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From Association to Dissociation: The NRP’s *translatio* of Gourmont

Abstract: This study explores the influence of the French Symbolist poet, novelist and literary critic Rémy de Gourmont on Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s conception of dissociation. It proposes *translatio*--the medieval trope describing a transfer of ideas--as a lens through which to read the significance of Gourmont’s thought on the NRP. Thus forgoing more traditional comparative approaches such as intertextuality, this study argues that *translatio* serves here as a particularly valuable conceptual tool: it unveils the evolution of Perelman’s thought over time, and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s significant contribution to it; it also provides a clearer understanding of the relationship between association (in the guise of analogy) and dissociation in the NRP than what is generally understood by scholars of the *Traité*. More importantly, *translatio* unveils the features that make their conception of dissociation one of the truly innovative aspects of the NRP.

Keywords: Chaïm Perelman; Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca; Rémy de Gourmont; dissociation; *translatio*; New Rhetoric Project; association; analogy

This study examines in detail the *translatio*—the transfer of ideas—from the French Symbolist poet, novelist and literary critic Rémy de Gourmont to Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. Placing a spotlight on Gourmont’s influence on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, it proposes that Gourmont’s thought influenced the vision of dissociation presented in the New Rhetoric Project (NRP). It explores how, via this *translatio*, we may arrive at a more nuanced understanding of dissociation in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s *Traité de l’argumentation* and in the NRP more broadly and, moreover, its relation to other techniques of argumentation, especially analogy.

I acknowledge that for most scholars of rhetoric, such a premise may come as a surprise, and for two reasons.

First, readers may be surprised at my choice to draw on *translatio*, the topos used in the Middle Ages to portray the transfer of learning from the Classical world of Athens and

Rome to medieval Paris, as a conceptual framework within which to view Gourmont's influence on the NRP.¹ Why *translatio*, rather than a more traditional comparison based on intertextuality, the "dialogue among several writings," in which any text becomes "the absorption and transformation of another" (Kristeva 1980, 65-66)? While intertextuality may provide our initial analysis of Gourmont's and the NRP's writings on dissociation with a comparative aspect, its scope is here limited. Intertextuality depends upon a reading practice based on the perception of comparability and even on the assumption that comparison must take place in reading (see Riffaterre 1980, 626); it highlights a similarity between literary texts fashioned by a reader, rather than a transfer of ideas leading to novelty especially within a different discipline entirely. It is thus of little use for understanding how such a philosopher and logician as Perelman and a sociologist as Olbrechts-Tyteca refashioned Gourmont's concept of dissociation.

On the other hand, the medieval trope of *translatio*—the transfer of ideas over time and space—offers a more useful theoretical framework for understanding how Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca simultaneously draw on Gourmont and yet refashion his ideas to their own purpose. As I have argued elsewhere (Bolduc 2020, 28-53), *translatio* not only locates rhetorical theory in time, and thus within a specific social, political, historical, and linguistic context to which it responds, but also provides a corrective to the notion that the history of rhetoric is linear and progressive. But, more importantly, *translatio* also allows us to see how a specific rhetorical theory can both adopt principles of earlier, even non-rhetorical, theories, and inventively refashion them, offering simultaneously innovation and tradition.

Second, readers may also be surprised that Gourmont played an important role in the NRP, and in particular, in its shaping of the concept of dissociation. After all, Gourmont has been described as "an extreme art-for-art's-sake theorist" (Wellek 1992, 24), someone who objected wholeheartedly to what he saw as the musty art of rhetoric, producing only the

debris of clichés and commonplaces (Gourmont 1900, 76). What's more, we can hardly call Perelman a *littérateur*. Recall the letter he had written to Ray Dearin (28 November 1969; Brussels, Université libre de Bruxelles Archives Perelman, BE.ULB-ARCH/89PP 21.4), in which Perelman insists that he was by no means trained in literature:

You should never turn to poetical theory or literary criticism in order to discover the sort of influence we [i.e., Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca] have undergone. Do not forget that I am a philosopher trained in logic and law, and that literary theory is very remote from my education.

And yet, although often forgotten today, Gourmont was at the turn of the twentieth century well known in literary circles, a landmark writer for poets and critics alike (see Boyer 2002; Dantzig 2008).² One of the founders of the journal *Mercure de France* (1890), this Symbolist poet and novelist, a frequent attendee of French poet Stéphane Mallarmé's literary salon, had found fame chiefly after the publication of his *Problème du style* (1902). His Symbolist aesthetics influenced a wide range of not only French but also Italian writers, including André Gide, Blaise Cendrars, Gabriele d'Annunzio, Giovanni Papini, and Ardegnò Soffici (Kalantzis 2012). The mark Gourmont left on modernity was manifest as much in literature and linguistics as in philosophy and the arts. In addition, his work had an international appeal, translated into English by no less than the English writer Aldous Huxley in 1921 (*A Virgin Heart*, of Gourmont's 1907 *Un Coeur virginal*) and by American modernist poet Ezra Pound in 1926 (*The Natural Philosophy of Love*, of Gourmont's 1903 *Physique de l'amour*) (see Wellek 1992, 23-25).

More important, Gourmont's conceptualization of language was at the center of debates on the role of rhetoric in literature and philosophy in the early twentieth century. For early twentieth-century modernism, following Gourmont, rhetoric was a "force to be driven out" (Somers and Trudel 2015, 254). Ezra Pound, who went so far as to attribute the decline

of Rome to the pre-eminence it gave to oratory (1970, 114), saw in Gourmont's death in 1915 the threat of a revival of rhetoric in France: "I suppose that the washy rhetoricians, this back-flush of dead symbolism, dead celtism etc., will have its way, their ways, south of the channel. There seems no one to stop it" (1917, 40).

On the other hand, Gourmont's ideas were significant for the newly rediscovered field of rhetoric as an art of persuasion. The example of Kenneth Burke is telling (see Burne 1963; Selzer 1996; Wolin 2001). Even if he would later limit the scope of Gourmont's dissociation to literature (Burke 1953, 23-24), in 1935 Burke engaged directly with it in his notion of "perspective by incongruity" (Burke 1984, liv, 112); indeed, his later idea of identification relies upon it (Burke 1969, 150; see also Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 552; Hayden 2011; Fernheimer 2014, 44-48).³ On the whole, however, Gourmont was a primary target of critics and scholars working to rehabilitate Classical rhetoric. His ideas were consequently a pre-eminent feature of the early twentieth-century recuperation of rhetoric, particularly in France.

One of the critics most well-known for working to combat Gourmont's ideas on rhetoric was none other than the French literary critic and long-time director of the *Nouvelle Revue française*, Jean Paulhan. Paulhan, whose critical goal in his *Fleurs* was to recuperate the tools of rhetoric and especially commonplaces for use in poetic expression, sets his project in direct opposition to Gourmont, who emphasized originality at all costs. Paulhan, who declares a rebirth of rhetoric in his 1938 "La rhétorique renaît de ses cendres," characterizes the modernist condemnation of rhetoric as a form of literary Terrorism. The literary Terror promoted by such literary and philosophical notables as Gourmont, Marcel Schwob, Antoine Albalat, and Henri Bergson, writes Paulhan, attempts to banish from literature such tools of traditional rhetoric as commonplaces, considered to be signs of "degeneration and distraction" (*déchéance et inattention*) (Paulhan 1941, 45; see also 2011,

53-54).⁴ In seeking to recuperate the tools of rhetoric, Paulhan takes aim at Gourmont's denigration of rhetorical commonplaces.

Paulhan's overt criticism of Gourmont is significant for the present study, as it helps to answer what may seem a tangled question of Gourmont's influence on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. My research has identified but a single reference to Gourmont in the NRP (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 552); no references to Gourmont appear in any of the other NRP writings, or in Perelman's notebooks. This seeming lack of critical engagement marks, I believe, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's rejection of Gourmont's ideas, particularly about the value of rhetoric, rather than an unawareness of them. I believe that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's knowledge of Gourmont's ideas, and in particular, his idea of dissociation, was most likely mediated through and by Paulhan.⁵

In studying Paulhan's importance for the NRP in detail, I have unveiled Perelman's direct engagement with the stars of mid-century French poetics (Barthes, Genette, Ricoeur), an idea which has not been to date explored at any length in Anglo-American studies of the NRP (Bolduc 2020, 266-330; see also Bolduc 2019). In the present study, I extend from that basis to offer a meditation on the importance of yet another literary star, this time from the early twentieth century--Gourmont--for the NRP's concept of dissociation, expanding significantly recent scholarship on the subject (see Fernheimer 2014, 44-48). Gourmont's ideas appear throughout Paulhan's *Fleurs*, the keystone text in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's turn to Classical rhetoric; as a result, Gourmont serves as an essential if shadowy presence in the NRP's idea of rhetoric generally and, more specifically, of dissociation. The present study provides, then, an illustration of Dilip Gaonkar's characterization of two histories of rhetoric, one manifest and the other hidden (1990, 354).

This study thus uses *translatio* as a trope offering a way to understand how Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca not only re-read the work of Gourmont, but also translated the ideas of

this literary critic into the realm of rhetoric, making of dissociation one of their signature and most innovative ideas.

Before we can discuss the *translatio* of dissociation from Gourmont to the NRP, however, we must first investigate their respective views on association. Inspired by Takuzo Konishi, who has called dissociation the counterpart of *a priori* analogy, or a *dis*-analogy (2007, 789-799), I begin by tracing association, which for Gourmont as well as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca alike, is related to analogy.

Association

Whereas for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, association is effected when speakers join concepts considered to be distinct (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 471; see also Olbrechts-Tyteca 1974, 157), for Gourmont, the association of ideas is more generally an essential operation of thought. Gourmont opens his 1899 essay, “Dissociation des idées,” where he treats association and dissociation the most explicitly, by writing, “There are two ways of thinking: by accepting customary ideas and their associations as they are, or by engaging privately in new associations; or original dissociations of ideas, which is even more rare.”⁶ Gourmont here describes a hierarchy of thought based on associations ultimately leading to dissociation. That is, first he presents the most common form of association, which simply reproduces traditional ideas and the associations between them. He then portrays new associations of ideas, which are formed by artists on an independent and individual basis. For both, Gourmont suggests a hierarchy of creative intelligence: standard, usual associations are formed by truly mediocre artists, whereas new associations may be formed by those artists who are less mediocre than the first. It is only at the last step, that of dissociation, suggests Gourmont, that we find, but rarely, the most creative associations of ideas. Association is thus a way of thinking often marked by inertia, which entails the acceptance per se of common ideas and traditional associations. Over time, these commonplaces form truths,

which although based in banality and prejudice, can become historical (as in the case of the association tying Byzantium to decadence) and even vital (Gourmont 1900, 77-81, 83).⁷

Despite the artistic rather than argumentative bent of Gourmont's notion of association, we may be struck by some suggestive correspondences between his and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's vision of association, the most important of which is their shared view that association is manifest in analogy. Gourmont grounds the operation of association in analogy: "The principle" underlying the association of ideas (and implicitly, by extension, their dissociation), he writes, "is analogy."⁸ Similarly, although in the NRP association is most decidedly an aspect of argument, serving (like commonplaces) as a tool of argumentation, it is also most visible in analogy (and, to a lesser extent, metaphor).⁹

Although a significant conceptual touchstone in the NRP--even early in his career, Perelman had asserted that "the importance of analogy is extraordinary" (1933, 19; see also Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1950, 28)--analogy is rarely studied today. In fact, scholarship on the role of analogy in the NRP's vision of argument, with some notable exceptions (i.e., Measall 1985), can be characterised as slight. Gross and Dearin (2003, 115), who note that in the NRP, "...style plays a supporting rather than a leading role in argument," do not, for example, treat analogy as one of the important figures considered as argumentative in the NRP. They suggest, instead, that rhetorical figures are considered by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca as necessary not in a systematic sense, but rather based on the specific aspect of the individual argument under study. This argument unfortunately disregards the many pages on analogy and metaphor in the *Traité* (§§ 82-88), which discuss their function within argument; it also ignores Perelman's early work on analogy as a means of proof (1933: 16-20), the notes that he takes on his reading of the scholarship on analogy in 1940-1941, and his later work, both published articles (1969; 1977) and such unpublished manuscripts as "Analogie (et métaphore)" (written sometime after 1975) on the subject.¹⁰ It is

for the slightness of scholarship on the topic that in what follows I sketch out, if in brief, the evolution of Perelman's thought, alone and with Olbrechts-Tyteca, on analogy.

Initially, analogy was for Perelman related to a psychological kind of induction; Henri Bergson's 1919 *Énergie spirituelle* is here the primary touchstone.¹¹ In 1933, Perelman describes analogy being employed to understand another person's emotional state based on his behavior and reactions. Since we know how our reactions manifest our own emotional state, we can ascertain by means of analogy the emotional state of another person based on the manifestations of it that we perceive (Perelman 1933, 16-17). Analogy may be an imprecise and weak basis for reasoning, but is not entirely arbitrary, because it can be modified or corrected (1933, 17; see also Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 527). It is employed especially in historiography and in law (1933, 18).

In their *Traité* Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca will continue and expand on many of the themes present in Perelman's 1933 work, especially how analogy serves as a means of proof (Perelman 1933, 16; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 500). If in 1933, Perelman acknowledges analogy's imprecise character in reasoning (Perelman 1933, 19), in 1958 he and Olbrechts-Tyteca will emphasize that because analogy exists in a similitude of relations (A:B as C:D), it is useful as a form of reasoning (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 500; see also Olbrechts-Tyteca 1974, 302-304). Here, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca demonstrate the influence of their turn to rhetoric, as they make use of Aristotelian concepts of analogy, drawn not only from the works of Aristotle, but also from late antique and medieval philosophers (especially Plotinus and Thomas Aquinas); they also acknowledge the use of this tradition in the work of such philosophers as Kant, Whately, and Carnot (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 500-502). In 1933, Perelman stresses the importance of analogy in social life (Perelman 1933, 19-20); in 1958, the *Traité* will accentuate analogy's function not only in the structure of the real but also in the transfer of values which derive from it

(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 512). Perelman's characterization of analogy's recourse to imagination (Perelman 1933, 18) will in the *Traité* be more firmly tied to invention, in the prolongation of argument (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 517-521). Analogy thus serves as an argumentative technique of liaison (which creates connective links), one of the types of arguments establishing the structure of reality that, as Warnick points out, "seek[s] to create new perceptions and to cause the audience to see things differently" (Warnick 2011, 26; see also Perelman 1933, 19-20; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 499-534).

Perelman's later work on analogy seeks to differentiate the cognitive, philosophic use of analogy from its use in science and poetry (Perelman 1969; see also Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 531-532). While the Aristotelian tradition of analogy remains paramount, Max Black's 1962 *Models and Metaphors* is here the primary touchstone. From its basis of a similitude of relations described in the *Traité*, analogy will be described by Perelman as proportion, as he stresses its Classical and etymological roots (see also Perelman 1969, 4; Perelman 1977, 523). For her part, Olbrechts-Tyteca will see the comic and even laughter as potential effects of analogy (Olbrechts-Tyteca 1974, 288-304). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's treatment of analogy and metaphor from the 1960s on can be situated within contemporary discourses - philosophical, semiotic, psychoanalytic - on metaphor; these, however, tend to consider analogy as simply a verbal matter. Perelman, on the other hand, while gesturing at I.A. Richards' idea that thought itself is metaphorical (Richards 1938, 48), will insist on the importance of analogy in philosophy and rhetoric. For one, Perelman argues that the history of philosophy may be written based on the analogies that philosophers give of their ideas, and he sketches out the various analogies used by such philosophers as Descartes (a man walking alone in the shadows), Leibniz (a troop, marching), Hegel (a path that constructs itself), and Spinoza (tools and a forge) to describe the

acquisition of knowledge (Perelman 1969, 10-12, 15; see also Bolduc 2020, 300-302), Furthermore, Perelman will argue that analogy is especially useful in argumentation for the effect it may have on audiences in structuring thought and, as a consequence, how it may act upon audiences (Perelman 1969, 6).¹²

Having investigated at some length association, we turn now to dissociation. Reading the NRP's conception of dissociation through the lens of a *translatio* from Gourmont will allow us to better understand the context within which it arises; moreover, it will also help us to work out the ties between association (*qua* analogy) and dissociation in the NRP.

Dissociation

In the late nineteenth century, dissociation was well-established in terms of the medical world, and particularly in psychology. The French psychologist Pierre Janet (1886/2005) had proposed dissociation as a way of describing what seemed to be a double consciousness in hypnotism, a problem which had been raised by his uncle, the philosopher Paul Janet (1884).¹³ It was from this basis in psychology and psychoanalysis that dissociation, promoted by Gourmont's critical statements on the subject, became a feature of literature.¹⁴ Gourmont's ideas on dissociation, paramount in literature and philosophy, were instrumental for no less than T.S. Eliot (see Krockel 2011, 90), who described in 1921 a dissociation of sensibility (1951, 288; see also Bateman 1952, vs. Thompson 1952).

Gourmont's 'dissociation des idées,' is, as he declares in *Dissociations* (1925, 9-10), foundational for his entire *oeuvre*, his signature idea and a marker of his philosophy more broadly. As he writes in the preface to his posthumously published *Dissociations* (which compiles texts originally published between 1910 and 1915), "I spent my life fashioning dissociations, dissociations of ideas and of feelings, and if my work is worth anything, it is because this method persists."¹⁵ As we have seen above, Gourmont asserts that dissociation occurs in the imagining of new relationships between ideas, which occurs when old ideas (or

images) that are traditionally joined are cleaved. The writer/artist endowed with an unusually creative intelligence will consider these old ideas individually, unbinding what binds them, and in so doing, create new associations between ideas and, perhaps, if rarely, new dissociations. Dissociation for Gourmont thus aims at disrupting thought; it intends to eliminate the power that such received ideas as commonplaces and clichés have over pure ideas.

Like Gourmont's dissociation, the NPR's version is a technique of division or separation. However, whereas Gourmont locates dissociation in the work of the creative artist who creates originality in art and literature by taking apart commonplaces, the NPR uses dissociation as a technique in argumentation. In fact, dissociation for the NPR goes beyond the mechanism described by Gourmont: it is not concerned with simply undoing the links, or *liaisons*, of an argument. Rather, dissociation in the NPR aims at breaking apart the conceptual ideas upon which an argument is built; it is a notional dissociation (*dissociation notionnelle*, or *dissociation des notions*; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 556). In other words, for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca dissociation causes a change in an argument's fundamental data; its goal is no longer to detach elements of an idea that have been tied together by language or tradition (as in Gourmont), but rather to modify their very structure (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 550-551). Olbrechts-Tyteca herself goes further, noting that one effect of dissociation is the modification of systems of thought brought about by the modification of their conceptual touchstones (1974, 158).

It is easy to see how association for Gourmont leads as if by foregone conclusion to dissociation: tied to poetic expression, association is a step on the way to the expression of true intellectual poetic innovation, which is dissociation.¹⁶ In the NPR, however, association as analogy appears to be distinct from dissociation, an effect produced not only by the structure of the *Traité*, but also by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's insistence that

dissociation is not a technique of argumentative liaison (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 550-551). And yet, dissociation in the NRP also presupposes an original unity (*l'unité primitive*) of the foundational elements of a conception, recalling how for Gourmont dissociation ultimately works to uncover the unity of 'pure' ideas.¹⁷ Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca clarify that dissociation is a rupture of unity rather than the separation of associated elements that are otherwise independent, acknowledging the difficulty in distinguishing between the two in actual fact (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 550-551).

Whereas they gesture at the traditional association presented by Gourmont between association and dissociation, they insist on their fashioning of dissociation as different. In so doing, they also mark the evolution of their notion of dissociation as it appears in their *Traité* from Perelman's first use of dissociation in his "De l'arbitraire dans la connaissance," in which he describes a strange, third [*tiers*] kind of judgment, neither that of value nor that of reality, being produced from the dissociation of the pair of value/reality (1933, 5-6; see also Bolduc and Frank 2019, 238-240; 242-243). That is, whereas Perelman in 1933 leaves the mechanics of dissociation unexplained, with Olbrechts-Tyteca in the *Traité* he grounds dissociation in a lengthy exploration of how it operates by means of philosophical pairs (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 556-590). This evolution highlights the novelty of the NRP's concept of dissociation, a point Olbrechts-Tyteca makes explicitly (Olbrechts-Tyteca 1979, 81-82); it also indicates her important contribution to its elaboration, which continues well beyond the publication of the *Traité* (see Olbrechts-Tyteca 1974, 1979; Warnick 1998, 73, 83; Frank and Bolduc 2010, 149).

Dissociation has been frequently studied, seen as a source of controversy (Johnstone 1958, 67), as a way of avoiding binaries in thought (Schiappa 1985; Schiappa 2003; see also Handleman 1991), and finally, as a technique aiming at pluralism (Frank 2004, 277; Frank 2014, 86), which not only arises from the trauma of the Second World War, the Occupation

and the Holocaust, but also serves as a means of working through this very trauma (Frank 2007).¹⁸ However, working through the *translatio* of dissociation (and association) from Gourmont to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also allows us to highlight the other important and innovative features they attribute to dissociation, those traces of its very rhetoricity (see Warnick 1998, 75).¹⁹

For example, for Gourmont dissociation operates in pure ideas, and one of its goals is the dissociation of traditional morality.²⁰ The NRP, on the other hand, views dissociative argumentation as taking place in the world, aiming to solve real differences in values by means of compromise (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 554-555). Similarly, whereas Gourmont uses past associations to laud present-day dissociations, in the NRP dissociation takes place in time. In fact, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also portray dissociation as looking to the future: the solution to an incompatibility provided by a dissociation will be valid in the future, they write, because, in remodeling our conception of reality, it prevents the reappearance of the same incompatibility (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 552). Most important, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca retain Gourmont's insistence on dissociation as original and innovative, pointing out that any new philosophy presupposes the introduction of a new conceptual apparatus, the originality of which derives from a dissociation of notions made by the philosopher (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 554; see also Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1950, 21).

In this reading of the NRP's conception of dissociation, we have unearthed precisely how Gourmont's association and dissociation alike are influential for the NRP, and how Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca transform these concepts. The present study has nevertheless more extensive ambitions than the tracing of the adoption and adaptation of ideas. For one, it makes an appeal that we broaden the lens through which we see the intellectual development of the NRP, enjoining scholars of rhetoric to pay close attention to elements (like analogy)

that they may have otherwise written off as too literary to be of interest for studies of rhetoric. And finally, and more importantly, it offers scholars of rhetorical history an important conceptual tool for understanding the originality of the NRP beyond that of a “renewal” (*renouvellement*) of rhetoric (Noulet 1956, 273). As I have written elsewhere, the topos of medieval *translatio* simultaneously establishes a line, even a tradition, of thought and yet simultaneously recognizes the newness of each iteration--each rediscovery--along the way (Bolduc 2020, 34-39). From the perspective of a diachronic intellectual history, *translatio* thus serves to elucidate how the rhetoric of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and in particular its notion of dissociation, may be seen as an utterly ‘new’ reading of an ‘old’ tradition.

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1. For a definition of medieval *translatio*, see Curtius, 1990, 29-30; for an illustrative contemporary example, see Chrétien de Troyes 1994, 44-46.

2. Whereas Kaës's recent French critical edition of Gourmont's *Esthétique de la langue française* (Gourmont 2016) suggests a renewed interest in Gourmont in France, Lowell's 1915 essay indicates there had been at the time a cool reception of Gourmont, especially in the Anglophone world: "Of the six poets whom I have chosen for the subjects of these essays, it is certain that the one for whom Anglo-Saxon readers must feel the least sympathy is Remy de Gourmont" (1915: 107).

3. Burke had written on Gourmont initially in his 1921 essay "Approaches to Remy de Gourmont," which was republished as part of the essay "Three Adepts of 'Pure' Literature," in his 1931 *Counter-Statement* (Burke 1953, 15-28).

4. Commonplaces are at the heart of Gourmont's rejection, and of Paulhan and the NRP's rehabilitation, of rhetoric. For Gourmont, analogy serves as the foundation of commonplaces (*lieux communs*), which may be historical in origin, or close at hand and broadly accessible (Gourmont 1900, 79). But commonplaces, for Gourmont, are always more or less banalities, especially when seen as expressing a truth (Gourmont 1900, 77). Paulhan qualifies Gourmont's characterisation of the use of rhetorical commonplaces (and cliché) as an example of literary Terrorism (Paulhan 1941, 54). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958,

112-113) acknowledge the banality of commonplaces, and even use the same term (*banalité*) in a way that echoes Gourmont, above (1900, 77). However, unlike Gourmont, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca will insist that commonplaces, like *topoi*, are indispensable tools for argument (1958, 112-113).

5. As I have argued elsewhere (Bolduc 2020, 2-4, 273), even the very origin of the NRP's turn to rhetoric may be found in Paulhan's work: Olbrechts-Tyteca had described the 'turn' to rhetoric she and Perelman had made as deriving from her explicit admiration of Paulhan's works and in particular in his 1941 *Fleurs de Tarbes, ou La terreur dans les lettres* (Olbrechts-Tyteca 1963, 3), a point later confirmed by Perelman (2002, 9).

6. "Il y a deux manières de penser: ou accepter telles qu'elles sont en usage les idées et les associations d'idées, ou se livrer, pour son compte personnel, à de nouvelles associations et, ce qui est plus rare, à d'originales dissociations d'idées" (Gourmont 1900, 73). All translations here are my own.

7. Gourmont (1900, 77) even describes such truths as formed by association as essential to human life: "Privés de la vérité des lieux communs, les hommes se trouveraient sans défense, sans appui et sans nourriture."

8. See Gourmont 1900, 79: "Il serait peut-être utile d'examiner d'abord comment les idées s'associent entre elles et dans quel but. Le manuel de cette opération est des plus simples; son principe est l'analogie."

9. I would note that Gourmont (1900, 81) also explores analogy in terms of chemistry, as will Perelman alone (Perelman 1933, 11-12) and with Olbrechts-Tyteca (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, 531).

10. Perelman takes notes on Harald Höffding's 1931 work, *Le concept d'analogie*, in his Carnet 21, which he began 12 March 1940 and finished 12 August 1941; see BE.ULB-ARCH/89PP 12.

11. Analogy is not, however, simply induction, for two reasons: first, because the temporal range of analogy may differ, and second, induction requires experimentation, and we cannot conduct experiments on someone's emotional state (Perelman 1933, 17).

12. The description of reasoning from analogy given by Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik is not entirely dissimilar to that of the NRP; however, they discount figurative analogies as argumentative. See Toulmin et al. 1984, 217.

13. Pierre Janet's description of this doubled consciousness and later, dissociation as a reaction to trauma (see, for example, 1904) would later be fundamental for Freud's theory of psychoanalysis. See Ellenberger 1970.

14. All three fields share the exercise of automatic writing as a means of (self-)induced dissociation. See Janet 1886, 586-588. Janet had modelled his automatic writing experiments on those of Frederick W.H. Myers (1885; 1886/1887). Automatic writing was employed by Freud as a tool in his psychoanalytic treatments, and adopted by Hippolyte Taine (1892, 1:16-17) and André Breton (1924/1999, 1: 331-333) as *l'écriture automatique*, a means of free literary invention.

15. Gourmont 1925, 9: "J'ai passé ma vie à faire des dissociations, dissociations d'idées, dissociations de sentiments, et si mon oeuvre vaut quelque chose, c'est par la persévérance de cette méthode."

16. The beginning of Burne's English translation of Gourmont's "Dissociation des idées" makes this clear by translating the French *dissociations* into English as "associations" (here, set off in italics): "Either you accept current ideas and associations of ideas, just as they are, or you undertake to form new associations or, what is rarer, original *associations* of ideas" (Gourmont 1966, 11).

17. This process happens when dissociation eliminates the questionable aspects of a 'truth' that veil pure ideas. See Gourmont 1990, 94: "Le travail de la dissociation tend précisément à

dégager la vérité de toute sa partie fragile pour obtenir l'idée pure, une, et par conséquent inattaquable.”

18. Gross and Dearin (2003) portray dissociation as both technique and mode of truth; Ritivoi stresses the importance of contextual factors in dissociation (2008, 187); conversely, Van Rees, who while denying that dissociation is an argumentative scheme, inserts dissociation within pragma-dialectics (2009, 8-10).

19. I would point out, moreover, that both Paulhan and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca see dissociation as operative via translation. In an essay written in 1938, Paulhan describes translation as effecting the dissociation of textual stereotypes (Paulhan 2009, 262). Echoing Paulhan, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca will later assert that translation produces a dissociation in metaphor (1958, 546).

20. For example, Gourmont unties intellectuality from infecundity, pleasure from reproduction (1900, 84-87), and honor from the fact of being a soldier (Gourmont 1900, 90-91). Divorce is a central thematic metaphor of Gourmont's dissociation (1900, 75).