

# The United States, China, and the Politics of Hegemonic Ordering in East Asia

Beverley Loke

University of Exeter

[b.w.loke@exeter.ac.uk](mailto:b.w.loke@exeter.ac.uk)

## Abstract

China's rise has raised important questions about the durability of US hegemony in East Asia. Much of the debate, however, has generally been cast in fairly simplistic terms, suggesting the durability *or* end of US regional hegemony. Such framings nevertheless fail to fully capture regional dynamics and complexity. Advancing an English School conception of hegemony, this paper examines the politics, contestation, and renegotiation of the post-Cold War US hegemonic order in East Asia. It maps out four logics of hegemonic ordering in the existing literature, outlines their shortfalls and advances a twofold argument. First, although regional order will not disintegrate into binary "order versus disorder" or "US versus Chinese hegemony" scenarios, the politics of hegemonic ordering—the interactive discourses, processes, relations, and practices that underpin hegemony—will intensify as the United States and China continue to both cooperate and compete for power, position, and influence in East Asia. Second, I argue that the East Asian regional order will evolve in ways that resemble hybrid forms of hegemony in a complex hierarchy. Specifically, I develop a new logic—"coalitional and collaborative hegemonies in a complex hierarchy"—that is anchored in assertiveness, fluidity, and compartmentalization. It demonstrates that Washington and Beijing will form coalitional hegemonies, seeking legitimation from multiple and often overlapping constituencies, but also engage in a collaborative hegemony on shared interests. This better reflects evolving regional dynamics and yields theoretical insights into examining hegemonic transitions less as clearly delineated transitions from one distinct hegemonic order to the next, and more as partial and hybrid ones.

## Introduction

China's rising economic and military power is fuelling a more confident China in the region. Beijing is far more adept in its institutional statecraft and is more explicitly articulating its vision for regional order. Such developments raise important questions about the durability of US hegemony and the future direction of East Asian regional order.<sup>1</sup> Yet much of the analysis has often been presented in simplistic and binary terms, suggesting the durability *or* end of US regional hegemony along the lines of American benevolence, linear Chinese socialization, US-China hegemonic confrontation or dual hierarchies. Furthermore, discussions about power and order transitions typically tend to assume that transitions are easily delineated, with a distinct hegemonic order supplanting the one that preceded it (Allison 2018; Kupchan 2014b; Mearsheimer 2001). Such accounts neither fully capture evolving regional developments nor address the complexity of regional order-building in East Asia.

How might we then best conceptualize the evolution of hegemonic order in East Asia, and with what implications for processes of hegemonic ordering? What forms of hegemony are likely to occur? Drawing on the English School and more recent work on complex hierarchies and hegemonic orders, this paper advances a social conception of hegemony to examine the politics, contestation, and renegotiation of the post-Cold War US hegemonic order in East Asia. A twofold argument is posited here. First, although regional order will not disintegrate into stark “order versus disorder”, “US versus Chinese hegemony” or “US-China power transition” type scenarios, the politics of hegemonic ordering—the interactive discourses, processes, relations, and practices that underpin hegemony—will become more complex.<sup>2</sup> This stems from an understanding that hegemony and hegemonic orders are not static entities, but are fundamentally dynamic. Hegemonic bargains, special responsibilities, and ordering processes are subject to contestation and negotiation, particularly when we take into account the various legitimizing and delegitimizing constituencies that underpin hierarchical structures. Such negotiations will intensify as the United States and China continue to both cooperate and compete for power, position and influence in East Asia.

---

<sup>1</sup> This paper recognizes that regions are social constructs, underpinned by normative and geopolitical visions. A narrower focus on East Asia, rather than the Indo-Pacific, is employed here for several reasons. Comprising the states of Northeast and Southeast Asia, East Asia is China's immediate backyard and the foundation for its broader regional goals. It is thus where the effects of China's rise on US regional hegemony are most pronounced, and where the politics of hegemonic ordering are playing out most acutely.

<sup>2</sup> The term “politics of hegemonic ordering” is taken from Ikenberry and Nexon (2019).

Second, and building especially on Clark's (2011b) seminal work, I argue that the East Asian regional order will evolve in ways that resemble hybrid forms of hegemony in a complex hierarchy. Specifically, I advance a new logic—"coalitional and collaborative hegemonies in a complex hierarchy"—that is anchored in assertiveness, fluidity and compartmentalization. This more accurately captures the competitive-cooperative nexus in, and regional receptivity to, US-China regional hegemonic management.<sup>3</sup> It demonstrates that Washington and Beijing will form coalitional hegemonies, seeking legitimation from multiple and often overlapping constituencies, but also engage in a collaborative hegemony driven by shared interests. This logic is also theoretically significant for examining hegemonic transitions less as full, clearly delineated transitions from one distinct hegemonic order to the next and more as partial and hybrid ones, thus examining changes *and* continuities in order-building processes (Clark 2011b; Foot and Goh 2019; Goh, 2019).<sup>4</sup>

The paper develops these arguments in three sections. The first section provides a conceptual unpacking of hegemony in International Relations (IR). It advances a social understanding of hegemony to examine the content, character, and durability of hegemony and hegemonic orders. The second section surveys the literature and identifies four prominent logics of hegemonic ordering in post-Cold War East Asia. It demonstrates that many of these analyses do not fully capture existing dynamics and do not push the politics of hegemonic ordering far enough. The final section addresses this gap by developing the new logic of coalitional and collaborative hegemonies to more comprehensively reflect the evolving US-China relationship and hegemonic management in East Asia. The logic's underlying characteristics—assertiveness, fluidity, and compartmentalization—are outlined here.

### **A Social Conception of Hegemony**

Viewed as a form or subset of hierarchy, hegemony is an important but contested concept in IR. Realist conceptualizations of hegemony typically describe a preponderant power with the ability to exercise dominance over others and dictate the rules of the game. They are founded on the

---

<sup>3</sup> Beijing eschews the term hegemony and rejects claims that China will pursue hegemony. This is nevertheless understood and employed in a coercive, power political manner. From a social conception of hegemony, it becomes clearer that the pursuit of regional centrality and leadership are central to its foreign policy goals.

<sup>4</sup> The broader conceptual arguments on hybridity and hegemonic ordering also yield interesting insights into an evolving global order, especially in the context of shifting legitimating constituencies in the Global South. This empirical application is nevertheless beyond the scope of this present article.

belief that “might equals right”, best articulated by Thucydides’ (1954, 402) classic statement that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” Such understandings focus on power and prestige, whereby a state with overwhelming material power dominates other lesser states in the system (Gilpin 1981, 29). States are driven by the desire for greater relative power to improve their position in the international system, with hegemony as the ultimate goal (Mearsheimer 2001, 29). In this context, there is far less conceptual delineation between primacy, preponderance, and hegemony. Hegemony is enforced by imposition and sustained through power political means.

This focus on material strength and the systemic distribution of power is important and indeed the very basis upon which world politics turns. Material preponderance is nevertheless a necessary but insufficient condition of hegemony, as it does not adequately capture the role that hegemons perform and the manner in which hegemony is exercised (Clark 2011, 19; Cox 1981, 139; Prys 2010). In other words, hegemony is not reducible to dominance. A hegemon must demonstrate capability, willingness and receive social endorsement of its leading role. As Wight (1979, 36) wrote, “a dominant power must be described by purpose as well as by power” and appeal to “some design of international unity and solidarity.” Hegemony is thus conceived as a social institution, “associated not simply with the exercise of dominant power but with the creation of a distinctive, and acceptable, pattern of order” (Clark 2011b, 24).

A more comprehensive understanding requires conceptualizing hegemonic orders as produced and sustained by material, social, and normative forces. They are underpinned by “packages of ideas and rules that inform the nature of a given order and govern social relations within that order” (Kupchan 2014a, 221). The establishment and durability of hegemonic authority nevertheless rests on various factors. Much of the existing literature posits that hegemonic orders generally reflect the ordering principles that are found in the hegemon’s domestic polity, with domestic norms and values exported to its sphere of influence (Kupchan 2014a). Hegemonic stability theory emphasizes the hegemonic role and provision of public goods to maintain system stability (Gilpin 1981; Keohane 1984; Kindleberger 1973), a costly endeavor but one where the hegemon reaps a disproportionate share of the benefits (Norloff 2010). Rationalist approaches focus on transactional and functional bargains, highlighting the ways in which a hegemon provides public and private goods that secondary states view as beneficial (Lake 2009). Other explanations focus on structural power (Strange 1987) or state socialization and compliance (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). These accounts may nevertheless be viewed as thinly social conceptions that focus primarily on the preponderant power, conceptualize socialization as a linear process and view secondary states simply as recipients,

diminishing the agency and accentuating the passivity of these secondary states (Lee 2016; Pu 2012).

This paper is therefore situated within a growing volume of work that is calling for a deeper unpacking of hegemony. These more recent studies focus on the dynamics, politics, and practice of hegemonic orders and ordering (Ikenberry and Nexon 2019; Kang 2020), highlighting the ways in which hierarchical structures manage international order, create role expectations, and shape actor behavior (Mattern and Zarakol 2016). It is in this context that this paper espouses a “thicker” social conception of hegemony, defining hegemony as a condition of preponderance and leadership where a state (or states) with order-generating capabilities receives social endorsement of its leading role.<sup>5</sup> Cast in this explicitly social conception of hegemony, four interrelated points are worth emphasizing here.

First, although material preponderance remains a prerequisite, hegemony is sustained by ideational and social capital. This emphasizes the role that ideas play in ensuring a broad measure of consent for hegemony and, in turn, the social conferral and preservation of hegemonic status (Cox 1987). From this perspective, there is a crucial difference between empire and hegemony, where the former refers to a rule by coercion and the latter focuses on the ability to “lead rather than coerce, inspire affection rather than suspicion” (Cox 2005, 28; see also Destradi 2010; Sterling-Folker 2008). Hegemony thus involves legitimation and endorsement. It is based on authority that is “legitimate power, contingent on a mutually recognized or socially constituted set of rights and obligations respected by both the superordinate and subordinate states” (Lake 2017, 367). This is perceivably along the lines of what Yan (2016) refers to as “humane authority”, where morality, strategic credibility and leading by example serve as the foundation for the durability of a state’s leading position. Ideational and social capital thus sustain the hegemonic order: if a leading state(s) acts in ways beyond what is established as appropriate responsible behavior, its international legitimacy is eroded and its hegemonic status disempowered. Notions of responsibility therefore play an important part in the normative content and contours of international society. As Clark (2017, 249) articulates: “The concept through which the principle of hierarchy has been legitimated in international society has recurrently been that of ‘responsibility’: this has been mostly presented as the counterpart of special rights, and hence it is those gradations in responsibility, and the reasons for its relative assignment, that provide such normative support as exists for hierarchy.”<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> This definition draws on Ikenberry and Nexon (2019, 411) and Clark (2011, 4).

<sup>6</sup> See also Bukovansky et al. (2012) and Goh (2013).

Second, hegemony should be examined not only from the perspectives and preferences of the dominant power(s) but also from those of secondary states as they play a key role in legitimizing and delegitimizing hegemonic orders (Schweller and Pu 2011). This allows us to capture a more comprehensive and complex conceptualization, demonstrating that hegemony and order-building involves the negotiation of top-down and bottom-up processes (Lee 2019). Secondary states do not automatically “buy into” an order but instead show varying degrees of receptivity ranging from acquiescence, endorsement, resistance, and contestation. It is thus fundamentally important to interrogate followership: the ways in which other actors respond to hegemony and how this interaction shapes the nature of hegemony itself. This gives us a more complete picture of hegemony as a relational, rather than static, condition (Jesse et al. 2012; Lee 2016; Zhang 2015). It is equally important to recognize that international society comprises of multiple and often overlapping clusters of legitimating states. A hegemon will rarely appeal to, and find universal endorsement from, international society in its entirety. It is more likely that a hegemon will find its legitimation restricted to a specific constituency or constituencies in international society (Clark 2011b, 60; Loke 2016b, 856). This distinction is important, particularly if we wish to further interrogate hegemony along social and ideational dimensions.

Third, a social reading of hegemony highlights the politics of hegemonic ordering and counter-ordering through processes of bargaining, negotiation, and contestation (Costa Buranelli 2018; Ikenberry and Nexon 2019; Goh 2019; Mattern and Zarakol 2016). As Alagappa (2003, 39) expressed, the “construction of order is a historical process in which intersubjective understandings and their translations into institutions are reached through struggle, conflict, accommodation, and cooperation.” It is nevertheless crucial to recognize that intersubjectivity remains a site of continuous reinterpretation.<sup>7</sup> Any type of order—including a hegemonic order—is created out of, and remains subject to, negotiation and contestation. This dynamism is intrinsic to, and indeed constitutive of, order-building and ordering processes. Hegemonic bargains and special responsibilities are therefore subject to renegotiation and renewal (Bukovansky et al. 2012; Goh 2019; Loke 2016b).

Fourth, hegemony can assume various institutional forms. With the aim “not to present hegemony in one unique and reified form, but instead as something expressed through a variety of forms,” Clark (2011b, 9) highlights the different configurations of institutionalized hegemony, ranging from the singular to the collective. A singular hegemony exercised by one preponderant

---

<sup>7</sup> This is highlighted especially by constructivist work on norm contestation. See, for instance, Deitelhoff and Zimmermann (2020), and Wiener (2009).

power over international society in its entirety may be difficult to attain and sustain in practice, a reality even Mearsheimer acknowledges in his exposition of hegemony. A more feasible option would be hegemony limited to a specific geographical base, in the form of a regional hegemony, or, as mentioned earlier, over a particular constituency or group of states (Clark 2011b, 66; Mearsheimer 2001, 41). A collective hegemony is one shared among the great powers. It is an elite directorate with special rights and responsibilities to maintain international order. This relates to the English School conception of great power management, of which the Concert of Europe is a typical example.<sup>8</sup> Situated between the singular and collective variants is a form of coalitional hegemony. This is composed of a hegemon working with like-minded states, or states with shared interests, and seeking legitimacy from a more restricted constituency. One such example would be a US-led coalitional hegemony of liberal democracies (Clark 2011b, 59-69).

### **Mapping the Literature: Logics of Hegemonic Ordering in Post-Cold War East Asia**

Hegemony and hierarchy are not unfamiliar concepts in East Asia; indeed, they remain defining features of an evolving regional order. China's rising power has nevertheless raised important questions concerning the nature, extent, and durability of US hegemony in post-Cold War East Asia. Drawing on the conceptual analysis above, this section identifies four logics of hegemonic ordering that have been prominent in the existing literature, and assesses their key characteristics and applicability in an evolving East Asian regional order.

#### *Logic One: Singular Hegemony, Simple Hierarchy*

---

<sup>8</sup> As hegemony was not fully theorized in classical English School writings, there is some conceptual ambiguity between collective hegemony and great power management. Bull (1977) rejected the notion of hegemony, captured in a single concentration of power, in favour of balance of power and great power management. Hegemony was given more attention by Watson (2007), although largely from a power political perspective. He explored hegemony as comprising a single dominant power or group of great powers. This latter conception begins to blur the distinction between collective hegemony and great power management, most evidenced in Simpson's (2004) study on the Concert of Europe as "legalized hegemony." I recognize this conceptual ambiguity but make one fundamental distinction in how great power management and collective hegemony are employed in this paper. Hegemonic or great power management in the context of US-China relations is a normative ideal. A US-China *collective* hegemony, on the other hand, ascribes greater institutionalization and durability onto that arrangement.

This first logic is characterized by a simple hierarchical structure, with one dominant power above all other states. In post-Cold War East Asia, this has been a narrative centered on American primacy and unipolarity: a preponderant United States unencumbered by systemic constraints and bolstered by the hegemonic benefits of its deep engagement strategy (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008). From the very outset, the United States has played a pivotal role in East Asia's regional order through the "San Francisco System", a hub-and-spokes alliance system designed to maximize Washington's strategic manoeuvrability and establish Japan as an anti-Communist growth engine for East Asia (Cha 2009/2010). More than half a century after the San Francisco System was institutionalized, these alliances remain an enduring feature of contemporary regional order.

Over the years, the United States has nevertheless recognized the need to further legitimize its hegemonic role in the region by demonstrating both great power restraint and reassurance. As a result, Washington has become increasingly embedded in regional multilateral arrangements. It signed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and has become an active participant of the East Asia Summit. US bilateralism has also served as a foundation for the construction of a networked security architecture, underpinned by the strengthening of US partnerships and alliances as well as greater spoke-to-spoke alignments alongside broader multilateral arrangements (Fontaine et. al 2017; Dian and Meijer 2020; Tow and Limaye 2016). East Asian regional architecture is thus best characterized by various overlapping geometries that are weaved and stitched together to minimize security dilemmas, foster cooperation and support regionalism along the lines of Cha's (2011) "complex patchworks" or Yeo's (2019) "institutional layering" frameworks.

Logic one therefore prioritizes the rules-based regional order that US liberal hegemony has helped to establish and maintain. It is premised on the US hegemonic bargain to provide security guarantees, promote economic liberalization, manage regional crises and prevent great power rivalry (Mastanduno 2003). It highlights America's hegemonic benevolence through the "voice opportunities" offered to regional states, allowing China as well to rise within this regional order (Ikenberry 2004, 356). In turn, regional states have endorsed US hegemony and have raised broad concerns when confronted with the prospects of American retrenchment, alliance abandonment, or offshore balancing (Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth 2012/2013; Cho 2018). It is a singular hegemony with the United States occupying the apex because of its perceived benignity and because the other great powers, China and Japan, are simply unable or unwilling to assume this hegemonic role. Indeed, the effects of US hegemony has meant that



regional powers such as Japan are largely restrained, with prospects for indigenous individual or collective regional leadership mostly circumscribed (Beeson 2017, 570).

To some extent, this logic acknowledges the varying responses by secondary states and the feedback mechanisms that exist in hegemonic orders. As Ikenberry observed: “American hegemony became more open, predictable, reciprocal, and institutionalised— and therefore more benign and tolerable. But the United States was able to lock other countries into operating within a legitimate and US-centred order” (Ikenberry 2004, 356). Indeed, a United States that is responsive to the demands and concerns of regional states and allies helps to secure its hegemonic position. This logic nevertheless downplays the challenges presented by a rising China and assumes an excessively liberal reading of US hegemony in ways that have been called into question under the Trump administration.

### *Logic Two: Singular Hegemony, Multilayered Hierarchy*

There are obvious overlaps between the first and second logics as both operate under the premise of a single hegemon embedded within a hierarchical structure. The key distinction of logic two lies in the multilayered representation of hierarchy in East Asia. It is multilayered in the sense that it “does not consist simply of the dominant state, and the rest, but is genuinely hierarchical in that there are various stratifications within the hierarchy” (Clark 2011b, 189). This conception therefore has the potential to more explicitly recognize the wider tapestry of actors, the complex power dynamics, and the ways in which these actors, forces, and dynamics restrain, react to, or contest hegemony. According to this logic, the United States continues to occupy pole position but is followed by regional great powers such as China and Japan in the second tier, and other regional states below. US hegemony is therefore embedded within a more complex hierarchical structure that is underpinned by processes of complicity, resistance, and renegotiation (Goh 2013). In this regard, logic one has given way to logic two, with a more explicit focus on China’s rising positionality and status in the US hegemonic order.

Yet although this layered hierarchical model captures China’s rising power and the resulting shift in hierarchical dynamics, it posits that Beijing lacks hegemonic capacity and intent, and remains largely wedded to a regional order undergirded by US hegemony. In material terms, China does not possess the military, economic, and technological capabilities to rival US superiority (Beckley 2011/2012; Brooks and Wohlforth 2015/2016). Most prominently, however, this logic perceives China to be co-opted and integrated as a “constrained, pro-status quo regional great power subordinate to the United States as global and regional hegemon” (Goh

2013, 209). This by and large denotes a China that is socialized into the existing US-led order *on US terms*. To be sure, Beijing has at varying degrees subscribed to, and been socialized into, the liberal international order and has displayed some level of deference to the United States, adhering to Deng Xiaoping's dictum of "keeping a low-profile" as it navigated and adapted to the rules of the game. Certainly up to the mid-late 2000s, Beijing's approach was reflected in its peaceful development narrative and in "learning to live with the hegemon" (Jia 2005).

The key question, however, is how far this linear socialization trajectory will take us. The fundamental issue here is whether China is content to remain "at a level below that of the United States, that is, as the second ranked but still subordinate power" (Goh 2008, 368).<sup>9</sup> As the final section will demonstrate, the degree to which China is satisfied to remain co-opted under US hegemonic bargains is far more tenuous, with Beijing now more actively contesting aspects of the US hegemonic regional order. Furthermore, unlike previous administrations that largely welcomed a peaceful, prosperous, and responsible China, the US under Trump has pursued more antagonistic policies towards Beijing. While the Biden administration will seek greater stability in US-China relations, Washington will continue to view China as a strategic competitor. These developments suggest that the terms and nature of logic two's "single hegemon in a multilayered hierarchy" will be, and indeed are currently being, renegotiated.

### *Logic Three: Hegemonic Challenge and Transition*

The third logic is starkest in its prediction of the likelihood of great power war and hegemonic conflict. It centers on China's contestation of the US hegemonic order in East Asia and the various counter-hegemonic projects it has undertaken in recent years. Although by most accounts the US currently remains the predominant power in the region, China is fast catching up, presenting a military, economic, and institutional challenge to Pax Americana (Layne 2018; Lind 2018; Mastanduno 2019; Mastro 2019b). As China's power and influence grows, its resistance to US hegemony has risen. China's military rise and increasing presence in the South China Sea is intensifying regional anxieties, fueling security dilemmas, and driving US-China strategic rivalry (Liff and Ikenberry 2014). Beijing is promoting a new model of international relations,

---

<sup>9</sup> Importantly, both Clark and Goh, key proponents of this multilayered hierarchical model, acknowledged the challenges and sustainability of this model for the future. Goh (2013, 209) described this logic as an "interim outcome" in an evolving regional order. Clark (2011b, 191-192) similarly questioned whether a second-ranked and subordinate position would suffice for China.

expanding its network of global partnerships, and is an increasingly active participant in regional multilateral bodies, as reflected in Beijing's first ever White Paper on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China 2017).

Many therefore argue that China has both the capabilities and intention to supplant US hegemony and resume its position of regional preeminence. Driven by realist logics of strategic competition, balancing, and power politics, post-Cold War predictions of Asia's future have generally been depicted as pessimistic and bleak (Friedberg 1993-1994). Particularly in the context of China's rising material power, mistrust and strategic rivalry are observed to be key characteristics of the East Asian regional order. To that end, value pluralism and normative divergence create fundamental and irreconcilable differences amongst the great powers, with China and the United States "locked in an increasingly intense struggle for mastery in Asia" as long as China remains a non-democracy (Friedberg 2011, 27). Offensive realists argue that Beijing will seek regional hegemony in Asia the way that the US sought regional hegemony in the Western hemisphere. The United States should therefore contain China's rise and form balancing coalitions to curb China's rising regional influence. From this perspective, these two great powers are "destined to be adversaries" (Mearsheimer 2001, 4). There are similar predictions from a power transition "Thucydides trap" perspective detailing the likely conflict between a dissatisfied emerging power and a declining hegemon (Allison 2018; Mastro 2019a).

Such structurally deterministic arguments, however, do not address important points about agency and the role that key leaders have played over the years to temper the more competitive elements of the US-China relationship. They also run the risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that would ultimately lead to US-China conflict. As Kirshner (2012, 61, emphasis in the original) critiques, Mearsheimer's argument is flawed because of "his failure to distinguish between *being* a hegemon and *bidding* for hegemony." Whilst China's rise may be alarming, Beijing faces a very different strategic landscape in East Asia and historical analogies with the United States can therefore only be taken so far. Kang and Ma (2018) similarly highlight that predictions of power transition clashes are drawn largely from European examples, with the Asian historical experience yielding potentially different insights.

Furthermore, there remains widespread consensus that China lacks the ideational and social capital necessary for hegemonic contention. As detailed above, hegemony involves acquiescence and followership. Beijing's discourses on non-interference and win-win cooperation clearly find significant purchase in a region that holds sovereignty concerns and economic development in high regard. Many regional states are nevertheless wary of the growing discrepancies between Beijing's discourses and practices. Whilst welcoming the opportunities

presented by China's economic power, they remain circumspect with regards to its economic leverage, rising military capabilities, and leadership potential. According to "The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey Report" conducted by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute (2020, 35), 38.2% of survey respondents believe that "China is a revisionist power and intends to turn Southeast Asia into its sphere of influence" and only 1.5% hold the view that "China is a benign and benevolent power." Significantly, China is viewed as the most distrusted power (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute 2020, 53). Such perceptions also resonate outside Southeast Asia. The 2018 Global Attitudes Survey by the Pew Research Center, for instance, indicated a strong preference in Japan (81%) and South Korea (73%) for US rather than Chinese leadership (Devlin 2018). The 2019 Global Attitudes Survey further demonstrates that favourable opinions of China continue to fall across key regional states and "is now hovering at or near historic lows" (Silver, Devlin and Huang 2019).

These survey results show us that although there is regional *recognition* of China's rising power, *receptivity* is more ambivalent. They highlight most clearly that China's rising power and influence do not automatically translate into hegemonic leadership. In its pursuit of regional centrality, China does not receive full regional endorsement. In other words, "it will not be a simple transition from American hegemony to Chinese hegemony" (Ikenberry 2016, 40-1). Regional states have in fact adopted various strategies in response to China's rising power, ranging from engagement, hard and soft balancing, omni-enmeshment, and hedging (Goh 2007/2008; Jackson 2014; Murphy 2017; Zha 2020). As regional concerns rise over Beijing's growing assertiveness and lack of great power restraint in the South China Sea, we have observed calls for renewed US regional commitments and a discernible shift towards more networked security arrangements that have, in turn, reified the image of a benign US hegemonic order (Dian and Meijer 2020; Goh 2019, 630). Given persisting regional anxieties over the normative purpose of Chinese power and its legitimacy deficit as a regional leader, Beijing is currently unable to mount a comprehensive and direct challenge to US hegemony. Prospects for a US-China hegemonic transition or "hegemonic succession" are therefore premature (Allan, Vucetic and Hopf 2018; Clark 2011a; Shambaugh 2018).

#### *Logic Four: Two Hegemons, Dual Hierarchy*

This logic is distinct from the previous three, where hierarchy is typically conceptualized in holistic terms with the regional hegemon preponderant across most if not all domains. This fourth logic instead highlights more explicitly that different hierarchical structures can occur across

different issue areas, while presenting power in more binary terms along economic and security dimensions. Here, China is perceived to dominate East Asia's economic hierarchy, while the United States continues to dominate its political-security hierarchy. This logic is manifested in Ikenberry's (2016) "dual hierarchy" and Zhao's (2017) dual leadership models. In a similar fashion, Yang has advanced a "China-US economic-security dual leadership configuration", with the prospect of joint leadership and co-governance under specific conditions: when great power functional differentiation exists and meets the needs of the smaller powers; and when great power war is no longer a strategic option. Accordingly, East Asian states are willing to accept US-China leadership because the two powers are playing to their individual strengths (the United States in the security realm and China in the economic realm). Spheres of influence are not geospatial but are instead issue-based and grounded in functionality (Yang 2018).

Importantly, logic four reflects the region's changing power dynamics, particularly in the context of China's economic power. Its spectacular economic growth over the past decades has in turn given rise to an increasingly confident China in regional and global affairs. According to the Lowy Institute's 2020 Asia Power Index, China substantially outranks the United States in its capacity to exercise influence through economic interdependencies, measured in terms of regional trade and investment relationships as well as economic diplomacy. This is unsurprising given that China is the top trading partner for the region, with recent Beijing-led initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) serving to enhance China's regional economic influence. Underpinned by key material, historical, and ideational drivers, these initiatives allow Beijing to adopt soft balancing measures against the United States, project great power responsibility on its own terms and reshape global governance in line with Chinese preferences, values, and interests (Loke 2018).

The economic-security dichotomy of logic four is nevertheless untenable and can be dismantled on several fronts. On one level, it downplays the cooperative and competitive elements in US-China relations across both domains. Most fundamentally, contemporary regional dynamics make clear that economics and security are strategically intertwined in ways not captured by this dual hierarchy model (Liu and Liu 2019). Findings from the abovementioned "State of Southeast Asia" 2020 survey report are especially revealing. China is viewed by Southeast Asian respondents as overwhelmingly the most economically influential power (79.2% of the survey respondents hold this view, compared to only 7.9% for the United States) and, significantly, also the most politically and strategically influential power in Southeast Asia (52.2%, compared to 26.7% for the United States) (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute 2020, 15-18).

By presenting China as the most influential power in *both* the economic and political-strategic domains, this calls into question the dual hierarchy model.

Several implications may be discerned here. On the one hand, these statistics clearly reflect America's diminished regional standing and credibility under the Trump administration. Despite introducing the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act to support the administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy, apprehensions over America's regional commitments have paved the way for greater Chinese influence and leadership. On the other hand, China's growing economic clout has undeniable geopolitical consequences. As the political and economic stability of many regional states increasingly depend on their economic links with China, some are inevitably gravitating towards greater alignment with Beijing. This was demonstrated most clearly in 2012, and again in 2016, when Cambodia blocked reference to the South China Sea maritime disputes at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Cambodia's deference to Beijing's preference for managing the disputes on a bilateral basis and away from multilateral forums was unsurprising given that China is its largest investor and provider of foreign aid (Hutt 2016). Indeed, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen remarked that the two countries are "siblings who share a single future" (Nachemson 2019). In sum, although logic four rightly recognizes China's economic might, in reality it is difficult to draw a clear line between the economic and security domains. East Asian regional dynamics are far more fluid and complex than the bifurcated order presented in the dual hierarchy model.

On the whole, each of these logics captures an important part of East Asia's regional order, highlighting the centrality of China's rise to continuing debates about the durability of US hegemony. These logics nevertheless tend to frame the debate in fairly simplistic terms. They either assume an overly liberal reading of US hegemony, a linear socialization trajectory that is no longer defensible, a structurally deterministic prediction of hegemonic contest and great power war, or a dual hierarchical model that is too binary. While they acknowledge the politics of hegemonic ordering at varying levels, they do not push it far enough. Across these logics, therefore, is a neglected consideration of complexity and evolving dynamics. Reconfigurations of regional power demonstrate that the singular form of hegemony in logics one and two are no longer tenable. Although logic two's multilayered hierarchy is structurally sound, its assumption of China as a coopted, constrained and subordinate power is arguably now problematic. Yet while Beijing's regional power and influence are clearly rising, the structural predictions of hegemonic conflict and transition in logic three neglect important ideational and social dimensions of hegemony. Finally, although logic four recognizes the implications of China's growing economic power, the economic-security dichotomy is false and unhelpful. New

frameworks are thus needed to capture the intricate processes of regional hegemonic (re)ordering as well as the cooperative and competitive dynamics in US-China relations.

### **Coalitional and Collaborative Hegemonies in a Complex Hierarchy**

East Asia is currently undergoing a transitional and transformational geopolitical adjustment. Elements of logics two and three will remain, but China is no longer content to be complicit and coopted into US hegemony. Nor will we witness a hegemonic transition—at least not for the foreseeable future. China’s contestation of the US regional hegemonic order is varied and complex, and is met with varying levels of success (Foot 2020; Goh 2019). Moving forward, regional order-building will be messier and more complex, and the politics of hegemonic ordering will only intensify. This section thus advances a new logic—“coalitional and collaborative hegemonies in a complex hierarchy”—to better capture these evolving regional dynamics (see Table 1). This fifth logic builds on the conceptual foundation that Clark (2011b, 204) established in describing a multilayered hierarchy as comprising “an interesting amalgamation of the singular and collective forms” of hegemony with sufficient architectural flexibility to function in different combinations—albeit with three key distinctions. First, the logic developed here highlights that China, not just the United States, has the potential to establish coalitional hegemonies in East Asia.<sup>10</sup> Second, a regional order characterized by a hybrid blend of coalitional and collaborative hegemonies helps to better capture the competitive-cooperative dynamic in US-China relations. US-China hegemonic collaboration will be selective and driven by pragmatic considerations. Importantly, it will not downplay the strategic competition between the two powers, with both Washington and Beijing simultaneously seeking hegemonic legitimation from various and often overlapping constituencies. Third, the logic envisages a “complex” hierarchy rather than a “multilayered” one to explicitly emphasize the deeper relational complexity between China, the United States, and other regional states. Hierarchical delineations are less clear-cut and shift across multiple domains. At its core, this fifth logic is underpinned by three key characteristics: assertiveness, fluidity, and compartmentalization.

---

<sup>10</sup> Clark (2011b, 202-4) only referred to a US-led coalitional hegemony in East Asia, along the lines of a Concert of Democracies or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), and did not entertain the prospect of a Chinese-led coalitional hegemony. Goh (2019) and Foot (2020) have, however, more recently begun to consider this latter conceptualization to reflect current regional dynamics.

<b>Logics of Hegemonic Ordering in East Asia</b>	<b>Key Characteristics</b>	<b>Applicability</b>
Logic One: Singular Hegemony, Simple Hierarchy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ One dominant power above all other states</li> <li>▪ Benign US liberal hegemony in unipolarity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Some contestation and renegotiation of hegemonic bargains, but remains a US-centered narrative</li> <li>▪ Downplays the challenges of a rising China</li> </ul>
Logic Two: Singular Hegemony, Multilayered Hierarchy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ US hegemony embedded within a more complex and stratified hierarchy</li> <li>▪ China as a co-opted second-ranked status quo power</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Highly questionable as to whether China is content with this status and positionality</li> </ul>
Logic Three: Hegemonic Challenge and Transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ China seeks to challenge and replace US regional hegemony</li> <li>▪ “Thucydides trap” conflict between rising and dominant power</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Recognizes China’s growing power and influence but is structurally deterministic</li> <li>▪ Does not fully consider the ideational and social dimensions of hegemony</li> </ul>
Logic Four: Two Hegemons, Dual Hierarchy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ US hegemony in the security domain</li> <li>▪ Chinese hegemony in the economic domain</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Establishes a binary economic-security dichotomy that is untenable</li> </ul>
Logic Five: Coalitional and Collaborative Hegemonies, Complex Hierarchy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Complex hegemonic ordering anchored in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Assertiveness</li> <li>○ Fluidity</li> <li>○ Compartmentalization</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Recognizes the multiple and often overlapping legitimating constituencies</li> <li>▪ Captures the competitive-cooperative dynamic in US-China relations and the politics of hegemonic ordering in East Asia</li> </ul>

Table 1: Logics of Hegemonic Ordering in East Asia

*Assertiveness*

China’s growing assertiveness in its approach to US-China relations, hegemonic aspirations, and vision for regional order is opening up space for the establishment of coalitional hegemonies. On a structural level, the “layers” of logic two’s multilayered hierarchy are no longer as easily



demarcated, with hierarchical positioning more complex and dependent on the issue area. Linear assumptions of Chinese socialization into the US regional hegemonic order are similarly questionable. Although China is currently unable to launch a successful hegemonic challenge, we must surely acknowledge that the distance between the first tier (where the United States is located) and the second tier (where China is located) is shrinking in consequential ways where the hegemonic bargains are being contested and renegotiated.

The politics of hegemonic ordering is most evident when examining how the “responsible stakeholder” narrative has evolved over the years. First articulated by then United States Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick (2005), the discourse of “responsible stakeholder” contained normative expectations of China’s global stewardship and special responsibilities: to provide public goods, uphold existing norms and rules, and contribute to the maintenance of international order. For a China that has seen Washington’s policies towards it frequently oscillate between containment and engagement, the responsible stakeholder thesis demonstrated some evolution in American thinking. It granted Beijing a seat at the great power table and acknowledged that US-China relations are not a zero-sum game, with Zheng Bijian (2005) calling Zoellick’s speech “the most definitive political comment by the United States on Sino-US relations.” China’s initial reactions were welcoming but cautious, not wanting to be overburdened with global responsibilities at the expense of its domestic development goals. Over time, however, Chinese reactions grew indignant with the realization that responsible stakeholdership binds China to a system of hegemonic ordering as defined by the United States and inherently labels China an “irresponsible” or “revisionist” power should Beijing fail to act in accordance with US preferences (Chan, Hu and He 2019; Loke 2016a). The notion of the United States as global gatekeeper of China’s responsible great power status was increasingly problematic and did not resonate well with both the Chinese government and public (Interview with American scholar, Washington DC, 2015). Indeed, the prospect of Washington co-opting China under the responsible stakeholder concept came to be viewed by many Chinese academics as a “self-elusion” (Interview with Chinese scholar, Shanghai, 2015). The emerging consensus was that China should instead be a responsible power *on its own terms*.

Since then, Beijing has been in a far stronger position to control the discursive narrative. Xi Jinping’s “new model of major country relationship” reflects a more confident China willing to articulate the basis upon which it will conduct its foreign policy and take the discursive lead in defining the US-China relationship. This is not to be dismissed as mere rhetoric; rather, it demonstrates a more proactive China in its projection of discourse power, with significant consequences for US-China relations. It is a “relationship defined *by and for* China/Chinese

interests on Chinese terms, rather than one established by outsiders to primarily serve the interests of others” (Zeng and Breslin 2016, 775, emphasis in the original). Chinese slogans such as “Chinese Dream”, “Asia-Pacific dream”, and “community with a shared future for mankind” all serve to further demonstrate greater hegemonic aspirations under Xi (Goldstein 2020; Mulvad 2019; Rolland 2020).

In its pursuit of regional centrality, Beijing has embarked on a series of counter-hegemonic projects to delegitimize US hegemony. Declaring at the Conference of Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) that “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia”, Xi’s (2014) speech constituted “an unsubtle effort to delegitimize America’s presence in the region” (Zhao 2017, 491). Beijing has also been more vocal in offering an alternative model of order-building. In his first speech at the UN General Assembly, Xi (2015) remarked that states “should forge a global partnership at both international and regional levels, and embrace a new approach to state-to-state relations, one that features dialogue rather than confrontation, and seeks partnership rather than alliance.” From China’s perspective, the US model is exclusive in membership and is based on liberal democratic values, anachronistic Cold War alliances, and a “winner takes all” mentality intended to preserve US hegemony. Beijing calls instead for an inclusive and just order driven by political pluralism, pragmatic partnerships, and ‘win-win’ cooperation (Liff 2018; Poh and Li 2017; Zhang 2018; Zhou 2017). Chinese experts are actively debating measures to increase China’s strategic maneuverability, including the employment of “wedge” strategies between the US and its allies, in order to achieve a more balanced regional order and greater fluidity in regional states’ alignments (Wang and Meng 2020, 501-4).

In presenting itself as an alternative to, but not in direct competition with, the US model, Beijing is finding support from selected regional states. China’s geoeconomic policies, especially as they relate to infrastructure and development, are undeniably appealing to the region (Ho 2020; Wei 2020). Just as how Washington seeks endorsement from like-minded states, Beijing will do the same. Interestingly, the fact that states have rallied together and stepped up their commitment to uphold the rules-based international order despite Trump’s retreat from leadership has demonstrated to Beijing that “the US is not as indispensable as it was in the past” (Chen and Zhang 2020, 461). Both the United States and China will therefore seek to establish respective coalitional hegemonies, finding legitimation in restricted but often overlapping constituencies. This posturing does not yet resemble concrete spheres of influence because regional states fundamentally reject a fragmented bipolar order, and because there are varying levels of endorsement and resistance to American and Chinese regional influence.

## *Fluidity*

Even as Washington and Beijing pursue respective coalitional hegemonies, however, both powers will also engage in selective hegemonic collaboration. This collaborative hegemony emphasizes the transitory and mutable nature of US-China hegemonic management. It is distinct from a collective hegemony that implies a greater degree of permanence, power sharing, and institutionalization. Indeed, any orientation towards a US-China condominium or broader concert of powers in East Asia remains elusive given the precariousness of US-China relations. As Clark (2011b, 204) observed, “Any fully collective hegemony, acting as a concert of equals, must be considered a distant prospect: there is too much residual hierarchy in regional great-power relations to sustain an effective model of that kind.”

At its core, a collaborative hegemony recognizes that contemporary US-China relations are undeniably complex. With respective national agendas to “Build Back Better” and “rejuvenate the Chinese nation”, Washington and Beijing are recognizing each other as major competitors in the current strategic landscape. In recent years, US policy elites have become deeply frustrated over the state of bilateral relations and the limits of its ‘lock in’ socialization strategy to shape China’s rise as a “responsible stakeholder” and junior partner in the US hegemonic order (Campbell and Ratner 2018; Layne 2018). The view that China is a revisionist power challenging US interests and influence, requiring Washington to adopt a tougher China policy, is one that now commands bipartisan consensus (Ganesh 2020; Luce 2019).

For its part, Beijing is fully aware that US-China relations have long been characterized by misperceptions and strategic rivalry. It is thus not unfamiliar with Washington’s portrayal of China as a revisionist and disruptive challenger to the international order (Zha 2018). However, the scale of current US posturing has exposed the volatility of the relationship moving forward, with significant implications for what is arguably the most consequential bilateral relationship of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Beijing recognizes that Washington’s China policy has undoubtedly entered a post-engagement phase, with cross-domain competition between the two powers intensifying and inevitable (Wu 2020; Zhao 2019). Internal debates nevertheless highlight the delicate balance that China needs to strike in defending its core interests and reputation while ensuring that more strident diplomatic responses do not backfire (Campbell and Rapp-Hooper 2020; Min 2020).

The increasingly competitive dynamic in US-China relations highlight the challenges in executing the kind of comprehensive G2 partnership or broader concert-type arrangement that a

collective hegemony would call for in the region (Bush 2011; White 2013). Furthermore, it remains to be seen if the United States can genuinely accept China as an equal partner. As mentioned above, Washington's approach to the relationship has largely been framed in the context of burden-sharing rather than power-sharing. Washington is unlikely to fully accommodate China's status claims and the corresponding rights and privileges associated with that standing, especially since status is a positional good (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Ward 2017). Prospects for an all-encompassing collective hegemony therefore remain relatively bleak for the foreseeable future. Instead, a collaborative hegemony that recognizes the intensifying strategic competition and conceptualizes the two powers as pragmatic associates, rather than comprehensive partners, better captures the fluidity in US-China relations.

### *Compartmentalization*

Such a collaborative hegemony would depend on compartmentalization. As US-China competition continues across multiple domains, Washington and Beijing are setting more realistic expectations over the feasibility of full bilateral cooperation and acknowledging the limits to which both powers can shape each other's behavior (Yan 2010, 291-2). Solidarist aspirations for US-China hegemonic management, underpinned by shared values and identities, are unlikely given that these are two countries with incompatible ideologies and vastly different political systems (Cui and Buzan 2016, 192). Intensified competition in some areas should not, however, close off the opportunities to cooperate in other areas. Both powers are, after all, "mutually interdependent and mutually vulnerable in a wide array of policy and problem areas" (Ikenberry 2016, 42). From this perspective, we can envisage selective US-China mutual accommodation and collaboration based on "shared-fate problems" such as climate change and nuclear non-proliferation (Cui and Buzan 2016, 191).

This approach stems from an understanding that overly antagonistic strategies risk creating spirals of mistrust and a "potential compounding effect" that could result in a further deterioration of the US-China relationship (Heath and Thompson 2018, 115). Despite the increasingly competitive nature of US-China relations, moderate voices on both sides have rejected or sought to temper the "new Cold War" analogy. Even while calling for the adoption of a tougher China policy, for instance, many in the United States highlight the need for better calibrated strategies to navigate increasingly complex dynamics (Campbell and Sullivan 2019; Fravel et al. 2019). Such measures include cultivating coordinated and multilateral responses to confront a rising China even as the United States seeks to collaborate on issues of shared interest

(Biden 2020). Chinese government officials have also stressed the importance of managing strategic rivalry and expanding cooperation on common ground (Fu 2020; Yang 2020). State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared that “neither China nor the United States can move ahead without the other” and more recently outlined a four-pronged framework to guide the US-China relationship: avoid red lines and confrontation; open channels for dialogue; reject decoupling and uphold cooperation; and shoulder shared responsibilities (Wang 2019, 2020).

Current realities demonstrate that the politics of hegemonic ordering is especially acute in East Asia. As Zhao (2019, 392) remarked, “the United States cannot contain China in the region; nor can China exclude the United States” from it. Both powers nevertheless suffer from legitimacy deficits. Neither country will receive widespread regional endorsement if it chooses to bid for a singular hegemony. Washington and Beijing will thus seek support from multiple and often overlapping legitimating constituencies. Rising US-China tensions similarly demonstrate that hegemonic management will be selective and pragmatic. East Asian regional order will therefore evolve in ways resembling coalitional and collaborative hegemonies in a complex hierarchy. The flexibility embedded in this fifth logic will be particularly appealing for regional states that are reluctant to take sides and seek instead to balance an array of relationships with both Washington and Beijing.

## **Conclusion**

Debates about the impact of China’s rise on US hegemony and the East Asia regional order are clearly not new. However, much of the analysis has been cast in simplistic or binary terms. These have manifested in overly liberal readings of US hegemony, linear Chinese socialization trajectories, hegemonic transition predictions, and a binary dual hierarchy model. Discussions about hegemonic transition also tend to assume a move from one distinct type of hegemonic order to another, emphasizing the changes and stark contrasts across hegemonic orders but downplaying the potential for continuity or hybridity (Kupchan 2014b, 53-5). This article has argued instead for a deeper understanding of hegemony in order to better comprehend the ways in which the post-Cold War US hegemonic order in East Asia is being renegotiated.

In doing so, this article contributes to the research agenda on hegemony and hegemonic orders in two ways. First, it advances a social conception of hegemony, demonstrating that hegemonic orders are produced and sustained by material, ideational, and normative forces. It highlights the critical role that secondary states play in legitimating hegemony, while recognizing that these social constituencies are often varied and overlapping. Most

fundamentally, it entails an understanding that hegemonic ordering—the interactive discourses, processes, relations, and practices that underpin hegemony—is dynamic, with important consequences for the renegotiation and reconfiguration of hegemony. Complexity and contestation are therefore intrinsic to order-building.

Second, the article demonstrates that the East Asian regional order will not disintegrate into “order versus disorder” or “Chinese versus US hegemony” type scenarios. As Foot and Goh (2019, 411) aptly state, “international order could also be understood in terms of contingent negotiated bargains forged in the context of the dualities of international life...Thus, studying systemic change would also profit from searching for a succession of contingent consensus, alongside great ruptures and transformations.” Neat conceptions of hegemonic ordering defy contemporary East Asian realities. This article therefore builds on recent English School works that emphasize regional complexity in East Asia (Ba, 2020; Buzan and Zhang 2014; Clark 2011b; Foot and Goh 2019). It argues that the politics of hegemonic ordering between the United States and China will intensify as they continue to both cooperate and compete with each other, and as legitimating constituencies within the region shift and overlap. The East Asian regional order is therefore evolving in ways that resemble coalitional and collaborative hegemonies operating in a complex hierarchy that is anchored in assertiveness, fluidity and compartmentalization. This yields theoretical insights into examining hegemonic transitions less as clearly delineated transitions from one distinct hegemonic order to the next, and more as partial and hybrid ones.

## References

Alagappa, Muthiah. 2003. “The Study of International Order: An Analytical Framework.” In *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 33-69. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Allan, Bentley B., Srdjan Vucetic, and Ted Hopf. 2018. “The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects.” *International Organization* 72 (4): 839-69.

Allison, Graham. 2018. *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?* New York: Marina Books.

Ba, Alice D. 2020. "Multilateralism and East Asian Transitions: The English School, Diplomacy, and a Networking Regional Order." *International Politics* 57 (2): 259-77.

Beckley, Michael. 2011/2012. "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure." *International Security* 36 (3): 41-78.

Beeson, Mark. 2017. "Why Has Leadership in the Asia-Pacific Proved So Elusive?" *Chinese Political Science Review* 2 (4): 567-81.

Biden Jr., Joseph R. 2020. "Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump." *Foreign Affairs* 99 (2): 64-76.

Brooks, Stephen G., G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. 2012/2013. "Don't Come Home, America: The Case Against Retrenchment." *International Security* 37 (3): 7-51.

Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. 2008. *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bukovansky, Mlada, Ian Clark, Robyn Eckersley, Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit, and Nicholas J. Wheeler. 2012 *Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. Hampshire: Palgrave.

Bush, Richard C. 2011. "The United States and China: A G-2 in the Making?" *The Brookings Institution*. Last modified October 11, 2011. Accessed August 25, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-united-states-and-china-a-g-2-in-the-making/>

Buzan, Barry and Yongjin Zhang. 2014. *Contesting International Society in East Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Campbell, Kurt M., and Ely Ratner. 2018. "The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations." *Foreign Affairs* 97 (2): 60-70.

Campbell, Kurt M. and Jake Sullivan. 2019. "Competition Without Catastrophe: How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China." *Foreign Affairs* 98 (5): 96-111.

Campbell, Kurt M., and Mira Rapp-Hooper. 2020. "China Is Done Biding Its Time: The End of Beijing's Foreign Policy Restraint?" *Foreign Affairs*. Last modified July 15, 2020. Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-07-15/china-done-biding-its-time>

Cha, Victor D. 2009/2010. "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia." *International Security* 34 (3): 158-96.

Cha, Victor D. 2011. "Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia's Regional Architecture." *Asia Policy* 11: 27-50.

Chan, Steve, Weixing Hu, and Kai He. 2019. "Discerning States' Revisionist and Status-Quo Orientations: Comparing China and the US." *European Journal of International Relations* 25 (2): 613-40.

Chen, Zhimin, and Xueying Zhang. 2020. "Chinese Conception of the World Order in a Turbulent Trump Era." *The Pacific Review* 33 (3-4): 438-68.

Cho, Il Hyun. 2018. "Downsizing Hegemony: Alliance, Domestic Politics, and American Retrenchment in East Asia, 1969-2017." *Asian Security* 14 (3): 246-62.

Clark, Ian. 2011a. "China and the United States: A Succession of Hegemonies?" *International Affairs* 87 (1): 13-28.

Clark, Ian. 2011b. *Hegemony in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clark, Ian. 2017. "Hierarchy, Hegemony, and the Norms of International Society." In *The Globalization of International Society*, edited by Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit, 248-64. Oxford: Oxford University Press.



Costa Buranelli, Filippo. 2018. "Spheres of Influence as Negotiated Hegemony—The Case of Central Asia." *Geopolitics* 23 (2): 378-403.

Cox, Michael. 2005. "Empire by Denial: The Strange Case of the United States." *International Affairs*, 81 (1): 15-30.

Cox, Robert W. 1981. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10 (2): 125-55.

Cox, Robert W. 1987. *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Cui, Shunji, and Barry Buzan. 2016. "Great Power Management in International Society." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9 (2): 181-210.

Deitelhoff, Nicole, and Lisbeth Zimmermann. 2020. "Things We Lost in the Fire: How Different Types of Contestation Affect the Robustness of International Norms." *International Studies Review* 22 (1): 51-76.

Destradi, Sandra. 2010. "Regional Powers and their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership." *Review of International Studies* 36 (4): 903-30.

Devlin, Kat. 2018. "5 Charts on Global Views of China." *Pew Research Center*. Last modified October 19, 2018. Accessed August 3, 2020. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/19/5-charts-on-global-views-of-china>.

Dian, Matteo, and Hugo Meijer. 2020. "Networking Hegemony: Alliance Dynamics in East Asia." *International Politics* 57 (2): 131-49.

Fontaine, Richard, Patrick M. Cronin, Mira Rapp-Hooper, and Harry Krejsa. 2017. "Networking Asian Security: An Integrated Approach to Order in the Pacific." Center for a New American Security (CNAS), June 19.

Foot, Rosemary. 2020. "China's Rise and US Hegemony: Renegotiating Hegemonic Order in East Asia?" *International Politics* 57 (2): 150-65.

Foot, Rosemary, and Evelyn Goh. 2019. "The International Relations of East Asia: A New Research Prospectus." *International Studies Review* 21 (3): 398-423.

Fravel, M. Taylor, J. Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton, and Ezra Vogel. 2019. "China Is Not An Enemy." *Washington Post*. Last modified July 3, 2019. Accessed August 3, 2020. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-is-counterproductive/2019/07/02/647d49d0-9bfa-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-is-counterproductive/2019/07/02/647d49d0-9bfa-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html)

Friedberg, Aaron L. 1993-1994. "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia." *International Security* 18 (3): 5-33.

Friedberg, Aaron L. 2011. "Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics." *The National Interest* no. 114: 18-27.

Fu, Ying. 2020. "Dark Moment, Smart Choices." *China-US Focus*. Last modified July 20, 2020. Accessed August 25, 2020. <https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/dark-moment-smart-choices>

Ganesh, Janan. 2020. "America's Eerie Lack of Debate About China." *Financial Times*. Last modified July 15, 2020. Accessed August 25, 2020. <https://www.ft.com/content/9b7e64c9-c7c4-47b7-b038-f728bfd23e28>

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goh, Evelyn. 2007/2008. "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies." *International Security* 32 (3): 113-57.

Goh, Evelyn. (2008) "Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East Asian Security Order." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 8 (3): 353-77.

Goh, Evelyn. 2013. *The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goh, Evelyn. 2019. "Contesting Hegemonic Order: China in East Asia." *Security Studies* 28 (3): 614-44.

Goldstein, Avery. 2020. "China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance." *International Security* 45 (1): 164-201.

Heath, Timothy R. and William R. Thompson. 2018. "Avoiding U.S.-China Competition is Futile: Why the Best Option Is to Manage Strategic Rivalry." *Asia Policy* 13 (2): 91-119.

Ho, Selina. 2020. "Infrastructure and Chinese Power." *International Affairs*. Advance Access, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iaa171>

Hutt, David. 2016. "How China Came to Dominate Cambodia." *The Diplomat*. Last modified September 1, 2016. Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/how-china-came-to-dominate-cambodia/>

Ikenberry, G. John. 2004. "American Hegemony and East Asian Order." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58 (3): 353-67.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2016. "Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia." *Political Science Quarterly* 131 (1): 9-43.

Ikenberry, G. John, and Charles A. Kupchan. 1990. "Socialization and Hegemonic Power." *International Organization* 44 (3): 283-315.

Ikenberry, G. John, and Dan H. Nexon. 2019. "Hegemony Studies 3.0: The Dynamics of Hegemonic Orders." *Security Studies* 28 (3): 395-421.

ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. 2020. "The State of Southeast Asia: 2020 Survey Report." Last modified January 16, 2020. Accessed August 25, 2020.

[https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/TheStateofSEASurveyReport\\_2020.pdf](https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/TheStateofSEASurveyReport_2020.pdf)

Jackson, Van. 2014. "Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 14 (3): 331-56.

Jesse, Neal G., Steven E. Lobell, Galia Press-Barnathan, and Kristen P. Williams. 2012. "The Leader Can't Lead When The Followers Won't Follow: The Limitations of Hegemony." In *Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons: Why Secondary States Support, Follow, or Challenge*, edited by Kristen P. Williams, Steven E. Lobell and Neal G. Jesse, 1-30. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Jia, Qingguo. 2005. "Learning to Live with the Hegemon: Evolution of China's Policy Toward the US Since the End of the Cold War." *Journal of Contemporary China* 14 (44): 395-407.

Kang, David C. 2020. "International Order in Historical East Asia: Tribute and Hierarchy Beyond Sinocentrism and Eurocentrism." *International Organization* 74 (1): 65-93.

Kang, David C., and Xinru Ma. 2018. "Power Transitions: Thucydides Didn't Live in East Asia." *The Washington Quarterly* 41 (1): 137-54.

Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. *The World in Depression, 1929–1939*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Kirshner, Jonathan. 2012. "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China." *European Journal of International Relations* 18 (1): 53-75.

Kupchan, Charles A. 2014a. "The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax Americana." *Security Studies* 23 (2): 219-57.

Kupchan, Charles A. 2014b. "Unpacking Hegemony: The Social Foundations of Hierarchical Order." In *Power, Order, and Change in World Politics* edited by G. John Ikenberry, 19-60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lake, David A. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lake, David A. 2017. "Domination, Authority, and the Forms of Chinese Power." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 10 (4): 357-82.

Larson, Deborah W., and Alexei Shevchenko. 2010. "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy." *International Security* 34 (4): 63-95.

Layne, Christopher. 2018. "The US-Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana." *International Affairs* 94 (1): 89-111.

Lee, Ji-Young. 2016. "Hegemonic Authority and Domestic Legitimation: Japan and Korea under Chinese Hegemonic Order in Early Modern East Asia." *Security Studies* 25 (2): 320-52.

Lee, Ji-Young. 2019. "Contested American Hegemony and Regional Order in Postwar Asia: The Case of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 19 (2): 237-67.

Liff, Adam P. 2018. "China and the US Alliance System." *The China Quarterly* 233: 137-65.

Liff, Adam P., and G. John Ikenberry. 2014. "Racing toward Tragedy? China's Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma." *International Security* 39 (2): 52-91.

Lind, Jennifer. 2018. "Life in China's Asia: What Regional Hegemony Would Look Like." *Foreign Affairs* 97 (2): 71-82.

Liu, Feng and Ruonan Liu. 2019. "China, the United States, and Order Transition in East Asia: An Economy-Security Nexus Approach." *The Pacific Review* 32 (6): 972-95.

Loke, Beverley. 2016a. "Responsible Stakeholder with Chinese Characteristics." *Asia Dialogue*. Last modified June 16, 2016. Accessed August 25, 2020. <https://theasiadialogue.com/2016/06/16/responsible-stakeholder-with-chinese-characteristics/>

Loke, Beverley. 2016b. "Unpacking the Politics of Great Power Responsibility: Nationalist and Maoist China in International Order-Building." *European Journal of International Relations* 22 (4): 847-71.

Loke, Beverley. 2018. "China's Economic Slowdown: Implications for Beijing's Institutional Power and Global Governance Role." *The Pacific Review* 31 (5): 673-91.

Lowy Institute. 2020. *Asia Power Index*. Last modified October 19, 2020. Accessed November 7, 2020. <https://power.lowyinstitute.org/>

Luce, Edward. 2019. "Getting Acclimated to the US-China Cold War." *Financial Times*. Last modified July 19, 2019. Accessed August 25, 2020. <https://www.ft.com/content/a3062586-a9ac-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04>

Mastanduno, Michael. 2003. "Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia." In *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 141-170. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Mastanduno, Michael. 2019. "Partner Politics: Russia, China, and the Challenge of Extending US Hegemony after the Cold War." *Security Studies* 28 (3): 479-504.

Mastro, Oriana Skylar. 2019a. "In the Shadow of the Thucydides Trap: International Relations Theory and the Prospects for Peace in U.S.-China Relations." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 24 (1): 25-45.

Mastro, Oriana Skylar. 2019b. "The Stealth Superpower: How China Hid Its Global Ambitions." *Foreign Affairs* 98 (1): 31-9.

Mattern, Janice B., and Ayşe Zarakol. 2016. "Hierarchies in World Politics." *International Organization* 70 (3): 623-54.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.

Min, Ye. 2020. "Wolf Warriors Blow Hot Before Cooling Down." *Global Asia* 15 (3): 102-6.

Mulvad, Andreas Møller. 2019. "Xiism as a Hegemonic Project in the Making: Sino-communist Ideology and the Political Economy of China's Rise." *Review of International Studies* 45 (3): 449-70.

Murphy, Ann Marie. 2017. "Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages." *Asian Security* 13 (3): 165-82.

Nachemson, Andrew. 2019. "Chinese Investment in Cambodia in Bringing Phnom Penh Closer to Beijing – and Further from the EU." *South China Morning Post*. Last modified May 1, 2019. Accessed August 25, 2020. <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3008451/chinese-investment-cambodia-bringing-phnom-penh-closer>

Norloff, Carla. 2010. *America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Poh, Angela, and Mingjiang Li. 2017. "A China in Transition: The Rhetoric and Substance of Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping." *Asian Security* 13 (2): 84-97.

Prys, Miriam. 2010. "Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood." *International Studies Review* 12 (4): 479-504.

Pu, Xiaoyu. 2012. "Socialization as a Two-Way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion of International Norms." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 5 (4): 341-67.

Rolland, Nadège. 2020. "China's Vision for a New World Order." *The National Bureau for Asian Research*. NBR Special Report no. 83.

Schweller, Randall L. and Xiaoyu Pu. 2011. "After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline." *International Security* 36 (1): 41-72.

Shambaugh, David. 2018. "U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence?" *International Security* 42 (4): 85-127.

Silver, Laura, Kat Devlin and Christine Huang. 2019. "People Around the Globe are Divided in their Opinions of China." *Pew Research Center*. Last modified December 5, 2019. Accessed August 25, 2020. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/05/people-around-the-globe-are-divided-in-their-opinions-of-china/>

Simpson, Gerry. 2004. *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. 2008. "The Emperor Wore Cowboy Boots." *International Studies Perspectives* 9 (3): 319-30.

Strange, Susan. 1987. "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony." *International Organization* 41 (4): 551-74.

The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. 2017. "China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation." Last modified January 11, 2017. Accessed August 25, 2020. [http://english.gov.cn/archive/white\\_paper/2017/01/11/content\\_281475539078636.htm](http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2017/01/11/content_281475539078636.htm)

Thucydides. 1954. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics.

Tow, William T., and Satu Limaye. 2016. "What's China Got to Do with It? U.S. Alliances, Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific." *Asian Politics & Policy* 8 (1): 7-26.

Wang, Dong and Weizhan Meng. 2020. "China Debating the Regional Order." *The Pacific Review* 33 (3-4): 497-519.

Wang, Yi. 2019. "Vision and Conviction Will Take China-US Relations Forward." Keynote Speech by State Councilor Wang Yi at Dinner Co-Hosted by National Committee on US-China Relations, US-China Business Council, US Chamber of Commerce and Council on Foreign Relations, New York. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Last



modified September 24, 2019. Accessed August 25, 2020.  
[https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjb\\_663304/wjbz\\_663308/2461\\_663310/t1701595.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1701595.shtml)

Wang, Yi. 2020. ‘Interview on Current China-US Relations Given by State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Xinhua News Agency’, *Xinhua*. Last modified August 5, 2020. Accessed August 25, 2020. [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-08/06/c\\_139267908.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-08/06/c_139267908.htm)

Ward, Steven. 2017. *Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Watson, Adam. 2007. *Hegemony & History*. Oxon: Routledge.

Wei, Ling. 2020. “Developmental Peace in East Asia and Its Implications for the Indo-Pacific.” *International Affairs* 96 (1): 189-209.

White, Hugh. 2013. *The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wiener, Antje. 2009. “Enacting Meaning-In Use: Qualitative Research on Norms and International Relations.” *Review of International Studies* 35 (1): 175-93.

Wight, Martin. 1979. *Power Politics*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Wu, Chengqiu. 2020. “Ideational Differences, Perception Gaps, and the Emerging Sino-US Rivalry.” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 13 (1): 27-68.

Xi, Jinping. 2014. “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation.” Remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference of Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Shanghai Expo Center. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Last modified May 21, 2014. Accessed August 25, 2020. [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/zxxx\\_662805/t1159951.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml)

Xi, Jinping. 2015. “Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind.” Statement by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of

the People's Republic of China at the General Debate of the 70<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly, New York. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Last modified September 29, 2015. Accessed August 25, 2020. [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt\\_665385/zyjh\\_665391/t1305051.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1305051.shtml)

Yan, Xuetong. 2010. "The Instability of China-US Relations." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3 (3): 263-92.

Yan, Xuetong. 2016. "Political Leadership and Power Redistribution." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9 (1): 1-26.

Yang, Jiechi. 2020. "Respect History, Look to the Future and Firmly Safeguard and Stabilize China-US Relations." *Xinhua*. Last modified August 13, 2020. Accessed August 25, 2020. <http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/0813/c90000-9721204.html>

Yang, Yuan. 2018. "Escape Both the 'Thucydides Trap' and the 'Churchill Trap': Finding a Third Type of Great Power Relations under the Bipolar System." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 11 (2): 193-235.

Yeo, Andrew. 2019. *Asia's Regional Architecture: Alliances and Institutions in the Pacific Century*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Zeng, Jinghan and Shaun Breslin. 2016. "China's 'New Type of Great Power Relations': A G2 with Chinese Characteristics?" *International Affairs* 92 (4): 773-94.

Zha, Daojiong. 2018. "U.S. Defense Strategy Is Not News to China." *East Asia Forum*. Last modified February 11, 2018. Accessed August 25, 2020, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/02/11/us-defence-strategy-is-not-news-to-china>

Zha, Wen. 2020. "Great Power Rivalry and the Agency of Secondary States: A Study Based on China's Relations with Southeast Asian Countries." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Advance Access: 1-33, <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcaa018>

Zhang, Feng. 2015. *Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Zhang, Feng. 2018. "Chinese Visions of the Asian Political-Security Order." *Asia Policy* 13 (2): 13-8.

Zhao, Minghao. 2019. "Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US-China Strategic Competition." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 12 (3): 371-94.

Zhao, Quansheng. 2017. "An Emerging U.S.-China Dual Leadership in Asia-Pacific." *China-US Focus*. Last modified May 8, 2017. Accessed August 25, 2020. <https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/an-emerging-us-china-dual-leadership-in-asia-pacific>

Zhao, Suisheng. 2017. "American Reflections on the Engagement with China and Responses to President Xi's New Model of Major Power Relations." *Journal of Contemporary China* 26 (106): 489-503.

Zheng, Bijian. 2005. "Way that Communist Party of China takes in 21<sup>st</sup> Century." *People's Daily*. Last modified November 24, 2005. Accessed August 25, 2020, [http://en.people.cn/200511/23/eng20051123\\_223414.html](http://en.people.cn/200511/23/eng20051123_223414.html)

Zhou, Yiqi. 2017. "China's Partnership Network Versus the U.S. Alliance System: Coexistence or Conflict?" *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies* 3 (1): 1-18.

Zoellick, Robert B. 2005. "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" Remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York City. U.S. Department of State. Last modified September 21, 2005. Accessed August 25, 2020, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>