***On Animals*: An extended review of David Clough's two-volume work**

Key words: nonhuman animals, Christian ethics, systematic theology, human distinctiveness, veganism

Abstract: David Clough's two-volume work *On Animals* claims to be the first systematic Christian theological reflection on the place of nonhuman animals within creation which also provides an ethical reflection on what that might mean for our relationship with nonhuman animals in contemporary (Western) society. In this extended review, we provide a summary of the cumulative arguments across both volumes of *On Animals* before offering our reflections. While we agree with many though not all of Clough's theological conclusions, we ultimately conclude that Clough's ethical solutions are too radical in places, and too optimistic without economic and systemic changes as to how humans relate to the nonhuman world.

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David L. Clough, *On Animals, Volume I: Systematic Theology* (London: T&T Clark, 2011). xxiv + 215 pp. £120.00. ISBN 978-0-5671-3948-1 (hbk)

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David Clough's two-volume work *On Animals* claims to be the first systematic Christian theological exploration of the place of nonhuman animals within creation which also provides an ethical reflection on what that might mean for our relationship with nonhuman animals in contemporary (Western) society. It follows in the footsteps of Andrew Linzey's works such as *Animal Theology* and *Animals on the Agenda*.[1] It is perhaps surprising, given that Clough's theological approach is based, like Linzey's, on a strong emphasis on both fall and eschaton, that Clough does not interact more with this earlier work.

Volume 1, *Systematic Theology*, is dedicated to doctrinal discussion and concludes that nonhuman animals are divinely valued members of the created order and, as such, will share in the new creation.

Volume 2, *Theological Ethics*, sees Clough developing a Christian nonhuman animal ethic from his doctrinal conclusions. He suggests a variety of practical solutions covering a wide array of areas of contemporary life where human activity impacts the lives of nonhuman animals.

In this extended review, we shall provide a summary of the cumulative arguments across both volumes of *On Animals* before offering our reflections.

Clough seeks to provide a reappraisal of what he calls 'ill-considered renditions of the distinction between human beings and other animals that are implausible, unbiblical, theologically problematic and ethically misleading.' (Vol 1, xii)

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[1] Andrew Linzey, *Animal Theology* (London: SCM Press, 1994); Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (eds), *Animals on the Agenda: questions about animals for theology and ethics* (London: SCM Press, 1998).

He begins with a discussion of the doctrine of creation, concluding (with Pannenberg) that humans should not be placed at the centre of creation, nor should they be considered the purpose of creation. Thus, Clough rejects any and all attempts to justify an inherent human superiority on the basis of the notion that humans were the last things to be created in the Genesis creation narrative (Vol 1, 3, 8-9, 15n43). He invokes the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* as a means of retaining the distinction between God and creation (Vol 1, 26).

This God/creation-including-humans hierarchy is assisted by both Christian theology and evolutionary science. The Christian idea of creaturely continuity dates back at least to Basil of Caesarea (Vol 1, 27). Scientifically, the human genome project and research into the cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals challenge the dominant historical view of human-nonhuman discontinuity (Vol 1, 29-30).

This theological continuity between humans and nonhuman animals includes redemption and, more specifically, the redemption made possible by the Christ-event. Clough argues that Jesus' being human should not entail human exclusivity in the salvation made possible by the Christ-event, particularly given that the word used in John's Gospel to describe the Incarnation is *flesh*, which, biblically, is a quality possessed by all creatures (Vol 1, 83-85). Clough further holds that such nonhuman redemption is necessary and argues for the possibility of nonhuman animals committing sin, which he supports with references to the Hebrew Bible, for example: the culpability of nonhuman animals in acts of sexual misconduct (Leviticus 15:15) and the necessity of the nonhumans of Nineveh to repent alongside the humans (Jonah 3:7-10) (Vol 1, 109).

Nonhuman animals are, for Clough, in need of atonement as much as humans. This is because, whether nonhuman animals sin or not, they are still affected by the consequences of sin (Vol 1, 120). Clough therefore argues that the scope of redemption extends to nonhuman animals: ‘the hope that the whole of creation will be restored, liberated and redeemed is present in the Old and New Testaments and in patristic teaching, as well as being represented in more recent theological discussions’ (Vol 1, 152). Clough ends Volume 1 by describing the nonhuman-inclusive eschaton. Predators and prey can coexist in the eschaton, says Clough, because predators no longer need to hunt and to kill prey animals to ensure their own survival, and so they no longer would do such a thing.

We applaud Clough’s effort not merely to investigate this area of exploration but to integrate it into systematic theology rather than leaving it as a specialist sub-sub-discipline (as has perhaps been the fate of Linzey’s work).

Volume 2 on theological ethics is a more extensive and stronger book, perhaps a sign of the author growing into his theme. Here Clough takes up the doctrinal conclusions of Volume 1 to address several major issues in the contemporary (Western) world. In a clear methodology, Clough systematically evaluates those spheres of twenty-first century (Western) human life where human behaviour towards and treatment of nonhuman animals is unacceptable, considering these doctrinal conclusions. Each chapter then concludes with ethical suggestions for improving these interspecies relationships, though Clough emphasises the speculative nature of this attempt and admits the possible controversy of his conclusions (Vol 2, 32).

Previous philosophical and ethical considerations of nonhuman animals – such as those of Aquinas, Kant, Hume, Rawls, Singer, Regan, Hursthouse, Donovan and Adams, and Nussbaum – have been either 'theologically inadequate' or only useful in part (Vol 2, 3-15). An adequate nonhuman animal ethic, for Clough, is one which 1) facilitates the flourishing of individual nonhuman animals (Vol 2, 22); 2) avoids blocking the flourishing of individual nonhuman animals (Vol 2, 23-24); and 3) sees nonhuman animals as humans' neighbours with all the moral responsibility that entails (Vol 2, 26-29).

The first six out of seven spheres of twenty-first century Western life which Clough discusses involve humans' use of domestic nonhuman animals. The first sphere is food production, with emphasis on the meat and dairy industries and their practices (Vol 2, 35). He discusses both how these industries affect the nonhuman animals used for food themselves (Vol 2, 35-54) and how current farming practices affect humans, wild nonhuman animals, and the environment (Vol 2, 54-59).

The second sphere is the textile and clothing industries, with a focus on the production of silk and its impact on silk moths (Vol 2, 104).

The third sphere is that of working nonhuman animals, which Clough deems a unique phenomenon due to the incentive for humans to care for nonhuman animals under their employ; additionally, there is no need to kill working nonhuman animals (Vol 2, 108). Clough focuses on police dogs and argues that while there may seem to be legitimate ethical concerns in raising and training non-consenting nonhuman animals to be placed into dangerous situations, the criteria on which police dogs are selected for service are not so different from the criteria by which human recruits are judged. Thus, only those best suited to police work are entered into police service,

and that includes willingness and enthusiasm for the work itself (Vol 2, 128-129). The situation is, however, quite different for nonhuman animals employed in draught labour (Vol 2, 120).

The fourth sphere is the use of nonhuman animals in experimentation and research, which has historically (and uniquely) received much Christian criticism. The chief sins of this industry lie in insufficient and poorly enforced regulation, as well as the inconsistency in our arguments for nonhuman animal testing and experimentation (Vol 2, 131-134, 152-153). (So, for example, Clough points out that animal testing would have failed to predict correctly the efficacy of some important drugs.)

The fifth sphere is the use of nonhuman animals in sport and entertainment. Clough argues that it is never excusable to make use of a nonhuman animal in sport or entertainment where that nonhuman animal's inclusion is detrimental to their flourishing because 'our goals in making use of other animals in these areas are essentially frivolous' (Vol 2, 161). This remains the case when the individual nonhuman animals appear, at first, to be well looked after, such as racing horses (Vol 2, 163-173).

The sixth sphere is that of companion animals – a phrase which Clough prefers to 'pet' though he admits it is not perfect (Vol 2, 182). Clough identifies four issues with the pet industry which require attention: 1) even if a human believes they are treating their nonhuman animal companion well, they have no guarantee the nonhuman animal in question is flourishing (Vol 2, 183); 2) despite the positive character of nonhuman animal shelters, the misleading language of euthanising nonhuman animals who cannot be rehomed or accommodated should be replaced with language of killing; 3) the pedigree industry oversaturates the pet market, which

means more nonhuman animals are taken to shelters (or abandoned) when they cannot be homed, which puts them at a greater risk of being killed (Vol 2, 208); 4) the pet industry has a negative impact on wild populations, such as has been seen with the dramatic decrease in wild terrapin populations due to their being appropriated by the pet industry (Vol 2, 199-200).

The final sphere which Clough discusses is the (negative) human impact on wild nonhuman animal populations (Vol 2, 216). He specifically references poaching (Vol 2, 218), and laments the necessity of the language of the Anthropocene as well as the evidence which suggests we are currently living in a sixth mass extinction that is (almost entirely) the fault of the species *Homo sapiens* (Vol 2, 221).

Considering the current state of these spheres, Clough offers the following ethical conclusions (summarised in Vol 2, 239-242):

1. Christians should stop participating in industries which make use of intensive farming, and they have ‘strong faith-based reasons to adopt a vegan diet’ (Vol 2, 239).
2. Christians should clothe themselves using materials which do not contain nonhuman animal products
3. We must develop a series of norms of what it means to give nonhuman labourers fair working conditions and treatment
4. We must seek to bring to an end our use of nonhuman animals as research subjects when this burdens those animals and ‘is incompatible with their flourishing as creatures of God’ (Vol 2, 159)

5. Nonhuman animals should never be subjected to suffering and death for the sake of sport or entertainment
6. ‘the pedigree breeding of animals should be stopped, pets and companion animals should be sourced from shelters, and attention given to ensuring they are kept in spacious and enriched environments where they can flourish’ (Vol 2, 241)
7. Captive wild animals should be kept in appropriate environments and conservation efforts should continue, and conflict between wild nonhuman animals and humans should be reduced
8. We must take care vis-à-vis the causes of contemporary mass extinction, which can be done through a switch to veganism

We will begin our evaluation of these two books with a discussion of those areas of Clough’s argument with which we most uncritically agree. Those are: his preference for subjective over objective immortality and his doctrine of Incarnation. We will then discuss those areas where we feel Clough’s argument falls short.

Clough argues that all creatures must retain individual eschatological immortality. While he does not use this language specifically, Clough is here arguing for universal subjective immortality. Subjective immortality is as opposed to objective immortality, the latter a term first coined by Alfred North Whitehead to mean preservation of lives only in the memory of God.

Historically, Christian theology has afforded humans subjective immortality and nonhuman animals either no immortality at all or, at best, objective immortality. If we are to argue that God has the same relationship to nonhuman animals during their earthly lives as God does to humans during their earthly lives, then it would be inconsistent to say that God has a different relationship to nonhuman animals in the

eschaton than God does to humans in the eschaton. Thus, we have two options: 1) all creatures, human or no, have subjective immortality in the eschaton, or 2) no creatures do. Clough takes option 1), which we feel better reflects the Christian belief in an omnibenevolent God who would send God's Son to redeem creation.

The second area of Clough's argument with which we mostly confidently agree is that of his doctrine of Incarnation. The reality of Jesus' humanity has, historically, been used to justify the human-specificity of the Christ-event. Clough rejects this, pointing out that John's use of the word *flesh* indicates Jesus is incarnate in a physicality which is shared by all creatures, and hence the Christ-event is universal to all creatures. Clough holds that the familiar maxim offered in Galatians 3:28 can include that there is no human or nonhuman in Christ.

This argument is helpful for two reasons. First, it satisfactorily addresses the meaning behind the inclusion of the word *flesh* (rather than the word *human*) in John's prologue. Second, it supports the cosmic nature of the Incarnation and redemption made possible by the Christ-event, which is consistent with other parts of the New Testament.[2]

In his review of Volume 1, James R A Merrick critiques Clough's doctrine of Incarnation. He argues that understanding the Incarnation as *flesh* ignores 'tradition's debates about the composition of Christ's humanity as well as the perceived soteriological significance of such'. He further holds that Clough contradicts himself in saying that humanity is not a microcosm of creation but that

[2] John G Gibbs and John C Gibbs provide a helpful study of the cosmic scope of redemption in Pauline theology: Gibbs and Gibbs, 'The Cosmic Scope of Redemption According to Paul', *Biblica* 56.1 (1975), pp. 25-9.

Jesus' humanity is sufficient to represent all of creation.[3] We would disagree particularly with this second point on the ground that it is not humanity which is a microcosm of creation but *flesh*.

Robert John Russell holds that our view of the Incarnation must consider both the physics and biology of Jesus' physicality. Athanasius famously argued that 'only that which is assumed by Christ can be redeemed by Christ'. Thus, Russell argues, Jesus' Incarnation as a physical creature necessitates that all aspects of Jesus' physical existence are part of the Incarnation and all that it entails. Jesus' Incarnation as a physical creature includes the entirety of the biological and physical laws of the universe, so the entirety of the biological and physical laws of the universe are part of the Incarnation and all that it entails.[4] This, we argue, answers Merrick's challenge regarding the microcosm contradiction, as the use of the word *flesh* can refer to both the biology and physics of Jesus' physical existence. Thus, *flesh* is not only a biological trait, but a physical one as well, and one which is shared by all living creatures (and possibly extends further). This includes the 'boundary cases' which Clough identifies as problematic but does not discuss in detail (Vol 1, xvi). To be a physical human – and to be *flesh* – is to rely on the physical laws by which everything is governed. In this sense, Jesus' *flesh* can be truly universal. It is disappointing however that Clough does not even acknowledge Niels Gregersen's pioneering work on deep incarnation, stemming back to his *Dialog* paper of 2001.[5]

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[3] James R A Merrick, 'Review of *On Animals Volume 1: Systematic Theology* by David L Clough', *Anglican Theological Review* 95.2 (2013), pp. 364-5.
[4] Robert John Russell, 'Jesus: The Way of all Flesh and the Proleptic Feather of Time', in Niels Henrik Gregersen (ed.), *Incarnation: On the Scope and Depth of Christology* (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2015), p. 340.
[5] Niels Gregersen, 'The Cross of Christ in an Evolutionary World', *Dialog: A Journal of Theology*, 40.3 (2001), pp. 192-207.

We now move on to those areas in which we are more critical.

On several occasions in Volume 1 we felt that views contrary to the campaign were brushed aside too readily. So for example, Clough begins – rightly – by exploring creation and God's purposes in creation. But it is puzzling that Clough does not treat Gen 1:28 there, since one obvious (if wrong) answer would be that the God-given human vocation to exercise dominion and subdue provides an account of why both human and non-human creatures were created. Likewise Genesis 2 seems clear that God created animals as companions for humans, but this is not explored at all until the chapter on companion animals in Volume 2.

A second area with which we disagree is that of Clough's insistence on the possibility of nonhuman animal sin. This has been criticised by Bethany Sollereder, who notes that Clough only references chimpanzee behaviour, which cannot be translated to other creatures that have lower levels of cognitive ability and are evolutionarily further away from *Homo sapiens*. She goes on to argue that:

> While there may indeed be proto-moral violence amongst the highest of sentient non-human animals, it would be impossible to attribute any sort of moral rebellion amongst the creatures extant when predation first occurred, estimated to be in the early Cambrian period.[6]

Similarly, the biblical examples Clough draws upon are all focused on nonhuman animals with relatively high levels of cognitive ability, such as oxen; 'There is no such provision in the law codes for locusts, for example'.[7] Sollereder prefers to locate the need for nonhuman animal reconciliation to God not in their sinning, but in their

[6] Bethany N Sollereder, *God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering: Theodicy Without a Fall*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), p. 68.
[7] Sollereder, *God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering*, p. 69.

existing outside the definition of sin, instead arguing that not sinning is not itself perfection in the way that Jesus was perfect in his sinlessness.

It is a big stretch from viciousness in chimpanzees to supposing that the violence of which the non-human world is full everywhere reflects animal sinfulness. And we sense problems with method too in this area. Clough is very happy to deploy the latest scientific findings in ruling out classic loci of human distinctiveness that have been important in the tradition's reading of its scriptures. But faced with accounts of the suffering of animals in nature that derive from contemporary evolutionary theory, he claims that:

> Genesis 3 makes clear that something happened which means that we can no longer read off God's purposes by observation of the world in its current state. To insist against this that the life of the world we see around us is a reliable indication of God's creative purposes is to privilege our own independent observation of the world over basic affirmations concerning the doctrine of God that are biblically rooted and defended throughout the Christian tradition. (Vol 1, 124)

So in the one area, human distinctiveness, we can apparently appeal to science to overthrow tradition but not in the other, the historical fall. Some meta-reflection on this would have strengthened Clough's account, just as it would have been good to acknowledge that most of the Hebrew Bible does not seem to know this chronological fall from creaturely harmony. At crucial points Clough reveals the over-dependence on the sort of fairly literal reading of Genesis 1-11 that has arguably distorted much of the encounter between science and Christian theology. In particular, the dependence on the Eden myth for God's original ordering of human

relationships with other animals needs to be tempered by a recognition that it is unlikely that such a harmonious state ever existed. Clough quotes Barth (very much his theological mentor) that 'the biblical witness looks beyond the field of natural history' (Vol 2, 82); we suggest, rather, that interpretation of scriptural texts needs to look at God's ways with the world in dialogue with what the sciences can tell us.

Clough does not offer an account of the origins of violence in nature, which so long preceded the evolution of human beings. Instead we are back to Barthian territory and a sense that 'We should avoid an account of the fall that is detached from the work of Christ' (Vol 1, 125). But, again, there is no account of God's reconciliation with the (sinning) non-human creature, only a sense that in the final redeemed state it will after all make sense for lions to have green plants for food, as Clough claims, surely implausibly, that they had in Eden (Vol 1, 121).

Indeed, our overall concern with the theological volume is that Clough may have hitched his star-seeking to too conservative a hermeneutical and theological waggon for the project to deliver its full potential.

The next area of contention which we identify is in Clough's argument for a functional and relational interpretation of the *imago Dei*.[8] This interpretation of the *imago Dei*, plus his understanding of the ambit of incarnation, allows Clough to include other animals in the *imago*. That is not to say that other animals image God in the way humans do (though Clough's account is thin on how that imaging does take place in non-human creatures). Humans have been given a great responsibility, which is their version of the *imago Dei*, to live their lives in a certain way; in being given this

[8] A detailed typology of interpretations of the *imago Dei* can be found in: Noreen Herzfeld, 'Creating in Our Own Image: Artificial Intelligence and the Image of God', *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science* 37.2 (2014): pp. 303-16, esp. p. 304.

responsibility, they have also been given power. But, he argues, this power is not an inherent part of being human, and nor was this responsibility given to humanity because of any inherent power which they already possessed; rather, human power is as a result of the divine bestowal (or gifting) of responsibility upon them. Again, any theological discontinuity between humans and nonhuman creation is to be found in that which has been divinely bestowed upon (or gifted to) them, not in any inherent aspect or characteristic of humanity.

Clough is particularly suspicious of attempts to locate the *imago Dei* in a supposedly unique characteristic of humanity (the substantive interpretation), as whichever characteristic is said to be the locus of the *imago Dei* is often chosen not because of any sophisticated theological reasoning but because it is a characteristic which humans value about themselves. While Clough accepts there are differences between humans and nonhuman animals, he rejects (drawing on Derrida) any attempt to list attributes which are supposedly possessed *uniquely* by humans (Vol 1, 72-73).

However, if we dismiss all those characteristics which are commonly attributed to humans (*Homo sapiens*) alone, we risk disintegrating the very remarkable extent to which humans are distinctive. We would argue that this distinctiveness is not in a single characteristic uniquely possessed by humans, but rather is in a combination of characteristics that they uniquely possess. Neither intelligence, nor language, nor play, nor tool-use, nor modification of environments is unique to humans, and Clough emphasises the new data that reveal this, but humans possess the combination of these in a degree that renders them completely distinctive. It is not the case either that humans (*Homo sapiens*) have some characteristic which makes them *biologically* superior to all other organisms, or one which makes them *theologically*

superior to all other organisms. Yet this does not mean that humans (*Homo sapiens*) are not distinctive, and that these properties form the basis of humans' God-given vocation to relationship and creation care. This perception allows us to reclaim the very clear assignment of the *imago* to human beings that we find in Gen 1:26, 28.

Lastly, we offer some thoughts as to the ethical conclusions reached in Volume 2. We are inclined to agree that in each of these areas – the use of other animals for food, clothing, tasks, experiments, sport, and companionship, and the relationship between humans and wild animals – Clough correctly highlights major abuses and indicates directions of travel along which lie improved relations with nonhuman animals. This would indeed better reflect their proper theological position within the created order as put forth in Volume 1. However, the radical nature of Clough's analysis is bound to raise questions. *No* use of other animals for food, clothing, or experimentation is a bold position indeed.

Clough claims in his final section that many Christians will find his ethical conclusions so inconvenient and uncomfortable that they will challenge the analysis that underpins them. Well, we do find ourselves challenging the analysis, but not just on grounds of personal discomfort (though we readily admit to that). Clough's conclusion that other animals are loved by God, who cares for them and delights in their flourishing, seems irreproachable. And he is right that this rules out anthropomonism. But it is much less clear that it rules out a 'chastened and humble anthropocentrism'[9] that recognises that – in this interim before the eschaton – human needs and interests may indeed come before those of other animals. That

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[9] Cherryl Hunt, David G. Horrell and Christopher Southgate, 'An Environmental Mantra? Ecological Interest in Rom. 8.19-23 and a Modest proposal for its Narrative Interpretation', *J. Theological Studies* 59.2 (2008), pp. 546-79, esp. pp. 574-5.

indeed is where the great weight of Scripture and tradition lies. Furthermore it is striking, and never addressed by Clough, that Jesus' own practice gives no hint of the radical stance Clough advocates. Jesus is in other ways so radical, and is surely our best guide to a Kingdom-seeking ethic, yet there is no hint that he had any qualms about animals kept for food, or the catching of fish, or indeed animals put to tasks.

Clough must be right that Christians have slipped into colluding with many evil practices in food production and other uses of animals. From that point of view Volume 2 is extremely timely and should be required reading for any introduction to Christian ethics. Much reform is needed, and Christians as consumers can and should make their objections to cruelty and exploitation heard at the checkout as well as on petitions. But to do that they need not, in our judgment, buy the sweeping rejection of animal use that Clough mandates.

We now consider whether Christians may constructively and with integrity go part-way down some of Clough's directions of travel. In his chapter on the use of nonhuman animals for food, Clough acknowledges that Christians can lobby the farming industry to adopt more ethical practices. This lobbying would take the form of buying products from nonhuman animals which have been produced using more ethical farming practices, such as buying free-range over battery farmed eggs. Indeed, if battery farmed eggs were no longer selling but free-range eggs were, certainly there would be an economic incentive on the part of the farmers to stop battery-farming and instead use exclusively free-range farming. Yet this is only an economic incentive for the farmers to change their practices, and not for the consumers to change their buying habits.

As it stands in the UK, free-range eggs (to continue using this example, though we could just as easily apply this to other nonhuman animal products such as meat, or indeed to organic fruits and vegetables for a vegan option) are more expensive than battery farmed eggs. This means that, on the part of the consumer, there is an economic incentive to buy battery farmed eggs over free-range eggs. One could say that education is key – that if people were more informed about the process of battery farming, then they would automatically begin spending more money on free-range eggs because they understand the impact of where they are spending their money. Indeed, Catholic theologian Christopher Steck notes that the continuance of the morally reprehensible practices of factory farming in the meat industry are partly down to public ignorance and, indeed, public wilful ignorance.[10] He says further: 'The suffering inflicted upon animals and the quest for cheap meat are, in the operations of factory farms, bound together, so that in choosing one, we are effectively choosing the other.'[11]

The ability to choose where to spend one's money is, however, a luxury, particularly in the UK where more and more people every year are relying on food banks to keep themselves and their families fed. According to the Trussell Trust's most recent end-of-year statistics, 'Between 1 April 2018 and 31 March 2019, the Trussell Trust's food bank network distributed 1.6 million three-day emergency food supplies to people in crisis, a 19% increase on the previous year.'[12] Not only do many people in

[10] Christopher Steck, *All God's Animals: A Catholic Theological Framework for Animal Ethics* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), pp. 210-11n74.
[11] Steck, *All God's Animals*, p. 195.
[12] Trussell Trust. 'End of year stats.' *Trussell Trust*. Accessed 08 July 2020. Available at: https://www.trusselltrust.org/news-and-blog/latest-stats/end-year-stats/.

the UK not have the incentive to make more ethical choices when shopping, but many people do not have the financial ability to make those choices either.

We conducted a study on the prices of eggs in the UK as of July 2020. We investigated the price of large eggs in the top five supermarkets in the UK (as revealed by a YouGov study)[13], comparing the most expensive non-free-range large eggs with the cheapest free-range large eggs. We conducted these investigations on the UK websites for each of these supermarkets.[14]

Our results were as follows:

Supermarket Popularity (according to YouGov)	Supermarket	Cheapest free-range large eggs (each)	Most expensive non-free-range large eggs (each)	Price difference
1 (most popular UK supermarket)	Aldi	14.08p	9.9p	4.8p
2	M&S Food	-	-	

[13] YouGov. 'The most popular supermarket chains in the UK.' *YouGov*. Accessed 08 July 2020. Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/ratings/food/popularity/supermarket-chains/all.

[14] These websites were: aldi.co.uk, marksandspencer.com, lidl.co.uk, sainsburys.co.uk, and tesco.com. All websites were accessed 08 July 2020. Some qualifications to the data are necessary: 1) M&S Food did not display individual prices of groceries on their website, instead only showing the prices of meal packs and essentials boxes available for delivery and collection in light of the Covid-19 pandemic; 2) neither Sainsbury's nor Tesco displayed prices for non-free-range large eggs on their websites, indicating that they do not sell large eggs which are not free-range; 3) Tesco did not display the prices of products which were out of stock.

3	Lidl	12.9p	9.9p	3p
4	Sainsbury's	18p	-	
5	Tesco	20p	-	

The range of difference in price between individual large free-range eggs and individual large battery-farmed eggs was between 3p-4.8p, an amount which could easily add up over time. If one chooses instead to shop at a supermarket which does not sell battery-farmed eggs, however, individual eggs are up to 17p more expensive each than battery-farmed eggs at a supermarket which does. This is one small indication of the extent of the systemic change that would need to occur before the human relationship with nonhuman animals can truly be improved to any real significant degree, which we feel cannot sufficiently be achieved only by the behavioural alterations which Clough suggests. This remains, however, only a small illustration of how a major shift is needed in the systems by which humans buy and consume food.

Our other major query concerns the analysis of the use of non-human animals for medical research. We wonder if Clough would have been quite so sure about his conclusion that this is to be absolutely proscribed if he had been writing during the COVID pandemic. He is happy to accept all that has been learned in the past through the use of animals, but now wants to call an absolute halt. That is perhaps not to recognise the huge challenges that human health now faces, and will shortly face. Clough, like Linzey, lays great stress on Rom 8:19-22, the liberation of the nonhuman creation awaiting the freedom of the glory of the children of God. That has clear ethical overtones in terms of what might constitute signs of our freedom. But we have already noted that economic constraints may limit human possibilities.

How much greater is the threat to human freedom and flourishing posed by major diseases? Clough is right to realise that animal experimentation has many problems, and needs to be subject to tighter and tighter controls, but wrong to suppose that it does not remain a vital tool in seeking to protect human flourishing, which is under graver threat than most imagined until this spring. We are not nearly as conversant as Clough with the literature in this area, but we suspect this conclusion too needed more robust engagement with its critics.

In this article, we have provided an overview and critical evaluation of both volumes of David Clough's work *On Animals*. We first described the key points and arguments given across both books. We then provided our own views on these, agreeing with many though not all of Clough's theological conclusions from Volume 1, but ultimately concluding that Clough's ethical solutions in Volume 2 are too radical in places, and too optimistic without economic and systemic changes as to how humans relate to the nonhuman world.