



Secularism Confronts Islamism:

Divergent Paths of Transitional Negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia

Submitted by **Mohammad A A Affan** to the University of Exeter

as a thesis for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Middle Eastern Politics

In August 2020

This thesis is available for library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

I certify that all material in this thesis, which is not my work, has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature: Mohammad Abdul-Monaem Abdul-Hamid Affan

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M.A. Affan". The signature is stylized and includes a horizontal line that extends to the right, underlining the name.

ABSTRACT

The secularist-Islamist conflict proved to be a major hindrance in front of democratisation and a main source of political instability in the Middle East. Therefore, this thesis is an attempt to obtain a clear understanding of the transitional negotiations between the Islamists and secularists in the Arab Spring countries, namely: Egypt and Tunisia. The main research question is: Why did the Islamists and secularists in Tunisia manage to reach a political compromise while they failed in Egypt?

This entails answering three questions: What do Islamism and secularism exactly mean in the context of the Arab Spring? Who negotiated with whom on what during the transitional period? And what were the determinants that shaped the negotiation process and affected its results?

First, it is argued in this thesis that Islamism and secularism are two sets of competing political ideologies – or worldviews in their extreme versions – with contesting projects for modernisation and rationalisation of religion. Both are not static mutually exclusive categories; instead, they are grand concepts or banners, under which different tendencies and orientations gather.

Second, the root causes of this conflict in the case studies can be summarised in three main issues: the political arrangements for power-sharing during the transitional period, the poor performance of the Islamist-dominated governments, and ideologically-driven disagreements during the constitution-making process. The articles related to the political and social role of Islam, whether and how the *Shari'ah* should be enshrined in the constitution, the universality of human rights, and the freedom of consciousness and

faith, among many other issues ignited severe secularist-Islamist polarisation in Egypt and Tunisia.

Third, three sets of variables have shaped the transitional negotiation between the Islamists and secularists in Egypt and Tunisia: the macro-structural variables related to the secularist nature of the pre-transition regime and the role of the military institution in the transitional administration, the meso-structural variables related to the balance of power between the negotiating parties and the degree of maturity and autonomy of the civil society organisations, and the micro-agential variables related to the degree of the negotiating elites' inclusiveness, legitimacy, capacities, and pragmatism.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

To my supervisor, Dr Omar Ashour, for his continuous support and expert guidance,

To my beloved family for their unconditional love and unwavering care,

And, finally, to all martyrs of freedom in the squares of Arab revolutions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	1
Acknowledgement.....	3
Table of Contents	4
List of Acronyms	7
List of Figures	8
List of Tables	9
Transliteration	10
<u>Chapter One:</u> Introduction	11
1.1 Objectives, Research Questions, and Hypotheses	17
1.2 Research Design and Methodology	21
1.3 Theoretical Framework	27
1.4 Thesis Outline	35
<u>Chapter Two:</u> Conceptual Framework	38
2.1 Secularism and Islamism As Two Competing Versions of Modernised Islam	44
2.1.1 Secularism as a Modern Form of Religiosity	45
2.1.2 Islam and Islamism: An Attempt at Differentiation	55
2.2 Multiple Secularisms, Multiple Islamisms	63
<u>Chapter Three:</u> Review of Literature	79
3.1 Transitional Negotiations in the Pre-Arab Spring Experiences	79
3.2 The Literature on Transitional Negotiations During the Arab Spring	97
<u>Chapter Four:</u> Background	112
4.1 Contested Transitions	112
4.2 Mapping of the Islamist and the Secularist Political Forces	122
4.3 Causes of the Secularist-Islamist Disagreement in Egypt and Tunisia	133
4.4 Transitional Negotiations and National Dialogues in Egypt and Tunisia	143

4.4.1 Transitional Negotiations, National Dialogues, and Pact-making Attempts in Egypt	144
4.4.1.1 Together We Start Building: A Dialogue for Egypt	144
4.4.1.2 <i>‘Iṣṣām Sharaf’</i> s Dialogue	145
4.4.1.3 <i>Yaḥiā ‘Al-Jamal’</i> s Dialogue	146
4.4.1.4 <i>‘Abdul-‘Azīz Ḥigāzī’</i> s Dialogue.....	148
4.4.1.5 The National Council Conferences.....	149
4.4.1.6 <i>‘Alī ‘Al-Salmī’</i> s Dialogues and Documents	153
4.4.1.7 <i>Sāmī ‘Anān’</i> s Dialogue	155
4.4.1.8 SCAF Dialogue with the Parliament-represented Parties	157
4.4.1.9 Fairmont Accord	161
4.4.1.10 <i>Maḥmūd Mikkī’</i> s Dialogue	164
4.4.1.11 Minister of Defence <i>‘Abdul-Fattāḥ ‘Al-Sīsī’</i> s Call for Dialogue..	166
4.4.1.12 <i>‘Al-‘Azhar</i> Document to Renounce Violence	167
4.4.2 Transitional Negotiations, National Dialogues, and Pact-making Attempts in Tunisia	170
4.4.2.1 The Negotiations to Establish the HIROR	170
4.4.2.2 <i>Ben ‘Āshūr’</i> s Dialogue	171
4.4.2.3 The Pledge of the Republic Document	173
4.4.2.4 The National Dialogue Conference – First Round	175
4.4.2.5 <i>Majlis ‘Al-Ḥukamā’</i> “Council of the Wise” Dialogue	178
4.4.2.6 National Dialogue Sponsored by President <i>‘Al-Munṣif ‘Al-Marzūqī’</i>	180
4.4.2.7 National Dialogue Conference – Second Round	181
4.4.2.8 The National Conference to Combat Violence and Terrorism....	182
4.4.2.9 The Quartet-Sponsored National Dialogue	183
<u>Chapter Five: Results</u>	192
5.1 Macro-Structural Set of Variables	194
5.1.1 The Nature of the Pre-Transition Regimes	199
5.1.2 The Role of Military Institution During the Transition	218

5.2 Meso-Structural Set of Variables	243
5.2.1 The Balance of Power Between the Negotiating Parties.....	245
5.2.2 The Maturity and the Plurality of the Civil Society	264
5.3 Micro-Agential Set of Variables	285
5.3.1 Elites' Unity and Legitimacy	286
5.3.2 Elites' Capacity and Experience	298
<u>Chapter Six: Discussion and Conclusion</u>	318
6.1 Making Sense of the Concepts of Islamism and Secularism	318
6.2 Transitional Negotiations During the Arab Spring: New Dynamics?	322
6.3 The Determinants of the Transitional Negotiations Course and Outcome	331
6.4 Concluding Remarks	342
References	346

LIST OF ACRONYMS

- **ANC:** National Constituent Assembly
- **BDP:** Building and Development Party
- **CRP:** Congress for the Republic Party
- **CSOs:** Civil Society Organisations
- **EMP:** Ennahda Movement Party
- **ETUF:** Egyptian Trade Unions Federation
- **FJP:** Freedom and Justice Party
- **HIROR:** High Authority for the Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition
- **ISIE:** High Independent Authority for Elections
- **LTDH:** Tunisian Human Rights League
- **MB:** Muslim Brotherhood
- **NDP:** National Democratic Party
- **NLPR:** National Leagues for the Protection of Revolution
- **NSF:** National Salvation Front
- **ONAT:** Tunisian Bar Association
- **RCD:** Rally for Constitutional Democracy Party
- **RYC:** Revolutionary Youth Coalition
- **SCAF:** Supreme Council of Armed Forces
- **SCC:** Supreme Constitutional Court
- **T-NSF:** Tunisian National Salvation Front
- **UGTT:** Tunisian General Labour Union
- **UTICA:** Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts

LIST OF FIGURES

- **Fig. 1:** The differentiation of the political and religious authorities in the Islamic experience.
- **Fig. 2:** Parameters of secularism concept sub-categorisation.
- **Fig. 3:** Sub-categorisation of secularism and Islamism ideologies.
- **Fig. 4:** Horseshoe-shaped continuum of secularism and Islamism sub-ideologies.
- **Fig. 5:** Independent variables affecting the output of elite negotiations during the transition.
- **Fig. 6:** The gap between the ideological preferences of the Islamists and secularists in Egypt and Tunisia.
- **Fig. 7:** “The Army and the People Are One Hand” Poster.

LIST OF TABLES

- **Table 1:** Differences between the sub-categories of secularism.
- **Table 2:** Transition patterns and the associated negotiations criteria, according to I. William Zartman.
- **Table 3:** Institutional arrangements to fill the power vacuum in Egypt during the transitional period.
- **Table 4:** Institutional arrangements to fill the power vacuum in Tunisia during the transitional period.
- **Table 5:** Mapping of political forces competed during the transitional period in Egypt.
- **Table 6:** Mapping of political forces competed during the transitional period in Tunisia.
- **Table 7:** Comparing the Egyptian and the Tunisian militaries according to the Military Balance Report 2010.
- **Table 8:** Comparing the Egyptian and the Tunisian militaries according to the Global Militarisation Index Report 2010.
- **Table 9:** Results of the ANC elections in October 2011.
- **Table 10:** Results of the parliamentary and the presidential elections during the transitional period in Egypt.
- **Table 11:** Comparing the rate of citizens' membership in voluntary organisations in Egypt and Tunisia according to the World Value Survey, Wave VI.
- **Table 12:** The evaluation of the Egyptian civil society in the USAID reports in 2011, 2012, and 2013.
- **Table 13:** The degree of inclusiveness of the main negotiation rounds during the transitional period in Egypt.

TRANSLITERATION

أ	اَ	ط	ṭ
ا	ā	ظ	ẓ
ب	b	ع	ʿ
ت	t	غ	gh
ث	th	ف	f
ج	j	ق	q
ح	ḥ	ك	k
خ	kh	ل	l
د	d	م	m
ذ	dh	ن	n
ر	r	هـ	h
ز	z	و	w/ū
س	s	ي	i/ī
ش	sh	اَ-	a
ص	ṣ	اُ-	u
ض	ḍ	اِ-	i

CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION

Middle Eastern scholars were clearly blindsided by the Arab Spring* given that almost “no social scientist was able to foresee what happened.”¹ Not only its occurrence, but the nature of the uprisings too was a surprise. Many scholars and policymakers thought that any challenge to the authoritarian regimes in the MENA region would unleash a wave of Islamist revolutions. However, the Arab Spring cannot, by any means, be described as Islamist. Although protestors deployed religious rituals such as praying in squares and utilised religious times such as Friday prayers and religious places such as mosques as rallying points, these religious rituals were only part of the regular routines of all pious Arabs, rather than an indicator of the uprisings’ Islamist nature.²

Furthermore, in the case of Egypt, it was argued that the new social movements that played the key role in calling for and organising the demonstrations on 25 January 2011 were predominantly secularist; therefore, the banners and slogans which were raised during the ‘*Al-Taḥrīr*’ sit-in were not religious.³ The Islamist movements, though, denied the accusation of being under-represented or joining the uprisings late. They argued

* Academic works use different terms to describe the wave of political unrest and violence that has swept the MENA region since December 2010 such as uprisings, revolts, revolutions, *refolutions*, regime change cascade, and *intifāḍāt*. Disagreement on the appropriate term to describe these events is due to their hybrid complicated nature. Popular mobilisation, civil wars, military coups, democratisation, political reforms, and failing states have intermingled together within this phenomenon. For clarity, concepts associated with deep theoretical debates such as revolution will be avoided in this thesis. Also, the dynamic and the outcome of these events are varied and uncertain to use concepts like regime change or democratisation. Therefore, the widely used term “the Arab Spring” seems to be a more convenient option, as well as other descriptive terms such as uprisings and revolts.

¹ Asef Bayat, “The Arab Spring and its Surprises”, *Development and Change* 44, 3 (2013): 587.

² *Ibid*, 590.

³ Nadine Sika, “Dynamics of a Stagnant Religious Discourse and the Rise of New Secular Movements in Egypt” in *Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond*, eds. Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi, 63 (Cairo; New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012).

that the secularists got that impression because the Islamist members intentionally avoided raising their banners and slogans in order to prevent *Mubārak* regime from defaming the uprisings and cracking down on the protestors under the claim of fighting extremism and terrorism.⁴

This heterogeneous nature of the uprisers and their ideologies and slogans led some scholars, such as Asef Bayat and Olivier Roy, to consider the Arab Spring as a post-Islamist phenomenon for neither Islamism nor secularism was on the demonstrators' agenda.⁵

Nevertheless, it seems that the Arab Spring represented a chance for a new round in the confrontation between secularists and Islamists in some countries such as Egypt and Tunisia. Disputes between both political trends sparked shortly after getting rid of their common enemy: the autocratic rulers. First, they disagreed on how to lead the transitional period. Then, polarisation grew deeper with the political competition in the parliamentary and presidential elections and the ideological disagreements during the drafting of the constitution.

In Egypt, *Ḥizb 'Al-Ḥurriyyah wa 'Al-'Adālah* (the Freedom and Justice Party or FJP), the political party of *'Al-'Ikhwān 'Al-Muslimūn* (the Muslim Brotherhood or MB), got the largest number of seats in the 2011 parliamentary elections. Furthermore, the party's candidate *Muḥammad Mursī* won the presidential elections the following year. In

⁴ Interviewee no. 3: September 18, 2019 – Istanbul.

⁵ Asef Bayat, "The Post-Islamist Revolutions: What the Revolts in the Arab World Mean?", *Foreign Affairs*, 26 April 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-africa/2011-04-26/post-islamist-revolutions> (accessed 4 July 2017).

Olivier Roy, "Islamic Revival and Democracy: The Case in Tunisia and Egypt" in *Arab Society in Revolt: The West's Mediterranean Challenge*, eds. Cesare Merlini and Olivier Roy, 47 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).

Tunisia, *Hizb Ḥarakat 'Al-Nahḍah* (the Ennahda Movement Party or EMP), the Tunisian equivalent of the MB,* achieved the first place in the National Constituent Assembly (ANC)** elections in October 2011 to form a government headed by *Ḥammādī 'Al-Jibālī*, the Secretary-General of the party.

On the other side, the youth activists who mostly belonged to secularist social movements and were at the forefront of the uprisings failed to take a significant share in power because they lacked clear political agenda and were not capable of building strong political parties.⁶ These political gains achieved by the Islamist movements in the early transitional period awakened the secularists' fears of being marginalised and oppressed by an Islamist majoritarian tyranny.

Mutual fears and distrust were further reinforced during constitutional drafting attempts. For instance, two Constituent Assemblies were established in Egypt: The first, although it was elected jointly by the two houses of parliament, failed to convene because it was ruled out as unconstitutional. Selection of the Assembly's members with apparent Islamist majority and with the participation of the members of the parliament pushed

* The relationship between the EMP and the MB is a little bit problematic. No doubt, the founders of the EMP (*Rāshid 'Al-Ghannūshī* and *'Abdul-Fattāḥ Mūrū*) were greatly influenced by the Brotherhood's intellectuals (*Ḥassan 'Al-Bannā* and *Sayyid Quṭb*). However, they adopted an unorthodox version of the MB ideology, mixing it with other intellectual sources including the traditional Tunisian reformist legacy, Shiite political Islam ideologues (*'Al-Khūmainī*, *'Al-Ṣadr*, and *'Alī Sharī'atī*), and Western political ideologies. Concerning the organisational ties between the two movements, it has been reported that the EMP was part of the international entity of the MB, even if this entity was loose and not well-organised. *'Azmi Bishārah, 'althawrah 'altūnusiyah 'almajīdah: biniat thawrah wa ṣairūratahā min khilāl yaumiyyātihā* (Beirut: Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies, 2012), 173. Basheer Nafi, "Tunisia's Ennahda Can Change Its Discourse, But Not The Reality Of Political Islam", *Middle East Eye*, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/tunisia-ennahda-can-change-its-discourse-not-reality-political-islam-1737542604> (accessed 11 March 2020).

** It is abbreviated after its French name.

⁶ Cesare Merlini and Olivier Roy, "Introduction" in *Arab Society in Revolt* 7-9.

non-Islamists to boycott the constitution drafting process and submit a request to the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) to dissolve it.

Another attempt was carried out after the presidential elections; nevertheless, the second Assembly faced the same challenges and had to continue its work in a very turbulent condition with a wide boycott from non-Islamist groups. Even when the constitution draft was submitted for a referendum in December 2012, an aggressive campaign for boycott or “Vote No” was carried out by secularist groups, which resulted in a relatively low voter turnout and negative results in Cairo and some other major cities.⁷

In Tunisia, the case was very similar. A fierce confrontation between secularist and Islamist camps erupted during the drafting of the constitution on the role of Islam in the new political regime. While secularists insisted on a civil state, Islamists called for enshrining Islamic reference in the constitution, and the more extreme among them called for what they named the ‘*Al-Sharī‘ah* state.’⁸ This political stalemate hindered the elected ANC from delivering the constitution by the one-year deadline. Consequently, the legitimacy of the whole interim arrangements became at stake.⁹

Political polarisation continued to escalate in both countries throughout the transitional period in many manifestations: strikes, sit-ins, street clashes, black media campaigning, even political assassinations. Although some authors considered the secularist-Islamist conflict as a “hollow debate” and an “empty quarrel”; nevertheless, its impact on the

⁷ Nathan J. Brown, “Egypt’s Failed Transition”, *Journal of Democracy* 23 (2013): 47-49.

⁸ Amel Grami, “The Debate on Religion, Law and Gender in Post-Revolution Tunisia”, *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 40, 4-5 (2014): 391-392.

⁹ Abdul-Fattah Mady, “Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, *Cordoba Foundation Research Papers* (2016): 21.

democratisation process proved to be very subversive. Instead of focusing on the core issues such as consolidation of democracy, political rights, and economic reforms, secularists and Islamists turned against each other and engaged in counterproductive debates about implementation of *'Al-Sharī'ah* and the relationship between religion and state, accusing each other of being either theocratic or “Western puppets”.¹⁰

Many rounds of negotiations, national dialogues, and pact-making attempts were organised to contain this escalating polarisation. For example, in the period from March to November 2011, at least four attempts to make a pact of “supra-constitutional principles” between political elites in Egypt failed. Initiatives from the presidential candidate *Muḥammad 'Al-Barādī*, Deputy Prime Minister *Yahīā 'Al-Jamal*, Deputy Prime Minister *'Alī 'Al-Salmī*, and the Grand Imam of *'Al-'Azhar Aḥmed 'Al-Ṭayyib* faced rejection.¹¹

Islamists were sceptical of the drivers for these attempts and saw them as a manipulation to hollow out their electoral victory in the March 2011 referendum and to put constraints on the coming Constituent Assembly which they expected to dominate. The revolutionary youth movements shared their suspicions when the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) attempted to abuse the concept of supra-constitutional principles to maximise the privileges of the military institution.¹²

¹⁰ Tariq Ramadan, *The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East* (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 86-93.

¹¹ Mohamed H. Shaaban, “maṣr: ṣirā' 'alwathāiq 'aldustūriyyah”, *AlSharq AlAwsat Newspaper* <http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=45&article=650424&issueno=12043#.WVksF4iGODJ> (accessed 2 July 2017).

¹² Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz, “Democratization Theory and the Arab Spring”, *Journal of Democracy* 24 (2013): 22.

Moreover, during the year of *Muḥammad Mursī's* presidency, many attempts for dialogue were either ineffective or totally aborted.¹³ Eventually, the whole democratic transition in Egypt collapsed with the military coup launched on the 3rd of July 2013.

The summer of 2013 was also the peak of the secularist-Islamist confrontation in Tunisia. Anti-Islamist opposition organised a sit-in forcing the ANC to suspend its work and called for its dissolution. Influenced by the developments in Egypt, some secularist voices daringly demanded a military intervention to remove the EMP from power.¹⁴

However, in January 2014, it seemed that Tunisia could manage to avoid the catastrophic fate of the Egyptian transition. Marathon negotiations were organised by the Quartet Committee for National Dialogue (i.e., formed of four Tunisian civil society organisations or CSOs): the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), and the Tunisian Bar Association (ONAT).^{15*}

Thanks to this committee, the competing rivals succeeded in reaching an agreed-upon constitution and installing an impartial government. The huge efforts exerted by the Quartet Committee to overcome the obstacles in negotiation won it the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2015 “for its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution of 2011.”¹⁶

¹³ Mady, “Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, 72-73.

¹⁴ Ibid, 24.

¹⁵ ‘Anwar ‘Al-Jam‘āwī, “‘almashhad ‘alsiyāsī fī tūnis: ‘aldarb ‘alṭawīl naḥw ‘altawāfuq”. *Siyasat Arabiya* 6 (2014): 20.

* These institutions are abbreviated after their French names.

¹⁶ The Nobel Peace Prize 2015. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2015/ (accessed 22 November 2015)

As the secularist-Islamist conflict proved to be a major hindrance for democratisation and a main source of political instability in the Middle East, it is of great importance to study the recent round of this confrontation in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and to see how this chronic dispute could be contained through negotiations and other peaceful means. This is sorely needed to have a stable democratic MENA region.

1.1 Objectives, Research Questions, and Hypotheses

This thesis is an attempt to obtain a clear understanding of the conflict between the Islamists and secularists in the Arab Spring countries, namely in Egypt and Tunisia. To achieve this goal, the appropriate conceptual and theoretical approaches need to be carefully selected; then, the particular case studies will be examined in light of these frameworks.

Accordingly, the objectives of this thesis can be summarised as follows:

- i. To consult transition theories and critically review how they approach the topic of negotiations and pact-making during transitional periods.
- ii. To identify what the concepts of Islamism and secularism mean exactly in the context of the Arab Spring.
- iii. To specify the variables that could affect the outcome of transitional negotiations based on previous experiences such as transitions in Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America, post-communist countries, and Africa.

- iv. To explore the negotiations, national dialogues, and the attempts of pack-making in Egypt and Tunisia during the transitional period to understand their contexts, which political and social forces were involved, the core issues around which these negotiations revolved, and their results and outcomes.
- v. To examine structural and agential variables that affected the process and the outcome of the transitional negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia and to find out what the Arab Spring experience can add to the body of knowledge in the field of political transitions.

Given the varied courses and outcomes of the transitional negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia, despite the many similarities between both cases, the main research question in this thesis is: Why did the Islamists and secularists in Tunisia manage to reach a political compromise while they failed in Egypt?

Consequently, the dependent variable here is the outcome of negotiations and not the democratic transition itself. The success of the transition as a whole is a highly contested issue with different parameters and understandings, while successful negotiations simply mean that the negotiators reached an agreed-upon solution and overcame the political impasse.

As regards the independent variables, the transitional negotiations seem to be a very complicated and vulnerable process as it is affected by several variables: structural and agent-related, organisational and contextual. Therefore, many factors can account for the different outcomes of the secularist-Islamist negotiations in the case of Egypt and Tunisia such as the nature of the outgoing regime, the professionalism of the military institution, the balance of power between the negotiating parties, the influence of the

civil society, and the degree to which the negotiating elites were representative and skilful.

Many of the common-sense answers to the thesis question remain quite unsatisfactory. For instance, some arguments focused only on the direct actor-centric and contextual factors, overlooking the underlying structures. In other words, the claim that the Tunisian elites were more pragmatic and more willing to reach a compromise did not tell the whole story. Elites' behaviour is not solely determined by their convictions, personalities, and experiences. Deep structural factors did play a significant role in shaping the elites' choices and decisions.

Another simplistic, yet popular, argument claims that it was the coup in Egypt in 2013 that forced the EMP to compromise to avoid the same fate. This is not also the whole truth. On the one hand, the removal of the Egyptian MB from power, no doubt, sent a strong message to the EMP; however, it made the latter not only more willing to compromise, but also more cautious and reluctant to give up power without sufficient guarantees. On the other hand, the political attitude of the EMP throughout the transition was remarkably different than its Egyptian counterpart, even before the coup.

Therefore, a more meticulous examination is mandatory for a better understanding of the transitional negotiations in both countries, as well as the variables that determined their course and outcomes. This constitutes studying three sets of variables:

I. Macro-structural set of variables (i.e., at the state level)

In this set, two main variables will be highlighted:

i. The pattern of secularism adopted by the pre-transition authoritarian regime:

The hypothesis suggested here is that the more aggressive the secularism adopted by the pre-transition regime, the less favourable conditions to the Islamists' domination during the transition, the less ambitious their agenda, and the less advantageous their bargaining position.

ii. The nature of the military institution and its role in the transitional administration:

It is hypothesised that, with a high degree of societal militarisation and a previous history of military rule, it is highly expected that the military institution will intervene to control the transitional process and impose its ideological preferences on the negotiators by all means.

II. Meso-structural set of variables (i.e., at the level of organisations)

This set of variables is concerned with intermediary societal organisations, which include two factors:

iii. The negotiating parties and their bargaining position:

The balance of power, as manifested in the electoral results or the capacity for mobilisation, may favour one group during the negotiations. Relative bargaining power without a clear dominating group is supposed to facilitate compromise.

iv. The role of the CSOs during the negotiations:

This entails examining the degree of development and plurality of the CSOs. The proposed hypothesis is that the more developed and plural the civil society is, the more influential it is as a mediator and independent arbitrator during transitional negotiations.

III. Micro-agential set of variables:

This set of variables is concerned with the negotiating elites such as the degree of elites' inclusion in the negotiations, their legitimacy within their constituency, the degree of divergence between their preferences, their leadership capacity, and the degree of their flexibility and pragmatism. To put it another way, the transitional negotiations are more efficient if they include most of the relevant elites who enjoy authoritative leadership in their constituency, and who are skilful, pragmatic, and experienced enough to manage their differences.

1.2 Research Design and Methodology

In this thesis, the comparative politics approach will be applied. The issue of secularist-Islamist negotiations in the Arab Spring will be examined through two representative case studies: Egypt and Tunisia. The aim of comparison, in this case, is not to control; rather, to understand and explain and to “assess the validity of our interpretations of specific political phenomena.”¹⁷ Needless to say, this kind of comparison is not

¹⁷ Giovanni Sartori, “Comparing and Miscomparing”, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 3,3 (1991): 244. Jonathan Hopkin, “Comparative Methods”, in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, eds. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, 252 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

adequate for generalisation, but still has more explanatory power than a single case study.¹⁸

In general, there are two main strategies in comparative studies:^{*} large-N systematic deduction of grand theory and the more traditional case studies with small-n comparisons that lead inductively to middle-range theory.¹⁹ This thesis belongs to the latter because small-n research is more appropriate for descriptive, exploratory, and explanatory purposes.²⁰ It entails comparing a few countries with in-depth analysis and detailed knowledge.²¹ Small-n research, therefore, excels at studying rich and thick concepts and complex relationships.²²

Considering that the purpose of this study is to explore the political behaviour of the Egyptian and Tunisian Islamists and secularists during transitional negotiations to understand why compromise may or may not be achieved, and that the studied concepts and variables are thick and multi-dimensional, it is more helpful to follow this

¹⁸ Janet Johnson and H T Reynolds, *Political Science Research Methods* (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2012), 198-199.

^{*} Sometimes, comparative politics is argued to include three models (not two): comparing many countries using quantitative analysis or the statistical method, comparing a few countries using qualitative analysis or the comparative method, and single-country studies, which are by their nature not comparative but may have comparative merit.

Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 25.

¹⁹ Michael Coppedge, "Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories: Combining Large N and Small in Comparative Politics", *Comparative Politics* 31, 4 (1999): 465.

²⁰ Johnson and Reynolds, *Political Science Research Methods*, 196.

²¹ Kenneth Newton and Jan W Van Deth, *Foundations of Comparative Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 404.

²² Coppedge, "Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories", 475.

“more intensive, less extensive” research design, which is known as a focused comparison, comparable cases strategy, or case-oriented approach.^{23*}

The case studies were selected following John Stuart Mill’s “Method of Difference” or the “Most Similar Systems Design” to use Przeworski’s and Teune’s term. This design searches for the causes of diverse outcomes in similar countries, or as Mill put it, “comparing instances in which [a] phenomenon does occur, with instances – in other respects similar – in which it does not.”²⁴ In this research design, the selected case studies are very similar, except in regards to the variables whose relationship to each other is examined.²⁵ Mill says, “[i]f an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former: the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon”.²⁶ This strategy helps to narrow down the number of explanatory variables because many factors will be held constant.²⁷

On the one hand, Egypt and Tunisia are comparable in many aspects. *Muṣṭafa Kamil ʿAl-Sayyid*, for example, enumerated eight aspects of similarities between the Arab Spring phenomenon in Egypt and Tunisia: (i) their societies are relatively homogenous

²³ Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics*, 28.

* The case-oriented approach is defined as a comparison that “focuses on specific countries and the themes, patterns and tendencies within these countries.”

²⁴ Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative” *The American Political Science Review* 65, 3 (1971): 687.

Ahmet T. Kuru, *Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 35.

²⁵ Hopkin, “Comparative Methods”, in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 252.

²⁶ Johnson and Reynolds, *Political Science Research Methods*, 198.

²⁷ Hopkin, “Comparative Methods”, in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 254.

in comparison to the other Arab Spring countries; (ii) their pre-transition political systems showed many similarities as two republican regimes delegitimised because of their authoritarianism and corruption; (iii) the social and economic inequalities were a main driver for the popular revolt; (iv) social media was an essential tool for mobilisation in both countries; (v) their so-called revolutions were the shortest and relatively the most peaceful in the Arab Spring; (vi) their military institutions decided not to support the autocratic leaders in the face of the uprisers; (vii) the political debate during their transitional period was shaped by the secularist-Islamist polarisation as a result of the presence of a strong Islamist party; (viii) finally, both countries showed a demonstration effect on the other Arab Spring countries.²⁸

On the other hand, Egypt and Tunisia differ in the examined dependent variable: the outcome of the secularist-Islamist negotiation during the transitional period. While negotiating parties succeeded to reach a compromise in case of Tunisia, failed negotiation attempts between the Egyptian secularists and Islamists led to the collapse of the entire transitional process. However, as the consequences of the Arab Spring are still ongoing, and it is not possible to study “moving targets”,²⁹ the time frame of this research will be limited. In the case of Egypt, the research will cover the period between President *Ḥusnī Mubārak*’s stepdown on 11 February 2011 to the military coup that took place on 3 July 2013, as a clear sign of failed political consensus.* In Tunisia, the

²⁸ Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, “The Divergent Trajectories of Arab Dignity Revolts: Egypt and Tunisia” in *Re-envisioning West Asia: Looking Beyond the Arab Uprisings*, ed. Priya Singh, 188-191 (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2016).

²⁹ Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 9.

* As Huntington once stated, “military intervention in politics should be first understood as a reflection of and response to an extreme politicization of society.”

study will be confined to the period between the fall of President *Zain 'Al-'Ābidīn Ben 'Alī* on 14 January 2011 and 27 January 2014 – the date of the Tunisian constitution approval, which represents a sign of the successful negotiation between the rival political factions.

According to the “Method of Difference”, the proposed independent variables should be different between both cases too. Of course, Egypt and Tunisia can be different in countless ways (e.g., demography, geopolitical significance, and colonial legacy); however, only differences that seem to be relevant to the transitional negotiations will be considered. Also, it is noteworthy that the presence of other points of contrast between the selected case studies do not contradict the “Method of Difference” design because, as Mill himself admitted, finding cases which are identical in every respect except dependent and independent variables is impossible.³⁰

Regarding data collection technique, small-n comparative research is generally characterised by being heuristic and based on qualitative research methods such as observation and interviews.³¹ This methodology is “good at capturing meaning, process, and context” and seeks to understand and interpret actions rather than “drawing conclusions about relationships and regularities between statistical variables.”³²

Accordingly, multiple data sources and data collection techniques have been employed in this thesis, mainly:

Rina Kirkova and Tanja Milosevska, “The Success of Democratization in Post Arab Spring Societies”, *International Journal of Social Sciences III, 1* (2014): 33.

³⁰ Ibid, 253.

³¹ Newton and van Deth, *Foundations of Comparative Politics*, 404.

³² Fiona Devine, “Qualitative methods”, in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, eds. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 199, 201.

i. Document Analysis:

This means the examination of written, oral, and visual materials to come up with some qualitative or quantitative data.³³ The list of documents that were analysed in this thesis includes:

- All documents produced out of the transitional negotiations and national dialogues, which were collected and systematically examined to explore their content, whether the issue of religion and politics was addressed and how, and who were the participants in these dialogues.
- The pre-transition constitutions in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as all constitutional declarations and drafts produced during the transitional period. They were examined to explore the interim arrangements in both case studies and, more importantly, how the religion-related clauses were developed and modified in the successive constitutional proposals.
- International reports and surveys on Egypt and Tunisia issued by regional and international organisations. These documents were a rich source of qualitative and quantitative data related to the political regime, military institution, civil society, and public opinions in both countries.
- Other materials such as parties' platforms, the official statements of the leading elites, the media releases, and the electoral results were also included in the analysis.

ii. In-depth Interviews:

The interviews were the other main research tool for data collection. Although the planned field visit was cancelled for security and practical reasons, and although many

³³ Johnson and Reynolds, *Political Science Research Methods*, 278.

key actors were not available, nor accessible in the Egyptian case, semi-structured interviews were conducted in repeated visits to Istanbul, London, and Doha in Fall 2019 and Winter 2020. These interviews provide for significant data, especially in examining the variables related to the negotiating elites' qualities and behaviour.

To overcome the limitation of the interviews, though, two other sources were heavily utilised: the testimonies documented in the biographies books and the articles written by key figures during the transitional period and the interviews that had been previously conducted with those figures in newspapers, TV shows, and other media outlets.

iii. Secondary Sources:

Systematic consultation of relevant books and academic articles were beneficial, especially in setting the conceptual and theoretical frameworks and exploring the state of the field.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

In this thesis, negotiations between the political elites in Egypt and Tunisia regarding the role of religion in the new political regime will be examined. However, it will not be helpful to explore the dynamics and the variables affecting the outcome of these negotiations using classical theories of political negotiations. Obviously, transitional negotiations are organised in special circumstances and revolve around more foundational topics.

Therefore, it is more appropriate to examine these negotiations through the lenses of political transition and democratisation theories.³⁴ As negotiation and compromise among political elites was argued to be “at the heart of the democrati[s]ation processes”, these theories pay great attention to the issue of transitional negotiations.³⁵

Jean Grugel has stated that “theories of democrati[s]ation have been concerned chiefly with causation and the identification of the main factors that lead to the emergence of democracies.”³⁶ They can be considered as middle-range theories, inducted from comparative studies of democratic transitions, primarily from the mid-1970s or from the third wave of democratisation as it has been termed by Samuel Huntington. These studies were conducted on tens of cases in diverse geopolitical areas, namely: Eastern and Southern Europe, Latin America, post-communist countries, and Sub-Saharan Africa, aiming at understanding the phenomenon of democratisation and explaining why, when, and where it happens and what its prospects would be.³⁷

According to Grugel, democratisation theories classically have two approaches: the structuralist approach and the agency approach. The first is concerned with studying the structural prerequisites for democracy, such as mature capitalism or the level of societal modernisation, while the latter focuses on the elites’ bargaining and the strategic

³⁴ Mady, “Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, 15.

³⁵ Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship”, *World Politics* 54, 2 (2002): 224.

³⁶ Jean Grugel, *Democratization: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2002), 46.

³⁷ Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics*, 186.

Barbra Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?”, *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999):141.

choices they made. These actor-centric theories are usually termed transitions approach.³⁸

Unlike structuralist theories, the transition approach affirms that democracy is not a result of structural necessities; instead, it can be achieved by conscious choices of committed elites, independent of the structural setting. In this context, elites are defined as “persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organi[s]ations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. Elites are the principal decision-makers in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, and cultural organi[s]ations and movements in a society.”³⁹

The main propositions of transition theories can be summarised as follows:

First, democratisation is a process that is shaped by interactions and bargains between different groups of elites, essentially the authoritarian leaders and the democratic opposition.

Second, elites’ choices are continuously determined according to their definition and redefinition of their interests, preferences, and constraints.

³⁸ Gerardo L. Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff, “Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective” in *Transitions to Democracy* ed. Lisa Anderson, 194-195 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

Grugel, *Democratization*, 46.

Amel Ahmed and Giovanni Capoccia, “The Study of Democratization and the Arab Spring”, *Middle East Law and Governance* 6 (2014): 3-6.

³⁹ Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, “Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, eds. John Higley and Richard Gunther, 8 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

Third, successful transition depends upon reaching mutual agreements that put the foundations for the governing rules of the new regime.⁴⁰

If the concept of transition – in a casual sense – refers to “any country moving away from dictatorial rule”, these premises clearly do not fit for all cases of transitions.⁴¹ Rather, they only can be applied in a specific pattern called the *pacted* transition.

According to Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, there are four ideal-types of transitions based on two main criteria: whether the transition is a result of unilateral enforcement or multilateral compromise, and whether the impetus for transition came from below (i.e., subordinated excluded political, social, or economic forces) or from above (i.e., dominant elites or institutions in the authoritarian regime).⁴² These four ideal-types include:

- i. Imposition: This term described the regime change when it occurs as a result of unilateral enforcement from the dominant elites of an authoritarian regime.
- ii. Revolution: This occurs when masses use force successfully against the authoritarian incumbents and unilaterally drive regime change.
- iii. Reform: In this case, mass mobilisation is not efficient enough; therefore, it succeeds only to reach a compromised outcome.
- iv. Pact: This refers to the regime change imposed from above but through mutual agreements between the rival elites.⁴³

⁴⁰ Grugel, *Democratization*, 56-59.

⁴¹ Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, *Journal of Democracy* 13,6 (2002): 6.

⁴² Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, “*Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe*,” *International Social Science Journal* 128 (1991): 274.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 274-276.

The pact was defined by Guillermo O' Donnell and Philippe Schmitter as "an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement between a select set of actors which seeks to define, or better, to redefine rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the vital interests of those entering into it."⁴⁴ It aims at the establishment of a consensus between contending elites around the rules of the new political game and finding out formulas for power-sharing, distributing the spoils of office, and influencing policymaking.⁴⁵

The foundational pact, according to Karl, has its own characteristics that make it different from any other political agreements: (i) It has to be inclusive to all relevant elites;* (ii) it should be comprehensive, covering the main issues related to policymaking such as the form of government, civil-military relations, market management, and distribution of wealth; and (iii) its items should be interdependent and interlocking so that each party is assured that no one will threaten its vital interests, while it abstains from threatening other parties interests in return.⁴⁶

Although pacts are usually praised in the democratisation literature as a tool to create a more stable regime transition, they have also been objected to because they were considered undemocratic manoeuvring to protect the interests of the "traditional

⁴⁴ Guillermo O' Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 42

⁴⁵ Burton *et al.*, "Introduction" in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 3.

Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years", 120.

* However, some have argued that not it is only the masses who should be excluded from the pacted transitions, but radical elites should be sidelined too. They assumed that democracy is less likely to result if they become part of the equation.

McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship", 218.

⁴⁶ Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America", *Comparative Politics* 23, 1 (1990): 11.

dominant classes” and that they eventually lead to the institutionalisation of political exclusion.⁴⁷

Furthermore, some scholars consider the argument that pact-making is crucial for a successful transition a theoretical flaw. It was claimed once that “if the transition is not pacted, it is more likely to fail.”⁴⁸ However, later academic works on the fourth wave of democratisation in the post-communist countries and the regime change experience in Africa in the 1990s revealed that pacts do not enjoy such significance. Hence, it was concluded that pact-making was only a particular criterion of the third democratisation wave in Latin America, and Southern and Eastern Europe.⁴⁹

Transition theories, on the one hand, are generally criticised for being too elitist and voluntaristic by assuming that the democratisation is decisively an outcome of elites’ choices and preferences. They focus only on micro-processes of transition, overlooking macro-structural contexts and constraints. On the other hand, structuralist theories of democratisation are also accused of being too deterministic by assuming that democracy is an outcome of pre-determined social, economic, and historical preconditions.⁵⁰

To adequately capture the complexity of reality and to avoid the excessive voluntarism of transition theories and the excessive determinism of structural theories, democratisation theorists come up with the hybrid approach of structured contingency. If

⁴⁷ Grugel, *Democratization*, 59.

Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America”, 11-12

⁴⁸ McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship”, 216.

⁴⁹ Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 275.

McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship”, 221.

⁵⁰ Grugel, *Democratization*, 58-61.

the structural approach gives priority to analyse preconditions “embedded in the architecture of social systems” and if the contingent approach focuses on “the decisions and behavio[u]rs of individual political agents,” the structured contingency approach states that pre-existing structures are merely “confining conditions” that restrict or enhance – and not determine – available choices in front of political actors. In other words, deep structures should be considered, but they are better held as background factors.⁵¹

Some academic concepts are closely related to the structured contingency approach. Terry Karl, for instance, uses the concept of the path-dependent approach, which, according to her, examines how “structural and institutional constraints determine the range of options available to decision-makers and may even predispose them to choose a specific option.”⁵²

Also, Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle use another closely related concept, which is the politico-institutional approach. The institutions here refer to both formal and informal structures, which represent “sets of constraints on behaviour in the form of rules and regulations.” The politico-institutional approach, according to Bratton and Van De Walle, is “well suited to the analysis of regime transitions.” Its core proposition is that the interactions between the structures and the political actors are reciprocal, without any *a priori* supremacy.⁵³

⁵¹ Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America”, 7.

Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 20- 24.

⁵² Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America”, 7.

⁵³ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 40-42.

Consequently, the behaviour of political actors is not simply shaped by structural necessities, but it is also an independent force and an autonomous analytical variable on its own. Therefore, political actors do not struggle only with each other concerning the rules of the new political game, but also against the current design of societal and state institutions, and the outcome is the result of interactions between different competing groups, as well as the “authoritative rules” of institutions.⁵⁴

To conclude, variables that affected the dynamics and outcome of the transitional negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia will be examined through the structured contingency approach. The focus will be on the agential variables, as well as the structural constraints that affected the negotiating elites’ choices and strategies. However, the following points need to be taken into consideration regarding the theoretical approach:

First, in the classical literature on transitions, foundational negotiations and pact-making processes are concerned with the new rules of the political games in general, such as the government system, electoral law, military interests, and economic policies. Nevertheless, in this thesis, the scope will be narrowed down to focus exclusively on the issues related to the role of religion, Islam in this context, in the new regime, such as the codification of the *’Al-Sharī’ah*, religious freedoms, and minority rights.

Second, the transition literature usually describes a four-player game, which runs between hardliners and soft-liners of the *ancien régime* and the moderates and radicals from the democratic opposition.⁵⁵ In the context of the Arab Spring, this categorisation is not precise. As the disagreement on the religio-political issues became the main axis of

⁵⁴ Ibid, 42.

⁵⁵ McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship”, 216.

polarisation during the transitional period in the examined case studies, the negotiating groups are better classified into Islamists and secularists. Each of these categories could be further divided into sub-categories: the Islamists included the MB (or its analogues) and the more conservative Salafist trend, and the secularists consisted of the elites representing the opposition forces, as well as those affiliated with the *ancien régime*.

Third, out of all structural variables that were reported to impact the transition in the previous experiences, only those seem to be closely related to the transitional negotiations will be selected and examined. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity and following Michael Bratton's and Nicolas Van De Walle's study design, analysis of structural variables will focus exclusively on the domestic political variables (for instance: the pre-transition authoritarian regime, the transitional administration, the party system, and the CSOs). Other international and economic factors will be downplayed to be secondary and explanatory variables. As Bratton and Van De Walle previously argued, these factors are only relevant as much as they can influence the domestic political status.⁵⁶

1.4 Thesis Outline

This thesis will be divided into six chapters, including the introductory one. Chapter Two will be dedicated for clarification of the main concepts in this thesis: secularism and Islamism. This entails answering three questions: First, given the European and

⁵⁶ See: Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 19-41.

Christian origins of the concept of secularism, is it appropriate to use it in the Arab-Islamic context? And if so, what does it mean exactly? Second, taking into consideration the argument of the political nature of Islam, what is the difference between Islam and Islamism? Does Islamism reflect an implicitly secularist orientation? Finally, how to overcome the simplistic dichotomy of secularism versus Islamism, which proved to be futile and misleading?

In the third chapter, the main literature that covers the topic of transitional negotiations will be critically reviewed. The aim of this chapter is to overview all variables reported in the previous transition experiences in Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America, post-communist republics, and Africa. Then, the literature written on the negotiations and pact-making attempts during the Arab Spring will be examined to benefit from their insights in the particular cases of Egypt and Tunisia, as well as to find the gaps and the missing aspects in their analyses.

Chapter Four will explore the background and contexts of the secularist-Islamist negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia in the transitional period. This includes the description of the transitional arrangements to fill the power vacuum, mapping the main Islamist and secularist political groups, examining major causes of the conflict, and most significantly, exploring the negotiations, national dialogues, and pact-making attempts throughout the transition and the outcome of each.

In Chapter Five, three different sets of variables which influenced the transitional negotiations will be studied comparatively:

- i. Macro-structural variables (i.e., at the state level) including the nature of the pre-transition regime and the military institution and its role in the transitional administration.
- ii. Meso-structural organisational-related variables that include the balance of power between the negotiating political forces and the role played by CSOs in both countries.
- iii. Micro-variables which are actor-centric and include elites' leadership capacity and legitimacy, as well as the degree of the negotiations' inclusiveness.

The comparative analysis of the results will be discussed in the last chapter. The aim of this chapter is to explore how the examined variables affected the transitional negotiations in the case of Egypt and Tunisia. In addition to that, these results will be contrasted with those of the previous literature written on the transitional experiences in other regions in the world to find out what the Arab Spring experience can add to the literature on transition theories.

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

It is important to start this thesis by clarifying its two principal concepts: secularism and Islamism. This is direly needed not only out of the academic necessity, but also because the misperception of these terms by the rival political actors in the Arab Spring countries was itself an integral part of the conflict. Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to reach an understanding – as clear as it can be – of these concepts and to suggest definitions and categorisations that would be more appropriate for the Arab Spring context.

In order to meet these ends, the causes of the conceptual vagueness will first be addressed. Then, for conceptual clarification, three main arguments will be proposed and defended. The first is that it is valid to use the concept of secularism in the Arab-Islamic context despite its Christian and European origin. In this case, secularism should not be defined as a call for separation between the state and the church, a call for privatisation of religion, or a social division of labour that is related to modernity. Instead, secularisation should be seen as a process of re-making of religion to be more compatible with modernity, and subsequently, secularism is a political ideology that embodies a modernised version or versions of religion.

Secondly, Islamism should not be simply equated to Islam, despite the political nature of the latter. Islamism is a concept that refers to a modern phenomenon: a set of political ideologies and/or social movements. In other words, Islamism is a socio-political manifestation of Islam in the modern era, which – to a great extent – has been shaped by the conditions of modernity.

Finally, in the context of the Arab Spring, Islamism and secularism should not be depicted as two mutually exclusive domains that represent theism vs. atheism, authenticity vs. westernisation, or the like. Instead, both should be understood as two distinctive patterns of the interaction between Islam and modernity and as two different sets of ideologies that adopt competing versions of modernised Islam.

After this first step of conceptual clarification, a second necessary step will follow. These two concepts will be broken down into a number of minor sub-concepts in order to become more capable of describing different variants of secularism and Islamism. Accordingly, secularism will be divided based on the extent of the secularised domain and the degree and nature of state involvement in the secularisation process into four categories: anti-religious secularism, irreligious secularism, areligious secularism, and religious secularism.

Similarly, Islamism as a political ideology can be divided according to the power structure of its Islamic state model and the degree and nature of state involvement in the “Islamist-isation” process into four sub-ideologies: traditional authoritarian Islamism, modern democratic Islamism, semi-theocratic Islamism, and idealistic totalitarian Islamism.

In sum, a two-fold plan will be applied in this chapter for the sake of reaching an appropriate understanding of secularism and Islamism in the context of the Arab Spring: conceptual clarification followed by conceptual subcategorisation. But before proceeding, factors that have led to this conceptual vagueness and misunderstanding should be addressed. At least four basic factors are worth mentioning here:

The first is the evolutionary nature and the continuous dynamism of these concepts. To put it another way, secularism is not a static concept with a fixed definition; rather, it is an unfolding phenomenon, which has different manifestations in different civilisational and societal contexts.⁵⁷ By the same token, a universal definition to include all manifestations of religion in all contexts – including its modern ideological forms such as Islamism – cannot be reached because any definition will be historically and contextually specific.⁵⁸

Second, the secular-religious relationship represents a multi-dimensional dialectic, which interacts at different levels: institutional, normative, epistemological, and ontological/ paradigmatic. Therefore, when the concept of secularism is used either in academia or in a political debate, it is not usually clear whether it means: (i) a call for institutional separation between the religious institutions and the state; (ii) a call to separate the religious teachings and values from the other social domains as politics, economy, law, science, and arts;⁵⁹ (iii) the refusal of religious epistemology and assertion of the scientific positivist epistemology as the only valid source of knowledge;⁶⁰ (iv) another ontology or paradigm that adopts a materialistic worldview and denies religious truth altogether; hence, a near-synonym of atheism.⁶¹

⁵⁷ 'Abdul-Wahhāb 'Al-Missīrī, *'al-'almāniyyah 'al-juz'iyyah wa 'al-'almāniyyah 'al-shāmilah – Part 1* (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouq, 2011), 15

⁵⁸ Talal Asad, "The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category," in *A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion*, ed. Michael Lambek, 116 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002).

⁵⁹ Heba Raouf Ezzat, "Secularism, The State and the Social Bond" in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, eds. John Esposito and Azzam Tamimi, 125 (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002).

⁶⁰ William H. Swatos and Kevin J. Christiano, "Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept", *Sociology of Religion* 60,3 (1999): 212

⁶¹ Azzam Tamimi, "The Origin of Arab Secularism" in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, eds. John Esposito and Azzam Tamimi, 15 (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002).

Third, secularism and Islamism are not neutral concepts attempting to describe sociological or socio-political phenomena related to modernity. Rather, they represent doctrines or ideologies around which aggressive debates have revolved for decades. On the one hand, secularism has become a “doctrine more than a theory, based on presuppositions that represent a taken-for-granted ideology.” “[O]ver time..., the idea of secularisation became sacrali[s]ed, that is, a belief system accepted on faith.”⁶² On the other hand, religion for the contemporary religious movements – including Islam for the Islamists – is not only a matter of faith, but it “has become the ideology of protest.”⁶³ Being at the heart of prolonged aggressive disputes, both concepts have been frequently abused or misused, and their connotations have been intentionally or unintentionally distorted.

The last factor is related to the transcultural transfer of these concepts. In other words, the translation of concepts like secularism or religion into the Arab-Islamic context and coining the concept of Islamism using the Western-style conceptualisation of political ideologies has resulted in ambiguity and misperception.

As for the term of religion, it is derived from the Latin word *religio*, which is related to rites, rituals, and organisation of the religious life, while *’Al-Dīn* in the Arabic language has wider notions, including law or *’Al-Shar’ah*, a blueprint for governance, or even a way of life.⁶⁴ That is why some committed believers refuse any attempt to put a

⁶² Swatos and Christiano, “Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept”, 210.

⁶³ Mark Juergensmeyer, “Rethinking the Secular and Religious Aspects of Violence” in *Rethinking Secularism*, eds. Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen, 185 – 186 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁶⁴ ’Azmi Bishārah, *’al-dīn wa ’al-’almāniyyah fī siāq tārikhī – Part I* (Beirut: Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2013), 342.

definition for religion or *'Al-Dīn* because they see religion in everything in social life.⁶⁵ Moreover, for them, to give a set of beliefs and practices the term religion means that you can distinguish and separate these practices from other practices of social life, and to demarcate religious domain from other social domains as politics or science – the matter that reflects in their opinion an obvious secular orientation.⁶⁶

Translating secularism to the Arabic language is not less problematic nor contentious. Despite becoming one of the grand concepts and being used extensively in the contemporary Arabic discourse, it is usually utilised lightly, inappropriately, and in an argumentative way.⁶⁷ Moreover, it has been translated into five or six Arabic terms that have different meanings:

- i. The first translation was carried out in the nineteenth century by *Jamal 'Al-Dīn 'Al-'Afghānī*, who chose the Quranic term *'Al-Dahriyyīn* to describe the secularists.⁶⁸ This Arabic term is close to the concept of materialists – the people who deny the afterlife and believe only in this physical world.⁶⁹
- ii. The literal Arabic translation of secularism is *lā dīniyyah*, which means non-religious; nonetheless, it is scarcely used because it is too offensive for the Arab Muslims as it implies disregard and total exclusion of religion.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ Ibid, 341

⁶⁶ Linell E. Cady and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Comparative Secularisms and the Politics of Modernity: An Introduction” in *Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age*, eds. Linell E. Cady and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, 9 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

⁶⁷ 'Azīz 'Al-'Aẓmah, “'al-'almāniyyah fī 'al-khiṭāb 'al-'arabī 'al-mu'āṣir” in *'al-'almāniyyah taht 'al-mijhar*, eds. 'Abdul-Wahhāb 'Al-Missīrī and 'Azīz 'Al-'Aẓmah (Damascus: Dar Al-Fikr, 2000), 153.

⁶⁸ John Keane, “Secularism?”, *Political Quarterly*, 71 (2000): 15.

⁶⁹ 'Azīm Bishārah, *'al-dīn wa 'al-'almāniyyah fī siāq tārikhī – part II-1* (Beirut: Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2015), 69.

⁷⁰ Tamimi, “The Origin of Arab Secularism” in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, 17

- iii. Other literal translations include *'Al-Duniawiyyah*, which equates secular to the worldly and *'Al-Zamāniyyah*, which coincides with the English term the temporal.⁷¹
- iv. The commonest and widely accepted translation of secularism is the term *'Al-'Almāniyyah*; yet, its Arabic linguistic root is not quite clear. Some refer to the word *'ālam* meaning the world, while others claim it is derived from the Arabic word *'ilm*, which makes *'Al-'Almāniyyah* related to science and knowledge.⁷²
- v. In the Arab countries that have been dominated by French culture such as Tunisia, the term secularism is often translated into *lā'ikiyyah*, which signifies the French concept of *laïcité* or laicism.⁷³

In short, the concept of secularism and its religious counterpart “Islamism” both show a great deal of ambiguity and lack of clarity due to the evolutionary nature of their connotations, the multi-dimensional aspects of their dialectical relation, their normative and ideological implications, and the problematics related to their translation into Arab-Islamic contexts.

All these academic challenges may be what makes Jose Casanova – a leading scholar on secularisation – to warn: “At the entrance to the field of seculari[s]ation, there should always hang the sign: proceed at your own risk.”⁷⁴

⁷¹ Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford; California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 207.

Bishārah, *'al-dīn wa 'al-'almāniyyah fī siāq tārīkhī – part II-1*, 69.

⁷² Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 207

⁷³ 'Al-Missīrī, *'al-'almāniyyah 'al-juz'īyyah wa 'al-'almāniyyah 'al-shāmilah – Part 1*, 61

⁷⁴ Jose Casanova, *Public Religion in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 12.

2.1 Secularism and Islamism As Two Competing Versions of Modernised Islam

As mentioned above, the first step in the two-fold plan of this chapter is conceptual clarification. This entails getting rid of all “impurities” associated with the concepts of secularism and Islamism. Decades ago, it was argued that the concepts of secularism, secular, and secularisation had become so extensively “polluted” that they should be dropped from academic works altogether.^{75*} However, as Larry Shiner noticed, “moratorium” on such widely-used terms is “unlikely to be effected.” Hence, he advised anyone who employs such concepts “to state carefully his intended meaning and to stick to it” as a way of “salvaging” these terms as useful concepts in empirical research.⁷⁶ Accordingly, in what follows, it is intended to make clear what these concepts mean (and do not mean) in this thesis and then to stick to what has been stated onwards.

Clarifying the concepts of secularism and Islamism in order to reach a definition appropriate for the Arab Spring context necessitates answering three major questions:

First, is it valid to use secularism as a concept and as a phenomenon in the Arab-Islamic context despite its Euro-Christian origin? And if it is valid, what does it mean?

⁷⁵ Ibid.

* “David Martin (1965) was the first contemporary sociologist to reject the seculari[s]ation thesis outright, even proposing that the concept of seculari[s]ation eliminated from social scientific discourse on the grounds that it had served ideological and polemical, rather than theoretical, functions”

Rodney Stark, “Secularization, R.I.P.”, *Sociology of Religion* 60, 3 (1999): 254.

⁷⁶ Larry Shiner, “The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 6, 2 (1967): 219.

Second, taking into consideration that Islam is a political religion *par excellence*,⁷⁷ how to differentiate between Islam as a religion and Islamism as a political ideology? And does this differentiation imply a secular tendency by denying the political nature of Islam and aiming at its depoliticisation?

Third, given that religious-secular dichotomy is believed to be misleading and a sort of reductionism,⁷⁸ how to reach an appropriate and illuminating understanding of the relationship between the religious and the secular, or to be more specific, the Islamist and the secularist in this context?

2.1.1 Secularism as a Modern Form of Religiosity

In this part, the arguments that stand for the invalidity of using the concept of secularism in Arab-Islamic contexts because of its Christian origin and its association with European Enlightenment and Modernity will be discussed and refuted. Then, some of the widely used and accepted definitions of secularism will be discredited, and a new definition appropriate to the Arab Spring context will be proposed.

As a term, it is no longer a surprise for Arab academicians that the concept of the secular is originally a Christian religious term, and that it was juxtaposed, not to religion, but eternity, and that secularisation was a mere procedural concept denoting clergymen's transition from a religious order to serve worldly in local parishes.⁷⁹ This procedural notion of secularisation persisted for ages. For instance, in the treaty of

⁷⁷ Mujtaba Razvi, "Muslim Ummah: Problems and Prospects", *Pakistan Horizon* 40,3 (1987): 46.

⁷⁸ Shiner, "The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research", 218.

⁷⁹ Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen, "Introduction" in *Rethinking Secularism*, 8.

Bishārah, *'al-dīn wa 'al-'almāniyyah fī siāq tārīkhī – part II-1*, 50.

Westphalia, the concept of secularisation was used as a term indicating transfer of the church possessions to a lay power: the newly formed nation-state.⁸⁰

It was the mid-nineteenth century when George Holyoake (1817 – 1906) coined the term secularism, interestingly to bypass the dichotomy of religion-infidelity, and to introduce a concept that can appeal to both atheists and theists due to its neutral descriptive nature and its belonging to wider Christian culture. He did not mean to put secularism as an antithesis of religion, but as “a canopy” that house different non-traditional forms of religion.⁸¹ This attempt was stimulated by purely European developments because it was influenced by the political turmoil in England that preceded the Reformation Bill in 1832 and amid an intense conflict between science and religion in Europe.⁸²

Not only as a term, but even as a religiopolitical phenomenon, secularism is also argued to be exclusively related to the Christian context or – in other words – to the nature of Christianity itself and the historical development of its churches.⁸³ Jose Casanova stated resolutely that “discussion of the secular has to begin with the recognition that it emerged first as a theological category of Western Christendom that has no equivalent in other religious traditions or even in Eastern Christianity.”⁸⁴

This argument is based on the fact that in the Christian faith, there is the tradition to “render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto God the things

⁸⁰ 'Al-Missīrī, *'al-'almāniyyah 'al-juz' iyyah wa 'al-'almāniyyah 'al-shāmilah – Part 1*, 53-54.

⁸¹ Cady and Hurd, “Comparative Secularisms and the Politics of Modernity” in *Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age*, 3.

⁸² Tamimi, “The Origin of Arab Secularism” in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, 14.

⁸³ Bishārah, *'al-dīn wa 'al-'almāniyyah fī siāq tārīkhī – part II-1*, 44.

⁸⁴ Jose Casanova, “The Secular, Secularizations, and Secularisms” in *Rethinking Secularism*, 56.

that are God's," which laid the foundation for the differentiation between two separate realms or domains: the City of God and the City of Man, as Saint Augustine famously conceptualises them.⁸⁵ Moreover, institutionally, the Christian Church had a three-centuries opportunity to establish and develop an autonomous religious realm before its first contact with the state on the occasion of the council of Nicaea in 325 AD, and before the subsequent question of the relationship between the state and the church became valid.⁸⁶

On the basis of the above facts, it has been claimed that secularism, both as a term and as a phenomenon, is definitely and exclusively Christian and European, and therefore, it is not appropriate to be generalised universally or applied in the particular Arab-Islamic context.⁸⁷ Further, what strengthened this idea and increased the aversion of the Muslim world from secularism was the fact that the first generation of Arab secularists were Christians, who had their education in the European missionary schools.⁸⁸

According to Oliver Roy, two main arguments are usually presented in the Islamic case: theologically, the separation between religion and politics is alien to Islam, and culturally, Islam is more than a religion in its Western notion.⁸⁹ Furthermore, historically, "Islam was born as a sect and as a society, a political and religious community" and the model that existed during the era of the Prophet *Muhammad* PBUH and the following

⁸⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, "Render Unto Caesar?: The Dilemmas of a Multicultural World", *Sociology of Religion* 66, 2 (2005): 121.

Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and Van Antwerpen, "Introduction" in *Rethinking Secularism*, 12.

⁸⁶ Bishārah, *'al-dīn wa 'al-'almāniyyah fī siāq tārīkhī – part I*, 443.

⁸⁷ Yūsuf 'Al-Qaraḍāwī, *'al-taḥarruf 'al-'almānī fī muājahit 'al-'islām: namudhaj turkiā wa tūnis*, (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouq, 2001), 19-25.

⁸⁸ 'Al-Missīrī, *'al-'almāniyyah 'al-juz' iyyah wa 'al-'almāniyyah 'al-shāmilah – Part 1*, 82.

⁸⁹ Olivier Roy (trans. by George Holoch), *Secularism Confronts Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), ix.

Righteously Guided Caliphs has dominated the Islamic political imagination to the present day.⁹⁰

Another argument in this regard include the fact that, in Islam, there is no church nor clergymen; hence, the secular-religious problematic cannot logically emerge, even if some Muslim academicians conclude from this fact that Islamic *Sharī'ah* can only be secular.⁹¹

The contention proposed here is a little bit more complex than these simple arguments. Secularism, no doubt, is primarily a European term with a Christian origin before being translated and universally used in other contexts. Also, as a phenomenon, it is contextually related to the socio-political and religious developments that happened in Europe. However, this does not negate the fact that separation and subsequent tension always existed between the religious and the political in the Islamic experience, yet with different manifestations.* Interestingly enough, it was argued that Islamic history could be summarised as the history of “institutionalisations of the dual religious and political charisma” of the Prophet *Muḥammad* PBUH into differentiated religious and political institutions.⁹²

⁹⁰ Olivier Roy (trans. by Carol Volk), *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge; Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001), 12.

⁹¹ Abdullahi An-Na'im, “Political Islam in National Politics and International Relations”, in *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, ed. Peter L. Berger, 117 (Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999).

'Al-Missīrī, *'al-'almāniyyah 'al-juz'īyyah wa 'al-'almāniyyah 'al-shāmilah – Part 1*, 69.

* Interestingly, one of the Prophet's sayings predicted that the Quran and the Sultan will be separated and another saying states that the Caliphate would be the first knot to be undone in Islam.

Yūsuf 'Al-Qaraḍāwī, *min fiqh 'al-dawlah fī 'al-'islām* (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouq, 2001), 17.

⁹² Casanova, *Public Religion in the Modern World*, 48.

In the Islamic historical experience, the institutional separation between the religious and the political authorities* – once unified in the person of the Prophet and, to a lesser extent, in the Four Righteously Guided Caliphs – took place gradually thanks to two dynamics: First, religiopolitical authority in the Islamic context became increasingly more political and less religious with the emergence of the dynastic rulers that started with the Umayyad Caliphate in the seventh century.⁹³ Later, with the secession of the local sultanates from the Abbasid Caliphate, which ended with the control of military over the institution of the Caliphate itself, the real power transferred from the quasi-religious post of the Caliph to the purely political post of the sultans in the tenth century.⁹⁴




Fig. 1: The differentiation of the political and religious authorities in the Islamic experience

The second concomitant dynamic concerns the establishment of the religious scholars' institutions and their autonomy from the state dating from the second Abbasid era.⁹⁵ As *Wā'il Ḥallāq* notices, the foundation of the *'Al-Sharī'ah* educational and legal systems was not the work of the state in Islam. Instead, the religious scholar establishments

* Religious authority means in this context the authority to interpret and judge the religious text.

⁹³ Munir Shafiq, "Secularism and the Arab-Muslim Condition", *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, eds. John Esposito and Azzam Tamimi, 146 (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002).

⁹⁴ Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, "Islam and Politics" in *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, eds. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, 20 (London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia* (Cambridge; Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), 65.

⁹⁵ Bishārah, *'al-dīn wa 'al-'almāniyyah fī siyāq tārikhī – part I*, 447.

emerged from the Muslim community forming an informal religious and moral authority, in which the scholars as “the heirs of the Prophet” monopolised the right to legislation without intervention from the political ruler.⁹⁶

Nevertheless, the separation between the religious establishment and the political institution in Islam was not complete. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed describe the relationship between the political rulers and religious scholars in Islam as “mutually dependent”.⁹⁷ This complicated relationship was best explained by ‘*Abullahi*’ *’Al-Na’im* as follows:

“... rulers needed to balance their control of religious leaders by conceding their autonomy from the state, which is the source of the ability of religious leaders to legitimi[s]e the authority of the rulers. At the same time, rulers could not afford to leave religious leaders completely free because the religious leaders might use that independence to undermine the political authority of the state. In other words, the distinction between state and religious institutions was historically both necessary and difficult to maintain in practice for both sides.”⁹⁸

This institutional differentiation and tension between the political and the religious in the Islamic history, according to *Munir Shafiq*, “bore the seeds of secularism” to the Muslim world.⁹⁹ Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the medieval church managed to exert a more powerful influence on the state than the religious ‘*Ulamā*’ institutions in Islam. In fact, the tension between religion and politics in Islam was less in comparison to the case of Christianity not due to the successful and harmonious unity between the

⁹⁶ Wael B. Hallaq, *The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 53.

⁹⁷ ‘Al-Qaraḍāwī, *min fiqh ’al-dawlah fī ’al-’islām*, 39.

⁹⁸ Akbarzadeh and Saeed, “Islam and Politics” in *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, 4.

⁹⁹ An-Na’im, *Islam and the Secular State*, 52

⁹⁹ Shafiq, “Secularism and the Arab-Muslim Condition”, *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, 147.

religious and the political authorities in Islam but because of the successful control of the religious by the political, and because the religious institutions in Islam were too weak and decentralised to challenge the political power of the rulers while this was not the case of the Christian papacy.¹⁰⁰

Later, the tension between the religious and the political in the Muslim world was further aggravated with the beginning of the modern age. In this regard, it is important to differentiate between two main concepts: secularity and secularism. Secularity is one of the features of modernity, which includes – among other things – social differentiation, the rise of positivist sciences, and the emergence of the modern state.¹⁰¹ On the other hand, secularism is a political ideology – or a worldview in its extreme form – that adopts these intellectual and socio-political changes as a political project. This makes secularity a universal historical process that took place in both European and non-European communities, or to be more accurate, means that the experience of Western modernisation and secularisation stimulated and catalysed analogous or equivalent dynamics in the other civilisational contexts all over the world.^{102*}

Therefore, Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian Burchardt argue that the problem in the contemporary Muslim world, as part of the non-Western communities, that secularity –

¹⁰⁰ Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 16.

Mohammed Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim world* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 13.

¹⁰¹ Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge; Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 21.

¹⁰² Bishārah, *'al-dīn wa 'al-'almāniyyah fī siāq tārīkhī – part II-1*, 41.

* Casanova enumerated four interrelated and simultaneously unfolded developments that triggered the secularisation process in the medieval Europe: Protestant reformation, formation of the modern state, growth of the modern capitalism, and early scientific developments.

Casanova, *Public Religion in the Modern World*, 21-24.

as a process of social differentiation – was perceived as the ideological secularism, which is associated with hostility to religion. Nevertheless, this negative stance towards secularism does not preclude *de facto* differentiation that underwent in the Muslim social domains such as education, science, law, and politics, which were classically subordinated to the reference of the Islamic *Sharī‘ah*.¹⁰³

Accordingly, it is argued here that secularism is a valid concept to be used in the Arab-Islamic context; however, its definition, in this case, is different from the classical Western-oriented definitions for secularism. To find an appropriate definition of secularism in the context of the Arab Spring, “we need to take a deep breath and jump into a completely different mindset.”¹⁰⁴ This means that secularism should *not* simply be defined as:

i. The socio-political developments related to modernity, which entail the movement from a sacred to a secular society, more conformity with this world and turning away from the supernatural, and the substitution of the religious beliefs and institutions with secular alternatives.¹⁰⁵ Secularism – instead – is an ideology; a doctrine; an active political programme for secularisation that believes in the ultimate goodness of these transformations and aims to use the power of the modern state – as a secularising agent – to propagate and entrench them.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian Burchardt, “Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities”, *Comparative Sociology* 11 (2012): 882.

¹⁰⁴ Cady and Hurd, “Comparative Secularisms and the Politics of Modernity” in *Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age*, 21.

¹⁰⁵ Shiner, “The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research”, 209-217.

¹⁰⁶ ‘Abdul-Wahhāb ‘Al-Missīrī, *‘al-‘almāniyyah ‘al-juz’iyyah wa ‘al-‘almāniyyah ‘al-shāmilah – Part II* (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouq, 2013), 237.

ii. A call for a mere institutional separation between the church and the state or the religious and political authorities, because obviously “examples of this separation can be found in medieval Christendom and in Islamic empires – and no doubt elsewhere too.”¹⁰⁷ Rather, it is a call for ending the dualism and the subsequent tension between both realms by subordinating one to the other.¹⁰⁸ It is a struggle over legitimacy and supremacy within this context of separation.¹⁰⁹ Hence, an integral aspect of the ideology of secularism is to put an end to the supremacy of divine institutions over the city of Man and subordinate religious establishments to the state.¹¹⁰ Therefore, some scholars argued that secularism aims to emancipate and liberate religion from politics and not the other way around.

iii. A call for privatisation of religion or “religious interiorisation” as a consequence of the differentiation and emancipation of social domains from the authority of religious institutions and norms.¹¹¹ Jose Casanova summarises this dynamic by stating that, in the pre-modern world, the religious realm was the all-encompassing reality, within which the secular realm strived to find its place. Now, the secular sphere is perceived as all-encompassing reality, to which the religious sphere has to adapt.¹¹² This led to the recession of the religious field and decrease of the social significance of religion to

¹⁰⁷ Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 2.

¹⁰⁸ Casanova, *Public Religion in the Modern World*, 14.

¹⁰⁹ Ahmet Davutoglu, “Philosophical and Institutional Dimensions of Secularism”, in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, eds. John Esposito and Azzam Tamimi, 180 (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002).

¹¹⁰ Roy, *Secularism Confronts Islam*, 46.

¹¹¹ Casanova, *Public Religion in the Modern World*, 6.

Cady and Hurd, “Comparative Secularisms and the Politics of Modernity” in *Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age*, 6.

¹¹² Casanova, *Public Religion in the Modern World*, 15.

confinement to the private sphere only.¹¹³ Moreover, some scholars argue that the religious significance in the private sphere is doomed to vanish with increased prosperity and human security. Therefore, secularisation, according to them, is “a systematic erosion of religious practices, values, and beliefs in both public and private spheres.”¹¹⁴

Despite being widely used and accepted, this definition for secularism implies many controversial assumptions, such as the assumption that clear demarcation and insulation of different social domains or the public and private spheres is practically possible and that the endeavour to have a religion-free public sphere is an achievable goal.

In conclusion, the definition of secularism proposed in this thesis and argued to be more appropriate for the Arab-Islamic context is: a political ideology or a worldview – in its totalitarian forms – that aims to remake religion on the conditions of modernity and to confine and control its social functions and manifestations in both public and private spheres.

In this way, secularism is not necessarily non-religious or anti-religious; rather, it is simply religious in a different manner or “another form of religiosity,” which is even argued by some scholars to be “a healthy part of a cycle of religious growth and development.”¹¹⁵ As Graeme Smith claims, “secularism is not the end of Christianity,

¹¹³ ‘Azmī Bishārah, *‘al-dīn wa ‘al-‘almāniyyah fī siāq tārīkhī – part II-2* (Beirut: Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies, 2015), 203.

¹¹⁴ Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 4-5.

¹¹⁵ Shiner, “The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research”, 207.

Swatos and Christiano, “Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept”, 217.

nor is it a sign of the godless nature of the West. Rather, we should think of secularism as the latest expression of the Christian religion.”¹¹⁶

It is an attempt to have a more worldly, more rationalised, more pragmatic, and less mythical version of religion that is compatible with modernity. This endeavour is argued to be a necessary adaptation of the sacred to the changing social conditions so that religion can survive the modern age because, as Taylor contends, secularity has ended the era of “naïve religious faith” and bring about “new conditions of belief.”¹¹⁷

2.1.2 Islam and Islamism: An Attempt at Differentiation

The other principal concept in this thesis is Islamism, which is no less problematic than secularism. It is usually argued that, in Islam, the religious and the political cannot be meaningfully separated and that Islam is both a religion and a state.¹¹⁸ If this is the case, coining concepts like Islamism shall appear as a secular attempt to depoliticise Islam and to apply the narrow Western notion of religion to it. In other words, if Islam is political by nature, what does Islamism mean?

Generally speaking, Islam as a religion has “something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered.”¹¹⁹ But Islamic teachings and values related to politics or social organisation do not mean that Islam represents a distinctive political

¹¹⁶ Graeme Smith, *A Short History of Secularism* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2008), 2.

¹¹⁷ Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 19 - 20.

N. J. Demerath III, “Secularization and Sacralization Deconstructed and Reconstructed” in *The SAGE Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, eds. James A. Beckford and N. J. Demerath III, 69 (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2007).

¹¹⁸ Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Characteristics of the Islamic State”, *Islamic Studies* 32,1 (1993):17.

¹¹⁹ Ayoub, *The Many Faces of Political Islam*, 2.

ideology. As Rhys H. Williams put it: “any approach that automatically considers religion as ideology is not useful for understanding religion in politics.”¹²⁰

Although the definition of concepts of religion and ideology is beyond the scope of this thesis, what is important to be highlighted here is that ideology is a modern phenomenon or ideational system.¹²¹ In the pre-modern era, religious values and injunctions regarding governance or social organisation were embedded in “the amorphous of the political traditional culture” as shared meanings, customs, and norms, or as “a proto-ideology”.¹²² Nevertheless, political ideology is a more systematic, coherent, comprehensive and worldly-oriented intellectual construct, as its emergence and development were greatly shaped by the rational and secular paradigm of the Enlightenment.¹²³ That is why even ideologies derived from a religious origin tend to deal less with metaphysical and theological issues and focus more on the social and political.¹²⁴

What makes it difficult to differentiate between religion and ideology as two ideational and belief systems is the interplay of three factors: the theoretical difficulties of defining

¹²⁰ Rhys H. Williams, “Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology?”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 35,4 (1996): 373.

¹²¹ William E. Shepard, “Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19,3 (1987): 308

Manfred B. Steger, “Religion and Ideology in the Global Age: Analyzing al Qaeda’s Islamist Globalism”, *New Political Science* 31 (2009): 530.

¹²² Hassan Rachik, “How Religion Turns into Ideology”, *The Journal of North African Studies* 14 (2009): 375.

¹²³ Steger, “Religion and Ideology in the Global Age”, 530.

* Ideology term was coined for the first time by Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) in 1796 and defined as the “science of ideas”.

Emmet Kennedy, “Ideology from Destutt De Tracy to Marx”, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 40,3 (1979): 353.

¹²⁴ Rachik, “How Religion Turns into Ideology”, 348.

each phenomenon *per se*, the great deal of conflation between their social functions, and the possibilities of mutual transformation between both phenomena.

Concerning the first factor, as has been stated, there is a great debate around how religion should be defined. Some scholars strongly believe that a universal definition of religion cannot be reached at all.^{125*} Similar controversies have always been present on the definition of ideology, which is described as one of the most elusive and contentious concepts in the social sciences.¹²⁶

Secondly, both religion and ideology serve some common social functions such as guidance for social action, political legitimisation, and social mobilisation.¹²⁷ Ideology as “a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” is said to have the functions of describing and interpreting the world as it is, and envisioning the world as it should be.¹²⁸ Similarly, Clifford Geertz describes religion as “a shaping force for the political life”, which justifies social organisation and establishes a clear sense of what it is, as well as what it ought to be.¹²⁹

The third factor is what primarily concerns this thesis, which is the phenomenon of mutual transformation between religion and ideology. In the first case, some secularist

¹²⁵ Asad, “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category,” in *A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion*, 116.

* Krishna Shrimali has informatively discussed four historical phases for the development of the sociology of religion. In each phase, different approaches and methodologies have been utilized to give a definition for religious phenomenon such as: social anthropology, structural anthropology, ethnology, psychology, philology, etc.

Krishna Mohan Shrimali, “Religion, Ideology and Society”, *Social Scientist* 16,12 (1988): 14-60.

¹²⁶ John T. Jost, Christopher M. Federico, and Jaime L. Napier, “Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities”, *The Annual Review of Psychology* 60 (2009): 308–309.

¹²⁷ Rachik, “How Religion Turns into Ideology”, 347.

¹²⁸ Jost, Federico, and Napier, “Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities”, 309.

¹²⁹ Williams, “Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology?”, 370.

political ideologies have turned into a quasi-religious or pseudo-religious phenomenon.¹³⁰ Emilio Gentile argues that totalitarian ideologies, such as communism and fascism, are “secular religions” because they assume some religious features.¹³¹ In accordance with him, Hans Maier suggests the term “political religion” as a proper concept for ideologies like communism, fascism and national socialism, because they show cultic patterns of behaviour similar to traditional religions. In his views, the emergence of the political religion phenomenon “reminds us that religion does not allow itself to be easily banished from society, and that, where it is tried, it returns in unpredictable and perverted forms”.¹³² Even secularism itself, as S. Parvez Manzoor argues, has become a faith (faith in a man, in progress, etc.). It was even described to be the most sacrosanct value of the modern age.¹³³

In contrast to this process of “sacralisation of politics”, the modern era has also witnessed the more interesting process of “ideologisation of religion.”¹³⁴ In a reversal to the secularisation process and in response to it, some religions turn into political ideologies – the process that results in the fading of the chasm between secularist ideologies and religious thought-systems. That is why this phenomenon is considered one of “the most puzzling cultural phenomena of our dawning global age.”¹³⁵

¹³⁰ Bishārah, *‘al-dīn wa ‘al-‘almāniyyah fī siāq tārikhī – part II-2*, 197.

¹³¹ Steger, “Religion and Ideology in the Global Age”, 530.

¹³² Hans Maier, “Political Religion: A Concept and Its Limitations”, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8,1 (2007): 5,15.

¹³³ S. Parvez Manzoor, “Desacralizing Secularism”, in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, eds. John Esposito and Azzam Tamimi, 84 (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002).

¹³⁴ Rachik, “How Religion Turns into Ideology”, 347.

Steger, “Religion and Ideology in the Global Age”, 530.

¹³⁵ Steger, “Religion and Ideology in the Global Age”, 529.

Manfred Brocker and Mirjam Kunkler, “Religious Parties: Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis - Introduction”, *Party Politics* 19,2 (2013): 173.

To sum, although Islam did provide a social guide for the issues of governance and social organisation through the *Sharī'ah* rulings, in the pre-modern Muslim societies, the political manifestations of Islam in traditional societies had a form of norms and customs, which were of a too basic level to be considered as an ideology. Islam had to wait until the modern age to witness this ideologisation process that gives birth to the Islamic ideology or the Islamism.

Indeed, the relationship between Islamism and modernity is a little bit complicated. Islamism is argued to be a conservative reaction to and a rebellion against modernity. On the one hand, traditional Muslims, who did accept the material and technical aspects of modernity, refused its way of thinking because they believe that relativism of modernity negatively affects the morality and the traditional values of Muslim communities.¹³⁶

On the other hand, Islamism is a modern phenomenon, and it was not possible without modernity. It is as much product of modernity as it is a reaction to it.¹³⁷ Islamists, while attempting to resist Western modernity and to build an authentic Islamic code for a new way of life, have borrowed many modern Western ideas. They did not only borrow Western material technology but also borrowed many modern methods of political and social organisation, as well as Western political ideas and symbols.¹³⁸

Furthermore, Islamism should not be seen only as a modern phenomenon; it could be considered as a modernising agent. It did not only get the benefit of the modern

¹³⁶ Kjetil Selvik and Stig Stenslie, *Stability and Change in the Modern Middle East* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011),131.

¹³⁷ Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam*, 34.

¹³⁸ Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology", 315.

transformation of the traditional Muslim societies, but it also helped in the entrenchment of such transformation. For instance, Geertz points to the necessity of the spread of politics in its modern sense for the process of religion ideologisation. Thanks to the emergence of the modern form of political activism (i.e., modern political organisations, modern politicians and intellectuals, and modern public space and mass media), the ability to detach members of traditional societies from their traditional ties and recruit them to adhere to a new system of ideas has significantly increased, and hence, religious ideologies were able to grow ever larger.¹³⁹

Other features of modernity that had a great impact on the emergence of Islamism include the print revolution and mass literacy, which rendered the fundamental Islamic texts available for increasing masses of educated Muslims and the recession of the religious role of traditional establishments and scholars, who once were the sole interpreters of Islam in the pre-modern Muslim societies. Both factors allowed religiously inclined individuals, usually educated in non-religious institutions and engaged in “secular” professions, to practice their right to interpret the religious scriptures in their own way. Those Islamic “thinkers” or “intellectuals” challenged the religious authority of the traditional scholars and succeeded in gaining popularity for their Islamist ideology.¹⁴⁰

Thus, Islamism has benefited from the modernisation of the Muslim societies to spread its ideology and its own definition of religion through the establishment of social movements and political parties and attracting members and supporters to their organisations. Nevertheless, by doing so, Islamist activists helped to entrench the

¹³⁹ Rachik, “How Religion Turns into Ideology”, 351-352.

¹⁴⁰ Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam*, 27-29.

values of the modernity and its mode of thinking, which was considered perverted and harmful to the morality of Muslim societies.

Those modern religious activists were the ideologising agent, who laid the foundation of Islamist ideologies by using religious arguments to support their claims in politics and applied their moralised premises in the policymaking processes.¹⁴¹ The end product of this process was a religious ideology, which is defined as “a set of ideas that refer to religious and secular tools, and accompany political actions and processes in a sustained and systematic way.”¹⁴²

Accordingly, Islamism can be defined as either a political ideology or as a social movement. As an ideology, it is “presenting Islam as the guiding principle, even the blueprint, of government”;¹⁴³ it is “Islam as a political ideology, rather than religion or theology.”¹⁴⁴ It is “the tendency to view Islam not merely as a religion in the narrow sense of theological belief, private prayer and ritual worship, but also as a total way of life with guidance for political, economic, and social behaviour.”¹⁴⁵

As a social movement, Islamism is defined as a “political activity and popular mobili[s]ation in the name of Islam”;¹⁴⁶ “a modern intellectual and political movement that seek to bring society and politics into agreement with Islam”;¹⁴⁷ “it is an effort to render Islam sovereign to all domains of life from faith and thought to politics, administration and law, and the quest for arriving a solution to the problem of

¹⁴¹ Williams, “Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology?”, 375-376.

¹⁴² Rachik, “How Religion Turns into Ideology”, 357.

¹⁴³ Akbarzadeh and Saeed, “Islam and Politics” in *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, 2.

¹⁴⁴ Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam*, 2.

¹⁴⁵ Shepard, “Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology”, 308.

¹⁴⁶ Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam*, 6.

¹⁴⁷ Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and Change in the Modern Middle East*, 128.

underdevelopment of the Muslim countries against the West by establishing among Muslims unity and solidarity.”¹⁴⁸

In short, if pre-modern Islam manifested itself in the socio-political life as popular traditions and customs, and structurally as Caliphates, sultanates, sects or *feraq*, juristic schools or *madhāhib*, Sufi orders or *turuq*, and other religiopolitical structures; Islamism, Islamist parties, Islamist social movements, and Islamic republics represent the modern socio-political manifestations of Islam. If Islam as a religion is the counterpart of other religions as Christianity, Buddhism, and Judaism; Islamism as a political ideology is the equivalent to nationalism, capitalism, liberalism, and socialism. If Islam as a faith is a matter of belief and gives priority to the afterlife, Islamism is more concerned with social organisation in this world. It does not contribute to the jurisprudential and theological schools in Islam; rather, it invented and theorised for Islamic political, economic, legal, and societal systems.

Concludingly, the aforementioned definitions of the concepts of secularism and Islamism arguably give a better understanding of the complicated relationship between the religious and the secular in the Arab-Islamic context, bypassing the reductive dichotomies of the city of God vs. the city of Man, the church vs. the state, or revelation vs. rationality. It does not help much to understand this relationship using Edward Bailey’s argument that “secular is really quite easy to define! Its meaning keeps changing yet remains consistent. It always means, simply, the opposite of religious –

¹⁴⁸ Yasin Aktay, “The Ends of Islamism: Rethinking the Meaning of Islam and the Political”, *Insight Turkey* 15,1 (2013): 114.

whatever that means.”¹⁴⁹ In contrary, *Talāl ʿAsad*’s argument affirms that the secular and the religious in certain occasions overlap with each other.¹⁵⁰ Many hybrid religiopolitical phenomena (e.g., political religions, religious ideologies, and civil religion) bridge this gap mixing the divine with the humane, scriptures with reason, and revelation with empirical-based science, giving rise of different versions of theological politics and politicised theology.

Consequently, secularism and Islamism do not represent here atheism and theism, modernity and tradition, Westernisation and authenticity, or enlightenment and darkness. Instead, both are two competing political ideologies – or worldviews in their extreme versions – with contesting projects for modernisation and rationalisation of religion – namely, Islam in this study. Both share the concern to refashion the relationship between the religious and the secular and are involved in the process of their mutual reconstruction.¹⁵¹ Both are not static mutually exclusive categories; instead, they are grand concepts or banners, under which different tendencies and orientations gather with blurred boundaries, a lot of greys, and a great deal of conflation.

2.2 Multiple Secularisms, Multiple Islamisms

The second step after conceptual clarification and proposing appropriate definitions for secularism and Islamism is to break down these two grand concepts into a number of sub-concepts. As stated above, secularism and Islamism are two casual loosely-bounded domains, which encompass diverse tendencies and ideological inclinations.

¹⁴⁹ Swatos and Christiano, “Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept”, 213.

¹⁵⁰ Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 25.

¹⁵¹ R. Scott Appleby, “Rethinking Fundamentalism in a Secular Age” in *Rethinking Secularism*, 233–234.

Therefore, in the remaining part of this chapter, different attempts at a categorisation of secularism and Islamism in previous literature will be explored, and finally, a more comprehensive categorisation model will be suggested.

As regard secularism, it is widely established that it represents a wide spectrum or “a whole range of modern worldviews and ideologies.”¹⁵² These sub-categories or sub-ideologies can be classified according to two main parameters (figure no. 2):




Fig. 2: Parameters of the subcategorisation of secularism

i. The extent of the secularisation process, that is whether this process should be confined only to the domain of politics, or aims to cleanse or purge the whole social domains from any religious influence, or even the total abolishment of religion, and

¹⁵² Casanova, “The Secular, Secularizations, and Secularisms” in *Rethinking Secularism*, 66.

hence, it targets the religious institution itself in the public sphere, as well as beliefs and conscience of individuals in the private sphere.

ii. The degree and nature of the state involvement in the secularisation process, that is to say, whether the state should be accommodating and supportive of religion, or just neutral toward religions, or actively involved in the confinement of religion chasing it to the private sphere and rigorously protecting the secularity of all social domains.

A third parameter may be added here, which is whether secularisation is democratic or authoritarian. Alfred Stepan differentiates between secularism with low state controls on the majority and minority religions, which is consistent with democracy, and secularisms with high controls on religions that can be labelled as “separatist autocracy,” “authoritarian secularism” or even “fundamentalist secularism”.¹⁵³

This is further developed by N J Demerath III, who differentiates between secularisation that originates naturally from the society and that was forcefully imposed on it, in addition to the source of secularisation itself whether internal or external to the society. Thus, four types of secularisation were stated:

- i. Emergent secularisation, which is an internally evolved and non-directed secularisation.
- ii. Coercive secularisation, which is imposed coercively on the society by an autocratic regime.
- iii. Imperialist secularisation, which is another form of directed secularisation, but imposed externally from foreign powers.

¹⁵³ Alfred Stepan, “The Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes”, in *Rethinking Secularism*, 118.

iv. Diffused secularisation, in which secularisation involves external forces also, but this time is promoted by diffusion rather than direction as unintended consequences of culture contacts.¹⁵⁴

In his two-volume book *'Al-'Almāniyyah 'Al-Juz'iyyah wa 'Al-'Almāniyyah 'Al-Shāmilah* or *Partial Secularism and Comprehensive Secularism*, 'Abdul-Wahhāb 'Al-Missīrī elaborately discussed these two sub-concepts. On the one hand, partial secularism refers to the institutional and normative separation between church and state, as well as religion and politics respectively. The state here means simply the state apparatus, and politics is used in its narrowest sense. This pattern of secularism remains silent regarding absolute values and ultimate issues and goals, and although it may include secularisation of some other social domains as economics, it spares many aspects of the public sphere and the whole realm of the private life.¹⁵⁵

On the other hand, comprehensive secularism represents a more aggressive totalitarian pattern that aims to the secularisation of all domains of social and private life. It is a worldview that refuses and resists any transcendental ethical or religious references and adopts a materialistic naturalistic world outlook.¹⁵⁶

Close to this dichotomic classification, Charles Taylor points to two discrete patterns of secularism: assertive and passive. This classification is based primarily on the state

¹⁵⁴ Demerath III, "Secularization and Sacralization", in *The SAGE Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, 71-76.

¹⁵⁵ 'Al-Missīrī, *'al-'almāniyyah 'al-juz'iyyah wa 'al-'almāniyyah 'al-shāmilah – Part II*, 471.

Abdul-Wahab Al-Messeri, "Secularism, Immanence, and Deconstruction" in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, eds. John Esposito and Azzam Tamimi, 67 (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002).

¹⁵⁶ 'Al-Missīrī, *'al-'almāniyyah 'al-juz'iyyah wa 'al-'almāniyyah 'al-shāmilah – Part II*, 472.

Al-Messeri, "Secularism, Immanence, and Deconstruction" in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, 68.

relationship with religion. In assertive secularism, the state generally has a negative stance towards religion and puts firm restrictions in order to prevent its appearance in the public domain. On the contrary, passive secularism adopts the limited notion of separation between the church and the state and remains tolerant to religious existence in the public sphere and even works to protect religious liberties and diversities.¹⁵⁷

Other like-minded classifications include E. Fuat Keyman's terms of objective secularism, which means separation of the state and political affairs from religious institutions and subjective secularism, which entails the abolishing of the cultural role of religion;¹⁵⁸ 'Abullahi 'Al-Na'im's categories of weak and strong secularism;¹⁵⁹ and Wilfred Mc Clay's negative and positive conceptions of secularism, which typically refer to passive and assertive secularism respectively.¹⁶⁰

Concerning the assertive, strong, positive pattern of secularism, it is argued to be an equivalent to the French style of secularism: *Laïcité* or Laicism. It is repeatedly stated that laicism is a more radical, hostile, exacerbated, and militant form of secularism.¹⁶¹ However, this concept is occasionally used to describe mere political secularism in the form of institutional separation between the state and religious institutions, in comparison to a more generalised cultural, societal process of secularism.¹⁶² In this

¹⁵⁷ Bishārah, *'al-dīn wa 'al-'almāniyyah fī siāq tārikhī – part II-1*, 86-87.

¹⁵⁸ E. Fuat Keyman, "Assertive Secularism in Crisis: Modernity, Democracy, and Islam in Turkey" in *Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age*, 144–145.

¹⁵⁹ Abdullahi An-Na'im, "Islam and Secularism", in *Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age*, 226 – 227.

¹⁶⁰ Kuru, *Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion*, 11.

¹⁶¹ Tamimi, "The Origin of Arab Secularism" in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, 15.

Roy, *Secularism Confronts Islam*, xii.

Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and Van Antwerpen, "Introduction" in *Rethinking Secularism*, 15.

Stepan, "The Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes", in *Rethinking Secularism*, 118.

¹⁶² Roy, *Secularism Confronts Islam*, 66 – 98.

case, laicism will be closer to the passive, weak, negative pattern of secularism – the claim that is not supported by the real French model of secularism.*

As regards the passive or pluralistic secularism, it is usually divided into two further groups: accommodationists and separationists. Both groups share the concept of separation between the state and the church; yet, the first group stands for “close state-religion entanglements”, including an active ethical role of the religions in the public domain and active state support for religion in the form of public funding of religious institutions and schools as an example. They believe that this state-religion rapprochement is compatible with secularism, as long as the state does not favour one religion at the expense of others. From their side, separationists see this active state role as contrary to secularism and call for a strict separation between both state and religion.¹⁶³

Interestingly, the American religious historian Clark Gilpin puts a tripartite sub-categorisation for the passive pattern of secularism as it is applied differently in the USA, namely: irreligious secularism, areligious secularism, and religious secularism. Religious secularism refers to the accommodationist pattern, while the other two patterns represent two different stances within the separatists' group: irreligious stance, which is “inhospitable to both historic religions and religious secularism” and the

* “Political secularism *per se* does not need to share the same negative assumptions about religion or assume any progressive historical development that will make religion increasingly irrelevant. It is actually compatible with a positive view of religion as a moral good or as an ethical communitarian reservoir of human solidarity and republican virtue. But political secularism would like to contain religion within its own differentiated religious sphere and would like to maintain a secular public democratic sphere free from religion.”

Casanova, “The Secular, Secularizations, and Secularisms” in *Rethinking Secularism*, 69.

¹⁶³ Kuru, *Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion*, 34, 44.

Areligious stance, which favours strict state-church separation, though, it still “hono[u]rs religion as a human universal and in which religious pluralism can be creatively renegotiated in the many contemporary sites of cultural exchange.”¹⁶⁴

In sum, it can be concluded that there are four sub-categories for secularism based on the extension of the secularisation process and the degree and nature of the state involvement in this process. These four sub-categories are anti-religious secularism, irreligious secularism, areligious secularism, and religious secularism. However, it is important to state that these categories are mere ideal-types* symbolising different abstracted ideological tendencies. They do not reflect real categories of the existing political regimes, which usually show mixed criteria with a hegemonic pattern rather than a pure ideal-type.

With some generalisation and simplification, the differences between these four sub-categories can be summarised as follows:

¹⁶⁴ Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, “Varieties of Legal Secularism”, in *Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age*, 109-110.

* Max Weber defines “ideal-type” as a unified analytical mental construct, which cannot be found empirically anywhere in its conceptual purity.

Kuru, *Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion*, 3

	Anti-religious Secularism	Irreligious Secularism	Areligious Secularism	Religious Secularism
Other related terms:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assertive secularism • Comprehensive secularism • Positive secularism • Subjective secularism • Strong secularism • Fundamentalist secularism • Laicism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Separatist secularism • Passive secularism • Partial secularism • Negative secularism • Political secularism • Objective secularism • Weak secularism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Separatist secularism • Passive secularism • Partial secularism • Negative secularism • Political secularism • Objective secularism • Weak secularism • Pluralistic secularism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accomodationist secularism • Passive secularism • Partial secularism • Negative secularism • Political secularism • Objective secularism • Weak secularism • Pluralistic secularism
The extension of secularism	<p>Aggressive and militant secularism with a materialistic and naturalistic world view.</p> <p>Aiming at the secularisation of all domains of social life, as well as the private life of individuals.</p>	<p>Strict institutional separation between the church and the state or between the religion and politics.</p> <p>Religion is not welcomed in social life.</p> <p>Resisting religious secularism.</p>	<p>Strict institutional separation between the church and the state or between the religion and politics.</p> <p>Religion is still honoured, and religious diversity is allowed to be negotiated in the cultural sense.</p>	<p>Institutional separation between the church and the state (i.e., state apparatus) or between the religion and politics (in its narrowest sense).</p> <p>Stands for close state-religion relations, including an active ethical role of religion in the public domains and active state support for religion.</p>
The degree and nature of the state involvement	<p>Actively purging the religious from the public sphere and does not even tolerate excessive religiosity of individuals.</p>	<p>Neutral (but it is concerned more with the privatisation of religion)</p>	<p>Neutral (but it is concerned more with protecting religious liberties and diversity)</p>	<p>Actively supporting religious role in social life, yet without any positive discrimination for a specific religion.</p>

Table 1. Differences between the sub-categories of secularism

Turning to the second main concept: Islamism, it has also been argued that Islamism does not represent a monolithic political ideology and is not composed of eternal, purely divine, and context-free doctrines because the political manifestation of Islam – like the practice of Islam itself – is context-specific.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, Islamism constitutes different sub-ideologies, each of which is a result of the reaction between three elements: sacred religious texts and legacies, political and societal contexts, and the ideological inclination of the founding ideologues.

It is true that all different versions of Islamism claim their commitment to the reference of Islamic *Shari'ah*, and that all adopt the concept of comprehensive Islam, which means that Islam represents a total system of life. Also, it is true that the vast majority of Islamists call for the establishment of an Islamic state, which is an ideological state representing and defending Islam.¹⁶⁶ However, there are great differences between the competing versions of Islamism regarding their understandings of the Islamic model of the state and how to establish it.

Many classifications have attempted to differentiate between the various sub-categories or sub-ideologies within Islamism. The most common classification is the moderate Islamism vs. radical Islamism subgrouping. This classification is based on some vague criteria; for instance, the moderate Islamists accept to work within the existing political regimes, while the extremists do not recognise their legitimacy and reject to work within their framework. Also, the moderate group believes in gradual change and adopts a

¹⁶⁵ Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam*, 15.

Omar Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2009), 7.

¹⁶⁶ Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology", 308.

Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and Change in the Modern Middle East*, 128.

peaceful strategy through participation in the formal political process seeking to induce as many reforms to the political, economic, and social systems as they can. Extremists, on the contrary, seek to overthrow the existing regimes and to induce immediate and radical changes in society, mostly by using violence.¹⁶⁷ Further, according to ‘Umar ‘Āshūr, moderate Islamists accept electoral democracy and political pluralism, while the radicals ideologically reject them.¹⁶⁸

Another common categorisation of Islamism is Salafi vs. modernised variants. For instance, Bassam Tibi divided the Islamic ideology into two types: the archaic or Salafi variant, which calls for a return to the authentic Islam of the Prophet’s era, and modernistic variant that calls for pan-Islamism and attempts to reactivate Islam as a mobilising ideology.¹⁶⁹

A more relevant categorisation of Islamism is based on the pattern of sovereignty. Andrew March describes three different attempts to reconcile the ideals of divine and popular sovereignty in the Islamic state models. The first model is the traditional one that is exemplified in the Saudi state. In this model, there is a sort of “division of labour” between the religious scholars, who are responsible for expression and interpretation of Allah’s law and the rulers who enjoy a certain space to exercise power.¹⁷⁰ However, in this model, the notion of popular participation is minimal, and although the king’s

¹⁶⁷ Jillian Schwedler, “Religion and Politics”, in *Politics and Society in the Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Michele Penner Angrist, 111-112 (Boulder; Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010).

¹⁶⁸ Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists*, 4.

¹⁶⁹ Bassam Tibi (trans. by Judith von Sivers), *The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), 90.

¹⁷⁰ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices From a New Generation* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 25.

authority is theoretically limited by the *'Al-Sharī'ah*, all the official bodies of religious authority are appointed and dissolved by him.¹⁷¹

The second attempt is the Shiite model of the governance of jurists or *Velayat-e-Faqih*. In this model, Allah's sovereignty is embodied in His law; therefore, the supreme religious authority has full right to claim the supreme political authority.¹⁷²

The last theoretical attempt is the democratic model that seeks to reconcile between the divine and the popular sovereignties and to popularise the political authority by asserting the concept of man's vicegerency of Allah. This model is adopted by some Islamist intellectuals "in the orbit of the MB" such as *Rāshid 'Al-Ghannūshī*.¹⁷³

In conclusion, the proposed sub-categorisation of Islamism ideology is based on two main parameters:

First: who is the centre of the power structure in the Islamic state model? In other words, who is the final arbitrator entitled to define and implement Islamic *Sharī'ah*: the ruler, the *'Ulamā'*, or the *'Ummah*? While the traditional answer refers to the *'Imām* (the highest political and religious post in the Islamic state), the Shiite *Velayat-e-Faqih* theory states that it is the Islamic scholars or the *'Ulamā'*, and the Islamic democrats emphasise that it is the Muslim *'Ummah*.

The second parameter depends on the degree and nature of state involvement in the "Islamist-isation" process. Should the state intervene to impose the Islamist ideology on

¹⁷¹ Andrew F. March, "Genealogies of Sovereignty in Islamic Political Theology", *Social Research* 80,1 (2013): 300 – 301.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 304 – 305.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 308 – 309.

politics and other social domains only or it should extend its intervention to the private sphere as well? Does the state adopt a soft Islamist ideology that is less deterministic and more pluralistic, or it adopts a fundamental and more comprehensive model that represents a holistic worldview?

Based on these two parameters, Islamism can be classified into four sub-ideologies: traditional authoritarian Islamism, democratic Islamism, semi-theocratic Islamism, and idealistic totalitarian Islamism. Although they will be defined as ideal-types, two of them (namely, the traditional authoritarian and semi-theocratic Islamism) are manifested in real political models: the Saudi regime and the Iranian regime respectively.

i. In traditional authoritarian Islamism, it is the *'Imām* who is mainly responsible for the implementation of the *Sharī'ah*. Therefore, the political authority is patriarchal, highly centralised, and personally vested in his office. Additionally, he enjoys a wide range of executive powers including an indefinite term of office, unlimited power in the appointment of officials and fiscal matters.¹⁷⁴ The people, in such a model, have minimal room for political participation and only the religious scholars are allowed to play a political role through advising the *'Imām*.

ii. Democratic Islamism, contrarily, affirms that Islamic *'Ummah* is the true vicegerent of God; therefore, it has the supreme authority, and it is who is assigned the task of defining and implementing the *Sharī'ah*.¹⁷⁵ Accordingly, the order of sovereignty in such a model, as *Ghannūshī* defines it, is Allah – the *'Ummah* – the *'Imām* and not Allah –

¹⁷⁴ Kamali, "Characteristics of the Islamic state", 31.

¹⁷⁵ Azzam Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannoushi: A Democrat Within Islamism* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 100.

the *ʿImām* – the *ʿUmmah*.¹⁷⁶ Consequently, the relationship between the ruler and the *ʿUmmah* is contractual, and political power is institutionalised, divided, and law-bounded.

iii. Although the *ʿUlamāʿ* do play important roles in the two previous ideologies, in semi-theocratic Islamism,* they enjoy the supreme authority over both the political rulers and the *ʿUmmah*. According to the Shiite doctrine, the *ʿImāmah* is by appointment from an infallible *ʿImām* to his successor, and it should be exclusively in the Prophet’s descendants or *ʿĀhl ʿAl-Bayt*. However, in the time of “occultation”, according to *Velayat-e-Faqih* theory, it is the duty of the *ʿUlamāʿ* to assume this position, because they are the only group who can be trusted with this task.^{177**}

iv. The last ideal-type is the idealistic totalitarian Islamism, exemplified in the concept of *ʿAl-Ḥākimiyyah* (the governance) of *ʿAbū ʿAl-ʿAlā ʿAl-Mawdūdī* and *Sayyid Quṭb*. In this version, the Islamic Sharīʿah is embodied in rigid fascist-style ideology.

As for idealism, *Quṭb* linked the political and social organisation in his concept of *ʿAl-Ḥākimiyyah* with a higher and all-encompassing system of the universe. His argument is something along the lines of: “The universe is regulated by one single law that binds all its parts in a harmonious and orderly sequence. This systematic arrangement is the creation of the will of the one *Ḥākimiyyah*”. As Man is obliged to live in this universe, he

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 256.

* It is not a classical theocracy because there is no clergyman or religious institution in Islam that can claim infallibility or an exclusive representation of Allah’s law.

¹⁷⁷ Abdellilah Belkeziz, *The State in Contemporary Islamic Thought: A Historical Survey of the Major Muslim Political Thinkers of the Modern Era* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 229-235.

** This model of scholars’ rule is not exclusively related to the Shiite sect as a result of its theological doctrines, but there are other Sunni equivalents to it as the case of Afghani Taliban and Somali legal courts systems.

is not allowed to follow any different path than the one of Allah to maintain the harmony between the system that guides the human life and that of the whole universe. Otherwise, man will collide with the forces of the universe and will be torn and crushed.¹⁷⁸

Also, 'Al-*Hākimiyyah* for Quṭb is not related to the organisation of social domains or the public sphere only; rather, it is a matter of faith and creed. Recognising Allah as the only *Hākīm* or sovereign is one of the necessities of the confession of faith "There is no god but Allah".¹⁷⁹ Therefore, 'Al-*Hākimiyyah* is not related only to the legislation or even to the principles of governance, but it extends to everything that Allah has prescribed for the organisation of human life. "This means that all-human conduct; political, economic, art, literature or other activities must fulfil the ordinances of *Hākimiyyah* as acts of worship."¹⁸⁰

In conclusion, the two grand concepts: secularism and Islamism, can be broken down into eight sub-ideologies, illustrated in the following continuum (figure no. 3). As the ends of the continuum are approached, more totalitarian ideological patterns and more aggressive state intervention exist. While, toward the centre, soft ideological patterns exist, and more pluralistic and accommodative state policies are followed.

¹⁷⁸ Sayed Khatab, "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb", *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, 3 (2002):152.

Sayyid Quṭb, *hādihā 'al-dīn* (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouq, 2001), 24-26.

¹⁷⁹ Khatab, "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb", 155.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 151.




Fig. 3: Sub-categorisation of secularism and Islamism ideologies

Furthermore, Andrew Heywood’s horseshoe-shaped continuum of political ideologies (figure no. 4) can be applied perfectly in this case because there are a lot of similarities that can be observed between the ideological patterns at both ends of the secularist-Islamist continuum.¹⁸¹ Anti-religious comprehensive secularism and idealistic totalitarian Islamism share many criteria: both are rigid and assertive forms of ideologies or worldviews, both necessitate an excessive and invasive state intervention, and both seek to control and influence the public, as well as the private spheres.




Fig. 4: Horseshoe-shaped continuum of secularism and Islamism sub-ideologies

¹⁸¹ Andrew Heywood (trans. by *Muḥammad Ṣufār*), *madkhal 'ilā 'al'ideulujiyyāt 'alsiāsiyyah* (Cairo: National Center For Translation, 2012), 29-30.

To conclude, what has been proposed in this chapter is three-fold:

First, it is valid to use the concept of secularism in the context of the Arab Spring. In this context, it should be defined as a political ideology or a worldview – in its totalitarian forms – that aims to remake Islam on the conditions of modernity and to confine and control its social functions and manifestations in both public and private spheres – as much as it is relevant and feasible.

Second, Islamism is not equal to Islam and, as a concept, it does not imply a secular tendency. Rather, it is one of the modern manifestations of Islam, which refers to a political ideology that constitutes ideas for political and social organisation inspired from the teachings of the *'Al-Sharī'ah* and a social movement that routinely involved in political activities and mobilisation in the name of Islam.

Third, secularism and Islamism in the Arab Spring context should not be perceived as mutually exclusive concepts. Rather, they are two grand ideologies, aiming at re-making of Islam in the modern era. While doing so, they conflate divine scriptures with human reason giving rise of many sub-ideologies that show a number of differences and similarities.

By clearly setting the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, the first two objectives of this thesis have been realised. In the next chapter, literature that has studied negotiations and pact-making processes during the transitional periods since the third wave of democratisation will be reviewed. In these works, the dynamics of the transitional negotiations, as well as variables that affected its course and outcome, will be explored and identified to be examined later in the case studies.

CHAPTER THREE: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Since the third wave of democratisation in the mid-1970s, the topic of elites' negotiations and pact-making has become one of the central themes in the transition literature. Experiences from Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the post-communist republics, and Sub-Saharan Africa have been studied thoroughly to understand the dynamics of these negotiations and find the variables that affect their outcomes.

Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to critically review the relevant literature addressing the topic of transitional negotiations and pact-making in previous experiences, as well as in the Arab Spring countries. Then, in the light of these works, the independent variables that had been previously concluded will be enlisted, and the relevant ones will be studied in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia.

3.1 Transitional Negotiations in the Pre-Arab Spring Experiences

As discussed in the theoretical framework section, the structured contingency approach states that two different sets of independent variables affect the process of elites' negotiations and pact-making: First are the structural factors which represent the background conditions that confine or enhance the choices of the negotiating elites. Second are the agent-related factors that focus on the qualities of elites, such as their leadership capacity, their legitimacy, and how pragmatic they are.

These two sets of variables will be reviewed in six seminal works that extensively studied the dynamics of transitions over more than twenty years (i.e., from the mid-

1970s till mid-1990s) in different regions throughout the world.* The first is the four-volume *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*:¹⁸² Volume one and two discussed transitions in fifteen countries in Southern and Eastern Europe and in Latin America respectively, volume three contains a series of papers which discussed general themes of democratic transition from different perspectives, while volume four was dedicated to the lessons learnt from the examined experiences.¹⁸³

Samuel Huntington's *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* published in 1991 is the second work on transitions that is worth mentioning. In his book, Huntington examined democratic transitions in about thirty countries that occurred between 1974 and 1990. It represented "preliminary assessment and explanation of these regime transitions", in which historical and political science approaches were employed to understand why, how, and what the consequences of such wave of democratisation would be.¹⁸⁴

Another important work in the same field is Jan J. Linz's and Alfred Stepan's *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and*

* Reviewing this sample of literature is fulfilling the purpose of giving an overview on the pre-Arab Spring transitional experiences. As Brownlee *et al.* once stated, given the fact that literature on democratisation and authoritarianism is huge, "our treatment is necessarily selective."

Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 18

¹⁸² See: Guillermo O' Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

— *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Latin America*, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

— *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Guillermo O' Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*. Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

¹⁸³ O' Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, xi.

¹⁸⁴ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman; London, University of Oklahoma Press: 1991), xiii-xiv.

Post-Communist Europe.¹⁸⁵ In this work, Linz and Stepan extended their study to include some cases from the post-communist Europe (part of the fourth wave of democratisation as has been termed by Michael McFaul).¹⁸⁶ In this research, both cross-regional and intra-regional comparative analyses were applied to fifteen countries (three from Southern Europe, four from South America, and eight from post-communist Europe) to examine the independent variables that affected regime transition and democratic consolidation in these cases.

Transitions in Sub-Saharan Africa in the first half of the 1990s were studied in Michael Bratton's and Nicolas Van De Walle's work titled: *Democratic Experiments in Africa*. This study compared the transitional process in a total of forty-two countries during the period 1989-1994. The aim of their study was to understand the causes, trajectories, and different outcomes of the African transitions by a comparative analysis of multiple institutional and actor-centric variables.¹⁸⁷

The last two works in this list primarily focus on the elite variable and its impact on the regime transition process. In an edited book titled *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, Michael Burton, John Higley, and Richard Gunther discussed the roles played by elites during democratic transitions in thirteen countries in the previously mentioned regions. Their basic research question addressed the topic of elite's transformation from disunity to consensual unity: whether it happened

¹⁸⁵ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

¹⁸⁶ McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship", 212.

¹⁸⁷ See: Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

or not during regime transition, in which forms, how the nature of the elite and the public promoted or hindered it, and the outcome of the transition.¹⁸⁸

The second work is Gretchen Casper's and Michelle M Taylor's *Negotiating Democracy: Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*. In this work, the authors examined the transitional process in twenty-four cases from Southern Europe, South America, post-communist republics, and Sub-Saharan Africa. They studied the interactions between the political elites and the public and how the elite negotiations during the transitional phase influence the possibility of democratic consolidation.¹⁸⁹

Reviewing this list of works aims at serving two objectives. Firstly, to comprehend the dynamics of the process of transitional negotiations and pact-making: how they were described, how the involved social forces and political elites were categorised, and what the main topics were in the negotiations' agenda. Secondly, what were the macro-structural, meso-organisational, and micro-agential variables that influenced the course and outcome of these negotiations?

Concerning the first goal, the literature on the pre-Arab Spring experiences disagrees on whether elites' negotiation is a constant feature of regime transitions or not, as well as on its importance for successful democratisation. For instance, Huntington differentiates between three different broad patterns of democratisation: (i) transformation, in which democracy is brought about by the elite in power; (ii) replacement, when it is the opposition counter-elite who takes the lead; and (iii)

¹⁸⁸ John and Richard, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 324.

¹⁸⁹ Gretchen Casper and Michelle M Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy: Transitions From Authoritarian Rule* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996).

transplacement, when democracy is the outcome of the combined action of the government and the opposition. All types, according to Huntington, usually involve some negotiations between the government and the opposition, whether implicit or explicit, overt or covert.¹⁹⁰ However, negotiations, compromise, and agreements are the central elements only in the transplacement model – the model that happened in eleven out of thirty-five cases during the third wave.¹⁹¹

Contrary to this, Linz and Stepan stated that elite negotiations do not occur in all regime transition cases. Instead, the likelihood of negotiation and pact-making depends on the nature of the outgoing regime. Based on the four-player model, elite negotiations occur if there is a possibility for the regime's differentiation into hardliners and soft-liners and when there is a chance for the development of organised moderate opposition. Therefore, according to their typology, pacted transitions are possible only if the outgoing regime was authoritarian or post-totalitarian and cannot occur if it was a totalitarian or a personalistic sultanism.¹⁹²

In different circumstances, Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle noticed that weak political institutions in the Sub-Saharan African countries did not provide a favourable context for transitional negotiations and pact-making between political elites. Instead, regime transitions in Africa during the 1990s were zero-sum conflicts, in which the winner-takes-all pattern dominated.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 114.

¹⁹¹ Ibid, 151, 165.

¹⁹² Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 56-57.

¹⁹³ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 177.

Concerning the parties involved in the negotiation process, it seems that there is an agreement that negotiations during the transition are an exclusively oligarchic practice. O' Donnell and Schmitter, as an example, stated that negotiations usually occur between a limited number of participants who represent both the outgoing regime and the opposition as well.¹⁹⁴

Huntington used the four-player categorisation also to describe the negotiating parties: the hardliners (or standpatters to use Huntington's term) and soft-liners (or reformers) of the government and moderates and radicals in the opposition. According to his typology for democratisation, negotiations in case of transformations are usually implicit and the initiative comes from the reformers in the government, while the opposition just adapts their tactics to take the chance of the political opening. During transplacements and replacements, regime change negotiations occur between government reformers and opposition moderates on the one hand and among democratic opposition groups themselves on the other hand.¹⁹⁵

In their study, Casper and Taylor have a different categorisation. They theorise that regime transition is a tripartite game between what they call the defenders, the challengers, and the mass public. Each party has its own preference regarding the ideal regime. Eventually, the nature of the regime that will be installed is determined by negotiations that run between the defenders or the elite in power and the challengers or the democratic opposition elite. The mass public does not participate directly in the negotiations; nevertheless, it plays an important role as a source of information. The

¹⁹⁴ O' Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*, 44-45.

¹⁹⁵ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 165.

public support or opposition to proposals and counter-proposals offered by the negotiating elites influences the relative bargaining positions of the defenders and the challengers.¹⁹⁶

The reviewed literature describes the transitional process and the dynamic of elites' negotiations in different ways. O' Donnell and Schmitter conceptualise the transition as involving "a sequence of moments", each may entail a separate pact or pacts:

i. The military moment, where the negotiations run around the conditions under which the military will refrain from disrupting the process of transition and give up its claim to govern. These conditions usually aim at protecting the generals from any act of revenge and safeguarding the vital interests of the military institution.

ii. The political moment, which comes after ensuring that the military will go back to its barracks. The goal of these negotiations is to put regulations on the competition between the political elites, share the benefits between them proportionately, limit their policy agenda, and restrict the participation of the outsiders or extremists in policymaking.

iii. Last to come is the economic moment, which aims at compromising class interests and assuring both the bourgeoisie of property rights and the working class of social justice policies.¹⁹⁷

Burton *et al.* conceptualise the process of transitional negotiations using the concept of "elite settlement". According to them, elite settlement represents "a rare event" in which the conflicting elites decide to negotiate their points of disagreements and offer

¹⁹⁶ Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 19-20.

¹⁹⁷ O' Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*, 45-54.

compromises. They emphasised that this concept differs from the concept of “elite pact” as used by O’ Donnell and Schmitter in two aspects. Firstly, it is equal to the political moment only, and it does not include the military nor the economic moments. Secondly, the design of elite pact as described by O’ Donnell and Schmitter is more exclusive than the concept of elite settlement; therefore, it leads to more limited democracy or even pseudo-democracy. Accordingly, they argue that the result of elite settlement is a better chance for a more consolidated and less limited form of democracy.¹⁹⁸

Casper and Taylor tell a different story about the process of transition. According to them, regime transitions entail three stages:

- i. A critical juncture stage, in which an opportunity for change is opened when the authoritarian regime is weakened as a result of an internal or external factor such as mass protests, a succession crisis, an economic bankruptcy, or a military defeat.
- ii. A sorting out stage, in which the challengers identify themselves and the mass public starts to react positively or negatively to the initial proposals offered by the competing elites – the matter that initially reflects their bargaining positions.
- iii. A deal cutting stage, during which, each elite group assesses its position and subsequently modifies its strategies and proposals about the specifics of the new regime. The defenders and challengers continue to negotiate and renegotiate their proposals and counterproposals until they eventually reach an acceptable deal.¹⁹⁹

During these negotiations, each actor may follow either a facilitator or roadblock strategy. The first means that one party starts with offering concessions hoping that this

¹⁹⁸ Burton *et al.*, “Introduction” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 13-14, 33-35.

¹⁹⁹ Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 22-32.

attitude will encourage the competitor to make concessions too. On the contrary, the roadblock strategy entails that a negotiating elite resolutely insists on their preferred regime model in order to force the competitors to make concessions.²⁰⁰

Accordingly, Casper and Taylor classify different paths of transition into three categories:

- i. An extreme conflict path, in which the negotiating elites have divergent regime preferences and the defenders choose to follow a roadblock strategy and adopt a winner-take-all approach in the negotiation. In this case, the most probable outcome of the transition is continued authoritarianism.
- ii. A compromise path, in which the competing parties choose to cooperate with each other because the defenders realise that their best option is to cut a deal with the challengers, so they follow a facilitatory strategy during the negotiations. The outcome of such path is usually democratic installation; nevertheless, there is no guarantee for its consolidation.
- iii. An intense negotiation path, which is characterised by difficult negotiations due to divergent preferences of the negotiating elites and an initial roadblock strategy adopted by the defenders. This path would be an extreme conflictual one which leads to continued authoritarianism; however, the defenders during the course of negotiations decide to change their strategy due to a weak bargaining position. This path usually has a better chance to reach a consolidated democracy because the competing elites have already succeeded in overcoming all contentious points of disagreement.²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ Ibid, 34.

²⁰¹ Ibid, 226-243.

To summarise, elite negotiations are a common – but not a constant – feature during regime transitions. They are more likely to occur if there are developed political institutions, and when the outgoing regime is less personalistic and totalitarian. The transitional negotiation usually involves agreements between oligarchic groups, which consists of political elites of the outgoing regime and the challenging opposition, as well as the economic elites. The masses are not involved directly in such negotiations, but they may influence them indirectly by showing their support or opposition to the proposals of the negotiating groups. Generally, these negotiations are political in nature and usually run around the features of the new regime. However, other specific topics may be included, such as the new economic policies.

Based on the previous experiences, it can be concluded that while the negotiating elites' reaching an agreement or making a pact enhances the chance for democratic installation, it does not guarantee its consolidation. The more inclusive and comprehensive the negotiations are, the better the chances for the installed democracy to consolidate.

After understanding the dynamics of transitional negotiations in pre-Arab Spring experiences, the second objective is to review the structural and actor-centric independent variables that influence the outcome of transitions. Structural variables, as mentioned before, represent confining conditions that directly or indirectly shape the strategies and choices of the political actors. On the other hand, in agential variables, elite decisions are considered autonomous factors determined by their personal skills, experiences, and idiosyncrasies.

For example, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan examined seven variables affecting the outcome of the transition categorised into three sets:

- i. Two macro-variables: the degree to which the state has an established national identity and sovereignty, and the type of the outgoing regime (totalitarian, post-totalitarian, authoritarian, and sultanism).
- ii. Two middle-range actor-centric variables: the nature of the previous regime's leadership (military, civilian, and sultanistic) and the initiator of the democratic transition (civil society, military coup, or armed rebellion).
- iii. Three middle-range contextual variables: international influences, the political economy of regime legitimacy, and constitution-making environment.²⁰²

Another example is Michael Bratton's and Nicolas Van De Walle's study which puts the variables that affect regime transition in the form of three dichotomies: structural vs. contingent factors, political vs. economic factors, and international vs. domestic factors. However, for non-contingent structural and contextual variables, they choose to give priority to the domestic political variables and downplay economic and international factors to be secondary and explanatory variables.²⁰³ They contend that "to the extent that economic and international factors were important to regime transitions, they were mediated by domestic political and institutional considerations."²⁰⁴

Furthermore, Bratton and Van De Walle specified four domestic political institutions, whose impact on transition should be examined thoroughly: the nature of the pre-

²⁰² Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics*, 198-199.

See: Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 16-83.

²⁰³ See: Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 19-41.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 272.

transition regime, the professionalism and neutrality of the army, the degree of organisation and plurality of political parties, and the density and autonomy of associations within the civil society.^{205*}

Other contextual variables have been highlighted in other studies. For instance, Burton *et al.* specify two contextual circumstances that help the negotiating elites to reach a compromise: if those elites have previously experienced heavy losses due to their division and if they have become facing “a major crisis that threatened the resumption of widespread violence.”²⁰⁶

The presence of a crisis of stalemate with a comparable balance of power between contested elites was affirmed by a number of academics as an important catalyst for reaching a compromise.²⁰⁷ This stalemate situation is reached when negotiating elites realised that their “bargaining position [is] approximately equal.” In other words, when they realised that no single actor has enough power to establish the new regime based exclusively on his own preferences, they “work together to negotiate a compromise.”²⁰⁸

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 40-41.

* In an unpublished draft, Philippe C. Schmitter pointed to the impact of what he called “guardian institutions” on transitions. These institutions include armed forces, especially their General Staffs, supreme or constitutional courts, and independent central banks.

Philippe C. Schmitter, “Democratization and Political Elites”, *European University Institute on-line Publications*

<http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Profiles/Schmitter/DEMOCRATIZATION-AND-POLITICAL-ELITES.REV.pdf> (accessed 2 April 2017)

²⁰⁶ Burton *et al.*, “Introduction” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 14.

²⁰⁷ Dukhong Kim, *Democratization in South Korea during 1979-1987* (MA thesis, University of Virginia Tech, 1997), 56-57.

Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 178.

²⁰⁸ Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 238,244.

Regarding contingent actor-centric variables, as explained before, they deal with the elites' qualities and choices as variables on their own that are not simply shaped by structural or contextual necessities. Moreover, it was argued that, in highly personalised political regimes with weak formal institutions, the contingent variables become superior over non-contingent structural ones.²⁰⁹ Bratton and Van De Walle, as an example, described regime transitions in the African experience as “highly contingent political processes”.²¹⁰ Therefore, subjective factors such as personal trust, mutual rivalries, and willingness to compromise do matter.²¹¹

Accordingly, Burton *et al.* enlisted some of the elite qualities necessary for reaching a compromise such as:

i. Elites' flexibility, which means their ability to modify their political beliefs and behaviours for the sake of supporting the forming democracy.²¹² This flexibility can be achieved when the relevant elites perceive politics as “bargaining” rather than “war or zero-sum game” and when they are aware of the catastrophic impact of uncompromised political conflicts on the democratic transition – probably from their experience in past conflicts.²¹³

²⁰⁹ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 221.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 169.

²¹¹ O' Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*, 69.

²¹² Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 11.

²¹³ Burton *et al.*, “Introduction” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 3,13.

ii. Elite unity, which means involvement of all or most relevant elites in negotiations via formal and informal communication networks to promote and defend their interests. On the contrary, elite fragmentation makes negotiation and compromise even harder.²¹⁴

iii. Elite legitimacy, which means to what extent those elites are “anchored in coherent and powerful organisations” and their positions in these organisations are clearly acknowledged and secured. If those elites lack such legitimacy, they will be reluctant to make any concessions and even if they do, they will not be able to keep supporters’ backing or to implement what has been agreed to.²¹⁵

In conclusion, out of all variables reported in the previous experiences, the following variables seem to be more relevant to the outcome of the transitional negotiations:

Macro-structural variables (i.e., at the state level)	Meso-structural variables (i.e., at the level of intermediary societal organisations)	Micro-actorcentric (agent-related) variables
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The outgoing or pre-transition regime type. • The administration of the transitional period. • The professionalism of the military institution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The relative bargaining position of the negotiating groups. • The maturity and autonomy of the CSOs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elites' legitimacy. • Elites' unity. • Divergence in the elites' preferences. • Elites' capacity. • Elites' experience of previous loss due to their disagreement.

Fig. 5: Independent variables affecting the output of elite negotiations during the transition

²¹⁴ Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, “Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe: An Over View” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* eds. John Higley and Richard Gunther, 323, 343 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

²¹⁵ *Ibid*, 342.

Concerning the macro-structural variables, elite negotiations are influenced by three main factors:

i. The nature of the pre-transition regime:

According to the reviewed works, elite negotiations are more likely and compromise is the possible outcome if the reformers of the outgoing regime and the moderates of the democratic opposition succeeded in marginalising both the hardliner governing elites and the radical opponents and to have the upper hand during the transitional period. This occurs when the pre-transition regime is neither personalistic nor totalitarian and allows for the emergence of a reformist wing amongst its elites and the development of an organised opposition.²¹⁶

ii. The administration of the transitional period:

Who initiates and controls the transition is another important variable that affects the dynamic of the elite negotiations.²¹⁷ If a group of elites claims to play an essential role in the regime's overthrow, this may give them more legitimacy to control the trajectory of the transitional process and render them relatively stronger bargaining power during the negotiations *vis-à-vis* the other elite groups.

iii. The degree of professionalism of the military institution:

The military institution is one of the important guardian institutions that determines the path of the regime transition.²¹⁸ According to Bratton and Van De Walle, military intervention in the transitional process depends on the degree of the military's penetration of polity and society, the strength and cohesiveness of the military

²¹⁶ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 56-57.

²¹⁷ *Ibid*, 71.

²¹⁸ Schmitter, "Democratization and Political Elites", 3.

organisation *vis-à-vis* the civilian political institutions, the institutional legacy of military coups and rule, and to what extent the transitional process is perceived as a threat to military privileges.²¹⁹ In other words, the unprofessional military institution which used to directly or indirectly control the political power will be keen to manage the transition and it will be in a position to impose its will on the negotiating civilian elites. The bargaining position of the military is further increased if the civilian political institutions are weak and if the military plays a significant role in the initiation of the transitional process.²²⁰

Meso-structural variables include variables related to the intermediary societal organisations. The reviewed literature concluded that successful transitional negotiations require well-established intermediary organisations (i.e., political parties, trade unions, advocacy groups, etc.) with a supportive political and civil culture to serve the function of interest articulation and aggregation. The following two variables are the most relevant to the scope of this thesis.

i. Relative bargaining position of the negotiating forces:

The first organisational meso-structural variable is about the relative balance of power or bargaining position of the negotiating parties. It has been emphasised that when the bargaining position of the negotiating groups are relatively balanced, it is more likely that both sides will make concessions to reach a compromise.²²¹ On the other hand, according to Casper and Taylor, uncertainty about the relative bargaining position may be an obstacle to the negotiations because “either actor (or both) thinks it can get a

²¹⁹ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 170, 215-217.

²²⁰ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 72.

²²¹ Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 235.

better deal for itself by refusing to compromise.”²²² This relative bargaining power is sometimes referred to as a stalemate crisis, which occurs when the negotiations reach a deadlock situation with comparable bargaining positions and growing fears of widespread violence.²²³

How the bargaining position is assessed or perceived by the negotiating actors is an important topic here. The reviewed literature mentions a number of indicators such as the capacity of popular mobilisation and the results of the founding elections.²²⁴ Other indicators are not related to the mass support as the “moral authority” claimed by one negotiating group because of its previous struggle against the outgoing authoritarian regime or its decisive role in its collapse.²²⁵

ii. The maturity and autonomy of the civil society:

Burton *et al.* stated that elite settlement requires “a degree of hierarchical organisation in a society” which means the presence of well-established civil and political organisations that articulate the interests of specific social groups and can bargain on their behalf.²²⁶ In the African context, Bratton and Van De Walle mentioned that weak political and civil institutions which lack “the principles of pluralism” hindered any efficient negotiation or democratic bargain. Furthermore, the explanation they offered for

²²² Ibid, 233.

²²³ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 178.

Burton *et al.*, “Introduction” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 14.

²²⁴ Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 50-53.

Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 71.

²²⁵ O’ Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*, 52.

Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 71.

²²⁶ Burton *et al.*, “Introduction” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 33.

the exceptional case of South Africa, where pacted transition occurred, is indebted to the settler oligarchic regimes – despite all their fatal flaws – having institutionalised their political competition.²²⁷

For the micro-agential variables, the outcome of transitional negotiation and the possibility of compromise are influenced by many actor-centric factors, which may be summarised as follows:

- i. Elite legitimacy, which means to what extent those elites are representative, anchored in well-established organisations, and have an authoritative position (vertical control) in their constituency.²²⁸
- ii. Elite capacity, which refers to the elite leadership style, skills, flexibility, pragmatism, and other personal qualities or idiosyncrasies.
- iii. Elite unity, which refers to the degree of participation of elites in the negotiation process. In other words, whether the relevant elites become involved in these negotiations or decide to boycott and defect from this process.
- iv. The degree of divergence of the negotiating elites' preferences or to use Casper's and Taylor's expression, the degree of "proximity of actors' preferences on a regime continuum".²²⁹
- v. Elite experience of previous loss due to their disagreement or as Burton *et al.* put it, the prior occurrence of a conflict in which all factions suffered heavy losses make the divided elites tend to seek a compromise.²³⁰

²²⁷ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 177-179.

²²⁸ Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics*, 198.

²²⁹ Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 48.

3.2 The Literature on Transitional Negotiations During the Arab Spring

In the previous section, the literature on the pre-Arab Spring transitional negotiations was critically reviewed to explore how significant the transitional negotiations were, how their dynamics were described, how the negotiating parties were categorised, the main issues around which the negotiations revolved, and most importantly, which variables affected the course and the outcome of such negotiations. In what follows, the same topics will be examined in the recent works on the Arab Spring countries, with a special focus on the case of Egypt and Tunisia.

In general, many Arab Spring countries have witnessed negotiations or at least “limited conversational experiences.”²³¹ However, most of these negotiations were either badly organised or inappropriately implemented, and sometimes both. Only Tunisia seems to have more organised negotiations and a “structurally superior” transition than the others.²³²

Lack of organised negotiations and pacted transitions in the Arab Spring was explained by the spontaneity of the uprisings, the absence or ill-developed political parties to be

²³⁰ Burton *et al.*, “Introduction” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 14.

²³¹ Mady, “Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, 17.

²³² *Ibid.*

Ricardo René Larémont, “Moving Past Revolution and Revolt: Transitions to Democracy in North Africa” in *Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond*, ed. Ricardo René Larémont, 148 (New York: Routledge, 2014).

presented in the pact-making process, and the de-legitimised and rapidly collapsed authoritarian regimes in some cases.²³³

‘Alī ‘Al-Rajjāl and Hebah Ra‘ūf ‘Ezzat pointed to the complexity and the hybridity of the Arab Spring nature as another important obstacle in front of negotiations. They argued that the Arab Spring was not simply democratic outbursts with clear nationalist, religious, or class-based demands. The drivers for the uprisings were much diverse and complicated. Therefore, it was hard to have organised negotiations with a clear agenda. As they put it, “[r]eligion, passion, ideology, and memory play an important role in the distorted and fragmented process of negotiation.”²³⁴

Two reasons make “the most fitting regional analogue for the Arab Spring” is the regime transition experiences in Sub-Saharan Africa, as they were described by Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle. First, the limited outcome of the transitional process with the persistence of authoritarianism or failing states in almost all cases of the Arab Spring.²³⁵ Second, the weak political institutions that reduced the possibility and the significance of transitional negotiations, in contrary to the transitions of the third wave, in which negotiations and pact-making were a prominent feature.

The second account is what convinced Philippe Schmitter and *Nādīn Sīkā* to argue that the Arab Spring transitions are better understood by using McFaul’s model of “non-cooperative transitions” which predominated the fourth wave of democratisation in the

²³³ I. William Zartman, “Negotiations in Transitions: A Conceptual Framework” in *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat*, ed. I. William Zartman, 9 (Athens; Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2015).

²³⁴ Aly El Raggal and Heba Raouf Ezzat, “Egypt: Can A Revolution Be Negotiated?” in *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat*, ed. I. William Zartman, 81-82 (Athens and Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2015).

²³⁵ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 18.

post-communist republics. In such a model, the outcome of transition is determined by the will of the powerful political forces, rather than the negotiations and compromises.²³⁶

Despite the categorisation of the wave of uprisings that have swept the Arab region since December 2010 under the same banner of the Arab Spring, the magnitude, the course, and the outcome of these uprisings clearly differ from one case to another. In some cases, the mobilisation was intense with a high magnitude, as in the case of Tunisia and Egypt. In others, the mobilisation was limited as the case of Morocco and Gulf countries. On some occasions, regime repression succeeded in aborting the uprisings as in the case of Bahrain. On other occasions, it resulted in a civil war as in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Even in the countries that succeeded in unseating their rulers, the change was limited only to the leadership in some cases while, in others, they succeeded to induce an institutional change and establish new rules for the game.²³⁷

Transitions after the leadership change in the Arab Spring countries were classified by I. William Zartman into short track transitions and long track transitions. The first is characterised by the rapid overthrow of the old regime within one month as the case of Egypt and Tunisia. This pattern, according to Zartman, occurs “[i]n the context of a worn-out autocrat expected to go anyhow, the army’s refusal to fire on the people, the government officials’ willingness to accept a negotiated transition removing them from

²³⁶ Philippe Schmitter and Nadine Sika, “Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa: A More Ambidextrous Process?”, *Mediterranean Politics* (2016): 18.

²³⁷ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 3-4,10.

their positions, the primary opposition organisation’s emphasis on its moderation, and all parties’ expressed commitment to state (not order) continuity.”²³⁸

As for long track transitions, they follow a pattern that witnessed a relatively long period of violence (i.e., more than eight months) before the overthrow. In such a category, the uprisers usually disagree on the question of using violence, and the insurgents break up into factions based on sectarian, tribal, and regional identities as the case of Libya and Yemen.²³⁹

Both categories, according to Zartman, are characterised by distinctive patterns of negotiations, as shown in table no. 2:²⁴⁰

	Description of the Transition Pattern	The Criteria of the Negotiations	Example
No Leadership Change			
a. Adapting Pattern	The old regime is strong enough to resist the change but cannot totally ignore its demands, so it adopts a mild reform path. While the opposition is obviously weak, popular mobilisation is limited, and the demands are moderate.	Negotiations are usually tacit and secret “within the corridors” of the old regime.	Morocco

²³⁸ Zartman, “Negotiations in Transitions” in *Arab Spring*,18.

²³⁹ Ibid, 22-25.

²⁴⁰ Ibid, 25-33.

b. Repressing Pattern	The old regime feels strong enough to totally ignore the call for change, and does not feel any need to compromise, so it decides to crush the uprisings.	Negotiations between the old regime and opposition are unlikely. Instead, tough divisive negotiations usually occur within each group on the appropriate strategy to be adopted.	Bahrain
	Long Track Transitions		
Fragmenting Pattern	This pattern happens when the transition is lost in a protracted conflict. Violence results in fragmentation of the political forces into small suspicious groups with no strong parties.	Negotiations in this pattern are the most unstable and complicated because all parties are reluctant to join negotiations. It usually needs an external pressure and mediation to push warring factions to negotiate.	Libya and Yemen
	Short Track Transitions		
a. Competing Pattern	This pattern occurs when the post-overthrow system is multiparty without any dominant force.	The political forces are involved in negotiations for coalitions and constitutions. Meanwhile, all parties are keen not to push political conflicts too far.	Tunisia

b. Pacting Pattern	The post-overthrow transition is dominated by two main forces forming a bipolar system.	In this pattern, continual – yet tacit – negotiations between the two main forces result in unstable pacting. The system remains stable as long as each party feels it cannot push the other party out the game.	Egypt
--------------------	---	--	-------

Table 2. Transition patterns and the associated negotiations criteria, according to I. William Zartman

What mainly concerns this thesis is the negotiation patterns associated with the short track transitions, because, in the patterns of repression or adoption, negotiations are either tacit and secret or did not occur at all. For the long track transitions, protracted and militarised conflicts fragmented and complicated the negotiation process, and the priority was given to the military rather than the political aspects of these conflicts.

Concerning the issues around which the transitional negotiations took place, in contrast to the three sequential “moments” of negotiations described by O’ Donnell and Schmitter: the military, the political, and the economic, the last does not enjoy a real significance during the Arab Spring in comparison to issues of religion. As Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz have stated, despite the role played by the Catholic Church in the third wave countries such as Poland, the conflict over religion or in-between religions was not a prominent feature during these countries’ transitions. Moreover, the third wave had no parallel to the hegemony of religious forces over civil society in the Arab Spring countries.²⁴¹

²⁴¹ Stepan and Linz, “Democratization Theory and the Arab Spring”, 15-17.

Therefore, despite the fact that the conflict between the political elites in the Arab Spring countries revolved around many issues such as the nature of the government, military privileges, and the electoral system, the most aggressive debate did occur around the relationship between religion and the state.²⁴² This includes the role of the *Sharī'ah* in the constitution, religious freedoms, and civil rights, among many other issues.²⁴³

The centrality and severity of the divide on religious issues during the short track transitions makes the usual categorisation of political forces in the third wave literature into incumbents and opponents with a four-player negotiation game not helpful. Rather, it would be more productive to pay attention to the division inside the opposition camp after they had deposed the incumbents.²⁴⁴

Accordingly, the literature on the Arab Spring took into consideration the ideological divide between the Islamists and the secularists, and hence, it commonly categorises the political forces during the Arab Spring transitions into the *ancien régime*, the Islamists, and the liberal secularists.²⁴⁵ Furthermore, this new stratification based on religious ideology, and not democratic agenda, helped to reinstate the outgoing political elite to be part of the secularist forces, as was the case in Egypt and Tunisia.²⁴⁶

To examine the variables that affected the course and the outcome of the transitional negotiations during the Arab Spring, many works have followed the structured

²⁴² Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 169.

²⁴³ Larémont, "Moving Past Revolution and Revolt" in *Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa*, 149. Nathan J. Brown, "Arab Constitutions, the Many Voices of the Public, and the Word of the One God" in *Arguing Islam After the Revival of Arab Politics*, ed. Nathan J. Brown, 172-173 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

²⁴⁴ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 196.

²⁴⁵ Schmitter and Sika, "Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa", 21.

²⁴⁶ Mady, "Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings", 24.

contingency theoretical approach.²⁴⁷ However, there was disagreement on the relative importance of the structural and the agential sets of variables. Paola Rivetti, for instance, highlights the importance of the agent variables stating that the uprisings represent “rare moments when agency defeats the structure.”²⁴⁸

On the contrary, other scholars stressed the primacy of structures over agents in the context of the Arab Spring. According to Schmitter and *Sīkā*, the heavy emphasis on the leaders’ *virtù* – in the Machiavellian sense – and the downplaying of structural variables to be merely facilitating or debilitating factors “proved not to be the case” in the MENA region.²⁴⁹ Brownlee *et al.* also argue that, in the context of the Arab Spring, “the success or failure of transitional processes was less due to contingent factors — such as particular institutional choices or the foresight or political acumen of particular politicians — than to structurally defined power imbalances among relevant political actors.”²⁵⁰

Accordingly, the literature on the Arab Spring has attributed the different paths and outcomes of the transitions to many structural and agent-related variables. For instance, Kristen Kao and Ellen Lust conducted an extensive literature review to answer why the Arab Spring uprisings turned out the way they did. They found that the classical structural factors used for a long time to explain the persistence of authoritarianism in the MENA region are still widely used in the post-Arab Spring literature. Scholars still

²⁴⁷ Paola Rivetti, “Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco: Regime Reconfiguration and Policymaking in North Africa”, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42,1 (2015): 6.

Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 15.

Schmitter and Sika, “Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa”, 3-4.

²⁴⁸ Rivetti, “Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco”, 6.

²⁴⁹ Schmitter and Sika, “Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa”, 3.

²⁵⁰ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 16.

refer to “the role of Islam, geopolitics, oil, regime institutions and coalitions, the military, and civil society” as determinant variables for the outcome of the Arab Spring transitions. According to them, few pay enough attention to the role played by agents such as the political elites or even the ordinary citizens in shaping the transitional process.²⁵¹

Other works highlight the interplay between the structural and agential variables. Brownlee *et al.*, as an example, stated that successful transition to democracy in the Arab Spring countries depends on the political elites’ decisions that were shaped by two main structural factors: the presence of a strong state able to channel the political conflicts and competition to the formal institutions rather than the battlefields, as well as the presence of a sufficient degree of pluralism or balance of power between the pro-democratic forces that prevent any force from overwhelmingly dominating the political scene and making the others act as spoilers to the newly established regime.²⁵²

Moving to the particular cases of the short track transitions: Egypt and Tunisia, many works attempted to explain why the latter succeeded in maintaining the democratic transition course, while the whole process collapsed in the former. The simple voluntaristic agent-centric explanation, which argues that the Tunisian transition survived because the military generals decided not to intervene and the political elites – especially the Islamists – were more keen to compromise does not tell the full story.²⁵³

²⁵¹ Kristen Kao and Ellen Lust, “Why Did the Arab Uprisings Turn Out as They Did? A Survey of The Literature”. *POMED Reports*. 1-8.
<http://pomed.org/pomed-publications/pomed-snapshot-why-did-the-arab-uprisings-turn-out-as-they-did-a-survey-of-the-literature/> (accessed 11 March 2018)

²⁵² Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 15.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, 186.

Instead, different macro- and meso-structural, as well as micro-agential variables, resulted in the different attitudes and behaviours of the main political actors in both cases.

Concerning the macro-structural variables (i.e., at the state level), the nature of the military institutions in both countries and their role during the transitional period were highly emphasised. Although the military in Egypt and Tunisia played a decisive role in ousting the authoritarian leaders, the Tunisian military accepted to withdraw from the political scene and leave it to the civilian politicians, while the Egyptian military insisted on running the transitional period alone and made it clear it would not submit to any civilian government in the future.²⁵⁴

The difference in the political behaviour of these institutions could be explained by many structural variables. Most significantly, the degree of “militarisation” of the country, that is to say, the number of military personnel and their ratio to the population, the military expenditure in relation to the GDP, and the level of armament reflect the centrality of the military institution in both countries.²⁵⁵ Furthermore, in accordance with Bratton and Van De Walle, Brownlee *et al.* stressed the previous history of military intervention in politics as an important indicator of its behaviour during the transitional period. In other words, military coups are more expected in the countries that have previous experience of military rule.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁴ John Liolos, “Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The Problems and Promise of Constitutionalism Post-Arab Spring”, *Boston College International & Comparative Law Review* 36,1 (2013): 7-8.
Al-Sayyid, “The Divergent Trajectories of Arab Dignity Revolts: Egypt and Tunisia” in *Re-envisioning West Asia*, 198.

²⁵⁵ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 191.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 187, 189-190.

Accordingly, as the military in Egypt has dominated Egyptian politics since the 1952 coup, it was highly expected that the military would strive to maintain its “political centrality” in the post-*Mubārak* era.²⁵⁷ In contrast, the Tunisian military has a totally different legacy. Since the establishment of the Tunisian Republic in 1956, its two autocratic presidents were keen on keeping the military institution away from domestic politics.²⁵⁸

Apart from military institutions, other macro-structural variables have been reported as well. For example, an essentialist account refers to the different cultures between Egypt and Tunisia. According to this explanation, the Tunisian people have a well-entrenched civil culture that is “more hospitable to the democratic institutions.”²⁵⁹ This cultural difference is attributed to many factors, such as a more mature middle class, a higher level of literacy, a better educational system, a higher level of urbanisation, and a higher GDP per capita.²⁶⁰

Scholars also have paid a lot of attention to the meso-structural variables (i.e., the variables related to the intermediary societal organisations). As regards the first meso-variable, it has been argued that the civil and political societies in Egypt and Tunisia are different both quantitatively and qualitatively. In general, it is argued that Tunisia has a stronger and more plural civil society with a more balanced relationship with political

²⁵⁷ Schmitter and Sika, “Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa”, 16-17.

Larémont, “Moving Past Revolution and Revolt” in *Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa*, 153-154.

²⁵⁸ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 192.

²⁵⁹ Al-Sayyid, “The Divergent Trajectories of Arab Dignity Revolts” in *Re-envisioning West Asia*, 188. Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 207.

²⁶⁰ Shadi Hamid, *Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in A New Middle East* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 29.

Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 205.

society than the case of Egypt.²⁶¹ This fact helped Tunisian civil society to be a trusted and efficient mediator between the rival political forces during the transitional negotiations while it failed to play this role in Egypt.²⁶²

According to Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz, civil society has an essential role in the breakdown of the authoritarian regime, but the establishment of a new democratic regime needs a mature political society. Consequently, they explained the varied outcome in the case of Egypt and Tunisia by stating that “[a]lthough Egypt arguably had a more creative civil society than did Tunisia, the former’s specifically political society was and is woefully underdeveloped.”²⁶³

The qualitative and quantitative differences between the Tunisian and Egyptian civil society explain the differences of the power balance between the Islamists and secularists, as manifested in the results of the founding elections. It has been stated that:

“In Egypt, a weak civil society dominated by Islamic institutions provided Islamist parties with far more resources for mobili[s]ing voters in the country’s founding elections than were available to their secular rivals. In Tunisia, in contrast, a relatively strong civil society with a mixture of religious, non-religious, and labo[u]r-based groups meant that political contestants from across the political spectrum possessed significant resources for mobili[s]ing voters into the country’s first democratic elections.”²⁶⁴

²⁶¹ Kao and Lust, “Why Did the Arab Uprisings Turn Out as They Did?”, 7-8.

²⁶² Al-Sayyid, “The Divergent Trajectories of Arab Dignity Revolts” in *Re-envisioning West Asia*, 199-200. Mady, “Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, 28.

²⁶³ Stepan and Linz, “Democratization theory and the “Arab Spring”, 23.

²⁶⁴ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 204.

According to McFaul's model of "non-cooperative transitions," whether the outcome of the transition is democracy or persistence of authoritarianism depends upon which faction the power distribution favours: the democratic opposition or the *ancien régime*. In the case of the balance of power, the outcome will often be an unstable hybrid regime. Accordingly, Schmitter and *Sīkā* attributed the different outcomes of the transitions in Egypt and Tunisia to the power distribution that favoured the military (or the *ancien régime*) in the case of Egypt and the balance of power that produced fragile democracy in Tunisia.²⁶⁵

As mentioned before, Zartman has a different telling about the power balance dynamic during the Arab Spring transitions. According to him, the Tunisian transition showed a multi-party system and was not dominated by a single overwhelming force. Instead, the *ancien régime*, the Islamists, and the liberal secularists enjoyed a comparable political power – a fact that facilitates the negotiations during the transition. In contrast, the Egyptian transition was dominated mainly by two rival forces: the military and the Islamists. Both had engaged in a seesaw-like relationship, in which each party tried to push the other outside the game when it had enough power.²⁶⁶

Regarding the micro-agential variables, many accounts focus on the qualities of the political actors in both countries, especially with the claim that structural differences between Egypt and Tunisia "seem minor."²⁶⁷ In these accounts, the survival of the Tunisian transition is explained by the moderation and flexibility of the Tunisian Islamist leaders. This was overstated by many scholars such as Stepan and Linz, Schmitter and

²⁶⁵ Schmitter and Sika, "Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa", 18.

²⁶⁶ Zartman, "Negotiations in Transitions" in *Arab Spring*, 25-28.

²⁶⁷ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 186.

Sīkā, Muṣṭafā Kāmil ʿAl-Sayyid, and Nathan J. Brown.²⁶⁸ However, this moderate, pragmatic attitude of Tunisian Islamists was attributed to some agential factors such as their personal attitude and vision, mindset, and ideological choices, as well as contextual factors such as the absence of an overwhelming electoral majority and the concomitant catastrophe of the Egyptian MB in the Summer of 2013 that forced Tunisian Islamists to compromise.²⁶⁹

In conclusion, a wide array of structural and actor-centric variables has influenced the course and outcome of the transitions in Egypt and Tunisia, and subsequently, the process of negotiations between the political elites in both cases. For instance, *ʿAbdul-Fattāḥ Mādī*, explained the successful dialogue in Tunisia during the crisis of 2013 by “limited foreign interference, an impartial military, civil society mediations, and the moderate positions of Islamic and secular rivals.”²⁷⁰

After reviewing this sample of literature, it is noted that the academic works either focus on the course and outcome of transition in Egypt and Tunisia as a whole and not on the transitional negotiations specifically, or on the negotiations in general not on the religion-related issues in particular. Therefore, in what follows, it is intended to focus on

²⁶⁸ Stepan and Linz, “Democratization theory and the “Arab Spring”, 22-23.

Schmitter and Sika, “Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa”, 15.

Al-Sayyid, “The Divergent Trajectories of Arab Dignity Revolts” in *Re-envisaging West Asia*, 188, 197.

Brown, “Arab Constitutions, the Many Voices of the Public, and the Word of the One God” in *Arguing Islam After the Revival of Arab Politics*, 168.

²⁶⁹ Mady, “Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, 25,30.

Al-Sayyid, “The Divergent Trajectories of Arab Dignity Revolts” in *Re-envisaging West Asia*, 197-199.

Brown, “Arab Constitutions, the Many Voices of the Public, and the Word of the One God” in *Arguing Islam After the Revival of Arab Politics*, 166-167.

Larémont, “Moving Past Revolution and Revolt” in *Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa*, 151.

²⁷⁰ Mady, “Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, 28.

the disputes related to the political role of Islam in the post-Arab Spring regimes, and the negotiations took place between the Islamists and secularists to contain them.

Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz once stated that “religion was undertheori[s]ed in scholarly writing about the third wave;” therefore, “the central role that Islam has played in the Arab Spring presents students of democrati[s]ation with a novel phenomenon and prompts them accordingly to come up with new concepts and fresh data to shed light upon it.”²⁷¹ This is exactly what this thesis aims to do.

²⁷¹ Stepan and Linz, “Democratization theory and the “Arab Spring”, 15-17.

CHAPTER FOUR: BACKGROUND

Before examining different variables that affected the transitional negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia, it is essential to shed light on the context and background against which these negotiations took place. Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is threefold: first, to describe the transitional period in Egypt and Tunisia highlighting different institutional arrangements and the main political forces during the transition. Second, it discusses the causes and manifestations of the conflict between the Islamists and secularists in both cases. Finally, and most importantly, this chapter examines the significant rounds of transitional negotiations and national dialogues detailing their context, participants, agendas, and results.

4.1 Contested Transitions

The concept of transition is – to a great extent – confusing. On the one hand, it is too general, so it can be applied to “any country moving away from dictatorial rule.”²⁷² On the other hand, the end result of the transition is not clear, as the transitional process may lead to democracy, another authoritarian government, hybrid forms, or chaos.²⁷³ Therefore, it is not usually possible to know when it comes to its end.

Theoretically, it was stated that transition to democracy ends with a phase of democratic consolidation, which is described as “a slow but purposeful process in which democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of state

²⁷² Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, 6.

²⁷³ Francesco Cavatorta, “No Democratic Change and Yet No Authoritarian Continuity: The Interparadigm Debate and North Africa After the Uprisings” in *Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco*, eds. Paola Rivetti and Rosita Di Peri, 141 (New York; Oxon: Routledge, 2016).

institutions, the regulari[s]ation of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation of the society to the new democratic rules of the game.”²⁷⁴

Samuel Huntington suggested that the consolidation can be examined by “two-turnover test.” This means that consolidation is confirmed if “the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election.”²⁷⁵

For Linz and Stepan, the completion of democratic transition is reached when an agreement between the relevant political elites on the rules of the new regime is achieved, a new government is erected through free and fair elections, and the elected government enjoys real authority to generate policies and is not obliged to share it with any other powers.²⁷⁶ Similar indicators were affirmed by Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle. They argued that end of transition is marked by the absence of overt disputes on the rules of the new game, an installation of the new regime based on competitive elections, and acceptance of the results by all participants.²⁷⁷

Based on both arguments, despite being controversial, it can be stated that Egypt achieved neither democratic consolidation as defined by Huntington, nor transition completion as described by Linz and Stepan or Bratton and Van De Walle; while, apparently Tunisia did.

²⁷⁴ Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, 7.

²⁷⁵ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 266-267.

²⁷⁶ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 4.

²⁷⁷ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 194.

On the one hand, the transition in Tunisia seems to meet the criteria of a complete transition by reaching a consensual constitution and having an elected government that enjoys real power in the policymaking process. In addition, according to the procedural definition of Huntington, Tunisia is in the phase of consolidation by witnessing two peaceful devolutions of power: from the transitional government headed by *Fu`ād `Al-Mabazza`* to an elected interim president (*`Al-Munṣif `Al-Marzūqī*), cabinet (formed by the Troika coalition), and legislative body (the ANC) after the 23 October 2011 elections. Then, another turnover happened to a new president (*`Al-Bājī Qāid `Al-Sibsī*), cabinet, and parliament (with another winning party: *Nidā` Tūnes* or Call of Tunisia Party) through free and fair elections that were held after the adoption of the new constitution in January 2014.

On the other hand, Egypt did not reach at any moment of transition a consensus on the rules of the game or an elected government with a complete *de facto* power. The SCAF, which led the transition and monopolised both legislative and executive powers after *Mubārak's* stepdown, handed over the legislation to the People's Assembly after the parliamentary elections of 2011, but kept the executive power. Then, just before the end of the presidential elections of 2012, it reclaimed the legislative power by the constitutional declaration promulgated on 17 June 2012 after the dissolution of the People's Assembly by the SCC on 14 June 2012. Therefore, the transitional authority never delivered full power to an elected government. Furthermore, the elected president *Muḥammad Mursī's* constitutional declaration on 12 August 2012 that united the executive and legislative powers in his office could barely be considered a democratic

move that signified the end of the transition. Finally, the whole transitional process crumbled with the *coup d'état* of July 2013.

As mentioned before, the transition of Egypt and Tunisia is categorised as short track transitions by I. William Zartman, in which the leadership change occurs within less than one month and witnesses limited violence.²⁷⁸ Afterwards, both countries made different institutional arrangements to fill the power vacuum and manage the transitional period, as shown in tables no. 3 and 4.

Egypt		
Executive Power	Presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The SCAF (11 February 2011 – 30 June 2012)* • <i>Muḥammad Mursī</i> (30 June 2012 – 3 July 2013)
	Cabinet	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>ʿAḥmed Shafīq</i> (29 January 2011 – 3 March 2011) • <i>ʿIṣṣām Sharaf</i> (3 March 2011 – 7 December 2011) • <i>Kamāl ʿAl-Janzūrī</i> (7 December 2011 – 24 July 2012) • <i>Hishām Qandīl</i> (2 August 2012 – 8 July 2013)
Legislative Power	Constitution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The 1971 Constitution was suspended and replaced by the constitutional declarations of 13 February and 30 March 2011. The latter was proposed by a committee appointed by the SCAF and headed by the Egyptian intellectual and judge <i>Ṭāriq ʿAl-Bishrī</i>, and it was approved in a popular referendum on 19 March 2011.**

²⁷⁸ Zartman, “Negotiations in Transitions” in *Arab Spring*, 18.

* Until the presidential elections that were held in 2012 in two rounds: the first was on 23 and 24 May and the second on 16 and 17 June.

“*intikhābāt ʿalrī ʿāsaḥ ʿalmaṣriyyah 2012: tasalsul zamanī*”, *BBC Arabic*, 27 April 2012, http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2012/04/120427_egypt_election_time_line (accessed 24 November 2018).

**Throughout the transition, many complementary constitutional declarations were issued by the SCAF (namely: the constitutional declaration on 25 September 2011, constitutional declaration on 19 November 2011, and constitutional declaration on 17 June 2012) and by President *Muḥammad Mursī* (namely: constitutional declaration on 12 August 2012, constitutional declaration on 21 November 2012, and constitutional declaration on 8 December 2012).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The 2012 constitution was approved in a referendum held on 15 – 22 December to be adopted on 25 December until it was suspended after the coup of 3 July 2013.²⁷⁹
Legislative Body	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The SCAF (13 February 2011 – 23 January 2012): According to the constitutional declarations of 13 February 2011 and 30 March 2011.²⁸⁰ The People’s Assembly – The lower house of the Parliament (23 January 2012 – 15 June 2012): The parliamentary elections of the People’s Assembly were organised in three rounds between 28 November 2011 to 11 January 2012. It held its first session on 23 January 2011, and its mandate lasted until it was dissolved by the SCAF as a consequence of the verdict of the SCC on 14 June 2012 (two days before the second round of the presidential elections).²⁸¹ The SCAF (17 June 2012 – 12 August 2012): After the dissolution of the parliament, the SCAF reclaimed the legislative power for itself by the constitutional declaration on 17 June 2012. President <i>Muḥammad Mursī</i> (12 August 2012 – 25 December 2012): The newly elected president <i>Muḥammad Mursī</i> decided to grab the legislative power for himself by the constitutional declaration on 12 August 2012, seemingly after

“Dr. ‘Alī ‘Al-Salmī yaktub: ‘awd ‘alā bid”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 19 June 2012, <http://today.almasryalyoum.org/printerfriendly.aspx?ArticleID=343305> (accessed 24 November 2018).

“‘al’i‘lānāt ‘aldustūriyyah walīdat ‘althwrah ‘almaṣriyyah”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 11 December 2012, <https://goo.gl/dQS9dE> (accessed 24 November 2018).

²⁷⁹ ‘Abdul-Raḥmān ‘Abū ‘Al’ilā, “qirā‘ah fī nata‘ij ‘al’istiftā’ ‘alā dustūr maṣr”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 24 December 2012, <https://goo.gl/dP8meu> (accessed 24 November 2018).

²⁸⁰ Daliā ‘Uthmān, “‘almaṣrī ‘alyaum tanshur naṣ ‘al’i‘lān ‘aldustūrī ... wa ‘intikhābāt ‘alri‘āsah qabl nihāyat ‘al‘ām ‘aljārī”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 30 March 2011, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/122361> (accessed 24 November 2018).

²⁸¹ Gianluca P. Parolin, “Constitutions Against Revolutions: Political Participation in North Africa” in *Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco*, eds. Paola Rivetti and Rosita Di Peri, 38-39 (New York, Oxon: Routledge, 2016).

	<p>the failure of his attempt to recall the dissolved parliament on 8 July 2012.²⁸²</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Shura Council – The upper house of parliament (25 December 2012 - 3 July 2013): It was first gathered on 28 February 2012, and it had only consultative roles. Later, according to the 2012 constitution, it assumed “all legislative powers starting from the date the Constitution enters into effect until the new House of Representatives is elected.” However, the SCC ruled to dissolve The Shura Council on 2 June 2013, and the verdict was put into effect after the coup on 5 July 2013.²⁸³
--	--

Table 3. Institutional arrangements to fill the power vacuum in Egypt during the transitional period.

Tunisia	
Executive Power	<p>Presidency</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Muḥammad ʿAl-Ghannūshī</i> (14 January 2011 – 15 January 2011): He was the Prime Minister who claimed the position of the president after the departure of President <i>Zain ʿAl-ʿĀbidīn Ben ʿAlī. ʿAl-Ghannūshī</i> based his claim on the article 56 of the Tunisian constitution, which states that if the president is temporarily unable to serve, the prime minister becomes the acting president. But, on the second day, the Constitutional Council declared the permanent inability of the president and appointed the head of the parliament as interim president according to article 57.²⁸⁴

²⁸² “naṣ ʿal-ʿilān ʿaldustūrī ʿalmukammil bi-maṣr”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 13 July 2012, <https://goo.gl/zWDEmB> (accessed 24 November 2018).

ʿAḥmad ʿAllīthī, “Mursī yuqarrir ʿilghā ʿal-ʿilān ʿaldustūrī ʿalmukammil”, *Masrawy*, 12 August 2012, <https://bit.ly/2VQ3xoN> (accessed 24 November 2018).

²⁸³ “ḥal majlis ʿalshūrā wa raʿīs jadīd lil-mukhābrāt”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 5 July 2013, <https://goo.gl/8WPHN6> (accessed 24 November 2018).

“dustūr maṣr li-ʿām 2012”, *Dostour Masr*, <http://sharek2012.dostour.eg/2012/> (accessed 29 March 2019).

²⁸⁴ Bishārah, *althawrah ʿaltūnusiyyah ʿalmajīdah*, 296-297.

Legislative Power		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Fu'ād 'Al-Mabazza'</i> (15 January 2011 – 13 December 2011) • <i>'Al-Munṣif 'Al-Marzūqī</i> (13 December 2011 – 31 December 2014): He was elected by the ANC on 12 December 2011.
	Cabinet	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Muḥammad 'Al-Ghannūshī</i> (15 January 2011 – 27 February 2011) • <i>'Al-Bājī Qāid 'Al-Sibsī</i> (27 February 2011 – 24 December 2011) • <i>Ḥammādī 'Al-Jibālī</i> (24 December 2011 – 14 March 2013): The President <i>'Al-Munṣif 'Al-Marzūqī</i> appointed him as he was the Secretary-General of the EMP, the winning party in the ANC elections. • <i>'Alī 'Al-'Arrayyīḍ</i> (14 March 2013 – 29 January 2014)
	Constitution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The 1959 constitution was suspended by the Decree-Law 14/2011 on 23 March 2011 issued by the interim president <i>Fu'ād 'Al-Mabazza'</i>, to be cancelled and replaced later by the constitutive law 6/2011 “Law on the Provisional Organisation of Public Authorities” issued on 16 December 2011 by the ANC.²⁸⁵ • The 2014 constitution was adopted by the ANC on 27 January.
	Legislative Body	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The parliament dissolved by Decree-Law 14/2011 (23 March 2011) • The interim president <i>Fu'ād 'Al-Mabazza'</i> (23 March 2011 – 16 December 2011): During this period, the High Authority for the Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition (HIROR)* played

²⁸⁵ Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, The Decree-law 14/2011, 23 March 2011, http://www.legislation.tn/en/detailtexte/D%C3%A9cret-loi-num-2011-14-du-23-03-2011-jort-2011-020_2011020000142?shorten=7qaV (accessed 24 November 2018).

Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, The Constitutive law 6/2011 “Law on the provisional organisation of public authorities”, 16 December 2011, http://www.legislation.tn/detailtexte/Loi-num-2011-6-du-16-12-2011-jort-2011-097_2011097000061?shorten=7qrT (accessed 24 November 2018).

* It is abbreviated after its French name.

		<p>consultative roles in the legislation. It was founded on 18 February 2011 by Decree-law 6/2011, and its activities continued until it held its final meeting on 13 October, ten days before the ANC elections. Finally, it was officially dissolved by the legislation committee of the ANC on 20 April 2012.²⁸⁶</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The National Constituent Assembly (ANC) (16 December 2011 – 25 November 2014)
--	--	--

Table 4. Institutional arrangements to fill the power vacuum in Tunisia during the transitional period.

From the previous tables, three main observations on the institutional arrangements during the transitional period can be made:

First, in both cases, the old regime maintained its presence during the transition showing a degree of continuity despite the leadership change. After the stepdown of *Ben 'Alī* and *Mubārak*, political figures attributed to the outgoing regimes continued to play key roles in directing the transition and charting its roadmap.²⁸⁷ However, the regime continuity in Tunisia was manifested in civilian elites as *Muḥammad 'Al-Ghannūshī*, *Fu'ād 'Al-Mabazza'*, and *'Al-Bājī Qāid 'Al-Sibsī*. In the Egyptian case, on the contrary, the continuity of regime was assured mainly by the military institution which had nearly full control over the transitional process. It occupied the empty position of the presidency and substituted for the dissolved parliament.

²⁸⁶ Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, The Decree-law 6/2011, 18 February 2011, http://www.legislation.tn/en/detailtexte/D%C3%A9cret-loi-num-2011-6-du----jort-2011-013_2011013000062 (accessed 24 November 2018).

Khamīs ben Brīk, "tūnis – 'alhai'ah 'al'uliā liṭaḥqīq 'ahdāf 'althawrah tUSDil 'alsitār 'an 'a'mālihā", *almasdar*, 13 October 2011, <https://bit.ly/30ydZkV> (accessed 21 August 2019).

"ḥal 'alhai'ah 'al'uliā liṭaḥqīq 'ahdāf 'althawrah wa 'al'iṣlāh 'alsiyāsī wa 'al'intiqāl 'aldīmuqrātī", *Islam Times*, 21 April 2012 <https://goo.gl/1VZDK3> (accessed 24 November 2018).

²⁸⁷ Parolin, "Constitutions Against Revolutions" in *Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco*, 44.

Second, the opposition forces, in case of Tunisia, succeeded to institutionalise themselves and take part in managing the transition. First, a 14 January Front was announced by some leftist and nationalist parties alongside independent revolutionary movements. Then, on 11 February 2011, the Front with the EMP, the UGTT, and a number of human rights organisations announced the establishment of the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution. The latter was a main force in the *Qaṣabah* II sit-in that eventually brought down *Muḥammad 'Al-Ghannūshī's* government to be replaced by a government headed by a more appealing figure: *'Al-Bājī Qāid 'Al-Sibsī*.²⁸⁸ Finally, the Council merged with High Commission for Political Reform that was founded by *'Al-Ghannūshī's* government and headed by *'Iyāḍ Ben 'Āshūr* to form the HIROR on 18 February 2011.²⁸⁹

The new organisation saw itself as the embodiment of revolutionary legitimacy, and hence, it did not confine itself to the task of the preparation for founding elections only, but also it “claimed co-decision on all governmental matters.”²⁹⁰ In sum, in the Tunisian case, the transition was jointly managed by the so-called soft-liners of the old regime and the “moderates” of the opposition movement.

Contrarily, in Egypt, the military institution monopolised the administration of the transitional period and all attempts to form a civilian front with a unified political agenda

²⁸⁸ Ibid, 34-35.

Amel Boubekeur, “Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: Bargained Competition”, *Mediterranean Politics* 21,1 (2016):111.

²⁸⁹ Hatem M'rad, *National Dialogue in Tunisia: Nobel Peace Prize 2015* (Tunisia, Éditions Nirvana: 2015), 22.

Parolin, “Constitutions Against Revolutions” in *Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco*, 34.

²⁹⁰ Sami Zemni, “The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making”, *Mediterranean Politics* 20,1 (2015): 6-7.

to take part in the transition administration were doomed to failure. The only youth organisation that emerged during the eighteen-day sit-in in the 'Al-Tahrīr Square was the Revolutionary Youth Coalition (RYC). Yet, the lack of experience and internal division within the coalition did not allow it to play a significant role in the post-*Mubārak* era. Besides, the political parties dealt with the RYC as a temporary organisation that accomplished its mission by unseating *Mubārak*.²⁹¹ Therefore, the military institution led the transition almost single-handedly.

Third, in comparison to the Tunisian case, the Egyptian transition seemed to be more chaotic and poorly organised. In fact, the transition roadmap in Tunisia also did witness a significant delay and entered in a deadlock many times. For instance, the ANC, founded after the elections of October 2011, failed to meet the one-year deadline for constitution drafting – a fact that put the legitimacy of the whole transitional process at stake.²⁹² However, Egyptian political forces failed even to agree upon a transitional roadmap. As early as March 2011, the opposition groups were deeply divided into “elections first” and “constitution first” camps.²⁹³ This rift was not mended even after the voters decisively supported “elections first” roadmap in the 17 March referendum.²⁹⁴

Moreover, the power struggle between the elected bodies (i.e., the presidency and parliament) on the one hand and the guardian institutions as the SCAF and the SCC on

²⁹¹ 'Azmī Bishārah, *thawrat maṣr ('al-juz' 'al-thānī): min 'al-thawrah 'ilā 'al-'inqilāb* (Beirut: Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies, 2016), 36.

²⁹² Abdelwahab Ben Hafaiedh and I. William Zartman, “Tunisia: Beyond the Ideological Cleavage: Something Else” in *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat*, ed. I. William Zartman (Athens; Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2015), 59.

²⁹³ Zartman, “Negotiations in Transitions” in *Arab Spring*, 34.

²⁹⁴ Parolin, “Constitutions Against Revolutions” in *Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco*, 37.

the other hand led to institutional mess and severe political instability.²⁹⁵ For instance, the People's Assembly (the lower house of parliament) was dissolved only five months after its establishment by a verdict issued by the SCC; the Shura Council (the upper house of parliament) also was declared as unconstitutional and dissolved after a few months; the 2012 constitution was suspended by the military coup six months after its approval in a popular referendum; not to mention, the elected president himself was deposed after only one year.

4.2 Mapping of the Islamist and the Secularist Political Forces

To describe and categorise the political forces in competition during the transition in Egypt and Tunisia is a hard task. For one thing, it's not clear how to categorise these leaderless, structure-less public masses, whose role in the Arab Spring cannot be reduced to just being followers of well-organised political parties or trade unions.²⁹⁶ These masses can be described using Asef Bayat's concept of social non-movement, which refers, according to him, to "collective actions of non-collective actors" aiming at a unified goal: social change, despite lacking a unified ideology, leadership, or organisation.²⁹⁷ *Alī 'Al-Rajjāl* and *Hebah Ra'ūf 'Ezzat* use the term "rhizomes" in an attempt to capture the fluidity and dynamism of these masses:

²⁹⁵ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 185.

²⁹⁶ Billie Jeanne Brownlee and Maziyar Ghiabi, "Passive, Silent and Revolutionary: The Arab Spring Revisited", *Middle East Critique* 25,3 (2016): 305-306.

²⁹⁷ Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013), 14-15.

“Rhizomes are about lines of interactions and not cent[res] and pivots and not even nodes in networks; they are multiple, plural, and different, and they are fluid and nomadic. But they are not chaotic; organi[s]ation and leadership are not transcendental and hierarchal but are dissolved and immanent in the dynamics of movements. They do not mobili[s]e through a hierarchal institution or well-established organisations; rather, they arrange in mobility; they initiate and do not wait for external orders; they do not delegate to represent – actually, rhizomes are anti-representation.”²⁹⁸

Secondly, it is also hard to describe and categorise the structured organisations as well, neither in the form of political parties, trade unions, nor even state institutions. Both countries have witnessed proliferation and mushrooming of political parties during the transitional period – a phenomenon that greatly fragmented the political scene.^{299*} Additionally, after the dissolution of the ruling parties in Egypt and Tunisia; namely: the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Rally for Constitutional Democracy (RCD) respectively, the old regime maintained its political role in various forms: offspring parties, state institutions (as the military institution in the case of Egypt), or independent figures (such as *Kamāl 'Al-Janzūrī* in Egypt and *Fu'ād 'Al-Mabazza'* in Tunisia).

Therefore, it is common in the Arab Spring literature to find hybrid categorisations of political forces during transitional periods, surpassing the binaries of democratic vs. authoritarian or *ancien régime* vs. opposition. For instance, according to I. William Zartman, the organised forces that filled the vacuum in the aftermath of leadership

²⁹⁸ El Raggal and Ezzat, “Egypt: Can a Revolution Be Negotiated?” in *Arab Spring*, 87-88.

²⁹⁹ * For instance, in Tunisia, the number of the legal parties jumped from eight opposition parties during *Ben 'Alī's* era to more than 100 parties at the eve of October 2011 elections.

Emma C. Murphy, “The Tunisian Elections of October 2011: A Democratic Consensus”, *The Journal of North African Studies*, 18,2 (2013): 236.

Daniel L. Tavana, “Party Proliferation and Electoral Transition in Post-Mubarak Egypt”, *The Journal of North African Studies* 16,4 (2011): 563.

change in the Arab Spring countries are old regime offspring parties, Islamic movements, labour unions, and military institutions.³⁰⁰ Furthermore, in the Egyptian case, he stated that the transition was shaped by a power-triangle formed of the SCAF backed by the courts, the MB, and the uprisers (i.e., grassroots, leftists, and liberals).³⁰¹ In accordance to him, Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz stated that the three major players in post-*Mubārak* Egypt are the SCAF, the MB, and secular liberals.³⁰²

Another way to describe and categorise the political forces during transitional periods is based on political alliances, regardless of ideological and structural differences. For example, 'Abdul-Fattāḥ Mādī categorises the political actors who competed during the Tunisian transition into three blocs:

- i. The Troika: the political coalition that was formed after the ANC elections in October 2011 and created the interim government between 24 December 2011 and 29 January 2014. It is composed of the Islamist party (EMP) and its two liberal allies: The Congress for the Republic (CRP) and the Democratic Bloc for Labour and Liberties.
- ii. The Troika opposition "The Union for Tunisia": It was led by the Call of Tunisia Party, which was established by 'Al-Bājī Qāid 'Al-Sibsī in 2012 and composed of a combination of liberals, the old regime's officials, and some left-wing activists and union representatives. This coalition also contained two other secularist parties: The Social Democratic Path party and the Republican Party.
- iii. The third bloc is another anti-Troika coalition: "the Popular Front", which was formed of some radical left parties such as the Labour Party. It had poor representation in the

³⁰⁰ Zartman, "Negotiations in Transitions" in *Arab Spring*, 16-17.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁰² Stepan and Linz, "Democratization Theory and the Arab Spring", 21.

ANC; however, it enjoyed considerable influence on the trade unions and human rights organisations.³⁰³

To sum up, there were plenty of poorly structured and well-structured political forces that took part in shaping the transitional periods in Egypt and Tunisia. Furthermore, these forces can be categorised along different ideological axes such as *ancien régime/opposition*, *moderate/radicals*, and *secularist/Islamist*. Therefore, to overcome the problem of structural fragmentation, two main conditions will be applied to include a political force in this mapping: to show a fair degree of stability and organisation and to play a tangible role in shaping the transition, either by being part of the interim government, or achieving a decent electoral success, or proving to have an adequate mobilisation capacity.

Regarding ideological categorisation, for simplicity and convenience, the relevant political forces will be classified primarily along the secularist-Islamist axis. As *Malīkah 'Al-Zaghal* noticed, although this dichotomy does not encompass the totality of the complex political landscape during the transition, efforts to define politics outside of this dichotomy will not be successful.³⁰⁴

Although defining Islamism and secularism in the Arab-Islamic context is quite problematic as thoroughly discussed in the conceptual framework chapter, it was concluded that both concepts should simply be understood as two sets of ideologies with contesting projects of modernisation of religion. As *Rāshid 'Al-Ghannūshī* once put

³⁰³ Mady, "Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings", 23-24.

³⁰⁴ Malika Zeghal, "Competing Ways of Life: Islamism, Secularism, and Public Order in the Tunisian Transition", *Constellations* 20,2 (2013): 264.

it: “the conflict nowadays is not between a modernity project and an anti-modernity project. Rather, it is between two projects: one calls for modernity guided by Islam, and the other wants modernity without Islam.”³⁰⁵

Accordingly, in the case studies, the Islamist political forces can be defined as those who emphasised the reference of the Islamic *Sharī‘ah* for political and social organisation and called for more alignment between the legislation and the *Sharī‘ah* law and a more active state role in promoting Islamic values in the public sphere.

On the contrary, secularists, in this context, are those who are not “overtly or specifically religious”, to use the Merriam-Webster’s definition of the secular.³⁰⁶ They resisted the Islamist endeavour for authoritative enforcement of the Islamic *Sharī‘ah* and forced adherence to Islamic values. Some of them contented only by maintaining the pre-Arab Spring *status quo*, the representatives of the *ancien régimes* as an example, while the others demanded a more secular legislative system and a less active state in the religious field.

By applying the previously mentioned parameters, and after reviewing many works, the main political forces which competed during the transition in Egypt and Tunisia can be summarised as follows:

³⁰⁵ Rached Ghannouchi Official Page, *Facebook*, 21 June 2013, <https://www.facebook.com/rached.ghannouchi/posts/724146900955250> (accessed 24 November 2018).

³⁰⁶ Michele Dunne and Amr Hamzawy, “Egypt’s Secular Political Parties: A Struggle for Identity and Independence”, *Carnegie Middle East Center* (2017): 3.

Egypt

Islamist Political Forces

- The *'Al-'Ikhwān 'Al-Muslimūn* (MB) and its party (FJP): It is by far the largest non-state actor in Egypt. It was founded in 1928, but it was banned in 1954 after its clash with the Free Officers' regime. Although it was informally tolerated by the *Mubārak* regime, the MB was a target of continuous security harassment and crackdown especially after emerging as the major opposition group in the 2005 parliamentary elections.³⁰⁷ The legal recognition of the MB party only occurred after the uprisings of 2011. Afterwards, it became the main political force throughout the transitional period.
- The *'Al-Da'wah 'Al-Salafiyyah* (the Salafi Call) and its party *'Al-Nūr* (The Light Party): The origin of the Salafi Call goes back to the 1970s university student activists. Its main centre is in Alexandria, and it remained almost apolitical till the beginning of the transitional period. In 2011, the Salafi Call decided to engage heavily in party politics and justified this strategic shift by the need to protect the identity of Egypt from the secularists who want to change it.³⁰⁸
- The *'Al-Jamā'ah 'Al-'Islāmiyyah* (the Islamic Group) and its party *'Al-Binā' wa 'Al-Tanmiyyah* (the Building and Development Party or the BDP): It is an ex-Jihadist movement, whose party was established after the release of its leaders in the early period of transition and given legal status in October 2011.³⁰⁹
- The *'Al-Wasaṭ* (The Centre Party): A moderate Islamist party founded by ex-members of the MB in the mid-1990s; however, it was denied legal recognition until the January Revolution and was the first party legalised in the post-*Mubārak* era.³¹⁰

³⁰⁷ Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013), 20-21, 121.

³⁰⁸ Khalil al-Anani and Maszlee Malik, "Pious Way to Politics: The Rise of Political Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt", *Digest of Middle East Studies* 22,1 (2013): 59,63.

³⁰⁹ Interviewee no. 2: September 12, 2019 – Istanbul.

³¹⁰ Tavana, "Party Proliferation and Electoral Transition in Post-Mubarak Egypt", 566.

- The presidential campaign of *Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ 'Abū-'Ismā'īl*: He is a Salafi scholar who was a front-runner in the 2012 presidential elections before he was disqualified for legal reasons. However, 'Abū-'Ismā'īl managed to have a popular campaign that continued even after his disqualification as *Ḥāzimūn* network and proved to have a high capacity for mobilisation on different occasions.³¹¹

Secularist Political Forces

- The guardian bureaucratic institutions: mainly the SCAF and the SCC.
- The main secularist parties in the two houses of the parliaments: The 'Al-Wafd Party, 'Al-Maṣriyyīn 'Al-'Aḥrār (the Free Egyptians Party), and 'Al-Maṣrī 'Al-Dīmuqrātī 'Al-'Ijtimā'ī (the Egyptian Social Democratic Party).
- The presidential campaigns of the secularist candidates: 'Aḥmed Shafīq, 'Amr Mūsā, Ḥamdīn Ṣabbāḥī, and Muḥammad 'Al-Barād'ī. The first two candidates belong to the old regime elite, Ṣabbāḥī is a Nasserist figure, while Muḥammad 'Al-Barād'ī, is a liberal candidate, who, despite managing to have a strong campaign, decided to withdraw from the presidential race because he objected to the roadmap of transition.³¹²
- The National Salvation Front (NSF): It was founded in November 2012 by the leading secularist figures: Muḥammad 'Al-Barād'ī, 'Amr Mūsā, and Ḥamdīn Ṣabbāḥī, in addition to a number of opposition parties and organisations such as the 'Al-Wafd Party, the Free Egyptians Party, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, and the April 6th Youth Movement, as well as many independent figures.³¹³

³¹¹ Khalil Al-Anani, "Islamist Parties Post-Arab Spring", *Mediterranean Politics* 17,3 (2012): 468.

³¹² "'al'intikhābāt 'alri'āsiyyah 'almaṣriyyah 2012", *Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies*, July 2012, https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Egyptian_Presidential_Elections.aspx (accessed 25 November 2018).

Nūrā Fakhrī, "'albarad'ī yuqarrir 'al'insihāb min 'intikhābāt 'alri'āsah", *Youm7*, 14 January 2012, <https://goo.gl/6K72bW> (accessed 25 November 2018).

³¹³ Resource Page, "National Salvation Front", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 3 September 2013, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/09/03/national-salvation-front-pub-54921> (accessed 25 November 2018).

- *Ḥarakat Tamarrod* (the Rebel Movement): It is a youth movement announced in May 2013, a few weeks before the military coup. It launched a campaign to collect signatures demanding the downfall of President *Muḥammad Mursī* and played a crucial role in calling for the protests of 30 June. It was supported by the NSF; however, many indicators showed that it was supported by *ancien régime* figures and even the intelligence and security institutions. Therefore, some claim that its popularity was fake and instead a *façade* for the security institutions activities.³¹⁴

Undetermined

- Revolutionary Youth Coalition (RYC): It was announced during the *ʿAl-Taḥrīr* Square sit-in on 1 February 2011 and played a crucial role in organising the protests. It was formed by representatives of different youth movements such as April 6th Movement, the leftist Justice and Freedom Movement, *ʿAl-Barādī*'s popular campaign, the youth of the Democratic Front party, and the MB youth who represented a major part of that Coalition. It maintained to exert a political influence especially during the early period of transition until it dissolved itself in July 2012 after the presidential elections arguing, at this step, that the Egyptian transition came to its end. Being composed of activists from different ideological backgrounds, the RYC did not position itself as an Islamist nor a secularist force.³¹⁵
- The presidential campaign of *ʿAbdul-Monʿim ʿAbul-Futūḥ*: He was the presidential candidate who came fourth in the first round of the presidential elections by securing 17.47% of votes. He was previously an Islamist leader in the MB; however, his presidential campaign contained both Islamist and secularist activists. In addition, a number of secularist figures declared their

³¹⁴ Bishārah, *thawrat maṣr* (*ʿal-juzʿ ʿal-thānī*), 351-356.

³¹⁵ Yusery Ahmed Ezbawy, "The Role of the Youth's New Protest Movements in the January 25th Revolution", *IDS Bulletin* 43,1 (2012): 29-30.

Salma Shukrallah, "Egypt Revolution Youth Form National Coalition", *Ahram Online*, 9 February 2011, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/~NewsContent/1/64/5257/Egypt/Politics-/Coalition-of-The-Revolutions-Youth-assembled.aspx> (accessed 28 November 2018).

Zeinab El Gundy, "Updated: Revolution Youth Coalition Disband with End of Egypt's Transitional Phase", *Ahram Online*, 7 July 2012, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/46988.aspx> (accessed 28 November 2018).

support to him, as well as two Islamist parties: The Light Party and the Centre Party. Accordingly, it was thought that he could potentially bridge the secularist-Islamist divide in Egypt.³¹⁶

Table 5. Mapping of political forces competed during the transitional period in Egypt

Tunisia
Islamist Political Forces
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ennahda Movement Party (EMP): It is the main Islamist movement in Tunisia, founded as the Islamic Group <i>'Al-Jamā'ah 'Al-'Islāmiyyah</i> in 1972. Then, in 1981, it became the Islamic Tendency Movement <i>Ḥarakat 'Al-'Itijāh 'Al-'Islāmī</i>. In 1989, after Ben 'Alī's ascendance to power, it changed its name to the EMP to be consistent with the Tunisian law of political parties, which bans religious parties. For four decades, it was banned and became the regime's main target of repression. Only after the Tunisian Uprisings it finally gained legal status in 2011.³¹⁷ • The Salafi movement <i>'Anṣār 'Al-Sharī'ah</i>: Despite lacking legal recognition, <i>'Anṣār 'Al-Sharī'ah</i> had a significant impact on the Tunisian transition. It was established in April 2011 by ex-Jihadist members. Throughout the transitional period, it organised many demonstrations calling for strict implementation of the <i>Sharī'ah</i> and engaged in clashes with the security forces. Furthermore, its members allegedly were behind the assassination of the two prominent leftist figures <i>Shukrī Bel'īd</i> and <i>Muḥammad Brāhmī</i> in 2013 – the events that pushed the polarisation between the Islamists and secularists in Tunisia to its peak. It was designated as a terrorist organisation in August 2013.^{318*}

³¹⁶ "'al'intikhābāt 'alri'āsiyyah 'almaṣriyyah 2012", *Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies*, July 2012, https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/PoliticalStudies//Pages/Egyptian_Presidential_Elections.aspx (accessed 25 November 2018).

Zeinab El Gundy, "Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh", *Ahram Online*, 2 April 2011, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/124/36854/Presidential-elections-/Meet-the-candidates/AbdelMoneim-AbulFotouh.aspx> (accessed 3 December 2018).

³¹⁷ Alaya Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia Between Confrontation and Participation: 1980– 2008", *The Journal of North African Studies* 14,2 (2009):258.

Bishārah, *'althawrah 'altūnusiyah 'almajīdah*, 172-175.

^{318*} Other moderate Salafist parties as the *Jabhit 'Al-'Iṣlāḥ* (the Reform Front), *ḥizb 'Al-'Aṣālah* (The Authenticity Party), and *ḥizb 'Al-Raḥmah* (The Mercy Party) had much lower political significance.

Secularist Political Forces

- The Troika secularist parties: The first is the CRP, which was headed by 'Al-Munşif 'Al-Marzūqī. The party was established in 2001; however, it was not legally recognised until the early transition. The second party is the Democratic Bloc for Labour and Liberties. It was headed by *Muṣṭafā Ben Ja'far*. Although it was established in 1994, it was given legal licence only in 2002.³¹⁹
- The main secularist opposition parties in the ANC: The Popular Petition for Freedom, the Progressive Democratic Party, and the National Destourian Initiative party.³²⁰
- The Tunisian National Salvation Front (T-NSF): It is an anti-EMP secularist coalition announced on 26 July 2013. It included the Union for Tunisia parties and the Popular Front parties, as well as Tunisian *Ḥarakat Tamarrod* (the Rebel Movement) and a number of civil and human rights organisations.³²¹
- Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT): Supposedly, the UGTT and other organisations constituting the Quartet Committee should be classified as impartial forces as they were the mediators between both ideological rivals. But, the UGTT, before it re-positioned itself as a dialogue facilitator, was involved in anti-Troika activism. This could be explained by the fact that the Union is a stronghold of leftists in Tunisia.^{322*}

Table 6. Mapping of political forces competed during the transitional period in Tunisia

Emmanuel Karagiannis, "The Rise of Electoral Salafism in Egypt and Tunisia: The Use of Democracy as a Master Frame", *The Journal of North African Studies* (2018): 8-10.

³¹⁹ Bishārah, *'althawrah 'altūnusiyah 'almajīdah*, 171, 176.

³²⁰ 'Abdul-Latīf 'Al-Ḥināshī, "'intikhābāt 'almajlis 'alwaṭanī 'altūnisī: 'al'itār, 'almasār wa 'alnatā'ij", *Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies*, March 2012, 22.

³²¹ Mady, "Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings", 24.

³²² 'Al-Jam'āwī, "'almashhad 'alsiyāsī fī tūnis", 13.

* According to Sālim Labiyaḍ, the UGTT has unambiguous secularist orientation since dismissing Sheikh 'Al-Ṭāhir Ben 'Āshūr from the Honorary Presidency of the UGTT and siding with the Tunisian President *Būrqubah* against his dissidents "the Yousufians", who advocated for more emphasis on the Arab-Islamic identity of Tunisia in the 1960s.

Sālim Labiyaḍ, *'alhuiyyah: 'al'islām, 'al'urūbah, 'altawnasah* (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2009), 146-147.

Out of tables no. 5 and 6, two general remarks could be observed:

First, in Egypt, the Salafist trend was heavily engaged in the formal politics and enjoyed a significant political influence, while, in Tunisia, the Salafist parties were too weak to play an influential role in the political scene. The only Salafist force that had a strong presence was illegal. Accordingly, while the EMP nearly monopolised the formal expression of the Islamist trend in Tunisia, this representation in the Egyptian case was severely contested between the MB and the Salafists.

Second, the secularist trend in Tunisia showed a clear internal division based on its stance from the Islamists, as two major secularist parties were reliable allies to the EMP in the Troika government. On the contrary, in the case of Egypt, the Islamists failed to build an enduring alliance with the secularist trend. Even when some small secularist parties joined the MB electoral alliance named *'Al-Taḥāluf 'Al-Dīmuqrātī* or the Democratic Alliance such as the socialist *Hizb 'Al-Karamah* (the Dignity Party), the liberal *Ghad 'Al-Thawrah* Party, and the Nasserist *'Al-'Arabī* party, their electoral results were extremely modest as the FJP alone gained 218 out of the 238 seats won by the Alliance. In addition, after the elections, almost all of them broke their alliance with the MB and turned against it.³²³

Detailed examination of all these actors would definitely be confusing and counterproductive. Therefore, the research will focus mainly on the major players in each case study. For instance, the MB and the EMP will be the principal representatives of the Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia respectively. Other Islamist parties and groups will

³²³ Hānī Ramaḍān, "majlis 'alsha'b 'almaṣrī 2012 ... 'altashkīl wa 'almahām", *BBC Arabic*, 23 January 2012, http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2012/01/120123_egypt_palt_hani (accessed 25 November 2018).

be included to the degree they were relevant. Similarly, special attention will be given to the SCAF and the NSF and to the Call of Tunisia party and the UGTT being the major secularist forces during the Egyptian and the Tunisian transitions respectively.

4.3 Causes of the Secularist-Islamist Disagreement in Egypt and Tunisia

As mentioned above, the secularist-Islamist divide was a prominent feature in the political dynamics during the transitional periods in Egypt and Tunisia. The root causes of this divide can generally be summarised in three main issues: the political arrangements for power-sharing during the interim period, the poor performance of the Islamist-dominated governments, and ideologically-driven disagreements during the drafting of the constitution.

How to manage the period of transition was the first breaking point between secularists and Islamists in Egypt. Only a few weeks after *Mubārak's* deposition, both camps disagreed on whether the constitution should be drafted first or the elections held first.³²⁴ The pro-“constitution first” camp argued that the political institutions should not be established before drafting a constitution determining its authorities and mandate, while those who supported “elections first” roadmap believed that a new electoral legitimacy was direly needed as soon as possible to fill the power vacuum and legitimise the post-revolutionary arrangements.

Although both arguments were valid and the whole debate was apparently about procedural arrangements, the underpinning cause was ideological. Secularists, in

³²⁴ Zartman, “Negotiations in Transitions” in Arab Spring, 34.

Parolin, “Constitutions Against Revolutions” in *Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco*, 37.

general, supported the “constitution first” plan as it was highly expected that Islamists would achieve a sweeping victory in the coming elections. Therefore, they would be able to draft “an Islamic constitution.” Islamists, being aware of the secularists’ concerns, felt that the “constitution first” roadmap was just a manoeuvre to enable the secularist elite to confiscate people’s will, put restrictions on the mandate of the future parliament, and unjustifiably enforce their “secular constitution.”

The results of the March referendum strongly supported the “elections first” roadmap, but this was not enough to settle this dispute.³²⁵ Fearful of being marginalised by Islamist majoritarianism, the non-Islamists sought to have a SCAF-backed document of supra-constitutional principles to partially curb Islamists from imposing their agenda. Although the idea of supra-constitutional principles could be a way out, the Islamists refused or – at least – were not cooperative enough with all the attempts to set these principles because they perceived it as an attempt to hollow out their electoral victory. The fears of abusing the concept of the supra-constitutional pact were strengthened by the SCAF’s attempts to secure its political and economic interests out of negotiation.³²⁶

Similarly, disagreement between the Islamists and secularists on the institutional arrangements during the transition occurred in Tunisia. Despite the initial agreement on the roadmap by electing transitional institutions (i.e., the ANC, an interim government, and a provisional president), they disagreed on the timing of elections. Islamists were pushing to hold these elections on the appointed date in July 2011, while secularists

³²⁵ “Egypt Referendum Strongly Backs Constitution Changes”, *BBC News*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12801125> (accessed 27 February 2019)

³²⁶ Tamir Moustafa, “Drafting Egypt’s Constitution: Can a New Legal Framework Revive a Flawed Transition?”, *Brookings Doha Centre Publications* (2012): 4-5.

supported it to be delayed until October. As a result, the EMP decided to withdraw from the HIROR accusing High Independent Authority for Elections (ISIE)* of being impartial and biased. Later, the EMP and its allies returned back after reaching an agreement on the transitional roadmap in September 2011.³²⁷

After the ANC elections in October 2011, extending its authority to go beyond the constitution drafting and its term to be more than its initial one-year mandate ignited another fierce conflict. With an Islamist majority party, the ANC assigned to itself the functions of a parliament: determining the government authority and supervising its performance, as well as legislation and law enactment. Furthermore, due to frequent deadlocks, the ANC failed to carry out its original task of drafting the constitution during its mandate, and it had to extend it for more than a year.³²⁸

What further aggravated the conflict between the Islamists and secularists was the poor performance of the Islamist-dominated governments in both Egypt (during the one-year *Mursi's* presidency) and Tunisia (during the Troika government). Failure to restore security, deteriorating economic status, and reluctance to establish a transitional justice were the main opposition complaints.³²⁹ Two other points had an extraordinary significance in this regard: First, accusing the Islamists in both countries of attempting to take over the state bureaucracy or what was termed *Ikwhanisation* or

* It is abbreviated after its French name.

³²⁷ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 133.

Ben Hafaiedh and Zartman, "Tunisia" in *Arab Spring*, 57.

³²⁸ Mady, "Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings", 19-22.

Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 136-137.

³²⁹ Mady, "Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings", 20-24.

Brotherhoodisation of the state.³³⁰ Secondly, Islamists in power were accused of being tolerant of the violence committed by radical and Jihadist groups, especially in Tunisia after the assassination of the leftist figures *Shukrī Bel'īd* and *Muḥammad Brāhmī*.³³¹

At the core of the conflict between Islamists and secularists in both countries was the nature of the new constitution and the principles upon which the new regime should be established. This explains why, in Tunisia, the constitution drafting process took more than two years, in which four drafts were publicly released before reaching the final version.³³² In Egypt, two Constituent Assemblies were formed: the first was short-lived and dissolved in April 2012 by the Supreme Administrative Court, which ruled that the way of the Assembly's foundation was unconstitutional; the second was elected in June 2012, and it faced many deadlocks and repeated withdrawals too. In November, most of the members representing the liberal and leftist trends, the representatives of the three official churches in Egypt, and eight out of the ten members of the consultative committee decided to permanently withdraw.³³³ However, the Constituent Assembly insisted on continuing its work as usual, and the constitution draft finally submitted to a public referendum in December 2012 amid wide boycott and "Vote No" campaigns.³³⁴

The points of disagreement during the making of the constitution in Tunisia can be summarised in four main issues. The first was on how the Islamic *Sharī'ah* should be

³³⁰ Ibid., 21.

Alison Pargeter, *Return to the Shadows: The Muslim Brotherhood and An-Nahda Since the Arab Spring* (London: Saqi Books, 2016): 45.

³³¹ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 143-145.

³³² Grami, "The Debate on Religion, Law and Gender in Post-Revolution Tunisia", 395.

³³³ Muḥammad 'Abdullāh, "shuqūq fī jidār ta'sīsiyyat dustūr maṣr", *Anadolu Agency*, 19 November 2012, <https://bit.ly/39t3HWO> (accessed 29 March 2020).

³³⁴ Parolin, "Constitutions Against Revolutions" in *Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco*, 39.

addressed in the constitution. The EMP called for enshrining the *Shari'ah* as a principle source of legislation or – at least – a source among sources.³³⁵ Furthermore, they sought to immune the first article stating that “Islam is the religion of the state” by adding another article prohibits any revision of this clause.³³⁶ From their side, secularists ardently refused any attempt to constitutionalise the *Shari'ah* reference or overemphasise the cultural and civilisational affiliation of Tunisia to the Arab-Islamic nation as proposed in the preamble of the constitution draft.³³⁷

Second, in article 3 in the draft, it was stated that: “The state guarantees freedom of religious belief and practice and criminali[s]es all attacks on that which is sacred”.³³⁸ This clause raised the secularists’ criticism because, from their point of view, it contradicted freedom of thought and conscience, and its formulation was too broad opening the door to limiting freedom of expression.³³⁹

The third point of disagreement was also related to the issue of human rights. Restricting the universality of the human rights in the constitution preamble by stating that they should be “in harmony with the Tunisian people’s cultural specificities” ignited the secularists’ ire.³⁴⁰ The debate whether the source of human rights should be secular or Islamic was also manifested in the controversy on women rights’ clause. Article 28 in

³³⁵ Hamid, *Temptations of Power*, 32.

Ben Hafaiedh and Zartman, “Tunisia” in *Arab Spring*, 62.

³³⁶ Grami, “The Debate on Religion, Law and Gender in Post-Revolution Tunisia”, 396.

M'rad, *National Dialogue in Tunisia*, 75.

³³⁷ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 144.

³³⁸ Grami, “The Debate on Religion, Law and Gender in Post-Revolution Tunisia”, 396.

Hamid, *Temptations of Power*, 32.

³³⁹ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 143-144.

³⁴⁰ Grami, “The Debate on Religion, Law and Gender in Post-Revolution Tunisia”, 396.

Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 143-144.

the constitution draft stated that: “The government guarantees the protection of women’s rights and supports their achievements; it also considers the woman a true partner to man in building the nation. Their roles complement each other within the family.”³⁴¹ Secularists refused the expression of “complementarity” used by the Islamists to describe the social roles of both men and women and insisted on the concept of “equality” because, for them, the former indicated a sort of subordination of women and entailed discrimination in rights and responsibilities.³⁴²

Fourth, apart from these ideologically driven disagreements, the nature of government was another cause of dispute between the Islamists and secularists. The former supported the parliamentary system because they advocated that, in this system, power is not vested in a person but resides with the people, and because it was the system some Islamist leaders, including *Rāshid `Al-Ghannūshī* himself, admired during their exile in Britain. Furthermore, it was claimed by some that the EMP thought they would have a better chance to be the first party in the parliamentary elections than winning the presidential elections.³⁴³

Despite its bad reputation in the post-Arab Spring Tunisia, the secularists preferred to maintain the presidential system – or at least – to have a semi-presidential one because they aimed to balance the expected Islamist-dominated parliament with a strong presidency or a two-headed executive.³⁴⁴

³⁴¹ Ben Hafaiedh and Zartman, “Tunisia” in *Arab Spring*, 64.

³⁴² Grami, “The Debate on Religion, Law and Gender in Post-Revolution Tunisia”, 398. Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 143-144.

³⁴³ M’rad, *National Dialogue in Tunisia*, 75-76.

Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 142.

³⁴⁴ Ben Hafaiedh and Zartman, “Tunisia” in *Arab Spring*, 63-64.

Besides these major issues, the disagreement between both factions extended to include other minor topics. For instance, the Troika government sought to issue an “Immunisation of the Revolution” law in order to enforce the political exclusion of the old regime loyalists. Further, it advocated to include this law in the constitution to guarantee more obligation. Anti-Troika secularist opposition stood firmly against this law because they claimed it would unjustly put restrictions on political rights and also due to a sizeable part of this opposition was affiliated to the ousted regime.³⁴⁵

The National Leagues for the Protection of Revolution (NLPR) were another point of conflict. These leagues were spontaneously formed all over the country in December 2010 to protect private properties after the collapse of the security services. Later, with the political support of the Troika government, these leagues were granted legal status and rapidly became part of the political polarisation when they assigned for themselves the task of defending the electoral legitimacy against what they called the counter-revolution. Anti-Troika opposition called for the prompt dissolution of these leagues advocating that defence of the elected institutions was the task of the state security and judiciary apparatus.³⁴⁶

In Egypt, the same ideological differences hindered the process of the constitution drafting; however, the gap between both rivals was not as wide as it was in the Tunisian case. As an example, most of the secularists in Egypt, unlike their Tunisian counterparts, accepted to keep the second article of the suspended constitution stating

³⁴⁵ 'Al-Jam'āwī, “'almashhad 'alsiyāsī fī tūnis”, 11-12.

Domenica Preysing, *Transitional Justice in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia (2011–2013): How the Past Shapes the Future* (Berlin: Springer VS, 2016), 112.

³⁴⁶ 'Al-Jam'āwī, “'almashhad 'alsiyāsī fī tūnis”, 12.

Mady, “Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, 22.

that “the principles of the Islamic *Sharī‘ah* is the main source of legislation” in the new constitution. However, some sought to mitigate its language by dropping the word “the” and making it “a” principal source of legislation. Also, some secularists demanded stronger wording on women’s rights and religious freedoms.³⁴⁷

From their side, Egyptian Islamists proposed more controversial articles that rendered the constitution more religiously tinted for the secularists. Article 3, for example, recognised the right of the Christians and Jews to implement their canons in matters related to the personal status and regulation of their religious affairs; article 4, grants the autonomy of *‘Al-‘Azhar* Sheikhdome as an institution and gives it a consultative role in the implementation of the *Sharī‘ah*; and article 219 puts a meticulous theological definition of the Islamic *Sharī‘ah* and confines it to the Sunni creed.³⁴⁸

Other articles that endowed the state with vague religious and ethical roles also raised the secularists’ concerns. In articles 10, 11, and 12, the state was assigned the mission of protecting the Egyptian families and their moral foundations; safeguarding ethics, morality and the public order; guaranteeing of a high level of education, and religious and patriotic values; and defending the cultural, civilisational, and linguistic bases of the community.³⁴⁹

Furthermore, some articles were modified to include more religious terms. For example, the first article of the 1971 constitution, which mentioned that “the Egyptian people are

³⁴⁷ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 195.

³⁴⁸ Al-Sayyid, “The Divergent Trajectories of Arab Dignity Revolts” in *Re-envisioning West Asia*, 188, 193. “dustūr maṣr li-‘ām 2012”, *Dostour Masr*, <http://sharek2012.dostour.eg/2012/> (accessed 29 March 2019).

³⁴⁹ Hamid, *Temptations of Power*, 184.

Brown, “Arab Constitutions, the Many Voices of the Public, and the Word of the One God” in *Arguing Islam After the Revival of Arab Politics*, 169-172.

“dustūr maṣr li-‘ām 2012”, *Dostour Masr*, <http://sharek2012.dostour.eg/2012/> (accessed 29 March 2019).

part of the Arab nation”, became “the Egyptian people are part of both the Arab and the Muslim nations”. Also, in article 6, the political system was stated to be based on the principles of democracy and Shura, in an attempt to give the democracy a more religious connotation. Moreover, the religious freedoms, which were granted universally in the 1971 constitution, were confined to the divine religions only in article 46.³⁵⁰

Nathan Brown, though, described significant differences within the Islamist groups in the Egyptian case. According to him, the MB was generally content with the existing *Sharī‘ah* article and did not seek to overemphasise it. It was the Salafist trend who pushed for stronger religious language in the constitution, arguing that, in the previous constitution, the second article alone failed to guarantee enough commitment. For instance, the Salafists suggested to add an article stating that sovereignty is exclusively for Allah, and it was He that endowed it to the ‘*Ummah*, to extend the sanctity to the Prophet’s Wives and Companions – an article that would be directed against the Shiites’ beliefs, and to put an article about alms *or zakah* to be a constitutional matter.³⁵¹

Based on our categorisation in the second chapter, by overemphasising the ‘*Al-Sharī‘ah*’ reference and the role of the state authority and the ‘*Al-‘Azhar*’ establishment in its application, it seems that the Islamist trend in Egypt was adopting an ideology close to the traditional authoritarian Islamism. While the EMP, despite attempting to enforce the presence of the *Sharī‘ah* in the constitution, forwarded less authoritarian

³⁵⁰ “Comparing Egypt’s Constitutions”, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Comparing-Egypt-s-Constitutions.pdf> (accessed 17 February 2020).

³⁵¹ “‘aljam‘iyyah ‘alt‘siyyah lil-dustūr ‘almaṣrī: su‘āl wa jawāb”, *BBC Arabic*, 19 November 2012 http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2012/11/121119_egypt_constitution_questions.shtml?print=1 (accessed 27 July 2019).

Brown, “Arab Constitutions, the Many Voices of the Public, and the Word of the One God” in *Arguing Islam After the Revival of Arab Politics*, 169-172.

proposals. Furthermore, 'Al-Ghannūshī was a long advocate of the compatibility between Islam and democracy; therefore, the declared EMP ideology was close to the modern democratic version of Islamism.³⁵² Interestingly enough, 'Al-Ghannūshī announced on many occasions his acceptance of two models of secularism: the Anglo-Saxon model of religion-friendly secularism, in which the people's religiosity is tolerated and can be publicly expressed without being officially controlled; and the partial secularism as described by 'Abdul-Wahhāb 'Al-Missīrī, which does not reflect an atheist philosophy, rather it represents a procedural arrangement aiming to safeguard the freedom of belief.³⁵³

On the other hand, the mainstream secularists in Egypt, by accepting the presence of the *Sharī'ah* article in the constitution while advocating for the guarantee of the same religious freedoms to all without discrimination, was clearly adopting a sort of religious secularism. While the Tunisian secularists, especially the anti-Troika coalitions, with their obsession with any active religious role of the state or any strong religious formulation in the constitution, adopt an irreligious version of secularism (figure no. 6).

³⁵² See: Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannoushi: A Democrat Within Islamism*.

³⁵³ Brown, "Arab Constitutions, the Many Voices of the Public, and the Word of the One God" in *Arguing Islam After the Revival of Arab Politics*, 168-169.

Ben Hafaiedh and Zartman, "Tunisia" in *Arab Spring*, 61-62.




Fig. 6: The gap between the ideological preferences of the Islamists and secularists in Egypt and Tunisia

4.4 Transitional Negotiations and National Dialogues in Egypt and Tunisia

After outlining the institutional arrangements during the transitional period, mapping the Islamist and the secularist political forces, and highlighting the main points of disagreement between them, in what follows, the main negotiation rounds implemented to contain this dispute will be discussed. This entails describing the context, participants, agendas, and the outcome in each case, and most importantly, whether and how the issue of Islam and politics was addressed.

Given the fact that each meeting between any political actors may include explicit or implicit, structured or unstructured negotiations, the task of enlisting transitional negotiations and dialogues in the case studies seems unachievable. Furthermore, during political crises, many negotiation rounds are usually organised in secrecy and the deals cut between the negotiating parties remain undeclared.

Therefore, the following lists will include mainly politically significant, adequately inclusive, fairly structured negotiations and national dialogue rounds, as well as pact-making attempts in both Egypt and Tunisia. Too exclusive, poorly structured, or politically insignificant dialogues and negotiations will be dropped.

4.4.1 Transitional Negotiations, National Dialogues, and Pact-making Attempts in Egypt

4.4.1.1 Together We Start Building: A Dialogue for Egypt: (The National Democratic Alliance Document)³⁵⁴

Context: It was an attempt by the MB at the beginning of the transitional period to build a political consensus between the main political forces. The dialogue started before the January Revolution; then, it was resumed on 16 March 2011. After many sessions, a provisional document was announced on 14 June 2011, and the final version was issued on 5 September 2011.

Participants: The initiative came from *Muḥammad Badī*, the General Guide of the MB. In the beginning, forty-two parties and revolutionary movements responded to the call, as well as a number of independent figures from all over the political spectrum. Later, many political forces withdrew mainly due to disagreements on the terms of the electoral alliance reducing the participants to only eleven parties just before the parliamentary elections in November 2011.

³⁵⁴ Mady, "Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings", 69-73.

Samīr 'Al-Sayyid, "bawābat 'al'ahrām tanshur muswadat wathīqat 'altaḥāluf 'alwaṭanī min 'ajl maṣr", *Al Ahrām Online*, 15 June 2011 <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/83091.aspx> (accessed 15 April 2018).

Qutb 'Al-'Arabī, "'alḥiwār wa 'almuṣālahah fī maṣr: ḍarūrāt 'aldākhl wa tadakhulāt 'alkhārij", *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 26 March 2014, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/discussionstrategytosolvearabworldconflict/2014/02/2014225105334470365.html#> (accessed 26 April 2018).

Agenda: The dialogue agenda was set to include eight main themes: the political field, the economic field, the social field, human development, public liberties, foreign policy, police reform, and agriculture.

Debated *Sharī'ah*-related issues: The final version of the National Democratic Alliance Document stated that the principles of the *Sharī'ah* are the main source of legislation. The rights of non-Muslims to refer to their canons in issues pertaining to the personal status is said to be preserved. Citizenship was stressed to be the basis for building society. It also emphasised adhering to the nation's agreed maxims, identity, and spiritual values as established by the divine religions. For human rights, the document accepted the international charters and pacts provided that they do not conflict with the principles of Islamic *Sharī'ah* or the Arab identity.

Outcome: The National Democratic Alliance Document failed to reach a consensus between main political forces after the withdrawal of most of the parties which initially participated. Eventually, it turned into the platform of an electoral coalition in the 2011 parliamentary elections.

4.4.1.2 'Issām Sharaf's Dialogue:³⁵⁵

Context: On 30 March 2011, after the referendum on the transitional roadmap and its divisive results.

³⁵⁵ Mady, "Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings", 73-74.

Quṭb 'Al-'Arabī, "'alḥiwār wa 'almuṣālahah fī maṣr: ḍarūrāt 'aldākḥil wa tadakhulāt 'alkhārij", *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 26 March 2014, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/discussionstrategytosolvearabworldconflict/2014/02/2014225105334470365.html#> (accessed 26 April 2018).

"'ūlā jalasāt 'alḥiwār 'alwaṭanī taṭṭlik ghada bi-majlis 'alwuzarā'", *Ahram Online*, 29 March 2011, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/54808.aspx> (accessed 25 April 2018).

Participants: The PM *ʿIṣṣām Sharaf* and his Deputy for Dialogue *Yaḥiā ʿAl-Jamal* called representatives of the main political forces for dialogue. One hundred and fifty political figures attended this meeting, including some who were affiliated with the ousted regime. As a result, the revolutionary youth and some opposition figures such as *Muḥammad ʿAl-Barādī* and *Ḥamdīn Ṣabbāḥī* boycotted the dialogue.

Agenda: It was a preparatory meeting that aimed at setting the agenda for a series of dialogues to put a new social contract.

Debated *Sharīʿah*-related issues: N/A

Outcome: The boycott of the representatives of revolutionary youth groups and many key politicians set this dialogue up for failure. After the first session, the Deputy PM *Yaḥiā ʿAl-Jamal* declared that the dialogue organisation would be transferred to civil society under the supervision of *ʿAbdul-ʿAzīz Ḥigāzī*. However, *ʿAl-Jamal* himself started another track of dialogue called “The National Accord”.

4.4.1.3 *Yaḥiā ʿAl-Jamal*’s Dialogue: (The National Accord)³⁵⁶

³⁵⁶ Mady, “Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, 74.

Qutb ʿAl-ʿArabī, “alḥiwār wa ʿalmuṣālahah fī maṣr: ḍarūrāt ʿaldākhil wa tadakhulāt ʿalkhārij”, *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 26 March 2014, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/discussionstrategytosolvearabworldconflict/2014/02/2014225105334470365.html#> (accessed 26 April 2018).

“muʿtamarān lil-ḥiwār wa ʿalwifāq bi-maṣr”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 22 May 2011 <http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/f6451603-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/67ddd7b5-6cd4-47fe-9ae0-ac9db2a83538> (accessed 25 April 2018).

ʿAbdul-Raḥmān Saʿd, “intiḳādāt ḥāddah liḥiwārāt maṣr”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 1 June 2011 <http://tiny.cc/odjw4y> (accessed 25 April 2018).

“muʿtamar ʿalwifāq ʿalqawmī ʿalmaṣrī”, YouTube video, 2:40, *Al Jazeera Arabic*, 21 May 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=SN&hl=fr&v=TmJA7gKqlzk> (accessed 25 April 2018).

Muḥammad Gharīb and Maṣṣūr Kāmil, “sharaf yaqbal ʿistiḳālat yaḥiā ʿaljamal”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 12 July 2011, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/143511> (accessed 6 May 2019).

Context: The preparatory committee was announced on 19 April 2011, and the dialogue was held between 21 and 30 May 2011. Afterwards, follow-up committees were organised, but they pursued their work in very unstable circumstances. Finally, 'Al-Jamal was forced to resign on 12 July 2011, and a draft was announced later by his successor 'Alī 'Al-Salmī on 25 July. During this period, the secularist political forces were attempting to set supra-constitutional principles before the parliamentary elections.

Participants: The call came from the Deputy PM *Yaḥiā 'Al-Jamal* while the member of the SCAF, General *Mamdūḥ Shāhīn*, was the assistant rapporteur of the Dialogue. Most of the secularist political forces participated, as well as independent experts and academics specialised on the constitutional law; however, the MB decided to boycott the Dialogue declaring that they suspected its agenda.

Agenda: This dialogue aimed to reach a national consensus on the main issues of the constitution and propose a tentative, yet non-binding, draft to the future Constituent Assembly.

Debated *Sharī'ah*-related issues: Interestingly, despite the main Islamist forces not being represented in the Dialogue and the subsequent follow-up committees, the supra-constitutional principles of the National Accord document used the same words of the National Democratic Alliance document regarding the *Sharī'ah*. It stated that 'Al-

Jamāl 'Iṣṣām 'Al-Dīn, “'alsalmī yatawallā ri'āsat 'alwifāq 'alqawmī khalaf lil-jamal ... wa rafa' tawṣiyyātih lil-majlis 'al'askarī”, *Ahram Online*, 25 July 2011, gate.ahram.org.eg/News/98196.aspx (accessed 6 May 2019).

Muḥammad Ḥassan Sha'bān, “maṣr: ṣirā' 'alwathāiq 'aldustūriyyah”, *AlSharq AlAwsat*, <http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=45&article=650424&issueno=12043#.WVksF4iGODJ> (accessed 2 July 2017).

Official statement of the Muslim Brotherhood, *Ikhwan Online*, 25 May 2011, https://www.ikhwanonline.com/official_statements/84981/Default.aspx (accessed 12 May 2019).

Sharī'ah principles are the primary source of legislation, and non-Muslims have the right to refer to their canons in regulating their personal and religious affairs. Additionally, the document emphasises the values of citizenship, popular sovereignty, pluralism, multiculturalism, and equality.

Outcome: The Dialogue failed to achieve its goal due to the absence of the Islamist trend and revolutionary youth. Besides, it was abused by some secularist groups to push for the postponement of the parliamentary elections and extend the SCAF's mandate. Consequently, the document of supra-constitutional principles issued later by the National Accord committees was not widely accepted.

4.4.1.4 'Abdul-'Azīz Ḥigāzī's Dialogue: (The National Dialogue)³⁵⁷

Context: 'Abdul-'Azīz Ḥigāzī, a former prime minister, was appointed to chair the National Dialogue on 2 April 2011, and the dialogue was organised between 22 and 24 May 2011. This means that both the National Accord and the National Dialogue were simultaneously taking place. However, the former was said to be concerned with the supra-constitutional principles, while the latter was concerned with more general

³⁵⁷ "taghiyyr ri'āsat 'alḥiwār 'alwaṭanī bi-maṣr, *Al Jazeera Net*, 2 April 2011, <http://tiny.cc/vu6a6y> (accessed 7 May 2019).

"mu'tamarān lil-ḥiwār wa 'alwifāq bi-maṣr", *Al Jazeera Net*, 22 May 2011 <http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/f6451603-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/67ddd7b5-6cd4-47fe-9ae0-ac9db2a83538> (accessed 25 April 2018).

'Abdul-Raḥmān Sa'd, "'intiḳādāt ḥāddah liḥiwārāt maṣr", *Al Jazeera Net*, 1 June 2011 <http://tiny.cc/odjw4y> (accessed 25 April 2018).

"Dr. 'Abdul-'Azīz Ḥigāzī fī 'alḥayāt 'alyaum", YouTube video, 12:59, *Sccegypt*, 14 May 2011 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sUftolqEV68> (accessed 25 April 2018).

"mudākhalat Dr. 'Abdul-'Azīz Ḥigāzī", YouTube video, 3:01, *Sccegypt*, 12 May 2011 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qHd1d_gk2-A (accessed 25 April 2018).

"al'āshirah masā' munā 'alshāzilī Dr. 'Abdul-'Azīz Ḥigāzī ra'īs lajnat 'alḥiwār 'alwaṭanī wa tafāṣīl jalsat 'alḥiwār 'alwaṭanī ḥalaqat 22 05 2011 juz' 001", YouTube video, 11:46, *Dreamstvchannel*, 23 May 2011 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TvDOWVVErY8> (accessed 25 April 2018).

discussions about managing the transitional period, as well as policy recommendations in political, economic, and social fields.

Participants: In the dialogue, about seven-hundred and fifty members participated from all political forces including secularists, Islamists, revolutionary youth groups, and the *ancien régime*.

Agenda: The dialogue was planned to cover five main themes: democracy and human rights; human and social development; economic and monetary policies; culture, media, and religion; and foreign policies.

Debated *Sharī'ah*-related issues: N/A

Outcome: The participation of some figures affiliated to the ousted regime spoiled the dialogue. The representatives of the revolutionary youth groups objected to both the attendees and the agenda of the dialogue, which was prepared without their participation. Consequently, the three-day dialogue was over with no concrete outcomes.

4.4.1.5 The National Council Conferences:³⁵⁸

³⁵⁸ “Egyptian Engineer Mamdouh Hamza Announces Plans to Create a National Council”, *Ahram Online*, 3 May 2011, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/11331.aspx> (accessed 11 May 2019).

Maḥmūd Gawīsh, “mu’tamar maṣr ‘al’awwal yakhtār 220 shakhṣiyyah lil-majlis ‘alwaṭanī min baynihim ya’qūb wa zūwīl”, 3 June 2011, *Al Masry Al Youm*, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/136037> (accessed 11 May 2019).

“‘almajlis ‘alwaṭanī yunaqish mabādi’ fawq ‘aldustūriyyah”, *Al Nahar*, 19 July 2011 <https://www.alnaharegypt.com/39960> (accessed 11 May 2019).

“mamdūḥ ḥamzah: ‘almajlis ‘alwaṭanī yahduf li-jam‘ ‘alqwā ‘alsiāsiyyah ‘alā wathīqah muwaḥḥadah lil-dustūr”, *Ahram Online*, 18 July 2011, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/95638.aspx> (accessed 12 May 2019).

Sha‘bān Hadiyyah, Nirmīn ‘Abdul-Zāhir, Muḥammad ‘Ismā‘īl, and Maḥmūd Ḥussīn, “‘alyaum ‘alsābi’ yanshur malāmiḥ wathīqat ‘almabādi’ ‘alhākimah lil-dustūr ‘aljadīd ... ‘almajlis ‘al’askaī yukallif ‘alghazālī ḥarb bijam‘ ‘almasharī’ ‘almuqaddamah min ‘alqwā ‘alsiāsiyyah ... wa zurūf ṭārī‘ah taḥūl dūn ‘ijtimā‘ih

Context: The establishment of the National Council was decided on 7 May 2011 during the First Conference of Egypt. The initiative came from a prominent independent secularist figure *Mamdūḥ Ḥamzah*. The preparatory committee gathered on 1 June 2011 and chose two-hundred and twenty members representing different political trends to form this Council. Then, on 19 July 2011, the National Council held a conference to put a supra-constitutional document and criteria for the Constituent Assembly. Obviously, the National Council was another attempt by the secularist political forces to neutralise the perceived threat of Islamist majoritarianism.

Participants: The National Council included representatives from different political and societal forces, as well as independent public figures. The MB refused to join the Council and boycotted its conferences despite the participation of a few independent ex-MB leaders. The MB released a statement that they preferred to participate in the official dialogue only, headed by ‘*Abdul-‘Azīz Ḥigāzī*’.

Agenda: The original goal of the National Council, as announced by *Mamdūḥ Ḥamzah*, was to create a “revolutionary mandate” and to help the SCAF and the cabinet in fulfilling the goals of the January Revolution. To differentiate itself from the National Accord and the National Dialogue, the National Council was described by *Ḥamzah* as a “people’s dialogue” while the formers were, according to him, government-sponsored dialogues.

Later, on 12 July, the SCAF announced that it would work with different political parties and forces to put a document for governing principles of the constitution and regulations

bil-liwā’ mamdūḥ shāhīn”, *Youm7*, 13 July 2011, <http://www.youm7.com/454325> (accessed 12 May 2019).

for the formation of the Constituent Assembly to be promulgated as a constitutional declaration. Hence, *Ḥamzah* declared that the National Council would hold a conference on 19 July and stated that the goal of this conference was to unify eight documents for supra-constitutional principles into one document to be presented to SCAF.

These documents were: The National Democratic Alliance document,^{*} the National Accord document, the *ʿAl-ʿAzhar* document,^{**} the document of the presidential candidate *Muḥammad ʿAl-Barādī*,^{***} the document of the presidential candidate *Hishām ʿAl-Başṭawīsī*, The document (papyrus) of the CSOs (*Bahyyi ʿAl-Dīn Ḥassan*),^{****} and declaration of Principles of Citizenship and the State of Egypt (*Majlis ʿAl-Ḥukamā* or the Council of the Wise),^{*****} besides a document prepared by the National Council itself. The consensus document was presented by the Vice President of the SCC *Tahānī ʿAl-Jibālī*.

^{*} Just before the conference, Dr *Waḥīd ʿAbdul-Majīd*, an independent scholar and the general coordinator of the National Democratic Alliance, denied his attendance after the MB's statement against the National Council. However, the conference organisers asked a representative of the *ʿAl-Wafd* Party, which then was still part of this Alliance, to present the document.

^{**} "almajlis ʿalwaṭanī yunaqish mabādiʿ fawq ʿaldustūriyyah", *Al Nahar*, 19 July 2011 <https://www.alnaharegypt.com/39960> (accessed 11 May 2019).

^{**} More details about the *ʿAl-ʿAzhar* document is available on <http://www.youm7.com/438757> (accessed 12 May 2019).

^{***} More details about the *ʿAl-Barādī's* document is available on <http://www.youm7.com/443021> (accessed 12 May 2019).

^{****} More details about the document of civil society organisations is available on <http://www.youm7.com/452442> (accessed 12 May 2019)

^{*****} More details about the Council of the Wise and the declaration of Principles of Citizenship and the State of Egypt are available on

<https://cms.shorouknews.com/mobile/news/view.aspx?cdate=11022017&id=9b3c6476-40cb-465c-97eb-8132bb737d39> (accessed 12 May 2019).

<https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=25012017&id=68ed627a-1897-4687-b682-1fb392e13330> (accessed 19 May 2019).

Debated *Sharī'ah*-related issues: By analysing the presented documents in the July conference, as well as the final consensus document, the following remarks can be observed:

- i. Almost all documents recognised the reference of the *Sharī'ah*. Furthermore, the documents of the National Democratic Alliance, the National Accord, the 'Al-'Azhar, the National Council, and the consensus document almost used the same wording: "*Sharī'ah* principles are the primary source of legislation and non-Muslims have the right to refer to their canons in regulating their personal and religious affairs". It is only the papyrus of the CSOs that denied the *Sharī'ah* reference and affirmed the importance of diversification of the legislation resources in order to reflect the diversity of the Egyptian identity.
- ii. All documents, with varying degrees, confirmed the principles of citizenship, popular sovereignty, civility of the state, and religious freedoms.
- iii. Some documents stressed the reference of the universal human rights declarations and charters as 'Al-Baṣṭawīsī's document and the CSOs papyrus. The 'Al-'Azhar document, however, put a restriction on the commitment to the international human rights charters by conditioning their compliance with the Arab and Islamic culture and traditions.
- iv. A few documents spoke about guarantees to maintain the civility of the state, such as immunity of the constitutional articles related to the state identity and the supervisory role of the SCC. Furthermore, the National Council document and 'Al-Baṣṭawīsī's document stated that the military institution is entitled to protect the civilian republican nature of the state.

v. The *'Al-'Azhar* document emphasised its independence and stated that the *'Al-'Azhar* Sheikhdome is the only competent authority to be consulted in Islamic affairs, sciences, traditions, and jurisprudential innovations.

Outcome: Despite including documents from diverse political forces, the consensus document of the National Council failed to gain wide acceptance due to the Islamists' objection. Eventually, the document was presented to *'Alī 'Al-Salmī*, who was appointed as the Deputy PM instead of *'Al-Jamal* and assigned the task of chairing the national dialogue to reach a consensus on the governing principles of the constitution and the criteria of the Constituent Assembly.

4.4.1.6 *'Alī 'Al-Salmī's* Dialogues and Documents:³⁵⁹

Context: After the SCAF announcement of its intention to promulgate a constitutional declaration for governing principles of the constitution and regulations for the formation of the Constituent Assembly, *'Alī 'Al-Salmī*, the Deputy PM for Democratic Transition Affairs, started a National Dialogue that was carried out on 8 - 25 August 2011. Then, a follow up consultative meeting took place on 1 November 2011 at the Egyptian Opera House, as well as other two meetings with representatives of the Islamist trend on 15 and 17 November. Consequently, many drafts for supra-constitutional principles were prepared on 6, 13, and 22 Augustus, and 1 and 15 November.

³⁵⁹ 'Usāmah Haikal, *150 yawmā fī tārikh maṣr: ḥaḳīqah fī zaman 'alkazib* (Cairo: Al Dar Al Masriah Al Lubnaniah, 2013), 154-157, 223-240.

'Alī 'Al-Salmī, *'ishkāliyyāt 'aldustūr wa 'albarlamān* (Cairo: Dar Sama for Publishing and Distribution, 2016), 17-49.

'Alī 'Al-Salmī, "'alḥaḳīqah fī qaḍiyyat 'almabādi' 'al'sāsiyyah lil-dustūr", *Al Ahram*, 9 November 2011, <http://www.ahram.org.eg/archive/Al-Mashhad-Al-Syiassy/News/111721.aspx> (accessed 29 May 2019).

Participants: Between 8 to 25 of August, twenty-two meetings were held with extensive participation of thirty-four political parties from all trends, in addition to trade unions, NGOs, youth movements, and Sufi and Salafist organisations. Out of the main political forces, it was only the Salafist Light Party that boycotted these meetings.

In the Opera House meeting, on the first of November, representatives of fifty parties and hundred-and-five trade unions, youth movements, and NGOs participated. Yet, the main Islamist parties boycotted this time, in addition to some small secularist parties.

Therefore, in an attempt to convince the Islamist parties to accept '*Al-Salmī's* document, two meetings were organised with the representatives of the Islamists parties: the first on 15 November with '*Al-Salmī* and other members of the political committee of the cabinet, and the second on 17 November between the PM '*Iṣṣām Sharaf* and the President of the FJP '*Muḥammad Mursī* and a representative of the Salafist trend Sheikh '*Muḥammad 'Abdul-Maqsūd*.

Agenda: The '*Al-Salmī's* Dialogue was the last chance for the Islamists and secularists to agree on supra-constitutional principles before the commencement of the parliamentary elections which were set to be held on 28 November 2011.

Debated *Sharī'ah*-related issues: '*Al-Salmī's* document showed the same combination of the emphasis on the civility of the state, democracy, popular sovereignty, citizenship, and religious freedoms on the one hand, and the acknowledgement of the *Sharī'ah* reference on the other hand. Regarding the *Sharī'ah*, the document used the same expression as it was in the previous documents: *Sharī'ah* principles are the primary source of legislation, and non-Muslims have the right to refer to their canons in regulating their personal and religious affairs.

Outcome: Despite their participation during the initial phase, the main Islamist forces boycotted the dialogue. They refused two main issues in the document: using the concept of “civility” for fear of being a synonym of secularism and giving this document an obligatory status so that the Constituent Assembly would have to be bound to its clauses.

Furthermore, in the November drafts, the SCAF proposed two articles to be included in the document: making the military budget immune from civilian oversight and calling for the establishment of a National Defence Council that was proposed to decide on all matters related to the national security. These two controversial articles pushed the Islamists and the revolutionary youth groups to join forces and call for a one-million march against the *'Al-Salmī's* document on 18 November, which forced the government to permanently withdraw it.

In his book, *'Alī 'Al-Salmī* insisted that the Islamists' objection was not because of the supra-constitutional principles included in the document as they had already participated in their formulations. According to him, the real cause of the Islamists' veto was another auxiliary document which placed the selection criteria for the Constituent Assembly members. He claimed that the Islamists were keen to have a free hand to decide on the Assembly composition in order to impose their will on their opponents.

4.4.1.7 *Sāmī 'Anān's* Dialogue: (The Parties' Document)³⁶⁰

³⁶⁰ 'Aḥmad Bān, *'al'ikhwān 'almuslimūm wa miḥnat 'alwaṭan wa 'aldīn* (Cairo: Al Mahrousa Center, 2015), 198-199.

Nirmīn 'Abdul-Zāhir, Nūrā Fakhrī, and Muḥammad Ḥajjāj, “ru'asā' 'al'aḥzāb yakshifūn kawalīs liqā'ihim bi-'anān: 'almajlis 'al'askaī wāfaq 'alā 'alsamāḥ lil-munazzmāt 'aldawliyyah bi-mushāhadat 'al'intikhābāt faḡaḡ ... wa ra'īs ḥizb 'alnūr ṭalab 'al'askaī bi-sur'at taslīm 'albilād li-sulṭah madaniyyah muntakhabah”, *Youm7*, 1 October 2011, <http://www.youm7.com/504006> (accessed 16 June 2019).

Context: On 1 October 2011, amid the troubled negotiations around 'Al-Salmī's document, the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General *Sāmī 'Anān* called for a meeting with the heads of the main political parties.*

Participants: Thirteen political parties participated in this dialogue, including the chairmen of the main Islamist and secularist parties: the FJP, the Light Party, the 'Al-Wafd Party, and the Free Egyptians Party.

Agenda: The dialogue focused mainly on the administration of the transitional period and how to rectify the roadmap. This includes a timeline for delivering power to an elected civilian government, the electoral law, the political isolation law, and the abolition of the emergency law. Additionally, one of the main points of negotiation was the supra-constitutional principles and the selection criteria for the Constituent Assembly.

Debated Sharī'ah-related issues: N/A

Outcome: By the end of the meeting, the political parties' leaders signed a document, in which they agreed upon some issues related to the parliamentary elections law and a timeline for the making of the constitution.

Munīr 'Adīb, Ḥamdī Dabash, 'Usāmah 'Al-Mahdī, and Hanī 'Al-Wazirī, "al'ikhwān yuraḥḥībūn bi-wathīqat 'anān ... wa shabāb 'alsalafiyyīn yarfūḍūn ... wa 'aljamā'ah tantaqid 'istib'ādahā", *Al Masry Al Youm*, 2 October 2011, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/115158> (accessed 16 June 2019).

* *Sāmī 'Anān's* dialogue was not the first national dialogue organised and chaired by the SCAF. The latter launched a series of dialogues with revolutionary youth groups started on 2 June 2011 and continued though out the whole 2011 summer. However, these meetings were criticised for being poorly organised and futile and aiming only at youth containment and marginalisation.

Mady, "Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings", 70-71.

Maḥmūd Jum'ah, "'alḥiwār 'almaṣrī bain 'alshabāb wa 'al'askar", *Al Jazeera Net*, 3 June 2011 <https://bit.ly/2wUSu0p> (accessed 16 June 2019).

In an attempt to resolve the tension over the obligation of the supra-constitutional principles, the signatories promised that they would sign later “a document of honour” which would govern the process of the Constituent Assembly formation and the constitution drafting.

However, signing this document prompted severe conflicts within most of the political parties. The fact that Lieutenant General *Sāmī ‘Anān* was not one of the signatories, according to the critics, meant that there was no obligation on the SCAF to keep its promises. What made the situation worse was that the final paragraph in the document stated that “the signatories declare their complete support to the SCAF and totally appreciate its effort in protecting the revolution and delivering the power to the people.” According to the opponents, the document provided little, lacked enough guarantees, and looked like a document of surrender to the SCAF.

4.4.1.8 SCAF Dialogue with the Parliament-represented Parties:³⁶¹

³⁶¹ “taḥdīd ‘almawqif min ‘alta’sīsiyyah bil-nisbat lil-‘aḥzāb yaum ‘alkhamīs ba’d ‘ijtimā’ ‘almushīr ṭaṭṭāwī”, YouTube video, 0:55, *Misralhurrah*, 27 March 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15Tz4wjjqE> (accessed 23 June 2019).

Khālid ‘Al-Shāmī, “‘almajlis ‘al’askaī yurīd ‘aldustūr qabl ‘alra’īs ... wa ‘anṣār ‘abū ‘ismā’īl yasta‘idūn li-‘iḥtijājāt ‘alā ‘istib‘ādiḥ”, *Al Quds Al Arabi*, 14 April 2012, <http://backup.alquds.co.uk/pdfarchives/2012/04/04-15/All.pdf> (accessed 23 June 2019).

“liqā’ ‘almajlis ‘al’askaī wa ‘al’ahzāb ‘alyaum waṣṭ tadhammur fī ‘awsāt ‘altayyār ‘al’islāmī min ‘iqṣā’ murashaḥīn”, *Al Nahar*, 15 April 2012, <https://bit.ly/2ZGTOA8> (accessed 23 June 2019).

“tafāṣīl wa khabāiā ‘ijtimā’ ‘almushīr ma’ ru’asā’ ‘al’ahzāb”, YouTube video, 3:03, *Altahrirtvchannel*, 15 April 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hd4fiOb0ShE> (accessed 23 June 2019).

“‘almushīr ṭaṭṭāwī: lā ‘intikhābāt ri’āsiyyah qabl ‘al’itihā’ min ‘i’dād ‘aldustūr”, *Al Joumhouria*, 15 April 2012, <https://bit.ly/2ygWJXM> (accessed 15 April 2020).

“‘ijtimā’ bain ‘almajlis ‘al’askaī fī maṣr wa ‘al’ahzāb ḥawl ‘i’ādīt tashkīl ‘aljam‘iyyah ‘alt’sīsiyyah”, *Al Nahar*, 28 April 2012, <https://bit.ly/2X3vX0H> (accessed 23 June 2019).

“‘ikhtiār ‘a’ḍā’ ‘aljam‘iyyah ‘alt’sīsiyyah lil-dustūr ‘almaṣrī”, YouTube video, 2:05, *Al Jazeera Arabic*, 7 June 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J_4JovwYsWs (accessed 23 June 2019).

‘Aḥmad Hāfiz, “kawālīs ‘ijtimā’ ‘al’askaī bil-‘hazāb ... ‘iḥiā’ dustūr 71 ‘alā ma’idat ‘altafawuḍ”, *Ahram Online*, 5 June 2012, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/216597.aspx> (accessed 23 June 2019).

Context: The massive demonstrations of 18 November and the withdrawal of *'Al-Salmī's* document ignited a wave of severe political instability and polarisation that endured for months. Throughout this period, political negotiations and national dialogue attempts almost ceased, and the level of political violence markedly increased. The two events worth-mentioning are clashes with the police forces that erupted on 19 November in *Muḥammad Maḥmūd* Street at the headquarters of the Ministry of Interior while these forces were trying to evacuate the *'Al-Taḥrīr* square from sit-in protestors. Later, another wave of confrontations, known as the cabinet clashes, erupted between the protestors and the military officers on 16 December 2011 because the demonstrators organised a sit-in blocking the cabinet headquarters to show their objection to the appointment of *Kamāl 'Al-Janzūrī* as the new Prime Minister.

During this period, many factors resulted in rising tension between the secularists and Islamists to unprecedented levels: First, failure to reach a consensus over the supra-constitutional principles and the criteria of the Constituent Assembly composition before the parliamentary elections that started on 28 November 2011 awakened the secularists' fears of the exclusive tendency of the Islamists. These fears were further amplified and affirmed after the Islamists' landslide victory in these elections that enabled them to choose the Constituent Assembly members free-handedly in March 2012.

Second, also in March 2012, the MB decided to field a candidate in the presidential elections abandoning their previous commitment and giving their rivals another proof of what they perceived as power greed.

"maḥaṭṭāt hāmmah fī mishwār 'alt'sīsiyyah", *Rassd*, 3 December 2012, <https://rassd.com/50544.htm> (accessed 27 July 2019).

Third, during the protracted bloody confrontations that preceded and accompanied the parliamentary elections in 2011, the MB refused to officially join the demonstrations and even accused some parties of resorting to violence intentionally to spoil the transitional process and push the SCAF to suspend the elections. This stance was perceived by some secularist and revolutionary forces as complacency with the SCAF's transgressions, and the MB was accused of "selling out" its revolutionary partners.

Nevertheless, in the same period, the tension between the MB and the SCAF also reached its climax. After the Islamists' sweeping victory in the parliamentary elections and the MB's decision to run for the presidency, the guardian institutions seemed to feel threatened too. From its side, the MB felt discriminated against because the SCAF denied its right to form the cabinet as the winning party of the parliamentary elections. Furthermore, the Supreme Administrative Court issued a controversial sentence to dissolve the Constituent Assembly on 10 April 2012 – only a few days after being jointly elected by both houses of the parliament on 24 March.

Besides, on 14 April, the Supreme Committee for Presidential Elections disqualified the two most prominent Islamist candidates: the Salafi preacher *Ḥāzīm Ṣalāḥ 'Abū-'Ismā'īl* and the MB's Deputy-General Guide *Khairat 'Al-Shāṭer*. The supporters of the former responded aggressively and started a sit-in in front of the military headquarters in 'Al-'Abbāsiyyah. Amid these turbulent events, the SCAF decided to invite the political parties' chairmen to a dialogue. The first meeting was held on 27 March, and the dialogue sessions continued until 7 June 2012.³⁶²

³⁶² Jack Shenker, "Egypt Protests: New Street Battles Erupt in Tahrir Square", *The Guardian*, 21 November 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/21/egypt-protests-erupt-tahrir-square> (accessed 23 June 2019).

Participants: The call came from the chairman of SCAF, Field Marshal *Muḥammad Ḥussīn Ṭanṭāwī* who, besides his deputy, Lieutenant General *Sāmī ‘Anān* headed most of the negotiation sessions. The heads of the parties represented in the parliament from all over the ideological spectrum participated in most of the negotiation rounds. Yet, the representatives of the FJP and the Centre Party parties boycotted some of these sessions.

Agenda: The SCAF aimed by these negotiations to resolve the tensions between secularists and Islamists on the issue of the Constituent Assembly and to contain the resentment of the Islamist trend after the disqualification of the two Islamist presidential candidates and the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly. In the beginning, the SCAF sought to have the constitution approved before the start of the presidential mandate on 30 June 2012. In a meeting with sixteen political parties on 15 April, Field Marshal *Ṭanṭāwī* decisively declared that there would be no presidential elections before the constitution.

Later, this goal became apparently unachievable due to time constraints. Hence, the SCAF aimed – at least – to form an agreed-upon Constituent Assembly before this date. Other topics were included the negotiations agenda, most importantly the political isolation law that was approved by the parliament, but it was rejected by the SCAF because, the law was tailored against specific presidential candidates in its opinion.

Maggie Osama, “Egypt’s Unfinished Revolution”, *Open Democracy*, 19 December 2011, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/egypts-unfinished-revolution/> (accessed 23 June 2019).

“’istib’ād ‘asharat murashaḥīn min ri’āsiyyāt maṣr”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 14 April 2012, <https://bit.ly/2RwoBNu> (accessed 23 June 2019).

“’al’ikhwān ’almuslimūn wa ’almajlis ’al’askaī: ’alṣafqah wa ’alṣidām”, *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 17 April 2012, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/positionestimate/2012/04/2012417104949318130.html> (accessed 23 June 2019).

Debated *Sharī'ah*-related issues: N/A

Outcome: These negotiation rounds were a partial success. On 7 June 2012, the rival parliamentary blocks reached an agreement on the formation of the Constituent Assembly which was approved by the parliament on 13 June. However, on the second day, the parliament itself was dissolved by the verdict of the SCC, and many cases were filed against this Constituent Assembly as well.

4.4.1.9 Fairmont Accord: (National Front for Completing the Revolution) ³⁶³

Context: During the second round of the presidential elections held on 16 and 17 June 2012, many events pushed the Islamist and some secularist political forces to work together again and to rise up against what was perceived as a threat to their Revolution. It was a great surprise that *'Aḥmed Shafīq*, the last PM in *Mubārak* era and the candidate that represented the remnants of the old regime “*'Al-fulū'*”, came second in the first round of the presidential elections, and his chance to win was reasonably big. In addition, the SCAF's decision to dissolve the parliament on 14 June and to re-claim

³⁶³ Mady, “Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, 77-78.

ʿĪsmāʿīl ʿAl-ʿAshwal, “ḥamdī qandīl bi-mudhakkiratih: muḥammad mursī ʿalṭaiyyb ʿalladhī ʿakhlaf wuʿūdah .. fariḥ bil-riʿāsah kaṭīfl ḥaṣal ʿalā luʿbah (9)”, *Shorouk News*, 3 February 2014, <https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=03022014&id=f1970be7-8dff-449a-aaf8-9112320e8f8a> (accessed 28 July 2019).

Quṭb ʿAl-ʿArabī, “alḥiwār wa ʿalmuṣālahah fī maṣr: ḍarūrāt ʿaldākhil wa tadakhulāt ʿalkhārij”, *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 26 March 2014, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/discussionstrategytosolvearabworldconflict/2014/02/2014225105334470365.html#> (accessed 26 April 2018).

El Raggal and Ezzat, “Egypt: Can a Revolution Be Negotiated?” in *Arab Spring*, 87-88.

“aljabhat ʿalwaṭaniyyah tuṭātib ʿalraʿīs mursī bi-taṣḥīh masār ʿalthawrah”, YouTube video, 1:08:25, *Al Jazeera Mubasher*, 28 July 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lsul6pYJwso> (accessed 28 July 2019).

Interviewee no. 1: September 9, 2019 – Istanbul.

Interviewee no. 3: September 18, 2019 – Istanbul.

Interviewee no. 4: October 13, 2019 – London.

legislative power again by the constitutional declaration on 17 June was perceived as “a minor coup” against the people’s will.

Later, after the apparent winning of the MB candidate *Muhammad Mursi* according to the initial polls and the SCAF’s reluctance to declare the official results for many days, rumours spread about results manipulation in favour of *Shafiq*. In such heated circumstances, the MB decided to call for a consultative meeting at the Fairmont Hotel that was held on 20-21 June.

Participants: Many politicians, academicians, intellectuals, and revolutionary youth figures responded to the MB’s call. However, it is worth noting that those public figures, despite coming from the different ideological background, participated on a personal behalf and did not represent their parties and institutions.

Agenda: The meeting, according to many participants, was confrontational and harsh. Most of the attendees criticised the MB’s political decisions and overall behaviour. In order to side with the MB against any possible elections fraud, they demanded a full partnership and transparency. At the end of the two days, the elected candidate declared what was termed as “Fairmont pact” which included the following: the confirmation on the national partnership, the promise to appoint an independent figure as a prime minister, the promise to form a presidential team from different ideological backgrounds and a national consensus government, and the promise to re-structure the Constituent Assembly to be more balanced. In return, the attendees refused the SCAF constitutional declaration and its decision to dissolve the parliament.

Debated *Sharī‘ah*-related issues: N/A

Outcome: This move from the MB paid off as the official results were declared after two days on 24 June. From their side, the participants of the Fairmont meeting formed a National Front for Completing the Revolution, which meant to be a consultative body to the presidency.

Whether President *Muḥammad Mursī* kept his promise or not is a matter of debate. On the one hand, *Mursī* chose his deputy and the prime minister from independent figures, and the members of the presidential team and the cabinet came from different ideological backgrounds. On the other hand, the members of the National Front accused him of ignoring them and lacking in transparency. They were not consulted in the appointment of the main political posts. Furthermore, the Constituent Assembly was not re-structured, and many members in the Assembly resigned due to what they described as Islamist hegemony. Finally, on 28 July 2012 in a press conference, most of the National Front members declared that the President was not abiding by his commitment.

The Coordinator of the National Front for Completing the Revolution admitted that both parties missed the chance: the MB badly managed its relationship with the Fairmont group and behaved as if it was not bound to its promises; while the members of the Fairmont group failed to maintain their unity and force the President to respect their accord.

4.4.1.10 The Constitutional Declaration Crisis Dialogue: (*Maḥmūd Mikkī's* Dialogue)³⁶⁴

Context: After assuming the presidency, *Muḥammad Mursī* failed to maintain the coalition that supported him in the second round. The conflict between the secularists and Islamists resumed around the constitution, and many non-Islamist members withdrew from the Constituent Assembly. Meanwhile, the SCC was expected to issue a verdict to dissolve the Assembly for the second time.

Proactively, *Mursī* issued a constitutional declaration on 22 November 2012 which made the Constituent Assembly, the Shura council, and all his presidential declarations legally immune until the election of a new parliament. This meant that the President became not only the head of the executive power and represented legislative power, but was also immunised against the judiciary.

What made the opposition reaction more aggressive was how this constitutional declaration was issued. Neither the Vice President, who was previously a prominent

³⁶⁴ "Dialogue Called for to End Egyptian Violence", *Euronews*, 6 December 2012 <https://www.euronews.com/2012/12/06/dialogue-called-for-to-end-egyptian-violence> (accessed 30 July 2019).

Hishām 'Al-Miānī, "Bawwabit 'al'ahrām tanshur 'alnaṣ 'alkāmil lil-qarārāt .. mursī yuḥaṣṣin qarārātih bi-'i'lān 'aldustūrī wa yamna' ḥal 'alt'sīsiyyah wa 'alshūrā", *Al Aḥram*, 12 November 2012, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/275479.aspx> (accessed 30 July 2019).

Muḥsin Sālim, Jihād 'Al-'Anṣarī, and 'Aḥmad 'Al-Jundī, "'alri'āsah tuqarrir 'ilghā' 'al'i'lān 'aldustūrī wa 'al'istiftā' bi-maw'iduh", *Alwafd News*, 8 December 2012, <https://bit.ly/2K8jAbF> (accessed 31 July 2019).

Hishām 'Al-Miānī, "maḥmūd mekkī yu'lin rasmiyyā: 'ilāqatī bi-mu'assasit 'alri'āsah ḥāliyyā 'idārit 'alḥiwār 'alwaṭānī faqaṭ", *Al Aḥram*, 1 January 2013, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/290257.aspx> (accessed 31 July 2019).

"mu'tamar ṣuḥafī lil-mutaḥaddith bi-'ism 'alri'āsah 10/1/2013", YouTube video, 15:58, *Egyptian Presidency*, 12 January 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=09xZY5KPg_0 (accessed 31 July 2019).

Bishārah, *thawrat maṣr ('al-juz' 'al-thānī)*, 288-289.

Quṭb 'Al-'Arabī, "'alḥiwār wa 'almuṣālahah fī maṣr: ḍarūrāt 'aldākḥil wa tadakhulāt 'alkhārij", *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 26 March 2014, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/discussionstrategytosolvearabworldconflict/2014/02/2014225105334470365.html#> (accessed 26 April 2018).

Interviewee no. 7: December 15, 2019 – Doha.

judge, nor the President's consultants were involved or even informed in advance. Strong evidence suggests that the text of this Declaration was drafted by the MB's Guidance Bureau itself.

Consequently, demonstrations and bloody clashes erupted in the whole country between the opponents and the supporters of the President. Furthermore, the opposition parties, many CSOs, and independent figures declared the establishment of the NSF on 24 November and '*Al-Barādī*' was chosen as its general coordinator.

With widespread violence, especially on 4-5 December in front of the '*Al-Ittiḥādiyyah*' Presidential Palace, the Vice President *Maḥmūd Mikkī* called for a political dialogue on the second day.

Participants: While the call came from the Vice President, the President himself did participate in many sessions of the dialogue. Islamist parties such as the Light, the Centre, and the Building and Development parties accepted the invitation, as well as small liberal parties and many public figures. However, the main opposition parties forming the NSF refused to join before cancelling the constitutional declaration and postponing the constitutional referendum which was set to be held on 15 December 2012.

Agenda: The first session was held on 8 December 2012, in which the amendment of the constitutional declaration was discussed, and a new declaration was issued. However, the NSF refused to join the following sessions due to the affirmation of the constitutional referendum date.

The Vice President *Maḥmūd Mikkī* chaired six other sessions of the dialogue until 10 January 2013. In these sessions, the controversial articles in the newly approved

constitution and the electoral laws among many other points of disagreement between the President and the opposition were discussed.

Debated *Sharī'ah*-related issues: N/A

Outcome: According to the spokesman of the presidency, this dialogue succeeded in achieving three goals: ending the crisis of the constitutional declaration of November 2011, reaching a consensus on the appointed members in the Shura Council, and drafting the new electoral law.

However, its overall impact on the political scene was minimal due to the absence of the main opposition groups. Therefore, widespread violence and continuous mobilisation and counter-mobilisation persisted, and the political instability and polarisation reached its climax.

4.4.1.11 Minister of Defence 'Abdul-Fattāh 'Al-Sīsī's Call for Dialogue:³⁶⁵

Context: Amid the escalation of political tension and three days before the referendum on the new constitution, on 12 December 2012, the military institution made a formal statement condemning the rise of violence and declaring its support for dialogue. The statement warned of the consequences of the lack of consensus and affirmed that the armed forces realised its responsibility to protect the higher national interests.

³⁶⁵ Mahā Sālim, “alquwāt 'almusallaḥah: nanḥāz dā' mā li-sha'b maṣr ... wa 'al'inqisāmāt tuḥadid 'arkān 'aldawlah ... wa nad'am 'alḥiwār 'alwaṭanī wuṣūlā lil-tawafuq”, *Al Aḥram*, 8 December 2012, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/281141.aspx> (accessed 1 August 2019).

Bishārah, *thawrat maṣr ('al-juz' 'al-thānī)*, 282-286.

Qutb 'Al-'Arabī, “alḥiwār wa 'almuṣālaḥah fī maṣr: ḍarūrāt 'aldākḥil wa tadakhulāt 'alkhārij”, *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 26 March 2014, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/discussionstrategytosolvearabworldconflict/2014/02/2014225105334470365.html#> (accessed 26 April 2018).

Interviewee no. 7: December 15, 2019 – Doha.

Following this statement, the Minister of Defence ‘*Abdul-Fattāh*’ *Al-Sīsī* started to invite the heads of the political parties and many public figures to a national dialogue without consulting President *Muḥammad Mursī*.

Participants: In contrast to its stance regarding the repeated presidential calls for dialogue, the NSF accepted the Minister of Defence’s invitation. According to one of its leaders, the NSF denied the President’s calls because of the lack of trust and absence of any guarantees that he would be committed to the outcome of these dialogues. Having the military institution on board, he claimed, gave a sign of seriousness to the NSF. However, the invitation was rapidly withdrawn, apparently due to pressure from the President and the dialogue was never held.

Agenda: N/A

Debated *Sharī‘ah*-related issues: N/A

Outcome: Despite the cancellation of this dialogue, it had great political significance. For many, it was a sign of an impending military coup, which was waged six months later because, for the first time, the military institution assumed an impartial position between the President and his opponents as if it was no longer bound to its constitutional role.

4.4.1.12 ‘*Al-’Azhar* Document to Renounce Violence:³⁶⁶

³⁶⁶ Bassām Ramaḍān, “bil-ṣūrah ... ‘asmā’ ‘almuwaqqi’īn ‘alā wathīqat ‘al’azhar li-nabdh ‘al’unf”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 31 January 2013, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/273789> (accessed 16 October 2019).

“ṣidāmāt khilāl muḏāharāt ḥāshidah lil-mu’araḍah ‘almaṣriyyah tandīdā bi-siyāsit mursī”, *Al Hurra*, 1 February 2013, <https://www.alhurra.com/a/egypt-mass-demonstrations/218246.html> (accessed 16 October 2019).

Aljazeera Encyclopedia, “blāk bulūk”, *Al Jazeera Net*, <https://bit.ly/2IVL17v> (accessed 16 October 2019). Bishārah, *thawrat maṣr* (‘*al-juz*’ ‘*al-thānī*’), 337-338.

Context: The approval of the new constitution in the popular referendum held in December 2012 did not ease the political crisis. On the contrary, it resulted in its escalation. In January 2013, on the second anniversary of the Revolution, widespread protests erupted with violent clashes with the police forces. Simultaneously, a curfew was announced in the Canal cities after massive riots followed the mass execution sentences issued in the case of Port Said Stadium. The violence in these few days left tens of dead and hundreds of injured people.

More alarmingly, the occasion of the January Revolution anniversary witnessed the announcement of the “Black Bloc”, which was a violent group formed of youth activists from different backgrounds such as 6th of April movement, leftists, Ultras groups with possible involvement of security institutions. They started to attack public facilities, highways, the headquarters of the MB and its affiliated party FJP, and the *’Al-’Ittihādiyyah* Presidential Palace. They used firearms and Molotov cocktails, and their activities were almost nation-wide.

Participants: In such circumstances, an initiative came from prominent youth activists, including *Wā’il Ghunīm*, *’Aḥmed Māher*, *Muṣṭafā ’Al-Najjār*, and *’Islām Luṭṭfī*, who contacted the Grand Imam of *’Al-’Azhar* and encouraged him to sponsor an initiative to contain the escalating violence. The Grand Imam of *’Al-’Azhar* *’Aḥmed ’Al-Ṭaiyyb* made a call on 31 January 2013, and it was widely welcomed.

Almost all main political groups participated including a Deputy of the General Guide of MB, the heads of the main Islamist parties: the FJP, the Light Party, and the BDP, the

leading opposition figures such as *Muḥammad ʿAl-Barādī*, *Ḥamdīn Ṣabbāḥī*, *ʿAbdul-Monʿim ʿAbul-Futūḥ*, as well as representatives of the three Christian churches in Egypt.

Agenda: This document emphasised the sanctity of life and called for renouncing violence and any complacency with it. It stressed the necessity to preserve the national unity and the state institutions and suggested holding a dialogue to contain the political crisis.

Debated *Sharīʿah*-related issues: N/A

Outcome: This document was signed by twenty-eight representatives of the major political and religious entities in Egypt; however, it failed to break the cycle of violence. On the one hand, many grassroots activists declared that they were not bound by this document. On the other hand, according to one of the meeting organisers, many opposition leaders rapidly withdrew their support from this document because of the harsh criticism waged by media that accused the signatories of being complacent with the authoritarian rule of the MB. Nevertheless, the significance of this dialogue was that it succeeded in gathering politicians from all political spectrums after a long period of confrontations and was the last chance to control the deterioration of political and security situation in Egypt.

4.4.2 Transitional Negotiations, National Dialogues, and Pact-making Attempts in Tunisia

4.4.2.1 The Negotiations to Establish the HIROR:³⁶⁷

Context: After removing *Ben 'Alī* from his office, two simultaneous, yet contradicting, tracks were launched to manage the process of the transition: an official one and a revolutionary one. The government headed by *Muḥammad 'Al-Ghannūshī* announced on 22 January 2011 three national committees for political reform and investigations of corruption and transgressions. Meanwhile, a series of meetings started on 25 January and organised by representatives of the EMP and leftist parties, as well as the UGTT, the ONAT, the Association of Tunisian Judges, and some public figures. These meetings gave rise to the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution on 11 February. The PM *'Al-Ghannūshī* refused to recognise the new council and insisted on maintaining the official track only. In response, the Council joined forces with the protestors of *Qaṣabah II* sit-in and demanded the intervention of the interim President *Fu'ād 'Al-Mabazza'*.

Participants: Twenty-eight parties and CSOs participated in the negotiations to form the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution. Then, with the intervention of the interim President, the Council was merged with the High Commission for Political

³⁶⁷ M'rad, *National Dialogue in Tunisia*, 21-23.

Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 128-129.

Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, The Decree-law 6/2011, http://www.legislation.tn/en/detailtexte/D%C3%A9cret-loi-num-2011-6-du----jort-2011-013_2011013000062 (accessed 24 November 2018).

Presidency of the Government Portal, “nadwah ṣaḥāfiyyah li-ru'asā' 'allijān 'alwaṭaniyyah 'althalāth 'almukallafah bil-'iṣlāḥ 'alsiyāsī wa bil-naẓar fī 'altajawzāt wa 'alfasād”, <http://admin.pm.gov.tn/pm/actualites/actualite.php?id=2016&lang=ar> (accessed 3 August 2019).

Reform, one of the national committees that was founded by 'Al-Ghannūshī's government, to form the HIROR by a Decree-Law issued on 18 February. The head of the High Commission for Political Reform, 'Iyāḍ Ben 'Āshūr, was appointed as the head of the newly founded organisation.

Agenda: The negotiations in this period revolved mainly around two issues: how to get the revolutionary forces represented in the transitional administration and the prerogatives of the HIROR.

Debated Sharī'ah-related issues: N/A

Outcome: After the establishment of the HIROR, it became a semi-official institution of national dialogue aiming to find compromises and prepare the ground for the founding elections. According to the Decree-law, the HIROR was "in charge of studying the legislative texts having link with the political organisation and proposing the reforms likely to concreti[s]e the revolution objectives relating to the democratic process. It may also give an opinion on the government activity, in dialogue with the Prime Minister."

4.4.2.2 Ben 'Āshūr's Dialogue: (Declaration of the Transitional Process)³⁶⁸

³⁶⁸ Ben Hafaiedh and Zartman, "Tunisia" in *Arab Spring*, 56-57.

Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 136-137.

"ḥizb 'alnahḍah yu'alliq 'uḍuyyatah fī 'alhai'ah 'al'uliā liṭaḥqīq 'ahdāf 'althawrah", *France 24*, 31 May 2011, <https://www.france24.com/ar/20110531-nahdha-movment-islamic-party-tunisia-elections> (accessed 22 August 2019).

Ṣalāh 'Al-Dīn 'Al-Jūrshī, "ba'd tajādhubāt .. tūnis tatajih 'ilā 'intikhāb majlis ta'sīsī fī 23 'uktūbar", *Swiss Info*, 9 June 2011, <https://bit.ly/2KP96hW> (accessed 22 August 2019).

"ḥizb 'alnahḍah yansaḥib min 'alhai'ah 'al'uliā liṭaḥqīq 'ahdāf 'althawrah", *France 24*, 27 June 2011, <https://www.france24.com/ar/20110627-ennahda-islamists-reform-commission-rached-ghannouchi> (accessed 22 August 2019).

"'almarzūkī yashḥab ḥizbah min 'alhai'ah 'al'uliā lil-thawrah 'altūnisiyyah", *Middle East Online*, 1 July 2011, <https://bit.ly/2KPQNsX> (accessed 22 August 2019).

Context: Despite its success in drafting the electoral law and establishing the ISIE, the HIROR faced severe disagreements between its members on the timing of the ANC elections, its mandate, and for how long it should last.

The elections that were set to be on 24 July 2011 were postponed by the ISIE to 23 October for technical reasons. The EMP was sceptical about the real causes of this postponement and accused the ISIE and its head of serving the agenda of its rivals.

Furthermore, some members representing the secularist forces and the old regime elites advocated for a limited mandate and duration of the ANC. They called for only a one-year term, during which, the ANC would draft the constitution in the first six months, and then, during the parliamentary and presidential elections that would be held in the second half of the year, the ANC would become a mere supervisory institution. The situation became worse when they asked to submit this plan to a popular referendum, which meant that the ANC elections would be further postponed.

Owing to these reasons, the EMP decided to freeze its membership in the HIROR on 30 May before it totally withdrew on 27 June, followed by *'Al-Munṣif 'Al-Marzūqī's* party: the CRP on 1 July. Later, on 9 September 2011, the EMP responded to the endeavours to hold a referendum for a new transitional roadmap by forming a "23 October Coalition" with a few secularist parties declaring its objection to this move and to any attempt to postpone the elections beyond 23 October or to limit the ANC mandate.

Participants: To overcome this crisis, *'Iyāḍ Ben 'Āshūr*, the head of HIROR, invited the twelve parties represented in it to dialogue. The sessions of negotiations lasted from 5 August to 13 September 2011.

Khamīs ben Brīk, "tūnis – 11 ḥizb yatabannā khāriḡat ṡarīq ba'd 'intikhāb 'alta'sīsī", *Almasdar*, 15 September 2011, <https://bit.ly/2ziB9j5> (accessed 24 August 2019).

Agenda: The dialogue revolved around the arrangements for the ANC and its mandate. In the end, the participants reached a compromise. On the one hand, the ANC duration was limited to only one year as advocated by some secularist parties; on the other hand, the ANC elections date was affirmed to be on 23 October, and it was given full authority as demanded by the EMP and its allies. It was entitled to draft the constitution, as well as appoint the interim president and cabinet.

Debated *Sharī'ah*-related issues: N/A

Outcome: On 15 September, eleven Tunisian parties, including the EMP, signed the Declaration of the Transitional Process. Although the Declaration was only morally binding and was not a legal document, and although the CRP refused to join the signatories, *Ben 'Āshūr's* Dialogue succeeded in solving the HIROR crisis and preventing the side-tracking of the transitional process.

4.4.2.3 The Pledge of the Republic Document:³⁶⁹

Context: In May 2011, a proposal for supra-constitutional principles named “Pledge of the Republic” was submitted by some partisan and independent members in the HIROR to be discussed and approved as guidance for the new constitution. In response, the EMP accused the HIROR of transgressing its assigned tasks by intervening in the mandate of the coming ANC. Moreover, the initial discussions on the principles included

³⁶⁹ Miḥriz 'Al-Mājirī, “tūnis – mā huwa muḥtawā 'al'ahd 'aljumhūrī 'alladhī tunāqishuh 'alhai'ah 'al'uliā liṭaḥqīq 'ahdāf 'althawrah?”, *Almasdar*, 6 May 2011, <https://bit.ly/2KQGLaM> (accessed 24 August 2019).

Ṣalāh 'Al-Dīn 'Al-Jūrshī, “ba'd tajādhubāt .. tūnis tatajih 'ilā 'intikhāb majlis ta'sīsī fī 23 'uktūbar”, *Swiss Info*, 9 June 2011, <https://bit.ly/2KP96hW> (accessed 22 August 2019).

“alnaṣ tawafuqī wa lais 'istishrāfī”, *Al Sahafa Alyoum*, 30 June 2011, <https://bit.ly/2U15UIZ> (accessed 24 August 2019).

“'alhai'ah 'al'uliā lil-thawrah 'altūnisiyyah tuqir 'al'ahd 'aljumhūrī”, *Middle East Online*, 1 July 2011, <https://bit.ly/2PdjeFn> (accessed 24 August 2019).

within the Pledge uncovered how serious the contradictions were between the Islamist and secularist members. Disagreement on the idea and the content of the Pledge was one of the reasons that pushed the EMP to withdraw from the HIROR.

Participants: The document was discussed by all parties and organisations represented in the HIROR. However, in June, a number of representatives withdrew during the crisis of ANC elections, including those of the EMP and the CRP.

Agenda: In May and June 2011, the HIROR discussed three different versions of the Pledge of the Republic. The Document constituted five items related to the values of the Tunisian Republic, Tunisian identity, political and social rights granted to Tunisian citizens, and the main principles of the Tunisian foreign policies.

Debated *Shari'ah*-related issues: The first principle in the Pledge was dedicated to the issue of identity. It used the very words of the first article in the 1959 constitution: "Tunisia is a free, independent, and sovereign state; its religion is Islam; its language is Arabic; its system is republican." Then, it re-stated that the Tunisian people identity as "a modernist Arab-Islamic" country which reflects the rich history and diverse components of Tunisia, interacting with the principles of the modernity and progress.

The second one stressed the sovereignty of the people exemplified in the free, fair elections and the peaceful devolution of power. Furthermore, besides acknowledging religious freedoms, it clearly affirmed that the state should guarantee separation between the religious field and the political field.

The third principle emphasised the equality of all citizens in rights, duties, and before the law. Furthermore, it affirmed that it is the duty of the state to protect the acquired rights of women and to develop them towards absolute equality with men.

Outcome: The Pledge of the Republic was adopted by the HIROR on 2 July 2011. However, the withdrawal of many representatives before its approval, most importantly the members of EMP, negatively affected the significance of the Pledge. It turned out to be a document that represents the consensus between non-Islamist members of the HIROR. Therefore, after the ANC elections and during the constitutional drafts, many problems related to Tunisian identity and human rights issues resurfaced again.

4.4.2.4 The National Dialogue Conference – First Round:³⁷⁰

Context: After the 23 October elections and the establishment of the ANC, the process of constitution-making started on 13 February 2012. After seven months, the first draft was released on 8 August with many unsettled disputes. It was clear that the ANC would not be able to meet the deadline, which meant that the legitimacy of the whole transitional process became in question.

Meanwhile, the rising tension between the secularists and Islamists during the drafting process was transmitted to society and resulted in severe political congestion. Between March and August 2012, thousands of Salafists staged many demonstrations calling for

³⁷⁰ Ben Hafaiedh and Zartman, "Tunisia" in *Arab Spring*, 59-60, 65.

M'rad, *National Dialogue in Tunisia*, 23-25.

EU Spring Project Resources, Timeline-Tunisia, Summer 2014, <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/euSpring/advisoryboard/> (accessed 30 August 2019).

Ḥussīn Ben 'Al-Hāj Naṣr, "alḥiwār 'alwaṭanī 'altūnisī: 'almaw'id 'almuqṭarah lil-'intikhābāt ghair mulā'im", *Al Riyadh*, 18 October 2012, <http://www.alriyadh.com/777151#> (accessed 31 August 2019).

"taqrīr 'ikhbārī: mu'tamar lil-ḥiwār 'alwaṭanī fī tūnis yajma' 'akthar min 50 ḥizb wa 22 munazzamah", *People's Daily Online*, <http://arabic.peopledaily.com.cn/31662/7979963.html> (accessed 31 August 2019).

the adoption of the *Sharī'ah* in the constitution, and on some occasions, they clashed with security forces and attacked police stations. Moreover, TV stations and art exhibitions were targets of some Salafist protests accusing them of spreading blasphemy and immorality.

Felling threatened by the hegemony of the EMP and its allies over the ANC and the Salafist show of power, the secularist trend mobilised its bases against the rising Islamism and took to the streets on many occasions. For instance, on 20 March 2012, secularist groups demonstrated to defend liberties while commemorating the National Independence Day. Later, after the release of the first draft of the constitution in August, the secularist protesters objected to the articles related to women's rights.

Approaching the end of the ANC term without finishing the task of constitution-making amid these highly divisive and convulsive circumstances motivated the UGTT's call for dialogue.

Participants: The call for dialogue was first proposed by the UGTT on 18 June 2012, the LTDH and the ONAT then joined in October. The National Dialogue Conference was held on 16 October with the participation of the interim President *'Al-Munşif 'Al-Marzūqī*, the Prime Minister *Ḥammādī 'Al-Jibālī*, and the head of ANC *Muṣṭafā Ben Ja'far*, in addition to fifty political parties, twenty-two CSOs, and many independent figures.

Despite the participation of *'Al-Marzūqī* and *'Al-Jibālī* in their personal capacity, their parties, the CRP and the EMP, decided to boycott this conference and justified their abstention by the presence of the Call of Tunisia Party that contained many figures from the ousted *Ben 'Alī*'s regime and other parties that no longer recognised the legitimacy

of the ANC. In fact, as the UGTT openly sided with the anti-Troika secularist parties, its role as a mediator was not welcomed by the Troika parties.

Agenda: The agenda of the National Dialogue was designed to address two main issues: how to de-escalate the political tension and maintain the national unity, and how to reach a consensus on the transitional roadmap.

The UGTT declared six main principles as the basis for this dialogue:

- i. The adherence to the civil nature of the state, the democratic-republican system, and the social achievements of the Tunisian people.
- ii. Respecting human rights, defending both public and individual freedoms, and sanctifying the values of citizenship and justice.
- iii. The rejection of extremism and violence in all its forms.
- iv. Protecting the state bureaucracy, as well as mosques, and the economic and educational institutions from political manipulation.
- v. Law enforcement, protection of institutions, and defending citizens' properties and freedoms are solely the responsibility of the state.
- vi. The necessity to implement a new model for development that would combat poverty, strengthen investment and productivity, and reduce social and regional disparities.

Debated *Shari'ah*-related issues: It was obvious that the declared principles for the National Dialogue were largely addressing the fears of the secularists. The emphasis on the civility of the state, protection of the social achievements, observation of human rights, rejection of extremism, and warning against political manipulation of the state

institutions and mosques were an attempt to prevent the EMP and the Salafist trend from imposing their agenda on the constitution and abusing the power of the state.

Outcome: The closing statement contained some recommendations, including:

- i. Rejection of the interim government proposal to hold the elections on 23 June 2013 and the call to shorten the transitional period.
- ii. The separation between the timing of the parliamentary elections and the presidential elections.
- iii. Calling for the impartiality of the sovereign ministries (i.e., Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Foreign affairs) as a guarantee for the elections fairness.
- iv. The necessity of reaching a compromise on the structure of the new ISIE, the Interim Authority for the Supervision of the Judiciary, and the Revisionist Authority of Audiovisual Communication.
- v. The emphasis on the universality of human rights.

4.4.2.5 Majlis 'Al-Hukamā' "Council of the Wise" Dialogue:³⁷¹

Context: The one-year mandate of the ANC passed without delivering the constitution. Even the second draft that was released by 14 December 2012 failed to secure consensus.

³⁷¹ M'rad, National Dialogue in Tunisia, 26-27.

"wūtsh: thagharāt fī mashrū' dustūr tūnis", *Al Jazeera Net*, 23 January 2013, <https://bit.ly/30RC9WP> (accessed 6 October 2019).

"alḥukūmah 'altūnusiyyah tu'lin 'asmā' 'al'a'ḍā' bi-majlis ḥukamā' tūnis", *Shorouk News*, 13 February 2013, <https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=13022013&id=fe5e8ef9-c62a-4b13-84d8-7d019005ce08> (accessed 6 October 2019).

"tūnis ... 'aljibālī yushakkil majlis ḥukamā' li-taqdīr 'almawāqif wa 'almustajaddāt 'alwaṭaniyyah", *RT Arabic*, 13 February 2013, <https://bit.ly/2oYShso> (accessed 6 October 2019).

"Peace and Security Council Report, Country Analysis: Tunisia", *ETH Zurich*, March 2013, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/168553/PSC44March13E.pdf> (accessed 6 October 2019).

Furthermore, during this period, political violence continued to escalate to reach an unprecedented level. On 18 October 2012, *Luṭfī Naqqā*, the regional coordinator of the Call of Tunisia Party in *Taṭāwīn*, died during clashes with the NLPR. Later, on 4 December 2012, violent clashes erupted again between syndicalists and members of the NLPR in front of the headquarters of the UGTT.

The assassination of *Shukrī Bel'īd*, the leader of the Popular Front, on 6 February 2013 was an earth-shattering event that threw the country into further turmoil. The UGTT called for a national strike on 8 February, and the funeral was accompanied by widespread violence and actions of looting and destruction.

Participants: As a response, on 12 February, the PM *Ḥammādī 'Al-Jibālī* called sixteen public figures to form a panel that was termed “Council of the Wise” at the Guest House of the *Qarṭāj* Presidential Palace. These figures participated in their personal qualities, some were non-partisan, and the partisans were affiliated to secularist and Islamist groups. The list of participants included: *'Iyāḍ Ben 'Āshūr*, *'Abdul-Fattāḥ Mūrū*, *'Aḥmīdah 'Al-Naifer*, and *'Aḥmed 'Al-Mistīrī*.

Agenda: The Council was invited to discuss how to overcome the socio-political crisis in general and to address the problem of the legitimacy of ANC in particular.

Debated *Sharī'ah*-related issues: N/A

Outcome: After its meeting, the Council issued a statement that the ANC should appoint a new deadline for the constitution submission and set a date for the upcoming elections. However, it affirmed the legitimacy of ANC and refused the calls for its dissolution.

The important initiative came from PM *Ḥammādī 'Al-Jibālī*, who suggested forming a new cabinet of technocrats till the next elections to reduce the political tension. Some opposition parties welcomed this initiative, but it was totally refused by the Troika parties including the EMP, his own party. Upon refusal of his suggestion, *'Al-Jibālī* decided to resign, and a new cabinet was formed by *'Alī 'Al-'Arrayyīḍ*, the Minister of Interior and the prominent leader in the EMP.

4.4.2.6 National Dialogue Sponsored by President *'Al-Munṣif 'Al-Marzūqī*.³⁷²

Context: The political blockage continued after the cabinet reshuffle. By March 2013, it was clear that the Troika government would not be able to meet the elections deadline on 23 June 2013 because there was no consensus on the constitution nor the ISIE. The third constitutional draft released in April 2013 failed again to obtain the acceptance of the secularist forces as some articles were still seen as a concession to the Islamists; therefore, these forces insisted on the dissolution of the ANC and the resignation of the Troika government.

Participants: The call came first from *Najīb 'Al-Shabbī*, the leader of the *'Al-Jumhūrī* (the Republican) Party, who contacted different leaders of the ANC-represented political parties. Then, President *'Al-Munṣif 'Al-Marzūqī* officially sponsored this National Dialogue, which was held on two sessions: the first was on 15 April and lasted for days and the second was organised in May 2013. Some parties decided to boycott the dialogue such as the Popular Front parties; others withdrew later such as the Call of

³⁷² Nawāl 'Al-Ṭāhirī, "qaṣr 'alḍiyāfah bi-qarṭāj: 'intilāq fā'iliyyāt 'alḥiwār 'alwaṭanī", *Arrakmia Tunisia*, 15 April 2013, <https://bit.ly/339ZSTs> (accessed 7 October 2019).

M'rad, National Dialogue in Tunisia, 28-30.

Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 144-145.

Ben Hafaiedh and Zartman, "Tunisia" in *Arab Spring*, 67-68.

Tunisia Party due to the exclusion of the UGTT. Finally, the remaining participants were the Troika parties in addition to the Republican Party.

Agenda: The dialogue agenda focussed on how to overcome the current blockage and to make a rapprochement between the rival political forces in order to hasten the process of constitution-making and to set a date for the elections.

Debated *Sharī'ah*-related issues: N/A

Outcome: Many causes resulted in the failure of this dialogue: the boycott of the major opposition parties, the exclusion of the UGTT, limited discussions that focused on setting timetables rather than addressing the controversial constitutional issues, and the lack of neutrality of the President *'Al-Marzūqī*. For many, *'Al-Marzūqī* was part of the political polarisation as he described the demand for his resignation and the call for the government dissolution as a revolt and an act of treason.

4.4.2.7 National Dialogue Conference – Second Round:³⁷³

Context: After the failure of the National Dialogue sponsored by the President, the UGTT took the initiative again and called for a new round of dialogue as a continuation of the National Dialogue held on 16 October 2012.

Participants: This round was held on 16 May 2013 at the Congress Palace with the participation of fifty political parties (including the EMP and the CPR who boycotted the

³⁷³ “mu'tamar 'alḥiwār 'altūnisī yakhtatim 'a'mālah bil-tawaṣul 'ilā tawāfuqāt tata'allāq bil-dustūr wa 'alqānūn 'al'intikhābī”, *Saudi Press Agency*, 17 May 2013, <https://www.spa.gov.sa/1111212> (accessed 7 October 2019).

M'rad, National Dialogue in Tunisia, 31-32.

Ben Hafaiedh and Zartman, “Tunisia” in *Arab Spring*, 68.

first round) and thirty CSOs, in addition to the interim President, the Prime Minister, and the head of ANC.

Agenda: The agenda was set to address many issues, such as the final date of the next presidential and parliamentary elections, the deadline for the constitution submission, settling the disputes on the nature of the political regime, and how to deal with the escalating violence and extremism and deteriorating socio-political status.

Debated *Sharī'ah*-related issues: N/A

Outcome: The concluding statement urged for the foundation of the ISIE that should be assigned the task of the preparation for elections within six months from its establishment and before the end of 2013. Besides, the constitution drafting process should be finalised by the end of July 2013. The statement also called for the adoption of a comprehensive national strategy to combat terrorism.

4.4.2.8 The National Conference to Combat Violence and Terrorism:³⁷⁴

Context: As one of the recommendations of the previous dialogue is to adopt a national strategy to combat violence, the UGTT alongside with the LTDH, the ONAT, and the UTICA organised a conference on 19-20 June 2013 to discuss this strategy.

Participants: The three presidents (i.e., the provisional President, the Prime Minister, and the head of ANC), as well as seventy political parties and thirty CSOs, participated.

³⁷⁴ “mu'tamar yad'ū li-ḥtirām 'altadāwul 'alsilmī bi-tūnis”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 20 June 2013, <https://bit.ly/2VN5bG7> (accessed 16 October 2019).

“tūnis tattajih lil-tawqī' 'alā 'almīthāq 'alwaṭanī li-munāḥaḍat 'al'irhāb”, *Al Arabiya Net*, 24 June 2013, <https://bit.ly/2Bf5G2b> (accessed 16 October 2019).

“mashrū' 'almīthāq 'alwaṭanī li-munāḥaḍat 'al'unf wa 'al'irhāb”, *Al Sahafa Alyoum*, 19 June 2013, <https://bit.ly/33A09zq> (accessed 16 October 2019).

M'rad, National Dialogue in Tunisia, 32-33.

However, on the first day of the conference, seven parties (including the EMP and the CRP) withdrew after attacking the EMP by the Popular Front representative accusing it of being politically responsible for the assassination of *Shukrī Bel'īd*.

Agenda: The conference goal was to set a “National Pact to Combat Violence and Terrorism” that would be morally binding to the political parties and CSOs.

Debated *Shari'ah*-related issues: This pact contained a set of principles concerning political practices, civil society activities, and the media and communication code of ethics. The spirit of these principles was slightly secularist with their emphasis on the concept of civility and the universality of human rights.

Outcome: Although this pact was signed by almost all participant organisations, even by those parties which withdrew on the first day, it failed to alleviate the violence, and after only one month, another prominent secularist figure, *Muḥammad Brāhmī*, was assassinated.

4.4.2.9 The Quartet-Sponsored National Dialogue.³⁷⁵

³⁷⁵ “*khilāf bi-sha'n 'almādah 'alsādisah min dustūr tūnis*”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 22 January 2014, <https://bit.ly/36hgDie> (accessed 28 October 2019).

“*'alt'sīsī yabda' jalsāt tawqī' 'aldustūr 'altūnusī*”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 27 January 2014, <https://bit.ly/2JtGuJT> (accessed 28 October 2019).

“*tūnis ... 'almajlis 'alt'sīsī yuqir qānūn jadīd lil-'intikhābāt*”, *Al Arabiya Net*, 1 May 2014, <https://bit.ly/31YNxkl> (accessed 28 October 2019).

M'rad, National Dialogue in Tunisia, 33-35, 49-52, 59-61, 63-70, 75-80, and 85-89.

Mady, “Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, 26-34.

'Al-Ḥināshī, “*'intikhābāt 'almajlis 'alwaṭanī 'altūnisī*”, 3-6.

Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle, Amine Ghali, Hèla Yousfi, Mohamed Limam and Nina Grønlykke Mollerup, “Tunisia's 2013 National Dialogue: Political Crisis Management”, *Berghof Foundation*, February 2017, 31-39.

Context: In summer 2013, it seems that Tunisia was at the edge of a civil war. The political polarisation between the Islamist-dominated Troika government and its secularist opposition reached its climax for three reasons:

First, the constitution-making process witnessed a new deadlock. On the first of June, another version of the constitution was released. Although it represented a modified version, for the opposition parties and many legal experts and civil activists, it failed to resolve some controversial articles.

Second, during this period, the violent extremist groups became more active and staged many attacks – most importantly, the assassination of *Muḥammad Brāhmī* on 25 July. The popular response to this crime was overwhelming: On the second day, a broad anti-Troika coalition was announced under the title of the T-NSF that included the Union for Tunisia parties and the Popular Front parties in addition to many CSOs and political groups; massive protests erupted in all cities countrywide; the UGTT declared a general strike on the funeral day; thousands of political and civil society activists launched the sit-in of departure or “Bardo II sit-in” in front of the ANC demanding its dissolution and the resignation of the Troika government; one-third of the ANC deputies declared their withdrawal, forcing its president *Muṣṭafā Ben Ja‘far* to suspend its work on 8 August. On 13 August, the situation became more hectic when the Islamists and the secularists mobilised tens of thousands of their supporters to take the streets at the same time as a show of power; and the civil strife became closer than ever.

Third, the military coup in Egypt that happened on 3 July poured fuel on the fire in Tunisia. On the one hand, the opposition became more daring, and some demonstrations openly demanded the military to intervene and topple the Troika

government. On the other hand, the EMP became afraid of the same scenario being repeated in Tunisia and falling victim to bloody repression and exclusion; therefore, it was forced to make concessions in order to avoid this fate, but at the same time, it became more reluctant to give up power without assuring guarantees.

To contain the political crisis, the Quartet Committee (UGTT, LTDH, ONAT, and UTICA) decided to mediate negotiations between the conflicting parties. The long marathon of this National Dialogue lasted for almost six months from 29 July 2013 (when the UGTT announced the first draft of the dialogue roadmap) until 26 January 2014.

Participants: It is important first to highlight how the Quartet was set up before talking about who responded to its call. The Quartet Committee succeeded in strengthening its legitimacy and representativeness by gathering the leading CSOs in Tunisia. Starting with the UGTT, with its 600.000 members, newly elected leadership, and broad support of the leftist parties, it proved to be an influential actor in the political scene throughout the interim period. Having the UTICA on board was essential to counterweight the UGTT and to establish an ideological balance with it. From one side, the UTICA traditionally represents the business circles in Tunisia with 165,000 members representing 2.5 million direct and indirect employees. From the other side, *Widād Boū Shamāwī*, the leader of the UTICA, was known to have relatively a good relationship with the EMP – the thing that was highly needed, given the deteriorated relationship between the EMP and the UGTT. The other two organisations: the LTDH and the ONAT, enjoyed high credibility among different political groups being long defenders of human rights and ardent opponents of the previous authoritarian regime.

The first task of the Quartet Committee was to convince political rivals to join the National Dialogue. The opposition coalitions refused to negotiate their demands. For them, the legitimacy of ANC expired after its failure to submit the constitution in one year, and the Troika government had to resign because it was unable to meet the people needs. The leftist parties, in particular, refused to negotiate with the EMP because they accused them of being politically and morally responsible for the assassination of their prominent figures: *Bel'īd* and *Brāhmī*, and of falling short to stand up to the threat of terrorism.

The EMP, from its side, insisted on the legitimacy of the ANC given that the one-year mandate was not included in any legal decrees, and it was merely a moral obligation. Accordingly, to respect the ANC legitimacy, the EMP generally preferred to carry out the political discussions and negotiations within the elected institutions.

Furthermore, the EMP was reluctant to join the National Dialogue because it did not trust the impartiality of the Quartet Committee, especially the UGTT, because, in the beginning, it openly sided with the opposition. Besides, it utterly rejected any National Dialogue having the Call of Tunisia Party as a participant because the EMP accused it of having strong ties with the ousted regime.

Two initiatives helped to overcome this mistrust between political rivals: First, a trust-building secret meeting held in Paris between *'Al-Bājī Qāid 'Al-Sibsī*, the leader of the Call of Tunisia Party, and *Rāshid 'Al-Ghannūshī*, the leader of the EMP, on 15 August 2013 – two days after the alarming protests staged by both camps in Tunisia and one day after the *Rābī'ah* massacre in Egypt. Second, a series of individual meetings between the Quartet Committee and the parties of the ruling Troika and the T-NSF were

simultaneously held. In these shuttle meetings, the Quartet Committee succeeded in convincing the EMP that the Troika government had to resign, and, at the same time, it persuaded the opposition that the prompt dissolution of the ANC before submitting the constitution would be dangerous because it would create a power vacuum.

Eventually, by early October 2013, twenty-three parties of the twenty-seven parties represented in ANC agreed to join the National Dialogue with an abstention of only four parties including the CPR of the interim President *'Al-Munşif 'Al-Marzūqī*.

Agenda: The roadmap of the National Dialogue was announced on 17 September 2013 by the Quartet Committee. In this document, the Troika government pledged to resign, and, in return, the opposition deputies accepted to join back the ANC work. The roadmap specified three tracks for negotiations that should go hand in hand:

First, the governmental path, which was concerned with the formation of a non-partisan technocratic government. It was stated that an independent national figure should be chosen in one week, then the consultations to form the new cabinet should be finalised in only two weeks, and the ANC had to approve the new government. In other words, the Troika government should leave in three weeks; however, the EMP insisted that the government would resign only after approving the constitution and setting up the mechanisms of elections.

Second, the constitutional path, which, according to the roadmap, had to deliver the consensual draft of the constitution in four weeks. It stated that an expert committee would be formed to help speed up the process.

Third, the electoral path, which was assigned the task of selecting the members of the new ISIE in two weeks, passing and enacting the electoral law in two weeks, and setting the elections agenda in two weeks from the ISIE instalment.

Accordingly, all tracks, and subsequently the ANC mandate itself, were expected to end in four weeks from the first date of the National Dialogue. Of course, the unfolding of events proved that this agenda was too optimistic. First of all, the start of the National Dialogue that was set to be on 6 October 2013 was postponed to 25 October mainly because the EMP was asking for more guarantees before leaving the government.

Eventually, the EMP's conditions to participate were approved, which included that the Troika government would be in place until the end of the constitution-making, and it would be the Prime Minister *'Alī 'Al-'Arrayyīd*, who would sign it. Also, the opposition parties were not allowed to participate in the coming technocratic government. Furthermore, a secret agreement that offered the EMP more guarantees was reached between *'Al-'Arrayyīd* and *Hussīn 'Al-'Abbāsī*, the leader of UGTT. Some claimed that this agreement was a kind of guarantee to obviate the prosecution after the government resignation.

Second, the political environment was intoxicated by widespread protests that continued during this period, notably those of 23 October 2013 organised by the opposition on the occasion of the second anniversary of the ANC elections. Even, after the official inauguration of the dialogue, it was interrupted many times. As an example, on 4 November, *Hussīn 'Al-'Abbāsī* halted the dialogue sessions due to disagreements on the nomination of the new prime minister.

Debated *Sharī'ah*-related issues: In the constitutional track, many controversial articles were debated; however, most of the ideologically problematic clauses were already resolved in the previous versions. According to Zartman, the EMP gave up the *Sharī'ah* article in March 2012, its formulation of the women's rights clause in August 2012, and the blasphemy article in October of the same year. Furthermore, it accepted the universality of human rights in April 2013.

Outcome:

i. The outcome of the governmental path:

After fierce disputes on the possible candidate for the prime minister office, on 14 December 2013, *Mahdī Jum'ah*, an independent technocrat who served as the Minister of Industry in the Troika government, was selected out of seventeen names. He was not elected unanimously because, for the opposition, he was too close to the EMP and did not reflect a departure from the Troika government. However, a balanced choice of the cabinet members later decreased the tension. The interim President *'Al-Marzūqī* officially assigned him to form the government on 10 January 2014, and the ANC gave its approval for the government on 28 January.

ii. The outcome of the constitutional path:

After the rejection of the June 2013 draft, a committee called "Commission of Consensus", chaired by the head of ANC *Muṣṭafā Ben Ja'far*, was formed to overcome both the controversial matters and the procedural obstacles. By 22 August 2013, the Commission members reached an agreement on five major points of dispute; they accepted to rewrite the article related to the nature of the Tunisian State and the sentence in the preamble related to the teachings of Islam; it was agreed to state that

articles 1 and 2 cannot be amended and to delete article 141. Later, the Commission induced many other changes such as revising articles 109, 112, 115, and 117 concerning the judiciary power and amending article 73 to lower the candidacy age of the president to be thirty-five years old, remove the age limit, and allow the candidate with dual nationality to run for presidency provided that he/she would be obliged to abandon the second nationality if elected.

On 3 January 2014, the ANC started the discussion of the constitution draft article-by-article. Reading sessions occasionally witnessed heated debates such as the discussions on article 6 concerned with the freedom of consciousness; however, the constitution was finally approved on 26 January with a vast majority.

iii. The outcome of the electoral path:

Negotiations in this track succeeded in appointing an agreed-upon independent figure to head the ISIE on 9 January 2014. Then, the ANC started to discuss the electoral law in April 2014 to be approved on the first of May. During these discussions, some political disputes resurfaced again, such as isolation of the politicians affiliated to the previous regime and giving a quota for the female candidates in the parliamentary elections.

Moreover, during the National Dialogue, a serious debate happened on the exact timing and sequence of the coming presidential and parliamentary elections. The parties that intended to run for presidency such as the Call of Tunisia preferred to hold the presidential elections first, while the EMP, which was not planning to field a candidate for the presidency, preferred to hold both elections simultaneously or to have the parliamentary elections first. The ISIE, for practical reasons, chose to separate between

the two elections and to organise the legislative elections first in October 2014 followed by the presidential ones a month later in November.

To conclude, after many unsuccessful attempts, the marathon negotiations paid off, and the Tunisian elites finally reached a consensus on the new rules of the game and overcame the crisis of 2013. On the contrary, the Egyptian elites failed to reach a consensus at any point throughout the transitional period. Furthermore, throughout the whole year of *Mursi's* presidency, which witnessed severe political polarisation and repeated violent confrontations between Islamists and the secularists, all attempts at negotiations and peaceful containment of the crisis were inefficient. Accordingly, in what follows, the different variables which accounted for these divergent paths of the transitional negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia will be examined.

CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS

Examining the transitional period in Egypt and Tunisia reveals how turbulent it was due to two main reasons: Firstly, the institutional arrangements in both countries failed to represent different political interests and tendencies, fulfil the duties assigned to them efficiently, and maintain their legal and popular legitimacy. Secondly, the transitional process witnessed fierce conflicts between the Islamists and the secularists that revolved around the roadmap of the transitional period, the performance of the Islamist-dominated interim governments, and most notably, the criteria of the new regime to be installed.

At the core of the secularist-Islamist debate around the newly forming regime was the constitution, especially the articles related to the political and social role of Islam. Whether and how the *Sharī'ah* should be enshrined in the constitution, the universality of human rights, women's rights, and the freedom of consciousness and faith, among many other issues, ignited the conflict during constitution-making and pushed the whole process into many deadlocks.

The inability of the interim institutions to resolve disagreements and contain the escalating crisis between the Islamists and the secularists through routine paths led to the organisation of a series of national dialogues and negotiation rounds. Sometimes, these initiatives were sponsored by the official institutions and on other occasions by independent CSOs. They showed varying degrees of success, but eventually, the rival political forces in Tunisia reached a compromise in January 2014 with their agreement on the constitution, the government, and the formation of ISIL, as well as the electoral

arrangements. On the contrary, the negotiation rounds between the Egyptian Islamists and secularists failed to contain their disagreements, and the whole transitional process collapsed with the military coup of July 2013.

To understand the different outcomes of the transitional negotiations in both cases, two sets of variables should be examined: the structural and agential. As thoroughly discussed in the theoretical framework section, the concept of structured contingency combines both aspects by examining the political elite's strategic choices depending on their skills, experience, and ideological inclination, as well as the structural determinants that confine these actors' choices. In other words, it looks into the interactions between structures and agents during the transitional process assuming that the relationship between both aspects is reciprocal without any *a priori* supremacy.³⁷⁶

Accordingly, in this chapter, the impact of three sets of variables on the transitional negotiation process will be studied: the macro-structural variables related to the nature of the state and the transitional administration, the meso-structural variables concerning the intermediary social organisations (i.e., the CSOs and the political parties), and the actor-centric micro-variables related to the elites' qualities and the choices they made. The potential variables to be examined have been selected based on the literature written on previous transitional experiences, as well as the Arab Spring.

³⁷⁶ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 42.

5.1 Macro-Structural Set of Variables

The transitology literature usually studies many macro-structural variables that potentially affect the course and fate of the transitional process. As an example, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan highlighted the role of two macro-variables on the possibility of democratic transition completion: the degree of stateness (i.e., to what extent the state enjoys national unity and well-established sovereignty) and the type of the pre-transition regime. As for stateness, according to them, democratic transition is hard to be completed if the state legitimacy is questionable or if a significant segment of its population do not identify themselves with the state and prefer to join another state or seek independence.³⁷⁷ This is not to argue that the democratic transition in a multi-cultural or pluri-ethnic state is doomed to failure; however, it does mean that it requires more effort to craft the democratic norms and institutions.³⁷⁸

The implications of prior regime type for the transition paths were argued to be profound. As the transitology literature emphasises the role of the pact between the regime reformers and the opposition moderates, Linz and Stepan argued that the pact could be made only in two of their four non-democratic regimes ideal-types: the authoritarian and the post-totalitarian. In both cases, the regime elites have sufficient autonomy to take different positions and subsequently differentiate into hardliners and soft-liners, and the opposition has a chance to organise and institutionalise itself, and to secure enough power to take part in the negotiations. On the contrary, the other two

³⁷⁷ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 7-8.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 29.

ideal-types of non-democratic regimes: the totalitarian and the sultanistic do not allow for the autonomy of reformer elites or institutionalisation of the moderate opposition.³⁷⁹

It is not only the nature of the prior regime that affects the dynamics of the transition, but also the interim administration. Who launched and managed the transitional period is a pivotal variable in determining its trajectory and outcome. According to Linz and Stepan, the transition is initiated by the breakdown of the non-democratic regime. It either collapses suddenly, or due to civil society uprisings, an armed rebellion, or a *coup d'état*, which may be non-hierarchically led or a hierarchical state-sponsored coup.³⁸⁰

In the latter case (i.e., regime-initiated and controlled transition), there is no interim government, and the old regime holds the upper hand throughout the transitional period. Accordingly, the regime transition outcome depends on its behaviour, which could be depicted in a continuum from democratically loyal to disloyal. If the old regime succeeds in securing enough political and coercive power to control the transitional administration, it becomes reluctant to deliver power to the democratically elected institutions and attempts to maintain some non-democratic features in the evolving regime. This pattern, according to the authors, reflects democratically disloyal behaviour.³⁸¹

In other scenarios, when the regime collapse is not due to a hierarchically led coup, the transition is usually managed by an interim government. In such cases, the transition trajectory is determined by the strategies made by this government and which political group is more powerful than the others. For instance, if a specific group of elites claims

³⁷⁹ Ibid., 55-65.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., 72

³⁸¹ Ibid.

an essential role in bringing about the transition, or if it succeeds in gaining electoral legitimacy at the beginning of the transitional process, it usually enjoys a more privileged position *vis-à-vis* the other groups of elites.³⁸²

The study of Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle on the transition experiments in Africa in the 1990s emphasised the centrality of the military institution during the transitional process. They specified four main determinants which usually affect its behaviour: (i) The degree of military infiltration of the polity and society; (ii) The institutional legacy of the military intervention in politics; (iii) The degree of material privilege the military enjoys and is keen to maintain; (iv) The degree of coherence of the military institution in comparison to civilian political institutions.³⁸³

According to them, oligarchic military rule, which directly governs through the army with limited civilian competition and participation, always aims to tightly manage the regime transition.³⁸⁴ This tendency was explained by the authors using three justifications: First, the military usually believes that it is the only disciplined and rational institution in the state, and believes that it is responsible for imposing order on the chaotic civilian politics by gradually opening the door for political participation. Second, monopolisation of the means of coercion enables the military generals to control the transitional process. Third, the military institution is usually keen to avoid uncertainties or the evolving of any unexpected consequences, especially being prosecuted for any legal violations that happened during their rule.³⁸⁵

³⁸² Ibid., 71-72.

³⁸³ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 170, 215-217.

³⁸⁴ Ibid, 170.

³⁸⁵ Ibid, 171-172.

In sum, the main macro-variables that will be examined to understand how they affected the dynamics of the transitional negotiations between the secularist and Islamist elites are the nature of the pre-transition regime and the transitional administration with a special focus on the role played by the military institution. The Stateness variable was ruled out because of its irrelevance to our case studies. Both Egypt and Tunisia have a stable unitary state, relatively homogenous societies, and bureaucratic institutions with a fair capacity to govern.³⁸⁶

According to *Ḥalīm Barakāt*, who suggested a continuum to depict the degree of homogeneity of Arab Societies, both Egypt and Tunisia are almost at the homogenous pole, as both countries are characterised by few ethnic, religious, and tribal differences that have been efficiently assimilated into a shared social identity.³⁸⁷

Furthermore, Egypt and Tunisia have a long history of statehood.³⁸⁸ At least from the nineteenth century on, and before the colonial period, they exercised *de facto* self-government under the rule of *Muḥammad ‘Alī’s* dynasty in Egypt and the *‘Al-Ḥussainī’s* dynasty in Tunisia. According to *‘Īliyā Ḥarīq’s* classification of the traditional (pre-modern) Arab authorities, both states fall in the category of countries ruled by bureaucratic-military oligarchies, whose leaders are ex-military personnel assisted by a developed administrative apparatus.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁶ Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 28.

Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 174-178.

³⁸⁷ Halim Barakat, *The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 15-16.

³⁸⁸ Raymond Hinnebusch, “Change and Continuity after the Arab Uprising: The Consequences of State Formation in Arab North African States”, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42,1 (2015): 25.

³⁸⁹ Selvik and Stenslie. *Stability and Change in the Modern Middle East*, 24-26.

These arguments do not negate the fact that both countries face some problems regarding their communal unity and state capacity. For example, the Coptic Christian minority in Egypt, whose estimation ranges between 6-10 % of the total population, and ethnic minorities such as Nubians in the extreme south or Bedouins in Sinai and other deserts are chronic sources of social tensions and instability.³⁹⁰ Also, in Tunisia, the disparity in the regional development between the Northern 'Al-Sāḥil region where the public services are more concentrated in comparison to the deprived central and southern regions occasionally causes serious problems.³⁹¹

Furthermore, on the eve of the uprisings, Egypt, and to a lesser extent Tunisia, were suffering a decline in their governance efficiency. In the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, as an example, Egypt was ranked 78 and classified in the category of “states to watch” due to its fragility, while Tunisia was in a better status and ranked 112 out of 141. In the 2010 World Bank’s Governance Indicators, the scores of Egypt and Tunisia were 43.1 and 64.2 (out of 100) respectively.³⁹²

Nevertheless, according to Linz’s and Stepan’s definition of stateness, there are no competing nationalisms or dispute regarding the members of the political community neither in Egypt nor Tunisia. But what can be argued here is that, during the transitional period, Islamism and secularism in both countries were more than political ideologies; they were atypically perceived by competing political actors as different ways of life or

³⁹⁰ Ibid., 8.

Michele Penner Angrist, “The Making of Middle East Politics” in *Politics and Society in the Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Michele Penner Angrist, 222-223 (Boulder; Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010).

³⁹¹ Amr Yossef and Joseph R. Cerami, *The Arab Spring and the Geopolitics of the Middle East: Emerging Security Threats and Revolutionary Change* (Hampshire; NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 20

³⁹² Ibid., 14-16.

different cultures.³⁹³ Therefore, as the authors theorised, the “agreement on the fundamentals of democracy” was difficult, and “considerable political crafting of democratic norms, practices, and institutions” was highly required.³⁹⁴

5.1.1 The Nature of the Pre-Transition Regimes

The outgoing authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia showed many similarities. They were categorised, according to Freedom House index in 2010, as “Not Free”. Egypt’s score was 5.5, while Tunisia was 6 (out of 7, where one is the best and seven is the worst). This means that both countries were denying their citizens essential political and civil rights.³⁹⁵

In Egypt, the report stated that “[t]he political system is designed to ensure solid majorities for the ruling NDP at all levels of government”. It enumerated many violations of political and civil liberties committed by *Mubārak’s* regime, who had been running the country since 1981, such as the crackdown on the opposition, especially the MB, the persistence of emergency law for thirty years, pervasive corruption, putting restrictions on legalisation of new political parties, systemic manipulations of the elections, tight monitoring of media, and limitation of academic freedoms.³⁹⁶

Tunisia under *Ben ‘Alī*, who had been in power since 1987, suffered the same grievances. He induced constitutional amendments in 2002 to enable him to rule for unlimited terms and raised the maximum age of the presidency to seventy-five.

³⁹³ Zeghal, “Competing Ways of Life”, 263.

³⁹⁴ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 29.

³⁹⁵ “Freedom in the World 2010 – Report”, *Freedom House*, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2010> (accessed 24 November 2019).

³⁹⁶ “Freedom in the World 2010 – Egypt Report”, *Freedom House*, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/egypt> (accessed 24 November 2019).

According to the constitution, *Ben 'Alī* enjoyed wide prerogatives and a full hegemony over the executive branch of the government. He was entitled to appoint the prime minister and the cabinet, as well as regional governors. Moreover, according to the Freedom House report, in 2010, Tunisia had “one of the worst media environments in the Arab world” as dissent voices were silenced using various legal and economic measures.³⁹⁷

In the academic literature, both regimes were usually classified in the same categories. As an example, *Nazīh 'Al-'Ayyūbī* described the ruling regimes in Egypt and Tunisia as “Monarchistic presidency”, in which a “presidential monarch” shares many similarities with the traditional monarchs: (i) They are out of competition despite façade electoral practices, and any challenge or opposition to the incumbents is systematically suppressed; (ii) They usually appoint their relatives and friends to key positions in the state, which are decided based on how close the candidates are to the president; (iii) The presidents are not held accountable for their disposition of the state revenues; (iv) They are centres of personality cults as their special qualities and wisdom are cherished by the state-sponsored media, their pictures, statues, and monuments are set up in squares and public facilities, and towns and streets are named after their names.³⁹⁸

Linz and Stepan, as another example, put *Mubārak* and *Ben 'Alī's* regimes in the same category also. As mentioned before, they classified non-democratic regimes into four

³⁹⁷ “Freedom in the World 2010 – Tunisia Report”, *Freedom House*, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/tunisia> (accessed 24 November 2019).

³⁹⁸ Nazih N. Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*, (London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2009), 204.

Fred Halliday, *Nation and Religion in the Middle East* (London: al-Saqi Books, 2000), 154.

Selvik and Stenslie. *Stability and Change in the Modern Middle East*, 178-179.

ideal-types: authoritarian, sultanistic, totalitarian, and post-totalitarian. In their paper titled “Democratisation Theory and the Arab Spring”, the authors classified the political system of *Mubārak* and *Ben ‘Alī* as sultanistic regimes.³⁹⁹

Sultanism was defined as a regime characterised by that:

“the private and the public are fused, there is a strong tendency toward familial power and dynastic succession, there is no distinction between a state career and personal service to the ruler, there is a lack of rationalised impersonal ideology, economic success depends on a personal relationship to the ruler, and, most of all, the ruler acts only according to his own unchecked discretion, with no larger, impersonal goals.”⁴⁰⁰

Accordingly, the *Mubārak* and *Ben ‘Alī*’s regimes, the authors contend, showed many sultanistic features such as proposing *Jamāl Mubārak* as a successor for his father and how *Ben ‘Alī*’s wife and her family dealt with the Tunisian economy as private properties.⁴⁰¹

In another categorisation of political systems, Bratton and Van De Walle used Robert Dahl’s two parameters to classify the authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa: the political participation (assessed by the degree of popular mobilisation) and political competition (assessed by the degree of the plurality of political associations). They found that almost all examined cases could be grouped into three categories: military oligarchies, which are characterised by low participation and contestation; plebiscitary one-party regimes with medium levels of participation and low levels of competition; and

³⁹⁹ Stepan and Linz, “Democratization Theory and the Arab Spring”, 28.

⁴⁰⁰ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 52.

⁴⁰¹ Stepan and Linz, “Democratization Theory and the Arab Spring”, 28.

competitive one-party regimes that show medium degrees of both parameters.⁴⁰² By applying the same methodology to the pre-Arab Spring regimes, Brownlee *et al.* concluded that the *Mubārak* and *Ben ‘Alī’s* regimes, despite their similarities, differed in their degrees of plurality; therefore, they were classified as competitive and plebiscitary one-party autocracies, respectively.⁴⁰³

The institutional core of the autocratic system represents another difference between the ousted regimes in Egypt and Tunisia. According to Barbra Geddes’s classification of authoritarian regimes, there are four ideal-types: (i) military regimes, in which a military junta decides who will rule and enjoys a great influence on policymaking; (ii) single-party regimes, in which one party monopolises the power and occupies the main political offices; (iii) personalist regimes, in which the access to political influence or offices depends on the unchallenged will of an individual ruler, and (iv) amalgams of the previous ideal-types.⁴⁰⁴

Although both *Mubārak* and *Ben ‘Alī’s* regimes showed hybrid characters, in the updated data set on regime transitions after the Arab Spring, Geddes *et al.* classified Tunisia as a single-party authoritarianism, while Egypt was an amalgam of the three forms.⁴⁰⁵

As thoroughly explained in the literature review, the nature of the prior regime has a great influence on the possibility, course, and outcome of the transitional negotiations.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that in both case studies, the nature of the pre-transition

⁴⁰² Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 77-80

⁴⁰³ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 30&33.

⁴⁰⁴ Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?”, 121.

⁴⁰⁵ Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set”, *Perspectives on Politics* 12,2 (2014): 326.

regimes was not too personalist nor too totalitarian to deny the possibility of transitional negotiation. In Egypt and Tunisia, there was room for the ruling elites to differentiate into reformers and hardliners, and for the opposition to organise and institutionalise.

What is more relevant to this thesis, though, is not the autocratic type of the pre-transition regimes in Egypt and Tunisia; rather, it is the pattern of secularism they adopted. The hypothesis proposed here is that the more aggressive the pattern of secularism, the less favourable the political conditions for the dominance of Islamist movements during the transition, and hence, the less the negotiation power they have. Accordingly, in what follows, how different secularism patterns dominated in Egypt and Tunisia have affected the transitional negotiations will be examined.

Secularism in the Arab-Islamic context, as it has been defined in the conceptual framework chapter, is a political ideology or worldview – in its totalitarian forms – that aims to remake religion on the conditions of modernity and to confine and control its social functions and manifestations in both public and private spheres – as much as it is relevant and feasible. According to *Bjørn Olav Utvik*, political secularisation has a three-pronged goal: to reduce religious institutions' power, to deny the religious scholars any privilege or guardianship roles during the policymaking processes, and to ban any political parties which advocate religious platforms and discriminate against minorities.⁴⁰⁶

Both *Jamāl `Abdul-Nāṣer* (ruled from 1954 to 1970) and *`Al-Ḥabīb Būrḡībāh* (ruled from 1956 to 1987) utilised their charismatic legitimacy as the champions of independence in

⁴⁰⁶ Bjørn Olav Utvik, "A Question Of Faith? Islamists And Secularists Fight Over The Post-Mubarak State", *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 10,1 (2017): 94-95.

Egypt and Tunisia, respectively, to set a new order and apply a project of top-down modernisation. At the core of their social engineering project was the issue of how to control religion and redefine its social and political roles. However, 'Abdul-Nāṣer and Būrḡībah regimes applied different patterns of secularisation policies.

In post-independence Egypt, three main variants of Islam generally dominated the religious field: the official Islam represented by the 'Al-'Azhar establishment, the popular Islam rooted in the society with dominant Sufi features, and the political Islam preached by the MB, which is relatively more radical.⁴⁰⁷ 'Abdul-Nāṣer worked systematically to control and co-opt the first two variants while eliminating the third.

Concerning the official Islam, 'Abdul-Nāṣer's regime incorporated the religious establishments into the state and confiscated their properties to be controlled by the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs.⁴⁰⁸ Furthermore, the semi-independent status of the 'Al-'Azhar Sheikhdом was ended, and the two leading religious positions in Egypt: the mufti and the Grand Imam of 'Al-'Azhar became appointed by the president.⁴⁰⁹

Furthermore, the significance of social roles played by religious scholars was markedly decreased. For instance, in 1955, 'Abdul-Nāṣer abolished the *Sharī'ah* courts and unified the legal system in new national courts, which went under the authority of the

⁴⁰⁷ Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 95.

⁴⁰⁸ Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State*, 211.

Utvik, "A Question Of Faith?", 94.

⁴⁰⁹ Mirjam Kunkler, "Religion-State Relations and Democracy in Egypt and Tunisia: Models from the Democratizing Muslim World and their Limits", *Swiss Political Science Review* 18,1(2012): 118.

Ministry of Justice and the High Judiciary Organisations Council. The latter was chaired by President 'Abdul-Nāṣer himself.⁴¹⁰

Also, in the 1960s, the Committee on National Education gave more attention to secular education at the expense of traditional religious curricula. The aim was to raise a new generation who enjoyed the vocational qualities needed to implement the state development programs. More significantly, the educational curricula became more politicised and ideological by giving the students compulsory courses on socialism and Arab nationalism.⁴¹¹ Furthermore, in 1961, 'Abdul-Nāṣer introduced fundamental changes in the educational system of 'Al-'Azhar University itself by adding to it some technical "secular" faculties.⁴¹²

As for the popular Sufi variant of Islam, it was also put under the state's indirect control. An organisation body named the High Sufi Council constituted of more than sixty orders was founded in 1964. The Council head was appointed by President 'Abdul-Nāṣer, and it was assigned the task of regulating the Sufi activities.⁴¹³

The other non-official variant, i.e., political Islam, entered into a fierce confrontation with the Nasserist regime. After its initial support for the Free Officers' coup in 1952, the MB disagreed with 'Abdul-Nāṣer on which regime should be installed. With the establishment of the Liberation Rally in 1953 and the declaration of a new constitution, the MB started to criticise the forming political system and accused it of being secular.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid, 163.

Hussein Ali Agrama, *Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in Modern Egypt* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 53.

⁴¹¹ Hopwood, *Egypt*, 136-137.

⁴¹² Ibid., 96.

⁴¹³ Ibid, 161-162.

As a result, conflicts escalated, and eventually, the Revolutionary Command Council decided to ban the MB in 1954. Furthermore, a few months later, after a failed assassination attempt of ‘*Abdul-Nāṣer*, tens of thousands of the organisation members and supporters were sent to jail.⁴¹⁴

In short, the post-independence regime in Egypt followed a clear strategy of secularisation by attempting to control and limit the social and political roles of the religious institutions and organisations. Nevertheless, ‘*Abdul-Nāṣer* was keen not to ignore the religious sentiments of Egyptian people; he regularly appeared practising Islamic rituals and preached Friday sermons on a few occasions. Even more, he referred to Islamic values many times to justify his social and economic policies.⁴¹⁵

Additionally, in the provisional constitutions of 1956 and 1964, Islam was affirmed as the religion of the state.⁴¹⁶ This article was only dropped in the interim constitution of the United Arab Republic, issued in 1958 after the union between Egypt and Syria. Furthermore, in his Charter for National Action issued in May 1962, ‘*Abdul-Nāṣer* emphasised the vital role of religious values in general with a limited reference to Islam specifically.⁴¹⁷

Comparatively, in post-independence Tunisia, *Būrḡībah* adopted a more assertive, anti-religious pattern of secularism. He openly described his political project as laic, being

⁴¹⁴ Gillian Kennedy, *From Independence to Revolution: Egypt's Islamists and the Contest for Power* (London: Hurst, 2017), 39 - 41.

⁴¹⁵ Hopwood, *Egypt*, 95.

⁴¹⁶ “dasātīr”, *Legal Documents Archive*, <https://manshurat.org/taxonomy/term/2> (accessed 4 December 2019).

⁴¹⁷ Hopwood, *Egypt*, 96.

inspired by the French model of *laïcité*.⁴¹⁸ Accordingly, he strived to minimise the role of religion in social arenas, especially in the legal and educational fields, cancelled the Islamic courts, closed the historical religious university of *'Al-Zaytūnah*, secularised the family laws, and abolished the religious endowments.⁴¹⁹

Not only did he believe in confining religion to the private sphere, but also, *Būrqībah* was not content with excessive expression of religiosity. Therefore, *Būrqībah's* regime used to monitor mosques to investigate anyone particularly religious and prevented women from wearing hijab in universities.⁴²⁰ *Būrqībah*, furthermore, boldly criticised Islamic rituals such as praying, showed disrespect to prophets and denied their miracles, and questioned theological beliefs, such as the truth of the stories told in the Quran and the presence of Hell and the Paradise. Also, he discouraged people from fasting the month of Ramadan, claiming that it negatively affected productivity, and from doing pilgrimage because it led to the loss of hard currencies.⁴²¹

'Abdul-Nāṣer and *Būrqībah's* secularisation projects showed a few similarities. First of all, both can be described as coercive secularisation, according to N J Demerath III's classification or authoritarian secularism as described by Alfred Stepan.⁴²² In such categories, secularism was imposed on society by an autocratic regime and did not

⁴¹⁸ Kuru, *Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion*, 246.

Bishārah *'althawrah 'altūnusiyah 'almajīdah*, 158.

⁴¹⁹ Mohamed Hamdi, *The Politicization of Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia* (Colorado; Oxford, Westview Press, 1998), 13.

⁴²⁰ Hamid, *Temptations of Power*, 33

⁴²¹ Labiyad, *'alhuiyyah: 'al'islām, 'al'urūbah, 'altawnasah*, 46.

⁴²² Stepan, "The Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes", in *Rethinking Secularism*, 118.

naturally emanate from it.⁴²³ Secondly, *Būrqiḅah*, like *ʿAbdul-Nāṣer*, was aware of the significance of religion in political legitimation. Therefore, he set Islam as the state religion in the constitution and sporadically used Islamic references to boost his legitimacy.⁴²⁴

Absolute enmity towards political Islam movements was another aspect of similarity between *ʿAbdul-Nāṣer* and *Būrqiḅah*'s regime. In the late 1960s, many Islamist organisations had emerged in Tunisia. *ʿAl-Jamāʿah ʿAl-ʿIslāmiyyah* or the Islamic Group, which was established by a number of university graduates such as *Rāshid ʿAl-Ghannūshī*, *ʿAbdul-Fattāḥ Mūrū*, and *ʿAḥmīdah ʿAl-Naifer*, was by far the largest one. Its name had changed to the Movement of the Islamic Tendency in 1981, and once again in 1989, to the EMP.⁴²⁵

Būrqiḅah's regime reacted aggressively to the rise of the Islamic Group because it found its ideology subversive to the regime's secularisation project, especially after the Group's declaration of *Būrqiḅah*'s party as its "principal enemy" in the early 1980s.⁴²⁶ Consequently, the Tunisian regime turned down the application of the Movement of Islamic Tendency party and refused to give it legal recognition. Later, *Būrqiḅah*'s regime waged two waves of crackdown on the party: in the summer of 1981, when the Islamist leaders were arrested and prosecuted to remain in prison till 1984. Then, after a short

⁴²³ Demerath III, "Secularization and Sacralization", in *The SAGE Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, 71-73.

⁴²⁴ Labiyad, *ʿalhuiyyah: ʿalʿislām, ʿalʿurūbah, ʿaltawnasah*, 227.

Loretta Dell'Aguzzo and Ester Sigillò, "Political Legitimacy and Variations in State-Religion Relations in Tunisia", *The Journal of North African Studies* (2017): 9.

⁴²⁵ Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia Between Confrontation and Participation", 257-272.

Hamdi, *The Politicization of Islam*, 16.

⁴²⁶ Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia Between Confrontation and Participation", 260.

period of political de-escalation, the second wave of repression was launched in September 1987. In this wave, hundreds of the Islamist leaders and members were sent to jail, and *'Al-Ghannūshī* was sentenced to lifetime imprisonment.⁴²⁷

The gap between the Egyptian and Tunisian secularism models further widened with *'Abdul-Nāṣer* and *Būrḡībah*'s successors. During the presidency of *Muḥammad 'Anwar 'Al-Sādāt* (1971-1981), Egypt entered a phase of de-secularisation. Two main factors resulted in such transformation: First, domestically, *'Al-Sādāt* wanted to promote a more religious and conservative ideology to weaken his Nasserist and leftist opponents. Second, he shifted the Egyptian foreign alliances away from the Soviet Union and the socialist Arab Republics and substituted for them by joining the “Western camp” and rapprochement with the conservative Arab monarchies.⁴²⁸

'Al-Sādāt accused *'Abdul-Nāṣer*'s era of being a period of unbelief and materialism. Iconised as “the Believing President”, he claimed his mission is to establish “a state of science and faith”. Accordingly, *'Al-Sādāt* took significant steps to reverse some secularisation policies such as: adding an article that made the Islamic *Sharī'ah* a principal source of legislation in the 1971 constitution and launching a state-sponsored project of revisioning penal, civil, and procedural codes, in consultation with the scholars of *'Al-'Azhar* Sheikhdome, to ensure its compliance with the *Sharī'ah*.⁴²⁹ As *'Al-Sādāt* was more dependent on the religious legitimacy provided by the *'Al-'Azhar*

⁴²⁷ Ibid, 261-263.

Bishārah, *'althawrah 'altūnusiyah 'almajīdah*, 173.

⁴²⁸ Kennedy, *From Independence to Revolution*, 79-91.

⁴²⁹ Hopwood, *Egypt*, 116.

Agrama, *Questioning Secularism*, 82.

Kennedy, *From Independence to Revolution*, 91.

establishment than 'Abdul-Nāṣer; he allowed them to have more autonomy and freedom than his predecessor.⁴³⁰

Furthermore, 'Al-Sādāt released the MB leaders and activists after two decades of imprisonment and gave them permission to organise and resume their activity in mosques and universities. Consequently, a wave of "Islamic Awakening" was launched, which led to a marked increase in the social and political role of Islam with a concomitant decrease in state control over the religious field. As an example, Gillian Kennedy stated that:

"In 1962, the number of mosques in Egypt was 17,224, with 3,006 controlled by the state, and 71 per cent of which were run by an official state preacher. These official preachers were educated at Al-Azhar, where subservience to the regime was an institutional dictum. By 1979, the number of mosques increased to over 34,000. Of this only 5,600 were state-controlled, and only 45 per cent were led in prayer by an official preacher."⁴³¹

Of course, 'Al-Sādāt's regime cannot be described at any rate as Islamist. The previously mentioned moves were nothing but political manoeuvring to serve domestic and international purposes. 'Al-Sādāt himself repeatedly emphasised the slogan "No religion in politics and no politics in religion".⁴³² He also did not approve the proposals to implement laws inspired by the *Sharī'ah* such as banning alcohol or Islamic criminal

⁴³⁰ Malika Zeghal, "Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of Al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952-94)", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31, 3 (1999): 380-381.

⁴³¹ Kennedy, *From Independence to Revolution*, 92.

⁴³² Geneive Abdo, *No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 54.

penalties. Even for the MB, which was his ally against the leftists and the nationalists, he did not give them legal recognition despite allowing them to work freely.⁴³³

The marriage of convenience between 'Al-Sādāt's regime and the MB, though, rapidly came to an end. As early as 1977, the Islamists started to criticise the regime for its rapprochement with the Western governments and, more importantly, for signing the peace treaty with Israel. Eventually, this conflict led some radical jihadists to assassinate 'Al-Sādāt in 1981.⁴³⁴

Mubārak's three-decade presidency was in one way or another a continuation of 'Al-Sādāt's regime. He maintained this confused and confusing position *vis-à-vis* the secular-religious dilemma and adopted the same strategy of informal containment of political Islam movements with occasional waves of repression. For example, despite the *Sharī'ah* article in the constitution, the Egyptian legal system drives a lot from European laws. Even though the injunctions of Islamic *Sharī'ah* are much considered in the family and personal status laws, the regime continuously strives to give these injunctions a more liberal interpretation.⁴³⁵

Also, despite the legal ban of the MB since 1954, the Group was allowed to run candidates as individuals in the parliamentary elections held in 1984, 1987, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. Furthermore, the MB lists managed to win the elections of many syndicates such as the Doctors' Syndicate in 1986, the Engineers' Syndicate in 1987, the Pharmacists' in 1990, and the Lawyers' in 1992, before a new law for syndicates

⁴³³ Hopwood, *Egypt*, 117.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid*, 111, 117.

⁴³⁵ Agrama, *Questioning Secularism*, 2-3.

was enacted in 1993 to make the election process less favourable to Islamists. In addition, the MB succeeded in building nationwide social welfare networks consisting of hundreds of clinics, schools, nurseries, and mosques.⁴³⁶

This strong presence of Islamist movements in the social and political arenas for almost four decades had a great impact on the religiosity of Egyptian society.⁴³⁷ The manifestations of what was called the Islamic Awakening were unmistakable such as the increased ratios of people committed to Islamic rituals, women wearing the *hijab*, and children who regularly attend Quranic classes, as well as the widespread presence of Islamic banks, popular preachers, and Islamic publishers and multimedia production companies.⁴³⁸

Tunisia under *Ben 'Alī*, who deposed *Būrqībah* in 1987, followed a totally different path. Unlike Egypt, the Tunisian regime maintained assertive secularism policies until the Arab Spring. At the early stage of his presidency, *Ben 'Alī* promised to find “a happy and final solution” to the Islamist problem.⁴³⁹ In order to gain the support of Islamists, the new regime took many reconciliatory steps such as halting the crackdown on Islamists, granting amnesty to those in prison, and allowing those in exile to return. Furthermore, the Movement of the Islamic Tendency was invited to join the High Council of the National Covenant and the Islamic High Council. Also, it was allowed to establish a

⁴³⁶ Bruce K. Rutherford, *Egypt After Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, And Democracy in The Arab World* (Oxfordshire; New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), 92-94.

⁴³⁷ Hamid, *Temptations of Power*, 194.

⁴³⁸ Agrama, *Questioning Secularism*, 8-9.

⁴³⁹ Hamdi, *The Politicization of Islam*, 64.

student wing, to publish an official magazine, and take part in the parliamentary elections of 1989 despite lacking the legal recognition.⁴⁴⁰

The Movement of the Islamic Tendency reacted positively to the regime's move. It accepted to make ideological concessions by signing the National Covenant in 1988 in order to not distance itself from the national consensus. Also, it decided to change its name to the EMP, dropping the word Islamic from the title, to be consistent with the Tunisian law of political parties, which bans religious parties, and to assure the new regime. Furthermore, the Movement declared its support for *Ben 'Alī* as a unanimous candidate in the presidential elections held in 1989.⁴⁴¹

Nevertheless, the confrontation between the Tunisian regime and the EMP resumed in the same year during the parliamentary elections. The EMP decided to change its strategy in these elections from a political group seeking legal recognition and running for a limited number of seats to a party furiously competing with the ruling RCD on the parliamentary majority and claiming a serious Islamic alternative. According to one of its leaders, the EMP at that time misunderstood the regional and the international transformation, namely: the Algerian uprisings in 1988, the democratic wave in Eastern Europe, and the Gulf war in 1990; hence, it went too far.⁴⁴²

Despite coming second to the ruling party, the EMP failed to secure any seat in the parliament; therefore, it turned against the regime accusing it of rigging the elections

⁴⁴⁰ Allani, "The Islamists in Tunisia Between Confrontation and Participation", 263.

⁴⁴¹ Rāshid 'Al-Ghannūshī, *min tajribat 'alḥarakah 'al'islāmiyyah fī tūnis* (Maghreb Centre for Research & Translation, London: 1999), 141.

⁴⁴² Interviewee no. 6: November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.

and organised a fierce anti-regime campaign.⁴⁴³ As a response, the regime waged a new wave of repression and political exclusion against the EMP in late 1990. Hundreds of its leaders and activists were imprisoned or forced to flee into exile. Furthermore, its magazine was banned and its student organisation dissolved.⁴⁴⁴ Accordingly, throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, when the Egyptian MB was enjoying a strong presence in the political, religious, and social domains, its Tunisian counterpart was harshly excluded and effectively eradicated with no organised presence in the country.⁴⁴⁵

Şafwān 'Al-Maşrī highlighted this fact by stating that:

“Ennahda came into a different environment in Tunisia than the one the Muslim Brotherhood inherited in Egypt. Islamists in Egypt had already reversed much of the secular trend that characterised Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt; by the time Mubarak fell, the country was largely Islami[s]ed. Civil society was also largely Islamist, much of it controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. Article Two of the Egyptian constitution, which enshrined the principles of Shari’a as the primary source of legislation, was just as sacred as the *Code du statut personnel* was in Tunisia. By the time Ben Ali left office, Tunisia had been largely seculari[s]ed and transformed to such a degree that it stood in very sharp contrast to the rest of the Arab world.”⁴⁴⁶

To conclude, based on the categorisation standards discussed in the conceptual framework part, the secularism model adopted by the Egyptian pre-transition regime could be classified as an atypical variant of religious secularism. In such a model, the

⁴⁴³ Hamdi, *The Politicization of Islam*, 68-69.

⁴⁴⁴ Allani, “The Islamists in Tunisia Between Confrontation and Participation”, 265.

⁴⁴⁵ Bilāl 'Al-Talīdī, *'al'islāmiyūn wa 'alrabī' 'al'rabī: 'alšu'ūd, 'altaḥadiyyat, tadbīr 'alḥukm* (Beirut: Namaa Center for Research and Studies, 2012), 22.

Hamid, *Temptations of Power*, 28.

⁴⁴⁶ Safwan M. Masri, *Tunisia: An Arab Anomaly* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), 59-60.

state put a limitation on the political role of religious establishments and bans parties and organisations that mix politics with religion. Nevertheless, the role of religion in social life is generally tolerated or even welcomed by the regime. Furthermore, religious establishments are occasionally invited by the state to serve some political purposes as legitimising its policies and de-legitimising the religious discourse adopted by its opponents.

The classification of the Tunisian regime, on the contrary, falls somewhere between the anti-religious and the irreligious secularism categories. It had a negative stance towards religion in general so that it strove to purge it from the public sphere, especially during *Būrqībah's* rule. Furthermore, it followed a more aggressive policy towards the Islamist movement, which witnessed three consecutive waves of oppression and exclusion in 1981, 1987, and 1992.⁴⁴⁷

The difference between the two secularism models accounts for the variation in popular political attitude toward the role of the *Sharī'ah* and the relationship between Islam and politics in the two countries. As an example, in the Arab Barometer survey, conducted in July 2011, Egyptians showed strong support towards the political role of Islam. About 80% of the respondents said that laws should be made in accordance with the *Sharī'ah*, and 83% disagreed with the claim that democracy is incompatible with the teachings of Islam. Furthermore, 63% agreed that “religious scholars should have influence over the

⁴⁴⁷ Bishārah, *'althawrah 'altūnusiyyah 'almajīdah*, 175.

decisions [of] government”; meanwhile, 88% agreed with the statement, “[r]eligious leaders should not interfere in voters’ decisions in elections.”⁴⁴⁸

The Arab Barometer Survey conducted by the Applied Social Science Forum in Tunisia in 2012 showed that Tunisians are comparatively less favourable for an active political role of Islam. When they were asked about the *Sharī‘ah reference*, 21% of the respondents said they prefer the *Sharī‘ah* to be considered as the exclusive source of Tunisian law, 51% preferred the *Sharī‘ah* to be only a source among others, 19% preferred that it should not be a source, and 10% said they knew nothing about the debate.⁴⁴⁹

These results are consistent with the Gallup World Poll conducted between 2005 and 2011. The support for *Sharī‘ah* law in Egypt was much higher than the case in Tunisia. When the participants were asked whether the *Sharī‘ah* should be the only source of legislation, 71.15% of the Egyptian respondents agreed in comparison to 25.51% of their Tunisians counterpart.⁴⁵⁰

In the Gallup’s report on the Arab Spring countries in 2012, the statistics showed a notable decrease in these ratios, as well as a variation between men and women in both countries. The support for the *Sharī‘ah* to be the only source for the legislation was 50% and 44% amongst male and female Egyptian respondents respectively in comparison to 16% and 14% for their Tunisian counterparts. Furthermore, 37% of

⁴⁴⁸ Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan, Ahmad Nagui Qamha, and Subhi ‘Asilah, “The Arab Barometer Project – Egypt Report”, *Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies*, June 2011, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/Egypt_Public_Opinion_Survey_2011.pdf (accessed 26 December 2019).

⁴⁴⁹ Ben Hafaiedh and Zartman, “Tunisia” in *Arab Spring*, 62.

⁴⁵⁰ Eric Chaney, “Democratic Change in the Arab World, Past and Present”, *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (2012): 390.

Egyptian men and 38% of Egyptian women compared to 66% of Tunisian men and 56% of Tunisian women chose the second answer, which stated that the *Sharī'ah* should only be a source for legislation among other sources.⁴⁵¹

Another public opinion survey carried out by the Pew Research Centre's Forum on Religion and Public Life between 2008 and 2012 provides more evidence. In this survey, the percentage of Egyptians who supported making the *Sharī'ah* the official law in their country was 74% compared to 56% in the case of Tunisia. Also, 75% of the Egyptian participants agreed that religious leaders should have a large or some political influence, while only 58% of Tunisians agreed. Even the support for having religious judges to decide on the family law and property disputes varied greatly with 94% of the Egyptian participants in favour of this statement in comparison to only 42% of their Tunisian counterpart.⁴⁵²

To conclude, thanks to less aggressive secularism policies adopted by the ousted regime in Egypt and its more accommodative attitude towards the Islamist movement, the latter enjoyed a stronger presence in the political and social fields and more popular support to their ideology during the transitional period than the Tunisian Islamists. Consequently, it could be argued that the Egyptian Islamists had a more favourable position *vis-à-vis* their secularist rivals during the negotiation process than the position of their equivalents in the Tunisian case.

⁴⁵¹ "After The Arab Uprisings: Women On Rights, Religion, and Rebuilding – Final Report", *Gallup*, Summer 2012 <https://news.gallup.com/poll/155306/arab-uprisings-women-rights-religion-rebuilding.aspx> (accessed 26 December 2019).

⁴⁵² "The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society", *Pew Research Centre's Forum on Religion & Public Life*, April 2013 <https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-full-report.pdf> (accessed 26 December 2019).

Furthermore, the official religious establishments in Egypt (mainly: the 'Al-'Azhar Sheikhdom and the Coptic Church) had more room for involvement in politics during the transition compared to those of Tunisia. As mentioned before, the 'Al-'Azhar Sheikhdom issued two important documents addressing the controversial issues related to the *Shari'ah* reference: the document of "the Future of Egypt" in June 2011 and the document of "Basic Liberties System" in January 2012. Furthermore, the Grand Imam of 'Al-'Azhar 'Ahmed 'Al-Ṭayyib sponsored a negotiation round between different political forces to stop the escalating violence in January 2013.⁴⁵³ Not to mention, the military institution needed to deploy the religious legitimacy of 'Al-'Azhar and the Coptic Church to remove the MB president *Muḥammad Mursī* from his office by inviting Sheikh 'Al-Ṭayyib and Pope *Tawadros II* to give speeches during the announcement of the July 2013 coup.⁴⁵⁴

5.1.2 The Role of Military Institution During the Transition

The other crucial macro-structural variable is related to the military institution. As mentioned before, the dynamics and the fate of the transitional process is greatly affected by who launched and managed the transition. It has been argued that, if the uprising is initiated by civil society, usually the transition is managed by an interim government, whose behaviour will be affected by the dominant political forces.

⁴⁵³ "'Al-'Azhar wa thawrat 25 yanāir: raṣd tawthīqī wa qirā'h mawdu'iyah", *Al Arabiya Net*, 15 October 2012, <https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/10/15/243828.html> (accessed 1 April 2020).

Bassām Ramaḍān, "bil-ṣūrah ... 'asmā' 'almuwaqqi'īn 'alā wathīqat 'al'azhar li-nabdh 'al'unf", *Al Masry Al Youm*, 31 January 2013, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/273789> (accessed 16 October 2019).

⁴⁵⁴ George Fahmi, "The Coptic Church and Politics in Egypt", *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 18 December 2014, <https://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/18/coptic-church-and-politics-in-egypt-pub-57563> (accessed 8 January 2020).

Whereas, if the regime transition was initiated by a hierarchical state-sponsored coup, and the old regime managed to retain enough political legitimacy and coercive power, usually there will be no interim government and the outcome of the transition will be decided based on whether the transitional administration is democratically loyal or disloyal.⁴⁵⁵

In both Egypt and Tunisia, the regime transition was initiated by civil society uprisings. Then, the military institution in both cases took the same position by deciding not to support the incumbent presidents and to side with the uprisers. Nevertheless, it seems that, in each case, the generals had their own reasons.

In Tunisia, the Army Chief of Staff General *Rashīd ‘Ammār* had denied the request of *Ben ‘Alī* to deploy his troops to suppress the uprisings, and some claim that it was he who convinced the President to step down.* The military impartiality could be explained by two main factors: First, the Tunisian military could be ranked as one of the most professional Arab militaries; it is by and large a homogenous national institution that lacks religious, sectarian, or tribal divisions. Famously described as *la grande muette* (the big silent one), it has an old well-established tradition of not interfering in politics and distancing itself from the ruling regime. Second, the military was quite unsatisfied with its disadvantageous status in comparison to the Ministry of Interior and the

⁴⁵⁵ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 71-72.

* Some sources challenge this narrative and claim it was just a rumour. According to them, *Ben ‘Alī* did not order General *Rashīd ‘Ammār* to open fire upon the protestors and the latter remained loyal to *Ben ‘Alī* till the end.

Sharan Grewal, "A Quiet Revolution: The Tunisian Military After Ben Ali", *Carnegie Middle East Center* (2016): 5.

Presidential Guard, and with the rampant corruption of the President's clique; hence, it had no stake in defending the regime in the face of the popular uprisings.⁴⁵⁶

In the case of Egypt, wherein the military institution is an integral part of the regime, it was less expected that the military would follow the same path. Nevertheless, after more than two weeks of mass demonstrations, the SCAF generals sided with the protestors and conducted what was described as “a democratic *coup d'état*”.⁴⁵⁷ Not only because they were worried about the disorder, the rising violence, and the possibility of military defections, but also the military was discontent with the growing political influence of *Mubārak's* son and his potential successor *Jamāl*, the increasing privileges lent to the police forces, the poor economic performance, and widespread radicalisation amongst the alienated Egyptian youth.⁴⁵⁸

In short, although both militaries took the same decision of withdrawing their support from autocratic rulers, their motivations for doing so differed. Consequently, in contrast to the Tunisian military that returned to its barracks after removing *Ben 'Alī*, the SCAF seized power after *Mubārak's* fall.⁴⁵⁹

The question posed here is as follows: although the regime transition in both Egypt and Tunisia was initiated by civil society uprisings, why was it managed by a civilian interim government only in the latter? Why was the Egyptian military more willing and more capable of controlling the transitional period than its Tunisian counterpart?

⁴⁵⁶ Zoltan Barany, *How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why* (Princeton; Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2016), 135-137.

⁴⁵⁷ Ozan O. Varol, “The Democratic Coup d'état”, *Harvard International Law Journal* 53 (2012): 339.

⁴⁵⁸ Zoltan Barany, “Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military”, *Journal of Democracy* 22,4(2011): 31 – 32.

⁴⁵⁹ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 126.

Based on the reviewed literature, a number of reasons could account for the different paths followed by both institutions.

i. The institutional legacy of military intervention in politics:

In Egypt, since the Free Officers' coup in 1952, the military has established its hegemony over the political regime. Being the institution that ended the monarchic rule of a foreign dynasty and the British colonial occupation, and that led the foundation of the republic, the Egyptian military efficiently deployed nationalistic rhetoric to build its own legitimacy and claim an entitlement to rule the country.⁴⁶⁰ In other words, from 1952 on, the narrative of statehood and independence in Egypt has been “strongly intertwined with the armed forces.”⁴⁶¹

This hegemony was further potentiated owing to the decades-long conflict between Egypt and Israel. Having a neighbouring country representing a constant threat and with which Egypt had fought four wars in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 rendered it “a warfare state”. Roger Owen used this concept to describe the states “so preoccupied with military preparation that it permeates all levels of the economy, society, and culture”.⁴⁶²

The manifestations of the Egyptian military's hegemony over the political regime are numerous. As an example, all successive presidents of the Egyptian Republic since its commencement till the Arab Spring were ex-military officers: *Muḥammad Najīb* (1953 – 1954), *Jamāl 'Abdul-Nāṣer* (1956 – 1970), *'Anwar 'Al-Sādāt* (1970 – 1981), and *Ḥusnī*

⁴⁶⁰ Steven A. Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 28.

⁴⁶¹ Florence Gaub, “Arab Armies: Agents of Change? Before and After 2011”, *EU Institute for Security Studies - Chaillot Paper* 131 (2014): 23.

⁴⁶² Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, 195.

Mubārak (1981 – 2011).⁴⁶³ Furthermore, the Egyptian military has a past history of conducting military coups, which were organised in the years 1952 and 1954, and again in 2011 and 2013.⁴⁶⁴

However, the pattern of the Egyptian military's political hegemony changed through the course of the years. After 1952, the military officers were the actual rulers of the state. Between 1952-1970, seventeen out of the eighteen cabinets were headed by officers. Moreover, under 'Abdul-Nāṣer's presidency, more than one-third of the cabinet members, especially those controlling the important portfolios, were military personnel.⁴⁶⁵

After 'Abdul-Nāṣer, the political involvement of the military institution markedly decreased, and it gave up direct control over the government.⁴⁶⁶ According to Steven Cook, the officers opted for a "ruling, not governing" strategy, and their hegemony became less apparent and took more complex and subtle forms. Therefore, the pre-transition Egyptian regime, according to him, cannot be categorised as a military dictatorship; instead, it is more appropriate to be described as military-dominated.⁴⁶⁷

The Tunisian military has a totally different institutional legacy. 'Al-Ḥabīb Būrḡībah, the champion of independence, who succeeded in ending the French occupation in 1956 and abolished dynastic rule the following year, was a civilian leader "with little sympathy

⁴⁶³ Zeinab Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 2.

⁴⁶⁴ Holger Albrecht, "The Myth of Coup-proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coups d'état in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950–2013", *Armed Forces & Society* 41,4 (2015): 679-680.

⁴⁶⁵ Imad Harb, "The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?", *Middle East Journal* 57,2 (2003): 278.

⁴⁶⁶ Gaub, "Arab Armies: Agents of Change?", 23.

⁴⁶⁷ Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing*, ix.

for the military”.⁴⁶⁸ His political struggle was primarily conducted through a civilian institution: The Neo-Destour Party.⁴⁶⁹ Apart from limited confrontations with the French garrison in the battles of *Ramādah* in 1958 and *Banzirt* in 1961, which helped in putting an end to the French military presence, the Tunisian military could not claim any significant role in attaining independence.⁴⁷⁰ Furthermore, Tunisia was never a warfare state, because its military, throughout its history, was not involved in any major war, including the Arab-Israeli wars.⁴⁷¹

Also, it could be argued that Tunisia never witnessed a military coup. Deposing the aged *Būrqiḅah* in 1987 was not technically a military coup as it was committed by his Prime Minister *Ben ‘Alī* in accordance with a constitutional article. Even the security forces assigned the task of besieging the presidential palace was the National Guard that was institutionally affiliated to the Minister of Interior.⁴⁷² Similarly, in 2011, General *Rashīd ‘Ammār’s* decision of inaction that resulted in *Ben ‘Alī’s* fall also cannot be considered a military coup.

Nevertheless, two military coups were attempted throughout the Tunisian Republic era: the first was in 1962 and organised by the supporters of *Būrqiḅah’s* rival *Sālih Ben Yūsuf*, and, in the second, three hundred Islamists, including one hundred military

⁴⁶⁸ Hicham Bou Nassif, “A Military Besieged: The Armed Forces, the Police, and the Party in Ben Ali’s Tunisia, 1987–2011”, *International Journal Middle East Studies* 47 (2015): 67.

⁴⁶⁹ Bishārah, *‘althawrah ‘altūnusiyah ‘almajīdah*, 157.

⁴⁷⁰ Kevin Koehler, “Officers and Regimes: The Historical Origins of Political-Military Relations in Middle Eastern Republics”, in eds. Holger Albrecht, Aurel Croissant, and Fred H. Lawson, *Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring*, 47 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). Grewal, “A Quiet Revolution”, 2.

Gaub, “Arab Armies: Agents of Change?”, 25.

⁴⁷¹ L. B. Ware, “The Role of the Tunisian Military in the Post-Bourqiba Era”, *Middle East Journal* 39,1 (1985): 37.

⁴⁷² L. B. Ware, “Ben Ali’s Constitutional Coup in Tunisia”, *Middle East Journal* 42,4 (1988): 592. Grewal, “A Quiet Revolution”, 3.

officers, were accused of plotting against *Ben 'Alī* in what was known as *Barrākit 'Al-Sāhil* affair in 1991. Although the first plot failed and the second turned out to be entirely made up, both incidents cast a shadow over the relationship between the presidency and the military institution in Tunisia.⁴⁷³

Amid the wave of military coups that swept the MENA region during the 1950s and 1960s, *Būrquībah* took many coup-proofing measures such as: keeping the army small and underfunded, limiting its armaments, establishing a para-military institution: the National Guard, promoting the loyal officers especially from the *'Al-Sāhil* region, preventing the military officers and soldiers from joining parties and voting in elections, and, most importantly, laying down the tradition of civilian control over the military via appointing a civilian Minister of Defence.⁴⁷⁴

Being an ex-military officer, *Ben 'Alī* started his first term by increasing the political influence of the military institution as never before.⁴⁷⁵ Through establishing the National Security Council, which included two military officers among its members, *Ben 'Alī* constitutionalised the involvement of the military institution into the decision-making of the state affairs. The council was assigned the tasks of “collecting, studying, analysing, and evaluating information related to domestic, foreign, and defence policies with the aim of safeguarding internal and external state security.” Furthermore, many senior

⁴⁷³ Ibid., 2,4.

Anne Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 74-75.

⁴⁷⁴ Ware, “The Role of the Tunisian Military in the Post-Bourgiba Era”, 37-38.

Grewal, “A Quiet Revolution”, 2.

⁴⁷⁵ Ware, “Ben Ali’s Constitutional Coup in Tunisia”, 593.

military officers were appointed to top security posts.⁴⁷⁶ Accordingly, *Ben 'Alī's* ascendancy to power was seen at that time as signalling "the entry of the military establishment into Tunisian politics."⁴⁷⁷

However, after the *Barrākit 'Al-Sāḥil* affair, things totally changed. By making this plot up, the ruling party and the Ministry of Interior, which were unhappy with the growing political influence of the military institution, sought to hit two birds with one stone: demonising the EMP to find an excuse for its repression and exclusion and making a wedge between the new President and the military. Hereafter, *Ben 'Alī* grew suspicious of his army and resorted to the same coup-proofing tactics of his predecessor. He stopped appointing military officers in civilian posts and dismissed those already in the cabinet and top state bureaucracy, cut the military budget in favour of the Ministry of Interior, marginalised the role of the National Security Council, and tightened his personal control over the military by abstaining from appointing a chief of staff for the armed forces and taking the position for himself. Eventually, the plot paid off, and the military institution lost the competition with the police and the ruling party. Till his deposition, *Ben 'Alī* was convinced that latter institutions were his dependable allies.⁴⁷⁸

ii. The degree of militarisation of the state and society:

The political hegemony of the military institution is usually accompanied by its infiltration of state and society, which in turn, is a crucial factor in determining the dynamics of the

⁴⁷⁶ Grewal, "A Quiet Revolution", 3-4.

⁴⁷⁷ Ware, "Ben Ali's Constitutional Coup in Tunisia", 593.

⁴⁷⁸ Bou Nassif, "A Military Besieged", 72-73.

Grewal, "A Quiet Revolution", 3-4.

transitional period.⁴⁷⁹ The concept of “Praetorian State” is used to describe societies “where the military has become part of the bureaucratic state and a substantial force in creating the middle class.”⁴⁸⁰ For Amos Perlmutter, Egypt has been a perfect example of the Praetorian State since 1952.⁴⁸¹

Many parameters have been used to evaluate the degree of state militarisation. For instance, the size of the military and its budget is a basic parameter for how central the military is to a given polity. According to the annual report of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2010, the Egyptian military clearly outnumbered its Tunisian counterpart regarding its personnel and expenditure, as shown in table no. 7.⁴⁸²

	Egypt	Tunisia
Defence Expenditure (US\$ m)	4,562	534
Defence Expenditure per capita (US\$)	59	51
Defence Expenditure (% of GDP)	2.9	1.28
Armed Forces Estimated (in thousands)	469	36
Reservists (in thousands)	479	0
Paramilitary (in thousands)	397	12

Table 7. Comparing the Egyptian and the Tunisian militaries according to the Military Balance Report 2010

⁴⁷⁹ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 170.

⁴⁸⁰ Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Failure of a Revolution: The Military, Secular Intelligentsia and Religion in Egypt’s Pseudo-Secular State” in *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization*, ed. Larbi Sadiki, 254 (Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2015).

⁴⁸¹ Amos Perlmutter, *Egypt: The Praetorian State* (New Brunswick; New Jersey: Transactions Book, 1974), 4.

⁴⁸² James Hackett, *The Military Balance 2010* (London: Routledge, 2010), 464-465.

The Bonn International Center for Conversion has developed a more sophisticated measure: the Global Militarisation Index to assess militarisation level based on three main factors: (i) military expenditures as a percentage to the GDP and the government expenditure on the health services; (ii) the ratio of military and paramilitary personnel to the total population and to the number of physicians, as well as the ratio of the reserves to the total population; and (iii) the number of heavy weapons in relation to the population. The wide gap between the two militaries' ranking is shown in table no.10.⁴⁸³

	Egypt	Tunisia
Military Expenditure Index Score (8)	6.24	6.02
Military Personal Index Score (8)	5	3.64
Heavy Weapons Index Score (4)	2.68	2.28
Global Militarisation Index	755.97	619.05
Ranking	23	87

Table 8. Comparing the Egyptian and the Tunisian militaries according to the Global Militarisation Index Report 2010

Another important aspect of the polity militarisation is ideological or what is termed “militarism”. This concept is defined as “a set of ideas and structures that glorify practices and norms associated with militaries.” Accordingly, it aims to normalise the

⁴⁸³ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 190-191.

“Global Militarisation Index 2010”, *Bonn International Center for Conversion*, https://gmi.bicc.de/index.php?page=ranking-table&year=2010&sort=country_asc (accessed 6 January 2020).

military's hegemony over "the civilian life, politics, economics, and people's self-understandings."⁴⁸⁴

The Egyptian military managed to efficiently promote this ideology within society. Its propaganda apparatus named the Department of Morale Affairs used to open museums, organise festivals, and produce songs, movies, and documentaries to cherish the heroic sacrifice of the army and commemorate the great battles in the Egyptian history. Furthermore, through compulsory conscription of young males, the military expands its reach to almost all Egyptian families.⁴⁸⁵

Therefore, it is not a surprise that Egyptians show greater trust in the military institution and broader support for military rule than their fellow Tunisians. In the 2011 Arab Barometer survey, as an example, 99% of Egyptian participants said they trust the armed forces (82% trust them to a great extent, 15% to a moderate extent, and 2% to a limited extent), while their trust in the CSOs and political parties were only 72% and 58% respectively.⁴⁸⁶ Also, in the wave V of the World Value Survey (2008), the opinion of Egyptian respondents on having an army rule was: 23% very good, 32% fairly good, 26.6% fairly bad, and 15.6% very bad. Moreover, the majority of respondents (68%)

⁴⁸⁴ Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the Nation*, 18-19.

Ayşe Gül Altınay, *The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Mac Millan, 2004), 2.

⁴⁸⁵ Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the Nation*, 2,4.

⁴⁸⁶ Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan, Ahmad Nagui Qamha, and Subhi 'Asilah, "The Arab Barometer Project – Egypt Report", *Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies*, June 2011, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/Egypt_Public_Opinion_Survey_2011.pdf (accessed 26 December 2019).

were not of the opinion that the army taking over the incompetent government would contradict the characteristics of democracy.⁴⁸⁷

Comparing these results with those of Tunisian respondents in the wave VI of the World Value Survey in 2013 shows significant differences. The support for having an army rule was as follows: 16.5% very good, 16.6% fairly good, 24.6% fairly bad, and 30.7% very bad. Also, only 36% of respondents agreed that the army taking over the incompetent government does not contradict democracy.⁴⁸⁸

iii. The military institutional culture:

As mentioned before, the Egyptian military has a feeling of entitlement to rule the country. Not only because the military personnel generally believe that their institution is the most – if not the only – disciplined and reliable entity in the state,⁴⁸⁹ but also because of the institution's historical legacy. Furthermore, the military doctrine in Egypt has evolved over the decades towards more domestic affairs. Besides protecting state independence against any foreign threats – the mission that was deeply entrenched in the 1950s and 1960s, military leaders also assigned to their institution other two missions: contributing to state development (since the 1980s, after signing Camp David treaty with Israel) and fighting terrorism (since the early 2000s).⁴⁹⁰

The feeling of entitlement is explicitly or implicitly indoctrinated in the military colleges.

As *Khālid 'Abū 'Al-Faḍl* stated, the military students in Egypt are openly taught that only

⁴⁸⁷ “Wave V – Egypt 2008”, *World Value Survey*, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp> (accessed 6 January 2020).

⁴⁸⁸ “Wave VI – Tunisia 2013”, *World Value Survey*, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp> (accessed 6 January 2020).

⁴⁸⁹ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 171.

⁴⁹⁰ Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the Nation*, 11-12.

the military mind is precise, incorruptible, and efficacious. Accordingly, it is part of the military graduates' expectations to run the country more than to fight wars. Therefore, according to him, the military was not aiming to return to its barracks after the transitional period because it never confined itself to them in the first place.⁴⁹¹

The statement of Major General 'Iṣmat Murād, the Director of the Military College in 2015, clearly reflects the military institutional culture. On the occasion of the graduation of a new group of military students, he addressed them saying: "Our graduates are the future leaders of the country; they are ministers, governors, ambassadors, presidents of the republic, and managers, thanks to their sacrifices and hard working."⁴⁹²

With the chaotic situation during the transitional period, this feeling of the entitlement was further strengthened. The street poster that was heavily advertised by the SCAF on the first anniversary of the January Revolution under the title "The Army and the People Are One Hand" perfectly depicted the military feeling of custodianship over the civilians (figure no. 7).⁴⁹³

⁴⁹¹ Abou El Fadl, "Failure of a Revolution" in *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring*, 261.

⁴⁹² Daliā 'Uthmān, "'alliwā' murād 'iṣmat mudīr 'alkuliyyah 'alḥarbiyyah: kharījū 'alkuliyyah hum qādat 'almustaḡbal", *Al Masry Al Youm*, 31 July 2015 <https://today.almazryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=472788> (accessed 11 January 2020).

⁴⁹³ Neil Ketchley, "The Army and the People Are One Hand!" Fraternization and the 25th January Egyptian Revolution", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56,1 (2014): 179-180.



Fig. 7: “The Army and the People Are One Hand” Poster

This slogan was first chanted by the protestors during the early days of the uprisings to emphasise the peaceful nature of the protests and to encourage the army to behave similarly.⁴⁹⁴ However, the chosen picture in this poster did not give this meaning of fraternity, but rather gave a paternalistic image of a soldier smiling at a baby he is carrying. Other slogans that were widely featured on the same occasion sent the same message such as “The 25th January Revolution – the army protected it”.⁴⁹⁵

The Tunisian military has an entirely different institutional culture. As Risa A. Brooks explains, the military in Tunisia refrains from political engagement because it upholds republican values, in which political participation is beyond its mandate and safeguarding the constitutional process is its primary mission.⁴⁹⁶ As *Muḥammad 'Al-Mizūghī*, the former Head of Tunisia’s National War College put it, “we are a republican

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid., 172.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid., 179-180.

⁴⁹⁶ Risa A. Brooks, “The Tunisian Military and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces” in eds. Holger Albrecht, Aurel Croissant, and Fred H. Lawson, *Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring*, 209 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).

military, and we never wanted to become politically hegemonic; this goes against our values.”⁴⁹⁷

Many factors account for the entrenchment of the republican ethos in the Tunisian army such as lack of a particular role in Tunisian independence, being insulated from domestic politics throughout the history of the Tunisian Republic as a coup-proofing measure, lacking any specific ideological make-up or political agenda, and stressing these values during the education and socialisation processes in the military schools.⁴⁹⁸

iv. To what extent the regime transition is perceived as a threat to military privileges:

The final factor that explains why the Egyptian military was keen to control the transitional period is to shield its political and economic interests from any unexpected change. In this regard, it is not accurate to depict the military institution merely as being a part of the old regime that sought to defend it. Instead, it should be seen as a relatively autonomous organisation that had its own interests and calculations, which are not necessarily identical to those of the political regime as a whole.

The more the political and the economic interests the military institution has, the more it perceives any regime change as a possible threat. As the Egyptian military had extensively infiltrated the state economy and bureaucracy in the pre-transition Egypt, it had far more at stake to worry about than its Tunisian equivalent, and hence, it was more resolute on controlling the transitional process and its outcome than the latter.

⁴⁹⁷ Bou Nassif, “A Military Besieged”, 68.

⁴⁹⁸ Brooks, “The Tunisian Military and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces”, in *Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring*, 210.

Top-ranking positions in the state bureaucracy were usually staffed with retired officers. This was mediated by the Organisation and Administration Authority of the Armed Forces, as well as the Administrative Monitoring Authority, which used to send lists of officers on the verge of retirement to all ministries to find them suitable posts in the state apparatus based on their experiences.⁴⁹⁹

The most common place for employing former officers was the local governance, where the entire hierarchy from the governorates down to the councils of villages and cities were filled with ex-military personnel. For instance, during the last two decades of *Mubārak's* presidency, the percentage of the governors who had a military background ranged from 50 - 80% and, when the uprisings erupted, fourteen out of twenty-seven governorates were headed by retired officers. Other common places for military retirees were the state-owned natural gas and oil companies, public utilities, civil service, security apparatus, and the maritime and land transport public sector companies.⁵⁰⁰

Concerning the economic interests of the Egyptian army, they go back to the early 1980s, when Field Marshal 'Abdul-Ḥalīm 'Abū Ghazālah laid the foundations for the military business empire advocating that, in the time of peace, the military has a duty of supporting the state development plans. This empire continued to grow with his successor, Field Marshal Ḥussīn Ṭanṭāwī, to be constituted of dozens of factories and business enterprises under the following eight institutions: The Ministry of Defence and

⁴⁹⁹ Yezid Sayigh, "Above the State: The Officers' Republic in Egypt", *Carnegie Middle East Center* (2012): 12.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid., 12-17.

Zeinab Abul-Magd, "The Egyptian Military in Politics and the Economy: Recent History and Current Transition Status", *CMI Insight* (2013): 2.

Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the Nation*, 195.

National Service Projects Organisation, the Ministry of Military Production, the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation, the Engineering Authority of the Armed Forces, the Maritime Industries and Services Organisation, the Department of Medical Services of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces' Land Projects Organisation.⁵⁰¹

This huge economic empire enjoyed many privileges such as exemptions from taxes and duties, free conscript labour, subsidised energy supply, and favourable exchange rates for foreign currencies.⁵⁰² Furthermore, it was kept away from any civilian supervision and monitoring by the authority of law. Accordingly, the economic activities of the military could be considered as a shadow economy, which was estimated in 2012 to represent from 5 – 15 % of Egypt's GDP.⁵⁰³

The military's concerns about the impact of regime transition on its political and economic interests were not merely hypothetical. At the early stage of the transitional periods, a wave of protests, sit-ins, and strikes stormed military enterprises and factories, as well as the civilian institutions led by ex-generals. The companies of the Suez Canal Authority, Egyptian Holding Company for Airports and Air Aviation, the military factories 99, 63, and 45, and the natural gas and oil companies such as Petrojeat and Petrogas are but a few examples. The workers' demands ranged from fair wages and better working conditions up to total de-militarisation of their enterprises.⁵⁰⁴

Simultaneously, revolutionary groups exerted pressures to reduce the political privileges

⁵⁰¹ Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the Nation*, 12-14.

⁵⁰² Yezid Sayigh, *Owners of The Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt's Military Economy* (Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2019), 33.

⁵⁰³ Chérine Chams El-Dine, "Egypt: From Military Reform to Military Sanctuarization", in *Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring* eds. Holger Albrecht, Aurel Croissant, and Fred H. Lawson, 189 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).

⁵⁰⁴ Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the Nation*, 189-194.

of the military institution demanding civilian oversight over the military budget and banning civilian prosecution in front of the military courts among many other things.⁵⁰⁵

These concerns reached their peak when the revolutionary fervour was transmitted to the military institution itself. According to a special Reuters report, in the aftermath of the January Revolution, the low-ranking and middle-ranking officers started to show less obedience and voice their demands for better treatment, salaries, training, and armament. Moreover, some of them openly showed their resentment for the concentration of wealth in the hand of top generals, while lower-ranked officers were struggling for a decent standard of living.⁵⁰⁶

To conclude, the argument presented here is that the Egyptian military was both more willing and capable of controlling the transitional period than its Tunisian counterpart, despite the fact that both almost played the same role in bringing about the change, because the former was more politicised with a strong historical legacy and institutional culture of political hegemony and it further enjoyed large political privileges and huge economic interests that it strived to protect.

On the contrary, if the armed forces were not involved in the state policymaking under the ousted regime, as the case of the Tunisian military, they usually take “a hands-off attitude” during the transitional period and abstain from involvement in influencing the

⁵⁰⁵ Chams El-Dine, “Egypt”, in *Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring*, 199.

⁵⁰⁶ Marwah ‘Awad, “taqrīr khāṣ: muḥāwalāt lil-taghīr fī ‘aljaish almaṣrī”, *Reuters*, 12 April 2012 <https://www.reuters.com/article/oegtp-egy-army-report-mm6-idARACAE83B0OE20120412> (accessed 11 January 2020).

new political regime. Their main focus, instead, becomes maintaining their institutional professionalism and protecting national security.⁵⁰⁷

Accordingly, the political engagement of the military institution during the transitional period varied significantly in both cases. In Egypt, the military tightened its control over the state as soon as *Mubārak* decided to step down. The list of authorities that the SCAF claimed for itself by the constitutional declaration of March 2011 are:

“legislative authority; appointing the cabinet and state officials, ratifying state budget, and monitoring its implementation; appointing a number of parliament members; representing the state in foreign relations and concluding international treaties; pardoning or reducing legal penalties; and all other authorities established for the president in laws and decrees.”⁵⁰⁸

Moreover, throughout the transition, the military seemed reluctant to deliver power to the elected institutions. When the People’s Assembly was elected, the SCAF gave up the legislative authority on 23 January 2012, but still maintained the presidential prerogatives. Nevertheless, it returned to reclaim it again in June 2012, a few days before delivering the executive power to the newly elected president.

Some sources argued that the verdict of the SCC to dissolve the parliament was issued in collaboration with the SCAF to prevent the MB from controlling both the executive and legislative authorities. What supported this argument is that, after the court’s decision, the military tanks besieged the parliament and prevented the members of the parliament from gathering inside. Three days later, the SCAF issued a new

⁵⁰⁷ O’ Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*, 34.

⁵⁰⁸ Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the Nation*, 205.

constitutional declaration on 17 June 2012 putting strict limitations on the presidential powers.⁵⁰⁹

When President *Mursī* cancelled this constitutional declaration and reshuffled the SCAF in August 2012, the power seemed to slip out of the military's hand. However, the latter managed to constitutionalise its political role and to protect its economic interests in the 2012 constitution.⁵¹⁰ As early as May 2011, Major General *Mamdūḥ Shāhīn*, the member of the SCAF and the Deputy Minister of Defense for Legal and Constitutional Affairs, stated that the new constitution must assure the army that it will not fall under the whims of the head of state, whoever this president is going to be, and the parliament should not be allowed to question the army.⁵¹¹

The military institution's insistence on its autonomy *vis-à-vis* the elected institutions was perfectly depicted in the debate within the Constituent Assembly between the Brotherhood MP *Muḥammad 'Al-Beltājī* and Major General *Shāhīn*, who was the representative of the army in the Assembly. When the former suggested adding more civilian members to the National Defence Council, which was given the exclusive right to discuss all internal military affairs, the latter refused in outrage. To ensure the hegemony of the generals over this Council, *Shāhīn* shouted at *'Al-Beltājī*, "If you put one of yours, I will put one of mine".⁵¹²

⁵⁰⁹ Larémont, "Moving Past Revolution and Revolt" in *Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa*, 156.

⁵¹⁰ Abul-Magd, "The Egyptian Military in Politics and the Economy", 3.

⁵¹¹ Edmund Blair, "Analysis-Egypt Army May Pull Strings From Barracks in Future", *Reuters*, 22 June 2011 <https://af.reuters.com/article/idAFLDE75E0UL20110622> (accessed 11 January 2020).

⁵¹² "'iqrār 'almādah 197 bil-dustūr ... 'inshā' majlis lil-difā' 'alwaṭani'", YouTube video, 5:00, *Sotelsh3b*, 29 November 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pLPfggij2N4&playnext=1&list=PL1A0ADFB0FFD1B5D1&feature=resu_lts_main (accessed 26 January 2020).

Concerning its economic privileges, the SCAF, during the transitional period, did not only maintain military's business activities but also expanded them remarkably. Field Marshal *Hussīn Tanṭāwī* signed many contracts with international companies working in different industrial sectors such as cement, agricultural fertilisers, and vehicles. Also, the Engineering Authority of the Armed Forces remained "the largest contractors for public construction projects."⁵¹³

Therefore, it could be safely argued that the SCAF's administration of the transitional process was "democratically disloyal". For Linz and Stepan, the transitional administration is disloyal "when the leaders of the outgoing non-democratic regime are reluctant to transfer power to democratic institutions and ... where the non-democratic leaders retain substantial coercive and political resources".⁵¹⁴ Bratton and Van De Walle used the concept of "managed transition" to describe cases where the governments endeavour to control the process of transition and set its timetables and ultimate parameters in order to shape the unfolding political situation and limit the opposition gains.⁵¹⁵

On the contrary, the transition in Tunisia was managed by a civilian interim government. However, the political significance of the military institution witnessed a real surge in the early stage of the transitional period because the other two pillars of the Tunisian regime (i.e., the ruling party and the Ministry of Interior) were almost dysfunctional. First, the military generals controlled the top security posts of the country: the Director-

Stephan Roll, "Managing Change: How Egypt's Military Leadership Shaped the Transformation", *Mediterranean Politics* 21,1 (2016): 32.

⁵¹³ Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the Nation*, 201-203.

⁵¹⁴ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 72.

⁵¹⁵ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 170.

General of National Security and the Command of the National Guard. Second, General *Rashīd ‘Ammār* claimed for himself the position of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces besides taking over many of the Minister of Defence’s authorities. Third, military officers were appointed in some top bureaucratic positions such as the Director-General of Customs and governorship in nine provinces out of eleven in 2011.⁵¹⁶

Nevertheless, shortly after the elections of the interim institutions, the Tunisian military became under the dual responsibility of the President and the Prime Minister. The latter, *Ḥammādī ‘Al-Jibālī*, established and headed the Security Council that was formed of the Ministers of Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and the Director-General of Military Security, as well as the top Interior Ministry officers.⁵¹⁷

The provisional president, *‘Al-Munṣif ‘Al-Marzūqī*, was the head of the Supreme Council of the Armies. Nevertheless, feeling marginalised by both the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, *‘Al-Marzūqī* appointed a military advisor to have his own channel for military information and reactivated *Ben ‘Alī*’s National Security Council that started to have its monthly meeting headed by the President. Consequently, neither the President, nor the Prime Minister, nor the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces had unchallenged control over the Tunisian military.⁵¹⁸

After the Egyptian coup, more measures were taken by President *‘Al-Marzūqī* to avoid the same scenario. He decided to appoint a new Chief of Staff of the Army after General

⁵¹⁶ Grewal, “A Quiet Revolution”, 5-6.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid., 6.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid., 6-7.

'*Ammār*'s resignation in June 2013. The new leader was chosen from outside General '*Ammār*'s personal network and from outside the privileged '*Al-Sāḥil*' region entirely. Moreover, to decrease the military's coordination ability, the post of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces was left empty.

Apart from the coup-proofing measures, other appeasement steps were taken by the interim administration. For instance, the President and the Troika government throughout the transitional period were keen to increase the military budget and to improve its armament in order to compensate for its relative deprivation during *Ben 'Alī*'s presidency.⁵¹⁹

This difference between the role of the military institution in the transitional administration had a significant impact on the negotiations between the Islamists and the secularists in both cases. First, procedurally, the military institution was directly involved in the negotiations between both factions throughout the transition in Egypt. Sometimes, it was only represented in negotiation rounds as in the National Accord dialogues where the member of the SCAF, General *Mamdūḥ Shāhīn*, was the assistant rapporteur.⁵²⁰ On other occasions, the military intervened to enforce its own agenda on the negotiators such as proposing two articles in '*Alī 'Al-Salmī*'s document to shield its budget against civilian monitoring and institutionalise its hegemony over the national security issues via establishing a military-dominated National Defence Council.⁵²¹

⁵¹⁹ Ibid., 7-9.

⁵²⁰ Quṭb '*Al-ʿArabī*', "ʿalḥiwār wa ʿalmuṣālahah fī maṣr: ḍarūrāt ʿaldākḥil wa tadakhulāt ʿalkhārij", *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 26 March 2014, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/discussionstrategytosolvearabworldconflict/2014/02/2014225105334470365.html#> (accessed 26 April 2018).

⁵²¹ '*Al-Salmī*', '*ishkāliyyāt ʿaldustūr wa ʿalbarlamān*', 37.

Further, the SCAF organised and headed many negotiation sessions. For instance, Lieutenant General *Sāmī ‘Anān* chaired a dialogue with the heads of the political parties in October 2011 during ‘*Al-Salmī*’s document negotiations.⁵²² A few months later, during the Constituent Assembly crisis, the Chairman of SCAF, Field Marshal *Ḥussīn Ṭanṭāwī*, sponsored a three-month series of negotiations between the parliament-represented parties from March to June 2012.⁵²³ The last initiative of such kind was in December 2012, when the Minister of Defence Lieutenant General ‘*Abdul-Fattāḥ ‘Al-Sīsī*’ invited the chairmen of the political parties and a group of independent politicians and intellectuals for a national dialogue amid escalating political violence. This dialogue failed to take place because it was objected to by President *Mursī*.⁵²⁴

Second, ideologically, the Egyptian military’s doctrine cannot be typically described as secularist. Being a continuation of the pre-transition regime, it advocated for maintaining a distorted pattern of religious secularism, in which the state welcomed the political and social role of religion as long as it remains under its control. As mentioned above, the regime’s strategy toward the three dominant variants of Islam in Egypt was to co-opt and control the official version represented by the ‘*Al-‘Azhar*’ establishment and the popular Sufi version while repressing the political and radical versions of the Islamist movements. In other words, what really concerned the military-dominated regime in

⁵²² Nirmīn ‘Abdul-Zāhir, Nūrā Fakhrī, and Muḥammad Ḥajjāj, “ru’asā’ ‘al’aḥzāb yakshifūn kawalīs liqā’ihim bi-‘anān: ‘almajlis ‘al’askaī wāfaq ‘alā ‘alsamāḥ lil-munazzmāt ‘aldawliyyah bi-mushāhadat ‘al’intikhābāt faqaṭ ... wa ra’īs ḥizb ‘alnūr ṭalab ‘al’askaī bi-sur‘at taslīm ‘albilād li-sulṭah madaniyyah muntakhabah”, *Youm7*, 1 October 2011, <http://www.youm7.com/504006> (accessed 16 June 2019).

⁵²³ “‘ijtimā’ bain ‘almajlis ‘al’askaī fī maṣr wa ‘al’aḥzāb ḥawl ‘i’ādīt tashkīl ‘aljam‘iyyah ‘alt’sisiyyah”, *Al Nahar*, 28 April 2012, <https://bit.ly/2X3vX0H> (accessed 23 June 2019).

⁵²⁴ Mahā Sālim, “alquwāt ‘almusallaḥah: nanḥāz dā’ mā li-sha’b maṣr ... wa ‘al’inqisāmāt tuhadid ‘arkān ‘aldawlah ... wa nad’am ‘alḥiwār ‘alwaṭanī wuṣūlā lil-tawafuq”, *Al Ahram*, 8 December 2012, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/281141.aspx> (accessed 1 August 2019).

Bishārah, *thawrat maṣr (‘al-juz’ ‘al-thānī)*, 282-286.

Egypt was how to produce and promote a regime-friendly version of Islam, regardless of its content.

From this perspective, it can be surmised that the military institution during the transition was deeply concerned about the political rise of the MB, as well as the growingly independent 'Al-'Azhar Sheikhdom. In a meeting hosted by the army in June 2011, some generals addressed the academicians and intellectuals in attendance:

“you people ... do not know how dangerous our region is. You do not understand the dangers posed by the puritanical Islamic groups. You do not understand the dangers posed by an independent Azhar.”⁵²⁵

Therefore, the military institution did intervene many times to curb the Islamists' attitude of majoritarianism and to prevent them from imposing their agenda on the constitution. Stripping the parliament elected in 2012 from its right to form the government or even to withdraw confidence from it, complicity in dissolving this parliament only after a few months from its convention, the constitutional declaration of 17 June that attempted to reduce the presidential authorities and gave the SCAF the right to appoint a new Constituent Assembly, and finally, committing “a veto coup” against the Islamist president in 2013 are some examples of how the SCAF was heavily involved in challenging the Islamists during the transitional period.

The following is the summary of the two main macro-structural variables that affected the negotiations between the Islamists and the secularists in Egypt and Tunisia:

⁵²⁵ Abou El Fadl, “Failure of a Revolution” in *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring*, 261-261.

Argument One: The Islamists in Egypt enjoyed a better bargaining position *vis-à-vis* their secularist rivals in comparison to the Tunisian case thanks to the less assertive pattern of secularism and less aggressive exclusion policies adopted by the pre-transition regime that earned the Egyptian Islamists broader popular support for their ideology and greater mobilisation capacities.

Argument Two: The negotiations between the Islamists and the secularists in Egypt was affected by the custodianship role of the military institution during the transitional period that enabled it to mediate, steer, and shape the agenda of some negotiation rounds and by its ideological bias against the Islamists that pushed it many times to intervene and challenge the latter's hegemonic attitude.

5.2 Meso-Structural Set of Variables

After identifying the structural variables related to the pre-transition regime and the transitional administration, in what follows, the variables associated with the intermediary social organisations that affected transitional negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia will be examined. In the transition literature, two main meso-structural factors received much attention: the relative bargaining power between the negotiating parties and the degree of maturity and plurality of the CSOs.

Concerning the former, there are two contradicting arguments deduced from different transition experiences. Based on their study of the third wave of democratisation, Guillermo O' Donnell and Philippe C Schmitter, as well as Gretchen Casper and Michelle M Taylor concluded that if the negotiating parties have comparable bargaining power with no dominant political force that can establish the new regime based on its

own preferences, they usually seek compromise and opt for their second-best options.⁵²⁶ Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle described this state of the relative balance of power as a stalemated crisis, which, according to Burton *et al.*, might threaten the eruption of violence.⁵²⁷

Nevertheless, Michael McFaul claims that the stalemated balance of power, which was affirmed as “the single most important condition” for pact-making in the literature of the third wave of democratisation cannot be applied to the fourth wave of the post-communist transitions. On the contrary, it led to an unstable regime, which could be democratic or authoritarian. In such a non-cooperative pattern of transition, a stable democratic regime only occurred when the asymmetrical balance of power favoured the democratic elites.⁵²⁸

Furthermore, according to Casper and Taylor, uncertainty about the relative bargaining positions between the negotiating parties may hinder the compromise. In such cases, either actor or both may refrain from making any concessions in an attempt to reach a better deal.⁵²⁹

In short, if the negotiating political forces enjoy relative bargaining positions, this may convince them to find a middle ground or may create an annoying state of uncertainty that hinders the compromise and aggravates the conflict.

⁵²⁶ O’ Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*, 38.
Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 244.

⁵²⁷ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 178.

Burton *et al.*, “Introduction” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 14.

⁵²⁸ McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship”, 221-222.

⁵²⁹ Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 33.

Similarly, in the non-cooperative transition model, having a dominant political actor that can impose its will on the others, according to McFaul, may result in the establishment of a stable regime based on this party's preferences, or, according to Casper and Taylor, it may bring about more instability, if the overwhelmed parties feel locked out the decision-making process and decide to act as a spoiler.⁵³⁰

The second variable is related to the degree of civil society development. The previous literature identified many criteria the CSOs must have to facilitate the transitional negotiations. For Burton *et al.*, as an example, elites' settlements require a mature civil society, which means it is fairly organised with acknowledged leadership able to represent a specific clientele.⁵³¹ Another essential feature is the plurality and autonomy of civil society, which means that the CSOs are not dominated by a single ideological group, not severely polarised, and have a balanced relationship with political parties.⁵³² In such a case, they become more independent and are trusted to mediate the negotiations.⁵³³

5.2.1 The Balance of Power Between the Negotiating Parties

How the balance of power between the negotiating parties affects the course and the outcome of the negotiation process is a quite problematic issue. On the one hand, it is not clear how to define the power that each party has during the negotiation. Transition literature classically mentions some indicators such as mobilisation capacity, the results

⁵³⁰ Ibid, 47-48.

⁵³¹ Burton *et al.*, "Introduction" in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 33.

⁵³² Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 40.

⁵³³ Al-Sayyid, "The Divergent Trajectories of Arab Dignity Revolts" in *Re-envisioning West Asia*, 200. Kao and Lust, *Why Did the Arab Uprisings Turn Out as They Did?*, 7-8.

of the founding elections, and the merit that each party claims in challenging the ousted regime and making the change.⁵³⁴

Nevertheless, other hard to measure, yet crucial, factors do exist. For example, it matters how the ousted regime maintains its presence during the transition: by establishing new parties or through the state institutions themselves, and also, to what extent the guardian institutions are still functional and have enough resources and legitimacy to defend their interests and veto the new arrangements.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, it is not clear whether the balanced bargaining power will facilitate or hinder reaching a compromise. Also, it is not clear whether the presence of a dominant political player will make its rivals tame their expectations and moderate their demands, so reaching an agreement becomes easier or it will make them revolt against the hegemonic force and subvert the whole transition.

The hypothesis proposed here is that, in Tunisia, there was no dominant political force during the transition, which, in the beginning, created a state of instability. Later, after reaching a stalemated crisis with escalating violence in the summer of 2013, the rival political forces decided to compromise. On the other hand, throughout the transition period in Egypt, dominance rotated between the Islamists and the military institution in a seesaw pattern.⁵³⁵ In either case, the temporarily predominating force, whatever it was, did not feel obliged to compromise and the challenging forces, in return, pushed back and did not feel obliged to surrender.

⁵³⁴ Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 50-53.

Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 71.

⁵³⁵ Zartman, "Negotiations in Transitions" in *Arab Spring*, 27.

As previously explained, the main political players during the transitional period in Egypt and Tunisia cannot be simply categorised into the *ancien régime* vs. the democratic opponents because ideological orientation divided the democratic opposition into Islamists and secularists. Furthermore, if the Islamists are defined as those who adopt a more comprehensive understanding of the *Shari‘ah* and push for a more authoritative enforcement of its provisions; and if the secularists are those who are not “overtly or specifically religious” and who aim at mitigating the *Shari‘ah* reference and limiting its socio-political roles, the representatives of the *ancien régimes* during the transition in both Egypt and Tunisia better fit into the category of secularists.

Having that said, it can be argued that both secularists and Islamists had a comparable bargaining position in case of Tunisia, while in Egypt, the Islamists were in a much stronger position *vis-à-vis* their secularist rivals at the beginning of transition until the guardian institutions gathered forces with the secularist political forces and turned the balance of power in the latter’s favour.

In Tunisia, there was only one general election that took place during the transitional period in October 2011. The significance of this election is that it gave the legitimacy to all interim institutions: the presidency, the cabinet, and the ANC. The following table summarises the results of the main political forces in these elections:⁵³⁶

⁵³⁶ ‘Al-Ḥināshī, “‘intikhābāt ‘almajlis ‘alwaṭanī ‘altūnisī”, 20-26.

The Party	Classification	No. of Votes (4,053,148)	No. of Seats (217)
The EMP	Islamist	1.500.649 (37.02%)	89 (41.01%)
The CRP	Secularist	341.549 (8.42%)	29 (13.36%)
The Popular Petition for Freedom	Secularist	252.025 (6.22%)	27 (12.44%)
The Democratic Bloc for Labour and Liberties	Secularist	248.686 (6.14%)	20 (9.12%)
The Progressive Democratic Party	Secularist	111.067 (2.74%)	16 (7.36%)
The National Destourian Initiative Party	Secularist	97.489 (2.4%)	5 (2.3%)

Table 9. Results of the ANC elections in October 2011

These results clearly reflect that the Islamist party did achieve a decisive victory given the wide gap between its results and those of the closest secularist parties. The Islamist electoral superiority was further evidenced by the fact that the EMP was the only party that could field candidates in all electoral districts both inside the country and abroad and achieved first place in all domestic districts except only one, *Sīdī Boū Zaīd*.⁵³⁷ Its electoral victory was further potentiated by its coalition with two secularist parties, the CRP and Democratic Bloc for Labour and Liberties, forming the Troika that has the support of 63.6% of the ANC members.

Besides this electoral legitimacy, the EMP enjoyed what O' Donnell and Schmitter called "moral authority" owing to its decades-long struggle against the ousted authoritarianism and being one of its most oppressed victims.⁵³⁸

⁵³⁷ Ibid., 23.

⁵³⁸ O' Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*, 52.

⁵³⁹ Al-Taīdī, *'al'islāmiyūn wa 'alrabī' 'al'rabī*, 11.

However, the secularist faction did enjoy a fair bargaining position too. The secularist parties, after the ANC elections, entered into a series of negotiations to make coalitions with each other. For example, the Union for Tunisia coalition was announced in mid-January 2013, and was constituted of: (i) the Call of Tunisia Party, the party that was established by *'Al-Bājī Qāid 'Al-Sibsī* in June 2012 and attracted many figures from the old regime; (ii) the Republican Party, the party that resulted from the union of the Progressive Democratic Party with other eight smaller liberal parties in April 2012;⁵³⁹ (iii) the Social Democratic Path Party, a coalition that formed by the merge of three leftist parties in April 2012;⁵⁴⁰ and (iv) two other smaller parties.⁵⁴¹

The Popular Front is another example of the coalitions that formed at the same time. It included eleven leftist parties and political groups with either Marxist, Nasserist, or Arab nationalist ideology, and it had a strong presence at labour unions and civil society.⁵⁴²

Later, when the political polarisation escalated in July 2013, the Union for Tunisia, the Popular Front, and “nearly all political forces opposed to the Troika” joined forces in an alliance called the T-NSF.⁵⁴³ Eventually, the secularist opposition had enough power to

⁵³⁹ “*alḥizb aljumhūrī (tūnis)*”, *Al Jazeera Encyclopedia*, <https://bit.ly/38s4IUu> (accessed 20 January 2020).

⁵⁴⁰ Marina Ottaway, “The Tunisian Political Spectrum: Still Unbalanced”, *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 19 June 2012, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/19/tunisian-political-spectrum-still-unbalanced-pub-48478> (accessed 20 January 2020).

⁵⁴¹ Monica Marks and Omar Belhaj Salah, “Uniting for Tunisia?”, *Sada*, 28 March 2013, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/51330> (accessed 20 January 2020).

⁵⁴² Jano Charbel, “The Left of the Arab World”, *Mada Masr*, 13 October 2014, <https://madamasr.com/en/2014/10/13/feature/politics/the-left-of-the-arab-world/> (accessed 20 January 2020).

Mady, “Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings”, 23-24.

⁵⁴³ Boubekour, “Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia”, 117.

paralyse the ANC and mobilise nation-wide demonstrations against the Islamist-dominated interim institutions.

In the Egyptian case, the Islamists also enjoyed the legitimacy of being the leading opponents to *Mubārak's* regime and the political group that most suffered from its oppression. Furthermore, in comparison to the EMP, the MB played a remarkable role in mobilisation and sit-ins organisation during the uprisings especially in the 'Al-Taḥrīr square – the fact that earned it more “moral authority” in the early stage of the transitional period.

As regards the founding elections, the Islamists “won every electoral consultation they contested” during the transition.⁵⁴⁴ In addition to the referenda of the transitional roadmap in March 2011 and the constitution of 2012, which the Islamists supported and succeeded to have them approved by 77.3% and 63.8% respectively, the Islamist candidates won the elections of both houses of parliament, as well as the presidential elections in 2012 as shown in table no. 10.⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴⁴ Al-Sayyid, “The Divergent Trajectories of Arab Dignity Revolts” in *Re-envisioning West Asia*, 199.

⁵⁴⁵ The Official Website of the 2011 Referendum, <https://referendum2011.elections.eg/84-slideshow/155-result.html> (accessed 22 January 2020).

The Official Website of the 2012 Referendum, <https://referendum2012.elections.eg/results/referendum-results> (accessed 22 January 2020).

	The Candidate	The Results
The Elections of the Lower House of the Parliament (2011-2012) ⁵⁴⁶	1. Main Islamist parties:	(Total: 498 seats)
	- The FJP (MB) - The Light Party (Salafist) - The BDP (Salafist – ex-Jihadist) - The Centre Party	235 seats (47.2%) 107 seats (21.5%) 13 seats (2.6%) 10 seats (2%)
The Elections of the Upper House of the Parliament (2012) ⁵⁴⁷	2. Main secularist parties:	
	- The 'Al-Wafd Party - The Egyptian Social Democratic Party - The Free Egyptians Party	41 seats (8.2%) 16 seats (3.2%) 15 seats (3%)
The Elections of the Lower House of the Parliament (2012) ⁵⁴⁷	1. Main Islamist parties:	(Total: 180 seats)*
	- The FJP (MB) - The Light Party (Salafist)	106 seats (58.8%) 45 seats (25%)
The Elections of the Upper House of the Parliament (2012) ⁵⁴⁷	2. Main secularist parties:	
	- The 'Al-Wafd Party	14 seats (7.8%)

⁵⁴⁶ Ellen Lust and David Waldner, "Parties in Transitional Democracies: Authoritarian Legacies and Post-Authoritarian Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa" in *Parties, Movements, and Democracy in the Developing World*, eds. Nancy Bermeo and Deborah J. Yashar, 180-181 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

⁵⁴⁷ "fawz 'al'islāmiyyīn fī 'alshūrā 'almaṣrī", *Sky News*, 26 February 2012 <https://bit.ly/30JqZ7R> (accessed 22 January 2020).

* In addition to 90 members to be appointed by the president, which happened to be the MB candidate *Muḥammad Mursī*.

The Presidential Elections 2012 (First Round) ⁵⁴⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Muḥammad Mursī</i> (MB) 24.8% of votes - <i>ʿAḥmed Shafīq</i> (secularist – old regime) 23.7% of votes - <i>Ḥamdīn Ṣabbāḥī</i> (secularist) 20.7% of votes - <i>ʿAbdul-Monʿim ʿAbul-Futūḥ</i> (ex-MB) 17.5% of votes - <i>ʿAmr Mūsā</i> (secularist – old regime) 11.1% of votes
The Presidential Elections 2012 (Second Round) ⁵⁴⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Muḥammad Mursī</i> (MB) 51.7% of votes - <i>ʿAḥmed Shafīq</i> (secularist – old regime) 48.3% of votes

Table 10. Results of the parliamentary and the presidential elections during the transitional period in Egypt

By achieving a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections, the Islamists did not only control the legislative authority but also, had the upper hand in deciding the Constituent Assembly composition. Also, having an Islamist president constitutionally made the Islamists control the executive power.

However, as argued before, calculating the bargaining position of the rival political forces during the transitional period should take into consideration the guardian institutions' role. Therefore, the secularist forces in Egypt, despite being largely overwhelmed by the Islamist majoritarianism, did benefit from the endeavours exerted by the SCAF and the SCC to tame the Islamists.

⁵⁴⁸ “ʿalʿintikhābāt ʿalriʿāsiyyah ʿalmaṣriyyah 2012”, *Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies*, July 2012, https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/PoliticalStudies//Pages/Egyptian_Presidential_Elections.aspx (accessed 25 November 2018).

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

The relationship between the SCAF and the Islamist political force, in general, and the MB particularly is neither simple nor straightforward as it was shaped by various ideological, historical, psychological, and pragmatic factors. After about a six-decade conflict between “Egypt’s most organised, armed state bureaucracy and its most organised non-state actor”,⁵⁵⁰ in the wake of the stepdown of *Mubārak*, the military institution and the MB found themselves in a situation that forced them to work together.

In the early stage of the transition, a rapprochement did occur between two institutions with many sources talking about tacit and even explicit understandings between the old rivals.⁵⁵¹ The SCAF aimed at achieving many goals by indulging the MB at that critical time. First of all, it was struggling to contain the revolutionary fervour and bring back political order. As an ex-general openly admitted:

“The SCAF’s goal at the time was to calm down the streets, and with the Brothers being the most organised and numerous group, they naturally felt it made sense to let them have a critical say. ... When you enter a new block, you usually look to see who [are] the strongest *thugs* with whom you could have an understanding. The SCAF was the newcomer, and the *thug* was the Muslim Brothers.”⁵⁵²

Second, both institutions have the same conservative attitude with strong hierarchical structure and organisational culture based on discipline and obedience;⁵⁵³ therefore, they shared the same goal of absorbing the revolutionary wave and preventing it from

⁵⁵⁰ Omar Ashour, “Collusion to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt”, *Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper* 14 (2015): 1

⁵⁵¹ Al-Sayyid, “The Divergent Trajectories of Arab Dignity Revolts” in *Re-envisaging West Asia*, 198. Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the Nation*, 206.

Parolin, “Constitutions Against Revolutions” in *Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco*, 37.

⁵⁵² Pargeter, *Return to the Shadows*, 25.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*

unfolding in an unexpected way. Third, even before the uprisings, the military institution was partially tolerant to the MB's religiopolitical activism because it believed that the latter was useful in draining away support for and weakening Jihadist movements.⁵⁵⁴

The manifestations of this rapprochement at that time were numerous. In February 2011, the SCAF appointed a committee to amend the constitution and chose the eminent Islamist intellectual and judge *Tāriq 'Al-Bishrī* to chair it. Moreover, the MB was the only political force represented in this committee via its prominent member and the lawyer *Şubḥī Şāliḥ*.⁵⁵⁵ Later, in March referendum, the SCAF and the MB supported “the election first roadmap” that served the objective of the SCAF in containing the revolutionary demands in a reformist constitutional channel and, at the same time, it favoured the Islamists, who had a much better electoral chance than their secularist competitors.⁵⁵⁶

In return, the MB, as early as May 2011, started to repeatedly abstain from participating in the Friday rallies that the RYC used to organise at that time. Not only that, but it also criticised the participation in some of these demonstrations. For example, the MB's official website described the call for the protest on 27 May 2011 as a wedge between

⁵⁵⁴ Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing*, 78.

⁵⁵⁵ Parolin, “Constitutions Against Revolutions” in *Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco*, 37.

⁵⁵⁶ Abul-Magd, “The Egyptian Military in Politics and the Economy”, 3.

the army and the people.⁵⁵⁷ On the same occasion, it decided to withdraw from the RYC by denying its youth members in it the representation status.⁵⁵⁸

The most unequivocal evidence of the deliberate demobilisation of the MB during the transitional period was the incident of *Muḥammad Maḥmūd* clashes, where bloody confrontations erupted in November 2011 between the revolutionary groups and the public masses from one side and the police forces on the other side. The MB refrained from engaging in these clashes despite the brutality of the police against the protestors. The General Guide, *Muḥammad Badī*, declared that the involvement in such confrontations would result in significant harm to the MB because the situation was ambiguous. “It could be a plot to drag the MB to clash with the military police and the police forces”, he added. This decision created a permanent rift within the “revolutionary camp”. Ever after, the secularist revolutionary groups used to say “the Brotherhood sold us out in *Muḥammad Maḥmūd*” to show their disappointment, distrust, and rage against the MB’s behaviour during this crisis.⁵⁵⁹

Nevertheless, the marriage of convenience between the SCAF and the MB did not last so long. The SCAF seemed to be dissatisfied with the muscle-flexing attitude of the Islamist trend after the March referendum. When the secularists demanded to put supra-constitutional principles before the parliamentary elections, the Islamists’

⁵⁵⁷ Hānī ‘Al-Wazīrī, “mawqī’ ‘al’ikhwān yaṣīf 27 māiyo bi-jum‘it ‘alwaqī‘ah ... wa shabāb ‘aljamā‘ah yarud: yuṭabbiq ‘uslūb mubārak, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 27 May 2011, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/134569> (accessed 23 January 2020).

⁵⁵⁸ “‘ikhwān maṣr yansaḥībūn min ‘i’tilāf ‘althawrah”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 29 May 2011, <https://bit.ly/30LiNnK> (accessed 23 January 2020).

⁵⁵⁹ Muḥammad Rashād ‘Al-Madhūn, “‘al’ikhwān bā‘ūnā fī muḥammad maḥmūd ... qiṣṣat ‘almaqūlah ‘al’abraz fī 3 sanawāt, *Masr Al Arabia*, 19 November 2014 <https://bit.ly/2ushq10> (accessed 23 January 2020).

Ashour, “Collusion to Crackdown”, 3.

response was massive. The MB, the Salafists, and the ex-jihadists joined forces and mobilised their bases claiming that the supra-constitutional document was a plot to hollow their decisive victory in the referendum and to prevent the enshrinement of the *Sharī'ah* in the new constitution. Two big rallies are worth mention here: “the Friday of the Popular Will” on 29 July 2011, which was dubbed by the secularists as “the Friday of Kandahar”, in reference to the Jihadists-ruled city in Afghanistan, and the rally of 18 November that succeeded to eliminate the *'Al-Salmī's* document, which was the last chance to agree upon supra-constitutional principles before the parliamentary elections.⁵⁶⁰

Afterwards, the SCAF became heavily involved in curbing the Islamists' power. First, the SCAF announced that the coming parliament was only entitled to enact the laws and choose the members of the Constituent Assembly. It was out of its mandate to form a government or even withdraw confidence from it. As the leading journalist *Muḥammad Ḥassanīn Haikal* reported, Field Marshal *Ḥussīn Ṭanṭāwī*, after the results of the parliamentary elections, rejected his advice to ask *Muḥammad Mursī*, the Chairman of the winning FJP, to form the cabinet because “he did not want to hand the country to the MB”.⁵⁶¹

This is why, when the parliament attempted to withdraw confidence from *Kamāl 'Al-Janzūrī's* government in April 2012, the latter threatened the spokesmen of the

⁵⁶⁰ Noha El-Hennawy, “A Year in Review: The Military Council's Mixed Messages”, *Egypt Independent*, 30 December 2011 <https://egyptindependent.com/year-review-military-councils-mixed-messages/> (accessed 23 January 2020).

Bishārah, *thawrat maṣr ('al-juz' 'al-thānī)*, 154-155.

⁵⁶¹ Maḥmūd Karīm, “bil-vīdīū ... haikal: ṭanṭāwī rafaḍ taslīm maṣr lil-'ikhwān ... wa mubārak tanḥḥā bisabab 'alḍaghṭ 'al'ajnabī”, *Sada El Balad*, 6 December 2012 <https://www.elbalad.news/332815> (accessed 23 January 2020).

parliament and the MB leader *Sa'd 'Al-Katātnī*, in the presence of Lieutenant General *Sāmī 'Anān*, that the decision to dissolve the parliament has been already taken and could be officially announced by the SCC at any time.⁵⁶²

Second, as mentioned before, the SCAF sponsored many negotiation rounds between the Islamists and the secularists and exerted more pressure to have the constitution approved or – at least – to form an agreed-upon Constituent Assembly before the presidential elections. When both goals seemed to be unachievable due to time limitation, the SCAF resorted to more confrontational methods; it collaborated with the SCC to dissolve the parliament and issued the constitutional declaration on 17 June taking over the legislative authority, claiming the right to form a new Constituent Assembly, if the current one was dissolved, and limiting the prerogatives of the new president.

Rising tension between both sides at that time reached an unprecedented level, when the SCAF boldly threatened the MB in an official statement, in response to the latter's expression of its suspicion about the impartiality of the state institutions, especially the SCC. "All parties should learn the lessons of history carefully in order not to repeat their mistakes, so that the past, which we are trying to avoid, would not repeat", the statement concluded.⁵⁶³

Clearly, the SCC and the Administrative Court were part of the guardian institutions that engaged in challenging the Islamist hegemony during the transition. They issued many

⁵⁶² Muṣṭafā Bakrī, *'aljaish wa 'al'ikhwān: 'asrār khalf 'alsitār* (Cairo: Al Dar Al Masriah Al Lubnaniah, 2013), 157-159.

⁵⁶³ "ba'd biyānain shadīdī 'allahjah min 'al'ikhwān wa ḥizb 'alḥurriyyah wa 'al'adālah ... 'al'askaī muhaddida 'iḥdā 'alqwā 'alsiāsiyyah: nuṭalib 'aljamī 'an ya'ū durūs 'altārīkh", *Shorouk News*, 25 March 2012, <https://bit.ly/2tOOctq> (accessed 25 January 2020).

verdicts that induced a real paralysis of the transitional process such as the sentences to dissolve the first Constituent Assembly in April 2012,⁵⁶⁴ the People's Assembly in June 2012, the Shura Council that assumed the legislative power after the dissolution of the People's Assembly in June 2013, and the second Constituent Assembly also in June 2013 – even though, the latter had already finished its task six months before that time.⁵⁶⁵

Furthermore, after the approval of the 2012 constitution, the SCC hindered the election of a new lower house of parliament that was set to be held in April 2013 by ruling the electoral law proposed by the Shura Council unconstitutional in February 2013.⁵⁶⁶ As a consequence, in the next month, the Administrative Court cancelled President *Mursī's* decision to hold these elections – a ruling that was further confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court in April 2013.⁵⁶⁷

On the same vein, during that turbulent time, the military institution sent many strong messages to the presidency. On 29 January 2013, the Minister of Defence Lieutenant General '*Abdul-Fattāḥ* '*Al-Sīsī*' expressed in public for the first time the concern of the

⁵⁶⁴ Hadīr Yūsuf, "ḥaithiyāt ḥukm ḥal 'allajnah 'alt'sīsiyyah", *Alwafd News*, 10 April 2012 <https://bit.ly/2NWgrwY> (accessed 25 January 2020).

⁵⁶⁵ "'almḥkamah 'aldustūriyyah fī maṣr bi-ḥal majlis 'alshūrā wa buṭlān 'allajnah 'alt'sīsiyyah wa qānūn 'altawāri'", *BBC News*, 2 June 2013 https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/06/130602_egypt_constitutional_rulings (accessed 25 January 2020).

⁵⁶⁶ 'Ibrāhīm Qāsim, "'aldustūriyyah tuqarrir 'adam dustūriyyat nuṣūṣ qānūn 'al'intikhābāt wa tursilah lil-shūrā", *Youm7*, 18 February 2013 <https://bit.ly/2ut1NXs> (accessed 25 January 2020).

⁵⁶⁷ "waqf 'al'intikhābāt 'albarlmāniyyah fī maṣr bi-qarār min 'alqaḍā' 'al'idārī", *BBC News*, 6 March 2013 https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/03/130306_egypt_decree_Mursi_elections (accessed 25 January 2020).

Shaimā' 'Al-Qarnashāwī, "'al'idāriyyah 'al'uliā tu'aiyyd ḥukm 'alqaḍā' 'al'idārī bi-waqf 'intikhābāt majlis 'alnuwāb", *Al Masry Al Youm*, 21 April 2013 <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/306716> (accessed 25 January 2020).

military institution about the possible collapse of the state.⁵⁶⁸ A few days later, the Chief of Staff General *Sidqī Ṣubḥī* gave another bold statement that “the military is not involved in politics, but it always oversees the developments taking place within the Egyptian state, and if the Egyptian people need the intervention of the military, the Armed Forces will be on the streets in less than a second”.⁵⁶⁹ In addition, leaked news in March 2013 reported that the SCAF held a meeting without the President to discuss “domestic developments amid concerns over Egypt’s ongoing political crisis”, which was an early sign of the military defection from the presidency.⁵⁷⁰

From its side, the MB did not stand helplessly in front of these measures; when the parliament was denied the right to form the cabinet, the MB decided in March 2012 to run for presidency breaching its previous promise;⁵⁷¹ when the SCAF issued the constitutional declaration of 17 June, the newly elected President *Mursī* cancelled it with another constitutional declaration on 12 August and made a reshuffle in the SCAF hoping to have a more cooperative council; when the SCC dissolved the People’s Assembly, *Mursī*, only one week after his inauguration, issued a decree calling the Assembly to meet; when the SCC ruled his decision to be void, he transferred legislative authority to the MB-dominated Shura council;⁵⁷² when it seemed that the SCC would dissolve the second Constituent Assembly and the Shura Council itself, *Mursī* issued a constitutional declaration of 22 November to shield them, as well as all

⁵⁶⁸ Bishārah, *thawrat maṣr* (‘*al-juz*’ ‘*al-thānī*’), 289-290

⁵⁶⁹ Mona El-Kouedi, “From Morsi With Love”, *Sada*, 12 March 2013 <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/51179> (accessed 25 January 2020).

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁷¹ Hishām ‘Al-Ghunīmī, “‘amīn ‘al’ikhwān: rashaḥnā ‘alshāṭer li-tamassuk ‘al’askaī bil-ḥukūmah wa talwīḥah bi-ḥal ‘albarlamān”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 31 March 2012, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/169298> (accessed 8 March 2020).

⁵⁷² Bishārah, *thawrat maṣr* (‘*al-juz*’ ‘*al-thānī*’), 257-258.

his decisions against the judiciary rulings and dismissed the Attorney General ‘*Abdul-Majīd Maḥmūd*. Moreover, the MB sent its members to besiege the SCC in December 2012, forcing it to hold its activities until having the constitution approved. Then, President *Mursī* restructured the SCC by dismissing seven of its members using the authorities given to him by the new constitution.⁵⁷³

This does not negate that the MB generally followed an appeasement strategy with the military institution during the transition in an attempt to have it on its side. Even after winning the presidential elections and having the upper hand over the executive and legislative powers, as well as the Constituent Assembly, the MB did its best to assure the military institution about its autonomy, as well as its political and economic interests.

In the 2012 constitution, Article 195 stated that the Minister of Defence should always be appointed from officers, which means that civilians were not allowed to claim this post; Article 197 gave the generals-dominated National Defence Council the exclusive right to discuss all internal military affairs including its budget; it also constitutionalised military engagement in domestic politics by extending its mandate to examine the issues related to the safety and integrity of the country; Article 198 allowed military trials of civilians if accused of crimes that harmed the Armed Forces.⁵⁷⁴

The MB-dominated Shura Council also enacted many laws in favour of the military institution such as annexing state-owned companies to the Ministry of the Military

⁵⁷³ “aldustūriyyah tu ‘alliq jalasātihā ‘iḥtijājā ‘alā ḥiṣār ‘almutaẓāhrīn lil-maḥkamah”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 2 December 2012 <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/255189> (accessed 25 January 2020).

‘Amr Wālī, “‘abraz ‘azamāt ‘alqaḍā’ ma‘a ‘alri’āsah fī ‘ahd Mursī”, *Masrawy*, 24 April 2013 <https://bit.ly/37rLA3h> (accessed 25 January 2020).

⁵⁷⁴ “‘iṣdār dustūr jumhūriyyat maṣr ‘al‘arabiyyah li-sanat 2012”, *Legal Documents Archive*, <https://manshurat.org/node/3573> (accessed 26 January 2020).

Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the Nation*, 209.

Production, raising the retired military personnel's pensions 15-20% annually, and allowing the military institution to establish its own medical college.⁵⁷⁵

President *Mursī*, from his side, maintained the same privileges the military used to have during *Mubārak's* presidency. He assured the officers in one of his speeches that “the Armed Forces' money, savings, and allocations are not affected” and their spending would even increase. Accordingly, the Engineering Authority of the Armed Forces granted many public projects; the military enterprises cut business deals with different state institutions without competitive public tenders; ex-generals were kept hired in the top bureaucratic posts.⁵⁷⁶

This complicated relationship between the Egyptian military and the MB was a principal source of instability throughout the transition. Their long history of struggle, their contradicting political views and interests, and their institutional culture characterised by hegemonic tendency prevented them from reaching an enduring agreement to determine their “spheres of influence” – a matter that would yield a hybrid or flawed democracy, yet more stable regime.

Feeling locked out the power-sharing arrangements, the secularist political forces also developed a complicated position *vis-à-vis* the military institution. In the early stages, many secularist groups accused the SCAF and the MB of cutting secret deals and working together to abort the revolutionary transformation.⁵⁷⁷ Later, a split happened in the secularist trend position: on the one hand, the traditional parties generally attempted

⁵⁷⁵ Abul-Magd, *Militarizing the Nation*, 209-210.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 210-213.

⁵⁷⁷ Bishārah, *thawrat maṣr* ('*al-juz*' '*al-thānī*'), 138-139.

to have the SCAF's support for their demand for the supra-constitutional document; while, on the other hand, the more revolutionary groups were mobilising people against the SCAF's transitional administration and vocally chanted the downfall of the military rule.

Nevertheless, after the presidential elections, the secularist trend started to come closer to the military as it was the only institution that could counterbalance the Islamist power. Although many secularist groups, such as the April 6th Youth Movement, sided with the MB candidate *Mursī* in the second round against the old regime candidate 'Ahmed Shafiq, they rapidly turned against him because they felt that they had been betrayed.⁵⁷⁸ The opposition accused *Mursī* of not keeping the promises he made in the Fairmont Accord and following exclusionary policies against the opposition; therefore, they mobilised people against him, especially after the Constitutional Declaration of November 2012.⁵⁷⁹

When the constitution was approved by a popular referendum, the conflict between the secularist opposition and the President turned into a zero-sum game.⁵⁸⁰ The secularist trend became convinced that the Islamists would always win the elections thanks to their ability to manipulate people's religiosity – in their opinion – and that a military intervention was the only way to remove the MB from power.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷⁸ Donatella Della Porta, *Where Did the Revolution Go? Contentious Politics and the Quality of Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 268-269.

⁵⁷⁹ Bishārah, *thawrat maṣr* ('al-juz' 'al-thānī), 287.

⁵⁸⁰ 'Abdul-Fattāḥ Mādī, 'al'unf wa 'alḥawul 'aldīmuqrāfī ba'd 'althawrah (Cairo, Dar Al Bshir, 2015), 69.

⁵⁸¹ Tarek Masoud, "Egypt" in *The Middle East*, ed. Ellen Lust (California; London: SAGE Publications, 2017), 716-717.

Afterwards, most of the secularist forces insisted on the stepdown of the President and organisation of a snap election.⁵⁸² In March and April 2013, the call for the military intervention to secure the country was repeated many times by leading figures of the opposition, and some groups launched popular campaigns to make procurations for the Minister of Defence to take over the power.⁵⁸³ Furthermore, after the coup, it was uncovered that some parties within the NSF, the main secularist opposition group at that time, collaborated with the military generals for months to achieve their common goal of deposing President *Mursī*.⁵⁸⁴

To conclude, in the Tunisian case, both the Islamists and secularists enjoyed a relative bargaining position. The old regime maintained its presence during the transitional period essentially in the form of offspring political parties while the guardian institutions were not directly involved in the power struggle. This led to an initial period of instability before all parties decided to compromise by resorting to their second-best option: the EMP accepted to give up the government and mitigate the articles related to the *Sharī'ah* in the constitution; while the secularist opposition agreed to keep the ANC working until the approval of the constitution and to form a non-partisan government of technocrats.

The transition in Egypt fits more closely to the non-cooperative model of McFaul; nevertheless, it did not result in the establishment of a stable regime based on the

⁵⁸² Bishārah, *thawrat maṣr* ('*al-juz*' '*al-thānī*'), 290.

⁵⁸³ Bashīr 'Abdul-Fattāh, "'istid'ā' lil-jaish 'am hurūb min 'alsiyāsah", *Al Jazeera Net*, 7 March 2013 <https://bit.ly/2Gte0Ow> (accessed 27 January 2020).

⁵⁸⁴ Abou El Fadl, "Failure of a Revolution" in *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring*, 266.

"wa fī riwāyah 'ukhrā | 'alduktūr muḥammad 'albarād'ī | 'alḥalaqah 'alrābi'ah", YouTube video, 1:05:05, '*altilifizūn 'al'arabī - Alaraby TV*, 28 January 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_OfixW9vt_c (accessed 27 January 2020).

preferences of the most powerful political faction. As Casper and Taylor theorised, the overwhelmed groups pushed back and acted as spoilers. When the Islamists were in a stronger bargaining position after their successive electoral victories, they were not keen to reach a compromise with the opposition. Then, when the secularist political groups became powerful enough thanks to the guardian institutions, they did not seek a middle ground; they denied the President's repeated invitations for national dialogues and pushed for a military coup to get rid of their Islamist rivals.

5.2.2 The Maturity and the Plurality of the Civil Society

During the transitional period, the CSOs usually play many vital roles. At first place, trade unions, professional associations, human rights organisations, and grassroots movements are key forces in mobilising people to induce a breakthrough within the authoritarian regime. Then, they take part in the process of making the new rules of the game, trying to defend the interests of their constituencies. As mentioned before, the more the civil society is hierarchical and organised, the more legitimacy and power it has to represent its clientele and enforce its agenda.

However, what concerns this thesis more is a peculiar function served by the civil society during the transition: mediation between the rival political forces. This requires a civil society that is not only well-developed and influential but also trusted and relatively autonomous from the political parties. In other words, the hypothesis examined here is that the Tunisian civil society was more able to efficiently mediate the conflict between the Islamists and the secularists, because it was more mature, plural, and autonomous than its Egyptian counterpart.

Concerning how mature civil society is, it seems that, quantitatively, both Egypt and Tunisia have a vivid civil society. In Egypt, the database of the Ministry of Social Solidarity in 2012 showed that the registered CSOs were 37,500.⁵⁸⁵ Another estimate by the Institute of Development Studies in 2011 stated that there were over 45,000 registered CSOs as follows: 30,000 civic associations; 13,000 agricultural, housing, and water cooperatives; 5,400 youth and sports centres; 115 trade and industry chambers; 24 professional syndicates; and 22 labour unions. Moreover, according to the estimation of some experts, the number of unregistered CSOs in 2011 was about 50,000.⁵⁸⁶

In Tunisia, according to the official Centre for Information, Training, Studies, and Documentation on Associations (IFEDA), there were nearly 10,000 registered associations in January 2011. Then, the number of organisations jumped in the aftermath of the uprisings to reach 14,966 associations in early 2013.⁵⁸⁷ This surge occurred primarily in specific sectors: charity and relief (1130 new associations), cultural and artistic associations (1018 new associations), development (935 new associations), and human rights (310 for citizenship associations, 190 for rights associations, and 68 women's associations). Most of the charitable and cultural associations have religious and ideological affiliations.⁵⁸⁸

⁵⁸⁵ "2012 CSO Sustainability Index for The Middle East and North Africa", *United States Agency for International Development*, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/2012_MENA_CSOSI.pdf (accessed 3 February 2020).

⁵⁸⁶ "2011 CSO Sustainability Index for The Middle East and North Africa", *United States Agency for International Development*, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/2011_MENA_CSOSI.pdf (accessed 3 February 2020).

⁵⁸⁷ "Study on Civil Society Organisations in Tunisia", *Foundation For the Future*, January 2013, <http://africanphilanthropy.issuefab.org/resources/20291/20291.pdf> (accessed 3 February 2020).

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

Based on the parameter of self-reported membership in voluntary organisations, although both countries had significantly low rates, Tunisia showed more citizens' engagement in civil society in comparison to Egypt according to the Wave VI of the World Value Survey conducted in 2013 (table no. 11).

Civil Society Sector	Egypt ⁵⁸⁹			Tunisia ⁵⁹⁰		
	Not a member	Inactive member	Active member	Not a member	Inactive member	Active member
Religious Organisations	99.2%	0.4%	0.4%	98.4%	1%	0.6%
Labour Unions	99.7%	-	0.3%	98.1%	1.6%	0.3%
Professional Associations	99.5%	0.1%	0.3%	98.2%	1.3%	0.5%
Humanitarian or Charitable Organisations	99.5%	0.1%	0.4%	98.9%	0.7%	0.3%
Environmental Organisations	99.7%	-	0.3%	99.3%	0.6%	0.2%
Art, Music, or Educational Organisations	99.7%	0.1%	0.8%	96.1%	2%	1.9%
Sport or Recreational Organisations	99.7%	-	0.3%	94.5%	3.3%	2.2%

Table 11. Comparing the rate of citizens' membership in voluntary organisations in Egypt and Tunisia according to the World Value Survey, Wave VI

Qualitatively, the civil society in both countries was severely weakened owing to the restrictive political and legal environments under the pre-transition authoritarian regimes. For example, Egyptian civil society under *Mubārak's* presidency suffered from limited human and financial resources, poor governance, low professionalism, absence of transparency, and insufficient expertise. Even, after the January Revolution,

⁵⁸⁹ "Wave VI – Egypt 2013", *World Value Survey*, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp> (accessed 3 February 2020).

⁵⁹⁰ "Wave VI – Tunisia 2013", *World Value Survey*, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp> (accessed 6 January 2020).

according to the USAID report in 2011, the civil society evaluation remained negative in most of the assessment parameters: legal environment, organisational capacity, advocacy, and public image. It only evolved in service provision and infrastructure parameters.⁵⁹¹

Despite the improvement in the political environment during the transitional period, civil society remained targeted by the military-dominated transitional administration. It staged a negative campaign against the CSOs, especially those working in human rights and political advocacy sectors. It promoted through the media that these organisations received foreign funds to serve subversive agendas and that civil activists were Western agents.⁵⁹²

In December 2011, this hostile attitude materialised in security raids on many local and international NGOs closing a number of them and confiscating their assets. In February 2012, forty-three Egyptian and foreign activists in the field of human rights and promotion of democracy were charged with working without a licence and receiving illegal funds from foreign institutions.⁵⁹³ As a result, the evaluation of civil society in the

⁵⁹¹ “2011 CSO Sustainability Index for The Middle East and North Africa”, United States Agency for International Development, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/2011_MENA_CSOSI.pdf (accessed 3 February 2020).

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, 2, 15.

⁵⁹³ “2012 CSO Sustainability Index for The Middle East and North Africa”, *United States Agency for International Development*, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/2012_MENA_CSOSI.pdf (accessed 3 February 2020).

USAID reports in 2012 and 2013, did not show any improvement as illustrated in table no. 12.⁵⁹⁴

	2011	2012	2013
CSOs Sustainability	Impeded	Impeded	Impeded
Legal Environment	Impeded	Impeded	Impeded
Organisational Capacity	Impeded	Impeded	Impeded
Financial Viability	Impeded	Impeded	Impeded
Advocacy	Impeded	Evolving	Impeded
Service Provision	Evolving	Evolving	Evolving
Infrastructure	Evolving	Evolving	Evolving
Public Image	Impeded	Impeded	Impeded

Table 12. The evaluation of the Egyptian civil society in the USAID reports in 2011, 2012, and 2013

Under *Ben ‘Alī’s* regime, Tunisian CSOs too were besieged and co-opted. The legal environment put severe restraints on the legalisation of funding, assembly, and public activities which hindered the development of an independent civil society.⁵⁹⁵ Accordingly, on its diagnostic report on the civil society during the early stage of transition, the Representation of the EU Commission in Tunisia enumerated many points of weakness and challenges such as inadequate managerial skills, lack of civic culture, insufficient and interrupted financial resources, the weak commitment of volunteers, poor communication and collaboration among associations working in the

⁵⁹⁴ “2013 CSO Sustainability Index for The Middle East and North Africa, *United States Agency for International Development*, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/2013MENA_CSOSI%20Final.pdf (accessed 5 February 2020).

⁵⁹⁵ “Building Bridges: Connecting Civil Society in North Africa”, *The National Council for Voluntary Organisations*, 15 April 2013 https://www.ncvo.org.uk/images/documents/policy_and_research/international/bulding-bridges-report-civil-society-tunisia.pdf (accessed 3 February 2020).

same fields, problematic relationship between the CSOs and the state stakeholders, and limited participation and weak impact on the policy dialogue and decision-making processes.⁵⁹⁶

Nevertheless, the political opening during the transitional period allowed for a remarkable improvement in civil society in terms of its organisational capacity, sustainability, autonomy from the state, and political advocacy. The legal framework for the CSOs was significantly improved; an enormous amount of funds became available from local, regional, and international foundations; dozens of leading global CSOs such as the Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the National Democratic Institute opened their own branches or partnered with local networks of organisations and engaged in capacity building activities; public prestige and popular support were restored; and their ability to influence the policymaking process and the legislative agenda was markedly increased. As an example, eighteen associations were invited to participate as members in the HIROR, including the UGTT, the LTDH, and the ONAT, so that, from the early beginning, civil society was officially involved in the transitional administration. Furthermore, it was reported that approximately three hundred NGOs did participate in the activities of the ANC.⁵⁹⁷

⁵⁹⁶ “Assessment Report on Tunisian Civil Society”, *The European Neighbourhood Policy*, March 2012 <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/assessment-report-tunisian-civil-society> (accessed 3 February 2020).

“Study on Civil Society Organisations in Tunisia”, *Foundation For the Future*, January 2013, <http://africanphilanthropy.issuelab.org/resources/20291/20291.pdf> (accessed 3 February 2020)

⁵⁹⁷ Laryssa Chomiak and Robert P. Parks, “Tunisia” in *The Middle East*, ed. Ellen Lust (California; London: SAGE Publications, 2017), 1485-1468.

Kinga Brudzińska, “Support for NGOs in Tunisia After the Arab Spring”, *PISM Bulletin* 61,656 (2014):1.

The second precondition for CSOs to have an active role in mediating the conflict between political rivals during the transitional negotiation is their plurality and autonomy. Theoretically, for the civil society to be a trusted facilitator of negotiation, it should not be part of the ideological polarisation and have a fair distance from the political parties.

In Egypt, as civil society was argued to be dominated by the Islamist trend and to be too polarised, it could not act as “a credible mediator”.⁵⁹⁸ According to the USAID report in 2011, the MB and the Salafist organisations excel at service provision at the local levels. Through their extensive membership and nationwide informal networks, they were able to efficiently deliver charity services such as food, clothing, health care, and educational services. Therefore, despite negative public image to the civil society, the Egyptian population had a better perception of what the report called “faith-based organisations”. Being involved in party politics, the MB is said to straddle the blurring line between civil society and the political sphere.⁵⁹⁹

The strong presence of the MB in civil society is evidenced by the massive number of the institutions confiscated after the military coup of 2013. In 2018, Egypt’s Committee for Inventory, Seizure, and Management of Terrorist Funds seized 118 companies,

⁵⁹⁸ Al-Sayyid, “The Divergent Trajectories of Arab Dignity Revolts” in *Re-envisioning West Asia*, 200. Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 204.

Masri, *Tunisia*, 59.

⁵⁹⁹ “2011 CSO Sustainability Index for The Middle East and North Africa”, United States Agency for International Development, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/2011_MENA_CSOSI.pdf (accessed 3 February 2020).

1,133 NGOs, 104 schools, 69 hospitals, and 33 websites and TV channels with alleged ties to the MB.⁶⁰⁰

Moreover, during the transitional period, almost all professional syndicates witnessed new elections, in which the MB candidates succeeded to control these syndicates partially or even totally as follows:

- i. In the Engineers' Syndicate, there were sixty-five members of the MB in the higher council of the syndicate, including the secretary-general, assistant secretary-general, undersecretary of the syndicate, secretary of the fund, and most of the committee rapporteurs.
- ii. In the Medical Syndicate, members of the MB controlled the higher council by a vast majority, their independent candidate won the presidency post, and they assumed the key top positions and almost all committee rapporteurs in the syndicate.
- iii. In the Bar Association, despite losing the presidency, the MB candidates controlled two-thirds of the higher council.
- iv. The higher council of the Syndicate of Scientists was dominated by sixty-four MB members who filled the main top positions.
- v. In the Pharmacists Syndicate, the MB candidates won twenty seats out of the twenty-five seats of the council.
- vi. In the Veterinary Syndicate, the MB members in the higher council were twenty-three members.
- vii. In the Dentists' Syndicate, the MB members constituted the majority of the higher council by winning twenty-two seats, in addition to the position of presidency.

⁶⁰⁰ Khaled Mahmoud, "Sisi's Grab for Brotherhood Assets", *Sada*, 5 October 2018 <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77427> (accessed 5 February 2020).

viii. In the Physiotherapists' Syndicate council, the MB members were seven, including the general secretary of the syndicate.

ix. The number of MB members in the Agricultural Syndicate council exceeded thirteen, including the position of general secretary.⁶⁰¹

The MB, also, managed to relatively increase its influence in the labour unions, which the *Mubārak's* regime had previously tightened its grip over to bar the opposition, in general, and the MB, in particular, from having a foothold.⁶⁰² In August 2011, the executive board of the Egyptian Trade Unions Federation (ETUF), which is the only legal representative of the Egyptian workers according to law, was dissolved, as well as the boards of seven of its twenty-three constituent national general unions and 173 trade union committees in implementation of judicial rulings.⁶⁰³ As a consequence, the Minister of Manpower and Migration appointed provisional committees instead of the dissolved boards.⁶⁰⁴

⁶⁰¹ Walīd 'Abdul-Salām, "bil-'asmā' ... kharītat 'al'ikhwān bil-niqābāt 'almihaniyyah ... 'aljamā'ah saiṭart 'alā ghuraf ṣinā'at 'alqarār li-taf'īl dawrahā ka-haiy'āt 'istishāriyyah lil-ḥukomah ... wa 'almustaqillīn: 'alḥurriyyah wa 'al'adālah ḥashad ṭāqatah 'albashariyyah li-'iḥkām qabḍatah 'alā mafāsil 'aldawlah", *Youm7*, 16 March 2013 <https://bit.ly/37Z33QR> (accessed 6 February 2020).

Hibah Kamāl 'Abdul-Ḥamīd, "'al'niqābāt 'almihaniyyah fī 'ahd mubārak wa 'altaḥawulāt ba'd thawrat yanāir", *Beirut News Arabia*, 4 December 2015, <https://www.beirutme.com/?p=15404> (accessed 6 February 2020).

⁶⁰² Joel Beinin, "Workers' Struggles Under Socialism and Neoliberalism", in *Egypt: The Moment of Change*, eds. Rabab El-Mahdi & Philip Marfleet, 68-69 (London; New York: Zed Books, 2009).

⁶⁰³ "ḥal majlis 'idārit 'al'itiḥād 'al'ām li-niqābāt 'ummāl maṣr", *Legal Documents Archive*, <https://temp.manshurat.org/node/3174> (accessed 6 February 2020).

Tāriq Ṣalāh, "lajnit 'idārit 'itiḥād 'al'ummāl taḥil 173 lajhah niqābiyyah tanfizā li-'aḥkām qaḍā'iyyah", *Al Masry Al Youm*, 10 August 2011, <https://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=306784&IssueID=2223> (accessed 6 February 2020).

Joel Beinin, "The Rise of Egypt's Workers", *Carnegie Middle East Center* (2012):7,10.

⁶⁰⁴ "tashkīl lajnah mu'qatah li-'idārit 'al'itiḥād 'al'ām li-niqābāt 'ummāl maṣr", *Legal Documents Archive*, <https://temp.manshurat.org/node/3175> (accessed 6 February 2020).

Interviewee no. 8: February 6, 2020 – Istanbul.

The MB was represented in the new committee running the ETUF by three members (out of twenty-five), including a vice president and the treasurer.⁶⁰⁵ Also, one or two members of the MB – on average – were appointed in most of the provisional boards in national general unions and trade union committees.⁶⁰⁶ Later, during *Mursī's* presidency, the prominent MB leader, *Khālīd 'Al-'Azharī*, was appointed as the Minister of Manpower and Migration, giving the MB more power over the trade unions.⁶⁰⁷

The secularist trend, though, was remarkably active in some civil society sectors such as human rights and democracy promotion. Nevertheless, these organisations were not influential enough because they were a continuous target for security harassment and black media campaigns. Another important sector with a prominent presence of the leftist trend was the trade unions.

Given their mass membership, huge resources, and political significance, the successive authoritarian governments in Egypt saw the trade unions as a security concern and took many measures to keep them under full control. First of all, the ETUF was given the exclusive right to represent the labour unions to allow the state to control the workers easily. Second, to ensure the loyalty of the ETUF leaders, the elections were always rigged to exclude the dissenting voices. Especially in the last elections before the January Revolution in 2006, the level of interference was exceptional because it extended to all hierarchical levels and not just the executive boards. Furthermore, the candidates elected in top positions were either members in the ruling

⁶⁰⁵ Nādīn 'Abdullāh, “‘alḥarakah 'alniqābiyyah fī maṣr: 'alsaiṭarah wa 'al'iḥtiwā' wa ḥudūd 'almuqāwamah”, *Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs* (2017): 11.

⁶⁰⁶ Interviewee no. 8: February 6, 2020 – Istanbul.

⁶⁰⁷ 'Abdullāh, “‘alḥarakah 'alniqābiyyah fī maṣr”, 12.

NDP or forced to be so. Third, from the executive board of ETUF down to the lowest administrative levels, the unions' leaders pursued clientist policies towards specific groups of the workers to maintain a fair degree of support.⁶⁰⁸ Therefore, the ETUF was usually described as “the arm of the state”, “serving the interests of the regime rather than the workers”.⁶⁰⁹

Nevertheless, the tight governmental control decreased the legitimacy of the ETUF amongst workers and gave the leftist activists the room to mobilise them against the neoliberal policies adopted by the *Mubārak* regime. In the last few years before the January Revolution, workers' strikes and other forms of collective actions increased significantly from 202 in 2005, 222 in 2006, 614 in 2007, to reach 700 in 2009.⁶¹⁰

The establishment of independent trade unions was another sign of workers' revolt. The two initiatives taken in this regard were the Egyptian Federation of Independent Unions, which was announced during the *'Al-Taḥrīr* sit-in on 30 January 2011, and played an important role in mobilising workers against *Mubārak*, and the Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress, which was announced in April 2013 and was made up of two hundred trade unions.⁶¹¹ No doubt, the independent unions represented an added value to the workers' struggle during the transitional period; however, they suffered from many

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., 11.

Interviewee no. 8: February 6, 2020 – Istanbul.

⁶⁰⁹ Beinín, “Workers' Struggles Under Socialism and Neoliberalism”, in *Egypt*, 3.

Mona Khneisser, “Civil Societies' and the Arab Uprisings – Prospects for Socio-political Change: A Comparative Analysis of the On-going Tunisian and Egyptian Plight” in *Women, Civil Society and Policy Change in the Arab World Women*, eds. Nasser Yassin and Robert Hoppe, 20 (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2019).

⁶¹⁰ Beinín, “Workers' Struggles Under Socialism and Neoliberalism”, in *Egypt*, 79.

‘Abdullāh, “alḥarakah ‘alniqābiyyah fī maṣr”, 12.

⁶¹¹ Daniel Blackburn, “Trade Unions and Democracy in Egypt”, *International Union Rights* 2,15 (2018): 11
Nādīn ‘Abdullāh, “mabrūk ‘itiḥād ‘ummāl maṣr ‘aldīmuqrāt”, *Al Hewan Al Mutamadn*, 27 April 2013, <http://www.ahewan.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=356438&nm=1> (accessed 8 February 2020).

problems such as weak organisational structures, a relatively limited membership, lack of internal democracy, and internal defections, which hindered their influence.⁶¹²

Consequently, the ETUF remained the most influential representative of workers in Egypt. Furthermore, throughout the transition, it remained resilient in front of any endeavours to reform and persisted under the control of the old regime leaders owing to many reasons: the SCAF objected to any major change in the ETUF leadership; neither the MB nor the leftists had enough labour cadres to fully replace the dissolved boards so that more than 90% of the provisional committees were filled with the cadres affiliated with the old regime; the MB failed to gain the workers' support because it did not offer them a lot in terms of wage improvement and more protective legislation.⁶¹³

The MB also failed to have the support of the independent trade unions because it did not support their Labour Law draft in the parliament. Furthermore, the independent unions were more ideologically aligned with the secularist political parties in the NSF.⁶¹⁴ Therefore, according to Daniel Blackburn, “[n]either the ETUF nor the independent unions wanted the Muslim Brotherhood in power”; accordingly, both of them joined anti-*Mursī* protests on large scales and supported the military coup.⁶¹⁵

To conclude, the civil society in Egypt was too weak, divided, and polarised to act as a trusted arbitrator between the rival political forces. On the one hand, the political and law environment remained unfavourable to the civil society during the transition hindering its maturity, and, on the other hand, the most structured and influential CSOs

⁶¹² ‘Abdullāh, “’alḥarakah ’alniqābiyyah fī maṣr”, 13-14.

⁶¹³ Interviewee no. 8: February 6, 2020 – Istanbul.

⁶¹⁴ ‘Abdullāh, “’alḥarakah ’alniqābiyyah fī maṣr”, 11,18.

⁶¹⁵ Blackburn, “Trade Unions and Democracy in Egypt”, 12.

(namely the faith-based organisations, the professional syndicates, and the ETUF) were part of the political struggle being under the control of either the MB or the old regime elites.

In Tunisia, civil society showed more plurality in terms of ideological inclinations; however, it was generally dominated by the secularists. As for the Islamist trend, it was largely excluded from civil society during *Ben 'Alī's* regime. Nevertheless, the Islamists were relatively active in three sectors: (i) They had a limited presence in the trade unions and professional syndicates, only at the local levels; (ii) They sporadically engaged in human rights activism in collaboration with the leftist trend, especially after forming the *18 October Collectif* in 2005. The most prominent examples of these organisations were the Freedom and Equity Association, the International Association for the Support of Political Prisoners, and the National Council for Freedoms;⁶¹⁶ (iii) The quietist Salafists were allowed to be active in the late years of *Ben 'Alī's* presidency to absorb the religious awakening wave that Tunisia had witnessed in the early millennium. The most notable example of these organisations were the Quranic schools that meant to provide the religious Tunisians with “a safe space to practise and live their faith free from the interference of politics and the violence of ideological conflicts”.⁶¹⁷

The Salafist religious organisations further boomed during the transitional period, and their activities significantly intensified. According to the International Crisis Group report

⁶¹⁶ Bishārah, *'althawrah 'altūnusiyyah 'almajīdah*, 184-185.

Interviewee no. 9: February 10, 2020 – Istanbul.

⁶¹⁷ Francesco Cavatorta, “The Complexity of Tunisian Islamism: Conflicts and Rivalries Over the Role of Religion in Politics”, in *Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings: Governance, Pluralisation, and Contentions*, eds. Hendrik Kraetzschmar and Paola Rivetti, 254 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018).

Interviewee no. 9: February 10, 2020 – Istanbul.

in February 2013, the number of Salafist associations exceeded 150, including the Tunisian Association of Religious Sciences, the League of Religious Scholars and Preachers, the Tunisian Association of Imams of Mosques, and the League of Quranic Associations.⁶¹⁸

Regarding the secularist trend, it can be argued that it had relatively more space to organise and work in civil society under *Ben 'Alī's* regime. On the one hand, the regime did support some organisations that served its own agenda, such as women rights associations. On the other hand, the regime was less exclusive and more tolerant of the secularist opposition in civil society compared to the Islamists.⁶¹⁹

Consequently, during the transitional period, the secularists had the upper hand over civil society as proved by two facts: First, all the CSOs represented in the HIROR were affiliated to the secularist trend; second, the leadership of the UGTT, the by and large strongest and the most influential civil society organisation in Tunisia, was dominated by the socialists and nationalists.⁶²⁰ In December 2011, the first national congress of the UGTT held in the aftermath of *Ben 'Alī's* downfall convened in *Ṭabarqah*. Amongst 506 trade unions representatives, in addition to the twelve members of the outgoing executive board, the estimated number of Islamists was less than sixty.⁶²¹

The UGTT shared a few common features with the ETUF, being the principal and the only legal representative of the working class in their countries and the largest CSOs

⁶¹⁸ "Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge", *International Crisis Group, MENA Report No. 137* (2013): 15.

⁶¹⁹ Interviewee no. 9: February 10, 2020 – Istanbul.

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶²¹ Miḥriz 'Al-Mājirī, "'al' itihād 'al' ām 'altūnisī lil-shughl: mu'tamar ṭabarqah 'alā ṣafih sākhin", *almasdar*, 22 December 2011, <https://bit.ly/2vouULQ> (accessed 11 February 2020).

with 0.6 and 3.8 million members in 2011 respectively.⁶²² Also, both were largely co-opted and infiltrated by the pre-transition authoritarian regime to the extent that they were described as “empty shells”.⁶²³

However, during the uprisings, the UGTT proved to not be “a pure and simple appendage to power” and showed relative autonomy *vis-à-vis* Ben ‘Alī’s regime.⁶²⁴ On the contrary to the ETUF that was involved in mobilising its base to support *Mubārak* and to attack the ‘*Al-Taḥrīr*’ sit-in in the infamous “Battle of the Camel”, the UGTT offices represented the backbone of the structureless public masses that enabled them to organise nationwide transforming the scattered unrests into a full-fledged revolution.⁶²⁵ This role was best manifested in the massive protests which were called upon by the UGTT in *Şfāqis* on 12 January 2011 and in the Capital two days later, which had a decisive impact on bringing down the regime.⁶²⁶

Two factors could explain this relative autonomy of the UGTT: First, the *Ben ‘Alī*’s regime failed to infiltrate and subdue the whole structure of the UGTT. While the regime succeeded in securing the loyalty of its leadership with different measures of co-optation, the local branches and the intermediate chiefs remained mostly independent –

⁶²² Nādīn ‘Abdullāh, “mabrūk ‘itiḥād ‘ummāl maṣr ‘aldīmuqrāt”, *Al Hewan Al Mustamadn*, 27 April 2013, <http://www.ahewan.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=356438&nm=1> (accessed 8 February 2020).

Mohamed-Salah Omri, “No Ordinary Union: UGTT and the Tunisian Path to Revolution and Transition”, *Workers of the World* 1,7 (2015): 20.

⁶²³ Kasper Ly Netterstrøm, “The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy”, *Middle East Journal* 70, 3 (2016): 383.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁵ Vickie Langohr, “Labor Movements and Organisations” in *The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in The Middle East*, ed. Marc Lynch, 184 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.*, 183-184.

Netterstrøm, “The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy”, 384.

Interviewee no. 9: February 10, 2020 – Istanbul.

a matter that created a horizontal divide within the organisation between the top leadership, which was often referred to as the Union bureaucracy, and the base.⁶²⁷

This divide within the UGTT was perfectly depicted by the meeting of the Secretary-General 'Abdul-Salām Jirād with Ben 'Alī in the presidential palace only one day before the latter fled the country. After this meeting, while the UGTT rank-and-file were busy preparing for the demonstrations almost countrywide, Jirād gave a supportive statement to the regime, and some UGTT leaders reportedly sent text messages to their union members to convince them to make strikes “at their offices” and avoid joining the protests.⁶²⁸

Second, the UGTT used to follow a double-prong strategy of appeasement and resistance with the pre-transition regime. In other words, it never totally surrendered to the will of the regime even during its heydays and, at the same, it never pushed the confrontation too far even during the last days of the regime. For example, in the elections of 2004 and 2009, the UGTT leadership declared its support for Ben 'Alī and the ruling RCD party, but it did not stage a campaign for them.⁶²⁹ Also, during the uprisings, the UGTT bureaucracy did not engage themselves in the mobilisation against the regime nor call for a general strike; however, in the last three days, it issued a

⁶²⁷ Bishārah, 'althawrah 'altūnusiyah 'almajīdah, 185.

'Afīfah 'Al-Mannā'ī, "'al'itihād 'al'ām 'altūnisī lil-shughl wa 'al'intiqāl 'aldīmuqrātī", *Arab Reform Initiative* (2016): 4.

Haugbølle *et al.*, "Tunisia's 2013 National Dialogue", 23.

⁶²⁸ Netterstrøm, "The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy", 394.

'Al-Mannā'ī, "'al'itihād 'al'ām 'altūnisī lil-shughl wa 'al'intiqāl 'aldīmuqrātī", 4.

⁶²⁹ Netterstrøm, "The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy", 393.

statement supporting the demands of the uprisers and gave the local branches permission to organise their own strikes.⁶³⁰

This complicated relationship was described by Kasper Netterstrøm as follows:

“The union’s affiliation with the regime was not a passive process nor a stable equilibrium. The lines between those sectors and regions that were more antiregime and those which were more pro-regime shifted over the years. Sometimes the regime gained ground, sometimes the more resistant milieus did.”⁶³¹

Accordingly, the relationship between the UGTT and *Ben ‘Alī’s* regime “fluctuated between cooperation and confrontation” as concluded by a Human Rights Watch report issued in October 2010.⁶³²

During the transition, this fluctuation and double-prong strategy came to an end. Capitalising on the political opening and empowered by its role during the uprisings, the UGTT reached full autonomy. Its independency was further affirmed after holding the elections for new leadership in the *Ṭabarqah* congress. On the contrary to the ETUF, where the elites accounted for *Mubārak’s* regime remained influential during the transitional period, the opponent wing in the UGTT succeeded in entirely replacing pro-*Ben ‘Alī* leaders in the executive board. Ten out of thirteen members were initially denied the right to re-run for their offices after serving two terms, and the elected Secretary-General *Ḥussīn ‘Al-‘Abbāsī* belonged to the democratic leftist trend within the

⁶³⁰ ‘Al-Mannā‘ī, “‘al’itihād ‘al’ām ‘altūnisī lil-shuḡhl wa al’intiḡāl aldīmuqrātī”, 5.

⁶³¹ Netterstrøm, “The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy”, 389.

⁶³² “The Price of Independence: Silencing Labor and Student Unions in Tunisia”, *Human Rights Watch*, 21 October 2010, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/10/21/price-independence/silencing-labor-and-student-unions-tunisia> (accessed 13 February 2020).

Union.⁶³³ The UGTT also secured its autonomy during the transition by refusing the offers to join the interim government and emphasising the Union's nature as an NGO.⁶³⁴

However, the UGTT's political role was quite pivotal. The fluctuating relationship with the ousted regime endowed it both the legitimacy for being part of the revolution and the experience to deal with state affairs due to not being excluded from the policymaking process by the pre-transition regime.⁶³⁵ Therefore, the UGTT during the transition was said to be more than a union, less than a political party; it was not power or counterpower; instead, it acted as a balancing force.⁶³⁶

The UGTT's autonomy *vis-à-vis* the transitional government does not negate the fact that it was an integral part of the ideological polarisation throughout the transition. Once the Troika government was formed, the UGTT became one of the ardent opposition forces. It organised many regional strikes, protests, and sit-ins demanding social and economic reforms.⁶³⁷

In 2012, at least eight regional strikes were reportedly staged by the UGTT offices, as well as the national unions of some sectors such as the National Syndicate of the Tunisian Journalists.⁶³⁸ Moreover, on some occasions, bloody clashes erupted between the unionists and members of the NLPR, which were affiliated with the EMP. The two

⁶³³ Netterstrøm, "The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy", 396. Haugbølle *et al.*, "Tunisia's 2013 National Dialogue", 22.

⁶³⁴ 'Al-Mannā'ī, "al'itihād 'al'ām 'altūnisī lil-shughl wa al'intiqāl aldīmuqrīatī", 7-8.

⁶³⁵ Netterstrøm, "The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy", 396.

⁶³⁶ 'Al-Mannā'ī, "al'itihād 'al'ām 'altūnisī lil-shughl wa al'intiqāl aldīmuqrīatī", 10.

⁶³⁷ Haugbølle *et al.*, "Tunisia's 2013 National Dialogue", 23.

⁶³⁸ 'Ādil 'Al-Thābitī, "tūnis: 'aham maḥaṭṭat 2012, *Anadolu Agency*, 3 January 2013 <https://bit.ly/2UUOkTv> (accessed 13 February 2020).

"wathīqah: 17 dīsambir 2010 - 17 dīsambir 2013 ... krūnūlogiā thawrah lam taktamil", *Assabah News*, 16 December 2013 <https://bit.ly/2OQKjvb> (accessed 13 February 2020).

worth mentioning incidents are the clashes that took place in front of the *Taṭāwīn* headquarters of the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Maritime Fishing in October and storming the UGTT headquarters in the Capital by the NLPR members on 14 December that pushed the UGTT executive board to threaten a nationwide general strike for the first time in decades.⁶³⁹

With the rise of polarisation in 2013, the UGTT did resort to staging nationwide strikes twice: the first was on 8 February after the assassination of *Shukrī Bel'īd* bringing down the first Troika government headed by *Ḥammādī 'Al-Jibālī* and the second was organised after the assassination of *Muḥammad Brāhmī* on 26 July.⁶⁴⁰ Even during the Quartet-sponsored National Dialogue, the UGTT took to the streets many times to force the second Troika government to resign.⁶⁴¹

A member of the EMP executive board attributed this bitter enmity between the UGTT and the EMP to two reasons: First, after its significant loss in the ANC elections, the leftist trend decided to abuse its influence within the UGTT to increase its political weight in the transitional process; therefore, the Union became heavily engaged in partisan rivalries. Second, the EMP failed to respond adequately to the working-class demands or to build a trusting relationship with the UGTT leaders.⁶⁴²

⁶³⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁹ 'Al-Mannā'ī, "al'itihād 'al'ām 'altūnisī lil-shughl wa al'intiqāl aldīmuqrīatī", 14.

⁶⁴⁰ "wathīqah: 17 dīsambir 2010 - 17 dīsambir 2013 ... krūnūlogiā thawrah lam taktamil", *Assabah News*, 16 December 2013 <https://bit.ly/2OQKjyb> (accessed 13 February 2020).

⁶⁴⁰ 'Al-Mannā'ī, "al'itihād 'al'ām 'altūnisī lil-shughl wa al'intiqāl aldīmuqrīatī", 14.

⁶⁴¹ "al'itihād 'al'ām 'altūnisī lil-shughl yuṭālib bi-ḥal 'alḥukūmah", *Al Jazeera Mubasher*, 30 July 2013 <https://bit.ly/38qk1b6> (accessed 13 February 2020).

⁶⁴¹ "al'ālāf min 'almu'āraḍah yatazahrūn dīd ḥukūmat 'alnahḍah", *Al Jazeera Net*, 26 September 2013, <https://bit.ly/2SGZYyp> (accessed 13 February 2020).

⁶⁴² Interviewee no. 9: February 10, 2020 – Istanbul.

Another explanation was offered by Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle *et al.* and Netterstrøm. During the 1980s, the EMP and the leftist trend within the UGTT were competing over the same constituencies: the low-income social groups and the workers, especially after the growing influence of the Islamists within the UGTT. Later, *Ben 'Alī's* crackdown on the EMP helped the left-wing Unionists to win this competition.⁶⁴³ Accordingly, it seems that the contest between the two organisations resumed in post-*Ben 'Alī* Tunisia and the political rise of the EMP awakened the fear of the UGTT's leftist wing from a renewed Islamists' infiltration of the Union.

Consequently, it is valid to inquire here how the UGTT that was deeply involved in the political polarisation and was seen by the EMP "as a wing to the leftist parties" became widely accepted as the National Dialogue mediator?⁶⁴⁴

There is no straightforward answer to this question; however, a few accounts were proposed to explain this. Some referred to the significance of the Secretary-General *Ḥussīn 'Al-'Abbāsī*, who was known to be non-partisan, despite adopting a declared political ideology. This enabled him to show independence *vis-à-vis* the competing political parties and gain the trust of the EMP, especially after his success in convincing the opposition to give up its demand of dissolving the ANC and his acceptance of the simultaneity between the resignation of the second Troika government and the approval of the constitution.⁶⁴⁵

⁶⁴³ Netterstrøm, "The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy", 387. Haugbølle *et al.*, "Tunisia's 2013 National Dialogue", 16.

⁶⁴⁴ Mady, "Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings", 24.

⁶⁴⁵ Interviewee no. 9: February 10, 2020 – Istanbul.

Another factor was the inclusion of other Quartet organisations, namely the UTICA, the LTDH, and the ONAT, which, on the one hand, widened its representativeness and strengthened its legitimacy and, on the other hand, mitigated the tension between the UGTT and the EMP. As *Ḥātim Murād* concluded:

“It is not wrong to say then that the Quartet, through its wise composition, representative of civil society, was one of the guarantors of the official beginning of the national dialogue in a serious way, and one of the causes of its subsequent success... The Quartet embodied in a word, simultaneously an enlarged neutrality, a consensus, a balance and a form of representativeness of civil society, components that have strengthened the support of dialogue both nationally and internationally”.⁶⁴⁶

In sum, during the transitional period, Tunisian civil society was powerful and autonomous enough to effectively mediate the conflict between the Islamists and the secularists in comparison to Egyptian civil society. This can be evidenced not only by the Quartet-sponsored National Dialogue that succeeded in overcoming the political crisis in the summer of 2013 but also by examining the mediation efforts of the civil society in both countries throughout the transition. As an example, in the list of negotiations and national dialogues mentioned in the previous chapter, four out of the nine significant rounds in Tunisia were sponsored by civil society (mainly the UGTT), while in the case of Egypt, it was only one out of twelve: The National Council Conferences. The other sponsors in the case of Egypt were either the government, the military institution, the *ʿAl-ʿAzhar* Sheikhdome, or the MB.

To conclude, the meso-structural variables that influenced the negotiations between the Islamists and the secularists in Egypt and Tunisia can be summarised as follows:

⁶⁴⁶ M'rad, *National Dialogue in Tunisia*, 40-41.

Argument Three: In Tunisia, the relative balance of power between the Islamists and the secularists eventually convinced both parties to compromise, whereas, in Egypt, the power balance initially favoured the Islamists, owing to their successive electoral victories. Then, thanks to the guardian institutions intervention, the balance tilted towards the secularist opposition. In either case, the privileged party felt itself too powerful to seek a compromise with its rival.

Argument Four: Despite being largely weakened and co-opted by the pre-transition regimes and despite being heavily involved in the political polarisation during the transitional period, the Tunisian civil society succeeded in being relatively more developed and autonomous than its Egyptian equivalent owing to a better political and legal environment during the transition and its relative ability to balance its relationship with the political parties. Accordingly, the former was more capable of being an influential and trusted mediator in the transitional negotiations between the Islamists and the secularists than the latter.

5.3 Micro-Agential Set of Variables

The course and outcome of the transitional negotiations, as explained before, are determined by the interaction between confining structures on the one hand and contingent choices made by agents on the other hand. Accordingly, the criteria related to the negotiating elites and their choices are not merely a reflection of structural necessities; instead, they should be addressed as variables on their own.

The hypothesis proposed in this regard is that despite the relatively wider gap between the ideological preferences of the Tunisian secularists and Islamists in comparison to

their Egyptian equivalents, the negotiating elites succeeded to reach a compromise in the former case because they were generally more representative, legitimate, skilful, and pragmatic than the latter.

As explained earlier in the previous chapter, the schism between the ideological preferences of the Islamist and secularist rivals in Egypt and Tunisia was not the same. While the Egyptian Islamists were adopting a more authoritarian and traditional version of Islamism, their secularist rivals were calling for a sort of religious secularism. In Tunisia, although the EMP was advocating a more democratic version of Islamism, the secularist trend was striving to maintain the irreligious pattern of secularism (see Figure no. 6).

According to Casper and Taylor, the outcome of elites' negotiation is influenced by the degree of proximity of their preferences on "a regime continuum".⁶⁴⁷ However, other elites' related variables do also matter, such as the degree of their inclusion in the negotiation process, the legitimacy they enjoy within their constituencies, and their leadership capacity.

5.3.1 Elites' Unity and Legitimacy

This variable is concerned with the degree of inclusiveness and representation of the negotiations or, in other words, to what extent the elites of all relevant political groups were engaged in the negotiations, as well as to what extent those elites have a secure leadership position within their organisations.

⁶⁴⁷ Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 48.

To reach a compromise, Burton *et al.* emphasised the significance of the elites' unity, which means having all the influential elites, or most of them, represented on the negotiation table either through formal or informal communication, and the elites' legitimacy, which means that those elites are affiliated to powerful organisations and their leadership within these organisations are acknowledged. Without having "authoritative elites" who are "anchored in coherent and powerful organisations", they argued, the negotiators will be reluctant to compromise because they will not be sure whether the base of their organisations and their social constituencies – at large – will support them.⁶⁴⁸

In case of Tunisia, most of the negotiations succeeded to include the relevant political forces, especially the crucial rounds, such as the one that gave rise to the establishment of the HIROR in February 2011, *Ben 'Āshūr's* dialogue that gave rise to the Declaration of the Transitional Process in September 2011, and the Quartet-sponsored National Dialogue in the fall of 2013. Out of the enlisted negotiations in the previous chapter, the EMP boycotted only the first round of the National Dialogue Conference sponsored by the UGTT, the LTDH, and the ONAT in October 2012, and withdrew from the National Conference to Combat Violence and Terrorism that were held in June 2013; however, it later joined the signatories of the Conference's final pact. As for the secularist opposition, the Popular Front parties and the Call of Tunisia only boycotted the National Dialogue sponsored by President 'Al-Munṣif 'Al-Marzūqī in April and May 2013.

In Egypt, most of the negotiations and pact-making attempts showed a poor representation of either the Islamists or the secularists, as shown in table no. 13.

⁶⁴⁸ Burton *et al.*, "Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe: An Over View" in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 323, 343.

The Dialogue	How inclusive it was
1. Together we start building: A Dialogue for Egypt (March – September 2011)	The dialogue started with wide political participation from all political spectrum but ended up with a poor secularist representation.
2. <i>‘Iṣṣām Sharaf’s</i> Dialogue (March 2011)	The revolutionary youth groups withdrew.
3. <i>Yahīā ‘Al-Jamal’s</i> Dialogue (April – July 2011)	It was boycotted by the MB.
4. <i>‘Abdul-‘Azīz Ḥigāzī’s</i> Dialogue (May 2011)	Despite the broad participation from different political affiliations, it was boycotted by some revolutionary youth groups.
5. National Council Conferences (May - July 2011)	They were boycotted by the MB and most of the Islamist forces.
6. <i>‘Alī ‘Al-Salmī’s</i> Dialogues (August - November 2011)	Only the Salafist Light Party boycotted the first sessions, then all the Islamists, as well as some secularist parties withdrew from the following sessions.
7. <i>Sāmī ‘Anān’s</i> Dialogue (October 2011)	The main Islamist and secularist parties participated.
8. SCAF Dialogue with the Parliament-represented Parties (March – June 2012)	It was attended by parliamentary parties from all over the spectrum; however, the MB and the Centre Party parties boycotted some sessions.
9. Fairmont Accord (June 2012)	Although the participants were from different ideological backgrounds, they were either independent or participated in personal capacities and were not representing their parties.
10. <i>Maḥmūd Mikkī’s</i> Dialogue (December 2012 - January 2013)	It was boycotted by the main secularist force: the NSF.

11. Minister of Defence's Call for Dialogue (December 2012)	The secularist opposition showed its intention to participate, but the dialogue was cancelled due to the objection of the presidency.
12. 'Al-'Azhar Document to Renounce Violence (January 2013)	The signatories represented the main Islamist and secularist parties.

Table 13. The degree of inclusiveness of the main negotiation rounds during the transitional period in Egypt

Interestingly, the most inclusive negotiations in Egypt were the ones sponsored by the SCAF. Furthermore, during the one-year presidency of *Muḥammad Mursī*, despite successive crises, all the national dialogue attempts were either aborted or boycotted by the opponent secularists. The direct communication between the President and the key opponent figures were almost cut after the clashes of the 'Al-'Ittiḥādiyyah Presidential Palace in December 2012. As a leader of the Islamist BDP put it:

“The one-year presidency of *Mursī* can be classified into two phases: during the first half of the year, the President was politically strong, so he did not do much to contain his opponents. At that time, many of secularist leaders would accept to be appointed as Prime Minister such as 'Al-Barādī, 'Amr Mūsā, and 'Al-Sayyid 'Al-Badawī of the 'Al-Wafd Party. But, in the second half of the year, they felt they were powerful enough to unseat the President; therefore, they denied all his invitations for dialogue and stubbornly dealt with all rapprochement attempts.”⁶⁴⁹

Not only the degree of inclusiveness, but also the leadership legitimacy of the negotiating elites was more clearly secured in the Tunisian case. It can be safely argued that Burton *et al.*'s precondition of having authoritative elites “anchored in coherent and powerful organisations” was adequately met in the Quartet-sponsored National

⁶⁴⁹ Interviewee no. 2: September 12, 2019 – Istanbul.

Dialogue. The EMP, the Call of Tunisia party, and the UGTT were, by and large, the most powerful organisations within the Islamist trend, the secularist parties, and the CSOs respectively, and the leadership of 'Al-Ghannūshī, 'Al-Sibsī, and 'Al-'Abbāsī in their respective organisations was mostly unchallenged.⁶⁵⁰ The significance of the role of 'Al-Ghannūshī and 'Al-Sibsī in reaching a compromise between the Islamists and the secularists led the Tunisians to refer to the agreements of the fall of 2013 as “the consensus of the two sheikhs”.⁶⁵¹

Concerning 'Al-Ghannūshī, he was not only the founder, the main ideologue, and the head of the EMP since its establishment, but also, he also successfully renewed his leadership legitimacy after being elected in the EMP's ninth general conference held in July 2012 by more than 70% of votes.⁶⁵² 'Al-Ghannūshī succeeded to remain the uncontested leader of the EMP throughout the transitional period despite the tension that happened between him and Prime Minister Ḥammādī 'Al-Jibālī in February 2013 that led to the latter's resignation.⁶⁵³

On the one hand, 'Al-Ghannūshī utilised his uncontested leadership many times to take serious decisions on his own responsibility without consultation. As an example, during the highest days of polarisation in August 2013, the EMP organised a rally as a show of power to deter anti-Troika opposition. Nevertheless, the Movement's bases, as well as its leaders, were surprised by the reconciliatory tone in 'Al-Ghannūshī's speech contrary

⁶⁵⁰ M'rad, *National Dialogue in Tunisia*, 91.

⁶⁵¹ Monica Marks, “Tunisia”, in *Rethinking Political Islam*, eds. Shadi Hamid and William McCants, 51 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

⁶⁵² “'alnahḍah tu'īd 'intikhāb 'alghannūshī ra'īsā”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 17 July 2012 <https://bit.ly/2T1XESI> (accessed 19 February 2020).

⁶⁵³ Interviewee no. 6: November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.

to the escalation strategy adopted by the EMP. A few days later, this new tendency was materialised in the Paris meeting with *'Al-Sibsī*. Also, *'Al-Ghannūshī* accepted to sign the negotiation roadmap document on 5 October 2013, despite the objection of the EMP's Shura Council.⁶⁵⁴

On the other hand, during the Quartet-sponsored National Dialogue, *'Al-Ghannūshī* was keen to increase the legitimacy of his decisions by forming a Committee of Twenty, which was elected from both the executive bureau and the Shura Council of the EMP to follow up closely and around the hour the progress of the negotiations and to deal with any urgent situations.⁶⁵⁵

'Al-Bājī Qāid 'Al-Sibsī's leadership charisma was also crucial for the success of the National Dialogue, according to many participants. He was entrusted not only by his party's bases and the former regime's affiliates but also his rival: *'Al-Ghannūshī* himself, after their meeting in Paris. Although he did not participate in all the Dialogue meetings, his intervention was decisive on many occasions such as convincing the opposition to accept *Mahdī Jum'ah* as Prime Minister and *Luṭfī Ben Jiddū* as Minister of Interior. Also, his engagement was essential in reaching a consensus over the electoral law.⁶⁵⁶

The third key figure in the National Dialogue was Ḥussīn *'Al-'Abbāsī*, who also enjoyed strong legitimacy within the UGTT. Empowered by being unanimously elected by all the thirteen members of the new executive bureau as Secretary-General and by his strong leadership charisma, *'Al-'Abbāsī* was able to push the negotiating rivals to

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁵ Interviewee no. 9: February 10, 2020 – Istanbul.

⁶⁵⁶ M'rad, *National Dialogue in Tunisia*, 95-96.

compromise.⁶⁵⁷ He also succeeded in gaining the trust of the EMP, despite their long hostility, and to convince them of his impartiality when he guaranteed the simultaneity of the government resignation and the approval of the constitution – the vital precondition the EMP demanded to join the National Dialogue.⁶⁵⁸ “We did not accept the dictates of any party; if we did, the National Dialogue would collapse”, *’Al-’Abbāsī* affirmed.⁶⁵⁹

On the contrary, Egypt comparatively lacked such authoritative elites with secured legitimacy that could make concessions without being afraid of the response of their organisations and constituencies. Therefore, on many occasions, the signatories of an agreement pulled back after being attacked in media and criticised by their bases such as those who signed the Parties’ Document of *Sāmī ’Anān* in October 2011 and *’Al-’Azhar’s* Document to Renounce Violence in January 2013.⁶⁶⁰

The argument proposed in the Egyptian case is two-fold: First, although the MB leadership had a strong legitimacy within its organisation, the MB’s hegemony over the Islamist trend was fiercely challenged by the Salafists. Therefore, contrary to the case of the EMP, the MB leaders were less able to make concessions for fear of losing the support of a significant share of the Islamist bases. Second, the Egyptian secularists were too divided and fragmented to have an authoritative figure with a well-established

⁶⁵⁷ “’intikhāb ḥusain ’al’abbāsī ’amīnā ’ammā jadīa lil-’itihād ’al’ām ’altūnisī lil-shughl”, *France 24*, 30 December 2011, <https://bit.ly/2HPw5Xu> (accessed 22 February 2020).

M’rad, *National Dialogue in Tunisia*, 91.

⁶⁵⁸ Interviewee no. 9: February 10, 2020 – Istanbul.

⁶⁵⁹ “2014 12 26 shukrā ’alā ’alḥuḍūr”, YouTube video, 1:29:29, *Watania Replay*, 27 December 2014 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FD6vQPvHXyA> (accessed 5 March 2020).

⁶⁶⁰ “’inqsām bain ’alquwā ’alsiāsiyyah ḥawl natā’ij liqā’ ’alfarīq ’anān wa ru’asā’ ’al’ahzāb”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 3 October 2011, <https://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=312765> (accessed 22 February 2020).

Interviewee no. 4: October 13, 2019 – London.

leadership such as *'Al-Sibsī* in Tunisia, who was able to convince them to take hard decisions during negotiations deadlock.

For sure, the MB leaders did enjoy a secured legitimacy within their organisation despite some defections happening in the early transitional period. An incident worth mention is the defection of the ex-Guidance Bureau member *'Abdul-Mon'im 'Abul-Futūh* in March 2011, who decided to run for presidential elections independently, contrary to the MB's decision.⁶⁶¹ Also, during *Muhammad Mursī's* presidency, some muted tensions occasionally existed between the presidency and the Guidance Bureau. However, it can be safely argued that the decision within the MB during the transitional period remained – to a large extent – unified. Interestingly, the most charismatic leader and the most influential figure in the decision-making within the MB was neither the General Guide *Muhammad Badī'*, nor the President *Muhammad Mursī*; rather, it was undoubtedly the Deputy-General Guide *Khairat 'Al-Shāṭer*.⁶⁶²

The MB's position within the Islamist trend, though, was always under pressure of the Salafists, which was continuously following an ideological outbidding strategy to increase their support within the Islamist constituency. According to one of the FJP spokespersons, it is not clear why the Salafists followed this strategy:

“Some Salafists did so out of conviction; some to satisfy their electoral bases, and others were manipulated by the security institutions to serve their agenda. After *Mubārak's* stepdown, many Salafist scholars frankly talked about their

⁶⁶¹ Muḥammad Fawzī, “‘istiḳālat ‘abū ‘alfutūh: hal bada’at hijrat ‘iṣlāḥiyyī ‘al’ikhwān”, *Al-Akhbar*, 30 March 2011, <https://al-akhbar.com/Arab/85839> (accessed 22 February 2020).

⁶⁶² Interviewee no. 10: February 18, 2020 – Istanbul.

collaboration with these institutions. Whatever the cause, they played a major role in aggravating the political polarisation during the transition.”⁶⁶³

The idea that the Salafist trend, especially the Salafi call and its Light Party, was politically outbidding the MB was repeated by many interviewees.⁶⁶⁴ According to a leader of the BDP, the Salafi call and its leader *Yāssir Burhāmī* were a main cause of the polarisation between the Islamists and the secularists in Egypt. “They staged a series of protests and public conferences to defend the *Sharī‘ah* during the eighteen days of the Revolution even before *Mubārak’s* stepdown when the *Sharī‘ah* was not an issue, and no one was talking about a new constitution”, he added.⁶⁶⁵

Moreover, when the MB sponsored a dialogue between the Islamist parties and the secularists to reach a common electoral programme and form the National Democratic Alliance, the Light Party withdrew and declared that joining an electoral alliance with secularists is an act of infidelity. Therefore, the Islamic Group organised a scholastic debate with the leaders of the Salafi Call: *Yāssir Burhāmī* and ‘*Abdul-Mon‘im ‘Al-Shahḥāt* and proved their arguments wrong, but eventually, the Party insisted on its position.⁶⁶⁶

Later, during the constitution drafting, the MB was generally satisfied with the *Sharī‘ah* article of the 1971 constitution.⁶⁶⁷ However, the Salafist representatives in the Constituent Assembly pushed hard to have more guarantees for the constitution’s

⁶⁶³ Interviewee no. 3: September 18, 2019 – Istanbul.

⁶⁶⁴ Interviewee no. 2: September 12, 2019 – Istanbul.

Interviewee no. 3: September 18, 2019 – Istanbul.

Interviewee no. 7: December 15, 2019 – Doha.

⁶⁶⁵ Interviewee no. 2: September 12, 2019 – Istanbul.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷ Interviewee no. 3: September 18, 2019 – Istanbul.

Interviewee no. 5: November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.

compliance with the *'Sharī'ah*. In a leaked video, *Yāssir Burhāmī* proudly addressed a Salafist gathering admitting that the Islamist members in the Assembly utilised the “ignorance” of the secularists and the Copts to add some technical terms in the expounding article of the *'Sharī'ah* (i.e., article 219) that rendered the *'Sharī'ah* reference in the constitution more guaranteed than ever before in the Egyptian history. He also stressed that they succeeded to eliminate or – at least – mitigate the terms that have “infidelity” connotations such as civil state, democracy, and citizenship. Furthermore, he assured the Salafist audience that all the freedoms and rights guaranteed by the constitution were restricted by putting the condition of complying with the *'Sharī'ah*.⁶⁶⁸

The relationship between the MB and the Salafi Call during the transitional period fluctuated between cooperation and competition. According to an MB cadre, it has witnessed two turning points: First, in the parliamentary elections, the Light Party's results were a surprise not only to the MB, but also to the Party and its leaders themselves. Afterwards, the party started to gain more self-confidence and to see itself as a parallel religiopolitical force to the MB. Meanwhile, the MB decided to utilise this chance and became more dependent on the Salafists in mobilising people against the secularists and more keen to consult them frequently. Second, when the MB decided to run for the presidential elections, the Salafi Call felt endangered by the possibility of having an *ikhwani* president; therefore, it decided to support *'Abul-Futūḥ* in the first round to avoid the *tamkīn* “empowerment” of the MB, as *Burhāmī* himself admitted.⁶⁶⁹ In

⁶⁶⁸ “vīdīū musarrab yakshif mukhaṭaṭ 'alsalafiyyīn li-'azl shaikh 'al'azhar”, *Al Arabiya Net*, 24 December 2012, <https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/24/256864.html> (accessed 25 February 2020).

Ana Salafy, The Multimedia Section, Al Sheikh Yasser Burhami, <https://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=37004#> (accessed 25 February 2020).

⁶⁶⁹ Interviewee no. 10: February 18, 2020 – Istanbul.

May 2012, during the first round of the presidential elections, *Burhāmī* clearly said in one of his public sermons: “If the Brothers get empowered, they will eliminate the Salafi Call. I know that for sure, based on my long experience with them”.⁶⁷⁰

Later, during *Mursī*'s presidency, despite their collaboration during the constitution-making and in mobilising their supporters to have it approved, the relationship between the MB and the Light Party continued to deteriorate. The latter became more demanding and more dissatisfied about their share in power (i.e., the number of their ministers and the governors).⁶⁷¹ Also, the party was critical of some of the policies adopted by *Mursī* such as accepting the loan of the International Monetary Fund and rapprochement with Iran; therefore, it started to accuse the President of not being truly committed to the rule of *Sharī'ah*. More alarmingly, the Salafi Call felt that the Minister of Endowments and Religious Affairs was intentionally putting restrictions on its scholars' activities. Eventually, the Light Party decided to support the coup against *Mursī*, most probably in a bid to fill the religiopolitical vacuum that the crackdown on the MB would create.⁶⁷²

The Egyptian secularist elites were even more divided and fragmented. Throughout the transitional period, they failed to coordinate their positions owing to their ideological, strategic, and personal differences. As an example, during the parliamentary elections, they disagreed on how to deal with the Islamists: some accepted to join the Democratic

Yāssir Burhāmī, “dhikriāt 1”, *Ana Salafy*, 4 July 2019, <https://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=82053> (accessed 26 February 2020).

⁶⁷⁰ Ranā Yusrī, “vīdīū burhāmī: law tamakkan 'al' ikhwān siaqdūn 'alainā”, *Alwafd News*, 5 February 2013, <https://bit.ly/3a7sDni> (accessed 26 February 2020).

⁶⁷¹ Interviewee no. 10: February 18, 2020 – Istanbul.

⁶⁷² Ashraf El-Sherif, “Egypt's Salafists At a Crossroads”, *Carnegie Middle East Center* (2015): 15-16.

Alliance of the MB, some refused and formed an anti-Islamist electoral alliance: the *'Al-Kutlah 'Al-Maṣriyyah* or the Egyptian Bloc, while others attempted to avoid the identity-based polarisation such as the *'Al-Thawrah Mustamirrah* or the Revolution Continues Alliance.⁶⁷³

As mentioned above, the results of the secularist parties in the parliamentary elections were modest and, more significantly, did not give any specific party or figure the credit to assume a leadership position. Also, during the presidential elections, no single secularist candidate succeeded to gain the endorsement of the mainstream secularist trend: *Muḥammad 'Al-Barādī* withdrew; *'Amr Mūsā* was endorsed by the *'Al-Wafd* Party, *Ḥamdīn Ṣabbāḥī* by his own Party: the Dignity Party, and *'Aḥmed Shafīq* by a few parties including the Free Egyptians Party. Additionally, the leftist trend was represented by two candidates: *'Abū 'Al-'Izz 'Al-Ḥarrīrī* and *Khālid 'Alī*. Moreover, when the secularist candidate *'Aḥmed Shafīq* succeeded to reach the roundoff, he did not unite the secularists behind him. Many secularist parties did not support *Shafīq* and decided to either boycott or even support his Islamist competitor because he was considered as the candidate of the ousted regime remnants or the *'Al-Fulūl*.⁶⁷⁴

The only widely representative secularist entity during the transitional period was the NSF, which was announced after the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. However, it cannot be argued that the Front was too coherent and influential to be the uncontested representative of the secularists, given that many significant political forces did not join the Front. The parties representing the elites of the ousted regime,

⁶⁷³ Dunne and Hamzawy, "Egypt's Secular Political Parties", 14-15.

⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

mainly *Ḥizb 'Al-Ḥarakah 'Al-Maṣriyyah* or the Egyptian National Movement Party of 'Aḥmed Shafīq, and some grassroots movements, most importantly *Tamarrod*, were not included.

Also, it cannot be argued that the General Coordinator of the NSF, *Muḥammad 'Al-Barādī*, had a well-secured leadership position within the secularist trend given that he was not supported by the guardian institutions and the remnant elites of *Mubārak's* regime. Even his leadership was contested by other figures within the Front itself.⁶⁷⁵

5.3.2 Elites' Capacity and Experience

No doubt, having adequately representative and well-entrenched elites is an essential precondition for reaching a compromise; however, it is equally important to have skilful and experienced elites, who can shrewdly manage the negotiation process and overcome the deadlocks. As the transitional negotiations are usually tough and complicated, many scholars highlighted how “the predominance of experienced political leaders”, who are characterised by flexibility, committed to conciliatory behaviour, and perceive politics as a bargain, not a zero-sum game is crucial to reach a settlement.⁶⁷⁶

Accordingly, two main differences between the Egyptian elites and their Tunisian equivalents are argued here: First, the former lacked the qualities and experience to plan and execute a professional negotiation; second, the Egyptian MB leaders were less pragmatic and flexible than those of the EMP; therefore, they were less willing and able to compromise.

⁶⁷⁵ Interviewee no. 7: December 15, 2019 – Doha.

⁶⁷⁶ Burton *et al.*, “Introduction” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 3,18.

⁶⁷⁶ Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 11.

In Egypt, many interviewees, who involved in the organisation of the national dialogues during the transitional period affirmed that one of the major obstacles was the lack of experienced and responsible elites. As one of the leading organisers of the Fairmont Accord and a member of the President’s Advisory Board bitterly said:

“The political, societal, and cultural elites in Egypt did not realise the very nature and the necessities of the transitional period, which is usually characterised by fluidity, uncertainty, and exceptionality. They brought to the negotiation table all fundamental issues and insisted on including them in the agenda. They entered the negotiations with a politicised ideologised memory, which is preoccupied with the history of the conflicts and points of disagreements. They were not content with the compromise and strived to impose their own agenda. Most dangerously, they allowed their disputes to be transmitted to the very core of society resulting in severe polarisation and societal convulsion.”⁶⁷⁷

Additionally, he described different strategies adopted by both the elites in power and the opposing elites to fail the dialogues:

“On some occasions, the ruling elites – whoever they were – abused the idea of national dialogue either to show that they are keen to accommodate the opposition but without a real intention or for time-consuming and distraction. I used to name those patterns “a political show” or “a smoke bomb” dialogues. On other occasions, some participants “booby-trapped” the dialogue and geared the discussions away from the settled agenda toward too foundational or too controversial issues to subvert any attempt for agreement and avoid any commitment.”⁶⁷⁸

Poor preparation and execution of the dialogues were also affirmed by an MB interviewee, who was part of many negotiation sessions:

⁶⁷⁷ Interviewee no. 1: September 9, 2019 – Istanbul.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid.

“Many of the negotiation documents failed to resolve the successive political crises because they were neither properly prepared nor adequately discussed; therefore, the signatories did not bind themselves with their promises and, at the first chance, re-negotiated them again.”⁶⁷⁹

Apart from the complexity of the transitional negotiation itself, it seems that psychological barrier and the distrust between the Islamist and the secularist elites in Egypt was massive, and the efforts exerted for trust-building before any negotiation was insufficient.

The Egyptian secularist academician *‘Izziddīn Fishīr* accurately described the stereotyped image the Arab Islamists and secularists had of each other. For Islamists, he argued, secularists are “a product of Western cultural imperialism and patronage”, and secularism is “an aberration” or “a virus that infected Muslim societies”. As they are alien to the Muslim communities, the Islamists believe that secularists are hypocrites, calling for democracy as lip service but, as a matter of fact, they support autocracy because they have no other chance. Accordingly, both jihadists and moderate Islamists have the common goal of eliminating secularism from their community; only the latter is more gradualist and peaceful.⁶⁸⁰

From their side, the secularists also see Islamism as an aberration and “a travesty of both politics and Islam”. Also, for them, the Islamic state is “the extreme version of what this dangerous conflation [between religion and politics] can achieve”. Their explanation of the Islamist phenomenon is a combination of ignorance, failed socio-economic

⁶⁷⁹ Interviewee no. 3: September 18, 2019 – Istanbul.

⁶⁸⁰ Ezzedine C. Fishere, “The Middle East’s Warring Factions Need To Find a Way To Coexist”, *The Washington Post*, 12 January 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/01/13/middle-east-warring-factions-need-find-way-coexist/> (accessed 2 March 2020).

development, historical frustration, and foreign intervention; therefore, these illnesses had to be addressed to eradicate this phenomenon.⁶⁸¹

This negative stereotyped image has another dimension, described by an MB leader:

“Both Islamists and secularists had a feeling of entitlement to run the country after *Mubārak*. The Islamists got that feeling thanks to their huge sacrifices and protracted struggle against the ousted regime, their strong social base, and their decisive electoral victories. On the other hand, secularists felt that they own the revolution and are more intellectually and politically capable of running the country even without an electoral mandate. Therefore, especially after the presidential elections, they showed disrespect to President *Mursī*. Their stance is best described by the Quranic expression in the story of *Talut*: “How can he have kingship over us while we are more worthy of kingship than him?” (2:247). As they could not express these feelings openly, they showed their discontent by stirring up the problems, sometimes for good reasons and sometimes not. It’s true that the MB had a feeling of superiority, but other political forces had an unjustified feeling of parity.”⁶⁸²

Mending the ties and improving the mutual perception of both rivals was supposed to be a mandatory step before any serious negotiation; however, what happened throughout the transition widened the gaps and deepened the mistrust for three reasons: First, the MB, according to its opponents, did not keep its word many times. It promised not to run for more than 40% of the parliament seats, not to field a presidential candidate, to appoint a diverse presidential team, and to reconsider the composition of the Constituent Assembly after having the President in office. Even, in the Constituent

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

⁶⁸² Interviewee no. 3: September 18, 2019 – Istanbul.

Assembly, the MB leaders promised to approve the articles unanimously but, at the last moment, they went for the simple majority.⁶⁸³

Second, according to many sources, the MB leaders sometimes showed disrespect and behaved arrogantly with other political forces. For instance, during the negotiations of the Democratic Alliance Coalition, the representative of the Islamic Group complained of the way he was treated and outrageously declared the Group's withdrawal in media saying, "there was no freedom nor justice in this Coalition."⁶⁸⁴ Also, the Coordinator of the National Front for Completing the Revolution mentioned that the behaviour of the MB's representatives was one of the causes of the tension between the Front members and the MB.⁶⁸⁵

Third, the street clashes and the language of intimidation prevailed most of the transitional period and intensified from November 2012 till the coup. According to a secularist figure, Islamists' practices were really frightening. During the "Friday of Kandahar" in July 2011, as an example, the Islamist protestors chanted for '*Usāmah Ben Lādin*'; during the Islamists' besiege of the SCC in December 2012, the mob chanted: "O' *Mursī!* Give us an order, and we will bring you their dead bodies" – meaning the SCC judges. Another example, during the conference of Syria in June 2013, a Salafist scholar cursed the secularist opposition and referred to those who would participate in the 30 June demonstrations as hypocrites and infidels in the presence of the President. In addition to that, many scholars were continuously intimidating the secularists on Islamist TV stations. One of them issued a fatwa that,

⁶⁸³ Interviewee no. 7: December 15, 2019 – Doha.

⁶⁸⁴ Interviewee no. 2: September 12, 2019 – Istanbul.

⁶⁸⁵ Interviewee no. 1: September 9, 2019 – Istanbul.

according to the rulings of *'Al-Shari'ah*, the members of the NSF should be sentenced to death.⁶⁸⁶

From the other perspective, in the Islamist telling of the events, the secularist parties were over-demanding and uncompromising because it was emboldened by and colluded with the guardian institutions. Sometimes, they misunderstood or misinterpreted the MB promises as what happened with the Fairmont Accord. On other occasions, they intentionally fabricated problems and unjustly accused the MB of exclusion. In the second Constituent Assembly, as an example, all members (i.e., the hundred principal members and the fifty spare names) were consensually chosen by name, including the head of the Assembly, his five deputies, the secretary-general, and the rapporteurs of the main subcommittees. However, this did not prevent the secularists from later complaining of being under-represented and marginalised.⁶⁸⁷

Also, it was the secularist opposition who frequently resorted to violence and blatantly formed quasi-military groups such as the Black Block; meanwhile, the MB was committed to self-discipline. In this telling, the Group response to the attacks on its members that led to tens of casualties, setting fires in many of its headquarters nationwide, and the attempt to storm the presidential palace in December 2012 was minimal.⁶⁸⁸ Even the secularist political parties at that time did not outspokenly condemn the violence against the MB, let alone to make any attempts to stop it.⁶⁸⁹

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁷ Interviewee no. 3: September 18, 2019 – Istanbul.

Interviewee no. 5: November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.

⁶⁸⁸ Interviewee no. 10: February 18, 2020 – Istanbul.

⁶⁸⁹ Interviewee no. 7: December 15, 2019 – Doha.

Furthermore, the secularists-run media outlets were not less hostile, nor aggressive than the Islamists'. They played a major role in fueling the anger of the people against the MB rule, and some of them used to spread fake news against President *Mursī* and his family. This unprofessional and biased behaviour could be explained by the fact that most of the private TV stations were owned by businessmen who were affiliated to *Mubārak's* regime and were accused of corruption during his reign.⁶⁹⁰

In Tunisia, the psychological barrier, the degree of mistrust, and the level of violence were almost the same. The Troika government was accused by its opponents of not keeping its promise by passing the one-year mandate of the ANC and did not respect the deadline for delivering power many times. Also, the EMP was accused of forming an informal militia: the NLPR that was involved in many violent incidents. The tension in the relationship between the Troika and its opposition reached its peak with the assassination of the two prominent leftist figures: *Shukrī Bel'īd* and *Muḥammad Brāhmī*. Although the EMP was not involved, it was accused by the secularist opposition of holding political and moral responsibility.

What made the negotiations efficient and the compromise possible, though, was the good preparation and management of the Quartet Committee. The four organisations, especially the UGTT and the UTICA, were expert at mediating conflicts and managing dialogues, being routinely involved in negotiations of the unions and the government.⁶⁹¹

⁶⁹⁰ "Mursī we 'Al-'l'ām ... 'Itihāmāt mutabādalāh", *Al Jazeera Net*, 30 June 2013 <https://bit.ly/39FOD87> (accessed 5 April 2020).

Fatima El-Issawi, "The Role of Egyptian Media in the Coup" in *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2014* (Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2014): 302.

⁶⁹¹ M'rad, *National Dialogue in Tunisia*, 92.

The process of trust-building and warming the relationship between the EMP and many secularist parties goes back to the 18 October *Collectif*, according to a member of the EMP executive bureau. Between 2005 to 2009, the controversial issues between both rivals were discussed, such as the EMP's view of the state, democracy, and women rights. On some occasions, these meetings looked like inquisitions, but eventually, it led to a rapprochement with a part of the secularist trend.⁶⁹²

Additionally, before the National Dialogue, many measures were taken to bring both rivals together after the communication between them had stopped entirely. The face-to-face meeting between 'Al-Ghannūshī and 'Al-Sibsī in Paris and the closed meetings between Ḥussīn 'Al-'Abbāsī and 'Alī 'Al-'Arrayyid are just but examples. According to 'Al-'Abbāsī, the National Dialogue composed of tens of open sessions that lasted 164 hours in total, while the preparatory, bilateral and multilateral, closed meetings were around two-thousand hours.⁶⁹³

Building trust was not only needed between the negotiating groups, but also between the EMP and the Quartet Committee itself. For some leaders of the EMP, the Committee was just a tool to execute the coup against the Troika.⁶⁹⁴ The President of the ONAT, *Muḥammad Fāḍil Maḥfūz*, utterly denied this accusation:

⁶⁹² Interviewee no. 6: November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.

⁶⁹³ “ḥusain ‘abbāsī ‘uḍu rubā‘iayt ‘alḥewarāt ‘altūnusī ‘alḥā‘izah ‘alā jā‘zat nubil yulqī kalimah fī ‘almajlis ‘al’aṭlantī”, YouTube video, 27:30, *Aljazeera Mubasher*, 4 November 2014 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nmOFn6VGx9o> (accessed 5 March 2020).

⁶⁹⁴ Interviewee no. 6: November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.

“It was not true that the Quartet-sponsored National Dialogue was designed against the Troika government, the President, or any particular movement. Our goal was to overcome an impasse and speed up the slow transition.”⁶⁹⁵

Widād Boū Shamāwī, the head of UTICA, affirmed that by stating that the anti-Troika opposition was demanding the immediate dissolution of the three interim powers: The president, the ANC, and the government, but the Quartet Committee rejected these demands. “The problem was mainly with the poor performance of the government”, as she explained, “but the ANC was kept until it accomplished its mission of drafting the constitution”.⁶⁹⁶

The Quartet Committee also was skilful at managing the Dialogue and bypassing the deadlocks. *ʿAbdul-Sattār Ben Mūsā*, the President of the LTDH, mentioned that the Committee members used to hold a preparatory meeting before each session to discuss the agenda and examine possible scenarios to come up with a unified position.⁶⁹⁷

The one who was given most of the credit among the Quartet Committee was definitely *Ḥussīn ʿAl-ʿAbbāsī*. An EMP leader described him as a person who does not easily give up or affords failure.⁶⁹⁸ Other participants described how strict and tough he was during the sessions that sometimes lasted twelve or thirteen hours; “he never stops discussing

⁶⁹⁵ “2014 12 26 shukrā ʿalā ʿalḥuḍūr”, YouTube video, 1:29:29, *Watania Replay*, 27 December 2014 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FD6vQPvHXyA> (accessed 5 March 2020).

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ Interviewee no. 9: February 10, 2020 – Istanbul.

a problem until they come to a solution. He sometimes did not let anyone leave the room until we approached a solution”.⁶⁹⁹

ʿAl-ʿAbbāsī mentioned how he used different strategies to push the steadfast parties to make concessions. “When the National Dialogue reached a deadlock, we shifted to plan B and took the street to change the balance of power and force the Troika government to compromise”, he explained.⁷⁰⁰

On another occasion, when the negotiators failed to reach an agreement on a nominated Prime Minister, he went to a press conference and announced that the Dialogue was suspended. Then, he gave the negotiators a final ultimatum on 14 December 2013 to agree; otherwise, he warned them that the National Dialogue would stop permanently and threatened that the names of those who implicated in its failure would be uncovered to claim his/her responsibility in front of the Tunisian people.⁷⁰¹

As *Najīb ʿAl-Shabbī*, the leader of the Republican Party, rightly concluded: “if the Quartet has played an important role, in the Quartet we must attribute a special role to the UGTT, and within the UGTT a special role to *Abbassī*”.⁷⁰²

The second difference between the Egyptian and Tunisian elites is related to the Islamist leaders’ flexibility and pragmatism. As mentioned before, the moderate and reconciliatory attitude of the Tunisian Islamists was repeatedly highlighted in many

⁶⁹⁹ Mʿrad, *National Dialogue in Tunisia*, 91.

⁷⁰⁰ “2014 12 26 shukrā ʿalā ʿal-ḥuḍūr”, YouTube video, 1:29:29, *Watania Replay*, 27 December 2014 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FD6vQPvHXyA> (accessed 5 March 2020).

⁷⁰¹ “alnadwah ʿal-shuḥufiyyah li-ḥusain ʿal-abbāsī bi-lughat ʿalwaʿid wa ʿaltahdīd”, YouTube video, 6:29, *Akḥbar asaa*, 4 December 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btQpZLZIkjk> (accessed 5 March 2020).

⁷⁰² Mʿrad, *National Dialogue in Tunisia*, 92.

works as a cause of the Tunisian transition survival.⁷⁰³ However, this argument is too generalised and vague. It needs more elaboration on what moderation in this context means, how the pragmatic attitude was manifested in the Islamists' choices and strategies, and more essentially, to whom exactly they referred among the Islamist elites in both countries.

Starting with the last point, as previously stated, the EMP was, by and large, the most organised and influential organisation within the Tunisian Islamist trend, and 'Al-Ghannūshī was the most charismatic leader within the Movement. In the case of Egypt, the Salafists enjoyed a more prominent presence and influence than the case of Tunisia. Some Salafist figures had a great impact on the collective Islamists' strategies and political behaviour such as *Yāssir Burhāmī*, the Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board of the Salafi Call; *Ṭāriq 'Al-Zumur*, the Head of the Political Bureau of the BDP; and the independent presidential candidate *Ḥāzim Ṣalāḥ 'Abū-'Ismā'īl*, as well as some Salafist preachers, for example, 'Abū-'Ishāq 'Al-Ḥuwīnī, *Muḥammad Ḥassān*, and *Muḥammad Ḥussīn Ya'qūb*.

Nonetheless, the MB remained the centre of gravity of the Islamist trend in Egypt during the transitional period thanks to many reasons: its huge resourceful well-disciplined organisation, its comparatively long and rich political experience, its strong presence in the professional syndicates and trade unions, being the party that had the majority in

⁷⁰³ Stepan and Linz, "Democratization theory and the "Arab Spring", 22-23.

Schmitter and Sika, "Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa", 15.

Al-Sayyid, "The Divergent Trajectories of Arab Dignity Revolts" in *Re-envisioning West Asia*, 188, 197.

Brown, "Arab Constitutions, the Many Voices of the Public, and the Word of the One God" in *Arguing Islam After the Revival of Arab Politics*, 168.

Mady, "Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings", 30.

both houses of the parliament, being the party that won the presidential elections, and being the party that had the largest share in the cabinet and the governors among the Islamists.

Therefore, it could be arguably stated that the two most influential Islamist elites in Egypt and Tunisia were *'Al-Shāṭer* and *'Al-Ghannūshī*, respectively. Both figures played the key role in charting the strategies and making the choices that affected the Islamists political behaviour in their countries. Even, President *Mursī*, whose position gave him the power to play a more significant role than *'Al-Shāṭer*, was – to a large extent – committed to the strategies and choices of the MB.

According to an MB official, who was routinely involved in coordination between the Guidance Bureau and the presidential institution, *Mursī*, after winning the elections, showed an initial sign of independence when he appointed some members in the presidential team without consulting the MB. Nevertheless, the Guidance Bureau rapidly moved to surround him gently with MB cadres, who filled different positions in the presidential team. Moreover, a Guidance Bureau member was officially assigned the task of coordination between the President and the Group. Later, after the clashes of the *'Al-'Ittiḥādiyyah* Presidential Palace, which was perceived by the MB as an attempted coup, the Group became more involved in the decision-making process, and President *Mursī* became more committed to consulting with it. “The rationale was: if the Group will be called upon to mobilise its bases to support the President’s decisions, it is fair to be involved in the making of these decisions in advance”, he explained.⁷⁰⁴

⁷⁰⁴ Interviewee no. 10: February 18, 2020 – Istanbul.

Consequently, the pragmatic attitude of the EMP in comparison to the apparent MB inflexibility could be partially attributed to the different personality and life experience of their main leaders. An MB cadre who used to work with *'Al-Shāṭer* closely for years and – at the same time – had the chance to know *'Al-Ghannūshī* personally described the differences between the two as follows:

“Both are totally different. *'Al-Ghannūshī* is an intellectual who used to meet with the secularists and who is open to deal with different ideologies. *'Al-Shāṭer*, on the contrary, is an organisational man who spends most of his time managing his organisation. Adding to that, in the last two decades, while *'Al-Ghannūshī* was in exile in Europe, *'Al-Shāṭer* was in prison most of the time. Also, *'Al-Shāṭer* barely attended meetings with the secularists; he usually communicates with them through some mediators. But he was continuously talking to the Salafist leaders and scholars; not only for pragmatic reasons but also because he is leaning more toward conservatism and he was even okay with dealing with some radical figures such as *Ḥāzīm 'Abū-'Ismā'īl*.”⁷⁰⁵

The interviewee remembered an incidence that reflected how *'Al-Ghannūshī* was more resolute in facing radical ideas than *'Al-Shāṭer*:

“It happened that I was visiting *'Al-Sheikh* – referring to *'Al-Ghannūshī* – in Tunisia and he was furious because, in one of the EMP events, an Egyptian preacher affiliated with the MB gave a controversial sermon. *'Al-Ghannūshī* asked me angrily: Why does your guy – referring to *'Al-Shāṭer* – tolerate those extremists and *takfiris* within the Group?! This is what we get from *'Al-Mashriq!*”⁷⁰⁶

The issue of the difference between the attitude of the Islamists of *'Al-Mashriq* and *'Al-Maghrib* was raised by another EMP leader. For him, the EMP was more pragmatic

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid.

because it is the closest Islamist movement to the party-style since its transformation into the Islamic Tendency Movement in 1981. Therefore, it was more politically mature and open than its equivalents in 'Al-Mashriq, which are just pedagogical religious movements with a political interest. "The long history of cooperation between the Islamists on the one hand and the liberal and leftist trends, on the other hand, had an impact on the Tunisian Islamist Movement ideology. Many of those trends' concepts and vocabularies found their way into Islamist discourse", he added.⁷⁰⁷

Another worth-mentioning reason behind the pragmatic attitude of the EMP, according to this leader, was its previous history of severe loss due to political conflict with *Ben 'Alī's* regime in 1991:

"For sure, the EMP was greatly affected by the Egyptian coup, which we felt as if it happened in Tunisia. However, our behaviour was also influenced by the bad memory of the 1991 events. We were always asking ourselves whether we would send thousands of our members to jail again."⁷⁰⁸

Therefore, it is reductionist to attribute the EMP's concessions only to their obsession with the Egyptian scenario. From the early transition and before the coup, the EMP was keener to build alliances with the secularist parties and more open to reconciliation. As mentioned previously, 'Al-Ghannūshī announced that he would accept the Anglo-Saxon model of secularism, which is more religion-friendly than *Būrqībah's* secularism. Also, he said, on other occasions, that the partial secularism, as described by 'Abdul-Wahhāb 'Al-Missīrī, is an essential guarantee against the abuse of religion in politics.⁷⁰⁹

⁷⁰⁷ Interviewee no. 6: November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁹ Brown, "Arab Constitutions, the Many Voices of the Public, and the Word of the One God" in *Arguing Islam After the Revival of Arab Politics*, 168-169.

'*Al-Ghannūshī*'s position stands in stark contrast to that of the MB on secularism. When the Turkish Prime Minister *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan* visited Egypt in September 2011, he encouraged the Egyptians to reconsider their understanding of secularism while drafting the new constitution. He argued that they would realise that the secular state does not mean non-religious, rather a state that shows respect for all religions and gives everyone the freedom to practice his belief. Therefore, he assured the Egyptians not to worry about secularism and advised them to write a constitution that makes the state stands at the same distance from all religions. "The individuals could be secular or not, but the state has to be secular", he affirmed.⁷¹⁰

The MB spokesperson aggressively responded to the Turkish Prime Minister's statement by criticising his understanding of secularism and accusing him of intervening in the domestic issues of other countries. He claimed that the Turkish model does not fit for Egypt, whose people are Muslims to their bones and long for the rule of '*Al-Sharī'ah*', and that Egypt will remain always standing against the secularist trends.⁷¹¹

Accordingly, the MB and the EMP managed their relationship with the other political forces differently. '*Al-Ghannūshī*' was keen to build and maintain the EMP's alliance with secularist parties of the Troika throughout the transition; meanwhile, he tended to differentiate his Movement from the Salafists. '*Al-Shāṭer*', on the other hand, did exactly the opposite.

Ben Hafaiedh and Zartman, "Tunisia" in *Arab Spring*, 61-62.

⁷¹⁰ "'irdūghān yad'ū 'almaṣriyyīn lil-'almāniyyah wa 'al'ikhwān ya'tabirūnah tadakhulla", *Al Alam TV*, 14 September 2011, <https://bit.ly/39x5k6w> (accessed 8 March 2020).

⁷¹¹ Ibid.

'*Anwār Boū Kharṣ* described three different trends within the EMP regarding how to deal with the Salafist trend. The first one believed that the Salafists should be contained within formal politics to urge them to moderate their views and behaviour. The second, represented by some conservative leaders within the EMP, called for collaboration with the non-violent Salafists as they believed that both groups belong to “the same Islamist family”. The third trend objected to rapprochement with them and advocating for a strict policy against the Salafists, especially the violent groups. According to *Boū Kharṣ*, with the escalation of the violence in 2013, the third trend eventually won and became the representative of the official strategy of the EMP.⁷¹²

A leader, who obviously belonged to the third group, believed that The EMP badly managed its relationship with the Salafists:

“Some EMP leaders were pushing to have a close relationship with the Salafists for three different reasons: First, there is a Salafist component within the EMP, who shares with them the same ideology. Second, some miscalculated the political significance of the Salafists and thought that the EMP would expand its electoral base by having a strong relationship with them. Third, some aimed at helping them to be integrated into official politics.”⁷¹³

'*Al-Ghannūshī* arguably was supporting the inclusion strategy as proved by his statements that advocated for the Salafists' integration into politics and attributed their radicalism to the coercive policies of the ousted *Ben 'Alī's* regime. In this context, he attempted to build a positive relationship with the Salafist trend and he even praised

⁷¹² Anouar Boukhars, “In the Crossfire: Islamists' Travails in Tunisia”, *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 27 January 2014, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/27/in-crossfire-islamists-travails-in-tunisia-pub-54311> (accessed 8 March 2020).

⁷¹³ Interviewee no. 6: November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.

them once when he addressed a gathering of Salafist youth saying, “you remind me of my early days”.⁷¹⁴

On the contrary, *ʿAl-Shāṭer* adopted a clear collaboration strategy with the Salafist trend. He aimed at empowering the Salafists so that they could – in return – back the MB against the secularists in their identity-based struggle. Therefore, many sources mentioned that *ʿAl-Shāṭer* encouraged the Salafi Call and other organisations as early as March 2011 to form political parties and that the MB gave the founding members of these Salafist parties logistical training on how to organise and manage their parties.⁷¹⁵

At that time, *ʿAl-Shāṭer* also used an important platform for coordination with the independent Salafist scholars, which was the *ʿAl-Haiʿah ʿAl-Sharʿiyyah Lil-Ḥuqūq wa ʿAl-ʾIṣlāḥ* or the Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights and Reformation. This platform constituted of 119 prominent scholars from different Salafist and ex-Jihadist groups, as well as Azharis. The MB supported the activities of this Body, and *ʿAl-Shāṭer* was a member of its executive board. He was keen to regularly attend its monthly meetings and was described as the mastermind behind its decisions. No wonder, the Body used to support the MB politically throughout the transitional period and, during the presidential elections, it endorsed its presidential candidate.⁷¹⁶

⁷¹⁴ Anouar Boukhars, “In the Crossfire: Islamists’ Travails in Tunisia”, *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 27 January 2014 <https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/27/in-crossfire-islamists-travails-in-tunisia-pub-54311> (accessed 8 March 2020).

Munṣif ʿAl-Salīmī, “alghannūshī - dhiʿb fī thawb ḥamal?”, *Deutsche Welle*, 24 October 2014, <https://p.dw.com/p/1DbWc> (accessed 8 March 2020).

⁷¹⁵ Interviewee no. 4: October 13, 2019 – London.

Interviewee no. 10: February 18, 2020 – Istanbul.

⁷¹⁶ Rāmī Nawwār, “alhaiʿah ʿalsharʿiyyah lil-ḥuqūq wa ʿalʾiṣlāḥ ʿallāʾib ʿalʾasāsī bi-sāḥat ʿalʾislāmiyyīn ... ʿalʾikhwān wa ʿalsalafiyyūn wa ʿaljamāʿah ʿalʾislāmiyyah yantaẓirūn daʿmahā ... wa taḍum 119 qiadiyyā

The relationship between *'Al-Shāṭer* and *Yāssir Burhāmī*, arguably the second most influential Islamist figure, was slightly complicated. Both were keen to have a good relationship with each other: *'Al-Shāṭer* wanted the Salafi Call to support him in his struggle against the secularists, while *Burhāmī* aimed at influencing the MB's decisions by gaining the respect and the trust of *'Al-Shāṭer*. However, their relationship was negatively affected by the fierce competition between both groups in the parliamentary elections in 2012 and by the decision of the Salafi Call not to support the MB candidate in the presidential elections.⁷¹⁷

In comparison, *'Al-Shāṭer* was not very supportive of the collaboration with the secularist trend. This could be attributed either to his ideological commitment and conservative nature or that he did not find the Egyptian secularist elites trustworthy.⁷¹⁸ An ex-MB youth activist, who was in the executive bureau of the RYC, affirmed this fact and offered another interesting explanation:

“On the very day of *'Al-Shāṭer's* release in early March, when I went to visit him, he warned me of the secularists and indirectly informed me that the collaboration with the secularist activists in the RYC should remain confined. At that time, there was no reason for this exaggeration. In my opinion, an essential factor that maintained the MB organisational coherence was the external security threat. After *Mubārak's* overthrow, this defensive narrative was no longer valid;

'islāmiyyā ... wa 'alshāṭir wa 'alzumur wa ḥigāzī wa 'abū 'ismā'īl 'abraz 'a'ḍā'ahā”, *Youm 7*, 3 January 2013, <http://www.youm7.com/896217> (accessed 8 March 2020).

Interviewee no. 2: September 12, 2019 – Istanbul.

⁷¹⁷ Interviewee no. 2: September 12, 2019 – Istanbul.

Interviewee no. 10: February 18, 2020 – Istanbul.

⁷¹⁸ Interviewee no. 10: February 18, 2020 – Istanbul.

therefore, the secularist ‘threat’ was abused by the MB leaders to serve the same purpose.”⁷¹⁹

This attitude was clearly reflected in the MB’s behaviour. A secularist figure stated that the tough exclusive behaviour of the MB became clearer after the release of *’Al-Shāṭer*. As an example, the MB targeted all the candidates of the RYC in the parliamentary elections by fielding strong cadres against them, while it shunned from running in some electoral districts against candidates affiliated with the old regime.⁷²⁰

Contrary to the EMP, it seems that the MB failed to reach or maintain any power-sharing arrangements during the transitional period with the secularists, and almost all its attempts to cooperate or to work with them doomed to failure. The National Democratic Alliance started with forty-two parties to end with only eleven small parties.⁷²¹ The attempt to coordinate in the internal elections of the People’s Assembly committees failed, and the MB took over the majority of the offices after the withdrawal of most of the secularist parliamentary members.⁷²² The National Front for Completing the Revolution that was formed mostly of secularist figures after the Fairmont Accord and meant to be a consultative body to the elected president dissolved itself after one month and accused the President of breaking his promises.⁷²³ The widely

⁷¹⁹ Interviewee no. 4: October 13, 2019 – London.

⁷²⁰ Interviewee no. 7: December 15, 2019 – Doha.

⁷²¹ Quṭb *’Al-’Arabī*, “*’alḥiwār wa ’almuṣālahah fī maṣr: ḍarūrāt ’aldākhlil wa tadakhulāt ’alkhārij*”, *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 26 March 2014, http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/discussionstrategygyptosolvearabworldconflict/2014/02/201422510533447_0365.html# (accessed 26 April 2018).

⁷²² *’Amr ’Al-Nādī*, “*’al’ikhwān yafūzūn bi-ri’āsah ’aghlabiyyat li-jān ’albarlamān ... wa 3 nuwāb min ’alwafd yakhriqūn qarār ’almuqāṭ’ah*”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 31 January 2012, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/148238> (accessed 9 March 2020).

⁷²³ *’Ismā’īl ’Al-’Ashwal*, “*ḥamdī qandīl bi-mudhakkirātih: muḥammad mursī ’alṭaiyyb ’alladhī ’akhlaf wu’ūdah ... fariḥ bil-ri’āsah kaṭīfīl ḥaṣal ’alā lu’bah (9)*”, *Shorouk News*, 3 February 2014,

representative presidential team that was formed of four assistants and seventeen consultants rapidly collapsed. In less than eight months, 60% of the team resigned, and only nine members remained; six of them were MB members. Even before their resignation, most of the team complained of having no clear mandate, marginalised, and not really involved in decision-making.⁷²⁴

To conclude, the micro-agential variables that affected the course and outcome of the transitional negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia can be summarised into two arguments:

Argument Five: The Tunisian negotiations were more representative, and the negotiators had a more compelling leadership within their constituencies in comparison to the Egyptian case; therefore, the Tunisian elites were more capable of making concessions, and the outcomes of the negotiations were more likely to be implemented.

Argument Six: The Tunisian elites succeeded in reaching a compromise because the negotiations were generally better prepared and managed thanks to the experienced and skilful mediators and due to the Tunisian Islamists' pragmatism and shrewdness in managing their relationship with the secularist trend compared to their Egyptian counterparts.

<https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=03022014&id=f1970be7-8dff-449a-aaf8-9112320e8f8a> (accessed 28 July 2019).

⁷²⁴ 'Amr Wālī, "mursī wa fariquh 'alri'āī ... 'istiqālāt bil-jumlah wa ṣalāḥiyyāt ghāmiḍah", *Masrawy*, 23 June 2013, <https://bit.ly/2xIBDHn> (accessed 9 March 2020).

CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to examine the transitional negotiations between the Islamists and secularists in Egypt and Tunisia in order to understand their dynamics and explain the different outcomes in each case study. Accordingly, three main questions had to be answered: What did Islamism and secularism mean exactly in the context of the Arab Spring? Who negotiated with whom on what during the transitional period? And what were the determinants that shaped the negotiation process and affected its result? Afterwards, these answers need to be examined in the light of the previous literature and contrasted with the established body of knowledge in the field of transition studies to find out what this experience could add to the field, if any.

6.1 Making Sense of the Concepts of Islamism and Secularism

Understanding the meaning of Islamism and secularism in the context of the Arab Spring was a chief goal for this thesis. For conceptual clarification, what these concepts do and do not mean were thoroughly examined, and different subcategories of each concept were extensively discussed in the second chapter.

As regards secularism, it was emphasised that it should be differentiated from secularity, which refers to socio-political developments related to modernity. Also, it was argued that to define secularism merely as a call for institutional separation between the state and the church or the privatisation of religion would be reductionist.

Instead, secularisation should be understood as a process of re-definition and re-making of religion in the modern age, and secularism is an overarching concept that

harbours different non-traditional forms of modernised religion.⁷²⁵ Such versions have many features in common, such as their attempt to rationalise religious beliefs, confine its political and social roles, and subordinate the religious to the political. Some extreme forms of secularism, though, believe that modernisation of religion means its abolition and subsequent substitution with another positivist materialistic pseudo-religion.

Accordingly, the secularists in the Arab-Islamic context generally adopt a political ideology that aims at remaking a rationalised, socially confined, and authoritatively controlled version of Islam and seek to use state power in producing and promoting this version.

Islamism should be understood as another version of a modernised religion too. However, the modernisation process, this time, had different motives and gave rise to different products. Islamist ideologies, political parties, and social movements are a few examples of modernisation, and its goal was to maintain the efficiency and the relevance of Islam in the socio-political organisation in the modern Muslim societies.

Similar to secularism, Islamism is also an umbrella concept, under which many variants of ideologies are subsumed. What they have in common is their emphasis on reference to the Islamic *Sharī'ah* and the role of the state in fostering commitment to religion and defending the Islamic traditions and culture. Nevertheless, they disagree on many fundamental issues such as their definition of the *Sharī'ah*, the degree of state intervention, and most importantly, whether it is the ruler, the *'Ummah*, or the *'Ulamā'* who lie at the centre of the Islamic political system.

⁷²⁵ Cady and Hurd, "Comparative Secularisms and the Politics of Modernity" in *Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age*, 3,5.

Although these definitions and categorisations were meant to reach a precise understanding of Islamism and secularism, they could not adequately capture the complexity of these dense concepts. Examining the political polarisation during the transitional period in Egypt and Tunisia proved that Islamism and secularism are not only two sets of ideologies or two rival social movements. Sometimes, they meant to the political actors two different cultures or ways of life. Accordingly, the disagreements between the Islamists and secularists on many occasions went beyond policymaking and power-sharing arrangements and revolved around more foundational issues such as the moral and ethical references in the society, the paradigm of human rights, and the religious functions of the state.

On other occasions, Islamism and secularism can be understood as two political tendencies rather than ideologies: the Islamists are those who are pushing to have the socio-political organisation in more alignment with the *Sharī'ah* and the state to be more involved in the Islamisation of society, and the secularists are those who push to dilute the *Sharī'ah* reference by rationalising the interpretation of its provisions, limiting its scope, and mitigating its legally binding status in the constitution. They also refused to assign the state any task related to the people's religious commitment.

Therefore, as illustrated in figure no. 6, the Islamists and secularists in Egypt and Tunisia were struggling at different points on the Islamism-secularism continuum. It can be argued broadly that the mainstream secularists in both countries were just aiming to keep the *status quo* of the political and social role of Islam and prevent the Islamists from utilising their growing political influence during the transition to change the rules of the game. The Islamists, from their side, sought to push the new regime to be as

Islamicised as much as they could. Eventually, while their endeavours crumbled with the military coup in Egypt, the EMP succeeded to have a more religion-friendly regime in post- *Ben 'Alī* Tunisia.

Perceiving Islamism and secularism as political tendencies by the rival groups indirectly aggravated their struggles. Some secularists believed that the Islamists would keep pushing until they eventually reached the end of the continuum by establishing a totalitarian '*Ulamā*'-dominated Islamist regime when they secured enough power to do so. On the other hand, some Islamists were afraid that the secularists would not stop the top-down authoritarian secularisation until reaching the other pole and installing a totalitarian anti-religious regime.

Not only it was hard to define Islamism and secularism in the case studies due to its multi-facticity: a political ideology, a social movement, a political culture, and a political tendency, but it was also too difficult to categorise different political actors, as well as the pre-transition regimes for many reasons. First, the ideal-types are theoretical constructs that are too simplistic to cope with reality. Second, different patterns of Islamism and secularism co-existed in each case study. Third, the degree of the secularisation of the pre-transition regimes differed from time to time and from one social field to another.

For simplicity, only the mainstream of the Islamist and the secularist trends, who were involved in the transitional negotiations, were categorised and their categorisation was based principally on their proposals for the new regime during the constitution-making process. Concerning the pre-transition regimes, the evolving pattern of the Egyptian and

Tunisian regimes' secularism was traced, and they were classified based on two main parameters: how the state religion and the *Sharī'ah* reference were included in the constitution and the regime's policies towards the official religious institutions, as well as the Islamist movements. Setting these parameters partially eased the process of categorisation; however, it could not adequately reflect the diversity of the ideological variants and policies which co-existed in the case studies.

6.2 Transitional Negotiations During the Arab Spring: New Dynamics?

The chaotic path, poor institutionalisation, and limited outcome of the transitional experience in the Arab Spring make the transition dynamics as described by the third wave literature unfitting. As Brownlee *et al.* suggested, the most fitting model for the Arab Spring transition is the experience of Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s.⁷²⁶ Also, as the course and outcome of the transitional process in Egypt and initially in Tunisia were not determined by the mutual understandings between the key political actors, Philippe Schmitter and *Nādīn Sīkā* argued that the best way to understand these experiences is the non-cooperative model of regime change in the post-communist republics as described by Michael McFaul.⁷²⁷

Although the transition in Egypt and Tunisia shared many common features, they also differed in many significant ways: First, the old regime in both cases succeeded to retain a variable degree of political influence; however, it was through the guardian institutions, mainly the SCAF, in the case of Egypt, while, in Tunisia, it was principally through the offshoot parties.

⁷²⁶ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 18.

⁷²⁷ Schmitter and Sika, "Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa", 18.

Second, the opposition in Tunisia was represented in the transitional administration from the early beginning through the HIROR, while in Egypt, SCAF, according to the constitutional declaration of March 2011, managed the transition singlehandedly for at least one year – until the convention of the elected parliament on 23 January 2012.

Third, as I. William Zartman noticed, during the transitional period in Tunisia, there were multiple centres of power with no dominant political force. On the contrary, the post-overthrow political system in Egypt was bi-polar, dominated by two main forces: the MB and the SCAF.

Fourth, despite the messy transitional period in both cases, the interim institutions in Tunisia: the presidency, the government, and the ANC were more stable and functional in comparison to the transitional arrangements in Egypt, which were spoiled by severe political polarisation and the repeated intervention of the guardian institutions.

Fifth, the transitional roadmap was a matter of conflict in both cases; nevertheless, it was settled by the dialogue in Tunisia through the HIROR and, then, *Ben 'Āshūr's* dialogue that gave rise to the Declaration of the Transitional Process. In Egypt, the disagreement between the supporters of elections-first and constitution-first roadmaps was not resolved by the popular referendum of March 2011 and remained a source of instability throughout the whole transition.

Finally, while the Tunisian transitional period witnessed only one founding elections, which gave legitimacy to all interim institutions, the Egyptian transition witnessed five elections: two constitutional referenda, the elections of the two houses of the parliament, and the presidential elections. Given that each election was organised on

multiple phases and some had second rounds, and that the electoral campaigns were accompanied by intensified political tensions, the Egyptians became electorally fatigued and disappointed from this path that failed to bring back order and stability.

As negotiation was the principal tool to chart the transition and reach a consensus on the new rules of the game in Tunisia, it is argued here that the Tunisian experience fits more in the cooperative model of regime change, contrary to the argument of Schmitter and *Sīkā*. Egypt did witness many rounds of transitional negotiations too, but they were mostly non-productive. The rival parties failed to reach an agreement on the transitional roadmap and the criteria of the new regime; therefore, they attempted to resolve their disputes through either electoral majoritarianism or force. As Burton *et al.* argued that South Africa emerged as an exception during the transitional experience of Sub-Saharan Africa, where negotiations were efficient in charting the regime change process, Tunisia likewise could be the exception in the Arab Spring experience as well.⁷²⁸

By applying the classification of Gretchen Casper and Michelle M Taylor, the Egyptian transition was close to what they named the extreme conflict path. In this path, the transition failed because the negotiating elites followed a roadblock strategy and adopted the winner-take-all approach, and consequently, the outcome was enduring authoritarianism. Tunisia went through a very turbulent transition too because the negotiating elites had divergent preferences and initially followed a roadblock strategy. However, due to a marked change in bargaining power, one party decided to follow a facilitatory strategy to save the transitional process from failure. This scenario was

⁷²⁸ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 177-179.

termed by Casper and Taylor as an intense negotiation path, which, according to them, is associated with a good chance for democratic consolidation.⁷²⁹

The points of disagreement debated during the transitional negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia were numerous. As thoroughly described before, Islamists and secularists in the examined case studies disagreed over how to manage the transitional period, the political, economic, and security policies taken by the Islamist-dominated governments, and the *Shari'ah*-related clauses in the constitution. These disputes were further complicated by the long history of struggle, lack of trust, and psychological barriers as reported by many interviewees.

Two new features in the dynamics of the transitional negotiations can be observed here: First, they almost lacked the military and economic moments as theorised by Guillermo O' Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. The civilian political forces in Egypt were too weak and divided to engage with the military institution in a negotiation about its political and economic privileges. In Tunisia, the military lacked such privileges already; therefore, it was not represented in any round of negotiations. Also, a salient feature in these negotiations was that economic and social justice policies were almost absent from all negotiations agenda. Although poor economic performance and inadequate social security policies were main grievances behind the Arab Spring uprisings, they were largely overlooked by the transitional administration.

Having that said, it seems that the concept of the elite pact as described by O' Donnell and Schmitter doesn't properly apply to the transitional agreements between the

⁷²⁹ Casper and Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy*, 226-243.

negotiating elites in Egypt and Tunisia. Instead, they are closer to the concept of elite settlements, coined by Burton *et al.*, which strictly focus on the political arrangements. However, these agreements in both case studies were not as inclusive as this concept assumes.⁷³⁰

Second, the polarisation around the religious issues was so deep and divisive that it reshaped the stratification of the whole political forces during the transitional period. The classical divide between the *ancien régime* vs. the democratic opposition widely described in the transition literature rapidly shifted to be the Islamists vs. the secularists. The latter included the guardian institutions, the offshoot parties of the ousted ruling parties, and the secularist opposition parties. Accordingly, it is better to describe the four-player transitional game as moderate and extremist Islamists and assertive and accommodationist secularists.

This perfectly fits the case of Tunisia. When moderate Islamists and accommodationist secularists finally took the upper hand and sidelined the other two hardliner groups during the transitional negotiations, compromise was possible. In Egypt, the stratification was more complicated and overlapping. On the one hand, the by and large most influential faction within the secularist trend in Egypt was the *ancien régime*-affiliated guardian institutions. That is why when the SCAF waged a “veto coup”, which usually occurs when “a society moves into the phase of mass participation without developing effective political institutions” in order to maintain the existing order, the

⁷³⁰ Burton *et al.*, “Introduction” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 13-14.

whole democratic transition collapsed.⁷³¹ On the other hand, the main faction in the Islamist trend was the MB, which generally adopted a moderate ideology. Nevertheless, it gradually fell under the growing influence of the more ideologically-strict Salafist factions, and hence, its attitude became increasingly more stringent, especially with the rising political polarisation.

Examining the major rounds of transitional negotiations and national dialogues in Egypt and Tunisia revealed significant differences between the two experiences:

i. In Egypt, most of the rounds addressed in Chapter Four were either aborted or failed to reach a concrete result. Even when the negotiations succeeded to conclude an agreement and produce a document, it eventually proved to be of little political impact, such as the National Democratic Alliance document, the National Accord document, the consensus document of the National Council, *'Alī 'Al-Salmī's* Document, the Parties' Document, and *Al-'Azhar* Document to Renounce Violence.

In Tunisia, many negotiations and national dialogues were aborted or ineffective too. As extensively discussed before, some negotiations, such as the two rounds of the National Dialogue Conference and the National Dialogue sponsored by President *'Al-Marzūqī*, were non-productive. Similarly, a few documents produced at that time, the Pledge of the Republic for example, were politically insignificant. Nevertheless, three principal dialogues succeeded in achieving their goals and keeping the transition on track: the negotiations to establish the HIROR in February 2011, *Ben 'Āshūr's* dialogue

⁷³¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1973), 222.

that gave rise to the Declaration of the Transitional Process in September 2011, and, of course, the Quartet-sponsored National Dialogue in 2013.

ii. As mentioned before, most of the dialogues in Tunisia succeeded in including the major political actors, while in Egypt, the majority of the dialogues witnessed poor representation of either the Islamists or the secularists. Also, the Tunisian CSOs (mainly the UGTT) played the most significant role in organising and mediating the transitional negotiations. In Egypt, most of the negotiations were sponsored by the transitional administration: either the government, the SCAF, or the presidency. The civil society sponsored only one round of dialogue worth mentioning: The National Council Conference.

iii. How the *Shari'ah*-related issues were addressed is another point of difference between the two case studies. In Egypt, most of the negotiations and dialogues before the parliamentary elections focused on the issue of the supra-constitutional principles. The last attempt was the dialogues of 'Alī 'Al-Salmī that ended in November 2011. Interestingly enough, there were no significant differences between the vast majority of the proposed documents in these dialogues concerning the *Shari'ah* article. To enshrine the principles of the Islamic *Shari'ah* as the primary source of legislation and to guarantee for the Egyptian Christians and Jews the right to consult their religious laws in regulating their personal status and religious affairs were common clauses in almost all these documents. Nevertheless, neither of them succeeded in reaching a consensus mainly because the Islamists were categorically against the idea of supra-constitutional principles.

After the parliamentary elections and having the Constituent Assembly installed, the national dialogues and negotiation rounds were mainly about balancing power-sharing and re-structuring the Constituent Assembly. These attempts also failed to reach satisfying results. Later, during *Mursi's* one-year presidency, meetings between the President and the secularist opposition almost stopped from November 2012 and on. During this period, escalating violence became a burning issue, and a few initiatives were futilely organised to contain it.

The debate on matters pertaining to the *Sharī'ah* reached their zenith during the constitution drafting between June and December 2012. Nevertheless, they seemingly were not addressed outside the parliament and the Constituent Assembly; no overt, widely inclusive, well-organised national dialogues were reported to take place during this period. A number of interviewees, though, told about the occurrence of many closed multi-lateral negotiations sponsored by some partisan or independent figures to bring the divergent views closer.⁷³²

For instance, an official in the Constituent Assembly, who was affiliated to the MB, mentioned that there were many informal channels to discuss the sensitive, controversial issues before being discussed in the Assembly committees, especially since all sessions were broadcasted live on the national TV. These meetings, according to him, succeeded to reach agreement on many controversial clauses. On 3 October 2012, he reported, an informal meeting was held in the presence of many secularist members and the representatives of the Coptic Church. In this meeting, the participants

⁷³² Interviewee no. 1: September 9, 2019 – Istanbul.
Interviewee no. 5: November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.

reached agreement on twelve controversial clauses, including Article 219, and signed a document containing the final version for these clauses. A few weeks later, strangely, the secularist signatories pulled back and changed their mind.⁷³³

In Tunisia, two important differences can be observed. First, the idea of supra-constitutional principles was not widely debated during the transitional period contrary to the Egyptian case. Apart from the Pledge of the Republic, which was discussed and approved by the HIROR amid the withdrawal of the EMP and its allies, no serious attempts were made to draft these principles.

Second, the issues pertaining to the *Sharī'ah* started to be negotiated within the HIROR and then in the ANC. However, after the release of the first draft in August 2012, the CSOs stepped in and sponsored many initiatives for national dialogue. Since then, it can be argued that there were three tracks of negotiations which co-existed and worked in synergy: the formal negotiations and dialogues within the committees of the ANC, the publically-organised national dialogues such as the National Dialogue Conferences and the Quartet-sponsored National Dialogue, and the closed bi-lateral and multi-lateral meetings that took place on the sidelines of the other two tracks. For sure, not all these rounds were effective, and sometimes, the negotiations through all tracks stopped altogether; nevertheless, the cumulative efforts of these tracks enabled the rival political forces to overcome their disputes and rescue the Tunisian transition from the Egyptian tragedy.

⁷³³ Interviewee no. 5: November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.

6.3 The Determinants of the Transitional Negotiations Course and Outcome

According to the structured contingency approach, during transitions, agents are competing with each other, as well as the confining structural settings, on the new rules of the game. Which set of variables are more significant, though, is a controversial issue. As the transitional process in the Arab Spring countries is argued to be close to the Sub-Saharan experience, it was expected to be a highly contingent process owing to the weak formal institutions.⁷³⁴

However, Schmitter and *Sīkā*, as well as Brownlee *et al.*, concluded that careful examination of the Arab Spring experience proved that the structural variables had more impact on the course and outcome of the transition than the agent-related ones.⁷³⁵

This could be explained by two facts: First, the formal institutions in Egypt and Tunisia are relatively stronger than other Arab Spring countries such as Libya and Yemen; therefore, their impact was particularly more significant than the contingent variables in these two cases. Second, the structural variables are not only formal institutions. As extensively discussed before, other macro- and meso-structural determinants were relevant too, such as the political culture, the maturity of the civil society, and the bargaining power of the rival political groups.

The findings of this thesis support the conclusion of Schmitter and *Sīkā*, and Brownlee *et al.* Although the variables related to the agents were – no doubt – important, the Islamists and secularists in both cases were competing and negotiating within

⁷³⁴ Bratton and Van De Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 169.

⁷³⁵ Brownlee *et al.*, *The Arab Spring*, 16.

Schmitter and Sika, "Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa", 3.

complicated and pressing structural designs that had a great impact on their behaviour and choices.

As an EMP leader rightly argued:

“It is not accurate to explain the different trajectories of the transition in Egypt and Tunisia only by the behaviour and the decisions made by the EMP and the MB. It is mainly due to structural and geostrategic factors. In Egypt, the military institution dominated politics for decades; there are seven million Copts; there are shared borders with Israel and KSA. Tunisia, on the contrary, is a small and marginal state and does not have particular geopolitical significance.”⁷³⁶

Worth-noting, *Rāshid 'Al-Ghannūshī* also emphasised the geopolitical factors on his explanation of the survival of the Tunisian transition. “Tunisia was lucky because it does not have oil such as Libya, nor enjoy the geopolitical significance of Egypt and Syria”, he stated.⁷³⁷

After reviewing the literature on the previous transition experiences, three sets of variables were chosen and examined in the transitional negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia: the macro-structural variables related to the pre-transition regime and the transitional administration, the meso-structural variables related to the intermediary societal organisations: the political parties and the CSOs, and the actor-centric or micro-agential variables related to the elites' qualities.

This study found that there are four determinants representing the main confining background structures of the transitional negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia. The first was the secularism pattern of the pre-transition regime. The argument is that: in Tunisia,

⁷³⁶ Interviewee no. 6: November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.

⁷³⁷ 'Ādil Dallāl, “rāshid 'alghannūshī: min ḥusn ḥaẓ tūnis 'annahā lā tamlik 'al-bitrūl mithl lībyā”, *Euronews*, 19 October 2017, <https://arabic.euronews.com/2017/10/19/tunisia-politic-rached-ghannouchi-protest> (accessed 15 April 2020).

the pre-transition regimes followed more assertive secularisation policies and a more exclusive attitude toward the Islamist movements than its Egyptian equivalent.

This variable impacted the transitional negotiations in three ways: (i) the *status quo* challenged by the Tunisian Islamists was the irreligious secularism, while in Egypt, it was an atypical variant of religious secularism; (ii) the degree of popular acceptance or habituation to the role of religion and religious establishments in politics was remarkably higher in Egypt than Tunisia; (iii) the infrastructure and the mobilisation capacities of the Egyptian Islamist forces were significantly greater than its Tunisian analogue. Accordingly, the Egyptian Islamists had a favourable negotiation position and a stronger bargaining power *vis-à-vis* their secularist rivals in comparison to the Tunisian case.

The second determinant was the role of the military institution in the transitional administration. The argument here goes as such: (i) on the contrary to Tunisia, the military institution in Egypt was keen and able to control the transitional administration for many reasons: it has a long history of the intervention in politics; the degree of the militarisation of Egyptian state and society is remarkable; the custodianship over the civilian politics is an integral part of the military institutional culture; and the military perceived the transitional process as a real threat to its political and economic privileges.

(ii) Having that stated, the Egyptian military affected the transitional negotiations in two main ways. First, it sponsored and intervened in many negotiations aiming at controlling its outcome and protecting its political status and economic interests. Second, from the parliamentary elections of 2012 onwards, the military institution, in cooperation with

other guardian institutions, challenged the Islamist majoritarianism and growingly tilted the balance of power towards the secularist opposition, which became more daring and stringent over time. Both ways negatively affected the course of the negotiations and made reaching a compromise even harder.

In Tunisia, the military institution, on the contrary, was deliberately weakened by the pre-transitional regimes. At the beginning of the transition, though, it seemed that the moment had finally come for the Tunisian military to flex its muscle and increase its centrality within the political regime. Nevertheless, after the ANC elections, the interim government and presidency used a combination of coup-proofing and appeasement strategies efficiently to tame the military ambitions.

The third determinant was the bargaining power between the Islamists and secularists during the negotiations as manifested in the results of the founding elections and the mobilisation capacity. In this regard, two contradictory arguments were described: the balanced bargaining power may facilitate the negotiations by convincing the two rivals to compromise, or it may create a state of uncertainty that hinders reaching an agreement as the two parties push for a better bargaining position.

In the Tunisian case, it could be argued that both dynamics co-existed; in the beginning, the unclear balance of power was a source of instability during the transition, and each party was pushing too far. Then, when both groups realised that they did not have enough power to impose their full agenda, they opted to compromise.

The balance of power in Egypt showed, as Zartman accurately theorised, a seesaw pattern.⁷³⁸ It can be argued that the balance of power favoured the Islamists from March 2011 until March 2012. During this period, they succeeded to achieve decisive victories in the constitutional declaration referendum and the parliamentary elections, and their mobilisation capacity greatly exceeded the secularist trend. However, in March 2012, it seems that the MB's decision to run for the presidential elections, breaching its previous commitment, and its majoritarianism attitude that appeared during the formation of the first Constituent Assembly pushed the guardian institutions to take severe measures to curb the MB. Besides the SCAF's threatening statements, the Administrative Court and the SCC dissolved the Constituent Assembly in April and the People's Assembly itself in June 2012. Furthermore, SCAF issued a new constitutional declaration on 17 June to regain the legislative power, reduce the presidential authorities, and claim the right to re-structure the Constituent Assembly.

After winning the presidential elections and the President's constitutional declaration and the SCAF re-shuffling decision in August 2012, the balance of power temporarily favoured the MB again. Nevertheless, after issuing the infamous constitutional declaration of November 2012 and the non-consensual constitution in January 2013, the guardian institutions and the secularist opposition joined forces and the power balance gradually tilted towards them until reaching the moment of the coup.

In managing their relationship with the military institution, it seems that the Egyptian Islamists and secularists committed the same mistake. While fiercely struggling against each other, both factions got two things wrong: First, the military was not merely a

⁷³⁸ Zartman, "Negotiations in Transitions" in *Arab Spring*, 27.

winning card each player should strive to have in his pocket; but rather a player on its own, if not the strongest player, in the transitional period. Second, a strategy of appeasement is not often the most successful in convincing the military to accept change. As O' Donnell and Schmitter previously concluded, protecting the interests of the entrenched institutions such as the armed forces "is unlikely to extract from those actors sufficient support for democracy."⁷³⁹

Another argument can be added here. In the transitional negotiations, it was not only the existing bargaining power that mattered but also the possibility of change in the balance of power in the future. In Egypt, after repeated electoral competitions, it seems that the secularist trend became convinced that power would remain favouring the Islamists in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the opposition was afraid that if the MB succeeded to infiltrate the state bureaucracy, the syndicates, the trade unions, and the business circles, this would bestow more power on it. That is why, after the referendum of the 2012 constitution, the conflict between the President and his opposition became a zero-sum game, and the vast majority of the secularist forces supported the rapid removal of the MB from power, even if it meant the collapse of the whole democratic transition.

In Tunisia, the possibility of change in the balance of power and that the EMP would lose its majority in the near future was reasonable. Indeed, it came true in the parliamentary elections of 2014. Therefore, the secularist opposition was relatively keener to maintain the democratic path in comparison to its Egyptian analogue because

⁷³⁹ O' Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*, 62.

it had a fair chance to benefit from its continuation, on the contrary to their chances under a new authoritarian regime.

The fourth structural determinant was the maturity and plurality of civil society. It has been argued that the Tunisian civil society was able to exert greater political influence and to play the role of mediator more efficiently than its Egyptian equivalent thanks to two main causes: (i) Although the civil society in both countries was co-opted and oppressed by the pre-transition regimes, in Tunisia, the political and legal environment improved much more rapidly during the transition than the case in Egypt. This allowed not only the establishment of hundreds of new NGOs, but also the revitalisation of the existing major CSOs, most importantly, the UGTT.

(ii) While civil society in Egypt was largely dominated by what was termed faith-based organisations, Tunisian civil society was dominated by the secularist trend. Nevertheless, the latter was more plural with the presence of a significant share Islamist-affiliated organisations in some sectors such as charity and educational sectors. Also, in Egypt, the *ancien régime* managed to maintain its hegemony over the only formal worker organisations in the country: the ETUF.

In fact, civil society in both case studies was involved in the political polarisation; however, what made the difference was that the main Tunisian CSOs succeeded to establish a healthier relationship with the political parties than the Egyptian case. The leadership of the UGTT, as an example, despite being constituted of well-known leftist cadres, was non-partisan. This enabled the UGTT, as well as other members of the Quartet Committee, to re-position itself as a mediator between the negotiating parties.

In Egypt, a significant number of the members of the professional syndicates executive bureaus, as well as the chairmen of hundreds of NGOs were organisationally affiliated to the MB; the councils of the ETUF were extensively infiltrated by the *ancien régime* cadres; many NGOs and independent trade unions leaders were engaged in the party politics and members in the NSF. Consequently, these organisations lacked the necessary autonomy and the impartiality to act as trusted mediators.

To conclude, the choices the Egyptian Islamists and secularists had during the transitional negotiations and the decisions they made were largely affected by many structural determinants. On the one hand, the Islamists got the benefit of the accommodative secularist policies of the ousted regime, the relatively favourable political culture, their well-developed organisational infrastructure and mobilisation capacities, and the legitimacy they gained thanks to their repeated electoral victories. On the other hand, two structural factors were in favour of the secularists: having the guardian institutions on their side and their qualitative presence in the CSOs, mainly the ETUF. Notably, these two factors represented – in general – structural remnants of the outgoing regime.

In comparison to the Egyptian case, the Tunisian negotiating elites were under the influence of a different structural setting: the Islamists were struggling against more assertive secularism, less favourable political culture, and more hostile CSOs; however, they heavily capitalised on being the dominant political force in the transitional administration, having a more professional military and more benign guardian institutions. The secularists, from their side, had the advantage of enjoying a wider representation in the ANC and a stronghold in CSOs, especially the UGTT.

Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the negotiating elites' behaviour is not a mere reflection of structural constraints; rather, the agent-related variables act independently and have their own dynamics. Two agential determinants were examined in this study: to what extent the negotiating elites were representative and legitimate, and to what extent they were shrewd and pragmatic.

The majority of the negotiation rounds in the Tunisian case arguably succeeded to gather the most influential political forces, especially during the decisive Quartet-sponsored National Dialogue. Furthermore, the representative elites in these rounds enjoyed a secured leadership within their constituencies. The transitional negotiations in Egypt, as shown in table no. 13, were less inclusive, and the negotiators lacked authoritative leaders, who could take hard decisions and still guarantee acceptance and respect from their bases. To put it short, the Egyptian elites were lacking leaders who enjoyed the legitimacy and authority of 'Al-Ghannūshī, 'Al-Sibsī, and Ḥussīn 'Al-'Abbāsī within the Islamists, secularists, and CSOs respectively.

The other agential variable is related to the elites' mediation and negotiation skills. Seemingly, the Tunisian negotiations, especially the decisive rounds such as *Ben 'Āshūr's* dialogues and the Quartet-sponsored National Dialogue, were skilfully prepared and implemented. On the contrary, almost all negotiations and national dialogues in the Egyptian transition were poorly structured. This proved by the fact that none of them reached concluding results or be effective. For instance, many pacts such as *Sāmī 'Anān's* Document, Fairmont Accord, the 'Al-'Azhar's Document to Renounce Violence meant little to their signatories. They either pulled back later or disagreed on the explanation of these documents' clauses during their implementation.

The relatively better design and execution of negotiations during the Tunisian transition could be explained by the wide experience of the UGTT and other members of the Quartet Committee. No doubt, their efforts in trust-building between the rival forces, preparing and modifying proposals, managing the three tracks of dialogue simultaneously, and overcoming repeated deadlocks is proof of the Committee members' shrewdness and professionalism.

Apart from having experienced mediators, the degree of the Islamist leaders' flexibility and pragmatism was another important agential determinant. As stated before, it is not totally accurate that the EMP leaders opted for compromise only out of their fear of the repetition of the Egyptian scenario. From the early transition, the MB and the EMP adopted different strategies to overcome the uncertainty of the transitional period and to strengthen the movements' position in the evolving political regime.

The latter was more cautious: it attempted to secure its position through making alliances with the moderate secularist forces and differentiate itself from the more conservative Salafist trend. On the contrary, the MB arguably adopted a four-pronged strategy during the transition: rapprochement with the Salafist trend to have them back it up, marginalising and weakening the secularists and revolutionary youth groups, neutralisation of the military institution by using a mixture of appeasement and pressure, and the escape forward strategy in political crises (e.g., running for the presidential elections and speeding up the constitution drafting process).

It is true that the MB attempted at the early beginning of the transition to build a wide coalition including secularist and Islamist parties in the dialogue called "Together We

Start Building: A Dialogue for Egypt". Nevertheless, when its attempt failed, the MB decided to secure its political position by grabbing more power: firstly, it broke its promise and ran for more than 40% of the parliamentary seats. Then, when the parliament turned to be with limited authority, it broke its promise again and ran for the presidency. After his inauguration, the President issued a constitutional declaration in August 2012 and claimed the legislative power for himself. When he was faced by a revolt from the guardian institutions, he issued another constitutional declaration in November to immunise his decisions from the Judiciary power.

Throughout the transitional period, it seems that the MB entered a vicious circle. By seeking more power to secure its political position, the MB's ability to form alliances with other political forces gradually decreased, as the latter became more suspicious of its hegemonic tendency. The secularists' resentment and rebellious attitude deepened the MB's own feeling of insecurity and pushed it to seek more power. With this strategy, the MB ended up occupying more offices; however, as it did so, became more vulnerable rather than more secure.

Finally, it is necessary here to re-emphasise that the abovementioned determinants are exclusively political and domestic. This does not negate the significance of other sets of variables such as the economic and the international determinants. For sure, they had undeniable effects on the course and the outcome of the transition in Egypt and Tunisia; however, as being clarified before, these variables usually count when they exert their influence on the political domain thorough domestic actors.

6.4 Concluding Remarks

This study aimed to offer a focused and detailed examination of the transitional negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia that could be of use to the academics in the Middle Eastern and democratisation fields, and, equally important, to those who experienced and survived this eventful time. It did not – by any means – aim to evaluate and judge the decisions taken by different political forces or to come up with some recommendations for the decision-makers in the form of a list of “Dos and Don’ts”. Enriching the literature on transition studies, though, could hopefully improve the understanding and rationalise the decision-making of the socio-political actors engaging in any future transition.

Consequently, the following remarks are worth mentioning here:

i. The meaning and implications of the concepts of secularism and Islamism should be carefully reconsidered and clearly explained in each case study. The widely circulating clichés and taken-for-granted assumptions obscure rather than illuminate, because these concepts are variably utilised and perceived by different actors and in different contexts. Moreover, with political polarisation, the rival ideological forces usually tend to debate their differences, not at the level of programmes and policies, but as conflicting moral ideals and ways of life. This tendency usually spoils any attempts for negotiation or compromise as the competing ideologies become more closed and mutually exclusive, and the dispute turns into an existential zero-sum struggle.

ii. Ideologies do not tell the whole story. Any argument built exclusively upon static ideological doctrines or categorisations will definitely be misleading. Ideology, for sure, does matter in guiding decisions, legitimising actions, and mobilising resources;

nevertheless, it is not the sole, nor even the major, determinant of political behaviour. As an example, the commitment of the MB and the EMP to the principles of moderate Islamism did not prevent them from charting different paths during the transition. Furthermore, the ideological categorisation of the Egyptian Islamists into moderates, conservative Salafists, and ex-Jihadists cannot provide enough explanation for their behaviour during the constitution-making or during the crisis of the military coup.

iii. Transition is a very exceptional experience with no established golden rules. Each case has its own peculiarity and complexity as history might repeat, but never fully replicates itself. Variables could act differently each time; the balance of power, as an example, sometimes facilitates the transitional negotiation and, in other times, hinders it; the pact-making, which was emphasised in the third wave literature as a recommended measure to have a smooth and successful transition, proved to be irrelevant during the fourth wave of the post-communist republics and even harmful in the case of Egypt. The endeavour to set a document for supra-constitutional principles was a major source of instability and tension during the Egyptian transition. The Islamists perceived these endeavours as a way to tie their hands and hollow their electoral victories, while some revolutionary groups found it to be a plot by non-democratic forces to impose their agenda.

iv. One of the transition paradoxes is that the challenging political parties and CSOs, which are divided, weakened, and coopted by the ousted non-democratic regimes, are the very institutions meant to make the change. In other words, under the authoritarian rule, the intermediary societal organisations are often lacking the favourable conditions for their development, capacity-building, networking, and collaboration. When the

moment of change took them by surprise, all their illnesses resurface: poor leadership capacities, limited organisational resources, inadequate experiences, and mutual distrust and rivalry. At such times, agents gain relatively more significance. If they efficiently deal with these inconvenient structural settings, the transition will survive.

v. Another paradox pertains to the transitional negotiations. On the one hand, different socio-political groups, especially the disadvantaged and oppressed ones, usually tackle the transition with the “now or never” approach. Therefore, they bring to the negotiations their long-awaited demands and show no patience in having them accepted. On the other hand, addressing these fundamental issues and accumulated grievances naturally needs a lot of time and efforts and adequately skilful mediators and negotiators. As time passes without achieving rapid or satisfactory results, these groups eventually become more disappointed and impatient, the negotiations become even harder, and the whole transitional process becomes more unstable.

For further comprehension of the evolution of the relationship between the Islamists and secularists in Egypt and Tunisia, follow-up research work needs to be carried out. For instance, studying the agendas and the outcomes of the post-transitional negotiations in Tunisia such as the *Qarṭāj* Agreement One in 2016 and Two in 2018 might reveal more facts and provide more evidence for transitologists. Also, it will be of great significance to examine how the tough transitional experience affected the structures, the ideologies, and the political behaviour of the Islamists and the secularists in the two case studies.

In December 2018, it seems that a delayed aftershock of the 2011 Arab uprisings hit the MENA region after eight years. In Sudan and Algeria, widespread popular mobilisations

against the inefficient, corrupt, authoritarian regimes forced the military institutions to intervene and unseat the Algerian President *ʿAbdul-ʿAzīz Būtaflīqah* and the Sudanese President *ʿUmar ʿAl-Bashīr* on 2 and 11 April 2019 respectively.⁷⁴⁰ Then, six months later, massive protests erupted simultaneously in Iraq and Lebanon against their incompetent confessional systems and resulted in the resignation of the Lebanese Prime Minister *Saʿd ʿAl-Ḥarīrī* and his Iraqi counterpart *ʿĀdil ʿAbdul-Mahdī*.⁷⁴¹

These unexpected events sent a clear message that the peoples of the region did not give up their dreams of freedom and dignity. Furthermore, as the regime in three out of the four aforementioned cases, namely Sudan, Iraq and Lebanon, is either Islamist or supported by the Islamist political forces, the issue of Islam and politics re-emerged and were once more heatedly debated. Whether the Islamists and secularists in these countries are able to learn from the wisdom of the previous experiences and navigate their way in these turbulent circumstances will be uncovered in the near future.

⁷⁴⁰ “Istiḳālat ʿalraʿīs ʿaljazāʿirī ʿabdul-ʿazīz būtaflīqah”, *Sky News*, 2 April 2019, <https://bit.ly/3ax6VsX> (accessed 23 April 2020).

“alnaṣ ʿalkāmil li-bayān ʿazl ʿalbashīr”, *Sky News*, 11 April 2019, <https://bit.ly/3eOh9Zk> (accessed 23 April 2020).

⁷⁴¹ Wasīm Saifulddīn, “saʿd ʿalḥarīrī ... ʿIstiḳalah ʿalā waqʿ ʿalʿintifāḍah”, *Anadolu Agency*, 29 October 2019, <https://bit.ly/2VtU7iE> (accessed 23 April 2020).

“albarlamān ʿalʿirāqī yaqbal ʿistiḳālat ʿādil ʿabdul-mahdī”, *Sky News*, 1 December 2019, <https://bit.ly/2XYq700> (accessed 23 April 2020).

REFERENCES

Books and Academic Journals (English)

- Abdo, Geneive. *No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Abul-Magd, Zeinab. "The Egyptian Military in Politics and the Economy: Recent History and Current Transition Status", *CMI Insight* (2013): 1-6.
- . *Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017.
- Agrama, Hussein Ali. *Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in Modern Egypt*. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
- Ahmed, Amel and Capoccia, Giovanni. "The Study of Democratization and the Arab Spring", *Middle East Law and Governance* 6 (2014): 1-31.
- Akbarzadeh, Shahram and Saeed, Abdullah. *Islam and Political Legitimacy*. London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003.
- Aktay, Yasin. "The Ends of Islamism: Rethinking the Meaning of Islam and the Political", *Insight Turkey* 15,1 (2013): 111-125.
- Al-Anani, Khalil. "Islamist Parties Post-Arab Spring", *Mediterranean Politics* 17,3 (2012): 466-472.
- and Malik, Maszlee. "Pious Way to Politics: The Rise of Political Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt", *Digest of Middle East Studies* 22,1 (2013): 57–73.
- Albrecht, Holger. "The Myth of Coup-proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coups d'état in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950–2013", *Armed Forces & Society* 41,4 (2015): 659-687.
- ; Croissant, Aurel; and Lawson, Fred H. *Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring*. Philadelphia: University Of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.
- Allani, Alaya. "The Islamists in Tunisia Between Confrontation and Participation: 1980– 2008", *The Journal of North African Studies* 14,2 (2009): 257-272.

- Al-Rasheed, Madawi. *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices From a New Generation*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Altınay, Ayşe Gül. *The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Mac Millan, 2004.
- Anderson, Lisa. *Transitions to democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
- March, Andrew F. "Genealogies of Sovereignty in Islamic Political Theology", *Social Research* 80,1 (2013): 293 – 320.
- Angrist, Michele Penner, *Politics and Society in the Contemporary Middle East*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.
- An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed. *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008.
- Asad, Talal. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford; California: Stanford University Press, 2003.
- Ashour, Omar. *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2009.
- . "Collusion to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt", *Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper* 14 (2015): 1-43.
- Ayoob, Mohammed. *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim world*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011.
- Ayubi, Nazih N. *Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*. London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2009.
- Barakat, Halim. *The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Barany, Zoltan. "Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military", *Journal of Democracy* 22,4 (2011): 28 – 39.
- . *How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why*. Princeton; Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2016.

- Bayat, Asef. "The Arab Spring and its Surprises", *Development and Change* 44, 3 (2013): 587–601.
- . *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013.
- Beckford, James A. and Demerath III, N. J. *The SAGE Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2007.
- Beinin, Joel. "The Rise of Egypt's Workers", *Carnegie Middle East Center* (2012): 1-23.
- Belkeziz, Abdelilah. *The State in Contemporary Islamic Thought: A Historical Survey of the Major Muslim Political Thinkers of the Modern Era*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2009.
- Berger, Peter L. *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999.
- Bermeo, Nancy and Yashar, Deborah J. *Parties, Movements, and Democracy in the Developing World*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Blackburn, Daniel. "Trade Unions and Democracy in Egypt", *International Union Rights* 2,15 (2018): 10-12.
- Bou Nassif, Hicham. "A Military Besieged: The Armed Forces, the Police, and the Party in Bin Ali's Tunisia, 1987–2011", *International Journal Middle East Studies* 47 (2015): 65–87.
- Boubekeur, Amel. "Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: Bargained Competition", *Mediterranean Politics* 21,1 (2016):107-127.
- Bratton, Michael and Van De Walle, Nicolas. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Brocker, Manfred and Kunkler, Mirjam. "Religious Parties: Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis - Introduction", *Party Politics* 19, 2 (2013): 171–186.
- Brown, Nathan J. "Egypt's Failed Transition", *Journal of Democracy* 23 (2013): 45-58.
- . *Arguing Islam After the Revival of Arab Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Brownlee, Billie Jeanne and Ghiabi, Maziyar. "Passive, Silent and Revolutionary: The Arab Spring Revisited", *Middle East Critique* 25,3 (2016): 299-316.

- Brownlee, Jason; Masoud, Tarek; and Reynolds, Andrew. *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Brudzińska, Kinga. "Support for NGOs in Tunisia After the Arab Spring", *PISM Bulletin* 61,656 (2014): 1-2.
- Cady, Linell E. and Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman. *Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Calhoun, Craig; Juergensmeyer, Mark; and Van Antwerpen, Jonathan. *Rethinking Secularism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Carothers, Thomas. "The End of the Transition Paradigm", *Journal of Democracy* 13, 6 (2002): 5-21.
- Casanova, Jose. *Public Religion in the Modern World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
- Casper, Gretchen and Taylor, Michelle M. *Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996.
- Chaney, Eric. "Democratic Change in the Arab World, Past and Present", *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (2012): 363-414.
- Cook, Steven A. *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.
- Coppedge, Michael. "Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories: Combining Large N and Small in Comparative Politics", *Comparative Politics* 31, 4 (1999): 465-476.
- Dell'Aguzzo, Loretta and Sigillò, Ester. "Political Legitimacy and Variations in State-Religion Relations in Tunisia", *The Journal of North African Studies* (2017): 1-25.
- Dunne, Michele and Hamzawy, Amr. "Egypt's Secular Political Parties: A Struggle for Identity and Independence", *Carnegie Middle East Center* (2017): 1-39.
- El-Mahdi, Rabab and Marfleet, Philip. *Egypt: The Moment of Change*. London; New York: Zed Books, 2009.

- El-Sherif, Ashraf. "Egypt's Salafists at a Crossroads", *Carnegie Middle East Center* (2015): 1-28.
- Esposito, John and Tamimi, Azzam. *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002.
- Ezbawy, Yusey Ahmed. "The Role of the Youth's New Protest Movements in the January 25th Revolution", *IDS Bulletin* 43,1 (2012): 26-36.
- Gaub, Florence. "Arab Armies: Agents of Change? Before and After 2011", *EU Institute for Security Studies - Chaillot Paper* 131 (2014): 1-44.
- Geddes, Barbra. "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?", *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 114-144.
- ; Wright, Joseph; and Frantz, Erica. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set", *Perspectives on Politics* 12,2 (2014): 313-331.
- Grami, Amel. "The Debate on Religion, Law and Gender in Post-Revolution Tunisia", *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 40, 4-5 (2014): 391- 400.
- Grewal, Sharan. "A Quiet Revolution: The Tunisian Military After Ben Ali", *Carnegie Middle East Center* (2016): 1-16.
- Grugel, Jean. *Democratization: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2002.
- Hackett, James. *The Military Balance 2010*. London: Routledge, 2010.
- Hallaq, Wael B. *The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
- Halliday, Fred. *Nation and Religion in the Middle East*, London: al-Saqi Books, 2000.
- Halpern, Manfred. *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton. University Press, 1963.
- Hamdi, Mohamed. *The The Politicization of Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia*. Colorado; Oxford, Westview Press, 1998.
- Hamid, Shadi. *Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in A New Middle East*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

- and McCants, William. *Rethinking Political Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Harb, Imad. "The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?", *Middle East Journal* 57,2 (2003): 269-290.
- Haugbølle, Rikke Hostrup; Ghali, Amine; Hèla, Yousfi; Limam, Mohamed and Mollerup, Nina Grønlykke, "Tunisia's 2013 National Dialogue: Political Crisis Management", *Berghof Foundation*, February 2017.
- Higley, John and Gunther, Richard. *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Hinnebusch, Raymond. "Change and Continuity after the Arab Uprising: The Consequences of State Formation in Arab North African States", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42,1(2015):12-30.
- Hopwood, Derek. *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. London: Yale University Press, 1973.
- . *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman; London, University of Oklahoma Press: 1991.
- IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2014*. Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2014.
- Johnson, Janet and Reynolds, H T. *Political Science Research Methods*. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2012.
- Jost, John T; Federico, Christopher M; and Napier, Jaime L. "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities", *The Annual Review of Psychology* 60 (2009): 307–337.
- Kamali, Mohammad Hashim. "Characteristics of the Islamic State", *Islamic Studies* 32, 1 (1993):17-30.

- Kao, Kristen and Lust, Ellen. "Why Did the Arab Uprisings Turn Out as They Did? A Survey of The Literature. *POMED Reports*. <http://pomed.org/pomed-publications/pomed-snapshot-why-did-the-arab-uprisings-turn-out-as-they-did-a-survey-of-the-literature/> (accessed 11 March 2018).
- Karagiannis, Emmanuel. "The Rise of Electoral Salafism in Egypt and Tunisia: The Use of Democracy as a Master Frame", *The Journal of North African Studies* (2018): 1-19.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America", *Comparative Politics* 23, 1 (1990): 1-21.
- and Schmitter, Philippe C. "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," *International Social Science Journal* 128 (1991): 269-284.
- Keane, John. "Secularism?", *Political Quarterly*, 71 (2000): 5-19.
- Kennedy, Emmet. "Ideology from Destutt De Tracy to Marx", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 40,3 (1979): 353-368.
- Kennedy, Gillian. *From Independence to Revolution: Egypt's Islamists and the Contest for Power*. London: Hurst, 2017.
- Ketchley, Neil. "The Army and the People Are One Hand!" Fraternalization and the 25th January Egyptian Revolution", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56,1 (2014):155–186.
- Khatab, Sayed. "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb", *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, 3 (2002):145-170.
- Kim, Dukhong. "Democratization in South Korea during 1979-1987". MA thesis, University of Virginia Tech, 1997.
- Kirkova, Rina and Milosevska, Tanja. "The Success of Democratization in Post Arab Spring Societies", *International Journal of Social Sciences III,1* (2014): 29-40.
- Korany, Bahgat and El-Mahdi, Rabab. *Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond*. Cairo; New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012.
- Kraetzschmar, Hendrik and Rivetti, Paola. *Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings: Governance, Pluralisation, and Contentions*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018.

- Kunkler, Mirjam. "Religion-State Relations and Democracy in Egypt and Tunisia: Models from the Democratizing Muslim World and their Limits", *Swiss Political Science Review* 18,1(2012): 114 -119.
- Kuru, Ahmet T. *Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Lambek, Michael. *A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.
- Landman, Todd. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Larémont, Ricardo René. *Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond*. New York: Routledge, 2014.
- Lijphart, Arend. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative" *The American Political Science Review* 65, 3 (1971): 682-693.
- Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Liolos, John. "Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The Problems and Promise of Constitutionalism Post-Arab Spring", *Boston College International & Comparative Law Review* 36,1 (2013): 1-35.
- Lust, Ellen. *The Middle East*. California; London: SAGE Publications, 2017.
- Lynch, Marc. *The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in The Middle East*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.
- M'rad, Hatem. *National Dialogue in Tunisia: Nobel Peace Prize 2015*. Tunisia: Éditions Nirvana, 2015.
- Mady, Abdul-Fattah. "Dialogue Processes After the 2011 Arab Uprisings", *Cordoba Foundation Research Papers* (2016): 1-123.
- Maier, Hans. "Political Religion: A Concept and Its Limitations", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8,1 (2007): 5 – 16.

- Marsh, David and Stoker, Gerry. *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- Masri, Safwan M. *Tunisia: An Arab Anomaly*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019.
- McFaul, Michael. "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship", *World Politics* 54, 2 (2002): 212-244.
- Merlini, Cesare and Roy, Olivier. *Arab Society in Revolt: The West's Mediterranean Challenge*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012.
- Moustafa, Tamir. "Drafting Egypt's Constitution: Can a New Legal Framework Revive a Flawed Transition?", Brookings Doha Centre Publications (2012): 1-11.
- Murphy, Emma C. "The Tunisian Elections of October 2011: A Democratic Consensus", *The Journal of North African Studies* 18,2 (2013): 231–247.
- Netterstrøm, Kasper Ly. "The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy", *Middle East Journal* 70,3 (2016): 383-398.
- Newton, Kenneth and Van Deth, Jan W. *Foundations of comparative politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Norris, Pippa and Inglehart, Ronald. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- O' Donnell, Guillermo and Schmitter, Philippe C. *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*. Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.
- O' Donnell, Guillermo. Schmitter, Philippe C. and Whitehead, Laurence. *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- . *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- . *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Latin America*, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

- Omri, Mohamed-Salah. "No Ordinary Union: UGTT and the Tunisian Path to Revolution and Transition", *Workers of the World* 1,7 (2015): 15-29.
- Owen, Roger. *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. London; New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Pargeter, Alison. *Return to the Shadows: The Muslim Brotherhood and An-Nahda Since the Arab Spring*. London: Saqi Books, 2016.
- Perlmutter, Amos. *Egypt: The Praetorian State*. New Brunswick; New Jersey: Transaction Book, 1974.
- Porta, Donatella Della. *Where Did the Revolution Go? Contentious Politics and the Quality of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Preysing, Domenica. *Transitional Justice in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia (2011–2013): How the Past Shapes the Future*. Berlin: Springer VS, 2016.
- Rachik, Hassan. "How Religion Turns into Ideology", *The Journal of North African Studies* 14 (2009): 347–358.
- Ramadan, Tariq. *The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East*. London: Allen Lane, 2012.
- Razvi, Mujtaba. "Muslim Ummah: Problems and Prospects", *Pakistan Horizon* 40,3 (1987): 46-55.
- Rivetti, Paola. "Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco: Regime Reconfiguration and Policymaking in North Africa", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42,1 (2015): 1-11.
- and Di Peri, Rosita. *Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco*. New York; Oxon: Routledge, 2016.
- Roll, Stephan. "Managing Change: How Egypt's Military Leadership Shaped the Transformation", *Mediterranean Politics* 21,1 (2016): 23-43
- Roy, Olivier (trans. by Carol Volk). *The Failure of Political Islam*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001.

- (trans. by George Holoch). *Secularism Confronts Islam*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
- Rutherford, Bruce K. *Egypt After Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, And Democracy in The Arab World*. Oxfordshire; New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Sadiki, Larbi. *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization*. Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Sartori, Giovanni. "Comparing and Miscomparing", *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 3,3 (1991): 243-257.
- Sayigh, Yezid. "Above the State: The Officers' Republic in Egypt", *Carnegie Middle East Center* (2012): 1-31.
- . "Owners of The Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt's Military Economy. Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2019.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. "Democratization and Political Elites", *European University Institute on-line Publications*, <https://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Profiles/Schmitter/DEMOCRATIZATION-AND-POLITICAL-ELITES.REV.pdf> (accessed 2 April 2017).
- and Sika, Nadine. "Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa: A More Ambidextrous Process?", *Mediterranean Politics* (2016): 1-21.
- Selvik, Kjetil and Stenslie, Stig. *Stability and Change in the Modern Middle East*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011.
- Shepard, William E. "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19,3 (1987): 307-336.
- Shiner, Larry. "The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 6,2 (1967): 207-220.
- Shrimali, Krishna Mohan. "Religion, Ideology and Society", *Social Scientist* 16,12 (1988): 14-60.
- Singh, Priya. *Re-envisaging West Asia: Looking Beyond the Arab Uprisings*. Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2016.

- Smith, Graeme. *A Short History of Secularism*. London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2008.
- Stark, Rodney. "Secularization, R.I.P.", *Sociology of Religion* 60,3 (1999): 249-273.
- Steger, Manfred B. "Religion and Ideology in the Global Age: Analyzing al Qaeda's Islamist Globalism", *New Political Science* 31,4 (2009): 529-541.
- Stepan, Alfred and Linz, Juan J. "Democratization Theory and the Arab Spring", *Journal of Democracy* 24 (2013): 15-30.
- Swatos, William H and Christiano, Kevin J. "Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept", *Sociology of Religion* 60, 3 (1999): 209-228.
- Tamimi, Azzam. *Rachid Ghannoushi: A Democrat within Islamism*. London: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Tavana, Daniel L. "Party Proliferation and Electoral Transition in Post-Mubarak Egypt", *The Journal of North African Studies* 16,4 (2011): 555-571.
- Taylor, Charles. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge; Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007.
- Tibi, Bassam (trans. by Judith von Sivers), *The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988.
- Utvik, Bjørn Olav. "A Question Of Faith? Islamists And Secularists Fight Over The Post-Mubarak State", *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 10,1 (2017): 93–117.
- Varol, Ozan O. "The Democratic Coup d'état", *Harvard International Law Journal* 53 (2012): 292-356.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. "Render Unto Caesar?: The Dilemmas of a Multicultural World", *Sociology of Religion* 66, 2 (2005): 121-133.
- Ware, L. B. "Ben Ali's Constitutional Coup in Tunisia", *Middle East Journal* 42,4 (1988): 587-601.
- . "The Role of the Tunisian Military in the Post-Bourguiba Era", *Middle East Journal* 39,1 (1985): 27-47.

Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement*. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013.

Williams, Rhys H. "Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology?", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 35,4 (1996): 368-378.

Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika and Burchardt, Marian. "Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities", *Comparative Sociology* 11 (2012): 875–909.

Wolf, Anne. *Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Yassin, Nasser and Hoppe, Robert. *Women, Civil Society and Policy Change in the Arab World Women*. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2019.

Yossef, Amr and Cerami, Joseph R. *The Arab Spring and the Geopolitics of the Middle East: Emerging Security Threats and Revolutionary Change*. Hampshire; NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Zartman, I. William. *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat*. Athens; Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2015.

Zeghal, Malika. "Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of Al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952-94)", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31,3 (1999): 371-399.

———. "Competing Ways of Life: Islamism, Secularism, and Public Order in the Tunisian Transition", *Constellations* 20,2 (2013): 254-274.

Zemni, Sami. "The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making", *Mediterranean Politics* 20,1 (2015): 1-17.

Books and Academic Journals (Arabic)

‘Abdullāh, Nādīn. "‘alḥarakah ‘alniqābiyyah fī maṣr: ‘alsaiṭarah wa ‘al’iḥtiwā‘ wa ḥudūd ‘almuqāwamah", *Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs* (2017): 1-21.

———. "mabrūk ‘itiḥād ‘ummāl maṣr ‘aldīmuqrāt", *Al Hewan Al Mutamadn*, 27 April 2013, <http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=356438&nm=1> (accessed 8 February 2020).

- 'Al-Ghannūshī, Rāshid. *min tajribat 'alḥarakah 'al'islāmiyyah fī tūnis*. Maghreb Centre for Research & Translation, London: 1999.
- 'Al-Ḥināshī, 'Abdul-Latīf. “'intikhābāt 'almajlis 'alwaṭanī 'altūnisī: 'al'itār, 'almasār wa 'alnatā'ij”, *Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies*, March 2012.
- 'Al-Jam'āwī, 'Anwar. “'almashhad 'alsiyāsī fī tūnis: 'aldarb 'alṭawīl naḥw 'altawāfuq”. *Siyasat Arabiya* 6 (2014): 72-85.
- 'Al-Mannā'ī, 'Afīfah. “'al'itihād 'al'ām 'altūnisī lil-shughl wa 'al'intiqāl 'aldīmuqrīatī”, *Arab Reform Initiative* (2016): 1-19.
- 'Al-Missīrī, 'Abdul-Wahhāb. *'al-'almāniyyah 'al-juz'iyyah wa 'al-'almāniyyah 'al-shāmilah – Part I*. Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouq, 2011.
- . *'al-'almāniyyah 'al-juz'iyyah wa 'al-'almāniyyah 'al-shāmilah – Part II*. Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouq, 2013.
- and 'Al-'Azmah, 'Azīz. *'al-'almāniyyah taḥt 'al-mijhar*. Damascus: Dar Al-Fikr, 2000.
- 'Al-Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf. *'al-taṭarruf 'al-'almānī fī muājahit 'al-'islām: namudhaj turkiā wa tūnis*. Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouq, 2001.
- . *min fiqh 'al-dawlah fī 'al-'islām*. Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouq, 2001.
- 'Al-Salmī, 'Alī. *'ishkāliyyāt 'aldustūr wa 'albarlamān*, Cairo: Dar Sama for Publishing and Distribution, 2016.
- 'Al-Talīdī, Bilāl. *'al'islāmiyyūn wa 'alrabī 'al'rabī: 'alshū'ūd, 'altaḥadiyyat, tadbīr 'alḥukm*. Beirut: Namaa Center for Research and Studies, 2012.
- Bakrī, Muṣṭafā. *'aljaish wa 'al'ikhwān: 'asrār khalf 'alsitār*. Cairo: Al Dar Al Masriah Al Lubnaniah, 2013.
- Bān, 'Aḥmad. *'al'ikhwān 'almuslimūm wa miḥnat 'alwaṭan wa 'aldīn*. Cairo: Al Mahrousa Center, 2015.
- Bishārah, 'Azmī. *'al-dīn wa 'al-'almāniyyah fī siāq tārikhī – part I*. Beirut: Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies, 2013.

— . *'al-dīn wa 'al-'almāniyyah fī siāq tārīkhī – part II-1*. Beirut: Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies, 2015.

— . *'al-dīn wa 'al-'almāniyyah fī siāq tārīkhī – part II-2*. Beirut: Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies, 2015.

— . *'althawrah 'altūnusiyyah 'almajīdah: binīat thawrah wa ṣairūratahā min khilāl yaumiyyātihā*. Beirut: Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies, 2012.

— . *thawrat maṣr ('al-juz' 'al-thānī): min 'al-thawrah 'ilā 'al-'inqilāb*. Beirut: Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies, 2016.

Haikal, 'Usāmah. *150 yawmā fī tārīkh maṣr: ḥaqīqah fī zaman 'alkazib*, Cairo: Al Dar Al Masriah Al Lubnaniah, 2013.

Heywood, Andrew (trans. by Muḥammad Ṣufār), *madkhal 'ilā 'al'ideulujjiyyāt 'alsiāsiyyah*. Cairo: National Center For Translation, 2012.

Labiyaḍ, Sālim. *'alhuiyyah: 'al'islām, 'al'urūbah, 'altawnasah*. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2009.

Māḍī, 'Abdul-Fattāḥ. *'al'unf wa 'altaḥawul 'aldīmuqrāfī ba'd 'althawrah*. Cairo, Dar Al Bshir, 2015.

Quṭb, Sayyid. *hādhā 'al-dīn*. Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouq, 2001.

News, Reports, and Articles (English)

Ahram Online, “Egyptian Engineer Mamdouh Hamza Announces Plans to Create a National Council”, 3 May 2011, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/11331.aspx> (accessed 11 May 2019).

Basheer Nafi, “Tunisia's Ennahda Can Change Its Discourse, But Not The Reality Of Political Islam”, *Middle East Eye*, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/tunisia-ennahda-can-change-its-discourse-not-reality-political-islam-1737542604> (accessed 11 March 2020).

Bayat, Asef. “The Post-Islamist Revolutions: What the Revolts in the Arab World Mean?”, *Foreign Affairs*, 26 April 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-africa/2011-04-26/post-islamist-revolutions> (accessed 4 July 2017).

- BBC News*, “Egypt Referendum Strongly Backs Constitution Changes”, 20 March 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12801125> (accessed 27 February 2019).
- Blair, Edmund. “Analysis-Egypt Army May Pull Strings From Barracks in Future”, *Reuters*, 22 June 2011 <https://af.reuters.com/article/idAFLDE75E0UL20110622> (accessed 11 January 2020).
- Bonn International Center for Conversion*, “Global Militarisation Index 2010”, https://gmi.bicc.de/index.php?page=ranking-table&year=2010&sort=country_asc (accessed 6 January 2020).
- Boukhars, Anouar. “In the Crossfire: Islamists” Travails in Tunisia”, *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 27 January 2014, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/27/in-crossfire-islamists-travails-in-tunisia-pub-54311> (accessed 8 March 2020).
- Charbel, Jano. “The Left of the Arab World”, *Mada Masr*, 13 October 2014, <https://madamasr.com/en/2014/10/13/feature/politics/the-left-of-the-arab-world/> (accessed 20 January 2020).
- El Gundi, Zeinab. “Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh”, *Ahram Online*, 2 April 2011 <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/124/36854/Presidential-elections-/Meet-the-candidates/AbdelMoneim-AbulFotouh.aspx> (accessed 3 December 2018).
- . “Updated: Revolution Youth Coalition Disband with End of Egypt’s Transitional Phase”, *Ahram Online*, 7 July 2012, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/46988.aspx> (accessed 28 November 2018).
- El-Hennawy, Noha. “A Year in Review: The Military Council’s Mixed Messages”, *Egypt Independent*, 30 December 2011 <https://egyptindependent.com/year-review-military-councils-mixed-messages/> (accessed 23 January 2020).
- El-Kouedi, Mona. “From Morsi With Love”, *Sada*, 12 March 2013 <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/51179> (accessed 25 January 2020).
- ETH Zurich*, “Peace and Security Council Report, Country Analysis: Tunisia”, March 2013, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/168553/PSC44March13E.pdf> (accessed 6 October 2019).

Euronews, “Dialogue Called for to End Egyptian Violence”, 6 December 2012, <https://www.euronews.com/2012/12/06/dialogue-called-for-to-end-egyptian-violence> (accessed 30 July 2019).

Fahmi, George. “The Coptic Church and Politics in Egypt”, *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 18 December 2014, <https://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/18/coptic-church-and-politics-in-egypt-pub-57563> (accessed 8 January 2020).

Fishere, Ezzedine C. “The Middle East’s Warring Factions Need To Find a Way To Coexist”, *The Washington Post*, 12 January 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/01/13/middle-east-s-warring-factions-need-find-way-coexist/> (accessed 2 March 2020).

Foundation For the Future, “Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia”, January 2013, <http://africanphilanthropy.issuelab.org/resources/20291/20291.pdf> (accessed 3 February 2020).

Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2010 – Egypt Report”, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/egypt> (accessed 24 November 2019).

—, “Freedom in the World 2010 – Report”, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2010> (accessed 24 November 2019).

—, “Freedom in the World 2010 – Tunisia Report”, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/tunisia> (accessed 24 November 2019).

Gallup, “After The Arab Uprisings: Women On Rights, Religion, and Rebuilding – Final Report”, Summer 2012, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/155306/arab-uprisings-women-rights-religion-rebuilding.aspx> (accessed 26 December 2019).

Human Rights Watch, “The Price of Independence: Silencing Labor and Student Unions in Tunisia”, 21 October 2010, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/10/21/price-independence/silencing-labor-and-student-unions-tunisia> (accessed 13 February 2020).

International Crisis Group, “Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge”, *MENA Report No. 137* (2013): 1-48.

Mahmoud, Khaled. “Sisi’s Grab for Brotherhood Assets”, *Sada*, 5 October 2018 <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77427> (accessed 5 February 2020).

- Marks, Monica and Salah, Omar Belhaj. "Uniting for Tunisia?", *Sada*, 28 March 2013, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/51330> (accessed 20 January 2020).
- Osama, Maggie. "Egypt's Unfinished Revolution", *Open Democracy*, 19 December 2011, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/egypts-unfinished-revolution/> (accessed 23 June 2019).
- Ottaway, Marina. "The Tunisian Political Spectrum: Still Unbalanced", *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 19 June 2012, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/19/tunisian-political-spectrum-still-unbalanced-pub-48478> (accessed 20 January 2020).
- Pew Research Centre's Forum on Religion & Public Life*, "The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society", April 2013 <https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-full-report.pdf> (accessed 26 December 2019).
- Shenker, Jack. "Egypt Protests: New Street Battles Erupt in Tahrir Square", *The Guardian*, 21 November 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/21/egypt-protests-erupt-tahrir-square> (accessed 23 June 2019).
- Shukrallah, Salma. "Egypt Revolution Youth Form National Coalition", *Ahram Online*, 9 February 2011, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/~NewsContent/1/64/5257/Egypt/Politics-/Coalition-of-The-Revolutions-Youth-assembled.aspx> (accessed 28 November 2018).
- Soltan, Gamal Abdel Gawad; Qamha, Ahmad Nagui; and 'Asilah, Subhi. "The Arab Barometer Project – Egypt Report", *Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies*, June 2011, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/Egypt_Public_Opinion_Survey_2011.pdf (accessed 26 December 2019).
- The European Neighborhood Policy*, "Assessment Report on Tunisian Civil Society", March 2012 <https://library.euneighbours.eu/content/assessment-report-tunisian-civil-society> (accessed 3 February 2020).
- The National Council for Voluntary Organisations*, "Building Bridges: Connecting Civil Society in North Africa", 15 April 2013 https://www.ncvo.org.uk/images/documents/policy_and_research/international/bulding-bridges-report-civil-society-tunisia.pdf (accessed 3 February 2020).

United States Agency for International Development, “2011 CSO Sustainability Index for The Middle East and North Africa”, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/2011_MENA_CSOSI.pdf (accessed 3 February 2020).

—, “2012 CSO Sustainability Index for The Middle East and North Africa”, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/2012_MENA_CSOSI.pdf (accessed 3 February 2020).

—, “2013 CSO Sustainability Index for The Middle East and North Africa”, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/2013MENA_CSOSI%20Final.pdf (accessed 5 February 2020).

World Value Survey, “Wave V – Egypt 2008”, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp> (accessed 6 January 2020).

—, “Wave VI – Egypt 2013”, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp> (accessed 3 February 2020).

—, “Wave VI – Tunisia 2013”, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp> (accessed 6 January 2020).

News, Reports, and Articles (Arabic)

‘Abdul-Fattāḥ, Bashīr. “‘istid‘ā’ lil-jaish ‘am hurūb min ‘alsiyāsah”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 7 March 2013 <https://bit.ly/2Gte0Ow> (accessed 27 January 2020).

‘Abdul-Ḥamīd, Hibah Kamāl. “‘alniqābāt ‘almihaniyyah fī ‘ahd mubāarak we ‘altaḥawulāt ba‘d thawrat yanāir”, *Beirut News Arabia*, 4 December 2015, <https://www.beirutme.com/?p=15404> (accessed 6 February 2020).

‘Abdullāh, Muḥammad. “shuqūq fī jidār ta‘ sīsiyyat dustūr maṣr”, *Anadolu Agency*, 19 November 2012, <https://bit.ly/39t3HWO> (accessed 29 March 2020).

‘Abdul-Majīd, Waḥīd. “‘ayyām majīdah fī thawrat almaṣriyyīn”, *Shorouk News*, 25 January 2017 <https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=25012017&id=68ed627a-1897-4687-b682-1fb392e13330> (accessed 19 May 2019).

ʿAbdul-Salām, Walīd. “bil-ʿasmāʾ ... kharīṭat ʿal-ikhwān bil-niqābāt ʿalmihaniyyah ... ʿaljamāʿah saīṭart ʿalā ghuraf šināʿat ʿalqarār li-tafʿīl dawrahā ka-haiyʿāt ʿistishāriyyah lil-ḥukomah ... wa ʿalmustaqillīn: ʿalḤurriyyah wa ʿalʿadālah ḥashad ṭāqatah ʿalbashariyyah li-ʿiḥkām qabḍatah ʿalā mafāṣil ʿaldawlah”, *Youm7*, 16 March 2013, <https://bit.ly/37Z33QR> (accessed 6 February 2020).

ʿAbdul-Zāhir, Nirmīn; Fakhrī, Nūrā; and Ḥajjāj, Muḥammad. “ruʿasāʾ ʿal-aḥzāb yakshifūn kawālīs liqāʿihim bi-ʿanān: ʿalmajlis ʿalʿaskaʿī wāfaq ʿalā ʿalsamāḥ lil-munazzmāt ʿaldawliyyah bi-mushāhadat ʿalʿintikhābāt faqaṭ ... wa raʿīs ḥizb ʿalnūr ṭalab ʿalʿaskaʿī bi-surʿat taslīm ʿalbilād li-sulṭah madaniyyah muntakhabah”, *Youm7*, 1 October 2011, <http://www.youm7.com/504006> (accessed 16 June 2019).

ʿAbū ʿAlʿilā, ʿAbdul-Raḥmān. “qirāʿah fī natāʾij ʿalʿistiftāʾ ʿalā dustūr maṣr”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 24 December 2012, <https://goo.gl/dP8meu> (accessed 24 November 2018).

ʿAdīb, Munīr; Dabash, Ḥamdī; ʿAl-Mahdī, ʿUsāmah; and ʿAl-Wazīrī, Hanī. “ʿal-ikhwān yuraḥḥibūn bi-wathīqat ʿanān ... wa shabāb ʿalsalafiyyīn yarfuḍūn ... wa ʿaljamāʿah tantaqid ʿistibʿādahā”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 2 October 2011, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/115158> (accessed 16 June 2019).

Ahram Online, “ūlā jalasāt ʿalḥiwār ʿalwaṭanī tantlik ghada bi-majlis ʿalwuzarāʾ” 29 March 2011 <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/54808.aspx> (accessed 25 April 2018).

—, “mamdūḥ ḥamzah: ʿalmajlis ʿalwaṭanī yahduf li-jamʿ ʿalqwā ʿalsiāsiyyah ʿalā wathīqah muwaḥḥadah lil-dustūr”, 18 July 2011, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/95638.aspx> (accessed 12 May 2019).

Al Alam TV, “irdūghān yadʿū ʿalmaṣriyyīn lil-ʿalmāniyyah wa ʿal-ikhwān yaʿtabirūnah tadakhulla”, 14 September 2011, <https://bit.ly/39x5k6w> (accessed 8 March 2020).

Al Arabiya Net, “ʿAl-ʿAzhar wa thawrat 25 yanāir: raṣd tawthīqī wa qirāʿh mawduʿiyyah”, 15 October 2012, <https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/10/15/243828.html> (accessed 1 April 2020).

—, “vīdīū musarrab yakshif mukhaṭaṭ ʿalsalafiyyīn li-ʿazl shaikh ʿalʿzhar”, 24 December 2012, <https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/24/256864.html> (accessed 25 February 2020).

- , “tūnis tattajih lil-tawqī‘ alā ‘almīthāq ‘alwaṭanī li-munāhaḍat ‘al‘irhāb”, 24 June 2013, <https://bit.ly/2Bf5G2b> (accessed 16 October 2019).
- , “tūnis ... ‘almajlis ‘alt’sīsī yuqir qānūn jadīd lil-‘intikhābāt”, 1 May 2014, <https://bit.ly/31YNxkl> (accessed 28 October 2019).
- Al Hurra*, “ṣidāmāt khilāl muḏāharāt ḥāshidah lil-mu‘āraḍah ‘almaṣriyyah tandīdā bi-siyāsīt mursī”, 1 February 2013, <https://www.alhurra.com/a/egypt-mass-demonstrations/218246.html> (accessed 16 October 2019).
- Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, “al‘ikhwān ‘almuslimūn wa ‘almajlis ‘al‘askaī: ‘alṣafqah wa ‘alṣidām”, 17 April 2012, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/positionestimate/2012/04/2012417104949318130.html> (accessed 23 June 2019).
- Al Jazeera Mubasher*, “al‘itiḥād ‘al‘ām ‘altūnisī lil-shughl yuṭālib bi-ḥal ‘alḥukūmah”, 30 July 2013 <https://bit.ly/38qk1b6> (accessed 13 February 2020).
- Al Jazeera Net*, “taghiyyr ri‘āsat ‘alḥiwār ‘alwaṭanī bi-maṣr, 2 April 2011, <http://tiny.cc/vu6a6y> (accessed 7 May 2019).
- , “mu‘tamarān lil-ḥiwār wa ‘alwifāq bi-maṣr”, 22 May 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/f6451603-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/67ddd7b5-6cd4-47fe-9ae0-ac9db2a83538> (accessed 25 April 2018).
- , “‘ikhwān maṣr yansaḥibūn min ‘i‘tilāf ‘althawrah”, 29 May 2011, <https://bit.ly/30LiNnK> (accessed 23 January 2020).
- , “‘istib‘ād ‘asharat murashaḥīn min ri‘āsiyyāt maṣr”, 14 April 2012, <https://bit.ly/2RwoBNu> (accessed 23 June 2019).
- , “naṣ ‘al‘i‘lān ‘aldustūrī ‘almukammil bi-maṣr”, 13 July 2012, <https://goo.gl/zWDEmB> (accessed 24 November 2018).
- , “alnahḍah tu‘īd ‘intikhāb ‘alghannūshī ra‘īsā”, 17 July 2012 <https://bit.ly/2T1XESI> (accessed 19 February 2020).
- , “al‘i‘lānāt ‘aldustūriyyah walīdat ‘althwrah ‘almaṣriyyah”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 11 December 2012, <https://goo.gl/dQS9dE> (accessed 24 November 2018).

— , “wūtsh: thagharāt fī mashrū’ dustūr tūnis”, 23 January 2013, <https://bit.ly/30RC9WP> (accessed 6 October 2019).

— , “mu’tamar yad’ū li-ḥtirām ’altadāwul ’alsilmī bi-tūnis”, 20 June 2013, <https://bit.ly/2VN5bG7> (accessed 16 October 2019).

— , “Mursī we ’Al-’lām ... ’Itihāmāt mutabādalah”, 30 June 2013 <https://bit.ly/39FOD87> (accessed 5 April 2020).

— , “ḥal majlis ’alshūrā wa ra’īs jadīd lil-mukhābrāt”, 5 July 2013, <https://goo.gl/8WPHN6> (accessed 24 November 2018).

— , “’al’ālāf min ’almu’āraḍah yatazahrūn ḍid ḥukūmat ’alnahḍah”, 26 September 2013, <https://bit.ly/2SGZYyp> (accessed 13 February 2020).

— , “khilāf bi-sha’n ’almādah ’alsādisah min dustūr tūnis”, 22 January 2014, <https://bit.ly/36hgDie> (accessed 28 October 2019).

— , “’alt’sīsī yabda’ jalsāt tawqī’ ’aldustūr ’altūnusī”, 27 January 2014, <https://bit.ly/2JtGuJT> (accessed 28 October 2019).

Al Joumhouria, “’almushīr ṭaṭṭāwī: lā ’intikhābāt ri’āsiyyah qabl ’al’itihā’ min ’i’dād ’aldustūr”, 15 April 2012, <https://bit.ly/2yqWJXM> (accessed 15 April 2020).

Al Masry Al Youm, “’inqsām bain ’alquwā’ ’alsiāsiyyah ḥawl natā’ij liqā’ ’alfarīq ’anān wa ru’asā’ ’al’ahzāb”, 3 October 2011, <https://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=312765> (accessed 22 February 2020).

— , “Dr. ’Alī ’Al-Salmī’ yaktub: ’awd ’alā bid’”, 19 June 2012, <http://today.almasryalyoum.org/printerfriendly.aspx?ArticleID=343305> (accessed 24 November 2018).

— , “’aldustūriyyah tu’alliq jalsātihā ’iḥtijājā ’alā ḥiṣār ’almutazāhrīn lil-maḥkamah”, 2 December 2012, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/255189> (accessed 25 January 2020).

Al Nahar, “’almajlis ’alwaṭanī yunaqish mabādi’ fawq ’aldustūriyyah”, 19 July 2011, <https://www.alnaharegypt.com/39960> (accessed 11 May 2019).

- , “liqā’ ’almajlis ’al’askaī wa ’al’ahzāb ’alyaum waṣṭ tadhammur fī ’awsāt’ altayyār ’al’islāmī min ’iqṣā’ murashaḥīh”, 15 April 2012, <https://bit.ly/2ZGTOA8> (accessed 23 June 2019).
- , “’ijtimā’ bain ’almajlis ’al’askaī fī maṣr wa ’al’ahzāb ḥawl ’i’ādit tashkīl ’aljam’iyyah ’alt’ sīsiyyah”, 28 April 2012, <https://bit.ly/2X3vX0H> (accessed 23 June 2019).
- Al Sahafa Alyoum*, “alnaṣ tawafuqī wa lais ’istishrāfi”, 30 June 2011, <https://bit.ly/2U15UIZ> (accessed 24 August 2019).
- , “mashrū’ ’almīthāq ’alwaṭanī li-munāḥaḍat ’al’unf wa ’al’irhāb”, 19 June 2013, <https://bit.ly/33A09zq> (accessed 16 October 2019).
- ’Al-’Arabī, Quṭb. “’alḥiwār wa ’almuṣālahah fī maṣr: ḍarūrāt ’aldākhlil wa tadakhulāt ’alkhārij”, *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies*, 26 March 2014, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/discussionstrategytosolvearabworldconflict/2014/02/2014225105334470365.html#> (accessed 26 April 2018).
- ’Al-’Ashwal, ’Īsmā’īl. “ḥamdī qandīl bi-mudhakkiratih: muḥammad mursī ’altaiyyb ’alladhī ’akhlaf wu’ūdah .. fariḥ bil-ri’āsah kaṭīf ḥaṣal ’alā lu’bah (9)”, *Shorouk News*, 3 February 2014, <https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=03022014&id=f1970be7-8dff-449a-aaf8-9112320e8f8a> (accessed 28 July 2019).
- ’Al-Baḥrāwī, Muḥammad. “’altaiyyb yu’lin wathīqat ’al’azhar ḥawl mustaqbal maṣr wa tataḍmman 11 bandā ... minhā da’m ta’sīs ’aldawlah ’almaidaniyyah wa ’al’ibti’ād ’an ’aldawlah ’aldīniyyah wa ’alkahanūtiyyah ... wa ’albu’d ’an ’altakfīr wa ’altakhwīn wa ’istiqlāl ’al’azhar wa ’ikhtiār shaikh ’al’azhar bil-’intikhāb”, *Youm7*, 20 June 2011, <http://www.youm7.com/438757> (accessed 12 May 2019).
- ’Al-Ghunīmī, Hishām. “’amīn ’al’ikhwān: rashahna’ alshāṭer li-tamassuk ’al’askaī bil-ḥukūmah wa talwīḥah bi-ḥal ’albarlamān”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 31 March 2012, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/169298> (accessed 8 March 2020).
- ’Al-Jūrshī, Ṣalāh ’Al-Dīn. “ba’d tajādhubāt .. tūnis tatajih ’ilā ’intikhāb majlis ta’sīsī fī 23 ’uktūbar”, *Swiss Info*, 9 June 2011, <https://bit.ly/2KP96hW> (accessed 22 August 2019).
- ’Allīthī, ’Aḥmad. “Mursī yuqarrir ’ilghā’ ’al’i’lān ’aldustūr ’almukammil”, *Masrawy*, 12 August 2012, <https://bit.ly/2VQ3xoN> (accessed 24 November 2018).

'Al-Madhūn, Muḥammad Rashād. “al'ikhwān bā'ūnā fī moḥammed maḥmūd ... qiṣṣat 'almaqūlah 'al'abraz fī 3 sanawāt, *Masr Al Arabia*, 19 November 2014 <https://bit.ly/2ushq10> (accessed 23 January 2020).

'Al-Mājirī, Miḥriz. “tūnis – mā huwa muḥtawā 'al'ahd 'aljumhūrī 'alladhī tunāqishuh 'alhai'ah 'al'uliā liṭaḥqīq 'ahdāf 'althawrah?”, *Almasdar*, 6 May 2011, <https://bit.ly/2KQGLaM> (accessed 24 August 2019).

— . “al'itihād 'al'ām 'altūnisī lil-shughl: mu'tamar ṭubarqah 'alā ṣafīḥ sākhin”, *almasdar*, 22 December 2011, <https://bit.ly/2vouULQ> (accessed 11 February 2020).

'Al-Miānī, Hishām. “Bawwabit 'al'ahrām tanshur 'alnaṣ 'alkāmil lil-qarārāt .. mursī yuḥaṣṣin qarārātih bi-'ilān 'aldustūrī wa yamna' ḥal 'alt'sīsiyyah wa 'alshūrā”, *Al Ahram*, 12 November 2012, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/275479.aspx> (accessed 30 July 2019).

— . “maḥmūd mekkī yu'lin rasmiyyā: 'ilāqatī bi-mu'assasit 'alri'āsah ḥāliyyā 'idārit 'alḥiwār 'alwaṭanī faqaṭ”, *Al Ahram*, 1 January 2013, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/290257.aspx> (accessed 31 July 2019).

'Al-Mu'allim, 'Ibrāhīm. “shahādātī lil-tārīkh 'an 'a'māl lajnit 'alḥukamā' khilāl thawrat 25 yanāir, *Shorouk News*, 11 February 2017, <https://cms.shorouknews.com/mobile/news/view.aspx?cdate=11022017&id=9b3c6476-40cb-465c-97eb-8132bb737d39> (accessed 12 May 2019).

'Al-Nādī, 'Amr. “al'ikhwān yafūzūn bi-ri'āsat 'aghlabiyyat lijān 'albarlamān ... wa 3 nuwāb min 'alwafd yakhriqūn qarār 'almuqāṭ'ah”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 31 January 2012, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/148238> (accessed 9 March 2020).

'Al-Qarnashāwī, Shaimā'. “al'idāriyyah 'al'uliā tu'aiyyd ḥukm 'alqaḍā' 'al'idārī bi-waqf 'intikhābāt majlis 'alnuwāb”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 21 April 2013 <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/306716> (accessed 25 January 2020).

'Al-Salīmī, Munṣif. “alghannūshī - dhi'b fī thawb ḥamal?”, *Deutsche Welle*, 24 October 2014, <https://p.dw.com/p/1DbWc> (accessed 8 March 2020).

'Al-Salmī, 'Alī. “alḥaqīqah fī qaḍiyyat 'almabādi' 'al'sāsiyyah lil-dustūr”, *Al Ahram*, 9 November 2011, <http://www.ahram.org.eg/archive/Al-Mashhad-Al-Syiassy/News/111721.aspx> (accessed 29 May 2019).

- 'Al-Sayyid, Samīr. "bawābat 'al'ahrām tanshur muswadat wathīqat 'altaḥāluf 'alwaṭanī min 'ajl maṣr", *Ahram Online*, 15 June 2011 <http://gate.ahram.org/News/83091.aspx> (accessed 15 April 2018).
- 'Al-Shāmī, Khālid. "'almajlis 'al'askaī yurīd 'aldustūr qabl 'alra'īs ... wa 'anṣār 'abū 'īsmā'īl yasta'idūn li-'iḥtijājāt 'alā 'istib'ādih", *Al Quds Al Arabi*, 14 April 2012, <http://backup.alquds.co.uk/pdfarchives/2012/04/04-15/All.pdf> (accessed 23 June 2019).
- 'Al-Ṭāhirī, Nawāl. "qaṣr 'alḍiyāfah bi-qarṭāj: 'intilāq fā'iliyyāt 'alḥiwār 'alwaṭanī", *Arrakmia Tunis*, 15 April 2013, <https://bit.ly/339ZSTs> (accessed 7 October 2019).
- 'Al-Thābitī, 'Ādil. "tūnis: 'aham maḥaṭṭat 2012", *Anadolu Agency*, 3 January 2013 <https://bit.ly/2UUOKTv> (accessed 13 February 2020).
- 'Al-Wazīrī, Hānī. "mawqī' 'al'ikhwān yaṣif 27 māiyo bi-jum'it 'alwaqī'ah ... wa shabāb 'aljamā'ah yarud: yuṭabbiq 'uslūb mubārak", *Al Masry Al Youm*, 27 May 2011, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/134569> (accessed 23 January 2020).
- Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies*, "'al'intikhābāt 'alri'āsiyyah 'almaṣriyyah 2012", July 2012, https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/PoliticalStudies//Pages/Egyptian_Presidential_Elections.aspx (accessed 25 November 2018).
- Assabah News*, "wathīqah: 17 dīsamber 2010 - 17 dīsamber 2013 ... krūnūlogiā thawrah lam taktamil", 16 December 2013 <https://bit.ly/2OQKjvb> (accessed 13 February 2020).
- 'Awad, Marwah. "taqrīr khāṣ: muḥāwalāt lil-taghīr fī 'aljaish 'almaṣrī", *Reuters*, 12 April 2012 <https://www.reuters.com/article/oegtp-egy-army-report-mm6-idARACAE83B0OE20120412> (accessed 11 January 2020).
- BBC Arabic*, "'intikhābāt 'alri'āsah 'almaṣriyyah 2012: tasalsul zamanī", 27 April 2012, http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2012/04/120427_egypt_election_time_line (accessed 24 November 2018).
- , "'aljam'iyyah 'alt'sīsiyyah lil-dustūr 'almaṣrī: su'āl wa jawāb", 19 November 2012 http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2012/11/121119_egypt_constitution_questions.shtml?print=1 (accessed 27 July 2019).

- , “waqf ‘al’ intikhābāt ‘albarlmāniyyah fī maṣr bi-qarār min ‘alqaḍā’ ‘al’idārī”, 6 March 2013, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/03/130306_egypt_decree_morsi_elections (accessed 25 January 2020).
- , “almḥkamah ‘aldustūriyyah fī maṣr bi-ḥal majlis ‘alshūrā wa buṭlān ‘allajnah ‘alt’ sīsiyyah wa qānūn ‘alṭawāri’”, 2 June 2013 https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/06/130602_egypt_constitutional_rulings (accessed 25 January 2020).
- Ben ‘Al-Hāj Naṣr, Ḥussīn. “‘alḥiwār ‘alwaṭanī ‘altūnisī: ‘almaw‘id ‘almuqtaraḥ lil-‘intikhābāt ghair mulā‘im”, *Al Riyadh*, 18 October 2012, <http://www.alriyadh.com/777151#> (accessed 31 August 2019).
- Ben Brīk, Khamīs. “tūnis – 11 ḥizb yatabannā khārīṭat ṭarīq ba‘d ‘intikhāb ‘alta’ sīsī”, *Almasdar*, 15 September 2011, <https://bit.ly/2ziB9j5> (accessed 24 August 2019).
- . “tūnis – ‘alḥai‘ah ‘al‘uliā litaḥqīq ‘ahdāf ‘althawrah tusdil ‘alsitār ‘an ‘a‘mālihā”, *almasdar*, 13 October 2011, <https://bit.ly/30ydZkV> (accessed 21 August 2019).
- Burhāmī, Yāssir. “dhikriāt 1”, *Ana Salafy*, 4 July 2019, <https://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=82053> (accessed 26 February 2020).
- Dallāl, ‘Ādil. “rāshid ‘alghannūshī: min ḥusn ḥaḥ tūnis ‘annahā lā tamlik ‘al-bitrūl mithl lībyā”, *Euronews*, 19 October 2017, <https://arabic.euronews.com/2017/10/19/tunisia-politic-rached-ghannouchi-protest> (accessed 15 April 2020).
- Fakhrī, Nūrā. “‘albarad‘ī yuqarrir ‘al’ insiḥāb min ‘intikhābāt ‘alri‘āsah”, *Youm7*, 14 January 2012, <https://goo.gl/6K72bW> (accessed 25 November 2018).
- . “nanshur muswadat wathīqat ‘albarad‘ī lil-mabādi’ wa alḥukūk ‘al’ asāsiyyah ... mabādi’ ‘alsharī‘ah ‘al’ islāmiyyah ‘almaṣdar ‘alra‘isī lil-tashrī‘ ... wa ‘alḥaqq fī ‘i‘tināq ‘al‘aqā‘id wa ‘almadhāhib ... wa ‘alkarāmah ‘al’ insāniyyah ‘asās ‘al’ bunūd”, *Youm7*, 26 June 2011, <http://www.youm7.com/443021> (accessed 12 May 2019).
- Fawzī, Muḥammad. “istiḡālat ‘abū ‘alfutūḥ: hal bada‘at hijrat ‘iṣlāḥiyyī ‘al’ ikhwān”, *Al-Akhbar*, 30 March 2011, <https://al-akhbar.com/Arab/85839> (accessed 22 February 2020).

France 24, “ḥizb ’alnahḍah yu’alīq ’uḍuiyyatah fī ’alḥai’ah ’al’ulīā litaḥqīq ’ahdāf ’althawrah”, 31 May 2011, <https://www.france24.com/ar/20110531-nahdha-movement-islamic-party-tunisia-elections> (accessed 22 August 2019).

—, “ḥizb ’alnahḍah yansaḥib min ’alḥai’ah ’al’ulīā litaḥqīq ’ahdāf ’althawrah”, 27 June 2011, <https://www.france24.com/ar/20110627-ennahda-islamists-reform-commission-rached-ghannouchi> (accessed 22 August 2019).

—, “’intikhāb ḥusain ’al’abbāsī ’amīnā ’āmmā jadīdā lil-’itiḥād ’al’ām ’altūnisī lil-shughl”, 30 December 2011, <https://bit.ly/2HPw5Xu> (accessed 22 February 2020).

Gawīsh, Maḥmūd. “mu’tamar maṣr ’al’awwal yakhtār 220 shakhṣiyyah lil-majlis ’alwaṭanī min baynihim ya’qūb wa zūwīl”, 3 June 2011, *Al Masry Al Youm*, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/136037> (accessed 11 May 2019).

Gharīb, Muḥammad and Kāmil, Maṣṣūr. “sharaf yaqbal ’istiḳālat yaḥiā ’aljamal”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 12 July 2011, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/143511> (accessed 6 May 2019).

Hadiyyah, Sha’bān; ’Abdul-Zāhir, Nirmīn; ’Ismā’īl, Muḥammad; and Ḥussīn, Maḥmūd. “’alyaum ’alsābi’ yanshur malāmiḥ wathīqat ’almabādi’ ’alḥākimah lil-dustūr ’aljadīd ... ’almajlis ’al’askaī yukallif ’alghazālī ḥarb bijam’ ’almasharī’ ’almuqaddamah min ’alqwā ’alsiāsiyyah ... wa zurūf ṭārī’ah taḥūl dūn ’ijtimā’ih bil-liwā’ mamdūḥ shāhīn”, *Youm7*, 13 July 2011, <http://www.youm7.com/454325> (accessed 12 May 2019).

Hāfiz, ’Aḥmad. “kawalīs ijtimā’ ’al’askaī bil-’ḥzāb ... ’iḥiā’ dustūr 71 ’alā ma’idat ’alṭafawuḍ”, *Ahram Online*, 5 June 2012, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/216597.aspx> (accessed 23 June 2019).

Islam Times, “ḥal ’alḥai’ah ’al’ulīā litaḥqīq ’ahdāf ’althawrah wa ’al’iṣlāh ’alsiyāsī wa ’al’intiḳāl ’aldīmuqrīatī”, 21 April 2012, <https://goo.gl/1VZDK3> (accessed 24 November 2018).

’Iṣṣām ’Al-Dīn, Jamāl. “’alsalmī yatawallā ri’āsāt ’alwifāq ’alqawmī khalaf lil-jamal ... wa rafa’ tawṣiyyātih lil-majlis ’al’askarī”, *Ahram Online*, 25 July 2011, gate.ahram.org.eg/News/98196.aspx (accessed 6 May 2019).

Jum’ah, Maḥmūd. “’alḥiwār ’almaṣrī bain ’alshabāb wa ’al’askar”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 3 June 2011 <https://bit.ly/2wUSu0p> (accessed 16 June 2019).

Karīm, Maḥmūd. “bil-vīdīū ... haikal: ṭaṭāwī rafaḍ taslīm maṣr lil-’ikhwān ... wa mubāarak tanḥḥā bisabab ’aldagḥt ’al’ajnabī”, *Sada El Balad*, 6 December 2012 <https://www.elbalad.news/332815> (accessed 23 January 2020).

Middle East Online, “’alhai’ah ’al’uliā lil-thawrah ’altūnisiyyah tuqir ’al’ahd ’aljumhūrī”, 1 July 2011, <https://bit.ly/2PdjeFn> (accessed 24 August 2019).

—, “’almarzūkī yashḥab ḥizbah min ’alhai’ah ’al’uliā lil-thawrah ’altūnisiyyah”, 1 July 2011, <https://bit.ly/2KPQNsX> (accessed 22 August 2019).

Nawwār, Rāmī. “’alhai’ah ’alshar’iyyah lil-ḥuqūq wa ’al’iṣlāḥ ’allā’ib ’al’asāsī bi-sāḥat ’al’islāmiyyīn ... ’al’ikhwān wa ’alsalafiyyūn wa ’aljamā’ah ’al’islāmiyyah yantaḥirūn da’mahā ... wa taḍum 119 qiadiyyā ’islāmiyyā ... wa ’alshāṭir wa ’alzumur wa ḥigāzī wa ’abū ’ismā’īl ’abraz ’a’ḍā’ahā”, *Youm7*, 3 January 2013, <http://www.youm7.com/896217> (accessed 8 March 2020).

— . “nanshur naṣ bardiiyyat munazzamāt ḥukūk ’al’insān lil-’aḥkām ’al’asāsiiyyah fī ’aldustūr ... 6 mawad faqaṭ lil-dustūr tau’kkid mabda’ ’alsh’ab maṣdar li-kul ’alsuluṭāt ... wa ’almādah ’al’ulā: maṣr ’ummah muta’addidat ’al’adiān wa ’almadhāhib ... wa tuṭālib bita’addud maṣādir ’altashrī’”, *Youm7*, 11 July 2011, <http://www.youm7.com/452442> (accessed 12 May 2019).

People’s Daily Online, “taqrīr ’ikhbārī: mu’tamar lil-ḥiwār ’alwaṭanī fī tūnis yajma’ ’akthar min 50 ḥizb wa 22 munazzamah”, <http://arabic.peopledaily.com.cn/31662/7979963.html> (accessed 31 August 2019).

Qāsīm, ’Ibrāhīm. “aldustūriyyah tuqarrir ’adam dustūriyyat nuṣūṣ qānūn ’al’intikhābāt wa tursilah lil- shūrā”, *Youm7*, 18 February 2013 <https://bit.ly/2ut1NXs> (accessed 25 January 2020).

Ramaḍān, Bassām. “bil-ṣūrah ... ’asmā’ ’almuwaqqi’īn ’alā wathīqat ’al’azhar li-nabdh ’al’unf”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 31 January 2013, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/273789> (accessed 16 October 2019).

Ramaḍān, Hānī. “majlis ’alsha’b ’almaṣrī 2012 ... ’altashkīl wa ’almahām”, *BBC Arabic*, 23 January 2012, http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2012/01/120123_egypt_palt_hani (accessed 25 November 2018).

Rassd, “maḥaṭṭāt hāmmah fī mishwār ‘alt’sīsiyyah”, 3 December 2012, <https://rassd.com/50544.htm> (accessed 27 July 2019).

RT Arabic, “tūnis ... ‘aljibālī yushakkil majlis ḥukamā’ li-taqdīr ‘almawāqif wa ‘almustajaddāt ‘alwaṭaniyyah”, 13 February 2013, <https://bit.ly/2oYShso> (accessed 6 October 2019).

Sa’d, ‘Abdul-Raḥmān. “‘intiḡādāt ḥāddah liḥiwārāt maṣr”, *Al Jazeera Net*, 1 June 2011 <http://tiny.cc/odjw4y> (accessed 25 April 2018).

Saifulddīn, Wasīm. “sa’d ‘alḥarīrī ... ‘Istiḡalah ‘alā waq’ ‘al’intifāḡah”, *Anadolu Agency*, 29 October 2019, <https://bit.ly/2VtU7iE> (accessed 23 April 2020).

Ṣalāḡ, Tāriḡ. “lajnit ‘idārit ‘itiḡād ‘al’ummāl taḡil 173 lajhah niḡābiyyah tanfīzā li-‘aḡkām qaḡā’iyyah”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 10 August 2011, <https://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=306784&IssueID=2223> (accessed 6 February 2020).

Sālim, Mahā. “‘alquwāt ‘almusallaḡah: nanḡāz dā’ mā li-sha’b maṣr ... wa ‘al’inḡisāmāt tuhadid ‘arkān ‘aldawlah ... wa nad’am ‘alḡiwār ‘alwaṭanī wuṣūlā lil-tawafuḡ”, *Al Ahram*, 8 December 2012, <http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/281141.aspx> (accessed 1 August 2019).

Sālim, Muḡsin; ‘Al-’Anṣarī, Jihād; and ‘Al-Jundī, ‘Aḡmad. “‘alri’āsah tuḡarrir ‘ilḡhā’ ‘al’i’lān ‘aldustūrī wa ‘al’istiftā’ bi-maw’iduh”, *Alwafd News*, 8 December 2012, <https://bit.ly/2K8jAbF> (accessed 31 July 2019).

Saudi Press Agency, “mu’tamar ‘alḡiwār ‘altūnisī yakhtatim ‘a’mālah bil-tawaṣul ‘ilā tawāfuḡāt tata’allaḡ bil-dustūr wa ‘alqānūn ‘al’intikhābī”, 17 May 2013, <https://www.spa.gov.sa/1111212> (accessed 7 October 2019).

Sha’bān, Muḡammad Ḥassan. “maṣr: ṣirā’ ‘alwathāiḡ ‘aldustūriyyah”, *AlSharḡ AlAwsat*, <http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=45&article=650424&issueno=12043#.WVksF4iGODJ> (accessed 2 July 2017).

Shorouk News, “ba’d biyānain shadīdī ‘allahjah min ‘al’ikhwān wa ḡizb ‘alḤurriyyah wa ‘al’adālah ... ‘al’askaī muhaddida ‘iḡdā’ ‘alqwā’ ‘alsiāsiyyah: nuṭalib ‘aljamī’ ‘an ya’ū durūs ‘altārīkh”, 25 March 2012, <https://bit.ly/2tOOctq> (accessed 25 January 2020).

— , “alḥukūmah ’altūnusiyyah tu’lin ’asmā’ ’al’a’ḍā’ bi-majlis ḥukamā’ tūnis, 13 February 2013, <https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=13022013&id=fe5e8ef9-c62a-4b13-84d8-7d019005ce08> (accessed 6 October 2019).

Sky News, “fawz ’al’islāmiyyīn fī ’alshūrā ’almaṣrī”, 26 February 2012 <https://bit.ly/30JqZ7R> (accessed 22 January 2020).

— , “’Istiḳālat ’alra’īs ’aljazā’irī ’abdul-’azīz būtaflīḳah”, 2 April 2019, <https://bit.ly/3ax6VsX> (accessed 23 April 2020).

— , “’alnaṣ ’alkāmil li-bayān ’azl ’albashīr”, 11 April 2019, <https://bit.ly/3eOh9Zk> (accessed 23 April 2020).

— , “’albarlamān ’al’irāqī yaqbal ’istiḳālat ’ādil ’abdul-mahdī”, 1 December 2019, <https://bit.ly/2XYq700> (accessed 23 April 2020).

’Uthmān, Daliā. “’almaṣrī ’alyūm tanshur naṣ ’al’i’lān ’aldustūrī ... wa ’intikhābāt ’alri’āsah qabl nihāyat ’al’ām ’aljārī”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 30 March 2011, <https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/122361> (accessed 24 November 2018).

— . “’alliwā’ murād ’iṣmat mudīr ’alkuliyyah ’alḥarbiyyah: kharījū ’alkuliyyah hum qādat ’almustaḳbal”, *Al Masry Al Youm*, 31 July 2015 <https://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=472788> (accessed 11 January 2020).

Wālī, ’Amr. “’abraz ’azamāt ’alqaḍā’ ma’a ’alri’āsah fī ’ahd Mursī”, *Masrawy*, 24 April 2013, <https://bit.ly/37rLA3h> (accessed 25 January 2020).

— . “mursī wa fariḳuh ’alri’āī ... ’istiḳālat bil-jumlah wa ṣalāḥiyyāt ghāmiḍah”, *Masrawy*, 23 June 2013, <https://bit.ly/2xIBDHn> (accessed 9 March 2020).

Yusrī, Ranā. “’vidīū burhāmī: law tamakkan ’al’ikhwān siaḳḍūn ’alainā”, *Alwafd News*, 5 February 2013, <https://bit.ly/3a7sDni> (accessed 26 February 2020).

Yūsuf, Hadīr. “ḥaiḥiyyāt ḥukm ḥal ’allajnah ’alt’sīsiyyah”, *Alwafd News*, 10 April 2012 <https://bit.ly/2NWgrwY> (accessed 25 January 2020).

YouTube

“2014 12 26 shukrā ‘alā ‘alḥudūr”, YouTube video, 1:29:29, *Watania Replay*, 27 December 2014 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FD6vQPvHXyA> (accessed 5 March 2020).

“al‘āshirah masā’ munā ‘alshāzilī Dr. ‘Abdul-‘Azīz Ḥigāzī ra’īs lajnat ‘alḥiwār ‘alwaṭanī wa tafāṣīl jalsat ‘alḥiwār ‘alwaṭanī ḥalaqat 22 05 2011 juz’ 001”, YouTube video, 11:46, *Dreamstvchannel*, 23 May 2011 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TvDOWVVErY8> (accessed 25 April 2018).

“aljabhat ‘alwaṭaniyyah tuṭātib ‘alra’īs mursī bi-taṣḥīḥ masār ‘althawrah”, YouTube video, 1:08:25, *Al Jazeera Mubasher*, 28 July 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lsul6pYJwso> (accessed 28 July 2019).

“alnadwah ‘alshuḥufiyyah li-ḥusain ‘al‘abbāsī bi-lughat ‘alwa’id wa ‘altaḥdīd”, YouTube video, 6:29, *Akhbar asaa*, 4 December 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btQpZLZlkjk> (accessed 5 March 2020).

“bayān ‘almajlis ‘al‘askarī .mp4”, YouTube video, 4:39, *Video Youm7*, 12 July 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbR4m9SjJc> (accessed 11 May 2019).

“Dr. ‘Abdul-‘Azīz Ḥigāzī fī ‘alḥayāt ‘alyaum”, YouTube video, 12:59, *sccegypt*, 14 May 2011 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sUftolqEV68> (accessed 25 April 2018).

“ḥusain ‘abbāsī ‘uḍu rubā’iyyat ‘alḥewarāt ‘altūnusī ‘alḥā’izah ‘alā jā’zat nubil yulqī kalimah fī ‘almajlis ‘al‘aṭlantī”, YouTube video, 27:30, *Aljazeera Mubasher*, 4 November 2014 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nmOFn6VGx9o> (accessed 5 March 2020).

“‘ikhtiār ‘a‘dā’ ‘aljam‘iyyah ‘alt’īsīyyah lil-dustūr ‘almaṣrī”, YouTube video, 2:05, *Al Jazeera Arabic*, 7 June 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J_4JovwYsWs (accessed 23 June 2019).

“‘iqrār ‘almādah 197 bil-dustūr ... ‘inshā’ majlis lil-difā’ ‘alwaṭanī”, YouTube video, 5:00, *Sotelsh3b*, 29 November 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pLPfgqij2N4&playnext=1&list=PL1A0ADFB0FFD1B5D1&feature=results_main (accessed 26 January 2020).

“mudākhalat Dr. ‘Abdul-‘Azīz Ḥigāzī”, YouTube video, 3:01, *sccegypt*, 12 May 2011 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qHd1d_gk2-A (accessed 25 April 2018).

“mu’tamar ’alwifāq ’alqawmī ’almaṣrī”, YouTube video, 2:40, *Al Jazeera Arabic*, 21 May 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=SN&hl=fr&v=TmJA7gKqlzk> (accessed 25 April 2018).

“mu’tamar ṣuḥafī lil-mutaḥaddith bi-’ism ’alri’āsah 10/1/2013”, YouTube video, 15:58, *Egyptian Presidency*, 12 January 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=09xZY5KPg_0 (accessed 31 July 2019).

“tafāṣīl wa khabāiā ’ijtimā’ ’almushīr ma’ ru’asā’ ’al’aḥzāb”, YouTube video, 3:03, *Altahrirtvchannel*, 15 April 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hd4fiOb0ShE> (accessed 23 June 2019).

“taḥdīd ’almawqif min ’alta’sīsiyyah bil-nisbat lil-’aḥzāb yaum ’alkhamīs ba’d ’ijtimā’ ’almushīr ṭaṅṭāwī”, YouTube video, 0:55, *Misralhurrah*, 27 March 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-15Tz4wjjqE> (accessed 23 June 2019).

“wa fī riwāiyah ’ukhrā | ’alduktūr muḥammad ’albarādī | ’alḥalaqah ’alrābi’ah”, YouTube video, 1:05:05, *’altilifizūn ’al’arabī - Alaraby TV*, 28 January 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_0fixW9vt_c (accessed 27 January 2020).

Other Electronic Sources

Al Jazeera Encyclopedia, “’alḥizb ’aljumhūrī (tūnis)”, <https://bit.ly/38s4IUu> (accessed 20 January 2020).

—, “blāk bulūk”, *Al Jazeera Net*, <https://bit.ly/2IVL17v> (accessed 16 October 2019).

Ana Salafy, The Multimedia Section, Al Sheikh Yasser Burhami, <https://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=37004#> (accessed 25 February 2020).

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Files, “Comparing Egypt’s Constitutions”, <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Comparing-Egypt-s-Constitutions.pdf> (accessed 17 February 2020).

Dostour Masr, “dustūr maṣr li-’ām 2012”, <http://sharek2012.dostour.eg/2012/> (accessed 29 March 2019).

EU Spring Project Resources, Timeline-Tunisia, Summer 2014, <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/euspring/advisoryboard/> (accessed 30 August 2019).

Legal Documents Archive, “dasātīr”, <https://manshurat.org/taxonomy/term/2> (accessed 4 December 2019).

— , “ḥal majlis ’idārit ’al’itiḥād ’al’ām li-niqābāt ’ummāl maṣr”, <https://temp.manshurat.org/node/3174> (accessed 6 February 2020).

— , “iṣdār dustūr jumhūriyyat maṣr ’al’arabiyyah li-sanat 2012”, <https://manshurat.org/node/3573> (accessed 26 January 2020).

— , “tashkīl lajnah mu’qatah li-’idārit ’al’itiḥād ’al’ām li-niqābāt ’ummāl maṣr”, <https://temp.manshurat.org/node/3175> (accessed 6 February 2020).

Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, The Decree-law 6/2011, 18 February 2011, http://www.legislation.tn/en/detailtexte/D%C3%A9cret-loi-num-2011-6-du----jort-2011-013_2011013000062 (accessed 24 November 2018).

— , The Decree-law 14/2011 (23 March 2011) http://www.legislation.tn/en/detailtexte/D%C3%A9cret-loi-num-2011-14-du-23-03-2011-jort-2011-020_2011020000142?shorten=7qaV (accessed 24 November 2018).

— , The Constitutive law 6/2011 “Law on the provisional organisation of public authorities” (16 December 2011), http://www.legislation.tn/detailtexte/Loi-num-2011-6-du-16-12-2011-jort-2011-097_2011097000061?shorten=7qrT (accessed 24 November 2018).

Official statement of the Muslim Brotherhood, *Ikhwan Online*, 25 May 2011, https://www.ikhwanonline.com/official_statements/84981/Default.aspx (accessed 12 May 2019).

Presidency of the Government Portal, “nadwah ṣaḥāfiyyah li-ru’asā’ ’allijān ’alwaṭaniyyah ’althalāth ’almukallafah bil-’iṣlāḥ ’alsiyāsī wa bil-nazar fī ’altajawzāt wa ’alfasād”, <http://admin.pm.gov.tn/pm/actualites/actualite.php?id=2016&lang=ar> (accessed 3 August 2019).

Rached Ghannouchi Official Page, *Facebook*, 21 June 2013, <https://www.facebook.com/rached.ghannoushi/posts/724146900955250> (accessed 24 November 2018).

Resource Page, “National Salvation Front”, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 3 September 2013, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/09/03/national-salvation-front-pub-54921> (accessed 25 November 2018).

The Nobel Peace Prize 2015. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2015/ (accessed 22 November 2015)

The Official Website of the 2011 Referendum, <https://referendum2011.elections.eg/84-slideshow/155-result.html> (accessed 22 January 2020).

The Official Website of the 2012 Referendum, <https://referendum2012.elections.eg/results/referendum-results> (accessed 22 January 2020).

Interviews

	Date and Place	Biography
Interviewee no. 1	September 9, 2019 – Istanbul.	- Coordinator of the National Front for Completing the Revolution (Fairmont Accord). - A member of President <i>Mursi's</i> advisory team.
Interviewee no. 2	September 12, 2019 – Istanbul.	A leading figure in the political bureau of the Building and Development Party.
Interviewee no. 3	September 18, 2019 – Istanbul.	A spokesperson of the FJP and a leading figure in the Higher Press Council.
Interviewee no. 4	October 13, 2019 – London.	An ex-MB activist and a member in the Executive Bureau of the RYC.
Interviewee no. 5	November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.	- An ex-minister in the second cabinet of <i>Hishām Qandīl</i> . - A member of the FJP Higher Committee. - A leading figure in the Constituent Assembly.
Interviewee no. 6	November 4, 2019 – Istanbul.	- A member of the Shura Council and the Executive Board of the EMP. - A previous Deputy-President of the EMP. - The Head of the Committee of Twenty of the EMP.
Interviewee no. 7	December 15, 2019 – Doha.	A spokesman of the NSF.
Interviewee no. 8	February 6, 2020 – Istanbul.	A labour Activist and an ex-candidate in the People's Assembly elections in 2011.
Interviewee no. 9	February 10, 2020 – Istanbul.	- A member of the Shura Council and the Executive Board of the EMP. - A member of the Committee of Twenty of the EMP.
Interviewee no. 10	February 18, 2020 – Istanbul.	An MB Cadre, who was involved in coordination between the MB and the presidential institution.