

Uncovering the Patterns of United States Oil Diversification Motivations via a neo-Coxian Interpretation

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Abstract

This thesis develops and applies neo-Coxian analysis to understand patterns of US oil diversification motivations. Because mainstream IR approaches lack a historical perspective and do not consider reflexivity due to their overt rationalism, a historicism method is employed to uncover the motivations for US oil diversification in this research. Critical Theory, which prioritizes a 'holistic view' of IR, helps to uncover these motivations through analysis of oil diversification processes, to understand how they have changed when viewed from a duration-based perception which includes a 'diachronic' time period and also a 'synchronic' one moment snapshot. Whereas rational IR approaches are supported by established methodologies, researching from a reflexivity perspective requires innovative methodological strategies. Here, three cases were chosen to examine US oil diversification motivations, namely the Keystone XL pipeline, the Iraq War and the Arctic Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution. All are considered key cases for illustrating such motivations. Primary data was collected from official archives to identify how political agents have viewed oil diversification, within the three case studies. Semi-structured elite interviews with social actors (e.g. policymakers, business, NGOs) were also conducted to support data collection. The theoretical analysis shows that Coxian Critical theory can explain US oil diversification motivations and can help to uncover the patterns of these motivations through the interaction of ideas, material capabilities and institutions, thereby providing an original contribution to knowledge. However, when a Coxian interpretation is reviewed, social dynamics as a new structural sphere arises as one of the important factors of US oil diversification motivations in the new millennium. The research finds that the patterns of US oil diversification motivations can be classified under: 1. oil politics, 2. domestic politics and 3. foreign policy. Moreover, there are also contradictions (i.e. 1. economy-biosphere, 2. national-state interests and 3. national-transnational benefits) that are the products of the

system, which should be accepted as patterns and triggers of the system. However, their existence is not persistent and depends on the context in which they are created.

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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my grandfathers, Mustafa Altıparmak and Hacı Musa Kılıç, whose funerals I was unable to attend during my research.

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List of Abbreviations

ANILCA	Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980
ANWR	Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
ARRA	American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
BDO	Congressional Budget Office
BOEM	Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
BOEMRE	Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement
CAFE	Corporate Average Fuel Economy
CEAA	Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CEP	Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada
CEPA	Canadian Energy Pipeline Association
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DEIS	Draft Environmental Impact Statements
DER	Draft Evaluation Report
DOD	US Department of Defense
DOE	US Department of Energy
DOI	US Department of the Interior
DOS	US Department of State
DSEIS	Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statements

ECH	Energy Commerce House
ECT	Energy Charter Treaty
EIA	US Energy Information Administration
EISA	Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
EPA	US Environmental Protection Agency
EPAc	Energy Policy Act of 2005
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FEIS	Final Environmental Impact Statement
FSEIS	Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
GHG	Greenhouse gas emissions
IEA	International Energy Agency
IOCs	International Oil Companies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
ITIC	International Tax & Investment Centre
KBR	Kellogg, Brown and Root
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
KXL	Keystone XL pipeline
LIUNA	Laborers International Union of North America
Mbbl	Thousand barrels
Mbbl/d	Thousand barrels per day
MMbbl/d	Million barrels per day
MMgal	Million U.S. gallons
MOPSA	Major Oil Pipeline Siting Act

MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NDEQ	Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality
NEB	National Energy Board Canada
NEP	National Energy Policy Report
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NID	National Interest Determination
NPR-A	National Petroleum Reserves-Alaska
NPRPA	Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act
NOCs	National Oil Companies
NRDC	Natural Resources Defense Council
OCS	Outer Continental Shelf
OCSLA	Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PNAC	Project for New American Century
PSAs	Production Sharing Agreements
R&D	Research and Development
RIO	Restore Iraqi Oil
ROD	Record of Decision
SDEIS	Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statements
SPR	Strategic Petroleum Reserve
TAPS	Trans-Alaska Pipeline System
Tax Act	Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017

UCC	US Chamber of Commerce
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USMCA	United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement
WMDs	Weapons of mass destruction

List of Publications

Published Book Chapter

Altıparmak, S. O. (2018). Enerji Güvenliğine Artzamanlı ve Eşzamanlı Yaklaşım [Diachronic and Synchronic Approaches to Energy Security]. In: M. A. Okur, ed., *Güvenlik: Kargaşa Ve Belirsizlik Çağından Nereye?*. İstanbul: KOCAV Yayınları, pp. 187-203.

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1. Introduction

Diversification is a policy approach aimed at providing energy security. The importance of energy diversification is derived from its requirement for reciprocity. On a global scale, mutual relationships between energy suppliers and consumers lead to reciprocal foreign policy arrangements (Monaghan 2005). Given its increasing importance to national energy and foreign policy, this thesis consequently explores oil supply diversification (i.e. suppliers) motivations in the case of the USA, a globally significant state for both energy production and consumption. At this point we (the author) should be clear in terms of the definition of the 'state', since there is an ambiguity about what it is (Hay et al. 2006; Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009). To use commonly used conceptualisations, the state is composed of political and civil societies in a set of organized governing institutions (ibid.). The USA, a country consisting of 50 federated states, is accepted as a state in global politics. Therefore, when we talk about nation/federal/country and state level differences, we are actually referring to the subparts of the US federal system.

Oil's importance in global politics has been evident since the early 20th century. While oil sometimes has been a target of foreign policies, it has also been a tool of foreign policies. Its importance for industries and transportation leads states to become more dependent on oil. Moreover, it is relatively cheap to transport and use compared to other fuels. Despite the recent growth of renewable energy sources, it is expected that oil will remain the most important fuel until the 2040s thereby still being an object and subject of security issues (Johansson 2013a; 2013b). Oil's importance in global politics is highly connected with prices. Oil prices determine a country's vulnerability to accessing this resource. The current era is characterized by high price fluctuations linked to various sources of price fluctuations (e.g. political problems, supply disruptions, natural disasters).

Thus, the oil market, which involves a commodity, has become a 'politicised market' (Vivoda 2008: 10). To reduce their vulnerability on oil, importing countries employ 'hard power' military interventions, diplomacy, and investment to ensure security of supply. In addition, many states (e.g. the USA, EU, Japan, China, India) have introduced policies and strategies for diversification to reduce their vulnerability to oil provision (Stokes 2005; Rosner 2009; Lesbirel 2004; Kiriyaama and Kajikawa 2014; Chakraborty and Katakey 2014).

The current literature sees diversification policy as the most important strategy for reducing national oil supply vulnerability in terms of price fluctuations and political distributions (Yergin 2006; Stringer 2008; Cao and Bluth 2013; Kiriyaama and Kajikawa 2014). This feature pushes us to study oil diversification in more detail, with both empirical and theoretical dimensions significant to this debate. Empirically, the questions of 'how and why do countries such as the US engage in oil diversification?' should be examined. Consequently, the next question is 'how can we theoretically interpret these political issues?'

When answering both the 'how' and 'why' questions, several empirical considerations are important. Diversification might be attributed to multiple factors such as different production sources, suppliers, transport routes, technologies and energy import contracts (Dirks 2006; Bahgat 2006; Rosner 2009; Ang et al. 2015), i.e. supply and demand sides. However, in this research, oil diversification will be studied in terms of suppliers, since the US is a major oil producer, consumer and importer country and is globally significant in all of these areas. Oil supply has become very important in the US context and oil supply policies cannot be studied without considering suppliers. Thus, there is a spatial dimension to diversification. However, this spatial scope also involves a temporal dimension in terms of how diversification policy evolves. This temporal process is naturally directed by the US' internal and external politics. Here, we find that suppliers are defined as supplier countries in the literature, but supplier states should also be included in the US case.

One potential approach for explaining these complex spatial and temporal aspects of oil diversification is critical theory (Chapter 3). This theoretical approach potentially provides us with a credible explanation, because it includes dialectics between ideas and materials, and reciprocal causality to understand the significance of possible determiners in global politics. Moreover, because critical theory sees “people as historical agents”, it provides both social and historical perspectives to study global politics (Budd 2008: 176). The term ‘global politics’ is used, because the term ‘international relations’ (IR) is based on a Westphalian nation-state understanding. Although we accept that the state (see above definition) is the key factor in global politics, we think that the term ‘inter-national’ is a legalised contemporary structure because of its *status quo* context. Its *status quo* context is derived from a positivist perception. Here, there is a separation of observer and observed leading to value- and time-free explanations. Thus, positivism makes its arguments based only in the context of specific time events. However, there has not always been a ‘nation-state’ in history – the notion of the Westphalian state is obviously historically dependent. Although we try to see reality, we do not legalise it.

When the state is the key factor in the global arena, structural dimensions in the world have become necessary to analyse it. The current world system has been a US-based uni-polarity for the past half century. It means that the US feels responsibility for the institutions, markets and political arena across the world, even in different regions. Any counter movement against this structure means a counter movement against the US or vice versa. This relationship has been evident since the end of the Cold War, which occurred after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, the US hegemony has been discussed more intensely since the Iraq War, which began in 2003 (Cox 2004; Stokes 2005). An increasing counter movement against the US means changing this structure. On the other hand, the US is the largest crude oil importer and producer country (CIA World Factbook: 2019). As mentioned above, when the

oil price is affected by foreign policy, it also affects the foreign policy of states. In the context of the US, oil diversification motivations are a 'reflection' of the current global system, domestic conditions and how they are changing through mutual interactions. Thus, the US is the main focus of oil diversification motivations in this research, both empirically and theoretically.

US oil diversification motivations will be studied through three specific high profile cases, which are the Keystone XL pipeline (KXL), the Iraq War, and Arctic Drilling in the context of the so-called 'Energy Revolution' (Chapters 5,6,7). KXL has a more regional dimension compared to the international dimensions of the Iraq War, but in addition, there are also environmental concerns which contradict economic and state-level concerns/benefits, which in turn oppose national-level (federal) political preferences. The Iraq War's causes and effects on US oil diversification are highly related to US foreign policies and the US' position in the world. However, there is also a domestic effect in the Iraq War. During the war period, these dynamics, transnational and national benefits, have become contradictory. Lastly, Arctic Drilling in the context of the Energy Revolution shows the transition between domestic, foreign and oil policies in a debate encompassing the economy vs. environment and state vs. nation conundrum. This study demonstrates that diversification has emerged as a key driver of policy since the early millennium but that important research questions remain unanswered, namely: Is diversification only related to US oil dependency or are there any additional foreign policy targets? Are domestic policies affected by foreign policy targets? In the context of the US, how much of its hegemonic/empire position and its foreign and domestic dimensions are related to oil diversification motivations? The shifts in US oil diversification motivations lead to these questions.

The remainder of this chapter is structured into four sections. The following section focuses on the rationale behind this research. This section will be divided into two parts, which are the empirical and theoretical puzzles addressed in this thesis. The first part (i.e. the

empirical) will provide a brief history of the global oil market and then specify the rationale of the study by focusing upon the importance of oil and oil diversification in global politics, as well as US oil politics. The second (i.e. the theoretical) part will justify the focus of the study on oil diversification, US behaviour and its effects on global policies and global events' effects on US behaviour. The second section introduces the research aims, objectives, and main research question and sub-questions. The third section focuses on the contribution my research will make to the existing literature. Finally, an outline of the thesis chapter structure is provided.

1.1. Rationale

This research seeks to theoretically understand oil diversification as a global (i.e. spatial) process (i.e. temporal) through a focus on the US as a signifier of these events (see Chapter 2). In this sense, the thesis fills a significant gap in the literature on oil diversification which, as explained below, tends to be understood via the lens of positivist IR theory and, in doing so, rather ignores the potentially valuable contribution of critical theorists, including their historical-dialectical arguments, to this debate. In fact, as argued throughout this thesis, such research makes an important contribution to the academic literature through both empirical and theoretical innovation.

1.1.1. Empirical Puzzle

1.1.1.1. A Brief History of the Global Oil Market

In order to uncover US oil diversification motivations in the period of the new millennium historically, there is a requirement to determine how the global oil market has evolved and accumulated during this period. The history of the oil market presents some key points for understanding the structure of the oil market and also sometimes understanding the global political economy.

In the early 20th Century, Standard Oil which provided nearly 90% of the refined oil in the US was a commercial trust enjoying a near

monopoly in the US oil market. After the Supreme Court's antitrust legislation in 1911, Standard Oil was split into Chevron, Exxon and Mobil (now ExxonMobil). During this period other oil companies (i.e. BP, Royal Dutch/Shell, Gulf Oil and Texaco) were becoming internationalized. Subsequently named the "Seven Sisters" they ensured a monopoly of the global oil market between 1950 and 1973 (Sampson 1975). Preceding the 1973 Crisis, they held 85% of global oil production. Apart from the oil reserves that they controlled, they held all upstream (exploration, production), midstream (transportation, refining) and downstream (marketing, distribution) areas of the oil market. Thus, they were able to determine the magnitude of oil production as well as oil prices. At the time, there was no Keynesian interventionist approach regarding this sector, i.e. government intervention was constrained. It was the Cold War era and US allies' (i.e. Europe and Japan) economies were also developing, therefore rapidly increasing their oil demand. While demand in Europe rose thirteen-fold as it recovered from war (World War II) by , Japan's consumption rose 137-fold (McNally 2017: 106). However, the development of the Israeli state supported by the USA caused Middle East supplier countries, which still had the biggest oil reserves and provided the Seven Sisters' market power, to nationalize their oil production. During the Cold War, the Soviets' increasingly flooded the market with cheap oil, also undermining the Seven Sisters' power.

These events provided the context to how the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was founded in 1960. After the Suez Crisis in 1956, an oil shortage occurred and after the Egypt-Israel war in 1967 an oil embargo was imposed on Western countries. OPEC were ineffective in changing the market. However, the embargo after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, particularly on the USA, led to a significant re-organisation of oil markets. Reasons for these structural changes included declining US oil production, down to 16.5% of global output in 1973, meaning that US imports and import dependency had increased enormously (Painter 2014). While the US pulled out of the Bretton Woods system, related to maintaining the

gold exchange standard, the value of the dollar had decreased along with the oil revenues of oil supplier countries. Thus, the motivation behind the 1973 embargo and the power of its effect were not only a political issue. After the crisis, the definition of the oil market changed. New supplier countries joined the market and the US administration declared `energy independence` as a key strategic objective for `energy dominance` (The White House 2019a). It was the first time that diversification became significant in US policy thinking.

Diversification was an issue not only for the US but also for the US' allies in the Cold War era. In total, 71% of Japan's oil imports came from the Middle East in 1970 (Licklider 1988). OPEC nations were the source of 70% of total U.S. petroleum imports in 1977 (EIA 2019a). Today this figure is down to 29%. There were several long term institutional and policy effects of the crisis, including the foundation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) based in Paris in 1974, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 1977, the US Department of Energy (DOE) in 1977, Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) and The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards under Energy Policy and Conservation Act (Congress 1975) and the Carter Doctrine¹ as a policy. Another consequence was the realisation that for any one actor to control global oil production and prices was no longer possible.

While there were some sudden price changes in history, with oil prices going up (e.g. World War I) or down (e.g. the discovery of oil in East Texas which occurred during the Great Depression), they were accompanied by a trust or monopoly of control mechanism. The 1973 crisis destroyed these mechanisms and created price fluctuations that have endured in the period since. The increasing power of National Oil Companies (NOCs) and the growing number of supplier countries has changed a previously relatively stable market. Any crisis since this time has consequently had a huge effect on prices, leading to supply

¹ A foreign policy initiative that enables the US to employ military force against any country that attempted to gain control of the Persian Gulf region.

cuts/increases. The Iranian Revolution (1979), the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), and the Iraq invasion of Kuwait (1990) are examples. Although OPEC showed its power in the market, the 1980s was not a bright period for the organisation. The effect of the 1973 crisis led to increasing supply production from different actors (e.g. Norway, Mexico, US) and oil demand collapsed because of the effect of the crisis on the global political economic system. Moreover, it was the advent of the era of neoliberalism, which promotes market-oriented policies for the global political economy in parallel to a Hayekian view. Market-oriented decisions started to be followed by OPEC countries. While OPEC played a destructive role in the 1973 crisis, it has had a constructive, stabilising role in the market in recent decades. By this point, a market based view had become dominant.

The investments in oil started showing their effects after 10 years. The 1973 crisis had its results during the 1980s and early 90s. Because these investments were not sustained, the late 90s started experiencing problems. While the 90s had a less volatile oil market, the 1997 Asian crisis hit oil demand. Increasing prices led to a more distinguished supply-demand imbalance. This situation led to OPEC and non-OPEC actors cutting production. The aftermath of 9/11 led to economic weakness, thereby decreasing oil demand. This time, oil supply was decreased in response. However, it did not lead to oil prices being stabilised, because there was uncertainty about supply combined with increasing demand from India and China. During late 2002 and early 2003, Venezuelan oil workers' strikes and the Iraq War combined with election violence in Nigeria to cause disruption to the global oil market. Moreover, the IEA did not use its strategic reserves and prices were pushed up dramatically. Not all disruptions (e.g. Iranian Revolution) led to shortages, but there was an oil market tightening (McNally 2017: 171). While the Iraq War has undermined liberal ideas around the global economy, thereby the hegemony of the US, market oriented perceptions have been maintained by all actors. The oil market was also triggered by increasing oil prices. The

dimensions of energy security consequently changed again in response.

1.1.1.2. Importance of Oil

Oil is the most consumed energy resource globally. Under the globalisation era, while numbers of developed countries have increased, this situation has led to increased competition between them over oil. As a commodity, oil is affected by this competition. However, the main oil producing countries have political instabilities and these types of political obstacles are seen even in transit routes (e.g. both sea and land). Thus, besides economic competition for oil resources, there is also a political dimension visible between states. As one of the most consumed energy resources, oil 'reflects' current global conditions and is a powerful signifier of international security. In this sense, oil security reflects and is reflected by global conditions more than any other energy security issue. Oil has a global market, because it is still widely available, easy to transport and available to multiple industrial processes from energy generation to manufacturing (CIEP 2004). This situation highlights the global importance of oil prices. Any event might easily trigger wider repercussions because of oil's global importance, for example the 1973 Oil Crisis was initially sparked by the Arab-Israeli conflict. Oil price fluctuations strengthen oil's importance on national (i.e. a Realist perspective) and economic (i.e. a Liberal perspective) security for states.

1.1.1.3. Why focus on Oil Diversification?

Diversification might be attributed to many areas such as different sources, suppliers, transport routes, technologies and energy import contracts (Dirks 2006; Bahgat 2006; Rosner 2009; Ang et al. 2015). Therefore, it is important to specify what is being studied. In this research, oil diversification will be studied in terms of suppliers. Thus, we cannot follow diversification across all its sources and must necessarily be selective. Technological diversification is not included within this study because technology is not readily diversified, rather it has progressed. Lastly, import contracts are related to suppliers. Although the literature refers to supplier countries, when it says

'suppliers', this study has found that supplier states of the US should also be considered as part of its diversification strategies. It is one of the contributions of the study with the help of consideration of domestic dynamics. Thus, oil diversification will be defined, in this study, as diversifying supplier countries and states.

For various scholars, diversification of oil policies should be interpreted as the best solution for reducing oil vulnerability, thereby ensuring energy security (Yergin 2006; Stringer 2008; Cao and Bluth 2013; Kiriya and Kajikawa 2014). Thus, most scholars believe Churchill's idea is still valid in that "Safety and certainty in oil lie on variety and variety alone" (Kalicki 2007: 79; Stringer 2008: 127). While some believe oil diversification reduces dependence on oil prices (Kalicki 2007), others assert that oil diversification cannot reduce the dependence on oil prices, because oil has a global market (Nivola and Carter 2010). Oil is fungible. Any disruption might affect global oil prices. However, it is certain that oil diversification policies reduce dependence on supply disruptions (Ang et al. 2015). The current world energy supply structure includes minor disruptions (e.g. weather, natural disasters, labour strikes, or technical failure/accident) and terrorist attacks. The importance of disruptions and terrorist attacks cannot be ignored. Economic reasons, minor disruptions and terrorist attacks mean that oil is also a political problem. Thus, oil as a commodity has become a strategic commodity.

1.1.1.4. Why focus on US Oil Diversification?

A study of global oil diversification should include analysis of the USA, for several reasons. Although the US is one of the most important oil producer countries, it is *the* most significant oil importer country (CIA World Factbook 2019). The US relationship with oil production and importation is caused by its domestic oil needs. The US is the leading oil consumer country (EIA 2015). Thus, securing supplies of crude oil has become a very central issue for the US. Moreover, because of oil's huge importance in the world, oil has become a central focus of US foreign, security and, increasingly, environmental policy. These realms are the key points required to uncover the patterns of US oil

diversification motivations. Under the global system, whereas states try to increase their suppliers, supply and demand competition is hugely affected by these policy decisions too. At this point, US oil diversification has become a global issue because of the diversity of the US' oil trade partners. It imported crude oil from 79 countries in 2016 (EIA 2017). Studying US oil diversification therefore tell us much about this phenomenon on a global scale.

The necessity to look at US oil diversification motivations is therefore evident, but there appear four main deficiencies in the literature on this subject. Firstly, existing arguments are mainly driven by scholars using problem-solving IR theories², which are Realism and Liberalism. However, a significant problem is that these theories ignore a historical perspective in social relations, whereas social and state relations go through changes in the oil diversification process. Besides their lack of consideration of a historical perspective these theories give only a partial explanation of both sides of the oil trade (i.e. supplier and demander countries), although, as this study argues, state relations emerge *through* behaviour rather than *in* behaviour (see Chapter 4). Secondly, the problem-solving perspective typically views oil diversification from an importer side and cannot cover general oil diversification motivations, because it is a reciprocal process. Thirdly, although the state is manifestly the most important actor in the international arena, it is certainly not the only influential actor. Societal effects on oil diversification motivations should be also analysed. This effect can only be adequately evaluated with the acceptance of state-society complexity, which considers political, economical and social aspects of inter- and intra-states relations (see Chapter 3). Lastly, in the literature, there is no study which compares different cases in terms of US oil import motivations. A comparison of different cases provides for a more holistic and reliable analysis of patterns for oil import motivations.

² These theories use value- and history-free explanations with the help of *ceteris paribus* assumptions which reduce parameters, while Critical Theory seeks out complex processes "as a whole rather than separate parts" (Cox 1981: 129).

1.1.2. The theoretical Puzzle

1.1.2.1. Oil Diversification from a Theoretical Perspective

In the IR literature, there are two main theoretical positions on oil diversification motivations, which are derived from Realism and Liberalism. A Realist perspective has a more pessimistic view since it focuses on state self-interest under conditions of international anarchy. According to Realists, oil means national security because its demand continually increases and it is a strategic commodity (Klare: 2008b), vital to state survival. To reduce national security threats, Realists argue that states should consequently diversify their suppliers (Luft and Korin 2009a). Moreover, diversification means that every state acts only in its own interests. The US policy of `Energy Independence` therefore does make sense in the context of Realism, since it becomes a matter of national interest for states to diversify away from reliance on others. However, for Liberals, the energy security perspective is more about the terms of `availability` and `affordability` (Yao and Chang 2014: 597). Oil diversification provides both of them. Thus, Liberals see economic security being weighed against national security. Moreover, Liberals believe that when states increase diversification, they try to establish a good relationship with suppliers and transport countries (Yergin: 2005). Importers, which are mainly developed or developing countries, therefore help exporters and transporter countries in terms of developing infrastructure. This activity leads to more social and political stability in these countries. Thus, Liberal arguments emphasise `interdependence` rather than `independence`, which may be considered more of a Realist concept. When one side consequently highlights competition (i.e. a Realist perspective), the other side puts an emphasis on cooperation (i.e. a Liberal perspective). However, both agree about oil policies, whereby oil diversification policies affect foreign policy and vice versa. For the purposes of this study, we agree with Realists and Liberals in this respect but diverge from their analysis in other respects. This thesis therefore argues that a historical-dialectical method addresses significant gaps left in our understanding of oil diversification by these

mainstream positivist approaches. This thesis does not falsify their arguments but provides a broader and deeper picture than theirs. The ontological assumptions and strategic concerns of those theories are actually historically contingent and changeable. Critical Theory's two main assumptions, people as historical agents and state-society complexity, will be used to overcome the issue.

To reduce oil policy to a process of securitization (Vivoda 2008; Vivoda 2009a; Cohen et al. 2011) is too reductive, as it is often not debated (solely) in security terms. However, in this study, oil diversification motivations will be studied as a foreign policy matter, for reasons outlined below. For this purpose, we define security as 'reducing threats or reducing damages of threats' (see Chapter 2). However, the term 'oil policies' is not entirely suitable for use within this definition. There is some divergence between states about the actual nature of oil diversification policies such as the influence of "geography", "political relationship", the "availability of oil and transportation infrastructure", "refining capacity", "policy" and "resources" (Vivoda 2009a: 4620), but also the actual objectives of oil policies. Thus, oil security requires both defensive and also offensive policies. For example, the KXL oil import project from Canada to the US was rejected by the Obama administration because of potential environmental damage. However, the Obama administration's decision can be interpreted as a result of attempts by the administration to project a more positive environmental image for the US globally (Klare 2014a), particularly at a time when the US' leadership on climate change issues was being questioned. Thus, oil diversification policies and motivations should be studied as a foreign policy matter.

1.1.2.2. US Oil Diversification from a Theoretical Perspective

As an alternative to positivist IR theory or a securitization approach, this thesis adopts a critical perspective, specifically drawing on the work of Robert Cox. As discussed in Chapter 3, this approach potentially provides several advantages vis-à-vis positivist IR theory. Primarily, it allows our understanding of oil diversification to be

extended to engaging with its historical nature but also notions of hegemony and structural dynamics in ways not possible through positivist theory. This thesis argues that critical theory allows us to move beyond value- and history-free explanations that can only provide a momentary picture rather than displaying dynamic change as a historical process that is a product of patterns on structural interaction. Under this point of view, the Coxian triangle (material capabilities, institutions and ideas) should be operationalised into the US oil diversification motivations to provide a balanced view on structure-agency and materials-ideas transitions. On the other hand, Cox's explanation of global political economics in terms of how he defines hegemony and how the hegemonic power decreases should be used to check empirical findings related to the triangle's operationalisation on US oil diversification motivations.

From a critical perspective, which is mainly associated with a Coxian interpretation, US oil policies, thereby oil diversification policies, are not only about US geographical, economic and environmental dimensions, there is also an effect of the US' position in the world. The US is symbolically representative of the current unipolar system which can be linked to the collapse of Soviet Union in the late 1980s. This position means that there is no counter-superpower operating against US activities in the rest of the world. The "Ideas", "Material Capabilities" and "Institutions"³ of the US have been strengthening US hegemony in the world (Cox 1981: 136). Furthermore, these structural forces of the US have been interacting in social spheres which are "social forces", "forms of state" and "world order" (Cox 1981: 138). In addition to Cox, we believe that there is also an important influence of social dynamics on structural spheres in the new millennium. Thus, there are some questions that require answering, for example: how much are the US' power and the global oil market interconnected? What are the sources of problems in these areas? Did US policies trigger or empower the problems of other countries? On the economic side, what is the effect of US energy companies on US foreign

³ These three are defined as the forces of structure that interact reciprocally and continually.

policies? When oil prices are affecting importer country economies negatively, have US oil companies been strengthened because of high oil prices or any other factor? On the other hand, if the US wants to import more from its neighbours, does regionalism affect US policies? Here, we argue that there is a role for critical theory, which includes materials, institutions and ideas interactions, in responding to these questions from a historical perspective. Thus, the topic should not be analysed through a pure political-economic perspective but with the consideration of structure (social relations and physical production) and superstructure (ideology and political organizations) that encompasses both materials, institutions and ideas dynamics over time.

1.2. Research Aims, Objectives and Questions

1.2.1. Research Aims and Objectives

State behaviours, reflected in foreign and domestic policies, change according to different time, space and context dimensions. They can be analysed by focusing on one specific topic, for example the key area of oil diversification. Oil as a global `strategic` commodity has both economic and political aspects and it provides a highly significant area in which to analyse state foreign and domestic policy decisions. Moreover, oil is not only an object of these decisions, it is also a subject of them. For researching oil diversification, the USA is the best national case in which to analyse decision-making, both theoretically and empirically, due to the structure of the global unipolar system and its position as the leading oil importer.

This research therefore aims to uncover general patterns of US oil diversification motivations with the help of a critical perspective, rather than mainstream IR approaches (i.e. Realism and Liberalism) which have dominated academic explanations to date, and in so doing reflect back on the value of such an approach for interpreting decision-making. The research aims and objectives are:

- To critically review published studies on US oil diversification in order to identify gaps in their explanations:

The existing literature will be evaluated according to critical theory's principles (e.g. people as historical agents, state-society complexity).

- To develop a novel critical IR theory perspective in order to uncover US oil diversification motivations, thereby adding to the existing literature;

A Coxian IR interpretation will be reviewed according to the new millennium's realities. Thus, if they exist, new structural spheres may be found.

- To construct a reflexivist epistemological and duration-based historicist methodological stance in order to apply this theory to the US case study on oil diversification;

A Coxian IR theory will be operationalized through the combining of basic assumptions and stances of Critical theory and reflexivist epistemology to develop a novel methodology.

- To examine the value of such a revised critical IR theory perspective for explaining US oil diversification;

The theory will be assessed with the help of primary data which will be collected from official archives and semi-structured elite interviews, plus secondary data derived from official and academic sources.

1.2.2. Research Questions

This thesis examines the motivations for oil diversification in the US case. There is one main question and three sub-questions. These sub-questions are framed in order to find the best answers for the main question. Using critical theory, our sub-questions have been set up to have both synchronic and diachronic perspectives see Chapter 4). The questions are framed to comprehend both a theoretical and

an empirical puzzle. As with problem-solving theory, we seek to reveal the current patterns of oil diversification (i.e. synchronic). However, on the other hand, we also try to find the triggers of those questions which have arisen in the historical process, which have been evolving since the early millennium (i.e. diachronic). Our main and sub-questions are therefore:

How can the Iraq War, Keystone XL Pipeline and Arctic Drilling in the context of the Energy Revolution be theoretically interpreted to uncover general patterns of oil diversification?

- What have been the definitions of oil diversification in US policy cycles and how have they been changing over time?
- To what extent do these definitions fit the ‘material capabilities-ideas-institutions’ arguments of Cox?
- What are the limitations of this theory for explaining patterns of US oil diversification?

1.3. Contribution to the Literature

This research contributes to three areas of scholarship, which are empirical, theoretical and methodological. The first contribution is aimed empirically at extending our understanding of US oil diversification motivations which is the main focus of the research (pure empirical contribution). Secondly, Coxian theory is presented along with its critiques in the literature and our contribution to developing Coxian theory, i.e. neo-Coxian arguments (pure theoretical contribution). Thirdly, a Coxian IR interpretation is used to determine energy security and more specifically on oil diversification motivations (theoretical and empirical contribution). Lastly, this Coxian IR interpretation is combined with a reflexivist epistemology in addition

to ontological corrections (theoretical and methodological contribution).

The thesis, firstly, contributes to the literature is with regards to US oil diversification motivations. A review shows that there are six important points in the literature that should be looked at more closely. The first point, which focuses on arguments about the lack of a historical perspective, suggests that we accept people as `historical agents` (see Chapter 4). States' relationships are going through changes in process. The second point evident in the literature is that there is no perspective on supplier sides, even amongst the `interdependence` defenders. However, oil diversification involves suppliers and demanders and the motivations of oil importers are also affected by suppliers' behaviours. As discussed below (see Chapter 4), people and states act not *in* behaviour but rather *through* behaviour. Thus, suppliers of US oil imports should be also looked at through their interests and interactions with the US. Thirdly, any sources of US oil diversification motivations ignore the domestic effect on US foreign and oil diversification policies. Separation of state and society cannot give an adequate view of US oil diversification, because there is state-society complexity in the global arena (see Chapter 3). The fourth point is that there is no study which examines US oil diversification motivations through comparing different cases. Previous studies typically employ single, non-cumulative cases, making any generalisation problematic. In this study, while recognising the problems of generalisation from small N samples, three cases are nonetheless used to uncover US oil diversification motivations, thereby adding greater strength to the findings. Fifthly, oil producer states should also be considered as part of diversification (see Chapter 7). Thus, suppliers mean supplier countries and supplier states. Lastly, there is insufficient literature on KXL and Arctic Drilling in the context of the Energy Revolution. Moreover, the albeit limited Arctic Drilling literature is mainly concerned about the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) which is obviously related to the context.

However, this work provides sufficient grounds for using both these case studies to offer a historical-dialectical point of view.

As a continuation of our critique against the literature, we have found that the general patterns of US oil diversification motivations are composed of the triangle of *oil politics*, *domestic politics* and *foreign policy*. The findings can also be applied to the pre-millennium era. However, every period also has their contradictions that are the products of the reflections of patterns in that period. The *economy-biosphere* contradiction has been put placed within the context of oil politics. *National-transnational benefits* (Stokes and Raphael 2010) can become contradictory during the process as part of US foreign policy. Lastly, the dynamics between *state-nation interests* become more problematic in terms of domestic politics in the millennium. They are the triggers of the process, but not persistent.

Secondly, Coxian theory is predicated on assumptions that balance materials and ideals, structures and agents and power and morality. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, Cox struggles to show transitions between issues of structure and agency, and state and society. This struggle leads to a misinterpretation of Cox by the literature. The first contribution is that operationalising Cox into a specific topic helps us to see this transition clearly. Secondly, Coxian critiques are outlined in order to see how Cox is interpreted by others, because there is no study that synthesises critiques of Cox after the study of Cox and Schechter (2002). The third part of this contribution is a review of Coxian structure dimensions. It is conducted with the help of Sinclair's (2016) critique. 'Social dynamics' is added to the structure spheres. In this way, misunderstandings of Coxian analysis are eliminated with the help of operationalising the theory. Fourthly, however, the definition of institutions provided by Cox are too historically static. We know that they maintain global order, but our investigation shows their roles involve more active participation during the declining of this order.

Thirdly, although there are studies on US hegemony, energy security and oil diversification motivations (Stokes 2005; Stokes and Raphael

2010), administration effects, changes in US policies (i.e. domestic and foreign) and the effects of US foreign policies on the US (plus responses from other countries) are also studied. While the arguments about world order and US hegemony are derived from Cox's studies (see Chapter 3), the key motivations of oil diversification could be found via Coxian IR interpretation. Specifically, it should be noted how he draws upon the terms hegemony, the triangle of ideas-material capabilities-institutions and the triangle of social forces-forms of state-world could be operationalized on the US oil diversification motivations. While these terms are used as basic concepts and transferred to oil diversification motivations in the US, additional arguments are also used in this research. Although the basic terms of his Neo-Gramscian interpretation is used for understanding US hegemony, reciprocal causality (i.e. inner states and inter-states) is used to find "rationally knowable principles" which are inspired from Vico and Ibn Khaldun, in the oil diversification motivations (Cox 1992: 148). The importance of production, social forces and a dialectic approach which are drawn from Marx are the other realm that are used to find patterns and the triggers of the system. Lastly, synchronic and diachronic time frames which are sourced from the work of Fernand Braudel (1995 [1972]) are used to develop historical view on changing dynamics of US oil diversification motivations.

Laslty, according to Cox (2008: 89), "more holistic, more relativistic, and more historically oriented approaches" are emerging. Thus, we are living under the complexity paradigm at the moment. To better interpret the current global structure, reflexivist epistemology provides the most optimal opportunities. Reflexivity's key assumptions, which are the intertwining of the observer-observed, and facts-values bring together ideas and materials. While ideas are directed by materials, there is also a feedback to materials from ideas. This *becoming* ontology (i.e. diachronic) which includes *being* (i.e. synchronic) provides a more active understanding and thereby creative explanation of global politics. However, it does not mean that a *being* ontology is entirely discounted. It is one of the ontological corrections

of Cox, while his theory is conceptualized in reflexivist epistemology. Although he suggests diachronic and synchronic views, he (2008) prioritises becoming rather than being. Besides the diachronic perspective, specific cases/events (i.e. synchronic) which also have systemic accumulation will be also looked at. Critical reflexivist approaches differ from positivism's ahistorical explanations and law-like generalizations in IR, and provides us with a patterns-based approach. Patterns are reflected in different images at different times, space and contexts. Oil diversification motivations should be found within patterns and then global arguments can be asserted. However, this leads to the second ontological correction of Coxian theory. While he avoids using the term 'cause', this research transforms his structural forces into the notion of structural causes (see Chapter 4). It is agreed with Kurki (2008) that Cox is afraid of using 'cause' in order not to be trapped in positivism, but accepting 'first cause' does not require a cause-effect relationship. Causation is accepted as only an ontological issue rather than epistemological in this research.

1.4. Thesis Structure

The remainder of the thesis is structured into eight chapters. The *second* chapter explores the academic debates on energy security to identify gaps in the literature. Research questions are identified according to these gaps in the literature. There are six main parts to this chapter. Initially, security perspectives are provided through energy security definitions, concepts and perspectives. Theoretical perspectives on energy security are then discussed. Thirdly, the literature on oil, oil diversification and oil diversification motivations are outlined. The fourth section focuses on US oil diversification motivations, because the US is the only case used in this research. The fifth section is the key part of this chapter, because it combines all key points in the literature which are theoretical security, energy security perspectives and oil diversification motivations. Counterarguments are also discussed in this section. However, a

critique is provided to emphasise the necessity of using a critical perspective in the last section.

The *third* chapter outlines the theoretical approach of the research. Critical theory is used for this research, drawing on a Coxian interpretation. The thesis develops the argument about our understanding of oil diversification, through its focus on hegemony, state-civil society and power-morality relationships. The main themes of critical theory are provided. Then, the main theoretical arguments are derived from the work of Cox or scholars who have subsequently developed his ideas. A Gramscian interpretation of hegemony is the basic concept employed to understand US oil diversification motivations theoretically. However, Cox's structural forces that are operationalised to uncover the process of US oil diversification motivations empirically, are described along with Cox's explanation of his times and future scenarios. We also provide critiques of Cox and our contribution to Coxian interpretations, i.e. a neo-Coxian analysis. Lastly, we show how Coxian structural forces that are identified as causes in this research will be operationalised to uncover US oil diversification motivations.

The *fourth* chapter discusses the methodology of the research, which is critical reflexivity. A brief discussion of the philosophy of science is initially given to show the ontological foundations of the study. After giving the basic assumptions of positivism, realism and interpretivism, critical reflexivity and its benefits are presented. To understand what reflexivity asserts, design considerations are then given. Historicism is used for this research because critical theorists see people as historical agents, but the historical-dialectical approach is used to compare case studies. Later on in this section, case study choices and their roles are discussed. The last sub-part of this section describes how historical views are addressed through historical analyses, which is embraced as a duration-based perception. Duration is constituted by diachronic (historical process) and synchronic (current moment) time dimensions. Lastly, in parallel to our

critical reflexivist position, we provide a reflexive analysis section that shows how the research was undertaken.

Chapter five explores the KXL in terms of US oil diversification motivations. The chapter starts with an introduction to the KXL, followed by examination of the literature on it. After providing highlights from a timeline of KXL and the historical background of US-Canada oil relations, the process is described in detail using primary data collected via interviews and online sources from the US and Canada. The empirical structure also includes theoretical analysis based upon a duration based perception. Because of differentiated time structures, the processes are classified under three presidencies: George W. Bush (2001-2009); Barack H. Obama (2009-2017); and Donald J. Trump (2017-). Following the presidential eras, data and its theoretical analysis are discussed in terms of the value of a Coxian view which also includes discussion of our neo-Coxian arguments.

The *sixth* chapter explores the second case study of the thesis, the Iraq War. The first section the study provides context to the conflict by examining the literature on the war and then placing the thesis research into this context. The third section provides highlights of a timeline and historical background to the war. They are followed by a detailed theoretical analysis according to structural causes. Since every case is unique, the process of the war is classified according to the war's key events for oil diversification. These are: Pre- and Early War: 1998-2004; The Era of Oil Law: 2005-2008; and Iraqi Oil Contracts with IOCs: 2009- . Primary data were collected via interviews, online sources and archive documents. Later on, data and their theoretical analysis are discussed in terms of the value of a Coxian view which also includes the discussion on our neo-Coxian arguments.

The *seventh* chapter explores Arctic Drilling in the context of the Energy Revolution. As in the other two case studies, the chapter starts with an introduction to the main themes and a critique of the existing literature, which in this case is limited. The third section highlights the

timeline and historical background to Arctic Drilling. They are followed by a detailed theoretical analysis according to structural causes. Primary data were sourced from interviews, online sources and archive studies. The process is classed according to different Presidential administrations: George W. Bush (2001-2009); Barack H. Obama (2009-2017); and Donald J. Trump (2017-), since the accumulation of the process is differentiated according to different governments. The process is then discussed in terms of the value of a Coxian view, which also includes consideration of our neo-Coxian arguments.

The *eighth* chapter tests the suitability of the theory for US oil diversification motivations. This chapter is composed of five sections. It initially answers the first sub-question. US oil diversification patterns are synthesised to show how they have changed through time in the cases. To do this, it provides the brief historical background to US oil diversifications, what the case studies show and findings of these cases in the new millennium. The next section answers the second sub-question through discussing the following themes: uncovering the case studies' patterns and interpretations, including the core value of the research to the US oil diversification motivations literature. The third sub-question is discussed in terms of limitations of the theory and the scope for neo-Coxian theoretical innovation. The fourth section discusses the limitations of the research methods. The last section provides recommendations for future research based upon the use of neo-Coxian interpretations to fill gaps in explanations of US oil diversification motivations. Normative implications of critical theory and how they may lead to future research are also discussed.

The *final* chapter concludes the study by reflecting back on the research aims/questions and objectives, situating the findings within the literature and developing some avenues for future research.

2. Literature Review

This chapter situates the thesis research in the extant literature, to develop the gaps and research questions identified in Chapter 1. Here, it initially sets out the main arguments in the security studies literature to show how it has been dominated by IR Realist and Liberalism debates based upon a positivist epistemology. It then outlines how these mainstream theories have permeated the energy security studies literature, constituting a dominant theoretical paradigm. Critiques of this positivist paradigm within energy security studies are then discussed as a prelude to examining the implications of these theoretical arguments for studying oil diversification. A significant point then developed is that these theories may be inadequate for studying oil diversification motivations due to their narrow empirical focus on either state self-interest or economic cooperation, most notably their limited considerations of historical agents, structures and the synchronic-diachronic nature of evolving oil diversification motivations. One potential response, it is argued, is to engage in critical theoretical analysis to overcome these theoretical limitations.

2.1. Security Studies

IR literature is a very broad church. Security is one of the most important subject areas in this literature. To understand the motivations for oil diversification within this body of research, and thereby energy security, security definitions need to be first examined.

Within the literature, the notion of security is dominated by Realist and Liberal theory. These two interpretations constitute two sides of early debates in IR (Hoffman 1987; Dalby 1991), and still enjoy enduring popularity. Both theories also reflect a positivist understanding of IR. However, as this Chapter will argue, positivist understandings are increasingly inadequate since they only present a partial view of security. Thus, a critique of the energy security and oil diversification

literatures suggest that it has not widely been investigated using more critical, post-positivist or non-positivist perspectives – thereby presenting a significant gap in research. Initially, Realist and Liberal security understandings are presented in order to develop this line of argumentation.

2.1.1. Realist Perspective

Security, which means reducing threats or reducing damages of threats, is one of the most important areas of IR theory (Collins 2013). Although most IR theories offer explanations for security, Realism is one of the most important among security studies. Because Realists' basic concerns are states, security and power, they are interested in inter-state competition and cooperation. However, states' strategic behaviours are determined by an international structure that distributes the capabilities of states. Thus, Realism has a structure-based point of view. International security cannot be studied without an acknowledgement of the contribution of Realism.

Realism explains international security problems in reference to some basic terms, which are “states, power and international anarchy” (Glasner 2013: 14). In this view, there is not any authority over the international arena and states are therefore trying to secure themselves under an anarchy situation. States can secure themselves with power. Power includes wealth, population, technology and military capacity (ibid.). Power is steered by the state, which is a rational and unitary actor in the international arena. But one problem with Realism is that these terms are used according to a positivist perspective and even Realists themselves do not agree on terminology (Rose 1998). For example, when power allows a state to secure its position internationally (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001), there is no agreement about what security then entails. Therefore, it could be asked: what is a more secure position? And how much power is necessary for a state to secure itself? Thus, Baldwin's (1997: 13-17) questions, which are based on Wolfers (1952), have become more important in guiding research: “security for whom?”; “security for which

values?"; "how much security?"; "from what threats?"; "by what means?"; "at what cost?" "in what time period?".

Because of different perceptions of these terms, there are different types of international security explanations encompassed by Realism (Rose 1998; Glasner 2013). Thus, the international system is interpreted in different ways within Realism. For example, for Waltz (1979) states are trying to *survive* under an anarchic international system. States should adopt a "self-help" position to ensure the balance of power (Waltz 1979: 111). However, offensive realists see the international system as more competitive, so states attempt to *maximize* their *power* under the anarchic international system (Mearsheimer 1994; 2001). Compared to Waltzian explanations and Offensive Realism, Defensive Realists are more interested in context, so they believe cooperation is also possible as much as competition (Jervis 1978).

A *security dilemma* is established due to the relationship with potential adversaries. If states care about their adversaries' insecurities, they can reduce own insecurities. Thus, the key point for defensive realists is not power, rather *danger* (Waltz 1986). If the extinguishing of danger is pursued by states, there will be "much less room for increasing cooperation" as offensive realists believe (Jervis 1999: 51). When cooperation is possible, a *zero-sum* world perspective is also not expected from defensive realists. This understanding arises from an assumption that *status quo* powers can agree with expansionist powers to reduce conflict and this demand can be replied to positively by expansionist powers, because there is not only conflict of interests, but also a mixture of common and conflicting interests in international politics (Jervis 1999).

While Realism is hugely popular within security studies, it nonetheless has problems in its application. Despite different priorities, the Realist view has a value- and history-free perception that cannot explain change in the system and has a materiality-based structure that cannot adequately explain foreign policy mechanisms (Lynn-Jones

2012). Moreover, Although Liberalism has a relative advantage over Realism in terms of explaining internal security dynamics, it is also based on principles (e.g. integration) that cannot be applied to all regions. What security studies require is a much wider view that can reflect back on these assumptions during the research process.

2.1.2. Liberal Perspective

Liberalism is the other important positivist theory of International Relations. With its *scientific* perspective, it shares some arguments with Realism, however, it also has different assumptions and thereby conclusions. For example, contrary to popular belief, Liberalism also “identifies states as the most important actors” (Morgan, 2013). Unlike Realism, Liberalism focuses upon states’ relationships with domestic and transnational dynamics to explain state behaviours. However, Liberals time-free explanation of these dynamics also entails a structural explanation, as in Realism, because temporal change in societal and transnational dynamics are ignored. This aspect of Liberalism, in which the state is seen as the most important actor, is criticised by Critical Security Theorists (Devetak 2005, Bilgin 2008). According to them, states are not the ends of security policy and they should be de-centred in scholarly studies as well as in policy practice (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010). For Liberalists, besides the importance of states, there are also other factors which affect foreign policies, which are international governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations within the international system, elites and other domestic actors within domestic systems. Through this interaction, contrary to Realism, Liberalism believes in an *inside-out* approach to security. Thus, Liberalists put forward political, economic and social factors as important in affecting the international system and they have a more optimistic view about cooperation and integration that contrasts with the power-based perceptions of Realism. Mutual gains, rather than rational self-interest, can order the international system.

Liberalism forwards four types of interpretation, which are “commercial or economic liberalism”, “human rights liberalism”,

“international organization or institutions liberalism” and “democratic liberalism” (Morgan 2013: 30). *Commercial or economic liberalism* normatively supports free-trade ideas and believes that capitalism can bring wealth and higher living standards. This belief is optimistic regarding the potential for cooperation. Human rights liberalism asserts the significance of international human rights norms in supporting cooperation. *International organization or institutions liberalism* tries to solve security problems with organizations or regimes. Institutional Liberals believe that states can cede much of their sovereignty to a central authority to create a more secure international system. Contrary to institutional liberalism, Realists believe that states establish organizations to help themselves in reaching goals (Jervis 1999: 54). Whereas Realists believe that states stand alone, Liberals believe that states act together. Thus, unlike Realists, Institutional Liberals emphasize “interdependence” (Keohane and Nye 1977). If states cede their sovereignty to international authority, it can be said that they are not rigid about sovereignty and authority (Morgan 2013: 34). The last belief of Liberalism, that democracy brings peace, stems from *democratic liberalism*. This idea’s basis relies on the philosophical arguments of Kant (Navari 2008). According to this idea, if every country has become a democracy, there would not be not war.

Compared to other forms of security studies, Liberalism has a distinct advantage. Liberalism is not just a theory, rather it also reflects ideas and practice. However, strong criticisms against liberalism emerge from this point. Even though the problem of separation of theory and practice are discussed below, we need to know the potential contradictions of Liberalism now. For example, there is an inherent contradiction when some countries (e.g. China, Russia) violate human rights or do not implement democratic rules but have also totally adopted the current global economic market, a situation tacitly accepted by democratic countries. The other criticism relates to Western norms. As mentioned above, a belief in the necessity of spreading democracy and other liberal norms to the whole world

belongs to Western philosophy. Pressure on non-Western countries to accept Western norms can and does lead to a backlash.

2.2. Definitions, Concepts and Perspectives of Energy Security

What then do these different IR perspectives mean for studying energy security? Energy security is a huge discussion topic in IR, because there are so many perceptions (Luft and Korin 2009a). For some scholars (for example, Cao and Bluth 2013), it is a topic of national security, whereas others (Manning 2000) see it as belonging to the market. Besides this discussion, some believe (Mulligan 2010) that energy is a material good which is provided by nature, thereby the environment. However, in the existing literature, the meaning of energy security generally depends on a market perspective.

The market perspective is evident in many studies, with importer-exporter and temporal approaches significant. When energy security is defined “as the availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufficient quantities, and at reasonable and/or affordable prices” by the Clingendael International Energy Programme (2004: 37), it is seen as meaning reliable supplies at reasonable prices for the economy and industry, a feature shared by Dorian et al. (2006). Thus, sufficient quantities and affordable prices are the key factors in energy security, according to the existing literature. Classical energy security definitions are grounded in the 1973 Oil Crisis and the 1980s-1990s neoliberal dominancy. However, these definitions are seen as market based. From these definitions, one perspective that can be inferred is that they generally look at security from an importing countries’ perspective. Although the majority of the literature reflects an importer/developed countries perspective, the definition of energy security also logically depends on exporter countries (Vivoda 2009b; Goldthau and Sovacool 2012). Also, the importance of transit routes cannot be ignored in the energy security definition (Luft and Korin 2009a). However, besides such theoretical and spatial approaches,

temporal perceptions should not be forgotten (Stringer 2008; Cherp and Jewell 2014). For example, the oil price fluctuations, which began in the 1970s, the Gulf War of the 1990s, the Iraq War, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the global economic crisis of the new millennium and Covid-19, have had a huge effect on energy security perceptions at different points in time.

Besides these theoretical, temporal and spatial effects, there are also socio-cultural and socio-political aspects to defining energy security (Chevalier 2006). For example, Yao and Chang (2014) believe that governments consider social and cultural factors in energy policy decision-making. Thus, governance has become more important than before and democracy's effects also should not be ignored, because governments do not only try to serve their nations, but also serve their political parties. Governments sometimes ignore energy security or environmental security for supporting their position or using an environmental concern rhetoric to serve their political parties. What we have after these effects is a situation where energy security generates different perceptions from different scholars. For Stringer (2008: 123), it means energy supply infrastructure for the global economy, but also includes "military, diplomatic, informational and economic" elements. On the other hand, Kiriya and Kajikawa (2014: 415) categorize energy security into four perspectives, which are "geopolitical, economic, policy related and technology". Thus, energy security is not only perceived as involving military and national security or the economy, it can also include environmental and geopolitical perspectives. It therefore depends on which elements of the energy security dimension or dimensions is/are chosen by the definer. The literature on energy security can consequently be classified under four titles: theoretical; spatial; temporal; and socio-cultural and socio-political works (see Table 2.1).

Theoretical	Spatial	Temporal	Socio-Cultural and Socio-Political
National Security	Exporters	Chronologic	Government Effect
Market	Importers		Material factors (Military, Economic, technology)
Environmental	Transport Routes		Non-Material factors (Diplomatic, informational, policy related)

Table 2.1: *Different approaches to energy security*

In general, energy security relates to different types of dimensions and includes different components. It is difficult to separate them, and also context dependency should not be forgotten. In this study, energy security will be discussed in terms of foreign policy conceptions. Foreign policy analysis will privilege all these factors. However, in order to analyse it, initially energy should be defined within the security concept. Is energy an object of security or a subject of security or both? If it is an object, it will be exposed to security threats. If not, it will be a generator of security threats (Johansson 2013a; 2013b). As Johansson's (2013a: 599; 2013b: 200) classification shows, energy is an object under "security of supply" and "security of demand" sides, but it is a subject under "economic & political risk factors", "technological risk factors" and "environmental risk factors". Beyond

the energy-security nexus, Cherp and Jewell (2014: 416) evaluate energy security using Baldwin's (1997) three questions "security for whom, security for which values and from what threats", when Von Hippel et al. (2011: 6719) asks "what to protect, what risks to be protected from and how to protect" questions which are forwarded by Tanaka (1997). Similarly, Leung et al. (2014: 317) evaluate energy security along with "what to protect, from what risks and by what means" questions.

In concluding this section, energy's relationship with security and also energy security dimensions and perceptions have been given, along with their categories. Which dimensions are prioritized in this literature will now be discussed according to different theoretical perspectives.

2.2.1. Realist Perspectives

As mentioned above, Realists believe that states pursue power out of self-interest under conditions of international anarchy. Although different types of Realism think differently regarding some areas, they share some points which are the importance of power, the importance of the state as a unitary and rational actor and the importance of the anarchic international system (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). Thus, they do not entirely ignore the economy, energy or institutional actors, because they believe that states pursue power. These types of materials and factors (economy, energy, or institutional actors) serve states in gaining more power. States use them only for their own benefits (Hancock and Vivoda 2014). Because of this self-interest, there are consequently different types of Realist explanations for energy security that evaluate how states approach it, namely: *corporations; markets; and conflicts*.

The first explanation focuses on corporations. Due to global neo-mercantilism/resource mercantilism, which involves state-sanctioned capital relations, NOCs have gained much more power in recent decades (Raphael and Stokes 2015). However, although some importer countries (e.g. China, India) follow these policies, exporter countries support this strategic policy more than importers. Thus, neo-

mercantilism has spread to whole regions of the world. We can find this in some periods of history (Correljé and Linde 2006; Hancock and Vivoda 2014). For example, Hancock and Vivoda (2014: 1) argue that some years were conflictual (1970s-1980s) and NOCs were dominant, but some periods were more cooperative (late 1980s-1990s). On the other hand, Correljé and Linde (2006: 532) believe that the current international system depends on post-1945 tenets, and they refer to it as *Markets and Institutions*. However, historical events (e.g. Iraq War, 9/11) have forced states to respond to the international system. Institutions and Markets have become more unreliable. Some states started to change their policies according to *Regions and Empire* (Correljé and van der Linde 2006: 536-537). Under the Regions and Empire approach, importer states are trying to solve supply disruptions, according to their policies, while exporter states are trying to follow bilateral agreements by which they can get more gains. Qinhu (2007) also supports this argument about exporters, believing that under the current international system, international organizations and International Oil Companies (IOCs) belong to Western countries, which are the main rule-makers. When exporters want to change this order, conflict or competition can start between importers and exporters.

The second explanation is related to the first one. Although Realists do not ignore market power, they do not trust it either (Klare 2009a; Luft and Korin 2009b), because nearly 80 per cent of the world's oil reserves are controlled by government owned companies (ibid.). Even though the market provides benefits much greater than conflict, it is not available in every instance: "In some cases, the materials at stake will be viewed as so essential to national survival or economic well-being that compromise is unthinkable" (Klare 2002: 23). Furthermore, a global market can lead to conflict with some resources more valuable and states can become more conflictual (Klare 2002). Klare (2009a) continues his arguments about the market using the US case. Even though markets can be trustworthy, the US, it is argued, should protect its overseas oil delivery lines with military force. Conflicts in

the world cannot be ignored and decisions should be made according to them.

Thirdly, Realists see the international system as conflictual and some regions which are specifically oil producing are considered more unstable (Cheon and Urpelainen 2015). Besides the danger of competition between states, conflicts are making the international oil system more dangerous. In this view, states use and should use more military force, because the problem is not about security, but is about degrees of insecurity. Insecurity is seen on land and at sea, because localized insurgency, separatist warfare, regional conflict and potential power wars increase degrees of insecurity (Klare 2009b). Thus, the problem not only involves oil producer countries. Transit lines are also important. The Strait of Malacca in South East Asia is a good example because it includes terrorist attacks, competition between states and geographic obstacles (Ziegler 2006). If states increase their military force, it will not only protect their demands, it will also affect future perceptions. Klare (2009b) believes that if all states increase their military power, they will try to avoid wars because of fear of attack from others, i.e. mutually assured destruction. Thus, Realists see energy security as a national security issue. National security is a key point for foreign policy decisions according to Realists and they see oil security policies as related to foreign policies. For example, the US “not only safeguards oil transport routes and oil producing regimes, but also contributes to political goals” in the Middle East (Metcalf 2013: 18-19). This position contrasts with Liberal views of energy security (see below).

Derived from a security perspective, Realist Energy Security (Klare 2009a; Klare 2009b; Luft and Korin 2009b) sees three important factors, which are corporations, markets and conflicts, contributing to energy security. As with Liberal Energy Security, which is shown below, their key terms and arguments are credible, but in their specific context. For example, there was conflictual context before and after 73 crisis which the 1980s-1990s had a market based situation which was parallel to the wider neo-liberal wave. Liberal and Realist Energy

security cannot explain more general time and space dimensions. Conflicts are a reality of our world, and there are some results which arise from conflicts like economic and political uncertainties, and decisions which are caused by these uncertainties. These uncertainties lead to more protective policies such as mercantilist understanding of corporations and acting without trust of the market. However, this only provides a picture of one moment in time. States' foreign policies can lead to more conflictual world politics, and then these states can be affected by events which are actually being influenced by states. Thus, we believe that there is reciprocal causality in world politics, not looking at it from one point. The 1973 Oil crisis and Iraq War can be given as examples of this view. Besides reciprocity in world politics, there are also more general (i.e. spatially and temporarily) sources which will be mentioned below like the structure of world politics. As a problem-solving theory, the current realist perspective is able to see the realities of our world, but it is not plausibly able to explain the motivations for these realities. Thus, realists are limited by their perceptions.

2.2.2. Liberal Perspectives

Liberals generally focus on economic dimensions, or factors that affect the foreign policy decisions of states and elements which relate to economic dimensions. Their perceptions of energy security are influenced by assumptions which are related to these three effects (dimensions, factors and elements). There are three key points informing Liberal perceptions of energy security, which are a *belief in markets and capitalism, interdependency* and the *activity of non-state actors*.

The first point relates to a belief in markets and capitalism. Liberals believe that there is a global energy market, which shapes global energy security (Luft and Korin 2009b). Under market conditions, states act rationally and they only follow the maximization of their profits. Trade is a better option than inter-state competition and it is difficult to see a mercantilist energy market (Fettweis 2009). Thus, they believe that market conditions are more optimal than Realist

beliefs which support resource mercantilism or neo-mercantilism. States which do not follow mercantilist policies accept free-market capitalism and want only stable global conditions. Even though these basic arguments are shared by Liberals, there are differing interpretations about the role of markets. Questions arising from this point are '*What is the market?*' and '*How is it shaping state decisions?*'.

According to Chester (2010: 891), there are two competing market paradigms which are "the pure Walrasian market" and "the market which is a social, political and historical construct". The first variant is "assumed to clear automatically via price adjustments", when the second of them is the "fruit of complex social and historical developments" (Chester 2010: 892). According to Chester (2010), both market definitions argue that the state has no active role in the market. However, the other argument about market order does not ignore state or government effects. Thus, some scholars (Helm 2002; Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007) believe that states should intervene in the market. Helm (2002) thinks that although there is an international energy market, it is complex because of government interventions. States intervene with four different strategies, which are "tax revenues", "broad industrial and social objectives", "on environmental grounds" and "security-of-supply reasons" (Helm 2002: 174). On the other hand, Verrastro and Ladislaw (2007) think that energy has a very important position in national and global economies, and that states which are importers and exporters try to change market dynamics according to their profits. Resource nationalism is therefore accepted under market conditions. However, Liberal scholars (Helm 2002; Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007) totally disagree with Realist arguments and they (Helm 2002; Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007) believe that current conditions should be changed. Consequently, two different explanations of the state-government relationship are established. Beyond whole market definitions, Fuerth (2005) and Yergin (2005) see any challenges to the market as equal to any challenges to the US. Thus, Fuerth (2005) and Yergin (2005)

associate the market with US hegemony. This is the other main liberal perspective on the market.

The second key point made by Liberals is highly related to market beliefs concerning interdependency. According to Liberals there is an interdependency condition under market order (Yergin 2006; Verrastro and Ladislav 2007). There are two characteristics of states which are as producer and consumer. How much one side wants to buy energy resources, the other side wants to sell its energy resources just as much. Security of supply is as important as security of demand. Thus, there is “a mutual interdependency” between suppliers and demanders (Verrastro and Ladislav 2007: 98). Although this perspective can be accepted from importer/developed countries, it cares about both sides of states (i.e. importer and exporter). The key point from this argument is that it opposes Realist arguments. Realists believe in, as is mentioned above, the existence of mercantilism. The next step of mercantilism is energy independence (Luft 2009; Samuelson 2011). Existence of security threats is a reality, and states should solve their insecurity conditions according to a Realist perspective. They generally quote from US President Nixon’s and then Carter’s energy independence emphasis that aims at freeing the flow of oil from foreign sources of supply to the US (Klare 2009a, 2009b; Luft 2009; Metcalf 2013). Liberals however do not accept energy independence, because the market in their view is self-ordering (Yergin 2005; Verrastro and Ladislav 2007). If there is a supply disruption, it cannot be a self-reliant, because there is not a zero-sum game between importers and exporters (Černoch and Jirušek 2014), and problems can be solved only with cooperation. In justifying this position they (Verrastro and Ladislav 2007: 99) argue that “of 193 countries in the world, none are energy independent”, providing a counter to Realists claims.

Thirdly, although Liberals agree with Realists’ arguments on states as unitary actors, they also privilege non-state actors such as institutions in the global economic order, multinational corporations, civil society groups, governmental players and individuals (Hancock and Vivoda

2014). Due to the lack of a global governance system, these actors define the global energy security system. The target of institutions and corporations is therefore providing a more secure global system without war, and domestic actors act rationally according to this idea. Thus, cross-national variations cannot be explained with a state-centric perspective (Hughes and Lipsky 2013). Leung et al. (2014) analyse China's energy policies and its roots. According to them (2014), there is an interplay reinforcing the relationship between issues, ideas and institutions to focus on oil security policies. There is a complex energy security system set up to maintain Chinese oil policies. Thus, national and trans-local dynamics, and rational and ideational perceptions exist.

Institutional dynamics are also considered important by Liberals. Helm (2002), in contrast, emphasises the importance and domination of oil companies. Besides the economic benefits of their dominance, there are also costs associated with these companies. According to him (2002: 176) "these companies are often vertically integrated, with the resulting incentives to discriminate between their own customers and those of rival suppliers". Powerful companies are therefore a threat to both their customers and their rivals. This situation damages the market approach and in his view the market needs to be re-balanced as a result (Helm 2002: 177). To explain the importance of institutions, Yergin (2006) discusses the IEA and why it was set up. He (2006: 75) believes that the IEA was established by industrialized countries to defend themselves against the exporters' *oil weapon* strategy. In this argument, the oil weapon means oil exporter countries using oil prices as a weapon against importers. More specifically, whenever exporters want to, they can stop or reduce oil production. Thus, they can affect oil prices suddenly and limit importers' decisions about oil imports and other foreign policy decisions such as the 1973 oil crisis. Regarding this point, the questions that arise include: *Why were the IEA and OPEC set up?*; and *Are institutions set up to support national power?*.

Contrary to Realist Energy Security's three arguments, which are corporations, markets and conflicts, Liberal Energy Security therefore

asserts three main assumptions: belief in markets and capitalism; interdependency; and the activity of non-state actors. Liberals believe in the market's self-ordering structure is significant. States want to act under the market conditions in order to maximise their own profits. Both sides' (Realists and Liberals) arguments could be seen as valid. Also Liberals' market explanations should be used. Whether Yergin (2005) and Fuerth (2005) support US hegemony with a liberal market perspective or not, current liberal market conditions should not only evaluate with mercantilist policies, rather also US hegemony, its effects on mercantilist policies and how US hegemony is affected by these mercantilist policies. Moreover, although there is no independence in energy policy (i.e. a Liberal argument), some states are trying to get more independence in energy thereby foreign policies such as US (a Realist argument). How interdependence is structured and its potential effects on independence targets should be assessed. Lastly, although both sides accept the state as a unitary actor, Liberals also assert non-state actors like institutions (e.g. NOCs) in contrast to Realists' structure-based explanations. Both sides' perceptions are therefore valuable and moreover should be used. However, as argued in this thesis, only a critical perspective that adopts a holistic view can comprehend these assumptions without prioritizing any of them.

2.2.3. The Alternative Approach and Climate Change

Geopolitical (Realist) and Market (Liberal) approaches' arguments about energy security are outlined above. As mentioned, they constitute the principal arguments on energy security in the IR literature. Whereas Realists assert their arguments with a pessimistic view, Liberals believe in more optimistic global conditions. Both sides' positivistic approach leads to them more material- and state-centred approaches while Liberals also consider non-state actors. Although their arguments cannot be denied easily, because their arguments seem coherent theoretically and supported by examples, whether some areas are covered by both sides' arguments is a moot point. The key point is the degree to which these arguments reflect the whole of reality. The explanatory scope of theoretical explanations is also

important. Rather than taking a snapshot of energy security at specific points in time and space, we care about the temporal evolution of these dimensions.

Because of this, there are two more additional approaches to energy security which could be labelled as the “Alternative Approach” and “Climate Change” perspectives that aim to fill in the blanks left in the literature. These two approaches either use a material- or norm- and state-centred approach. Both approaches will be described under the same title because their arguments relate to geopolitical and market approaches. Although they are presenting new arguments, we can see the influence of geopolitical and/or market approaches.

Youngs (2007) and Tunsjø (2010) present alternative approaches to the first two theories. They (Youngs 2007; Tunsjø 2010) accept geopolitical and market approaches and try to synthesise them into one theory. Tunsjø (2010) does this by accepting the key terms of both sides. For example, it is argued that there is a totally competitive energy market because of the existence of a zero-sum game and states should cooperate under this system. States can reduce market risks with cooperation which includes “hedging and risk management” (Tunsjø 2010: 28). Hedging is given, because the percentage of government based oil companies are not ignored. Diversification is the best option for hedging, because states encompass tools that are finance, politics, military, and diplomacy (Tunsjø 2010: 31). Youngs (2007) stresses the necessity of the market-government nexus. He (2007) evaluates his theory using the EU-Russia relationship. There is a market based rhetoric that belongs to the EU governance system. After Russia’s rejection of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the EU has tried to apply market principles to Russia. Thus, Russia wanted to participate in the global market system and accepted it. Whereas the EU tried to impose its values on Russia, both sides agree on the benefits. While the EU spread its values to another state, Russia benefitted from trade with the EU. As an economic and an energy sector, both sides received gains from trade and mutual dependency. Despite their initial good relationship, framed by dialogues and

agreements starting after 2000, the reality of the market system was far from what is seen: the period thereafter was characterized by conflict when Russia ceased supplying EU states in the Ukraine gas crisis. Producer countries therefore follow norm-based foreign policy to a point. However, that said, EU-Russia energy trade is still continuing. Thus, there is not a balance between the EU's internal and external dimensions nor between market and strategic approaches in the world. To provide balance, "*conjoining* markets and politics" is therefore necessary (Youngs 2007: 15).

Environmental concerns started in the 1960s; however, its consideration in IR, and thereby energy security, only began at the start of the new millennium (Collins 2013). Politics or economics were important in the Cold War or Post-Cold War dynamics until the millennium; however, after that time a new global order has presented new problems. Besides expanding consumption, increasing environmental concerns place energy security within this wider debate (Stringer 2008). Environmental concerns are accepted as a third dimension of energy security, along with market and geopolitical concerns (Victor and Yueh 2009; Ciută 2010). These explanations generally depend on a norm-based perspective. Because of that, they do not totally disagree with Realist and Liberal explanations, but ask the "why" question as an additional critique. Although Ciută (2010) does not focus on environmental problems, he utilises norm-based approaches in examining energy security. He (2010) believes that any problem can exist only under its context. It means that every situation is located under its conditions. Thus, it should not be mixed with other conditions. If there is a problem in the market, it is on the market and not in energy security. And also, under market conditions, competition for energy resources cannot be ignored. Every competition and cooperation should be evaluated according to its context. When in some contexts energy is an object, in other contexts energy is a subject for energy security. Thus, the 'right' concept of energy security appears a normative rather than an analytical choice' (Ciută 2010: 129).

Kuzemko and Bradshaw (2013) evaluate a normative energy security approach for environmental concerns. According to them (2013), there was a dominance of neo-liberal ideas in the West in the 1980s-1990s. Environmental concern was one of them. However, environmental concern has now fallen behind other liberal thoughts. Economics was seen as more important than the environment and the market was blamed for ignoring this point (Kuzemko 2013). On the other hand, when the Western media emphasised energy independence between 2001 and 2006, a strategy now pursued by non-Western states (Bordoff et al. 2010). When geopolitical competition has increased between Western and non-Western countries after the mid-2000s, environmental concerns have also found themselves increasingly discussed as part of energy security. Thus, at the same time climate change, geopolitical and market factors are seen as significant (Kuzemko 2013). The problem is that under *us* and *them* perspectives, how can the climate change problem be solved? The answer is important, because environmental problems can be only solved by cooperation between countries.

The other important point about energy security and environmental concerns is the contradiction between them (Mulligan 2010; Bordoff et al. 2010; Froggatt et al. 2013). If fossil fuels are consumed, climate change problems increase, meaning ensuring energy security can lead to environmental impacts. Thus, although climate change is seen as outside of energy security problems, it is highly connected with it. Only renewable energy solutions can solve the contradiction between energy security and climate change (Froggatt et al. 2013), but renewable energy is expensive due to infrastructure costs. Although there is now a positive trend in terms of renewable energy investment and consumption, oil is still more profitable for investors and thereby preferable for consumers. What the shale revolution has done in the US has had massive effects relative to renewable energy investments and policies such as the EPC Act and EISA. Renewable energy has helped to reduce gasoline prices, but the shale revolution has made the US a game changer. The costs of energy are increasing, if

environmental concerns are accounted for in energy pricing policies. Thus, the problem is about quantity of energy consumed and its effect on the environment. There is not any direct relationship between environmental concerns and oil diversification in the literature. Oil diversification can lead to consuming more energy, thereby affecting the environment, so motivations for oil diversification is affected by environmental concerns indirectly.

After our Realist and Liberal energy security interpretations, Youngs` (2007) and Tunsjø`s (2010) arguments might be easily understood, because they are only synthesising Realist and Liberal arguments. However, the same critiques still exist. In response, we do not only combine both sides (i.e. realist and liberal) arguments, we also try to look at behind the scene. At that point, Ciută`s (2010) condition based explanation is closed to us, however, his explanation is based on a normative choice. However, historical-dialectical view that considers ideas-materials continual transition can put the context in a historical line. The same arguments might militate against Kuzemko and Bradshaw (2013). We believe that normative elements are triggered by material realities and they are affecting these material realities. It is argued that there are more than one structural dynamic and more than one agent interests. Thus, what we believe that alternative approaches only partially fill the gaps in realist-liberal explanations, therefore we need to look beyond positivist theory.

2.3. Oil, Oil Diversification and Motivations of Oil Diversification

An important signifier of energy security is oil security, since it is the most important energy source globally and there are many concerns over access to oil and hence interest in oil diversification. Because of these reasons, the importance of oil and the oil diversification literature will be given in this section.

Since the First and Second World Wars, oil has assumed a key position in IR. Its importance has expanded to a position where it

affects all sectors of life. Despite oil's importance now decreasing because of other energy resources such as shale gas and renewables, it is still the most important energy resource. Transportation still depends on oil (Cao and Bluth 2013) and it is relatively cheap to use and to transport compared with other fuels. However, although some threats such as terrorism and conflict jeopardise the security of supply, states cannot give up oil usage due to its economic benefits. These benefits cannot be ignored, because any oil price fluctuations affect almost everything (e.g. food, furniture, governments' re-election chances). Owing to its huge importance, Vivoda (2008: 10) characterises "the international [oil] market as a `politicised` market", because governments want to interfere in this market. Thus, the "world will not *run out of oil* for both technical and policy reasons" (Dorian et al. 2006: 1990) and it is not surprising to see oil security as an energy security issue (Dirks 2006; Vivoda 2010).

As mentioned above, although there are different interpretations of energy security dimensions, the current literature identifies four key dimensions which are "economic, geopolitical, environmental, and military and national security" (Wu 2014: 5) or "geological, economic, socio-political and environmental" (Sovacool 2011: 7472). Any challenge to these four dimensions affects energy security or security in the case of oil. Oil is a commodity. It follows that oil prices are the most important symbol of oil security. When oil prices are affected by oil/energy security, they also affect energy security. This feature has been visible since the 1973 Oil crisis. Since that time, oil price fluctuations have always been evident. To escape from price fluctuations and other security factors mentioned above, states are trying to establish more secure oil imports. Diversification is seen as the most important policy to ensure energy security (Yergin 2006; Stringer 2008; Cao and Bluth 2013; Kiriya and Kajikawa 2014). Most scholars believe Churchill's idea is still valid in that "Safety and certainty in oil lie on variety and variety alone" (Kalicki 2007: 79; Stringer 2008: 127). Before explaining the motivations for oil diversification (to address the why question), as a beginning we need

to understand what diversification is and how countries can diversify oil supplies.

General definitions of diversification refer to importing any source from different countries (Cohen et al. 2011). However, some scholars understand diversification as diversifying different sources and suppliers (Bahgat 2006; Kalicki 2007; Stringer 2008). Besides the different sources and suppliers explanation, there are also other explanations that include other factors. For example, Rosner (2009) sees diversification as availability for supplier countries, transport routes and energy sources in the case of EU imports. In the same case (i.e. EU), Chevalier (2006) also uses three areas of diversification including technologies, primary sources and geographical diversity of imports. Ang et al. (2015) identify source, spatial, energy mix, technology and transport route diversification. Highly connected with these arguments, Dirks (2006) notes alternative fuels, technology, sources of energy imports, product imports, energy import contracts and market participants. As areas of diversification besides the diversification of energy policies on conventional fossil fuels, Cohen (2007: 1) expands the meaning of the energy mix to non-traditional oil sources “such as oil sands, oil shale, deep off-shore oil, and heavy crude oil”.

An economic perspective asserts that importer countries can reduce their vulnerability to price fluctuations and to exporter countries' potential *oil as a weapon policy* with diversification (Kalicki 2007). However, this perspective is criticised by others (Nivola and Carter 2010). Counter-arguments assert that the oil market is global, not regional like the gas market, because oil can be transported easily and more cheap. Therefore, any dramatic events (human or naturally inspired) anywhere can affect oil prices in the world. There is no door to escape from fluctuations in oil prices. However, although importer countries cannot escape from oil price fluctuations, they can reduce vulnerability to supply disruptions (Ang et al. 2015). Thus, we have passed to a geopolitical perspective. The other important argument concerns military security. Oil rich countries and oil transport routes

are generally associated with unstable regimes (Stringer 2008). To reduce vulnerability to disruptions caused by events, importer countries are trying to expand their import sources. These disruptions can happen because of human activities (e.g. terrorist attacks, Gulf Crisis) and natural events (e.g. 2005 Hurricane Katrina).

Besides economic and geopolitical factors, some studies focus on systemic and non-systemic risks (Lesbirel 2004; Vivoda 2009a). Lesbirel (2004: 10) explains systematic and specific risks. Systematic risk is a non-diversifiable risk. Thus, any events involving systemic risk affect the whole market. Specific risks, which are diversifiable risks, are more unique or specific. Lesbirel (2004) attributes economic factors to the systemic side and political factors to the specific side. On the other hand, Vivoda (2009a) emphasises the context dependency of diversification and gives indicators of oil import diversification in the cases of the US, China and Japan. There are two features identified, which are country specific and systemic types. Country specific types are “oil import dependence ratio”, “total oil imports”, “change in total oil imports”, “Middle East oil import ratio”, “non-regional oil import ratio”, “total oil stocks”, “vulnerability perception” and “past experience”, while systemic types are “instability in major supply disruptions”, “non-market strategies” and “exporter concentration” (Vivoda 2009a: 4618). He (2009a: 4620) then gives the limitations of oil import diversification which are “geography”, “political relationship”, “availability of oil and transportation infrastructure”, “refining capacity”, “policy” and “resources”.

In this study, oil diversification is accepted as a diversification of suppliers. Thus, diversification is defined in its spatial context. US oil diversification is analysed from both economics and political factors and both systemic and specific risks and implications, to uncover patterns of the motivations for diversification.

2.4. US Oil Diversification

US oil diversification policy is a topic of oil security, thereby energy security. To understand more clearly what the US oil diversification motivations are, US energy security perceptions should initially be considered. Sovacool and Brown (2010) assert that energy security is defined by the definers which are generally engineers, economists, consumers/users, producers and politicians. However, the main energy security conception includes three pillars which are related to national styles, geology and geography (Sovacool and Brown 2010: 80). These three pillars are evident in US energy security and four main outcomes arise which are “availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices, protecting Middle East suppliers and shipping lanes against piracy and attack, maintaining a SPR, and reducing physical threats to energy infrastructure” (Sovacool and Brown 2010: 80). On the other hand, the US Chamber of Commerce (UCC) (2016: 29) proposes four main sub-indexes to analyse US energy security risk which are geopolitical, economic, reliability and environmental. Because of their relations with foreign policy, the first two factors have 30% importance, whereas the others have 20% importance in terms of energy security risk (ibid.). Lastly, Salameh (2003: 135) believes that four main themes direct US energy security policies, which are diversity of the fuel mix (e.g. oil, natural gas, nuclear power), diversity in the geographic origin of energy, conservation and energy efficiency and managing growing dependence on oil imports.

The main pillars, which are given above, show us the main points of US energy security. As can be determined easily, the last source (Salameh 2003) presents more practical arguments. These arguments include one more perception of oil in terms of its importance. In 2016, 37% of US energy consumption was petroleum which includes crude oil and natural gas plant liquids (EIA 2017). Moreover, crude oil is the largest source of US energy imports (CIA World Factbook 2019). Because of the importance of oil diversification policies, we need to find indicators which represent the importance of oil import diversification. Vivoda (2009a: 4618) asserts four systemic and seven specific (country) types of indicators. Specific indicators are “oil import dependence ratio, total imports, change in total oil

imports, Middle East oil import ratio, Total Oil Stocks, Vulnerability perception and Past experience” (Vivoda 2009a: 4618). Vivoda (2009a) believes that after analysing US oil quantitative indicators, successful US diversification policies can be easily identified. However, the main motivations of US oil diversification are evaluated qualitatively in this research. In the literature, the motivations of US oil diversification policies are based upon four main factors which: are *energy independent policy*; *oil’s relation with foreign policy*; *avoiding shortages*; and *duality of transnational and national (i.e. US) interests*.

The first argument asserts the importance of oil independence targets in US oil policies. Dependence on Middle East oil was first discussed in the US after the 1973 Oil Crisis. In this event, the US supported Israel in the Arab-Israeli war and OPEC then raised oil prices for US exports in retaliation. This event then precipitated the oil crisis and recession in the USA. In 1974, President Richard Nixon announced the danger of dependency on any one country for energy imports (Nixon, 1974). Then in 1977, President Jimmy Carter made energy independence the central ambition of his presidency. Dependence on foreign oil was defined as a danger for US national security (Carter, 1980). An oil independence target was then defined by the George W. Bush administration. The target was replacing the huge amount of oil imported by the USA from the Middle East with domestic production (Bush, 2006). This process affected the definition of energy independence used in relation to the USA. Sovacool (2007: 5506) therefore defines `energy independence` in this context as “ending all oil imports, eliminating imports only from the Middle East, merely reducing dependence on foreign imports, and entirely weaning the country of oil”. Using this argument, the Middle East is seen as a danger because of its control of oil and its countries` relationship with the US (Andrews 2005). This relationship is argued to be based on conflict and hostility.

The basic emphasis in this argument is based on where the oil import derives from. The target actually is not diversifying the suppliers, rather it is seeking to reduce reliance on the Middle East. However,

there are two different disagreements with this idea. One of them is from an oil price perspective. This view asserts that oil is fungible (Brown and Huntington 2015; Crane et al. 2009). In short, this term means that oil has a global market and any incident anywhere will affect global oil prices, because world oil prices move together (Brown and Huntington 2015: 10). Thus, a state cannot insulate itself from oil price effects. There is no independence. It can be deduced that this side sees diversification policy as infeasible (Brown and Huntington 2015; Crane et al. 2009). The second counter argument separates dependency and vulnerability (Salameh 2003 and UCC 2016). If the importer state diversifies its oil suppliers, although it cannot reduce its dependency, it will reduce its vulnerability. In this view, the US should act to prevent using oil as a political weapon by OPEC which is what happened in the 1973 crisis. There is a global oil market and it can only be sustained with `interdependence` rather than an `independence` target, as the latter is unrealistic. Thus, the second view is closer to diversification policies than the first and its argument illustrates the relationship between diversification policies and foreign policy.

The second argument is related to diversification`s importance for foreign policy. At this point, it is seen in the context of two basic arguments which are derived from liberalist and realist perspectives. The liberal side emphasises an interdependency and optimistic perspective based on cooperation between states. A CNA Report (2009) asserts that there is an interdependent oil market. Under this system, the US cannot be truly independent of anything in terms of energy matters (CNA 2009: 2). The US should therefore act according to what the system requires. Diversification policies rely on the reciprocal relationship between exporters and importers. Both sides need each other. If the state wants to diversify its suppliers, it should have a good relationship with other countries. Thus, this perspective sees that diversification policies shape foreign policy, because they have a trigger effect. Rutledge (2005) exemplifies this argument with US foreign policies on Central Asia. While the US increases its imports

from Central Asia, it can also improve its friendly relationship with ex-Soviet Union countries. Foreign policy then becomes an output of diversification policy.

On the other hand, the Realist perspective sees oil and oil diversification policies more as a tool of foreign policy (Klare 2012; Klare 2014b), thereby reversing this relationship. This perspective gives more importance to geopolitics. The US foreign policy targets remind us of the Carter Doctrine, which was proclaimed in 1980, which stated that the United States would use military force if necessary to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf, and its different reflections (Klare 2009a). Klare (2012) argues that the expansion of US military power can be supported with diversification policies. Along with the diversification policies, the US would have more allies and trading partners and it can easily expand its military capacity to protect them. George W. Bush's (2002) affirmation is shown as an example to emphasize on the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia and the Caspian region. Klare (2014b) continues this line of argumentation to evaluate the Obama administration's actions on the KXL project, because for him "Obama's principal international objectives were to withdraw from ground wars in the Middle East and refurbish the US image abroad". Here, arguments on green technology and the environment were used as justifications for oil diversification. However, Klare (2014b) cares more about energy independence rather than the American image. When the KXL was withdrawn, US reliance on Middle East oil increases. However, the US can push severe sanctions on Iran, when it has less reliance on Middle Eastern oil.

The third argument made relates to shortages of global oil supplies, which include terrorist attacks, storms, accidents, blackouts, wars and surges. At this point, we see once again the US turning away from the Middle East, but this argument is more about the region's volatile politics and economics rather than the region's huge oil reserves and their potential effects on global oil prices (O'Sullivan 2013). This situation leads to instability, thereby oil import shortages. To improve

energy security, using this argument, the US needs to diversify from more risky towards more stable democratic states (Clemente 2015). Besides the volatility of the Middle East, its distance to the US also cannot be ignored. The oil which comes from the Middle East travels “long-haul” and arrives in the US market after several weeks, whereas the oil which comes from Venezuela is “short-haul” and arrives in a few days (Rutledge 2005: 97). However, in terms of supply disruptions, the Middle East and its volatility is not the only problem. There is one more reason to diversify oil import suppliers, namely natural hazards. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf of Mexico brought a new dimension to oil security (Chevalier 2006: 1). Besides the human-resourced obstacles, there is also the huge importance of natural factors. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 show that the US should not only worry about the Persian Gulf, but also the Gulf of Mexico (Yergin 2005). These hurricanes impacted on an energy affected US economy and national security, thereby domestic and foreign policy through supply, price and systems (infrastructure) issues (Chow and Elkind 2005: 147-152). The importance of diversification is the basic element of supply issues, because more than one-third of US oil production was affected by these incidents (Chow and Elkind 2005: 147).

The fourth perspective concerns the relationship between US oil diversification motivations and the contemporary global system. There are two main logics which concern the US: national and transnational, which operate within the US empire system (Stokes 2005; Stokes 2007; Stokes and Raphael 2010). When the US state intervenes or acts in any country, it is not directly for the protection of *American* capital *per se*, but for transnational capital. However, on the other hand, scholars argue that “the USA is the first state among capitalist equals” (Stokes 2005: 228). For example, in the Iraq War case, the US opened up Iraqi oil to the world capitalist system which is led by core capitalist powers and has acquired crucial energy sources via world markets. When looked at energy matters closely, it can be seen that US policymakers see energy security as one of the most

important issues related to foreign and security issues (Stokes and Raphael 2010). Moreover, oil's importance to energy resources means it has a central position. US oil diversification motivations have a strong relationship with the state's global targets. While the US wants to open up the global South's economy to the global economic system, diversification policies have given beneficial support. Whereas the US is trying to diversify imports from the Gulf and establish an American hegemony in other oil rich zones in the South such as West Africa, Central Asia, the Caspian and Latin America, military aid and training programs help to facilitate US policies. These "counter-insurgency" programmes help to stabilize the global South and integrate their oil and economy within a globalising world (Stokes 2007). Thus, diversification of oil, counter-insurgency, US foreign policy and the global economy are interpreted as key factors.

The main literature about US oil diversification motivations have four main standpoints which are: *energy independence; diversification's relation with US foreign policy; oil shortages; and the dual logic of transnational and national (i.e. US) interests*. There are four points which show the gaps in the understanding of US oil diversification motivations in the literature. The first point seen in the arguments is a lack of historical perspective. Only the last argument (i.e. the dual logic of national and transnational interests) is exceptional, because it is set up through comparison of the early internationalization and transnationalisation era. However, even this literature does not intentionally focus on historical context. On the other hand, we accept people as 'historical agents' (see Chapter 4) and we believe a historical view can help us understand how dynamics can have different interactions in different times because of the accumulation of process. States' relationships are changing in this process. The second deficit seen in the literature is that there is no perspective from supplier sides, even in the 'interdependence' defenders. Oil diversification is happening between suppliers and demanders and motivations for oil imports are also manifestly affected by suppliers' behaviours. As discussed in Chapter 4, people and states act not *in*

behaviour rather *through* behaviour. Thus, suppliers of US oil imports' policies and behaviours should also be examined since even 'interdependence' argument defenders (i.e. Liberals) do not examine this. Thirdly, any sources of US oil diversification motivations ignore the domestic effect on US foreign and oil diversification policies. Separation of state and society cannot give an adequate argument of US oil diversification, because there is state-society complexity in the global arena (see Chapter 3). The last deficit is that there is no study which seeks to uncover US oil diversification motivations through comparing different cases. All arguments in this literature are asserted without empirical testing or by employing single cases: a significant challenge to their validity.

2.5. Theorizing Oil Diversification Motivations in the IR Literature

As discussed above, IR theories' interpretations of oil diversification motivations are shaped by their energy security perspectives. However, oil diversification itself is a more specific and detailed topic in the energy security literature, with two main theoretical explanations applied. Here, Realist and Liberal interpretations are evident in the literature but other theories are largely absent (Tunsjø 2010). Also, as mentioned above, an environmental perspective does not readily address the motivations for state oil diversification.

2.5.1. Realist Interpretations

Realism focuses on analysing insecurity conditions in IR and normatively tries to find ways of reducing potential damages for states. However, the dominant literature is interested specifically in the US (Klare 2008a, Luft 2009). Realist oil diversification interpretations are hence similar to their energy security approaches and diversification is seen as one of the most important policies that states can adopt to enhance security (Luft 2009). To interpret oil diversification motivations, the first step for Realists is finding state insecurity motivations, and then solving them. There are three arguments about

state motivations for oil diversification presented by Realists, which are oil's importance in terms of *national security*, *independence security perceptions* and *foreign policy*.

When considering *national security*, oil's position in the global energy system is significant. Population, industrialization and urbanisation are on the rise globally. Thus, global demand for energy is increasing, while oil demands are expanding. Although oil's importance as an import commodity can decrease with the diversification of fuel policies, the transportation sector still depends on oil. Thus, oil demand goes up and oil becomes a strategic asset for ensuring national securities (Klare 2008b). Under the Realist national security argument, reliance on imported oil should be reduced and diversification is seen the best optional policy for achieving this target (Luft and Korin 2009a). Security of oil imports is therefore seen more as a national security issue than one of economic security. In this simple cause-effect solution, diversification of oil increases national security.

Secondly, in the *independence* argument the centre of gravity of world oil production has shifted from North to South but the South has political instabilities such as ethnic extremism and criminal violence (Klare 2008a). A result of the South's instability, the consumer countries' oil imports reflect a national emphasis on increased diversification. Under this Realist logic, countries which import oil from different suppliers and transport routes will not depend on any one specific area due to their diversification policies. Besides supplier and transport route problems, there is one more concern that the Realist perspective cares about, namely terrorism. Robert Ebel observes that militarily "Pipelines are very soft targets" and "They're easy to go after. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out where you can do the most damage, both physical and psychological, with the minimum amount of effort and the minimum chance of being caught" (cited in Vieth and Rubin 2003). Although the dominant literature looks at these threats from the importer country perspective, there is also lessons for exporters. Importer or exporter states cannot trust other states, because the global energy market does not solve the problems of

international anarchy. Here, interdependency cannot solve security problems or reduce security threats or the damages of threats and can increase them. Diversification of oil is an important strategic policy objective for states to decrease oil import disruptions, thereby leading to more independence policies.

The final reason is highly connected with first and second arguments. Owing to oil's importance and political instabilities in the world, Realists argue that oil diversification is employed as a tool of state *foreign policies*. For example, the US is trying to import its oil from multiple regions. The Caspian Sea and West Africa are just two examples. Since the Clinton presidency, the US has given military training and assistance to these regions to provide more stability (Klare 2009b). Diversification, which is necessary for more secure energy policies, has therefore been supported with military agreements because oil rich countries generally have political instabilities. In parallel with its diversification policies, the US sphere of influence consequently increases. On the other hand, China's energy diplomacy policy, which means having a good relationship with oil exporter countries, is another example of how foreign policy is constructed around oil diversification motivations (Qinhua 2007). To ensure a balance of power, China follows energy diplomacy (Qinhua 2007). Thus, not only a hard balance of power but also a soft balance of power is cultivated.

To summarise, oil diversification motivations are interpreted by Realists in terms of national security, an independence security perception and foreign policy. When we synthesise these arguments, we see that oil diversification motivations connect with state foreign policies, because states' foreign policy decisions are affecting and affected by security problems in the world. However, oil diversification motivations cannot just be limited to a state-centric view.

2.5.2. Liberal Interpretations

Although Liberals view energy security more optimistically than Realists, their oil diversification interpretations are less optimistic than

their general energy security perspectives. One reason is that for states, oil diversification motivations depend on negative effects. Oil diversification tries to provide a more secure position either economically or politically. States need to diversify their routes and suppliers because of current or potential supply problems. This policy is seen as the best option to ensure energy security (Yergin 2006). However, the Liberal theoretical approach differs from Realists. There are three perspectives used by them to explain oil diversification motives, which are *economy*, *interdependency* and *foreign policy*.

The first motivation concerns the *economy*. Liberalism tells us much about economic factors and, in turn, that the economy is very important in oil diversification policies. For liberals, energy security can be defined as a “reliable and adequate supply of energy at reasonable price” (Bielecki 2002: 237). Thus, providing an availability and affordability of oil is very important (Yao and Chang 2014) and diversification is necessary to ensure these two aspects. Also, whereas liberals are concerned about economic security, they do not totally forget or ignore supply shortfalls in unstable supplier regions (Yergin 2006). Oil exporter countries and transport routes, particularly in the Middle East, generally exhibit political instabilities and any disruption in these areas affects importer countries. On the other hand, like other commodities, energy has a global market and supply-demand balance in the energy market should always be watched (Bielecki 2002). Whereas global consumption has been expanding from the West to all over the world, it is difficult to provide a market balance. Diversification policies can therefore help to counter importer countries’ vulnerabilities in the market and help to reduce instabilities in the supplier regions. Therefore, according to a Liberal view, diversification can reduce systemic risks (Månsson et al. 2014).

Interdependency is another important aspect of Liberal interpretations of oil diversification. Vulnerability and sensibility are two important terms in the interdependence perspective (Keohane and Nye 1977). Importer countries’ vulnerabilities to market conditions can, it is argued, be solved through diversification. However, not only one side

gains. Diversification needs infrastructure (e.g. technology, Research and Development [R&D]). As importer countries therefore invest in oil exporters, market conditions become more stable (Yergin 2005). Thus, price volatilities can be reduced, alongside other potential shock effects (Helm 2002). This condition is beneficial for exporters because they need infrastructure. Although infrastructure is emphasized, the problem is not about geology, rather, is about politics (Bielecki 2002; Yergin 2005). Political conditions can be solved with political decisions however they are not made by only one side, thereby it should be a cooperative process. Thus, in Liberalism, oil diversification brings together all sides (importer, exporter and transport countries) to cooperatively act together.

Finally, oil diversification policies show that states do not compete; instead they cooperate, influencing *foreign policy* decisions. Whereas importers invest in the exporters and transport routes, countries receiving this investment accept it as a way of reducing instability. States are not then motivated by competition as Realists would argue, rather by cooperation – a key feature of Liberal views on global governance. Bilateral and multilateral agreements on oil diversification present examples of this cooperation (Helm 2002; Yergin 2006). In addition to oil diversification's effect on the global economy, there is also an effect on foreign policy (Yergin 2005). Because of diversification policies, importer countries can get two gains, namely reducing dependence on oil imports and gaining foreign partners (Cheon and Urpelainen 2015). Diversification policies therefore lead to more open foreign policy areas for importers.

In the Liberal perspective, because of the different assumptions made on the scope for cooperation, a more optimistic perspective is presented that contrasts with the pessimism of Realists. However, they emphasise infrastructure (i.e. interdependency) and the economic realities of oil as much as national security and independence. Both sides look at oil diversification from differing standpoints but there is one common point; the key points of foreign policy for oil diversification and key points of oil diversification for

foreign policy. Because of these points, we will look at oil diversification motivations in terms of foreign policy analysis rather than security studies.

2.6. The necessity of a Critical Perspective

As two positivist perspectives, Realism and Liberalism understand energy security with shared and also different assumptions. This understanding reflects their perception of oil diversification motivations. The state is seen as the most important actor in the international arena, a key point on which their arguments rely. We agree with them, but it is important to note from a critical perspective that we cannot separate state and civil society. States are necessarily directed by social forces. Facts and values are important factors which are downplayed by a positivist perspective. Although this separation of facts is criticized, it should be accepted that this separation can lead to them providing more successful explanations, depending on context (Cox 1981). As problem solving theories, Realism and Liberalism accept some points in their evaluation and ignore others (Cox 1981). However, in thinking 'critically' it is argued that neither observer nor observed can be accepted as value-free. An analysis of US oil diversification motivations should, it is argued in this thesis, then consider these realities. After accepting these realities, the researcher will realise self-awareness and more objective explanations will, theoretically, be possible.

The other problem is separation of theory and practice. Separation of the elements which are in reality intertwined provide more practical explanations, however, global conditions are made by more general factors. Beyond the static 'snapshot' interpretation of positivist theories, we argue that a holistic approach is required to better understand oil diversification motivations. The global order relies on social and historical roots, so interpretation should follow their paths. Thus, the state is important but it is not the outcome of global conditions, rather it is an intermediate determining factor.

As a more pessimistic perspective, Realist explanations have three main arguments about energy security which are increasing the power of national corporations, unreliability of markets and existence of conflicts (Raphael and Stokes 2015; Klare 2009b). On the other hand, Liberal explanations present counter arguments which relate to a belief in markets and capitalism, the existence of interdependency and non-state actors (Helm 2002; Yergin 2006; Hancock and Vivoda 2014). Both sides' arguments seem correct when they are evaluated theoretically, with multiple examples used to confirm their assumptions. However, every explanation can potentially be shown as 'right' under its context (Vivoda 2009a; Ciută 2010). For instance, most cited examples in the literature concern the relationship between Russia and the EU around energy politics (e.g. Correljé and van der Linde 2006; Kuzemko 2013). This relationship is seen as completely differently between the early 2000s and the mid-2000s, and from the mid-2000s until now. Both sides' arguments can be supported easily and successfully in these years, because they focus upon 'one moment' in time. However, wider temporal and spatial realities should be acknowledged. Positivist arguments ignore temporal dimensions, so they are seen as correct for these specific 'moments'; however, they do not explain reality exactly in terms of its evolving temporal context. We argue that a more holistic, critical perspective needs to be used, otherwise elements of this 'reality' will be missed in analysis. Thus, analyses need to look at reality itself, not an abstraction of reality (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010).

Regarding oil diversification motivations, both sides have successful explanations, because they argue specific 'interests' are significant. Both sides agree about oil diversification's effect on foreign policy, but there is a disagreement about which type of interest is the most important: either economic (i.e. Liberal) (Cheon and Urpelainen 2015); or national security (i.e. Realism) (Qinhua 2007). When Realists mention oil's importance in the market, they actually mean oil's use as a strategic commodity (Klare 2008b). Control of oil then becomes an indicator of state power. However, Liberals see oil

primarily as a commodity. It can be interpreted as a national security problem. Lastly, Realists assert security problems in the international arena, whereas Liberals believe the existence of interdependency and its effects on oil diversification motivations (Yergin 2005). Criticisms made regarding their explanations for energy security are therefore relevant for oil diversification. Thus, their explanations only reflect their assumptions. Both structural and domestic factors and both economic and political factors are seen as active in shaping oil diversification motivations. However, the observer can choose motivations, but the motivations chosen depend on where the observer stands and how she/he looks. Having assumptions on how global politics work can only work in the period researched, while having assumptions on how global politics accumulates can provide much wider and deep inquiry. In contrast to positivist theory, critical theory can not only potentially provide alternative motivations for oil diversification, it can also explain how these motivations are affecting oil diversification policies. Replying to the question of 'how?' in oil diversification can provide a temporal-spatial perspective and thereby historical interpretation. In this way, triggers of oil diversification motivations can also be understood.

In summary, the chapter provided a review of the literature on energy security, oil diversification and US oil diversification. The gaps in the literature, which is mainly shaped by positivist perspectives, is discussed in terms of these areas. Given the problems in applying positivist IR theories to explaining energy security, oil diversification and oil diversification motivations identified above, it is argued that a critical theoretical approach could potentially help fill these gaps in the literatures, an argument expanded upon in the next chapter.

3. Theory

Chapter 2 identified a 'gap' in the literature on oil diversification in that, despite a large number of studies on this subject, it had not been considered from a critical IR perspective, potentially leaving a significant shortfall in our understanding. Hence, the Chapter argued that there is a need to consider the value of this approach for explaining energy diversification in ways that are not readily available to positivists. Problematically, while there is evident potential for critical theory to significantly expand our knowledge, it is not homogenous and there is no single theoretical view, particularly within IR. These theoretical views can mainly be divided into the Frankfurt School, Marxian/Gramscian analyses, Feminism and Post-Structuralism (Rengger and Thirkell-White 2007). However, traditional critical theory can be divided into the Frankfurt School and Marxian/Gramscian analyses, and Robert W. Cox is one of the leading exponents of Critical Studies in IR. Although the Frankfurt School, Marx and Gramsci's influences can be seen in his works, he rather eschews such labels, defining himself as a theoretical "non-conformist" (Cox 2012: 17). Therefore, if we can accept him as a non-conformist, his arguments and the type of explanation developed by him will be used. Thus, this research is heavily influenced by his works while also seeking to extend forward the work that Cox started, to update and develop his arguments to add theoretical novelty to the literature.

In order to do this, the chapter firstly draws out the key theoretical concepts and assumptions presented within the main dimensions of critical IR theory, then situates a Coxian interpretation in relation to these arguments by discussing its reflections on reality. An analysis of critiques made of Coxian arguments is then provided and, finally, these challenges are linked to the notion of oil diversification to provide a novel 'neo-Coxian' theoretical-analytical framework to guide subsequent analysis of the thesis case studies (see Chapter 4).

3.1. The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory

Although Critical Theory's roots can be originally attributed to philosophers such as Kant, Hegel and Marx, its twentieth century manifestation is most associated with the Frankfurt School (Wyn 2001). Some of the key exponents of the Frankfurt school are Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm and Jürgen Habermas. Here, their work is classified as 'critical', because they opposed positivist (i.e. traditional) understandings of social processes. Whereas positivism separates fact and values, subject and object, observer and observed, the Frankfurt School criticises this position because its proponents believe that these separated terms are actually intertwined and hence indivisible (Rothe and Ronge 2016) (see Chapter 4).

Members of the Frankfurt School use Kantian, Hegelian and Marxian concepts, because firstly "the Kantian point that reflection on the limits of what we can know is a fundamental part of theorizing, [and] secondly, a Hegelian and Marxian point that knowledge is always, and irreducibly, conditioned by historical and material contexts" (Devetak 2005: 139). Thus, according to these scholars theories cannot be separated from social and political life and its self-reflective context. Neither can they be separated from history. Using the notion of the dialectic and emphasising the economy they are seen as neo-Marxist in their assumptions. However, the Frankfurt school has not totally accepted a Marxian interpretation of the economy. According to them (Horkheimer 1993 [1931]; Rothe and Ronge 2016), the economy is not the only material being and not the only baseline of structure. Although the economy is a basic underlying structure, there is also a mutual relationship between the economics and political arenas as material dimensions. Moreover, there is also a mutual relationship between materials and ideas. Originally developed by Gramsci and then inspired by Cox (1993a: 56), this relationship is seen as reciprocity between structure (social relations and physical production) and superstructure (ideology and political organizations).

Thus, there are economics, cultural and political aspects to Frankfurt School theorising.

3.2. A Coxian IR Interpretation

While heavily influenced by such critical theory, Cox's initial point of departure starts with a methodological position which includes ontological assumptions and an epistemological perspective. His idea about 'knowledge' and 'knowledge process' is highly influenced by the Frankfurt School's basic line of argumentation. In the positivist context, the separation of observer and observed requires a separation of value-facts and the researcher assumes that she/he can exclude her/his ideas, ideology and background from her/his research. Moreover, a value-free perspective leads to history-free explanations, because a researcher examines only what she/he sees at the current point in time. However, to understand change to social reality, historical dimensions should necessarily be considered. If history becomes a part of the explanation, a value-based perspective must be used in its interpretation. If these effects on facts and historical concepts are not considered, the factors determining global politics cannot be easily captured. To understand global politics, Cox therefore starts with comparing problem-solving (rational) and critical theories (Cox 1981). In his view, problem-solving theory views the world it finds and asks why that order came about in order to find a cause-effect relationship. This positivist epistemological perspective uses the logic of *ceteris paribus* (take a limited variable for study and suppose others are stable) and this understanding of cause-effects to provide practical theory for explaining the 'why' question, i.e. why did this social process occur? Critical theory, however, adds a 'how' question to problem-solving's scientific and technological perspectives questions of 'who gets what, when and why' and tries to understand more general conceptions of 'how' social processes evolve both temporarily and spatially.

3.2.1. Perspective on Theory

Problem-Solving theory takes the world and social relations as it finds them. Thus, all social and power relations are accepted as static, thereby also their reflections on institutions. The world is accepted as it is given (Cox 2008). However, for critical theories, all social relations have origins and change over time. Thus, there is not a law-like explanation; rather it is the changing process which is of interest (Leysens 2008). This process is directed by its origins and basic patterns. The origin of social processes occurs in a societal context (i.e. social, economic and political) and has shared points, so they affect each other. Thus, a successful theory must see all complex processes “as a whole rather than separate parts” (Cox 1981: 129). To better see this general picture, theory needs to use a historical perspective (i.e. Critical Theory) rather than ahistorical explanations (i.e. Problem-Solving Theories). However, we should be wary of making claims on the universal explanatory power of Critical Theory: the critiques of problem-solving theories do not mean that all their explanations are wrong. *Ceteris paribus* assumptions which reduce parameters, problem areas and particular problems and finds laws or regularities and provides them with successful explanation. To arrive at that point, critical theories should use a synchronic perspective (looking at the current moment) in addition to a diachronic perspective (historical explanation). Thus, the often-held assertion that critical theory does not concern the real world is not true but critical theory is not as practical as problem solving theory since it looks at historical accumulation rather than investigating chosen variables. According to Cox, “History generates theory” and “this theory is not absolute knowledge, not a final revelation or a completeness of rational knowledge about laws of history” (Cox 1993b: 135).

Traditional IR theory privileges the centrality of state interests, either with outside-in (Realism) or inside-out (Liberalism) views. While a state’s importance in the global arena cannot be ignored, the state should not be separated from civil society. Critical theory within IR is therefore based on a “state/society complex” (Cox 1981: 127) in which

state interests are situated in this context. This complexity leads to changing processes in society. Thus, social and political theory should consider a history-based background, because theory, it is argued, is itself a product of historical circumstances. For this reason Cox argues that “Theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose” (Cox 1981: 128). In other words, theory reflects the origins of global circumstances and must respect its contextual limitations. Hoffman (1987: 237-238) consequently sums up Coxian Critical Theory with seven basic points, which are that it:

“stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about... contemplate[s] the social and political complex as a whole... entails a theory of history (process of continuous change)... questions the origins and legitimacy of social and political institutions and how and whether they are changing... contains problem-solving theory and has a concern with both technical and practical cognitive knowledge... contains a normative order... is a guide for strategic action for bringing about an alternative order”.

Before the discussing a Coxian Critical IR interpretation, we should position his stance relative to mainstream IR theories. Cox’s standpoint is highly connected with Realism, because he accepts and uses Machiavelli’s and E.H. Carr’s explanations. Both these Classical Realists use a “historical mode of thought” (Cox 1981: 131). However, after the work of Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, realism theory became neo-realism, which is the ideological form abstracted from the realist historical framework referred to as the “American product” (Cox 1992: 169). This product is built upon behaviouralism, which asserts that human relations are happening *in* behaviour rather than *through* behaviour (see Chapter 4). Thus, while neo-realists follow ‘common rationality’, they also follow a value- and history-free perspective. For neo-realists, predictions follow from examining the foundations of social processes. However, in reality there is no effective prediction in social contexts. Material capabilities have always been changing, so the future cannot logically be predicted (Cox 2008). The belief in

changing processes distinguishes Cox's arguments from the superstructure perspective of neo-realism. However, these counter-arguments against neo-realism do not mean that they are totally ignorant of realism. Social context and human relations have always included contradictions and struggles. Indeed, classical realism recognises these points and explains them with a *historical mode of thought* that includes economic, social and ideological forms besides politics. The importance of these notions is accepted by a Coxian interpretation. However, Cox's (1997: XVI) *new realism* "differs from classical realism in broadening the range of determining forces beyond state power" and "differs from neo-realism in its concern with structural change and in understanding this change in historical terms".

The historical process is used in explanation rather than `scientific` arguments which focus on evolution and predictable regularities (Cox 1976). Thus, the critique made against neo-realists is also applicable for liberal institutionalists. The theory should understand the current moment (i.e. Realism) initially, so then it can develop and change the future (i.e. Liberalism). Before seeing reality, the future cannot be changed successfully. This is the counter argument to Liberalism. A value-free approach is another problem with Liberalism. Value-free explanations cannot see reality, because facts are made and found by values.

The definition of the state and its position in the global context is the most important topic for comparing the Coxian IR interpretation with neorealism and liberalism. According to the neo-realist perspective, the state is the only actor within an anarchic international system that defines its decisions. The main actor of the international system, which is the state, has no definition. Consequently, the "State is a state is a state" within the Waltzian approach (Cox 1981: 239). This definition considers only political factors in the designation of statehood. However, current inter-state relations should consider capital effects. Capital effects do not include only the economy, but also social aspects. Thus, civil society is as important as the state and

because of this reason, every political, economic and social factor should be considered. On the other hand, although neoliberalism considers the importance of the economy, the critique of it comes from another perspective. When neoliberalism prioritises the importance of the economy, it explains it with the importance of institutions. For example, the global economic market is supported by global institutions. Neoliberalism therefore seeks to explain how the current institutional structure is given. However, economical and institutional dimensions have always been changing, i.e. they are not 'given'. To explain only what is given conserves and promotes the current structure, but change should be set free. In this respect, drawing on Giambattista Vico, Cox (1981: 132-133) believes that

“Human nature (the modification of the mind) and human are identical with human history; they are to be understood in genetic and not in essentialist terms (as in neo-realism) or in teleological terms (as in functionalism)”

3.2.2. The Creation of Cox

The relationship between knowledge and interests is one of the most important topics for the Frankfurt School and can be seen as its defining feature. Whereas traditional positivist theory assumes that knowledge is derived from the activity of describing the world, Horkheimer, who was influential on Cox, believes that knowledge is not independent of our existence: rather it is integral to social relations. These social relations are not static but dynamic, because they always change according to their associated facts. 'Facts' in this sense are social and historical products. Thus, knowledge is always “situated” (Rupert 2003: 186), because it is conditioned by its historical and material context. Cox (1993b: 134) does not have a target objective to contribute “a universal and absolute knowledge, but to devise a fresh perspective useful for framing and working on the problems of the present”.

The definition of knowledge and condition of facts rely on changing, however, the process of changing is unlike that envisaged in *pure*

historical materialism. There is a disagreement between Marxian concepts and Critical Theory. In the Marxian concept, human consciousness has a passive role because of the mechanistic and deterministic role of history (see Chapter 4). Although Cox agrees with the importance of material based explanations, there is also a link between the materialist world and ideas (Leysens 2008). Thus, ideas and material conditions are bound together and not reducible one to one another (Cox 1993a). This perspective is derived from Gramsci. According to Cox, all global politics interpretation depends on this point. The importance of materials and ideas relations brings us to the importance of norms. Thus, it is distinguished from a Marxian `historical economism` (Gramsci 1971). This perspective also affects ideas about consciousness. The other main difference between critical theory and Marxism focuses on technology (Hoffman 1987). Marxism embraces technology as a good thing. However, for critical theorists, contradictions are everywhere and technology brings negative impacts as much as positive effects.

Material conditions direct ideas and then are directed by ideas. This contradiction is the basic phenomena in social life. When it is transferred to IR, it can be interpreted as a power and morality relationship. Power, morality and their relationship have always been changing, but the fact of power and morality remains (Cox and Schechter 2002). Thus, the term of power continues, but power relations change through history. Here, "The dominant political authority (state or empire) in one era gives place to another" (Cox and Schechter 2002: 58). Morality also has no universality. There are two reasons for it. Firstly, every region (space) has own moral judgments and set of values at specific times. Secondly, moral judgements are defined by the dominant power of one group, in every spatio-temporal reality which is a specific region and a specific time. Thus, the content of power and moral judgements can change, but the patterns of the power and morality have always existed and they will continue to exist. Global politics should consider these two patterns. The most important point in a Coxian power definition is that power is not only

derived from state. There are three different power sources, which are state, economic and social (Cox and Jacobson 1977: 357).

Power, which is defined by materials and also ideals/ideology, is the basic concept of Coxian theory. Here, the dominant power group defines the moral judgements of legitimacy of its position. The legitimacy of domination brings hegemony. Thus, neither military nor economy, or even a combination of them provides hegemony. In this sense, "In the structure of hegemony, cultural and ideological factors are decisive" (Cox 1992: 179). The contexts of legitimacy and ideology brings to civil society in social order. In terms of the state context, Cox draws upon Gramsci's formulation which is "State = political society + civil society" (Gramsci 1971: 263). From this perspective, "Civil society is both shaper and shaped, an agent of stabilization and reproduction, and a potential agent of transformation" (Cox 1999: 4-5). Thus, civil society is not defined in terms of a pure economic condition as Marxist interpretation would infer. Rather, it is a combination of leadership and movement from below. The coherence between state and civil society leads to more secure and successful organization. Moreover, besides civil society, there is also a "covert world" which includes organized crime, terrorist networks, intelligence operatives, and the drug trade (Cox 2008: 92). The covert world destroys established orders and damages security confidence. To protect its position, dominant groups or administrations need to solve these problems or act together. Military activities and ideology can be used by one group or together with others.

Bringing civil society into line leads to a critique of the common characterisation of global politics. The current name is derived from a Westphalian interpretation of the nation-state system and its combination with capitalism. States' relations are generally attributed to the national context. Although it is a current condition that we live in now, there has not *always* been a nation-state system: in fact, this notion is relatively recent. As an alternative, the term "global politics" covers a more general spatial and temporal area than the term "international relations" (Cox 1993b: 132). Moreover, although the

term of global politics is used, it refers to `political economy` because of the economy`s relationship with politics.

A Gramscian sense of hegemony and its structure is transferred into this notion of global politics by Cox. Accordingly, structures are socially and historically constructed and they are “the product of recurrent patterns of actions and expectations” (Cox 1993b: 138). Three categories of forces interact in a structure: material capabilities; ideas; and institutions (see Figure 3.1). Definitions and the contents of them and the relationship between each other have been changing in the particular cases, but in reciprocal and no one-way determinism. Thus, there is not a mechanistic process, but they create limitations.




Figure 3.1: *Structural Forces* (Cox 1981: 136)

Material capabilities are productive and destructive potentials. These exist as technological and organizational capabilities and in their accumulated forms. *Ideas* can be intersubjective meanings and collective images of social order held by different groups of people. They include multipolar and even opposed social discourses. *Institutions* maintain a particular order. They are particular amalgams of ideas and material power. This reciprocal relationship of the political, ethical and ideological spheres of activity within the economic area avoids reducing everything to economics or to ideas (Cox 1993a: 56). Thus, to set up and maintain hegemony, domination should be supported by institutions, because they are dealing with internal conflicts and inconveniences. On the other hand, ideas should be understood in the material capabilities context, because material aspects include both social relations and the physical means of production. The position of ideology and political organisation in the production process, which they shape and are shaped by production,

resembles the superstructure. Thus, the base comprised of material conditions and superstructure do not have to be the same character as it is in the Marxian concept (Gill 1993: 37-38).

The method of historical structures includes three spheres (Cox 1981: 137-138); *the organisation of production* (more particularly with regard to the *social forces*), *forms of state* (reflection of state-society complex) and *world orders* (forces` configurations). These three levels are interrelated and they have a non-linear relationship. Transnational social forces have influenced states through the world structure (e.g. capitalism). Whereas world order affects forms of state, forms of state also affect the development of social forces through the kinds of domination.




Figure 3.2: *Structural Spheres (Cox 1981: 138)*

Reflecting back on this earlier work, Cox and Schechter (2002: 28) emphasise the importance of synchronic and diachronic perspectives. A synchronic dimension sees the world or society as what it is. Synchronic parts are therefore more spatially oriented rather than time oriented. Time is accepted at a zero point, and then all observations are based on it. Thus, synchronicity is a snapshot of the structure of the world or society in its `mediated totality` (ibid.). On the other hand, a diachronic dimension sees the world or society as ruptures and conflicts that bring about system transformation. The belief of transformation elicits a more time oriented approach rather than space oriented. A diachronic dimension is a `process of presentation` rather than mediated totality (Leysens 2008: 87). The most important point to consider is that time and space cannot be separated or be thought of as opposed. Therefore, a spatio-temporal analysis should be used. In this research, structural forces are accepted as causes of the historical process because of the methodological arrangement of

Coxian Theory (see Chapter 4). This process shapes historical spheres. The patterns of the historical process are reflected under the historical spheres. The contents of a synchronic perspective are defined in the historical process (diachronic) patterns and they can change the historical processes.

Cox defines the term hegemony as “a structure of values and understandings about the nature of the order that permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities” (Cox 1993b: 140). Although values are universal, interpretations and understandings of them are local but relatively stable. Ideas of dominant strata expands and is maintained by its owner. Thus, the hegemonic concept of world order is founded not only upon regulation of inter-state conflicts but also upon a globally-conceived civil society (Cox 1993a: 61). International organisations, which are a product of hegemony, legitimate norms of the world order and co-opt the elites from peripheral countries and absorb counter-hegemonic ideas (Cox 1993a: 62). The difference between the Coxian hegemony definition, which is inspired by Gramsci, and problem solving theories’ hegemony is about the perception of consensus and coercion. Liberal (Keohane 1984) and Realist (Waltz 1979) hegemony perspectives are based on a static theory of politics, an abstract ahistorical conception of the state and appeal to universal validity. Whereas Liberal and Realist hegemony is based on economics and politics dimensions which are mainly defined in terms of consensus (i.e. Liberal) and coercion (i.e. Realist), the Coxian hegemony definition is based on a continual process of historical change, spheres of production and the exploitative character of social relations (Bieler and Morton 2004: 86). Thus, Coxian hegemony is a combination of economics, politics and social dimensions in terms of combination of consensus and coercive (Rupert and Solomon 2006).

Kinhide Mushakoji (1997: 83-108) is inspired by Cox. His work focuses on multilateralism in the modern world and compares modern and pre-modern eras. According to him, the Modern era in global politics changed after establishment of the Westphalian system.

Fewer numbers of institutions, which performed some of the functions of government, have given their place to the state as a central authority. Their place was power, legitimacy and identity (Mushakoji 1997: 84). However, these terms are defined by the modern context, because the Western modern formal `world order` has affected the understanding of world interpretation. *Rationality* and *Progress* emphasises have been brought into social areas and the basic terms of global politics (e.g. individual, society, state) have been defined according to this context. These terms have been defined in the “absolute value to concepts” (Mushakoji 1997: 89). Changing definitions of the basic terms has affected the definition of power, legitimacy and identity.

While power is transient, it is a fact that the weak are subjugated by the strong. Whereas legitimacy must come from the eternal essence in the pre-modern era, it turns brute force into power. Legitimacy is not decided by God anymore, rather by humans. While identity was not absolute and accepted by other communities, it has become a formal framework for a legitimate group. The consciousness of social groups is a historical product rather than a determined condition. It means that consciousness of class has always changed. For example, “identities” consciousness like gender, ethnicity, religion and nationality are the common reality in our world (Cox 1999: 15). How people identify themselves differentially depends on context that is determined by the accumulation of the past. In terms of legitimacy, Cox (2008: 92) asserts that when governments provoke fears among the public, as is now a common aspect of the “war on terror”, they are preparing for oppressive measures. The relationship between fear and legitimacy is a `transhistorical truth`. This situation reflects the legitimacy in global governance. “The overwhelming “hard power” of “Empire” has generated “terror” as the response of those who utterly reject “Empire” (Cox 2008: 93). After the basic terms of modern era, we can look at a reflection of Cox` basic arguments for the contemporary era.

3.2.3. Reflection of Cox

Cox (1981) transfers his key terms of reality for the *Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana* eras. The internationalisation of production and the internationalisation of the state are the key terms of these areas, thereby they still continue (Cox 1981: 144-147). The internationalisation of the state gives precedence to certain state agencies –notably finance and prime ministries - to adjust domestic to international policy. On the other hand, the internationalisation of production is about the expansion of production. The problem arises, when the two internationalisations are combined. Although rhetoric asserts the importance of industrialisation, it is only available for finance, not for workers. Workers are limited by their nationally-defined social formations. Although internationalisations of production and state are important, how they are constructed is the key point. Cox (1993b) tries to find triggers for them from structural analysis. As a reflection of social forces, forms of state and world orders, he (1993b: 140-147) asserts that hegemonic, Westphalian and globalization factors are significant.

The hegemonic idea is based on liberal arguments which are dependent on interdependence between states; however, it faces with Westphalian key understanding which stresses the importance of territorially based power (Cox 1993c: 263). Moreover, globalisation challenges the classic Westphalian state system which is a nation-state. The United Nations reflects the crisis of this system clearly. United Nations institutions were born in the Westphalian order founded upon a belief in state sovereignty; however, it targets the global arena, but, it has broadly reflected the priorities of American public opinion (Jacobson 1997: 165). These contradictions lead to new priorities in the global context. Since the 1980s, the US hegemony has been decreasing, because of dualism in the system. During the 1970s, the neo-liberal system faced internal challenges such as the OECD, the Club of Rome and the Trilateral Commission because of the disintegration of neo-liberalism and the historic bloc which is the coherence of structural elements (i.e. institutions, ideas

and material capabilities) (Cox 1993c: 266). This leads to change as a `hyper-liberalism` in the Thatcher-Reagan eras (ibid. 267). It is the separation of state and economy envisaged by classical liberalism. Employers have gained more power over workers since that time as capital has gone global. Unlike the neo-liberal approach, the state-capitalist approach does not post any consensual regulation of the world market as regards multilateral trade and financial practices. The state-capitalist form involves a dualism. On the one hand, a competitively efficient world-market-oriented sector, and on the other, a protected welfare sector (ibid. 270).

When the states increased their power with these economic targets, they have faced more problems. Increasing economic globalisation has constrained states' autonomies and the states that cannot resist the current structure have chosen macro-regionalism against US economic power (e.g. Germany, Japan) (Cox 1993c: 262). It means increasing states relationships in the regions. However, there is also a micro-regionalism (ibid.). Larger economic global and macro-regional spaces weaken the autonomy of states. Micro-regional demands increase in countries (e.g. Catalonia, Lombardy). Thus, it is a sub-state process. When the dominant US ideology (i.e. neo-liberalism) and institutions are not able to stabilise or persuade these demands, it will resort to another option which is military force (Cox 1999: 12). Using military forces (e.g. Gulf War, Iraq War) rather than using ideology and institutions to create new enemies and ideology which can bring together all basic actors, leads to the image of *Empire* rather than *Hegemony* (Cox 2008: 90).

In the current era, because of reasons which are mentioned, the global structure has become an *American Empire*, *Westphalian inter-state system* and *civil society* (Cox 2008: 90-91). Transnational corporations influence domestic policy in countries where they operate, while military cooperation is constructed under the leadership of the core of `Empire`. On the other hand, the sovereign state understanding which is derived from the Westphalian inter-state system, is weakened by Empire (ibid.). There are two challenges to

the Westphalian inter-state system and Empire. Firstly, the inter-state system and its creations like the United Nations are directed by the Empire and secondly, strengthening the bonds linking the citizen to political authorities. While a second factor protects the economic and social organisations of the states, it also strengthens the plural world perspective. However, in the global context, decisions are not made by pluralist acts. An Empire can ignore the Westphalian basic principle (i.e. non-intervention) and act how it wants to. The Iraq War can be given as an example. Lastly, civil society is constructed within states and within Empire. It leads to a transnational form of organisation. The environment and women`s rights are defended by this form of transnational organisation. The basic fact is that, increasingly, civil society is not centralised like Empire and sovereign states (ibid.). Thus, it is a resistance to Empire`s homogenizing force, but it can be manipulated easily. The covert world which is mentioned above, can be used for these manipulations.

Thus, when we look at this feature more closely, we are seeing three different contradictions in the current system which are *production and finance*, *real economy and biosphere*, and *contradiction in social relations* (Cox 1999: 17-18; Cox and Schechter 2002 82-107). Firstly, finance has a synchronic (space-oriented) perspective which ignores the time dimension and can undermine the social legitimacy of capital and the productive apparatus itself, because its fragile condition can damage the requirements of production which is a certain stability (Cox 1999: 17). Whereas finance occupies a more globally oriented space, production (diachronic process) has a more locally focused space. There are significant banners of mobilization. Two basic points (i.e. nationality and class) in global context which are derived from the nineteenth and twentieth century, is triggered by this contradiction (Cox and Schechter 2002: 88). Secondly, the onward expansion of consumer demand is the driving force of the global economy, however, it damages the biosphere. However, consumers demand both products and a clean environment (Cox 1999: 17; Cox and Schechter 2002: 107). Lastly, because of post-Fordism which is

reinforced by global finance, Fordist-era social safety nets have been diffused, because specialized products and jobs and new information technologies have lead that excluded categories like immigrants and women workers have become a key generating means of production. The fragmentation of the old working class has generated strengthened capital and weakened and divided labour (Cox 1999: 17-18; Cox and Schechter 2002: 107).

Along with the above arguments and contemporary world explanations, Cox (1992: 179-180) sees five different possibilities for the future of hegemony on a global scale:

“1. A revival of the declining hegemony; 2. A revival of the universals of the declining hegemony underpinned not by one state but by an oligarchy of powerful states that would have to concert their powers; 3. The founding of a new hegemony by another state successfully universalizing its own principles of order; 4. A non-hegemonic order lacking effective universal principles of order and functioning as an interplay of rival powerful states, each with their client states, most probably based on an organization of rival world regions; and 5. A counterhegemonic order anchored in a broader diffusion of power, in which a large number of collective forces, including states, achieve some agreement upon universal principles of an alternative order without dominance”.

3.3. Analysis of Coxian Critique

The preceding section provides a `Reflection of Cox`, whereas its practicality is critically evaluated in the section below (see Chapter 8). However, after showing a Coxian interpretation, it will be explained why this research is heavily influenced by Cox rather than any other Critical Theorists, critiques of Cox's thinking made by other IR thinkers and how deficiencies in Coxian interpretation can potentially be solved within a neo-Coxian critique. To analyse Coxian critiques in the IR literature, initially, *Cox's difference within Critical Theory* will be

examined in order to see the importance of Cox in critical theory. Then, the *critiques of Cox* are given. As a last step, a *review of Cox* is developed in order to update these arguments for contemporary analysis of oil diversification.

3.3.1. Cox`s Difference

Cox`s difference from other Critical Theorists can be classified under four main points. While the first two arguments assert a non-Eurocentric perspective by Cox, they also show how Cox escaped from being a Eurocentric. Moreover, this situation leads to better explanations in order to understand IR events. The third argument asserts the importance of balance between opposite terms (e.g. agency-structure, material-ideal) to understanding human and global political economy conditions. Moreover, using time-based concepts (i.e. synchronic and diachronic) on these terms provide chances to explain more clearly. Lastly, Cox (1981) believes there is a constructive relationship between theory and history, so he leaves an open door to be reviewed in the future.

Critical theorists are inspired by Hegel. However, his term `immanent critique` led to a Eurocentric understanding and explanation emerging within Critical Theory. Immanent critique is defined as “without reference to an independently articulated method or to transcendent criteria” (Hutchings 1999: 99). Three important thinkers in IR agree with the importance of immanent critique in order to avoid approaching IR with abstract ethical principles (Linklater 1989; Hutchings 1999; Robinson 1999). They (Linklater 1989; Hutchings 1999; Robinson 1999) believe that theorists must engage critically with the background normative assumptions and fit between modes of thought and forms of political organization. Although Cox`s (1981: 128) most cited phrase “Theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose” can be shown as an example of immanent critique, this sentence does not totally address immanent critique. It could be derived from two sources. Firstly, Cox does not address `immanent` openly. Secondly, a Coxian interpretation sets up a balance between material and ideal, power and morality, structure and superstructure. The balance is

provided with emphasis on `reciprocity` between opposite forces. While reciprocity takes the normative assumptions into the theory, the same term protects the theory from normative-based arguments. Moreover, we know how Cox criticizes the normative based explanation, when he evaluates Hedley Bull (Cox 1993b: 137). Subjective perception of the world should be given an objective explanation (see Chapter 4).

The second difference with Cox is related to another Eurocentric term which is emancipatory interest. Emancipatory interest is defined as “freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely they would choose to do” (Booth 1991: 539). Many critical theorists do not use this term because of integrality with Kant and Marx (Ashley 1981; Linklater 1999; Booth 1991). Emancipation relies on Western `rationality` based explanations and terms. It is believed that emancipation can be a target objective. While emancipation is seen as a security in IR (Booth 1991), it can also be interpreted as a main and absolute target of states. However, security is no such thing. States can only strive to a less dangerous position for themselves, because logically there is not an absolute freedom in global politics. The world has already globalized and every state action and even civil society demands can affect the whole world (Cox 2004). Thus, state relations run with mutual effects. While Cox does not follow Eurocentric *rational* and *progress* concepts, his arguments provide a better explanation.

The third advantage of using Coxian interpretation is about the balance between structure and agency. Critical Theorists can easily be interpreted as structuralist (Ashley 1984; Dalby 1991). However, the main point for us in IR is a balance between opposite terms. The terms which are accepted as opposite to each other, are defined in terms of spatial dimensions. When we also consider a temporal dimension, it is seen that opposite terms supersede the others' position. Thus, it is easy to understand which factors are structure- and agency-based; however, it is difficult to separate which one of them triggers another. In terms of a trigger, the same arguments can

be asserted regarding material and ideational issues. At this point, Cox's (1999) synchronic and diachronic emphasis are very important; however, problems with Cox arise from this feature. Although he emphasises important concepts and asserts correct arguments, some points do not seem clear as is mentioned below. Although a Coxian interpretation is not undermined by Marxian or Neorealist structural-based explanations, even with the help of Gramsci-inspired and well-defined notions of `structure` and `superstructure` (Cox 1993a: 56), Cox does not explain the connection and transition between structure and agents clearly for Sinclair (2016). This research will investigate how this transition can be understood.

Lastly, Cox's view on theory-history construction creates the last advantage. Although Critical Theory considers the importance of history-based perceptions compared to problem-solving theories, his (Cox 1981: 128) most quoted argument, "Theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose [*italics from original*]", shows that his theory is situated in a history context. "History generates theory" and "this theory is not absolute knowledge, not a final revelation or a completeness of rational knowledge about laws of history" (Cox 1993b: 135). Thus, he leaves an open door to be reviewed according to a new historical context in the future. We can easily add social dynamics as a new structural sphere without contradicting Cox. A neo-Coxian interpretation is a theory that Cox actually asks future researchers to consider.

3.3.2. The Critiques of Cox

In the literature, there are different types of criticism of Cox; however, the main critique comes from the need for people to assert their own interpretation of his work. Because of this reason, there are also contradictions between critiques made of Cox (Schechter 2002). Other critiques of Cox can be classified under nine titles which are: *being an Eurocentric, lack of historical materialist analysis, ontological, epistemological and methodological deficiency, inspiration by Weber, being a pessimist and optimist, state-centrism*

and the position of state, overestimation of the military's importance, non-specificity, and unclear argumentation (see Table 3.1).

In terms of *Eurocentrism*, there are three main arguments regarding Cox. The first (of the arguments) relies on dominance and hegemony in a Coxian interpretation. For Pasha (2005: 548-551), a Coxian transnational hegemony definition (firstly national then the translational) and its practicality (firstly European or American and then whole world) ignores the rest of the world. Pasha's (2005) argument relies on the hypothesis of mutual relations between the West and the Rest and the definition of hegemony is queried in terms of its position in the core and periphery. It can be interpreted as a historical critique. Thus, Pasha (2005: 549) thinks the rest of the world is ignored historically and analytically by Cox's focus on Europe. The second argument relies on hegemony and its connection with culture (Pasha 2005; Pasha 2008). This argument is posed against neo-Gramscians more widely but Cox is also mentioned (Pasha 2005: 248; Pasha 2008: 204). Neo-Gramscians are interpreted as reductionist in terms of culture, because after hegemony is structured by economic based power, culture follows it. Thus, culture is defined by economic power. However, culture and consciousness materialization have mutual effects in Gramsci's arguments. Gramsci is therefore misunderstood. The last argument is a class definition within the Eurocentric perspective. Keyman (1997: 120) believes that Cox's concept of mode of production relies on a social classes analysis, although Cox tries to use the term inter-subjectivity. The reductionist characteristic of Coxian inter-subjectivity which priorities class relations, leads to privileging class over non-class identities. Thus, according to his interpretation, Coxian inter-subjectivity rises from its class emphasis. In contrast to Keyman's critiques, Dale and Robertson's (2003) interview with Cox should be examined. In it, Cox emphasises the origins of myths, language and religion and their intersubjective relations with material conditions in terms of civilization (Dale and Robertson 2003). Thus, identity constitution is defined more clearly.

The second main critique comes *from the historical materialist side*. This critique includes three parts. The first is related to the overstating of ideology. Burnham (1991) thinks that with the Weberian pluralism effect, Cox tries to find a middle point between idealism and economic arguments. This point can be derived from the interaction between material capabilities, ideas and institutions. However, the insertion of ideas and culture into the economic process leads to an “overestimation of the importance of ideology” (Burnham 1991: 79). Although finding the middle point between ideas and economy provides an advantage, it also fails to recognize the importance of capital relations. Morton`s (2003a; 2003b) criticism of Cox starts with supporting for Burnham`s argument in accusing Neo-Gramscians, who include Cox, as liberal pluralist interpreters rather than historical materialists. Thus, the second part, which is a liberal interpretation of Gramsci rather than historical materialist interpretation, arises. For Morton (2006), *Critical International Political Economy*, which includes Cox, has an anti-historical perspective and the lack of historical-materialist perception leads to an understating of class struggle. In contrast to Morton, Germain (2007) asserts that Morton has a historical materialist explanation with the refusal of ideas, so he is not able to explain historical process widely and deeply. Rather, Colingwood inspired Cox`s “historical idealism” is able to explain historical process with the emphasis of motivations and self-understandings of people (Germain 2007: 129). The last part of the critique refers to a lack of production explanation. Budd (2007a) believes that Cox`s rejection of Marxian theory because of its `static and abstract` analysis in terms of the mode of production is wrong, because Marxism`s mode of production is constituted by internal contradictions, which is more active than Cox thinks. From the opposite side of the historical materialist arguments, Bernstein (2000) asserts that Cox overstates the importance of economic factors; however, economic based explanations need to be considered with ideational explanations.

The third critique, which involves is an *ontological, epistemological and methodological deficiency*, has four main parts. The first is related to the ontological, epistemological and methodological complexities of Neo-Gramscian interpretations. For Germain and Kenny (1998), the main Gramscian concepts like hegemony, civil society and historic bloc were used to explain the national context. When they are used for interpreting international phenomena, more complexities arise. Moreover, the meaning of concepts is damaged when they are used for contemporary events in terms of historical idealism. The second of the critiques is about agency-structure and state issues in terms of ontology. The arguments come from the critical realist point of view. From this perspective, if there are intersubjective relations, there will be two sides. Thus, there is a dualistic social ontology (Joseph 2008: 101-102). This lack of ontological depth in Cox's assumptions, it is argued, leads to insufficient explanations of the social world. Joseph (2008) as a Critical Realist asserts the ontological distinction between structures and agents, because for him, Cox does not explain the difference between agency and structure. This condition of Coxian interpretation leads to an unsuccessful intersubjective relationship emphasis. In contrast to inter-subjectivity, he asserts the terms of structure and superstructure that are derived from Gramsci (Joseph 2008: 114-115). From a Critical Realist perspective, there is one more critique of Cox. Although van Apeldoorn (2004) supports the Coxian interpretation to include its normative emphasis, he finds deficiencies in terms of the state issue. Van Apeldoorn (2004: 154) believes that Cox has a more state-centric explanation; however, there is an "importance of the role of the agency in creating the conditions at the level of the state". This is what the functionalist view requires. In terms of agency-structure, there is one more argument, which criticises Cox as a reductionist (Schechter 2002). Thus, there is a third part of this critique. Although the reductionism discussion is highly related to the agency-structure issue, it has more of an epistemological reflection rather than an ontological one. Both Spegele (1997) and Hobson (1998) agree that Cox tries to be a non-reductionist with the emphasis

on `reciprocity`, but that he is not able to avoid reductionist arguments. A Coxian argument relies on the terms of “production” and “base-superstructure model” derived from Marx (Spegele 1997: 221; Hobson 1998: 357). From the opposite side, Berry (2007: 13) believes that Cox is not a reductionist, because structure “is one moment in a continual process of structural change orchestrated by human beings”. A clear structural perspective provides a balance between agency and structure. The last critique is from another foundationalist epistemology, positivism (Smith 1999). Thus, we have one more epistemological critique. The critique from the positivist side is understandable, because Cox`s critical theory is in opposition against problem-solving theory which derives from a positivist epistemology. From the positivist side, Critical Theorists like Cox are accused of not using universally valid laws (Schecher 2002: 5) but it is this feature that critical theory actively seeks to avoid.

The fourth critique of Cox relates to his *inspiration by Weber*. At this point Weber`s argument is not criticized; rather, a Coxian interpretation is seen as more than Weberian pluralism oriented (Smith 1996). The emphasis on pluralist empiricism is the first part of this critique. This argument is same as Burnham`s (1991) interpretation of Cox and neo-Gramscians, as mentioned above. Like Weber, finding a middle point between economism and idealism is a good idea, because that point considers the structural variability and the historical specificity of data. However, this pluralist empiricism “lacks the power to explain either the systematic connection between values, social relations and institutions or the extent to which the historical appearance of capital as a social relation transforms the social order in such a way that all relations are subsumed under the capital relation” (Burnham 1991: 78). Moreover, Burnham (1999) and Saad-Filho and Ayers (2008) extend critiques of the methodological approach used by Cox. Cox`s methodology is seen as a mid-point between Weber and Marx, who have two incompatible methodologies. Thus, Cox does not address critical theory in relation

to problem-solving theory clearly because of his methodological complexity.

Fifthly, whereas some see Cox as an *undue pessimist*, others see Cox as an *undue optimist* (Cox and Schechter 2002). The first person to interpret Cox as an undue pessimist is Gareau. Gareau's (1996) critique of Cox starts with Cox's International Labour Organization experience. Cox is alleged to have a jaundiced view of international institutions after his ILO years. In response to Cox, the argument presented is that international institutions are not seen as organizations of the US hegemon; rather, they challenge the hegemony. The second critique under this title relates to Cox's perception of civil society. From this perspective, civil society is not particularly strong or well organized in Coxian interpretations. However, Shaw et al. (2000) are more optimistic about civil society and its effects on multilateral agreements. From the perspective of civil society, there is one more critique of Cox. Transnational civil societal groups and coalitions like Greenpeace and OXFAM provide more optimistic expectations for the future (Macdoland 1994). A Coxian interpretation of civil society is often seen in one-dimensional terms in opposition to transnational capitalist hegemony.

On the other hand, some scholars think that Cox is an optimist. The first part of this critique comes from a realist perspective. As a problem-solving theorist, Waltz (1986) interprets critical theory as utopianism. Like Waltz, Mearsheimer (1994) also criticizes critical theorists as attempting to create a more peaceful state order which has not been practiced yet. Although Mearsheimer (1994) mentions Cox a few times, his critique is more targeted towards critical theorists generally. In the second part of this critique, more specifically about Cox, Hampson (1997: 735) accepts Cox's evolving global society as a multilateral interpretation as utopian because of its bottom-up characteristic. Spegele's criticism of Cox is also about his undue optimism, but Spegele's (1997) criticism is about the awareness of people. For him (1997), Cox tries to make people aware rather than transforming their self-understandings.

The sixth critique is about *state-centrism* and *the position of the state*. Here, the first criticism relates to the civil society concept. Cox is accused of limiting civil society in national terms (Shaw 2000). When the civil society's internationalization and transnationalization structure is kept in view, civil society which is limited in a national context, leads to state-centrism (Robinson 1998). Thus, the position of the state is defined by civil society's positioning. This critique can be extended in terms of transnationalization. Burnham (1997: 153) accuses Coxian interpretations of globalization to be authored by states. However, in contrast, Budd (2007b: 337) believes that "the realization of capitalism's potential for globalization is not automatic but dependent on the intervention of states". Whereas this intervention of states affects transnationalist structures, this structure also shapes states. Thus, the state is transformed "into agents of the global" (2007: 337). The second critique accuses Cox as being a state-centrist, as suggested by Kütting (2001) and Saad-Filho and Ayers (2008). Cox is argued to see state actors as the most important factors in the international arena and as a result changes in the international arena can only be created by actors. Cox's actor-focused statist approach is interpreted as a traditional approach in IR (Kütting 2001). Thus, Cox is seen as an unsuccessful Critical Theorist. The third critique in terms of his state position comes from Berry (2007). For him (2007: 19-20), the Coxian interpretation of state and its position in the global arena evolves through time. While in the beginning, Cox describes states as a 'transmission belt', he (2002) changes his interpretation in his *The Political Economy of a Plural World* thereby creating more depth in Coxian methodology.

In opposition to the above arguments, there are two arguments asserting that Cox ignores the importance of the state. Linklater (1989) thinks that Cox's analysis understates the peripheral role of weak states. For Cox and Schechter (2002: 11), Linklater argues that Cox understates the residual power of the state. On the other hand, Laguerre (1999) also thinks that separation of civil society and political society in Coxian interpretations is unnecessary. If they are equally

intertwined, there is no need to separate them. This critique, which is about state structure, asserts that separation of civil society and political society shows the state as less important than it is.

The seventh critique of Cox relates to the *military*. The first side of this argument asserts that Cox gives high importance to the military in terms of global political economy (Glassman 1999). Moreover, “Cox is accused of not even granting states the ‘residual’ military-security role that neo-liberal institutionalists like Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane” identify (Cox and Schechter 2002: 4). Comparing the above argument, Linklater (1989) asserts a different argument in terms of the military. He (1989: 31) criticizes Cox by arguing that he does not discuss the threat of violence in IR. Thus, this argument can be accepted as an opposite to the first argument, because this emphasises a lack of military explanation in Coxian interpretation. The third aspect of the critiques of the military comes from Budd (2007b). For him (2007b), a Cox interpretation of military evolves through time, because Cox sees a contradictory relationship between military power and capitalist transnationalization after the Cold War. After this recognition, Cox sees military force as an important aspect (Budd 2007b: 341).

The eighth critique is about the *specificity and generality of Cox*. Cox is accused of not focusing enough attention on issues like feminism and ecology (Cox and Schechter 2002). For example, LaFerrrière (2001: 213) wants to see ecology as an autonomous actor in the Coxian interpretation of world politics. However, Cox has a more positive image in terms of gender issues because of his emphasis on ideas besides the economy. Although his interpretation is accused of promoting more economic based arguments (Bernstein 2000: 504), the ideas emphasis can encompass gender issues (Whitworth 1994). In terms of specificity and generality, another critique relates to neo-Gramscians more widely. Germain and Kenny (1998: 13-14) emphasise the importance of meaning and the history of ideas. In terms of the history of ideas, Gramscian concepts cannot be applied to all spatial and temporal contexts, because they have their own

context and they seem to apply in every context. The open interpretation of the concepts stretches their meanings.

The ninth critique of Cox refers to *the unclear nature of his interpretation* (Cox and Schechter 2002). There are two main interpretations of this critique. One is about state definition. Baker (1999) finds a weak point in the Coxian internationalization of the state definition. It is ill-defined, in his opinion, because domestic factors and ideas in the transformation of the state are overstated. On the other hand, Shaw (2000: 265) sees a Coxian interpretation of state is not clearly defined and follows a realist definition; however, the realist definition of state is no more than a superficial understanding. In terms of unclear points, Saad-Filho and Ayers (2008: 148) finds the Coxian interpretation abstract and eclectic. A Coxian interpretation uses history and transformation concepts in the global order, because it leads to the social world definition as more open and context-dependent. However, these terms heavily depend on the internal consistency of the analytical framework (Saad-Filho and Ayers 2008: 150). Moreover, a Coxian class interpretation is static and ideal-typical rather than dynamic and historically specific. Despite his efforts, it is difficult to see class changes and movements clearly in his arguments.

Critiques	Parts of Critiques	Interpretations of Critiques	Sources
Being an Eurocentric	-Dominancy and hegemony -Hegemony-Culture connection -Class definition		-Pasha (2005) -Pasha (2008) -Keyman (1997)
Lack of Historical Materialism	-Overstating of ideology -Liberal interpretation of		-Burnham (1991) - Morton (2003a; 2003b; 2006)

State-centrism and position of state	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Overestimation of state - Underestimation of state 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Limit Civil Society -State-centrism -Evolving State position through time -Ignores the importance of society -Unnecessary civil-political society separation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Shaw (2000); Burnham (1997) -Kütting (2001); Saad-Filho and Ayers (2008) -Berry (2007) -Linklater (1989) -Laguerre 1989)
Military	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -High importance military in terms of GPE -Do not discuss the threat of violence -Evolving military importance through time 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Glassman (1999) -Linklater (1989) -Budd (2007b)
Non-specificity and non-generality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Not attention on issues -Cannot be applied all spatial and temporal contexts 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - LaFerrerrière (2001) -Germain and Kenny (1998)
Unclear argumentation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Internationalisation of state 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Baker (1999)

	definition -Abstract and eclectic		- Saad-Filho and Ayers (2008)
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Table 3.1: *Critiques of Cox*

There are some recurrent issues which can be found in the different critique types. Cox's understanding of the state is the one of them. It is discussed in terms of ontological problems, state-centrism and state positions and also unclarity of arguments sections; however, in all areas, different types of arguments on Coxian state interpretation are given. Civil society is another issue in the critiques. However, there are four types of arguments presented on Cox regarding civil society about how it leads to optimism, pessimism, state-centrism and a weak state definition. In the critiques, there are two issues (i.e. state position and military) which are used for how a Coxian interpretation changes through time. Another critique classification can be conducted on perception differences. Thus, the critiques come from different perceptions and priorities to the same topic lead opposite arguments in the same topic. The topics which have two opposite critiques, are overstating/understating of economy, reductionism/non-reductionism, civil society in terms of pessimism/optimism, civil society in terms of state position, whether it leads to weak state or state-centrist perceptions, the state's position in terms of transnationalisation whether it affects transnationalization or it is affected by transnationalization, important/unimportant military, clear/unclear state definition.

We mainly find the opposing arguments are unnecessary. In Coxian terms, the economy is stated as equal to political dimensions, while material dimensions are accepted as equal to ideas. Moreover, Cox emphasises the importance of structure, whereas he also sees the importance of agents, which is heavily influenced by the work of Colingwood, to be able to shape structure. In terms of the military, we accept how Cox's arguments change through time, but they are

acceptable because the end of the Cold War has had a huge impact on global issues. In the current conditions, the importance of the military cannot be ignored.

However, the most important issue is state structure. Our contribution to Coxian interpretation of critical theory will be mainly predicated on this point. Although Cox declares how he sees the agency-structure issue clearly and this perception does not cause reductionism or non-reductionism, we do not see how this process is occurring. Moreover, there is also an unclear position of civil society in contrast to political society. To understand civil and political societies' position, both should be looked at. It is difficult to see how the forces (i.e. material capabilities, ideas and institutions) are developing in the structure spheres. Unclear process description leads to discussions of reductionism/non-reductionism and weak state/state-centrism. The last topic is therefore specificity. We cannot blame Cox for not focusing on any specific issue, if he only looks at the broader picture and sets up general theoretical assumptions: others should therefore add specificity to his arguments. His theory can consequently be used on specific issues and, we argue in this thesis, US oil diversification motivations can be studied with the help of a Coxian interpretation. Moreover, operationalizing Coxian theory on a specific issue can help to analyse such uncertainties (transition between agency-structure, the positioning of civil society-political society, how the forces are running).

3.3.3. Review of Cox

Beside the above critiques, there is one more critique forwarded by Sinclair (2016). This critique is mentioned separately, because it includes constructive elements and non-critical elements. For Sinclair (2016), Coxian theory was developed in the 1980s and 1990s; however, it needs to be adapted to the contemporary world given the significant changes that have occurred in the global order. Besides adaptation, there are also three main points which can be accepted as problems in Coxian theory. "First, the possible perception that the approach was more structural and determinist than was the case"

(Sinclair 2016: 512), although Cox (1981: 135) clearly says that structure does not determine “but imposes pressures and constrains” and agency acts according to this condition. “Second, a seemingly narrow ontology” because of his state/society complexity concept, although this complexity emphasises a plurality in the form of states (Sinclair 2016: 512). Thus, Sinclair (2016: 514) thinks that “structure and ontology is clear and visible; however, how things move and why, is not”. Lastly, “potential confusion between the purpose of the two `triangles` and how they are related to each other” (Sinclair 2016: 512). Sinclair (2016) tries to solve these problems and restore the lack of agency. However, we think that operationalisation of the structural causes into a specific topic can help to see how this transition happens. We agree that Cox requires better ontological arrangement, but it will be discussed in the methodology (see Chapter 4).

To solve these problems the forces and spheres of Coxian structure is reviewed. In terms of forces, Sinclair (2016: 516) asserts that `competing ideas`, which highlight conflict between collectively held ideas instead of `ideas`. This intersubjective notion can connect with `social facts` which is added to institutions “in order to capture the everyday understanding of institutions as organizations” (Sinclair 2016: 517). Thus, ideas are separated into two different areas as competing ideas and intersubjective norms. The `Material capabilities` of Cox is separated into two areas: `production` which is interpreted by Marxists; and `reproduction capabilities` which include reproductive technologies and gender dynamics (Sinclair 2016: 517). In terms of spheres, the `social dynamics` conception is added (Sinclair 2016: 517), because `social forces` of Coxian terminology is narrowly understood by production process and it does not include social issues like gender, race, sexual orientation, disability, age, and so on (Sinclair 2016: 515). Thus, this new sphere (i.e. social dynamics) is about human conflict and cooperation. “Struggles by social movements about things such as human rights and the biosphere” need to be recognized (Sinclair 2016: 515). Thus, Sinclair (2016: 517) creates one forces triangle and one spheres diamond.




Figure 3.3: *Forces redux in Sinclair (2016: 517)*




Figure 3.4: *Spheres redux in Sinclair (2016:517)*

Sinclair's (2016) study presents a very useful discussion in order to see how Coxian interpretations can be used on present issues and how the agency-structure issue can be resolved, but we have some agreement and disagreements with Sinclair. In Coxian terminology, ideas are two kinds which are intersubjective meanings and collective images of social order. While the former means covered collaboration in general understanding, the following one includes different perspectives by different groups. These perspectives might compete each other. Thus, Coxian `ideas` include two dimensions, while one of them includes competitions and contradictions. There is no need for separation of ideas. Moreover, we do not see the necessity of separation of productive and reproductive capabilities. It is a good idea to practice Coxian terminology on the contemporary world; however, contemporary world events in IR are not run by reproductive issues. Gender dynamics have been heavily discussed in Western countries since the early 2000s, and extend to the whole world; however, material capabilities are still defined by productive and

destructive events. Material capabilities can be derived from a moment, whether it is productive or destructive or how much productive and destructive it is.

The biggest contribution by Sinclair comes with `social dynamics`. A Coxian interpretation needs to include it because of three reasons. Firstly, it can help to see the transition between the agency and structure issue. Secondly, it provides a clearer civil society emphasis in the national and also transnational context. The civil society definition provides a clear state position, because, when the social dynamics are added to spheres, political society`s position in the forms of state becomes much clearer. The last reason is being able to update a Coxian interpretation for the contemporary context. Thus, following Sinclair (2016), we only add social dynamics into the spheres of structure. Our analysis will be based upon one triangle and one diamond (see Figure 3.5; Figure 3.6).




Figure 3.5: *Structural Causes in this research*




Figure 3.6: *Structural Spheres in this research*

3.4. Theoretical Framework on Oil Diversification Motivations

Hegemony is the basic concept of a Coxian global politics interpretation; however, hegemony is not constructed by just material based effects but also ideational factors. The US is the hegemony of the world and its current structure can be understood as a unipolarity. The US` hegemony is based on material and ideational factors, but there is also a discussion whether US is hegemony or empire (Cox 204). Empire reflects more material based acts (e.g. military interventions, economic sanctions). Although unipolarity still continues, its contents and interpretations by other countries has been changing. While the image of empire rather than hegemony is caused by US foreign policies, reaction of the empire affects US foreign policies and domestic politics. Besides these discussions over how US policies are directed to change the US image as an Empire in the global context should be examined. This is how social forces, forms of state and world order are entering into foreign policy analysis. These three spheres of historical structures reflect structure`s itself and its changing dynamics. Global economics and social markets on the one side and the Westphalian state order on the other side cannot be ignored. These factors must be used and a Coxian structural analysis has already been mentioned in the section of “Reflection of Cox”.

The basic elements of the structure, thereby hegemony, are material capabilities, ideas and institutions. These three factors decide hegemony, its behaviours and then are affected by hegemony. All these terms also have a reciprocal relationship with historical structures (i.e. social forces, world order, forms of state and social dynamics). Thus, current material capabilities, ideas and institutions are decided by historical structures and in the time process they can cause new historical structures. Why we name them as causes rather than forces will be discussed in the Methodology (chapter 4).

Oil as a commodity is one of the most important topics in this context. It has global importance; moreover, it can also be considered a

strategic commodity (see Chapter 2). Thus, oil's importance is not limited to only economic, but also political, factors. While some states use it as an 'oil weapon', others try to decrease vulnerability to this 'oil weapon'. Terrorist organizations see the importance of oil and act accordingly. Beyond these problems, oil is a commodity and it is used to improve or maintain life conditions. It is a main commodity for supporting the welfare state, which is the source of legitimacy in modern era. It means that oil also has an importance for social factors. Thus, we see reciprocal interaction between economics, politics and social aspects on the oil issue. On the other hand, the importance of oil diversification policies has already been mentioned (see Chapter 2).

The strategic importance of oil can be studied in terms of material capabilities and institutions. Oil has a material capabilities context and there are institutions for energy and more specifically oil (e.g. EIA, OPEC). Moreover, oil is not an isolated topic from the global political economy, so non-oil institutions can also interfere with the oil market. On the other hand, ideas increase the importance of society in different aspects. The importance of legitimacy and absolute limits of identity increase the importance of society. There can also be ideational splits. Thus, causes of a historical structure (i.e. ideas, material capabilities and institutions) include and interact with forces of oil structures. However, it is worth reminding ourselves that this is the structure of *American Empire*, *Westphalian inter-state system* and *civil society*. These conceptions, which are established by Cox according to structural spheres, are the assumptions used in this study. Thus, we are investigating operationalized versions of structural causes in relation to oil diversification motivations (see Figure 3.7; Figure 3.8), but the system is determined by structural spheres that are already given by Cox's explanation. We will use structural causes to uncover process, but also investigate our structural sphere contribution (i.e. social dynamics).




Figure 3.7: Structural Causes




Figure 3.8: *Structural Causes` operationalisation on US oil diversification*

4. Methodology: Operationalizing Cox

This chapter explains the methodological basis of the thesis, showing how the thesis objectives were addressed in practice during the thesis research. These objectives were tackled by using a reflexivity approach, which draws upon identification of US oil diversification motivations amongst policymakers to analyse them using the Coxian 'triangle' of structural causes and spheres. More specifically, it employed a historicist approach to detecting these motivations.

The remainder of this chapter adopts the following structure. Firstly, it outlines the ontological and epistemological discussions in the literature and the basis of the research, which is reflexivity. Secondly, it then describes why a historicist (and specifically historical-dialectical) approach was considered suited to meeting the objectives outlined. The research used qualitative data from documentary and elite interviewing sources to uncover patterns of oil diversification motivations predicted by the theory in each policy case, along with the rationales cited by actors as being especially significant to its development. In terms of comparative historical analysis, the logic behind the case selection and the roles of the three cases are detailed. They are followed by a description of how historicism will be interpreted in the cases. Finally, this chapter details the self-reflexive investigation adopted along with the researcher's perspective on how knowledge will be produced in the study.

4. 1. The Philosophy of Research

Research methods should be based on a coherent ontological, epistemological and methodological approach. All of these three key elements should be supported by well-informed collection and interpretation of data. To maintain coherency, the ontological, epistemological and methodological approaches should be identified, and then the researcher's own approaches should be detailed – which is a particularly important when using a reflexivity perspective.

4.1.1. Science and Paradigms

In explaining the thesis research, the notion of a 'paradigm' will be employed to inform the methods. To understand different paradigms in the social sciences, thereby IR, the meaning of a paradigm should be defined initially. To define what a paradigm is, its historical roots should be understood. Thus, the historical roots of research paradigms will be introduced shortly.

Following on from Hume, Descartes and Kant's notion of causality, rationality and knowledge discussions, which will be discussed below in terms of their positivism roots, the Vienna Circle members as logical empiricists introduce a more mathematics and logics weighted explanation of science. Thus, in this view ideas are not derived from experience as Hume and Descartes assert, rather derived from pure reason as Kant believes (Jackson 2011). This belief in analytical truth is predicated on the *verifiability principle* and eliminates meaning-based phrases with *logical analysis* (Neufeld 1995: 26). In opposition to this view, Karl Popper replaces *verifiability* with *falsifiability*. It is the inversion of the Cartesian problem (Jackson 2011). Thus, along with mind-world dualism, falsification does "the testing of hypothetical conjectures about the world against that world, and seeing which conjectures survive the process" and seeks to disprove "falsehoods" (Jackson 2008: 135). This dualist critique of earlier thinking asserts that "we know more than we did before" and we are always getting "nearer to the truth" (Popper 1970: 57). This is the 'cumulative' sense of the Popperian idea. In this respect, "Preconceived theory" is more important than experience and observation (Popper 1970: 52).

Following Popper, two lines of thought have been established by Imre Lakatos (1970a) and Thomas Kuhn (2012 [1962]). Kuhn adopts a more opposed position than Lakatos against Popper. Unlike Popper's notion of the growth of knowledge, Kuhn asserts that there are *discontinuous jumps* between paradigms and "moments where an old paradigm, the worth of which has been called into question by a plethora of *unresolved puzzles* [italics added], is replaced wholesale by a radically different set of assumptions" (Jackson 2011: 55). This

revolutionary jump rarely happens and paradigms cannot be commensurable, because Kuhn's paradigmatic argumentation includes more socialisation perceptions. On the other hand, as a student of Popper, Lakatos defends the idea that a process of learning occurs from errors, which derives from Popper. However, he accepts Kuhn's discontinuous jumps and the uncertainty of falsification (Jackson 2011). Lakatos' study is predicated on paradigmatic explanations, using the notion of a *scientific research* programme (Lakatos 1970b).

Paradigms are determined by three key assumptions, which are ontology, epistemology and methodology. In defining terms, "[o]ntology is the study of being that is the nature of existence and what constitutes reality" (Gray 2014: 19). In other words, an ontology is a worldview that informs how researchers perceive reality. Thus, the ontology asks about the world "what is there that can be known about it?" (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 185). There are two ontological positions: foundationalism, which believes there is a *real world out there*, independent of our knowledge; and, anti-foundationalism which sees the *world as socially constructed*. It is worth pointing out that the first ontology informs natural sciences and most elements of social sciences. In contrast, the second ontology determines that the observer is in the observation area and he/she is interacting with the social process being studied.

While ontology "relates to the nature of the social and political world", epistemology is about "what can be known about it" (Hay 2007: 117). Thus, we initially accept that whether the world does/does not exist independent of our knowledge (i.e. ontology), then we try to understand what knowledge means in relation to this worldview (i.e. epistemology). Besides that, the research methodology which is influenced by "the theoretical perspectives adopted by the researcher, and, in turn, by the researcher's epistemological stance" exists to determine data gathering and help interpret it (Gray 2014: 19). For this thesis, a reflexivity epistemology is adopted, grounded in anti-foundationalist ontology. This stance in turn determines a more

qualitative research method. A justification for this position is now made along with a brief critique of alternative epistemologies.

4.1.2. Alternative Paradigms

In this research, an anti-foundationalist (i.e. mind-world monism) ontology, which accepts that the observer is intertwined with the observed, will be used. This ontology is mainly opposed to a positivist epistemology. We believe that mind-world monism provides us with a more general and holistic perspective to understand (and not only explain) social phenomena. Mind-world monism should not be interpreted as a position which is against quantitative and materialistic approaches. However, in this study, a qualitative approach will be used through collecting and interpreting of data, and material realities will be studied alongside ideational factors.

There are two main ontological approaches in the philosophy of sciences which are “Foundationalist/Objectivist/Realist” and “Anti-Foundationalist/Constructivist/Relativist” (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 185). As can be deduced from their names, foundationalism has been the main scientific approach for hundreds of years. Because constructivism (this constructivism is not the political constructivism in IR) has been developed in contrast to naturalism, it is also called anti-foundationalism. The roots of foundationalism rely on Western Enlightenment thinkers. Some of them need to be mentioned, because reflexivity approaches’ basic themes depend on Western thinkers such as Kant, Hegel and Marx (Neufeld 1995). The foundationalist approaches’ basic theme is mind-world dualism. Descartes is one of the most important figures in developing this notion. For Descartes, “absolute certainty of his own existence extended only as far as his mental processes” (Jackson 2011: 46). Thus, he isolated the mind from the rest of the world with the help of rationality. In contrast to Descartes, Hume asserts that “our ideas are not innate to us but arise from experience” (Kurki 2008: 34). Knowledge is defined by individual observed events and observations are transmitted perceptions. Knowledge is created beyond impression-derived ideas. This idea led Hume to develop scepticism

about what can be known, however, the important point for us is that he also followed mind-world dualism like Descartes. Responding to them, Kant agrees with Hume about what constitutes the Real World, however, for him the mind acts as an interpreter of impressions. Thus, “Kant shifted the ontological terrain from nature to the human mind” (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 176). This argument is very important, because natural worlds and laws of nature arise from the Human Mind, not from nature or Real World observations as previous thinkers believed. Consequently, the Real World (the *noumena*) cannot be observed and we only interpret our perceptions of it (the *phenomena*). After that point, we see in the literature counterarguments to objectivist/naturalist arguments, because the human mind became the central point of Kantian arguments.

Dualism has two main components, which are externality and determinacy (Jackson 2008). Whereas externality is derived from an object-subject separation, determinacy is derived from natural law. In terms of knowledge, valid knowledge mirrors the world, because knowledge corresponds to the world. However, we see it specifically in positivism, rather than realism (this is not political realism in IR), because according to realists, there are also unobservable realities. Moreover, if we separate realism as scientific realism (Putnam 1982) and critical realism (Bashkar 2008), critical realism adds a more social element to the conception of scientific knowledge.

In contrast to them, mind-world monism does not believe in the central importance of thoughts/actions/discourses but there are also things (the world) that should be understood. Thus, monism is not simply idealism, dualism or materialism. For example, political constructivist theory in IR is identified with asserting the importance of ideas/social elements to state decision-making (Wendt 1987); however, it accepts object-subject separation and proponents are defined as critical realists. For Critical Realists, although social phenomena are ontologically subjective, epistemologically objective statements are possible (Searle 1995). It therefore asserts a more value-orientation than positivist approaches. Thus, dualism and monism cannot be

separated as materiality and ideationally, but in terms of how the observer sees world (see Figure 4.1.). After consideration of how these positions interpret the world, a classification might be complicated.




Figure 4.1: *Furlong and Marsh`s (2010: 186) Epistemology figure*

Positivism and realism have a foundationalist ontology. While positivism’s basic assumptions depend on observations from the real world, as realists believe that all observation is mediated by theory. Both sides agree about the causal relationship between social phenomena. However, realism and interpretivism do not believe that a separation of empirical and normative values presents value free explanation (Furlong and Marsh 2010). In terms of the Kantian view, William Whewell presents us with clear constructivist arguments (see Moses and Knutsen 2012). In terms of methodology, he (2012 [1840]) believes that scientists do not begin with observations, rather with questions. After finding possible answers, they test them in a process of active tinkering. In terms of ontology, the independent Real World presumption is limited to foundationalists.

In the interpretivist position there is no objective truth in terms of methodology, because the world is socially constructed. Social phenomena are interpreted according to the researchers’ perception. Even the term `science` is contestable in the social context. In terms of ontology, constructivists believe in mind-world monism. Although the physical world is material, we cannot say the same thing in the

social world context, because there are many social worlds. In terms of epistemology, they are pluralists. Thus, “knowledge is carried by individuals but anchored in collectives” (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 200). In terms of methodology, they accept regularities and patterns like positivists, but they believe that these patterns are socially constructed. However, according to postmodernist Gray (2014: 20), interpretivists believe that “meaning is *constructed* not discovered [italics from original]”. It means subjects construct their own meaning in different ways, even in the same phenomena. Thus, they use a *being* ontology such as foundationalists, rather than a *becoming* ontology. Although we agree with Gray’s (2014) criticism, his argument is more structural based. However, actors are constructing reality in respect of what they have discovered. On the other hand, King, Keohane and Verba (1994) believe that interpretivism can be accepted in methodology. They (1994) see interpretivism as a next step of scientific inferences.

In summary, all three methodologies are evident in the social sciences. The problem for foundationalist perspectives, which are linked to positivism and realism, is that when they separate the observer and observed, they also separate facts and values in society. Society is, however, made by values and objective observation then becomes impossible. They can only be found via consideration of changing dynamics in human nature, including the researcher’s perceptions.

4.1.3 Reflexivity

In this research, the observer will be accepted in the observed context. Monist ideas will provide us with a more value based approach. But also we accept a *being* ontology (Parmenides) inside of a *becoming* ontology (Heraclitus), so we can see more general patterns of life in terms of change, and reflections of these patterns in specific moments and places. Changing in being is accepted as a guiding principle for research investigation and it will be captured across a period of time through adoption of a reflexivity approach. When we say reflexivity, we mean critical reflexivity which in turn is inspired by Critical Theory.

In the social sciences, thereby in IR, the ignorance of human values and an ahistorical approach which belongs to positivism lead to a search for new methodologies to support constructivist interpretivism. At this point, critical theory (e.g. Frankfurt School, Feminism, neo-Marxism) emerges as helpful. While some believe postmodernism is located in critical theory (Neufeld 1993), others put postmodernism as a different side of the anti/post-positivist perspective (Gray 2014). Critical Theory and reflexivity consider the knowledge-production relationship much more than interpretivism. It establishes a relationship between ideas and materials, which is important because human life is conditioned by both. Although critical theorists try to move away from universal-covering laws and deductive-nomological explanations associated with positivism (Neufeld 1995), they try to uncover universal principles, rather than focusing on local contingencies such as interpretivists do (Chernoff 2007). Universal principles are necessary, because, although problem-solving theories are criticised, their successful explanations cannot be ignored (Cox 1987). To understand general patterns of universal truths or “rationally knowable principles”, which are inspired by Ibn Khaldun and Vico, new approaches should be found (Cox 1992: 148).

To understand what reflexivity encompasses and where reflexivity is located within IR, a short review of IR arguments will be given. There are three main debates in IR. The *first debate* is realism versus liberalism. The *second debate* is history versus science. The *third debate* is positivism versus post-positivism. Compared to the first two debates, the *third debate* is not about “individual propositions or hypotheses, but in terms of larger conceptual schemes”, because it is more about specifying the “analytic framework” for IR research (Neufeld 1993: 61). Thus, we see more of a paradigmatic discussion within this debate (Cox and Sjolander 1994). Reflexivity which is a part of post-positivism (Neufeld 1993) has three key terms. In essence, these themes relate to “the preoccupation with meta-scientific units (paradigmatism), the concern with underlying premises and assumptions (perspectivism), and the drift towards methodological

pluralism (relativism)” (Lapid 1989: 239). Beyond the three debates, Kurki (2008: 89) believes that rationalism has changed within positivism in IR in the last decade and there is a new (i.e. *fourth*) debate between “reflectivists” and “rationalists”. Rationalists identify themselves in comparison with the reflectivists (Keohane 1988). It can also be interpreted as a paradigmatic debate.

The roots of reflexivity rely on three Enlightenment thinkers, Kant, Hegel and Marx (Neufeld 1995). As a reply to Descartes, Kant asserts that empirical reality is apprehended in *a priori* categories of the mind. There is clearly a monist perspective to this thinking. However, looking for the universality of reason ignores societal constructions that are an interaction of autonomous individuals. On that point, Hegel uses intersubjectivity and human consciousness to solve this problem (Neufeld 1995). *A priori* has evolved to address the categories of reason and the world history consciousness of freedom is a central tenet (Hegel 1988: 163). While reason has become a central tenet, world history depends on rationality and reason has changed in the time period (Jackson 2011). Although its rationality emphasis resembles the arguments of Descartes, the temporal structure of reason emphasis is a major difference. At that point, it is seen that the roots of Critical Theory; “Critical theoretical reflection would be understood to involve more than the questions (Kant) would be seen to [entail] a critique of rational action or forms of life” (Hegel)” (Neufeld 1995; 18). Thus, “the role of critique” is “more than `negative judgement””, because it includes historical movements (ibid.). Whereas Hegel uses the creative role of `Geist` (spirit), he also uses self-reflection of *Geist*. Thus, his critique is not against mainstream approaches, but to human life itself. Later on, Marx transfers Hegel`s *reason to labor*. Thus, the historical-dialectic which is a central point of critical reflexivity is used in Hegel`s history by thinking (Leysens 2008), but it is used in Marx`s history with thinking and acting. For Marx, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it” (Marx 1975 [1845]: 30), i.e. it has a normative dimension.

Positivism asserts mind-world dualism and also the limitation of knowledge to experience. Because of this *hypotheses testing* and *empirical generalisation* has become a central point (Chernoff 2007). On the other hand, critical realists believe in the existence of the real-but-unobservable realities. To explain this, past experience has become a central point. This leads to a more *transcendental argument* (Jackson 2011: 156). However, the future might be different from what happened in the past. As an alternative to both positions:

“Reflexivity grounds or warrants empirical claims by relating them neither to a mind-independent world nor to a set of cultural values, but to the practices of knowledge production themselves” (Jackson 2011: 157)

While reflexivists do not separate the observer from the observed, they also do not separate knowledge from the *social position of scientific researcher*. However, there is no strong *cultural values* emphasis in reflexivity, because the knowledge and interests/power relationship is a central point. On this point, Cox’s often quoted sentence summarises his central approach “Theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose [italics from original]” (Cox 1981: 128). A scientific researcher’s *self-awareness* is consequently an important aspect to how theory is used. Knowledge is not derived from the external world but from “our” world (Neufeld 1993: 57). Consequently, knowledge is not only grounded in a foundationalist belief of senses or observation, because “knowledge is developed in a circular and not linear way” (Chernoff 2007: 137).

In short, there are three core elements of reflexivity in IR; “self-awareness”, “politico-normative dimension of paradigms” and an “absence of natural observation language” (Neufeld 1993: 55). The first element relates to the position of the observer in the observed. The second element is about value free understanding, which is derived from Comte, the Vienna Circle and Popper. Reflexivity does not separate value from facts. When we transfer it to politics, it means power and morality are intertwined. Both terms are defined in the

specific paradigm. There is no universal power and morality definition. Thus, relating these views to our case, US oil diversification motivations will be looked under the specific paradigm which shows time gaps and its global politics structure. The last element is about “active and vital role played by the community of researchers in the production and validation of knowledge” (Neufeld 1993: 56). The “truth as correspondence” is therefore opposed by reflexivity (Neufeld 1993: 55).

Using reflexivity protects us from the ontology and epistemology contradiction which exists in positivism. Whereas object and subject are separated, the researcher should find objective forces in social interactions. However, there are no objective forces. Because of this, these interactions are inferred by behaviour. Thus, interactions, which are actually intersubjective meanings, are explained in terms of behaviour (Sanders 2002). However, actors’ behaviour affects others’ behaviour, because actors do not communicate *in* behaviour, rather *through* behaviour (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 765). Each side is intersubjectively affected by others’ behaviour. It is a reflection of a reciprocal causality in terms of human context. Reciprocal causality provides us with a more general understanding of possibilities, because we are not limited by behaviouralism’s one-sided explanations. We believe Cox’s (1986) stance, which has a historical-dialectical approach and prioritises intersubjective practices, can be conceptualized according to reflexivity. Reflexivity aims at “opening up the positivist epistemology to more interpretive strains” and aiming to solve the ontology and epistemology contradiction (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 766).

In the literature, there is a difference in usage of *reflexivity* and *reflectivity*. Critical theorists use the term reflexivity, because reflexive science makes “a claim about the mind-world hook-up characteristic of its practitioners” (Jackson 2011: 158). On the other hand, foundationalists use the term reflectivity, because reflectivists emphasize the importance of human reflection (Keohane 1988). However, there is a difference between *reflexive* science and human

capacity for *reflection*. We defend the science of *reflexivity*. Reflexive science has a scientific explanation of human reflection. Although at this point we need to define what we mean by science. Natural and social sciences sometimes do not use the same methodologies. But under the term *science*, they should have common points. Jackson (2011: 193-195) draws a very clear picture of science with three key points. Firstly, the methodology should be clear and systematic (ibid.). Secondly, systematic connection should consider “explicitly or tacitly rules and procedures that other members of the scientific community acknowledge”, thus public criticism is important (ibid.). Lastly, it must be worldly knowledge which means “realms of actuality that a methodology takes to exist, whether that realm of actuality is limited to phenomenal experience or whether it also includes real-but-undetectable dispositional causal powers or yet-to-be-realized dialectical syntheses of divergent perspectives and the social group that hold them” (ibid.). If research meets these three requirements, we can accept it as a ‘science’. Thus, the term ‘social science’ can and will be used in this thesis.

In comparing reflexivity and reflectivity, the source of any definitional problems is terminological ambiguity. According to the Macmillan Dictionary (2017), reflect means “to show the existence or nature of something”, while reflex means “a movement that your muscles make without you thinking about it or being able to control it”. While ‘reflect’ defines both the passive act of revealing and the active act of reflection on something (Hamati-Ataya 2012), reflex defines a specific (re)action and subject-based understanding. This subject-based interpretation underlies its epistemic/ontological frame (Fierke 2002). As a science method, reflexivity is “a self-defining process that depends on monitoring of and reflection upon, psychological and social information about possible trajectories of life” (Elliott 2001: 37). Thus, while reflexivity asserts “reflection-in-action”, reflectivity accepts “reflection-on-action” (D`Cruz et al 2007: 85). The important difference between reflexive and reflection arise from here. While reflection-on-action means a more determinative process, reflection-in-action

means much indeterminate acting. Actors also act *through* behaviour rather than *in* behaviour, because behaviour in the latter is affected by events/behaviours in the process. Thus, reflexes are indeterminate, immediate and non-linear (Lash 2003). Moreover, there is also critical reflexivity:

“Critical reflexivity is therefore not a way of purifying the social scientist’s own view of a situation, but is instead a way of making sure that this view is sufficiently rooted in the concrete situation of the group with whom the social scientist is aligned – the social group whose vision she or he seeks to advance” (Jackson 2011: 176)

Although Critical Reflexivity looks to a conception of knowledge-production, knowledge is related with lived social practice rather than cultural values (Jackson 20011). Culture cannot be prioritized, because human society is bound up in organizational structures, norms, behaviours and ideologies (Freire 1972, cited in Cunliffe 2004: 409). Thus, critical reflexivity prioritizes how knowledge is constructed through our interaction.

In order to see and show the knowledge construction process, the researcher of this study used critical reflexivity. For example, he wrote a diary in the US, when he collected data to allow subsequent reflection on personal biases and contexts during data interpretation. It means that methodological reflexivity was used in terms of self-consciousness, which is a “canonical feature of participant-observation” (Lynch 2000: 29). The researcher subsequently cares about “reflective and refractive processing of `reality`; the dependence of appearances on observational `standpoints`; and the need to correct biases that distort ... access to the object of study” (ibid.).

The main focus for reflexivity is how knowledge is structured and how the research process evolves through time. Thus, reflexivity requires a historicist perspective rather than causal analysis (Kurki 2008). By not following causal analysis, it therefore provides “data-driven study” rather than “data-centred approaches” (Alvesson and Sköldberg

2009: 283). Reflexivity means that data, and thereby data analysis, is still important but data analysis must be combined with temporal, spatial and contextual dimensions. This understanding of data requires much more qualitative interpretation rather than quantitative, however, it does not mean that quantitative methods cannot be used. Therefore, in practice “[i]f we can avoid the trap of regarding quantitative results as robust and unequivocal reflections of a reality ‘out there’, there is no reason to be rabidly “anti-quantitative” (Alvesson and Sköldbberg 2009: 8). Here, we can alter Furlong and Marsh’s (2010: 186) figure to illustrate this observation (Figure 4.2):




Figure 4.2: *Redux of Furlong and Marsh’s (2010: 186) figure*

Reflexivity is not merely related to a historicist perspective, it also includes knowledge-production and how knowledge-producers are located in ethical meaning (Hamati-Ataya 2012). Thus, reflexivity is also important in terms of ethics. When we say ethics we give two different meanings which are “procedural ethics” and “ethics in practice” (Guillemin and Gillam 2004: 261). As can be deduced from its name, procedural ethics is, for example, the completion of the application form mentioned in the ‘data collection’ section of this thesis. But we also need to move beyond this rather instrumental interpretation to consider ‘ethics in practice’, i.e. how can ethics be connected with reflexivity? The answer starts with the how question, because the reflexivist researcher asks two questions, which are “What do I know?” and “How do I know what I know?” (Hertz 1997, viii). Highly related to these questions is the ‘how is knowledge

generated?` question. In order to respond to this question the process between values and research must be considered. A researcher's choice of "research design", "research methodology" and "theoretical framework" are governed by the researcher's values and how these values are shaped (Guillemin and Gillam 2004: 274). To realize this process, ethical priorities lead to this process, which is critical reflexivity or being reflexive.

In summary, using reflexivity provides advantages compared to other methodologies. The knowledge and production relationship is a key point in the reflexivist methodology. When reflexivism analyses the knowledge process in the production process, it tries to establish universal understanding rather than local (i.e. interpretivism), but also moves away from universal law (i.e. positivism). Secondly, the knowledge process is prevented from hypotheses testing (i.e. positivism) and experience based (i.e. critical realism) and establishes a non-linear direction which means complex realities in social phenomena. Thirdly, as a post-positivist methodology, reflexivity accepts three main points which are paradigmaticism, perspectivism and relativism. It provides us with a more holistic, more relativistic and more historically contingent approach. Fourthly, although reflexivist arguments are framed against a positivist approach, their roots also depend on Enlightenment thinkers. The critique does not only mean going against a positivist approach, it also encompasses the critical roots of social phenomena. It provides us with a more active understanding. This point will be detailed in the next section. Fifthly, reflexivity insulates us from the ontology versus epistemology contradiction in the positivist sense. Behaviour's effect in social life is very clearly positioned and arguably more realistic than how positivism understands it. Lastly, reflexivity provides us with the consideration of an ethical dimension in terms of `ethics in practice`, because it recognises the importance of `being reflexive`.

Coxian IR theory is based on a power and morality relationship. Reflexivity's knowledge process and its universal principles are highly connected by this relationship. The terms of power and morality have

a universal and perpetual existence, but their meaning changes through space and time dimensions. Under global world conditions, universal principles can be found with the help of reflexivity. The complexity character of reflexivity is the other benefit for combination with a Coxian IR interpretation. There is a reciprocal relationship in the social context. A cause-effect dimension is often hard to establish, but finding general patterns-based process is a shared characteristic between Cox and reflexivity. Historical perception and the importance of paradigms are another point. While there are paradigms in the philosophy of science context (reflexivity is one argument), there are also paradigms of global politics (e.g. a Coxian argument). It means that there are historical structures in global politics and these have been changing according to general findable patterns and recent developments. Lastly, a *being* in a *becoming* ontological assumption combines well with creative critical theory. An effort to see changes over the general patterns provides a creative and productive interpretation ability. Belief of general patterns in global politics provides the ability to depict rather than predict, because there is no law-like repetitive events in the social area. Thus, events cannot be predicted. In addition to a *becoming* ontology, acceptance of a *being* (passive) ontology can help us to see specific moments with a timeless perception, like problem-solving theories. Thus, while a *becoming* ontology provides us with a diachronic perspective, a *being* ontology provides a synchronic perspective as Cox identifies (Cox and Schechter 2002). Problem-solving theories` power is derived from their *being* ontology which considers a time-specific moment and place, but they lack explanatory power when compared to a diachronic perspective.

4.2. Design Considerations

A research design was required that met the thesis objectives (see Chapter 1), encompassing both data collection and data analysis. These objectives were addressed through use of a historicist design

using an embedded single case study of US oil diversification motivations.

4.2.1. Historicism

In this research, historicism (or otherwise the Historical Method) was used. When we say historicism, we specifically mean a critical reflexivist historicism which is inspired by the historical-dialectic; which is a common characteristic of the work of Hegel and Marx. We use historicism, because it is not only suitable for addressing the research objectives it is also necessary. Critical reflexivity and its roots, which is critical theory, see people as historical agents (Budd 2008: 176). Reflexivity's arguments are therefore predicated on a historical base.

Historicism can be understood through its causality understanding originally provided by Hume. There are four main Humean conceptions of causation which are "regular patterns of occurrences", "patterns of *observable* [italics from original]", "regulatory-deterministic" understandings and "efficient (moving) causes" (Kurki 2008: 6). This explanation of nature belongs to the natural world. Whereas nature is observed, empirical generalisations are fabricated under general law. However, in social phenomena, the conditions of life are always changing. These changes happen under a conflict model (Cox 1976). Thus, social phenomena continue with antinomies. Reflexive causation explains social phenomena with; "dialectical interplay between social conditions and explicit efforts to delineate them" (Jackson 2011: 199), because "for reflexivists, knowledge itself causes and is caused by the operation of broader social forces" (ibid.). While we consider the changing of social forces, we can see unresolved tensions in the historical-dialectical approach. Consequently, critical reflexivists are not against everything that foundationalists argue, as Mearsheimer (1994) believes. Rather they criticise natural explanations of the social sciences and embrace the critique of existence in social life. Thus, this critique is not only conducted in a pejorative sense, there is also a positive meaning

(Guess 1981). This critique does not only analyse, it also directs us to current conditions.

According to Kurki (2008: 7), Hume's model does not present historical, qualitative and interpretive approaches in the social sciences methodologically, leading to the need to set objectivists' aims for social knowledge epistemologically. It also poses difficulties in seeing unobservable causes such as ideas and reasons ontologically. Because of these reasons, reflexivists reject the Humean causation concept and as historians, they "should not even think about causality in the natural science sense of the term. For the historian the *causal chain of events* would emerge naturally [italics added]" (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 125). As critical theorists, reflexivists follow historical analysis, because they see "people as historical agents who are participants in action as well as being subject to action" (Budd 2008: 176). They try to uncover unfolding patterns that culminate in and clarify the present in history (Jackson 2011). Reflexivity's history interpretation is the same as Cox's (1976: 175) understanding of history as *cyclical* rather than *circular*. Thus, history is an ongoing process and is characterised by change rather than continuity, not progress or repeating realities such as foundationalists believe (Keohane 1988). Further to this point, historicism protects from the ahistorical explanations of foundationalism. If we are insulated from ahistorical explanation, what are we gaining? Foundationalism relies on naturalist explanation, which is law-like explanation of social and international life. Thus, in this view what has happened until now, will happen in the future. There is predictability in social life for them. However, logic tells us there are no such repeatable patterns, i.e. history is manifestly not replicable. We can only find general patterns of replication amongst social processes which are separated by time periods.

Whereas foundationalism uses law like patterns and deterministic explanation, they also protect the *status quo*, because according to them, whatever exists now, existed in the past and will therefore exist in the future (Nicholson 1996). For example, current explanations and

theories depend on nation-state realities; however, in history there has not always been a nation-state structure. To avoid this problem, historicism can help us to move away from foundationalism's determinism. Reflexivist historicism does not totally disagree with determinism or discount unchanging patterns; however, it believes that they exist in a non-linear way and more importantly that determinants are not purely predetermined (Germain and Kenny 1998). Society is always changing and conflicts which affect history constantly emerge. Patterns exist but they are always evolving because of their socialisation roots (Kellner 1989).

Reflexivist historicism is also different from Historical Materialism and in need of further explanation. Historical Materialism also depends on a deterministic approach. One deterministic dimension is that the "economic base determined the superstructure" and the other is that "laws of history, rooted in the economy, determined the trajectory of all social life" (Kellner 1989). However, historicism should also rely on subjectivity, culture and action, because besides material factors, there are also ideational factors. Thus, there is also conflict between ideas and materials. This reciprocity relationship insulates us from "one-way determinism" (Cox 1981: 136). Moreover, we do not struggle with structural explanations like foundationalists and Marxists do. "Structure" exists, but it "is transformed by agency" (Gill 1993: 23). Thus, determinations are influenced by social phenomena. This leads to a move away from a cumulative or progressive knowledge process (Neufeld 1993). At this point, it should be understood why reflexivist historicism is closer to the paradigms of Kuhn (2012 [1962]) rather than scientific research programmes (Lakatos 1970b). Whereas, Kuhn (2012 [1962]) emphasises revolutionary change, Lakatos (1970b) does not discount Popper's notion that learning occurs from errors. Thus, progress of ideas is seen in the arguments of Lakatos (1970b); however, there is an incommensurability emphasis in the work of Kuhn (2012 [1962]).

In the positivist sense, it is argued that there is a separation of events from ideas. However, reflexivist historicism tries to look at events from

a more holistic perspective, thus we see the link with ideas. This historicism approach can be seen in events at three different points, image of society, material conditions and structural changes (Leysens 2008: 32). While these parts have contradictions in themselves, there is also a reciprocity relationship between them. On that point, we should look at Carr (1987[1961]). Although Carr is a political realist, he does not use problem-solving theory like Morgenthau (1993 [1948]) or Waltz (1979). His approach is rooted in a “historical mode of thought” (Cox 1981: 131). In history, Carr (1987: Chapter 1 and Chapter 2) sees the dialectic between the historian and his/her facts, and dialectic between society and the individual. These ideas are not different from reflexivist historicism, as is mentioned in the reflexivity title. The question is how does Carr do it? Here, it is suggested that “Causes and effect are not generalizable and `isolable`; so he saw the world consisting of `reciprocal causalities`: various structures, agents, events as well as process exerting influence on each other” (Kurki 2008: 93). Further to this point, reflexivity’s close relationship with political classical-realism arises. Rather than accepting a structural based neo-realist approach, it accepts a “structural-critical” one (Leysens 2008: 68). Structural actors (e.g. institutions) are not accepted as a given, rather as made. For example, “The word “data” derives from the verb “to give” (dare, datum); and the word “fact” derives from the verb “to make” (facere, factum): a given is just there; a fact presupposes a maker and the maker’s purpose” (Cox 2008: 89). Value and facts are not separated.

Reflexivist historicism and its definition of history are therefore explained. However, a new question then arises; how do we read history, or current history? Or, how can problem-solving theory’s successful explanation be explained? There are two concepts of relevance here: synchronic and diachronic (see Chapter 3). The synchronic concept “describe[s] certain conceptual division[s] within a given domain of social reality at a specific point in time”, whereas the diachronic concept “trace[s] historical stages of development from one era to the next” (Kellner 1989: 8). Thus, like a traditional theory, it is a

snapshot of structure of society in a specific moment of time, much like a photograph. But it is followed by a historical perspective of process. There are so many realms such as politics, economy, culture, society and the relationship and contradictions between these areas which are mediations. A synchronic perspective can capture this `mediated totality` through depicting them through time.

In short, there are four points characterizing a reflexivist historicism approach, which are forwarded by Leysens (2008: 21) and inspired by Cox (1976). Firstly, subject and object are accepted in unity, because the subjective ideal and objective conditions of existence are not separated. Secondly, “events (action and thought)” are “locating them within the *larger totality* [italics added]” (ibid.). Thirdly, ideal types (e.g. capitalism) are generalised along with specific historical phases. Lastly, the importance of contradictions in the change process is accepted. In other words (Cox 2008: 88), there is a *becoming* ontology rather than *being*, *complexity* overweighs *causality*, complexity does *not* include a *single force determining* it; rather, it includes interactions in *complexity*, there are *exploratory hypotheses* rather than *universal laws* and the *observer* and *observed* are equally involved in change in the current paradigm. However, although we agree with Cox on these arguments, we believe that *becoming* and *being* ontologies cannot be separated. *Being* exists in *becoming*. Choosing *becoming* rather than *being* leads to uncertainties in Coxian theory (see in Chapter 3).

In summary, reflexivist historicism provides several advantages. Firstly, it protects us from Hume`s ahistorical and anti-qualitative causations, because knowledge is derived from social conditions. Social conditions are made in historical processes. To understand conditions (i.e. synchronic), the historical process should be considered (i.e. diachronic). To understand these social and historical processes, reciprocal causality is used to give a more extended dimensional perception. Secondly, as mentioned in the reflexivity section, the main critique forwarded concerns contradictions in the social conditions. This critique tries to see and explain these

contradictions. Each contradiction creates new events in the global context. Thirdly, reflexivist historicism contrasts with positivism's *status quo* protective structure. Thus, we will not follow a uni-linear deterministic perspective, but to understand global oil diversification conditions we will find general patterns of oil diversification motivations. Lastly, reflexivist historicism also protects from historical materialism's two main faults which are the economic base approach and laws of history. If there is an assumption which believes in the existence of dialectic, we cannot use any area based approach (i.e. economic). Dialectic should also consider the ideas-material interaction. Events arise from that point and we can see the larger picture from these special events. Under the US-based unipolar system, US oil diversification motivations will be our specific topic.

4.2.2. A Comparative Historical Research Design

A comparative historical research design was considered for meeting my objectives for several reasons, but comparative historical analysis' basic points should be explained to show its suitability. Thus, this section will answer the question 'why use comparative historical analysis?' as a first step while the following section (see Duration) will answer the 'how will it be used?' question.

Comparative historical designs embrace multiple case studies of social processes to research and compare specific phenomena in-depth. The importance of these cases relies on the complexity of their contexts (Yin 2009). Cases which have complex contexts can only be understood with the help of comparison (the comparative part) but also with the help of a holistic view (the historical part). A comparative historical design's first importance relies on the difference between quantitative and qualitative comparisons. While quantitative comparisons are based on statistics, qualitative comparisons require holistic perceptions. This perception distinguishes the qualitative-comparative from a quantitative-comparative design (Ragin 1987). While quantitative studies are strongly analytic and produce probabilistic predictions, qualitative studies research events in their contexts and accept them as wholes (Hopkin 2010). As mentioned

above, depiction is prioritized rather than prediction in this research because data-centred and prediction-directed studies are mainly positivist and not associated with a reflexivist epistemology. The second defining feature relates to how they view data. Quantitative analysis asserts that numbers provide a more objective explanation and description of events, but actually “much data used in quantitative political science is qualitative data, coded into numerical form” (Hopkin 2010: 298). Thus, quantitative findings are decided by qualitative analysis. The last significant point relates to the selection of cases. While statistical analysis identifies confounding cases, qualitative research focuses on confounding factors and gives greater attention to the selection of relevant cases (Peters 1998). This difference between qualitative (small-N cases) and quantitative (large-N cases) comparisons can result in large differences in case numbers between designs.

The comparison between quantitative and qualitative comparisons should not mislead us to accept all the current comparative historical literature as relevant (Goldstone 2003; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Mahoney 2004). Not using statistical analysis prevents generalizing causal effects and thus explaining specific outcomes (Mahoney and Villegas 2009). However, it does not mean that comparative historical studies must aim at causal inferences - as Rueschemeyer (1984) and Mahoney (2004) assert. Moreover, historical analysis should not include causal analysis in order to respond to the ‘why’ question and generalize from case studies; rather, it should look at the process in order to respond to the ‘how’ question and be didactical (Moses and Knutsen 2012). Thus, specific cases can be compared with the help of reflexivist epistemology rather than seeking cause-effect relations belonging to a positivist epistemology.

The comparative historical design’s key importance relates to its definition and how it works. It deliberately involves choosing specific cases and then considers historical process (Tilly 1984; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). A key point arises from here. In order to work

with cases from a historical perspective, comparative historical design must use systematic and contextualized comparison (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Osinsky and Eloranta 2014). In the thesis, this design allows the examination of the rationales used by individual actors to justify patterns of US oil diversification motivations.

The target for comparative historical research is to find general patterns of social life from large-scale processes such as policy making. In order to analyse such large-scale processes, a holistic view is required, yet this not only requires a temporal dimension but also a spatial dimension. In terms of spatiality, both the macroscopic level and level of groups and individuals must be considered in a comparative historical design (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003: 7). Thus, we come to the basic problem of global politics, the structure-agency issue. Although the comparative historical approach is interpreted as a structuralist design in the main social science literature (Mahoney 2003), it is not compatible with this research's main assumptions, which are structure-agency and ideas-materials balances in the social context. If the cases are analyzed with a historical perspective all dimensions must be considered. Thus, comparative historical analyses do not have a structuralist feature (Møller 2016).

Use of such a design for this thesis therefore has several advantages over other approaches. Firstly, it allows non-statistical based evidence to be collected on US oil diversification motivations. It has value and history considerations that can see the change and different dimensions in a complex process. Secondly, it allows a systematic and contextualized approach in order to justify US oil diversification motivations. Thirdly, it is highly compatible with this study's theory (see Chapter 3) and its suitability for data analysis. Fourthly, it allows a broad based empirical analysis, through comparing cases within an overall design, thereby strengthening research findings. Fifthly, there is no comparative historical analyses study in terms of US oil diversification in the literature (see Chapter 1), adding methodological novelty to the study. The use of this research design therefore makes

a considerable contribution to the literature. Sixthly, it is useful in countering the agency-structure issue discussed above. Lastly, the use of mixed data types and sources is compatible with a reflexivity epistemology.

4.2.2.1. Case Study Choice

In view of the advantages offered by comparative historical research, this thesis selects three cases of US oil diversification motivations for further investigation within an embedded case design. This commonly-used design ‘embeds’ similar cases within an overarching case (see Yin (2009), giving a multi-level feature to the analysis.

This research investigates US oil diversification motivations by using a different approach to the common “case-oriented” and “variable-oriented” design (Osinsky and Oleranta 2014: 11). The reason for this can be understood by understanding what a reflexivist epistemology necessitates. It does not compare many randomly chosen cases in order to generalize the research findings. However, because only a few cases can necessarily be being targeted if the overall case is US oil diversification, constituent case numbers and their types are still important. In order to provide relations between cases and theory, it is argued that “more cases” means “better” (Peters 1998: 58). However, selection of cases must be made according to some criteria or targets. One of the most important points is that selected cases must be compatible with the research design and objectives (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Moses and Knutsen 2012), i.e. the cases should be deliberately chosen (or ‘situated’ according to Peters 1998) in respect of the design. The other important point relates to theory. Cases are chosen in order to test, elaborate and develop theory (Peters 1998). This research has a theory-oriented approach. In order to provide this coherency, this research will use three cases in terms of US oil diversification motivations, chosen specifically to support the research aims.

In reality, in historical-comparative designs “The ‘cases’ chosen for comparison vary a great deal” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003:

14). Cases can be chosen according to different priorities such as territorial boundaries, temporal dimensions and policy differentiations. However, these priorities must be defined by a target. The most important factor in terms of case choice is finding maximum heterogeneity of conditions and outcomes in order to explain the widest array of data (Gross 2010, in Jordan et al. 2011: 1163). In respect of this heterogeneity, research must be targeted to find certain characteristics of the research topic rather than probabilities (Jordan et al. 2011). Thus, cases are chosen in order to reflect as much of the wider study area as possible. Cases chosen at random without consideration of contexts or conditions cannot be compared. The number of cases should have a connection with the number of conditions (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009). Comparative historical analysis aims to find specific conditions or patterns of social life.

The numbers of cases are another issue. The USA imported crude oil from 79 countries in 2016 (EIA 2017). The cases and the numbers of cases must then reflect the general pattern of US oil diversification motivations on the one hand and must also reflect the empirical depth of US oil diversification motivations on the other hand. In order to get the most compatible cases, they must have coherency with theory. However, within the confines of PhD research, with attendant limitations on time and resources, a compromise must be reached in case choice and case numbers. Three discrete cases studies were therefore selected to show the underlying patterns of US oil diversification motivations. This choice helps to test theory vis-à-vis the necessary empirical depth. It also reflects the case study design requirements discussed above.

Thus, a single-case (embedded) design rather than single-case (holistic) designs, multiple-case (holistic) designs, and multiple-case (embedded) designs (see Figure 4.3) was considered suitable for capturing the US oil diversification motivations. A multiple-case design clearly was not appropriate for the research objectives, since the

research focus on US oil diversification motivations. Embedded single-case designs with multiple units of analysis will be used.




Figure 4.3: Basic types of designs for case studies (Cosmos Corporation, cited in Yin 2009: 46)

4.2.2.2. The Heroic Role of Diverse Cases

Comparative quantitative data can be analysed with statistical methods but qualitative data is “typically rich and complex” making management problematic (Burnham et al. 2008: 88). To overcome this situation, particularly when faced with historical analysis employing qualitative or mixed methods, comparison of suitable cases is required to test theoretical assumptions. However, the suitability of cases varies according to the theory used and ontological-epistemological foundations of the research. One problem is so-called case selection bias ‘commonly understood as occurring when some form of selection process in either design of the study or the real-world phenomena under investigation results in inferences that suffer from systematic error’ (Collier and Mahoney, 1996: 60). For positivists,

selection of comparative cases should then ideally be undertaken on the basis of variance in the independent variables, as determined by the theory employed (Peters 1998). Here, 'most different' case studies can be used to increase variability on such variables (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Peters 1998: 144; Burnham et al. 2008; see also Patton 2002: 234). However, with post-positivist research, different considerations are important, most notably the need to carefully 'situate' the cases used in terms of the theoretical assumptions so that they provide a suitable venue for explaining the object of study, i.e. oil diversification motivations.

The academic literature provides some guidance on comparative historical research design and attendant case choice (e.g. Mahoney and Rueschmayer 2003; Mahoney and Thelen 2015). Typically, these studies tend to frame comparative case selection in terms of positivist, theory-testing rationales that do not fit easily with a post-positivist perspective, which infers three main selection criteria. Another way of viewing case selection therefore is, rather than choosing at random, is to employ cases on the basis of whether they perform a 'heroic' role that represents a picture 'much larger than the case itself' (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 294). In other words, cases should not only be selected according to the theory employed but also where they provide comment (rather than aim at generalisability) on the wider process being studied, which in this thesis is oil diversification policy in the USA. It is worth emphasising that while cases should have heterogeneous points on which they coincide, they should also have internally homogenous processes that do not contradict each other, i.e. be similar in the processes studied but otherwise discrete (ibid.). Then, in this way, the social processes of interest can be isolated for analysis. Finally, the historical 'diachronic-synchronic' emphasis of the theory (Chapter 3) necessitates cases that take a long temporal perspective while also allowing examination of social processes at specific points in time. Case studies in this thesis have therefore been chosen to meet these criteria, to broaden the extent of theoretical testing.

With these criteria in mind, three case studies were selected to uncover US oil diversification motivations patterns via structural causes, ideas, material capabilities and institutions. These cases are the KXL (see Chapter 5), the Iraq War (see Chapter 6) and Arctic Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution (see Chapter 7). The patterns of oil diversification motivations will be uncovered through application of the theory to each case study, when they are analysed together (see Chapter 8).

The KXL case (see Chapter 5) fits the three selection criteria. Firstly, if Cox is correct, state-society complexity and people as historical agents (see Chapter 3) should fit the evolution of oil diversification policy in this selected case. The case should also fit the explanation of Cox on changing global politics from hegemony to empire and changing foreign policy due to declining hegemonic power of the dominant state (see Chapter 3). Here, the KXL case could be considered a 'heroic' case for US oil diversification policy since, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 8, it provides a classic example of how ideas, material capabilities and institutions interact through time in the accumulation of policy in this area. As this thesis shows, this accumulation was not only constructed via the interactions of these different dimensions as there is also an important role for societal participation. Secondly, KXL is both internally and externally consistent. As Chapter 5 shows, it features the homogeneous process of US oil diversification policymaking, set within the broader context of federal energy policy that intersects but does not overlap with the Iraq War and Arctic Drilling/Energy Revolution cases. Finally, it allows a long temporal perspective to be adopted on the accumulation of policy, as dictated by the theory. The case study charts interactions that have occurred over a period of two decades, with political arguments still raging.

The Iraq War case provides a complementary but discrete example for theoretical analysis. Again, it highlights the importance of structural dimensions to understanding the evolution of policy – as discussed in Chapters 6 and 8. To a lesser extent, domestic US social dynamics

played a role in the accumulation of oil diversification policy but were overshadowed by ideas, material capabilities and institutions, which as in the KXL, became operationalised to varying degrees at different points in time. That said, the Iraqi people's reaction to privatisation of Iraqi oil shows a state-society complexity and also encompasses a social dynamics debate. As identified in Chapter 6, these reactions reflexively influenced US oil diversification motivations via the pressure it created on the domestic administration and the US federal government. Changing global politics from hegemony to empire and changing foreign policy due to the declining power of the dominant US state were also critically in evidence in this case, far more than in the KXL example. As identified above, there is complementarity with KXL in terms of a parallel but essentially different set of motivations for oil diversification, yet the case allows a wider, global perspective particularly on the relationship between US foreign and energy policy. Finally, the Iraq War is overtly an ongoing historical process, rather than a single event, and current US oil diversification can only be understood through a temporal perspective.

Finally, the Arctic Drilling/Energy Revolution case is similarly optimal for the thesis research due to its 'heroic', complementary and temporal nature. This case too reflects an operationalised version of structural causes. Ideas as nation- and state-level priorities and as political party differences, material (in)capabilities and institutions are reflected at different time periods in the accumulation of policy. On the other hand, this case also reflects Cox's explanation of global politics. From finding global solutions to energy security to a more US based energy approach is reflected in US oil diversification motivations in this case. While KXL (see chapter 5) will show how much domestic politics, foreign policy in the case of Canada, unstable oil suppliers and oil markets influence US oil diversification motivations, Arctic Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution (see Chapter 7) will demonstrate the importance of private interests that arise out of policy controls on these dynamics. Obviously, foreign policy dynamics will not be related to a specific country, but relate more to US perceptions of itself. As in

the Iraq War case, Arctic Drilling provides a different but largely non-intersecting perspective on US oil diversification to KXL but also constitutes one element of a broader evolving historical process of policy accumulation that can only be understood through a long-run temporal perspective.

Having identified these cases, the thesis then collected data on oil diversification rationales – a process outlined in greater detail below. Data collection itself was determined by both the theoretical framework and the needs of the specific data analysis technique chosen to aid theoretical testing.

4.2.3. Duration

While this work uses a comparative-historical research, it accepts history in terms of three essential features. Firstly, history is a process, i.e. a series of interlinked events. These events 'can be modelled as a function of salient features of the institutional, ideological or social context in which the actor is situated' (Hall 2014: 10). Secondly, any definition of a historical process should, however, recognise that both agency and structure are intertwined. While rational theory explains how individual agency within historical processes is determined according to specific material structures, a more critical theoretical perspective accepts that the two are mutually interlinked. Critical theory is based on historical-dialectic. Both agency and structure and both materials and ideas always affect and are affected by each other. Thus, this process reflects an agency-structure balance. Finally, we must also consider how this balance changes through time, particularly in terms of duration. Three different temporal dimensions are generally understood: duration; tempo (pace); and trajectories (paths) (Aminzade 1992). While pace refers to repetitive events, trajectories implies a sequential order of events (ibid.). However, in the duration perception, time passes, changes occur and they never repeat (Bergson 1998: 46). Thus, although the sequence of events is used, they are not the mere line of history. The sequence of events-based perception requires cause-effect relations, but duration looks

at them from both diachronic and synchronic perspectives in order to see `how` structure changes.

In addition, after collecting data on oil diversification motivations in each of three case studies, the thesis then needed to theoretically analyse them. In other words, a means of linking the empirical evidence to the theoretical framework (Chapter 3) was required. Firstly, this section shows how a duration technique was used to establish the non-causal process analysis. Secondly, it shows the definition of duration and how duration can be interpreted and understood. Thirdly, it shows how these decisions helped the analysis of theory in each case using a `congruence` technique (George and Bennett 2005: 181).

4.2.3.1. Non-Causal Causal analysis

In the `Reflexivity` section, a causation perception is already mentioned, but needs to be emphasised in more detail here. For Kurki (2008: 10), in order to avoid `metaphysical questions`, a causation problem is accepted in an epistemological (e.g. can we know causes?) or methodological sense (e.g. what methods should we use for causal analysis?) rather than ontological. However, causes do exist in ontological entities and they are not found in patterns of events. Thus, a Humean sense of causation is not rejected entirely, rather causation is limited to constitutive language in social contexts. Historicist explanations cannot only be derived from causal explanations. Moreover, Kurki (2008: 131) has already mentioned that a Coxian `historicist` framework is not applicable to causal explanation or vice versa. Then, questions arise that if causality is not rejected totally, how can it be used, when can it be used and how can the process be explained without causal explanation?

Elton (2002[1967]: 9) thinks that historical analysis differs from other studies in terms of its concern with the `events`, `change` and the `particular`. Although it is a good explanation, there is one more step which must be emphasised that history takes these three concerns in the whole. Although in the whole, there are causal effects and

sequential events, they do not repeat and cannot be discovered directly. The facts which resemble each other can be found from patterns of history, because their interactions with each other create the patterns. Historians select facts in the process which are managed by a “multiplicity of sequences of causes”, then fit them into his/her “pattern of rational explanation” (Carr 1987: 138-140). At this point, we have to review Cox’s approach to ‘causes’. He avoids using the term ‘cause’ to distinguish his arguments from positivists’ cause-effect analysis, although causation is a matter of ontology rather than epistemology (Kurki 2008). Thus, we agree with Kurki (ibid. 138) that preferring ‘structural causes’ than structural forces that mean only pressures and constraints. They are only the first causes of the process that is shaped inside of structure-agents-shocks and determine the rationally knowable principles; in other words patterns.

The first key point is finding patterns of the process. In other words, uncovering “inner hidden laws” (Rigby 1997: 890). Patterns can be covered, because they are reflected in different time and space contexts. If the historical laws are not like natural laws, they must reflect differently in different contexts. We call these reflections ‘events’. While those reflections do not have causal explanation, a historian can only describe them (Spalding and Parker 2007). Reflections can be named as ‘what happened’ and they can only be ‘conceptualized’ or ‘described’ (Dray 1997: 768). In terms of the description issue, questions arise regarding how can they be described and why is it described in this way? These questions are based on three classifications from historical works that are ‘description, analysis and narrative’ (Elton 2002[1967]: 9). While the first two are separated, they can be involved in the third. Whereas analysis is static and attempts to find causal connections, description tries to ‘display a manifestation of the past’ (ibid. 109). In terms of patterns’ reflections, causal priorities are not our preferences. Description is seen as much closer to our process of interpretation, but the best way to undertake it is using less narrative in a descriptive method which is ‘a setting down of event one after the other’ (ibid.

111). The most important contribution of narrative to description happens in terms of questions. While `what`, `who` and `when` questions are basic underlying tenets of historical research, narrative contributes a `how` question in order to describe processes.

In this research, patterns of US oil diversification motivations are uncovered with the help of Coxian IR interpretation. Structural `causes` which are material capabilities, ideas and institutions are the causes of the structure rather than `pressures and constraints` (Kurki 2008: 138), and the spheres of structure which are social forces, world orders, forms of state and social dynamics are shaped by them, see Figure 4.4. The patterns of US oil diversification are shaped by the interaction of structural causes that can be derived from different cases/events, in a paradigm of structural spheres already given in the Reflection of Cox (Chapter 3). Thus, patterns can only be uncovered when the question we pose is `how do events change?`. Patterns exist in the process and they can only be derived from a perspective on how the events occur and changes through time, which requires consideration of duration.




Figure 4.4: Conceptualisation

4.2.3.2. *Developing Duration*

Duration is “the amount of time elapsed for a given event or sequence of event” (Aminzade 1992: 459). It is taken or derived from an event in a time gap, but the real consideration is the length of a time gap. In this research, it is accepted that there are two different time perceptions which are diachronic and synchronic (see Chapter 3). While diachronic reflects a long duration process, synchronic encompasses short durations or even single events (Mhyre 2013: 396). In diachrony, in order to see long term cyclical or inter-cyclical shifts, a cause-effect relationship needs to be found. However, synchrony is a specific moment within a long duration. Thus, a synchronic perspective can only see ‘how the structure changes’ rather than seeing ‘why it happened’. Time gap and causality perceptions leads to the basic separation between synchronic and diachronic, and they also affect perceptions of comparison. If history is accepted as changes within cyclical processes, transitions in this gap have causes and effects. Thus, although every long duration is different to another sequence, predecessors lead to subsequent conditions. In other words, long durations accumulate from a series of events. If there is an accumulation relationship between them, they cannot be compared. On the other hand, events in long durations can be compared because they must have similarities (because of structural effects) and differences (because of time, space and context dependency in each case) (Werner and Zimmermann 2006). Thus, synchrony (i.e. events or cases) is required in comparative-historical analysis.

	Diachronic	Synchronic
Focus	Process, how matters develop	Structures, how matters stand
Analysis	Features of change over time, historical dynamics	State of the systems at a given point of time

Logic of order	Cause and effect chains	Systemic associations
Basic interest	“What comes after what” - historical understanding	“What associates with what” - systemic understanding
Comparison	Solitarities, unique feature and process	Similarities, contrasts, proximities, equalities

Table 4.1: *Logics of Order (Hämäläinen 2013: 9)*

The main characteristics of events are reflected in long durations. It means that “internal patterns of occurrences” in the events are shaped by the long duration (Abbott 2001: 291). Although, important events can lead to transformation of the long duration, how events change is the main consideration of this research. Events are explained in a diachronic perspective by force of “limiting” and “imprisoning” them in the short term (Braudel 2009: 174). Thus, duration is not limited to cause-effect relations and thereby predictable regularities, rather it is accepted that individual events exist in the larger totality, and they can be described and compared. The definition and contents of a synchronic perspective have been discussed, but it must also be made clear regarding how ‘the how’ question can be answered. If synchronic is described as focusing on structures, how does it see structure? In order to understand synchronic interpretation of structure, we must reflect back on the ‘duration’ issue. It is worth remembering that the duration conception “implies a unity defined by a beginning and an end, or a constancy of the event, or sequence of events, over a defined length of time” (Aminzade 1992: 460).

Notwithstanding which type of duration is chosen, there can be three main triggers for constituting duration which are *selected*, *exogenous shock* and *structural determined* (Mickey and Pierson 2004: 26-31). *Rational selection* is about an individual’s position in the duration of a

process or event (ibid.). Whereas this selection happens in a conscious way, it can also happen without the subject being aware of how it occurs. In this research, it is accepted that people do not behave *in* behaviour, rather *through* behaviour. Rationality is not a pure defined and context-free concept. It is determined by institutional practices (i.e. mutual expectations), shared cognitive frameworks (i.e. shared narratives) and network relations (i.e. regular contact or communication) (Hall 2014: 7-8). In *exogenous shock*, actors' preferences are determined by external events (Mickey and Pierson 2004: 26-31). *Structural determination* means the process under examination is largely pre-determined (ibid.). In order to explain various diachronic or synchronic considerations, these three triggers must be considered. Triggers are not only shaped by common/universal factors, there are also country-specific factors. The difference between universal and national dimensions should be clear in terms of US oil diversification motivations.

This research will therefore analyse the three cases with the help of a revised Coxian IR interpretation. Events and their process (i.e. from their beginning until now) are accepted as a synchronic dimension. Structural dimensions, similarities and contrasts between each other, systemic understanding will be prioritized. However, a synchronic understanding cannot make sense of events without a diachronic perception. In the 'Reflection of Cox' section, a diachronic perception which shows historical dynamics and cause-effect relations, is already given. Current global contradictions, situations, and the US's position in the world was reflected upon. Thus, we do not need to research all diachronic and synchronic perceptions. However, we can set two main targets. One of them is finding triggers of social dynamics and its effect on oil diversification motivations patterns in a diachronic perspective. In order to do this, events must be analysed and compared in a synchronic perspective: our second target. All case studies require a synchronic perception that can be compared and used to find general patterns of US oil diversification motivations (diachronic), but all these case studies are also a long term process

(diachronic) that is composed by synchronic variations. This feature guides how we operationalise our contribution to Cox, which is *being* in *becoming*. How the research is conceptualised is shown in Figure 4.4.

4.2.3.3. Theory-Testing: Congruence

The theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3 was then used to analyse these rationales using a `congruence method` (Goldstone 2003: 50; George and Bennett 2005: 181; Blatter and Blum 2008: 315). This method begins with “a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case” (George and Bennett 2005: 181). In critical theory using a historicist method, prediction is not a prior objective. Theory must help explain and describe the case, with an emphasis on uncovering patterns of oil diversification motivations (see Chapter 3). A congruence method provides an approach to examine the ability of a theory for this purpose.

Before starting a congruence method, theory-testing is analysed. In order to build a theory, `conceptualizing`, `categorizing` and `ordering` are the key targets of a researcher (Andersen and Kragh 2010: 50). These targets need to be checked by cases. Thus, cases are in a central position for theory building, whereas they are only instrumental for theory-testing (Løkke and Sørensen 2014: 69). Theory-testing does not limit itself with research questions, rather it tries to see all elements. The cases are part of these elements. However, seeing all elements and establishing universal generalizations are different aspects. Congruence testing aims to examine “how *particular interests* are related or different” (Goldstone 2003: 50). In order to arrive at this target, a congruence method does not have to follow the causal process. It follows that the congruence method is compatible with historical analysis, because it opens up complex conceptualizations which are beyond finding a specific causal relationship (Blatter and Blume 2008).

Congruence testing is therefore a “theory-centred method” rather than specifically case-centered (i.e. Process Tracing approach) and

variable-centred (i.e. Co-Variational approach) (Blatter and Blume 2008: 331). In order for testing analysis with a theory-based perspective, it needs to look from a broader context. The broader context requires `plurality` and `diversity` of observations (ibid. 319). Multi-dimensional considerations increase to help explain or understand the cases. Moreover, a theory-centred perspective leads to the use of both deductive and inductive methods. Here, “[d]eductively, the researcher generates ex-ante predictions”, whereas “inductively, the researcher reflects on which theory makes (more) sense for a specific observation” (ibid. 325). Thus, research moves between concepts and observations. A concept-based perception can deduce easily and the deductive part provides prediction ability for theory. Thus, testing is not the only target. Congruence can develop, refine and test theoretical assumptions (George and Bennett 2005: 200). In terms of being a theory-centred method, there is one more phenomena of note. Although, the congruence method is `theory-based`, it does not start with theory (Blatter and Blume 2008). Researchers have predictions before conducting the empirical work. Thus, there is an interaction “between theoretical implications and empirical indications” (Blatter and Blume 2008: 327). Case selection arises from this process according to their `likeliness` for supporting the dominant theory (ibid. 336).

Use of congruence is therefore entirely consistent with other aspects of the thesis methodology. *Firstly*, it does not require finding causal relations, because it tries to look from the broader context in order to see complex conceptualizations. It leads *secondly* to consistency which is the suitability with historical analysis. *Thirdly*, theory-centered perceptions lead to the use of both deductive and inductive methods, while it also sets up a balance between theoretical and empirical aspects. In this thesis, congruence involved comparing the cases of US oil diversification motivations with the theoretical framework (see Chapter 3; Figure 4.4). This comparison is discussed in chapter 8.

4.2.4. Data Collection

Interviewees were selected according to the Coxian triangle's operationalised version for US oil diversification motivations (see Figure 3.8). Actors that could potentially fill the positions in the figure were contacted. Obviously, the balance between opposite and different sides had to be considered in this selection process. For example, think-tanks close to opposite political parties and oil industry representatives from different areas (i.e. upstream, midstream) needed to be included in the sampling. In this way, opposite views and different priorities were collected and interpreted.

On reflection, the research findings suggest this interview selection could be modified in future investigations, because they show that US oil diversification motivations cannot be limited to state-oriented interests. There are different actor interests from different levels (federal and national, private and public); however, it is not a stable picture. Even the interests change because of change in the context composed of ideational and material factors.

Thus, the questions to interviewees initially targeted their views in terms of change in the time process for all cases. What the researcher experienced was that every interviewees' opinions and arguments contributed the next ones' questions, thereby who should be contacted for interviewees to be able to give correct impressions differed between cases, since every case is unique. For example, both the KXL and Arctic Drilling cases are environmentally controversial, but KXL has been chosen by environmentalists as a front-page issue. It led the researcher to focus more about environmentalist opinion when investigating the KXL. However, on the other hand, the findings have showed that lobbies have had more power on Arctic Drilling and energy policies (e.g. EPAAct, EISA), so lobbies were the focus in this case study.

Data collection via online resources and archive studies was conducted to collect all the relevant information related to the case studies. However, only the documents that can help to tell the story according to Coxian triangle were selected, since not all documents

could have been used. The relevant documents that can provide an impression of both structural reality-agent's interests and both material reality-ideational factors were filtered. At this point, it is seen a great debate on balance and priority between the use of documentation and the use of interview data. While the relevant documents can create a story of the cases, they might not always be enough to give an agent's interpretation of the context. On the other hand, the entire process cannot be given only via interviews because of the following reasons. Firstly, interviewees can only provide their subjective opinions, often without detailed supporting data (e.g. statistics, numbers). Secondly, the interviewees' opinions cannot always be corrected or can easily be disproved by documents, as in the Iraq War case discussed in Chapter 8. Thus, there is a balance between the documents and interviews, and it is obvious that one cannot help without the other. Stories should be told with documents, but they should be enriched with interviews. The motivations behind the documents can only be learned via the interviews, while the veracity of interviewee information should be cross-checked with the documents. Indeed, social scientists refer to the use of such multiple data sources through the term 'triangulation' (Denzin 1970), to describe this process.

4.3. Reflexive Analysis

Before data collection of case studies

As indicated above, the researcher's position is constructed in social and historical contexts in terms of mind-world monism. However, in this view knowledge which is a product of a researcher's interaction with the context is not created by cultural values, but by the researcher's position in a politico-normative dimension of a paradigm which is a decline of US hegemony and liberalism in this research. Thus, this research is not value-free and thereby does not separate value and facts as positivists do. As reflected in the researcher's position, facts are also situated in social and historical context. The

researcher is aware that the same research topic would be analyzed differently before or after the research is conducted, even by the same researcher. Awareness of this relationship between values and facts allows a departure from hypotheses testing and empirical law-type generalizations. The case studies' stories will therefore be told according to a duration perception and discussed with a theory-based view. In this way, rationally knowable principles can be found. Moreover, while the researcher will look at how the research topic is situated in a context, s/he will also try to be aware of how knowledge is situated during the research process, but within the paradigm that s/he researches in.

After data collection of case studies

Reflexivity in the research started even with the case studies. The KXL and the Iraq War had been chosen in terms of encompassing foreign policy, domestic policy, changing power and oil market dimensions. In order to provide more domestic politics and internal oil market dimensions, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) was selected in the beginning. However, on reflection of interview and archival data, it was apparent that EISA cannot be separated from the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAAct) and even problems of the oil market in the early millennium, which was not initially realized by the researcher. This awareness led to the researcher focusing more on the Energy Revolution in the US. However, Arctic Drilling showed itself as the key debate in the US oil market/production in relation to these events. As a result, case selection in Chapter 7 was not changed, but the focus and the scope considered were expanded during the course of the research.

The main research question never changed throughout the thesis programme, but the sub-questions changed slightly in response to the research process. The number of questions were reduced during the process to allow more focused data collection and analysis. During the data collection, it was realized that some questions were interconnected, so they could be combined. The two questions that are

‘What are the main obstacles and challenges the US has encountered on its way to ensuring energy security in the three cases?’ and ‘What have been the definitions of energy security in US policy circles?’ were combined as ‘What have been the definitions of oil diversification in US policy cycles and how have they been changing over time?’.

As part of the reflexivity approach adopted, the researcher diarised his field trip over 5 months in Washington D.C., USA. The diary shows that while the primary data shaped the researcher’s focus on the case studies, collected evidence has proved the capacity of the theory to explain US oil diversification motivations in terms of both the operationalised version of structural causes and Cox’s explanation of global politics (see Chapter 3; Figure 4.3). In terms of the focus on case studies, KXL has been showed as a symbol of the economy-environment debate in the US, more generally as one of the important symbols of a fracturing US domestic politics by interviewees – an unanticipated outcome of the research. The information helped the researcher to compare with the Arctic Drilling controversy. The ‘Why does Arctic Drilling have not the same power in US media as KXL?’ question was asked and answered (see Chapter 5; 7; 8). On the other hand, the necessity of critical discourse was not considered in the beginning. However, data collection on KXL identified a controversy that was determined by the definition of ‘national interest’. It led the researcher to compare with the other case studies, finding that ‘national security’ coverage in the Iraq War case (see Chapter 6) and the contested definition of ‘national energy needs’ in the Arctic Drilling issue (see Chapter 7) were also discursively significant to how oil diversification was understood by actors.

In terms of proven availability of structural causes, new findings always have to fit the operationalisation. For example, the importance of different types of crude oil (light, medium and heavy) and of different types of oil sectors (upstream, midstream, and downstream) have helped the researcher become aware of different dynamics in material capabilities, nation- and state-level differences and institutional interferences. On the other hand, increasing domestic political

polarization and its reciprocal relationship with oil-environment debate was another key point that fits structural causes in terms of changing political party stances (i.e. ideas) and thereby institutional reflections. There was also an evident neo-Coxian aspect to the cases which adds social dynamics as a new structural sphere. Data on both KXL and the Iraq War showed that social dynamics exist, but that neo-Coxian arguments should be revised to reflect these evolving global dynamic (see Chapter 8). Data collection (i.e. interviews, archive documents and online sources) was conducted according to structural causes. We were able to identify different dynamics in all structural causes and new evidences related to the triangle. Thus, it did not only help us to uncover US oil diversification motivations, but also how the data collection was conducted.

Finally, the connection between global politics and US oil diversification motivations was also proved and in turn shaped the research. For example, US oil diversification could be seen as reflecting US allies' oil diversification. However, it also changed through time. The process of the Iraq War has in this respect helped the researcher to see changes in US oil and foreign politics. More generally, Cox' discussion on changing hegemonic power could be observed via US oil diversification motivations (see Chapter 8). Thus, US oil diversification motivations have been observed in the paradigm that also changed the direction of the research topic and shaped the researcher's context.

In summary, the research findings are not based on the assumptions that were already decided before the research process, rather they are determined by the process of the research which itself was shaped by the events related to the topic, new data, interactions with the participants/observers of the processes and the investigation of researcher's approach to topic during the research process. Only the main principles of Critical Theory (e.g. people as historical agents, state-society complexity) were held and the findings prove the necessity of those principles: features discussed further in the case study chapters and the discussion of this thesis.

5. Keystone XL Pipeline: a project stuck between the tensions of economy vs. biosphere and national vs. state interests

5.1. Introduction

Keystone XL Pipeline (KXL), which has been owned by TransCanada since 2009 (TransCanada 2010a), is the main oil pipeline system between Canada and the United States. It runs from Alberta, in Western Canada, to refineries in Illinois and Texas, and to oil tank farms and an oil pipeline distribution centre in Oklahoma. The pipeline has been controversial since the announcement of its expansion which routes over nationally protected Sandhills in Nebraska (ibid.) and also its intended transfer of oil tar sands – which have significant environmental implications. The main political discussions have involved environmental considerations but the pipeline also included trade relations that support economic benefits. Thus, there is a contradiction between environmental considerations and economic benefits. However, in relation to this contradiction, national vs. state interests are significant in the process too. While the local areas are environmentally affected, nation-level environmentalist organisations have overseen of the challenge. While there are job benefits from the project locally, there are national benefits for US oil market. However, there are also Midwest midstream and downstream oil industries that are sceptic about the KXL. When the two tensions combine, there is not unique opposition from one side, rather complex scopes and interests.

All debates include consideration of the national interest, because according to Executive Order 13337 (DOS 2004), all US energy exports and imports must serve this objective. All participants in the project have defined national interest from their own perspective and this has led to multiple societal actors participating in the debate. While different actors have asserted their own perceptions, there is no clear determination of what the national interest entails. The discourse

on national interest has remained uncertain because of the contradictions and the context which are determined by oil prices, political party polarization in the US and US foreign policy perceptions that have been interpreted variously by different administrations. It is these interests that we can investigate regarding oil diversification motivations.

KXL is potentially an ideal example for investigating US oil diversification motivations in this study. In the USA, there have been huge societal discussions and political debate concerning this case (Price of Oil 2017). KXL is then an example of a hugely controversial issue involving environmental considerations and national interest definition. It also has a clear foreign policy dimension because it involves oil imports from Canada. Thus, the issue moves our analysis beyond the scope of domestic oil policies (DOS 2011c). In addition, there are evident structural dimensions to the case that should, in theory, be amenable to a critical theoretical explanation.

This research claims that the KXL debate has centred on a national interest definition. When the structural causes are used to uncover dynamics that are shaped by structural determination, agents' interests and external shocks, it is seen that all these dynamics cannot be isolated from each other and their weight in the process is differentiated. As a conclusion, specific variables are not prioritized as mainstream IR approaches would do, but the reciprocal interaction between domestic politics, oil politics and foreign policy dimensions of US should be considered. KXL shows that oil import policy from Canada cannot be limited to the environmental debate or foreign policy perceptions. The interaction between these three helps create the policy process. This process been triggered by two contradictions that are economy-biosphere and national-state interests. Social dynamics as a contribution of neo-Coxian theory is identified in the research as a process shaper, but with the necessity of institutional organization.

In examining the potential of a Coxian analysis for analysing these aspects of the KXL case, this chapter starts with a literature review on existing KXL studies (Fair 2014; Gravelle and Lachapelle 2015; Bradshaw 2015; Kojola 2015) to provide a critique. Secondly, historical events and the background of US-Canada oil relations are given. It is followed by empirical evidence on the KXL project process, which is then explored using the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3. These data are used to establish the critical decision points as the policy-making unfolded. These points are used to understand the rationales for oil diversification motivations that developed over time, which are then analysed across three semi-distinct phases that map on to specific Presidential tenures. The last section will discuss the value of the theory in terms of explaining structural causes and the role of social dynamics as part of a neo-Coxian approach.

The data were collected from online resources and interviews. Although the research focuses on US oil diversification motivations, the Canadian side has also been considered. In total, 310 documentary resources were identified, of which 185 were used. In order to collect data, open-source governmental websites (e.g. White House; NDEQ; NEB), oil company's website (e.g. TransCanada), politicians' websites (e.g. George Bush; Bernie Sanders) and the websites of institutions for energy, oil and trade (API; CAPP; ECH) have been used as primary data sources. Environmental groups' websites (e.g. Greenpeace, Natural Resources Defense Council [NRDC]) and news websites (e.g. New York Times) were also used to collect secondary data. In addition, 17 'elite' interviewees were asked questions about the KXL to corroborate documentary sources (see 'triangulation' in Chapter 4). Interviews were held with retired and current policymakers (including from Canada), people from think-tanks, lobbies, environmental organizations (including Canada), local people and the oil industry (including the US and the Canadian side).

5.2. Literature Review

As the KXL pipeline application is still an on-going process, there is only limited theoretical analysis of the case, which is surprising given its controversy and the salience of other oil pipeline projects in North American politics (e.g. BBC 2019). That said, studies to date have focused on specific aspects of the KXL process including the implications for jobs and the environment, political support, opposition and media constructions. After critical review of this literature, this study argues that significant gaps exist in our understanding that could be addressed through a Coxian analysis. In this respect, more holistic theoretically-driven analyses of the KXL process over time are required.

For example, Fair (2014) researches the KXL process in terms of the 'jobs vs. the environment' debate, i.e. labour-environmental relations, setting the analysis within the context of a green transition. The jobs vs. environment debate is examined through the position of two labour unions: The Laborers International Union of North America (LIUNA) and Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP). The study shows that labour unions are far from unified in their position towards the pipeline. While LIUNA supports the construction of KXL, CEP is in opposition. The characteristics of both unions are classified under five titles: economic position; social unionism; cultural divide; coalition organization; and framing (Fair 2014).

To an extent, Gravelle and Lachapelle's (2015: 99) study does provide a broader perspective through examining the economic benefits, energy security implications and environmental impacts of KXL. Decision-making processes are analysed through mass public opinion, political parties and the ideologies which they embrace. Gravelle and Lachapelle (2015: 101-102) pose four main hypotheses which revolve around political party differences in the US. According to their hypotheses, conservative members of society (e.g. Republicans) tend to support KXL, with left-leaning Democrats typically opposed. Moreover, ideological polarization around KXL in local areas increases in direct proportion to proximity to the pipeline.

Bradshaw meanwhile (2015: 433) explores the KXL process through opponents' (i.e. indigenous people, landowners, environmental activists) perceptions and how oppositions are formed. The KXL debate is framed in terms of climate change and state-corporate crimes. The latter includes policies and institutions, shaped by different opponents' goals. Although the conflict of interests of opponents and proponents is explored, a historical perspective is lacking. While KXL is accepted as a case of state-corporate crimes and climate change, it is shown that it has a symbolic value in terms of civil movements (Bradshaw 2015: 445).

Similar themes are reflected in Kojola's (2015) study of KXL media discourse, composed of ideology and power. Drawing upon theoretical notions of power, ideology and hegemony, the analysis is heavily inspired by Gramsci's (1971) study. These terms are the main sources of legitimacy in KXL which is "maintained through ideology and perceptions of jobs versus environment trade-offs" (Kojola 2015: 5). Thus, in theoretical terms, media power is used to direct society according to powerful actors' interests. In KXL, these arguments are applied to conflicts between labour unions and environmentalists.

A critique of these studies shows significant gaps in our knowledge of KXL. Firstly, the lack of a *temporal dimension* to analysis of the case is evident. For example, in Gravelle and Lachapelle's (2015) study adopts a 'snapshot' of events, meaning policy evolution is overlooked. Indeed, all these studies ignore the temporal aspect of the case when KXL should be understood as a historical process. Kojola's (2015) study meanwhile limits its analysis to the narrow timeframe of 2011-2012. In Bradshaw's (2015) analysis, the importance of discourse or the power of ideas is emphasised, but again a long term historical perspective is required to fully understand how they have shaped the process. Secondly, these studies tend to focus on *specific actors*, thereby only providing a partial view of events: namely the position of unions (Fair 2014); political parties (Gravelle and Lachapelle 2015); opposition groups (Bradshaw 2015); and the media Kojola (2015). Thirdly, the current literature fails to acknowledge the *supply side*

characteristics of KXL, since studies focus exclusively on events in the USA: a Canadian perspective should also be considered. Fourthly, KXL is a symbol not only of economics vs. the environment but also *polarization* in American politics. Gravelle and Lachapelle's study does start to address this issue but ideology and partisanship are manifestly not the only shapers of the process. There is increasing polarization in national politics around 'culture wars' issues such as the environment (see Hunter 1991; Benkler et al. 2018). Finally, in this respect, we argue that the influence of *ideas* can only be understood in relation to other motivations, such as material capabilities and also key institutions: factors that require a more holistic, temporal perspective. Research is therefore required that helps interpret interactions between these dimensions over time to understand the motivations behind the accumulation of oil diversification policy in the KXL case.

5.3. A Timeline of KXL and Historical background of US-Canada Oil Relations

In this section, a timeline of significant events showing the process of diversification motivations is constructed from empirical evidence from the KXL project process. The process details will be given according to a chronological sequence starting in the early 2000s and ending with the current situation, thereby illustrating the synchronic and diachronic nature of the case.

5.3.1. A Timeline of Significant Events

February 2005 – TransCanada and ConocoPhillips announce plans to spend \$1.7 billion to build a 3,000 km pipeline to move oil from Alberta to Illinois. They were expected to be operating the pipeline as early as 2008.

March 2008 – U.S. State Department (DOS) gives the green light for the expansion plan of the pipeline.

April 2010 – The Deepwater Horizon explosion.

May 2010 – DOS holds public meetings in Nebraska as part of the Environmental Impact Assessment process for KXL.

July 2010 – US Department of Energy (DOE) criticizes the State Department's Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS).

June 2011 – EPA rates the Supplemental Draft EIS (SDEIS) as having "Insufficient Information" and recommends additional analysis.

August 2011 – Protests erupt in Washington calling on the Obama administration to reject the KXL. DOS releases the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), which warns that no "major environmental risks" have been found.

November 2011 – The State Department says TransCanada must reroute the pipeline to avoid the ecologically sensitive Nebraska Sandhills. TransCanada and Dave Heineman, Nebraska governor, agree to re-route the pipeline in order to avoid the Sandhills and the Ogallala aquifer.

December 2011 – A group of Republican senators introduced legislation aimed at forcing the Obama administration to make a decision within 60 days.

January 2012 – The State Department announces it will not approve the construction of the KXL in its current form but will allow TransCanada to re-apply once it has devised a new route avoiding sensible ecosystems.

May 2012 – TransCanada submitted a second request for a permit to construct the pipeline to the DOS.

September 2012 – TransCanada submits a Supplemental Environmental Report to Nebraska DEQ with a preferred route alternative.

January 2013 – Nebraska Governor Dave Heineman approves TransCanada's proposed new route for KXL.

April 2013 – The EPA criticizes the State Department’s latest the Draft Supplemental EIS (DSEIS) as insufficient, and recommends routing the pipeline to avoid the Ogallala aquifer. By this date, the State Department has received a million public comments on the EIS, most of them against the pipeline.

January 2014 – After a five-year review process, the State Department releases its FEIS, stating: “Approval of a single project is unlikely to significantly affect the rate of extraction of the oil from the oil sands or the refining of heavy crude on the U.S. Gulf Coast.”

February 2014 – A district court judge in Nebraska declared the law that allowed for the pipeline’s route through the state unconstitutional.

April 2014 – The Cowboy Indian Alliance and others gather in Washington, D.C. for Reject and Protect, five days of protest.

November 2014 – The House of Representative held by a Republican majority votes in favour of KXL. The Senate votes against the northern portion of KXL.

January and February 2015 –The Keystone XL Pipeline Act passed the House (H.R. 3) and the Senate (S. 1) but President Obama vetoed the bill. Later on, the Senate failed to override President Barack Obama’s veto by a vote of 62-37.

November 2015 – The Obama administration rejects TransCanada’s application to build the KXL.

January 2016 – TransCanada filed a claim under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) against the U.S. government’s rejection of KXL. TransCanada file in a Houston federal court accused Obama of “exceeded his authority in November when he blocked the pipeline’s construction”.

January 2017 – Trump signs an executive order approving KXL, but suggests the U.S. will renegotiate the terms of the project.

March 2017 – President Trump issues a presidential permit for Keystone XL.

November 2018 – The District Court of Montana blocked construction.

Figure 5.1: *KXL Timeline*

5.3.2. The Historical Context to US-Canada Oil Relations

Even before KXL was planned, USA and Canada had an extensive, long-established oil trade. While the US imported 591,489 thousand barrels of oil (Mbbbl) from Canada, it exported 8,972 Mbbbl to Canada in 2004 (EIA 2018a; EIA 2018b). Although exports to Canada had fluctuations, imports from Canada had been increasing since the early 1990s until 2004, except in 1999. While imports from Canada represented 13% of all US oil imports in 1993, they constituted 16% in 2004. In 2004, two Canadian companies (i.e. Kinder Morgan Canada and Enbridge) were responsible for oil exports from Canada to the USA (Oil Sands Magazine 2018).

Although TransCanada was part of the US-Canada energy resources trade during this period, it was primarily exporting natural gas not oil. The company then proposed expanding its existing pipeline system to export oil to the US in the KXL development (TransCanada 2005). The development of Alberta tar sands for oil production during this period then provided an opportunity for this export trade. Albertan oil is largely comprised of bitumen which is ‘a thick, sticky form of crude oil’ (NEB 2019) and requires a specific but environmentally destructive extraction process which also generates significant climate emissions due to the high energy inputs required for oil extraction.

5.4. The Bush Era: 2001-2009

To understand the motivations for the KXL pipeline, we must go back to events in the early 2000s. Here, it is important to note the influence of political authority in shaping US oil diversification. By this point, the incumbent Bush Presidential administration started to favour reliance on the exploitation of domestic oil supplies and ‘secure’ sources from countries including Canada, as opposed to unreliable supplies from the Middle East. The Iraq War (Chapter 6) had exposed US dependence on these sources, which led the administration to pursue

a supply side policy of oil diversification. Moreover, Bush withdrew the US from the Kyoto agreement in March 2001, after just two months in office (The Heritage Foundation 2001). Thus, his limited environmental considerations supported new oil pipeline construction and hydrocarbon imports. His administration and energy transition team were also dominated by industry representatives such as Dick Cheney (Vice President), the former CEO of oil services company Haliburton, who supported oil development (Cushman 2014). A key component of this policy was to source further oil supplies from Canada by building a new pipeline linking US oil processors to Canadian producers, primarily in Alberta.

In this respect, the earliest attempts to develop a pipeline date from DOS and Presidential actions in 2004. These attempts began with Executive Order 13337 which sought to establish “energy-related facilities and land transportation crossings on the international boundaries of the United States” (DOS 2004). According to the Order, Presidential authority was used to determine US energy exports and imports in order to maintain safety, public health and environmental protection. In this respect, a pipeline to transport tar sand oil from Alberta to the US was identified as best serving ‘the national interest’ (ibid.). In the project process, it was announced, the Secretary of State would consult with State, tribal, local, and federal government officials on the KXL project. Different actors were going to mean different considerations would be in play. Then later in the process, environmentalists signalled their opposition to the pipeline and business friendly national level institutions supported KXL, whereas some local residents were happy to have income from KXL construction and construction jobs (Interviewee-2, Interviewee-19). Obviously, there was also going to be some local level opposition (Interviewee-17).

Prior to the Executive Order, initial discussions on the project had commenced in late 2003 with certain Canadian petroleum producers, which then continued during 2004 (NEB 2006) and into 2005, primarily between the TransCanada Corporation and ConocoPhillips

(TransCanada 2005; NEB 2005: 1). The project, which included new pipeline construction (3,000 km in length) and conversion of the current natural gas pipeline systems (1,240 km), was expected to begin operations in 2008/2009 and start to service suppliers in 2012 (see Figure 5.2). Preliminary discussions had by this point already begun with stakeholders, including communities, government representatives and landowners in the USA (ibid.). In November 2005, TransCanada and ConocoPhillips Company signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) defining the responsibilities of both companies in constructing the pipeline (TransCanada 2006a: 14). In Canada, Keystone was described by its industry proponents as an innovative and cost-competitive project (TransCanada 2006a: 5). Attempts were made by industry to include all stakeholders in the planning process, as obliged by Canadian federal and state legislation. TransCanada was careful to include the views of Aboriginal groups (ibid. 17), considering their concerns in field studies, environmental and socio-economic assessments, engineering designs and other activities necessary to support the application (TransCanada 2006b).

These concerns were addressed in the requirements of the National Energy Board Canada (NEB) and Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA). Such concerns were discussed via consultation activities with stakeholders, including elected officials, community leaders and directly affected landowners, plus other public engagement, including mail-outs and open house events (NEB 2006: 26). Public hearings were completed in mid-November 2006 in Canada and official approval was received from the NEB in February 2007 (TransCanada 2007: 30). A decision on a second application, which focused on constructing and operating new pipelines was given on 20th September 2007 (NEB 2007b). Responsible institutions and their roles were being defined under the CEAA (NEB 2007a). Although the NEB argued that the project would have some negative impacts on domestic industries, employment, security of supply and aboriginal peoples, it still approved the project. In justifying its decision, the NEB

(2007b; 2007c) stated that on the basis of safety, security, environmental protection, enhanced efficiency in energy markets, the project was in the Canadian public interest. However, according to environmentalists (Interviewee-1; Interviewee-7; Interviewee-17) from both countries, neither Aboriginal nor environmental groups views were, despite the consultations, integrated into decision-making. At this point, an implicit hierarchy in state-society complexity should be considered. Legal requirements by political society did not correspond with the expectations of civil society.




Figure 5.2: *The proposed KXL route (TransCanada 2005: 20)*

A similarly positive view on the project was reflected by US federal policymakers. The KXL was accepted by the US and the DOS as serving the national interest because of the proximity of the Canadian source (and its security), the newly available supply of crude oil with minimum transportation requirements and the status of Canada as a reliable and long established US trading partner: factors contained in its Record of Decision (ROD) and National Interest Determination (NID) documents (2008a: 2). These positive reasons were compatible with the FEIS, which necessitated an environmental review of the project by the DOS, published on January 11, 2008 (DOS 2008b).

Under obligations contained in the federal National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (1969)⁴, the DOS considered the project's environmental, social and economic impacts, including geology, soils, water resources, wetlands, terrestrial vegetation, wildlife, fisheries, threatened and endangered species, land use, socioeconomics, cultural resources, air, noise, reliability and safety (DOS 2008a: 9-12) which were also evaluated by TransCanada (2008e). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) then published the Notice of Availability and the DOS (2008b: 19) accepted its comments on the FEIS. On the other hand, NEB scheduled an oral hearing to review the proposal that commenced in April 2008 (TransCanada 2008a: 23). On the 14th March 2008, the DOS (2008a) issued a Presidential Permit to construct, operate and maintain KXL, since it was accepted as in the national interest because it involved oil imports from a stable and reliable trading partner and Canada's close proximity to the US. In addition, a report by TransCanada (2008b) shows how the company had sought to address public and employee safety and its respect for the environment and native cultures, for example, in trying to develop opportunities in terms of economic, educational and social advancement for Aboriginal people (TransCanada 2008d). During this time, oil prices had already been increasing since 2001 globally and peaked at \$91.17 per barrel in 2008. The US saw the highest import quantity of oil in 2005 at 12,549 thousand barrels per day (Mbb/d), whereas production was 5,000 Mbb/d which was the lowest quantity since 1947 (EIA 2019b). Thus, in addition to Canada's attractive position as a supplier, systemic pressure was also effective in providing a rationale for the project.

However, this consensus of support for the project started to break down after the announcement of the expansion of KXL to the US Gulf Coast on 16 July 2008 (TransCanada 2008c) (see Figure 5.3). Expansion was supposed to result in a 3,200 km long pipeline, much

⁴ NEPA establishes the right of all US citizens to a healthy environment, in addition to obliging federal officials to conduct a full analysis of the environmental effects of their programmes or actions (Section 102(1)(2)) and produce an environmental statement detailing such effects.

larger than originally anticipated, and the project would carry 1.1 million barrels per day (MMbbl/d) in total, again exceeding original estimates. It was proposed to begin construction in mid-2010 for completion by 2012 (NEB 2009a). TransCanada's application would be evaluated under section 52 of the NEB Act in Canada (NEB 2008: 1), while they also needed a Presidential Permit in the US for the expanded project (TransCanada 2008f). In this application (ibid.: 1), US national interests were again emphasized by the company. Before 2009, TransCanada agreed to increase its ownership interest from 62% to 79.99 per cent of Keystone (TransCanada 2009b: 19) and then secured 100% ownership in August 2009 (TransCanada 2010a).

Although the importance of oil imports from Canada in terms of availability can be inferred as indicative of diversification in US federal policy, a clear diversification emphasis is seen in the Application to the South Dakota state government for a Permit for the KXL (TransCanada 2009a: 23). Thus, KXL required both federal and state level permits/approvals. Canadian oil imports were argued by the applicants to be compatible with decreasing US domestic production and increasing domestic demand in the US. However, on the Canadian State side, an oral hearing was scheduled to start September 15, 2009 (NEB 2009a). A list of parties included the applicant (TransCanada), first nations, companies, governments and government participants, while issues proposed included production facilities, economic feasibility, potential commercial impacts, potential environmental and socio-economic effects, appropriateness of the general route, toll and tariff regulation, and potential impacts on Aboriginal interests (NEB 2009b). The CEP requested the consideration of three goals, which were ensuring Canadian energy security, promoting sustainable economic development of Canada and reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Expansion of pipeline network was identified in TransCanada's Annual Report (2010a) and the NEB Reasons for Decision (2010a).



Figure 5.3: *KXL with the Expansion Plan (TransCanada 2010a: Summary)*

Duration: Theoretical Analysis

KXL starts with material pressures and influences of the US and global oil market. However, it was joined by ideas later in the process. We do not see significant institutional participation in the interaction of structural causes in this period.

For the DOS (2004), the main considerations in considering the project were safety, public health and environment. These factors can be interpreted as being of material importance because of their productive and destructive capabilities. In order to be compatible with this order (ibid.), TransCanada (2006a) highlighted the importance of

material considerations such as environmental issues and engineering designs. Moreover, socio-economic assessments and highlighting of Aboriginal groups showed other ideas were considered by TransCanada. TransCanada's consultation activities, which included stakeholders, elected officials, community leaders, directly affected landowners and open-house events (NEB 2006: 26), show that TransCanada considered societal participation. Canadian public interest was also being emphasized (NEB 2007b). Although neither Aboriginals nor environmentalists were listened to, according to environmentalists (Interviewee-1; Interviewee-7; Interviewee-17), we do not think that the lack of societal participation of the process was the cause of KXL being a national issue. It was a project that could benefit different identities. It could be a negative symbol for environmentalists since it was carrying tar sand oil as much as it could provide economic benefits both publicly and privately. It was therefore a material issue, but the conflicts of interests were also bringing an ideational split into the process, i.e. ideas started to supplant material capabilities as significant in determining oil diversification motivations.

Increasing oil prices and oil market pressure were supporting the US import policy from Canada on the one hand, while the contribution of oil exports to the economy was supporting the Canadians' ambition to sell oil on the other hand. Increasing oil market problems and climate change considerations started shaping the priorities. It is at this point that the influence of ideas was most evident in the process. In 2008, the US government (DOS 2008a) was examining both these priorities, but there was not a strong political reaction. Oil imports from stable and reliable trading partners was still being defined as being in the national interest (DOS 2008a). The US had already been importing from Canada and the rest of the world and Canada at this point was being prioritized as a key trading partner.

However, the first breaking point in the system happened in 2008, when TransCanada announced the expansion of KXL to the US Gulf Coast (TransCanada 2008c). TransCanada as an economic actor was trying to increase its benefits, but this attempt expanded the

discussion on KXL to include this more ambitious project, necessitating wider support for their actions. When the DOS (2008a) agreed to this expansion, it could be blamed for being too close to the oil industry.

During this period, the main discussion on the KXL was about whether it was suitable for the national interest. However, national interest is not defined clearly in any state document (DOS 2008a; DOS 2012b). The main problem here is that some justifications can be contradicted, such as environmental considerations and economic benefits. All the KXL process was subsequently determined by the discussion around national interest which was defined differently by actors and institutions. Thus, the priorities of different actors led to contradictions. Institutions eventually started to shape the process, but not during the Bush era. For example, we do not yet have clashes between institutionalist priorities during the Bush era, as seen between TransCanada (2009a) that believed oil imports from Canada strengthened the diversification power of US oil policies, and The Pembina Institute (2011) that thought that KXL increases US dependency on Canadian oil.

In short, during this period the project emerged from a material structure while ideational factors then became significant in terms of debates over the economy vs environment. The material structure was composed of both US and global dynamics in terms of the international oil market. Ideational motivations, however, were related to reducing ties with the Middle East and looking for more friendly and much safer suppliers. The government's approach to the oil industry and environmental issues also eased the project's approval in terms of it being judged in the national interest. Up until the expansion project was announced there was not a state-federal split and few clear political party clashes. Moreover, up until the 2010s, although there were some tendencies to favour fossil fuel interests in the Bush administration, US political parties themselves could not be defined clearly as being pro (or anti) the oil industry (Interviewee-14; Interviewee-33).

5.5. The Obama Era: 2009-2017

Despite the environmental concerns over the project, in the 111th US Congress (H.R. 2454), under the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 an energy bill was approved by the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009 by a vote of 219-212 (211 Supporters were Democrat). However, it was never brought to the floor of the Senate for discussion or a vote (Congress 2009). The Act was not, however, about KXL; it was a cap-and-trade bill⁵ under which the government would set a limit on the total amount of GHG that would be emitted nationally. Thus, again environmental considerations were being pitted against oil development, demonstrating the growing importance of ideas in the process. The unsuccessful attempt at adopting the bill was a breaking point in US environmental politics (Interviewee-28) but was also symptomatic of the wider polarization of US politics. While Democrats were the supporters of the cap-and-trade bill, the right-wing Republican Tea Party Movement, whose members called for lower taxes and for a reduction in the national debt, were implacably opposed. This ideological ‘culture wars’ polarization of the issue was also reflected in an increasingly acrimonious bi-partisan national debate over guns, abortion, immigration and social issues (Interviewee-14).

In March 2010, the NEB (2010b) approved KXL according to: the considerations of maintenance of safety; protection of the environment; and ensuring landowner rights. Environmental issues were becoming more significant to both Canadian and US policymakers. While they were becoming a subject of much wider debate in the US case, they were mainly an oil production (i.e. upstream) issue in Canada. The Deepwater Horizon explosion, which

⁵ ‘It’s a system designed to reduce pollution in the atmosphere. The cap on greenhouse gas emissions that drive global warming is a firm limit on pollution. The cap gets stricter over time. The trade part is a market for companies to buy and sell allowances that let them emit only a certain amount, as supply and demand set the price. Trading gives companies a strong incentive to save money by cutting emissions in the most cost-effective ways’ (EDF 2019).

involved an accident on a US oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico and resultant three months of oil leaking, had triggered a widespread debate over the environmental consequences of the pipeline. For example, images of dead ducks in an oil sands tailings pond were plastered on billboards in Denver, Portland, Seattle and Minneapolis by opponents (Inside Climate News 2010). Next to them, there was a picture of an oil-drenched brown pelican at the site of the Deepwater Horizon spill. The billboards were entitled “Alberta: The Other Oil Disaster”. Moreover, 2010 was recorded as the warmest year ever, prompting further debate over climate change (National Geographic 2010). In mid-June, 50 members of Congress led by three Democrats (Jay Inslee, Peter Welch, and Dennis Kucinich) sent a letter which emphasized the unnecessary risks of tar sands oil importation into the United States to Secretary Clinton (Congress 2010). On July 2, 2010, DOE (2010) criticized the KXL DEIS. Both the letter and the DOE’s response were welcomed by environmental groups (Inside Climate News 2010). In contrast to these events, TransCanada (2010b) then announced a construction, mitigation and reclamation plan for KXL. It explained how the work would be compliant with federal, state, and local permits.

Two significant institutional reports were then published in 2010. According to the Perryman Group, an economic and financial analysis firm (2010), KXL would provide an economic stimulus and stable supply of oil to the USA. The stable supply arguments forwarded were based on estimates of reliable oil reserves, plus more stable and predictable sources in Canada compared to volatile regions such as the Middle East. These arguments powerfully promoted the pipeline to policymakers. The EnSys group, an independent consulting firm specializing in the petroleum industry, produced a study (2010) prepared at the request of the DOE. It mainly focused on different scenarios but the important issue for this study (ibid. 13) was that Canadian producers, shippers and government agencies were promoting the flexibility, security and diversification of domestic markets which would occur from the pipeline. Later on, The Pembina

Institute (Droitsch 2011) published a study in opposition to the EnSys (2010) study. The report argued that the EnSys conclusion that KXL would not affect production was flawed, as Canada's new link with Asia would drive increases in upstream production (ibid. 2-4). Institutions with different priorities were showing their positions on the economy vs. environment contradiction.

The accumulation of events in 2010 and the reaction to it saw 2011 as the year that combines all structural causes interactions, since public participation and environmental considerations became prominent in the debate. Hence, in a NRDC study (2011), threats from the pipeline to agriculture, increased climate emissions and risks to communities on the Gulf Coast from oil spills were highlighted. The study asserts that KXL would not serve the national interest, because tar sands is an expensive and dirty form of oil to produce. National interest was one of the most controversial topics surrounding the debate on KXL and two opposite groups were created. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report (Parfomak et al. 2011a) evaluated opponents and proponents' arguments under the national interest discussion. Opponents were against KXL, the study suggests, because Canadian oil is environmentally dirty and promotes US dependency on fossil fuels. However, there is an uncertainty between environmentalists. While some were against tar sands (Interviewee-1), others eschewed promoting all kinds of fossil fuels (Interviewee-5). At the time, opponents (Interviewee-1; Interviewee-5) recommended transferring energy sources from fossil fuels to clean/renewable energy, whereas for proponents of KXL, this demand was not achievable in the short-term because of current car production and people's preferences for maintaining existing lifestyles rather than climate change considerations (Interviewee-2; Interviewee-26).

On the other hand, KXL proponents (e.g. Canadian agencies, petroleum industry, stakeholders) thought that it was good for energy security in terms of diversifying US petroleum supply and economic benefits such as job creation (Parfomak et al. 2011a: 6-7). Moreover,

KXL could lead the US to be less dependent on foreign sources. Also, if the oil exports from Canada did not go to US, they would go to Asia, thereby enhancing the energy security of rival states. Although crude oil has a global price market, it was also argued, imports from Canada could lead to lower transport and refining costs (ibid. 10). The Canadian oil industry and government (Interviewee-16), on the other hand, thought that this situation would bring competition for Midwest US midstream and downstream industries, so they supported the opponents.

The Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) (2011) sent a letter which emphasized the economic and social benefits of KXL and the importance of a trade-friendly and politically stable neighbour, to Secretary Clinton. They argued that KXL would enhance US quality of life and allow the economy to grow, while considering the environment. The letter was sent to Clinton on the same day (June 6) that the EPA (2011) emphasized oil spill concerns and the necessity of a FEIS. The same day was also the end of the public comment period for the SDEIS, which was released in April 2011 (DOS 2011a). Additional public meetings were undertaken in order to discuss energy security, environment and safety issues (ibid.). In the same year, the CRS (Parfomak and Ratner 2011) announced a second study. It emphasized mutually beneficial energy trade relations between two countries and the link between physical, economic and environmental places. Canada's importance in terms of trade with US, its political stability, and also its huge petroleum reserves were identified as positive factors in favour of KXL (ibid. 5).

In the FEIS (DOS 2011c), which interprets the national interest under energy security, environmental, cultural, economic, foreign policy dimension and federal regulations titles, was heavily criticized by the NRDC, Sierra Club and National Wildlife Federation (2011). In the North American-Made Energy Security Act (H.R. 1938) (Congress 2011a), it was stated that oil imports from Canada rather than politically and economically unstable places, Canadian oil's effect on domestic refineries' activities, and the strengthening the world's

largest two-way trading relationship and employment opportunities necessitated the pipeline. The same view was also held by TransCanada (2012a). By this point, 19th of August, DOS (2011b) had already held 21 public meetings and received public comments in order to decide whether a KXL permit was suitable for the national interest. Just three days after the FEIS, CRS (Parfomak et al. 2011b) published its third report on KXL. In addition to previous reports, it (2011b: 10) emphasized that Venezuela, another key source of US imports, had been trying to diversify business away from the US. It showed that the current trade relations with Canada must be secured and also that the US' energy and trade relationships with other countries did not only depend on the US side.

KXL's potential effects on jobs in US were emphasized in other sources but the Cornell University study (2011) focused on job creation and industry benefits as a whole. Its perception of KXL was pessimistic. Reasons included a higher project budget was necessary than actually stated by the company and that the predicted job creation was questionable (ibid.). This study's (ibid.) main discussions challenged the Perryman Study (2010). On the other hand, Oil Change International (2011) found that KXL was primarily an export project, so it could not decrease US oil dependency. US domestic production had been increasing for 30 years, thus KXL could not serve the national interest itself. On 23th of September, TransCanada (2011a) announced that KXL supporters would speak with the media about the project's claims on supporting energy security and job growth in the US and how much Canada is more preferable than the Middle East and Venezuela as a trade partner. When the discussions then became more politically charged, two important speeches were made by Joe Oliver, Minister of Natural Resources of Canada. While the first (National Post 2011) was about KXL's importance to the US, emphasizing low levels of GHG and the energy partnership between Canada and US, the second (Natural Resources Canada 2011) concerned KXL's importance for Canada in creating jobs and low-tax benefits for society, since oil sand was accepted as a key engine of

the Canadian economy. Parallel claims can be found in TransCanada reports that asserted KXL's importance for the US economy, Canadian economy and the national interest of the US (2011b). They stated that the "Route will be changed and Nebraskans will play an important role in determining the final route" (TransCanada 2011c). State and Federal level approvals then became as significant as political party clashes. Two subsections of ideas (see Chapter 3) became influential in the process.

On November 10, 2011, President Obama (White House 2011a) declared his support for the DOS's announcement, which asserted requirements for additional information because of the importance of an open and transparent process. The necessity of additional information was also emphasized by Obama when he had a dialogue with Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings (White House 2011b). These events happened just before the 2012 elections, making them more political salient. While environmentalists (Interviewee-5; Interviewee-7) complained about the fossil fuel industry's power over the election process through lobbying via the media and elites from both countries, environmentalists' power to influence through lobbying via the same tools should not be ignored (Interviewee-14; Interviewee 20). President Obama sided with the environmentalist positions, primarily because it coincided with his election pledges to reduce GHG emissions but also his support for restoring US international leadership on this issue, which had been damaged at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) climate conference in Copenhagen in 2009 (Russel and Benson 2014). He declared his personal interest in KXL (Interviewee-21), helping the issue to become a symbol of the Presidency's environmental credentials. Moreover, grassroots activism's effect on Democrats is worth emphasising (Interviewee-17).

In terms of the KXL permit, both the Senate (2011) (S. 1932) and Congress (2011a) (H.R. 3548) discussed the application in House committees. The topics focused upon by senators and

representatives were US overdependence on oil imports from hostile and unstable regions and its effect on national security, US vulnerability to geopolitical tumult, threats to supplies under higher oil prices, secure and reliable trade, oil's importance for the Department of Defense (DOD), bi-lateral trading, possible environmental social and economic impacts and long term jobs impacts (Senate 2011). There was only one Democrat co-sponsor (Joe Manchin III from West Virginia) in 40 co-sponsors for the permit. On November 23, a group of Republican Congress members introduced an Act aimed at forcing the Obama administration to make a decision within 60 days (Congress 2011c). Again, Obama approached the permit decision slowly because of the Presidential election in 2012 (New York Times 2011).

On January 18, 2012, the DOS (2012a) announced that it would not approve the KXL construction. The main reason for this decision was stated as a lack of necessary information but the importance of maintaining positive bilateral relations with Canada was also emphasized. On the same day, Obama (White House 2012a) said his government prioritised benefits for American workers and business without risking the health and safety of the American people. The administration (Zichal 2012) announced how the government was seeking to boost domestic energy production and increase efficiency but through cleaner energy sources rather than fossil fuels. Although US domestic production is generally light sweet oil as opposed to heavy crude, it is still fossil fuel. It does actually seem difficult to distinguish what environmentalists or President Obama opposed, whether it was tar sands, fossil fuels, production of fossil fuel or distribution of fossil fuel. In terms of fossil fuel production and distribution, proponents argued that new technologies are far better than old ones (Interviewee 11). Moreover, the climate change issue is not a production, rather a consumption issue (Interviewee-16). However, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) can be given as an example, which made available significant federal subsidies for clean energy. These priorities were also seen as

compatible with national `energy independence` and `all of the above` policies/targets/rhetoric. In order to support this argument, two examples were given which were US crude oil production had reached its highest level since 2003 and oil imports had been falling since 2008 (ibid.).

While Democrat Senator Bernie Sanders from Vermont (2012) supported this decision (DOS 2012a), CEPA (2012) announced their disappointment at the decision. Their announcement (2012) included an argument that KXL represented a reliable and safe source of oil for Americans and provided significant opportunities for American and Canadian business and citizens. TransCanada`s president and executive officer Russ Girling (TransCanada 2012a) said that the US would, as a result, continue to import oil from conflictual areas like Middle East, Venezuela and other countries who did not share the same democratic values as Canadians and Americans. It was then announced that TransCanada would re-apply for a permit (ibid.). This project, it was argued, was an export pipeline for Canada which would help send oil from Canada to Europe and Latin America by the NRDC and Oil Change International common study (2012). Thus, its benefits for the US were outweighed by benefits for Canada. Moreover, the pipeline would increase the price of oil in the American Midwest and it would affect US consumers.

In February 2012, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) (2012) announced a review of KXL in terms of serving the national interest after a request from Congress (2011b). Neither the DOS or TransCanada violated the law since they had followed the necessary permit process. In March 2012, the President`s remarks (White House 2012b) on American-Made energy shows how his administration interpreted the energy issue. For Obama (ibid.), America was producing more oil than at any time in the last eight years with the help of the shale revolution, but the real issue was dependency on oil market prices and imports from the Middle East. The target for him was reducing dependency on every source of fossil fuel energy. Here is the question: if the US did not have the shale revolution during the

time (see Chapter 7), would President Obama still have had the same view?

While on 17 April 2012, the Governor of Nebraska signed into law a statute authorizing the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality (NDEQ) to review an alternative pipeline routing in the state. An initial alternative routing report was then submitted on 18 April (DOS 2012b). Then, as referenced in the SDEIS, the national interest was described in terms of environmental impacts, diversity of supply to meet US crude oil demand, security of transport pathways, cross-border facilities, relations between the US and various foreign suppliers of crude oil, foreign policy objectives, economic benefits and reducing reliance on fossil fuels (ibid. 10-11). On 24 May, a MOU was signed between the DOS and NDEQ in order to define roles and responsibilities (DOS 2012c). In June, the NDEQ (2012) published a KXL feedback report which summarized Nebraskans' concerns, outlined NDEQ's concerns and provided Nebraskans with an interim status report on NDEQ's decision-making. On 5th of September, TransCanada (2012b) submitted a Supplemental Environmental Report to the NDEQ for the preferred alternative. Republican Senator Greg Brophy from Colorado (2012), supported a revised route in order to meet federal environmental, social and economic standards. In October 2012, the NDEQ published its Draft Evaluation Report (DER) which set out potential impacts and reflected back comments from Nebraskan citizens. On November 1, the US House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (2012) evaluated Obama's actions regarding KXL in terms of domestic energy production. Although domestic production would increase, it was concluded, it would not happen on federal lands. Thus, increasing domestic production did not benefit American society economically. From the evaluation it can be discerned that there was by this point no strong argument for importing oil from Canada: a marked change from the Bush administration era.

That said, according to polls conducted by Anderson Insight and CAPP (2012), American society supported oil imports from Canada

rather than Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Polling suggested that 78% of the public consequently approved of Keystone in both 2011 and 2012. On the other hand, people from 25 tribes met at the Protect the Sacred Gathering (2013) to protest against the tar sands projects in South Dakota in January 2013.

The Pembina Institute (2013) then published another study. It emphasised two main points which related to how an accumulated surplus of oil in the US Midwest could affect domestic oil prices, and the pipelines' potential effect on diversification in the producers' market. In January, the NDEQ (2013) announced its Final Evaluation Report which considered potential environmental, social, economic and social impacts proposed mitigation measures for pipeline safety and potential spills. On this basis, the Governor of Nebraska approved KXL. On 22 January, the Energy and Commerce Committee leaders (2013) announced their support for Governor Dave Heineman's approval. Making this announcement (*ibid.*), they argued that KXL would help create thousands of American jobs and strengthen American energy independence. The DOS (2013) then released the DSEIS in March. On 15th March, the House of Republicans (2013) evaluated Obama's green energy efforts and showed how these policies had largely failed, with some energy green producers going bankrupt such as solar energy, electric car battery technologies manufacturers. The Institute for 21st Century Energy (2013) then sent a letter to Secretary of State Kerry arguing that KXL was in America's national interest, because Canada is an important and reliable trading partner, oil imports from Canada would not be from a geopolitically unstable region, and KXL could support North American energy self-sufficiency, jobs and economy. However, the EPA (2013) criticized the DSEIS as insufficient.

On 22 May 2013, the House (2013) passed H.R. 228 bill, entitled as "...to approve the construction, operation, and maintenance of the KXL...". While 219 Republicans supported the measure, 185 Democrats were against. In terms of the oil trade, the US is not only the country who cared about diversification as a buyer: Canada also

considered diversification of its imports. Here, the NEB (2013) released a Market Diversification report for Canadian oil and gas. In order to increase the benefits of resources for Canadians and ensure public health, safety and environmental protection, diversification was accepted as a key target. At this point, environmentalists' arguments (Interviewee-8) that KXL was an export rather than an import project can be supported. However, here the same point is valid. What is the interest or benefit for the US of KXL? The Canadian side's perspective can be seen through comparing both sides' governments. While Democrat and Republican administrations had different positions in terms of KXL in the US, both Conservative and Liberal governments supported it in Canada. Economic priorities proved too attractive even for an environmentally friendly Liberal government (Interviewee-2). During the time, there were two important factors on the US side that shaped the process. Firstly, the US was becoming more self-sufficient in oil, and secondly, North American oil prices were by then lower than global prices.

A CEP submission (2013) to the NEB also emphasizes Canadian energy security, employment and GHG as important reasons why the project should be supported. In terms of employment, similar support came from the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) which is based in the US (2013). In terms of the benefits of KXL on employment, they (ibid.) disagreed with the President. On the other side, environmentalists (NRDC 2013; Public Citizen 2013) did not find KXL in the national interest because of its environmental impacts and potential chances of oil spills. This split of ideas is reflected in the polls. According to the Pew Research Center (2013), 65% American continued to favor building Keystone. But while 82% of Republicans favored construction, only 51% Democrats supported the project. On the other hand, in the first half of the 2014, NGO protests increased and new organizations were set up such as Reject and Protect (2014) and the Cowboy Indian Alliance (National Geographic Blog 2014).

In January 2014, the DOS (2014) released its Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS). This report (DOS 2014:

1.9-1-1.9-9) shows clearly that different levels (i.e. federal and state) and areas (i.e. Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas) were being considered. On the Canadian side, Gaétan Caron (NEB 2014), Chair and CEO of NEB, said Canadians' energy interests were evolving to balance economic, environmental and social considerations. In terms of environmental considerations, OIG (2014) released a KXL Compliance Follow-up review in February. In order to decide a project suitable for the national interest, it was evaluated under economic, energy security, foreign policy, environment and cultural criteria. In the same month, a district court judge in Nebraska (2014) declared the law that allowed for the pipeline's route through the state unconstitutional. The decision was adopted pursuant to the Major Oil Pipeline Siting Act. Plaintiffs were Randy Thompson, Susan Luebbe and Susan Dunavan, three Nebraskan Landowners. These landowners were supported by environmental groups such as Bold Nebraska (Kleeb 2014) and Resilience (Genoways 2014).

However, support for KXL by this point was growing, particularly amongst right wing politicians. Republican Senator Chuck Grassley from Iowa (2014) argued that KXL was important for economic growth and energy stability in the US, because it would create jobs and provide energy independence. Using similar arguments (creating jobs and boosting economy), Republican Congressman Peter Roskam from Illinois (2014) also announced his support. The highly influential UCC (2014) was also supportive, announcing six different reasons why KXL should be accepted by the federal government. These were that the pipeline would not harm the environment (this argument was referenced to a DOS report (2008b: 5-1), it would give the US more oil supply flexibility, allow oil imports from a friendly supplier (as opposed to unfriendly countries), strengthen the North American economy, help address GHG, and would produce jobs, higher wages and a growing economy. Similar support came from House Republicans (2014). For them (2014), 61% of Republican congressmen supported KXL, since it was argued to provide direct and indirect jobs, reduce American dependency on foreign oil and

strengthen the economy. These examples represent the critiques of politicians and lobbies of Obama during this period (Lance 2014; Brooks 2014).

Indeed, the President could be seen as contradicting public and political opinion. In November, the House of Representatives, that was under Republicans control (2014) (H.R. 5682), voted in favour of KXL, while the Senate (2014) (S. 2280) voted against the northern portion of KXL. In the House of Representatives, while 221 Republicans supported the project, only 31 Democrats voted in favour. In the Senate, while 59 Senators (45 Republicans and 14 Democrats) supported it, 41 Senators (39 Democrats and 2 Independent) were against. In 2014, according to the Pew Research Center (2014), a majority of Americans (59%) favoured building KXL which was down from 2013. Whereas 83% of Republicans favoured building the pipeline, only 43% of Democrats supported the project (ibid.). The percentage of Democrat supporters had fallen 11% since 2013. Support or opposition to KXL clearly reflected Democrat or Republican affiliation (Interviewee-14).

In January 2015, the House of Representatives (Congress 2015a) (H.R. 3) and Senate (2015a) (S. 1.) both passed the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act, directly challenging Obama's authority. As Obama then decided on whether to grant approval, many influential institutions and politicians announced their opinions on KXL in an attempt to sway his views. For example, President and CEO of the American Petroleum Institute (API) Jack Gerard (API 2015a) said that a majority of Americans wanted the project to be built and the President could not hide behind the Nebraska court case. Congresswoman Terri Sewell (Dem.) from Alabama (2015) supported KXL since it provided energy independence, job creation and strengthened the economy. Similar arguments were given by Senator Rob Portman (Rep.) (2015) and the Energy Commerce House (ECH) (2015). The Congressional Budget Office (BDO) (2015) then announced that KXL would have no significant effect on federal spending. On 16 January, a memorandum requesting views on the

proposed KXL in accordance with Executive Order 13337 was sent to state departments. This letter was replied to by several departments (DOC 2015; DHS 2015; DOD 2015; DOE 2015; DOI 2015c; DOT 2015; EPA 2015). They either did not make serious comment (DOC 2015) or emphasised their support (DOE 2015). Some institutions⁶ sent a letter of support for KXL to John Boehner (Rep.) speaker of the House of Representatives, and Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader. These groups are mainly known as having a close relationship with Republicans. Their lobbying helped influence the debate. On the other hand, scientists and economists sent a letter criticising KXL to President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry (NRDC 2015). Lobbies, more generally institutions, were therefore being shaped by the polarization of ideas around KXL.

However, despite intense lobbying by energy and business interests, on February 24, the KXL approval act was vetoed by the President (Senate 2015a). Security, safety and the environment were defined as key factors for national interest in support of the decision (White House 2015a). From another perspective (Interviewee-20), Obama became a political target when he announced publicly he was going to consider KXL from an environmental perspective during the 2012 election rally. Lobby groups were quick to react. The API (2015c) criticized the decision on the same day. This process then closed because of the failed passage of the approval in the Senate by 62-37 votes (Senate 2015b), which required a majority of 2/3. While 8 Democrats voted `yes`, none of Republican Senators voted `no`. In July, TransCanada (2015b) announced its estimates of KXL's contributions to US energy security and local benefits (i.e. tax and economic input) as around \$200 million, plus more than 14,000 construction jobs for the 11 states involved. Pipeline safety, consideration of GHG, increasing oil supply and moving away from

⁶ Including the API (2015b), Americans for Prosperity (2015), Consumer Energy Alliance (2015), Frontiers of Freedom (2015), International Brotherhood of Teamsters (2015), International Union of Operating Engineers (2015), NAM (2015a), North America's Building Trades Unions (2015), The 60 Plus Association (2015), TransCanada (2015) and UCC (2015).

Venezuela and Middle East suppliers were other points which were made. On July 22, State of Nebraska Governor Peter Ricketts (Rep.) (2015) sent a letter which emphasised a revision of the pipeline route as a result of the legislative and public process in Nebraska, to Obama. Increased safety conditions for health and environmental issues were made. While on 3 November the DOS (2015a) announced the ROD NID report, Obama (White House 2015b) denied another KXL application on 6 November. By this point, it had taken more than six years to review the project. For him (ibid.), KXL did not serve the national interest, because there was no meaningful economic contribution in job creation, lower gas prices for Americans and the dirtier crude oil it supported. However, Obama also considered his own political legacy on climate change pledges and these factors may have proved more significant in his decision-making.

Indeed, US backing helped paved the way for the signing of the UNFCCC 2015 Paris agreement (Interviewee-6). However, Obama (White House 2015b) admits that there were also material factors that helped him in denying the project: oil and gasoline prices were relatively low and US domestic production had been increasing. Moreover, KXL had become a campaign issue between parties rather than an objective policy – an example of so-called bi-partisan ‘culture wars’ issues. Some institutions such as the UCH (2015), NAM (2015b) and politicians such as George W. Bush (2015), Justin Trudeau (Prime Minister of Canada 2015) the new Prime Minister of Canada, Senator Joe Donnelly (2015) and Nebraska Governor Peter Ricketts (2015) stood against the decision. In his press statement, Secretary Kerry (DOS 2015b) explained Obama’s announcement by stating that he “evaluated information provided by TransCanada, SEIS, the views of other federal agencies, and nearly five million public comments”. According to a West Virginia University paper on KXL (2015a), 57% American favoured KXL, representing a significant decline from previous polling. According to the poll which was completed in

December by CNN and ORC (2014), 80% of Republicans supported it compared to just 39% of Democrats.

On January 6, TransCanada filed a legal action (2016a) in a Houston federal court accusing Obama of `exceeding his authority` and filed (2016b: 1) a claim which asserted that the “Administration`s actions violated U.S. obligations under NAFTA”. Peter Watson (NEB 2016), Chair and CEO of NEB, expressed some uncertainties over Canada’s energy future. These were deployment of advanced technologies for renewable and fossil fuel energy production, decisions by OPEC, lifting of sanctions against Iran, the historic climate agreement in Paris, denial of the KXL and the recent lifting of US oil exports. Thus, in this view, there was no one dimension dictating the national interest, rather multi-interacting dimensions. On 10 June, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (2016a) sent a second subpoena to the State Department for KXL documents after letters on February 24, 2016 (Oversight 2016b) and May 31, 2016 (Oversight 2016c) requesting additional documents for further clarification. The first subpoena was made on July 8, 2015 (Oversight 2015a), after the DOS failed to respond to letters sent on 24 February 2015 (Oversight 2015b) and 15 June 2015 (Oversight 2015c) requesting letters. At the end of the year, a CRS (Yacobucci 2016) report asserted that energy policy is complicated by the diversity of energy consumption and supply in the US. The debate was shaping an institutionally informative approach.

While the Obama presidency was finishing, there was a new presidential election campaign. In terms of KXL, all four Republican candidates (i.e. Rubio, Carson, Bush and Trump) supported the project (Rubio 2012, McCormick 2014, Bush 2015, Schleifer 2015), whereas both Democratic candidates (Clinton and Sanders) (New York Times 2012a, Sanders 2012) were against it. Election of Trump as President then led to a new phase in the KXL story. When Clinton was a member of the Obama administration in 2010, she said she was inclined to approve it but changed this view in the election

campaigning. Trump, meanwhile, had consistently expressed support for the project during the campaigning.

Duration: Theoretical Analysis

The process by this point had become a reflection of reciprocal interaction between ideas, institutions and material capabilities, rather than being a pure material issue as in the beginning. However, there is no static picture in terms of weigh of structural causes. While institutions only reflected the different ideas at the beginning, they also shaped the ideas in the process as it progressed. We also saw the division in ideas (between political parties and national-state interests) through time. However, these changes happened in parallel to material capabilities improvements. Thus, material capability, which was significant at the starting point of the process, was overtaken by the two other structural causes in driving the KXL process.

In this respect, the period began with TransCanada (2009a) emphasizes that KXL was important for US oil diversification policy, because of decreasing domestic oil production and increasing demand in the US (i.e. material capabilities). Although it is not possible to establish whether the Canadian government supported this expansion plan, the Canadian reaction (NEB 2009b) expanded KXL`s main dimensions to the institutional area. In addition to discussions on the benefits to Canadian public interest, the implications for government, government participants, and Canadian sustainable economic development were also prioritised (ibid.). Thus, at the beginning of the process KXL was discussed as an economic-energy trade issue involving Canadian oil between a Canadian oil company and the USA (i.e. a material capabilities dimension). But it became increasingly characterized by a relationship between the US state (and its departments) and US public interest on one side, and the Canadian state (and its departments), Canadian public and oil company on the other side (i.e. an institutional dimension).

By the start of the next decade, this interplay between material capabilities and institutions was overtaken by the increasing

importance of ideas in the KXL process. In mid-2010, the Deepwater Horizon explosion, which is an external shock, was a key trigger for climate change considerations, leading to environmental issues becoming more significant as the debate developed. This ideational feature received more prominence in the discussion on whether 2010 was the warmest year ever, triggering a strong reaction by environmental groups to KXL. To illustrate this point, the letter of Members of Congress to Secretary Clinton on environmental concerns around the project shows the importance of ideas (i.e. collective images by one of different groups). A battle over ideas was also gaining momentum during the cap-and-trade bill, as the climate-sceptic Tea Party movement became more politically important. The political divergence in the process can be deduced from the Perryman Group (2010) and EnSys` (2010) conclusions since institutions also reflect the process (see Chapter 3). By 2011, material capabilities issues, in terms of problems for the US and global oil market, still existed but the debate was becoming framed more in party ideological terms. Thereby, institutions started to reflect these different priorities.

Indeed, the remaining part of the Obama era could be characterised by a conflict over ideas, which in turn were promoted by, and influenced through, institutions such as the Presidency, political parties and departments of state. Opponents and proponents of the project were more visible in this period (Perfomak et al. 2011a). Considerations for the environment, dependency on fossil fuels and Midwest midstream and downstream actors constituted one side of the ideological debate, while the benefits of diversity of US petroleum supply and economic benefits (e.g. job creation) and the possibility of Canadian oil supplying Asia, instead of the USA, represented the other side. Different perspectives, priorities and interpretations of the terms led to increased involvement by different institutions in the process in parallel to ongoing ideational separation (CEPA 2011; EPA 2011). Institutions started to shape the ideas and the direction of the process rather than only reflecting the ideas.

In addition, material benefits became only part of arguments for KXL rather than being the main focus, as in the Bush era. Obviously material improvement (i.e. decreasing oil prices, increasing global and US oil production) was helping generating support for the project. The DOS tried to solve an accumulated problem with additional public meetings. To inform society, environmental and safety issues (i.e. material capabilities) and energy security (i.e. ideas) were chosen. However, an ideational split between institutions could not be stopped. Environmentalists already saw KXL as a front page issue and focused on it between many other issues (Interviewee-3). KXL had become a symbol of wider splits in US politics. The dynamics of oil politics and domestic politics were also becoming increasingly intertwined.

KXL then became prominent before the election rally, showing how institutionally-driven ideas were gradually supplanting material capabilities. Political party clashes had already started and the benefits for the US Midwest had become an important issue in addition to national interests in terms of Midwest midstream and downstream oil industries, oil prices and the environment. Ideational splits heavily influenced President Obama, who was being pressured by the increasing power of grassroots activism, that also had an effect on Democrats. As a result, other institutions (i.e. state departments, oil and environmental lobbies, think-tanks that prioritise energy-economy and environment, Canadians' participation) started showing oppositional positions against each other as coalitions formed in support of or in protest to KXL.

At this point, the national interest was being defined as including environmental impacts, diversification of supply of crude oil, safety issues, compatibility with foreign policies and economic benefits (DOS 2012b). 2013 started with similar discussions which were mainly about ideas and institutional issues surrounding KXL (NDEQ 2013; ECC 2013), while it was also considered a material issue. Moreover, there were also clashes between state departments (institutions) (EPA 2013 vs. DOS 2013). Changing the US and global oil markets

generated a contradiction between biosphere and economy as a trigger of these debates.

Institutional divisions became increasingly evident. Pew Research Center polls (2013; 2014) are important in terms of showing the huge difference between Republicans' and Democrats' support for KXL. Collective images were held by different groups at different times (see Chapter 3). Moreover, the percentage of Democrat supporters had fallen 11% in one year. This shows that people's reactions/perceptions change in time through the process because of an accumulation of events and discussions and their intensity. The split between political parties was reflected in their supporters' views, which then became prominent in the election. Thus, voters' expectations from the parties were also changing. The parties' reaction against this `reflection back` wave was not only related to KXL and also other controversial issues. It was not surprising that a candidate like Donald J. Trump, who promoted controversial arguments, would be selected in this increasingly polarized context.

On February 24, 2015, President Obama (White House 2015a) vetoed the KXL bill during the KXL debate (API 2015; Sewell 2015; ECH 2015; BDO 2015; NRDC 2015). Specific reasons for the decision cannot be determined but we can at least choose a dimension and focus on it. In democratic systems, societal reaction showed itself to be more influential year by year. Thus, in addition to current discussions and Obama's personal opinions, societal pressure also exerted an evident influence on him. It was seen both before the 2012 election and the 2016 election. Moreover, besides his personal and party legitimization requirements inherent in the process, there was also an American global leadership of climate change emphasis to consider (White House 2015b). The dynamics of foreign policy became influential in the process in addition to oil politics and domestic politics. Both administrations and politicians (i.e. Republicans and Democrats) have to consider their legitimacy. Thus, legitimacy became the main decider of the process at this point (see

Chapter 3). Moreover, the US administration also had to consider the US' position and image in the world specifically after the Iraq War.

In short, the project to carry oil from Canada to the US had become a very controversial issue in US politics. It started with material needs for both countries (i.e. material capabilities) linked to foreign policy, but environmentalist considerations (i.e. ideas), that were connected with US oil and domestic politics, changed the direction of the process. Ideas and their different reactions from political parties brought institutions into the process. While institutions only represented the ideas in the beginning, they started being the determiners of the ideas in parallel to increasing material capability (i.e. a changing US and global oil market). State-Nation interests also became prominent as part of ideas and as part of domestic politics. This clash also represents a contradiction. Specifically the Midwest was the key point of the debate in terms of oil industry in the region, oil prices of the Midwest and environmental impacts. This contradiction was not effective as an economy vs. biosphere argument; however, both sides (economy and environment) could use the Midwest as part of their arguments.

Thus, both institutional representatives of ideas (political parties and nation-state interests) split over time. The effects on institutions and institutional reflections show how different actors and interests were interacting under the system and their behaviours had been shaping the `others`. During the process, we also see how oil politics, domestic politics and foreign policy dynamics were pulled into the process. Now, a polarized domestic politics that could carry grassroots activism and populism was supporting the election of a new president.

5.6. The Trump Era: 2017-

On 24 January, newly-elected US President Trump (White House 2017a) signed a Presidential Memorandum inviting TransCanada to refile an application for the Presidential Permit. Trump had made a point of expressing support for fossil fuel sectors in his controversial

'America First' Presidential election campaign, so this move was unsurprising. Here, Trump emphasized the role of KXL in creating jobs, enhancing energy security, providing affordable and reliable energy for Americans and tax revenues for state and local levels. Moreover, a new term 'energy dominance' for US foreign policy was adopted by Trump over 'energy independence' (Interviewee-17). A more regionally integrated market (e.g. the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement [USMCA]), including Canada, it was argued, could help achieve it. Environmental impacts of KXL were not mentioned. This decision was supported by industry lobbies (CAPP 2017a; API 2017a; NAM 2017) and leading politicians (Nebraska Governor Pete Ricketts 2017). In addition to the President's points, they (CAPP 2017; Ricketts 2017) also added their own environmental reviews that stated minimal impacts from the project.

Encouraged by this changed political context, on January 26 TransCanada (2017) filed another Presidential Permit application. However, this time the approval was challenged by Greenpeace (2017). It sent a letter to the US Office of Government Ethics citing a conflict of interest in the Presidential administration. The letter wanted recusal of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson from the decision process because his recent employer ExxonMobil was investing heavily in producing crude oil from Canada's tar sands and would directly benefit from the approval by Presidential Permit. On 23 March, however, a Presidential Permit (DOS 2017) was announced. In contrast to this decision, Democrat Senator Brian Schatz from Hawaii (2017) asserted that KXL was not in the US national interest, because countries like Germany and China continued to make progress in the transition away from dirty energy, thereby gaining significant efficiency advantages. In contrast, the UCC (2017) and House Representative Mike Bost (2017) supported the permit because of KXL's effects on energy security, creating jobs and economic growth. The US embassy in Canada (2017) announced that the permit supported foreign policy, environmental, social and economic impacts and compliance with applicable law and policy. Adding further supporting evidence, the API

(2017b) estimated that 42,000 jobs would be created during construction along with the generation of \$55 million from property tax revenues. Some opposition was voiced by residents close to the line of the proposed pipeline. The Price of Oil (2017) announced that they received more than 460,000 comments against KXL from native tribes, farmers, ranchers, Nebraskans and activists. Their `No KXL Promise` letter (2017) announced that re-routing the project would not work.

Canada was also supportive of the Permit decision. The CAPP (2017b) announced that Canada's energy future relied on overcoming five challenges: low commodity prices; pipeline capacity; industry competitiveness; regulatory uncertainty; and access to new markets. In terms of oil, challenges include low oil prices, Canadian and US regulators' responses on climate change, potential US protectionist policies to block Canadian oil's access to its traditional export markets, technological developments that reduce costs and GHG (CAPP 2017b: 2). Jim Carr (Government of Canada 2017), Canadian Minister of Natural Resources, emphasized the benefits of an integrated energy market between Canada and the US. Here, KXL was seen as significant in creating thousands of good jobs for Canadians. By the end of 2017, Canada had also become the US' largest energy trade partner (EIA 2017b), meaning the project took on a strategic trade dimension. In 2016, 41% of total US crude oil imports were from Canada.

On December 19, The Nebraska Public Service Commission (2017) issued an order for a KXL application docket. According to the docket (*ibid.*), "there will be no comment from the Commission". Trump's permit has since been faced with both legal challenges and protests. Environmental and landowner groups are still trying to block the project via state courts. They assert that this approval is a rubber-stamp (NRDC 2018). In November 2018, a Judge of the United States District Court for Montana (2018) blocked construction, why the court arguing that the administration failed to follow established rules and procedures for decisions. Trump approved the project on the same

document that was provided by Obama`s DOS. Although, further legal challenges to this decision are likely (Biological Diversity 2018), in an attempt to break the Montana court stalemate, Trump (White House 2019b) cancelled his 2017 permit and issued a new permit not contingent on State Department review. The project is planned to be completed in 2022 (TC Energy 2020), although further legal action is likely.

Duration: Theoretical Analysis

Although governmental decision-making during this period was completely opposite to the Obama era, Trump actually came into power under the conditions that Obama left the administration in terms of interaction of structural causes. That interaction continued in this period. However, changing oil politics, domestic politics and foreign policy perceptions that altered via the interaction of structural causes led to a new direction in the KXL process.

Again, institutions and their interaction with ideas were highly evident during this era, particularly the ‘America First’ rhetoric of the Trump Presidency. Trump’s prioritization of ‘energy dominance’ over energy ‘independence’ marked a significant ideational change in the process, demonstrating the importance of foreign policy ideas. Here, Trump used this reframing of oil diversification to invite TransCanada to refile an application (White House 2017a). The main reasons behind this decision, according to the President, were jobs, energy security, affordable and reliable energy and tax revenues (i.e. State and local levels). It is interesting to note that the same issue was accepted in a totally opposite way by two different presidents from two different parties. However, Trump’s priorities were also determined by his party, supporters and US global power. Improving US-Canada ties was also connected with a changing US opinion about the rest of the world. While the public wanted to hear ‘America First’, it became interpreted by Trump as isolationism in response to wider perceived threats from globalization. American national interests then became more important than global interests, as reflected in oil diversification.

The important point is that, although Trump announced his approval, 58.7% of Nebraskans voted for him. Until that time, there were challenges by the people of Nebraska and increasing opposition to KXL in polls, but it did not affect the election outcome. This perception can be connected with lack of support for grassroots activism. Certainly, the general election process and arguments must be evaluated. Generally, the parties' backgrounds (i.e. ideas) affected both presidents' behaviours rigidly as KXL became increasingly a 'culture wars' issue. Thus, legitimacy can have a different meaning to people and to political parties even in the same time and place. Moreover, there is a process of accumulation. Obama's (White House 2015b) argument that KXL had become a campaign battle between parties rather than a pure policy decision, shows how different backgrounds affected the process differently. Discussions which occurred before approval have consequently continued after approval (UCC 2017; Boost 2017). The accumulation of interaction between structural causes led the same president (Obama) to have different stances at different time points, while the same process has witnessed opposite administrative decisions (Obama and Trump).

5.7. Discussion: the Value of a Coxian Perspective

5.7.1. Structural Causes: Material Capabilities, Ideas and Institutions

In contrast to a more rational perspective that would prioritise single causal factors and the synchronic nature of events, a Coxian perspective reveals far more about the motivations for US oil diversification over time. Here, it is obvious that the KXL process has never had one dimension and can be understood in terms of structural causes such as the material capabilities, ideas and institutions of Cox.

This observation can be derived from comparison between the beginning and end of the process. The oil company's changing plans in order to get more benefit was actually following its rational interest. It was a deliberate selection made by an agent (see Chapter 4).

However, pre-determined rules and expectations also existed in the process (ibid.) After TransCanada's expansion plan to the Gulf Coast, the selections of actors and structurally determined existences started to clash and KXL presented a more complex picture. However, it developed according to patterns which are determined by actors' and structures' preferences, considerations and limitations. But exogenous shocks can also direct and shape these patterns (ibid.). In the case of KXL, in 2010 two important shocks became evident which were the Deepwater Horizon explosion and scientific evidence that it was the hottest year on record. They affected societal perceptions on environmental issues, because, while an idea manifested itself in a short-term perception of that topic, materiality considerations exist over a long-term. It does not mean any superiority over each other, since long-term events are shaped by short-term perceptions in the beginning.

All KXL discussions have been mediated through the national interest. While different actors asserted their own perceptions, lack of clarity over the national interest term led to an accumulation of these perceptions. An unclear picture of contradictions between the economy-biosphere and the national interest-state interest led to societal interference much more than in the ordinary policy process. Societal reaction caused a legitimacy issue for government. As a Democrat leader, Obama was certainly affected. In terms of environmental considerations, Democrats were more receptive than Republicans. Obama acted in response to these contradictions. Trump, on the other hand, as a new president, asserted arguments in a directly oppositional and more definite way. If the process had not been controversial, Trump's assertive line of argumentation might not have worked. The process was not controversial in the beginning, but evolution of the process led to conflict.

Although this study is about US oil diversification motivations, the US' energy partners specifically Canada in this case cannot be ignored. From the both sides perspectives (DOS 2008a; TransCanada 2008f), the necessity of protecting trade relations between Canada and US

were emphasized. There are some reasons for this. Firstly, Canada was interpreted as a better trade option than politically unstable regions (e.g. Middle East). Thus, the main emphasis for diversification was secure and reliable supply. Secondly, Canada shares democratic values with the US and both countries have more historical connections than with any other country. Thirdly, Canada-US trade is the world's largest two-way state economic relationship. Moreover, Venezuela, another oil exporter country, had been trying to reduce its trade relations with the US for political reasons linked to its left-wing government (Perfomak et al. 2011b). However, Canada worked to protect its own interests. Canada also looked to diversify its oil market as much as the US, because northern America oil was cheaper and US protectionist arguments could not be relied upon (CAPP 2017). Finally, the Canadian public's interest evolved to support a balance between economic, environmental and social considerations (NEB 2014). Government and its oil policies are shaped and supported much more than before.

The accumulation of the process had combined oil politics and domestic politics in the beginning. However, they were joined by foreign policy dynamics in terms of US power in the world, in addition to US-Canada ties. This event prompts a discussion as to whether Cox's (1992: 179-180) scenario of "a non-hegemonic order lacking effective universal principles of order and functioning as an interplay of rival powerful states, each with their client states, most probably based on an organization of rival world regions happen" was now emerging. By this point, the international order was experiencing inter-regional splitting, while there was a fundamental change in international institutions. Thus, President Trump's decisions were largely determined by a process which started long before his appointment, with the decline of US hegemony and a fracturing international liberal order (Mauil 2019). This declining order and its supporting institutions have been connected with increasing social causes. Although economic and technological advancements have contributed, a lack of belief in institutions increasingly led society to

participate more actively in policy processes. Social forces, including populism and grassroots activism, have had an evident influence but also has become an outcome.

5.7.2. Additional Structural Sphere: The Role of Social Dynamics?

In view of the intervention of society actors in the KXL process, we might ask the question: what is the role of social dynamics? As identified in Chapter 3, Cox's theoretical arguments lack clarity in terms of the transition between agency-structure and civil society-political society.

Social dynamics were certainly significant in the case. In the early process, the case was defined by oil trading from supplier companies (i.e. TransCanada and ConocoPhillips) to a demander (i.e. the US). However, during the KXL process, different ideational arguments and different state agencies (institutions) intervened to expand the scope of the debate. Moreover, the Canadian state, at the supplier side, engaged in the process in the institutional form of the Prime Minister (Prime Minister of 2015) and Minister of Natural Resources (Natural Resources Canada (2011)). Different US state departments participated as well, providing another institutional dimension. However, global politics is not based purely on state/government behaviors. In terms of the oil trade, petroleum and business institutions (CAPP 2017; API 2017a; NAM 2017), environmental institutions (NRDC 2011), universities, polls showing societal perceptions (Pew Research Center 2013) and protests as societal reactions (Reject and Protect 2014) cannot be ignored. Thus, as with any other issue in global politics, US oil diversification motivations are based on, and should be studied through, the lens of state-society complexity. In this respect, social dynamics shows itself as another structural sphere in the Coxian analysis.

These dynamics are particularly evident in the environmental debates on the pipeline project. Increasing environmentalist opposition against KXL occurred after 2010. This social reaction was shaped by institutions. Moreover, with the help of the lobby system in American

politics, they became a powerful rival to oil industry interests. They pushed the oil industry to support the Republican side, while environmentalists sided with Democrats, who have been more receptive to environmental considerations. Moreover, the environmentalist opposition, shaped by these institutions, has in turn become a shaper of Democrat interests, thereby partly shaping domestic politics. While hardly evident before 2010, these social dynamics therefore became more pronounced in the period thereafter; suggesting that a neo-Coxian analysis has become more feasible in the KXL case. In short, while social dynamics fill the gaps in Coxian theory, they also show the nature of changing contemporary world dynamics.

5.8. Conclusions

US oil diversification patterns can be uncovered by the help of ideas, material capabilities and institutions derived from Cox (Chapter 3). All these elements affect each other during the process, with some becoming more prominent at specific points, e.g. material capabilities in the early Bush phase, and ideas and institutions under Obama. The three main causes can therefore be shown and processes described. The KXL pipeline, in this respect, is a useful case for uncovering patterns of US oil diversification. While oil is a material substance, its effect and importance are related to ideas. That material issue has brought ideas dynamics into the process. And these two interests were reflected and shaped by institutions.

This process also links US oil politics, which is connected with the global oil market, into wider areas that encompass domestic politics and foreign policy. Thus, US oil diversification motivations cannot be attributed solely to isolated economic benefits or environmental considerations. They were also connected with the splits of both political parties and national-state interest under domestic politics dynamics. Moreover, the changing scope of US foreign policy which included drawing away from the Middle East oil and going back to the

American continent also intervened in the reciprocal interaction between oil politics and domestic politics. Thus, oil diversification cannot be reduced to administrative process or government participants but must be understood in this wider structural context.

On the other hand, there are also non-governmental institutions and societal reactions, i.e. social dynamics. Although non-governmental institutions and societal reactions affected the process, it finished according to what the administration wanted in the end. Demands and abilities of administrations cannot be understood without considering their political parties and leader's preferences, thereby determinants of administrations' legitimacy which is composed of domestic politics and foreign policy in US case. Thus, the picture seen in US oil diversification motivations supports a state-society complexity characteristic (see Chapter 3). However, a Coxian emphasis on state-society complexity needs to be explained in more detail. Social dynamics shows itself as a new social sphere in the 2000s millennium – a feature particularly evident in the KXL case, although it requires institutional organization to effect the process.

The process has proved our methodological stance that the rationality of people is not decided by some definite limitations, rather in time processes and according to events. KXL shows that people behave *in* behavior, rather than *through* behavior (see Chapter 4). For example, Trump's approval decision in 2017 cannot be evaluated without understanding the discussions on the project which started in 2008. This research, finds that the accumulation of the process has occurred around disputes over the national interest definition. Mainstream IR approaches could have chosen a selected topic, dynamic or independent variable to explain KXL, for example state self-interest (Realism) or economic cooperation (Liberalism), but can at best only provide a partial explanation of oil diversification. However, we have shown how different dynamics are influencing the duration process and shaping each other in a non-linear feedback loop that moves beyond these rational explanations. This analysis therefore adds significantly to the KXL literature. It also provides a basis for

uncovering oil diversification in other cases, which we can examine in the next chapter.

6. The Iraq War: transnational and national benefits - from cohesion to contestation

6.1. Introduction

The Iraq War (2003-2011), also commonly referred to as the invasion of Iraq, was the war that targeted the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) government by a US-led coalition that included the UK. While the relationship between Iraq and the US had already been deteriorating since the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the accusation by the US that Iraq possessed 'weapons of mass destruction' (WMDs) kept tensions alive. Before start of the new millennium US officials began discussing the ending of the Hussein government and regime change (Senate 1998: S1178; Congress 1998). However, 9/11 which involved coordinated terrorist attacks against the US led to a more aggressive intervention by the US in the Middle East. It has always been questioned as to whether the Iraq War was connected to control of Iraqi oil (Jhaveri 2004; Duffield 2005). Oil was certainly not the only reason for the conflict, but Iraqi oil was important for the US and its allies because of its potential reserves and production capacity. Diversification of US energy supplies geographically was strategically important and Iraq was the one of the potential candidates along with Iran and Libya in terms of their oil contribution to the market. Thus, there was not only the US national interest to consider, but also a transnational requirement for oil that was compatible with the national interest. However, having military intervention abroad (national interest), specifically in the Middle East, has undermined US hegemony, thereby reducing national and transnational benefits (i.e. as a unipolar power) for the US.

The national security discourse will be investigated through this research. The main theme of this discourse was convincing the American people on the justice of war with Iraq, but it also reflects how US policymakers and institutions interpreted US national security differently i.e. through the view of US and its global position. Thus, it helps us to find contradictions in the process in terms of national-transnational benefits. The US military interventions abroad and its

global oil market requirements have become contradictory. However, of interest is whether this diversification motive can be proven using pre-war US departments reports and studies. Certainly, Iraq's participation in the global oil market after the war shows that this US strategic target has been achieved.

The Iraq War is therefore an important case study in terms of discussing a US-led global system and US responsibilities theoretically and analysing US oil interests empirically. While the theoretical view shows us foreign policy dynamics in the War, they are connected with oil politics, which is provided by an empirical view. However, there is also a transition in domestic politics which is related to other dimensions. The USA was involved in Iraqi oil at different levels, and through different actors, including government, policy makers, state departments, oil lobby-industry and think-tanks. On the other side, this involvement led Iraqi civil society to react against the US, while Iraqi policymakers had a positive relationship with the US. This complex process is therefore evaluated from two aspects which are firstly the motivations of the US government within a national security discourse and secondly how the Iraqi governments considered/resisted civil society around the discursive issue of the meaning of Iraqi people's ownership of Iraqi oil. These two aspects have a sequential order.

The research claims that the War started with the national security discourse that could unite political and civil societies after the 9/11 shock. However, this unified domestic politics was integrated with a structural change in terms of the global political system which is related to US foreign policy and the global oil market, leading to a new picture. Collapse of united American ideas around national security reveals the attempts of IOCs, policymakers and elites for the internationalisation of Iraqi oil. It has also led political parties to become divided resulting in a transition in domestic politics. Obviously, it was not a one sided process. The effect by the US on an Iraqi political-civil society split and its results have underpinned the process since attempts to introduce oil regulation in Iraq. US legitimacy has been more strongly questioned in terms of US foreign policy. Thus, transnational-national benefits have become

contradictory. However, the process has not accumulated just through structural dynamics. There were agents' interests and interpretations of oil and non-oil (e.g. Israel lobby, neoconservative ideas) groups that interfered, shaped and triggered this structural change. However, we will consider an oil perspective. The Iraq War is an important case study to show how US oil diversification perceptions changed from a position of 'freeing the Middle East oil' to 'drawing away from the Middle East oil'.

In this chapter, empirical evidence on the Iraq War is explored using the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3. This data is used to establish the critical decision points as the policy-making unfolded. These are used to understand the rationales for oil diversification motivations that developed over time, which are then analysed across three semi-distinct phases that map on to important key points for the Iraqi oil case. The first of them covers the pre- and early war period to provide context. Next, the early war period is accepted as finishing with the adoption of a new Iraqi constitution which is the beginning of second period. Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) marked the end of second period and led to a new stage of Iraqi oil development. The current situation is dated from the Iraqi oil bids.

The data were collected from archive studies, online resources and interviews. Online resources were selected under two headings (i.e. US and Iraq perspectives). Although the research focuses on US oil diversification motivations, the Iraqi side has also been considered to provide balance. In total, 220 primary resources were identified, of which 69 of them were used. In order to collect data, open-source governmental websites (e.g. White House 2000; KRG 2007a), NGOs websites (e.g. Platform 2007a; 2007b) and the websites of institutions on energy, oil and trade (e.g. Bearden 2001; Deutsche Bank 2010) have been used as primary data sources. In addition, 6 interviewees were asked questions about the Iraq War to corroborate documentary sources. Interviews were held with retired diplomats, retired policymakers and people from think tanks and lobbies in Washington DC, USA over a period of five months in 2018-2019.

6.2. Literature Review

There is a wide literature about the motivations behind the Iraq War. While some (e.g. Hepburn 2003) focuses specifically on the oil motivation behind the war, others (Schmidt and William 2008) identify ideological, social and political factors. Moreover, there are also some (e.g. Mearsheimer and Walt 2007) who discuss the motivations of other countries. A review of this literature suggests that an oil diversification motive is a credible explanation - but one which requires further analysis.

For example, Hepburn`s (2003) work asserts that the war was not fought for oil. He (ibid.) believes that there is no direct US motivation for oil, because the short-term results of the war led to dramatically increasing oil prices, but it did lead to a slow rise in Iraqi oil production. Rising oil prices was not the target policy makers would have preferred. And in order to get back what was paid for the war from American taxpayers, Hepburn argues that oil production would have to rise in the short-term to account for this discrepancy. Moreover, the argument about weakening OPEC with a strong US ally does not make sense, because of Saudi Arabia`s power within the organization.

Schmidt and William (2008) take a different standpoint by looking at neoconservative effects on the US foreign policy. According to them, neoconservatives were already interpreting the US position in the world as a sole (unipolar) power. However, this world view was changed with the Bush Doctrine which targeted preserving the US` hegemonic position. In accordance with the neoconservatives` bandwagoning logic, which believed in US hegemony rather than a multipolar balance of power, the Bush doctrine included pre-emptive use of military force. Of course, the effect of 9/11 on this transition cannot be ignored. Again, according to a neoconservative worldview, the Bush doctrine believed unipolar power should not act multilaterally. Lastly, in parallel with Wilsonianism, democracy promotion holds an important place in US foreign policy objectives. For neoconservatives, public interests also inform the national interest. All these elements, according to the authors, created the main motivation for the Iraq War.

Taking a very different view, Whyte (2007) looks at neo-liberal institutionalised corporate corruption. The main political focus for neo-liberalism is de-regulation; however, this unregulated space creates a suitable environment for a corrupt market. Economic shock-therapy in a country helps to create such an environment. In the case of Iraq, since it is the biggest source for Iraqi revenue, oil is the main object of bribery, over-charging, embezzlement, product substitution, bid rigging and false claims (ibid. 177). The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its mission was the main facilitator. The CPA restructured the economy and disbursed Iraqi oil revenue to US corporations. In practice, "The high profitability of reconstruction contracts was guaranteed via a system of `cost-plus` contracts" (ibid. 188). Western – mainly US – corporations then benefited from Iraq's reconstruction in many areas. Kaufmann's work (2004) also focused on misused civic institutions and the marketplaces of ideas. This thesis is applied to analyse how the Iraq War was sold to the American people. The research (ibid.) shows how threat inflation was successful. Five main factors were found as key for the legitimatising of the war: political manipulation in democracies; control of information; the administration's authority in foreign policy; the weakness of countervailing forces; and the effect of 9/11 (ibid. 32-46).

In examining an oil motivation behind the Iraq War, Stokes (2007) and Stokes and Raphael (2010) argue the case for a dual logic. They suggest that there is a transnational state rather than a nation-state logic and the US is mainly responsible for the current system. While global oil demand increases, the global oil market should provide oil to all demanders whether they are Western or non-Western powers. However, this economic logic combines with American military targets aimed at unilateral military superiority. While the US tries to diversify oil suppliers for transnational markets from the Middle East, the Caspian Basin, West Africa and Latin America, counterinsurgency programmes are also created in these regions. With this programme, the US has rolled back social forces to challenge the prevailing order.

Colgan (2013) categorizes the conflicts that are caused by oil, but the term "resource wars" is exaggerated. In the categories, causal pathways are classified under three mechanisms: ownership and

market structure; producer politics; and consumer access concerns. The Iraq War is accepted as connected to oil indirectly. The U.S. presence in the Middle East creates a historical motivation: “Motivations for war included US desire to remove Saddam Hussein, who had a history of petro-aggression, and U.S. fears that Hussein would destabilise region, threatening consumer access to oil” (ibid. 171). Thus, the US did not aim to profit and control Iraqi oil, but the Carter Doctrine and United States Central Command (CENTCOM) increased US interest in the region. Decreasing Iraqi oil production during the 1990s and Hussein’s aggressive behaviours are interpreted as two motivations behind the war.

In contrast, Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) investigate the power of the Israeli lobby in US politics. The Israeli lobby is one of the most powerful interest groups in the US and they are close to neoconservatives. 9/11 contributed enormous power to this alliance and the Bush administration’s unilateralist foreign policy to invade Iraq. Removing Saddam was strategically important for both the US and Israel: “The war was motivated ... by a desire to make Israel more secure” (ibid. 231). In terms of the Iraq War, the Israeli lobby but also the Israeli state helped neoconservatives sell the war to the American people. The authors (ibid.) do not believe oil was the real motivation behind the war, because oil companies did not lobby for the 2003 war. However, they do ignore the US’s most important interest, which was maintaining access to oil and gas in the Persian Gulf. They argue that “This objective does not require the US to control the region itself; it merely needs to ensure that no other country is in a position to keep Middle East oil from reaching the world market” (ibid. 337).

Lastly, Butt (2019: 251) asserts the term a “performative war”. This thesis is grounded on the belief that challenging hegemony leads the hegemon to show its power to a global audience. 9/11 is accepted as a trigger for performative war. Thus, American hegemony and its status with material capabilities are differentiated before and after the incident. However, this hegemonic focus is combined with a neoconservative desire and Wilsonian ideas in reference to Schmidt and William’s (2008) work. These motivations are found to be superior

to arguments about WMD, oil and Israel lobbies or spreading democracies in the Middle East.

We believe oil was one of the main motivations behind the war, so we disagree with the argument (Hepburn 2003) that asserts war was not related to oil. Since we do not focus on the motivations behind the war generally, we do not focus on Wilsonian ideas or the neoconservative unilateral world view (Schmidt and William 2008) versions of the story. However, the US led unipolar world system and its implications related to them are important, since US foreign policy is also considered as a motivation behind oil diversification. The argument (Whyte 2007) related to the collapse of neoliberalism or misused marketplaces of ideas/institutions are important and supported in this study, since it should consider world structure's theoretical point of analysis and empirical application in the Iraq War. However, we do not see it as the only motivation behind the war.

The importance of providing oil to the transnational market is also one of the arguments (Stokes 2007; Stokes and Raphael 2010) that is asserted in this work. When we look at the process, the market argument does provide a structural explanation, so we partly agree that there is a dual logic. However, as it will be seen, the process includes lobbies, individual actors or societal reactions in both countries. The motivation does not stay stable and national-transnational benefits become contradictory in parallel to changing US power. The US' historical motivation in the region argument (Colgan 2013) is right, but it is not the only reason. Meetings and reports on Iraqi oil before, during and after the war clearly show this in the study below. The study on the effects of the Israel lobby and Israeli state interest (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007), again similar to Wilsonian ideas or Neoconservatives, is not the focus of this work, but it should also be mentioned to create a general picture of the war. Lastly, we could consider the "performative war" thesis (Butt 2019). A challenge to US hegemony might be effective when explaining the war; however, the process cannot be reduced to just this one point.

We assert as Duffield (2012) does that oil is not the only reason for the war, but it is one of the main reasons. However, while he (ibid.)

looks at the motivation behind the war through the historical context of US interests in the region and US government approaches, we also analyse the changing motivations during and after the war. This chapter tries to show oil motivations behind the war, how Iraqi oil was interpreted by different actors, how the process of motivations on Iraqi oil evolved, and the war's place in changing US oil diversification motivations. Although there is a huge literature on the Iraq War and more specifically oil motivations behind the Iraq War, none of the work covers actor-actor and actor-structure reciprocal relationships in the process. On the one hand, ideational and material sides of the structure should be kept in balance during the analysis, while actor participation from both sides (Iraq and US) is not ignored. On the other hand, work on the Iraq War cannot be reduced to either an empirical or theoretical view. Since both views analyse the motivations behind war, the literature is large but lacks engagement with this aspect.

6.3. A Timeline of and Historical background of the Iraq War

In this section, a timeline of significant events is presented showing the process of Iraq War which starts with the Gulf War as a historical background. The process details will be given according to a chronological sequence starting in the early 1990s and ending with the current situation, thereby illustrating the synchronic and diachronic nature of the case.

6.3.1. A Timeline of Significant Events

January 1991 – The Persian Gulf War began when Operation Desert Storm was launched by a U.S.-led coalition and ended on 28th February.

April 1995 – the United Nations allowed partial resumption of Iraq's oil exports to buy food and medicine in an oil-for-food programme.

October 1998 – Iraq ended cooperation with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to Oversee the Destruction of Iraq's WMDs.

October 1998 – President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act which targeted removal of the Saddam Hussein government.

December 1998 – The US and British Operation Desert Fox bombing campaign to destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes.

September 2001 – September 11 attacks in the USA.

October 2002 – Congress (H.J.Res.114) authorizes an attack on Iraq.

March 2003 – President Bush announced U.S. forces had begun a military operation into Iraq.

July 2003 – The Iraqi Governing Council (provisional) was established under the US led-CPA.

June 2004 – The US handed sovereignty to an Interim Government headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.

May 2005 – The Iraqi Transitional Government replaced the Iraqi Interim Government.

October 2005 – The Constitution of Iraq was adopted.

May 2007 – President George W. Bush defies the Democratic-controlled Congress by vetoing a war-spending bill that set a timetable for withdrawal of US troops from Iraq.

May 2007 – The Iraq Oil Law (The Iraq Hydrocarbon Law) process started.

August 2007 – Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region was approved.

February 2008 – 70 firms register for Iraqi Oil Contracts.

September 2008 – Iraq's oil minister, Hussain al-Shahristani, announces that plans to award Exxon Mobil, Shell, Total, BP, and Chevron no-bid contracts to service Iraq's oil fields have been withdrawn.

April 2009 – The Model Producing Oil Field Technical Service Contract was prepared for the Iraqi Government and International Oil Companies.

August 2010 – Over seven years after the war in Iraq began, President Obama announced the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom with a withdrawal of combat troops.

August 2011 – A completed version of the Federal Oil & Gas Draft Law was presented.

December 2011 – The last U.S. soldiers leave Iraq, ending a nine-year military mission.

April 2012 – Oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan halted amid a row with central government over contracts with foreign firms.

Figure 6.1: *The timeline of the War*

6.3.2. Historical Context to the War

The historical origin of the Iraq War can be found in the first Gulf War in 1991 which brought US attention specifically on Iraq and Saddam Hussein. It was the war between coalition forces led by the United States and Iraq. Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, which had arisen from oil pricing and production disputes, was the main reason. For ensuring demilitarisation of Iraq, economic sanctions against Iraq started in 1990. Since sanctions caused huge civilian sufferings, the United Nations (UN) (1995) established the oil-for-food programme that led Iraq to sell oil in exchange for food, medicine and other humanitarian needs in the era of president Bill Clinton (1993-2001). However, the relationship between the USA and the Saddam Hussein government became increasingly conflictual.

Since the Hussein government used chemical and biological weapons during and after the Iran-Iraq war, it had been accused by US-led coalitions and institutions of possessing WMDs. Although Iraq had declared information to international observers about its WMDs in 1992, 1995, 1996 and 1997, this disclosure did not reduce international pressure (UNSCOM 1999). Moreover, there were tensions between the Iraqi government and WMD inspection teams, because UNSCOM (ibid.) did not find Iraq's declarations `verifiable`. In the meantime, Iraq could not increase oil production, since developing its infrastructure was limited by sanctions. In 1998, Iraq's oil production was 2,15 Mbbl/d, while total world production was 75,68

Mbbl/d (EIA 2019a). Whereas Iraqi proven crude oil reserves were the second largest after Saudi Arabia at 112,500 Mbbl, total world proven reserves was 1,034,623.7 Mbbl. Iraq therefore had a huge potential in terms of oil flow to the global oil market, but the political economic structure was restraining it. Before the war, Iraq's situation was evaluated by US officials and oil debates occurred in the US in relation to oil sanctions on Iran and Libya (Morse and Jaffe 2001a; Ebel 2002).

6.4. Pre- and Early War: 1998-2004

The following period witnessed increasing tension between the US and Iraq. Two cruise missile attacks on Iraq occurred in 1993 which were related to the attempted assassination by alleged Iraqi agents on former U.S. President George H. W. Bush. In 1998, in response to an Iraqi offensive in the Kurdish Civil War, and Iraq's failure to comply with UNSCOM inspectors in terms of WMDs, Operation Desert Fox was launched by the US and UK. It was a four day bombing campaign on Iraqi targets, reflecting the tension between Iraq and the US. In early 1998, the neoconservative Project for New American Century (PNAC) (1998) sent a letter to President Bill Clinton which emphasised the danger of the Hussein government, its destabilization of the Middle East and the lack of success of the containment policy. It framed Iraq as the most fundamental national security threat of the country. Some of the signatories were Zalmay Khalilzad who later became US ambassador to Iraq (2005-2007) and played a significant role in the first post-Saddam government, Donald Rumsfeld who later became the Secretary of Defense (2001-2006), Paul Wolfowitz who later became the Deputy Secretary of Defense (2001-2005) and Robert B. Zoellick who later became the Deputy Secretary of Defense (2005-2006).

In the same year, the danger of the Iraqi government and the solution of "military action" was first debated in the US Senate (1998: S1178). Moreover, oil's economic importance for liberated areas (Northern Iraq where the US-backed Kurds dominated) in terms of resistance to Hussein was also emphasised. Later in the year, a National Security Strategy for a New Century was announced (White House 1998).

Three core objectives were enhancing energy security, bolstering America's economic prosperity and promoting democracy abroad. According to the report (ibid.), although the US did not rely on Persian Gulf exports, allies of the US such as Europe and Japan were importing 85% of Persian Gulf exports and were heavily reliant on the region's oil. However, since US domestic production was depleted, national dependence on foreign oil was expected to increase. Thus, ensuring access to the region's oil resources and the free flow of these resources were the main targets (ibid. 33). The flow of oil from this region to the rest of the world was also related to the geo-political constraints provided by the Strait of Hormuz and the national security perception of US. The oil market and US national security was connected with that spatial area (Interviewee-28). Thus, the issue was not just related to Iraq but also to stability in the supplier countries in the global oil market (Interviewee-14; Interviewee-26). On the other hand, in parallel with the US's broader 'promoting democracy' target, Iraq's "transition to democracy" was emphasised in the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Congress 1998). It was supported in Congress by 360 (202 Republicans and 157 Democrats) votes to 38. The US position therefore enjoyed bipartisan support.

In 1999, the post-Saddam era started to be evaluated by US policymakers (CENTCOM 1999). US action seemed to be required and a US role for a transitional government also discussed in government circles. Later in the year, UN Security Council Resolution (1999) referred to Iraq's oil production capacity and 'the options for involving foreign oil companies in Iraq's oil sector'. In 2000, the PNAC (2000) published a paper on Rebuilding America's Defenses. The basic ideology behind the report was a foreign policy that promoted American principles abroad and national leadership with US global responsibilities. One of America's global leadership responsibilities was shown as "the preservation of favourable balance of power in ... the Middle East and surrounding energy-producing region..." (ibid. 5). That same year, Bill Clinton's Government (White House 2000: 8) announced a National Security Strategy for a Global Age report which emphasised the need to "deter threats to the free flow of Middle East oil". On the Iraqi side, Hussein devised an approach involving selling

oil in euros rather than dollars, although the decision was providing less income because of conversion fees. It was a huge challenge attempting to circumvent a petrodollar system led by the US but nonetheless raised concerns amongst federal policy actors.

In the first month of the George W. Bush administration, an information memorandum (DOS 2001a) was prepared by Near Eastern Affairs for Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor (2001-2005) who then became the Secretary of State (2005-2009). In the memorandum letter (ibid.) “regime change” in Iraq was specifically emphasised. However, important warnings to the new government were made by think tanks in terms of increasing energy demand and decreasing supply in the US and in the world (Muttitt 2012). In the Strategic Energy Policy Report and its updated version (Morse and Jaffe 2001a; Morse and Jaffe 2001b) was co-sponsored by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University and Council on Foreign Relations, all close to Republicans, there were two key issues mentioned, energy delivery challenges and volatile prices. In order to solve these issues, three policy paths were established: a SPR, diversification of energy supply resources and adjusting economic interdependence in energy (Morse and Jaffe 2001a: 33). The tension in the Middle East and free access to oil in the region is one of the main themes in the report, since the “Gulf” was going to “remain the world’s base-load supplier and the least expensive source of oil to meet growing demand” (ibid. 30). The Bush administration was actually not unfamiliar with the oil market because of the background of the members. Vice President Dick Cheney (2001-2009) was the former chief executive of the Halliburton oil field service company, whereas Condoleezza Rice was a previous director of Chevron. Also, the president himself came from an oil industry background as did his father. The administration was consequently called the “oil and gas administration” (Kay 2001).

The administration was aware of the warnings of the oil market, so the North American Energy Working Group was announced by Spencer Abraham the Secretary of Energy (2001-2005) at the 5th Hemispheric Meeting of Energy Ministers Hemispheric Energy Initiative (DOE 2001). The Secretary then emphasised increasing demand,

decreasing supply and energy infrastructure at the National Energy Summit of UCC (Bearden 2001). However, there were two main issues to such a policy: “diversifying America’s energy supply” which meant security of supply, and “protecting consumers against price spikes” which could only succeed with the increasing of supply (ibid.). During this time, the National Energy Policy report (NEP) (2001) had been prepared under Cheney. It included the main issues of the time (e.g. imbalance between supply and demand, environmental considerations), but did also emphasise the importance of promoting “geographic diversification of energy supplies” (ibid. 8-19). However, according to some (AEI 2002: 98), the plan followed a proposed draft written by oil lobbyists.

However, a lawsuit concerning the activities of the Task Force found the documents contained a map of Iraqi oilfields, pipelines, refineries and terminals, as well as two charts detailing Iraqi oil and gas projects and “Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield Contracts” (Judicial Watch 2002). When the year ended, 9/11 triggered a widespread xenophobic attitude in the US (Interviewee-21). Before 9/11, the aggressive behaviour of Saddam and the potential nuclear danger of Iraq were emphasised in a memorandum which was provided by Rumsfeld to Rice (DOD 2001c). As a summary of the previous debates, a DOD (2001a: 4) Quadrennial Defense Review Report mentioned that “the US and its allies and friends will continue to depend on the energy resources of the Middle East, a region in which several states pose conventional military challenges”. However, the US government had already started evaluating war with Iraq and the main post-conflict issues that should be considered such as “How to Start?”, “Provisional Government”, “Reactions to Bombing Iraq” (DOD 2001b; DOS 2001b).

The danger of Hussein and his secret WMDs programme were discussed by both US and UK allies (White House 2002a; DSD 2002) and included an operational timeline plan and maps (CENTCOM 2002a). Subsequent high level meetings between governments were overwhelmingly about the future of Iraq after regime change. For example, the UK’s Washington ambassador Christopher Meyer (DSD 2002) met with Wolfowitz to discuss these issues. There were also

some meetings/reports that include an `Oil and Energy` title such as the Future of Iraq Working Project which involved three total meetings held primarily in Washington from July 2002 through to early April 2003 (DOS 2002a; DOS 2002b; DOS 2003). Restoring, developing and transparency provision were the main focus on the Iraqi oil and gas sector. Iraqi oil was not only of interest to the US oil industry, rather for all importer nations, but the US was one of the main interested parties. At this point, Ahmet Chalabi, who was the founder of the Iraqi National Congress, an opposition group to Hussein supported by the US, said “American companies will have a big shot at Iraqi oil” (Beaumont and Islam 2002).

Towards the end of 2002, Iraqi oil policies started to be decided. A CENTCOM (2002b) Energy Infrastructure Planning for the Deputies presentation concerned Iraqi oil fields, infrastructure plans and the future ownership structure of oil industry. Increasing Iraqi oil production was interpreted as “diversifying/increasing global oil supply” (ibid. 15). The same focus can be seen in the US-UK Energy Dialogue meeting of 2002 (DOE 2003). In parallel with this meeting, the National Security Strategy (White House 2002b: 20) was emphasising “working with ... energy producers to expand the sources” for enhancing energy security. During this time, UK oil companies such as BP and Shell were expressing their concerns to the Government about “securing future oil contracts in Iraq” (Iraq Inquiry 2016: 256). In this emerging context, “H.J.Res.114 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002” was agreed in the House of Representatives by 296 votes (215 Republican and 81 Democrat) against 133 votes (6 Republican and 126 Democrat) and in Senate by 77 votes (48 Republican and 29 Democrat) against 23 votes (21 Democrat and 1 Republican) (Congress 2002 and Senate 2002). Democratic Party stalwarts such as John Kerry, Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden and John Edwards also voted to support the resolution.

On March 19th, 2003 President Bush started planning military operations in Iraq with the emphasis on “no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat” (The White House 2003). On the other hand, US think tanks were evaluating the Iraqi oil industry. In order to repair and

restructure this industry, the participation of international players was argued to be necessary, while the other principle that “Iraqis maintain control of their own oil sector” was also supported by the CFR and Baker Institute (2003: 10). However, in order to achieve a sustainable and more productive Iraqi oil industry, foreign investment was considered necessary. Oil rich areas, are located in Northern Iraq in and around Kirkuk and the southern field of Rumalia, were also mentioned. Participation of international actors and the flow of Iraqi oil to global market were the main themes evident in thinking during this period (CFR 2003). In terms of repairing and restructuring of Iraqi oil, Halliburton and Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) had already been awarded a no-bid contract under the name of Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) by the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group, which was tasked “to restore and operate Iraq’s oil infrastructure” (House 2006) within DOD (RIO 2003; Mobbs 2004; Congress 2005a). Meetings between US-UK energy groups emphasised the risks of increasing global reliance on Middle East oil and the region’s necessity for investment (DOE 2003). The need for foreign investment was also emphasised by a BearingPoint report (2003) which was prepared for the US Agency for International Development (USAID). In addition to previous arguments, the necessity for good governance in the form of an Iraqi foreign investment law was also emphasised to protect commercial interests (ibid.).

The UK government also commissioned studies on Iraqi oil including the UK Energy Strategy for Iraq in 2004 (Muttitt 2012). It was believed that with the help of foreign direct investment (FDI), the Iraqi oil sector could be improved. The improvement of the Iraqi oil sector was prioritised, “since Iraq is extremely important to the UK’s objectives on energy security” (UKESI 2004). During this time, when Iraqi people were asked whether they wanted coalition forces to leave Iraq, 76 of 866 respondents who agreed stated the main reason was “They want Iraqi oil and resources” (Brookings 2004: 40). It must be emphasised that the majority (418) did not support a specific reason, since they saw others as “occupiers and must leave immediately” (ibid.).

Duration: Theoretical Analysis

The first period of the war helps us to see how the US oil diversification policy in the war process was established. Structurally all the dimensions (i.e. structural causes) were interacting to develop the motivations for diversification.

As mentioned, Hussein and his relationship with the US and US-led institutions had already produced a negative momentum since the Gulf War. However, in the meantime, US institutions started mentioning the security issue of the Middle East and specifically Iraq (PNAC 1998). The pressure for war with Iraq cannot be isolated just through institutions and ideational structures, since many signatories of the PNAC had significant roles in the Bush Administrations. Thus, they did not only pressure institutionally, they also had an active role in the Republican Party as policymakers. Structures were creating the actors that would lead to Iraq a more complex situation. It is also worth emphasising that Democrat leader Clinton's administration and Democrats generally cannot be seen as having a pure anti-war approach (Congress 1998). There was unified ideas in the US in terms of the war with Iraq with Republicans and Democrats largely united. The reason why 1998 is accepted as the beginning point of the Iraq War is not only related to the operation, but also the emphasis of Iraqi oil in the US Senate (1998: S1178) which shows institutional attention in US. However, the National Security Strategy for a New Century (White House 1998) clearly showed that one of the three core issues were energy security and related to that, accessing oil from the Persian Gulf was one of the main objectives. Institutional attention and ideational unification were combined with material issues of the US and global and US national security. This situation supports the points made by Colgan (2013).

The US was not only thinking about national interests concerning oil diversification but also its allies' (i.e. Europe and Japan) oil imports. Moreover, they also considered the rest of the oil market participants. Middle East oil was heavily in demand by US market participants, because the oil market's supply-demand balance was tightening (see Chapter 1). The interests of these states were also the interests of the

US because of US power which provides a unilateral world, so diversification of global oil supply was also considered (CENTCOM 2002b: 15) in parallel to global leadership responsibilities (PNAC 2000). Thereby, US led international institutions (UN Security Council 1999) considered foreign oil companies' involvement in Iraqi oil sector. Institutions were therefore keeping the *status quo*, but also shaping oil diversification as parallel with our institutions definition. Maintaining the Middle East as an energy producing region was one of the main material objectives for this US leadership. However, material incapability (tightening US and global oil market, lack of infrastructure of global oil market) and ideas (neoconservative US leadership interpretation that was combined with a 'negative' Saddam image in both parties) were pushing the US to take an action as these structures became more important to the story.

When the new administration started working, there were two material capability issues in the energy sector concerning oil diversification that were delivery challenges and volatile prices. Freeing oil from the region was one of the solutions identified in the CFR (2001) report, so geographical diversification was necessary (NEP 2001). Moreover, increasing gasoline prices would put the new administration in danger from public anger (Bearden 2001). But, the administration's background which was very close to the oil sector, also opens up a debate on the importance of institutional determinants of oil diversification. Of course, the power of the oil lobby cannot be accepted as the same over time. US interest in the region is also highly related to its relationship with Israel (Interviewee-26). The security of Israel in addition to US national security were by this point beginning to influence the process. This study does not assert the Iraq War was only related to oil, but oil diversification was certainly one of the main themes behind the war. However, other interests/factors (oil industry, Israel) helped shape US oil diversification in the long term as will be discussed.

Studies (Judicial Watch 2002) by the new government on Iraqi oil which included oilfields, pipelines, refineries and terminals before the war were not that surprising given this material capabilities context. Thereby, the US and its allies' dependence on Middle East energy

could easily be emphasised by the DOD (2001a: 4). In the meetings of operation on Iraq, Iraqi oil was still considered important for diversifying and increasing the global oil supply (CENTCOM 2002b: 15). This was the perception of the government. However, from the industry point of view, Iraqi oil was attractive for both the upstream and downstream industry (Interviewee-11; Interviewee-19). This public-private interest collaboration found a reflection in US institutions. Foreign investment was seen as a key factor for US think tanks (CFR and Baker Institute 2003; CFR 2003) and the US government (BearingPoint 2003). Moreover, the necessity of the foreign investment law was mentioned (ibid.).

During war preparations and the early war period there was a materially problematic situation for the US and global oil markets, in turn influencing the motivations for diversification. By this point, intersubjective US ideas, shared by political parties, were becoming united against the Saddam regime. And, US institutions were reflecting and shaping the war with Iraq and Iraqi oil. This structural explanation also includes agents' interests or backgrounds in ideas and institutions, with examples given above. These ambitions had in turn been shaped by US power in the world, but also US societal support. The "danger" of Saddam was combined with the 9/11 incident, which was an exogenous shock to the structure-agency interaction which occurs in a state-society complexity. It triggered the public fear of national security (Interviewee-21) and legitimised the government's action on Iraq. Democrats who were already not opposing the war with Iraq also became more pro-war because of the national security fear of the public. Although the US does not have territory in Persian Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz, the region was framed as a threat for national security. The interpretation of national security was different for civil society and political society, which included elites in institutions and the media. However, the war with Iraq could not be escaped after 9/11 as these interpretations merged.

6.5. The Era of Oil Law: 2005-2008

In 2005, Democrat politicians questioned the RIO 1 and RIO 2 contracts that were held in 2003 and 2004 (DOD 2005; House 2006). Congress questioned the excessive costs that were being generated by holder companies which were Halliburton and KBR. On the other hand, the CRS (Kumins 2005) and National Strategy for Victory in Iraq report (NSC 2005) emphasised the importance of increasing Iraqi oil production. Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-Iraq Article IV Consultation Report (2005a) and IMF-Iraq Stand-By Arrangement (2005b) strongly recommended increasing oil production, with the solution shown as “US technical assistance” and “draft[ing] a new petroleum law” (ibid. 14). It is worth remembering that the global oil price had been increasing steadily since 2002, with the 2005 level almost around its early 1980s level. The oil price was therefore attracting the attention of policymakers. US officials started focusing more on supply from unstable regions like the Middle East and Africa (Oil Shockwave 2005; IEA 2005).

In late 2005, the Constitution of Iraq (2005) was approved. Two points should be mentioned since they reflect the main issues faced by the Iraqis regarding their oil industry: “*Article 111*: Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.”; and “*Article 112*: Second The federal government, with the producing regional and governorate governments, shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth...”. In the meantime, the negative aspects of the global oil market and an increasing price had been triggered by the war. Arguments concerning increasing biofuels and focusing on renewables then got enormous attention in the US (Interviewee-4; Interviewee-14) (see Chapter 7).

In the Constitution, Iraqi oil is designated as belonging to the Iraqi people. However, the agreement introduced to manage Iraqi oil was a PSA supported by the US-UK. Under the PSA, the Iraqi state had ultimate control over the oil, but, since private companies provided capital investment for exploration, drilling and the construction of infrastructure, the state was constrained by the contracts (Platform et al. 2005: 12). While Iraqi oil was a controversial issue federally, the

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) started signing exploration and development deals and MOUs with foreign companies (ibid. 19). The KRG had already started agreeing contracts in 2002 and signed five new agreements in 2004.

An imbalance between global supply and demand and heavily import dependence countries were still important factors in the National Security Strategy 2006 (White House 2006a). In the case of Iraqi oil, the necessity for more infrastructure and FDI were also repeated (DOD 2006a). However, it should also be mentioned that “through April 2006, the United States has invested more than \$265 million” in Iraq’s oil, gas and electricity infrastructure (SIGIR 2006: 4). On the other hand, Iraq still experienced other issues that were general and oil specific which were increasing arguments over religious and ethnic identities (e.g. Shi’a, Sunni, Kurd) in Iraqi politics, decentralised control of petroleum resources by federal and regional governments and terrorist threats to energy production and transportation (DOD 2006a; DOD 2006b; Revenue Watch 2006).

As mentioned, the KRG had already started signing contracts with foreign companies, but they had also passed a draft law inside the territory (KRG 2007a). Before the law, they prepared a draft model for production sharing contracts for discussion (KRG 2006a). According to supporting memorandums, it was designed to “reflect and implement the extent of Kurdistan’s constitutional right to control petroleum development in its territory” (Jaffe 2006: 16). The inconsistency between Federal and Kurdish government policy was evaluated by KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani (KRG 2006b) through reference to the constitution which says “all powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government” in Article 115 were enumerated to constituent states. Moreover, he found that the federal governments’ behaviour was sabotaging foreign investment in Kurdistan’s oil sector. The debate on oil revenues was not unexpected, since oil production was providing 95% of government income. Apart from the governance level issues, there were also reactions against the new constitution. Labor and Professional Oil Unions identified complex problems in terms of administrative and technical implementation issues (Global Policy

Forum 2006). They were clearly against the privatization of the oil industry being promoted by government policy.

In 2007, President Bush was under pressure by a Democrat Congress to withdraw from Iraq with the introduction of the “U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act” bill to Congress (Congress 2007a). On the other hand, US policymakers and government were trying to support a new oil law in Iraq in order to sell Iraqi oil on global markets. Moreover, US advisors who worked with the Ministry of Iraq since 2003 on a contract basis were being funded by USAID. They worked with the US embassy and were affiliated with the DOC and DOE between mid-2006 and April 2007, according to the CRS (Blanchard 2007). The US Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman (2005-2009) emphasised the importance of “new legislation to govern Iraq’s oil industry and to facilitate international investment” in July 2006 and “later that month, Iraqi Minister of Oil Shahrstani (2006-2010) visited Washington, DC, and met with executives from major IOCs” at the DOE (ibid. 20).

The draft hydrocarbon framework (Parajon 2007) which was submitted by the Iraqi cabinet in February 2007 had been prepared since mid-2006 under the DOS (Blanchard 2007). However, according to Platform (2007a) the draft was seen and discussed by nine IOCs within two weeks after being written in mid-2006. In the meantime, there was also support from think tanks, State Departments (RAND 2007), lobbyists, and the International Tax & Investment Centre (ITIC) which was supported by six oil companies, BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, Total and Eni. They pushed for Iraq to offer long-term oil production contracts known as PSAs (Platform 2007b). Their demands were included in a report entitled “Petroleum and Iraq's Future: Fiscal Options and Challenges” (Muttitt 2012: 121). They also held meetings in Beirut, Amman and Istanbul (ibid. 289).

The Iraqi hydrocarbon law had four main titles which were managing hydrocarbon investment, revenue sharing, restructuring the Ministry of Oil and establishing the Iraqi National Oil Company (SIGIR 2007). There was some opposition to the law (Blanchard 2007). Sunni Arabs were suspicious of the proposed revenue sharing arrangements. The

Iraq Federation of Oil Unions disrupted oil production with strikes due to concern over IOCs and PSAs. Some Shiite Arab and Sunni Insurgent groups also opposed the PSAs. It is worth emphasizing that the opponents of the law were faced with aggressive reactions. For example, eight members of the Federation of Workers' Council were kidnapped on their way to a press conference for the oil law (Muttitt 2012: 218-219). Oil experts were also opposed after announcing their positions on the new law in a series of meetings (ibid. 220-223). An oil workers' strike demanding their participation in the oil law process gained victory (ibid.). After the strikes, they were offered a role in the oil law debates. Of course, military intervention against the oil unions by the government did result in international reaction and pressure from American and British trade union confederations (ibid.). Another factor limited government decision-making. The counter reactions against the oil law were slowing down the process since opposition to the oil law became associated with rising nationalism. Nationalist feelings against the US were reflected in and reflected upon the oil issue.

Although not related to the draft law, but related to Iraqi oil, IOCs also held suspicions about how Iraqi oil would be governed. The legal and regulatory environment was not healthy and there were major security issues (Jaffe 2007). The Iraq oil sector was experiencing problems such as a deteriorating security environment due to ongoing Sunni and Shiite backed insurgencies, corruption and smuggling and lastly the lack of funds for investments – factors identified in a testimony to the US Government Accountability Office (Christoff 2007: 11). However, there were still commercial benefits from Iraqi oil: “Once companies have recouped their costs from developing the oil field, they are allowed to keep 20 per cent of the profits, with the rest going to the government” (Congress 2007b: H397).

In the second half of 2007, the Petroleum Law of Kurdistan (KRG 2007a) was approved by Article 112 and 115 of the constitution. While Article 112 allowed federal and producer regional governments to formulate strategic policies together, in Article 115 “priority” is “given to the law of the regions and governorates not organized in a region in case of dispute” (Constitution of Iraq 2005: 33-34). This

compatibility was confirmed by independent expert legal opinion (Crawford 2008). In regard to the Petroleum Law of Kurdistan (KRG 2007a), a Production Sharing Contract (KRG 2007b) model was adopted. Using the same law, the KRG (2007c) signed a contract with US-based Hunt-Oil. During this time, some US policymakers started commenting about the oil focus of the war. While Alan Greenspan, former chair of the Federal Reserve, declared that "...the Iraq war is largely about oil" (Beaumont and Walters 2007), Republican Senator for Nebraska Chuck Hagel said "People say we're not fighting for oil. Of course we are" (Shamoo and Bricker 2007). General John Abizaid, former commander of CENTCOM with responsibility for Iraq supported this view, saying that "Of course it's about oil, it's very much about oil" (YouTube 2008). In the meantime, the American public's opinion on the war with Iraq was becoming softer and regret-related (AEI 2007).

Competition for Iraqi oil extraction and service contracts intensified in 2008. More than 70 companies including BP (Britain), ConocoPhillips (China), ONGC (India) and Royal Dutch Shell (Anglo Dutch) registered for oil contract bidding (Reuters 2008). However, no-bid contracts were negotiated with Shell, Chevron, Total, BP, Exxon Mobil and others were signed. US congressional leaders (Democrats) then pressed the "Bush administration to block deals to be signed between the Iraqi federal government and the world's largest oil companies and to cancel deals between the Iraqi Kurdish region and smaller U.S. oil firms" (Lando 2008). Chairman Henry A. Waxman requested information about the US government's role in the contracts processes in his letter to Condoleezza Rice (ibid). This challenge affected the oil contract process. The Iraqi government cancelled six no-bid oil contracts with Shell, BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron and Total and four smaller companies (Kramer and Robertson 2008). While 2008 ended with the Withdrawal of US Forces from Iraq the Strategic Framework Agreement was then signed between the USA and Iraq (DOS 2008c; DOS 2008d).

Duration: Theoretical Analysis

Institutional influences on the direction of US oil diversification policy already existed during the war, but this period witnessed their expansion. On one hand, material incapability in terms of oil had been increasing with the effect of the War being felt on global markets. On the other, the unified ideas picture evident before the War was overtaken by increasing division in terms of how political parties were interpreting these ideas alongside decreasing support for the War from US society. This section shows how the `national security` and `oil as belonging to Iraqi people` ideas became controversial discursive issues that, driven by institutions, can lead to tensions in the process.

This period was subsequently characterised by the increasing importance of institutions and their interpretation of ideas in determining oil diversification. 2005 is chosen as the beginning date of the new era because of two institutional turning points. One of them is the new Iraq Constitution (2005). It includes an `oil and gas` emphasis, but general responsibilities for Iraqi oil and gas were not spelled out. At this point, the importance of interpretation by institutions or individuals as an agent became important. The absence of an agreed interpretation, which is what happened in the constitution, meant that new problems could be triggered. For example, Iraqi oil and gas were specified as belonging to the Iraqi people (Constitution of Iraq 2005); however, private companies were given rights to exploit Iraqi oil and gas with PSAs. This contradiction triggered nationalist feelings in the Iraqi people who were not specifically from the oil industry. The whole hydrocarbon law process was shaped by this struggle. It resembles what happened in the KXL process in terms of conflicts of ideas and institutions in defining the US national interest.

This year is also significant because of the agreement which was signed with the IMF. US-led international institutions were also pressuring Iraq to accept "US technical assistance" and "draft a new petroleum law" (IMF-Iraq Stand-By Agreement 2005b: 14). As we see later, this rhetoric was also used at the agent level. These institutional attempts were actually being influenced by increasing material incapability of the global oil market, which was a trigger of and

triggered by the War. There were also terrorist activities aimed at energy supply sources and transportation routes, while smuggling and corruption were becoming other shapers of material (in)capability. Because of a high insecurity level, central government was coming under pressure in terms of the hydrocarbon law to attract Iraqi oil for IOCs.

During the preparation of the draft law, we see different types of institutional interferences and participation from the US side such as American advisors who were supported by USAID, the US Secretary of Energy, DOS, IOCs, and industry lobbies (Blanchard 2007; Platform 2007a; RAND 2007). During the time of the announcement of the law, ethnic separation had spread in Iraq in parallel to increasing nationalism stemming from opposition to the law. The Americans' (Senate 1998: S1178) support for the Kurds even before the War was making them powerful and leading others to unite against this law. On the other hand, the Kurds started agreeing their own contracts with foreign companies. These contracts had already started in 2002 and were still continuing by 2007 (KRG 2009). Moreover, the Kurdish government (KRG 2007a) was adopting their own Oil and Gas Law in defiance of the national government.

Because of this uncertain picture of combining structural causes reflections, we start seeing strikes and societal reactions against the new law and PSAs from civil society under the organisation of institutions (e.g. Labor and Professional Oil Unions, Federation of Workers' Council). Political society's tough responses to civil societal unrest could not end the reactions. As shown above (see Chapter 3), the state is composed of political society and civil society (Gramsci 1971: 263). While these two elements conflict against each other, it is easy to have an issue (i.e. new oil law) as a national symbol. As KXL became a symbol of US oil and environmental policies, the new oil law became a symbol in Iraq of civil unrest.

What we have seen until now is that there was an emergent nationalist feeling in Iraq (collective images of social order of ideas), but also a regional-federal dispute (intersubjective meanings of ideas) which was connected with the first one. Material incapability existed in Iraqi

internal dynamics, but also in the global oil structure. There was institutional interference by US and US-led global institutions in Iraqi decision-making, but also private ones. This uncertainty found its reflection with institutional clashes in Iraq that resulted in tough responses by the Iraqi government. While the war had already been criticized by international society, the critiques were further supported by this clash in Iraq and the comments of American policymakers (Beaumont and Walters 2007; Shamoo and Bricker 2007; YouTube 2008) about the War's connection with oil. What we argue here is that there were evident material and ideational, but also structure- and agents-based pressures and influences on Iraqi political society. There was a huge US-based influence on this picture, with attendant feedback effects. Structural causes help us to uncover the transition within the US on the issue of oil diversification during this period.

The new era of the Iraq war started in 2008 with oil extraction and service contracts that were agreed with IOCs. There was also US government interference in the process that became challenged by Democrats. The war was originally supported by both parties, however, democrats were increasingly opposed to the war as it progressed. Of course, oil exploitation was becoming a key criticism of the administration. The reason why Democrats were becoming opposed is related to American societies' perception of the war, which was characterised by decreasing support (AEI 2007). Although there had always been Democrats support, the war was staged under a Republican government. Political pressure from the Democrats worked in terms of government interference in the no-bid contracts (Goodman 2008). Along with the change in the Iraqi oil situation, American domestic politics faced a transition. National security fears as a trigger for war did not exist anymore. Now, the war was primarily perceived in terms of the oil law and the `interpretation of belonging to Iraqi people` which became a new discourse debate.

The US was interfering in the internationalisation of Iraqi oil process not only at a governmental level, but also with other institutional level pressures that were joined by private interests. In addition to these pressures, there were significant challenges for the US led world system internationally. US hegemony had been declining. While US

legitimacy was decreasing, material incapability was also increasing due to increasing oil prices that placed another pressure on US policymakers. This period shows how the US institutions responsible for decreasing hegemony reacted and there is a connection with US domestic politics related to ideas. The material capabilities side of the war was also significant in shifting the debate on US oil diversification. Internationalisation of Iraqi oil could help the global oil market in the long term as it does now, but in the short term it just led to increasing prices that put the US and its institutions under further pressure, which is ironic given the original rationales for the conflict.

6.6. Iraqi Oil Contracts with IOCs: 2009-

2009 started with the pressure of peaking global oil prices of \$91.17 per barrel. The new President Obama declared that the US was ending the war (White House 2009), but he was also supportive of the government of Iraq's comprehensive legislation (Blanchard 2010). However, the Iraq central government (2009) had already prepared the model of Technical Service Contracts which would be signed with IOCs. On April 23, 2009 Iraq's First Petroleum Licencing Round was declared which included contract areas and participating companies by means of 20-year technical service contracts. (MOO 2009). Thus, oil contracts started being signing without a hydrocarbon law agreed. The second bid process was also held in the same year. Big oil companies like BP, CNPC, Exxon Mobil, Lukoil (Russia) and Conoco Phillips were some of beneficiaries of the bids (Chalabi 2009).

Although central government started this bidding process, the tension between central government and the KRG over oil production was still ongoing (Blanchard 2010). Under these uncertainties, a delegation of British, Dutch, Italian and Japanese diplomats arrived in Iraq to help the government develop its oil industry (Bennett 2010). They were either Ambassador or Charge D' Affaires level officials, thereby demonstrating that Iraqi oil was still considered important for global supply-demand imbalance (Deutsche Bank 2010). Iraqi proven oil reserves were also increasing. Iraqi Oil Minister Shahristani announced that proven oil reserves had been increased by 25 per

cent from 115 billion to 143.1 billion barrels (Elass and Jaffe 2011). Increased oil reserves opened a new era for the Iraqi oil industry. The third licencing bid round was held in 2010.

While Iraq was the 13th biggest oil producer in 2002, it only attained the same level again in 2010 due to the conflict. There were shortages because the war caused significant damage to oil infrastructure and threats to production then emerged in the subsequent insurgency. Since this time Iraq has increased its production significantly (EIA 2019a). At the moment, it is the 6th biggest oil producer. Iraq's oil export capacity increased by 500 per cent over seven years. The country now almost has the same influence as Saudi Arabia in OPEC (Elass and Jaffe 2011). Of course, increasing oil production has been accompanied with proposed legal changes. A revised version of the Federal Oil & Gas Draft Law (IEI 2011) was presented to cabinet by the Federal Ministry of Oil in 2011. This law, known as the Refining Law (Strong 2017) has not yet been passed due to the opposition described above.

Iraqi oil has been attractive for IOCs because its production costs are lower compared with Saudi Arabia (USCS 2012). More than 70% of Iraq's oil production come from fields that are being operated by IOCs under technical service contracts and nineteen of these contracts have been awarded by the rounds since 2009 (IEA 2012: 23). The fourth bid round was held in 2012. This time results were disappointing for Iraq, since the participants' profit expectations were low because of the continued lack of infrastructure (Wing 2012). In 2015, Iraq was the second-leading contributor to the growth in global oil supply 2015 (behind the US) (EIA 2016). By this point, production was almost 700 Mbbl/d above the 2014 level. On the other hand, US oil imports from Iraq were almost at the same level in 2000 and 2017 (EIA 2019a).

Duration: Theoretical Analysis

The trend of the separation of ideas on oil diversification between political parties continued in this period. Moreover, the peak oil price in 2008 was the reflection of the highest point of material incapability. It affected how oil diversification was viewed in this period, specifically in the beginning. However, changing oil market dynamics in the 2010s

reduced this pressure. Institutional interferences worked at some points (private attempts), but they did not work at governmental level which reflects the US position in the world. Institutions' role are defined as maintaining particular order in theory, but this section shows how much institutions interfere with the declining of that order.

Political division of ideas was a significant factor in how US oil diversification played out in Iraq. A new era started with the US forces' withdrawal from Iraq (DOS 2008c; DOS 2008d) and the agreement on Iraq's oil and gas facilities with IOCs (Reuters 2008). During this time, the US was changing its administration. Democrat leader Obama secured the Presidency by promising to end the war, so he was also supportive of the comprehensive oil legislation in Iraq (Blanchard 2010). Thus, political party debates on the War were not of the type where one party opposes the war and the other supports it. Rather it was that the coming wave was more suitable Republicans to declare war but Democrats were also participants of the process. When the War started creating its negative image on American and international society, one party (i.e. Democrats) that was not responsible for the war directly could distance themselves against the war in order to gain public support. A war with Iraq existed in the Clinton era, while pressures for internationalisation of Iraqi oil existed in the Obama era. This reflects political party splits in terms of ideas as a structural cause for oil diversification.

Although the Iraqi government was not able to adopt an oil law because of civil unrest, PSAs had been established through contracts with IOCs. They were not only from traditional oil-importer countries (i.e. US, Europe and Japan); rather importers from all over the world specifically India and China. A new dimension of energy security created an image that encompasses non-Western buyers on importers. The participation of IOCs from different countries was a parallel situation with the delegation interference from multiple countries (Bennett 2010). Global oil politics had been changing, while US hegemony had largely been diminished. Of course, a supply-demand imbalance did still exist, but there were also high oil prices. Not only for providing supply-demand balance, but also for decreasing abnormal oil prices to the acceptable level, Iraqi oil should have

participated in the market. While Iraq`s proven reserves were growing, the contract bids for Iraqi oil were also signed.

However, a legal-constitutional status for Iraqi oil was still seen as necessary to establish property rights. The Federal Oil & Gas Draft Law can be interpreted as fulfilling that necessity. But also, the first bids were about resolving technical and service issues. Bids during this period were about refining (Strong 2017). Iraqi oil`s participation in the market was growing in both spatial and sectoral areas. However, institutional pressures from the US and US-led international organisations backfired during the process. Thus, the target of oil diversification had been achieved but US hegemony had been overwhelmingly damaged as a result.

In summary, the War started with united ideas on the need for the conflict amongst US public and policymakers, but the end of the process reflected a schism in political-civil society and political party stances. The war did not provide a strong material contribution in terms of oil to the US directly, although it did initially reflect the Carter Doctrine based oil diversification perception. However, the War changed this view as time progressed. Military interventions abroad, specifically in the Middle East, have become one of the most controversial topics in US foreign policy, raising questions over their need to diversify US oil supply. Lastly, interference by US institutions in terms of the internationalisation of Iraqi oil has undermined US power/legitimacy/hegemony.

6.7. Discussion: the Value of a Coxian Perspective

6.7.1. Structural Causes: Material Capabilities, Ideas and Institutions

In this study, oil is not accepted as the main reason for the Iraq War, but Iraqi oil was obviously considered by the US and UK policymakers and it has its own dimension that changed through time during and after the war. Motivations behind the war are various. It can be interpreted as resulting from WMDs, the Israeli lobby effect, regional insecurity, neoconservative ideology, the roots of Carter doctrine etc. (UNSCOM 1999; Duffield 2005; Schmidt and William 2008; Colgan;

2013; Ahmed and Liton 2018). All these motivations including oil had shaped the war, but also shaped the US oil diversification motivations through the war. On the other hand, Iraqi oil was and has actually still been important for the global oil market because of the relatively high reserves and its type. The discussion section therefore focuses on Iraqi oil, but not in an isolated way from rest of Iraq war or Iraq's economy-politics (i.e. material) and socio-cultural (i.e. ideas) structure, as the chronology and duration sections.

The historical origin of the Iraq War can be found in the Gulf War which showed that the oil market is not trustable (Interviewee-18). This is what can be seen from an empirical view, but there was also a motivation that can be seen via a theoretical point of view. US allies (i.e. Japan and Europe) were highly dependent on Persian Gulf exports, including Iraq (White House 1998). The oil flow from the region was important for the US, since its hegemonic leader position in the world depended on its allies' energy security. Its allies' interests can only be interpreted as its own interests. However, other participants become important with the changing global oil market (CFR 2003). The diversification and security of their energy supply was accepted as the energy supply of the US itself. America's global leadership responsibility was combined with securing and providing the flow of Middle East oil to the market (PNAC 2000; White House 2000). There was a compatibility between transnational and national interests (Stokes and Raphael 2010). The importance of diversification has been emphasized by policymakers (Bearden 2001), institutions (Morse and Jaffe 2001a; 2001b) or institutional reports of policymakers (NEP 2001). There were dynamics of the global oil market and US foreign policy.

However, this structural picture which also includes agents' interests-backgrounds (US government) was triggered by 9/11 as an exogenous shock. Unified domestic politics were completing as the motivations behind the War that triggered problems in Iraq. Increasing identity separation in Iraq combined with uncertain definition of the ownership of Iraqi oil. The oil in the Kurdish-governed region was already important and controversial from the US perspective, but the debate on legalization of oil production increased the polarization in

Iraq. On the other hand, during this time, US involvement for the new constitution and the new hydrocarbon law started having more Iraqi societal attention. The US and its allies were already defined as “occupiers” (Brookings 2004: 40), but increasing resistance to them started in 2007 during the hydrocarbon draft law debates. Thus, the interaction and struggle between political and civil society started showing itself in Iraq. This reaction was not able to stop the entire internationalisation of the Iraqi oil process, but merely slow it down. Moreover, it was one of the main reasons for international pressures that undermined US legitimacy. The oil diversification of the US has therefore also been shaped by the internal context in Iraq.

The story of RIO 1 and RIO 2 contracts were important in terms of two issues that are the oil industry’s power/effects on policymakers and increasing political party clashes on the War. Political parties were not in the same position as before the war (Congress 2007). The war’s connection with oil has always been discussed, but some policymakers also started mentioning the issue (Beaumont and Walters 2007; Shamoo and Bricker 2007; YouTube 2008). It was combined with American society’s suspicions about the necessity of the war (AEI 2007), so the new condition gave shape to the election rallies of 2009 in the US. There was an obvious transition in US domestic politics and foreign policy in addition to oil price hiking. However, this is only the structural picture.

The institutions of the US government and US led international organizations could not change the oil law despite a changing administration in the form of the Democratic Party that had been pressuring the Republican government in terms of not interfering in Iraqi oil contracts (Lando 2008). At this point, IOCs’ and KRG’s mutual interests put the Iraqi federal government under pressure and PSAs were agreed for Iraqi oil despite the lack of an oil law. The process pushed the Iraqi government to start oil-bid contracts with international participants. IOCs participation in Iraqi oil has widened as a result. US institutional participations have been damaged in consequence, thereby US hegemony too. The target of oil diversification has been achieved but mostly by IOCs employing their own efforts. This situation leads to a debate on the definition of

institutions in Coxian theory. Do they only maintain the particular context? When they intervene in combination with other dynamics, they can actually speed up declining hegemony. In a historical process, they have a more active role than Cox envisages.

The target of increasing Iraqi oil production and reserves of governmental institutions, policymakers and oil industry has been achieved. Iraq's oil production rate has increased, oil flows from the Middle East have become more reliable, a US friendly government is now established in Iraq (although events in early 2020 might challenge this view) which has now replaced Hussein's threat to the region, while US power has been damaged globally. However, changing US power has altered the scope of US foreign policy and oil imports thereby its oil diversification attention. The policies aimed at freeing or securing Middle East oil have become transformed into 'running away' from Middle East oil. Diversifying the global oil supply has become diversifying the US oil supply which finds its reflection in the notion of 'America First' (see Chapter 5). Hussein's attempt to trade oil with Euro has ended, but ironically the US has damaged the petrodollar system more than Saddam ever did. Now, regional challenges against US are undermining the dollar based oil trade (Frisani, 2017).

9/11 as an exogenous shock has changed American society's perception thereby government decisions dramatically, because it gave a fillip to the national security fear. What government's, elites, institutions, Israel lobby and neoconservative ideology understand from national security was highly related to being global leader perception, but not like society's fear after attack on US land. However, there was a collapse of national-transnational compatibility. They worked together, but the war has speeded up decreasing US power and has created a contradiction between the definitions of national security thereby, national and transnational benefits. National interests of the US had become ambiguous and a trigger of a process that evolved around domestic politics, oil politics and US foreign policy. Can the decisions of American governments that rely on IOCs that lobby during the election process be counted as aiming of public or private benefits? Can be America-based IOCs' interests be related to rational or transnational interests? Can the interests of different

groups (e.g. Israel lobby, neoconservative ideology) still count as national benefits, although they are able to shape national decisions that can damage the US' position in transnational market? Who benefits?

During the time period, there is only one part that cannot be easily studied academically but included in our theory (see Chapter 3). Intelligence services or the meetings/plans that were not held by political society count as a `covert world` (DOD 2001b; CENTCOM 2002b). The war process cannot be studied without their influence, but their participation can only be studied as much as they permit outsiders to see which leads a limitation for research methods (see Chapter 8). The Iraq War clearly shows that political and civil societies of the US were joined by a covert world that we cannot expose how much they were shaping the institutions of the US, but we know, at least, the existence of intelligence services of US before and during the war, and terrorist organizations in Iraq after the war have influenced the process.

6.7.2. Additional Structural Sphere: The Role of Social Dynamics?

We believed that operationalising Coxian theory within a specific topic could help us check whether our neo-Coxian assumptions actually work. Emphasis on the balances of structure-agency and civil society-political society exist in Cox's arguments, but we could see how this transition can happen, as was evident in Chapter 5, within this case. Moreover, updating Coxian theory for the contemporary world is also clearly possible.

As discussed in Chapter 5, social dynamics can exert a significant influence over oil diversification motivations as an additional structural sphere. Although structural pressures and agency participations are the main definers of the process, state-society complexity arose out of events in the case. State-society complexity is one of the main suppositions of Coxian theory (see Chapter 3) which is a Gramscian-inspired formulation, i.e. state = political society + civil society (Gramsci 1971: 263). The (dis)connection between political and civil societies can find a reflection as triggering social dynamics that

differentiate depending on the context. During the hydrocarbon law process, the key legislative attempt for determining the flow of Iraqi oil to the market, civil society's interference in the process cannot be ignored. This reactionary movement could be explained with the role of social dynamics. Although this dynamic was not able to change the direction of Iraqi oil production entirely, it had a major impact on the process. The role of social dynamics should then be considered as a structural sphere of the new millennium in this case, mirroring observations on the KXL case (Chapter 5).

Increasing social dynamics during the millennium obviously derived significant impetus from the War but they existed anyway. For example, Kurdish people were repressed by Saddam. Moreover, the Iraq War is one of the important factors that has damaged US legitimacy in the world. The societal reaction of Iraqis was organized by unions to bring civil society together against Iraq's political society, which was perceived as elitist and foreign influenced. The aggressive reaction by the Iraqi government to the protests received more international attention and pressure that were ready to have a complain about US behaviours in related to the war. During the time, the US used institutions and individual actors to pressure the Iraqi government to adopt new oil legislation. Social dynamics in Iraq has definitely exerted some power on a changing global structure, but it is not clear whether social reactions could still have had the same power without union backing. It reminds us of Cox's (2008) argument about decentralized civil society structure.

6.8. Conclusions

As the War shows, US oil diversification processes cannot be attributed to just one dimension. While oil is evidently a material substance, its effect and importance in relation to diversification is related to ideas and their utilization by institutions. US oil diversification vis-à-vis the Iraq War therefore cannot only be attributed to economic or political benefits, because there is also a US hegemonic position which exists beyond these benefits. It is more reflective of the responsibility of the leadership. This role is shaped

and reflected by institutions. However, institutions cannot be limited to the governmental level. As the Iraq War shows, there are also non-governmental institutions, oil industry, oil market effects and furthermore, a covert world of interaction to consider. Demands and abilities of administrations cannot be thought of without their political parties and leader's image, thereby determinants of administrations' legitimacy. However, it is worth emphasizing that even political party effects are differentiated at different time points. Thus, the picture seen in the US oil diversification motivations covers a historical process which is shaped by the interactions of structure-agency and materials-ideas rather than one determiner variable such as mainstream IR approaches would prioritize, i.e. state self-interest or economic cooperation.

The changing picture of structural causes of US oil diversification motivations evolved through structure, agents' interests and shocks. When uncovered, it is found that there are actually reciprocal relations between global oil politics, US foreign policy and US domestic politics. We show how they transition in a duration. When their interactions are followed through the process, contradictions in the system emerges. The transnational and national benefits were compatible in the beginning of the process in relation to compatibility between these three spheres. However, their interaction has brought dual logics as separated and contradictory. Oil diversification motivations can be uncovered, when change of this triangle are compared across cases. However, it is worth remembering that showing structural change requires the consideration of a structure-agents-shocks relationship, because people behave *through* behavior, rather than *in* behavior (see Chapter 4). For example, PSAs with IOCs cannot be understood without considering world oil reserves in 1998, the draft hydrocarbon law process and KRGs' PSAs with IOCs which started in 2002.

In short, US oil diversification motivations can be explained by the Coxian triangle, which is material capabilities, ideas and institutions. Their operationalization on the Iraq War case has demonstrated the importance of Cox's theory and also the limitations of positivist approaches. This chapter does not challenge the existing literature on motivations behind the war entirely. Moreover, those arguments can

be shown as supportive of ours. What we do argue is that, there is not one static motivation behind the War in terms of oil, as Realists or Liberals may contend. Oil diversification motivations can be shaped at structural and agent levels but require both theoretical and empirical observation. It brings a much wider argument in relation to the literature on oil motivations behind the war. Both material and ideational sides of the story are uncovered via actor-actor and actor-structure reciprocal relationships in a structural accumulation. The Iraq War is a consequently an important case for demonstrating how US oil diversification motivations have evolved from `securing and freeing oil flow from the Middle East` to `running away from the Middle East`. As can be deduced from the above analysis, it is not obviously a perception of events in one region of the world, rather it is related to a change in wider foreign policy perception of the US.

Finally, it should be emphasized that a Coxian analysis of state-society complexity needs to be explained in more detail, as Iraqi civil society`s participation in the process shows. Social dynamics shows itself as a new social sphere in the 2000s millennium – a feature particularly evident in the Iraq War case. When social dynamics need to be considered, in addition to forms of state, world order and social forces, both the state-society complexity and agency-structure issue can be explained. It leads us to a clearer application of Coxian analysis. Thus, neo-Coxian theory works in terms of the significance of social participation, but it does not tell us whether it would still work without institutional interference. With these conclusions in mind, we can now test Cox`s theory again in the final case of Arctic Drilling to compare our findings.

7. Arctic Drilling in the Context of Energy Revolution: a process pushed by the contradictions of economy vs. biosphere and national vs. state interests

7.1. Introduction

Arctic Drilling is heavily linked to concerns over the security of external oil supply, primarily from the Middle East, which have precipitated the Energy Revolution in the USA. The first time drilling in this region became a significant political issue was after the 1973 oil crisis. The second time that it rose up the political agenda was in the new millennium when the global and US oil markets faced another major oil supply issue. By this point, reducing reliance on foreign sources, specifically the Middle East, increasing domestic production and energy independence had become the common rhetoric of the federal government, echoing events of the 1973 crisis. Not only did this rhetoric restart debates over the merits of drilling in the Arctic but it also pushed policymakers to create new legislation for promoting alternative energy sources. However, different governments and political parties can have opposite views on exactly what constitutes energy needs and how to resolve them. These views in turn, including private interests, have shaped the political context of the so-called Energy Revolution, whereby the US has sought to develop alternative sources of energy such as Arctic oil along with shale oil and biofuels to reduce reliance on imported oil, and hence often unreliable, sources particularly from the Middle East later on (see Chapter 6). This is the story that this chapter seeks to illuminate.

Arctic Drilling in the context of the national Energy Revolution in the US is another good example for investigating US oil diversification motivations in this thesis. Arctic Drilling has increasingly received media attention while having a polarising effect on political discourse. Now, it is one of the biggest oil issues for the US under the 'America First' agenda of Donald Trump, although the country has conversely become a leading oil producer rather than importer. In the thesis literature review (see Chapter 2), oil diversification was defined

according to import policies but as this case concerns increasing production in the US it can be understood as a significant component of national oil diversification policy since it is aimed at reducing imports and therefore increasing security of domestic supply. The process accumulation will be followed through approaches to `best meet the national energy needs` as required for the legislation. Approaches to `best national energy needs` has created contradictions, along with environment-energy and national-state interests as triggers of the process. Energy usage is one the requirements of modern life standards, but it can involve negative environmental effects. On the other hand, some federal legislative measures do not fit local/state level expectations/demands. For example, shale oil is seen by some as what the US economy needs in parallel to private interests, but some states (e.g. New York) challenge it because of environmental considerations despite benefitting from it economically. A similar debate can be found in Arctic Drilling too due to the state level costs and benefits.

This chapter claims that a Coxian IR interpretation can uncover the dynamics of the case over time. The beginning of the process was highly shaped by global oil politics and its material effects, but its pressures on government, which already had an oil interest via oil prices, started the interactions and trajectory of the process. There has been a structural accumulation, but the actors (public and private) tried to survive and benefit from the crisis that was going to lead new `conditions`. In parallel to the Iraq War and KXL, the case topic has seen increasing domestic polarization and changing foreign policy perceptions in addition to changing US oil politics. However, external shocks (Hurricanes and the Deepwater Horizon accident) have clearly led to environment-economy contradictions in addition to this non-linear relationship between structure-agents. These contradictions have led to another contradiction which relates to national-state interests. Changing pictures of interaction between oil politics, US domestic politics and US foreign policy show how oil diversification motivations have to led from US `energy independence` rhetoric to `energy dominance` without actor dominance. Lastly, the chapter also finds that neo-Coxian theory does not work here as entirely as in the

other two case studies. Reasons why will be discussed later in the thesis (see Chapter 8).

The data are used to establish the critical decision points regarding oil diversification policy as the political process unfolded. These decision points are then used to understand the rationales for oil diversification motivations that developed, which are then analysed across three semi-distinct phases that map on to important key points at which Arctic Drilling was developed. They are researched across three federal administrations, those of George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump. As the Trump administration is still developing policy, only events up to middle of 2019 are encompassed in the study. Later on empirical findings are discussed through neo-Coxian theory.

In this chapter, empirical evidence on Arctic Drilling in the context of the Energy Revolution policy is explored using the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3. Data from original documentary sources are combined with secondary and tertiary sources, plus in-depth interviews, to develop an understanding of evolving policy in this area. In total, 332 primary resources were identified, of which 76 of them were used. In order to collect data, open-source governmental websites (e.g. White House 2007; P.L. 113-67 2013), lobby works (e.g. Open Secrets 2008; Senate 2017) and the websites of institutions on energy and oil (e.g. Yergin 2014) have been used as primary data sources. In addition, 12 interviewees were asked questions about Arctic Drilling plus the shale boom and the alternative fuel program to corroborate documentary sources. Interviews were held with retired diplomats, retired policymakers and people from think tanks and lobbies in Washington DC, USA over a period of five months in 2018-2019.

7.2. Literature Review

Very few studies have engaged with the issue of Arctic drilling. Therefore, this Chapter makes an important contribution, both empirically and theoretically, to our understanding of oil diversification policy in this area. Studies that do exist have been conducted on economic implications, environmental effects and geopolitical

concerns, without providing in depth analysis of the socio-political context to this form of oil exploitation. As such, they do not consider either structure-agency or materials-ideas interactions. Rather they provide a discussion on a topic that is isolated in dimensions and mainly out of context. Context- and history-free arguments can seem true, but they do not give insight on the accumulation of process. On the other hand, existing literature mainly focuses on the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), which is the most controversial area of the US Arctic drilling, but the process has involved drilling in the entire Arctic, so this work will look at this wider context.

From an economic perspective, studies have examined the implications for global oil prices. Here, Ikeda (2011) looks at the economic effects of ANWR drilling on global oil markets, but the study tries to provide cost-benefits assessments in comparison to environmental effects. A quantitative method is used for the analysis and as a conclusion, Ikeda (2011) asserts that environmental effects would actually be reduced by this form of oil production. The ANWR's effect on global oil prices is also investigated by Coats et al (2008). The commonly held view that ANWR drilling does not have any effect on prices is questioned. ANWR drilling is seen as only being able to affect the global market in the long-run, however, an economic model (ibid.) holds that this common view is wrong. Interaction between expected prices and current prices lead them to conclude that "Increases in future output capabilities because of current discoveries will lead to lower prices in the future and so, a lower opportunity cost of using those resources in the present" (ibid. 10). ANWR production is interpreted as relatively small compared to world production, so there is doubt that it would reduce current prices.

Aside from economic effects, studies have also examined the environmental impacts. For example, Tanus (2012) examines potential oil production and its implications for the ANWR coastal area (1002 Area). The author then considers the Fish and Wildlife Services statutory mandate and rules on ANWR drilling and oil reserves to determine the risks of exploration. Finally, normative arguments are forwarded for policy in order to conform to the goals of ANWR management, the conservation purpose of the system and to protect

human health and the environment (ibid. 371). Waterman's study (2003), in contrast, analyses the environmental decision-making of the George W. Bush administration. Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is the main subject of the investigation. The work includes both climate change and international law dimensions. While the US' pro-growth ideology is criticised, a leadership role for combatting climate change is suggested for the US as a normative view. Thus, the study (ibid.) focuses more on US international environmental obligations rather than ANWR.

Some limited study has also been conducted into the wider geopolitical implications of Arctic drilling. Yang (2008) looks at how the ANWR explorations effect OPEC behaviour. The research question is based on whether reducing dependence on foreign oil and easing energy shortages can help protect the US from OPEC's market power. A quantitative model is used for the investigation in order to understand the ANWR's potential effect on the OPEC cartel. As a result of the study, it is predicted that increasing domestic production with ANWR does not seem to be helpful for countering OPEC's power since, given the actual volumes, it has a negligible influence on foreign petroleum suppliers' strategic behaviour.

This literature therefore exhibits a number of gaps in understanding. Firstly, it mainly involves quantitative analyses of the economic and/or environmental effects of ANWR drilling in order to provide normative prescription for policy, e.g. Ikeda 2011. However, depicting the process rather than providing normative prescription is an important target of studies since the former tells us little about how oil diversification evolved. Secondly, little examination of the political rationales for the drilling is provided, with normative arguments based more on positivist assessments of economic efficiency or effectiveness of the policy rather than the 'realpolitik' of its context. Thirdly, these rationales can only realistically be placed in historical context, which is not readily achievable from the 'snapshot' nature of these studies. A historical-dialectical view, taking a synchronic-diachronic perspective, could be used to provide insight into these aspects of the case as it unfolded, thereby moving beyond existing research to reveal its evolving dynamics. Therefore, this study will also

provide context for understanding the Arctic drilling issue. Finally, little discussion is engaged with surrounding the politically contested nature of drilling and the shifting nature of political support for the policy through time: a major oversight in the literature. As in the KXL case, (see Chapter 5) this support for Arctic drilling has varied according to specific domestic and external circumstances in the USA.

7.3. A Timeline and Historical background of Arctic Drilling

In this section, a timeline of significant events is presented to show the historical process of Arctic Drilling. The process details will be given according to a chronological sequence starting in the early 2000s and ending with the current situation, thereby illustrating the synchronic and diachronic nature of the case.

7.3.1. A Timeline of Significant Events

2 August 2001 – Bush’s Energy Plan (H.R.4 - Energy Policy Act of 2002), which includes a provision allowing ANWR drilling, is passed in the House.

21 April 2005 – The Republican-controlled House of Representatives approved Arctic Refuge drilling as part of the 2005 Energy Bill (EPAAct), but the House–Senate conference committee later removed the Arctic Refuge provision from the Act.

15 December 2005 – Republican Senator for Alaska Ted Stevens attached an Arctic Refuge drilling amendment to the annual Defense Appropriations Bill. A group of Democratic Senators led a filibuster of the bill on December 22, and the amendment was subsequently removed.

25 May 2006 – The House of Representatives passed H.R.5429 - American-Made Energy and Good Jobs Act to open ANWR development.

5 January 2007 – Democrat Representative Edward J. Markey from Massachusetts introduces the H.R. 39 Udall-Eisenhower Arctic

Wilderness Act legislation to declare 1002 Area “wilderness” and thus permanently off limits to exploration. Shelved in Committee.

25 September 2007 – the ANWR amendment was killed in the House Resources Committee. Republican Rob Bishop from Utah moves to amend H.R. 3058 to include pro-ANWR language. Rejected.

13 March 2008 – Introduction of S. 2758 of The American Energy Independence and Security Act of 2008 by Republican Senator Murkowski from Alaska Authorizes the opening of 1002 Area if the price of oil reaches \$125 per barrel.

1 May 2008 – Introduction of S.2958 The American Energy Production Act by Republican Senator Pete Domenici from New Mexico as an amendment to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) to permit states including Alaska to explore and production oil.

21 May 2008 – Introduction of H.R. 6107 American Energy Independence and Price Reduction Act by Alaskan Republican Don Young opening the 1002 Area of ANWR and the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). Co-sponsored by Democrat Rep Bartlett for Maryland.

Summer 2008 – ANWR bills stack up following the skyrocketing price of oil on global markets.

31 March 2010 – Obama announces that the administration will expand oil and gas development and exploration on OCS. The Cook Inlet Recovery Act (HB 280) was passed by the Alaska Legislature.

12 May 2011 – H.R.1231 - Reversing President Obama's Offshore Moratorium Act was passed in the House.

4 August 2011 – The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) approved Shell’s drilling plan. It was the first approval since the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 20th April 2010. The Final Programme was announced in July 2012.

11 October 2012 – The Department Secretary of the Department of the Interior (DOI) David Hayes stated that support for the permitting process for Arctic offshore petroleum drilling will continue if President Obama stays in office.

22 January 2014 – the United States District Court for the District of Alaska announced that the BOEM prepared incomplete or unavailable information in terms of environmental effects of the proposed leases.

21 January 2015 – President Barack Obama proposed to designate 12.28 million acres of the refuge, including the coastal plain, as wilderness, prohibiting drilling (Executive Order 13689).

16 October 2015 – The US government announces that it has cancelled oil leases for 2016 and 2017, and that it will not extend current leases.

1 April 2016 – For the first time in more than a decade, oil production in Alaska increased year-over-year during the 12 months, ending March 2016.

9 December 2016 – President Obama approves another Arctic drilling withdrawal (Executive Order 13754)

28 April 2017 – President Trump Executive Order 13795 which supports the Implementing and American-First Offshore Energy Strategy to reverse the previous administration's Arctic leasing ban.

3 July 2017 – The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) announced the 2019-2024 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Programme to replace the 2017-2022 Programme which was approved on January 17 2017.

22 December 2017 – Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (Tax Act) which establishes an oil and gas leasing programme for the ANWR in Alaska was passed through a Republican controlled House of Representatives and Senate.

29 March 2019 – The District Court of Alaska cancelled Trump's proposition which was for opening all offshore Alaska for drilling. The reason was President Obama's 2015 and 2016 Executive orders which indicated that bans could only be recoverable by an act of Congress, so Trump did not have authority.

12 September 2019 – The Trump administration announced a plan would allow oil leasing on 1.56 million acres of the 19-million-acre

refuge, in accordance with Section 20001 of the Tax Act. It would open the entire coastal plain to the energy industry.

Figure 7.1: *The Timeline of Arctic Drilling*

7.3.2. Historical Context to Arctic Drilling

US oil exploitation in the Arctic dates back several decades. On August 7, 1953, OCSLA (P.L. 113-67 2013), which makes the US Secretary of the Interior responsible for the administration of mineral exploration and development of the OCS, was created. The Act, as amended, provided guidelines for implementing an OCS oil and gas exploration and development programme. Alaska is one of the four OCS regions in the US, while the Alaska OCS region had been classified into four sub-regions: the Beaufort Sea, Chukchi Sea/Hope Basin, Norton Basin and Cook Inlet. The others are the Gulf of Mexico Region, Atlantic Region and Pacific Region. In 1976, the federal Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act (NPRPA), then renamed the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska (1976), was approved to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to establish on certain public lands of the United States national petroleum reserves for the development of the total energy needs of the country. It was also the time (1974-1977) that the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) was constructed, which was initiated just after the 1973 Oil Crisis caused a sharp increase in oil prices. TAPS, which is 800 miles (1,287 km) long, conveys oil from production wells in Prudhoe Bay to tankering facilities in Valdez, Alaska (see Figure 7.2).



Figure 7.2: Alaska Map (Alaska Centers 2019)

On November 12, 1980, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) (1980) which provides varying degrees of special protection to over 157,000,000 acres of land was signed by President Jimmy Carter. The ANWR, including the “1002 area”, was then given federal legal protection. ANWR comprises 19 million acres, while the “1002 area” covers 1.5 million acres. It was the largest unexplored and potentially productive geological onshore area in the US for oil reserves (EIA 2000). Nine years later, in 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred. The second largest oil spill in history, it caused significant damage to the Alaskan marine environment. It led to accident avoidance procedures for the TAPS to be strengthened in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-380). At this point, both energy needs and environmental considerations started becoming important and the main controversy in the Arctic was the potential impacts on the ANWR.

Before President Bush came to power, US oil imports were 60% of the US oil supply and was sourced from 30 countries (NPC 2000). While the US was producing 5,822 Mbbl/d, Alaska was producing 970 Mbbl/d of it in 2000 (EIA 2018c). Alaska was the second biggest oil producer state after Texas. However, in 2018, while the US produced 10,990 Mbbl/d, Alaska was the fifth biggest oil producer (EIA 2019b).

7.4. The Bush Era: 2001-2009

The Bush administration had a close relationship with the oil industry, as mentioned above (see Chapter 6). When George W. Bush came to power, he already had an interest in drilling in the ANWR. On July 27, 2001, the H.R.4 - Energy Policy Act of 2002 (Congress 2001) was introduced to the House by Republican Billy Tauzin for Louisiana and passed by 240-189. While the 'ayes' side was 203 Republicans and 36 Democrats, the 'noes' side was 16 Republicans and 172 Democrats. Title V of Division F of the Act contained the 1002 area development provisions. President Bush's (DOI 2002) attention on ANWR drilling was reflected in the 2002-2007 OCS plan (see Figure 7.3). The Mineral Management Service used to be responsible for implementing the requirements of the OCSLA in the DOI until 2010. It was reorganized as BOEM and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement in 2010. Five yearly lease sales were planned to "best meet the Nation's energy needs" as specified in the section 18 of OCSLA (P.L. 113-67 2013). It was a controversial point of ANWR drilling, since every government could interpret 'best meet the national energy needs' from their perspective, although the eight evaluate factors provided in Section 18(a)(2) are: (A) Geographic, Geological, and Ecological Characteristics; (B) Equitable Sharing of Developmental Benefits and Environmental Risks; (C) Location with Respect to Regional and National Energy Markets and Needs; (D) Location with Respect to Other Uses of the Sea and Seabed; (E) Interest of Potential Oil and Gas Producers; (F) Laws, Goals, and Policies of Affected States; (G) Relative Environmental Sensitivity and Marine Productivity and (H) Environmental and Predictive Information (ibid. 32).




Figure 7.3: Proposed Final Programme 2002-2007 OCS Planning Areas (DOI 2002: 4)

During this time, the share of US petroleum demand met by net imports went up to 64% (DOI 2002). It was expected to be 70% by 2025 (Hirsh et al. 2005). While domestic production was decreasing, import and global oil prices were rising. Price volatility peaked in 1998, whereas gasoline price volatility peaked much later in early 2002. President Bush was aware of the situation, so emphasised energy issues as one of his government’s core goals in the State of the Union Address 2003 (Washington Post 2003). One of the goals was promoting “energy independence” for the country, while “dramatically improving the environment”. In referring to the NEP (2001), these targets were provided by energy efficiency and conservation, developing cleaner technology and producing more energy at home. Thus, the administration was considering different aspects of energy security, so drilling in Arctic would not be the only solution to achieving the government’s goal. Early in 2005, there were some unwanted problems for the US government and oil consumers. Price volatility had just happened and prices had been increasing rapidly. Venezuela had experienced a strike, which affected oil imports, and global oil

demand, specifically from China and India, had been increasing. Apart from the economic developments, political events and labour strikes, weather, infrastructure problems and terrorism would also lead to further volatile oil prices.

All the targets of the administration given above were only achievable through new energy legislation, which already started to be discussed in the Senate. The EPAct progressed through the House and Senate in this context. It was the first energy act since the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which was agreed just after the Gulf War. Both Congress and the Administration were held by the Republicans but it was bipartisan legislation (Congress 2005b). The main target of the Act was reducing dependence on foreign sources achieved via new technology for conservation, producing and refining more crude oil and developing alternative fuels (White House 2005a). The transportation sector was responsible for 60% of total oil consumption in the US and alternative fuel produced would decrease the amount consumed and thereby imports. Moreover, renewable fuel is, despite some impacts for biodiversity and land use, a more environmentally friendly alternative. Ethanol produced by corn and biodiesel from soybeans were the main alternative fuel programmes supported by the federal government. While US was producing 3,904 million U.S. gallons (MMgal) in 2005, a target of 7.5 billion gallons of ethanol in gasoline by 2012 was specified in the Act. However, this target was achieved in just a few years as farmers switched from arable products to more lucrative ethanol production (Interviewee-30). The bill introduced tax credits for biofuels producers and established a federal fund of \$550 million to improve technology. The importance of supporting new technology was emphasised in the legislation. It could help four different areas for increasing domestic production from existing energy resources, creating new sources like ethanol, conserving energy and being used by other nations to reduce their own demand (DOE 2005). In four years of being in power, the administration spent nearly \$10 billion on new energy technologies for renewables (White House 2006b).

The result of the EPAct was a great success, because apart from the oil market pressure and government targets, there was also significant support from the farm lobby and entrepreneurs in the biofuels

business (Interviewee-2; Sen. Cantwell 2005). Specifically, Mid-continent farmers have a major effect on decisions taken in the Congress (Interviewee-2; Interviewee-22). Republican farmer states (e.g. Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, Wisconsin, South Dakota) were also supportive of EISA. It is also worth emphasising that Iowa carries great importance for the re-election of presidents because of the caucus process, in which it is the first state in determining party nominations (Interviewee-26). Making Iowans happy was going to be important in 2008 election rally. The EPIA also included amendments on efficiency and conservation. However, in terms of oil production, there was only one paragraph about oil shale and adoption of tax incentives for decreasing oil production costs. However, it led to significant diversification of US oil producer states. An oil shale R&D programme was created as a result, while an estimated 2 trillion barrels of oil were locked in oil shale primarily in Colorado, Utah and Wyoming (Sen. Cornyn 2005; DOE 2007b). In terms of oil diversification, the amendments on ANWR drilling in the original text were removed in the signed version in December. ANWR drilling would potentially increase US oil production to around 1 MMbbl/d (USGC 2005).

President Bush argued that production was targeting `affordable` and `reliable` sources in four ways when he was signing the EPIA: energy conservation and efficiency; more clean productive energy; diversified energy supply; and investment in electricity (White House 2005b). However, in the second half of the year two extreme weather conditions occurred: hurricanes Katrina and Rita. They led to enormous energy shortages and oil price increases due to their impacts on US Gulf of Mexico production, thereby placing major pressures on the government. The global oil price was heading to \$60 a barrel, while domestic retail gasoline prices increased to \$3.06 a gallon. On the other hand, in terms of tax incentives for oil production, five oil companies (i.e. Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, BP America and Shell Oil USA) were under pressure from some Democrats (Sen. Wyden 2005) who wanted to announce that Big Oil did not need the tax breaks provided by the EPIA. According to

agreements they had with President Bush, when the price of oil exceeded \$55, they would not need tax breaks.

While the US tried to increase domestic oil and biofuel production, decreasing imports from the Middle East started to be promoted by the Presidency. Reducing dependence on foreign oil was linked directly to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East (see Chapter 6). In early 2006, President Bush announced that their target was to replace more than 75% of oil imports from the Middle East by 2025 (White House 2006b). During this time, North Africa and the Middle East were holding 62% of the world oil reserves but were considered unstable parts of the world (Warnecke 2007). US oil imports from Canada and Mexico were heading to more than 30% of total oil imports (DOE 2006). On the other hand, ANWR drilling was approved by the House in the H.R. 5429-American Made Energy and Good Jobs Act (Congress 2006). Bush justified this policy in terms of three main motivations: having a reliable domestic supply of energy; keeping the economy growing by creating jobs; and ensuring business can expand (White House 2006c).

The EISA can be seen as a continuation of the EPAct, but there are some differences. While the oil industry (because of the MTBE and tax breaks), farm lobbies and renewable associations were behind the EPAct, environmental groups were not supportive, but this time they joined the lobbying in order to counteract the oil industry. When the oil price exceeded \$70 a barrel in 2007, environmental lobbies knew that the Act was going to be passed (Interviewee-26, Interviewee-30). It passed the Senate by record voting - 86 votes for and 8 against (Senate 2007). Both parties had the same number of members in the Senate, while the House of Representatives was under the Democrats' control. While oil and retail gasoline prices were creating pressures on the administration, they were not the only motivations behind the act. Democrats wanted to make environmental groups happy while Republicans wanted to support farm states (Interviewee-22). Disengaging from the Middle East was an argument common to the rhetoric of both sides (Interviewee-14).

As noted above, EISA can be seen as a continuation of the EPAct. It targets improving vehicle fuel economy through the CAFE (clean air) standards that were first enacted after the 1973 crisis, increasing biofuels production to 36 billion gallons in 2022 and increasing the efficiency of lighting. Apart from the Act, the importance of oil shale started to be announced in governmental speeches and reports. US officials knew that the US had three-quarters of the world's estimated 2.6 trillion barrels of oil shale resources (DOE 2007a). It was not a new industry but an evolving one in need of financial support driven by government policy. By this point, public and private investments had been coming together again to develop the industry (Interviewee-14).

Besides biofuels and oil shale, ANWR drilling was also discussed in Congress. At the beginning of 2007, President Bush modified the 1998 withdrawal leasing in the North Aleutian Basin Planning Area (White House 2007). However, the 2007-2012 final programme (see Figure 7.4) to best meet national energy needs did not include this area because of the comments of the Governor of Alaska, a large majority of local governments and tribal organizations (DOI 2007: 3-4). Party differences also started to emerge on the topic. While Democrats asserted the necessity of accepting ANWR as wilderness, as in H.R. 39 (Congress 2007c), the Republican side used pro-ANWR drilling language as in H.R. 3058 (Congress 2007d).




Figure 7.4: *Proposed Final Programme 2007-2012 OCS Planning Areas (DOI 2007: 8)*

The oil price was still increasing in 2008 and it eventually reached \$147 per barrel in July, compared with \$18 in January 2002. The price of a gallon of gasoline reached \$4.11 for US consumers. As an election was coming, oil prices shaped the discussions. On the other hand, one of the main topics discussed in the Congress was tax incentives for Big Oil. Although prices had already exceeded \$55 a barrel, tax incentives for Big Oil had not been removed and the industry was making record profits (Representatives 2008). Exxon-Mobil reported earning \$40.6 billion in 2007, which caught Democrats' attention (Representatives 2008). On the other hand, the Republican government (White House 2008) was trying to convince Democratic Congressional leaders to take steps on four issues: increasing access to the OCS; using the potential of oil shale despite the Democrats omnibus spending bill to block oil shale leasing on Federal Lands; permitting exploration in the ANWR; and expanding refinery capacity. At this point, party collaboration gave way to party polarization. Estimates suggested that 10.4 billion barrels of oil could be produced in ANWR, equivalent to roughly two decades of imported crude oil from Saudi Arabia (ibid.).

Because of the controversies in 2008 there were many Congressional attempts for ANWR drilling and debates in the congress. Alaskan Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski (Congress 2008a) introduced S.2758, that would authorize the exploration, leasing, development, production, and transportation of oil and gas. Republican Senator Pete Domenici then introduced S. 2958 which included an oil and gas development programme within the Coastal Plain of the ANWR. Those attempts were not surprising, because opening ANWR would provide the largest oil price reduction impacts (EIA 2008). However, although ANWR's oil reserves were attractive for oil companies, drilling costs in the region were high compared to domestic onshore oil because of the geographic location, which also led to uncertainty for investments. The difference between the drilling costs of onshore and ANWR had been growing significantly.

However, Republicans were arriving at more pro-drilling positions. Just before the election, one of the Republican presidential candidates, Senator John McCain, who originally held an environmentalist position until a 2008 election rally but had received the largest oil and gas industry financial contribution for the election (Open Secrets 2008), called for lifting the Federal moratorium on offshore drilling for oil and gas (Congress 2008b). The suggestion gained support from the future president. Democrat presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama, as the second biggest oil and gas industry recipient (Open Secrets 2008) had been trying to put limits on oil shale and stood against OCS drilling. However, in summer 2008 he met with a delegation of oil company chief executives and as a result announced a major policy shift (PBS 2008; New York Times 2012b). He was still emphasising his belief in renewables, but he showed support for Arctic drilling. Republicans argued in the Congress that getting oil from US lands was the priority rather than paying countries such as Saudi Arabia or Venezuela that saw the US as an enemy (Congress 2008c). The public agreed with them in terms of supporting domestic production because of gasoline prices. The polls showed more than 70% of the public supported OCS and ANWR drilling (Congress 2008d). In the second half of the year, two main acts were passed by Democrats in the House. H.R.6515 - Drill

Responsibly in Leased Lands Act of 2008 (Congress 2008e) that amends the NPRPA of 1976 directed the Secretary of the Interior to conduct an oil and gas competitive leasing programme in the National Petroleum Reserves-Alaska (NPR-A), that included at least one lease sale each year during the period 2009 through to 2013 but failed in the House, while H.R.6899 (Congress 2008f) that limited offshore drilling and amended the oil shale part of EPA Act was passed by the House.

Duration: Theoretical Analysis

Material incapability was the main determiner of oil diversification motivations in this period, although it interacted with ideas and institutions as time progressed. However, none of them held the same influence over the process across the entire period. Oil market pressures increased during the Bush administration despite their attempts at finding solutions to rising prices and hence declining material capabilities. Even the ideas influencing oil diversification motivations differed over time. The early administration process reflected the 9/11 effect which unified the political parties, while later on there was an increasingly visible split between them which found its reflection in the ANWR. Another dimensional aspect of ideas involved national-state interests, which resulted from and shaped the process too. Institutions were influenced by relative material incapability but also the divergence in ideas on Arctic drilling (political parties and national-state interests).

The process of the Bush administration energy policies and Arctic drilling perspective was initially heavily shaped by the material structure of global and US oil markets and the administration's approach to the oil industry. In terms of the oil market, we see increasing oil and gasoline prices, increasing oil demand and decreasing supply. Being dependent on imports made the US more vulnerable to insecure foreign supply, particularly from the Middle East. As mentioned, around 60% of domestic oil consumption was provided by imports (EIA 200a; DOI 2002). Thus, the material capabilities of the US oil market were highly limiting and were predicted to become more constraining year by year. This material

limitation put the government under pressure to open new domestic sources of production such as the Arctic.

The Bush administration's relations with the oil industry and gasoline price effects on voters then influenced the institutional and ideational side of the process. In terms of ideas, material incapacities were pushing both Republicans and Democrats to support new energy programmes. This period also included the time after 9/11 and the Iraq War, so nationalist rhetoric was used against importing oil from the Middle East, which has the biggest global oil reserves. Moreover, some Democrat politicians were responsible for their states or donors in terms of a pro-drilling agenda. However, as the process evolved party politics became heavily engaged with the economy-environment issue, as in the KXL case. The idea of Energy Independence, which was used first after 1973 crises, was therefore re-emphasised by the government as being in the national interests. Material incapacities were reflected in institutional arguments given as being important for countering this incapability (Interviewee-32).

At this point, Republican supporting farmers, renewable energy entrepreneurs and associations, the oil industry (although not as much the others) and both political parties were coming together to promote their interests but also to improve US material capabilities in the EPAct. Thus, both private and public actors were standing together on this issue. New technology and innovation were the main targets of both the EPAct and EISA for increasing material capability (White House 2005a; Interviewee-14). Increasing alternative fuels, energy efficiency and expanding domestic production would strengthen not just the government's hand but would also benefit other groups (e.g. Renewable Fuel Associations). Institutions were shaping the process as much as ideas and material capabilities. Most importantly, steps taken would make consumers happy by reducing the price of domestic fuel. However, technology was also important for environmental considerations then promoted by the government (Washington Post 2003). The environmentalists' campaigning had been increasingly influential on EISA. As the entire process shows, concerns over climate change and an oil production friendly perspective merged as a result. A contradiction between

environmentalist considerations and energy necessity did however increase the tension between Republicans and Democrats, although there was also a general polarization in US politics occurring at this time (see also Chapter 5). This ideas problem was caused by material incapability which was evident in environmentalist considerations (i.e. ideas) which had become more powerful in parallel to their lobbying power (i.e. institutions). However, there was also a general trend in terms of polarization within US politics (i.e. ideas and institutions interacting).

In the last year of the Bush presidency, while prices were still going up, oil politics became even more polarized. Republicans were more pro-oil, while Democrats became more environment friendly thereby leading to open conflicts. After the EPAct and EISA, President Bush still tried to get Democrat support, but ultimately was unsuccessful in winning them over (White House 2008). In response to the rhetoric, presidential candidate Democrat Obama opposed Arctic Drilling; however, in reality he was more supportive, reflecting the influence of the fossil fuel lobby on his decision-making. Republican McCain, on the other hand, changed his stance from pro-environmentalist to pro-oil to better align with partisan prerogatives. Ideational polarization in both parties then started to shape actors, thereby institutions. These same institutions would go onto support further polarization in the following era.

To summarise, this era shows that material incapacities were combined with unified political ideas which also reflected institutions in terms of the energy issue. This structural evolution also accelerated after the two Hurricanes, but also reflected agents` (individuals and lobbies) interests. When material incapability combined with the election process, the picture started to change in parallel with the result of the Iraq War in terms of the energy issue. This ideational split (between political parties) was reflected in the Arctic Drilling issue. Republicans started becoming more-pro oil, while Democrats more pro-environmental. However, even before the election process, Arctic Drilling was becoming less of a concern for Democrats since its electoral salience was low. Removing the ANWR emphasis in the EPAct, which was a bipartisan policy, is a clear example of this


declining concern. Thus, Arctic Drilling was not entirely connected with the energy revolution process.

7.5. The Obama Era: 2009-2017

No specific events related to Arctic Drilling occurred in 2009, but in terms of oil production the ARRA was signed by President Obama (Public Law 111-5 2009). It was actually a stimulus package triggered by the economic crisis (Russel and Benson 2014). More than \$40 billion was made available to the energy sector for energy efficiency, renewable programmes, fossil fuel research and development, and cleaning up nuclear weapons production sites. That amount was more than the EPCA and EISA provided in total. A Treasury Grant Program was created to provide roughly \$25 billion for renewables between 2009 and 2016. However, it was adopted at the time when American politics started becoming polarized, with the rise of the ultra-conservative Tea Party, affiliated to the Republicans (Chapter 5). Only three Republican senators voted for ARRA, while all non-Republican members of the House were in favour of it. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Administration was also attempting to pass a cap-and-trade system that additionally increased polarization in US politics.

2010 was the year that the new administration made a stand against Arctic drilling. However, the situation was more complex. On March 31, 2010, President Obama announced the expansion of oil exploration in the region, reflecting the shifting position in his presidential campaign. The Deepwater Horizon explosion in the Gulf of Mexico, which is the biggest oil drilling disaster in US history, subsequently led the President to reverse his decision (Goldenberg 2010) and resulted in the DOI issuing a 6 month drilling moratorium in the US, including Alaska (Hagerty 2010). The explosion had a great effect on environmentalist reactions. Leading environmental groups called for a pause to plans by Royal Dutch Shell to begin drilling exploratory wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas in late May. Moreover, the administration revised the 2007-2012 leasing programme because of the potential environmental damage (DOI

2010). It removed the upcoming Beaufort Sea and North Aleutian Basin leases and some Chukchi Sea leases (see Figure 7.5).



Map A: Shows the Alaska Program Areas

Figure 7.5: Revised Programme 2007-2012 OCS Planning Areas (DOI 2010: 20)

In 2011, Republicans in the House passed H.R.1231 - Reversing President Obama's Offshore Moratorium Act which made the OCS available for leasing (Congress 2011d). In August of the same year, BOEMRE approved Shell's drilling plan. It was the first approval since the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. During this time, although the US started producing oil and biofuels, oil prices were still high and a gallon of gasoline was still over \$4. However, tax breaks for Big Oil were still a discussion topic in the House (Congress 2011e). ExxonMobil had made almost \$1 trillion profit in the previous 10 years and Big Oil was still receiving tax breaks. This issue too was increasing the pro-oil (a more Republican focus) vs. environmentalism (a more Democrat focus) polarization.

In 2012, the US oil import rate fell to 45% of total consumption thanks to the development of oil shale, biofuel production and efficiency

programmes. The Obama administration then announced the 2012-2017 OCS final programme (see Figure 7.6). While president Obama was still protective of Atlantic and Pacific drilling, Alaskan drilling was not viewed the same way. Leaving open the doors for Arctic drilling by a Democrat president was surprising for environmentalists while he had very strict opposition against KXL (New York Times 2012b) (see Chapter 5). However, Shell's election support for Obama in 2008 created a significant impact (Open Secrets 2008). As mentioned above, presidential candidate Obama changed his position on Arctic drilling in summer 2008. Despite his negative speeches on Arctic drilling, his government's decisions were supportive. But of course, Shell was not the only actor drilling in the Arctic. Producing 1 MMbbl/d of crude in the region did mean more than 10% of domestic production. The signal for diversification of domestic oil supply existed because of oil politics. It could create a significant impact on US domestic production and thereby decrease gasoline prices. At this point it is worth emphasising that while Shell was getting permission to drill, environmental groups were not reacting strongly. Environmentalists tried to find a front page issue and after finding KXL, they mainly focused their attention on it (Interviewee-3). Shell received the final permit in 2012 to sink the wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas, but the company reversed its plan because of "regulatory challenges and stubborn ices" (Eaton 2012). In 2013, President Obama started his second term. He was the third biggest oil and gas industry donation recipient after two Republican candidates Mitt Romney and Rick Perry (Open Secret 2012).




Figure 7.6: 2012-2017 Proposed Final Programme of OCS Planning Areas in Yellow Are under Consideration for Inclusion (DOI 2012: 1-3)

Hydraulic fracturing (fracking) then started to transform the US oil and gas sector. In fracking, large volumes of water mixed with specialized chemicals are pumped under pressure into the ground. The pressure forces oil and gas to flow out of the rocks and into a production well. The EPA revised the Safe Drinking Water Act term `underground injection` to exclude the injection of fluids and fracking agents (except diesel fuel). As a result, the EPA lacked authority to regulate fracking (Tiemann and Vann 2013). This became an issue as the oil and gas industry were starting to combine fracking with horizontal drilling (Interviewee-31). Both methods were well established but the combined method was costly. Technological improvement and innovative efforts by independent energy companies that were not members of Big Oil triggered a race for shale (light) oil and gas production (Interviewee-31). With the pressure of high oil and gasoline prices, public and private interests had combined.

Some states including Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Wyoming supported and benefitted from shale oil, while other states banned it because of voters' opinions. However, states like New York, Maryland

and Vermont benefited economically from shale oil because of the boom's great effect on US oil and gas production (Interviewee-34). North Dakota had not even produced oil before, but it rapidly became one of the biggest oil producers in the US. As a result, there has been a diversification of supply states in the US. From the beginning of 2008 through to the end of 2012, US oil imports declined by more than 1.3 MMbbl/d, while domestic production rose around 1.5 MMbbl/d (Greco 2013).

However, the Arctic OCS was still a focus of the oil industry and the administration were not totally against Arctic drilling. The approach of Obama (White House 2014) was an 'all-of-the-above' approach that targeted developing every source of American-made energy and did not exclude continuing to explore and produce Arctic oil and gas. The goal of policy was determined as supporting economic growth and job creation, enhancing energy security and a clean energy future (ibid.). It could be made compatible with energy independence rhetoric and would suit 'best meet energy needs' this time. On the other hand, Republican support for Arctic drilling was also reflected in federal policies. Although the oil industry had interests in Arctic drilling, it was not as attractive as shale oil, because of geographical limitations under federal legislation. For example, ConocoPhillips announced suspension of its drilling. Alaska started losing its domestic production share since some states (e.g. North Dakota, Texas, Alabama, Oklahoma, New Mexico) were increasing shale production rapidly (Pawlowski 2013), while Alaska's oil production had been in decline since 1998. Alaska had moved from the second to fourth biggest US oil producer state (RDC 2014).

In 2014, US oil production had increased three times compared to 2008, a rise of 60% (Yergin 2014). Domestic production and imports from Canada (see Chapter 5) and Mexico were supplying 75% of US oil consumption (NPC 2014). The tendency to supply from the North American continent had been increasing in tandem with the rhetoric on reducing reliance on Middle East oil. On the other hand, controversies in the Arctic area were still ongoing. The US District Court for the District of Alaska (2014) announced that BOEM's reports were incomplete or lacking information on Shell's Chukchi Sea

planned drilling. Shell was already scaling-back production from the Beaufort Sea on October 31st, 2013, but then also announced cancellation of drilling in the Arctic in January 31st, 2014 after the court decision (Greenpeace 2015). In the same year, Noble Drilling LLC admitted keeping false and incomplete records and willingly failing to notify the U.S. Coast Guard of hazardous conditions aboard the drill ship Noble Discoverer. It was fined \$12.2 million (ibid.). Around the same time, Chevron scaled back attempts at drilling in the Beaufort Sea area which had been planned since 2009 and prospected in the 2020s, because of “economic uncertainty” (Reuters 2014). Chevron had already spent more than \$100 million in production investments, however, decreasing oil prices triggered `economic uncertainty`. From June 2014 (\$113.48 per barrel) to January 2015 (\$53.02 per barrel), oil prices dropped 60%. During this time, apart from the shale boom in the US, OPEC members consistently exceeded their production and China experienced a slowdown in economic growth thus decreasing global demand. The global oil market was not stable anymore.

2015 was also the year that the Obama administration sought to lead the Paris Climate Agreement. The emphasis on being a ‘global leader’ in terms of reducing GHG could be seen in the White House’s (2015c) rhetoric. The Arctic area was going to be severely affected by climate change, meaning that the US needed to become the global leader in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. As the controversy surrounding KXL increased in the same year, the polarization of US politics around this issue grew. Although over 7 million acres of the refuge was determined as wilderness in ANILCA, the government thought that 60% of the refuge did not carry this designation (DOI 2015a), so the president called upon Congress to withdraw certain areas of the OCS Alaska from leasing disposition in January (White House 2015d). In accordance with this request, the government brought in new requirements for Arctic drilling in February. However, in the same year, while BOEM approved Shell’s exploration plan in the Arctic, the administration granted Shell a final permit to drill for oil in the Chukchi Sea. Mirroring Chevron’s actions in late 2014, Shell abandoned its project for the “foreseeable” future (Macalister 2015). However, US

policymakers could not ignore Arctic drilling entirely, because there are three type of oils required for the US market, sweet, medium and heavy, and shale oil did not provide all of them.

While shale oil provides light-sweet crude, the main US refineries were refining medium-to-heavy sour crude oil. New refineries for light-sweet crude were not built because of the low oil price and bigger investment risk. Despite the shale boom, the US needed to drill Arctic oil in order to diversify the oil types that it produced. Increasing domestic production does not then necessarily make the US independent or isolated from the global market. The US therefore needed to buy heavy crude from Canada, Mexico, Venezuela or some OPEC countries and increase medium-to-heavy crude domestic production via the main OCS to provide medium-to-heavy crude (DOI 2015b), while finding new export markets for its light-sweet crude. After heavy pressure from oil producers, the government had to remove an export ban (Interviewee-14; Congress 2015b). The Obama administration took this decision in the year of controversial decisions on KXL and Arctic Drilling that were politically symbolic of the economy vs. environment debate. While onshore oil produces higher-quality quick-turnaround, “long-term, traditional projects general produce medium-to-heavy sour crudes”. (DOI 2015b: 4-10). The CFR (2017) therefore also share the government’s perception that Arctic resources are a long-term proposition since the market can get oil over a 15-20 years period. It is worth emphasising that Alaska had an exceptional position in terms of banning crude export. In 1996, President Bill Clinton amended the policy to allow exports for Alaska (Muskal 2014).

For the first time in more than a decade, oil production in Alaska increased year-over-year between April 2015 and March 2016 (RDC 2016). Nevertheless, Alaska’s oil production share in the country had decreased. While the state was producing 25% of all US oil in 1988, it was down to 7% by this point. However, more than one-third of state jobs relied on the oil and gas industry and the oil and gas industry creates 92% of the state’s revenues (AOGA 2019). Thus, despite some local and tribal challenges, it is difficult to talk about people’s direct opposition to Arctic drilling in the state. If the administrations do

not prevent the state from relying on one sector, there will always be an open door for Arctic drilling (White House 2016). The Obama administration announced the 2017-2022 OCS oil and gas leasing proposed final programme (DOI 2016). Only the Cook Inlet area was included in the lease sales (see Figure 7.7). Executive Order 13754 (Federal Register 2016) were going to be announced as a support for Executive Order 13689 (White House 2015c). These orders were going to cause a problem to the new president who supported Arctic Drilling.




Figure 7.7: 2017-2022 Proposed Final Program of OCS Planning Areas (DOI 2016: S-11)

Duration: Theoretical Analysis

The Obama administration provided a similar picture of oil diversification motivations to that identified in the KXL case (Chapter 5). Gradual increasing material capability as overtaken during this period by ideational clashes between political parties (institutions) and national-state interests. These ideas were shaping institutional positions that then affect how they tried to influence the process. Thus, they did not have a role which only maintains the particular order, as Cox suggests.

Obama`s presidency started with a severe economic crisis, which was harmful to the global economic market including the oil market. Material incapability therefore still existed in terms of unstable oil price vulnerabilities but increasing ethanol production and the results of federal energy efficiency programmes started showing their effects. However, thereafter declining material incapability through technological change was matched with increasing institutional interaction with ideas.

The first few years of the Obama administration was characterised by polarized rhetoric and contradictions in the government. The Obama administration was trying an ‘all-of-the-above’ approach to make both environmentalists and the oil industry happy. While one side was one of the main supporters of his party, the other side was one of the biggest contributors and was responsible for gasoline prices, so bridging this divide was not easy. However, the biggest turning point that also reflects controversial stance of Obama in terms of Arctic Drilling, was the Deepwater Horizon shock. It created a deeply divisive environment vs. oil debate with BP in particular singled out for condemnation for its role in the disaster. It led to more institutional polarization along party lines, with the 2012 election campaign showing more clearly the environment-energy clash around Arctic Drilling.

The wave of increasing ideational and institutional polarization had been occurred alongside increasing material capability through increasing global and US oil supply, in addition to increasing technological efficiency that resulted from investments since the Bush administration in terms of production and consumption of oil. The US oil import share was down to 45% in 2012. While biofuel and efficiency programs were working, the shale boom expanded US oil production enormously. Moreover, it added diversifying producer states into the oil diversification definition. These improvements, that were supported by both ideational and institutional sides and both public and private interests, were decreasing US oil vulnerability. In addition to environmentalist concerns and low global oil prices there was another factor that slowed down Arctic Drilling. Even while the Obama administration was still approving the drilling, decreasing oil prices

and increasing global supply made investments in Arctic drilling riskier. Geologically the Arctic is one of the most difficult areas for oil production. As a result of increasing US oil capabilities, there was limited private attention to the Arctic as oil companies scaled back their investments in favour of other drilling areas where profit margins were higher.

New environmentalist ideas were also influential on institutions in other ways. They combined with Obama's desire to ensure US 'global leadership' on the climate issue and ultimately led to the Paris Climate Agreement. Thus, there was a change in the integration of oil politics, US domestic politics and US foreign policy. The US had been losing its hegemonic position after the Iraq War, and had aimed to recover its position at some point. Climate change was the most attractive policy option to achieve this aim in Obama's last two presidential years. Decreased oil prices helped Obama to act against fossil fuel programmes, including Arctic Drilling, since they strengthened the scope for government action.

Obama's oil diversification motivations should be discussed in detail here. It is important to note that he focused on energy diversification rather than just oil. When he came to power oil prices were high, and the solution did include both increasing domestic oil production and renewable programs. While oil prices were decreasing, ideational polarization was rising up. This context too was informing general energy production policy, because renewable programs were what environmentalists heavily supported. Oil diversification has never been the main target for the administration, and this has shaped both KXL and Arctic Drilling. The Administration's decisions on these policies were never consistent inside of the processes. However, since the KXL was more a front-page issue, this inconsistency could be seen more in this case than in the Arctic Drilling one.

In short, the oil diversification motivations picture was constantly changing through structural causes interacting within wider structural spheres. Material incapability around oil turned into a capability with the help of public-private collaboration. Ideas that were connected with the interests of individuals and institutions helped solving this

incapability, but solving this issue split ideas, and thereby institutions more dramatically. Ideationally, there was increasing polarization politically, while nation-state interests became contradictory. Some states (e.g. New York) did not support shale production because of environmentalist considerations, but the entire US was benefitting from it economically (and even politically). On the other hand, oil and gas drilling did have a huge meaning for Alaska's revenues, but national politics had been preventing Alaska from deciding itself. However, one material issue that is often ignored still keeping the Arctic Drilling debate alive, which is different oil types and industries. There was a national refining necessity for medium-to-heavy sour crude oil for downstream industry that conflicted with lighter crude shale oil production. At the end, there was increased domestic polarization that was shaped by splits and contradictory ideas, thereby institutions would not discard the populist presidential candidate as much as they were shaped by grassroots activism.

7.6. The Trump Era: 2017-

In 2015, Shell did not continue its Arctic operations because of high costs and regulatory uncertainty. However, with the new president, who was oil industry friendly, oil companies' interests increased again in parallel with oil price increases. The decreasing amount of oil production in Alaska was going to be reversed (see Figure 7.8). BP spent \$1,720,000.00 lobbying for Arctic drilling (Senate 2017). The Administration's ambition for energy policy was encapsulated in the "America-First Offshore Energy Strategy" (White House 2017b). In the Executive Order 13795 (ibid.), the president modified the offshore drilling withdrawals of January 2015 (White House 2015c) and December 2016 (Federal Register 2016). The President announced that they were going to open the Arctic for drilling again, so the government would announce a new 5-year plan (DOI 2017a). It was going to be called the 2019-2024 program (Federal Register 2017). As his predecessors did, Trump was seeking to "best meet national energy needs" (DOI 2017b). However, the government's ambition for Arctic drilling has been shaped by the target of "achieving American energy dominance" (DOI 2017c). The 'All-of-the-above' approach of

Obama to federal policy had been transformed into the `energy dominance` of Trump, reflecting his populist agenda. BP (2018a) then announced their appreciation to the administration in terms of the new 5 year plan for OCS energy exploration and leasing.




Figure 7.8: Oil production history, when president Trump came in power (A-DOR 2017: 8)

The key event of this presidential era happened in late 2017. A Republican Congress and administration passed the Tax Act which established an oil and gas exploitation program for the coastal plain of the ANWR while also amending ANILCA (Congress 2017: 183). The administration announced the first draft of the 2019-2024 leasing programme in early 2018 (see Figure 7.9). Both the Alaska Governor Bill Walker (2018) and BP (2018b) announced their support. Drilling in ANWR is key for Alaskan oil production and three different regions provide Arctic oil production. In federal areas there was 45 billion barrels of oil production composed of offshore (27 billion barrels), NPR-A (8.8 billion barrels) and non-wilderness areas in the ANWR (10 billion barrels) (RDC 2018). Congress focused on Arctic drilling. The “America-First” strategy was showing itself in the energy area (UBS 2018). Only 21% of US oil came from imports in 2017, while it was around 60% in 2005. Fuel import exposure risk was 12% in 2005, but it decreased to 2% in 2016 (ibid.). However, it seems that oil production was not only related to oil import levels (UCC 2018). The

majority of the decrease in oil import supplies were from OPEC countries, mainly in the Middle East. Imports had declined around 25% from 2011 levels (UBS 2018); however, the US was still importing 2.6 MMbbl/d crude from OPEC.




Figure 7.9: 2019–2024 Draft Proposed Programme Alaska Region Program Areas (DOI 2018: 9)

On March 29, the District Court of Alaska (2019) decided on Trump’s executive order 13795 (White House 2017b) which purported to revoke the 2015 and 2016 Obama withdrawals. According to the Court (2019: 13), Trump’s decision was unlawful, because “Obama’s ... withdrawals indicated that he intended them to extend indefinitely, and therefore be revocable only by an act of Congress”. At this point, the Tax Act would help president Trump. This Act was passed through the Congress (2017), so the Arctic drilling decision made by the administration could then revoke Obama’s withdrawals. At this point in time, the Trump policy enjoyed significant support from the oil industry.

Duration: Theoretical Analysis

As in the KXL case (Chapter 5), this period was characterised by the dominance of ideas around the institutional interpretation of the best meet energy needs in oil diversification, stemming from declining material in-capabilities in the patterns of oil diversification.

The clash between climate change considerations and oil friendly views had been increasing and were reflected in the different line taken by the new Republican president. Oil prices were almost at the same level experienced under the previous president; however, Trump was asserting an `America-First` policy which prioritised US interests everywhere and did not have global considerations, including the environment. Even the offshore energy strategy was labelled with “America-First” (White House 2017b). The new approach of the government was supported by both private and public interests. Investments by the energy industry had decreased oil prices and increased domestic production to a point where US reliance on the global market was becoming much lower than previous eras. Trump then acted in a totally opposite way to the direction President Obama had in his last two years on material capabilities. There was a similar institutional and ideational picture, but the decision was going to be pro-oil: President Obama`s ‘all-of-the-above’ was transformed into the “energy dominance” approach (DOI 2017c). It was compatible with new administration`s ideational (‘America First’) worldview and supported by improving material capabilities.

Energy dominance now targets more energy production in US. Moreover, while it can increase the material capability of the US, ideational and institutional clashes can also be triggered, as the recent project approval process shows. However, increasing domestic production cannot lead the US to be an energy leader or energy dominator of the world because oil has a global market. Trump`s policy rhetoric does not reflect the reality of global oil politics. Events in the world are still able to affect the US oil market. As in `Energy Independence`, energy dominance; is also a rhetoric of government. However, the difference between them is created by the context in which they are asserted. The Energy Independence rhetoric that

emerged after the 1973 crisis, was supported by a position of vulnerability to oil supply. However, there is a difference between dependency and vulnerability. The US is much less vulnerable now, although it is still dependent on the global oil market. Less vulnerability leads actors to more freely assert their arguments in domestic politics. Arctic Drilling was seen as a solution for oil vulnerability of the US in the early millennium, but its specific parts were discussed (e.g. four OCS areas, ANWR). However, the entire Arctic has now become dominated by the issue of drilling despite reduced vulnerability, because while the material capability of the US has changed, it is not isolated from ideas and institutions and the interactions between these three structures.

7.7. Discussion: the Value of a Coxian Perspective

7.7.1. Structural Causes: Material Capabilities, Ideas and Institutions

The US Energy Revolution of the mid-2000s was determined by the material realities of US oil production and the global oil market and their ideational effects. Increasing global demand, decreasing supply, increasing oil prices became significant. Oil prices` direct connection with gasoline prices are the most important point leading policymakers to care more about oil. The other main reason is any economic or political event in the world changes oil prices directly. Oil is fungible. Thus, whenever the oil market is affected, investments and policy impacting upon oil arises such as the 73 crisis and the Gulf War. In the early-2000s, the oil market was making oil prices more vulnerable but 9/11 and the Iraq War triggered oil price rises again. Moreover, this wave was helped by the fear of oil shortages after the two Hurricanes. With the help of the structure and close relationship with the oil industry, policymakers tried to interfere in the process. They were joined by industry associations and entrepreneurs. With little lead from the federal government apart from ARRA, public and private collaboration created the energy revolution in terms of the shale boom, renewable fuels, efficiency programmes and more generally technology investments in these areas. Thus, oil politics dynamics became intertwined with domestic politics. This combination included

a structural wave but also agents' interests, backgrounds and priorities. That said, the Arctic drilling issue does not follow exactly the same path with the energy revolution in the beginning.

While the US started to produce more oil and reduce dependency on oil in the transportation sector with the help of alternative fuels, the Deepwater Horizon explosion in 2010. This material event triggered environmental arguments against oil production. Since that explosion was an offshore issue that included drilling in Alaska, president Obama took an action against Alaskan production which was already a debate that spanned the economy-environment. Political parties were collaborating in terms of the energy issue in EPAAct and EISA, except Arctic Drilling. However, this event was the explosion of economy-environment debate that would integrate Arctic Drilling with the Energy Revolution. With the help of decreasing import and oil prices that are material realities, ideational (in terms of political parties) and institutional differences started showing themselves. The contradiction between environment and economics would start to be a main debate and trigger of the process. The definition of how 'best to meet the nation's energy needs' was not only changing according to different administrations/political parties, even for the different synchronic picture of structural causes in the same presidency. However, the economy-environment debate was not the only contradictory production of the process.

Micro-regional interests, as another part of the ideational arguments forwarded for domestic oil production, have always been important in the energy revolution in the US. Both the shale boom and alternative fuel programmes have showed how the idea of energy independence fundamentally reshaped the US' relationship with energy production. In terms of Arctic Drilling, we have to remember that Alaska's dependency on oil and gas revenues is not replicated in any other state. However, in both the shale boom and alternative fuel programmes, many states are coming together and triggering the process. In terms of Arctic drilling, there is only one state's representatives really considering the state interests. Other supporters are determined by their contributors, their party tendencies or their own personal views. Apart from the private lobby efforts, there

has never been a huge alliance supporting Arctic drilling. Even the oil companies, as shown above (e.g. BP, Shell, Chevron), have had suspicions about Arctic drilling. The region's geography and climate are complicating features that lead to high production costs, and uncertainty surrounding federal regulations have led oil companies to become wary of investing too much in Arctic drilling. Private interests have not had the same ambition as in the shale boom and alternative fuels, where profits are more easily made. Nation and state-level priorities reflect the federal administrative process, but can have different perceptions. The shale revolution did lead to an environmental debate but not as much as in KXL and Arctic Drilling. Thus, its nationwide growth could not be stopped despite state level resistance. On the other hand, Arctic Drilling, despite the state-level economic necessity, could be stopped with federal level decisions.

However, increasing domestic production with growing state producers changed the definition of oil diversification into the diversification of both countries and states rather than only countries, with the help of the shale revolution. A new definition could therefore be added to the oil diversification literature in a time of collapsing liberal ideas and a more nationalist-populist rhetoric system which added a foreign policy dimension into the process, in addition to oil politics and US domestic politics.

The US was a global leader in early 2000s. Its global/regional focuses are also important. Since the Iraq War, US hegemonic position has been heavily degraded. As a result of contradictory transnational-national benefits (see Chapter 6), the US is becoming more focused on itself or North America (macro-regional) in addition to micro-regional interests, as Cox's (1992) scenarios suggest. A changing foreign policy dimension is integrated into oil politics and US domestic politics. Obama's decision on being a leader in the Paris Climate Agreement reflected the interaction of these dimensions, which was in response to collapsing US hegemony globally.

Trump's current views on climate change, America-first and energy dominance cannot be thought just thought of as his personal views, neither was Obama's global leader ambitions in terms of

environmentalist policies in his last years of the presidency. Increasing US domestic production and Trump's America-First 'energy dominance' view have emerged in tandem. The withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement was started by the president who does not have a 'global leader' ambition and climate change consideration. While in the early-to-mid 2000s the government was trying to solve vulnerability to energy needs, it now wants to dominate the global market, because structural causes have brought new dynamics. America's game changer position with the energy revolution has helped and pushed the pro-drilling administration to adopt a new rhetoric. Arctic drilling has been affected by the new context, as in Obama's last few years, but pushed oil diversification in the opposite direction.

7.7.2. Additional Structural Sphere: The Role of Social Dynamics?

As with the KXL and Iraq War cases (Chapters 5 and 6), social dynamics were also evident, although they differ in terms of their significance, the types of actors involved and their political demands. Two main social effects are seen in the process of Arctic Drilling in the Energy Revolution context.

Firstly, voters' expectations about gasoline prices was one of the main drivers of the Energy Revolution. However, this process is more about legitimacy issues for governments, rather than one that created an obvious dynamic in society. Under the democratic system, meeting voters' material expectations cannot be defined as a social dynamics issue. There are some realities that governments always have to meet in terms of the demands of people, for example their economic wellbeing. However, issues like human rights and climate change are more about medium-to-long term objectives that might lead society to react together.

The second social effect is close to this point, although it also cannot be accepted as social dynamics. As indicated above, the climate change consideration is one of the biggest issues for the Arctic Drilling process. However, we do not see a huge collaboration between environmentalists, local residents and a political party in this specific

case – unlike the KXL. Strangely, given the high profile nature of the case and the sensitivities of Americans to preserving wilderness areas, Arctic Drilling has never become a national front page issue in this manner. It seems that environmental group's efforts are the key approach for creating attention. Only during the Deepwater Horizon disaster did environmentalists seek to use the issue to campaign against offshore drilling but not in the Arctic, as might be expected. Thus, institutional interference in social dynamics cannot be ignored when organized and directed in a specific way, which did not occur to the same extent as in KXL. The findings on neo-Coxian theory can be compared with the other two case studies (see Chapter 8) but it appears that social dynamics operated in different ways.

7.8. Conclusions

Arctic Drilling in the Energy Revolution context has changed the definition of oil diversification in the USA. A policy of sourcing oil from many supplier countries has changed to supplying domestic demand from states in the US, thereby increasing domestic production. However, the motivations behind these efforts cannot only be interpreted through a policy-centred analysis, because there has been a reciprocal interaction between oil politics-US domestic politics-US foreign policy that cannot be analysed in isolation.

Both Arctic Drilling and the Energy Revolution are shaped by material in/capabilities, ideas and institutions. While the interactions between these three dynamics accumulate and lead to new decisions, all these decisions cannot be considered only through public or governmental perceptions. Private interests also influence the motivational process. In terms of the governmental side, political parties' approaches to the issue were differentiated at different time points. State-society complexity shows itself here. However, the carriers of the process that are structural determination, agent's decisions and shocks are shown too. These complex relations have created the contradictions that triggered the Arctic Drilling process. Contradictions between economy-energy and national-state level interests have emerged as a result of structural causes, in a reflection of the interaction between

oil politics-US domestic politics-US foreign policy. How to 'best meet the national energy needs' has continually been re-defined in different contexts by different governments along with the contradictions of the process.

While structure has been determined by three structural causes, they have structure-agents-shocks interactions. Patterns emerge under oil politics-US domestic politics-US foreign policy. Thus, what we have seen is that it is not a policy-centred process. Apart from the governmental structure and agents, private interests always appear significant, since oil has political economic importance. There is not only one determiner of the process despite the different priorities of governments. Oil price as part of material interests has the biggest motivational role behind the process, but after the interactions of material capabilities, ideas and institutions, even the oil price is shown as less influential. It is not an independent variable as a positivist view would suggest. Other factors (e.g. political party influence, a changing US position in international politics) start having more key point as a motivation behind the diversification policies. Thus, this complex picture cannot be interpreted with theoretical suggestions which focus on specific priorities, as the Arctic Drilling literature does. However, this study has identified interactions between agents-structure occurring within a temporal process, thereby showing how changing dynamics can help us depict the process and allow us to identify possible alternative scenarios. As a method of inquiry for depicting the process, a Coxian approach helps to create much wider areas of debate for future research.

Lastly, a Neo-Coxian revision of Coxian theory that adds social dynamics to the structural spheres of Cox, does not have the same degree of resonance as in other two case studies. We do not see a huge environmentalist reaction as in KXL, since the environmental groups (i.e. institutions) did not embrace the issue to the same extent as in KXL. Thus, it poses the question as to whether social dynamics as a new sphere of the new millennium requires more institutional effort than ideational and material facts. Adding social dynamics as a new sphere should then be clearer in terms of how institutions' influence over/around the two other causes. How much social

dynamics can be part of the new millennium without huge institutional support is consequently an area for further analysis.

8. Discussion: Assessing Coxian IR Theory for Uncovering General Patterns of US Oil Diversification Motivations

8.1. Introduction


The preceding chapters (see Chapter 5; 6; 7) focused on the data collection and analysis of empirical material. This chapter aims to discuss the empirical and theoretical findings through returning to the research question posed in the introduction, most notably: *How can the Iraq War, Keystone XL Pipeline and Arctic Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution be theoretically interpreted to uncover general patterns of oil diversification?* It was argued in the introduction that Robert Cox's 'material capabilities-ideas-institutions' view of structural dynamics could potentially help explain these patterns by providing a holistic, temporal view of these interacting dimensions over long time spans that, theoretically, move us beyond rational and temporally static interpretations of national oil diversification evident in the extant literature, thereby adding significantly to these studies. But to what extent is this argument valid?

This chapter therefore seeks to discuss the research findings in order to inform a balanced consideration of this question, using the three sub-questions forwarded in Chapter 1. Firstly, it synthesises the scopes of US oil diversification over time from the three case studies to show how Cox's structural dynamics help interpret the accumulation of policy over time. Secondly, it discusses the added value of a Coxian analysis for helping understand oil diversification motivations vis-à-vis established and more widely used rational theoretical perspectives. This section focuses on the potential positive contribution of a Coxian analysis to broadening our knowledge of oil diversification through filling gaps in the literature but also blind spots and challenges to the theorising. On this basis, the chapter then discusses the potential for developing a neo-Coxian approach that updates the theory to account for the increasing influence of social dynamics on motivations in the new millennium, relating it back to recent advances in Critical theory. Thirdly, the chapter then discusses

limitations to the research before finally forwarding recommendations on how to take studies forward through further empirical, theoretical and policy-relevant research as a prelude to our conclusions.

Along with help of the sub-questions, this chapter claims that US oil diversification motivation patterns can be classified under the triangle of oil politics, domestic politics and foreign policy. *Oil politics* is composed of the global oil market, US oil market and US and global oil industry. *Domestic politics* is composed of legitimacy of administration and politicians, political parties and non-oil lobbies. Lastly, *foreign policy* is composed of the US position, power and legitimacy in the world and the relationship with the suppliers of US oil imports. These patterns can find their reflections in different time periods as they accumulate. There are also the contradictions that are additional patterns and triggers of the change in the system. *Economy-Biosphere* is the issue of the oil politics. The clashes between *national and state interests* are the part of domestic politics. *National-transnational benefits* can create a contradiction for US foreign policy. While above patterns provide a general picture and their reflections are accumulated, the contradictions as additional patterns are the product of those reflections (see Figure 8.1). Thus, contradictions represent the researched time period which is between early 2000s and now. In addition to the patterns uncovered by Coxian theory, social dynamics was also discussed as a neo-Coxian suggestion. Although the theory should be revised and social dynamics` participation to the structural spheres requires observation in the future, social dynamics are becoming a shaper of patterns. While social dynamics show systemic determinations and agents` rational participation, they are also shaped by the shocks (political-economic and shortages) from outside.

The Patterns of US Oil Diversification Motivations



The Patterns that are the products of system's contradictions




Figure 8.1: *The Patterns of US Oil Diversification Motivations*

These patterns cannot be isolated from each other. They change and are shaped according to the interactions between each other. This formulation might seem like material- or structural-based explanation, but it is not, because all these patterns have agents that follow their interest, although it is determined by the context. Thus, we offer a formulation that state-centric mainstream IR approaches cannot readily explain during the processes, or in the new millennium period.

8.2. US Oil Diversification Scopes

The first sub-question (Chapter 1) asked: *What have been the motivations for oil diversification in US policy cycles and how have they changed over time?* These motivations were traced through time in each of the three cases (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) to show that they were not a static phenomenon but shifted both within and between the different temporal phases, often during the same federal

administration. However, in order to view the new millennium's US policy cycle, how the process evolved should be understood and then analysed in terms of changes.

8.2.1. A Brief Historical Background of US Oil Diversifications

In order to uncover the patterns of US oil diversification motivations through the historical-comparative analysis, contextual background of the researched period was given in addition to the historical background of each cases. The patterns found make more sense when they are considered with this brief background. The change and effects of the oil market, the transition of US foreign policy perception of the rest of the world and the role of domestic politics (specifically when the gasoline prices are high) are not only the dynamics of the millennium.

The main US oil diversification motivation in recent decades was triggered by the 1973 crisis (see Chapter 1). Oil was used as a weapon in which OPEC used supply as a means of pursuing wider political aims. It was the first time in the US oil history that the US had faced two issues: accessibility to oil sources and buying it at reasonable prices. The policy of Energy Independence was announced in response (Nixon 1973). Oil diversification through diversifying sources is one of the part of the policy along with reducing reliance on foreign oil. Thus, changing supplier countries became important to strategic thinking. After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, President Carter (1980) interpreted the invasion as a "threat to the free movement of Middle East oil". The conclusion was that the US needed to have a military presence in the Middle East to protect global oil market suppliers. Reliance on foreign oil and military intervention was eventually combined in the Gulf War of 1991. However, using troops would eventually undermine US power. Reducing reliance on foreign oil then became converted to removing "reliance on the Middle East", an aim heavily mentioned during the George W. Bush administration (White House 2006a). The decreasing power of the US was putting pressure on governments and an "energy independence" rhetoric re-emerged. In the early millennium, the oil market experienced lack of supply due to an availability issue. Thus, accessibility and affordability combined with

the availability issue. In the mid-1990s, the US started looking at importing from Central Asia, West Africa and Eurasia, while trying to limit reliance on the Persian Gulf. During the time, US oil diversification did mean oil diversification for the US allies (Japan and Europe) (Interviewee-6) and even for global market too. Moreover, it was going to be one of the motivation for the Iraq War (CENTCOM 2002b). US attention on its allies had found its roots in the Cold War, but this focus has changed in the early-millennium.

8.2.2. The Millennium through the Cases

In the KXL process (Chapter 5), oil diversification was framed primarily in terms of the national interest – but this ‘interest’ changed through time. Oil companies initially characterised the pipeline in commercial terms but as the project became politicised the importance of US oil vulnerabilities, driven by global oil markets, became more evident. During the first stage the Bush administration presented KXL as important to national energy security through its diversifying of oil supply away from ‘unreliable’ sources of foreign oil, i.e. from the Middle East, which became particularly acute during the Gulf War. Proximity of supply and established, stable trading relations with Canada served to endorse this framing. As the political consensus for the project began to break down in the late 2000s, the national interests were then argued to involve diversifying oil supply from Canadian producers due to declining US domestic production, increasing domestic demand but also the tightening global oil market which cause oil price increases. The need for oil diversification was then reinterpreted under the Obama administration. KXL was argued as not in the national interests, primarily because of the environmental and social impacts, sparking a bitter ideological bi-partisan debate. Counter arguments focused on the benefits for the national interest of job creation, economic competitiveness and reducing reliance on foreign supply. However, the shale revolution and increasing domestic oil production during the Obama administrations reduced the rationale for diversifying oil supply from Canada. As Trump assumed office, how oil diversification was presented in terms of the national interests changed again. The Trump administration argued that KXL was in the national interest due to its potential for job creation, enhancing energy

security, energy provision for US citizens and the increased tax revenues for governments. This view of oil diversification fitted Trump's wider 'America first' doctrine, encapsulated by 'energy dominance' based on national self-interest. The important point is how declining US power and legitimacy globally in parallel to polarization of US domestic politics has brought national self-interest argument more acceptable for American people and oil policies.

Patterns of oil diversification motivations differed in the Iraq War case (Chapter 6). After 9/11 as an exogenous shock to Americans, has triggered national security fear in both civil and political society. Although they had different definitions of national security view (political society including elites and think-tanks was thinking US security was comprehending the rest of the world), the shock was enough to bring them together for declaring the War with Iraq. However, the changing view on national security would divide the society and political actors, after negative outcomes of the war. Unified political parties will have this separation too. Democrats' opinion on Iraq were generally the same as Republicans even before the War, but Republicans were responsible from the negative outcomes of the war since they led the administration. The situation has changed Democrats' rhetoric easily. Unified ideas did not exist anymore. On the other hand, during the time, US perceptions of the Middle East oil and oil diversification has been changing too. The Middle East oil policy rhetoric had been become one of running away from Middle East oil. US attention on the Iraqi oil did exist even before the War, but not only for US national interests. US, as hegemon and responsible actor for the transnational system, needed to have Iraqi oil in the market, primarily for the US allies but also for the tightening global oil market. Nationally, it justified having a US military presence in the region. However, the War did not go well for the US that did not decide the War multilaterally. Decreasing of US hegemony/power/legitimacy has sped up, thereby national and transnational benefits have become contradictory. On the other hand, the global oil market has tightened more. Unstable regions were seen as unsuitable oil suppliers for the US and US interests needed to be

prioritized anymore. Energy Independence and self-sufficiency had become the rhetoric of Obama administration.

Arctic Drilling has been discussed in terms of how to `best to meet national energy needs`, but without an agreed definition. Energy needs can conflict with environmental considerations of this idea or be pressured by global and US oil markets. Obviously, agents would define it under the context, but according to their interests, background and group. Arctic Drilling was discussed as a way of increasing US oil production in the early Bush administration because of the tight oil market. The government was trying to increase oil and other sources of energy production, not only in Arctic, however, there was also the rhetoric of reducing oil imports from the Middle East. Oil consumption was increasing and oil prices were at peak point in 2008. It was not unexpected, but created a shock effect. It was the year that Arctic Drilling had the most intense debate, because Democrats could easily use it for challenging the government`s position in terms of gasoline prices and environment considerations. A new president (Obama) did not stop the Arctic Drilling debate because the context did not evolve dramatically and the political party differences did not make huge difference at the time. However, changing US and global oil market dynamics in a positive meaning have changed energy needs definitions. He was talking more environmentalist position, while oil price decreases were helping. Environmentalist considerations have increased since Deepwater Horizon that also affected the KXL. National energy needs are defined only around energy issues. However, increasing strong hand in terms of oil (i.e. material) was being combined with the decrease of US power (i.e. ideational) during the time. Polarisation in US domestic politics and changing US foreign policy toward a more self-interested perception has brought the new president Trump who could carry this wave further. More strong US hand in oil would change the rhetoric from energy independence to energy dominance, which is parallel to changing domestic and foreign politics. The definition of US oil diversification has expanded to `supplying also from the states` and that definition was supporting the drilling scope on Arctic Drilling. The participation of production from different states has brought another

dimension, national-state interests, into the evolving definition of national energy needs definition.

Every each cases have their own historical process, but they also have interactions that create the context where they are. After looking at the stories of the each case studies, we can now find what they have created together. It will help us to uncover the patterns which represent the second sub-question.

8.2.3. Findings of the Case Studies

The case shows the methodological stance of the research (see Chapter 4). US oil diversification motivations have been shaped by the *rational choice* of actors (i.e. individual's position in the process/event), *structural determination* (i.e. pre-determined context) and *exogenous shocks* (i.e. external events).

The main shocks are the 1973 crisis, the 1979 crisis, 9/11 and the Iraq War process (see Chapter 6), 2005 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (see Chapter 7), the peak oil price in 2008 (see Chapter 7), and the Deepwater Horizon explosion (see Chapter 5; 7). The Middle East has been a problematic supplier for the US because of these shocks. Of course events in unstable parts of the world were also creating shocks, such as the Nigerian election process in 2002. However, the 2005 Katrina hurricane show that not only the Persian Gulf or unstable countries but also the Gulf of Mexico can be unreliable. On the other hand, environmentalist considerations after Deepwater were able to change structures more sharply in terms of the environment-energy issue. Oil diversification means more energy, and typically involves environmental considerations. Policymakers have been pressured by the debate more intensely relative to before the crisis. Of course, structural determination is not only determined by shocks but also by structures' themselves such as the oil availability issue of the early mid-2000s, increasing environmentalist considerations through time, decreasing US hegemony that has led to a turning back towards a continental focus, the increasing polarization of domestic politics, and changing actors in oil policies (oil industry, farm lobby, renewable industry, car industry, private entrepreneurs, small and medium power oil producers). Rational selection is mainly through the political lenses

of policymakers. The process influenced Obama's switch to an environmentalist position, Trump's as an oil friendly Republican with a non-environmentalist view or the Bush administration's attempt to secure Iraqi oil for the market are all rational decisions. In short, US oil diversification motivations are not only shaped by oil-related sectors and oil-related political-economic picture. The motivations can belong to different groups and be shaped through the process.

US oil diversification meant reducing reliance on foreign oil for the US and its allies between the 1973 crisis and the early-millennium. However, it was combined with prioritising the security of Middle East oil production and transportation in the 1979 event, Iranian Revolution. A market-based diversification approach (i.e. Liberal) started giving way to a military-based view (i.e. Realist). The Gulf War was the key point for leaving the market-based oil market. However, Around the end of Gulf War diversification meant importing from ex-Soviet countries and also Africa. A unipolar world was targeting new members for the global political economy market, global oil market. On the other hand, the US had been losing its power. The Iraq War was the result of this process and helped speed it up. Oil diversification had now become predicated upon reducing national reliance on the Middle East in the early millennium. By the Mid-2000s the energy revolution changed the meaning of oil diversification again towards diversifying oil import countries and oil producer states. The energy revolution was joined by Arctic Drilling, now driven by the rhetoric of energy dominance. A changing US role in the world has also changed the import suppliers to the US as a new oil diversification focus emerges.

What we have now is a positive trend in terms of oil imports from Canada (see Chapter 5). While US power has been decreasing and the US' reducing dependency on the Middle East, Canada has been prioritised by US oil policy actors and institutions (see Chapter 7). Isolation from the rest of the world has led the US to focus on regional suppliers. While a macro-regional stance against the US has been increasing (Cox 1993c), it leads the US to follow its own macro-regional policies in a reactionary way. Re-arrangement of NAFTA through the USMCA in 2018 can be seen as a key example of this

trend. While 70% of US petroleum imports were from OPEC in 1977, 50% petroleum imports are now from Canada (43%) and Mexico (7%) (EIA 2019c). Petroleum imports from the Persian Gulf have decreased to 16%. In addition, the Canadian democratic governance system is similar to the US and their historical trade connections make Canadian imports more attractive. This changing context has shaped successive presidents' (Bush, Obama and Trump) decisions and they in turn have been shaped by them. As indicated above, actors decide *through* behaviour relative to other actors and structure. The structure is not only composed of material (in)capability, but also the institutional and political context.

Since the US presence in other countries required military operations or stationed forces, they have a cost. While military intervention can be related to national interest and can bring transnational benefits (Stokes and Raphael 2010), it also brings costs, internal oppositions, and can also undermine US hegemony. On the other hand, in terms of oil issue, freeing the US from foreign oil rhetoric had been used since Nixon till Obama but the rhetoric changed with Trump. Not only because of his personality, but also because of the new oil structure when he came in power. Here, 'Energy Dominance', which reflects how US power and focus has been changing, is the new rhetoric (DOI 2017c). Three states (Canada, Mexico and Colombia) out of five US oil import countries are from the Americas now. If there were no political problems with Venezuela, it would also be an oil import supplier. Thus, US oil diversification has turned towards the continent and itself.

In summary, the story of US oil diversification motivations are composed of the interaction between structural determination, agents' selections and external influences (see Figure 8.2). This transition between structure-agency create the patterns that can be uncovered by the structural causes (ideas, material capabilities and institutions) in more detailed scope and a wider temporal perspective (see Figure 8.3.), rather than a narrow temporal perspective that can provide explanations that are not sustainable in the long-term as mainstream IR theories do.




Figure 8.2: *The creation process for the patterns*




Figure 8.3: *Uncovering the patterns*

8.3. Explaining Patterns of Oil Diversification Using Cox

The second sub-question (Chapter 1) asked: *How can these motivations be explained by the 'material capabilities-ideas-institutions' arguments of Cox?* Given the changing nature of these motivations within and between cases over time, it would be

problematic to interpret them using conventional rational IR theorising that aim at generalizable theoretical explanation: a feature identified in Chapters 1 and 2.

For example, Realism explains international security in terms of competition to secure state power under conditions of international anarchy (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001), while Liberalism focuses on 'interdependence' between states (Keohane and Nye 1977). As Chapter 2 shows, when applied to energy security, Realism focuses on the role of *corporations*, *markets* and *conflicts* in securing state self-interests, Liberalism takes a more economic view when considering *markets and capitalism*, *interdependency* and *activity of non-state factors*. A raft of criticisms are made of these positions in the literature (Chapter 2) that become more evident when applied to the case studies. Although Realist notions of state self-interest, to an extent, characterise oil diversification motivations in all the case studies, its exercise through corporations, markets and conflicts was hardly predictable and did not conform to any 'rational' pattern. Moreover, this explanation fails to account for the role of other actors. A Liberal focus on state economic interdependency through markets is equally problematic since, again, the case studies show that oil diversification motivations changed repeatedly through time, making prediction difficult. In fact, as Devetak (2005: 150) argues, these theories tend to take for granted the "social and historical production of both... agents and structures" making their application problematic and therefore potentially providing an important role for Critical theory to fill these gaps.

Since this research considers how the social-historical production is made, as in the first sub-question, it was found that the findings of the mainstream IR approaches reflect 'what researchers are already looking for'. This research too can be limited by the researcher's approach, but he is not stuck with these presumptions (see Reflexive Analysis in Chapter 4). The research itself too has a process as the researched topic. The researched area should not be limited to theoretical pre-selections, because they would become the determiners of findings. Thus, when offered Critical theory for uncovering the patterns of US oil diversification motivations, we do not

only challenge mainstream IR approaches theoretically, but also methodologically.

An alternative theoretical approach was therefore forwarded (Chapters 1 and 2) based in Critical theory. According to Devetak (2005: 150), Critical theory “is more interested in explaining how both individual actors and social structures emerge in, and are conditioned by, history”. Here, it was postulated that Cox’s (1981) ‘material capabilities-ideas-institutions’ view of structural causes could potentially better explain oil diversification motivation patterns due to its capacity to encompass a holistic and temporal view that does not rely on ‘rational’ or, to use Cox’s (1981) term ‘problem-solving’, positivist interpretations of complex social processes that seek to legitimise rather than expose current political structures. These features were – to varying degrees - evident in all three cases, suggesting that oil diversification motivations can be interpreted from this theoretical perspective in ways that move interpretations beyond pre-existing studies. After setting out the patterns of each case studies, they can be interpreted together.

8.3.1. Uncovering the Case Studies

Chapter 5 showed how interpretation of the ‘national interest’ in oil diversification motivations changed through time in the KXL process. It initially developed in response to US material interests under the Bush administration. Here, material considerations such as the vulnerabilities of the global oil market in the early millennium were a significant factor in explaining the need to diversify domestic US supply away from ‘unreliable sources’ (i.e. the Middle East) through the KXL project. The Gulf War (Chapter 6) only served to intensify this need for reducing domestic reliance on foreign imports, highlighting the importance of this dimension. Evolving material conditions in the USA and globally in relation to changing ideas in the US regarding its hegemonic power in the world increased state-society complexity around the KXL process. By the time Obama came to power, the role of intersubjective ideas particularly regarding environmental protection vis-à-vis jobs and competitiveness became the defining feature of an American state-society complexity, with state institutions and public interests on one side, with other institutions, including the

Canadian state, oil companies and the Republican Party, on the other. External shocks to global oil markets (from the Deepwater Horizon disaster) and increasing polarization in US domestic politics as a result then shaped institutions' positions. The re-shaped national interest became environmental protection as the rationale for oil diversification via KXL was reduced. The second term of the Obama administration witnessed further polarization of domestic and oil politics. However, decreasing US power globally interacted with these political spheres, specifically after the Iraq War (Chapter 6). So while material capabilities were strongly evident in oil diversification motivations at the start of the KXL process, by this point they increasingly reflected a clash of ideas and institutions (between political parties and state-national levels). Material capabilities' role declined as a factor during Obama's second term because of increasing domestic and global oil production, reducing the need to secure domestic supply (see also Chapter 7). Ideas about oil diversification – particularly the America First 'energy dominance' rhetoric – then became important in the Trump era, alongside material capabilities, or rather technical practicalities, related to importation of heavy crude oil from via KXL Canada to serve the US domestic market, as domestic supply was increasingly geared towards lighter crude production and processing. These dimensions now appear influential in the oil diversification motivations of the Trump administration, which is redefining this concept again in terms of diversifying supply from Canada while reducing reliance on Middle East states, which in turn reflects a withdrawal of US hegemony from the region in foreign policy.

Coxian structural dynamics are also evident in oil diversification motivations in the Iraq War case (Chapter 6) but, as in the above analysis, they varied in their interaction at different points in time. Despite the denial of institutional actors (see below), it could be argued that material capabilities in terms of the US need for Middle East oil supplies, combined with ideational fixations concerning national security were significant in the early phase. After 9/11, the perspective of American society was almost exclusively on national security concerns. There was a united political-civil society. The oil

supply-demand balance of the US and the global oil market, oil prices, technology to produce oil at a lesser cost and more efficiently, security (politics) and safety considerations of where the oil was produced and transported from, and global politics were key determinants of the structure of oil diversification. However, as the Iraq War case progressed, oil diversification motivations in the US began to reflect more the interaction between ideas and institutions. As the post-War conflict continued, the domestic consensus on ideas around the War collapsed in two ways: increasing opposition from Democrats and decreasing public support for the war. On the other hand, US institutions' interference in Iraqi oil caused Iraqi society to pay attention on Iraqi oil. Civil unrest in Iraq, which met a tough response from the political establishment supported by US institutions, was increasing international opposition to the war. Social dynamics played a key role here. Also, decreasing US power combined with more hurtful oil market. Thus, in addition to the collapse of united ideas, the US was more vulnerable materially than before the war. Institutional positions were also more obvious in the process, because an increasing oil market pressure was leading institutions to increase their pressure on the process. However, US and US-led international institutions could not solve the 'pulling out Iraqi oil to the market' issue. Decreasing US institutional power was reflecting and supporting decreasing US hegemony/power/legitimacy. When Obama came into power nothing changed, because the Democrat leader's rhetoric (i.e. Democrats) and actions (i.e. Republicans) were close to different parties. Institutional attempts continued in parallel to 'running away' from Middle East oil. Trump's disengagement from Iraq and hence Iraqi oil reflects a more isolationist US stance. However, changing ideas, material capabilities and institutions show that this change in oil diversification motivation is reflected in the other two cases.

In the final case (Chapter 7), oil diversification through Arctic Drilling and the Energy Revolution of the US was heavily shaped by the material structure of the global oil market and US vulnerability to it. As in the KXL case, the motivations to diversify domestic oil production through Arctic Drilling were initially driven by concern over these

material capabilities, combined with the Bush administration's oil interests. State level interests were a factor but they were not as important in oil diversification decisions as US material incapacities and Presidential institutional influence. Ideas were less prominent under this administration but, as in the KXL case, this changed under Obama. Growing US oil vulnerability due to unstable global markets and polarization in US domestic politics shifted the nature of structural dynamics so that ideas and institutions became more prominent. While Republicans supported a pro-oil stance and Arctic drilling to address energy insecurity, Democrats were concerned about the environmental impacts. However, increases in US material capabilities due to the Energy Revolution (i.e. shale gas, increased domestic production, renewables) altered the debate again on domestic oil diversification, allowing Obama to pursue a more environmental stance in his second term. This position was reflected in the US' leadership role in the Paris Climate Agreement, as Obama tried to reassert US global hegemonic influence during a period of its declining power in global politics. Trump's desire to diversify domestic oil supplies through supporting Arctic drilling again, as with KXL, arguably reflect the role of America First ideas, articulated through 'energy dominance' rhetoric rather than overt concern over US material capabilities since domestic oil supply has actually increased meaning that the US is not entirely reliant on diversifying imports.

In short, our analysis shows that, in contrast to the perceptions of rational IR theories, US oil diversification motivations are the product of *ideas* (intersubjective meanings and collective images), *institutions* and *material (in)capabilities* (technological; organisational; natural resources and wealth) of US and global oil markets but also the nature of the relationship between these dimensions as they changed through time in transition between structure and agency. The KXL case demonstrates the importance of material capabilities shaped by global markets to oil diversification motivations but also shows how they can be mediated through institutions such as the Presidency, corporations and political parties and the role of powerful ideas such as environmentalism or America First in determining outcomes. Oil diversification motivations in the Iraq War case, despite the denial of

policymakers, were overtly predicated on US energy security concerns and global hegemony, demonstrating how policy was related to the global oil market and hence national material capabilities. Arctic drilling follows a similar pattern to the KXL case: while oil diversification motivations have also reflected national material capabilities conditioned by oil markets, ideas around environmentalism and their utilisation by institutions have also shaped policy. This thesis therefore argues that Coxian theory has significant utility, especially when compared to rational theories, in helping uncover patterns of oil diversification motivations over time. In fact, it would be impractical to uncover these patterns using rational theories, demonstrating the added value of the thesis.

8.3.2. The General Patterns of US Oil Diversification Motivations

As discussed in the Introduction section, the research findings indicate that the general patterns of US oil diversification motivations are composed of the triangle of *oil politics*, *domestic politics* and *foreign policy*. The findings can also be applied to the pre-millennium era. However, every period also has their contradictions that are the products of the reflections of patterns in that period. The *economy-biosphere* contradiction was already predicted by Cox (1999: 17), but this research has put placed it within the context of oil politics. Moreover, the research also evaluated the argument *national-transnational benefits* argument (Stokes and Raphael 2010) and found that these elements can become contradictory during the process as part of US foreign policy. Lastly, the dynamics between *state-nation interests* become more problematic in terms of domestic politics in the current millennium. These three contradictions, each products of the Coxian 'triangle' are also patterns, but limited to the researched area. They are the triggers of the process, but not persistent (see Figure 8.1).

The Core Value of the Research

After finding the patterns of US oil diversification motivations, we can discuss the core value the research now. Literature on US oil diversification motivations suggests available patterns, but not as the structure that have continual interactions that lead change in history.

Rational theories are able to identify key point in the process, but do not encompass the changing picture over time. However, the process changes through the interaction between structural causes and the contradictions they produce and are triggered by.

The first point in the literature regards the importance of *energy independence policy* for oil. However, this study paints a different picture. Such policy had been used by politicians until Trump but not in Trump era, because the accumulation of the process has brought new dynamics. Moreover, as the background and findings of the case studies show above, even the definition of energy independence was not static during the different administrations. Initially this concept was more about policy rhetoric that did not refer to any specific region (Nixon, 1974), but it became about securing Middle East oil (Carter, 1980) was further reinterpreted to mean 'running away' from the Middle East (Bush, 2006). Now, the US has an 'energy dominance' rhetoric, but we do not suggest *energy independent and dominant policies* are compatible. Moreover, we believe that there might sometimes be a tension between policy and politics. Good *policy* does not always mean good *politics*, because the policymakers' interests (politically) are not always compatible with countries' benefits (in a policy context) . Furthermore, they might be contradictory. For example, President Obama was also caught in the controversy between policy and politics. Announcing his stance against fossil fuels in a 2012 election rally led to huge problems and placed pressure on him politically in his second presidency to be part of the energy-environment debate (see Chapter 5; 7).

Other parts of the literature argue that *foreign policy* can be revealed through liberal or realist world views, but this thesis argues against this suggestion. A Liberal perspective (CNA Report 2009) emphasises interdependency of trade relations between states. Diversification policies are interpreted from this view since they require both suppliers and demanders. It is partly right, because diversification prioritises the importance of the supplier country. However, it is evident from the case studies that it is not the only dimension of US oil diversification motivations. For example, the US` increasing oil imports from Canada cannot only be explained by these dynamics. On the other hand,

Realists (Klare 2012; Klare 2014b) offer an alternative explanation that diversification can be used as a foreign policy tool, in order to assert state power under anarchy. The expansion of US military power supported by diversification policies such as the Carter Doctrine suggest that Realists are partly correct. However, the scope of American society and the state has changed since the 1970s. US military interventions in the rest of the world have been decreasing, despite the Gulf War. The current trend in oil diversification shows that the scope of tension is within the American region, but it has fallen short of direct intervention towards hostile regimes such as Venezuela. Thus, US foreign policy is shaped by its position in the world, its administration and also the material context global political economically. Lastly, both rational views have state centric explanations, even though Liberals also consider non-state actors. However, as the cases show, the formulation of 'State = political society + civil society' that also includes covert world interference are shaping and shaped by the structural causes.

Thirdly, *keeping shortages effects at a less damaging level* was another explanation in the literature (Chow and Elkind 2005), but the case studies show that the picture is not the same since the energy revolution. Increased domestic oil production made the US less vulnerable to oil shortages and disruptions. In September 2019, attacks on Saudi Arabia's oil tankers did not harm the US and did not affect oil prices as in the past, because the US and Iraq had been increasing their supplies rapidly, so enabling them to keep relatively balanced supply-demand in the market. Moreover, there are also high levels of biofuel production in the US that can keep gasoline prices at a relatively stable level. Since oil has a global market and its price is defined globally, there is always dependency on oil prices. However, the US has, to an extent solved its oil vulnerability. US oil petroleum imports constituted 11% of total consumption in 2018 (EIA 2019c). While the US is less vulnerable to oil supply, it has reduced its concerns for oil-dependent allies.

Lastly, the argument (Stokes and Raphael 2010) on *two logics of national-transnational benefits* had been right, but analysis from the case studies shows that it is increasingly less defensible. According

to this argument, when the US state intervenes or acts in any country, it is not directly for the protection of *American* capital *per se*, but for *transnational* capital. For example, opening Iraqi oil to the global capitalist system can be given as an example of this feature. However, whether the US still wants to expand its military interventions is now controversial, given its relative retreat from several conflict areas, e.g. Iraq. An isolationist and America First rhetoric were visible in the Trump election process, and has arguably filtered into US foreign policy. Moreover, decreasing US power has created a contradiction between national-transnational benefits.

What this study then offers is a new perspective on oil diversification motivations by showing that its patterns cannot be isolated from each other. They are created by dynamics that are composed simultaneously of oil politics, domestic politics and foreign policy, so they change and are shaped according to the interactions of these three spheres. This formulation might appear to be a material- or structural-based explanation, but it is not, because all these areas have agents that follow their interest and ideational factors that shape actors' behaviour according to contexts.

8.4. Limitations of the Theory and Theoretical Innovation

The third sub-question (Chapter 1) asked: *What are the limitations of this theory for explaining motivations for US oil diversification?* As with all theories, there are potential blind spots and challenges in empirical application.

The three evident areas relate to normative theorising, ontological concerns and challenges to Cox's theory. Firstly, critics of Critical theory have in the past generally focused upon its lack of normative political prescription for social change. However, this question was not explicitly considered in the thesis even though an understanding of how oil diversification motivations have emerged that could provide the basis for future reflexive change in energy security policy (see below). Secondly, there is a tendency, as with other theoretical perspectives, to see the cases as artefacts of the theory, i.e. through only considering evidence that fits its assumptions, in this instance

about structural dynamics, and discarding other, more established theoretical explanations. However, this observation is more ontological than epistemological. As discussed above traditional 'problem-solving' theories do not readily capture the complexity of state-society dynamics in the cases since they focus on narrow conceptions of state self-interest or economic determinism, so Cox's approach can provide new insight not available through such theories through its Critical perspective. Thirdly, and more significantly, this study has shown that, in the new millennium, social dynamics are a growing phenomenon in political decision-making, in this case around oil diversification. That is not to say that social dynamics are historically novel but they do appear to be more prevalent in the new millennium, primarily due to globalisation and advances in information technology. For example, in the KXL case (Chapter 5) environmental NGOs and civil society groups were increasingly influential through time. Evidence from other sectors, for example, climate politics and the trans-nationalisation of environmental justice (see for example, Schlosberg and Collins 2014) or the growing influence of transnational advocacy groups (Keck and Sikkink 1998) shows the increasing importance of social dynamics as a force in global processes. Although the case studies show that institutional organization is required for effective social dynamics (see Chapter 5 and 6), how institutions become important and how they evolve in response to the policy process was outside the scope of this thesis. Transnational civil society is not centralised but there is a possibility that non-governmental institutions can change the structure, thereby leading social dynamics to be an important sphere of the structure. One response to this deficiency in theorising could therefore be to integrate Sinclair's (2016) notion of social dynamics with the material capabilities-ideas-institutions model to provide more holistic explanations of structural forces.

Such an approach would add to the work of Cox. For this author (Cox 1993b: 135) 'History generates theory' and 'this theory is not absolute knowledge, not a final revelation or a completeness of rational knowledge about laws of history'. Thus, while Cox established his theoretical view in the 1980s-1990s, he based his view on the

contemporary paradigm of the time. However, he (ibid.) left an open door for this theory to be reviewed in the future in relation to an evolving historical context. As identified above, such a review would be opportune. When viewing his theory in the 'history' of the new millennium, there is a great wave of social dynamics occurring in many states worldwide, a feature not evident when Cox was formulating his theory. Society's reaction to identity rights, human rights, gender equality, democratic rights, environmentalism and climate change has created novel transnational social dynamics that interact with material capabilities, ideas and institutions. Adopting social dynamics as a new structural sphere, as Cox (1981) predicts, helps to explain these emergent structural contexts: as was evident in the case studies. In addition to explaining this new reality, social dynamics should be considered for two other reasons. Here, it helps to show the transition between agency and structure with the help of operationalising Cox's structure interpretation within the specific issue. As discussed in Chapter 3, although Cox is clear about the balance between agency and structure, he does not provide a clear picture of how it happens. Also in considering social dynamics, we are able to operationalise the "State = political society + civil society" formulation of structural spheres identified by Gramsci (1971: 263). While political society can be equated with forms of state, civil society can be a reflection of social dynamics. Again, operationalising this insight within a specific topic helped to reveal the reflections of these concepts. In this sense, we have already started the process of developing a preliminary neo-Coxian approach in this thesis through the initial discussions made in all the case studies (see Chapter 5, 6, 7).

In addition to the limitations of the theory's empirical application and theoretical innovation, the study indicates that Cox's institutions definition does not comprehend their role entirely. They were interpreted as 'maintaining particular order' (Cox 1981: 136), however, a durational view on specific events has shown that institutions do not only reflect power relations but also contribute to the change of the process in parallel to Cox's understanding of history. Thus, institutions can also be the agents and participants of a particular declining order. The reason behind why institutions lack

definition is that other varieties of institutions are being ignored. Institutions have different ideas and agendas, thereby they focus on various topics from various standpoints. Moreover, there is now a declining of hegemony which changes the role of institutions that should be further studied in parallel to those changes.

8.5. Limitations of the Research Methods

The reliability of study data was impacted by the limitations of obtaining some primary data: a conspicuous problem with historical and political studies in general. In all the case studies it was not possible to interview oil companies that were involved with the processes directly, although interviews were conducted with other oil industry representatives, including ones from small/independent oil companies. Although big oil companies are the focus of energy/environmental issues, their representatives did not volunteer to talk for reasons of commercial confidentiality. They were offered this chance as part of the balanced investigative approach adopted. If a direct view could have been elicited from TransCanada on KXL (see Chapter 5), Halliburton on the Iraq War (see Chapter 6) or from BP, Shell, ConocoPhillips on Arctic Drilling (see Chapter 7), we could assess how oil companies see these cases and potentially obtain information that cannot be found in online sources and archive studies.

The other limitation on collecting primary data concerned sensitivities related to the Iraq War. Some policymakers who were involved in policy-making declined interview, while some of the archive documents were not obtainable, even under freedom of information requests, due to their classified status. It led to incomplete information about the role of oil diversification in the war. Even US policymakers who were in senior administration positions during this period said that oil diversification was not a factor in the war. That information ran counter to the findings in the archive documents. The reliability of interviewees then became an issue. Apart from policymakers, there is also an evident `covert world` effect that was proved in the Iraq War case. Findings regarding the influences of the covert world are hard

to state exactly because documents relating to it were often not accessible.

However, this limitation did not significantly restrict the study. Policymakers, diplomats, environmental groups, other oil industry representatives, think-tanks and lobbies were open to speaking in both the US and Canada. Primary documentary data from state departments and other governmental sections were easy to identify, locate and access in the US. While a majority are from online sources, the archive documents can also be easily accessed: a feature of US federal government that supports such types of research. Primary data collected was enough to provide answers to the research questions.

In addition, the reflexivity that underpinned the research approach (Chapter 4) helped the researcher remain open to new avenues of enquiry that supported the data collection. Although the problems encountered in securing interviews, the reliability of witnesses and the embargoing of official documents could be considered constraints on the research, they often led to alternative research strategies to secure data, for example 'triangulating' interviews with multiple data sources such as media articles and company reports to cross-check the veracity of statements. These strategies in turn then led to new thinking through reappraisal of prior assumptions. While the researcher now reflects back on the research process (how the knowledge was produced), he realizes that the interpretations of interviewees from all sectors, and the multiple documents consulted, have shaped and helped him to identify new directions for research.

8.6. Recommendations

This study both offers a new perspective on oil diversification motivations also also informs new areas of theoretical, empirical and – to a lesser extent – normative research. While the study has helped further develop Cox's original arguments and applied them to 'real world' examples, thereby providing innovation, the case for neo-Coxian theoretical development is also established. Neo-Coxian theory identifies 'social dynamics' as a new sphere of the developing

world order in ways not originally anticipated by Cox. As this 'new wave' increases, it will require both interpreting and observing, providing a key role for Critical theory in which a neo-Coxian perspective could add significant value. There is an important role, therefore, for not only future theory building, based on the findings of the thesis, to take forward these arguments in the new millennium but also further empirical testing in different state contexts to ground such novel theoretical approaches.

The above discussions on social dynamics are not covered in the IR literature, although societal participation into the policymaking process have already been discussed in other political science areas (e.g. Snow et al. 2019), suggesting greater integration between these traditions is necessary. Social movements and their collaboration with NGOs have been analysed via a political science perspective (Saunders and Roth 2019). In contrast, the meaning of social dynamics throughout the global economic political context has not been discussed in IR theories. Thus, this research only contributes an IR perspective in term of the role of social dynamics, which is not new debate topic in wider political science areas. Consequently, this thesis argues that the role of social dynamics should be further studied in IR literature in an attempt to making stronger a bridge between IR and the rest of the political science literature. What the social dynamics are and how they work should be further contextualised through their role in foreign policy and global economic politics dynamics. As this research shows, although they are not able to shape process entirely, social dynamics can create a wave that is considered by politicians in their political choices. This leads to change in foreign policy expectations and creates new foreign policy dynamics that are not isolated from social dynamics, as understood in wider political science studies.

Problematically, the US oil diversification motivations uncovered in this thesis provide a unique case, so cannot be applied easily to another country. All countries have their own internal dynamics and their own position in global politics. However, by drawing upon a (neo)Coxian analysis, US oil diversification motivations can be compared with other countries, such as China, the second biggest oil

consumer and rising power of the world. Japan or the European Union can also be added to this comparison because of their oil consumption rate and their relationships with the US. Developing countries such as Brazil, with its long established policies for domestic biofuel production and oil import substitution, would make interesting alternative comparators. Comparison would allow differences in oil diversification motivations and the reasons behind those differences to be identified in terms of structural dynamics over time in order to further develop the theoretical arguments. In this sense, while not attempting to develop a 'universal' theory for oil diversification motivations, as positivists would prioritise, operationalisation of Coxian structural causes can be productively applied to all countries to help better uncover their unique circumstances.

In this respect, such theory would not aim for predictive capacity in normatively informing or determining oil diversification policy but would allow a better understanding of 'where we are now?' on the basis of 'where did we come from?' to inform reflexive policy change, made through historical analysis. To an extent, this approach would reflect the role of Critical theory in allowing us to engage in 'social criticism' as a prelude to 'societal transformation' (Devetak 2009: 167; see also Hoffman 1987; Neufeld 1995). Indeed, when determining the ultimate 'value' of such a theoretical perspective, a question posed in the opening chapter, we could argue that a Coxian approach is potentially significant in shifting our perceptions on the motivations behind oil diversification globally as a prelude to a more constructive dialogue on policy solutions - which moves us away from simplistic 'problem-solving' explanations based on rational notions of state self-interest or economic determinism.

8.7. Summary

This chapter has discussed the research questions outlined in the introduction chapter. Firstly, the accumulation of oil diversification is synthesised to provide an overview of the empirical findings from the case studies. Secondly, Coxian theory was assessed through its ability to explain US oil diversification motivations patterns thereby to

see the value of the theory compared to more traditional rational theories. Challenges to applying the theory are also discussed. Lastly, in the self-reflexive view on the research, implications of the research are discussed relative to existing literature, but limitations of the research are also explained. The final part also includes recommendations for future theoretical and empirical work.

9. Conclusions

This chapter aims to conclude the thesis by summarising how it meets the research question, placing the findings in the current literature to show its added value and identifying new avenues for future research: a process started in Chapter 8. Firstly, in this respect, the aims, objectives and research questions posed in Chapter 1 are returned to. Secondly, the thesis' contribution to the literature is stated. This contribution is categorised into three principal areas, empirical, theoretical and methodological: (i) the contribution to understanding of US oil diversification motivations; (ii) revision of Coxian theory, by providing a neo-Coxian view; (iii) the operationalization of Coxian theory; and (iv) methodological innovation that combines a synchronic and diachronic analysis of oil diversification motivations through time (methodological and theoretical contribution). In the third section, future directions of the research are outlined, with a focus on theoretical development and new empirical testing. Lastly, the themes of the chapter are summarized.

9.1. Aims, Objectives, Research Questions

This thesis sought to (address a specific aim and) answer one main research question, plus three sub-questions (see Chapter 1). As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the fundamental premise forwarded by the thesis is that the existing literature on oil diversification motivations is dominated by the 'causal' explanations of mainstream IR approaches, namely Liberalism and Realism. Due to the limited interpretative capacity of these theories, it was argued that oil diversification could be better examined and interpreted by using critical theory, namely the arguments of Cox, to help expose the underlying motivations for policy in terms of structural forces created through the interacting dynamics of ideas, institutions and material capabilities (see Chapter 4): thereby filling a significant gap in knowledge. The existing literature does not entirely discount using critical theory for this purpose but it does largely ignore historical

evolution and policy cycles in analysing oil diversification policy, again presenting a deficit in understanding. As discussed in Chapter 2, both the diachronic and synchronic nature of oil diversification motivations should be considered to give a more holistic explanation, thereby providing a role for the historicism inherent in critical theory. In addition, a state-centric view also lacks significant perception of wider structural forces, which can be countered by adopting a critical view. By using critical theory, state-society complexity can be considered allowing it to be matched with structural causes. These gaps then informed the main aim of the thesis to uncover US oil diversification motivations.

Meeting this aim was achieved through four key objectives of the research:

1. *To critically review published studies on US oil diversification motivations in order to identify gaps in their explanations;*

In order to meet this objective, the existing literature was critiqued to show the limitations of traditional 'problem-solving' accounts compared to critical theory's assumptions (e.g. people as historical agents, state-society complexity), in order to identify specific gaps in knowledge. From this review, a Coxian IR interpretation was identified as potentially significant for uncovering oil diversification motivations - but further testing was required.

From this initial review, the key theoretical arguments were developed. A Coxian IR interpretation was used for uncovering US oil diversification motivations since it specifies arguments on how structural forces operate through time, providing significant advancement on static, snapshot interpretations evident in other theories (see Chapter 3). Cox's perspective on the global capitalist system and core theoretical assumptions are predicated upon the interaction of a 'triangle' of structural causes: ideas, material capabilities and institutions. This research is therefore premised on

operationalising these elements. However, as identified in Chapter 3, Coxian theory could also be considered according to new millennium dynamics such as social forces; a feature developed in the thesis. These observations led us to our second objective:

2. *To develop a novel critical IR theory perspective in order to uncover US oil diversification motivations, thereby adding to the existing literature;*

A Coxian IR interpretation was reviewed according to the new millennium's realities. Social dynamics was found as a new structural sphere of Cox's (1981: 138) triangle. The new millennium's structural spheres were therefore conceptualised using a diamond (Chapter 3) to further inform the analysis. Moreover, although it was not in the study scope to revise the theory, Cox's definition of institutions was found to lack clarity after its operationalisation. Institutions do not only maintain the global order, but also are the active participants and agents of declining order: a feature not identified by Cox.

Cox's structural forces are accepted in this research because of our ontological position. Moreover, this position also led us to operationalize it using the contemporary paradigm debate, which is *reflexivity* vs. *positivism* (Kurki 2008: 89). His theory not only challenges positivist epistemological positions (using problem-solving theories) (see Chapter 3), his theory and its emphasis on historical interpretation integrate reflexivity as an approach to research. Given this ontological and epistemological position, the third objective is:

3. *To construct a reflexivist epistemological and duration-based historicist methodological stance in order to apply this theory to US case studies on oil diversification;*

To meet this objective, Coxian IR theory was operationalized by combining basic assumptions and arguments of critical theory along with a reflexivist epistemology. This operationalisation involved development of a theoretical approach based upon Cox's structural

forces for uncovering the motivations for oil diversification. Theory was then matched to data through the development of a dedicated research design based upon a multiple historical case design of US oil diversification that employed qualitative data sources to interpret the diachronic and synchronic aspects of policy accumulation.

The final objective involved testing of the revised Coxian theory through its operationalization via a reflexivist epistemology:

4. *To examine the value of such a revised critical IR theory perspective for explaining US oil diversification.*

The theory was then tested using a qualitative case study design employing primary data collected official archives, and semi-structured elite interviews conducted with key actors in the accumulation of oil diversification motivations. Cox's theory was able to clarify the actors and dynamics in the process of US oil diversification motivations via structural causes. Adaptation of a complexity paradigm rather than causal explanations did fit the research topic; however, it was also found that basic structural dimensions were significant at different time periods through structural causes' reflections. By interpreting the accumulation of the process Cox helped show how these different time periods shaped the next ones. While the research was not conditioned by a causal view, as in mainstream IR approaches, it was able to identify the implications of structural obstacles and pressures and agencies' interests and reactions. However, the revision of the theory to add social dynamics of the new millennium as a new structural sphere (Chapter 3) was not clearly reflected in US oil diversification motivations. Two cases (see Chapter 5; 6) proved that social dynamics are, however, an emergent sphere during contemporary times, although the last case (see Chapter 7) did not show the same pattern. This leads to the conclusion that there are three possibilities for revising the theory: firstly, by accounting for social dynamics, which are still emerging as a significant structural force; secondly, revision requires recognition of

the organizing significance of institutions (see Chapter 7); and lastly, both features require consideration together through theoretical revision.

Results of the research were discussed in Chapter 8 in relation to the three sub questions that were established to structure the research in answering the main question posed in Chapter 1: *How can the Iraq War, Keystone XL pipeline and Arctic Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution be interpreted to uncover general patterns of US oil diversification motivations?* Sub-questions are:

1. What have been the definitions of oil diversification in US policy cycles and how have they been changing over time?
2. To what extent do these definitions fit the 'material capabilities-ideas-institutions' arguments of Cox?
3. What are the limitations of this theory for explaining patterns of US oil diversification?

In order to uncover the motivations behind US oil diversification, three case studies were chosen. They broadly represent the same period of time between the early-millennium and now, thereby allowing comparison using the same structure. However, actors and the interaction between actors are differentiated in all the case studies. KXL provided a reflection of how material capabilities, driven by foreign policy and trade considerations, initially shaped oil diversification motivations and the decision to construct the pipeline in terms of the 'national interest'. However, this is not the only important point about the KXL case. As the process unfolded through time, it is evident that oil diversification motivations shifted to reflect the importance of ideas, most notably environmentalism and later 'America First' ('energy dominance'), and their mediation through key institutions such as the Presidency and a conflictual bi-partisan Congress. During the Obama period, the policy process was characterised by dynamics such as environmental concerns,

environmental groups, and the polarization of domestic politics. Social dynamics was therefore an emergent factor although ultimately not decisive on the final policy. Material capabilities, influenced by global capitalism, including liberal dominancy, and US hegemony were significant in oil diversification motivations in the Iraq War case. Although the desire to diversify US oil supplies through access to Iraqi oil was never explicitly stated by actors, the motivations of the Bush administration are widely understood. In contrast to the KXL case, social dynamics were visible, but not in the USA, where popular support for military intervention continued, rather within Iraq in response to continued US involvement in oil production. To an extent, the patterns of oil diversification motivations in the Arctic Drilling case mirrored the KXL case. They also reflected the influence of the oil market and US foreign policy on material capabilities but also the role of ideas such as environmentalism and the Energy Revolution and their interaction with institutions. What is also visible is the changing nature of oil diversification definitions where they also became related to oil production (diversifying production) as well as imports (diversifying supply). Thus, the definition of diversification also transformed in relation to wider changes in global politics, US foreign policy and the US oil market. Diversifying supplier states joined the process in order to increase the oil supply at nation- and state-level.

9.2. The Added Value of the Study to the Literature

As discussed in Chapter 1, the study contributes to the literature in four different areas: the contribution to understanding of US oil diversification motivations (empirical contribution); revision of Coxian theory, by providing a neo-Coxian view (theoretical contribution); the operationalization of Coxian theory (theoretical and empirical contribution); and lastly, methodological innovation that combines a synchronic and diachronic analysis of oil diversification motivations through time (methodological and theoretical contribution).

9.2.1. Contribution to US Oil Diversification Motivations

This study found four major gaps in the US oil diversification motivations literature: the lack of a historical perspective; the lack of a supplier side view; limited consideration of state-society complexity; and a lack of studies that compares cases (see Chapter 2). This study helps fill these gaps in the literature, thereby representing a significant advance in knowledge. However, there is one last contribution that provide a debating point for the two cases, that are KXL and Arctic Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution.

From a Critical theorist perspective, people are accepted as “historical agents” (Budd 2008: 176). Global politics, which is a product of ‘historical agents’, goes through interactions and struggles under historical development. Our case studies show that this observation holds for US oil diversification motivations. While we considered interactions in the system, we show contradictions and controversies that pushed changes of structure through a historical-dialectical view (see Chapter 8). This method helps to reveal that there are no fixed and repeatable patterns in US oil diversification motivations; rather they evolve through time through the accumulation of events. Secondly, in both case studies (KXL and the Iraq War), supplier countries’ dynamics are evident. Both them (see Chapter 5; 6) showed that they are also part of US oil diversification motivation determinants. In terms of KXL, the Canadian side is economically reliant on oil export incomes and geographically relies on the US. It makes them more positive about the oil trade with the US. Despite the KXL issue, oil imports from Canada are still increasing. Although US political dynamics promote this trend (see Chapter 8), Canadian production policy is also important. On the other hand, the activated social dynamics of the Iraqi people delayed the process of internationalization of Iraqi oil. It kept pressure on US administrations to take action. Moreover, this reaction has led to ‘the war for oil’ accusations and damaged US power.

In accordance with Critical theory’s state-society complexity considerations, the research shows that state-centric explanations are

not able to give the whole picture of events. Non state actors including environmental groups, lobbies, trade and oil groups and entrepreneurs were able to influence the process of US oil diversification motivations by shaping and triggering aspects of them. With the help of different case studies, it becomes clear that neither foreign policy nor domestic politics are the sole determinants. They are both integrated into the US oil market. The case studies also show that different actors are able to join the process. The actors determining US oil diversification motivations are not fixed in time or space. However, state-society complexity is visible in the case studies processes. In addition, this study also contributes to the further definition of oil diversification. The Energy Revolution in the US, which is combined with the US position in global capitalism, has also included diversifying oil producer states (see Chapter 7).

Lastly, although all case studies are discussed through the literature, there was not sufficient literature for KXL and Arctic Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution. The controversial position of these cases leads to the view that there are different arguments for varied issues, but both them have limited debates. Moreover, the Arctic Drilling literature is mainly concerned with the ANWR, which is obviously related to the context. Just recently, it has become an issue across the entire Arctic. This work, however, provides sufficient debate grounds, for both these case studies consider structure- and agency-based, and material- and ideas-based dynamics.

9.2.2. Contribution to Coxian Theory and a neo-Coxian view

Initially, it was specified why a Coxian view was chosen rather than any other critical theory. We found four key points that made Coxian theory suitable for the aims of the study (see Chapter 3). Firstly, because the theory is against 'immanent critique' which is "without reference to an independently articulated method or to transcendent criteria" (Hutchings 1999: 99), a Coxian view is more appropriate than other Eurocentric Critical theories (for example, Linklater 1989; Hutchings 1999; Robinson 1999). Cox presents a reciprocal relationship between structure (social relations and physical

production) and superstructure (ideology and political organizations). Their reflexive relationship creates a historical evolution that cannot be predicted and should not be subject to normative assumptions made by theorists. Although “Theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose” (Cox 1981: 128), subjective perception of the world should be made by objective explanation. Emancipatory interests which involve “freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely they would choose to do” (Booth 1991: 53) is another aim of Critical theorists (Booth 1991). However, this term is associated with a Eurocentric *rationality* view. In reality, there is no absolute freedom, neither for actors nor for states. Any action can affect the whole organization (Cox 2004). Thus, a Coxian view can be interpreted as one in which people’s actions are not predetermined: they do not act *in* behavior rather *through* behavior (see Chapter 4). Another reason why a Coxian view was used is because of his balanced system of structure-agency and materials-ideals. It protects from having a structuralist or reductionist and historical materialist view. Interactions of these dimensions always result in different patterns during historical processes. Considerations of diachronic and synchronic durations offered by Cox help to understand these patterns. In relation to this point, Cox is also important due to his history-theory connection. Theory is situated in history, so it cannot be absolute knowledge (Cox 1993b: 135). Cox leaves open the door for his theory to be reflexively renewed in the future as history evolves: a conspicuous problem with context specific rational theory.

This study shows how Coxian theory is specified according to such principles (see Chapter 3). Moreover, a critique of Cox was also provided to show the positive and negative aspects of his analysis. This literature allows us to suggest a neo-Coxian theory which has social dynamics as the additional sphere of the new millennium. Social dynamics also help Coxian theory to show the transition between agency-structure and conceptualizing state-society complexity within structural spheres. However, while two cases (see Chapter 5; 6) showed the existence of powerful social dynamics, the other one (see

Chapter 7) did not show the same degree of influence. This leads us to a gap in neo-Coxian arguments allowing for their future revision, as indicated below. On the other hand, this study also shows that a Coxian institutions definition does not adequately comprehend their role. They not only maintain the particular order but also participate in a changing process. The definition of institutions should also include an active role in addition to a passive role.

9.2.3. Operationalization of Coxian Theory on US Oil

Diversification

This thesis has significant value for both Coxian theory and the empirical topic. In the academic literature, there is no study which conceptualizes Coxian structural forces for energy security issues, such as US oil diversification motivations: therefore, this thesis fills this evident gap. Cox's structural forces, ideas, material capabilities and institutions, are accepted as structural causes (see Chapter 4) and their reflections in US oil markets are conceptualized (see Chapter 3). *Ideas* that are intersubjective meanings (habits and expectations of behavior) and collective images (the common ground of social discourse and different views on legitimacy of power relations) are accepted as (ir)rational decisions in terms of national and state level and political party differences (different priorities). *Material capabilities* are composed of three aspects: productive and destructive potentials; technological and organisational capabilities; and accumulated forms such as natural resources, stocks of equipment and wealth. In this thesis, material capabilities are firstly the US oil market, oil production, oil reserves, import levels and oil prices and secondly technological sufficiency in the US oil market. *Institutions* that maintain a particular order and reflect power relations in this thesis are companies, state departments, institutions of trade and environment, environmental groups and lobbies.

Our case studies prove that reflection of these structural causes are significant, as Cox asserts. Because every case has its unique context, the effect of causes are different. Moreover, even the sub-parts of causes can also be differentiated. For example, two sub-parts

of ideas did not follow each other. While there was limited evidence of nation- and state- level power differentiation (i.e. intersubjective meaning) in the Iraq War (see Chapter 6), political party stances (i.e. collective images) were different between the beginnings and the ends of KXL and Arctic drilling case studies. Accumulation of the process with different interactions of the structural causes were evident in all case studies. Even some key determinants such as increasing oil prices did not always have the same effect. Different actors (public and private) reacted in different ways at different times. Again, these features would be difficult – if not impossible - to explain using rational ‘problem-solving’ theory within positivist studies.

Operationalization of the theory has been examined through diachronic and synchronic time dimensions – adding significant innovation to the existing literature. To date, existing studies take time limited perspectives on oil diversification, failing to follow such processes over long periods. The study shows that there are no historically repeatable patterns, but rather, cyclical oil market and oil diversification motivations. In the oil market sense, and in the US oil market, the contemporary cycle started in the new millennium. It has triggered different dynamics in the US. There is manifestly no pre-determined structural power, but interactions and their results that become causes. On the other hand, Cox’s view on US hegemony, which was already connected to the US oil market and its evolution, has been demonstrated. The study shows that US oil diversification motivations cannot be isolated from the global oil market, global capitalism, and US power in the world. However, there are also empirical truths that are triggering actors or expectations internally. Structural causes can help to see how these dynamics are working in a non-linear way. Although the case studies start with the early millennium, the historical background of the oil market is provided to show how history works in cycles and accumulates (see Chapter 1). Key shocks and determinants of previous cycles help to reveal how the current picture is situated in its historical context.

Lastly, the study showed that structural causes can be applied to energy security issues and can fill the gaps in the literature left by mainstream approaches. Moreover, Cox's structural explanation on the global political economic organization that includes hegemony, its allies and rivalries can be applied and reflected on within this energy security topic. Because of oil's global market, the energy security issue also had an effect on the hegemon's power reciprocally. Obviously, the US was the best case for observing such changing global politics.

9.2.4. Methodological Innovation Using Coxian Theory

The study also provided significant methodological innovation in terms of a conceptualization of Cox in the current paradigm with an ontological arrangement in terms of time perception. However, it also embraces Kurki's (2008) critique of Cox in terms of structural forces for this conceptualization.

Cox (2008: 89) refers to a complexity paradigm through emphasizing the necessity of "more holistic, more relativistic, and more historically oriented approaches". His main stance is therefore against a positivist epistemology and can be categorised as a reflexivist view. However, Cox avoids using the term 'cause' to distinguish his arguments from positivists' cause-effect analysis, although causation is a matter of ontology rather than epistemology (Kurki 2008). Thus, we agree with Kurki (ibid. 138) that preferring structural causes than structural forces that mean only pressures and constraints. However, in addition, we also think Coxian (2008: 88) ontology should be corrected as that *becoming* and *being* ontologies are intertwined rather than *becoming* in order to provide grounds for a diachronic and synchronic view. In this approach, we can find general patterns that are separated by time periods but not attempt to uncover repeatable and predictable patterns as positivist problem-solving theories do (see Chapter 3).

In short, Cox's view fits a reflexivist epistemology because of the compatibility of both sides' principles in how they look at history, people in history, theory construction, state relations and the position

relative to positivism. The most innovative methodological contribution of the research is that it suggests *becoming* and *being* ontologies as intertwined. They are reflected as the diachronic and synchronic views used by Cox. The reason for following this assumption is that gaining an overall picture of the process is the target, while the process also becomes a smaller picture in a much longer process. For example, our case studies exist in the period between the early millennium and now, but this period is a picture of the global oil market which starts as far back as the Seven Sisters (see Chapter 1). Secondly, we agree with and use Kurki's interpretation of structural "causes". All case studies' processes and more generally US oil diversification motivations have been shaped through structural causes which are not only pressures as forces would suggest, but also motivations and pushers depending on the context. Ontologically, it also provided a stricter stance in order to find determiners of rationales of the processes, while not imprisoned by positivist cause-effect assumption. While we use only "first causes" of the process that also comprehends the process, an historical-dialectical method has been used to see interactions in the duration as Cox suggests. It allows finding contradictions and controversies in the topic that have triggered and reflected motivations for US oil diversification (see Chapter 8).

9.3. Future Directions of the Research

This research opens up the possibility of further research in two main areas: theoretical and empirical. By applying Coxian theory to a social process in the new millennium, it became obvious that neo-Coxian theory could offer an explanation for structural changes over time (see Chapter 3). However, the case studies show that without institutional interference, societal reactions are not able to be part of the structural spheres (see Chapter 8). The decentralized character of transnational civil society organization still exists. However, the study suggests that social dynamics is a new sphere that is still developing, so it will require further observation in the future. Here, events related to other

structural spheres can show how social dynamics can be effective by themselves or the importance of institutional interference behind them can be identified. In short, neo-Coxian arguments require better specifying theoretically but also developing through further theoretical application.

An analysis of (neo)Coxian structural causes can also be applied to different case studies to comparatively assess the additional value of the theory. Such research could be undertaken via inter-state or intra-state comparison. Further examples of oil diversification could be researched within countries such as the USA, to further test and develop the theory. But significant potential exists to expand the analysis to other national contexts. While this research focuses on US hegemony, which involves a globally significant oil producer, importer and consumer country, the oil diversification motivations of potential rival hegemon globally (i.e. China) and an ally of the US (i.e. Europe or Japan) could be compared. This research could productively analyze changing relationships between the US, its potential rivals and historical allies on the one hand, and changing perceptions of oil diversification through time on the other hand. Such analysis would also aid theoretical development of neo-Coxian perspectives discussed above.

9.4. Summary

This research has achieved the aims that in Chapter 1. The main research question is answered through consideration of several sub-questions (see Chapter 8). Three case studies have helped to reveal different reflections of US oil diversification motivations. In this way, we were able to see whether Cox's theoretical operationalization on US oil diversification motivations work and the value of a neo-Coxian approach. The results show that Cox's IR view can be operationalized on oil diversification motivations, but a neo-Coxian perspective still requires further theoretical and empirical development. Future studies

could consider both aspects, thereby adding significantly to oil diversification research.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview Questions

General questions

What factors affect US oil diversification motivations?

Why do we see that two different parties (i.e. Republicans and Democrats) have two different priorities? Because of their voters, supporters?

Can we say oil companies, oil lobbies or any foundations which are related to trade or oil trade are able to direct the governments?

What have been the definitions of diversification for US since the Gulf War?

Keystone XL

Is the Keystone XL pipeline damaging the environment?

How does American society perceive the Keystone XL pipeline? Do these perceptions differ between people in Nebraska and the rest of America?

As an environmentalist what were the the motivations for you to be interested in Keystone XL? Is it an environmental consideration or lack of information which is caused by administrations or anything else including ideologies?

We see different decisions in different administrations Obama and Trump. And also, as I remember George W. Bush announced his support to Keystone XL in 2015 as I remember. Can we separate the republicans and the democrats?

Do you think American government(s), Obama and Trump, do or do not reflect societal demands in terms of Keystone XL, environmentally or economically?

Do you think Keystone XL has become a symbol?

Both Liberal and Conservative governments in Canada have supported this project unlike the US. Why?

What do Canadian oil mean to US oil industry?

The Iraq War

How have US oil policies changed since the Iraq War?

Do you see any connection between the Iraq War and US oil diversification targets?

Do you think that US oil diversification motivations changed after the Iraq War?

What did Iraqi oil mean to US governments or US oil industry before the War?

Has the War changed the perception on Iraqi oil globally or nationally?

What have been the perceptions of the Middle East oil for US oil industry in terms of oil type, security, global politics?

Arctic Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution

Why were the EPOA and EISA adopted? Do you think that its adoption occurred in response to a societal influence or international pressure or even both?

Have the EPOA and EISA become successful? Should they be supported?

Are EPOA and EISA related to reducing the oil imports from the Middle East?

What kind of groups, lobbies, ideas or material factors did affect EPOA, EISA and the energy revolution?

How much have social dynamamics played a role during the policy process of Arctic Drilling?

Why is drilling in Arctic still discussed despite of energy revolution and solved gasoline prices issues?

How much has technology played a role in the millennium`s oil debate in terms of renewables, shale revolution, Arctic Drilling, offshore drilling?

Do you see nation-state level tensions in terms of shale legislations or Arctic Drilling?

Appendix 2: List of Interviews

Case Studies	Groups	Number
Keystone XL	Environmentalists	9
	Oil Industry-Think tanks	4
	Government-Policymakers	4
The Iraq War	Oil Industry-Think tanks	4
	Government-Policymakers	2
Arctic Drilling in the Context of Energy Revolution	Lobbies	4
	Oil Industry-Think tanks	4
	Government-Policymakers	4
Total		35

Appendix 3: Information sheet and consent form for research

Title of Research Project

US Oil Diversification Motivations in the case of the Iraq War, the Keystone XL pipeline and Energy Independence and Security Act 2007.

Details of Project

I am a PhD student at the University of Exeter's Environment and Sustainability Institute (ESI), based on Penryn Campus in Cornwall. My project is on examining the US oil diversification motivations. This research is funded by the Turkish Republic Ministry of National Education.

The information, collected from the participants through interviews, will be used in my PhD thesis and it may be used for academic publication as well.

Contact Details

For further information about the research /interview data (amend as appropriate), please contact:

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If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss with someone else at the University, please contact:

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Confidentiality

Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence. They will not be used other than for the purposes described above and third parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may be required by the law). However, if you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below so that I am able to contact you at a later date).

Your interview data will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act.

Data Protection Notice

The information you provide will be used for research purposes and your personal data will be processed in accordance with current data protection legislation and the University's notification lodged at the Information Commissioner's Office. Your personal data will be treated in the strictest confidence and will not be disclosed to any

unauthorised third parties. The results of the research will be published in anonymised form."

a. Interview recordings

The digital recording of your interview will be deleted as soon as there is an authoritative written transcripts and contact details.

b. Interview transcripts and contact details

Your personal and contact details will be stored separately from your interview transcript that will be stored on U drive and may be retained for up to 5 years.

If you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please provide your email below)

Third parties will not be allowed access to interview tapes and transcripts except as required by law or in the event that something disclosed during the interview causes concerns about possible harm to you or to someone else.

Anonymity

Interview data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your name, but we will refer to the group of which you are a member. If this is not the case you need to adapt the text.

Consent

I have been fully informed about the aims and purposes of the project.

I understand that:

- there is no compulsion for me to participate in this research project and, if I do choose to participate, I may withdraw at any stage;
- I have the right to refuse permission for the publication of any information about me;

- any information which I give will be used solely for the purposes of this research project, which may include publications or academic conference or seminar presentations;
- If applicable, the information, which I give, may be shared between any of the other researcher(s) participating in this project in an anonymised form;
- all information I give will be treated as confidential;
- the researcher(s) will make every effort to preserve my anonymity.

..... (Signature of participant) (Date)

..... (Printed name of participant) (Email address of participant if they have requested to view a copy of the interview transcript.)

..... (Signature of researcher) (Printed name of researcher)

One copy of this form will be kept by the participant; a second copy will be kept by the researcher(s).

Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data.