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It's not just about the Mafia! Conceptualizing business-society relations of organized violence

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Conceptualizing business-society relations of organized violence

Academy of Management Perspectives
Special Call 'Doomsday Scenarios'

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ABSTRACT

While there is some scholarship in management and organization studies on forms of organized violence, it has rarely focused on the role of organized violence within wider business-society and governance relations. In this article, we argue that conceptualizing the role and capacity of the state is still paramount, precisely because it is normally the state that holds a monopoly on violence. Yet, this state monopoly has continuously been eroded as private firms and civil society actors are increasingly involved in paramilitaries, trafficking, mafia-like and terrorist organizing and other forms of organized violence. To help management and organization scholars appreciate and make sense of these dynamics in contemporary economic affairs, this article puts forward a conceptualization of business-society relations

1
2 of organized violence. We develop six propositions that seek to understand organized violence within,
3
4 what we call, the ‘governance triangle’ of state-firm-civil society relations. These propositions give rise
5
6 to three ‘doomsday scenarios’: 1) Rise of military dictatorships; 2) Rise of private security monopolies
7
8 and oligopolies; 3) Rise of civil wars. We conclude the article by outlining the implications of such a
9
10 violence-based view for management and organization scholars.
11

12
13 **Keywords: organized violence, monopoly of violence, business-society relations, state-firm**
14
15 **dynamics**
16

17 18 19 20 **INTRODUCTION**

21
22 Some analysts argue that we have been witnessing a steady decline of wars and armed conflict since
23
24 World War II, which is largely thanks to a stable global geo-political order and the relative strength of
25
26 political and state institutional setups associated with the global rise of parliamentary democracies and
27
28 liberal capitalist regimes (Goldstein, 2011; Bloomfield et al., 2017). Indeed, homicide rates in many
29
30 countries seem to be at the lowest level since official statistics began (Roser, 2018). Others are not so
31
32 sure. Malešević (2017) emphatically argues that organized military violence is ripe even in the 21st century,
33
34 although the nature of armed conflict has changed. He argues that, on the one hand, national states and
35
36 their armed forces now have more organizational and technological capacity and capabilities than ever
37
38 before. On the other hand, however, the rise of liberal trade regimes, benefiting globally operating
39
40 economic actors, have undermined “the sovereignty of many states, which ultimately can lead to the loss
41
42 of the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and the emergence of paramilitary warlords capable
43
44 of privatizing coercive power” (Malešević, 2017, p. 458).
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49
50 While there is some appreciation of the role of organized violence in contemporary regimes of
51
52 management and organization (Costas & Grey, 2018; Wood & Wright, 2015; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015;
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54 Crane, 2013; Harrington et al., 2015; Stokes & Gabriel, 2010; Doh et al., 2003), these have rarely taken
55
56 wider business-society and governance relations into account. In this article, we develop six propositions
57
58 that point to the changing governance relations between state, firm and civil society actors, showing that
59
60 dynamics of organized violence are at their center. Given the fast-paced changes and contemporary

1
2 social, economic and environmental challenges faced worldwide - political violence, terrorist activism,
3
4 rapid climate change, breakdown of liberal-democratic values, rise of authoritarianism, to name but a few
5
6 (Dryzek, 2013; Dannreuther, 2014; Giroux, 2018) - we argue it to be of extreme importance for
7
8 management and organizational scholars to understand these dynamics of organized violence, being
9
10 aware of possible violent 'doomsday scenarios' that may become reality in the not too distant future, if
11
12 they do not exist in some parts of the world already. Based on our analysis, we develop three such
13
14 'doomsday scenarios' that represent extreme versions of the firm-state-civil society governance dynamics
15
16 of organized violence.
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19
20 This article contributes to our understanding of business-society relations by highlighting the need
21
22 for a governance of organized violence perspective. All too often firm-state-civil society relations are
23
24 dominated by CSR and other 'win-win' perspectives (e.g. Cochran & Wood, 1984; McWilliams & Siegel,
25
26 2001), neglecting the often violent nature of governance relations. In times of rapid social, economic and
27
28 environmental changes, we argue that such a violence-based view may be important if we appreciate that
29
30 there might be increased struggles for natural resources, political recognition and legitimacy of business
31
32 activity (McFate, 2017). This article also aims to contribute to the debate of the role of the state and
33
34 private actors to protect and enhance fundamental human, economic, political and environmental rights.
35
36 Often neglected in management and organization studies, we put forward a violence-based view of
37
38 business-society relations, which, we argue, is of importance and significance for businesses,
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40 policymakers and civil society in a world that is seemingly becoming more polarized, disorganized and
41
42 violent.
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49 **THE STATE MONOPOLY OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE AND ITS PRIVATIZATION**

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51 Violence is a long-lived, pervasive, ubiquitous and multifaceted way of organizing and managing
52
53 economic and social activities (Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015). Violence in organizational settings is often
54
55 associated with the use of actual or potential physical or symbolic force and coercive power by an
56
57 individual or an organization (Costas & Grey, 2018). The use of violence in organizations can be
58
59 legitimate or not, be perpetrated explicitly or implicitly, and it can be physical, symbolic or structural
60

1
2 (Kilby, 2013). Organizational and managerial practices relying on the use of violence - which can simply
3
4 be defined as 'organized violence' - may take various forms, such as victimizing, corrupting, intimidating,
5
6 bullying, extorting, coercing, abusing and threatening, among others (Kilby, 2013). As such, organized
7
8 violence is manifested at various interpersonal, organizational or structural/societal levels, for example
9
10 regulating social and economic activities among and between peers, competitors, customers, and being
11
12 shaped by specific institutions (Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015) and social relations (Costas & Grey, 2018).
13
14

15
16 Regardless of its specific definition or manifestation, organized violence can be understood as a
17
18 *strategic resource* for any actor aiming at organizing and managing economic and social activities. In modern
19
20 states the use of organized violence by private actors, like firms or civil society, is not allowed nor
21
22 tolerated: political, social and economic violence is considered as an illicit and illegal practice which ought
23
24 to be persecuted and eradicated (Wulf, 2011). State persecution of all forms of illegitimate violence
25
26 constitutes one of the elements of the social contract between the state and its citizens (Acemoglu et al.,
27
28 2013). The key word is 'legitimate', as the state has a monopoly over deciding what constitutes legitimate
29
30 and illegitimate forms of violence (Fukuyama, 2007). The state, in fact, uses the law and its legal apparatus
31
32 to legitimize its own use of organized violence in the form of armies, police and state security forces. For
33
34 example, a state government can legitimately deploy police forces to disperse street protesters if the
35
36 security of the wider population is in jeopardy. A private firm or NGO cannot. From a historical
37
38 perspective, it can be argued that the process of establishing, supporting and maintain a 'monopoly of
39
40 violence' legitimates the presence of the state and its very existence (Weber, 1946).
41
42
43

44
45 Yet, this monopoly can be under threat. The state can fail to establish or maintain its monopoly of
46
47 violence due to its geography. For example, some regions are difficult to access and control and different
48
49 ethnic groups may claim the legitimate use of violence. There may also be socio-economic reasons, such
50
51 as the lack of resources to organize an army/police force and the presence of income inequality, which
52
53 can all challenge the state's legitimacy to the use of violence (Acemoglu et al., 2013). Moreover, the state
54
55 can fail to establish or maintain its monopoly of violence as part of a political process in which non-state
56
57 (e.g. firm-based) organized violence is tolerated, allowed or even encouraged, for example by
58
59 authoritarian or corrupted elites, and/or ethnic groups (Acemoglu et al., 2013).
60

1
2 Wulf (2011) has identified the ‘privatization of violence’, i.e. the process of outsourcing the control
3
4 of organized violence, as a key element that has shaped state-firm dynamics over the last few decades.
5
6 Particularly two main dynamics of the privatization of violence seem to prevail (Wulf, 2011; Acemoglu
7
8 et al., 2013): on the one hand, *bottom-up privatization mechanisms*, often related to ‘weak and fragile
9
10 capabilities’ to defend the state monopoly; on the other hand, *top-down privatization mechanisms* in which
11
12 the state has developed ‘new capabilities’ and consequently outsourced the control of organized violence
13
14 to other actors, particularly private firms. Wulf (2011, p. 138) argues that a bottom-up privatization of
15
16 organized violence can be due to the state’s failure to guarantee law and order at the advantage of
17
18 organized crime, warlords, militias and criminal gangs. This is becoming an increasing challenge in a
19
20 world that is facing continuous and unprecedented political, socio-economic and environmental crises
21
22 (Enamorado et al., 2016). For example, organizations such as Russian mobsters, Eastern European crime
23
24 rings, African drug trafficking and financial scamming groups, Chinese Tongts, Japanese Yakuza and
25
26 Boryokuda, and Middle Eastern organizations connected with declared jihadist groups have all become
27
28 prominent actors today (Kleemans, 2007; FBI, 2015). These groups profit from the manipulation and
29
30 monopolization of legitimate markets, institutions and industries as well as from black markets and
31
32 illegitimate practices, e.g. illicit drug trade and human trafficking. They rely on tools of violence,
33
34 corruption, bribes, graft, extortion, intimidation, and murder to maintain their respective operations and
35
36 control their market profits (Kleemans, 2007; Costa, 2010; FBI, 2015).
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43 Top-down privatization mechanisms, on the other hand, are characterized by the proactive
44
45 reorganization of the state and the emergence of private armies, security corps, and pro-government
46
47 militias (Carey et al., 2013; Heinisch & Mandel, 2002; Wood & Wright, 2015). Resources that are seen to
48
49 be of strategic importance for states, such as large mining operations, power stations and other key
50
51 infrastructure, are increasingly secured by private armies and police forces. Private firms are also running
52
53 prisons and a range of other security forces, acting in the interest of the state (Genders, 2002; Wood &
54
55 Wright, 2015; Alonso & Andrews, 2016). In fact, companies with large-scale, land-based operations often
56
57 have their own security forces, as there is an increasingly fierce battle to exploiting the remaining natural
58
59 resources of the planet (Borras et al., 2012).
60

1
2 Regardless of their differences, both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms can be seen as part of
3
4 a wider transformation of states' capabilities to managing strategic public assets in a context of rising
5
6 (neo-)liberal and globalized market regimes (Wood and Wright, 2015). Parallel to this transformation,
7
8 there is an increasing activism of multinational corporations, such that various analysts have claimed that
9
10 state institutions may have less capacity and willingness to implement and monitor laws and public
11
12 control on strategic assets within their jurisdiction (Kaldor, 2007). Moreover, illicit and criminal
13
14 organizations, as well as warlords, para-military, political and/or ideology-driven, violent groups are
15
16 constantly strategizing for undermining the state's capabilities to control organized violence. In short,
17
18 the state seems to have lost power and/or redefined its capabilities as an institutional actor, which means
19
20 that it is perhaps not in full control of its own monopoly of organized violence anymore (Malešević,
21
22 2017). However, whether the loss of control is due to bottom-up or top-down mechanisms, this
23
24 approach may create a too narrow view of the governance processes shaping the privatization of
25
26 organized violence. What seems particularly neglected in this perspective is the role of other societal
27
28 stakeholders as well as the dynamic relationships between firms, states and civil society actors. Therefore,
29
30 we argue that it is important to develop a broader understanding of the privatization of organized
31
32 violence, taking into account wider governance dynamics.
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40 **BEYOND PRIVATIZATION: FIRMS, STATES AND THE GOVERNANCE TRIANGLE**

41 **OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE**

42
43 Privatization is only one of the dynamics involving the role of the state and private firms in economic
44
45 activities. For more than three decades now, it has been argued that state-firm dynamics need to involve
46
47 a robust appreciation of the vital role of multiple stakeholders, in a wider state-firm-civil society relational
48
49 perspective (Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman & Phillips, 2002). As
50
51 early as in 1983, Freeman and Reed (1983) put forward the need to go beyond the sole focus of corporate
52
53 managing of shareholders, decisively moving towards, what can be called, 'stakeholder capitalism'
54
55 (Freeman et al., 2007). Their now well-rehearsed argument has been that the firm does not only have
56
57 responsibility towards its shareholders and their financial expectations but indeed responsibilities towards
58
59
60

1
2 a broader set of internal and external stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, customers,
3
4 communities, civil society organizations, governments and others. This has resulted in a burgeoning
5
6 literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) (e.g. Cochran & Wood, 1984; McWilliams & Siegel,
7
8 2001; Matten & Crane, 2005).

10 The emerging literature on ‘political CSR’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011; Scherer et al., 2014) has
11
12 gone further, arguing that this increased focus on firm’s wider societal responsibility has been an
13
14 important political moment, as governments around the world have had less capacity – or have shown
15
16 less willingness – to address, and legislate for, social and environmental problems. This has been called
17
18 the ‘privatization of governance’ or ‘private regulation’ (Brammer et al., 2012; Vogel, 2010). While this
19
20 political move towards private regulation has been widely accepted, there is a body of literature that
21
22 argues that the role of the state has been too under-represented by management scholars (Yamak & Sürer,
23
24 2005; Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2004; Moon & Vogel, 2008; Bendell et al., 2010; Fassin, 2009; Gond et al.,
25
26 2011; Schrempf-Stirling, 2018; Djelic & Etchanchu, 2017). While the role of governments has certainly
27
28 changed, these authors argue that the state has far from disappeared. In many parts of the world, for
29
30 example, governments have been much more interventionist in their industrial policy (Coates, 2005).
31
32 China’s rapid capitalist development in the past 30 years has been highly directed from the top of the
33
34 Communist State (Dickson, 2003). Even in Anglo-Saxon and so-called neoliberal contexts of the West,
35
36 governmental institutions still matter, and always have (Djelic & Etchanchu, 2017). For example, when
37
38 governments are implementing public-private partnerships – often involving large-scale infrastructure
39
40 projects – elaborate legal frameworks have to be in place to secure the workings of these often long-term
41
42 contracts between states and private sector actors (Selsky & Parker, 2005; Kwak et al., 2009).
43
44 Neoliberalism and private regulation, it is argued, cannot take place without the state (Jessop, 2002).
45
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49

51 Instead of arguing for a one-directional perspective of privatization, a range of authors have
52
53 emphasized the changing dynamics of relations between government, business and civil society. Steurer
54
55 (2013), for example, shows how governmental deregulation has been accompanied by soft governmental
56
57 regulation as well as ‘societal re-regulation’. Here, the state does not simply disappear but is entangled in
58
59 a complex web of changing power relations that lead to different outcomes across time and space. Such
60

1
2 a perspective requires detailed studies of the dynamic, triangular interactions between state, corporate
3
4 and civil society actors, involving mechanisms of political maneuvering, interest alignment and alliance
5
6 building (Levy & Kaplan, 2008; Bo et al., 2018; Midttun, 2005). What we are, hence, dealing with is, what
7
8 Abbott & Snidal (2009) call, a 'governance triangle'.
9

10
11
12
13 [Insert Figure 1]
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17

18 This triangle features different modes of regulation, including 'hard regulation' by the state,
19
20 'industry self-regulation' by business, and 'civil regulation' by civil society actors (Steurer, 2013, p. 395).
21
22 These regulatory modes are not necessarily stable, but marked by continuous struggles over differing
23
24 interests, values and cultural perspectives (Bo et al., 2018). These conflicts are well documented in the
25
26 literature (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015; Surroca et al., 2013) with authors showing how disagreements and
27
28 different interests between firm, state and civil society actors often involve struggles over identity (Bruijn
29
30 & Whiteman, 2010), recognition (Westermann-Behaylo et al., 2015) and access to resources, such as land
31
32 (Banerjee, 2011a).
33
34

35
36 However, what is perhaps less appreciated in the current literature - although there are exceptions
37
38 (e.g. Kraemer et al., 2013) - is that these conflicts can also involve violence, and more precisely organized
39
40 violence. As indicated in Figure 2 and discussed above, the current debate on the privatization of
41
42 organized violence revolves around only two specific governance dynamics involving state-firm-society
43
44 relations. Specifically, bottom-up privatization mechanisms are seen in the literature as a governance
45
46 response of the state to civil society pressures, and top-down privatization mechanisms are new
47
48 governance responses to the perceived need to outsource the control of strategic assets to private firms.
49
50 What we have discussed in this section is that this privatization-of-violence view may be too limited.
51
52 There is a need to appreciate the wider governance dynamics at play, involving a complex array of firm,
53
54 state and civil society actors and their often violent relationships. We will now further elaborate on this
55
56 approach and widen our perspective on a violence-based view of business-society relations using a
57
58 governance triangle perspective, while, first, we briefly discuss our methodological approach.
59
60

[Insert Figure 2]

METHODOLOGY

Adopting an inductive and interpretative approach to theorizing (Gioia et., 2013; Gehman et al., 2018), our main objective has been to understand contemporary forms of violence in governance relations, and theorizing the changes in firm-state-civil society relations of organized violence (Langley 2009; Langley et al. 2013). Based on existing literature in management and organization studies, war, peace and security studies, political theory and international relations, we have developed conceptual propositions forming a theoretical framework of organized violence that focuses on the dynamic relations between state institutions, private firms and civil society actors (see Table 1).

[Insert Table 1]

Rather than a systematic literature review, we have purposively selected academic reports and manuscripts engaging with the conception of firm-society relations as a dynamic and constantly changing process of ‘governance making’ in which the three main actors, state, firm and civil society, have differing interests, goals and objectives. From the selected sources, all academic sources have been categorized and coded to delineate the different governance processes of the three main actors in the governance framework. We have identified a set of codes related to core tensions and pressures arising between these actors, as well as a set of codes referring to core challenges, resolved in the emergence or shift of the control of violence in the governance triangle. Based on this perspective, we have developed six propositions that constitute, we propose, the key violence-based governance dynamics in business-society relations. Based on these six propositions we have finally identified three main doomsday scenarios.

TOWARDS A VIOLENCE-BASED VIEW OF BUSINESS-SOCIETY RELATIONS

1
2 In this section, we first present our findings related to a violence-based view of business-society relations
3
4 represented by six key conceptual propositions. Figure 3 represents the dynamic relations between our
5
6 conceptual propositions, in the attempt to enlarge and problematize the governance triangle presented
7
8 in Figure 2.
9

10
11
12
13 [Insert Figure 3]
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16

17
18 *Proposition 1a: Outsourcing of violence and security to firms*
19

20 This proposition summarizes what has been already discussed in the debate on top-down privatization
21
22 dynamics in which states are using private firms to organize, deliver and control its monopoly of violence
23
24 and/or turn a blind eye to the violation of state laws by private firms (Volkov, 2016). In the above, we
25
26 have identified an important tendency for the state to increasingly face economic and social incentives
27
28 to ‘privatize’ and liberalize the monopoly of violence, and to include new private economic actors to
29
30 deliver security services, protect human rights, and support its geo-political interests (Kinsey, 2006;
31
32 Alonso & Andrews, 2016; McFate, 2017). This is due to either the rising of complexity in society on how
33
34 to manage control and order, or to a political shift towards the privatization of public and common assets
35
36 like social security and protection. Hence, private economic actors are more often legitimized to lead the
37
38 control of organized violence, pushing for further liberalization and ‘outsourcing’ of security services
39
40 (Krahmann, 2009; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2010). The nascent private military industry, private-owned
41
42 or controlled prisons and private security forces are few examples of a fast-growing business context and
43
44 marketplace based on organized violence (Avant, 2005).
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49 However, another form of outsourcing of violence and security is when states do not have the
50
51 capacity to challenge any violation of their laws; or states are deliberately tolerating it (Volkov, 2016).
52
53 Examples include large-scale private investments in strategic industries, such as oil, gas and mining, where
54
55 states have a strategic interest in working with private firms to develop and extract these resources. Often,
56
57 however, these industries then operate outside any regime of public scrutiny of work conditions and
58
59 environmental impacts (Bush, 2008; Obi, 2010; Volkov, 2016). This also refers to the case when
60

1
2 corporations adopt illegal practices in the workplace or exploit natural resources without being
3
4 sanctioned by the state, or when they are bribing or corrupting key public officers to gain a license to
5
6 operate in illicit markets (Crawford & Botchwey, 2017).
7
8
9

10
11 *Proposition 1b: Deployment of state armies and security forces (against civil society)*
12

13 This proposition is about the increasing use of state armies and security forces against civil society actors,
14
15 often done in an illegitimate way (Clarke, 2010; Beckman, 2016). One could also call this the illegitimate
16
17 use of the state's monopoly of violence. The core pressures here are arising from an increase or
18
19 persistence of political instability and social unrest, for example leading the state to pursue a political
20
21 agenda to repress minorities/ suppress human/ democratic rights, or the need to respond to exogenous
22
23 shocks (e.g. climate change, terrorist attacks, conflicts with other state(s) or internal guerrillas,
24
25 pandemics), leading the state to quickly react to unforeseen circumstances and events. There are
26
27 increasing concerns that the freedom of speech is curtailed in even liberal, democratic societies (House,
28
29 2014). The threat of terrorism and guerrilla warfare, directed at the state, is often used by state institutions
30
31 to legitimize unprecedented increases in the powers of the police, the army and the state's legal system
32
33 to deal with such 'states of emergencies' (Epifanio, 2011; Beckman, 2016). There is an extensive literature
34
35 about how, in the post-9-11 world, the freedom of expression and organization has been curtailed by
36
37 governments around the world (Epifanio, 2011).
38
39
40
41

42 Yet, this goes beyond anti-terrorist measures. As already mentioned above, states often support
43
44 large-scale development projects, such as dams, oil and gas installations, mines and power stations, which
45
46 will not only benefit private interests but are seen to be of strategic importance for nations' development
47
48 (Martinez-Alier, 2001; Obi, 2010; Maher et al., 2019). When communities resist such large-scale projects,
49
50 for example because they feel their livelihoods are threatened, then often the violent force of the state is
51
52 mobilized to deal with the resisting communities (Dunlap, 2019). Banerjee argues that so-called 'spaces
53
54 of exception' are actively created by state authorities to push through strategic projects and crush civil
55
56 society resistance: "Violence, torture, and death can occur in this space of exception without political or
57
58 juridical intervention. The state of exception thus creates a zone where the application of law is
59
60

1
2 suspended but the law remains in force” (2008, p. 1544). For example, in the mining conflicts they study
3
4 in Chile, Maher et al. (2019) show how violence is used as a strategic resource mobilized by the state to
5
6 support national development projects, delivered by large multinational mining companies.
7
8
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10
11 *Proposition 2a: ‘Mafia-like’ economic organizations*
12

13 While, up until the 1950s, the *mafioso* was considered to be a ‘man of honour’, the Italian mafia can
14
15 increasingly be considered as a rational economic actor, “combining modern entrepreneurial activities in
16
17 the legal sector with traditional cultural values which give Mafia firms important competitive advantages
18
19 over their rivals” (Chubb, 1996, p. 275). Some of the Italian Mafia practices Chubb mentions are the
20
21 “discouragement of competition, holding down of wages, reserves of liquidity from illegal activities
22
23 which can be reinvested in the legal sector” (ibid.). Yet, it is clear that such business practices are now
24
25 commonplace, exercised and perpetrated by the criminal, illegal and violent economic activities of
26
27 organized crime gangs globally (Beckert & Wehinger, 2012; Albanese, 2014), using tactics based on
28
29 victimizing, abusing, corrupting, intimidating and threatening, among others (Kilby, 2013; Riccardi, 2014;
30
31 Chin, 2016). Mafia organizations often specialize in black market and other illegal or semi-legal economic
32
33 activities, such as weapons dealing, organized prostitution, drug trafficking, smuggling and tax evasion
34
35 (Kleemans, 2007; FBI, 2015). Their business empires are considered to be spanning the entire globe,
36
37 while there is particular emphasis on transferring proceeds from illegal activities to legitimate businesses
38
39 through money laundering (Lavorgna, 2015).
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45 Private economic organizations acting as ‘Mafia’ organized crime may emerge when there is an
46
47 increased interest of organized crime to control socio-economic activities/assets in key regions or
48
49 sectors, for example due to weak/fragile political and institutional conditions, or when there is an
50
51 increased capacity of these organizations to influence political arenas and institutions. Mafia or mafia-
52
53 like organizations often use state institutions to organize, control and legitimize their violence (Albanese,
54
55 2014), for example by corrupting civil servants and politicians, and/or setting up public-private
56
57 enterprises operating at the edge of legal and illegal sectors (Riccardi, 2014; Chin, 2016; Volkov, 2016).
58
59 In this way, they increasingly violate the state’s monopoly of violence by weakening and corrupting its
60

1
2 capacity to control. In some cases the mafia acts even on behalf of the state (Chubb, 1996; Naím, 2012;
3
4 Lavorgna, 2015). Some authors argue that in a world that is facing continuous and unprecedented
5
6 political, socio-economic and environmental crises, we will see a rise of mafia-like economic practices
7
8 (Enamorado et al., 2016).
9

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13 *Proposition 2b: Deployment of private security forces and division of resistance*
14

15 As shown in Table 1, an increased interest of private businesses to control socio-economic
16
17 activities/assets in key regions or sectors or the need to respond to social unrest, political instability and
18
19 institutional uncertainty can lead private firms to be legally entitled and legitimized to exert a monopoly
20
21 of violence in certain regions or sectors. Private firms receive economic and political powers from the
22
23 state as part of a political agenda to use of violence by private firms against civil society (Brock & Dunlap,
24
25 2018). These practices include bullying, intimidation, divide and conquer deployment of private security
26
27 forces and other approaches that could be deemed violent (Sampat, 2015; Dunlap, 2019; Maher, et al.,
28
29 2019). Whereas the public image of firms is one that is dominated by CSR and other ‘win-win’
30
31 approaches, there is often a hidden, secret agenda to the way companies go about dealing with resisting
32
33 civil society groups, including NGOs, indigenous people and communities (Newell, 2005; Banerjee,
34
35 2011b; Sampat, 2015). Kraemer et al. (2013), for example, document this hybrid approach in a mining
36
37 conflict in India, where, on the one hand, the mining company tries to establish a partnership with the
38
39 local community, while, on the other hand, deploys violent measures against protesters. Equally, Hönke
40
41 (2013) shows how companies often make large investments into local communities, while also using
42
43 private security forces to coercively protect their turf. Such private security practices are often not
44
45 possible without the, at least tacit, approval by the state. That is, either states do not have the capacity or
46
47 willingness to protect people’s freedom to protest, often giving private companies a free reign in dealing
48
49 with what is perceived to be ‘uncivil’ society (Sullivan et al., 2011).
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58 *Proposition 3a: Guerrilla warfare and terrorist organizations*
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1
2 Increased political, cultural and/or religious struggles in society between classes, groups or minorities, or
3
4 a raise of economic inequality and social unrest, collective fear or distrust for public authorities and
5
6 political organizations can lead groups in society, such political parties or ethnic minorities to question
7
8 the state capacity or legitimacy to maintain and enforce a shared social contract. This is also exacerbated
9
10 by the presence of economic, social and/or cultural elites directly control the state. Whereas most civil
11
12 society groups, including NGOs, community groups, etc. use non-violent tactics to resist the state and
13
14 its regime of power and control, there are also groups that specialize in using strategic violence to further
15
16 their aims and objectives (Gupta, 2008; Khalil, 2013). The most-talked about violent civil society groups
17
18 have been jihadist terrorist cells and militia, such as al-Qaida, ISIS and others (Clutterbuck, 2003;
19
20 Stepanova, 2008). There are many theories trying to explain why civil society activism for social and
21
22 political change turns into violent radicalism and extremism (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009; Dalgaard-
23
24 Nielsen, 2010). Some authors highlight social inequalities that have increased exponentially under
25
26 neoliberal globalization and the contingent institutional and class responses to them (Sandbrook &
27
28 Romano, 2004). Others emphasize psychological factors (Loza, 2007).
29
30
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32

33
34 Whatever the reasons for the recent surge in terrorist activity worldwide, civil society groups have
35
36 always used violent tactics, including guerrilla warfare, to make themselves heard, defend territories or
37
38 resources and fight for recognition as well as social and political change (Duyvesteyn, 2004). Examples
39
40 include the Maoists in India and Nepal, the IRA in Ireland, among others (Sharma, 2004; Shah, 2013;
41
42 Sanchez-Cuenca, 2007), which have been fighting against regional and central governments to follow
43
44 their ideological interests. However, as Shah (2006) points out, there is not always a clear distinction
45
46 between state and violent civil society group, as both actors can be seen to compete in, what can be
47
48 called, the 'market of protection'. That is, as the state's monopoly of violence is watered down, violent
49
50 civil society groups can step in to provide security and protection for the population.
51
52
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56 *Proposition 3b: Mobilization of violent resistance (against corporations)*
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58 As highlighted in Table 1, increased needs for social and economic justice and/or political representation,
59
60 as well as social response to scandals or misconducts perpetrated by private businesses can lead civil

1
2 society actors to act and try to directly ensure and provide social security, income redistribution, voice,
3
4 and ‘safety nets’ to citizens in opposition to the state and private firms. Civil society actors can be forced
5
6 to control and monitor private businesses’ operations due to lack of capacity or interest from the state.
7
8 Therefore, just as violent resistance can be targeted at state institutions and forces, it can also be targeted
9
10 at private firms, particularly those that are engaged in large-scale economic development projects, such
11
12 as mines, oil and gas extraction, hydropower dams and forest plantations. Such large-scale projects often
13
14 displace large amounts of people, particularly peasants, farmers, and indigenous people - those who
15
16 depend on the land for their livelihoods and spirituality (Taylor, 2011; Verweijen, 2017). Violent
17
18 resistance against firms hence can be particularly encountered in struggles over land, given that basic
19
20 livelihoods are at stake. There are many examples of land-based communities - particularly in Global
21
22 South countries - encountering evictions from their land, as extractive industries - often with the tacit or
23
24 explicit approval by state authorities - start digging for coal, oil, gas or minerals (Obi, 2010; Pedersen,
25
26 2014). Even within agricultural and forestry settings, indigenous people have been evicted as their land
27
28 is being included in global agricultural commodity chains and carbon markets (Gerber, 2011; Lyons &
29
30 Westoby, 2014). These are examples of dispossessions and land grabbing that these communities resist,
31
32 sometimes using violent tactics, in order to defend their land.
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40 **DOOMSDAY SCENARIOS OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE**

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42 In a world characterized by increasing systemic and complex crises, so-called grand challenges or wicked
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44 problems, an extended understanding of violence-based governance dynamics in business-society
45
46 relations can help scholars and practitioners to engage in a richer and more informed sense-making of
47
48 future scenarios. Based on our conceptual propositions, outlined in the previous section and Table 1, we
49
50 now elaborate on a violence-based view of business-society relations, developing ‘ideal typical’ doomsday
51
52 scenarios of organized violence. In our approach, an ‘ideal type’ doomsday scenario of organized violence
53
54 is identified as a specific configuration of the firm-state-civil society relations, when the core tensions,
55
56 pressures and challenges pushed out of balance these dynamics, such that one of the actors takes control
57
58 of violence, establishing a new ‘monopoly’ or reinforcing an existing one. An extreme environmental
59
60

1
2 crisis, for example, a world of extreme climate conditions, or socio-economic collapse, due to global
3
4 spread of a new contagious disease, a nuclear disaster or conflict, a systematic technology breakdown -
5
6 these are all events that can trigger a violent radicalization of contemporary governance relations,
7
8 allowing one of the actors take control of the monopoly of violence. Based on our inductive and
9
10 interpretative approach to theorizing, summarized in Table 1, we have identified the following doomsday
11
12 scenarios (see Figure 4): (1) the rise of state-based authoritarianism based on novel forms of military
13
14 dictatorships; (2) the rise of new monopolies or oligopolies of organized violence managed by private
15
16 firms; and (3) the rise of systemic and epidemic civil wars orchestrated by violent civil society
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18 organizations at regional or global scale.
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24 [Insert Figure 4]
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29 *Doomsday scenario 1: Rise of military dictatorships*

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31 Based on our reading and coding of an interdisciplinary set of literature, our inductive theorizing has
32
33 revealed a scenario in which states might reclaim control of organized violence and systematically limit
34
35 the activities of civil society and private firms, establishing new forms of dictatorships, for example by
36
37 the use of coercion through state-controlled police and military forces. State authoritarianism – and
38
39 military dictatorships as their most extreme version – may emerge as a response to increasingly severe
40
41 geo-political instability, rapid disease outbreaks, climate disasters and unpredictable social and political
42
43 turmoil, all triggering the need for more state control and use of organized violence (Grint, 2010;
44
45 Epifanio, 2011; Beckman, 2016). This process may emerge either through an increased state capacity and
46
47 need to limit private actors' activities, for example by limiting any private initiatives in the military, police
48
49 and security sectors, revising and limiting any outsourcing process and by 're-nationalising' the
50
51 governance of public assets, including social security through organized violence (Epifanio, 2011); or by
52
53 a full alignment between corporate and state interests and power. Novel, violence-based forms of state
54
55 authoritarianism emerge at the expense of civil society voices and democratic rights as well as by reducing
56
57 or abolishing any liberal rights (Clarke, 2010; Giroux, 2018; Volkov, 2016). The emergence of Trump
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1
2 and other populist governments (Fuchs, 2017) as well as the rise of China as a significant economic and
3
4 geopolitical force (Ma, 2009) has already fueled debates about an ‘authoritarian capitalism’ that has taken
5
6 hold around the world (Witt & Redding, 2014). This doomsday scenario predicts that these developments
7
8 might accelerate – particularly in times of major economic, health, social and environmental crises –
9
10 leading to the rise of extreme versions of state authoritarianism, for example military dictatorships.
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16 *Doomsday scenario 2: Rise of private security monopolies and oligopolies*

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18 Our inductive theorizing has given rise to quite a different scenario; one that predicts extreme versions
19
20 of privatized forms of organized violence, deregulated and even encouraged by states. This depicts a
21
22 future in which the state is ‘systematically outsourcing’ control and legitimization of organized violence
23
24 to private economic actors. This process is supported by a progressive control of states’ functions by
25
26 violent organizations, for example through their increased capacity to be represented in state institutions
27
28 and to use them to organize, control and legitimize their violence (Albanese, 2014). The state’s
29
30 capabilities are fully controlled by private actors, systematically using violent practices, for example by
31
32 corrupting civil servants and politicians, and legitimized to operate in illegal sectors (Riccardi, 2014; Chin,
33
34 2016; Volkov, 2016). The full collapse of the state’s monopoly of organized violence is accompanied by
35
36 the emergence of new monopolies and oligopolies in which democratic control of such organized
37
38 violence will be limited or completely absent. This can lead to increased lawlessness and a ‘wild-west’
39
40 neoliberal capitalism, which is fully focused on producing wealth for a small minority of private business
41
42 elites. This scenario also depicts a future of organized crime led by violent organizations, like the mafia,
43
44 specialized in business operations such as human trafficking, modern slavery, and private economic
45
46 organizations being directly or indirectly dependent on such organized crime (Kleemans, 2007). This
47
48 process includes the rise of private armies and warlords, with proxy wars being fought entirely by private
49
50 security forces. Part of this scenario is the prediction that states will be increasingly called upon to cover
51
52 large-scale health, economic, social and environmental risks, leading to extreme indebtedness and further
53
54 reduced capacity of the state to regulate and fund social security and welfare programs. As the global
55
56 financial crisis has shown (Kolb, 2010), large-scale, state-funded rescue packages can lead to, what is
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1
2 called, a socialization of risk, contributing to extreme income and wealth gaps in society (Lee &
3
4 Woodward, 2012).
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8 *Doomsday scenario 3: Rise of civil wars*

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10 We might also witness states increasingly incapable or unwilling to legislate against organized violence,
11
12 which will lead to increased lawlessness and the exponential increase of ‘uncivil society’ actors, including
13
14 terrorist organizations and guerrilla groups. In this scenario, democratic rights and duties as well as civil
15
16 liberties have been abolished, as the governance space is dominated by violent civil society organizations
17
18 emerging in an unregulated society. Both, states and firms, will increasingly have difficulty in controlling
19
20 any monopoly of organized violence, leading to lawlessness and civil war-like social conditions. In this
21
22 scenario, disorganized, uncoordinated, non-controlled violence becomes (again) the central trait of how
23
24 society works, resembling pre-modern state dynamics (Bloomfield et al., 2017). It is likely that groups
25
26 that dominate this scenario, i.e. terrorist and guerilla organizations, establish symbiotic and violent
27
28 relations with private economic actors, which dominate scenario 2. Hence, terrorists, guerrillas, warlords,
29
30 mafia firms and their mercenaries are likely to be engaged in direct or proxy warfare with each other,
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32 fighting for regional or global control of the governance space of organized violence.
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40 **CONCLUSIONS**

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42 In this article we have conceptualized firm-state-civil society relations through the lens of business-
43
44 society governance of organized violence. Our inductive and interpretative approach to theorizing has
45
46 presented an ‘extreme’ perspective on business-society governance in which doomsday scenarios of
47
48 violence-based governance mechanisms emerge in response to social and environmental crises, such as
49
50 rapid climate change or outbreaks of contagious diseases. In this concluding section, let us reflect about
51
52 the implications of our analysis for management practitioners and scholars.
53
54

55
56 We should, above all, highlight that, while this article has conceptualized a governance triangle
57
58 of business-society relations, involving firms, states and civil society actors, ‘management’ cannot be
59
60 reduced to processes and structures in the domain of firms. Understanding governance as a continuous

1
2 struggle over differing interests, values and cultural perspectives (Bo et al., 2018) also implies that
3
4 ‘management’ should be understood as a dynamic relationship between firms, state and civil society
5
6 actors. As stakeholder theorists (Freeman et al., 2007) and political CSR scholars (Scherer et al., 2014)
7
8 have argued for a while, management can be seen as a third space in the dynamic interactions between a
9
10 range of different societal actors. Building on these understandings, the purpose of this article has been
11
12 to show that these business-society relations are by no means always following ‘win-win’ scenarios. On
13
14 the contrary, these relations should be understood as conflictual, involving violence and, more precisely,
15
16 organized violence. Our goal has hence been to read an interdisciplinary set of literatures to conceptualize
17
18 business-society relations as a dynamic process of organized violence, giving rise to a range of doomsday
19
20 scenarios that may or may not already be visible in contemporary society. We argue that anyone involved
21
22 in the management and governance of business-society relations should take note of these possible
23
24 scenarios that paint a bleak, but possible, picture of contemporary and future society. The doomsday
25
26 scenarios that have emerged out our inductive reading and theorizing are by no means inevitable. As we
27
28 have emphasized through this article, relations between firms, states and civil society will always involve
29
30 contestations and struggles, producing a range of different outcomes. It is our hope that our analysis
31
32 contributes affirmatively to these contestations, providing societal actors with conceptual tools to
33
34 critically analyze business-society relations and enabling more just and ethical futures to emerge. This
35
36 also implies that managers of governance relations can be a force for good. If they are aware of the
37
38 doomsday scenarios of the future analyzed in this paper, it would be our hope that they are able to shift
39
40 the balance of power with the governance triangle, helping to avert the worst potential outcomes in
41
42 relation to more distributed violence capabilities.
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49 In conclusion, let us outline the three main contributions this article makes to the management
50
51 and organization studies literature:
52

53 First, we have argued that firms are embedded in dynamic governance relations, which are not
54
55 always defined by so-called ‘win-wins’ (e.g. Cochran & Wood, 1984; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). That
56
57 is, the relations between states, firms and civil society actors are not necessarily harmonious or stable.
58
59 On the contrary, they are very dynamic and often determined by conflict (Levy & Kaplan, 2008; Bo et
60

1
2 al., 2018; Midttun, 2005) as well as sensitive to pressures from systemic and global socio-economic and
3
4 environmental crises. Building on this extant literature, we have suggested the idea that these conflicts
5
6 can also involve violence, and more precisely organized violence (Kraemer et al., 2013; Banerjee,
7
8 2011a,b).
9

10
11 Second, we have argued that the privatization-of-violence view (Wulf, 2011) may be too limited,
12
13 proposing, instead, a violence-based view of business-society relations, using a governance triangle
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15 perspective. In other words, our approach problematizes the idea that the state has a monopoly of
16
17 organized violence that can be altered either by transferring functions and capabilities to private firms or
18
19 by the emergence of civil society actors. Instead, basing our argument on an interdisciplinary set of
20
21 literatures, we have developed six propositions that show the complex and dynamic relations of
22
23 organized violence between states, firms and civil society.
24
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26
27 Third, key to our approach is the idea that organized violence is a strategic asset that triggers
28
29 conflictual views and interests, and can be subject to processes of commodification, and thus be
30
31 mobilized and traded as any other strategic asset in a neo-liberal world. In line with this view, Barros
32
33 (2012, p. 56) sees “violence itself a commodity-form”, which he calls ‘security’, highlighting that we can
34
35 formalize “security as a marketable commodity [...]. Thus, if security is a marketable commodity
36
37 expressible economically, then it is possible to refer to security goods and security trades as variables of
38
39 the system”. In our approach, we have identified key dynamics shaping this process and enlarged the
40
41 spectrum of actors involved.
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43

44
45 Based on existing literature in management and organization studies, war, peace and security
46
47 studies, political theory and international relations, we have presented a first attempt to conceptualize
48
49 the governance of organized violence and violence-based doomsday scenarios, focusing on the dynamic
50
51 relations between state institutions, private firms and civil society actors. Given the intensification and
52
53 unpredictability of global challenges, the increase of political violence, terrorist activism, rapid climate
54
55 change, breakdown of liberal-democratic values and rise of authoritarianism, we highlight the importance
56
57 for management and organizational scholars to further engage with our conceptualization of organized
58
59 violence and develop an interdisciplinary research agenda fit for an uncertain future.
60

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


Figure 2 - The governance triangle of organized violence - the current literature




Figure 3 - The governance triangle of organized violence - Propositions





Figure 4 - The governance triangle of organized violence - Doomsday scenarios



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Table 1 – Relations between core tensions and pressures, challenges in the governance triangle and doomsday scenarios

Exemplary narratives from the literature	Core tensions and pressures	Leading to core challenges	Propositions on firm-state-civil society relations of organized violence	Leading to doomsday scenarios
<p>“ [...] Over the past decade, many governments have found it increasingly difficult to recruit enough qualified uniformed personnel for combat and post-conflict operations. They have consequently come to depend more and more on Private Military Corps (PMC) and Private Security Corps (PSC) for training, repair, and maintenance of weapons systems and vehicles; collection of intelligence information; interrogation of prisoners of war; asset protection; and support of troops and police personnel in operational theatres. As a result, thousands of PMCs and PSCs, keen to cash in on this new market, have rapidly emerged. Contractors are hired to provide support before and during wars and, increasingly, to assist with post-war programs.” (Wulf, 2011: 139)</p> <p>“The private management of prisons has become a hotly debated issue in many countries across the world, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). Some of these countries have a long history of privately managed prisons of one sort or another stretching back into the nineteenth century and beyond.” (Alonso and Andrew, 2016 : 236)</p>	<p>1/ Increased economic and social incentives to ‘privatize’ and liberalize the monopoly of violence (Kinsey, 2006; Alonso & Andrews, 2016; McFate, 2017)</p> <p>2/ Limited capacity to challenge any violation of laws or state deliberating tolerating it (Volkov, 2016)</p>	<p>A/ State confronted with increasing trade-offs on which public assets to manage (Krahmann, 2009; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2010)</p> <p>B/ State has limited resources/capabilities/willingness to maintain or re-establish a monopoly of organised violence (Bush, 2008; Obi, 2010; Volkov, 2016; Crawford & Botchwey, 2017)</p>	<p>P1a: Outsourcing of violence and security to firms</p> <p>State → Firms</p>	<p>D1: Rise of military dictatorships</p>
<p>“Major elements of China’s strategy in the region, such as increased migration of Han and increased state control/management of ethnic minority religious and cultural expression, have been major ongoing sources of Uyghur grievance against the state. The state’s response to this has consisted of alternating periods of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policies toward ethnic minority religious and cultural expression.” (Clarke, 2010: 545)</p> <p>“The declaration of a ‘war on terror’ marked the most obvious, but by no means the only response to the rise in international terrorism. Immediately after the attacks of 11 September 2001, governments started to overhaul their countries’ systems of anti-terrorist legislation.” (Epifanio, 2011: 399)</p> <p>“[...] efforts to implement the intervention of the executive branch of the state also involved the use of force via police action. For example, at Caimanes [Chile] the police broke up a roadblock with the use of riot control gear, and then demolished the campsite in March 2015, on day 76 of protest. The roadblock was organized in protest at the absence of any action after the supreme court ruling in October in 2014 requesting Pelambres to disassemble the El Mauro tailings dam. Members of the community told us that such intervention was really a form of protecting the interests of the company instead of complying with the court order to dismantle the El Mauro dam.” (Maher et al., 2019: 1181)</p> <p>“This police practice of planting weapons on protestors once in custody was common during the Tía Maria conflict. This conflict began in 2009, yet</p>	<p>1/ Increase or persistence of political instability and social unrest (Clarke, 2010; Beckman, 2016)</p> <p>2/ Response to exogenous shocks (e.g. climate change, terrorist attacks, conflicts with other state(s) or internal guerrillas, pandemics) (Epifanio, 2011; Beckman, 2016)</p>	<p>A/ State pursues a political agenda to repress minorities/ suppress human/ democratic rights (Dunlap, 2019; Maher et al., 2019)</p> <p>B/ State needs to quickly react to unforeseen circumstances/events (Epifanio, 2011)</p>	<p>P1b: Deployment of state armies and security forces</p> <p>State → Civil society</p>	

<p>1 Southern Copper Peru, a subsidiary of Grupo Mexico, already began 2 assessing the mineral reserve situated above the agricultural Tambo Valley 3 in 2000.” (Dunlap, 2019: 11)</p>				
<p>4 “Under the conditions in Russia in the mid-1990s, where the boundaries 5 between public and private violence became blurred, when the de facto 6 capacity to enforce and thereby define justice gained priority over written 7 laws, when protection and taxation were increasingly privatized, the very 8 existence of the state as a unified entity and of the public domain itself was 9 called into question.” (Volkov, 2016:7)</p> <p>10 “The additional profits from the [Italian] Mafia’s economic activities in the 11 legal sector that created the capital reserves that in turn made possible its 12 entrance as a major player in the international drug trade in the 1970s and 13 1980s. It is striking that a substantial portion of these capital reserves can be 14 traced directly to Mafia penetration of the public administration. [...] The 15 1970s and 1980s, however, were characterized by the growing political 16 autonomy of the Mafia, which formed ‘Mafia-political lobbies’ to advance its 17 interests and at times directly assumed positions of political and 18 administrative power at the local level (Chubb, 1996: 275-276)</p> <p>19 “[...] thanks to the inherently transnational character of the Internet, the 20 physical location of criminal actors is less important than it was before, 21 providing them with the possibility to operate in countries where there are 22 loopholes in legislation and security that can be exploited or to easily 23 connect with distant criminal peers” (Lavorgna, 2015: 156)</p>	<p>1/ Increased interest of organised crime to control socio-economic activities/assets in key regions or sectors, due to weak/fragile political and institutional conditions (Riccardi, 2014; Chin, 2016; Volkov, 2016)</p> <p>2/ Increased capacity of organised crime/violent organizations to influence political arenas and institutions (Beckert & Wehinger, 2012; Albanese, 2014; Kilby, 2013)</p>	<p>A/ Private firms control specific geographical areas or economic sectors since the state lacks resource and/or capabilities (Chubb, 1996; Naím, 2012; Lavorgna, 2015)</p> <p>B/ Private firms share or take over the political and economic control of certain areas/societal groups in agreement with the State (or some of its representatives) (Volkov, 2016; Enamorado et al., 2016)</p>	<p>P2a: ‘Mafia-like’ economic organizations</p> <p>Firms → State</p>	<p>D2: Rise of private security monopolies and oligopolies</p>
<p>23 “Security authorities, following Brigadier General Kitson’s (1971/2010) 24 advice, have come to view opposition in different stages of proto-insurgent 25 activity: the ‘preparatory period’ and ‘non-violence phase,’ which are viewed 26 as precursors to an ‘insurgency’ that challenges the legitimacy and operations 27 of governments and resource extraction companies. This leads authorities to 28 respond with various pre-emptive and sustained efforts, mixing concession 29 and coercion to defuse social movements and their consequent disruptions of 30 business. It is from this perspective that we analyse the operations of 31 Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk (RWE), looking at how so-called 32 ‘insurgency’ is defined and how governments and companies collaborate to 33 legitimise their operations and ‘pacify’ opposition (Brock and Dunlap, 2018: 34 35)</p> <p>35 “When resistance against the proposed mine emerged in Niyamgiri [India], 36 both the corporation and state responded with counter-mobilization efforts 37 in an attempt to quell opposition to the mine. [...] Two black jeeps driven 38 by pro-Vedanta ‘goons’ regularly traversed the mountains and some 39 Vedanta supporters even occupied a hut in a Dongria Kondh village to 40 demonstrate their continued presence and intimidate villagers. Pro- 41 corporate ‘thugs’ appeared in villages and at resistance meetings, 42 intimidating attendees and those who spoke out against the mine. The 43 heavy-handed tactics and violence by various pro-corporate actors are well 44 documented by international NGOs, building on information gathered with 45 the support of local and NAN activists” (Kraemer et al., 2013: 841)</p>	<p>1/ Increased interest of private businesses to control socio- economic activities/assets in key regions or sectors (Sullivan et al., 2011; Kraemer et al., 2013)</p> <p>2/ Response to social unrest, political instability and institutional uncertainty (Brock and Dunlap, 2018)</p>	<p>A/ Private firms are legally entitled and legitimised to exert monopoly of violence in certain regions or sectors (Newell, 2005; Banerjee, 2011b; Sampat, 2015)</p> <p>B/ Private firms receive economic and political powers from the state as part of a political agenda (Brock & Dunlap, 2018)</p>	<p>P2b: Deployment of private security forces and division of resistance</p> <p>Firms → Civil society</p>	

<p>1 “[...] warlords, organized crime, militias, rebels, and even youth gangs and 2 child soldiers have increasingly fought in wars and violent conflicts” (Wulf, 3 2011: 138)</p> <p>4 “In Pakistan, the central state in Islamabad has little control of the “tribal 5 areas” such as Waziristan. Similarly, the Iraqi state in Baghdad exercises 6 little authority in Kurdistan. In the case of Pakistan, the tribal areas have 7 existed since the formation of the country in 1947, and even though they 8 have been largely out of the control of the central state, they have also been 9 represented within it. Under the 1973 Constitution the tribal areas had eight 10 representatives in the National Assembly elected by the tribal elders (the 11 Maliks). Under General Musharraf’s regime this was increased to twelve. In 12 Iraq, while the peshmerga militia control the streets of Mosul, a coalition of 13 Kurdish political parties keeps the government in power in Baghdad 14 (Acemoglu et al., 2013; p:6)</p>	<p>1/ Increased political, cultural and religious struggles in society between classes, groups or regional minorities (Sandbrook & Romano, 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2013)</p> <p>2/ Raise of economic inequality and social unrest, collective fear or distrust for public authorities and political organizations (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009; Dalgaard- Nielsen, 2010)</p>	<p>A/ Groups in society, minorities question the state capacity or legitimacy to maintain and enforce a shared social contract (Duyvesteyn, 2004; Gupta, 2008; Khalil, 2013)</p> <p>B/ Unclear distinction between state and violent civil society group in the control of violence (Shah; 2006)</p>	<p>P3a: Guerrilla warfare and terrorist organizations</p> <p>Civil society → State</p>	<p>D3: Rise of civil wars</p>
<p>15 “[...] the majority of Hamas’s resources were spent (prior to their 2006 16 election victory) on the social and welfare programs that the movement 17 provides to the Palestinians. [...] The Nepali Maoists similarly employed a 18 wide range of nonviolent methods with the aim of generating support 19 during their “People’s War.” They lowered rents in their areas of influence, 20 and in certain cases even fulfilled their promise to redistribute “land to the 21 tiller.” They also undertook campaigns in support of female inheritance 22 rights and employment, and in opposition to polygamy, prostitution, and 23 domestic violence. In addition, they provided community justice, with a 24 focus on crimes such as corruption, rape, and murder.” (Khalil, 2013: 422- 25 423)</p> <p>26 “In April 2014, Bembe armed fighters assaulted the town of Misisi, a 27 burgeoning artisanal gold mining site located in Fizi territory in South Kivu 28 province, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Getting close to 29 the compound of CASA Minerals, a Virgin Islands incorporated company 30 engaged in gold exploration, the assailants framed their attack as a protest 31 against the alleged sale to CASA of ‘their’ hill, the gold-rich Akyanga 32 Mountain, seen as part of the Babembe’s ancestral grounds. He presented 33 this action as a way to express disapproval with Banro’s alleged surpassing 34 of its concession limits, and the derisory compensation offered to 35 expropriated peasants. At the face of it, these actions constitute violent 36 reactions against the intensifying expansion of industrial mining in the 37 eastern Congo, which threatens the livelihoods and ways of life of hundreds 38 of thousands of people depending both directly and indirectly on artisanal 39 mining” (Verweijen, 2017: 466-467)</p>	<p>1/ Increased needs for social and economic justice / fairness or political representation in response to firms exploitation of public assets (Taylor, 2011; Verweijen, 2017)</p> <p>2/ Response to scandals or misconducts perpetrated by private businesses (Obi, 2010; Pedersen, 2014)</p>	<p>A/ Civil society actors ensure and provide social security, income redistribution, voice, and 'safety nets' to citizens in opposition to the state (Khalil, 2013; Gerber, 2011; Lyons & Westoby, 2014)</p> <p>B/ Civil society actors control and monitor of private businesses’ operations due to lack of capacity or interest from the state (Verweijen, 2017)</p>	<p>P3b: Mobilization of violent resistance</p> <p>Civil society → Firms</p>	