# *Duces Christi:*

## *A thematic analysis of the non-combat aspects of military leadership in the First Crusade*

*Submitted by Michael Charles Edward Whelan to the University of Exeter as a dissertation for the degree of Master of Philosophy in History in December 2017*



*I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other university.*



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‘*God blesses those who hunger and thirst for justice, for they will be satisfied.*’

~ Matthew, 5:6

‘*God blesses those who work for peace, for they will be called the children of God*’.

~ Matthew, 5:9

‘*the taking of one innocent life is like taking all of Mankind... and the saving of one life is like saving all of Mankind*’

~ Qur'an, 5:33

‘*The true servants of the Most Merciful are those who behave gently and with humility on earth, and whenever the foolish quarrel with them, they reply [with words] of peace.*’

~ al-Furqan, 25:63

*Dedicated to all those that seek peace and justice*

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Lastly I would like to show gratitude to the late Professor Simon Barton who took a chance on a library worker in York and brought him into a world of intrigue and high adventure.

## Contents

## Abbreviations

*AA* - Albert of Aachen, *Albert Of Aachen's History Of The Journey To Jerusalem*, trans. Susan Edgington (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013)

*AK*- Anna Comnena, *The Alexiad* , trans. E. R. A Sewter, and Peter Frankopan (London: Penguin, 2009)

*FC* - Fulcher de Chartres, *A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, 1095-1127* ed. and trans Harold S. Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972).

*GDPF* - Guibert of Nogent, *The Deeds Of God Through The Franks*, trans Robert Levine (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1997)

*GF - Anonymous*. 2011. *The Deeds Of The Franks And Other Jerusalem-Bound Pilgrims*, ed. and trans. Nirmal Dass (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers)

*GT* - Ralph of Caen, *The Gesta Tancredi Of Ralph Of Caen,* trans. Bernard S Bachrach and David S Bachrach (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010)

*RM* - Robert the Monk, *Robert The Monk's History Of The First Crusade*, trans. Carol Sweetenham (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005)

*DEL* - Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi* , trans. Charles W. David, ed. Jonathan Phillips, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001)

## Family Tree




*Source: the author, based on Hodgson (2007)*

*'Out of every one hundred men, ten shouldn't even be there, eighty are just targets, nine are the real fighters, and we are lucky to have them, for they make the battle. Ah, but the one, one is a warrior, and he will bring the others back.'*[1]

~ Heraclitus

# Introduction

## Structure

The purpose of this study is to identify some of the principal combat support aspects of military leadership that were key to the success of the First Crusade. Whilst the commanders of the armed pilgrimage were active in conflicts outside the Middle East theatre, across Europe and the Mediterranean, the aim of this dissertation is to identify the traits that the command team employed for success in the period between the sermon at Clermont in 1096 and the victory at Aschelon in 1100.

The study and analysis of multiple primary and secondary sources has been an essential component in composing this dissertation, with a focus on those written both by pilgrims themselves and their contemporaries in the years immediately after the campaign's conclusion. It concentrates on three non-combat themes of the First

[1] Cited by Mark Edmundson, *Self and Soul*: *A Defense of Ideals* (London: Harvard University Press, 2015) p. 97.

Crusade as a military campaign. These facets were directed by the military leadership, in order to overcome challenges presented during the campaign away from the battles and main combat.

The first focus is on the intelligence gathering techniques the Crusaders employed during this campaign; focusing on the use of scouts, spies and interrogation of locals and prisoners. Following on from this, the dissertation examines the complex methods of logistics supply, the challenges of acquiring foodstuffs and war material that the military leaders had to overcome. Lastly the study explores the concepts of psychological warfare used in the Crusade to overcome enemies and bolster the pilgrims' collective resolve, both by the use of terror and playing on the religious fervour, of the age.

## Literature Review: Military Leadership and Military History

Secondary sources for the Crusades have often presented the incidents of the First Crusade in a linear pattern, focusing on each violent episode as if it were a link within a chain of events isolated from one another. The last century and a half has seen a steady growth in research and interest in medieval military history. Beginning with research by Victorians such as Charles Oman with works including the 1885 publication of *The Art of War in the Middle Ages*, historians have attempted to piece together the military history of the Middle Ages using a variety of methods from archaeology to translation and interpretation of the sources of the period.[2] The dawn of the internet age, with wider access to sources, catalogues and the works of others, has provided authors with new points from which to commence and continue research. From the 'barbarian' peoples of Post-Roman Europe to the confluence and conflict of peoples in the Mediterranean, researchers have broadly explored a wide range of conflicts in the period. Included in this have been grand narratives of great and disastrous campaigns, as well as detailed narratives of individual military leaders and their military careers.

The popular portrayal of the medieval period often conjures romanticised images of knights, castles and monasteries. The former two were components of the medieval military infrastructure and society that was an integral part of our forebears' lives. Stephen Morillo observed in *What is Military History?* that this theme of research naturally centres heavily on wars and warfare, but is not exclusive to these

[2] Oman, C. W. C. *The Art of War in the Middle Ages, A.D. 378-1515* (London: B. H. Blackwell, 1885).

themes.[3] A holistic military history must consider topics that encompass more than the participants and their battles, with studies concentrating on technology and logistics alongside the more common approaches. The war diaries and accounts of the Crusades focus on recounting the deeds and influence of leaders on those events as perceived by the authors. Public interest in history developing through the last one hundred and fifty years has coincided with the advent of accessible modern media for the wider audience and the rise to prominence of authors such as Sir Walter Scott. His depiction of the English knight fighting adversaries in short clinical bouts with little, or no, reference to the pain, suffering, or disease of the medieval period presented a historical model for an audience in which, just as in the chronicles, heroes were forged to be admired and followed.

With such a heritage and influence, it is perhaps to be expected that the subject of military leadership beyond combat and politics has not been covered in such detail. In 1994, Sean McGlynn suggested that:

> *'The study of medieval warfare has suffered from an approach that concentrates on its social, governmental and economic factors to the detriment of military methods and practice. The nature of feudal society has been analysed in great depth, but its application to how wars were*

[3] S. Morillo, *What is Military History?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) p. 3.

*actually fought has largely been ignored and frequently misinterpreted.*"[4]

He also cites the pivotal role of Charles Oman in the study of medieval military history since the first publication of *The Art of War* in 1885. McGlynn highlights possible laxities by historians who he feels have placed too great an emphasis on Charles Oman's work. While it was an innovative study in 1885, he felt it should never have been allowed to permeate through the decades into more contemporary studies.[5]

Where previously some military historians had failed to critically use sources or indeed some failed to use them at all,[6] now new studies began more methodical research. The study of medieval military history was conducted primarily through the exploration of battles and campaigns, isolated from the environment in which they were conducted and aimed at narrating their events rather than at the intensive contextual analysis of their surroundings. Jeremy Black's study of military generals, *Great Military Leaders and Their Campaigns,* discusses this theme from antiquity to the modern era.[7] He explores case studies of individual commanders from the medieval period, with emphasis on the events of battles within campaigns. R.C. Smail and Jan Fran Verbruggen, however, began looking from different perspectives. R. C. Smail stated in *Crusading Warfare*, that

[4] S. McGlynn, 'The Myths of Medieval Warfare'. *History Today* 44.1 (1994): p. 28. Accessed December 20, 2015. http://www.historytoday.com/sean-mcglyn/myths-medieval-warfare.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] J. Black, *Great Military Leaders and Their Campaigns* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2008).

'*The study of warfare and that of political and social organisation illuminate and complete each other*.'[8]

He further expressed his opinion that this view had not been taken up by many of his fellow Crusade historians.[9] Works such as Jonathan Riley Smith's *The First Crusade and The Idea of Crusading*,[10] and Jonathan Phillips' *Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades* have focused on aspects of the campaign itself, including perspectives drawn from the sources of the period. They considered the development of later Crusading, and in some cases considered the concept of the term 'Crusader' in modern events.[11] Other historians have, in turn, concentrated on the detailed analysis of the personalities and careers of a variety of medieval commanders.[12]

A prime example of this new way of thought is found in the extensive treatise of Philippe Contamine in *War in the Middle Ages.*[13] Contamine's study focuses on the strategies and tactics of medieval warfare, tracing their development and evolution from the end of the Roman Empire. It incorporates such themes as the effects of courage and technology, ranging from the use of gunpowder to the stirrup. Verbruggen's *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages* continued this way of study as recognised by Clifford J. Rogers in the first issue of *The Journal of Medieval Military History*.[14]

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[8] R.C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, *1097-1193* (Cambridge: CUP, 1995) p.2.
[9] Ibid.
[10] J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and The Idea of Crusading* (London: Continuum, 1993).
[11] J. Phillips, *Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades* (London: Bodley Head, 2010).
[12] For examples of this see J. Black, *Great Military Leaders and their Campaigns* (London: Thames and Hudson 2008).
[13] P. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
[14] J.C. Rogers, 'The Vegetian 'Science of Warfare' in the Middle Ages', in *Journal of Medieval Military* Vol. 1, (2002), pp. 1-20.

John Gillingham used the scope of the later 12th century to consider the impacts of organisational and logistical strategies employed in the conduct of warfare by Richard the Lionheart in *Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages*. He made the assertion that military leaders of the time would have relied on the treatise of Vegetius. In his article, Gillingham stated that *'My chief reason for this choice is the fact that strategy still remains the most neglected area of medieval military history.*'[15] The article focuses on the developments that Richard I employed throughout his life in the different theatres and military challenges of Europe and the Crusades to strengthen his position both in the field and in castles, such as Château Gaillard, built in his often perilously held lands in France. Concurrently Gillingham attempts to assess why medieval military leaders are often considered great conquerors compared to the relatively minor number of battles that he believes took place in the medieval period, pointing out that

> *'Henry II, for example, in his whole life never fought a single battle – though Jordan Fantosme described him as* "*the greatest conqueror since Charlemagne*."'[16]

Gillingham's findings suggest that the nature of leadership is not so easily defined by great victories and contains a more varied number of factors aside from military battlefield prowess, rather incorporating less combat, but nevertheless martial aspects in order to be considered successful.

Battles and sieges have formed major themes for examination, as researchers have uncovered a number of sources that reveal a larger view of

[15] J. Gillingham, 'Richard I and the Science of War', in *Anglo-Norman Warfare* ed. Matthew Strickland (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1992) p. 195.
[16] Ibid., p. 198.

medieval warfare in the form of battle. Jonathan Phillips' foreword to Charles Wendell David's translation of *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi* has unlocked opportunities to reassess and analyse the Second Crusade;[17] his study further supplements the works that Phillips has focused on for the overall campaign of the Second Crusade with *The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom.*[18] Andrew Ayton's investigation of the Battle of Crécy in 1346 provides an example of how battles have been investigated using archaeology, topography and other modern techniques alongside contemporary literature.[19] Ayton's study of the battle includes the context of the environment in which the campaign took place and how different factors directly affected the events. In a similar vein, Anne Curry's *The Battle of Agincourt* examines the contemporary sources and their interpretation,[20] while Steven Morillo furthered exploration of the medieval battle with research into the sources of the Battle of Hastings.[21] Juliette Barker's *Agincourt,* on the other hand, investigates the political machinations prior to Henry V's victory in 1415,[22] as well as exploring the technology that the English army employed.[23] This increased understanding of battle plans and tactics was utilised by Matthew Bennett et al. in *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World* to explore how technology directly influenced tactics on the field.[24] Bennett's work also includes a large section on military leadership.[25] The chapter focuses on how armies were recruited and

[17] Raol, *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, tr. Charles Wendell David with new foreword by J. Phillips (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936) pp. xi-xxxiv.
[18] J. Phillips, *The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom* (London: Yale University Press, 2007).
[19] A. Ayton, *The Battle of Crécy 1346* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2005).
[20] A. Curry, *The Battle of Agincourt: Sources and their Interpretations* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000).
[21] S. Morillo, *The Battle of Hastings: Sources and interpretations* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1996).
[22] J. Barker, *Agincourt: The King, The Battle, The Campaign* (London: Abacus, 2005).
[23] Ibid., pp. 88-89.
[24] M. Bennett, *Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World: Equipment, Combat and Tactics* (Staplehurst: Amber Books, 2009).
[25] Ibid., pp. 130-169.

structured in the different phases of Europe's history from the 'tribalism' found with Nordic and Saxon armies through to the later 'feudal' armies of France and Germany.[26] Bennett however concentrates mainly on the battle tactics employed by European commanders throughout the Middle Ages, fighting one another and particularly focusses on the Mongolian Armies in the mid-13th century in Eastern Europe. There is a significant gap in historical study both for the period of the First Crusade and for more general military leadership qualities. Ayton, Morillo and Bennett's works are largely campaign based with focus on battle tactics and equipment. The latter shows how important such research can be in regards to the study of military leadership and as such supports the study of logistics as show in chapter 3 of this study. The focus upon battlefield tactics and campaign strategy of choosing battlefields or troop selection is a major aspect shown by both Ayton and Bennet in their treatise on military leadership. Whilst this has shed important light upon concepts of leadership, there remains an opportunity to research the non-combat aspects of the same subject. This is a neglected subject as I have stated, and one generally lacking in research beyond the parameters of the First Crusade.

A number of modern scholarly works have looked at the campaigns and strategies that classical generals committed to, such as Adrian Goldsworthy's *In the Name of Rome.*[27] Though these consider the detailed history of events, few look to show why the generals who were in command became the leaders they were, in other words what made great generals great. Jonathan Phillips specifically stated

[26] Ibid., p. 132.
[27] A. Goldsworthy, *In The Name of Rome: The Men Who Won The Roman Empire* (London: Orion, 2003)

that *Holy Warriors* was predominantly '*character driven*'[28], though at the same time he declared

> '…*whilst there [was] a narrative thread here, [it] is not a detailed, chronological history…*'[29]

In fact the work provides a thematic study of the Crusades and the use of Crusader rhetoric yet declines to examine military leadership when considering the characters of the Crusades. Early modern scholars considered the subject in very broad terms; Stanley Carpenter's *Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642-1651*, being an example.[30] Carpenter's study relies on the debatable 'Great Man' theory of leadership, based on the idea that leaders have a natural, genetic disposition to attaining their leadership role.[31] Though few historians have covered leadership, the sources they use can be mined for relevant information. Few histories of medieval military endeavours have concentrated on individuals, using primary sources to narrate their histories. David Green's *Edward the Black Prince: Power in Medieval Europe* is a rare example of a history of military leadership, concentrating on the deeds of Edward, Prince of Wales in the first decades of the Hundred Years War.[32] Green uses a host of campaign letters written by Edward and his staff, as well as a number of chronicles. His examination of the Prince's household considers contemporary events as the Black Death and its effect on the Prince and the politics of England. While David Crouch's *Birth of Nobility* includes a chapter on the concepts of the *Preudomme* or *Great Man,* it seeks to identify more

[28] J. Phillips, *Holy Warriors,* p. xvii.
[29] *Ibid*.
[30] S. D. M. Carpenter, *Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642-1651: The Genius of this Age* (London: Routledge, 2005).
[31] M.R. Waite, *Fire Service Leadership: Theories and Practices* (London: Jones and Bartlett, 2008) p. 3.
[32] D. Green, *Edward the Black Prince: Power in Medieval Europe* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007), *passim*.

the origins of *Chivalerie* and *Noblesse* than investigate the relative merits of genetic, nature, or nurture routes to outstanding leadership. .

The proposition of the Great Man Theory assumes that leaders are more intelligent, more energetic and have greater communication skills than their counterparts.[33] Allan Mazur in 'Military Rank and Attainment of a West Point Class' identifies that previous studies had suggested that leadership potential of male junior officers was assessed in part, on a perception of their physical features against a stereotypical leader.[34] His research points out that the US military in the mid to late twentieth century was based on a meritocracy, where commanders were able to attain promotion through competency rather than through their birth right.[35] There were however contrary studies such as that by Young in 1958 that suggested other factors would have a direct effect on the mobility of a commander.[36] Moore and Trout in 1978 contrasted the meritocratic 'performance theory' with that of the 'visibility theory' by which emphasis was placed on being seen and forming contacts with senior officers and politicians able to influence their career progression.[37]

This sign of favouritism was looked at again from a different angle by Mazur who questioned if dominant 'manly' features such as the height, handsomeness and sporting physique of a graduate, directly affected their career.[38] In essence Mazur questioned if a leader naturally 'looked' like a leader. The study followed the 670 graduates of the class of 1950, the largest post war class until 1968. He found that

[33] R.L. Taylor, W.E. Rosenbach and E.B. Rosenbach, 'Leadership: Perspectives and Context' in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009) p. 2.
[34] A. Mazur, J. Mazur and C. Keating, 'Military Rank Attainment of a West Point Class: Effects of Cadets' Physical Features' in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 90, No. 1, (1984) p. 125.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., p. 126.
[38] Ibid.

the number of generals that came from this class was the second highest number since 1939.[39] 8% of the class became generals, whilst others had usually retired by 1970.[40] Mazur suggested in his study that facial features and athletic prowess provided the fastest vehicles for promotion.[41] He did however, go on to point out that he could not isolate the singular aspect of 'Athletic Prowess' that signified that that man would become a high-ranking commander. Mazure et al suggest levels of endogenous testosterone (T) leads to dominant behaviour that in a military environment might create the basis of a leader, but channelled in other circumstances would be antisocial behaviour and bullying.[42] This may provide a degree of background to the acts of violence on defeated enemies when any form of military discipline has evaporated in the immediate aftermath of a hard won victory. There is no clear link to their physical characteristics and leaves an undefined presumption that the tall square jawed ideal is based on classical imagery from sculpture from the Greek gods to Michelangelo. Evidence has been shown more recently that would suggest this is inaccurate. Of those leaders selected, Taylor informs us that most only just stood out from those under their command.[43] In fact, peers were more likely to assess one another as leaders by their actions. Prospective leaders were found to have more ability in completing tasks and in inter-personal relations.[44]

The theory does not totally remove one aspect of leadership: circumstance can often expose or indeed hide leadership. The ability of those under the command

[39] A. Mazur, J. Mazur and C. Keating, 'Military Rank Attainment of a West Point Class: Effects of Cadets' Physical Features' in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 90, (1) (1984) p.128.
[40] Ibid., p. 130.
[41] Ibid., p. 146.
[42] A. Mazure, 'Testosterone and dominance in men' in *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*. Vol. 21 (3) (1998) pp. 353- 363
[43] Taylor, Rosenbach and Rosenbach, 'Leadership: Perspectives and Context', p. 2
[44] Ibid.

of a leader, as well as the type of challenge presented, must be recognised as parameters by which leaders are constrained.[45] To this end, fortune once again rears its head. A truly excellent leader would have to be able to find routes around issues that opportunity presented. Thus effective military leaders had to be adaptable, capable of identifying opportunities and threats and be able to respond effectively to situations. Whether they are perceived as being 'great' then depends on the perceptions of those who chronicle their actions and the wider audience who subsequently read their accounts of the action. Awards for gallantry are dependent on reports of the event; inevitably immensely brave sacrifices go unrecorded just as historical events will similarly have been ignored. Time and circumstance are inevitably components of great leaders.

In the last 25 years, the study of medieval military history has further expanded beyond the battlefield to encompass areas such as technology and logistical support: Michael Prestwich's *Armies and Warfare in the Middle-Ages* extended the themes of military history to include logistics as a major section of his study, alongside other themes.[46] Clifford J. Rogers continued to focus his attentions on weaponry, concentrating on the development of the extension of firepower and combat range provided by the English Longbow in 'The development of the longbow in late medieval England and 'technological determinism''[47] studying, not only the technological development, but also its effect in terms of whether or not it produced a military revolution in English medieval warfare. Kelly DeVries and Robert D. Smith's

[45] Ibid.
[46] M. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the middle ages: the English Experience* (London: Yale University Press, 1996) p. 245.
[47] C.J. Rogers, 'The development of the longbow in late medieval England and 'technological determinism'' in *Journal of Medieval History*, Vol. 37, (2011) pp. 321–341.

*Medieval Military Technology* focuses, as the title suggests, on the military technology available and developed during the Middle Ages. DeVries and Smith use physical records, literature and art works to build a concise image of the technology in an almost encyclopaedic way. The result is a highly detailed practical study of the arms and armour of the period, without applying the same level of analysis of how they were practically deployed by commanders in the field.

This interest in pre-modern weapons technology prompted Kelly DeVries to publish 'Catapults are not atom bombs' in the journal *War in History*.[48] Here, DeVries critically questioned the influence attributed to weapons from the medieval period. Speaking of the land mine and its use in the 20th century, DeVries writes:

> '*…military historians and historians of technology would never refer to this weapon as "decisive", "invincible" or "revolutionary". Indeed, very few modern military technologies are referred to by these terms. Despite playing significant roles in the outcome of the First World War, neither the machine gun, the tank, noxious gas, the aeroplane or the submarine is determined to have "won" or "lost" that war.*'[49]

John Stone's *Technology, Society, and the Infantry Revolution of the Fourteenth Century* formed a rebuttal to this, arguing that DeVries had been part of the 'Revolutionists' in terms of the technology of the fourteenth century, stating:

[48] K. DeVries, 'Catapults are not atom bombs: towards a redefinition of 'effectiveness' in pre-modern military technology', in *War in History*, Vol 4, (1997), pp. 454–70.
[49] Ibid., p. 454.

*'DeVries's [sic] readership might be forgiven for inferring that technology is, after all, the key driving force behind the nature of medieval warfare.'*[50]

It is, however, apparent that all three scholars believe in the evolution of military technology as opposed to singular revolutions, each stating emphatically their beliefs within the scope of their field of research, most notably the Hundred Years War. Andrew Ayton's *Knights and Warhorses* stresses the place of horses within English military society during the same conflict, considering husbandry and the development of warhorses. The study also considers the pay received and status of knights within English armies, whilst also considering their personnel.[51] Other studies have further focused on the use of literature and rhetoric.

Clifford Rogers, Bernard Bachrach, John Gillingham and Stephen Morillo joined in fierce debate in *The Journal of Medieval Military History* in the first two volumes. The debate considered the place of Vegetius' *De Re Militari* and how the conduct of medieval commanders reflected, or not, the advice given by the 4th century Roman administrator.[52] Considering the events of the Hundred Years War as a basis, they investigated how the English may have applied Vegetian thought to their warfare. Whilst this is invaluable research for the study of military history, there are still opportunities for a wealth of research into strategy and tactics and the importance of literature for commanders.

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[50] J. Stone, 'Technology, Society, and the Infantry Revolution of the Fourteenth Century' in *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 68, (2004) p. 366.

[51] A. Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy Under Edward III* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1999) pp. 84-138.

[52] For further reading see : Rogers, 'The Vegetian 'Science of Warfare' in the Middle Ages'; S. Morillo, 'Battle Seeking: The Contexts and Limits of Vegetian Strategy', *JMMH*, Vol. 1, pp. 21-42; and J. Gillingham, ''Up with Orthodoxy': In Defense of Vegetian Warfare', *JMMH*, Vol. 2, (2004), pp. 21-41.

Considering that many of these campaigns were led by members of the aristocracy, it could be expected that the study of leadership has already been explored within this context. David Crouch's *The Birth of Nobility* is an example of how historians have been able to reconstruct the history of the aristocracy in medieval England and France. Yet even here, leadership was not given wide attention.[53] This highly detailed study does not seek to include perceptions of military leadership or the traits sought in contemporary commanders. As with Jeremy Black's *Great Military Leaders*, some academic thought has been given to the careers of individual commanders; most notably amongst these are the works covering Richard I.

The subject of military logistics within medieval military history has increasingly been highlighted in recent years. Emily Amt noted in her article *Besieging Bedford*[54] that

> '*Both Logistics and siege warfare are subjects whose significance in medieval military history has generated new and sometimes heated discussion in recent years*.'[55]

As the popularity of researching campaigns has increased, so too has the focus on questions of supply that follow. Works such as John H. Pryor's *Logistics in the age of the Crusades* have concentrated on logistics within the particular campaigns.[56] Other historians, such as Craig K. Lambert, note that a number of fourteenth-century sources in England comment on the logistics required and used by their

[53] D. Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility: Constructing Aristocracy in England and France 900-1300* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005)
[54] E. Amt, 'Besieging Bedford: Military Logistics in 1224' in *Journal of Medieval Military History*, Vol. 1, (2002), pp. 101-124.
[55] Ibid., p. 101.
[56] J. H. Pryor, *Logistics in the age of the Crusades* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2006).

contemporaries,[57] demonstrating not only that there is a demand for such research but also a wealth of sources for researchers to use. Lambert has covered both the logistic and maritime history of the Hundred Years War. Even so, there is little written on the organisation and administration on campaigns by military leaders, and the majority of logistical research has centred on Northern Europe, continuing to leave opportunities for further research in other regions.

## Concepts of military leadership

The public perception of military leaders, fashioned by popular literature and media, is often of a dashing commander astride a charger, leading men in deeds and occasionally with a bark of encouragement. Often the truth is very different. One of history's most famous commanders, Napoleon, as depicted by Jacques-Louis David upon a charger whilst crossing the Alps[58] might fit an expected image, but in truth Napoleon wisely chose to ride a more surefooted mule[59] which immediately prompts a far less heroic image.

The concept of effective leadership is challenging to define. Robert Taylor, in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence* informs us that

[57] C.K. Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2011) p. 1.
[58] I.F. Walther and R. Suckale, *Masterpieces Of Western Art: A History Of Art In 900 Individual Studies From The Gothic To The Present Day, Part 1* (London: Taschen, 1996) p. 366.
[59] C. Prendergast, *Napoleon and History Painting: Antoine-Jean Gros's La Bataille D'Eylau* (Oxford: OUP, 1997) p. 188.

'*Although leadership is a widely discussed and often studied discipline, little agreement exists amongst scholars or practitioners about what defines it.*'[60]

Military leadership as a subject has tended to be the preserve of military training establishments, but until more recently has not enjoyed a wide literary audience. A growing number of writers in the post-September 11th era have considered the subject, as the Western powers have been engaged in significant conflicts throughout this century. Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach's *Military Leadership,* as well as Bernd Horn and Robert William Walker's *The Military Leadership Handbook,*[61] directly examine the junior officer leadership expected of the young men and women who lead modern military forces. The qualities of military leadership have been explored in works such as *Understanding Counterinsurgency* by Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney.[62]

There are few studies of the characteristics of military leadership in pre-modern history. Political leadership has been well documented, however. Hugh Kennedy's *Muslim Spain and Portugal* is an example of the political machinations of the Islamic powers of Al-Andalus between the 8th and 15th centuries. It shows the effects of military campaigns and their commanders in the political sphere. Narratives portraying commanders' abilities to deal with issues that arose in campaigns and the fluid state of the battlefield present an image of the commander, whilst research on the battles allows a glimpse of the reality in which the commander

[60] R.L. Taylor, W.E Rosenbach and E.B. Rosenbach, 'Leadership: Perspectives and Context', in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009) p. 2.
[61] B. Horn and R.W. Walker, *The Military Leadership Handbook* (Ontario: Gazelle Book Services, 2008)
[62] T. Rid and T. Keaney, *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations and Challenges* (London: Routledge, 2010)

made his decisions. The aim of this dissertation is to consider how commanders resolved non-combat issues to support their military objectives.

## A brief history of the study of the Crusades

Since the events of the September 11th attacks in 2001, Britain and her allies have been in an asymmetrical conflict. This has prompted a number of scholars to consider more closely the impact of the Crusades. Perhaps to aid military officers, as well as to respond to the increase in interest in the military, a number of academics have also considered what makes a military leader successful, so that they can be more effective in the field and in turn be more likely to bring about victory.

The fundamentals of modern studies of the crusading period were established in the mid nineteenth-century by historians such as Gustav Schlumberger and Louis de Mas Latrie.[63] Setting out a 'golden age' of scholarship that was interrupted with the Great War, discussion of the Crusades re-emerged in the aftermath of the war to end all wars. This golden age firstly looked at the narrative of the Crusades, due to the wealth of primary source material that had survived from the early twelfth century. The First and Second World wars altered and in many ways perverted the ways in which Crusader history was studied and presented. David Lloyd George, Britain's wartime leader for the Great War published his combined speeches under the title *The Great Crusade.*[64],[65] Axis and Allied powers used the imagery of the Crusade in their propaganda and speeches during the Second World War, but this did not damage research on the Crusading period.[66] The Second World War, with

[63] J. Riley-Smith, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades,* (Oxford: OUP, 1995) p. 5.
[64] David Lloyd George, *The Great Crusade: Extracts from Speeches Delivered during the War,* ed. F. L. Stevenson (George H. Doran, 1918)
[65] For an in depth view of how the Crusades were used during the Great War see A. Dupront 'le mythe de croisade' in *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, T. 47e, No. 3, (2000) pp. 616-620.
[66] J. Phillips, *Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades* (London: Bodley Head, 2009) pp. 332-333.

destruction on a sinisterly industrial scale, created a sea change in the way Western society thought about itself.[67] Whilst initial histories had considered the brutality faced by the Crusaders and their heroism in overcoming it, the new way of thinking made the Crusaders more human and approachable. The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, as Jonathan Riley-Smith put it:

> '*...had revived an interest in Natural Law, and the debate whether obedience to orders was justified had raised questions relating to the traditional just-war criterion of legitimate authority.*'[68]

Rationalising actions against modern cultures and values that have established the concept of criminal acts during total war, Steven Runciman in his *History of the Later Crusades* in 1951 launched a vitriolic attack on the Crusaders and what he saw as the war crimes that they committed in achieving their goals:

> *'The triumphs of the Crusade were the triumphs of faith. But faith without wisdom is a dangerous thing. By the inexorable laws of history the whole world pays for the crimes and follies of each of its citizens. In the long sequence of interaction and fusion between Orient and Occident out of which our civilisation has grown, the Crusades were a tragic and destructive episode. The historian as he gazes back across the centuries at their gallant story must find his admiration overcast by sorrow at the witness that it bears to the limitations of human nature.*

[67] J. Riley-Smith, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades,* p. 6.
[68] Ibid.

*There was so much courage and so little honour, so much devotion and so little understanding*.'[69]

The growth in research following the war generated a number of scholarly works epitomised by the multivolume *Wisconsin History,*[70] following the lead of Runciman. As late as the 2000s, Thomas Madden noted that the impact of Runciman's history set him as a second Charles Oman when it came to writing crusader history. He stated:

'*It is no exaggeration to say that Runciman single-handedly crafted the current popular concept of the crusades. The reasons for this are twofold. First, he was a learned man with a solid grasp of the chronicle sources. Second, and perhaps more important, he wrote beautifully. The picture of the crusades that Runciman painted owed much to current scholarship yet much more to Sir Walter Scott. Throughout his history Runciman portrayed the crusaders as simpletons or barbarians seeking salvation through the destruction of the sophisticated cultures of the east. In his famous 'summing-up' of the crusades he concluded that 'the Holy War in itself was nothing more than a long act of intolerance in the name of God, which is a sin against the Holy Ghost.'*[71]

In the years following the industrial scale destruction, it would seem that Runciman, who did not personally take part in the war, and those others who began to research the Crusades in the shadow of the Nuremburg trials, began to examine more closely

[69] S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades: The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades* (Cambridge: CUP, 1951) p. 480.
[70] Riley-Smith, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades,* p. 5.
[71] T.F. Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) p. 216.

the roles of the crusaders and the atrocities carried out. The view was to apply modern 20th Century morality to the actions of 11th Century individuals. Whilst this skewed some opinions of the Crusaders, theses historians did note with greater clarity a sense of the events of the Crusades. This however did not attempt to truly examine the activities of the military leaders but rather judge their personalities and actions as projected from the primary sources.

The renewed post Second World War interest in the study of the Crusades was further fuelled by major works, such as those by R.C. Smail[72] and John France[73], through to Jonathan Philips' *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact* a collection of studies that built upon this post-war interest on the causes and consequences of the First Crusade.[74] John France's *Victory in the East: A military history of the Crusades* provided a great deal of insight into the campaigns of the Crusading period that have left echoes from their impact in the modern age.[75] This became a core text for the military study of the First Crusade and has maintained an influence on modern studies, much as Runciman and Oman have in their own eras.

In the wake of the September 11th attacks on Washington and New York, an apparent growth in interest in the clash of European and Middle-Eastern cultures began a period of intense interest; Phillips' *Holy Warriors,*[76] Anthony Pagden's *Worlds at War,*[77] and Thomas Asbridge's *The Crusades,*[78] being just some of the works produced in the 2000s immediately after the commencement of the "War on

[72] R.C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare 1097-1193* (Cambridge: CUP, 1995)
[73] J. France, Victory in the East: A History of the First Crusade (Cambridge: CUP, 1994)*: A History of the First Crusade* (Cambridge: CUP, 1994)
[74] J. Philips, et al., *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact* (Manchester: MUP, 1997)
[75] J. France, *Victory in the East: A History of the First Crusade* (Cambridge: CUP, 1994)
[76] J. Phillips, *Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades* (London: Bodley Head, 2009)
[77] A. Pagden, *Worlds at War: The 2500-Year Struggle Between East and West* (Random House, 2008)
[78] T. Asbridge, *The Crusades: The War for the Holy Land* (Simon and Schuster, 2010).

Terror". Academic interest had certainly existed prior to the commencement of conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, though it remained generally broad in its focus. By contrast, there was a much greater participation in more focused research into the crusades as a subject in their wake. It is possible that such things are coincidental, but a greater interest in the lands provided a larger audience than before. Jonathan Phillips focussed on the repercussions of the Crusades in his *Holy Warriors: a modern history of the Crusades*[79], one of eighteen publications that have been released since the same date. Thomas Asbridge brought this to the public view with documentaries such as his "The Crusades" series[80], which was released alongside academic papers such as his "Talking to the enemy" article two years later[81]. This in fact was Asbridge's third article following the events of the 11th September.

Specific Crusader study was furthered by the journal *Crusades*, released by Ashgate Publishing. Themes within the journal form a broad spectrum, moving between military and sociological concepts. Of note was Jonathan Riley-Smith's attempt to identify, where possible, the names, and to calculate the number of knights taking part in the expedition of the First Crusade.[82] His analysis, when allied with Johannes A. Mol's '*Frisian Fighters and the Crusade*',[83] gave depth to the discussion, allowing academics to explore and illuminate further the individual human characteristics and the logistics of the subject. Michael Evans concentrated on the character of Eleanor of Aquitaine and her role and perception with the Second

[79] J. Phillips, *Holy Warriors* pp. 277-312, *ibid* pp. 350-355
[80] https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01b3fpw
[81] T, Asbridge, , 'Talking to the Enemy: The Role and Purpose of Negotiations between Saladin and Richard the Lionheart During the Third Crusade', *Journal of Medieval History*, vol. 39 (3), pp. 275-96.
[82] J. Riley-Smith, 'Casualties and the Number of Knights on the First Crusade', in *Crusades*, Vol.1, (2002) pp. 13-28.
[83] J.A. Mol, 'Frisian Fighters and the Crusade', in *Crusades*, vol. 1, (2002), pp. 89-110.

Crusade.[84] Christoph T. Maier's '*The roles of women in the crusade movement: a survey*'[85] sought to examine the role that women played outside of the campaign, examining the factors of propaganda, financing, and how they managed the estates left behind on the home front.'[86]

Natasha Hodgson's *Women, Crusading and the Holy Land* built upon these themes, focusing not just on the roles and influences of the women in the region, whose activities are reported in the literature of the Crusades, but also their roles in supporting Crusaders in the Levant and from their homes.[87] This study collated sources from a broad base for research, expanding knowledge of the roles of women in the Crusades as an aspect of military and crusading history that had been often overlooked. Simon Barton also considered the role of women in a Crusader context when discussing the cross-cultural marriages of Al Andalus and Medieval Leon in Spain.

Interfaith marriages between opposing military factions suggests a desire to forge alliances, creating tactical advantages by removing an opposing force from the field. Strategically, however, such marriages potentially establish a dynasty, as indicated by Baldwin in his marriage with the Armenian noblewoman Arda.[88] Different faiths did not in themselves outweigh secular objectives. Considering its cultural and political ramifications as well as its symbolism, Barton noted that the chronicled history not only provided useful insight to the marriage pacts, but also

[84] M. Evans, 'Penthesileaon the Second Crusade: Is Eleanor of Aquitaine the Amazon Queen of Niketas Choniates?' in *Crusades*, Vol. 8, (2009) pp. 23-30.
[85] C.T. Maier, 'The roles of women in the crusade movement: a survey', in *Journal of Medieval History*, Vol. 30, (2004) pp. 61–82.
[86] Ibid., p. 61.
[87] N. Hodgson, *Women Crusading and the Holy Land in Historical Narrative* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2007).
[88] J. Phillips, *Holy Warriors*, p. 50.

suggests how views on religion and identity flexed throughout the period. He also examined the role of the tale of interfaith marriage as motivation for victory in the *Reconquista* so that the daughters of the northern lords escaped similar fates to that of Teresa Vermúdez.[89]

The importance of women in the context of medieval military history should not be underestimated. Though fewer have been noted from historical sources than their male counterparts, noblewomen such as Adela of Blois, her mother Matilda of Flanders, Anna Komnene, and Matilda of Canossa all played major roles in the period surrounding the Crusades. In the former's case, Adela was instrumental in her influence over Stephen of Blois as to persuade him to return to the Holy Land in the failed campaign of 1101[90]. The non-combat aspects that women in the Crusades have provided, whether in the period surrounding the First Crusade or pilgrimages that followed thereafter have been explored in some detail. This continues to highlight, by omission, the lack of study provided to military leadership during the First Crusade when considering non-combat elements.

The Crusades remain a controversial and heavily debated topic that has both been greatly explored and yet remains heavily shrouded in academic mist in some respects. It holds regions that are filled with assumption and rhetoric, and which are prime areas for further research.

[89] S. Barton, 'Marriage across frontiers: Sexual mixing, power and identity in medieval Iberia' in *Journal Of Medieval Iberian Studies*, **Vol.** 3(1) (2011) pp. 1-25.

[90] K. LoPrete, "Adela of Blois: Familial Alliances and Female Lordship" in *Aristocratic Women in Medieval France*, ed. T. Evergates, pp. 7-43 (Philadelphia: UPP) p. 23 See also C. James Lea. "The Crusade of 1101". In Setton, Kenneth M.; Baldwin, Marshall W. *A History of the Crusades: The First Hundred Years*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. **Vol.** 1 (1969) pp. 343–352.

# Method

The key objective of this dissertation is to identify the strategies supporting military action utilised by the commanders of the First Crusade to secure their objectives. It considers skills not used in battlefield combat that were, nonetheless, crucial to achieve military success. My aim is to consider these skills whilst negotiating the lens of the chroniclers who transcribed their perceptions of the events of the Crusade, seeking to look beyond their opinions by cross referencing where possible these views with other chroniclers' accounts of the events. Examination of the perceptions of the chroniclers versus the reality of the events in a future study would build on the work of such academics as J. Riley-Smith.[91] The study of military history is dominated by considerations of technology and biography. These have greatly illuminated the field and created impetus for further refinement of ideas and research. This dissertation builds upon some of that work to consider other aspects, not primarily addressed in current research.

I will be exploring a range of primary sources that can be categorised into two distinct types: those written by participants and those written later based on the original sources and witness accounts prior to the launch of the Second Crusade. The dissertation will suggest that, far from the Crusade being a bloody, fanatical horde rampaging through the Levant, the military leaders of the armed pilgrimage were in fact highly sophisticated and deliberate in their actions, yoking the wildfires of religious fervour to a set of military objectives in order to organise success. The First

[91] J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (London: Continuum, 1993)

Crusade is important in the number of sources that have survived, providing material for comparison to later conflict, such as the siege of Lisbon in the Second Crusade.[92]

As a result of my close reading of the narrative sources, my analysis is structured thematically. I identify three key areas by which military leaders were depicted in these chronicles using long term strategies a in order to secure success. These are intelligence gathering, logistics and supply management and the nature of psychology as a tactic of war both for bolstering allies and as a way to diminish adversaries. These strategies have not previously been gathered into one study and my aim is to show how the strategies were linked or kept separate. Previous studies, particularly those dedicated to military leadership, have usually consisted of narratives concerning the actions of individuals. It is my intention to highlight general strategies employed by the leaders and the effect they had on military outcomes. Due to the nature of the sources, this may seem to portray one leader's perspective more than the others, but the intent is to highlight how these traits and skills must have been present in other military leaders for the campaign to have been successful.

These are not the only issues that can be studied, but as the study of military leadership in the medieval age remains largely untouched, I feel it important that these tactics be explored in detail as a start point for further research.

[92] Only two short sources survive for the siege of Lisbon for example.

## Source literature

The sources for the Crusade can be divided into two distinct groups; those written by participants, or first wave chronicles, and those written subsequently in the wake of the victory in the east or second wave chronicles. It is important to understand these texts in their own right and how they can provide information on the First Crusade. The nature of the primary of the First Crusade is one of perceptions and writing for an audience. The chronicles can be divided into two "waves" or generations of authorship.[93] The first wave of three chronicles was written in the immediate aftermath of the crusade's conclusion at the Battle of Ascelon. They present a variety of differing styles and content that provides an rounded image of the events that took place during the campaign. Of the three eye witness accounts, it is perhaps surprising that the secular based *Gesta Francorum*, which could be considered a war memoire, is the source a large number of the second wave of the early to mid-12th Century. Ralph of Caen, Robert the Monk, Guibert of Nogent and Albert of Aachen all utilised the *Gesta Francorum* as their main source of information though it is possible that they also had access to eye witnesses to aid in their work.[94] Where the second wave authors differ are in their ways by which they attempt to employ elements of the literary epic.[95] A main reason given in most texts, such as that of Robert the Monk, is that the Gesta Francorum is too unsophisticated with a jejune use of liturgical texts.[96] The four names at the back of the *Anonymous* support

[93] P. Frankopan, *The First Crusade: The Call from the East*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012) p. 201.
[94] M. Bull, 'Robert the Monk and His Source(s)" in *Writing the Early Crusades: Text, Transmission and Memory* ed. M. Bull & D. Kempf (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2014) p. 127.
[95] M. Bull, 'Robert the Monk and His Source(s)" in *Writing the Early Crusades: Text, Transmission and Memory* ed. M. Bull & D. Kempf (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2014) p. 135.
[96] *RM*, Sermo apologeticus, p. 73, *GN*, Letter of Guibert to Lysiard, p. 20.

the hypothesis that the source was written or directed by secular participants[97]. The lack of detail in the combat situations suggests that the authors were involved in the fighting, but were either so focused on survival in the melee, were unaware of the events of battles at the battalion level or understandably simply did not wish to remember them to record. This lack of detail frustrated Guibert of Nogent and Robert the Monk as it was at odds with their requirements to generate a literary "epic" that would allow their histories to stand out amongst an increasingly competitive market appealing to widening audiences.[98] It is perhaps of note that the compiler(s) of the *Gesta Francorum* may have been members of Bohemond's personal retinue from details shared concerning isolated events, such as the treatment of William the Carpenter following his desertion and capture at the siege of Antioch.[99] Their experiences however would not have been like those who commanded the battalions of Crusaders, even if they fought side by side in the melee of each encounter, for the commanders were able to direct their troops against the Turkish and Arab forces they encountered with a degree of control such as that shown at Dorylaeum.[100]

In contrast to the *Gesta Francorum*, Raymond of Aguilers account is considered lacking in military knowledge, a complaint that derives from his descriptions of the armies. Perhaps the most notable is that of the sallying of the Crusaders against Kerbogha at Antioch, where Raymond refers to the pilgrims

[97] *GF*, p. 117
[98] M. Bull, 'Robert the Monk and His Source(s)" in *Writing the Early Crusades: Text, Transmission and Memory* ed. M. Bull & D. Kempf (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2014) p. 135.
[99] *GF*, 6N, p. 56
[100] see for example Fulcher's description for Crusader armed formations FC, Book I, Chapter XI:2, p.84.

almost in an ecclesiastic way as if partaking in a parade[101]. It would seem completely at odds, that a man who spent years on campaign would not have been able to recognise military terms and structures. Raymond's audience however was not that of the Crusaders or those pilgrims that were on campaign, but rather to a domestic, ecclesiastical background. To this, it becomes reasonable that Raymond translated his military experiences into a format that would be more recognisable to his 12th Century clerical peers, particularly at Puy.

The First Crusade was a major inspiration for medieval literature. Twelve separate European accounts were generated in the first half of the 12th Century, highlighting the general appetite for the subject, which in turn served to preserve the three "first wave" texts.[102] Historical research has revealed later editions of the first wave chronicles though these reworking have been met with differing responses from modern researchers. For example the reworking of Fulcher of Chartres referred to as the L-manuscript was completely ignored by Hagenmeyer.[103] Second wave chronicles have also been criticised for attempting to justify the actions of the Crusades after the fact, possibly recognising the atrocities committed on the pilgrimage, even by late 11th Century standards. This is poignantly seen with Robert the Monk's account of the sermon at Clermont that was otherwise neglected in both Raymond of Aguilers' and Fulcher of Chartres' accounts.[104] Nevertheless, the second wave chronicles do proceed to flesh out the ideas of the time, for example

[101] *RA*, VIII, p. 63.
[102] J. Riley-Smith: *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (London: Continuum 2003) p. 135.
[103] J. Rubenstein, "Guibert of Nogent, Albert of Aachen and Fulcher of Chartres: Three Crusade Chronicles Intersect" in *Writing the Early Crusades: Text, Transmission and Memory* ed. M. Bull & D. Kempf (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2014) p.26.
[104] P. Frankopan, *The First Crusade: The Call from the East*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012) p. 201.

irrespective of the true sermon, Robert the Monk provides a setting that at the least explains why so many pilgrims set forth to Jerusalem, considering the otherwise small numbers that had departed beforehand.

The *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum* [hence forth *Gesta Francorum*] written by a crusader in the early years after the conquest of Jerusalem, is one of only three texts written by crusade pilgrims. The author remains unknown, but provides a rich amount of data that can be analysed. Uniquely, the source appears to have been written by a layman, likely from the content, a knight or combatant.[105] The text informs us that this fighter was pious, though comfortable with defining the horrors and detailed in his description of combat. The anonymous author or possibly director of the history is likely to have been in Bohemond's forces as far as Antioch, as his details focus on those of the Sicilo-Normans, including details of the battle of Dorylaeum, which is absent in the account of Raymond of Aguilers. Clearly, he was knowledgeable of the councillors of Bohemond's retinue, suggesting that he was part of his household, or knew men that were. References to individuals by name, men whom it is doubtful would have been known to the masses of the pilgrimage, as well as the layout of his commander's personal pavilion, supports this. An alternate view is that he may be simply be presenting himself as such. What is clear is that either he was literate or had connections with those who were, suggesting someone who was well connected. The original Latin has been suggested as crude in comparison to other contemporary chroniclers, however, and

[105] Jay Rubestein suggests that the *Gesta Francorum* is in fact a series of anecdotes from a number of Crusaders compiled post victory at Ascelon. For more on the history and possible authors of the Gesta Francorum see: Jay Rubenstein, 'What is the Gesta Francorum, and who was Peter Tudebode', in *Revue Mabillon,* 16, (2005), pp. 179-204.

the lack of allusions to well-known texts such as Sallust as used by Raol in the *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi* or the *Aeneid* by Ralph of Caen further strengthens the suggestion of his more temporal estate rather than the possibility of him being a member of the classically trained clergy.

As a soldier's point of view, the *Gesta Francorum* gives a more earthly view of the First Crusade. Aspects such as siege weaponry, cavalry movements and impressions of being in infantry formations are the norm, compared to the brief accounts given to such incidents as the discovery of the Holy Lance and a complete lack of coverage of the subsequent trial of its discoverer Peter Bartholomew. The identity of the author, though not given, may be attributed to the strange inclusion of four names at the end of the text: two laymen and two clerks.[106] It could be that these are the authors and directors, though if this is the case the two clerks remained loyal to their dictation, with the lack of religious or classical references. The text does include the sermon of Clermont as well as the mass given at the Sepulchre in Jerusalem, and this is perhaps the work of the two clerks, as it is doubtful that the author was in France for the former, though was certainly present for the latter.

The language is refreshingly simple, with few embellishments, though if it includes a candid approach to the bloody violence of the campaign, neither suggesting horror nor a naive excitement. As such, this suggests that the author was used to violence. Though tournaments were on the increase, the Sicilian Normans had been in constant warfare for almost four decades prior to the Crusade, with Italian, Arab and Byzantine adversaries. This matter of fact way of considering violence supports the thesis that this was a veteran of warfare. Certainly this would

[106] *GF,* p. 117

be the case if he was with Bohemond at Amalfi immediately prior to his joining the armed pilgrimage.[107]

The *Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem* [Hence referred to as *Historia Francorum*] concentrates upon Count Raymond IV of Toulouse, also known as Raymond of Saint-Gilles, and the perspectives of the substantial Provencal forces under his command. Raymond of Aguilers, the chronicle's author, was chaplain to the Count of Toulouse and, as such, presents a varied view on the events of the First Crusade. Contrasting greatly to the *Gesta Francorum*'s approach, the *Historia Francorum* reveals its audience as being essentially ecclesiastical. This has been misinterpreted to suggest that Raymond of Aguilers was naïve when it came to military matters, but we must consider the possibility that the readership of his chronicle may well have been the Cathedral of Puy. Certainly Raymond IV's donation to the Cathedral and his links to Adhemar Bishop of Puy during the campaign may explain this. Of Raymond of Aguilers we know very little. His presence in the historical record ends with the Battle of Ascelon in 1099 and it may be that he either died of wounds gained there or returned to Europe soon after. If this is the case though it would suggest he presided over a team of clerics, as details of the battle are contained in his history. Whatever the reason for his disappearance, Raymond's detailed account of the Crusade includes several events that have been reinterpreted for an ecclesiastical audience. He is the only chronicler to have detailed the trial by fire of Peter Bartholomew, though his version of the outcome differed, possibly for political reasons and his support of Raymond IV.

[107] For more on the links between the *Gesta Francorum* and Bohemond see: K. Baxter Wolf, 'Crusade and narrative: Bohemond and the *Gesta Francorum*', In *Journal of Medieval History*, Vol. 17, Is. 3, (1991) pp. 207-216.

The chronicle contains a variety of biblical references and comparisons and shows a high degree of piety amongst the crusaders. This is alongside a shrewd assessment of the military leaders, linking the failures of the Crusaders to their less than Christian actions in part, forever placing the Crusade as a religious endeavour that required a temporal force for its completion. Raymond's view on the Byzantines, an element often neglected by the *Gesta Francorum*, is often sympathetic. This again reflected the close political ties built between the Emperor Alexius I and Raymond IV during the course of the campaign.

The Chronicle presents a balanced view of the Crusade, providing detail where the *Gesta Francorum* is lacking, but must be viewed with the realisation that Raymond's perceptions were skewed by both his target audience and his superior's political machinations.

Fulcher of Chartres' *History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, 1195-1127* provides the third main crusader chronicle for the First Crusade employed in this dissertation. Fulcher was chaplain to Baldwin of Bouillon and so places much of the emphasis on the experiences of Baldwin and the Norman contingents under his command, alongside his elder brothers Eustace and Godfrey. The latter became King of Jerusalem in 1099. As such, the details of the Crusade diverge from that of the main body of text as Baldwin departed the Crusade to take ownership of Edessa and form the County of Edessa. Fulcher's descriptions from the siege of Antioch to the Battle of Ascelon are detailed enough to suggest that he compiled his history using witness accounts. He mentions the fate of Peter Bartholomew,[108] for example,

[108] *FC*, b. 1, c. XXV, p100

and the cannibalism encountered at Ma'arrat-an-Nu'man,[109] without actually being there. His record of the Crusade further includes a largely inaccurate taxonomic list of the flora and fauna of the Levant.

Fulcher's account is highly informative, with a wide range of details from logistical problems to the tactics of the battles until his own disappearance from the historical record in 1127, when the text comes to an abrupt end. The text provides another view that falls between the stark style of the *Gesta Francorum* and the often melodramatic *Historia Francorum* to provide a balanced eye witness account that allows for the study of military leadership.

Following the Crusade's success, a number of authors compiled a variety of chronicles and histories to better understand the campaign as well as set out a case to legitimise many of the actions that took place. The First Crusade was bloody and brutal but was also an extraordinary achievement for the European powers and particularly the Church in its ability to expand its power. Many of these texts based their information on the first wave chronicles as well as being able to interview those veterans who survived the campaigns into the early 12th century.

Written around 1108, the *Gesta Dei Per Francos* or *Deeds of God through the Franks* [hence forth *Gesta Dei*] was compiled by Guibert of Nogent. Guibert, an Abbot of the Abbey of Nogent-sous-Coucy, compiled the chronicle by expanding upon the *Gesta Francorum*, an indication of the dissemination of the earlier work in Europe. This chronicle has been largely neglected by academics yet provides added information that helps to explore the campaign and its narrative further. The date of the writing also suggests that much of the expanded information may have come

[109] Ibid., p112

directly from returning Normans from the contingents of Robert of Normandy and Eustace of Boulogne, who returned to Northern Europe around the same period.

The chronicle, while providing a different view, fails to deliver great detail and is pockmarked with claims of the credibility to write such a history despite the fact that he was not present for the events concerned. Guibert highlights the anarchic European environment that the Crusaders travelled from and so seeks to explain how they could so easily engage in military affairs, often with brutal outcomes. Of the authors of the contemporary texts Guibert is the one about whom we have the most information compared to the other chroniclers.[110] Despite Guibert's personal fame as a commentator of his time, it is only recently that his text on the Crusade was translated. It is often presented as a solid text.[111] Ironically, Guibert is said to have been inspired when he viewed a copy of the *Gesta Francorum* and its crude grammar and syntax. Of interest is the way his view of Peter the Hermit conflicts with that of Albert of Aachen, who appears to have venerated him as a holy man. The *Gesta Dei Per Francos* is a curiosity that hold more interest due to its historiography than the relatively small amount of material it adds to the *Gesta Francorum*'s version of events. As such, it features insignificantly in the dissertation.

Also taking its cue from the *Gesta Francorum*, the *Gesta Tancredi* of Ralph of Caen, written after the reign of Tancred of Taranto as Prince of Antioch, details the Crusade from the point of view of the Normans under Bohemond and Tancred. The chronicle reads much like a heroic epic such as *The Song of Roland*. Ralph of Caen, a native of Caen, travelled with Bohemond back to Antioch during the nobleman's recruitment tour of 1107, after which he served as a military chaplain to the Princes

[110] Jay Rubenstein, *Guibert of Nogent: Portrait of a Medieval Mind* (London: Routledge, 2013) p. 1.
[111] *GDPF passim*

of Antioch. Ralph had previously studied under Arnulf of Choques, who was chaplain to Robert of Normandy as well as aiding Bohemond and becoming Patriarch of Jerusalem. His chronicle details the events from a surprisingly humanist view, often comparing Tancred to Aeneas and thus the Crusade as a campaign for the Christians to find a home rather than as a war of conquest. His sophisticated use of classical texts and inclusion of relations with the Armenians betrays the ability of Ralph as a propagandist, highlighting the worthiness of his household compared to the perceived cowardly conduct of Raymond of Toulouse and Alexios I in their dealings with the Crusaders. His account of the battle of Dorylaeum places more emphasis upon the Normans, possibly thanks to interviews with Bohemond's veterans who remained in Antioch. From the battle of Antioch, Ralph focuses solely upon Tancred and his household as they marched upon Jerusalem, adding possible apocryphal acts to further Tancred's position as a hero in the Crusade. Ralph's detail, however accurate, does add a level of information concerning the perceived qualities of leadership in the Crusade and how he felt a commander should act.

Robert the Monk, also known as Robert of Rheims, states in his introduction to the *Historia Iherosolimitana* that his abbot issued him with the task of reediting the *Gesta Francorum*. In his History of the Jerusalem Pilgrims, Robert refocuses the *Gesta Francorum*'s attention from the mainly Norman contingents to the Northern Crusaders, including added emphasis on Hugh the Great, who otherwise receives little attention from the first wave chronicles. This may in part be due to the geographical proximity of Robert the Monk to the Court of France and the latter's rise in power in the early 12$^{th}$ century. His view of the victory paints its importance as surpassing any other human endeavour and, as such, provides a romantic view of

the Crusaders that embellishes the *Gesta Francorum*. His account though may also have been based on witnesses from the French contingents and as such may explain why his view expands on those of the *Gesta Francorum*. There are also several issues with the precise details Robert the Monk derives from his interpretation when chronicling events using the *Gesta Francorum* as a source. In one such instance Robert misunderstands the concept of the scorched-earth policy that Alexios employed following the false reports of the Crusaders' demise at Antioch as the Emperor seeking to devastate the land as if invading.[112] As a reliable source on the perceptions of the leaders of the Crusade, Robert includes a variety of practical details that can be used for this study and how he envisioned the military leaders were successful.[113]

Albert, Bishop of Aachen, or Aix-en-Chapelle, reported that he was restrained from going on crusade, but that he would author a chronicle of the events from the testimonies of those who took part in his *Historia Ierosolimitana.*[114] The history is a rich tapestry of events, broken into six individual books in the first volume, with a second volume of equal size.[115] Notably, Albert's account of events conflicts with the descriptions given by first wave chronicles in the account of the instigation of the Crusade coming from Peter the Hermit,[116] on whom Albert places special emphasis as being both competent and devout. This major difference is, however, an anomaly rather than a rule and it is clear that Albert used German witnesses as well as both the *Gesta Francorum* and the *Historia Francorum* to colourfully narrate the Crusade.

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[112] Compare *RM*, c. XVI, p. 160; *GF*, 9N, p. 83; *AA*, b. IV, c. 41, p. 164.
[113] A strong view on the accuracies of the Second Wave chronicles Is shown in S. Runciman, *The First Crusade* (Cambridge: CUP, 1951) p. 42.
[114] *AA*, b. I, c. 1, p. 15.
[115] S.B. Edgington, 'Albert of Aachen Reapraised', in *From Clermont to Jerusalem* ed. Alan Murray (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998) pp.55.
[116] *AA*, b. 1, c. 2, pp. 15-16.

His concentration on the Peasants' Crusade is rare, as is his concentration upon Godfrey of Boulogne's travels through Europe, which may have been politically influenced by the latter's rise to the throne in 1099. His view of the Byzantines and Turks is conflicted, with them both being depicted as being both heroic and treacherous throughout.

Doubt could be cast upon the level of detail that Albert employs. As previously stated Albert did not participate in the Crusades and yet has produced by far the longest chronicle of the First Crusade. His clear use of witnesses and other chronicles goes some way to dissuade any such reservations, but even if his chronicle is false in content for the true events, the perceptions Albert composed at least highlight how an early 12th century military leader should have acted. His apocryphal use of narrative in some episodes may reveal greater ideas of strategy than perhaps would be acknowledged.

**Non-Latin sources**

The violence that engulfed the region and the intervening period since the mid-11th century is such that few documents have survived from the era that were not immediately copied and transcribed. Arabic sources from the period are rare. Anna Komnena's tome concerning her father, Byzantine Emperor Alexius I, is the most detailed of the Crusade from the point of view of the Byzantines. As such, these chronicles present a rare and colourful view of the crusaders that adds to our understanding. Due to their nature though they can provide little to add to this study, but are used sparingly to enhance the views shown by the Crusader Chroniclers.

Anna Komnena's *Alexiad* is key to understanding some of the more complex issues faced by the Crusaders, as well as highlighting the long and turbulent relationship between Constantinople and Bohemond as leader of the Sicilo-Normans. Hamza Ibn Asad, also known as Abu Ya'la bore the surname Ibn Qalanisi. Ibn Qalanisi's short yet detailed *Damascus Chronicle* may be one of the only survivors from the Levant purely as Damascus was never placed under siege, surviving the ravages of the Crusades. It may be that others existed in Antioch, Jerusalem and the countless towns and cities along the coast that came under attack from the Crusader armies, but these have not survived that bloody period. Ibn Qalanisi details, in particular, the Turkish view of the Siege of Antioch, providing a fresh view of Bohemond's turncoat and thus the opportunity to further understand the otherwise reticent events surrounding the fall of Antioch in 1098.

*'The whole art of war consists in getting at what lies on the other side of the hill, or, in other words, in deciding what we do not know from what we do.'*

~ Field Marshall Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington[117]

## Turncoat, Ally, Soldier, Spy: Intelligence Gathering

The role of intelligence gathering in the formation of military strategy cannot be over-estimated. The ability of commanders to interpret opposing force deposition, movement of a battle group or entire army, or simply assessing morale at individual combatant level can decisively influence the outcome of a campaign.[118] Collection, collation and interpretation of intelligence material can be a significant exercise, requiring the combined efforts of large numbers of intelligent personnel. Conversely, sheer chance, whether perceived as good fortune or divine intervention, could and arguably still can define the outcome of a battle.

The compilation of information from different sources and of different types to create a credible narrative is one of the roles of the commander or his trusted staff. Detection, location, the capture and deciphering of means of communication in the modern era of communication is still as important as the capture of a messenger or carrier pigeon was at the time of the Crusades. Cryptographic communication, either in seemingly unintelligible enciphered codes or hidden in plain sight in a letter or

[117] Duke of Wellington in John Wilson Croker, *The Croker Papers* (London, 1885) iii p. 276.
[118] Gregory Daly, *Cannae: The Experience of the Second Punic War* (London: Routledge, 2005) pp. 113-114

poem, which can only be unlocked by a cypher key or code breaker, provides and provided the means to transfer information covertly through enemy lines. While the lack of medieval espionage evidence may be self-explanatory, as one would not expect such clandestine activities to have been openly documented, other factors may also have led to a general lack of physical evidence. In 840 Einhard, a nobleman in Charlemagne's Empire, wrote to his son to impart some advice concerning the conveying of information.

> "... *I think that it is better to trust a loyal man than a written document, since if a document or a piece of parchment falls [out of the hands] of its bearer, every secret it holds is revealed, but a loyal messenger, [even if] tortured, does not betray the message entrusted to him*." [119]

This suggests that, aside from questions of literacy in the medieval period, spymasters may have deliberately chosen to avoid writing down intelligence for fear of it being captured.

Artistic sketches of local topography can be interpreted to provide detailed advice on the potential location and dispersal of opposing forces, while a fast rider can scout many miles ahead of a slowly moving major force, to identify the dust cloud of an enemy on the march, or the sight and smell of an encampment. Supplementing this data, military commanders were able to exploit the human intelligence provided by interrogating captives, merchants and local inhabitants or by debriefing military units to increase their chances of success. All the foregoing activities may readily be undertaken by regular, albeit specialist, members of an army. The role of the spy takes the intelligence fight into the enemy's camp by

[119] Einhard to R., printed in: Edward Dutton, *Charlemagne's Courtier, the complete Einhard*, p 158

clandestine means to survey and collect information, influence and even change the loyalties of opponents. He or she might openly or covertly sabotage communications and lines of communication, and even physically destroy valuable targets in anticipation of military action. Once the spy becomes saboteur, their covert role may cease, or they may merge back into the chaos they have created to strike again.

Numerous military treatises from across the centuries have urged military leaders to understand the value of intelligence gathering and its subsequent analysis.[120],[121],[122],[123],[124],[125],[126] These have varied from specific methods to general observations, but have sought to demonstrate how intelligence gathering has been an important aspect of military tactics and how its interpretation can influence leadership and command decisions leading to strategy. The very nature of intelligence gathering, which frequently concentrates on minutia to build a picture, makes it less glamorous than more comprehensively documented aspects of military history, from technology to strategy, to actual force engagement.

This chapter concentrates on the largely clandestine and sparsely documented realm of intelligence gathering in the medieval period, by identifying the events and activities during the First Crusade. By its nature, the goal of Jerusalem as the culmination of the pilgrimage required those embarking on their quest to travel the terrain and climate of foreign lands at a time when few had previously been able to. Successful completion of the undertaking required tactical intelligence;

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[120] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War***,** trans. Thomas Cleary (London, 2005) pp. 144-9.
[121] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia,* trans. Henry Graham Dakyns (London, 1906) pp. 112-3.
[122] Herodotus, *The Histories,* trans. Aubrey Sélincourt (Harmondsworth, 1972) p. 491.
[123] Julius Caesar, *Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars,* trans. H. J. Edwards (New York: Dover Publications,2006) p. 105
[124] Flavius Vegetius Renatus, *De Re Militari* (*s.l.* 2012) p. 69
[125] Niccolo Machiavelli, *Secrete conveying of letters* in *Machiavelli,* trans. Peter Whitehorne and Edward Dacres (London, 1905) pp. 218-9.
[126] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* trans. J. J. Graham (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1997) pp. 64-65.

information had to be gathered on obstacles and hazards, which was then collated and interpreted to identify the least hazardous routes to negotiate them. Knowledge the level of risk of various routes allowed commanders to decide on the relative risks and merits of taking each route, depending on their objectives and plans. The overriding need to meet a deadline might outweigh the additional risks associated with a particular route. Much as with other aspects of military leadership within the Crusade, this detail can be analysed from the sources, and they also provide a number of elements concerning intelligence gathering that they perceived as being crucial, or at least significant to the successful outcomes of military leadership during the First Crusade. This chapter is to focus on the role and composition of scouts, the role of spies and saboteurs and the use of interrogation of local inhabitants and prisoners, factors that have not previously been investigated within academic study.

## Scouts

The role of the scout to range ahead of a slower moving large force was a crucial tool at the medieval military leadership's disposal. The role of scouts to identify potential logistic advantages, such as food sources and issues that might impede a force, to create an ambush location as well as military observation and minor engagements is one that has not been covered in great depth in academia. The image of the military scout, in the role of reconnaissance rather than espionage, is often presented by historic documentation as a lightly armed and armoured mounted soldier.[127] While the nature of ancient warfare often limited their role in battle, lightly

[127] See Józef Brandt, *On Reconnaissance,* Walter's Art Museum, 1876.

armoured and armed horse mounted troops were well suited to ranging ahead of armies. Acting as the eyes and ears of the army, scouts were capable of identifying and relaying information on enemy camps, settlements and troop movements, geographical obstacles such as rivers and mountains as well as the routes to bypass them. The evidence for scouts, though sporadic, is more accessible than that relating to their covert counterparts. In terms of academic research, a great deal has been committed to cavalry in general, but there is scant research dedicated to scouting in the period. R. C. Smail[128] and John France[129] commented on the role of mounted scouts as part of the overall military apparatus. Andrew Ayton's *Knights and Warhorses*[130] focuses on the effect of the knightly classes and heavy cavalry during the Hundred Years War. Christopher T. Allmand's *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War C.1300-c.1450*[131] complemented this research by investigating similar themes. Reconnaissance often finds its place within other academic work. Clifford J Rogers' *The Vegetian 'Science of Warfare' in the Middle Ages* principally examines whether medieval commanders could be identified to have used a template of military leadership as suggested by the late Roman writer Vegetius,[132] noting that English armies of the Hundred Years War utilised scouts as part of their large mounted raids.[133]

Sources for the First Crusade contain abundant detail and information relating to the use of scouts as *cursores* and *exploratores* and the variety of military assets that could be drawn upon in their composition. Their continued involvement suggests

[128] Smail, *Crusading Warfare,* pp. 111-2, 147, 151.
[129] France, *Victory in the East*, p. 189, 228, 238, 361
[130] Andrew Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1994) p, 64.
[131] C.T. Allmand does mention Hobelars, light cavalry in the period, on one page of *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War* (Cambridge: CUP, 1988) p. 61.
[132] Rogers, 'The Vegetian 'Science of Warfare' in the Middle Ages' pp. 1-20.
[133] Ibid., p. 5.

that scouting was an integral part of martial society and as such recognised as an invaluable source of information for the military leader. The visual and auditory range of any military force was extended in a circle around any given position by its reconnaissance forces. The range and speed of scouts, allied with their ability to operate undetected by the enemy as well as the accuracy of their reporting, largely defined the quality of the unit. Whilst many have suggested that spies are the world's second oldest profession,[134] the role of scouts as their counterparts in a military unit might be assumed to be of a similar age. In the First Crusade, scouts proved themselves to be crucial, not just to gather intelligence on the enemy and terrain, but to perform other invaluable duties.

The *Gesta Francorum* noted the use of spies both by and against the Crusaders.[135,136] The use of the word *exploratores* was not new to the medieval world. The Roman legions used the term to refer to spies rather than scouts, due to the fact that they generally operated beyond the range of the legions' cavalry capability.[137] There is, however, some complication with the author's usage of the term. *Exploratores* are used in the Sixth Narrative to describe patrols of scouts sent by Bohemond to investigate the Turkish positions prior to his attack in February 1098.[138] This complication suggests that either the authors were unaware of the difference between the classical and medieval uses of the word, or the scouts of the expedition were also classified as spies, or indeed that the position of scout did not exist in the crusader armies. This latter suggestion supports the idea that

[134] For further works on intelligence gathering by scouts see Sergio Boffa, *Warfare in Medieval Brabant, 1356-1406* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2004) pp. 160-163.
[135] *GF*, 5N, p. 52.
[136] Alexander Daniel Beihammer, *Byzantium and the Emergence of Muslim-Turkish Anatolia, Ca. 1040-1130* (London: Routledge, 2017) p. 43.
[137] Rose Mary Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome: Trust in the Gods But Verify* (London: Routledge, 2005) p. 168.
[138] *GF*, 6N, p. 58.

reconnaissance was a function carried out by regular cavalry members in the army, and a knight could be expected to act in multiple roles from scout and special forces through to battle line infantry and cavalry.

Similarly, the word *cursores* has been translated to 'messengers', and certainly this usage is accurate for certain roles. The messengers who raced between Bohemond and Robert of Normandy's Norman column and Raymond of Toulouse's column at the battle of Dorylaeum clearly did so to convey the urgency required for reinforcement.[139] Yet *cursores* is a term also used to describe the scouts that moved ahead of the columns of pilgrims, as seen before the skirmish at Heraclea.[140] This ambiguous use of terms may be an example of what Robert the Monk meant when he defined the *Gesta Francorum* as unsophisticated.[141]

The nature of scouts varied remarkably according to their origins[142]. The chronicles suggest that they were horsemen, able to range ahead at speed, equipped with fast horses with relatively few weapons and lightweight armour. The following section discusses the role of leaders as scouts and shows that European scouts may well have been made up of any combatant who could ride a horse, including knights. The crusaders were augmented by Turcopoles who were lightly armed soldiers used both as mounted archers in a combat role and as reconnaissance scouts[143]. They were able to perform such duties thanks to their light, nimble horses and minimalist, but effective, equipment.

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[139] *GF*, 3N, p. 42.
[140] *GF*, 4N, p. 46
[141] *RM*, Sermo Apologeticus, p. 75.
[142] See A.R. Shulman, 'Egyptian representations of horsemen and riding in the New Kingdom', in *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, xvi (1957), pp. 84-93 and Philip H. Stevens, *Search Out the Land: A History of American Military Scouts* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969)
[143] M. Ehrlich, 'The Battle of Hattin' in JMMH **Vol.** V (2007), p. 20

The readiness of commanders to join a patrol with the objective of personally assessing the forward situation could lead to disaster. The sources support the notion that the desire of the commander to view the situation personally provided instances where military commanders on the First Crusade actively participated in reconnoitring the passage of the army. An effective demonstration of this is shown in the *Gesta Tancredi*.[144] Following Tancred's departure from the siege of Antioch to gather supplies and harass the outlying settlements still loyal to Antioch in the winter of 1097 to 1098, he patrolled in search of further gains:

> *'While he often acted in this manner, it happened once that he set out on patrol accompanied only by Achates. Three armed Turks were also on patrol having left the gate from Antioch. [Although being ignorant of each other] wants to be found, the three rushed upon them ignorant of whom they were attacking. Upon seeing this man charged, Tancred took up a spear and transfixed, as is normal, the leading man… His attack transformed the helmet into a turban, shielding to a cloak and a hauberk into a shirt. He struck would as if it were flacks, steel as if it were had, and the blade as if it were wool.'*[145]

Whilst this commentary, seemingly revealed by 'Achates' contrary to Tancred's humble wishes, is likely a rhetorical instance composed to extoll the 'hero's' character, the fact that Ralph of Caen utilises this device as a narrative template implies that the medieval knight was expected, or at least was capable, of performing the role of scout besides any regular tactical duties upon the battlefield as part of the European heavy cavalry. If this were not the case, the scenario would be

[144] For wider reading on the siege of Antioch see Bernard S Bachrach, 'The Siege of Antioch: A study in Military Demography' in *War in History* Vol. 6 (1999) pp. 127-146.
[145] *GT*, Chapter 52, p. 78.

unbelievable to his readership. Similar references appear in medieval romances and heroic tales. One of the earliest, *The Song of Roland*,[146] uses the device of the lone warrior facing a larger force.[147] A similar use of the "lone warrior" can be seen in the *Historia Roderici* in Chapter 5.[148] Here, the hero of the chronicle defeats fifteen antagonists in combat, one of whom he kills.

> '*When King Sancho besieged Zamora, it happened that Roderigo fought alone with fifteen enemy soldiers: seven of them were in mail; one of these he killed, two he wounded and unhorsed, and the remainder he put to flight by his spirited courage. Afterwards he fought with Jimeno Garcés, one of the more distinguished men of Pamplona, and defeated him. He fought with equal success against a certain Saracen at Medinaceli, whom he not only defeated but also killed.'*[149]

The perceived best leaders were those who were willing and competent at performing the duties that they expected to be undertaken by their men. This may have included the role of scout. Raymond of Aguilers' own inclusion of a patrol by Godfrey also gives the heroic image of the knight in combat. In this case Godfrey was returning to Antioch from the newly conquered Albara:

> '*Godfrey was on his way to Antioch with twelve knights, he encountered one hundred and fifty Turks, and, not the least hesitant,*

[146] For details on the origin date of the Chanson de Roland see: Gerard J. Brault, *Song of Roland: An Analytical Edition: Introduction and Commentary* (London: Pennsylvania State, 1978) pp. 3-6
[147] *Chanson de Roland*, Laisses 168-170, versus 2259-2296
[148] *HR*, Chapter 5, p. 101
[149] *HR*, Chapter 5, p. 101

*prepared his arms, exhorted his knights, and courageously charged the enemy.*'[150]

This narrative follows the same structure as that of Tancred, the lone knight, here perhaps reflecting the twelve apostles besides Jesus, as Raymond's ecclesiastical audience could recognise. The heroic narrative was budding in the early 12th century, at a similar time to the production of such chronicles. Secular stories such as *The Song of Roland,*[151] *The Song of William*[152] and *Gormond and Isembart*[153] were composed around the deeds not of gods, or of a race of people, but more reminiscent of such classical works as *The Aeneid*, focusing on the secular deeds of heroes.[154] In this context, it would be easy to assume that Ralph of Caen also assumed his "Tancred" would be viewed in similar heroic characteristics, much as Raymond of Aguilers considered the actions of Godfrey, who may have recently become King of Jerusalem as his chronicle was being composed. The lone, or outnumbered warrior, attacking and defeating an "evil" antagonist:[155] whilst this may be a concept of his composition, the context of the lone patrol also provides evidence of the manner in which reconnaissance was conducted as well as the risks it could encounter. This was not unique to the Crusader movement, with medieval scholars seeking to link themselves to ancient heroes as far away as Ireland.[156]

[150] *RA,* p. 74.
[151] Anon, *La Chanson de Roland* (London: Pennsylvania State University, 1984)
[152] Anon, *La Chanson de Guillaume*, ed. Elizabeth Stearns Tyler, (Oxford University Press, 1919)
[153] Anon, *Gormond et Isembart*, ed. Bruno Panvini (Milan: Pratiche, 1990)
[154] William Duffy, "Aias and the Gods" in *College Literature*, Vol. 35, No. 4, Homer: Analysis & Influence, pp. 75-96 (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008) p. 76
[155] See also the duel between Charlemagne and the Emir in *La Chanson de Roland* for similar examples in Anon, *La Chanson de Roland*, laisses, 258-262, verses 3562-3620 (London: Pennsylvania State University, 1984) pp. 217-221
[156] See for example Brent Miles. "Ekphrasis in Togail Troi", in *Heroic Saga and Classical Epic in Medieval Ireland* (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2011) pp. 104-121

Representations aside, although Godfrey of Bouillon's group detached from the main column was not a patrol of scouts in the same way as I have identified with Tancred, it does highlight the small numbers of men that patrols would require in order to be able to move swiftly and cautiously, perhaps also revealing alternate methodologies for intelligence gathering in the campaign. A small patrol would allow the crusaders to avoid conflict with potentially superior forces, but to be able to effectively counter another enemy reconnaissance unit, or other small armed band. In the case of Godfrey of Bouillon, Raymond was probably attempting to highlight the piety of the leader with the use of religious rhetoric. This may account for the fact that the knights are perceived as being heavily armed and armoured compared with the light cavalry equipment carried by Tancred. Scouting ahead of the main force was inevitably risky; Tancred's actions, though no doubt brave, incurred a level of risk that was probably believed to be unnecessary by the main body of military leadership. Thus it is possible to suggest that whilst Ralph of Caen believed that the perfect military leader should engage in reconnaissance patrols to perform in the role of the hero, the risks in reality outweighed the benefits. A reliable cavalryman would be equally able to relay the details of any given patrol to the commanders. However, Ralph and the *Anonymous* author both highlight that an important factor in the perception of military leadership was the willingness of commanders to place themselves ahead of the army in order to establish a plan of action, especially in the context of battle.

A further factor is the lack of accurate, non-ecclesiastical maps from the period of the Crusade. This suggests, as Sergio Boffa points out, that the scouts

provided a tacit form of military mapping for medieval armies.[157] As such, they could have proved extremely valuable to an enemy should they be captured, but equally they could easily mislead forces by accident or by design if they were being solely relied upon. Just as modern military officers are expected to have map reading and navigation expertise, the Crusader military leadership may have been required to do the same, or to construct a map from the verbal reports of their scouts in order to plan their strategy.

The growth of tournaments, and more specifically tournament fields, had provided an opportunity for these skills to be honed.[158]

Military leadership required the support of effective, reliable scouts for gathering intelligence in anticipation of the main force's arrival. Their abilities were critical to the success of the mission. The military leader's ability to survey large areas of terrain relied on the many scouts that formed a network of information gathering, collation and, to some degree, assessment for the following army. They were the vanguard, being the first to encounter new terrain and assess the threat or support potential of inhabitants, as well remaining alert to other military dangers. In one instance in February of 1098, Bohemond wanted to seek out the Turks in the areas around Antioch in order to commit to battle. Unaware of their positions or size, he sent out scouts to gather intelligence so that he could better prepare an attack:

> *'At daybreak, [Bohemond] ordered patrols to be quickly sent out to go and see how many cavalry squadrons the Turks had, where they were located, and indeed what they were up to'*[159]

[157] Sergio Boffa, *Warfare in Medieval Brabant 1356-1406* (Woodbridge, 2004) p. 161.
[158] David Crouch, *Tournament* (London: Continuum, 2005) pp. 49-55.
[159] *GF*, 6N, p. 58.

The *Gesta Francorum* contains similar statements, such as the following, that demonstrate the use of scouts, and how vital their role was as the campaign reached Antioch in October 1097:

> *'When we approached the bridge of iron, our forerunners, went ahead and is, as was the custom, found in front of them innumerable Turks gathered together and were rushing to support Antioch.'*[160]

The constant need for intelligence continued throughout the siege of Antioch, no less so than when Kerbogha began his march to relieve Antioch. News of the relief force reached the Crusade's leaders whilst they were still outside the city walls. Coinciding with the departure of Stephen of Blois and his 4,000 troops, it became increasingly crucial to have up to date intelligence.[161] Godfrey, Raymond of Toulouse and Bohemond orchestrated a number of scouting patrols based on 'rumours'.[162] Of note is how Albert of Aachen suggests that these were made up of competent and trusted soldiers rather than soldiers from a dedicated scouting corp. In his passage Albert writes:

> '…*the army captains were increasingly astonished by the rumour of the approaching gentiles, so they decided unanimously to select diligent men from the army and send them out through the mountains and inaccessible places from where they could quite safely keep watch and find out the truth of the matter.*'[163]

[160] *GF*, 5N, p. 51.
[161] For more on Stephen of Blois and his treatment by contemporary chroniclers see James A. Brundage, 'An Errant Crusader: Stephen of Blois', in *Traditio* 16 (Fordham University, 1960) pp. 380–95.
[162] *AA*, Book IV, Chapter 13, p. 142.
[163] *AA*, Book IV, Chapter 13, pp. 142-3.

Albert goes on to name the scouts, but also notes that they moved in a fanned direction away from Antioch to the north and east where they all saw elements of the Turk relief.[164] This, in turn, grants us the opportunity to study the strategy that the military leaders employed in patrol missions. They involved small numbers of knights travelling to 'concealed' areas where they could watch for the enemy.

According to the chroniclers, the scouting missions conducted by the Crusaders were overwhelmingly executed by knights. From Ralph of Caen's romantic image of Tancred patrolling alone to Albert of Aachen's more matter of fact strategy, it denotes that the 'fore runners' of the *Gesta Francorum* were knights of the army.

The armies of the Crusade were massive. Thomas Asbridge's estimation of a combined fighting and non-combatant force of 70,000 shows the huge numbers that would need to be guided, potentially hidden and generally supported with food and water. This number of people gathered into one place produced a variety of challenges that the Crusade command had to overcome. Not least amongst these were the challenges of finding a route both to avoid confrontation and ambush, while also being safe enough to move all these people at once. Raymond of Aguilers whilst writing the *Historia Francorum* illustrated the importance of scouting the Crusade's route towards the conclusion of the siege of Antioch in 1098:

> '*After reconnoitring and setting a time, some of our men circled around the city by crossing a rough mountain while others forded a river.*'[165]

[164] *AA*, Book IV, Chapter 13, p. 143.
[165] *RA,* p. 46.

This concurs with and explains earlier statements by the *Gesta Francorum* that specified that after the siege of Nicaea, the armies' routes from Nicaea were blocked and required sappers to create a new road:

> *'But the Duke saw that there existed no good road by which he might lead his men to the city of Nicaea, because the road that was there, and which had been used by earlier pilgrims, was not wide enough to allow so many men to pass through. And so he sent ahead three thousand men, with axes and swords, and told them to go and cut and widen the road for our pilgrims, all the way up the city of Nicaea. The road that they opened up lead through the passes of the huge mountain, and they left behind crosses made of iron and wood placed upon states that they might serve as markers for our pilgrims.'*[166]

Accepting the individual risk, deploying troops in forward reconnaissance roles, or as discussed, committing themselves or their general staff to the task provided leaders with the confidence to allow the progress of the pilgrims. As the routes were being reconnoitred and assessed as safe, placing iron crosses to guide the route may have allowed the scouts to act as main force guides, providing a distinct set of markers for the main body of the army to follow. Light cavalry could move forward without direct communications with the main force during critical manoeuvres.

Lack of direct communication is perhaps more observable by its absence than by direct evidence. It is likely that specific evidence in the form of communiques and its subsequent circulation would have been strictly controlled by commanders, since the existence, let alone the content, of such information might prejudice future

[166] *GF,* 2N, p. 36.

reconnaissance activity. To survive, any such communiques would have needed to be copied by scholars, which has not occurred, so removing evidence of their contents. At least in the cases transcribed by Raymond of Aguilers, where he recorded scouts having returned to report information during the lengthy siege at Antioch in 1098; he specifies a significant difference, saying that

> '*At this time arriving couriers often reported enemy reinforcements…*'[167].

Further evidence of visual observation and some degree of force analysis is depicted by Raymond of Aguilers, recording reports of troop movements within Jerusalem in early July 1099 to their commanders, so that

> *'Godfrey and the counts of Flanders and Normandy now noted the Saracen build up.'*[168]

In this particular case, the observations made by the scouts enabled the military leadership to relocate their forces, including siege equipment, surprising the Jerusalem defenders. The scouting force was capable of working in close company with the main body with a brief to act as both guides and maintain a watch over the pilgrims and their armies.

Bohemond, whilst besieging Amalfi prior to joining the Pilgrimage, deployed force reconnaissance scouts in order to protect himself from a surprise attack from a siege breaking force by gaining knowledge of the order of march he was able to assess whether the group were aggressive, or likely to be peacefully foraging. This

[167] *RA,* p. 46.
[168] *RA,* Chapter. XIV, p. 124.

would in turn have determined their readiness to engage his own force, or to repel his attack should he wish to do so.

> *'On hearing the news [Bohemond] sent to inquire which princes were in charge of such a large army, what arms it carried, the order of march and whether it intended to plunder or buy supplies. His scouts told him about the princes…'*[169]

So too it appears that pickets were set out to identify threats to the Crusade's forces, preventing the Turks from launching an ambush. Early in the campaign, Alexius effectively arrested each of the military leaders, bringing them with escorts directly to him at Constantinople. Godfrey was one of the first to be escorted to the Emperor. Baldwin of Bouillon, Godfrey's brother, utilised his scouts to outwit a Byzantine ambush and defeat it.

> *'However, Baldwin found out about this wicked stratagem. He hid and thwarted their ambush, attacking them with considerable courage and a sharp assault…'* [170]

This particular use of passive military intelligence to understand the intention of the enemy and counter attack from a hidden or camouflaged position was instrumental in preserving the capability of his own force and imperative to further successes. The battle of Dorylaeum was initiated by an ambush of the Norman advance. It is certain after that almost disastrous encounter, and learning from the mistakes leading up to the massacre at Civetot, the Crusader military leadership became more aware of the potential threats and capability of the opposing Turks and Arabs. An ambush can only be effective while it remains undetected. The military commander has

[169] *RM*, Book II, Chapter III, p. 91.
[170] *RM*, Book II, Chapter IX, p. 94.

committed the ambushing force to an assault in a particular position and deployed his assets to prosecute the action. If the attacking force is detected by scouts, would-be victims must assess the relative force strengths and potential terrain advantages that might allow them to encircle the would-be ambushing force, or attack from a stronger position. Once prepared for the fight, the original target has the option of engaging the enemy in a head on charge, using heavier firepower or manoeuvrability, as shown at the siege of Nicaea in 1097. Here Raymond of Toulouse was able to use intelligence to confront a Turkish relief force with his and the Bishop of Puy's forces:

> *'Our men, one step ahead of them, thwarted this strategy under God's inspiration…as soon as they saw the Turks, [they] rode…towards them…'*[171]

This sudden, sharp assault may have failed had the scouts been in their heavier armour, particularly if they were pursuing the lighter native horsemen and mounted archers, suggesting that the scouts were lightly armed and armoured in order to use their 'great horses' to chase down the ambushers. Having frustrated the initial ambush, the Christian scouts were capable of tracking the enemy deeper into their own territory. Committing a lightly armed unit in such a way was not without the risk of a counter offensive. Its value was the opportunity to further locate threats. It also provided the option of surveying terrain further from the main body of the army to find alternate routes by which they and potentially the Crusade could move forward more easily, with better cover from attack, or where food and water might be found. In addition to their tactical roles in assessing opposing force capabilities, morale and

[171] *RM*, Book III, Chapter III, p. 105.

the surrounding geography, the scouts could be used in larger forces more directly to trigger ambushes. At Artah in 1097, Tancred used Turcopoles in order to do this.

> *'(following attacks by five Turkish cavalrymen) In order to obtain evidence for this view (that the Turks were part of a larger force), he sent out three Turcopoles. If the enemy retreated, they were afraid and alone. If they fought, they had hope of reinforcements.'*[172]

Light cavalry scouts allowed military commanders to dictate the flow of battle, stealing the impetus and forcing the violence of action against their would-be ambushers. Robert the Monk's suggestion here of 'skilful' tracking may refer to the ground conditions, such as rocky outcrops, where the marks of horses and men would be less distinct. If this were the case their capabilities were above the norm, and they may have been specialists. More generally, it perhaps doesn't immediately take into account the role of tracking in hunting, a pastime that many of the military leaders and their retinues would have taken part in.[173] Following the battle of Dorylaeum, pilgrim knights were able to hunt down the Turks that had ambushed them, so that

> '*The Christians tracked them skilfully…*'[174]

The level of expertise and the wide-ranging remit of the light cavalry suggests that military scouts from this period were from a background of sufficient status to own their own horse, or to have continuous use of a mount, and that they had a range of skills and competencies that included far more than combat. It suggests that significant numbers of the Christian as well as the Byzantine force were composed of

[172] *GT*, Chapter 45, p. 71.
[173] Maurice Keen, *Nobles, Knights, Men-at-arms in the Middle Ages* (London: Hambledon, 1996) p. 22.
[174] *RM*, Book III, Chapter XVIII, p. 114.

cavalry, who had a tactical advantage in most aspects of a battle other than a close quarters fight. Yuval Harari suggests that the use by Raymond of Aguilers,[175] and Albert of Aachen,[176] of the term Turcopoles may have referred to a generic military group, rather than an ethnic group who were the offspring of Greek and Turkish parents.[177] In his assessment, Harari notes that by 1115 a Turcopole force was included in the right flank of the Frankish force at Sarmin.[178] Harari's assessments, based on several sources, suggest that Turcopoles may have dominated mounted contingents.[179] This later influence may have come from the distinct role play by the light cavalrymen during the First Crusade, especially as the chroniclers note the severe loss of European horses throughout the campaign.

Further to the need for field reconnaissance, the *Gesta Francorum* confirms the siege and civil engineering aspects of reconnaissance missions, noting that military leaders used scouts to observe fortifications in order to seek out areas that could be exploited by their forces, so :

*'That our chief Lords saw which part of the city was the weakest*…'[180]

While some understanding of fortifications might be gained from experience alone, such deployments support the notion that the European scouts may have had their roots in the noble classes, who would have been expected to have had some knowledge of the principles of fortification and in turn where its weaknesses might be exploited. These skills would not be ordinarily recognised within the Turcopole

[175] *RA*, Book IV, Chapter, p. 37.
[176] *AA*, Book 1, Chapter 22, p. 34n.
[177] Yuval Harari, 'The military role of the Frankish Turcopoles: A reassessment', in *Mediterranean Historical Review* (2008) p. 75.
[178] Ibid., p. 17.
[179] Ibid. *passim*
[180] *GF*, 10N, p. 102.

description, presenting a complex image of the organisation and origins of the military leaders' scouts.

The chronicles also mention the exploitation of local human intelligence in the form of local scouts for the pilgrimage, both to locate targets for their approach to Jerusalem and to navigate geographical boundaries that might otherwise block their march. This would have first required an assessment of the reliability of the individual, both in terms of loyalty and knowledge. In two separate events, the *Gesta Francorum* notes how the post Antioch Crusaders relied on native support for success. The march south to Jerusalem was fraught with issues. Several smaller sieges were enacted, with some being costly yet successful whilst others were abandoned. Careful selection of targets after the heavy losses experienced at Antioch, not least as Bohemond remained there, became essential. This was seen in the march from Antioch along the Levantine coast. In one instance the military leadership used local scouts to navigate a route across a river:

> *'When the day broke, he sent two Turks, that is messengers, to go with them and show them the ford of the river and then to guide them to where they could have some good plunder.'*[181]

In an earlier instance on the same journey, native scouts provided the Crusaders with intelligence concerning not only local fortifications but which of them would be worth attacking to secure supplies.[182, 183] In this role they further allowed the military leadership to process viable information to lower risks and thus the cost to the Crusade's success:

[181] *GF*, 10N, p 97
[182] For examples of medieval supply depots see Dianne L. Smith, 'Muscovite Logistics 1462-1598' in *The Slavonic and East European Review,* Vol. 71, No.1 (Jan, 1993) pp. 35-65.
[183] See Also Thomas F. Glick, *From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle* (Manchester: MUP, 1995) p. 23.

*'When they had all stayed there for eight days, messengers came to them, saying, "There is a Saracen Castle very close to others, which is filled with all kinds of provisions."'*[184]

The reconnaissance information gained by these scouts and their local agents would require effective validation through repeated missions and possibly collation with other sources if time allowed. The trusted information was invaluable to the supporting the military leader's decision process, and might lead directly to the success or failure of the mission. Incorrect or insufficient intelligence could prove perilous, as seen at the battle of the Vardar River in the Balkans during the autumn of 1096:

'*…it seemed to the Greeks the Latins were ignorant of their hiding places… The Greeks therefore came out of their hiding places and shot a terrible flight of arrows.'*[185]

The chronicles mention a number of Turcopole and Turkish scouts that joined the Crusade as guides. R.C. Smail, writing in *Crusading Warfare: 1097-1197,* informed us that the Turcopoles were recruited from the native populations in a variety of roles.[186] In the First Crusade the majority of Turcopoles are described as being mounted as light cavalry, ideal for the role of scouting, introducing native scouts to a significant role in the Europeans' campaign.

Deployment of the Turcopoles enabled the heavier Norman shock cavalry to use them as a screen behind which to approach enemy formations.[187] This capability gave a level of flexibility of tactics to the military leadership that had been devalued

[184] *GF*, 10N, p. 90.
[185] *GT*, Chapter 4, p. 25.
[186] Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, pp. 111-2.
[187] *GT,* Chapter 34, p. 58.

in the European style of warfare. Depictions of unarmoured horsemen, fighting alongside Norman knights in the Bayeux tapestry show them fighting in similarly mixed formation.[188] This flexibility shows how the military leadership was able to adapt to new circumstances and helps provides a possible explanation of a major factor in the Frankish armies' success. Its continued portrayal in the chronicles is revealing in that the reporters clearly felt both the light cavalry's capability and its tactical deployment to be an important part of successful military leadership, which led to the continued Frankish presence in the region.

Unsurprisingly, references to scouting made by the chronicles exclude the routine and uneventful scouting expeditions that failed to return with credible or useful intelligence, only the incidents that came about from failure.[189] The chroniclers were not interested in recording the daily journal of unproductive scouting patrols that were taking place during the long march to Jerusalem, so the time and effort invested, the risks and undoubted near misses inflicted by the terrain, disease, climate and population in scouting activity is not fully appreciated. Though romanticised by the *Gesta Tancredi* to explore Tancred's martial prowess,[190] scouting appears not to have been an endeavour worthy of the chroniclers' detailed attention, yet they formed an invaluable signal corps. There is a lack of evidence concerning how the enemy forces scouted the field, possibly suggesting some degree of covert counter intelligence activity that military leaders did not wish to share. Alternatively, due to the nature of the authors, it may simply be that the style of the enemy scouts was not of interest to them. A small example may be the use of

[188] Wolfgang Grape, *The Bayeux Tapestry: Monument to a Norman Triumph* (Munich, 1994) p. 111.
[189] *RM*, Book I, Chapter VII, p. 85.
[190] *GT*, Chapter 52, pp. 78-9.

light cavalry at Tarsus to scout Ursinius' distraction raid during the capture of Adana.[191]

This instance not only gives us a witness to the participation of leaders in reconnaissance roles but also shows how mounted scouts would likely have been equipped. The use of the lance allowed lesser armoured forces to engage with heavily armoured opponents, similar to the later use of lancers in the modern era. In the Napoleonic period one such unit of light cavalry was still referred to as 'The Company of Guides'.[192] The Turcopoles, however, were also referred to as having been armed with bows.[193]

Using native scouts had a broader political goal too. Scouts were the epitome of trust between two polities and as such we may view a degree of trust between the Crusaders and the indigenous kingdoms and cities of the Levant. General C. G. Gordon 'of Khartoum', noted as late as the 19th century that

> '*Native Allies above all things, at whatever the cost. It is the country of the irregular, not of the regular.*'[194]

This belief concerning Sudan would have resonated with those military commanders seeking to remain in the Holy Land after the pilgrimage had been completed. Bohemond, Tancred, Baldwin and Godfrey all gained territory directly. These crusader commanders at least may well have been aware of the high numbers of local inhabitants that they would be tasked to not just rule but engage with diplomatically. Indigenous scouts provided opportunities for intelligence

[191] *GT*, Chapter 40, p. 64.
[192] Edward Ryan, *Napoleon's Shield and Guardian* (London: Greenhill, 2003) p. 52.
[193] Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p. 112.
[194] C. G. Gordon, *The Journal of Major General C. G. Gordon, C.B., at Khartoum,* ed. A. Egmont Hake (London, 1885) p. 89.

gathering for the Crusading armies and to provide an insight to ideology and societal mores that could allow the military leader to move closer to the potential strategy of an opponent and his supporters. This represented an opportunity to exploit tribal and territorial jealousies, thus 'beating him at his own game'. Returning scouts could relay their experiences to their own peoples and start to introduce and even gain some tolerance among the Middle-Eastern states for those about to become their diplomatic neighbours.

Unsurprisingly, intelligence gathering is not in the general descriptions of operations by the chroniclers of the First Crusade. Scouting as an activity was carried out by a group generally referred to by the use of the word 'runners'[195] in the *Gesta Francorum* or 'messengers' as they appear in the *Gesta Tancredi*.[196] This perhaps refers to a secondary role for the scouts as part of the communications network between the various military commanders, but it is also a reasonable assumption of a lightly armed horseman, who appears with information for commanders. Whether the source of the information is the messenger's own observation, that of another messenger, or information from a leader in another location would not have been disseminated to those not required to know the business of the messenger. The assumption or generic description of individuals who were likely to be mounted on swift horses, wearing little or no armour that would weigh them down and lightly armed is understandable. Their equipment was fitted to increase their travel speed and mobility should they need to negotiate more treacherous terrain than soldiers whose primary role was direct combat wearing heavy protective defensive armour. Evidence of the use of signalling is provided in

[195] *GF*, 4N, p. 46.
[196] *GT*, Chapter 13, p. 35.

the case of the fall of Jerusalem, a lookout was able to signal to the conference of military leaders using his shield:

> *'…a knight, whose name is unknown to me, signalled with his shield*
>
> *from the Mount of Olives to the Count and others to move forward.'*[197]

Whether a scout, or as retold a knight, made the signal, this use of his shield is an intriguing idea. A heavy kite shield would have been difficult to view from a significant distance, especially one as described by Raymond. It may instead be that the horseman in question used a reflection from the sun and had been given a specific code to transmit. The Romans are thought to have had a complex system of relay signal towers capable of sending messages across their frontier by the use of flags and torches.[198] The prevalence of *De Re Militari* amongst the growing number of classical works known to medieval scholars would have allowed access to this knowledge. How widespread the use of these texts was amongst military leaders is still debated though and the lack of detail from Raymond of Aguilers is troublesome, preventing proper comparison to those methods employed by the Romans.

The chronicles provide evidence of opportunities to deploy sentries in watches, keeping rotas to maintain surveillance over long periods, and to have scouts immediately available. The Crusaders had messengers '*cursores'* and scouts readily available within the command structure. When the Turks ambushed the Norman column at Dorylaeum; Bohemond appears to have been able to command a messenger in his command team readily:

> *'Bohemond, thinking quickly, immediately sent a swift soldier:*
>
> *Who was tasked with riding swiftly and summoning our men*

[197] *RA* Chapter XIV, p. 127.
[198] R.J. Forbes, *Studies in Ancient Technology* (Leiden: Brill, 1966) pp. 171-180.

*To hurry to the battle which was imminent.'*[199]

It may also have been that these messengers relate closely to the light cavalry 'messengers' depicted on the Bayeux Tapestry,[200] and also to the youths of the siege of Lisbon in 1147 who were deployed in non-combat military functions,[201] allowing members of their Crusade with the ability to ride, but who had yet to complete sufficient military training to undertake the fighting role of men at arms or knights to carry out crucial support duties. Robert the Monk also notes in his chronicle that the Turcopoles too could be utilised to send messages. This was experienced at the Siege of Nicaea in the summer of 1097, where 'Through the Turcopoles they sent a message to the Emperor…'[202]

Robert was possibly trying to explain the specific means by which the Emperor received knowledge of the surrender of Nicaea, adding a practical note to the *Gesta Francorum'*s simple note of a 'legation' being sent to the Imperial forces to negotiate the surrender.[203] Nevertheless, the use of the Turcopoles as messengers was clearly a viable option that his audience felt was believable for him to have declared it at all.

Scouts provided an invaluable role by gathering intelligence. This open military reconnaissance allowed the military commander access far ahead of their own position, so that they could plan their campaign with greater confidence. The use of scouts allowed for greater freedom of movement and security. The issues of foreign armies and cities however presented a new set of challenges to be

[199] *RM*, Book III, Chapter VIII, p. 108.
[200] Grape, *The Bayeux Tapestry*, p. 111.
[201] *DEL,* p. 161.
[202] *RM*, Book III, Chapter V, p. 106.
[203] *GF,* 2N, p. 39.

overcome. In these cases scouts became a limited resource. Though able to gather intelligence such as numbers, composition and location, military leaders required something more detailed in order to calculate an enemy's exploitable weaknesses. In this case, the chronicles make it evident that the Crusade's commanders employed espionage.

## Spies and espionage

The truth of the past is that the events recorded therein and the elements driving the study of history are inevitably an amalgam of the perspective, biases and limitations of the observers of the time. The lens of the modern historian and their agenda influences the portrayal and emphasis given to the historical description. One of the first factors a historian learns is that there is no truth, but there are many perspectives of events. It is within this construct that spies and intelligence officers join in battle without necessarily directly confronting each other, relying on others to deliver the physical damage to the enemy, using the weaknesses and opportunities their professionalism and capability has revealed to force commanders by processing gathered information referred to as intelligence.[204]

While prostitution is well-known to be the oldest profession,[205] it is dwarfed in magnitude and scope by the second oldest: espionage. The development of scouting and message-carrying into the collection, collation and interpretation of intelligence material provides force commanders and political leaders with additional resources. On the one hand, spies and espionage have entered a romanticised state in the

[204] Ernest Volkman, *The History of Espionage* (London: Carlton, 2007) p. 7.
[205] Ronald B. Flowers, *The Prostitution of Women and Girls* (London: Mc Farland, 1998) p. 5

public consciousness, especially with such stories as those of the very real Eddie Chapman as *Agent Zigzag* and Dušan 'Duško' Popov, upon whom his handler Ian Fleming may have based James Bond. This public and academic interest has, however, neglected the role and impact of other forms of intelligence gathering.

Interviewing or interrogating non-pilgrims in the Crusade and military scouting, as well as responses to enemy scouts can be explored in the chronicles that depict the Crusades. There is no general lack of study of the history of espionage and intelligence gathering, though it is not in the same volume of research that has been committed to other aspects of military history, As Rose Mary Sheldon notes:

> *'Spies or Clandestine agents are mentioned even less frequently than scouts, but we must consider the possibility that this was because the clandestine nature of their work resulted in the absence of documented evidence.'*[206]

This lack of documentary evidence mirrors a similar lack of material evidence generally restricting historical research into the subject. Sheldon's work covers a period of Roman History from Rise of the Roman Empire to its height and the loss of Varus' Legions in the Teutoberg Forest. The study of espionage has been aimed at either the ancient world or modern eras. Terry Crowdy's *The Enemy Within: A history of spies, spy masters and espionage* details the use of intelligence agents in Rome, Ancient Egypt and the near east.[207] His work contains parallels to that of Jock Haswell in *Spies and Spymasters: A concise history of intelligence,* which tells the narrative of the use of secret agents in the ancient world through to the Post-Roman

[206] Rose Mary Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome: Trust in the Gods But Verify* (London: Routledge, 2004) p. 20.
[207] Terry Crowdy, *The Enemy Within: A history of spies, spy masters and espionage* (Oxford: Osprey, 2006)

European era and the use of such agents by the Carolingians.[208] This was explored by Desree Scholten in *Trust in an Untrustworthy Time* which attempts to track the history of espionage. The common strand running through the works is their omission of the medieval period from the decline of the Frankish empire to the Renaissance, charting the rise of such figures as Francis Cecil under Elizabeth I in the 16th century. Terry Crowdy's work, perhaps acutely, highlights this with the choice of chapter titles: Chapter 1 *In Ancient Times*, Chapter 2 *Through Dark Ages* and Chapter 3 *Spy Britannia,* emphasising a lack of research in the medieval period. Christopher T. Allmand has, however, produced significant studies into the roles of spies in the Hundred Years War, *Spies in the Fourteenth Century,* which coupled with *Espions au Moyen Age* details the extensive use of intelligence gatherers by both sides during the lengthy conflict. As with all espionage, detailed evidence has rarely survived from the medieval period, but in the Mediterranean a number of incidents allowed Robin Vose to pursue two identifiable agents working on behalf of King Louis the Saint prior to his ill-fated Crusade to Tunis.[209] Even this occurs in a broader context of the history of Dominicans in the kingdom of Aragon, particularly under the rule of James I during the 13th Century.[210] Susan B. Edgington's 2014 article 'Espionage and military intelligence during the First Crusade 1095-1099'[211] made headway into the subject, noting that little work had been written on the subject of espionage in the crusade.[212] Nevertheless, Edgington's article focused heavily on the 'secondary' evidence produced by Albert of Aachen whose work she

[208] Jock Haswell, *Spies and Spymasters: A concise history of intelligence* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1977)
[209] Robin Vose, *Dominicans, Muslims and Jews* (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) p. 231.
[210] Ibid. *passim*
[211] Susan B. Edgington, 'Espionage and military intelligence during the First Crusade, 1095-1099', in *Crusading and Warfare in the Middle Ages: Realities and Representations. Essays in Honour of John France* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014) pp. 75-85.
[212] Ibid p. 75.

translated. Albert of Aachen, presented a heavily xenophobic and biased opinion of the events of the Crusade, often clashing with events presented by earlier and contemporary chroniclers, though this has also been seen as a more levelled approach.[213] As such, much of his work on the subject may be viewed as apocryphal and intended to highlight his distrust of the Turks and Greeks rather than as an accurate representation of events that took place in 1095-1099.

A general confusion of terms, discussed later, further leads to complication when considering the activities associated with espionage. The accounts of a complex system of intelligence gathering are characterised by a lack of detail, as would be expected, even as to the roles that spies may have had away from their espionage duties. A lack of credible evidence helps to explain the dearth of work on medieval spies, and yet there is evidence provided by the sources of the First Crusade to support analysis of their deployment, their origins and perhaps even their motivations.

The campaign to take the Holy Land began, according to Albert of Aachen, with plots and espionage from the start. Even before the Latins had reached Constantinople, Bohemond, who had a long-standing rivalry with the Byzantine Emperor Alexius, sent out a number of diplomatic messages to his Northern allies. Albert of Aachen suggests that as Duke Godfrey approached the borders of the Byzantine emperor, Bohemond cautioned them not to trust Alexius but rather to winter on the border and advance on Constantinople with him in March.[214] The purpose of this legation was intercepted by Alexius who immediately countered with his own. What is of interest is the chronicles' use of 'When he learned'. In many

[213] *AA*, introduction, S. Edgington, pp. 6-9.
[214] *AA*, Book 2, Chapter 14, p. 53.

cases this matter of fact use of hindsight is used as a vehicle to explain the next part of the narrative. However, in this instance, it is as likely that members of Alexius' diplomatic team were accompanying Godfrey and his forces, and though not military in their use, nevertheless gathered intelligence for Alexius not just on the needs of the crusaders but also on how they interacted with each other.

A full reference to espionage during the First Crusade is made during the siege of Antioch, presented mostly by the *Gesta Francorum* and its successors. Espionage and spy craft were covert extensions of the military intelligence gathering process. Whilst the majority of work such as topographical surveys could be undertaken by military scouts, specialist skills and activities were required to garner detailed information on specific targets. All spies require the opportunity to identify, or create an exploitable weakness in their target, which may be human or inanimate. For the citizens of Antioch, the battles at Dorylaeum and the siege at Nicaea demonstrated their vulnerability to the efficiency of the European fighting machine. Creation of an environment in which the morale and emotions of the general population were vulnerable to psychological attack provided an opportunity to shift the balance of power in the conflict. The Normans, of course, had been in determined conflict with the Islamic world long before the First Crusade. The Normans of Sicily conquered a large proportion of the island thirty years before the pilgrimage was conceived. Curiously, *Anonymous* does not specify any particular spies Bohemond set forward into the city, but the actions of Bohemond in the war councils, securing the city, and the surety he held in Firuz as a double agent/saboteur, provide evidence that Bohemond was, or was at least being

portrayed to be, emulating the biblical Joshua in his siege of the city of Jericho.[215] During the Siege of Jericho the Israelite general sent two spies into the city in order to gather intelligence. The pair used the brothel owned by Rahab as a safe house and base of operations when Canaanite forces began looking for them. Rahab was rewarded with a promise of safety once the city fell to the Israelites. It has been suggested that Firuz may have been Armenian and therefore more sympathetic to a Christian cause and ruler than his then current Muslim employers.[216] He may have felt that the personal risk to him and his family's safety was too great to ignore should the Crusaders succeed, as depicted by Ralph of Caen in response to having a portion of his grain seized to feed the Emir:

> *'Please my children can no longer be called my beloved guaranties for the future, they are now my dire wounds. Your hunger consumes mine, your heart penetrates mine, I cannot feel my hunger. What good does it do me to feed with delicate foods those whom bread fit only for slaves is denied?'*[217]

Firuz is recognisable against Sun Tzu's description of an 'inside agent' as part of his 'divine skein', inside agents being enemy officials or citizens who are convinced to turn against their home nations.[218] The motivations for someone to turn against his own people can be traced to greed for some physical reward, or otherwise unattainable recognition. A second group spy for fear of being deprived of something material, such as ransom of a hostage, or the worth of an intangible asset –

[215] Joshua 6:1-27.
[216] *GT*, Chapter 63, p. 88.
[217] *GT*, Chapter 62, p. 87.
[218] Sun Tzu: *The Art of War,* p. 145.

blackmail.[219] In each case there will be a thread of evidence that can lead counter intelligence directly to the spy. The ideological spy who outwardly appears to have nothing to lose or gain by his actions is a more formidable target to identify.

Whether the image of Firuz fits Tu Mu's perceptions of what constitutes Firuz' motivations to betray his countrymen as those of an aggrieved malcontent, or whether he is a more noble man afraid for his family, the outcome is the same:

> *'Among the official class/caste of the enemy, are those that have deprived of office, demoted due to punishment. Sycophants covetous of wealth. Those that remain too long in a lowly office and are overlooked thus feel unappreciated. And those that take the time to use chaos to further their own scope of their abilities. There are those that are two faced, changeable and deceitful, and who always remain sat on the fence. As far as all such are concerned you can secretly inquire after their welfare, reward them liberally with gold and silk, and so tie them to you (Bribery). Then you may rely on them to seek out the real facts of the situation in their country (state) and to ascertain its plans directed against you (further bribery or black mail). They can as well create cleavages between the sovereign and his ministers so that these are not in harmonious accord.*'[220]

Hamza Ibn Asad Ibn Al Qalānisī, author of the only known contemporary Arab chronicle concerning the First Crusade, informed his readership that during the siege by the Crusaders between October 1097 and its conclusion in the summer of 1098:

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[219] For the extensive use of hostages in the Medieval Period see A.J. Kosto, *Hostages in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: OUP, 2012) and 'Hostages during the First Century of the Crusades' in *Medieval Encounters*, Vol. 9 (1) (2003) pp. 3-31

[220] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, p. 145.

> '*…certain men of Antioch amongst the armourers in the train of the Amir Yāghī Siyān had entered into a conspiracy against Antioch and had come to an agreement with the Franks to deliver the city up to them, because of some ill-usage and confiscations which they had formerly suffered at his hands.*'[221]

Whilst this agrees with Ralph of Caen's assessment for Firuz's motivations to betray the city, curiously it also suggests that he was not acting alone but was part of a larger number of men. This cabal of Antiocenes may well explain how Firuz was able to influence three towers of the city rather than just one that he may have been commander of. Furthermore, though the Damascus chronicle has used the word 'armourer'. This translation however produces a question as to why an armourer, in this case a 'fabricator of chain mail' was placed in command of a fortification. It may be that as a member of the Emir's retinue, he was trusted to manage a position of great importance irrespective of his expertise. I doubt this however and believe that the term has been mistranslated. The term used in the Damascus chronicle is *'zarrādīn'*[222], a term that does indeed refer to a mail fabricator; however, the term is also used as 'a strangler' and as such may have been a way for Al-Qalānisī to utilise a pun to describe Firuz and any co-conspirators as both members of the retinue and traitors to the city.

Firuz was a demoralised conspirator, a turncoat who felt that he could no longer rely on the promised Islamic coalition reinforcements from Damascus, Aleppo and beyond. He was motivated by an overwhelming sense of self preservation, a stimulus maintained by many of the unsure Armenian and Syrian citizens of Antioch.

[221] Ibn Al Qalānisī, *The Damascus Chronicle,* ed. H.A.R. Gibb, (London: Luzac, 2002) p. 44
[222] Ibid.

Certainly Firuz was in a position of power. Either as part of a conspiracy or as an individual, he was in control of at least one tower on the walls. He may well have been able to use his influence to convince two adjoining towers to defect with him, which when placed with his position as warden of his tower does indeed suggest a high position in the city's hierarchy.

How contact was made with Bohemond is uncertain as the sources do not comment upon it. Being that the crusaders were on a pilgrimage, we might assume that the leadership knew of the biblical references to espionage. In the first instance two 'angels' were sent to Sodom to gather intelligence for God so that he could judge its worth. In a second instance two spies were sent by Joshua into the heavily fortified city of Jericho in order to locate a weakness. In both cases, the foreign agents sought safe houses with those that may be compliant to their cause. In a later historical case concerning Friars Francis Cendra and Martini, the monks were utilised by Louis the Saint to gain intelligence on the city of Tunis and possibly to clandestinely pass diplomatic papers to its ruler. In this case the friars were more easily accommodated, staying in the *Fondaco*; the Christian mercenary barracks.[223] As Bohemond did not move his forces during the siege, we can assume that he sent agents into the area around the tower that he was facing. In view of the biblical and historical record, it is likely that he sent two agents into Antioch.

The progress of the Crusade had already taken the armies through Armenian and Syrian territory. Al-Qalānisī suggests that Antioch had already begun to expel its Armenian population in case their loyalty was being tested. The Crusader chronicles contradict this, or at least suggest that the expulsion was not complete. If Antiocene

[223] For further reading on the exploits of Mendicant monks as spies, see Vose, *Dominicans, Muslims and Jews*, pp. 222-249.

Armenians were amongst the Crusader force, this could have provided Bohemond with a useful resource of those with knowledge of the city. Even if such figures were not amongst refugees, there were many instances recorded by the *Gesta Francorum* that suggest the Armenians within the city were being actively involved in intelligence gathering for the Turks.[224] In that same vein it may be that dissatisfied Armenians from the city took the opportunity to defect and in doing so provided valuable intelligence and services to Bohemond and his peers.

The siege undoubtedly severely diminished food and supplies within the city, demonstrated further by the continued hardships of the Crusaders once they themselves were under siege from Kerbogha. These circumstances may well have pushed Firuz towards ending the siege in hope of relief as well as undoubtedly some form of improvement. There was also a factor of fear. The Crusaders had been completely successful to that point with their strategy and military campaign. How Firuz contacted Bohemond with his offer of betrayal is only accounted for in one source chronicling the period from the climax of the siege in the spring or early summer of 1098:

> *'So when the sentries were asleep, he looked down from the wall joined to his tower and let down a rope on which he and two of his children descended.'*[225]

Firuz voluntarily leaving family hostages to show good faith to Bohemond was a fundamental act of faith, but quite essential to the spy to seal the bargain. How else might a man who had already betrayed his own people be trusted? Richard I, whilst treating with Saladin's brother Al-Adin, also came into direct contact with the latter's

[224] *GF,* 5N, p. 52 and 6N, p. 55.
[225] *GT*, c. 63, p. 88.

son, whom he knighted in 1192.[226] The use of children not only as conditional hostages but as diplomatic tools was not uncommon in the 12th century in Western Europe either.[227] King Stephen of England, for example, had William Marshall as a hostage to ensure his father's loyalty.[228] The presence of children was not unknown and it may have been a stipulation made by Bohemond in order to secure Firuz's cooperation. Unless Firuz had exceptional faith in Bohemond, it is likely that there had been earlier dialogue to agree terms and while this may have been the first direct contact between the Sicilian and the Armenian asset, there must have been an initial contact channel elsewhere.

So the question remains as to who could have made this first contact. Later examples of the use of espionage by King Louis the Saint,[229] and the importance of the bible in daily life of Europeans at large provide a potential clue that Bohemond may have sent two agents, most likely bilingual monks with knowledge of the local languages, to investigate and isolate a weakness for him to exploit his peers, as well as the enemy. The means to employ such tactics was readily available to Bohemond or one of his Sicilian counterparts: Sicily had been slowly conquered by the Normans between the 1060s and 1080s when Bohemond had expanded his interests in Greece and the Byzantine Empire. Sicily and Malta's Muslim communities had allowed many occupying Normans to learn Arabic, or to employ Italians who had done so as interpreters. Even during the earliest days of the Norman Conquest of Sicily the Normans employed Peter the Deacon of Monte Cassino to act as an

[226] Richard of Holy Trinity, *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, ed. Helen Nicolson, (Publications Medieval Latin Series, Ontario, 2001) Chapter XII, p. 211.
[227] Kosto, *Hostages in the Middle Ages*, p. 138.
[228] David Crouch, *William Marshal: War and Chivalry 1147-1219* (Harlow: Pearson, 1990) pp. 20-21.
[229] Vose, *Dominicans, Muslims and Jews*, p. 224.

emissary and undoubtedly as an intelligence asset.[230] This unique aspect would have granted Bohemond an Arabic speaker in his retinue before he made his way to Holy Lands. It is likely that it also provided some insight to likely targets and how they might be exploited, although such clandestine detail is missing.

Bohemond's unique asset in Arnulf Malacorona gave him the advantage over not just his adversaries but his fellow military leaders. Utilising Malacorona's clerical connections and the Armenians, the spy master may have sent in two spies to the area around the tower to search out for a pliable pawn. This, however, only goes so far as to explain the part played by Bohemond in securing a turncoat. Subtle enquiries once inside the city would have been required to ascertain who was both in the vicinity of Bohemond's forces and able to be turned. As is often the case, this investigation was not noted down, and so we can only make assumptions as to its method. What is clear is that the negotiations took a certain amount of time which resulted in Firuz possibly lowering his own children to act as insurance for his compliance. These negotiations were not one way, as stated above a relief force had already set out to destroy the Crusader force, so there had to be rewards for Firuz to take such risks. The clandestine nature of these negotiations can be seen in the lack of history written about the subject, though Albert of Aachen did note a perceived conversation between Bohemond and the senior commanders on the eve of the assault on Antioch in 1098.

[230] Gordon S. Brown, *The Norman Conquest of Southern Italy and Sicily* (London: McFarland, 2003) p. 109.

> '*I have agreed to give him a great and infinite sum of money, and I have bound myself by a solemn oath to raise him up and enrich him among my people no less than Tancred, the son of my sister.*'[231]

In the few chronicles that consider the episode, most refer to Firuz as a citizen; his name only being recorded in the *Gesta Francorum* and subsequent *Gesta Tancredi*.

As to the conclusion of the business, we know that Firuz and Bohemond were present at the final assault. The elder general first sent a special force of capable Norman knights up a ladder or rope ladder provided. This small force identified Firuz, and then must have secretly signalled back to Bohemond that the plan had succeeded its first part. Of importance was Firuz' perceived response at the sight of so few knights taking part in the night assault on 3rd June 1098, '*Micros Francos echome.*'[232] This response suggests that perhaps the author was part of the securing force, something that would explain the keen detail that he used to describe the act. It also reveals something about Firuz. Whether apocryphal or not, Albert of Aachen describes the fate of two Turkish spies caught at the siege of Nicaea. Whilst the passage is used more as a way to denounce the 'untrustworthy Turk' it nevertheless includes the threats and fortunes of captured spies:

> '*Bohemond, Godfrey and the rest used threats of torture to force the man who had been caught to explain without any lies what was the reason he had come.*'[233]

The special force of Norman knights then secured the three towers that faced Bohemond's camp before allowing a second force to enter via a portis gate at the

[231] *AA*, Vol. 4, Chap. 15, p. 144.
[232] '*So few Franks.*' *GF*, 8N, p. 68; see also *GDPF*, V, p. 92.
[233] *AA*, Book 1, Chapter 26, p. 62.

base of the tower. Whilst the chronicles state that this action was due to the rope or ladder breaking, it is just as possible that the rope was deliberately jettisoned as part of the plan to stop any of the knights from being able to retreat. Once over the parapet they would be forced then to complete the mission or die trying. The conclusion of the campaign saw the Crusaders able to take most of the city before Kerbogha arrived. Albert of Aachen, writing sometime later, attempted to suggest that Firuz and his family converted to Christianity and took Bohemond as his Baptismal name[234] and certainly it would have provided Firuz and his family some protection from the fanatics amongst the pilgrims.[235] The fate of Firuz or his children is not known from those chronicles written in the immediate aftermath by the pilgrims however, and so as with the individual agents that took part in the initial stages, it is pure speculation to assume anything of his destiny.

The Crusaders' use of spies for the campaign did not stop there. Malacorona's intelligence network was likely used again by Tancred in the siege of Jerusalem. Albert of Aachen notes that Tancred's agents were able to intercept and identify the Fatamid route for messages being passed between Cairo and Jerusalem via the plain of Jehosaphat.

> '…*it came to the ears of the princes of the army, by way of those same spies who told Tancred about the money and ornament of the Lord's Temple before the capture of the city, that from the city of Jerusalem through that gate in the Mount of Olives and valley of Jehosaphat which was not blockaded, a constant communication was sent to the king of Egypt about everything which happened, and the king's*

[234] *AA*, Book 4, Chapter 15, p. 144.
[235] Michael Köhler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Leaders in the Middle East* (Leiden: BRILL, 2013) p. 35.

*messages and advice were sent back again by the city's defenders frequently and secretly through that same gate.*'[236]

What becomes clear from this is startling when we consider the methods of blockade for Nicaea as well as for Antioch. In both these sieges, areas of the city either were not or could not be blockaded and were thus used by the defenders for supply. What is interesting is that in both these cases espionage also played a key role in their downfall as well. It is possible that the Normans were fully adept at the means not only of gathering their own intelligence but in being capable of controlling and channelling their enemies' surveillance efforts. Tancred, with Arnulf Malacorona still within his retinue, was again the one to make the most of this intelligence gathering ploy. In the succeeding chapter, Albert of Aachen describes once again how Fatamid agents were captured, with the same pattern of one being killed and another captured.[237] By using a little *Sachkritik* we may assume that the Crusaders actively controlled routes allowing a number of enemy agents to leave the besieged city whilst snatching individuals to further their own intelligence gains.[238] Still, it is important to remember the chronicler's readership when we consider numbers. The medieval world was one of vast numbers; distances, taxes and herds were all to be considered, irrespective of how those numbers were counted in effect. A number of studies into the basics of medieval counting suggest that medieval people utilised the finger counting system, Agnus Trumble's research into the history of the use of the hand notes that, as early as the Roman Republic, numbers were being counted on hands with a sophisticated system, as shown by the survival of the word "digit"

[236] *AA*, Book VI, Chapter 13, p. 218.
[237] *AA*, Book VI, Chapter 14, pp. 218-219.
[238] A similar incident involving agents being captured and killed for intelligence gains can be found in *DEL* p. 136.

being used to describe the finger in modern English.[239] The use of such a system was noted by philosophers and ancient chroniclers such as Seneca and Pliny the Younger. As these works were preserved for posterity by being copied repeatedly in order to further the life of Latin into the medieval age, it is not surprising to learn that such systems were at the least interpreted by medieval scholars. The Venerable Bede, writing in 8th Century Northumbria, noted the use of the finger numbering system,[240] which allowed medieval merchants and scholars to count from the left hand up to ten with a series of bends at the finger to indicate number, as perhaps being even more popular in commerce than the use of counting boards or the abacus.[241] Interestingly this does not translate into art. An outstretched left hand pointing upward with the middle, ring and little fingers bent at the middle knuckle indicated the number three, a sacred number in Christianity, yet there are no artistic interpretations that show this. Jesus, popes and saints are regularly shown with the two-fingered right hand giving a blessing, as seen in the Beatus manuscripts from Northern Spain,[242] or pointing at objects or people with an outstretched index finger as shown throughout the Bayeux Tapestry.[243] How this then relates to the complex knowledge of mathematics and in particular arithmetic is unclear, though such methods do outline that the chroniclers would have been aware of complex numbers and were not simply referring to "a few" or "a lot" when considering the numbers as they could recognise them.

[239] A. Trumble, *The Finger: A Hand Book* (Carlton, Melbourne University Press, 2010) pp. 100-101.
[240] A. Trumble, *The Finger: A Hand Book* (Carlton, Melbourne University Press, 2010) p. 102.
[241] Christine Cooper-Rompato "Numeracy and Number in the Book of Margery Kempe" in *The Medieval Mystical Tradition in England: Exeter Symposium VIII* (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2013) p. 61.
[242] John O'Neill, *The Art of Medieval Spain, 500-1200* (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1993) p. 158
[243] *BT*, 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 26, 27, 28-29, 31, 32, 34, 37, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54-55, 56, 57, *passim*

This may not, however, have translated to the audience that each chronicler was writing for. Perceptions of the campaign would be difficult to convey and it may be that such references were made in order to give a sense of scale rather than being accurate. We know that, with the exception of the *Gesta Francorum,* the authors were all clerics in their own right. Such positions would allow them to utilise the Bible at the very least as a template. The descriptions of numbers such as "two" spies either caught or sent in to the enemies' positions in order to gather information may have been influenced by biblical description rather than reality, aiming for the readers to comprehend the general sizes of units used and perhaps also to allude to the piety of their combined mission. It is possible that the proverbial "one, a few, many" may have been a literary tool being utilised, with the grander numbers in the thousands to notify the numbers of pilgrims to an audience that may have been aware of just hundreds or tens gathered at any one time.

Conversely, the Bible may have influenced the clerics who were in charge of intelligence-gathering agents as to the numbers that they should send. Joshua at Jericho[244] and God at Sodom[245] each were said to have sent two operatives, whilst Robin Vose's evidence suggests that just two Mendicant monks were involved in espionage in Tunis. This therefore brings uncertainty as to whether the representations in the chronicle are fact or literary-based, particularly as the *Gesta Francorum, Gesta Tancredi* and Albert of Aachen only mention the use of one agent in the form of Malacorona.[246] If we are unable to identify the size of each cell of spies, attention must then be turned to their handlers.

[244] Joshua 2:1
[245] *Genesis* 19:1
[246] *GF*, 8N, p. 67, *GT*, Chapter 66, p. 91, *AA*, Book IV, Chapter 17, p. 145.

Peter the Hermit was likely to have been attached to the retinue of Bohemond to take advantage of his intelligence analytical skills when he was held in Bohemond's custody.[247] Peter was clearly a charismatic man who, despite his leadership failures during the Peasants' Crusade, had shown great intellect. Clergy were, by and large, given a classical education[248] including works outside of bible studies.[249] The various references and analytical comparisons of authors and others in the chronicles highlight how the clergy were capable of analysing and evaluating data presented to them. Such abilities would be vital in the interpretation of collected intelligence from diverse and possibly conflicting sources. Intelligence gathering demanded translation of information sourced directly from the local area, whether by letter or interrogation of local inhabitants. Apart from the immediate language issue, verbal information which might have been coerced from sources would be far more reliable and accurate if it could be corroborated. Unverified, it may potentially provide false trails. The name of Herluin is given during the siege of Antioch by the author of the *Gesta Francorum* as a translator during the negotiations with Kerbogha:

> *'And our messengers quickly came back and reported everything that these cruel people had told them. It is said that Herluin, who knew both languages, served as interpreter to Peter the Hermit.*'[250]

The role of the secret agent covertly infiltrating enemy territory in order to perform their role is a very small part of the intelligence operation. In the case of Herluin, his abilities to decipher the enemies' language were vital for the success of the Crusade and reflect the complexities of timeless espionage activity with its networks of local

[247] *GF*, 6N, p. 56.
[248] Julia Barrow, *The Clergy in the Medieval World* (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) p. 11.
[249] For more of the education of clerics in non-biblical works see Daniel Anlezark, 'Gregory the Great: Reader, Writer and read' in *Church Studies* vol. 48, Ecclesiatical History Society (Woodbridge: 2012) pp. 12-34
[250] *GF*, 9N, p. 84.

agents and ground agents supported by intelligence analysts. In addition to the references to Armenians within the Crusade,[251] as well as the aforementioned Turcopoles, scouts could have had the potential to employ their own networks of native spies to extend the range of their operation.

This is especially important if we consider the potential that the Islamic states were not using written messages to convey intelligence. Evidence provided by the *Gesta Francorum* suggested that the Antiocenes were using some Armenian collaborators as spies.[252] These collaborators were not alone in their allegiance to the Turkish regime that held lordship over the city at that time, the *Gesta* also noting that Syrian and Armenian caravans moved to supply the city and were blocked by Tancred.[253] Whether this was the author's attempt to explain why the siege took so long, when compared to Jerusalem or Nicaea, is unclear, but the inclusion of the Armenian spies does suggest both a level of intelligence-gathering by the Antiocene rulers and an element of counter-intelligence as suggested by Albert of Aachen at both Jerusalem[254] and Nicaea.[255] Unlike the siege of Lisbon in 1147,[256] or much later in the 15th Century during the period surrounding the Wars of the Roses, [257] or indeed into the modern era and the breaking of the Enigma Code at Bletchley Park, the Crusade chroniclers do not note any interception of physical messages or letters. Instead, Albert of Aachen notes that enemy spies were threatened, alluding to them being tortured, in order to exact information. This again echoes the statement of Einhard

[251] *GF,* 4N, p. 48.
[252] *GF*, 5N, p. 52.
[253] *GF*, 8N, p. 66.
[254] *AA*, Book VI, Chapter 13, p. 218.
[255] *AA*, Book II, Chapter 25-26, pp. 61-62.
[256] *DEL*, p. 139.
[257] B. Walter, 'Urban Espionage and Counterespionage in the Burgundian Wars (1468-1477)' in *JMMH: Volume IX* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011) pp. 132-145

*"...I think that it is better to trust a loyal man than a written document, since if a document or a piece of parchment falls [out of the hands] of its bearer, every secret it holds is revealed, but a loyal messenger, [even if] tortured, does not betray the message entrusted to him."* [258].

Such activity, which blurs the boundary between military and covert operation, would have carried significant risks. If networks were established, none of the chroniclers were in a position to say so and so it becomes a tempting if unsupported theory that might parallel French and British activities in the colonial Americas.[259]

Firuz had been contacted and a plan set out prior to Bohemond's suggestion of controlling the city should he be able to capture it.[260] Access to valuable intelligence sources and networks of informants and intelligence gatherers were assets worth considerable effort to hide and protect from his fellow Crusaders, as shown by the general lack of depictions of the agents working with Firuz in other chronicles.[261] The likely contact is named as a 'soldier', Malacorona.[262] The name Malacorona, identified in the *Gesta Francorum*, is important due to its translation; meaning ill-tonsured. The name was often used for a defrocked priest.[263] However, in this case it applied to Arnulf Malacorona, better known as Ralph of Caen's tutor Arnulf of Chocques.[264] Arnulf, whom Ralph depicts as having aspirations for the

[258] Einhard to R., printed in: Edward Dutton, *Charlemagne's Courtier, the complete Einhard*, p 158
[259] Daniel Beattie, 'The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare 1751-63' and Peter Russell, 'Redcoats in the Wilderness British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe & America' in *William & Mary College Quarterly* 35 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978) pp. 629-652.
[260] *GF*, 8N, p. 67.
[261] RA, Book VI, p. 47.
[262] *GF*, 8N, p. 67.
[263] *GF*, 8N, p. 67n.
[264] Francis Palgrave, *The History of Normandy and of England: William Rufus, accession of Henry Beauclerc*, Volume 4, (Parker, 1864) p. 570.

Patriarchy of Jerusalem,[265] is mentioned throughout the text, though only by his first name. Ironically, Arnulf may have disappeared into obscurity as yet another short reigning Patriarch of Jerusalem, had the *Gesta Francorum* not in advertently drawn attention to him as *'One of Bohemond's foot soldiers, Malacorona by name*'.[266]It is of interest that in the same incident at Antioch, Ralph only refers to Bohemond's agent as '*…a messenger who scouted and looked over the situation to see if everything was safe…'*[267]

Like Peter the Deacon, other priests were often bilingual, comprehending Latin, used as the *Lingua-Franca* of the Church and the local languages of the area of operation. In the case of Sicilian clergymen, it would have been necessary to learn Greek and Arabic to perform their evangelist mission duties. Certainly this may explain Albert of Aachen's description of the agent being a Lombard '*…they sent a certain interpreter of languages, a Lombard by race and a member of Bohemond's household.'*[268] As a polyglot, Malacorona's spy would have been the perfect candidate to enter Antioch and engage with the disgruntled Firuz. The fact that the *Anonymous* was able to name this individual is striking. Few spies have ever been named, especially from the medieval period. It suggests that the author was close to Bohemond or Tancred's personal retinue, perhaps explaining both his high regard for the two, and his intimate knowledge of their actions during the Crusade. As in the example of Bishop Peter Compte of the Aragonese court, monks were not the only ones to undertake informal or formal espionage.[269] This bishop, as with the

[265] *GT*, Chapter 135, p. 149.
[266] *GF*, 8N, p. 67.
[267] *GT*, Chapter 66, p. 91.
[268] *AA*, Book IV, Chapter 17, p. 145.
[269] Vose, *Dominicans, Muslims and Jews*, p. 224.

unassuming Arnulf Malacorona, did not achieve world renowned clerical success but was distinguished as a spy master.[270]

This may also explain Bohemond's vitriolic assault on the legitimacy of the 'Holy Lance'. The monetary and political capital that the relic could have drawn to it may well have been too great a lure for Arnulf not to follow. The potential to be both Patriarch, following the death of Adhemar of Puy, and guardian of the Holy Lance would have made Arnulf's position more powerful. Bohemond's shrewd prosecution of the spear tip demonstrates a political awareness emanating from intelligent analysis of the intelligence presented to him and also a significant capability to organise and process complex issues. Such skills differentiated good combat soldiers from those who became military leaders. Having shown his worth, Arnulf became a prize that was worth holding on to. It may be this that is being referenced by Arnulf when he charges Tancred had mistreated him following the departure from Antioch. Arnulf may have become accustomed, as is suggested by both his status and his aspiration to the See of Jerusalem, to power and responsibility in return for his temporal services as well as any spiritual chaplaincy that he may have been able to maintain. It may be that Tancred had failed to deliver or show the respect that Malacorona expected. In his career to that point, Bohemond had demonstrated an almost Norse-like flair for analysing his opposition and relative strengths to choose to engage his enemies at times and places of his choosing, fighting the battles he knew he could win. His confident prediction of the city's fate must have been after the services of Firuz had been secured as the *Anonymous* suggests. If Bohemond seemed to hesitate when Firuz executed the plan for the men to creep onto Antioch's walls, it was almost certainly a carefully executed scheme to prevent his force's

[270] Ibid., p. 248.

discovery when he prudently sent one of his Arabic speakers first to verify that it was Firuz lowering the ladder and not a trap to capture the Crusaders as they ascended. Perhaps this was the token of faith that Arnulf had expected greater reward for. The risks that he undertook for the Sicilo-Norman family he felt perhaps should have earned their support for his subsequent claim.

Certainly, Bohemond had bribed, or otherwise influenced, Arnulf sufficiently to both lure him from Robert of Normandy and to keep him till he had taken Antioch. His redeployment to Tancred's retinue however was less palatable to Arnulf, who took his issues to the rest of the magnates[271]. How Bohemond retained the services of Malacorona is disappointingly not commented upon by the chroniclers, adding a further level of complexity and emphasising to the importance of secrecy to the clandestine world in which covert agents and spies operate. Opportunities to deploy spies who were clerics may have been few and their valuable skills were used sparingly, presumably as they both were expensive to maintain and had other more spiritual duties to perform amongst the Crusade's faithful. The use of spies was an asset that had to be deployed only after certain information could be gathered to indicate how they might operate and how information could be transmitted securely.

The Antiocenes were keen on gathering intelligence on the Crusaders through use of agents, posing as refugees[272]. This further complicates the potential identification of how spies were recruited and introducing the concept of counterintelligence. It would not be accurate to simply state that all spies came from any one origin. A spy may have been recruited from among the many disaffected and driven individuals who were involved in the events of the First Crusade. The

[271] *GT*, C. 135, pp. 148-151
[272] *GF*, 5N, p. 52.

campaign created large numbers of refugees, many of whom appear to have aided both the Crusaders and their local governments, presumably as they were seeking stability and shelter. Evidence highlighting the use of spies by the Turks and Fatimids may give parallel clues as to their use by European powers. The motivations of the spies of the medieval age usually remain obscure, though in the case of the Crusading spies and their spy masters, the objectives remained the same as their employers. They involved the successful occupation of cities and resources as well as survival, presumably in a relatively comfortable and secure environment. The finite resource of the educated spy directly contrasts with the image of the numerous street urchins plucked from the alleys of some dilapidated slum. As discussed, the two groups might work together with a common purpose, driven by completely different ideologies. The spy master might be determined to deliver religious and material change in an occupied territory, while the members of his spy ring are driven by oppression, or the simple expectation of food and some degree of safety. The medieval spy may have had much in common with modern intelligence officers; being highly educated and astute individuals motivated by complex issues such as religious and military duty. Societal change has altered the emphasis of temporal and spiritual reward, but military establishments continue to have venues for religious services, where soldiers presumably reconcile their own temporal and spiritual issues. The crucial importance and position that intelligence gathering held in order for a military leader to be successful should not be underestimated. It could change the course of action and even the perceived stratagem to achieve the current objective. It was necessary then for the commanders to act decisively from the intelligence that they received.

In the case of espionage, spies enabled military commanders' access, at a cost, to enemy cities. It gave them the ability to look within enemy strongholds and armed forces in order to assess their threat potential when it came to the moment that they would have to be engaged. This asset proved to be vital and it is only because of the mix of sources available from the period that we are able to identify credible evidence of not just their use but also their identity. The majority of spies depicted in the sources appear to have been clerics. Though this may only represent a small fraction of the professions involved in espionage, it does highlight that there appears to be no singular profession of spy that the military leadership could approach. It is also shown that the successful military leaders were those that could employ their intelligence agents fully.

## Interrogation and interview

Deployment of valuable assets such as spies and specialist scouts allowed military leaders to gain access to focused intelligence that wouldn't otherwise be available. Validation of the information provided and its collation into a format suitable for incorporation into battle plans required skilled analysis. Armed with the disseminated information, force commanders had better opportunities to exploit weaknesses in enemy positions, forces, or even morale and gain success in particular engagements. Unless the spy was particularly highly placed, the narrow focus of the intelligence often presented a microscopic view for the campaign. Overheard intelligence, without corroboration, suffered the risk of being simply dismissed as hearsay. Shortening the intelligence evidential chain by speaking directly to sources of information by the use of interviewing and interrogation techniques potentially

opened a wider scope and allowed the questioning to probe different areas according to changes in tactical priorities, or the answers provided. It allowed the military leaders to maintain a focus whilst examining more sources for evidence. Opportunities to interrogate captured prisoners throughout the campaign was impeded in some cases by the indiscriminate slaughter of prisoners and conquered citizens, although such brutal techniques might also be used to distinguish the fact that a small number of key assets might have been spared without any chronicling of their capture. Without suitable validation of the information from allied, or other independent sources the intelligence gathered from interviewing was of questionable value.

For many of the participants the Crusade was a war of liberation and military evangelism, so Syrian and Armenian Christians who reasonably appeared to be fleeing assaults and battles were not challenged. The *Gesta Francorum* gives a definitive account of such Christians in Antioch escaping regularly to venture into the Pilgrim camps throughout the siege:

> '*The Armenians and Syrians, who were inside the city, came out and showed themselves as if they were fleeing; daily they came to us… They cleverly found out things from us, about our situation, and then reported everything back to those who were inside the city.*'[273]

This account suggests that the altruistic attitude toward some of these same local inhabitants was ill judged, as they were using this opportunity to gather intelligence about the Crusaders. They may have been simply trying to compare the attitudes of their potential 'liberators' and the treatment they might receive under their

[273] *GF*, 5N, p. 52.

governance with the conditions under their current Seljuk rulers. The balance of that comparison might have been sufficient to tilt their allegiance. The meeting of any two groups of people inevitably allows for information to be transferred in both directions. Whether either side can capitalise on the information would depend on the outcome of the meeting and the subsequent destination of the two parties. In 1147, the forces besieging Lisbon faced a similar encounter where Moors were able to leave the city in search of food or to surrender:

> *'Meanwhile, the Moors being hard pressed by hunger, whenever any of their poor were able to do so secretly, they gave themselves up to our men. And so it came about that the acts and plans of the enemy could be but little concealed from us.'*[274]

Through interview and interrogation, according to the circumstances of the interviewee, the Crusaders were able to gather information from the refugees about the city and its forces. Robert the Monk suggests that this was the case at Tarsus where the local inhabitants attempted to alert the Crusaders of the departure of the garrison at night:

> *'The Christians in the city came to the camp in the dead of night, exclaiming aloud with joy, and said "Come on and get yourselves out of bed, you undefeated Frankish soldiers, because the Turks are all fleeing the city and no longer dare to fight you."'*[275]

The use of information provided by civilians in the human intelligence gathering processes was not a secret or controversial idea during the campaign, not least as the leaders did not have a particular asset to shield, or support. The

[274] *DEL*, p. 141.
[275] *RM*, Book III, Chapter XX, p. 116.

absence of confrontation with the enemy by using interrogators, rather than scouts or spies, had the advantage of being less risky. There were challenges that could arise because a group of civilians with a common motivation might appear to validate a particular piece of information, but in practice they were not be independent sources. Raymond's small contingent of 500 would have met with defeat as they attempted to take Antioch were it not for their questioning of a near heretical group of Armenians known as Paulicians in the vicinity.

> *'And they came to a valley near Antioch, where stood a castle of the Paulicians, and there they heard that the Turks in the city were preparing to defend in strongly.'*[276]

The false intelligence gathered by Raymond at Coxon, modern day Goksun, would have led the 500 into a trap,[277] and it is unclear if that was intention or merely that the locals were unaware of the true strength of the Antiocene garrison. The episode highlights the degree of analysis and validation of evidence obtained. Whilst it is generally cheaper and easier to gather information from a large group of civilians than to deploy scouts, or insert a spy, the quality of the information received would have required further validation, whereas a known scout group, or agent could be relied upon to provide information of a known quality – assuming the agent had not been captured and his allegiance turned by counter intelligence agents.

Information gathered and the potential spread of disinformation to alter military strategy or influence morale from simply conversing with people could have marked effects on both military strategy and political alliances. This was perhaps most critical and potent when survivors of the Peasants' Crusade reunited with the

[276] *GF,* 4N, p. 49.
[277] *RM,* Book III, Chapter XXVI, p. 118.

Princes' Crusade. When we consider that Alexius had sent a contingent of Byzantine troops under Tatikios, the potential for a rift may have been great. News of the fate of the Peasants' Crusade reached the Princes' Crusade via survivors of the massacre rather than through diplomatic channels between the Byzantines and the Latins following the siege of Nicaea:

> *'At this time we learned that when Peter the Hermit and his peasant hordes had arrived in Constantinople…Alexius had betrayed him by forcing Peter and his followers…to cross the Straits…'*[278]

The lack of trust between the Sicilo-Normans and the Byzantines had already caused tensions. At the Vardar, Eastern Roman forces had already attacked the crusaders as they made their way, albeit slowly, to Constantinople. The gossip that the Emperor had removed his support from the Peasant's Crusade must have caused greater issues for the military leadership to overcome.

Military leaders appear to have appreciated the hierarchy of particular assets they wished to capture for interrogation versus those that were otherwise disposable. Scouts and military intelligence units were highly prized for their knowledge of the armies that they were part of, as shown by the *Gesta Francorum's* author concerning the capture of sentries for the Fatimid army marching on Ascelon:

> *'Our men chased them and captured many of them, who gave all the details of the battle: where they were, and how many, and where they were planning to engage in battle with the Christians.'*[279]

[278] *RA*, Chapter. III, p. 27.
[279] *GF*, 10N, p. 105.

Questions posed to Bohemond's scouts upon sighting the Crusade as it reached Amalfi give an indication of the nature of the intelligence the military leadership sought. This could provide information of force strengths and leadership in addition to the practical aspects of their battle readiness and equipment, as seen at Amalfi as Bohemond took the cross in 1096:

> *'Now, Bohemond, the mighty in war, who was besieging Amalfi at the Bridge of Scafati, heard that innumerable Christian people, mostly Franks, had arrived and were determined to proceed to the Sepulchre of our Lord and were prepared to fight against pagan people. He then diligently inquired as to what type of weapons they fought with, what emblem of Christ they carried as they went on their way, and what war cry they shouted in battle.'*[280]

So too, when Norman scouts, prisoners captured by Alexius' forces, were asked:

> *'The men were asked whom they served, whence they had come, and for what purpose they had been sent.'*[281]

The military, rather than religious, focus of the questioning is revealing. The authors' reporting of the questioning is often related to rhetorical answering that highlights the piety and righteousness of their respected heroes as in the case of the previous quote and in the *Gesta Francorum*'s questioning of captured Turcopoles after the battle of the Vardar.[282]

[280] *GF*, 1N, p. 30.
[281] *GT*, Chapter. 13, pp. 34-35.
[282] *GF*, 1N, p. 32.

The influence of the author's perspective and use of rhetoric in reporting interrogation, shown greatly in the epic tale of Ursinius,[283] has the potential to detract from the substance of examination techniques. By looking beyond the rhetoric, we see that interviewing and interrogation were critical apparatus of the process of gathering intelligence.

Use of intelligence and its collection was clearly not the sole preserve of the Europeans. Turks, such as Kerbogha, were capable of interrogating prisoners and understanding their response as the Normans sallied out from Antioch in June 1098:

> *'Finally Kerbogha summoned captives from our people, for he held certain of our people as prisoners, and he asked whose banners these were and what they signified.'*[284]

His questioning is typically military, reflecting the inquiries made by Bohemond upon sighting the Norman detachment of the Crusade, yet again emphasises that prisoners and deserters were a key target for interview by the military leadership. This is shown by Raymond of Aguiler's mention of Turks having joined the Crusade early in 1097 as the campaign entered Anatolia:

> *'Although we learned this from an Apostate Turk now in our ranks…'*[285]

as well as the later reference to deserters being debriefed so as to ascertain the size of enemy forces as seen during the later siege of Antioch in 1098:

> *'Deserters later informed us that there were at least twenty-eight thousand Turkish cavalrymen in this encounter.'*[286]

[283] *GT*, Chapter. 40, p. 64.
[284] *GT*, Chapter. 86, pp. 106-107.
[285] *RA*, Chapter. III, p. 28.
[286] *RA*, Chapter. V, p. 40.

These military aspects were not restricted to troop numbers and unit identities and were as useful to gain geographical and topographical information that might assist in ascertaining routes that the scouts would be unfamiliar with and where enemy forces might be deployed. Raymond of Toulouse, recognising this weakness, relied heavily on local information, as shown when leaving the aborted siege of Arqah to proceed to Jerusalem:

> *'At this time Raymond and other crusading chieftains asked natives of the region which was the best and least difficult route to Jerusalem.'*[287]

Having received the information on several routes, Raymond then sought which the locals believed would be the easiest for the army to travel to Jerusalem, so that

> '*The Surians …were questioned upon the route…*'[288]

This in turn shows that the successful military leaders were intent on verifying the information being presented. Even in the case of Raymond of Toulouse's previous intelligence failure concerning Antioch's strength, it could be viewed that he was attempting a reconnaissance in force. This would explain the 500's interview of the Paulicians as they approached Antioch for more reliable, more local, evidence.

Whilst scouts may have reconnoitred routes in the past, the use of local intelligence clearly afforded updated information that bolstered the military leadership's chances of success. Whilst scouts were able to investigate land routes to their proposed destination, the added human intelligence allowed for a greater scope of the hazards any such route might take. Locals may have witnessed enemy troop movements that may have become hidden by the time the scouts reached that

[287] *RA*, Chapter. XIII, p. 108.
[288] *RA*, Chapter. XIII, p. 109.

area. Also, as seen with the march over the mountains around Antioch and Mamistra, the routes selected may not have been the optimal to transport such large numbers of pilgrims and soldiers in the single necessary movement that was required for greater protection.

Human intelligence provided a frame by which the more focused intelligence gathered by other agents could be put to use. By itself, as with the other methods, human intelligence could be unreliable and provide an unfinished image of what the enemy, the territory or political allies were undertaking during a brittle campaign.

## Conclusion

Military leaders could not in isolation know all the details required to properly execute their military campaigns. Though they could and did perform their own reconnaissance in order to supplement their knowledge, other vital duties to the running of the campaign also required their attention. Military commanders used a variety of assets to increase their chances of a successful outcome. By employing native and European scouts the Crusader leadership was capable of creating an accurate view of their adversaries' size and location as well as safe routes to transit.

Principally amongst these resources, scouts appear to have been recruited from the serving knights and semi-professionals as well as native light cavalrymen in the form of Turcopoles. These provided the main source of military intelligence. These swift and experienced horsemen were capable of forming a corps of signals able to swiftly allow the commanders to communicate their intelligence with one another, creating a greater flexibility. Once engaged with the enemy, these lightly

armed forces probably afforded the strategists options of deploying light cavalry to harass the main force without directly engaging them. The multiple roles of scouts may explain why they are not identified as a single unit type. Leaders are portrayed regularly performing reconnaissance duties personally, which according to the personality of the commander may have been a factual representation, or used to enhance perceptions of his bravery and standing. It is also possible that the campaign's commanders organised some form of roster that allowed the knights to commit to exploration whilst maintaining a core of the heavy cavalry that so typifies medieval European armies from the period, which could explain knights signalling the main force using shields. This too may explain the effective use of scouts to reconnoitre fortifications, revealing potential weak spots, as well as tracking enemy forces, as this might be a skill expected whilst hunting.

Field reconnaissance was limited in the intelligence it could provide, however, and it is here that the military leadership chose to employ spies and espionage. Whilst most of the individuals used as spies remain anonymous, their spy masters may be able to be identified. As has been shown, clergymen played a large role within this system. It is unsurprising that the analytical skills employed by such ecclesiastical men as Arnulf of Choques and Peter the Hermit could be employed in interpreting gained intelligence as easily as they could biblical and classical works, remembering the extent of the armed conflict and military techniques depicted in the books of the Old Testament. The use of highly skilled, bilingual clergy, as well as local agents recruited as the Crusade advanced, gave the Crusaders an edge in their dealings with the enemy. Certainly, they were instrumental in the capture of Antioch, where they were able to convince Firuz to betray his own city, and allow the Crusaders to enter.

These two main sources of military intelligence provided a surgical view of the enemy armies and their settlements. This could, however, only reveal so much and the military leadership were quick to employ interrogation of both local allies and enemy forces when the opportunity arose. The command group appears to have prioritised particular forces, such as scouts, for interrogation. It should be kept in mind that a number of references to interrogation may have been purely used for rhetorical purposes; a tool by which to exemplify the heroes of the authors' chronicles or justify the Crusade as a campaign. Nevertheless, the instances of interrogation inform us that the technique was being used, and widely enough that the authors' readership base would have understood its use and methods.

Overall, the use of military intelligence was a vital requirement for a successful military campaign and as such it is unsurprising that the military leaders grasped such a concept so vehemently.

Having supplied the army with the intelligence it would require for success in the field of battle it was important that the Crusade's military leaders employed skills and assets in ordered to feed, clothe and maintain their subordinates. In the next chapter we examine how this was achieved.

'*Only a commander who understands logistics can push the military machine to the limits without risking total breakdown*.'

~ Major General Julian Thompson

## Feeding the Troops to Deny the Vultures: Logistics Organisation and Deployment

### Introduction

The proverb that an army marches on its stomach was illustrated by the pilgrims of the First Crusade. Despite the incredible levels of violence and the distances undertaken, the numbers opposing them and the uncertainty of the entire campaign, the most notable and constant remark of the chronicle authors was to the lack of resources available to the pilgrims; most notably food. The distance and route of the campaign did not allow for complex supply lines to stretch as far back as the relative safety of Western Europe. Instead, the Crusade would be forced to forage for food, water and fodder along their route of march. Concerning the logistics of the crusades Bernard Bachrach noted:

*'All study of logistics must begin with numbers. When a commander undertakes a campaign, he must know of the order of magnitude of forces under his command for a variety of reasons, among which is*

*providing sufficient quantities of materiel, especially food, to sustain the campaign.'*[289]

The medieval citizen neither viewed the world as a flat sheet,[290] nor as depicted in the Hereford Mappa Mundi with Jerusalem in its geographical centre.[291] This misconception of the medieval citizen isn't helped by a lack of maps, as mentioned in the previous chapter. It is crucial to understand that the Crusaders understood that the journey to Jerusalem would be long and something that would require a great deal of supplies. Ralph of Caen, perhaps using hindsight, showed that Tancred, before he had even taken the cross, considered exactly this when he stated:

'*[Tancred's] fear grew as he considered how to acquire provisions along a path so lacking in supplies*'[292]

This 'fear' was not unwarranted. Tancred knew well what war required, especially as Sicily was in the grasp of civil war between Roger Borsa and Bohemond de Hautville.[293] Earlier, in the death throes of the Roman Empire, an administrator named Vegetius produced a popular tome on military management named *De Re Militari*,[294] where he noted that hunger was more 'terrible than the sword.' Whilst there is increasing debate on the role of Vegetius,[295] certainly the Crusaders could see the truth in the Roman's statement. By far the greatest cause of desertion

[289] B.S. Bachrach, 'Crusader Logistics', in *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. John Pryor (London: Ashgate, 2006) p. 45.
[290] C. Tyerman, *How to plan a Crusade*, (London: Penguin, 2015) p. 2.
[291] For details of the Mappa Mundi of Hereford Cathedral see D. Terkla, 'The Original Placement of the Hereford Mappa Mundi' in *Imago Mundi,* **Vol. 56**, (2) (2004) pp. 131-151
[292] *GT*, Chap 2, p. 24.
[293] Brown, *The Norman Conquest of Southern Italy and Sicily*, p. 177.
[294] The role of Vegetius in medieval military history is greatly debated, for example see Rogers, 'The Vegetian 'Science of Warfare' in the middle ages'; Morillo, 'Battle Seeking'; B.S. Bachrach, 'A 'Lying Legacy' Revisited. The Abels-Morillo Defense of Discontinuity.' In *JMMH*, Vol. 5, (2007), pp. 153-193; C. Allmand, *The 'De Re Military' of Vegetius. The Reception, Transmission and Legacy of a Roman Text in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: CUP, 2011).
[295] Rogers, 'The Vegetian 'Science of Warfare' in the middle ages'

appears to have been preceded by long periods of the loss of food and supplies.[296] To counter this, military leaders used two stratagems: timing and organisation.

In this chapter we explore the organisation of the logistics for the First Crusade. The first section examines the food that the Crusaders were used to in medieval Europe. Through the sources, it is possible to examine the capability of the military leaders to organise supplies from allied states by sea. Yet there were consistent logistical failures during the campaign, and as we refer back to Bachrach's quote, we will come to understand how the military leaders sought to overcome such failures on campaign. The nature of supplies is more complex than perhaps even the chronicles portrayed. Supporting large bodies of troops in the field required immense logistical support that needed the willing, or unwilling cooperation of both allies and captured enemy resources. They would not have wished to be in the position of defending the flank of the army against the remnants of defeated opposition, or a local population that was not committed to the cause.

Negotiations by Rayond of Toulouse and Bohemond were critical when securing the resources the Crusade would require on the march.[297] The *Historia Francorum* notes that Raymond was heavily involved with negotiations with Alexios I. The Emperor was keen to have Raymond's homage but Raymond of Aguilers notes the elder statesman was also key to negotiating for the logistics of the Crusade.

> '*…they pressed Raymond to come to Constantinople with a small force so that upon completion of arrangements with Alexius there would be no delay of the march.*'[298]

[296] *RM*, XII, p. 128; *AA*, b. IV, c. 36, p. 160; *GT*, c. 79, p. 101.
[297] GF, 2N, p. 36.
[298] *RA*, Book II, p. 22.

## Food

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the use of educated men in an age where many of the populous were illiterate and innumerate may point to the ecclesiastical origins of these clerks. Though not discounting the numeracy required by the average person, whether shepherd or blacksmith, the large sums and equations of logistics did require a level of specialisation. The chronicles do not illuminate this area by naming any such dedicated logisticians. The sources instead allude to the state of affairs concerning food and supplies prior to the expedition. The preparations for the Crusade began long before the campaign was launched in 1096. As Pope Urban II and his clerics toured France and the Low Countries magnates were able to gather both support and supplies for their forces. Before the crusaders set out on their mission, Fulcher of Chartres noted that 1096 had seen:

> '*…a very great abundance of grain and wine… so that there was no lack of bread on the trip.*'[299]

This suggests that there would be a profusion of provisions available for the campaign if the commanders were capable at gathering it for such an operation. Evidence from the introduction of the heavy plough and the Domesday Book would suggest that Europe experienced an abundance of agricultural produce in the late eleventh century.[300] This would suggest that the majority of the pilgrims would have had access to a more varied diet and thusly would have access to the vitamins and

[299] *RM*, b. 1, c. VI, p. 72

[300] T. Andersen, P. Jensen and C. Skovsgaard, 2014, 'The Heavy Plough and the Agricultural Revolution in Medieval Europe', in *EHES Working Papers*, No. 70, (2014) p. 1.

minerals to promote health. The arrival of the Princes' Crusade at Constantinople in October would suggest that the Crusade left Europe at the end of summer 1096. The *Deeds of God through the Franks* states that Godfrey arrived in Constantinople in December,[301] which agrees with the *Gesta Francorum*'s spring arrival by Bohemond in the next year in April.[302] Departing for the Holy Land during the harvest season may have placed stress on the home nations as they rushed to gather the grains necessary to make the daily bread required for the pilgrims. It would, however, have given the crusaders' various host nations the time and ability to supply the armies on the route to the Middle East. Certainly the stresses of gathering supplies can be seen in the events leading up to Bohemond's arrival at the Byzantine court. Unlike the other military leaders, Bohemond was not informed by delegations from the Church but rather by pilgrims arriving in Southern Italy. Bohemond, with Tancred, was aiding in the siege of Amalfi by Roger of Sicily.[303] The *Gesta Francorum* notes that he was already in command of a large force, but there is a lack of detail as to whether he also had significant reserves of supplies. Robert the Monk notes that Bohemond provided his troops with the necessary supplies from his own coffers:

> '*Bohemond of Apulia, as we have described, having prepared at his own expense all that was needed for such a major expedition, took ship.*'[304]

The details are unclear, and how many of the soldiers received supplies from Bohemond compared to those that had to provide their own is not addressed. The military leader was undoubtedly expected to perform these duties.

[301] *GDPF*, b. 2, p. 22.
[302] *GF*, 2N, p. 34.
[303] *GF,* 1N, p. 30.
[304] *RM*, Book 2, Chapter XI, p. 95.

Without doing so it would impossible for a fighting force to be readily equipped to fight in the field or endure long marches. These details could emphasise the size of potential military depots being exploited by military commanders for campaigns. The *Gesta Tancredi* suggests that supply was the sole responsibility of Tancred for his troops:

> *'Nor, indeed, did this man, whose custom have been from boyhood to have others administer his inheritance, require great expenses. Furnish the military arms, horses, mules, and other goods of this type in quantities sufficient number of his fellow soldiers.'*[305]

It is unclear again however if this was the duty expected of all military leaders or only of the subordinates of higher generals as Tancred was to Bohemond. Such details in the hierarchy could illuminate the relationships between those military leaders that offered to pay others to become their lieutenants and the expected duties of both parties.[306]

The concept of depositing supplies in depots was not a new concept for the First Crusaders. Evidence for stockpiling for military campaigns can be gathered from the information provided for earlier, near contemporary, campaigns such as that of William the Conqueror's invasion of England.

> *'William's staff very satisfactorily maintained about 14 000 men and perhaps 3000 or more horses in the Norman camp at Dive-sur-Mer for several months during the summer and early autumn of 1066. This effort required all kinds of complicated estimates for food, shelter and*

[305] *GT*, Chapter 1, p. 22.
[306] See for example the relationship between Raymond of Toulouse and Tancred in *AA*, b. VI, c. 8, p. 215.

*equipment which depended on a reasonably accurate estimate of the order of magnitude of William's troops.'*[307]

Bohemond and Tancred with Roger Hauteville would have been in a position to readily access such supplies at the siege of Amalfi, as there is little to suggest that the besieging army was in a poor state to join the campaign. The other nobles were not comforted by such circumstances. The nobles of Northern Europe in particular were in a rare period of peace in between wars.[308] The Norman nobles had come to an accord with their English counterparts.

Roger had likely gathered supplies for the siege to feed, clothe and arm his forces from the local area. These provisions would not be sufficient for the long march ahead of Bohemond and the Sicilo-Normans. As a result, his march across the Balkans and Greece was slow. It should also be recognised that the slow pace of march was affected by the hostility faced by the Sicilo-Normans due in great part to the previous conflicts with the Byzantine Empire.[309] The supplies gathered by the Crusaders presented as many issues as they did solutions. Firstly, as Bernard Bachrach notes, psychology concerning food is large issue.[310] In the modern age, Western forces are supplied with a number of 'Ration Packs' or 'Meal Ready to Eat's. Invariably these reflect the food and cuisine of the home nations of the soldiers rather than being created from the recipes of host nations. Whilst the logistics and food technology of modern nations make this possible, this was a challenge the First

[307] B.S. Bachrach, 'The Siege of Antioch: A Study in Military Demography' in *War in History*, Vol. 6 (1999) p. 131.
[308] Robert of Normandy had fought against his own father in 1077-9. For more information on Robert of Normandy and his succession see R. H. C. Davis, 'William of Jumièges, Robert Curthose and the Norman Succession', in *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 95, Nr. 376 (1980) pp. 597-606.
[309] See for example the Norman campaigns in Byzantine Balkans immediately prior to the First Crusade: G. Theotokis, *The Norman Campaigns in the Balkans: 1081-1108* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2014) pp. 177-184.
[310] Bachrach, 'Crusader Logistics', p. 45.

Crusade's military leaders had to overcome. It was not only necessary for the military leadership to locate provisions but to locate the precise staples that they and their subordinates would be able to know and trust. Runciman notes that a number of Armenian princes and monasteries donated what they could,[311] but the food amounts and ingredients would still have been alien to the Crusaders.

The European medieval diet was dominated by bread.[312] Bread was baked in ovens that could be owned by land owning lords, or in common. Loaves could be made from a variety of ingredients whose range determined their quality and colour from the light coloured *paindemaigne* or 'bread of the lord' to darker bread with higher bran content.[313] Research is lacking into the methods of the distribution of food within households,[314] so it is unclear how much sustenance the pilgrims would be expected to carry. Robert the Monk suggests a daily ration,[315] and that this was enough to sustain a working man through the day, but it is unclear what this constituted. A method of preserving stocks of bread could come in the form of a mobile bakery. The *Bayeux Tapestry* and later texts present images of possible flat portable open ovens or two wheeled carts carrying light, small baking ovens.

[311] Runciman, *The First Crusade*, p. 134.
[312] M. Weiss Adamson, *Food in Medieval Times* (London: Greenwood, 2004) p. 2.
[313] Ibid.
[314] C. Dyer, *Everyday Life in Medieval England* (London: Hambledon and London, 1994) p. 84.
[315] *RM*, b. II, c. XIX, p. 100.

316


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Keeping the process mobile allowed the suppliers to provide the Crusaders with flour rather than having to transport the more perishable bread. Using European recipes, the relatively simple bread could also go some way to ease the shock of

316 *BT*, 46-47, p. 187.

317 Ulrich von Richtenthal, a mobile bakery from *Chronicle of the Council of Constance* 'Council of Constance, 1414 - 1418, pastry baker with mobile baking oven, Chronicle of Ulrich' http://www.travelwriticus.com/wp-content/uploads/constance-mobile-baking-oven.jpg (accessed 29/04/2016).

entering the Holy Land and its foreign foods. Robert the Monk noted early on that some of the Crusaders struggled with the nature of the food that they were receiving on the march. He noted that:

'*[Tancred] decided against remaining any longer at Susa because the food he was obliged to eat was unfamiliar.*'[318]

The effect that this had on morale is not known. By Kerbogha's siege of Antioch any and all food was welcome, as evidenced by Ralph of Caen's presentation of the Crusaders willingly eating venomous foods.[319] Food itself became a weapon, and supplies from Cyprus and the Byzantine Empire would have increasingly become familiar to the Crusaders as time passed, yet the food taken from the Antiocenes' external grain stores was not wasted:

> *'Soon we were living around the city, and we found a great abundance in the surroundings, namely much fruit on the vine, pits of grain, trees with lots of apples on them, and many more good things that the body needs.'*[320]

The discovery of the pits was a significant boon to morale as well as to supplies. As the winter months wore on the supplies dwindled quickly. The *Gesta Francorum*'s author, a survivor from this period stated:

> *'But, before Christmas, the grain we had taken and all foodstuffs that nourish the body began to run scarce… And they decided in Council that one part of our men should go and diligently try to gather*

[318] *RM*, Book 2, Chapter XV, p. 97.
[319] *GT*, c. 80, p. 102.
[320] GF, 5N, p. 52.

*provisions and protect the flanks of the army. And the other half should faithfully remain to protect the camp.'*[321]

The Crusader foraging teams started relatively informally. Numbers of pilgrims would leave the camps seemingly on a daily basis. John Gillingham's study into the techniques employed by Richard the Lionheart during the Third Crusade suggests he ordered his men to carry ten days' worth of supplies, and noted that this significantly reduced the rate of march.[322] Certainly this could help explain the apparently slow rate of progress of the pilgrims. On average, the Crusaders were only able to complete 10 kilometres per day between Nicaea and Dorylaeum.[323] This is despite the fact that the pilgrims were able to utilise the Roman roads between Constantinople and the ancient Roman cities such as Tarsus.[324] This average speed includes the significant stops made by the Crusaders. In fact the average speed of march, when these stoppages are removed suggests that the Crusaders were capable of moving 30 kilometres a day.[325] For such a large number of people to move at this speed would require supplies to be able to move just as swiftly. The chronicles note a growing lack of horses, and as such it would be more practical for the individual Crusaders to transport their own supplies and equipment.

The passage of Anatolia and the Konya plain proved almost disastrous, the Crusaders struggled to locate water.[326] The impracticalities of supplying overland from Constantinople drove the commanders to attempt to live from the local terrain. This was not a new practice and has never been readily or totally abandoned even in

[321] GF, 5N, p. 53.
[322] John Gillingham, 'Richard I and the Science of War', in *War and Government* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1984) p. 205.
[323] Bachrach, 'Crusader Logistics' p. 43.
[324] France, *Victory in the East*, pp. 171-172.
[325] Bachrach, 'Crusader Logistics' pp. 44-45.
[326] *GT*, 4N, p. 46.

the late 20th century. The impact on the route, however, would have been so great as to effectively fail to keep the pilgrims fed properly and certainly not enough in order for their strength to remain great enough to be able to fight the Turks who awaited them. The damage caused by 70,000 people and their livestock marching through one particular area, feeding from it alone will also have been such magnitude that its effect would have been seen in the years afterwards and would certainly been commented on by more chroniclers in the case of the First Crusade. However neither of the two main sources reports any such damage. They do explain exactly how this was overcome, by dividing the four armies into two main groups between the French and the Normans, who:

> *'…became divided into 2 detachments, and travelled in this way 30 days. In the 1st detachment were Bohemond, that brave man, and Robert of Normandy and the wise Tancred, and many others. In the 2nd detachment but the count of Saint Gilles and Duke Godfrey and the Bishop of Puy and Hugh Magnus and the count of Flanders, and many others.'*[327]

The two forces were able to follow two different paths to remain within contact close enough to that should disaster befall one the other could rally to its aid. Certainly this is something that Ralph of Caen notes, though he also notes that this was presented as an accident to the regular pilgrims who were participating in the military campaign:

> *'As they have become accustomed during their daily, or rather nightly, marches, that the road divided into the army of Christ was likewise*

[327] *GF,* 3N, p. 41.

*divided to sections. Many thought that this error was due to a decision, namely that a wide area might provide greater spies were widely spaced people that are constricted area would to a tightly packed group.'*[328]

This was contradicted by Raymond of Aguilers, whose plain language suggests that it was a manoeuvre well known to military leaders, so that

'*…on the march the next day Bohemond and some of the princes indiscreetly parted from the Count, the Bishop and the Duke.'*[329]

The splitting of forces was repeated as necessary, though those numbers dwindled following the garrisoning of various towns in Anatolia as well as the losses from the battle of Dorylaeum and seizure of Antioch. Later, with the final siege of Jerusalem, these groups merged into one larger army.[330] The disadvantage shown at Dorylaeum meant that a Turkish force could, had the other section not arrived sooner, have destroyed the Crusading armies piece by piece as occurred in 1101 to Hugh Magnus and Stephen of Blois.[331] The fact that the two stayed within a few hours' reach of one another ensured that they were close enough for support, yet were able to range further for supplies in the difficult terrain of Anatolia.

Still, the need to live off the land was such that it would require high levels of organisation. Certainly there was trade between the Crusading parties, and :

[328] GT, Chapter 20, p. 44.
[329] *RA*. Book III, p. 27.
[330] GF, 5N, page 53; Bohemond led an expedition to get provisions at the end of December 1097: 'They left on Monday, second feast day, and they took with them some 20,000 Warriors and foot soldiers and safely came into the land of the Saracens.'
[331] Kenneth M. Setton, Marshall W. Baldwin, *A History of the Crusades: The First Hundred Years* (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005) p. 365.

*"'Before the arrival of lord Bohemond, there was such a dearth of bread among us that just one loaf sold for twenty or thirty deniers*.'[332]

Splitting the force for logistical support purposes has a number of military advantages if communication is maintained by scouts and slower convoys, but separation, as shown at Dorylaeum, can be devastating. Military commanders had to be able to balance the vulnerability of their separated force against enemy action, or conversely using a divided force tactically to out flank or deceive an enemy into thinking an army less capable than it really was.

As the winters began to clear and harvests were to be found in the Levant, foraging resumed, particularly after the victories at Antioch:

> *'You can see some running agilely in hope of obtaining grain and others groaning under their burden as they return. Some restored the wells to their earlier use while others were engaged in the construction of new ones. Many were hoping the something from the cataracts of heaven and prepared containers hold water from the sky*.'[333]

Indeed, by this point, thirst had levied such a heavy toll on the Crusaders that it is understandable for them to be more concerned with gathering water than anything else. What these passages also highlight is the sheer number of people, and large physical areas too, that were engaged in the gathering of food and water. The Provençals were noted as expert foragers. In addition to the grains that were common place for Norman food, the southern French were capable of exploiting the land during a siege. At Ma'arrat-an-Nu'man, Provençals were capable of foraging for legumes:

[332] GF, 2N, p. 36.
[333] GT, Chapter 96, p. 115.

> ‘*We were inadequately prepared… It grieves me to report that in the ensuing famine one could see more than ten thousand men scattered like cattle in the field scratching and looking, trying to find grains of wheat, barley, beans or any legume.* ‘[334]

It was a trait that Ralph of Caen noted in his description of the customs of the Provençals:

> ‘*When there was a dearth of bread, they endured, content with roots. They did not spurn husks and they took up long iron tools with which they found grain in the bowels of the earth.*’[335]

## Arms and armour

One of the key aspects of maintaining both offensive and defensive operations during the armed pilgrimage to Jerusalem was the ongoing requirement for a supply of weapons and military equipment, ranging from arrow heads to siege artillery. The chronicles recount a variety of incidents where weapons, armour and ammunitions were used and acquired. Perhaps the most intriguing event, however, was that of the passage from Mamistra[336] to Marasim[337] depicted in the *Gesta Francorum:*

> ‘*Horses fell off headlong, and one lead horse dragged down others with it. And the warriors stood wretchedly, wringing their hands in misery and agony, not knowing what to do with themselves and their arms.*

[334] *RA*, Book X, p. 76.
[335] *GT*, c. 61, pp. 86-87.
[336] modern Mopsuetia
[337] modern Kahramanmaraş

*They wanted to sell their shields and splendid hauberks with helmets for no more than three or four derniers, or whatever they could get. Those who found no buyer simply threw them away and went on their way*.'[338]

The concept of soldiers exchanging equipment to make up for damaged items, or swapping a weapon for something they feel is more effective, is not a revelation. Whilst this has lessened in the contemporary era of global logistics, examples could be seen in the 20th Century when German and Soviet forces regularly utilised armoured vehicles captured from the enemy as attrition affected their armoured vehicle numbers.[339] In the late middle ages, Lord Fauconberg's less sophisticated use of the Lancastrians' arrows against them at Towton is well documented.[340] Certainly the opening statement suggests that equipment was regularly traded between the Crusaders, but the latter part of this passage raises the question: if the crusaders threw their equipment into the ravine, what were they armed and armoured with when they arrived at Antioch? Resupplying arms and war material was an issue that the military leadership felt was contained, probably because the negotiations entered into by the Crusade leaders upon their arrival at Constantinople had so far involved provisions to be supplied for the campaign.[341] Whilst the *Gesta Francorum* paints this desperate image of the Crusaders' route to Marasim from Mamistra,[342] the knights and military leaders must have felt confident that they would be able to resupply safely before reaching Antioch, unless they were vainly holding

[338] *GF*, 4N, p. 49.
[339] Thomas Anderson, *The History of the Panzerwaffe: Volume 2: 1942–45* (Oxford: Bloomsbury, 2017) p. 57.
[340] 'Edward Hall's Chronicle' in Philip Haigh, *From Wakefield to Towton: The Wars of the Roses* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2002) pp. 80-1.
[341] *GF*, 2N, pp. 34-5, *FC*, b. I, c. 9:1-2 p.79, *RA*, b. II, p. 22-4, *GT*, c. 9-10, pp. 30-2, *RM*, b. II, c. X, p. 95, *AA*, b. II, c. X, p. 50.
[342] *AA*, b. III, c. 59, p. 123.

on to the hope that they would be able to be supplied. It is possible that the foraging mentality that applied to food extended to the sourcing of military material amongst the Byzantine. Armenian and Syrian populations that the Crusaders came across, though there is no source material that would suggest this. A further complication of the evidence comes in a lack of archaeological evidence for the campaign, not just for the march to Marasim. The common image of Norman and Frankish knights active in the crusade is one that has much in common with the Bayeux Tapestry.[343] But if supplies for the Crusaders, whether food or weaponry, relied far more on Armenian, Syrian and Byzantine sources, potentially such equipment could have been alien to the Crusaders. The *Gesta Tancredi* notes that the Seljuk Turks of Nicaea used curved swords known as scimitars.[344] This sword would have been a relatively unknown type in Europe,[345] where the medieval sword was not so different from its early medieval ancestors. The Frankish sword, Danish Sword and Saxon Sword all sported a 30 inch blade.[346] These swords developed into the types of sword (Type X) that were used by Norman and Frankish knights in Europe from the 1050s through to the Hundred Years War.[347] The Type X has a relatively straight edge, tapering to a single point.

[343] An excellent example of this is shown by the opening credits of Pen Densham's adaptation of Robin Hood, *Robin Hood Prince of Thieves* when the director uses the Bayeux tapestry in the context of the military of the 3rd Crusading period. 1991. [Film]. Kevin Reynolds. dir. U.S.A.: Morgan Creek Productions, 0:35-2:25
[344] *GT*, chap 17, p. 40.
[345] For an example of a late 11th century sword see E. Oakeshott, *Swords in the time of Chivalry* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1997) p. 31
[346] N. Evangelista, *The Encyclopaedia of the Sword* (London: Greenwood, 1995) pp. 60-61.
[347] Oakeshott, *The Sword in the Age of Chivalry*, p. 25.




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The victors of confrontations, roaming across the battlefield foraging for items of value in the wake of a battle that left casualties who were either dead or unable to defend themselves, has been a common theme of warfare up to the modern era.[349] There is no reason to believe that the combatants of the Crusades were any different. Indeed, with the nomadic nature of the crusade, such actions may have been necessary, though it is unclear how much they would be encouraged or discouraged by the military or spiritual leadership. A lack of commentary on the subject implies a sense of the everyday, it being unremarkable, unlike the act of

[348] Ibid., p. 24
[349] See for example *BT,* 71, p. 194.

cannibalism,[350] or the massacre of the Arab women following the battle of Antioch during the second siege which is noted not to have involved any rape.[351,352] The circumstances surrounding the condition of the victorious army might dictate whether items of value on any particular day were jewellery, precious metals, militaria, livestock, or mundane items such as boots, clothes and even food and water. A number of weapons including scimitars are likely to have been recovered with each Frankish victory, as in Albert of Aachen's descriptions of Count Hartmann and Henry of Esch.[353] Allowing that the chroniclers' accounts of the quantities of weapons taken may be discounted as not wholly accurate, even using the concepts of *Sachkritik* the chroniclers inform us in each account of the high numbers of Turks defeated on the road to Jerusalem.[354]

The style of using particular weapons varied and soldiers spent many hours practising their effective use in a variety of situations. Those who had sufficient funds had armourers produce swords and other weapons that were of weight, balance and length suited to the build of an individual. Suddenly acquiring a different weapon that was unfamiliar could have a detrimental effect on those used to a particular style of mêlée combat, even though a professional soldier might identify the weapon as being superior to their own, as suggested by Albert of Aachen.[355] Attempting to change fighting style could potentially decrease the individual crusader's capability in combat and pose an individual risk as well as reducing force effectiveness against the enemy. When multiplied, this could then force the crusader armies to change

[350] *RA*, b. X, p. 81.
[351] *AA*, b. IV, c. 56, p. 175.
[352] *FC*, b. I, c. XXIII:5, p. 106
[353] *AA*, b. IV, c. 54, pp. 173-4
[354] *GF*, 3N, p. 43 for example.
[355] Military training for a knight usually began in childhood, see K. DeVries, 'The Stirrup, Mounted Shock Combat, Chivalry, and Feudalism' in *Medieval Military Technology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press ,2012) p. 103.

their tactics simply to cope with the change in equipment, something that could weaken their military capability due to the compounded reduction in individual effectiveness. Where soldiers in a particular group may have acquired weapons from benefactors or their comrades who for some reason had no further use for them, these would have been a familiar style and would likely have been brought from sources closer to home. So problematic was the issue that I believe that those trained with Gallic or Frankish swords[356] would have retained their weapons rather than attempt to use scimitars until they had had an extensive opportunity to train and evaluate the merits of each type of weapon. This is not something that would have affected every crusader, however, as the Byzantines under Tatikos in particular, as well as any Syrian and Armenian recruits, may have been more capable of utilising such weapons due to their closer geography and contact with Arab and Turkish military societies. A 10th century Byzantine Treatise, for example, suggests a growth in the use of the *paramerion,* a prototype sabre undoubtedly influenced by the Turkish scimitar.[357]

While some weaponry was tailored to individuals, the majority was likely to have been of a standard issue that the combatant learned to use. By contrast, body armour is more personal and would generally require more adaptation as it passed between owners. The armour of the First Crusading knights consisted mainly of a hauberk made from chain links to produce mail.[358] These coats of mail could be supported by boiled leather pieces shaped to come extent around the wearer [*Cuir bouilli]*. Compared to the sword, the hauberk was a considerable weight. John

[356] *GT*, c. 13, p. 140.
[357] J. Haldon, 'Military Technology and Warfare', in *Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies,* ed. E. Jeffreys, J. Haldon and R. Cormack (Oxford: OUP, 2008) p. 477
[358] France, *Victory in the East*, p. 33.

France noted that the hauberk alone weighed around 11kg.[359] Smail notes how these hauberks had transformed; by 1100 the hauberk had become a suit of mail which covered the body with additions of mail leggings, gauntlets and coif,[360] adding considerable further weight and requiring extra effort by the combatant. In temperate climes this may have be tolerable, the heat of exertion in combat being dissipated. In the un-shaded heat of the sun in Anatolia and Levant, however, it must have been intolerable. We are informed by Al Qalanisi that the Turks also employed chain mail fabricators for their armour.[361] This suggests that mail would be available to the knights and Crusaders at Antioch that they took from defeated Turks. The ability to adapt was key for the crusaders as they advanced through the Crusade. Certainly their Byzantine allies would have been able to provide mail coats. Haldon notes that the mail coat was the most popular style of armour alongside iron cuirasses called *loriton*,[362] although this may also be a form of laminar armour as suggested by Piotr Grotowski.[363] The note of repair by the knights presumably refers to maintenance which they could do alone, but may also refer to work by blacksmiths and armourers retained by the knights. It is reasonable to assume that the medieval blacksmith was therefore an important part of the fighting army, making new weapons, keeping up the supply of arrowheads and the repair of damaged weapons and modification and routine repair of armour[364].

In many ways the army of the Crusaders must have slowly but surely come to look more like a Middle Eastern army, whether Greek or Turkish, from the arms and

[359] *Ibid*. p. 33.
[360] Smail, *Crusading Warfare,* p. 107.
[361] Ibn Al Qalānisī, *The Damascus Chronicle*, p. 44.
[362] J. Haldon, 'Military Technology and Warfare', in *Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies,* ed. E. Jeffreys, J. Haldon and R. Cormack (Oxford: OUP, 2008) p. 476.
[363] Piotr Grotowski, *Arms and Armour of the Warrior Saints* (Leiden: BRILL, 2010) p.155.
[364] Edge, D. & Paddock J.M., *Arms and Armour of the Medieval Knight*. (London: Saturn, 1998)

armour which it recovered. The popular image of the *Maciejowski Bible* or *Bayeux Tapestry* representation of the Crusaders therefore is probably less likely than similar Byzantine art of the same period.[365] Of course there would also have been European equipment cannibalised from that thrown away or lost in battle. In this respect then looting as a motivation was less for material gain but again for survival and to ensure the final victory. Sadly, the chroniclers didn't go into detail as to what was, or perhaps more interestingly wasn't, taken by the Crusaders. We can assume from the references to curved swords and hauberks that the pilgrims were keen to maintain their weaponry, lost as a result of their earlier errors, perhaps reinforced by a lack of description concerning the discarding of swords and spears during the mountain climbs. The military leadership had little control over its forces' equipment procurement. Besides providing initial equipment as suggested by all the sources, the individual combatant was responsible for their own equipment maintenance. Raymond of Aguilers notes that, prior to the battle of Antioch, the knights not only repaired but adjusted their armour. The taking of loot following victories would likely have involved stripping the bodies of the dead, as shown in the final scenes of the Bayeux Tapestry.[366] This is something that may go some way towards explaining why the Crusaders felt they could throw away their equipment in the Taurus Mountains and still be able to complete their objective of conquering the Levant. The complex mix of armour types including mail, lamellar, leather and scale would have presented both options and adaptability to the eastern form of combat. As looting was so prevalent, large scale victories such as Dorylaeum may have enabled the

[365] See John France, *Western Warfare In The Age Of The Crusades, 1000-1300* (London: Routledge, 2002). *Cardinal Maciejowski's Bible* (Mah-chi-eh-yov-ski) otherwise called the *Morgan Bible* is a rich source for visual material concerning the equipment of European soldiers. Certainly the mass majority of forces that joined the crusade would have looked similar to these images as they departed Europe.
[366] *BT*, 71, p. 194.

military leaders to upgrade their forces. This, however, is not noted as a planned strategy nor could it have been something that was reliable.

## Looting

Whilst the aristocracy was able, in less turbulent times, to gather funds through taxation and tithing,[367] the nomadic nature of the Crusade meant that much of their funding, as with their logistics, would have to be gained from the lands and peoples that they conquered. In this case monetary gain was as much a necessity as it was a motivation. It is therefore unsurprising that the main source of income for the Crusaders was through looting battlefields and cities after they were finished.

> *'Our men who had routed them, by the grace of God, took much loot- horses, camels, mules, donkeys laden with grain and wine.'*[368]

This was largely commented upon, at least by the *Gesta Francorum* as a matter of fact, suggesting that the practice was widely accepted by society at the time and thus by the military leadership of the era. For a large part, logistics were an important part of the scavenging process. The Crusaders were without farms or constant lines of logistical support. Following the sallying out of the Crusader forces from Antioch, the Crusaders' dire need for food was still complemented by a rush for financial improvement:

[367] 'This also clear that largesse was a little sister of this sense of mercy so that he [Robert of Normandy] would purchase a sparrow hawk on dog for any amount of silver. The same time, the count's Treasury was supported by plundering his citizens.' *GT*, Chapter 15, p. 37.
[368] *GF*, 5N, p51

*'And they abandon their pavilions, and their gold and silver many furnishings, as well as their sheep and oxen, horses and mules, camels and donkeys, grain and wine, flour and many other things which they needed.'*[369]

Looting too was a major factor in motivating the troops under a general's command. At the spectacular victory at the Battle of Dorylaeum, many were heavily motivated by the chance of gaining loot:

*'Come what may, stand firm in the faith of Christ and have faith in the victory of the Holy Cross, because today, if it pleases God, all riches shall be given to you.'*[370]

This secretive message that passed between the line troops did seem to steady them. And as the waves of Turks began to fall back, despite the death of Tancred's brother and lieutenant, William,[371] the Normans and Franks did indeed grasp the riches they were hunting:

*'And we took much loot-gold, silver, horses, donkeys, camels, sheep, cattle, and so many other things that we did not know about.'*[372]

The stress placed upon animals being seized is highly significant, not least, as we shall see, for the way in which famine gripped the Crusaders during their sieges at Antioch and of Jerusalem. Taking the pack animals presumably also included taking the supplies they carried, thus bolstering the troops for no extra charge to the senior commander. This non-material gain was a significant logistics boon for the

[369] *GF*, 9N, p. 87.
[370] *GF*, 3N, p. 42.
[371] *GT*, Chapter 26, p. 49.
[372] *GF*, 3N, p. 43.

military leadership, not least as all the gold and jewels taken could only be spent on food that was available, that is the resources that were physically in the vicinity of the forces.

## Foraging in the First Crusade

The issues with food supply were such that the Crusader army was forced to rely upon foraging.[373] In the modern age of military logistics and supply, food, equipment and personnel can be reasonably brought from depots to front lines in a matter of hours. Whether by mule train, truck or aircraft, modern soldiers can, in most circumstances, expect to be able to be fed and armed in the manner that they have been trained for. The medieval commander did not have such a luxury, and relied heavily upon living off of the land they were operating in. The First Crusade saw this action performed on a large scale, requiring vast sums of produce to be sourced and harvested so that the Crusader army could feed itself.

Following the successes at Nicaea and Dorylaeum, the Crusaders faced an inhospitable journey across Anatolia. Both Raymond of Aguilers and Fulcher of Chartres fail to note the difficult journey, yet the Robert the Monk states that after the battle of Dorylaeum, the Turks withdrew, burning the land around them to deny resources to the pilgrims.[374] The *Gesta Francorum* and Albert of Aachen both state how this affected the troops. Albert notes that due to a

[373] The logistics of the Second Crusade were explored by John France in, 'Logistics and the Second Crusade' In *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. J. H. Pryor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) pp. 77-94.
[374] *RM*, b. III, c. XVIII, pp. 114-115.

"'*…great shortage of water ...as many as five hundred of both sexes gave up the ghost on the same day.*'[375]

Albert also notes that the stresses of the march were too much for pregnant women in the Crusade, with many miscarrying on the Roman Road.[376] The *Gesta Francorum* notes that the Turkish scorched earth policy forced the pursuing column to travel through:

> '*…deserts and a land which was waterless and uninhabitable, from which we only just escaped and came out alive. Hunger and thirst harassed us, and we had nothing to eat other than spiky plants which we plucked and crushed in our hands… A great number of our horses died there, and as a result many of our mounted soldiers became foot soldiers.*'[377]

The *Gesta Francorum* further states that the inhabitants of Iconium (Konya) warned the Crusaders that there was little water to be found at that time of year on the Konya Plain, and to take water skins.[378]

Beyond the Konya plain, the Crusaders were able to engage in foraging on a larger scale. The area before them encouraged the army to spread out so that it might better be able to live off the land. In one instance Albert of Aachen notes that Godfrey hunted for food in forests. It was here that Albert relates his account of Godfrey being savaged by a bear.

[375] *AA*, b. III, c. 1, p. 79.
[376] *AA*, b. III, c. 2, pp. 79-80.
[377] *GF*, 4N, p. 46.
[378] *GF*, 4N, p. 46.

> '*When at length they had spread out through the shady parts of the wood, each on his own path to ambush the wild beasts, Duke Godfrey saw that a bear of most enormous and frightful appearance had seized a helpless pilgrim out gathering twigs...*'[379]

This episode, though likely there more to highlight the heroic struggle of the Crusade commanders, and specifically Godfrey who became king, does show the hazards that the Crusaders faced in their search for food.

Reaching Antioch in the Autumn of 1097, the Crusaders found a variety of foodstuffs in the vicinity. These supplies were vital for the winter survival of the Crusaders until such time as supplies from the Byzantine Empire's islands could reach the pilgrims. The foraging parties were also under constant threat of attack as they remained scattered across foreign countryside.[380] Raymond of Aguilers states that the Turks, having learned that the foraging parties were lightly armed, decided to take the opportunity to attack. He states that the Turks either patrolling from Antioch or else travelling the two-day trek from Aleppo readily attacked the foragers in the fields.[381] Following the attacks, and the lack of resupply from the sea port of St. Symeon, the provisions lasted until December. Upon realising the danger, Bohemond and Robert of Flanders set out to gather supplies on a *chevauchée,* or swift armed cavalry raid, along with a large number of mounted troops.[382] This mounted raid proved successful enough to enable the Crusaders to continue their

[379] *AA*, b. III, c. 4, pp. 81-82.
[380] B.S. Bachrach, 'Crusader Logistics; from victory at Nicaea to resupply at Dorylaeum' in *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, ed. John H. Pryor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) p. 61.
[381] *RA*, IV, p. 32
[382] *GF*, 5N, pp. 53-54.

siege of Antioch. Bohemond repeated the exercise in early January[383] with limited success. [384]

The settlements around Antioch provided a further source of supply for the military leaders. Each one targeted an area that would otherwise have supplied Antioch. The *Gesta Tancredi* lists the towns and their new overlords following the departure of Stephen of Blois to Alexandretta in Lent 1098. Ralph states that:

> '*The other leaders occupied the nearby towns, and there was, therefore, a better opportunity to bring aid easily.*"[385]

The strategic value of the settlements was clear by the emphasis that each was given, both in who ruled it and what it would produce to sustain the Crusade forces. Whilst it is clear that higher income earning towns, such as Sedium, with its wine production were taken by Godfrey and Robert of Flanders, it is worth noting that Tancred was supposed to have taken towns closer to the camps.

> "*Hamah and Hirem served Tancred along with many other productive [towns] near to the camp*"[386]*.*

Tancred's choice of Hamah and Hirem as his base of operations was thought out with Ralph of Caen stating that he had been able to do so as he led the vanguard to the city.[387] With these settlements the military leaders were able to form rear support bases that allowed wounded and exhausted troops

[383] *GF*, 6N, pp. 55-56.
[384] *GF*, 6N, pp. 55-56.
[385] *GT*, c. 59, p. 85
[386] *GT*, c. 59, p. 85
[387] *GT*, c. 59, p. 85

somewhere to withdraw to, as well as access to supplies to further aid their cause.

Further supplies arrived from St. Symeon, as will be discussed, and the route along the coast of the Levant provided opportunities for the Crusaders to continue to be supplied from allied areas. To supplement this, a number of cities were also coerced into supplying the pilgrimage or else face its wrath. Just as the military leadership was required to spend money, so too it realised that it had to gain it. Looting was a haphazard affair, with many unable to find worthwhile items. By contrast state level extortion could be used as a tool against the lesser enemies of the Crusade.

> *'(The) King of Tripoli made a treaty with the chief Lords and at once handed over to them more than three hundred pilgrims that he had captured, and he also gave to them 15,000 bezants and fifteen horses of great value… which enriched the Army of Christ.'*[388]

Exaction of assets like this was possible thanks to the prior ruthlessness that had accompanied the Crusade. As the horde fell upon each city, the risks as previously explored, were such that opposing civic and military leaders had to consider whether or not resistance would be worthwhile. Inhabitants of the cities of the Holy Land faced a stark choice. Resisting and succumbing to a siege led to destruction, but failure to resist was often met with horrendous consequences for the inhabitants of such cities:

[388] *GF,* 10N, p. 100.

> '*And Bohemond took those that he had ordered into the palace, and he took away all that they had, namely gold, silver and other ornaments; some he had killed, and others he had sent to Antioch to be sold.*'[389]

Thus it became safer not to resist the Crusaders as they made their way to their main target city; Jerusalem. Tripoli was able to hold out long enough for a peace deal, as mentioned.[390] Raymond states that the castles and cities now regularly supplied the Crusaders:

> '*Now we were well provisioned because many gifts from castles and cities other than Gibellum were sent to us. Moreover, some of the Saracens, prompted by fear or because of a zeal for life, anathematized Mohammed and all his progeny and were baptised.*'[391]

Foraging was no longer relied upon until the siege of Jerusalem. Here the conditions were so poor, despite extended supply lines from Antioch, that the Crusaders were forced to forage again, but for water and not food.

Robert the Monk stresses that mostly the pilgrims suffered from thirst in this time, something supported by Raymond of Aguilers, and the *Gesta Francorum.*[392] Fulcher stresses that the supplies were plentiful except for water.

> '*Meanwhile, however, our men did not suffer from lack of bread or meat. Yet because the area was dry, unwatered, and without streams our men as well as their beasts suffered for lack of water to drink.*'[393]

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[389] *GF*, 10N, p. 95.
[390] *RA*, XI, p. 91.
[391] *RA*, XI, p. 91.
[392] *RM*, b. IX, c. V, p. 198-199; *RA*, XIV, p. 118; *GF*, 10N, p. 102.
[393] *FC*, b. I, c. XXVII, p. 119.

Once again the foragers found themselves subject to ambushes by enemy forces.[394] Supplies from the sea became more reliable, especially as the ports could be garrisoned and protected from the sea by the ships themselves. The nature of foraging was a delicate one. On the one hand it shortened the length of supply lines required and allowed for troops to remain with the main body of the army, rather than be garrisoned elsewhere. Conversely the act of foraging made the pilgrims more vulnerable to attack as they were more spread out and less able to be defended. The military leaders allowed foraging to occur, seemingly considering it as a last resort rather than a method to rely upon. Organised supply caravans and ship convoys were the preferred method, with the latter enabling a great quantity of supplies to be delivered over a shorter period from the Mediterranean, as we shall now explore.

## Ships of the First Crusade

To fully comprehend how the First Crusaders were effectively supplied from the sea we should consider the vessels available to them. The chroniclers do not consider the maritime issues confronting the pilgrims in any great detail.[395] However, the military leaders were certainly concerned with it, and we are granted glimpses of this through the events of the pilgrimage as it arrived at the Levant. In terms of the vessels that existed in the Mediterranean to use, we can consider ships as belonging to two differing classes: warships and cargo vessels. Richard Unger demonstrates that the Mediterranean ships of both the Fatimids and Byzantines continued upon

[394] *AA*, b. VI, c. 4, p. 212.
[395] J. Pryor, 'Shipping and Sea Faring' in *Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies* (Oxford: OUP, 2008) p. 488.

the lines of the *monoremes*, *biremes* and *triremes* of the Roman Empire.[396] The Byzantine navy could be subdivided into several distinct galleys or *dromons* based upon the Byzantine concept of the maritime unit used to crew each vessel. The *ousia* consisted of 108 men,[397] and was used to determine the size of crew required for each of the vessels. The *ousiakos* for example required a single *ousia* to man it completely, and informs us that it thus had banks of 50 oars each side with one man on each oar. One and a half *ousia* were required to crew the *pamphylian.*[398] This was manned with Mardite marines resettled to Pamphylos by Justinian II.[399] Finally the workhorse of the Byzantine Navy was the *chendalian*. Taking its name from the Greek word *kelos* meaning coarser,[400] the *chendalian* was noted by the early eleventh-century German chronicler Thietmar of Merseberg as 'a ship of marvellous length and speed, having two banks of oars on each side with space for one hundred and fifty sailors.'[401]

Arab, and thus Fatimid, designs followed the Byzantine model for the most part.[402] The Arab *shalandi* (plural *shalanda*) was based directly on the *chendalian*, even going so far as to retain its name.[403] It was these ships that became the mainstay of the Crusader states' fleets in the years after the conquest. The *Gesta Tancredi* describes how, in 1104, Bohemond set out once more to Europe on a

[396] R. W. Unger, 'Warships and Cargo Ships in Medieval Europe' in *Technology and Culture*, **Vol. 22** (2) 1981, pp.233-252.
[397] L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World*, (London: Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 150.
[398] A. Konstam, *Byzantine Warship vs Arab Warship: 7th-11th Centuries* (Oxford: Osprey, 2015) p. 22.
[399] C. Stanton, *Medieval Maritime Warfare* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2015) p. 25.
[400] Ibid.
[401] Thietmar of Merseberg, *Chronicon*, ed. D. A. Warner (Manchester: MUP, 2001) book III, chapter 23, p. 145.
[402] C. Stanton, *Medieval Maritime Warfare*, p. 15.
[403] D. Agius, *Classic Ships of Islam: From Mesopotamia to the Indian Ocean*, (Boston: BRILL, 2008) pp. 337–338, A. Konstam, *Byzantine Warship vs Arab Warship,* p. 22.

recruiting campaign, leaving Tancred as regent of the city. Bohemond is noted to have left with three *sandaliae* alongside ten other galleys.[404]

Both the *chendalian* and its Arabic counterpart were occasionally referred to as being used as troop transports. The 960 Byzantine invasion of Crete used the large *chendalians* to transport forces,[405] whilst a document from the *Cairo Geniza* or 'storeroom' notes a slow and cumbersome trireme called a *koumbaria.*[406] There were, however, issues which denied galleys a position as significant cargo vessels. The design of the *dromon* was aimed at cutting through waves like a sword, using its slender body. This meant that vessels were more prone to swamping.[407] This was so great a threat that Emperor Leo VI advised Roman captains only to set sail in favourable winds and to take refuge from squalls.[408] A further issue was created from the requirements of the sailors. The cargo capacity of *dromons* meant they could only carry two to three days of fresh water, forcing them to travel between sources of water rather than being able to take more direct routes.[409] The development of the 'roundship', a ship with a ratio of 4:1 length to beam, in the 11th and 12th centuries enabled vessels such as the *cog* to a greater impact on maritime trade and supply.[410] These were by no means a new innovation in maritime technology. The Roman Empire, once it held dominion over the Mediterranean Sea, chose to use round vessels to transport the majority of goods.[411] So too, the post-Roman Arabian

[404] *GT*, Chapter 153, p. 170.
[405] Pryor, *Oxford Handbook,* p. 488.
[406] C. Stanton, *Medieval Maritime Warfare*, p. 15.
[407] Pryor, *Oxford Handbook*, p. 489.
[408] Ibid.
[409] Ibid.
[410] R. W. Unger, 'Warships and Cargo Ships' p. 237.
[411] Ibid., p. 206.

states developed the design into the *jafn*, which utilised both sails and oars despite its shape.[412]

Northern Europe's development of ships can be linked to earlier Scandinavian designs.[413] The designs of long ships and Scandinavia may dominate the imagination when considering Norse ships but the *knarr* or *knǫrr*, was the principal merchant and exploration craft of the Viking age. The *knǫrr*, like its Mediterranean counterparts such as the *dhow* and the *jafn*, can be considered a round ship,[414] with a broad hull capable of carrying men and material but not as well-suited to maritime battles as vessels such as the *dreki*, *fley* or *langskip,*[415] which clearly influenced the development of the *esnecca.*[416] The vessels were constructed with planks overlapping with five iron rivets per metre of planking, referred to as clinker built.[417] It was in these *knǫrrs* that the hazardous deep sea voyages across the Atlantic were completed.[418] One such vessel found had a 4.5 m beam with 16.3 m length and 2.1 m deep,[419] reflecting the round ship principle of ratios and considered by maritime experts to be principally transport ships.[420] From these ships the broad bottomed *knǫrr* would develop into a ship more recognisable as the *cog.*[421]

[412] D. Agius, *Classic Ships of Islam: From Mesopotamia to the Indian Ocean*, p. 340, *jafn* is an Arabic term meaning large bowl
[413]Teresita Majewski and David R. M. Gaimster, *International Handbook of Historical Archaeology* (London: Springer, 2009) p. 118
[414] William Sayers, 'The Etymology and Semantics of Old Norse 'knǫrr' 'cargo Ship' The Irish and English Evidence', in *Scandinavian Studies*, Vol. 68 (3) (1996), p. 279.
[415] Ibid.
[416] Richard H. F. Lindemann, 'The English Esnecca In Northern European Sources' in *The Mariner's Mirror*, Vol 74:1, (1988) pp. 75-82.
[417] Jan Bill, 'Ships and Seamanship', in *The Oxford Illustrated History Of The Vikings*, ed. Peter Sawyer (Oxford: OUP, 2001) p. 195.
[418] Ibid., p. 190
[419] Ibid., also R. W. Unger, 'Warships and Cargo Ships', p. 237.
[420] R. W. Unger, 'Warships and Cargo Ships', p. 237.
[421]Richard A. Gould, *Archaeology and the Social History of Ships* (Cambridge: CUP, 2000) p. 171.

The structure and design of the *cog* remained a mystery until the find of the Bremen *cog.*[422] The ship shared many of the principal structural points as the *knǫrr*, and though evidence for it only arrived in the 13th century, a Carolingian designation of a *cokingi* suggests that a ship of this type existed prior to 1200.[423] Wrecks such as that found at Serçe Limani portray these cargo vessels as having two masts with a length of 15.66 m and a being of 5.12 m, with a displacement of 35 tonnes.[424] The small size of this ship agrees with the images of low sided vessels in the Bayeux tapestry, a valuable source of the period.


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These small vessels, with the horses able to peer over the sides in the tapestry, were vital to the conquest of England by the Normans in 1066. The European war machine relied heavily upon horses, not just for their cavalry but also in transport. There was no discernible change to this strategy for the Crusaders.[426] As losses of horses mounted during the campaign, such vessels were vital to resupply the armies.

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[422] Majewski and Gaimster, *International Handbook* p. 118
[423]Nicholas Hooper and Matthew Bennett, *The Cambridge Illustrated Atlas of Warfare: The Middle Ages* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996) pp. 166-7.
[424] Stanton, *Medieval Maritime Warfare,* p. 73
[425] *BT*, 42, p. 186.
[426] *GF*, 9N, p. 86, *AA*, Book II, C. 42, p. 76, *GT*, C. 52, p. 78.

At the inception of the Norman Conquest of England, Bishop Odo, half-brother to William the Conqueror, was responsible to gathering 100 ships for the campaign.[427] Without Odo, William's campaign would have been far more difficult. This large number of ships was necessary to carry, not just the men and horses, but their provisions as well. It is suggested by the Bayeux Tapestry that Odo was able to have ships built specially for the occasion.[428] The size of the Norman fleet in 1066 is estimated between 696 and 3,000 ships of differing classes and sizes, used to transport around 10,000 men and 2,500 horses,[429] with all the necessary supplies to support the invasion. At the time of the invasion, it was considered the largest amphibious action since the fall of the Roman Empire. The majority of ships Bishop Odo gathered must have come from privately owned vessels if for no other reason than the high number of vessels that were gathered in such a short space of time.[430] Indeed, navies of the medieval world had to be composed of private ship owners. The ill-fated vessel that carried Henry I's heir William, the White Ship, was itself privately owned, showing that there was no Royal Naval vessel to carry the prince back to England. So too the account of the Conquest of Lisbon, written for the Second Crusade in 1147, informs us that the expedition had involved William Vitulus, anglicised as Calf or Veal, and his brother Ralph,[431] two private ship owners apparently with a small fleet.[432] We have already noted in a previous chapter how the skills of the Church could be utilised for temporal means, and the organisation of ships appears to have been in high demand during the late 11th century. The

[427] Marc Morris, *The Norman Conquest* (London: Windmill, 2013) p. 146.
[428] *BT*, 35-37, pp. 183-4
[429] For more on the ships used by William I see Elizabeth van Houts, 'The Ship List of William the Conqueror' in *Anglo-Norman Studies X* (Martlesham, 1987) pp. 159-183.
[430] Bernard S. Bachrach, 'On the Origins of William the Conqueror's Horse Transports', *Technology and Culture*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jul., 1985), p. 505-531.
[431] *DEL*, p. 100-102.
[432] *DEL*, p. 102.

organisational achievement of Odo of Bayeux was eclipsed by Urban II working on his *magnum opus*. In early 1097, Urban sent two of his finest orators, Bishop William of Orange and his counterpart Bishop Hugh Chateuneuf d'Isere of Grenoble, to preach the Crusade to the Genoese. The mission was a success and in July of the same year, Genoa sent 12 ships including their own *chendalion* or *sandarum* to Antioch.[433] Almost a year later, after the harsh winter of 1097-8, a multinational fleet comprising English, Venetian and Pisan ships arrived, docking in March 1098.[434]

The importance of this second fleet was how it then performed after reaching the Levant. The fleet not only joined the Genoese in providing valuable reinforcements but also now began the vital role of ferrying supplies from Byzantine held islands in the Aegean, mainly Rhodes and Cyprus.[435] Its success can be measured in how ineffective the Crusaders were at supplying their forces when they chose to leave the coast line. At Maarat al-Nu'man the failings in supply were so great that they fell to acts of cannibalism as described by Fulcher of Chartres:

> '*Here our men suffered from excessive hunger. I shudder to say that many of our men, terribly tormented by the madness of starvation, cut pieces of flesh from the buttocks of Saracens lying there dead. These they cooked and ate…* '[436]

Albert of Aachen's horror over the issue was clear when he stated:

> '*It is extraordinary to relate, and horrifying to the ears: these same torments of famine grew so great around these cities that – it is wicked to tell let alone to do – the Christians did not shrink from eating not only*

[433] Stanton, *Medieval Maritme Warfare,* p. 76
[434] Ibid., p. 77
[435] *GF*, 6N p. 57; *AA*; *RA*, b. VII, p. 54.
[436] *FC*, Book I, p. 112.

*killed Turks or Saracens, but even dogs…There is no sharper sword than long-drawn-out hunger(also see Vegetius)*'[437]

The *Gesta Francorum* noted with some explanation that some of the mutilation was not completely due to cannibalism:

'*Now there were among our men those who did not find what they needed, either because of our long halt or because they were driven by hunger, for outside the city [of Maarat al-Nu'man] they could find nothing to seize, and so they tore apart the bodies of the dead since one could find bezants in their stomachs. But others, in fact, cut their flesh as morsels which they cooked and ate.*'[438]

Even through the harsh winters of the siege of Antioch and the struggles of Anatolia the Crusaders had never resorted to such means. It is possible that there was a psychological shift caused by the siege. Seeing such events as there must have had some impact, but still it is not coincidental that the acts of cannibalism came at a period when supplies could not be brought effectively by sea as Raymond of Aguilers noted for the siege of Arqah:

'*During the protracted siege our ships from Antioch and Latakia, along with Venetian and Greek vessels, anchored with grain, wine, barley pork, and other marketable goods. However, the sailors soon sailed back to the ports of Latakia and Tortosa in view of the fact that Arqah lay a mile from the sea, and the ships had no place to dock.*'[439]

[437] *AA*, Vol. 1, Book V, C. 29, p. 194.
[438] *GF*, 10N, p. 95.
[439] *RA*, Book XI, p. 88.

In the end the siege of Arqah was abandoned. The ability of the 'navy' to supply the Crusaders with supplies was highly successful. In the cases where the Crusaders were capable of securing routes to the ports held by sailors, they were more successful during the campaign, reflecting a conscious effort by the commanders to maintain the links between ports and sites of conflict, most notably seen during the lengthy Siege of Antioch with Bohemond clearing the route to St. Symeon as well as escorting organised convoys of supplies and reinforcements.[440]

The Crusaders' need for regular supply from the sea was not something that was purely achieved by chance. The military leadership was a combination of leaders who excelled at a variety of skills. Whilst Bohemond stands out in having spies within his retinue, Count Eustace, Godfrey and Baldwin of Boulogne are noted to have retained the services of a naval agent. To understand fully how this sailor was related to the count we should note that he was not unique to the House of Boulogne.

The Vitulus brothers were involved in piracy alongside crusading, adding to the mix of merchants and 'maritime entrepreneurs' who supplied military leaders with maritime transport capabilities. A large amount of detail can be gathered on the Vitulus family thanks to a number of Anglo-Norman records from the 12th century which detail their service for the Dukes of Normandy and successive monarchs of England. This service runs from at least the reign of William II through to the reign of Henry II as well as supporting the Empress Mathilde in her war with her cousin King Stephen.[441] The two were clearly not retained as part of a household directly as

[440] *GT*, Chapter 50, p. 75; *RM*, Chap XVII, p. 131; *GF*, 7N, p. 61.
[441] Léopold Delisle and Élie Berger, *Recueil des Actes de Henry II, roi d'Angleterre et duc de Normandie, concerant les provinces françaises et les affaires de France* (Paris, 1909-27) Volume I, p. 266.

shown by their ability to take the cross and join with Alfonso-Henriquez' abandoned 1142 siege of Lisbon.[442]

A similar character is included by Albert of Aachen in the events of the First Crusade. Winemer of Boulogne is noted as being a member of the household of Count Eustace of Boulogne and his brothers.[443] The meeting with Baldwin's advance forces was clearly planned, most likely for the resupplying of the army. As with the land forces, supplies were seemingly scavenged and looted from enemy shipping at sea by the naval forces. This is implied by Albert's reference to the division of spoils upon the shores near Tarsus:

> '*And they saw men disembarking from those same ships on to the seashore and dividing among themselves a great deal of booty, which they brought together over a long period of time.*'[444]

The long period of time suggested by Albert as eight years,[445] seems very excessive. Whilst European ships and shipping had been active in the east, it also seems highly coincidental that these particular Flemings, Belgians and Frisians should happen upon the very household members that they served in the channel. The booty that had been gathered also found its way into the city of Tarsus, then under Baldwin's control.[446] The whole episode suggests that, as Bohemond had his intelligence agents,[447] the sons of Eustace of Boulogne were able to add a naval asset to the strengths of the military command unit. These forces, under their direct control, were

[442] *DEL*, p. 100.
[443] *AA*, Book I, p. 90.
[444] Ibid., p. 89
[445] Ibid.
[446] *GT*, Chapters 36-38 pp. 59-61.
[447] See Chapter 1.

more pliable than the allied naval forces that arrived during the sieges of Antioch and Jerusalem.

The military leaders employed a number of naval assets to increase the chances of success. As with clerical and martial members of their retinues, they also employed naval captains to act as 'privateers' and freighter captains to weaken the enemy further. These private owners sailed vast distances in order to join the crusade. The level of communication to coordinate this was extraordinary in an era before radios and satellite phones. The sailors clearly aimed to arrive at ports, either that were already secure or with the intention of seizing them, as the Crusade advanced.

Supplying the Crusaders by sea was only possible so long as there were ports to supply them through. It was not impossible for ships to use strands along the coast as Winemer had done, but to do so risked getting beached or running aground, damaging the vessels beyond repair. The importance of large ports was therefore obvious to the military leadership. Latakia was of strategic significance thanks to the depth that the port allowed.[448] Being due south of St. Symeon, now Samandağ, the port of Latakia provided a necessary staging post for the Crusader advance. It lay almost half way between St. Symeon and the port city of Tripoli, a settlement later besieged by Raymond of Toulouse for the precise reason that it lay on the coast and thus could provide a supply depot for the Crusaders.[449] The harbour of Latakia then remained a valuable asset to the Crusaders. It is unclear as to why Winemer took the anchorage from the Byzantines,[450] but the strategic value and his presence in the

[448] For more information on Latakia's turbulent history see Ralph-Johannes Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, *1096-1204* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) pp. 259-76.
[449] *RA*, Book XIII, p. 104.
[450] *AA*, Book III, C. 59, p. 123.

Mediterranean with Eustace, Godfrey and Baldwin of Boulogne clearly showed that it was part of the Crusader stratagem as it had been at St. Symeon.

Albert fails to note exactly how Winemer took Latakia other than to note that he had

'*…all the military equipment of the navy.*'[451]

Winemer's seaborne assault appears to have overwhelmed the towers of the port before assaulting the city proper. Here he is reported to have found a great deal of supplies, possibly meant to maintain the Crusaders' march south, but either did not attempt to send supplies north to St. Symeon or else was unable to do so. The Turcopole counter attack upon Latakia being too swift to counter by Winemer he found himself in Byzantine imprisonment.[452]

The strategy for capturing sea ports was something that Albert of Aachen noted during the aftermath of the siege of Jerusalem. Bohemond, now Prince of Antioch, gathered his forces as well as a number of Pisan sailors to besiege the Byzantine port of Latakia. Albert of Aachen's account states that the sailors joined a landward siege which assaulted two towers:

'*…after a long siege [Bohemond] has seized Latakia, a city inhabited by Greek Christians, with the support and a naval attack from the Pisans and Genoese, and he had captured and entered two towers of the town situated on the seashore, citadels which exacted dues from*

[451] Ibid. p. 123
[452] Ibid. and AA, Book VI, C. 55, p. 246

*sailors, and he had slaughtered some of the Catholic guards, had blinded others, and had thrown them from the top of the towers.*'[453]

Though the rhetoric of the passage is clearly aimed at propaganda against the cruel and conniving Bohemond, the episode is also an indicator of the level of violence meted out by sailors. A similar intensity of violence can be seen in the later Siege of Lisbon.[454] Here sailors proved to be equally vicious and violent towards their enemies, perhaps a hangover from the cruel nature of combat at sea as there is simply no place to retreat to other than their ships or the hazardous waters.

Anna Komnene notes in her chronicle of Emperor Alexius, *The Alexiad*, that the Italian states' navies utilised a method for securing a sea dock to prevent their ships from being dispersed away from land.[455] The security of the sea harbour was strengthened by hoisting the small boats the Venetians in this case towed behind them. These were brought to the top of the masts to act as fighting platforms as Anna describes at Dyrrakhion:

'*Wooden towers were then constructed at their mast heads and with the help of cables the little skiffs towed by each ship were hoisted up between them. Armed men were put in these skiffs, and very thick pieces of wood cut up into lengths of not more than a cubit, into which they hammered sharp iron nails.*'[456]

This description of the Venetians using their ships to create towers goes some way to further enlighten us as to how the Pisan and Genoese sailors may have besieged

[453] *AA*, Book VI, C. 55, p. 245.
[454] For examples see the assault on the suburbs of Lisbon, *DEL*, pp. 124-128, Also the assault on Almada *DEL*, pp. 140- 142.
[455] *AK*, Book IV, p. 112.
[456] Ibid.

the customs towers at Latakia. Albert describes them as having used their ships' masts to do the same noting:

> '*…with their ships' masts which touched the clouds with their great length and had wicker baskets fixed to the tops, they bore down heavily upon the guards of the fortresses, attacking towers and men with constant bombardment of stones and arrows from the towering timber.*'[457]

These ships, due to their description of being so tall, are likely to have been comparable to the *Chendalian* galleys rather than the smaller vessels of Northern Europe available to Winemer and his 'co-pirates'. Nevertheless, such vessels as the *knǫrr*/proto-*cog* could have presented a high enough platform for the Latin sailors to similarly attack the towers.

Seizing ports along the coast of the Levant was a key strategy for the campaign. Each port, from Civetot to Jaffa, was not simply assaulted at the start of the Crusade, but systematically taken in order that they could then provide a supply base for the main body of the army. As with the port of St. Symeon during the siege of Antioch, the siege of Jerusalem required the taking of a suitable port. Raymond of Aguilers notes that the ships arrived just in time to alleviate some of the burdens:

> '*At this time news of the anchoring of six of our ships at Jaffa came to us as well as demands from the sailors that we send a garrison to protect the towers of Jaffa and their ships.*'[458]

[457] *AA*, Book VI, p. 246.
[458] *RA*, Book XIV, p. 119.

The port of Jaffa remains 50 kilometres from the city of Ascelon, which would become the centre of the final battle of the Crusade. It had been left in a dilapidated state, with its walls and most of the towers in ruins.[459] Its importance to the final siege echoes that of the previous sieges along the coast. Here once again the sailors who arrived brought with them not just food and arms but also craftsmen and the materials for siege engines and construction.[460]

The strategy of capturing ports was not wasted upon the Seljuks or the Fatimids. Indeed, Kerbogha's troops, besieging the Crusaders at Antioch, managed to not only close off the port to the Crusaders for supply but also destroy an amount of the ships as Albert of Aachen noted:

> '*Seizing the opportunity of this affair, some 2000 Turks gathered and set out for the aforesaid port and through into disorder with a sudden attack all the sailors they found there, piercing them through with arrows. They burned at the ships by throwing fire on them, seized by force the food and everything brought in by sea and carried it off. And thus they frightened away those selling and buying from the port from then on, and there was no longer any sustenance of food to be found in that place for the Christians.*'[461]

The location of Jaffa also suggests that the Fatimid relief army's approach to Jerusalem would include an attempt to wrest the port from the Crusaders before moving once again to Jerusalem.

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[459] Ibid.
[460] Thomas Asbridge, *The Crusades*, (London, 2010) p. 95.
[461] *AA*, pp. 159-160.

Overall, the strategy for resupply relied heavily upon taking and maintaining ports along the coast of the Levant. The Crusader States as they would form would rely heavily upon these, perhaps emphasised by the way in which the Islamic states of the same region forced the Crusaders into ever smaller areas along the coastline during their reconquest through the 12th and 13th centuries, with the final Crusader city of Acre, a major port, falling in 1291.[462] When Raymond of Toulouse failed to use ships and ports for the march to Jerusalem in his aborted siege of Maarat al-Nu'man, it caused a catastrophe, and almost defeated the pilgrimage. The ports allowed for larger siege equipment to be disassembled and transported by sea, rather than having to be carted over land, freeing up valuable space for food and water.

## Siege equipment and specialist imports

Specialist supplies were routinely requested by the military leaders. Though the chronicles omitted the entreaties themselves, the responses in physical items are recorded. Whilst food and arms were general needs that the Crusaders required throughout their march, the inclusion of large wooden beams and craftsmen was especially pertinent in an age before professional military engineering corps. Ralph of Caen noted during the siege of Antioch how important these resupply and reinforcement voyages were to the overall outcome of the siege.

> *'Finally, a huge number of Greek ships filled the port at Latakia. The ships were filled with weapons as well as with both craftsmen and*

[462] C. Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291* (Cambridge: CUP, 1994) p. 1.

*troops, so that they could both wage war and undertake building operations.'*[463]

The building operations were not limited to siege machines.[464] According to the *Gesta Francorum* when Raymond of Toulouse sought to build fortifications around the city of Antioch as counter-castles it was Bohemond that suggested that St. Symeon would provide the builders to construct such fortifications stating:

'… *[Raymond of Toulouse] was the first to speak: "Give me the help to build this castle and I shall fortify it and watch over it." Bohemond responded, "If this is what you want, and if others approve, I shall go to the Port of St. Symeon and bring back safely those men that are there who know how to do such work…'"*[465]

Fortifications were a major part of medieval strategy. They not only formed the basis for defence, but allowed a degree of control when attacking. This was imperative for success, but required skilled labour not only to build strong points, but to make them defensible. Such skills were not available to all masons, but required military architects as well, whom Bohemond clearly believed were present at the port.

Such supplies were a necessity for success, not a luxury that was welcome. The supplies themselves were bought and sold by merchants, something that Pisa and Genoa profited greatly from. As we will see in the next chapter, much of this was achieved by diplomacy between the Crusaders and outside forces. The supply by sea was able to provide specialist equipment for sieges such as the invaluable resources provided for siege equipment.

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[463] *GT*, p. 167.
**[464]** For more on the siege equipment used during the First Crusade see Randall Rogers, 'Latin Warfare in the First Crusade' in *Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992) pp. 53-6.
[465] *GF*, 7N, p. 61.

## Conclusion

The need for supply was a limitation that the military leadership were well aware of. These requirements were not limited to food supplies that are often taken for granted in the modern age, but to war materials such as ammunition and armour. The presentation to Kerbogha of a decrepit sword, spear and bow by Turks taking captives during his siege of Antioch[466] was a tool by which to show the Turkish general's arrogance, yet their inclusion shows the wear and tear that the Crusaders' equipment faced. The arms and armour of the Crusaders must have changed and evolved both with the equipment provided by their supply origins and with the climate they were moving into.

Without resupply of food and equipment the Crusade physically could not have succeeded in its objective of conquering the Holy Land. Food from the Empire as well as that captured from native sources enabled the Crusaders to continue with their work, yet also introduced foreign foods that may have had an effect on their psychology. Such issues may have been overcome by relying on foodstuffs that could be used as ingredients for European recipes, allowing for 'a taste of home' during the long campaign.

Significant supplies were provided by the Byzantine Empire and its islands,[467] via ships from both the Byzantine Empire and European mariners venturing from as far as England and Flanders. This in turn meant that a 'Crusader Navy' was formed with various ship types and classes that allowed for a degree of flexibility to the

[466] *GF*, 9N, p. 73.
[467] *RA*, VII, p. 54.

tactics of the maritime force. Food, equipment and specialised building resources were ferried to the Crusaders as they needed them, suggesting a complex yet currently unrevealed communications network.

Protection of the temporal and physical could only go so far towards final victory. Having fed and equipped the body, the Crusade's military leaders were also conscious that the needs of the mind and soul were a driving factor for their success. The following chapter seeks to examine methods through which the military and spiritual leadership sought to do this.

'*There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind.*'[468]

~ Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte

## 'Rivers Of Blood', Fathoming the Depths:

## An Examination of Psychological Warfare Methods

Urban's speech at Clermont was probably carefully planned and crafted, reacting more likely to the Council of Piacenza in 1095, when envoys from Constantinople had arrived begging for aid from the West against increasingly violent Islamic powers,[469] than an impulsive outburst of rhetoric. Though Jerusalem was in the hands of Islamic powers, few if any, of the atrocities he alluded to were limited solely to Christian victims in the East. Jerusalem had fallen to the Muslims in the 8th century, not even in the century when Urban called for his armed pilgrimage. Greater emphasis could have been placed on Antioch which had been taken and lost by the Byzantines and Turks constantly over the course of the 10th and 11th centuries. At the Council of Piacenza in 1095, envoys from Constantinople had arrived begging for aid from the West against increasingly violent Islamic powers.[470]

[468] L. Janczewski, *Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism* (London: Information Science Reference, 2007) p. 26.
[469] Thomas Asbridge, *The First Crusade* (Oxford, OUP, 2004) p. 15.
[470] Robert Somerville, Pope Urban II's Council of Piacenza (Oxford, OUP, 2011) pp. 15-16.

Pope Urban II concluded a meeting with the highest-ranking officials of The Church in a council at Clermont. The precise details of the meeting are lost to the mists of history, but its climax is one of the better-known moments in European history. At its close, Urban gathered the aristocrats and priests from the surrounding area and gave what was remembered by later chroniclers, including Robert the Monk, as one of history's most fateful speeches:

> *'Disturbing news has emerged from Jerusalem and the city of Constantinople and is now constantly at the forefront of our mind: namely that the race of Persians, a foreign people and a people rejected by God, indeed a generation that set not their heart aright, and whose spirit was not steadfast with God, has invaded the lands of those Christians, depopulated them by slaughter and plunder and arson, kidnapped some of the Christians and carried them off to their lands and put others to a wretched death, and has either overthrown the churches of God or turned them over to the rituals of their own religion. They throw down the altars after soiling them with their own filth, circumcise Christians, and pour the resulting blood either on the altars or into the baptismal vessels. When they feel like inflicting a truly painful death on some they pierce their navels, pull out the end of their intestines, tie them to a pole and whip them around it until, all their bowels pulled out, they fall lifeless to the ground. They shoot arrows at others tied to stakes; others again they attack having stretched out their necks, unsheathing their sword to see if they can manage to hack off their heads with one blow. And what can I say about the appalling treatment of women, which it is better to pass over in silence than to*

*spell out in detail? … So to whom should the task fall of taking vengeance and wresting their conquests from them if not you?'*[471]

In Robert's account, the speech roused the crowd to cries of '*Deus Vult!*'[472] The Bishop of Le Puy, Adhémar of Monteil then became the first to receive the Red Cross of the Pilgrimage to Jerusalem.[473] Adhémar likely had knowledge of the inflammatory nature of the message that Urban would present to the nobles who had gathered, having been a participant at the council at Clermont. Robert the Monk's version of the Clermont sermon though written sometime after Jerusalem had been captured and Urban II had died, thus painted a vivid and monstrous image of the Muslim denizens of the Middle East. His depiction thus suggests that Europeans had had no previous contact with the Arabs and Turks aside from the conquest of the Holy Land by them, and indeed, that Jerusalem had only recently been seized from Christian rule. Yet even those that took part in the armed pilgrimage knew this not to be the case. A German pilgrimage had departed for Jerusalem in 1064 that was in living memory. [474] It was a sign that Robert's depiction of the "alien" Muslim was a fallacy; these were not civilisations that had chance upon their first encounter, but more enigmatic strangers. In fact since 711 Christian polities had sought to understand Muhammad's (pbuh) forces in the greater Christian plan.[475]

As a whole Northern Europeans appear to have had little inclination to focus on Islamic culture. In the same period of the Islamic expansion into the

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[471] *RM*, b. I, c. 2, pp. 79-80.
[472] '*God Wills it!*' See J. Morwood, *A Dictionary of Latin Words and Phrases*, (Oxford: OUP, 1998) p. 46.
[473] Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades,* (Oxford: OUP, 1995) p. 1.
474 Vita Altmanni episcopi Pataveiensis, ed. Wilhelm Wattenbach, MGH SS 12 (Hannover, 1856), pp. 226-43, p. 230 accessed at http://opac.regesta-imperii.de/lang_de/anzeige.php?pk=602728
475 J. V. Tolan, *Saracens : Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2002) p. 69

Mediterranean, Maghreb and Arabian Peninsula, Northern Europe was still settling its new form after the fall of the Western Roman Empire from the 5th Century[476]. The 8th century saw not only the rise of the Holy Roman Empire across central Europe,[477] but the beginning of the Scandinavian migration and expansion from the Volga River[478] to as far as Green Land and Nova Scotia[479]. With these new polities and peoples being encountered, and their heathenism being so feared by an often fragile Catholic Church, focus by Northern proto-academics fell upon these northern pagans and efforts were consecutively launched to bring them into the fold. Bede, one of the many clerics that chartered the rise of the Norse in Britain and Europe made special exceptions to this lesser inclination to research Islam.[480] It was at this time that Charlemagne, who had wrestled an Empire from the Pyrenees to the Danube, probed the Moors of Al Andalus on how they would receive attempts to convert them in a series of political and military campaigns.[481] There may even have been an earlier attempt to bring Islam into the fold of the fledgling Latin Church through Pope Martin I in the mid-7th Century.[482] These correspondents had been used as an accusation against Martin to betray the Byzantine Empire during his trial and subsequent exile to Crimea.[483] The hostile response from early Christian rulers as well as the dangers posed to missionaries who ventured into Muslim held lands who

[476] Peter Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians* (Place: OUP, 2007) p. xi.
477 Marios Costambeys, Matthew Innes, Simon MacLean, "The Creation of the Carolingian Kingship to 800" in *The Carolingian World* (Place: CUP, 2011) pp. 31-79 , p. 31
478 Tim McNeese*, The Volga River* (Philidelphia: Chelsea House, 2005) p. 24.
479 Sveinbjörn Raffnson, "The Atlantic Islands" in *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Vikings*, ed. Peter Sawyer (OUP, 2001) pp. 110-133, p. 116
480 Benjamin Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission: European Approaches Toward the Muslims* (Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 6.
481 Hugh Kennedy, Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of al-Andalus
(Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 1996) p. 37
482 "Martin I, Letter: PL 129, col. 587" in Visions of Community in the Post-Roman World: The West, Byzantium and the Islamic World, 300–1100, ed. Walter Pohl, Clemens Gantner, Richard Payne (London: Routledge, 2016) p. 168
483 Eamon Duffy, Saints and Sinners: A History of the Popes (London: Yale university Press, 1997) p. 76

were often executed as apostates and heretics combined with the resurgence of "pagans" to the North greatly diminished any cultural interest into Islam from the developing Northern European powers.

By contrast Italy and Anatolia presented very different arenas for interaction. Though Bohemond had become famous at Antioch, his forefathers had made their names fighting first as mercenaries, and then by carving out their own kingdom on Sicily and Southern Italy. Ibn Timnah, a *taifa* kingdom Moorish ruler in the Andalusian style, had become embroiled in civil war with his neighbours and called for Norman aid in 1053.[484] The deal struck with the Hautevilles at Miletto, it included possession of Eastern Sicily as well as the cooperation of Ibn Timnah's army.[485] Whilst the details of the conquest of Sicily are well documented, their origins highlight that, to the Crusaders, the Muslims could not have been completely as alien as Robert suggests. It was also during this time that the Byzantines began to expand their commercial power alongside the Venetians. The Islamic rise of Mediterranean naval power had been noted by Ibn Kaldun.[486] It is obvious threat to Byzantine rule resulted in alliances driven to protect trade between Constantinople and the Latin West with offers of new trade deals as late as 1092.[487]

It should be remembered that the medieval perception of national or ethnic identity was predominantly based on ideas of shared culture rather than ideas of

[484] Gordon S. Brown, Norman Conquest of Italy and Sicily (London: McFarland, 2003) p. 104.
[485] Gordon S. Brown, Norman Conquest of Italy and Sicily (London: McFarland, 2003) pp. 104-5.
[486] Ibn Kaldun, *The Maqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, tr. Franz Rosenthal (Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1989) p. 210
[487] Peter Frankopan, *The Silk Roads: A New History of the World* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015) p. 142.

race.[488] This concept of culture extending beyond race goes to explain such things as the acceptance of such non-white groups the Maltese into Latin circles,[489] and possibly why Arabs and Turks were viewed with such enmity. Muslims are regularly referred to as pagans within the source texts, but in doing so the Crusaders do not identify them as alien or with *the other*. Indeed the use of the term "Pagan" in a conflict setting was more of a continuation of the wars that had been fought against Christendom for centuries prior,[490] this was reflected in the term "*pagan Sicily*" by Ralph of Caen.[491] References such as "*Hispania*" by Raymond of Aguilers,[492] suggest a wilful ignorance in the chronicles to simply label the lands of non-Christians. In fact attempts had already made decades before by the papacy to reconcile Christianity with the Arabic Muslims. Gregory VII had written:

> "*For there is nothing which Almighty God, who wishes that all men should be saved and that no man should perish, more approves in our conduct, than that a man should first love God and then his fellow men ... Most certainly you and we ought to love each other in this way more than other races of men, because we believe and confess one God, albeit in different ways, whom each day we praise and reverence as the creator of all ages and the governor of this world. For, as the Apostle says: "He is our peace, who hath made both*"[493]

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[488] M. Jubb, "the crusaders' perceptions of their opponents", in Palgrave Advances in the Crusades, ed. Nicholson, H.J. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 226.
[489] On the concepts of differing genetics of Maltese to Italian peoples see D.B. Goldstein et al. "Population Structure in the Mediterranean Basin; A Y Chromosome Perspective" *in Annals of Human Genetics*, **Vol.** 69 (London: Wiley, 2005) pp. 1-20.
[490] J. V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) p. 109
[491] *GT*, c. 1, p. 21.
[492] *RA*, IV, p. 33
[493] *Das Register Gregorus VII, Bk. Ill, no. 21*, *Epistolae Selectae in usum scholarum ex Monumentis Germaniae Historias separatim editae* ed. E. Caspar (Berlin, 1955), ii(i), p. 288 (citing Ephesians 2:14)

Clearly these feelings were one sided, and the reconciliation between Christians and Muslims never took place on the spiritual level at least. As Margaret Jubb states:

> "*This enlightened view of Islam was not widely shared in Latin Christendom at that time, nor was it rooted in any very profound knowledge of the Muslim religion*"

Misconceptions of Islam continued by delivering images of paganism within the first wave chronicles that would have been known to be false by the chroniclers. The *Gesta Tancredi* informs its readers that the crusaders had found an idol in the Al-Aqsa mosque, when they stormed Jerusalem.[494] Even Urban, Gregory's prodigy used such ideas as propaganda to whip up support for his armed pilgrimage. Fulcher's version of the Clermont sermon uses terms such as "*infidel*",[495] and "*enslaved by demons*"[496], in order to provoke a reaction from his now more compliant knights. But as Hamilton stated

> "*…such statements, intended in part to inflame hostility to Islam at a time of war, should not be taken seriously as evidence of what the West knew about Islam.*"[497]

In fact the chroniclers were being purposefully ignorant in their descriptions of Islam and Muslims in order to justify Crusader action against them.[498]

[494] *GT*, C. 129, p. 144
[495] *FC*, b. I, c. III, p. 67
[496] FC, b. I, c. III, p. 66
[497] B. Hamilton, "Knowing the Enemy: Western Understanding of Islam at the Time of the Crusades" in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Third Series, **Vol.** 7, **3** (CUP, 1997) p. 375.
[498] J. V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) pp. 105-106

The details of Muslim attacks specified in Robert's account of the sermon of Clermont are very doubtful and yet between its lines we can read something else. The events surrounding the background to the First Crusade suggest that the Crusade leadership would have had at the very least a tangible knowledge of Muslims. The 11th century saw the rapid involvement by Northern Europeans in the Mediterranean, most notably by the Normans in Sicily. There was a pattern of escalation between the collisions between the Islamic world and that of the Northern Europeans, not to mention their southern neighbours. French escalation could be drawn back to the Battle of Tours/Poitiers in 732. Here Charles Martel's early Carolingian forces faced down Abd ar Rachman al-Ghafiqi ending the Moorish expansion into Europe in a bloody but importantly for this study famous battle.[499] The legend that was created upon the battle lives on into the modern era, and it would be reasonable to believe that the story of the battle filtered through the years of the Frankish and German aristocracies that formed the nucleus of the Crusader forces centuries later. The scene for the Clermont sermon, even by Robert's account, set the Frankish aristocracy into a zealous fury, built upon the foundations laid at Tours 250 years before. Robert's version of the sermon therefore represents the sort of sermon he felt would have "caused" the reaction seen from the point of view of hindsight of the capture of Jerusalem.

Even in Raymond's own life time, although evidently a competent soldier, he had gained a questionable moral reputation. The chroniclers of the First Crusade had their differing views on the leaders, but Raymond was compared poorly against many of his allies. Whilst the most vitriolic assessment might be understood to have

[499] Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire (Philidelphia: UPP) p. 170

come from the *Gesta Tancredi*, whose benefactor was the son of Bohemond and Raymond's greatest adversary, many of the other writers fail to present Raymond as a capable or even likable commander. The *Gesta Dei,* in its description of the Crusade's leaders, suggests that Raymond:

> '*ennobles the telling of this history, from beginning to end, with the model of great virtue and constancy. Having left behind his own son to rule his land, he brought with him his present wife and the only son he had had with her. Raymond was older than the other leaders, but his army was in no way inferior, except perhaps for the Provencal habit of talking too much.*'[500]

This strange comment on the Provençals' over communicative habit may relate too to a way that the Provençals were 'different' to the rest of the Norman Crusaders. Ralph of Caen notes with some degree of fascination the methods by which the Provençals would forage for food, finding it alien to the methods he felt were the norm. His interest in their ability and willingness to augment their diet with root vegetables sets a curious image.

> '*When there was a dearth of bread, they endured, content with roots. They did not spurn husks and they took up long iron tools with which they found grain in the bowels of the earth. Thus, boys still sing, "Franks go to War and Provençals to Food".*'[501]

Ralph's appraisal of the Provençals is rarely positive. In the same chapter, Ralph notes that the Provençals engaged readily in war profiteering, substituting dog and

[500] *GDPF*, II, p. 55.
[501] *GT*, c. 61, pp. 86-7.

mule meat for hare and goat.[502] Yet it was their clandestine slaughter of horses that Ralph truly reviled. The Provençals were accused of killing horses by wounding the animal 'from the back or through its rectum.'[503] The horse meat was then viewed as suspect by the Crusaders who would avoided it, believing it cursed, or the horse possessed. During a time though when the pilgrims willingly ate poisonous food the Provençals who were accused of killing the horse then fell upon it crying

'*we would rather die in eating this food than from fasting.*'[504]

Even the suspicion of the destruction of horses and mules, which were seen as invaluable animals, would have added to the tensions between the pilgrim groups. The leadership would have had to overcome incendiary behaviours and emphasise the common objectives and common enemy to re-establish and maintain the links between the groups in order to improve chances of military success.

When considering the 'Great Man' theory none of the chroniclers provide us with a sufficient physical description, instead enabling us to understand that the military leaders were virtuous. Of Robert of Flanders Ralph of Caen notes that he took a lower command position, just as Tancred did, excelling more as a soldier than a general.[505] Neither Fulcher of Chartres nor Raymond of Aguilers provides a description of even these virtues or the roles, though Raymond does state that Stephen of Blois was elected a principal leader.[506] This was neglected in Stephen's own letter to his wife Adele of Blois.[507] Instead of looking to their physical descriptions then, the 'Great Man' theory could be related to the military leaders'

[502] Ibid. p. 87.
[503] Ibid.
[504] Ibid.
[505] *GT*, c. 15, p. 38.
[506] *RA*, VIII, p. 59.
[507] Stephen of Blois, 'Letter from Stephen, Count of Blois to his wife Adele (June, 1097)' in *Letters from the East*, trans. M. Barber and K. Bate (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) pp. 15-17.

lineage. The sources provide familial heritages, as well as personal traits that were perceived as important motivations for military leadership. Heritage according to the *Gesta Tancredi* was especially important. The qualities of Robert and Roger Guiscard were especially important to solidify Bohemond's credentials as a prince, as well as a military leader, noting:

> '*Guiscard's eleven brothers conquered Campania, Apulia, and even Calabria. Particular mention should be made of Roger gained the greatest glory among the remaining brothers took his place second only to Guiscard when pagan Sicily felt him.*'[508]

Similarly, Fulcher of Chartres placed importance on Robert of Normandy being the son of William I of England, and that aged just sixteen he had been left in nominal control of Normandy in 1066 when his father invaded England to take his crown.[509] In his chronicle Fulcher notes that:

> '*Robert, Count of the Normans, a son of William, King of the English, began the journey, having collected a great army of Normans, English and Bretons.*'[510]

Guibert of Nogent however viewed the duke less favourably, emphasising instead alleged negative personal traits, describing him as having:

> '*…bodily indulgences, weakness of will, prodigality with money, gourmandising, indolence, and lechery* [only negated by his] *heroism that he vigorously displayed in the army of the Lord.*'[511]

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[508] *GT*, Chapter 1, p. 21.
[509] W.M. Aird, *Robert Curthose, Duke of Normandy: C. 1050-1134* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2011) p. 58.
[510] *FC*, b. I, c. VI, p. 73.
[511] *GDPF*, I, pp. 48-49.

Guibert's view of Robert may have been influenced by the failures that Robert suffered after the Crusades against his younger brothers regarding the throne, especially when we consider Guibert's perception of Hugh Magnus as being

> '*…second to none in birth or in probity of his behaviour.*'[512]

This opinion was not supported however by Ralph of Caen's view of Robert of Normandy, his former liege lord, who claimed

> '*He was not inferior to the Duke [Godfrey] in family, wealth, or eloquence, rather he was his superior.*'[513]

Albert of Aachen's own view of Robert concentrated on his affluence and lineage, rather than the man himself, noting:

> '*Count Robert, who was prince of Normandy, the son of the King of England, most warlike in military weapons was well endowed with property…*'

The *Gesta Tancredi* emphasises later a key difference in the immediate period of succession when a leader was incapacitated or died on either side. The European hierarchy presented natural successors and continuity, whereas internecine disputes frequently dominated the immediate aftermath of many Muslim leaders' deaths. The *Gesta Tancredi's* description of Hugh the Great highlights that he was *'…the brother of King Philip of France and the son of Henry [I of France]'*[514] while Stephen of Blois is noted to be the great-grandson of '*…the King of the Gauls and of the family of the*

[512] Ibid., p. 48.
[513] *GT*, c. 15. P. 37.
[514] *GT*, c. 15, p. 38.

*kings of the English*'[515] and Robert of Flanders is remarked upon to be 'merited [by] the royal lineages of Gaul, England and Denmark.'[516]

Whereas the *Gesta Francorum* is detailed in its description of the routes taken by the Crusade's commanders, it lacks detailed descriptions of their origins and heredity; seen through the lens of the contemporary author it assumes that the reader will understand that these were noblemen from noble families by their names alone.[517] The *Gesta Tancredi* goes into detail to describe the leaders of the Crusade:

> *'These men were as follows: Duke Godfrey, son of old Count Eustace of Bouillon. …Thus, as the son of a fighting count and the most religious countess, even when he had been observed by a rival deserved to hear: "in his eagerness for war look to the father, in his cultivation of God behold the mother".*[518]

Inclusion of information on some of the reported circumstances and origins of each of the Crusade's military leaders fits with the norms of historical writing but also indicated what writers considered to be leadership potential; they seem to have based their view of leadership on the role of their subjects as good lords, and successful stewards of lands and property in Europe. Recording their status also suggests that a perception that they solely sought material wealth and land is probably at best a partial answer to their motivations. In fact, something more fundamental may have encouraged the leaders to devote their time and resources to

[515] Ibid.
[516] Ibid.
[517] *GF*, 1N, p. 28.
[518] *GT*, c. 14, pp. 36-37.

the cause of the Crusade. Certainly Godfrey of Bouillon is described as having *'demonstrated more of the qualities of a monk than he did of a soldier.'*[519]

Whilst it is possible that the leaders of the First Crusade, despite their backgrounds, were motivated primarily by the opportunities to gain vast wealth and prestige in the sacking of immensely rich cities such as Antioch and Jerusalem, I am less inclined to agree with this concept; given the vivid words attributed to Urban II to conjure of the imagery of a Mother Church desperately in need of defence we must also consider the concepts of the *Preudomme* and David Crouch's concept of the noble *habitus*. There remains a question of ignorance; as Prutz has suggested, drawing on the writings of Bernard the Wise, pilgrims had previously been on visits to the Holy Land and had been made welcome.

> *'The Christians and pagans have there such peace between them, that if I should go a journey, and in the journey my camel or ass which carries my baggage should die, and I should leave everything there without a guard, and go to the next town to get another, on my return I should find all my property untouched'*[520]

Despite the medieval pilgrimages, very little was commonly known in Europe about Islam largely because the writings of the pilgrims did not concentrate on the Saracens[521] and their religion and their narrative had a narrow readership. The earlier validation of the military expeditions of Pope Gregory VII as a counter offensive against the enemies of God probably played a part in the rhetoric of Pope Urban II. Archbishop Baldric of Dol' s recollection of the Claremont speech includes

[519] *GT*, Chapter 14, p 36.
[520] Bernard (the Wise). *The Itinerary of Bernard the Wise (AD 870).: How the City of Jerusalem is Situated (circ. AD 1090?)*. Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund, 1893
[521] H.I. Prutz, *Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Berlin, 1883), p. 72

'*dire sufferings, scourgings, and enslavements.*'

While Guibert of Nogent' s account records that:

> '*Urban dwelt upon the extortion and unspeakable cruelty from which the pilgrims had suffered and said, 'remember, I pray you, the thousands who have perished vile deaths.'*'[522]

Robert the Monk's version of the speech as well as including detail of alleged atrocities, includes:

> '*They destroy the altars, after having defiled them with their uncleanness*'

which may lead back directly to later accounts of the same holy places being cleansed by rivers of blood. Issues of course arise from the rhetoric deployed by Robert the Monk. The chronicler would be considered a secondary source, using previous articles such as the *Gesta Francorum* alongside witness statements and interviews that were available from survivors of the campaign who returned to Northern Europe. If the first surviving chronicles are cross-examined they may produce a different story altogether.[523] We are only afforded the chronicles and testimonies preserved in the first three accounts of the Crusade, namely the *Gesta Francorum*, *Historia Francorum*, and the *Historia Hierosolymitana.* These three have differing accounts of the speech delivered at Clermont. The *Anonymous* notes the speech in brief terms, completely at odds with that of Robert the Monk:

[522] Dana C. Munro, *"The Western Attitude toward Islam during the Period of the Crusades"* in *Speculum*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul., 1931), p. 330

[523] Georg Strack, 'The sermon of Urban II in Clermont 1095 and the Tradition of Papal Oratory', in *Medieval Sermon Studies* 56 (2012), pp. 30-45.

> '*[Urban II] began to speak and deliver shrewd sermons, saying that if anyone would save his soul, let him humbly take the path of the Lord, and if he lacked the derniers, divine mercy would provide. And then the lord Apostle also added: "Brothers, much must you suffer for the name of Christ – even destitution, poverty, nakedness, persecutions, adversity, sickness, hunger, thirst, and other such evils – at the Lord said to his disciples: "Greatly must you suffer for my name." And "Be not ashamed to speak in front of men; I shall give you the voice and the eloquence." And again, "Great shall be your reward."*[524]

This account is, however, more detailed than that given by Raymond of Aguilers. It is unclear whether the chief target audience for the book, the Bishop of Viviers, was present at the Council of Clermont, Viviers lies approximately 300 kilometres to the South of Clermont, yet the Bishop is not mentioned by name as a witness in the only known list of those present at the sermon.[525] His presence, and that of many from the Cathedral at Puy, would explain the lack of detail on the Pope's speech commending those to join the Crusade, as they would already be familiar with its content.

The most detailed first account comes from Fulcher of Chartres. This account suggests that Fulcher was likely at the sermon himself due to the number of facets that are considered. The speech in this account focused heavily, not on Mother Church being defiled in the Near East, but rather on the aid to be given to Emperor Alexius and the Byzantine Empire against the encroaching Turks. Urban in this

[524] *GF,* 1N, p. 25.
[525] Martin Bouquet; Michel-Jean-Joseph Brial (1877). *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France*. Tome quatorzieme (14) (nouvelle ed.). Gregg Press. p. 98.

instance firstly reaffirmed the "Truce of God" between the magnates of Europe,[526] after which Fulcher notes:

> '*When these and many other matters were satisfactorily settled, all those present, clergy and people alike, spontaneously gave thanks to God for the words of the Lord Pope Urban and promised him faithfully that his decrees would be well kept. But the pope added at once that another tribulation, not less but greater than that already mentioned, even of the worst nature, was besetting Christianity from another part of the world.*'[527]

Fulcher suggests that Urban tested the waters of his congregation with the preceding decrees and sermons. Urban clearly felt that his call to arms in the East was just,[528] yet ulterior motives could be suggested for mobilising such a mass of European military might. In 1080, Emperor Henry IV of the Holy Roman Empire placed the Bishop of Ravenna as Anti-Pope in Rome; as Clement III, he was able to hold on to parts of Rome until his death in 1100.[529] Whilst Clement was able to retain much of Italy, Christendom beyond the Alps and the Rhine recognised Urban II as their Pope. It was for this reason that the Council was called in France and not in the papal city where such a monumental endeavour might otherwise have been launched. The Crusaders who marched south through Italy from France in the summer of 1096 found their way to Rome, where they found supporters of "that stupid pope", and appear to enter into conflict with them in the Basilica of St. Peter. [530] The show of

[526] *FC*, b. I, c. II, p. 65
[527] *FC*, b. I, c. III, p. 65.
[528] Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Idea of Crusading* (1993) p. 17.
[529] I. S. Robinson, *The Papacy, 1073-1198: Continuity and Innovation* (CUP, 1990) p. 7.
[530] *FC*, b. I, c. VII, p. 75.

strength by Urban II was such that it cemented his strength as Clement III lost support.

The whole of medieval society and culture was dominated by church dogma; These regulations were significantly different to that of the inclusivity of the modern church Medieval citizens were faced with a stark choice of salvation versus a vision of eternal damnation spelled out in graphic detail by the clergy. The church took pain to emphasise that these final destinies could not be escaped once a given path had been taken. There was a social expectation that the aristocracy would act more like warlords than chivalrous Christian knights. . Their culture espoused a stable society was built on virtues of violence; strength, courage and loyalty. The Church had sought to curb unsanctioned violence on pain of on The *Truth of God* and *Peace of God* were created by the Papacy in Rome in order to legislate when European knights could legally fight. Their military intervention was generally demanded in support of the political and material agenda of Rome.

The emergence of the tournament as a relatively safe training arena, but also as an outlet for knights to channel their aggression in mock battles, was deplored by the Church. The nature of tournaments meant that accidents and injury were commonplace with occasional fatalities. Despite the Church decreeing that any knight killed in a tournament could be excommunicated, its influence in military society was evident. Ralph and the Anonymous frequently refer to *'The warriors of Christ'*[531], and the *'army of Christ'*.[532] While the European church compared the traits of martial aggression unfavourably with good Christian behaviour, this bellicose

[531] *GF*, 10N, pp. 101-2.
[532] *GT*, Chapter 20, p. 44.

energy presented the establishment with a military force to be deployed against the threats of expansionist Islamic powers on Jerusalem and the boundaries of Rome and its trading empire.

The dichotomy of having a noble class who were on the one hand a fierce fighting force and who meekly followed church doctrine reached a crisis point in the 11th century. . The Church felt it needed to act to save its own flock. Unlike Gregory the Great, Urban II successfully implemented a process of incremental reform rather than radical change. The Church had regained influence over the temporal activities of its membership

The dilemma experienced by the Church trickled down through society at the very least to the military and secular leadership of the medieval world. In both the *Gesta Tancredi* and the *Gesta Francorum*, the subjects of their works show how they faced the reconciliation of the conflicting doctrines in their personal and societal, spiritual and temporal realms. In the case of Tancred, Ralph of Caen suggests that he faced a serious conundrum as to his place in any coming campaign:

> '*Earlier, as is noted above, his (Tancred) soul was at a crossroads. Which of the two paths should he follow: the Gospels or the world? Experience in arms recalled him to the service of Christ. This two-fold opportunity for struggle energises the man.*'[533]

The *Gesta Francorum* is slightly more pragmatic on the subject of Bohemond though as it depicts the future Prince of Antioch asking a series of questions as to the motivations, strength and unity of the First Crusaders who were moving south into the Balkans, only agreeing to join them upon their answer of:

[533] *GT*, Chap 1, p. 22.

*'This was the response [Bohemond] received, and in this order: "they are properly armed for battle; either on the right shoulder or between the shoulders they wear the cross of Christ; and their war cry is: 'God Wills it! God Wills it! God Wills it!' Which they all shout in one voice.'"*[534]

Clearly the response he received was sufficient to encourage him to join the Crusade. The practical and cunning Bohemond seemingly found himself enthused by the holiness of the expedition:

*'And inspired by the Holy Spirit, Bohemond at once ordered that the most costly cloak he possessed be cut up pieces made into crosses.'*[535]

An alternate view may portray a morale-boosting and popularist stunt by Bohemond, in direct competition with other leaders to gain the material support of the Crusaders, and it certainly served the purpose of gathering troops to his cause.[536] There can be little doubt that the religious motivations were there, as well as extolling Bohemond's virtues as a worthy noble and 'hero'. Count Roger, whom Bohemond was ostensibly serving, was clearly not as moved, or finding himself potentially lacking the essential support and influence to exert his position, did not take up the cross but instead returned to Sicilian lands.

These views of the events and leaders of the Crusade may be close to the Runciman's general view that they were a merciless and ruthless group more interested in seeking land than fighting for the Church. The rewards of conquest held

[534] *GF*, 1N, p. 30.
[535] Ibid.
[536] Bohemond was serving with Count Roger of Sicily at Amalfi when the Crusade departed. So many of the Sicilo-Normans departed with Bohemond from the force that Roger was seemingly unable to continue his siege and was forced to retire. *GF*, 1N, p. 30.

tangible worth, the sort that could be transferred into a dynasty and moved physically from the East to Europe. The Crusade, however, further provided a double solution, not only thwarting Turk expansion and channelling the "warrior ethos" of the nobility, but also being recompensed in spiritual terms. Fulcher notes Urban stating:

> '*He said, "Since, oh sons of God, you have promised Him to keep peace among yourselves and to faithfully sustain the rights of Holy Church more sincerely than before, there still remains for you, newly aroused by Godly correction, an urgent task which belongs to both you and God, in which you can show the strength of your good will. For you must hasten to carry aid to your brethren dwelling in the East, who need your help for which they have often entreated."*[537]

Though less fiery than Robert the Monk's portrayal, the element of defence of the Byzantine Empire was clearly central to the call to arms. Whether Robert was embellishing the speech, or Fulcher was watering it down, is academic. What is certain is that the speech must have been powerful for some of the most important magnates in Europe to join the proposed military endeavour, something often observed.

The rhetoric of '*…killed or captured many people, have destroyed churches, and have devastated the kingdom of God*'[538] should be considered in the context of the Peace of God that Urban had reaffirmed earlier in the same Council. With such a backdrop, knights were reminded of their duty to protect the poor and those that

[537] *FC*, b. I, c. III, pp.65-66.
[538] *FC*, b. I, c. III:3, p. 66.

could not defend themselves, especially the Church, a duty that found its way into the culture of the noble classes even before the Peace of God.[539]

While some are tempted to downplay the concepts of chivalry and nobility within the leading social classes of the early Middle Ages,[540] doing so risks diminishing a key motivational factor of their actions. In fact, the notions of justice, honour and glory were heavily ingrained in the military leading class but were tempered by the reality that war and battle were none of these things.

It becomes easier to see how religious retribution, allied with penance for previous wrongs become sufficient motivation to disregard any previous fleeting knowledge of the Holy Lands when there is credible evidence from many reputable sources of atrocities being carried out on fellow Christians. The question of 'How could we lose with God on our side?' perhaps caused enthusiasm to obscure what should have been more pressing and legitimate questions of logistics, strategy, tactics or indeed simply numbers.[541] Indeed, as the 12th century came into view, the *chansons de geste,* including the *Song of Roland,* told the very real story of how numbers, logistics and tactics could fail even those who were supposed to be blessed by God and the Church and to be the literary heroes of their stories.

This was a motivation; and to overcome, as Norman Housley puts it, a spiritual anxiety by pilgrimage was part of a '*larger family of penitential practices*'.[542] These anxieties were clear to Tancred, according to Ralph of Caen, who stated:

> *'The Lord admonished that it is necessary to give over one's cloak, as well, to the one asking for a tunic. By contrast, the necessity of military*

[539] David Crouch, *Birth of Nobility* (2005) p. 73.
[540] Notably by Steven Runciman
[541] J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, (London: Continuum, 2003) p. 91
[542] Norman Housley, *Contesting the Crusades* (Blackwell Publishing; Oxford, 2006).

*life urges that once these garments have been seized, the rest are to be taken as well. These two principles opposed to one another and undermined the bravery of a man full of wisdom, if, indeed, they ever permitted him to sleep.'*[543]

This image of the penitent pilgrimage may suggest that the sources should view piety as standing above any other martial aspect of military leadership in a hierarchy of virtues; the dissonance between Christian virtue and outright violence presumably would have had to be reconciled by religious absolution. As JRS observed over forty years ago, the legitimacy of violence supporting religious idealism again illuminates the complex attitudes that framed the values of medieval military society. Religious fervour and absolution provided the sparks that, feeding on ignorance of culture and beliefs, created a cause that spurred all echelons of the martial hierarchy to commit such ferocious acts and make material gains while underwriting their immortal future.

## Religious motives

Religion and the potential influence of invoking the support of a charitable deity clearly mattered to the military leadership of the First Crusade. As JRS observed It is not coincidental that Raymond of Toulouse, referred often as Raymond of Saint-Gilles, donated (what) to the Cathedral of Le Puy upon taking the cross. The elder statesman invested in the insurance policy of asking for a candle and prayers to be

[543] *GT*, Chapter 1, p. 22.

kept for the entirety of his life for going on the pilgrimage.[544] Indeed, the author of the *Gesta Francorum* begins their magnum opus with:

> *'When that time came, foretold to his faithful by the Lord Jesus, especially in the Gospel, in which he says: 'If anyone would come after me, he must deny himself and take up his cross and follow me,' there was a great awakening in all the regions of Gaul, so that anyone, with a pure heart and spirit, who diligently sought to follow the Lord and would carry the cross after Him, did not tarry but in all haste sought out the road to the Holy Sepulchre.'*[545]

The emphasis Urban placed upon martyrdom in the cause of the church is highlighted by both chroniclers eager to validate the campaign and its bloody conclusion. The *Gesta Francorum* notes the massacre of the Peasant's Crusade at Civetot stating that '*Among [the martyrs] was a priest who was celebrating Mass who they made a martyr, right on the altar.*'[546] Such desecration of the altar and the irreverence shown to the holy men of the European West. Whether true or not was a clear reference to, or influence upon Urban's message as penned by Robert the Monk. It introduces the simultaneous strands of an implication of eternal life for a martyr while seeking support for a campaign against the destruction and desecration of key aspects of Christian values. So too Ralph of Caen stresses through the conversation between Ursinus and Tancred the pains that the Christians of the East were suffering under the 'yoke' of Islamic rule:

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[544]Jonathon Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (Continuum, 1993) p.36.
[545] *GF*, 1N, p. 25.
[546] *GF*, 1N, p. 28.

*'I was free, but I did not groan less at the servitude of the Christian people than those who actually suffered it.'*[547]

The depiction of the Christians' suffering at the hands of the Muslims was part of the injustice that the Crusade sought to remedy. During a period when justice and punishment were generally both swift and brutal, it was logical to redress criminal activity with overwhelming force. The Crusaders saw themselves, and thus were motivated as not just soldiers of Christ but also as knights using military prowess to protect the weak and prosecuting justice to evil doers. This proto-chivalry, or *preudommerie,* was a huge part of the medieval ideal that it was felt all leaders should aspire to. The ideal that they should be acting with a thirst for justice is echoed by the multiple sources and therefore has merit.

The suffering of the Eastern inhabitants was not only created by oppression from a clash of cultures. As we shall see, both chronicles mention in great detail the issues and suffering caused by failings in supply, the effects of siege warfare on the inhabitants of cities and natural phenomena ranging from earthquake to drought during campaigns in a region with very different climate conditions and landscape to those encountered in Europe. An immediate martyr's death was always a possibility. Obviously the trials of the Crusade weren't isolated to the environment; enemy action apart from immediate death in battle leading to acute and chronic injuries that were ultimately fatal, or life changing. The *Gesta Francorum*, and *Gesta Tancredi* both consider the subject of martyrdom. The lists of names of those killed include many of the leaders and lieutenants who commanded the armies.

[547] *GT*, Chap 40, pp. 63-4.

*'And during that same siege, many of our men received blessed martyrdom, namely Anselm of Ribemont, William the Picard, and so many others whom I do not know.'*[548]

The death of Tancred's brother, William, at the battle of Dorylaeum understandably gains a great deal of attention from Ralph; the description that the arrows 'hailed'[549] upon the ranks of the Sicilo-Normans may show how devastating the bows of the Turks were, but it is the use of words such as 'suffering'[550] that truly give a sense that the Crusader dead were viewed as martyrs to the cause. Although achieving martyrdom was still a major factor on morale, battlefield casualties and overwhelming attacking force would have had effects that depended on the quality of the fighting force and its military discipline. Ralph continued to observe that William's men were ready to flee when they were bolstered by reinforcing troops.[551] There were negative aspects to the martyrdom as one could imagine; upon sighting Jerusalem, many of the Crusaders appear to have completely lost discipline in their fervour.

[548] *GF*, 10N, p. 99.
[549] *GT*, Chap 26, p. 49.
[550] Ibid. pp 49-50.
[551] *GT*, Chap 26, p 50

## Psychology – Holy Adhemar and the Holy Lance

Despite its prominence in the history of the First Crusade, and the detailed accounts of its discovery and effect on the pilgrims, the discovery of "Holy Lance" or "Spear of Destiny" of Antioch is an incident of the first crusade that has since the early 20th Century gained little research, though was critical to the Crusader's success. The most recent detailed account was by Thomas Asbridge in 2007[552], and Jonathan Riley-Smith in 2003;[553] as well as the lesser known Master's thesis by Marius Kjørmo in 2009[554]. Prior to these the Holy lance was only studied in any detail in a small number of cases dating from 1904 to 1984[555]. Sheffy's 1915 master's dissertation noted the use of the lance but failed to examine it further than highlighting the witness accounts, whilst the previous study by de Mely concentrated more on the general paraphernalia of Holy Lance in history, with the Antioch relic being part of a great analysis of the concept of Holy Lance relics from the medieval age. Steven Runciman in his critical study of the First Crusaders was, albeit cynical, the first to analyse the Holy Lance in 1950. In his "The Holy Lance Found at Antioch"[556] Runciman noted the immediate effect upon the Crusaders in bolstering their general morale as well as noting the conflict it subsequently brought about between

[552] T. Asbridge, "The Holy Lance of Antioch: Power, Devotion and Memory on the First Crusade" in, *Reading Medieval Studies* (2007) vol. 33, 3-36

[553] J. Riley Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (London: Continuum, 2003) p. 115, pp. 116-117.

[554] Marius Kjørmo , *The Holy Lance of Antioch: A study on the impact of a perceived relic during the First Crusade*, University of Bergen, 2009

[555] See F. de Mely, *La Croix des premier croisés; La sainte lance; La saint couronne* (1904), Lester Fields Sheffy, *The Use of the Holy Lance in the First Crusade*, (University of Texas, 1915), S. Runciman, *The Holy Lance Found at Antioch*, pp. 197-209 vol. 68 (1950), C. Morris, "Policy and Vision: The Case of the Holy Lance at Antioch" in War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J.O. Prestwich, pp. 33-45. (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1984)

[556] S. Runciman, "The Holy Lance Found at Antioch", in Analecta Bollandia, (1950) vol. 68, pp. 197-209,

Raymond of Toulouse and Bohemond[557]. Runciman's 1950 article however introduces more questions that he feels should be answered with further research than he felt capable of answering, at least within the confines of this article.

These queries were somewhat addressed by Colin Morris in 1984.[558]. Morris' study focused on debating the findings of the 19th-century H. Hagenmeyer and confronting the "galvanising effect" of the lance upon the pilgrims during the Second siege of Antioch in 1098. This study allowed further debate and analysis by Thomas Asbridge in 2007 who acknowledged the difficulties the Holy Lance presents not least by highlighting the conflicting resolutions of both Morris and Runciman as they attempted to wrestle with the Lance. Asbridge's emotive study considers the context of the discovery of the lance during the desperate days of the Pilgrimage where defeat could well have ended the campaign and consigned it to the history books as yet another failed endeavour.

Since its discovery during the siege on 14th June 1098, veracity of the Holy Lance has been contentious. Whilst some believed the spear was that which had pierced Jesus upon the cross, others thought it was a fallen roofing nail or as Ralph of Caen suggested an exotic Turkish spearhead.[559][560]. Nevertheless it seems to have provided a crucial boost in morale at a difficult time.

In the desperate times of the siege of Antioch by Kerbogha, Peter Bartholomew claimed to have been granted a vision from Saint Andrew informing

[557] S. Runciman, "The Holy Lance Found at Antioch", in Analecta Bollandia, (1950) vol. 68, p. 200,
[558] C. Morris, "Policy and Vision: The Case for the Holy Lance at Antioch" in *War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in honour of J. O. Prestwich*, ed. Gillingham, J & Holt, J.C. (Boydell Press, 1984) pp. 33-45
[559] *GT*, Chap. 100, p. 119
[560] *RA*, VII, p. 57

him of the location of one of the most potent and important relics from the Crucifixion.[561]

> *'There was a certain pilgrim in our army, whose name was Peter (Bartholomew), and to whom, before we entered the city, there appeared St Andrew the apostle; and he said … you will find there the Lance of our Saviour Jesus Christ with which he was pierced when he hung upon the cross.'*[562]

Despite the long description of its trial by Raymond of Aguilers, the discovery of the lance is kept relatively short. The *Historia Francorum* agrees that after five days following the visions of Peter Bartholomew, twelve men, the same number as apostles accompanied Peter Bartholomew and dug in the Church of St. Peter in Antioch.[563] The *Gesta Francorum* reflects the effect that the discovery had upon the average pilgrim, but the detail that Ralph provides when concerning the party searching for the Holy Lance perhaps shows the realisation that if the Crusading leadership could legitimise a religious claim it had a very powerful additional resource to support its temporal authority.

The eight month siege had already pushed many of the military leaders to their limits. Stephen of Blois had already abandoned the siege along with his retinue of Norman knights[564]. This added challenges to the crusade's cause when Stephen,

[561] *RM*, b. VII, c. 2, p. 162; *GF*, 9N, p. 83, *GT*, c. 100, p. 118; *RA*, VII, p. 51.
[562] *GF*, 9N, p. 78.
[563] *RA*, VII, p. 57.
[564] *GF*, 9N, p. 81

who had been considered so highly by Alexios[565], that he convinced the Byzantine emperor to turn back to Constantinople with the Byzantine relief force[566], believing that Antioch had already been retaken by Kerbogha's forces. For following their own eight month siege of Antioch and with the citadel remaining in Turkish possession, the crusaders found themselves besieged by one of the largest and most powerful Muslim forces. Kerbogha was an accomplished soldier, having been part of the Abbasid attempt to conquer Aleppo in 1095[567]. His force was itself multi-ethnic and mirrored the Crusaders' forces with its many leaders. Runciman noted that just as with the Europeans, Kerbogha's forces were as fragmented with various political leaders holding personal and political antipathies against one another[568]. Still despite this, the Crusaders' situation was more grave.

For Raymond of Aguilers the death of Adhemar of Puy (specify when his death was) was both a massive political and psychological set back. Prior to the Crusade, as noted above, Raymond had made a donation to the Cathedral at Puy on condition that a candle be kept lit for him for the rest of his life.[569] His connection to the cathedral was thus essential for his personal salvation. Though Raymond proceeded with the largest contingent and war chest, his political endeavours were often met with huge resistance from the other leaders, particularly the Norman magnates. His promotion of the Holy Lance after the victory over Kerbogha brought

[565] Stephen of Blois, "Letter to Adele of Blois, June 1097, Near Nicaea", in *Letters from the East*, tr. Malcom Barber and Keith Bate (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) p. 15
[566] *AA*, Book XI, p. 312
[567] J. Bradbury, *The Routledge Companion to Medieval Warfare*. (London: Routledge, 2004) p. 55
[568] S. Runciman, *The First Crusade* (CUP, 1951) p. 154
[569] Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, p. 36.

him into direct conflict with Bohemond of Taranto.[570] Fulcher of Chartres, a Norman chaplain, writing a little after the Crusade's completion, noted that the Bishop of Puy had held his own suspicions over the validity of the Lance. Whilst still besieged Fulcher, who was not present, claimed Adhemar '*thought the story false…*'[571], though this may have been as much an assault on Raymond of Toulouse, who was still in the region as Fulcher completed his chronicle. The biggest motivation for the 'discovery' of the 'Holy Lance' is evidently religious.

The Lance received the immediate blessing of the Bishop of Orange, and Raymond of Toulouse. The Normans, led by Bohemond, doubted the lance's authenticity during the campaign, though they were perceptive enough to see its positive effect on the troops under their command for the Battle of Antioch at least.[572] Fulcher noted its effects on the Crusaders prior to the battle of Kerbogha, writing that:

> '*All the people when they heard [about the Lance] exulted and glorified God. For almost a hundred days the Lance was held in great veneration and was carried gloriously by Count Raymond, who guarded it.*'[573]

The claim could subsequently be refuted once the danger imposed by Kerbogha was neutralised. The battle of Antioch was a daring affair,[574] with the loss of his battle banner in an earlier skirmish the Bishop of Puy appears to have adopted the

[570] *GT*, c. 102, p. 120.
[571] *FC*, b. I, c. XVIIII, p. 100.
[572] *GF*, 9N, p. 8.
[573] *FC*, b. I, c. XVIII, p. 100.
[574] For a detailed analysis see France, *Victory in the East*, pp. 280-96.

blessed, but now bare, lance as his battalion standard amongst the footmen in his command.[575] The besieged Crusaders, who held the bulk of the city, but not its citadel, mounted a daring attack on the surrounding forces under the command of Kerbogha. Their victory was a hard won surprise to the Crusaders. The *Gesta Francorum* states that the Crusaders had been commanded to fast for three days in preparation,[576] whilst Albert of Aachen notes the bishops ordered the soldiers to spend their nights in prayer.[577] For many of the Crusade's leaders it may have seemed to have been the last chance for the campaign. The Crusaders had learned valuable tactical lessons from the skirmishes with the Turks around Antioch and Nicaea as well as at Dorylaeum, but the sheer weight of numbers was against them. The victory was so complete that the citadel immediately surrendered to Raymond of Toulouse, placing his banner and not that of Bohemond on the parapet.

Bohemond waited until the psychological effect of the discovery was able to be used in invigorating the Crusaders and encourage them in their highly driven and organised attack on Kerbogha.[578] Since he was Bohemond's chief political rival, and a significant claimant for the crown in Jerusalem, Raymond of Toulouse's backing the Holy Lance was a very temporal danger for Bohemond. What followed was a court case concerning the legitimacy of the lance, and its discoverer, Peter Bartholomew. It is interesting that the author of the *Gesta Francorum* neglects any of

[575] *RM*, b. VII , c. VIII, p. 167.
[576] *GF*, 9N, p. 84.
[577] *AA*, b. 4, c. 47.
[578] *GF*, 9N, p 85 according to *the Gesta Francorum*, it may have been as much as a fortnight after the lance's discovery before the Crusaders were able to launch their attack. The *Gesta Tancredi* however only mentions that it took place during Kerbogha's siege of Antioch.

this, yet includes a great amount of detail about Bohemond to suggest who was in Bohemond and Tancred's retinue.

The trial by fire of Peter Bartholomew is of great interest to medieval scholars.[579] The detail that Raymond of Aguilers gave on the event is at complete odds with the lack of any account in the *Gesta Francorum*, placing it in a delicate place as to whether or not it actually occurred.

Raymond of Aguilers notes that Arnulf of Choques was called forward as the *'…chief of the unbelievers.'*[580] to dispute the authenticity of the Lance. The trial of the Lance had Peter Bartholomew request a trial by fire.[581] Fulcher of Chartres' account was likely written after Baldwin's ascension to the throne in Jerusalem and likely used the account of Raymond for its basis, at least as a literary source,[582] though he may also have used eye witness accounts. The reliance upon Raymond of Aguilers, Raymond of Toulouse's chaplain, throws the reliability of the source into question. However even if Raymond was biased regarding the outcome and how Peter of Bartholomew met his fate, his description of the event can be perceived as the 'ideal' of how the trial by fire was to be carried out as well as how an innocent man would escape unharmed. Raymond's account began with Arnulf of Choques' questioning of both the Lance and Peter Bartholomew's provenance.[583]

[579] see for example H. C. Lea, *Superstition and Force* (Philadelphia: Collins, 1892) pp. 305-306.
[580] *RA*, c. XII, p. 96.
[581] for more on Peter Bartholomew see Riley Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading,* p. 106; and W. Porges, 'The Clergy, the Poor and the Non-Combatants on the First Crusade' in *Speculum*, Vol. 21, (1) (1946) pp. 1-23.
[582] *FC*, XVIII, pp. 99-101.
[583] *RA*, XII, pp. 100-101.

The Trial by Fire proved controversial. All agreed that Bartholomew had died but Raymond of Aguilers believed this to be the work of the crowd rather than the flames.[584] For Ralph of Caen there was little doubt that the flames had burned Bartholomew completely, stating:

> '*By means of this examination, the truth of discovery would be proved by his unhurt state while its falseness would be proved by his burns… Thus, it was confirmed that Peter had been a disciple of Simon Magnus*'[585]

Peter Bartholomew might have died but the controversy of the Lance continued. Ralph noted that the morale of the Crusaders had dropped. Impetus ebbed from the cause and the pilgrims found that it took nearly a year for them to convalesce and prepare to continue the campaign. With the loss of so many leaders, the *Gesta Tancredi* continues that the leaders formed a new war council specifically due to the difficulties faced following the loss of the Lance:

> *'…a new assembly was convened in order to provide a new source of consolation for the army following the discovery of the fraud.'*[586]

Adhemar's death had too sown disorder amongst the Crusade's leaders, highlighting just how unifying the Papal Legate had been. It was Adhemar's key leadership that had repeatedly brought the Crusader commanders together,[587] and though both Arnulf of Choques and the Bishop of Orange were held in high regard by Pope

[584] *RA*, XII, p. 101.
[585] *GT*, c. 108, 9.126.
[586] *GT*, Chapter 110, p. 127.
[587] Conor Kostik, *The Social Structure of the First Crusade,* (Leiden, 2008) p. 245.

Urban,[588] it was Adhemar who was given over all 'care' of the Crusade.[589] It may be that Urban envisaged an expansion of Papal secular power in the East by founding a religious state ruled by a Papal governor, suggested by Godfrey's title of "Defender (*advocatus*) of the Sepulchre" following the conquest[590]. This could explain Raymond of Toulouse' constant actions to further the Crusade whilst attempting to curb the expansion and conquest of the Normans such as his occupation of the Citadel at Antioch after its surrender.[591] One issue Raymond faced was the apparent unity of the southern and northern Normans. This was not merely political or racial unity but was apparent familial.

It is not surprising perhaps that many of the commanders were related. Robert of Normandy and Stephen of Blois are well known as brothers-in-law. Though Eustace II of Boulogne was not related by blood or marriage, his depiction on the Bayeux Tapestry shows him to be a close companion of the Conqueror as his standard bearer.[592] Through William the Conqueror's marriage to Matilda of Flanders, Robert of Normandy was cousin to Count Robert II of Flanders who, being in his early 30s, may have shared a childhood with Robert and the sons of Eustace II including Eustace III, Godfrey and Baldwin. This close household bond may likely have resulted in a close relationship between Eustace II, his sons and Robert and Stephen.

More surprising perhaps would be this Northern European powerhouse's connection to the Mediterranean. Matilda of Flanders' mother, Adele of France, was

[588] Conor Kostik, *The Social Structure of the First Crusade,* (Leiden, 2008) p. 245.
[589] *GDPF*, b. VI p. 114.
[590] Alan V. Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Dynastic History 1099-1125* (Oxford: Unit of Proposographical Research, 2000) p. 71
[591] *GT*, c. 99, pp. 117-18.
[592] *BT*, p. 68.

sister to Henry I of France, making her a cousin to Hugh Magnus. Most surprisingly of all perhaps was Hugh Magnus' relationship to Bohemond. Bohemond's marriage to Constance of France in 1104,[593] Hugh Magnus' niece, closed the link with the Northern Magnates. His brother Roger Borsa's marriage to Robert II of Flanders' sister Adela of Flanders further supports the hypothesis of a strong political and familial network between the major commanders. The only leader who was not part of this family tree was Count Raymond IV of Toulouse. Raymond seemingly did not enjoy a domestic connection to the other magnates in the Crusade with him. This in turn may also explain his reliance on the clergy for support despite his numbers and large war chest.[594]

Raymond's popularity following the death of Adhemar of Puy declined greatly, especially when compounded by the debacles of Maara, Tripoli and Arqah.[595] The departure of Stephen of Blois, Bohemond and Baldwin, along with the losses suffered at Antioch and the subsequent sieges, almost resulted in failure for the First Crusade. The distrust of the Byzantines due to the loss of Tetigus and his troops also added to the commanders' problems diplomatically. Raymond of Aguilers mention of Greek emissaries calling for the Crusaders to wait for Alexios was clearly ignored.[596] Raymond of Aguilers notes the '*unanimous opposition of the leaders…*' to the siege of Tripoli which highlights Raymond of Toulouse's precarious position.[597] It is, perhaps, testament to Raymond's poor leadership skills that his own chaplain was

[593] P. Hill, *The Norman Commanders: 911-1135* (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2015) p. 103.
[594] S. Runciman, *The First Crusade*, p. 82.
[595] T. Asbridge, *The First Crusade*, p. 302.
[596] *RA*, XIII, p. 105.
[597] *RA*, XIII, p. 110.

so critical of him and his treatment of the few remaining military leaders willing to continue to Jerusalem.[598]

**Astrology, astronomy - myths and beliefs**

The perceived power of astrology played a major part in the psyche of the First Crusaders. Nowhere was this more evident than in the chronicles. When military leaders were able to harness the hopes and fears of their men using a combination of the myths of astrology with the undeniable evidence of the appearance of for example a celestial body in the night sky a potent motivational force might be created. Occurring only a few times each century, the dramatic appearance of a comet is one of the most striking astronomical phenomena. They can be extremely bright and easily visible to the naked eye for weeks or even months. Although comets move at different rates against the night sky, they usually move through the apparently stationary star background at about 1 or 2 degrees per day relative to the Earth.[599] Between September 30th and October 14th 1097 a comet was sighted moving east to west.[600] The tail and corona formed a shape the crusaders believed was that of a sword. Fulcher of Chartres described his own interpretation:

> '*When we reached Heraclea, we beheld a certain sign in the sky which appeared in brilliant whiteness in the shape of a sword with point towards the east. What it portended for the future we did not know…*'[601]

[598] *RA*, IX, pp. 71-2.
[599] S.J. Edberg and D.H. Levy, *Observing comets, asteroids, meteors, and the zodiacal light*. Vol. 5. (Cambridge: CUP, 1994) p. 165 .
[600] Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading,* p. 92.
[601] *FC*, b. I, c. XIV, pp. 88-89.

The same comet was observed in the sky at the time of the defeat of the Damishmend and Hasan alliance at Heraclea.[602] Given the association with successful events, it is easy to understand why so many believed this to be a good omen.

In the absence of any of the scientific background knowledge of the natural events that took place in the period 1097-1099, the Crusaders were left with reliance on the influences of their creator, or some miracle as the cause of the otherwise unexplainable and immensely powerful events they were witnessing.[603] It is notable how many of these phenomena took place which it may be assumed would have only added to their mystery to observers. The comet in 1097 was widely documented.

It was followed not long afterwards by an earthquake documented by the *Historia Francorum.*[604] Despite causing damage to buildings, the December earthquake did not hinder the progress of the Crusaders. It was cited by the Bishops as evidence of the righteousness of their cause, demonstrating the Christian associations of the quake by pointing out that the mysterious red glow that Guibert of Nogent claimed was:

> *'a brilliant red light, like fire, shone in the night above the army unmistakably took the form of a cross.*'[605]

This early recording of the phenomena that was identified later as earthquake lights was an opportunity for the military leaders to use the offices of the clergy to boost

[602] Runciman, *The First Crusade*, p. 104.
[603] For an examination on the medieval perceptions of miracles see: R.C. Finucane, 'The Use and Abuse Of Medieval Miracles', in *History* Vol. 60 (198) (1975) pp. 1-10.
[604] *RA*, IV, p. 36.
[605] *GDPF*, p. 157.

morale. This was important at a time of both high military stakes and while the army was suffering depravation from the effects of prolonged time in the field. The siege of Antioch was a critical period in the campaign, one which, if it failed, could spell disaster. The role of the clergy in maintaining morale cannot be underestimated. The chronicles note how crusaders viewed themselves as being pilgrims; Fulcher of Chartres for example said that '*God, like a good pastor, held his sheep together*'.[606]

Taking risks to expose themselves to enemy fire to demonstrate their apparent immunity to earthly weaponry gave priests an opportunity to show combatants whose faith might be wavering that belief in God would protect them and that the blessings of priests on allied ventures and condemnation of the enemy would produce a good outcome. Raymond of Aguilers noted the fervour of the priests during the Crusaders' assault against Kerbogha at Antioch. Whilst we must remember Raymond's readership, the chaplain was well enough versed in military matters to describe how the columns of knights formed. Raymond also noted how during the same battle at Antioch some priests took to the walls of Antioch stating:

> '*Now as with our army outside of Antioch, barefooted priests clad only in priestly vestments stood upon the wall invoking God to protect his people …*'[607]

Raymond attributed the victory as much to divine intervention as to the lances of the European cavalry. So too Ralph of Caen notes of a priest, so fuelled by a desire to complete his pilgrimage during the siege of Jerusalem, that feeling immune to enemy attack, he left the shelter where soldiers had just retreated following an unsuccessful assault. Ralph stated:

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[606] *FC*, b. I, c. XV, p. 95.
[607] *RA*, VIII, p. 63.

'*But who would not be moved to laughter, even in the midst of tears, by this warlike priest who, while the soldiers were growing tired, took up a ladder although he was not a fighting man and was dressed in his white stole?*'[608]

This episode, Ralph claims, not only preceded an assault but actually inspired it, causing the exhausted Crusaders to return to the walls with a new fervour singing the *Kyrie eleison.*[609] More practically the clergy provided a labour resource, tending the wounded and burying the dead, so that:

'*bishops, priests, monks were there committing bodies of the dead the earth, commending the faithful souls into the hands of Jesus Christ with prayers and psalms*.'[610]

The death of the Bishop of Puy shortly after the victory at Antioch was a large blow to the Crusading command. Adhemar of Puy, who is reported to have been the first to take the cross at Clermont,[611] had been a principal political figure amongst the Crusade leaders. His banner is recorded in the same vein as those of temporal military commanders.[612] As a prominent leader of the campaign, his death had a tremendous effect. Prior to his death, with some pointed exceptions such as the disputes between Tancred and Baldwin,[613] the military leaders had been capable of maintaining strong and vital alliance between themselves. Urban II had placed the pilgrimage under Adhemar's leadership.[614] Raymond of Aguilers noted how Adhemar

[608] *GT*, c. 125, p. 141.
[609] The development of the *kyrie eleison* (God Have Mercy) was studied in R.E. Messenger, 'Medieval Processional Hymns Before 1100', in *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, Vol. 80, (1949) pp. 375–92.
[610] *AA*, b. II, c. 43 pp. 77-8.
[611] *FC*, b. I, p. 67; *RA*. Prologue, p. 15.
[612] *GF*, 6N, p. 55.
[613] *GT*, cc. 37-39, pp. 60-63.
[614] Kostick, *The Social Structure of the First Crusade*, p. 245.

was ‘beloved by God and mankind, flawless in the estimation of all’[615] Adhemar had been compared to Moses leading a new exodus of God’s chosen people back into the Holy Land.[616] This, however, required hints to both Moses and Joshua. In his diplomatic role Adhemar of Puy had sought to cooperate with Byzantines.[617] organising supplies for the Crusaders within the Orthodox Church.

Achieving cooperation between the leadership factions was no easy feat. Bohemond and the Sicilian-Normans had been constant adversaries of the Byzantine Emperors, each blocking the other’s advances in the Mediterranean. Under Adhemar’s leadership, the Crusading force had taken custody of the Holy Lance and relied on its provenance as a relic in battle to support the legitimacy of their cause and defeat the enemy. On his death, opposition to its authority began to rise more fervently; its legitimacy was questioned as its usefulness had faded. Adhemar himself had tested the visionary Peter Bartholomew calling him to swear upon a bible and crucifix.[618] His apparent sense of fairness and good leadership earned respect from the Crusade Military command. Albert of Aachen notes that:

> ‘*Bishop Adhemar of the Puy, making a speech to the people, gave them all a fatherly warning, and told them, with encouragement of this sort, to which the present emergency and constant news from nearby Antioch were driving him:.*’[619]

This ‘fatherly’ approach, both as legate and commander, was highly effective. His death on August 1st 1098 produced a new crisis.[620] The departure of Tetigus

[615] *RA*, b. IX. p. 66.
[616] C. Sweetenham, ‘Robert as theologian, historiographer and storyteller’, in *RM*, p. 57.
[617] Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p. 48.
[618] *GF*, 9N, p. 78.
[619] *AA*, b. III, c. 32, p. 104.
[620] Runciman, *The First Crusade*, p. 159.

from the siege of Antioch had placed a strain on the relationships between the Byzantines and the pilgrims.[621] Bohemond had already used the departure to reinforce his claim upon Antioch, a city from which he now reserved his forces. Bohemond remained in Antioch with a sizable force, a move that caused a significant split with Tancred.

[621] *GF*, 6N, p. 57.

## Terror

Fear and terror were the weapons de jure for the Normans. William the Conqueror faced with resistance in England from the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Scandinavian communities, undertook a long campaign against rebels within his kingdom, systematically destroying areas around London following his victory at Hastings in 1066.[622] The viciousness of his response to resistance resulted in decades of peace only interrupted by rebellions from his own sons, including Robert of Normandy. It is therefore unsurprising that those engaging in the Crusades went on to employ a stratagem that was familiar to them. Massacring a defeated enemy, including local civilian populations, would have been a part of the arsenal of the Crusader command as much as the weapons of war. In 1071, the same year as the Byzantine defeat at Mazikert, the Turkish military commander Atsiz Ibn Abaq peacefully captured Jerusalem, without the massacres more commonly associated with the period. Abaq, a comparable Turkish commander to El Cid in both personality and style, continued his success, conquering Damascus and the cities of the Levant.[623] Five years later, the Fatimids recaptured Jerusalem only for Abaq to assault the city in a campaign that proved bloody. Having recaptured the city, only the Christians were spared from the massacre that followed by seeking refuge behind the walls of their quarter.[624] Abaq then returned to Damascus, raiding and terrorising the Damascene until its capitulation. A series of assassinations followed, allowing the Seljuk Turks into Damascus and the Levant.[625]

[622] Morris, *The Norman Conquest,* pp. 194-195.
[623] Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, p. 75.
[624] Susan Bauer, *The History of the Medieval World* (New York, W.W. Norton, 2010) p. 649.
[625] Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, pp. 76-77.

In 1085 Emperor Alexios finalised a peace treaty with the Sicilian Normans, including Bohemond, following Robert Guiscard's death.[626] This closure of hostilities on the Greek front allowed the Byzantines to re-focus on their Turkish enemies. The conflict with the Turks that followed turned on Alexios until he was forced to send representatives for Latin support.

The Europeans did not have a monopoly on the use of terror; massacre of a defeated enemy was both a tacitly accepted outcome of conflicts and deliberately inflicted military tactic of terror for the commanders of both sides to subdue a conquered settlement or people. Preceding the many brutal actions of the Crusaders in the Levant and Anatolia, German elements of the Peasants' Crusade attacked populations from the Rhineland to Anatolia, the majority of their victims being Jewish.[627] The riotous behaviour of the peasants drove Alexios to evict them to Civetot in Anatolia.[628] The harbour at Civetot was a principal port for the entrance to Anatolia, but its castle could not possibly have protected all the pilgrims who had been displaced. The massacre, which was not the first Turkish massacre in the area, but the first inflicted on the Crusaders, was extensive. The corpses of the pilgrims stretched from the pass of Dracon to the port of Civetot.[629] The dead included priests,[630] yet, despite the slaughter, the castle held[631] and the attempt to destroy the Crusade before it had begun failed.

[626] Avner Falk, *Franks and Saracens: Reality and Fantasy in the Crusades* (London, 2010) 9. 82
[627] *AA*, b. I, c26, pp. 37-38; *AA*, b. I, c. 27. pp. 38-39.
[628] *RA*. bII, p. 27.
[629] S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, *Vol. I* (Cambridge: CUP, 1951) p. 32.
[630] *GF*, 1N, p. 28.
[631] *RA*, bIII, p. 27.

If the massacre at Civetot had been intended to intimidate the pilgrims it failed. The propaganda generated from the massacre drove the Crusaders on, though it damaged the Alliance with the Byzantines.[632] The Turk defenders at the siege of Nicaea avoided a potential massacre by prudently surrendering to the Byzantines.[633] It is plausible that the Nicaeans had been involved in the massacre of Christians at Civetot and knew well the Crusaders' ferocity while they sought retribution.[634]

Both the Crusaders and their enemies sought to use beheading and headhunting as a form of psychological warfare to use upon their enemies in order to increase their dominance over them and thus gain victory over them[635].

As the Peasants' Crusade reached Civetot it was met by a Turkish force that surprised and massacred the mass of the pilgrims unable to take refuge with in the castle there. During the massacre the Turks discovered a priest offering Mass at an altar. The Turks proceeded to kill him at the altar. Though differing slightly to the *Gesta Francorum's* version of events Robert the Monk notes how this was viewed by the Crusaders.

> *'…the Turks then ran to the Christian camps and there they found one priest celebrating Mass. They cut his head off in front of the altar. What a fortunate martyrdom for that fortunate priest, who was given the body of Our Lord Jesus Christ [through the Eucharist] as a guide up to heaven.'*[636]

[632] *RA*, III, p.27.
[633] *AA*, b.2, c.37, p. 71.
[634] *GT*, c.16, p. 39.
[635] *GF*, 2N, p. 15 (Hill)
[636] *RM*, b. I, c. XII, p. 87.

The act was clearly an attempt to horrify the Crusaders, convince those within the castle to surrender and dissuade any would be reinforcements from continuing from any campaign against them. Though in this case it failed to deter the forces that later crossed from Constantinople, to behead someone of such importance as a priest was clearly meant as a tactic of terror and not one of strategic military importance.

This act of taking heads by the Turks to demoralise the Crusaders was repeated during the siege of Antioch. Roger of Barnville was a prominent knight leading a number of troops within the Crusader armies. His bravery and competency had brought him to the attention of Tancred who placed him in the special operations unit that attacked a Turkish relief column's camp during the Crusader siege of Antioch in 1098.[637] Roger was caught and killed in a Turkish ambush, and those realising the significance of their victory beheaded Roger to be displayed in the Kerbogha's camp.[638] The effect on the Crusader camp was significant. Whilst Albert suggests that the reason Roger was allowed to be killed and beheaded in sight of the walls was due to a lack of horses, the truth may also be that the sight created a sufficient sense of terror within the Crusader ranks to dissuade them from mounting a rescue attempt. Use of the tactic of beheading leaders in front of enemy troops had certainly been the intent of the Crusaders and adds an example of the behaviour that the European military leadership would have been aware of and thus a tactic that they would have been ready to employ.

An example of such beheading is seen during the siege of Nicaea. Here Tancred was the first to engage the Turks. Due to the scale of the massacre of the

[637] *AA*, b. III, c. 61, p. 125.
[638] *AA*, b. IV, c. 27, p 152; RA, X, p. 74; RM, b. VI, c. VIII, p. 151.

Peasants Crusade by the Turks, it is possible that the Crusaders passed many of the dead on their way to Nicaea and rather than being demoralised by the bodies, they were fired by a sense of revenge. Tancred often appears to have been in Bohemond's vanguard, departing from the main body with Baldwin towards the coast of southern Anatolia.[639] This may explain how Tancred came into conflict with the Nicaean Turks first. This opening clash resulted in a victory enabling the Crusaders to initiate their siege. Tancred, however, was able to score a psychological victory of his own over the Nicaeans. Following his victory over a presumably prominent Turk, Tancred decapitated the corpse and paraded the severed head through the Crusader camp as a way to bolster their resolve, just in the same way that Roger of Barneville's head is portrayed. The *Gesta Tancredi* states:

> '*The Turk's head was presented as a spectacle to the crowd. Tancred was celebrated by all the people of the army, whatever their language, age, sex or profession, both as the first taker of a Turkish head and as a pursuer of countless others.*'[640]

This display of ruthlessness sent a significant message to the soldiers of Nicaea and the potentially long siege was ended through diplomatic messages sent directly to the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I. This in itself is significant as the Nicaeans clearly believed that they would not face such harsh terms with the Byzantines as the ruthless and blood thirsty Crusaders.[641] Such a mind-set was undoubtedly created by the desecration of corpses by the crusaders.

[639] *GF*, 4N, p. 47; *GT*, c. 34, p.57; S. Runciman, *The First Crusade* (Cambridge: CUP, 1951) p. 113.
[640] *GT*, c. 16, p. 40.
[641] *RA*, III, p. 26; *AA*, b. II, c. 37, p72, *AK*, b. X, p. 296.

The resistance at Antioch, which was the next major massacre, preceded the Crusaders' long march south to Jerusalem. Both the possibility of the relief force of Kerbogha and the apparent absence of terror tactics being unleashed by the Crusaders while crossing Anatolia may well have bolstered the resolve of the Turkish garrison, which led to their deaths following their defeat. Though the defeats of Nicaea and Dorylaeum shocked the Turks enough to cause them to retreat, it was an orderly retreat, rather than a rout, allowing sufficient time for them to engage in a scorched earth policy, described by the *Gesta Francorum* as:

> '*… they ransacked the churches and homes and other places and took away horses, donkeys and mules, and gold and silver and anything else that they could carry. As well they took with them Christian children and burned and destroyed everything that could be useful to us, even as they fled and trembled before our face*'[642,]

As the Crusaders approached Antioch there was an absence of terror within the Antiocene garrison that would bolster the morale of the garrisons of the Levantine cities along the coast.

The Crusaders' use of terror tactics and savage violence to foreshorten a longer conflict was reinstated at the siege of Antioch. Foraging parties from Antioch were still capable of leaving the city to gather supplies. Again, Tancred showed the calculated use of terror as a military strategy under his leadership, separating it from an uncontrolled emotional response to provocation. In this instance Tancred held back his forces for two days, delaying his ambush until the besieged garrison had

[642] *GF*, 4N, p. 46. Little has been written on the scorched earth as a tactic, but information can be derived from Michael G. Hasel, 2002, 'The Destruction of Trees in the Moasite Campaign of 2 Kings 3:4-27: A study in the laws of warfare' in *Andrew's University seminary studies*; Vol. 40, (2) (2002) pp. 197-206; also A.A.L. Caulincourt, *With Napoleon in Russia*, ed. Jean Hanoteau (Minnesota: New York, 2005) p.86.

developed sufficient confidence to deploy large numbers, their decreased wariness maximising the impact of his attack. Ralph of Caen's numbers for the dead are presumably exaggerated for effect but what is interesting is how Tancred dealt with the situation. The delay maximised the numerical military impact, while the beheading of at least some of the party within sight of the city and their later display suggests the terror aspect. Ralph records:

> '*Lest this account be too long, after about 700 had been killed, Tancred sent 70 heads taken from the dead men to the bishop of Le Puy, a tenth of his triumph.*'[643]

The rationale for sending heads to the bishop perhaps returns to the makeup of the leader and a moment of unmanaged brutality, a deliberate message with a different agenda to an ally – getting noticed as a leader on the promotion ladder perhaps. The reaction of the bishop was not one of horror, but elation for the victory and tribute sent by Tancred.[644] Tancred, though perhaps appearing to modern students as a ruthless commander acting effectively as the attack dog of Bohemond for most of his pilgrimage, was not alone in the ritualistic head taking. Bohemond's forces were said to have taken heads in their attack on the relief force coming to break the Crusaders' siege. The *Gesta Francorum* states that '*Our men chased after [the retreating Turks], lopping off their heads, right up to the Bridge of Iron.*'[645] It was the treatment of these heads that possibly provides the clearest use of beheading in the First Crusade. The

[643] *GT*, c. 51, p. 77.
[644] Ibid.
[645] *GF*, 6N, p. 59.

*Gesta Francorum* notes that '*[The crusaders] brought back to the city gate one hundred heads of the dead Turks.*'[646]

Raymond of Aguilers then writes that the Crusaders publically displayed these in view of the defenders with the sole aim of diminishing their resolve to continue resistance as well as provide them with visual threats of what would become of the Turkish garrison should the Crusaders prevail. Raymond of Aguilers stated that the heads were arranged on spikes:

> '*Thus God disposed that the sight of lifeless heads of friends supported by pointed sticks would ban further taunts from the defenders of Antioch.*'[647]

The psychological war against the defenders of Antioch was a victory for the Crusaders, who continued to dominate their adversaries from without the city walls. The optimism of the Crusaders in the camps was also bolstered by such acts. Albert of Aachen notes that this same raid by Bohemond, Tancred, Robert of Flanders, Robert of Normandy and Godfrey upon the relief column was a crushing victory for the Crusaders. Albert states that as losses were so low:

> '*…they dismounted and cut off the heads of those killed, tied them to their saddles and carried them back in great happiness to their many comrades.*'[648]

Having returned, the Crusaders then threw some of these heads into Antioch or staked them upon lances in full view of the garrison.[649] This reference to catapulting heads into a besieged city was an established tactic for the Crusaders. In earlier

[646] Ibid., p. 60.
[647] *RA*, V, p. 40.
[648] *AA*, b. III, c. 62, p.126.
[649] Ibid.

sieges in Anatolia many of the settlements appear to have capitulated easily compared to Antioch and Nicaea. This may be why at Nicaea, Robert the monk noted that after a Seljuk Turk relief force had been intercepted and routed by the Crusaders, the victors catapulted the Turks heads from siege engines.

> '*There they climbed up again onto their machines, and lobbed the severed heads of slaughtered Turks from their throwing-machines and their catapults into the city to strike more fear into their enemies*.'[650]

Such acts of terror by the Crusaders upon the Turks may have influenced Firuz's decision to betray Antioch to Bohemond. The hunger being inflicted by the Crusaders' blockade had already succeeded in reducing the morale of the garrison and the attacks on the relief forces prior to Kerbogha's main force, further inspiring defeatist thoughts within him.

During the same siege, as the Antiocenes were defeated on the river during one of the many skirmishes, many of the citizens left the safety of their walls in order to bury their dead in the Islamic custom. These were supposed to have been buried in a cemetery near to the mosque outside of the city itself. When the Crusading commanders received word of this they immediately dispatched their forces to vandalise the Muslim graves, cut off their heads and carry them back to the camp, and to bury their headless corpses in a mass grave.[651] This abuse of the dead was a form of psychological warfare was intended to send a deliberate message to the garrison of Antioch that neither they, nor their religious customs, were going to be permitted within the walls once the Crusaders took the city. It was a systematic

[650] *RM*, b. III, c. IV, p. 105.
[651] *GF*, 7N, pp. 63-4.

campaign of terror that would be more recognisable as ethnic cleansing than perhaps regular warfare to modern eyes.

The siege by Kerbogha of Crusader Antioch proved particularly trying for the Crusaders. His efforts to surround and starve the city so soon after its fall to the pilgrims were highly successful and the chronicles note a number of desertions.[652] So great was the issue that both the *Gesta Francorum* and *Gesta Tancredi* note that Bohemond and/or Robert of Flanders actively burned the city to coerce their troops to fight the Turks still within the citadel.[653] Rumours of the demise of the Crusade began to fester within the Crusaders, and Raymond of Aguilers notes that morale fell so low that rumours spread that at the nightly church meetings, talk of desertion could be heard:

> '*… in the city soldiers returning from [the failed attempt to stop Kerbogha's forces] circulated widely a rumour that a mass decapitation of the defenders was in store.*'[654]

It may be for this reason that Tancred sought to assault Kerbogha's forces, thus sowing fear into the numerically superior force under Kerbogha's command. Albert of Aachen notes that:

> '*Tancred a very fierce knight who could never have enough of Turkish bloodshed but was always eager for their slaughter, saw their madness, their raging and rashness, and, with his limbs clad in iron as usual, he put on his hauberk, took with him ten comrades … …and he*

[652] France, *Victory in the East*, p. 270.
[653] *GF*, 9N, p. 80; *GT*, c. 76, pp. 98-99.
[654] *RA*, V, p. 40.

*fell with a sudden shout upon the Turks … and destroyed the unsuspecting soldiers..*'[655]

The effect of the raid upon morale is unclear, suggesting that it did little to stem the tide of deserters. Only the discovery of the Holy Lance appears to have stemmed the flow of the desertions. Even so Stephen of Blois returned to Europe, with a large portion of his forces.[656] Raymond of Aguiler's own views on the desertions was portrayed through the voice of St. Peter in which the Apostle is depicted as stating:

'*Deserters of Almighty God may well be fearful for having so forgotten the perils from which He delivered them that they failed to offer thanks [at Jerusalem]*'[657]

This produced a difference of opinions when it concerned a major leader's desertion from Antioch. Stephen of Blois was the son-in-law to William the Conqueror and as such brother-in-law to Robert of Normandy. This family tie was incapable of supressing Stephen's fears as he abandoned the city. The horrors of the siege clearly took their toll on Stephen who, with disease and famine rife in the besieging troops, may well have legitimately retired to Alexandretta for treatment.[658] The *Gesta Francorum* does state that Stephen had attempted to return to Antioch, but that when he received the intelligence from his scouts[659] he turned and fled in fear. The *Gesta Francorum* at this point does not pull punches, labelling him '*that*

[655] *AA*, b, IV, c. 32, p. 156.
[656] France, *Victory in the East*, p. 270; *GT*, c. 58, p. 84; *RM*, b. VI, c. XV, p. 158; *GF*, 9N, p. 81.
[657] *RA*, X, p. 77.
[658] *GF*, 9N, p81.
[659] Ibid.

*fool*'[660], and that Stephen '*pretended to have caught some disease and shamefully went off to another fortified city.*'[661]

Ralph of Caen however wrote after Stephen's death in the 1101 Crusade. It was with this hindsight that Ralph softened his own treatment of Stephen. The *Gesta Tancredi* states that:

> *'In the meantime, the count of Blois and [Robert of Normandy] left camp, exhausted by the miserable circumstances… The count of Blois went to Tarsus to repair his health.'*[662]

Whilst Ralph is keen to follow the story of Robert here after as he attempted to gather English soldiers from the Varangian Guard, and supplies for the Crusaders at Antioch, there is no further judgement of Stephen. The sources' perceptions of cowardice and how it should be dealt with are far more revealing. In the *Gesta Francorum* the author notes that leading deserters such as William the Carpenter and Peter the Hermit were effectively placed on trial, and hint that there was some system of physical or capital punishment:

> '*The whole of the night, William remained in the tent of Bohemond, lying on the earth like an evil thing.*[663]
>
> *'…Then nearly all the [men of the Ile-de-France] gathered around together and humbly asked the lord Bohemond to let him suffer no other penalty.'*[664]

[660] Ibid.
[661] Ibid.
[662] *GT*, c. 58, p. 84.
[663] William had also deserted his men during a campaign against the Moors of Spain previously in 1087. This infamous action may have spurred him to join the First Crusade.
[664] *GF*, 6N, p. 56.

Nevertheless the good commander was as lenient or pragmatic as he was just and it is not surprising that the scene concludes with Bohemond agreeing to clemency in return for William's word of parole that he would not later desert the pilgrimage.[665] It should be remembered that this work was compiled, even as a war memoir, in the period when Bohemond was Prince of Antioch. It may therefore be entirely apocryphal, with only an idea of how the author felt Bohemond should have treated the deserters. Tancred chasing them down however would unlikely have been so secretive, and it may have been that the returning party was more public.

Alternatively this may be a cover up, an opportunity for retribution negated by the psychological damage caused by leaders, especially Peter the Hermit, deserting their posts and the pilgrimage at large. The *Gesta Tancredi*, written years later, considers the desertions of William of Grandmesnil, Alberic his brother, and Guy Trousseau as crimes not only against the Crusade but against '*God, their homeland and of themselves*'.[666] When the deserters used ropes to lower themselves down the walls, in a mirror of the city's capture by Bohemond, the ropes were kept upon the walls as a '*monument of their shame to posterity*'.[667] The pragmatism of the Crusade leadership to do what was necessary to achieve the goal of taking the Holy Land, stands at odds then with the ideals of the chivalrous knight commander.

The medieval military leader's control over his army relied on it being able to be successfully motivated or coerced. In the instance of the deserters, examples were clearly made so that others would think twice of committing the same crime.

[665] Ibid., p. 57.
[666] *GT*, c. 79, p101
[667] Ibid., p102

That said, the lack of reinforcements presented a limitation on manpower. Robert the Norman, as mentioned above, was already looking to commandeer the Varangian Guard. There is a suggestion therefore that other methods of punishment would have to be used in order to both preserve discipline yet also not damage the Crusade's fighting ability too much.

Medieval leadership in this period is very much portrayed as a matter of carrot or stick. When the lure of loot and the compulsion of faith were no longer able to lead the campaign forward into danger, the leaders were obliged to use coercion. In both accounts; the urban fighting of Antioch between the Antiocene garrison of the citadel and the crusaders was intense and forced many of the fighters to seek shelter away from the combat either to recuperate or else to simply hide for their own safety. Upon hearing this one of the commanders began to burn the city. The *Gesta Francorum* insists that it was Bohemond,[668] whilst the *Gesta Tancredi* states that it was a joint command carried out by Robert the Fleming.[669] The fire grew out of control, yet by denying their own men the chance to slumber, it would seem that the commanders were able to rally their men from their hiding places and back into the harshness of the battle. Such actions were not to be taken lightly. In this case, the passage shows the desperation that the Crusade's commanders had to motivate their men to fight. This act of coercion on the part of the military leadership is not perceived as a failing on their part, something that cannot be understated. Burning a portion of the city was indeed a desperate act. This was after all a city that had been taken in order to be occupied. Coercion therefore was used as a last resort, a necessity when confined by the limitations of what was effectively nomadic warfare.

[668] *GF*, 9N, p. 80.
[669] *GT*, c. 75, p. 98.

Those who shied away from their duties to God and the cause, were viewed in the harshest terms, yet seemingly were dealt with compassion and a great deal of mercy. Deserters from later periods, when caught, were often executed ignominiously, yet in the two examples of William the Carpenter and Peter the hermit at Antioch, they were merely called upon to re-pledge their oaths to go to Jerusalem.

It is certain that they were humiliated to lie prostrate in Bohemond's pavilion, an episode which highlights the *Gesta Francorum's* author's close proximity to Bohemond and the layout of commanders' quarters as well, but they were allowed to live. In the case of Stephen of Blois, he was scolded by his wife Adela daughter of William the Conqueror and by the authors of the *Gesta Francorum* and the *Gesta Tancredi*, but was not put in any danger directly. Perhaps his attempt to make recompense for his desertion speaks most, however, for the subject. Stephen joined a small campaign a year after the Crusade's completion known as the Crusade of 1101. There, he led his Norman forces back into the Levant to further strengthen the new kingdom of Jerusalem. It was during this renewed campaign that Stephen was killed, to be succeeded by his sons. One of these sons, his namesake, found that his honour was not so tarnished by his father's desertion at Antioch as to stop him becoming King of England. Public opinion was often the harshest judge. William the Carpenter would desert again, but disappeared from record at this point, reduced to a nobody. Those who sought to redeem themselves, however, were able to raise their fortunes in the course of time. This also highlights the need for fame, as well as fortune for the Crusaders. It shows the Crusaders, though adventurous by definition, were not bravos and thugs managing a rabble, but were an identifiable force de guerre, motivated by identifiable goals and structure.

The victory over Kerbogha effectively ended significant Seljuk opposition. The city states of the Levantine coastline often resisted for short periods, but the brutality of the Crusaders through the siege and the rumours of cannibalism that emerged from the siege of Maara further damaged their resolve, with many seeking out diplomatic solutions other than to pay the Crusaders off from attacking them.[670] Compared to the siege of Antioch, the siege of Jerusalem was brief. After forty days the Crusaders breached the walls of Jerusalem and with it committed the most controversial act of the Crusade.

In mid-July the city was taken after a siege of approximately 40 days, the Crusaders having arrived at Jerusalem on June 7th.[671] In accordance with custom, the remaining inhabitants of the city came under the mercy of the conquering force. There was no military reason to allow the defenders to survive and continue to consume scarce supplies, so a massacre might have been anticipated. The *Gesta Francorum* records that:

> '*…all the defenders of the city fled… to 'Solomon's Temple, where there was so much slaughter that our men put down their feet in blood up to the ankle*.' [672]

The narrative continues to recount the battle for the Temple following the peaceful surrender of the emir at David's Tower. The *Gesta Francorum* describes the flow of blood through the temple. The only significant change in language between the Dass and Hill translations comes from the description of the bloodshed and depth seen at

[670] *GF*, 10 N, p 100; *AA*, b. V, c. 38, p. 201; *GT*, c. 111, p. 128.
[671] S. John, 'The 'Feast of the Liberation of Jerusalem': remembering and reconstructing the First Crusade in the Holy City, 1099–1187' in *Journal of Medieval History*, Vol. 41 (4) (2015) pp. 409-431, p. 412.
[672] *GF*, 9N, p. 103.

the Temple of Solomon. Hill translates the text as simply "streaming with their blood"[673]. This is the translation of "*ita ut sanguis illorum per totem templum flueret*"[674]. This is a vague translation on both parts and relies on the translation of "flueret" which in its most basic translation could also simply imply that the blood "flowed" through the temple, not implying a sense of depth at all.

Justifying the loss of life as purification of the temple, chaplain Raymond of Aguilers provides an account of the slaughter at the al-Aqsa mosque in which the blood flow is as deep as the *'horses' bridles'*[675]. Such a description was based though on biblical literature rather than facts as Raymond notes the similarity of the massacre to Revelations 14:20

> '*They were trampled in the winepress outside the city, and blood flowed out of the press, rising as high as the horses' bridles for a distance of 1,600 stadia (180 miles or about 300 kilometres)*.'[676]

Writing to the pope later he reports Frankish forces '*riding in Saracen blood to the knees of the horses*'.[677] Fulcher of Chartres, who arrived several months after the ending of the temple siege and noting the stench of the corpses that had not been burned reported:

> '*Nearly ten thousand were beheaded in this Temple. If you had been there your feet would have been stained to the ankles in the blood of the slain.*'[678]

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[673] *GF*, 10N, p. 91. (Hill)
[674] GF, 10N, p. 91 (Hill)
[675] *RA*, XIV, p. 128.
[676] Revelations 14: 20.
[677] H. Hagenmeyer, 'Epistulae et chartae ad historiam primi belli sacri spectantes' in *Die Kreuzzugsbriefeaus den Jahren 1088-1100* (Innsbruck, 1902), Vol. 18, p. 171; B.Z. Kedar, 'The Jerusalem Massacre of July 1099 in the Western Historiography of the Crusades,' in *Crusades*, Vol. 3, (2004)p. 18.
[678] *FC*, b. I, c. XXVII, p. 122.

Albert of Aachen, similarly reporting accounts of events from witnesses reports ankle deep blood from a massacre of 10,000 fighters on the first day at the end of the siege.[679] The report continues with the massacre on the following day of the Muslims who had evaded capture by taking to the roof tops overnight and further killings on the third day.[680] Poitevin priest Peter Tudebode, in his eyewitness account, quotes Tancred commenting on '*house high mounds of bodies throughout the city, brought outside for burning*'.[681] It is an image that is repeated in the *Gesta Francorum.*[682]

The *Gesta Dei* repeats the story of the first two days of killing, but does not recount the third day and the river of blood had receded to '*boot height*'.[683] In his account, written almost eighty years later, William of Tyre records the carnage in the Temple as battle mutilations and the Crusaders being covered in blood in a battle that lasted a single day.[684] Madden suggests that later authors presented a picture of unimaginable blood loss partially as an anti-war treatise and that modern historians relying on accounts in the Encyclopaedia Britannica continued to report 'rivers of blood' into the mid twentieth century.[685] Madden proposes that while there may have been deep pools of blood in the temple in small areas that might have been ankle deep, the rivers of blood are a biblical reference suggesting cleansing of the pagan influence, rather than literal blood flow.[686] He continues with various calculations of the area of the mosque and possible number of corpses to suggest ankle deep blood

[679] *AA*, b. VI, c. 21, p. 223.
[680] Ibid., p. 228.
[681] Petrus Tudebodus, *Historia de Hierosolymitano itinere*, eds. J.H. Hill and L.L. Hill (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1977), pp. 140-42.
[682] *GF*, 10N, p.104.
[683] *GDPF*, VII, p. 119.
[684] William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, eds. R.B.C. Huygens, H.E. Mayer, and G. Rösch, cited in T.F. Madden, 'Rivers of Blood: An Analysis of One Aspect of the Crusader Conquest of Jerusalem in 1099' in *Revista Chilena de Estudios Medievales* Vol. 1, (2012) p. 32.
[685] Madden, 'Rivers of Blood' p. 33.
[686] Ibid., p. 34.

may have been possible, but rightly concludes that the loss of life was undoubtedly terrible, given the number of reports of the carnage. The manner of its reporting is largely superfluous.

The stark difference between William the Conqueror's campaign and the Crusade was timescales. Whereas William could operate from Normandy if necessary to mount campaigns further north through the British Isles, the Hautevilles' low numbers of adventuring knights also dictated that the conquest of Sicily and Southern Italy would be protracted. They deployed systematic terror against relatively weak resistance, dispersed over a wide region to terrorise the numerically larger local populace regularly until they capitulated. The dominance of the Normans in Italy also brought them into near constant conflict with the various factions who had vested interests in the region. The experiences gained in Southern Italy would be used to anticipate likely events in the Mediterranean, where Byzantine interests coincided with both Islamic and Papal interests. The nature of the First Crusade was relatively rapid in its timescale. The number of cities taken and land conquered was greater than that that had be taken by either William or Roger in Europe. As the timescales were shorter, a more brutal approach was taken, especially as Crusader numbers plummeted with each confrontation. War and horror were certainly a key element for the military leaders, as depicted in the Chronicles, but the reasons for these changed over time. The carnage that was abhorred by most of society was viewed as a necessary military act, but as so often happens, these necessities were brought into question and twisted to fit a new narrative. What had begun as an attempt to show how well Jerusalem and the Holy Land was "cleansed" through blood was used for propaganda both by anti-war critics like

William of Tyre and the Crusader States' Islamic rivals that would use the massacre in the years following.

## Conclusion

The hysterical response at the conclusion of the campaign,[687] when Jerusalem had been taken, meant that gore and carnage was left in the streets of the city[688] as the Crusaders gathered together at the Sepulchre, the site which they had promised to 'relieve' four long years previously. Long before any comprehension of the mental effects of sustained battle, or sudden trauma, the spectacle that followed was reported as a clearly highly emotional event for the veterans of such a long campaign. The military commanders of the First Crusade were shrewd in their use of psychology, employing incredible brutality and violence to dominate their enemies militarily, theologically and politically. Their grasp of these skills produces a more sophisticated image of the Crusaders, moving from the barbarous rabble they are sometimes perceived as to an armed force that was well aware of their actions. The leaders' ability to curtail any such brutal action was difficult. Whilst martyrdom may have been sought by a few religious fundamentalists, the majority were more willing to hold on to life. This was evident from the desertions from the Crusade at Antioch, as well as the way the armed pilgrims fought against sometimes incredible odds when a suicidal charge could have secured them martyrdom though at the cost of the campaign. The use of the Holy Lance to bolster the troops before the total victory over Kerbogha indicates that the Crusade's

[687] *GF*, 10N, p. 104.
[688] *GT,* Chapter 134, p. 148.

command was in tune with the spiritual rhythm of their subordinates. They also recognised its political and economic power, shown by the infighting that briefly erupted after the victory and the commencement of the march from Antioch. The death of Adhemar of Puy, followed closely by the Bishop of Orange, delivered a heavy blow to the Crusader's morale, yet the leaders were able to restructure their hierarchy to accommodate the new situation. In essence, as with intelligence gathering and logistical challenges, the leaders were able to adapt, adjust and overcome these to attain success.

# Conclusion

## Summary

This dissertation has examined three non-combat components of military leadership. In particular it has thematically explored the ideas of intelligence gathering, logistical organisation and psychological warfare over the course of the First Crusade. The chroniclers, of whom three were pilgrims of the campaign, chose to divulge their experiences of the campaign through their works. Each chronicle is different, yet provides a common thread by which the dissertation has been able to identify and examine those traits of leadership present in successful leaders. It highlights where elements of intelligence gathering, supply or moral failed, and the leaders were placed in jeopardy. The stakes for the First Crusade were high, not just for the forces that took part, but for Europe. Urban II, who died before news of Jerusalem's conquest could reach mainland Europe, was in contest with Clement III.[689] The failure of the campaign would have heavily damaged his reputation, especially if it had cost the lives of so many pilgrims in the process. Failure for the Byzantines too would have been disastrous. Whilst the Crusader states, particularly that of the Principality of Antioch, became a thorn in the Byzantine side, the failure of the Crusaders to retake Jerusalem might have bolstered the Arab, Egyptian and Turkish drive to push towards Constantinople, as occurred in the 15th century. The Crusaders, however, had the most to lose. Failure in their endeavour did not just

[689] R. Somerville, *Pope Urban II's Council of Piacenza* (Oxford: OUP, 2011) p. 1

mean death or slavery, but could also forfeit their agreement for absolution concerning past sins. The psychology then would be one that fuelled the Crusaders to throw themselves more heavily into their endeavour, a useful tool to a military commander if utilised correctly.

Even with some remaining Roman roads[690], in a continent almost devoid of signposts and largely covered by forests it is perhaps incredible that any of the various forces assembled and found their way from Austria, not to Jerusalem, but even through the Northern European forests to the coast to embark on small ships in support the Byzantine army of Emperor Alexius I in its conflict with the Seljuk Turks. The band led by the Monk Peter the Hermit was the first group who found their way to Anatolia, but with no military impact. The more organised and effective pilgrim armies from various regions under the leadership of Bohemond of Taranto (with his nephew Tancred), Raymond of Toulouse , Adhemar of Puy, Godfrey of Bouillon, Robert of Normandy, Robert of Flanders and Hugh of Vermandois provided an effective fighting force, but less than might be expected of a national army. The nature of the forces was determined by the local circumstances. A large body of Normans and Franks followed Robert Guiscard, but England was yet to settle under the Normans, Germany had poor relations with Rome, while the Italians were engaged in a conflict between two challengers for the throne of Saint Peter and the Spaniards were engaged in local conflicts with the Muslims. While the logistics and military infrastructure of a national army may have supported the outcome, the

[690] R. Evans, *Roadworks: Medieval Britain, Medieval Roads* (Oxford: OUP, 2016) p. 128

absence of nationalism may have prevented a major conflict among the pilgrims themselves.

Arriving at Constantinople, the would-be liberators of Jerusalem might have been expected to understand at least the environment and physical challenges of the mission they were about undertake though no such evidence is presented in the sources either highlighting their naivety of the Crusaders to the differences they would face or else it was taken as a matter of fact, either being possible due to the numbers travelling and previous pilgrimages to the Middle East.

The fundamental aspects of nomadic or mobile warfare, using local animals, as well as modern transport to overcome the natural challenges of modern desert warfare are discussed at length by Gilewitch and Perret from an academic and military perspective respectively.[691] Both authors emphasise the overwhelming forces of nature that cannot be readily challenged. Not least the dependence on water that restricts warfare to areas of natural water supply in the form of rivers and oases. This, to some extent, explains why subsequent Crusades appeared to make the mistake of repeating failed campaign manoeuvres and anticipating a different outcome. They had to take the same routes to follow the water. It was therefore crucial for military commanders firstly to manage the morale of their troops to prevent the wind and dust – the natural desiccants of the hot areas such as the Konya plain, from disorientating and injuring both personnel and animals. Preventing injury was next, as wounds in the field will generally become infected or cause other incapacity to the victim. Maintaining sufficient food is also crucial. Much is made of the amounts of food required to support the armies, but the starvation conditions endured by

[691] D.A. Gilewitch, *Military geography: The interaction of desert geomorphology and military operations*. (Tucson: University of Arizona State Press, 2003).

Russians in the siege of Stalingrad demonstrates that an army can be highly effective in atrocious conditions. Once all the natural challenges have been addressed the leaders are faced with an enemy that is familiar with its surroundings and competent soldiers.

The popular portrayal of the medieval period often conjures romanticised images of knights, castles and monasteries, the former two being components of the medieval military infrastructure and society that was an integral part of our forebears' lives. Stephen Morillo observed in *What is Military History?* that this theme of research naturally centres heavily on wars and warfare, but is not exclusively wedded to these themes.[692] A holistic military history must consider topics that encompass more than the participants and their battles, with studies concentrating on technology and logistics alongside the more common studies. The first wave chronicles and accounts of the Crusades focus on recounting the deeds and influence of leaders on those events as perceived by the authors. The repetition of their success in meeting these issues was impossible. The Second and Third Crusades failed in their objectives to retake the lands lost to the Turks from 1146. The Crusader forces that followed were unable to repel ambushes in the same places encountered in 1097. Bearing in mind that the First Crusade was a coalition of races and ethnicities in a period before definite borders hemmed in and defined nations, it is perhaps surprising that those 'nations' that followed in subsequent campaigns failed despite the increase in infrastructure that kingdoms and states have by definition. The Crusaders, however, were a group that combined their efforts for a common goal, evolving by reacting and adapting to each event and circumstance.

[692] S. Morillo, *What is Military History?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) p. 3.

When in need of intelligence they sought it out through sophisticated means, employing spies and scouts besides talking to natives of the Levant. The use of clerics from monks to Bishops in roles other than ecclesiastical reveals a multi-dimensional society, capable of using their skills to break barriers and breach cities. Multilingual agents were capable of hiding in plain sight, recruiting enemy agents and soldiers and profiting from their skills and resources. Military leaders were keen to retain such individuals, as seen with Bohemond and Arnulf of Chocques.

Clerical skills in maths and science may have been employed to consider supply and logistics. The tonnage of supplies delivered from ships was often enough to satiate the pilgrims, if not make them feel comfortable or prepare them for periods when supplies were unable to be delivered. When these failed or were unavailable, the Crusaders were able to adapt and feed themselves, though at a higher risk than that when being supplied by sea. The nature of their supplies enabled them to continue to preserve their way of cooking and eating, removing a significant barrier that could otherwise have reduced morale. Other materials were readily available thanks to the use of ships, enabling the military leaders to move more quickly in the sure knowledge that their heavier supplies would be waiting for them, or close behind for the next siege.

The nature of psychology was not wasted upon the Crusade's leaders, who encouraged increasing acts of brutality on the inhabitants of the Levant as a weapon to wear down opposition. Such acts were not unique to the Crusaders and were equally doled out to them by their enemies. The Crusaders became hardened to the violence of actions that surrounded them, yet required almost constant psychological bolstering during times of great peril. These periods saw the greatest desertions, and the use of flame and threat was relied upon for some who failed in their duties. The

discovery of the Holy Lance, irrespective of its true provenance, aided the Crusaders greatly, appearing at the moment of greatest need, a miracle and a relic that could be relied upon. The clerics used cosmology, astronomy and otherwise natural disasters readily to highlight the righteousness of their cause. God was on their side and would guide what they saw as His new chosen people.

Through the already explored martial skills found on the battlefield, from Godfrey's swordsmanship and Tancred's talent with the lance, the addition of research into these non-combat skills adds new depths to the understanding of how military leaders were capable of marching vast distances in such large numbers to take and hold Jerusalem.

## Further research

This research belongs to a larger and well-studied field. Further research could utilise other sources to explore the natures of medieval naval military leadership. Recent scholarship on medieval maritime military history has identified importance of crusade period, but has focussed more on developments in ship technology than on the leadership of naval commanders. There is an opportunity to focus on such individuals as Winemer and the Vitulus family by exploring their mention in sources such as William of Malmesbury's *Gesta Regum Anglorum*,[693] and Raol's *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*.[694] Other works such as The anonymously written *De*

[693] William of Malmesbury, *Gesta Regum Anglorum*, II, ed. & trans. Rodney M. Thomson, Michael Winterbottom (Clarendon Press, 1998) p. 594.
[694] Raol, De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, trans. C. W. David (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) pp. 100-101.

*Itinere Navali,*[695] may present an opportunity to identify themes that could then be used to search further within First Crusade chronicles that seemingly have not been located as of yet. It would be of note that the Vitulus family is recorded at least in part in several Anglo-Norman charters from the reign of William I and Henry II which could also be consulted.[696] Susan Rose's *Medieval Naval Warfare, 1000-1500* covers a broad range of medieval maritime military history focusing both upon individual campaigns and producing a wider view of the requirements and techniques of technology, as well as the necessary logistics within the field. John B. Hattendorf and Richard Ungar's collection of studies on medieval naval history, *War at sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, concerns similar themes, dividing studies into Northern and Southern Medieval Maritime history, followed by a third selection of early modern studies. Themes focus once more on the technology and campaigns conducted in particular geographical areas concentrating on Scandinavia, the English in the Hundred Years War in the Northern Section and Italian, Iberian and Byzantine navies in the Southern theatre of the Mediterranean. Remarkably, despite the wide range of geographical locations explored and the breadth of research chronologically for this topic there is nothing within the publication concerning military leadership. This is not uncommon and with only one notable exception, the studies of Medieval Naval history only concern matters of technology, logistics and details of campaigns.

*Roles of the Sea in Medieval England* by Richard Gorski et al. focuses on North Western European Maritime History both military and commercial, with

[695] Anonymous. *De Itinere Navali: A German Crusader's Eyewitness Chronicle of the Voyage and Reconquest*, trans. & ed. D. Cushing, (Leiden: BRILL, 2012)
[696] L. Delisle and E. Berger, *Recueil des actes de Henri II, roi d'Angleterre et duc de Normandie, concernant les provinces françaises et les affaires de France*, 1 (Paris, 1909-1927), p. 266

chapters on technology and the development of maritime institutions as seen in many other contemporary works.[697] David Simpkin's chapter concentrates on the English Admirals from 1369-89, how they were selected and their campaigns as well as a detailed account of the forces directly under their command. This work remains the only part of this very detailed study to focus on the perceptions of leadership as opposed to the details of individual commanders' careers.

From the First Crusade it would be possible to explore similar themes in the Second, Third and Fifth Crusades that focused attention on the Levant. The nature of the military leaders of these campaigns, as kings and emperors, means that a number of works have already been committed to them as individuals, providing a broad foundation for the research of their military leadership as a cadre of contemporary generals and commanders. From the same period as the First Crusade, further research could be focused upon the Iberian Peninsula to consider the leadership qualities of those commanders engaged in the *Reconquista* of Spain and Portugal. Again this is a field with a broad range of research that has at times been touched upon by this dissertation. The histories of the military orders that emerged in the 12th century following the victory of Jerusalem have also been widely considered,[698] yet an assessment has not yet been made of their leadership with their campaigns. This study further provides a stepping off point for themes that must have been considered by the Orders Militant.

[697] Richard Gorski et al., *Roles of the Sea in Medieval England* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2012)
[698] See for example J. Walker, 'Crusaders and Patrons: The Influence of the Crusades on the Patronage of the Order of St Lazarus in England' in *The Military Orders: fighting for the faith and caring for the faith*, ed. M. Barber (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994) pp. 327-32 also for his work on the lesser known Leprosy suffering Knights of St, Lazarus see J. Walker, *The Patronage of the Templars and of the Order Of St. Lazarus in England in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries*. Ph.D. thesis, University of St. Andrews. (1991).

This study should be considered a contribution to future research that has sought to add knowledge and understanding to just one area in the investigation of military history and could be engaged with other studies on the period or in the field for a broader understanding of history and current world events.

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