodernity” demands such specificity. Through critically engaging with Rose’s challenge to Foucault's method of genealogy I argued that this challenge is misguided, but resourcefully so – that is, through defending Foucault’s method of genealogy against Rose’s challenge, Foucault’s method of
genealogy was shown to be, not something that contrasts with Rose’s critical project, but something bears the potential for clarifying and supporting it. Accordingly, it was through such specificity that I have been able to contribute to the secondary literature on Rose. This contribution consists in affording an alternative reading of Rose’s critical project – a reading in which Rose’s critical project is open to being read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy.

**How have I argued this?**

In chapter one I argued that the critical projects of Rose and Foucault are comparable – comparable in that they each imply a concern with continuing and correcting Kant’s critical project. This concern results in Rose and Foucault construing the task of criticism as twofold and continuous – that is, to continually call into question the authority of reason, and to do so in a way that affords the resources for reconfiguring this authority.

The argument of chapter one contributed towards the overarching argument of this thesis in two ways. First, this argument called attention to a respect in which the critical projects of Rose and Foucault can be read as comparable – specifically, the respect in which they each construe the task of criticism in a way that is comparable. Second, this argument afforded the basis on which, in chapter two, I critically engaged with Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s genealogy – for in order to understand Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy, it is necessary to understand Rose’s reading of Kant, and in order to understand why
Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided, it is necessary to understand Foucault’s reading of Kant.

In chapter two I argued that Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is misguided, but resourcefully so. Rose’s challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy is an extension of her challenge to Kant – that is, for Rose, Foucault’s method of genealogy results in a critical blindness. This challenge works on the premise that Foucault’s method of genealogy is nihilistic. It is on account of this premise that I argued that Rose’s challenge is misguided. It is misguided because it recognises only one of the two integrated aspects that constitute Foucault’s method of genealogy – aspects that are negative and positive. The negative aspect involves showing that our concepts are contingent. The positive aspect involves showing how our concepts are contingent. It through the integration of these two aspects that Foucault’s method of genealogy acquires its critical capacity – that is, the capacity of problematisation. To recognise that the authority of our concepts is the result of complex, historical and contingent processes is not necessarily to reject such authority. Rather, it is to recognise that it is problematic – problematic in the sense that such authority, because it is revealed as having been configured and reconfigured through history, is revealed as being potentially reconfigurable within the future.

The argument of this chapter contributed towards the overarching argument of this thesis in two ways. First, this argument removed the central basis on which Rose’s critical project appears opposed to Foucault’s method of genealogy, and thereby opened up the possibility that Rose’s critical project could be read
constructively in conjunction with it. Second, this argument helped clarify the critical potential of Foucault’s method of genealogy.

In chapter three I argued that Rose’s critical project can be read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy. Rose reads Hegel’s idea of phenomenology as affording an approach to criticism that avoids the critical impotence / blindness that results from Kant’s transcendental approach. Through explicating this reading, Rose’s critical project was shown to require a form of criticism that can yield the experience of identity and non-identity, and to do so in a way that is open-ended. In other words, Rose’s critical project requires a form of criticism that can yield the *aporia* of recognising that reason is always both unavoidable and partial. While Rose is clear about this, she is not clear about how criticism can meet this requirement. Foucault’s method of genealogical problematisation is, I argued, one way of clarifying this unclear, but pivotal, part of Rose’s critical project. It does this, I argued, centrally through affording a way of thinking about contingency as being consistent with a sense of universality. Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals the complex, historical and contingent processes through which certain concepts are universalised – that is, constituted as norms for certain thoughts and actions. By revealing this, Foucault’s method of genealogy does not undermine such a sense of universality. Rather, it shows that such a sense of universality is always problematic. In other words, Foucault’s method of genealogy reveals that the authority of reason, because of its actual past and possible future, can always be called into question.

*What are the implications of my argument?*
As I mentioned above, the overarching argument of this thesis is motivated by a concern with opening Rose’s critical project up to the possibility of being influenced by and influencing alternative critical projects – specifically, the critical projects from which it has been unfortunately and unnecessarily barred. Such barring, I argued, is largely a product of the way in which both Rose, and her commentators, present her critical project as being generally opposed to the critical projects of “postmodernity”. By presenting Rose’s critical project as involving a specific challenge to Foucault’s method of genealogy, and by arguing that this challenge is misguided, but resourcefully so, I have afforded an alternative way of reading Rose’s critical project – a reading in which Rose’s critical project is open to being read constructively in conjunction with Foucault’s method of genealogy. If nothing else, I hope that the argument of this thesis provides a basis on which others might consider further, and more deeply, the possibility that Rose might be closer to those that she criticises than her criticisms of them might otherwise suggest.

[40170 Words]


Beiser, Frederick C., The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1987).


Brower Latz, Andrew, 'Gillian Rose and Social Theory', Telos 173 (2015), 37-54.


Fraser, Nancy, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989 [1981]).


Geuss, Raymond, History and Illusion in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)


Geuss, Raymond, Morality, Culture, and History: Essays on German philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).


Kant, Immanuel, ‘On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice’, in Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 277-309.


Małecki, Wojciech, 'If happiness is not the aim of politics, then what is?': Rorty versus Foucault', Foucault Studies 11 (2011), 106–25.


Milbank, John, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).


Schick, Kate, *Trauma and the Ethical in International Relations* (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2008).


Sembou, Evangelia, *Hegel’s Phenomenology and Foucault’s genealogy* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015).


