Milton’s Utopian Millennium:
Ideal Society and Eschatology in Seventeenth-Century
England

Submitted by Anthony Bromley to the University of Exeter
as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in English,
In May 2021.

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Anthony Bromley
Abstract

This thesis presents the argument that in John Milton’s theology, political philosophy and poetry there is an underexplored relationship between utopianism and millenarianism. The study defines this relationship as the utopian millennium, through which the utopian values of control and regulation secure a chiliastic future. In a series of comparative chapters, the thesis traces how Milton’s utopian millenarianism can be situated within and how it develops through the intellectual, political and radical landscape of mid-seventeenth-century England. The study analyses Milton’s theology and political philosophy alongside contemporary intellectuals and radical figures, such as, amongst others, Samuel Hartlib, James Harrington, Thomas Hobbes, Marchamont Nedham, and Gerrard Winstanley. It also considers how the utopian and millenarian ideas of Milton’s prose works are reflected in his epic poetry. In doing so, the study observes how Milton’s gradual loss of faith in the English people encourages utopian formulations in the hope of ensuring the realisation of his eschatology. Milton’s growing disillusionment with the people coincides with his growing elitism: from the early 1640s to the end of his life, he placed his faith of those who he believed were capable of realising the millennium in fewer and fewer people. In contrast to the studious community of London in Areopagitica in 1644, by 1671, Milton idealises perfect, elect individuals, to whom he can aspire, if not with whom he self-identifies. Milton’s utopian millennium, tolerant and yet elitist, unorthodox and yet conservative, encodes the dynamic changes of the political and intellectual landscape of the mid-seventeenth-century.
Acknowledgements

I am indebted to the tireless support of Nicholas McDowell, particularly for his frequent, comprehensive, and valuable comments on this thesis in its various drafts and incarnations. As a distance learning student, I am aware that I may not have felt as welcome with other supervisors as I did in my monthly visits to Exeter. In light of his recent book, I can attest that the quality of Nick’s research is matched only by the quality of his teaching. I am also grateful to Niall Allsopp, whose sharp and perceptive comments on drafts of this dissertation broadened my understanding of seventeenth-century political philosophy. Lilla Grindlay should be aware that this thesis would never have been realised had she not handed me a copy of Paradise Lost some seven years ago. My parents and my wider family have always remained steadfastly supportive of my academic pursuits, however far removed these may be from farm life. I am especially thankful to my grandfather, Brian, who unfortunately passed away while I was researching for this thesis. His belief in my academic work has remained an inspiration in the most challenging periods of my research. My other major inspiration in my studies and beyond is my fiancé, Elizabeth Bradley, to whom I became engaged in the final year of my research. It was Elizabeth’s idea that I pursue my interest in Milton further and it is Elizabeth to whom I have turned in times of difficulty during the last four years, not least during the recent pandemic. I now look forward to a life with her and, of course, with Milton.
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Note on Texts & Abbreviations

In all quotations, punctuation, spelling, and italicization are unaltered from the originals, apart from the modernisation of the long s, i/j, and u/v. Where a text is discussed at length, page references and, where relevant, line numbers will be provided parenthetically in the running text. The place of publication is London unless otherwise stated. All references to Milton’s shorter poems are to Barbara Kiefer Lewalski and Estelle Haan, eds., Complete Works of John Milton. Volume III: The Shorter Poems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; corrected impression, 2014) (CWJM iii.). All references to Paradise Lost are to Alastair Fowler, ed., Paradise Lost (Harlow: Longman, 1998) and are incorporated parenthetically by book and line numbers. The following abbreviations have been used throughout:


**HP** Hartlib Papers, Sheffield University. References are taken from the online resource, accessible at https://www.dhi.ac.uk/hartlib/

**OED** Oxford English Dictionary

**ODNB** Oxford Dictionary of National Biography

Introduction

Utopianism was diverse, divergent, and pervasive in mid-seventeenth-century England. It encompassed not only Baconian intellectualism – the belief that the propagation of empirical knowledge could bring about a return to man’s prelapsarian dominion of nature – but also the stringent, regulated totality of More’s *Utopia* (1516).\(^1\) It was not ‘nowhere’, an unrealistic and unrealised social vision, but rather a pragmatic and achievable visionary mode of thinking. As a prospect of earthly perfection, the millennium, which was broadly anticipated by much of English society in the 1640s and 1650s, served as an essential referent and source of inspiration for utopianism in the period. The turbulent events of the mid-seventeenth-century – the English civil wars, the republic, and the Restoration – produced myriad religious and political ideologies that accommodated utopian values of regulation and control in order to better secure and emulate the perfection expected at the millennium. While liberty of conscience, for instance, was central to the radical millenarian theology of Gerrard Winstanley (1609-76), in response to the failure of his Digger colonies on St George’s Hill and in Cobham, Winstanley produced the utopian work, *The Law of Freedom* (1652), in order to more successfully appeal to Oliver Cromwell and the government for reform.\(^2\) As the case of Winstanley suggests, religious freedom was compatible with utopianism and millenarianism. While this study will acknowledge how utopianism became aligned with political ideologies, such as English republicanism, it will focus on the complex and often idiosyncratic relationship between utopia and millennium, particularly in the political and poetic works of John Milton (1608-74). In doing so, the thesis will also reflect more broadly on how these ideas developed, evolved, and adapted to the unprecedented political and social changes of mid-century England.

Milton’s utopianism developed in tandem with his radically changing socio-political context and shows how ideas of utopia and the millennium could evolve in response to the events of the mid-seventeenth-century. Milton was directly engaged with major intellectual, political and religious events and groups of his time, from the


enterprise of the Hartlib Circle, to the political upheaval of the English republic, under which he served as Secretary for Foreign Tongues, and even in his exposure to early English Quakerism in later life through his student and friend Thomas Ellwood (1639-1714). Milton was often aware of how society could usher in the millennium, and associated himself with groups and events to realise that end: in 1644, in his engagement with the Hartlib circle, Baconian intellectualism was prominent in Milton’s mind; the English republic and the Cromwellian Protectorate during the 1650s retained eschatological potential, while the English people, favouring monarchy, lost it; in the Restoration, this potential narrowed further to the select few capable of realising the millennium themselves. This study will show how Milton’s elitism, which became increasingly entrenched throughout the 1640s and beyond, influenced the development of his utopian millenarianism. Whereas in *Areopagitica* (1644), Milton envisions an ideal society contributing to an eschatological good, by 1671, in *Paradise Regain’d*, Milton’s utopian millennium was internalised in the figure of the Son. Milton’s growing disaffection with the English people necessitated utopian formulations. The popular desire for a return of the monarchy encouraged his most distinctly utopian text, *The Readie and Easie Way* (1659), which sought a return to republicanism on stringent terms. While Milton’s unorthodox theology and advocacy of religious toleration identifies him alongside contemporary radicalism, his elitism nonetheless marks him apart from such radicals as Winstanley. Milton’s utopian millennium represents a conjunction between toleration and elitism in the seventeenth-century. This thesis will, therefore, show both how Milton’s utopianism developed alongside his millenarianism, and also how this informs our understanding of his alignment with – or lack thereof – contemporary radicalism.

**UTOPIA**

Many discussions of utopianism equate utopia with ideal society without the qualifications necessary for the seventeenth-century. While ‘utopia’, as the *OED* suggests, could mean simply a ‘hypothetical place, system, or state of existence in which everything is perfect’, in the seventeenth-century, Milton himself denigrates

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‘Atlantick and Eutopian polities, which never can be drawn into use’ (CPW ii. 526) in Areopagitica (1644). Similarly, Thomas Hall (1610-65), in his A Confutation of the Millenarian Opinion (1657), identifies utopianism alongside millenarianism as equally idealistic, unlike the true, apocalyptic manifestation of Christ’s kingdom: ‘the Lord at last would bring us, not to a Millenarian, Utopian, Imaginary, Terrestrial Kingdom; but to a Real, Caelestial and Everlasting Kingdom’.\(^4\) Hall not only establishes a connection between millenarianism and utopianism, but he also identifies a dichotomy between this kind of earthly end time and the latter, apocalyptic eschatology. Hall’s use of ‘Real’ is ambiguous: while not ‘substantial’, the apocalyptic kingdom is ‘not imaginary’ (OED); Hall seems to be placing the emphasis on the idealism of utopianism and millenarianism, in contrast to the certainty – and future reality – of the apocalypse. In Paradise Lost, by comparison, Adam views Eden in contrast to his dream: ‘whereat I waked, and found / Before mine eyes all real, as the dream / Had lively shadowed’ (viii. 309-11).\(^5\) Whereas Hall conflates utopia with millennium as jointly idealistic, this study will address how some millenarians perceived utopianism as a model of political and educational reform that could help to usher in the millennium. As the following chapter will explain in more detail, the utopianism that this study will discuss draws on the precedent of Thomas More’s (1478-1535) Utopia and Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626) New Atlantis (1626). The strict, regulated community of Utopia and the advancement of knowledge central to New Atlantis are ideas that feature prominently in the utopian and millenarian texts considered in this study. Milton’s engagement with utopian and millenarian ideas is often directly tied to contemporary groups or events, such as the Hartlib circle and the Restoration; it is far removed from the idealism he criticises in Areopagitica. The cross-fertilisation of ideas in the mid-seventeenth-century meant that utopianism in the period was multifaceted and multivalent, manifesting in various forms and various interpretations of More and Bacon’s precedent.\(^6\)

J. C. Davis’s analysis of utopianism in Utopia and the Ideal Society, which ranges from Thomas More to the mid-seventeenth century, remains a seminal work on utopian literature, and will serve as an important critical source for this dissertation. Davis argues that contemporary criticism on utopianism establishes a disparity between

\(^4\) Thomas Hall, A Confutation of the Millenarian Opinion, Plainly demonstrating that Christ will not Reign Visibly and Personally on earth with the Saints for a thousand yeers either before the day of Judgement, in the day of Judgement, or after it (1657), sig. A7.

\(^5\) The empiricism of Eden and its relation to utopianism and millenarianism in Baconian terms is discussed in Chapter 7, pp. 263-70.

the ‘classical utopia’ first depicted by More and the ‘modern utopia’ of mid-seventeenth-century writers, such as Samuel Hartlib (1600-62) and James Harrington (1611-77). This is seen, generally, as a disparity between the abstract classical utopia, which the writer has no intention of being realised, and the pragmatic modern utopia, which ‘seeks primarily to change social arrangements, only thereby changing man’, and incorporates ‘a capacity for change within the model society.’ In pursuit of a more comprehensive definition, Davis returns to the fundamental roots of utopianism, as constituting part of the generic form of ideal society. Davis identifies the taut balance between ‘the existing and changing supply of satisfactions’ and ‘the wants of a heterogenial group’. The problem exists in the challenge of meeting supply with demand: this can be either quantitative (people want more), qualitative (people want different satisfactions), or the unequal social distribution of such satisfactions. Having explained the collective problem of a society, Davis outlines the varying forms of ideal society – of which utopia is part – that theoretically strive to tackle this problem.

Davis defines four major forms of ideal society separate from utopia: Cockaygne, Arcadia, the Perfect Moral Commonwealth, and millenarianism. In the Land of Cockaygne, a medieval European tradition, ‘there were satisfactions enough to satiate the grossest appetite.’ Through complete individual sensual fulfilment, the potential for conflict is eliminated; there is no desire for anything alternative to that which is provided in Cockayne. In Arcadia, while nature is not as overwhelmingly generous as that of Cockaygne, men’s desires are more reserved. Where Cockaygne increases supply to meet demand, Arcadia envisions reduced demand to meet supply. With similarities to Arcadia, the Perfect Moral Commonwealth was structured on the ‘moral reformation of every individual in society’. Like Arcadia, such moral improvement was commensurate with a reduction of appetite, which, in turn, increased satisfaction. The most popular and prevalent form of ideal society in the mid-seventeenth-century was millenarianism. According to Davis, millenarians considered history as ‘a meaningless flow of contingencies’, in which meaning was only ascribed to major Christian events (creation, fall, incarnation, resurrection). It was, therefore, defined by the fervent anticipation of the second coming of Christ; this solution, significantly, was valued above the means of achieving it. ‘In this case’, Davis argues, ‘the ideal society is left as a vague, tenuously perceived goal and neither in its

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conception nor its realisation can it be described or analysed.\textsuperscript{8} The potential to achieve the millennium of Christ is taken out of the hands of men. However, while for some millenarians this did result in a more passive attitude to imminent social reform, in that society simply had to wait for the second coming to herald a new millennium, it also encouraged more active sectarianism from those who believed that societal reform preceded and was a catalyst of the second coming.\textsuperscript{9} Millenarianism can, to some extent, explain this paradox: the prospect of Christ descending to earth – as opposed to the apocalyptic end of time, where earth is subsumed into the Kingdom of Heaven – encouraged social reform to prepare society in the hope of expediting the second coming. The Fifth Monarchists, believing that they were saints aiding in the realisation of the millennium, were some of the most aggressive and, in their governmental presence, influential of mid-seventeenth-century active millenarians. The Hartlibians and the Diggers acted with a similar degree of millenarian agency in their respective educational and agrarian efforts. Within this sectarian and intellectual context, Milton himself, exhibiting millenarian ideas as early as ‘Lycidas’ (1637), but more prominently in the anti-prelatical tracts, can be identified as such an active millenarian.\textsuperscript{10} This study will focus on seventeenth-century millenarians who believed that societal reform was a central part of the process of bringing about the second coming.

Davis explains that, in notable contrast to the alternate forms of ideal society, the utopian embraces the reality of ‘limited satisfactions exposed to unlimited wants.’ Rather than unrealistically hoping for moral reformation or awaiting divine intervention, the utopian imposes restrictions through laws with the intention of controlling social problems, such as crime, poverty, insurrection, and war. By reorganising society through education, legal restrictions, and sanctions, the utopian attempts to solve the collective problem. In Davis’s own, definitive words: ‘The totality of the utopian vision is part of the perfection, the order of the utopia. It stems from the urge, not merely to improve, but to perfect. These three – totality, order, perfection – are cardinal characteristics of the utopian form.’ This utopian totality and the desire to

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., pp. 21, 29-30, 36.
perfect remain central tenets of utopian writings in the mid-seventeenth-century. The decision to impose control in the form of social totality is shared by many mid-seventeenth-century writers, even those who are conventionally not considered to be utopian. While Davis identifies James Harrington as utopian, for instance, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), whose utopianism is, in many respects, more immediately evident than Harrington’s, is not included in Davis’s study. By encompassing both millennium and utopia as forms of ideal society, Davis accommodates their intellectual proximity during the seventeenth-century. However, by separating utopia and millennium into distinct categories of ideal society, Davis does not reflect the interrelationship between the two forms of ideal society. This study will show how the millenarians who believed in the reform of society as a necessary precursor of the millennium sometimes perceived that reform as utopian, whether as the Baconian advancement of knowledge or as a homogenous, regulated society in the style of More’s Utopia.

Amy Boesky’s Founding Fictions offers an analysis of utopianism that brings attention to the institutionalism that often attends it. Boesky explains that she views ‘the utopia as both a fiction and a sociology of statehood, centrally concerned with organization, with new institutions, and with institutionalism.’ She identifies the fictional nature of utopias – specifically the artifice of the travel narrative – and how they are often ‘found’ by individuals, which reflects the imperial context of the New World colonies. Boesky includes, most importantly, Bacon’s utopian institution in New Atlantis, Salomon’s House, and its mid-century realisation, the Hartlibian Office of Address, both of which drew on the idea of Michel de Montaigne, who, in turn, inspired Théophraste Renaudot’s Bureau d’adresse. Boesky’s analysis of utopias in the 1640s is expansive, covering both the Hartlib circle – including Gabriel Plattes’s A Description of the Famous Kingdome of Macaria (1641) – and Winstanley’s Law of Freedom (1652). She even accommodates Milton’s The Readie and Easie Way (1659) into her discussion of utopia, aligning the tract with ‘the utopias of industry which it succeeds.’ As Boesky argues, ‘the utopia taught the preeminence of the state, the need for supervision, surveillance, and control. Perhaps most important, utopias demonstrated that institutions, not individuals, had the capacity to manufacture and transform

13 On the Office of Address, see Webster, Great Instauration, pp. 67-77; Nicholas McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance in the English Civil Wars: Marvell and the Cause of Wit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 54-67.
Boesky is also quick to draw away from the utopian totality that Davis outlines: ‘Utopias often strike modern readers as restrictive or totalitarian’; ‘Macaria may sound grimly over regulated to modern readers’. Boesky instead spends much of her book identifying the fictional elements of utopianism, such as the travel narrative. Such a literary approach to utopianism is valuable as a contrast to Davis’s historical interpretation. This study, however, intends to accommodate both perspectives to better reflect the diverse intellectual and textual environment of the mid-seventeenth-century. James Harrington’s (1611-77) *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656), for instance, while in part a utopian fiction, nevertheless lacks a travel dialogue; Thomas Hobbes similarly depicts the Leviathan state on the frontispiece of *Leviathan*, incorporating an artifice that diverges from the traditional utopian travel narrative. The relationship between utopianism, the millennium, and institutions, such as the English republic that Milton defended and worked for, will help to show how ideas of the utopian millennium reflected major political events of the mid-seventeenth-century.

Chloë Houston’s book, *The Renaissance Utopia*, begins to address the relationship between the fiction of utopia and its realisation in society, while also providing a valuable insight into the dynamic between utopianism and millenarianism. Rather than comparing utopianism to other forms of ideal society, as we see in Davis, Houston casts her net more widely, asserting that ‘in the Renaissance period a utopia is a text which portrays an ideal or seemingly ideal society in order to address the question of how to live well.’ This encompasses such a wide generic field that both Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantis* (1626) and John Dury’s *The Reformed School* (1650) are included. Davis categorises Bacon as a millenarian rather than a utopian, but Bacon was a significant precedent for establishing common ground between utopianism and millenarianism in the seventeenth-century. Houston’s less rigid approach better reflects the cross-fertilisation of ideas in the period. ‘A text’, Houston explains, ‘may be classed as utopian when it contains a description of an ideal society, even if the text as a whole is concerned with other matters’.

According to Houston’s definition, while Milton produced no specific, self-contained utopian vision, many of his works – such as, most

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Houston also offers a valuable analysis of the relationship between utopianism and millenarianism, but she limits her analysis to the 1640s when the more practical ‘utopian moment’ was during the 1650s. ‘As political conditions and millennial enthusiasm converged to make the perfect earthly community appear to be within reach,’ Houston asserts, ‘the utopia formed a central means of both imagining and promoting its achievement.’ Millenarians, such as Milton and the Hartlib circle, considered political and educational reform as necessary to realise the millennium. Utopian ideas of a homogenous, systemised state and of the propagation of knowledge both constituted part of the reform envisioned by some of these millenarians. In *A Description of the Famous Kingdome of Macaria* (1641) by Gabriel Plattes, for instance, the traveller insists to the scholar that utopian reform on the model of Macaria – specifically in the centralisation and control of medical knowledge – will precede the millennium. Houston goes on to discuss the Latin romance, *Nova Solyma* (1648), by Samuel Gott (1614-71), a utopia which she identifies as millenarian in its depiction of what Jerusalem would be like following the conversion of the Jews, which was a prominent event in the seventeenth-century millenarian imagination. However, Houston concludes that after the 1640s, ‘utopia no longer seemed within reach for England. The utopian moment, encapsulated in the optimistic idealism of the mid-seventeenth-century, had passed, and in its passing, the unqualified belief in the truth and imminent reality of the ideal society was also left behind.’

This study will revise the limits imposed by Houston by showing how Milton’s utopianism developed in tandem with and in response to the radical political transformation of the 1650s. Houston’s inclusive definition of utopianism is valuable, but restricting utopianism to the 1640s fails to reflect the pervasive nature of utopian ideas in mid-seventeenth-century society.

Jonathan Scott, in his perceptive analysis of English classical republicanism in the seventeenth-century, *Commonwealth Principles*, identifies More as an important precedent for Greek classical republicanism in the period. Scott argues that More’s *Utopia* ‘not only combines the metaphysics and community of property of Plato’s

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Republic, but does so within a humanist context which is self-consciously anti-Roman.’ As such, More contributes to the increased attention placed on Greek classical republicanism in the seventeenth-century that differed from – if not contradicted – the political philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527).20 This study will show how utopianism – particularly the regulated utopianism characterised by More’s Utopia and articulated by Davis above – became more prominent in the 1650s. Where Harrington, for instance, wrote Oceana partly in response to the failure of the successive republican parliaments in the early 1650s, Marchamont Nedham (1620-78) responded to Harrington in his ‘letters from Utopia’ in 1657, identifying utopianism as a threat to the security of the Protectorate; Milton, moreover, wrote partly in response to Harrington in his most distinctly utopian work, The Readie and Easie Way (1659). Milton’s opposition to the fiction of traditional utopias is clear in Areopagitica and in the lack of such a text in his corpus. The utopianism that he would nevertheless come to espouse – both the Baconian utopianism of 1644 and the Morean utopianism in 1659 – was that of ideas rather than ideals, of utopian concepts rather than detailed blueprints of ideal societies. Milton’s was a theoretical rather than monumentalised utopianism. Milton’s utopianism would be depicted in his later epic poetry, Paradise Lost and Paradise Regain’d.

The utopianism considered in this study infiltrated into and was a manifestation of its socio-political context. In their Utopian Thought in the Western World, Frank and Fritzie Manuel argue that utopianism should be considered as a timeless genre, and not be analysed in the confines of its historical context:

Limiting an interpretation to the immediate environment of the utopian, tying him down too closely and mechanically to the precise circumstances and incidents that could have triggered his writing, fails to recognize that he may have something ahistorical to say about love, aggression, the nature of work, the fulfilment of personality.21

This study maintains a contrary view of utopianism: mid-seventeenth-century utopianism was a product of the radical political landscape of the period. Fervent millenarian anticipation attended such unprecedented events as the civil wars and the regicide of Charles I in January 1649. Utopian ideas of the advancement of knowledge

and of a homogenous totality similarly grew in volume, as they were perceived as means of realising the millennium. Milton engaged with both the Baconian idea of the propagation of knowledge in the early 1640s through the Hartlib circle and with a Morean, regulated totality in 1660, on the eve of the Restoration; it is in his later epic poetry that he shifts from utopian reform in society to that of the individual, specifically in the inner utopia of the Son of Paradise Regain’d. Utopianism was a model of reform, particularly that of politics and education, which was perceived by seventeenth-century millenarians as a tool for ushering in the millennium.

MILLENNIUM

The compatibility of utopianism and millenarianism depends on their mutual perfectionism. The perfect ideal of the millennium correlates with the absolutist, utopian means of achieving it. Millenarianism itself is distinguished from other forms of eschatology, such as apocalypticism, for its anticipation of Christ’s second coming on earth. Millenarians who expected a terrestrial millennium believed that it was necessary to enact social, political, and educational reform in anticipation of this singular event. Lutz Greisiger explicates the differences between the various forms of eschatology:

*Millennialism* may be used in the universalized sense current within millennial studies, as referring to beliefs in a breakthrough to a time profoundly better than the present. In contrast, *millenarianism and millenarian* may be reserved for discourses involving a millennium in the narrower sense, a penultimate period of near perfection preceding the actual end of history, as it is so particularly widespread and specified in Abrahamic traditions.

Apocalypticism, as a third eschatological form, ‘does not necessarily involve a millennium or similar interim period.’ For many of the millenarians considered in this study, the millennium was imminent and would be brought about by divine intervention, but still necessitated societal transformation in preparation for that *deus ex machina*. The importance of the distinction between apocalypse and millennium for Milton was that individuals – particularly the elite individuals to whose example Milton aspired – could assist in the realisation of eschatological change. 'History,’ Greisiger explains, ‘as envisioned by the apocalypticist, is marked by determinism and periodization: since eternity each and every event has been predestined in God’s master
plan and the unfolding of this plan discloses its pattern, bit by bit.’ At least from 1644, Milton did not advocate Calvinist predestination; instead, he placed greater emphasis on the role of individuals, particularly superior, elect individuals. In Milton’s seventeenth-century millenarian mindset, such individuals could contribute to the realisation of his eschatology. The millennium provided a referent of perfection to which utopian writers could aspire, and played a significant role in Milton’s theology.

Nigel Smith’s *Perfection Proclaimed* identifies the millenarian perfectionism of 1640s and 1650s, which served as the end goal of some forms of utopianism, such as Milton’s. Acknowledging the significance of the ‘more spectral presence of radicals’ dating back to the 1550s, Smith explains that the mid-seventeenth-century was a unique time for religious sectarianism in England. He writes that ‘1640 was the first time the phenomenon had broken out on such a scale’, and fed into the ‘civil turmoil in the following years’: ‘It is no surprise that the abolition of episcopal government, the collapse of the censorship, and the absence of a national policy of church government throughout the Interregnum contributed to the expansion and fragmentation.’ The mid-seventeenth-century environment was a breeding-ground for nonconformity. Myriad radical sects emerged in the late 1640s in response to turbulent contemporary events. Apart from Smith’s impressive analysis of myriad sectarian radicals, most important to this study is his discussion of millenarian perfectionism:

The quality which most centrally characterizes the subject of this book is the attempt to bear witness in expression and behaviour to the immediacy and charisma of the Holy Spirit, however it was defined. It was the search for perfection, or the claim that it had arrived, which led to the most interesting discursive experiments of the Interregnum years.

Millenarians anticipated the second coming of Christ with fervour; the political changes of the 1640s indicated to such believers that the wait was almost over. Significantly, this ‘search for perfection’ appears to associate, if not align, with Milton’s millenarian pursuit of truth. The perfection of this absolute form of truth, just like the perfection identified by Smith, is mirrored in the utopian totality, as it is defined by Davis. Like other utopians, Milton channels the perfection he perceives in Christ and his thousand-year reign into the utopianism he invests into his works. Smith concludes that ‘Versions

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of self were created which moved increasingly towards the merging of the individual with the Godhead, the ultimate claim for perfection.\textsuperscript{24} This thesis argues that Milton looks to societal reform as a means of advancing the nation collectively towards his millenarian ends. Towards the end of his life, as he depicts his utopian millennium in his epic poetry, figures such as the Son of Paradise Regain’d may even be viewed as a ‘version of self’ for Milton. Milton came to employ utopian ideas, especially the idea of a perfect totality, as the most effective means through which society could usher in the millennium.

Barbara Lewalski offers a perceptive analysis of Milton’s peculiar millenarianism in her essay, ‘Milton and the Millennium’. Lewalski acknowledges that ‘the millennium is important for both the argument and imaginative vision of Milton’s poetry and prose.’ She explains that Milton’s millenarianism was dependent on contemporary events: ‘When the reformation seemed to be going well, he imagined that the millennium might be close at hand, and when it was in difficulties he deduced […] that Christ “will be slow to come” (CPW vi. 618).’ The connection that Lewalski observes between Milton’s theology and his political philosophy informs an understanding of how Milton’s utopianism infiltrated into his prose as well as his poetic writings:

The projected downfall of all tyrants at the millennium offered support to his other arguments from scripture and natural law for eradicating bishops, idolatry and kingship, disestablishing the church, and promoting religious and intellectual liberty. And from 1648 on the projected millenarian reign of Christ as the only rightful earthly king regularly served Milton as an argument for republican government.

Political transformation, particularly that which secured religious toleration, was an essential tool for ushering in the millennium for Milton. In Areopagitica, Milton associated the millennium with liberty of conscience; in the 1650s, Milton continued to support the English republic and Cromwellian Protectorate in part due to their tolerant religious policies. By 1660, it became necessary for Milton to articulate a more distinctly utopian blueprint in The Readie and Easie Way, especially with his awareness of the ideas of James Harrington. As Lewalski asserts, Milton believed that ‘the

millennium will come when the English (and presumably others) have become virtuous and free, rejecting all the forces that promote servility.”

Toleration was increasingly important to Milton’s theology from the 1640s onwards and represents a central means through which he believed society could usher in the millennium. In *Milton and Toleration*, Nigel Smith offers a valuable essay on Milton’s tolerationist views. Smith explains that while the ‘chiliast notion that it was time in the last days to gather the faithful and that no truth should be excluded in a debate that would finally establish the true church’ was a view that ‘Milton famously propounds in *Areopagitica*’, the same tract is also recognised for its defence of heretical Protestant views:

> Behind all of this lies the tradition of intellectual freedom of belief that belonged to elite groups in Europe, and that we most readily associate with the Italian city states of the later Middle Ages and the sixteenth century. Milton himself is a very pure descendant from this tradition, where speculation belonging to an educated elite might be left alone by ecclesiastical authorities.

Smith explains how Milton’s early formulation of toleration developed into his ‘mature knowledge of religious toleration and persecution, of free will theology and of anti-trinitarian theology’ in works such as *Of Civil Power* (1659) and *Of True Religion* (1673). ‘His writing,’ Smith continues, ‘fusing classical republicanism and advanced Protestantism, is dedicated toward inculcating freedom and belief as vigorously anti-idolatrous and hence anti-enslaved activities’. Religious freedom is central to Milton’s millenarianism. In *Areopagitica*, the citizens of Milton’s idealised London are at liberty to collectively contribute to millenarian truth; by 1673, in *Of True Religion*, the boundaries of Milton’s toleration (not including his entrenched anti-Catholicism) had only expanded.

The religious liberty that Milton defends in his works is a liberty to serve God, as Davis explains in his ‘Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution’. Davis acknowledges that there were different perceptions of freedom in the

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seventeenth-century, and how commentators often suggest that the Calvinist ‘disciplinary assurance of double predestination was displaced by an “Arminian” emphasis on free will and human agency’. Milton does not fit into a single discrete category: his advocacy of free will invites comparisons with Arminianism, though he distances himself from Arminians in both 1644 and 1673 (CPW ii. 519-20; viii. 425-6); he is frequently against Calvinism, especially in his opposition to Presbyterians, but he retains a belief in the elect, or at least a meritocratic elite, as does the God of Paradise Lost (iii. 183-4). Davis cautions that ‘we should not automatically identify liberty with personal autonomy or individual self-expression, self-realization.’ Distinguished from civil liberty, religious liberty was more commonly associated with obedience: ‘Properly understood, liberty of conscience meant submission to God, therefore, and not to self. The notion of personal autonomy was a gross misunderstanding of such liberty and its consequences were horrifying.’ As Dzelzainis explains in relation to Samson Agonistes (1671), ‘what matters in turn about [Samson] freeing himself from inward slavery is that it means he becomes a slave to God instead – once more alieni iuris and subject to heteronomous impulses and commands, this time of divine origin.’ The irony, as Davis observes, was that tolerance of religious diversity necessitated obedience: ‘Liberty of conscience was one side of a coin, the other face of which was submission and discipline.’ Crucial to Milton’s mature theology, as it is represented in his later poetry, such as Paradise Lost, is that the individual is free to choose to obey. The hierarchical structure that frames that choice, whereby in Paradise Lost obedience promises heavenly ascension and disobedience eternal damnation, encourages utopian homogeneity. For Milton, toleration was necessary to achieve the millennium, but the conditions of that toleration and the system in which it existed were dependent on the state of England and its people at the time.

Milton’s millennium was intricately connected to his utopianism. As he asserted in De Doctrina Christiana, ‘from the beginning, I say, of his judgement until its end, and for some time after its end, it appears that that so often promised glorious kingdom of Christ with his saints will come into being on earth’, after which he lists a number of scriptural references to support this claim: ‘But that that kingdom will be on


earth, how very many passages show!’ (CWJM viii. 883-7). Where William B. Hunter is sceptical about Milton’s authorship of *De Doctrina*, suggesting that it lacked the immediacy that defined Milton’s millenarianism in the 1640s, John T. Shawcross strongly refutes this argument with the suggestion that the changing political circumstances in the late 1650s, following the failed republican parliaments and in anticipation of the imminent Restoration, meant that Milton’s expectation of an imminent millennium was similarly tempered.29 This study will contribute to evidence for the Miltonic provenance of *De Doctrina* by showing in detail how Milton continued to invest his prose writings with the form of millenarianism that he had espoused in *Areopagitica*, and which manifests in *De Doctrina*. Whereas Milton believed that the millennium could be brought about by political transformation – a belief that encouraged his support of the republic and Protectorate – the experience of the Restoration internalised Milton’s utopian and millenarian ideas. With the English republic having failed, Milton turned from society to individuals, specifically the elect individuals capable of exhibiting the internal, utopian self-control exhibited by the Son in *Paradise Regain’d* (1671).

THE ELITE

The utopian millennium, given its conservative and radical nature, questions arguments for an exclusively radical Milton. Christopher Hill’s landmark reassessment of Milton in *Milton and the English Revolution* asserts a seminal view of the ‘radical Milton’ that is still maintained in some recent criticism.30 Writing in the wake of major twentieth-century Milton criticism, such as C. S. Lewis’s *Preface to Paradise Lost* and William Empson’s *Milton’s God*, Hill, radical in his own right by so strongly opposing the contemporary critical consensus, conveys a lasting image of Milton: ‘Milton was not just a fine writer. He is the greatest English revolutionary who is also a poet, the


greatest English poet who is also a revolutionary.'\(^{31}\) Hill drew upon his extensive knowledge of the ‘radical underground’, which he believed fully emerged in the 1640s, to explain that Milton’s more unorthodox – if not heterodox – ideas most likely developed through discourse with this heretofore subterranean sectarianism.\(^{32}\) Although acknowledging his independence of such radicalism, Hill identifies Milton as having ideas comparable with those of contemporary sectarians, such as the Levellers, Diggers, and Ranters. Allied to this, Hill maps a consistent anti-establishment attitude in Milton’s 1640s writings, from the anti-clericalism – the ‘acid test of radicalism’ – in the early 1640s, to the divorce tracts, in which opposition to custom prefigures the anti-monarchism of *The Tenure*, and in the defence of the freedom of the press in *Areopagitica* (1644). However, Hill does admit that Milton’s attitude towards the English people degenerates over time, which perhaps influenced his ‘advocacy of revolutionary dictatorship together with freedom among the ruling elite’. The problem was that ‘Milton’s age was facing for the first time in human history the problem of educating an electorate.’\(^{33}\) The taut balance between Milton’s potential for radicalism and the elite status from which he wrote and by which he was influenced will be reconsidered in this thesis from the view of Milton as an elitist rather than an exclusively radical writer. Contemporary utopian ideals will serve as the most valuable illustration of Milton’s discourse with and advocacy of authoritarianism and elitism.

In contrast to Hill, Jonathan Scott argues for a collective intellectual revolution in the seventeenth-century, which was radical in its departure from the past. The revolution itself, Scott explains, was a ‘process of belief’, rather than a constitutional overhaul brought about by civil war, which means that the return of the monarchy did not mark its end. This is because the revolution was intellectual: ‘English radicalism, the profoundest intellectual consequence of the seventeenth-century instability, was the English revolution.’ By aligning the intellectual and radical events of the seventeenth-century, Scott coheres them into an identifiable whole. The English revolution was a collective, societal movement towards more divergent thinking that progressed independently of contemporary political changes. Milton was doubtless part of the intellectual developments as Scott sees them. Scott, for instance, uses Milton to

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\(^{32}\) See Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution* (Isleworth: Maurice Temple Smith, 1972), for Hill’s analysis of the radical underground.

illustrate desire for religious change in the 1640s, as opposed to continuity. Scott’s argument for the collective process of this intellectual revolution spans to sectarian groups: ‘But the majority of the group labels we use – Levellers, Seekers, Diggers, Fifth Monarchy Men, Quakers – in fact describe not simultaneously existing organisations but chronological stages of a single process by which radical expectation mutated in response to a rapidly moving sequence of external events.’ Scott consistently emphasises the collective experience of the English in the seventeenth-century. The desire for change was intellectual and outlasted the significant political oscillations of the mid-century. If radicalism was a process in this way, which means that it was more commonplace than is often maintained, then the focus should be placed on the varying degrees of radicalism in a subversive spectrum, rather than a binary distinction between radical and non-radical. There is no doubt that Milton was a radical: his ideas regularly challenged convention. However, he was not an activist, communist radical like Gerrard Winstanley, nor even a republican of the same cast as Marchamont Nedham. Milton’s desire for change served his ulterior millenarian ends. Whereas Milton viewed the republic and Protectorate as sufficient means for realising these ends, in 1659, at the eve of the Restoration, a state with a utopian regulatory structure was necessary. Scott’s argument for the widespread intellectual radicalism of the seventeenth-century requires the binary focus in Milton criticism, of radical and non-radical, to be reoriented in order to appreciate the diverse spectrum of radicalism extant in the seventeenth-century. By comparing Milton to contemporary millenarian radicals in Chapter 4 and contemporary intellectuals in Chapters 5 and 6, this study, particularly by addressing his utopianism, will identify Milton on the conservative end of the mid-century radical spectrum. By his later life, as Chapter 8 will discuss, his toleration for all Protestant sects encouraged his close proximity to early English Quakerism.

Milton’s utopian attitude, by its absolutist nature, created a gulf between what he wanted the people of England to achieve and what they were actually capable of, which helped to foster his deep-seated elitism. Where James Holston suggests that the ‘virtuous citizen is the product of the virtuous utopian state, not its precondition’, for Milton, the elite were increasingly necessary in bringing about utopian and millenarian change in society. Paul Hammond offers an excellent analysis of Milton’s perception of the people in *Milton and the People*, particularly in that Hammond’s extensive

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classical knowledge allows him to interpret Milton’s works at an etymological level. Having acknowledged Milton’s idealisation of the people, observing that ‘Milton’s rhetoric soars as he envisages their role’, Hammond writes

And yet Milton is uncomfortably aware that the people are rarely sufficiently pure, intelligent, or energetic to discharge those responsibilities which his political theory and his theology would place upon them. Indeed, while Milton defends ‘the people’ and the revolution which Parliament has brought about in their name, he also refers to ‘the vulgar’, as well as ‘the rude multitude’, and ‘the rabble’, even characterising some people as ‘scum’.

Hammond’s approach of investigating the etymology of Milton’s choice of words and how they recur in certain texts shows the disparity between Milton’s vision for the people and the reality of their insufficiency. Milton was repeatedly disappointed by the English people, showing his frustration for their mourning of the regicide in *Eikonoklastes* (1649), and finding in the Restoration an unforgiveable betrayal of his faith in them. This thesis will contribute to Hammond’s research in particular through the study of *Of Education* in Chapter 2. Hammond covers a broad array of Milton’s works, but does not consider one of Milton’s most explicitly elitist texts. Nevertheless, this study will agree with Hammond’s argument that, as Milton ages, ‘his ideals become entrusted to a smaller and smaller group, until after the Restoration his hopes seem directed towards lone individuals rather than communities.’ Whereas Milton believed that a social elite, defined by education and socio-economic status, was necessary to lead society in the 1640s and 1650s, the elite individuals in whom Milton placed his faith after the Restoration, following the failure of the English republic and Protectorate, were specifically the elect. The ‘fit audience […] though few’ (vii. 31) that Milton’s epic narrator asks Urania to seek out in *Paradise Lost* is representative of Milton’s narrow conception of the elect in the 1660s. As Milton invested his faith in fewer and fewer individuals, so his utopian and millenarian ideas became interiorised, located specifically in elect individuals rather than English society. This study will observe how the socio-economic elite that Milton envisions in *Of Education* transitions to the elect individuals of his later poetry and how this reflects and coincides with his evolving conception of utopia and millennium in society and the individual.

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THESIS STRUCTURE

The remainder of this introduction will outline the structure of the thesis chapter-by-chapter. The structure is broadly chronological in relation to Milton’s corpus, beginning with the anti-prelatical tracts of the early 1640s and ending with the 1671 poems, with reference to the 1673 *Of True Religion*. As such, it will acknowledge and identify the changes to and development of Milton’s political philosophy and theology in response to contemporary political and ecclesiastical events. The initial discussion of Milton’s utopian and millenarian ideas in his prose works of the 1640s and 1650s will inform interpretations of his later literary texts, considered in the final chapters of this study. Following the first chapter, which, separated into two parts, serves as a broad theoretical discussion of utopianism and millenarianism, each chapter of this dissertation will begin with a review of relevant critical material, and the main body of each chapter will be separated into sections.

The thesis will begin with a chapter broken into two parts, each forming an overview of utopianism and millenarianism respectively. The former will analyse the origins of early modern utopianism in More’s *Utopia* and Bacon’s *New Atlantis*. In particular, it will identify just how significant Bacon is in providing a means of interpreting More’s original *Utopia* for seventeenth-century utopian writers. The second section will address the origins of Milton’s millenarianism in relation to Joseph Mede (1586-1639) and with an analysis of the anti-prelatical tracts of the early 1640s. Together, the two sections of this first chapter will establish the theoretical foundation from which this thesis will progress.

The second and third chapters will discuss Milton’s proximity to the network of correspondents coordinated by Samuel Hartlib (1600-62) in relation to the 1644 works, *Of Education* and *Areopagitica*. Chapter 2 will show how *Of Education*, a text solicited by Hartlib himself, compares with Platter’s *Macaria*, the most explicit Hartlibian utopia. The Baconian ideas of *Of Education* will inform the discussion of *Areopagitica* in Chapter 3. While *Areopagitica* and *Of Education* are both recognised as having been printed on the same press as other tracts from the tolerationist circle of Henry Robinson (1604-64), Chapter 3 will also address how they both equally reflect their Hartlibian context. The calls for toleration in *Areopagitica* imbue the ideals of the Robinson coterie, but the emphasis in the text on public good also mirrors a similar Presbyterian standpoint advocated by the ecumenist John Dury (1596-1680) in *An Epistolary Discourse* (1644). These two chapters will emphasise how Milton’s early
utopianism was in keeping with his Hartlibian context and, as it was Baconian, also naturally accommodated Milton’s millenarianism.

The fourth chapter will assess Milton’s radicalism in contrast to that of the Digger, Gerrard Winstanley (1609-76) and the early Fifth Monarchist, Mary Cary (ca. 1621-53). While Milton’s millenarianism had, in *Areopagitica*, encouraged the active participation of private individuals in bringing about a public good, after he became employed by the English republic in 1649, he narrowed the parameters of this participation to exclusively include such statesmen as himself. Milton’s political involvement necessarily differs from Winstanley’s sectarian activism, which sought to bring about a prelapsarian-style common treasury. Cary offers a valuable contrast to Milton in that she advocated denominational unity, which did not ultimately become a part of Fifth Monarchist theology, while Milton maintained his strong criticism of the Presbyterians. This chapter, focusing predominantly on millenarianism rather than utopianism, will identify Milton at a distance from contemporary millenarian radicalism.

In Chapter 5, Milton’s Latin works of the 1650s will be compared to the contemporary tracts of his friend and fellow statesman, Marchamont Nedham (1620-78). Rather than ideologically aligned, this chapter will suggest that Milton and Nedham were consistently divergent in their political thinking, regardless of how close they were as colleagues and friends. The chapter will contend that Nedham’s interest theory, which he partly draws from Machiavelli, and popular republicanism is distinct from Milton’s increasingly entrenched disillusionment with the English people. Whereas Nedham advocates popular participation, taking inspiration from the Machiavellian model, Milton defends a superior part of the English people, which accommodates Cromwell himself during the Protectorate. The final section of this chapter will address how Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’, published as editorials in *Mercurius Politicus* in 1657, identify utopianism, particularly in the form of Harrington’s *Oceana*, as an undesirable alternative to the Protectorate.

In the sixth chapter, Milton’s 1659-60 works will be directly compared to two influential seventeenth-century political philosophers and utopians: Thomas Hobbes and James Harrington. The chapter will argue that Hobbes’s *Leviathan* and Harrington’s *Oceana* exhibit both utopian and millenarian ideas that inform our understanding of Milton’s *The Readie and Easie Way* (1659). The differences between Milton and these two philosophers will further illustrate his peculiar form of utopian millenarianism. Whereas, specifically, Hobbes and Harrington advocate a national
church, Milton proposes greater division between church and state, particularly in a congregationalist organisation of religion in England. Whereas, moreover, Hobbes and Harrington espouse a particularly stringent form of negative liberty, Milton, as this introduction has explained, maintains his belief in religious liberty. As such, this chapter will show how Milton aligns with the utopianism and millenarianism of Hobbes and Harrington, while acknowledging that he nonetheless maintained ideological differences from the two writers.

The final two chapters of this thesis will address Milton’s attempt to depict the utopian millennium in his epic poetry. In *Paradise Lost*, which will be the subject of Chapter 7, Milton’s universal hierarchy and Heaven are reminiscent of a utopian totality. Eden, by contrast, exhibits the empirical ideal that defined Bacon’s natural philosophy, and which Milton had advocated in *Of Education*. The millennium is anticipated by Michael in the final two books of the poem, in which Adam, having failed to act on Raphael’s advice and thereby having transgressed, returns to the utopian conformity of Heaven by accepting that obedience is best. The chapter will show, therefore, how *Paradise Lost* depicts many of the utopian and millenarian ideas that this study has traced in Milton’s political and polemical works.

The final chapter argues that Milton successfully realises the utopian millennium in *Paradise Regain’d* through the figure of the Son. The chapter will contend that Milton’s proximity to Quakerism through his friend and student Thomas Ellwood, and through his move to Chalfont St. Giles, reflects the inner utopia represented by the Son’s unwavering self-control in the brief epic. As Milton and the Quakers were both persecuted in the Restoration, the internalisation of the ideals Milton had espoused more openly in the 1640s and 1650s reflects this experience. The chapter will argue that the Son is the embodiment of Milton’s utopian millennium.

Milton’s utopian millennium offers a valuable insight into how the ideas of the poet and pamphleteer developed during the mid-century, and further illustrates the conjunction between his prose and poetic works. Milton’s ideal of the millennium necessitated utopian formulations and fuelled his disaffection with the English people, as they invariably failed to live up to his high standards. Utopianism was a means to achieve the millennium. Where Milton envisioned Baconian utopianism as such a means in 1644, by 1649, this had been replaced by the English republic; by 1659, he believed that a totality on the Morean model was necessary; by 1671, the means were internalised in elect individuals, such as the Son and Samson, who served as utopian models in their own right. Milton’s toleration of all Protestant sects meant that by the
early 1670s, he was more accommodating of sectarian values, such as Quakerism. This did not mark Milton as a late-blooming radical sectarian. Rather, as Quakerism had become less extremist and more individual Quakers were well-educated and from established echelons of society, Milton was more likely to be sympathetic towards their views. Milton’s utopian millennium, tolerant and yet elitist, unorthodox and yet conservative, encodes the dynamic changes of the political and intellectual landscape of the mid-seventeenth-century. As his disenfranchisement with the people grew and the republic failed, utopianism became an interior, qualitative means of achieving the millennium. The utopian millennium was an ideal that Milton believed increasingly few could realise. Indeed, one of the few worthies was Milton himself.
a) Utopian Origins: More & Bacon

The concept of ideal society has been a subject of political philosophy for centuries, finding its most evident origin in Plato’s *Republic*. Thomas More’s (1478-1535) *Utopia* introduces the idea that regulation and control could overcome the inherent flaws of human nature. The societal totality that this generates is the essence of More’s original utopianism, and, as will be shown later in this study, constitutes a part of the mid-seventeenth-century utopian mindset, particularly in terms of the republicanism of the 1650s. However, the form of utopianism that this study will analyse is not a carbon copy of More’s *Utopia*. Rather, it develops from a rejuvenated interest in the concepts of utopianism that Francis Bacon (1561-1626) instigates through his *New Atlantis*. Bacon’s self-conscious alignment to More in his text, and the frequent comparison made between the two authors by later seventeenth-century writers, is indicative of Bacon’s significant role in the utopian tradition as it was received at the time. Having identified the major utopian tenets that originate in More’s *Utopia*, this chapter will argue that Bacon’s interpretation of the utopian tradition – particularly his focus on scientific learning – facilitated the greater variety of utopia that pervades the mid-seventeenth-century period. As Chapter 2 will acknowledge, Milton’s engagement with Baconian utopianism was facilitated by his proximity to the Hartlib circle in the early 1640s. While J. C. Davis argues that Bacon’s *New Atlantis* is not utopian, but rather straddles the distinction between perfect moral commonwealth and utopia, this chapter will argue that this ambiguity is nevertheless an important contribution to the utopian tradition. This chapter, therefore, identifies the myriad form of mid-seventeenth-century utopianism to be the product of an intertextual development of ideas, which ensured that no utopia following *New Atlantis* conformed to a distinct conceptual blueprint.

Davis identifies the fundamental tenets of utopianism that originate in More’s *Utopia*. Regulation and control, Davis observes, exist at the foundation of the Utopian state. As explained in the Introduction to this thesis, in Utopia, the inherent problem of civil existence that the ideal society tries to combat – want and desire

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exceeding that which the state or society can provide – is moderated through ‘a system of law and public administration […] that is all-embracing in its totality.’ As Davis explains,

What we have called the collective problem is solved in Utopia neither by the idealisation of men (perfect moral commonwealth) nor by the idealisation of nature (arcadia), but by the twofold disciplining of men. First, although they are not fond of work, the Utopians are inured to it by their upbringing, social attitudes and structure and the supervision of the phlyarchs […] Secondly, this produce appears sufficient because the Utopian’s demands are minimal, his wants conditioned by the society in which he lives, its laws and customs.

This suggests that More had ‘little faith in the average human being’s propensity to civilised social behaviour.’ More allows no room for transgression in this idealised state; each Utopian must conform and contribute to the larger totality. The emphasis in *Utopia* is on discipline and how state apparatus can maintain stability in society by controlling the behaviour and actions of its population. In terms of other forms of ideal society, the perfect moral commonwealth relies on the assumed – and unrealistic – immutable morality of its citizens; a millenarian elevates all hope of an idealised societal change to the second coming of Christ. The utopian, by contrast, leaves no margin for error: the state removes the potential for demand to outstrip supply through systemic control. This study will show how the utopian vision described by Davis and originating in More contributes to the focus on control and regulation in mid-seventeenth-century utopianism. However, mid-seventeenth-century utopian writers did not draw exclusively from More, but rather from a generic tradition upon which Bacon had doubtlessly left his mark. It is necessary to address the utopianism of the mid-seventeenth-century period from the perspective of the development of the genre.

More’s *Utopia* is structured in two books, the former of which conveys a conversation between Raphael Hythloday – a mariner who has travelled to the island of Utopia – a fictionalised figure of More himself, and Peter Giles, who introduces Hythloday to More. Commentators have identified this first book as a valuable indication of More’s engagement with contemporary humanism. Brendan Bradshaw, arguing against J. H. Hexter’s view that More perceived Utopia as an idealised Christian commonwealth, interprets the Platonic aspects of *Utopia*, particularly in the figure of

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40 Davis, *Utopia and Ideal Society*, pp. 52, 54, 56.
Hythloday. He contrasts this with the fictionalised More’s belief that an intellectual, like Hythloday, was morally obliged to offer counsel to the government of a commonwealth. The figure of More in *Utopia* repeatedly suggests that Hythloday should ‘enter some king’s service’: ‘I am fully persuaded that if you could overcome your aversion to court life, your advice to a prince would be of the greatest advantage to the public welfare.’ Hythloday’s response is that ‘doubtless Plato was right in foreseeing that unless kings became philosophical themselves the advice of philosophers would never influence them’. Quentin Skinner argues that Hythloday’s self-consciously Platonic outlook contrasts with the fictionalised More, who articulates a distinctly Ciceronian civic humanism:

If we are to speak more precisely, we must recognise that what More is doing in Book I is reviving one particular set of humanist beliefs – those of a ‘civic’ or Ciceronian humanism – and sharply opposing them to a more fashionable and broadly Platonist outlook that was threatening to undermine the element of political commitment in the humanism of More’s own time. This is a contrast between the active life, in which the intellectual contributes to the commonwealth through counsel, and the contemplative life, which Hythloday argues is preferable if philosophers are not kings, as they are in Plato’s *Republic*. The importance of participation in a commonwealth was central to mid-seventeenth-century utopian texts. In *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656), James Harrington secures popular participation through a system of perpetual rotation, which was designed to avoid corruption of either the popular assembly or the senate. For Milton, the concept of participation in *Areopagitica* was dependent on his understanding of the relationship between the private and public, which, significantly, finds precedent in *Utopia*.

More’s *Utopia* idealises a form of communism in which the private sphere is subsumed into the public. There is neither private property nor money in Utopia; their houses are never locked and even the privacy of the body is exposed before marriage to the future spouse. The Utopian is not a private individual, but rather a public servant.

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Work and leisure hours are equally regulated; idleness is limited just as recreation is monitored. As Hythloday asserts at the end of book 2 of the text, ‘Even the rich, I’m sure, understand this. They must know that it’s better to have enough of what we really need than an abundance of superfluities, much better to escape from our many present troubles than to be burdened with great masses of wealth (112).’ The private is removed to solve the problem of social inequality; public, collective wealth is, instead, favoured in Utopia. As this study will show, Milton’s own perception of the relationship between private and public spheres develops during the course of his polemical career. Where *Areopagitica* idealises the contribution of private individuals to a public, millenarian good, during the 1650s Milton became increasingly disaffected with the potential for private individuals to enact positive change in society. Milton’s attention narrowed to those individuals capable of serving the commonwealth, particularly to millenarian ends, who were largely defined by their education, religion, and political persuasion.

One of Skinner’s major arguments for *Utopia* is that More advocates a view of nobility that is not defined by wealth, as it was perceived by humanists contemporary to More. If the Utopians have achieved the ideal state, then they have not done so through wealth and status. While Milton’s elitism was meritocratic, he also increasingly believed that the common sort was incapable of fulfilling his own ideals. The relationship between private and public spheres that More establishes in *Utopia* is further explored in seventeenth-century utopian texts. Milton’s elitism is distinct from More’s communism, but he nonetheless engages with civic humanism in the mid-seventeenth-century as More does in *Utopia*.

The central means through which More envisions the conflation of the private and public spheres is through the absolute uniformity of the Utopian society, in which a totalising communist system, moderated by the state, suppresses human want. The fifty-four cities that comprise Utopia are ‘entirely identical in language, customs, institutions and laws’ (44). In turn, Hythloday discusses the egalitarian nature of the Utopian state in that the Utopians take it in turns to act as farm labourers (45) as well as other roles in society. The system is total and dominating: all Utopians contribute equally to the betterment of the state. More collapses all societally-imposed boundaries. Despite this wider structural equality, there is a distinct system of regulation that percolates into the domestic confines of the Utopian household. The hierarchy of the

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household, whereby men remain in the same house ‘and are subject to the oldest
member’ (56) correlates with the wider magisterial system, in which syphogants are
elected by every thirty families, which, in turn, are under an officer known as the
tranibore (49-50). The role of the syphogrant is simple: eliminate idleness (52). As will
become a major feature of future utopian works, every citizen must contribute equally
and effectively to the betterment of the state.46 The macrocosm of the Utopian state,
therefore, mirrors the microcosm of the domestic household; both are formed on a
patriarchal system of control that regulates through hierarchical authority. These are the
mechanisms through which the private becomes conflated with the public in Utopia.
While More’s hierarchical state anticipates the patriarchal utopia of Winstanley’s *The
Law of Freedom* (1652), state-regulated societies are also represented in Harrington’s
*The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656) and Milton’s own *The Readie and Easie Way*
(1659). Indeed, More’s careful attention to detail – he lists, for instance, the exact
timings of every Utopian’s day, in which they work for nine hours and sleep for eight –
mirrors Harrington’s own meticulous description of the minutiae of his balloting
system. In keeping with the role of the syphogrant, the Utopians are not expected to
waste their free time in ‘roistering or sloth’, but rather to utilise it in some form of
recreational learning, which varies from lectures to music (52-3).

Every facet of the life of the Utopian encourages the maintaining and
enforcing of discipline. As Hythloday affirms,

> So you see that nowhere is there any chance to loaf or any pretext for evading work; there are no
> wine-bars, or ale-houses, or brothels; no chances for corruption; no hiding places; no spots for
> secret meetings. Because they live in the full view of all, they are bound to be either working at
> their usual trades or enjoying their leisure in a respectable way (62).

There is nowhere to escape from the self-perpetuating and self-fulfilling totality of life
in the Utopian state. The system depends on, and in turn enforces, discipline and
conformity. More’s original utopianism is a totalising form of ideal society that
infiltrates the intimate and domestic details of a Utopian’s life. The communist equality
that Hythloday lauds in Utopia, which he suggests Plato advocated (39-40), is
systemically structured to ensure participation of every citizen to the betterment of the
Utopian state. There may be few laws, as Hythloday insists (39), but the system itself,

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as it is in *Oceana*, is self-perpetuating. In *Areopagitica*, a text in which Milton criticises utopian idealism, he envisions a London in which the community contributes to an eschatological end point. Indeed, it is in the absence of laws – in this case, pre-publication licensing – that necessitates the cultural system of participation in the betterment of the state. It was not, however, until 1659, with the imminent prospect of the Restoration, that Milton decided that, with the people incapable of contributing to the betterment of the state themselves, a stringent society comparable to the Morean model was necessary. Milton’s 1644 texts are more comparable to the utopianism of the Hartlib circle, the precedent for which was established by Bacon in his *New Atlantis*.

**BACON’S NEW ATLANTIS**

*Of Education* and *Areopagitica* owe more to Bacon’s utopianism than to More’s. Stephen Fallon has suggested that Milton’s developing theory of a relationship between spirit and matter may have drawn from a similar aspect of Bacon’s own philosophy. Other critics have similarly made arguments for Milton’s Baconian sympathies. William Poole, however, has argued for Milton’s distance from contemporary scientific discourse, particularly that of the Royal Society in his later life. While Milton was not a proponent of contemporary scientific ideas, which is likely a reason for his distance from the Hartlib circle during the later 1640s, this does not negate his Baconianism. Poole himself asserts that ‘there is no denying that it is possible to situate Milton in some kind of “dialogue” with contemporary science,’ but that ‘the dynamics of this dialogue are affected by other variables, notably the appropriation of radicalism, particularly theological radicalism.’ It is, in fact, Milton’s theology that most clearly aligns him with Bacon’s natural philosophy. Bacon’s belief that the propagation of knowledge would bring about a return to prelapsarian dominion of nature, which will be discussed further in the following chapter, mirrors Milton’s own belief, particularly in the early 1640s, that intellectual reform would help usher in the millennium. In his *New Atlantis*, Bacon conflates his natural philosophy with the original utopianism that More

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had established over a century earlier. It may not be a carbon copy of *Utopia*, which has led Davis to remove it from the utopian genre altogether, but it is written as a travel narrative, offering an insight into an ideal commonwealth in a style that self-consciously aligns with More. As Paul Salzman posits, ‘Bacon uses the *New Atlantis* to offer a vision of a society dedicated to scientific advancement, but he also uses it indirectly to convey a political vision of an ordered society’.

As this study will show, mid-seventeenth-century utopianism was myriad in style, form, and substance. One of Bacon’s most valuable contributions to the development of utopianism as a genre was to innovate on More’s utopian model: Bacon not only created his own utopia, one dedicated to the advancement of knowledge, but he also set a precedent as a utopian writer innovating on the utopian form that preceded him.

Bensalem in *New Atlantis* is structured by a system of order, which is reminiscent of More’s original *Utopia*. Davis concludes that ‘the description of *New Atlantis* is too superficial for it to be labelled utopian in the sense already allocated’. While there is ‘a disciplinary and conflict-resolving function allocated to fathers preparing for the Feast of the Family […] given infant mortality rates and life expectancy, this can hardly have been expected to provide the basis for a general social order.’ Davis’s argument assumes that Bacon’s *New Atlantis* must closely adhere to the blueprint of More’s *Utopia* for it to be called a utopia. While basic Morean tenets help define a text as utopian – and indeed some mid-seventeenth-century utopias are more evidently utopian in a Morean sense than *New Atlantis* – Bacon’s interpretation of the utopian tradition provides a more diverse precedent for the utopias that follow. The Feast of the Family, for instance, is, in fact, a significant representation of patriarchal order within Bacon’s ideal society, and one that resembles the familial system of More’s *Utopia*. Although the event occurs when a man lives ‘to see thirty persons descended of his body alive together, and all above three years’, which Davis suggests means that it is an infrequent event, the prominence of the Feast in the text should not be overlooked. Indeed, the manner in which it prompts the discussion with Joabim about marriage in Bensalem and its differences with Utopia suggests a wider parallel with More. During the Feast, at which all members of the family attend, the Tirsan deals with ‘any discord or suits between any of the family’; if any of the family are ‘distressed or decayed, order is taken for their relief and competent means to live’; ‘if

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any be subject to vice, or take ill courses, they are reproved and censured’. Equally, ‘orders and advices’ are given regarding marriage.\textsuperscript{52} The patriarchal authority described by Joabim in this tradition draws from the power of the state: ‘The governor assisteth, to the end to put in execution by his public authority the decrees and orders of the Tirsan, if they should be disobeyed; though that seldom needeth; such reverence and obedience they give to the order of nature’ (169). This situation epitomises the relationship between utopianism and perfect moral commonwealth ideas in \textit{New Atlantis}: while the framework of authority exists, the descendants of the Tirsan predominantly adhere to any orders. This is not, however, to say that the citizens of Bensalem are idealistically moral during the Feast, but rather that they are aware of the system in place. As the Feast plays a prominent role in interrelating \textit{New Atlantis} and \textit{Utopia}, and given the evident parallels between Bacon’s patriarchal system and that of More’s, the Bensalemite tradition illustrates the utopian order that lies behind the narrative of \textit{New Atlantis}.

Within this system of order is the institution that most clearly distances Bacon from More: Salomon’s House. Bacon’s theorisation and idealisation of such an institution had been at the forefront of his thinking for many years.\textsuperscript{53} As William Rawley, Bacon’s private chaplain, writes in the preface of the text: ‘This fable my Lord devised, to the end that he might exhibit therein a model or description of a college instituted for the interpreting of nature and the producing of great and marvellous works for the benefit of men, under the name of Salomon’s House, or the College of the Six Days’ Works’ (151). Rawley views Salomon’s House as the defining feature of \textit{New Atlantis}. He does not describe Bacon’s desire to depict an ideal society in the style of More, but rather explicitly refers to the House. Accordingly, the House looms over the text; it takes until the end of \textit{New Atlantis} for a Fellow to divulge its inner workings to the narrator. In this narrative structure, which reaffirms the educational purpose of \textit{New Atlantis} – we learn about the House before we actually see it – its status as the integral kernel of Bensalem is clear. In the description of the advent of Christianity in Bensalem, it is described as ‘the very eye of this kingdom’ (159); the governor defines it as ‘the noblest foundation (as we think) that ever was upon earth; and the lanthorn of this kingdom’ (167). It is appropriate, therefore, that the arrival of the Father of Salomon’s

\textsuperscript{52} Bacon, \textit{New Atlantis}, in Susan Bruce, ed., \textit{Three Early Modern Utopias} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 169. Further references will be made to this edition and will appear parenthetically in the running text.

\textsuperscript{53} See Boesky, \textit{Founding Fictions}, pp. 63-5.
House is uniquely detailed in *New Atlantis*. Bacon focuses closely on the ‘sun of gold’ that the Father wears, alongside a ‘small cherub of gold, with wings displayed’; the ‘chariot was covered with cloth of gold tissue upon blue’; and ‘fifty attendants, young men all, in white satin loose coats to the mid-leg’ comprised the entourage. In the narrative, the Father is quasi-monarchical in his resplendent attire; he certainly appears with royal splendour and authority. Even the narrator treats him differently, as he ‘stooped down, and kissed the hem of his tippet’, a sign of deference that other Bensalemites refused earlier in the text. Joabim, however, describing the Fathers, explains how ‘we have seen none of them this dozen years. His coming is in state; but the cause of his coming is secret’ (175). The Father may have made his appearance due to the return of Merchants of Light, who journey abroad for twelve years, but it may also be because of the surprise arrival of foreigners. What is important is that Joabim and the other Bensalemites have not seen the Fathers for so long. This suggests that the House is very much removed from Bacon’s wider ideal society.

The aloof nature of the House is indicative of the inherent liberty – tantamount to self-governance – that the institution enjoys. Most evidently, the Fellows of the House manage the twelve-yearly expeditions abroad of two ships, manned by the Merchants of Light. As the ancient King Salomona decreed, their ‘errand was only to give us knowledge of the affairs and state of those countries to which they were designed, and especially of the sciences, arts, manufactures, and inventions of all the world; and withal to bring unto us books, instruments, and patterns in every kind’ (167-8). The expeditions of the Merchants of Light are exclusively intellectual. As expeditions, and particularly for that length of time, they are entirely uncontrolled by the state. This means, of course, that the state of Bensalem assumes that these Merchants have the moral fortitude to fulfil their objective and return home. They are, however, as with Bacon and the Hartlibians after him, exploring uncharted intellectual terrain; in order to fulfil Bacon’s ideal of the Great Instauration, certain liberties were necessary. The necessary freedom of the Merchants of Light illustrates the conflict in *New Atlantis* between utopianism and perfect moral commonwealth ideas. These expeditions originate from a time where King Solamona was centralising power: the liberty of the Merchants of Light is borne out of his decree. It is clear, moreover, from the reception of the Father of the House, that Salomon’s House is treated with a reverence that distinguishes it from the state, whilst it always works to the betterment of Bensalem. Therefore, whereas Davis removes the definition of ‘utopia’ from Bensalem, given the greater diversity of mid-seventeenth-century utopias, it is better to consider
New Atlantis as an important contribution to the utopian genre, one that innovates on More’s original form. In Areopagitica, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, Milton advocates freedom from pre-publication licensing in order to achieve an ultimate ideal of the millennium; Bacon envisions the freedom of Salomon’s House with similarly eschatological ambitions. While Milton refrains from monumentalised Baconianism, such as in the distance he keeps from the Hartlib circle, whose Office of Address was partly modelled on Salomon’s House as well as Renaudot’s Bureau d’adresse, Bacon’s ideal of returning to prelapsarian dominion over nature is depicted in the dialogue between Adam and God in Paradise Lost (v. 250-451).

Gabriel Plattes’s A Description of the Famous Kingdome of Macaria (1641) exhibits both the ideal of advancing knowledge – specifically medical knowledge – prominent in New Atlantis and is also structured as a travel narrative and dialogue reminiscent of More’s Utopia. Plattes’s utopia was written within the Hartlib circle and reflects the Baconian attitude of centralising knowledge in order to advance its communication, distribution and propagation. However, in his prefatory address to parliament, Plattes acknowledges that he is writing in the utopian tradition of More as well as Bacon.54 Accordingly, while Macaria is structured as a dialogic exchange between a traveller and a scholar, reflecting that of Hythloday and More in Utopia, it also envisions a ‘Colledge of experience’ (83), through which medicine and medical knowledge are distributed nationally. In Salomon’s House, there are ‘dispensatories, or shops of medicines’, which are described as being in far greater variety and volume than that found in contemporary Europe (180-1). Later in Macaria, moreover, the scholar explains that ‘one thing troubleth me, that many Divines are of opinion, that no such Reformation as we would have, shall come before the day of judgement’ (89). In response, the traveller insists that reformation will precede the millennium, specifically utopian reformation on the model of Macaria. Dissemination of knowledge by printing will encourage common people specifically to bring about Macarian reform. Macaria is not only a valuable seventeenth-century utopia in its synthesis of Morean form and Baconian ideas, but also, as the next chapter will show, in its proximity to Milton’s Of Education, the elitist ideas of which seem to have had an impact on Hartlibian ideology in the late 1640s.

CONCLUSION

The development of the utopian tradition between More and Bacon sets a significant precedent for the utopian texts that this thesis will consider. More’s *Utopia* defines the style of utopianism that Davis uses as a standard for the utopias that follow. Bacon’s *New Atlantis* innovates on More’s model. Bacon does not unequivocally conform to the generic tradition initiated by More, but rather places greater emphasis on learning, and particularly on a form of scientific research. This results in the institution of Salomon’s House enjoying a level of freedom incongruous with the wider Bensalem society. Notwithstanding the Merchants of Light, the House itself is structured by an empirical system of research that resembles a utopian totality. Bacon’s form of utopianism is more in keeping with that which follows him in the mid-seventeenth-century. None of these latter utopias are carbon copies of the Morean totality. They often focus on regulation and control, especially within the context of education. For Milton in particular, poor levels of education directly necessitated utopian formulations, in order to overcome the downfalls of an ignorant public. The fundamental difference between More’s *Utopia* and Bacon’s *New Atlantis*, which was more in keeping with mid-seventeenth-century utopias, was that More’s utopia was an end in itself; Bacon’s, by contrast, through Salomon’s House, served the higher goal of wider scientific progress. The utopias that will be considered in this study follow Bacon’s model: the idealised endpoint of much mid-seventeenth-century utopianism – especially with Milton – is the millennium of Christ. Bacon, in many respects, catalysed the process of development of utopianism as a genre from its origins in More to its proliferation in the mid-seventeenth-century.
b) Millenarian Origins: Joseph Mede & Of Reformation

Milton’s early poems, ‘Nativity Ode’ (1629) and ‘Lycidas’ (1638), exhibit an early form of the chiliasm that would become more prominent in the prose tracts Milton published during the eschatological excitement and fervour of the 1640s. Milton wrote ‘Nativity Ode’ while he was at Christ’s, the Cambridge college where Joseph Mede (1586-1639), a significant millenarian writer, was a tutor. Mede’s works, specifically *Clavis Apocalyptica* (1627), illuminate the juncture between Milton’s early millenarian formulations and the more consolidated eschatology of his 1644 pamphlets, *Of Education* and *Areopagitica*. As this thesis will show, Milton’s belief in the imminence of the millennium, and his conviction that intellectual progress would realise this idealised end of history, necessitated the increasingly utopian mindset that he exhibits most evidently from 1644 onwards. The previous chapter suggested that, despite arguments for Milton’s distance from Bacon, they shared a belief that intellectual progress could bring about some form of reunification with God. This chapter will argue that *Of Reformation* was a significant precedent for the 1644 writings that Milton wrote while he was in correspondence with the Hartlib circle. Of *Reformation* illustrates for the first time Milton’s belief that society can achieve the intellectual progress necessary to realise the millennium through the frictional and competing ideas of society-wide research and thinking. Just as these ideas, which disparately appear throughout the anti-episcopal tracts, are more coherently articulated in *Areopagitica*, so the utopianism of these tracts is not yoked to millenarianism in the way it is in later works. Indeed, the elitism that largely inspires Milton’s utopian attitude in later texts lacks prominence at this early stage in his writing career: a key component of Milton’s anti-episcopal argument, based on the Presbyterian model – which he would come to strongly oppose in the latter part of 1649 – is that laymen should have the power to elect...

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local religious leaders. Milton, forging his authorial identity within the complex and varied landscape of 1640s pamphleteering, was also still forming his political philosophy and theology.\textsuperscript{57} Milton’s faith in the people between 1641-2 is the key reason why he does not begin to associate his millenarianism with utopianism. Milton had faith that the people could contribute to his eschatological ends. This chapter will show how the anti-prelatical tracts represent the foundation of what would become the utopian millennium for Milton.

Lutz Greisiger illuminates the distinction between millenarianism and apocalypticism, which is often overlooked by commentators.\textsuperscript{58} Greisiger’s definitions of millenarianism and apocalypticism are valuable: ‘Apocalyptic and apocalypticism are derived from the last book of the New Testament, the Revelation \textit{(apokalypsis)} of St John which originally served as the prototype and “reference work” for a great number of – mostly extra-canonical – Jewish and Christian writings.’ ‘It marks’, Greisiger continues, ‘not just “the end” but the \textit{completion} of history, the conciliation of contradictions, and an essentially better world to come.’ In contrast to apocalypticism, millenarianism refers to the part of Revelation ‘where there is revealed to the seer the coming of a thousand years, a \textit{millennium}, of the binding of Satan and of peace and prosperity for the chosen part of humankind.’ This millennium is the thousand-year reign of Christ that was believed to foreshadow the apocalypse: ‘a penultimate period of near perfection preceding the actual end of history’. Greisiger explains that often ‘apocalypticists expect that future aeon of cosmic purity and perfection to come about only after a millennium-like interim period in which earthly conditions will already reach a near-to-ideal state.’ Resonating with Smith’s analysis of the millenarian perfectionism of the 1640s, the concept of a ‘near-to-ideal state’ is consistent with the genre of ideal society, in which utopianism is situated.\textsuperscript{59} These are, moreover, ‘earthly conditions’ that will be elevated to ideal status, which suggests that millenarianism


could inspire individuals, such as Milton, to pursue reform on the earthly plane. Milton’s desire to usher in further reform is inspired by a belief that Christ will return to earth before the apocalyptic close of history. In *Of Reformation*, Milton perceives England as an elect nation, observing the ‘Precedencie which GOD gave this Iland, to be the first Restorer of buried Truth’ (CPW i. 526). The elect stature of England in Milton’s ideology at this point feeds the social elitism that is evident in *Of Education* (1644), and which becomes more prominent when he works for the English republic in the 1650s. Well-educated statesmen are required to keep England on the path of Reformation towards the millennium. In later life, with the failure of the republic and Protectorate, Milton turns from England as an elect nation to elect individuals, such as Milton himself, as capable of realising eschatological change in England.

The previous chapter has shown how important Bacon is as a precedent for utopian ideas in the seventeenth-century, but it is also important to acknowledge how his speculative philosophy was compatible with mid-century millenarianism. As a literary and ideological precedent, Bacon’s works represent the concept of intellectual progress – particularly empirical and scientific in nature – as integral to regaining the ideal status of knowledge and dominion that Adam enjoyed in Eden. Although Bacon’s millenarianism is less prominent, the idea that reform was necessary to achieve a newfound unity with God does share principles with later seventeenth-century millenarians. In his *The Advancement of Learning* (1605), written in the form of a letter to King James, Bacon acknowledges the argument, particularly made by ‘Divines’, ‘that knowledge is of those things which are to be accepted of with great limitation and caution, that thaspiring [sic] to overmuch knowledge, was the originall temptation and sinne, whereupon ensued the fal of Man’ (OFB iv. 5-6). Bacon responds that ‘it was not pure knowledg of nature and universality’ that caused the Fall, but rather ‘the proude knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in man to give law unto himself, and to depend no more upon Gods commandments, which was the fourme of the temptation’. Bacon likens this former pursuit of knowledge by empirical means that he favours to ‘a knowledge by the light whereof man did give names unto other creatures in Paradise, as they were brought before him’ (6). Drawing inspiration and justification from Ecclesiastes, which he suggests was written by King Salomon, Bacon advocates learning that does not make the mind ‘swell or outcompasse it selfe’ (7). The image of swelling corresponds with the sense of transgression or overreaching that Bacon

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pinpoints as the reason for the Fall. Instead, Bacon asserts that ‘God hath framed the minde of man as a mirrour, or glasse, capable of the Image of the universall world’ (6). A better understanding of the world that God created facilitates a better understanding of God himself; such a pursuit of knowledge does not challenge divine authority. As Charles Webster explains, ‘investigations conducted into secondary causes, and with utilitarian ends in mind, would incur no risk of transgression, but instead glorify God, and restore man’s dominion over nature.’ As Milton will come to argue nearly forty years later, in a text dedicated to Samuel Hartlib, an intelligencer with strong Baconian ideas, ‘The end then of learning is to repair the ruins of our first parents by regaining to know God aright’ (CPW ii. 366-7). Although Milton’s educational principles were more specifically orientated towards the millennium, Bacon and Milton share the belief that the propagation of knowledge was commensurate with greater unity with God.

JOSEPH MEDE

Joseph Mede’s eschatology remained influential at the time when Milton, in his correspondence with the Hartlib circle in the 1640s, engaged with and expressed millenarian ideas. Mede, who became a fellow of King’s in 1613, published his seminal Clavis Apocalyptica in 1627, during Milton’s second year at Cambridge. As one of the most prominent millenarian texts of the early-seventeenth-century, the Clavis was translated posthumously as the Key of the Revelation in 1643 by the order of the Long Parliament, along with tracts from other significant millenarian writers. In the pamphleteering landscape of the early 1640s, these texts, selected and promoted by parliament, existed alongside other controversial millenarian tracts, such as Thomas Goodwin’s A Glimpse of Sions Glory (1641) and John Archer’s The Personall Raigne of Christ Upon Earth (1642). McDowell, in his biography of Milton, explains the unique significance of Mede in Milton’s early life at Cambridge, particularly as a figure whom he almost certainly would have encountered in his time at Christ’s,

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61 Webster, The Great Instauration, p. 22.
62 These texts include Thomas Brightman, The Workes of Thomas Brightman (1644), John Napier, A Plaine Discovery of the whole Revelation of Saint John (1593 – reissued in 1640s(?)), and Johann Heinrich Alstead, The Beloved City, or The Saints Reign on earth a Thousand Yeares (1643).
who combined a strong, millenarian anti-Catholicism with distaste for the harder forms of Calvinist predestinarianism; who made public in the mid-1630s views on devotional practice that he had long held and that appealed to Laudian ceremonialists, yet in his private correspondence lamented what he regarded as the growing authoritarianism and intolerance in the Laudian party.\(^{64}\)

The parallels with Milton are apparent: Milton’s anti-prelatical tracts mark his first explicit attack on the Laudian church in print; his opposition to Calvinist predestination would become a prominent part of his theology; and, most importantly for this study, his millenarianism would only become more strongly articulated in the 1640s and beyond.\(^{65}\) McDowell also observes how Milton’s pursuit of universal learning, drawing from the humanist ideal of ‘general learning’ and mirroring the pursuit of encyclopaedic learning that characterised the Hartlibian enterprise, was an ideal that suggests common ground with Mede’s own humanist scholarship, especially in *Clavis Apocalyptica*.\(^{66}\) Indeed, given Milton’s lack of interest for scientific learning, which would eventually distance him from the Hartlib circle, Mede’s humanism would have likely encouraged his interest in the famous Cambridge don and his works.

In turn, Mede also provides evidence for why someone like Milton would have engaged with the Hartlib circle: Mede maintained a discourse with Samuel Hartlib and John Dury in the 1630s, in which he was asked for his thoughts on particular tracts that the pair planned to publish, such as Dury’s treatise on Batavian churches.\(^{67}\) Hartlib, who had referred to his ‘high estimation’ of Mede’s ‘worthy memory’ shortly after his death, explicitly praises Mede’s works, particularly in comparison to the apocalyptic writings of Ezerel Tonge, in a letter to John Worthington: ‘The Revelation Book translated out of High Dutch hath almost nothing but what worthy Mr. Mede hath published.’\(^{68}\) That Hartlib was in correspondence with Worthington about Mede in the years prior to Worthington’s publication of *The Works of Joseph Mede* in 1665 is suggestive of Mede’s enduring impact on the development of Hartlibian thinking. Chapter 2 will discuss how Hartlib, as a prominent educationalist of the 1640s, was in

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\(^{64}\) McDowell, *Poet of Revolution*, p. 267.


\(^{66}\) McDowell, *Poet of Revolution*, pp. 66-78.


discourse with Milton; his desire for educational reform and belief that it was necessary to achieve the millennium correlated with Milton’s own ideas at the time. As a theologian who maintained a friendly correspondence with Hartlib, Mede represents a significant part of Milton’s millenarian context. Where Sarah Hutton suggests that Mede’s Laudian sympathies are at odds with Milton’s anti-prelatical tracts, McDowell shows how Mede was critical of Laudian authoritarianism. Mede, therefore, offers a possible context through which Milton’s anti-episcopacy developed, alongside the millenarianism that attended it.

Mede’s *Clavis Apocalyptica* set a precedent for its interpretation of the various symbols of Revelation as signifiers of a coherent eschatological timeline. Mede interpreted ‘synchronisms’ within Revelation, which he described as ‘when the things therein designed run along in the same time; as if thou shouldst call it an agreement in time or age: because prophecies of things falling out in the same time run on in time together, or Synchronize.’ In translation, the *Key to the Revelation* is not full of the rhetorical anticipation and fervour of later millenarians, such as Gerrard Winstanley. Instead, Mede takes a more scholarly approach to Revelation by identifying unity between the myriad symbols of the text. Mede’s interpretation of symbolic patterns in Revelation allows him to create a temporal framework from which synchronic predictions about end times could be made. Mede explains his interpretative approach to Revelation in the second part of the *Key*:

> For truely he that will endeavour with successe to finde out the meaning of the Apocalyptique visions, must first of all place the course, and connexion of them one with another according to things done, being thorowly searched out by the foresaid characters and notes, and demonstrated, by intrinsical arguments as the basis, and foundation of every solid, and true interpretation.

Mede explains that his text was the product of careful research and contemplation of Revelation. The *Key* establishes unity from the seemingly eclectic symbolism of the

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71 Other significant contemporary millenarian texts include: John Archer, *The Personall Raigne of Christ Upon Earth* (1641), which argues for the monarchical reign of Christ on earth for a millennium; and Thomas Goodwin, *A Glimpse of Sions Glory* (1641), considered below.
biblical text. The seven synchronisms that Mede identifies initially in the text parallel with his interpretation of the seven seals; the seventh seal, in turn, opens to the seven trumpets, the last of which heralds the ‘excellent and Emperiall Kingdom of Christ’ (22).

William Twisse, a friend and correspondent of Mede, wrote a preface to the Key that highlights the value of the text itself and of Mede for his interpretative approach. In his praise of Mede’s ‘studiousnesse and dexteritie’, Twisse explains how Mede ‘hath drawne together the homogeneall parts of [Revelation], dispersed here and there, yet belonging to the same time; the indistinction whereof may expose many to no small errour ere he be aware’ (A4). Twisse lauds Mede as much for the interpretative method as for the substance of the interpretation itself. This analytical approach supports the millenarian conclusions of the tract. Twisse emphasises Mede’s ‘distinction’ of ‘the clearing of the state of Christs glorious Kingdom here on earth’ (A8). Mede discusses this in the fifth and sixth synchronisms of the second part of his text, in which he explains that the millennium of Christ will follow the defeat of the Beast, and will be defined by the reign of Christ and his saints on Earth in the form of a new Jerusalem. By the early 1640s, Milton would have known of Mede, his Clavis Apocalyptica, and the millenarian exegesis within. As he made his first major foray into the world of pamphleteering, he would also likely have been aware of, if not affected by, the millenarian interest and focus of English government and society that resulted in the translation of Clavis in 1643 as the Key.73

YOUNG MILTON AND THE MILLENNIUM

The impact of Milton’s millenarian context on his works and developing theology can be discerned in both ‘Lycidas’ (1637) and Of Reformation (1641). Marjorie Nicolson has suggested that the ‘old Damaetas’ of ‘Lycidas’ refers to Mede himself.74 McDowell also posits that Milton may have included millenarian imagery in ‘Lycidas’ in the knowledge that readers at Christ’s, such as Mede, would have understood these references, the meaning of which has caused substantial disagreement between recent

74 See John Milton, ‘Lycidas’ in CWJM iii. 50-8, line 36; further references to ‘Lycidas’ will be made parenthetically in the running text; Marjorie Nicolson, ‘Milton’s “Old Damaetas”’, in Modern Language Notes, 61 (1926), 293-300.
critics. Of Reformation exhibits Milton’s millenarianism more explicitly: it represents an early eschatology that anticipates the ideas of the 1644 tracts. John Leonard discusses Of Reformation as a means of unpacking the meaning of the ‘two-handed engine’ of ‘Lycidas’. The difference in form between these two texts illustrates Milton’s decision to focus on prose during the 1640s and beyond. The decision shows how Milton invested his millenarianism in society and state; he would not return to poetry as a form of conveying the millennium until Paradise Lost and the 1671 texts, Paradise Regain’d and Samson Agonistes. This reflects Milton’s faith in England as a nation capable of realising eschatological change; in the 1660s and 1670s, with the Restoration monarchy firmly established, the idealised, elect individuals of Milton’s poetry are representative of how Milton comes to believe in individuals as vehicles for change, rather than in England itself. From an eschatological standpoint, the change of form between ‘Lycidas’ and Of Reformation suggests that Milton decided to encourage reform in society – in this case arguing against episcopacy that was inhibiting the progress of the Reformation – rather than to patiently look ahead to the imminent return of the ‘two-handed engine’.

While the millenarian image in ‘Lycidas’ has often been viewed as equivocal, its association with end times is widely accepted: ‘But that two-handed engine at the door, / Stands ready to smite once, and smite no more’ (130-1). Leonard’s comprehensive analysis of the first of these two lines identifies Milton’s meaning as distinctively millenarian. Leonard separates the line into three parts: ‘(1) the demonstrative adjective “that”; (2) the engine itself; (3) the prepositional phrase “at the door”’. The first part is indicative of familiarity with the engine; the final part is suggestive of the imminence of that engine, as the phrase would have been recognised at the time; but the middle image of the engine is more ambiguous. The engine appears as a vehicle of forceful, heavenly judgement. Milton would show an interest in such apocalyptic climaxes later in his life: while the Son of Paradise Regain’d is an embodiment of self-control, he makes reference to rescuing ‘Israel from the Roman yoke’ through ‘Brute violence and proud Tyrannick pow’r, / Till truth were freed, and equity restor’d’ (i. 217, 219-20). More climactically, Samson Agonistes ends with

75 McDowell, Poet of Revolution, pp. 317-18.
Samson bringing down ‘two massie Pillars’ with a ‘burst of thunder’ onto the Philistines (CWJM ii. lines 1638, 1641). The imminence of ‘at the door’ in Lycidas is also earthly, even domestic. Such violent divine intervention appears as a herald to the millennium. Indeed, while there has been some doubt over millenarian readings of ‘Lycidas’, there is evidence of comparable contemporary interpretations of Revelation using similar language to Milton’s elegy.79

The Royall Guest (1637) by Thomas Drant (b. 1601/2) explores many of the ideas associated with Milton’s millenarianism in ‘Lycidas’, and thereby supports millenarian readings of the poem. Drant insists on his opening page that Christ will manifest himself on earth: ‘Wee meete here a Royall Guest, who enstated in all the Royalties of Heaven, yet sues for a welcome on earth’ (1). Drant positions Revelation 3:20 from the Authorised Version – ‘Behold I stand at the doore, and Knock’ – on the first page of The Royall Guest. While Leonard insists that the door is not a physical door – that the phrase ‘at the door’ is suggestive of the imminence of Christ’s arrival – Drant discusses the door attached to a building: ‘Behold One is here to whom the greatest Monarch is more base, than the basest Boare to the greatest Monarch, one who knocks importunately, why shut wee Him out, why are doores blockt up against Him?’80 Drant also associates the edifice with a human body – ‘CHRIST yet, but in the closet of our hearts, will take up no lodging in us’ – and the door as ‘the doore of our hearts’ (12).

Drant expands his analysis to include language that militarises the act of knocking, as depicted in ‘Lycidas’: ‘First, GOD knocks by the Ministery of His Word; this is a knock of power, and His, who knocks with Authority, for such is his Word, and so He teacheth, what strong holds will not this engine pull downe? what bulwarks of humane policie not scale, what rampiers of flesh and blood not raze and dig through?’ (17). The divine engine overcomes not only well-defended institutions, but also – to conflate the human body with a building once again – a corporeal entity. Similar to the various purposes of the engine that Leonard identifies in ‘Lycidas’, Drant’s engine – the word of God here – brings to heel through violent disembodiment those who will not obey Christ: ‘Men have fore-heads of Stone, necks vein’d with Adamant, hearts rib’d with Marble, these cannot bleed, nor those bow, nor tother blush, the Word is a hammer to breake this rock a peeces, a fire to melt it into softnesse, a rod to make waters of penitence gush from it (17).’ The corporeal imagery that Drant uses to illustrate the

79 Ibid., p. 264.
80 Thomas Drant, The Royall Guest: Or, A Sermon Preached At Lent Assises, Anno Dom, M.DC.XXXVI (1637), p. 11; further references will be made parenthetically in the running text.
power of the engine bears resemblance to Revelation: ‘out of his mouth went a sharp
twoedged sword’ (1:16); ‘And out of his mouth goeth a sharp sword, that with it he
should smite the nations’. McDowell argues that Milton’s ‘two-handed engine’ is most
likely a reference to Revelation.81 The Royall Guest, therefore, shows how the idea of
the imminent advent of Christ, in a wrathful manifestation on earth, was articulated in a
pamphlet using language in 1637 that echoed that of ‘Lycidas’.

Milton’s millenarianism extends to the anti-prelatical tracts, especially Of
Reformation, though some critics have resisted this argument. In Milton’s
Animadversions, which uses language that also resonates with ‘Lycidas’, he writes ‘thy
Kingdome is now at hand, and thou standing at the dore. Come forth out of thy Royall
Chambers, O Prince of all the Kings of the earth, put on the visible roabes of thy
imperiall Majesty, take up that unlimited Scepter which thy Almighty Father hath
bequeath’d thee’ (CPW i. 707). Christ’s second coming is imminent, and his reign will
replace earthly kings. Janel Mueller argues that ‘there is no room for millenarianism in
Of Reformation. The glorified saints of the peroration are quite explicitly imaged in a
heaven beyond time’.82 The final section of Of Reformation, however, challenges this
assertion.83 Mueller focuses on the description of the saints ‘in supereminence of
beatific Vision progressing the dateless and irrevoluble Circle of Eternity’, where they
‘shall clasp inseparable Hands with joy, and blisse in overmeasure for ever’ (i. 616).
There is little doubt that this in itself is apocalyptic and post-history. However, the
depiction of the elect subsumed into the kingdom of heaven, which concludes the
millenarian timeline, appears after Milton’s passionate address to Christ in heaven, in
which he declares ‘thou the Eternall and shortly-expected King shalt open the Clouds to
judge the severall Kingdomes of the World, and distributing Nationall Honours and
Rewards to Religious and just Common-wealths, shalt put an end to all Earthly
Tyrannies, proclaiming thy universal and milde Monarchy through Heaven and Earth
[…])’ (i. 616). The imminence of ‘shortly-expected’ transfers to the highly decorative
language that Milton uses to describe the ‘beatific vision’. The monarchy that Christ
will establish ‘through Heaven and Earth’ is, by its terrestrial nature, millenarian. In

81 McDowell, Poet of Revolution, p. 317.
82 Janel Mueller, ‘Embodying glory: the apocalyptic strain in Milton’s Of Reformation’, in David
Loewenstein and James Grantham Turner, eds., Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose
83 For arguments in favour of the millenarianism of this section of Of Reformation, see, in Juliet
May 1641, the same month as *Of Reformation* was first published, the Root and Branch Bill was introduced, which called for the removal of bishops from the Church of England and for church reform along Presbyterian lines. At this early stage in his developing eschatology, Milton viewed church reform – specifically the end of episcopacy – as contributing to the process of realising the millennium.

Thomas Corns suggests that while Mueller ‘recognizes a tension between the apocalyptic vision and the ambitions of the individual’, she does so ‘without engaging the complexity with which Milton and his contemporaries regarded the imminence of the Apocalypse while continuing their day-to-day lives.’ As Milton suggests in the peroration of *Of Reformation*, the millennium will occur in a time when England is ‘instructed and inur’d to the fervent and continuall practice of Truth and Righteousnesse’, populated by ‘the soberest, wisest, and most Christian People at that day’ (616). For millenarians like Milton, the millennium was not the product of passive expectation, but rather active, laborious reform. Indeed, Milton opposes those who would say that society ‘must not run […] into sudden extremes.’ He argues that ‘if it be found that these two extremees be Vice and Vertue, Falshood and Truth, the greater extremity of Vertue and superlative Truth we run into, the more vertuous, and the more wise wee become’ (i. 601). Accordingly, Milton advocates that one day a week should be ‘set apart wherein to examin and encrease our knowledge of God, to meditate, and commune of our Faith, our Hope, our eternall City in Heaven, and to quick’n, withall, the study, and exercise of Charity’ (i. 589). As in *Areopagitica*, which will be discussed at length in Chapter 3, Milton believes in *Of Reformation* that a society dedicated to study will increase the likelihood of realising ‘superlative Truth’ by also allowing Falsehood to exist and be challenged.

Milton’s belief in the potential of the laity to become scriptural interpreters suggests that he held a faith in the people at this early stage of his polemical career that would recede from 1649 onwards. Milton explains that the ‘intellectual ray which God hath planted in us’ provides all people, ‘not only the wise and learned, but the simple, the poor, the babes’ with ‘the ability of searching, trying, examining all things’ (i. 566). These three present participles mirror the ‘musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas’ (ii. 554) that defines the studious activity of Milton’s London in *Areopagitica*. Milton’s support of the laity, moreover, aligns *Of Reformation* with Thomas Goodwin’s *A Glimpse of Sions Glory* (1641), in which Goodwin directly

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addresses the commons themselves in rousing support of their innate, God-given abilities. ‘You that are of the meaneer rank, common People’, Goodwin declares, ‘be not discouraged; for God intends to make use of the common People in the great Worke of proclaiming the Kingdome of his Sonne’. An early sign of Milton’s belief in the elect is nevertheless apparent towards the end of the tract: Milton suggests that, ‘if Conformity of Church Discipline to the Civill be so desir’d’, the prince should appoint ‘the godliest, the wisest, the learnedest Ministers […] by whose full and free Election they are consecratet to that holy and equall Aristocracy’ (i. 599-600). The superlatives here indicate the idealised product of Presbyterian election of ministers by the people. While Milton, therefore, advocates greater autonomy of the people in Of Reformation, he also exhibits his sympathies for superior, elect individuals of society.

The embryonic millenarian ideas of these early texts provide a valuable foundation from which Milton’s eschatology could develop. ‘Lycidas’ encodes contemporary chiliastic language in much the same way as Of Reformation mirrors the burgeoning interest in millenarianism in England in the early 1640s. Of Reformation in particular anticipates many of the ideas that would feature prominently in Milton’s 1644 tracts: the interpretative capabilities of the laity; the unique potential of England in realising the millennium; and that the millennium was the product of the labour of the elect on earth, rather than an inevitable endpoint granted to the patient few. The most significant development in Milton’s intellectual context, as the following chapter will show, was the neo-Baconian ideas of the Hartlib circle. Milton’s involvement with the Hartlib circle, however brief, would help to consolidate and refine the eschatological ideas that he exhibited at this early stage in his life.

CONCLUSION

The early context of Milton’s millenarianism illustrates how close the young Milton was to prominent eschatological ideas of his time, and how he explored such ideas in his early polemical prose. As McDowell has recently shown, Mede would have been a significant figure in Milton’s education at Cambridge, even if only because of the theologian’s fame following the publication of Clavis Apocalyptica. If Mede provides

85 Thomas Goodwin, A Glimpse of Sions Glory (1641), pp. 5-6; on Milton’s belief in the people electing the clergy, see Paul Hammond, Milton and the People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 44, see generally 31-57.
evidence for Milton’s intellectual and physical proximity to major contemporary millenarian ideas, then ‘Lycidas’ and *Of Reformation* show how Milton was developing his eschatology at this early stage in his career. The following two chapters will show how 1644 was a significant year in Milton’s intellectual development, particularly through his involvement with the Hartlib circle. This chapter has shown how the seeds of those ideas were planted much earlier than 1644. The 1640s provided the platform and pamphleteering the mechanism through which Milton could hone and develop his utopian and millenarian ideas.
‘Regaining to know God aright’: Milton and the Hartlib Circle

Milton’s involvement with the Hartlib circle through his friend, Samuel Hartlib (1600-62), marks a significant period during which the pamphleteer encountered and contributed to a discourse of millenarian and utopian ideas. The Hartlib circle emerged primarily through the close relationship of Samuel Hartlib, who acted as a central intelligencer in England and Europe, and the irenicist and Presbyterian minister, John Dury (1596-1680). In association with the Czech educationalist, Johannes Amos Comenius (1592-1670), Hartlib and Dury led a diverse group of progressive intellectuals, who shared their belief that universal reformation could be achieved through the advancement of all forms of learning. Drawing inspiration from Bacon, the network believed that the institutionalised dissemination of knowledge would bring about reform necessary for the millennium. So passionately invested in its cause was the group that, by the late 1640s and early 1650s, they had achieved palpable parliamentary support, largely through the assistance of Sir Cheney Culpeper (1601-63), an advocate of the Hartlibian cause with influence in government. Charles Webster captures the extent of Hartlib’s influence in the mid-century: ‘A great proportion of the voluminous educational writings of this period was directly instigated by Hartlib, who became the central figure in […] the “Educational renaissance” of the commonwealth.’ Milton’s *Of Education* (1644) was one of these writings to have been produced in response to the direct solicitation of Hartlib himself. This chapter will orientate Milton in a discourse that included the earlier utopian text by Gabriel Plattes (1600-44), *A Description of the Famous Kingdom of Macaria* (1640), and which was dedicated to an eschatological purpose. It is important to address not only how *Of Education* can be viewed from a

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utopian perspective, particularly in comparison to *Macaria*, but also how, as Timothy Raylor suggests, Milton’s educational ideas enjoyed an afterlife in the Hartlibian texts of the later 1640s, specifically in those penned by Dury and John Hall of Durham (1627-56). The analysis will focus on the relationship and boundary between private and public spheres, which, as will be discussed in the following chapter, Milton continued to theorise and navigate in *Areopagitica* (1644). Milton’s vision for a private and exclusive academy facilitated the emergence of similar ideas in the Hartlibian texts of the late-1640s. The chapter will be split into three sections: the first will address Milton’s relationship to the Hartlib circle; the second will identify the utopianism of *Of Education* in comparison with *Macaria*; the third will consider how Milton’s proposal for exclusive education experienced an afterlife in Hartlibian works of the late-1640s.

Chloë Houston has explored how Hartlib and his associates espoused both utopian and millenarian ideas. Houston identifies the utopianism of the Hartlib circle as marking a shift away from utopian fiction and the travel narrative. The Hartlibians desired tangible social and educational reform in order to realise the ideal of the millennium. As Houston explains, ‘Apocalyptic beliefs thus created a cycle of optimism and reform: the fact that society was improving was an indicator of the imminent millennium, and the fact that the millennium was coming meant that there was a need to improve the present society in order to prepare for it; this was God’s will.’ Some critics, like J. C. Davis, have identified millenarians as lacking this will to action. Davis suggests that, as the millennium constituted an apocalyptic end point of history, its inevitability negated the need for societal reform. ‘The millenarian’s solution to the collective problem is then,’ according to Davis, ‘the product of a *deus ex machina*.’ The example of the Hartlibians challenges Davis’s rigid categorisation: they represent an active form of seventeenth-century millenarianism, which finds a more radical edge in groups like Winstanley’s Diggers and the Fifth Monarchists. In Hartlib’s *A Further Discoverie of the Office of Adдресse* (1647), having asserted that ‘wee believe that his Kingdome will be set up’, he identifies the role of the Hartlibians and the Office of Address – an institution for collecting and disseminating knowledge that resembled

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90 Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society*, p. 36.
Bacon’s Salomon’s House that he proposes in the tract – in bringing about eschatological change: ‘Wee expect also, that before this Kingdome of His Mediatorship between God and the Elect bee ended, & given up unto the Father; the Restitution of all this shall be wrought in the Churches & by the Church in the World & therefore wee desire to sow our seed upon all waters, whiles wee have opportunity.’91 Houston explains that, as ‘political conditions and millennial enthusiasm converged to make the perfect earthly community appear to be within reach, the utopia formed a central means of both imagining and promoting its achievement.’92 This chapter will explore in greater detail how Baconian utopianism – the ideal that the advancement of learning will bring about a return of prelapsarian dominion over nature – and Morean utopianism – the controlled, regulated totality that forms Davis’s definition of utopianism – feature in the Hartlibian writings of the 1640s.93 Of Education, written within the same intellectual context as other Hartlibian texts, will be interpreted within these same parameters.

Timothy Raylor shows how, in Of Education, Milton is formulating an early proposal for an English version of the French noble academies, based on the model of Antoine de Pluvinel (1552-1620). The French academies offered a comprehensive education for gentry, which included ‘horsemanship, supplemented by some combination of fencing, vaulting (the art of leaping onto horses), dancing, applied mathematics (for fortifications), moral and political philosophy, drawing and painting, writing and music.’ As Raylor explains, these academies ‘greatly appealed to the English nobility and gentry, who enrolled in considerable numbers, usually in the course of […] an embryonic grand tour’.94 Milton describes his own tour to Italy during 1638-9 in The Reason of Church Government (1642), recalling the ‘privat Academies of Italy’ where he was ‘favor’d to resort’, which suggests that he was aware of private, European educational institutions (CPW i. 810).95 As Raylor posits, Milton’s idealised institution in Of Education ‘was a version of a noble academy – a distinctly English,

92 Houston, Renaissance Utopia, p. 119.
reformed, and Miltonic version, to be sure; but a version nonetheless.’ As Hartlib himself assisted efforts by individuals, such as Balthazar Gerbier, in establishing noble academies in England, Raylor shows how Milton’s association with the Hartlibians suggests that he was emulating the noble academies in *Of Education*. In opposition to Ernest Sirluck’s argument that Milton’s lack of support for Comenius also meant a lack of support for Hartlib and his network, Raylor asserts that ‘Milton was, without being sympathetic to Comenianism, nevertheless working within the mainstream of Hartlibian educational reform as it was conceived during the 1640s.’ 96 This chapter will build on Raylor’s conclusion with the argument that Milton contributed a vision for private educationalism to an intellectual group dedicated to national reform and ‘Publique good’. 97

Milton’s enduring impact on Hartlibian ideology, in terms of the importance of private institutions contributing to a public good, is most clearly exhibited by the works of John Hall. Nicholas McDowell explains how Hall was engaged with both the Hartlib circle, and the coterie of Thomas Stanley (1625-78). Stanley served as patron to Hall’s studies at Durham Cathedral and St John’s College, Cambridge. Stanley also formed his own literary coterie in 1646-7 that longed for a return to poetic court culture. McDowell explains that the coterie ‘provided a private, cultured audience for each other’s work at a time when dramatic performance was banned and published poetry was under threat of censorship by a philistine Parliament.’ In June 1647, Hall left Cambridge to join Stanley at the Inns of Court and was admitted to Gray’s Inn. Around the same time, Hall was in correspondence with Hartlib and promoted Hartlib’s efforts with the Office of Address at Cambridge in 1646-7. ‘It is clear’, McDowell explains, ‘that Hall had swiftly become an ardent supporter of the Hartlibian vision of knowledge as an endowment from God to be used for public benefit.’ Hall’s strong support for *Of Education* suggests that he was able to reconcile his engagement with the Hartlib and Stanley circles. As McDowell explains, ‘the political distance between the “private” and “public” conceptions of English intellectual culture held by the Stanley and Hartlib circles was [...] real, and is measured by the considerable patronage that Hartlib received from Parliament during the 1640s.’ Milton’s major tracts in 1644, *Of Education* and *Areopagitica*, in their respective proximity and relationship to the Hartlib

circle, exhibit an awareness of, if not an attention to, the juncture between public and private spheres. Hall’s positive reaction to *Of Education* is significant: it suggests that he found in Milton a form of private intellectualism that was dedicated to public good in Hartlibian terms.

**COMENIUS AND BACON: THE HARTLIBIAN CONTEXT**

There is an apparent tension between the Hartlibian perception of universal educational reform pre-1644 and Milton’s vision for private, aristocratic academies. As the following chapter will explore in more detail, in 1644, Milton espouses the Baconian ideal that the advancement of learning will achieve an eschatological end point. For Bacon, the advancement of learning would specifically manifest in a return to prelapsarian dominion over nature. As Webster suggests, Bacon’s writings encouraged millenarian interpretations from millenarian reformers, such as those of Hartlib and his associates.98 Whereas Milton’s seventh prolusion indicates that he read and admired Bacon (*CPW* i. 288-306), he explicitly asserts his disinterest in the Comenian view of pansophic reform that Hartlib had supported since the late 1630s: ‘to search what many modern Janua’s and Didactics more then ever I shall read, have projected my inclination leads me not’ (*CPW* ii. 364-6).99 Accordingly, while Milton’s educational vision does not share in the concept of universal learning that Comenius advocated, it does, as a contribution to the Hartlibian discourse, represent a desire to advance public good. While Raylor is sceptical of any explicitly Baconian elements in *Of Education*, Thomas Festa posits that the ‘expanded scientific breadth, and the increased spiritual depth, of the mature educational project owed at least as much to Milton’s sustained engagement with the educational thinking of Bacon as it did to his personal friendship with Samuel Hartlib.’100 However, Festa identifies two separate ends of learning in *Of Education* that, with an awareness of Baconian precedent, can be viewed as one. ‘The end then of learning’, Milton asserts early in the tract, ‘is to repair the ruins of our first parents by regaining to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love him, to imitate him, to be like him, as we may the neerest by possessing our souls of true

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98 Webster, *Great Instauration*, pp. 21-3.
99 Milton alludes to Comenius’s *Janua Linguarum Reserata* (1631) and *Didactica Magna* (1657).
vertue, which being united to the heavenly grace of faith makes up the highest perfection’ (366-7). This, Festa suggests, is distinct from Milton’s assertion that ‘I call therefore a complete and generous Education that which fits a man justly, skilfully and magnanimously all the offices both private and publike of peace and war’ (377-9). 101 Festa argues that Milton is being ‘Janus-faced’: where the first end of learning is ‘recuperative and memorial’, the second is ‘ideological’, aligning with the classical republicanism that Dzelzainis identifies. The latter end of learning relates to Milton’s awareness of the noble academies. This study takes a middle ground between Festa and Raylor. Rather than separate, these two assertions are part of the same educational vision: Milton believed that the Baconian philosophy – that educational reform will serve the end of ‘regaining’ unity with God – can be achieved through his idealised private, educational institution. While Milton’s private educationalism contradicts the Comenian pansophy that the Hartlibians advocated in the early 1640s, Of Education remained a significant and influential contribution to the Hartlibian discourse.

Hartlib and his associates were committed to pansophic reform in the early 1640s. While Comenius played a significant role in directing the Hartlibian project towards a belief in universal reform, Bacon remained an influential precedent in the formulation of Comenius’s pansophic philosophy. 102 In a letter that Dury wrote to Culpeper on 13th January 1642, which was published in A Motion Tending to the Publick Good of This Age (1642), he expresses the intricate relationship between the originators of the Hartlibian enterprise: ‘I meane Master Comenius, Mr Hartlib, and my selfe: For though our taskes be different, yet we are all three in a knot sharers of one anothers labours, and can hardly bee without one anothers helpe and assistance.’ 103 This was followed by a ‘Foederis fraterni’ or ‘fraternal pact’, signed by Dury, Comenius and Hartlib on 13 March 1642. 104 Hartlib published Comenius’s tracts, Conatuum Comenianorum praedudia and Pansophiae prodomus, in 1637 and 1639 respectively, the latter of which he republished in translation in 1642 – the year after he had invited Comenius to London – under the title The Reformation of Schooles. 105 As Dagmar Čapková explains, Comenius was inspired by the ideal of ‘panharmonia’, ‘a Neoplatonic conception of the whole, of the world as an organism in which

101 Festa, End of Learning, p. 16.
103 Dury, A Motion, p. 107.
104 HP 7/109/1A-2B; see McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance, p. 53.
interrelationships played an important role and mankind is conceived as a microcosm within a macrocosm.’ *Pansophia* represented the perfect relationship between man and the world, through which man could attain unity with God, as the ‘truth revealed in Scripture’.

In *A Reformation of Schooles*, Comenius makes clear the Baconian precedent for his philosophy: ‘It is a matter of moment, which the Lord VERULAM hath effected in his excellent *Novum Organum*, where he shewes the infallible way of making a narrow search into the natures of things’. Baconian empiricism was a means of re-establishing a prelapsarian relationship with the natural world. However, Comenius proceeds to interpret Baconian empiricism in a pansophic light, asking ‘why should wee not hope for some invention of inventions, whereby the severall inventions, and endeavours of so many wits, may not onely in their matter, but even in their manner of discovery be united into one, and made common to mankind?’.

Comenius repeatedly advocates reform to serve a universal and common good. As *A Motion* indicates, the Hartlibians increasingly accommodated pansophic values. Pansophic good, moreover, served a millenarian purpose, which further aligns Comenius to Bacon: ‘We have also an expresse promise concerning the latter times, that *Many shall runne to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased*, Dan. 12. 4.’ As Mark Greengrass observes, this is the same quote used by Bacon on the frontispiece of his *Instauratio magna*. Comenius, drawing from the Baconian design, facilitated the Hartlibian focus on pansophic reform, which was inherently universal and egalitarian.

It is within this context that, just a year later, in 1643, Hartlib makes a note, in his *Ephemerides*, of a promising, emergent pamphleteer. ‘Mr Milton in Aldersgate Street’, Hartlib notes, ‘hase written many good books a great traveller and full of projects and inventions.’ It is possible that Hartlib had learned this from correspondence within his network, or he may even have met Milton at this stage. Milton’s ‘projects and inventions’ that Hartlib approves of are presumably theoretical and institutional, anticipating the proposal in *Of Education*. In November 1643, Hartlib notes that Milton, when he was ‘living off a modest private income’, contributed three

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107 Comenius, *The Reformation of Schooles* (1642), pp. 28-9; for other references to Bacon, see 31, 43, 47.

108 See Bacon, *OFB* xi. IN1, facing xxxii: ‘*Multi pertransibunt & augebitur scientia*’.

shillings to the war engine of Edmond Felton. Milton’s modest income, prior to his public employment in 1649, was largely sourced from the private tuition of young students. Having taught his young nephews, John and Edward Philips, since his return from Italy, Milton took in more pupils to his house in Aldersgate in April 1643. In the autumn of 1645, Milton moved into a house in the Barbican, where Edward Philips would later recall ‘probably he might have some prospect of putting in Practice his Academical Institution, according to the Model laid down in his Sheet of Education.’

When Hartlib met Milton, then, the pamphleteer was already practising a distinctly private form of educationalism, designed for children of wealth and status. Hartlib himself had attempted to establish a private academy in Chelsea College in 1630-1 with William Petty. However, Of Education must be viewed in the context following Hartlib’s ‘fraternal pact’ with Comenius and Dury, dedicating the Hartlibian cause to public good. As Milton’s educational treatise was dedicated to Hartlib, it was not just a private educational institution established solely for private ends. Milton’s educational vision was intended to serve the public good.

While Milton positioned himself away from the Comenian side of the Hartlibian project, he dedicates Of Education to Hartlib and his neo-Baconian philosophy. In the form of a letter addressed to Hartlib, Of Education was inspired by and written for the Hartlibian cause. Milton explains to Hartlib that, while he considers the ‘reforming of Education’ to be ‘one of the greatest and noblest designes, that can be thought on’, he would not have put pen to paper ‘but by your earnest entreaties, and serious conjurements’ (CPW ii. 362-3). Milton affirms that his praise for Hartlib is not the product of their ‘private friendship’, ‘but that I see those aims, those actions which have won you with me the esteem of a person sent hither by some good providence from a farre country to be the occasion and the incitement of great good to this Iland’ (363). Milton does not identify a contradiction between the private, aristocratic academy that he proposes and the Hartlibian efforts to reform England that he praises. To return

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to Milton’s asserted purpose of learning, of ‘regaining to know God aright’ (367), he specifically refers to ‘the learned correspondence which you hold in forreigne parts, and the extraordinary pains and diligence which you have us’d in this matter both heer, and beyond the Seas’ (363). The value of international intelligencing and the idea of dissemination of knowledge attaining unity with God suggest a Baconian precedent. Rather than tolerating Comenianism, Milton should be viewed as actively praising the neo-Baconian project that Hartlib co-ordinated. As the final section of this chapter will show, Of Education is a prominent contribution to the Hartlibian discourse that redirects Hartlibian focus away from the universal and pansophic ideals of Comenius.

**OF EDUCATION, MACARIA AND UTOPIA**

Milton’s educational proposal is a rigorous and comprehensive vision for the training of aristocratic leaders and statesmen. Gordon Campbell and Thomas Corns describe ‘Milton’s nightmarish model for English education’ as ‘Repressive, prescriptive, elitist, masculinist, militarist, dustily pedantic, class-ridden, and affectionless’.¹¹² This pejorative criticism does not acknowledge that Milton, in his continued role as private schoolmaster, viewed his proposal as having the potential for practical application. Many of the qualities that Campbell and Corns identify are features of utopianism. As Davis argues, ‘totality, order, perfection – are cardinal characteristics of the utopian form.’ Utopias are intended for ‘the reorganisation of society and its institutions, by education, by laws and by sanctions’ in order to achieve ‘order, that social necessity.’¹¹³ While Plattes’s Macaria exhibits similar utopian characteristics, Amy Boesky also identifies Macaria as part of a contemporary utopian focus on industry and institutions: ‘these utopists envisioned a civilian corps of trained and zealous workers dedicated to the ideals of industry, cooperation, and productivity.’ Hartlibian educational reform resembles such a utopian vision.¹¹⁴ Where Davis does not accommodate Bacon in his definition of utopianism – categorising Bacon instead exclusively as a millenarian – this section will acknowledge the Baconian roots of institutional utopianism, as originally exhibited in Salomon’s House. Aware of Baconian precedent, the Hartlibians were

¹¹³ Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, p. 38.
¹¹⁴ Boesky, Founding Fictions, 87-90; on Macaria generally, see Webster, Instauration, pp. 47-51; on Macaria in its Hartlibian context, see Manuel and Manuel, Utopian Thought, pp. 325-9.
committed to the potential of specific institutions, such as the Office of Address or schools, as vehicles for wider societal change. Milton’s educational institution belongs to this Hartlibian utopian discourse. Where Boesky, moreover, suggests that Macaria is an ‘artisanal utopia, promising utopia not to the patrician classes, like Bacon’s *New Atlantis*, but to ordinary laborers’, it is necessary to acknowledge how the aristocratic education of *Of Education* aligns with the institutional restriction of knowledge that Macaria’s College of Experience maintains. Having identified the Baconianism of Milton’s education system, this section will proceed to compare *Of Education* with *Macaria*. In doing so, it will show how *Of Education* contributed ideas of aristocratic education, drawing from the French academy model, to the Hartlibian discourse that drew from and developed essential Baconian – and, thereby, utopian – ideas.

Milton’s education system is structured as a linear progression from sensory to theoretical learning. Milton explains that ‘because our understanding cannot in this body found it selfe but on sensible things, nor arrive so cleerly to the knowledge of God and things invisible, as by orderly conning over the visible and inferior creature, the same method is necessarily to be follow’d in all discreet teaching’ (367–9). There was Hartlibian precedent for empirical learning: one of Dury’s proposals in *A Motion Tending to the Publick Good of this Age* (1642) was to establish in schools a ‘Systeme of things obvious to the sences of children’.  

115 Dury, *A Motion Tending to the Publick Good of this Age* (1642), in Webster, *Samuel Hartlib*, p. 104.


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elements of Geometry (386). The study of classical texts will augment the general grasp of Latin and Greek, Milton explains: ‘Ere halfe these Authors be read, which will soon be with plying hard, and dayly, they cannot choose but be masters of any ordinary prose’ (389). Milton’s students proceed to study agriculture (388), geography and natural philosophy (389-90) and, with ‘the difficulties of Grammar being soon overcome’, they can focus Aristotle, Seneca, and other classical texts of ‘Historicall Physiology’. The early speculative and physical education expands to include trigonometry, architecture, ‘History of Meteors, minerals, plants and living creatures as farre as Anatomy’, followed by ‘tempers, the humors, the seasons’ (392). These initial studies will be complemented by the vocational experiences of ‘Hunters, fowlers, Fishermen, Shepherds, Gardeners, Apothecaries; and in the other sciences, Architects Engineers, Mariners, Anatomists’. Experiential education will ‘give them such a reall tincture of naturall knowledge, as they shall never forget, but dayly augment with delight’ (394). Although Raylor insists that this is not Baconian, it coincides with the Baconian framework that Milton asserts at the beginning of his proposal. At this stage in their education, students can proceed to some classical poetry, which is strictly not epic at this point – ‘the rurall part of Virgil’ (396) – alongside moral (396) and political (398-9) philosophies, before attending to ‘Histories, heroic poems, and Attic tragedies of statlies and most regal argument’ (400-1).

It is from this comprehensive basis that Milton’s students begin to learn the ‘organic arts which enable men to discourse and write perspicuously, elegantly, and according to the fitted stile of lofty, mean, or lowly’ (401). Fittingly, rhetoric, which Milton would employ in his work for the republican parliament five years later, features at this vital, final stage of the Miltonic education. ‘To which Poetry’, Milton asserts dramatically, ‘would be made subsequent, or indeed rather precedent, as being lesse suttle and fine, but more simple, sensuous and passionate’ (403). This is not ‘the prosody of a verse’ that Milton’s students would already have studied, ‘but that sublime art which in Aristotles poetics […] teaches what the laws are of a true Epic poem, what of a Dramatic, what of a Lyric, what decorum is, which is the grand master peece to observe’ (404-5). ‘This would make them soon perceive what despicable creatures our common rimers and play-writes be,’ Milton asserts, ‘and shew them, what Religious, what glorious and magnificent use might be made of Poetry both in divine and humane things’ (405-6). Milton stresses that it is ‘From hence and not till now’ that they will ‘be able writers and composers in every excellent matter, when they shall be thus fraught with an universall insight into things’ (406). Milton structures his curriculum as
progressing from speculative, practical learning to more abstract, theoretical studies, the universal ideal of which is poetry.

Martin Dzelzainis identifies classical republicanism in *Of Education* that, considering the Hartlibian context, can be viewed more accurately as utopianism. ‘Behind the diffident pose’, Dzelzainis writes, ‘lay a deep anxiety about the malaise afflicting the parliamentary cause and a conviction that the only cure for it was, in effect, a New Model education.’ As Dzelzainis argues, Milton likely believed that classical education of the elite was the means through which society could be progressively reformed. The attention Milton places on educating students to a noble and virtuous standard, such as in the seemingly republican language of rousing students to godly patriotism (e.g. ‘enflamed’ and ‘stirred up’), supports this argument. The expansive education that Milton proposes suggests that he ‘saw in such classically educated statesmen and orators not the destruction but the salvation of the commonwealth.’ Milton believed that his educational system would produce the necessary leaders for a pre-millennial society. As this chapter has argued, Milton intended his proposal to contribute to the Hartlibian project of advancing learning to an eschatological endpoint. The Miltonic education is not only dedicated to an elite few, but it also constitutes a rigid totality. Each component of Milton’s educational blueprint directly and uncompromisingly serves the ends of learning he articulates at the beginning of the treatise. Rather than classical republicanism, Milton’s desire for educational reform to usher in wider progress in society, particularly in comparison with the Hartlibian utopia, *Macaria*, means that *Of Education* can be viewed as a mid-seventeenth-century form of utopianism.

Addressed to parliament and styled in conventional utopian dialogue – a conversation between a traveller and a scholar – *Macaria* retains the fictional artifice of More and Bacon’s utopias. In the preface, in which he directly addresses parliament, Plattes explains that he has ‘delivered [his] conceptions in a Fiction, as a more mannerly way, having for my pattern Sir Thomas Moore, and Sir Francis Bacon’. Houston suggests that Plattes intentionally locates his dialogue in London in order to identify the Macarian Great Council as something that the Long Parliament could emulate. ‘Plattes’,

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118 Gabriel Plattes, *A Description of the Famous Kingdome of Macaria*, in Webster, ed., *Samuel Hartlib*, p. 80. All subsequent references to *Macaria* will be made to this edition, and will appear parenthetically in the running text.
Houston posits, ‘seeks to distance his utopia from the fictional elements of travel writing.’\(^\textnormal{119}\) The scholar illustrates this by expressing that he feels greater satisfaction from the traveller’s description of Macaria, than he had felt from the utopias of More and Bacon (86). Platte’s vision is, moreover, distinctively utopian in its promotion of systemic control. As Robert Appelbaum posits, Macaria is a state ‘governed by an educated elite’, in which the ‘rulers, operating on the basis of cooperative, collective, and “experimental” behaviour, see to the care of the body and soul alike of the members of the polity’.\(^\textnormal{120}\) The Great Council of Macaria, ‘like to the Parliament in England’ (81), is the central authoritative body under which exist sub-councils in husbandry, fishing, trade by land, trade by sea, and plantations. These state institutions create the system that maintains order in Macaria. The legal enforcement of this order is the necessary utopian component that ensures its longevity (81-2). The problem of the disproportionate ownership of land, for instance, is resolved by penalties levied against anyone who ‘holdeth more land than he is able to improve to the utmost’ (82). This anticipates James Harrington’s more developed concept of the equal agrarian in the *Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656).\(^\textnormal{121}\) In Macaria, if penalties do not solve the problem, then the transgressor is ‘banished out of the Kingdome, as an enemy to the common-wealth’ (82). In characteristic utopian fashion, the Macarian state safeguards its own future through a strict penal system.

More pertinently for the Hartlibians, state control extends to education and the dissemination of knowledge. Macaria’s ‘Colledge of experience’ (83), a precursor to Hartlib’s Office of Address, is intended to centralise knowledge of medicine. Platte’s College seems to be specifically modelled on the centralisation of medicine envisioned by Théophraste Renaudot, which he realised in his *Bureau d’adresse* in September 1640. The College in *Macaria* supplies parsons, who also serve as physicians for each parish. Medical knowledge is, therefore, centrally managed by the College. ‘Platte’s, Webster argues ‘was insistent that state supervision was essential, not only for verification of results, but also to ensure the dissemination of useful information to the widest public.’\(^\textnormal{122}\) The divines, who the scholar – a divine himself – acknowledges ‘have great estimation with the people, and can rule them at their pleasure’, serve as an integral and controlled means of communicating ideas and opinions to the common


\(^{121}\) For a discussion of the equal agrarian, see p. 204.

\(^{122}\) Webster, *Instauration*, p. 48.
people. Rather than part of an artisanal utopia, as Boesky asserts, Frank and Fritzie Manuel argue that here ‘the Baconian priest-scientist […] is rehabilitated in modified form.’ To the question of how ‘good Divines’ are identified and formed, the traveller answers, ‘They are all of approved abilitie in human learning, before they take in hand that function, and then they have such rules, that they need no considerable studie to accomplish all knowledge fit for Divines, by reason that there are no diversitie of opinions amongst them.’ This lack of ‘diversitie’ implies that the knowledge the Divines impart to the common people is predetermined, likely by the Great Council. In particular, as Divines are initially ‘approved’ for their level of education, the standard of knowledge must not only be determined by the state, but such education must also be readily available in Macaria. If that is the case, then the dissemination of knowledge in Macaria is self-fulfilling: a Macarian meets the standard to become a Divine through the education they have already received by the Divines. This is qualified by the traveller: ‘for they have a law, that if any Divine shall publish a new opinion to the Common people, he shall be accounted a disturber of the publick peace, and shall suffer death for it’. In Platter’s utopia, the dissemination of knowledge is carefully and brutally mediated by the state. New opinions are permitted to be aired once a year before the Great Council, but these must overcome the established ‘truth’ at that time (84). Although in Macaria, ‘the people doe live in great plenty, prosperitie, health, peace, and happiness, and have not halfe so much trouble as they have in these European Countreyes’ (81), this is dependent on stringent regulations that promote state control of a utopian standard.

*Of Education* can be viewed as a utopian totality along similar lines to *Macaria*. Boesky, identifying ‘contemporary utopian interest in regulation and discipline’, argues that the purpose of discipline in *Of Education* ‘was to consolidate the corps of ideal students in the Miltonic academy’. With regard to his full, lengthy curriculum, Milton asserts that ‘all this may be done between twelve, and one and twenty’ (379); it would ‘be at once both School and University, not needing a remove to any other house of Scholarship’ (380). Milton’s educational vision is an educational totality. By encompassing such a significant proportion of education in a relatively short time within just one building, each school under Milton’s educational proposal is essentially a utopia unto itself. In his description of Latin and grammar tuition, Milton articulates the central purpose of the stringent educational system: ‘But here the main

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skill and groundwork will be, to temper them such lectures and explanations upon every opportunity, as may lead and draw them in willing obedience, enflam’d with the study of learning, and the admiration of vertue; stirr’d up with high hopes of living to be brave men, and worthy patriots, dear to God, and famous to all ages (384-5).’ In a utopian fashion, Milton juxtaposes the muting power of ‘temper’ and ‘willing obedience’ with the animation of ‘enflamed’ and ‘stirred up’, as if inspiration in his ideal academies is dependent on submission. A good teacher, Milton suggests, ‘who hath the Art and proper eloquence’, in part ‘with the intimation of some fear’, but ‘chiefly by his own example’, would be capable of ‘infusing into their young brests such an ingenuous and noble ardor, as would not fail to make many of them renowned and matchlesse men’ (385). Milton’s education expects only the best – perhaps to an unrealistic degree – from its students.

Milton’s educational vision aspires to perfection because it is dedicated to an elite group of society, which can be compared to the divines of Macaria. This chapter has acknowledged Raylor’s comprehensive observations of how the French noble academies served as an inspiration for Of Education. In Macaria, Plattes places the power of knowledge and its dissemination in the hands of elite, highly educated divines. Milton’s educational reform, while orienting intellectual power in statesmen rather than church officials, retains the locus of that power in elite members of society. Almost all aspects of Milton’s educational blueprint have some form of ulterior purpose for such individuals. The study of agriculture, for instance, is intended to help ‘improve the tillage of their country’ (388-9); the study of politics ensures that students do not become ‘poor, shaken, uncertain reeds […] as many of our great counsellers’, but rather ‘stedfast pillars of the State’ (398). Whereas Dzelzainis bands the military side of Milton’s proposed education together with the collective whole of the classical republicanism of the text, Milton, in fact, believes his educational proposal superior to the classical precedent from which he draws inspiration, for ‘this institution of breeding which I here delineate, shall be equally good both for Peace and warre’ (408). Situated around midday, time shall be scheduled for Milton’s students to be given military training. They will learn to use a sword, ‘to tugge, to grapple, and to close’ (409), ‘with much exactness, and dayly muster, serv’d out the rudiments of their Souldiership in all the skill of embattailing, marching, encamping, fortifying, beseiging and battering’ (411). Such physical education will ensure that Milton’s students become ‘renowned and perfect Commanders in the service of their country’ (412). Older pupils will also have the opportunity ‘to ride out in companies with prudent and staid guides, to all the
quarters of the land: learning and observing all places of strength, all commodities of building and of soil, for towns and tillage, harbours and Ports for trade’ (413). The image of highly educated students riding out to learn more from the country they will ultimately lead is an aristocratic one. It presents the students of Milton’s academy as preparing for their roles as statesmen, as they increase their first-hand knowledge of agriculture, commerce, trade, and defence. Milton’s emphasis on practical learning, specifically in the application of the theory learned in the educational institution, is once again evident here. Where the divines serve as conduits of knowledge from the Macarian College to the people in Macaria, education is focused on aristocratic individuals in Milton’s academy in order to better prepare them for their roles as English statesmen. Both Macaria and Of Education exhibit how mid-seventeenth-century utopianism places faith in well-educated, aristocratic individuals. 

Of Education and Macaria identify regulation and control in utopian terms as necessary to realise the eschatological purpose of the Hartlib circle. The dissemination of knowledge in Macaria is filtered through the state in a controlled manner comparable to the strict curriculum of Milton’s proposed educational reform. Both Macaria and Of Education are founded on regulated systems that control learning, students and, ultimately, society. The elite, aristocratic focus of Of Education, moreover, corresponds to the highly educated divines, in whom the responsibility for education is placed in Macaria. While the appointment of Plattes’s divines is not predetermined by class, knowledge is nonetheless managed by an elite few. As the following chapter will show, Milton’s aristocratic education revitalised Hartlibian attention to exclusive intellectualism from 1644. The Hartlibian tracts of the later 1640s include or show an awareness of private – and particularly aristocratic – education. Milton’s 1644 texts suggest that there is a significant relationship between elitism and utopianism, particularly in Milton’s developing ideology.

AFTERLIFE: DURY, HARTLIB, AND HALL

Milton not only effectively contributed to already-existing ideas of social reform in Hartlibian discourse, but his ideas also had a tangible afterlife in later Hartlibian works. Raylor concludes that ‘Milton’s tract played a significant part in shaping the Hartlibians’ understanding of the institutional and curricular structure of a reformed
institution of aristocratic education.¹²⁵ It is important to recognise this as a contrast between the Comenian dedication to universal learning in *A Motion Tending to the Publick Good of This Age* (1642) and the attention given to selective education in post-*Of Education* Hartlibian tracts by Dury, such as *Considerations* (1647) and his *Reformed School* (1650), and Hartlib’s *Parliaments Reformation* (1646). It is also necessary to position John Hall within this evolving Hartlibian context. McDowell posits that Hall, in his equal engagement with both the Stanley coterie and the Hartlib Circle, straddles proponents of private and public intellectual cultures in England respectively.¹²⁶ Characteristic of a private intellectual discourse, the Stanley circle was exclusive: Hall’s letters to Hartlib frequently encouraging him to contact Stanley suggest Hartlib’s lack of success in this endeavour.¹²⁷ Hall’s strong support of *Of Education*, therefore, suggests that he found in Milton a bridge between private and public intellectual spheres. Hall’s interest also exhibits how Milton’s treatise continued to play a role in the developing Hartlibian ideology and enabled Hall to formulate his own original perspective of private intellectualism.

There is a transition in Hartlibian publications from the distinctly Comenian *A Motion* and the post-*Of Education* tracts that consistently endorse some form of selective educational vision. In *A Motion*, Dury espouses a public view of educational reform: ‘That a Publique good is nothing else but the universall private good of every one in the life of God; for that which serveth the turne of some only, although they may be many, and even the greater part, is not to be counted truly Publique; but that is properly Publique which is common, and reacheth alike unto all’ (99). Dury unequivocally advocates universal learning that serves a public and common good. *A Motion* notably differs from Dury’s proposal in *Considerations Tending to the Happy Accomplishment of Englands Reformation* (1647), in which he envisions four different types of school in his reformed society: ‘The First for the Vulgar, whose life is to be Mechanicall. The Second for the Gentry and Nobles, who are to beare Charges in the Commonwealth. The Third for Scholars, who are to teach others Humane Arts and Sciences. And the Fourth for the sons of the Prophets, who are Seminary of the Ministry.’¹²⁸ *Considerations* evidently does not conform to the egalitarian ideal of

¹²⁷ See Hall to Hartlib, 11 January 1647, *HP* 60/14/13B; 11 March [1647], *HP* 60/14/8A.
¹²⁸ Dury, *Considerations Tending to the Happy Accomplishment of Englands Reformation* (1647), in Webster, *Samuel Hartlib*, p. 123. Further references will be made parenthetically in the running text to this edition.
universal ‘Publique good’ that Dury advances in *A Motion*. These schools entrench class boundaries. Dury also advocates the banishment of any individuals who ‘spend their time in Idleness, in riot and vanity’, or who ‘live disorderly, and cannot be reduced to any certain Employment’ (124). Hartlib initially discussed the concept of idleness, which is prominent in More’s *Utopia* and in Gerrard Winstanley’s utopian text, *The Law of Freedom* (1652), in *The Parliaments Reformation* (1646). In this proposal for workhouses for the poor, Hartlib asserts that ‘the major part of the people doe never move to any good work willingly before they are commanded; and the command must be upon a penalty too, else they will doe little’.

As *Parliaments Reformation* attests, the change of Hartlibian attitude to accommodate private, selective educational ideas began in the pivotal year of 1646, after which Hartlibian tracts increasingly adopted Miltonic ideas. The two-year hiatus between *Of Education* and 1646 can be partly explained by the first civil war, which was in its final stages between April and June 1646, and Dury himself having to look after his sister, Jean Dury (fl. 1638-48), who between June 1644 and May 1645 troubled her brother as she became romantically involved with Henry Appelius, an associate from Hartlib’s network. Dury references these difficulties with his sister as a reason why he did not reply to Henry Robinson’s letter, which he received in November 1644, until 24 April 1646.

Accordingly, it is in April 1646 that Dury references his ‘next taske’, which is ‘the subject of education in the Academie’. He includes an ‘Idea of education’ in a letter to Hartlib dated 4 May 1646, in which he references that he has ‘something more particular of the heads to bee elaborated concerning the education of Nobles’. The ‘second part of the Idea of Education’ is included in a letter to Hartlib on 12 May. Given that Dury goes on to write the manuscript pages for *Reformed Librarie-Keeper* (1650) in August 1646, it is possible that the letter is an early draft of his *Reformed School*. In the latter text, Dury exhibits a utopian awareness of the need for ‘outward Authority and Power to restrain exemplary disorderliness, or of inward

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130 On Appelius, see Webster, *Instauration*, pp. 277, 387-90.
Conviction’. The third part of Dury’s proposed education, which covers the ages of 13/14-19/20, similar age parameters to that proposed in Of Education, borrows from Milton’s model. This is the order of Dury’s education: agriculture, natural history, architecture, moral philosophy, economics, mathematics, natural philosophy, logic, rhetoric, poetry, and history (163-4). The emphasis on ‘Sense’ (153-4, 159), which Dury identifies as an early, formative form of a child’s education, recalls the empirical aspects of Milton’s educational treatise.

In the same early part of 1646, Milton is also referenced in – and deleted from – educational proposals in Hartlib’s hand. The first, dated to February 1646 and written in a mixture of English, Latin and German, was originally entitled ‘Mr Miltons Academie’, but was changed to ‘Mr Lawrence Academie’, which may refer to Richard Lawrence (d. 1684), who founded a school for twenty boys at Lambeth in 1661. While there are clear Hartlibian elements in the proposal, including ‘An Office of Learned Addresse’ and ‘House of Sensuals’, it also contains more Miltonic elements, such as a ‘Schoole and Councel of Warre’, alongside ‘exercise of shooting out of a long Bow’s’ and ‘Also with Crosse-bow’s’. While such physical exercise does not exactly resemble the martial training of Of Education, the amended title suggests that Hartlib was thinking about Milton when drafting these ideas. In another undated page of notes, entitled ‘Gymnasticae’, Hartlib lists the ‘Art of moulding et Turning. Art of distilling. Art of Fortification’, and questions ‘How a childs spirit may bee enobled by certain Exercises?’ In a more extended list of recreational exercises for young boys, Hartlib includes cross-bow shooting, both in German – ‘Nach dem ziel schießen mit armbrust’ – and Latin – ‘sagitare’. He also twice references ‘equitare’ or horse-riding, which, as we have seen, was a major part of the Miltonic education. Elsewhere, Hartlib discusses riding as an essential quality, especially for nobility: ‘For of all outward qualities, to ride faire is most cumelie for himself most necessarie for his Contri, et the greater he is in the blood, the greater is his praise, the more he doth exceede al other therin.’ The skill of horsemanship will benefit England as much as noble heritage determines superiority. To return to 1646, on 14 April, Dury wrote a letter to Hartlib in which he asserted his support for the ‘waye of Aristocracy, which doth unite most the

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135 These translate as ‘to shoot at the target with a cross-bow’ and ‘to shoot arrows’.
136 Hartlib, ‘Notes on Colleges’, February 1646, HP 47/9/34A-35B; ‘Gymnasticae’, HP 22/14/1A, 3A; ‘Didactica Gymnasticae Infantalis’, HP 22/14/5A-7A; ‘Gymnastica Athletica Baconiana’, HP 22/12/3A.
Body, & is strongest to uphold state Authority’. Rather than democratically elected, Dury writes that an ‘Aristocracy which hath its foundation upon a priority & superiority, not derived from the multitude’ is preferable. Dury’s assertion anticipates Hartlib’s assistance of Colonel John Humphrey’s proposal for a noble academy in England, which Raylor dates to around 1647. In an early edition of the proposal, Hartlib seems to have changed the order of Humphrey’s curriculum to place oratory and poetry later, before the martial training of fencing, riding, and ‘Exercise of armes’, a structure which resembles *Of Education and Reformed School*. From 1646, then, the Hartlibians were showing an increasing acceptance of and engagement with the importance of aristocratic education and how more private, exclusive institutions could benefit the public good.

Hall came into contact with and began writing for Hartlib within this context. It was in 1646 that, in his essay ‘Of Fables’, Hall expressed his support for Bacon and More’s utopias: ‘what rare Common-wealths have beene molded, by Sir Thomas Moore, Campanella, &c. What a stupendious Fabrick of a Colledge for Nature, hath great Saint Albanes reard’. Between November 1646 and April 1647, Hartlib harnessed Hall’s interest in utopianism by requesting him to translate utopian texts by Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) and Johann Valentin Andreae (1586-1654). In his translation of Andreae’s *Christianae Societatis Imago* (1620), entitled *A Modell of Christian Society* (1647), which is discussed in the following chapter, Hall laments that there are too few intellectuals of his age ‘as have wholly espoused themselves to great and publick endeavours’. It was during this time, in March 1647, that Hall was writing his own ‘Idea of a Commonwealth & Colledge in a Romance’, called ‘Leucenia’, which he never finished and was ultimately lost. On 2 January, moreover,

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138 *HP*, 47/8/9A-B; other versions at 47/8/5A-6B, 7A-8B; see also Hartlib’s involvement with Balthazar Gerbier (1592-1663) and his *The Interpreter of the Academie for Forrain Languages, and All Noble Sciences, and Exercises* (1653), at *HP* 10/2/27/1A-8B; see generally 10/2/1-47.
142 See Hall to Hartlib, late March 1647, 60/14/39B; see also John Davies, ‘An Account of the Author of this Translation, and his Words’, in John Hall, trans., *Hierocles upon the Golden Verses of Pythagoras* (1657), sig. b2.
Hall, having acknowledged his own ‘back-wardness to the Publick service’, suggests that ‘A sole office’ should be established for ‘the gatherings of Experiments’, such as that which ‘great Verulam feigns in his new Altantis’. Hall believed that a Hartlibian institution, anticipating the Office of Address, would be preferable to the ‘Invisible College’ advocated by Robert Boyle (1627-91): ‘me thinkes better for a Colledge then Correspondence’. Hall identified a Hartlibian institution serving the public good as utopian in Baconian terms. David Norbrook acknowledges that this ‘emphasis on public life placed him in disagreement with Stanley’. Joad Raymond also discusses the ambiguity of Hall’s ‘quasi-Royalist allegiances’ and his involvement with the Parliamentarian cause, such as his editorship of *Mercurius Britannicus* in 1648. While Stanley was Hall’s patron, and was the dedicatee of Hall’s 1646 *Poems*, following the end of court culture and the royalist defeat in the first civil war, Hall believed in the potential of the state-funded and public-serving institution of the Hartlib circle.

The ‘Academy of Ingenuitys’, theorised by the Stanley circle, which Hall explains to Hartlib in his correspondence in April 1647, illustrates and complicates the distinction between the Stanley and Hartlib circles, and Hall’s involvement within them. Between March and April 1647, Hall explains in his letters to Hartlib that, having visited a sick Stanley, ‘some Gentlemen ar gatrhing [sic] an Academy for Ingenuitys of humane learning & one of them came with me to crave your advise & assistance.’ Two weeks later, on 13 April, Hall sends to Hartlib both a description of the Academy for Ingenuitys in his own hand and, due to the illegibility caused by writing pain, includes a more formal copy in scribal hand, entitled ‘A Short Model of Society’. Hall explains to Hartlib in the following letter that he ‘was ever of the opinion that it was far too slight, to advance any way the Publique being rather a private Conglobation of some for (in a manner) private.’ Hall’s criticism not only highlights his reservations about private intellectual institutions, but it also reiterates his belief in the Hartlibian project. Although McDowell suggests that we do not know Hartlib’s reaction to the Academy of Ingenuitys, in a letter likely dated to 26 April 1647, Hall expresses to Hartlib ‘I am extreamly sorry I so freely Communicated my Thoughts to yow of our utopian Academy’, assuring Hartlib that he ‘made […] show of a great deal of Negative

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143 Hall to Hartlib, 2 January [1647], *HP* 9/10/1A-2B.
144 Norbrook, *Writing the Republic*, p. 169.
applause of it (I mean I objected nothing) because I knew the other Agents wedded to there own opinions’, and accepting Hartlib’s ‘most Judicious Censure’. Given Hall’s criticism of the Academy on 20 April, it seems likely that this is what he is referring to in the letter dated ‘26th’. Hall’s apologetic tone in the letter suggests that Hartlib may have disapproved of Hall’s criticism of the Academy. As this chapter has shown, Hartlib and his associates were increasingly supportive of private institutions and the aristocracy for serving public good. Although Stanley was too busy with the Armilla Nigra – the Latin name for the Black Riband – to become involved in the Academy, it is possible that Hartlib saw more potential than Hall in the private institution.

Hall’s reaction to the ‘Academy of Ingenuitys’ is interesting given that it shares the private and aristocratic nature of Milton’s educational proposal. The Academy is managed by a President and Orator, under which are a ‘Secretarie library-keeper & Master of the Ceremonies’. Each of its sixty members – or ‘Essentials’ – would be ‘at least a Gentleman of blood & coat-armour’. They are elected through a character reference, ‘for the Enquiry after his parts & manners’, and are required to pay a subsidy of ‘noe lesse then 4lb a yeare’ to the Academy, alongside a book donation to the library. Hall explains that Essentials would participate in weekly debates: they are tasked ‘publiquely to discourse before the President, these discourses to bee carefully reserved & registred, for the Peculiar use of the Society’. By only benefitting the Academy, these discussions illustrate the privatised, self-fulfilling nature of the intellectual community. The recording of discourses, moreover, corresponds with the annual task of Essentials to provide ‘a Paper of Verses and some choise discourse as allso those that were Poetically inclined’, which are ‘gathered up, the choisest cull’d & printed under the name off the Academy’. In contrast to the Office of Address, knowledge and literature are internally moderated rather than internationally and nationally disseminated. By 1651, William Rand (1617-63), a physician who Hartlib identifies alongside Milton as a potential commissioner for the ‘Councel for schooling’, explains that he ‘would define Ingenuity to be an uprightnes & gallantry of mind, makeing a man owne truth & justice though to the prejudice of his owne interest’. Hall would agree with Rand’s definition in the context of the Hartlib circle. His

147 McDowell, *Poetry and Allegiance*, p. 62; Hall to Hartlib, 29 March 1647, *HP* 9/10/5A-6B; 13 April 1647, *HP* 60/14/30A-31B; John Hall, ‘A Short Model of Society’, 13 April 1647, *HP* 26/20/1A-2B; Hall to Hartlib, 20 April 1647, *HP* 60/14/32A; Hall to Hartlib, 26 [April? 1647], *HP* 60/14/35A.
150 *HP* 47/13/4A; Rand to Hartlib, 1 September 1651, *HP* 62/27/1A.
reservations of the ‘Academy of Ingenuitys’ seem to be inspired by its private and exclusive nature, which bears resemblance to Milton’s aristocratic educational vision. Indeed, Hall even refers to a desire ‘to enlarg to Horsmanship, Fencing, etc’. Hall’s support for Milton’s educational vision, in contrast to his criticism of the ‘Academy of Ingenuitys’, seems to be because the treatise is dedicated to public good, regardless of its private nature.

Hall’s ardent support for Of Education illustrates how Milton’s tract continued to navigate the evolving Hartlibian distinction between public and private intellectual spheres in 1646-7. Whereas Hall describes ‘A Short Model’ as ‘too slight’, Dury had expressed in July 1644 his dislike for the ‘brief & generall’ Of Education that Hartlib had sent to him; Culpeper similarly in November 1645 suggested that Milton’s treatise had ‘some good sprincklings’ but was lacking in not ‘descendinge enowght into particulars’. Hall was more enthused by Milton’s proposal. Having indicated to Hartlib that Milton had been in contact with him a few days previously, on 21 December 1646, Hall expresses his desire to maintain regular correspondence with Milton: ‘I am much ambitious of the acquaintance of Mr Milton (who is said here to be the Author of that excellent discourse of Education you were pleased to impart) I beseech you be a means to bringing us a Correspondency if you can.’ Hall’s keen desire to maintain communications with Milton, which he reiterates on 8 January 1647, suggests just how much Of Education must have impressed him. However, in late March 1647, around the same time as Hall visited Stanley and first heard about the ‘Academy of Ingenuitys’, Hall makes reference to Milton’s lack of support for the ‘Enclosed Originall’ – a reference perhaps to a proposal given to Milton by Hartlib or Hall himself – after which there is no extant evidence of further communications between Milton and Hall. Hall bands Milton’s aloof response alongside Stanley’s lack of communications with Hartlib: ‘I am sorry Mr Milton dos abundare suo sensu I wish I cold not Complain the like of my dear Stanley (To whom expect a letter as yow desire next Week) But I hope I shall win or him when I come to Remain at London as I shall shortly.’ These two proponents of exclusive intellectual reform are equally resistant to what was presumably a proposal for universal learning. The difference is that Hall remains optimistic that he could sway his patron, whereas Milton, three years after the

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151 John Hall, ‘A Short Model of Society’, 13 April 1647, HP 26/20/1A-2B.
152 Dury to Hartlib, 21 July 1644, HP 3/2/43B; Culpeper to Hartlib, 12 November 1645, HP 13/122A.
153 Hall to Hartlib, March 1647, HP 60/14/39B; the Latin is from Romans 15:4, which translates in the Authorised King James Version as ‘fully persuaded in his own mind’.
publication of *Of Education*, is presumably now a lost cause. Hall’s enthusiasm for Milton’s private educational vision, in contrast to his criticism of the ‘Short Model’, can be explained in that *Of Education* remained dedicated to the Hartlibian project, even if its author, in 1647, began to distance himself from the circle, most likely due to his lack of support for scientific learning. Milton’s treatise exhibits how a private institution could serve the public good, which is a belief – particularly in terms of the aristocracy – that Hall and Hartlibian tracts from 1646 increasingly espouse.

Hall’s proposal for educational reform, *An Humble Motion to The Parliament Of England Concerning The Advancement of Learning* (1649), illustrates how he processed his mutual involvement with Hartlib and Stanley and their respective groups. Joad Raymond suggests that Hall’s *Advancement of Learning* was written ‘in the spirit of Milton and Hartlib.’ Hall does, however, make an original contribution to the Miltonic and Hartlibian ideas that he had encountered: he establishes a distinction between the term ‘private’ and the aristocratic heritage with which it is associated in contemporary discourse. Hall acknowledges that, while some commonwealths have ‘withered under the decay of Learning’, never

have they been so fortunate under any governours as those who comming from a noble education, and a right observation and deduction of things (which may well make a man learned, though he never had seen a book) were neither subject to these wilde evagations, nor savage rudenesses which unturored Natures, through the want of a better discipline, were apt to fall into.

The parenthesis interjects a meritocratic perspective that Hall proceeds to develop: ‘many private men born amidst the dregs of the people, & not capable of any such high hopes, have by this means far overtopped men of antiquity and ancient discent’. Hall refers to Augustus, ‘who though his Cradle was not private, yet in his first accesse to business, was not onely left in a private capacity, but surrounded by an inimical faction’ (8). Hall divorces the word ‘private’ from an exclusively aristocratic definition, placing greater emphasis on the potential of a uniquely talented individual, regardless of their heritage. He also maintains his support for universal learning: ‘What means were used to keep it in a few hands in a corner (like a great exile, thrust away by contrary power) till some better times, must now be used to disperse it through the face of the earth, and

154 Joad Raymond, ‘Hall, John’, in *ODNB*.
155 John Hall, *An Humble Motion to the PARLIAMENT of England Concerning the ADVANCEMENT of Learning: And the Reformation of the Universities* (1649) p. 8. Further references will be made parenthetically in the running text.
make it tread as far as mankind’ (18). In January, Hall had referred to ‘private men’ working in an institution resembling Salomon’s House. In *Advancement of Learning*, he returns to this utopianism by discussing the value of scientific and empirical experiments in Baconian terms, as they will force ‘Nature […] into an open veracity and pure nakednesse’ (44). Hall articulates his own definition of ‘private’ as a form of elite individual who serves the public good: graduates of Milton’s academy as well as members of the Hartlib network fit into this categorisation. Hall’s *Advancement of Learning* epitomises how the Hartlibians developed an increasingly tolerant view of private intellectualism following the first civil war. While Milton distanced himself from the circle during this period, it seems as though his ideas enjoyed an afterlife in Hartlibian tracts of the late-1640s.

**CONCLUSION**

Milton’s contribution to the Hartlib circle marks an early stage in which he encounters contemporary utopianism and millenarianism. From Platte’s *Macaria* in 1641 to Hall’s *Advancement of Learning* in 1649, utopian concepts are discussed, accommodated and creatively adapted in a discourse that has at its heart Baconian philosophy and eschatology. Milton’s vision of elite, aristocratic academies, nationally instituted and serving the Hartlibian and Baconian end goal, channelled the Hartlibian interest away from exclusively universal Comenianism and towards a more tolerant view of exclusive and private learning. Hall’s engagement with the circles of both Hartlib and Stanley marks his positive response to *Of Education* as particularly valuable. Milton’s private academy represents a selective institution that serves the public good in explicitly Hartlibian language. Where Dury accommodates an aristocratic educational establishment into both *Considerations* and *Reformed School*, Hall articulates a more original view of the private sphere as representing elite individuals, who, determined meritocratically or by birth, serve a public good. As this study will show, Milton’s faith in elite individuals becomes increasingly entrenched over his polemical and literary career. This early Hartlibian context illustrates how such elitist ideas cross-fertilised with utopianism and millenarianism. The following chapter will show how the tension between public and private spheres, particularly in relation to the utopianism and millenarianism exhibited by contemporary Hartlibian tracts, is more prominent in

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156 Hall to Hartlib, 2 January [1647], *HP* 9/10/2A.
Areopagitica, as Milton navigates the growing Presbyterian and Independent divide. In 1644, Milton formulates a complex relationship between utopian ideas of state regulation and educational advancement within the millenarian milieu of mid-seventeenth-century England. The Hartlibians were central to this ideological development beyond Of Education.
Truth, Toleration, and Utopia in *Areopagitica*

*Of Education* was not the only tract of 1644 to address the advancement of knowledge in Hartlibian terms. Where *Of Education* marks Milton’s response to Hartlib’s project, *Areopagitica* (November, 1644) represents his contribution to the efforts of Henry Robinson (1604-64) and his associates in the toleration controversy. Recent typographical research into *Areopagitica* and contemporary tolerationist tracts suggests that Milton published *Areopagitica* through the same clandestine printers as the Robinson circle: Matthew Simmons and Thomas Paine. This chapter will not only incorporate this evidence into its analysis of Milton’s engagement with tolerationism, but it will also consider how *Areopagitica*, less directly, represents Milton’s continued contribution to the Hartlibian discourse, particularly in the form of John Dury’s *An Epistolary Discourse* (July, 1644). Dury, in his ecumenist desire to maintain church unity, remained defensive of mainstream Presbyterianism in response to *An Apologetical Narration* (January, 1644), the first major assertion of Independent views in print. Robinson himself responded to Dury’s tract in a letter of the same year. Just as Milton straddled discourses of public and private intellectualism in *Of Education*, which were discussed in the previous chapter, so too does he exhibit strong support for individual liberty of conscience, endorsed by the Robinson circle, and, in Hartlibian fashion, a desire for national progress in *Areopagitica*. This chapter will show how Milton engages with the toleration controversy through a pamphlet that exhibits a form of Baconian utopianism intended to recover a lost, millenarian ‘Truth’. This is the first time that Milton envisions utopianism – specifically, in a Baconian, intellectual form – as a means of ushering in the millennium. Many of these ideas were anticipated by *Of Reformation*, as discussed in Chapter 1, but they lacked the more consolidated and

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157 For a comprehensive discussion of the toleration controversy of 1643-44, see Ernest Sirluck, *CPW* ii. 57-92.
159 See Henry Robinson’s letter to John Dury, dated 8 November 1644, in *HP*, 10/11/1A-10B; see Dury’s response in *Some Few Considerations Propounded, As so many Scruples by Mr Henry Robinson in a Letter to Mr. John Dury upon his Epistolary Discourse: With Mr. Durey’s Answer thereunto* (July 1646); John Coffey identifies Henry Robinson as a member of Hartlib’s network in ‘Scripture and Toleration between Reformation and Enlightenment’, in *Religion and Tolerance in the Atlantic World* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 18.
developed form of *Areopagitica*. The tract also further exhibits Milton’s complex approach to public and private realms of intellectual and religious activity. While the public and private in *Areopagitica* are yoked together, Milton’s vision for those who can advance the Reformation in England, borne from millenarian fervour, becomes increasingly narrow in scope, centring on the private and individual sphere – specifically of elect individuals – in his later writings. The desire for public good in *Areopagitica*, and the role of the private individual in realising this, therefore, represents a standard against which his later tracts, from the late 1650s and beyond, can be compared.

Thomas Corns has analysed the toleration context of *Areopagitica* in comparison with Roger Williams’s *Bloudy Tenent* (1644).<sup>160</sup> *Bloudy Tenent* was published by the same clandestine printers as *Areopagitica*; Williams participated in the subterranean tolerationist movement of the Robinson circle in 1644.<sup>161</sup> Corns suggests that, while Milton’s views on toleration may have more closely aligned with Williams’s belief in complete, encompassing toleration in the late 1650s, some form of Presbyterian sympathy remains in *Areopagitica*, particularly given that only two years previously he had written in support of the Presbyterian ministers, Smectymnuus, in the anti-prelatical tracts. Corns argues that Milton identified with both the authors of *An Apologetical Narration*, such as Philip Nye – who, signalling the beginning of Independency, requested from the developing Presbyterian mobilisation a limited form of toleration in the form of non-separating Congregationalism – and also more extreme tolerationists, like Williams:

> Like Nye, he had assumed he could be in dialogue with men such as Thomas Young and the other Smectymnuans, whose efforts they had recently seconded. But he had developed, too, an awareness of his own differences from presbyterians, both in the heterodoxy of his doctrinal position, specifically and explicitly about divorce reform, and in his perspective on the extent to which sectaries should be tolerated.

While Corns detects Presbyterian language in *Areopagitica* – ‘he persistently speaks the language of “we” and “us”, as though he and they were still comrades, as in his anti-prelatical campaign of 1641-2’ – it is important to remember that Milton was staunchly opposed to attempts to implement Presbyterianism nationally, which he was aware was


a potential outcome of the Westminster Assembly: ‘While things are yet not constituted in Religion, that freedom of writing should be restrain’d by a discipline imitated from the Prelats, and learnt by them from the Inquisition to shut us up all again into the Brest of a licenser must needs give cause of doubt and discouragement to all learned and religious men’ (CPW ii. 541). Dury’s ierenism and central role in the Hartlib circle nevertheless suggest that he was more likely to respond to well-argued cases for liberty of conscience. As Milton continued to be in discourse with the Hartlib circle in 1644, Dury’s An Epistolary Discourse (1644), in which the Presbyterian minister opposes the Independent argument of An Apologetical Narration, represents the kind of Presbyterian that Milton would have wanted to reason with in Areopagitica. Indeed, Dury’s Considerations Concerning the Present Engagement (1649), in which he encouraged citizens to take the Oath of Allegiance to the new republic, ‘earned him the undying hatred of presbyterians’, which suggests that his support of Presbyterianism in An Epistolary Discourse was ienic rather than zealous. As we shall see, where Dury’s dedication to public good necessitates his opposition to individual liberty of conscience in An Epistolary Discourse, Milton reconciles this conflict in Areopagitica. As a contribution to Hartlibian discourse, Areopagitica establishes a relationship between liberty of conscience and public good, possibly in answer to Dury’s tract. Dury’s An Epistolary Discourse will help to illustrate the conflicting religious context of 1644 and how Milton, recently a supporter of Presbyterianism against prelacy and now printing Areopagitica on a press associated with the Independent Robinson circle, can be situated in this context. ‘The vision of Areopagitica’, Corns continues, ‘is of a new Jerusalem for the saints to dwell in; for both men, that vision is as much utopian as millenarian.’ This chapter will address in greater depth the relationship in Areopagitica between the public and national achievement of the millennium and the Baconian and utopian advancement of learning that requires individual liberty of conscience.

The recent typographical study of ‘Damaged Type and Areopagitica’s Clandestine Printers’ identifies Areopagitica as part of a series of tracts published anonymously by Matthew Simmons and Thomas Paine. Ernest Sirluck observed in his annotations to the Yale edition consistencies between Areopagitica and Henry

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162 Corns, ‘Limits of Toleration’, pp. 76; 81-5.
163 John Dury, Considerations Concerning the Present Engagement (1649); John T. Young, ‘Durie [Dury], John (1596-1680)’, in ODNB (2004).
164 See John Milton, Areopagitica, in CPW ii. 551-60; further references will be made to this edition and will appear parenthetically in the running text; Corns, ‘Limits of Toleration’, p. 81.
Robinson’s *Liberty of Conscience* (1644), and even William Walwyn’s *Compassionate Samaritane* (1644). More recently, James Egan has considered Milton’s rhetorical strategy in *Areopagitica* in contrast to tolerationist tracts from 1644, such as Robinson’s *Liberty of Conscience*, positing that *Areopagitica* may be read as a process of participating in the toleration controversy while at the same time communicating the uniqueness of his role. Through analysis of damaged type, the new research of Christopher Warren (et al.) materially aligns Milton with the clandestine tolerationist tracts of 1644: *Areopagitica* was printed using the same type as tracts published by other members of the Robinson network, such as Williams and Walwyn. Alongside *Liberty of Conscience*, *John the Baptist* (1644), *Bloudy Tenent*, and *Compassionate Samaritane*, the study identifies *Areopagitica*, *Of Education*, *Tetrachordon* (1645), and *Colasterion* (1645) all as having been printed by Paine and Simmons. John Coffey goes as far as to suggest that Robinson financed – or indeed owned – the press on which *Areopagitica* and the other Independent tolerationist tracts were published. This chapter will use this evidence to further investigate Milton’s involvement with both the Hartlib and Robinson networks. While Dury defended the mainstream Presbyterian argument in *An Epistolary Discourse*, Robinson, who wrote to Dury about the tract just two weeks prior to the publication of *Areopagitica*, would become increasingly involved with the Hartlibian project, ultimately establishing an ‘Office of Addresses and Encounters’ in Threadneedle Street, London. David Como’s observation is pertinent: rather than placing ‘ideas into abstract and discrete categories – anabaptist, separatist, antinomian, independent, and so forth – the fact is that at the fringe of the puritan community, these boundaries were not always apparent.

David Norbrook considers Milton’s engagement with the public sphere in *Areopagitica* within the context of the Hartlib circle. Norbrook suggests that, as Hartlib had solicited Milton to write *Of Education*, the intelligencer may also have encouraged him to write *Areopagitica*. He also acknowledges that there are Baconian elements of *Areopagitica* that suggest Milton still participated in the Hartlibian enterprise. There is

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169 Coffey, ‘Scripture and Toleration’, p. 18; see also Warren, *et al.*, ‘Damaged Type’, p. 21, although left as a question for future study on p. 30.
170 On the Office of Addresses and Encounters, see *HP* 63/7/1A.
evidence that Hartlib disseminated *Areopagitica* within his network, and even that he considered translating the tract into German, but received criticism from Joachim Hübner (1610-66) in response.\(^{172}\) Norbrook further indicates that Cheney Culpeper (1611-63) read and was inspired by *Areopagitica*. A letter from Culpeper to Hartlib, dated to 20 November, around the time of *Areopagitica*’s publication, which espouses the view that books have vitality, resembles Milton’s argument that ‘Books are not absolutely dead things’ (*CPW* ii. 492): ‘havinge firste freede ourselves from a slavishe reverence of some fewe men or books’.\(^{173}\) For Norbrook, in *Areopagitica*, Milton is ‘turning his linguistic gifts to the public service’, which was helped by the fact that the tract ‘displays greater trust in the broad masses of the people than his later writings’.\(^{174}\) This chapter will analyse the relationship between public and private spheres in *Areopagitica*, particularly in the context of Hartlib’s network. While Norbrook spends time arguing that Milton intended to align London with Athens in *Areopagitica*, there is just as much value in exploring the relationship between public and private spheres within the context of Milton’s involvement with contemporary intellectual circles. In *Of Education*, Milton proposed an exclusive, aristocratic education system that appeared at odds with the central ideology of the Hartlib circle for a public advancement of learning; in *Areopagitica*, there is a tension between individual liberty of conscience and national, eschatological progress, as represented by Milton’s idealised London.

## TOLERATION

*Areopagitica* was written within a diverse and complex intellectual and textual context, in which wider political changes and growing support for Presbyterianism in parliament were prominent. Abbe Blum argues that *Areopagitica* ‘encodes much that is symptomatic of what was occurring in England at this tumultuous time’, and that it shows ‘how the realms of “public” and “private” are historically defined.’ Specifically, Blum argues that Milton’s defence of authorial ownership and authority against the Licensing Act of 1643 is representative of a conflict between private and public

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\(^{172}\) See copy letters in German at *HP* 59/9/1A-9B; Leigh T. I. Penman suggests that the author of the criticism is Joachim Hübner, in ‘*Areopagitica*, freedom of the press, and heterodox religion in the Holy Roman Empire’, in *The Seventeenth Century*, 33/1 (2018), pp. 48-54.

\(^{173}\) See Culpeper to Hartlib, 20 November 1644, *HP* 13/55A-56B.

spheres. In Milton’s engagement with both the Hartlib and Robinson circles, he shows in his writings a developing awareness and theorisation of the relationship between private and public spheres. Where the Independent resistance to national Presbyterianism in the form of the Robinson circle has been explored, Dury’s contribution to this discourse in support of the Presbyterians through *An Epistolary Discourse*, Robinson’s response to Dury, and how this particular context illuminates *Areopagitica*, lacks such attention. Whereas Walwyn in *Compassionate Samaritane* responds directly to *An Apologetical Narration*, arguing that its authors’ call for toleration is too limited, Dury defends Presbyterianism, arguing that the Independents’ request should not be implemented. In *Areopagitica*, Milton endorses ideas that had been previously articulated by Robinson and Walwyn, whilst also advocating contribution to the public good in Hartlibian terms. The contrast between the ‘public edification’ that Dury propounds in *An Epistolary Discourse*, which is formed from millenarian and Baconian ideals, and the individual liberty of conscience proposed by the Robinson circle that Milton espouses in *Areopagitica* warrants further attention.

Toleration in *Areopagitica*, and its limits, are best understood within the wider context of the Robinson circle. Arguments against the Licensing Act had already been made in 1644 by Robinson and Walwyn. In *Liberty of Conscience*, Robinson argues that the ‘combat’ of religious debate ‘must be fought out upon eaven ground, on equal termes, neither side must expect to have greater liberty of speech, writing, Printing, or whatsoever else, then the other.’ Walwyn, in *Compassionate Samaritane*, explicitly refers to the ‘Ordinance for licensing of Bookes’, which, while having good intentions, ‘namely the prohibition of all bookes dangerous or scandalous to the State, is become by meanes of the Licensers (who are Divines and intend their interest) most serviceable to themselves (scandalous books being still disperst) in the stopping of honest mens writings […]'). The difference with *Areopagitica* is that Milton places greater value on books as vital and influential public artefacts than either Robinson or Walwyn. As such, he establishes an indissoluble relationship between freedom of the press and liberty of conscience; the two concepts, for Milton, are interdependent. Where Robinson criticises the suppression of voices by Synods who instruct scriptural

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176 William Walwyn, *Compassionate Samaritane* (1644), pp. 1-3; Dury, *An Epistolary Discourse* (1644), pp. 21-3; further references to *Epistolary Discourse* will be made parenthetically in the running text.
178 Walwyn, *Compassionate Samaritane*, p. 39, see also pp. A4, 70-1; see *CPW* ii. 84-7.
interpretation (42), Milton argues that vocalised grievances, such as that which his oratory persona represents in *Areopagitica*, should be ‘freely heard, deeply consider’d, and speedily reform’d’ (487). However, Milton asserts later in the tract that ‘writing is more publick than preaching’ (547). He grants greater power to books than either Robinson or Walwyn, asserting that it is necessary to have a vigilant eye how Bookes demean themselves, as well as men; and thereafter to confine, imprison, and do sharpest justice on them as malefactors: For Books are not absolutely dead things, but doe contain a potencie of life in them to be as active as that soule was whose progeny they are; nay they do preserve as in a viol the purest efficacie and extraction of that living intellect that bred them (492).

While books should be published freely, Milton acknowledges the need to address bad books post-publication. He does not, therefore, advocate a complete, uncompromising freedom of the press. By the same argument, however, he also stresses that good books must not be licensed, for ‘as good almost kill a Man as kill a good Book’ (492). Milton personifies books as having authorial vitality that enables them to wield substantial influence, which can both be of benefit to and endanger society.

Milton develops a close relationship between the public artefact of the book and the private voice of the author in *Areopagitica*. ‘By using the trope of books as men,’ Nigel Smith argues, ‘Milton finds an apt metaphor of many collaborating bodies, healthy in their active juxtaposition, as opposed to the dominant royalist image of the body politic.’ The conflict between differing views, which Robinson acknowledges above, is envisioned by Milton as textual, in which differences represent a collaborative effort in the pursuit of ‘Truth’. In Milton’s idealised depiction of London, discussed later in this section, he describes the unified effort of a ‘vast City’, where ‘the shop of warre’ serves ‘to fashion out the plates and instruments of armed Justice in defence of beleaguer’d Truth’ (553-4). Milton refers to the ‘warfaring Christian’ (514), who, as he explains later in the tract,

hath furnisht out his findings in all their equipage, drawn forth his reason as it were a battell raung’d, scatter’d and defeated all objections in his way, calls out his adversary into the plain, offers him the advantage of wind and sun, if he please; only […] for his opponents then to sculk,

179 Nigel Smith, ‘*Areopagitica*: Voicing Contexts, 1643-5’ in *Politics, Poetics and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose*, p. 117.
to lay ambushments, [and] to keep a narrow bridge of licencing where the challenger should passe (562).

Licensing in this metaphor inhibits the combative dialectic of ideas and opinions that Milton idealises. As this textual conflict is necessary in the ‘wars of Truth’ (562), Milton ‘cannot praise a fugitive and cloister’d vertue, unexercis’d & unbreath’d, that never sallies out and sees her adversary’ (514). The public entity of the book manifests the individual voice of the author; Milton reduces the boundary between author and text in order to facilitate intertextual disagreement, through which Truth can be realised. For Milton, books are potent because they are vital. By manifesting an animate, authorial voice, books can be a force for good just as they can endanger a society.

Milton’s perception of heresy in Areopagitica reflects his defence of liberty of conscience and his awareness of the vitality of books. In Of Civil Power (1659), Milton, drawing from the Greek etymology, argues that ‘heresie, by what it signifies in that language, is no word of evil note; meaning only the chose or following of any opinion good or bad in religion or any other learning […]’ (CPW vii. 247). It is important to note that Of Civil Power was written as an address to Richard Cromwell’s parliament, which, as Janel Mueller notes, were comprised largely by conservative Presbyterians. Fifteen years earlier, Milton, not explicitly drawing on the Greek etymology of ‘heresy’, nevertheless references in his historical narration Dionysius Alexandrinus, ‘a person of great name in Church for piety and learning, who had wont to avail himself much against hereticks by being conversant in their Books; until a certain Presbyter laid it scrupulously to his conscience, how he durst venture himselfe among those defiling volumes’ (CPW ii. 511). In this example, Milton defends the need to read and interpret heretical ideas and opposes Presbyterian resistance to that freedom. Responsibility is afforded to the interpreter to judge what is false or heretical. As the Yale edition references, in The History of the Council of Trent (1619) by Paolo Sarpi (1552-1623), Sarpi writes that Dionysius, ‘being reprehended by his Priests for these causes, and troubled with these respects, had a vision that hee should reade all bookes, 

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Milton’s argument in *Areopagitica* is that people are morally bound to judge books in order to contribute to the production of truth and hence do not require pre-publication licensing to protect them.

While Milton defended the need for individuals to read and interpret heretical ideas, this did not mean he tolerated such ideas. Just as Milton stops short of advocating a complete free press, acknowledging that some texts may be damaging to society, so he qualifies his argument for tolerance, explaining that ‘I mean not tolerated Popery, and open superstition’, for that ‘which is impious or evil absolutely either against faith or manners no law can possibly permit, that intends not to unlaw it self’ (565). The limits of Milton’s toleration indicates a similarity between his argument for free press and that of liberty of conscience in *Areopagitica*: the force of the argument in both examples, and their qualifications – or limitations – are mirrored. The Licensing Act should be withdrawn in order for different voices, materially constituted in texts, to be heard and debated; equally, just as some books found pernicious after publication can be removed, some religious beliefs, especially Catholicism, cannot be tolerated. Such religious views published in pamphlets, which represent Falsehood, can be tackled through printed responses from proponents of Truth, like Milton. The emphasis that Milton places on textual potency and the limitations that he imposes on his philosophy of toleration mark how he developed ideas that were already present in the writings of the Robinson circle. Writing within the Independent tolerationist framework of the Robinson circle, Milton established a more direct relationship between the private, individual role of the author and the public product of the text.

The Hartlibian context of 1644 tolerationism illuminates the relationship between private and public spheres, as represented by the ideas of liberty of conscience and free press, in *Areopagitica*. Some critics have acknowledged that it is necessary to consider *Areopagitica* as an extension of Milton’s engagement with the Hartlib network in *Of Education*. Given that *Of Education* was published on the same press as *Areopagitica*, the proximity of both texts to Hartlibian discourse is significant. *An Epistolary Discourse* is a collection of Dury’s letters to Philip Nye and John Goodwin from June-July 1642 and one to Hartlib himself in response to *An Apologeticall*

183 Milton also read of Dionysius in Eusebius, as he references in his Commonplace Book (*CPW* i. 377).
Narration, co-authored by Nye and Goodwin, amongst others, from March 1644.\textsuperscript{186} Dury’s correspondence indicates how he anticipates the early Independent argument for non-separating Congregationalism that Goodwin and Nye, alongside the other ministers, would propose in \textit{An Apologetical Narration}. As a consequence, it also pre-empts how \textit{An Epistolary Discourse} would oppose \textit{An Apologetical Narration}. The first letter printed in \textit{An Epistolary Discourse}, dated 24 June-4 July 1642, details Dury’s irenic attempt to unite the Calvinist and Lutheran churches.\textsuperscript{187} The form of ‘Toleration’ that he describes in \textit{Epistolary Discourse} is not a ‘bare Toleration’, but rather a ‘publique protection of Brotherhood, whereupon I conceived a Toleration would follow of it selfe in matters of lesser difference’ (2).\textsuperscript{188} Greater tolerance between churches will ‘set forward the Reformation of Protestant Churches, unto that period whereunto it may be Gods assistance be brought’ (1). Although Kenneth Gibson argues that Dury was not millenarian like fellow Hartlibians, his irenicism maintained an eschatological purpose.\textsuperscript{189}

Dury’s ‘publique protection of Brotherhood’ (2) is nevertheless distinct from individual liberty of conscience. As Dury explains in his letter dated 7-17 March 1644, having not received adequate responses from Goodwin and Nye, \textit{An Apologetical Narration} has shown him that their tolerationist argument serves their own benefit, rather than that of the public: ‘For I see that their aime is rather Private than Publick, and that their whole Way is answerable to a particular Interest, to commend themselves in a distance from others, by some distinct practises wherein they suppose they come nearer to the right Way of Church government than others doe’ (17). Dury opposes any form of toleration that would cause separation, however limited. Even non-separating

\textsuperscript{186} Dury references these letters in correspondence with Hartlib: see \textit{HP} 27 June 1642, 2/9/8; 4 July 1642, 2/9/8A; 10 July 1642, 2/9/10A; 24 July 1642, 2/9/12A.
\textsuperscript{187} Hartlib forwards this letter to Goodwin on 6 July; see Hartlib to Goodwin, 6 July 1642, \textit{HP} 7/27/30A-B; Charles Webster associates Dury’s irenicism with his eschatology in \textit{The Great Instauration}, pp. 21, see also 32, 34.
Congregationalism, which the apologists requested, endangered the ‘fraternall union’ (3) that Dury viewed as necessary to advance the Reformation. He associates organised churches – and tolerance between such institutions – with the public good; individual liberty of conscience is representative of private, selfish interest. Dury explains that ‘to keep the Unitie of the Spirit in the bond of Peace entire, and to prevent occasions which may be taken to abuse Libertie, a few should yeeld unto many, except they can fairely perswade those many to yeeld unto them: and if both sides in matters Tolerable should intend mutually to yield to one another, their Way will be, not to separate from each other, but to keep the interest of love and Communion entire (22).’ Dury’s overriding message is that religion should be organised. The toleration he advocates is denominational and ecumenic: different churches should tolerate each other in order to achieve ‘the universall end of Publique Edification in the Communion of Saints’ (14). Dury associates public, brotherly unity with an eschatological end point; individual religious liberty impedes progress to that end.

Milton’s idealised vision for London at the end of *Areopagitica* exhibits his view of how individuals can contribute to national, eschatological progress. In his ideal London, the studious efforts of individuals contribute to a city-wide collaboration of ‘labouring the hardest labour in the deep mines of knowledge’ (562) in order to help recover and defend ‘beleaguer’d Truth’ (554). Milton explains that his ideal society will ‘joyn, and unite into one generall and brotherly search after Truth’, for ‘the perfection consists in this, that out of many moderat varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportionall arises the goodly and gracefull symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure’ (554). Although it is tempting to interpret Milton here as advocating a modern sense of free press, as an organised, societal effort, there are limitations to the freedom enjoyed in his London. The repeated use of the word ‘brotherly’ is important here. Dury uses the word to describe his irenic efforts (2) in *Epistolary Discourse*, and explains at length what he means by the term ‘Brother’ (12-13): to Dury, a brother would share ‘the same interest in God […] and doth call him Father upon the same grounds which I do; namely, by vertue of the same new Covenant whereby I am united unto God in Christ’ (13). Robinson, in a letter dated 5 November 1644, and published by Hartlib alongside Dury’s responses in *Some Few Considerations Propounded, As so many Scruples by Mr. Henry Robinson in a Letter to Mr. John Dury upon his Epistolary Discourse* (July 1646), responds to Dury in support of his idea of brotherly discourse:
You approve the casting off subjection and absolute obedience unto Episcopacy, but would not have dissolved the brotherly correspondencie in a Presbyterie; and certainly it should not be, but it must then continue brotherly; we must run hand in hand like brothers, so long as we can keep a good conscience both towards God and man [...].

As Dury acknowledges in a subsequent letter, dated to 24 April 1646, also printed in *Some Few Considerations*, Robinson, despite his strong advocacy of religious freedom in *Liberty of Conscience* and *John the Baptist*, agrees with him here (26). Indeed, Robinson’s continued support of the Hartlib network throughout the late 1640s and early 1650s suggests that such opposing ideas as his and Dury’s did not exist in discrete, separate categories. While Milton may not be making a reference to Dury’s *Epistolary Discourse*, or indeed Presbyterianism in general in his use of ‘brotherly’ in *Areopagitica*, his idealised London straddles the boundary between the ideal of individual liberty of conscience and the realisation of public progress, or, more simply, between private and public spheres. The individual efforts of citizens in Milton’s London contribute to a society-wide enterprise in much the same way as Milton’s wider argument in *Areopagitica* establishes a relationship between private author and public textual artefact. Like Robinson, Milton seems to have sought reconciliation with Presbyterianism. The Independent idea of liberty of conscience and the concept of public good with which Dury defends Presbyterianism against Independency in *Epistolary Discourse* are united in the idealised London that Milton envisions in *Areopagitica*, possibly in the hope that a Presbyterian like Dury would listen to arguments for liberty of conscience.

While *Areopagitica* participated in the efforts of the Robinson circle, it also extended Milton’s contribution to the Hartlibian programme. *Areopagitica* can be identified as the earliest stage in which Milton’s support of Presbyterianism in the antiprelatical tracts gave way to his opposition to their national aspirations, which would further manifest in his rejection of Presbyterian ‘backsiders’ in *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* (1649), and ultimately, his own vision for congregationalist churches in *The Readie and Easie Way* (1659). In a year of radical religious change, *Areopagitica* represents Milton’s first criticism of the Presbyterians in language that resonates with...
contemporary early Independents. It nevertheless also encodes the language of ‘public good’ that Dury articulates both as a Presbyterian minister and a Hartlibian. Dury’s exclusive position on public progress and national organisations is at odds with Milton’s advocacy of individual liberty of conscience as a means to realise a national effort in the reconstitution of millenarian truth. However, just as Milton contributed a private and exclusivist view of educationalism in Of Education to a group of Baconians intending to enact national intellectual and educational reform, so the participation of Areopagitica in both the Robinson and Hartlib discourses, the latter represented by Dury in this case, is less contradictory than it appears. While Areopagitica, therefore, participates in the Independent discourse of the Robinson circle, it also maintains ideas of public progress that align with Dury’s contribution to the tolerationist debates of 1644. In a year in which Milton engaged with both the Hartlib and Robinson networks, Dury is a prime example of a Presbyterian who may have attended to Milton’s arguments in Areopagitica. Areopagitica can be viewed as a text intended to promote the Independent argument of liberty of conscience using language that may have influenced individuals like Dury, during a period in which the influence of Presbyterians in England continued to grow.

TRUTH & UTOPIA

Within the framework of private and public spheres, Milton establishes a relationship between utopianism and millenarianism that becomes increasingly prominent in his 1650s writings and beyond. This chapter has already discussed Milton’s ideal of truth as the purpose of his vision for London and how it lies at the centre of his metaphor of conflicting texts, but its millenarian and materialist meaning requires further exploration. This section will posit that the embodied ideal of ‘Truth’ represents the product of the Baconian form of utopianism that Milton exhibits in Areopagitica. It has been recognised that Milton expresses reservations about utopian idealism in Areopagitica: ‘To sequester out of the world into Atlantick and Eutopian polities, which never can be drawn into use, will not mend our condition; but to ordain wisely as in this world of evill, in the midd’st whereof God hath plac’d us unavoidably (526).’

Smith, however, argues that the ‘aspersions which Milton casts upon utopias here are typical of the Janus-faced modes of apprehension which Areopagitica comes to recommend.’ Smith explains that as ‘they are ideal the Utopia and the New Atlantis are unattainable’; they are nevertheless still capable, as Milton acknowledges in An Apology against a Pamphlet (1642), of ‘teaching this our world better and exacter things, then were yet known, or us’d.’ The Baconian philosophy of an intellectual exchange of knowledge, which promises eschatological realisation and which is essentially Hartlibian, is at the heart of Areopagitica.

This chapter has provided evidence for Milton’s continued proximity to Hartlibian ideas. It is now necessary to compare Areopagitica to Dury’s Reformed Librarie-Keeper (1650), the original manuscripts for which date back to August 1646, in letters to Hartlib. Dury’s Librarie-Keeper provides a contemporary standard of Baconian utopianism against which Areopagitica will be interpreted. As the Librarie-Keeper was published alongside a supplement to Dury’s Reformed School (1648), both texts together mirror Milton’s major 1644 works, Of Education and Areopagitica. However, where Dury’s Librarie-Keeper exhibits a distinctly public and institutionalised form of Baconian utopianism, Areopagitica, characteristic of the tract as a whole, maintains a fluid relationship between author, text, and millenarian Truth. Milton, in the tolerationist context of 1644, establishes a relationship between utopia and the millennium that will become increasingly prominent in his later prose and poetry.

Milton’s developing conception of a unity of spirit and matter frames how he depicts books in Areopagitica. As Stephen Fallon explains, Milton increasingly developed a form of animist materialism in response to contemporary mechanism, such as that of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Milton’s materialism was inspired by his monistic view of the body and soul, which Fallon identifies as early as the 1643-5 divorce tracts. However, he acknowledges that these are just ‘intimations of materialist monism’, and that the ‘articulation of a mature and thoroughgoing monism will wait until the late 1650 and 1660s.’ Where Of Reformation exhibited developed dualist ideas, early monist formulations are apparent in Milton’s depiction of Truth and its

192 Smith, ‘Voicing Contexts’, p. 116; Milton, An Apology against a Pamphlet Call’d a Modest Confutation of the Animadversions upon the Remonstrant against Smectymnuus (1642), in CPW i. 881.
193 See Dury to Hartlib, 18 August 1646, HP 3/3/24A-29B; 25 August 1646, HP 3/3/30A-31B; copy extracts at HP 47/14/1A-8B, 1/15/1A-4B.
relationship to books in *Areopagitica*. As the previous section identified, Milton grants books a remnant of authorial vitality in *Areopagitica*. As Genelle Gertz-Robinson asserts, Milton imagines ‘books as bodies, giving texts a worldly agency that reflects the prolific powers of their authors.’\(^{195}\) Books ‘contain a potencie of life in them to be as active as that soule was whose progeny they are; nay they do preserve as in a viol the purest efficacie and extraction of that living intellect that bred them’ (492). As Milton notes later in *Areopagitica*, it was ‘from out the rinde of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of good and evill as two twins cleaving together leapt forth into the World’ (514). The close, familial relationship between good and evil means that books may contain both, and so must be read and judged by perceptive readers accordingly. Milton continues by blurring the distinction between material text and spiritual vitality: ‘a good Booke is the pretiou life-blood of a master-spirit, imbalm’d and treasur’d up on purpose to a life beyond life’ (492). Rather than just a material artefact, a book can also possess a transcendent spirituality. Through licensing, Milton asserts, ‘we spill that season’d life of man preserv’d and stor’d up in Books’, and it is for this reason that we see a kinde of homicide may be thus committed, some times a martyrdome, and if it extend to the whole impression, a kinde of massacre, whereof the execution ends not in the slaying of an elementall life, but strikes at that ethereall and fift essence, the breath of reason it selfe, slaies an immortality, rather then a life (493).

Milton not only challenges the boundary between the material and animate, but also between the animate and transcendent. A book possesses an immanent vitality that is both material and supernal. While there remain dualistic ideas in *Areopagitica*, the relationship between spirit and body is much closer in the tract than in *Of Reformation*.

Milton’s early form of animist materialism aligns with Bacon’s empirical philosophy, in which tangible matter is essentially animate. As Graham Rees explains, Bacon believed that ‘spirits are imprisoned within the tangible bodies of the earth’s crust and surface’, which ‘gave the speculative philosophy a measure of unity or theoretical integrity which joined together the celestial and terrestrial realms in an articulated system’.\(^{196}\) In *Sylva Sylvarum*, under the title of ‘Experiment Solitary

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touching the Secret Processes of Nature’, Bacon explains that the ‘Spirits or Pneumaticals, that are in all Tangible Bodies, are scarce known’, and that they are ‘the most Active of Bodies.’ Resonating with Milton’s explanation that books are ‘as active as that soule was whose progeny they are’, Bacon explains that when these spirits ‘come to Plants and living Creatures, they call them Soules.’ Bacon clarifies:

For Spirits are nothing else but a Naturall Body, rarified to a Proportion, & included in the Tangible Parts of Bodies, as an Integument. And they be no lesse differing one from the other, than the Dense or Tangible Parts: And they are in all Tangible Bodies whatsoever, more or lesse: And they are never (almost) at rest: And from them, and their Motions, principally proceed […] most of the Effects of Nature […] 197

Bacon’s idea of a natural, connective system, which bears resemblance to the Neoplatonic and hierarchical image that Raphael conveys to Adam in Paradise Lost (v. 468-505), illuminates Milton’s theory of spirits – particularly ‘master-spirits’ – in Areopagitica.198 Fallon affirms that ‘in Bacon the young Milton would have found a natural philosophy in which the inanimate and animate are located along a continuum of matter’.199 Spirits animate tangible material in Bacon’s philosophy; spirits, transferred from authorial vitality, animate books in Areopagitica. Bacon explains in Novum organum that the ‘Latent Processes’ created by spiritual animism in matter require empirical study, as he widely advocates in Instauratio magna: ‘For since every natural action is carried out per minima, or at least by bodies too small to impinge on the sense, no one can hope to be able to govern or change nature unless he has by due means understood and observed them’ (OFB xi. 211).200 While empiricism is more evident in Of Education, Milton’s developing theory of a spectrum of matter and spirit mirrors aspects of Bacon’s speculative philosophy.

Milton’s metaphorical depiction of Truth in Areopagitica embodies his emergent monistic theology and aligns with his chiliasm. Gertz-Robinson identifies a relationship between the millenarian expectancy and martyrdom in Areopagitica,

198 For the universal hierarchy of Paradise Lost, see Chapter 7, pp. 192-6 of this thesis.
199 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, p. 114.
200 For further explanation and discussion, see Rees, ‘Atomism’, p. 569.
epitomised in the idea of Truth. Milton’s millenarianism is personified in the corporeal metaphor of Truth:

Truth indeed came once into the world with her divine Master, and was a perfect shape most glorious to look on: but when he ascended, and his Apostles after him were laid asleep, then strait arose a wicked race of deceivers, who as that story goes of the Egyptian Typhon with his conspirators, how they dealt with good Osiris, went up and down gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them.

‘We have not yet found them all,’ Milton explains to his parliamentary audience, ‘nor ever shall doe, till her Masters second comming; he shall bring together every joynt and member, and shall mould them into an immortall feature of lovelines and perfection’ (549). The millennium is associated with the unification of Truth, whose body had been broken apart and her remains scattered. In his characteristic millenarianism, Milton does not suggest that society should patiently await this chiliastic reunification. Rather, through greater tolerance and the dissemination of ideas, society can work ‘to unite those dissever’d peeces, which are yet wanting to the body of Truth’ (550-1): ‘To be searching what we know not, by what we know, still closing up truth to truth as we find it (for all her body is homogeneal and proportionall) this is the golden rule in Theology as well as in Arithmetick, and makes up the best harmony in a Church’ (551). The process of re-embodying Truth is realised in Milton’s London, where citizens ‘joyn, and unite into one generall and brotherly search after Truth’ (554). The metaphor of Truth illustrates Milton’s belief that diversity of religious ideas and scriptural interpretation constitute millenarian unification, just as the disjointed body parts of Truth unify to create a homogenous whole. The metaphorical formulation of Truth represents Milton’s developing monism at this stage in the 1640s. The process of writing transfers spiritual animation to a text, which in turn contributes to a wider, societal effort to reanimate and thereby reconstitute the body of Truth.

Dury’s Reformed Librarie-Keeper more evidently draws on Baconian precedent of monumentalised utopianism in Solomon’s House than Milton’s vision for London, especially as the Hartlibians were invested in establishing the Office of Address at the time. Kevin Dunn asserts that the Office of Address ‘shows itself as an incompletely democratized form of Bacon’s House of Salomon, a version in which the

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aristocratic Brethren distribute information to people and state alike’. 202 The Office of Address, however, realised an idea of Michel de Montaigne, which had also been put into practice in Paris in 1630 by Théophraste Renaudot (1586-1653) as the *Bureau d’adresse et de rencontre*. 203 Renaudot’s *Bureau* was designed to centralise communication, providing a means through which unemployed individuals could find work, purchases could be made by connecting buyer and seller, and, between 1633-42, weekly conferences could be held, at which prominent scholars gave talks to a public audience. 204 Renaudot was also specifically dedicated to the improvement of the efficacy and distribution of medicine. In September 1640, just a few months before Plattes’s *Macaria* – in which Plattes proposed a centralised institution for medicine – the *Cour des Monnaies* granted Renaudot permission to set up laboratories at the *Bureau*. 205 In the *Hartlib Papers*, there is a copy of *L’Usage Et Commodity Des Bureaux D’Adresse* (1639), which details the operations of the *bureaux*. John Dury has made marginal notes to this copy that reads as a list of the different potential functions of the *bureaux*. 206 It is likely that Plattes was aware of Renaudot’s developments in centralising medicine when he was writing *Macaria*, especially given that the College of Experience in *Macaria* is designed to centralise the dissemination of medical knowledge. The Hartlibian Office of Address was modelled on the precedent established by Renaudot’s *bureaux* in Paris as much as it was inspired by Bacon’s Salomon’s House.

In his *Considerations Tending to the Happy Accomplishment of Englands Reformation in Church and State* (1647), Dury describes the Office as a state institution ‘whereunto all Men might freely come to give Information of the Commodities which they have to be imparted unto others’, and from where an individual can receive information about such commodities: ‘this Office will be a Center of all Mens satisfactions to gaine their Interest in each other for mutuall help.’ As a collaborative

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206 *HP*, Printed Booklet, *L’Usage Et Commodity Des Bureaux D’Adresse*, 31 October 1639, 48/7/1/1A-16B & 48/7/2A-3B.
enterprise, it will facilitate ‘Mutuall Communication’, which is ‘the Chief fruit of all Society’. Dunn asserts that, in their opposition to monopolisation, which encouraged ‘the conflation of public and private’, the Hartlibians proposed ‘a system of private acts that benefit the larger public’. Cheney Culpeper, for instance, identified the Office, by dismantling monopolies, such as ‘the monopoly of trade’ and ‘monopoly of Equity’, as serving an apocalyptic purpose: ‘thus will Babilon tumble, tumble, tumble.’ Like Milton, the realisation of public good had an eschatological purpose for the Hartlibians.

Culpeper also illustrates how Milton’s ideas in *Areopagitica* may have circulated within the Hartlib circle and influenced the ideas of prominent members. Norbrook has observed how Culpeper’s letters in November 1644, only a few days before Thomason received his copy of *Areopagitica*, exhibit ideas that closely resemble Milton’s. McDowell also shows how Culpeper, later in the 1640s, advocates liberty of conscience and strongly criticises the Presbyterians in a manner that resembles Milton’s views at the time. Miltonic ideas, in fact, can be discerned in a number of Culpeper’s letters leading into early 1645. On 20 November, in a letter that Norbrook believes suggests Miltonic influence, Culpeper is specifically concerned with preserving the ideas of Gabriel Platten, who had published *The Profitable Intelligencer* just a week before:

I cannot but conceive wee shall by degrees (havinge firste freede ourselves from a slavishe reverence of some fewe men or bookes) try every spirit & that as well in rationall as spirituall thinges; & yf wee can once redeeme ourselves into this liberty, I am very confidente that Mr Plats thoughts (though they lye a while under grounde) will yet then like corne that dothe soe) afforde the better harveste.

Culpeper stresses that ‘our resolution must be to plante to posterity though our selves may not perhaps hope to injoy any other part or fruite of the action than to have done it’. Culpeper believes in ‘preservation only & not to prepare for the presse’, which,
while it appears distinct from Milton’s argument in *Areopagitica*, shares with Milton the belief that good ideas of private men should serve a public good. Indeed, in a letter dated 4 January 1645, Culpeper expresses concern about the condition of Plattes’s death in poverty, which may partly have been caused by Culpeper not being able to ‘sende [Hartlib] what I promised’ in November due to his own diminishing funds that he explains to Hartlib on 18 December 1644 and reiterates in January. Culpeper does, however, reassert his desire to support Hartlib ‘in the preservinge of [Plattes’s] children I meane his books & ingenuities which yf you looke after in time may (I conceive) fall into your handes & by your care be improved to the publique good & his honor’.  

That Culpeper identifies Plattes’s books and ideas as ‘children’ grants them the kind of authorial vitality that pervades Milton’s writing in *Areopagitica*. Culpeper’s keen desire to preserve Plattes’s texts suggests that the Hartlibians did, like Milton, believe in the value of private authors contributing to a public good. However, the stronger emphasis and enthusiasm that Culpeper exhibits towards Plattes’s works over Plattes himself aligns with the emphasis on public book over private author in Dury’s *Librarie-Keeper*, which differs from Milton’s argument in *Areopagitica*.

While the Office of Address depends on the involvement and contribution of private individuals, for which the Office serves as a communicative catalyst, in Dury’s *Librarie-Keeper*, the dissemination of information is more institutionalised. Dury’s *Librarie-Keeper* envisions the role of an individual librarian in managing national and international textual categorisation and commerce. Just as Hartlib intended to establish the Office of Address in Oxford, so Dury proposes the library-keeper to be employed at a university or college, with the Bodleian Library at the centre of the library-keeper’s research and thinking. Catherine J. Minter identifies similarities between the role of the library-keeper and the warden of the Office of Address. Minter explains that both institutions ‘are charged with the keeping of lists and catalogues as indexes to the information in their possession’, and that they are both to ‘cultivate a correspondence with learned men at home and abroad’. Dury explains that the Warden of the Office manages ‘all manner of Registers, Inventaries, Catalogues and Lists containing the Peculiar Objects wherof he should furnish Information for Addresse to such as shall desire it’, both ‘within and without the Kingdome’.

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215 Dury, *Considerations*, p. 46, see also 43-4.
library-keeper is, however, far more detailed and central to *Librarie-Keeper* than that of the warden in *Considerations*. Dury recommends the keeper is paid £200, a significant increase of the £50-60 paid by the Bodleian Library at the time, as his role is not just the ‘bare keeping of the Books.’ The keeper is ‘to keep the publick stock of Learning, which is in Books and Manuscripts to increas it and to propose it to others in the waies which may bee most useful unto all’ (18). After creating an inventory, Dury proposes that ‘the waie of Trading with it, both at home and abroad, is to bee laid to heart both for the increas of the stock, and for the improvement of it to use’. The keeper should maintain correspondence ‘with those that are eminent in everie Science, to Trade with them for their profit’ (19). Any new international texts that have not yet been publicised, should be used to trade with texts from English individuals. Each year, moreover, the ‘Librarie-keeper should bee bound to give an account of his Trading, and his Profit’, which is then presented to ‘the chief Doctors of each facultie of the Universitie’ (21). Texts are, therefore, very much a commodity in Dury’s idealised library. Similar to the Merchants of Light in Bacon’s utopia, who acquire knowledge from outside of Bensalem, Dury’s library-keeper is tasked with procuring international texts for public dissemination. As Vera Keller explains, ‘Hartlib and his associates stressed far more sharply than Bacon […] how society could be considered a marketplace.’ While Dunn describes the Hartlibians as theorising private contributions to a public effort in the Office of Address, the institutionalised role of the library-keeper and the mercantile commodification of books in Dury’s *Librarie-Keeper* suggest that they were prepared to fully invest in the public sphere as a means of opposing privatisation and monopolisation. In doing so, the role of the author is reduced, if not eliminated, in favour of the tangible artefact of the book. As an individual, the library-keeper is the embodiment of the system, who catalyses the process of public textual dissemination.

Similar to his approach to toleration, Milton’s depiction of the dissemination of knowledge in *Areopagitica* blurs the line between private and public spheres. At its heart, *Areopagitica* can be read as a utopian vision for the advancement of learning, which will help to usher in the millennium. However, as Milton’s London exhibits, the process of reconstituting truth, however collaborative, is not institutionalised. This distinguishes Milton’s vision from both Bacon’s Salomon’s House, and the Hartlibian

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intelligence. organisations. Milton, in fact, while he identifies Truth as ‘our richest Marchandize’ (548), also asserts that ‘Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopoliz’d and traded’ (535). The form of institutionalised trading of texts as monetised artefacts that Dury envisions in Librarie-Keeper is absent from Milton’s vision for London. For Milton, by contrast, the process of individual study and composition is necessary for the propagation of knowledge:

there be pens and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas wherewith to present, as with their homage and fealty the approaching Reformation: others as fast reading, trying all things, assenting to the force of reason and convincement. What could a man require more from a Nation so pliant and so prone to seek after knowledge (554).

The synthesis of these ideas, where ‘moderat varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes [...] commends the whole pile and structure’ (554), contributes to the unification of Truth. Milton’s early understanding of the unity of spirit and matter means that, in the relationship between the processes listed above and the reconstitution of Truth, the public artefact of the text is not permitted a commodified status, as it is for Dury. Trade would inhibit the author-book-Truth relationship that Milton depicts in Areopagitica. Areopagitica, therefore, exhibits a form of Baconian utopianism distinct from that of Hartlib and his associates. Where the Hartlibians invest exclusively in the public institutionalisation of knowledge, Milton maintains some form of authorial agency in Areopagitica. For both Milton and the Hartlibians, the millennium nevertheless remained an essential endpoint of their intellectual and intelligencing endeavours.

Milton’s utopianism and millenarianism are rendered within his complex and developing theory of spirit and matter in Areopagitica. A comparison with Dury’s Librarie-Keeper illuminates the quasi-Baconian relationship between author, books, and millenarian Truth in the tract. The utopian idea of the advancement of knowledge bringing about eschatological change is at the heart of Areopagitica. However, where Dury envisions an institution that commodifies texts to establish a system of trading knowledge, in the shape of Salomon’s House, such an institution is tellingly absent from Areopagitica. Although Milton rejects utopian idealism in Areopagitica, in the mindset of An Apology, he envisions a world of ‘better and exacter things’ that shares in the Baconian foundation of Hartlibian philosophy. Books are an integral stepping-stone from author to millennium. They, therefore, manifest both spirituality and materialism that marks them above commodification. Citizens in Milton’s London serve this higher,
eschatological purpose. In Hartlibian fashion, they contribute to a public good, but unlike Dury’s *Librarie-Keeper*, they retain their private, individual participation to that end. The reason for this can be best discerned in terms of the religious liberty that Milton would increasingly come to espouse in his later writings.

**LIBERTY**

The individual agency that Milton affords his citizens in his idealised London, which they use to serve a chiliastic greater good, represents an early form of Milton’s belief in religious liberty. In J. C. Davis’s definition of utopianism, the lack of institutional control in Milton’s London would prevent it from being classed as utopian.218 As this chapter has argued, however, Milton exhibits a form of Baconian utopianism, which is illuminated by his interaction with the Hartlib network. Milton’s citizens do not patiently await the millennium. They are, instead, invested in a collaborative, city-wide effort to studiously search for, compose and reconstitute Truth. This section will argue that this service represents the religious form of liberty that Milton will continue to advocate in his later poetry and prose. In order to better identify Milton’s religious liberty, it will be necessary to consider how such a form of liberty is formulated in John Hall’s translations of Johann Valentin Andreae’s (1586-1654) *Christianae Societatis Imago* (1620) and *Christiani Amoris Dextera Porrecta* (1620), which Hall received from Hartlib on 23 November 1646, and published in February 1647 as *A Modell of a Christian Society and The Right Hand of Christian Love offered*. Hall’s writings will provide further evidence for the cross-fertilisation of ideas between Milton and the Hartlibians that persisted in the later 1640s.

Hall’s translations of Andreae’s works suggest a continued Hartlibian interest in utopianism in the late 1640s. However, these particular texts share more with Dury’s irenicism than Plattes’s utopianism. Having lamented that the civil war was inhibiting the advancement of learning and ‘publick endeavours’ on Comenian terms, Hall in his introduction to *A Modell* calls for international commerce in Baconian language, in which ‘Commodities are dispers’d into several Countries to occasion mutuall relief and consequently Commerce […] since one Countrey can neither

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engrosse all great spirits, nor one great spirit all knowledge.' Vera Keller observes that Hall ‘seized upon the idea of the divine market’ in Andreae’s tract. Hall’s translation appears to share Dury’s mercantile institutionalism. McDowell, moreover, identifies a consistency between Hall’s prefatory comments and his translation, where Andreae envisions a Christian society in which ‘good men and desirous of heaven […] might comfort themselves with mutuall charity, and free communication of all necessaries and ornaments of this life’ (8). As McDowell explains, this is a ‘fraternity of Lutheran intellectuals […] who dedicate themselves to the discovery of divine truth through the study of nature and the advancement of all branches of knowledge. Dury similarly advocated a ‘fraternall unity’ for advancing the Reformation in his Epistolary Discourse. Andreae describes his fraternity in the attendant tract to A Modell, The Right Hand of Christian Love offered: ‘Christian friendship is the concurrence of good men in Christ, with the purpose to serve God aright’. In Hall’s translation, Andreae envisages fraternal, intellectual collaboration: ‘men vers’d in diverse faculties and studies meet together’ and a ‘Directour, who having heard the opinions of all, extracted what seemed best, being carefull to remedy their evils and provide for their good’, collated this information and ‘was admitted to a universall contemplation of affairs, and breviary of all Learning’ (24-5). Faculties of study, represented by twelve ‘Colleagues’, include, amongst others, theology, history, economics and natural philosophy (28-47). Andreae envisions a collaborative Christian society dedicated to the advancement of learning in the service of God.

This idea of intellectual advancement as a form of service aligns A Modell with the religious liberty of Areopagitica. In his Epistolary Discourse, Dury explains that the ‘fraternall unity’ he idealises, which Andreae similarly promotes, will realise ‘the unblamable Libertie of the Sonnes of God in the Kingdom of their Father, to serve him, and declare the praises of his goodnesse towards us […] in the great Congregation’ (6). Davis explains the relationship between freedom and service in the seventeenth-century concept of Christian liberty. Davis suggests that ‘we should not automatically identify liberty with personal autonomy’: ‘liberty of conscience meant submission to God, therefore, and not to self.’ For such seventeenth-century proponents of religious liberty, they ‘must not be bound by worldly authorities but only in order to submit to a

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220 Keller, Knowledge and the Public Interest, pp. 190-1.
221 McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance, p. 56.
222 See Houston, Renaissance Utopia, p. 79.
higher but mutable and, in some senses, inscrutable authority.'

Andreae’s ideal society is framed in precisely these terms:

The scope of this Christian society is solely this, to follow all means of knowing truth and doing good, to make use of what is already found out, to discover things falsely reputed for truths, to renounce all customes of the world to obey the commandments of Christ, or in a word to represent and expresse the doctrine and manners of our Saviour, in heart, gesture and expression (11).

There is a direct relationship between distance from worldly affairs, advancing knowledge, and serving God. In language more consistent with Areopagitica, in Right Hand, Hall’s translation reads that ‘none ought to be accounted truly and really Christians, but who so earnestly and ardently labour for heaven’ (69-70). Milton describes his vision for London as ‘the mansion house of liberty’ (553-4). Rather than simply freedom from the ‘iron yoke of outward conformity’ (563), however, a citizen in Milton’s idealised city experiences the freedom of ‘labouring the hardest labour in the deep mines of knowledge’ (562), in order to ‘bring his helpful hand to the slow-moving Reformation which we labour under’ (565). These are the ‘free and ingenuous sort of such as evidently were born to study’, who write ‘not for lucre, or any other end, but the service of God and truth, and perhaps that lasting fame and perpetuity of praise which God and good men have consented shall be the reward of those whose publisht labours advance the good of mankind’ (531). Milton’s idealised citizens write out of service to God: study and composition secures the millennium. The millennium, as an end point for Milton’s London, necessitates the framework of religious liberty in Areopagitica. Milton’s citizens do not just write because they have liberty to do so, but because they have liberty to serve God, and writing is a form of that service. Hall’s translation of A Modell suggests not only that he shared Milton’s belief in religious liberty as a necessary prerequisite for the advancement of learning in the service of divine or eschatological ends, which helped to shape his translation, but also that these were ideas endorsed by Hartlib and his associates around the time that Dury wrote his letters to Hartlib for the Librarie-Keeper. Areopagitica exhibits, if not synthesises, essential ideas of the developing Hartlibian ideology in the mid-1640s.

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While *Areopagitica* was printed within the context of the Robinson circle, this chapter has shown that the tract continued to participate in the mainstream Hartlibian discourse, both in 1644 and in the later 1640s. The relationship between private and public spheres is prominent in the tract, as it is in *Of Education*. Milton advocates individual liberty of conscience, but the limitations of his argument and his advocacy of public good permit comparison with Dury’s Presbyterian promotion of ‘public edification’. Although Milton focuses on the role of the individual author in *Areopagitica* and does not advocate the commodification of texts as Dury does in *Librarie-Keeper*, his vision for London represents a form of Baconian, collaborative utopianism in its purpose to advance knowledge in order to realise the millennium. The key difference between *Areopagitica* and *Librarie-Keeper* is illustrated by Hall’s translations of Andreae: religious liberty. Dury, just as he promotes institutionalism in *Librarie-Keeper*, believes in toleration within the public and irenic construct of churches. While he does not accommodate the individual liberty of conscience that Milton advocates, he can be viewed as a Presbyterian who Milton thought may have been swayed by his argument for toleration in *Areopagitica*. For Milton, religious liberty is necessary to propagate service to God. This service, in turn, secures societal progress towards the millennium. Such progress, however, is intellectual: Truth is the embodied ideal of utopian intellectual advancement and its end achievement of the millennium. The ideal of Truth is the earliest form of the utopian millennium that Milton realises in his prose. *Areopagitica* is, therefore, an essential standard of Milton’s developing utopian and millenarian ideology, from which the later development of his ideas in his prose and poetry will be compared. The relationship, in particular, between religious liberty, utopianism, and the millennium is prominent in Milton’s late-1650s works. In 1644, *Areopagitica* exhibits Milton’s contribution to a diverse cross-fertilisation of ideas, at the heart of which, as *Of Education* attests, was Hartlib and his circle.
Millenarian Radicalism: Milton, Winstanley and Cary

Milton’s 1649 writings were written in a period of widespread excitement for and expectation of the millennium of Christ, which was further galvanised by the regicide of Charles I on 30 January. Critics have associated Milton with the sectarian radicalism that displayed this eschatological fervour most strongly.\textsuperscript{224} This thesis endorses the view of seventeenth-century radicalism proposed by Jonathan Scott, that much of seventeenth-century theological and political thinking was new and subversive – and therefore radical – but that radicalism existed on a spectrum, rather than in a binary dynamic between radical and non-radical. ‘English radicalism,’ Scott asserts, ‘was the English revolution.’\textsuperscript{225} This chapter will argue that, while Milton participated in the radical political changes of the nascent republic and fostered his own developing heretical theology, he was distant from the sectarianism that flourished during the period. Gerrard Winstanley (1609-76) and the Digger colonies that he helped to establish are widely accepted as an ideologically extreme form of seventeenth-century radicalism.\textsuperscript{226} Mary Cary (1621-53), an early Fifth Monarchist writer, who wrote multiple tracts before Fifth Monarchism became established and organised in late 1651, offers a millenarian vision that is almost as inclusive as Winstanley’s, but which places faith in the actions of the nascent republic. Cary’s belief in the republic would be rewarded after her death by the significant Fifth Monarchist representation in the ‘Barebones’ Parliament of 1653.\textsuperscript{227} Cary and Winstanley are particularly valuable as contemporary millenarian thinkers of Milton in how they perceived the eschatological potential of the republic, or lack thereof, and in how they viewed themselves as


\textsuperscript{226} Christopher Hill’s \textit{The World Turned Upside Down} (London: Penguin, 1972) was instrumental in popularising this view of Winstanley and the Diggers; see also Andrew Bradstock, \textit{Winstanley and the Diggers, 1649-99} (Abingdon: Frank Cass & Co., 2000) for some informative essays on the sectarian group; and also John Gurney, \textit{Brave Community} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007) for a well-researched and perceptive biography.

individual prophets in relation to the public process of realising the millennium. While Milton shares the millenarianism of both Winstanley and Fifth Monarchists, he invests his eschatological faith exclusively in the republic, which differs from Winstanley’s Digger colonies, and he also advocates the contribution of statesmen to public good, rather than individual prophets like Cary and Winstanley. A comparison between Cary, Winstanley and Milton brings into greater focus how Milton perceived the participation of private individuals in public affairs in the period surrounding the emergence of the English republic. This chapter will show how Milton invests his millenarianism in the republican regime that employs him, and how this encourages a more exclusive vision of the participation of elite individuals in the realisation of the second coming that necessarily distinguishes him from Cary and Winstanley.

Mid-seventeenth-century English radicalism has been viewed as a series of sectarian movements that primarily involved lower orders of society. Christopher Hill made this influential characterisation of the period in *The World Turned Upside Down*. It was to this view of seventeenth-century sectarianism that Hill compares Milton, suggesting that ‘we should see him living in a state of permanent dialogue with radical views which he could not wholly accept, yet some of which greatly attracted him.’ Since Hill, Warren Chernai has posited that the critical consensus regarding Milton and Winstanley is one of a binary disparity between elitism and radicalism: ‘Despite the valiant efforts of Christopher Hill in *Milton and the English Revolution* to forge links between Milton and the “popular radical traditions” of the seventeenth century, Milton and Winstanley are still, in the conventional view, sharply contrasted as elitist and radical democrat.’ Hill himself acknowledges that Milton was ‘highly elitist’, but, in contrast to Chernai’s view, his argument for Milton’s proximity to contemporary sectarianism remains influential. David Loewenstein, for instance, in his analysis of Milton’s conception of England as a nation, suggests that Milton embraced ‘the dramatic outburst of sectarian activity’ in 1640s England. As with Chernai, this leads Loewenstein to align Milton to contemporary sectarianism, and the Levellers. More recently, David Williams has argued for ‘the notable depth of Milton’s sympathy with

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Leveller principles’. More recent criticism appears to agree with Chernaik: he argues that Milton, Winstanley and the Levellers ‘share in a common project: the creation of a public sphere of discourse which, by its very existence, challenged the hegemony of traditional ruling elites.’ This chapter will show that, while Milton shared Winstanley’s millenarian fervour in 1649, during the course of the year his growing disillusionment with the English people encouraged him to remove popular participation from his conception of the public sphere – the emergent English republic – which thereby excluded sectarians like Winstanley and his Diggers.

This chapter intends to contribute to the reorientation of Milton’s ideas in the seventeenth-century radical milieu. Nicholas McDowell argues that many seventeenth-century radicals were, in fact, well-educated, and used ‘their access to elite discourses of cultural authority to shape the development and expression of their heterodox ideas’. McDowell suggests that only Winstanley and the Diggers ‘support the argument that organised radical religion flourished amongst the bottom half of the population.’ While Cary’s ideas would be represented as high as parliament – through Fifth Monarchist members of the Nominated Assembly in 1653 – as a female prophet, in the late 1640s she, like Winstanley and his Digger theology, lacked such representation. Where McDowell addresses how Milton relates to university-educated radicals, this chapter will consider how Milton’s millenarianism is similar to and yet distinguishes him from sectarians who, in particular, valued their ability as private individuals to contribute to the public effort of realising the millennium. Thomas Corns has argued that Milton, in the early 1640s, intentionally styled himself apart from the contemporary sectarians with whom opponents often associated him.

discussed in the previous chapter, it is Milton’s independent attitude that likely led him to distance himself from the Hartlib circle in the late-1640s. Milton’s millenarianism may be the clearest means through which he could be aligned to Winstanley and Cary, but it is also, in relation to the development of his eschatology from 1644, the characteristically elitist form of Milton’s millenarianism that identifies his differences from them.

The development of Milton’s political philosophy over the course of 1649 exhibits how his involvement with the republic influenced his developing political ideas. Stephen Fallon observes that whereas the *Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* (1649) was written as the ‘work of a private citizen’, the *Observations* (1649) and *Eikonoklastes* (1649) ‘are works commissioned by the Council of State.’ In the *Tenure*, Fallon observes that Milton identifies the people, who he argues have the sovereign right to depose a tyrannical ruler, as ‘the naturally free, those who are not held in the grip of custom, those not dazzled by monarchy.’ Fallon suggests that this attitude was a necessary product of Milton’s role as a statesman for a republic that required a political theory to justify its existence: ‘Milton found himself caught in the toils of a circular logic: only the upright are “the people”, even (and especially?) if they are in the minority, and one knows the upright by their disposition on the question of who comprise “the people”.’

McDowell acknowledges the incongruity of Milton’s political philosophy in his successive 1649 tracts in the Oxford *Complete Works*. With regards to *Observations*, McDowell posits that the ‘Calvinist distinction between magistrates and private persons that Milton had worked to demolish in the first edition of the *Tenure* – but which appears to edge back into the second edition – has become one of the structuring principles of his defence of the authority of the purged or “Rump” parliament.’ The substantial changes to Milton’s political philosophy, which Martin Dzelzainis describes as a ‘volte face’, illustrates ‘the anxieties that Milton increasingly felt in spring 1649 both about the future of the English republic […] and the capacity of the English people to maintain the conditions of civil and religious liberty for which they fought.’

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The changes in Milton’s political philosophy during the course of 1649 were concurrent with his growing disaffection with the English people. Paul Hammond argues that Milton was concerned that ‘some peoples are simply not fit to be free.’ Hammond observes Milton’s ‘oscillation between restrictive and non-restrictive definitions of “the people’”, and how he uses pejorative epithets, such as ‘throng’ and ‘noises’, to describe them. ‘For Milton’, Hammond explains, ‘the exercise of liberty […] entailed rational moral choice, and he thought that many people were insufficiently rational or moral to recognize or to pursue true liberty, even when it was offered to them.’

Daniel Shore identifies in *Eikonoklastes* an early manifestation of a ‘fit-though-few’ trope that Milton articulates in *Paradise Lost* (vii. 27-31). Shore discusses this trope in relation to the expansion of the public sphere in the 1640s. He argues that ‘Milton’s representations of an immutably divided audience seem to deny the possibility of an authentic public sphere.’ To reconcile this contradiction, Shore posits that Milton uses these representations as ‘active, rhetorical, instrumental gestures that seek to shape the audience in the process of describing it.’ Shore continues: ‘The elitist impulse is perhaps the most powerful social control he employs for rhetorical purposes. He brings readers to a consciousness of audience only so that they can immediately surpass and dissociate themselves from the many to join the elite few.’

The latent elitism that this study has traced in *Of Education* and *Areopagitica* becomes more entrenched in 1649 as Milton became directly involved in developing and defending English republicanism in a society that was unready—or ‘unfit’—for such unprecedented changes to the political landscape. This chapter will show how Milton’s perception of the involvement of private individuals in contributing to the public good, a concept which featured prominently in *Areopagitica*, encodes the turbulent political atmosphere of 1649. As such, he becomes increasingly distant from Winstanley, whose egalitarian millenarianism idealised a conflation of private and public spheres, and Cary, who, while identifying the republican parliaments as saints, maintained the essential importance of all private individuals, including female prophets like herself.

Winstanley and Cary represent different responses to the eschatological excitement that attended the turbulent events of the 1640s and 1650s. Winstanley,

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forced to leave his work as a cloth merchant in London, moved to Cobham in 1643, where he ‘was able to maintain a relatively settled – if precarious – existence […] as a farmer or grazier’. It was following this move, between 1643-8, that ‘Winstanley underwent a period of acute religious struggle and depression […] and that his heterodox religious positions began to develop significantly’. As Gurney suggests, Winstanley’s mythopoeic theology took a radical turn in The New Law of Righteousnes (1649), which was written concurrent with the trial of Charles I. By 16 April 1649, Winstanley had joined William Everard (1602-51) and other disenfranchised labourers on St George’s Hill, to establish the emergent Digger community. Cary’s millenarianism, which, as Jane Baston suggests, pre-empted the mainstream Fifth Monarchist ideas in the 1650s, similarly transitions from abstract theology to a more focused and increasingly utopian blueprint. Unlike Winstanley, however, instead of an organised sect, Cary invested her hopes in the republican parliament. While Cary’s works have often been collectively defined as a utopian, this chapter will argue that Cary’s utopianism becomes more apparent in the early 1650s. Like Winstanley, her earlier works are millenarian rather than utopian. Whereas the organised Fifth Monarchist sect from late 1651 would advocate a theocratic regime ruled by the elect, Cary, whose death in 1653 preceded the representation of these ideas in the Nominated Assembly, published tracts that are predominantly more tolerant and inclusive, identifying all those who helped to defeat the king as elect. The chapter will begin with a comparison of the different millenarian visions of Milton and Winstanley, before comparing Cary’s belief in freedom of conscience with Milton’s own. The final section will address how Milton’s perception of private and public spheres not only differs to that of Winstanley and Cary, but that it also marks an ideological development from his 1644 works.

243 Gurney, Brave Community, pp. 71-4.
244 CWGW i. 53; on Winstanley’s theology, see CWGW i. 51-9; Bradstock, ‘Theological Aspects of Winstanley’s Writings’, in Prose Studies, 36/1 (2014), pp. 32-42.
245 Gurney, Brave Community, pp. 103, 121-2.
248 On the Fifth Monarchists, see B. S. Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men: A Study of Seventeenth-Century English Millenarianism (Faber, 1972).
Milton’s response to and employment by the emergent republic in 1649 orientates his chiliasm in relation to Winstanley. For Milton, the millennium was promised by the regicide of January 1649, which served as a sudden climax to the uncertainty of 1648, where the prospect of a settlement with Charles was widely anticipated. Although Thomas Corns has shown that Milton does not explicitly advocate republican ideas in his regicide tracts, he is nonetheless, as Fallon suggests, assisting the fledgling republic in ‘cobbling a set of intuitions and nascent principles into a coherent and explicitly anti-monarchic political theory.’ Winstanley’s millenarianism, by contrast, is more vibrantly subversive in its mythopoetic form. Although his Digger writings increasingly show an awareness of the republican institutions that impede the progress of his communist colonies, Winstanley’s egalitarian vision is extreme: it anticipates, at least prior to 1652, the replacement of economic, social, and political structure with Digger communes, including the republican regime that Milton worked for. While Milton’s millenarianism identifies how he engaged with a major contemporary theological movement, the manner in which it becomes dependent on the republic marks a disparity between his chiliasm and that of Winstanley.

Milton’s use of the postlapsarian natural condition of man as a precedent for his argument in the *Tenure* illustrates how his polemical voice in defence of the parliamentarian efforts leading up to the regicide is distinguished from that of the defender of religious liberty in *Areopagitica*. Corns has shown how there is a stylistic transition from Milton’s tracts of the early 1640s to those following the regicide, where ‘the image density falls […] and his imagery loses the luxuriance that characterizes it earlier’: ‘politics and political writing assumed for Milton a deadly seriousness.’ Accordingly, Milton’s political persona influences how he conveys his millenarianism. In *Areopagitica*, as discussed in the previous chapter, Milton had asserted the importance of textual conflict, through which authors of good books could help to reconstitute millenarian truth and thereby assist in defeating falsehood. As part of this argument, Milton refers to the postlapsarian natural ‘state of man’, which is ‘that doom which *Adam* fell into of knowing good and evill, that is to say of knowing good by

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evill’. Milton asks ‘what wisdome can there be to choose, what continence to forbeare without the knowledge of evill?’ The true ‘warfaring Christian’ is he who is able to confront falsehood and choose truth (CPW ii. 514-15). In the Tenure, by contrast, Milton returns to the postlapsarian natural state of man to buttress his argument for natural law as supporting the autonomy of private individuals. Natural law placed emphasis on individual action and served as ‘a barometer by which people must adapt their worldly laws to come as close as possible in a fallen world to enacting and obeying divine law.’

Elizabeth Oldman suggests that it ‘measures the extent to which men can recapture and behave in conformity with standards of prelapsarian ideals in his motives and actions.’ In the Tenure, Milton encodes natural law into his conception of prelapsarian liberty: ‘No man who knows ought, can be so stupid to deny that all men naturally were borne free, being the image and resemblance of God himself, and were by privilege above all the creatures, born to command and not to obey: and that they liv’d so’ (CWJM vi. 155). Milton then articulates his own vision for postlapsarian history, which, like the natural state of man in Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651), is chaotic and violent, requiring ‘common league to bind each other from mutual injury’ (155). The people, therefore, entrusted individuals who ‘they chose above the rest’: ‘Not to be thir Lord and Maisters […] but, to be thir Deputies and Commissioners, to execute, by vertue of thir intrusted power, that justice which else every man by the bond of nature and of Cov’nant must have executed for himself, and for one another’ (155). Milton argues that the prelapsarian authority enjoyed in Eden necessitates the autonomy of the private individual in the postlapsarian world. Milton’s defence of ‘arbitrement’ (156) – the capacity to decide for oneself – contributes to his argument for the individual to decide how to obey divine law.

In Areopagitica, the postlapsarian condition of man is defined by his obligation to reconstitute divine Truth; in the Tenure, postlapsarian man has the freedom to constitute governmental authority. By 1649, Milton had decided to invest his faith in governmental authority, rather than on the collaborative labour of society, as exemplified by his vision for London. Milton’s millenarianism in the Tenure, which is often associated with his defence of religious freedom, lacks the prominence that he affords it in Areopagitica. Milton exclusively defends the legality of the actions

253 On ‘arbitrement’, see McDowell, CWJM, vi. 576, note 240.
of purged parliament leading up to the regicide, which secured his employment by the nascent regime soon after the tract was published.

Winstanley, by contrast, places more emphasis on the prelapsarian ideal of Adam’s dominion over nature, the return of which he directly associates with the millennium. John Rogers explains that, for Winstanley, the ‘gradual realization of a social utopia is figured throughout his work […] as a return to the Edenic state of communality.’ The realisation of this communist paradise was the product of the immanent manifestation of Christ, in the form of an internalised millennium that ‘enables him to equate the Second Coming with the gradual transformation of humanity.’ Charles Webster describes Winstanley as exhibiting ‘a kind of intuitive Baconianism’ in that he envisioned that ‘his communes would undertake the more effective exploitation of nature.’ In his The New Law of Righteousnes (1649), the final book in Several Pieces Gathered Into One Volume (1649) and written concurrently with Charles I’s trial, Winstanley identifies the importance of man’s ruling over nature in Eden in an unconventional image of natural equality: ‘In the beginning of time the whole Creation lived in man, and man lived in his Maker, the spirit of Righteousnesse and peace, for every creature walked evenly with man, and delighted in man, and was ruled by him; there was no opposition between him and the beast, fowls, fishes, or any creature in the earth […]’ (CWGW i. 478). Winstanley conveys the return to this prelapsarian ideal as a ‘freedom of the spirit’, which contrasts to ‘the bondage of the flesh’: ‘for every one was made to be a Lord over the Creation of the Earth, Cattle, Fish, Fowl, Grasse, Trees, not any one to be a bond-slave and a beggar under the Creation of his own kinde’ (i. 502).

As Winstanley explains in The Breaking Day of God (1648), internal bondage is a manifestation of the Beast of Revelation and also the product of Adam’s original sin. ‘If you desire to know the Beast’, Winstanley declares, ‘look first into your own hearts, for there she sits’. In contrast to Milton, Winstanley aligns the postlapsarian Adam with the Beast: the ‘unrighteous Adam, that dammed up the water springs of universall liberty, and brought the Creation under the curse of bondage’. The postlapsarian Adam brought about the mercantile society founded on property and

257 The epistle of the New Law is dated to 26 January 1649; see CWGW i. 477.
commerce that Winstanley condemns.258 ‘Millenarianism in Winstanley’, the Oxford Complete Works editors explain, ‘is as much of an internal spiritual process as it is an external transformation’ (CWGW i. 57). The immanent manifestation of the ‘new Law of righteousnesse’ (i. 476), which is simultaneously a spiritual law and the ‘King of Righteousnesse’ (i. 473) – or Christ himself – will bring about the radical communist transformation of society necessary to achieve a ‘common treasury’ (i. 482; 507; 511), by killing the ‘first Adam’ (i. 482), in anticipation of the second Adam, Christ himself. The prelapsarian ideal not only takes precedence in Winstanley’s eschatological vision, but it also actively replaces the postlapsarian condition of society. Milton’s use of a postlapsarian precedent, as opposed to the prelapsarian ideal that Winstanley enshrines in his writings, is indicative of his focus on the present republican – or at least anti-monarchical – moment, rather than in anticipation of the millennium to come. It is possible that Milton and Winstanley were writing the Tenure and the New Law at the same time; they were certainly writing their tracts in response to the same contemporary events. The significant difference, therefore, is that Milton writes anachronistically, in defence of the events that have led to the regicide; Winstanley, by contrast, anticipates his radical vision for the millennium, which would ultimately see an end to the republican regime that would employ Milton later in 1649.

Indeed, it is only after he has been employed by the republic that Milton invests his prose with prospective millenarian zeal. In the first edition of the Tenure, Milton links Satan’s offer of temporal authority in Luke 4 to where ‘the Dragon gave to the beast his power’: ‘which beast so autoriz’d most expound to the tyrannical powers and Kingdoms of the earth’ (160).259 In the second edition of the Tenure, however, the first issue of which McDowell dates to between September-October 1649, in the writing that Milton adds to the end of the tract about divines, the apocalyptic focus shifts from retrospective to expectant. Milton anticipates ‘he who is our only King, the root of David, and whose Kingdom is eternal righteousness, with all those that Warr under him, whose happiness and final hopes are laid up in that only just & rightful kingdom (which we pray incessantly may com soon, and in so praying wish hasty ruin and destruction to all Tyrants)’ (184). Milton associates the imminent advent of the millennium with the end of tyranny. Barbara Lewalski asserts that in Eikonoklastes, published in early

November 1649, ‘Milton makes his most direct application of apocalyptic symbols to contemporary politics’. The animadvertive rhetoric with which Milton systematically deconstructs and confutes *Eikon Basilike* (1649) is distinct from the mythopoeic voice that Winstanley employs to signify the radical change he proposes in his pre-Digger writings. Having quoted a line of *Eikon Basilike* that asserts the ‘protection of God over all Kings’, Milton refutes the alleged voice of the martyred king with reference to Revelation 17 and 18. ‘To bind thir Kings in Chaines, and thir Nobles with links of Iron,’ Milton asserts, ‘is an honour belonging to his Saints […] and first to overcome those European Kings, which receive thir power not from God, but from the beast’ (422-3). These kings will eventually join ‘thir Armies with the Beast, whose power first rais’d them’, and ‘they shall perish with him by the King of Kings against whom they have rebell’d […] This is thir doom writ’n [Rev. 19] and the utmost that we find concerning them in these latter days; which we have much more cause to beleive, then his unwarranted Revelation here’ (423). Milton puns on the word ‘revelation’, encouraging readers to interpret for themselves the biblical Revelation rather than the false account or ‘revelation’ of Charles himself. Milton predicts that monarchy in both England and Europe as a whole will be defeated by Christ at the second coming. By deconstructing the king’s image, *Eikonoklastes* contributes to the anticipatory, eschatological effort. Given the proximity of their publication, the millenarian sentiment that both the second edition of the *Tenure* and *Eikonoklastes* share seems to belong to the same period of 1649, after the regicide in January and after the Rump declared England a commonwealth on 19 May. While both the *Tenure* and *Eikonoklastes* anachronistically focus on the period surrounding the trial and execution of the king, the expectant millenarianism of the tracts should be viewed within the context of the newly established English commonwealth.

Whereas Winstanley invests his chiliastic zeal in an original and radical vision of the common treasury, Milton’s millenarianism seems to be aligned to his work for the republic in 1649. The retrospective focus of the *Tenure* is at odds with the kind of anticipatory rhetoric that characterises eschatological works of the period, such as Winstanley’s. In the argument of the *Tenure*, Milton shows a development from his ideas in 1644: the postlapsarian freedom he advocates in the *Tenure* is to grant authority to a sovereign power, which is far removed from that of *Areopagitica*, where the collaborative effort of Milton’s idealised London assists in reconstituting Truth and

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ushering in the millennium. Where Winstanley offers a vibrant and complex vision of millenarian society, which he attempts to realise in the work of the Diggers later in 1649, Milton loses the visionary tendencies that characterised Areopagitica as the republic itself takes precedence. Part of the reason for Milton’s faith in the republic was the liberty of conscience that he enjoyed under the regime, which identifies a significant common ground with Cary.

TOLERATION AND THE MILLENNIUM: MILTON AND CARY

While Milton’s focus on the republic distinguishes him from Winstanley’s expectant millenarianism, Cary, in her early form of Fifth Monarchism, associates the parliamentary actions of the late 1640s with her eschatology. As the Fifth Monarchists were increasingly represented in the parliaments of the early 1650s, Cary’s belief that the republic was necessary for the realisation of the fifth monarchy strengthened. It is important to acknowledge that both Milton and Cary believed in liberty of conscience. For Milton, as the previous chapter has shown, toleration was essential for realising his millenarian vision. Cary shared Milton’s support for the republic’s actions in 1649, in the expectation that they would bring about greater toleration for unorthodox views like her own, and thereby help to usher in the fifth monarchy. This comparison with Cary, however, will also illustrate how Milton exhibits greater concern than Cary about the actions of the Presbyterians, particularly in their support of a national church and monarchism, before Pride’s Purge. Milton’s ‘Digression’ of The History of Britain (1670), appended to Book Three of the History and not published until 1681, in which he expresses his dissatisfaction with the parliamentary actions of the 1640s, illustrates Milton’s concerns with contemporary Presbyterians. Critics have argued for a variety of dates for the ‘Digression’, from early 1649, to 1660, to around 1670. Thomas Fulton has recently argued for a date before Pride’s Purge, in 1648; McDowell similarly suggests that ‘the virulent anti-Presbyterianism of the “Digression” resembles that of the

unpublished sonnets and the 1649 prose.\textsuperscript{262} The 1648 dating, which this chapter supports, will help to make the argument that, while Milton shared essential values of toleration with Cary, his opposition to Presbyterianism necessarily distinguishes him from her early Fifth Monarchism. The section will show that Milton’s philosophy of toleration was often articulated within his arguments against contemporary Presbyterianism.

Cary addressed her exegetical analysis and millenarianism to parliament as early as 1647. As Jane Baston argues, Cary had published multiple tracts by the time other major Fifth Monarchists began writing. By 1653, the year of Cary’s death, she had published tracts in the non-militant phase of Fifth Monarchism; Anna Trapnel (fl. 1642-60), the female Fifth Monarchist who has received the most critical attention, belongs to the period in which Fifth Monarchism turned to aggressive opposition of the Protectorate.\textsuperscript{263} Cary’s writings, therefore, represent an emergent and developing form of Fifth Monarchism, in which the inherent elitism characteristic of the movement is more inclusive. In \textit{A Word in Season} (1647), Cary’s first published tract, she directs her writing to ‘you Chaire-men […] you that sit at the Sterne, you that are the heads and rulers of the people, and are in places of authoritie’.\textsuperscript{264} It is in her instructions to parliament that Cary, using the imperative refrain ‘Be wise ye Rulers, and be instructed’, asserts that they must ‘let Jesus Christ raign over you […] who as a King must only raign in the conscience of his people, and govern them by his own Lawes: and therefore make you no Laws for the consciences of his people, nor suffer any to do it by any authority derived from you’ (3). Cary specifically defends the freedoms of prophets: ‘Be wise and be sure you do not stop the mouths of the Prophets of Jesus Christ’ (4). Loewenstein suggests that ‘Cary recognizes – and gives voice to – the desire of other frustrated women prophets and preachers […] who, forbidden or unable to speak, have yet to see fulfilled their visionary yearnings’.\textsuperscript{265} It is partly for this reason that she supports the actions of parliament: she is able to publish and express her

\textsuperscript{262} Fulton, \textit{Historical Milton}, p. 129; McDowell, \textit{CWJM} vi. 8-9.
\textsuperscript{264} Cary, \textit{A Word in Season} (1647), sig. A3; all future references to Cary’s works will be to the original publication and will appear parenthetically in the running text; see Warburton, ‘Mary Cary’s Millennial Visions’, pp. 18-20.
\textsuperscript{265} Loewenstein, ‘Scriptural Exegesis’, p. 138.
millenarian vision without resistance at this early stage in the Fifth Monarchist movement.

Cary continued to approve of parliamentary proceedings over the next year: in *The Resurrection of The Witnesses* (1648), she identifies parliament as the two witnesses of Revelation 13. Cary embarks on a lengthy and comprehensive exegesis in the tract, in which she asserts that the royalists embodied the Beast of Revelation, which, from 1645, was gradually defeated by the Witnesses, or the parliamentarians (82-99). The parliamentary army, ‘being new modelled, and having a great many precious Saints in it’, in April 1645, ‘began to march against the enemy, and then had a Spirit of life from God, that entred into them’ (99). In ‘The Application’ section of *The Resurrection*, in which she analyses her exegesis, Cary addresses those who supported the parliamentarian effort and reassures them that ‘You have cause to rejoice in all that you have done therein: for you see it was a most just and righteous act, and God hath by it brought a most glorious worke to passe, in the bringing of this Kingdome from that vassallage to Rome’ (165). Cary then addresses parliament and, more specifically, Fairfax himself. She encourages parliament to ‘goe on, to deal well with all the Witnesses and servants of Jesus Christ […] whether they be such as are commonly called Presbyterians or Independents, or Anabaptists’ (178-9). To Fairfax, she explains that ‘the hearts of all the Saints in England, are generally knit unto you, and the eyes of all the Saints in England are upon you, most Noble General’ and that he has ‘special encouragement’ to continue the ‘suppressing of the Beast, and defending all the Saints’ (179). Cary’s explicit and direct address to parliament not only exhibits how she associates parliament with the fifth monarchy, but also how her perception of religious freedom incorporates irenicism. She dreams of a day when ‘these distinctions and difference might be all laid aside, and that all that belong to Jesus Christ might only be called Saints’ (173). The elitism characteristic of Fifth Monarchism is more accommodating in Cary’s early works, as she identifies multiple denominations, provided they support the parliamentary effort, as saints.

Milton’s defence of liberty of conscience, by contrast, invariably draws on the anti-Presbyterian sentiment that featured in his writings from 1644. Baston suggests that Cary’s defence of free speech for prophets aligns with Milton’s argument for freedom from pre-publication license in *Areopagitica*.

In *A Word*, Cary responds to a possible objection that her claims for tolerance could lead to an increase in ‘erroneous
persons’ airing their views. Cary argues that even after clergy have been ordained, ‘they may preach erroneous doctrine, and prove scandalous in their lives’ (7). As the previous chapter has shown, Milton argues against pre-publication licensing because he believes such texts should be published first and their ideas addressed and confuted, if necessary. However, while Milton may have viewed Dury as the kind of Presbyterian that he could have won over with his argument in *Areopagitica*, his opposition to Presbyterian attempts to institute a national religion remain prominent in the ‘Digression’. Milton’s belief in liberty of conscience often fuelled his opposition to Presbyterianism in the period. In the ‘Digression’, Milton initially discusses the lack of political progress, which he describes as ‘justice delai’d’, possibly referring to the proceedings of the Treaty of Newport between September-December 1648, during which Woolrych suggests ‘it is likely enough that Milton went through a period of despondency’ (*CPW* v/1 443). Milton then turns to religion, explaining that ‘if the state were in this plight, religion was not in much better’ (447), citing as an example the Westminster Assembly of Divines, which was established in 1643 to reform the Church of England and bring it closer to the Scottish Presbyterian church. Milton asserts that ‘thir intents were cleere to be no other then to have set up a spiritual [sic] tyrannie by a secular power to the advancing of thir owne authorit[ie] above the magistrate’ (447). Milton’s disaffection with the current state of affairs in the ‘Digression’ is distinct from Cary’s ardent praise of the actions of parliament in 1648. Where Cary responds to the tensions between Presbyterians and Independents with a call for unity and broad toleration, Milton, although not explicitly siding with the Independent faction, criticises the stalled progress of the parliamentarian effort that was impeded by the Presbyterian desire for settlement and only solved by the purge of such members by the Independents in December. Milton’s disillusionment with Presbyterianism, therefore, supports a 1648 dating of the ‘Digression’.

Milton’s position hardens in 1649 as he responds to Presbyterian opposition to the trial of the king and subsequent regicide. Introducing the refutation and peroration of the *Tenure*, Milton, referring to the Presbyterians, explains that, due to ‘the tongues and arguments of Malignant backsliders’, the ‘examples which follow shall be all Protestant and chiefly Presbyterian’ (166). ‘Milton’, McDowell explains, ‘charges the Presbyterians with self-interested reversion to the very clerical authoritarianism against

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which they had fulminated in their pulpits and took arms against on the battlefield.\footnote{McDowell, CWJM, vi. 5; see also Go Togashi, ‘Milton and the Presbyterian Opposition, 1649-1650: The Engagement Controversy and The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, Second Edition (1649)’, in Milton Quarterly, 39/2 (2005), pp. 59-81; see also Fallon, ‘Nascent Republican Theory’, pp. 321-3.}

Milton opposes these ‘Apostate Scarcrowes’, who ‘with the unmaskuline Rhetorick of any puling Priest or Chaplain’, interpret scripture ‘with a double contradictory sense, transforming the sacred verity of God, to an Idol with two Faces’ (153-4). The duplicity of their scriptural interpretation in this passage, which alludes to the equivocating weird sisters of Macbeth, doubles as a broader comment on the Presbyterians as ‘revolters from those principles […] which are the necessary consequences of thir own former actions’ (151).\footnote{Cf. Sonnet XII, line 10: ‘And still revolt when truth would set them free’; on Milton’s allusion to Macbeth, see McDowell, ‘Milton’s Regicide Tracts and the Uses of Shakespeare’, in Handbook of Milton, pp. 261-7.}

While Milton’s opposition to the Presbyterians aligns with the purpose of the Tenure – and permits him to rhetorically attack those who had offered scathing responses to his divorce tracts and against whom he was arguing in Areopagitica – it also belies a deeper anxiety about the potential for a settlement between the Rump and the purged Presbyterians.

Milton’s Articles of Peace ... Upon all which are added Observations (1649), published in May, most clearly expresses this anxiety. On 28 March, Milton was tasked by the commonwealth with making observations on the ‘Complicacion of interest’ in Ireland. Milton’s pamphlet included most prominently the original tracts and commentary on the Articles of Peace (1649), an agreement between the Catholic confederacy and the Marquess of Ormond, James Butler (1610-88), and Necessary Representation (1649), issued by the Belfast Presbytery, which opposed the regicide and the new republic.\footnote{See Joad Raymond, ‘Complications of Interest: Milton, Scotland, Ireland, and National Identity in 1649’, in The Review of English Studies, 55/220 (2004), pp. 344, see also 316-18.}

The Observations has been interpreted for Milton’s characterisation of the Irish as ‘Barbarians’ (235) and ‘Savages’ (239) and how this anticipates Cromwell’s campaign in Ireland in August 1649.\footnote{See Jim Daems, ‘Dividing Conjunctions: Milton’s Observations Upon the Articles of Peace’, in Milton Quarterly, 33/2 (1999), pp. 51-5; and Corns, ‘Milton’s Observations upon the Articles of Peace: Ireland Under English Eyes’, in David Loewenstein, James Grantham Turner, eds., Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 123, 125-8.}

There is evidence, however, that Milton was more concerned with Presbyterianism in the tract.\footnote{See Raymond, ‘Complications of Interest’, p. 344.} Blair Worden explains that, in April 1649, Cromwell encouraged a settlement with the purged Presbyterians, which resulted in a declaration intended ‘to settle religion according to
presbytery, and a full maintenance to the ministers’. It seems appropriate that Milton, having opposed similar attempts in 1644 and 1648, would have felt anxious at the renewed possibility of a permanent Presbyterian settlement in England. While it is likely that Cromwell would have defended religious toleration following a Presbyterian settlement, a national church would have inevitably impinged on the religious liberty that Milton defended from 1644 onwards. Indeed, it is possibly due to Council of State’s insistence on toleration that his discussions with the Presbyterians fell through. Milton’s concerns about the Presbyterians in *Observations* resemble those of the ‘Digression’, but with the republic now realised, the need to defend against Presbyterian opposition was that much greater.

Milton’s *Observations*, then, is as much a defence of religious liberty against Presbyterianism as it is criticism of the Irish and Ormond. In his commentary on the *Necessary Representation*, Milton’s response to the assertion that ‘we oppose the Presbyteriall government, the hedg and bulwark of Religion’ exhibits how his continued defence of religious liberty infringes on the republic’s recent attempts at settlement. Milton claims that the assertion is an ‘impudent falshood, having established it with all freedom, wherever it hath been desir’d.’ This brief and limited attempt at appeasement reverts to the critical tone that was evident in the *Tenure*:

> Nevertheless as we perceive it aspiring to be a compulsive power upon all without exception […] or to require the fleshly arm of Magistracy in the execution of a spirituall Discipline, to punish and amerce by any corporall infliction those whose consciences cannot be edifi’d by what authority they are compell’d, we hold it no more to be the hedg and bulwark of Religion, than the Popish and Prelaticall Courts, or the *Spanish Inquisition* (244).

Milton’s criticism extends beyond the Belfast Presbytery. Identifying the Presbyterian church with Catholicism and episcopacy, the latter which he had opposed since the early 1640s, Milton comments on the threat to individual conscience that a tyrannical, ‘compulsive power’ poses. Earlier in the tract, Milton had commented ‘that Church Censures are limited to Church matters’ and ‘that affaires of State are not for their Medling’: bishops ‘have the least Warrant to be Pragmaticall in the State’ (240). Milton explains that the role of clerics, such as the Belfast Presbytery, is essential in combating heresy, as the Solemn League and Covenant does not in ‘any way engage us to

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274 On Milton’s anxiety over Presbyterianism in *Observations*, see McDowell, *CWJM*, vi. 54-5.
extirpate, or to prosecute the men, but the heresies and errors in them’. This accords with Milton’s argument in *Areopagitica*, where the absence of pre-publication licensing permits heretical ideas to be disseminated and then, if necessary, confuted post-publication. Divines must attend to ‘the diligent preaching and insisting upon sound Doctrin, in the confuting not the railing down errors […] and by the powr of truth, not of persecution, subduing those authors of hereticall opinions’ (243). *Observations*, therefore, coincides with the central millenarian argument of *Areopagitica*: liberty of conscience is necessary in order to permit good writers – proponents of Truth – to openly oppose and defeat Falsehood, or writers of heresy. Although Milton’s language lacks the luxuriance of his pre-republican tracts, his support of the republic depends on his belief in religious liberty, which coincides with the eschatological theology he had been articulating since 1644.

Cary’s first post-revolutionary tract, *The Little Hornes Doom and Downfall*, which was printed alongside *A New And More Excellent Mappe or Description of New Jerusalems Glory*, was published in 1651 and exhibits how she perceived the republic as a group of Fifth Monarchists. Within her extensive exegesis of Daniel 7:24-6, Cary, having identified Charles as the symbolic ‘little horn’, asserts that the regicides who put Charles on trial were saints: ‘Thus it is also evidently the sense of these verses compared together, that by judgment sitting is meant, a certaine number of Saints, that by the wisdome, providence, and power of the most High, were convened together, and invested with power and authority […] to judge this little Horne, and do justice upon him’ (34). In accordance with her argument for religious unity in *A Word and Resurrection*, Cary envisions the defeat, trial, and execution of the late king as enacted by a group of saints. While Milton remained steadfastly opposed to the Presbyterians, Cary retrospectively enshrines the actions of the early republic as Fifth Monarchist, disregarding factional and denominational distinctions. Cary identifies ‘those whom the beast, and his adherents the Popish, and prophane party […] most opposed, and hated’ as those ‘who most desired to worship God in his Ordinances in their purity, such as they termed Roundheads, Puritans, Independents, Presbyterians, Anabaptists, Sectaries, Precisians, and what not?’ (22). The rhetorical question is indicative of Cary’s ecumenical disregard for such categories: all who have contributed to the parliamentarian and republican effort are saints. Cary’s passionate call for a unity between Presbyterian and Independent factions in *Resurrection* – ‘O unite, unite, unite! since your God hath made you one in his love, O be you one in your love one to another’ (172) – is answered in the retrospective application of her exegesis.
Cary’s irenicism meant that she supported the Presbyterians in a way that marks her apart from Milton’s entrenched anti-Presbyterian attitude. Cary had clear justification for her unwavering optimism: her requests for parliament to continue their efforts in defeating the royalists in 1648 were answered with the regicide in 1649; by 1653, moreover, there was substantial Fifth Monarchist representation in the Nominated Assembly. Milton was no Fifth Monarchist and, as the comparison with Winstanley in this chapter has shown, he maintained his own specific, idiosyncratic form of millenarianism. Toleration of individual conscience, as this study has argued, was central to that vision. Where Milton exhibits a belief in the public good with Dury in 1644, which was part of Dury’s anti-Independent argument, by 1648-9 there is no association between public good and Presbyterianism in Milton’s eyes. Instead, Presbyterianism represented a ‘spiritual tyranny’ as much as Charles in the Tenure is defined as a tyrant. While Milton and Cary share a belief in the republic, which Winstanley did not, Cary still shares Winstanley’s idealism: she dismantles religious distinctions in her tracts as much as Winstanley dismantles social boundaries. As a republican statesman, Milton is distant from this millenarian radicalism. He shared essential eschatological ideas and excitement with Cary and Winstanley, but his millenarian zeal manifested in a decidedly different way to these radicals. Cary’s voice as a radical female exegete may have coincided with contemporary events of the state, but they did not coincide with the writings of a republican statesman.

PRIVATE STATESMAN AND PUBLIC PROPHETS

Milton’s perception of public and private spheres undergoes a significant transition in 1649 that further distances him from Cary and Winstanley. In Areopagitica, as discussed in the previous chapter, Milton defended the right of private individuals to contribute to a public good. Milton defended liberty of conscience and opposed pre-publication licensing, in the belief that individuals should be able to express views and judge books in the public process of reconstituting Truth and ushering in the millennium. The relationship between private and public spheres returns in the first edition of the Tenure, where Milton argues for the legal right of a group of private individuals – in this case the Army – to act against the king, as they did in Pride’s Purge. Following his employment by the republic, however, Milton changes his argument in the second edition of the Tenure to exclusively refer to parliament and
magistrates. In *Eikonoklastes*, moreover, his disaffection with the English people negated the possibility for there to exist a worthy group of private individuals. By contrast, for both Winstanley and Cary, who belonged to poorly represented segments of seventeenth-century society, the significance of the private individual and the potential for such an individual to contribute to public, millenarian good, was an essential part of their self-identification and self-worth as prophets. In her exegetical tracts, Cary is clearly aware of the societally imposed limitations of being a female radical, especially when she addresses a male-dominated parliament.\(^\text{275}\) As a Digger, Winstanley identified himself as part of a group of poor, agrarian labourers that participated in a wider, public – and universal – process: the millennium itself.\(^\text{276}\) Milton’s change of argument illustrates how his role as employee of the state influenced his writings and how it further removes him from the radicalism of Winstanley and Cary. As a private individual, in early 1649, he defended the agency of private individuals; as a statesman, in late 1649, he defended the agency of the government he worked for, a decision that was reinforced by his growing perception of the unfit English people.

Milton’s central argument in the first edition of the *Tenure* is a defence of the right of private individuals to overthrow a tyrant. As we have seen, Milton argues for individual ‘arbitrement’ through the postlapsarian history he delineates, from which he locates sovereign power originally in the people: ‘It being thus manifest that the power of Kings and Magistrates is nothing else, but what is only derivative, transferr’d and committed to them in trust from the People, to the Common good of them all, in whom the power yet remaines fundamentally, and cannot be tak’n from them, without a violation of thir natural birthright’ (157). Unlike Hobbes, whose argument in *Leviathan* (1651) for the authorisation of a sovereign by the people negates the right of the people to oppose the sovereign after the covenant has been established, Milton suggests that a monarch and magistrate are entrusted with power that can easily be retracted.\(^\text{277}\) Milton goes as far as to assert, with regard to a monarch, that the people can ‘either choose him or reject him or depose him though no Tyrant, meerly by the liberty and right of free born Men, to be govern’d as seems to them best’ (159). Unlike the religious liberty that


\(^{276}\) For a Marxist reading of Winstanley, see James Holstun, ‘Communism, George Hill and the *Mir*: Was Marx a Nineteenth-Century Winstanleyan?’, in *Prose Studies*, 22/2 (1999), 121-48.

\(^{277}\) On Hobbes’s theory of authorisation, see Noel Malcolm, *CETH* iii. 15-17; on Milton and trust, see Dzelzainis, *Political Works*, xvii-xviii; see also Fallon, ‘Nascent Republican Theory’, p. 312.
Milton advocates in *Areopagitica* and will defend again in *The Readie and Easie Way*, Milton, as Togashi explains, ‘draws on classical conceptions of liberty and its opposite, slavery, in order to articulate what an ideal government is under which the people can truly be said to be free.’

Quentin Skinner has defined this as the neo-roman argument for republican liberty, given that it draws from the ideas of classical Rome and was a prominent view of liberty in the early English republic. Milton’s defence of the autonomy of the people appears to align with *Areopagitica*: the actions of the Army in purging parliament and putting the king on trial contribute to public good, just as different writers participate in a public millenarian process in *Areopagitica*.

However, the *Tenure* accommodates the elitist tendencies that had been prominent in Milton’s printed writings since 1644, which anticipates the transition away from support for private individuals in the second edition of the tract. Milton asserts in the second edition that ‘indeed I find it generally cleere and positive determination of them all […] who have writt’n on this argument; that to doe justice on a lawless King, is to a privat man unlawful, to an inferior Magistrate lawfull’ (185). Rather than a volte face, critics have recognised that there is more consistency between the two editions of the *Tenure*. ‘For Milton in the *Tenure,*’ Fallon argues, ‘the “people” are not every adult […] but the naturally free, those who are not held in the grip of custom, those not dazzled by monarchy.’ Accordingly, Milton’s most explicit assertion of republican liberty assumes that the people are not capable of removing themselves from self-imposed bondage:

> If men within themselves would be govern’d by reason, and not generally give up thir understanding to a double tyrannie, of Custom from without, and blind affections within, they would discern better, what it is to favour and uphold the Tyrant of a Nation. But being slaves within doors, no wonder that they strive so much to have the public State conformably govern’d to the inward vitious rule, by which they govern themselves.

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278 Togashi, ‘Milton and the Presbyterian Opposition’, p. 60.
Milton declares that ‘none can love freedom heartily, but good men’, as ‘the rest love not freedom, but licence’ (151). Milton in *Defensio Secunda* (1654) would laud Cromwell for exhibiting the self-control that he wishes the English people had (*CPW* iv/2. 667-8). Even in the first edition of the *Tenure*, Milton expresses a concern that some of the English people were incapable of exerting the self-control necessary to participate in the republic as private individuals.

Milton’s perception of certain individuals as more capable and worthy than the broader English people reflects an attitude that he had held in print since *Of Education*. Early in both editions of the *Tenure*, Milton writes about the role of the elite in the aftermath of a successful insurrection against the king, similar to that which England had experienced in the civil wars: ‘then comes the task to those Worthies which are the soule of that enterprize, to be swett and labour’d out amidst the throng and noises of Vulgar and irrational men’ (152). Milton envisions a distinction between the elite few and the common sort in their respective roles within the new regime. As this study has recognised, Milton values such ‘Worthies’, those whom his educational system in *Of Education* would have produced, above the general English people. This is reiterated soon after in Milton’s suggestion of who can decide whether a monarch is tyrannical:

> But who in particular is a Tyrant cannot be determin’d in a general discours, otherwise then by supposition; his particular charge, and the sufficient proof of it must determin that: which I leave to Magistrates, at least to the uprighter sort of them, and of the people, though in number less by many, in whom faction least hath prevaild above the Law of nature and right reason, to judge as they find cause (154).

Hammond observes that Milton uses a ‘series of restrictive clauses’ to narrow the definition of the people who possess such power to an elite few.\(^{282}\) Robert Filmer recognised a tension between Milton’s argument for popular resistance to tyranny and his conception of the people: ‘nay J. M. will not allow the major part of the Representors to be the people, but the *sounder and better part only* of them […] If the *sounder, the better, and the uprighter* part have the power of the people, how shall we know, or who shall judge who they be?’\(^{283}\) To answer Filmer’s question, where Milton locates such individuals to be in the Army in the first edition of the *Tenure* – as those who have enacted the Purge that he is justifying – in the second edition, these

\(^{282}\) Hammond, *Milton and the People*, p. 120.

individuals are republican statesmen, to whom Milton now identifies himself as belonging. In both editions there are limitations to which private individuals can participate in public activities; the second edition, however, narrows participation to statesman such as Milton himself. While Milton’s elitism in the first edition of the *Tenure* anticipates the greater restrictions he imposes on the private participation in the second edition, his employment by the republic is a key catalyst in bringing about this specific change to his argument.

Winstanley, by contrast, envisions a conflation of private and public spheres, and asserts that the immanent millennium will initially rise up in the common sort. Winstanley makes clear in his *New Law*, that the Law of Righteousness will manifest in each individual without prejudice:

> But this is not done by the hands of a few, or by unrighteous men, that would pul the tyrannical government out of other mens hands, and keep it in their own heart, as we feel this to be a burden of our age. But it is done by the universall spreading of the divine power, which is Christ in mankind making them all to act in one spirit, and in and after / one law of reason and equity (*CWGW*, i. 503-4).

This is why the mercantile and private system of ‘*This is mine, and that is yours*’ will end in favour of universal, public cultivation of the common treasury, where the ‘earth shall be common to all’ (i. 506). At the present moment, in early 1649, Winstanley asserts that the ‘Father now is rising up a people to himself out of the dust, that is, out of the lowest and despised sort of people, that are counted the dust of the earth, man-kind, that are trod under foot’ (i. 508). The commons, beginning practically in the Digger movement a few months after the publication of *New Law*, will lead this revolution of returning common land to the people, away from private hands. The radical vision of *New Law* extends to the ‘swaggering confidence’ of the first Digger work, the *True Levellers Standard Advanced*, published in April 1649.284 Winstanley explains how his vision of an egalitarian common treasury will unify society and collapse the boundary between public and private spheres: ‘Not inclosing any part into any particular hand, but all as one man, working together, and feeding together as Sons of one Father, members of one Family; not one Lording over another, but all looking upon each other, as equals in the Creation’ (ii. 10). While Winstanley is giving voice to his fellow Diggers, he is also representing the Digger enterprise as a unified effort, anticipating what will happen

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284 See *CWGW*, i. 81.
to the rest of society as the Law of Righteousness rises up in them. Through this process, the common people take ownership of the public sphere by effectively becoming it: the unified effort of the commons will gradually subsume private land ownership and trade as the Law of Righteousness manifests in the wealthy as well as the poor.

Cary’s self-identification as a female radical informs her defence of private individuals contributing to the public good of the fifth monarchy. In her address to Francis Rous and Thomas Boon at the beginning of Resurrection, Cary praises them as ‘glorious Starres, shining with a great deal of splendour in Your Countrey [...] in the publikeness of Your spirits’. Despite recognising their public role as members of parliament, Cary asserts that ‘though I publish it under Your name and favour, yet doe I not thereby desire You to patronize any thing in it’. ‘I need desire no Patron’, Cary stresses, ‘For great is the truth, and it will prevail’ (A10-11). Cary defends her right as a private individual – and particularly as a female prophet – to communicate the truth. It is interesting, therefore, that she chooses to include prefatory accounts of Hugh Peters (1598-1660), a prominent regicide and close associate of Cromwell, Henry Jessey (1603-63), a nonconformist minister whose views of reconciling Christianity and Judaism correspond with Cary’s own in Little Horns (pp. 139-68), and Christopher Feake (1612-83), who, along with other prominent Independents, spearheaded the first major organised gathering of Fifth Monarchists in December 1651.285 However, these male authorities are preceded by Cary’s dedication of the tract to three prominent women: Elizabeth Cromwell (1598-1665), Bridget Ireton (1624-62), Cromwell’s daughter, and Margaret Rolle, wife of Henry Rolle (1589-1656), Lord Chief Justice and member of the Council of State.286 Cary acknowledges that ‘God hath selected and chosen out your Ladiships, and pla[ced] you in some of the highest places of honour’ (A4), from which they have served as ‘the exaltation [...] of that great King of Saints, the Lord Jesus; whom you love in sincerity, and for the setting up of whose glorious Kingdome in the perfection of it, you longingly waite’ (A5). Cary identifies in them ‘that indwelling presence of the holy spirit’, which they are ‘demonstrating to all Saints’ (A5). While Cary relies more on male authority in Little Horns, partly because Fifth Monarchism was becoming an established movement, she nonetheless identifies herself as a female saint and private prophet with the prominent public roles of these women. In

A Word, Cary asserts ‘let all the people, from the highest to the lowest, from the King that sits upon the Throne, to him that sits upon the Dunghill […] attend to the insuing discourse’ (A3). In Resurrection, this inclusivity extends to encompass female prophets as well as male. Within Cary’s inclusive vision of England as a society of saints, not only can ‘fifth monarchy men’ of all descriptions contribute to the fifth monarchy, but so can fifth monarchy women.

Milton’s negative attitude towards the people, by contrast, only becomes more entrenched as he writes against the extremely popular Eikon Basilike in Eikonoklastes. Daniel Shore suggests that Milton employs a ‘fit-though-few’ trope in Eikonoklastes, through which he limits participation in the public sphere. It is also possible to discern, more simply, that Milton becomes more frustrated and disillusioned with the commons as Eikon Basilike remains overwhelmingly popular. In the second edition of Eikonoklastes, published between July and December 1650, some of Milton’s changes to the tract reflect this developing disaffection. In the preface, Milton acknowledges that ‘well it might have seem’d in vaine to write at all; considering the envy and almost infinite prejudice likely to be stirr’d up among the Common sort’. However, ‘it shall be ventur’d yet, and the truth not smother’d, but sent abroad, in the native confidence of her single self […] to finde out her own readers; few perhaps, but those few, such of value and substantial worth, as truth and wisdom’ (280). In 1650, Milton exhibits a clear change of attitude to 1644: he no longer accommodated the potential of private individuals to contribute to his chiliastic ideals, as his vision of London in Areopagitica enshrines; rather, truth, that which he communicates in his writings, will find the few worthy readers to serve the millennium privately.287

Milton’s role as republican statesman from 1649, therefore, distinguishes him from the radical visions of Cary and Winstanley. As Milton has to articulate the voice of the nascent republic, his perception of worthy private individuals must necessarily transition to the republic itself, a collection of individuals who are enacting a public good and with whom he self-identifies. Indeed, his definition of the public sphere is now the republic: whereas public good takes on an exclusively millenarian form for Cary and Winstanley, it is also necessarily republican in Milton’s mindset as a statesman. As the divorce tracts suggest, Milton would also not have approved of Cary’s own specific participation in the public sphere as a woman, regardless of her religious or radical status. Not only did Milton argue for a separation of roles between sexes

287 Cf. Eikonoklastes, CWJM vi. 424, where Milton similarly increases his criticism of the commons in the second edition.
(Tetrachordon (1645), CPW ii. 597), but, in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643), he uses this distinction to assert the exclusive role of women in the private, domestic sphere, while men were able to venture ‘abroad’ to the public, political sphere (ii. 334-5, 347-6). Milton’s criteria for private participation in the republic was exclusive in early 1649 and only became more so through 1649 and 1650. Milton’s increasingly exclusive definition of those capable of overthrowing a tyrant, therefore, distances him from both the radical millenarians considered in this study and from his own more inclusive vision in Areopagitica.

CONCLUSION

In the landscape of seventeenth-century English radicalism, Milton’s views and writings must be considered within their republican setting. Milton’s defence of the regicide and his role in the unprecedented political changes of the late 1640s and 1650s may have been radical, but it is neither comparable to Winstanley’s communist vision nor to Cary’s inclusive Fifth Monarchist millenarian society. Milton is perhaps, as the following chapter will show, best compared to the Fifth Monarchists of the 1650s – those who emerged prominently towards the end of Cary’s life – whose elitist belief that only the saints could bring about the millennium in England aligns with Milton’s own eschatology. This chapter has recognised that Milton’s millenarianism only becomes prominent in his tracts after he is employed by the fledgling republic. As Areopagitica attests, this is likely due to the value he places on freedom of conscience. However, unlike in Areopagitica, Milton increasingly loses faith in the people to contribute to this public good during the post-revolutionary period of 1649-50. As a republican statesman, Milton perceived himself as belonging to the group that had changed the English political landscape for the better, and which was capable of maintaining this progress; the people, in their unaltered belief in the monarchy, proved themselves unworthy of such elect status. As radical millenarians, Winstanley and Cary envisioned significant and far-reaching changes to the socio-economic and political spectrums. The republic was only part of their millenarian process. While Milton, as the following chapter will

suggest, did not view republicanism as an idealised end in itself – this is a view better discerned in Marchamont Nedham – he also did not share a belief in such a radical overhaul of society and politics. Milton invested his millenarian hope in the republic in a way that necessarily excluded contemporary sectarians from realising their radical visions for end times. The radical event of the English republic, which Milton continued to support in its various incarnations during the 1650s, resisted the rise of both the Diggers and the Fifth Monarchists, while maintaining the participation of individual statesmen, such as Milton himself.
Utopia & Republicanism: Milton and ‘that scribling Knave Nedham’

Marchamont Nedham (1620-78), serial turncoat, prolific newsbook writer and pamphleteer, was one of Milton’s closest colleagues as the statesmen navigated the turbulent early years of the new republic. Their republican careers were immediately entwined: Milton was tasked with seeking out Nedham from hiding following the latter’s previous employment by the monarchy; he was subsequently appointed as licenser to Nedham’s republican newsbook, *Mercurius Politicus*, in January 1651. As a result of their close professional proximity, according to Anthony Wood and Edward Philips, the pair became great friends. Whereas some critics have argued that this friendship corresponded to ideological similarities, particularly in that the pair worked closely together on joint projects, this chapter will posit that Nedham and Milton’s political thought became increasingly distinct as the Interregnum progressed.

Nedham’s *The Case of the Commonwealth of England, Stated* (1650) exhibits the interest theory that was prominent in his writings throughout the 1650s. The theory of accommodating interests necessarily differs from the more totalising, utopian vision of Winstanley’s *The Law of Freedom in a Platform* (1652). While Milton does not explicitly articulate a utopian vision, his *Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio* (1651) defends a specifically elect part of the English people that differs from Nedham’s more inclusive interest-led analysis of the state of political affairs. This early distinction between Milton and Nedham is mirrored throughout the 1650s: Milton, as the following chapter will show, proposes a more utopian vision in his *The Readie and Easie Way* (1659),

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while Nedham retains his belief that competing interests are conducive to a healthy republic in *Interest Will Not Lie* (1659). The intervening years exhibit how Nedham’s faith in the populism of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), particularly the *Discorsi* (1531), distinguishes him from the utopian and millenarian Milton. The disillusionment that Milton continues to harbour with the English people, as this study has shown, coincides with his millenarianism: a people unworthy of liberty are also unworthy of the millennium. Nedham’s republican populism, in turn, aligns with his lack of faith in the millennium. A fully realised republic on the Machiavellian model is the idealised endpoint of the republican project as Nedham sees it. By 1657, Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’ satirise the kind of idealism manifest in utopianism and millenarianism, while explicitly subverting Harringtonian utopianism, with which, as the following chapter will show, Milton’s late republican tracts align.

Central to the republican theory that emerged in the 1650s was classical republicanism, and, for Milton and Nedham, the manner in which Machiavelli influenced the reception and interpretation of classically republican ideas in the period. J. G. A. Pocock’s seminal book, *The Machiavellian Moment*, firmly placed Machiavelli in English republican discourses of the mid-seventeenth-century. Paul Rahe has since argued that Machiavelli’s revision of certain classically republican ideas meant that he had less influence on classical republicans in the English revolution like Milton, who, Rahe posits, did not allow ‘the thinking of Niccolò Machiavelli to shape in any fundamental way the manner in which he wrote about, defended, and surreptitiously tried to guide the nascent English republic in strictly political affairs.’

Jonathan Scott, in *Commonwealth Principles*, postulates a more inclusive definition of classical republicanism that accommodates both Greek and Roman origins. Scott suggests that Machiavelli participated in a classically republican discourse that became prominent in the republican phase of the 1650s. Significantly for this study, Scott includes not only Machiavelli, but also Thomas More in the chronological development of classical republicanism: he suggests that More’s *Utopia* not only combines the metaphysics and community of property of Plato’s *Republic*, but does so within a humanist context.

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which is self-consciously anti-Roman.’ Scott explains that, in the mid-seventeenth-century, ‘two principles informed this commonwealth discourse’: ‘The first was that whatever its constitutional form, government must be directed to the public good. The second was that it must be legal and constitutional […] rather than the product of the will of a single person.’ During the English revolutionary period, these classically republican ideas were used to oppose monarchy: Charles I was defined as a tyrant, which meant that his actions were inhibitive to public good. Scott’s inclusive definition of classical republicanism, therefore, suggests that Milton’s interest in Machiavelli in 1651-2, as evidenced by his Commonplace Book, is compatible with his continued belief that certain individuals were better endowed with a capacity for reason in the political sphere, which is foundational to Aristotle’s ideal polity in his Politics. It also suggests that Nedham’s advocacy of Machiavelli did not negate his classical republicanism. Scott explains that seventeenth-century classical republicanism ‘was characterised by the combination not only of Greek and Roman sources, but, more challengingly, of Plato and Machiavelli’. This chapter will discuss Milton and Nedham within this classically republican context. Given More’s role in the development of these ideas, the prominence of utopianism in republican texts of the 1650s is more congruous than it may initially appear. Where Nedham satirises Morean utopianism in 1657, Milton edges closer to the utopianism that characterises his 1659 vision for the republic.

As this study has argued, utopianism manifested in various forms in the mid-seventeenth-century. In 1644, Milton articulated a form of Baconian utopianism that was prevalent in the Hartlib circle; by 1659, as the following chapter will show, he espoused the form of totalising utopianism depicted in More’s Utopia and defined by J. C. Davis. Rosanna Cox discusses Milton’s The Readie and Easie Way in relation to Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’ (1657) and James Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656). ‘Even those writers like Milton’, Cox explains, ‘and the journalist and polemicist, Marchamont Nedham, who are not always comfortable with the utopian

298 Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, pp. 36-8.
form, are nevertheless fascinated by its possibilities.\textsuperscript{299} Cox identifies \textit{Of Education} as utopian, but stops short of including \textit{Areopagitica}.\textsuperscript{300} This is partly because she uses the utopian idealism that Milton opposes in \textit{Areopagitica} (\textit{CPW} ii. 526) as a general definition of utopianism for the period. Whereas Davis has categorised different forms of ideal society, the utopianism that Cox defines is effectively an ideal society.\textsuperscript{301} It is with this definition of utopianism that Cox argues that ‘Nedham’s rejection of utopias is the corollary to his rejection of political modelling in times of acute political crisis and at moments when the commonwealth is under threat. The problem with utopias, as becomes clear in the penultimate letter, is the \textit{fiction} of the ideal state and the ramifications of this fiction in the wider political sphere.\textsuperscript{302} While fiction and artifice, as the following chapter will show, remained significant features of utopias in the mid-seventeenth-century, utopianism was also acknowledged in contemporary texts as advocating a stringent, totalising regime. Thomas Hall (1610-65) in his \textit{A Confutation of the Millenarian Opinion} (1657) identified utopianism alongside millenarianism as jointly idealistic, unlike the true manifestation of Christ’s kingdom: ‘the Lord at last would bring us, not to a Millenarian, Utopian, Imaginary, Terrestrial Kingdom; but to a Real, Caelestial and Everlasting Kingdom’.\textsuperscript{303} Thomas Bancroft (1596-1658), by contrast, in his poem \textit{The Heroical Lover} (1658), in which the hero Antheon leaves his home in New Atlantis and goes in search of his lover, Fidelta, whom he eventually finds in Utopia, identifies the stringent nature of Utopia. The Utopians, ‘Hating the names of injury & strife, / As bitter enemies to the sweetest life’, established ‘good laws amongst them’ that ‘were / (Like those of famous Sparta) so severe / That such as dar’d offend, were never spar’d’.\textsuperscript{304} The Utopians remove internal conflict in society and state through controlling regulations. Utopianism is distinct from the interest theory that Nedham consistently advocates. Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’, therefore, in which he creates a fiction similar to Bancroft’s, exhibit a concern for how this kind of utopianism

\textsuperscript{300} Cf., Chloë Houston, ‘Utopia and Education in the Seventeenth Century: Bacon’s Salomon’s House and its Influence’, in \textit{New Worlds Reflected}, pp. 161-78.
\textsuperscript{301} See Davis, \textit{Utopia and Ideal Society}, pp. 20-38.
\textsuperscript{302} Cox, ‘Constitutional Design in the Interregnum’, p. 193.
\textsuperscript{303} Thomas Hall, \textit{A Confitutation of the Millenarian Opinion}, Plainly demonstrating that Christ will not Reign Vissibly and Personally on earth with the Saints for a thousand yeers either before the day of Judgement, in the day of Judgement, or after it (1657), sig. A7.
\textsuperscript{304} Thomas Bancroft, \textit{The Heroical Lover Or Antheon & Fidelta} (1658), p. 82.
– both idealistic and stringent – could be realised in a republic like that described by Harrington’s *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656).

This chapter will also offer an interpretation of Milton and Nedham’s ideological differences, which contrasts with recent criticism to the contrary. Blair Worden’s *Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England* offers an extensive analysis of the relationship between Milton and Nedham, from the viewpoint that the two republican writers not only thought similarly, but also worked closely together in the production of *Mercurius Politicus*. Worden gives new life to the argument that Milton had a significant input in the editorials of *Politicus* between 1650-1. In particular, he suggests that ‘*Politicus* anticipated, and seems to have hoped to provide, replies to *Defensio* from Salmasius or others, which would heighten the controversy and enable Milton to respond in writings that would raise it further.'\(^{305}\) Williams suggests that, within his educational editorials, Nedham had made subversive comments against Cromwell’s rise in power, and the possibility that he may take the crown himself. Given that Milton had permitted this commentary on Cromwell, it argues that this was part of the reason for Milton’s dismissal as licenser for *Politicus* in January 1652. Similarly, within his wider argument for Milton’s Leveller sympathies, Williams suggests that a March 1652 editorial exhibits a defence of Levelling that may have been penned by either Milton or Nedham, or both.\(^{306}\) Levelling, however, as we shall see, is a contrary form to successive assemblies that Nedham criticises in the interest theory of *The Case*. Rather than arguing for Milton’s influence over *Politicus*, it is more valuable to explore and acknowledge Nedham’s intellectual independence and autonomy. As this chapter will show, Nedham develops his own increasingly anti-utopian ideology apart from Milton; *Mercurius Politicus* is part of that process.

The first section of this chapter will address the differences between the interest theory of *The Case* and the elitism of Milton’s first *Defensio*. The second will show how Milton and Nedham respectively respond to the Protectorate in 1654, in *Defensio Secunda* and *A True State of the Case of the Commonwealth*. The final section will focus on Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’, arguing that Nedham’s continued opposition to utopianism informs his continued support for the Protectorate, however begrudgingly.

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\(^{306}\) *Williams, Milton’s Leveller God*, pp. 86-9, 93-4, 97-8; see *Mercurius Politicus*, 4th-11th March 1652.
‘INTEREST IS THE TRUE ZENITH OF EVERY STATE’: DEFENDING THE NEW REPUBLIC

Like Nedham in The Case of the Commonwealth of England, Stated (1650), Milton was tasked with defending the republic against Defensio Regia pro Carolo I (1649), penned by Claudius Salmasius (1588-1653), in Defensio Pro Populo Anglicano (1651). In The Case, his first tract for the republic, Nedham waded into the Engagement controversy that followed the introduction of the mandatory Oath of Engagement in support of the republic early in 1650.307 Whereas contemporary de facto theorists, such as Anthony Ascham (1614-50) and Francis Rous (1581-1659), argued that the Rump parliament was de facto in power, which necessitated obedience, Nedham went one step further to assert that a de facto government was also valid de jure.308 In Milton’s Defensio, his first Latin polemic for the republic, his animadverting rhetoric refutes Salmasius’s argument as he defends the revolutionary actions of parliament in 1648-9. The crucial difference between Milton and Nedham’s republican defences lies in the latter’s use of interest theory, which, as Raymond explains, he ‘had developed from Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and especially the Duc de Rohan’: ‘Nedham was committed to “interest” as a means of analysis, and as a powerful means of linking theory to practice.’309 As Nedham asserts in The Case Stated between England and the United Provinces, in this Present Juncture (1652), ‘Interest is the true Zenith of every State and Person, according to which they may certainly be understood, though cloathed never so much


with the most specious disguise of Religion, Justice and Necessity.' Although Nedham uses such profiling as a means of identifying areas of anti-republican interest in England, it also anticipates the successive governments that he would advocate in *Mercurius Politicus*, in which succession of parliaments ensures that different views can be represented. Milton’s argument in his first *Defensio*, by contrast, maintains a distinction between a superior and more virtuous part of the people – the *sanior pars* – and the wider populace, which he had exhibited throughout 1649. Although neither Milton nor Nedham endorse the kind of utopianism that Winstanley depicts in his *Law of Freedom* – Nedham, in fact, addresses the Diggers as a form of anti-republican interest – Milton’s attitude towards the people in the *Defensio*, as an extension of the views he expressed in 1649, prefigures the utopian standpoint he will come to espouse in *The Readie and Easie Way*.

Nedham’s *The Case* addresses ‘those two Parties whereof the world consists; *viz*: the Conscienious man, and the Worldling.’ He does so by dividing *The Case* into two parts: the former addresses the conscientious man with his *de facto* argument; the latter meets the self-interest of the worldling with his interest theory analysis. Nedham explains that

> The former will approve nothing but what is just and equitable; and therefore I have labored to satisfie him (as I have done my Self) touching the Justice of Submission: The latter will imbrace any thing, so it make for his Profit; and therefore I have shewn him the Inconveniences and Dangers, that wil follow his opposition of a settlement (sig. A3).

‘Where Nedham differs from the typical pamphleteer’, Raymond explains, ‘is that, instead of dismissing the latter, and persuading readers to identify with the former, he seeks to persuade both through diligence and the reasoned appeal to self-interest.’

Even at this early stage in his republican career, in a tract in which he is proving his worth to a form of government he had once opposed in print, Nedham is fashioning his own distinct view of republicanism. Nedham’s awareness of the interests of different parties encourages him to include the interests of the people in a way that Milton, as we

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311 Marchamont Nedham, *The Case of the Commonwealth of England, Stated* (1650), A3r; further references will be made parenthetically to page numbers in the running text.

have seen, generally avoids. In the *Discorsi*, which Nedham admired and the ideas of which he serialised in editorials of *Mercurius Politicus* in 1651-2, Machiavelli acknowledges that ‘in every republic there are two different tendencies, that of the people and that of the upper class’, which leads to ‘disturbances between the nobles and the plebeians’, but that contemporary republics in Italy ‘give more consideration to the noises and cries arising from such disturbances than to the good effects they produced’. A solution to this, Machiavelli asserts, is ‘that every city must possess its own methods for allowing the people to express their ambitions’.  

Nedham accommodates the views of the people and addresses them in an accessible way because he believes, as Machiavelli does, that the ambitions of the people are represented in a healthy republic. His identification of non-republican interests in *The Case* enables him to show the worldling that these various parties and factions inhibit, if not prohibit, popular interests.

Nedham identifies four anti-republican interests in post-revolutionary England that oppose the popular interest: royalists, the Scottich, Presbyterians, and Levellers. The pamphleteer effectively yokes the first three interests together to exhibit how they all strived collectively to oppose the superior republican interest that he is defending in the tract. In the section ‘On the Scots’, Nedham addresses the ‘*Kirke-Interest*’, which he identifies as essentially Presbyterian in character, and from which he anticipates an extension of the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643: ‘the Scots might easily have translated the *Covenant union* as good as an absolute *National union*, by gaining a *Joynt-Interest* with us in our Affairs for ever’ (50-1). The problem with Scottish interest, which naturally aligns with the Presbyterian interest in the third section, is that, by combining various interests together, it tyrannically inhibits the popular interest that Nedham is acknowledging in his address to the worldling. The danger with the English and Scottish Presbyterians creating a ‘new *Scottish Combination*’ (67) is that it will be ‘destructive to every mans Interest of Conscience and Liberty’ and it will establish ‘an intolerable Tyranny, over Magistrates and People’ (64).  

The combined interest of Scottish and the English Presbyterians, which is made possible by discussions between them and Prince Charles, is a danger to both the political and religious interests of the worldling, and indeed the English commonwealth.

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as a whole. Like Milton, Nedham identifies Presbyterianism as limiting and endangering religious liberty; unlike Milton, however, as we shall see, he supports and defends the interest of the people. In line with Machiavelli, he identifies the English republic as permitting popular ambition to be represented and realised in a way that the other interests he addresses do not.

Milton’s first *Defensio*, by contrast, favours an elect part of the English people as singularly capable of realising the virtue and success of the English republic that he defends. Raymond shows how Milton addresses different audiences in his *Defensio*. While Salmasius is the most obvious member of his audience – he refers to Salmasius with derogatory epithets such as ‘windbag’ (67) and, more regularly, ‘slave’ (73) – Milton also isolates the Europeans to whom he defended the nascent republic. Raymond argues that the English people, as a third audience, ‘Latin-reading and otherwise, […] are repeatedly separated from the European readership.’ While he purports to defend the English people – *populo Anglicano* – Hammond observes that Milton struggled with articulating precisely who fulfils his definition of the people. Milton argues in the preface of the *Defensio* that ‘if a commonwealth which is in difficulties with factions, and protects itself with weapons, concerns itself with the healthy and sound part only, and neglects or excludes the rest, whether they are commoners or aristocrats, it is certainly just enough.’ The translation of ‘sanae & integrae […] partis’ here as ‘healthy and sound part’, which has also been translated as ‘sound and upright side’ (*CPW* iv. 317), has connotations of mental and physical health (‘sanus’) and of wholeness or completeness (‘integer’). Where Nedham suggests that a republic more effectively secures the interests of the people, through which he encourages the commons to avoid the factions he opposes, Milton proposes that in a factious commonwealth, favouring superior individuals is justified.

In Milton’s argument in the *Defensio* that the people, in the form of the Army, during Pride’s Purge acted against the king rather than parliament, he finds it necessary to explicitly articulate his definition of the people. Elizabeth Sauer explains

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317 Milton, *Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio*, in Martin Dzelzainis, ed., Claire Gruzelier, trans., *John Milton: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 61; references will be made to this translation parenthetically in the running text unless otherwise stated, where the Yale *Complete Prose Works* translation has been considered.
that the ‘representation of the people in terms of a qualitative principle rather than numerical majority in constitutionalism is grounded in the Aristotelian political concept of government by the most worthy.’ The concept of the sanior pars, which Milton describes later in the Defensio, was prominent in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the ‘distinction that Marsilius of Padua articulated in the following century between the populus (the nobles) and the plebs (the lower-class masses) resonated even through to the early modern era.’ In answer to Salmasius’s question about whether it was the people ‘who maimed the commoners of the lower house, by putting some of the members to flight, etc?’, Milton answers

> It was the people, I say. For why should I not say that the action of the better, that is the healthier, part of the government, in which resides the true power of the people, was the act of the people. What if the majority in parliament should prefer to be slaves, and to offer the commonwealth for sale – should not the minority be allowed to prevent this and keep their liberty, if it lies in their power? (181-2)

The phrase ‘pars potior, id est sanior’ (‘the better, that is the healthier part’) echoes the language Milton used in the preface to describe the better part of the people. Here, where ‘sanior’ means ‘healthier’, ‘potior’ can translate as both ‘preferable’ and ‘more powerful’. The comparative form of these adjectives indicates the superior quality of this part of the people that Milton defends. Milton viewed the better part of the people as the middle sort:

> You then inveigh against the common people, saying that ‘being blind and dull, it does not have the skill of ruling; nothing is more puffed up, empty, changeable and inconstant’. All these things suit you very well; and of the lowest rabble indeed are even true, but not likewise of the middle sort. Of their number are the men who are almost the most sensible and skilful in affairs. As for the rest, luxury and opulence on the one hand, poverty and need on the other, generally divert them from virtue and the study of statesmanship (194).

In 1649, as the previous chapter showed, Milton consistently identified the superior and upright apart from those who are, in the words of Eikonoklastes, ‘like a credulous and hapless herd, begott’n to servility’ (CWJM vi. 424). Milton’s defence of the established

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English republic to a European audience bears resemblance to these vernacular arguments. Virtuous men, who are more commonly found in the middle sort, are better suited to participating in the commonwealth.

By favouring certain parts of the people over others, Milton’s defence of the English republic is necessarily distinguished from Nedham’s. At the end of The Case, Nedham delivers ‘A discourse of the excellency of a Free-State, above a Kingly Government’, in which he draws on Machiavelli’s Discorsi. Nedham explains how, in ‘the Florentine’s subtile discourses upon Livy’, Machiavelli ‘compares such as have been educated under a Monarchy or Tyranny, to those Beasts which have been caged or coop’t up all their lives in a Den […] and if they be let loose, yet they will return in againe, because they know not how to value or use their Liberty’ (80). Nedham’s awareness of the poorly educated people informs his decision to separate The Case into two sections, and to serialise the Discorsi in the educational editorials of Mercurius Politicus. It is also this attitude, and his knowledge of Machiavelli, that leads him to argue for a populist vision of a republic: ‘Therefore (Machiavell saith) no the that placeth a virtuous Government in his own Hands or Family, and Governs well during his naturall life; but he that establisheth a lasting Form for the Peoples constant Security, is most to be commended’ (86).

A specific part of the English republic that Nedham defends, which aligns with Milton’s enduring commitment to religious freedom, is liberty of conscience. In further opposition to Presbyterianism, which he describes as ‘the great Pretenders of Nationall Uniformity in Religion’ and ‘those high imperious Uniformity-mongers, that would have men take measure of all Opinions by their own’, Nedham asserts ‘that variety of Opinions can be no way destructive of Publique Peace’ (90-1). Just as Nedham’s ‘free state’ permits popular interests to be represented, so it also allows a diversity of religious opinions to exist within the state. ‘Toleration’, Raymond argues, ‘continued to be central to Nedham’s vision of a flourishing commonwealth, and I think it was a foundation of his personal religion and his public politics.’ While Milton would agree with Nedham’s defence of religious freedom here, as this study has shown, Milton viewed liberty of conscience as necessary to realise the millennium, which is a different kind of freedom to the one that Nedham advocates in The Case. Whereas Nedham’s free state encourages the participation of the people in government – partly, in Machiavellian terms, to vent ambitious tendencies – Milton in the first Defensio...
defends a part of the English people capable of serving the idealised end point of the millennium: “The Messiah is a king”: we acknowledge, we rejoice and we pray that he may come as quickly as possible, for he is worthy, and no-one is like him or able to follow him’ (99). The ‘Son of God for whom we wait’ (153), although not as explicit as in 1644, is no less significant in Milton’s first Defensio. Although Milton shares with Nedham a belief that it is important for there to be a variety of religious opinion in a commonwealth, he does so for a different reason: religious liberty in Milton’s commonwealth helps to realise the millennium; Nedham’s defence of religious liberty – the ‘variety of Opinions’ – by contrast, reflects his wider belief in popular participation in government. For Milton, while his classical republicanism encourages him to denounce Salmassius and monarchism as slavery, he also advocates the religious liberty defined by J. C. Davis: ‘liberty of conscience meant submission to God, therefore, and not to self.’

In Winstanley’s utopia, The Law of Freedom, he similarly draws on this form of religious liberty in a significant manifestation of a utopian millennium. In its direct address to Cromwell, The Law of Freedom represents Winstanley’s final – and possibly desperate – promotion of change to the power structures of a society that had resisted the formation of his ‘common treasury’. While Winstanley remains dedicated to the commons, the society he proposes manifests the law of righteousness, which had been prominent in his millenarian works, in a distinctly utopian vision. Winstanley explains to Cromwell that he has decided ‘to present this Platform of Commonwealths Government unto you, wherein I have declared a full Commonwealths Freedome, according to the Rule of Righteousness, which is Gods Word.’ Freedom within Winstanley’s commonwealth is no less dependent on the ‘Rule of Righteousness’ than it was in the millenarianism of The New Law of Righteousnes (1649). J. C. Davis argues that Winstanley transitions in his conception of ideal society: ‘His early works had been afire with millenarian expectation, his social attitudes illuminated by the optimism of the perfect moral commonwealth theorist. In his last work he was a utopian.’ Michael Rogers argues against Davis and suggests that ‘Winstanley did not make the radical aboutface’, but instead his ‘thought on crime and punishment reflects both the popular,

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321 Gerrard Winstanley, The Law of Freedom in a Platform, in CWGW ii. 287; further references will be made to book and page numbers of this edition parenthetically in the running text.

324 Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, p. 171, see generally 170-203.
radical tradition of law reform in the revolutionary era and realistic lessons in common
cultivation and state power learned in the Digger colonies.\footnote{Michael Rogers, ‘Gerrard Winstanley on Crime and Punishment’, in Sixteenth Century Journal, 27/3 (1996), pp. 735-7, 747.} As this study has argued, Davis’s uncompromising distinction between millenarianism and utopianism does not reflect the cross-fertilisation of ideas between these two forms of ideal society in seventeenth-century England. The previous chapter suggested that the ‘Law of Righteousness’ was central to Winstanley’s millenarian vision, as an immanent manifestation of the millennium and even Christ himself that would bring about radical communist change and establish the ‘common treasury’.\footnote{On the common treasury, see Chapter 4, pp. 108-9.} In the Law of Freedom, the Law manifests as a stringent, utopian totality. Although Winstanley no longer anticipates an immanent realisation of the millennium, he does still base the model of his utopia on the prelapsarian ideal: ‘the Law of common Preservation, Peace and Freedom, was the righteous Law that governed both Adam and his household’ (313). In contrast to a ‘Kingly Government’ (305), therefore, Winstanley explains that the ‘Commonwealths Government governs the Earth without buying and selling; and thereby becomes a man of peace, and the Restorer of ancient Peace and Freedom’ (309).

Many of the characteristic elements of Winstanley’s millenarianism survive in his utopia. The difference is that Winstanley, with his Digger enterprise having failed, now depends on state apparatus rather than divine intervention, in order to more effectively appeal to Cromwell and the Rump.

Not only does Winstanley’s form of religious liberty invite comparisons with Milton, but he positions the stringent hierarchical structure of his utopia in contrast to ‘Machivilian cheats’ (357). These ‘cheats’ resemble the factional interests that Nedham is aware of and strives to accommodate in his republican theory. In Winstanley’s history of the ‘Rise of Kingly Government’, he explains that ‘politick wit’ drew ‘people out of Common Freedom into a way of Common Bondage’, as the ‘Kingly spirit seats himself’ in the people: ‘And then he went about to establish buying and selling by Law, whereby the people had some ease for a time, but the cunning Machavilian spirit got strength thereby to settle himself King in the Earth’ (307).

Although it remains unclear whether Winstanley had more than a basic understanding of Machiavelli, he does identify self-interest with the machinations that led to the establishment of monarchy, and which signified the end of the original common treasury. Winstanley’s ‘Commonwealths Officer,’ therefore, ‘is not to step into the
place of Magistracy by policy, or violent force, as all Kings and Conquerors do; and so become oppressing Tyrants, by promoting their self-ended Interests, or Machiavilian Cheats, that they may live in plenty, and rule over their Brethren’ (315). The patriarchal hierarchy in Winstanley’s utopia is nevertheless rigid: parliament is the highest authority, under which are county senates or judges courts, under which are the powers of towns, cities, or parishes.\textsuperscript{327} To reinforce this totality, at the very foundation of the state, fathers serve as officers, the authoritarian leaders, in each private family. Within this system, the local roles in every town, city, or parish – peace-maker, overseers, soldiers, task-masters – are collectively represented in the county senate. The various county senates, moreover, are controlled by the laws of parliament, and the other components of state-wide governance: Commonwealth’s Ministry, Post-masters, and the Army (321-31). Winstanley emphasises physical work to avoid the kind of Machiavellian, interest-led political participation that Nedham favours: ‘Therefore to prevent idleness and the danger of Machivilian cheats, it is profitable for the Commonwealth, that children be trained up in Trades and some bodily imployment, as well as in learning Languages, or the Histories of former ages’ (357). Whereas Nedham decides to provide the commons with a Machiavellian education in \textit{Mercurius Politicus}, Winstanley believes that education is necessary to avoid the kind of Machiavellian factional interests that Nedham advocates.

Nedham himself opposes the Diggers in the fourth and final interest on the Levellers that he addresses in \textit{The Case}. It was necessary for Nedham, who had actively supported the Levellers in the late 1640s, to distance himself from the group in his first tract for the republic.\textsuperscript{328} In \textit{The Case}, Nedham explains that the democratic form advocated by the Levellers was damaging to a free state because ‘the multitude is so Brutish, that […] they are ever in the extreames of kindnesse or Cruelty; being void of Reason, and hurried on with an unbridled violence in all their Actions, trampling down all respects of things Sacred and Civill, to make way for that their Liberty’ (71). This kind of riotous environment is precisely the situation that Nedham’s free state sets out to avoid by permitting popular representation in successive parliaments in a way that prevents the ‘Anarchy and Confusion’ that results from Levelling. From the Levellers, Nedham turns to the Diggers, which were still active in their communes at the time:

\textsuperscript{327} On Winstanley’s perception of women, which may have contributed to this emphasis on patriarchy, see Phyllis Mack, \textit{Visionary Women: Ectastic Prophecy in Seventeenth-Century Women} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 68-74, especially 73.

\textsuperscript{328} See Smith, \textit{Literature and Revolution}, p. 183.
Lastly, from Levelling they proceed to introduce an absolute Community. [...] we see there is a new Faction started up our of ours, known by the name of Diggers; who, upon this ground, That God is our common-Father, the earth our Common-Mother, and that the Original of Propriety was mens pride and Covetousnesse, have framed a new plea for a Returne of all men ad Tuguria, that [...] we might renounce Towns and Cities, live at Rovers, and enjoy all in common (79).

Nedham opposes Winstanley’s communism in much the same way that Winstanley rejects Machiavellian philosophy, especially in its focus on self-interest. While Winstanley’s utopia is distinct from the millenarian ideal of the common treasury, it creates a structure in order to realise some form of communism, such as a rejection of property ownership. Nedham disagrees with the radical overhaul of society that the Diggers advocate. Winstanley’s absolutist utopia, with its authoritarian and patriarchal power structures, is far removed from Nedham’s interest-led republican free state. Communism and utopianism, therefore, are at odds with Nedham’s interest theory, and the republican philosophy he draws from it.

In the early post-revolutionary period, Milton and Nedham offer distinctive defences of the nascent republic that establish their form of republicanism at the time in relation to contemporary utopianism and anticipate the development of their ideas throughout the 1650s. Nedham’s interest theory, as Winstanley’s opposition to Machiavelli suggests, is not compatible with a utopian totality. His awareness of different interests, moreover, includes the popular interest of the worldling, to whom he addresses the second part of The Case. Milton’s awareness of the commons, by contrast, leads him to define the people that he defends in the first Defensio as the middle sort, the worthy and capable individuals that he prioritised in 1649. Winstanley wrote the Law of Freedom to more effectively appeal to Cromwell for reform. While it had little or no impact following its publication, and is evidently distanced from Nedham’s Machiavellianism, the religious liberty of the ‘Rule of Righteousness’ recalls Milton’s own commitment to the millennium, which remains implicit in the Defensio. The republic was a means to an eschatological end for Milton; for Nedham, the free state of the republic, which represented different interests and maintained religious toleration, was a sufficient end in itself. It is this distinction between the two pamphleteers that ultimately leads Milton to endorse utopianism more explicitly in 1659, while Nedham satirises it in 1657. Milton’s growing disillusionment with the English people continues to define how his texts and ideas differ from Nedham’s own.
Milton and Nedham’s respective apologies for the Protectorate, *Defensio Secunda* (1654) and *A True State of the Case of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (1654) further illustrate how the two pamphleteers differed in their responses to the significant changes in the English political landscape in the 1650s. The Nominated Assembly, nicknamed the ‘Assembly of Saints’ because of its large Fifth Monarchist representation, suffered from significant in-fighting, particularly on the subject of tithes, during its brief sitting between July and December 1653. Along with a group of frustrated MPs, Cromwell engineered its dissolution on 8 December, after which the Instrument of Government was drafted on 16 December that gave executive power to Cromwell as Lord Protector.329 Where Nedham denounces the actions of the Nominated Assembly and Fifth Monarchism, Milton focuses on the Protectorate itself, particularly the figure of Cromwell. This was partly because *Defensio Secunda*, published on 30 May, was a response to *Regii Sanguinis Clamor Ad Coelum* (1652) by Peter du Moulin (1601-84), who criticises Cromwell in the tract. It was also, however, because Milton identified in Cromwell the idealised qualities of self-control that he had called for in 1649, and which belonged exclusively to the *sanior pars*.

There has been disagreement between critics about the extent to which Milton supported the Protectorate.330 ‘Milton’s approval of the protectorate,’ Worden asserts, ‘hesitant from the start, soon yielded to barely concealed antagonism.’331 Tobias Gregory disagrees with this view, arguing that while Milton’s support of the Protectorate in 1654 differs from his opposition to single-person rule in *The Readie and Easie Way* (1659), this is likely because the single person on the horizon in 1659 was Charles II. In ideological terms, Gregory explains how Milton would have valued Cromwell’s policy of religious tolerance: ‘In both domestic and foreign policy, Cromwell aimed at the pan-Protestant unity that Milton urges from *Areopagitica*.

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forward, whereby differing sorts of Protestants should set aside their “neighbouring differences” and join to advance the incomplete work of the Reformation.

While Nedham also supported Cromwell’s policy of toleration, his focus in *A True State* is in defending Cromwell’s actions in dissolving the Nominated Assembly. As McDowell suggests, he shows that it was ‘as an essential and urgent action to preserve civil liberty and national security.’ Milton’s lack of explicit opposition to the Fifth Monarchists, therefore, invites a comparison between the Fifth Monarchist millenarian vision of a godly elect leading society with totalising control and Milton’s own views on the social elite that would safeguard societal progress towards the millennium. While the previous chapter showed how Milton’s elitism distinguishes him from the inclusive tolerationist philosophy of Mary Cary, stronger comparisons can be made with the Fifth Monarchism that emerged from 1653.

The difference between Milton and Nedham’s commentary on the Nominated Assembly could not be starker. Milton’s criticism is brief and to the point:

> Another Parliament was convened anew, and the suffrage granted only to those who deserved it. The elected members came together. They did nothing. When they in turn had at length exhausted themselves with disputes and quarrels, most of them considering themselves inadequate and unfit for executing such great tasks, they of their own accord dissolved the Parliament.

This serves more as an account of rather than a commentary on the Barebones Parliament. Milton observes the inaction and in-fighting of the assembly, but any criticism is implicit. In his *A True State*, by contrast, Nedham is extensively critical of not only the Nominated Assembly, but also specifically of the Fifth Monarchist faction within it. Having identified the dangers of religious intolerance and maintaining his strong belief in successive governance, Nedham writes of how the Nominated Assembly ‘took upon them ordinarily to administer Law and Justice, according to their own wills, and endeavoured to perpetuate the Office of Administration in their own hands, against the will of the People’.

Characteristic of the editor of *Politicus*, Nedham is averse to any form of government that removes power from the people. This

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334 Milton, *Defensio Secunda*, in *CPW* iv/1. 671; further references will be made parenthetically in the running text to this edition.

335 Marchamont Nedham, *A True State of the Case of the Commonwealth of England*, p. 17; on religious intolerance, see 14-15; further references will be made parenthetically in the running text.
leads him to target the Fifth Monarchist representation in the Assembly, employing interest theory to warn against ‘how the common Interest of this Nation would have been swallowed up by a particular Faction’ that ‘would have utterly confounded the whole course of Natural and Civil Right, which is the only Basis or foundation of Government in this world’ (18). As we have seen, Nedham was averse to factions that eclipsed the common interest of the republican state, particularly given that Nedham’s vision for the republic was in support of popular interests.

Nedham’s significant opposition to the actions of the Fifth Monarchists suggests why he would have supported a regime that protected religious liberty. Raymond argues that Nedham’s ‘writings contain the clearest exposition of the opposition between Fifth Monarchists and the principles of Government.’ He explains that Nedham, who had attended Fifth Monarchist meetings in secret, had written to Cromwell in mid-November 1653 with the recommendation that he fix ‘the Nations Interest & your own, upon some solid fundamentals [sic], in reference to the State both of Religion & Politie.’³³⁶ The request was, in many respects, fulfilled by the Instrument of Government.³³⁷ In December, Nedham attended another meeting in which he reported suggestions that the ‘little horn’ was not Charles II, but he that ‘is to make war with the saints, that is, to set himself against them, and prevail in his design’; by February 1654, Nedham was making the observation to Cromwell that such a meeting ‘diminishes your reputation among foreigners, who expect changes, because they are proclaimed from the pulpit, and great things are made of it, though it is but a confluence of silly wretches.’³³⁸ In A True State, Nedham condemns the assertion ‘That godly persons, though of small understanding, and little ability of mind in publick Affairs, are more fit for Government than men of great knowledg and wisdom’ (25). In his most explicit commentary on millenarianism, Nedham opposes the view of godly power taking precedence over civil authority on earth, arguing that Christ himself declared that ‘his Kingdom is not of this world’. As Nedham’s advice to Cromwell suggests, his anti-millenarian attitude is inspired by a fear of religious intolerance and theocratic governance:

Nor must it be forgotten here, what a Rock such men are ready to rush upon, who shall endeavour to twist the Spiritual and Civil Interest both in one, and so make the Church and State of the same extention, as they do who hold that none ought to be in Authority but Saints by calling: for, in this there is a recurring to the very Papall and Prelatick principle (27).

Like Milton, Nedham advocates keeping the ‘Spiritual and Civil Interest’ separated; he values the liberty of conscience that this secures. Unlike Milton, however, Nedham articulates a strong and extended argument against the Fifth Monarchists. His defence of the Protectorate, therefore, becomes a defence of religious and civil liberty against millenarian extremism, as he believes that the Protectorate ‘might hereafter barr up the way against those manifold inconveniences, which we have felt under other fleeting Forms’ (27).

The Fifth Monarchism that emerged in 1653, although lacking a coherent ideology, manifested a significant and influential form of utopian millenarianism. Rather than patiently awaiting the second coming, the saints believed that they had to lay the foundations for the fifth monarchy by forming a government managed by the elect: ‘Until Christ arrived,’ B. S. Capp explains, ‘the government was to be by the small minority who formed the elect, organized into a church-parliament based on the Jewish sanhedrin.’

Fifth Monarchist representation in the Nominated Assembly signifies how close the saints were to power. On 1 August 1653, when the Fifth Monarchists constituted part of the Nominated Assembly, William Aspinwall (1605-62) published *A Brief Description of the Fifth Monarchy*, which effectively resembled a manifesto for the sect. As Aspinwall explains, the saints shall form ‘the suprem Council of the State or Nation’, from which they are ‘to study how they may enlarge the Kingdom of Christ, and demolish the Kingdom of Antichrist’. The saints will choose ‘faithful and choice men’ to model every city in accordance with Christ’s perfect laws. Aspinwall explains the manner in which these men will be chosen:

Now all subordinate Officers, whether Judges, Clerks, &c. Collectors of Customs, &c. Treasurers, &c. are places of trust, and comprehended under that name of Exactors, and unto these the wisdome of God saw it needfull to add *Visitors, or Overseers*, not only to have inspection into their actions, but to controul or restrain them, and if cause require, to acquaint the suprem authority or Council, whose office it is to call them to account, & censure them according to their.

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merit, placing faithfull men in their steads, & so preserve the Civil Government sound and upright.  

This stringent political system, inspired by the ideal of Christ’s millennial reign, is a valuable example of utopian millenarianism. Even Mary Cary, who’s early Fifth Monarchist works, as we have seen, were inclusive, encodes this more characteristically elitist attitude in her Twelve Humble Proposals (1653). Directly addressing the Nominated Assembly, Cary suggests that parliament should implement a decentralised political system with ‘Commissioners in every County’. These should be managed by the ‘choicest men in each County for holiness of life, and freedom from covetousnesse, and for wisdom, prudence and understanding’. This meritocratic attitude, however, belies a more elitist side when, in discussing the various roles in Fifth Monarchist society, she acknowledges that ‘some men of mean parts, may be fit onely for mean imployments; whereas other imployments require men of better parts’. As Cary died in 1653, we do not know what she thought of the premature dissolution of the Nominated Assembly or of the growing Fifth Monarchist militarism in the late 1650s. What Twelve Humble Proposals nevertheless suggests was that she did begin to espouse the utopian millenarianism of her Fifth Monarchist contemporaries.

Before the dissolution of the Nominated Assembly, some Fifth Monarchists idealised Cromwell in a similar manner to Milton in Defensio Secunda, and in a way that reflects their utopianism. In April 1653, John Rogers (1627-c.1665) endorses Cromwell to ‘choose the men that must governe this Commonwealth (being that it is the judgement of many faithful discerning Ministers, and others, that you are called thereunto of God.).’ ‘So Moses’, Rogers reminds his reader, ‘did choose able men to be Rulers’. In the following month, John Spittlehouse (1612-57), in A Warning-Piece Discharged (1653), similarly envisions Cromwell as a second Moses: ‘under God we are the most ingaged to the present General of all the men in the Nation, because the Lord hath every way fitted him with the strength, courage and valor of the aforesaid Moses’. The Newcastle Fifth Monarchists were equally supportive of this form of governance. These saints rejoice at the news that ‘such eminent, holy, and faithful men’ have been appointed in the Council of State, who, along with Cromwell, they regard as

340 William Aspinwall, A Brief Description of the Fifth Monarchy, OR KINGDOME, That shortly is to come into the World (1653), pp. 4, 6.
341 See Mary Cary, Twelve Humble Proposals To the Supreme Governours of the three Nations now assembled at Westminster (1653), pp. 10-12.
342 John Rogers, To His Excellency the Lord Generall Cromwell (1653) (single sheet).
most worthy ‘to make choice of the holiest and best affected men to rule us out of all Counties’. Their utopian reasoning is, moreover, evident: ‘And truely we may see herein the wonderfull and secret working of God, that as the Parliament did new model the Army before there was any good issue of the War; so the Army must new model a Parliament, before there be any good issue of the Peace.’\textsuperscript{343} The concept of ‘new modelling’ parliament in accordance with Fifth Monarchist values is consistent with Aspinwall’s suggestions for purges and reform. Fifth Monarchist elitism, therefore, complements their utopian millenarianism just as it invariably attends that of Milton.

Milton’s panegyric to Cromwell in \textit{Defensio Secunda} suggests an alignment with Fifth Monarchist ideas and, in turn, distance from Nedham. Togashi has provided valuable context for the praise of Cromwell by millenarian ministers from the early 1650s.\textsuperscript{344} Similarly, the immediate millenarian context of the Fifth Monarchists, particularly given their involvement in the Nominated Assembly that preceded the Protectorate, can illuminate an interpretation of \textit{Defensio Secunda}. At the beginning of the peroration of \textit{Defensio Secunda}, Milton’s praise of Cromwell is announced with exclamation: ‘Cromwell, we are deserted! You alone remain. […] there is nothing in human society more pleasing to God, or more agreeable to reason, nothing in the state more just, nothing more expedient, than the rule of the man most fit to rule. All know you to be that man, Cromwell!’ (iv/2. 671-2). Milton’s praise of Cromwell the man is commensurate with his support for the single rule of the Protectorate. He expresses his gratitude that Cromwell decided to ‘come down so many degrees from the heights and be forced into a definite rank, so to speak, for the public good’ (672). Cromwell’s role as Lord Protector is the paragon of a private individual contributing to the public good, which Milton had ardently defended since 1644. In Milton’s eyes, Cromwell represented an ideal member of the \textit{sanior pars}, who possessed the necessary qualities of self-control that, as he suggests in the \textit{Tenure}, distinguished the better part of the people from those ‘govern’d to the inward vitious rule’:

\begin{quote}
he was a soldier well-versed in self-knowledge, and whatever enemy lay within – vain hopes, fears, desires – he had either previously destroyed within himself or had long since reduced to
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{343} \textit{A Perfect Diurnall}, 16-23 May, pp. 2718-19.

subjection. Commander first over himself, victor over himself, he had learned to achieve over himself the most effective triumph (iv/2. 667-8).345

Milton seems to be aware of the personal crisis that Cromwell experienced in 1628 that, as John Morrill explains, led to the ‘religious conversion which henceforth dominated his life.’346 Milton reminds his readers later in the peroration that they need to resist and expel internal tyrants of ‘avarice, ambition, and luxury’ (680). Given Milton’s increasingly entrenched disillusionment with the people, there is good reason for his belief in an individual like Cromwell, who not only exuded many of the personal qualities that Milton idealised, but whose office supported the policy of toleration that he advocated.

Milton’s peroration is as much exhortation as it is panegyric. The imperative tone that Milton employs to make requests of Cromwell illustrates his continued self-identification as a defender of the English people. Milton begins by reminding Cromwell to ‘Consider again and again how precious a thing is this liberty which you hold’, and that if ‘the republic should miscarry, so to speak, and as quickly vanish, surely no greater shame and disgrace could befall this country’ (671). To avoid such a fate, Milton suggests that Cromwell should populate his counsels with ‘men who are eminently modest, upright, and brave, men who […] have learned finally that liberty is to be cherished’. ‘These men,’ Milton explains, ‘come not from the off-scourings of the mob or of foreign countries. They are no random throng, but most of them citizens of the better stamp, of birth either noble or at least not dishonorable, of ample or moderate means’ (674). Having explicitly praised the regicides that he deems worthy of counsel, Milton makes a substantial request for church freedom:

Next, I would have you leave the church to the church and shrewdly relieve yourself and the government of half your burden (one that is at the same time completely alien to you), and not permit two powers, utterly diverse, the civil and the ecclesiastical, to make harlots of each other and while appearing to strengthen, by their mingled and spurious riches, actual to undermine and at length destroy each other.

The passage echoes Milton’s sonnet to Cromwell of 1652, in which he calls on Cromwell to ‘Help us to save free Conscience from the paw / Of hireling wolves whose

345 See The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, CWJM vi. 151; cf. Togashi, ‘Contextualizing Milton’s Second Defence’, pp. 218-25; this praise anticipates the inner utopia that will be discussed in Chapter 8, pp. 301-12.
gospel is their maw’ (*CWJM* iii. 288). 347 As with Nedham, Milton clearly saw in the Protectorate a means to maintain the religious toleration that he had enjoyed since 1649. Unlike Nedham, Milton articulated this support for Cromwell in explicitly elitist and anti-populist terms.

In accordance with *Areopagitica*, Milton’s defence of liberty of conscience in *Defensio Secunda* depends on freedom of the press. Milton requests that Cromwell ‘permit those who wish to engage in free inquiry to publish their findings at their own peril without the private inspection of any petty magistrate’. This means that ‘so will truth especially flourish’ and the ‘censure, the envy, the narrow-mindedness, or the superstition of the half-educated’ will be prevented. It is from this that Milton encourages Cromwell himself to ‘listen to truth or falsehood’ instead of ‘those who do not believe themselves free unless they deny freedom to others, and who do nothing with greater enthusiasm or vigor than cast into chains, not just the bodies, but also the consciences of their brothers, and impose on the state and the church the worst of all tyrannies, that of their own base customs or opinions’ (679). Where in *Areopagitica*, in an address to the Long Parliament, Milton had promoted freedom from pre-publication licensing as a means of maintaining liberty of conscience, in *Defensio Secunda*, he is able to shift from this familiar defence to a direct address to the Lord Protector himself. In a reverse of the context of *Areopagitica*, Milton addresses an idealised leader who he believes is capable of choosing truth over falsehood. As such, Cromwell does not require ‘brothers’, like the Presbyterian brethren, to impose a state church on England. The panegyric to Cromwell and the exhortation illustrate how Milton’s elitism and millenarianism are connected. Fifth Monarchists like Spittlehouse idealised Cromwell as a means to their millenarian ends, just as Milton does in *Defensio Secunda*. As Milton turned away from the people, so he invested his eschatological faith in an idealised individual like Cromwell. The self-control that Milton discerns in Cromwell, which he identifies as a characteristic of a free man, anticipates the inner utopia that Milton will idealise in the figure of the Son in *Paradise Regained* (1671). In *Defensio Secunda*, Milton makes a request to the people to emulate the qualities of the Protector. While the Protectorate may not permit the kind of popular participation that Nedham advocates, it protects the religious liberty that Milton had defended since 1644.

Milton and Nedham produced substantially different apologies of the Protectorate in 1654 that illustrate how both pamphleteers continued to diverge

347 See Woodward, *Perceptions of a Monarchy*, pp. 82-5.
ideologically in the 1650s. Nedham’s strong opposition to the Fifth Monarchists defines *A True State*. His fear of a Fifth Monarchist government that would limit religious liberty seems to have encouraged his support of the Protectorate in 1654. Indeed, in *The Observator*, published between October and November 1654, Nedham offered a scathing critique of the ‘Paperworm, by name Spittlehouse, you may call him Spit-fire, or Squib-crack’, who had recently published *An Answer to one part of the Lord Protectors Speech, or a Vindication of the Fifth Monarchy-men*. Nedham warns that their ‘Carnall divisions and Contentions’, if they manage to ‘quell an Authority’, will throw ‘Themselves and their Monarchy into Anarchy, and the Commonwealth into Blood and Confusion.’

Where Nedham fears a sectarian overthrow of government in England, Milton offers no such explicit opposition to the Fifth Monarchists. By 1659, in *The Readie and Easie Way*, Milton would criticise the ‘Ambitious leaders of armies’ and ‘thir own tyrannical designs’, which, once overcome, would mean ‘no more pretending to a fifth monarhie of the saints; but much peace and tranquilitie would follow’. As Stella Revard observes, Milton removed this from the second edition of the tract in 1660. ‘To criticise the actions of the Fifth Monarchists,’ Revard argues, ‘is not the same as dismissing their millenarian views.’ In the second edition, Milton replaces his criticism of the Fifth Monarchists with familiar criticism of Presbyterianism and episcopacy, both of which Milton suggests the restored monarchy – with the Restoration now imminent and inevitable – may reintroduce. While Milton, as the previous chapter has shown, was no sectarian radical, his ideas nonetheless exhibit a relationship between elitism, millenarianism and utopianism that align with the emergent – if not at times divergent – eschatology of the Fifth Monarchists. By lauding Cromwell as an epitome of self-control, Milton shows how his faith in the individuals capable of bringing about the millennium grew ever narrower during the 1650s. In 1654, then, the distance between *A True Case* and *Defensio Secunda* mirrors that of the first *Defensio* and *The Case*: Nedham’s opposition to factionalism and belief in toleration leads him to support the Protectorate, even though it does not permit the popular participation he advocates; Milton, by contrast, having defended the *sanior pars*, can more naturally invest his hopes in an idealised individual, like Cromwell. The key difference that leads Milton to articulate a more comprehensive utopian vision in

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348 See Nedham, *The Observator*, 24-31 October 1654, pp. 4-7, cf. 31 October-7 November 1654, pp. 9-10.
1659 and Nedham to satirise the genre in 1657 is millenarianism. As the Fifth Monarchists show, the perfection of the millennium serves as a representation of potential perfection on earth. Where Nedham lacks this belief and instead endorses a Machiavellian republic as an ideal to which the emergent English republic should aspire, Milton views English republicanism as a steppingstone to chiliastic perfection.

A UTOPIAN SATIRE

Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’, published as editorials in *Mercurius Politicus* between March and April 1657, are a significant commentary on – if not parody of – contemporary utopianism. J. G. A. Pocock suggests that Nedham ‘feared identification with the Good Old Cause and with Harrington’ following the publication of The Excellencie in 1656, which led him to produce the letters that led ‘unswervingly back to Nedham’s old Hobbesian contention that we should submit to de facto authority even when its form is monarchical.’\(^{351}\) Cox argues that Nedham aligned himself with Cromwell’s pragmatic decision to inaugurate the Protectorate: the letters, Cox suggests, represent an opposition to the idealism of utopianism and general political modelling that necessitate his support for the Protectorate, just as, in 1653, the Protectorate was ‘the only option given the conflict between factions and their competing constitutional models.’ ‘Nedham’s rejection of utopias’, Cox asserts, ‘is the corollary to his rejection of political modelling in times of acute political crisis and at moments when the commonwealth is under threat.’\(^{352}\) Taking the form of satirical and fictional letters, Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’ are able to serve as a commentary on contemporary events while remaining equivocal enough that any political criticism is implicit. Irony is particularly prominent in Nedham’s satire: the letters simultaneously praise political changes in Utopia resembling the recent history of the Protectorate and convey a farcical craniotomy to remove seriousness from the populace. Nedham’s *joco-serio* style seems most unambiguously critical in its parody of Harrington and Hobbes in the final letter. Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’ encode the reservations about utopianism he


\(^{352}\) Cox, ‘Constitutional Design in the Interregnum’, pp. 190-6; Worden also argues for Nedham using the letters to support the Protectorate in Worden, *Literature and Politics*, p. 317.
had exhibited in 1654. They also, given the potential for Cromwell to take the crown himself at the time, permit a critical interpretation of the Protectorate.

The threat of utopianism infiltrating the political establishment was tangible: Harrington’s *The Commonwealth of Oceana* was published only the year before. Nedham had supported the Protectorate in 1654 for offsetting the influence, if not political domination, of the Fifth Monarchists; his ‘letters of Utopia’, while more ambiguous than *A True State*, suggest Nedham’s continued support of the Protectorate is equally dependent on Cromwell’s resistance to the new utopian interest. Nedham, the classical republican and Machiavellian populist, is quick to assert that any political form – even the Protectorate – should only remain while it is necessary. In the letters, his *joco-serio* style, as Raymond acknowledges, ‘reached its apogee, and he most closely welded serious political criticism with a dry, comic style.’ As Nedham reports in *Mercurius Politicus*, on 31 March 1657, Cromwell was presented with the Humble Petition and Advice, which had been debated in parliament throughout February and March, and which served ‘to commend the Title and office of a King, in this Nation’ to Cromwell. While Cromwell ultimately turned down this offer, the threat of the Protectorate potentially becoming a monarchy would have been at the forefront of Nedham’s mind as he wrote the letters. Through the fictional form of the ‘letters from Utopia’, Nedham is able to simultaneously comment on contemporary events, assert his opposition to utopianism, and more easily maintain his distance from any suggestions of subversive political commentary in the editorials.

In Nedham’s introductory first letter from Utopia, his correspondent identifies the editorials themselves and the ideal society that they represent as founded on a *joco-serio* style. Following ‘so lamentable a Fate befaling our Founder’, Thomas More, who, ‘by being but once in his daies in earnest’, was beheaded in 1535, the Utopians, the correspondent explains, resolved ‘*To live in Jest, and never to be in Earnest, except it be in order to die.*’ This coincides with the correspondent’s explanation ‘that whatever I write is no further in earnest than you please to make it so’. The ‘News’ that the correspondent provides to Nedham is that

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355 Nedham, *Politicus*, 5th-12th March 1657, p. 7642; further references will be made parenthetically in the running text; the letters are also printed in *Making the News*, pp. 369-79.
This renowned City and Commonwealth of Utopia hath been sorely afflicted with an infectious Itch of scribbling political discourses, caused by a Salt humour first bottel’d in the Braine pan, and then breaking out at the fingers ends. The world hath run a madding here in disputes about Government, that is to say about Notions, Forms, and Shadows, and the grand Pols of the Town […] have so often (like Lucians philosophers) ended their Conventions in a Quarrel […] (7643).

The Utopian problem reported resembles the kind of factional squabbling with which Nedham characterised the poor organisation of the Fifth Monarchists, and which he believed a popular free state would prevent. In an extreme and absurd state intervention, the Utopian magistrate

gave order to put the whole society of Pols into the Hospital of the Incurabili, to have their Sculls opened and searched with a long Sword, and so served up the green-sauce, as a fit punishment for presuming to break the Fundamentall Law of Utopia, by daring to be in earnest, and appear in print so profound and serious Projectors (7643).

This radical and ridiculous political move epitomises the subversive nature of these editorials: Nedham parodies not only the fiction commonplace in utopian tracts, but also the stringent penal system that defines the Morean style of utopianism that this study has traced in the mid-seventeenth-century. Nedham invests himself in this comical utopian vision by rendering the ‘Fundamentall Law’ of this Utopia ‘To live in Jest, and never to be in Earnest, except it be in order to die.’

The subsequent letters read like a fictional representation of the events of the 1650s, but in a way that invites comparisons with contemporary utopianism. In the third letter, dated 19-26 March, the correspondent explains how ‘wee Utopians had hitherto been mistaken touching the notion of Liberty’, as, possibly in further opposition to the Levellers – John Lilburne having been released on parole from his imprisonment in Dover Castle in 1656 – ‘the High Shoon, the Leveller, and the Enthusiast, thought it lay in having no land-Lord no Law, no Religion, save his own Phantsie’. ‘Thus while they sate still,’ the correspondent explains,

and the People ran out into endless Factions, still further and further from a Settlement, there was in conclusion no visible means left, to keep the old Race of Kings from over-running our Estates and Liberties, had not the most excellent Basilides, that Renowned Prince, resolved to encounter all the Monsters of Scandal, Prejudice, Ignorance and Faction at home, and the Common Enemy abroad (7674-5).
Much like Cromwell’s Protectorate warded off the danger of factionalism in the form of Fifth Monarchists, Basilides steps in to take over from the Senate. As the correspondent reports in the second letter, Basilides had recently given the ‘order for the Assembling of the Senate this week’, which resembles Cromwell’s own Protectorate parliaments. Although Nedham, as this chapter has acknowledged, supported Cromwell in 1654, by styling the Cromwellian figure as a Prince, he implicitly anticipates the offer of kingship that Cromwell would receive just five days after the publication of the letter. Nedham uses a parody of the utopian mode to ambiguously comment on the Protectorate. In this letter, Nedham could as much be praising as criticising Cromwell.

There is a similar ambiguity in the first resolve that is passed by the Utopian Senate, which is reported in the 26 March-2 April letter. As the correspondent describes,

*That in the Electing of Members to serve for the respective Provinces and Boroughs in the Senate of Utopia, the People do, together with the Interests and Trusts reposed in those Members, resign up to them all their Wit, Wisdome, and Understanding; so that the Wisdome of the Senate, is the Wisdome of the whole people, and contrary Opinion (whatever the pretence be) is adjudged Faction (7690).*

Similar to the Cromwellian figure of Basilides, this resolve is equivocal: the representation of popular interests was central to Nedham’s political philosophy from *The Case* forward, but the intolerant attitude towards ‘contrary Opinion’ appears more in keeping with the totality that often defined contemporary utopias. It is possible that Nedham is referring here to a faction like that of the Fifth Monarchists, but as we will see in Nedham’s ‘letter from Oceana’, he may also be passing comment on such a strict, regulated state. ‘That where a Civill Power is to be setled,’ the correspondent suggests, ‘we cannot all be Princes.’ While Nedham may genuinely believe that interests, like those of the Fifth Monarchists, need to be suppressed, he had only the year before published *The Excellencie*, collating his Machiavellian editorials of 1651-2, in which he characteristically espoused interest theory. It is in a political system of popular participation that the ambitions of common ‘Princes’, who act in their own self-interest, can be realised, and factionalism thereby prevented. Nedham had argued that the alternative, a state that does not accommodate popular interest, would, as Machiavelli suggests, lead to popular disaffection and revolution. This ambiguity is representative of the letters as a whole: Nedham permits both interpretations of support and criticism of the Protectorate. As the correspondent emphasises, the Utopians came to understand
‘That all Forms of Government are but temporary Expedients, to be taken upon Tryal, as necessity and right Reason of State enjoyns in order to the publike safety’ (7692).

The quasi-Protectorate role of Basilides in the letters, which is establishing ‘the Form of the Three Estates’ that was promised by the Humble Petition and Advice, only exists out of necessity. Nedham may be encouraging the people of England to be as understanding as the Utopians are in his letters; he also may be reminding Cromwell not to fall into the intolerant system exemplified by utopianism, especially if he were to accept the crown.

After Cromwell rejected the crown on 31 March, Nedham in the letters focuses on the stringent nature of contemporary utopianism, and its potential threat to contemporary society. Nedham’s criticism of utopianism is directed at Harrington and, to a lesser extent, Hobbes. In the first letter, following the ‘Operation’ of satirical craniotomy, Nedham’s correspondent reports that ‘here landed a jolly Crew of the Inhabitants of the Island of Oceana, in company of the learned Author himself, they having been sent hither with him, by order of the most Renowned Prince Archon’, alongside ‘Mr Hobbs’ and, emblematic of Nedham’s ‘joco-serio’ style, ‘that wondrous wise Republican called Mercurius Politicus’. Whereas Nedham would have little need of the operation to remove seriousness, Hobbes and Harrington appear to have arrived having heard of the event, ‘it being a Cure that this Country is famous for’. In the final letter, from Oceana this time, dated 2-9 April, Nedham offers a pastiche of Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana. Recalling the meticulous list of orders that Harrington included in Oceana, the correspondent refers to ‘the Agrarian-Wits of the five and fiftieth order’, after which Nedham seems to deliberately obfuscate the list of political roles in Harrington’s commonwealth, with one figure, the ‘Non-sincer’ – appropriately sounding like ‘nonsense’ and ‘not sincere’ – comically serving only ‘to provide Boxes of all Colours of the Rainbow’ (7706) for the ballot. In this letter, Nedham’s joco-serio style spars with the stringent system of the equal agrarian that Harrington idealises in Oceana, which Davis describes as ‘a self-contained system capable of harnessing men’s natural behaviour into a harmonious social whole.’

While Harrington’s utopian republicanism – and, as the following chapter will show, millenarianism – was not as dangerous a faction as Fifth Monarchism, in 1657 it was gathering support. By dedicating a whole letter to Harrington’s Oceana, Nedham appears to view the stringent utopianism of Harrington’s Oceana as an undesirable – perhaps even a threatening –

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356 Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, p. 238, see generally pp. 206-40.
alternative to the Cromwellian Protectorate. Given that this letter was published after Cromwell had rejected the crown, Nedham may have found renewed energy and reason to satirise opposing factions to the Protectorate, rather than the Protectorate itself.

The correspondent goes on to criticise Harrington and Hobbes as a kind of organised utopian faction. Harrington, the correspondent explains, has agreed to settle Henry Ferne (1602-62), the bishop of Chester, whose letters in opposition to Oceana were published by Harrington in Pian Piano (1656), in a ‘fat Bishopprick, if he please but to wright against him.’ Nedham seems to be suggesting that Harrington engineered the correspondence that was published in Pian Piano, a conclusion he may have drawn because Harrington’s sister sent Ferne a copy of Oceana and requested his commentary. In Nedham’s Oceana, Ferne is financially rewarded for his criticism of Harrington. With regard to Harrington, the correspondent explains that ‘I have done with him, and all the Builders of Castles in the aire’, but

I desire the Wits to beware of him and his Antagonist; for those Worms in their Brains, which were at first but as Mogats, are improved to such a magnitude, by feeding upon Politick Notions, that their Sculls being opened with a Goose-quill of their own, the one was delivered of that Monster Leviathan, and the other lately voided at least a Conger (7706).

The operation that Harrington and Ferne undergo illustrates how Nedham perceives Harrington’s utopianism as becoming more organised in 1657. The vermian imagery in the passage represents Hobbes’s influence over Harrington.357 Where Harrington is ‘delivered of that Monster Leviathan’, Ferne is ‘voided’ of a conger, a type of eel. The reference to ‘feeding upon Politick Notions’, moreover, which appears to have increased the ‘magnitude’ of Harrington’s ideas, recalls the ‘green-sauce’ that was ‘served up’ in the comparable cranial operation described in the first letter from Utopia (7634).358 The operations are invasive and feminising in the verb ‘delivered’. They end the cycle of utopian influence – of one writer ‘feeding’ on another – that is representative of an organised faction. Harrington has consumed Hobbes’s ideas such that Harrington effectively gives birth to a leviathan in a process that expunges the seriousness of his work. Whereas Nedham had used Hobbes’s writings in The Case, in 1657, he associates Hobbes with his criticism of Harringtonian utopianism. To complete

357 According to the OED, the word ‘vermis’ would be associated with the brain in the nineteenth-century.
358 The OED defines ‘green sauce’ as ‘A sauce of a green colour made from herbs’; see also Henry Buttes, Dyets Dry Dinner (1599) sig. P2, ‘Greene Sauce. Made of sweete hearbes, as Betony, Mint, Basill […] Eaten with flesh […] exciteth appetite.’
this paradoxical image, Ferne himself had commented on the influence of *Leviathan* on *Oceana* in the correspondence that Harrington published in *Pian Piano*. If in Nedham’s satirical vision of Oceana, Ferne is working for Harrington, then he equally needs to be delivered of utopian seriousness. Nedham’s utopian satire, which becomes more focused in this final letter, is partly inspired by an awareness of the potential dangers of a Harringtonian faction. The utopian, stringent political systems that Harrington and Hobbes envision in *Oceana* and *Leviathan* are precisely the kind of societies that Nedham warns against in the letters.

The ‘letters from Utopia’ represent a form of utopian satire that further distinguishes Nedham from Milton. As the following chapter will show, Milton, while he opposes Harrington in his prose tracts of 1658-9, nevertheless exhibits the kind of utopianism and millenarianism apparent in Harrington’s utopian and political writings and Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’, while intentionally ambiguous, offer a rejection of utopianism that the pamphleteer specifically locates in Oceana in the final editorial. While his parody of the fictional artifice of utopias does suggest a rejection of idealism, he also opposes the idea of the utopian totality, as represented by Oceana in the last letter. His support of Cromwell and the Protectorate, then, is equivocal: Basilides, while a prince, gives substantial political powers to the Senate; the Senate, however, imposes a stricter mode of governance than Nedham’s Machiavellian populism, which he had reasserted the previous year, would permit. Nedham’s pastiche of utopianism, which takes an explicitly critical tone in the ‘letter from Oceana’, suggests that, as in 1654, he would support Cromwell so long as the Protectorate could resist the onset of factionalism. Indeed, after Cromwell’s rejection of the crown on 31 March, Nedham had renewed reason to directly satirise Harrington in the ‘letter from Oceana’ editorial, dated 2-9 April. Where Milton would use the breakdown of the Protectorate to issue his own vision for ideal society on a utopian and millenarian basis, Nedham, who had opposed the millenarian faction of the Fifth Monarchists, was equally resistant to the influence of utopianism on the fragile English commonwealth.

CONCLUSION

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Nedham’s Machiavellian republicanism represents a significant counterpoint to Milton’s elitist, millenarian, and increasingly utopian thinking during the Interregnum. Where Nedham’s belief in interest theory informs the populist republican ideology that he develops in the early-1650s, Milton’s disillusionment with the English people only encouraged him to turn to elite individuals. One of the most significant moments of divergence for Milton and Nedham was 1654: Nedham offers scathing opposition to the Fifth Monarchists as a faction that threatened the security of the republic, while Milton praises Cromwell in millenarian and elitist terms that align with similar praise from Fifth Monarchists like Spittlehouse and Rogers. Nedham’s utopian pastiche in 1657 extends his opposition to factionalism, but this time focuses on utopianism itself in the form of Harrington’s *Oceana*. Nedham’s commentary on utopianism is less explicit, but the satire itself is unmistakable; the ‘letter from Oceana’, written after Cromwell has rejected the crown, exhibits Nedham’s concerns about Harrington, and his hope that the Protectorate will resist a Harringtonian faction just as it had a Fifth Monarchist one. Nedham would maintain his *joco-serio* style in *Newes from Brussels* (1660), impersonating a member of Charles Stuart’s court in a critical commentary that marks how resistant he was to change allegiances once again. Milton, by contrast, would articulate his most explicit utopian vision in *The Readie and Easie Way*.\(^{360}\) As the following chapter will show, while Milton may have been critical of Harrington’s contemporary works, this did not prevent him from espousing similar ideas, just as his criticism of Fifth Monarchism did not prevent him from advocating utopian millenarianism. While Milton can be interpreted for his classical republicanism, he was also a millenarian. As the English people increasingly exhibited their unworthiness, so the pamphleteer decided to finally turn to a utopian form of government that could better secure his eschatological ends.

‘A Commonwealth is held immortal’: Milton, Hobbes, and Harrington

Marchamont Nedham’s depiction of James Harrington (1611-77) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in his satirical Utopia suggests a relationship between the two political theorists that illuminates Milton’s 1659-60 texts. The utopianism of Hobbes’s *Leviathan* (1651) and Harrington’s *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656) appears as the relationship between permanence of the state and obedience of its citizens within a totality that, as J. C. Davis explains, aspires to perfection. The concept of representation is central to the utopianism of *Leviathan* and *Oceana*: the utopian artifice of *Oceana* is self-evident in the model of Oceana itself; in *Leviathan*, the image of the Leviathan relates to Hobbes’s concept of representation and authorisation. While Milton lacks such an artifice in *The Readie and Easie Way* (1660), he does envision an ideal society dedicated to permanence and obedience, partly in response to Harrington’s *The Rota* (1660) and *The Ways and Means* (1660). However, Milton’s utopianism is, as this study has shown, invariably related to his millenarianism. Milton returned to advocating religious freedom with fervour following the restoration of the Rump Parliament in May 1659, publishing both *Of Civil Power* and *Considerations* in the same year. Contrary to the distinction that Davis suggests between seventeenth-century utopian and millenarian thought, the millennium, as this study has been arguing, was the perfect ideal to which utopian writers regularly aspired. The relationship between church and state in *Leviathan* and *Oceana* will indicate how the millennium was integrated with Hobbes and Harrington’s utopianism. Although all three writers exhibit their idiosyncratic visions for church and state, the millennium, and liberty, this chapter will argue that these are qualitative rather than substantive differences. The comparison with Hobbes and Harrington’s political philosophies will bring Milton’s peculiar form

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361 *The Readie and Easie Way*, in *CWJM* vi. 496.
364 Davis, *Utopia and Ideal Society*, p. 36.
of utopian millenarianism into greater relief and identify how Milton’s ideal studious society in *Areopagitica* is reasserted in his 1659-60 tracts. The chapter will be structured into three sections: the first will focus on utopianism; the second will discuss different views on liberty, and how this relates to utopianism; the final section will show how millenarianism relates to and inspires the utopianism of these writers.

Richard Tuck posits that *Leviathan* ‘may indeed be the greatest piece of utopian writing to come out of the English Revolution.’ Tuck acknowledges how Hobbes positions *Leviathan* within the history of failed commonwealths that precede it, most evidently in the final section of the text, ‘Of the Kingdom of Darkness’. In his comparison of *Leviathan* and More’s *Utopia*, Tuck observes the mutual attention to ‘the management of labour and the attack on luxury’, and the mutual aversion to other societal institutions, such as universities and the church. It is for this latter reason, in part, that ‘the most strikingly utopian feature of *Leviathan* is its account of religion’. Tuck posits that Hobbes’s theology in *Leviathan*, the most notable transition from his earlier works, was intended partly to remove any rival to the sovereign; ‘but it goes much farther than that, since Hobbes devoted a great deal of effort to the construction of a new kind of Christianity’. The purpose of this religious revision is to remove some forms of fear from the people. Just as ‘God wishes Job to learn that he is as nothing compared with the Leviathan’, so the Leviathan state, which is a ‘Mortal God’, purges some forms of fear from those who live without pride. By constituting themselves in ‘the artificial man who feels no fear’, citizens are free of it, ‘their sense of their own individual importance reduced to nothing in the face of their commonwealth.’365 The relationship between religion and utopia that Tuck has identified in Hobbes will be explored further through the intellectual framework that this study has been tracing: utopian millenarianism. While there is value in Tuck’s comparison between More, Rousseau and Hobbes, Harrington and Milton offer a more immediately illuminating comparison to the political philosopher.

Jonathan Scott shows how Hobbes and Harrington’s respective philosophies and theologies were closely related.366 In his ‘Rapture of Motion’ essay, Scott explains that both *Leviathan* and *Oceana* have the same object: stability and peace.’ In *Oceana*, this security is achieved by a lack of autonomy: ‘political participation is actually

restricted to the tedious repetition of prescribed rituals which cannot be changed. Scott’s argument correlates with Davis’s suggestion that the perfection of Harrington’s commonwealth is indicative of his utopianism. In contrast to arguments for Harrington’s meritocracy, Davis posits that the class system in Oceana is rigid, and that the equality of the state manifests within each class, and not across the entire society. Davis continues: ‘To Harrington, at least, Oceana was a self-contained system capable of harnessing men’s natural behaviour into a harmonious social whole. Its great merit was its ‘entireness’. It answered every possibility. It was a total, utopian solution. In Davis’s eyes, despite the self-defined equality of the equal agrarian, Harrington ‘took a dismal view of men’s capacities for individualism’, convinced that most men would defer to leadership. Scott takes this one step further by arguing that, as participation in Oceana manifests in a permanent systemic cycle, it marks, ‘no less than in Hobbes’s Leviathan, the abolition of the participatory basis of classical citizenship.’ Harrington’s ideal of a senate proposing and a popular assembling resolving laws, which is at the heart of Oceana and his later texts, accommodates participation from the people. Harrington’s political framework, however, exists within a system of rotation that conflicts with – or, as Scott suggests, negates – popular, autonomous participation. Unlike the theory of rotation that Nedham advocates, the utopian permanence and regulation of Harrington’s equal agrarian limits the autonomy of political participation. The equal agrarian is a system of social designation, in which economic equilibrium secures political rotation and state permanence. Scott extends this comparison between Hobbes and Harrington to include their equally materialist philosophies of motion. Scott argues that Harrington established, ‘following Hobbes, an artificial copy of the natural art of God. Nature was a universe whose planets and stars (Harrington’s “orbs” and “galaxies”) moved in perpetual circular motion. By so copying nature’s perfection Harrington believed he had harnessed for politics its very immortality.’ This chapter will develop this understanding of Harrington’s relationship to Hobbes through the utopianism and millenarianism that both writers share with Milton. The connection

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367 Scott, ‘Rapture of Motion’, pp. 149, 151.
369 Davis, Utopia and Ideal Society, p. 238.
370 On the subject of Hobbes’s materialism, see also Stephen Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, pp. 3-8, 31-9; and John Rogers, The Matter of Revolution, pp. 4-6.
between utopianism, liberty and millenarianism in Hobbes, Harrington, and Milton identifies an unexpected relationship between the three writers.

This chapter will also address the close relationship that Blair Worden identifies between Nedham and Harrington. Worden asserts that ‘there were many arguments in Oceana that had been anticipated […] by Marchamont Nedham.’ He identifies the ‘fundamental insistence of both writers on the rotation’, the dual chambers of governance and successive governance as evidence for Nedham and Harrington’s intellectual homogeneity.372 However, successive parliaments have different purposes for Nedham and Harrington: Nedham, as his educational editorials attest, advocated popular participation, for which rotation of parliaments was a means of ensuring that this ideal was maintained; Harrington, by contrast, believed in eternal rotation, which would ensure the permanence of the republic. As Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’ suggest, utopianism distinguishes Nedham from Harrington and Hobbes. Nedham did not advocate a totalising state that regulated the actions of its people; he believed in the capacity of the people to realise their republican potential. As this chapter will show, Harrington’s belief in freedom was systemic: as with Hobbes and Milton, the people are components in a wider process, which for Harrington was eternal rotation. This chapter will, therefore, argue that, in contrast to Worden’s assertion that both Nedham and Harrington ‘shroud classical aspirations to political deliverance in apocalyptic language’, the ideal of the millennium is more prominent in Oceana than Nedham’s work.373 As the previous chapter showed, Nedham is distinct from Milton because of his anti-utopian values and his lack of millenarianism. Nedham is similarly distinct from Harrington in that the latter exhibits a form of utopian millenarianism.

UTOPIANISM

The development of Harrington’s political ideals and the form in which he presents them in the 1650s illustrates the shift of utopianism itself from artifice to realistic application. The fictional element of the utopian genre, which originates in More’s Utopia and is maintained in Bacon’s New Atlantis, is traditionally in the form of a travel

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narrative.\textsuperscript{374} As Pocock suggests, Harrington’s \textit{Oceana} is more of a model than utopia; it is intended to serve as a direct mirror of 1650s England in order to encourage its realisation.\textsuperscript{375} While it appears more utopian in its form than, for instance, Winstanley’s \textit{The Law of Freedom}, as Davis suggests, the utopianism of \textit{Oceana} is more evident in the carefully constructed detail and stringently constructed form of the state. Harrington’s desire for the pragmatic application of utopian ideas, moreover, which challenges contemporary criticism of utopian idealism – such as Milton’s own in \textit{Areopagitica} – meant that Harrington parted with the fiction of \textit{Oceana} in his later works. Accordingly, the condensed form of \textit{Aphorisms Political} (1659), which is reflected in \textit{The Rota} (1659) and \textit{A System of Politics} (1661), is gnomic. Rather than removing from the extensive detail of \textit{Oceana}, this enables Harrington to communicate his complex political philosophy in a more accessible form. As Pocock acknowledges, the gnomic ‘style of writing […] marks an enormous advance in the clarity and readability of Harrington’s work’.\textsuperscript{376} Harrington’s aphorisms may lack the fictional component of the utopian genre, but, just as this study has shown some of Milton’s works to exhibit utopian ideas, so Harrington’s later tracts, in promoting an ordered commonwealth on the Oceanic model, distil Harrington’s utopianism. Harrington’s self-conceded indebtedness to Hobbes – ‘I have opposed the politics of Hobbes, to show him what he taught me’ – invites a comparison between the fictional artifice of \textit{Leviathan} and that of \textit{Oceana}; Milton’s awareness of and opposition to Harrington’s aphoristic tracts in 1659-60 similarly requires further analysis.\textsuperscript{377} The fictions of \textit{Leviathan} and \textit{Oceana} nevertheless distinguish Hobbes and Harrington from Milton. For Hobbes and Harrington, the concept of representation, which encompasses both the political and artistic, is central to the form of utopianism that this chapter will trace and discuss. Milton, writing on the eve of the Restoration, and making direct reference to Harrington’s contemporary tracts, lacks any form of utopian fiction, but, as a comparison with Hobbes and Harrington will show, he exhibits utopianism no less than these contemporaries.\textsuperscript{378} This study has shown that mid-seventeenth-century utopianism

\textsuperscript{374} For a discussion of the travel narrative in utopian texts, see Houston, \textit{Renaissance Utopia}, pp. 1-30.
\textsuperscript{376} Pocock, \textit{Political Works}, p. 101, see also 119.
\textsuperscript{377} James Harrington, \textit{The Prerogative of Popular Government}, in \textit{Political Works of James Harrington}, p. 423; see also Matthew Wren, \textit{Considerations Upon Mr Harrington’s Oceana} (1657), p. 41, to which Harrington is responding here; Scott discusses this in ‘Rapture of Motion’, pp. 154-5.
was an interpretation of the precedent established by More and Bacon. While some of the texts addressed in this thesis are not explicit utopian blueprints, they espouse essential utopian ideas. A comparison between Milton, Hobbes, and Harrington shows how the central utopian values of control and obedience existed separate from the traditional utopian form.

It is necessary first to address the concept of representation, both political and artistic, with which both Hobbes and Harrington engage. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes’s utopianism is formed from political representation, which is in turn generated by the process of authorisation. In order to avoid the natural condition of chaos, a group of people covenant with a person or assembly of people, through which they ‘Authorise all the Actions and Judgments, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men’ (*CETH* iv. 264). Noel Malcolm observes that authorisation is the most marked difference between *Leviathan* and Hobbes’s earlier texts, *Elements of Law* (1640) and *De Cive* (1642). Malcolm explains that all ‘problems are solved in *Leviathan* with the introduction of the concept of authorization.’ Through this process, citizens take ownership of the actions of the sovereign. Unlike Milton’s belief in popular resistance to tyranny in *The Tenure*, Hobbes argues that citizens cannot resist the sovereign because they own and have authorized all sovereign actions.379 While the assumption of a biddable populace is indicative of utopian idealism, the process of authorisation also accommodates the utopian values of control and regulation, as citizens must adhere to the decrees of the sovereign, of which they are themselves co-authors. As Quentin Skinner shows, Hobbes’s authorisation creates two persons: the ‘artificial’ person of the sovereign, and the person of the state.380 Hobbes himself names the person of the state: ‘This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence’ (*CETH* iv. 114). Later in the text, Hobbes addresses the etymology of ‘person’, explaining that ‘When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person: And when they are considered as

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379 See Noel Malcolm, *CETH* iii. 15-17 for an analysis of Hobbes’s use of authorisation in *Leviathan*. Malcolm argues that this is the most significant departure in the political theory of *Leviathan* from Hobbes’s previous works (15).

380 Quentin Skinner, *From Humanism to Hobbes*, p. 358. Skinner’s wider argument is useful in positioning Hobbes’s political philosophy within the context of contemporary parliamentarian arguments for ideas of the state and those of royalist absolutists.
representing the words and actions of an other, then is he a Feigned ox Artificiall person’ (iv. 244). Through popular authorisation, political representation is conveyed as the paradoxical process of a group of people subsuming into one person. Jon Parkin posits that Hobbes was intentionally paradoxical, as paradox – ‘that is, something which the reader does not understand – naturally creates wonder.’ While the process of representation in Leviathan is utopian – a means of preventing a return to natural chaos – that representation is depicted in a utopian artifice that relates to the idea of paradoxical wonder.

The paradox of Hobbesian representation is best exhibited by the initial description of the Leviathan state, which is itself depicted on the frontispiece of Leviathan. The process of authorisation is embodied in the material totality of the Leviathan in just the same way as this totality is conveyed in the embellished frontispiece. As a ‘Mortal God’, the Leviathan state necessitates wonder, and, more importantly, obedience. As we will see later in this chapter, it is a representation of the ‘Immortal God’ on Earth. The Leviathan is a representative, utopian entity that is uncompromisingly universal in its scope and power:

For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man […] and in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificiali Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall Joynts; Reward and Punishment […] are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi (the peoples safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, an artificiall Reason and Will […] Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation (ii. 16).

The frequent use of ‘art’ and ‘artificial’ signifies the importance of representation in this passage. Citizens are corporeal constituents of the Leviathan state; they are represented within the artificial and total entity. As the Leviathan is an artificial person, it ‘is the Actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR’ (ii. 244). The visual language at the beginning of the text, which reflects the image of the frontispiece itself, accords with this theatrical concept: the Leviathan performs the role of its constituent,

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authorial parts. Skinner explains in detail how Hobbes’s use of visual forms in his works was part of a humanist tradition that was intended to help readers more easily ‘see’ the ideas discussed in humanist texts. Skinner also observes that there is a striking contrast between the frontispiece of *De Cive* and that of *Leviathan*. Not only is the sovereign depicted in the latter frontispiece constituted by bodies – representative of the Leviathan state itself – but it also yields a bishop’s crozier, which replaces the scales in *De Cive*, alongside a sword that appears in both. Such a change is itself suggestive of the greater power over religion that Hobbes affords the sovereign in *Leviathan*, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Rather than just helping a reader to visualise, however, the frontispiece contributes to the paradoxical wonder of the text. The Leviathan sovereign looms over the state as the embodiment of the utopian totality. Although Hobbes does not structure *Leviathan* as a travel dialogue, or even a fictional ‘model’ like Harrington’s *Oceana*, the Leviathan itself is an artifice constructed by the process of representation that defines Hobbes’s political philosophy in *Leviathan*. The people are authors of the Leviathan artifice just as they are bound by the act of authorisation. Representation is, therefore, central to the utopianism of *Leviathan*.

Harrington’s is the most explicit utopian artifice of the writers considered in this chapter. Like *Leviathan*, *Oceana* exhibits a clear relationship between artistic representation and the utopian qualities of stability and obedience. Lacking a travel narrative, Harrington depicts in *Oceana* an ideal commonwealth that represents a clear model for his vision of a perfect England. Within this artifice, Lord Archon – Harrington’s fictional Oliver Cromwell – implements the utopian scheme in Oceana. Archon, who possesses Machiavellian individual powers that he retains in ‘The Corollary’ of the tract, helps to convey and defend the thirty orders that comprise the constitution of Harrington’s ideal commonwealth. Archon begins by debating with concerned nobles the significance of the equal agrarian - a system that structures wealth to establish an economic equilibrium in order to prevent the imbalance of property distribution and, thereby, corruption - and the ballot system, both of which are integral to Harrington’s utopian system. Archon alone, however, asserts the value of subsequent orders, without evidence of further debate. Like Milton, Harrington’s view of debates was less democratic than it might appear. Where in *Areopagitica*, the debating and

384 On the significance of debating in Harrington’s political philosophy, see Hammersley, pp. 149-50.
studious society that Milton idealises serves the purpose of uncovering a lost millenarian truth, debates in Harrington’s commonwealth are a component of the wider system of perpetual rotation. Debate in the senate of Oceana is a process of division that provides for the popular assembly that which they choose to make law: ‘Dividing and choosing, in the language of a commonwealth, is debating and resolving; and whatsoever upon debate of the senate is proposed unto the people, and resolved by them, is enacted auctoritate patrum jussu populi, by the authority of the fathers and the power of the people, which concurring make a law.’\(^{385}\) The fictional debates between the Archon and nobles in Oceana serve the purpose of illustrating the value of the equal agrarian and the ballot system by addressing potential criticisms, just as the dual assembly system – the senate to propose and the popular assembly to resolve political matters – is constructed to ensure the unassailable permanence of the Oceanic state. While Harrington’s belief in debates in the senate and resolution in the popular assembly appears like a classically republican endorsement of popular participation, it serves the end purpose of stability and perfection: ‘a commonwealth’, Lord Archon asserts after he has explained all thirty constitutional orders of Oceana, ‘rightly ordered, may for any internal causes be as immortal or long-lived as the world’ (218). The various characteristic components of Harrington’s utopia serve this ideal end purpose: the equal agrarian prevents corruption by ensuring that aristocratic individuals cannot own more than £2000 of land; the system of rotation similarly ensures that the state self-perpetuates as neither assembly has complete control or absolute sovereignty; Harrington’s attention to detail, which Davis identifies, is indicative of the systemic regulation that pervades Oceana.\(^{386}\) Harrington intends the fiction of Oceana to make his peculiar political system appear more immediately realisable in 1650s England. Although the role of representation in Oceana is different to that of Leviathan – Harrington focuses on conventional utopian fiction rather than political representation – there is a relationship between fictional artifice and utopian values in both texts. As Harrington’s conventional utopian form invites comparison with the concept of political and artistic representation in Leviathan, so Harrington’s aphoristic writings, as we shall see, invite comparison with Milton’s contemporary tracts, in which he showed direct awareness of Harrington.

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Despite lacking the utopian artifice of either *Leviathan* or *Oceana*, Milton’s *The Readie and Easie Way* engages no less with the utopian ideas that Harrington exhibits in his contemporary texts. Published around 21-22 February 1660, *The Readie and Easie Way* shows awareness of Harrington’s *The Rota* and *The Wayes and Meanes Whereby an Equal & Lasting Commonwealth May be suddenly introduced*, published on 9 January and 6 February respectively. Milton’s implicit references to Harrington suggest his awareness of the contemporary Harringtonian intellectual movement that promoted rotation, the ideas of which were central to the Rota Club, which met during the winter of 1659, and produced, through Harrington, *The Rota* itself. With the Rump restored on 6 May 1659, there was a real sense among republicans that there was a second chance to implement republicanism in England. Milton himself may even have attended the Rota Club during this period. As Milton’s objective was, like Hobbes and Harrington, the security and stability of the commonwealth, he equally shared their desire for permanence. However, unlike Harrington, Milton believed that permanence could be achieved through a single aristocratic assembly that would sit without change or rotation:

> And although it may seem strange at first hearing, by reason that mens minds are prepossessed with the notion of successive Parliaments, I affirme that the Grand or General Councel being well chosen, should be perpetual: for so thir business is or may be, and oft times urgent; the opportunitie of affairs gaind or lost in a moment (*CWJM* vi. 495).

Milton acknowledges the Harringtonian ideology of rotation – ‘the notion of successive Parliaments’ – that was openly discussed in the Rota Club and promoted by republicans like Henry Neville (1620-94). Harrington explains in *Oceana* that the Oceanic political system is constructed by ‘the senate debating and proposing, the people resolving, and the magistracy executing by an equal rotation through the suffrage of the people given by the ballot’ (34). The system appears aphoristically in *The Rota*, in which the triennial rotation of the senate and popular assembly is reasserted (809), which secures the ‘perpetual revolution or rotation’ (820) necessary to maintain the equal agrarian of Harrington’s commonwealth; and also in *The Ways and Means* (824-5). In the first edition of *The Readie and Easie Way*, Milton argues that ‘successive and

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389 On Neville and Harrington, see Hammersley, p. 5; and Pocock, *Political Works*, p. 101.
transitory Parliaments’ are ‘much likelier continually to unsettle rather then to settle a free government’; in the second edition, he adjusts this section by acknowledging that ‘partial rotation’ is viewed by some as necessary ‘to prevent the settling of too absolute power’, but insists that there is an associated ‘danger and mischance of putting out a great number of the best and ablest’ (495-7). While Milton’s aristocratic commonwealth is evidently distinct from Harrington’s Oceanic model, they both share a desire for permanence. The utopian in Milton and Harrington saw that to achieve this permanence, there must be some form of restriction, which draws from and informs their perception of the people.

The perception of citizens as components of a wider totality, rather than active participants of the state, is shared by all three writers. Harrington and Hobbes share a materialist view of the people in Oceana and Leviathan. Harrington explains that ‘The materials of a commonwealth are the people; and the people of Oceana were distributed by casting them into certain divisions, regarding their quality, their ages, their wealth, and the places of their residence or habituation, which was done by the ensuing orders’ (75). Harrington’s systematic and pervasive categorisation distinguishes the people into freemen and citizens, young and old, wealthy and poor; habituation (75-7) is, moreover, integral to establish and maintain Harrington’s equal agrarian.

Harrington’s concept of equality is better termed as balance: all citizens must remain within their class status and be led by a ‘natural aristocracy’ (23). Later in Oceana, an orator explains that ‘neither by reason nor by her experience is it impossible that a commonwealth should be immortal, seeing the people, being the materials, never dies, and the form, which is motion, must without opposition be endless’ (99). The people are substantive, rather than autonomous: they feed the system of rotation that ensures permanence by avoiding the human potential for corruption (218). The idea of motion and opposition here recalls Hobbes’s materialism: ‘that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it’ (CETH iv. 26). Harrington’s eternal rotation exemplifies Hobbesian motion: the equal agrarian, by eliminating corruption, ensures that the rotation and progress of Oceana is perpetual.

This similarity extends to Hobbes’s view of citizens in the Leviathan state. Hobbes refers to the people as a ‘multitude’ in their natural state, from which they transform through the process of covenanting in a political sense into citizens and in a material sense into the person of the state (iii. 260-6).\(^{390}\) Hobbes describes the stability

\(^{390}\) For a discussion of Hobbes’s view of the people, see Hammond, Milton and the People, pp. 140-5.
of a commonwealth in bodily terms as avoiding ‘internal diseases’, which relates to the corporeal entity of the Leviathan discussed earlier in this chapter. Regarding commonwealths, Hobbes explains

For by the nature of their Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as the Lawes of Nature, or as Justice it selfe, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter; but as they are the Makers [sic], and orderers of them (iii. 498).

Hobbes acknowledges, in accordance with Harrington, that a commonwealth can be permanent so long as its constituent parts, the people, do not cause disease in their authorisation of the sovereign. Hobbes identifies the paradoxical relationship between the people acting simultaneously as material ‘Matter’ and ‘Makers’ (‘makers’) of the Leviathan through the process of authorisation. Hobbes illustrates this point by comparing a sovereign, whose power authorised by the people is not absolute, to ‘the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents’, which ‘are subject either to untimely death, or […] breaking out into biles and scabbs’ (iii. 499-500). Hobbes’s graphic image emphasises how the people are, as in Oceana, formative materials in constructing a commonwealth. They may have the power to authorise the sovereign, but in doing so, by becoming ‘makers’, they also become the subordinate ‘matter’ of the commonwealth. For Hobbes and Harrington, materialism influences the role of the people in their ideal commonwealths. In Oceana, the people constitute a totality of equality, in which they form a part of a system of eternal rotation; in Leviathan, they constitute a paradoxical corporeal totality, in which their antecedent authorisation yields any potential for active participation.

Milton’s perception of the people, which is directly related to his utopianism, more closely aligns him with Hobbes and Harrington than their political differences suggest. Martin Dzelzainis identifies a lengthy excursus in the second edition of The Readie and Easie Way that has been underexplored. Dzelzainis focuses his explanation of ‘Milton’s repudiation of populism’ on Machiavelli’s Discorsi, ‘the founding text of renaissance republicanism’, to which he argues Milton refers. The excursus, however, is phrased in Miltonic rather than Machiavellian terms: Milton expresses his anti-populism in the characteristic elitist language and oligarchic ideology of the tract as a

As Paul Hammond explains, the political landscape had changed significantly since the first edition of *The Readie and Easie Way*, which contributed to Milton’s growing disillusionment with the people: General Monck permitted the return of the purged royalist parliamentary members to government on 21st February, at the time of publication for the first edition of *The Readie and Easie Way*. In contrast to Harrington’s fear that an exclusively oligarchic assembly would be prone to corruption, which he acknowledges in the examples of Athens, Sparta and Rome, Milton asserts that a popular assembly is incapable of governance, as ‘none being more immoderate and ambitious to amplifie thir power, then such popularities’ (499). Milton proceeds to criticise the Harringtonian system of ‘annual rotation […] as is lately propounded’ as ‘unweildie with thir own bulk’ to meet ‘from so many parts remote to sit a whole year lieger in one place, only now and then to hold up a forrest of fingers, or to convey each man his bean or ballot into the box, without reason shewn or common deliberation’ (499). While Milton may well be referring to the cost of popular gatherings of large Harringtonian assemblies, he is also degrading popular participation to the synecdoche ‘forrest of fingers’ and suggesting that they vote without the qualities exhibited by the aristocratic ‘perpetual Senat’ that he idealises. To complete his elitist denunciation of populism, Milton continues by asserting that the people are ‘incontinent of secrets, if any be imparted to them, emulous and always jarring with the other Senat.’ The inability to maintain control and utilise reason resonates with Milton’s impassioned criticism of the ‘inconstant and Image doting rabble’ in *Eikonoklastes* (*CWJM* vi. 424).

In the latter half of the excursus, Milton offers a compromise to the Harringtonian system, in which he accommodates a Miltonic version of Harrington’s utopian totality. Milton’s alternative option is ‘to wel-qualifie and refine elections’, which avoids ‘the noise and shouting of a rude multitude’ by allowing

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\text{only those of them who are rightly qualifi’d, to nominat as many as they will; and out of that number others of better breeding, to chuse a less number more judiciously, till after a third or fourth sifting and refining of exactest choise, they only be left chosen who are the due number, and seem by most voices the worthiest (501).}
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This process of systemic exclusivism, despite lacking the meticulous details of Harringtonian utopianism, is no less utopian in its desire to generate stability through reducing the powers of the people. Milton, moreover, proposes educational reform that

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would ‘make the people fittest to chuse, and the chosen fittest to govern’ by teaching them the qualities that he would expect of his idealised aristocratic assembly. Hammond explains that Milton’s is ‘an analysis not only of why the ordinary people are currently unfit to choose their rulers, but also of why the current potential rulers are unfit to govern.’ Education in the Miltonic commonwealth is part of the selective process of ‘sifting and refining’; the people are worthy only when they can exhibit the idealised qualities that can result from an education like that which Milton proposes in *Of Education*: ‘vertue, temperance, modestie, sobrietie, parsimonie, justice’. The product of this education, besides the list of qualities, is that the people ‘shall not then need to be much mistrustfull of thir chosen Patriots in the Grand Councel’. Instead, ‘several ordinarie assemblies’ will be established ‘in the chief towns of every countie, without the trouble, charge, or time lost of summoning and assembling from far in so great number’ and without the ‘wariest rotation’ (501). Not only do Milton’s proposals resemble Harrington’s concentric society, in which ‘parishes annually pour themselves into the hundreds, the hundreds into the tribes, and the tribes into the galaxies’ (118), but both Harrington and Milton also envision societies in a federated form comparable to More’s Utopia, in which there are fifty-four cities that ‘be all set and situate alike, and in all points fashioned alike’. Milton had referred to this in the first edition as ‘if every countie in the land were made of a kinde of subordinate Commonaltie or Commonwealth’ (517). In the excursus, Milton adds to his previous vision for miniature commonwealths, which are managed by the ‘nobilitie and chief gentry’ with the self-determination to ‘make thir own judicial laws’ (517), with the allowance of well-educated and intricately-selected popular contributions. Although he lacks specific detail, these are miniature totalities that permit popular participation in terms that ensure sovereignty remains exclusively centralised in the Grand Council. Milton’s decentralised popular participation is a development of Harringtonian republicanism: as Milton explains towards the end of the tract, his federated form is not ‘many Sovrantes united in one Commonwealth, but many Commonwealths under one united and entrusted Sovrantrie’ (519). Although this suggests that Milton is challenging Harrington, he is also – in much the same way as Harrington challenges and learns from Hobbes – accommodating Harringtonian ideas. The excursus, therefore, exhibits Milton’s attempt to reconcile Harringtonian republicanism and utopianism with his oligarchic elitism and disillusionment with the people. In doing so, Milton shows how

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he, Harrington and Hobbes share a view of the people as components for an end purpose of state stability and permanence.

LIBERTY AND THE PEOPLE

The particular and idiosyncratic perceptions of liberty that all three writers exhibit in their utopian works inform both their affinity to utopianism and their treatment of religious freedom and millenarianism. Quentin Skinner has discussed at length the neo-roman view of liberty that was determined by a free state and is defined by the absence of arbitrary power. As the exercise of independent autonomy and agency, freedom is distinguished from slavery or servitude. Skinner argues that we ‘find the republican theory vehemently reaffirmed in the course of the 1650s by such leading apologists for the English commonwealth as Marchamont Nedham, John Milton, William Sprigg, and above all James Harrington in his Oceana of 1656.’ This form of negative liberty was, according to Skinner, distinct from that of Hobbes. This chapter will contend that the shared utopianism of Milton, Hobbes, and Harrington informs an understanding of their perceptions of liberty. As the previous chapter showed, Nedham, lacking the millenarianism that the final section of this chapter will discuss, did not pursue perfection in the form of a totality of stability, and instead challenged that idea with his anti-utopian editorials of 1657. Republicanism and its attendant participatory liberty were, for Nedham, an end in itself. Given their shared utopianism, it is necessary to address how this informs our understanding of the form of liberty that Milton, Hobbes, and Harrington respectively advocated.

Hammersley, agreeing with Skinner, uses Harrington’s repudiation of a part of Hobbes’s chapter 21, ‘Of the Liberty of Subjects’, as evidence for Harrington’s neo-Roman perception of liberty. Hobbes asserts in point 8 of Chapter 21 of Leviathan that in the process of authorisation, the ‘full and absolute Libertie in every Particular man’, which results in the natural state of ‘perpetuall war’, is transferred to the state itself: ‘every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it

398 Hammersley, James Harrington, pp. 72-4; see also Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, pp. 85-6.
shall judge [...] most conducing to their benefit' (CETH iv. 332). Free commonwealths, therefore, are not constituted by citizens who possess a comparable degree of liberty. Harrington responds in Oceana by asserting that ‘He might as well have said that the estates of particular men in a commonwealth are not the riches of particular men, but the riches of the commonwealth; for equality of estates causeth equality of power, and equality of power is the liberty not only of the commonwealth, but of every man’ (20). Harrington rejects the manner in which Hobbes places sovereignty above property ownership; liberty in Oceana is determined by the systemically regulated equilibrium of property. Although Harrington may advocate individual liberty, he does so in terms of the equal agrarian, which, as we have seen, is a form of utopian totality. Hobbes explains that his perception of liberty is not exclusive to one particular form of government:

> There is written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether the Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedom is still the same (333).

Harrington responds firstly in terms of anti-monarchism, satirically suggesting that ‘the greatest bashaw is a tenant, as well of his head as of his estate, at the will of his lord’, and then, characteristically, in terms of property: ‘the meanest Lucchese that hath land is a freeholder of both, and not to be controlled but by the law; and that framed by every private man unto no other end (or they may thank themselves) than to protect the liberty of every private man, which by that means comes to be the liberty of the commonwealth’ (20). Once again, Harrington refers to the equal agrarian as a means of securing liberty in Oceana. Whereas Hobbes views liberty as transferred by the people to the Leviathan sovereign, Harrington believes that individual liberty constitutes the liberty of the commonwealth. As we have seen in the previous section of this chapter, Hobbes and Harrington’s contrasting political ideologies do not negate their mutual utopianism. It is necessary to identify how the relationship between utopianism and liberty manifests in both Hobbes and Harrington, which is best understood in terms of the materialist determinism that they share.

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399 Cf. Oceana, pp. 13-14, where Harrington claims that his equal agrarian proves that ‘covenants are but words and breath.’
While Harrington objects to a specific point in chapter 21 of *Leviathan*, he makes no comment on the mechanist philosophy that Hobbes espouses, which features prominently in *Oceana*. Hobbes’s determinism, which draws from his Calvinistic beliefs – even if he may have misinterpreted Calvinism as some critics suggest – is a defining feature of his ideology. As A. P. Martinich explains, ‘Hobbes’s commitment to predestination is for him the logical consequence of orthodox and traditional Christian doctrine.’ The concept of predestination, of a sequence of causality that originates in a creator, informs Hobbes’s perception of liberty: ‘LIBERTY, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may be applyed no lesse to Irrationall, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall’ (*CETH* iii. 324). For Hobbes, liberty manifests in a motional and mechanistic process. As this liberty is also determined by material reality, so long as motion and action are not impeded, even an imprisoned individual retains Hobbesian liberty. Hobbes expands on the paradoxical relationship between liberty, necessity and free will:

> Liberty, and Necessity are consistent; as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the Channel; so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes,) they proceed from necessity (326).

The actions of individuals have liberty because they are the authors of those actions, even if those actions are determined by a prime mover, such as God, or, in political terms, by the sovereign. This resembles the form of freedom that this study has identified in utopian texts: in order to attain perfection, which is often associated with the millennium, liberty must exist within a system. For Hobbes, this philosophy is exemplified in the artificial process of representation. ‘The Liberty of the Subject’, Hobbes explains, ‘lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions,

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400 On Hobbes’s philosophy of motion, see Malcolm, pp. 17, 49.
the Soveraign hath praetermitted’ (328). Citizens are at liberty to act only in accordance with the will of the sovereign, the decisions of whom they have already authorised.

Harrington shares Hobbes’s mechanist philosophy: in *Oceana,* liberty is similarly utopian. The concept of motion in Harrington’s philosophy is at the centre of his ideal of rotation. Harrington believed that in nature, the celestial movement of extraterrestrial objects was a form of ‘perpetual rotation’. ‘By so copying nature’s perfection,’ Scott explains, ‘Harrington believed he had harnessed for politics its very immortality.’

Hobbes himself used the word ‘perpetuall’ in *Leviathan* to describe the constant, chaotic motion of the natural state of mankind, which the Leviathan state channels and manages: ‘a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power’ (ii. 150). In ‘The Corollary’ of *Oceana,* the figure of Archon alludes to Plato’s description of how God, having completed the creation, ‘saw his own orbs move below him: for the art of man (being the imitation of nature, which is the art of God) there is nothing so like the first call of beautiful order out of chaos and confusion, as the architecture of a well-ordered commonwealth’ (244). The concept of artistic representation that we saw earlier in relation to utopianism and political representation extends to the act of creation itself: Oceana mirrors the perfect order of celestial orbit. This characteristic interpretation of the philosophy of motion is founded on determinist mechanism: ‘Unless a man will deny the chain of causes, in which he denies God, he must also acknowledge the chain of effects; wherefore there can be no effect in nature that is not from the first cause, and those successive links of the chain without which it could not have been’ (218).

Although Harrington’s commonwealth resembles neo-Roman liberty, it is not therefore distinct from Hobbes’s mechanistic view of liberty. For both Hobbes and Harrington, freedom exists within a system. As Oceana is a representation of the perfect universe, its citizens, despite being free to participate within the system, are also determined by it: ‘And as man, seeing the world is perfect, can never commit any such sin as can render it imperfect or bring it unto a natural dissolution, so the citizen, where the commonwealth is perfect, can never commit any such crime as can render it imperfect or bring it unto a natural dissolution’ (218). The eternal rotation of the Harringtonian commonwealth is immune to dissent. In much the same way, the citizens of the Leviathan commonwealth cannot disobey due to the societal construct of law; the Oceanic citizen, by comparison, participates in a system that inexorably self-replenishes regardless of that participation.

To return to Hobbes and Harrington’s perceptions of the people, as the people are

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societal components in a wider system, the reality and experience of liberty in these respective ideal societies are necessarily determined by that system. As representations of a determinist universe, these commonwealths exemplify the controlling and regulatory form of liberty that this study has identified as inherent to seventeenth-century utopianism.

Milton’s formulation of liberty in *The Readie and Easie Way* aligns with that of Harrington and Hobbes. Where Hobbes and Harrington present their ideal commonwealths as representations of God and his determinist universe, for Milton, the commonwealth served the ideal end point of the millennium. In 1659-60, Milton returned with renewed optimism to the subject of religious freedom. As Davis explains, the concept of religious freedom in the seventeenth-century is distinct from civil freedom and was not simply defined in terms of toleration. Paradoxically, freedom from arbitrary civil power was necessary to ensure full subjection under an omnipotent deity. Davis posits:

What was wrong then with a tyrannical civil authority was not that it deprived its subjects of their liberty or humanity in some secular sense but that it could prevent their agency under God; it got in the way of christian subjection. With an active, interventionist, engaged God, the true end of christian liberty was its self-immolation in submission to the Divine will.\(^{405}\)

This study has identified Milton’s form of liberty in *Areopagitica*, in which freedom from pre-publication licensing ensured that studious citizens could labour in the search for millenarian truth; it has also shown how toleration remained prominent in Milton’s belief in and defence of the fledgling republic. By the late 1650s, Milton defined his particular perception of religious freedom in *De Doctrina Christiana*, which will be discussed further in the next chapter:

Christian freedom is that whereby, with Christ freeing [us], we are freed from the slavery of sin—and likewise from the prescript of the law and of human beings—like manumitted [slaves], so that, having become sons after being slaves, [and] adults after being children, we may be slaves to God in charity through the spirit of truth as our guide (*CWJM* viii/2. 717).\(^{406}\)

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Where Milton may have viewed subjection to a monarch as the condition of being ‘slaves within doors’ (CWJM vi. 151), he also actively embraces the freedom to serve God in a form of slavery. In his advocacy of religious freedom in *A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes* (1659), one of Milton’s issues with religious adherence to civil power is that Protestants cannot fulfil their submission to God. Milton is concerned that ‘we receive again the spirit of bondage to fear’ in place of ‘the spirit of adoption to freedom’ brought about by Christ, ‘if our fear which was then servile towards God only, must be now servile in religion towards men: strange also and preposterous fear, if when and wherein it hath attain’d by the redemption of our Saviour to be filial only towards God, it must be now servile towards the magistrate’ (CPW vii. 226). Milton discusses freedom and servility in equal terms of service to God that is inhibited and endangered through state control over religion. Although lacking this mature expression, Milton’s defence of free press in *Areopagitica* is determined by his belief in society serving God, as his vision for London exemplifies in the peroration of the tract. Milton’s conception of freedom, therefore, is inspired by a desire to serve and contribute to eschatological progress. Rather than patiently awaiting the second coming, service meant active earthly contribution to the chiliastic cause. For Milton, this is the most evident source of freedom in his utopianism: by identifying liberty with servitude in his conception of religious freedom, Milton would understandably identify freedom within a system in his ideal societies both as a conceptual mirror of religious freedom and as a means of achieving the ideal form of pious servitude requisite for the millennium.

Milton’s conception of religious freedom informs how he envisions the implementation of his utopian project of scriptural study in his late republican tracts. Milton envisions the religious education proposed in *Considerations Touching the Likeliest Means to Remove Hirelings out of the Church* (1659) as capable of making the people worthy of society-wide biblical study, which would, as in *Areopagitica*, help to usher in the millennium. To encourage the accessibility of biblical text, Milton proposes that all scripture be ‘translated into English with plenty of notes’, and that there should be found ‘some wholesome body of divinity […] without school-terms and metaphysical notions, which have obscured rather than explained our religion’. By encouraging some services to take place outside of churches, even as far as agricultural barns, Milton believes ‘that by such meetings of these, being, indeed, most apostolical and primitive, they will in a short time advance more in Christian knowledge and reformation of life, than by the many years’ preaching of such an incumbent […].’
He even suggests that it would be beneficial to the promotion of Christian liberty to ‘erect in greater number all over the land schools and competent libraries to those schools, where languages and arts may be taught free together’. However, the intention of such a free education seems to be that by making ‘all the land […] better civilized’, the common people ‘should not gad for preferment out of their own country, but continue there thankful for what they received freely, bestowing it as freely on their country, without soaring above the meanness wherein they were born’ (CPW vii. 306). This thesis has addressed Milton’s concerns about the aptitude of the people, especially in the 1650s. The education that Milton proposes in Considerations would ensure that the commons would be able to contribute to the betterment of society, while maintaining the role of the elect in leading wider societal progression. Where in Areopagitica, Milton had offered a more optimistic view of the people, his vision for a studious society in Of Civil Power reflects his increased disillusionment with them. As he explains in Of Civil Power, ‘nothing more protestantly can be permitted than a free and lawful debate at all times by writing, conference, or disputation of what opinion soever, disputable by scripture’ (vii. 251). This resembles the ideal London, constructed ‘in defence of belaguer’d Truth’, where ‘there be pens and heads […] musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas wherewith to present’. Just as in Areopagitica, where ‘moderat varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes’ produce ‘the goodly and gracefull symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure’ (CPW ii. 553-5), the freedom that Milton advocates in Of Civil Power is defined by a societal system of scriptural interpretation. The difference with Milton’s vision in Of Civil Power is that education is now used as a tool for realising his eschatological goal; in 1644, Milton’s view of education was exclusively aristocratic. Liberty of conscience for scriptural study serves the ideal end purpose of the millennium. Just as in Hobbes and Harrington, the ideal of perfection – the ‘advancement of truth’ that Milton advocates in Of Civil Power (vii. 245) – necessitates a systemic form of liberty.

In each ideal society considered in this chapter, the people serve a higher purpose. Systemic apparatus is necessary to ensure that the people fulfil that purpose. In Hobbes and Harrington, this draws from their mechanistic philosophy, as their utopias are representative of mechanism in nature. For Milton, his belief in free will does not detract from the equally systemic form of liberty that he espouses. As obedience to God is a form of servitude, in Milton’s philosophy a society exercises its Christian freedom when it is dedicated to scriptural interpretation in pursuit of millenarian truth, in which the people are components in a wider process just as they are for Hobbes and
Harrington. It is in the relationship between religious and civil power – as this study of their differing perspectives of liberty suggests – that the nuanced differences between the utopian visions of Hobbes, Harrington, and Milton become apparent.

**MILLENARIANISM**

As this study has shown, utopian thinkers often drew inspiration and purpose from the prospect – whether it be imminent or distant – of the millennium of Christ. As the section above suggests, Milton exemplifies this paradigm in 1659-60.\(^{407}\) Although the debates over the significance of religion in Hobbes and Harrington remain contested, this study maintains that eschatology was central to their respective utopias.\(^{408}\) Integral to this analysis is their respective views on the relationship between church and state: Hobbes espoused a radical and indissoluble unity between church and state; Milton, as we have seen, advocated religious freedom in congregationalist and Independent terms; Harrington sought a mid-point between these two views, in which he maintained a national church alongside tolerance for sectarian beliefs through liberty of conscience. The major difference between Milton’s millenarianism and that of Hobbes and Harrington is that he viewed the millennium as an ideal that could be ushered in through reform. Hobbes and Harrington, by contrast, perhaps in opposition to active millenarians, such as the Fifth Monarchists or Henry Vane, integrated their millenarianism into the representational framework of *Leviathan* and *Oceana*. For Hobbes and Harrington, the millennium was realised through their political philosophy; for Milton, political reform was a necessary stepping-stone to an eschatological end. A comparison between millenarianism and utopianism in the political philosophy of these

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three writers is integral to understanding how Milton was situated within the spectrum of 1650s utopian millenarianism.

Although Milton lacked the fervour of *Of Reformation* on the eve of the Restoration, he exhibited with no less conviction the belief that society could help to usher in the millennium.\(^{409}\) Where Clay Daniel has recently asserted that the ‘restoration of the monarchy and its causes […] is the dominant theme’ of *The Readie and Easie Way*, this chapter agrees with N. H. Keeble’s suggestion that central to Milton’s political proposals in 1659-60 was ‘the subordination of the political to the religious.’\(^{410}\) As this study has shown, Milton’s belief in liberty of conscience predominantly focuses on the freedom to interpret scripture.\(^{411}\) It is through this philosophy that Milton, in *Of Civil Power*, asserts that a Protestant who ‘to his best apprehension follows the scripture, though against any point of doctrine by the whole church received, is not a heretic’ (*CPW* vii. 251). Just as Milton endorses and exemplifies this philosophy in the scriptural analysis for and composition of *De Doctrina Christiana* (*CWJM* viii/1. 9), so he proposes a society in *The Readie and Easie Way*, as discussed above, dedicated to scriptural interpretation reminiscent of the model initially envisioned in *Areopagitica*.\(^{412}\) Elizabeth Sauer acknowledges how ‘Milton’s identification of the nation with the fight for freedom of conscience and with resistance to a settled religion’ was at the heart of his 1659 tracts and ‘laid the groundwork for *De Doctrina Christiana*.’\(^{413}\) So central was liberty of conscience to Milton’s political proposals in 1659 that he was ‘prepared to severely limit civil liberty’: a commonwealth will only flourish, Milton suggests, ‘when either they who govern discern between civil and religious, or they only who so discern shall be admitted to govern’ (*CPW* vii. 243).\(^{414}\) Milton’s insistence on a separation of church and state further illustrates how religious freedom is a necessary means to achieve eschatological ends: the worthy individuals permitted to govern in *The Readie and Easie Way* would need to exhibit this commitment to religious freedom and congregational separation from the state. As Milton lobbied government in 1659 to

\(^{410}\) See *Of Reformation*, in *CPW* i. 616: ‘thou the Eternall and shortly-expected King shalt open the Clouds to judge the severall Kingdomes of the World […] proclaiming thy universal and milde Monarchy through Heaven and Earth’, as discussed in Chapter 1 b) of this thesis.


\(^{412}\) Milton’s belief in the freedom to interpret scripture is discussed at length in Chapter 8, pp. 294-301.

\(^{413}\) See *De Doctrina Christiana*, *CWJM* viii/1. p. 9.


liberate English Protestantism from ‘force on the one side restraining, and hire on the other side corrupting the teachers thereof’ (245), he also saw this freedom, on the terms of liberty discussed in the previous section, as necessary to help realise the millennium through a studious community like that presented in *Areopagitica*.

Harrington, who advocated both a national church and liberty of conscience, makes implicit reference to Milton’s *Considerations* in his *Aphorisms Political* (1659). Harrington likely alludes to Milton in aphorism XXIX, with the parentheses added in the second edition of the tract: ‘To hold that hirelings (as they are termed by some), or an endowed ministry, ought to be removed out of the church is inconsistent with a commonwealth.’

Although it is impossible to prove Robert W. Ayers’s suggestion, that, regarding the aphorisms that concern religion following XXI, ‘Harrington expanded them on reading *The Likeliest Means*’ (*CPW* vii. 518), the aphorisms do identify Harrington’s theological differences with Milton in 1659. Harrington’s civic religion encompasses both national religion and liberty of conscience. He explains in *Aphorisms* that, as the ‘major part of mankind giveth itself up in the matter of religion unto the public leading’ (XXXI), ‘there must be a national religion’ (XXXII), but that the ‘minor part’ should be permitted liberty of conscience in much the same way as the major part through their conscience decide to endorse national religion (XLI–XLII) (766). These carefully articulated aphorisms reiterate Harrington’s assertion in the preliminary of *Oceana* that ‘a man that, pleading for the liberty of private conscience, refuseth liberty unto the national conscience, must be absurd’ (39). In 1659, Milton exemplifies this absurdity to Harrington. National religion is a necessary product of liberty of conscience in much the same way as an ‘endowed clergy’ is the product of a national religion (XLV–XLVI) (767). The reason for Harrington’s entrenched opposition to Milton on the subject of church and state, and the effort he takes to justify them in *Aphorisms*, can be better understood when considered alongside the religious policy depicted in *Oceana*.

In *Oceana*, religion is instituted in a similar manner to the idealised political system, which invites comparisons with the utopian dimensions of that system discussed above. When Harrington discusses the sixth order in *Oceana*, central to the justification of forming a national religion is the ability to interpret scripture: Harrington

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explains that a commonwealth ‘can never be secure that she shall not lose the Scriptures and by consequence her religion, which to preserve she must institute some method of this knowledge, and some use of such as have acquired it, which amounteth unto a national religion’ (82-3). It is for this reason that the universities are charged, under the authority of the state-managed council of religion, to interpret scripture and disseminate this learning to the national churches (200-202). As Hammersley suggests, ‘this was because he believed that the people needed to be publicly led in religion, just as they did in politics, and a national church was a means of providing such guidance.’

Although Milton, as shown above, believes like Harrington and Hobbes that the people are components in a wider system, he affords them greater individual potential to interpret scripture than Harrington. Milton views education, as we have seen, as a means of ensuring the people are capable of fulfilling their potential as scriptural interpreters. Religion in Oceana resembles its political system: the universities, as outlined in the sixth order, provide ministers that the people, after a year, vote to keep or replace, in much the same way as the senate proposes and the popular assembly ratifies acts and laws of government. The ability to interpret scripture distinguishes university-educated individuals from the laity just as the elite individuals of the senate are superior in their political judgment to the people. To further clarify the mirror between religion and politics in Oceana, it is necessary to consider how religion contributes to the permanence of Oceana as a representation of God’s universe.

This is best understood through comparison with Hobbes, whose views on religion were a significant contribution to his political philosophy in Leviathan. As Jon Parkin suggests, ‘almost all of his readers would be shocked by the extraordinary theology elaborated in Parts 3 and 4 of Leviathan.’

Pocock, in his analysis of Hobbes’s eschatology and perception of history, stresses the importance of the eschatological third and fourth parts of Leviathan in Hobbes’s philosophy as a whole. Johan Olsthoorn has recently argued against critics who interpret the latter half of Leviathan as secularising. However, in Olsthoorn’s analysis of the relationship between representation and religion, he suggests that subordinate ecclesiastical entities exist in the Leviathan state outside of the representational system while not detracting from the

418 Hammersley, James Harrington, p. 207.  
419 Jon Parkin, Taming the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 92.  
absolute sovereignty of the civil sovereign. As Hobbes presented an indissoluble relationship between church and state, the sovereign is the unequivocal head of the national church. The paradoxical process of authorisation and representation in the political framework of *Leviathan*, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, is central to the religious system in Hobbes’s ideal society: ‘For so God the Father, as Represented by Moses, is one Person; and as Represented by his Sonne, another Person; and as Represented by the Apostles, and by the Doctors that taught by authority from them derived, is a third Person; and yet every Person here, is the Person of one and the same God’ (*CETH* iv. 776). The hierarchical transference of power here is embodied by the earthly representatives of God, who constitute the divine person of that same God. There is no difference between the process of authorisation, through which citizens constitute the political person of the Leviathan, and the Leviathan’s representation of God: the Leviathan is a ‘Mortal God’ in representation of the ‘Immortal God’ (iv. 260). In accordance with Hobbes’s materialist philosophy, he explains that the ‘Kingdome therefore of God, is a real, not a metaphorical Kingdome’ (v. 642), and existed under the jurisdiction of Moses in Israel, who acted as God’s ‘Viceroy or Lieutenant’ (640). As such, this kingdom, which was lost upon the election of Saul until civil states once again endorsed Christianity, is distinct from ‘when Christ shall come in Majesty to judge the world, and actually to govern his owne people, which is called the Kingdome of Glory’ (644), and will manifest specifically in Jerusalem (702). Not only does Hobbes use this interpretation of biblical history to oppose active millenarians, such as the Fifth Monarchists (726), but he also uses the prospect of the millennium to grant representative powers to the civil sovereign. To return to the example of scriptural interpretation, Hobbes gives absolute power to the sovereign, who acts as vicegerent to God: ‘Out of which we may conclude, that whosoever in a Christian Common-wealth holdeth the place of Moses, is the sole Messenger of God, and Interpreter of his Commandments’ (744). Similar to *Oceana*, the utopian system of representation is mirrored in the religious institution of *Leviathan*. While subordinate ecclesiastical entities exist in Hobbes’s commonwealth, they remain subject to sovereign dictate. Milton, whose 1659-60 works lack the representational model of *Leviathan* and the utopian artifice of *Oceana*, did not believe in as close a relationship between the millennium and his ideal society. As Hobbes illustrates, representation is central to the eschatology of *Leviathan* just as it informs our understanding of its utopianism.

The manner in which Harrington identifies the millennium as Oceana itself in *Oceana* illustrates the nuanced difference between the Hobbes-Harrington utopian millennium, and that of Milton. It was Pocock who identified that Harrington made the radical decision to ‘equate the republic with the millennium’ as a ‘climactically satisfactory solution of the problem of republican immortality.’\(^{422}\) Davis argues directly against this view of Pocock’s, which he believes is a contradiction, asserting instead his exclusivist view of utopianism as separate from millenarianism, against which this study has been contending.\(^{423}\) Luc Borot similarly argues that, when ‘the fictional framework of *Oceana* was removed’, Harrington’s later texts lack the millenarianism identified by Pocock.\(^{424}\) It is evident that there is a relationship between utopianism and millenarianism in *Oceana*. The ideal of perfection in Harrington’s commonwealth draws from the perfect rotation in God’s universe. Where Hobbes believed that the Hebraic commonwealth could be emulated by the Leviathan state and would serve as an interim between Mosaic Israel and the millennium, Harrington believed, as Eric Nelson suggests, ‘that it is within the reach of any human community to restore the pristine Hebrew theocracy.’\(^{425}\) Unlike Hobbes, Harrington makes no explicit distinction between this kingdom of God and the millennium:

Now if you add unto the propagation of civil liberty, what is so natural unto this commonwealth that it cannot be omitted, the propagation of the liberty of conscience, this empire, this patronage of the world, is the kingdom of Christ. For as the kingdom of God the Father was a commonwealth, so shall be the kingdom of God the Son; *the people shall be willing in the day of his power* (231-32).

This is most clearly expressed in a passage at the end of *Oceana*, in which Archon apostrophises Oceana in language reminiscent of the Song of Solomon. Declaring that ‘Oceana is *as the rose of Sharon, and the lily of the valley*’, Archon identifies the utopian commonwealth as ‘queen of the earth […] holy spouse of Jesus’ (233). Although this is within the utopian fiction of *Oceana*, just as Harrington’s utopianism remains prominent in his later works, so the millennium, as the ideal that Oceana emulates, remains implicit in his later political philosophy as the ideal of perfection that

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422 Pocock, *Political Works*, p. 73; see also Blair Worden, ‘Harrington and the *Commonwealth of Oceana*’, pp. 101-5.
Harrington’s utopianism strives to emulate. In both *Leviathan* and *Oceana*, the representational philosophy at the heart of each utopian artifice exhibits a millenarian dimension. For both Hobbes and Harrington, the idea of permanence was secured by the fact that their ideal commonwealths in some way represented the godly commonwealth of Israel.

Stability for Milton’s commonwealth, by contrast, was necessary for society to help usher in the millennium itself. For Hobbes and Harrington, the millennium is in some way represented in their ideal commonwealths. For Milton, a societal collaboration of scriptural interpretation on utopian terms, which he institutionalises in *The Readie and Easie Way* in contrast to the idealised London of *Areopagitica*, and which neither Hobbes nor Harrington were capable of emulating in their Erastian theologies, was necessary to realise the millennium. Milton explains in both editions of *The Readie and Easie Way* that with the ‘Grand Councel being thus firmly constituted to perpetuitie […] there is no cause alleage’d why peace, justice, plentifull trade an all prosperities should not thereupon ensue throughout the whole land’, a stability which can last ‘Even to the coming of our true and rightfull and only to be expected King, only worthie as he is our only Saviour, the Messiah, the Christ, the only heir of his eternal father, the only by him anointed and ordaind since the work of our redemption finishd, Universal Lord of all mankinde’ (*CWJM* vi. 503). Revard suggests that this passage of millenarian fervour is reminiscent of *Of Reformation*, in which Milton ‘encourages the English people to persevere in truth and righteousness’, in anticipation of ‘the Eternall and shortly-expected King’. The difference in *The Readie and Easie Way*, of course, is, with Milton’s disillusionment with the English people reaching its apogee, his utopian proposal systemically regulates the role of the people in society. By securing the permanence of English society through the Grand Council and the attendant system of scriptural research, Milton ensures that England will be prepared for, if not help to usher in, the millennium. Milton’s form of utopian millenarianism is, therefore, distinguishable from that of Hobbes and Harrington by his insistence on liberty of conscience and a separation of church and state.

**CONCLUSION**

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This analysis of the utopianism and millenarianism of Hobbes, Harrington, and Milton has served to better appreciate Milton’s peculiar form of utopian millenarianism in comparison with contemporary ideal societies. The utopian artifices that both Hobbes and Harrington integrate into *Leviathan* and *Oceana* align with their theories of representation, which, in turn, align with the millenarian theologies of both utopias. Milton, lacking any fictional utopian component in his 1659-60 works, also does not identify his ideal commonwealth as millenarian or godly. He nevertheless does, in echo of and development from the ideas of *Areopagitica*, accommodate the utopian, systemic form of freedom that is prominent in both *Leviathan* and *Oceana*. Whereas Nedham, lacking the theological and millenarian components of his contemporaries considered in this chapter, believed in popular participation and used *Mercurius Politicus* as a platform for republican education, Hobbes, Harrington, and Milton all represent the people in their societies as components in the wider utopian totality. Even Milton’s strong advocacy of liberty of conscience and religious toleration in the late republican period, was a means to an end: religious freedom is necessary to help uncover the lost millenarian truth. Hobbes, Harrington, and Milton, therefore, exhibit a spectrum of 1650s utopian millenarianism. The desire for perfection, modelled by the millennium, is achieved through state regulation, in which liberty is necessarily defined in its relation to rather than absence of the state system. For Milton, *The Readie and Easie Way* was the closest that he came to a utopian model in his prose works. As *Paradise Lost* will show in the following chapter, the utopian millenarian ideas that Milton had been developing over the course of his political career, having not been effectively realised in the English republic, found their most effective expression in his epic poetry.
Milton most clearly envisions his utopian millennium in his epic poetry. Where *Paradise Lost* depicts the process of attaining a millenarian paradise, *Paradise Regained*, which will be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis, represents the utopian millennium itself in the symbolic figure of the Son. Prelapsarian Eden – in itself reminiscent of Baconian empirical philosophy discussed in Chapter 2 – is lost because of a lack of obedience; in turn, the postlapsarian millennium is promised to Adam in exchange for his obedience. The process that Adam and Eve undergo between these two paradisal ideals is one of disunification from and reunification with Heaven. Heaven is utopian in *Paradise Lost*. As a militarised totality, Milton establishes a distinction between transgression, which results in lapsarian repercussions, and obedience, which brings with it the security of the millennium that is prophesied in the final books of the poem. The military order of Heaven reflects the hierarchy of the collective universe of *Paradise Lost*. In accordance with the literal sense of ‘fall’, to sin – or transgress – results in descending this universal hierarchy: Satan and the apostate angels descend from Heaven to Hell; Adam and Eve descend from prelapsarian paradise in Eden to postlapsarian mortality. In order for Adam and Eve to reascend, however, they must be educated. Raphael’s prelapsarian teachings and the postlapsarian education that Michael provides in Books XI and XII, with the intervening Fall, represent the learning Adam must undergo to realise his obedience. As Chapter 6 discussed at length, the liberty that Milton espouses is religious: the liberty to serve God. As such, Adam’s education provides him with the means through which he can rehabilitate by choosing to serve God, just as he chose to disobey. The emphasis on Adam as an individual, who at the end of the poem chooses obedience in a display of self-control, recalls Milton’s celebration of a similar quality in Cromwell in *Defensio Secunda*, as discussed in Chapter 5, and anticipates the inner utopia of the Son of *Paradise Regain’d*, which will be discussed in the following chapter. While the utopian millennium is not explicitly depicted in *Paradise Lost*, many of the utopian and millenarian ideas discussed in this

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427 For a definition of sin as transgression, see Milton, *De Doctrina Christiana*, in *CWJM* viii/1. 413: ‘Sin, as it is defined by the Apostle himself, is anomia or transgression of the law, 1 John 3:4.’
study are manifest in the poem and serve as an important foundation for its realisation in the brief epic that follows.

The concept of obedience in *Paradise Lost* remains central to critical debates about the poem. Historically, discussions of obedience have pervaded criticism of Satan and God. The Romantic view of Satan as the hero of *Paradise Lost* found seminal support in William Empson’s *Milton’s God*, in which he defined the God of the poem as a Stalinist tyrant.\(^{428}\) Satan’s rebellious nature, moreover, encourages interpretations of the radical Milton. David Loewenstein suggests that Satan’s ambiguity allows him to represent the varied mid-seventeenth-century political landscape, including an ‘antimonarchical revolutionary or heretic’. Rather than encouraging ‘readers to make literal equations between its mythic characters and major historical figures’, Loewenstein argues that *Paradise Lost* ‘constantly challenges its engaged readers by showing them how to discern the treacherous ambiguities and contradictions of political rhetoric and behaviour.’\(^{429}\) Warren Chernaik, moreover, argues for the ambiguity of Milton’s ‘religious, political and ethical beliefs’. He posits that ‘Milton’s political views, like his religious beliefs, are radical in some respects, conservative in others.’ Where Chernaik spends an entire chapter explaining the Old Testament character of Milton’s God, with only the Son’s sympathy offering a contrast in Book III, this is preceded by a chapter on Satan’s rebellion, in which he finds parallels with Milton’s own experience in Restoration England: ‘After the Restoration, Milton lived under a civil magistrate he considered oppressive and illegitimate, and a central issue in *Paradise Lost* and in *Samson Agonistes* is how to conduct oneself under such conditions.’\(^{430}\) The problem that Chernaik tries to answer is how Milton can justify the ways of an Old Testament God to men and exhibit the radical tendencies that he discusses elsewhere.\(^{431}\) This thesis has identified Milton’s radicalism as distinct from that of contemporary sectarians in the 1650s. If we, therefore, separate sectarian radicalism, which Chernaik associates with Milton, from the God of *Paradise Lost*, then Milton’s emphasis on obedience, especially in a utopian context, is congruous with his wider ideology. Obedience to authority had been key to Milton’s political philosophy


\(^{429}\) David Loewenstein, *Representing Revolution*, p. 203.


for much of his polemical career; the role of obedience in his radical theology and epic poetry was no different.

This study supports a view of obedience that Michael Schoenfeldt asserts, which resembles the form of religious freedom discussed in the previous chapter. Schoenfeldt posits that, ‘both before and after the Fall, moral authenticity and psychological autonomy emerge from the practices of obedience.’ He is emphatic that Milton ‘articulates autonomy in the language of obedience.’ This is, in many respects, an effective description of the paradoxical nature of Milton’s conception of religious freedom. As this chapter will show, education fosters Adam’s will to obey, especially in Michael’s postlapsarian teachings. Amy Boesky contributes to this view of Paradise Lost with her argument that Heaven represents a military totality. Boesky suggests that the growth of utopian thinking in the seventeenth-century was associated with a form of military ideology that stemmed from Cromwell’s New Model Army. However, where Boesky postulates that utopianism becomes more militarised following Cromwell, this thesis maintains that discipline was at the heart of utopianism from its inception in More’s Utopia. The militarised representation of Milton’s Heaven extends to Hell: the apostate angels resemble heavenly order until they have to pile into Pandaemonium. Indeed, this chapter will argue that the entire universe of Paradise Lost is structured as a hierarchical, though mutable, structure that both punishes transgression by ‘falling’ down the laddered order of the universe, and provides the elevated status of Heaven as an ideal to aspire to, especially for Adam and Eve both before and after the Fall.

Cedric Brown perceptively addresses how the ideal of obedience, particularly through the figure of Adam, is realised through education. Brown identifies the significance of the triangular relationship between the epic narrator, Adam, and the reader in Paradise Lost, expanding the boundaries of Milton’s education from the confines of his fictional universe. In his essay, ‘Godly Senates and Godly Education’, Brown also aligns Paradise Lost to Milton’s political works, arguing that ‘Milton’s political language was never free from the categories of religious and moral definition’. As such, Brown identifies the godly republicanism that Milton had advocated in The

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Readie and Easie Way, and which Brown compares to Harrington, in the poem: ‘in times of adversity, when men have fallen and the fit are few, when the great efforts for renewal seem to have failed, there may be a turning to the basics of godly discipline, and a need to reaffirm the providential scheme.’ This chapter will agree with Brown’s argument that Paradise Lost is ‘directed at the spiritual discipline of [Milton’s] countrymen’ through the framework of utopian millenarianism that this study has observed and analysed. As Paul Hammond explains, the poem ‘was written […] at a time when Milton was contemplating the imminent or actual defection of the English people from their God-given task of embracing liberty and thereby offering an example of true Protestant freedom to the rest of Europe.’ Obedience is a necessarily pervasive theme in Paradise Lost if Milton wanted to encourage the English people away from the monarchy that he considered inhibitive to the progress of the Reformation. However, given Milton’s disillusionment with the English people at the time, the emphasis on Adam as an individual is emblematic of Milton’s elitism. As the process of Adam’s transgression, fall, and rehabilitation anticipates the redoubled emphasis on individual heroes in the 1671 poems, it serves as an example to fit readers, however few.

This chapter will also use De Doctrina Christiana to support readings of Paradise Lost. With the Miltonic provenance of the treatise now firmly established, critics have used De Doctrina as an effective tool for interpreting Milton’s theology, and, in turn, Paradise Lost. As De Doctrina was likely completed at the end of the 1650s, it may well have briefly coincided with the composition of Paradise Lost, which is often attributed to between 1658-63. Emma Wilson has argued that Ramist logic, which was a mode of structuring knowledge and was used in De Doctrina, is discernible in Paradise Lost, particularly in Adam’s speeches. However, where Wilson, drawing from Mordechai Feingold, suggests that there was a division between Baconian scientific study and logic in this period, this chapter will show how empiricism, which was at the heart of the Baconian philosophy, is a prominent feature

436 Hammond, Milton and the People, p. 217.
Indeed, the representation of Adam’s dominion over nature is the idealised endpoint of Bacon’s natural philosophy. Instead of a Ramist structure of knowledge, the chapter will show how freedom to interpret scripture is depicted in Milton’s epic poetry.

The first section of this chapter will address the hierarchy of the universe of Paradise Lost, which will be compared in the second section to the militarised totality of Milton’s Heaven. The third section will address the empiricism intrinsic to Adam’s early existence in Eden, while the final section will consider the importance and necessity of the postlapsarian education in the final two books of the poem. Having transgressed and fallen from the prelapsarian paradise, Adam must rehabilitate by returning to the heavenly totality through obedience.

‘VARIOUS FORMS, VARIOUS DEGREES’: MILTON’S UNIVERSAL HIERARCHY

The hierarchy of Milton’s universe in Paradise Lost is representative of the form of regulatory utopianism that this study has been tracing. Raphael’s explanation of a universal structure to Adam in Book V reflects the scala naturae of Neoplatonist philosophy. Clay Daniel argues that Raphael is not a Neoplatonist and that Adam in fact articulates Neoplatonist ideas that Raphael resists, but he does so by arguing that this hierarchy is not central to the poem.439 David Williams argues that Raphael’s Neoplatonism works against the otherwise egalitarian and ‘levelling’ existence of Adam and Eve. Williams identifies Raphael as maintaining hierarchical ideas that had ended when God poured ‘his Equal Love’ on the Edenic pair (viii. 228-9). He questions how Raphael can ‘suddenly forget on earth that heaven’s feudal order was dissolved, and that he himself had renounced hierarchy?’440 Williams references the point in Book III where the angels ‘to the ground / With solemn adoration down they cast / Their crowns inwove with amaranth and gold’, but this not only coincides with


the angels being ‘lowly reverent / Towards either throne they bow’ – an act of inferiority, not equality – it also follows God’s announcement to the Son that, it is only following the apocalypse and at the end of history, ‘thou thy regal sceptre shalt lay by’ (iii. 350-52; 349-50; 339). The point at which ‘God shall be all in all’ (341) has not happened by the time Raphael descends to Eden; the universal hierarchy remains firm and established. Indeed, it is through this hierarchy that the idealised millenarian endpoint of godly unity shall be achieved. The ‘New Heav’n and Earth, wherein the just shall dwell’ still requires ‘tribulations long’ (335-6), which resembles the kind of laborious study that Milton undertakes in the composition of De Doctrina, and which he idealised in Areopagitica and The Readie and Easie Way, or the obedience that Adam enacts at the end of Paradise Lost. John Rogers, whose analysis of Milton’s engagement with mid-seventeenth-century vitalist philosophy in both De Doctrina and Paradise Lost is valuable, also suggests that Milton espouses ‘egalitarian vitalism’. As we shall see, Milton’s universal hierarchy is not only defined by his animist materialism and monism, which is comparable to Bacon’s speculative philosophy, but its structure – through which obedience promises ascension and disobedience necessitates descension – epitomises the controlling framework of many utopias discussed in this study. Milton’s universal hierarchy is a form of utopianism that anticipates the millennium.

Raphael’s description of the universal hierarchy is formed from a language of animist monism. Where Chapter 3 identified Milton’s developing theory of a unity between spirit and matter in Areopagitica, Raphael shows how his mature monistic theology is palpable in Paradise Lost. Milton articulates this philosophy in De Doctrina:

man is an animate being [animal], inherently and properly one and individual, not twofold or separable – or, as is commonly declared, combined or composed from two mutually and generically different and distinct natures, namely soul and body – but that the whole man is soul and the soul is man; namely a body or substance which is individual, animated, sensitive, and rational […] (CWJM viii/1. 303).

441 Rogers, The Matter of Revolution, pp. 112, see generally 103-44.
442 On Bacon’s spiritual animism, see Graham Rees, ‘Atomism and “Subtlety” in Francis Bacon’s Philosophy’, in Annals of Science, 37 (1980), p. 553; for a more comprehensive discussion of Bacon’s natural philosophy in these terms, see OFB vi. liv-lxiv; see also Rees, ‘Matter Theory: A Unifying Factor in Bacon’s Natural Philosophy?’, in AMBIX, 24/2 (1977), pp. 110-125.
In response to Adam’s mundane question about how earthly food compares to that of Heaven, Raphael, who is described as a ‘winged hierarch’ (v. 468) at this point, articulates a comparison between Heaven and Eden that is defined by the ‘gradual scale’ (483) between spirit and body. In Raphael’s description, God is connected to the entire hierarchy: ‘O Adam, one almighty is, from whom / All things proceed, and up to him return’ (469-70). In this way, creatures are ‘created all / Such to perfection’, but are also thereby ‘Indued with various forms, various degrees / Of substance’, such that ‘more refined, more spiritous, and pure, / nearer to him placed or nearer tending’ (471-2; 473-4; 475-6).444 This is a scale of divine perfection; all creatures are connected to God through this hierarchy. The metaphor of a plant that Raphael incorporates here, where from root to bloom marks a scale of substance, illustrates the aspirational ideal of reaching towards the status of the ‘consummate flower’, from which ‘Spirits odorous breathes’ (481-2). The ethereal odour of the flower represents to Adam the heavenly ideal that Raphael anticipates when he says ‘time may come when men / With angels may participate’ (493-4). The spectrum of matter to spirit signifies the potential for corporeal man to become spiritual angel. Accordingly, Milton’s angels are able to eat, defeate, and have sex (v. 404-13; viii. 615-29).445 The promise that Raphael makes to Adam that he and Eve may be able to ‘participate’ with angels is supported by Milton’s monism and eschatology. As Juliet Cummins argues, the ‘unfallen and regenerate human beings evolve toward a more materially and spiritually refined state on earth, anticipating their reformation at the end of time.’446 While there is a material connection between God and all his creatures, this does not mean that they are equal; it is a vertical and linear hierarchy that encourages obedience.447

Raphael goes on to explain how an individual like Adam can navigate the universal hierarchy, using language that corresponds with the philosophy of liberty that Milton had been developing over a number of years. Shortly following Raphael’s

445 See Poole, Milton and the Making of Paradise Lost, p. 101.
explanation of the hierarchical universe of animist monism, he explains the relationship between free will and obedience:

Attend: that thou art happy, owe to God;
That thou continuest such, owe to thyself,
That is, to thy obedience; therein stand.
This was that caution given thee; be advised.
God made thee perfect, not immutable;
And good he made thee, but to persevere
He left it in thy power, ordained thy will
By nature free, not overruled by fate
Inextricable, or strict necessity;
Our voluntary service he requires,
Not our necessitated [...] (v. 520-30)

Schoenfeldt describes this as ‘definition by negation’, which captures the taut balance between the ideal of obedience and the reality and mutability of free will. Raphael’s speech is emblematic of Milton’s view of liberty: the reality of free will risks transgression, but the ideal of Heaven – and the promise of accessing spiritual paradise – necessitates obedience, especially when the alternative is a fall akin to that of Satan, which Raphael subsequently describes. Such freedom within a penal structure is reminiscent of many utopias: in Harrington’s Oceana, as discussed in the previous chapter, the freedom of political participation is measured and contained within an eternal system of rotation, the equal agrarian. Freedom exists in a system. The difference with Milton is that he places more emphasis on the individual, who chooses to serve God, however much the system encourages that choice.

Milton’s animist monism helps to illuminate his views on freedom, especially within the unorthodox theology he delineates in De Doctrina. The animist condition of Milton’s monism distinguishes him from contemporary materialists, such as Hobbes. As the previous chapter acknowledged, Hobbes’s was a mechanistic materialism, in which all ‘life is but a motion of Limbs’. Hobbes’s mechanism necessitates determinism; freedom is negatively defined by the absence of impediments: ‘LIBERTY, or FREEDOM, signifieth (properly) the absence of opposition; (by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion;) and may be applied no less to irrational, and inanimate creatures, than to rational’ (CETH iv. 324).

As freedom can be applied to inanimate creatures, then it is merely a temporary condition of existence, rather than a vitalist reality; free will must give way to predetermined motional influences. Fallon asserts that Milton responded to such mechanism with a vitalist view of matter being ‘individual, animated, sensitive, and rational’. Rogers has similarly identified Milton’s ‘autonomous universe’ in *Paradise Lost* in contrast to ‘the direct and ongoing intervention of a powerful sovereign’ that defines the experience of the Hobbesian man. Milton explains in more explicit detail the nuances of this view of freedom in *De Doctrina*. In his discussion of Christian freedom, Milton asserts:

Christian freedom is that whereby, with Christ freeing [us], we are freed from the slavery of sin—and likewise from the prescript of the law and of human beings—like manumitted [slaves], so that, having become sons after being slaves, [and] adults after being children, we may be slaves to God in charity through the spirit of truth as our guide (*CWJM* viii/2. 717).

Jason A. Kerr argues that *serviamus*, translated in the Oxford edition as ‘we may be slaves to’, emphasises ‘the active exercise of Christian liberty’. J. C. Davis captures the essence of this view of freedom, which readily applies to Milton: ‘liberty of conscience meant submission to God […] and not to self.’ As discussed in the previous chapter, this philosophy of freedom is distinct from the neo-Roman conception of freedom as a condition separate from slavery, a form of negative liberty prominent in republican philosophy that Milton employed in his tracts for the English republic. Milton’s Christian individual is free—particularly free in conscience—in order to serve God. Milton enacts this service in *De Doctrina* through scriptural interpretation that he structures in a Ramist system: he exercises his freedom to serve through unorthodox interpretation and carefully structured textual dissemination.

Milton’s exegetical study is laborious and a kind of servitude, but it helps to unearth the ‘truth’ that is so difficult to ascertain in a postlapsarian age. Kerr extends Milton’s view of freedom to the reader of *De Doctrina*: ‘Rather than appeal to a mystical sense of interpersonal interconnections, Milton looks for his model of society

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to the unity achieved by a divine collective comprised of persons who are not only different and distinct from one another, but whose relations are characterized by liberty." This resembles the studious society that Milton portrays in his idealised London in *Areopagitica*, where Milton’s citizens are ‘sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas wherewith to present’ (*CPW* ii. 554). Kerr suggests that Milton intends to realise this ideal society by encouraging the reader to enter into the lengthy process that produced his theological treatise. Milton asserts this view himself at the beginning of *De Doctrina*:

> Lastly, I intend to make everyone understand, from the arguments I shall be found to have advanced (whether old or new), by their weight and influence, but more by the authority of the scriptures on whose very frequent witness the arguments rely, just how crucial it is for the Christian religion that the freedom be granted not simply of probing every doctrine, and of winnowing it in public, but also of thinking and indeed writing about it, in accordance with each person’s firm belief (*CWJM* viii. 9).

The agency that Milton affords his reader, however, especially given his entrenched disaffection with the English people by the late 1650s, is individual to that reader. As this study has shown, Milton’s belief in an ideal society of studious interpreters in *Areopagitica* is distinct from the increasing emphasis on the individual – exclusively the elect individual – from 1649 onwards. Indeed, in *The Readie and Easie Way*, Milton proposed national education as a means of making the commons more effective scriptural interpreters. While freedom of conscience remains a universal ideal for Milton, its purpose nevertheless becomes more centred around individuals rather than societies. The comprehensive biblical references that he makes in the running text of *De Doctrina*, rather than in the margins, therefore, illustrates the need for the reader to undertake individual research. Incorporating the words of *De Doctrina*, Kerr identifies this process as a form of slavery. If Milton did formulate his animist monism in response to determinist mechanism, then he does so through this freedom-as-servitude philosophy. Milton’s philosophy of liberty, therefore, is compatible with the universal, utopian hierarchy of *Paradise Lost*. Whereas Hobbes views freedom as a condition of motion, and systems as artificial – illustrated most famously by the ‘artificial man’ of the Leviathan – Milton perceives freedom as immanent and vital, but systems as universal and pervasive. The universe of *Paradise Lost*, which is defined by the Fall of

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453 Kerr, ‘Milton’s Theology of Liberation’, pp. 359, 351
Adam and Eve and the promise of millenarian ascension, is structured by its hierarchical system.

The universe of *Paradise Lost* is constituted by a hierarchy that incorporates many of the essential aspects of Milton’s political philosophy and theology. As a structure of animist materialism, the universal hierarchy permits access to the celestial sphere through obedience. Spiritual metamorphosis is brought about by service to God and elevation through the hierarchy. This anticipates the kind of apocalyptic transformation that will occur after the millennium, where ‘God shall be all in all’ (iii. 341). Until then, in characteristic utopian fashion, obedience is required, as Raphael suggests. Raphael’s prelapsarian instruction exhibits the essence of Milton’s utopian millenarianism: the individual is free to choose to obey, but that choice is encouraged by a penal hierarchical system that punishes transgression. In *De Doctrina*, Milton’s laborious scriptural interpretation is characterised as a godly service, which Milton hopes his reader is capable of emulating. Adam’s failure to fulfil this service, as we shall see, necessitates Michael’s rehabilitative postlapsarian education in the final two books of the poem. The universal hierarchy has Heaven at its helm, which epitomises the kind of structure and obedience that Raphael explains to Adam.

**HEAVENLY HIERARCHY**

Milton’s Heaven is an idealised totality. As the paragon of the universal hierarchy that Raphael describes to Adam, and the zenith of that hierarchy – the ideal to which the obedient, godly individual aspires – the Heaven in *Paradise Lost* is utopian. Amy Boesky has described Milton’s Heaven as a militarised totality.\(^{455}\) To understand Milton’s depiction of a hierarchy in Heaven, it is valuable to consider the godly republicanism of Henry Vane (1613-62), who Milton had praised in Sonnet 17 (*CWJM* iii. 291) for his advocacy of a separation of church and state. Chapter 6 showed how Milton’s 1659-60 texts shared utopian and millenarian ideas with Hobbes and Harrington, and also that his belief in liberty of conscience – specifically in the form of religious liberty discussed earlier in this chapter – marks him apart from them. By contrast, Feisal G. Mohamed argues that ‘Milton is clearly keeping company with the Vane circle in the critical years of 1659-60, and the ideas he promotes at this moment

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\(^{455}\) See Amy Boesky, ‘Milton’s Heaven and the Model of the English Utopia’, 91-110.
remain pervasive in his major poems. Vane’s *A Healing Question propounded* (1656) and *The Retired Mans Meditations* (1655) illustrate the relationship between godly republicanism and utopian millenarianism. Vane’s angelology helps to elucidate the juncture between Milton’s theology and political philosophy and its manifestation in the Heaven of *Paradise Lost*.

Theologically and politically, Vane shares considerable common ground with Milton. As part of the Council of State, Vane was involved with the Barebone’s Parliament that Cromwell forcibly dissolved in December 1653, but he maintained his distance from the Fifth Monarchist faction of the Council of State by suggesting that ‘he was willing to defer his share in the reign of the saints until he came to heaven.’ In *A Healing Question propounded* (1656), he writes in implicit terms of Cromwell’s impact on the ‘good Old Cause’. Vane explains how the right to ‘be governed by National Councils, and successive Representatives of their own election’, which was ‘ratified, as it were, in the blood of the last King’, has been repressed by ‘a great interruption’, which he defines as ‘accommodated to the private and selfish interest of a particular part’ and has resulted in disintegration of the commonwealth: ‘Hence it is that this compacted body is now falling asunder into many dissenting parts’ (2-3). Vane’s opposition to Cromwell in *A Healing Question* led to his arrest and imprisonment in 1656. The similarities that this chapter will acknowledge between Milton and Vane, therefore, must be considered in light of their differing support for Cromwell. Chapter 5 showed how Milton is necessarily distinguished from Nedham for his elitist attitude towards the people, which anticipated the utopianism of *The Readie and Easie Way* and did not align with Nedham’s interest theory. Milton nevertheless wrote in *The Readie and Easie Way* that ‘what I have spoken, is the language of the good old cause’ (*CWJM* vi. 520). Martin Dzelzainsis argues that Milton viewed this slogan, coined by Vane, as representing a government that protects

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457 For a discussion of Milton in relation to these texts, see Mohamed, *In the Anteroom of Divinity: The Reformation of the Angels from Colet to Milton* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), pp. 98-113.


459 Henry Vane, *A Healing Question propounded and resolved upon occasion of the late publique and seasonable Call to Humiliation, in order to love and union amongst the honest party, and with a desire to apply Balsome to the wound, before it become incurable* (1656), p. 25. All subsequent references to *A Healing Question* will be made parenthetically in the running text.
religious freedom: ‘This liberty of conscience which above all other things ought to be to all men dearest and most precious, no government more inclinable not to favor only but to protect, then a free Commonwealth’ (CWJM vi. 515). While Milton, as this study has argued, continued to support Cromwell during the Protectorate due to the latter’s protection of religious freedom, which is also in part why Nedham does the same, he considered a commonwealth like the one he proposed in The Readie and Easie Way preferable. Dzelzainis also posits that, while Milton did not tolerate Catholicism, which Vane did, their views on toleration were closer than is conventionally maintained. A comparison with Vane illuminates Milton’s similarities with godly republicanism, but it also further emphasises how Milton’s theology is his own and that, in Paradise Lost, it can be interpreted with an awareness of his utopian millenarianism.

Milton’s Heaven in Paradise Lost is defined by its hierarchy. Although the Father refers to the ‘Thrones, Princedoms, Powers, Dominations’ (iii. 320), and again later to the ‘Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, Virtues, Powers’ (v. 601), he does not go into detail about these angelic ranks. Milton’s clearest departure from the Dionysian model is in ‘promoting the ministerial Archangels to the top of his angelic hierarchy, and demoting the Seraphim and Cherubim to the bottom’. Joad Raymond emphasises the significance of hierarchy in Heaven, but acknowledges that the militarised formation of Heaven overrides the Dionysian system, which suggests that the angels ‘do not constitute a single, coherent hierarchy’. The military depiction of Heaven has led Amy Boesky to argue that Milton’s Heaven is the most evident utopia in Paradise Lost. Boesky compares the rise of the New Model Army to contemporary utopias exhibiting ‘a civilian corps of trained and zealous workers, dedicated to the common goal of productivity.’ Not only does Boesky accommodate both Plattes’s

462 See Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, p. 158.
Macaria and Winstanley’s Law of Freedom into her definition, but she also includes Of Education:

Discipline was to consolidate the corps of ideal students in the Miltonic academy, and similarly discipline governs the celestial community in Paradise Lost. Milton’s Heaven draws on contemporary utopian interest in regulation and discipline while offering one of the most elaborate presentations of the military aesthetic in the period.465

The discipline evident in Of Education, which shares more with More’s Utopia than Cromwell’s New Model Army, is a prominent feature of Milton’s utopianism. While Vane lacks the military emphasis of Milton’s representation of Heaven, he does believe in a universal hierarchy that he discusses in detail.

Vane defines his millenarian vision of a heavenly hierarchy in The Retired Mans Meditations, OR THE Mysterie and Power of GODLINESS (1655). Mohamed, in his lengthy discussion of angelology that looks back to the origins of the ninefold hierarchy in Dionysius, compares Vane’s angelic hierarchy to that of Milton in Paradise Lost.466 It is possible, however, to identify more evident and illuminating similarities between the two polemicists. Indeed, it is interesting that Vane encourages the reader to withhold judgment and ‘not to be prejudiced at the first view […] without a full and serious weighing of the whole; but by a diligent search and perusal of the Scriptures, whereon the things here witnessed’ (sig. a3). This resonates with Milton’s hope that a reader will be inspired by De Doctrina to embark on their own investigation of scripture (CWJM viii/1. 9). Vane offers in Meditations a lengthy interpretation of the hierarchical relationship between the saints, Heaven, and the millennium. He describes different groups of earthly people in hierarchical order: the first ‘know no higher rule at present, then this shadowy image of Christs natural perfection’; the second are Jews, described as ‘higher enlightened’ and the ‘seed of Abraham’ (126-8); the third, the idealised elect, are of the ‘Spiritual Seed’, and, ‘through the blood of the Lamb, being received into the unity of their faith of the Son of God, have the use of the spiritual senses […] enabling them to hear and obey what the spirit saith unto the Churches’ (137). The blurred boundary between body and spirit in Vane’s depiction of the elect extends to him envisioning the elect as ‘being made one dead or crucified body with Christ’, which, following the second coming,

466 For Dionysius, see Mohamed, In the Anteroom of Divinity, pp. 3-5.
metamorphoses into ‘one glorified body with Christ’ (403), during which ‘the believer hereby receives a raisedness of discerning and enlargedness of his natural mind, answering that effusion of spirit upon him, surpassing all natural knowledge of the uncrucified mind, causing him to see as he is seen’ (75).

Vane’s depiction of the saints constituting both a pre-millennial ‘crucified’ body and a spiritualised post-millennial body exhibits the remarkably close relationship between the saints and Christ that Vane envisions. Vane explains that, in the ‘heavenly Jerusalem’, ‘where the Elect and holy Angels are to have their residence, howbeit in station inferior to the Church or general assembly of the first-born, whose names are written in heaven, and who are the Lambs Bride and wife, whilst the Angels are but friends of the Bridegroom, and admitted into the secrets of the Bride-chamber […]’ (73). As Mohamed acknowledges, Vane envisages the saints as above the angels and in a marital union with Christ; the angels are only permitted access to the bridal chamber, rather than being an intimate part of it like the saints.

Vane differs from Milton in that he places the elect above the angels, whereas Milton does not articulate the structure of a post-millennial Heaven. Where Milton’s depiction of the Son is at the helm of a united angelic entity – ‘your head I him appoint’ (v. 606), the Father announces to the assembled angels in Heaven – Vane portrays the saints as wielding the power of judgement on behalf of Christ:

Secondly, as the Father gives authority to Christ in the capacity of the Sonne of man, to execute judgement as the only TENTATE, KING OF KINGS and LORD OF LORDS, under him, so Christ also shall give and derive to his body (the general assembly of the first-borne, whose names are written in heaven) authority to be the only Potentates, Lord of Lords, and King of Kings under him, whose Decrees and Ordinances, shall be binding unto all in heaven or in earth, or under the earth, next and immediately under Christ their head […] (409).

By placing the elect in such a high position within the heavenly hierarchy, Vane identifies their unique value in Christ’s threefold governance. However, unlike Milton, this did not encourage Vane to become more elitist in his political beliefs. Although Milton did not envision such an elevated position for the elect, the prospect of the millennium exacerbated his disillusionment with the commons and, in turn, encouraged his utopian formulations, which drew away from Nedham and Vane’s republicanism. Vane’s exegetical discussion of a universal hierarchy, and especially a

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467 Cf. Of Reformation, in CPW i. 572.
468 Mohamed, In the Anteroom of Divinity, p. 102.
hierarchy in Heaven, is comparable to *Paradise Lost* and Milton’s own knowledge and experience of godly republicanism.

In *Paradise Lost*, the hierarchy of Heaven is depicted alongside utopian discipline early in Book V when Raphael recounts God’s appointment of the Son as his right hand. In Raphael’s initial description, the angels stand ‘Innumerable before th’ Almighty’s throne’, ‘Under their hierarchs in orders bright’:

Ten thousand thousand ensigns high advanced,  
Standards and gonfalons ‘twixt van and rear  
Stream in the air, and for distinction serve  
Of hierarchies, of orders, and degrees (v. 585, 587-91)

As Raymond suggests, these military ranks contradict the Dionysian system that Milton accommodates in Heaven elsewhere. The emphasis here is on the extreme discipline needed to create order within the extreme number of angels present. The image is followed by a declaration by ‘the Father infinite’ that the Son will stand at his right hand to rule over Heaven:

your head I him appoint;  
And by myself have sworn to him shall bow  
All knees in Heav’n, and shall confess him Lord  
Under his great vicegerent reign abide  
United as one individual soul (v. 606-10)

Where Vane envisions the saints as having a ‘vicegerent’ role above that of the angels, in Milton’s pre-millenarian Heaven, there is no saintly elect. Instead, resonating with Milton’s assertion in *Of Reformation* that ‘a commonwealth ought to be but as one huge Christian personage’ (*CPW* i. 572) and with the unity of his studious London in *Areopagitica* (*CPW* ii. 553-5), the angels constitute a unified and disciplined collective. This collective is, moreover, monistic: rather than a ‘personage’, the angels form ‘one individual soul’, but the Father appoints the Son as its ‘head’, suggesting a corporeal aspect to the entity. As the angels experience bodily functions and yet are at the spiritual end of the universal hierarchy, they represent the linear continuum of spirit and matter that Milton had theorised since the early 1640s. Comparable to the image of Hobbes’s Leviathan state, depicted on the frontispiece of *Leviathan*, in which the sovereign is constituted by the bodies of its citizens, Milton’s representation of Heaven in *Paradise Lost* corresponds with the concept of a utopian totality.
The need to defend Heaven from Satan’s rebellion, or, given God’s omnipotence, perform the act of defence, militarises the utopian depiction of Heaven. Milton’s God, aware of Satan’s plan to incite insurgency against the Godhead, addresses the Son with distinctively militarised language:

Nearly it now concerns us to be sure
Of our omnipotence, and with what arms
We mean to hold what anciently we claim
Of deity or empire, such a foe
Is rising, who intends to erect his throne
Equal to ours, throughout the spacious North  
(v. 721-6)

Milton establishes a careful balance between ‘deity or empire’: the supernal and godly language of ‘omnipotence’ and ‘erect’ contrasts with the imperial tone of ‘arms’ and ‘throne’. The utopian stability and security of the totality, which God asserts to be embodied in the Son earlier in Book V, requires defence; its omnipotent permanence must be upheld. This translates to Milton’s depiction in Book VI of the angelic forces in an even more concentrated totality than before, as they marshal against Satan’s insurrection. The ‘powers militant, / That stood for Heaven, in mighty quadrate joined /
Of union irresistible’ and marched ‘In silence their bright legions, to the sound / Of instrumental harmony’ (vi. 61-3, 64-5). The cohesive movement is a fitting illustration of perfect, military discipline. ‘On they move’, Raphael continues,

Indissolubly firm; nor obvious hill,
Nor straitening vale, nor wood, nor stream divides
Their perfect ranks; for high above the ground
Their march was, and the passive air upbore
Their nimble tread […]  
(vi. 68-73)

The heavenly totality is whole and perfect in its unassailable permanence. The uncompromising cohesion of the angelic collective mirrors the military status of Heaven. As we shall see, it is to this perfect, utopian totality that Adam will aspire to return following Michael’s postlapsarian education in Book XII.

Milton’s Heaven is, therefore, like the wider universe of *Paradise Lost*, defined by hierarchy. Raymond’s concept of a ‘flexible hierarchy’ captures the complex relationship between status and proximity with God afforded by the universal hierarchy that Raphael describes: ‘Milton’s theory of matter, free will, and evil
depends on flexible hierarchies.' Abdiel, in his passionate and solitary rejection of Satan’s sinful rhetoric, articulates a view of progressive heavenly unity, whereby the hierarchy of Heaven accommodates an elevating association with the Godhead:

all the spirits of heaven
By him created in their bright degrees,
Crowned them with glory, and to their glory named
Thrones, dominations, princedoms, virtues, powers,
Essential powers, nor by his reign obscured,
But more illustrious made, since he the head
One of our number thus reduced becomes (v. 838-43)

The final juxtaposition of ‘reduced becomes’ represents the potential for ‘One of our number’ to ascend the heavenly hierarchy, and therefore the relationship between hierarchical rank and collective ennoblement brought about by connection to God, especially with the Son as the head of the angelic collective. Given the exalting influence of the Son at its head, the embodied angelic entity is comparable to Raphael’s explanation of the universal hierarchy. It may not be an explicit Neoplatonic chain of being, but there is a vital consistency between Milton’s Heaven and the universal hierarchy that Raphael describes. The flexibility of this hierarchy depends on an essential quality that encourages elevation from material to immaterial, from Earth to Heaven: obedience.

The one figure in Paradise Lost who chooses not to obey, and thereby incited a futile rebellion against God in Heaven, is Satan. Raphael describes to Adam in Book V how Satan, as one of the highest archangels, could not accept that the Son was higher up the universal hierarchy than he was: ‘he of the first, / If not the first Archangel, great in power, / In favour and pre-eminence, yet fraught / With envy against the Son of God’ (v. 659-62). ‘Affecting all equality with God’ (763), Satan erects a ‘royal seat’ (756) in the hope of artificially elevating himself to his desired status. It is here, in a further corruption of the speech that God made about the Son just a few lines earlier, that Satan addresses his own ‘Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, Virtues, Powers’, but expresses concern that

If these magnific titles yet remain
Not merely titular, since by decree

Raymond, Milton’s Angels, pp. 262-3.
Another now hath to himself engrossed
All power, and us eclipsed under the name
Of King anointed […] (v. 772-7)

Satan’s argues that the Son’s appointment at the head of Heaven overshadows the hierarchical positions of the rest of the angels. Such a reduction of hierarchical value, Satan explains to his fellow apostates, in a perverted formulation of Milton’s concept of liberty, impacts their condition of freedom: ‘if not equal all, yet free, / Equally free; for orders and degrees / Jar not with liberty, but well consist’ (v. 791-3). For Milton, the universal hierarchy provides the opportunity for mobility if Adam chooses to obey; for Satan, the inability to raise to the status of the Son is a limitation that necessitates transgression in exercise of that essential freedom to choose. The consequence of Satan’s rebellion, as God announces pre-emptively after anointing the Son, is to fall to and remain steadfastly at the base of the universal hierarchy, ‘Into utter darkness, deep engulfed, his place / Ordained without redemption, without end’ (v. 614-15). Like Adam and Eve, Satan is ‘free to fall’ (iii. 99); unlike Adam and Eve, though, Satan does not have the opportunity to be forgiven and reascend. The manner in which Milton’s hierarchy is flexible corresponds to how freedom, both in Paradise Lost and in his wider corpus, is at once individual and systemised. Adam and Eve must navigate this hierarchical system: they have the choice to remain steadfastly obedient like Abdiel, in the promise of spiritual elevation, or to transgress and fall like Satan and his apostates.

EDENIC EMPIRICISM

In Eden, Adam and Eve must maintain their obedience in order to ascend to Heaven rather than descend – or fall – to a lesser Eden, or even Hell. Adam and Eve come to understand the condition of Milton’s universe through Raphael’s prelapsarian education, which mirrors the postlapsarian counterpart that Michael provides in Books XI and XII. As Milton republished Of Education in 1673, he appears to have maintained the elitist educational ideas presented in the tract in 1644, which was discussed in Chapter 2. Critics who have read the educational aspects of Paradise Lost

with an awareness of *Of Education* have often focused on Milton’s asserted intention in the tract that the purpose of learning was to ‘regain to know God aright’. Michael Allen suggests that Raphael and Michael represent two different styles of education – the former too lenient and the latter too critical – neither of which succeed; Adam’s discussions with the Father, by contrast, represent a successful education, which enables Adam to ‘know’ God in the manner to which Milton aspires in *Of Education*.471 Erin Webster has recently observed a similar relationship between *Of Education* and *Paradise Lost*, acknowledging the ‘empirical flavour of Milton’s epistemology’.472 While there is value in these arguments, neither acknowledge the Hartlibian context of *Of Education*, which informs a reading of education in *Paradise Lost*. As Chapter 2 has shown, the idealised intention of ‘regaining to know God aright’ – the idea of education and learning *regaining* something lost – is inherently Baconian. Milton more often identifies postlapsarian learning as studious scriptural research in order to discover – or rediscover – a lost Truth, as he suggests in *Areopagitica* – the ‘generall and brotherly search after Truth’ (*CPW* ii. 554) – and exemplifies in the composition of *De Doctrina*. Adam’s initial discovery of the world, in which he ‘learns’ God, is a representation of Baconian empiricism. As the following two sections will show, however, empiricism can not only help an individual to understand God, but it can also encourage characters like Adam and Eve to become enraptured by sensual experience. The ability to moderate such experience – in an exercise of self-control – is an essential quality of the elect individual that Adam must learn at the end of the poem.

There has been much debate over Milton’s Baconianism and his sympathy for new science, as it developed from the Hartlib Circle through to the Royal Society. Alvin Snyder argues that Milton ‘found himself drawn towards the new philosophy and scientific ideology of the Great Instauration’, with a particular focus on origins, which he aligns to Bacon.473 William Poole, by contrast, argues for Milton’s distance from the organisations of new science. He argues that ‘Milton remained a very peripheral contact of the Hartlibians’ and equates this to his continued distance from the Royal Society,

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exemplified by correspondence with members of the Society, such as Henry Oldenburg (1619-77).\textsuperscript{474} As Chapters 2 and 3 of this study have shown, while Milton can be defined neither as a Hartlibian nor a Comenian, he espoused many central Hartlibian ideas, such as, most clearly, the Baconianism of \textit{Of Education}. Members of the Royal Society remained wary of Milton: John Beale (1608-83), for instance, was concerned with Milton’s depiction of Satan in \textit{Paradise Lost}, but also considered how Milton’s services could be employed by the Royal Society.\textsuperscript{475} Milton may not have engaged with contemporary scientific movements of the Royal Society, but the Baconianism of some of his 1640s writings survived into his later works. ‘While there is no denying that it is possible to situate Milton in some kind of “dialogue” with contemporary science,’ Poole argues, ‘the dynamics of this dialogue are affected by other variables, notably the appropriation of radicalism, particularly theological radicalism.’\textsuperscript{476} This study has identified in Milton’s utopian millenarianism precisely this bridge between Milton’s theology and his Baconianism. While Milton became aloof from the Hartlibians in the late-1640s and remained separate from the Royal Society, his utopian millenarianism maintained the view that knowledge, in a Baconian fashion, could regain proximity to God by reconstituting truth. M. L. Donnelly asserts that Milton’s characterisation of ‘the lonely and heroic champion of truth against the sottish multitude, would have found no congruence in Bacon’s Atlantic collaborative enterprise’.\textsuperscript{477} Milton’s utopianism was institutionalised in \textit{Of Education} and \textit{The Readie and Easie Way}, but, as the focus of Milton’s utopianism became more internalised in the 1660s, so the focus of Milton’s Baconianism became more individualised. While Adam is an individual in \textit{Paradise Lost}, the exposition of his post-creation experience nonetheless reflects Baconian empiricism. As Bacon advocates in \textit{The Advancement of Learning}, ‘pure knowledg of nature and universality’ is comparable to ‘a knowledge by the light whereof man did give names unto other creatures in Paradise, as they were brought before him’ (\textit{OFB} iv. 6).


\textsuperscript{476} Poole, ‘Milton and Science’, p. 28.

The empiricism of Eden reflects Bacon’s natural philosophy: Adam comes to know God by his decisive and dominating understanding of Eden’s natural world and its inhabitants. In Book VIII, Adam explains to Raphael how, having just been created, his power to name facets and creatures of the natural world gives him both understanding and control. Adam explains how he tried to speak, ‘and forthwith spake, / My tongue obeyed and readily I could name / What’er I saw.’ Adam’s natural ability to name is illustrated by his emphatic second person address of nature: ‘Thou sun’; ‘thou enlightened earth’; ‘Ye hills and dales, ye rivers’ (viii. 271-3; 273; 274; 275). Adam then questions ‘how came I thus, how here?’ (277), which is answered by the Father in a theophany. It is here that the Father explains to Adam his dominance over the natural world, and the role of naming, which Adam had begun to do impulsively, in bringing about this dominion:

Not only these fair bounds, but all the earth
To thee and to thy race I give; as lords
Possess it, and all things that therein live,
Or live in sea, or air, beast, fish, and fowl.
In sign whereof each bird and beast behold
After their kinds; I bring them to receive
From thee their names, and pay thee fealty
With low subjection […]

(viii. 338-45)

The names come directly from Adam in a display of the natural power he has over the animals and the ‘fealty’ they show him. Adam’s empirical knowledge, of learning from a direct and sensual understanding of nature, is Baconian in its relationship to dominance. The Father encourages the empirical process by prompting Adam, who questions why he is alone, to explain why the ‘various living creatures’ of Eden are not sufficient company (369). Milton’s God, aware that he is going to create Eve, encourages Adam to look beyond himself and to the natural world. In response, Adam expresses himself in hierarchical language – ‘Hast thou not made me here thy substituted, / And these inferior far beneath me set?’ (381-2) – and provides evidence through examples from nature, referring to ‘Each with their kind, lion with lioness; / So fitly them in pairs thou hast combined’ (393-4). By naming the Edenic creatures that God has presented to him, Adam is able to understand the subtle distinctions between them. As a result, Adam comes to an understanding of the universal hierarchy.
The Father then elevates Adam’s focus from the natural world to God himself, which completes Adam’s empirical process from natural world to knowing God. The Father responds to Adam’s comparison of himself to natural creatures with a comment on how he is ‘alone / From all eternity, for none I know / Second to me or like, equal much less’ (viii. 405-7). Adam replies by drawing on his understanding of distinctions in the natural world; he uses language of elevation, in accordance with Milton’s ordered universe:

To attain  
The height and depth of thy eternal ways  
All human thoughts come short, supreme of things;  
Thou in thyself art perfect, and in thee  
Is no deficiency found; not so is man,  
But in degree, the cause of his desire  
By conversation with his like to help,  
Or solace his defects.  

(viii. 412-19)

It is from Adam’s understanding of God’s ineffable and inscrutable nature that he can identify his own lesser status, ‘in degree’, and understand his need for conversation and procreation.\(^\text{478}\) One of the distinctions that Adam observes between himself and God is the Father’s ability to elevate the status and condition of the Edenic creatures: ‘I by conversing cannot these erect / From prone, nor in their ways complacence find’ (432-3).’ God commends Adam for ‘knowing not of beasts alone, / Which thou hast rightly named, but of thyself’, particularly because Adam was made in ‘My image’, which was ‘not imparted to the brute’ (438-9; 441). Adam raises his empirical gaze from the Edenic creatures to the Father, which helps him to understand himself. Milton, therefore, exalts empirical knowledge as a prelapsarian skill that God nurtures by his questioning of Adam.

However, Adam’s excessive use of the senses – as a corruption of Edenic empiricism – also exposes his fallible nature, and his inadequate response to Raphael’s education. When Adam invites Raphael to join him and Eve in their bower, he does so using hierarchical language:

\(^{478}\) Cf. Milton’s concern in *The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce* that marital partners should enjoy a ‘correspondence [...] of the mind’ (*CPW* ii. 326), rather than just carnal union; see also Diane Purkiss, who suggests that ‘conversation’ was a ‘euphemism for sex in the period’, in ‘The Rhetoric of Milton’s Divorce Tracts’, note 14, p. 192.
Heavenly stranger, please to taste
These bounties which our nourisher, from whom
All perfect good unmeasured out, descends,
To us for food and for delight hath caused
The earth to yield; unsavoury food perhaps
To spiritual natures; only this I know,
That one celestial Father gives to all.

(v. 397-403)

Raphael’s education is intended to fill the gap in Adam’s knowledge. Where Adam intuits through his empirical process that there is a universal order, Raphael explicitly educates him with his monistic and Neoplatonic description of the universal hierarchy, and, as discussed above, the obedience required to remain or elevate within this hierarchy. It is, therefore, significant that Adam does not appear to fully understand Raphael’s teachings. Adam explains how Eve was created following his encounter with the Father. In his account, Adam responds to Eve in much the same way as he did with Eden earlier, but he does so by allowing his senses to overwhelm reason, and thereby ignore Raphael’s lengthy education. Adam explains how Eve ‘on her bestowed / Too much ornament, in outward show / Elaborate’ (viii. 537-9), and acknowledges that ‘Of nature her the inferior’, but he admits that

when I approach
Her loveliness, so absolute she seems
And in her self complete, so well to know
Her own, that what she wills to do or say,
Seems wisest, virtuousest discreetest, best

(viii. 546-50)

Adam is overwhelmed by Eve’s appearance: unlike his empirical interaction with Eden, Adam’s response to Eve is sensual, which draws away from his understanding of God. He affirms this when he says that ‘All higher knowledge in her presence falls / Degraded’, for ‘Authority and reason on her wait’ (551-2; 554). ‘Ignoring his rational superiority to Eve’, Mohamed explains, ‘Adam focuses instead on sensual desire’, which ‘puts him directly at odds with the internal fitness to which his celestial physician has devoted his efforts.’ Adam is not the only character in Paradise Lost to become overwhelmed by sensual stimulus: Eve herself is enchanted by her own reflection when she was first created (iv. 453-91) and Satan becomes ‘Stupidly good’ as a consequence

479 Mohamed, In the Anteroom, pp. 119-22, 127.
of beholding Eve (ix. 455-72). The difference with Adam is that he has received Raphael’s education. As a result, his failure to learn from Raphael here anticipates the Fall later in the poem and signifies the importance of self-control that Adam will need to exhibit in order to reattain God’s favour, and which the Son of Paradise Regain’d exemplifies.

While Milton locates Baconian empiricism in Eden, he also identifies its limits: Adam must adhere to Raphael’s explanation of obedience, and be aware of the universal hierarchy, in which there is both reward by elevation and punishment through a ‘fall’. Empiricism is a means of knowing God. With only a few scaffolding comments from God, Adam swiftly – over just a few lines – moves from sense and sensual response to nature to an appreciation of God and the structured order of Milton’s universe. Adam, nevertheless, despite Raphael’s warnings, exhibits the sensuous fallibility that marks the consequence of the Fall, whereby he is ‘fondly overcome with female charm’ and, having eaten of the forbidden fruit, ‘he on Eve / Began to cast lascivious eye, she him / As wantonly repaid’ (ix. 999; 1014-15). Indeed, Adam’s failure to adhere to Raphael’s education has led some critics to suggest that Raphael’s education is performative rather than constructive: Philip Gallagher argues that Raphael’s ‘descent turns out in the event to have been a restorative work of merciful supererogation’. That Adam’s empiricism is associated with the Fall accords with Milton’s belief that obedience is required to attain the millennium in the postlapsarian world. Whereas Adam’s innate, empirical skills indicate his natural ability to withstand the Fall and suggest that he is ‘Sufficient to have stood’ (iii. 99), the Fall means that Michael has the difficult task of re-educating the transgressed Adam. Raphael’s education is affirmative, in that Adam is already innately sufficient; Michael’s postlapsarian teachings, by contrast, are rehabilitative, in that Adam has fallen and must uncover a truth now disparate and lost.

POSTLAPSARIAN EDUCATION: REGAINING PARADISE

Adam makes clear progress in Michael’s postlapsarian education, despite being a more challenging pupil than Raphael encountered. Critics such as Allen and Schuler

discussed above have focused on the teaching qualities and methods of Raphael, Michael and the Father. A problem with these arguments is that they assume a consistency of pupil, or at least deny the significance of the Fall as a transitional and complicating factor in the progress of Adam’s education: the ‘similarities between Michael’s instruction and Raphael’s teaching should suggest that the Fall does not drastically alter the educational process; rather, the Fall simply makes the process more difficult.”481 However, Adam’s initial response to Michael’s visions signifies his fallen condition; he is distinct from the Adam that Raphael educates earlier in the poem.

Having ascended the ‘hill / Of Paradise the highest’, which recalls the height of God’s hill in Book V and Satan’s perverse reflection of it, Michael displays to Adam ‘visions of God’, or an account of biblical history from the reader’s perspective (xi. 377-8; 377). Adam is first exposed to Cain murdering Abel, as Abel, ‘deadly pale / Groaned out his soul with gushing blood effused’ (xi. 446-7), the graphic language of which illustrates the visionary quality of this education. Adam’s immediate reaction is one of incredulity, if not defiance: ‘O teacher, some great mischief hath befallen / To that meek man, who well had sacrificed; / Is piety thus and pure devotion paid?’ (xi. 450-2). Allowing the vision to overwhelm his reason – now a familiar mistake for Adam – Adam’s rhetorical question appears as a challenge, as he blindly questions why Abel is killed. Such a confrontational question is of stark contrast to the inquisitive questioning Adam displayed in his discussions with Raphael and God. While the Fall may have been inevitable, Adam was still ‘Sufficient to have stood’ (iii. 99) for Raphael; for Michael, Adam is fallen and must now begin the journey to recovery and ascension.

In a sign of early progress, Adam’s defensive pity for his firstborn sons soon gives way to anguish over the reality of death that all mankind must experience, images of which Michael provides through the ‘lazar-house’ of sickness, ‘wherein were laid / Numbers of all diseased, all maladies’ (xi. 479-80). Adam laments,

O miserable mankind, to what fall
Degraded, to what wretched state reserved!
Better end here unborn. Why is life giv’n
To be thus wrested from us? rather why
Obtruded on us thus? who if we knew
What we receive, would either not accept
Life offered, or soon beg to lay it down,
Glad to be so dismissed in peace. (xi. 500-7)

481 Schuler, ‘Sanctification of Milton’s Academy’, p. 53.
These rhetorical questions draw parallels with Adam’s wider postlapsarian existential questioning, which he directs to God himself in Book X:

Did I request thee, Maker, from my clay  
To mould me man, did I solicit thee  
From darkness to promote me, or here place  
In this delicious garden?  

(Milton, Paradise Lost, Book X, lines 743-6)

Mirroring the progression of the Father’s questions for Adam immediately after he had been created, Adam shifts from an egocentric focus in Book X to a broader sympathy for his sons in Book XI and then, finally, to an encompassing mourning of all ‘miserable mankind’. Although Adam is making progress, he is a different student to the individual whom Raphael taught. Michael’s education is, therefore, necessarily restorative: where Raphael’s explanation of hierarchy and obedience was not enough to overcome Adam’s sensual overreliance, Michael’s prophetic visions use the senses to more tangibly show the fallen man why obedience is best. The visions themselves – as a sensory means of teaching – may be an effective and pragmatic pedagogical decision on Michael’s part.

Adam continues to make progress by responding appropriately to and identifying with the elect individuals in Michael’s visions. By comparing what Adam learns about suffering to the experience of the Levellers in 1649, Williams argues that the latter two books of Paradise Lost ‘level’ boundaries and hierarchy through unity with God. As this chapter has shown, hierarchy is a defining theme of Paradise Lost, and this is no less clear in the latter two books of the poem. As Hammond explains, “‘Few’ is a word that frequently appears in Paradise Lost, signifying the small group in which – rather than in the people – Milton has now invested his hopes.’ The trajectory of Milton’s elitism is one of increasing exclusivity: ‘In the postlapsarian world it is often not even the few but only the solitary individual who now embodies faithfulness […].’ This is illustrated by Michael’s vision of a debauched, sinful world, in which only an elect few remain steadfast and obey God. Having depicted a scene of a siege, where ‘carcasses and arms th’ensanguined field / Deserted’, Michael reassures Adam of

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482 Williams, Milton’s Leveller God, pp. 341-5.  
483 Hammond, Milton and the People, pp. 227; 228
what will happen to the ‘one rising, eminent / In wise deport’, who ‘spake much of right and wrong, / Of justice, of religion, truth and peace’:

  him the Most High
  Rapt in a balmy cloud with winged steeds
  Did, as thou saw’st, receive to walk with God
  High in salvation and the climes of bliss,
  Exempt from death, to show thee what reward
  Awaits the good, the rest what punishment

(xi. 654; 665-7; 705-10)

This initiates a series of Old Testament stories, in which Michael focuses on the select individuals that promote God and truth to their people. Michael’s description of Noah, for instance, has a significant influence on Adam. In a time where ‘all shall turn degenerate, all depraved’, ‘One man except, the only son of light’ will ‘them admonish, and before them set / The paths of righteousness’ (xi. 806, 813-14). Adam responds directly to the vision of Noah, declaring that he no longer feels the need to ‘lament for one whole world’, but can instead ‘rejoice / For one man found so perfect and so just’ (xi. 874; 875-6). Where he earlier shifted away from a selfish focus on himself and towards all of ‘miserable mankind’, he now returns to a celebration of the success and obedience of elect individuals, distinct from his earlier concern for his fallen descendants. The elect individual compensates for the decimation of an entire world. Just as Of Education illuminated our understanding of the Baconian qualities of Eden when Adam was first created, so it shines a light on Adam’s development as an elite individual through Michael’s education. The celebration of the elect in Paradise Lost resonates with Milton’s belief in the education of the elite serving as a necessary means of bringing about greater unity with God and greater societal progress. As Adam recognises and aspires to the ideal of these elect individuals, so he is himself fulfilling that ideal.

The millennium serves as the final inspiration for Adam to return to obedience.\footnote{For discussions of millenarianism in Paradise Lost, see Stella P. Revard, ‘Milton and Millenarianism’ in Milton and the Ends of Time, pp. 56-62; Malabika Sarkar, ‘Astronomical Signs in Paradise Lost: Milton, Ophiucus, and the Millennial Debate’, in Milton and the Ends of Time, pp. 88-92.} Having witnessed the Hebraic republic, Adam asks Michael ‘why to those / Among whom God will deign to dwell on earth / So many and so various laws are giv’n’ (xii. 280-2). Adam’s valid question solicits a valuable response from Michael, who identifies the millenarian purpose of obedience: while the ‘law appears imperfect’,
Michael explains, it is intended ‘to resign them in full time / Up to a better cov’nant, disciplined / From shadowy types to truth, from flesh to spirit’ (xii. 300, 301-3). This recalls the promise that Raphael made to Adam that man could eventually ascend to the spiritual status of angels. Michael’s prophecy of the second coming encodes the idea of a spiritual metamorphosis of matter:

And thence shall come,
When this world’s dissolution shall be ripe,
With glory and power to judge both quick and dead,
To judge th’ unfaithful dead, but to reward
His faithful, and receive them into bliss,
Whether in Heav’n or earth, for then the earth
Shall all be Paradise, far happier place
Than this Eden, and far happier days (xii. 458-65)

‘The transformation of the universe at the end of time’, Juliet Cummins suggests, ‘is achieved in Paradise Lost through material transformation.’ In accordance with the emphasis on the elite few throughout Michael’s education, Adam asks ‘what will betide the few / His faithful, left among th’ unfaithful herd, / The enemies of truth’ (xii. 480-2). Michael responds to this not only with a story of the disciples, but also by indicating that the role that the disciples play in spreading truth in a world of sin will also be the role that the elect must take throughout Christian history. Michael’s final description of ‘New heavens, new earth, ages of endless date / Founded in righteousness and peace and love’ solicits Adam’s conclusive declaration of obedience:

Greatly instructed I shall hence depart,
Greatly in peace of thought, and have my fill
Of knowledge, what his vessel can contain;
Beyond which was my folly to aspire.
Henceforth I learn, that to obey is best,
And love with fear the only God […] (xii. 557-62)

Adam does not seek more knowledge; he recognises that ‘beyond is all abyss, / Eternity, whose end no eye can reach’ (xii. 555-6). Adam will not replicate the act of overreaching that led to the Fall. He will, instead, obey: with a knowledge of what will

486 See Hammond, Milton and the People, p. 229.
result from his continued obedience, he now emulates the elect individuals of Michael’s visions. Aligning with the relationship between utopianism and millenarianism identified in this thesis, Adam’s conformity will, ultimately, result in his elevation beyond Eden and to millenarian unity with God.

Adam’s postlapsarian, rehabilitative education, is the part of *Paradise Lost* that most directly relates to Milton’s own postlapsarian condition. Throughout his prose works, Milton had increasingly developed a belief in the elect individual. By the mid-1660s, Milton, whose disillusionment with the English people had become irredeemably entrenched, would have naturally invested his faith and creative energies in an individual such as Adam, who, having fallen, commits to obedience in order to reintegrate into the universal hierarchy and, ultimately, ascend to angelic participation. Claude Stulting observes how, in the final two books of the epic, ‘rather than being grounded externally in the materiality of the created order, Adam’s and Eve’s relation to God becomes radically interiorized’.487 Where Adam comes to a prelapsarian understanding of God through his empirical observations of the Edenic natural world, his postlapsarian condition necessitates internal self-control, the virtue for which Milton praised Cromwell in *Defensio Secunda*, and which, as we shall see in the following chapter, would become a central motif in *Paradise Regain’d*. As Michael’s reference to ‘shadowy types to truth’ suggests, to emulate Adam, Milton requires his reader to labour through scriptural study, just as Milton himself had done in *De Doctrina*, and which he idealised in *Areopagitica*. The distinction between Raphael’s affirmative and Michael’s restorative education is significant. Adam and Eve’s transgression removes them from the totality of the universal hierarchy; the promise of the millennium by Michael and the example of their elect, godly descendants, inspires in Adam the utopian obedience and self-control necessary to secure eschatological reunification with God. Adam’s reaction to Michael’s education exemplifies how elect individuals should act in Milton’s time: obedience to God through internal self-control, realised by a condition of essential religious freedom.

CONCLUSION

Paradise Lost exhibits multiple facets of Milton’s utopian millennium. The hierarchy that pervades the poem is defined by the totality of Heaven: as the hierarchical head, it is a utopian ideal from which Adam and Eve, through transgression, fall away, and to which, through obedience, they aspire to return. As in Milton’s wider corpus, utopian obedience in Paradise Lost is necessary to achieve the millenarian ideal promised to Adam by Michael at the end of the epic. The Baconian utopianism of Adam’s prelapsarian empiricism – individualised, rather than monumentalised as in Salomon’s House – results in an overreliance on sensual experience. In the postlapsarian world, it is obedience to God, the exercise of religious freedom that Milton had idealised throughout his prose works and which formed a central feature of his utopian millenarianism, that promises reunification with God and ascension of the universal hierarchy. Milton depicts an epic universe in which utopian means achieve millenarian ends. The individualised focus on Adam anticipates Milton’s most complete depiction of his utopian millennium in the figure of the Son of Paradise Regain’d. The decision to obey God is an exercise in religious liberty. Adam begins to appreciate this postlapsarian reality in the final books of Paradise Lost; the Son of Paradise Regain’d, who will bring about the millennium and who exhibits utopian self-control, embodies it.
Milton most clearly realises his utopian millennium in the figure of the Son in *Paradise Regain’d* (1671). Where the pedagogical final two books of *Paradise Lost* depict Adam’s rehabilitative learning curve, from the Fall to his vow of obedience in the final lines of the poem, the Son in *Paradise Regain’d* is the embodiment of the obedience that Michael teaches. Milton makes the distinction between ‘one man’s disobedience lost’ and the ‘Recovered Paradise to all mankind, / By one man’s firm obedience fully tried’ (i. 2; 3-4) explicit in the opening lines of the brief epic. This chapter will argue that Milton’s Jesus demonstrates his status as Christ through his utopian will: a perfect, unflawing resilience to temptation that secures the millennium for mankind. The Son, therefore, becomes a representation of truth sparring against satanic falsehood, which in *Areopagitica* served as part of Milton’s argument against pre-publication licensing: ‘Let her and Falshood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and open encounter’ (*CPW* ii. 561). The chapter will use Milton’s proximity to contemporary Quakerism to illuminate this depiction of the Son: Milton’s steadfast belief in liberty of conscience not only contributes to the internal focus of *Paradise Regain’d*, but it also establishes a common ground between the blind poet and contemporary Quakerism. The individualism of the idealised Son, moreover, aligns with Milton’s entrenched disaffection with the commons. Far removed from the backsliding English people, with whom he had long been disillusioned, the Son embodies Milton’s perfectionist elitism. The total self-control that the Son exhibits, resembling similar qualities that Milton praises in Cromwell in *Defensio Secunda*, is representative of an inner utopia. Having shown Milton’s Quaker context, this chapter will assert that Milton’s utopian millennium is realised in the figure of the Son and, as Milton aspires to emulate the qualities of the hero of the brief epic, in Milton himself.

488 For Adam’s declaration of obedience, see *Paradise Lost*, book xii, lines 557-62
490 On Milton’s defence of heresy, which he initially articulates in *Areopagitica* on these terms, see *Of Civil Power*, *CPW* vii. 250-2; *Of True Religion Hæresie, Schism, Toleration* (1673), *CPW* viii. 422-7.
491 See Milton, *Eikonoklastes*, in *CWJM*, vi. 424, and chapter 4 of this study; see also *The Readie and Easie Way*, in *CWJM*, vi. 501, and chapter 6 of this study.
Thomas Corns posits that *Paradise Regain’d* exhibits a continuity between Milton’s political and poetical works, in which Milton’s self-representation is central. While the debate surrounding *Paradise Regain’d* has centred on its pacifism or implicit militarism, Corns argues that this critical tradition ‘misses the point that Milton, since the 1640s, has sought assiduously to equate the two.’ The role that Milton identifies himself as fulfilling is an activist one. Specifically, for ‘Milton, evidently, the image of the battle of the books, revitalised in his prose, is an unironised representation of the continuities between his polemical endeavours and military conflict.’ As this study has shown, Milton depicts textual conflict in *Areopagitica* as millenarian Truth combating Falsehood, which can only be realised in a community that tolerated liberty of conscience and did not enforce pre-publication licensing. Milton’s vision for a studious and collaborative London community exemplifies this ideal (*CPW* ii. 553-9). The concept of military-style textual disagreement that Corns identifies in *Paradise Regain’d*, as we will see, is the mature realisation of the combative Truth depicted in *Areopagitica*. Milton, as with the Son he conveys, identifies himself as a defender of Truth, in active opposition to Falsehood: ‘whatever the Son’s conduct and values may be associated with, they are not, in the Miltonic value system, to be equated with passivity’. Rather than an ‘*imtatio Christi*’, the Son represents an ‘*imtatio Miltoni*’.492 This chapter will contribute to Corns’s astute analysis by bringing greater attention to Milton’s engagement with the contemporary liberty of conscience debate, especially in relation to his proximity to Quakerism, and how that further aligns Milton’s experiences in Restoration England with the internalised qualities of the Son.

Studies concerning Milton’s proximity to contemporary Quakerism have focused on the pacifist principles that he may have drawn from the religious sect.493 Stephen Marx and John Coffey offer differing views of the pacifism depicted in *Paradise Regain’d*. Marx suggests that Milton and the Quakers underwent similar experiences during the Interregnum and Restoration periods. With many Quakers originating from Cromwell’s New Model Army, Marx posits that they, like Milton, transitioned from support for the violent actions that secured the republic to


disillusionment with the republican regime to further disaffection with the subsequent restoration of the monarchy.\textsuperscript{494} John Coffey offers a different perspective, arguing that \textit{Paradise Regain’d}, despite advocating pacifist principles, which are ‘a sharp reminder to the godly that they should be willing to live with the mysteries of divine providence and follow the Son on the road of “patience and heroic martyrdom”’, is not a pacifist text. Coffey explains that many critics do not acknowledge that \textit{Paradise Regain’d} depicts a scene from the ‘grand narrative of salvation history, a narrative with a beginning, a middle, and an end.’ \textit{Paradise Regain’d}, Coffey asserts, is emphatic in its insistence that one day the Son will come in glory and in power to crush the satanic forces.\textsuperscript{495} While Marx focuses too readily on pacifism as a connective factor between Milton and Quakerism, Coffey himself identifies Milton’s millenarian militarism at too great a remove from Quaker pacifism. Whereas the militarism of \textit{Areopagitica} is metaphorical – the ‘war-faring Christian’ helps metaphorical Truth to combat Falsehood – in a text like \textit{Samson Agonistes}, which will be discussed at length in the conclusion, violence is at the climactic heart of the dramatic poem. The toleration that Milton advocates in \textit{Areopagitica}, including of Quakers, creates a landscape where textual ideas can conflict through disagreement; the violence in \textit{Samson Agonistes} is partly a consequence of Samson’s oppression, an experience that Milton shared with the Quakers in the 1660s. The apocalyptic violence that Samson exhibits at the end of the dramatic poem also finds parallel in Quakers like Thomas Ellwood: ‘Lament and mourn you sons of Belial […] for a sudden destruction is coming upon you.’\textsuperscript{496} While Milton was not afraid of violence, the Son’s apparent passivity in \textit{Paradise Regain’d} signifies his self-control, an inner utopia that brings about the defeat of Satan. Rather than focusing on violence, this chapter will show how Milton’s engagement with contemporary Quakerism informs an interpretation of the individualism and internalisation of \textit{Paradise Regain’d}.

David Loewenstein identifies a consistency between the messianic hero’s patience and perseverance in \textit{Paradise Regain’d} and the experience of the early Quakers, in which ‘inward strength, obedience, and faith were indeed fully tested and

\textsuperscript{496} Thomas Ellwood, \textit{An Alarm to the Priests; Or, a Message from Heaven, To forewarn them of the dreadfull day of the Lord which will suddenly overtake them, unless by speedy and unfeigned repentance they return to the Lord} (1660), p. 3.
proven by trials and tribulations in the hostile wilderness of this world.’ This observation is astute, but it does not mean, as Loewenstein suggests, that Milton is depicting the struggles of the commons. Although it is true that the Son ‘hardly qualifies as an aristocratic epic hero’, Milton is representing the social status of the biblical Jesus, rather than making a social commentary. The representation of the Son does not support the implicit comparison Loewenstein makes between the social status of Jesus and the experience of Gerrard Winstanley or the Quaker, Richard Hubberthorne.497 Paradise Regain’d was written during a time of significant change in contemporary Quakerism. George Fox had published A Declaration from the Harmles & Innocent People of God, called Quakers, Against all Plotters and Fighters in the World (1660), in which he asserted Quaker pacifism to the king.498 The Quakers themselves had also moved away from the radical Digger-like egalitarianism that defined the movement for a large part of the 1650s.499 As Barry Reay explains, ‘In the 1650s the movement had been poised on the brink of a genuine radical egalitarianism: in the 1660s and 1670s it drew back.500 To illustrate, Robert Barclay declares in his An Apology For the True Christian Divinity (1678), which became a defining Quaker text, ‘let not any judge, that, from our opinion of these things, any necessity of levelling will follow, or that all men must have things in common’.501 Although the Quakers remained resistant to tithes, refused to take an oath to the king and actively lobbied for freedom of conscience, by the 1660s, they no longer espoused radical egalitarianism.502 As such, Milton’s association with the Quakers, which is the closest he came to engaging with contemporary sectarianism, must be qualified by these changes to Quaker ideology. The Son is an idealised individual. Rather than representative of the potential of the common people, the Son serves as a model of self-control for elect individuals like Milton.

This chapter intends to contribute to N. H. Keeble’s work on identifying the nonconformist context of the Restoration period. At various points in The Literary Culture of Nonconformity in Later Seventeenth-Century England, Keeble discusses

497 David Loewenstein, Representing Revolution, pp. 247; 251-54.
498 George Fox, et al., A Declaration from the Harmles & Innocent People of God, called Quakers, Against all Plotters and Fighters in the World (1660).
499 Edward Burrough in 1654 wrote ‘Wilstandley [Winstanley] sayes he believes we are sent to perfect that worke which fell in their handes hee hath bene with us’, quoted in Reay, The Quakers and the English Revolution (Palgrave Macmillan, 1985), p. 33.
501 Robert Barclay, An Apology For the True Christian Divinity, As the same is held forth, and preached by the people, Called, in Scorn, Quakers (1678), pp. 369-70.
Milton’s nonconformity alongside contemporary Quakerism. Within his extensive analysis of broader nonconformist ideologies, he observes the pervasive ideas of internalisation and individualism, which are manifest in *Paradise Regain’d*. Although this ‘trend was most marked amongst the Quakers’, with their theology of the inner light, it was also a feature of broader nonconformist millenarianism in the Restoration. ‘The millenarianism of the Interregnum’, Keeble explains, ‘was transmuted into what a modern theologian would call “realized eschatology”, the doctrine that the kingdom of God belongs not to the future nor to the world but is founded within each believer who possesses, in Milton’s phrase, “a paradise within”’. In the specific context of the early 1670s, Laura Lunger Knoppers explains that the repressive legislation of the Clarendon Code, ‘designed to exclude dissenters from the Church of England and prohibit their worship outside of it, galvanised and unified an otherwise loosely connected assortment of Presbyterians and Baptists, Independents and Congregationalists, political radical and republicans.’ Milton’s experience of persecution not only encouraged his association with contemporary Quakers, but it also facilitated his focus on the elect individual, which this study has traced as a product of his increasingly entrenched disaffection with the English people from 1649.

Milton’s anti-trinitarianism separates the Son from the essence of God and closer to the human form of Christ. As Milton writes in *De Doctrina*, ‘what else can more plainly be understood than that God by his own will created – that is, generated, or brought forth – the Son as the first of all things, endowed with divine nature, just as in the fullness of time he wondrously engendered a human nature from the virgin Mary?’ (*CWJM* viii/1. 135). Martin Dzelzainis also observes that Milton argues in *Of True Religion* that Arians and Socinians, while heretical, should be tolerated as they base their views on scripture (*CPW* viii. 424-5). Milton’s anti-trinitarianism, positioning Christ closer to humanity than trinitarian Christology allowed, suggests that the Son of *Paradise Regain’d* was an individual to whom Milton could aspire. It also lends credence to Fallon’s suggestion that Milton’s belief in the individual was so exclusive

505 Laura Lunger Knoppers, ed., *CWJM* ii. xxi, see generally xx-xxii.
that it became increasingly limited to, if not modelled on, himself: ‘Milton’s extraordinary claims for his own virtue in his earliest self-representations, and at times in his later ones, imply his exemption from the frailty attendant on the fall.’ Fallon extends this interpretation to *Paradise Regain’d* by suggesting that Milton self-identifies with the Son in the brief epic.\(^{507}\)

Early English Quakerism was accused of anti-trinitarianism in the late-seventeenth-century.\(^{508}\) While Quakers such as William Penn defended Quaker theology as trinitarian, they did believe in the internal manifestation of Christ and the light within.\(^{509}\) In his *The Light and Life of Christ within* (1668), George Whitehead (1636-1723) explains the importance of the light of Christ within Quakers for illuminating the truth of scripture: ‘And as to Christ within both to Save and Rule, (for which we are accused) we are not ashamed of him; but do testify to him within, and his Government, Power, and Authority within’.\(^{510}\) The inner utopia that this chapter will identify as depicted within the Son of *Paradise Regain’d* – recalling the ‘paradise within’ of *Paradise Lost* (xii. 587) – shares the interior emphasis of the internalised Christ in Quaker theology. Contemporary Quakerism provided Milton with a model of religious individualism and internalisation through which he could more effectively realise in his poetry the ideal of the utopian millennium that the English republic and the English people had failed to fulfil. Milton’s anti-trinitarian theology, moreover, enabled the Son to be an aspirational model of self-control. The internalisation of the utopian millennium was such that one of the few individuals – if not the only – capable of meeting the standard of Milton’s utopian millennium was Milton himself.

**MILTON AND THE EARLY ENGLISH QUAKERS**

Milton’s reaction to the Protectorate differed from contemporary Quakers: where many Quakers requested greater representation of their philosophy of inner light in the political sphere, Milton continued to work for the Protectorate, probably due to the

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509 William Penn asserts Quaker trinitarianism against such accusations in *A Key opening a way to every Common Understanding* (1693), p. 17.
broad toleration of Protestant beliefs that Cromwell secured and maintained.\(^{511}\) However, during the Restoration, Milton and the Quakers mutually suffered from a significant loss of religious freedom. Compared to Milton’s brief incarceration in the Tower of London for his work for the republican regime, Quaker freedom was systematically repressed in the 1660s. The Clarendon Code, which incorporated the Quaker Act (1662) and Conventicle Act (1664), resulted in the mass persecution of Quakers; in 1680, an account of Quaker persecutions numbered nearly 11,000 imprisonments and 234 deaths.\(^{512}\) The Conventicle Act was renewed in a more severe form in March 1670, but was met with ‘lack of enthusiasm, ineffectual enforcement, and renewed and widespread resistance’ (\textit{CWJM} ii. xxviii). It was only in 1687, after the \textit{Declaration of Indulgence}, that nonconformist religious groups experienced a form of toleration. By consequence, both Milton and the Quakers in the 1660s and 1670s were naturally invested in debates surrounding liberty of conscience, which saw a revived interest during the period of composition of \textit{Paradise Regain’d}.\(^{513}\) Milton’s belief in liberty of conscience – specifically freedom of scriptural interpretation – is key to understanding his relationship with and tolerance of contemporary Quakerism. Milton’s belief in freedom of scriptural interpretation is particularly pertinent given the 1662 Licensing Act, which required the pre-publication licensing of texts by a censor of the Stationers’ Company. A key difference between the individualism of Milton and the Quakers was that, where Milton argued for toleration in order to facilitate scriptural interpretation, the Quakers placed greater emphasis on inner light as a means of understanding God than scripture. For both, the individual was key, but Milton identified scripture, guided by the spirit, as the conduit to truth, rather than the individual himself. The relationship between scripture and internal sanctity is prominent in \textit{Paradise Regain’d}. As we will see, Milton’s proximity to contemporary Quakerism exhibits how his tolerationism does not detract from the elitism that characterised a large part of his prose works.

The form of Restoration Quakerism that Milton encountered when he moved to Chalfont St Giles in 1665 – organised, pacifist, and conservative – was far removed from the radical movement of the 1650s. James Nayler’s (1618-60) re-


\(^{512}\) Reay, \textit{The Quakers and the English Revolution}, p. 106.

enactment of Christ’s arrival in Jerusalem in October 1656, by riding a horse into Bristol attended by followers, was widely condemned and resulted in a trial in December that made publicly clear concerns about Quaker theology, especially that the belief in inner light implied equality with Christ. Between 1656-60, there was a shift in Quakerism from a movement that opposed the established church to an organised religious institution. The first Quaker document on church discipline, the Epistle from the Elders of Balby, appeared in November 1656, possibly in response to the Nayler incident. Monthly and General Meetings further served to coordinate the sect. Quaker leaders, such as George Fox and Edward Burrough, worked to improve the Quaker image, especially in London, to one of established respectability, rather than the radical disorder represented by the Nayler affair.

Quakers generally did not oppose the return of monarchism, believing that they served the higher authority of God and could do so under any regime. There was broad – and perhaps unrealistic – hope for religious toleration from the Restoration. The Quakers were, however, as has been noted above, widely persecuted in the Restoration period, which may have contributed to the increased organisation of the sect. In 1660, the Declaration from the Harmles & Innocent People of God made clear the Quaker commitment to pacifism. Internal bodies of central organisation, known as the Second Day Morning Meeting and the Meeting for Sufferings, limited Quaker publications and served as a form of self-censorship. Quaker discipline also became more organised and widespread, whereby errant Quakers were counselled through visitations that resembled church intervention that had once been opposed by the movement. The Quaker movement of the 1650s prioritised the individual, which facilitated the occurrence of extreme, heterodox displays of religious zeal, as exemplified by the Nayler controversy of 1656; in the 1660s, the collective conscience and needs of the Quaker community were prioritised, in a process of self-preservation as much as a natural evolution of the religious movement. It is important that, rather than

518 See A Declaration from the Harmles People of God called Quakers (1660), pp. 4, 8.
the radical movement of the 1650s, Milton came into contact with this form of Quakerism that was conservative, organised, and, at the height of the severe persecutions of the 1660s, maintained a belief in liberty of conscience illuminated by the inner light of Christ.

Milton came into contact with Quakerism through his friend and student, Thomas Ellwood, who famously claimed to have inspired Milton to write Paradise Regain’d, ‘which before [Milton] had not thought of’. According to Ellwood’s account, Milton not only ‘remained a natural teacher’, as he helped Ellwood with his Latin pronunciation in 1662, but also developed a fondness for his student: after Ellwood had to take leave of his studies in Buckinghamshire, he recalls that Milton ‘seemed heartily glad of my recovery and return’ (91). Through Ellwood, moreover, Milton chose to move to Chalfont St Giles, an established Quaker community, in 1665, in order to escape a major outbreak of the bubonic plague in London. Whereas some critics suggest that it was Ellwood who instigated the move, Ellwood himself explains that, as Milton made the request before Ellwood was imprisoned in 1665 for attending a Quaker burial, Ellwood was unable to oversee the move, despite facilitating the process:

I was desired by my quondam master, Milton, to take a house for him in the neighbourhood where I dwelt, that he might go out of the city, for the safety of himself and his family, the pestilence then growing hot in London. I took a pretty box for him in Giles Chalfont, a mile from me, of which I gave him notice, and intended to have waited on him, and seen him well settled in it, but was prevented by that imprisonment’ (144-5).

The move to Chalfont St Giles was Milton’s idea: he intentionally integrated himself into a large Quaker community at a time when a number of Quakers, including Ellwood and Isaac Penington (1616-79), had been imprisoned for attending the funeral of the Quaker Edward Perrot. This study has frequently shown how Milton shared faith in the millennium with many contemporary sects, but that he nonetheless maintained a distance from organised religious radicalism. Ellwood shows how Milton’s

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520 Thomas Ellwood, C. G. Crump, ed., The History of the Life of Thomas Ellwood (Methuen, 1900), p. 145; subsequent references to this text will be made parenthetically in the running text.
522 See David Loewenstein, Representing Revolution, p. 243, for an example of a commentary that does not acknowledge Milton’s initial request to move to Chalfont St Giles.
523 See, in particular, Chapter 4 for a discussion of Milton, Winstanley, and Cary.
engagement with the Quakers changed this rule. Campbell and Corns provide an optimistic and insightful image of Milton’s experience in the Quaker community:

He was among religious radicals, who knew and respected his contribution to English puritanism and to tolerationism, and was visited by brave, buoyant young Quakers, at least one of whom hero-worshipped him. Instead of the desperate and discredited men with whom he worked in the 1650s, now hanging on to life and liberty as best they could, these embodied a new generation of dissent.\textsuperscript{524}

In the immediate post-revolutionary period, Milton, the newly-employed statesman, was at a significant remove from Winstanley, the agrarian Digger radical; after the Restoration, Milton shared with contemporary Quakers the common experience of persecution and reduced religious freedom. Ellwood, an inquisitive, supportive and able student, facilitated Milton’s sympathetic attitude to the organised and conservative Quaker community of the 1660s.

The apparent incongruity between Milton’s belief in freedom of scriptural interpretation, which will be discussed later in this chapter, and the authority Quakerism places on the inner spirit over scripture suggests the importance of toleration in his engagement with the religious sect. The concept of an inner, divine light that informs the conscience of individual believers was central to Quaker theology. ‘The divine light of Christ manifesteth all things’, George Fox explains in his Journal, ‘and the spiritual fire trieth all things, and severeth all things.’\textsuperscript{525} The Son’s words in the final book of Paradise Regain’d seem remarkably close to those of Fox: ‘he who receives / Light from above, from the fountain of light, / No other doctrine needs, though granted true.’\textsuperscript{526} As Fox explains in his Journal, this inner light provides Quakers with ‘the pure knowledge of God and of Christ alone, without the help of any man, book or writing.’\textsuperscript{527} The Son’s assertion that ‘No other doctrine needs’ seems to support this. However, Milton, as he expresses most explicitly in De Doctrina Christiana, places his faith, above all, in the ‘authority of the scriptures’, and thereby asserts ‘just how crucial it is for the Christian religion that the freedom be granted not simply of probing every

\textsuperscript{524} Campbell and Corns, Life of Milton, p. 329.
\textsuperscript{526} John Milton, Paradise Regain’d, in CWJM ii. Book IV, lines 288-90. All future references to Paradise Regain’d will be taken from this edition, and will appear parenthetically in the running text as book and line number respectively.
\textsuperscript{527} Fox, Journal, p. 11.
doctrine, and of winnowing it in public, but also of thinking and indeed writing about it, in accordance with each person’s firm belief’ (CWJM viii/1. 9). Milton’s belief in freedom of scriptural interpretation defines his idiosyncratic view of liberty of conscience. As discussed in the previous chapter, this dates back to Areopagitica, in which his idealised London is populated by studious individuals who interpret scripture in the fashion Milton outlines in De Doctrina. Milton also advocates a form of interpretative conscience in Of Civil Power, arguing that ‘To protestants therfore whose common rule and touchstone is the scripture, nothing more protestantly can be permitted than a free and lawful debate at all times by writing, conference, or disputation of what opinion soever, disputable by scripture’ (CPW vii. 251). In Considerations (CPW vii. 302-4), moreover, Milton endorses a more extensive, national education in order to create the kind of community he idealises in Areopagitica, which he reiterates in The Readie and Easie Way (CWJM vi 501-3). As he had envisioned as early as the anti-prelatical tracts, debate and difference of opinion – especially in terms of scriptural interpretation – were essential to uncover lost truth within myriad falsehood. While Milton, therefore, may have disagreed with the Quaker belief that scripture was subordinate to free-standing inner light, he evidently tolerated the sect and encoded some Quaker ideas into Paradise Regain’d.

George Bishop’s (fl. 1615-1668) references to Of Civil Power in his A Looking-Glass For The Times (1668) suggest that Milton’s ideas of religious freedom were not only compatible with and endorsed by contemporary Quakerism, but that Bishop shared Milton’s faith in scripture. Bishop, who was the official spokesperson for the Quaker movement in 1656 while Fox and Nayler were imprisoned, explains at the beginning of A Looking-Glass that he intends to show ‘That the Principles and Practices of the People called Quakers […] are the same as were the Principles and Practices of Christ and his Apostles’, for which he uses ‘pregnant instances of Scripture, History, and other Writings’. Bishop explicitly references Milton in the final section of the tract, which concerns ‘changeable Priesthood’. By this, Bishop means that, as established churches are prone to change, they are ‘neither from Christ nor the Scriptures, and hath neither ground nor foundation to be believed in’, for ‘the whole progress of the History […] speaks the Priesthood after the Apostles decease to be

528 George Bishop, A Looking-Glass For The Times (1668). All references to this text will be made parenthetically in the running text; on Bishop, see J. W. Martin, ‘The Pre-Quaker Writings of George Bishop’, in Quaker History, 74/2 (1985), pp. 20-7; see also G. E. Aylmer, The State’s Servants: the Civil Service of the English Republic, 1649-1660 (Routledge, 1973), pp. 272-4.
changeable’ (210-11). By opposing ‘Priesthood’ and established religion, Bishop promotes the Quaker values of the inner light and the liberty of conscience that necessarily attends it. However, he does so with a clear focus on scriptural research, alongside an analysis of classical and modern texts. Here Bishop identifies ‘John Milton’, who, ‘in his Treatises of the power of the Civil Magistrate in causes Ecclesiastical, hath excellently pitched the bottom of the matter’ (231). Bishop’s citation of Milton runs over two pages, after which he explains

Much more I might have produced as to this author, even the whole Discourse, wherein he fully convinces what in his Title page he asserts, to wit, That it is not lawful for any power on earth to compel in matters of Religion. He is one who pretends to the Church of Christ, but not by compulsion to Church-ship, or matters of Religion; as this his Treatise shews him (233).

Bishop finds in Milton not only a fellow advocate of liberty of conscience and believer in the separation of church and state, but also a fellow nonconformist. Bishop may well be drawing from Milton’s suggestion that ‘He then who to his best apprehension follows the scripture, though against any point of doctrine by the whole church received, is not the heretic; but he who follows the church against his conscience and persuasion grounded on the scripture’ (CPW vii. 251). Bishop’s enthusiasm for Of Civil Power shows how a contemporary Quaker appreciated and drew on Milton’s works, in much the same way as Milton shares Quaker ideas in Paradise Regain’d.

Milton’s elitism, which remains prominent in the individualism of Paradise Regain’d, does not limit his toleration of – or distance him from – contemporary Quakers. The emphasis on the individual in both Milton’s theology and that of the Quakers means that Milton’s elitism facilitates his toleration of Quakerism, rather than inhibits it. The Son himself voices an explicit aversion to the common people in Book III of the brief epic. At the beginning of the book, Satan tempts the Son with the prospect of counselling kings and experiencing thereby ‘The fame and glory, glory the reward / That sole excites to high attempts the flame / Of most erected spirits’ (iii. 25-7). The Son’s response, while initially focusing on the brevity and futility of glory and empire, soon develops into a passionate rejection of the vulgar people:

And what the people but a herd confus’d,
A miscellaneous rabble, who extol
Things vulgar, & well weigh’d, scarce worth the praise,
They praise and they admire they know not what;
And know not whom, but as one leads the other;
And what delight to be by such extoll’d,
To live upon thir tongues and be thir talk,
Of whom to be disprais’d were no small praise? 

(iii. 49-56)

The Son’s description of the people in these lines resembles Milton’s own denunciation of the people as ‘an inconstant, irrational, and Image-doting rabble’ in Eikonoklastes (CWJM vi. 424). It also recalls Milton’s specific defence of the sanior pars in his first Defensio. Given the Restoration context, it is difficult not to see here an allusion to the backsliding people who popularly desired the return of monarchy.

Paul Hammond identifies how the Son turns away from the many, as he observes that ‘Th’ intelligent among them and the wise / Are few’ (iii. 58-9), in favour of the elect individual, ‘who dares be singularly good’ (57). Milton’s belief in the individual, which appeared in the attention afforded to elect individuals in Michael’s education of Adam in Paradise Lost and in the potential for Adam to rehabilitate at the end of the poem, necessitates focus on similar individuals in Paradise Regain’d.

Hammond also observes the powerfully derogatory tone that the Son employs in his response to Satan’s suggestion that he should depose a tyrannical emperor, ‘and in his place ascending, / A victor-people free from servile yoke!’ (iv. 101-2). The Son’s response is consistent with that of Book III: ‘What wise and valiant man would seek to free / These thus degenerate, by themselves enslav’d, / Or could of inward slaves make outward free?’ (iv. 143-5). Hammond explains that the word ‘vile’ ‘is chiefly used in early modern English to denote moral depravity’. The suggestion ‘that the common people, having once been roused to victorious action, have now relapsed into their habitual condition’ of self-imposed slavery to tyranny, echoes Milton’s condemnation in the Tenure of those who are ‘govern’d to the inward vitious rule, by which they govern themselves’ (CWJM vi. 151) and, a decade later, his growing disillusionment with the people over the two editions of The Readie and Easie Way.529 The Son’s clear aversion to the common people in Paradise Regain’d exhibits how Milton is not only far from the egalitarian radicalism that Loewenstein suggests, but that his disaffection with the commons continued to contribute to his entrenched elitism. Milton’s philosophy of liberty of conscience and his proximity to Quakerism magnifies his individualised and narrow view of the elect.

529 Hammond, Milton and the People, pp. 233-5.
This study has posited that Milton’s utopianism and millenarianism developed alongside and in tandem with his belief in liberty of conscience and elitist disaffection with the common sort. While contemporary Quakers elevated the status of inner light above scripture, George Bishop illustrates how Milton’s own tolerationist values were espoused by contemporary Quakers. While Milton’s elitism remained prominent in *Paradise Regain’d*, moreover, this did not negate his Quaker sympathies, as it had his sectarian sympathies in the immediate post-revolutionary period. Keeble observes how William Penn (1644-1718), who joined the Quakers in 1667 and suggested that Ellwood seek out Milton, was ‘of gentle birth and well educated’; both ‘Classical learning and the later European tradition [were] at his disposal.’\(^{530}\) While Milton may have been tolerant of a broad swathe of Protestant sects, it was into this specific, educated form of the sect, introduced to him by Ellwood, that he integrated himself.

**SCRIPTURAL INTERPRETATION AND THE BRIEF EPIC**

Freedom to express heretical ideas, which Milton first proposed in *Areopagitica* and reasserted in *Of True Religion* (1673), defines the action of *Paradise Regain’d*. In *Areopagitica*, Milton argued that it was necessary for individuals to publish ideas so that they could be met with opposing views before post-publication licensing was imposed, where necessary. In *Of True Religion*, Milton calls for the free discourse of texts in one of his clearest defences of toleration, using language that at times appears like a direct defence of the struggles of contemporary Quakers. In the tract, Milton places an emphasis on the individual as interpreter rather than, as he does in *Areopagitica*, on the individual as author. Whereas he idealised London in *Areopagitica*, Milton’s explicit defence of Protestant sects in *Of True Religion* draws on his experience of persecution, which he shared with contemporary Quakers. In *Paradise Regain’d*, Milton’s Son epitomises and idealises an elect individual, who successfully interprets scripture to defeat falsehood, which is represented by Satan in the brief epic.

The interpretative freedom that Milton had advocated throughout much of his career is internalised in the utopianism of *Paradise Regain’d* and particularly in how the Son can use his knowledge of scripture to defeat Satan.

*Of True Religion* (1673), despite being often interpreted for its anti-Catholicism, promotes the philosophy of toleration and liberty of conscience that Milton endorsed in 1659, and which originates in 1644. Of True Religion was written in response to the 1672 Act of Indulgence that was voted down by the Cavalier Parliament, through which Charles intended to increase toleration for Catholics. Elizabeth Sauer argues that ‘Milton establishes the case for toleration negatively in arguing against Popish tyranny’ and, elsewhere, that the desire for liberty of conscience in the tract is borne out of a belief in reconfiguring English national identity. Ray Tumbleson compares *Of True Religion* to tracts by Andrew Marvell (1621-78) and Elkanah Settle (1648-1724), but acknowledges that ‘Milton makes the logical leap from condemnation of explicit faith to the necessity of absolute toleration – of Protestants’. It is necessary to develop the view that the ‘appeal for tolerating and testing of all beliefs does not contradict Milton’s opposition to […] Roman Catholicism’ by drawing greater attention to the significance of toleration in the tract. The anti-Catholicism of *Of True Religion* is a framing device: it emphasises the toleration that Milton endorses, draws on Milton’s belief in freedom of scriptural interpretation, and permits him to defend nonconformist theologies that he privately supported, such as Arianism and Socinianism. Milton uses the threat of Catholic indulgence to promote greater religious freedom for Protestants. As he explains, ‘the Rule of true Religion is the Word of God only; and that their Faith ought not to be an implicit faith, that is, to believe, though as the church believes, against or without express authority of Scripture’ (*CPW*. viii. 420).

As Milton had advocated throughout his pamphleteering career, it is because of the truth inherent in scripture that liberty of conscience, especially freedom to interpret scripture, is essential. ‘Without that liberty’, Milton explains in *De Doctrina*,

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‘there is no religion [...] violence alone prevails’; in Of True Religion, he identifies this violence as ‘debates and contentions, schisms, and persecutions’ (CWJM viii/1. 133). In Of Civil Power, Milton argued for a separation of civil and religious powers for fear that ‘Till then nothing but troubles, persecutions, commotions can be expected’ (CPW vii. 243). Although Milton more readily supports the church in Of True Religion (419-23) than he does in Of Civil Power (247-9), he does maintain that those who hold unorthodox beliefs that are inspired by their conscience – so long as it is based on scriptural interpretation – cannot be heretics. ‘Heresie’, Milton argues, ‘is in the Will and choice profestly against Scripture; error is against the Will, in misunderstanding the Scripture after all sincere endeavours to understand it rightly’ (423). So long as sectarians interpret scripture in obedience to God and with every intention of fulfilling divine will, then they will be forgiven:

But so long as all these profess to set the Word of God only before them as the Rule of faith and obedience; and use all diligence and sincerity of heart, by reading, by learning, by study, by prayer for Illumination of the holy Spirit, to understand the Rule and obey it, they have done what man can do: God will assuredly pardon them [...] (423-4).

This passage is followed by a list of Protestant denominations that zealously – and with no desire to promote falsehood – misinterpret scripture, including Calvinism, Arianism, and Arminianism (424-6). The conscientious efforts of these sects resemble Milton’s idealised citizens of London in Areopagitica, who he envisions as ‘musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas’ (CPW ii. 554). In comparison with Areopagitica, however, the emphasis in Of True Religion is explicitly on scripture. As we shall see, in the context of Paradise Regain’d, this is significant as the Son’s ability to refute Satan is enshrined in scripture. As with books in Areopagitica, freedom to interpret scripture should be protected so long as such interpretations can be refuted where necessary, as Milton illustrates in Of True Religion.

Paradise Regain’d, published two years prior to Of True Religion, represents scriptural interpretation as central to the climactic temptation of the poem and also to the Son’s own self-identification. John Rogers observes that, as the ‘conveyor of revealed truth most important to Paradise Regain’d is unquestionably Hebrew Scripture’, the Son’s knowledge of this scripture is central to his resistance of Satan’s
temptations and self-identification as the Son. The Son, in his opening monologue, explains how he realised from a young age that he was ‘Born to that end, born to promote all truth’ (i. 205). The Son resembles the speaker of Areopagitica, for whom millenarian truth is an ideal attainable through debates over differing and opposing ideas. He makes multiple direct scriptural references, which range from Daniel (ii. 277-8) to Judges (ii. 436-40) to Job (iii. 65-70), the latter with whom the Son can be most easily compared. However, Milton’s Jesus also makes meaningful use of scripture as the word of God when he defends himself against Satan, who requests him to prove himself as the Son of God. In Book I, in response to Satan’s demand that ‘if thou be the Son of God, Command / That out of these hard stones be made thee bread’ (342-3), the Son asserts ‘is it not written / [...] / Man lives not by Bread only, but each Word/ Proceeding from the mouth of God’ (347-9). In the climactic temptation of Book IV, Satan, having placed the Son on the ‘highest pinnacle’ (549) of a temple tower in Jerusalem, tells him to jump:

For it is written, He will give command
   Concerning thee to his angels, in thir hands
   They shall up lift thee, lest at any time
   Thou chance to dash thy foot against a stone. (iv. 556-59)

Whereas the Son responds to Satan’s temptation with a question – however rhetorical – in Book I, in the final book he cites Hebrew scripture with unwavering confidence: ‘also it is written, / Tempt not the Lord thy God, he said and stood’ (560-61). In this climactic moment, after which Satan falls, the Son is the embodiment of truth: Satan has misinterpreted scripture in an intentional manner that the pardonable heresy Milton defends in Of True Religion does not encompass, to which the Son has responded with an accurate interpretation that defeats his diabolic adversary. Corns compares the Son’s dual with Satan in Paradise Regain’d to the ‘battle of the books’ that Milton advocates in texts like Areopagitica. Where Truth defeats Falsehood in Areopagitica, in Paradise Regain’d, Milton’s Jesus is able to defeat Satan through an accurate reading of Hebrew scripture, in an act that would itself be recorded as scripture in the New Testament.

The Son’s implicit activism has often been interpreted as pacifism in *Paradise Regain’d*. In his autobiographical monologue of the first book, the Son, having identified himself as a defender of truth, explains how he had to decide whether

To rescue *Israel* from the *Roman* yoke,
Then to subdue and quell o’er all the earth
Brute violence and proud Tyrannick pow’r,
Till truth were freed, and equity restor’d:
Yet held it more humane, more heavenly first
By winning words to conquer willing hearts,
And make perswasion do the work of fear […]

(i. 217-23)

The Son’s decision to use words rather than forceful, political action retains the power to ‘conquer’ those who are ‘willing’. While lacking physical action, this is not a passive decision. The Son’s active role as a scriptural interpreter contradicts arguments from critics such as Regina Schwartz, who identifies the Son’s suffering as ‘the portrait of his passivity’: ‘Christ can do nothing. He must suffer everything.’

In comparison with the militant Son of *Paradise Lost*, or even the defiant Samson in *Samson Agonistes*, which was published alongside *Paradise Regain’d* in 1671, the Son of *Paradise Regain’d*, resembling contemporary Quakers, is physically inactive. The words of the Son, however, by defeating Satan, represent the action of the poem. Where in 1644, Milton believed that the people could fulfil the interpretative roles in an idealised London – even one structured by a system of utopian obedience – in 1671, with the people long since having backslided, Milton internalises this role in the Son. Action in both *Areopagitica* and *Paradise Regain’d* is metaphorical: it is represented by the recurring image of Truth combating Falsehood. The difference is that Milton envisions such action as individual rather than collaborative in his brief epic.

Scriptural interpretation, therefore, is central to the action of *Paradise Regain’d*. The Son’s words represent a speech-act: they are performative in their ability to defeat Satan and cause him to fall. Laura Lunger Knoppers has shown how, in *Paradise Regain’d*, ‘Milton employs with Satan language of pretence, fraud, and usurpation that is elsewhere part of his anti-Catholic arsenal.’

In light of *Of True*...

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538 On the relationship between *Paradise Regain’d* and *Paradise Lost*, see John Rogers, ‘*Paradise Regain’d* and the Memory of *Paradise Lost*’, pp. 589-612.
Religion, it seems that Milton would have identified Satan’s intentional scriptural misinterpretation with Catholicism: he saw no justification for idolatry, given scriptural opposition to it. His tolerance of contemporary Quakers is, by contrast, distinct in the tract, as he seems to specifically defend the Quakers: Milton declares ‘how unequal, how uncharitable must it needs be, to impose that which his conscience cannot urge him to impose, upon him whose conscience forbids him to obey!’ (428). This exclamation echoes numerous requests for amnesty for Quakers who cannot take the Oath of Allegiance because it is ‘contrary to their own conscience’. While the emphasis on freedom of scriptural interpretation, therefore, is Milton’s own, the individualisation of this ideal in Paradise Regain’d accords with Milton’s exposure to Quaker theology. The Son’s wholeness as an individual – lacking the metaphorical dismemberment that defined Truth in Areopagitica – can be attributed to the inner utopia that he manifests.

THE INNER UTOPIA

In accordance with Milton’s Quaker context, the utopian millennium is internalised in the figure of the Son in Paradise Regain’d. As the brief epic shows, the Son’s resistance to Satan secures both the redemptive crucifixion and the restorative second coming. His success in defeating Satan is characterised by utopian self-control. Knoppers suggests that the ‘Son’s action, to all appearances, is inaction’ (CWJM ii. liii). The Son’s immobility, accordingly, represents his resistance to Satanic falsehood. As such, Milton’s representation of an inactive hero contradicts deterministic arguments of motion that defined the utopias of Hobbes and Harrington, as discussed in Chapter 6. The Son’s ability to maintain self-control, as modelled by his immovable stasis, is a personification of the totality that this study has identified as a common characteristic of seventeenth-century utopias. ‘The totality of the utopian vision’, Davis posits, ‘is part of the perfection, the order of the utopia.’ The difference between Paradise Regain’d and contemporary utopias is that Milton depicts an inner utopia in his poem. As the

540 A Declaration, p. 6; see also, George Whitehead, et al., To the King and Both Houses of Parliament (1666), pp. 5-6; William Penn, William Mead, The Peoples Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted in the Tryal of William Penn, and William Mead (1670), pp. 3-4; and Edward Burrough, The Case of Free Liberty of Conscience in the exercise of Faith and Religion, Presented unto the KING and both Houses of PARLIAMENT (1661).
541 Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, p. 38.
individual who will bring about eschatological end times and who exudes perfect, utopian self-control, the Son embodies Milton’s utopian millennium.

The immanence of the totality of the inner utopia in *Paradise Regain’d* invites a valuable comparison with the epic poem, *A Sea of the Seed’s Sufferings* (1661), by the Quaker John Perrot (d. 1665), which, like *Paradise Regain’d*, is modelled partly on the Book of Job.\(^{542}\) Perrot claims to have written a large part of the *Seed’s Sufferings* in a ‘Rome-Prison of Mad-men’, in which he was incarcerated for attempting to convert the Pope to Quakerism.\(^{543}\) As Nigel Smith notes, the *Seed’s Sufferings*, alongside Perrot’s prose works of the time, ‘sublimate the experience of being tortured or beaten into sanity […] into a spiritual allegory built out of natural imagery.’\(^{544}\) As Kristina J. Kesselring suggests, Perrot was part of the schismatic and more radical side of early English Quakerism.\(^{545}\) His involvement with the ‘hat testimony’ scandal, by which Quakers wanted to remove any unnecessary outward forms of worship that detracted from the light within, such as doffing a hat before prayer, is representative of his belief in ‘the universality of the Light within both male and female’.\(^{546}\) Smith suggests that, where Satan’s rebellion and the Fall must be restored at the end of *Paradise Lost* with Adam’s obedience, in the Quaker theology that Perrot espouses, the trajectory is ‘not from innocence to (ultimately) felix culpa, but from reprobation to grace and perfection.’\(^{547}\) In *Paradise Regain’d*, which Smith does not address, the Son exhibits inner, utopian perfection. However, while both *Seed’s Sufferings* and *Paradise Regain’d* share an interior focus, the universality of Perrot’s Quakerism necessarily distinguishes his *Seed’s Sufferings* from the individualised vision of the Son in *Paradise Regain’d*. While Milton’s increasingly narrow perception of the individual may have negated any form of universality, the interiority of Quakerism, as represented in Perrot’s epic, may have contributed to the inner utopia depicted in *Paradise Regain’d*.

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\(^{542}\) On Job and *Paradise Regain’d*, see Lewalski, *Milton’s Brief Epic*; see also Victoria Kahn, ‘Job’s Complaint in *Paradise Regained*’, in *ELH*, 76 (2009), 625-60.


Perrot’s *Seed’s Sufferings* depicts the struggle of a Quaker who finds renewed faith in the internal manifestation of the word of God in a formally diverse collection of songs. The poem begins from the perspective of a man who perceives himself as a worm – ‘I Am a Worm poor and low’ – and who immediately observes the suffering of the seed: ‘So saith the Seed, grievous Oppressions long have bin / My weighty burthens’ (3). Having lamented the suffering of the seed, the worm experiences a theophany (10-19), which bears strong resemblance to that of the Job 38-41. In both Job and *Seed’s Sufferings*, God delivers a series of rhetorical questions that affirms his omnipotence. The difference with Perrot’s poem is that, in the second theophany, in which God appears ‘through the Clouds of Morning Dewes, in a clear serene Day of the early Spring’ (20), God promises to elevate the status of the worm by manifesting himself within the worm. Whereas Job is reminded of his low status as a man and accepts the authority of God, announcing ‘I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes’ (*KJV* 42:6), Perrot’s theophany exerts an elevating influence over the suffering worm. ‘Lift up thine head,’ God commands the worm, ‘the DAY draws very nigh / In which this WORM I will exalt on high’, after which he requests that ‘thee wait in content and belief; /

In th’Ark of the New-Testament abide,  
And in its secret desk, see that thou hide  
The written Rolls of Fire and pure Gold,  
Until the Word shall be, Thou maist unfold:  
The Sum of all thus seal’d up in thy breast,  
Lye down in Peace in the Lamb’s Endless Rest.  

(22)

The word of God, explicitly defined as the New Testament, in which the worm has initially taken succour, is to lie dormant in this man until the time when, in an apocalyptic sense, it can be revealed. Perrot blurs the boundary between flesh and textual word. The relationship between the interior manifestation of God and New Testament scripture, as the Word is materialised in flesh, recalls the disembodied figure of Truth in *Areopagitica*. The author in *Areopagitica* constitutes a bodily part of Truth through the act of composition; Perrot’s depiction of the Word materialises in the body of the worm.548 In *Paradise Regain’d*, by contrast, the Son is the embodied whole of

548 For a discussion of embodiment and Truth, see Chapter 3 of this study, pp. 87-95; see also, Genelle C. Gertz-Robinson, ‘Still Martyred after All These Years: Generational Suffering in Milton’s *Areopagitica*,

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Truth; he himself is responsible for bringing about the millennium. As such, the utopian qualities with which Milton depicts the Son distinguishes him from the worm in the *Seed’s Sufferings*.

The utopianism of *Paradise Regain’d* is represented by the Son’s self-control, which informs readings of immobility in the poem. In Book II of *Paradise Regain’d*, the Son identifies the qualities of an idealised king, who could rule over the people that he denounces in the final book of the poem. Having explained that ‘I reject / Riches and Realms’, the Son declares that, while the external appearance of a king is defined by ‘His Honour, Vertue, Merit and chief Praise, / That for the Publick all this weight he bears’,

Yet he who reigns within himself, and rules
Passions, Desires, and Fears, is more a King;
Which every wise and vertuous man attains:
And who attains not, ill aspires to rule
Cities of men, or head-strong Multitudes,
Subject himself to Anarchy within,
Or lawless passions in him which he serves.  

(ii. 457-58; 464-65; 466-72)

The Son establishes a dichotomy between the worthy king, who rules internally, and the unfit king, who, like his people and as Milton articulated in *The Tenure*, is ‘govern’d to the inward vitious rule’ (*CWJM* vi. 151). Milton’s praise of Cromwell in *Defensio Secunda* reiterates support for self-rule: ‘he was a soldier well-versed in self-knowledge, and whatever enemy lay within – vain hopes, fears, desires – he had either previously destroyed within himself or had long since reduced to subjection. Commander first over himself, victor over himself, he had learned to achieve over himself the most effective triumph’ (*CPW* iv/2. 667-8). As Hammond observes, ‘the English republic had failed because the people, individually and collectively, failed in Milton’s estimation to master their own passions, desires and fears’. Milton had, in 1654, invested his faith in Cromwell after the people had failed to live up to his high expectations. The inadequacy

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549 For a discussion of Milton and Cromwell, see Chapter 5 of this study, pp. 147-50; on Milton’s support of Cromwell and the Protectorate, see Tobias Gregory, ‘Milton and Cromwell: Another Look at the Evidence’, in *Journal of British Studies*, 54 (2015), 44-62.

of the people and the self-control exhibited by contemporary individuals like Cromwell helps to explain the focus on the individual that defines *Paradise Regain’d*.

The Son’s stasis and immobility, through which he defeats Satan, is emblematic of both his self-control and of Milton’s animist view of matter. Hobbes articulated a determinist view of motion: ‘When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder it) eternally’ (*CETH* iv. 26). In opposition to this view, Milton argues in *De Doctrina Christiana* that ‘all necessity must be removed from our freedom, nor even must the shadowy and external necessity based on immutability or prescience be admitted to the discussion. If any necessity remains, then as I said earlier it either determines free agents to a single course of action or else compels them against their will […]’ (*CWJM* viii/1. 61). The Son in *Paradise Regain’d* is not influenced by external forces of motion. Rather, as a self-active and free being, he is a paragon of internal control. References to the Son’s immobility steadily increase throughout the brief epic. The early reference to the Son’s ‘unalter’d brow’ (i. 493), initially indicating that he is unaffected by Satan’s temptations, which is mirrored by Mary’s general description of her son as ‘Private, unactive, calm, contemplative’ (ii. 81), becomes more specifically motional in the adjective ‘unmov’d’, used in both of the latter books to describe a response of the Son to Satan (iii. 386; iv. 109). It seems that, as Milton’s Jesus undergoes a process of realising his self-identification as the Son, his growing ability to use scripture with authority to defeat Satan coincides with a utopian self-control.

The emphasis on the Son’s stasis in Book IV is most clearly expressed by the epic narrator, who addresses the Son as he endures the nightmares Satan afflicts upon him:

> ill wast thou shrouded then,  
> O patient Son of God, yet only stoodst  
> Unshaken; not yet staid the terror there;  
> Infernal Ghosts, and Hellish Furies, round  
> Environ’d thee; some howl’d, some yell’d, some shriek’d,  
> Some bent at thee thir fiery darts, while thou  
> Sat’st unappall’d in calm and sinless peace.  

(*iv. 419-25*)

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The effort Milton invests into conveying the horrors that the Son has to endure further emphasises the contrasting stasis of the latter’s endurance. ‘Unshaken’ joins the negative adjectives that implicitly allude to how an average individual would respond to this experience. In the image, the Son is sat unmoving and at peace. Whereas Perrot’s seed and worm suffer and require immanent divine intervention in the form of the word, the Son is able to resist Satan’s horrors without fear or self-doubt. As Satan, frustrated and almost defeated, says to the Son the following day,

And opportunity I here have had
To try thee, sift thee, and confess have found thee
Proof against all temptation as a rock
Of Adamant, and as a Center, firm
To the utmost of mere man both wise and good (iv. 531-5)

The Son’s unwavering will to resist epitomises his inner, utopian self-control. Satan’s astonishment illustrates the unique status of the Son as a perfect individual. While a contemporary Quaker may have more easily related to the speaker of Perrot’s epic, whose inner struggle and external persecution are eased by the inner light, the interiority of the Son’s resistance to Satan in Paradise Regain’d reflects the experience of contemporary Quakers. An individual, however elect, could not become Jesus, but if the Son is separate from God and became human, then just as Adam is promised that one day ‘with angels may participate’, the Son serves as an idealised model to which an individual may aspire. As Satan exhibits in Paradise Lost, aspiring to be the Son will result in eternal damnation; taking inspiration from the Son, however, was essential during the period of persecution that Milton and the Quakers were experiencing at the time.

The interior focus of the Seed’s Sufferings complements the Son’s self-control, then, but it is distinct from the utopianism that defines that self-control. In the Seed’s Sufferings, the speaker – likely the individual who, having once identified as a worm, has now been elevated by God – directly addresses the seed as capable of manifesting the light within. ‘Stand still,’ the speaker commands,

I’ll touch a Stone and thou shalt know,
That Waters in thee out of it shall flow;
In Conscience there’s a secret LIGHT within,
Which doth distinguish Truth from every sin. (32)
There is a complex material relationship between external natural imagery and internal conscience and inner light in this passage: ‘Th’ Internal Knowledge of the virtuous Stone, / Out of which Waters pure of Life do gush’, from where ‘will his River run, and Flames ascend / Of heav’nly Vertue’. The speaker-as-worm announced earlier in the poem that ‘Yea, for thy sake my Bowels are a River, / Pour’d on the grounds, my Reins, my Heart, and Liver’ (7). Perrot’s correspondence with Benjamin Worsley (1618-73), who, in turn, sent a letter from Perrot to Hartlib himself, may help to explain the relationship that Perrot establishes between nature and knowledge in the poem. Perrot, however, uses imagery of the natural world to convey the significance of conscience. ‘The depiction of moving bowels,’ Smith suggests, ‘which were associated with pity or tender feelings, becomes the most striking way of communicating the pressure on the conscience in response to suffering.’ The materiality of Perrot’s depiction of conscience encodes his own experiences of persecution as a Quaker. In Areopagitica, Milton envisioned a dismembered Truth that resonates with the fluid boundary between inner light and materiality that Perrot establishes in the Seed’s Sufferings. In Paradise Regain’d, Milton depicts an elect individual who internalises the utopian values he had once believed English society could realise. While the Son of Paradise Regain’d is distinct from the transformational speaker of Seed’s Sufferings, the interiority that Perrot depicts in his Quaker epic finds a parallel in the Son of Milton’s poem.

The language used by Satan and the Son in the dialogue form of the poem reflects the contrast between the immovable, unshakeable figure of the Son and the futile and desperate attempts of Satan to break Milton’s elect hero. In Book IV, where the Son swiftly ends Satan’s attempts at temptation, the Son’s language is performative: his words act as the terminus of both the action and rhetoric of Satan’s temptation. After Satan has inflicted a night of terror on the Son, to which he ‘only stood’st / Unshaken’ (iv. 420-1), Satan explains to the Son, in long, elaborate verse, that the events of the night before bode ill for the future, a future that could have been avoided if the Son had allowed Satan to help him to ‘win thy destin’d seat’ (469). The Son, not stopping to listen to Satan, eliminates any appearance that Satan’s temptations have succeeded by his use of penetrating reason: he identifies Satan as the cause of the terrors, and

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552 Smith, Literature & Revolution, p. 226; Ibid., ‘John Perrot and the Quaker Epic’, p. 261; Worsley to Hartlib, undated, HP 26/28/4; Perrot to Worsley, 10 September 1657, HP 26/28/1A-2B.

acknowledges that the purpose of the night terrors were ‘to terrifie / Mee to thy will; desist, thou art discern’d / And toil’st in vain, nor me in vain molest’ (496-8). The caesural semi-colon in the second line demarcates the Son’s response from the imperative ‘desist’. The transition from rational refutation to authoritative command is abrupt and final. Rather than responding to Satan with a speech of equal length, the Son terminates the dialogue. The Son uses language and syntax to resist temptation by ending the conversation with Satan.

What follows is a Satan ‘swoln with rage’ (499), who, attempting to restart the dialogue, describes over 41 lines (499-540) how the Son is ‘Proof against all temptation as a rock / Of Adamant’ (533-4). The Son, significantly, says nothing in response to this and neither comments on nor acts against Satan as he takes him to the ‘highest Pinacle’ of Jerusalem. By not engaging in dialogue with Satan, the Son does not permit the temptation to succeed. As has already been discussed, this final and shortest of Satan’s attempted temptations features a battle of scriptural interpretation in which the Son, as the proponent of truth, is victorious. Satan’s language is framed as an opposition between the immobile act of standing and the motion of falling: Satan jibes, ‘There stand, if thou wilt stand; to stand upright / Will ask thee skill’ (iv. 551-1). The first part of this statement indicates the choice that the Son will make between standing or not; the latter suggests that Satan is aware that it will require effort – or the will of the Son’s self-control – to remain standing on this high point. The Son is succinct in his response to Satan: ‘To whom thus Jesus: Also it is written, / Tempt not the Lord thy God, he said and stood’ (iv. 560-1). The Son once again shuts down the dialogue between him and Satan using succinct, powerful, and performative language. After this simple acknowledgement by the unmoving Son, Satan, ‘smitten with amazement fell’ (iv. 562). Satan, becoming increasingly frustrated by his lack of success in tempting the Son, lacks the inner control that the Son embodies. The dialogue form of Paradise Regain’d brings attention to the differences between the Son and Satan: the authority and finality of the Son’s language, both as an accurate interpretation of scripture and as representative of his unmovable endurance in the face of temptation, contrasts with Satan’s elongated, misleading rhetoric. The Son subverts the dialogue form by resisting conversation with Satan, and in doing so resists Satan’s temptations. The Son’s stasis, in contrast to Satan’s fall, represents how he is the terminus of Satan’s tempting rhetoric.

While the Son’s maintained stance at this high point illustrates his inner utopia, the scriptural words that he uses to defeat Satan are representative of the truth that both Milton and Perrot idealise. Where Milton idealises an elect individual,
however, truth for Perrot is a universalising agent. Following a familiar passage about bowels – ‘feel my Bowels, which like Rain distils, / And runs like Rivers down the steepest Hills’ – Perrot’s speaker employs universalising language to assert ‘So read me, You, We, One, through Life’s infusion, / In the first Principle, and last Conclusion’ (34). The speaker identifies with the text here, much as the inner light constitutes a material part of the speaker in the poem. Inner light here is framed, however, in multiple perspectives that unite as ‘One’. Unity – specifically Quaker unity – is brought about by the internalisation of the word in Seed’s Suffering. The Son’s inner utopia, by contrast, is an absolute ideal to which only the elect few can aspire. The inner utopia of the Son may bring about universal change in the form of the millennium, but it does not accommodate universal participation in that process, as the Quaker inner light does. The interior focus of Quakerism, therefore, may have facilitated the internalisation of Milton’s utopianism in the Son, but it did not draw him away from the latent elitism that had distinguished his writings for so many years. Whereas the inner light and immanence of the word in Seed’s Sufferings represents an interior proximity to God, the inner utopia in Paradise Regain’d is the means through which Milton believes the millennium, and thereby proximity to God, can be realised.

Although the millennium itself is promised by the Son throughout Paradise Regain’d, he equally represents the ideal of Milton’s utopian millennium himself. Coffey insists that the militancy of Paradise Regain’d is found in the promise of a violent eschatological end of history.\(^{554}\) Christ’s everlasting millenarian kingdom is foreshadowed throughout the poem (i. 20, 241, 265; iii. 199, 351; iv. 151).\(^{555}\) Despite this prophesy, as Stella Revard observes, the millennium was increasingly viewed as a spiritual phenomenon in the Restoration period, rather than happening literally.\(^{556}\) By conquering Satan in Paradise Regain’d, the Son’s inner utopia of perfect, unwavering self-control realises Milton’s utopian millennium. As the cherubim sing at the end of the brief epic,

now thou hast aveng’d
Supplanted Adam, and by vanquishing
Temptation, hast regain’d lost Paradise,
And frustrated the conquest fraudulent:

\(^{554}\) Coffey, ‘Pacifist, Quietist, or Patient Militant?’, pp. 163-4.
He never more henceforth will dare set foot
In Paradise to tempt; his snares are broke:
For though that seat of earthly bliss be fail’d,
A fairer Paradise is founded now
For Adam and his chosen Sons, whom thou
A Saviour art come down to re-install. (iv. 606-14)

The paradise that the Son has regained is not externally manifest, like Eden, but rather, as Michael promised in *Paradise Lost*, it is the ‘paradise within’ (*PL* xii. 587) that Adam can attain by his constant obedience. In echo of the hierarchy of *Paradise Lost*, the Son has attained for Adam and his descendants a ‘fairer Paradise’; obedience, as in *Paradise Lost*, is the key to elevation. Adam’s ‘chosen Sons’ remind us of the elitism that invariably attends Milton’s millenarianism. The Son, however, has regained paradise ‘now’. It is not the product of the crucifixion, a role that only Christ can fulfil, but rather the defeat of falsehood by asserting scriptural truth. This is something that a seventeenth-century Protestant could achieve.

Utopianism is internalised in *Paradise Regain’d* through the figure of the Son. While Perrot’s epic depicts the power of inner light in bringing about change in a suffering Quaker, for whom the scriptural word of God can manifest immanently, the inner light is a universalising ideal, which differs from the individualised ideal of the Son in *Paradise Regain’d*. This is in part because Perrot’s speaker is representative of the experience of persecuted Quakers in Restoration England; the Son of *Paradise Regain’d*, by contrast, is a figure to whom only elect individuals, such as Milton himself, could aspire. In Milton’s brief epic, the Son’s faithful few – Andrew, Simon and Mary – move from doubt (ii. 11-12) to questioning (39-40) and demand for action (47-48) to acceptance that they must wait (49-54). While Milton, with the English republic having failed and the monarchy restored, seems to acknowledge the value of patiently waiting for Christ’s second coming, the Son also represents a model of how the elect few could individually contribute to the realisation of end times. The collective responsibility of the community in *Areopagitica* is now embodied in the Son; the utopianism that Milton advocated in *The Readie and Easie Way*, is similarly internalised in the Son as an inner utopia. Just as *The Readie and Easie Way* is a model for pre-Restoration England, the Son is a model for the post-Restoration elect individual. Indeed, Fallon has asserted that ‘Milton represented himself, to us and to himself,
through the Son’. While it is unlikely that Milton identified with the Son of God, the Son of *Paradise Regain’d* is situated between man and God along the continuum of the universal hierarchy that he depicted in *Paradise Lost*. The Son embodies Milton’s utopian millennium: his utopian qualities of immobility and self-control secure the millennium by defeating Satan. The role of Milton and the elect few in bringing about the millennium, in the acme of Milton’s elitism, is embodied in the Son himself.

CONCLUSION

The liberty of conscience debate that surrounds *Paradise Regain’d* illuminates the poem’s distance from its epic precursor. Scriptural interpretation is at the climactic heart of the brief epic, which also accommodates Milton’s toleration of and engagement with the Quaker ideal of internalisation. While for Milton, authority will always remain with scripture, the emphasis still remains on individual interpretation. Milton’s entrenched elitism only facilitates this process: he imbues the Son with the ideal qualities that the people have persistently failed to exhibit for over thirty years. This process of internalisation brings clarity to Milton’s utopian millenarianism. The Son, through his utopian self-control, defeats Satan and secures the millennium. This is not the collective achievement of the community in *Areopagitica* or even the more controlled, systematised society of *The Readie and Easie Way*, but rather the individual victory of the Son. *Paradise Regain’d* provides an insight into the mind of the epic poet, disillusioned with his monarchical society, who has found in the Quakers a theological value of internalisation with which he can sympathise. As he invests his hopes in fewer and fewer individuals over his life, by 1671, near the end of his life, Milton may well have believed that one of the few individuals capable of meeting the Miltonic standard, and of helping to usher in the utopian millennium, was Milton himself.

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Conclusion: The Ends of Utopia

*Samson Agonistes*, appended to the 1671 publication of *Paradise Regain’d*, offers an alternative Miltonic hero who nonetheless embodies the mature utopian millenarianism in the brief epic. Milton’s dramatic poem conveys a fallen Samson, who is far removed from the perfection of the Son in *Paradise Regain’d*. *Samson* has remained a divisive text for critics: some have argued for an intentional contrast between Samson and the Son of *Paradise Regain’d*; others have argued that the dramatic poem valorises, in John Coffey’s words, ‘the destruction of the Stuart monarchy and Anglican persecution that the defenders of the Good Old Cause continued to seek after 1660.’ In contrast to Blair Worden’s suggestion for a more quietist Milton in the Restoration period, more recent criticism has characterised a Milton who endorsed the godly violence of Samson, even comparing it to terrorism. Richard Serjeantson, moreover, has shown how Samson’s violence was widely endorsed by radical Protestants in the Restoration period. Chapter 8 showed how the Jesus of *Paradise Regain’d* embodies Milton’s ideal of the utopian millennium. While *Samson Agonistes* is a markedly different text to *Paradise Regain’d*, it nevertheless espouses the political and theological values that this study has identified in Milton’s prose works, which anticipated and defined the representation of the utopian millennium in Milton’s epic poetry. Laura Lunger Knoppers, the most recent editor of the 1671 poems, acknowledges that ‘the violent action of *Samson Agonistes* seems to contrast with the restrained piety and refusal to act in *Paradise Regain’d,*’ but argues that ‘both poems focus on inner faith (whether maintained or regained), and individual endurance under persecution’.

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561 Knoppers, *CWJM* ii. lvii.
It is precisely these qualities of the 1671 poems that bring into greater relief Margaret Cavendish’s (1623-73) royalist, intolerant utopia, *A Description of a New World, Called The Blazing World* (1666). Born into a royalist family in Essex, Cavendish accompanied Charles I’s wife, Henrietta Maria (1609-69) to Paris in 1644, where she met William Cavendish (1593-1676), who would become Duke of Newcastle in 1665, after the couple’s return to England in the early Restoration period. Newcastle served as patron to Hobbes, which identifies Margaret Cavendish’s proximity to the man and his philosophy, even if Hobbes does not seem to have directly engaged with her in person.\textsuperscript{562} Cavendish’s utopia, therefore, exhibits a relationship between Restoration royalism and utopianism – both Baconian and Morean – that marks a significant counterpoint to Milton, the ex-republican statesman, whose utopianism, as Chapter 8 showed, became interiorised in *Paradise Regain’d*. John Rogers has argued that the animist monism of both Milton and Cavendish, alongside their mutual interest in the scientific debates of the time, suggest a valuable common ground between the two writers.\textsuperscript{563} Where this study has observed Milton’s early utopianism in the context of his proximity to the Hartlib circle, Cavendish envisions a Baconian academy in *Blazing World* that reflects her own proximity to the Royal Society.\textsuperscript{564} Where Milton employed the utopian republicanism of *The Readie and Easie Way* at a time when the English commonwealth had failed and the Restoration was inevitable, the Duchess assures the Empress in *Blazing World* that a monolithic, monotheistic state was superior to the changes that the Empress had implemented when she first arrived. Cavendish, keen to rebuild the Newcastle estate along with her husband following the Interregnum, offers a stark contrast to the internalised utopianism of the ex-statesman and still-expectant millenarian, Milton.

This thesis has argued that Milton’s millenarianism fostered his engagement with and articulation of various forms of seventeenth-century utopianism. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 identified Milton’s involvement with the Hartlib circle as a reflection of the


\textsuperscript{564} Bethany Williamson suggests that Cavendish satirises the Royal Society in *Blazing World*, in ‘Margaret Cavendish, the Royal Society, and the Alchemy of the Arabian Sands’, in *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies*, 17/1 (2017), 120-46.
Baconian utopianism of *Of Education* and *Areopagitica*. Chapter 5 acknowledged how Milton’s ideological divergence from Nedham during the 1650s anticipated his more direct engagement with the stringent, Morean form of utopianism manifest in *The Readie and Easie Way*, which was discussed in Chapter 6. In *Paradise Regain’d*, the millennium is secured by the utopianism immanent in the Son, the embodiment of unwavering constancy that Milton had failed to find in the English people throughout his polemical and republican career. Karen Edwards suggests that Samson’s melancholy represents the condition of waiting: Samson is one of ‘those born afterward who wait, in darkness, for Judgment, for apocalypse, for the coming of the Lamb. His melancholy is crucial to this representational strategy.’\(^{565}\) In contrast to Edwards, as this study has argued, while some individuals may have been content with patiently awaiting the apocalypse, many seventeenth-century millenarians sought ways to realise or at least prepare society for the second coming. For Milton, as with other political philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes and James Harrington, utopianism became a means to achieve this eschatological end. The Son of *Paradise Regain’d* represented a model of idealised self-control, astute scriptural interpretation and constancy to which individuals like Milton could aspire. In his ‘Afterword’ to *Milton and the Ends of Time*, David Loewenstein argues that Milton intended the 1671 poems to serve as ‘a double-edged response to the crisis of the Restoration. The vision of spectacular apocalyptic destruction in *Samson Agonistes* is juxtaposed with the millenarian vision offered in *Paradise Regained*.\(^{566}\) Discussing end-times in *De Doctrina Christiana*, Milton asserts ‘from the beginning, I say, of his judgement until its end, and for some time after its end, it appears that that so often promised glorious kingdom of Christ with his saints will come into being on earth’, after which he lists a number of scriptural references to support this claim: ‘But that that kingdom will be on earth, how very many passages show!’ (*CPJM* viii. 883-7). Samson is neither passive nor exclusively apocalyptic in Milton’s dramatic poem. Samson is, however, more immediately relatable to Milton than the Son of God. The characteristic components of Milton’s millenarianism are manifest in *Samson*: utopianism; toleration; and elitism. As we shall see, Samson acts as an elect individual in obedience to God, in exercise of his religious liberty, having realised inner, utopian self-control.


Slavery and its relation to liberty – particularly as a contrast between negative liberty and Milton’s conception of religious liberty – in Samson invites comparison with both Hobbes and Cavendish. In keeping with the tragic framework of the drama, the theory of which Milton articulates in the preface of the text, Milton presents a fallen Samson in ‘servile toyl’, where the condition of incarceration defines Samson’s experience: ‘Daily in the common Prison else enjoyn’d me, / Where I a Prisoner chain’d, scarce freely draw / The air imprison’d also, close and damp’ (5-7). The Chorus identifies Samson’s blindness as compounding the experience of imprisonment:

> Which shall I first bewail,  
> Thy Bondage or lost Sight,  
> Prison within Prison  
> Inseparably dark?  
> Thou art become (O worst imprisonment!)  
> The Dungeon of thy Self […]

(151-6)

Imprisonment is both a physical reality and an internal condition for Samson. As the Chorus goes on to express, ‘inward light alas / Puts forth no visual beam’ (162-3). Read in the Quaker terms of Paradise Regain’d, Samson possesses an inner light that remains trapped within himself. As Martin Dzelzainis argues, ‘Samson’s physical enslavement, however much insisted upon, actually functions as a metaphor for his true, inner slavery.’ In line with his identification of slavery as a condition of both royalism and Catholicism, Milton, drawing on the negative conception of liberty from classical Rome, depicts Samson as a slave to himself, to his hubristic heroism and vainglory, which leads to the peripeteia of confiding the secret of his strength to Dalila: ‘The base degree to which I am fall’n, / These rags, this grinding, is not yet so base / As was my former servitude, ignoble’ (414-16). The concept of inner slavery aligns with Milton’s criticism in the Tenure of those who are ‘slaves within doors’, governed by the ‘inward vitious rule’ (CWJM vi. 151). Chapter 6, moreover, discussed Milton’s perception of religious liberty in contrast to the negative liberty of Hobbes and Harrington. While the thought of Hobbes and Harrington cohered with utopianism,

Milton’s religious liberty – a freedom to serve God – provided an essential freedom to the Christian individual, particularly in terms of liberty of conscience. As we shall see, Samson’s condition of incarceration and the manner in which he is able to attain the freedom to serve God appears as a direct refutation of Hobbes’s theory of liberty.

The animist materialism of Cavendish’s *Blazing World* distinguishes her from Hobbes and identifies a common ground with Milton. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes expressed that ‘LIBERTY, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition’. As Cavendish insists in her *Philosophical Letters* (1664), with an awareness of Hobbes’s mechanist philosophy, ‘Motion is not the cause of Matter, but Matter is the cause of Motion, for Matter might subsist without Motion, but not Motion without Matter, onely there could be no perception without Motion, nor no Variety, if Matter were not self-moving […].’

568 Sarasohn suggests that Cavendish’s ‘all-encompassing internalized freedom of self-movement results in a continuum of spirituality or soul from the smallest piece of matter to the rational soul of man.’

Bacon’s natural philosophy included a belief in immaterial spirits inhabiting matter.

In *Blazing World*, therefore, the world Cavendish envisages draws and develops from Bacon’s theory of matter and spirit, which Chapter 3 compared to *Areopagitica*. The ‘young Lady’ at the beginning of the text, having been captured by a sailor, ultimately arrives at the fantastical, immaterial realm of the Blazing World following a storm, where she is soon appointed Empress. It is here that she has discussions with the animalistic spirits of the Blazing World that mark the empirical focus of the text, from which she concludes that ‘this living, self-moving body gives a spirit motion, and not that the spirit gives the body, as its vehicle, motion.’

As Sarah Hutton suggests, the materialistic quality of Cavendish’s vitalism suggests her familiarity with Hobbes’s ideas as much as her criticism of his philosophy suggests distance and disagreement.

Rogers explains that Cavendish’s resistance to Hobbesian mechanism took on a gendered form: ‘Mechanism provided masculine dominance with a powerful organizational sanction, and I suspect that it was precisely the untenable nature of such

569 Sarasohn, *Natural Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish*, p. 122.
571 Margaret Cavendish, *The Description of a New World, Called The Blazing World* (1666), in Kate Lilley, ed., *Margaret Cavendish: The Blazing World and Other Writings* (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 133-62, 169; further references will be made parenthetically in the running text.
conclusion that impelled Cavendish to distance herself from the mechanical explanation of natural change and the negative conception of liberty it seemed logically to imply. Cavendish’s natural philosophy rejects Hobbesian mechanism in favour of a quasi-Baconian theory of spirit and matter. This, in turn, enables Cavendish to depict in Blazing World a means of state-modelling that sheds the limitations of a female intellectual of the seventeenth-century.

In a representation of state-modelling, after the soul of the Duchess of Newcastle – a fictionalised Margaret Cavendish – has joined the Empress in the Blazing World, she and the Empress enquire about other, undiscovered immaterial worlds. State-modelling itself is precisely the kind of idealistic utopianism that Milton opposed in Areopagitica – ‘To sequester out of the world into Atlantick and Eutopian polities, which never can be drawn into use’ (CPW ii. 526) – and which Nedham satirised in his ‘letters of Utopia’, as discussed in Chapter 5. The spirits of the Blazing World, explaining that these other worlds are populated and should not be conquered, suggest that ‘every human creature can create an immaterial world fully inhabited by immaterial creatures, and populous of immaterial subjects, such as we are, and all this within the compass of the head or scull’ (185). The Duchess at one stage attempts to make a world ‘according to Hobbes’ opinion; but when all the parts of this imaginary world came to press and drive each other, they seemed like a company of wolves that worry sheep, or like so many dogs that hunt after hares […].’ The animalistic depiction of a Hobbesian world is likely in reference to the chaotic natural state of man that Hobbes theorises, from which the process of authorisation and covenanting brings about security and order. By contrast, the world that the Duchess mentally creates ‘was composed of sensitive and rational self-moving matter; indeed, it was composed only of the rational, which is the subtlest and purest degree of matter’ (188).

While Milton’s mature philosophy shares Cavendish’s animist materialism, the liberty that he depicts in Samson Agonistes is distinctively religious and characteristic of the conception of liberty that this study has identified in earlier works. Despite Samson’s physical imprisonment, his liberty is dependent on his internal condition. Rather than determined by external forces of motion, as it is for Hobbes, liberty is immanent for Milton. Indeed, Hobbes explicitly refers to incarceration in his expression of freedom in Leviathan:

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573 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, p. 188.
For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks, or vessels, [...] they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without those externall impediments they would (CETH iv. 324).

Rather than depicting this form of liberty, Milton takes the emphasis away from external impediment and focuses it on the internal realisation of liberty. Milton’s internal liberty is represented in the dramatic poem as Samson’s gradual acceptance of responsibility, which forms the anagnorisis of the drama. Having blamed the leaders of Israel for not accepting and acting on his heroic actions (241-76), when Manoa arrives, Samson’s tone changes, as he requests his father to attribute responsibility for his condition to him, rather than Heaven:

Appoint not heavenly disposition, Father,
Nothing of these evils hath befall’n me
But justly; I my self have brought them on,
Sole Author I, sole cause […] (373-6)

Rogers illustrates Milton’s focus on the individual in Samson by identifying the Socinian parameters of the dramatic poem. Socinianism, which was a form of seventeenth-century anti-trinitarianism, ‘provided the earliest and most coherent theological foundation for that new sense of the person we call liberal individualism.’ ‘Socinus’s dismantling of the Trinity’, Rogers argues, ‘provided Milton with his best model, in the De Doctrina, for the incorporation of the liberal principles of individualism and free will into the very foundation of his religion.’ In Chapter 8, Milton’s anti-trinitarianism helped to explain how the Son of God could be perceived as an aspirational ideal. The anti-Calvinist and Socinian depiction of Samson helps to place the locus of agency and responsibility on the individual. Milton’s conception of

liberty in *Samson*, like Cavendish’s, is distinct from the negative liberty that defined Hobbes’s philosophy.

Samson’s assertion of his status as an individual coincides with the implicit tolerationism encoded in his experience as a prisoner. Chapter 3 showed how Milton’s defence of liberty of conscience and toleration was formed by the belief that a private individual should be able to contribute to public good. Serjeantson argues that the emphasis on Samson as a private individual, both in the rebellious violence that precedes the poem and in the righteous violence with which the poem climaxes, is shared by contemporary interpretations of Samson.578 Whereas the collection of private individuals in Milton’s studious London collectively contribute to a public, millenarian good in *Areopagitica*, Milton’s identification of those who could fulfil the role of these private individuals narrowed in scope over the next decade, particularly, as Chapter 4 has shown, following his employment by the nascent English republic in 1649. Whereas the Son in *Paradise Regain’d* is an idealised, constant hero, his perfection is necessitated by his divine status; in *Samson*, the fallen hero is afflicted and persecuted in such a way that, during his physical incarceration, he is unable to contribute to the public good of Israel.

Sharon Achinstein argues that *Samson* reflects the ‘persecuting conditions of Restoration Anglicanism’, and particularly Milton’s proximity to contemporary dissent. *Paradise Regain’d* also, as Chapter 8 showed, exhibits Milton’s proximity to contemporary sectarianism in the form of the Quakers. Achinstein identifies the request made by the Philistine officials for Samson to perform for them at the feast of Dagon as a significant moment where ‘Samson is pressed to perform for the state an action we know offends his conscience’: ‘Thou knowst I am an *Ebrew*, therefore tell them, / Our Law forbids at thir Religious Rites / My presence; for that cause I cannot come’ (1319-21).579 Samson subsequently repeats ‘I will not come’ (1342), asserting his internal freedom over his external slavery:

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My self? my conscience and internal peace.
Can they think me so broken, so debas’d  
With corporal servitude, that my mind ever  
Will condescend to such absurd commands? (1334-7)
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578 Serjeantson, ‘*Samson Agonistes* and “Single Rebellion”’, pp. 621-6.
This leads Samson to make his most significant declaration of internal liberty, in a final refutation of Hobbesian negative liberty:

Where outward force constrains, the sentence holds
But who constrains me to the Temple of Dagon,
Not dragging? the Philistine Lords command.
Commands are not constraints. If I obey them,
I do it freely […] (1369-73)

Andrew McKendry, in his discussion of toleration in relation to Samson’s blindness, argues that Samson’s earlier declaration that he ‘cannot come’ (1321), when the officer arrives to remove him from his cell, is representative of Hobbes’s view of liberty, ‘however ironically charged and perhaps erroneous’. Samson’s rejection of Philistinian commands contradicts McKendry’s argument. At this late stage in the dramatic poem, Samson is distant from the fallen figure who bewailed his physical and psychological imprisonment. Samson’s language expresses his willingness to serve God once again and fulfil his divine purpose, in exercise of his religious liberty. This liberty enables Samson as a private individual to contribute to the public good of Israel. Samson not only encodes the struggles of persecuted nonconformists, but he also represents an assertion of individual liberty – specifically the liberty to serve God – that accords with Milton’s tolerationist philosophy. For such nonconformists as Milton, who had suffered in the Restoration period, the example of Samson was a model of endurance in a more distinctly human form than that of the Son in Paradise Regain’d.

Cavendish’s royalist utopia is comparatively intolerant in its monotheistic policy. Corrine Harol argues that ‘in The Blazing World the literary imagination, as a world-creating faculty that shares attributes with politics and science, necessitates an engagement with questions about toleration – and the state-sanctioned violence that toleration seeks to manage.’ Having engaged with a lengthy discussion of natural philosophy, the Empress of the Blazing World turns to the task of converting her utopia to ‘divine truth’ (163). Rather than implementing a state religion, she establishes two chapels: one where she ‘preached sermons of terror to the wicked, and told them of the punishments for their sins’ and the other where ‘she preached sermons of comfort to

those that repented of their sins, and were troubled at their own wickedness’ (164). While the chapels serve as a form of state apparatus, Cavendish is insistent that the animalistic inhabitants of the Blazing World choose to convert by their own consciences:

And thus the Empress, by art, and her own ingenuity, did not only convert the Blazing World to her own religion, but kept them in a constant belief, without enforcement or blood-shed; for she knew well, that belief was a thing not to be forced or pressed upon the people, but to be instilled into their minds by gentle persuasions […] (164).

The Empress’s tolerationist policy, however, is disbanded at the Duchess’s suggestion. At the end of the first part of Blazing World, the Empress explains to the Duchess that ‘there are such contentions and divisions between the worm-, bear- and fly-men, the ape-men, the satyrs, the spider-men, and all others of such sorts’, and so asks ‘how I may order it to the best advantage, that this world may be rendered peaceable, quiet and happy, as it was before’ (201).

The Duchess’s proposed changes transition the Blazing World to the stringent utopianism that this study has traced in the seventeenth-century. The Duchess explains that the Blazing World should ‘have but one sovereign, one religion, one law, and one language, so that all the world might be but as one united family’, and this extends to a restriction of the various animalistic factions of the utopia. Where the Empress had permitted the bear men to use telescopes within their own society, enjoying a freedom comparable to that of Salomon’s House in New Atlantis (140-2), the Duchess advises the Empress to dissolve the animal societies, ‘for ‘tis better to be without their intelligences, than to have an unquiet and disorderly government’ (202). In his ‘letters from Utopia’, as discussed in Chapter 5, Nedham satirically envisioned political changes in Utopia that reflected the contemporary political landscape of the Protectorate in 1657; in Blazing World, Cavendish’s Empress transforms the Blazing World into a politically and religiously tolerant society that fails, and reverts to a regulated, monolithic and politically conservative utopia. Rachel Trubowitz is perceptive in identifying an absence of Cavendish from such studies as J. C. Davis’s Utopia and the Ideal Society. Indeed, Davis does not include any women writers in his analysis of utopianism. However, Trubowitz argues that Cavendish offers a revision of the intolerant, utopian society that Davis characterises in his book: ‘Unlike other utopias, including or especially those contemporaneous with it, Cavendish’s ideal world does not domesticate human and physical nature into a rationalized cultural grid that can
be easily managed and patrolled. The passages quoted above suggest the opposite. Cavendish’s utopia epitomises the form of utopianism that Davis defines. State control resolves any problems borne out of the diversity of opinions permitted in the Empress’s initial tolerationist policy. The matter of religious toleration, therefore, distances Cavendish from Milton. Milton, a decade into the Restoration, suffused his literary works with his experience of persecution and intolerance. Cavendish, by contrast, returning to England in 1660 after over fifteen years exiled abroad, necessarily supported the actions of the crown that prevented a return to republicanism and the toleration that was safeguarded by the Cromwellian Protectorate. The context of the Restoration further illustrates why Milton internalised his utopianism in his 1671 poems: whereas republicanism in the 1650s was compatible with utopianism, Milton’s experiences in Restoration England were not.

If Samson depicts Milton’s experience of persecution, then the final climactic lines of the dramatic poem represent a conclusive assertion of religious freedom in servitude to God. Rather than an act of terrorism, Milton depicts the destructive ending of Samson as an act of liberation. Where the Son is depicted in violent glory in Paradise Lost and inactive constancy in Paradise Regain’d, Samson at the end of the dramatic poem exhibits both utopian self-control and aggressive retribution. Stephen Fallon identifies Milton’s self-representation in the figure of Samson, just as he does in the figure of the Son of Paradise Regain’d, but specifically in terms of ‘the freedom of even those especially chosen by God to fall.’ While Samson falls, in keeping with the tragic framework of the drama, he also undergoes a process of self-realisation, from which he finally exercises religious liberty. The distinction that Fallon identifies, therefore, indicates a similarity between the two 1671 poems: in both texts, utopian self-control realises the will of God. Before Samson asserts his distance from the commands of Philistine officials, the Chorus, having praised Samson’s heroic glory, asserts

But patience is more oft the exercise
Of Saints, the trial of thir fortitude,
Making them each his own Deliverer,
And Victor over all

583 For a discussion of the revised intolerant philosophy, see Harol, ‘Imagining Worlds’, p. 111.
584 Fallon, Milton’s Peculiar Grace, p. 250, see generally 250-63.
This follows Samson’s heroic defiance against Haraptha – ‘bring up thy van, / My heels are fetter’d, but my fist is free’ (1234-5) – and anticipates his assertion of free conscience. Samson’s decision to follow the messenger is the consequence of his feeling ‘Some rousing motions’ (1382), which suggests that it accords with his conscience: ‘Nothing to do, be sure, that may dishonour / Our Law, or stain my vow of Nazarite’ (1385-6). When Samson is led to the two ‘massie Pillars’ (1623) that he ultimately pulls down, the messenger describes him as ‘with head a while enclin’d, / And eyes fast fixt he stood, as one who pray’d, / Or some great matter in his mind revolv’d’ (1626-8). Samson’s stasis and self-reflection, particularly in contrast to the burst of activity that brings down the temple on the Philistines, is a valuable mirror of the Son in Paradise Regain’d. Samson realises an inner utopia in order to bring about divine retribution on the Philistines. Rather than sanctioning violence against persecutors, as Gregory suggests, Milton celebrates action brought about by utopian self-control that attends the realisation of Christian liberty as he saw it. Violence is secondary in Samson: the dramatic action is the product of obeying the will of God. In comparison with Paradise Regain’d, Samson’s inner utopia encourages millenarian readings of the dramatic poem. The millennium may not be possible in the Hebrew context of Samson – as it is guaranteed by the figure of the Son in Paradise Regain’d – but Samson’s final act exemplifies how a persecuted individual like Milton can fulfil the will of God. Samson’s utopian self-control and liberty of conscience realises the will of God in just the same way that elect individuals in Restoration England, by maintaining their religious freedom in spite of persecution and maintaining self-control, could anticipate the millennium.

Cavendish’s Blazing World offers a valuable contrast to Milton’s utopianism that further illustrates the political and theological ideas that this study has discussed. In her Epilogue, Cavendish suggests that ‘if any would like the world I have made, and be willing to be my subjects, they may imagine themselves such, and they are such, I mean, in their minds, fancies or imaginations; but if they cannot endure to be subjects, they may create worlds of their own, and govern themselves as they please […]’ (224-5). Milton never endorsed this fictional state-building. His utopianism, while initially characterised as Baconian, takes on a republican and Morean quality in the 1650s, and, in the context of 1671, retreats internally, in response to his experience of

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Restoration intolerance. For Cavendish, a female intellectual who lacked recognition from contemporary intellectuals, such as possibly by Hobbes himself, the fictional artifice of utopianism enabled her to both assert her form of natural philosophy and realise her ‘ambition […] not only to be Empress, but Authoress of a whole world’ (224).\footnote{Sarasohn suggests that Hobbes may never have engaged with Cavendish in person, in \textit{Natural Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish}, p. 113.} For Milton, utopianism was a means to achieve the millennium. Where the intellectual progress of Baconian natural philosophy intended to bring about a return to prelapsarian dominion of nature, the utopian totality – of rigid, state control – became Milton’s recommendation for steering the failed English republic away from the wavering inconstancy of the English people in 1659. It is the perfect standard of the millennium that feeds Milton’s elitism throughout his life. Whereas the people in \textit{Areopagitica} contribute to a public good, by late 1649 Milton’s criteria for the upright private individual had narrowed; by 1671, it would be characterised by elect heroes, capable of realising inner utopian self-control. Milton’s utopian millennium sought to emulate divine perfection on earth. He never lost sight of the eschatological end point, but his utopianism adapted to the substantial political transformations of the mid-seventeenth-century. Milton’s millennium ultimately merges with his utopia in the form of the elect individual.
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