UNIVERSITY OF EXETER

"CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF FOUNDATION, TUTELAGE, AND TRANSFORMATION"

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ABSTRACT

Turkish history is too often a history of authoritarianism, from Ottoman authoritarianism to military, and now civilian authoritarianism.

Based on this authoritarian culture and historical legacy, civil-military relations and military interventions have been among principal causes of the lack of a mature democracy in Turkey. The 'foundation philosophy' of the Turkish Republic placed the military at the centre of the constitutional system. This research seeks to analyse and explain how the military institutionalised their dominance of Turkish politics for nearly 90 years, and how that dominance came to be challenged and terminated.

This thesis presents a theoretical framework in which continuity of military dominance is explained by reference to the main theoretical principles of historical institutionalism whilst those same principles are also employed to explaining the decline and collapse of military tutelage. The critical junctures in this historical process of institutional continuity and change are circumstantiated at various points to clarify the argument. This framework also allows a partial analysis of the trajectory of civilian authoritarianism under the Erdogan Governments and their changing relationship with the military.

A critical analysis over the continuity of the state authoritarianism in changing military and civilian forms, the research employs the concepts of cognitive frameworks, norms, and rules to tease out the implications of the power of balance in Turkey.

The research reveals the lasting impact of the cognitive, regulative, and normative frameworks in formation, institutionalisation, and displacement processes of the military tutelage.

The thesis re-emphasises the concern with the prospects for mature and democratic civil-military relations. In so doing it draws on the empirical research, particularly on the views of civilian interviewees.

Key words: *Historical Institutionalism, path-dependency, critical junctures, civil-military relations, authoritarian culture, coup d'état, military tutelage, internal-external determinants, gradual institutional change, civilian authoritarianism.*

CHAPTER 1: THE INSTITUTIONAL BASES OF TURKISH CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

"To meet the various needs men created the political institution…" Plato

1.1 Introduction, Focus of the Research, and the Research Questions: Turkish Military and Democracy

The military has been one of the most influential players in Turkish politics throughout history. This power has deep sociological, historical, and cultural roots. While sociological, historical, and cultural legacies were inherited from the traditional Turkish culture, Islam and the Ottoman Empire; the "foundation philosophy" of the new Turkish Republic has rendered the military as the "unique" and autonomous power in the constitutional system. The overt and covert military interventions into politics since 1960 have been fundamental path-dependencies which strengthened the soldier against the civilian in the Turkish political arena.

Identified as being "guardians of the republic" and the "true implementers of the revolution"; the military has enjoyed the credit accorded to them by the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his followers. The first constitution which was endorsed in 1924 in the aftermath of the Independence War and related legal arrangements made thereafter were the initial systemic formulation of the anti-democratic nature of the civil-military relations. The philosophy behind these arrangements has made a properly democratic and civilian oversight of the army in the new Turkey impossible.

Turkish multi-party democracy, which has been institutionalised in 1946 is, to a large extent, the history of military coup d'états which has reinforced the anti-democratic nature of civil-military relations in each time. Since the bloody 27 May 1960 coup in which democratically elected Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two other cabinet members were executed, Turkey's immature democratic life has been similarly subverted four times by the military. Each of these hard and soft interventions has served as critical periods in which the anti-democratic equilibrium of Turkish civil-military relations has been punctuated. Throughout these interventions, the interventionist officers have solidified their constitutional, constructionist stance over other state apparatuses. They have created new political and military agencies through which the military could shape the socio-political life. Such an institutionalisation has militarised the decision-making process and has formed a military tutelage over the entire political system.

The primary objective of this research is to find answers to the question of "What are the roles of institutions, norms and values in the formation, evolution, and transformation of Turkey's civil-military relations?". Through the answers to this question, the research aims at revealing the path-dependency of authoritarian characteristics of the balance of power in Turkey. The following sub-questions enable the researcher to reach these two main questions regarding the institutional legacy and authoritarian path dependency:

What historical legacies constitute the modern foundations of civil-military relations in Turkey?

To what extent do Turkish constitutions (1924-1961-1982) delegate authority to civilians in order to control the military?

To what extent have the military interventions influenced civil-military relations in Turkey?

What are the "critical junctures" and "punctuated equilibriums" in the Turkish civil-military relations and how have their outcomes shaped the power struggle in Turkey?

What are the cognitive frameworks of a civilian and an officer towards each other?

To what extent has the leadership capacity of the political figures impacted the civil-military relations?

To what extent has the long-standing Justice and Development Party (JDP) government transformed the established nature of Turkish civil-military relations?

To what extent the EU membership candidacy process has influenced Turkey's internal politics?

Can the EU-inspired reformation process which has been promulgated by the JDP bring democratic civil-military relations in Turkey?

What may be the possible outcomes of the destruction of the military tutelage under the Erdogan rule?

The following sections provide a fertile ground allowing the researcher to develop a new critical approach to answer the research questions above. This approach is going to produce novel findings and makes substantial contributions to the Turkish civil-military relations literature.

The significance of this project springs from many aspects along with analysing the politics of the Turkish civil-military relation, this research attaches great importance to the role of formal and informal institutions. Secondly, those who have criticised the military have always paid a hefty price in Turkey. Because of the authoritarian state practices and the military tutelage; Turkey's civilians have always hesitated from talking about the military critically. For the first time in an academic research, civilian interviews with active and retired high-ranking public figures on civil-military relations are included in this study. In order to make this possible; the researcher has interviewed former ministers, members of the Turkish Parliament and elite civilian bureaucrats who have closely worked with the officers. As interviewing with the officers is prohibited by the Military Internal Service Code; secondary resources, especially, memoirs of some junta members who actively took place in the previous coup d'états and some influential military leaders are analysed in order to reveal the officers' perspective on the civilians. This is a novel method of studying Turkish civil-military relations.

In addition to the above-mentioned issues, analysing the question of civilian oversight of the Turkish military has been neglected by researchers. This thesis pays special attention to this existential dimension of Turkish democracy and thereby aims at contributing an important scientific element to the literature.

Along with formal institutions, the military interventions have created informal norms and mechanisms which have, until recently, made the superiority of the military unquestionable. The executions of the prime minister and two other ministers in 1960 have created a persistent trauma among Turkish politicians, which can be described as a self-censorship mechanism in the face of the generals. In other words, the civilians have refrained from annoying the officers in order not to share the same with the politicians who were hanged by the 1960 Junta. Along with that trauma, another common deficiency of the civilians has been incompetency in generating solutions to the deep-rooted social and economic problems. The political clumsiness of the civilians has made the officers' work easier whenever they have needed arguments in order to legitimise their intervention.

The economic turmoil of the 1970s and the catastrophic dissolution of the political forces in Turkey have given the military a new excuse to justify their intervention in politics as a "constitutional duty and right" for "the sake of the nation". Utilising the experience of the 1960 coup and the 1971 memorandum, the military has operated more systematically and

militarised socio-political institutions. The new slogan of the armed force was: "Powerful army; powerful state"; indeed, to a large extent, this has been an all-inclusive approach which has aimed at militarising the state.

By strengthening the constitutional acquisitions of the preceding two interventions, the leaders of the 12 September 1980 military coup, systemised the military tutelage over politics. To this end, a new constitution has been written and promulgated under the command of the 1980 Junta. The legislation in force, such as The Military Internal Code, The Code of Political Parties, Election Laws and The Trade Unions Code, was reformulated according to the principles of the 1982 Constitution dictated by the generals. Following the path-dependent process created by the military-made constitution in 1961, the 1980 Junta constitutionalised the military tutelage by incorporating the tutelary institutions into the new constitution. All political parties and political activities were banned; social, cultural and trade union rights were redesigned and minimised under this militarist approach. Therefore, the 1980 military intervention and the institutions it has created pulverised almost all rights and freedoms which have been acquired thanks to uphill struggles against the absolutist regime since the Westernisation process launched in the late-Ottoman era.

The military tutelage which established by the Junta gave powerful instruments to the generals to intervene in and reshape all walks of public life whenever they have deemed necessary. In line with this purpose, new authoritarian and exclusionist institutions were formed, and those existing ones were rearticulated. Thus, some constitutionally empowered public agencies such as The National Security Council, The Higher Education Council, and The Supreme Military Council restricted civilian decision-making processes. By means of these institutions, rules and norms; the military has designated, once more, a new path-dependent process within the political system and it has strengthened the anti-democratic equilibrium which had been established by the foundational philosophy and cemented by the previous interventions.

Turkey has been established as a secular, nation-state in 1923. The founding ideology of the secularist and nationalist Republic has excluded all ethnic and religious differences. As the guardian of the new regime, the military has relentlessly been at war with those socio-political groups which have wanted their fundamental rights and freedoms. For that reason, the formal and informal institutions which have been formed by each military intervention have been designated with a mentality which would struggle against the ethnic and religious differences

in the society in order to safeguard the state against the "internal enemies". That is why Turkey's Kurdish Question and Political Islam have been two main focuses of conflict between the officer corps and civilians throughout the multi-party era. The tutelary institutions have been used by the generals in order to perpetuate the state's denial policies against the Kurds' -the most populous ethnic group in Turkey- social, cultural and educational rights which have paved the way for an endless war in the Kurdish Region. Similarly, these institutions have been utilised to knock the religious, political groups out of the realm of politics. Not only the generals but also Turkey's most politicians have regarded the Kurdish and Political Islam Questions as a matter of security throughout the decades. This research is also going to answer how this perspective and the militarisation of the fundamental rights and freedoms have affected civil-military relations. As will be analysed in chapter seven, the long-standing political persecution against the Islamists and Kurds through the tutelary institutions can be described as a "Pyrrhic Victory" for the officer corps, as it has catalysed anti-militarism in the society in the mid-term, which would trigger an unprecedented transformation in the balance of power along with other internal and external factors since 2002.

Turkey's "post-modern coup d'état" had been staged at a time when Turkey's military had been waging war against the separatist PKK in the Kurdish Region, and a bitter struggle against the civilian government under a staunch Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the "National Outlook" (*Milli Gorus*), a religiopolitical movement, and of a series of political-Islamist parties. Throughout the anti-Islamist war, the military utilised formal and informal institutions established by the previous military interventions to reach its final goal. Prior to the resignation of the government because of the soft military intervention on February 28, 1997, the powerful generals had issued declarations through media channels almost every day. Secret commissions were established to blacklist politicians, bureaucrats, tradespeople and students because of their political affiliations, ethnic backgrounds, and religious identities. The generals openly threatened political leaders and even a high-ranking officer swore at the Prime Minister Erbakan before the cameras because of the governments' close relations with Arab Countries.

Due to the decisions which had been taken at the National Security Council's monthly meeting and the ongoing psychological war against the civilians, Turkey's first Islamist government was obliged to resign. This resignation, which has been described as a "post-modern coup" by one of the most powerful generals of the term, has provided the National

Security Council with a new opportunity to reshape the socio-political life in accordance with the principles of the status-quo before the new millennium. The best narration that can describe the path-dependent characteristic of Turkish civil-military relations is implicit in General Kivrikoglu's, the Chief of General Staff of the term, analysis on the post-modern intervention: "The February 28 is going to last 1000 years!"

Ataturk had aimed at founding a modern state which would embrace Western values. Though he had established a state based on nationalist and "assertive secularist" principles that will be analysed in chapter three and four, his famous discourse on "reaching the level of contemporary civilisations" has been interpreted by many as a source of reformation and democratisation in the country that rose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, the EU membership has long been a prominent goal for civilian agendas. The EU candidacy process was granted to Turkey in 1999. The legal requirements for the candidate countries have initiated a reform process which has created some fundamental institutional changes that would challenge the military tutelage in the mid-term. Therefore, Turkey's being accepted as a candidate country by the EU has a historic importance, and this research examines this fact as a critical juncture which has deeply affected civil-military relations.

It was impossible to talk about a grounded transformation in Turkish civil-military relations before the EU candidacy process. Thanks to the grassroots support for democratisation and the EU membership candidacy process, the Erdogan governments were able to endorse some substantial legal arrangements, especially between 2004 and 2011. The alliance of internal and external factors has provided Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (JDP) with an unprecedented power to challenge the military tutelage.

During the initial years of his government, Erdogan has pursued a moderate attitude towards the officers since he was well aware of the limits of his power. To put in a different way, he has followed the rules and norms which were created by the long-standing military tutelage; but he created new rules and norms that would empower the civilians against the officers. Following Mahoney and Thelen (2010), the gradual institutional change that supported by the EU process can be described as a "layering" process that is "the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones" in a political environment where the veto mechanisms of the status quo are compelling. In this context, it has been the tempestuous presidential elections of 2007 in which Erdogan has rejected the ultimatums of the military and made his then closest friend the new President of Turkey.

From the historical institutionalist perspective, the election of an Islamist civilian to the presidency of the secular Republic can be described as the "displacement" process of the military tutelage, the second phase of transformation in the Turkish balance of power. In a critical juncture for politics, as will be analysed in chapter seven, Erdogan's new victory against the military has provided enough power with him to declare an open challenge against Turkey's once most powerful institution. Throughout this new path-dependent process, Erdogan has strategically employed the power of judiciary and police primarily through the Gulen-linked bureaucrats in order to defeat the secular establishment, "the common enemy" of the political-Islam.

Though some considerable progress has been made during the JDP governments between 2002 and 2010, these reforms have not democratised the Turkish civil-military relations but only civilianised it. Instead of implementing universal principles of democracy in civil-military relations, Erdogan has used the substantial public support and the EU process so as to deinstitutionalise the status quo in order to establish his personal hegemony over politics. This research is going to analyse the politics of this transformation and its possible outcomes.

This thesis is, therefore, focussed on the relationship between democracy and military power in Turkey. This relationship generates the central hypothesis centred on the potential for a more vibrantly democratic Turkish state. According to Article 2 of its constitution "The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law…" In democracies; there are at least five key concepts; "(a) free, fair, and competitive elections; (b) full adult suffrage; (c) broad protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association, and (d) the absence of nonelected 'tutelary' authorities (e.g., militaries, monarchies, or religious bodies) that limit elected officials' power to govern, (e) exercising final control by the people over the agenda… " (Dahl,1998, p.38; Kuru, 2012, p.53; Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.5). Turkey's weak democracy has suffered many times from direct and indirect interventions of its army in politics. The central hypothesis of this study is; since the inception of the multi-party system in 1946, military interventions in politics have been a principal cause of lack of a mature democracy in Turkey. In this context, the historically insecure civilian control of the army has caused anti-democratic civil-military relations in the ountry. Until it faced a civilian challenge in the early 2000s, the military shaped socio-political life through the tutelary institutions throughout the decades. If the "democratic state" characteristic of its constitution to be realised in universal norms; the country needs to reform its civil-military relations and construct full democratic control over its army. However, as

will be analysed in chapter seven, the historical opportunity occurred after the presidential elections of 2007 has been muffed by Turkey. The Islamist government under Erdogan, who has been seeking more power with the agenda of a one-man rule regime, opted for pursuing a "revenge politics" against the guardian of the regime, secular groups, and other opponents. The path preferred by the Islamists has been supplanting the military tutelage by increasing civilian authoritarianism.

1.2 Theories and Concepts: Historical Institutionalism

The theoretical approach adopted to explore military power and democratic processes is that of historical institutionalism. Studies of institutions are the very roots of political science. With a view to understanding the world of governing institutions that structure both the behaviour of the ruled and the ruler, the principal query of political thinkers for centuries has been on the nature of administrative entities (Peters, 2011, p.1).

In order to control the flexible universe of individual behaviour with common aims, preliminary political organisations were formed. By examining the ontology and outcomes of these institutions, political thinkers made proposals for the formation of novel organisations. Normative-systemic analyses and recommendations of the first political philosophers on institutions constitute the genesis of political science (Peters, 2011, p.3; Thoenig, 2003, p. 127).

Political science holds "power and institution" at the centre of its agenda. Institutions are the arena of political life in which state and society experience infinite interrelationships. State power and public resources are the limelight of political conflict that illuminates institutional and individual behaviour. In the dynamic political atmosphere of institutions, decisions of actors and individual political consciousness are shaped and reproduced. In this context, Bell (2002: p.1) states that:

> "In institutional terms, students of politics have analysed party systems, the rules of electoral competition, government bureaucracies, parliaments, constitutions, the judicial system, as well as large institutional complexes made up of the government and the gamut of public institutions, we call the 'state'".

One of the main apparatuses of the state entity, the military has drawn the attention of many political scientists' from various viewpoints. Samuel Huntington's ground-breaking study (1957), *The Soldier and the State,* theorises upon civil-military relations and civilian oversight of the army in modern politics for the first time. Following this milestone work, further studies of political science students have advanced "civil-military relations" as an important sub-field of the discipline.

This study applies the "historical institutionalist" version of the "new institutionalism" to its research question. The next sections discuss the institutionalist tradition and clarify reasons for adopting the historical new institutionalist approach. By establishing bridges between the project theme and fundamental concepts of historical institutionalism, the project will be examined within an analytical and critical framework.

1.2.1 Institutionalism: "Old" and "New"

Institutionalism is a particular approach of tracing how institutions form and impact social and political action. It maintains that political action, politics, and policy can be ascertained exclusively within the framework of the institution in which they occur. Since Plato`s Republic, institutionalism has been a "conventional school" of thinkers in which politics and political consequences are studied. Great thinkers such as Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, or Madison who can be assessed as "old institutionalists", focused on institutions that exemplified the "best political outcomes" and "how the specific design of institutions would shape political outcomes" (Steinmo, 2001, p.7554).

As for the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth century, influential works of American "old institutionalism", such as the studies of Wilson and Woolsey, concentrated on the concept of the state. This approach, which was generally accepted as a proto-theory, focused on examining the state phenomenon through a juristically dominated "methodology". Furthermore, European old institutionalists such as Schmoller, Durkheim (Nau and Steiner, 2002, p.1005) studied the state concept as an *"omnibus present"* entity that determines law and a unique spring of legitimacy for society (Peters, 2011, pp.5-6).

The "old institutionalism" was criticised due to its inherently descriptive nature and its weakness in theory building (Bell, 2002, p.3). However, this tradition developed a rich and significant part of the discipline. It is the works of the school - albeit not in a visibly

theoretical form- that prompted contemporary institutionalist studies in political science (Peters, 2011, p.11).

The 1950s and 1960s experienced the behavioural and rational revolutions in political science in which member of these schools almost annihilated any impact of institutions in analysing political outcomes (Koelble,1995, p.233). Despite this "the institution" never vanished wholly from political theory; March and Olsen, the vanguard advocates and epoch-making interpreters of the "new" institutionalist thinking, illustrated the hegemonic vision in politics by the term "*contextual reductionist, utilitarian*, *functionalist* and *instrumentalist*" (March and Olsen, 1984, p.734).

The exclusionist approach of the rational and behavioural schools to the "institution" forced institutionalist critical thinking to focus on "observable behaviour". After the ground-breaking article of March and Olsen in 1984, the intellectual accumulation against "methodological individualism" gained widespread sympathy among political theorists (Peters, 2000, p.1).

The new institutionalists fiercely objected to "observed behaviour" as the core fact of political study. To understand "all of the phenomena of government", their position was that behaviour is not an adequate ground. For a comprehensive political analysis, the researcher ought to view behaviour within the framework its operations (Immergut, 1998, p.6-7). Steinmo (2001, p.7554), one of the most influential thinkers of the school describes the central tenet of the "new institutionalism" as follows:

> "Institutions are not neutral to policy outcomes. Institutions define the rules of the political game, and as such, they define who can play and how they play. Consequently, they ultimately can shape who wins and who loses. If politics is the study of who gets what, when and why? Then Institutionalists argue that institutions should be at the heart of that study."

As is critically and deeply analysed in the following chapters, the military which has been the most powerful institution throughout the Republican era until the very recently has formed the nature of the civil-military relations in Turkey. It has been the military's institutional power which has determined the winners and the losers of the political game.

Following the institutionalist revolution, several intellectual approaches lay claim to the term "institutional"; but "the Rational Choice", "Sociological" and "Historical Institutionalism" are the most studied versions (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.936).

Due to its ubiquitous influence among political analysts across the discipline, the new institutionalism has been criticised as being surrounded by some so-called "ambiguities". But these critiques miss out that the school does not present an integrated body of thought, rather there are three different analytic interpretations at the least, each of which characterises itself as the new institutionalist. Moreover, these "three institutionalisms" depict considerably dissimilar interpretations of the political world (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.937).

The enhanced interest in institutional analyses of the political world paved the way of reorientation in various sub-fields, in which quite different theoretical and methodological approaches were applied. Evans, Rueschemeyer, Skocpol (1985), comparative-historical analysts, discussed the need to "bring the state back in". The significance of "organisational culture" in organisational theories was discovered by Meyer and Rowan in1977. "The rules of the game" interpretation was vocalised by economically oriented academics such as Levi (1988) and North (1990). Neo-Marxists such as Therborn (1978) and Wright (1978) were among the first scholars to pay attention to the specific organisational forms of the state (Rothstein, 1998, p.141).

This project examines how civil-military relations are constructed in Turkey and the process through which the problem of civil-military relations and civilian oversight of the army originates, remains stable and changes, throughout the multi-party era with a special focus on the period between 1980 and 2011. In this context, the reason why the historical institutionalist approach is applied ought to be explained briefly but clearly. Historical institutionalism considers organisational configurations where others analyse specific settings in isolation. While historical institutionalists examine "critical junctures and long-term processes", students of rational choice and sociological institutionalism prefer working merely on "slices of time or short-term manoeuvres". The attempt to understand the broad context that structures and reshapes states, politics, policymaking and interacting processes among institutions puts historical institutionalism in a distinctive position in the field of research (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.941; Skocpol-Pierson, 2002, p.693). As the historical legacy, the foundational principals of the state, and the authoritarian and tutelary institutions have become the most influential determinants which have designated the nature of the Turkish civil-military relations; the author has embraced the historical institutionalist approach in order to elucidate the questions this research has developed. In the next section, the principles of this approach will be analysed within the central concerns of the project.

1.2.2 Historical Institutionalism: Rules, Norms, and Ideas

Against the supremacy of group theories of politics and structural functionalism that dominated the discipline, historical institutionalism advanced on an older school`s infrastructure, in which a high level of significance was given to political institutions. Beyond the position of their predecessors, historical institutionalists developed a more comprehensive approach to "which institutions matter and how they matter" questions (Hall and Taylor: 1996, 938). These examinations are of vital importance for this study. They present the fundamental framework in which the research questions are analysed.

For historical institutionalism, the institutional organisation of the state is the primary factor that builds collective behaviour. As the main constituent of collective behaviour, the institutional organisation generates distinctive consequences. This overt reference to the "institution" led many researchers to take a strong interest in the state. Since the advent of historical institutionalism, the state has been studied as something more than a "neutral broker" among challenging interests, so that a holistic entity consists of institutions that can shape the nature and consequences of group conflict (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.938). In the Turkish case, the military has been identified with the state. The military, the most powerful institution, has determined the rules of political game until very recently. Through formal and informal mechanisms, it has designated the rules and norms which have shaped the path in which social, political, economic, and cultural relations have evolved.

What does "institution" mean? Peter Hall`s extensively accepted description embraces formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that build the relationship among participants in different units of the political territory and economy. John Ikenberry builds his explanation on three columns, which "range from specific characteristics of government institutions, to the more overarching structures of the state to the nation's normative social order". In this context, historical institutionalists show concern for all kind of state and societal establishments that structure how political figures define their advantages and that build their power affiliations to other groups. Distinctly covered in the definition are such characteristics of the institutional framework as the "rules of electoral competition, the structure of party systems, the relations among various branches of government, and the structure and organisation of economic actors like trade unions" (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, pp. 2-3).

Succinctly, rules are the most common explanatory concept for this approach. While some researchers in the tradition concentrate on formal rules and organisations (Streeck and Thelen, 2005), others include informal rules and norms (Marcussen, 2000; Hall, 1989). Whether the historical institutionalist means formal institutions or informal rules and norms, both are of great significance for politics as they form who takes part in a given adjudication and their strategic behaviour (Steinmo, 2008, PP.156-158). In this study, both formal institutions and informal rules and norms are going to be analysed in the scope of the research questions.

An implicit but vital principle of this approach is that though the institution limits and shapes political behaviour; it is not the unique element that produces political outcomes. For instance, the approach accepts the importance of broad political factors that evoke diverse theories in political science, such as group dynamics in pluralism and class struggle in Marxism. Instead of denying the significance of broad political forces, the historical institutional approach posits that institutions shape these conflicts and in so doing, analyses their impact (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, pp.2-3).

Sven Steinmo (2008, pp.160-161), one of the founders of Historical Institutionalism, declares three vital points of the approach as follows:

> "These students' questions *were not* motivated by the desire to press an argument or push a methodology. Second, they were motivated by the desire to answer real-world empirical questions. Finally, they found *through empirical investigation* that institutional structures had profound effects on shaping political strategies, outcomes and, ultimately, political preferences."

Being the most influential political entity of the Turkish Republic in politics (Harris, 1988, p.178), the military has been the dominant force in the creation of civil-military relations. The constitutional framework and formal-informal rules, along with a historical legacy have shaped the nature of the interaction between political leaders and soldiers. It is the construction of increased military power in politics after the 27 May 1960 coup d'état that has determined the ways and rules in which the military holds an autonomous institutional existence which has established a tutelary regime over the Turkish political life until the early 2000s.

The role of ideas in defining institutions is another crucial explanatory element for both the historical institutional analyses and this research. Many scholars who utilise this approach

stress the importance of ideas within the framework of institutional identity. Christensen (1997) demonstrates how the U.S. Forest Service or the Canadian Mounted Police hold powerful instruments to conserve their extant courses of conduct, even in the face of decisive reform efforts. These bureaucratic bodies employ specific institutional ideas and self-assessments within their organisational culture that structure the actions of their members. Through institutional training systems, each member of these agencies is indoctrinated by these ideas and self-assessments. For instance, in most cases, "Duty, Honour, and Country" is a commonly used motto for armies. Vis-à-vis this slogan, they firmly associate their co-existence with the state as a vital function. Indoctrination of each member with an institutional pride is the principal goal of those organisations (Peters, 2011, p.74). The Turkish case set an outstanding example of this indoctrination and cognitive-cultural framework. Nationalist, statist, self-praising, and status-quoits ideas have played a crucial role in the evolution of the anti-democratic nature of Turkish civil-military relations. Members of the Turkish military have been trained to embrace an institutional identity that was based on a "superior" republican idea. During officers' training, a cadet's institutional awareness was springing from his sense of superiority over civilians, a sense that was indoctrinated through education in the military schools which were closed by the Erdogan regime in 2016. According to the military school textbooks written by top-ranking generals; an officer has had a finer sense of patriotism and more of the Ataturkist way of thinking than civilians; he/she was nationalist but not chauvinist, and they were the soldiers who could die for their state. The code of honour for an officer was to serve the state, the republic and the military with honesty, braveness, and dignity: "The Turkish military is the guardian of the state, it constitutes the steely expression of Turkish unity, strength, ability, and of Turkish patriotism" was a commonly employed motto in military schools, a motto intended to structure the political behaviour of army members (Birand, 1991, pp.74-89). The result is the adoption of a set of ideas that provide a cognitive dimension of institutional influence.

In the following pages, the principle concepts of stability and change in historical institutionalism are going to be discussed in parallel with the research theme.

1.3 The Theoretical Framework and Conceptual Approaches

1.3.1 Path-Dependency and Stickiness of Chosen Policies

Endurance of a chosen policy in a given time throughout the life of an institution constitutes one of the central tenets of historical institutionalism. Path-dependency is a powerful concept of the new institutionalism, which inspires students to discuss the significance of policy choices at the beginning of institution building. Policy preferences when an institution is being established, or when a rule/principle is endorsed, will have an enduring and absolute impact on which policies will be chosen in the future. The founding philosophy that imbues a public institution or a government program that is launched upon a specific path has its own inertia. Changing the chosen way is not impossible; however, only a powerful political compulsion or leadership can manage this alteration (Peters, 2011, pp.69-74).

Initially, modernisation movements under the Ottomans were centred on the Westernisation of the military in the late 18th century. As an "elitist" style, in these movements lie the origins of the modern Turkish Republic. The focal concern of Sultan Selim`s "new order" was to generate a modern army. Throughout the following decades a new and Western-modelled military was planned at the centre of reforms that would be the forerunner of the Ottomans` reawakening in world-politics. Not just on the external sphere, the military was also located at the forefront of the internal scene throughout the political transformation during the last decades of the Ottomans. After a long period of political conflict during the 19th.century, the constitutional system had barely started when it fell under the shadow of a military coup d'état in 1908. Within a decade Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues had founded the republican nation-state on the basis of the Ottoman inheritance. The founders of the new state, who followed a top-down Westernisation project, determined the army as the "guardians" of the republican revolution (Rustow, 1959, p.514; Tachau and Heper, 1983 pp.19-20).

What fundamentally empowered the path-dependency of the army in politics were the coup d'états of 1960, 1971 and 1980. The Military Internal Service Code, endorsed in 1961 just after the 1960 coup-d'état, described the main functions of the army as follows:

> "The duty of the Armed Forces is to watch over and protect the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic that is designated by the Constitution (Article 35)."

The clear emphasis on protection and watching over the motherland legalised the "guardianship" role of the institution. Although the code does not imply an explicit regulation

on staging military coup as a "right and duty" for the soldier, the Junta members of various periods had tried to legitimise their actions using this article. For instance, Kenan Evren, the leader of 1980 military intervention, who was interrogated in January 2013 on his role in the coup, defended himself by referring to the 35th article of the internal service code. The same rhetoric was also used in another coup trial by Cevik Bir, the powerful member of the 28 February 1997 Junta, to legitimise his unlawful actions against the democratically elected government.

The military tutelage in Turkey has been established through institutions. Therefore, this study attaches great importance to those institutions and their institutionalisation processes. Beyond any doubt, it is the tutelary preferences of the coup leaders in the policy-making process aftermath of each military intervention that have strengthened the antidemocratic nature and problematic endurance of civil-military relations in Turkey. Along with existing structures, they have created new formal and informal institutions so as to perpetuate the military dominance over socio-political life. The National Security Council, which was set up by the 1961 Constitution in search of a military tutelage over democratically elected governments, is one of the most predominant and persistent policy choices that shape the balance of power in Turkey. According to Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution: The National Security Council was composed of the prime minister, the chief of the general staff, the deputy prime minister, the ministers of national defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs, finance, transportation and labour as well as the chief of staff and commanders of the army, navy, air forces and gendarmerie under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic. Depending on the agenda, ministers and experts from various institutions would attend the meetings of the Council upon the Prime Minister's invitation. As a constitutionally embodied public agency, the Council was joined onto the Council of Ministers in national policy-making processes. The functional territory of the Council designed by Article 2 of the Code shows how keen 1960 coup leaders were on shaping national policies over almost all public issues. The Council was responsible for (Law no. 129 dated 11 December 1962):

a-Outlining the principles of Turkish national security policy as well as its amendment and rectification,

b-Implementation of these principles, preparing national plans and programs for each national security issue, and determining intermediate and ultimate objectives for their realisation, as well as coordination of all works on these subjects,

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c-Determination of all duties and responsibilities of public organisations, private sector institutions and citizens on total defence and national mobilisation and taking necessary legal and administrative measures on this issue,

d- Determination of basic principles for National Mobilisation Plans (Civil Emergency Plans) which would be prepared by the ministries, and the harmonisation and evaluation of these plans. Basic views on national security issues were to be submitted to the Council of Ministers.

The 1971 coup d'état enhanced the position of the generals in the National Security Council. Through the constitutional revisions, the impact of the army in the Council was reinforced by additional soldier members. The 1982 Constitution promoted the constitutional significance of the Council from "consultative" to "binding-advisory" level (Yazici, 2011, p.10). In this regard, this research analyses the institutional and cognitive continuity among the officer-corps since the 1960 intervention that increased the military dominance and institutionalised the military tutelage in a full-fledged manner by the 1982 Constitution established under the 1980 Junta. Consequently, the Turkish political life is full of examples of how the National Security Council has created tutelary "institutional stickiness" on the path of public policies from top to bottom. These policy preferences have created their own "increasing returns" which have clinched the superiority of the officer over the civilian and have made the contrary unimaginable throughout the decades. Within such a framework until recently, the impossibility of civilian control over the military is clear.

1.3.2 Punctuated Equilibrium, Critical Junctures and Gradual Institutional Change

In order to analyse change within the historical institutionalist framework, one needs to recognize the path-dependant process. Path-dependency is tantamount to "increasing returns" in conceptual analysis. "Increasing returns" argue that antecedent positions along a certain path conduce to further progress in the same way. Also that it crucially constrains the possibility of altering the path, which was chosen as the initial direction, so that, the path first chosen by the institution produces similar steps all along the road. Pierson pays special attention to "increasing returns" as they nurture the philosophy of path-dependency. To him, they mostly possess the following elements:

"a- Unpredictability: Early random events may be reinforced over time.

b- Irreversibility: Once a particular path is selected, it may be difficult or impossible to return to an early point when additional alternatives were available.

c- Non-ergodicity: Accidents do not 'average out' over time.

d -Potential Inefficiency: Sub-optimal outcomes may become locked-in" (Mahoney, 2006, p.130).

The attributed "guardianship" role of the Turkish military by the founding philosophy of the Republic constituted a fateful path-dependency that reproduced the interventionist character of the institution. This character has produced "increasing returns" in politics through coup d'états, in which the army restated its duty as defending the state against "internal" and "external" enemies designated by the National Security Council which was a military-dominated institution established by the officer-corps.

Appointing the military as the protector of the state caused an autonomous (Sakallioglu, 1997, p.151) area for generals in politics, so it has re-produced the troubled relationship between civilians and soldiers. Simultaneously, it was another important reason for the non-existence of civilian oversight of the army in Turkey for decades.

Some leading Historical Institutionalists have discussed change through "punctuated equilibrium" and "critical junctures", two similar concepts. "Punctuated equilibrium" emphasises that throughout its institutional journey, an entity subsists in a condition of equilibrium, which operates in line with the preferences identified on its creation. Also, decisions taken before the "punctuation" phase have a decisive influence on this state of equilibrium. Nevertheless, this state does not remain the same *ad infinitum.* The "punctuated equilibrium" concept recognises the capability of change in intuitions. It argues that institutions change through the environment they exist within. Krasner explains the occurrence of punctuations in the equilibrium as 'rapid bursts of institutional change followed by long periods of stasis' (Krasner, 1984, p.242; Peters, 2011, pp.79-80). According to Krasner, after long terms of stability, institutions are "punctuated" by crises that lead to change. To him, changes in the external environment cause institutional crises. In fact, as will be analysed in chapter seven, the Turkish case in civil-military relations have experienced an unprecedented transformation as a result of changes in the internal and external environment after 1999. The atmosphere of the new process may cause fundamental transformations in the institution. The relative scale of the crisis determines the dimensions of the change.

Institutions reach stasis again after each crisis. Arguably, the punch line in Krasner`s explanations is his analytic approach to the causal logic behind the institutional response to the exogenous change. He stresses that: "After all, if institutions simply respond to changes in the balance of power in society around them, then they are epiphenomenal and we should be studying the forces that affect them" (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.13). This study also analyses the forces that created the transformation in the balance of power in Turkey, after the devastating socio-economic and political crises that occurred in the early 2000s.

Another historical institutionalist explanation of the logic of change is "critical junctures". Collier and Collier locate the idea of "critical juncture" into their seminal study, *"Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labour Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America"*. They describe the concept as "a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies." (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007, p.347).

Collier and Collier argue that due to the heavy "stickiness" of previous policies that caused strong inertia in public life, change was almost impossible in the region. It was the combination of different political forces that constituted the conjuncture in which political movements yielded to change in Latin America. The emergence of this conjuncture was solely possible thanks to a variety of political forces that meant individual initiatives would not have been able to generate such a transformation (Peters, 2011, p.79-80). Similarly, as this research clearly put forward, the military tutelage dominated the Turkish politics until the early 2000s could only be dismantled by the full support of the external factors- mainly the EU- to the internal factors.

James Mahoney (2001, p.113), one of the most influential scholars in the historical institutionalism, approaches critical junctures via two components. In his seminal study, *"Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective"*, Mahoney initially emphasises the significance of "choice points" among various possibilities when a specific preference is utilised. It is the preference between alternatives that marks the critical juncture. By the selection of an option, it becomes gradually more difficult to return to the first stage in which alternative choices were available. A critical juncture dramatically minimises the large scale of possible consequences of the alternative options before it emerges. Thus, critical junctures can only be embodied by choice points that close off significant future outputs that might in their turns be assessed as critical

junctures. Both sources of alternative points during critical junctures and origins of the options preferred by political actors are products of anterior cases and processes. After defeating the secular establishment in the Presidential Elections of 2007 thanks to the vast popular support and the EU reform process, Erdogan preferred building his civilian authoritarianism instead of the military tutelage though he had come to power by promising democratisation of Turkish political and social life. His preferences and personal agenda which were achieved by a Machiavellian approach closed off the path of prospective democratisation in civil-military relations in the mid-term.

Generally, for path-dependent analyses, contingencies are of crucial importance as they are moments in which unforeseen incidents may have a significant influence on the characterisation of critical junctures. So, in order to analyse critical junctures, students of the path-dependency ought to "focus on small events, human agency, or historical peculiarities that lie outside of available theoretical frameworks" (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007, p.347; Mahoney, 2001, p.113). However, no specific political circle`s concession can determine the institutional outcomes. Results of the change may be outputs of a clash between different groups or of an accord that may satisfy some goals of opposite actors. In this context, institutional change does not include any arrangement that is "automatic, self-perpetuating, or self-reinforcing". So, the process presents a dynamic content in which various "contested settlements" are open to shifts that may trigger new changes or stability. It is clear that actors who have an interest in existing arrangements may struggle for continuity of the *status quo*. However, conclusive public support is of great importance for achieving any political ambition (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, pp.8-9).

Turkish civil-military relations which had been constructed under the "guardianship" role of the army has experienced four major "punctuations" through the coup d'états of 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, respectively. The institutionalisation of the military tutelage on public life which was initiated by the 27 May 1960 coup came to a climax when the constitution was enforced in 1982. Junta leaders preferred to maintain their "political legitimacy" through the new constitutions (1961, 1982) in which they established new agencies or new immunities in favour of the guardian of the Republic. Due to the "punctuated equilibrium" which gave powerful political-legal instruments to the military, it can be argued that Turkish generals engaged with politics much more than their professional duties.

A relative emergence of the possibility of change may be traced through political leadership and the European Union membership process. After the 1980 coup, the first democratic election took place in 1983. This was a critical juncture that triggered political leadership with grassroots public support against the military interventionism in politics. Before the election, General Evren, who was the leader of the 1980 intervention, explicitly declared the support of the armed forces for the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) which was established by former generals. However, Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party won 45% of the vote and 212 of the 400 seats in the Parliament against the NDP. Thus, this election conduced to the critical juncture in which Ozal's popular leadership sparked off a new era that could have transformed Turkey politically, economically, and technologically (Laciner, 2009). During that process, civilian oversight of the military was dealt with for the first time since entering the multi-party system in 1946. The policy options preferred by Ozal aimed at restructuring civil-military relations with a democratic framework. However, the dominant institutions which had been established by the generals thwarted Ozal's long-range plans.

The second example of political leadership that is an outcome of a new critical juncture, leading to fundamental changes in civil-military relations came with the devastating natural disasters and economic crisis which erupted in 1999 and 2001, respectively. While the devastating earthquake of 1999 disclosed the corrupt and incompetent nature of the state; as the deepest depression in Turkish history, the economic crisis forced the coalition government to call an early election. While three members of the government experienced the worst results of their histories, the newly established Justice and Development Party (JDP) of Recep Tayyip Erdogan won the election by 34% of votes. The economic and democratic programmes implemented by Erdogan got grassroots support with an increasing vote rate of 46.58% in the 2007 elections and 49.83% in 2011 (YSK, 2001). Along with the substantial public support, the European Union (EU) membership process was one of the most influential exogenous factors that enabled the proper political environment for Erdogan governments in order to realise their programmes against the hard-line militarist objection of generals and their elite allies between 2002 and 2010.

This research employs Mahoney and Thelen's (2010) *Gradual Institutional Change* approach along with concepts developed for explaining change by the Historical Institutionalists to analyse the transformation in Turkish civil-military relations. Therefore, it will be productive to complement theories of exogenous institutional change with approaches analysing endogenous institutional evolution as explored in Mahoney and Thelen's (2009) *"A Theory of*

Gradual Institutional Change". Their approach presents four model types of institutional change of which 'layering' (the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones) and 'displacement' (the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones) seem especially revealing. "Processes of layering often take place when institutional challengers lack the capacity to actually change the original rules (or, as in displacement, to set up an explicit alternative institution or system). They instead work within the existing system by adding new rules on top of or alongside old ones. While defenders of the status quo may be able to preserve the original rules, they are unable to prevent the introduction of amendments and modifications. Each new element may be a small change in itself, yet these small changes can accumulate, leading to a big change over the long run." (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, pp.15-17).

As will be analysed in chapter seven, Erdogan's JDP pursued a "layering" process between 2002 and 2007. Against the powerful veto mechanisms of the military and the secular establishment, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) utilised the democratic requirements of the EU membership process that promoted domestic and international support for reformation in civil-military relations. In order to challenge Turkey's militarist status quo, Erdogan promised to leave his staunch Islamist past and introduce inclusionary policies which would have eventually brought a pluralist democracy in Turkey. It is possible to argue that the JDP's ever-increasing power since 2002 and the EU's external support to the party have created a new path-dependent process in terms civil-military of relations in favour of the civilians.

Thanks to the "layering" process, Erdogan's JDP has gained appropriate power by winning the Presidential Elections of 2007 against the e-ultimatum of the generals which provided the Islamist civilians to declare an open challenge against the powerful military. In this second phase, Erdogan followed a radical agenda that would dissolve the military tutelage in Turkey in the following years. Following Mahoney and Thelen, the second phase of transformation can be described as a "displacement" process (2010, pp.15-17).

"*A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change*" also helps to explain how the military resisted institutional change before 2002 and between 2002 and 2007; and how change has been affected, with the grudging acquiescence of the military, after 2007. In both cases, the strong veto power of the military, embodied in the potential to unleash lethal physical interventions, has been a significant constraint. Only since 2002 has electoral and European influences

allowed for gradual institutional adaptation leading to a transformation of the Turkish civil-military relations which would end up in civilian authoritarianism instead of the military tutelage.

When Turkey's authoritarian past, leader-oriented politics and Erdogan's Islamist past and aggressive, authoritarian policies especially in the last few years are considered, the prospective characteristic of the Turkish civil-military relations after that transformation is of crucial importance. In this regard, this research investigates whether the transformation in civil-military relations can create a democratic civilian-officer balance in Turkey.

1.4 Objectives of the Project

The theoretical approach outlined above, combined with the empirical research outlined below, allows this research to deliver a series of objectives. These objectives provide the raw material and the insights to permit a re-definition of the nature of the civil-military relations, which is emerging in Turkey. It also allows an analysis of the impediments to the creation of a fully-functioning and emancipating democratic system in Turkey which has been a goal of democratic reforms since the creation of the multi-party system in 1946. Hence, the analytical objectives are as follow:

To analyse Turkish civil-military relations critically and theoretically,

To identify "path-dependencies" and "critical junctures" in Turkish civil-military relations.

To clarify the institutional predisposition of the military to be an autonomous power in Turkey.

To examine the roles of formal and informal institutions in civil-military relations.

To discuss the historical, societal, and cultural dynamics which have created the military tutelage in Turkey.

To examine the new political environment critically and analytically, which has made the transformation in Turkey's balance of power possible.

To examine the impact of external (the EU) and internal (popular support, internal crises, political leadership) variables on the power struggle in Turkey.

To critically analyse the ever-rising power of Erdogan that has transformed the punctuated equilibrium of the civil-military relations.

To debate the possible effects of the JDP and the EU alliance on the future of the Turkish civil-military relations.

To analyse the new balance of power in Turkey after the military tutelage has been dissolved.

To develop an analytical and critical framework on the Turkish civil-military relations for future researchers.

To debate whether Turkey can have democratic civil-military relations in the short and mid-term.

1.5 Methodology

This project is a critical-explanatory thesis which examines Turkey's civil-military relations. It employs a qualitative research approach including primary documentation, interviews with key civilian actors, and analysis of military memoirs, speeches, and articles. These empirical sources provide material to implement the conceptual approaches defined above and enable the researcher to characterise the formal and informal rules, the norms, and the cognitive perspectives which define the institutional complex which is the Turkish military. Although the researcher mainly covers the period since 1946, the weight of the empirical research is more recent, concentrating on the period since 1980. Later chapter and the Conclusion will apply the insights to more recent developments and apply the findings to outline the likely evolution of civil-military relations in Turkey.

By applying a qualitative research approach, the project analyses primary and secondary sources from both state archives and personal collections. Personal (semi-structured) interviews with former ministers, member of the Turkish Parliament and senior bureaucrats form a significant part of the project.

The theoretical approach which will help to find answers to the research questions is that of historical institutionalism. Through this school of institutional theory, the students of historical institutionalism have developed the concept of "path dependence". This concept is intrinsic to every part of this research. Path-dependence is identified again and again throughout the thesis. Thanks to the other teachings of the historical institutionalism and particularly of the concept of "path-dependence"; the research analyses three forces- that are cognitive framework, institutional framework, and normative framework- which have made the evolution, stickiness, and transformation of Turkish civil-military relations possible.

While applying the concepts of "punctuated equilibrium" and "punctuations" to understand the path-dependant continuity in the Turkish case, the research also utilises the concept of "critical junctures" in which internal or external determinants or crises pave the way for a change of path.

To reveal the dynamics behind the change or path in the Turkish civil-military relations, this research also applies the theoretical framework which is developed for understanding gradual and incremental change by Mahoney and Thelen, two prominent historical institutionalists. This method of studying the Turkish case, which is to be analysed in chapter seven, will be a first in the literature.

 As mentioned above, this research draws on extensive secondary sources, including the rich literature on Turkish history, politics, and civil-military relations. Much of these sources are in Turkish and translated by the researcher into English. An extensive empirical research conducted for the thesis is presented in chapters five and six. This empirical study provides the thesis with a large amount of data to analyse the research questions. The elite civilian interviews are based on a deliberate qualitative methodology which is critically examined in chapter five along with details of ethical safeguards. This fieldwork reveals the considered views and judgments of some twenty senior and experienced officials in Turkey's contentious civil-military relations. Thanks to the productive interviews with the Turkish civilians, the researcher will have the opportunity to analyse historical and current debates, understandings, and interpretations as they illuminate the research theme.

The interviews provide empirical data to debate how the civilians interpret the past, present and future of the balance of power in Turkey. It is possible to claim that these interviews with civilians are the first of its kind in the Turkish civil-military relations studies. The fieldwork will contribute the civilian perspectives on the civil-military question in the literature and also provide pointers for future reforms, as explored in the Conclusion.

Because of the fact that conducting interviews with serving military personnel is illegal in Turkey, the researcher focused on finding an alternative methodology to reveal the views of the "man on horseback" over the research theme. This alternative methodology, which is designed and presented in chapter six; employs the memoirs, the articles, the speeches, and the press coverage of senior military personnel. These sources provide an exceptional insight into the values, mindset, and the motivation of the Turkish officers who have deeply influenced their periods. This alternative methodology supplies data to reveal the cognitive, normative, and institutional frameworks which have underpinned the long-standing military tutelage in Turkey until the early years of the 2000s.

The 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, acts of the Turkish Parliament which have been endorsed between 1960 and 2011 regarding civil-military relations and the EU candidacy process, the EU's Turkey reports, military codes, policy statements, census reports, statistical bulletins, reports of commissions of inquiry, ministerial and departmental annual reports, consultancy reports, textbooks of military schools represent an important part of the documentary research.

In order to gather Turkish written sources and examine archives, the researcher spent more than two months at the Turkish National Library and the Library of Ankara University. In the field research, special attention was paid to the memoirs of junta members of the 1960s-70s and 1980s, and the writings of some influential commanders of the 1990s and early 2000s. The main reason of this approach is that these resources are a kind of "mirror" which reflects the perspective of the officers on Turkish civil-military relations. Examining the literature revealed that most of the researchers valued those sources very inadequately. Because interviewing the officers is prohibited, the memoirs have become much more important for this research.

The second qualitative research method in this project is personal interviews with civilians, all of whom have/had professional experience and or expertise in civil-military relations. A table showing the codes and positions of the interviewees as of the interview dates is presented in chapter five. As mentioned above, this research is going to be the first study in the literature which is going to reveal critical civilian interpretations on the Turkish civil-military relations. This empirical study took place between 21 December 2013 and 25 January 2014 under the approval of the University of Exeter's Ethics Committee (see Appendix A).

All precaution and care were taken to ensure the interviewees participated willingly and felt comfortable about sharing their experience. In terms of venue, the interviews were conducted in Ankara in safe surroundings acceptable to the interviewees and even in locations designated by them. At every stage, informants were told that they have the right to withdraw from the interview and also withdraw their information from the study if they feel unsafe.

As will be explained in chapter five in details, the researcher is responsible for the protection of all hard and soft copies of interview materials in their original form. Some high-level private storage instruments are going to be formed and warranted by the PhD candidate in order to use the interview materials securely. Besides, any personal information about the interviewees is going to be stored by using pass-worded software, and all technological precautions are going to be taken so as to prevent any accidental disclosure of information (see chapter five).

1.6 Conclusion

Examining Turkish civil-military relations literature (see chapter two) reveals that most researchers have focused on military interventions and their impact on the political situation. In contrast, as explained in the introduction of this chapter the significance of this project springs from many aspects (see p.3).

Turkey has been a country in which criticizing the military, powerful institutions and leaders are almost impossible without taking the risk of being severely punished. Though the long-standing wrath of the military tutelage against the critical studies has been in a diminishing mood since it has been losing its power since 2002; the anti-regime academics of the country have been subjected to sanctions of the civilian government in recent times. When the anti-democratic practices and authoritarian tendencies of the current political and military leaders are taken into account, it is possible to say the government and the military are going to impose more severe sanctions against critical voices. This research is going to be developed under the afore-mentioned possible threats from both military and civilian leaders of Turkey. In this respect, the study aims at making some humble contributions to the idea of academic freedom in Turkey.

Writing the following sentences has only been possible three years after the comments above because of the Islamist regime's cruelty against the dissidents in Turkey, which has imprisoned the author almost two years and forced him and his family to live in exile. The experience of the researcher underlines the risks involved in the critical comment.

Turkey has become a more and more authoritarian state, especially after the failed coup attempt in July 2016. The Erdogan government has been dictatorially using the foiled coup as an instrument to eradicate the opposition and establish a one-man regime in the country. This study should have been completed in 2016. However, the oppressive regime has made it impossible. Like hundreds of thousands of other political opponents, the author has been debarred from using his all rights and freedom. He has been incarcerated without due process of law for almost two years. He has illegally been deprived of his research sources during his incarceration. They are Professor Stephen Wilks' great wisdom, patience and guidance, and the endless support of the University of Exeter which have made completing this research possible (see observations in the acknowledgements).

As outlined in this opening chapter, this research provides a critical analysis of Turkish civil-military relations in the multi-party life with special attention to the era between 1980 and 2011 in light of theories of Historical Institutionalism. The analysis proceeds as follows:

Chapter two reviews theories of civil-military relations, the research questions, and the literature on Turkish civil-military relations. It debates the most suitable theoretical approach which might provide a consistent framework in order to analyse the research questions critically. It reveals the weaknesses and strengths of the literature and evaluates possible contributions of the research to the literature.

Chapter three critically debates impacts of the historical legacies and the foundational philosophy of the Republic on the research theme in light of the teachings developed by the Historical Institutionalism.

Chapter four presents institutional dynamics which have perpetuated the military dominance over politics. It embraces a holistic approach which highlights normative, regulative, and cultural-cognitive aspects of the path-dependant nature of the question.

Chapter five produces new scientific knowledge for Turkish civil-military relations studies through one-on-one interviews with Turkish civilians who are involved in constant interaction with the officer-corps and military establishments. The interviews are of great value for the literature as they will be the first critical interpretations of the research theme.

Chapter six presents how the coups d'état have shaped socio-political life and institutionalised the military tutelage over politics, and the continuity of the military policies in Turkey. The chapter also critically analyses the civilian incompetency in the face of socio-political and economic problems, which have deepened the question.

Chapter seven focuses on the transformation of the Turkish civil-military relations. It presents the internal and external triggers of the transformation. The chapter applies the "Power Distributional Approach" and "Gradual Institutional Change Theory" of the Historical Institutionalism while debating the transformation process. The chapter reveals the new political environment that has made the change in the balance of power possible and analyses the deinstitutionalisation process of the military tutelage. It reveals whether this transformation can bring a democratic balance of power in Turkey.

By applying a historical institutionalist perspective, this thesis asserts how the regulative, normative, and cognitive-cultural determinants have shaped civil-military relations and the balance of power in Turkey. It critically analyses how the transformation in these determinants has caused civilian authoritarianism supplanting the long-standing military tutelage in the country.

CHAPTER2: LITERATURE REVIEW, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THEORETICAL DEBATES ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

2.1 Introduction

In democracies, institutions and the formation of legal hierarchies are designed to institutionalise the supremacy of civilians who govern on behalf of the citizens. In his pioneer work(1998) Dahl asserts that delegates of the people have the right to make decisions on any sphere of life in the context of public service, even if they do not have the required technical knowledge on the related task. Although the specialist may focus upon and understand the problem better, the specialist is not on a level to ascertain the view the public will attach to potential outcomes. Within the fundamental meaning of democracy, the supremacy of civilians over military officers, as well as each government agent, is a *causa sine qua non* (Feaver, 2005). On the other hand, in *Soldiers in Politics-Military Coups and Governments*, Nordlinger explains the tragic number of military revolts against democratic governments in different parts of the world, exclusively in non-Western countries. More than sixty per cent of governments in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East have been toppled by their armies since 1945 (Nordlinger, 1977).

Civilian control of the armed forces, which is one of the crucial necessities in a liberal democracy, has been one of the most significant deficiencies of the developing countries. Turkey's young and weak democracy has been interrupted four times by the military since the country entered into a multi-party system in the late 1940s. These military interventions have taken place in different forms which have eventually toppled the democratically elected ruling parties. Each military intervention has more and more cemented the military's power which has made the generals unquestionable, unelected authorities who have shaped socio-political outcomes.

In this chapter, the theoretical debates on the civil-military relations discipline and the Turkish civil-military relations literature will be analysed in order to develop a critical and theoretical approach to discuss and answer the research theme and questions. The issues of this chapter are going to be analysed thematically and chronologically.

2.2 Different Approaches to Theorising Civil-Military Relations and the Turkish Case

2.2.1 The *Problematique* or the Nucleus of the Civil-Military Relations Question

The tension between civilian and military authorities emerges from the paradoxical existence of an institution established to defend the state and society, but which is then given the power to mutate into a danger to the public. To a very large extent, this situation springs from the concept of civilisation. Humans need other people and establishments to survive and realise their aims and ambitions within a secure environment. As a result of this inevitable dependence, major endeavours were made to form diversified institutions in a wide range of areas in order to ensure a civilised order for members of the society since the very earliest appearance of human life. Further to this, the use of weapons and violence to protect the state and society have been delegated from the state to expert public servants and public bodies. These entities and establishments are responsible for the legal use of violence on behalf of the society, which means that the former are servants of the latter. "The civil-military *problematique* is so vexing because it involves balancing two vital and potentially conflicting societal desiderata" (Feaver, 1999).

On the one hand, a military is formed to defend the state and society from various enemies; intrinsically, it needs to be equipped with a sufficient and efficient level of power against any threat. Moreover, it must be ready "...to use its coercive power at any time..." On the other hand, the military which has legally been allowed to use violence and coercive power to secure its state, must not level its gun to the polity and society in which it serves (Feaver, 1999). Military interventions in politics have been extensively debated in civil-military relations studies. Since the idea of democracy has gained powerful grounds across the world, issues relating to the level of obedience of the armies to their civilian masters have become significant indicators of democratic maturity of a country. Today, a military's direct seizure of power in any state is unacceptable in terms of universal principles of the idea of democracy.

2.2.2 Huntington and Civil-Military Relations Studies

Today, each country of the world has its army, and armies are marked by the superior quality of organisation in the state where they serve (Finer, 1971). Although the "art of war" is an old heritage of history, the military profession is a product of modern society. As Huntington states, there was no such occupation as a professional soldier before the nineteenth century.

By the early twentieth century, professional soldiers appeared in almost all big states (Huntington, 1985).

It is largely accepted by the scholars of civil-military relations studies that the "military profession" concept of Samuel Huntington is the trigger point of the debates on the civil-military question that have intensified since the middle of the last century. To a large extent, the appearance of nationalism and nation state has given rise to the concept of a "nation in arms" leading to a national army, which necessitates military service of each citizen for a specified period of years. As the homeland of professionalism in the "art of war", Prussia was the first state to professionalise its soldiers and decree conscription as a national duty for its citizens. Huntington addresses the concept of "professionalism in the military and the modern military officer" as the fundamental thesis of his studies on civil-military relations and his landmark book *The Soldier and the State* (Feaver, 1999; Huntington, 1957; Huntington, 1985).

Professionalism in the armed forces, says Huntington, has three core features; these are expertise, responsibility and corporateness. Objective civilian control of the army is one of the key elements of his normative theory. His approach argues that representatives of the people ought to determine any kind of policies concerned with the realm of security. However, it ought to be the right of the soldiers to decide and implement the kind of services aimed at realising the goals of the security agenda. In other words, Huntington suggests a balance of sharing public power among civilians and officer corps. In such a system, by "recognition of an autonomous military professionalism", the army has to obey any commands of civilians but civilian authority, in the meantime, ought to ensure autonomy in martial issues; such as the operationalisation of a specified policy or the way of educating the cadets (Ari, p.11, 2007; Huntington, 1985). He analyses objective civilian control under the principles of Liberalism, Fascism, Marxism and Conservatism, respectively. As a highly debated consequence, Huntington suggests different patterns of civil-military relations, on the trio-basis of power, professionalism, and ideology (Huntington, 1985).

Professor Feaver, a prominent scholar in the civil-military relations studies, points to the first modern intellectual history in the field as being some works on antimilitarism written during the early decades of the last century, especially those by Vagts (1937) and Laswell (1941). During the early Cold War period, in a second important wave of literature, American scholars (Kerwin, 1948; Smith, 1951; Lasswell, 1950; Ekirch, 1956; Mills, 1956; Mills et al.

1958) attempted to conciliate the need of a persuasive military with citizens' fear against the menaces targeted by standing armies at democracies. Professor Feaver values Huntington, beyond debate, as the founder of modern civil-military relations and expresses that, studies that have been done later *The Soldier and the State* in the civil-military relations are expressed or non-expressed answers to Huntington`s approach. "After Huntington, the field split along two distinct tracks. The first and arguably more fruitful was a sociologically oriented examination of the military, first in the United States and then extending to other countries. The landmark study, Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (1960), spawned literally hundreds of follow-on studies exploring the relationship between society and the armed forces such as Moskos, 1970, 1971; Larson, 1974; Segal et al. 1974; Sarkesian, 1975; Segal, 1975; Bachman, et al 1977; Janowitz, 1977; Moskos, 1977; Segal, 1986; Moskos & Wood 1988; Edmonds 1988; Burk 1993; Sarkesian et al. 1995. The second track was an institutionally oriented examination of postcolonial civil-military relations in developing countries, a project dominated by political scientists (Finer 1962; Huntington 1968; Stepan 1971, 1988; Perlmutter 1977; Welch 1976; Nordlinger 1977) and largely focused on the problem of coups. This track has spawned numerous speciality literatures considering civil-military relations in specific contexts in communist regimes (Kolkowicz 1966, Herspring & Volgyes 1978, Colton 1979, Rice 1984, Colton & Gustafson 1990, Zisk 1993, Herspring 1996), in ethnically divided polities (Horowitz 1980, 1985), in authoritarian and post-authoritarian regimes (Rouquie 1982, Frazer 1994, Aguero 1995), and so on." (Feaver, 2009; Feaver, 2005, Feaver, 1999).

Recent studies published by scholars such as Lenze Jr (2018), Pion-Berlin and Martinez (2017), and (eds) Brueneau and Matei(2015) provide up-to-date comparative analyses highlighting different aspects of the discipline. By drawing on several of these earlier studies, this research presents an institutionally oriented examination of the Turkish civil-military relations.

Although Huntington has had an undeniably huge impact on the civil-military relations studies, it ought to be emphasised that his approach fits mainly to the Western, industrialised and democratically institutionalised states. As the following chapters are going to reveal, the Turkish case has falsified his ground-breaking theory of professionalism in civil-military relations. This study put forth that institutionalisation of professionalism and the institutional autonomy which has been granted to the military by the founding philosophy of the Republic have served to justify an interventionist approach among the officers. As Professor Cizre-Sakallioglu clearly stated the autonomous power of the military in the state structure has been

the biggest problem of Turkish democracy (Cizre: 1997). The idea of professionalism in military in *Huntingtonian* meaning has been utilised in the Turkish case to legitimise the dominance of the officers in politics.

2.2.3 Professional Military, Civilian Supremacy, or the theory of Concordance?

While this study falsifies Huntington's theory of professionalism for a democratic civil-military balance in terms of the Turkish case; it embraces the "civilian supremacy" approach that is constituted on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. For this reason, *The Man on the Horseback-The Role of the Military in Politics,* the legendary work of S. E. Finer has been a source of inspiration in analysing the Turkish civil-military question. Finer's book has been one of the founding resources of the discipline. A social scientist contemporary with Huntington, Finer starts to construct his theory by a fierce critique on the *"professionalist"* approach of his colleague. In contrast, he assesses "professionalism" as the origin of the very meaning of "military intervention". According to Finer, in its high level of self-centred value, "professionalism" triggers a debate in an officer's mind on the distinction between the nation and the government in power; subsequently, the soldier begins to invent his own special concept of "national interest", and finally, he sees himself at the service of the nation but not the government's (Finer,1962, pp.25-26). As chapter four and chapter six are going to reveal, the Turkish officer has suffered from such a political "disease" since the very beginning of the multi-party era, which has caused the destruction of the already weak democratic order several times. In parallel with the approach developed by Finer, the view of professionalism has created a common motivation in the military which can be described as seeing itself as the real and true owner of the state. For the officer-corps, a natural result of such cognition has been intervening in politics whenever the institutional interpretations of the military find it necessary.

Secondly, another harmful product of "professionalism" for democracy is a kind of vocational bigotry which may be termed as a "military syndicalism". Because they are experts in their service, army leaders may assume themselves to be uniquely able to determine the quantity and quality of such issues like education, budget, technology, workforce, training, and logistics. But all these matters need to be discussed and assessed within a democratic framework, because of the importance of their impact on civil military-relations which may occur in the long run. On the other hand, as a result of giving them an autonomous field,

professional soldiers may argue that they can guarantee victory on the grounds of some internal and external conjunctures. To illustrate these points, Finer cites the approaches of German and Japanese armies at the beginning of World War Two, and of the French military during the Dreyfus incident (Finer, 1962, pp.26-27).

As a third outcome of the mindset of "professionalism", Finer criticises Huntington's "compliant but autonomous military" in the context of task assignment. According to Finer, the professional army takes itself as the guardian of the state against external enemies, and so it may become hesitant amid an internal crisis or mutiny. It also sees itself as a fighting force but not as a police organisation. Nevertheless "the professional army vents its discomfort at having to act against its nationals by blaming the "politicians" and by thinking itself as being "used" by these for their sordid purposes. Thus, three tendencies all push the military towards a collision with the civilian authorities; and each one grows out of professionalism". In order to justify this kind of intervention of armies into politics, Finer gives examples from British, German and Turkish histories (Finer, p 27, 1962). In order to establish a democratic civil-military relations framework, Finer proposes the principle of "supremacy of civilian authority" instead of the "professional soldier" concept. Through that conceptualisation, he refers to a nation's elected government as the only authorized power that prepares and enacts all public policies, which includes any kind of major civilian or military affairs both officially and effectively. As Finer points out, "the civilian supremacy" approach is vital for developing a democratic ground in civil-military relations, especially in developing countries. Lack of such institutionalisation in the developing countries has been the primary cause of the democracy deficit in civil-military relations. The essential element to realise such a ground is establishing inclusive, formal, and informal institutions which accept the civilian supremacy. On the other hand, it intrinsically requires not only the officers' adherence to the principles of democracy, accountability and the rule of law but necessitates a democratically institutionalisation of these values also binding for the civilians. Otherwise, as the Turkish case has proved recently, it is always possible to end up in civilian authoritarianism that would take the place of self-ordained generals.

It is an undeniable fact that members of some militaries in different continents have been indoctrinated by a cliquish and self-oriented cognitive framework, which look down on politicians and civilians, and encourages the officers to think of themselves as the most patriotic, nationalist, intellectual, and so on, in the country. To them, politicians and civilians are ordinary and selfish people who mostly care about their interests; whose sordid elected

circles usually work against the common good and may also become compradors of external powers. Analysing Turkish officer's mindset and learning the civilian's perspective on the issue has been neglected by most researchers in the literature. This study endeavours to meet this deficit of the literature.

The descriptive and normative theoretical approaches inspired by Huntington, Finer and Janowitz to understand the nature of civil-military relations have enjoyed theoretical ascendency in the discipline until the end of the 1990s (Haltiner: 2000, p.35). These institutional interpretations which later were classified as a "separation model" have been widely employed to analyse the civil-military dichotomous power relationship in many states across the world. Particularly, the theoretical frameworks inspired by the *Huntingtonian approach* have dominated the literature in the studies of the Turkish case until the end of the 1990s (Ulucakar&Caglar, 2017, p.42). However, Rebecca Schiff's influential "*Concordance Theory*" in 1995 which has challenged the "separation model" has become a new source of inspiration for the academics to rethink the Turkish case[1].

Schiff builds her theory against the basic assumptions of the "separation model". Bringing the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and the various other possibilities for civil-military relations into the analysis, she challenges the theoretical explanations developed by Janowitz, Nordlinger, Feaver, Desch, and Cohen who were Huntington's followers. (Ulucakar&Caglar, 2017, p.43). Schiff criticises the Huntingtonian school for it is "western-bound, dichotomous, and institutional nature" (Schiff, 1995, p.22). The Concordance theory also challenges Finer's approach endorsing the separation of power between the military and civilian elites.

In pursuit of democratic ideals in civil-military relations, Schiff argues that "an effective civil control of the armed power is better guaranteed if a consensus between the civil and military elites as well as the citizenry is sought and developed as a form of political-military culture. If a basic concordance between the three mentioned actors exists concerning (1) the social composition of the officer corps, (2) the political decision-making process, (3) the recruiting method of the military, and (4) the military style, there is a maximum guarantee of political neutrality and subordination of the military." (Haltiner: 2000, p.36). Thus, the Concordance theory envisages a balance of power constructed by a consensus among the politicians,

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[1] For some notable articles written about the Turkish case in light of the "Concordance Theory", see: (Ulucakar&Caglar, 2017); (Cilliler, 2016); (Sarigil, 2015); (Narli, 2011); (Narli, 2000).

officers, and citizenry over each step of the military affairs. Schiff analyses two non-Western cases (Israel and India) to prove the merits of her theory (Schiff: 1995, p.16).

The most salient feature of Schiff's model is bringing the citizenry, a third agency, to the analysis. She attaches a special importance to the autonomous and causal role played by the society in the balance of power, which is ignored by the "separation model" (Ulucakar&Caglar, 2017, p.45). Concordance, shared values and goals among the military, political leaders, and society, Schiff argues, produce dialogue and accommodation in the civil-military sphere which minimise the probability of a military intervention in politics (Schiff, 1995, p.12).

The Concordance model has given a new impulse to the discipline and particularly non-Western cases have been studied in light of the paradigms developed by Schiff. Accordingly, as mentioned above, a growing interest in the theory has paved the way for new studies focusing on the Turkish case. It is true that Schiff's paradigms provide novel tools to analyse the civil-military question in pursuit of a democratic framework for non-Western polities which possess "active" and powerful citizenry and civil society. The theory envisages an equal partnership among military, political elites, and societal realm in the way of concordance and agreement. However, as this research clearly reveals; Turkish society has been a "passive" component of state-society relations for centuries. The Republican revolution in 1923 which aimed at constructing a Western-style state employed a "top-down" modernisation project and regarded the society as an inferior body which to be civilised by the state apparatus. The new "citizenry" of the new Republic, who had been subjects of the preceding Ottoman state, were subjected to a socio-cultural and economic programme during the formation years of the new state which was established by the officer corps upon the ashes of the Ottoman Empire (see chapter three). The teachings of the new state have been taught each generation in schools and military barracks in the following decades.

More importantly, as chapter four and six extensively debate, though it is not a monolithic entity, the fabric of the Turkish society and deeply rooted socio-cultural institutions in general, have produced societal legitimacy for military interventions and political dominance for the military. The socio-cultural codes such as "every Turk is a born soldier", "the military is the hearth of the prophet", "the Turkish nation is a military nation" and "being a martyr is the highest stage of patriotism" are the salient features of the Turkish national identity which is shared by a considerable majority of the society (see chapter four).

Last but not least, though it has passed through from a considerable transformation, Turkey has suffered from lack of political culture which could resist the anti-democratic imposition of the military and civilian regimes. For instance, the current constitution was established by the 1980 junta and approved by the society with a 91.37% majority in 1982. Similarly, after the demise of the military tutelage in 2007, a considerable majority of the Turkish society has approved the autocratic policies of the Erdogan regime (see chapter seven).

Though the coups have become less frequent across the world than the period in which Finer developed his approach in the early 1960s, the political power of the Turkish military has remained dominant throughout the following decades. During that process, the balance of power has been reconfigured between the officer corps and the civilians excluding a third agency which is proposed as "the societal realm" by the Concordance theory.

Despite the fact that the Huntigtonian analysis and the Concordance theory describe the balance of power as static after they are established in an envisaged path, Finer recognizes "that societies are not static, and his model results in the formation of continua for the development of the two dimensions of military intervention and political culture, with each reflecting four levels" (Stanley, 2002, pp. xvi- xvii). In parallel with this fact, Turkey remains in the category suffering from "low political culture" and lack of established democratic institutions. These deprivations, as Finer says, have continued causing anti-democratic balance of power in countries such as Erdogan's Turkey and Sisi's Egypt, the two polities in the Middle East afflicted with the coups, which have shared similar historical background and still suffering from the authoritarian way of governing.

The autocratic political culture and weak democratic institutions which have determined the characteristics of the Turkish state has maintained its influence over the operation of civil-military relations. Therefore, Finer's analytic approach which is based on the quality of the political cultures and democratic power of civilian institutions continue to be a guiding framework in order to analyse the Turkish case in the pursuit of a democratic balance in the country.

The e-ultimatum of the military in 2007, the witch-hunt against the Kemalist officers between 2007 and 2015, the failed coup attempt of 2016, and Erdogan's relentless oppression against the opponents prove that Turkey's imagined democracy can only survive if it manage to

develop a mature democratic culture and a civil-military relation based on the universal democratic principles.

Because of the reasons analysed above, this research follows Finer's "the civilian supremacy" approach designed in light of the universal democratic rules and principles in search of a democratic civil-military relations in Turkey.

In an in-depth article, Professor Bal discusses the psychology behind the above-mentioned mindset. He criticises the education methods and curriculum of the military schools which bring about the occurrence of that frame of mind. To him, the education system and the compulsory resources accessed by cadets during their school life fill their consciousness with distrust against civilian politics and cause them to view the people as uncultured and uneducated. They may perceive others who do not think like soldiers as enemies. Additionally, some facilities available to the officer corps, such as military clubs, lodging allowances, and specific social insurance companies have isolated them from society and social life. Consequently, army officers maintain a life disconnected from public beliefs, penchants, and traditions as well as sentiments. If the legal system has not enough checks against conspiracies, military leaders may presume a duty to interfere with politics under the "matured circumstances" (Bal, 2012).

In order to form a first-class democracy in such countries, Professor Bal suggests a long-term, radical change in the education system both in civilian and military schools, placing human rights and democratic values at the centre of curricula. The damage has done by previous coups and their illegal implications over society and politics ought to be told at the schools. Economic, social, and international disaffections of junta periods in the recent history of the country ought to be thoroughly addressed in schoolbooks. Civilian supremacy and the importance of freedom and the rule of law should be specifically taught in some lessons, especially in military schools and academies. The inevitably fatal impacts of coups on the internal affairs of the army and civil-military relations ought to be explained to the cadets by using cases from history (Bal, 2012).

After locating the concept of the "civilian supremacy" at the centre of his theory, Finer proceeds to establish his narration on civil-military relations by referring to the "political culture" of societies in four groups. According to him, the level of the political culture of a state is related to the maturity of the democracy, the democratic reflex of the society and

public involvement in, and attachment to, the democratic institutions and the rule of law. He groups societies according to the level of their political culture from the highest to the lowest. In countries with mature political cultures, the military fully obeys the rules of democracy and its civilian masters. In such states, any kind of intervention of the military is unacceptable, and public reflex of these states against the plotters is unobtainable. The Scandinavian states, Switzerland, the United States, Britain, and Australia are examples of the most mature political cultures. Turkey is in the third group among the states, in which political culture is low (Finer, 1971). Though his classification was made four decades ago, Finer's interpretations about the political culture and the level of democracy in Turkey are still accurate and valid. The main reason of this deep-rooted problem, this study reveals, is the path-dependency of the authoritarian state articulation, historical legacy, socio-cultural codes, and lack of democratic institutionalisation in the country.

2.3 Dependent- Independent Variables and the Level of Civil-Military Relations: Is it good or bad?

Due to its extremely complicated nature, social scientists disagree on how to determine and evaluate dependent variables of civil-military relations. The essence of civil-military relations has been generally discussed in terms of coups. Thence, if there are coups in a country, the *"problematique"* has been evaluated as bad, and if not; it is good. However, the issue is not as simple as this. Different aspects of civil-military relations have been discussed by scholars particularly since the end of the Cold War (Desch, 1999). Michael C. Desch of the University of Notre Dame, analyses dependent variables in terms of five points; the degree of impact of the army on areas beyond military affairs is used by some social scientists to measure the level of the *"problematique"*. If an army handles only military duties, there occurs a good civil-military relation. The drawback of this measure is, however, in some polities, armies are given some non-military missions by order. Additionally, in some circumstances, there is no clear division between civilian and military fields. Some scholars study the degree of military participation in national policy discussion. To them, if the military is among the groups debating major national policies, there is not a good civil-military relationship. However, this criterion, says Professor Desch, has not enough capacity to assess the *"problematique"* universally, due to the military's being a member of the society (Desch, 1999, p.4). After debating the "frequency of conflict between and respect one another of the figures", Professor

Desch proposes the concept of "preponderance", which refers to whose argument predominates when the civilian and military choice diverges. If the arguments of civilians prevail, there is no problem, if the military wins there are a serious problem). Although different theories make specific contributions towards understanding changing patterns of democratic control of the army since the Cold War, Professor Desch views these issues from which sort of threat is posed to the state. For civilians, he continues, confrontation against external challenges is the easiest periods to control the military. When internal threats are present, it is most difficult for civilians to oversee the military. This theory was developed after observing some case studies on American, French, Russian and Southern Latin American armies (Desch, 1999, p.4).

Ab initio, social scientists have utilised some dependent and independent variables in their studies in order to evaluate the nature of civil-military relations under coherent theories. Coups, military influence, civil-military friction, military compliance, delegation, and monitoring are prime dependent variables, which have been used by scholars such as Nordlinger, Finer, Huntington, Pion-Berlin, Benmeir, Welch, Feaver, Stephan. Independent variables are external and internal factors that give specific democratic colour to each country's civil-military relations context (Benmeir, 1995; Desch, 1999; Feaver, 1999; Nordlinger, 1977). All these dependent variables surface in the following chapters with a special prominence being given to coups.

2.4 Military, State and Politics

2.4.1 The Turkish Military and Politics: The Ottoman Legacy

In *The State Tradition in Turkey,* Professor Heper explains the birth of the Ottoman state as a *ghazi* state on the frontier of two competing religions and civilisations. During the enlargement process, he comments, what occurred was a specific understanding of predominantly state-based concept of conquest. Ottomans arose as a major frontier power defending and extending the idea of Islam against the Christian Byzantine Empire, and ultimately "they established their own polity at the expense of other Muslim principalities to the east and the Byzantines to the west. The military played a key role in the establishment of the Ottoman State". (Heper,1985, p.20)

The prestige of the Ottoman Army against its European rivals was stiffened by a distinguished way of institutionalisation, increased by the implementation of a sustainable training system during the ascension period of the state. Along with other well-established military unites; the Janissaries, who were carefully chosen from among the young sons of Christian subjects and converted to Islam, were not just ordinary soldiers but were also the commanders and spring fathers of the future's high-level civilian officials, and very close civil servants to the Sultan. After the effulgent ages of the State, putrefaction intensified in the Janissaries and defeats in war fields forced Sultans to renew the military system, which resulted in the abolishment of the Janissaries in 1826 (Dood, 1983).

The military of the 18th and 19th centuries in the Ottoman State was the centre of conspiracy, plots and coups against Sultans who had endeavoured to launch renewal in public life and military sphere. Osman the Young and Selim the Third were Sultans who were slew by the military that plunged into politics. In his competent study *The Culture of Disobedience: Diagnosing the Issue*, Professor Idris Bal explains that transgression of the military is a mindset problem. Since the seventeenth century, the Turkish polity system has suffered from an obvious disclamation of arm-holders against the state authority. The last century of the Ottoman Empire witnessed the military's direct interference into politics, and repudiation of the authority by the soldiers was among the major causes of the decadence (Bal: 2012).

On the other hand, unavoidable defeats of the Ottoman Empire in battles against western powers had forced Sultans to accept the structural and technological superiority of their rivals, and they, therefore, directed the Ottoman leaders to research and import European technology in order to bring to an end the defeats.

The most rigid reform attempt of the 19th century in the Ottoman state regarding the military is the policy called "Auspicious Incident (*Vaka-yi Hayriye*)", leading to the abolishment of the Janissary order in 1826, which was implemented by Mahmud the Second. Although Sultan Mahmud II had managed to annihilate five centuries of continued order for the sake of reform, there were greatest difficulties ingrained within social and institutional reflexes which favoured the old regime. The "Janissary mindset" was one of the prominent determiners of the tenor of social and public lives. In *The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's New Ottoman Army, 1826-1839,* Professor Levy explains this condition in a very laconic manner: "The Ottoman social structure rested on a strongly entrenched military establishment with long-standing traditions. The Janissaries, who had branched out from the military to penetrate and

overload other social strata, were not the only military element. Although their destruction cleared away the most conservative and tradition-minded corps within the army, there remained large segments of the old military order. Furthermore, the Ottoman system made no distinction between civilian and military government; the reins of authority from the Grand Vezir in Istanbul to the governor of the last province were usually in the hands of military men. The most important segment of the Ottoman ruling elite was thus made up of the old military, and it was to continue to be so. When Sultan Mahmud first sought a chief for his new army, he could find no one else but Aga Huseyin Pasha, a former Janissary who was also a supporter of reform" (Levy, 1971, p.23).

In order to develop a Western model army, some Sultans rigorously invested effort, time and subsidy to form military schools as the fount of human resources. Officers of the new army were sent abroad to learn new tactics and technologies and foreign languages. Western-type military schools were established to prepare the leaders of the new army. It is possible to argue that the graduates of those military schools were the forerunners of the transformation in the Ottoman State in the way of Western model institutionalisation and of life. On the other hand, a holistic view on the Ottoman type of modernisation might reveal the origins of disobedience culture in the military against civilians, the soldiers looking down on the politicians and the former's perception himself as the guardian of the order in the modern Turkish Republic.

2.4.2 The Young Turks, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and Praetorianism:

The 19th century was the most tumultuous age for the Ottomans in every respect. Some scholars describe that period as the "longest age of the Empire" (Ortayli, 2006). It is, indeed, the twinges of a state that lasts six hundred years, which tries to survive under huge challenges coming from both inside and outside. Professor Ilber Ortayli's *The Longest Century of the Empire (Imparatorlugun En Uzun Yuzyili)* and Professor Serif Mardin's (*The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas)* are pioneer works in which they expertly discuss the social and intellectual transformation of the Ottoman society. Besides many different analyses on the century's issues; in those books, one can find some highly original determinations on civil-military relations of the period which have influenced the subsequent age profoundly.

Intellectual roots can be traced back to the French Revolution; the "Young Turks" is a secret, nationalist, reformist society, which was formed by some military school cadets, following *Carbonari*, an underground Masonic group, of the *Italian Risorgimento*. In subsequent years, though it had gained members from a variety of careers, soldiers were the dominant power in society (Mardin, 2000). Reform efforts in the military, sparked after the abolishment of the Janissary, paradoxically resulted in increased activities of the officers in the politics. Abdul Hamid the Second (1876-1909), the founder of many initiatives in military education, and supporter of military reformation, had been opposed mainly by the new nationalist model of military schools' cadets who was rejecting the Sultan's absolutist regime. As the centre of a secret cell-modal structure, the military medical school was the home of the first opposition against Abdul Hamid II, aimed at toppling the Sultan and securing a constitutionalist order. Later named as the Committee of Union and Progress(CUP), the Ottoman Union Society was established by four military school cadets, directed by an Albanian Muslim Ibrahim Temo in 1889, as a "para-militaristic" organisation, whose soldier leaders Enver, Talat and Jamal Pashas, fatally drifted the state from disaster to disaster between 1908 and 1918 (Hale, 1994). Different aspects of the Young Turks and the CUP period have been largely discussed in the literature; however, this study discusses their influence and legacy on the modern civil-military relations in Turkey.

Political activism and schism in the military in the closing years of the Ottoman State reached a peak. Many high and middle rank officers divided into political groups with the aim of shaping the political future of the state. After the 1908 coup d'état against Abdul Hamid II, soldiers divided into, mainly, four groups- conservative, unionist, liberal and neutral. This division shattered unity and discipline in the army, in the following years, led to draconian illegal practices against opponents in the military (Hale, 1994).

The period between 1908 and 1914 after the overthrow of Abdul Hamid II witnessed an "absolutist" reign of the CUP influence. Although the committee itself operated secretly, it was governed the state behind the scenes under the massive influence of the officers. In his *Turkish Politics and the Military*, Professor William Hale explains the praetorian nature of the regime in that period in an ingenious way: "While the military history of Turkey`s involvement in the Great War has been thoroughly studied, the nature of the political regime in Istanbul remains perplexingly obscure. Could the Ottoman government of 1914 be described as a personal dictatorship under Enver, a single party regime under Union and Progress Party or a straightforward military regime? The answer probably lies somewhere

between all three. The Young Turk regime in its closing years might be likened to the military-civilian symbiosis of, say, the present Ba`ath regime in Syria, rather than the classic European dictatorship of Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia" (Hale, 1994, p.49).

Including some orientalist comments, Ramsaur's *The Young Turks; Prelude to the Revolution of 1908,* largely explains the emergence, structure, methods, challenges and differences of the leaders of the Young Turks. His remarks in the last chapter of the study on "The Role of the Great Powers" reveal how military leaders of the Union had controlled the foreign affairs of the state (Ramsaur, 1965).

In retrospect, those turbulent years of the Empire under the CUP left the army's intensified role in politics as a legacy to civil-military relations in the new republic. Chapter three is an in-depth analysis of the Ottoman legacy, which includes the CUP phenomenon on the modern civil-military relations in the multi-party era.

2.5 The New Republic and the Balance of Power in the New State

2.5.1 First Years of the New Republic: A Relative Civilian Supremacy

The series of wars against the invasion of the Anatolia in the early years of the twentieth century panned out amid a matter of life and death for the Anatolian populaces. By social resistance and countrywide struggle, the successful leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his colleagues defeated the Greek invasion in the war of national liberation, which opened the way to the emergence of the Turkish nation-state. The new Turkish state, arising from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, was established as a republic on 29 October 1923. The modernisation movements which had started in the previous ages in a quasi-holistic manner were turned into a radical changing program by the new leaders of the republic following the path of Westernisation. The main aim of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the new Turkish Republic, was to form a secular and western-style state and society. In order to realise that vast transformation, a radical revolution program was put into practice in all walks of life by a top-down approach (Dodd, 1983; Karpat, 2010). In the context of civil-military relations, during the first decades of the Republic, the army served as the vanguard and guardian of the revolution and reforms under the presidency of Ataturk, the legendary former officer with whom members of military took pride in doing the same job (Hale, 1994).

Legislation of the Military Internal Service Code in 1935 was a turning point for future conspirators, defending the staging of coups as a right and duty in conditions interpreted as posing major threats against the secular-nation state. Later, in 1960, Article 34 of the internal service code and repeated in the 35th, specified that "the task of the military is to secure and defend the Turkish fatherland and the Turkish Republic, as written in the Constitution" (Hale, 1994, p.80). By that enforcement, the military which had taken an oversight-free position in the regime during the Committee of Union and Progress reign consolidated its autonomous role for the next generation of politics, both legally, institutionally, and cognitively. The essence of the article was preserved after the 1960 and 1980 interventions of the armed forces into politics. This preservation, in fact, has been an institutionalisation of "the right of intervention" for the officers Both Kenan Evren, the leader of the 12 September 1980 coup d'états, and Cevik Bir, the mighty general of the 28 February 1997 "post-modern" coup, used the same rhetoric in two different courts, in front of the judges and prosecutors who interrogated them about breaking the constitution by toppling the democratic governments, respectively.

Both Ataturk and his successor Ismet Inonu, the two most famous generals of the Republic, were very close to the military after their retirement. Approving the armed forces as being the most loyal institution to their leadership and the new Turkish revolution, they have institutionalised the state apparatus as an authoritarian entity. Sevket Sureyya Aydemir, a well-known scholar on Turkish revolution history, has written highly authentic biographies of Ataturk and Inonu; *Tek Adam(The One Man)* is a three-volume biography of the former and *Ikinci Adam(The Second Man)* a-three volume biography of the latter. In these books the writer describes the state, social and economic life of the new Turkish republic in parallel with the personal histories of these most powerful presidents of the new state. Analysis of these books enables one to observe the zeitgeist in terms of civil-military relations. The ideological evolution of the officers, the unshakable belief of the soldiers in Ataturk principles and the systematic perpetual strengthening of their vision of themselves as the most patriotic citizens of the regime during the formation years of the state that would profoundly impact the future of the military can be traced from the sentences of those books (Aydemir, 1966; 1968).

2.5.2 Indoctrination, Conscription and the "Militarist Mindset": A Permanent Interaction

In the modern era, the main barriers to the idea of civilian supremacy over the military have been firstly a special indoctrination system in the military schools that has invigorated the "militaristic mindset"; secondly, the inadequacy of critical thinking in the civilian education sphere; and thirdly, compulsory military service for each male Turkish citizen. From an Althusserian viewpoint, it is possible to say that the variables mentioned above are the "ideological apparatus of the status quo", which regenerates the prevailing system in favour of the military between 1980 and 2011. Chapter four, five and six make an in-depth analysis of these factors from different aspects and critique the social, cultural and legal environments that have established the vicious circle which has nurtured the anti-democratic balance of power in Turkey.

Mehmet Ali Birand`s work, a unique study in the field, *Shirts of the Steel - An Autonomy of the Turkish Armed Forces* (1991)*,* sheds light on how military's educational and social life is concealed within the barracks and inaccessible to the outsiders. Until the publication of this book; due to the internal regulations, students of the Turkish civil-military studies have deprived of first-hand knowledge about the social and educational life of military officers who spend much of their life in barracks and out of sight. The cadets were still educated under a curriculum which was designated by the orders of the General Staff, which means that the civilian National Education Ministry has excluded from the training process of the future commanders until this research project started in 2011.

In his study, Birand describes the life of a young cadet from his or her entrance to a military school to retirement. Various section of the work, such as "A Total Change from the Very First Day", "You are an Officer. You are Superior", "Politics and Political Parties", "Does Their Training Prepare Officers for Intervention?", "Isolation from the Civilian World", are narrations that expertly explain how the "mindset" of Turkish officers comes into being. The book reveals how the indoctrination of the cadets by the military schools have shaped their thinking about politicians and political parties, and cognitive-cultural cornerstones of the institutional identity: "No-one can claim that the Turkish officer's image of the politician is, in general, a positive one. The majority of the cadets interviewed at the military schools and academies view as one who puts his personal interests or his party's ideological interests

before those of the nation. Of course, there also politicians who have won their trust and respect; but, overall, they voice the same kind of criticism as the general public:

> 'A politician does not put his country above everything else as I do. His priority is his own re-election in four years' time, though, in the meantime, he talks a lot about his patriotism. He can abuse the state by indulging in favouritism to secure his re-election. I trust very few of them…Some politicians are not half as educated as we are. Some know one-tenth of what we do. How can they govern the country? They have managed to become deputies through powerful party connections or bribes. Some of them cannot even speak proper Turkish, let alone a foreign language as we do… I measure a politician not by his education but by the priority he gives to country and nation. Politicians are not concerned for the state as much as we are. They talk about Ataturk's principles and all that only because they are wary of us or are afraid of some reaction... Some of our politicians are so ignorant that they have never really been aware of the dangers inside or outside the country'." (Birand, 1991, pp.76-77).

Birand's book is also particularly important as he has been the only researcher who was granted special permission to interview the cadets in the barracks by the General Staff.

Along with other formal and informal structures, the conscription for each male citizen in Turkey is one of the most influential institutions against a democratic civil-military relationship. Starting at the same time as the construction of a nation-state in Europe, the idea of a "nation in arms" has triggered the formation of national armies in many countries, making military service compulsory for each citizen. Since the end of the cold war, most states have abolished conscription, and today almost every country in Europe has a professional army that recruits vocational soldiers. However, each male Turkish citizen, no matter what his career or job is, has to do compulsory military service. Youngsters come from different parts of the country to spend a defined period in barracks and are pressed into the military education system, which leaves a permanent militarist mark on their consciousness (Altinay, 2004). Ayse Gul Altinay's *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey* and (eds.) Evren Balta Paker and Ismet Akca's *Turkiye`de Ordu, Devlet ve Guvenlik Siyaseti(Military, State and Security Policy in Turkey)* are pioneer works regarding the formation of the military mindset, which have been productive in developing the institutionalist approach in this study.

2.5.3 Hanging a Prime Minister: Stabbing the Democracy in the Consciousness and the Age of Military Interventions in Turkey

Turkey entered into multi-party life after the end of the Second World. The country witnessed significant changes in the introduction of democracy. However, this period is also an entrance into the age of the military interventions which have established institutions that would create and perpetuate the military tutelage over the socio-political life in Turkey.

Adnan Menderes and his three dissident friends resigned from Inonu's People`s Republican Party, the only party of the regime, and formed the Democrat Party in 1946. The Democrat Party's overwhelming victory in 1950 elections promised a massive democratic transformation and programme of economic development in Turkey. The new political system which had required fundamental changes in the way of governing caused uneasiness among the officers who were members of an army which has been located within the state structure as the guardian of the regime during the single-party period (Hale, 1994).

Feroz Ahmad, who is one of the prominent scholars on the Ottoman and Turkish political history, writes that four senior commanders visited Inonu, shortly after the Democrat Party's election victory and offered a coup to void the election results. The president, however, refused their plan (Ahmad, 1977, p.154-55). Memoirs of this period written by some influential officers, *ipso facto*, suggest that soldiers, dissenting from the practices of the Democrat Party government, came together to form juntas against the government from its outset. In this regard, works such as *Anilar, Sorular, Sorumlular (Memoirs, Questions and the Responsibles)* written by Orhan Erkanli, a staff major at the 27 May coup; *Harbiye Silah Basina(The Military Academy: Arms!)* written by Sitki Ulay, commander of the War School in Ankara at the 27 May coup , and *Bayar Gercegi (The Reality of Bayar),* a biography of Celal Bayar, who was the president of the Menderes era which was written by Suleyman Yesilyurt, are important resources towards understanding the zeitgeist in the barracks against the elected government and the atmosphere in the civilian realm.

The 1961 Constitution, legal regulations and other related documents which were enacted during this period served to reinforce the institutionalisation of the military tutelage in Turkey. Therefore, they are among the most important resources which are going to be analysed in this study.

In his *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*; *An Annotated Chronology of Multi-Party Politics in Turkey*, *1945-1971*; *The Making of Modern Turkey; Turkey: The Quest for Identity,* Faroz Ahmad analyses Turkey's transition to multi-party era. These works are of great value and are among the main resources that help the students of Turkish civil-military relations to understand the structural problems of Turkish democracy by means of a retrospective assessment. This study draws on Professor Ahmad's works extensively, especially in the discussion of the Democrat Party period.

Professor Kemal H. Karpat, an esteemed historian, discusses the problems of these times from a more individualist perspective. Karpat considers the results of the 1950 elections to be a triumph of the populace via democracy and the ballot box, assuring civilians' prominence against the *status quo,* an outcome that angered circles believing in the idea that "A Turk is born to die for the sake of motherland" (Karpat, 2010). Karpat`s works, such as *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society; Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis; The Transition of Turkey's Political Regime to a Multi-party System,* are among resources needing to be read in order to understand the dynamics of the antagonism which existed between ordinary citizens and the *status quo* that was mainly embodied and secured by the armed forces. Karpat's analyses on the civil-military dichotomy during the following decades are also very inspiring.

Though there is a unanimous rejection against the 1971 and 1982 military interventions in the Turkish academia, a considerable number of researchers praise the 1961 coup d'état. Prof. Erogul and Prof. Aksin are among the most well-known academics in this group. Because of the Democrat's increasing authoritarian practices especially in its second and third term, and the anti-democratic regulation of the socio-political life during that era; they harshly criticise Menderes and describe him as a counter-revolutionist against the Kemalist state. This study will discuss the Menderes era and its impact on civil-military relations.

The 27 May 1960 coup which was carried out by a junta formed by relatively low-ranking officers constitutes the first direct intervention of the armed forces into the politics in the multi-party era. Established just after the coup, the National Unity Council formed "kangaroo courts" to punish the leaders of the Democrats and efface the political influence and heritage of the elected government. The leaders of the Democrats were charged with treason, felony, misuse of public power and infringements of the constitution. At the end of the process, prime minister Adnan Menderes, foreign minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu and finance minister Hasan

Polatkan were sentenced to death and hanged on 16 September 1961. As a journalist, Nazli Ilicak's analyses on the trial process and its aftermath offer an insight into the Menderes legacy on the Turkish civil-military relations. (Ilicak, 1975). The executions of Menderes and two ministers by the officers, as chapter six reveals, have left an endless trauma on the consciousness of the next generation civilians. This situation can be defined as "the institutionalisation of the fear" among the civilians, which has caused self-censorship that always forces them to think about the possible reactions of the military against their discourses and policies.

The 27 May coup marked the start of the formation of a military tutelage on the socio-political life in Turkey via new institutions which were constituted just after the coup. The National Security Council (NSC), which has been established by the 1961 Constitution, is the most important of these institutions. As the conning tower of the military tutelage, the NSC has operated as a supra-governmental throughout the multi-party era. The impact of the NCS on the civil-military relations, legal regulations and related documents concerning the Council are going to be analysed in chapter four and six.

Although they are not academic researches, observations of some journalists are of great importance to understand the impact of the military interventions on the socio-political life. The observations and memoirs of some leading journalists are utilised in order to comprehend the living effects of the military tutelage on daily life. Hasan Cemal's and Birand&Dundar&Capli's books on the 1980 and 1971 military interventions are among these works, respectively. In this regard, the 1982 Constitution and other related legal texts are of great importance in analysing the path-dependent characteristics of the Turkish civil-military relations. Along with the resources mentioned above, newspapers which were published during the periods of the military interventions help to reflect the zeitgeist.

The research draws extensively upon the Turkish and English literature on the related periods and analyses all official documents related to civil-military relations in this research. One of the main deficiencies in the literature is the critical analysis of the transformation in civil-military relations, paving the way for increasing authoritarianism instead of the military tutelage. Focusing on the dynamics created the new political environment, especially after 2002, this research contributes to the literature by elaborating on the new balance of power in Turkey.

2.6 Conclusion

Studies of civil-military relations have been extensively developed thanks to a significant number of political scientists. Prof. Finer's theoretical approaches towards the discipline and the Turkey's civil-military question have been a source of inspiration for this research. Developed by Finer, the "civilian supremacy" perspective that is established in conformity with the principles of democracy and the rule of law has socio-cultural and institutional dimensions which can deeply theorise and analyse the Turkish case. For these reasons, Turkey's ever-lasting problem of the civil-military dichotomy is critically analysed in the light of Finer's influencing approach.

The military as an institution has been central to Turkish government literally for centuries. The legacies of military autonomy and military support for the practice and the legitimacy of autocratic rule extend their influence into the 1980s and the 1990s in a text-book example of path dependency. With respect to the politics of Turkish civil-military relations, Professor Hale's writings have profoundly influenced the author who had been thinking over the country's systemic problems long before this project has been started. Especially, Hale's "Turkish Politics and the Military" have shaped the author's way of thinking on the subject. The historical review of the role of the military in Ottoman and post-Ottoman Turkish politics provided by Hale and the authors cited above emphasises the compelling attractions of the historical-institutionalist methodology.

This study has extensively benefited from the previous works in the literature. However, to ward off the wrath of the Kemalist military tutelage and the Islamist Erdogan regime, respectively, a very substantial part of the Turkey-based studies that were done in the era of the military tutelage (1960-2007) and the growing civilian authoritarianism period after 2007 have refrained from developing a critical approach against the holders of the power. Therefore, lack of academic freedom resulting in a reluctance provide critical analysis of the research theme has been the most significant deficiency in the literature. In light of the theoretical approach developed by the school of Historical Institutionalism, this research extensively and critically analyses the policy preferences which were implemented by the founders of the Republic and the founding father of the civilian authoritarianism regarding the role of the military within the system. Some of the research questions posed at the beginning of this chapter were addressed in some of this literature. All of them are answered more deliberately and critically in the later chapters. By doing so, the research is going to reveal a

major reason of the anti-democratic power of balance in Turkey, which has been hesitated from being freely expressed by most of the Turkey-based researchers.

The research also aims at contributing to the literature by interviewing the civilians on the research theme, revealing roles of the formal and informal institutions on the institutionalisation of the military tutelage, and making emphasis on the importance of memoirs of the former military members in analysing the mindset of the Turkish officer.

CHAPTER 3: THE OTTOMAN LEGACY, THE FOUNDING PHILOSOPHY OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC AND FORMATION OF THE TURKISH CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

> *"Its (the military's) greatest defect is its political activity."* (Kaiser Wilhelm II of Prussia)

3.1 Introduction

The military has been one of the most influential agencies throughout Turkish political history. Policies, rules, norms, and cognitive processes regarding the military have shaped political behaviours by the ruler and the population. With a "new historical institutionalist" theoretical framework, this study argues that the Ottoman legacy, the founding philosophy of the new state, and policy preferences that were established during the foundation of the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk are of great significance to the current nature of civil-military relations.

In order to elucidate the path-dependent influence of the legacy and the foundational philosophy of the Republic; state and military relations during the Ottoman Empire and reflections of this relationship on politics are going to initially be analysed. Secondly, as the principal reason behind the Ottoman modernisation, the decline of the military and attempts at reform are going to be discussed. Thirdly, the legacy of political struggle between the reformists and the Sultan regarding the constitutional system, which caused coups d'état and party dictatorships, is going to be evaluated. The last section attempts to propound how the foundational philosophy of the new Turkish Republic attributed great value to the military in comparison with civilians within the state system. The path founded in this context and dependencies created through legal regulations and cognitive processes are to be analysed. The chapter reveals how the past has shaped the present through the arguments of the historical institutionalism.

This chapter has neither the aim of evaluating Ottoman military history nor of examining the foundation process of the Turkish Republic, but of analytically highlighting the legacies of the Ottoman and Kemalist era on the contemporary characteristics of the Turkish civil-military relations. It also aims to reveal the continuity of the Turkish authoritarian culture from the Ottomans to the Kemalist era which has been a significant cause of the anti-democratic nature

of civil- military relations. This revelation is of great importance since the authoritarian culture owes a great influence on the political game and policy-making processes in the country which are also going to shape the future of the Turkish civil-military relations.

3.2 State, Military and Political Reflections of the Ottomans

Inspired by the Islamic[2] teachings which institute the legality and legitimacy of the military as a force in society, traditional Turkish culture perceives the military as the "hearth of the Prophet". Thanks to their military talent and success on the field, Turks acquired a reputation among the Islamic communities and this prestige elevated them to the highest military positions under the reigning Caliphs of the 9th and 10th centuries. After the downfall of these Muslim monarchs, Turkish leaders established their sovereign state (Tachau and Heper, 1983, p.18).

The Ottomans were among the most influential playmakers in world politics between the 15th and 19th centuries and once possessed a territorial hegemony which stretched from the Caucasus and through the Balkans to North Africa. Along with well-functioning political and social institutions, the powerful military institution was among the secrets of Ottoman success. The centralised power of the Sultan and the supremacy of his disciplined army against rival powers in the 15th and 16th centuries have been studied by scholars since Machiavelli (Marriott, 2006, pp.22-26). Here, a brief explanation is to be given in order to examine the main subject.

The Ottoman military was made up of three main branches: a servant army, an army of frontiers and supplementary forces. The key resource of the military's human capital was supplied by a system which was called *devshirme* (ingathering, altering, permuting or collecting in Turkish). The system was built on the Islamic legal principle that the ruler was vested with having one-fifth of captured persons serving in the military. This *jus belli* article of Islamic law was used to legitimise obligatory enrolment from Christian societies. An imperial edict legalised under the reign of Sultan Murad II (1421-1451) ordered that a pool of candidates who were converted into Islam was to be elected from specific regions to provide

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[2] The army also had a vital role in the pre-Islamic Turkish states. For a comprehensive assessment, see: Bayrak (2006). *Türk İmparatorlukları Tarihi*, İstanbul: Bilgi Karınca.

the needs of the central government. The most capable of those between the ages of 8 and 18 years old of the selected groups were given intellectual and physical training that took almost twelve years. This long and arduous indoctrination period prepared them to rise to the highest ranks of the Empire. A significant portion of these candidates was subjected to intense military training, in which they were prepared to take on roles in the Empire`s most significant force, known as the "new troops" or Janissary (*yeniceri* in Turkish). This institution constituted the heart of the Ottoman ground forces, which was one of the closest units to the Sultan and the most disciplined and deterrent force against his rivals during wartime for centuries. Professor William Hale, a prominent scholar of Turkish civil-military relations, perspicuously describes the philosophy behind the Janissary army (Hale, 1994, pp.3-4):

> "The rationale for this system is clear enough. Its recruits were usually taken from remote and impoverished homes and then inducted into an entirely new religion, language, and way of life. Since they owed whatever power or property they might acquire entirely to the state, they would, in theory at any rate, be entirely loyal to it. Moreover, the training programme to which they were subjected was designed to endow them with the highest degree of expertise and commitment. It has even been compared to that proposed by Plato; although there is no evidence that the sultans were familiar with *The Republic*."

As will be discussed in chapter four, the military schools of the new state have served with similar mentality with the Janissary system to a large extent, creating a cognitive framework that has profoundly impacted civil-military relations. Although the new Republic, a secular and nation-state, has fully closed its doors to youngsters from other nationalities and religions than the Turks and the Muslims; most of the cadets have been chosen among the cleverest sons (and later daughters) of mid and low-income families of the Anatolia similar to the Ottoman experience. Owing to the fact that they have been given every opportunity at the modern military schools which most of their peers cannot even dream of in the ordinary civilian schools and would have a promising future thanks to the military education process, they have entirely become loyal to the state and canonised it.

The Janissary system had a decisive influence on the position of the military in the state apparatus throughout the ages. Along with other units of the powerful Ottoman military, it established a path in which the military won wars one after the other that extended the

Ottoman territories far and wide. The role and significance of the army in the advancement of political, social, and economic life in the Ottoman Empire have been frequently emphasised by scholars. According to Lybyer (1910), the Ottoman government and army were one, and it was the military before anything else. Lerner and Robinson (1960) stated that it was the military institution which sustained the global prestige of the Sultans. There was no difference between the civilian and military sections of the state because both were embodied by the Sultan (Karabelias, 2008, p.1). The Sultan (*Padisah*) was the owner of the whole country, the commander of the army and the absolute decision-maker on high-politics. During the reign of Sultan Suleiman, the Magnificent (1520-1566), the state reached its zenith through the well-functioning social, economic, and political institutions of the age. From the middle of the 16th century, the expansion of the Ottoman Empire started to lose momentum, and it fell into a period of decline throughout the following centuries. Continued territorial losses caused new internal and external challenges that impaired the prestige of the Sultan. The decline period of the Empire also witnessed social upheavals and the dramatic decline of institutions. As a result of successive defeats and on-going indiscipline, the military became one of the most degenerated institutions (Heper, 2000, p.63).

The Anglo-Ottoman treaty of 1838 provided unprecedented economic advantages to the British and French states in return for assistance to Sultan Mahmud II against his rebellious governor, Mehmed Ali of Egypt, who was preparing a declaration of independence. Though the treaty averted Egypt`s separation from the Empire, it swiftly expanded European involvement in Ottoman internal affairs, especially in the Middle East politics and economics (Rustow, 1973, p.118). The Russian expansionism diminished the Ottoman hegemony in the Eastern Europe and triggered the independence process of the Slav-origin nations influenced by the French Revolution. The results of the 1877-78 Russian-Ottoman War marks a breaking point on the latter`s inevitable collapse process; Bulgaria and Romania became sovereign states, the Austrian Empire seized Bosnia, and the Russian Empire invaded parts of Anatolia. Then, between 1912 and 1920, new nation-states were established following the independence struggles against the Ottoman Empire, which marked the end of the latter's territorial reign in Europe. Furthermore, most of the Ottoman-Middle East provinces were left to the British Empire by the end of the Great War. These territories that were lost throughout the decline and collapse periods had been Ottoman for almost five centuries, and they were all stamped with the Ottoman legacy (Zurcher, 2010, p.59).

Historians have agreed on two main points regarding the reasons for the military collapse in the Ottoman Empire. It has been suggested that the Empire touched such territorial latitude that it exceeded the competence of the state to secure its limits. The Ottoman state was governing an area ranging from the Tigris to the Danube and from the Aegean-Black Seas Crescent to the Sahara Desert. Within this enormous territorial region, the Empire had to cope with at least two adversary armies (Russian, French, Persian or Austrian) concurrently. Because of the highly centralised structure of the military and the long distance between the frontiers; the work of securing territories became tough. On the other hand, this was an age of political, social, technological reforms in Europe. These reforms provided technological and organisational advancements for the European militaries, which converted their defensive character into one of offensive. The European armies of the 18th and 19th centuries were much more offensive and puissant than their predecessors against the Ottoman armies (Karabelias, 2004, p.145; Yapp, 1987, pp.97-98).

Securing territorial rights and defending social togetherness are among the key features of being a state. To put it another way, if a state fails to protect its territories and population in the long term; it may be exposed to a vicious circle, paving the way for endless crises. From the early decades of the 19th Century, the prime concern of the Ottoman Sultans was to modernise the out-dated and crumbling Imperial Army and to secure the survival of the state. This chapter urges that along with the Janissary tradition, policies that were implemented to re-invigorate the Ottoman military have profoundly impacted the military of the Turkish Republic founded in 1923.

The actors that shaped the state evolution and public life in the Empire can roughly be categorised into two socio-political groups; the ruling class, which consisted of the Sultan-Caliph, the military, the civil bureaucracy and the religious hierarchy on the one hand, and the ruled class; all Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of the Empire on the other. The military was the key institution in the territorial expansion, and it also secured public order. As mentioned above, the state and the military were one and belonged to the Sultan. The local and global prestige of the officer-corps during the Ottoman advancement provided the military with a climate in which it cultivated a collective identity. Hence, equipped with an "institutional consciousness", the military emerged as a "power broker" in Ottoman politics. "As Karal remarks, the Ottoman Army had 'ceased being the source of the state's authority: the principle that the state exists to serve the state had been replaced with the formula that the state exists merely for the corps'" (Karabelias, 2008, p.2).

The decline process of the state that started to be felt during the years following the death of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent presented convenient ground for the military members to take advantage of the soldiery, and to soften the strict rules of the military art and devshirme system[3]. In alliance with certain powerful elite groups[4] of the Muslim population, the military posed the most serious "internal threat" against the Sultan for the sake of institutional interests. Sometimes, the "Janissary Lobby" reached such a point that it threatened the Sultan if he developed any political agenda without confirmation of the Janissary. This political confrontation evinced itself in many cases; for instance, Sultan Osman the second, a visionary and reformer ruler, was garrotted by the Janissaries because he planned a reform program for the military in 1622 (Tachau&Heper, 1983, p.18). This brutal assassination left a traumatic legacy on successive Sultans that profoundly impacted their relations with the military. Istanbul, the capital of the Empire, witnessed staggering rebellions between 1622 and 1730, in which five Sultans were dethroned by the Janissaries (Hale, 1994, p.8). This riot-prone and pro-coup mindset became a fatal threat against the survival of the state in the following decades. Therefore, the political gene of the military culture of the Turkish officer has transmitted interventionist codes with itself.

3.3 The Military Question: The Modernisation Movements and Political Chaos

In 1774 and 1792, the Ottoman military suffered heavy losses in wars with the Russian and Austrian armies, respectively. These losses forced the Sultan to acknowledge his notable military backwardness against his European rivals (Zurcher, 2010, p.60). Sultan Selim III, the pioneer reformist of the Ottoman Modernisation in the early 19th century, endeavoured to convince the Janissaries to use new arms and war methods that would be borrowed from Western Europe. However, the pro-*status quo* army, which maximised its institutional dominance by following old paths, resisted his approach fiercely. Though the army was defeated in almost all wars with foreign forces, it still retained enough power to secure its parochial interests at home. Exposed to strong Janissary resistance, the Sultan abandoned his

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[3] The starting point of this process can be traced in 1568 when Selim II, Suleiman the Magnificent's successor, permitted the officer corps the concession of employing their sons in the military. This privilege was followed by the abrogation of some military service rules that had minimised the direct interaction of the soldiers with civilian life, such as the proscription of trading and marriage during active military service (Hale, 1994).

[4] The traditional Ottoman ruling elite mainly consisted of the *ulema* (scholars and religious leaders), active and retired top-ranked officers and the *âyans* (autonomous feudal overlords) (Johnson, 1982).

struggle to reform the old-fashioned military and, instead, intensified his efforts to establish a new army, which was named the New Order *(Nizam-ı Cedid* in Turkish). The Sultan's primary target was to build a European-style army that could put an end to the unremitting fiascos on the battlefield. The *"Nizam-ı Cedid"* (*New Order*) concept was a general characterisation that encapsulated an entire reform agenda over the course of Selim III`s sultanate (1789-1807). In the long run, the philosophy behind this agenda was to renew the state apparatus in light of a "functional government"[5] idea (Shaw, 1965, pp.291-292).

The traditionalist block consisted of the Janissaries, the *ulema* (religious functionaries and scholars) and the *âyans* (self-reliant feudal seigneurs), jointly objected to the "New Order" reforms. There were two main reasons behind this opposition: to secure their vested internal and external interests within the existing system against potential new entities and clique, and to prevent the penetration of European ideas and "infidel innovations", especially those inspired by the French Revolution, into the Ottoman land (Johnson, 1982, pp.1-2). In fact, the philosophy of this political rivalry between the reformists and the traditionalists would be the main focus of the story of Turkish politics in the following centuries.

Despite the Sultan's rigorous attempts, the project of constructing a European-style army came to grief. Sultan Selim III, who spent his lifetime trying to realise military, administrative and social reforms, was deposed and killed by the Janissaries with the help of the traditionalist elite. Although the *"Nizam-ı Cedid"* ideals were not adopted, they shone a light on the fact that urgent reforms were necessary in order to save the state. It was the first official acceptance of the European supremacy[6] and paved the way for a growing recognition of the need to reform the state. Sultan Selim III's legacy became a vital determinant in the process of Ottoman modernisation throughout the following eras (Shaw, 1965, p.292). This "path" led the Ottoman state on a reform process which would result in transformations in every facet of life.

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[5] The official seeking of a functional government during Sultan Selim III's time was well-documented in a report submitted to the Sultan by Ebubekir Ratip, the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna. The ambassador portrayed features of a functional state as having a well-disciplined military, functional finance, well-educated and visionary public officials, safety and wealth among the populace, "all to result from government policies" (Karpat, 1972).

[6] European supremacy against the decline of the Ottoman Empire can be summarised by the following points: a- technological progress, b- the industrial revolution that enlivened and increased economic development, c- new methods in administrative organisation, d- new techniques and methods in the military art, along with modern arms production (Ahmad, 1972).

The staggering defeats on the battlefields, along with the destructive impact of the nationalist movements inspired by the French Revolution, aggravated the chaos in the Ottoman Empire. Following the Serbian civil rebellion in 1804, the biggest military challenge was to stop the independence movements of the various nations of the Empire throughout the nineteenth century. What made matters worse for the Sultan was an increasing internal threat orchestrated by the *ayans*, local autonomous landlords, who could establish their militias. As one of the most powerful branches of the traditionalist elite, the *ayans* were also members of the "junta", which deposed and executed Sultan Selim III. Sultan Mahmud (1808–1839), Selim III's successor and a passionate reformist, came to the throne under the tutelage of some leading *ayans*. The Sultan was well aware of the dominance of the traditionalist coalition on Ottoman politics. Hence, to attain power and the means to realise his reform programme and secure his throne against possible plots, he followed a "policy of balance" during the initial years of his sultanate. In September 1808, he signed the Charter of Alliance Agreement (*Sened-i Ittifak*) with the *ayans* that provided their support to maintain his authority against any Janissary revolts. Correspondingly, he accepted the *ayans* as a legal entity and legitimised their right of family inheritance (Karpat, 1972, p.253).

Greatly relieved by the agreement, the Sultan secured a favourable political climate to reinforce his overall authority. In the light of the "Nizam-I Cedid" experience, he aimed to exterminate the power of the traditionalist elite. The fiercest conflict, in this regard, took place between the Sultan and the Janissaries. On 15 June 1826, the Istanbul streets witnessed a merciless battle between two groups of soldiers: on the one hand the Sultan and his loyalist army units and the Janissaries on the other. The Sultan smashed this latest military revolt against his throne and issued a Sultanate decree abolishing the Janissaries. Thus, the Janissary Military, a centuries-old institution that became the biggest obstacle against the reform movements and a nightmare for the reformist Sultans, was terminated once and for all. It was announced that a modern army, named the *"The Victorious Troops of Mohammad"*[7] (Victorious Army in short) would be formed in its place (Levy, 1971, p.21).

Founder cadres of this new army were chosen from members of the New Order Army *(Nizam-i Cedid)*. The chief post *(Yeniceri Agasi* in Turkish*)* of the Janissaries, who was the leader in many revolts, was annulled. Instead, a new office, named the Head Staff Officer (*Serasker*), was established to fulfil the roles of supreme commandership and secretary of war (Ahmad,

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[7] The abolition of the Janissaries was described as the "Auspicious Incidence", *(Vaka-iHayriye)*, by historians of the era.

2002: p.25)**.** The organisational structure, along with the rules and norms of the "Victorious Army", was designed in light of those of Sultan Selim III`s "New Army" (Shaw, 1965, p.305).

The Sultan followed in his predecessor's footsteps, and his primary objective was to constitute a European-style force that could defend his Empire against powerful rivals. Amid institutional inadequacies and financial difficulties, the Sultan pinned his hopes on foreign instructors and advisers to train troops of the "modern army". This policy preference by the Sultan paved the way for a close interaction of the Ottoman officers with their European counterparts that had a crucial impact on the formation of the former's institutional mind-set. In the first stage, a British mission was invited to conduct "due diligence". Following this, a Prussian delegation was invited to train the new army in Istanbul (Ahmad, 2002, p.4). Therefore, the foundations of the new military, which would be the forerunner of the professional military of the Turkish Republic have been established in the light of the European experience.

The organic law of the "Victorious Army" based assignment and promotion on merit and seniority principles in order to minimise staff favouritism and corruption. However, the realisation of this aim was rather difficult due to the lack of an adequate educational system, the dominance of consuetudinary norms and nepotism in public life (Levy, 1971, p.26). "The disastrous defeat once again at the hands of Russia in 1829, which was accompanied by a flood of Muslim refugees from the Black Sea littoral, made military modernization even more of a priority. Modernizing the army remained the driving force behind the whole complex of reforms, at least until 1856. Conscription on the Prussian model, with a standing army, an active reserve and a militia, was introduced in 1844" (Zurcher, 2010, pp.60- 64). However, the Empire was girded by a vicious circle due to the irrepressible defeats on the battlefield, which had caused continuous human, territorial and revenue losses and minimised the efficiency of the military reform (Zurcher, 2010, pp.60- 64).

Under the circumstances mentioned above, the Sultan gained room for manoeuvring to implement supplemental administrative reforms thanks to the abolition of the Janissary Army. For the first time in the Ottoman history, the government introduced a population census and land survey aiming to establish a legal basis for conscription and taxation that could procure human capital and tangible assets for the modern army (Johnson, 1982, p.3). The importance given to the new conscription and taxation systems, along with the policy preferences in this

context, had a lasting impact on the socio-political life. Most notably, compulsory military service for each male citizen has been one of the most influential institutions on the evolution of the modern Turkish civil-military relations and formation of the "acceptable citizen" of the new secular Republic. In chapter four, the long-standing impact of this institution will be analysed in depth.

The complex nature of a successful "modernisation" idea forced Ottoman reformers to adopt an all-encompassing approach. The infrastructure of a modern army required the building of new barracks and the renewal of old roads and bridges. The search for a reinforced state-wide authority compelled the Sultan to update traditional communication methods and to transfer new instruments (Zurcher, 2010, p.61). To set up a modern bureaucracy, the governing structure was redesigned on the model of a ministerial cabinet (Ahmad, 2002, p.25). New military educational institutions were founded, and relationships with foreign military advisers were maintained. To attain a thorough grasp of modern combat methods and techniques, some bright members of the army were sent to European (Prussia, France, and Britain) military academies. In parallel with the idea of reforming the military bureaucracy, new civilian schools were established to provide human capital for reforming public administration and bureaucracy. The emergence of military colleges and public schools took an active role throughout Ottoman modernisation. They produced norms and values to reinforce the idea of a collective identity among their members. Ottoman embassies established in European countries were utilised as training centres for the new type of Foreign Service officers. The graduates of the new educational institutions, who were appointed to the ranks of the new bureaucratic system, served in a growing government apparatus in which a hierarchical structure designated social and institutional positions. Though these reforms were slow and inadequate in the short term, they constituted the framework of a modern-centralised governmental system. It was not long after their establishment that these institutions became a source of revolutionary ideas that triggered struggles between the Sultan and the new type civil-military bureaucrats throughout the second half the nineteenth century (Karabelias, 2008, pp.2-3, Zurcher, 2010, p.61). For all these reasons, it is possible to say that the idea of creating a European-style military has paved the way for the modernisation of the whole state apparatus in the Ottoman Empire inholding the nucleus of the new Turkish state established in 1923.

The idea of reform which had aimed at converting the patrimonial structure of the state into a modern bureaucracy harboured some unintended consequences within itself. Through the

influence of the new-style schools, the fidelity of civil-military bureaucrats started to change direction from the Sultan to the state. The level of the collective consciousness of the new type civil-military bureaucrats increased throughout their interaction with European political thoughts. The reorganisation process included the formation of the Assembly of Military Affairs *(Meclis-i Dar-i Suray-i Askeri),* the establishment of the office of Head Staff Officer *(Serasker)* and the furnishing of this post with the commandership of the Ottoman armies along with the Ministry of War, as well as its appointment as a Cabinet member. These reforms enhanced the political position of the military. The Ottoman military entered the second half of the nineteenth century with a reinforced political position, thanks to the reform efforts (Karabelias, 2008, p.4; Lewis, 1961, pp.45-60).

The reform agenda introduced by Sultan Mahmud II throughout his 31-year reign constituted the first radical juncture to transform the Ottoman state. His policies left significant legacies for future generations, which formed a basis for advancing the Ottoman modernisation. These generations, which would come to be known as the *"Young Ottomans"* and the *"Young Turks",* became the most influential political and military actors up until the end of the Empire.

After Sultan Mahmud II's death, his son Sultan Abdulmecid perpetuated the modernisation process. The Sultan`s first essential regulation that impacted the future of the Empire was proclaimed in 1839. The "Noble Rescript of the Rose Garden*" (Gulhane Hatt-i Humayunu)* initiated a period known as the "Reorganisation" *(Tanzimat),* intending to reform the Empire's declining institutions. In general terms, the Imperial Edict declared that new regulations on securing life and property rights, the forbidding of corruption, the reformation of the tax burden and the regulation of conscription and the length of military service would be promulgated. Although most of these promises could not be fulfilled at the time, the political atmosphere that was created by the reformers enhanced the social, institutional, and intellectual capacities of "egalitarian" and "libertarian" thinking in the Empire. The second most influential regulation proclaimed during Sultan Abdulmecid's reign was the "Imperial Reform Decree" (*Islahat Fermani)* in 1856. Amid political pressure imposed by the Great Powers in return for military assistance against the Russian invasion on the Ottoman territories in the Balkans, Sultan Abdulmecid announced that his administration would provide equality in education, government assignments and the prosecution process to the citizenry without any religious or national discrimination. The common purpose both in the "Noble Rescript of the Rose Garden" and the "Imperial Reform Decree" that formed the

"Reorganisation" *(Tanzimat)* process was to institutionalise the idea of equal citizenship. This idea of "equal citizenship" enhanced nationalist feelings and the demand for freedom among the communities of the Empire (Hanioglu, 2008, pp.72-92; Johnson, 1982, p.3). Most importantly, the Sultan endeavoured to prolong the Empire's life through these new institutions.

One of the remarkable characteristics of the *Tanzimat* era was the emergence of the new bureaucratic class as an increasing influence over the modernisation process. As the closest advisers to the Sultan, Mustafa Resid, Kececizade Fuat and Sadrazam Mehmet Emin Ali Pashas were leading statesmen, who prepared the foundations of the Imperial Rescripts and Decrees. It is surely beyond doubt that along with their educational backgrounds, the most important factor that shaped the intellectual approaches of these reformers was their experience as Ottoman ambassadors in European capitals. Along with their followers, they believed in Western ideas and ideals as the unique guidance of a true modernisation. The new bureaucrats developed political ideas on the "European dual principles of the sanctity of private property and constitutional restraints on the authority of the sultan, hitherto absolute" which were highly unfamiliar to Ottoman political life. This ideological antagonism between the Sultan and the new civil-military bureaucrats became a significant reason for the struggle that would continue until the end of the Empire (Ahmad, 2002, p.25). The invention of the "truly Westernisation" idea formed a critical juncture in Ottoman politics. Unlike the previous reform efforts, this conceding directed the decision makers to embrace a holistic approach on the modernisation instead of a monistic transformation of the military in the light of the European experience.

The *Tanzimat* policies left influential legacies on the civil-military relations of modern Turkey. One of these was the increase in the number of military training institutions. Following the policy of Sultan Mahmud II, military leaders of the Tanzimat intensified their efforts in establishing new military schools to meet the need for qualified officers. In their quest for a complete institutionalisation of military education; primary, secondary, and high schools were founded. Each of the regional armies was ordered to set up its own primary and secondary schools within a zone of responsibility. Furthermore, the military established trade and medical colleges in order to become more professional. These institutionalisation policies had profound effects on socio-political and cultural spheres. These institutions provided opportunities for those families which sought a bright future for their sons. The special educational system dedicated to the art of war evolved its institutional rules and norms, which

instituted corporate identity and social homogeneity for cadets. Along with their civilian counterparts, these military schools raised a new generation, as "the vanguard of enlightenment", who advocated the European way of government against the absolute rule of the Sultan. Some bright graduates of these military academies became leading figures, who determined the Empire's destiny. These cadres have also played crucial roles in the foundation of modern Turkey (Hale, 1994, p.24).

Another significant legacy of the *Tanzimat* era to modern Turkey was the establishment of the Gendarmerie. In order to maintain peace and order in rural regions, this institution was set up in 1846 on provincial and district levels (Hale, 1994, p.23). It was equipped with administrative, military and judicial duties and powers. Since its foundation, the Gendarmerie has been the first military institution that ordinary citizens encounter in the countryside. In the eyes of the country folks of Turkey, the institution has been identified with the state. Due to its being a nationwide organisation, the Gendarmerie has been a very purposeful organisation in implementing state and military policies since the *Tanzimat Era*. As chapter four reveals, the institution has been one of the most strategic implementers of the tutelary regime over civilian politics throughout the decades in the multi-party era.

3.4 Young Turks, Constitutional Order and Coups D'état

The emergence of the idea of "true Westernisation" produced a critical juncture in Ottoman politics. As mentioned earlier, the modernisation process bred a new type of elite, who believed in Westernisation as a vital requirement for the survival of the state. Consisting mainly of mid-level civil-military bureaucrats, journalists and thinkers, this "new class of reformists" was named the "Young Ottomans". The movement was formed as a secret society in 1865 (Mardin, 2000, p.10) to defend European constitutionalism in the Ottoman state rejecting the absolutist regime of the Sultan. For them, those who possess western knowledge can govern the state better than anyone else (Heper, 2000, p.68; Lapidus, 2002, pp.496-497). Indoctrinating with this idea, civilian and officer members of society thought themselves superior. This elitist cognitive framework became a significant determinant among the military and civil bureaucrats reproducing the interventionist mindset in late Ottoman and modern Turkish politics.

Paradoxically, the most challenging result of Ottoman modernisation against the Ottoman Sultan can be traced through the ideological transformation of the civil-military bureaucrats. One of the key targets of the modernisation efforts was to secure the shaken authority of the Sultan. The Western bureaucracy system of the era was taken as a model to achieve this aim. However, reconstruction of the education system and bureaucracy in this way created "revolutionary" groups that were impressed by European ideas. These groups admired the European style of government, which possessed fundamental differences with the absolutist regime of the Sultan. This ideological differentiation created the biggest "internal threat" against the rule of the Sultan. In this sense, the emergence of the *"Young Ottomans"* and *"Young Turks"* respectively paved the way for a constitutional order, which was an apodictic objection to absolute monarchy. The fact what the young cadres were rejecting about the Sultan was his absolutist position over the state. Though they were not going after the idea of abolition of the Sultanate, they aimed at constructing a constitutional order in which the monarch would share his authority with the peoples. With the help of western powers, these civil-military groups forced the Sultan to promulgate the first Constitution of the Empire in 1876 (Hale, 1994, p.25).

Although there were other several factors that paved the way for a constitutional life, it was a clandestine organisation composed of senior military and civilian bureaucrats, who took key posts in the heart of the Ottoman Palace, compelled the Sultan to accept the introduction of constitutionalism after long intra-palace conflicts. Due to heavy military defeats and political and financial turmoil, some senior military and civilian bureaucrats, who were also leaders of the secret Young Ottomans Society, decided to topple Sultan Abdulaziz with support of some other elite groups in May 1876. He was deposed the day after, and his nephew Murad V was proclaimed as the new Sultan by the junta. The coup d'état exacerbated the political turmoil and caused endless clashes in the Empire. The deposed Sultan Abdulaziz was found dead in his exile amid a suspicious sequence of events that was orchestrated by the junta. The new Sultan, Murad V, was deposed 93 days after his accession by the same group, due to his mental illness which deteriorated during the coup period. One of the two key leaders of the junta, Serasker Hüseyin Avni (Head Staff Officer) and four other senior junta members were killed by a staff captain, who was the brother-in-law of Sultan Abdulaziz (Oztuna, 2003, pp.55-80). In the next era, senior commanders took crucial roles during political conflicts that would determine the fate of the Empire. Thus, the "path-dependency" of the Ottoman

modernisation brought the military man along with some civil bureaucrats to the top of the political arena against the Sultan who was the owner of the state.

With the accession of Abdulhamid II to the throne, the first Ottoman constitution was promulgated, and the first parliament was instituted synchronously. His first years on the throne and his way of governing were shaped by the trauma of the calamitous war of 1877-78 with Russia. The Ottoman Empire lost enormous territorial ground and prestige in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus by the end of the war in 1878 (Karabelias, 2004, pp.147-148). Externally, the Sultan tried to minimise the risk of war with his old enemies by taking advantage of disagreements among the Great Powers on international politics. Shelving the constitution just two years after its promulgation, he followed an absolute one-man-rule at home due to the legacies left by the coup d'état and related incidents during the reigns of his predecessors, Sultan Abdulaziz and Murad V. To secure his authority, he restricted all freedoms granted by the 1876 constitution. Against the prorogation of the parliament *sine die* in 1878 and heavy state-censorship of the opposition, the constitutionalist circles established secret networks for the sake of defending fundamental rights and freedoms. Again, in these struggles, officer-corps were at the forefront of the political opposition (Oztuna, 2003: pp.90-95).

One of the significant legacies of Abdulhamid II, who was the most oppressive leader of the last decades of the Ottomans, can be traced through his efforts on technical innovations and investments in civil-military education. He initiated a programme to construct railways and telegraph lines that aimed to cover all strategic points of the Empire. He attached great importance to increasing the number of modern-style state schools in different regions of the Empire. During his reign, it can be argued that in terms of quality and quantity, the level of educational institutions was increased to its highest in comparison with the past. Higher educational institutions for law, commerce, medicine, and veterinary sciences became important bases for modern education, along with military and civil service colleges. On the other hand, the Sultan built a close relationship with the Prussian Empire, in order to import "secrets of modern warfare". He invited a large Prussian advisory group, under the command of Colonel Freiherr von der Goltz, to reorganise the Ottoman army in 1883. Colonel Von der Goltz stayed for twelve years in Istanbul where he coordinated the reorganisation of the Ottoman army in the light of the Prussian experience. *The Nation in Arms,* Von der Goltz's well-known work, became one the most famous and influential books among the Ottoman officers. During this period, the conscription system was extended, and the total number of

various forces was raised to their desired level. Concurrently, the Gendarmerie was expanded and restructured with the guidance of the Prussian officers. The military education system was reorganised, and the curricula of military colleges were rearranged in the light of the European experiences. Military logistics were renewed, with new armaments bought from Prussia (Hale, 1994, pp.27-29).

As a result of this institutional enhancement and modernist indoctrination of the officers, the military was asserted as a "progressive class" in the Empire (Karabelias, 2004, p.148). This Prussian military assistance also became a significant factor which shaped the mindset of prospective officers. These officers, who were deeply influenced by *"The Nation in Arms"* (Von der Goltz, 1914) and the Prussian experience of state-military-society relations in the nineteenth century, would be the key officers of the Turkish War of Independence after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Taken with the British and French contributions in the previous decades, the Prussian guidance during the late 19th century shows that the evolution of the modern Turkish military has been a product of the major European powers of the era.

As mentioned above, the politicisation of the cadets through the clandestine groups against the Sultan at the military colleges is a significant point in understanding the Ottoman modernisation and modern Turkish civil-military relations. This politicisation gained significant momentum throughout the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II. The autocratic approach of the Sultan against any opposition directed the dissidents to establish secret political organisations. A considerable number of radical opponents were sent into exile. Ideas and writings of those exiled figures, who were inspired by western thinkers, developed the intellectual backgrounds of young cadets at military schools (Rustow, 1959, p.515).

Seeds of the most vigorous opposition to Sultan Abdulhamid II were sowed at the military medical school of Istanbul in 1889. Four medical cadets, under the leadership of Ibrahim Temo, a Muslim Albanian, secretly established the Ottoman Union Society. The society was renamed as the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) later, and eventually coordinated the "Young Turk Revolution" (Ramsaur, 1957) against the Sultan who shelved the new constitutional order for a long time. The CUP organised in strict confidence and its chief aim was to restore the constitutional system that was shelved in 1878. For the Committee, the biggest obstacle to freedom and progress was the Sultan. Therefore, he had to be deposed. In a short span of time, the society became the most influential group that acquired members from various backgrounds. The first coup attempt by the CUP was nipped in the bud by the Palace

forces in 1896. All the plotters were either imprisoned or banished. Ahmed Riza and Prince Sabahaddin, leaders of the exiled reformists in Europe, developed the intellectual foundations of the movement. These activists saw themselves as the vanguards of the "Ottoman Enlightenment" and expressed their ideas through newspaper publishing (Hale, 1994, p.30). This cognisance was transmitted to young cadets and officers through newspapers, which were secretly circulated in the military schools and garrisons. Such "congregational self-praise" constructed an elitist approach among members of the CUP that would bear founders of the new Turkish Republic. It is possible to say that the idea of forming secret organisations by the officers against undesirable governments in the multi-party era of the Republic has been inherited from the cultural-cognitive framework established by the CUP officers in the late Ottoman era.

Dissidence between two masterminds, Ahmed Riza and Prince Sabahaddin, on the formation and substance of the "Young Turk Revolution" played a crucial role over the ideological evolution of the CUP. Ahmed Riza developed the concept of sustaining a powerful-centralised government that would consolidate its relationship with Ottoman-Muslim subjects, which was to become known as the "Unionist" approach (Zurcher, 1984, pp.2-6). On the other hand, Prince Sabahaddin, a liberal thinker, favoured decentralisation and struggled for an accord with non-Muslim populations and their European supporters. These two incompatible interpretations and the collision between their advocates brought about a sharp political division, in which the constitutionalists would follow separate paths after the 1908 military intervention. However, both sections were aware of the necessity of the support of active officers to make significant progress toward their constitutionalist plans (Hale, 1994, p.31).

Throughout the last two decades of the Empire, the officer-corps engaged in political activities much more than their professional duties. Forming secret societies to give an end to the autocratic rule of the Sultan and securing the survival of the state became a well-known method of political struggle among dissident junior officers. In this sense, an influential organisation, the Fatherland and Liberty Society *(Vatan ve Hurriyet Firkasi),* was established by Mustafa Kemal and his friends. He, who would be the founder of the new Turkey Republic in 1923, was then a little-known General Staff lieutenant, and played crucial roles in the Committee and earned a reputation among the young officers. In order to be more effective, opposition groups combined their forces under the umbrella of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) on the eve of the 1908 intervention. By the alliance of the opposition, several

military insurrections erupted in various provinces of the Empire (cited by Johnson, 1982, p.4).

Under the leadership of the CUP, these revolts continued for two months and compelled Sultan Abdulhamid II to restore the constitution in July 1908, which he had suspended thirty years ago. The CUP appointed a veteran statesman of the old regime as prime minister (*sadrazam* in Turkish) just after the intervention, because the Empire was traditionally not accustomed to the ruling of young officers and civil bureaucrats. Instead of taking part in the cabinet directly, the revolutionists governed behind the scenes and the CUP deployed itself (Zurcher, 2010, p.75) as a sort of "latent supra-governmental body" over the system, which had no legal responsibility. By doing so, the Committee aimed to secure the secrecy of its members and stand clear of the abrasive impact of governing.

The covert and overt influence of the CUP over the governments in which military officers took place with civilian figures endured more than ten years with massive political turmoil. Although the CUP ideology deeply influenced a great number of young officers, the military of that era was not a monolithic institution. There were older generations within the army who were monarchist and staunch supporters of the Sultan, and against the CUP idea. Accelerated the collapse of the state, this division between the officers caused a total politicisation of the military which paved way for relentless political conflicts between the fractions. Following the restoration of the constitution and the parliament, the ultimate goal of the revolutionists was the reconstruction of the shattered Ottoman state following the modern European examples, with a powerful alliance of its subjects. The on-going conflict between the unionists and the "liberals" paved the way for a single-party despotism of the Committee of Union and Progress. Throughout the rule of CUP governments, influential military members of the Union were in charge of all internal and external affairs. The absolute control of the state power was dominated by the famous triumvirate of the CUP; Enver, Cemal and Talat Pashas. The first two young staff officers were among the leading figures of the revolution and the third was a well-known civilian bureaucrat. Thanks to his close relationship with the Sultan and personal assertiveness, Enver Pasha was appointed as the Minister of War and Deputy Commander in Chief, thereby becoming the most powerful actor of the Empire. Only two or three cabinet members were informed while Enver Pasha was secretly negotiating an alliance with Germany that would subject the Empire to a disastrous defeat in the Great War. Thus, the high ideals of the CUP on modernism and constitutionalism were turned into a despotic rule and primitive partisanship (Rustow, 1959, p.516).

As mentioned above, during those years, the military was "neither monolithic nor did it act in unison". Since the very beginning of the century, there was a massive ideological polarisation among the military members. The most influential parties were "Jacobin" revolutionists that were radical members of the CUP and "liberal" advocates of the "Young Turk" movement. On the other hand, most of the middle and low-ranking officers were conservatives, who mutinied twice to rebuild the Abdulhamid Sultanate in October 1908 and April 1909 respectively. The revolt instigated in April 1909, known as the "31 March Incident", turned into a wide scale "counter-revolution" that was supported by various groups, which were negatively affected for different reasons by the 1908 coup. The shaken authority of the government in Istanbul was reinforced by forces sent from the Macedonia province. The uprising was quelled by loyalist brigades in a relatively short period of time, and the Committee took punitive measures along with severe sanctions against the rebel groups. Following the proclamation of martial law, Sultan Abdulhamid II was deposed and his brother Mehmed V inherited the throne under the aegis of the CUP. Throughout his nine-year sultanate, the state was ruled *de facto* by the Committee. Although the uprising was repressed in a relatively short period of time, it left an indelible imprint on the revolutionists and their successors. The uprising was supported by several groups. However, the Committee described the incident as a "religious reaction" (*irtica)* against the revolution that restored the constitution in 1908*.* The '31 March Incident' was employed as a symbol against the "danger" of "religious reaction" *(irtica)* in Turkish politics. Successors of the CUP frequently drew a close analogy between this incident and political revolts which erupted during the first decades of the new Turkish Republic. The path-dependency of the "religious reaction danger" has become an important instrument of the military when it has guarded the Republic against the "internal threats". It has been used by secularists against approaches and incidents that are not compatible with their secular way of thinking (Ahmad, 2002, p.2, pp.5-6; Zurcher, 2010, pp.76- 83).

The deep political polarisation among the officers and the army's perpetual messing with daily politics caused a disastrous defeat that culminated in the loss of a vast amount of territory throughout the Balkans in 1913. During the CUP government rule, hundreds of the dissident officers were drummed out of the army (Hale, 1994, p.32). The intervention of 1908 and subsequent political conflicts that were led by military actors symbolised a peak point in military intervention in the history of Turkish politics, which created an unalterable path in favour of the officer-corps for almost a century. "The Young Turkish Revolution of 1908 can

be seen as a model for military intervention in politics . . . it was a military operation which seized power, and it was followed by other military operations in 1909 and 1913 until the plenitude of power was concentrated in one junta" (Johnson, 1982, p.4; Mango, 1972, p.116). Although the CUP was unseated as a result of the Ottoman defeat in the Great War, it left an enduring legacy on modern Turkish politics which could be conceived as "the Unionist tradition" in the state affairs, the military's regular involvement in politics.

3.5 The New Turkish Republic: Founding Philosophy, Military and Emergence of the Guardian of the New State

The Ottoman Empire was obliged to sign the Mondros Armistice with the Allied Powers (the UK, France, Russia, Italy, and the US) because of the disastrous defeat in the Great War in October 1918. The overall meaning of the Armistice signalled the end of an Empire that had held a place in world history for around six centuries. The end of the Empire represented a "critical juncture" in terms of the military`s role in Turkish politics. Along with other fatal sanctions, all elements of the Ottoman army were demobilised, and military headquarters outside Anatolia were captured by the Allies. All strategic cities, ports, railways, and straits were taken over by the winners of the World War I. The invasion of Anatolia by the British, French, and Italian forces created a path in which "the Turkish National Struggle" ultimately set up a new state in 1923. Though it was greatly decimated throughout the First World War, the military was able to maintain its institutional structure and chain of command, especially in Eastern Anatolia. Because of the ruination of other political forces, the military and its officer-corps took leadership of the National Struggle in the post-1918 era (Rustow, 1959, pp.519-520). This historical juncture inheld several dynamics that set the stage for policies which would deploy the military at the heart of the new Turkish politics. Synchronously, Turkish national decadence and the invasion of Anatolia produced a new political and military leadership that would map out the path of Turkish political, social, economic, and cultural existence.

Following the fatal sanctions of the Armistice, several approaches were voiced on saving Anatolia from the invasion. At this turning point, one of the most notable and talented officers of the disbanded Ottoman military, who was "a genius in organising", Mustafa Kemal, emerged as the leader of the Turkish National Struggle (Tachau&Heper, 1983, p.19). In the

light of his Fatherland and Liberty Society experience which was mentioned above; Mustafa Kemal, who has been given "*Ataturk*, father of the Turks in Turkish" as a surname by the parliament in 1934, pioneered the establishment of the "Defence Associations". It was these organisations that would prepare political and social substructures of the national struggle for independence (Johnson, 1982, p.5). It is surely beyond doubt that the most significant success of these associations ahead of the "Independence War" (May 1919- July 1923) was their creation of collective cognition and ideal on resistance against the invasion. The national struggle, based on this cognitive framework, resulted in a victory which set the stage for the proclamation of the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in October 1923.

As the founder and the first president of the new state, Mustafa Kemal launched a radical, top-down modernisation and nation-building programme just after the proclamation of the Republic. His dominance of state affairs, in this period, emerged as an example of the identification of the state with its leader for which he served as president, head of government and the real leader of the military until he died in 1938 (Unsaldi, 2008, pp.45-47).

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk`s reform programme, which would be termed as "Kemalism" by his followers, was based on six principles: Republicanism, populism, secularism, revolutionism, nationalism and etatism (Kili, 1980, pp.390-395). There were two central aims of this programme; to establish a strong "nation-state" that would be interiorised with a high-level of patriotism and nationalism by its citizenry and to modernise the whole society. The modernity or the civilisation that was indicated by the Kemalists was the civilisation of the contemporary Western European civilisation. In this context, it can be stated that the reform programme of the Kemalist era was a continuation of the Young Turk Revolution analysed in the previous section. However, the Kemalist reform agenda was much more radical than that of the Young Turks. One of the significant components of this radical modernisation process was its secularist approach to the state-religion relationship. According to the Kemalist ideology, secularism was to be a *sine qua non* in the new Turkish state that presupposed new secular institutions and secularist individuals. To achieve this objective in a pious society, Mustafa Kemal and his followers implemented a wide range of "top to bottom" reform programmes in every sphere of life between 1924 and 1937 (Zurcher, 2007, p.95).

The new state envisaged an exclusionary and "assertive" laicism that will be analysed in chapter seven. As a top-down method of modernisation which was a continuation of the idea

of renewal based on an elitist understanding, it was the secular republic what to be the best for the state and society. Each step of the reform programme implemented under the six principles of Kemalism, which have been much studied by the students of history and politics. What ought to be enunciated in this context is the role given to the military during that era and the impacts of this role on the evolution of civil-military relations as it is going to reveal the path-dependency of the state-building process.

The new republic has been established upon the ashes and heritage of the Ottoman Empire although the Kemalist ideology officially rejects the Ottoman past. Along with other elements, the most influential legacy during the establishment process was the officer corps. They were the commanders of the collapsed Ottoman military, who orchestrated the "Liberation War" between 1919 and 1923. To be more precise, twelve of the seventeen Ottoman generals of the disastrous Great War dedicated themselves to the national struggle under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, and only a few of them took side with the old regime (Lerner and Robinson, 1960, p.25). The military of the new state was built on the intellectual and institutional accumulation of the Ottoman military, which meant that those officers who believed in and engaged with the national struggle became the nucleus of the Turkish Armed Forces (Karabelias, 2008, p.6). As examined in the previous section, most of the Ottoman officers were passionately involved in politics and divided into rival cliques. The military exhausted because of the political rivalry of the officers and defeats on the battlefield throughout the Young Turk and the CUP eras. The catastrophic defeat in the Great War and the invasion of Anatolia deepened this institutional crisis in the military. It was necessary to get a handle on this crisis. Mustafa Kemal set about reconstructing the military as an efficacious and combatant institution, in order to manage the national struggle against the occupying forces, and he aimed to put an end to the political fragmentation of the military members. He achieved his goals with victory gained during the War of Independence in 1923 (Hale, 2011, p.191). Along with other significant achievements, being able to give an end to the deep polarisation among the officers was one of his great successes.

Mustafa Kemal's approach to the officers' involvement in politics is of great importance to this study as he was the theorist behind the founding philosophy of the new state. It is generally expressed that Mustafa Kemal had endeavoured to prevent the politicisation of the military. However, owing to the fact that he had involved in so many political activities during his military career in the late Ottoman era, various aspects of this issue have to be analysed. To lay bare this matter is of great significance, because as the founder of the new

Turkish state and president until he died in 1938; Ataturk's philosophy, policy preferences and discourses became decisive factors shaping the institutional, sociological and cultural frameworks of Turkish civil-military relations.

As a staff captain in 1905, Mustafa Kemal took part in the foundation of the Fatherland and Freedom, a clandestine society which was set up to save the Ottoman State from collapsing and to struggle against the autocratic rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II (Mango, 1999). He then joined the ranks of the CUP in 1908. It is known that he clashed with some leaders of the Union, especially with Enver, (Zurcher, 2009, pp.2-3) over several policies that the Union established. In the second congress of the CUP in 1909, he declared how he felt uncomfortable about the extreme politicisation of military members of the Union. He uttered the same reservations as the head of state in the Turkish National Assembly in 1927 (Hale, 2011, pp.191-192):

> "Commanders, while thinking of and carrying out the duties and requirements of the army, must take care not to let political considerations influence their judgement. They must not forget that there are other officials whose duty it is to think of the political aspects. A soldier's duty cannot be performed with talk and politicking."

It can be argued that his criticism of officers for being politicised holds paradoxical elements in itself that is to say he himself engaged in political activities up to that time. However, when the zeitgeist is taken into account, this kind of opposition against the policies of a ruling dictatorial party ought to be asserted as a well-developed analysis on the possible results of political fragmentation of the officer-corps of an Empire that was on the verge of collapse. In fact, the political schism among the officer-corps was one of the main reasons for the disastrous defeat in the Balkan Wars in 1913.

The first three years of the Republic witnessed an intense political rivalry between Mustafa Kemal and some influential commanders such as Generals Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Cafer Tayyar Egilmez and Refet Bele. They were Mustafa Kemal's closest friends during the War of Independence. As influential leaders of the military that won the struggle for survival, these senior commanders believed that they served as much as Mustafa Kemal did for independence and had the right to voice their opinions regarding the establishment of the new state. Secondly, some commanders were uncomfortable with some of Mustafa Kemal's policies regarding state-religion relations, such as the annulment of the Caliphate. On

the other hand, Mustafa Kemal was worried about threats to his leadership and about policies developed by these military figures that also held political positions in the Grand National Assembly until 1924. To prevent any political conflict among military officers and to minimise the risk of further opposition against his leadership, Mustafa Kemal pioneered the enactment of certain legal arrangements to regulate the political activities of officers. In late 1923, the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a law (Law No. 385) declared that officers who wished to become a candidate in the future parliamentary election must resign from the military. This regulation forced active officers to make a choice between military service and politics. In 1924, following the annulment of the institution of Caliphate, the chief of general staff and head of the Turkish Armed Forces, was made directly accountable to the president, Mustafa Kemal Pasha. With this regulation, any prospective parliamentary oversight regarding the military was eliminated and the president became the absolute ruler of the military. The first organic law of the Republic, issued in 1924, constitutionalised the regulation of Law 385 through Article 23: "A person is not permitted to be a deputy and hold another government post at the same time." Undoubtedly, this article was *erga omnes*; but, considering the power struggle between Mustafa Kemal and some generals during early 1920s, one can argue that the prime collocutor of this provision was the active officers who might support the dissident group. Most of the opponent officers resigned from their military posts and preferred to concentrate on politics after these legal arrangements. On the other hand, most officers who preferred the military instead of politics were strict followers of Mustafa Kemal (Hale, 2011, pp.192-193).

One of the critical trends of the 1924 Constitution was its "civilianisation" policy in the making of state agencies which would profoundly impact civil-military relations in Turkey. For instance, Article 40 of the constitution declared that: "Supreme command of the army is vested in the Grand National Assembly, which is represented by the president of the Republic. The command of the military forces in time of peace shall be entrusted, according to a special law, to the chief of staff, and in time of war to the person designated by the president of the Republic, with the advice of the cabinet and the approval of the Grand National Assembly." In the same direction, the Constitution necessitated parliamentary approval for the declaration of martial law that would be in progress for more than a month (Earle, 1925, p.93).

The last battle between Mustafa Kemal and dissident generals erupted in 1924 and resulted in the former's favour. Because of an alleged assassination plot against Mustafa Kemal, influential members of the opposition most of whom had not even had any information about

the event were tried and sentenced (Lerner and Robinson, 1960, p.20). Their socio-political life and reputation were destroyed. By wiping out his opponents from politics, Mustafa Kemal concentrated on a thorough implementation of his reform programme. In this critical juncture which would determine the fate of a country and future of civil-military relations, his policy preferences positioned the military as the most influential agency within the state system. Mustafa Kemal, as mentioned previously, aimed at establishing a Western-type, secular and strong state that would be "one of the most respected polities of the civilised world". The military and its human capital, in this regard, served on two crucial points. Firstly, with its strengthened organisational structure since the War of Independence, the military became a significant component of the "strong state" ideal. Secondly, the officer corps who had been indoctrinated with the pro-western thoughts and feelings since the *Tanzimat Era* was appraised as the most reliable group by Mustafa Kemal on the arduous path of building a secular, nation-state. Throughout this transformation process, the military dedicated absolute institutional loyalty to Mustafa Kemal, who was a triumphant soldier, but later, preferred to govern the new state as a civilian. It can be stated that this kind of mutual trust and civilian supremacy- if the founder father of the state who was a famous former commander would be accepted as a civilian- is a rare exception in Turkish political history. As a witness of the political fragmentation and conflicts within the military during the Young Turk Era, Mustafa Kemal proposed legal regulations that forbid the officer-corps from meddling in daily politics. However, from the pivotal role of the military throughout the radical modernisation process and its influence on the "high politics" of the Republic, one can deduce that the primary purpose of these regulations was to strengthen the loyalty of the military to its leader, Mustafa Kemal, and the Republic (Karabelias, 2008, pp.6-7) instead of forming a "democratic" civil-military relations.

As stated above, the role given to the military by Mustafa Kemal in the new Turkey was more far-reaching than securing the nation against foreign threats. It was to be the engine of the reforms that were considered crucial for the westernisation of the state and society. The military, as the most "enlightened" institution of the Republic, was supposed to be the vanguard and "unyielding" advocate of Kemalist ideals. A reflection of this policy was observed by the assignments of human capital that would govern the new state and reform agenda (Johnson, 1982, pp.6-7). Those figures who had a military background became the most preferred persons for appointments to leading state institutions, in which they could also supervise the political activities of various social groups. They served as prime minister,

cabinet member, member of parliament, undersecretary, and some other leading roles throughout the single-party era. For instance, it was as late as 1948 before no bureaucrat with a military background had a ministerial post (Rustow, 1959, p.551).

In order to realise Turkey's radical modernisation, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and military elites sought absolute obedience of the society to the Kemalist principles of revolutionism, republicanism, secularism, statism, populism and nationalism. These principles were imposed on socio-political life as the unique guidelines on the path to westernisation. These norms were constitutionalised in 1937 and utilised by the military class to justify its privileged position on political and societal transformation throughout the early decades of the Republic (Karabelias, 2008, pp.6-7).

These policy preferences on the role of the military were enrooted through public speeches delivered by Ataturk. His discourses have been of prime importance in the creation and reproduction of public cognisance regarding the role of the military in politics. They have also formed the basis of informal institutions through which the generals would shape daily politics in Turkey. For instance, in February 1931, Ataturk addressed the people of Konya province in the Central Anatolia saying:

> "Whenever the Turkish nation has wanted to take a step up, it has always looked to the army…as the leader of movements to achieve lofty national ideals…When speaking of the army, I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country…The Turkish nation…considers its army the guardian of its ideals." (ctd.by Harris, 1965, p.55)

Similarly, in 1937, he said in a public speech that:

> "The army, which is the great school of national discipline, will help and assist especially in our economic, cultural, and social struggles."

This cognisance facilitating the militarisation of the society has been reproduced and handed down to the next generations through textbooks and lectures in military schools and academies. Chapter four and six analyse these indoctrinations in both military and civilian spheres. Namely, young cadets are proud to be members of the military, which was seen as the most trusted group by the founder of the Turkish state, rather than civilians. Thus, the officer-corps have proclaimed themselves as the "real owner and guardian of the secular

Republic". In parallel with this indoctrination, the conscription system which has designed compulsory military service for each Turkish male citizen over 18 years of age, imbued members of society with the supreme role and power of the military within the state system. The impacts of the indoctrination through military schools and conscription on civil-military relations are to be examined in the next chapter. These institutions have created their own path-dependencies which have clinched the power of the military within the socio-political system.

The guardian role was codified by Article 35 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Act in 1935. The code promulgated that: "The duty of the armed forces is to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey, as determined in the Constitution". This tutelary regulation, which was institutionalised by the military juntas of the following decades, has become the most salient characteristics of the anti-democratic Turkish civil-military relations. As chapter seven analyses, junta leaders and pro-coup officers in the following decades have utilised Article 35 of the Act as the "legitimate" source of their intervention in politics. They have argued that the constitutional system ordered the military not only to secure the country but also to guard and fight for the Kemalist, secular Republic (Hale, 2011, p.195). In chapter four and chapter six, the path-dependent impact of this enactment and indoctrination over the political cognisance of the soldiers and civil-military relations is to be analysed in depth.

3.6 Conclusion

As a joint output of historical, sociological, cultural, and geographical determinants, the military has become one of the most influential and enduring institutions in the Turkish state apparatus for centuries. It has been a major power which has a huge influence over socio-political life.

Along with other well-established institutions, the powerful armed forces of the Ottomans had served to the state in the course of being one of the dominant powers in the world politics for long periods. The Ottoman decline shows parallelism with the degeneration of the military. Therefore, the Sultan, who was the owner of the state, sought a remedy in modernising his military to sustain the survival of his polity. Such a preference on the way of modernisation had made the military epicentre of renewal and transformation, which paved the way for endless conflicts between the reformists and supporters of the status quo. The Ottoman modernisation was a model of the top-down transformation process in which the elites decided what to be the best for the state and society. Similarly, the Republican interpretation of westernisation has been an elitist designing of the state and society. That is why entering into the constitutional life has not brought inclusive rules, norms, and values into the socio-political life.

The secret Unionist organisation of the young officers along with their civilian peers against the regime caused deep hostilities among the soldiers within the same barracks, which accelerated the downfall of the Ottoman State. Though the young reformers attained a historical success against the absolutist monarchy, they sustained the authoritarian state culture by canonising the state instead of institutionalising freedom, equality, and justice for all. This statism would be one of the most influential norms which have fed the anti-democratic political culture in Turkey.

Another long-standing legacy of the CUP tradition over the new era has been its self-praised patriotism, which has constituted an important feature of the institutional identity of the Turkish military since 1923. For this reason, as "the most patriot institution", it is the duty and right of the military to intervene in politics if it is needed for the sake of the fatherland. The politicisation of the military reached a peak because of the CUP idea.

Military leaders of the War of the Turkish Independence were graduates of the western-style military academies which had been established during the Ottoman modernisation process.

Therefore, this institutional continuity has created its path-dependency in terms of interpretation of military education in the new era.

Although the major purpose of the Republican movement was to establish a western-style new state, the outcome was not more than the authoritarian reflection of the traditional Turkish culture which sanctifies the state apparatus. In this new form of state-building, although the Sultanate and Caliphate had been established, there was no place for transparency, critical thinking, respect for differences but absolute obedience to the state and teachings of the Kemalist Ideology.

Turkish civil-military relations have developed under the codes of an authoritarian state culture. Policies implemented under the secularist and nationalist paradigms of the authoritarian state have had profound impacts on the public and individual lives. While these paradigms of the regime have excluded any national and religious diversity except from the Turkish nationalism and a Sunni-Islam interpretation described by the state, they simultaneously formed the basis for ethnic and religious opposition which had crucial influences on the path of civil-military relations in the new state. These issues are to be analysed in the following chapters.

The ideological path to the Westernisation was determined as a kind of social engineering of an eastern society that was poorly trained, rural, and patriarchal. This social engineering model has excluded democratic rules, norms and values which could have institutionalised a democratic civil-military model in the country.

Thanks to the historical legacy, and its roles in the Independence War and formation process of the new state, the military continued its influential position in the Republican era. The foundational philosophy of the secular, nation-state and the law enacted in 1935 has authorised the military as the guardian of the Republic. Such a designation has created an irrecoverable, path-dependent state configuration in which the military would create its tutelage over politics in the next decades.

CHAPTER 4: CONSTANT INTERACTIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONS AND REPRODUCTION OF THE MILITARY TUTELAGE

"I am proud of you Gokcen! And not just I, but the whole Turkish nation that has been following this incident very closely is proud of you. . . We are a military-nation. From ages seven to seventy, women and men alike, we have been created as soldiers." (After an airstrike in 1937 on Tunceli-then Dersim, an anti-regime, Alawi province of Turkey, from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to his adopted daughter Sabiha Gokcen who became the first woman fighter pilot in the world.)(Cited by Altinay, 2004, p.13)

4.1 Introduction

The powerful dominance of the military in Turkish politics over the previous decades has deep historical, cultural, and societal roots. As stated in chapter three, the officer-corps was the vanguard class of the modernisation process, which became, on the one hand, a bridge between the Ottoman Empire and the new Turkish Republic. On the other hand, the officer-corps commanded the foundation process in which a new state rose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Through the 'guardianship' role that was bestowed on it, the military became the most loyal body to the Kemalist revolution in which a kind of social-engineering model was conducted.

To a large extent, Turkish politics is a history of coups d'état as the military has directly intervened in political rule four times in the multi-party era. The latest fully-fledged intervention, the coup staged in 1980, secured the military tutelage over politics. Both the free elections staged in 1983 and the new Constitution, endorsed under the military junta in 1982, ushered in a new era in Turkish democracy under the shadow of powerful generals. If the last few years are exempted, then the military tutelage over political life has been effectively maintained. In this respect, it is of great importance to analyse how this tutelage has been established and secured its presence. Despite resulting in high costs for society, the questions remain as to how the Turkish military gained societal legitimacy and through what kind of dynamics it has perpetuated its influence throughout the multi-party era?

This chapter develops its analysis around three pillars of the historical institutionalism. It argues that a three-legged mechanism, consisting of societal, educational, and executive frames, has maintained the military influence in politics. Reproduced by a powerful historical, institutional, and cultural legacy, this triumvirate generates a continual interaction among regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements. Accordingly, as a living mechanism, the triumvirate has been nourished by policies and practises conducted throughout society, military schools, and executive bodies. In the first place, the chapter deals with the societal aspect of this mechanism. In a society where the 'nation-in-arms' policy, which was based on the Prussian model, was implemented; it is of great significance to reveal how compulsory military service has procured an enduring societal legitimacy for the military. Relatedly, the second section presents the ways that normative and cultural-cognitive frameworks have influenced individual lives and passed militaristic values down through the generations. Despite growing questioning in the last years, the section shows just how powerful the institution of compulsory military service is thanks to the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive pillars that reinforce it.

The subsequent section is concerned with the autonomous structure of military education and the making of officers in military schools[8]. In the first place, the transformative role of military schools in Turkish modernisation will be explained briefly. Secondly, the ideology and indoctrination processes, through which the mindset of cadets are shaped, is discussed. This includes the norms, values, common frames, and patterns of belief, which give meaning to 'the world of the officer-corps' vis-à-vis civilians. In this sense, and in line with the 'custodian role' given to the military, the way in which officers are prepared to perform the 'duty' is explained. Two approaches to the concept of professionalism (Huntington and Finer) are compared and implemented to analyse the influence of the professionalization of the officer-corps over civil-military relations in the Turkish context.

In the third section, the executive leg of the triumvirate, by which generals have maintained tutelage over socio-political life for more than four decades, is analysed. The constitutional and legal powers given to the National Security Council (NSC) and the Supreme Military Council (SMC) have become the most influential rules, which have circumscribed elected governments' room for political manoeuvre until the early 2000s. In this respect, the national security understanding developed by the 1982 Constitution, and the practices of the soldier-

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[8] This chapter focuses on the role of the military schools in line with the scope of this study covering the research theme until 2011.The military schools have been shut down by the Erdogan regime after the failed coup attempt in July 2016.

dominant Council, are discussed. On the other hand, the Supreme Military Council, another soldier-dominant executive body, which determines military policies and human resources management of the armed forces, is discussed with particular attention to its influence over civil-military relations. This agency is also discussed in the context of the abovementioned transformative reform process.

4.2 The Militarisation of Society: The Idea of the 'Military-Nation' and Compulsory Military Service

The idea of the 'military-nation' has been a determinative norm in the making and reproduction of militaristic values in Turkish society. The idea that the 'Turks are a military-nation' is one of the founding elements of Turkish nationalism. The military nation or nation-in-arms is an ideal concept of the nation-state, which was the central organising principle in Europe, invented towards the end of the eighteenth century. As a consequence of the paradigm which established the nation-state, the new system produced both internal and external wars, which obliged citizens to make higher tax payments, to mobilise for war, and to demonstrate absolute obedience to the state. The nation-in-arms is a product of this context. Post-revolutionary France and Prussia, depressed by the Napoleonic Wars, were the first examples in the early nineteenth century where 'the nation' was constructed with patriotic ideals to become victors in wars. Through a gradual transition from a standing army set up through mercenaries and foreign soldiers to a mass one consisting of national elements, the project of the nation-in-arms aimed at producing patriotic and nationalist feelings to overcome the heavy burdens of the war. Thus, it focused on making war a matter for the whole of society. According to General Baron Colmar Von Der Goltz, war is the destiny of humanity; therefore, it is not only the problem of leaders but also of the whole nation (Ben-Eliezer, 1995, pp. 266-268).

As analysed in chapter three, though the initial advisors to the modernisation project of the military had been the British and French experts, respectively; they were Prussian officers who fundamentally transformed the military institution and its education system upon the invitation of the Sultan. As stated in the previous chapter, the Prussian military delegates under the commandership of General Baron Colmar Von Der Goltz stayed in Istanbul for many years to reform the military system from top to bottom. Additionally, since the CUP leaders had close relations with this country, the Prussian approach deeply influenced the young officers who would be the founders of the new state. Prussia, a remarkably successful instance of constructing a nation from above with the ideal of achieving victories over rivals,

had been the main source of inspiration for the Ottoman-Turkish reformers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, respectively. Thus, the far-reaching influence of the Prussian model became one of the building blocks of Turkish nationalism and the model of the nation-in-arms. In parallel with the growing American influence over world politics, the Turkish military has gone into the orbit of this country. It has been the American Marshall Programme after World War II, which has made the technical renewal of the military possible. Turkey has entered into NATO with support the of the US in 1952 (Akkaya, 2012, p.14).

It is highly possible to encounter relevant discourses in Turkish daily life, which are built on the militaristic values that the Turkish people possess. One of the most popular of these sayings, 'Every Turk is born a soldier', is a motto that is taught to all citizens by the authorities (civilian and military) at an early stage in life. As mentioned in chapter three, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and most of the founding actors of the Turkish Republic were soldiers and they completed their educational career in the late-term Ottoman military schools that were reformed by the Prussian military delegates under the chairmanship of General Colmar von der Goltz. General Goltz's seminal work, *Nation in Arms* (1887), which had established the foundations of the "citizen-soldier" idea in Prussia in the late nineteenth century, maintained its influence over the formative years of the Turkish Republic. In line with the path-dependency occurred in the last years of the Ottomans, the reason for this long-standing influence was Ataturk's policy preferences concerning the institutional position of the military within the formation of the new state and society. The book became a significant resource for the Kemalist elites who focused on constructing a new type of citizenship that would be indoctrinated with the ideology of the new state in the early 1930s. Afet Inan's *Vatandas Icin Medenî Bilgiler* (Civilised Knowledge for the Citizen), a-two-volume collection (1931) and one of the primary sources of this indoctrination process, was written and elaborated under the close attention of President Ataturk. The then government endorsed it as one of the essential textbooks for secondary and high schools (Gurses, 2010, pp. 235-237). The book reflects the policy preferences of the Kemalist elites regarding the relationship between the citizen and the military service, which would determine the fundamentals of civil-military relations. Describing the importance and necessity of military service for every male citizen, a special section of the book was dedicated to 'Military duty' following the principles of the nation-in-arms. In this regard, one of the institutional aims which has been successfully achieved for generations was to establish normative and cultural-cognitive frameworks within society that naturally procured the acceptance of military values. To this

end, military service was depicted as a "civic and sacred duty" designed on a volunteer basis for the sake of the fatherland (Cag, 2013, p. 160; Under, 1999, pp. 48–56). This teaching has become a perpetual paradigm of Turkish nationalism, which has determined each citizen's perception of, and relation to, the military.

Ataturk's adopted child, Inan's work and related legal regulations demonstrate that Ataturk was seeking a military based on conscription. The national military that he idealised had to be set up by the universal attendance of each citizen of a certain age, regardless of educational, vocational and income level, from all parts of society. Thus, it was to be a "pure national army" that would guard the young Republic against any threat. On the other hand, under the guidance of the officer-corps who internalised the Kemalist principles and ideals, each citizen would be indoctrinated by the doctrines and official ideology of the new state through the compulsory military service. This participation and indoctrination processes would be repeated for each generation. By this means, the military has been deployed in a superior position in which it would inculcate society in 'the truths' of the Kemalist enlightenment on a regular basis. The military, in this context, developed institutional regulations and instruments to reinforce this position over society. Some of these generated norms and cognitions will be analysed in the following sections.

It ought to be pointed out that military and militaristic values such as heroism, bravery, respect for ghazi/veterans, praising of conquest and exaltation of martyrdom are among the characteristics founding the Turkish cultural identity. Based on this cognitive framework, compulsory military service has been the most significant institution that reproduces these values in society (Demirel, 2004, p. 140). In parallel with these values, especially in the first years of their education, students are taught that "every Turk is born a soldier" in harmony with the idea of the nation-in-arms. Conscription reinforces this identification by implying that national service is a rite of passage into manhood for every Turkish boy (Jenkins, 2001a).

The origins of the compulsory military service system in Turkey dates back to the *Tanzimat* (the Reforms) era, which was institutionalised following the Prussian Conscription Law of 1814. However, certain religious (non-Muslims) and occupational groups (doctors, judges, imams, teachers, and sheikhs) were exempted from conscription under certain conditions until the early twentieth century. In 1909, these exemptions were nullified, and military service was made obligatory for all male subjects with the exception of the Sultan's family. The Turkish Grand National Assembly enacted the Turkish Republic's first conscription law (Law Number: 1111) in 1927 (Altinay, 2004, pp. 25-28). The law has been rearranged several times throughout successive decades. It is still in force and serves as one of the two principal

conscription laws[9]. Article 1 of the "Military Service Act" declares that "Every male citizen of the Turkish Republic is obliged to do military service regulated by the provisions of this law" (p.832). According to Article 2, military service must be fulfilled within the period determined by the law, in other words, between the ages of 20 and 41. This period was set at eighteen months for privates in general, but the Council of Ministers was endowed with the authority to reduce this duration to fifteen or twelve months, in accordance with the requirements of the armed forces (Military Service Act, 1927: Article 5). The conscript class of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) is made up of three groups: Long-term conscripts, short-term conscripts, and reserve officers. The duration and stature of each group member is determined according to their educational level (Gencer & Sumer, 2007, pp.1-3).Thus, the compulsory military service has been institutionalised by the power of law which has made the soldiery an indivisible part of the national identity.

The institution of conscription was constitutionalised in 1961 right after the coup d'état staged on 27 May 1960. The 1961 Constitution, which was promulgated by the junta, regulated conscription within the section of 'Political Rights and Duties'. Under the title of 'The right and duty to take part in defence of the homeland', Article 60 announced that "taking part in defence of the homeland is the right and duty of every Turk. This duty and obligation to be served in the armed forces and shall be regulated by law" (Official Gazette, 20/07/1961). The Generals of the coup d'état of 12 September 1980 followed the same path as the perpetrators of the 1961 intervention and allocated a special place in the new constitution for conscription, which has perpetuated the militarisation of society. The 1982 Constitution described conscription as a 'National Service' under the chapter of 'Political Rights and Duties'. According to Article 72: "Patriotic service is a right and a duty for every Turkish citizen. The conditions in which that service shall be performed or deemed to have been performed in the armed forces or civil service shall be laid down by law" (Official Gazette, 18/10/1982). Thus, the militarisation of society has been constitutionalised. Although the constitutional rule refers to the performance of patriotic duty in civil service as an alternative option, in effect, the legal arrangements do not allow for such a choice. Thus, being subject to the militaristic indoctrination in the barracks under the command of the officer-corps has been made compulsory for every civilian in Turkey.

In parallel with the typology of Alfred Vagts developed in his seminal work *A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military* (1959); in peacetimes, the Turkish conscription system has

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[9] The second Act is the 'Law for Reserve Officers and Reserve Military Servants' (Law Number, 1076).

produced a civilian type of militarism punctuating the societal legitimacy of the military in the public life. During compulsory military service, every Turkish male citizen is indoctrinated with "the unquestioning embrace of military values, principles, attitudes; as ranking military institutions and considerations above all others in the state; as finding the heroic predominantly in military service and action, including war - to the preparation of which the nation's main interest and resources must be dedicated, with the inevitability and goodness of war always presumed" (Vagts, 1959, p. 453). In this way, every male from all walks of life, i.e. teachers, judges, businessmen, district governors, prosecutors, farmers, academics, the unemployed, and so on, becomes the object of this militarisation process. As a matter of course, such a militaristic indoctrination of every male citizen dominantly includes the Kemalist interpretation of secularism under the guidance of commanders.

The TAF (Turkish Armed Forces) has effectively reproduced civilian militarism through various policies both within and without the barracks. Apart from its guardianship role, the TAF has been nationally implementing social policies for conscripts through each squad. According to Article 41 of the TAF Internal Service Code, which was enacted in 1961, apart from knowledge regarding soldiery; soldiers are taught reading and writing, general knowledge about homeland and life. "Teaching general knowledge about homeland and life" has been a highly influential instrument of Article 41 to indoctrinate the society. Although it has nothing to do with the military profession, the article has been utilised to consolidate the societal legitimacy of the military since the early years of the Republic. For instance, those privates who are illiterate have been put through literacy courses. Vocational courses are also designated for conscripts who need to look for a job at the end of their military services. The military has intensified these policies, especially in the Kurdish regions of Turkey, where there are more financial, social, and security problems than in other regions. By employing conscripted teachers, the TAF has organised free courses for high school students preparing for university entrance exams. It has provided rural communities with mobile health care services thanks to conscripted medical staff. The TAF even set about conducting wedding ceremonies for poor couples in some regions (Demirel, 2009, p. 371). This kind of policies has been part of daily life in Turkey throughout the decades and reproduced the societal legitimacy of the military.

As a socio-cultural framework, the institution of conscription has been perceived as a turning point in the lives of young Turkish men. It is believed that a young person who has done military service is properly prepared for life. It is socially claimed that those who have gone through the strict discipline of the military service can easily cope with the difficulties of

civilian life. Fulfilment of service makes things easier for couples that are planning to get married. No matter which qualifications are possessed, it is almost impossible to find a reasonable and permanent post for a jobseeker[10], unless he performs military service. Therefore, performing military service is the biggest obstacle before the male graduates to be able to enter professional life (Altinay, 2004).

Although conscription is remaining a significant component of citizenship; since the end of the 1990s, there has been a growing questioning over this institution. The debate has centred on the rationality, necessity, and efficiency of conscription, especially after the mass loss of lives[11]resulting from the fight against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) separatism over the last three decades. A growing number of people claim that conscription is now obsolete[12], and there is a need for a professional army composed of public servants who will perform soldiery as a profession. However, as will be expressed in the third section, it is soldiers rather than civilians who have had the last word on military policies throughout the period until 2011. Referring to the debates surrounding mandatory military service and the need for a fully professional army, the Chief of General Staff of the term, Gen. N. Ozel, told in a press conference that: "The abolition of conscription is out of the question for now, but professionalization in the Turkish Armed Forces is targeted on the long run".[13] In addition to this, a considerable amount of prospective conscripts, who are mostly graduates and/or the sons of prosperous families, have organised several campaigns for the military service by payment, instead of performing the service in the barracks. The government has rejected these demands and refused to take any political responsibility for the issue; instead, it has followed the preferences imposed by the TAF during the policy-making processes. For instance, in reply to a demand for paid military service arrangements, the Turkish Defence Minister said in November 2013: "The Defence Ministry is not engaged in preparations to issue a new arrangement on paid military service, adding that, it was harmful to speak of such steps at a time when officials are seeking ways to draft more than 500,000 absentees into service. The General Staff gives the final opinion on this matter".[14]

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[10] It is same both for public and private sectors.

[11] According to a report published by the Turkish National Assembly Human Rights Investigation Committee (2013; p.60), apart from thousands of civilian loses, 2375 members of the Turkish Armed Forces and 5543 civil servants lost their lives because of the fight with the PKK.

[12] Among the developed countries of the European Union, where Turkey has strived to gain membership, conscription has become almost an exception (The Economist, Jul 4th,2011) http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/07/military-conscription, last visited, 30/08/2014).

[13] For the full explanation, see: (Hurriyet,12 October, 2013) http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/24905450.asp (last visited,10/07/2014)

[14] "Defence minister denies hints of new paid military service arrangement" (Hurriyet, 28/11/2013)

Throughout the last three decades, there have been two instances of the 'military service by payment' regulation. The first one took place in 1999 because of a devastating earthquake in the Marmara Region that caused huge humanitarian and economic losses. The second regulation was endorsed in 2011 because of high public pressure. The amount of the second one was 35000 Turkish Liras, amounting to slightly more than 10000 GB Pounds (according to the exchange parities in the mid-2014), which is equal to the yearly income (after tax deductions) of a fully employed teacher in Turkey.

In comparison with the general acceptance, a small group composed of conscientious objectors in Turkey rejects the idea of conscription and the widespread acceptance of compulsory military service and challenges conscription for several reasons. Turkish society has started to acquaint with the term conscientious objection[15] since the early 1990s. Two young men in Istanbul declared their objection to performing national service, which was a highly unusual stance in Turkish society up until that time. This announcement resulted in court cases based on the grounds of (then) Article 155 of the Turkish Penal Code, namely that of "alienating the people from the institution of military service". The tutelary legal regulations have even banned people of thinking and acting against the conscription institution. According to the latest provision (Article 318, Law No: 5237): "Those who try to persuade or instigate people not to enlist armed forces or to make propaganda with this intention are to be punished with imprisonment from six months to two years. The punishment to be imposed is increased by one half in case of commission of this offence through press and broadcast organs". Following the first declaration, a small group of young people announced their rejection of military service and faced similar legal and institutional sanctions by the military. In a society in which military service has long been regarded as a significant part of the collective identity, the reactions of the system to this challenge are predictable. One of Altinay's (2004, pp. 111-3) interviewees draws attention to the punitive and exclusionary sanctions reproduced by the legal regulations and societal norms against any challenge in this context: "One has to run the risk of a wide variety of legal, social and economic pressure: Resistance from family members and friends, staying away from the legal job market, and the inability to undertake any legal transaction (buying or selling property, applying for a driver's licence or a passport, opening a bank account, education, marriage…).

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http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/defense-minister-denies-hints-of-new-paid-military-service-arrangement.aspx?pageID=238&nID=58658&NewsCatID=338

[15] Today, apart from Greece, all EU countries accept the right of conscientious objection. For a detailed debate on the evolvement of the right to 'conscientious objection, see: http://www.ppu.org.uk/learn/infodocs/cos/st_co_eurohistory.html

In many ways, a conscientious objector must take on the risks of leading the life of a non-citizen for the rest of his life, which is not an easy price to pay in the world of nation-states. Indeed, each member of the conscientious group has paid a high price because of their challenge against the conscription institution. One of these objections, Osman Murat Ulke's case, made Turkish society more aware of the issue and resulted in Turkey's conviction for violating Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2006. Ulke sued Turkey in the ECHR as he was faced with an "interminable series of prosecutions" by civilian and military authorities and served two years in prison. Referring to the whole Turkish judiciary system's regulating of penalties for those who reject compulsory military service on the grounds of conscience or religion, the Court convicted Turkey because of the "gravity and repetitive nature" of institutional and legal sanctions that generated "degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention"[16] (Altinay, 2004, pp.87-116; ECHR, 39437/98).

It is the punctuated nature of this institution, including regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements that have perpetuated the impact of conscription over Turkish society. On the one hand, the constitutional and legal regulations have coercively obliged each male citizen to fulfil compulsory service in the period envisaged by the act. On the other hand, to become an 'appropriate person', i.e. to get married, have a respected job and life, social and cultural norms have forced him to perform this 'honourable' duty. Last but not least, as a very successful example of "the socially mediated construction of a common framework of meaning" (Scott, 2014, p.70), he will share this "taken-for-grantedness" part of the collective identity of the Turkish citizenship. The 'civilian militarism' which has been punctuated by these frameworks has provided the military with a perpetual societal legitimacy through which it has reproduced popular consent in the course of being a powerful political actor and militarising the society.

Despite growing questioning, conscription has been one of the most influential instruments through which the military has strengthened its socio-political position and reproduced the militaristic values in Turkey. Although there has a growing questioning over the compulsory military service in the society and the conscientious objection movement is getting more support, there is not enough academic research on these issues. The main reason for this problem is the lack of academic freedom in the country and the state authoritarianism against any critical thinking on the military and the military service.

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[16]According to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment".

4.3 The Making of an Officer: Military Schools, Indoctrination, and the Interventionist Mindset

Since Sultan Mahmud's far-reaching endeavours to establish a European-style military in the 19th. century, the military schools[17] have become centres of high-quality education in comparison with their civilian counterparts since the late Ottoman era. Including current command echelon, the leaders of the secular Republic's military who have shaped socio-political life for decades have graduated from these schools in which the military superiority has been indoctrinated. In July 2016, President Erdogan closed all military schools of Turkey including war academies, military high schools and high schools that train non-commissioned officers by a statutory decree following the abortive July abortive putsch. The decree announced that a new university called the National Defence University would be established under the civilian Defence Ministry to train Turkey's prospective officers and non-commissioned officers. In light of the historical legacy, this section analyses the role of the military schools over the research questions during the period from 1980 until 2011.

Turkey has had modern military schools and important experience in the military training which date back to the early periods of the Ottoman modernisation. As of 2011, there were very prestigious military high schools and military academies which have had world-standard facilities and a reputable education quality compared with their civilian counterparts. Three military high schools in Istanbul and Izmir which chooses best candidates among tens of thousands of applicants have prepared young cadets to the Military Academies in Ankara and Istanbul which train future commanders of the military. Turkey's some most promising generals governed the three military academies which have specialised on land, air-force and naval studies. There were also three War Academies in Istanbul which have prepared candidate staff officers to the command echelons of the military. Likewise, there were many well-established educational institutions which specialised on training non-commissioned officers and specialist sergeants across the country. Although there has not any gender discrimination during the entrance processes for a long time, Turkey's military schools were male-dominant institutions.

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[17] For a detailed explanation of military educational institutions see: http://www.tsk.tr/ing/5_training/5_1_training_and_education_objective_of_the_turkish_trmed_forces/training_and_education_objective_of_the_turkish_armed_forces.htm. By 'military schools', this research refers to a specific type of educational institution which is devoted to the training of prospective officers of the TAF. The term also refers to an integrated body of education that includes various degrees from high schools to post-grad colleges. Since the ultimate and common target of these institutions is to train well equipped, Kemalist, and secularist officers for the TAF, the term of military schools is used to prevent any verbal confusion.

According to the official declaration of the Turkish General Staff (Tsk.tr: 2014):

> "The main objective of the training and education in the military schools is to have well-educated personnel who are always combating and mission-ready, determined to win and have a well-awareness of the mission, complete obedience, strong physical and moral power as well as up-to-date knowledge and skills. In light of developments in the twenty-first century, TAF training institutes aim to train their personnel in a way that they permanently affect individual development and change as a basis, fully grasp technological developments, effectively use every high tech weapon system and successfully command their staff. In addition, it aims to have cadets learn at least one and, if possible, two foreign languages. It trains post-graduate staff officers, who fully adopt the Kemalist[18] point of view, in accordance with today's dynamic education structure and, in parallel with the current developments in military, political and economic fields, increase their in-service training levels and professional motivations".

From the past to the present, one of the biggest obstacles to the Turkish civil-military studies has been the self-enclosed nature of the military institutions. Due to strict internal regulations, it is almost impossible to conduct interviews with cadets and military personnel, or observe military institutions and figures, in order to collect up to date data for academic studies. Birand's seminal study (1991), *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces* constitutes the only exception to this obstacle. Thanks to this study, one can trace the making and evolution of a Turkish officer from his/her entrance into the military institution as a young cadet at the age of fourteen years old to retirement from the highest echelon. The study is invaluable because of its one-to-one and group interviews with cadets and officers, which reveal the mindset and process of indoctrination of an average officer. Due to the abovementioned restrictions, this study could not conduct interviews with cadets and officers. Therefore, the study will analyse the memoirs of some retired officers who were influential figures of their periods in chapter six to compensate for the shortcoming caused by the interview ban with the officers.

In the first place, it ought to be expressed that the military education sector in Turkey has been handed over to generals, which means that it was an autonomous field of the military,

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[18] The Kemalist point of view was touched upon in chapter three. There are a large number of studies on Kemalism in the relevant literature. For a competent article see: Kili, S. (1980). *Kemalism in contemporary Turkey. International Political Science Review*, 1, (3)

over which civilians have no authority. Analysing military schools and the indoctrination process of candidate officers is of great importance in order to understand both Turkish civil-military relations and some of the fundamental reasons for the lack of proper civilian oversight of the military. As stated in chapter three, modernisation policies in the late Ottoman State were centred on the military. Inspired by the European models, reformist Sultans had focused on the idea of a powerful military, which would bring an end to the dissolution of the Empire. Thus, military schools gained strategic importance as vanguard centres for creating Western-type officers. On the path of renewal, they created their own rules, norms, and values which most of them would contradict the past. These schools were not only the first steps of the renewal for the military, but they also became avenues of European thoughts and ways of governing for the Ottoman officer. However, this path of policy produced tragic and unintended consequences for the Sultan. Becoming hubs of politicisation for cadets, new military schools generated the toughest opponent groups against the absolute monarchy. In this way, they improved the ideological grounds of the struggle for opposition officers who aimed at diminishing the power of the Sultan, the owner of the Ottoman state. The officers of this new type of military school toppled Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1909, which marks the beginning of a new era in the Turkish state tradition. Through this incident, to a large extent, the 'ownership' of the Turkish state was passed into the hands of a group of military and civilian bureaucrats. With this influential legacy, military schools of the Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottomans have possessed similar functionality in the new era in terms of reproducing political identity of the prospective officers.

As stated in chapter three, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk the new state and the Kemalist revolution were consigned to the guardianship of the military. In this context, the military schools have started to train prospective leaders of the Turkish military which would be the guardian of the Republic. In retrospect, from policies and practices, one can argue that the term 'guardianship' has been interpreted and utilised in the same meaning with being 'ownership'[19] of the state. Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration to say that the military schools have been training the real owners of the Turkish Republic in parallel with the late-term Ottoman counterparts which gained a related reputation particularly in the last two decades of the Empire. Having said that, while the former's influence was limited to a certain extent due to the forms of the states, contextual and cultural reasons; the latter has created a full-fledged indoctrination process over its members. This indoctrination process has included

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[19]The following section will analyse how this institutional and cognitive framework has been established and maintained throughout the decades.

intense normative and cultural-cognitive elements through which the mindset of a Turkish officer was formed.

Military professions are highly respected careers in Turkey. It has been observed that each year a considerable number of young students from each part of Turkey apply for military school entrance examinations to become an officer. According to figures for 2013, some 103,967 people applied for Military colleges[20]. There are several motivations behind this fact. Traditionally, there has been a widespread positive feeling and respect expressed toward military professions, and a widespread sympathy to the military uniform. In addition to that, the economic and social advantages of the profession have made military careers attractive in a developing country which has been suffering huge financial problems. First of all, the military schools have offered a complete and free education at well-qualified facilities, which none of their civilian counterparts could provide. These facilities and the subsequent investments per cadet were equivalent to degrees from the best examples of military schools in the developed countries. Thus, cadets have been prepared for the future within far better conditions than civilian students. Due to high unemployment rates[21], most families in low and mid-level income groups have regarded these free and qualified schools as a unique opportunity through which their children could acquire a brighter future. While graduates of civilian universities have suffered from unemployment for at least a couple of years following their graduation, those students in the fourth year of military colleges have automatically entered a respected profession with a high salary and additional incomes immediately after the last school day (Birand, 1991, pp. 4-14)

Arguably, the entrance examinations for military schools were the most gruelling tests in Turkey. Institutionally, the military has always sought to select the brightest and most promising applicants among whom prospective influential military and political figures were to be distinguished. From entrance examinations to retirement, there has been an intense intellectual and ideological surveillance of officer candidates and their family members. The reason behind this monitoring has been built upon rules and norms developed on 'threat perceptions' against the secular nation-state that were substantially created by the military. Analysing these perceptions is beyond the scope of this study, however illustrating the issue is of great importance to reveal how these rules and norms have profoundly impacted the

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[20]This figure is more than 21.99% that of 2012. See http://www.milliyet.com.tr/askeri-okullara-basvuruda-artis var/gundem/detay/1724182/default.htm
[21]The average unemployment rate between 2000-2010 in Turkey was approximately 10%. (http://www.indexmundi.com/turkey/unemployment_rate.html)

making of and promotion of officers, and how they have constituted a discriminatory policy toward certain communities.

Since the foundation of the Republic; "Kurdish Separatism", "Political Islam", and "Communism" (dropped from the radar by the collapse of the USSR), and ideas or organisations inspired by these concepts or ideologies have been asserted as the biggest threats to the Kemalist, secular, nation-state.[22] One of the most significant rules to be accepted to a military school and promotion in the rank during the service was having no sympathy with the abovementioned ideologies. In this context, it was almost impossible to be accepted to a military school and be promoted during the service if a candidate cadet or officer or a close relative of him/here was embracing these ideologies, and or attending activities of organisations affiliated with these groups. The dismissal reason of one of Birand's interviewees in this context is highly striking:

> "Towards the end of my first year, I was summoned to see the Commander of the School. I knew immediately there was something wrong. When I was ushered in, the Commander had a civilian opposite him. The Commander was annoyed. He said, 'I understand you have a cousin called Ahmet'. To tell the truth, I did not quite know who he was talking about. I did have a cousin I had never met in my whole life, and whose name I had heard once. I did not even know what he did. He lived in Adiyaman (a province in East Turkey). When I told the Commander that I did not know him, he was even more annoyed and shouted: 'Why did not you tell me that this man was a trade unionist who went to prison for inciting strikes?' I was quite unable to explain that I did not know my cousin at all, and I was eventually expelled from the Military School (Birand, 1991, p. 17)".

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[22] For a brief-sample literature on the Kurdish Question and Political Islam of Turkey; see: Cornell, S. E.(2001). *The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics*" Orbis, 45:1; Gunter, M. M. (1997) *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey, St. Martin's Press*, New York; Kaplan,S.(2002) *"Din-u Devlet All Over Again? The Politics of Military Secularism and Religious Militarism in Turkey Following the 1980 Coup*, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 34; Moustakis, F and Chaudhuri,R.(2005) *Turkish-Kurdish Relations and the European Union: An Unprecedented Shift in the Kemalist Paradigm*, Mediterranean Quarterly 16, 4; olson, R (1996) *"Introduction"* in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and The Middle East*, ed. Robert Olson ,The University of Kentucky Press; Tank, P.(2005) *Political Islam in Turkey: A State of Controlled Secularity*, Turkish Studies 6, 1; Yavuz, M. H.(1997*) Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey*, Comparative Politics 30,1

These regulative and normative sanctions were notably punctuated throughout the coup d'état eras and comprised a basis for 'witch-hunts' in the military. A salient example can be expressed regarding officers who were expelled from the military because of religious reasons. As will be analysed in chapter seven, throughout the 28 February 1997 'post-modern' coup process, some officers were blacklisted with accusations of being reactionary, against laicism and modernity, and enemies of Ataturk due to either performing Islamic rituals in their personal lives, or having married a head-scarfed lady. As a result of this profiling, some 3000 army personnel (officers and non-commissioned officers) in various ranks were drummed out of the military (Cobanoglu, 2012, pp. 219-229).

The founding philosophy behind the Republic which designated civilian and military spheres in Turkey did not formulate a state structure which would be based on the 'civilian supremacy'. The political codification of the military with a superior position within the state system has intrinsically created a negative and exclusionary approach reproduced in the military schools toward the civilians. For this reason, the military, the 'true guardian of the Republic' developed a political stance which can be depicted as "anti-civilian". This stance has been a rigid interpretation of Kemalism which rejects any political movement making politics beyond the limits set by the Kemalist ideology. This normative and cultural-cognitive framework has had several effects on civil-military relations. By this political interpretation, the military has described political entities and actors by anti-civilian terms through the autonomous military education system. The indoctrination process in the military schools has systemised the political stance of the prospective officers. Thus, in this anti-civilian climate, corruption, inefficiency, favouritism and nepotism, careerism, praetorianism, instability, populism, bribery, malpractice, and irresponsibility are descriptions that have been deemed suitable for political actors and institutions (Cizre, 1997, pp. 155-56).

Similar responses were given by interviewees, who were final year cadets at the military academy, strikingly illustrate how this anti-civilian indoctrination portrays the realm of politicians, and systematically create a cultural-cognitive framework within the institution of the military that poses a direct threat to the civilian rule:

> "A politician does not put his country above everything else as I do. His
> priority is his own election in four-years-time. Though in the meantime, he
> talks a lot about patriotism. He can abuse the state by indulging in favouritism
> to secure his re-election. I trust very few of them…Some politicians are not
> half as educated as we are. Some know one-tenth of what we do. How can they

govern the country? They have managed to become deputies through powerful party connections or bribes. Some of them cannot even speak proper Turkish, let alone a foreign language as we do… I measure a politician not by his education but by the priority he gives to country and nation. Politicians are not concerned 'for the state' as much as we are. They talk about Ataturk's principles and all that only because they're wary of us or are afraid of some reaction…Some of our politicians are so ignorant that they've never really been aware of the dangers inside or outside the country…My people are poorly-educated. They may be misled by politicians and the self-interested. As long as we are surrounded by external enemies and face perverted ideas at home, we are the country's guardians. We need, therefore, to be very well-prepared." (Birand, 1991, pp. 22-76).

Although a prime aim of the indoctrination process in the military schools was to create internal cohesiveness in the military, there are historical pieces of evidence showing that it is not possible to speak of a perfect cohesiveness, because officers were divided into factions during the pre-and post-coup periods. As will extensively be analysed in chapter six, the first two interventions in politics which were staged in 1960 and 1971 respectively, revealed intense power struggles between different juntas within the military. Apart from the detrimental effects on democratic processes, factionalism among officers triggered by pro-junta organisations, caused deep institutional failures regarding the chain of command, which is an essential requirement of modern armies. Therefore, taking lessons from unpleasant experiences of previous juntas, perpetrators of the 1980 coup exerted maximum efforts to secure the chain of command, and develop a course of action, which would preserve the internal cohesiveness of the military. In this sense, the coup of 1980 is the most successful intervention in which the military acted as a single cohesive entity.

As stated above, a significant aim of the military since 1980 regarding the education system in the military schools has been to provide a permanent internal cohesiveness. Two main approaches have been utilised as the way of realising this ideal. First, as a native ideology 'the state creed of Kemalism' has been strictly taught to each cadet. Through this ideological adherence, every prospective officer was supposed to believe in and follow the same principles and ideals throughout his or her life. Second, the military has aimed at pursuing this goal through a centralised institutional organisation and high discipline and low levels of corruption (Atli,2010). Considering the fragmentations that emerged throughout junta terms

in the past, it seems that the military has achieved internal cohesiveness to a large extent since the constitutional term started in 1982. However, due to strict internal regulations, there are no instruments to measure the degree of this achievement.

As extensively debated in chapter two, in his epoch-making study, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1959)*,* Professor Huntington describes professionalism as the central concept needed to minimise the risk of military's intervening in politics. He explains professionalism in the military through three elements, which are expertness, social responsibility, and corporate loyalty to fellow practitioners. These components are taught at the military schools, and each of them creates its own regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive frameworks. To Huntington, the officer-corps are technicians who are competent in the organisation and use of legitimate violence. Professional soldiers feel a responsibility to their society and state and possess an influential institutional identity. A sustainable professionalization makes the military self-centred. As can be observed in other professions, professionalization reproduces a sense of corporate unity vis-à-vis the others. Commanding a military, which includes organising and equipping forces, training cadets and serving members, planning a full range of services, and waging war against the enemy in due course is a full-time task which covers almost all regular work hours of military leaders. Thus, Huntington urges, the wider the professionalism, the more engaged the officer is in his military responsibilities, and the less concerned he is about any political cause or policy that does not influence him. By this logical sequence, he concludes that professionalization forces the officer-corps to leave politics to the civilians. Because of the vocational requirements that spring from professionalization, officers will be answerable to civilian leaders. Command upper echelons serve as an advisory board to elected governments, and the former carry out decisions and directives given by the latter. The most competent instrument of isolating the military from politics is the realisation of full military professionalization whereby the officer-corps will be non-partisan and will not intervene in politics. A fully professional military always amply fulfil the orders of any government, which is formed by any political party that is part of the democratic system. The surest way in which the military will fully obey the state and civilian leaders is to motivate soldiers with military ideals. Every officer must be indoctrinated with this professional military ideal that acts as a measure of their loyalty to their task. This path will assure civilian oversight over the military. Thus, Huntington establishes an ideal type of democratic civil-military relations based on the concept of professionalism that will produce civilian supremacy.

However, Professor Finer (1962), a prominent and respected political scientist whose studies have been a source of inspiration for this study, challenges Huntington's interpretation of professionalism, as analysed in chapter two. To Finer, it is evident that many highly professional militaries intervened in politics. For instance, if professionalism were the surest way of inhibiting the military from political engagement, and ensuring the most secure climate of civilian oversight of the military, then first and foremost, the Japanese and German militaries would not have interfered in politics in different cases. Instead of hanging upon a special conceptualisation of professionalization in order to prevent the military's politicisation, he defends the indoctrination of the officer-corps with an absolute obedience to the principle of civilian supremacy that is institutionalised in the light of universal rules principles of democracy and the rule of law. If officers do not believe in the principle of civil supremacy, inhibiting the military from politics and securing civilian oversight would be impossible no matter how professional the military is (Finer, 1962, pp. 23-25).

It is, indeed, the civilian supremacy anticipated through professionalism that has not worked in the Turkish case. Before anything else, professional identity created upon the 'guardianship role' has produced perception for the Turkish officer, through which his comrades are evaluated as the most loyal and reliable coterie in the society. They are endowed with an authority that is given by Article 35 of the Military Internal Service Code, which says the military has a duty to "preserve and protect the Republic of Turkey". Consequently, the military has seen itself as the servant of the state and/or Republic rather than of the government in office. Through the military school system, which was an autonomous institutionalisation, cadets have been trained as professional servants of a mystified state understanding which is unquestionable. The division between the state and the government has reproduced the anti-political and anti-civilian stance of the officer-corps against any political party which questions the norms and values of the secular, Kemalist nation-state. Taken together with the constitutional powers, some of which will be analysed in the following section, this cultural-cognitive framework has become one of the salient factors that have perpetuated the political influence of the military.

In the light the of the critical approach against the alleged benefits of professionalism (Finer: 1962), it can be argued that another significant result of the Turkish type of military professionalism is 'military syndicalism'. Along with other facts, military syndicalism has been an obstacle before the civilian control of the armed forces. In a self-determining manner, Turkey's well-educated generals have developed an approach claiming that the officer-corps is the only group that is capable of dealing with military issues such as organisation, size,

recruitment, promotion, and equipment of the armed forces. This syndicalism has been reproduced through the "Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Code" endorsed in 1961 and some other regulations which will be discussed in the following sections. According to Cizre (1997), the far-reaching power given to the officer-corps within the constitutional system placed the military in an autonomous position. The following section will critically analyse how the autonomous position that paved the way for a military tutelage were reproduced through two constitutional institutions, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Supreme Military Council (SMC), respectively.

All in all, as the product of intense indoctrination and education processes, which have been shaped by deep-rooted socio-cultural motives peculiar to historical, ideological and legal roles attributed to the military, the Turkish officer-corps has been the most influential play-maker in Turkish politics, with the exemption of the last few years. The autonomous structure of the military education sector, which was under the total control of the command chain that excluded any civilian oversight, has reproduced the interventionist mindset within this institutional structure throughout the previous decades.

4.4 The National Security Council and the Supreme Military Council: A State within the State

The constitutional system that was redesigned in 1982 under the military government following the 1980 coup d'état has bestowed an autonomous domain upon the military. In the literature, military autonomy (Pion-Berlin, 1992; Cizre, 1997) has been discussed from institutional and political perspectives. While military autonomy reflects structural features in institutional aspects; the political dimension of the term covers political aims and influences. By being an autonomous entity, on the one hand, a military aims to rule out any possibility of an outsider's interference in its professional functions that can be interpreted as a 'defensive target'. On the other hand, as an 'offensive target', it politically enhances the ideological and behavioural instruments that go beyond its institutional boundaries. Through political autonomy, the military develops a stance against civilian control. As a product of modernity, the military strives to maintain its institutional integrity and unity. However, the military becomes institutionally autonomous if it has the authority to develop policies and take decisions on internal issues such as "promotions, appointments, and punishments of junior personnel; levels in the armed forces; military education and doctrine; and military reform and modernization" (Cizre, 1997, p. 152). The previous sections critically analysed the way that the Turkish military has operated autonomously in its internal issues.

In the presence of an elected government, the political autonomy of a military leads to a stalemate within the legislative and executive bodies owing to extortion of some powers of the former by the latter. Though it is a state institution like any other legal authority, autonomous militaries function in a manner as if it were above and beyond the constitutional jurisdiction of the civilian government. In such examples, the military reduces civilians' sphere of influence in statecraft through a detailed political agenda, and it accumulates powers and privileges that will be extremely challenging to take back (Pion-Berlin, 1992).

Such a political climate is mostly a product of an extraordinary period, i.e., war, state-building, coup d'état, and so on. Institutions that are set up following these critical junctures enable the military to secure its political position through direct or/and indirect ways. Since the transition from military rule to democratic administration in 1983, the Turkish military has taken advantage of historical, cultural, constitutional, and structural parameters and instruments to maintain its exceptional status in politics. It has imposed and or suggested policies regarding almost all walks of life, warned civilian governments over various socio-political issues, and expressed an institutional stance on matters that fall into democratically elected governments' area of responsibility. Nonetheless, the point that differentiates the Turkish military from most interventionist armed forces in developing countries is its acceptance of the legitimacy of both democracy and civilian rule. Instead of destroying civil-military differentiation and operating directly in politics; it has developed and utilised tutelary institutions which were enshrined in the Constitution which have shaped the socio-political life in Turkey for decades. This approach can be interpreted as a highly pragmatic and strategic method, but analysing this preference goes beyond the scope of this study.

The persistency of these methods was punctuated through new regulative frameworks thanks to subsequent military interventions since the first of its kind took place in 1960. As the most comprehensive outcome of the coup d'état staged on 12 September 1980, the Constitution of 1982 broadly limited democratic rights and freedoms and consolidated the power and the political autonomy of the military through constitutional institutions. Thus, as will be analysed in chapter six, the autonomous and guardian roles given to the military by the foundational philosophy of the state have been evolved into a tutelary form through the constitutionalisation of the military-dominated institutions. Among these institutions, the NSC became the most powerful state authority and operated as a supra-governmental body that almost brought the political prerogatives of the military to the forefront of any civilian agenda.

The structure, jurisdiction, and accordingly, the influence of the NSC on politics ought to be analysed in two different periods. The first term, between 1982 and 2003, is a period in which the NSC maintained full dominance over democratically elected governments. As of 2011, according to Article 118 of the Constitution, under the chairman of the President, the NSC consisted of the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, Ministers of Defence, the Ministers of Interior and Foreign Affairs, Commanders of the Land, Naval and Air Forces and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie. The Constitution furnished the NSC with the authority to make decisions on identification, formulation, and implementation of the national security policy of the state that would be submitted to the Council of Ministers. In line with the abovementioned article of the Constitution, the Law No.2945 (Official Gazette 11/11/1983) vested the NSC with a very wide range of powers on determining policies regarding the national security of the state. However, analysing the duties and structure of the NSC in the light of socio-political experiences of the period between 1982 and 2003 proves that this regulative framework not only determined the state's national security policies, but also created a 'national security state'[23] under the heavy influence of powerful generals per se. It is quite normal and necessary for a state to have a national agency authorised with the power of discussing and shaping its national security policies. However, the Turkish case has been far-beyond this authorisation. The role given to the NSC throughout the research period has made Turkey a national security state that always preferred enhancing security measures to the detriment of democratic rights and freedoms. On the other hand, almost every problem regarding internal and external issues was incorporated into the national security paradigm through which generals shaped the whole policy-making process covering almost all socio-political issues.

Under the chairmanship of the President, number of the military members of the Council and their rights were equivalent to those of civilians. Thus, generals who have acted under a firm chain of command were a monolithic voice vis-à-vis the civilians in determining the 'National Security Policy Document'. According to Law no.2945; the 'National Security Policy Document' involved "principles behind domestic, foreign, and defence policy as specified by the Cabinet of Ministers, on the basis of views established by the National Security Council with the objective of ensuring national security and achieving national objectives." (Erdal,

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[23] For a component analysis of the 'the National Security State' see: Raskin, MG. (1976). "*Democracy versus the national security state". Law and Contemporary Problems*, *40* (3).
For a study focused on the impact of the National Security State's understanding of democratic right see: Urhan & Celik. (2010). "*Perceptions of "national security" in turkey and their impacts on the labor movement and trade union activities". European Journal of Turkish Studies* (2011/11)

2010: p.24). Associated with names such as 'The Red Book' and 'The Secret Constitution', the 'National Security Policy Document', which has been prepared under the heavy influence of generals and envisaged policies against internal and external threats, has been a subject of continuous debate in terms of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey[24].

More importantly, decisions of the NSC were to be considered by the Council of Ministers with priority. Through this constitutional institutionalised order, the political prerogatives of the generals were placed in a superior position to those of democratically elected governments. In other words, the Council have operated as a tutelary body over the elected cabinets. According to the National Security Council Act (No.2945), the Council was authorised (Mgk.tr: 2014):

> To formulate views with regard to taking decisions on the identification, formulation and implementation of the national security policy and ensuring the necessary coordination,
>
> -To establish the measures for the realization of national objectives as well as plans and programs that are prepared according to the national security policy of the state,
>
> -To continuously monitor and evaluate the components of national power that would influence the national security policy of the state and the political, social, economic, cultural and technological situation and developments in the country; and determine the basic principles by which the aforementioned factors could be improved in accordance with national objectives,
>
> -To determine the measures that are deemed imperative for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, territorial integrity and indivisibility of the country and the maintenance of peace and security of the society,
>
> -To determine the measures necessary for preserving the constitutional order, maintaining the national unity and integrity and bringing together the Turkish nation around the national ideals and values in accordance with the principles and reforms of Atatürk; counteract the internal and external threats directed against these aspects; in order to eliminate these threats, to determine strategies

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[24] For some critical assessments over the document, see: Kanli, Y. (2013, December 12*). Divine battle*. Hurriyet Daily News; Kemal, L. (2009, September 2). *Turkey should change its national security policy*. Today's Zaman.

and guidelines as well as opinions, requirements and necessary precautions regarding the planning and implementation services;

-To formulate opinions on the declaration of emergency, martial law, mobilization or war;

-To determine the duties and responsibilities to be assumed by the public and private sector organizations and institutions as well as the citizens with respect to total defence, national mobilization and other related issues at times of peace, war, imminent threat of war and at post-war times and establish the guidelines for planning on these matters;

-To determine the guidelines for ensuring the inclusion into the development plans, programs and annual budgets of the measures and funds related to the financial, economic, social, cultural and other aspects necessitated by the requirements of the national security policy and by the services for society and total defence services (Mgk.tr: 2014).

A model of tutelage over democratically elected governments, this kind of national security concept, which is profoundly incompatible with the modern understanding of democratic governance, has become a perpetual problem of Turkish politics. As Jenkins (2001) argues, it is understood from the letter and spirit of the law, the concept of national security was defined in such broad terms that it became a purposive instrument that could cover almost every policy area. In this context, it is not an exaggeration to say that the political climate established by the 1982 Constitution, which boosted the political position of the military through the National Security Council paved the way for a 'tutelary regime'[25] (Mango: 1983) over the civilian governments. Thus, through this legal framework, the military maintained a comprehensive dominance over politics, which covered almost all walks of life. The most notorious result of this tutelage was the 28 February 'post-modern' military intervention in 1997 which forced a democratically elected coalition government to resign because of the

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[25]Articles written by some well-known Turkish journalists reveal how this tutelage dominated politics during the 1980s and the 1990s, see: (Cizre, 1997, p.164): "Ozkok,E. *Milli Guvenlik Kurulu Gundemde" (National Security Council Is on the Agenda)*, Hurriyet, Nov. 30, 1991; Cekirge,F. *"Genelkurmay'in Ilginc Onerisi" (The General Staff's Interesting Suggestion)*, Sabah, Nov. 16, 1993; Ergin, S. *"Ciller ve Ordu-Hukmet Iliskisi"(Ciller and the Military-Government Relations)*, Hurriyet, Nov. 30, 1993; Candar C. *"Turkiye'yi Kim Yonetiyor?"(Who Rules Turkey?)*, Sabah, Jan. 8, 1994; Altan, M. *"Askeri Anlayis, Demokratik Anlayis" (Military Understanding, Democratic Understanding)*, Sabah, Jan. 10, 1994; Birand, M. A. *"Cok Sukur, Bu Da Oldu!" (Thank God This Happened, Too!)*, Sabah, Jan. 30, 1994."

constant pressure of the military-dominated NSC. The effects of this process over civil-military relations will be analysed in chapter seven.

A systemic change that constituted a critical juncture regarding the position of the NSC occurred as a result of an external determinant-the EU candidacy process- that promoted internal reform efforts by the end of 1990s and the early 2000s. To reveal how this transformation has become possible and analysing its results are of great importance for this study and they will be teased out in the light of the theories developed by the Historical Institutionalist scholars in chapter seven. Here, a brief analysis of the impact of the EU process over the NSC is presented.

The EU candidacy process and especially "the seventh EU Harmonisation Package" which implemented constitutional and legal reforms were endorsed by the Turkish National Assembly with the huge support of the political parties. Radical changes in Article 118 of the Constitution and Law No. 2945 regulating the NSC and its General Secretariat can be accepted as the first steps of the dissolution of the military tutelage in Turkey. Entered into force in August 2003, the Seventh Harmonisation Package made momentous changes with regard to the "expansion of the freedom of expression, freedom of association, safeguard provisions on the rights of prisoners, religious freedom, the rights of children, cultural rights, civilian-military relations and the functionality of the executive, by a series of amendments enacted to the Penal Code, Anti-terror Law, Code of Criminal Procedure, Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedures of Military Courts, Law on the Court of Accounts, Law on the Establishment, Duties and Trial Procedures of Juvenile Courts, Law on Associations and the Civil Code, Decree-Law on the Establishment and Duties of the Directorate-General for Foundations, Law on Assembly and Demonstration Marches, Law on Foreign Language Education and the Learning of Different Languages and Dialects by Turkish Citizens and the Law on the National Security Council and the Secretariat General of the National Security Council" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2007: p.15). However, as chapter seven will tease out, curative effects of this democratisation process over socio-political life would last a short time since Turkey's Islamist president Erdogan has used the EU candidacy and reform process as a means of destroying the military tutelage which has been the biggest obstacle before his personal agenda. Through de-institutionalising the tutelary institutions Erdogan would set to establish a one-man-rule regime in the following years, especially after 2010 that goes beyond the scope of this study.

According to the new legal framework, the duties of the NCS were redefined and limited. The Council was described as a consultative organ to the government, which would make

decisions on matters regarding the development and exercise of national security policy. Thus, the constitutional regulation, which obliges the Council of Ministers to prioritise the decisions of the NCS, was nullified. Decisions of the NCS that were given advisory status will be implemented if deemed appropriate by the Council of Ministers. Another crucial reform that has profoundly impacted upon the dominance of the generals in the Council was realised over the membership structure of the NSC, in which decisions were taken on the basis of a majority consensus through the voting of five civilians and five military members. In order to establish civilian supremacy in decision-making, the number of civilian members was increased in this process. In this sense, deputy prime ministers[26] and the minister of justice have been appointed as new members of the Council. A comprehensive civilianisation programme, which also involved the appointment of civilians to the office of Secretary-General instead of a high-ranking general, aimed to reduce the dominance of soldiers over the structure of the Secretariat General of the NSC (Yildiz,2008).

The above-mentioned regulations were supposed to bring a path-dependent democratisation process for Turkish civil-military relations in the era they were enacted. However, they could only civilianise the generals dominated NSC. As chapter seven reveals, along with other former tutelary institutions, the NSC would serve to the changing characteristics of the state authoritarianism which would take a civilian form that would be established under the presidency of Erdogan after he destroyed the military tutelage in the process started in 2007.

Along with the NSC, a second executive body that has perpetuated the political influence and autonomy of the military has been the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The legislative framework enacted in 1972, right after the 12 March 1971 military memorandum, established the SMC with political powers. The SMC operated with these powers until 2013. Through the SMC, the military built an autonomous domain where it has developed institutional policies almost without any civilian interference. Under the chairmanship of the prime minister, the SMC consisted of the chief of the general staff, the defence minister, commanders of land forces, navy, air Forces, and full generals and admirals serving in the Armed Forces. Theoretically, the prime ministers were presiding over the meetings and presenting the decisions of the Council to the President to be endorsed. In practice, however, the whole process was planned and effectuated by generals under the command of the chief of general staff.

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[26]According to the regulations of 2011, there are three Deputy Prime Ministers in the Turkish Council of Ministers.

An impressive symbol and a legacy of the coup-dominant past which has made real power of the military visible throughout the decades was the seating order in the meetings. The chief of general staff has sat together with the prime minister at the head of the table during the meetings as if he was the co-chairman of the Council. Decisions were taken on the basis of a simple majority where each member had an equal right. This regulative framework has automatically given the military supremacy over the representative civilians as there were only two civilian members on the Council. The SMC has punctuated the institutional autonomy of the military through its institutional powers on the preparation of defence policies and human resources management of the armed forces. According to Article 3 of the Act on Establishment and Duties of the Supreme Military Council (Official Gazette, 26/7/1972, No: 1612), the Council has the authority to evaluate and, if necessary, reconsider the strategic military concept which was prepared by the office of commander in chief. It also had the power to develop an institutional approach to shape the main programme of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). Furthermore, as Erdal (2010) explains, the Council was given the power to review the draft bills, by-laws and regulations concerning the TAF. This comprehensive framework has provided highly influential instruments for generals to become the most powerful actors in determining Turkey's defence policies for decades. Through its absolute power over the human resources management of the armed forces, the generals-dominated SMC has become the only institution ruling over the senior appointments, promotions, and retirements of the military personnel until recently.

As seen in other in countries ruled un the military rule for a long time (Perlmutter & Bennet: 1980; Pion-Berlin: 1992), the appointment of the chief of general staff, force commanders, and senior commanders in Turkey has had an extra political significance in terms of the institutional continuity that has maintained the dominant position of the military in politics. Although legal regulation has given the president and the prime minister explicit powers on the final decisions over the appointment of the Chief of General Staff and the top brass (Official Gazette, 26/7/1972, Law no: 1612), the period between 1982 and 2010 has witnessed an informal handing over of these authorities to the military's top brass through the SMC. The only exception to this tradition took place toward the end of the 1980s when Turgut Ozal was in power as a prime minister. Ozal discharged General Necdet Urug, the chief of general staff-in-office and General Necdet Oztorun, commander of the land forces, because of a secret plan they prepared in 1987 over the prospective commanders of the military. As will be analysed in chapter seven, amid on-going debates between the government and the military, also the new chief of general staff General Torumtay was compelled to resign owing to his

disagreement with Ozal's policies regarding the first Gulf Crisis in 1990. As an exceptional case in modern Turkish politics, Ozal's challenge was appreciated by the public and acknowledged as a historic step in civil-military relations by some scholars (EIR,1991). However, this historic move could not be institutionalised due to Ozal's sudden death, and the military dominance in Turkish politics resumed until a new challenge emerged with the rise of the Justice and Development Party thanks to grass-root support and the EU candidacy process towards the early 2000s.

There are several reasons behind this abdication of power, some of which have been analysed in the previous sections. Additionally, as chapter six analyses, the 'fear factor ' which was created and punctuated as a result of hard and soft military interventions throughout modern Turkish history has deterred civilians from any clash with officers, in which the former was afraid of making an enemy of the military that might cause irremediable loses on their part in the long run. Senior appointments, in this context, have been left to the deliberations of the incumbent Chief of General Staff with other top brass commanders. Based upon a vaguely and self-defined principle of seniority by the military and individual networks of the candidate commanders, these deliberations have become a norm in the armed forces (Cizre,1997) which has overridden the regulative framework throughout the decades.

The rationale behind this powerful normative framework could be traced in the rules and norms which designated the military as the guardian of the state. As prospective, reliable guardians of the state, new commanders had to be heartfelt followers of secularism and Kemalism, who would be chosen by the top echelons of the military. To prevent any infiltrations by those who do not passionately believe in these ideals; formal and informal surveillance mechanisms have been established in the armed forces with the power of monitoring both official and private lives of the officer-corps. This surveillance system has operated over all members of the military. In this context, hundreds of officers have been purged from the military between 1980 and 2011 by decisions of the SMC on the grounds of "anti-secular and reactionary attitudes and behaviours", a vague norm invented by the generals (Pala,2010, pp191-213). Thus, the SMC has operated as one of the most influential tutelary institutions reproducing the *status quo* for more than three decades.

Decisions of the SMC were exempted from the judicial review by Article 125 of the Constitution at that time. Such a constitutional privilege has punctuated the power of the tutelary institution for decades. Thanks to the constitutionalisation of that position, Turkey's generals have used the given powers regarding policy matters and human resources management at the SMC without paying attention to the approaches of the prime minister and

minister of defence. In fact, all the civilian members of the SMC until the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002 have acquiescently signed the decisions taken by the general members of the council.

For the first time in the history of the SMC, Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and Defence Minister Vecdi Gonul objected to dismissal decisions of the Council without any judicial review (Hurriyet: 2003). Despite their objections, all the military personnel referred to the Council with similar allegations were dismissed from the military because of the generals' hegemony and the non-conciliatory stance over the Council (Jenkins, 2007). However, in comparison with the generals' firm stance, civilians' integrity of idea and practice was far from being consistent during that period. For instance, though he affixed annotation to dismissals without judicial review during his premiership, Abdullah Gul has approved of every decision of the Council throughout his presidency between 2007 and 2014.

The *status quo* which was established in favour of generals in the SMC has started to shake in 2010 through a combination of external and internal transformative forces. As stated above, chapter seven will analyse this combination of the internal and external determinants which has set to transform the path-dependent balance of civil-military relations. A reform package of twenty-six amendments in the 1982 Constitution, which was written by the military junta of 1980, has been submitted to the Parliament. The amendment package was put to the vote on 12 September 2010, exactly thirty years after the coup d'état of 12 September 1980. It has brought changes and additions into effect concerning sections of the current constitution which regulates 'Judiciary', 'Fundamental Rights and Duties', 'Executive', 'Legislature', 'General Provisions' and 'Financial and Economic Provisions' (Gonenc, 2010, p .1). In addition, a referendum was held in 2010 by the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government, which repeatedly[27] has declared its intention to fulfil the political requirements to become a member of the EU since it came to power in 2002. The content of the reform package represented vital aspects of democratisation criteria that are considered imperative by the EU. As a whole, it proposed the biggest step forward in the way of membership since harmonisation reforms were carried out in 2004-2005. Of the participating voters, almost 58% supported the government's reform proposals (Ciddi, 2011; Gonenc : 2010). Alongside the focus on enhancing the democratic levels of the judiciary and fundamental rights and liberties in parallel with the EU rules and norms; the reform package has promulgated a significant

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[27]For a detailed party programme of the Justice and Development Party see:
https://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme   (Official web-site of the Justice and Development Party)

change regarding the legal immunity of decisions taken by the SMC, which was derived from Article 125 of the Constitution. Thus, decisions of the Council on expulsion from the military are opened to judicial review, which means a constitutional assurance for the military personnel and for those civilian members of the Council who may come out against the absolute power of generals on human resource management of the armed forces. On the other hand, a scare example of the fierce power struggle between a prime minister and generals in the modern Turkish politics erupted as a consequence of the 'Sledgehammer' coup trial in 2010 which will be analysed in chapter seven. Thanks to the changing regulative, societal, and normative frameworks since 2002, then prime minister Erdogan could manage to pursue a hawkish policy against the secular generals of the military. His punitive approach against the suspected officers in the "Sledgehammer" case has profoundly changed the command structure of the Turkish Armed Forces. Following the annual meeting of the SMC in 2011, Chief of the General Staff Gen. Kosaner, commander of the land forces, commander of the navy and commander of the air forces have resigned as a protest over Erdogan's policies. The resignations have become a symbol of an unprecedented fading of the country's most powerful institution vis-à-vis the civilians. Through the path opened as a result of this power struggle, for the first time since the entrance to the multiparty system, a civilian government had a powerful say in senior appointments (Cassandro, 2011).

Civilians' tempting to challenge the military tutelage and its powerful generals has not been possible overnight, indeed. Since the very early days of his new, Islamist party established in 2001, Prime Minister Erdogan (president since 2014) and his close circle have followed a very strategic and pragmatic way to challenge and change the power of balance which has been constructed by the officers. In the light of historical institutionalism, chapter seven will analyse, how he has been able to strategically use the internal (socio-political and economic crises) and external determinants (the EU candidacy process, the EU and international support) so as to de-institutionalise the military tutelage in the way of establishing his authoritarian regime.

Along with above analysed constitutional and legal amendments, some changes in the seating orders of the NSC and SMC have dealt a significant blow to the military's dominance which also punctuated by symbols. "After the mass resignation of commanders, the Supreme Military Council has convened under the sole leadership of Prime Minister Erdogan. In addition, the meeting held in 2011 marks a number of firsts. While in previous years the chief of general staff would be seated to the prime minister's left in equal alignment, for the first time Prime Minister Erdogan was seated alone at the head of the table. However, on future

meetings, the minister of national defence will be seated to the prime minister's left while the chief of general staff will sit on his right, symbolizing the subordination of the army to civilian authority (however imperfectly, as it underlines equal status between minister and chief of general staff within the ministry at that period). The seating order has also changed in the National Security Council meeting convened in August 2011. In this meeting, chaired by President Gul just as in previous years, civilian and military members sat on both sides of the table in accordance with the order of state protocol. In previous meetings, military members sat separately as a bloc on one side of the table in accordance with their rank. The changes in seating order were interpreted as a sign of the normalization of civil-military relations, i.e., civilian dominance over the military (Unsaldi&Dabagci, 2012, p. 16). These symbolic changes are of great importance as they have destroyed some of the military's informal institutions through which it had empowered its political presence for decades.

4.5 Conclusion

The ascendancy of the Turkish military in politics can be interpreted as a punctuated case of an integrated body of regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive systems. Based upon a powerful historical, societal, and cultural legacy; the authoritarian state system under the guardianship of the officer-corps redesigned by the juntas that dictated the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions respectively which has constitutionalised the military tutelage.

In this system reigned until the early 2000s; a triumvirate consisting of a militarised society, powerful and ideologically indoctrinated officer-corps, and executive bodies that have supra-governmental powers, has been an integral transmitter of the military influence over the civilians. Each building block of this triumvirate has had its own distinctive mechanisms, which have benefited from the disparate rules, norms, and meanings through which they have reproduced the position of the military in politics for decades. In line with the preceding regulations, the constitutional system as of 2011, which bestowed an autonomous frame on the military, ruled out civilian control over these building blocks.

A dynamic combination comprised of endogenous (the Justice and Development Party governments supported by grassroots support) and exogenous (the European Union membership candidacy process) factors since the early 2000s have started to shake the fundamentals of the triumvirate reproducing the punctuated equilibrium evolved throughout the decades. In this context, the reproducers of the societal, institutional, and cultural-cognitive frameworks perpetuating the military dominance have been gradually diluted. However, as chapter seven will reveal, the transformation process in the tutelary institutions and power of balance, in general, has not paved the way for the democratisation of the state and civil-military relations but changing the owners of the authoritarian state from the officers to the civilians.

Instead of preferring to establish a system which could have based on the principles of universal democracy and the rule of law, Erdogan has pursued a revenge politics against his old rivals after he has defeated Turkey's once most powerful generals by instrumentalising the public support and the EU candidacy process. As of 2011, Erdogan has set to utilise this transformation to establish his one-man-rule regime that would be a continuation of the Turkish authoritarian state tradition in a civilian form destroying its rival in uniform. His way of politics seems to build civilian authoritarianism which has destroyed the military tutelage in Turkey.

CHAPTER 5: ASSESSING CIVILIAN PERSPECTIVES: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

The first constitution which was endorsed in 1924 in the aftermath of the War of Independence along with the legal arrangements made thereafter created an anti-democratic framework reproducing officer-dominant civil-military relations that prevented a properly functioning democratic and civilian oversight of the army in the new Turkish Republic. As analysed in chapter three; while sociological, historical, and cultural legacies were inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the founding philosophy of the new Turkish Republic rendered the military a unique and autonomous power in the constitutional system.

Overt and covert military interventions in national politics since 1960 clinched fundamental path-dependencies that have strengthened "the soldier" against "the civilian" in the Turkish political arena. As "guardians of the Republic" and the "true implementers of the revolution", the officers enjoyed the status granted to them by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his followers for decades.

Turkish multi-party democracy started in 1946 is the history of military coup d'états which reinforced the anti-democratic balance of power to a large extent. In chapter six effects of these military interventions on Turkish civil-military relations will be analysed through personal memoirs of some junta leaders along with regulative framework. After the bloody 27 May 1960 coup d'état in which Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two other ministers were executed, Turkey's fragile democratic life has been destroyed three times by the military. In the light of the Historical Institutionalism, it is possible to argue that the interventions have served to the "stickiness" of the path-dependency of the Turkish civil-military relations. Throughout the post-single party era, the interventionist mindset has solidified its constitutional-constructionist superiority over other state apparatuses while creating new political and military agencies within which the military was able to shape the political process and retain its autonomy in the face of any civilian challenge until the early 2000s. Similarly, any legal arrangement regarding the socio-political life was scrutinised and moulded by powerful generals with a tutelary interpretation.

As broadly discussed in chapter four, the institutional triumvirate which has been reproduced by historical, sociological, and cultural codes of Turkey has provided a fertile environment in

which the officers have been able to perpetuate the dominance of the military in politics. Chapter six is going to analyse how the military interventions have institutionalised the military tutelage above the triumvirate, which has normalised the anti-democratic balance of power. While the uncontested dominance of the military in politics and the interventionist mindset of the officers can be analysed through various primary and secondary resources, the literature has been suffering from lack of scientific knowledge about the civilian interpretation on the military tutelage and civil-military relations. Therefore, it is of great importance to find out the civilian perspective on the balance of power to comprehend the path-dependency of Turkish civil-military relations. As stated previously, criticising the military and the state have been a taboo in Turkey. Moreover, some special laws have been enacted to punish those who critically think and write against the country's untouchable institutions and figures. Because of the heavy price it has imposed, most people have hesitated to be involved in discussions regarding the military and the authoritarian state policies. Therefore, the literature has suffered from civilian perspectives on the research theme. As a result of the transformation in the balance of power since the early years of the 2000s, which will be analysed in chapter seven, the EU reform process has provided a relative environment of freedom through which the civilians have more freely exercised the right to freedom of speech against the military. However, this relativity lasted short and critical thinking against the regime and its agencies have become the most common reason for punishment again in parallel with Erdogan's rising power.

As analysed in chapter two, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) developed a powerful theoretical framework to explain institutional change. Four concepts- displacement, layering, drift, and conversion- suggested by these two prominent scholars in the light of the school of Historical Institutionalism are of great value to comprehend the gradual institutional change. This study follows their ways of conceptualising in analysing the transformation in Turkey's civil-military relations.

This chapter constitutes one of the most significant empirical parts of the research project as it presents new and original scientific knowledge for Turkish civil-military relations studies, which have been derived from one-on-one interviews with members of the civilian elite who have involved in constant interaction with the officer-corps and the military agencies. The central objective is to explore the perceptions, perspectives, and life experiences of influential Turkish civilians in respect of civil-military relations. This chapter aims at revealing interpretations of Turkish civilians on internal and external factors that have instituted,

perpetuated, and transformed Turkish civil-military relations. It provides empirical data to analyse how the civilians interpret the past, present and future of the balance of power in Turkey. It can be claimed that these interviews with civilians are the first of its kind in the Turkish civil-military relations studies. The fieldwork will contribute the civilian perspectives on the civil-military question to the literature. With its humble findings, it is hoped that this field work will be a fruitful ground for future projects in the discipline.

Chapter five is centrally concerned with the methodological approach which has informed this key element of fieldwork. It seeks to establish the integrity, reliability, and authority of the findings. The concluding section briefly summarises the research results, but those results are employed more systematically in later chapters to inform the discussion and as an integral part of the overall analysis.

5.2 Research Method

There has been a growing interest in qualitative research methods in recent decades. In parallel with the pluralisation of lifestyles, perceptions, and different patterns of interpretation in modern and post-modern society, a growing number of social scientists have attached more significance to the empirical issues (Flick, 2009, p.12). "Qualitative research begins with assumptions, a worldview, the possible use of a theoretical lens, and the study of research problems inquiring into the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. To study this problem, qualitative researchers use an emerging qualitative approach to inquiry, the collection of data in a natural setting sensitive to the people and places under study, and data analysis that is inductive and establishes patterns or themes. The final written report or presentation includes the voices of participants, the reflexivity of the researcher, and complex description and interpretation of the problem, and it extends the literature or signals a call for action"(Creswell, 2007, p.37). Qualitative analysis situates the researcher in the cosmos of the research question(s). Through a cluster of interpretational and perceivable findings, it makes the research world visible. One-to-one notes from the field, recordings, memos, interviews, and each interaction with the world regarding research subjects may bring new scientific contributions to the discipline in question (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.3).

As Siegle points out (2006, p.3), a qualitative researcher focuses on how people describe life, knowledge, and semantic explanations of the world around them. In this context, his/her focal

point is the process rather than consequences. The researcher has a primary and determining role in data collection and analysis. Fieldwork is a significant constituent of the qualitative study. Through types of fieldwork, the researcher physically enters into the world of the research question(s), in which he/she examines and records attitudes in their natural environment. The qualitative study, intrinsically, possesses descriptive and inductive characteristics. As the researcher engages in process, context, and understanding procured through words or pictures, the qualitative approach is descriptive. It is inductive as details enable the researcher to develop concepts, abstractions, and theories. Due to the qualitative research being designed and developed through close interaction with informants, this research envisaged the following questions in order to prepare a productive discussion environment inspired by the theoretical debate developed by Siegle (2006) on "Research with Informants":

a-What do the participants know about their culture that could be explored?

b- What concepts do the participants use to categorise their experiences?

c- How do the participants describe these concepts?

d-What folk theory do the participants use to discuss their experience?

e- How can the knowledge provided by the participants be translated into a description that other researchers will comprehend and benefit? (Siegle, 2006)

Through narratives presented by the informants, a researcher can plumb the depths of individual cognitions. Words and sentences tell stories from one's consciousness regarding the research issue in question. Individuals' consciousness makes it possible to comprehend a diverse range of complex social matters since social issues are abstractions grounded on "the concrete experience of people"(Seidman, 2006, pp.7-10).

An important aspect of the qualitative interviewing method of data collection is the ethical responsibilities that the researcher has to obey throughout the inquiry process. The interaction between interviewee and interviewer affects the nature of the knowledge to be produced, and the understanding of others who are interested in this knowledge. Being a "moral enterprise", an interview process requires ethically accepted means and ends. To put it in a different way, the means and the ends that direct this fieldwork have to be legitimate and scientific. As Mauthner et al. underlined (2002, p.1), ethical concerns in interview inquiry are especially important due to the complex nature of "researching private lives and placing accounts in the

public arena" (Kvale, 2007, pp.23-24). For these reasons, it is the researcher's responsibility to fulfil ethical requirements throughout the interview agenda. This responsibility involves procuring the participants' informed consent to take part in the research, providing the participants with privacy and secrecy, and safeguarding them against any negative consequence that the interview may cause. Within this framework, the researcher has to share transcripts and analyses with the informant through a flexible approach in which the latter is given an opportunity to change, omit or retract his/her statements (Kvale, 2007, pp.23-24). Today in many countries and institutions, all projects involving human participants are asked to obtain an "Ethical Approval of Research" which is confirmed by experienced committees. According to the "Research Student Handbook"[28] implemented by the University of Exeter, staff and doctoral student projects involving interviews, questionnaires or observation of people needs to be submitted for an ethical review to the Ethics Committee. Initially confirmed by supervisors Prof. Stephen Wilks and Prof. Andrew Massey, this research's application[29] for the "Ethics Approval" has been accepted[30] by the Committee of the University of Exeter. The approved application covers the following headings[31] through which the researcher has declared his strict obedience to the ethical rules which have been implemented by the University:

> a-Research Methods, b- The Voluntary Nature of Participation, c- The Informed Nature of Participation, d- Assessment of Possible Harm, e- Data Protection and Storage, f- Declaration of Interest, g- User Engagement and Feedback, h- Ethical Requirements of the Relevant Country, i-Consent Form and Information Sheet for Interviewees.

5.3 Qualitative Interview: Preparing Substructure, Ethical Considerations, and Participants' Characteristics

Qualitative interviewing involves the active engagement of the interviewer and the informants around relevant research questions during some prearranged meetings (May, 2002, p.225). Holding interviews, in this sense, has been one of the primary research techniques. The interviewing technique is comprised of a wide variety of models that may be categorised into two groups. The first one involves a tightly structured and pre-arranged approach through

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[28]The "Handbook" is available at
http://intranet.exeter.ac.uk/socialsciences/student/postgraduateresearch/researchstudenthandbook/ (last visited on 01 February 2015)
[29]See Appendix A - Certificate of Ethical Approval.
[30]See Appendix B - Proposal for Consideration by the University of Exeter SSIS Ethics Committee.
[31]For content headings see Appendix B.

which the interviewee is asked to answer standardised and closed questions. The second group approves a method which is less structured and aims to have "friendly conversations". At this end of the continuum, the researcher works at obtaining answers to his/her unstructured, semi-structured and open-ended questions (Seidman, 2006, pp.15-16). For this project, the second approach has been applied, and the interviewees were provided with friendly environment in which they could freely discuss the research theme.

This in-depth interview process has produced scientific data regarding the Turkish civil-military relations in the light of the informants' responses and life experience. As a basic mode of data collection, interviewing attaches importance to others' knowledge. Putting questioner and informant together, it emphasises the significance of the interaction between these two parts. Obtaining rich and relevant data through interviewing techniques is in direct proportion to the researcher's ability to grasp, analyse, and have fruitful interaction with the verbal and nonverbal information presented by the interviewee (Ayres, 2008, p.812). Along with personal narratives, interviewing enables the researcher to access the context of informants' behaviour through which the meaning of that behaviour is grasped (Seidman, 2006, pp.7-10). Observing behaviours of informants throughout interviews is of great importance, especially in countries like Turkey, where freedom of speech is under threat and critical thinking against the state and government institutions. In this sense, attention has been paid to understand the level of the critical approach pursued by the interviewees on the research questions.

Qualitative interviewing is quintessentially a costly research method in terms of time and, for some projects, money. The researcher must spare a great deal of time from the beginning to the end of the interview process. The interviewer has to form a concept, on which the fieldwork will be developed. Subsequently, establishing access and contacting participants are of great importance. It will not be possible to have a successful interview process unless healthy communication is established with informants. Another very time-consuming dimension of qualitative interviewing is transcribing the narratives of informants, which sometimes requires hundreds of pages. At this point, an overly complex issue may emerge from the language difference between the research project and interviewees. In such cases, the researcher has to prepare an interview guide in the participants' language and then translate each word used by participants into the project's language. In the last instance, the researcher has to analyse the data he or she collected from the field thanks to interviews and share what has been learned from this process (Siedman, 2006, p.12). This fieldwork has been carried out

in Turkish since it is the native language of the informants. Afterwards, it has been transcribed and been translated into English by the researcher.

In some cases, a researcher has to make long study trips abroad and stay there in order to realise a qualitative interview, which can cost a large amount of money that is to be supplied by the researcher to a large extent. The researcher has gone to Ankara, the capital of Turkey, to do interviews with the participants.

As mentioned above, interviewing is a dynamic method of qualitative research that produces new information in social sciences. Although there are no binding standards regarding the sampling size in qualitative interviews, some researchers suggest a minimum inclusion ranging from 6-12 participants. Some leading researchers, such as Moustakas (1994) and Rubinstein (1994), say that a productive population for qualitative interviewing may be between 10 and 100 informants. Through this original empirical research, obtaining rich and notable data regarding Turkey's civil-military question from 30 informants have been planned in the beginning. However, 20 of the offers of interviews have been accepted. This percentage ought to be accepted reasonable since the deep-rooted freedom of speech problem in the country.

To ensure voluntary participation in the fieldwork; a participation consent form and an information sheet written in both English and Turkish were prepared. Before each interview, the interviewee was asked to read and confirm the consent form and information sheet. The sheet included all required information for informants to enable their understanding of the vision of the research that they would attend. It also emphasised matters such as anonymity, confidentiality, the right to withdraw from the interview at any time and to review the transcript. These forms included sufficient knowledge of the study. Each participant has been ensured that there is no overt or covert enforcement to take part in the interview and that the voluntary nature of participation in the study was explicitly declared[32]. Besides ensuring with written forms, it has been verbally declared before each interview that the researcher has been responsible for the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants, and of using the provided data for only academic purposes.

For this research, former ministers, members of Turkish Parliament, senior bureaucrats of the Turkish Interior Ministry and Ministry of Justice, governors, deputy governors and district

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[32]See Appendix B for details of the consent forms and information sheets.

governors all of whom have/had professional experience and or expertise in civil-military relations were interviewed. The informants were given pseudonyms[33] known only by the researcher. On a separate note, these codes were defined according to the names of the interviewees. High-level private storage instruments have been formed and warranted by the researcher to use the interview materials securely. Besides, any personal information about the informants has been stored using pass-worded software, and all technological precautions have been taken to prevent any accidental disclosure of the information. No other person or third party has been able to access, copy, or collect the interview documents. Personal information of the interviewees and the data harvested thanks to the interviews have been kept in accordance with the Data Protection Act[34]. They have been treated in confidence according to the criteria of research ethics.

Each of the participants was informed of his/her right to refuse to participate or withdraw from the project whenever, and for whatever reason, he/she wishes. One of the agreed participants withdrew from the interview though he had previously accepted the interview offer. A former high-ranking officer who later became an influential politician refused to give an interview when the researcher visited him in his office. He questioned the researcher's "real purpose" in doing such a "critical research" on the military in "a country like the United Kingdom".

The informants were informed of the academic purposes of the provided data, and that it was not to be adopted for any other reasons. Every precaution was taken to ensure that the interviewees' participated willingly and felt comfortable about sharing their experience. Each of the interviewees was given the right to anonymity and to review the transcript of the interview and alter some or all the given information. Additionally, the participants had the right to withdraw the given information until the viva date. Only one of twenty participants asked for interview transcripts to overview his statements. The transcripts were sent to the email address of the interviewee. None of the informants has changed, omitted, or withdrawn the given information till the present day.

This study has adopted semi-structured interviews. It has placed value on flexibility while preparing questions. Twenty semi-structured interviews have been conducted with the aim of gaining primary data from policymakers and implementers who have the expertise and or

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[33]A numerical coding system was adopted for each of the interviewees such as informant 1, informant 2, informant3…

[34]The UK Data Protection Act is available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/contents.

experience in civil-military relations. Interviews were conducted at the participants' offices, in Ankara-Turkey between 01 January 2014 and 28 February 2014. The interview date and time were determined according to the most suitable timeframe for each participant. Each of the interviews took between 50 and 70 minutes. For a thorough understanding of each statement, the face-to-face interviewing technique has been used to get an insight into the world of meaning of the participant. Notes were taken, and the gestures and facial expressions of the informants were observed by the researcher throughout the interviews. Eighteen of the participants have consented in using an audiotape to record the interviews. This percentage is significant in three aspects. Firstly, by accepting being recorded at a discussion regarding the military; the Turkish civilians displayed behaviour which has rarely seen before. Hence, it can be interpreted as an indication of the change in the balance of power which is an outcome of the transformation which will be analysed in chapter seven. Secondly, it proves that the participants are sure about their analyses. Thirdly, it may be interpreted as evidence of trust, showing the researcher's healthy communication with the participants.

5.4 Doing a Semi-Structured Interview: Questions, Answers, and Interpretations

The military has taken legal action against any critical approach directed by political analysts and intellectuals under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code that penalizes the "denigration of Turkishness or the Turkish military". For instance, in a press conference, General Ilker Basbug, the Chief of General Staff of the period between 2008 and 2010, said that the armed forces would take legal action against systematic attacks seen in the media that had increased in recent days. He also "invited everyone to be careful and stand in the right position"(Schleifer, 2008). This approach has not been peculiar to General Basbug, but a norm of the military in protecting its immunity throughout the decades. As a result of the transformation in the balance of power in recent years, which will be analysed in chapter seven, the military's tough stance against critical thinking has loosened to some extent. However, as of 2011, Turkey was not a country in which the rights of freedom of thought and speech are guaranteed in the light of the universal principles. As the following years have proved, freedom of speech and critical thinking are under huge attack in the country which is being ruled by a competitive authoritarian regime. Therefore, following universal principals of qualitative interviewing is of great importance to secure the privacy of the interviewees and

gain the trust of the participants. All precautions have been taken to secure the privacy of the participants.

As mentioned in the previous section, the semi-structured interview technique has been applied in this research through which the participants were asked a series of predesigned and open-ended questions. The application of open-ended questions through semi-structured interview sessions provided a free environment for the informants to relate their perceptions and experiences regarding the research questions. Researchers have prepared many kinds of open-ended questions to conduct semi-structured interviews. A brief literature review[35] shows that some questions were asked with the intention of gaining relatively concrete information, and some were designed to obtain more narrative information. Along with these direct treatments of the research matters, some researchers also preferred to adopt a range of probes for data acquisition or building a close and harmonious interaction with the informants through active listening methods. As a novice interviewer, the candidate benefited from the above-mentioned questioning experiences. Between unstructured and structured interview strategies, the semi-structured interviews provided the researcher with a certain degree of control over the interview process. Due to the flexible nature of the technique, there is no fixed range of answers to each question (Ayres, 2008, pp.811-812).

A written interview guide[36] was prepared with carefully worded questions before heading to Ankara, Turkey's capital, where the interviews were conducted. The site and time of the interviews were determined at addresses and time agreed upon by both the researcher and interviewees. Whilst designing the topics of the interview guide, the researcher attached importance to establish a framework based on the research theme has been discussed through a particular theoretical approach since the very beginning of the research. Therefore, the questions were designed in light of the tenets developed by the school of Historical Institutionalism[37].

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[35] For instance: Van Gorp, J(2014). *Semi-Structured Interviewing: Socio-Cultural Issues and Dutch Politicians* in *SAGE Research Methods Cases*. London:SAGE Publications; Cockburn, A. (2014). *Using Semi-Structured Interviews to Study Mediocre Teachers: Ethical Issues* in *SAGE Research Methods Cases*. London:SAGE Publications; Khatib, M. (2014*). Semi-Structured, Open-Ended Interviewing: A Qualitative Descriptive Study of Arab Muslim Immigrant Women's Experiences of Living* inn *SAGE Research Methods Cases*. London:SAGE Publications; Wengraf, T. (2001). *Models of Research Design and their Application to Semi-Structured Depth Interviewing*, in Qualitative Research Interviewing (pp.51-60). London:SAGE Publications.

[36]See Appendix C for the Interview Guide written in English.

[37]See chapter three for the theoretical framework.

The researcher has designed an interview guide which adopted a multi-layer approach focused on revealing the participants' perceptions, perspectives, and experiences regarding the research agenda. In the first stage, the researcher has aimed at having a grasp of civilian cognition over central themes of the project. To that end, the following questions have been investigated:

1- How do Turkish civilians describe the concepts of "civil-military relations in Turkey", and "civilian oversight of the military"?

2-How do Turkish civilians describe their experience with respect to their military counterparts?

3-What fundamental factors do they believe that form the nature of civil-military relations in Turkey?

In the second step, the researcher has tried to understand how the participants analyse the path-dependency of the political power of the military. Relatedly, questions have been prepared concerning rules, norms, and values that perpetuated this path-dependency. With this object in mind, the researcher has delved into finding answers to these questions:

1-What do they think of the question of civilian oversight of the military in Turkey, is the military being monitored by the elected authorities?

2- Is the civilian oversight of the military in Turkey a necessity? If so, are current legal regulations and constitutional infrastructure giving enough power to civilians to oversee the military?

3- How do self-governing educational systems in the military schools[38], which were independent of the civilian authorities, influence Turkish civil-military relations at the research period?

4-What do Turkish civilians think of the direct and indirect military interventions in politics, and impacts of these interventions over civil-military relations?

5-What do civilians believe about the reasons that there have been so many military interventions in Turkish politics?

6- In the light of their professional experience and intellectual accumulation, what are the interviewees' interpretations on the outlook of the officer-corps on civilian persons and institutions?

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[38]With the term "military schools", it is referred to all kinds of military educational institutions in Turkey.

In addition to these, the researcher has premeditated asking relevant sub-questions according to the tenor of each interview.

In the third stage, questions have been designed to debate the transformation in the balance of power established in favour of the military. The researcher has endeavoured to comprehend how Turkish civilians evaluate external and internal factors that have triggered the transformation in the above-mentioned equilibrium. Because of the fact that the research project started in 2011, the interview questions analyse the transformation process between 2002 and 2011.

During the third part of the interviews, the following questions were addressed to the participants:

> 1-How has Turkey's European Union full-membership process influenced civil-military relations and the question of civilian oversight of the military in Turkey?
>
> 2- How can a powerful civilian leadership influence civil-military relation?
>
> 3- How have the "Ergenekon" and "Sledgehammer"[39] criminal prosecutions, named as "coup cases", influenced civil-military relations in Turkey?

Along with the questions mentioned above, sub-questions were asked to reveal personal experiences of the Turkish civilians throughout this process.

In the last phase of the interview guide, a final question has been designed to receive a general assessment of the participants on current problems of the Turkish civil-military relations and the question of the civilian oversight of the military, and policy recommendations to those problems. The question is as follows:

> -What are the main problems of civil-military relations in Turkey? What kind of reforms does Turkey need to overcome those problems?

Thanks to the positive and generous approaches of the participants throughout the meetings, the researcher has managed to conduct fruitful one-on-one, semi-structured interviews.

As said in the previous section, a very large majority of the participants had consented to record the interviews. An audio recording device was used to receive the explanations presented by the informants in a whole and complete way. Along with supporting the exact

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[39]See chapter seven for the "Ergenekon" and "Sledgehammer" cases.

transcription of each session, this method helped the researcher to overcome some shortcomings of the note-taking system.

Theoretical principles of the credibility, validity and trustworthiness for this research were debated in APPENDIX D.

The table below shows the codes and positions of the informants as of the interview dates:

Code (Informant: I)	Position/Occupation
I-1	Ministry of Interior
I-2	Ministry of Interior
I-3	Ministry of Interior
I-4	Ministry of Interior
I-5	Ministry of Interior
I-6	Member of Parliament and Former Minister
I-7	Ministry of Interior
I-8	Member of Parliament and Deputy Head of a Parliamentary Commission
I-9	Governor and Under Secretary
I-10	Ministry of Interior
I-11	Governor and Deputy Under Secretary
I-12	District Governor
I-13	District Governor
I-14	District Governor
I-15	Ministry of Justice
I-16	Ministry of Interior
I-17	Ministry of Interior
I-18	District Governor

I-19	Governor
I-20	Ministry of Interior

5.5 Findings and Data Analysis

Qualitative interviewing provides researchers with large amounts of richly detailed data. By the end of intense interview processes, researchers have to rework this "raw information" through which they develop main themes and categories analysing the research subject. Reworking the interview transcripts includes the reduction of large amounts of data in the quest to represent the central themes of the research subject simply and efficiently. Identifying, coding, and categorising patterns and arguments which were derived from the interview transcripts and notes are fundamental components of the qualitative data analysis (Woods, 2011).

Focusing on the text, which is composed of transcripts and notes, researchers embark upon studying the final phase of the field research. It is during this phase that they can crown their project with unheard-of ideas, perspectives, and experiences regarding the research project. What can a researcher learn from a qualitative text? According to Chambliss and Schuttt, his/her question can be answered from "realistic" and "hermeneutic" perspectives. From the "realistic" approach, he/she examines a text in order to comprehend what informants 'really' "thought, felt, or did in some situation or at some point in time" (Chambliss and Schuttt 2012, p.321). On the other hand, texts that are analysed from a hermeneutic perspective are accepted as an interpretation, and they can never be judged true or false. This approach considers the text as just one example among many other possible interpretations. In this context, analysts construct a "reality" through subjective interpretations of the research text, that is to say, any other researcher holding different views may reach a substantially different conclusion. (Chambliss&Schutt, 2012, p.321). In harmony with the theoretical framework, this research has adopted a realistic approach to the research text.

There are several methods that are developed to analyse qualitative data (Miller and Brewer: 2003); this project has applied the van Kaam's method of analysis. This method aims at reducing and eliminating irrelevant and unnecessary statements[40]. In his guiding work Professor Moustakas (1994, pp.120-121) has modified van Kaam method and developed

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[40]For a detailed explanation of the van Kaam method see: van Kaam A. (1959).*Phenomenal analysis: Exemplified by a study of the experience of "really feeling understood." Journal of Individual Psychology* vol. 15(1) pp. 66–72.

seven steps in analysing the transcribed interview of each research attendee. These steps and content of each step are:

- Listing and preliminary grouping of meaningful expressions: Listing every pertinent expression.

- Reduction and elimination to determine the invariant: Expressions related to the experience.

- Clustering and thematising the invariant constituents: Revealing themes of the experience.

- Final identification of the invariant constituents and themes by application/validation: Validating if the invariant constituents and themes are accurate.

- Individual textural description: Verbatim quotations made by the participants.

-Individual structural description: Gaining insight into what and how of each experience.

-Textural-structural description: A composite description of the meanings of the experiences of the group as a whole. These steps provide a basis for being open and inclusive, in which each expression is evaluated as holding equal value in analysing the interview outputs (cited by Kelley, 2011, pp.77-78).

To ensure consistency in coding, categorising, interpretation, and analysis, the NVivo10[41] was used. A software programme which serves at a remarkably successful level, the NVivo10 supports researchers in minimising their subjectivities and biases, as well as helping to strengthen the validity of data analysis (Qsr International, 2014).

As explained in the previous section, in the first stage of the interviews, the researcher has aimed at having a grasp of civilian cognition over central themes of the research subject. To that end, the following questions were asked to each participant, respectively:

1- How do you describe the concepts of "civil-military relations in Turkey", and "civilian oversight of the military"?

2-Which factors do you think have determined the fundamentals of the Turkish civil-military relations?

3-Could you please tell me about your experience of working with the Turkish military officers?

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[41]For a detailed explanation on services provided by NVivo 10's see:
http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx

These three interrelated questions were asked to evaluate the participants' understanding of the terms "civil-military relations" and "civilian oversight of the military", and their contextual meaning regarding the Turkish case. By the third question, as a student of Historical Institutionalism, the researcher has gauged the interviewees' understanding regarding the impacts of "the initial decisions" over the construction of the Turkish civil-military relations. Responses received at the first stage of the interviews enabled the researcher to determine how Turkish civilians make sense of the fundamentals of civil-military relations. The participants, each of whom has had comprehensive experience on military matters, provided a large amount of information from different perspectives regarding the central themes of the research subject. These data are of great significance as they have revealed the civilian perceptions over how and in what ways the undemocratic structure of Turkish civil-military relations has been established. It ought to be mentioned that almost all the participants answered the first three questions confidently and critically. As mentioned previously, speaking critically about the military institution has been a taboo until very recently owing to the heavy political tutelage of the institution over the country. Therefore, it can be deduced that there has been a growing "self-confidence" among civilians toward the once most powerful institution in Turkish politics.

More than 90% of the participants expressed their perceptions and interpretations of "civil-military relations" and "civilian oversight of the military" through the term "coup d'état", and negative impacts of the military interventions in the socio-political life in Turkey. Almost all the informants supported their explanations with examples of how the military tutelage has shaped public life, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Because of these reasons, it is possible to say that civilian cognition, which includes thinking, knowing, remembering, judging, and problem-solving matters regarding civil-military relations and the question of civilian oversight of the military, has been produced under the profound political influence of the armed forces. In this context, the participants emphasised various operative key factors such as the "historical role of the military in Turkish history", "the Ottoman legacy", "culture", "the geopolitical position of Turkey" and "the officer-corps as the founder of the Republic" as core themes which have determined the fundamentals of the Turkish civil-military relations. Therefore, the answers confirm the theoretical approach of the Historical Institutionalism through which this study analyses the research theme.

In response to their experience of working with the military officers, the participants asserted two common issues. 80% of the participants laid stress on "separate worlds" that amounts to a

military system allowing the minimum level of civilian interference in military matters. When the reasons for such a system were inquired about, most of the participants referred to the legislative and constitutional regulations that were promulgated in the post-military intervention eras. The second issue which emerged in this context can be coded as the "communication problem between civilians and the officer-corps". More than 90% of the interviewees uttered that there has "no healthy communication" between civilians and the officer-corps. Reasons of that problem were explained through arguments such as "cliquish and elitist behaviour of the Turkish officers ", "baseless prejudices against civilians that are taught at the military educational institutions", and "lack of proper civilian control over the military". This line of reasoning shows parallelism with the findings which have been put forth in chapter four analysing the mindset of the Turkish officer.

During the second stage of the interviews, the researcher has focused on understanding how the participants analyse the path-dependency of the political power of the military over politics. In relation to that, questions were asked concerning rules, norms, and values that have perpetuated this lasting impact. Each of the participants was asked the following questions:

1-What do you think of Turkey's question of civilian oversight of the military, is the military being monitored by the elected authorities?

2- Is civilian oversight of the military in Turkey a necessity? If so, are current legal regulations and constitutional infrastructure giving enough legal mandates to civilians to monitor the military?

3- How does the self-governing educational system in the military schools, which is independent of the civilian authorities, influence Turkish civil-military relations?

4-What do you think of the direct and indirect military interventions in politics in Turkey?

5- Could you please evaluate the impacts of these interventions on civil-military relations?

6-What are the reasons for having so many military interventions in Turkish politics?

Almost all the participants similarly answered that there has not been an established system of civilian control over the military since the coup d'état took place in 1980. In a similar manner, they pointed out that the military's unquestionable position within the state apparatus has been one of the most important problems of Turkish democracy since its foundation. In addition to

these, a considerable amount of the participants, 72% of the interviewees, expressed that the first civilian president of the Turkish Republic, Turgut Ozal (1989-1993), challenged military tutelage during his tenure, and to some extent, he was successful especially in the appointment of some senior generals.

All the participants laid emphasis on the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkish politics since 2001, and the strong influence of the party's leader (then) Prime Minister Erdogan over civil-military relations especially between 2007-2011. It was similarly expressed that Erdogan's power struggle with the military has constituted an unprecedented example throughout the modern history of civil-military relations in Turkey. In this context, it is possible to argue that Erdogan's challenge against the military has been one of the factors which have increased his popularity and power. A striking point which can be deduced from the explanations of the participants is that the challenges mentioned above are limited to the personal endeavours of the two leaders and have not culminated in a true democratisation of Turkish civil-military relations. There are still huge democratic problems in civil-military relations, and a lack of a systemic civilian control over the military remains on top of the agenda as of the interview date.

Only 12% of the informants found current regulations enough for civilian oversight of the military. Most of the interviewees made policy recommendations which are assumed to ensure a better legal framework in search of democratisation of civil-military relations.

All the participants described the independent education system of the military schools from civilian authorities, which has reproduced the militaristic norms, values, traditions etc., as one of the most influential factors that have perpetuated military influence in politics. On the other hand, almost half of the participants said that they did not have enough information about the operation of the education system in military schools and course contents. This percentage shows the depth of the gap between civilian and military realms.

The participants have given significance and laid emphasis on the "lethal effects" of the direct and indirect military interventions over civilian politics. They explained the reasons for military interventions in politics through institutional, ideological (the military as the guardian of the Kemalist Republic), socio-cultural, and international arguments. Another attention-grabbing interpretation which emerged from the answers is that 100% of the participants considered the "global powers", especially the USA, as one of the key actors behind the military interventions in Turkey. This approach ought to be studied by social scientists, especially those students of the International Relations discipline.

Throughout the second stage of the interviews, the researcher saw that most of the participants have extensive knowledge about the history of Turkish democracy.

During the third phase of the interviews, the researcher asked the participants to assess three facts that have paved the way for the relative transformation in the Turkish civil-military relations. Within this context, each of the participants was asked to answer those questions:

1-How has Turkey's European Union full-membership process influenced civil-military relations and the question of civilian oversight of the military in Turkey?

2- How can a powerful civilian leadership influence civil-military relation?

3-How have the "Ergenekon" and "Sledgehammer" criminal prosecutions, named as "coup cases", influenced civil-military relations in Turkey?

Throughout the third phase of the interviews, all the participants put particular emphasis on the democratising effect of Turkey's European Union (EU) membership process on civil-military relations. Numerous examples were given by the participants on how the EU candidacy process has reformulated the balance of power in Turkey. In this context, it was indicated that the candidacy process had created a new political climate in which civilian governments have found the chance to weaken the everlasting power of the military in politics. 13 of the participants (65%) gave specific examples regarding the legal regulations and constitutional amendments which have been enacted since early 2000 as part of the EU harmonisation process which has transformed the balance of power in Turkey. A significant theme that emerged from the responses is that a vast majority of the participants believe that the new political climate which has been created thanks to the EU process has made criticising the military possible in Turkey, especially after 2007. According to the participants, the EU candidacy process has become the dominant fact that has triggered a normalisation process in Turkish civil-military relations.

Another significant point which was underlined by the participants is that the acquirements attained in the civil-military relations may be wasted if the country strays from the EU path[42]. While they were asked to compare the influence of the internal and external determinants on the balance of power, the vast majority of the participants asserted that without the EU candidacy process any transformation could not have been possible in Turkey.

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[42] As the research project focuses on the multi-party era until 2011, it does not address anti-democratic regression and deviation from the EU project after that time.

The role of political leadership in civil-military relations was widely debated at this stage. The study participants broadly explained paternalistic features of political parties and the socio-cultural roots of the great importance which is attached to leadership in Turkish politics. A common emphasis placed on how the legal regulations enacted in post-1980 coup d'état era has restricted intra-party democracy. The participants asserted that during the term of governments ruled by political leaders who possess high levels of public support have had a transformative effect on civil-military relations in favour of civilians. In this context, the participants referred to power struggles between the civilians and the generals that took place under (then) Prime Ministers Ozal and Erdogan, respectively. It was similarly expressed that Turkey has experienced an unprecedented example of transformation in civil-military relations, especially between 2007 and 2010. However, the participants pointed out that political leadership alone is not a sufficient factor to democratise civil military-relations and establish a systemic civilian oversight of the military in Turkey. In this regard, most of the participants argued that Turkey needs socio-cultural changes to have a sustainable transformation in the balance of power. In fact, Erdogan's deviation from the path of democracy and the EU project after 2011 has proved the informants right on the need for a socio-cultural change rather than the leadership-oriented transformation.

As for the "coup d'état trails"[43] , the participants stated that these trials had presented a turning point in the Turkish politics owing to the fact that they have paved the way for a new era in the civil-military relations. The participants similarly mentioned that it was impossible even to imagine trying retired or active military officers who had committed offences against governments in the civilian courts in the past. The participants explained the reason for such a transformation through two components: a) Legal and political reforms carried out during the EU candidacy process, b) The ambitious political struggle between the Erdogan governments which was supported by various social groups and the military. What is interesting in this context is that none of the participants criticised the politically motivated decisions of the judiciary under the immense influence of the Erdogan governments, and gross human rights violations during the trials. One of many reasons for such a deficiency might stem from the changing facets of the power in Turkey.

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[43]See chapter seven for the "coup d'état" trials. There has been an endless debate over these trials since they have deeply influenced the balance of power in Turkey. Erdogan's regime and his allies have successfully planned and used these trials to defeat their secular enemies. As the jurisdictions contain hundreds of thousands of legal documents, they ought to be studied by scholars who have legal expertise in Criminal Law. In this part of the interviews, civilian perceptions on how these trials have influenced civil-military relations have been investigated.

The last part of the interviews was designated for seeking a general assessment on the research subject and policy recommendations which can make contributions to the civil-military relations and civilian oversight of the military debates in Turkey. Each of the participants was asked the following question:

-What are the main problems of civil-military relations in Turkey? What kind of reforms does Turkey need to overcome those problems?

Seven themes from the participants' answers emerged within the scope of the question, and they were contextualised as follows:

a - From the very beginning of their educational process, military cadets ought to be indoctrinated with the idea of "civilian superiority".

b- The Chief General Staff ought to be subordinated to the Minister of National Defence instead of the Prime Minister.

c-The long-standing institution of conscription, compulsory military service for every male citizen, ought to be abolished, and alternatively, only professional soldiers ought to be employed in the Armed Forces.

d - To make administrative oversight of the military possible, civilian leaders ought to be fully authorised in appointing high-ranking officers.

e – The degree of influence and the number of generals in the National Security Council ought to be reduced.

f - All military expenses ought to be audited by the Court of Accounts on behalf of the Parliament.

g - In provinces, governors ought to be endowed with the authority to supervise the military units.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the central research questions through the life experiences, perceptions, and beliefs of the 20 Turkish civilian participants. The primary objectives of the field research were to explore how the participants evaluate the political construction and path-dependency of the Turkish civil-military relations. In addition to this, the study focused on revealing civilian interpretations regarding the relative transformation in civil-military relations, and the question of civilian oversight of the military. The study applied a semi-structured interviewing method with open-ended questions and audiotape recording technique. Each of the questions was prepared in the light of theoretical approaches developed by students of the Historical Institutionalism. The data collected through the experiences, perceptions and interpretations of the interviewees were transcribed word for word, and thereafter translated into English from Turkish by the researcher. This qualitative research study has provided the researcher with an opportunity to have rich, detailed, textual data through one-on-one, in-depth interviews with the 20 informants experienced in the research theme.

This qualitative study may have an exceptional place in the literature as it constitutes probably the first fieldwork which is dedicated to understanding civilians' perspectives, experiences, and perceptions on civil-military relations and the questions of civilian oversight of the military in Turkey. In that sense, it will enable an encouraging environment for prospective researchers in the discipline. In addition to this, the findings derived from the interviews may provide Turkish leaders and policymakers with a fertile intellectual ground, who aim at establishing democratic civil-military relations in the country.

Findings obtained from the interviews will be used in the next chapters while analysing officers' perspectives on civil-military relations and the question of civilian oversight of the military. In particular, they will be utilised when internal and external determinants that have triggered the relative transformation in civil-military relations are analysed in chapter seven.

CHAPTER 6: FOUR COUPS: CHANGING MODES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF MILITARY TUTELAGE

> " ...For you civilians, a general is a top officer; for us he is a kind of demi-god, the symbol of our values, and ideal rank toward which all the younger officers strive. What would happen to this value system if younger officers should see their general open the door and bow to a civilian minister". Response of a young officer- from an interview conducted after the 1960 intervention (Karpat, 1970, p. 1664).

> "The importance of our army is increasing because of those who are against the Republic, democracy and secularism". A quote from a senior general who was very active during the intervention of 28 February 1997 (Cizre, 2003, p. 213).

> "The meaning of four coups d'état in 40 years is that; you (the civilians) can do politics only within the limits we (the military) determined" (Interviewee 4).

6.1 Introduction

In four different conjunctures, the Turkish military has toppled the elected governments. Between 1960 and 2010, the formal and informal rules, norms, and institutions which were produced and reproduced through each of these military interventions have made the Turkish Armed Forces the most influential playmaker in politics until very recently. Along with the Ottoman legacy and the political philosophy of the founding father[44](s) of the secular, nation-state, which were widely analysed in chapter three, the generals invented new instruments through which they established a tutelary regime over the civilians within the political environment created by the coups d'état. For this reason, it is of crucial importance to analyse these military interventions for having a solid grasp of Turkey's civil-military relations. Such an analysis will also provide to comprehend how the military and its members have justified their political powers and legitimised the coups d'état.

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[44] Mustafa Kemal Ataturk

In chapter five, the civilian perspectives over the military, the military officers and civil-military relations have been revealed through the interviews carried out in Ankara, the capital of Turkey. Since interviewing active officers on such a critical project is not possible in Turkey, the researcher has employed another qualitative research method and analysed memoirs and other discourses of the intended population in this chapter. By analysing memoirs, statements, commentaries, and other narratives of influential military figures who took part had active roles and commanded thousands of officers in the military interventions; this research has aimed at revealing what the Turkish officers think of the civilians and how they evaluate the politicians and political parties. It has also focused on the arguments the officers gave to justify the coups d'état and legitimise the political actions of the military in Turkey throughout the decades.

Military interventions in Turkey have created their norms and rules to strengthen military dominance over the Republic, which had been trying to get familiar with the principles of democracy after entering the multi-party system. Each of the military interventions between 1960 and 1997 has both produced new anti-democratic institutions and reproduced those already exist within the system based on the Ottoman legacy and the Kemalist founding philosophy. Therefore, a chronological approach has been pursued to reveal the gradual institutionalisation of the tutelary regime.

In this chapter, many primary, secondary, and tertiary sources were reviewed to explore how the military interventions have served to the gradual institutionalisation of the military tutelage in Turkey. The chapter, in parallel, reveals the officers' perspectives on the civilians and their interventionist mindset which has justified the tutelary regime for decades.

6.2 The 27 May 1960 Coup D'état: Guardians and Rulers

The military's influential reappearance in politics after the War of Independence and the Kemalist Revolution coincides with the political transformation process that paved the way for the transition to multi-party democracy in the late 1940s. By the end of World War II, internal and external pressures forced President Inonu to lay the way open for a multi-party system in Turkey (Erkem-Gulboy, 2010, pp. 20-27). Influential members of the military, which was given the role of protecting the Republic within the state apparatus, did not hesitate to take part in the political discussions generated by Inonu. As stated in the previous chapters, according to Article 34 of the Military Internal Service Code (Law no. 2771) enacted in 1935, the role of the Turkish Armed Forces within the constitutional system was determined as follows: "The duty of the Armed Forces is to protect and watch over the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic designated by the Constitution". Between 1960 and 2010 this regulation became the most decisive rule through which the Turkish military periodically redesigned politics. The article was rewritten in 1961 and used by all junta leaders and interventionist officers in pursuit of legitimacy before and after the toppling of democratically elected governments. It has also become a constituent element that shaped the institutional culture and the mindset of the officer-corps from the very beginning of their indoctrination process in military schools (Birand, 1991).

President Inonu was a renowned general who actively took part in the Turkish Independence War and was a faithful ally of M. Kemal Ataturk throughout the formative years of the Republic. As one of the most influential ideologues of the new state, he succeeded Ataturk and became the second president. Inonu was declared "national chief" of the Republic and Republican National Party, which single-handedly ruled Turkey until 1946. It was this former general and veteran politician[45] who has carried Turkey to the multi-party life, which normally requires democratisation of political life.

After the staggering impact of World War Two and oppressive years of the single-party regime, Inonu's ground-breaking decision has created a new political atmosphere. At this critical juncture, a tacit polarisation among the officer-corps based on the political tendencies favouring the ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) or the newly established opposition, the Democrat Party (DP) occurred. In his memoirs, General Sıtkı Ulay, a prominent member of the junta which staged the coup d'état on 27 May 1960, says some of the senior generals who

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[45] For more information about Ismet Inonu, see: (Aydemir, 1966).

were unhappy with the result of the 1950 elections immediately visited President Inonu and told him they were ready to use their power to cancel the results. However, this offer was rejected by the president (Ulay, 1968, pp. 14-15).

While the Democrats' victory with 55 per cent of the vote was putting an end to 27 years of the RPP's one-party rule (Gungor, 2010, p. 202), the tragic end of the new government in 1960 would become a turning point in Turkish politics, opening the age of military interventions and institutionalisation of military tutelage.

Analysing memoirs of some high-ranking officers who served at that time shows that there were clandestine groups within the military who followed strategies for shaping politics since the beginning of the multi-party life. The primary objectives of these groups were "not to give way to the armed forces becoming an instrument to politicians", and "to struggle to get elected some reliable commanders to key positions in politics" (Ipekci&Cosar, 2010, pp. 8-15). It seems that those secret plans were achieved to a large extent. For instance, Lieutenant General Fahri Belen and Staff Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek resigned from their posts in compliance with the decision of the secret committee just before the general elections held in 1950 and were nominated from lists of the opposition Democrat Party. Belen and Kurtbek were initially elected as MPs, and thereafter were appointed as Minister of Public Works and Settlement, and Minister of Defence, respectively (Ipekci&Cosar, 2010, pp. 12-13).

Analysing the DP doctrine is beyond the scope of this study but touching upon its basic characteristics will be helpful to understand the root causes of the clashes between the military and the new party which would deeply influence the succeeding anti-establishment parties. The DP, in essence, envisaged a liberal philosophy and implemented an outward-oriented programme of growth. It attracted a great deal of attention from diverse groups who were unhappy with the RPP's long-standing rule for several reasons. Suppressed under the monopoly of the state power at the hands of a one-party regime which was one of the founders of the Republic; the business sector, religious groups, workers and peasants supported the emergence of the DP[46] as a promising alternative in the quest for equality, justice, prosperity and a fair distribution of income. What triggered the growing opposition to the DP was the worsening of the economy after a couple of successful years, from the second half of the 1950s (Hale, 1994, pp. 89-94).

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[46]For a competent analysis on the power relations between the DP and the RPP, see: (Kocak, 2012).

The DP also became a centre of the Islamist groups which had never consented to the Kemalist revolution, imposing staunch secularism on the public domain and state-society relations. Therefore, it was a long-awaited hope for the Islamists to provide the chance to challenge the secular regime. Four decades after the DP; Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Islamist politician who would change the balance of power in Turkey as will be analysed in chapter seven, would be proud of himself by imitating Menderes, the DP's executed leader.

According to Erkanli's [47] memoirs, it seems that the political polarisation among the officer-corps which emerged before the1950 election began to disappear by 1955-56, and evolved into a more sophisticated and institutional opposition to the DP government because the wing which had supported the new party lost its support after a few years. Merged under the name of the "Committee of Ataturkists", the secret formation rapidly increased its sphere of influence over the military (Erkanli, 1973, p. 14). The committee was founded in 1954 by Captains Dundar Seyhan and Orhan Kabibay at the Anti-Aircraft School in Istanbul (Ipekci and Cosar, 2010, pp. 16-17). It is possible to trace from Seyhan's memoirs how other members of this organisation justified their actions against the democratically elected government[48]:

> "By the end of the first year of the DP government, I noticed that the only target of politicians, no matter which party they belonged to, was to bring party interests to the forefront, which was a coarse, immature political idea. The politics of the DP was based on pleasing the people, but Turkey's problems could not be solved in this way. Turkeys problems required long term radical solutions which sometimes make a 'for the people, despite the people' policy obligatory. Nevertheless, from their first days in power, the politicians did not aim to create a better Turkey but focused on acquiring more power with the desire of perpetuating their political potency" (Seyhan, 1966, pp. 38-39).

Seyhan goes further and accuses the civilians of betraying Ataturk's principles and reforms, and making capital of the "democracy" they established:

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[47]Orhan Erkanli was a staff major during the coup. Although Erkanli was a middle-ranking officer, he played a significant role from the very beginning of the junta activities dating back to the early 1950s. He was appointed as Secretary General of the National Unity Committee (NUC) which was composed of 38 junta members, which took over administration in 1960. (Milliyet Daily, 25.07.1961).

[48]Excerpts and other narratives taken from the memoirs in this chapter were translated by the candidate from Turkish into English.

"It has been witnessed that the greed of politicians' created an aberration that blindfolded the public, a level of ingratitude[49] that can only be called 'political prostitution' " (Seyhan, 1966, p. 39).

Seyhan's demonising and belittling approach against the civilians bears a close resemblance to Birand's related findings which were analysed in chapter four, and the data derived from the interviews interpreted in chapter five.

It is possible to find similar approaches in the memoirs of other influential officers such as Batur (1985; pp. 78-79) and Celikoglu (2010; pp. 73-76) as well. Especially Batur, who later became Chief of the Turkish Air Forces and took leading roles during the 1971 coup, uses a derogatory and exclusionary discourse about the civilians in his book. For instance, at a dinner given in honour of Prime Minister Menderes, to which Batur and his comrade-in-arms attended unwillingly, but in which a group of leading figures from the PM's party showed a great interest, Batur describes the state of this group in charge of the country as "the tail wagging the dog", and asks his friends: "Are those the people having a say in the administration of the motherland?". He adds: "As the military officers in uniform, my fellow officers and I were suffering due to being at the same meeting with such a group and were seeking ways to hightail out of that place" (Batur, 1985, p. 79).

As a result, it is possible to say that since the transition to multi-party life, there has been continuity in the officer-corps' perspective on the civilians in Turkey. The continuity of such a perspective, of which more examples will be presented in the next sections, has multiplied the "increasing returns"[50] of contemptuous and exclusionist military treatment of civilians in the following decades.

Ahead of the 1960 coup, serious disagreements reappeared among the members of the junta regarding the ultimate goals of their political campaign. A hawkish group, consisting of relatively young officers, tenaciously proposed an extended term of military regime soon after toppling the Menderes government (Hale, 1994, p. 104). Captain Ozdag, a leading member of the radical wing, advocated their approach by the backwardness of the country, and the fact that Ataturk's revolution was incomplete. In an interview given to Cumhuriyet Daily[51] just after the intervention, the young junta member made the following assessments:

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[49]Refers to the DP's political stance.
[50] See chapter three for Pierson's analysis (2000, p. 251) on the increasing returns.
[51]24 July 1960.

"I observed during the tours of my country that we, as the state, could not adequately elucidate Ataturk's revolution, principles and norms to our fellow citizens, to our peasants. To accomplish Ataturk's revolution and save the fatherland; we did our job, but there is much more to be done. The Democrats did not like the military, and they could not comprehend that this military is a part of the nation. They insulted[52] the military in the party congresses and weakened the financial conditions of the soldiers. All their (the DP's) economic promises have failed; they converted our market into a colony market and cajoled the people".

"Radicals like Colonel Turkes and Captain Ozdag claimed that all previous governments, including Ataturk's, had failed to secure Turkey's salvation. This could only be assured by a revolutionary regime, under their own leadership. As an elaboration of this idea, Turkes proposed that the military should stay in power for four years, having submitted this plan to a national referendum" (Hale, 1994, p. 1 32). Captain Ozdag's following statements reveal through which rules and norms he and his companions justified subverting the civilian government:

"To protect the Republic is our oath. If the civilians go astray in a country where there is no institution such as a Constitutional Court etc., who will protect the Republic? Surely, the military. Those who founded the Republic did not envisage any other safeguard than the military in the constitution (for the Republic), and they also stated this idea in Article 34 of the Internal Service Code. In this sense, our revolution is not only legal but also statutory. The Turkish Military will be the most powerful safeguard of the Turkish Homeland in the future too." (Cumhuriyet Daily, 24 July 1960).

The above-quoted discourse, a reflection of the interventionist mindset, conspicuously shows how the subsequent officers have institutionalised the path in civil-military relations established by the founders of the Republic at that time.

On the other hand, the second group which was consisted of more "liberal" officers rejected remaining in power too long. They maintained that the worst thing to do would be to establish a totalitarian military rule since it would constitute a huge contradiction with one of their

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[52]It is reported that to display his supposed power over the military and generals, Menderes once told his supporters that he could govern the military even via the reserve officers (Altug, 1976, p. 20).

basic ideas which was to fight against the Menderes autocracy[53]. However, there were frictions within the second group, and some of them proposed different plans. A group of officers favoured handing over the administration to the Republican People's Party after overthrowing the DP government. Some urged the idea of establishing an interim military rule to hold elections and establish a new constitution. The fact remains that all the members of the junta were rigid followers of Ataturkism and wholeheartedly believed in the Republic, a secular and nation-state (Aydemir, 1990, p. 308).

Developments following the intervention strengthened the hand of the second group, and members of the hawkish wing were sent on foreign missions. Indeed, this was a way of sending into exile to detract them from the centre of power. Those middle-ranking officers, the most senior of whom was Colonel Turkes, were sent into exile and were known as "fourteens" due to the fact they were fourteen hawkish officers in the National Unity Council (Ipekci and Cosar, 2010, pp. 397-413).

The backbone of the junta was orchestrated by Colonel Turkes[54] who later became the founder of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party. To hold the armed forces together and to get the support of the rest of the military, they persuaded some senior commanders to take joint action beforehand (Hale, 1994, pp. 104-112). In this sense, the first military coup of Turkey was planned and executed by out of chain of command contrary to the subsequent interventions. As will be seen in the following sections, the 1980 junta attached great importance to act in unison and in the chain of command to preserve the institutional harmony.

The action plan was implemented on 27 May 1960, and the military took over the administration of the country. Colonel Turkes announced the intervention to the public in the following memorandum, which became the document[55] of a historical juncture in Turkish civil-military relations:

> "Honourable fellow countrymen: Owing to the crisis into which our democracy has fallen and owing to recent sad incidents and in order to prevent fratricide, the Turkish

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[53] For a detailed critical assessment of the political repression over the opponents throughout the third Menderes government between 1957 and 1960, see: (Bulut, 2009, pp. 1-25).

[54] An ambitious former officer and founding father of the far-right political movement, Turkes aspired to unite Turkish-speaking peoples of the world during his political career and still called as *Basbug* (Leader) by the nationalist and conservative circles in Turkey.

[55] The memorandum was broadcast by the state radio. The original text of the announcement can be found at (Aydin and Taskin, 2014, pp. 62-63). The English version presented here is a translation of Weiker (1963).

Armed Forces have taken over the administration of the country. Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose of extricating the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen and for the purpose of having just and free elections, to be held as soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above-party and impartial administration, and for handing over the administration to whichever party wins the elections. Our initiative is not directed against any person or class. Our administration will not resort to any aggressive act against personalities, nor will it allow others to do so. All fellow countrymen, irrespective of the parties to which they may belong, will be treated in accordance with the laws and all the principles of law. For the elimination of all our hardships and for the safety of our national existence, it is imperative that it should be remembered that all our fellow countrymen belong to the same nation and race, above all party considerations, and that therefore they should treat one another with respect and understanding, without bearing any grudge. All personalities of the cabinet are requested to take refuge with the Turkish Armed Forces. Their personal safety is guaranteed by law. We are addressing ourselves to our allies, friends, neighbours, and the entire world: our aim is to remain completely loyal to the United Nations Charter and to the principles of human rights; the principle of peace at home and in the world set by the great Ataturk is our flag. We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in NATO and CENTO, and we are faithful to them. We repeat: our ideal is peace at home, peace in the world." (Weiker, 1963, pp. 20-21).

Although the coup memorandum had a relatively moderate discourse and pretended to be inclusive, the actions and policies pursued by the military junta just after the intervention created a new path-dependent process where the military instituted a tutelary system over almost all areas of civilian life, which has remained influential until recently. This tutelage, as discussed in the next sections, was sealed through the implementation of new policies and regulations introduced after each military intervention.

The coup memorandum and following regulations bear the same sprite with the memoirs analysed above. In the preface of Law no. 1[56], the junta indicted the Menderes government for "flouting the constitution", and "abrogating all individual and human rights of the Turkish

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[56] Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette) No: 10525, 14 June 1960, "Temporary Law, no. 1".

nation". The overthrown government was accused of "forming a single-party dictatorship" and "losing its legitimacy".

As analysed in the previous chapters, then Article 34 (afterwards Article 35) of the Military Internal Service Code has been cited as the legal basis for the military interventions by the officers. In this sense, the 27 May coup is the first example of the tradition that advocates military intervention in politics through the role given to the armed forces by the founding philosophy of the Republic and the Internal Service Code. It was declared in the preface of Law no.1 that "the Turkish military acted on behalf of the Turkish nation", and through discharging the "sacred" duty of "protecting and watching over the Turkish homeland and Republic", the military would re-establish the state of law.

One of the most significant regulations implemented by using this law was the establishment of a National Unity Committee (NUC) composed of 38 junta members under the chairmanship of retired Land Forces Commander General Gursel, which was equipped with the "power of sovereignty on behalf of the Turkish Nation" (Hale, 1994, pp. 123-24). In other words, the "Temporary Law" abolished the democratically elected parliament and established a military rule instead. This step can be described as the origin of the institutionalisation of the military tutelage in politics, which would endure for decades. The increasing returns of that origin are to be analysed in the following sections.

While the coup was abolishing the civilian administration and the constitution, it also caused a deepening conflict among the junta members and further polarisation within the military. As explained above, the radical wing of the NUC was sent into exile abroad, and the idea of establishing long-term military rule was defeated vis-à-vis the approach that advocated an interim government to operate under the NUC. The rivalry between the two groups reached such a point that many of the junta members were afraid to stay at the same address permanently because of the fear that the rivalry group might have organised a conspiracy against them (Harris, 2011, p. 204).

The politicisation of the military because of the coups d'état resulted in massive purges of officers from the military who were blacklisted for political, ideological, and institutional reasons by the "power elites". The founding determinants of the "power elites", in this context, has been inspired by the official ideology of the Kemalist state until recently. Secular, republican and Ataturkist high-ranking officers who have clinched their power by

military interventions determined the fate of the fellow officers and the military institution until the Islamist government defeated them under Erdogan in the early 2000s.

The massive purge of the blacklisted officers from the military has historical roots and was observed after all military takeovers of the civilian administration. As discussed in chapter three, the powerful junta of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that toppled Sultan Abdulhamid II at the beginning of the 20th century was the first example of the considerable numbers of dismissals of "suspected" and "objectionable" soldiers. Almost 1400 officers were forced out of the military after the 1908 coup d'état (Zeyrek&Akman, 2014, p. 12). Similarly, two months after the 27 May coup, the NUC dismissed 235 of the 250 generals and admirals who were senior commanders of the Turkish military. Some most senior figures of the military such as the Chief of General Staff and his predecessor as well as the Chief of the Land Forces were among the dismissed commanders. Additionally, middle-ranking officers were expelled from the armed forces at a tremendous rate. The legal basis of the expulsions was Temporary Law no. 42, which was enacted by the NUC. Thus, ninety per cent of generals and admirals, seventy-five per cent of colonels, fifty per cent of lieutenant colonels and thirty per cent of majors in the Turkish military were compulsorily retired. In total, 7200 officers were forced out of the military by the end of 1960 (Kalyoncu, 2009).

The discharged officers established the "Association of Retired Officers of the Revolution" for the purpose of getting back their jobs and rights. But their attempt was defused as 2200 of those officers were appointed to the civilian posts (Mazici, 1989, p. 97). The appointment of the former officers to the civilian cadres triggered another wave of the militarisation of the civilian public administration.

The massive purge policies after the military interventions were not an overnight decision, but a well-prepared strategy planned by the interventionist officers to determine prospective generals of the military who would perpetuate the military dominance over politics. While the blacklisted officers were dismissed from the military unlawfully, those soldiers who shared similar ideas with the junta leaders were appointed to key posts to lead Turkey's most powerful institution in the following decade(s). For instance, senior commanders[57] who staged the military intervention in 1971 (Zurcher, 2004, p. 258) were those officers who had been promoted to the influential ranks after the massive purges executed in 1960. Therefore, it is

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[57] The Chief of General Staff Memduh Tagmac, the Commander of Land Forces Faruk Gurler, the Chief of Air Staff Muhsin Batur, and the Commander of Naval Forces Celal Eyiceoglu.

possible to say that such a policy preference played a significant role in the institutionalisation of the military tutelage in Turkey.

New power struggles emerged among the officers who were easily promoted by virtue of the purges paving the way for the formation of new secret organisations within the armed forces. Arguably one of the most ambitious of those officers was Colonel Talat Aydemir, who was appointed to commandership of the War College in Ankara after the 1960 coup. His group and cadet followers in the college made two unsuccessful coup attempts in 1962 and 1963. Due to the limited scope of this chapter, analysing these attempts is not possible. In his memoirs, General Batur, Chief of the Air Force between 1969 and 1973, who was one of the commanders staged the 12 March 1971 intervention, describes Aydemir as "an officer who got hung-up about power" and "a person mad about the coup d'état" (Batur, 1985, p. 118). Colonel Aydemir's comprehensive memoir (Aydemir, 2010) is a significant source of information to comprehend this period.

Another critical problem that the human resources policy implemented by the junta produced was the emergence of the Armed Forces Union (AFU)[58] which was formed by the hawkish officers after the coup. An informal and semi-secret organisation, the AFU acted as if it was "a military within the military" and further deepened the politicisation of the officers. The "Union", for instance, explicitly rejected some policies implemented by the NUC and resisted the appointment of its members to passive positions by the Office of Commander in Chief (Hale, 1994, pp. 139-141). The influence of the group over the military and politics was deeply felt, especially in the first years of the coup. The military interventions, in this regard, have not only destroyed the civilian rule in the country but also adversely affected the internal structure of the military.

The positive discourse used in the memorandums of the military interventions towards Turkey's allies and neighbours can be a prologue to touch upon the debates regarding the influence of the great powers over the military interventions. For instance, the 1960 memorandum declared that "We are addressing ourselves to our allies, friends, neighbours, and the entire world: our aim is to remain completely loyal to the United Nations Charter, and the principles of human rights; the principle of peace at home and in the world set by the great Ataturk is our flag. We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in NATO

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[58] Though it was a remarkable experience in the political history of the Turkish Armed Forces; the "AFU incident" has not drawn enough attention from researchers it deserves.

and CENTO and we are faithful to them. We repeat: our ideal is peace at home, peace in the world". By this positive approach, which was repeated by the following juntas, the officers sought international legitimisation for their actions.

There is a widespread belief in Turkish society that the USA has organised and or supported every military intervention in Turkey. For instance, all the interviewees took part in this research put emphasis on the "significant" role of the "external powers", in particular the USA, over the military interventions. It is known that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played active roles in some military interventions in different countries. For instance, according to the official documents published by the American Government, the CIA acknowledged its key role in the 1953 coup d'état that toppled Iran's democratically elected prime minister[59] (Byrne, 2013). Data gathered for this chapter[60] support the external influence allegations on the military interventions in Turkey; but as mentioned in chapter five, an in-depth analysis on this issue is beyond the scope of this research.

On the other hand, explaining major national and Turkey-related international problems by conspiracy theories is a highly prevalent pattern in Turkish society. There are historical and cultural reasons behind this fact which have been reproduced by xenophobia[61], and inadequate reading and research. As Cook (2016) explained clearly: "... There is an ingrained anti-Americanism, born of a general suspicion of foreigners that is directly related to the post–World War I Greek, French, and Italian efforts to carve up Anatolia. The result can be everything from a prickly, insular nationalism to wild-eyed conspiracies about American academics and the Central Intelligence Agency... It is important to note that well before the AKP existed, Turkish officials were perfectly willing to spin erroneous tales about the United States, American ambassadors, the CIA, Zionists, and others that any number of Turkish journalists were willing to repeat. That is because, for reasons previously noted, attacking the United States is politically profitable, and thus it makes no sense for politicians and the so-called journalists who do their bidding to act responsibly. In the AKP era, however, this sad state of affairs has been taken to its logical extreme with these kinds of odious headlines and stories... ".

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[59] For related news in the UK media, see: CIA documents acknowledge its role in Iran's 1953 Coup, BBC, August 20, 2013; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23762970 .

[60] For the alleged relationship between the US and the 1960 coup in Turkey; see: (Gunn, 2015)

[61] For the widespread xenophobia in Turkey, see: (Idiz, 2014).

In the last instance, whether the USA has supported or not, it was the Turkish history, society and culture which has created the officers with interventionist mindset who had decided to take political action at every turn and toppled the elected governments in different decades. Owing to the financial problems erupted after the intervention, the military regime was obliged to ask for financial support from the US to pay compensation and pensions to the dismissed officers. In light of a report prepared by Fletcher Warren, the American Ambassador to Turkey, a modernisation programme approved by the US and NATO in August 1960, and the American Government provided a special grant for the financial costs arising from the discharges (Hale, 1994, p. 125; Madra, 2010; Tavukcu, 2011, p. 1).

The prosecution process of the ousted President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, cabinet ministers, other DP members and senior public servants appointed by the toppled government has left an indelible mark on the Turkish civil-military relations. Along with full control of the executive and legislative bodies, the NCU regulated the judiciary in such a manner whereby judicial decisions would satisfy the military regime. The DP was closed; party leaders, ministers, MPs, mayors, and hundreds of local representatives of the party were banned from politics. The most tragic consequence of the prosecution process was the death sentences given to 15 senior politicians.

Colonel Guryay, Commander of the Yassiada Island where the hearings took place, confessed in an interview 25 years after the coup that some junta members like Brigadier General Mucip Atakli and Staff Major Suphi Gursoytrak met several times with Chief Judge Basol throughout the hearing process, and gave him detailed orders regarding how the court decisions ought to be, including the number of people to be executed by the end of the trials (Kamis, 2015).

After long debates over the verdicts, the NUC initially confirmed four of the death penalties that were given to the president, prime minister and two ministers. President Bayar's sentence was converted into life imprisonment because he was over 65 years old[62]. Accordingly, Prime Minister Menderes, Foreign Minister Zorlu, and Finance Minister Polatkan were executed by hanging due to their political activities and discourses. Along with the personal tragedies the execution of these death sentences caused, it was one of the most determinative phenomena

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[62] The death sentences were published in the Official Gazette on 16 September 1961 (No: 10908) and were immediately implemented the day after.

which have shaped the future of civil-military relations in Turkey. One of the interview participants, *Interviewee 4*, noted that:

"The executions of Prime Minister Menderes and two ministers marked a turning point in Turkish democracy and civil-military relations. After that sorrowful event, civilian politicians and bureaucrats have always been conscious of the fact that someday they may face the same fate as Menderes and his friends. No matter which office you hold, a group of officers can intervene in the political game and make decisions that might cost you your life. So, they always paid attention not to take on the generals".

Another related interpretation was made by *Interviewee 7* and is highly informative:

"The execution of this country's elected prime minister and two ministers by the military junta were major crimes against democracy. After that incident, politicians felt obliged to explain how the military would react to their political agenda and policymaking, and they paid special attention to not annoying the generals".

As the interviewees noted, the execution of the civilian leaders has paved the way for an institutionalised fear among civilians vis-à-vis the officer-corps. The elected representatives of the Turkish constituencies have lived with the *Sword of Damocles* hanging over their heads. This has resulted in self-censorship in the behaviour of civilians' which has contributed to the institutionalisation of the military tutelage.

Another significant point that should be emphasised is the state of Turkish society's insensitivity and taciturnity in the face of their elected representatives' tragic end. It is known that since 1950[63], the DP had won every election with a high proportion of the vote. Although there was a deepening political polarisation in the society caused particularly by Prime Minister Menderes and the DP policies, almost half of the electorate voted for the ruling party in the last election before the coup d'état. However, if one or two small-scale and ineffective reactions are exempted, the Turkish public - especially millions of the DP supporters - did not use the democratic system to fight for its elected representatives against the perpetrators of the coup, whereas the junta took serious measures across the country before and after the intervention on the assumption that "Menderes and sympathies towards the DP" would cause

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[63]The DP's voting share was at its highest level at 58.4% in the general election held in 1954. It received confirmation from almost half of all voters in 1957 (Official Page of the Turkish Supreme Election Board-YSK, 2015:http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/SecmenIslemleri/Seciml er/1950-1977-MVSecimleri/Turkiye.pdf).

wide-scale protests against the military (Hale, 1994, p. 120). Suleyman Demirel, former prime minister and the 9th. president, analyses this situation in an interview as follows:

> "Hundreds of thousands of people attended the last party rally run by the DP and frenetically applauded Prime Minister Menderes. The interest shown by the party supporters in the meeting was one of the rare examples in politics until that day...But on the day he (Menderes) was hanged, not even a glass was broken in the country...not a single glass..." (Cetingulec, 2015).

Similar societal insensitivities towards the military interventions were observed in the following decades. There are historical and socio-cultural reasons for this phenomenon, the origins of which were discussed in chapter four. In addition to them, the power of the military and the fear in the face of the gun holders are among the factors that have reproduced the above-mentioned paradox. This fact, as the interviewees pointed out in the interviews, has been one of the main reasons for the political weakness of the civilians in relation to the officers.

It is possible to say that the 1960 junta has established a new regime under the control of the officers, which shaped the future of Turkish politics. Came into force in July 1961, a new constitution was prepared by experts who had been appointed by the NUC. The 1961 constitution abolished the 1924 constitution which had been established by M. Kemal Ataturk and the founding cadre of the Republic. It remained in force until the enforcement of the 1982 constitution which was prepared after the 1980 coup d'état (Basa, 2014, p. 3). Turkey has since been governed under the rules of the 1982 constitution, although a large number of articles were amended over the course of time. What is striking in this regard is that all the constitutions of Turkey were made under the command of the officers. The first constitution was established by a group dominated by the officer-elites who founded the Republic in 1923, and the two subsequent constitutions were written by the juntas which staged the coups in 1960 and 1980, respectively. The continuity of the military-made constitutions is highly illustrative in terms of the military influence over all areas of life. Though the 1961 constitution was more "liberal" than the others, the military-made constitutions aimed to regulate the institutional, social, cultural, economic, and religious aspects of state-citizen relations with detailed articles made under a tutelary perspective.

The 1961 constitution has redefined the state bodies and granted the military greater influence over the state affairs and the political system. Because of the distrust towards civilians, the

generals planned to reduce the powers of politicians over the administrative and legislative functions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, a one-body parliament system composed of democratically elected MPs. To that end, a "Republic Senate" was established with legislative functions (Ozgisi, 2012, p. 106). The law that established the bicameral system appointed the NUC members, the officers who staged the coup, as the "natural members of the Senate" (Gozler, 2000, p. 86).

The Constitutional Court, another new institution established by the 1961 constitution, was furnished with the authority to examine the constitutionality of laws legislated by the parliament. Just as crucial as the power of examining laws, the Court was tasked with the dissolution of political parties (Odyakmaz, 1996, p. 233). The Court has been authorised with the same powers in the 1982 constitution and kept its influential role along with the military within the Kemalist system. Since its establishment in 1961, the Constitutional Court has closed 24 political parties (Erkek, 2008, p. 2). While the dissolution verdicts are analysed, it is seen that the court has mostly followed a pro-*status quo* and illiberal approach which shares similarities with that of the military. It is known that this approach has been reproduced through the rules and norms developed by the Kemalist interpretation of the idea of nation-state and the Turkish interpretation of secularism discussed in the following chapter.

Along with the constitutional and legislative instruments introduced by the 1961 constitution, the military regime has established a National Security Council (NSC) predominantly consisting of the generals. The construction of the military-dominated NSC has expedited the institutionalisation of the military tutelage over politics. As analysed in chapter four, according to article 111 of the 1961 constitution: "The National Security Council shall consist of the ministers as determined by law, the chief of the general staff, and the representatives of the armed forces. The president of the Republic shall chair the National Security Council, and in his absence, the prime minister shall preside over the council. The National Security Council (NSC) shall communicate the requisite fundamental recommendations to the Council of Ministers with the purpose of assisting in the making of decisions related to national security and coordination" (Balkan, Uysal &Karpat, 1961, p. 30).The constitutional authority given to the NSC was reinforced by the military intervention in 1971[64], and the NSC has operated as a controlling body over the Council of Ministers instead of assisting in decision

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[64]The third section explains how the council was further empowered by the 1982 constitution. By the amendment introduced at this stage, the Council of Ministers was obliged to act on advice given by the NSC.

making with regard to national security. Thus, as *Interviewee 11* depicted, the NSC functioned with the power of oversighting the democratically elected Council of Ministers.

As analysed in chapter four, it is a routine of executive function for states to have councils to discuss their national security problems to minimise possible risks, but the content of the "national security" concept in the Turkish model has been widened to such extent that covers almost all fields regarding the state-society relations. The concept was first defined in Article 3 of the By-law of the Secretariat General of National Security as "being able to resist all external or internal attacks, defeatist attempts, natural disasters, conflagrations. National security means to protect the state authority using all national strength, efforts and activities for being victorious in a war". The code enacted in 1983 after the 1980 coup has broadened the meaning of the term to such an extent that the NSC has readily developed policies and discourses regarding all spheres of life. According to Article 2 of the Code of the National Security Council and Secretariat General of the National Security Council, "national security" was defined as "The protection and maintenance of the constitutional order, national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural, and economic interests in the international field as well as against any kind of internal and external threats of the state" (Urhan & Celik, 2010, p. 11).

Two significant facts strengthened the generals' hands in the militarisation process of the NSC and Turkish politics. Firstly, because presidents of the Republic who served between 1961 and 1989 were either retired generals or admirals, the NSC was presided over by a chairman who was a former officer. Cemal Gursel, a retired land forces commander who led the 1960 coup and presided over the NSC, was elected as president by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) in 1961 and remained in office until 1966. His successor, President Sunay, was the chief of general staff before being elected to the presidency on 28 March 1966 where he served until 1973. The third commander of the Turkish naval forces, Fahri Koruturk, was elected as president for the period between 1973 and 1980. General Kenan Evren, the chief of general staff and leader of the junta which staged the 1980 coup d'état, was elected as president in 1982 and remained in office until 1989. This tacit consent (Harris, 2011, p. 206) and continuity of the election of the retired generals to the presidency increased military influence over politics. This continuity meant that every cadet graduate from the War Academy dreamt of becoming president of the Republic, a fact touched upon in chapter four. Though it had no legal basis, this precedent caused serious dissidence between the generals and the civilians, especially in the 1970s (Hale, 1974, p. 173). These conflicts are addressed in the following section.

Secondly, from the inception to 2003[65], the secretary generals of the council were appointed from generals. While the work experience of these generals is analysed, it is seen that - especially from 1966 - almost all the secretary generals were full-general or admiral, the highest rank in the military (Official web site of the National Security Council: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/kurumsal/makam/eski-genel-sekreterlerimiz).

A content analysis of the decisions of the NSC reveals that the council took decisions which have influenced all spheres of life. The decisions taken by the NCS forced the civilian governments to develop policies that regulate education, socio-cultural issues, security, matters relating to natural disasters, international relations, religious issues, secularism, Turkey's Kurdish and human rights questions, the labour movement and trade union activities, and so on (Sezen, 2000, p. 72). The power that the generals have retained through the NSC reached such a level that they could force the Islamist Erbakan Government to resign because of decisions taken in a council meeting on 28 February 1997. The path-dependency of the NSC power which has forced the coalition government ruled by an Islamist prime minister to resign is analysed in the following pages.

The years following the handover of the administration to the elected government witnessed an informal coalition among President Gursel, Prime Minister Inonu, Chief of the General Staff Sunay and the senior commanders of the armed forces (Tachau & Ulman, 1965, p. 168). Thus the two major forces, the military and the party - The Republican People's Party - that had taken significant roles in the process of forming the Republic came together again at a critical juncture where the future of socio-economic and political life was re-designed through the new constitution and other legislative regulations. This "coalition" disappeared when the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, JP), which was newly established by the followers of the defunct Democrat Party, had great success under the leadership of Suleyman Demirel in the 1965 general election where it won nearly fifty-three per cent of the vote. Although this success gave the JP a promising start to governing the country, the growing domestic and external problems created new turmoil which the ruling party would not be able to get through (Harris, 2011, p. 205).

Some major reasons for that failure were democratic and economic deficits in the country. Throughout this process, leading members of the left-wing sections emphasised the Kurdish

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[65] It was made possible to appoint a civilian secretary-general to the council in 2003. According to Article 27 of the law (no. 4963) on amendments to some laws which were enacted thanks to the EU reform process that has obliged Turkey to reduce the influence of the military in politics. This process is analysed in chapter seven.

Question, and advocated equality and rights for Kurds and the development of a solution for other major problems with Turkey's weak democracy. Thereby, Kurdish Nationalism found a fertile ground to advance amid the conflicts between left and right. Toward the late 1970s, many Kurdish groups set to establish their organisations based on the experience they gained within the left-wing political groups (Romano, 2006, p. 47). Established in 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) has come to the fore among those Kurdish groups through intense armed struggle against the Turkish state since the early 1980s. As stated previously, "Turkey's Kurdish Question" has become a constant and complicated field of conflict in which the military has perpetuated its influence over politics since the civilians could not develop effective policies to solve the question. The civilians' inability has provided the military with a powerful position on Turkey's long-standing problem, as analysed in section three.

The political turmoil, which was deepened by a combination of factors such as student-labour militancy erupted from a conflict between left and right political groups, economic crisis and widespread problem of unemployment, disrespect for diversity, relentless and unproductive disputes among the politicians (Ahmad, 2003, p. 132) reached a new breaking point for Turkey's fragile civilian administration. It came to light that a group of young officers were planning to stage a coup d'état under the influence of doctrines developed by some radical left-wing thinkers like Dogan Avcioglu (Harris, 2011, p. 206).

Avcioglu, a leading figure of the *Yon Movement* and author of *Turkiye'nin Duzeni: Dun, Bugun, Yarin (The Order of Turkey: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow:* Ankara, 1971*)* influenced intellectuals, military officers and civilian bureaucrats of the period. The movement outlined various interpretations of socialism. According to Avcioglu: "Imperialist powers" and "their domestic accomplices" are the main reasons for Turkey's backwardness. He favoured the "national-revolutionary path" to realise a successful pro-Kemalist development project. Avcioglu and his friends did not believe in parliamentary democracy and disapproved of the parliamentary regime as a method through which the "National Democratic Revolution" could be carried out due to it being dominated by the bourgeoisie. Instead, they endeavoured to realise the "revolution" through "non-parliamentary" forces, consisting of leftist officers, civilian bureaucrats and intellectuals, the youth movements, and the trade unions. They argued that coming into power through the elections was impossible for the "progressive forces" owing to the backwardness of the socio-economic structures and realities of the

country, and instead advocated that the "non-parliamentary forces" would carry out the "real Kemalist Revolution" through military intervention or a revolutionist action from above[66].

The punctuated equilibrium created by the historical legacy and founding philosophy of the republic in favour of the military has gained a new punctuation by the 1960 coup. This punctuation has created a new institutional order designed under the command of the officers.

As stated above, some executive and legislative bodies which were established in the aftermath of the coup have provided the military with instruments to institutionalise a tutelary regime. The execution of the elected civilians by the junta for the sake of power has established a new path within the path-dependency of the military superiority which has determined the limits of politics the civilians could act. Under that cognitive framework, the civilians have done politics by obeying the rules and norms of the status quo which had been created by the founding principles of the republic and has been punctuated by the 1960 coup. However, that self-censorship and conformism of the civilians did not satisfy the officers and the guardians of the regime who set to stage subsequent military interventions to safeguard the republic against the "internal threats".

6.3 12 March 1971: "Coup by Memorandum" or Institutionalisation of the Military Interventions

Although the ruling Justice Party (JP) won the 1965 and 1969 elections by gaining nearly fifty-three per cent and forty-seven per cent of the total votes respectively, it was exposed to exclusionary, menacing and depreciating remarks by some senior generals long before the second military intervention in 1971. The denigration of the politicians by generals was repeated in the following decades, and a press conference resulted in swearing publicly when a brigadier general, serving in East Turkey, harshly criticised Prime Minister Erbakan's Middle East policies and his pilgrimage visits with family members to Saudi Arabia in 1997. In that speech the general uttered some obscene words against the prime minister and his family members (Milliyet, 1997). What made this example so pathetic for Turkish politics was that the general staff did not take any legal action, although the prime minister said that the general deserved a punishment (Dogan, 2008). Moreover, in 1999, two years after this

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[66] For further information on Avcioglu, the Yon Movement, and their relationship with the officer-corps see (Avcioglu, 2015; Ulus, 2011; and Lipovsky, 1992).

incident, the brigadier general was appointed to a critical role in the military by the Supreme Military Council. Therefore, his insulting against the prime minister could be interpreted as a reflection of the military stance against the civilians.

The JP and its members were accused of being "abusers of religion", "reactionary", "the foes of the 27 May revolution", and similar adjectives. Along with these accusations, the JP government was also obliged to contend with unending coup d'état rumours, so much so that President Demirel in many of his public speeches said that "Turkey needs to recover from its sense of coup-phobia" (Bulut, 2009, p. 82). As mentioned previously, this fear was not just a rumour which had accidentally occurred but a phenomenon specific to the history of Turkish politics, born at the beginning of the previous decade, and institutionalised through the actions and discourses of the generals over time. In the next decades, the country would suffer from the "increasing returns" of this political environment.

What exacerbated the political turmoil in which the country was overwhelmed was the armed conflicts among the rival political groups and the socio-economic problems. Amid those crises, the JP attempted to prepare a law which would ensure amnesty for the former democrats. This amnesty plan triggered a new crisis between the generals and the civilians. Towards the end of the 1960s, MPs from different political parties that were mobilised by the JP agreed on making a constitutional amendment to remove political bans on the former DP members imposed after the coup. The proposal was approved by a qualified majority in the National Assembly. But while the motion was sent to the Senate for the final action, the command echelon of the military warned the politicians that the military was strongly against the amendment. As a result of the generals' ultimatum, the amnesty proposal was shelved until a new term (Hur, 2014).

Like this blocking, formal and informal ultimatums by generals have become a way of shaping politics in Turkey. Along with the constitutional platforms such as the National Security Council and the Supreme Military Council which were analysed in chapter four, public speeches and press releases of the leading military figures became frequently used instruments through which the commanders issued warnings over both "high" and "low" politics.

As will be analysed in chapter seven, another method that the generals developed in this context was making "anonymous" political statements to journalists who were close to the military, starting with the words *"A senior commander who wishes to remain anonymous*

said...”. Immediately published in some of the most influential newspapers of the country in that period, these statements played an important role in shaping the political debates, especially between the mid-1990s and 2010. It has also had a significant influence over managing the public perception of civil-military relations. A brief archival review of the Turkish dailies such as Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Hurriyet and Sabah, which were published in that period provide a considerable amount of data on this subject[67].

On the 25th anniversary of the multi-party system, Turkey was shaken by the second military intervention on 12 March 1971. The most powerful four commanders of the era[68] issued a “memorandum” within the chain of command, which targeted the democratically elected institutions of the state. Different from the previous intervention staged eleven years ago, the architects of this intervention did not take direct control over the administration but forced the elected government to resign. They overtly threatened the parliament, government, and other civilian institutions that in case of any hesitance in fulfilling the requirements of the memorandum, the military would take over the government. The memorandum which was announced in a state radio broadcast at 1 pm on March 12 carried the institutionalisation of the military tutelage in politics to a new phase (Hale, 1994, pp. 184-85):

> “ 1 - Through their persistent policy, views and actions, parliament and the government have driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife and social and economic unrest. In the public mind they have destroyed the hope of reaching the level of contemporary civilisation, which Ataturk set as our goal. They have failed to carry out the reforms which were envisaged in the constitution, and have thus plunged the future of the Turkish Republic into acute danger.
>
> 2 - The measures which are needed to end the concern and disillusionment felt about this grave situation by the Turkish nation and the armed forces which spring from its bosom should be assessed by our parliament in a non-partisan sprit. It is considered

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[67] For electronic archives of the mentioned dailies see:
http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/;
http://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/monitor/index2.xhtml;
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/index/?cal=open&r=tarih;
http://www.sabah.com.tr/arsiv.
"Media-military relations in Turkey" is among the neglected research fields in the literature, which may also provide researchers with a rich source of primary and secondary material for analysing the role of military in public life.
[68]The Chief of the General Staff General Memduh Tagmac, Commander of the Land Forces General Faruk Gurler, Commander of the Naval Forces Admiral Cemal Eyiceoglu and Commander of the Air Forces General Muhsin Batur.

essential that a powerful and credible government should be set up, within the democratic rules, which will end the present anarchic situation, will take up the reforms envisaged in the constitution, in the spirit of Ataturkism, and will implement reformist laws.

3 - If this is not speedily undertaken, the Turkish Armed Forces, carrying out the duty which is given to them by law to protect and preserve the Turkish Republic, are determined to take over the administration directly. For your information"[69].

In response to this memorandum which is full of rage, inculpation and threat, Prime Minister Demirel immediately assembled his council of ministers and announced the resignation of the government four hours after the radio broadcast. In retrospect, the decision of the prime minister and the government to not to resist the military's coercion may be criticised. However, personal documents of Lieutenant General Fuat Dogu, who was Secretary-General of the Turkish National Intelligence during the March intervention, which were published in a daily[70] in 2013 reveal how the generals were determined to topple the government, and to what extent the military was politicised and divided into juntas to seize control of the government.

According to Dogu's memoirs, the National Intelligence Agency was closely tracing a junta inspired by Dogan Avcioglu's[71] theories that consisted mainly of naval and air officers organised in the military headquarters in Istanbul, which aimed to topple the government on 9 March 1971. His documents disclose how senior commanders caused and were engaged in the politicisation of the armed forces in the early 1970s. For instance, it was reported that General Muhsin Batur, the Chief of the Air Force, was a leading figure in the radical left-wing group advocating socialist policies and that the Chief of General Staff General Memduh Tagmac and Commander of the First Army in Istanbul General Faik Turun were among the leading commanders of the right-wing junta. Dogu also refers to the contents of some meetings he had with senior leaders. According to this, the Chief of General Staff General Tagmac told him that the government was far from solving the current problems and that he would invite the President[72] to take action on the chaos and crises which were suffocating the country, and if

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[69]For Turkish original text, see, Milliyet Daily (13 March, 1971), *"Silahli Kuvvetler Sunay'a ve Meclislere Muhtıra Verdi"*.
[70]Milliyet Daily, 02 March, 2013 - 09 March 2013. The documents were prepared for publication by journalists Oktay Pirim and Suha Arabacioglu.
[71] For Avcioglu, see the previous section.
[72]Cevdet Sunay, the previous Chief of General Staff.

not, the military would directly seize control of the government. In another part of his memoirs, Dogu shares the information that the leftist junta completed preparations for a coup which would have been staged on March 9. According to the failed plan, the Commander of the Land Forces General Gurler and the Chief of the Air Staff General Batur would have been appointed as the head of the state and the prime minister, respectively. However, the left-wing junta failed to stage the coup owing to the operation conducted by the National Intelligence Agency using whistle-blowers who were quartered within the junta. The agency informed the Chief of General Staff General Tagmac and Commander of the First Army General Turun of the junta's plan for March 9; thus, these two commanders disrupted the leftist intervention plan and discharged junta members from the military. (Pirim and Arabacioglu, 2013). Just after the intervention, the command echelon dismissed five generals, one admiral and 356 colonels from the military because they were suspected of planning a coup d'état in the immediate future, which would have directly taken over the government (Demiriz, 2011, p. 85).

After revealing the coup attempt of the rival group on March 9, the right-wing junta in the military published the memorandum on March 12 and took control of the state and the military. As journalist Nazli Ilicak suggests: "We have witnessed military interventions in the lifetime of the Turkish Republic. Of these, that of 12 March is certainly the most complicated, and the most difficult to unravel. The reason is that, on 12 March, different juntas were at work, one within another, and sometimes independent of one another" (Hale, 1994, p. 185). In that sense, the March 12 process was a new phase in which the politicisation of the officercorps in the modern era has deepened and gained more complicated characteristics. The punctuated equilibrium of the military superiority has created ideological strife for power within the institution which the military had experienced at the beginning of the 20th.century that became one of the major reasons of the Ottoman failure.

As *Interviewee 12* incisively analysed, between 1960 and 1980, while the emergence of different juntas within the military had created a military tutelage over politics, it also generated traumatic practices and precedents that destroyed the internal mechanism and discipline of the military. To put an end to this corrosive legacy, senior generals who staged the 12 September 1980 coup attached great importance to keeping the internal discipline of the military and implemented the intervention plan within a strict command chain.

In his memoirs[73] General Batur, Chief of the Air Force at the time, uses several arguments to justify military intervention and the role of the officer-corps throughout the "coup by memorandum" process. He asserts that because of the fact that the military is a part of society, no one can say to it "mind your own business" in a climate where social unrest was mounting:

"As a commander, who was faced with the possibility of unrest in the force under my leadership, I could not turn a deaf ear to those (societal) problems and nor could I hide my head in the sand... I invited 21 generals who work in my headquarters and felt the need to learn what they think of Turkey's internal problems" (Batur, 1985, pp. 149-150).

Batur's memoirs show how generals from different forces frequently came together at the military headquarters to discuss the methodological and intellectual infrastructures of a prospective intervention (Batur, 1985, pp. 240-300). More details could not be presented here because of the limited scope of this chapter. As seen in other cases which occurred in different forms, the point of given quoted above is an illustrative example of how the military headquarters were turned into arenas of politics instead of serving as the basis on which individual and institutional capacities are developed in "the art of war".

A brief analysis of some of the "assessments of Turkey's internal problems" which were put forward by the 21 generals[74] at that meeting describes the generals' approach by which they sought to legitimise the military intervention and the tutelary role of the military in politics. They also help to understand what the leaders of the Turkish military of the period were thinking about civilians. "Deviation from" Ataturk's principles and reforms, and "making concessions to" the rightist political movements are the most common arguments that the generals used in their assessments. One general alleges that "the electorate is unqualified, the elected (representatives) are unqualified; therefore, a better way of administration is anticipated, and it will not be in elections conducted for these constituents". The second assessment focuses on "the threat directed by the radical right to national security", and according to this approach, while the radical left does not constitute a problem for the state, "the radical right do because of the fact that they have been honoured with great concessions

[73]All memoirs analysed in this research were translated from Turkish into English by the candidate.
[74]Batur conveys the thoughts of the generals anonymously.

granted (by the government)". A third general says he cannot approve a man's[75] premiership, because he was a previous representative of an American company, and therefore does not rely on the government. "There are unchaste persons in the government; the unskilled government has been incapable of taking founded measures (against the problems)". He asserts that the youth is of the opinion that the rapid deterioration of the country should be prevented through a military warning issued by the command echelon against the government. Another general accuses the parliament of increasing social problems and blames the 1961 constitution because it introduced "progressive ideas that we cannot digest". The "Parliament and the political parties have no dignity"; another angry general presents further accusations. He claims that "These (politicians) cannot solve problems. They are unqualified individually". The generals' assessments address almost every issue regarding state-citizenship relations. Apart from daily political debates, the generals, as witnessed in the past, seem eager to develop policy proposals from religion to economics to culture etc. Due to the limited scope of this chapter, all 21 assessments could not be analysed.

Although most of these aviation generals were close to the left-wing ideology, the power composition occurred in the command echelon and politics after the intervention clamped down on the left-wing organisations and activism (Hale, 1994, p. 197). During that process, many political figures, authors, and human rights defenders were subjected to persecution. It is estimated that most of those generals attended that meeting before the 12 March Memorandum were expelled from the military by the rival junta which seized the initiative.

Taken together with the data presented in the first section and in the previous three chapters, the officers' perspective on civilians and the idea of military intervention in politics show continuity with those of their predecessors. As will be explained in the next section, it resembles the approach of prospective officers.

Although the military did not seize the administration directly and abolish the parliament on 12 March 1971, it reconfigured the system from the general staff headquarters through two successive "above-parties" governments under an "independent" prime minister. Nihat Erim, who was appointed to form an "above-parties" government just after the memorandum, was a well-known politician and academic of the Republican People's Party (RPP). He was elected several times as MP for the RPP between 1943 and 1969, and served as minister of public

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[75]He refers to Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, who was Turkey's representative for American Morrison Knudsen Inc. before he went into politics in 1962. For a comprehensive biography of Demirel see: (Komsuoglu, 2008).

works and settlement, and deputy prime minister in the RPP governments, respectively. Erim was asked to resign from his party to be an "independent" prime minister who would form an "above-parties" government, which was laid down as a condition by the generals on 12 March 1971. These governments, which were formed under the implicit instructions of the generals, included technocrats and MPs from different parties and stayed in power until the new elections were held in October 1973. However, these governments that were set up under the military tutelage failed in a short period of time. The military's socio-political engineering project failed again, and the country faced more complicated societal, political and economic crises throughout the 1970s. Erim's memoirs (2007, *12 Mart Anilari*, YKY: Istanbul) contain significant narratives from an insider's perspective and provide original documents from the period for analysis.

Throughout this period, the military gained new institutional prerogatives and immunities and was given new powers under the colour of security concerns (Akinci, 2014, pp. 66-68). To restore law and order, the Erim government proclaimed martial law in six major cities (Erim, 1972, p. 7), and this was extended to 11 cities in the month it came into power. There is no doubt that the enforcement of martial law may be reasonable and necessary in some extraordinary cases, but the Turkish version gave the generals unlimited and unquestionable powers over almost all issues regarding human life. Thanks to Article 122 of the Constitution and the Martial Law (no. 1402) enacted in May 1971, the chief of the general staff, the martial law commanders and other members of the command echelon became the most powerful figures and decision-makers in the country's three major cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir), some other large metropolitan and industrialised areas (Adana, Zonguldak, Kocaeli, Eskisehir) as well as some Kurdish dominated provinces such as Diyarbakir and Siirt (Hale, 1994, p. 197) between April 1971 and September 1973.

Six martial law commanderships issued 419 communiqués along with other regulatory, administrative decisions throughout this process. During the first two months of martial law, more than 2000 people were arrested. Some well-respected intellectuals and trade-unionists were among those who were sent to prison. Two parties, the Turkish Workers' Party and the National Order Party were closed down by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of advocating pro-Kurdish ideas and Islamist ideology, respectively (Hale, 1994, p. 197). In this context, the concept of "national security" was interpreted in its broadest sense which further increased the militarisation of the public life. Thus, fundamental rights and freedoms

guaranteed by the Constitution were restricted (Coban, 2009, p. 5), and many essential requirements of democratic life were put aside for the sake of security.

The commanders developed policies and gave decisions not only on "law and order" but also on hundreds of issues that were directly related to daily life, such as local traffic, trade-unions, industrial relations, health, food security, price control, gambling, prostitution, hygiene, protection of forests, behaviours of supporters and players at football matches, the quality of potable water, order in bakeries and butchers, etc. By transmitting all state power into the hands of the local commanderships, the generals established a de-facto authoritarian military regime (Uskul, 2014). The martial law administration left bitter memories of arrests, tortures, and censorships (Hale, 1994, p. 210). Due to the limited scope of this section, it was not possible to further analyse the regime's human rights abuses.

Like the former interventionist officers, the generals of the 1971 intervention looked for a remedy to cure the country's problems through constitutional and legal regulations along with legislative arrangements strengthening the political power of the military. They have made 35 amendments to the constitution through the government under their tutelage. It is useful to address the most salient of these amendments to reveal the path-dependent process which has institutionalised the military tutelage in that period. The regulations focused on two key issues: Consolidating the state authoritarianism and giving new privileges and political powers to the military. The executive body was furnished with new authorities through the broadening of the scope of the concept of "national security". New prohibitions were enacted against political movements which were seeking class and ethnic equality, more freedom of religion and conscience, and language and cultural rights. In this context, the freedom of the press and the autonomy of universities were restricted because the new security paradigm regarded the free press, the autonomous university, and the independent trade-unions as potential dangers against "the national unity"[76] (Harris, 2011, p. 5). Maintained by the 1980 putschists, this militarist and authoritarian approach against rights and freedoms has become the official narrative of the Turkish state, which has been one of the major obstacles before the institutionalisation of pluralist democracy.

The 12 March regime has bolstered the political position of the military through several legislative regulations. As explained in the previous section, the most useful concept that

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[76]The prohibitions and restrictions, which were imposed on fundamental rights and freedoms, and new powers given to the executive body were enacted on 22 September 1971 and 20 March 1973, respectively. For the related law texts see the mentioned dated official gazettes from www.resmigazete.gov.tr.

allowed the generals to dominate the debates in the NSC was the Turkish version of the concept of national security, a highly flexible term through which they could have a say on any political issue in Turkey. The Council was given an advisory position over the elected Council of Ministers (Sezen, 2000, p. 71). Another significant gain acquired by the armed forces through these amendments was related to the judiciary. Before the military intervention, the administrative proceedings and actions of the military personnel were under the judicial review of the Council of State, a civilian high court. That jurisdiction was transferred to the Military High Administrative Court, a new institution established by an amendment made to Article 140 of the Constitution (Gozler, 2000, p. 90). Taken together with the existing military courts and the Military Court of Cassation, the establishment of the Military High Administrative Court generated a system decisively separated into civil and military justice (Aksel, 2013, p. 11). Thus, the civilian judiciary has been left no jurisdiction over any judicial cases that the soldiers were involved in. By the absolute separation of the military judiciary from the civilian jurisdiction, a dual system has been created in which any investigation regarding a military wrongdoing by the civilian prosecutors has been made impossible. There was not an organised opposition group to protest such an anti-democratic regulation in the country. In fact, those few dissidents who had challenged the military regime and defended the democratic state and society were exposed to severe persecution and torture at that time.

An amendment made to Article 127 of the 1961 constitution in September 1971 was the final nail in the coffin for the possibility of democratic civil-military relations in Turkey, as it presupposes civilian oversight of the military. The regulation annulled the Turkish Court of Accounts' (TCA)[77] constitutional authority on auditing the military's properties, on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Altindal, 2010, pp. 14-15; Akinci, 2014, p. 68). Taken together with the fact that the TCA already had no power to audit the military in terms of finance and performance, this regulation has given the armed forces an autonomous status within the state structure. Thus, the parliament, the democratically elected representative of the whole nation, was entirely deactivated in the face of the military, a public institution that owes its existence to money from taxpayers. This statutory status continued until 2010. The

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[77]The Court of Accounts is a supreme audit institution which was established in 1862 and took its place in the first Ottoman Constitution of 1876. The agency was transferred to the Republic of Turkey after the collapse of the Empire and continued its constitutional existence in the Republican era. The primary role of the institution is to perform regularity (financial and compliance) and performance audits of all public bodies on behalf of the Turkish National Parliament (Altindal, 2010, p. 4).

process that has created that change and its reflections on civil-military relations are analysed in the next section.

The previous section analysed how the office of the presidency became a significant component of the military tutelage after the 27 May coup in Turkey. The established order, the product of the 27 May regime, attached great importance to the tradition of a top commander's, if possible, chief of the general staff's getting elected as president. Thus, after the first military intervention, two successive presidents were elected among the most influential generals. The most serious crisis between the generals and the politicians after the "coup by memorandum" occurred during the election for a new president in 1973. While the military with the support of the incumbent President Sunay - the previous chief of the general staff - was importunately exerting pressure on the parliament to elect General Faruk Gurler, who was newly retired from the office of general staff to become a presidential candidate; the civilians were against that imposition and expressing their opposition in varied tones. On the eve of the election, the extent of this pressure resulted in some MPs and party leaders' being threatened with death if they did not vote for General Gurler. The memoirs of two veteran politicians who had active roles in political life throughout the 1960s and 1980s are valuable in revealing how the officer-corps exceeded its authority and was involved in crime according to the penal code for the sake of keeping hold of the state apparatus. For instance, Ali Naili Erdem, who served as an MP for nearly twenty years in the parliament between 1961 and 1981, and held posts in the Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Labour and Ministry of National Education, talks about how a brigadier general in uniform threatened him and his colleagues with death while in parliament on the evening of the election:

> "In a dark lobby of the parliament on the election evening around 9 pm, a brigadier general in uniform approached me and said: 'Dear Head of Group (refers to Erdem's title in the Justice Party), if General Gurler does not leave here as the president tonight, you cannot leave the building. 'Why can we not go out?' I asked. He replied: 'Your corpses remain here'. I said: 'Dear brigadier general, here is not a garrison, here is not a military headquarters, here every friend has his own ideas'. He said: 'Have it your own way; you bear the consequences.' (Ilhan Kara and Tekin, 2015).

Ekrem Saatci, another veteran politician who was an MP of the Justice Party, shares a similar memoir in which military officers were keeping a tight rein on each MP. Saatci talks about

how the officers threatened to kill him and his friends by crushing them under tanks if they did not elect General Guler to the presidency (Gursoy, 2013).

However, party leaders and the majority of the parliament did not give in to the threats, although the president, the chief of general staff, and the command echelon went all out with their threats. As a result, General Gurler failed to get the majority to be elected. Amid this high tension, the commanders could not achieve their primary purpose, so the party leaders agreed on another candidate. However, the new candidate, Fahri Koruturk, was a retired officer as well. He was the commander of the Turkish naval forces between 1957 and 1960 (Okcu and Aktel, 2001, pp. 250-251). Thus, it was the third consecutive time since the first military intervention in 1960 when a retired general became the head of state and chairman of the National Security Council.

The role granted to the military within the state apparatus by the founding philosophy of the Turkish Republic has created a guardianship and an interventionist cognitive framework, respectively through which the officers have held the reins of power over the civilians. Upon the clinched punctuated equilibrium of the 1960 system, the 12 March junta has made the military interventionism in politics a norm. According to this "norm"alisation; the constitutional and legislative regulations have given Turkey's most powerful institution the required instruments for reshaping the politics when the officers consider it necessary for the decades.

Though the massive politicization of the military has caused factionalism and rival juntas based on the conflicting ideas of the right and left-wing politics, the officers were at one with the Kemalist characteristics of the state which absolutized secularism and nationalism. The main motive behind the military interventions was protecting and watching over the Republic against the "internal threats" the civilians have caused.

The 12 March intervention has increased the stickiness of the new path established by the 1960 coup and expedited the institutional evolution of the Turkish political life towards a military tutelage excelled in September 1980.

6.4 12 September 1980: Triumph of Authoritarianism or Hegemony of Military Tutelage

The increasing returns of military interventions have caused a new socio-political and economic failure in Turkey. As happened in the 1960 context, the officers reshaped the system and handed over the administration to the civilians. The targets established by the junta could not meet for several reasons. In a country where the military tutelage had increasingly consolidated its position over politics through two military interventions in eleven years, some structural problems pertain to the civilians such as the incompetence of the political leaders in resolving conflict, the endless clash of interest among the parties, and political disrespect among the MPs deepened the crisis of governance and created a vicious circle. In other words, the civilians have been part of the problem as they could not develop a common sense to mature democratic understanding and find solutions to cure the long-standing predicaments of the country during the periods they were allowed to govern.

A product of the increasing returns of the military interventionism and the civilian incompetence, the political system in Turkey could not manage to set up successful governments quite some time. Throughout the period between the second military intervention and the third coup d'état staged on 12 September 1980, ten different governments were established in nine years. Along with Erim's technocratic cabinets during the authoritarian era, the subsequent civilian governments were either weak coalitions or minority governments. The civilian incapacity of good governance caused unending political and economic crises and Turkey once again experienced a political deadlock by mid-1977. The uncompromising attitudes and vindictive approaches preferred by political leaders especially those of Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the centre-right Justice Party, Bulent Ecevit, leader of the centre-left Republican People's Party, Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamist National Salvation Party and Alpaslan Turkes, leader of the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party towards their colleagues were among the major factors that fuelled this crisis. The continuous mutual hostility between Demirel and Ecevit, the leaders of the two major parties increasingly exacerbated relations between their followers. As a result, Turkey witnessed lots of incidents of fighting, beating, invectives and similar other incidents of scrimmage among political figures in the parliament and other political circles (Gunter, 1989, pp. 64-65). Correspondingly, from May 1977, political violence, and armed conflict among the opposing groups in the cities reached an alarming level and turned into a critical threat against the public order. As discussed in the following stage, along with other justifications,

this chronic political instability was used by the generals as an instrument to legitimise the 12 September 1980 coup d'état.

Indeed, the political leaders such as Demirel, Ecevit, Erbakan, and Turkes were the villains of the piece in the vicious political circle during the late 1970s. However, there were some institutional, sociological, and cultural causes of the political deadlock and extremism in Turkey[78]. This was reproduced by factors including unsuccessful governments, the escalation of anarchy and terrorism across the country with a sinking economy. Turkey, in this period, witnessed mass street fights, political violence assassinations that brought the country to the brink of a civil war. Clashes between the left-wing and the right-wing militias and their supporters caused death or wounding of more than 13,000 people in two years. Each day, it was reported that more than 20 political figures were assassinated from different political parties (Ludington and Spain, 1983, p. 155). The security crisis reached such a level that a significant part of the society applauded the 1980 junta as the coup ended the fratricide. The failure of economic policies, which, to a large extent, were the result of internal and external crises, caused an economic depression towards the end of the 1970s. Households suffered from a widespread shortage of goods and services, raging inflation, and chronic unemployment. In this period, inflation exceeded hundred per cent, and unemployment was around forty per cent (Onis, 2010, pp. 47-56; Gunter, 1980, p. 67).

The political deadlock[79] reached its peak when the political parties were unable to elect a new president at the end of President Koruturk's tenure in April 1980. The Parliament could not reach a consensus on the presidential election which was repeated more than 120 times throughout six months (Gunter, 1989, pp. 64-68). When the military junta toppled the Demirel Government on 12 September 1980, the presidential office was still empty. In this context, as mentioned above, the clash of interest among the political parties and the civilian incapacity of good governance proved that the elected representatives of the society had not done their fair share of work to give an end to the military interventionism. It is true that the officers have seen intervening in politics as a legitimate right and duty of the military and the military interventionism in the country, which has systematically built a tutelary regime since 1960. On the other hand, throughout that process, Turkey's political culture could not manage to produce an alternative cognitive framework to negate the rise of military tutelage. On the

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[78]For some works on the foundations of political deadlock and extremism in Turkey, see: (Mardin, 1978; Magnarella, 1982; Gunter, 1989; Konu, Sunar, Ornek, and Ungor, 2013).
[79]For a chronology of key events leading up to the 12 September Intervention, see: (Vanderclute, 1984, pp. 81-86).

contrary, the civilians' irreconcilable, short-sighted, and cliquish ways of doing politics along with intellectual and professional incompetency in the face of socio-political and economic crises provided the officers with the opportunity to justify their illegitimate interventions in politics. Therefore, as Hasan Cemal, a well-known intellectual, pointed out; Turkey's "soldier (or military) question" is a "civilian question" as well (Cemal, 2010, p. 45).

As explained in the previous section, in Turkey's most populated provinces martial law was declared after the 1971 military intervention and almost all metropolitan areas were ruled by senior generals for more than two years, who were only accountable to the chief of the general staff. Only five years after this experience of extraordinary administration under the generals, who implemented a ruthless and repressive state (Gemalmaz, 1990, pp. 115-116) the escalation of political violence and anarchy again forced the government to impose martial law on a total of twenty provinces. The martial law administration, a constitutional institution which was also regulated by a separate act (Law no. 1402) that gave almost all the executive and judicial powers to the military, failed to de-escalate the political violence and instability until the morning of the coup d'état on 12 September 1980.

In the following years, some leading politicians accused the generals of turning a blind eye to anarchy and internal conflict though they were given all legal powers and means. It was argued that the leaders of the 12 September coup took advantage of the security crisis, and deliberately did not exercise their power to stop the anarchy and terror; thus, they justified the coup d'état as the ultimate saviour of the nation and the state (Arcayurek, 2010, p. 9). Suleyman Demirel, the head of the government overthrown by the junta, said in an interview (Yetkin, 2005, p. 10) how he had urged the Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren and the command echelon to maintain law and order, a bounden duty which was a requirement of the martial law. He said:

> "After 40 days, my government obtained a vote of confidence in parliament, I called the command echelon to a meeting amid ongoing clashes and debates. The Chief of General Staff General Evren told me that they could not make the martial law successful, and they were hard pressed. He also alleged that they did not have enough power to stop the anarchy. I said to him that there is no other (more powerful) institution than the martial law and asked what the generals' proposed that would recover them from this despondency and also reminded them that I supported them in whatever they asked for and needed... But those authorities given by martial law which

the generals described as insufficient became abruptly enough (by the coup on 12 September). After seven years, when my political ban was removed, I asked General Evren that 'Only a day had passed from 11 September to 13 September, there were no new powers given to the military, so what had changed so that the bloodshed immediately stopped? He could not give an answer." (Yetkin, 2005, p. 10).

Those accusations were not only made by civilians but also some senior generals served in that period made similar confessions. For instance, eight years after the coup d'état, General Bedrettin Demirel[80], an active member of the junta, divulged in an interview that the generals had resolved to seize control of the government more than a year before the coup. By waiting until that date, he confessed, the junta had developed the conditions and prepared the ground for a total military action, and convinced the public there was no other solution than the military take-over of the administration (Kahraman, 1988, p. 9).

It is possible to find similar statements in Kenan Evren's, the head of the junta, narratives[81] (Donat, 2005), which corroborates the argument that he and his comrade in arms spent much time preparing for the coup d'état instead of doing their real job of ending the anarchy and terror. As a result, it is possible to say that the military cognitive framework reproducing the military interventionism has paved the way for a deliberate failure of the security institutions for the sake of obtaining more political power instead of doing their essential duty. While that Machiavellian way of doing politics by the generals has cemented the power of the military, it has cost lives of scores of innocent people.

Evren accused the politicians of the period because of the anarchy and street terror before the coup and told about the "deep state"[82] in an interview long years after the coup he led (Donat, 2005). "The Turkish Deep State" question is among the understudied issues in the literature. A structural problem in weak democracies, the concept of the "deep state" refers to authoritarian, criminal, and corrupt facets of the state. The "deep state" organisation- which is built on an alliance of some members of the security forces, politicians and some other

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[80]General Bedrettin Demirel, who was Commander of the War Colleges and of the second army during the coup d'état process, was among the leading figures of the junta, and a close friend of Kenan Evren, the Chief of the General Staff and leader of the junta. When Evren was elected as president after the coup, he appointed General Demirel as his senior advisor (Susoy, 1987, p. 5). He was a rare example of the pro-coup generals who spoke critically of military intervention.

[81]According to the notes he took before the coup, General Evren premeditated a draft plan of the new written constitution. He was planning a concise constitution, which would only contain fundamental issues (Donat, 2012).

[82] For a successful PhD thesis on the Turkish Deep State, see: (Soyler, 2015). For a seminal article on the Turkish Deep State, see: (Laçiner, 2016).

civilian elites, and mafia leaders - operates within the formal state structure and uses state authority and public funding to reach its illegitimate goals. Staging military interventions, committing organised crimes, extrajudicial executions and massacres, and massive human rights violations are among the methods developed by enactors of the deep state. The term was first used by then Prime Minister Ecevit in 1974 in Turkey while speaking about the "counter-guerrilla" operations performed and supported by some state authorities. Since then, the existence and operations of the deep state have been among the much-debated issues in Turkish Politics. Some prominent politicians such as Suleyman Demirel, Bulent Ecevit, Kenan Evren, and Recep T. Ergogan have publicly admitted the existence and functioning of the deep state (Soyler, 2015, p. 1).

It is impossible to discuss the "deep state" without reference to the military in a country like Turkey as the armed forces have been the real playmaker, especially after the 1960 intervention. The military and some members of it have been at the centre of these debates. For instance, in an interview in 2005, Suleyman Demirel – the former prime minister and president - stated that the deep state was the Turkish Armed Forces. Interestingly enough, the military neither denied nor accepted Demirel's statements. Furthermore, it was widely believed that an operational armed unit, which was named as the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Antiterrorism (JITEM) was illegally instituted within the military to struggle against "terrorist organisations" and other unspecified security challenges. It was argued, in this context, that the deep state used the JITEM as a sub-contractor to commit assassinations and wage unconventional warfare against the PKK insurgency. The JITEM was accused of hundreds of political assassinations, unidentified murders, tortures, and other grave human rights violations for its activities during the 1990s. The military never did officially accept the existence of such an organisation. Whereas some retired high-ranking generals denied the existence of the JITEM, others claimed it was established because of compelling reasons of the 1990s and abolished after the related challenges were overcome. The JITEM was put on trial in the second half of the 2000s amid intense controversy, and the organisation was described as a criminal enterprise by the Chief Prosecution Office of the Diyarbakir Province (Haberfeld and Cerrah, 2007, pp. 192-193). Since 2008, the deep state and related issues have been at the top of the political agenda owing to the penal proceedings that were based on coup allegations against the ruling Justice and Development Party, which are analysed in the next chapter.

The third coup d'état in three decades in Turkey was staged through a strict chain of command in contrast to the two former ones. The military members of the National Security Council - General Evren and four service commanders[83] - took over the administration with the full support of their subordinates at 4 am on 12 September 1980 (Hurriyet, 1980). Evren said in an interview that he and his commanders visited the military garrisons across Turkey to listen to their subordinates' ideas about a possible military intervention (Donat, 2005). Different from the former junta members, there were no important differences of views among those who staged the 12 September coup. To be more precise, the generals had no ideological attachments apart from Atuturkism, secularism, and the idea of nation-state (Hale, 1994, p 232). They were strict followers of these three tenets which are part of the standard ethos of the Turkish military, as explained in the previous chapters. Thus, the junta and the military were not forced to tackle the internal problems of fragmentation that their predecessors had faced.

In the announcement speech of the coup, General Evren declared that the military seized control of the government under the Internal Service Code, which has tasked the military with the duty of protecting and watching over the Turkish Republic. In another speech, Evren justified the coup d'état by mentioning the politicians' failures to solve the socio-political and economic crises (Hale, 1994, p. 246). The path-dependent characteristics of the guardianship role granted to the military by the foundational philosophy of the state and the interventionist mindset reproduced by the institutional cognitive framework demonstrated once again its long-lasting effect and decisiveness over the civil-military relations. As in the previous military interventions, Article 35 was used once again by the putschist generals as an historical-statutory justification[84] for the coup.

General Kenan Evren became head of the state and chairman of the National Security Council which was furnished with expanded legislative and executive authorities to govern the country for the next three years. Enacted on 27 October, the new regime was designed by a Law on Constitutional Order which was brought into force as a temporary constitution (Hale,

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[83] Commander of Land Forces General Ersin, Commander of Air Forces General Sahinkaya, Commander of Naval Forces Admiral Tumer, and Gendarmerie Commander General Celasun.

[84] As previously analysed, initially regulated by Article 34 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Code enacted in 1935, the custodian role of the Republic given to the military was reemphasised by Article 35 of the same law after the coup d'état in 1960. The text dated 1961 which says "The duty of the armed forces is to protect and safeguard the Turkish fatherland and the Turkish Republic as designated by the constitution" was preserved in the legal system until 2013 and was exploited by pro-coup officers as the legal basis for their interventions. What is surprising is that although the article was used by each junta as a legal power to stage a coup d'état, no elected government until 2013 made any serious attempt to abolish or amend the article.

1994, p. 247). The junta appointed a loyal military figure, Bulend Ulusu, former Commander of the Naval Forces, as prime minister through whom it would exercise its executive authorities. Similarly, some former and active officers were appointed to administrative posts in the presidency, prime ministry and other ministries, and central administrative bodies and local authorities. Because of the deep distrust against the civilians, the junta dismissed elected mayors and dissolved city councils not only in the metropolitan municipalities but also even in the smallest towns. Instead of them, active and retired officers, and public servants whose loyalty to the military regime was proven were appointed. The appointed mayors and councillors remained in office until the first democratic local elections on 26 March 1984 (TBMM Meclis Arastirma Komisyonu Raporu, Cilt 2, 2012, pp. 738-739). Through these appointments, not only officers but also military norms and values were transferred to the civilian bureaucracy in a similar pattern followed by the previous full-fledged military intervention in 1960. Thus, as experienced during the post-27 May coup process, the civilian bureaucracy went through a massive militarisation process throughout the reign of the military regime between 1980 and 1983.

Just after the seizure of government, the parliament was dissolved, and martial law was declared across Turkey. By the martial, the country was divided into 13 regions, and each region was allocated a senior general to administer it, who was invested with almost unlimited power. Under these administrations, court-martials were founded to exercise judicial review (Milliyet, 1980).

All political activities were prohibited, and leaders of political parties were detained. Both left-wing and right-wing trade unions were outlawed, and dozens of union members were arrested (Karacan, 2015, p. 81). Minutes after the coup announcement, the leading figures of political organisations were faced with the dark side of the coup, and hundreds of thousands of ordinary people were imprisoned because of their peaceful political activities such as being a member of a political party or group, making translation from works written in foreign languages, journalism, and charity activities (Amnesty International Report, 1982, p. 294). Of the four military interventions since 1960, the 12 September 1980 coup d'état is, without doubt, the bloodiest and most totalitarian. Under the oppressive[85] administration of the

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[85]Turkey witnessed unprecedented unlawfulness and systematic human rights violations under the military regime. According to the official records, between 1980 and 1983, more than 1,600,000 people were blacklisted by the Martial Law Commanderships, 650,000 people were detained, 230,000 of these detainees were put on trial in court-martials, and 517 of those who were on trial were sentenced to death, and 50 were executed, 299 people lost their lives in prisons and 144 lost their lives in suspicious circumstances while in custody. The

military regime, gross human rights violations, torture in prisons and police stations[86], political insecurity, and the arbitrary use of state authority became widespread in Turkey. Between 1980 and 1983, the regime's totalitarianism was imposed not only on certain groups who had been at the forefront before the coup but also on every segment of the society. The junta considered the principle of freedom of thought and conscience as a threat to national security. Apart from Kemalism and laicism, which are the standard ethos of the military, different opinions and intellectual activities were stigmatised as "dangerous" and "harmful"[87]. Based on Turkey's authoritarian mentality of administration which was consolidated by statutory regulations and implementations after the military intervention in 1971, the growing state totalitarianism under the junta focused on depoliticising the entire society[88]. By depoliticising society, the generals planned to establish stability across the country (Ahmad, 1993, p. 178).

Another restructuring programme was implemented in the economy. The generals supported and followed the economy programme which was introduced by the Demirel Government on 24 January 1980 before the coup. Based on a sharp shift from "mixed capitalism" to a "free market economy", Turkey started to implement neo-liberal policies to integrate with the globalisation process. The "24 January Decisions", which were supported and supervised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), paved the way for a new era in the Turkish

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Martial Law Commanderships announced the reason for the deaths of 43 people as suicide, and the same authorities gave "natural death reports" to the relatives of 73 people who lost their lives in prisons. It was reported that 171 people died in prison because of torture, and 14 prisoners died in hunger strikes (TBMM Meclis Arastirmasi Komisyonu Raporu, 2012, pp. xiv-xv, pp. 19-20).

[86] Following these widespread illicit practices under the military regime in the early 1980s, maltreatment and human rights violations in prisons and police stations became systemic. For a report on Turkey's human rights record in the late 1980s, see: (Amnesty International, 1989, p. 3).

[87] Under the reign of the junta, 13 leading newspapers from different circles were not allowed to publish anything for almost a year, and the owners and administrators of these newspapers were tried in 303 different cases. The generals destroyed 39 tonnes of "undesirable" newspapers and magazines. More than 70,000 people were tried under the notorious articles - 141,142, and 163 that were repealed in 1991 - of the Turkish Penal Code of the term, which considered opinions inconsistent with Kemalism and laicism a crime. Almost 99,000 people were tried because they were affiliated to organisations that were accused of being leftist, rightist, religious, nationalist, conservative, etc. Because of being blacklisted as "suspect", about 30,000 people lost their jobs in the private sector (TBMM Meclis Arastirmasi Komisyonu Raporu, 2012, pp. xiv-xv, pp. 19-20).

[88] Between 1980 and 1983, more than 14,000 people were deprived of citizenship because of their political records before the coup. Severe sanctions by the military regime forced 30,000 politically active people to go abroad as political refugees. As they were found "objectionable" by the Martial Law Commanderships, 937 films were banned. More than 23,500 associations were obliged to stop their activities. 3854 teachers, 120 academics, and 47 judges and prosecutors were dismissed because of their ideas, and political activities before the intervention (TBMM Meclis Arastirmasi Komisyonu Raporu, 2012, pp. xiv-xv, pp. 19-20).

Economy[89]. In this regard, it is possible to say that the junta pursued a strategy to get the support of the international actors as its predecessors did.

To institutionalise the military tutelage in Turkey, General Evren and his friends followed the path their predecessors had established in a much more rigid approach. After extirpating the opponents, they set to rewrite the rules of politics in Turkey. To that end, three new authoritarian institutions; a new constitution[90], a new law on political parties[91], and a new election act[92] have been established under a tutelary approach. Because of their distrust against the civilians which they explicitly declared at every turn, the generals have designed a constitution through which they would restrict the sphere of civilian politics as much as possible (Ozbudun, 2012, p. 41). Thus, the civilians would be able to participate in politics merely within the boundaries prescribed by the generals. Though a number of amendments have been made to the constitution and to these two key laws, they have been in force since that date. In other words, since the early 1980s, Turkey has been governed by a junta-made constitution, and the political parties code and election act that institutionalised the military tutelage over the political sphere.

The new authoritarian constitution has been the most effective instrument for realising the primary goal of the military, which was the "political restructuring and depoliticising of the entire society" (Ahmad, 1993, p. 178). The constitution has been established on the state-centric and tutelary mindset of its military founders and institutionalised heavy state censorship over the press, publishing and fine arts. General Evren's following statements reflect the mindset behind the constitution, the envisioned limits of the rights and freedoms and the nature of the state-citizen relationship in Turkey:

> "That issue should not be forgotten; there is no unlimited freedom in any society because unlimited freedom causes anarchy and captivity at the end. To have a practical meaning of freedom for the individual, its limits must be drawn, and ways of its usage must be determined, and they must be recorded by certain methods. The individuals' liberty is dependent on keeping the state's sovereignty and willpower. If the state's

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[89] Because of the limited scope of this chapter, the economic policies of the 1980 junta could not be analysed. For the economic transformation of Turkey after the coup d'état see: (Onder, 2016). For an analysis of the political economy of the Turkish military, see (Demir, 2010). For a comparative study on the economic effects of coups, see: (Ozer &Won, 2014).

[90] The third constitution of the Turkish Republic was ratified on September 18, 1982.

[91] Law no. 2820. The law was enacted on April 22, 1983.

[92] Law no. 2839. It came into force on June 10, 1983.

willpower is paralysed, there will remain no force and means to preserve the individuals' liberty." (Polat, 2011).

Through oppressive provisions, fundamental rights and liberties have been limited, and a "permission system" has been introduced to exercise political rights (Karacan, 2015, pp. 82-83). According to the original version of the 1982 Constitution; only political parties have been allowed to engage in political activities. In other words, any civilian entity such as trade unions, associations, foundations, occupational organisations, and other non-governmental organisations have been banned from involvement in political activities, and from having any relationship with political parties[93] (Ozbudun, 2012, p. 41). The constitution (Articles 68 and 69) and the Law on Political Parties (Articles 79-83) have promulgated a long list of restrictions and vague bans on establishing and operating political parties (Karakoc, 2013, pp. 59-63).

Since the 1982 Constitution came into force, 19 political parties were shut down and a large number of leading figures, and members of these parties have been banned from politics for a certain period by the Constitutional Court. Most of these parties have been closed on the grounds that their activities violated articles regulating secularism or the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state (Hale, 2014, pp. 51-52). In fact, these two articles have been among the most effective instruments of the military tutelage to debar the Kurdish and Islamist political movements from politics as they have been designated most dangerous "internal threats" against the state by the foundational philosophy of the state, based on secularism and Turkish nationalism.

Along with these restrictions and bans, the national election threshold constituted for the political parties by the military founders of the regime is noteworthy. According to Article 33 of the Law on Parliamentary Elections (no. 2839), parties must receive ten per cent of the national vote to be represented in the parliament. This legal obligation is not only for candidates of political parties but also for independent nominees. The underlying cause of the ten per cent election threshold was to secure political stability and prevent any political deadlocks such as those experienced before the coup. However, such an extraordinary election threshold which is one of the highest in the world has been a major source of democracy deficit in Turkey (Alkin, 2011, pp. 349-353). Since the threshold was established on 10 June 1983, the votes of millions of taxpayers have not been represented in the

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[93] These political restrictions remained in force until 1995.

parliament[94]. Despite the approval of hundreds of thousands of citizens, tens of political parties have not been permitted to take part in the democratic political process. To speak of democratic politics and fair, equal, and impartial elections is hardly possible in a country where a regulation enacted by the junta excludes the legitimate decisions of millions of voters. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the real reason of establishing such an extraordinarily high "election barrier" could be traced in the goal of "political restructuring and depoliticising society". As a result of internal and external factors[95] which were aimed at democratising Turkey in three different processes (1995, 2001, and 2010), some remarkable amendments were made to the constitution and related laws. However, the junta-made legal regime of political parties still maintains its militaristic characteristics and continuing to shape politics.

"The 1982 Constitution accorded the military establishment new significant powers. It added precision to the composition of the National Security Council and provided for staff. In addition, it specified that 'decisions of the council . . . are to be given priority consideration by the Council of Ministers.' That strengthened the language inserted in 1971 which only provided for the National Security Council to "recommend" its views to the Council of Ministers and stopped short of giving the generals the right to dictate to the Cabinet" (Harris, 2011, p. 210). As a continuation of the regulations implemented during the military regime of 1961 and 1971, which were analysed in the previous sections, Article 118 of the 1982 constitution settled the tutelage of the National Security Council (NSC) over the democratically elected cabinets. Through this expanded power over civilians and with its majority in the council, the military wing of the NSC perpetuated its supremacy of the military in Turkish politics until the second half of the 2000s[96]. In the next chapter the changing nature and role of the NSC will be analysed.

In the previous section, the importance attached to the office of president by the pro-coup generals and the role of presidents - all of whom were former generals - since the 1960 coup in the institutionalisation of military tutelage were analysed. The 1980 junta pursued a long-term strategy in the constitution-writing process through which it brought the presidency forward as one of the most influential institutions of the military tutelage. To realise this, the junta combined the constitutional referendum with the election of the new president, which means a yes-vote for the referendum would simultaneously confirm the leader of the junta's

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[94] For a study on the effects of the threshold on the parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2007 see: (Alkin, 2011, pp. 354-358).
[95] These factors are analysed in the next chapter.
[96] For further analyses on the role of the NSC in politics, see the previous sections and chapter four.

presidency for the next seven years. Before the referendum, the junta banned all criticism of the draft constitution and General Evren, the sole candidate for the presidency. Those who attempted opposition activities faced severe sanctions, and the junta declared that in the event of a rejection of the draft constitution, the military regime would remain in power indefinitely. Under this pressure, the constitution was adopted with a high "yes" vote, but without democratic legitimacy (Ozbudun and Genckaya, 2009, p. 20; Dede, 2008, p. 97). Consequently, through the junta-made constitution, General Evren[97] who was the leader of the coup and the military regime would stay in power until 1989. Thus, the military establishment sealed its tutelary existence over the elected civilians.

It is possible to say that the junta has given new powers to the presidency by the constitution on the assumption that the seat of the presidency would be filled by retired generals all the time as happened for decades. The military founders of the constitution established the Board on Higher Education (YOK) as an authoritarian institution responsible for higher-education policies, which would also keep universities under strict military-dominated state control (Dede, 2010, pp. 120-121). Article 130 of the Constitution and related articles of the Law on Higher Education[98] invested the president with the power to assign a chairman and some members of the Board on Higher-Education. In the same article of the Constitution, while the president was given the power to appoint university rectors, the Board on Higher-Education was designated the only authority which could appoint faculty deans of the universities (Gedikoglu, 2014, p. 584). The constitution has also restructured the judiciary, and the president has been given important powers regarding the appointment of members of the higher judicial bodies[99] (Ozbudun, 2012, p. 42).

In line with the path pursued by the 1960 and 1971 regimes, the military founders of the 1982 regime has given new immunities and prerogatives to the military. As noted by most of the interviewees, these privileges and exemptions were significant in the military's becoming a tutelary institution exempt from any civilian control. It is helpful to analyse these prerogatives to reveal how the junta-made Constitution provided the basis for the institutionalisation of the question of civilian oversight of the military in Turkey. By Article 108 of the Constitution, a State Supervisory Council was constituted with the task of monitoring the legality of the administrative agencies. Although the Council was invested with the power to supervise all

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[97] Kenan Evren was the fourth consecutive former general who became president. Thus, Turkey would be ruled by presidents who were former generals for more than 28 years until the end of Evren's tenure.
[98] The Law (no. 2547) was enacted on 4 November 1981.
[99] Owing to limited scope, analysing these powers was not possible. For an analysis of the constitutional powers of the president, see: (Ozbudun, 2012, p. 42).

governmental units on behalf of the president, the constitution left the military out of the scope of this control. Similarly, while the original version of the Constitution (Article 160) established a legal regime for the financial audit of all public agencies on behalf of the Parliament through the Court of Accounts, all the military's investments, income, and expenditure were excluded from this civilian supervision[100] (Yazici, 2006, pp. 4-7).

The influential role of the generals-dominated Supreme Military Council (SMC) in the formation of the undemocratic nature of the Turkish Civil-Military Relations was analysed in chapter four. Although every administrative decision and action have been subjected to judicial control by the Constitution, appealing against military policies, appointments and retirements of high-ranking officers and generals, promotions, and dismissals from the military have been excluded of this rule (Ozbudun, 2012, p. 43).

A final question ought to be addressed in this context and which was also mentioned by all the interviewees is the status of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) within the executive body. It has been a common rule in parliamentary democracies[101] that the CGS serves at a lower position and is accountable to the Minister of National Defence, who is an elected member of government *de jure*. However, to the contrary of the implementations in all the other NATO countries[102], both the 1961 Constitution and the 1982 Constitution held the CGS accountable to the Prime Minister (Berksoy, 2013, p. 12). According to Article 117 of the 1982 Constitution, the CGS is appointed by the President - not by the Prime Minister - upon the proposal of the Council of Ministers and is responsible to the Prime Minister for the exercise of his duties and powers. What further strengthens the status of the CGS is its position within the Turkish state protocol. According to the protocol hierarchy, the CGS ranks fourth after the President, the Parliamentary Speaker, and the Prime Minister. All elected members of the Council of Ministers, including Deputy Prime Ministers, and the Minister of Defence, are behind the CGS. The hierarchical position of the CGS is highly informative in itself in terms of the characteristics of civil-military relations in Turkey. While the Turkish CGS is fourth in the state protocol, his American counterpart ranks 48th. In Italy, the top commander ranks 25th and in Spain33rd. Turkey's *sui generis* regulation for the CGS has caused awkward protocol conflicts in the NATO meetings, which implements an order of seating that pays attention to the primacy of elected defence ministers (Guzeldere, 2013, p.

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[100] See the previous section for a detailed analysis of the former legal regulations that laid the foundations of this constitutional immunity.

[101] According to Article 2 of the constitution, Turkey is a "… democratic, secular, social state governed by the rule of law".

[102] Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952, three years after it was established by 12 founding members in 1949 (Nas, 2008, p. 3).

225). The status of the CGS has been changed after the failed coup in 2016. This transformation and related changes are beyond the scope of this study.

In contrast to the ethos of the NATO and EU countries, the legal regime that has regulated the relations between the office of the CGS and the Ministry of Defence in that period placed the former in a directing role over the latter. The Law on Organisation of the Ministry of Nation Defence, which was enacted under the rule of the 1961 constitution and was in force until recently, reduced the position of the Ministry to an auxiliary role to the office of the CGS. According to Article 2 of the Law, a large part of the task of the Ministry of Defence was to fulfil what are necessary for "...Recruitment of soldiers in times of peace and war; provision of weapons, tools and logistical requirements; war industry services; health services; construction, real estate, settlements and infrastructure services; and financial services including account enquiries...in line with the principles, priorities and programmes to be developed by the Office of the CGS" (Berksoy, 2013, p. 12). As a natural result of such an approach, the Ministry of Defence who is the elected representative of taxpayers has not been given any power to supervise the Office of the CGS until recently.

Each of the interviewees indicated the status of the Office of the CGS within the state hierarchy and its relationship with the Ministry of Defence as one of major problems with Turkish civil-military relations. Interviewee 3 drew attention to reflections of the CGS's position within the state hierarchy over the other public bodies. As a result of this structuring, he said, local military units and their commanders have thought themselves superior to the rest of the organisations and their administrators. The interviewees also said that for democratic civil-military relations, the status of the CGS ought to be reorganised in line with EU norms, and the CGS should be made accountable to the minister of defence instead of the prime minister. The military has opposed those who have voiced the necessity to change this structuring with arguments based on the "*sui generis* significance of the armed forces in Turkey" and said there was no need for such an amendment for decades (Guney, 2002, p. 174). However, the military's rejection was eliminated after the failed coup attempt in 2016, which has paved the way for an unprecedented shake-up in Turkey's power of balance.

In accordance with the programme predetermined by the military regime, Turkey held its first general election on 6 November 1983. Rather than a returning to the democratic life, the election process turned into a political engineering project through which the new President Kenan Evren and his friends suppressed new political formations and pre-1980 political parties. To establish a "desired" political order after the election, President Evren and the NSC vetoed candidacy of "objectionable" political parties under the powers given to them by

Provisional Section 4 of the new Law on Political Parties. Under this authoritarianism which also forbade criticism of the junta and (or) its decisions during the election campaign, only three parties – the Populist, the Nationalist Democracy and the Motherland Parties - were allowed to participate in the election (Hale, 1994, pp. 265-67). Although he had to be impartial as the head of the state by virtue of the Constitution, President Evren openly asked the electorate to vote for the Nationalist Democracy Party, led by a retired general on the eve of the election. He explicitly attacked the Motherland Party (MP) and its leader Turgut Ozal and tried to persuade the public not to support Ozal's party. The election result frustrated the President and the generals. Despite all the military regime's exertions, Ozal's Mother Land Party won a landslide victory by obtaining 45.14 per cent of the vote[103]. The Nationalist Democracy Party supported by the president and the generals was badly defeated and only received half the votes of the Motherland Party (Harris, 2011, p. 2011).

Such an election result sent a clear message from the electorate to the generals who had stood knee-deep in politics. However, this electoral fiasco was not the first such experience for the generals. Since the first coup d'état, this was the third time where none of the political parties supported by the pro-coup generals was able to achieve a satisfactory result in the election aftermath of the coup.

In retrospect, it emerges as an interesting point that while the majority of the Turkish society did not react even when the junta hanged their elected prime minister and ministers; but they rejected the electoral directives imposed on them by the generals in the elections held for returning to democracy. Similar rejections were experienced in some elections in the 1990s and 2000s, in which the generals endeavoured to tip the balance in their own favour. As will be analysed in the next chapter, the most radical of these refusals by the Turkish electorate, undoubtedly, occurred in the Presidential Election in 2007 in which they supported the Islamist Prime Minister Erdogan's candidate in defiance of the military's coup ultimatum declared by a mid-night memorandum. An important point ought to be analysed; this pattern shows a radical transformation in the Turkish culture, which glorifies the military. Besides, this voter preference can be interpreted as a strong pragmatism of Turkish society.

Turgut Ozal served as prime minister between 1983 and 1989 and then became president until his sudden death in 1993. He was regarded as one of the most influential political leaders in the history of modern Turkey after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. He obtained engineering and

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[103] The Populist Party came second with 30.46 percentage points. The Nationalist Democracy Party could only get 23.27 percent of the votes. For a detailed report of the election results see (YSK, 1983-2007, Yillari Arasi Secim Cevresine Gore Milletvekili Genel Secim Sonuclari).

economics degrees from Western universities and worked at prestigious international and national organisations. A visionary leader who internalised values of both tradition and modernity (Candar, 2013, pp. 28-29), Ozal developed a political perspective which had the aim of peacefully embracing different ideological representations under the same roof. During his premiership, he focused on liberating political and economic spheres. Along with friendly relationships with the neighbouring and MENA countries, he implemented an active and pro-Western foreign policy throughout his political life (Erkoc, 2014, p. 69). A devout and open-minded Muslim (Heper, 2013, p. 142), Ozal depicted "the West" as "the expression of a way of life based on freedom, democratic liberties and respect for human rights' that went beyond geographical boundaries" (Dagi, 2001, p. 30). In this sense, he made Turkey's European Community membership project his ultimate goal. Though he came to power after one of the darkest eras of Turkish political life, he made crucial contributions to democracy in Turkey. His sudden death has been one of the most controversial issues in Turkey. Millions of people believe that Ozal was killed by the "deep state" because of the democratisation policies he implemented, especially his efforts on Turkey's Kurdish Question (Seibert, 2012). An autopsy report which was revealed in 2012 claimed he had been poisoned (Bacchi, 2012)[104]. The mystery surrounding his death could not be solved until that time.

After the destructive effects of the coup and the military regime on democracy, freedom, and the rule of law, the rise of Turgut Ozal's in political life constituted a critical juncture in the history of modern Turkey. Although he went into politics under the heavy military tutelage which was institutionalised by constitutional and legal regulations, thanks to his political and intellectual capacity, he increased civilian influence over political, social, economic, and cultural life and made significant contributions to democracy in Turkey. In retrospect, it is possible to say that he pursued a policy aiming at transforming Turkey's balance of power by layering new rules and norms besides the old ones. During his short tenure under the military tutelage, he achieved implementing some major democratic reforms such as; the right to individual applications to the European Human Rights Commission, concrete endeavours to becoming a full member of the European Union, acceptance of the authority of the European Court of Justice, acceptance of the European and United Nations convention against torture, the abolition of the 141st, 142nd, and 163rd articles of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK) which prohibited socialist and Islamic views, the release of thousands of political prisoners,

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[104] For analysis on the Ozal Era in Turkey, see: (Mango, 1983; Mango, 1986; Bal, 1996; Aral, 2001; Dagi, 2001; Ataman, 2002; Onis, 2004; Heper, 2013; Candar, 2013; Erkoc, 2014).

the acknowledgement of Kurdish identity by the abolition of the prohibition of speaking in Kurdish, Turkey's signing of The European Social Charter and The Charter of Paris (cited by Erkoc, 2014, p. 63). "Ozal enabled Turkish politics to leave behind certain taboos and begin to debate significant issues such as the very function of the state vis-à-vis the people, possible solutions to the Kurdish problem[105], the nature of Republican laicism and civil-military relations in Turkey. In the process, Turks began to have real debates on these quintessential issues without necessarily incurring crises of political legitimacy" (Heper, 2013, p. 143).

Tracing Ozal's domestic and foreign policies proves that one of his challenging goals was to put an end to the military tutelage and establish democratic civil-military relations. After a transition period from the military regime to democratic life between 1983 and 1987, Ozal started to challenge Turkey's traditional national security paradigm that was developed and perpetuated by the generals. This challenge firstly started to fructify in two fields: Turkey's Kurdish Question and the appointment of senior generals. Thanks to his political capacity and powerful leadership, grassroots support, a majority in the parliament, and relative success in economics, he was able to talk about and implement new discourses and policies regarding the long-standing Kurdish Question, which was diametrically opposite to that of the military. Despite severe criticism by the generals and other state elites, Ozal advocated political and democratic methods instead of militaristic and rejectionist approaches in the treatment of the Kurdish Question which was complicated because of draconian and discriminatory policies established by the military regimes. Just after he was elected as president in 1989, he exerted untiring efforts to convince the military and other Kemalist elites, the public, and even some prominent members of his own party to lift the ban on the Kurdish language[106] and cultural rights. Ozal's historic success at changing the state paradigm with regard to the Kurdish Identity in 1991 provided him with new credibility to civilianise Turkey and to develop humanitarian policies for the suffering Kurdish populations of neighbouring countries (Aknur, 2005, pp. 98-108).

Another informative example in this context arose from the divisions between the president and the military in policymaking regarding the crisis in the Gulf which started after Iraq invaded Kuwait. While President Ozal was planning military involvement in the anti-Iraq Coalition, his plan was opposed by the military top brass. Because of Ozal's firm stance, the

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[105] In addition to the references on the Kurdish question propounded in chapter four, see these English resources on the issue (Barkey, 1996; Barkey and Fuller, 1998; Ergil, 2000; Gunther, 1996; Gurbey, 1996; Gurbey, 2000; Imset, 1992; Somer, 2004; Yegen, 2007).

[106] The military regime banned the Kurdish Language and cultural rights by a law (no. 2932) enacted on October 22, 1983. For the law text see: (Resmi Gazete-Official Gazette "*Turkceden Başka Dillerle Yapilacak Yayinlar Hakkinda Kanun*, 22.10.1983, Sayı: 18199).

Chief of the General Staff General Torumtay announced his resignation, which was an unprecedented event in Turkish politics (Haberman, 1990) until that time. "I see it as impossible to continue my service under the principles and perception of the state I believe in", said General Torumtay in his resignation letter. Despite the resignation, the new Chief of General Staff General Gures, the former commander of land forces, accepted to implement Ozal's Iraq policy (Hale, 1994, p. 292).

Thus, after a very long period of time, the military grudgingly acknowledged civilian supremacy. In fact, that breakup was a result of a long-standing clash between the military status-quo and a new cognitive framework embraced by a political leader prioritising civilian supremacy over the officers. Along with his political skills, popular support, and economic success; the new world order emerging towards the end of the Cold War and the US support to Ozal's leadership were among the factors which made that challenge possible. Though it could not be institutionalised, Ozal's challenge to the power of balance in Turkey has shown the possibility of change.

President Ozal's sudden death in 1993 constituted a turning point in the progress of his arduous de-militarisation and the civilianisation of politics in Turkey. There were no institutions which were designed for, or capable of, maintaining the momentum triggered by Ozal's leadership (Barkey, 2000, p. 101). Under the rule of the new leaders Prime Minister Tansu Ciller and President Suleyman Demirel, Turkey reverted to jingoistic militarism. Along with the mission attributed to the military by the founding philosophy of the Republic, all of the institutions which were established and or reinforced by the three different military regimes that had institutionalised the military tutelage -which were analysed in chapter three, four and previous sections of this chapter- were active in their original places. The civil society was still fragile, and many the so-called civil society organisations were under the state control. The ideological core of the curriculum at military high schools and academies remained untouchable, and there were not any changes in the autonomous military education system which raised hundreds of pro-coup generals in the previous periods. Moreover, there was no societal questioning regarding the role of the military in politics. Since Ozal's success was a result of a combination consisting of political experience, talented leadership, grassroots support, and the international context; without the support of an institutional framework and lack of cultural-cognitive transformation in the society, it could not create a path-dependent process which might have paved the way for the democratisation of Turkish civil-military relations. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the Ozal case established the

possibility of downgrading the military tutelage and establishing democratic civil-military relations in Turkey.

6.5 28 February 1997: "Post-Modern Coup", "Coup by Briefings" or Balancing the *Status Quo*

Sixteen years after the third coup d'état, Turkey once again headed towards another military intervention which would culminate in the resignation of the democratically elected government in 1997. The superior political position which the military regained after the death of President Ozal and the escalating armed clashes with the PKK in the Kurdish-dominated regions of Turkey cemented by the rise of an Islamist party in power as a coalition partner. In 1996, the Political-Islamist Welfare Party (WP, *Refah Partisi*) of Necmettin Erbakan formed the government as a senior partner with the centre-right True Path Party (TPP, *Dogru Yol Partisi*) of Tansu Ciller [107]. Under the unchallenged leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the WP was established in 1983 as the successor of two former cognate Islamist parties – the National Order Party (NOP, *Milli Nizam Partisi*) and the National Salvation Party (NSP, *Milli Selamet Partisi*) - which were banned by the Constitutional Court and the 1980 junta respectively. To put it more explicitly, the Islamist party was rising against the rules and norms established by the founding philosophy of the Republic and its guardian. The party increased its share of the vote in each election since it was founded and obtained 21.4% (which corresponded to 158 of the parliament's 550 seats) of the total votes cast in the 1995 general election.

As analysed in the previous chapters, the Islamist and Kurdish movements were described as the "biggest threats" to the Republic by the founding fathers of the Turkish nation-state. Since the beginning, the military - the "unyielding defender of the laic-secular state"[108] - took a very harsh stance against the Islamist senior partner of the government (Barkey, 2000, p. 102) and its predecessors. Erbakan, who was also the founding ideologue and leader of the two banned Islamist parties, NOP and NSP, developed a political project dubbed as "Just Order" (*Adil Duzen*). The project relied on a set of ideas which identified a new socio-political and economic order which was described with implicit and explicit references to Islam. The

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[107] As a centre-right leaning organisation, The True Path Party (TPP), the other partner of the coalition government, was established as heir to the Justice Party which was banned by the generals after the 1980 coup. With 19.2% of the vote, the TPP obtained 135 MPs in the same election. For a study on the TPP and parties which came from the same political tradition, see: (Landau&Heper, 1991).

[108] This statement is a self-attributed motto developed by the military. It has been employed by the generals hundreds of times to display their political stance regarding debates on state-religion relations in Turkey.

theoretical and philosophical teachings of the WP tradition and the Just Order[109] projects were inspired by Islamic principles (Kamrava, 1998, p. 291) and presented an anti-Western and anti-secular discourse on policy preferences. In politics, the long-term objective of the WP was to integrate Islamic identity and its symbols into the political realm (Yavuz, 1997, p. 76). However, the electoral success of the party in 1995 did not originate from religion or religious pledges but from ongoing political corruption and the failed coalition governments of the 1990s. Owing to the WP being an untested and promising political alternative, it was a pragmatic alternative preferred by the voters. Tracing the early months of the WP's leadership in the government reveals that the party's ideological engagements and the teachings of the "Just Order" were set aside to integrate into Turkey's mainstream politics. Indeed, the government protocol signed by the WP and TPP was almost the same as the former coalition protocol agreed on by the two centre-right parties, the TPP and Motherland Parties. Despite these concessions, the WP could not quell the fear and apprehension of the military and the other Kemalist elites (Caglar, 2012, p. 26).

As mentioned above, there was an existential antagonism between the military and the Political Islamist tradition in Turkey. While the former was the forerunner of the Westernisation project and guardian of the secular state, the latter envisaged and promoted anti-secular and anti-Western policies in socio-political and economic life, which developed a political discourse based on Islamic references. It was known that the generals had recorded Erbakan's every statement before he became prime minister. Erbakan made some remarks in the election campaigns such as "We will set up an Islamic United Nations, an Islamic NATO and an Islamic version of the European Union. We will create an Islamic currency. The other parties are finished. In the first place, they have no identity, no character. They only thing they want to do is imitating the West. That is a sickness. Their second mistake is their strongly capitalistic economic programme, which helps a small group of elites and leaves the rest of our people in misery. Furthermore, their third mistake is that they are against religion. These parties have been hostile to religion for 50 years. They act as if there is no such thing as religion" (Kinzer, 1996). These remarks, which were totally against the founding philosophy of the Republic, were cited as evidence by the Kemalists to support the allegations that the party constituted "a clear and imminent threat" to the laic-secular state.

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[109] For further explanations on the "Just Order", see :(Kamrava, 1998, pp. 288-291) and (Yavuz, 1997, pp. 73-79).

It is important to highlight, in this regard, how the principle of secularism has been interpreted and implemented by the generals and other elites. In his seminal work on secularism and state policies toward religion in the US, France and Turkey, Prof. Kuru developed the concepts of "assertive secularism" and "passive secularism". The founding fathers of modern Turkey preferred the assertive interpretation (the French model) of laicism-secularism instead of the passive one (the US-UK model). These two opposite approaches to laicism-secularism have been the cause of huge differences in state-religion relations in these countries. While the US-UK model generally embraced more tolerance and freedom towards religion, religious activities and symbols in the public realm; the French model (and its Turkish version) adopted restrictive and proscriptive measures against religion and aimed to exclude religion from the public sphere (Kuru, 2007). Thus, in compliance with the preference of the founders of the Republic, the Turkish military operated as the guardian of an assertive-exclusivist secular state.

Throughout its short-lived coalition government from 28 June 1996 to 30 June 1997 the WP was exposed to a fervent secularist opposition consisting of mainstream media groups, the military, and the judiciary while it was trying to build new rules and norms from its Islamist agenda. Through the mass media, the secularist opposition organised and maintained public campaigns which persistently accused the WP of seriously threatening the secular Republic and the lifestyle of secular segments of society (Safrati:2013). Accused of being "rising reactionary danger", some actions and statements of the WP members who challenged the symbols of a secular Republic were castigated in TV programmes, newspapers, and faced legal actions. For instance, statements of the Islamist politicians on the need to lift the headscarf ban in universities, a plan for constructing a mosque in Taksim Square in Istanbul, and Erbakan's fast-breaking dinner (*iftar*) invitation for leaders of religious congregations and orders in the prime ministry were seen as a revolt of the Islamist political mindset against the norms and values created by the secular regime and the military tutelage. Furthermore, activities of some municipalities such as "the Jerusalem Night" which was organised by the mayor of Sincan (a district of the capital Ankara) and the WP brought the tension between the two fronts to a boiling point. In this programme, Iran's Islamic revolution was sanctified, Turkey's secularism was harshly criticised, and the mayor delivered a speech in which he described how an Islamic system would be set up in Turkey. A foreign journalist depicted scenes from the programme which stunned the military and other secular circles as follows:

"...and the evening's guest of honour was the Iranian Ambassador, Muhammed Reza Bagheri. When Mr. Bagheri arrived, the crowd erupted with chants of 'Down with Israel! Down with Arafat!' He then stepped on to the podium and delivered a fiery speech demanding that Muslims obey the Sharia, the law of the Koran. 'On behalf of Muslims all over the world, I say that we can wait no longer,' the ambassador declared. 'Do not be afraid to call yourselves fundamentalists. Fundamentalists are those who follow the words and actions of the prophet. God has promised them the final victory'..." (Kinzer, 1997).

Following a huge reaction in secular circles, the mayor was arrested a few days after the programme. Along similar lines, on a state visit to Libya, the then-dictator Qaddafi chewed up Turkey's secular Republic and its approach to Kurdish citizens and Prime Minister Erbakan quietly listened to his counterpart, did not give any answer, and remained inactive. This instantly inflamed secular anger against the WP and the coalition government (Safrati, 2013, pp. 160-161).

In response to the accusations, "leaders of the Welfare Party complain that the press is whipping up public sentiment against them and insist that the steps they are taking are aimed only at giving Turks freedom of religious choice. 'Something happens that may have happened many times before, but when it happens now, the press shouts that Turkey is on the way to becoming Iran or Algeria,' said Justice Minister Sevket Kazan in an interview. 'In liberal systems, people are supposed to be free to act as they please. If a woman wants to cover her hair with a scarf, she should be able to do that without being discriminated against. If that is not possible, then her human rights are being violated'." (Kinzer, 1997). In fact, the dimensions of the issue that the Justice Minister of the term was not that simple. It was a power conflict between two totally opposite mindset for the prospective path that the country would follow.

It subsequently came to light that the military was the mastermind behind the secularist campaign, which also employed psychological warfare techniques through both its own institutional means and the mass media against the WP and the coalition government (TBMM Arastirma Komisyonu Raporu Cilt 2, 2012, pp. 934-937). To orchestrate the struggle against the "rising reactionary danger", a new unit called the Western Study Group (Batı Calisma Gurubu) was instituted within the General Staff headquarters. Through this military unit, a widespread "witch-hunt" was launched across the country against those who had any religious

affiliation. To that end, the political and ideological orientations of the middle class and senior state officials, governors, mayors, tradespeople, businesspeople, members of civil society groups and political parties, media employees and columnists were recorded.

Five of the interviewees took part in this research talked about various forms of discrimination they were subjected to during the 28 February process. It was reported that the Western Study Group blacklisted almost six million people in two years (T24: 2012). As a deputy governor, the candidate met senior colleagues who told him that because of their religious identity or the lifestyle and political backgrounds of family members, they were blacklisted by members of the gendarmerie, who work under their administration. During the period in which the previous sentence was written in 2016, the candidate[110] was a deputy governor in Turkey. After serving more than 12 years as a high-ranking civilian bureaucrat; first, he had been purged from his job along with tens of thousands of civil servants and then sent to jail for almost two years by the Erdogan regime because of political reasons after the failed coup attempt in July 2016. The author's personal tragedy, who is living in exile now is one of the recent examples of the path-dependent characteristics of the state authoritarianism in Turkey.

It was not only civilians but also members of the military who were subjected to the "witch-hunting" as, once again, the military dismissed hundreds of "objectionable" military members from the armed forces because of their religious or conservative world-view, resulting in the dismissal of more than 540 blacklisted officers by an administrative action of the Supreme Military Council (Brooks, 2008). Prime Minister Erbakan, who was also chairman of the Supreme Military Council, did not (or could not) actively resist and (or) reject the decisions given by the generals and signed all dismissals from the military during his tenure[111].

As analysed in the previous sections, this policy was the continuation of the purge strategy followed by all military juntas in Turkey in order to reshape the state organisation in parallel with the ideals of the junta leaders.

Apart from its traditional methods, the officers invented new political instruments to maintain the military tutelage and the guardianship role established by the founding philosophy of the Republic. For instance, a new social-engineering strategy employed in the struggle against

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[110] His wife, a judge, was also purged from her job at the same process and was imprisoned with their -then- 2 years-old daughter for more than one and a half years.
[111] For the tutelary role of the Supreme Military Council; see, chapter four.

Political Islam while readjusting the power of balance in Turkey established and punctuated by the officer corps. For the first time in history; prosecutors, judges, academics, journalists, and other influential societal groups were summoned to the headquarters of the General Staff for briefings on the "danger of Political-Islam and the serious threat it directed to the secular Republic" (Barkey, 2000, p. 103). In these seminars, political activities and discourses of the WP officials and related developments throughout the coalition government were castigated by senior generals. By using such a method, the military aimed to inflame societal reaction to the Islamist WP. By these briefings, the military achieved to direct state departments and civil servants, and successfully shaped the public perception in parallel with its agenda.

Sevket Kazan, the Justice Minister of the term, urged prosecutors and judges not to attend the briefing at the General Staff headquarters. However, his call was underestimated, and more than 400 prosecutors and judges participated in the programme. Furthermore, it was reported that even some legists who had not been invited to the General Staff headquarters joined the briefings (Bal&Bulut, 1997). Because of these briefings and of their socio-political influence, some authors dubbed the 28 process as "coup by briefings" (Goltz, 1997).

Among the policy proposals and political activities of the WP officials, an Islamic solution to the Kurdish Question and "the Sincan incident" was the most controversial topics which expedited the inevitable ending for the Islamist government. To put it differently, the punctuated equilibrium established on the tenets of Turkish nationalism and "assertive secularism" rebalanced by the military through the traditional and new instruments which would give an end to the elected civilians who were designated as "existential threats" against the state. Four days after the "Jerusalem Night" in Sincan, tanks and other armoured military vehicles appeared on the streets of the Sincan district of Ankara, the capital city. Such an extra-legal parade was considered an overt warning to the Erbakan Government, and a possible final sign before a coup d'état. Indeed, the people of Turkey who were all too familiar with coups easily understood the meaning of tanks on the streets (Caglar, 2012, p. 27).

As previously examined in detail, the junta-made 1982 Constitution gave supremacy to the generals in the National Security Council (NSC) and designated it as the most powerful tutelary institution in politics. Thanks to this constitutional power, in 1997 the military took action to "correct" the political course of the country for the fourth time in the history of modern Turkey (Haugom, 2016) in line with the founding philosophy of the state.

In chapter four, the role was given to the NSC on determining Turkey's "National Defence Concept" was analysed. One of the most influential reflections of this prerogative was that thanks to its position in the NSC, the generals were given the power of determining the "friends and foes of the state". Contrary to the global trend, along with "external threats" Turkey's generals continued to designate "internal threats and foes" after the Cold-War. Thus, some segments of the society, who were Turkey's own citizens but did not share or indigenise the orthodox ethos of the secular, Kemalist-nation state were defined as the "internal threat" to the Republic. In the 1990s "Kurdish Separatism" and "Political Islam-Islamic Activism" were determined as the "internal threats" to Turkey's unitary state quality" and to "the principle of secularism guaranteed in Articles 2 and 4 of the constitution " (Cizre, 2003, p. 216). While the "Kurdish Separatism" and the PKK insurgency were defined as the primary internal security threats to the state in 1992, the NSC declared in early 1997 that the "reactionary Islamic movements" were a greater threat to the secular Republic than "Kurdish Separatism". The decision was endorsed by the government, and the Council of Ministers signed the related policy document which required active struggle against the religious political organisations, communities and orders, associations, charities, and all.

By a governmental decree in early January 1997, a new administrative institution which was called the Prime Ministerial Crisis Management Centre *(Basbakanlik Kriz Takip Merkezi)* was set up within the Prime Minister's Office to organise the struggle against the "political Islamist reactionary". In appearance, the new institution was constituted as a unit of the Prime Minister's Office, but in practice, it operated under the command of the General Secretariat of the NSC which was directed by a full-general (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 2002, p. 196). Local branches of the centre were instituted under the chairmanship of governors and district-governors in all cities and towns. These local branches implemented the strategies developed by the NSC in the periphery and profiled the activities and operations of the above-mentioned organisations and those individuals who were associated with them. Interestingly enough, by endorsing and signing all these authoritarian-militaristic policies, Prime Minister Erbakan and the WP wing of the government put their own party, civil society organisations, and followers under heavy state surveillance and made them the subject of massive state oppression. There is no doubt the military-dominated NSC would do whatever was needed to have the policies mentioned above implemented, but the cognitive inconsistency (dissonance) of the Turkish politicians, in this case, showed once again the institutional and socio-cultural weakness and

incapacity of the civilians (this time the Islamist ones) on problem-solving vis-à-vis the generals.

The NSC meeting on 28 February 1997, which can be identified as the origins of the fourth military intervention in Turkey, was the fatal blow to the WP-TPP Government inflicted by the generals. The meeting witnessed intense debates in which the generals issued an ultimatum to the civilian government. In the 9,5 hours-long meeting, with the objective of redesigning the political realm, the generals forced the civilian members of the NCS to approve a well-documented and long list of policy recommendations which would minimise public manifestations of Islam and annihilate the religious social networks which were established by the Erbakan-WP tradition and other Islamic actors. Also, the Islamist approach proposal to solve the long-standing Kurdish Question would be rejected by the military. The following list put on the agenda in the NSC by the generals would restore, Turkey's social, cultural, and political life in line with the founding principles of the state:

> "1-The principle of secularism should be strictly enforced, and laws should be modified for that purpose, if necessary,
>
> 2 - Private dormitories, foundations, and schools affiliated with Sufi religious orders *(tarikatlar)* must be put under the control of relevant state authorities and eventually transferred to the Ministry of National Education (MNE), as required by the Law on Unified Education*,*
>
> 3 – To render the tender minds of young generations inclined foremost towards the love of the Republic, Ataturk, the homeland, and the nation, and towards the ideal and goal of raising the Turkish nation to the level of modern civilisation, and to protect them against the influence of various quarters:
>
> a) An eight-year uninterrupted educational system must be implemented across the country,
> b) The necessary administrative and legal adjustments should be made so that Koran courses, which children with basic education may attend with parental consent, operate only under the responsibility and control of the MNE,
> 4 - Our national education institutes are charged with raising enlightened clergy loyal to the Republican regime and Ataturk's principles and reforms must conform to the essence of the Law on Unified Education,

5 - Religious facilities built in various parts of the country must not be used for political exploitation to send messages to certain circles. If there is a need for such facilities, the RAA (Religious Affairs Administration) should evaluate the need, and the facilities must be built in coordination with local governments and relevant authorities,

6 - Activities of religious orders banned by Law no. 677, as well as all entities prohibited by said law, must be ended,

7 - Media groups that oppose the TAF (Turkish Armed Forces) and its members should be brought under control. These [groups] try to depict the TAF as inimical to religion by exploiting the issue of personnel whose ties to the TAF have been severed by decisions of the Supreme Military Council based on their fundamentalist activities,

8 - Personnel expelled from military service because of fundamentalist activities, disciplinary problems, or connections with illegal organisations must not be employed by other public agencies and institutions or otherwise encouraged,

9 - The measures taken within the framework of existing regulations to prevent infiltration into the TAF by the extremist religious sector should also be applied in other public institutions and establishments, particularly in universities and other educational institutions, at every level of the bureaucracy, and in judicial establishments,

10 - Iran's efforts to destabilise Turkey's regime should be closely watched. Policies that would prevent Iran from meddling in Turkey's internal affairs should be adopted,

11 - Legal and administrative means must be used to prevent the dangerous activities of the extremist religious sector that seeks to create polarisation in society by fanning sectarian differences,

12 - Legal and administrative proceedings against those responsible for incidents that contravene the constitution of the Turkish Republic, the Law on Political Parties, the Turkish Penal Code, and especially the Law on Municipalities should be concluded in a short period of time, and firm measures should be taken at all levels not to allow repetition of such incidents,

13 - Practices that violate the attire law and that may give Turkey an anachronistic image must be prevented,

14 - Licensing procedures for short and long-barrel weapons, which have been issued for various reasons, must be reorganised on the basis of police and gendarmerie

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districts. Restrictions must be introduced on this issue, and the demand for pump-action rifles, in particular, must be evaluated carefully (Gunay, 2001, pp. 5-16).

15 - The collection of [animal] sacrifice hides by anti-regime and uncontrolled [unregulated] organisations and establishments for the purpose of securing financial resources should be prevented, and no collection of sacrifice hides should be allowed outside the authority recognised by law,

16 - Legal proceedings against bodyguards dressed in special uniforms and those responsible for them should be concluded speedily, and, taking into account the fact that such illegal practices might reach dangerous proportions, all private bodyguard units not envisaged by the law should be disbanded (Gunay, 2001, pp. 5-16),

17 - Initiatives aimed at solving the country's problems on the basis of *"ummah"* [religious community] rather than "nation" and that encourage the separatist terror organisation (Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK]) by approaching it on the same basis [i.e., as a part of the *umma]* should be prevented by legal and administrative means,

18 - Law no. 5816, which defines crimes against the great saviour Ataturk, including acts of disrespect, must be fully implemented" (Sarfati, 2013, p. 161; Gunay, 2001, pp. 5-16).

After five days of resistance[112], Prime Minister Erbakan and his Council of Ministers signed the NCS decisions, and they have become the state policy document. Under the close scrutiny of the General Secretariat of the NSC, all central and local public institutions were instructed to implement the new state policy strictly. In the following months, the political tension in the country was deepened because of the military interventionism. The generals continued to instigate the secular-Kemalist circles against the coalition government by using the influential support of the media. Through this strategy, the military succeeded in mobilising all secular civil society organisations, media groups, judiciary and tutelary institutions established after the previous coups against the Islamist WP.

Under such a massive and organised political campaign masterminded by the military, it was not possible for the coalition government to remain in power. Behind the closed doors, the generals forced some secular MPs of the coalition partner, the TPP, to make the government

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[112] For the high political tension that erupted in the country in this period, see: Milliyet Daily (March 1-5, 1997).

non-functional[113]. Four and a half months after the NSC meeting on 28 February 1997 the Erbakan Government was obliged to resign on 17 June 1997 (Caglar, 2012, pp.29-31). Decisions taken by the military-dominated NSC throughout this process culminated in a "post-modern coup" which forced the democratically elected government to step down. Here, the term "post-modern" was not used in its philosophical meaning but for describing the new method of toppling the government. It was reported that, in a briefing at the General Staff headquarters, a senior general dubbed the 28 February process as a "post-modern coup" after the Erbakan Government resigned because of the heavy pressure exerted by the NSC (Candar, 1997; Demir, 2007). Since the path used by the generals in this military intervention into politics was quite different from those followed in the previous ones, most of the generals delighted in using this term. Since then, the 28 February 1997 military intervention has been referred to as the "post-modern coup". The adjective chosen to describe the 28 February intervention is telling as it demonstrates the level of institutional stickiness of the military power in politics. The military tutelage clinched by the 1980 intervention has reached to such a level towards the end of the century that it could topple an elected government without pointing guns at civilians as it did in the previous decades.

Along with the factors mentioned above, which forced Prime Minister Erbakan to resign, there was a fear of being subjected to a classic version of the coup d'état and the fate of Prime Minister Menderes and his friends who were executed by the actors of the 1960 Coup D'état. As analysed previously, the "institution of fear" established by the 1960 intervention has become the most influential factor shaping the cognitive approach of Turkish politicians' in relation with the generals.

After the resignation, Turkey was ruled by military-supported governments until the 1999 elections at which they were asked to implement the 28 February decisions. During that process, the military expanded its hegemony over the political and social spheres. One of the most zealous allies of the military during the late 1990s and early 2000s was the Higher Education Board (*Yuksek Ogretim Kurulu*, YOK) which was established by the 1980 military regime in order to keep a tight rein on the universities. Thousands of female undergraduates who wore headscarves for religious reasons were dismissed from universities across the country by a decision of the Higher Education Board and university administrations because

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[113] The TPP won 135 seats in the 1995 election. In June 1997, the party had only 97 MPs in parliament. Most of the resigned MPs transferred en masse to a new party which was established in 1997 under tacit guidance from the generals.

the headscarf was described as "a symbol of rebellion" against the secular state by the Kemalist elites (Kilinc, 2008, p. 182) at that time.

The Constitutional Court shut down the WP in January 1998 in a sweeping verdict on the grounds that the party had violated the principles of secularism stipulated in the constitution. All assets of the party were confiscated by the state, and former prime minister Erbakan and leading cadres of the party were banned from political activity for five years (Morris, 1998). As debated in chapter four, banning political parties from politics by the Constitutional Court since the 1960 intervention has become an influential instrument of the nationalist-secular regime against the Kurdish and Islamist movements. In this path, the Virtue Party, the fourth political movement of the Islamist tradition in Turkey, which was established after the Welfare Party's closure in 1998, shared the same fate with its predecessors. It was shut down in 2001 by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that the party became a focus for anti-secular activities (Ulsever, 2001). However, as will be analysed in chapter seven, it is not possible to say that the status quo has achieved its objective by this method in the long term since new political parties have burgeoned on the legacy of their banned predecessors that would trigger an unprecedented transformation in the balance of power in Turkey in the following decade.

As such in the 1980 coup d'état, the "post-modern" military intervention was carried out under the chain of command. However, some generals came to the forefront more than others because of their active roles and the statements they made during the process. Some discourses of those generals reveal how the generals justified toppling the democratically elected government and demonstrate the cognitive continuity of the pro-coup officers since the first military intervention in 1960. General Cevik Bir, then Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was among the most influential officers during that process. He was the senior officer who directed the military campaign against the WP from the General Staff headquarters and one of the founders of the "Western Study Group". He was also, it was reported, the general who gave instructions to prosecutors and courts in the "fight against the reactionary danger". Chief aide-de-camp of General Kenan Evren's before and after the 1980 coup d'état (Berberoglu, 2007), Bir said in a statement that he had learnt a lot from Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 military intervention[114]. He described the 28 February process as an act of

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[114] For photos showing General Evren and his once aide-de-camp General Bir in the same frame; see: http://www.dunyabulteni.net/haber/205798/cevik-bir-evrenin-yaveri-cikti-foto.

"readjusting the balance of democracy". General Bir advocated the military intervention in politics with similar motives employed by the members of the former juntas:

> "We (the military) have a legal obligation to protect the present constitutional order from Islamic agitation". "We (the military) founded this Republic, and we are going to protect it", he said. (Owen, 2002, p. 214).

General Karadayi, the Chief of General Staff in that period, was at the top of the chain of command which staged the post-modern military intervention in 1997. A self-aggrandising[115] general, as demonstrated by his active roles in all the military interventions since 1960, Karadayi typifies the cognitive framework that the Turkish officers internalised by entering the military high schools at an early age. In an interview in May 1997, he explained the philosophy behind their campaign against the government as follows:

> "The armed forces would ensure that Turkey remains a democratic and secular state based on the rule of law. The armed forces are dedicated to Ataturk's nationalism and are the untiring guardians of his reforms and principles." (Giuriato and Molinari, 1999, p. 28).

Commander of Land Forces during the process and subsequently Chief of the General Staff between 1998 and 2002, General Kivrikoglu's remarks on the role and significance attributed to the 28 February is quite sampling in terms of the anticipated outcomes of the military interventions in politics for the officer corps.

> "The February 28th process would last as long as necessary, ten, one hundred and even a thousand years." (Barkey, 2000, p. 103).

By the end of the 1990s, the military has readjusted the punctuated equilibrium in Turkish politics for the fourth time in five decades after the transition to a multi-party system in the late 1940s. When Turkey entered the third millennium, the military was the most powerful institution in the country and had enhanced its tutelage over politics by modern and "post-modern" means. As *Interviewee 4* pointed out, the civilians were allowed to do politics within the limits that the generals approved. In such a political climate, it was impossible even to imagine the idea of civilian supervision of the military in Turkey. However, the political

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[115] In a voice recording revealed in March 2009, retired General Karadayi spoke proudly of his active roles in all of the coups d'état since 1960, and of the instructions he gave to top politicians and bureaucrats throughout his career. Although the conversation was secretly recorded and revealed without his permission, the former Chief of the General Staff never denied the revelations. For further explanations on his remarks, see: (Disli, 2009).

pressure of the Kemalist groups over the religious and conservative segments of the society has deepened the political polarisation and increased the rage against the military tutelage among the Islamists, conservatives, and democratic circles. Along with other determinants, as a critical juncture, the 28 February Process has produced an unexpected result by triggering a rapprochement among the anti-militarist groups that would pave the way for rising of Recep Tayyip Erdogan , then Islamist Mayor of Istanbul, who would shake up the balance of power in Turkey ten years after the fourth military intervention. This transformation will be analysed in the next chapter.

6.6 Conclusion

The founding philosophy behind the Republic in 1923 has given the military an intrinsic functionality in politics by designating it as the guardian of the state. In this sense, the initial legal and institutional prerogatives have provided the officer corps to extend their authority both in the state-building process and in the evolution of civil-military relations. Thanks to the religious and national glorification of the military and the soldiering by the patriarchal socio-cultural codes of the Turkish society, the officercorps has easily found societal justification for their position in the power of balance.

The military schools, an enduring legacy of the Ottoman modernisation, has transmitted the interventionist mindset and tradition to the armed forces of the Kemalist era. In fact, they were the Ottoman officers who graduated from those schools, rebelled against the Sultan, and founded the new state in Ankara. The cognitive framework which was indoctrinated in the military schools has reproduced the military interventionism as both a duty and a right. According to Turkish officers, most civilians are unreliable, less patriotic, visionless, and self-seeking. The "true inheritors" of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkish officers have acted as the owner of the Republic. Protecting and watching over the fatherland is not only under their authority but is also their duty. Staging coups if necessary has been a method of fulfilling this duty which was given by law, they believed.

When the narratives of officers who took part in the coups d'état were analysed, it was seen that all the officers argued that they had done the right and necessary thing. It was also observed that these officers were proud of themselves because of their active pro-coup past. According to the collective belief in the military units, the soldiers founded the secular Republic and will protect it forever. The memoirs and other materials analysed in this chapter reveal how the institutional stickiness of the factors mentioned above have paved the way for institutionalisation of the military tutelage by subsequent coups d'états.

A dream job, especially for the children of middle and lower-class families across the country, officership has always been a prestigious position in the Turkish society. While each military intervention was granting new institutional authorities and prerogatives to the armed forces, they also provided new financial opportunities to the members of the military.

Turkey's adventure into the multi-party democracy is a history of coups d'état. The military, the real owner of the secular, Kemalist state, has redesigned the political realm four times

since 1960. Each time, the sphere of civilian politics was increasingly restricted by the generals through the military interventions. These restrictions empowered the authoritarian facet of the state. Thanks to the role attributed to it by the founding philosophy of the Republic, the military found itself authorised to "correct wrongs of the civilians" when it deemed necessary. The civilians paid the price for their political ideas and methods sometimes with their life and sometimes by being imprisoned for a long time. The execution of the country's elected prime minister and two other ministers by the generals in 1961 created an institution of fear in politics, which paralysed any possible civilian initiatives against military interventions in politics in the following decades. This institution of fear has also damaged the popularity of politics among civilians. The civilian incompetence and failure to cope with social, economic, and security problems were used by the generals as convincing instruments to legitimise the military interventions introduced as the acts of the salvation of the nation.

The lasting impact of policy preferences which were aggrandised by each military intervention clinched the power of the military and path-dependent stability of the military superiority over politics. The military juntas have given that path-dependency formal status through incorporating it into law which would create the military tutelage. Through the 1960 and 1980 interventions, the military-dominated institutions have been incorporated into the military-made constitutions, respectively and the military influence has been constitutionalised. These preferences, concordantly, closed off any possibility of democratisation of civil-military relations in the short and midterms. In light of the theoretical debates developed by Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: pp.342-349) each of the military interventions, in this context, can be described as a critical juncture for Turkish civil-military relations as it created new legal/constitutional regulations, institutions, and military-dominated political climate which were then gruelling to alter. During these processes, it was observed that the closest ally of the military was the other secular, Kemalist elites.

The historical and powerful role of the military in politics, in this sense, was reinforced by the military interventions and after each coup d'état, the military gained new prerogatives, impunities and immunities. Along with these acquisitions, the military constituted new institutions and consolidated the existing ones which systematised its tutelage over politics upon a powerful historical and cultural legacy and societal justification. The National Security Council, The Supreme Military Council, The Martial Law implementations, the compulsory military service for every male citizen, The Higher Education Board, being exempted from

supervisions from the Court of Accounts and the State Supervisory Council, and the separate system of military justice were the most influential of these institutions. By virtue of these institutions, the military did not only re-determine the rules of the political game, but it also re-designed social, cultural and economic spheres of life. The military developed new strategies in this context, which met the political requirements of changing conditions. Under this systemic tutelage, the politicians could only participate in politics within the limits that the generals deemed suitable.

In a fragile region between the East and West, the geopolitical location of the country has been an important reason legitimising the right of having the largest share from the budget for decades for the military to fulfil the requirements of the objective needs of security deficit. The military-dominated National Security Council until recently has been the authority defining what those objective needs are. As a NATO ally since 1952, the Turkish military has sided with the Western World and has followed the Alliance in determining its security and defence policy in the region. During the process culminated in the institutionalisation of the military tutelage over politics since the first coup in 1960, the officer corps have reiterated their commitment to the NATO and its Western Allies at every intervention. On the one hand, the military has acted in absolute harmony with the NATO, but on the other hand it has blocked the path through which Turkey might have reached the democratic standards that other NATO members enjoy in civil-military relations. It seems that, in a pragmatic manner, the military interventionism in Turkey's fragile democracy has not concerned the NATO and other external powers much as long as the military fulfil its external commitments to them.

Though the military tutelage has seemed successful in treating the Kurdish Question and Political Islam by force in the way of guarding the nationalist-secular Republic in the medium term until the early 2000s, the denial and oppression policies against the Kurds and Islamists have given unintended and unexpected results which have triggered an unprecedented transformation in the power of balance in Turkey in the following decade. In the next chapter, internal and external determinants which made this transformation possible will be analysed.

CHAPTER 7: Transformation of the *Status Quo*: The Impact of the Justice and Development Party and the EU Candidacy Process on Turkish Civil-Military Relations

Plus ça change: The more it changes, the more it stays the same

7.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the gradual institutional change in Turkish civil-military relations after the ruling party- the JDP- ascended to power in 2002. This path-dependent analysis brings forward the JDP's ever-growing power as the endogenous determinant of the institutional transformation, and the EU candidacy process along with the supportive international political climate as the permissive endogenous component. The "Power Distributional Approach" of two prominent historical institutionalists, Mahoney and Thelen's while analysing the developments debated in this chapter.

This chapter consists of four sections. In the first section, the candidate teases out the socio-political and economic factors that collapsed the established political structure in two years - between 1999 and 2001- which paved the way for a rapid power consolidation for the newly born JDP in Turkish politics. Subsequently, Turkey-EU relations in the context of civil-military relations will be analysed.

The second section is about the hidden power struggle that the JDP waged against the military between 2002 and 2007. It also highlights the controlled opposition of the generals against the rising power of the post-Islamist government. In light of the Mahoney and Thelen's conceptualisation, this period can be characterised as a "layering" process; due to the fact that in the face of strong veto mechanisms held by the military, the "subversive" JDP policies introduced some new rules and amendments alongside the existing ones which had perpetuated the military tutelage over the civilian politics. This section also analyses formal and informal instruments exerted by the military against the ruling party.

The third section analyses the open conflict between the ruling party and the military which erupted after the e-memorandum through which the military rebuffed the possibility of election of an Islamist candidate to the presidency in 2007. This process is described as a transition of the institutional "layering" into a "pro-displacement" process in which the JDP has set about deinstitutionalising the military tutelage in favour of the civilians. In this context, the candidate analyses some new rules and amendments, and the EU reform packages

through which the new elites of Turkey have started to change the balance of power in politics.

The fourth section focuses on how the afore-mentioned institutional changes created a new political context in which Turkey's once most powerful generals and some other prominent secular civilians were taken to court as a result of the power struggle between the Islamists and the Kemalists. In connection with this, the section teases out how these trials caused erosion of the public support, a deep-rooted socio-cultural source of legitimacy for the military. While this section will debate what these "Coup Trials" means for the Turkish civil-military relations from an institutionalist perspective; it will also analyse how this process has turned into a "revenge politics" waged by the ruling party and its allies, who were "losers" of the old regime, against Turkey's once most powerful institution. A special emphasis will be laid on arbitrary detentions of the officers and human rights violations for political purposes during the legal procedures.

In light of the outputs of the previous analyses in this research, the fourth section also debates whether this process could produce democratic civil-military relations and whether such an institutional transition could lead to a democratic civilian oversight of the military in Turkey. While analysing the successful strategy of "layering" and then "pro-displacement" processes developed under the leadership of Erdogan and his associates, specific emphasis will be put on Erdogan's success on making periodical alliances with the rival groups in the way changing the balance of power in Turkey.

Because the cut-off point for this research is 2011, the investigations will be analysed utilising the data revealed within that period. In fact, these two crucial legal battles between the Islamists and Kemalists deserve separate scientific research to comprehend the changing nature of the balance of power and "truth" in Turkey.

7.2 Emergence of the Justice and Development Party: From the "Objectionable Islamists[116]" to the "Conservative Democrats[117]"

Turkey was operating under the heavy military tutelage which had forced Erbakan's Islamist government in 1997 and which had redesigned the realm of politics over the subsequent years. The transformation was influenced by unpredictable external events, primarily the two devastating earthquakes in 1999 and an unprecedented economic crisis in 2001. The consecutive earthquakes destroyed some major industrialised cities, claimed lives of tens of thousands, and caused billions of dollars of economic losses (Akarca&Tansel, 2008, p.2). Along with the huge and devastating socio-economic costs, these disasters also revealed gross government corruption in public contracts and devastating state incompetence in dealing with the natural and economic disasters. As analysed in the previous chapter, the widespread corruption and the civilian incompetency in the state apparatus were not new things in Turkey; but, this time, it caused the downfall of the entire system and destroyed societal hope for a new start under such debris. This state of collapse exacerbated due to political clumsiness of the opposition parties in developing solutions against the current problems. While the society was still suffering from the multiple problems that the earthquakes had caused, the country was hit hard again by the worst economic crisis of its history in February 2001. In terms of intensity and repercussions, it was an unprecedented and the severest of its kind in the Turkish markets.

The tipping point that paved the way for the crisis was a confrontation which erupted between President Sezer and Prime Minister Ecevit in a National Security Council meeting[118] in February 2001. However, there had already many systemic[119] political and financial problems which had brought Turkey to the brink of economic collapse. By the outbreak of the crisis, tens of thousands of people lost their jobs, the Turkish Lira devaluated approximately 40%, and inflation rates hit historic new lows. As a result of the economic downfall; thousands of

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[116] The Islamist political movements and parties have been treated as the most "dangerous" groups against the Republic by the secular, Kemalist military; for a broad analysis; see, chapter six.

[117] Coming from a profoundly Islamist origin, Erdogan and his close circle "converted" their world view into "conservative democracy" in the formation process of their new party in the centre of the political spectrum. For an in-depth analysis on "conservative democracy" of the JDP; see: (Topcuoglu, 2006).

[118] The meeting, it was reported, witnessed a harsh quarrel between the President and Prime Minister, especially on the government's ineffectiveness on the fight against the widespread corruption. In a press conference after the meeting, Prime Minister Ecevit revealed what happened at the meeting: "Today, there happened a highly disturbing incident. In the presence of civil servants, the president held the floor and made gross accusations against me in an extreme caddish manner. I left the meeting because of this reason. He behaved in an unprecedented manner that has no example in our state tradition". Ecevit also described the debate as "a state crisis". For further explanations, see: (Milliyet Daily, 20-23 February 2001)

[119] For systemic problems of Turkish Economy see: (Ozgur, 2004; Onis&Rubin, 2005)

firms went bankrupt in a few months, hundreds of thousands of pauperised people took to the streets, and once again the political establishment failed to minimise the destructive effects[120] of the crisis on the society. The political incompetency was at such a level that, the then prime minister Ecevit invited Kemal Dervis, a well-known Turkish economist and Vice-President of the World Bank, to bring economy under control and reform the financial markets(Koch& Chaudhary: 2001, pp.467-483).

As mentioned before, most of the governments served throughout the history of the Republic[121] were corrupt and incompetence. In addition to these, the excruciating burden of the recent crisis caused a systemic failure which can be described as a state of systemic bankruptcy. This political climate, in which the established political movements and discourses were exhausted, created a highly fertile ground for the emergence of new political alternatives to run the country. The downfall of the socio-political and economic structure produced a critical juncture in Turkish politics, in which a new era harboured unpredictable developments which would shake Turkey's military tutelage up in the next future.

The path that paved the way for the establishment of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi*- AKP, henceforth the JDP) emerged in such a chaotic political atmosphere. Described itself as "reformer moderates" within the "National View" tradition, an influential group under R. T. Erdogan's leadership cut loose from the Islamist Virtue Party[122] of the former Prime Minister N. Erbakan who had been toppled by the military intervention on 28 February 28 1997 established the JDP in August 2001. Erdogan and his friends were among the most extensive "losers" of the military tutelage era along with the Kurds. The Kemalist regime demonised the political origin they had come from. Indeed, as discussed in chapter three and six, the founding philosophy of the Republic was based on strictly secular identity- "assertive secularism"- and Turkish nationalism. It harshly excluded any kind of Islamist political activity and denied the Kurdish identity in the public sphere.

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[120] For causes and consequences of the February 2001 Economic Crisis in Turkey; see: (Koch&Chaudhary, 2001; Akyuz&Boratav, 2003)

[121] See chapter six for failures of Turkish civilian authorities in face of socio-economic and political crises emerged throughout the multi-party system.

[122] In chapter six, on which grounds Erbakan's Islamist parties were shut down by the Constitutional Court was analysed. After the Welfare Party, the party in power, had been closed under the heavy tutelage of the February 28 Military Intervention, the fourth party of the same tradition - the Virtue Party (VP)- was established in 1998. This party was shut down by Turkey's strictly secular Constitutional Court as well. In June 2001, the Constitutional Court closed the VP on the grounds that the party violated secular nature of the Constitution, and it became the centre of anti-secular Islamist activities like its predecessor, the Welfare Party.

Since the very beginning, the JDP and its founding cadres have very strategically and successfully used this state of political alienation in quest of mass support. The party has continued to use this instrument even after it has become the most powerful institution of the country. This approach has been codified as a political discourse which concentrates on building a coherent Islamic-conservative constituency by creating an emotionally and intellectually convincing image of a "domestic other" (Alaranta, 2015, p.5). It has also served as a source of legitimacy for the new party in the fight against the elites of the status quo who had held strong veto powers[123]. Founding cadres of the JDP included some influential figures of the centre-right and left-wing of the politics. The JDP aimed to create an inclusive political discourse from the very beginning[124]. After they had paid high prices under the heavy tutelage of the military which also was still enjoying one of its most powerful periods, the new generation[125] within Erbakan's Islamist political movement "invented" the pluralistic democracy as a way of survival and of rebirth (Dagi, 2013, pp.85-87).

Erdogan, Abdullah Gul and Bulent Arinc who were then young and prominent figures of the Islamist tradition oppressed by the military tutelage between the '70s and the '90s emerged as the founding leaders of the new democracy-promising party, pretended as if rejecting its anti-establishment past. However, due to Erdogan's notorious discourses and practices about democracy in the previous decades; it was not easy to convince especially well-educated classes of the society for a broader societal coalition in search of a participatory politics in the country. For instance, while he was mayor of Istanbul in the early 1990s, he said: "Thank God Almighty, I am a servant of Shari'a" (Islamic Law), and "I am the imam of Istanbul". He claimed that: "One cannot be a secularist and a Muslim at the same time." As the mayor of Istanbul between 1994 and 1998, he was a staunch supporter and implementer of the Islamist agenda of his party. In this context, he compared democracy to a streetcar: "You ride it until you arrive at your destination, then you step off." Erdogan valued the idea of democracy as not an end itself but a means to an end[126]. In order to clear the air in terms of both internal and external suspicions; Erdogan declared that they rejected their Islamist past and "took off the National View shirt" in May 2003. Especially after the Referendum on Constitutional Amendments in 2011 which has conferred the government of absolute powers to redesign the

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[123] For impact of "strong veto powers" on the gradual institutional change, see: (Mahoney and Thelen: 2010, pp.16-22).

[124] For the JDP's party programme, see: http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_

[125] For the fight between the old and new generation within Erbakan's Islamist movement, see: (Dagi, 2013).

[126] For Erdogan's points of view on democracy, state-religion relations, and western culture in the 1990s; see: (Serdar, 2008; Caldwell, 2005; Rubin, 2007 and Middle East Forum Editorial, 2007)

state-system, it was proved this scepticism was not meaningless. Since that time, Turkey has witnessed an intensifying deinstitutionalisation process under Erdogan, which has broken all check and balances against his one-man rule regime.

On the eve of the parliamentary elections of 2002; the JDP promised a democratic, prosperous, fair, and peaceful Turkey. There were millions of people who were expecting that a broad coalition of democrats, conservatives and liberals might defeat the military tutelage under the political leadership of the JDP and that such a coalition would pave the way for a democratic system through the ideal of an inclusive civilian constitution, Turkey has never experienced(Dagi, 2015, p.7). Indeed, for the first time in the Turkish political history, a new-born political party which declared to democratise the country managed to convince people from different political backgrounds with 34.4% of the votes in its first election. Just after the election results were announced, Erdogan stated that their priority would be the European Union.

At the international level, the JDP's emergence in politics came "at a time   when the threat of Islamic terrorism is widely perceived as having thrown transatlantic security at risk. A pragmatic-conservative and Islam-sensitive party came to power by elections and 'propelled Turkey into an open-ended path of European style normalization' to converge with the European Union (EU) standards in almost all walks of life. Operating within the parameters of strictly secular state system and through a series of reforms in civil-military relations, the judiciary, parliamentary procedure, minority rights, national security, macroeconomic management and the public sector, the JDP government would endeavour to improve political and economic life with the EU accession process in mind" (Cizre, 2008,p.1). Therefore, the party was seen as a political project promising Islam's compatibility with democracy that could be a model for change and an antidote of the Islamist radicalism in the Middle East in the post-September 11 era. In his early visits to the western capitals; Erdogan reassured that they established a new political movement which adopted a pro-western path with neo-liberal economic policies and democratic values, and insistently repeated his pro-EU and NATO vision for Turkey (US Department of State:2002; Vick: 2002). Therefore, the JDP was very well received by governments, policymakers and institutions in the Western World, and the post-Islamist party was supported both politically and economically.

As discussed in chapter three and chapter four; the founding fathers of the Republic envisaged creating a model of a modern nation-state through which they could Westernise Turkish

society by a top-down westernisation project. "To reach the level of contemporary civilisations", a motto found voice in Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's idealisations, was set forth as a primary target for the political cultural and economic revolution which had launched in 1923. It was, undoubtedly, the Western Civilisation and the developed European countries which were aspired after by the term "contemporary civilisations". In this sense, Turkey's "European dream" has been a path-dependent ideal which has been perpetuated by all governments since the very beginning of the Republic. While Turkey has been seeking economic, political, cultural and social gains in the EU candidacy project; there has been a common expectation in some influential policy-making circles in Europe that Turkey's prospective membership in the club could make it a much more powerful global power both in the Middle East and at the macro-level, along with minimising security risks of the Union in many aspects (Alaranta, 2015, p.9).

Turkey's zeal in its European adventure took an official status when six European states founded the European Economic Community, the forerunner of the EU. Just after the foundation of the Community, Turkey applied for accession in 1959. Turkey's application was accepted four decades later, and it was recognised as a candidate state after the Helsinki Summit of the Union in 1999.[127] Therefore, the candidacy process had already been initiated by the then governments before the JDP has come into power. The reason of such a long delay ought to be sought in the fact that the applicant country has been lack of the democratic maturity that the club has regarded as essential for a prospective membership. As any country that targets to be a member state; Turkey has been obliged to fulfil requirements which were made essential by the European Commission. Thereupon, it has been stipulated to develop and demonstrate: "Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; the ability to take on and implement the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union effectively." (Copenhagen European Council, 1993). The membership criteria, a compendium of the European democratic acquisitions throughout centuries, have imposed on the elected bodies to dismantle existing authoritarian and tutelary institutions, and enforce new rules and norms which could pave the way for a plural democracy in Turkey. To put it another way; Turkish civilians have been invited to revolutionise the founding

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[127] For conditions of the EU membership; see: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en.

philosophy of the Republic which has given the "guardian" role to the military, and obliterate all rules and norms developed and shored up after each coup d'état since 1960 if they aspire to integrate Turkey into the European democracy. As an external determinant, this invitation was, in fact, a turning point for Erdogan and his associates through which they would implement their agenda to challenge the balance of power established by the founding philosophy of the secular-nationalist regime and clinched by the subsequent four military interventions.

7.3 "Layering" or a Hidden Struggle for Power

The November 3, 2002 Election was a first in Turkish politics in that an Islamist-rooted party won a landslide victory. Turkey's secular establishment, which was then under the guardianship of the military faced, beyond dispute, the greatest challenge since its foundation, though the JDP leadership continually declared its commitment to secularism and the founding principles of the Turkish state. However, there was no doubt in the military circles that the ultimate goal of the new post-Islamist party[128] would be to change the codes of the Kemalist state and the party would become the greatest challenge to secularism. The rise of that "danger" was only a matter of time and extent, the generals believed (Jenkins, 2006, p.185). What forced the military to be patient in this new political environment was the broad popular support for the JDP government and the European project which has been identified with the "level of contemporary civilisations" by a large majority of the public. General Ozkok, then Chief of the General Staff, said that the military would respect the election results. However, this state of non-intervention lasted only two months. After the monthly generals-dominated National Security Council[129] (NSC) meeting in January 2003, General Ozkok openly castigated the JDP government by accusing it of encouraging anti-secular circles because two civilian members of the Council, the prime minister and minister of national defence, had tried to obstruct expulsion of seven officers for the alleged Islamist links and activities. In the same speech to the journalists, General Ozkok said that: "The military should not be expected to tolerate the use of ...the headscarf, as a symbol and action aimed at eroding the republican traditions"[130]. This early warning, no doubt, was "a shot across the

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[128] For an insightful analysis on the post-Islamism in Turkey; see: Dagi, I. (2013). "*Post-Islamism à la Turca* ", in *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*, Bayat, A. Oxford University Press: New York
[129] See chapter four and chapter six, for the role of the National Security Council in Turkish politics.
[130] For the continuity in political discourses of Turkish generals over the decades; see chapter six.

bows" to remind the JDP of its limited place within the status quo (Dymond: 2003), which was another repercussion of the institutionalised military dominance in politics through the military interventions. Despite his open anti-JDP stance, General Ozkok was criticised by his inferiors for not taking more concrete steps against the government. It was also reported that some top generals secretly come together to develop a strategy against the government that would be something beyond talking (Jenkins, 2009: p.38). As will be analysed in the following sections, this methodological split between the generals would be an important factor which weakened the institutional power against the civilian government.

Under the afore-mentioned menacing atmosphere, the JDP pursued a pragmatic but allowable path in the political game as it was well aware of the fate of its predecessors who had incurred the wrath of the military many times. The JDP's well-established pragmatic strategy can be analysed through the "Theory of Gradual Institutional Change". As analysed in chapter two and chapter five, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) developed four modal types to analyse gradual institutional change. Based on the answer about the locus of institutional transformation, they suggest the following concepts to explain modes of institutional change in the Historical Institutionalist School:

> "1**.** Displacement: The removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones, 2. Layering: The introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones, 3.Drift: The changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment, 4.Conversion: The changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic redeployment(Mahoney&Thelen, 2010, pp.15-16).

During this process, which could be delineated as a very successful example of "layering"[131], due to the fact that it had not enough potency to challenge and change the whole tutelary system under the military scrutiny, the JDP ventured forth to enforce new rules, revisions and amendments to existing ones. "Processes of layering often take place when institutional challengers lack the capacity to actually change the original rules (or, as in displacement, to set up an explicit alternative institution or system). They instead work within the existing system by adding new rules on top of or alongside old ones. While defenders of the status quo may be able to preserve the original rules, they are unable to prevent the introduction of amendments and modifications. Each new element may be a small change in itself, yet these

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[131] For a masterful analysis of "layering" and other modes of transformation in the gradual institutional change; see: (Mahoney&Thelen, 2010).

small changes can accumulate, leading to a big change over the long run." (Mahoney&Thelen, 2010, pp.16-17).

Within the *status-quo* perpetuated by the military-made constitution, the generals-dominated NSC and the Supreme Military Council, the Military Internal Service Code[132], the institution of compulsory military service, and other rules and norms which were analysed in the previous chapters; the party added new rules on top of and alongside the old ones thanks to the growing societal and international support. As will be analysed in the following sections; these new regulations produced considerable institutional accelerators in the short run through which the JDP would be able to wage an open fight against the military that engineered the collapse of the generals' supremacy in less than a decade.

A method the JDP followed during this layering process was procrastinating the decisions taken by the National Security Council. While Erdogan was implementing the EU-sponsored reform programme in the new political environment aiming at reducing the power of the military in politics, he was also pursuing an agenda to pave the way for Islamisation of the state and society[133] by supporting the growing religious movements and orders. To that end, Islamic groups were provided with unprecedented financial support and other state opportunities to transform the secular and nationalist characteristics of the Republic against the objection of the generals. For instance, in its monthly meeting in August 2004; the generals-dominated National Security Council urged the government to take serious measures against the Gulen organisation[134], an Islamic group once the JDP's closest ally which later turned into a number one foe since 2014 as a result of the power struggle between the two after Erdogan robustly strengthened his position over politics. According to the Council Resolution (number 48): "The Gulen group's domestic and foreign activities should be closely monitored through the intermediation of the Interior Ministry, Foreign Ministry, National Intelligence Agency and other relevant bodies under the coordination of the Prime Ministerial Implementation Monitoring and Coordination Board... and the government ought to take necessary steps against the Group" (Kucukkaya, 2018). Although Prime Minister Erdogan and other civilian members of the Council signed on; his government had not implemented the resolution and shelved it until the Gulen organisation became a nemesis in late 2013.

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[132] As discussed in chapter six; Article 35 of this code granted the military to intervene in politics through formal ways.
[133] For Erdogan's "pious generation" project, see: (Lukuslu, 2016)
[134] The greatest ally of the Erdogan governments until late 2013, the Gulenists' clandestine activities within the military and other state institutions ought to be studied as a separate project in terms of their impact on civil-military relations in Turkey.

As a *sine-qua-non* of the EU candidacy process; the institutional transformation was fulfilled through "harmonisation packages"[135]. These were a collection of amendments to various legal arrangements, which were ratified by the Parliament. The packages were approved by supermajority support in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Such support was valid evidence of a broader socio-political consensus on demand for a change. One of the primary goals of the government was to reduce the power of the NSC, an executive body which has operated as the epicentre of the military tutelage upon the elected governments. This major step was also seen as the fundamental threshold of a European level of democratic civil-military relations. Within this context; because the National Security Council[136] has been a constitutional institution since 1961; the government drafted amendments regarding the related rules of the 1982 Constitution Act. As discussed in chapter four, according to Article 118 of the Constitution; "the NSC 'submitted' its views to the Council of Ministers and ensured the necessary conditions regarding the formulation, establishment, and implementation of state's security policy. Besides, the 1982 Constitution added another paragraph to the article which stated that the Council of Ministers 'primarily considered' the decisions of the NSC concerning the measures that 'it deemed necessary' for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state; the integrity and indivisibility of the country; and the peace and security of society." (Kaynar Kars, 2018, p.461).

As could be deduced from the letter and spirit of Article 118; to reduce the power of the generals-dominated NSC would mean restructuring the balance of power in the civilians' favour, which was a new and radical reinterpretation of the power distribution among the institutions of Turkey. As a follow-up regulation to the "harmonisation packages" which was started to be promulgated in 2001, the EU-encouraged transformation process focused on changes to the authority, functions, and structure of the National Security Council. In July 2003, the NSC was reduced to an advisory body to the cabinet. According to the new law, the Council convenes every two months, instead of on a monthly meeting-basis. Until that date, the Chief of General Staff had been given the power to offer a candidate for the secretariat general of the council; the regulation evoked this power and appointment of the secretary general was given to the authority of prime minister and approval of the president. It was not

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[135] The Harmonisation Packages included a general democratisation programme in compliance with the EU acquis. This chapter only discussed the legal-constitutional changes regarding civil-military relations and civilian oversight of the military. For a full explanation of the political reforms and harmonisation packages in Turkey throughout the EU candidacy process, see: (Foreign Affairs Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2007)

[136] For the legal-constitutional position of the National Security Council within the Turkish state structure, and role of it on politics, see; chapter four and six.

possible to appoint a civilian to the post but only a full-general; the new law made it open to the civilians. Thus, the first civilian secretary-general of the NSC set to work in 2004.

As discussed in chapter four, the General Secretariat of the NSC was institutionalised as an officers-dominated state agency through which the military could implement all decisions taken by the council and supervise whether the civilian and all other public enterprises abide by those decisions[137]. A private department was established within the agency with the power of conducting "psychological operations" upon the society by force of decisions and policies of the NSC. The EU-inspired process paved the way for abrogating some powers of the general secretariat. To this end, the agency would no longer request information from the civilian institutions, and it shall not be able to inspect and supervise the implementation of the NSC decisions by the government bodies and other civilian institutions. The new regulation stipulated that the general secretariat would no longer conduct "psychological operations" and those units of the institution that had been authorised for such purposes were abolished. In parallel with the civilianisation of the office of general secretariat; the proportion of civilian staff in the institution was increased. To terminate the fiscal autonomy of the NSC, its budget was put under the control of the prime ministry (Gursoy, 2011, p.295).

In May 2004, the right given to the general staff to assign representatives to the Council of Higher Education and the High Audio-Visual Board was repealed. Along the same line, the authority given to the NSC to appoint a representative to the Protection of Minors from Sexually Explicit Materials Board was cancelled. By the abolition of the State Security Courts, the military's authority to judge non-military persons in courts-martial was reduced. Though it could not be possible to use it during the early years owing to strong veto powers of the senior generals at that time, the Court of Audit was entrusted with authority on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to supervise the military budget and state properties owned by the military. Discussing the bills regarding national security, public order, foreign policy, military affairs and other high-politics issues in the NSC before they were sent to the Parliament was a norm until that term; but, throughout the reform process, the JDP bypassed the NSC and submitted the bills to the Parliament directly (Aknur, 2013, pp.136-137).

The JDP's increasing voting rate at each election during this period is mounting evidence of the public support to the implementation of the "harmonisation packages" in collaboration with the EU. The new political environment provided the Islamist government most

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[137] See the Law on National Security Council and General Secretariat of the National Security Council (Law No: 2945)

influential instruments to realise the "layering process" to downgrade the power of the military.

Though the senior staff of the military did not publicly deny or oppose the reform process implemented throughout the EU candidacy process; there was a massive uneasiness in the military headquarters with the JDP policies, and informal resistance against the EU reformation process led by the Islamist-rooted government. In May 2003, Turkey's oldest and most established secular newspaper Cumhuriyet[138] announced that "young officers within the military are increasingly uncomfortable with the actions and policies of the government". It was also reported that General Ozkok sternly warned Prime Minister Erdogan about the young officers who were uneasy with the JDP in a secret meeting. Similar to the headlines announced before the consecutive military interventions which were analysed in the previous chapter, the discourse presented in the newspaper caused a new wave of high-tension in Turkish politics. The day after, Chief of Staff General Ozkok disclaimed the news about "the young officers" by saying that "it is not only the 'young officers', but everyone else in uniform, who is feeling uncomfortable" (Gorvett, 2003).

In this regard, General Ozkok's testimony as a witness as part of the Ergenekon cases presents an explanatory sample of the Turkish officers' political mood during the early 2000s. In his statements, he said that some high-ranking generals offered him to react more strongly and take direct actions against the government during his tenure; but he took side with democracy[139]. In the last instance, the generals did not resort to the notorious Article 35 of the Military Internal Service Code that had been used as the legal basis for the previous military interventions, as long as the JDP did not directly attempt to change secular-nationalist characteristics of the Republic and territorial integrity of the state (Laranta, 2015, p.5). Nevertheless, it was also reported that there were clandestine groups within the military which were established with the aim of overthrowing the JDP government. These matters will be analysed in section four.

In order to comprehend the changing nature of the Turkish civil-military relations during the early years of the new century, it is vital to mull over why the powerful military preferred to take a controlled and passive stance against the JDP despite the party's pursuit of systematic political deactivation process against the military. Primarily, the growing electoral support for the JDP was enhanced by the economic recovery in a few years after the chaotic economic collapse of the late 1990s and early 2000s. In three consecutive parliamentary elections held

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[138] May 23, 2003
[139] For the full statement; see: (Agos Daily, 3 August 2012)

between 2002 and 2011, the party won 34,3%, 46,7% and 49,8% of the votes (YSK:2020) respectively, which none of the other political parties could manage to win in the history of the multi-party era. The reformation process also stimulated the flow of the cross-border investments into Turkey through which the JDP was able to make the economy better and perpetuate its international legitimacy against the domestic adversaries. There was not any other promising political opposition inside or outside of the parliament that could form an alternative government, which the military might support. In parallel with the ever-growing support for the ruling party, there was extensive public support in that period for Turkey's EU membership that can be interpreted as a confirmation of the reform programme implemented by the government. For instance, according to a survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund; 73% of Turks supported the EU membership in 2004 (German Marshal Fund, 2006, p. 19). As the modernising power and the most Western-oriented institution which Ataturk pinned his faith upon it on the way of founding a modern-secular state; any attempt to veto the EU candidacy would have been a contradiction in itself for the military. It also would have been interpreted as a clash with the will of nation on which the military have perpetuated its popular support. As a result of this potent combination of inhibiting practical, ideological and electoral force; while the generals, defenders of the status quo, were able to maintain the conventional place of the military within the system; they were unable to hinder the introduction of the new rule-making process that would transform the balance of power in Turkey.

The bewildered secular generals of the Turkish military had never come up against such a systemic but sneaky challenge dared by a civilian government and they resorted to informal mechanisms to preserve their political influence on national and foreign politics. The most common types of these informal mechanisms were press briefings and declarations, public speeches at formal ceremonies and informal programs organised by secular groups, and special interviews with some "confidential" journalists in the printed media. Through these politicised mechanisms, the commanders endeavoured to minimise the transformative effect of the JDP and the EU alliance that focused on a gradual change in the balance of power in Turkey through a patient and calculated process of "layering" institutional relationships.

In commemorations and anniversary programs across the country and graduation ceremonies at the military training institutions; the commanders lambasted several JDP policies on the grounds that the party targeted secular and nationalist characteristics of the state. A review of

the printed dailies[140] in this era reveals how the JDP government was forced to step back in some anti-secular policy preferences especially focused on the higher education and the state-society relations. For instance, though it had been an ever-lasting dream of all Islamist policymakers to abolish the legal barriers against the headscarves in the universities and public spaces; the JDP could not achieve these much-desired goals in its first era as a result of the active objection of the generals both in formal and informal environments. Similarly, the military regulations which had denied graduates of vocational religious schools*(imam-hatip* schools*)* to entering into military high schools and war colleges; and the discriminative bylaw which had made entering into universities much harder for those graduated from the vocational religious schools remained in force during the initial years of the JDP government (Aknur, 2013, p.137).

In his 14-pages inaugural speech of the opening of the 2006-2007 academic year at the Turkish War Colleges Command; General Staff Buyukanit warned the public of increasing Islamist Fundamentalism. The general's speech was a direct response to Prime Minister Erdogan who had asserted that there was no anti-secular threat in Turkey a few days before that event. General Buyukanit said that 'Are there not those who take every possible opportunity to cry out, 'Let us redefine secularism!'? Don't these same people occupy the highest levels of government? Isn't [it true that] the great founder of our republic, Ataturk, and the mentality he put into place, as well as the basic principles of the regime of our republic, are under attack? Are there not those who grab every chance they get to chip away and wear down the Turkish Armed Forces? Are there not elements that want to destroy our societal structure, and drag our people back into anachronistic ways? If you cannot answer all these questions with a 'no' and say 'these things do not happen in Turkey,' then yes, there is the threat of religious fundamentalism in Turkey, and we must do everything we can to fight it'...The government has been encouraging Islamic fundamentalism." (The Memri, 2006).

As can be deduced from other political speeches delivered by the generals; although a great deal of legal-constitutional regulations had been made in civil-military relations since the very beginning of the 2000s; the generals' menacing and depreciative discourse against the civilians did not change throughout the first period of the JDP government at all. They pursued similar approaches of defending entrenched positions on Turkey's other long-standing problems such as the Kurdish Question, the Minorities Issue, and the Cyprus

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[140] See Cumhuriyet and Milliyet Dailies for the term between 2003 and 2007.

debates. During this process, some retired but influential military figures supported their colleagues on duty by delivering harsh political speeches against the government[141]. In this regard, military leaders of the early 2000s were in an absolute continuity of discourse and mindset with their predecessors who were analysed in chapter six.

In the hidden struggle for preserving the *status quo*, the generals were not able to prevent the introduction of the amendments mentioned above and modifications by their classical and formal veto powers. An outcome of the new political environment, the erosive impact of the "layering" process over the military dispatched the officer-corps to use the informal instruments in a more frequent and tougher manner to regain the control of the system and public support.

7.4 A Prelude to the "Displacement" Process: Is the "Guardian" Dying?

The inevitable open conflict between the military and the JDP erupted at a time when the tenure of President Ahmet N. Sezer, a staunch secularist and a close ally of the military who was the former head of the Constitutional Court, was coming to an end. What brought the tension between the two institutions to a critical threshold was the fact that the ruling party was already holding an overwhelming majority in the Parliament which was needed to elect the new president. In fact, Erdogan himself, then the prime minister, was passionate about becoming the new president. However, it was not an easy task to announce his candidacy against a very imminent veto of the military though he had been enjoying ever-increasing popularity and power.

A first-hand statement once again refuted Erdogan's "we have harmonious relations with our military" policy and discourse just ten days before the presidential election. In a press conference held in the military headquarters, General Buyukanit described an "acceptable profile" of the prospective president: "We believe in that a person who is faithful to the Republican regime not in words but in deeds must be elected as president...We hope..." (Colasan, 2007). This statement was made in a political atmosphere in which Prime Minister Erdogan was seen as the most powerful candidate, and many interpreted the statement as the

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[141] For General Hursit Tolon's speech, who then newly retired from the First Army Commandership in 2006, on Secularism, Kurdish Question, Turkey-EU Relations, Armenian Problem and Cyprus Issue; see: (Cankus, September 10, 2006, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/emekli-orgeneral-tolon-turkiye-irtica-ve-bolunme-tehdidi-altinda-5350306).

rejection of Erdogan's candidacy. However, Erdogan and a group of leading figures of the JDP construed the general's declaration as "sensible" and "constructive" (Cizre: 2008, p.149; Colasan: 2007), and continued to pretend not to see the military's rage against them. Nonetheless, the opposition from military leaders forced Erdogan to postpone his presidential dreams to another time. General Buyukanit's statement is, therefore, one of the most influential examples of the informal mechanisms actuated by the military functioned as a catalyst which deepened the political crisis between the military and the government.

The presidential election crisis of 2007 can be interpreted as an unprecedented struggle between the old guardian of the system and the avid civilians for having and holding a critical institution through which they can implement their political agendas and outmanoeuvre in politics. It would constitute a critical, historical juncture which harboured unintended consequences over Turkey's balance of power shaking the foundational philosophy of the secular Republic in the near future.

A few days after the press conference held in the headquarters, the military made its most severe intervention in politics since the "post-modern coup" 28 February 1997[142]. The subtle clash between Turkey's most established institution and the power-hungry government turned into a pitched battle when General Staff Buyukanit issued an "e-memorandum" against the ruling JDP in a midnight ultimatum. Through one of its most preferred informal mechanisms at that period; General Buyukanit released a vitriolic e-statement on the official website of the military against the JDP policies and its Islamist-rooted candidate who would most likely be elected as the new president of the Republic in the 2007 elections. What made this midnight "e-memorandum" historic in terms of Turkish civil-military relations was that the military explicitly declared that it would defend the country's secularism if an Islamist politician were to be elected as the president. Much more wrathful compared to the previous statements, the General Staff declared on behalf of the Turkish Armed Forces that:

> "It is observed that some circles who have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, have escalated their efforts recently. Those activities include requests for a redefinition of fundamental values and attempts to organise alternative celebrations instead of our national festivals symbolizing unity and solidarity of our nation. Those who carry out

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[142] See chapter six.

the mentioned activities which have turned into an open challenge against the state do not refrain from exploiting holy religious feelings of our people, and they try to hide their real aims under the guise of religion. An important part of these activities was done with the permission and within the knowledge of administrative authorities, who were supposed to intervene and prevent such incidents, a fact which intensifies the gravity of the issue. This fundamentalist understanding, which is anti-republic and harbours no aim other than eroding the basic characteristics of the state, finds courage in recent developments and discourses and extends the scope of its activities. Developments in our region give numerous examples that playing on religion and manipulating the faith into a political discourse can cause disasters. There are accounts in our country and abroad that a political discourse or an ideology can destroy the faith itself and turn it into something else when it is imposed on faith... Doubtlessly, the sole condition for the Republic of Turkey to live in peace and stability as a contemporary democracy is through defending the basic characteristics of our state which are defined in the Constitution. The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments and absolute defender of secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely opposed to those arguments and negative comments. It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary. Those who are opposed to Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's understanding 'How happy is the one who says I am a Turk' are enemies of the Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute." (Turkish Armed Forces General Staff: 2007, www.tsk.tr)[143]

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[143] English version of the statement was quoted by the official Anatolia News Agency (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602775.stm , last visited on 23 July 2018). The ultimatum was withdrawn from the official web-site of the military in 2011(T24, 2011) when the JDP became more powerful and could manage to appoint a general, Necdet Ozel, to the military leadership who worked almost completely in line with the civilian government's policies (Cagaptay, 2014, p.53).

It is possible to say that there were two planned targets of the e-ultimatum when the discourse of Buyukanit's e-ultimatum, the memorandums[144] of the 1971 and 1997, which were forced the then governments to resign, and the mindset of the officer-corps, considered: To halt the expansion of the civilian "layering" in the balance of power by an open threat, and to prepare the political environment for an outright intervention if not the government retreats and obeys the rules and norms of the *status quo*. In this critical juncture, however, the government's unexpected challenge to the ultimatum has created a new stickiness of the gradual change in civil-military relations that would expedite the erosion of the military tutelage.

In the first place, contrary to the expectations, the government did not resign in the aftermath of such a verbal mutiny as its predecessors had done in 1971 and 1997, respectively[145]. Instead, it rejected the e-ultimatum. Indeed, this was a norm-breaking stance against the coercive power of the military which none of the former civilians had dared to do. Although the government did not make any attempt to dismiss any member of the higher echelons who supported the statement; it described the "e-memorandum" as "inappropriate". In a counterstatement, the government rejected accusations and declared that: "The General Staff is an establishment under the Prime Minister's Office. It would be inconceivable if the General Staff in a democracy upholding the rule of law made a statement critical of the government about any issue..." (Migdalowitz, 2007, p.3).

During the same period, the government also accused the military of influencing members of the Constitutional Court that would decide on current or prospective lawsuits against the party and the presidential election process. (Migdalowitz, 2007, pp.3-4). As analysed in chapter six, the party closure articles of the constitutions functioned as a systemic reaction of the secular-nationalist establishment through the Constitutional Court, an output of the 1960 intervention, against the Islamist and pro-Kurdish parties. All the JDP predecessors were shut down by the Constitutional Court, and leaders of the Islamist tradition were banned from politics for many years. In this regard, the closure cases had served as one of the most impactful veto mechanisms of the status quo spearheaded by the military. However, this time, both the military ultimatum and the closure case against the ruling party that would be commenced in the following year were foiled by the JDP's decision to go for a snap election in July 2007.

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[144] See chapter six.
[145] See chapter six.

During the presidential election crisis which turned into a political turmoil after the "e-memorandum"; the EU provided strong support to the JDP. The Union accused the military of manipulating the presidential elections and of intervening in politics. Since the very beginning of Turkey-EU relations which dates back to the 1950s; this was one of the toughest stances against the military that the EU had adopted. The EU pressed the military for respecting "the rules of the democratic game and its own role in that democratic game." (Independent Commission on Turkey, 2009, pp.14-16) There is no doubt that the EU's continuing support for the JDP was coming from its confidence in the latter's then clear and unambiguous pledges on democratising Turkey. It would also have been to the benefit of the EU to have a democratic partner in the greater Middle East region. However, Prime Minister Erdogan, a pragmatic and populist politician who comes from an authoritarian and staunch Islamist background with nationalist leanings, signalled that he would not keep his promises in the pluralistic and inclusionary governance he had vowed multiple times when he had founded his JDP. Some of those signals occurred throughout the presidential election crisis when he turned a deaf ear to the concerns of various segments of the society. In such a way that, neither did he consult who to be the presidential nominee nor did he deem a comprehensive parliamentary or public debate necessary concerning amendment of Constitutional regulations which were hampering election of his candidate. Erdogan's self-oriented approach led to an increasing criticism that he was amending the existing rules not for improving democracy but owing to the fact that he had not been able to realise his personal agenda under the old system (Migdalowitz, 2007, p.8).

In retrospect, it is possible to criticise the internal and external democratising factors that continued to support Erdogan at that time though he showed some indications regarding his real agenda. However, the flow of the history between the most powerful institution and the civilians in that period witnessed an unprecedented challenge by the latter that such a defiance "for the sake of democracy" was unimaginable even three years ago in Turkey. As the acquisitions gained between 2002 and 2007 thanks to electoral support and the EU process were so promising for a democratic Turkey in the near future that many internal and external observers could not even notice and or tolerated Erdogan's initial deviations from his promises on the EU-sponsored democratic reformation by comparing the cost of the military tutelage over the system for the decades.

Erdogan's authoritarian resurrection, beyond doubt, did not discomfort his Islamist and conservative supporters. On the contrary, they who had been "losers" of the old regime now were becoming "winners" of the "New Turkey"[146]. To them, Erdogan is a "man of the people" and a "religious and political hero" who has been changing the people's destiny. The JDP's relative economic success during its early periods had played an important role in the strengthening electoral support. However, it is also necessary to pay attention to the ideological motivations that held the pious, conservative, and mainly less educated but also some well-educated segments with less income, urban and rural communities together. As analysed in chapter four; these groups were among those who were excluded by the founding philosophy that had shaped the nation-state in 1923. The "others" of the old regime, most of these groups were now regarding Erdogan as the long-awaited leader who could eventually change their bad fate. Those "others" of the status quo who now have started to make the most of the state opportunities have fiercely supported the "layering" process which has triggered the transformation of the balance of power in Turkey. More importantly, Islamist supporters of the JDP enshrined Edorgan in the belief that he would make Islam dominant over Turkey again, "which had been made a pariah by the Kemalist Revolution"[147]. This cognitive transformation in parallel with the increasing power of the JDP is among the most influential determinants that have made the change in the balance of power possible in Turkey.

In parallel with his growing power, Erdogan succeeded in creating his own partisan media groups through which he could perpetually indoctrinate large masses[148] and manipulate the public opinion for various political aims. His influence over the media has enhanced in parallel with the "layering" process. Some changes in the media had already started in 2004 by administrative and legal actions against a controversial conglomerate that paved the way for pro-Erdogan handovers of its media outlets (The New York Times: 2004). Erdogan was provided with full support by the Gulen[149]-linked, liberal and conservative media outlets

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[146] "The New Turkey" is a term invented by Erdogan to idealise his perspectives and policies on changing Turkey. For a critical analysis on the "New Turkey"; see: (Lerner, 2018).

[147] In the 1960s, one of the most respected ideologues and poets of the Islamist circles whom Erdogan frequently recites his poems at the party meetings, Necip Fazil Kisakurek described statutes of the Muslims in Turkey in one of his poems as "in your own country, you are unfortunate; in your own fatherland, you are a pariah..." (Kisakurek, 1969).

[148] Today, more than 90 % of printed and visual media is being controlled by the partisan businessmen who owe their fortunes to Erdogan. It is almost impossible to give a headline in Turkey, which may upset the President.

[149] US-based reclusive cleric, Fethullah Gulen's community was one of the closest allies of the JDP since the very beginning of the party's foundation in 2002. The community provided Erdogan with social, intellectual, human capital and media support. In return, the group was given an informal credit to form a substantial

during the transformation process, which profoundly impact the public perception against the military tutelage. This influence has paved the way for a remarkable erosion in the traditional public support for the military. According to a survey published in 2009, trust in the military plummeted from 90% to 63.4% (Duzel, 2010), a historically low record never seen before.

The suppression against the journalists has gradually increased since the "layering" process evolved into a "pro-displacement" phase in parallel with Erdogan's growing dominance, which will be analysed in the following section. Once Erdogan's closest ally against the secular generals, all Gulen-linked and some liberal media outlets were seized by the government as a result of the power struggle after defeating the military tutelage, "the common enemy".

The snap election declared against the military's e-memorandum and the constitutional amendment referendum which was held as a result of the conflict between the ruling party and the secular circles brought landslide victories for the JDP in the second half of 2007. For the first time since the inception of the multi-party system in Turkey, a political party which declared an explicit challenge to the military, the owner of the status quo, was winning elections with ever-increasing rates. Erdogan's party gained 46.66% of the total votes in the snap election, and the constitutional amendments were approved by a 68.85% majority, respectively. These results have had a profound and transformative effect on civil-military relations. First of all, for the first time, Abdullah Gul, an Islamist-rooted politician who was the second man in the party after Erodagan, became the president of Turkey in defiance of the military's e-memorandum. This was a massive loss for the military as the office of the president had been a strategic ally in maintaining the secular and Kemalist status quo.

As addressed in chapter four and chapter six; the executions of then Prime Minister Menderes and two other ministers by the junta which staged the coup d'état on 27 May 1960 had created an internal mechanism of a self-censorship which restrained the civilians from disputing with the military that might eventually cost the former's lives. Erdogan's latest political triumphs over the military in 2007 have shaken this cognitive reign of fear among the civilians. Secondly, the new era in which Erdogan had deigned the presidential candidacy to his

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presence in the state apparatus, which was then instrumented to weaken their common enemies, the secular military and establishment. From the same socio-cultural backgrounds, the two allies turned into permanent enemies after the Gulenists accused Erdogan and his close circle of war crimes and gross corruption after 2011. In response to these, Erdogan has accused the Gulenists of staging coup against the government, declared the group as the most dangerous enemy of the state and has launched a relentless war against his once the closest ally.

"brother" Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul has been a clear sign of his becoming the new "king-maker" of Turkey. Simultaneously, he was also becoming the only "owner" of the JDP, a party which had been cooperatively founded by mostly Islamists, conservatives, and some liberal politicians. It is possible to say that these major victories provided Erdogan with taking full control of the party and warding presumptive opponents within the party off in the short and midterms. The exclusion of the party's leading founders in the following years would reach such a point that two of the most influential figures of the movement, former President Abdullah Gul and Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc would be accused of treason since they had not shown full obedience in a manner which Erdogan anticipated. Therefore, the civilianisation or normalisation of Turkish civil-military relations during that term did not follow an institutional path but mostly an idiosyncratic evolution shaped by the ever-rising political power of Erdogan. Last but not least; after losing some of its significant formal powers throughout the EU candidacy process, the military also consumed influential usage of its informal veto mechanisms as a result of the JDP's presidential challenge against the e-memorandum in April 2007.

The increasing Islamisation of politics and political domain has paved the way for normative and socio-cultural transformation undermining the societal basis of the military dominance. Therefore, what became a permanent disquiet for the generals was losing extensive public support which was one of the major components of the military's legitimacy[150]. The snap elections and constitutional referendum were to be seen as a litmus test measuring the electorate's approval rate of the military's political interventions through informal veto mechanisms during the presidential election period. The electoral results clearly showed the electorate rejecting the military intervention.

Following Mahoney and Thelen's gradual institutional change theory, it is possible to say that the JDP completed the "layering" period in which it abolished some old regulations and customs and introduced new rules on top of and alongside the existing ones which had shaped the fundamentals of civil-military relations in Turkey. However, this layering process did not wholly dissolve the military's deep-rooted political power. It brought a substantial change to the power distribution between the generals and the civilians because these amendments have started to transform "the logic of the stable reproduction of the original core" (Mahoney and Thelen: 2009, pp.15-16). It is possible to assert that the critical juncture created by the

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[150] See chapter four.

presidential election process ended up on a path where the military would incur an unthinkable loss of power which might put an end the military dominance in politics.

7.5 "Coup Trials": Demolishing the Military Tutelage or Perpetuating the Turkish Authoritarianism in a Civilian Form

The transformation triggered by the JDP with the support of the external factors has created a new balance of power in which the military tutelage has been shaken off its foundations. As analysed in the previous chapter, the presidential crisis which was exacerbated by the two military informal mechanisms paved the way for a critical juncture in which the civilians repulsed the military's attempts of intervention in politics. However, as Acemoglu and Robinson incisively analysed: "There should be no presumption that any critical juncture will lead to a successful political revolution or change for the better. History is full of examples of revolutions and radical movements replacing one tyranny with another, in a pattern that the German sociologist Robert Michels dubbed the iron law of oligarchy[151], a particularly pernicious form of the vicious circle." (Acemoglu&Robinson, 2013, pp.111-113). For instance, "The end of colonialism in the decades of following the Second World War created critical junctures for many former colonies. However, in most cases in sub-Saharan Africa and many in Asia, the post-independence governments simply took a page out of Robert Michel's book and repeated and intensified the abuses of their predecessors, often severely narrowing the distribution of political power, dismantling constrains, and undermining the already meagre incentives that economic institutions provided for investment and economic progress" (Acemoglu&Robinson, 2013, pp.111-113). As I shall bring forward in this section; though the critical juncture which occurred during the presidential election in 2007 has gradually weakened the military dominance in politics, it has not paved the way for a democratisation in civil-military relations in compliance with the EU norms. On the other hand, while the critical juncture provided the politicians with enough power to civilianise Turkey's security sector in the short term; it has caused a de-institutionalisation process in the mid-term in which Turkey's then Prime Minister Erdogan has incrementally built his own one-man regime where once mighty generals served him to clinch his autocratic hegemony[152].

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[151] With the "Iron Law of Oligarchy", Michel refers to the intrinsic tendency of all complicated social institutions to turn bureaucratic and highly undemocratic organisation. In his well-known study, Michel's analyses how even the left-wing parties of the Western Europe in the pre-World War I era which were formally committed to mass democracy, pluralism, and equality within their organisational structure, inclined to become de facto oligarchies. For a detailed insight on the Iron Law of Oligarchy"; see: (Gale, 2008)

[152] Since the "mid-term" process is out of the scope of this study; it shall not be analysed here.

In other words, as will be witnessed in the following decade, which is beyond the scope of this study, through the "layering" process and de-institutionalisation of the military tutelage Erdogan has supplanted the generals and reproduced the state autocracy in a civilian form.

As analysed above, breaking the hegemony of the military in politics did not happen abruptly. In other words, the displacement[153] of the military tutelage took place gradually and in two major steps. In the first place, as analysed in the previous sections; throughout the period between 2002 and 2007, the JDP under Erdogan leveraged all internal and external opportunities and gains for enhancing its power in order to touch the untouchable issues that the Kemalist legacy had designed. During such a tough and jeopardous process, the JDP did not directly target the military. Contrarily, it pursued a path which claimed to be "in harmony with the armed forces" even under the circumstances which the generals publicly castigated it. The reason of such a passive and pragmatic approach, by no means, was that the JDP was well aware of the military's veto mechanisms and punitive capabilities at that time. It asserted that to launch an open fight against the most powerful institution of the country before attaining enough power would be disastrous for it. The legal amendments for the EU candidacy, the ever-increasing public support and Erdogan's successes in defeating the military's threats during the presidential election process provided him with enough power to declare an open war against the military.

In the second stage, an unprecedented judicial process was initiated against hundreds of leading secular civilian figures and active and retired officers. They were accused of participating in chaos plans to justify overthrowing the JDP government. During that period, Erdogan did not have enough qualified cadres in the Turkish bureaucracy, coming from his own Islamist sect, National View (or Outlook, *Milli Gorus*), who could manage to implement his anti-military policies. Therefore, it is widely believed that high-ranking Gulen-linked bureaucrats in the police, military, intelligence, and judiciary were Erdogan's closest comrades in planning and implementing strategies against the secular generals and establishment (Basaran, 2017, pp.59-61).

On 13 June 2007, just a few weeks after the e-memorandum, an empty slum on the Asian side of Istanbul was busted by the Turkish police upon an anonymous tip alleging that some illegal ammunition including C4 explosives and grenades had been hidden under the roof of the

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[153] For an elucidative analysis on the gradual institutional change and "displacement"; see: (Mahoney&Thelen, 2010, pp.15-18)

building[154]. The police found 27 grenades, fuses, and TNT moulds in the premises, and detained an ex-NCO and a retired army captain respectively, based on the statements of the tenants and other related persons. Due to similar reasons that these were hiding illegal weapons and ammunition including more than 10 kilos of explosives in his house in the Western Anatolia; a retired major, Fikret Emek was arrested in late June 2007. After the first arrests, the police continued to fulfil multiple warrants of detention across Turkey issued by the Chief Public Prosecutor Office of Istanbul. Not only active or retired soldiers were detained; but also, some ultra-nationalist civilians were taken into custody as part of the same investigation. Among them, there were businessmen, leading figures of nationalist organisations and journalists. The detentions were welcomed by the pro-government media. Just after the investigation had been launched, the pro-government media started to publish "disclosures" on every detail regarding the elements of the investigation (Jenkins: 2009, p.37). The salient point in those publications was that it would not have been possible to obtain such details by the media unless the police or the prosecution leaked them. As will be readdressed below, the "revelations" published by the pro-government media became an influential instrument for the prosecution and government in order to secure public support against the groups targeted by the investigation which would be turned into one of Turkey's most debated cases. In another raid on late January 2008, the Istanbul police arrested 27 high-profile secular and/or ultranationalist people upon accusations of membership of the same structure as those who were already sent to jail. Among the detainees, a retired general, Veli Kucuk was one of the most debated officers in Turkey over the last two decades. General Kucuk[155] had been identified with the deep state[156] activities across Turkey in the 1990s and had been accused as one of the leading figures who was organising extrajudicial executions against those who were declared as "terrorist" or "promoting terrorism" by the National Security Council at some secret meetings (Hicyilamaz, 2015; Study Center On Turkey, 2012) .

The general's arrest had a symbolic meaning in terms of civil-military relations because he had refused to give testimony before the parliamentary commission when the Parliament launched an investigation on Turkey's deep state issue after a notorious traffic accident in north-western Turkey which revealed the shadowy relations between the state bureaucracy and mafia in 1996 (TBBM, 1997, p.364). As explained in chapter five, it was impossible even

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[154] For the transcript of the phone call; see: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ergenekon-u-baslatan-ihbar-konusmasi-siyaset-1186230/ (last visited on 27 September 2018)
[155] For a detailed analysis on General Kucuk; see: http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/veli-kucuk-neden-her-tasin-altindan-cikiyor-804381/ (last visited on 8 October 2018); and see: (Altan, 2008)
[156] See chapter six for "the deep state" debates in Turkey.

to think about the interrogation of any officer by a civilian prosecutor until that time. Therefore, the detentions of the retired and active soldiers by the civilian courts were a clear reflection of a normative change and the impact of the "layering" process in civil-military relations, making the "displacement" phase possible in the balance of power in the country.

The prosecutors accused the detainees of being a member of the "Ergenekon Organisation" which they described as a clandestine "terrorist" network that aimed at toppling the government. A well-known myth, the name "Ergenekon" comes from the Turkish nationalist mythology[157] and it is one of the founding cults of modern Turkish nationalism. It was a retired officer and a well-known conspiracy theorist, Erol Mutercimler, who first talked about the "Ergenekon" as "a clandestine organisation" in 1997. When he was discussing the Turkish deep state in a TV programme, Mutercimler asserted that a mighty retired commander, General Unluturk, who was very influential in the 1970s and 1980s, had bragged that he had been a member of a clandestine organisation named Ergenekon, a network employed "the patriots" for the good of the fatherland. Mutercimler claimed that the general asserted that the "organisation" was above the general staff, the governments, and the bureaucracy. Mutercimler, who ten years after that broadcast was grotesquely sent to jail with the accusation of being a member of the "Ergenekon", argued that the organisation had not only hired distinguished officers but also had employed figures from all walks of life[158]. In parallel with the arguments of the prosecution; he asserted that his investigations on the "organisation" had shown that "Ergenekon" was the main actor who had exacerbated Turkey's Kurdish Issue. While he was defending himself in the court; he said the "Ergenekon" he had investigated was not in that court room (Odatv, 2013).

The "organisation" was not only indicted for plotting destabilisation in the socio-political and economic life that would eventually pave the way for a military coup against the ruling party. The prosecution also impeached the "network" for being a superstructure which had masterminded the deep state as the "prime suspect" of almost all extrajudicial killings and other related criminal activities which were committed throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

Raids and detentions continued with the most shocking waves of the detentions staged at pre-dawn operations by the Turkish counter-terrorism police on March 21 and 1 July 2008, respectively. Dozens of leading civilian and military figures who were staunch nationalists and secularists were taken into custody. Those taken into custody included: "Professor Kemal

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[157] For a detailed English explanation on the name "Ergenekon"; see: (Jenkins, 2009, pp.43-44)
[158] For a full record of the programme; see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtv78yxz9xs (last visited on 18 October 2018)

Alemdaroglu, the former rector of Istanbul University and a fierce opponent of any attempt to abolish the headscarf ban in universities; Dogu Perincek, the chairman of the marginal then Workers' Party("Patriotic Party since 2015) and one of the most prominent participants in the ideological clashes of the 1970s, whose avowed Maoism had recently become increasingly overshadowed by a strident secular Turkish ultra-nationalism; and Ilhan Selcuk, the editor of the secularist daily *Cumhuriyet*. Together with the other suspects, Selcuk's home was raided at 4.30 am, ostensibly to prevent him from fleeing arrest; an eventuality which would have been complicated by the fact that he was 83 years old and had a police guard stationed permanently outside his home following numerous death threats from violent Islamists. There were two top retired generals among the detainees: Retired general Sener Eruygur was the former commander of the Turkish Gendarmerie and then head of the Association for Ataturkist Thought, the largest NGO in the country with 448 branches nationwide and which had a leading force behind the organization of mass public protests in spring 2007 against the JDP's plans to appoint Gul to the presidency; retired General Hursit Tolon, who had served as commander of the First Army of the Turkish Land Forces" (Jenkins, 2009, pp.44-47).

The detention of these retired four-star generals was a first in the Turkish modern history, which was a sign of prospective operations against some other top active and retired officers when the historical, political, social, and cultural dimensions of the fight between the Islamist government and the secular military taken into account. Indeed, in the following months, dozens of active and retired officers including General Kilinc, former Secretary-General of the NSC, were taken into custody and were accused of forming, aiding, and abetting or belonging to a "terror organisation", aiming to forcibly topple the ruling party (Haberturk, 2009). However, "most of the 'evidence' that the 'Ergenekon' organization even existed all appeared to come from a single, manifestly unreliable, source: A former journalist, forger and fantasist called Tuncay Guney. Some of the documents seized from Guney's apartment referred to an organization called Ergenekon and – together with his statements to the interrogating officers – were later to form the basis of the indictment of 10 July 2008" (Jenkins, 2009, p.49).

Upon a handwritten paper seized from a defendant, the prosecution argued that the network had prepared an assassination list targeted Prime Minister Erdogan, Commander of Turkish Armed Forces Gen.Buyukanit and some other influential leaders from every walk of life (Evrensel: 2009).

Throughout the storm against the military and secular establishment, which was launched in 2007, Erdogan utilised all civilian law enforcement mechanisms and some influential figures

within the military in a Machiavellian way. As mentioned above, it is widely accepted that most of the police and prosecution officials from the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, and the judiciary who planned and conducted those operations against "the common enemy" under the Erdogan's leadership were Gulen-linked civil servants (Tanir, 2018). After the secular generals were defeated, as a result of the new power battle between Erdogan and Gulen, the Gulen community and those officials who were closest comrades of Erdogan against the military were accused of "infiltrating into the state as a parallel structure". The community, then, has been designated as a terrorist organisation by the government and most of the executors of Erdogan's anti-military campaign in that period have been accused of "being a member of a terrorist organisation" and were subjected to a massive purge and persecution in the following years[159].

While the case deepened the societal polarisation in Turkey; Erdogan embraced it from the very beginning of the process. He harshly refused the allegations accused him of using the investigation as a political tool to destroy Turkey's secular fabric and weaken the military which Erdogan had regarded as the most powerful opponent. Along with other direct and indirect interventions in the due process, discourse and administrative action of Erdogan became the most debated symbols of the politicisation of the Ergenekon investigation. In a parliament speech just a day after the day prosecutors had submitted the indictment to the Istanbul 13th. High Criminal Court, Erdogan said he was "the prosecutor of the case on behalf of the nation". In this regard, not only did the head of the government breach the presumption of innocence but also numerous members of the cabinet and other influential figures of the ruling party declared the defendants as guilty through public statements in advance (Sozcu: 2016). Erdogan's giving one of his official armoured and luxurious vehicles in a way against the precedents to Zekeriya Oz, the most sensational prosecutor of the case, at a time when the prosecutor was accused of taking arbitrary and unfair actions against the defendants caused rightful outcry in the secular and nationalist circles. They denounced Erdogan and the prosecutor for violating the fundamental principles of the universal law, the constitution, and criminal law.

The Ergenekon case ought not to be interpreted as an ordinary criminal suit that appeared fortuitously on the natural flow of life. As indicated previously, it only had become possible after Erdogan reached at a certain level of power through the "layering" process that succeeded in transforming into the "displacement" phase. Challenging the traditional, secular

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[159] As it is beyond the scope of this study, the power struggle between Erdogan and Gulen, which tremendously impacted civil-military relations in Turkey after 2013 was not analysed here.

owners of the state, Erdogan gained the full support of almost all conservative organisations and religious communities and orders, especially of the Gulen community in his fight against the secular status quo. Erdogan's political agenda came to true as he desired with the huge bureaucratic and strategic collaboration provided by the Gulenists. In this regard, the Ergenekon case which was followed by the Sledgehammer-*Balyoz*- investigation turned into an unprecedented political and legal battle between Erdogan's Islamist JDP, which was zealously supported by the Gulenists and the secular establishment identified with the military and its loyal supporters in the state bureaucracy and the media. In fact, as analysed above, this struggle for power is a resurrection of the conflict between the secularist founders of the Republic and the "losers" of the status quo, representing the traditional segments of the society that were excluded and repressed by the foundational philosophy of the state for the decades.

While the Ergenekon detentions were full steam ahead, Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, the General Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals, a staunch secularist applied to the Constitutional Court for the closure of the JDP on the grounds that the party had "become the centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism" on 31 March 2008 (Aliriza, 2008, p.1). It had been reported for a long time that the Chief Prosecutor had been preparing a closure case against the ruling party; but his final action took place just after Erdogan's government passed a law to abrogate a long-standing ban on wearing Islamic headscarves in the primary and secondary education, universities, and government buildings. As known, the ban on wearing headscarves in the mentioned places had been imposed by the 1980 Junta as an imposition of the "assertive secularism" envisaged by the founding philosophy and institutionalised by the officer-corps. While the ban became one of the most notorious obstacles against the right to education and principle of equal opportunity in the previous three decades, it has also given the Islamist and conservative politicians a fertile ground through which they enhanced their political power and discourse against the military tutelage. In this sense, the abolishment of the ban has become another victory of Erdogan against the military tutelage which was systemised by the 1980 Coup d'état.

As analysed in chapter six, all the Islamist parties through which Erdogan engaged in politics were shut down by the Constitutional Court by reasons of breaching the principle of secularism of the Constitution and becoming a focus of anti-secular activities. Dozens of leading figures of those parties were banned from politics for long years and their properties were confiscated (Akyazan, 2006, pp.258-259). Not only the Islamist parties but also the Kurdish-sensitive political parties had their shares of the secular and nationalist regime's

wrath which made itself apparent through the closure cases. In this regard, it is useful to repeat that established under the directions of the 1961 Junta; the Constitutional Court was incorporated into the state apparatus to serve as a civilian check and balance system that would preserve the regime against the political parties which "cross the line" drawn by the founding philosophy of the Republic. In four decades, the Court closed 24 political parties.

When the Court members voted unanimously to hear the case for the closure of the ruling party, they also accepted considering the possibility of a five-year political ban demanded for Prime Minister Erdogan, President Gul and 69 leading figures of the JDP as well. This counterchallenge, undoubtedly, was a matter of life and death in politics for the new elites of Turkey. What made the trouble a grave peril for the prime minister, president and the other accused politicians was the fact that eight of the eleven members of the Constitutional Court were appointed by the former President Sezer who was the former head of the Court with ardent secular views (Aliriza, 2008, p.1).

Though the Constitutional Court found the ruling party guilty on the grounds that it became the focus of anti-secular activities with a majority of ten to one; the closure case resulted in the JDP's favour due to the fact that while five members of the court voted for closure, six members decided on pecuniary punishment instead of outlawing of the party (Safrati, 2014, p.171). Thus, Erdogan managed to survive on the toughest test of his political career and continued to shape the new power of balance in Turkey under his political agenda. The "victory" in the Constitutional Court in July 2008 is a critical juncture in which Erdogan has successfully completed the "layering" process. The next phase in the transformation of the balance of power in Turkey would be "displacement" of the military tutelage by a civilian who was getting increasingly authoritarian.

In the JDP circles, the closure case was interpreted as an attack of vengeance organised by the "Ergenekon" against the government. The JDP supporters and the media used it as a means of legitimisation of some unlawful enforcement of the prosecutors due to the understanding that the "Ergenekon" had posed a great danger against their existence. In the following months after the closure case; the government, the prosecution and the pro-government media turned up the pressure on the defendants and the prospective detainees. Though it is prohibited by law; transcripts of phone calls of some defendants and anti-government figures, and details of their private lives were published in the pro-JDP media. So much so that some of those newspapers and websites published indictments and related accusations before they were given to the courts and the defence (Jenkins, 2009, p.48). In assessing the transformed balance of power in Turkey; all these unlawful and politically motivated publications which could

only be possible with the mentorship and permission of the government and judiciary helped the JDP to silence its secular opponents.

As mentioned above, analysing the three indictments -which are thousands of pages- of the "Ergenekon" case goes beyond the scope of this study both technically and methodologically. By the end of 2010, the case became the most controversial legal battle through which the losers of the old regime clinched their ever-increasing powerful presence. The upheaval of the *status quo* has meant a fundamental transition of the secular and nation-state which had been founded by Ataturk and given to the guardianship of the military. The most influential reflection of the Ergenekon case on civil-military relations, undoubtedly, ought to be traced in its transformative political effect which made the "*Balyoz*" (Sledgehammer) investigation possible. The feasibility of a case such as the Ergenekon investigation against some of the most prominent secular, ultra-nationalist and Kemalist figures of the old regime created a zeitgeist in which Erdogan and the prosecution could clamp down on those officers who had allegedly conspired against Prime Minister Erdogan just after the first JDP government had been formed in 2002.

7.5.1 Wielding the "Sledgehammer": Demolition of the Political Dominance of the Military

On 20 and 22 January 2010; Taraf[160], a liberal and staunch anti-military daily, published a "coup plan" called "Sledgehammer" which was allegedly captured from the computer of a top officer serving in the First Army in Istanbul. According to the documents revealed by the daily, the plan which had been allegedly drafted by the then Commander of the First Army General Cetin Dogan had determined purposes and methods of the military intervention that would have toppled the JDP government. The officers under the leadership of General Dogan, the daily claimed, had aimed at overthrowing the Erdogan government and to restore the secular order by "violently eliminating the existing reactionary body and by installing specific cadres in government". According to the documents, to reach their goals the officers were accused of planning "systematically foment chaos in society through violent acts including planned bomb attacks on the Fatih and Bayezit mosques in Istanbul". It was also alleged that the "plotters" planned to "shoot down one of Turkey's own F-16 fighters over the Aegean

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[160] Taraf Daily was shut down on 27 July 2016 along with many other media outlets by the Erdogan regime on the grounds of having links with the attempted coup plotters of 15 July 2016. A staunch anti-militarist, Ahmet Altan, Taraf's editor and a renowned novelist, was arrested in September 2016 and has been in jail with the accusation of sending "subliminal messages" to encourage the attempted coup. The Turkish government has accused the Gulen Community of orchestrating the coup attempt. Fethullah Gulen has rejected the accusations. The July 2016 coup attempt was not analysed here as it is beyond the scope of this study.

Sea, which was to be blamed on the Greeks". The "Sledgehammer Operation" plan which had been made up of separate sub-action plans codenamed "Sheet", "Suga", and "Oraj" was allegedly agreed upon at a military seminar joined by 162 officers including 29 generals at the headquarters of the First Army on March 5-7, 2003 (OSC Report, 2010, pp.6-7).

The alleged plan was thwarted by then the Chief of Staff General Ozkok (Kucukkaya, 2012), an officer who looked upon the military interventions as a thing of the past. It is true that General Ozkok, Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces between 2002 and 2006, had strived against the pro-interventionist generals; however, the main reason behind the failure of any possible mutiny ought to be sought in the power struggle and collision among the top generals (Zeyrek, 2012; Oskay, 2014). This fact can be observed in memoirs and press statements of the top generals who served in that era[161]. Especially, the memoir of General Aytac Yalman, who was the Commander of the Turkish Land Forces and superior of General Dogan during that period, is highly illuminative regarding the cleavage among the generals[162]. What facilitated the work of the prosecution was that General Dogan had ordered a full recording of the seminar mentioned above[163]. The audio recordings of the plan were revealed in the pro-government dailies and websites just after *Taraf* had published the seminar documents. They served as one of the most influential meta-data in shaping the public perception against the pro-interventionist tendencies in the armed forces and gave the JDP effective leverage in its struggle against the military. In other words, Erdogan and his associates successfully utilised the informal instruments against their rivals as the generals had done in the past in managing the citizens' perception. Those who had attended the seminar were described as members of a junta by the prosecution. The generals and their subordinates were accused of conspiring to plan deadly attacks in order to foment chaos in society such as planning to shoot down their own jets and blow up two famous mosques during Friday praying, the most crowded period of a week in conservative regions of Turkey, on the purpose of forcing the Parliament to declare martial law that would handily open the path for a military intervention. A month after the publications, prosecutors started to detain the attendees on the grounds of being involved in an alleged plot against the then newly elected government. In a few days, dozens of active and retired officers were sent to jail in an unprecedented way. For the first time in its history, former Commanders of the Turkish Naval

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[161] For counter-accusatory discourses among the most influential generals of that period; see: (Basbug, 2013, pp.56-57; Yalman, 2014, p.360; Kulaksiz, 2009; Ergan, 2014).
[162] Pages between 297 and 447 of General Yalman's memoirs reveal the extent of the power struggle among the Kemalist generals (Yalman, 2014, pp.297-447).
[163] For the audio recordings; see: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjg7f5eLWx9KezCB3lUDY9A (last visited on 25 November 2018).

Forces and the Air Forces were sent to prison. Thinking of such a process before the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations would have been impossible.

General Dogan and other generals strictly refused the accusations of planning a military intervention. The generals claimed that they had not developed a coup plan in the seminar; but, studied it as a "wargaming scenario", a brain-storming programme on how the armed forces would govern the country in case of a crisis that might collapse the central government which was similar to those prepared in other NATO countries (Jenkins, 2010). The accused officers denounced the documents and audio recordings as fabricated[164] and blamed the government for masterminding a witch-hunt against the military and the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (BBC, 2012).

Akin to the violations of law experienced during the Ergenekon investigations, the officers were exposed to an extensive socio-political lynching because of the pro-government journalism. From the very first day of the investigation, the principle of presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial were violated especially by the pro-government and the Gulen-linked dailies, and some liberal journalists and pundits. Much before the investigation was sent to the court, character assassination campaigns were waged by the pro-government media outlets against the accused officers. As mentioned above; many politicians, journalist and bureaucrats believed that they were waging an existential war: "either they will bring the military and their allies to heel, or they will be forced to perish". (Dogan&Rodrik, 2010a)

During the "displacement" phase of the transformation process; the rules, the cognitive and the normative strengths of the military tutelage were targeted by the pro-government media. Made possible by the alliance of the executive and judiciary branches, this approach was part of a strategy focused on dismantling the traditional public support given the military by the Turkish society. Along with other variables mentioned above, it is possible to say that the mass anti-military publications during that term achieved their goals and the military, the most trusted institution of Turks, lost a considerable percentage of its traditional popularity in a few years[165] (Sarigil, 2012, p.15). Concordantly, the military came to a point in which it lost its traditional institutional strength against those "attacks" targeted its member from a very recent past where it was unthinkable to put an officer on trial in a civilian court. The fundamental reason behind this historic regression ought to be traced in the path-dependent process that triggered by the EU reform process and consolidated through the failed e-memorandum of the military which overturned by the government in April 2007.

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[164] For a detailed study that claims the forgery of the pieces of; see: (Dogan&Rodrik, 2010)
[165] For a research on trust in major institutions in Turkey; see: (Sonnenschein, 2013)

In the Sledgehammer phase of that path-dependent process, the government pursued the similar methods it had embraced during the Ergenekon investigation. The mood among the JDP policy-makers turned into a "revenge politics" which can be best summarised by the following discourse: "It is now *our* turn to submit the military to the persecution we experienced for so long" (Dogan&Rodrik, 2010b). It was argued that the documents were illegally obtained by a retired high-ranking officer who was in active duty and was working under the command of General Dogan during the mentioned seminars. The documents, allegedly, were sent to some top figures of the government and then they were handed over a Gulen-sympathiser journalist to be published in the anti-military, liberal *Taraf* daily. Before the publications, it was also alleged that related prosecutors were manipulated by some senior members of the government (Alus, 2010). Ruling against the wishes of the ruling party during that term became an uphill task. For instance, Nihat Ergun, a member of the then Erdogan government, accused the judge who released some detainees of belonging to the same criminal gang as the defendant officers (Dogan&Rodrik, 2010b).

As mentioned above, Erdogan has become the most powerful politician after he muzzled the military during the presidential election process in 2007. In parallel with the waning power of Turkey's most powerful institution, Erdogan's narrative of the events and facts have determined the fate of institutions and individuals. Like the self-declaration of being the "prosecutor" of the Ergenekon investigation himself, he pursued a strategy that would shape the judicial proceedings against the Sledgehammer defendants: "They should know that they will not get away with it"; "those conspiring behind closed doors to trample on the nation's will from now on find themselves facing justice.", Erdogan said on the day 11 high-ranking officers were detained in February 2010 (Head, 2010).

Erdogan's "reality" determining power and discourse served effectively when he destroyed his coalition with the Gulenists which had been formed against the military tutelage and the secular opposition. After crippling the dominance of the Kemalist and secular officers in the military with the huge support of his ally, Erdogan argued that the Gulenists deceived him about the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations: "My heart had never approved the detentions of the commanders through those operations.", he said in a speech at the headquarters of the Turkish War Colleges, where he was in search of a settlement with the new commanders of the military in his fight against the Gulenists after the Gulen-linked bureaucrats had launched anti-government corruption operations in December 2013(T24, 2015; Hansen, 2017).

By the end of 2010, hundreds of secular and prominent military, business, media, and university figures were detained. Most of them were sent to jail under the accusations charged with the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations which would lock the defendants up in pre-trial detentions without any judgement for many years. These pre-trial detentions have caused many individual tragedies and deepened the political polarisation between the seculars and Islamists. The fear of being arrested has silenced a considerable amount of public opposition against the government. To put in another way; the investigations have determined the new norms of making politics in Erdogan's "New Turkey". What has become a norm in Erdogan's "New Turkey" is his political power on determining ebb and flows of politics. Most of those officers who had been purged and sentenced to long prison terms because of the Sledgehammer case were acquitted in 2015 after Erdogan has launched a full campaign against the former ally, the Gulenist organisation, and they were appointed to some most prestigious ranks of the military in 2016 after the failed coup attempt (Hurriyet, 2016).

It is an undeniable fact that Turkey has long suffered from the illegal activities of its infamous "deep state". Whether it is called "Ergenekon" or not, this informal and extra-legal organisation which is composed of some most influential figures in the military, politics, business, police, media and other sectors has destroyed lives of millions of Kurds, Alevites, Christian and other religious minorities, and other opponents of the nationalist and secular Turkish status quo. It is also known that Turkey's some secular generals had embarked on a quest of toppling the newly elected Islamist-rooted government just after it came to power in 2002. Furthermore, because of the interventionist indoctrination in the military schools and the tutelary institutions incorporated into the constitution that analysed in chapter four and six, the generals believed that toppling the Islamist JDP was a normative function and a legal duty. Due to these reasons; the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases were widely welcomed by a large majority, including the author of this research, at first. Likewise, the investigations were hailed and supported by the EU and other external factors. It was believed that after a long thorny journey on the path of democracy, the rule of law would have reigned in Turkey. It was also anticipated that autocrats of the recent past would have paid the price of the military interventions, and the autocratic institutionalisation would have come to an end. However, after a while, it has been observed that the real motives behind these investigations were to demolish any institutional, societal, and individual opposition to Erdogan's assumption of absolute power. Although the JDP denied the criticism mentioned above and argued that all has been done for a democratic and EU member Turkey (Aksu, 2010); it is clear that it has instrumentally used and manipulated the EU project (Alaranta, 2015, pp.5-8)

at a very successful fashion. As almost all the interviewees took part in this research pointed out; Erdogan would not have been able to challenge the military without the unlimited support of the EU.

It is true that Turkey has experienced a massive civilianisation throughout this process; but it cannot be described as a democratic transformation of the civil-military relations. While the cases have de-institutionalised the dominance of the secular military in politics on the one hand; they have accelerated institutionalisation of a new type of the Turkish authoritarianism in the guise of a civilian rule.

7.6 Conclusion

In chapter four and six, it was thoroughly examined how the integrated system based on a triumvirate of regulative, normative, and cognitive/cultural bases has perpetuated the military dominance over the civilians. This system was established on a powerful historical, societal, and cultural legacy and redesigned by the juntas that dictated the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, respectively. The incorporation of the tutelary institutions into the constitutions have clinched the punctuated equilibrium in civil-military relations. However, this exclusionary system, which was the institutional embodiment of the Turkish state mechanism, doomed to fail as it could not produce solutions in the face of natural and economic crises erupted by the end of the century.

An output of the critical juncture which occurred after the financial and political upheaval in 1999, a new path dependant process has taken place which has paved the way for an unprecedented transformation in the Turkish civil-military relations. The transformation in the balance of power occurred as a result of well-planned, Machiavellian strategies followed by the JDP identified with Erdogan who utilised the Gulen-linked cadres in the state apparatus against the secular officer-corps. The rules were changed incrementally with the vital element of EU support. The normative basis was changed using arguments about the merits of representative democracy, the appeal to Islamic values, the lubrication of economic success, the important role of the media increasingly controlled by the JDP. The cognitive/cultural dimension was changed in parallel with the Islamisation of politics and political domain. Erdogan's personal 'charisma' and populism allured millions of middle and low-income conservative and pious electorates who were the "losers" of the *status quo*, hoping a better future.

The internal dynamic behind this transformation has been the rising of Erdogan's Justice and Development Party into power in 2002. As the most powerful political party of the new century; the JDP had denied its staunch Islamist legacy, and purported to be the most eager institution to democratise Turkey in its early years. Accordingly, it promised equality, justice, and prosperity for all. Turkey's Westernisation project which had been set as the ultimate goal by the founding fathers of the Republic took the form of being a full EU membership after the country had entered into the multi-party system. To realise its programme, the JDP declared the EU project as its primary objective and announced that it would abolish all prevalent anti-democratic rules and norms to become an EU member. The "losers" of the *status quo*; such as Islamists, liberals, some influential actors of left-wing groups, religious and ethnic minorities

endorsed the JDP's democratisation programme. The EU's response to that impetus was to give full support to the Turkish government which would sooner or later to face a rigid veto by the military, guardian of the status quo. In this context, the EU and some other external actors functioned as the exogenous determinants that made the above-mentioned transition possible.

The JDP pursued highly inclusive policies during its first term, between 2002 and 2007. Thanks to the EU's transformative acquis, which is obligatory for every candidate state, the JDP was able to annul so many acts, rules, norms, and other regulations that had been enacted under the shadows of military tutelage between 1960 and 1997. The reforms agenda and the inclusive socio-political and financial policies provided the JDP with substantial public support, none of the former elected governments could ever enjoy.

During its first tenure, then Prime Minister Erdogan and his political allies showed ultimate attention to not to annoy Turkey's mighty generals. Though the deep mistrust and antagonism between himself and the secular officers, he developed a reconciliatory discourse toward the military on the purpose of quelling the growing anger against his government's policies. Arguably, the primary objective of this moderate discourse was to gain time for having enough power to challenge the guardian of the secular Republic openly. The hidden struggle between the Islamist JDP and secular military broke out when Turkey's most powerful civilians who had the public support of around 50% decided to make the second man of the JDP as the new president of the Republic. As a response, the Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces explicitly warned in a mid-night memorandum that the military would take action if the civilians would insist on electing an Islamist politician as the new president. For the first time in modern history, a government rejected such a written ultimatum issued by the military in 2007 and carried on the ruling. This turbulent process of the presidential election has constituted a historic turning point in the Turkish civil-military relations, which has ended the peremptory superiority of the generals in politics. The JDP's presidential candidate was elected by a considerable majority. Those defeats of the generals before Erdogan have accelerated the de-institutionalisation process of the rules and norms that had been adopted throughout the decades under the military tutelage.

After the presidential election victory, a meteoric change has been observed in Erdogan's discourse against the military and other secular groups that have not supported his policies. Instead of the inclusionary approach he had embraced during the period between 2002 and 2007 which aimed at democratising Turkey, he has started to pursue a strategy that would

erode any institutional and individual opposition against his ever-rising power in the medium term. In relation to that, Turkey has started to be a land in which while Islamists and other JDP supporters have more and more enjoyed the benefits of democracy and market economy; the opponents have faced a growing socio-political and economic exclusion. For instance, it was the JDP government which has nullified Turkey's long-standing notorious headscarf ban in the universities and other educational institutions in 2008. Paradoxically, Erdogan has started to intervene directly in lifestyle of others, such as hitting those who drink alcohol and those women who wear mini skirt out in the mentioned period.

The Ergenekon and the Sledgehammer investigations have become Erdogan's the most instrumental means of destroying the military tutelage and the secular status quo. Although they had been presented as the major steps of making the rule of law sovereign in Turkey, the investigations have mostly served the political purposes of Erdogan. Embraced the cases by declaring himself as the "prosecutor" of these investigations, Erdogan has given an end to the decades-old military tutelage and secular supremacy in the country with the huge support of the Gulenists.

By the end of 2010, the balance of power between the generals and the civilians has entirely gone in the latter's favour. After a successful "layering" process, the "displacement" phase of the military tutelage was realised by civilian authoritarianism. This transformation cannot be described as a democratic shift; but, a de-institutionalisation process of the military tutelage and civilianisation of the use of state power which could provide Erdogan with absolute authority in the mid-run. It is not possible to talk about a democratic civilian oversight of the military in Turkey by the end of 2010. Instead, Erdogan seems to have the will to turn the armed forces into a military of the JDP which could facilitate his ambition of one-man rule in the long run. One of Erdogan's infamous assessments on democracy, when he was a staunch Islamist, in the 1990s may illuminate the future of the Turkish politics and civil-military relations: "Democracy is like a train; you get off once you have reached your destination."

CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

Introduction

Turkish history, the Turkish Republic, and the evolution of democracy in Turkey have as their central problematic civil-military relations. Tension between the military and society exists in all nation-states and at various historical junctures has often determined political outcomes. In Turkey that tension between civilian and military authorities has erupted with extraordinary frequency emphasising the paradox of an institution established to defend the state and society, but which is then given power to mutate into a danger to the public. Thus, the central hypothesis of the thesis is that military interventions have been a principal cause of the lack of a mature democracy in Turkey.

As chapter one outlines, the 'foundation philosophy' of the Turkish Republic placed the military at the heart of the new constitutional system. This Ataturk legacy is a familiar feature of Turkish politics, but this thesis seeks to analyse and explain how the military sustained their dominance of Turkish politics for nearly 90 years, and how that dominance came to be confronted and terminated.

Accordingly, the Conclusion initially rehearses the significance of civilian supremacy and goes on to consider the historical record concerning the involvement of the military in Turkish politics. The continuities are so powerful that some consideration is given to the history of the Ottoman Empire before turning to the post-1923 Republic. The empirical research which informs the thesis considers the period from 1980 to 2011 although analysis based on secondary sources embraces both earlier and more recent periods. The historical influences and continuities are such that the methodology that informs and runs through the whole thesis rests on the theories and literature of historical institutionalism. Hence the Conclusion goes on to consider the methods and concepts employed to understand both continuity and change. It then emphasises the distinctive features of the research based on original empirical material, on distinctive critical interpretation, and presenting a persuasive analytical framework.

There follows a more descriptive section which briefly summarises the main developments in the growth and consolidation of military power, followed by civilian challenges to military tutelage. Those main developments are then re-presented employing the key methodological tool of 'critical junctures' which allows some periodisation and generalisations about the effectiveness of Turkish democracy. The Conclusion then moves on to consider the remaining objectives of the thesis as outlined in chapter 1. In particular, it presents a theoretical framework in which continuity of military dominance is explained by reference to the main

theoretical principles of historical institutionalism whilst those same principles are also applied to explaining the decay and collapse of military tutelage. More speculatively this framework allows a partial analysis of the trajectory of civilian authoritarianism under the Erdogan Governments and their changing relationship with the military.

Finally, the thesis re-emphasises the concern with the prospects for a more mature and democratic civil-military relations. In so doing it draws on the empirical research presented in chapters five and six and particularly on the views of civilian interviewees. It is customary for theses to end with reflections on the research process and ambitions, and with some advice for future researchers. This thesis is no exception, with the caveat that no-one would wish to experience the delays, distortions and personal distress created for the researcher by the very people and events that are the recent subjects of this research. Perhaps the fact that this thesis has been completed whilst the author is a refugee from his own country simply underlines the importance of the subject matter.

Civil-Military Relations and Civilian Supremacy

The extensive literature on Turkish civil-military relations is reviewed in chapter two, but the principal theoretical insights are taken back to two of the seminal writers on civil-military relations who were instrumental in creating it as a sub-discipline in social science. Huntington's advocacy of professionalism in the military is influential, but chapter two argues that this thesis disproves his argument in the Turkish case. Spurious claims of professionalism have encouraged arrogance and self-interest in the armed forces and legitimised suppression of democracy. Instead, this thesis takes inspiration from Finer's eloquent comparative work which stresses the importance of civilian supremacy based on the rule of law in controlling the military and safeguarding democracy. The thesis argues that the inability to legitimise and embed civilian supremacy has been a major flaw in Turkish political life and constitutional practice. It must be a prime goal in the creation of a mature Turkish democracy.

Indeed, the hope that Turkish democracy could mature, deepen, and meet the standards expected by the European Union and practised by the mature European democracies was central to the EU candidacy process. The agreement on Turkey's candidate status achieved in 1999 played a fundamental role in the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the decline of military tutelage (see chapter seven). The EU shared the aspiration of civilian supremacy and built those aspirations into the candidacy assessment process. Paradoxically, and in a startling example of unintended consequences, this EU imperative was the midwife to the creation of a post-Islamist, authoritarian Turkish state under the populist and confrontational leadership of

Erdogan. Civilian supremacy perhaps, as examined later in this Conclusion, but hardly the outcome that the European Commission would have hoped for.

Chapter two suggests that military intervention in Turkish politics, which goes back to the Seventeenth Century, constitutes a textbook example of the path dependence analysed by Historical Institutionalism. Again and again the military engaged in coups against the government of the time in a pattern continuing up to the attempted coup of 2016. In the modern Turkish Republic, coups have instilled a culture of fear and anxiety amongst parties and politicians. The coup of 1960 which resulted in the execution of Prime Minister Menderes is highlighted as particularly and brutally influential. Chapter two also points out that the civil-military relations literature tends to concentrate on the coup d'état. Certainly, coups are important 'critical junctures'; but, the military influence is also pervasive, deterministic, and often indirect, incorporated into institutional arrangements. It is necessary to look behind coups to identify the institutional factors which have perpetuated military power so that coups are only undertaken when those institutional factors become less effective (chapter two) This argument is developed in chapter three which explores the historical record including the Ottoman legacy.

Chapter three emphasises the centrality of the officer corps which was one of the most powerful influences in the Ottoman Empire from the Janissaries onwards and which, in the Eighteenth Century, began to evolve as an agent of modernisation and then Westernisation. It argues that elements of path dependency were transmitted from the Ottoman era into the new Turkish Republic. These elements included the officer corps itself, an expectation of authoritarianism, a tolerance of military intervention, and, above all, a cognitive framework which visualised the military as the rightful vehicle of modernisation and state-building. The Kemalist Turkish Republic exhibited these characteristics clearly.

The Turkish Republic was, of course, created by the military under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. In consolidating his leadership, he went some way to 'civilianising' the military (chapter three), partly by colonising the main institutions of the civilian state with former military men. Within the new Republic, the military became the main agent of modernisation and engaged in systematic programmes of social engineering (chapter three). The principles of military-led modernisation can be expressed in the philosophy or ideology of Kemalism which has been the touchstone of the military for almost 100 years. The end goal of the Kemalist project was to achieve a strong nation-state which was militarily secure, Westernised, economically prosperous, and unambiguously secular.

Chapters one to three, therefore, make the case that the military tutelage experienced by the post-war Turkish Republic is not a product of crises, coups or opportunism but is rather an expression of a centuries-old path dependence. The institutional features of this path dependence sanctified the military as the agent of modernisation, as the expression of the strong state and with a paternalistic duty which gave it a 'right' the intervene in political life when the Kemalist goals were threatened. A reciprocal of the military paternalism was a relative infantilisation of the civilian sphere in which many politicians and political parties became incompetent, corrupt, autocratic and irresponsible in ways that almost invited military intervention which often (as in 1960 and 1980) generated popular support. The following three chapters, four, five and six, elucidate, analyse and document the various elements of this intensifying path dependence. They do so by analysing the rules, the norms and the cognitive patterns which reproduced military tutelage.

Methodology and Distinctiveness

The objectives of the thesis were outlined in chapter one. They centre on the possibility of creating civilian-led civil-military relations which will allow the development of a mature, emancipatory democratic system to be embedded in Turkish political institutions. This requires methodologies which offer interpretations of institutional dynamics and which provide conceptual tools with which to undertake research. In turn, these concepts need to be applied to empirical research material which can analyse and offer insights into both civilian and military institutions; and can offer interpretations and robust analyses of major political developments. The methodologies are employed to offer explanations for 'what has gone wrong' with civil-military relations to date and, by so doing, to provide a framework which can generate suggestions for what needs to change in the near future. Both the theoretical and empirical methodologies can briefly be rehearsed.

The theoretical approach, as outlined in chapter one, is that of historical institutionalism. The central concept of this variant of institutional theory is 'path dependence', and this concept is intrinsic to every part of the thesis. Path dependence is identified again and again, but more particularly the mechanisms by which it operates are analysed drawing on the three forces which underpin the 'stickiness' or continuity which path dependence analyses. The three forces are first, a cognitive framework or 'world view' which regards the current institutional arrangements as obvious, natural, and taken for granted. Chapter four argues that the 'militarisation of society' provides one such example. Second, an interlocked set of norms which are tacit but specific and provide a repertoire of behaviours. The secular, anti-Kurdish,

and anti-communist norms of Kemalism considered in chapter four constitute one of many examples. Thirdly, there is the influence of rules. The prevailing rules of political and societal behaviour incorporated into organisations, constitutions and legal frameworks are the most obvious manifestations of an institutional order. Examples emphasised in chapters four and six include the National Security Council and the Constitutional Court. This conclusion comes back to these three forces in later sections when presenting the explanatory framework. As virtually every student of historical institutionalism observes, a major problem with this set of theories is explaining institutional change. The standard approach is to treat path-dependent continuity as part of a 'punctuated equilibrium' in which 'punctuations' can be analysed in terms of altering political and societal paths. The punctuations can also be analysed as 'critical junctures' in which internal or external forces or crises dictate a change of direction. This thesis employs the concept of critical junctures and identifies a series of decisive conjunctures. Often these critical junctures reinforce the path dependence, but in some decisive cases they have indeed set the Turkish state on a new path. The key critical junctures are set out in the following section which also provides a rough periodisation of the prevailing features of civil-military relations. But change is not necessarily dictated solely by crises and major political events. Change can be achieved more gradually and incrementally in ways discussed by Mahoney and Thelen. As outlined in chapter seven, they advance four basic models of gradual institutional change, two of which apply effectively to explain the recent institutional change in 21st century Turkey. I come back to their models below in the presentation of the explanatory framework.

This thesis draws on extensive secondary sources, including the rich literature on Turkish history and civil-military relations, much of it in Turkish. It also builds upon extensive empirical research presented in chapters five and six. The elite civilian interviews are based on a deliberate qualitative methodology which is reviewed in chapter five along with details of ethical safeguards. These interviews capture the considered views and judgments of a range of senior and experienced officials, twenty in total, who were candid and revealing in their discussion of civil-military relations in the period up to 2014. The interviews provided new material and insights but also allowed the researcher to test facts, understandings, and interpretations, sometimes validating, sometimes modifying, conclusions derived from the secondary literature. It was not possible to replicate this exercise with members of the officer corps. Conducting interviews with serving military personnel is illegal in Turkey, a rather revealing 'rule' which confirms one of the consistent themes articulated by the civilian interviewees, namely the 'separate world' of the cliquish officer corps.

Accordingly, an alternative methodology was designed and presented in chapter six. It draws on the memoirs, the articles, the speeches, and the press coverage of senior military personnel. The chapter is organised chronologically around the four coups of the post-war era and combines analysis of the events with the views of the military officers participating in them. Of course, the military memoirs are remorselessly self-justifying and uncritical, but they provide a remarkable insight into the military mindset and the factors which influenced military intervention. The scores of military commentaries repeatedly maintain that civilians are untrustworthy and that the military had a duty, legitimised in constitutional law, to undertake coups. This deep, dense and exceptional insight into the cognition and the motivation of the Turkish military, over several generations, provides material with which to analyse the rules, norms and cognitions which underpinned the unambiguous path dependency of Turkish military tutelage from 1960 to 2002.

Based on the analysis and the methodology outlined above this research presents a distinctive and original contribution to the understanding of civil-military relations in Turkey and of Turkey's flawed democracy. There are a range of dimensions to this research contribution, and I can briefly rehearse five of them. First, the thesis offers a distinctive synthesis of English and Turkish language literature dealing with recent Turkish history and civil-military relations. In particular, the exploration of a huge range of Turkish language military literature is entirely novel. Second, the research adopts an unusual critical perspective. Due to deference, sometimes due to explicit threats and due to fears about career prospects very few critical studies of the military have been undertaken by Turkish scholars. Latterly that reluctance to criticise had extended to the post-Islamic regime evolving under President Erdogan. This research asserts the need for a critical treatment and delivers it. Third, the research is informed by a unique examination of civilian views and assessments based on the systematic interview programme. This original and rare body of empirical material provides unique insights and validates more generic conclusions. Fourth, the research applies and develops the revealing theoretical approach based on historical institutionalism. It, therefore, offers students of this powerful methodology an example of how the key concepts can be applied and understood. It further provides a theoretical framework which can be developed to aid understanding of Turkish politics and can also be used as a comparative case to aid understanding of institutional complexes and the dynamics of civil-military relations in a range of other countries. Fifth, and perhaps slightly optimistically, the research offers a series of conclusion which provide the basis for the development of policy. It argues not only that civil-military relations is in dire need for reform, but offers some guidelines and concrete

suggestions upon which to base future reform and institutional reconstruction of civil-military relations in Turkey.

The Consolidation and Collapse of Military Tutelage

The commentary on Turkish political history and the analysis of civil-military relations presented in earlier chapters tells an extraordinary story. This conclusion does not seek to summarise those earlier chapters but does highlight several salient features before addressing the pattern of critical junctures. In the pre-war period, the Turkish Republic led and dominated by Ataturk, engaged in a classic state-building programme in which the military was the vehicle of reform and took on a guardianship role. The post-war period, from 1946, was marked by the creation of a party system which failed to live up the Kemalist aspirations of the military and was brutally suppressed by the 1960 coup. The following period is the main focus of the thesis, and especially the period after 1980. It presents an amazing story of military dominance, effectively of indirect rule by the military and remorseless and cumulative self-aggrandisement which neutralised any mode of political or societal control. The conventional institutional controls in the shape of audit, budget, appointments, publicity, law, and regulation were paid lip-service but effectively ceased to operate. This complete lack of accountability may have led to military hubris, but it also succeeded in cowing elected politicians in a relationship of domination which reached its apotheosis in the 'post-modern coup' of 1997 when the government was simply instructed to resign.

Military dominance brought some inbuilt deficiencies, some structural contradictions which led to failure in 2007 and collapse after 2010. Chief amongst them, as noted by the interviewees reported in chapter five, was a closed world view, an elitist isolationism that was aggravated by the privileges and arrogance of the officer corps. That self-belief generated a lack of interest in the well-being of the mass of the population which, together with the hostility to Islam, provided ammunition for Erdogan's fateful populism. This is not to assert that the officer corps was monolithic. The rivalries and disagreements were identified in chapters six and seven and contributed to the failures of coups in 2007 and 2016. The EU candidacy process made clear to sections of the military that global pressures insisted on democratic integrity and regarded coups as intolerable. Despite this, the path dependence of Kemalist military self-belief acted like a runaway train which hit the buffers in 2010 with disastrous consequences for the military, and arguably also for the Kemalist project.

The critical junctures in this historical process of institutional continuity and change surface at various points on the earlier chapters and are brought together here to clarify the argument.

Critical Junctures in the Evolution of Turkish Civil-Military Relations:

1923   Creation of the Turkish Republic under the leadership of General Mustafa Kemal

1946   Establishment of Multi-Party democracy and the election of the Democratic Party with a liberal philosophy.

1960   May Coup d'état. Democratic Party abolished. Fifteen politicians condemned to death. In 1961 three hanged including Prime Minister Menderes. New Constitution enacted. NSC given constitutional status.

1971   Coup by Memorandum. Suppression of political activity. Indirect military rule through puppet parties followed by elections in 1973.

1980   Armed coup by the High Command. Consolidation of military tutelage. Martial law, mass arrests, closure of 19 political parties. Creation of a new Constitution in which NSC dominant. In 1983 election of Motherland Party led by Turgut Ozal.

1997   Post-modern coup in which Islamist Welfare Party surrenders to a military ultimatum and resigns. Military pursuing 'assertive secularism' and affirming Kemalist principles.

1999   December, Turkey granted 'candidate status' by the European Union. Harmonisation and compliance with the EU acquis provide a reform agenda and new norms.

2001   Creation of the JDP, Justice and Development Party by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In the wake of the 1999 earthquake and economic collapse the JDP secures a majority in the 2002 election.

2007   Attempted repeat of the post-modern coup fails. Erdogan calls a snap Presidential election which delivers a JDP landslide and elects his associate Abdullah Gul.

Direct attack on the military with coup trials and purges against the officer corps and secularists. A 'norm breaking' development.

2010   JDP alleges coup conspiracies ("Sledgehammer" case). Escalates purges against the military and secures a further electoral majority.

2016/17   Armed military coup fails. Massive purges of virtually all agencies of the state. JDP narrowly wins a referendum to change the Constitution and create a Presidency. Erdogan becomes President and military subordination complete.

A Periodisation of Civil-Military Relations

1946 - 1960   Formation and Deterioration of multi-party democracy
1960 - 1999   Consolidation and intensification of military tutelage
2002 - 2007   Decay of military dominance
2007 - 2016   Failed coups, military subordination, growing civilian supremacy
2017 - 2020   Post-Islamic authoritarianism

A Theoretical Framework to Explain Civil-Military Relations

As argued above, for almost fifty years, from 1960 to 2007, the military dominated Turkish politics. In explaining this remarkable phenomenon, there are undoubtedly external factors. Students of international relations and the civilian views discussed in chapter five would point to the Cold War and US support for the military expressed through NATO and military aid. However, the essential sources of military dominance were internal. This thesis, therefore, treats the military as an institution which consciously and unconsciously has exploited institutional tools to perpetuate its dominance in a textbook example of path dependence. Hence, we can first look to institutional concepts which explain institutional continuity. That dominance has been spectacularly punctuated in recent years, which requires us to apply those concepts also to the creation of change in Turkish politics.

Continuity through path-dependence.

As outlined in chapter one, and applied in multiple settings throughout the thesis, the three concepts of cognitive frameworks, norms and rules can be employed to explain path-dependence and are summarised here.

The cognitive framework has been the most powerful vehicle of path-dependence. The perceptions of what is obvious, natural, proper, and reassuring has elevated the military to a leading role in Turkish politics and society. Support for the military has been seen as a patriotic duty encapsulating the essence of Turkish identity and embodying the safety of the Turkish state. Chapter six emphasises the ubiquitous and entrenched power of that framework within the officer corps itself but, as chapter four outlines, such attitudes and beliefs have been endemic as part of the 'militarisation' of society. The pro-military attitudes have been reproduced through a variety of means including universal conscription, prestigious and effective military schools, and the respect, verging on adulation, devoted to Ataturk. The Kemalist philosophy has taken on elements of a state religion reinforced by Turkish national pride and by the cult of Ataturk. His image is ubiquitous, insulting him has been a criminal offence and the anniversary of his death (10 November) is a national day of remembrance. The military is, of course, the guardian of Ataturk's legacy and have prospered in the radiance of his prestige.

The naturalised support given to the military can be contrasted with a disdain for politicians. With a few exceptions, especially Ozal, and later Erdogan, politicians have been regarded as self-seeking, incompetent and often corrupt. That disdain has verged on contempt amongst the officer corps, as discussed in chapters two and six. Sadly, that disdain has often been merited, which has helped to legitimise military interventions. Thus, there is an associated aspect of the cognitive framework which draws on the chequered history of democratic governments and hence a shallow democratic tradition. Turkish history is too often a history of authoritarianism, from Ottoman authoritarianism to military, and now civilian, authoritarianism. In that respect, Erdogan's presidential regime could be said simply to be reproducing an authoritarian path dependency that goes back centuries.

Turning from cognitive world views to norms reveals a second set of influences which have underpinned path dependence. Norms are tacit, not explicitly articulated, but constitute a concrete guide to action. A key norm, explored in chapter four, has been a commitment to 'statism' rather than democracy. Westernisation under the Ottoman regime, as well as the Republic, has been seen as a 'top down' enterprise energised by elites. The norm therefore takes the form of a deference to authority, an absolute obedience from the mass of the population, an intolerance of criticism and acceptance of a notable lack of transparency. Amongst those respected elites, the military has been to the fore. Chapter four argues that military education has been quite central, both in creating self-belief in the military and in convincing the population at large that the military in inherently superior. The military

schools which were shut down by Erdogan in 2016 were of outstanding quality and selected and promote the leading members of the officer corps who in turn become social and political as well as military leaders. For twenty-eight years up to 1989, all Turkish Presidents were former generals and military appointments transferred military norms into the civilian bureaucracy (see chapter six). There is perhaps a parallel here with the Turkish *Mulkiye* (Political Science Faculty of Ankara University) which similarly has created and reproduced a political elite since 1859. Indirect military control of governments has taken place behind a veil of electoral legitimacy, but it is a transparent veil when it is seen that many political leaders are retired military men. This was seen as normatively acceptable since such leaders were by definition of superior competence.

Other important norms are also elements of the Kemalist principles. The anti-Kurdish and anti-communist norms have not been examined here (with the exception of some discussion of the 'deep state' in chapter six), but some emphasis has been placed on the secular norms. Ataturk was determined to create the Turkish Republic as a secular state and on that basis, the military tutelage abolished Islamic political parties through the Constitutional Court and in 1997 removed an Islamist Party from the government. The pious masses who came to support Erdogan may not have shared this norm of aggressive secularism, but the modernising sections of Turkish society certainly did. The role of Islam has been a divisive element within the military itself. At several points, especially after the 1997 coup, extensive purges of senior officers were undertaken to remove pro-Islamic officers. Indeed, it is possible to argue that 'the purge' itself is a long-standing norm. It was a feature of the Ottoman government and has been a notable feature of post-coup politics. The expectation that disloyal staff will be removed is an intriguing feature of Turkish politics in the light of the massive purges also undertaken by the Erdogan regime, a factor discussed above in terms of "revenge politics". In any event, the secularist norm rationalised and legitimised the military influence on policy and its interventions into politics.

A more overt expression of both world views and normative systems is expressed in the rules which have implemented military tutelage. A great variety of rules which enhance the institutional status and influence of the military have been reviewed in earlier chapters. Perhaps the most significant are the constitutional provisions which have created ruling organisations and defined their powers. Chief amongst them were the NSC (National Security Council) and the SMC (Supreme Military Council) which comprised the 'state within the state' explored in chapter four. Other bodies such as the Constitutional Court and the military schools have also carried huge weight. Successive constitutions also prescribed the

characteristics of political parties with rules on their membership, their activities and share of votes required. These provided the military with control over the operation of the democratic party system.

More specific institutional rules have applied directly to the military itself. Thus, after the 1971 coup, enforced legislation expanded the autonomy of the military by removing judicial and audit controls together with independence from budgetary controls and civilian intervention. The societal acceptance of the startling range of privileges enjoyed by the military may be explained simply by force majeure but are more persuasively explained by the influence of the cognitive and normative factors itemised above. Beyond the military is a range of formal and informal rules which enshrined various elements of the Kemalist programme. Thus, there were a whole range of laws that restricted the operation of Islam, from the banning of the call to prayer to the highly symbolic rules against the wearing of headscarves. On the control of the large Kurdish minority and its aspirations for independence, draconian rules entered into force, including the banning of Kurdish political organisations and the suppression of the Kurdish language. These rules, therefore, enshrined military priorities in legislative and regulatory provisions creating a sweeping and omnipresent legal and regulative system consistent with the institutional dominance of the military.

<u>Change through layering and displacement.</u>

The forces promoting path dependency and the supremacy of the military outlined above are formidable, yet change began, even before the more dramatic punctuations of 2007 and 2016, how to explain this shift in the trajectory of Turkish civil-military relations? The theoretical approach selected draws on the work of two scholars who are seminal originators of historical institutionalism, Mahoney and Thelen. They directly address the question of gradual institutional change and suggest four models of how institutions might be set onto new paths. Two of their models, layering and displacement apply persuasively to the Turkish experience. Layering applies 'when new rules are attached to existing ones' (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p.16), whilst displacement involves a direct challenge to the dominant institutional order. Chapter seven presents an analysis which identifies processes of layering from 2002 to 2007 followed by a displacement process through confrontation and elections in 2007.

The JDP's ability to implement layering and displacement depended on the exploitation of two aspirations of the Turkish Republic, the creation of a stable electoral system and membership of the European Union. The new JDP won the election in 2002 and was able to form a legitimate government. It received encouragement and support from European

democracies and from the European Union whose influence became substantial through the candidacy negotiations. The civilian respondents reviewed in chapter five agreed that the candidacy process was crucial to the 'layering' dynamics from 2002 to 2007. It facilitated a gradual reform of rules which downgraded military institutions and privileges. It would have been a material and psychological contradiction for the military to oppose the Kemalist goals of Westernisation and the 'bewildered' generals were outmanoeuvred by Erdogan and the JDP. As noted in chapter seven, they had never come up against such a systemic but sneaky challenge dared by a civilian government. They made clear their opposition but could not engage in direct action which would not only invalidate the EU candidacy process but would create huge opposition arising from the popularity of Erdogan whose standing was enhanced by the economic boom that the EU process had also encouraged.

Re-presented in Historical Institutionalist terms, it is illuminating to consider the forces of path-dependence outlined above and to note how they were changed after 2002. Above all, there was a major cognitive shift. In place of a militarised society, the EU candidacy process took precedence and became a source of national pride. Erdogan and the JDP adeptly exploited this dynamic and the JDP took on a partial Kemalist modernising colouration whilst Erdogan shamelessly (at least to the cynical Turkish intelligentsia) professed commitment to the EU and friendship for the military. Meanwhile, democratisation appeared more desirable as Erdogan and the JDP gained huge popular support. His populism served to trump traditional military loyalties. In addition, Erdogan as a politician earned respect rather than disdain. He appeared relatively honest, and his success as Mayor of Istanbul in improving services was followed up by a booming economy and apparent economic competence during the initial years of the JDP governments. The pro-military cognitive framework was disintegrating.

As regards path-dependent norms both deference and secularism were challenged by Erdogan's populism. As with the populism of Putin, Trump and Bolsonaro, Erdogan appealed to the hitherto ignored masses and challenged the established elites, including military elites. Unlike his fellow populists, he also encouraged Islam and Islamic practices which similarly challenged the secular norms so dear to the Turkish military establishment. These cognitive and normative transformations, in turn, removed institutional constraints which allowed the adaptation, re-interpretation, and revision of the prevailing rules in order to limit or abolish whole areas of military influence. Thus, for instance, the NSC became advisory with a civilian head. Military unease at these rule changes, and faced with Erdogan's presidential ambitions, the General Staff issued the e-memorandum in 2007. Unlike the 1997 post-modern coup, the

e-memorandum failed to precipitate the resignation of the JDP government and instead provoked outright confrontation in which 'layering' was supplemented by displacement.

The operation of displacement is considered in the following section after discussion of the theoretical framework presented here. The historical institutional approach employed as a conceptual and analytical approach in earlier chapters has been summarised in this section. It seeks to advance a convincing explanation of the path dependency of military tutelage up to 2002, and also to provide an interpretation of the termination of that tutelage in the five years up to 2007. It is a sophisticated framework, grounded in an extensive secondary literature, which aspires to stress deep-seated institutional patterns and to counter more superficial explanations based on events (especially coups) or personalities (especially Erdogan). It, therefore, provides a case study of Turkey suitable to inform comparative studies and provides a framework which can be employed to speculate on future developments. Hence, I turn to a more detailed consideration of displacement and, in that light, reflections on the prospects for a genuinely democratic civil-military relations in Turkey.

Displacement and the Future of Civil-Military Relations

The research upon which this thesis is based covers the period up to 2011. By the end of 2011, the processes of layering and displacement had affected the subordination of the military to civilian control and had ended decades, if not centuries, of military tutelage. The three years from 2008 to 2011 saw massive purges of military officers and secular civilians executed with the full support of the Gulen-linked civilian and military bureaucrats who once were Erdogan's closest allies. Some of the most senior generals were prosecuted in the civilian courts, removed from office, and imprisoned. These were developments unimaginable ten years earlier and constituted a revolutionary critical juncture that set the Turkish Republic on a new path. The JDP, under the leadership of Erdogan, had mobilised popular support, enhanced by shrewd public relations and increasing control of the media, and had enjoyed international support, especially from the EU. Domestically it moved against a weakened military through the judicial system and employed Islamic sympathisers and their organisations, inside as well as outside the military, including the Islamic Gulenist group which Erdogan was later to treat as traitors. The alleged coup plots were clearly unscrupulous devices which were either invented or exaggerated out of all proportion, but the transformed cognitive framework of Turkish society tolerated, and in some quarters celebrated, Erdogan's manipulation of the truth. It seemed that the traditional, Kemalist hierarchies of the officer

corps were paying the price of decades of insularity, arrogance, and disdain. A 'civilian coup' enabled by military hubris.

The assertion of civilian supremacy was widely welcomed, both within and outside Turkey. Chapter five summarised the recommendations of senior officials and politicians for reforms that would create a democratic civil-military relation. The seven recommendations for reform have, in fact, all been carried out to some degree. So, for instance, the number and role of generals in the NSC has been reduced and, although conscription has not been abolished, it has been modified. In 2014 the length of service for educated men was reduced from twelve to six months in a move intended by the JDP to increase its popularity ahead of a general election. In some ways therefore, the goal of civilian supremacy, which was one of the guiding lights of this research project, has been achieved. But in that process, some of the less desirable features of Turkish path-dependency have remained or re-emerged. Most worryingly, democracy has been exploited and cheapened to become a vehicle for personal aggrandisement. An historic toleration of autocracy has allowed media manipulation, it has allowed the promotion of people and business interests sympathetic to the JDP and Erdogan, and opposition to populist measures has been suppressed by JDP colonisation of the administration and the judiciary. Another historical continuity is tolerance of purges which have reached quite astonishing proportions in the military, the judiciary, the civil service, the virtually every other organisation in modern Turkey. Hence, although civilian control of the military might be welcomed, this does not equate to 'democratic civil-military relations' when democracy has departed so dismayingly far away from the principles of representative democracy.

As noted at the beginning of this conclusion, we can end with some signposts for future research on Turkish civil-military relations. First, the military remains a very powerful institution within Turkish society. It has the largest NATO army in Europe. Research should focus on relations between the government and the army on a more practical level. Will Erdogan seek to extend JDP (and Islamic) influence into the army and build bridges with the generals in order to use it to further populist causes in the unstable Middle East? Second, how will civil-military relations be affected by the evolving mission of the military? The focus has shifted from Cold War containment to moderation of the effects of civil wars in Iraq and Syria. As the military arm of an increasingly Islamic state, how will military capabilities be integrated into the policymaking apparatus? Third, to what extent does the relationship between the military and the civilian government vary with the respective popularity of each? If the popularity and electoral success of the JDP should decline, will there be a reciprocal

improvement in the standing of the military? This is the classic institutional cognitive dimension. Fourth, what is the likely role of the military in respect of internal security? There are competing organisations including the gendarmerie, but the question of Kurdish separatism is still very much alive and there is also a future potential for challenges to the (now Presidential) authority of Erdogan. Will the military form informal alliances with other institutions within Turkish society? Will they, for instance, become more determined defenders of the rule of law? Fifthly, successor researchers should be able to employ, to adapt, and to develop the historical-institutional framework which is intrinsic to this thesis. This research has, it is argued, provided a persuasive explanation for remarkable continuity and profound change in the civil-military relations of Turkey. It is imperative to sustain this research mission which is so crucial for Turkish society and the integrity of Turkish democracy.

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APPENDIX A: ETHICS APPROVAL

(A change has been made on the title of the project by the approval of my supervisors after this document was printed)

UNIVERSITY OF
EXETER

CERTIFICATE OF ETHICAL APPROVAL

Academic Unit: Politics

Title of Project: 'A Path Dependent Analysis of the Turkish Civil-Military
Relations since 1980 with a Special Attention to the
Civilian Oversight of the Military'

Research Team Member(s):   Serkan Seker

Project Contact Point: ss541@ex.ac.uk

This project has been approved for the period

From: 26.11.2013
To: 31.10.2015

Ethics Committee approval reference: 09.10.13-5

Signature..   Date....18/6 – 14
(Lise Storm, Chair, SSIS College Ethics Committee)

Request to amend project title approved.

APPENDIX B: PROPOSAL FOR CONSIDERATION BY SSIS ETHICS COMMITTEE

APPENDIX B: ETHICS PROPOSAL

This Proposal has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Exeter College of Social Sciences and International Studies on December 2, 2013 (Approval Reference 09.10.13-5). Only, the English version of the related documents were attached here.

To move between sections of the form click in any of the grey fields. Each field will expand as you type or copy in your information. Your application should be succinct but note that there is no maximum limit for any of the sections contained in the form.

Name: Serkan SEKER

Department: Politics

Students only

I am a PhD Student

Name of Supervisor: Prof Andrew MASSEY

                Prof Stephen WILKS

"My first or second supervisor has seen a copy of the final version of this ethics application and agrees to submission in its current form." ☐ (Double-click on the box and change the 'default value' to 'checked' to confirm supervisor's approval.)

Have you attended any ethics training? If so please give date:

Email: ss541@ex.ac.uk

Project title: A Path-Dependant Analysis of the Turkish Civil-Military Relations Since 1980 with a Specific Attention to the Civilian Oversight of the Military

Fieldwork start and finish dates (duration for which permission is required)

Start   01 January 2014

End   28 February 2014

Date submitted: 11 September 2013

Note: When completing this form be mindful that the purpose of the document is to clearly explain the **ethical considerations** of the research being undertaken. As a generic form it has been constructed to cover a wide-range of different projects so some sections may not seem relevant to you. Please include the information which addresses any ethical considerations for your particular project which will be needed by the committee to approve your proposal.

SYNOPSIS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

Note: (As a guide - 750 words)

The military has been one of the most influential political powers in Turkish politics throughout history. While sociological, historical, and cultural legacies vis-à-vis the military were inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the "foundation philosophy" of the new Turkish Republic rendered the military as the "unique" and autonomous power in the constitutional system. Also, the interventions of the military, both overt and covert, into national politics since 1960 are fundamental "path-dependencies" that strengthened "the soldier" against "the civilian" in the Turkish political arena.

Of being "guardians of the republic" and the "true implementers of the revolution"; the military enjoyed the credit accorded to them by Kemal Ataturk and his followers. The first constitution endorsed in 1924 in the aftermath of the Independence War as well as legal arrangements made thereafter, were the initial systemic formulation of the anti-democratic nature of the civil-military relations that prevented a proper democratic and civilian oversight of the army in the new Turkey.

 Entered in 1946, the Turkish multi-party life is, to a large extent, the history of military coup d'états which reinforced the anti-democratic nature of civil-military relations in each time. Since the bloody 27 May 1960 coup in which Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was executed, Turkey's poor democracy has been similarly interrupted four times by the army. These hard and soft interventions have created new opportunities for the military through which has perpetuated its political power. Throughout these interventions, the interventionist officers have solidified the military's constitutional and constructionist stance over the other state apparatuses by creating new political and military agencies within which the military could shape the political processes. On the other hand, any kind of legal arrangements regarded public-social life was scrutinised and strained by powerful generals with a tutelary interpretation.

The consecutive interventions which have been institutionalised through the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions and other legal regulations have created a military tutelage over the civilian system in which the generals have been given all instruments to intervene in politics and re-shape all walks of public life. Thus, some constitutionally empowered public agencies, such as The National Security Council, The Higher Education Council, and The Supreme Military Council have restricted the civilian power of making policy. In the same vein, the civilian

rights and freedoms have been limited through the   new regulations in the domestic legal order such as The Military Internal Code, The Code of Political Parties, The Electoral Law, and The Trade Unions Code.

A rare possibility of change in the equilibrium of Turkish civil-military relations was observed when Turgut Ozal came to power in the late 1980s. Though the presence of excessive military tutelage and repression was continuing, Ozal`s reformist vision and grassroots support provided him enough power to challenge the status quo. His civilian stance on both internal and foreign affairs, including policy making in military issues infuriated the generals. Despite the unrealised goals because of his sudden death, Ozal`s leadership showed that it is possible to change the balance of power in Turkey where civilian governments had been ousted by the military periodically.

The westernisation of Turkey was a part of Ataturk`s vision so, accordingly, EU membership has long been a prominent goal for civilian agendas. The EU candidacy process was granted in 1999 and the legal requirements of the EU obliged candidate states to initiate a fundamental democratisation process in Turkey.

Thanks to the grassroots support for democratisation and the EU membership candidacy process, the Erdogan governments have been able to endorse some substantial legal arrangements in spite of the continuing military tutelage, especially between 2004 and 2010. Thus, the power struggle between the generals and civilians has entered a new and unprecedented path. The generals` covert and overt interventions in politics have been restrained by Erdogan`s leadership. Accordingly, the National Security Council has become an arena of harsh political arguments between the civilians and the generals in which democratically elected figures sought supremacy over the armed bureaucrats. Though Erdogan has realised some reforms thanks to the huge support of the internal and external determinants during the initial years of his power, he has started to deviate from the path of democratisation as he has weakened the military tutelage. The 2007 presidential election process through which Erdogan has muzzled the formal and informal instruments of the military tutelage has paved way for a critical juncture in which Turkey's balance of power has been transformed unprecedentedly. Erdogan and his allies have strategically used the judiciary and law enforcement powers in order to defeat the secular generals and groups during this process. Erdogan, who has come to power with the promises of democracy in 2002, has set about realising his one-man rule agenda after he has crippled the once mighty generals of Turkey. Although the balance of power has been transformed for the benefit of the elected civilians, Turkey has faced with a growing danger of a new authoritarianism as of 2011. In this new era, though far from its old power, the military will be one of the most influential powers which will determine the future of Turkish politics.

The following sections require an assessment of possible ethical consideration in your research project. If particular sections do not seem relevant to your project please indicate this and clarify why.

RESEARCH METHODS

Note: (As a guide - 250 words)

This project is a critical-explanatory thesis examining the Turkish civil- military relations in the multi-party era**.** This study is done by Serkan SEKER as part of the requirements for the PhD degree at the Politics Department of the University of Exeter. Taking the qualitative research approach, the project will analyse primary and secondary sources from both state archives and personal collections. Personal (semi-structured) interviews with former ministers, members of the Turkish Parliament and senior bureaucrats will form a significant part of the project.

With a view to gain primary data, this study will adopt semi-structured interviews. This research places value on flexibility while building questions. For a thorough understanding of each narration, I shall use a face-to-face interviewing technique, which aims to get deepness and insight of meaning. I am planning to have 20 semi-structured interviews that concentrate on gaining primary data from policy makers and implementers who have expertise and experience on civil-military relations. Interviews will be conducted in Ankara-Turkey between 01 January 2014 and 28 February 2014. Each of the interviews will take almost 40-45 minutes. The researcher will take note during the interview. An audio tape will be on the record throughout the session on condition of the interviewee`s consent. If the interviewee confirms recording, the interview stuff will be destroyed after the transcript has been gained and approved by the participant.

As known, interview is a dynamic way of qualitative research that produces new information in social sciences. Through this original spring, I am planning to gain rich and notable data on civilian oversight problem of the Turkish military in the context civil-military relations.

THE VOLUNTARY NATURE OF PARTICIPATION

Note: You should include a brief outline on how participants will be recruited and whether written consent is obtained. If written consent is not obtained, this should be justified. The submission should include the consent form.

For the project, the researcher plans to interview with former ministers, members of the Turkish Parliament and senior bureaucrats of the Turkish Interior Ministry, all of whom have/had professional experience and/or expertise in civil-military relations.

Initially, the researcher will prepare an experienced participant list with due regard to the project title. The researcher will prepare a participation consent form written in both English and Turkish. Before each interview, the interviewee will be asked to read and sign two copies of the consent form and information. The consent form includes sufficient knowledge on the study and ensures that there is no overt or covert enforcement to take part in the interview, which clearly declares the voluntary nature of it. Before asking sign off the consent form, the informant will be given a reasonable time to consider his/her participation.

The researcher will inform participants of their right to refuse to participate or withdraw from the project whenever and for whatever reason they wish. The interviewees will also be informed on the academic purposes of the data they will provide. These data shall not to be used for any other reasons.

Each of the informants will have the right of anonymity and reviewing the transcript of the interview. In this context, the interviewee will be able to alter some or full part of the given information. Additionally, the participant has the right of withdrawing the given information till the viva date.

THE INFORMED NATURE OF PARTICIPATION

Note: Give a description of how participants will be informed of the nature of the project and whether they will be given an information sheet. If no information sheet is given, it should be justified. The submission should include the information sheet.

Initially the researcher will prepare an experienced participant list with due regard to the project title. Then, through contacting candidate informants, the researcher will share interview requests with a general notification on the PhD project. Throughout the initial conversations, each of the interviewees will be informed of voluntarily basis of their participation alongside the principle of "the right to withdraw from the interview at any time". Lastly, the dates and the times of the interviews will be determined with those persons who agree to participate.

The researcher will write an information sheet, explaining purposes of the project both in English and Turkish. This sheet will include all required information to informants understand vision of the research that they will attend. The information sheet will emphasise matters such as anonymity, confidentiality, the right to withdraw from the interview at any time and transcript review.

At the end of the sheet, it will be mentioned that further details and additional information is going to be presented upon the request of the interviewee at any time.

Before each interview, the interviewee will be asked to read and sign two copies of the information sheet.

ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE HARM

Note: Assessment of any possible harm that research may cause participants (e.g. psychological distress or repercussions of legal, political and economic nature). Any information sheet should clearly state any possible disadvantages participating in the study may have. You should also consider **your own** safety.

All precaution and care will be taken to ensure the interviewees participate willingly and feel comfortable about sharing their experience. In terms of venue, the interviews would be conducted in Ankara in safe surroundings which are acceptable to the interviewees and/or at locations which will be designated by them. At every stage, informants will be told that they have the right to withdraw from the interview and also withdraw their information from the study if they feel unsafe.

DATA PROTECTION AND STORAGE

Note: You should include:

 i)an account of how the anonymity of the participants will be protected

ii) how the security of the data will be guaranteed

iii) if and how the material will be anonymised

iv) what will happen to the material at the end of the project (if retained advise where and how long for).

The researcher is responsible for the confidentiality, anonymity of interviewees and of using the provided data for only academic purposes.

After confirmation of the transcripts by the participants, a numerical coding system will be adopted for each of the interviewees, such as informant 1, informant 2, informant3… On a separate note these codes will be defined according to names of the interviewees. Any identifying information (name, job, etc.) of the interviewees will not be seen in the thesis.

High level private storage instruments will be formed and warranted by the PhD candidate in order to use the interview materials securely. Besides, any personal information about the informants will be stored using pass-worded software and all technological precautions will be taken so as to prevent any accidental disclose of information. Research data will be uploaded to the UoE U drive (http://as.exeter.ac.uk/it/files/udrive/) and deleted from (encrypted) portable devices at the very earliest opportunity.

No other person or third party will be able to access, copy, or collect the interview documents. The information will be kept in accordance with the Data Protection Act and will be treated in confidence according to the criteria of research ethics. Personal data processed for the above purpose shall not be kept for longer than is necessary and all data gathered will be destroyed within 5 years.

DECLARATION OF INTERESTS

Note: You should include

i) an indication of how the participants are informed of any commercial or other interests involved in the project

ii) who funds the research

iii) how and for what purposes the results will be used

iv) how and where the results will be published.

The candidate is on a scholarship funded by the Turkish government, which aims to enhance academic capacity of deputy and district governors. He works as a deputy governor in Turkey. Information provided by the interviewees will solely be used for scientific purposes within the framework of this PhD project. The academic nature of this research will be explained in the information sheet and the interviewees will be ensured that data will not be used for any commercial or other purposes. The candidate, Serkan SEKER, hereby grants that all information presented thanks to interviews are correct and no of third parties will be able to access that information. The candidate also declares that he is not aware of any real, visible or potential clash of interest. If there are any changes in this situation, the candidate is responsible for informing the Committee.

The final copy of the thesis will be published by the University of Exeter as a PhD thesis.

USER ENGAGEMENT AND FEEDBACK

Note: Include an indication of whether and how the participants and users of the research will be consulted when designing, executing and reporting on the study. The submission should state, for example, if participants are given the opportunity to review their own interview transcript and omit statements at this stage.

The researcher will ask participants to authorise their transcripts, any unapproved data will not be adopted. The interviewees will have the chance to read their own interview transcripts before the information is used. Moreover, they may partly or entirely omit their statements at any time they wish before the viva. Any feedback from the informants will be appreciated. However, the researcher will kindly ask from participants to denote any alteration or feedback in such a way that will not impact ultimate structure/design of the thesis that is agreed by the researcher and the supervisor.

ETHICAL REQUIREMENTS OF COUNTRY IN WHICH RESEARCH IS TO BE CONDUCTED (if not UK)

I will investigate the website of the Turkish Higher Education Institution regarding the national ethical principles. I will confirm any further specific necessities if it is required.

NOTE: When submitting your proposal to the Committee please also include the following:

~ Consent form (+ translation, if research is to be conducted with non-English speakers)
~ Information sheet (+ translation, if research is to be conducted with non-English speakers). **For ease, please append these here rather than submitting as separate documents.**
~ **CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS**

Title of Research Project:

A Path-Dependant Analysis of the Turkish Civil-Military Relations Since 1980 with a Specific Attention to the Civilian Oversight of the Military

Details of Project:

This project is an academic study on the Turkish Civil-Military Relations. Its central aim is to analyse the research theme from the Historical Institutionalist approach, and to trace the civilian control of the Turkish Army as a democracy problem. I will ask some 20 Turkish experts (policy makers and implementers) to tell me of their experiences and their understanding of civil-military relations, and civilian oversight of the military.

This is solely an academic research. It has no commercial or other purposes. Data to be gathered thanks to this research will be used only for the PhD project, which is done by Serkan SEKER at the University of Exeter.

Contact Details

For further information about the research or your interview data, please contact:

Serkan SEKER, Department of Politics, University Exeter, Devon UK.   ss541@exeter.ac.uk

If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss with someone else at the University, please contact: Professor Stephen Wilks . Telephone: 01392 723168   Email: S.R.M.Wilks@exeter.ac.uk

Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence. They will not be used other than for the academic purposes as described above and third parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may be required by the law). However, if you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below). Your data will be held in accordance with the Data Protection.

Anonymity:

Interview data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your name, and we will not refer to the group of which you are a member.

TICK HERE: ☐   **DATE**……………………….

Note: your contact details are kept separately from your interview data

Name of interviewee...

Signature...

Email / phone...

Signature of researcher...

2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, one kept by each.

INFORMATION SHEET

Serkan SEKER

University of Exeter, School of Social Sciences and International Studies

Department of Politics Amory Building

Rennes Drive Exeter

DevonEX4 4RJ

United Kingdom

Email:ss541@exeter.ac.uk

Tel:(0044)7500933212

Dear Sir/Madam

I am a PhD student at the University of Exeter School of Social Sciences and International Studies. My project concentrates on civil-military relations in Turkey especially on civilian control of the army in Turkey since 1980.

I would like to interview you to hear your ideas and experiences on civilian control of the army in Turkey and civil-military relations of the country since 1980. I would be very happy to talk with you in your office or in any public place that suits you. The interview is planned to last around 60-90 minutes. The interview will be recorded for accuracy`s sake. Let me assure you that the principles of confidentiality and the maintenance of your anonymity are guaranteed.

Your contribution will help to form a crucial part of my PhD project, so I kindly ask your utmost assistance to this research by sharing your views and experiences. The research findings are of great importance as the data to be used in a PhD thesis with the potential to inform and buttress civilian and democratic oversight of the army in Turkey.

The purposes of this project are:

1-   To theorise Turkish civil-military relations and the concept of "civilian oversight of the military in Turkey,

2-   To identify "path-dependencies", "lock-ins" and "critical junctures" in Turkish civil-military relations ,

3-   To clarify the institutional predisposition of the military to be an autonomous power in Turkey,

4-   To examine the influences of constitutional regulations in the making of civilian oversight of the military in Turkey,

5-   To examine impact of powerful external (the EU) and internal (political leadership) variables on the concept of civilian control of the army in Turkey,

6-   To develop an analytical and critical framework on the civilian oversight of the Turkish military for future researchers.

I shall pay a follow-up visit to request your consent for the interview and shall be very happy to discuss any queries during my visit.

Here, I wish like to express my gratitude.

APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDE (in ENGLISH)

(I)

1- How do you describe the concepts of "civil-military relations in Turkey", and "civilian oversight of the military"?

2- Which factors do you think have determined the fundamentals of the Turkish civil-military relations?

3- Could you please tell me about your experience of working with Turkish military officers?

4- In light of your professional experience and intellectual accumulation, could you please tell me about your interpretations on the outlook of the officer-corps on civilian persons and institutions?

(II)

5-What do you think of Turkey's question of civilian oversight of the military - is the military being monitored by the elected authorities?

6- Is civilian oversight of the military in Turkey a necessity? If so, are current legal regulations and constitutional infrastructure giving enough legal mandates to civilians in order to monitor the military?

7- How does the self-governing educational system in the military schools, which is independent of the civilian authorities, influence Turkish civil-military relations?

8-What do you think of the direct and indirect military interventions in politics in Turkey?

9- Could you please evaluate the impacts of these interventions on civil-military relations?

10-What are the reasons of having been so many military interventions in Turkish politics?

(III)

11-How has Turkey's European Union full-membership process influenced civil-military relations, and the question of civilian oversight of the military in Turkey?

12-How can a powerful civilian leadership influence civil-military relation?

13- How have "Ergenekon" and "Sledgehammer" criminal prosecutions, named as "coup cases", influenced civil-military relations in Turkey?

(IV)

14-What are the main problems in civil-military relations in Turkey? What kind of reforms does Turkey need to overcome those problems?

APPENDIX D

A very important necessity of the data collection process in the qualitative interviewing is to produce accurate and credible information. In light of the statements of the participants, it is incumbent upon the researcher to frame validity and reliability of the data(Guba, 1981,p.77). Validity can be described as a proposition in research with a measurement that leads to valid conclusions (Trochim, 2006). In order to reach valid and trustworthy conclusions, the researcher ought to employ these four interrelated criteria:

1)Credibility, 2)Transferability, 3) Dependability, 4) Confirmability (Shenton,2004, pp.63-64).Table 1 was adopted from Kelley(2011, p.74). It explains the core elements for framing trustworthiness in research, and presents approaches applied in this project in the quest to ensure a reliable and valid study.

Framing Trustworthiness in Qualitative Interviewing

Criteria	Scope	The Research Method
Credibility	Handling the research theme in a way that procures an accurate identification and description of the phenomenon.	The qualitative interviewing process monitored by supervisors and the Ethics Committee of the University of Exeter. The Committee reviewed each step of the interview agenda, and approved the research proposal submitted by the researcher. Before granting approval, the Committee asked several changes in the interview documents, and made some recommendations to the researcher. Each participant was given an opportunity to audit his/her interview transcripts for accuracy.

		They also had the right to change and /or retract personal statements documented through transcriptions until the PhD project is completed.
Transferability	Introducing a precise interpretation of perceptions and experiences of research contributors.	25 Turkish civilians were selected to take part in the field research based on the following criteria: 1- they had at least 10year's work experience regarding civil-military relations or expertise on issues regarding the research subject; 2- they were currently working in senior posts are entitled to policy making or implementation concerning civil-military relations; 3 – they graduated from social science departments or law faculties.
Dependability	Maintaining detailed documentation using adequate sources to establish an audit trail.	The semi-structured interview sessions lasted between 50 and 70 minutes. Each informant was asked the same set of open-ended questions. In a free debate environment, each informant was enabled to answer the questions without being interrupted. The researcher transcribed the participants' statements word by word as they were recorded during the interview sessions. Then he translated Turkish transcripts into English.

Confirmability	Having a logbook of observations to minimise any bias while conducting interviews and analysis.	I took notes on the thoughts and behaviours of the participants during each interview session. The logbook was used along with interview transcripts to have a bias-free analysis.

Table 1 adapted from*A Study Exploring Factors Supporting Continued Underrepresentation of Oguta Women in Leadership Roles in Nigeria (Doctoral Dissertation),by* KELLEY, N.O. (2011),PROQUEST:University of Phoenix

The above-mentioned principles have been followed in order to frame trustworthiness in this qualitative interviewing.