

Polybios and the Rise of Rome:

Gramscian Hegemony, Intellectuals and Passive Revolution

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Polybios' *Histories* represent the work of a survivor of radical political upheaval. They comprise the first struggles of a member of a subaltern group to comprehend, negotiate and define their position following the chaos brought about by a new configuration of power (the rise of Rome). This process of comprehension and negotiation sets out the parameters of a new discourse on imperial leadership and the position of the Greeks under Roman ruler that would continue on long after Polybios and be taken up in various ways by other Greeks in the Republican and Imperial periods (for instance, Posidonius, Dionysios of Halicarnassos, Josephos, and Appian).ⁱ Some two millennia later, the Italian political theorist, Antonio Gramsci, also personally experienced and investigated the political changes that brought about the 'modern' Italian state via the *Risorgimento* and the subsequent rise of Fascism in the 20th century. This investigation resulted in new conceptualisations of hegemony, the relationship between dominant and subaltern groups, and the role of individuals in facilitating or hindering such relationships. Polybios and Gramsci were both, therefore, interested in political change and the mechanisms of state development, and this chapter aims to explore of how they and their thoughts might relate to each other. It will focus on Gramsci's concepts of hegemony, intellectuals and passive revolution, and how these might be useful in thinking about the nature of Rome's rise to power in the Greek East, the relationships the Romans developed with the Greek states, and Polybios' own contribution to the settlement of a new world order. The results of this study will contribute to discussions of Greeks under Roman rule, the establishment and maintenance of empire, and the applicability of Gramscian concepts more universally to time-periods and states beyond early 20th century Italy.

Until now, Polybios and Gramsci have never been directly connected in scholarship. While they are sometimes mentioned in the same works, and even inhabit the same breath in discussions of Machiavelli's influence on Gramsci – Polybios inspired the former's notions about Fortune in *The Prince* and the nature of republics in *Discourses on Livy* – no study of how they might relate to each other has yet been made.ⁱⁱ This gap in the scholarship is not surprising since Gramsci does not openly engage with the Hellenistic historian anywhere in his pre-prison or prison works: Polybios is mentioned only once, and in passing, in the *Quaderni* in reference to Charles V and his recommended reading list (Q5 §95).ⁱⁱ This need not indicate anything more than Gramsci's limited access to basic scholarly resources and texts, of course, yet it proves beneficial to this study. Their indirect connection reveals similarities of theme and lines of thought which allow us to posit comparisons without incurring the dangers of circular reasoning. Let us first consider Gramsci's concepts and their applicability to the ancient world before turning to Polybios and the rise of Rome.

Gramsci's Concepts: Hegemony, Intellectuals and Passive Revolution

A detailed discussion of Gramsci's concept of hegemony is not appropriate here and has been outlined elsewhere in this volume. However, some contextualisation is needed to explore Rome's rise to power in the second century BC in Gramscian terms and to understand the role of intellectuals and passive revolution within a state system. The coherency of Gramsci's concept of hegemony within his *Quaderni* was affected by prison life yet began from "certain constant connotations of the concept":ⁱⁱⁱ the progressive formation of alliances focused around a given social group, the transition of a state from the economic-corporative to the political (Q13 §17), the particular to the universal. The achievement of hegemony by a particular group requires two expressions of power: the political 'domination' (*dominio*) of the subaltern classes by the hegemonic class, but also its correct balancing with 'intellectual and moral leadership' (*direzione*)" to garner goodwill and consent

(Q19 §24).^{iv} The production of consent (usually through compromise) is crucial to hegemonic success and maintaining a stable and coherent state following the establishment of political and military control (Q10 §12).^v This “ethico-political” aspect of hegemony is dependent on “intellectuals” who develop alongside the ruling class and function for its benefit. These Gramsci defined as anyone whose role in society is primarily that of organising, administering, directing, educating or leading others (Q12 §1), for example managers, civil servants, the clergy, teachers, scientists, lawyers, doctors etc.^{vi} While Gramsci saw the production of intellectuals organic to the dominant group as the quickest and most effective way of establishing hegemonic security, assimilating and conquering “ideologically” the intellectuals from the subaltern groups was the most important step in securing it,^{vii} since this ‘transforms’ leaders and organisers of men who might resist the dominant group into allies and they thereby become “‘deputies’ exercising the functions of social hegemony and political government” (Q12 §1).^{viii}

Connected with intellectuals and hegemony is the concept of ‘passive revolution’. In its developed sense, Gramsci saw it as an analytical tool, a ‘criterion of interpretation’, rather than a practical programme for successful state development which could describe any historical situation in which new political formations come to power without a fundamental reordering of social relations (Q15 §62).^{ix} Where hegemony is achieved through political and social reform, acclimatisation, integration, and ideological change rather than violence and open class warfare. Gramsci had adopted the concept of passive revolution from Vincenzo Cuoco (1770-1823), who had envisaged this mode of revolution only being successful in constructing a new state structure if it was led by the bourgeoisie and deliberately excluded the involvement of the masses.^x Gramsci disapproved of such a top-down approach, however, since he observed that the exclusion of the masses produced a ‘passive’ citizenry unengaged in leadership and policymaking: policies are accepted passively by the masses through the influence of the ‘transformed’ subaltern leaders/intellectuals rather than through direct engagement (Q10ii §44). This is evidenced, he thought, by the actions of the Italian Moderates, a loose grouping of bourgeois MPs in the late nineteenth century, who in the aftermath of the Italian unification gained power by allying themselves with the traditional Italian ruling groups (the Piedmont leaders, their armies, the northern industrialists and southern landowners) and ruled without engaging with the working classes (Q10 §61). Gramsci’s main critique of top-down ‘passive revolution’ is that it produces a fragile configuration of power and ‘incomplete hegemony’ since it excludes the will of certain groups of people under its umbrella; it does not eliminate the old power structures to create a new normative and inclusive language, ideology or politico-social context. It is more likely, therefore, to face pressures from the underlying local ideologies, economic situations and worldviews of the subordinate groups that are not engaged with.^{xi} While Gramsci thought hegemony based on top-down passive revolution could be effective in some cases, notably in the Jacobean revolution which incorporated the interests of the masses into the programme of reform, it has a tendency to be tenuous and is in danger of being consumed by the resistance of the subaltern groups, as the hegemony established by the Italian Moderates proved.

In 2010, Callinicos argued that a tendency to over-extend the concept of passive revolution beyond its original setting of the Italian *Risorgimento* by both Gramsci and later scholars has led to a loss of analytical rigour and critical purpose. However, this assessment overlooks Gramsci’s own expansive use of it himself, which Vorza and Thomas have fruitfully analysed.^{xii} Other scholars such as Morton, Hesketh and Thomas have also not perceived the adaptation of such a term to other periods and geographies as problematic, provided that a form of critical consciousness of the time and place from which the theory emerged is retained.^{xiii} While bearing in mind the problems of over-generalisation pointed out by Callinicos, this more expansive interpretation of passive revolution based on Gramsci’s formulation of it is more convincing and the current chapter subscribes to this more flexible approach. Removing the concept of passive revolution from its modern European setting, therefore, and applying it to the second century BC Mediterranean should not be overly problematic; it has already been transposed to other historical periods and places, for instance, to 17th century Scotland by Neil Davidson, to 19th century Canada by Ian G. MacKay, to 20th century Mexico by Morton and Hesketh, to 21st

century Germany by Ian Bruff, to new Russia by Rick Simon and to contemporary China by Kevin Gray.^{xiv} On the other hand, while passive revolution has been taken up apace in the study of the more recent past, it has not yet been used to consider any time or part of the ancient world; this chapter, if only in a preliminary fashion, will be the first to test such an attempt.

Moreover, while the application of Gramsci's concepts to international political settings has been a point of contention among scholars, in more recent years it has been gaining support and currency. Morton's ground-breaking work, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony, Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy* (2007) outlined how Gramsci's theories can be successfully applied to a larger global scale, and Ives and Short have defended the use of Gramsci's theories in international relations and challenged the presumption of a disjuncture between the domestic and international in political affairs.^{xv} This chapter takes a similar stance since the distinction between domestic and international politics in the ancient world was blurred, and there is the same quest to establish and maintain hegemony for those acting in a national setting as for those acting in an international one. The differences primarily lie in the size, resources and political independence of the politico-social structures involved, whether they be larger states or smaller social groupings within them.^{xvi} International and national structures both involve dominant groups and subaltern groups, as well as agents from each working between the two, primarily in the interest of their own social context. The most crucial and distinctive dimensions of hegemony and passive revolution will also prove to be the most useful to this ancient context – their consideration of state formation and sustainability, and the nature and consequences of the relationships forged between dominant and subaltern groupings.^{xvii}

Regarding the concept of intellectuals, Gramsci says little about their nature and development in the ancient world. In a lone short passage at Q8 §22 he first outlines how Plato's philosopher kings might be translated as 'intellectuals' in a modern sense and that his utopia foreshadows mediaeval feudalism, and then attributes Caesar with creating the category of "imperial" intellectuals (by conferring citizenship on doctors and teachers of the liberal arts; cf. Suet. *Caesar* 42.1). These "imperial" intellectuals, he stresses, continue in the form of the Catholic clergy and leave many traces throughout the history of Italian intellectuals with their "cosmopolitan" nature until the 18th century. The classification of intellectuals was not, therefore, dependent on time-period, but on their function within society. They are a universal phenomenon across time and space. Later in the *Quaderni*, however, Gramsci openly states that the formation of intellectuals in feudal societies and the classical world is a question to be examined separately (Q12 §1), but unfortunately never takes up the discussion himself. This is one area, however, in which some headway has been made in recent years.

In 2000, Benedetto Fontana saw such a figure in Cicero and considered Rome's expansion into Italy and its spread of *civitas* among its Italian subjects to be a clear development of 'civil society' in ancient Italy.^{xviii} Rome had transitioned from the enforcement of her will on subjects to the creation of associations and consent with those who came under the umbrella of her influence – she had therefore moved, in Gramscian terms, from a narrowly economic and corporate interest to a hegemonic one.^{xix} Cicero, as an Italian, but also a Roman whose family had acquired citizenship several generations earlier (Arpinum got the Roman franchise in 188 BC and Cicero was born in 106), is pointed out as a clear example of a national-popular intellectual in this politico-social situation.^{xx} He had applied the Stoic idea of the universal fatherland, as opposed to individual fatherlands of each allied state, to the Roman and Italian political setting, and in doing so had created a new idea of what it meant to be a member of the Roman state.^{xxi} Therefore, Cicero had moved into the domain of the dominant, ruling group from his own subordinate social one, and thereby influenced the development of both his own class and Roman state by a dialectical discourse.^{xxii} Fontana's categorisation of Cicero as an intellectual opens the field for further consideration of ancient figures as 'intellectuals' in Gramscian terms.

Polybios and the Greek World in the Second Century BC

The position of Polybios and the Greek world in the second century BC was very different from that of Cicero and his first century BC Italy. In the 150 years that separated these two individuals, the Mediterranean had changed considerably. By the first century BC, Rome's Italian allies had already experienced the political and cultural domination of Rome, but also her endeavours to sustain this dominance by the encouragement of 'civil' or 'ethico-political' hegemony (for instance, by the cultivation of an *Italic* identity and distribution of citizenship) and thereby to create a more stable and unified state.^{xxiii} The process had started in the fourth century BC and ended with the Social War of 91-88 BC.^{xxiv} Later, of course, Rome would become very effective at integrating foreign states further afield, those in the eastern and western Mediterranean, into its governing structures following military conquest and a similar process of cultural integration and negotiation, and the distribution of citizenship. By the second century AD, much of the Mediterranean was incorporated into the Roman empire and benefited from its rule. Yet, the Greeks of the second century BC lived at the very beginning of Rome's hegemonic rise in the East, when violence and cultural misunderstandings were still commonplace (mainland Greece would not become a Roman province until 27 BC),^{xxv} and the dust of conquest had not yet settled to allow for the cultivation of peaceful co-existence and the generation of goodwill and consent.

Our knowledge of Rome's rise in the East is primarily supplied by Polybios who was contemporary with the latter part of it and by Livy (59 BC – 17 AD), who often relied on Polybios' work in his account of Eastern affairs.^{xxvi} Other contemporary writers and chroniclers of the period have been almost entirely lost, so we are constrained by the agenda and perspectives of these two men.

The perspective of Polybios is particularly unusual, however, as it comes from the camp of the recently defeated rather than that of the victors and may give us a more realistic impression of how Rome's rising supremacy affected certain parts and members of the Greek East. Moreover, Polybios occupied a privileged position by sitting between Greece and Rome as an ex-leading figure of the Achaian League, a detainee at Rome for 17 years, mentor to Scipio Aemilianus, and mediator in settling a number of Greek states to Roman rule (see below for more detail).^{xxvii} His view of Rome's encroachment in the East, while undoubtedly influenced by his own background and political perspective, is therefore reasonably well informed and his work has subsequently commanded the respect of many since antiquity for its relative commitment to truthfulness, rationality and reliability. The *Histories* also represents the perspective of a subaltern group at the very beginning of its relationship with a dominant group. In this regard, Polybios' experience of the Romans will prove to be something altogether different to Cicero's relationship with the ruling group, since his Italian social grouping had already experienced centuries of integration and compromise. Further study of the two may offer new insights into how the role of 'intellectuals' changes with hegemonic development, however this must be an investigation for another time. For now, let us turn to Polybios' view of the process of Rome's rise in the East and his thoughts on their leadership.

According to Polybios, Roman preponderance in the Greek East was consolidated after a series of wars against the Antigonid and Seleucid kings in the early second century BC (Plb. 1.1.5; 3.1.9-10). Following the Roman victory over Perseus of Macedon in 168, the eastern Mediterranean would no longer be structured around a multipolar system of Hellenistic kingdoms, but around a unipolar one with states subordinate to Rome. While the Romans had stopped short of annexing the Greek East in the second century, however, Polybios makes it clear that genuine and long-lasting consent, or 'goodwill' (εὐνοία), had not been generated and that violence and resistance were still strong features of the Graeco-Roman relationship. This is evident when, in the preface of book 3, he explains that he will be expanding his work beyond its original conclusion of the defeat of Macedon in 168 (Plb. 3.4) to the destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146 so that he can document and assess the attitude and conduct of the winners after their victory, how they ruled over their subordinates, and how acceptable their subordinates found their domination. He states:

In fact, educationally speaking, this will prove to be the most important aspect of my work, now and in the future. For neither rulers nor those who express opinions about them should think of victory and overall dominion as the goal of military action... No one gains expertise either, or learns a skill, just in order to master it; every action is only ever done for the sake of the future pleasure or good or profit it will bring the agent. So my work will be complete when it has clarified how all the various peoples felt from the time when the Romans' victories had brought them worldwide dominion, up to the disturbed and troubled period that came afterwards (Plb. 3.4.8-12).^{xxviii}

Frank Walbank once found the alleged purpose of this extension puzzling:^{xxix} in drawing attention to the elongation of the narrative beyond 168, Polybios, he states, would seem to imply that the defeat of Macedon had not proved final, but that "the Roman victory had somehow been reversed and the defeated powers... had turned their setback into success by their firm reaction to it. But that is manifestly untrue..." If we reconsider this passage through the lens of Gramsci's dual concept of hegemony, however, something different is suggested about Polybios' thoughts on successful imperial rule: there were two components to it.^{xxx} Victory and domination, he outlines, were not the ultimate goals of military action, but the first steps in consolidating an empire. Moral and upstanding leadership was also needed to create lasting and self-sustaining 'goodwill' (εὐνοια) among its subjects.^{xxxi} For instance, Polybios praises Philip II for his military successes but also for his magnanimity and benevolence because these two sets of qualities allowed him to fight for and build the Macedonian empire (5.10.1-5; cf. 8.9-11). His depiction of other 'good' leaders (cf. Antigonos Doson (2.47.5, 5.9.8-10), Alexander (5.10.6-8), T. Quinctius Flaminius (18.1-2.1, 5.1-12.3-5, 33.8-39), Scipio Africanus (10.2-5) and Scipio Aemilianus (31.23.5-30.3, 38.19-22)) similarly focuses on these dual qualities in the same way, suggesting that this type of leader and leadership based on military supremacy and the subsequent generation of goodwill by magnanimous and conciliatory behaviour is the best way to build and maintain an empire. In contrast, the opposite is drawn out in the case of Philip V who is militarily very successful but behaves tyrannically and treacherously towards his associates and thereby generates ill-will and resistance towards his rule. This ill-will, according to Polybios, was one of the main reasons for the Macedonian empire's destruction (Plb. 7.12-14; 15.20-24; 22.18; 23.10).

Yet, while Rome had demonstrated aptitude in military leadership by its defeat of the Antigonid and Seleukid dynasties, Polybios considered the conduct of the Roman state, particularly after Pydna, to be falling short of the consensual component of successful imperial rule. The extension of his *Histories* draws attention to Rome's increasing brutality, greed and heavy-handedness.^{xxxii} Polybios did not view Rome's domination in the Greek East, therefore, to have been reversed after Pydna, as Walbank questioned, but rather her dominance to be unsupported by consent generated through beneficent and moderate treatment. In Polybios' eyes, this made Rome's fate in the East uncertain and her dominance potentially reversible. As outlined in his cycle of constitutions in book 6, Polybios believed that it was when a state turned to tyrannical and brutish behaviour that it was eventually forced to change its configuration through dissent and resistance (Plb. 6.7-9).^{xxxiii} We will explore his response to this failing later in this chapter but must first turn back to passive revolution and how this concept may reframe the process of Rome's rise to power in the East.

Roman Dominance in the East: Minimal Hegemony and Failed Passive Revolution

The successive waves of conflict between Roman and Hellenic forces during the second century have been analysed by scholars in a variety of ways, but the nature of Roman imperialism during this period remains a complicated and contentious topic. Two main strands of thought have emerged to frame this debate: the view that Roman expansion was based on an aggressive and deliberate policy (headed by Harris) vs. the view that Roman expansion was based on a defensive and unintentional policy (headed by Gruen). Derow also emphasised Rome's increasing insistence on obedience, and Eckstein, in sympathy with Gruen, moved the debate into the realm of Realist theory, viewing Rome's conduct as unexceptional in an anarchic Mediterranean

system: it was merely one of many states competing in an anarchic system, and therefore *naturally* competitive, aggressive, fearful and opportunistic.^{xxxiv} We might reconsider the successive waves of Rome's progression eastwards in the second century BC once again and assess how and to what extent Gramsci's thoughts on hegemonic development and passive revolution might be useful in revisiting this discussion. Due to the constraints of space, we will focus on Rome's relationship with the Greek states of the mainland.

Rome's dominance over the Greek East was built upon successive waves of military conflict: the Illyrian Wars (229-8; 219), the First Macedonian War (211-205 BC), the Second Macedonian War (200-196 BC), the Antiochean War (191-188 BC), and the Third Macedonian War (171-168 BC). The last of these violent encounters, Polybios claimed, established Rome as the dominant power in the eastern Mediterranean (1.1.5; 3.1.9). These waves of conflict were, however, interspersed by periods of relative peace in which Rome's preponderance over the Greek states grew, but crucially without a fundamental reordering of political and social relations (228-219; 217-211; 205-200; 194-191; 188-172; 167-150). The Roman military and diplomatic presence was completely withdrawn after each war conducted on Greek soil (228, 219, 204, 194 and 188 respectively) and the Greek states were allowed and even encouraged to maintain their politico-social structures and govern themselves so long as they accepted Rome's pre-eminence and agreed to preserve the political landscape that they had left behind.^{xxxv} As Gruen and Eckstein have argued, Rome was reluctant to be heavily involved in Greek affairs and did not seek to fully commit to formal, long-term alliances that would convert multiple allied foreign policies into a singular purpose and direction, nor try to develop a new way of governance in the Greek world through the establishment of Roman garrisons, diplomats or even governors.^{xxxvi} It is possible to see Rome's relationship with the mainland Greek states during these intervening periods as phases of passive revolution. Yet, it was passive revolution that was not fully committed to and subsequently failed, giving way to the imposition of dominance by the larger power to an even greater degree.

Rome's initial influence in the Greek East was based on its appropriation of Greek slogans and interests. During the First Illyrian War (229-8) and particularly the Second Macedonian War (200-196 BC), the Romans claimed that they were defenders of the Greeks and in the latter even directly consulted their Greek allies before and after the battle of Kynoskephalai in arranging a settlement with Philip V (Plb. 18.1-12, 34, 36-39). After this victory, the Roman commander T. Quinctius Flaminius also succeeded in persuading his Roman colleagues to leave Greece free of a Roman presence. To the Greeks at the time, Polybios notes, this policy seemed an incredible act which hinted at the makings of a benevolent new hegemon who would develop a new kind of relationship with its subordinate associates and listen to and promote Greek culture and interests (Plb. 18.45-6).^{xxxvii} Later in 194, Flaminius also reorganised the politico-social structure of Thessaly in 194 so that power came into the hands of the wealthy (Livy 34.5), a class of individuals who would have likely therein sided with Roman rule and been transformed into Roman partisans. Having established dominance, therefore, the Romans appeared to be balancing out their position by offering compromises to their newly acquired associates and working with their language, customs and interests.

Yet, by the end of the 190s, there was deep disaffection among many of the Greek states towards the Italian power. In 191, right before the war erupted between Antiochos and Rome, many of the Greeks (except the Achaian League) were, Livy reports, alienated from the Romans and likely to join Antiochos should he arrive on the mainland with a sufficient force to confront the western power (Livy 39.6). Although the details are unclear, it seems that the Greek idea of freedom did not match up to the Roman concept of it, and there was little attempt by the Romans to ameliorate this difference. Flaminius, despite his earlier promise of freedom and autonomy, was connected with the assassination of a pro-Macedonian boiotarch, Brachylles (Plb. 18.43), and his mission to round up support in Greece against Antiochos in 192 failed as it was believed that the city of Demetrias, one of 'fetters of Greece' freed in 196 BC, would be returned to Philip V for his assistance in the war against Antiochos. The brutality and laxity of Gnaeus Manlius Vulso's command in Asia while fighting Antiochos also generated disillusionment with Roman power (Livy 39.6). While the Greeks and Romans had begun to learn the nuances of the other's culture, ideology and character,^{xxxviii} therefore, it became clear early

on that Rome was not as benevolent as originally believed and not so interested in pursuing policies that would accommodate Greek concerns beyond serving their own self-interest.

Yet, the Greeks still thought that they could develop a relationship with Rome on terms of equality, dialogue and reason (cf. the Philopoimen grouping in the Achaian League) and Polybios rightly notes that they were deceived in this belief (Plb. 23.17). Such an assumption was based on previous interactions with larger powers, and particularly their euergetic relationship with Hellenistic kings (the mechanisms of which had been in place for centuries), as well as encouraged by Rome's original use of this old language, the slogans of freedom and autonomy, and its initial policy of non-interference.^{xxxix} Many city-states continued, therefore, to pursue their own interests as before with only limited concern for the warnings of the Romans: the Achaian League's persistent and status-quo threatening pursuit of Sparta and Messene in the 180s and 170s only elicited cautions from the Italian power without real action and is the best documented example of Greek independence; Aitolia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Boiotia also followed their own domestic and foreign interests.^{xi} These policies did not align, however, with the attitude and interests of Roman power, which demanded obedience, acknowledgement of hierarchy and maintenance of the status quo.^{xii} This imbalance in the relationship produced disaffection, and resistance to the formulation of such a new ruler-ruled dynamic is clear in the Greeks' support of Perseus of Macedon before the Third Macedonian War in 171. The Greeks saw Macedon as a representative of the old ways of the Greek East and hoped that if Perseus succeeded that they would be able to go back to the previous manner of dealing with higher-level states via negotiation. Perseus' defeat in 168 BC, however, put a decisive dent in this confidence and woke the Greeks up to the reality of Rome rule.

Following the Greeks' resistance, the Romans implemented a more hands-on approach to revolutionise their attitude by massacring or deporting to Italy thousands of Greeks considered resistant or hostile to Roman orders. In their place, a class of Greek leaders who followed the wants of the dominant class rose to power: Polybios points out Kallikrates of the Achaian League (Plb. 30.29), Lykiskus of the Aitolians (32.4) and Charops of Epeirus (30.12, 32.5) as three examples. These Greek leaders were 'transformed' into partisans of Rome, brought into (if loosely) the governing nexus of the Roman empire and helped to perpetuate the domination of the Romans in the East for the next decade (for their deaths, see Plb. 32.4-5). These leaders would temporarily shift the relationship between Greece and Rome into the more obedient and hierarchical one that Rome desired.^{xiii} Following the failure of its earlier policy of limited intervention – the result of a difference in views on the appropriate relationship of rulers and ruled – Rome reverted to a policy of domination rather than hegemony.

Rome was not interested in creating a new politico-social framework in the Greek East, a new language between ruler and ruled, and meant that in the mid-second century it had not fulfilled the requirements of successful hegemony in this part of its empire. It depended more on domination than consent. Underlying pressures from yet unchanged or unintegrated Greek ideologies and policies regarding relationships between dominant and subordinate states, therefore, came to the surface and presented resistance to Roman rule. This resistance finally manifested in military conflict nearly twenty years later in mainland Greece and Macedonia. A generation after the defeat of the last Antigonid king and the imposition of four separate republican governments, opposition to Roman rule sprang up in Macedon once more: the Fourth Macedonian War or the Andriskos Revolt erupted in 150 and lasted two years before it was finally suppressed at a second battle of Pydna (Plb. 36.10, 17; cf. Velleius Paterculus 1.11; Diod. Sic. 32.9; Zonar. 9.28). The Achaian War, instigated by the new leaders of the Achaian League, Diaios and Kritolaos, and supported by the masses and "the worst men in each of cities", quickly followed on its heels (Plb.38.9-18, 39.2-6; Paus. 7.14-16; Velleius Paterculus 1.12; Florus 2.16).^{xliii} The long-running disregard for Roman warnings about Sparta and Messene by the League and their increasing disrespect of legates in recent years had finally gone too far.^{xliiv} In 146 BC, following his defeat of Andriskos, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus was ordered to turn south and quash Achaian disobedience; the Greeks were crushed, and Corinth was subsequently sacked. This war had also been supported by the Thebans and Chalkidians who thought, as the League had, that Rome would not

intervene (Paus. 7.14.6-7, 7.15.9; Livy *Per.* 52; cf. Plb. 39.6.5); the defeat would effectively stop indifference and resistance to Roman orders on the Greek mainland. It was after the violence of this conflict that Polybios, following years of exile in Rome, came to play his most significant role in reconciling and integrating the Greeks (or at least the Achaian League) into the Roman imperial apparatus.

Before we move on, we may observe from this analysis that a Gramscian understanding of hegemony is a useful lens to demonstrate that Rome's yo-yoing strategy of making war and making peace in Greece was, among other things, a result of their failure to consolidate the new political order with a strong hegemony, a true blend of coercion and consent. Following military success, Rome did not generally attempt or want to put the effort into revolutionising the politico-social machinery of the smaller Greek states, and tended to let the Greeks rule themselves provided they kept to the status quo. Yet, while it seems that some effort went into transitioning to a new system through less disruptive means, through passive revolution, at the earliest stages of this relationship, particularly in Flamininus' initial use of the slogan of freedom and autonomy and the transformation of Greek leaders into partisans of Rome, this ultimately failed. Greek culture and thought had highly valued freedom, autonomy and competition for centuries and had specific ideas surrounding the relationship between themselves and larger powers that were difficult to change. The Hellenistic kings had developed the system and language of euergetism to work with rather than against this difficult Greek temperament; the Romans, however, were not interested in playing the game and required a very different relationship between based on obedience and hierarchy. They were not willing to reconcile these attitudes through gradual reform or open to compromise in a consistent way. From this we can see that Gramsci's concept of hegemony with its stress on superstructures was not what the Romans were after. Theirs was an imposition of power and will, a form of domination rather than a process of integration, and they therefore demanded supremacy, hierarchy, obedience, and as little trouble as possible. They had the power and means to quash resistance should it arise, which they did on a number of occasions. In Gramscian terms, therefore, Polybios' second century BC Rome had not yet learnt how to govern, or perhaps more realistically was not yet interested in governing, the East in a way that would create a coherent self-maintaining politico-social state.

We have seen that Polybios' concept of empire is dependent on political and military domination as well as moral leadership and goodwill, and that he observed the Romans not to have met the demands of the second element in their interactions with the Greeks up until the middle of the second century BC, when he was released from his detainment in Rome. Let us now turn to his own role in establishing and shaping Roman hegemony as an intellectual, therefore, and his intention to right the balance between domination and consent.

Polybios: A 'Gramscian' Intellectual in the Second Century BC

Polybios' intellectual activity had a number of levels which changed as his own position and role in Greek and Roman society changed. In the first instance, he was a political and military leader and organiser of men in his original Greek context. His social class was that of the Greek ruling elite, but specifically that of Megalopolis and the circle in the Achaian League which sought to preserve as much freedom and autonomy from outside interference as possible and took a more distant and even resistant approach to Roman power, refusing to follow commanders that contravened Achaian laws (this group included the famous Philopoimen, Polybios' father Lykortas, Polybios, Arkesilaos and Ariston of Megalopolis, Stratios of Triteia, Xenon of Patrai, and Apollonidas of Sikyon; cf. 24.8-10; 28.3.4-10, 6.1-9; 29.24.1-25.5). Polybios rose to the second highest position within the League, *hipparchos*, and although he participated in the Third Macedonian War on the side of the Romans, was reluctant to expend Achaian resources and offer them military support, delaying meeting up with the Roman army in Perrhaebia in 169/8 long enough that Achaian forces were no longer needed and sent away (28.13.1-5; cf. 29.24.7). Polybios' interests, therefore, were closely bound to those of the elite group

in the Achaian League who preferred to check the dominance of the Romans rather than submit to it blindly, and he could be seen in this respect as an organic intellectual of this class.

Following Rome's ascendancy in the East, Polybios' life would change considerably as he and other Achaians more resistant to Roman power were detained in Italy after the defeat of Perseus.^{xlv} While this could have been the end of Polybios' story, here we see an example of an intellectual from a subaltern group being 'transformed' (or 'transforming' himself) into an agent working for the dominant group. During his time in Rome, Polybios developed close connections with members of the dominant group, notably the Scipiones, even mentoring one of their number, the young Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (31.23-24.1; he is described as "our guest Polybios", *noster hospes*, by Scipio in Cicero's *De Re Publica* 4.3.3). Upon his return to Greece, the connections Polybios had fostered with the dominant group were not severed but continued to flourish as he was called upon on a number of occasions to advise the Romans in matters of war, even witnessing the destruction of Carthage alongside Scipio Aemilianus (Plb. 38.19, 21-22), and later became directly involved in the settlement of Greek cities under Roman rule following the Achaian War and the resulting destruction of Corinth in 146:

Departing, they [the ten Roman commissioners] commanded Polybios to travel to the cities and to make clear any matters about which the people were in doubt until they grew accustomed to the constitution and laws. And indeed, after a certain time, he made the people accept the constitution given to them and saw to it that no difficulty on any subject arose either in public or in private from the laws... had he not worked this out carefully and drawn up the laws on the subject of common jurisdiction, all would have remained undecided and full of much confusion (Plb. 39.5.2-5).^{xlvi}

Unfortunately, the exact nature of this settlement and Polybios' role in does not survive. It is clear, however, that while Polybios had been 'transformed' into an agent working for the establishment of Roman dominance, he was also still working for the interests of his own Greek elite class, and he even states as much at the end of his *Histories*:

For in times of danger it is the duty of those who are Greek to help the Greeks in every way, by defending them, by cloaking faults, and by appeasing the anger of those in power, just as I myself truly did at the time of these matters [after the Achaian War]... (Plb. 38.4.7).^{xlvii}

Prior to this settlement, Polybios also urged the Senate (through the influence of Scipio and Cato) to review the status of the Greek detainees in Italy after 17 years and release them in c. 150 BC (Plb 35.6). Following the sack of Corinth in 146, it was also Polybios who placated the Romans and persuaded them not to destroy the precious works of art, statues and honorific decrees found in the city, and particularly those pertaining to Philopoimen, and to return the portraits of Achaios, Aratos and Philopoimen which had already been carried off (Plb. 39.2-31; Strabo 8.6.23; Plut. *Philop.* 21). After this activity and his settlement of Greek affairs, he was applauded throughout the Peloponnese for being an ally of the Romans and having stayed their hand against the Greeks (Paus. 8.30.8). He was conferred the highest honours in life and death for his actions (39.5.4-6) and had statues erected to him at Megalopolis, Tegea, Pallantion, Lykosura, Mantinea, and Olympia (dedicated by the Eleians; *SIG* 686) and a relief at Cleitor.^{xlviii} In this mediatory role, he initiated a dialectical discourse between ruler and ruled and urged the Romans to move towards true hegemony rather than dominance. "The fact of hegemony," Gramsci explains, "undoubtedly presupposes that the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is being exercised are taken into account, that there is a certain equilibrium of compromise... (Q13 §18).^{xlix}

Polybios' aim to mediate between Greece and Rome was assisted by another of his intellectual activities – the writing of history. This medium and venture allowed him to be involved in settling a new order through less direct means, through education which Gramsci saw as one of the primary means of creating consent and new ways of thinking. In the very first passage of his *Histories*, Polybios openly expresses his view that "the soundest education and training for active politics is the study of history, and that the surest and indeed the

only teacher of how to bear bravely the changes of fortune is to recall the reversals of others” (Plb. 1.1.2).^l In writing his *Histories*, therefore, Polybios intended to create awareness of the past and historical causality in his readers so that they might understand what possibilities of political action were available to them at any particular point. This correlates with Gramsci’s belief that historical awareness was an important component in arousing and ordering the political consciousness of the subaltern classes and that only once the past and historical causality has been thoroughly understood can a person realise their potential in shaping the present day and future and play an active part in modifying the world (*Il Grido del Popolo*, 4 May 1918; SP1: 170-3 = GR: 36-39).^{li} The intellectual was all-important in Gramsci’s theory of revolutionary change as it was through these individuals that the attainment of historical awareness was possible and society given a direction. Polybios’ aim to educate and bring awareness to the Greeks and Romans of their history, their present condition, and the best ways for them to move forward from crisis, therefore, clearly adheres to that of a Gramscian intellectual.

The activity of writing history, however, also allowed Polybios to (at least seem to) act and speak more autonomously and independently of the Roman ruling class than he would have been able to in his intermediary function outlined above. Following his earlier statement about protecting the Greeks and cloaking faults, he states that:

... on the other hand, the literary record of the events handed down to posterity should be kept free from all falsehood, so that instead of pleasing the ears of readers for the present, their minds may be reformed so that they do not frequently fall into the same errors (Plb. 38.4.8).^{lii}

This statement is only one of many instances in the *Histories* where Polybios outlines the importance of truthfulness in historical accounts.^{liii} While such a principle was helpful for education, it crucially also allowed him the freedom to speak more openly about both sides, and in some cases even offer resistance to the dominant group. It allowed him to continue in a more comprehensive and explicit way the dialectical discourse between ruler and ruled. While Polybios appears to be writing primarily for Greeks in his description and explanation of Rome’s rise at the beginning of his *Histories* (cf. 1.3.7-8) – which may suggest that he was working more in this respect for Roman hegemony– he is also aware that Romans will read his *Histories* (6.11.3-9) and does not hold back from speaking to power and questioning their leadership and conduct. While the Scipiones are generally described in glowing terms (see 10.2-20 for P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus and above for Scipio Aemilianus),^{liiv} Polybios criticises other Romans for their failures and disreputable conduct throughout his work (note, for instance, Gaius Atilius Regulus at 1.35, Tiberius Sempronius Longus at 3.70, Gaius Flaminius at 3.81). The Romans are also complicit in causing the Second Punic War (3.8-10), domineering towards the Aitolian *strategos* in 191 concerning the Aitolian *deditio in fidem* (20.9.1-10.17), deceitful in their policies towards the Achaians’ attempt on Messene (23.17.3-4), wrong to keep Demetrius Seleukos from his throne in Rome (31.2.6-11, 11.7-12), and ambivalently viewed for their destruction of Carthage in 146 (36.9). Moreover, Polybios asserts that the Romans’ social and moral institutions, the very components of their society which he saw as so crucial to their rise to power (1.1.5; 6.2.3, 11.1-2, 18) were being corroded by power, wealth and luxury as they adapted to imperial rule and were influenced by the peoples they conquered (cf. 18.35; 31.25.3-7).^{liiv} And the purpose of his extension from 168 to 146 was to offer his readers a chance to assess Roman conduct post-conquest and question the longevity of such a leadership model. The *Histories* aimed to throw a light on the deficiencies of Roman rule, exhort its readers to be aware of the negative effects of domination on imperial/state stability, illustrated clearly, for instance by the demise of the Macedonian empire, and take up reconciliatory measures to counteract correct this imbalance.^{livi} His intention to modify Roman behaviour is also exemplified in his celebration of Scipio Aemilianus for his practical and moral excellence (Plb. 31.23.5-25.1; Diod. 31.26-27), by which he encouraged the Romans to exhibit more magnanimity, generosity, clemency and fairness in their dealings with their subordinates, rather than the brutality, greed and arrogance that had appeared in recent years. As an intellectual invested in the concerns of the Greek elite, Polybios hoped through the more truthful medium of history to modify the harsh conduct of

the dominant power towards its subjects by getting the Romans to think about their ruling style and its limitations.

What becomes increasingly clear is that Polybios' work is not just, or even primarily, a historiographical and didactic piece, but a political and diplomatic one.^{lvii} Gramsci's concept of the intellectual helps to push this view of Polybios and his intentions further, offering a more nuanced portrait of the author and his work. He recognised that Roman hegemony, in a stable form supported by both domination and consent/goodwill, had not been achieved following Macedonia's destruction in 168, nor by the Achaian War in 146 BC. Alongside his role as mediator, therefore, Polybios hoped to set up a discourse between ruler and ruled as a historian and teacher to both Greeks and Romans that would reform this dynamic and create a more coherent and unified imperial system and with new mechanisms of interaction based on coercion and consent.

Conclusion

We are so used to thinking about Polybios as a historian that at times we forget that, to himself and his contemporary audience, he was primarily an active political agent working and fighting for the elite Greek group he came from. Evaluating him in line with Gramsci's concepts of hegemony and the intellectual reminds us of this fact, and exhorts us to see his work not just as a theoretical piece, but as a practical one, aiming to produce political and global awareness and politically effective and adaptable individuals. As a Greek statesman and historian who had accepted and been integrated into the Roman imperial structure, Polybios was, in Gramscian terms, 'transformed' into a partisan of Rome to aid in the advancement of their dominance in the East. Yet, while tied to the dominant power, Polybios' political aims were still based around obtaining the best possible outcome for the Achaian League and the Greeks. He therefore acted, directly and indirectly, not only to instil awareness of the historical situation and where both peoples fit into the new world order but also to begin a dialogue that would gradually change the relationship between the Romans and Greeks into a political-ethical one. In his work, the Romans were redefined in Greek terms by Polybios' construction of a wider time and space within the Mediterranean, but at the same time urged to treat their new Greek subjects fairly, reminding them of their original statements and promises of leniency, moderation and liberation.^{lviii} Only by moderating their behaviour could they create consent and sustain their hegemonic status.

That Polybios thought the Romans uninterested in developing a relationship based on consensus and goodwill in the first half of the second century is clear as they are depicted as showing little desire for commitment to the Greek East in a formal way. They are unconcerned about restructuring the Greek world once dominance has been established and transform subaltern leaders to perpetuate their will and maintain the status quo, only compromising or reordering relations when trouble arises on an *ad hoc* basis. Yet, this strategy of domination caused problems, as Gramsci saw, producing only limited hegemony and generating goodwill in only a limited group (the Greek leaders more willing to accept Roman orders). Internal pressures from those not integrated (the groups in Greek cities more resistant to Roman domination; note the three classes of anti-Rome statesmen outlined by Polybios at 30.6-9) remained unresolved and cultural differences surrounding freedom, autonomy and hegemon-subordinate relationships were not reconciled into a new politico-ethical state. Roman hegemony, therefore, experienced resistance and dissent as a result. We find that Polybios' view on what was necessary for successful imperial leadership correlates with Gramsci's view on successful hegemony: coercion must be balanced out by consent. Any state aiming for supremacy that dominates others without the reinforcement of goodwill tends to fail, as the example of one of Rome's main rivals, Macedon, showed. As Gramsci warned against such state development, therefore, so did Polybios. His *Histories* are a warning about what happens to states/empires if they do not generate and maintain enough goodwill among their subjects and what will happen to the Romans as the present dominant group if they do not correct their conduct: increasing dissent and the early collapse of their empire.

The results of this study support the use of Gramsci's concepts of hegemony, intellectuals and passive revolution in the investigation of the rise of Rome and offer new insights into the progression of Roman power over the Greek East and Polybios' life and work. In Gramscian terms, Polybios' account of the process of Rome's rise in the East in the second century BC may be seen in two ways: 1) as an account of a dominant group that has up until this point only achieved minimal hegemony because of the lack of balance between coercive and consensual policies, and whose attempt to achieve consent via passive revolution failed due to a lack of commitment and an uncompromising demand for obedience; but also 2) as a tool used by an intellectual to reinforce and moderate Rome's hegemony. Having reached this conclusion, extending the study beyond Polybios and second century BC would be fruitful and, it is suggested, demonstrate that Rome did in fact eventually establish 'integral hegemony' in the Greek East in the centuries to come via the establishment of permanent administrative and military structures, the policy of citizenship distribution, and the assimilation and creation of more Greek intellectuals (e.g. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Strabo of Amasia, Plutarch, Appian, and many authors of the Second Sophistic). Moreover, alongside Cicero, these Greeks living under Rome represent Gramscian intellectuals at different stages of hegemonic development to Polybios and a diachronic study of them may offer further insights into how the role of Gramscian intellectuals in the ancient world functioned and changed over time.

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i The scholarship for the evolution of Greek identity and culture under Rome is vast: the introduction of Schmitz and Wiater 2011 supplies a good summary of scholarship on this topic.

ii Translations come from SPN and GR. 1988/1999.

iii See Cospito 2016 49-90 and Anderson 2017 52-83 for Gramsci's development of the term hegemony.

iv Anderson 2017: 54. Initially, Gramsci only thought that hegemony applied to the perspective of the working class in a bourgeois revolution against a feudal system, but later extended its remit to include the mechanisms of bourgeois rule over the working class in a stable capitalist society. By this extension, Gramsci produced "a set of generic maxims" which could be applied universally to the investigation of state power.

v On Gramsci's intellectuals, see Sasson 1987: 109-18, 134-45; Fontana 2000 and 2002; Hier 2005; Anderson 2017: 55-56.

vi Intellectuals are divided into two types by Gramsci: 'traditional' and 'organic' (Q12 §1). The organic type emerges naturally with a particular class or group, is closely bound to its interests and development. Traditional intellectuals, on the other hand, regard themselves and are regarded as autonomous and independent from the dominant social group, forming a class in themselves. The clergy of the Middle Ages, Gramsci asserted, were originally organic intellectuals connected to the landed aristocracy but later became traditional after detaching themselves from this base (Q12 §2), for instance, and modern traditional intellectuals include doctors, lawyers, businessmen, scholars, scientists, philosophers, preachers, and the media.

vii Q12 §2 (QC 1517) = SPN: 10.

viii Cf. Ives 2004: 104.

ix As with hegemony, Gramsci's definition of it is multifaceted and it has been interpreted in a variety of ways in subsequent scholarship. Originally, Gramsci saw passive revolution as only applicable to the conditions of the *Risorgimento* but later expanded it into a universal concept which could describe "an entire historical period". Thomas 2006: 71-74. For discussion of the different modes of passive revolution, see Morton 2010 and Thomas 2018: 1.

x Cuoco 1998: 325-6; for the differences between Cuoco's and Gramsci's formulations of the term, see Ives 2004: 102-106 and di Meo 2014.

xi Ives 2004: 103-5.

xii Vorza 2004 and Thomas 2006.

xiii Morton subscribes to Edward Said's notion of 'travelling theory' (1983) in his discussion of the application of passive revolution to the global economy (2007) and introduction to the (2010) "Approaching Passive Revolution" special issue of *Capital & Class*, 330-331. See also Hesketh 2017 and Callinicos 2010: 492-3. Thomas 2018 questions the generally accepted historical interpretation and singularity of passive revolution as a concept in Gramsci's work through an important heuristic reading of the *Prison Notebooks* and supports the more flexible readings and applications of passive revolution in illustrating how Gramsci's own use of the term was a byproduct of his "search for a political strategy that could be the "actual" form of "the revolution in permanence"".

xiv These articles all appeared in the 2010 'Approaching Passive Revolutions' special issue of the journal *Capital & Class* (Vol. 34.3). For a survey of all recent applications of passive revolution to different geographical areas and political transformations, see Morton 2010: 320-26.

xv Morton 2003 and 2007b; Ives and Short 2012.

xvi Fontana 2000: 317.

xvii Morton 2010: 330-331.

xviii While not approaching Cicero from the perspective of a 'Gramscian' intellectual, his contribution to the political and cultural milieu as an intellectual of the later Republican period is recognised and drawn out in Part 1 of Steel 2013.

xix Cf. Fontana 2000: 321-322.

xx For Cicero's life and career, see Steel 2013: 1-6.

xxi Cf. Fontana 2000: 324-26, and Dench 2013 for Cicero and Roman identity.

xxii This assessment by Fontana is fundamentally different from Gramsci's own understanding of Cicero as the champion of an 'Italian' point of view, in contrast to Julius Caesar as the maker of a 'cosmopolitan' one. See Santangelo's chapter in the present volume.

^{xxiii} Cf. Arendt 1982: 187-88 and Fontana 2000: 320-26.

xxiv The scholarship relating to Rome's unification of Italy between the 4th and 1st centuries BC is vast and multifaceted. A good reassessment of the period, process of unification, and scholarship is provided by Carlà-Uhink 2017.

xxv For the dating and creation of the province of Achaëa, see Dio 53.13-15; Gruen 1984: 524, McGing 2003: 80 and Eilers 2003: 98.

xxvi For Polybios' life and work, see Walbank 1972 and McGing 2010. For Livy and his work, see Chaplin & Kraus 2009 and Mineo 2014. For Livy and Polybios, see Halfmann 2013.

xxvii For Polybios' position between Greece and Rome, see Walbank 1974, Henderson 2001, Millar 2006 and Erskine 2012 and 2013a.

xxviii Plb. 3.4.8-12: τὸ γὰρ ὠφέλιμον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἱστορίας πρὸς τε τὸ παρὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐν τούτῳ πλεῖστον κείσεται τῷ μέρει. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτ' εἶναι τέλος ὑποληπτέον ἐν πράγμασιν οὔτε τοῖς ἡγουμένοις οὔτε τοῖς ἀποφαινομένοις ὑπὲρ τούτων, τὸ νικῆσαι καὶ ποιήσασθαι πάντας ὑπ' ἑαυτοῦς... καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰς ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας αὐτῆς ἕνεκα τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀναλαμβάνει: πάντες δὲ πράττουσι πάντα χάριν τῶν ἐπιγνομένων τοῖς ἔργοις ἡδέων ἢ καλῶν ἢ συμφερόντων. διὸ καὶ τῆς πραγματείας ταύτης τοῦτ' ἔσται τελεσιούργημα, τὸ γνῶναι τὴν κατάστασιν παρ' ἑκάστοις, ποία τις ἦν μετὰ τὸ καταγωνισθῆναι τὰ ὅλα καὶ πεσεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐξουσίαν ἕως τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐπιγενομένης ταραχῆς καὶ κινήσεως.

xxix Walbank 1977: 146 (=1985, 330).

xxx Baronowski 2011: 87-90 claims that Polybios divided imperial rule into three stages – acquisition, expansion and preservation. This is based on a passage by Diodoros which some have believed to derive from Polybios (32.2): “Those who wish to attain hegemony over others employ courage and intelligence to gain it, moderation and acts of kindness to extend it widely, and paralysing terror to secure it.” However, Touloumakos 1971: 28 n. 28, Walbank 1974: 18-21 (= 1985, 289-91), and Eckstein 1995: 225-233 reject the attribution of this view to Polybios since in other passages (notably his discussions of Philip V at 7.11-14, the Carthaginians in Spain at 9.11 and 10.35-36) he considered a change in the benevolent and magnanimous conduct of a hegemonic power after the acquisition of empire to be detrimental to imperial stability. Polybios never makes a distinction between the three stages himself but notes that imperial success depended on the presence of the qualities of beneficence and moderation in the dominant partner.

^{xxxi} On Polybios and moral leadership see Eckstein 1995, and Hau 2016, esp. 56-71.

xxxii For the decline in Roman conduct cf. Plb. 18.35 and 31. 25.3-7; for the ill treatment of Demetrios of Seleukos and Carthage in the Third Punic War see respectively 31.2, 11-12 and 36.1-10. This contrasts with certain individual Romans who continued to demonstrate military prowess and moral conduct. Note especially Scipio Africanus (see Plb. 10.2.8-12, 11.7-8, 14.12, 18.7-15, 19.3-7; 11.20.1-23.9; 14.5.15; 15.5-6) and Scipio Aemilianus (31.22-30). Cf. Champion 2004: 146-51 and Baronowski 2011: 91-113 for the decline of generosity and moderation in Rome's dealing with Greece from 168 BC.

xxxiii For Polybios and the *anacyclosis* (cycle of constitutions), see Alonso-Núñez 1986 and Erskine 2013.

xxxiv See Derow 1979, Harris 1979, Gruen 1984, and Eckstein 2008.

xxxv See Eckstein 2008: 115, 289, 298-9, 336-9 for these withdrawals.

xxxvi For Rome's reluctance to establish permanent ties in Greece, see Gruen 1984: 437-528 and Eckstein 2008: 285-91, 297-305, 316-8, 335-41, 348-56.

xxxvii For the Romans' increasing use of the theme of liberty in the Greek East, see Ferrary 1988: 45-132 and Dmitriev 2011: 145-200.

xxxviii For instance, the Aitolians finally came to understand the meaning of Roman *deditio in fidem* in 191 BC (Plb. 20.9-10, 36.4.1-3; Livy 36.27-28). On this episode also see Moreno Leoni 2014.

xxxix For euergetism and the Greeks' relationships with the Hellenistic kings, see Gauthier 1985 and Ma 2003 179-83. See also Erskine 1994 for the title of *euergetes* and its application to the Romans.

xl For the Achaian League's pursuit of Sparta and Messene, see Plb. 22.3.1-3, 7.1-6, 10.5-8, 11.6-12.9; 23.4.8-14, 9.8-14, 16.1-18.1; 24.2.3, 9.9-14, 10.13-15; Livy 36.31; 39.48-50, 40.20. For the policies of the Greek states during this period, see Gruen 1984: 467-514, Eckstein 2008: 348-56.

xli For this misalignment, see Eckstein 2008: 350-51, 365-66.

xlii Cf. Eckstein 2008: 367-72.

xliii For the Andriskos Uprising, the Achaian War and their aftermaths, see Fuks 1970, Gruen 1976 and 1984: 431-3, 520-528, Harris 1979: 240-44, and McGing 2003: 77-84.

xliv For the Achaian League's dismissive treatment of Roman ambassadors, see for instance their treatment of Q. Marcius Philippus in 183 (Plb. 23.9.8, 24.9.12-13) and L. Aurelius Orestes in 147 (Plb. 38.9.1-2, 38.9.6-8; Paus. 7.14.2-3). Cf. Gruen 1984: 491, 494-5, 521.

xlv For Polybios' detention in Rome, see Erskine 2012.

^{xlvi} Plb. 39.5.2-5: ἐνετείλαντο δὲ τῷ Πολυβίῳ χωριζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἐπιπορευθῆναι καὶ περὶ ὧν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀμφιβάλλουσι διευκρινῆσαι, μέχρις οὗ συνήθειαν ἔχουσι τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις. ὁ δὲ καὶ μετὰ τινα χρόνον ἐποίησε πρὸς λόγον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους στέρξαι τὴν δεδομένην πολιτείαν καὶ μηδὲν ἀπόρημα μήτε κατ' ἰδίαν μήτε κατὰ κοινὸν ἐκ τῶν νόμων γενέσθαι περὶ μηδενός... μὴ γὰρ ἐξεργασαμένου τούτου καὶ γράψαντος τοὺς περὶ τῆς κοινῆς δικαιοδοσίας νόμους ἄκριτα πάντα ἦν καὶ πολλῆς γέμοντα ταραχῆς.

^{xlvii} Plb. 38.4.7: κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τοὺς τῶν περιστάσεων καιροὺς καθήκει βοηθεῖν τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὄντας τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατὰ πάντα τρόπον, τὰ μὲν ἀμύνοντας, τὰ δὲ περιστέλλοντας, τὰ δὲ παραιτούμενους τὴν τῶν κρατούντων ὀργὴν: ὅπερ ἡμεῖς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐποιήσαμεν ἀληθινῶς.

^{xlviii} For Polybios' involvement in the settlement of Greece, see Henderson 2001: 37-49.

^{xlix} Q13 §18 (QC: 1591) = SPN: 161: Il fatto dell'egemonia presuppone indubbiamente che sia tenuto conto degli interessi e delle tendenze dei gruppi sui quali l'egemonia verrà esercitata, che si formi un certo equilibrio di compromesso...

ⁱ Plb. 1.1.2: [...] φάσκοντες ἀληθινωτάτην μὲν εἶναι παιδείαν καὶ γυμνασίαν πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας μάθησιν, ἐναργεστάτην δὲ καὶ μόνην διδάσκαλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης μεταβολὰς γενναίως ὑποφέρειν τὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειῶν ὑπόμνησιν [...]

ⁱⁱ Joll 1977: 89-90.

ⁱⁱⁱ Plb. 38.4.8: ... τὴν δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν γεγονότων τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων παράδοσιν ἀμιγῆ παντὸς ψεύδους ἀπολείπεσθαι χάριν τοῦ μὴ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τέρπεσθαι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς διορθοῦσθαι πρὸς τὸ μὴ πλεονάκις ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς διασφάλλεσθαι.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ For Polybios and the importance of truth in historiography, see Nicholson 2018.

^{liv} For the relationship between intellectuals and patrons in Republican Rome, see for instance White (1993) 3-64 and the response by La Penna (1993).

^{lv} See Champion 2004: 144-69 and Baronowski 2011: 87-113 for the decline in Roman behaviour.

^{lvi} Polybios only hints at this outcome (cf. Baronowski 2011: 153-162), but other sources produced in that period were not so circumspect about Rome's future downfall. Note the 2nd/1st century BC Third Sibylline Oracle, which states (*Sib. Orac.* 3.350-5) that Rome will one day suffer what it imposed on others. For this oracle see Gruen 1998: 15-36 and Erskine 2013a: 128-29.

^{lvii} Cf. Thornton 2013; see also Wiater 2018 for Polybios' engagement with contemporary political discourse in his work.

^{lviii} Cf. Champion 2004 and Erskine 2013 for Polybios' redefinition of the Romans, Crawley Quinn 2013 for his expansion of a global consciousness by his syncretism of time and universal-spatial construction, and Thornton 2013 for Polybios' *Histories* as an example of a dual-facing diplomatic document.