

1 **Comparing performance indicators for assessing and building**
2 **resilient water distribution systems**

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11 **Abstract**

12 Water distribution systems (WDSs) are critical infrastructures that need to be resilient
13 to cope with and quickly recover from exceptional conditions in an uncertain and
14 challenging future. To build resilience in the design of WDSs, it is essential to explore
15 indicators that can effectively quantify the level of system resilience. On the basis of the
16 optimization of rehabilitation designs of three benchmark WDSs, four resilience related
17 indicators are investigated, i.e. Todini's index, which is a surrogate and indirect
18 performance indicator, and three direct performance indicators - failure duration, failure
19 magnitude and a severity-based resilience index. These indicators are widely used in
20 literature yet have not been comprehensively examined and compared. Results show
21 that strong correlations exist between the four resilience-related indicators, indicating

22 that optimization using any one indicator is likely to improve system resilience measured
23 by other indicators. Nevertheless, they have distinctive advantages and disadvantages.
24 In particular, the severity-based resilience index is effective in identifying nodes
25 susceptible to the occurrence of failures and slow in recovery. Todini's index can be
26 assessed without the need of setting up failure scenarios, which is an advantage
27 compared to the other three resilience indicators; however, its correlations with direct
28 resilience indicators are weaker in WDSs with tanks.

29 **Keywords**

30 Many-objective optimization, rehabilitation, resilience, Todini's index, water distribution
31 system

32 **Introduction**

33 Water distribution systems (WDSs) are critical infrastructures of our society for the safe
34 and secure provision of drinking water (USEPA 2005). These are complex systems
35 consisting of a large number of diverse and interconnected components such as pumps,
36 pipes, valves and storage facilities and they span over long distances (National
37 Research Council 2006). As such, WDSs are susceptible to a wide range of acute or
38 chronic threats and failures are reported to be reoccurring (Gheisi et al. 2016). The
39 magnitude and frequency of failures in WDSs are likely to increase under the pressure

40 of rapid urbanization and climate change (Zimmerman et al. 2008; Basupi 2013).

41 To address the challenges posed to WDSs, there is a paradigm shift in water
42 management where system capacity to rapidly recover from failures is increasingly
43 being valued (USEPA 2014; Minsker et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2017; Walski 2019). In
44 the conventional design of WDSs, reliability is the primary goal so that a system can
45 maintain the desired level of service, i.e. meeting consumers' water demand with
46 sufficient pressure and water quality, even under threats (Ostfeld et al. 2002; Shinstine
47 et al. 2002; Chung et al. 2009; Wu et al. 2009). However, incidents that lead to
48 unsatisfied water demand are often unavoidable and unpredictable, hence it is essential
49 to design resilient WDSs which can minimize the negative effects of system failures and
50 recover quickly (Zhuang et al. 2013; Diao et al. 2016). This can be achieved by
51 conventional measures without entailing excessive costs. For example, Diao et al.
52 (2016) found that the addition of a pump at the water source in the studied WDS can
53 shorten the maximum failure duration by 12 hours in the firefighting scenarios and the
54 duplication of 9 pipes can reduce water supply deficit by about 40% in the pipe break
55 scenarios. Software platforms such as WaterGEMS and InfoWater can support
56 decision-making by simulation of how the level of service is affected under component
57 failures to prioritize intervention strategies such as pipe renewal and to assess fire-
58 fighting capacity (Bentley 2018; Awe et al. 2019; Innovyze 2020).

59 A prerequisite for building resilience in system design is to identify representative
60 indicators for measuring resilience. It can be based on direct measurement of resilience
61 performance (e.g. failure duration, magnitude and severity) under scenarios where a
62 WDS is stressed leading to failures (Fu et al. 2013; Aydin et al. 2014; Hwang et al. 2015;
63 Diao et al. 2016; Roach et al. 2018). As such, direct resilience assessment is dependent
64 on the set up of failure scenarios, the number of which is usually limited. To address
65 this, indirect approaches of evaluating resilience without performing failure analysis
66 have been proposed. For example, the hydraulic or water quality-related capability of
67 WDSs, measured by water pressure or the level of residual disinfectant, etc., is strongly
68 influenced by innate system properties (Meng et al. 2018) and affects how a system
69 behaves under adverse conditions (Raad et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2017a). Todini's index,
70 which describes the global surplus hydraulic power above the minimum required nodal
71 water head (Todini 2000), is such a surrogate performance indicator widely used in
72 assessing system reliability (Farmani et al. 2005b; Saldarriaga and Serna 2007; Reza
73 et al. 2008; Raad et al. 2010) and perceived as a resilience indicator in some studies
74 though its relationship with resilience is not clear (Banos et al. 2011). As such, the
75 representativeness of Todini's index for resilience of WDSs needs to be examined by
76 comprehensive studies.

77 The aim of this study is to investigate the performance and relationships of three

78 direct and one indirect resilience indicators (i.e. failure duration, magnitude and a
79 severity-based resilience index, and Todini's index) widely used for guiding resilient
80 design of WDSs. This is achieved by formulation of a resilience enhance problem,
81 whereby different types (e.g. adding pipes, pumps and/or storage tanks and
82 duplication/cleaning/lining of pipes) and amounts (e.g. adding one to several pumps) of
83 rehabilitation measures are applied to a WDS to obtain larger resilience. Each
84 rehabilitation strategy, if not meeting the full level of service under normal operating
85 conditions, can also be viewed as a failure scenario of a well-established network.
86 Hence, the addition of a pump/pipe/tank to a WDS can be deemed as the failure of the
87 pump/pipe/tank in the well-established WDS. Resilience indicators and cost are defined
88 as objectives for the optimization and a wide range of Pareto optimal solutions, i.e. high
89 performing, resilient rehabilitation strategies at various levels of cost, are obtained for
90 analyzing the relationships of the four resilience indicators. Three case studies are
91 examined in this work so that findings are not limited to a single WDS. The sensitivity
92 of the research results to water demand assumptions (a key source of uncertainty) is
93 also examined. Note that isolation valves, which are key to the performance of WDSs
94 under pipe failures, are not represented and accounted in this work. Also, network
95 resilience could be affected by many internal and external factors and operational
96 issues, which are not considered in this study, such as transients, valve failure, water

97 contamination, natural hazards (e.g., drought, flooding and earthquake) and social-
98 economic factors (e.g., human errors and strikes) (Khatavkar and Mays 2019; Walski
99 2020; Zhang et al. 2020).

100 **Direct resilience indicators**

101 Resilience refers to the degree to which a system minimizes the magnitude and duration
102 of failure in service provision over its design life when subject to exceptional conditions
103 (Hashimoto et al. (1982). It can be assessed by failure duration, failure magnitude, and
104 severity which is a combination of the former two (Casal-Campos et al. 2015; Mugume
105 et al. 2015a; Mugume et al. 2015b; Ward and Butler 2016; Meng et al. 2018;
106 Sweetapple et al. 2018; Ayala-Cabrera et al. 2019). Failure duration indicates how
107 quickly a system recovers from a failure. It is commonly measured by the average time
108 at all nodes in a WDS that the quantity/quality of the supplied water is below the required
109 level of service. Failure magnitude suggests how badly a system can fail and it can be
110 quantified as the average drop in system service at all nodes at all time steps in a
111 simulation. Severity describes the deficit in the quantity/quality of water supply
112 compared to the total demand of the entire WDS; it is an aggregation of the failure
113 impacts within the simulation and is not a simple multiplication of failure duration and
114 magnitude. For the ease of understanding and analysis, the severity indicator is
115 normalized and modified in this work as illustrated in Figure 1 and is hereinafter referred

116 to as the 'resilience index'. The dashed line represents the required level of service (e.g.
 117 nodal pressure, water quality) and the solid line represents the actual level of service.
 118 Severity is the area between the dashed and solid lines (i.e. A). The resilience index is
 119 one minus the ratio between severity and the total need (i.e. $A+B$). As such, the value
 120 of the resilience index is in the range of 0 to 1, which allows for direct comparison
 121 between different networks - the higher the index value, the greater the resilience of a
 122 WDS. The equation of the proposed resilience index is presented as

$$r = 1 - \frac{A}{B} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{t=1}^N SW_{i,t} \times l_t}{\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{t=1}^N D_{i,t} \times l_t} \quad (1)$$

123 where r is the resilience of system, $D_{i,t}$ is the nodal water demand at node i at the
 124 t th time step, $SW_{i,t}$ is the water supply to node i at the t th time step, n is the number of
 125 nodes in a WDS, N is the number of total time steps, and l_t is the duration of the t th
 126 time step.

127 **Methodology**

128 As mentioned earlier, the three direct resilience indicators, Todini's index and cost are
 129 set as objectives for the many-objective optimization of rehabilitation design of WDSs.
 130 It is in theory equal to but more efficient than performing 10 optimizations for each pair
 131 of the five optimization objectives; moreover, by doing the optimization in one run, the
 132 randomness of Genetic Algorithm in every run can be avoided to enable fair

133 comparisons between the resilience indicators (Nicklow et al. 2010; Fu et al. 2013;
134 Reed et al. 2013; Maier et al. 2014; Matrosov et al. 2015). WDSs that cannot provide
135 full level of service (i.e. failing to meet water demand in the system) are studied and
136 structural and/or operational rehabilitation measures (e.g. adding new
137 pipes/tanks/pumps and duplicating or cleaning/lining of pipes) are applied to mitigate
138 the failures. Based on the Pareto optimal solutions, the correlations between the
139 resilience indicators are examined to reveal their relationships and the appropriateness
140 of using one single indicator for resilient system design. As water demand is one of the
141 key sources of uncertainty affecting system performance, the sensitivity of the research
142 findings of this work to water demand assumptions is tested. This is achieved by
143 repeating the optimization of rehabilitation for a case study WDS under different water
144 demand scenarios, including fireflow, increased base demands, stochastic water usage
145 behavior and leakage.

146 A pressure-driven hydraulic simulation model of WDSs developed by Morley and
147 Tricarico (2008) is employed in this study. It is a modification of the demand-driven
148 hydraulic simulation model EPANET2 (Rossman 2000; Morley and Tricarico 2008) so
149 that the amount of water supply to a node is determined by nodal pressure (Wagner et
150 al. 1988) rather than in full level of service regardless of water pressure. As such, the
151 adopted model can produce more realistic simulation of water leakage and system

152 behavior under abnormal conditions, such as involving excessively high water demands
153 (e.g. for firefighting) or under component (pipes, pumps, etc.) failures leading to low
154 pressures in a WDS.

155 Mathematical formulations of the four resilience indicators are provided in Equations (1)
156 and (S1) to (S3) in the Supplemental Data. The cost of rehabilitation includes both the
157 capital and operational costs. Capital costs are for new pipes (linking two nodes not
158 connected before) and tanks, pipe duplication (linking two nodes already connected),
159 and cleaning and lining of existing pipes. The costs for pipes are calculated by
160 multiplying pipe length with unit costs for new pipes/cleaning/lining which are functions
161 of pipe diameter. The cost for a new tank relates to the tank capacity. The operational
162 cost refers to the energy cost for running pumps and is calculated by multiplying
163 electricity tariff (\$0.12/kWh in the case study) with the total energy consumption (in kWh,
164 determined by pump efficiency and operational schedule). More details on the cost-
165 related parameters can be found in Center for Water Systems (2004). Non-dominated
166 sorting algorithm-II (NSGA-II) (Deb et al. 2002) is employed as it is a fast and popular
167 evolutionary algorithm for multi-objective optimization (Farmani et al. 2005a;
168 Atiquzzaman et al. 2006; Wang et al. 2014).

169 **Case studies**

170 Three benchmark WDSs (*New York Tunnel*, *Anytown* and *EXNET*) (Center for Water
171 Systems 2004) are chosen as the case studies. They are widely used in system design-
172 related studies with rehabilitation options defined and provided. The three WDSs vary
173 in size, topology and system configurations as shown in Figure 2 and Table S1. *New*
174 *York Tunnel* (*NYT*) (Figure 2a) is a gravity-fed water supply network that can be
175 rehabilitated by duplication of any pipes. For each duplicating pipe, there are 15 options
176 of pipe diameter and a 'do nothing' option (i.e. no duplication). *EXNET* (Figure 2b) is a
177 much larger WDS where 567 pipes (highlighted in thick lines in Figure 2b) of the total
178 3032 pipes can be chosen for duplication with 10 diameter options or 'do nothing' as
179 defined in the system file. *Anytown* (Figure 2c) is more complex than the former two
180 WDSs in terms of operation as it has several pumps and tanks. The network needs to
181 be reinforced to meet the projected water demand increase (Walski et al. 1987) and
182 rehabilitation measures include duplicating or cleaning and lining of 35 selected pipes
183 (in solid lines in Figure 2c), adding six new pipes between nodes not connected before
184 (in dashed lines in Figure 2c), optimizing the operational schedules of all pumps, and
185 building two new tanks at any nodes with no existing tanks connected (Basupi 2013;
186 Atkinson et al. 2014). As such, the investigated rehabilitation measures are structural-
187 related for *NYT* and *EXNET* and both structural and operational-related for *Anytown*.

188 Additional description or assumption of the three cases is presented in the
189 Supplemental Data. As resilience is associated with dynamic performance of a system
190 under failure, a water demand pattern (i.e. multiplying daily water demand with hourly
191 coefficients, as presented in Table S2) is applied to enable extended period simulations.
192 Results show hydraulic failures (i.e. insufficient water pressure exists at certain nodes)
193 in all three WDSs. Some other commonly used measures to increase resilience such
194 as adaptive pump operation during pipe failure (Zhuang et al. 2013), providing back-up
195 pumps, adding isolation valves (Walski 1993a; b; Liu et al. 2017b) to reduce the impacts
196 of pipe break, reduction in transients, emergency connections to neighboring water
197 systems and improved communications, are not considered and can be examined in
198 future studies (Murphy et al. 1994; Center for Water Systems 2004; Walski 2020).

199 The decision variables for the optimization are case-specific and include diameter for
200 duplicated/added pipes, operational scheduling of pumps, if cleaning or lining is
201 provided for pipes, and if and how (size and location) tanks are added. There are 21,
202 567 and 77 decision variables of the three case studies respectively. The optimization
203 is performed with a population size of 500, which is found to be sufficiently large to
204 produce satisfactory results according to a preliminary test. The optimization is run for
205 1000 generations, as the changes in the average objective values (among the optimal
206 strategies) are less than 2% in the last 10 generations as shown in Figures S1 to S3.

207 The cross rate and mutation rate are set as the default values of 0.9 and 0.1 respectively.

208 Due to the diverse rehabilitation options in *Anytown*, this WDS is selected to perform
209 the following scenarios with different water demand assumptions for the sensitivity
210 analysis.

211 • S1 - 'Fireflow': A slightly modified demand pattern with two hours of excessively
212 large water consumption (2.5 times as much as under normal condition) is applied
213 to node 19 (one of the nodes with the highest water demands, defined as the point
214 for fireflow analysis in the system file) to simulate fire flow conditions. The time and
215 duration of the fire flow coincide with low water level at the tanks and one pump
216 being out of service, which enable the appraisal of system resilience under extreme
217 conditions. According to the definition of the network, the minimum required
218 pressure in the firefighting scenario is set to be 20 psi (14.06 m) rather than the
219 minimum pressure standard at normal conditions (28.13m).

220 • S2 – 'Increased base demands': The nodal base demand is 1.2 times of that in the
221 normal condition scenario (Table S3) while other settings remain the same.

222 • S3 – 'Stochastic water usage behavior': Five different demand patterns are created
223 and randomly assigned to different nodes (Tables S3 and S4). Other parameters
224 and settings are the same as the normal condition scenario.

225 • S4 – ‘Leakage’: Additional modifications are made to S3 by adding water leakage
226 randomly placed at different locations in the network. The total amount of leakage
227 is about 10-20% of the customer water demand. The simulation of leakage is
228 described in the Supplemental Data.

229 **Results and discussion**

230 *Relationships between the optimization objectives*

231 The Pareto optimal rehabilitation solutions obtained for the three WDSs are presented
232 in Figure 3, where each line represents a solution plotted against the five objectives (i.e.
233 the vertical lines). The arrows at the top of the vertical lines show the desirable direction
234 of the objective value (i.e. lower cost and higher resilience). There is a clear trade-off
235 between cost and resilience (i.e. cost increases with higher resilience). The cost of
236 being more resilient is case specific; moreover, the marginal cost for improvement in
237 resilience gets higher as the value of resilience increases. In *New York Tunnel*, the
238 Todini’s index increases from 0.31 to 0.68 (120% increase) by rehabilitation measures
239 that cost $\$58 \times 10^6$ (135% increase), yet the same amount of investment only improves
240 the index value by 0.02 if the initial value is 0.82 (i.e. 2% of increase in Todini’s index
241 by 30% increase in cost). The trade-off between cost and resilience, the desirable level
242 of resilience and the affordable level of cost are key factors to consider in the selection

243 of rehabilitation strategy to implement.

244 The linear correlation coefficients (r) between each pair of the five objectives based
245 on all the optimal strategies are presented in Table 1. Strong correlations are observed
246 between the four resilience indicators (except that between failure magnitude and other
247 indicators in EXNET because the failure magnitude in this network is clustered around
248 two values as explained in the next section). However, there are more lines crossing
249 between Todini's index and resilience and between failure magnitude and failure
250 duration in Figure 3c than Figures 3a and 3b. This may be caused by the existence of
251 storage tanks in the network, which play a key role in enhancing system resilience
252 against failures but is not well captured by the Todini's index. Similar relationships
253 between the five objectives are observed in the other four scenarios of *Anytown* as
254 presented in Table S5 and Figure S4.

255 The correlations can also be seen by plotting the optimal strategies against cost
256 and each resilience indicator. Figure 4 shows the results on *Anytown*, with the Pareto
257 optimal fronts against each pair of objectives (i.e. cost and one resilience indicator)
258 highlighted in orange, yellow, purple and green respectively. Had the two-objective
259 problems with each resilience index and cost been solved separately, the same Pareto
260 fronts should have been obtained assuming that the influence of optimization algorithms
261 is excluded. Similar figures for *NYT* and *EXNET* are presented in Figures S6 to S7. The

262 strong correlations between the resilience indicators can be seen from the similar
263 shapes between dots with different colors. The weaker correlations in *Anytown* than
264 *NYT* and *EXNET* are obvious as the dots are not as close together in Figure 4 as
265 Figures S6 and S7.

266 *Performances of different resilience indicators*

267 Despite the strong correlations between the resilience indicators, each indicator
268 provides valuable perspectives on the resilience performance of WDSs. Figure 5 shows
269 the results of the optimal strategies plotted against Todini's index and failure
270 duration/magnitude. It can be seen that failure duration can vary greatly for strategies
271 with the same value of Todini's index. For example, the failure duration ranges from 5.7
272 to 9.6 hours when Todini's index is 0.39 for *Anytown* as shown in Figure 5c. In
273 comparison, the variations in failure magnitude are smaller which is in agreement with
274 the stronger correlations between failure magnitude and Todini's index. Similar results
275 are shown in the other four scenarios of *Anytown* as presented in Figure S5.

276 The examination of values of the direct resilience indicators at single nodes help
277 identify the vulnerable places that may fail badly or cannot recover rapidly after failures.
278 For example, the failure magnitude of *EXNET* clusters at two values (i.e. 1×10^{-6} and
279 1.2×10^{-5}) as is evident in Figure 5e. A detailed examination reveals that this is attributed

280 to a few crucial nodes having greater impacts than others in influencing the result of
281 failure magnitude which is an average value among all nodes. These critical nodes are
282 clustered at three areas near the end of the network hence are subject to limited
283 influence from most rehabilitation measures applied in the network. By contrast, Todini's
284 index is a summation of surplus energy at all nodes in a network, hence cannot support
285 the localization of vulnerable nodes in a WDS.

286 Todini's index is strongly correlated with the direct resilience indicators, suggesting
287 that the surplus energy of a WDS measured under one scenario is indicative of its
288 hydraulic capacity under other scenarios. However, it performs less satisfactory on
289 WDSs with storage tanks as mentioned in the previous section. This finding agrees with
290 discussions on the limitation of excess capacity indicators in representing resilience
291 (Walski 2020). Moreover, its value is not indicative of the absolute resilience capacity
292 of a WDS and should not be used to compare performance of different WDSs. For
293 example, the failure duration and magnitude of *New York Tunnel* can be as low as zero
294 if Todini's index is higher than 0.68. However, rehabilitation solutions that have the same
295 value of Todini's index of *Anytown* still show high failure impacts, that is, failure duration
296 can be as high as 3.5 hours.

297 **Conclusions**

298 The relationships between the Todini's index, a widely used surrogate performance
299 indicator, and three direct indicators of resilience (failure duration, failure magnitude and
300 a severity-based resilience index) are investigated in this study. This is achieved by the
301 optimization of rehabilitation measures towards lower cost and higher resilience of three
302 typical benchmark WDSs. Todini's index is a widely used indicator for system design
303 and can be assessed without setting up failure scenarios. Results show that Todini's
304 index is strongly correlated with the direct resilience indicators with the two networks
305 without tanks, *NYT* and *EXNET*. However, the Todini's index should be used with
306 caution for resilience design as its correlation with the direct resilience indicators are
307 found to be weaker for WDSs with complex configurations containing water tanks such
308 as the *Anytown* network. Moreover, the Todini's index value should not be used to
309 compare the resilience of different WDSs.

310 **Data Availability Statement**

311 The rehabilitation network designs used for the analysis in this study are available from
312 the corresponding author by request.

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318 **Supplemental Data**

319 Descriptions are provided in the Supplemental Data on 1) definition of the resilience
320 indicators, 2) description of the case studies, 3) pressure driven hydraulic modelling, 4)
321 pressure dependent leakage model, 5) correlation results of scenarios S1 to S4, and 6)
322 optimal Results of *NYT* and *EXNET*. They are available online in the ASCE Library
323 (www.ascelibrary.org).

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