"STATES" WITHIN A STATE: LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY
A DECADE AFTER THE HARIRI ASSASSINATION

submitted by

YOUSSEF MASRIEH

to the University of Exeter

as a thesis for the degree of *Doctor of Philosophy* in *Arab & Islamic Studies*

December 2020

(Signature) ……………………………(Date)… 24 December 2020…

ABSTRACT

During the decade after the Hariri assassination in 2005, domestic political divisions were a sharp reflection of a profound dispute over Lebanon's foreign affairs, principally in terms of its position towards conflict with Israel, and in affiliation with other regional struggles affecting a final peace resolution of the Palestine issue – itself influenced by regional and international state friendships, systematic bullying, and manipulative relationships. This also maintained negative outcomes for Lebanon, especially with the continued Israeli occupation of neighbouring Arab state lands – whether Lebanese, Syrian or Palestinian territories – in violation of their integral state sovereignty.

In this respect, while Lebanese foreign policy was predominantly coordinated with Syria (from as early as the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference), following the Hariri assassination Syria's withdrawal left Lebanon with major political gaps, split mainly over the concept of Lebanese state sovereignty amidst occasional foreign (political/armed) interventions in Lebanon and the region, and accompanied by exploitative economic rewards, debts, briberies or sanctions. This thesis examines the patterns and dynamics of Lebanese foreign policy, focusing on the internal and external factors shaping the contrasts in foreign policy behaviour, especially with the failure of international efforts for peace and the escalation of regional conflict after 2011, which impacted upon Lebanon's geopolitical sovereignty interests.

The thesis also investigates historic geo-dynamics that continue to contribute to the exploitation of equal civil and civic citizenship rights in the Lebanese state, being thus an obstacle to equal power-sharing influenced by the state issue in the region and in international relations amidst a constant cycle of conflict and violence. These are also considered by assessing issues of equal sovereignty relationships in a post-peace regional order, guarantors of equal social and individual citizenship rights, and identities or freedoms protected by the civil state and their relevance in interpreting foreign policy behaviour.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

To a countless invisible people, stubborn in their countless generous and modest deeds.

There are things we do not know, but we can try to understand or acknowledge their elements by observation through a timeline of events and consequences. There are things we do know, yet they reflect false thoughts or conceptions that we cannot fully understand if we are not driven by acknowledgement of hidden deeds in attempting to observe beyond their known, visible or taken-for-granted knowledge or truth.

Knowledge has a soul of discrete human imagination towards feelings and sensations that are embedded in a cultural timeline of material and non-material waves of evolution – marked by history and memory to a developing human civilization that remains to be acknowledged.

The spirit of this work is contributed to all the people who inspired the bits and pieces of this academic journey starting with Dr Samer Abboud and Prof Bill Skidmore who urged and supported this voyage at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter, beginning with my MA thesis and PhD admission under the supervision of Prof Gerd Nonneman. Whom I would really like to thank for his expert feedback on the Foreign Policy and International Relations of the Middle East, along with all the individuals who helped me continue this journey after having to shift into distance-learning status, especially Prof Illan Pappe accepting to become my supervisor alongside my second supervisor Dr Klejda Mulaj. I really appreciate all the support and help by my supervisors and also my examiners Prof Nadim Shehadi, to whom I am grateful for feedback on the important references to support my theoretical framework, and Prof Gareth Stansfield for his feedback on my thesis structure and wrapping up recommendations.

I would also greatly like to thank my editor Mrs Lindy Ayubi, especially for all the intellectual discussions and inspirations along with Sami Ayubi, at the presence of Dr Claws and the Devastator, every time I visited Exeter. Thank you for the precious books by Dr Nazih Ayubi, especially the book on the Arabs and the State Issue.

Indeed, this was a long and tough journey, being faced with personal delays and difficulties, but ironically it was not much different from my research case study on Lebanon or the Middle East region going through very complex events or situations during the period of conducting this research. I would really like to thank all friends I have met through this adventure and also family members, who had very precious visible or invisible influence in inspiring this path. Hey Jude with greetings to Lulwa and Hassan Zeidan...

List of Abbreviations

AAB   Abdullah Azzam Brigade

AI   Artificial Intelligence

ATC   Arab Tripartite Committee

CAT   Construction and Trading Company – CAT Group

CIA   Central Intelligence Agency

CND   Committee for National Dialogue

ECE   Electronic Common Era

FM   Future Movement

FPM   Free Patriotic Movement

FSA   Free Syria Army

GCC   Gulf Cooperation Council

GDP   Gross Domestic Product

IDF   Israeli Defense Forces

ISIL   Islamist State in Iraq and the Levant

ISIS   Islamist State in Iraq and Syria

ISF   Internal Security Force

JAN   Jabhat Al-Nusra (JAN), or Al-Nusra Front in the Levant

KSA   Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

LAF   Lebanese Armed Forces

LAS   League of Arab States

LCP   Lebanese Communist Party

LF   Lebanese Front

LFs   Lebanese Forces

LRB   Lebanese Resistance Battalions/Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya (AMAL)

LNDR   Lebanese National Dialogue Roundtable

LNM   Lebanese National Movement

LNRF   Lebanese National Resistance Front (Jammoul)

MB   Muslim Brotherhood

MEC   March Eight Coalition

MAC	Mixed Armistice Commission
MFC	March Fourth Coalition
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
ML	Machine Learning
MNF	Multi-National Force
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NDI	National Democratic Institute
OBOR	One Belt One Road
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PNO	Popular Nasserites Organization
PSP	Progressive Socialist Party
SAA	Syrian Arab Army
SLA	South Lebanese Army
SSNP	Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party
STL	Special Tribunal for Lebanon
TBCC	Treaty of Brotherhood, Coordination and Cooperation
UAR	United Arab Republic
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
YP	Young Phoenicians

Table of Content

Preface: From 'Dictated Chaos' to 'Creative Chaos': Lebanon a Decade after the Hariri Assassination

----

Chapter One: An Introduction to Lebanese Foreign Policy

1.1. Indigenous Geo-Dynamics: Chronological Literature Review of Lebanese Foreign Policy

1.2. The Art of Lebanese Foreign Policy

1.3. A Complex Omni-Balance: Middle East and Arab State Foreign Policy Literature Review Debate

1.4. The Arabs and the State Issue: Countless Small Deeds of Hidden People

1.5. 1920s Lebanon: The Quest for the Modern State within its Complex Domestic-External Context

1.6. Lebanon and its Regional-International Geopolitical Orientations Until 1948
> *1.6.1 Arab Supremacy Divisions: Arrogance in Facing the Supremacy of Zionism*

1.7. Early Israeli Political and Security Interventions in Lebanese Domestic-Foreign Affairs After Independence

1.8. Lebanon and Arab Regional-International Hostility and Compromise Excursions Until 1967
> *1.8.1. Invisible Lebanese Domestic-Foreign Policy Behaviours*
> *1.8.2. Renewed Conflict and War: The End of a Regional Stability Legacy*

1.9. Conclusion

Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework

2.1. A Hybrid Lebanese State Sovereignty Structure

2.2. Quantum Sovereignty Experiment Revelations

2.3. A Quantum Theory / Social Science Correlation
> *2.3.1. Altering the Manufacture of Dominant Misconceptions in Hidden Endeavours*

2.4. Misconceptions of Truth and False Knowledge: a Quantum Realism Theory Analysis in a Struggle of Chaos, Anarchy or Order

2.5. A Comparative Quantum Politics Theory Analysis

PREFACE

FROM "DICTATED CHAOS" TO "CREATIVE CHAOS": LEBANON A DECADE AFTER THE HARIRI ASSASSINATION

Despite continued hopes for political reform in Lebanon, especially in the period following the Hariri assassination in 2005, the country remained in a state of foreign-domestic dictated political chaos, which continued from 2011 onwards as the region entered a new level of creative disarray, dictated by an increasingly evident competitiveness over global hegemony. More than ten years after the assassination, Lebanon's unrest had delayed the implementation of any strategic economic or political reforms by the state. Constantly influenced by domestic divisions over regional conflicts and foreign interventions impacting the country at both domestic and foreign policy levels. Making Lebanon difficult to understand, as this also made it hard to arrive at systematic research conclusions, or even to determine the most feasible theoretical or methodological approach to writing this thesis.

During the eight months (between 2010-2011) that I spent in Lebanon on fieldwork as a graduate researcher (at CAMES, the Centre for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies at the American University of Beirut), I recall the reality that coincided with the regime change protests in the region. These protests, which started to evolve in the winter of 2010, first in Tunisia and later in Egypt in January 2011, became the stimulus for a cynical Arab Spring of armed conflicts and foreign military intervention that diverted the rise to an Arab Revolution of political sovereignty and socioeconomic security. In fact, the inspirations generated by the peaceful protests, especially those that followed in Egypt, reflected a sense of Arab public solidarity that was also felt in Lebanon. I was in Sidon on the night Mubarak was expected to give his first public speech about the protests, and people everywhere were mesmerized by the events.

Disappointment, expressed in a rather deep silence, overshadowed the mood on the street after Mubarak had made his TV appearance to declare that Egypt was not Tunisia, and that he was

staying in power. However, not long afterwards, and like Zine al-Abdine bin 'Ali in Tunisia, the Egyptian president was deposed, having also lost foreign political support in seeking to contain both events. Somehow this initially brought a certain relief regarding my research questions at the domestic level. Encouraged by the new events in the region I anticipated a better understanding of a more transparent Lebanese foreign policy future, and especially of the matter of the reform of political sovereignty and state power rule in the Lebanese state.

The Lebanese had already held their political change protests in 2005 and were not very keen to protest in 2011. The key for change was contained within the electoral law reforms that had been awaited since 2005 and were expected to be concluded before the 2013 general elections. Even so, a timid solidarity protest in Beirut in 2011 demanded regime change in Lebanon and called for implementation of the post-civil war political reforms relating to the abolition of sectarianism, beginning with the electoral law. Yet both the elections and the reforms were to be postponed, falling victim to an extremist Armed Spring that extended from Syria and Iraq reaching the Lebanese borders. Also across the region where new and 'un-anticipated' popular outburst of long-absent and massive political protests that demanded regime change and an end to state oppression were to become exploited by foreign interventions and security violence. It was interesting to observe the entire region descending into instability and protests while Lebanon by comparison, remained quiet, already enjoying the freedom of political protest, despite constant disappointments over the lack of reform action.

Traditionally Lebanon has been very rich in its varied counter-views on almost any topic one might raise. Diverse political views, confessional faiths and social freedoms have been the most genuine windows for a democracy of co-existence and acceptance. Resembled in the various geo-demographic communities, customs, heritage, music or food *mezza* varieties in this small opulent country, with its geo-political history of ideological, socio-economic, linguistic, intellectual, cultural and civilizational affiliations, all forming the pieces of a unique puzzle. When assembled, this assortment of ideas and opinions constitute Lebanon's complex identity. Yet these are impossible to read or understand with the non-attendance of the state institution in leading the fate of its people. Unfortunately, failure to achieve reform in Lebanon, or across the Arab world in general, was overshadowed by a number of political or security pretexts for postponement, as for

instance between 2011-2015 when Lebanon was influenced by the Syrian conflict or the Israeli continued threats of war in objection to an American agreement with Iran.

Additional to the security threats, the Garbage Crisis of 2015 which erupted into public anger and protests was also to expose the state's continued negligence and weakness, constantly failing to seek permanent resolutions. Whether in facing foreign threats or towards its legal and ethical obligations in securing the country's basic socio-economic and political interests. Hence, Lebanon also became stuck in a political deadlock, postponing both presidential and parliamentary elections while contributing to the absence of any political or legal accountability. At the foreign policy level there was also a Lebanese domestic conflict over determining the shape of relationships with Syria, whose ongoing crisis produced negative economic, trade and security impacts on Lebanon. In addition, there was the Syrian refugee issue which had escalated following the massacres committed by an Islamist state that had been declared in Iraq and Syria in 2014. This entity even occupied Lebanese territories along the borders with Syria until it was finally driven out in 2017, along with other Al-Qaeda-affiliated 'rebels' that had been present as early as 2012.

Regrettably, Lebanon remained hostage to the internal-external dynamics of regional conflicts or claims for peace, including also with Israel which was keen to see a regime change in Syria or an American war with Iran, thereby revealing a cynical 'deal of the century' plan for peace in 2017. Hence the external threats did not fade; nor did the domestic issues that distracted support from public interests, such as the garbage crisis and its polluting impacts on the Lebanese environment and public health. These reflected the reality of state carelessness on the part of the sectarian corporate-cartel political establishment that traditionally blamed domestic conditions strictly on external factors. Ironically, while the Garbage Crisis could not be blamed on any foreign or international intervention, there remained a lack of domestic and external interests or curiosity, regarding protection of the domestic or the regional environment from long-term pollution risks.

This comes back to the question of how to define, explain, or understand Lebanese foreign policy, in a state that has neither a defined national security strategy, nor sovereign political and economic policies to protect the state's interests at both the domestic and foreign levels. It would be interesting to explore this, taking into account the historic geo-realisms in the analysis of foreign

policy manoeuvres (within an omni-balanced domestic-external relationship context) at all domestic, regional and international levels; and by approximating the complex or quantum realisms that dominate both Lebanon and the Middle East region, located as they are at the centre of Eastern and Western intellectual dichotomies, whether in relation to global trade routes, natural energy sources or civilizational debate.

In a penetrated and conflicted region like the Middle East, political sovereignty remains key in assessing state behaviour. Domestically this issue falls in the correct, fair, and equal political representation or participation of all citizens and minority groups in the state, tenable through the 'general elections' electoral law and political funding methods. Perhaps a state that is incapable of providing basic services to its citizens or agreeing on an electoral law, cannot be expected to be able to promote an officially transparent and sovereign domestic or foreign policy. Although a new electoral law was finally drafted in Lebanon by 2017, it still fell short of abolishing the dominance of sectarianism on the electoral law that had been postponed since the end of the civil war in 1990.

The notion of state sovereignty and the question of power rule is important in reading this puzzle since the absence of the arbiter – the civil and social justice state – is usually the public expression or demand in reaction to the harsh reality lived by most Lebanese. It is also the dream of all Lebanese expatriates, who leave their hearts, thoughts, and hopes for families back home in search of the capable, just and ethical state which is extensively disregarded in Lebanon and is absent, whether in its domestic or its foreign policy behaviours towards the welfare of both its resident and expatriate citizens. They continue to struggle for the right of individual freedoms or mind freedom in pursuing human development and prosperity. Becoming intellectually distracted by the lack of electricity or water, jammed traffic, poor internet or phone connections, healthcare risks from pollution, economic stress and so on, all of which have become daily routine issues in Lebanon, surmounted with domestic and regional political tensions that invite foreign interventions, religiously-masked conflicts, massacres or incitements, thereby harming and delaying the dream of the sovereign state.

In exploring those domestic and external issues in Lebanon, Chapter One introduces Lebanese foreign policy, and includes a literature review and a historic overview of the background to the foundations of foreign policy in Lebanon. Chapter Two covers the conceptual framework, adopting quantum theory as a pluralist theory approach based on an omni-balancing theory of foreign policy formulation in Lebanon at all domestic, regional and international levels. Chapter Three examines the hypothesis of the research questions and outlines the methodological approach. Chapter Four reviews and explores the domestic, regional and international dynamics that impact on the geo-politics of Lebanese foreign policy, while Chapter Five provides a historical timeline analysis of the state and sub-state interplay during and after the civil war era until the Hariri assassination in 2005. Chapters Six and Seven analyse the multi-effects on Lebanese domestic and foreign policy after the Hariri assassination, examining issues of sovereignty and security in the context of power rule disputes, war violence, and hegemony exploitations. They also test the adoption of an omni-balancing theory approach, in a quantum historic timeline analysis of cyclical issues related to conflict or political chaos. In conclusion, Chapter Eight summarises the major research findings, and offers thoughts about possible future research trends.

CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY

"Is a Lebanese Foreign Policy Possible?" (Ghassan Salame, 1988)
"…the controversial issues that erupted into political crises and armed violence belong to the realm
  of foreign policy rather than domestic politics." (Nasif Hitti, 1989)
 "Does Lebanon have anything but a Foreign Policy?" (Paul Salem, 1994)
"Very little has been written on post-war Lebanese affairs, and almost nothing has been written
  on Lebanon's foreign policy." (Tom Pierre Najem, 2005)
"The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon" (Bassel F. Salloukh, 2008)
"… factors at the state and sub-state levels are more important than those at the systemic level for
  understanding Lebanese foreign policy." (Henrietta Charlotte Wilkins, 2011)
"… another period of Lebanon's modern history is defined in part by conflicting ideas about what
  Lebanon's foreign policy should be." (Samer N. Abboud and Benjamin J. Muller, 2012)

1.1. Indigenous Geo-Dynamics: Chronological Literature Review of Lebanese Foreign Policy

In analyzing the empirical patterns and dynamics of Lebanese Foreign Policy – in a region of complex conflicts and occasional interventions – a major reflection is that it is mostly dictated by regional security and power hegemony issues, and manipulated by Arab divisions over the issue of Palestine or conflict with Israel. Such issues – inspired by an early ancestor timeline of ancient generations of human civilizational junctions – exist in the intellectual foundations of the modern state of Lebanon; yet they are somewhat governed by the complex geo-dynamics that dominate all its domestic, regional or international relationships, mainly through seeking to revive the ancient Phoenician merchant city-states envisioned for the modern state of Lebanon, although the state continues to be faced by the challenges of regional instability that threaten Lebanese mercantile and economic interests. Lebanon has been made to lose almost its entire agricultural and industrial merchant trades since the end of its civil war in 1990, and instead has become largely influenced by the utilization of internationally-dominant neoliberal economic policies that were tied to the failed visions for peace in the Middle East and mainly constructed around a US-led "new world order" that replaced the Cold War era.

In other words, the country was to remain hostage to a history of complex inherited realities and misconceptions, relatively related to issues of regional hegemony and state power conflicts. Accordingly, this chapter aims to conduct a literature review of Lebanese foreign policy, or a literature timeline analysis that will be helpful in investigating the factors shaping or impacting on

foreign policy behaviour in Lebanon. Almost all literature on Lebanese foreign policy would agree on the unique yet complex role of the indigenous sub-state or non-state communal forces in shaping foreign policy behaviour, whether during rare occasions of peace and stability or during the 'usual' eras of political conflict and occasional threats of war or foreign invasion into Lebanon or the wider region. This chapter also aims to conduct a literature review analysis of the foreign policy of Middle East states – examining the global affairs of the Middle East or Arab region affected by various events, occasions, circumstances, conditions, environments or eras – as shaped at both the domestic and external level. In so doing, it tries to establish why it is so difficult to understand Lebanese foreign policy, and the nature of the domestic and external patterns and dynamics that impact upon it.

1.2. The Art of Lebanese Foreign Policy

In describing Lebanese foreign policy as "the art of the impossible", Bassel Salloukh reflected on two different positions, embodied in questions posed in 1988 by Ghassan Salame who wondered if "…a Lebanese foreign policy [was] possible?", and by Paul Salem in 1994 who asked "Does Lebanon have anything but a foreign policy?" Salloukh's response was that, especially in a polarized, regionally contested, and internationally entangled state like Lebanon, it was necessary to walk a "methodological tight-rope between the two positions … lacking national consensus on a range of strategic issues … [and] to have a foreign policy proactively serving its economic and security interests".[1] As such, in further examining this literature on Lebanese foreign policy, one notes that in 1988 the country was still embroiled in a civil war and, as Salame argues, was a hostage to the Cold War severities affecting the region, and which Lebanon had slipped into since the late 1960s, culminating by 1975 in civil war. Effectively the state became divided between the geo-communal sectarian warlords, who failed to unite over any of the controversial domestic or foreign policies while the country was being manipulated by foreign interventions that were funding the cost of war. Emphasising the organic relationship between domestic and foreign

---

[1] Bassel F. Salloukh (2008), "The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon", in Bahgat Korany and Ali Dessouki, eds., *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization*, new rev. ed. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, pp. 283-317.

issues at both regional and international levels, Salame concluded that there was no clear-cut distinction between the internal and external factors "which are intertwined and interdependent".[2]

Similarly, Nassif Hitti writing in 1989 on Lebanese foreign policy towards the end of the war, argues that "controversial issues erupt into political crises or armed violence that belong to the realm of foreign policy rather than domestic politics."[3] He also stresses how, unlike the rest of the Arab world, " the demarcation line between foreign policy and domestic politics is blurred in Lebanon" by being well-insulated from the influence of one dominant domestic political force; it thereby becomes well-guarded from the dominance of any one party-rule regime (clear foreign policy) that might come to power in Lebanon.[4] However, he blames all the controversial issues in Lebanon on the foreign policy realm, given the constitutionalized sectarian political dominance in the state, where "nursing different sectarian cultures that would encompass different, often contradictory political and national values can never be brought together to produce a harmonious foreign policy."[5] As a result, the Lebanese political system was "democratically" open to "all forms of lobbying for all kinds of goals" where, in the absence of a shared consensus to contain the lobbying game, "anti-state goals become [a] permissible and unorthodox means of pursuing any alternative sectarian 'security oriented' narrow or trans-national goals."[6]

In other words, it could be said that political sectarianism was influential in the "organic relationship" between the domestic and foreign issues for Lebanon. Hence, this relationship remained dominant in the era that followed the end of the Cold War and the civil war in Lebanon, where, as Salloukh notes, the overlap between domestic and foreign politics

> … exacerbates Lebanon's permeability to regional pressures and its vulnerability to external intervention, permitting outside actors to become the ultimate arbiters over Lebanese matters. In this process, Lebanese politicians compromise the sovereignty of their state and its foreign policy independence for instrumental political ends. Disagreements among the variable Lebanese sects and subsects over

---

[2] Ghassan Salamé (1988), "Is a Lebanese Foreign Policy Possible?" in Halim Barakat, ed., *Toward a Viable Lebanon* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies), pp. 347–360.
[3] Nassif Hitti (1989), "The Foreign Policy of Lebanon: Lessons and Prospects for the Forgotten Dimension", *Papers on Lebanon No. 9* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies), p. 3.
[4] ibid.
[5] ibid, p. 22.
[6] ibid, pp. 3-4.

foreign policy choices often avalanche into sectarian dominated political deadlocks or violent confrontations.[7]

Foreign sponsored resolutions dominated the domestic political scene in the post-civil war era in 1990, in which, apart from the sectarian and neo-feudal political dominance of the state, the country's stability remained hostage to the realm of foreign policy. To ensure the end of civil conflict in Lebanon as a prerequisite to a new alleged peace equation in the Middle East, the country remained under an armed Israeli occupation in the South, and under an Arab (mainly Saudi) mediated Syrian political and security mandate in Beirut.

Paul Salem's question in 1994, "Does Lebanon have Anything but a Foreign Policy?"[8] somewhat reflected a foreign policy and diplomacy that dominated the regional and international scene during the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. It was essential to help Lebanon to liberate itself from continued Israeli occupation and to reconstruct the state after its long civil war. There was a promise of regional peace and stability, with economic development rewards supportive of the reconstruction efforts in Lebanon, which became the core of Lebanese foreign policy. Yet the country became further dependent on the resolution of foreign regional issues, and further dependent on foreign sponsorships to resolve domestic issues; and these issues were further complicated with the escalation of regional conflicts and instability, manipulated by sectarian-oriented political clientelism at both the domestic and regional levels, and sometimes sufficiently devious to uncover the reality of events on the ground. As Tom Pierre Najem reflected in 2005, this era was dominated by political misconception, and especially a lack of significant literature on post-war Lebanese affairs, or foreign policy behaviour.

This presented a crucial problem for many scholars and policy-makers who assumed that Lebanon really had no "authentic foreign policy of its own". This view was based on receiving summarized material reflecting Syria's dominant role in Lebanon,[9] or was influenced by the Israeli political

---

[7] Salloukh (2008), op.cit., pp. 283-284.
[8] Paul Salem (1994), "Reflections on Lebanon's Foreign Policy", in Deirdre Collings, ed., *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p. 96.
[9] Tom P Najem (2005), "Lebanon and Europe: The Foreign Policy of a Penetrated State", in Gerd Nonneman, ed., *Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge), p. 100.

view, policy-making literature, and media or lobbying propaganda that blamed Syria, and Hezbollah, for failing to achieve peace with Lebanon. Leading researchers could only examine the country through erroneous contexts instead of seeking, as Najem argues, "to understand the reasoning and processes which underlie Lebanon's actions on the regional and international stages."[10] For example, Syria was to be blamed for being an obstacle to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and accused of supporting terrorism. Similarly, indigenous Lebanese roles or actions in seeking or achieving the liberation of South Lebanon in 2000 were also systematically ignored, or identified as seeking acts of terrorism against Israel – disregarding the official Lebanese state position or national Lebanese consent in rejecting the Israeli occupation. Najem emphasises the importance of examining the role of the domestic forces in the state, who were fervent about their own geo-demographic security, especially from foreign threats the state had failed to deter, such as seeking the liberation of the state from foreign invasion or military presence, whether by or of Syria or Israel, regardless of the other regional or international factors.

Another aspect identified by Salloukh is the need to reflect on the period after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon following the Hariri assassination, which exposed the role of the domestic powers in the escalation of political conflicts previously blamed on Syrian obstacles. This was particularly significant in relation to the multi-domestic and externally-complex factors that were shaping the "Art of the Impossible" in the making of Lebanese foreign policy. This complexity both shocked and disappointed the Syrians, who saw the majority of their previous Lebanese political allies in governance demand a boycott of relationships with Syria which they held responsible for the Hariri assassination. Inevitably, the country split into two divergent political coalitions, one strongly opposed to Syria and the other emphasizing good relationships and support for the Syrian state amidst the regional and international pressures facing both Syria and the region following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Regarding official relations with Syria, Lebanese foreign policy therefore found itself after 2005 in a grey area, and since 2011, given the ongoing conflicts in the region, right across the border with Israel, strongly influenced by the security of the indigenous sub-state forces holding the ground where the state was technically absent or incapable.

---

[10] Ibid.

In her doctoral thesis, Henrietta Wilkins similarly "tests, and ultimately supports, the hypothesis that factors at the unit level (mainly sub-state identities) are more important than systemic levels of analysis for understanding Lebanese foreign policy",[11] achieving this by examining the case of Hezbollah during the Israeli War against Lebanon in 2006. She argues that the role of sub-state actors is very influential in macro-behaviours or situations, and agrees with Sallouk, Najem, Salem, Hitti and Salame on the role of the indigenous geo-demographic forces in influencing Lebanese foreign policy, stressing the importance of examining both domestic and external factors in analysing Lebanese foreign policy, and vice versa. She also supports Abboud and Muller in their observation on Lebanese foreign policy in *Rethinking Hezbollah* (2012): "another period of Lebanon's modern history is defined in part by conflicting ideas about what Lebanon's foreign policy should be",[12] and stresses the role of sub-state forces in those divergences, especially in acquiring authority or legitimacy for the use of violence in a region of conflicts appealing to foreign interventions.

Although the micro-behaviours of sub-state forces may be hard to investigate or sometimes even predict, this does not deny their impact on macro-behaviours or events, whether at the domestic or external level. Yet this could possibly become feasible through examining the historic timeline of events threatening the security of the indigenous communities in Lebanon, also in affiliation with state security interests. In other words, examining the natural selections of Lebanese sub-state forces (beyond the strict/imposed 'proxy context' vis-à-vis external affiliations) could be an asset. For instance, investigating the natural indigenous ideological, political, philosophical, anthropological or psychological connections or their sub-variables, could probably provide an additional contribution towards a better understanding of the complex political scene in Lebanon and its surrounding regions – especially in a region with a history of repeated cycles of the domestic conflicts and foreign interventions overshadowing Lebanese foreign policy interests.

1.3. A Complex Omni-Balance: Middle East and Arab State Foreign Policy Literature Review Debate

---

[11] Henrietta C. Wilkins (2011), "The Making of Lebanese Foreign Policy: The Case of the 2006 Hizballah-Israeli War", PhD thesis, Durham University, UK, p. 72.

[12] Samer Abboud and Benjamin Muller (2012), *Rethinking Hezbollah: Legitimacy, Authority, Violence* (London: Ashgate /Routledge), p. 125.

As with modern foreign policy theories, actors, or cases, there is also a focus on the individual, group, or communal mind, mainly in the decision-making of formal foreign policy by the state in representing the interests of the general public. This emphasises the social context – in the uniqueness of pursuing individual mind security imaginations or the intellectual and ethical attitudes impacting social and personal fears, beliefs, faith, values, memory, experiences, emotions, sensations, straits, hopes, wisdom, knowledge or inspiration – in association with national interests versus strictly sectarian or individual self-conceptions. Relatively speaking, observing the socio- (political, economic, legal or psychological) contexts of both the official state decision-making mechanisms and the indigenous sub-state powers not represented by the state, could be a supportive approach in analysing Lebanese foreign policy (being reasonably comparable to the US, where individual, corporate, legal, political, financial or lobby groups interests might still influence specific foreign policy interests). Yet the key factor in foreign policy analysis remains the focusing on a wide range of phenomena, from individuals to groups, institutions, societies, economies, and polities.[13]

By default, this includes the local communal security interests applicable in the sectarian geo-demographic Lebanese situation. Even so, the many challenges in domestic Lebanese politics are contributing to the complex sectarian, political, and socio-economic 'traditional history' system that happens to attract foreign intervention and penetration by both regional and international powers. In fact, as Wilkins stresses, referring to Korany and Dessouki, domestic factors continue to become increasingly intertwined with regional and global dynamics and cannot be approached from an isolationist perspective.[14] Or, in considering what James Rosenau notes, such factors become increasingly blurred into a single indistinguishable unit, mainly with reference to the penetrated state; this, as Hinnebusch suggests, requires foreign policy makers to "omni-balance" between domestic and foreign pressures.[15]

---

[13] James N. Rosenau (2012), "Foreword", in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (eds), *Foreign Policy Theories: Actors Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
[14] Wilkins, 2011, referring to Korany and Dessouki, eds. (2008: 1-8) .
[15] Wilkins, 2011, referring to: Rosenau, J. N. (1997: 5); Hinnebusch R. (2002: 15)

Pressures that analysts might also attempt to investigate or understand would also take into consideration an "omni-balance" approach, particularly since – as articulated by Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, also referenced by Wilkins – the main challenge to the complex Lebanese environment and the Middle East region is being in a "penetrated regional system."[16] Attracting penetration for being rich with hydrocarbon resources and highly significant for their geo-strategic economic and security interests (as continuously emphasised by Gerd Nonneman), these states find themselves besieged by conflict over material constraints, interlinked with identity and power hegemony struggles.[17] When analysing Middle East and North Africa (MENA) states, Nonneman maintains that this falls under the constraints of 'North-South relations', highlighted mainly in the policies and interests of the 'Northern' end of the equation, and notes that "This reflects a similar bias in the study of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis: by and large, 'North–South relations' have been studied in a fashion that reflects the ordering of those labels more generally."[18] This is a struggle within a continuously-evolving complex international system that mirrors the bias of economic and political interests among international hegemonial powers in affiliation with the dominant regional client states; and is distant from the promotion of ethical policy behaviours respectful towards equal civic and civil human or citizenship rights.

Dunne, Kurki and Smith also suggest that in International Relations Theory there has often been a failure to recognise that choosing a theory is not necessarily an a-political question but reflects values and political leanings.[19] Similarly, Nonneman suggests, in his observations of the determinants of MENA states' foreign policy, that analysing the foreign policy of Middle Eastern states was "rooted in an eclectic 'complex model of international politics'. Its explanation [needed to] be multi-level and multi-causal, as well as contextual" on all three levels: domestic, regional and international.[20] Also, the bias observed when seeking resolutions to end regional conflicts was best reflected in the absence of the traditional Arab-Israeli conflict from any affirmative international obligations. For Lebanon, being at the centre of this explicit conflict is a very delicate

---

[16] Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch (1997), *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System* (London: Routledge)

[17] Gerd Nonneman, ed. (2005), *Analysing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe* (London: Routledge), pp. 8-12.

[18] Ibid, p. 1.

[19] Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (2013), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 1-13.

[20] Nonneman, ibid, p. 3.

geo-political factor for international security and economic interests in the region, whereas, at the domestic level, it is extremely important for the country to examine the effects of geo-political and security realism on its various sectarian communities. It is also important to understand the external factors affecting the diverse aspects of Lebanon's complex domestic reality.

This reality, as highlighted by Enver Khoury in *The Crisis in the Lebanese System,* suggested that the best approach to understanding crisis in Lebanon involved reaching ". . . beyond the objective determinants of [...] events into their subjective interpretations within the Lebanese framework. Knowing what is happening and why, is a necessary beginning, but we must also know how what is happening affects those to whom it is happening."[21] Khoury's book was written in 1976, a year after the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War that provided a dominant confessional role in the absence of state authority, and shifted away from political reform resolutions. Hence, a situation of endless conflict and chaos was created, which was also dominated by divisive external regional or international factors. This kept the Lebanese state hostage to external interventions until the civil war was paused by the rise of a new inclusive world order – thereby postponing an end-resolution to the political conflicts or causes of war, as remains evident to this day. Therefore, given such domestic, regional and international complexities, it is essential to adopt a similar approach in analysing or examining the Lebanese state's domestic and foreign policy determinants inclusive of all these three contextual levels.

Inter-relatedly, Badr bin Hamad Al Bu Said, Oman's Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, suggested in his study of the diplomacy of small states in a penetrated region that:

> … foreign policies are seen to sacrifice identity and autonomy to appeasement of an increasingly intrusive US hegemon [and] carry mounting legitimacy costs, obstructing the congruence between identity and interests needed for stability. The durability of the core-enforced regional state system affirms the ultimate dominance of superior material power over identity; but the continuing illegitimacy and instability of the regional order bears witness to the power of resistance rooted in historic identity.[22]

---

[21] Enver M. Khoury (1976), *The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism and Chaos* (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research), p. 3.
[22] Badr bin Hamad Al Bu Said (2005), "Afterword – Small States' Diplomacy in the Age of Globalization: An Omani Perspective", in Gerd Nonneman, ed., op.cit., p. 255.

Thus, any examination of the dominance of a "superior material power" global identity must consider the resistance from the traditional domestic or transnational regional identities in preserving indigenous historic or local national identity roots. In *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, Smith, Hadfield and Dunne argue that a "phenomenon" is any observable occurrence, since phenomena are often, although not always, understood as "appearances" or "experiences", or – as in the case of foreign policy phenomena – as "inordinately complex". Therefore both theory and empirical analysis are needed to understand how states behave in the international scheme, where it is also very important to consider all the different variations for differing possibilities.[23] These interchanges marked the beginning of what could be described as "complex realism" situations for Middle East and Arab states, as suggested by Hinnebusch who notes that

> [it] starts with realist basics since Middle Eastern policy-makers are quintessential realists, preoccupied with the threats that are so pervasive in MENA [Middle East and North Africa]. The Middle East is arguably the epicentre of world crisis, chronically war-prone and the site of the world's most protracted conflicts: it is the region where the anarchy and insecurity seen by the realist school of international politics as the main feature of states systems, remains most in evidence... Insecurity generates struggles for power and [...] state foreign policy seeks to counter security threats, first of all, to regime survival, but also to state interests such as sovereignty and territorial integrity. Because it specializes in explaining the central aspects of international politics – power, war, alliances, international order – realism offers unique insights into the dynamics of *interstate relations* in the region.[24]

1.4. The Arabs and the State Issue: Countless Small Deeds of Hidden People

Such complexity is evident in the case of Lebanon which, after all, is a small country and society. Yet it could be argued that despite being influenced by domestic and global values of greed or hegemony in the desire to maximize personal gains at the expense of others, there continue to be human solidarity foundations promoted by the sub-state actors or the "invisible people" within society. This is also true at the regional level, where the Arab state has traditionally remained

---

[23] Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, eds. (2012), "Foreword", in *Foreign Policy Theories: Actors Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
[24] Raymond Hinnebusch (2015), *The International Politics of the Middle East*, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press), "Introduction", p. 1.

separated from society, thereby helping to maintain a social heritage for independent survival. Thus the state has remained absent from its public obligations, especially in reaching out to the social grassroots through promoting social and economic justice arbitrated by legal and ethical state practices, and also in promoting equal collectively-shared political or citizenship rights with proud national identity values. In *The Arabs and the State Issue* (1992) Nazih Ayubi engaged with this issue, explaining that the proposition of examining the state idea as a political and intellectual subject remained a new and incomplete concept in the Arab region. He described the average Arab state as a huge administrative body that dominated national security, economy, identity, culture and education; it was imposed on the public by the ruling elite and was not derived from social and communal roots that were denied participation in the state.[25]

Ayubi summarizes the issues in the Arab state as follows: First, there remains a lack of interest or Arab awareness of the concept of the state. Second, the state represents a tool that simply hosts the mechanism for its huge administrative body and controls the national economy, state identity, culture and education, but nothing beyond. Third, the concept of the "current" state was introduced by the foreign mandate powers in the region for administrative and organizational purposes, with no focus on intellectual/academic state theory or the social basis of the state concept as being rooted in the needs of local citizens. States were looked at marginally, as part of modernity for international order and communications that were introduced to serve the interests of foreign powers, rather than to cater for the citizens' domestic needs and the state's role in this respect. Fourth, there is the relationship issue between the state and civil society, with the state operating in accordance with the ideological imperative of controlling society and monopolizing the trade and intellectual processes in society.[26] Finally – and this remains more of an issue with regard to the micro-macro behaviours in foreign-domestic relationships – there is a clear difference between the Arab intellectual approach towards the state concept, and the Western statehood paradigm, which is particularly pronounced with regard to its social roots, legal context and "ethical" philosophy.

---

[25] Nazih N. Ayubi (1992), *The Arabs and the State Issue* (Dar Al-Saqi, Beirut-Lebanon). [Arabic]
[26] Ibid, pp. 5-6.

Additionally, the idea of the state for Muslims related not to the concept of the state and its associated conception of individual rights, but rather to the rights of the nation or collective group;[27] that is, in terms of governance practice under the continued manipulations and misconceptions of state power rule violating individual or social rights, even though applied during the Prophet's era (such as the multi-sectarian Muslim and non-Muslim citizenship city-state constitutional rule of Medina).[28]

Ayubi also addressed the issue of the state in international and comparative thought by noting that when one looks at the state, one must consider its place, time and circumstance, alongside its social and economic structure. This echoes the concept of the state that was expressed in the thinking of Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Jean Bodin and George F. Hegel, and which influenced the development of national identity states from the sixteenth century onwards.[29] These writers viewed the state as an administrative mechanism that would organize civil services through bureaucratic and democratic processes. Ayubi explains how the Liberal view of state sovereignty added the concept of political accountability, while Karl Marx stressed the relationship between class and the state. The state should organize social class relations to prevent political oppression because the state apparatus is an independent body for political process but is isolated from the civil society medium. Since the bureaucratic system would allow the state civil service to influence social and political life, this would sometimes create change when there was a proportional balance between all levels of society.

Hence, for Marx the state is almost a reflection of the economic relations between social members who will not be marginalized – this applies because the state also sets the country's educational and cultural concepts, organizes and manages civil life, sets rules and punishment, and exerts control over public life duties.[30] In *Overstating the Arab State* Ayubi emphasises that the Arab state has not grown naturally from its own socio-economic history and interaction with its own cultural and intellectual tradition, having instead lived under centuries of insecurity in the form of

---

[27] Ibid, p. 6.
[28] Said Amir Arjomand (2009), "The Constitution of Medina: A Sociolegal Interpretation of Muhammad's Acts of Foundation of the Umma", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 555-575.
[29] Nazih N. Ayubi (1992), p. 6.
[30] Ibid. pp. 7-14.

conflicts, invasions and occupations. As a result, the current "fierce" state is produced in order to preserve itself from foreign political or economic manipulations, and similar constraints are reflected in most Arab states, especially those with economic difficulties. This causes any democratization process to cease or lose public confidence and suffer from fiscal crisis; in addition, increases in taxes do not increase participation.[31] Where the state is ineffectively connected with society, it lacks a unifying ideological harmony or legal hegemony mechanism that will enable it to establish a "historic" social bloc that accepts the legitimacy of the ruling stratum.[32] This reflects on the Lebanese situation which is bound by the ideological hegemony of the confessional sects, where most sects also reflect their independent external affiliation, whether Western or regional, thus hosting atypical model of "states" within the State.

1.5. 1920s Lebanon: The Quest for the Modern State within its Complex Domestic-External Context

After the announcement and the international recognition of Lebanon as a nation state in 1920, the country was held under foreign-domestic political and economic hegemony, even after independence in 1943 – a hegemony that had prevented any genuine political reform in support of Lebanese state sovereignty, largely because of the sectarian-oriented electoral law that since 1926 had maintained the outlawed sectarian power struggles. It thereby became the principal obstacle to genuine and equal political representation that parliamentary-oriented rule would have provided in a state like Lebanon. This situation contributed to a deficiency in political sovereignty by failing to secure either equal civic and civil citizenship rights, or overall human security rights at both domestic and external levels. As the secretary of the committee that had drafted the Lebanese constitution – the intellectual foundations of the new state of Lebanon – in 1926,[33] Michel Chiha (writer, politician, banker and journalist) had seen that the "constitution did not rule on every detail of the political structure of the republic, leaving the way open for periodical readjustments that would result from give and take among the republic's different confessional groups and political clans."[34]

---

[31] Nazih N. Ayubi (1995), *Overstating the Arab State* (London: I. B. Tauris), p. 457.
[32] Ibid. p. 3.
[33] Chiha, along with Charles Corm, Petro Trad and Omar Daouk.
[34] Kamal Salibi (2003), *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press) p. 180.

His understanding of modern Lebanon was related to its unique historical demographic and geo-sectarian distribution over a small geographical area with a series of mountains, in which, on each mountain, one would find a different sectarian community that had taken shelter, and in some regions co-existed with other sects. He could see that these minority communities were united in the same common cause, in finding safe shelter and security in this mountainous area during the dark times of domestic violence or invasions into the region.[35] Moreover, according to Kamal Salibi in his book *A House of Many Mansions*, Chiha greatly admired "the resilience of the unwritten British constitution whose forcefulness struck him as deriving entirely from tradition…", especially in a country where "Social Traditions Prevailed", and in the modern Lebanon of the 1920s reflected its many geo-demographic sectarian communities.[36] Chiha thought "it could accommodate differences without recourse to artificial legal rulings which could please one group, but anger another possibly to the point of violence",[37] and believed that Beirut would be like a Phoenician city state, making Lebanon into a centre of communication between East and West, and a bridge for exchanging merchants, finance, and knowledge as the Phoenicians had done.[38]

Chiha also prescribed this as the basis for a Lebanese foreign policy which would pursue "a delicate balance between the sects, clans and regions, along with a capitalist laissez-faire economy based on trade and services."[39] In fact Chiha himself was descended from a family in the banking business – the Pharaon-Chiha Bank which had accumulated most of its wealth from the silk trade – and he therefore sought a comprehensive ideology that would reflect Lebanon's geography and history.[40] However, the Lebanese state that Chiha had idealized as a merchant republic resurrecting

---

[35] Michel Chiha (1964), *Visage et Presence du Liban* (Beirut: Éd. Du Cénacle Libanais), trans. from French by Leo Arnold and Jean Montégu, as "Lebanon at Home and Abroad", re-impression 1994Tim (Beirut: Michel Chiha Foundation), http://www.michelchiha.org in Leo Arnold and Jean Montegu, "Lebanon at Home and Abroad", Michel Chiha Foundation, Re-impression 1994. http://www.michelchiha.org

[36] Kamal Salibi (2003), *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press,

[37] Ibid, p. 180.

[38] Asher Kaufman (2014), *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon (London:* I. B. Tauris, 2014, p. 168.

[39] Zamir, Meir (1997), *Lebanon's Quest: The Search for a National Identity, 1926-39* (I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd), pp. 36-37.

[40]Ibid.

Phoenicia failed to materialize, being "destroyed by the very violence he was so anxious to guard against."[41]

As a result, state power became centralized and concentrated in the capital Beirut, where it was promoted at the cost of the other newly-added, marginalized agricultural and border regions, such as Jabal Amel in the South of Lebanon, Akkar in Northern Lebanon, or the Beqaa region in the East. However, power remained under the influence of tribal or feudal socio-economic and political rule, and local sovereignty was dominated by the sectarian-oriented Parliamentary or political representatives in Beirut, thereby forming a feudal allied political leadership butwith a sectarian order reflected in Parliament, that constantly promoted deep sectarian divisions or occasional reconciliations during times of security, economic, and/or severe political threats. State sovereignty, national human equality, and civil services were to become fake titles for fake misconceptions or disputed state identity claims. A state present in public and political speech (symbolic) yet absent in *practice*, created a double, or even a multiple identity, and political conflict failed in the provision of *material* progress. What became apparent, as suggested by Sallouk et al in their investigation of sectarianism in postwar Lebanon, was that the state national institutions became divided and awarded in accordance with state wealth and power-sharing sectarian-splits.[42]

In other words, "an ideational cleavage overlapped with two culturally contradictory conceptions of the national identity, expressed in the form of Lebanism and Arabism, or Lebanese and Arab nationalism respectively", [43] while political debate focused instead on the collective cultural identity and historicity of the new state in what Albert Hourani famously described as "this 'national cleavage' (where different segments of the population subscribed to a different vision for Lebanon)" by invoking "different ideas of what Lebanon is and should be." The proponents of Lebanism, championed respectively by Michel Chiha and Lebanese Francophone poet Charles

[41] Salibi (2003), op.cit., pp. 180-81.
[42] Mustafa Hijazi (2005), *The Wasted Human: A Social Psychological Analysis* (Beirut: Arab Cultural Centre Press) [Arabic], p. 43.
[43] Bassel F. Salloukh, Rabie Barakat, Jinan S. Al-Habbal, Lara W. Khattab and Shoghig Mikaelian (2015), *The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press), esp. Chapter 2: "A Political History of Sectarian Institutions", Online at   http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183p3d5.5

Corm, advocated neo-Phoenician political visions that shaped the Maronite account of Lebanism at the time.[44]

Hence, at the domestic political level the inter-sectarian political split also became reflected in Corm's isolationist Maronite Lebanism, an extreme form of Phoenicianism that emphasised the Mediterranean links to the West and was promoted as a neo-Phoenician heritage for modern Lebanon. It was, however, opposed by Chiha's integrationist Lebanism, which promoted the sectarian diversity linking East and West, as well as Phoenician legacy trade and commerce. Thus,

> Chiha drew on the Phoenician legacy of trade and commerce to assert the Lebanese people's openness to other cultures, and to explain their distinctive evolution as a diverse society comprising multiple sectarian minorities. Corm, on the other hand, thought of Muslims as religious and historical rivals whose loyalty to the emerging state was highly suspect. His distinction between one community and the other drew on what he assumed were intrinsic cultural and linguistic attributes.'[45]

Ironically, a split that the Phoenician city-states had experienced amongst themselves was also influenced by geo-dynamics in terms of foreign policy behaviour that reflected domestic and external power differences, divisions or competitions. In addition, issues of regional peace and stability never did materialize, especially after the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, which caused a setback for Lebanese enthusiasm over the efforts made to pursue sovereign national interests after independence. These issues were also troublesome for a Lebanese foreign policy that favoured economic prosperity interests in the midst of regional conflict. Nevertheless, even before the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, Chiha feared the Zionist project in Palestine, mostly since it was also seeking economic and territorial domination in Lebanon.

As early as 1919 there had been Zionist interests in Southern Lebanon, especially because of its water-rich rivers – the Litani River, the Hasbani and the Wazani, which formed the main water sources for the River Jordan – and also because it had been home to the ancient Israelite tribes of Asher and Naphtali.[46] After World War I, during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and at least

---

[44] Ibid, p 15.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Scott Abramson (2012), "The Promise and Failure of the Zionist-Maronite Relationship, 1920-1948", MA thesis, Brandeis University, Waltham MA., p. 23.

until the 1923 Lausanne Treaty Conference, Zionist representative Chaim Weizmann lobbied to expand the Jewish homeland up to the Litani River – which would have cut off a major portion of South Lebanon. However, his efforts reached a dead end, as a result of resistance from the Maronite Church supported by the French (as its traditional protectors) and led by Elias Peter Hoayek, Patriarch of Greater Lebanon.

Thus, Chiha also had domestic and external political fears that had even contributed to a split to his Maronite Young Phoenicians movement. The Young Phoenicians had advocated for a Lebanese nationalist identity (similar to the Young Turks, the secular Turkish nationalist identity movement in the late Ottoman era) that would ensure both Christian freedoms and Western values. As they began to split, Corm's isolationist political camp also came round to favouring the Zionist project. Hence, their divisions also became related to Lebanese foreign policy issues, mainly over Lebanon's position vis-à-vis the Zionist project, the alliance with the French, and also Lebanon's role and stance towards the greater Arab and Middle East region. This escalated noticeably following the arrival of Patriarch Anthony Arida who succeeded Patriarch Hoayek in 1932. As early as 1919 Arida, while still an archbishop, had supported a Jewish national home in Palestine, reflecting sympathy with the Zionist cause.[47] Thus, he also supported the isolationist camp in the Young Phoenician (YP) Maronite-oriented society; which finally divided during the escalation of regional events in Palestine during the 1936-1939 Revolution. Although, Arida had a competing position against the French and pushed for immediate Lebanese independence, the isolationists under Corm advocated a Lebanon with a strictly French-protected Western identity and a permanent homeland for Christians sympathetic to the 'Zionist cause'.

Chiha's integrationist camp, on the other hand, continued to pursue Hoayek's equal multi-sectarian national co-existence vision for Lebanon, and opposed a Zionism that allegedly bridged both Western and Eastern values.[48] Relatively, for the Zionists, Corm and the isolationists were viewed as natural friends and allies towards their project, whilst Chiha was viewed as an "anti-

---

[47] Hilal Khashan (2010), "The Evolution of Israeli-Lebanese Relations: From Implicit Peace to Explicit Conflict", in Efraim Karsh, Michael Kerr, and Rory Miller, eds., *Conflict, Diplomacy and Society in Israeli-Lebanese Relations* (New York and London: Routledge, 2010, p 3.
[48] Asher Kaufman (2014), *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon* (London: I.B. Tauris), p. 148.

Semitic and anti-Zionist Chaldean journalist."[49] Chiha, however, continued to worry about the Zionist project that constantly spoke about Palestine, describing events in Palestine as a real danger which, as Lebanon's Southern border economic gate way, needed to be a domestic Lebanese priority, and in his editorials almost always questioned the ethics of international obligation concerning this aspect. In other words, he was critical of the macro international dimensions of this issue, especially the defiance of global political ethics or 'sacred' human morals.

In "Flawed Logic", an article published on 9 October 1946, Michel Chiha described the logic of this issue, commenting that the American interventions in Palestine looked increasingly as if they were dealing with a purely American question: "It's a pity that the people of the United States, today the most powerful in the world, would cover-up from their vantage point such an adventure; they are putting themselves in a definitive contradiction with their most sacred moral and political principles.'[50] In another article in *Le Jour* in 1947, Chiha spoke of the UN Partition Plan for Palestine as "…an error of this magnitude committed in this century [that] will have repercussions on our descendants in the next."[51] A further article discussed this in greater detail*:*

> The decision to partition Palestine with the creation of a Jewish State will prove to be the worst universal error ever committed. What appears to be a seemingly small act will have the most unexpected consequences and it is by no means an exaggeration to say that this little affair will shake the world to its core… Ignoring the facts and voting for the partition of Palestine is simply not acceptable. Those nations who chose to support partition also chose the outrageous option of creating the most prejudiced and the most exclusively confessional state in the world. This is the fact that liberals will not face and what the so-called 'democracies' are recommending. Never has anything so illogical and so contrary to the tenets of the United Nations been seen before. Members of the UN seem oblivious to the fact that the contagious nature of this will incite the most acute form of discrimination and an explosion of fanaticism in those who are being asked to show broadmindedness and tolerance for the Jewish people. If so much ambiguity is allowed the Jewish people, and that in every country and in every capital the manifest existence of a discriminatory and exclusively confessional Israeli state is allowed, then why is this not allowed for

---

[49] Scott Abramson (2012), "The Promise and Failure of the Zionist-Maronite Relationship, 1920-1948", MA thesis, Brandeis University, Waltham MA, p. 34; Michel Chiha, *Memorandum after the Truce*, in Palestine (Beirut: Trident, 1969), p. 73.

[50] Chris Doyle (2007), *Michel Chiha and Palestine Editorial Reflections: 1944-54,* (London: Stacy International and CAABU); see also Fondation Chiha (Beirut): Chiha Archives, "International Relations Palestine". Online at: http://www.michelchiha.org/international-relations/palestine/79/1/ Note: CAABU is the London-based Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding.

[51] Ibid. "The School of Prejudice", M.C., *Le Jour*, 3 December 1947.

others? How is this hypocrisy justified? Why are there two sets of rules? And how can this be defended? (Michel Chiha archives; typed letter). [52]

Chiha believed it would be disastrous for his beloved Lebanon and also for the Jewish people; he himself desired a single state where Arabs and Jews could build a shared future and "develop their country together."[53] Aside from all the political, socioeconomic or security impacts on Lebanon arising from the issue of Palestine there would also be, according to Chiha, an international politics hypocrisy in approaching confessional conflicts and divisions in Lebanon or the region. Unhappily, while confessional dominance occurred in neighbouring Palestine, it also promoted dominance to counter domestic sectarian reactions in Lebanon, where inciting isolationist political divisions would eventually marginalizie Palestinian, Lebanese or Arab, Jewish, Christian and Muslim national coexistence in a non-confessional state.

Whether in Lebanon or the Levant region, Chiha was also concerned because of the risks Lebanon would encounter if the balance between sectarian divisions and the national interest was broken. In fact, the 1926 constitution was drafted to be compatible with unwritten traditional sectarian agreements (which Chiha recognized could achieve a smooth transition towards the secular state), yet with the one condition of not harming national coexistence within the one state. Although confessional rights were acknowledged at all levels in the state, the constitution was also drafted for a modern civil state, eventually to replace the sectarian political order: yet escalation in the regional conflict was to divert the chances towards this transition. Article 95 of the 1926 Constitution mentioned that the sectarian representation in state government administrative and political institutions would be a temporary arrangement, under equal social justice grounds, on condition that it would not harm the national Lebanese state identity.[54] Yet it was an article that still contradicted the state's provision for civil obligations towards social security, and that found itself dominated by the unwritten sectarian norms of governance behaviour in the state. It remains until the present a 'temporary' arrangement, that empowers sectarian, ethnic, feudal or tribal dominance over state national sovereignty, and provides an occasional pretext for foreign intervention.

---

[52] Ibid. "An Absurd Policy", M.C., *Le Jour*, 5 December 1947.
[53] Ibid. Foreword by Chris Doyle, CAABU (London: Stacy International), pp. 1-2
[54] Lebanon, Govt of Lebanon (1926), *The Lebanese Constitution* 'Article 95', online at
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/lb/lb018en.pdf

With the weakness or even collapse of the central state, the sects were to monopolize alternative power for the state. This regional Arab weakness undoubtedly affected the domestic and regional geo-political reality of Lebanon, which was geographically at the forefront of regional and international power conflicts and interventions. Paradoxically, there had been an earlier mood among the general public in Lebanon and the region that had reflected an Arab-nationalist and anti-sectarian politically-orientated inspiration, with roots dating to the late nineteenth century (prior to the Young Turks movement). This was primarily motivated by the Syrian/Lebanese writer and scholar Butrus Al-Bustani, a pioneer of Pan-Arab nationalism, particularly in Syria where he promoted his nationalist ideas in his magazine *Nafir Suriya*: this had begun publication after the Druze-Maronite Mount Lebanon Civil War in 1860, which had influenced Al-Bustani's anti-sectarian opinions.[55]

He continues to be acknowledged for his famous saying: "Religion for God, Homeland for everyone", which became a slogan during most of the initial Arab Nationalist Revolutions during the early twentieth century.[56] In Lebanon it was adopted by the Greater Syria Levant nationalist Antoun Saadeh, and earlier in Syria during the Great Syrian Revolution against the French mandate by Sultan Basha Al Atrash in 1925, and by Saad Zaghloul during Egypt's 1919 Revolution against the British Occupation, calling for national unity and coexistence in Egypt, beyond any religious dominance or divisions.[57] Although this early wave of Arab nationalism was to decline after the defeat of the Syrian Revolution in 1926, this was also the case in Lebanon which, since 1920, had already split between a Greater Syria nationalist camp (Muslim Majority) and a Greater Lebanon nationalist camp (Christian Majority).[58] This division remained dominant

---

[55] Eliezer Tauber (2013), *The Emergence of the Arab Movements* (London: Routledge).
[56] Adel Beshara (2012), *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, Pioneers and Identity* (London: Routledge), p. 3; also Asim Bader Al-Din, and Samir M. Abu Shakra (2011), *Quote Origins: Religion for God, the Homeland for Everyone. Secularism, Politicized Religion and a Critique of Religious Thought*, Al-Hewar Lebanese Arab Research Center, 27 December 2011 [Arabic], online at http://www.m.ahewar.org/s.asp?aid=119689&r=0
[57] Hassan Hamadeh, (2017), "Hiwar al-Yawm Political Discussion", *OTV* 18 May 2017. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UaKd3IcGLIQ Also Joyce Laverty Miller (1977), "The Syrian Revolt of 1925", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 547.
[58] Raghid Al-Solh (2004), *Lebanon and Arabism, 1936-1945* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies), p. 8.

on the Lebanese political scene, affecting both domestic and external levels, until 1943 when the Christian-Muslim National Pact Agreement for Independence amalgamated both Western and Eastern domestic sectarian values and affiliations.

Relatively, the Arab-nationalist revolutions had happened in reaction to a long history of Ottoman-Western regional hegemony in the form of economic and political rivalries that exploited the civil rights of local social forces in the Arab region. In *The New Orient Question* Georges Corm described the region's concerns as resulting from Western competition issues over the East. Following Westphalia, the West, with its eyes on the Orient, had taken its wars beyond its borders, especially after the 1774 Russian-Ottoman Agreement in Bulgaria which gave Russia exclusive rights in the Ottoman-controlled region. French and British envy of the privileges gained by Russia led to their various colonialist Orient journeys in the region, as early as Napoleon's Middle East expedition in 1798. This began with the French invasion of Egypt, and was followed by the British who competed politically against the French to support Ottoman affairs, until they themselves took over Egypt in 1882, while the French imposed an occupation on Algeria that lasted from 1830 until 1962. Furthermore, European and American missionaries came to Mount Lebanon during the late nineteenth century under the pretext of protecting sectarian minority rights, with the French, for example, supporting the Maronites and the British supporting the Druze. While Lebanon officially became a French mandate after the First World War, the country and the entire East region was to become an official US inheritance from the previous European colonial powers following World War Two.[59]

A continuation of regional and international power hegemony competitiveness contributed to a biased systematic approach towards finding resolutions to conflict issues in the region, especially the historically-entrenched Issue of Palestine. In this regard Chiha was also critical of both the US and the Soviet Union over their international rivalry and for acknowledging the confessional/sectarian Israeli state, and criticised their uninformed double standard approaches towards the region. His article "Disappointment at the Role of the Great Powers", published on 19

---

[59] Georges Corm (2017), *La Nouvelle Question d'Orient* [The New Orient Question], Paris: Éditions La Découverte). https://fr.calameo.com/read/0002150221457d536560d

May 1948 also reflected his huge disappointment about the international community when he asserted:

> We maintain that at the present time, whilst the United States and Great Britain believe they are resolving the problem of the Jewish State by the indirect means of guile and cunning, it is in reality the Jews who are settling matters to the detriment of the great powers and world peace. We are not overstating our case. We view the situation with as much objectivity as possible at a time when the fighting serves to increase hatred and grief. But we here are the immediate neighbours of the Jewish State. We know its political and social climate better than westerners from Europe and America. And it is easier for us than for the powers that be to envisage the future.[60]

Thus, the issue for Lebanon escalated with the international exploitation of the regional issues amidst Arab weakness and divisions, and particularly, as Chiha noted "with regard to their perpetual ineptitude and failure to resist Israel's military violations or mobilize effective diplomatic initiative on their behalf…in stark contrast to Israel's bold initiatives on virtually all dimensions of the crisis." He also remarked that this was especially the case at the League of Arab States (LAS) level since "the Arab League countries do not devote a fraction of the attention they should to Palestine in their policies and concerns."[61]

At the same time, Chiha attempted in his article "Key Reasons for Resistance", to outline the issues arising out of Arab weakness, reminding the Arabs that they were up against a global organization of Zionist Jewish members from different nationalities all over the world, with great influence on their local state governments, possessing a powerful intrigue and professional propaganda capacity, and enjoying networks and a presence in every country. Thus, the Zionist project had enjoyed a "social, economic, political and human pressure capacity" that was totally lacking at the Arab end. According to Chiha,

> The whole global might of Israel, represented by the government of a sovereign state in Tel Aviv, would be focused on the Arab countries and on their economic subservience with an eye to future political domination. Those who do not wish to reflect on such things are unconsciously dismissing what is most likely, it could be said what is a certainty, what is obvious. True, Zionism may be thwarted by events; but this is its plan. If the plan came to

---

[60] Chris Doyle (2007), *Michel Chiha and Palestine Editorial Reflections: 1944-54,* (London: Stacy International and CAABU); also "Disappointment at the Role of the Great Powers published 19 May 1948", Chiha Archives. International Relations Palestine, Chiha Foundation. Online at: http://www.michelchiha.org/international-relations/palestine/79/1/ "Disappointment at the Role of the Great Powers published 19 May 1948".
[61] Ibid, pp. 11-12.

fruition, it would mean the barely disguised beginning of an exodus or of real slavery for Arab countries. It would be our tragedy to replace the Jews on the world's highways. For to have the sovereign Jewish State on our borders is tantamount to having three million Jews from New York and six million others, from London, from Paris, from all over moving there. [62]

Chiha also stressed the significance of Arab resistance as a vital means of defending Lebanese development and prosperity interests, declaring that in the long term, it was "truly, genuinely a matter of life and death for the Near East, from Asia to Egypt", and that it had contributed to the "blindness" of the Western or Great Powers "in their double and triple dealing" in this matter. He accused those powers of disregarding "the crux of the problem and [giving] in to opportunism or sentimentality sustained financial, economic or political gains." He concluded his resistance appeal by stating that "defending ourselves in this way we are conscious of defending the great powers themselves (pressured and undermined from within); and defending above all the enduring cause of justice and even world peace, now under threat.'[63] Chiha was also frustrated by the reluctance to protect Jerusalem, and urged Jordan to move its capital to East Jerusalem to prevent Israel from such a move:[64] however division among the Arabs remained predominant.

1.6.1 Arab Supremacy Divisions: Arrogance in Facing the Supremacy of Zionism

…When it came to the matter of Israel in its usual naked recalcitrance, Jordan pursued its own stratagem in defiance of the League. The Arabs paid the price. What is at issue now is the collective defence of the Mediterranean region. What do we do if Jordan and Iraq underestimate the long-term repercussions? Unlike them, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon are particularly affected by this matter as we all have an extensive Mediterranean coastline, one which is patently bound to consociate all Mediterranean nations... (Michel Chiha (1951), "Arab League policy", M.C., *Le Jour*, 12 May 1951.

When conflict broke out with Israel, the Palestinians and most of the Arab countries were not fully independent from foreign occupation or influence, and neither were they united in seeking a regional sovereignty mechanism at all political, economic or security levels. For example, in 1948 Algeria was still under French occupation, Egypt was still under British mandate monarchy rule, and most of the Arab Gulf States were still under British protected monarchy rule. Relatively, the

---

[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid. "Key Reasons for Resistance", pub. 18 May 1945.
[64] Ibid, pp. 1-2.

Palestine Issue became captive to regional power hegemony gravitations, and to international diplomatic resolutions adopting a biased approach in this regard. Moreover, despite going to war with Israel in 1948, the Arab states were not even prepared for this war, but had now to face war rather than confront a massively angry domestic public. Indeed, the only Arab states to participate were those bordering Palestine (Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon), along with support from Iraq, Yemen and Saudi Arabia (being also major founding members of the League of Arabs States in 1945).

Yet even after defeat in the war against Israel they maintained a careless, even negligent approach towards the Palestine issue, blaming events on foreign intervention while denying their failures or inability to take counter initiatives, including after 1945 at the LAS level, instead of collaborating to face the Zionist project. Instead the Arab states were occupied with their own quarrels over power dominance, mainly concerned with who would annex Palestine after the British departure and undermine the power of the others. The divisions that had been prominent before the war were reflected in the political split between the two Hashemite cousin Kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq with Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and including Lebanon, for fear that the British-supported kingdoms would annex parts of Palestine. Yet for decades Israel was better prepared, being in the same quarrel and ready to beat them by declaring Independence on 15 May 1948.[65] Ironically, the political splits on the Arab domestic front continued after the 1948 War, in competition for power dominance and also influence over the liberation of Palestine. Consequently, by the end of the war the Palestinian West Bank and East Jerusalem had come under Jordanian control and Gaza under Egyptian control, while the rest of Palestine was annexed by Israel.

1.7. Early Israeli Political and Security Interventions in Lebanese Domestic-Foreign Affairs After Independence

For Lebanon, although its October 1943 'national pact' for Independence was an unwritten agreement, albeit inspired by the sectarian-oriented constitution written in 1926, it was also meant to reflect a neutral foreign policy approach. This approach was also intended to reflect the

---

[65] Benny Morris (2004), *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 65–69.

reconciling of "ideas of Lebanese and Arab nationalism", thereby forming a consensus at both domestic and external levels. As Raghid El-Solh explains, this helped Lebanon to exercise considerable influence over regional Arab affairs, for example, by becoming a founding member of the League of Arab States in 1945, and at the international level being a founding member at the United Nations after World War Two (represented by Charles Malik); and later it became a member of the committee that drafted the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[66] Yet, as regional and international competition escalated after the war, ending with the Palestine issue in 1948, Lebanese foreign policy was to become a policy of compromise, dominated by the competing regional and international powers. Although the Lebanese state participated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and was part of a joint Arab states' resistance effort, its role was more symbolic, and aimed mainly at protecting Lebanon's Southern border.

Yet there were also domestic rejections as part of this conflict that argue for a different interpretation of the concept of Lebanese neutrality and which, ironically, still reflected a non-neutral approach. This was mainly advocated by the isolationist Young Phoenician camp, where as early as June 1947 an agreement was reached with the Maronite Patriarch Arida to support political efforts to keep the Lebanese army out of war with Israel, or prevent any Arab coalition against the projected Israeli state.[67] In fact, Patriarch Arida, who headed the Maronite Church until his death in 1955, had already reached a secret agreement with the Israelis in 1946 that acknowledged a Jewish state in Palestine. Correspondingly, with the outbreak of war with Israel in May 1948, the Israeli-Lebanese border had remained stable until, at the end of October, Israel invaded the Southern Lebanese border, occupied around 15 Lebanese villages, and reached the Litani River. During the invasion, the Israeli army did not meet any major resistance; yet the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) still committed civilian crimes, particularly in the village of Hula where

---

[66] United Nations, General Assembly (1958), Documents: "Charles M. Malik Elected President of the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly", 16 September 1958. Online at: https://www.unmultimedia.org/s/photo/detail/139/0139959.html

[67] As'ad Abu Khalil (2013), "The Maronite Patriarch on the payroll of Israel", *Angry Arab Blog*, 13 January 2013, citing Yoav Gelber (2006), "From Sharon's Inheritance", paper at the *ISA/AIS Annual Conference*, Banff, May 2006, online at: http://angryarab.blogspot.ca/2013/01/the-maronite-patriarch-on-payroll-of.html..

dozens of people were killed, 58 civilian prisoners were murdered in cold blood,[68] and 15,000 Lebanese civilians were displaced.[69]

Forcing Lebanon to engage in the conflict marked the first breach of, and challenge to, Lebanon's state territorial, national and integral sovereignty since independence. Israel on the other hand claimed that it was in retaliation for committed units in the Lebanese Army engaging in border clashes with the Israeli forces, thereby forcing Israel to reach the decision to invade.[70] Nevertheless, the Israeli invasion had occurred in the midst of regional and international political efforts to reach an end to the ongoing war crisis, where Israel had also attempted to bully Lebanon into secret peace negotiations. Moreover, Israel was dissatisfied with the role of Riad al-Solh, the Lebanese Prime Minister, who played a leading part in the pro-Palestinian political efforts on behalf the League of Arab States. In a research paper on these negotiations, Mahmoud Muhareb reveals that there were several secret Israeli attempts to negotiate with Riad al-Solh after the outbreak of the 1948 war, especially when he headed the Lebanese delegation to the Third United Nations Conference in Paris on 19 September 1948. Although most of these attempts failed, they were targeted mainly by the political division of the Jewish Agency "which created an intelligence apparatus whose task was to collect information on Arab countries and build intricate and ramified relations with Arab elites in countries bordering Palestine. This included recruiting agents from their ranks to work for the Jewish Agency."[71]

Such duties were, however, tasked primarily to indigenous Arab Jews who enjoyed local individual ties and relationships in the home states of their birth. Ironically, despite its failure to

---

[68] Mahmoud Muhareb (2011), "Secret Negotiations between Israel and Lebanon's Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh", research paper (Doha Institute: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies), August 2011, p 12. The Lebanese villages occupied in the context of "Operation Hiram" were Blida, Mhaibib, Mays al-Jabal, Hula, Markaba, Tallusa, Daiseh, Rubb Thlatheen, Bani Hayyan, Kfar Kila, al-Tayybeh, al-Qantara, Deir Siryan, Alman, and al-Qasr. Israeli sources mention that official Lebanon had hidden the fact of this occupation from the Lebanese public for years. For details on the Hula massacre, see the report in Ha-Ulam Haze magazine dated 1 March 1978. Ironically, "Operation Hiram" referenced the Phoenician King Hiram I of the ancient city of Tyre in South Lebanon, who was an ally and friend of King David of ancient Israel and later of his son King Solomon, around the tenth century BC.
[69] Ibid, p 21. .
[70] Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (2001), *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of* 1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 8.
[71] Mahmoud Muhareb (2011), "Secret Negotiations", op.cit., p. 2., and see for more details, Mahmoud Muhareb (2008), "Zionist Intelligence: The Beginning of Spying on Arabs", Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi [Arabic], Issue 257, November 2008.

pressure al-Solh, Israel still aimed to announce its 'secret negotiation' efforts with al-Solh in order to undermine his political role, both domestically and regionally, in the international negotiation efforts.[72] Hence, David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister, focused primarily on expansion rather than being deflected by international peace efforts,[73] especially as he was aware of Israel's strength, regionally and internationally. Protecting Israel's strategic national security to preserve an Israeli superiority that might be threatened by Arab unity was paramount, and Israel was determined to resist such threats, either by promoting common interests with political elites, as with Zionist alliances in Lebanon; or prompting internal conflict and violence within or between Arab states along sectarian, tribal, racial or geographic lines.[74] Conversely, Ben-Gurion was very annoyed with Riad al-Solh, the Muslim Prime Minister, for enjoying wide regional and international relations in lobbying for Palestine, and for refusing, along with the Christian President Bishara Khouri, to recognise the state of Israel.

All this made him more determined to invade Lebanon in October 1948. A memoir by Ben-Gurion written immediately after Israel's declaration of war on 25 May 1948 reveals his thoughts about Lebanon: "…the weak point of the Arab coalition is Lebanon. Its Islamic dominance is an artificial and ephemeral one that can be easily reversed. A Christian state with the Litani river as its southern border should be established. And we shall sign a treaty with it."[75] Ben-Gurion had therefore sought political and security intervention in Lebanon, and even considered the assassination of Riad al-Solh in the hope of terminating the 1943 Muslim-Christian 'National Pact' Agreement between Al-Solh and Khouri.[76] He also hoped that this would lead to an army coup in Lebanon,

---

[72] Muhareb (2008), op.cit., p. 18. See also Hassan Hallaq (1982), *Lebanon's Position Towards the Palestinian Cause: 1918-1952* (Beirut: Palestinian Research Centre), p. 240. On 24 January 1949 news of the top-secret meetings between Solh and Sasson and his group in Paris was leaked by Israeli sources to the *New York Herald Tribune* through its reporter Kenneth Pelby. The news reached Beirut's *al-Nahar* newspaper which, being opposed to the Solh Government, published a translation of the American newspaper article – quickly retracted by Lebanese intelligence services, but permanently shaking trust in any friendly relations or peaceful intentions.

[73] Avi Shlaim (1999), *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (London: Allen Lane).

[74] Giacomo Luciani and Ghassan Salame (2015), *The Politics of Arab Integration* (London: Routledge).

[75] Mahmoud Muhareb (2011), "Secret Negotiations…", op.cit., p. 19; also Avi Shlaim (1988), "Israeli Interference in Internal Arab Politics: the Case of Lebanon", in, Giacomo Luciani & Ghassan Salame, eds., *The Politics of Arab Integration*" op.cit., p. 236.

[76] Muhareb, ibid. p. 20. Muhareb cites an extensive list of sources, many archival, including: Israel, Central Zionist Archive; Collection S25/3269; Israel, State Archives, HETS; Collection 23/5563; Collection 6/3766: letter to Shamuni dated 13 July 1948. Notably, Israel did carry out the proposals presented by Emile Edde to Tofeh Arazi. The memoirs of Gamaliel Cohen, leader of the *Mistaarvim* (Arabist) unit in Beirut at the time, were published in 2002 as *The First Mistaarvim* (Tel Aviv, Israeli Ministry of Defence), pp. 268-272. Rafi Siton and Yitzhak Shushan published *Men of Secrecy and Mystery: Tales from Israel's Intelligence Services behind the Borders* (Jerusalem,

or limited domestic discord, or a full-scale civil war – options he considered as potentially allowing Israel an opportunity to preserve and annex the Lebanese border territories it had occupied during the war.[77] Nonetheless, a United Nations-sponsored Armistice Agreement in March 1949 was reached between Lebanon and Israel,[78] securing an Israeli withdrawal from the Lebanese villages it had occupied, and bringing armed conflict with Lebanon to a full halt. Even so, because of this conflict, Lebanon was forced to continue carrying a huge economic, security and political burden, amidst regional and international failures to reach a final resolution to the issue of Palestine and the fate of the Palestinian refugees who had fled the war in huge numbers to Lebanon and to other Arab states.

1.8. Lebanon and Arab Regional-International Hostility and Compromise Excursions until 1967

Whilst a Western arms ban was also imposed on the Arab states at war with Israel, the 1949 Armistice Agreement became part of an Arab compromise that accepted a cease fire with Israel, despite the harsh terms imposed by the Israeli side. Apart from Israel's refusal to consider any withdrawal from the Palestinian lands it had annexed based on the 1947 partition plan, Israel also banned the Palestinian refugees from exercising the Right of Return, or indeed the right to any type of armed resistance from the Arab states bordering Israel. Thus, with no end resolution to the conflict, Lebanon was kept captive to the regional-international hostility and compromise efforts. Any anticipation of peace in the Middle East during the Cold War era became devoted mainly to the US, especially after the British and French had retreated from the region after World War Two and, along with Israel, mainly following their 1956 War against Egypt. As for Israeli-Lebanese relations, the borders witnessed a 'cold peace' situation, influenced by an international Cold War over regionally-inclined peace and instability conflicts that lasted until the outbreak of a Second

---

Aydanim Press, 1990). Originally his doctoral thesis, the work by Reuven Erlich (2000), *In the Lebanese Trap*, was published with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, since Erlich has a security background.
[77] Muhareb, ibid., p. 25.
[78] Lebanon was the second to sign after Egypt, followed by Jordan and lastly Syria… Ironically during the Armistice Agreement negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, Maronite negotiators from the Lebanese Army had told their Israeli counterparts that for permanent peace, they should try to "reach a peace agreement with one of the other Arab states first, since Lebanon would be second." Tom Segev (1986), *1949: The First Israelis* (New York: The Free Press) p. 9.

Arab-Israeli War in 1967.[79] Yet somehow this era still contributed towards a success story for Lebanon, in the promotion of the mercantile and financial hub state.

As Salibi explains, this generally favoured the wealthy part of the Arab World which, mostly during the 1950s and 1960s, enabled Lebanon to prosper with capital, commerce, and tourism, as Chiha had envisioned. Until then it had been the only country in the Middle East – or in the world, according to the Kataeb Party founder Pierre Gemayel, "where a Christian could be fully Christian and a Muslim fully Muslim", with unconditional religious and civil freedoms.[80] However, it was a short-lived prosperity that had to face the consequences of the Arab loss against Israel in 1967 and its negative impacts in contributing towards the Lebanese civil war in 1975. The stability witnessed prior to the war had mainly contributed to international mediation efforts for regional peace, largely brokered by the United States and concentrated on Egypt which, under Nasser, had adopted a position of Arab deterrence towards Israel and the Cold War conflicts.

As early as 1952, Nasser and the Free Officers Council had, in fact, sought American cooperation and support for their revolution: however, the Americans were reluctant to provide any assistance to Egypt unless the country sought to recognise and normalise relations with Israel.[81] Nasser's response to the Americans was that he would be willing to consider acknowledging the state of Israel if it would agree to the UN Partition plan of 1947 while also ensuring an Arab sovereign road from Cairo to Damascus, crossing within the Palestinian-controlled territories.[82] Despite American efforts in promoting this initiative it was strongly rejected in Israel, which accused Nasser of supporting an Arab nationalist armed resistance movement in Gaza. Meanwhile, by

---

[79] Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir in a meeting with US President John Kennedy in January 1963 remarked that: "Israel has never had real trouble with Lebanon. Cows occasionally wander over the border from Lebanon and are sent back. Girls in the Israeli army may get lost and wander across the Lebanese border, but they are very politely returned. None of the incidents are serious." In U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963", Vol. 18: Near East, 1962-1963, *Memorandum of Conversation*, Palm Beach, Florida, 27 December 1962: Conversation with Israel Foreign Minister Meir, Online at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d121

[80] Kamal Salibi (2003), *Lebanon the House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press), pp 191-92.

[81] Al-Mayadeen (2017), "Abdel Nasser Revisited: Nasser and the United States", *Al-Mayadeen TV Documentary*, Part 4, 14 May 2017 [Arabic] Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GvCnGEtoLRw

[82] Al-Mayadeen (2017), "Abdel Nasser Revisited Nasser and the Issue of Palestine"*. Al-Mayadeen TV Documentary*, 21 May 2017 [Arabic] Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrAgUSg7uxI (Sami Sharif, Executive Director of the President's Public Office, 1955-1970).

October 1956 Israel was ready to opt for a tripartite war against Egypt (along with Britain and France), following Nasser's decision earlier in July to nationalize the Suez Canal. Israel found itself facing an Egyptian blockade of its maritime shipping from the Gulf of Aqaba through the Red Sea Straits of Tiran and Sanfir, and refused to tolerate this new Egyptian control of the Suez Canal. Instead it saw this as an opportunity to retract the negotiation-pressure card that Nasser had been using in the US-mediated efforts for peace. France, on the other hand, was upset with Nasser for his role in supporting the Algerians in their resistance to more than a century of French occupation, and his increasing political influence in Syria and Lebanon.[83]

Britain was mainly concerned with Nasser's rising influence, and the potential formation of an Arab-State orbit, opposed to Israel and threatening to Western economic interests in the region. Although the Americans had opposed the 1956 War against Egypt, they remained concerned about Egypt's close relations with its allied Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia being opposed to Hashemite rule in Baghdad.[84] The Americans were also annoyed with Nasser for refusing to join the 1955 Baghdad Pact (the Middle East Treaty Organization – METO), which included Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and the United Kingdom and aimed to confront 'international communism'; however, they continued their attempts to get the Egyptians on board by promising economic and military rewards or sanctions, as well as to thwart Egypt in its new international role after it had become a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which emphasized respect for state sovereignty and promoted a neutral position towards the Cold War conflicts,[85] and had been declared in July 1956 just days before Nasser's nationalization announcement. On the other hand, the Eisenhower administration was also very concerned to prevent any escalation that might attract Soviet intervention and armed troops into the region.[86]

---

[83] Henry Kissinger (1994), *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster), p 529.
[84] John L Gaddis (1998), *We Now Know:Rethinking Cold War History* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.168-9.
[85] The declaration called for a collective approach for Peace emphasized in the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter for international peace and justice, respecting equal individual human rights. It also emphasized mutual respect in states' relationships emphasizing: Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. Recognition of equality among all races and of equality among all nations, both large and small. Non-intervention or non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. Respect for the right of every nation to defend itself, either individually or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. Non-use of collective defence pacts to benefit the specific interests of any of the great powers. Non-use of pressures by any country against other countries.
[86] Isaac Alteras (1993)*. Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli relations, 1953–1960* (Gainesville FL: University Press of Florida), Chapter 7.

Correspondingly, in January 1957 the US announced the Eisenhower Doctrine, welcoming any country in the Middle East to request American economic aid or American armed forces support if threatened by any external threats or armed aggressions:[87] yet Egypt still rejected participation. Syria on the other hand, became worried and insecure since the US was also urging Syria's other neighbouring states (Jordan and Lebanon) to join the Baghdad Pact. Syria therefore sought unification with Egypt as the United Arab Republic-UAR, which was announced in February 1958. On the other hand, this was to contribute towards a political crisis in Lebanon, with the awakening of Arab nationalist socialist or leftist political aspirations in rejecting the Baghdad Pact, especially after Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, worried about the UAR's potential political influence or intervention in Lebanon, decided to join the Pact in May 1958, despite opposition from the Prime Minister Saab Salam. This led to further domestic political and sectarian divisions in the country ending with a civil conflict, and also across the region after the outbreak to an Iraqi revolution in Baghdad later in July rejecting the Pact. This led to Chamoun inviting an urgent US armed intervention into Beirut,[88] while the British sent troops to protect King Hussein's rule from any similar coup. However, escalation halted with an optimistic resolution, informally agreed upon within the contexts of Cold War management and which led to regional stability.

Lebanon was also becoming more or less the perfect arena to interpret an easing of the tensions within the political gravitations between the US and Egypt,[89] as well as the Soviet Union, all of whom were arguing over influence in the region. From the domestic political viewpoint, this was interpreted within the Lebanese-drafted political context of win-win or lose-lose resolutions. Saab Salam's famous slogan "No winner, no loser" reflected the political resolutions in Lebanon,[90] and a no winner or loser situation for the Americans and the Egyptians, with both maintaining their influence in Lebanon and the region. Chamoun was to remain in power until the end of his term in September of the same year: this was followed by the US Marines' withdrawal in October,

---

[87] Hahn, Peter L (2006), "Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957", *Presidential Studies Quarterly* vol. 36.no.1, pp. 38-47.
[88] Fawaz A. Gerges (1993), "The Lebanese Crisis of 1958: The Risks of Inflated Self-Importance", *Beirut Review,* pp. 83–113.
[89] Cobban, Helena (1985), *The Making of Modern Lebanon.* London: Hutchinson, p. 99.
[90] Michael Johnson (2001), *All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon* (London: I.B.Tauris) p. 128.

mediated by US envoy to Lebanon, Robert Murphy, who reached a compromise with Egypt to elect a moderate President.

The choice fell on Lebanese Army General Fuad Chehab, who became president and formed a national reconciliation government headed by Prime Minister Rashid Karami. This brought relative stability to the entire region, and US-Egyptian relations revived with an economic support programme for Egypt that focused entirely on food aid – mainly wheat. Also, US economic sanctions imposed since the 1956 War were lifted, as a gesture for renewing Middle East peace efforts in the region, including negotiations in reaching a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In conclusion, this also proved that the domination of security and political escalations in the region still made it impossible to achieve a standard neutrality approach, whether in the case of Nasser or in Lebanon's domestic or foreign choices tied to regional compromise under international hegemonic structures.

1.8.1. Invisible Lebanese Domestic-Foreign Policy Behaviours

Subsequently, Egyptian influence grew in Lebanon, with Nasser expanding his friendships across all Lebanese political sectarian powers, also including anti-sectarian politicians like Emile Bustani, a prominent and successful businessman who became a member of the Lebanese parliament and a Cabinet minister. In fact, Bustani was able to help Egypt during the 1956 War by leaking images to the British House of Commons of aggressive conduct by the tripartite forces in the Suez city of Port Said.[91] This escalated the domestic political backlash against English Prime Minister Anthony Eden due to public protests criticizing Britain's involvement with Israel and France in the war.[92] It also gave Bustani a special relationship with Egypt, in which he invested on the domestic political front by maintaining close relationships with assorted political leaders, as well as local political rivals Camille Chamoun and Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, and the newly-elected President Chehab.

---

[91] Emile Bustani Foundation (2013). "Beyond Sea and Sky: The Life and Story of Emile Bustani", Beirut Films Documentary, 11 September 2013. [Arabic]. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4JryExfom_c http://mtv.com.lb/Documentaries/Emile_Bustani_-_Beyond_Sea_and_Sky (accessed 30 November 2015). The veteran Egyptian journalist, Mohammad Hassanian Haikal, who was close to Nasser, confirmed that Bustani flew his private jet to London to leak the images.
[92] John T. Henderson (1976), *Leadership Personality and War: the Cases of Richard Nixon and Anthony Eden. Political Science Journal*, vol 28 no. 2, pp 141–164; also Keith Layborn (2002), *Fifty Key Figures in Twentieth Century British Politics* (London: Routledge), p. 102.

In fact, Bustani was an influential and outspoken politician, also friends with prominent Lebanese statesmen like Michel Chiha and Charles Malik, promoting knowledge and experience or relationships of and with various intellectual, cultural and political aspects of all domestic, regional or international matters. At the regional level for example, his good ties with Nasser did not prevent him from maintaining his very close friendship with King Faisal in Baghdad. Although, the 1958 crisis was not a pleasant experience for Bustani, given his close relations with all parties in the conflict, he remained committed to contributing his energy in mediating a final resolution for the crisis in Lebanon. Nevertheless, from the regional political aspect, he endorsed Nasser's state nationalism and his initiatives for development to be strengthened with good relations with the West, and to be protected by regional coordination and cooperation, with a political priority focused on the issue of Palestine.[93] At the international level, he maintained sound diplomatic and political contacts in London, and even in the US where he opened his own Lebanese public relations office. He knew the importance of media, especially the TV communication technology revolution of that era, and in addition, maintained local public relations and social, intellectual, and political gatherings, inviting Lebanese poets and thinkers, and engaging in different rational debates.

Bustani's vision for Lebanon was to see it become the base for a regional development, dependent on excellent mutual Arab and Western relations and cooperation, and operating mainly through the promotion of an Arab Development Fund financed by a small percentage share from Arab oil sale revenues that were to be invested all across the Arab World.[94] This vision was inspired by his international public relationships, business journeys, and tireless efforts through his Contracting and Trading Company, CAT, which had a fleet of small jets executing projects well beyond the norms of his time. Correspondingly, he was very critical of the political system in Lebanon, which was entrenched in constant careless governance, delays and postponements, especially with regard to political reform, regional security strategies, and economic development policies. In fact, he had also intended to run for President, and campaigned for this during the 1960 Parliamentary elections, even utilising his planes for dropping election leaflets from the skies for the 1964

[93] Bustani, Emile (1958), *Doubts and Dynamite: The Middle East Today* (London: Allan Wingate).
[94] Bustani, Emile (1961). *March Arabesque* (London: Robert Hale), 2nd ed.. 1963, pp, 171-174.

presidential elections, promising a new era for Lebanon. However, his ambitions and his life ended when, en route from Beirut to Jordan to attend a meeting, his plane crashed in a violent storm.[95]

On the whole, Bustani had adopted Chiha's *Integrationist Phoenician* Maronite political approach at both domestic and regional levels, mainly in the promotion of domestic and regional construction through the strategic development modelling of his successful business empire – the Construction and Trading Company (CAT Group).[96] The CAT Group undertook its first construction projects in Kuwait, expanding during the 1950s and 1960s, and becoming highly involved in foundational construction and development projects during the Arab Gulf oil boom, as well as mediating between Western firms and the local Arab monarchies.[97] Albeit a Western-dressed business man, Bustani spoke the local language, knew the traditions, and shared their political and economic development concerns, both domestically and externally, thereby gaining the trust of the local monarchs while also gaining extensive connections for himself both regionally and internationally.[98] His reputation extended into Africa and further East, to Pakistan, ironically with CAT winning a contract to build a power station, which also contributed to strengthening foreign relations at the Lebanese state level.[99]

In fact, CAT even grew bigger than the Lebanese state – creating Lebanese offshore labor opportunities absent at home; and resembling the position of a state within the Lebanese state. Yet it remained a state hostage to the corruption of sectarian-oriented political manipulations, acting unaccountably in its obligations towards securing equal citizenship rights in Lebanon. Thus, Bustani's domestic political speech focused on this issue of sectarian exploitation stressing 'the importance of abolishing sectarianism, demanding electoral law reforms to allow people to vote for free members of the Parliament, and unchaining the political system from the dominance of the corrupt feudal political establishment.'[100] Sadly, Bustani's death marked an end to any new

---

[95] Desmond Stewart (1967), *Orphan with a Hoop: The Life of Emile Bustani.* (London: Chapman & Hall).
[96] Emile Bustani Foundation (2013), "Beyond Sea and Sky: The Life and Story of Emile Bustani", Beirut Films Documentary, 11 September 2013 [Arabic] (Farid Al-Kahzen)
[97] MIT Center for International Studies (n.d), "About the Emile Bustani Middle East Seminar (est. 1985)", (Cambridge MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology CIS), http://cis.mit.edu/events-seminars/emile-bustani-middle-east-seminar
[98] Emile Bustani Foundation, "Beyond Sea and Sky", op,cit. (Mohammad AlSammak)
[99] Ibid, George Skaff.
[100] Bustani, Emile (1952), "August 1952 Speech." http://www.emilebustani.org/publications.html

promising hopes of abolishing political sectarianism in Lebanon, or to the remarkable but short-lived era of Lebanese state administrative and institutional reforms witnessed under Chehab's presidency (1958-1964). His death also saw an end to a Lebanese foreign policy adopted by Chehab that had become relatively balanced between a divided West and East Cold War era, a policy that maintained sensible diplomatic, economic and political (including military) relations with both world super-powers and with the influential political or economic forces in the Arab region; especially in support of the Arab cause on the Issue of Palestine.[101]

1.8.2. Renewed Conflict and War: The End of a Regional Stability Legacy

Unhappily, this was a short-lived political legacy that never had an opportunity to flourish amidst new political developments at the domestic, regional and international levels, and thus marked a slow deterioration of the period of stability in Lebanon and the region. At the regional level, Arab divisiveness conquered, as early as dissolving the UAR in 1961, followed by further division on the outbreak of the Yemen Revolution in September 1962, mainly with Saudi Arabia and Jordan in opposition to Nasser's armed intervention in Yemen to support the rebellion. Internationally, the arrival of US President Lyndon Johnson in power following the Kennedy assassination in November 1963 marked the beginning of renewed tension in relations with Egypt, especially with regard to the peace negotiation efforts during the Arab-Israeli conflict which had initially reflected optimism in the letters exchanged between Nasser and Kennedy.[102] Johnson, on the other hand, reflected great support for Israel, including dependency in shaping its Middle East foreign policy.

Johnson also renewed the economic and US aid sanctions on Egypt, conditional on Nasser's fulfillment of the following main demands: first, to cancel its nuclear programme; and secondly to cancel its long-range missile programme and to downsize the Egyptian army.[103] Nasser refused to abide by the US conditions, which led to further deterioration in US-Egyptian relations whereby in the summer of 1966 the US even cancelled its wheat supplies to Egypt. As a result Nasser

---

[101] Ghassan Salamé (1988), "Is a Lebanese Foreign Policy Possible?" in Halim Barakat, ed., Toward *a Viable Lebanon* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies), pp. 347–360.
[102] Kennedy, John F. and Yates, William. *The Historic Letters Between Kennedy and Nasser.* Nada Publications, 2003.
[103] Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs United States Department of State. "Foreign Relations of the United States. 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967**,"** 3 April 2000. https://fas.org/sgp/advisory/state/frusmide.html

sought to strengthen his relations with the Soviet Union while the Americans sought to initiate new anti-Nasser alliances in the region. Israel was not far from the regional security and political scene, and enjoyed extensive support from the Johnson Administration. It took the lead in carrying out air strikes and attacks, provoking further Arab divisions, criticising Nasser for failing to reach peace and (despite being trapped in the Yemen war), for failing to go to war with Israel, with events finally leading to the outbreak of war on 5 June 1967.

Lebanon was duly brought back into this repeated cycle of regional war, conflict and foreign interventions, to await a new opportunity for regional peace and stability. Yet by 1975 there was instead in a civil war – influenced mainly by the negative impacts that had left their mark since the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War – renewing the conflict with Israel and paving the way for domestic conflict, while also attracting foreign interventions into the country.

1.9. Conclusion

This chapter aimed at conducting a review of publications written on Lebanese foreign policy, including a literature review analysis on the making of foreign policy in Middle East or Arab states relative to the impact of geopolitical patterns and dynamics on foreign policy behaviour in Lebanon. It highlights the role of the indigenous non-state or sub-state actors in influencing the making of Lebanon's domestic and foreign policies amidst the domestic-external security complexities involving the entire region. These complexities, reflected in regional power struggles, were mostly highlighted in the divisions over the Arab-Israeli conflict, affected by foreign interventions. Where international efforts for regional peace are dictated by regional power hegemony interests, they can be interpreted through acts of war, economic sanctions, armed interventions or political manipulation under the pretext of protecting citizenship freedoms and democratic rights, mainly for sub-state minority groups.

Thus, the chapter also focused on examining the issue of the Arab state in the Middle East region as reflected in the problem of sectarian-oriented political manipulations in the Lebanese state. This has been embedded in the Lebanese political system since the foundation of Greater Lebanon in 1920, as outlined in the historic timeline literature review debate in this chapter. Unfortunately, it

was an issue that persisted after Lebanese independence in 1943, and has greatly influenced Lebanese foreign policy behaviour.

In addition, the chapter considered the importance of adopting an omni-balanced approach in examining internal and external factors impacting Lebanese foreign policy at all domestic, regional and external levels. Although all the studies on Lebanese foreign policy tend to agree on the complexity of fitting penetrated states like Lebanon into a systemic foreign policy or IR theoretical framework, more exploration could be carried out to understand the roots of such complexity, mainly by focusing on how the issue of state sovereignty, through the context of the historical roots of state power rule and security dilemma in Lebanon and/or the entire Middle East region, affects the behaviour of the sub-state forces. In other words, there should also be attempts to examine the security issue for the sub-state forces outside the systematic 'proxy' approach adopted in examining the regional and international hegemony competitions that affect the livelihood of citizens at both political and socioeconomic levels. This (as noted by Nonneman and Hinnebusch, and Wilkins, concerning Lebanese foreign policy) would contribute towards the adoption of alternative approaches in the analysis of foreign policy behaviour of Middle East and Arab states, mostly beyond the bias of systematic analysis of the region, and usually strictly focused on the macro-political or theoretical structures. In this regard, this thesis also prefers to try to examine the micro-behavioural structures of the sub-state forces on the ground.

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. A Hybrid Lebanese State Sovereignty Structure

Predictions of sovereign foreign policy behaviour can be challenging when assessing weak penetrated states that are usually influenced by external regional and international political or economic pressures. This is especially the case in relation to peace or conflict resolutions in which domestic political and economic sovereignty inspirations are hostage to foreign guardianships, and where multi-variable predictable and unpredictable determinants remain very relevant in assessing or altering macro-knowledge. When evaluating behaviour towards sub-state forces, counting their micro-behaviour in reaction to citizenship security anxieties is very important for assessing the progressive determinants to the power conflict affiliations that are shaping or harming Lebanese state sovereignty within its geo-influential factors. In other words, it is necessary to follow an approach that avoids what Stephen Krasner criticized in his *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*: i.e., that "most observers and analysts of international relations have treated sovereign states as an analytic assumption or a well-institutionalized if not taken-for-granted structure".[104] As he notes:

> The major theories of international politics – neorealism, neoliberalism, the English school, constructivism, world culture – are examples of more general perspectives on the nature of social life. One fundamental divide is between actor-oriented theories that take actors as the ontological givens, and sociological (for lack of a better word) theories that take institutional structures as the ontological givens. These two approaches have different understandings about the nature of actors or agents and institutions.[105]

Sara Fregonese also presents an interesting theocratical approach to assessing Lebanese sovereignty in her article "Beyond the 'weak state': hybrid sovereignties in Beirut"; she observes that Lebanese sovereignty results from complex hybridisations between state and nonstate actors.[106] Emphasising how treatment of analysis of Lebanese state sovereignty is based on a social construct that is invariably state-based or is being hybrid-based, she quotes an argument about Lebanese civil war realisms by George Corm (former Lebanese Finance Minister and economist)

---

[104] Stephen Krasner (1999). *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 220.
[105] Ibid, 43.
[106] Sara Fregonese (2012), "Beyond the 'weak state': hybrid sovereignties in Beirut", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (pub. SAGE Journals), 8 June 2012.

to the effect that in Lebanon "the last of the militiamen ... could become a historian and enact history".[107] Fregonese also refers to Sarah Whatmore's observation that Hybridity is a mixing of different ontological categories, "a condition describing those things and processes that transgress or disconcert binary terms that draw distinctions between like and unlike categories of objects – such as self/other, culture/nature, animal/machine or mind/body."[108] Citing Haraway (1991) and Latour (1993) she adds that "Science and Technology Studies use the notion of hybridity to counteract dialectic ontologies about mixing as the mere sum of difference, and to dissolve binaries between categories like nature and culture, including the 'nonhuman' in ethical and political debates."[109]

2.2. Quantum Sovereignty Experiment Revelations

Compatibly, quantum sovereignty is an approach proposed by Paul Cornish when examining the Westphalian principle for sovereignty in relation to modern global concepts, as, for example, in approaching the global governance of cyberspace: how, he wonders, can a non-confrontational environment can be found, with the means to exercise the conceptual rather than the physical component of state sovereignty, in a global yet non-physical environment? He says that Theoretical Physics could help tackle this question, being an idea that could enable different conceptions of state sovereignty to coexist, as proposed by John Polkinghorne who referred to "quantum theory" as a core proposition, being known as its *superposition principle.* Cornish adds that superposition theory

> … allows the mixing together of states that classically would be mutually exclusive of each other and strictly immiscible. In particle physics, Superposition theory allows not only for an individual electron to behave either like a particle or a wave but also for a single electron to behave in multiple forums concurrently. An electron cannot only be here and not here, but also in any number of other states that are superpositions of here or not here**.** Quantum theory encourages us to keep fluid with our conception of what is reasonable. It also encourages us to recognize that there is no universal epistemology, no single sovereign way in which we may hope to gain all knowledge. In the context of global cyber space, the quantum sovereignty thought experiment seems at least to be viable, where the purpose of the exercise would

---

[107] Ibid, p. 3 (2005, page 41).
[108] Ibid, p. 4 (referring to Whatmore, 2009, page 361).
[109] Ibid, p 4.

rather be simple, mainly to remove the all-convenient obstacle to the construction of an international consensus on the benefit of cyber space for mutual benefit.[110]

Cornish also refers to the Quantum Weirdness Metaphor,[111] which could be a good matching example for the proportional assessment of sovereignty, since

> … it aspires to nothing as useful as a policy framework… It cannot on its own answer to all the challenges of global governance but could simply be used at a metaphor where quantum super positioning allows for difference, and it insists essentially on the suspension of choice and judgement while an experiment (which we are in) is allowed to develop. The classical Westphalian approach to sovereignty tolerated differences in order to achieve the widest possible participation in a more or less ordered community, where applying it to cyber governance could help seek a broadly analogous goal by allowing different understanding and expectations of sovereignty to co-exist rather than conflict."[112]

This specifically reflects on the importance of quantum theory in also helping to include previously ignored or suppressed knowledge or truth about previous misconceptions, in analyzing the patterns and dynamics of state sovereignty. Or as Cornish maintains, "territorial boundaries, coastal waters and national airspace are not the full embodiment of a sovereignty, but merely the physical expression of a deeper more important and enduing idea." Maybe therefore, by allowing "different understanding and expectations of sovereignty to co-exist rather than conflict", this could also contribute towards allowing diverse independent human ethics and beliefs to co-exist, rather than remain as suppressed taboos within isolated identity complexities.

In conclusion, based on Cornish's analysis of sovereignty – and also the Hybrid approach – it is necessary to investigate fluid-geodynamics within the state's physical borders, and also beyond its physical structures, mainly through cultural or social constructs, best observed and explained

---

[110] Cornish, Paul (2016). "Quantum sovereignty: the Westphalian principle and the global governance of cyberspace", ANU TV 23 February 2016, Australian National University, . Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qqf-pHDE9WQ

[111] Ibid. As in the experiment of placing a cat in a booby trap with a radioactive source, a detector and a bottle of "cyanide". If the monitor detects a certain level of radioactive activity over a certain time, the bottle is broken and the cat dies. Up to that moment the cat is notionally both alive and dead. This may be related to superpositions of states, one corresponding to a live cat and one corresponding to a dead cat, where the cat is dead and alive at the same time, or the cat is neither dead or alive at the same time, and it stays that way until somebody opens the box and looks inside. And it is the act of opening the box and observing its contents, which returns theoretical superpositions to physical reality in the form of a cat alive or dead, and no longer both or neither; at one point between two uncertain states of being here and not here.

[112] Ibid.

through a historic perceptional or proportional approach of timeline analysis, whether of regressive or evolutionary eras. This is important in assessing the state concept and power rule issue, especially in Lebanon, the Levant, the Arab world or the entire Middle East region. In his quantum theory thinking, Cornish makes such timeline historic reflections in assessing the problem of the organization of Cyberspace towards the state in referencing how China provided the rapid development of internet throughout the country. He reflects that the cultural history of the Chinese nation has lasted for five thousand years without interruption, thereby forming a natural cultural tradition with its unique characteristics of philosophy, values, identity and unification, and making Chinese history one of a unified multi-national state for more than two thousand years. All of this firmly and deeply imprints the idea of unification on the psychology of a nation, which is emphasized in the right of a very long-established society to choose the rules under which it lives, and becoming the pluralistic founding idea of state sovereignty, under a multinational state unification demonstrated in physically-unified sovereign borders and national state identity.

Similarly, cyberspace serves as a multi-entity (co-existence based) unified network in which the state, in terms of state sovereignty, still represents an authority for regulation and order. Yet at the same time the extension of state sovereignty (intervention) into cyberspace could be a threat or could even destroy the open space we value in cyberspace.[113] This perception could also be pursued in international relations, and Cornish refers to Henry Kissinger saying that "the genius of the Westphalian system is that its provisions were procedural, not substantive". His third visit to China reflected his first visit of 1971, and he concluded that in our time, the quest for world order requires relating to the perceptions of societies whose various realities have been largely self-contained. Thus, the mystery to overcome is one that all people share: how can divergent historic experiences and values be shaped into a common order? If a state would accept these basic requirements it could be recognized as an international citizen, able to maintain its own culture, politics, religion and internal policies, shielded by the international system from outside intervention.[114]

---

[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid.

2.3. A Quantum Theory / Social Science Correlation

"Quantum Physicists discovered that physical atoms are vortices of energy that are constantly vibrating. So, every material structure in the universe, including you and me, radiates a unique energy signature."[115]

The Cornish theory approach also resembles the Quantum Physics Double Slit Experiment,[116] a metaphor which reflects how all material objects are made up of electrons (tiny bit of matter) that, in fact, expose the original natural behaviour of material objects or physical occurrences invisible or hidden to the 'current' knowledge or assessment capability of the human mind. What the human eye or mind can assess or see is not necessarily the true behaviour of material in impacting or shaping certain events. In other words, what one is capable of seeing or observing in black and white (two main visible macro lines) is the end result of invisible micro forces impacting, or impacted, around a central macro with effects on all domestic, regional and international levels imposed by human structured thinking or behaviour. This is a behaviour or structure that can be shifted if approached or observed differently, taking into consideration the evolution of knowledge over just a decade (such as the post-smartphone human behavioural era for both individuals and groups), and in the rapid ability of independent individuals to access a diversity of knowledge sources in assessing the shaping of seen or promoted macro news.

Attempting a Quantum theory approach into Social Science research may have great potential by placing sub-material thinking or imagination into a process that materializes into visible results and actions when it is analysed or observed – turning invisible electrons from a wave of complex/chaotic/unpredicted (emotional-sensational-spiritual) modes into a material particle result or a particle-material specific vision mode. It dismantles one status of chaos to an alternative status of order or renewed chaos, determined by constructive mind readiness to the outbreak of unpredicted moments, situations, occasions, or events, thus reviving invisible electron wave reactions, and usually shaping the form of organized chaos into a reflection of the sub-mind complex comportment. For example, in situations of mind weakness or wastage, this could lead to domestic surrender, usually accompanied by sustained repression that could explode to a chaos

---

[115] Bruce H. Lipton, (2011), *The Biology of Belief: Unleashing the power of Consciousness, Matter and Miracles*, Library of Congress Control.
[116] Jim Al-Khalili (2013), "Double Slit Experiment Explained", The Royal Institution, 1 February 2013. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A9tKncAdlHQ

of violence controlled by the interplay of domestic-external forces. Or it could become a determination for rebellion or resistance in seeking an alternative form of conscious and material order, as in accomplishing a revolution of human, social, economic, political or legal justice.

In examining the post-modern human mind adventure by tackling this theoretical challenge, Mustafa Hijazi, in his book *The Wasted Human*, suggests that relying on post-modern proportionality and quantum physics theories to possess new revolutionary determinants could lead to a shift away from the rational and fixed thinking achieved through traditional human mind experimental analysis and examination.[117] He explains that:

> Newtonian causality and consequence reasoning (reflected by rational understanding laws) is now challenged or replaced by the possible uncertain reasoning theoretical approach. With an unpredicted and non-individuality approach in the quantum theory of nature, multi prediction and multi approach possibilities became the dominant ideal, as new scientific evidence in a world of uncertainty. Proportional certainty became dominant over the previous divine scholarly or academic reasonings and certainties. It has also been concluded that progress in learning and education is not limited only to compiling notes and research, but to the applications used to conclude what might result in different and endless new outcomes and analysis. The idea and its application is a mind initiative and creativity, which could be possible or impossible to analyse. Only after reaching the end result of an analysis, might one determine an analysis that could end in the dark void of creation. The theoretical approach itself has become the theory of creativity for continued progressiveness.[118]

In other words, it is also an attempt towards adopting progressive acquaintance, challenging to manipulative or exploitive knowledge, misconceptions, or biased thoughts. It is a proper revolutionary tool to assess an accelerated revolution of knowledge and information,[119] faced by a historical challenge in the imagining of a collective human solidarity social construct, as for example, in the traditional IR Realism theory approach, not acknowledging new evolving truth to a continuously shifting factual realism in an accelerating knowledge realism. Preparedness, as Ryan Avent argues, is required for future realism such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) knowledge,

---

[117] Hijazi, Mustafa (2005), *The Wasted Human: A Social Psychological Analysis* (Beirut: Arab Cultural Centre Press) [Arabic], p. 192.
[118] Ibid, pp. 192-193.
[119] Allegedly, human knowledge today, on average, is doubling every 13 months, and according to IBM, access to this knowledge will even lead to the doubling of human knowledge every 12 hours, different types of knowledge will have different rates of knowledge growth, depending on the industry. Schilling is an American architect, designer, inventor and systems theorist.

which remains a key question, especially concerning the degree to which it might exceed human knowledge. Articulating over nanotechnology or clinical knowledge that now doubles every two years or less, emphasises the fact that quantum mechanical effects are important on this quantum-realm scale: might we therefore anticipate future quantum mechanical politics? There is also the process of acquiring new knowledge and learning truth – from misconception, manipulated or misleading knowledge – or probably this could be broken down and restructured in quantum mechanical realism, just as the way robots could break politics.[120]

Moreover, a non-*Idealist* perspective on *The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI),* by over two dozen experts from 14 different academic institutions and organizations, sounds an alarm in terms of enabling new, constantly advancing forms of cybercrime, physical attacks, and political disruption over the next five to ten years.[121] A co-author of this report, George Dvorsky, concludes that: "It is often the case that AI systems don't merely reach human levels of performance but significantly surpass it… It is troubling, but necessary, to consider the implications of superhuman hacking, surveillance, persuasion, and physical target identification, as well as AI capabilities that are subhuman but nevertheless much more scalable than human labour."[122] Nonetheless, he notes that fellow authors and experts find the system falls greatly in the ability to identify "between 'fake news' and the truth" or "the traditional AI and machine learning practices." In this regard, the report mainly warns that:

> …although AI will make better private or public surveillance technologies, there will still be risks of cyber-attacks involving automated hacking, spear phishing, speech synthesis to impersonate targets, and 'data poisoning', or, on the political front, will sway popular opinion, create highly targeted propaganda, and spread fake – albeit portrayed as highly believable – news, 'where these concerns are most significant in the context of authoritarian states, but may also undermine the ability of democracies to sustain truthful public debates'… Conclusions proposed for these 'strategies of "rethinking" cyber security' will need investments in institutional and technological solutions, where they say developers should adopt

---

[120] Ryan Avent (2018), "How Robots will Break Politics", *The Economist*, 9 January 2018. Online at: https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/05/robots-politics-automation-technology-216220
[121] Ibid.
[122] George Dvorsky (2018), "New Report on Emerging AI Risks Paints a Grim Future", *Gizmodo*, 26 February 2018. https://gizmodo.com/new-report-on-ai-risks-paints-a-grim-future-1823191087 In his review of the report entitled "The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention and Mitigation", Dvorsky quotes Miles Brundage, one of the 26 authors from 14 institutions who wrote the report, which was based on a two-day workshop held in Oxford in February 2017. A PDF link is available through Dvorsky's article at *Gizmodo*.

a "culture of responsibility" and consider the powers of data sharing and openness, yet with less optimism to a "good luck with that".[123]

There is a reality that draws back the focus or the discussion on the significance of the human idealist social construct – a human mind, that further examines the natural realisms of humans' success or failure to achieve a 'culture of responsibility', and is able to deter or resist the potential 'malicious threats' of the future, still exploited by humans. Particularly at the individual level, the human possesses the modern technological tools to express and mobilize on the public social level. Thus, there is also an intellectual or academic obligation – especially at the level of future teaching and learning – to develop the mechanism in adapting this transition into a 'responsible diverse human culture' – catering to a sovereign personal agency, since AI and Machine Learning (ML) also depend on the same basics as for human learning and teaching. Also, at the academic level there could be an AI combined knowledge in social sciences, and overall human studies on global affairs and relations, advancing to a human adoption of a global solidarity "cultural responsibility".

Approaching the early signs of AI threats, observing the macro-exploitations of a human civilization justified by a traditional IR state-centric Realism, and ignoring the future approaching true realisms of threats may exceed the capabilities of states or humans; "AI principles are modelled on science's understanding of how the human brain processes and categorizes information."[124] Even so, they are still challenged by such obstacles as misleading information or "poisoned" knowledge. This therefore also reflects on human mind security, free from corrupt supremacist souls or thinking, that is distant from a "cultural solidarity responsibility" – to become able to face what Noam Chomsky describes the "attack solidarity" foil by the hegemonial social culture that currently dominates.[125]

---

[123] Ibid.

[124] Anon (2018), "Artificial Intelligence: How We Help Machines Learn", *The New York Times*, February 2018. Referring to Trevor Darrell, a professor of computer science at the University of California, Berkeley. Online at: https://paidpost.nytimes.com/facebook/artificial-intelligence-how-we-help-machines-learn.html

[125] "Sympathy had to be driven out of people's heads [and one had to] look after oneself away from a system of human solidarity. [Attempts] to drive basic human emotions out of people's heads [are seen] today in policy formation, like the attack on social security based on the principle of solidarity and caring. It is no use to the very rich so there [are] systematic attempts to destroy it with the standard approach of defunding it by creating frustration as a technique to move towards privatization. [Also] like the attempts to privatize public schools where the public education system is under severe attack, despite being one of the jewels of American society, the right to free education. Nowadays, students leave colleges with big debts, meaning [they are] trapped, having to work for well-established law firms to be able pay [their] debts first before being able to think of [their] own work, and this goes

2.3.1 Altering the Manufacture of Dominant Misconceptions in Hidden Endeavours

Anticipating today's chaos in cyberspace media technology and misconceptions of truth, Marshall McLuhan, Canadian philosopher and intellectual wrote over fifty years ago that: "we live invested in an electric information environment that is quite as imperceptible to us as water is to fish."[126] He argued that the "old ground rules and human perceptions are being transformed by this new resonant surround where nothing is stable but change itself. But like water to a fish, the environment we live in remains hidden. Only children and artists see 'the emperor's new clothes.'"[127] Or, like "War and Peace in a Global Village", the truth for people could become as water is to fish. According to McLuhan "One thing about which fish know exactly nothing is water, since they have no anti-environment which would enable them to perceive the element they live in."[128] Thus, it is not strictly about the right to the other view – it is also about the mechanism for the truth of how to protect and justly perform the legal and constitutional rights in the state (electoral college system versus proportional representation), thereby ensuring both procedure and opportunity to participate or to be represented in the decision-making process.

When the state serves as a political democratic broker between all segment of society, it avoids false truths that lead to human conflict, and oppression and acts of violence leading to resistance or rebellion. In *Requiem for the American Dream* Chomsky describes this as facing the issue of attempts to "marginalize the population" – when society becomes marginalized from human instinct and emotions of sympathy, solidarity and mutual support, all will be driven out. If Society is based on the control of private wealth it will genuinely replicate the values of greed and the desire to maximize personal gains at the expense of others. Chomsky observes:

> Any society based on that principle is ugly, maybe a small society based on that principle can still survive, but a global society based on that principle is headed towards a massive destruction. The human mind is still not smart enough to design

---

across the board." Noam Chomsky (2016), *Requiem for the American Dream*, Documentary film by Peter Hutchison, Kelly Nyks and Jared P. Scott, Gravitas Ventures, 2016. Online at
http://requiemfortheamericandream.com/the-film/
[126] Marshall McLuhan (1969), *Counterblast* (Toronto: McClelland and Steward), p. 5.
[127] Marshall McLuhan and Barrington Nevitt (1973), "The Argument: Causality in the Electric World", *Technology and Culture*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Jan. 1973, p. 1.
[128] Marshall McLuhan (1968), *War and Peace in the Global Village* (New York: McGraw-Hill), p. 175.

in any detail what a perfectly just society would be like, but we may provide guidelines to make progress in this direction.[129]

Or we may attempt to provide guidelines for a progressing human mind about events that have occurred, which probably someday, finally, the human mind might be better able to grasp. In referring to the democratic process, Chomsky mentions the late twentieth century social philosopher John Dewey and his argument that until all production, commerce or media institutions are subject to participatory democratic control, it is redundant to speak of a functioning democratic society. As Chomsky observes, policy will be the shadow that business casts over society: "[w]hen there is a structure of domination and hierarchy, whether giving or removing orders, such orders are not justified, carrying the burden of proof."[130]

For example, even freedom of speech insured in the Bill of Rights or even in the US Constitution was to become manipulated after the rise of the civil rights movement in the sixties. Relatively, Chomsky refers to the 1975 *Crisis of Democracy Report*, on the governability of democracies, which was a Trilateral Commission led by Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuki, who were Liberal internationalists and observers of developments in the US, Europe and Japan. The report states that it seeks to reflect national interests by protecting the private business interest over reflecting the immediate human public interests, yet also reflecting that indeed an "excess of democracy" in the US is problematic. Hence, it would perhaps be worthwhile to compare the Arab Spring with the broad-based American mobilizations of the 1960s, demanding equal rights and freedoms; or "excess of democracy".[131] Fear from the previously passive or obedient elements of society who were trying to organize to enter the political arena in

---

[129] Chomsky, Noam (2015), "Requiem for the American Dream", Documentary film by Peter Hutchison, Kelly Nyks and Jared P. Scott, Gravitas Ventures, *PF Pictures*, April 2015. Online at http://requiemfortheamericandream.com/the-film/
[130] Chomsky describes the 60s as an era of democratic nation-wide revolution in the US, which led to a surge of civilizational influence demanding freedoms, justice and equality— women's rights, environmental advocates, race equality demands– this, in turn, scared the US ruling establishment, who reacted with aggression and violence. Chomsky also notes there was a coordinated business offensive, that was motivated by the fear of losing control over society, and a significant backlash sought to beat back egalitarian demands and reshape public ideology. Likewise, the Arab Spring demands for democracy and social justice, were to become contained under different security pretexts, aimed at exploiting human and natural resources in regional armed conflicts. And even, the 1936 Great Arab Revolution in Palestine, which initially promoted social or political injustice perpetrated against the Palestinians and was to inspire rebellious Islamic emotions in reaction to the religious Zionist-Jewish claims to annex Palestine, marking a long struggle of violence.
[131] Chomsky (2016).

the US, the Trilateral Commission recommended that they should return to their passivity and become depoliticized. The Commission also expressed concern about the growing independence of the young generation and noted that this raised questions about the role of schools, universities and even churches, to bring under control.[132]

Therefore, as Chomsky notes, more effort was required to ensure that a true democratic mechanism would include all sub-state levels, affirming that in the US "you learn by understanding what the world is like, for you to understand about how to go on, since it should still be recognized here that the US remains one of the freest societies. Government has very limited capacity and remains subject to the influence of corporate business but legal and constitutional mechanisms remain open to public influence and there is a substantial amount that can be done if people organize." [133] He concludes by quoting Howard Zinn: "What matters is the countless small deeds of hidden people that lay the foundations of the significant events that enter history; they are the ones who have done things in the past and they are the ones who will have to do so in the future."

2.4. Misconceptions of Truth and False Knowledge: a Quantum Realism Theory Analysis in a Struggle of Chaos, Anarchy, or Order

Correspondingly, Hijazi relates to Gaston Bachelard and Karl Popper on the concepts of new learning and education, where, according to Bachelard, "Education progresses with blowing up its previous foundations and techniques." Thus, progress in the history of education is the history of its lacking knowledge – knowledge lacked in human mind analysis and resolutions.[134] Similarly, Popper suggests that there is one infinite resolution for truth. Individual views of certainty and righteous independency, supported by previous verified knowledge and experiment, are replaced by an academic or knowledge culture of tolerance and certainty in having to accept other uncertain predictions or unpredicted possible alternatives. "It defies the concept of totalitarian social, political, academic or cultural ideals and conduct, being in contradiction to the new logic and soul of education." Popper also promotes the idea of the Falsifiability Criterion, which fully contradicts

---

[132] *Ibid.*
[133] Ibid.
[134] Mustafa Hijazi (2005), *The Wasted Human: A Social Psychological Analysis* (Beirut: Arab Cultural Centre Press) [Arabic], pp. 192-193.

divine religious knowledge. Science should possess the daring objective of examining the truth or fault in a theory, rather than proving the absolute certainty of a theory. "Knowledge should not be an accumulation but rather a cycle of contradictive observation; cleansing of old false knowledge would become the new thinking structure. There is no need for granted fixed knowledge academic research principles."[135]

In this phase Hijazi also refers to Thomas Kuhn who, in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), emphasized the principle of knowledge transition over accumulation throughout history, remarking that the 'Paradigm' model of knowledge would undoubtedly determine "the intellectual aspect of society, the issues to be proposed and the approach in proposing, in addition to evolution of research methods and outcomes. However, alternative ideas, thoughts or revelations could be restricted in this process, where knowledge growth could be constrained with affirmative theory obstacles."[136]

As such, Quantum Realism night reflect on a postmodern IR theory in assessing contradictive environments, especially in situations with ancient civilizational timeline-sheets of complex identities affected by their historic realpolitik domestic-external geo-dynamics. In examining the struggle for a multi-cultural civil state order in states with chaos, continuously faced with violence, instability and conflict, both state and people could become marginalized by a hegemonial power struggle. Hence, "the use of chaos related to theoretical and methodological constructs in political science is still in its infancy", yet, it is an assertion of the Quantum Theory and Relativity Theory that have been essential in examining Chaos Theory in social sciences.[137] The term 'Chaos' was based originally on scientific theories beginning with the Big Bang Theory, but ending with the Entropy (non-availability of energy) Factor disorder. It was initially used in the 1970s as a philosophical argument by a group of American philosophers, but was subsequently adopted as a political term by British policy makers and used to shift the basis of international relations

---

[135] Ibid, p. 194.
[136] Ibid.
[137] L. Douglas Kiel, and Euel Elliott, eds. (1996), *Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences:Foundations and Applications* (Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press), pp.2-10.

conduct.[138]   But, as noted by Douglas Kiel and Euel Elliott, in elaborating on the new theory, Chaos Theory presents:

> ... the most recent effort by social scientists to incorporate theory and method from the natural sciences… representing another strike against a singular commitment to the determinism of a Newtonian view of the natural realm… while focusing on nonlinearity, instability, and uncertainty, the application of this theory to the social sciences was perhaps a predictable eventuality... where the obvious metaphorical value of applying a theory of chaos to the social realm has served as an impetus for the emergence of the application of this theory to social phenomena.[139]

Hence, Chaos Theory is "founded on the mathematics of nonlinear systems, more specified to statistics for social scientists to match the mathematical rigor of the natural sciences…in examining how nonlinear and chaotic behaviour occurs and changes over time, through a Time-series analysis".[140] It is thus basically compatible with timeline, theoretical, and methodological constructs in assessing situations of analytical challenges, as in the case of Lebanon or the Middle East region attempting Quantum Realism.

Quantum Realism examines the multi-dimensional historic timeline of sequences of events that compares certain similar times, occasions or environments to uncertain reasoning, theoretical multi-prediction, and multi-approach possibilities for repeating human history and memory in a lengthy struggle for human freedoms, equality, peace, security, prosperity and stability. As Fawzi Shueibi argues, in a global system where chaos has been manipulated by a post-modernist notion that wishes the world to be viewed in a natural chaotic order, the increase of chaos increases the options and possibilities for reorganising within it. This is a different method that serves foreign interventionist interests – a tool for wishful thinkers to create and organize chaos according to their methods, where such actions become accepted as being a natural reality with 'disputed' natural science explanations. This is especially the case in international political practice where judging and deciding the lives of others, and/or being selective in choosing or deciding to act between good and bad, happens to be their evident objective.[141] Or, as Hijazi states, "Deciding the

---

[138] Imad Fawzi Shueibi, (2015), "Syria between the Civil and the Savage State" [in Arabic], *YouTube*, posted 20 May 2015. Online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ldUXz33nXbU Shueibi is a Syrian academic.
[139] Kiel and Elliott, op.cit., pp. 1-2.
[140] Ibid, pp. 2-3.
[141] Imad Fawzi Shueibi, (2015), "Syria between the Civil and the Savage State" [Arabic], online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ldUXz33nXbU

choice of Chaos for us means we are in a natural state of a natural post-neo-colonial model of natural intervention in a natural reorganization with a natural new order."[142]

2.5. A Comparative Quantum Politics Theory Analysis

Shueibi proposes quantum political science as a potential tool for complex reality analysis, providing a retreat into the ethics, objectives or confidence in the overall political science doctrine that leads to the entrance of political science into a state of hard, untruthful or complex faulty manipulative practices or analyses. He finds it more obvious that "micro-local events have a macro-interconnected relationship, impacting on overall political events, since micro-events lead to unpredictable (black swan) macro-events, more complex for political prediction." This creates a status referred to as "Blind Chaos", based on post-modernist physical scientific theory; a "chaotic entropy" factor that is present with creation, and can only increase over time, reaching constant periods of disorder intensifying the experience of the irreversible process towards the surrender to death; or acceptance of colonial hegemony. Also it was originally based on the Newtonian second law of thermodynamics, like the human cycle of birth, growth, ageing and death, thereby "surrendering to the fact that there is no possible vision for a predictable or possible peaceful order, since it defies the natural chaotic order."[143]

Thus, Shueibi proposes quantum politics as a theoretical tool that tackles misconception in theorising or analysing chaos- or conflict-stalled scenarios, stating that any political reality dominated by a future of infinite predictable and unpredictable resolution possibilities at times of peace, could by default be restrained by infinite predictable and unpredictable conflict possibilities dominated by war. He explains that:

> Reality itself is constrained by two realities, the truth and its opposite. But they are both realities that could still reflect different possibilities [….] based on a quantum theory movement political wave. Thus, applying political quantum theory to any conflict means that any two contradicting possibilities to end or re-mobilize conflict also exists naturally. Hence, any future reality is the result of an accumulation or superposition, for two opposite arguments, as is the case in

---

[142] Mustafa Hijazi (2005), *The Wasted Human: A Social Psychological Analysis* (Beirut: Arab Cultural Centre Press) [Arabic], pp. 194.

[143] Imad Fawzi Shueibi (2016), "The Impact of (Quantum) Metaphysics on Political Science" [in Arabic], *YouTube* posted 6 December 2016. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCevcyfLBVI

quantum physics. The status of life and death could be re-shifted by intervention to cause a new particle movement, all related to the one wave of movements.[144]

In other words, quantum politics is an interventional tool, whether for keeping a conflict or finding a resolution, and difficult to predict in a natural chaos order unless with a superior intervention to either maintain or stop conflict. Thus it remains a natural order of political realism, "with different outcomes for different types of intervention, until a final intervention, incident or event is able to change the status quo."[145] Shueibi further argues that this type of complex political analysis produces frustrating and contradictory political predictions and non-predictions; however, it has become the dominant political thinking and practice in international relations. Saying that "we sleep on Newton's cushion, but the reality is in the Quantum limitlessness" he adds that:

> ... future events are no longer available to traditional or accustomed human common sense. For example, natural human senses cannot sense atomic particles, although they materially exist. Thus, epistemology as a theory of knowledge, especially regarding its methods, validity, and scope in the investigation of what distinguishes justified belief from opinion, will be to learn new knowledge. However, there are three political realities in this aspect: One, remain in the status quo. Two, replace the status quo. Three, collect both contradictions towards a new coexisting reality. Then we have the spill-over impact, leading to the Domino theory, where four conditions should exist: One, an endorsing national base quick to grasp the political event. Two, the place, time and conditions for the event to be at coinciding times. Three, enjoyment of a suitable rhythm or speed wave movement. Four, the local base in the state structure to be ready and capable of enforcing the change. As, for example, with the Arab Spring, where the presence of all those factors together, or their partial presence, produced the differing outcomes for this event in each country. Thus, when a Domino effect occurs on a certain occasion in a butterfly movement, it might produce an outcome outside the predicted traditional outcomes.[146]

2.6. Lebanese State Foreign Policy Theory: A Butterflying Quantum Order

There is a domino effect that is also broadly applicable to the Lebanese political reality, constantly faced with political deadlocks and ending with collecting all contradictions towards new co-existing realities. Nonetheless, Lebanon has remained trapped for almost a century in the status

---

[144] ibid.
[145] ibid.
[146] ibid.

quo of sectarian-exploited political chaos that dominates all economic, financial, security, legislative and juridical structures in the state. This situation has contributed to the domestic-external interventionist tools that seek domestic political re-socialisations while maintaining the sectarian political system to satisfy sectarian minority security pretexts. On the other hand, Lebanon still displays an active, unpredictable mode, as in its domestic security situation or defence security status quo, due mainly to foreign security threats or regional conflicts – whether with Israel or related to issues with the Syrian war. Yet again it remains dependent on the domestic-external sectarian or political affiliations of the sub-state forces, also relying on a suitable rhythm of events and conditions on all domestic, regional or international levels. Hence, structuring Lebanese foreign policy sees constant clashes between naturally-competing regional and global power struggles that still resemble the East and West Cold War era at the periphery. This results in scarce occasions of peace, order and stability in a continued status quo of regional conflicts and chaos.

Although foreign policy is authentically aimed at promoting good foreign relationships that emphasise tolerance, peace and co-existence, and reflect respect for the Other (even in simple diplomatic-related gestures of food and drink traditions) while also seeking to promote shared cultural and economic interests, as with politics, it has unfortunately witnessed a retreat in its ethics and objectives. In the process foreign policy has turned into a complex manipulative tool, in both practice and analysis, that can also promote armed intervention, economic sanctions, or political dominance. Consequently, Lebanese foreign policy experiences a traditional geopolitical dominating blind chaos effect (Shueibi); it is important to investigate this in order to grasp domestic, regional or international political events. It is like the butterfly movement, with its effects of change also dependent on corresponding domestic-external occasions or events, and on timely circumstances that might even produce an effect outside traditionally-predicted outcomes, especially at the level of sub-state forces. These could be interconnected with macro events in a quantum varying relationship, also significant in proportional measuring at all domestic, regional and international levels; since unpredictable micro-behaviours could have a great impact on the predicted macro domestic or foreign policy behaviours.

In other words, to attempt a better proportionally-based understanding of misconceptions as to what can, and cannot, be predicted in a state's domestic, regional or international Foreign Policy behaviours, a quantum theory approach could surpass restrictions on false misconceptions, knowledge, imaginations or realities. Quantum foreign policy suggests it is also important to examine all potentially inter-related evolutionary foreign policy theories, while simultaneously focusing on the internal-external dynamics and determinants of foreign policy strategies, impacted by micro-human behaviour (mainly security) influencing the macro-social construct. Researching a case study like Lebanon, or the entire Levant region, means reflecting on the complex interaction of its historical domestic-external geo-indigenous political, demographic, strategic, national, ideological, religious, cultural, social, economic, security, and altogether multi-dimensional determinant factors. This will lead mainly to a better proportional understanding of untruthful or complex faulty manipulative practices or analyses, or else to multiple known/unknown or predicted/unpredicted factors, events or forces. In Lebanon's case, this could help in investigating the role and influence of its sub-state powers (whether in helping, threatening or defending Lebanese foreign policy interests), while also taking regional multi-geodynamics into consideration.

2.6.1. A Foreign Policy Theory Connection

According to research-specific inquiries, at a given time and situation, a variable could change with the interaction of new outcomes; these could in turn become independent variables to future outcomes, depending on the dynamics of the domestic and external levels within each level, and then become the interactive dynamics across those levels.[147] This also ensures that shedding the focus of the different interactions of the state's social forces, domestically and with their external environments, is significant in influencing or even shaping foreign policy conduct. Hence, different societies interact differently domestically and with their external environments, but two main aspects 'skill revolution and organizational explosion', together could greatly shape foreign policy conduct of any country, yet the rise of the social media represents a third revolution.[148] Similarly, quantum foreign policy enhances this theoretical approach to the skill revolution,

---

[147] Smith, Hadfield and Dunne (2012), in the Foreword, p. v.

[148] Ibid (2012), p. x. Skill revolution consists of three main dimensions: the analytical, the emotional and the imaginative. The Organizational Explosion on the collective work effort to raising awareness in expressing common and shared goals, which could pick up momentum on all levels of society domestically or externally.

including AI technology and exceptional organizational or executional transformation, in association with the state's political and social forces, and approached through a pragmatic acknowledgement and assessment of a timeline of evolutionary processes, or else in regressive shifts in foreign policy behaviour both domestically and externally.

Examining such an evolutionary timeframe can also help in understanding the state and sub-state environments, or the full dimensions of the shifts away from traditional principles, tasks or behaviours towards foreign policy in a more complex world or global environments. This, in fact, remains relevant with Classic Foreign Policy Theory and the moves toward Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis, and assertive as to the psychological and social *milieu* of Foreign Policy decision-making. It is also pertinent here to the first evolutionary period of the study of Foreign Policy, and early contributions, for example, by Richard Snyder, Henry Bruck and Burton Sapin, who in 1954 adopted decision-making as a way of approaching the study of international politics and initiated an examination of the forces *below* the official nation-state level; and Harold and Margaret Sprout whose *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* (1956) investigated the 'psycho-milieu' of the foreign policy decision-making individuals and groups influenced by both international and operational environments as they were *perceived* and *interpreted* by policy decision-makers.[149]

Smith, Hadfield and Dunne also consider James Rosenau's method, as presented in Farrell's *Approaches in Comparative and International Politics* (1966) which looked at "pre-theories and theories of Foreign Policy" while encouraging actor-specific theory, inclusive to integrating information at all levels of analysis; and methodological explanation, inclusive to individual decision-makers.[150] Also relevant to the second evolutionary period in foreign policy research from the late 1980s to the present, is Theory Development in decision-making, inclusive to leader characteristics, and influenced by culture, identity, and social groups[151] Here, analysis of foreign policy behaviour also filters through its domestic dynamics, as for example in the case of Neo-conservatism, by examining the domestic source of American foreign policy during the period,

---

[149] ibid, pp. 13-14.
[150] ibid, p. 13.
[151] ibid, pp. 30-31.

occasions, and events at times of conservative power dominance in the US.[152] Indeed, this still reflects on an American foreign policy era with continued quantum impacts on the Middle East region, whether through the war on terrorism or multi-ideological support (corporate, political, ideological) for the state of Israel.

2.6.2. A Foreign Policy Modelling of Micro-Macro Interplay

Similarly, Quansheng Zhao stresses his assessment of micro-macro behaviours in his book on Chinese Foreign Policy (1966), combining the "shaping influence of international constraints (structure and system) and domestic determinants (society and institutions)" as policy inputs for explaining a country's foreign policy, and referencing Henry Kissinger's systematic assessment of the impact of domestic elements on foreign policy that "would have to treat factors such as historical tradition, social values and the economic system", especially in a more complex interdependence on, and overlapping of, national and international systems.[153] The micro-macro dichotomy is understood to convey a sense of relativism. What is macro at one level will be micro at another level. It is a multi-level activity in relation to the international world order, domestic institutions, and individual leaderships. Zhao, citing Ritzer (1990) remarks that "For general social science purposes, the micro level is defined as 'the empirical reality of the individual in everyday life', and the macro level refers to 'social reality or the social world'."[154]

Hence, individual or small groups of decision-makers are the essential elements at the micro level in terms of policy-making; accordingly the macro analysis focuses on the elements of international system or structure in relation to domestic social, individual and institutional aspects. In other words, "while international constraints and domestic determinants are involved in a dynamic relationship at the macro level...they also converge on, and receive feedback from, individual decision-makers.'[155] Thus, taking the micro-macro movements into account, it is essential to examine the mechanisms of this movement in order to understand or explore new concepts in explaining such movement. In further discussion of the micro-macro interplay, Zhao refers to

---

[152] ibid, pp. 308-322.
[153] Zhao, Quansheng (1996), *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 19.
[154] ibid, p. 23. (quoting George Ritzer, 1990: 348)
[155] ibid, pp. 23-24.

Bernhard Giesen's evolution-theoretical model (1987), which divides social reality (macro-structure) into three dimensions: "symbolic, practical, and material", with each category differentiated in terms of process, situation, and structure. The model, in tabulated form, shows how "the macro structure is manifest at the micro level."[156] Thus, Symbolic Reality in the Process is about the Rational interpretation of the situation; Practical Reality is about the Action in the situation; and Material Reality is about the Organic human behaviour.[157]

Hence, also in Lebanon, the micro-macro-structures are reflected in a symbolic macro-structure, yet with restrained practical and martial reality processes, dominated by domestic security and foreign domination realities. Since 1920 we have Greater Lebanon (WWI-French Mandate), 1943 Independence (WWII-compromised sovereign stability) to 1975 civil war (violence anarchy), then post-Ta'if (guardianship sovereignty stability) in 1990, and finally post-Hariri in 2005, and post-the various 'Arab Springs' in 2011 (challenged sovereignty instability, with regional wars, interventions or invasions in between). In summary, this resembles an institutional macro-structure from horizontal sectarianism to a continuously worsening vertical sectarianism; and a power/regime macro-structural change from independence and national reconciliation flexibility to civil war political-corporate cartel rigidity (corrupt institutional sectarian monopolies), postponing political reform amidst continued regional conflict rigidity.

2.7. Lebanon: A Comprehensive Theory of Violence Integrated with Geopolitics

Through examining its complex quantum orders, Lebanon might provide an excellent example of an institutional macro-structure, especially as it has seen domestic divisions and violence over many years, mainly over foreign conflicts. This partly results from the international community's failure to reach a final resolution of the Palestine issue, or to solve the Syrian crisis, ongoing since 2011; meanwhile the state of Israel constantly seeks a secure 'supremacy' regional order within a

---

[156] ibid, pp. 24-25. (quoting Bernhard Giesen, 1987: 348)
[157] ibid, p. 24. Table 2.3 Symbolic Reality in the Situation is the Symbolic core structure or relevant pattern of conceiving the situation. Practical Reality is the Practical core structure, valid rules and interests induced by social positions; and Material Reality is the Material core structure, material resources, and techniques available in the situation. Finally, Symbolic Reality in the Structure is the Worldviews or Morals of a given situation; Practical Reality is about the Valid institutions and structures of differentiation in a situation; and Material Reality concerns the Material resources, size of collectivity, techno-structure, etc

geopolitical and military strategy involving excessive use of violence against the 'other'. In terms of the legitimacy of violence, there is also a major macro violence issue involving the state's sovereignty. Writing on causes of violence, Randall Collins notes that the state itself, as famously defined by Weber, "is an organization that claims monopoly of legitimate violence over a territory… On the ultra-macro level, we need to integrate a theory of geopolitics – the centuries – spanning patterns of expansion and contraction in territories of states, including the question of when and why wars start."[158] Although the state theoretically possesses legitimacy over violence, social movements within the state can still engage in violence and contribute to defending the state against external threats, or the collapse of the state engaging in domestic conflict. As Collins further notes:

> Such movements resort to violence, and what kind and degree, remains to be theorized, especially when the state is penetrated, which also has an effect on macro-trends of domestic corruption, crime, or violence. A general theory of violence will surely not only take the micro form, embodied in simple statements such as 'poverty and discrimination cause violence;' 'discipline leads to rebellion;' or 'frustration causes aggression.' Any general theory must include nested levels of macro and micro conditions. And it must incorporate, on the micro-interactional level, the barrier of *ct/f* and situational configurations [that] cause this to be circumvented.[159]

This reality, compatible with the Lebanese situation, fits with an ultra-micro and ultra-macro analysis (taking into account its historic geopolitical territorial entity or identity) of centuries of domestic and regional security patterns, dominated by an ultra-macro hegemony of power and violence. At the ultra-micro level, although the corporate business or religious institutions would influence the political conduct in the state, in reality the sectarian political powers in Lebanon are dominated by secular neo-feudal leaderships, who exploit the religious institutions or the geo-sectarian violence in the state, thereby jeopardizing even the state's national sovereignty at all levels of governance, whether towards domestic social security issues or even towards the macro foreign security threats or interventions.

---

[158] Randall Collins (2009), "Micro and Macro Causes of Violence", *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol. 3.1, pp. 9-22.
[159] ibid.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) explained the modern state as a functional concept associated with the "social contract", which he believed provided the tools of production among a shared communal property working for the public benefit (where the whole society become the guarantor, with a unified power to protect lives under justice to individual humans).[160] It also related to the individual nature of the concept of human security versus the relinquishing of boundless social or individual freedoms (where the transparent state was expected to be the fair arbiter, ensuring individual securities and liberties within its protected borders). Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan*, imagined these borders as the skin (most sensitive to external harm) of a nation's body, with the state's institutions being its organs; yet the border serves to draw clearly an inside and an outside, distinguishing between insiders and outsiders, channelling, regulating and controlling their exchanges.[161]

The skin serves to protect the state from foreign dangers coming from outside while also preserving and protecting the inside, rather than ending with domestic violence and murder or incitement for continued acts of revenge and rivalry. Thus, the state should dominate the public right to the legitimacy of violence – also legally acknowledged internationally – whether towards domestic security or foreign security threats endangering state sovereignty. Yet in the absence of the "social contract", in a state of 'no State', the sub-state forces would initiate the right to or legitimacy of the use of violence, especially at times of foreign aggressions, a reality that is important in assessing foreign policy determinants during times of conflict, war or dangers. In this respect, Collins refers to what Winston Churchill said after World War II: "We may be at the end of the beginning", with a comprehensive theory of violence in all its forms.[162]

2.7.1. A Critical Security Studies Theoretical Approach

There is thus a quantum dimensional Realism to both theory and ground reality, as assessed by people's long-term causality for state security or political stability, an obligation of the state's centric role that is threatened in a region of conflict. In their Critical Security Studies assessment

---

[160] Abdel Azam Saqf Al Hait (2009), "The Notable Offender", *Radical Justice*, 23 April 2009. Online at http://www.radicaljustice.net/1123973/1-مقالات-the-notable-offender.html accessed April 2015.
[161] Hastings Donnan and Dieter Haller, eds. (2000), "Borders and Borderlands: An Anthropological Perspective", *Journal of European Ethnology* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press), Vol. 30.2 p. 59.
[162] Randall Collins, op,cit, p. 21.

of the legitimacy of violence in terms of war and conflict, especially in international law or overall international relations (being influenced by public misconceptions in assessing equal legal justice), Abboud and Muller quote Stephen Chan who, after completing a second MA in War Studies, spoke about learning quickly that "when you have no experience of blood and death, shut the fuck up."[163] Yet, beyond the blood and death, there is also violence that causes social injustice, financial and economic instability, and affects the majority of individuals in society who find themselves facing a struggle for survival and dignified living. Confronting socio-economic stress or oppression within a multi-dimensional human reactionary causes confused identity behaviour, starting with denial, submission, neutrality, division, and foreign collaboration in an unacknowledged or denied oppression. Or there is civil resistance, which could become the supporting ground roots for conflict resolution, protective of a "social contract" honouring an equality in human blood sacrifices – or end up in domestic conflict.

This is further obstructed by an international intervention complexity, based on an anarchy in international law, over approaching modern state sovereignty concepts, and particularly influenced by the drafting of legal processes to conduct war, peace, economic or trade laws and agreements which, as Abboud and Muller discuss, became particularly significant after the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia. This ended the religiously-oriented domestic European wars between 1618 and 1648, when international relations in Europe were no longer governed by the normative and moral commitments of the religious authority.[164] Yet this authority remained for the foreign policy exploitation of Western colonial invasions, and as Abboud and Muller note, even before Westphalia there were questions of just wars or dominion over native lands, "where the legal right to control and own land was encountered in the course of new European conquests in some sort of alternative legal rationale; thus rather than being compelled by European public law, a normative European consensus on natural law governed relations with the 'other'."[165] After Westphalia, a new order in world politics was to be governed by the doctrine of sovereignty that enabled states to have absolute domestic power and control of their own domestic territorial affairs

---

[163] Abboud and Muller (2012), op.cit., p. 86. See also Stephen Chan (2011), "Accidental scholarship and the Myth of Objectivity", in Naeem Inayatullah, ed., *Autobiographical International Relations*: I, IR (London: Routledge), p.15.

[164] Abboud and Muller (2012), *Rethinking Hezbollah* op.cit., p. 107.

[165] ibid.

and territories. This entailed pursuit of "a rationally-motivated diplomacy between states that was not governed by historical, religiously-dominated, human, moral and ethical commitments."[166]

Yet, colonial and imperial expansion continued, and resulted in the emerging European international societies requiring some sort of code of behaviour to govern these interactions,[167] but only giving birth to what was described as a "bastard child of Europe's imperial and colonial adventures, to an international law authorized by sovereignty; and only those who could lay such claim to total and complete sovereignty underwrote the violent rule of 'others' that has come to be known as colonialism".[168] Moving beyond the moral commitment of international law Abboud and Muller argue that:

> …although natural law forms an important foundation for international law, the historical emergence of modern international law was required to move beyond the moral commitments of natural law, which were becoming a less legitimate core of international relations in the mid-seventeenth century, as European public law began to emerge as the foundation of modern international law (*jus gentium*). Yet in the context of empire and colonial expansion, natural law was relatively sufficient in terms of imposing an order on the natives who were encountered, rationalizing the sort of power differential that always placed the colonizer in the preeminent position.[169]

2.8. An Exploited "Social Contract" in International Law and IR Analysis

It is important to investigate Lebanese foreign policy in the context of Middle East history in International Relations. An aim of this thesis is to attempt a multi-dimensional creativity initiative approach, focused on the role of the indigenous sub-state communal forces and their influence in the statehood struggle for security on all domestic, regional and international levels of political or socioeconomic development orders. Thus, the history of Classical Realism theory in International Relations (IR) is associated with thinkers such as Thucydides (fifth century BC) and Machiavelli (early sixteenth century), whose ideas and concepts were developed later by Carl von Clausewitz and Hans Morgenthau during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively. These latter-day adherents believed that the goal, the means, and the uses of power were central preoccupations of

---

[166] ibid.
[167] ibid, p. 105 (citing Anghie 2007, Keene 2002, Grovogui 1996)
[168] ibid.
[169] ibid, p. 106.

international relations, which was an arena of continuous rivalry and potential or actual conflict between states that were obliged to pursue the goals of security and survival.[170]

This outline clearly maps onto the ancient political history of Lebanon and the Levant region, which possessed a strong normative doctrine dictated by a history of power struggles in international relations while at the same time largely ignoring moral and ethical human considerations, mainly towards minority indigenous populations exploited under split tribal, social, ethnical, religious or sectarian orders. Thus, in the era after the Westphalian sovereign state, foreign and international relations behaviours of Western states – as became reflected even in twentieth century Structural Realism or Neo-Realism theories – promoted the idea that human nature (especially outside the economic context) had little to do with power struggles between states seeking power dominance and protection, even through the application of force and violence.

This ignores the cultural aspect or the human differences, skills, inspirations, imaginations, abilities and capabilities that are represented in the sub-state forces or institutions which operate the state through civil, social, public, civic or political participation and representation; these can be ascribed to a natural political international relations conduct. However, the IR school of Liberalism, which began to advance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries came during a period of public revolutions that challenged the nobility along with inherited inequality.[171]   It emphasised the concept of the promotion of the 'liberal states system', which protected individual liberty, provided political and economic opportunity, and brought peace and prosperity based on collaboration and cooperation. But it still developed liberal rapports from a realist perspective; thus seventeenth century realism, such as that of Thomas Hobbes on the notion of conflicts among sovereign states, ensured great potential for human progress in a modern civil society and capitalist economy, even though both of these can flourish only through the realist international order of state relationships. Upon encountering the occasional lack of cooperation in liberal states, the school of Neoliberalism came to repudiate idealism; yet Neo-Realism, like Classical Realism or

---

[170] Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (2010), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 59.
[171] Eric Shiraev (2014), *International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 80–87.

Liberalism, was also primarily to emphasise the role of the centrist state in which cooperation can still emerge through the cultivation of mutual trust and interests, and is guaranteed by new knowledge and scientific research.[172] However, it remained open to economic exploitation.

Marxism, on the other hand, consistently warned economic liberals that an economy could also be used as a site for human exploitation through class and political inequality, and would come to operate in accordance with independent laws that were prior to, or separate from, the collective public interest – accordingly, economy could become a tool of politics, ending in bourgeois capitalist profit derived from labour exploitation. There was a clear distinction between the 'international' profile of colonialism and the ethnical and normative concepts that applied in the 'domestic' (e.g. European) sphere, nut were not necessarily applicable, or agreed upon, in other spheres. Regarding individual or social rights in Europe, Ayubi, in *Overstating the Arab State*, cites Hamid Rabi' who maintained that the 'nation-state', in its European form, was largely a reaction to the Catholic model that privileged the rights of the individual with the aim of inheriting "its direct unmediated relationship between the citizen and the state, forcing the Church to retire into its own cocoon, and thus expelling all non-political agencies from the relationship and ending up by adulating the state in the name of individual rights."[173] In other words, the adoption of the independent Church's duties was key to marginalising not only its traditional political powers and influence, but also its ethical or spiritual influence.

2.8.1. A Traditionally Constructivist and Colonial Regional Order

Likewise, for Islam in relation to the Arab state, as Ibn Khaldun suggests, and Rabi' also emphasises, and despite the evident reality of the isolationist political '*asabiyya* (group solidarity-sectarianism/tribalism) exploitations towards individual rights, the ethics of Islam still maintained a macro Arab cultural and civilizational diversity, rooted in the basis of Muslim equal human tolerance that was suitable for political interplay.[174] Resembling the German model of political

---

[172] Dunne, Kurki and Smith (2010), op.cit., p. 96.

[173] Nazih Ayubi (1995), *Overstating the Arab State* op.cit., (citing Hamid Rabi', *Suluk al-malik fi tadbir al-mamlik...*Vol.1, Cairo, 1980, pp. 15-16).

[174] Ibid, pp138-139. Arab secular-nationalists excluded the universal state concepts of Lessing, Kant, Hegel and others, attracted more by the notion of the 'Volk' as defined by German Romanticisim [citing Bassam Tibi, 1981: 91-93]. A major example of such an intellectual transformation is Sati' Al-Husari (1882-1968), who proposed the linguistic and cultural terms for nationalism. "He fused the German concept of the nation with the Arabic concept of

thought, individual identity is defined through cultural heritage ("[s]elf-recognition cannot spring up except from the past").[175] Yet, this also emphasises that Islam possesses its own "political vitality" unless it becomes overshadowed by sectarian supremacy and diminishes individual rights in favour of the sectarian group. Comparably, Ayubi adds, Rabiʻ considers that Western political realism or liberalism had, as early as the French Revolution, released political forces and realised the concept of national politics – but at the same time, in his view, this also sowed the seeds for racialism and national chauvinism while draining political vocation of any civilizational essence.'[176]

Thus, Rabiʻ calls for a "politically driven revival of the *turath* [heritage]" in the Arab state and even attributes the success of contemporary political Zionism "to its having been inspired by the historical German school on the one hand, and by Abbasid and Fatimid Islamic literature on *daʻwa* on the other."[177] He clarifies this, noting that: "[T]he Zionist call has been able to find, via the Islamic *turath*, a starting point from which to address the World of the twentieth century… and to achieve… success that could not have been anticipated by the most optimistic of analysts."[178] However, the Arab state shifted away from the ethics of equal social or individual justice reflected in the Islamic *turath*, as also occurred similarly with the Muslim Caliphate rule after the Umayyads. Power rule remained hostage to an isolationist political *ʻasabiyya* solidarity power rule, dominated by the "sectarian chosen people" rule, exploiting the principle of human ethics in religion. It was a historical era that could be described through Constructivism, which emerged in the late twentieth century in order to contribute a cultural identity-based component to IR theory; and emerging with the intention of emphasising the social, as opposed to material, aspect of international relations. It focused on social behaviour or policies impacting ruler-society relationships as, for example, attempts in the quest for local sovereignty which became particularly pronounced after the European shift towards the concept of the sovereign state.

'group solidarity' (*ʻasabiyya*) which he derived from Ibn Khaldun, and proceeded to develop his own 'pure' theory of nationalism" [Tibi, 1981: 1000-115]".
[175] Ayubi (1995), ibid., p. 17 (citing Hamid Rabiʻ, 1980, p. 218)
[176] ibid., p. 19. (citing Hamid Rabiʻ, *Suluk al-malik fi tadbir al-mamalik...*vol.2, Cairo, 1983, pp. 268-93, 288)
[177] ibid. [citing Hamid Rabiʻ, 1980, pp.192-5]
[178] ibid.

Constructivists argue that social reality is neither objective nor external for the observer of international affairs. This has been traditionally evident at the Middle East regional level, usually dominated by monarchy or one-party state rule. Yet the role of sectarianism remains very dominant, as can be seen when examining the case of Lebanon. Constructivism was, thereby, extended through imperial and colonial (sovereignty breach) expansions to other people and nations, thereby presaging the dominant macro-Realist approach in IR theory. Since the rise of European imperial and colonial state rule this has promoted a norm to the legal domination of new states by conquering lands and placing indigenous inhabitants under a new colonial rule that replaced the traditional lives of authentic nations. The domination of the state was the best way to secure financial, economic or energy resources, without establishing the local European civil and civic state model as a "social contract" to include the indigenous inhabitants, beyond race or sect, or to remain under the dominance of tyrant monarchy and dictatorship 'asabiyya power rule. As Postcolonial IR theory emphasises, the central issue relates to the construction of legitimacy that lends a further impetus to powerful state domination that is exerted over those who remain marginalized by dominant theories of IR theory. Yet it also maintains the debate over the legitimacy of the use of power and violence, especially in conflict resolution, disregarding the role of an indigenous "social contract" towards sovereign self-determination realism.

2.9. Lebanon in Modern IR Theory: Literature Debate

In a region dominated by a history of colonialism, wars, instability and violence, the theoretical and academic perception of International Relations or foreign policy theory could probably become more compatible in assessing the 'alternative' sub-state or non-state role in the causes of violence or the initiatives for peace at the state level. This goes beyond the key classical and theoretical positions in traditional theory – mainly realism, liberalism and their neo-variants, alongside Marxism. In other words, it is very important to try to investigate the political and security leanings in a region like the Middle East, or specifically in Lebanon, whether in assessing the traditional or in seeking the new positivist theoretical approach of empirically-justifiable scientific figures and data accuracy justifications, used as the principal counter-argument in the rationalist-reflectivist IR theories debate. It is important to overcome the conservative approach of not accepting the notion of changing perspectives, proposed through other theoretical debates;

whether regarding economic figures or official democratic political data, where the identity dimension remains marginalized.

In her assessment of Lebanese foreign policy Henrietta Wilkins argues that "that systemic theories, such as Waltz's neorealism (1979) and Wendt's social constructivism (1992) are unable to fully explain Lebanon's international political behaviour because they focus on factors at the systemic level and ignore those at the state and sub-state levels."[179] She suggests that while Waltz pursues a Neorealist IR theory approach towards understanding states' behaviours – arguing that they focus strictly on 'maximizing security' in their international behaviours of power distribution – this theory falls short of accounting for domestic power-sharing factors or identity variables at the state level, and also in understanding states' foreign policy behaviours.[180]

The case with Wendt's Social Constructivism IR theory is the same, although it does consider the domestic state identity variables, mainly 'cultural anarchy' interactions, within the international system. "However, Wendt ignores factors at the unit-level (state-level) that do not fit into his understanding of the enemies, rivals, friends, categories."[181] Conversely, Wilkins concludes that the common theory restriction by both Wendt and Waltz, promotes the assumption that states are strictly rational and unitary actors, without fully accounting for the extended role of sub-state factors.[182] Yet, it remains significant to approach both theories, since Constructivism could still tackle identity issues in the Middle East state, and Neorealism could still help understanding the current systematic determinants in international relations. Like also the Neoliberalist approach, which is relevant in understanding the global economic hegemony issue. All could be relevant in assessing the historical realism of power hegemony practicalities at all domestic, regional and international levels. Like also in understanding the acceptance – systematic international legitimacy – to "maximized security" acts by the centric state, especially at times of war, security interventions or aggressions, while disregarding the harm towards the security of the sub-state communal basis.

---

[179] Henrietta C. Wilkins, (2011), "The Making of Lebanese Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 15.
[180] ibid, pp. 6-11.
[181] ibid, p. 11.
[182] ibid, p. 8.

In the case of Lebanon, Wilkins argues that sub-state identities are important factors in the state, and should be examined, whether as defending the state (as in the case of Hezbollah's deterrent power towards Israel during the 2006 War); or as weakening the Lebanese state while all other sub-state forces were maintaining political disputes even in time of war,[183] under foreign regional and international hegemony influence or interventions. Referring to Hinnebusch, Wilkins also notes that the Arab states belong to an internationally-exploited region, with a global economy and political system that dominate the state under an international system of domination and dependency.[184] Yet, indigenous resistance to this hegemonic order with the intention of supporting state sovereignty is, in this context, a very important consideration. It is also important to register the domestic forces that are in power, or outside power, and able to promote state sovereignty trade-offs to serve client interests within and outside the state.

2.9.1. A Contrapuntal International Relations Theory

The familiar dilemma regarding the subject of state sovereignty affecting political or economic sovereignty at the domestic level continues. In this regard, Wilkins refers to Hinnebusch's argument, noting that the Middle East region is currently "as penetrated as it was during colonial times."[185] She adds, however, that Halliday offers an important qualification by explaining that "although Western powers have economically and politically penetrated the region, they have never managed to control ideas and social forces within it"[186] and have still had to face up to the domestic multi-diverse indigenous complexities of sub-state and supra-state identity conflicts, as well as to "the misfit between identity and sovereignty, nation and that state" which brought about the penetrated nature of the region.[187] Accordingly, Wilkins proposes Pluralism – which Willetts defines as "the theoretical approach that considers all organised groups as being potential political actors and analyses the processes by which actors mobilise support to achieve policy goals."[188] Thus, the focus is shifted back to the role of indigenous sub-state communal powers, whether in resisting or submitting to domestic or foreign interests and pressures.

---

[183] ibid, p. 34
[184] ibid, pp. 16-17: citing Raymond Hinnebusch (2003), *The International Politics of the Middle East* (Manchester University Press), p.35
[185] Wilkins, Henrietta C. (2011), p. 15, (quoting Hinnebusch, 2002: 3).
[186] ibid. (quoting Halliday, 2005: 70-71).
[187] ibid, p. 16. (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 2002: 29); Fawcett, Louise (2013), *International Relations of the Middle East* (Oxford University Press); Hinnebusch, and Ehteshami (2002, esp. Ch. 11).
[188] ibid, p. 33. (Willetts, 1998: 289)

Abboud and Muller are consistent in tackling the penetrated nature of the region by referring to Edward Said in articulating the issue of the International Relations (IR) theory dynamic, and suggesting a "contrapuntal" IR theory approach. They suggest that "this takes us towards more productive engagements with alleged 'misfit' actors such as Hezbollah, and their claims to authority and legitimacy, and often-complex questions of violence."[189] Alternatively it shows how to rethink "the extent to which international Relations (IR) theory has constituted the limited conceptualizations of legitimacy, authority and violence."[190] The authors also refer to an article on the work of Edward Said and his contributions to IR by Geeta Chowdhry: she contends that Contrapuntal IR theory will enable "the articulation of exiled voices into IR". Hence, they argue, this fits the case of Hezbollah, which "articulates its identity as a marginalized indigenous – pro and sub state – 'resistance society'."[191] Abboud and Muller also refer to Latha Varadarajan who (quoting Edkins and Vaughan-Williams) discusses Said's point on resistance: "… in the special context of orientalism, this resistance could take the form of knowing the orient outside of the discourse of orientalism, and presenting this knowledge to Orientalists."[192] They suggest that similarly, Hezbollah finds itself among a series of 'others' in IR, as does a wide range of actors

> who, due to the extent to which they threaten the state's monopoly of violence, are cast to one side as 'problematic' in so far as they shake up IR's staid story of world politics, reifying the existing power relations within it. To put it another way, Said asserts that the internal consistencies upon which the orientalist account rested, for example, was itself a political production that reinforced existing power relations, identities, and so on.[193]

2.9.2. Tuning in with Critical Security Studies (CSS)

Abboud and Muller argue that such a situation, which comes in tones familiar in Critical Security Studies (CSS) and is related to the subjective construction of threat and danger towards the 'others', "…not only speaks to the static nature of IR theory, but the intense commitment to staid notions of political authority, legitimacy and violence that present the western model of strong

---

[189] ibid, p. 86.
[190] Abboud and Muller (2012), op.cit., p. 1.
[191] ibid p. 87. (quoting Geeta Chowdhry 2007, on "Edward Said and Contrapuntal Reading…", p. 103).
[192] ibid, p. 87 (quoting Latha Varadarajan, 2009)
[193] ibid. p. 89. (quoting Edward Said 1995, *Orientalism*. New York Vintage Books).

state sovereignty as the only possible and desirable option."[194] They also propose CSS as another element of 'denaturalized' conventional IR, since CSS literature also relates "to the extent to which the concept of security is itself."[195] This, for instance, is how and why

> … Hezbollah is defined as a global threat, danger, and terrorist actor without legitimacy from the outside, while it is a provider of social and public goods, resistance identity, and a legitimate voice at the table of governance on the inside; [it] is an account of the political reality for which the distorted articulations of authority, legitimacy, and violence forwarded by much of IR theory [are] as relevant as the material realities of Hezbollah's domestic political status.[196]

Thus, Abboud and Muller argue that it also resembles the way that IR theory

> is responsible for constituting and maintaining the dual moral standard which allows liberal democratic states to act in altogether 'unbecoming' ways on the international stage – whether through the misuse of various banned weapons, use of torture techniques, or even catastrophic bombing campaigns – while the vital and complex ways in which CSS outlines the construction and definition of threats, dangers, and (in)security, highlights how it is possible to nullify the agency of a political actor, with legitimacy and political authority domestically, *vis-à-vis* the international community and its representative organizations.[197]

As such they suggest an alternative (pluralist) theory that puts the focus on Critical Security Studies (CSS) or Edward Said's "Contrapuntal IR" theory, and provides more in-depth understanding of the people who are affected or marginalized by the state. This, they argue, is mainly in the case of Lebanon, which is grounded in truncated histories that esteem fixity and homogeneity, and question the experience of colonialism: they tend "to be enabling to certain powers and systematically disabling to others, not simply failing to capture diverse forms of legitimacy and authority in global politics, but to limit political possibility for alternative articulations of power.'[198]

2.9.3. A Pluralist Investigation into Modern IR Theory

In other words, as Wilkins also argues, there is no one particular IR theory that can necessarily cater to all the indigenous dimensional factors, especially in states such as Lebanon, faced by

---

[194] ibid, pp. 88-91.
[195] ibid, p. 88.
[196] ibid.
[197] ibid.
[198] Abboud and Muller (2012), op.cit., p. 127.

challenges of weakness. For example, Post-Structuralism is critical to Neo-realism in reflecting a double standards dichotomy in representing or explaining the world, with a one-sided focus on a viewpoint that is biased towards the powerful Northern states and is therefore less focused on common human struggles, such as gender equality, poverty, and civil society protest or resistance movements that face systemic issues of exploitation, subordination or environmental degradation and that lack any deep insightful identification or analysis. This is a reality for which Feminism advocates in IR theory, by criticizing the continued disadvantaged human groupings, such as a majority of women and their status in the world in both material and value terms, but falling short of tackling the issue of the "social contract" that contain all those human groupings. This is especially the case in a region of conflict, where women and children encounter huge harm. Environmental issues advocated for by Green Theory promoters in IR are also included, warning of the threatening impacts on public health or overall living conditions, whether for humans, animals, or plants.

Yet the primary focus corporate of energy firms is directed towards accumulating power and wealth with continued environmental exploitations remote from determined global accountability measures. Ironically, when the world was celebrating the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2015, seeking to reduce global pollution, Lebanon was marking the beginning of a renewed garbage crisis, while environmental and water pollution issues in Lebanon were escalating, as was evident in the Litani river pollution crisis or mountain excavations, not to mention war contamination that resulted from the occasional use of internationally-prohibited weapons (such as the extensive use of cluster bombs by Israel in 2006). All of this had long-term negative impacts harmful to public health, and it is clear that the pretexts for international political intervention in Lebanon or the region, marginalized any acknowledgment or condemnation of crisis conditions surrounding exploited environmental or public health rights.

Correspondingly, that Post-Colonialism theory adopts a post-structural attitude in understanding further dimensional analysis of the continued negative impacts on Western- or US-inherited European colonial interests, also fits the case of Lebanon and its regional surroundings. This is mainly reflected in the traditional issues of underdevelopment, and still impacts upon socio-economic and political reform or sovereignty efforts under a global neo-colonial order of power

hegemony dominance. This is evident in the continued structured misconceptions or constructive classifications of the strong civilized and developed world (North or West), versus a permanently regressive, savage and underdeveloped world (South or East), perceived as dependent on an advanced leadership as is still demonstrated in the issue of Palestine. Although the sovereign order, following two World Wars, proved to be the only possible order for world politics, promoting self-determination, freedom of expression, free trade and international integration, the issue remained in the ethical pretexts for intervention, or the eras of 'New World Order' shifting from one that was European to one that was American-dominated.[199] This latter included US international support in providing political legitimacy to 'misfit' acts by its friends or allies, and political illegitimacy to their enemies, as has been evident in the Middle East region. This is relative to Critical Theory as advanced by the Frankfurt School, which presents a post-positivist Marxist-influenced approach to IR by rejecting the three basic postulates of positivism: an objective external reality; the subject/object distinction; and value-free social science.

Here, the focus is on the fundamental political nature of knowledge, that seeks to liberate humanity from the traditionally oppressive, realist conservative forces of the structures of (US-dominated) global hegemonic politics and economics, and instead promotes idealistic views that support progressive change while helping to bring about such change. Likewise, Normative International Relations Theory, being based in drawing on a combination of political theory, moral philosophy, and IR, openly raises and addresses ethical questions related to human values in international politics, though possibly not, in terms of suggested political neutrality, for Lebanon in a conflict region. The theory more or less fails to tackle the question of ethics in regional conflict, instability or violence, while its focus on the dominant sovereign role of the state is incompatible in the Lebanese case. There is also the English School, whose contributors seek to promote the concept of an international society, emphasized through states interacting with each other. Yet this also requires stability and security, missing in the region and right across the Lebanese borders.

2.10. A Hybrid Quantum Realism

---

[199] Abboud & Muller (2012), op.cit., p. 106.

This leads back to Hinnebusch's theoretical reflections on 'Complex Realism', especially following the Arab Spring, based on the quintessential realism of Middle Eastern policy-makers who are paranoid about security threats to the region in its position at the "epicentre of world crisis, chronically war-prone and the site of the world's most protracted conflicts."[200] This reflects on Lebanon's regional historical geo-political, geo-economic, geo-cultural or geo-demographic realist complexities, where anarchy and insecurity remain as the major features of state systems. It generates power struggles for power dominance that impact upon the state's domestic or foreign policies to counter security or political threats, while also emphasising authority by giving priority to sovereignty and territorial integrity, and balancing this with international politics or interstate relations of war, peace, disengagement, neutrality, submission, or the influence of regional power alliances.[201] Thus, given the timeline of the geo-political historic civilizational roots in the region, a Quantum Realism IR theory approach endorses a pluralist theory investigation – especially in situations of "complex realism" in domestic, regional and international relationships impacted by conflict, war, violence, chaos and hegemony.

Hence, it could probably provide further reflections in assessing the historic timeline to the multi-situations of relevant conflict events and occurrences. And it could be helpful in attempting to investigate the political patterns and dynamics of unpredicted or predicted chaos and order occasions in a state like Lebanon, or the Middle East region. In this particular research it would focus on the issue of the security of indigenous sub-state forces; yet approaching this through the influence of sectarian or '*asabiyya* power rule dominance in Lebanon or the region, mainly through observing historic sovereignty and power rule struggles still shaping current conflict or security situations. As Fregonese observes, it would also include international relations and foreign policy behaviours, while focusing on the complex relationships of dissolved boundaries between the categories of state and nonstate actors in hybrid sovereignty situations. She concludes that in the case of Lebanon:

> an exclusive focus on Lebanon's weakness with respect to a vision of sovereignty as either state-led or absent overlooks a series of other sovereignty enactments – which I have called 'hybrid sovereignties' – and as a consequence fails to inform an international stance on Lebanon that is productive and potentially conducive to peace… I have considered here a series of hybrid geographies where state and nonstate act in interconnected ways, and

---

[200] Hinnebusch (2015), *International Politics of the Middle East*, op.cit.
[201] ibid.

[have] looked at how they do so amidst specific built environments. These hybrid geographies transcend the accepted binaries that mark realist views of sovereignty: state/nonstate, legitimate/illegitimate, order/chaos, national/urban, domestic/ foreigner.[202]

Fregonese elaborates on hybrid sovereignty in relation to Lebanon, and also speaks about Hezbollah – regardless of it being described as a terrorist or resistance organization, commenting that hybrid sovereignty was not the sole prerogative of Hezbollah since government parties also used armed militias to maintain control of territory, and armed private security contractors were by no means politically neutral: "At different moments both in the civil war and in the clashes of May 2008 the government, army, militias, private security contractors, and, indeed, foreign states cooperated and counteracted the sovereign practices of the others."[203]

In other words, it is very important to grasp the domestic factors, forces or events in relation to domestic-external patterns and dynamics in assessing state political or foreign policy behaviour. Reaching beyond the traditional concepts of proxy-ascribed relationships might sometimes be misleading, but indeed still acknowledges the fact that foreign political and armed interventions, under the pretext of regional security or international peace efforts, have always been major decisive factors amidst Lebanese state weaknesses – under occasional pressures on its domestic or foreign policy choices. Yet a major factor in this dilemma has added to the issue of power rule, contributing to domestic security dilemmas and to physical, mind, emotional or spiritual human insecurities, whether at individual and group sub-state level or state level. Assessing the complex historic issues of power rule, especially in relation to the influence of Islam, or other religiously-inspired conflicts, in an ancient region like the Middle East, is a challenging dilemma.

2.11. The Issue of Arab 'Asabiyya: A Misconception of Power Rule and Authority

Such issues could be best understood in Ibn Khaldun's articulation of the cycle of the rise and death of power rule, or of civilizations (lasting about 100-120 years), since he also lived at the epicentre of a region impacted by historic chaos, where the rise of any civilisation possessed its own domestic and external historic factors. However, in the case of the Arab world, Islam was to

---

[202] Sara Fregonese (2012), "Beyond the 'weak state': hybrid sovereignties in Beirut", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (pub. *SAGE Journals*), June 2012., pp. 15-16.
[203] Fregonese, ibid.

remain a key influence, since power rule misconceptions were reflected from the early surrender to the empire's state monarchy, sectarian, or tribal authoritarian rule – based on a sectarian *'asabiyya* (elite group solidarity) that finally died out to be replaced by another similar cycle of a different shape of *'asabiyya* power rule. Ibn Khaldun argues that this dated back to Umayyad rule in 680 A.D., marked by the opposition of the Prophet's Family, mainly of his grandson Hussein who refused to acknowledge this transition to power rule, yet ended with their massacre, thus also marking a return to the pre-Islamic Arab tribal 'asabiyya power dominance conflicts that became exploitative of Islam.

This makes the relationship between Islam and *'asabiyya*/sectarianism a significant variable in Khaldunian thinking about, or cyclical theory of, the ethical, cultural, traditional or political behaviours of Arab *'asabiyya* (racism/tribalism/sectarianism).[204] In his *A History of the Arab Peoples,* Albert Hourani examines the persistent issue of *'asabiyya* in the modern Arab World, and particularly its role in contributing to an understanding of the concept of the state that remains distant from actual practice or obligations towards public citizenship. He argues that this has been attributed to *'asabiyya* being "a corporate spirit oriented towards obtaining and keeping power", where the rule of authority is based on isolated group cohesion with kinship, tribal or sectarian ties that develop human and class social network structures and relationships above the state level, while being overshadowed by a primitive human consciousness.[205] Hourani maintains that this promotes tyrannical rule, clientelism and corruption, and eventually culminates in the destruction of both the ruler and the state – furthermore he contends that, as argued by Ibn Khaldun, it is the primary seed of decline for all states in a cyclical renewal process.[206]

Ibn Khaldoun reached his conclusions on the cycle of death and rise to power rule by comparing the history of Western Arabia in Northern Africa, and Andalusia in South-west Europe. Bruce Lawrence, introducing a new edition of *Al-Muqaddimah*, noted that Ibn Khaldun observed such a

---

[204] Abdel Halim Quwais (2013),"Khaldounian Thinking on *'asabiyya* [Sectarianism or Group-Prejudice] and Arabism", *Alukah Magazine*, 30 July 2013 [in Arabic], online at www.alukah.net/culture/0/58181
(quoting Mohammad Abed al-Gabri (1982), *'Asabiyya and the State: A Reflection on Khaldounian Theory in Islamic History* [in Arabic]**,** Beirut: Dar al-Talia, p. 13).
[205] Malise Ruthven (2002), "New Afterword" in Albert Hourani (1991), *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), p. 462.
[206] ibid.

cycle based on his autobiography and his extensive travels and interactions, in which his own life, with its Tunisian roots, was placed squarely at the intersection between East and West.[207] From his beginnings up to the last decade of his life and his meeting with Tamerlane in 1401, the work of Ibn Khaldun places him at the centre of political activities in his time, and also emphasises the significance of geographical/historical ground factors (both land and people) in assessing political events and their consequences.[208]

Observing personal influences, environments, knowledge, and relations between Arab and non-Arab Muslims across what became divided Caliphate monarchy power rules in Andalusia (southern Spain) or the North African and West Asian Arab and non-Arab spheres, Ibn Khaldun perceived that non-Arab Muslims (Berbers) played a significant role in the spread of Muslim civilisation and its attainment of great knowledge; meanwhile the Arabs were mostly concerned with personal revenge, power and prejudice, and also sought out foreign collaborations with European monarchies to defeat their domestic Arab or Muslim rivals.[209] Thus, the promotion of sectarian extremism led to growing domestic conflicts, and an increasing distance from the teachings of Islam, and the dominance of *'asabiyya* in Arab ruling practices. Occasionally such extremism also acted above the non-Muslim Arabs,[210] despite the latter being People of the Book (*ahl al-kitab*), and therefore eligible for equal citizenship – rights that had been acknowledged since the Prophet's first city-state rule of Medina (*Yathrib*).

---

[207] Lawrence observes that: "[W]hat distinguished Ibn Khaldûn was neither his Arab lineage nor his linkage to Berbers via marriage but his Mediterranean location. At the intersection of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim influences, heir to Greek science and Arabic poetry, and connected by trade and history to Asia, the Mediterranean Sea had become the nexus of Muslim cosmopolitanism by the fourteenth century. Social mobility as well as physical travel animated Mediterranean Muslims, especially those, like Ibn Khaldûn, who rose to high posts in government, law, and education." See Bruce B. Lawrence (2005), "The Introduction to the 2005 Edition" [of Ibn Khaldun's *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History* c.1377] (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press): publisher's PDF, p. vii.
[208] ibid, pp. vii-viii (quoting Walter J. Fischel, *Ibn Khaldûn and Tamerlane* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1952, pp. 14–17).
[209] For example, in the first century of Islam, only a few years after taking Andalusia, the Arabs fought a tribal war lasting forty years (93-138AH), in which the Qahatinas in Hijaz opposed the Adnans in Syria; this war broke out again in the third Islamic century, and this time lasted for 80 years (399-478AH).
[210] Arabs would only win over the modest; if Arabs conquered other nation-states, state devastation would be the end result; Arabs could only achieve power through religious prophecy, inspiration or governance. To this extent, Arabs were the most distant from the ruler's politics and were most distant from manufacturing output, the effective management of institutions or administrative competence. Those enterprises managed by Arabs had quickly become corrupt and the primary holders of the Muslim flag had been non-Arab (*ajam*) Muslims. Quwais (2013c), (referencing Ibn Khaldoun's *Al-Muqaddima* (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam), pp. 149-543.

2.11.1. Ibn Khaldun's 'Asabiyya Link to Plato's Types of Political Regime in early Caliphate Rule

In explaining the issue of '*asabiyya* in *Al-Muqaddimah*, Ibn Khaldun approached the concept of virtue and divine, quoting Plato – "no certainty can be achieved with regard to the divine, and one can state about the divine only what is most suitable and proper", arguing that logic "can only be used within the limitation of human capacity of mental ability",[211] where 'divine' adds more value or immunity to human material virtues or the limited human earthly capacity to mind-logic. This would be a divine limited to endless cycle of human '*asabiyya* power rule issues; as reflected in Arab isolationist solidarity manipulation of power rule (of a Machiavellian type), an issue that contributed to the rise of an Arab civilization that constantly regressed in the trap of '*asabiyya* power dominance struggles. Here Ibn Khaldun's observations could help provide a better understanding of the complex state issue in the Arab world, or of the overall issue of regime change and sovereign power rule.[212]

It can also be interesting to observe the Arab or Muslim state issue of state power rule, vis-à-vis the cycle of power hegemony of an international scope, or to assess the Lebanese sectarian political order, influenced by an '*asabiyya*-dominant regional order and protected by similar international economic, juridical or political '*asabiyya*-supremacy colonial tools. This reality is best articulated by Ibn Khaldun's observations on the pros and cons of '*asabiyya* power rule that emphasize a continued complex reality of misconception-dominated realism. Misconceptions exploit knowledge and deny access to political awareness of alternative equal power-sharing mechanisms and diverse equal sectarian/communal coexistence within a statehood. Dictated by a material wealth '*asabiyya*, they are beyond the domination of one human faith, sect, class, ideology or race, thus also contributing to the dramatic cyclical rise and tragic fall of power supremacy rule, thus blocking a natural evolution of human knowledge that makes sense of what is beyond a humanly-visible or common accepted knowledge (that could still be misled by misconceptions).

---

[211] Zaid Ahmad, (2012), "Ibn Khaldun and the Greek Philosophy: Some Notes from the Muqaddima", *Historical Researcher Letter*, Vol 2, p. 29, quoting Franz Rosenthal (1967), *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History* (English translation) vol. 3, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 252).

[212] Ibn Khaldoun (1332-1406), an Arab historiographer and historian – who was first to use the term '*asabiyya* – contributed *Al-Muqaddimah*, a book that criticised the attitude of supremacy or '*asabiyya*' adopted by the Arab Muslims towards their tribal kinships (versus non-Arab Muslims or even Arab opponents), in addition to their predisposition to seek foreign support and collaboration rather than suffer domestic power loss.

This in fact also reflects on the cycle of the five types of power rule expressed in Plato's *Republic*: political regime types that follow an anticipated reputative course, in illustrating five types of man. By progressing from aristocracy (leadership by a Philosopher) to timocracy (leadership by power and military might) to oligarchy (leadership by a rich minority), man reaches an elite failure, culminating in democracy (poor become victors); yet boundless freedoms become exploited, ending with tyranny (championed by masses divided over authority rule), and society enters into chaos.[213]   Interestingly, this could also be compared to the Caliphate power rule cycle, also connected with the power rule disputes that had followed the Prophet's death. The first successor Abu Bakr (aristocracy) was chosen as the oldest wise man, after public paranoia and divisions had erupted over a successor since the Prophet's family were preoccupied in grief. Second was Caliph Omar (timocracy), famous for his strict rule although he promoted equality and justice. Third was Caliph Othman (oligarchy); he was wealthy, and his rule reflected an orientation that favoured kinship appointments to administrative positions that finally led to rebellion against him. Fourth, Imam Ali (democracy) was nominated Caliph by the people; he had never cared for material power rule but cared for Islam, especially having been announced as Imam/spiritual leader in Prophet Mohammad's last public speech. His fluid democratic rule was exploited by Muawiya, who had even rejected Imam Ali's Caliphate leadership. Fifth, was Muawiya (tyranny) who shifted power rule to Umayyad dynasty rule, as marked by the transition of power to his son Yazid.

2.11.2. Global Realities of a Human Resistance Type

This might also reflect the political, cultural or intellectual awareness of the public majority orientation during that era, still impacted domestically by the reality of tribal *'asabiyya* rivalry, while externally influenced by an international order of empire monarchy power rule which has continued to dominate since. This makes the issue of *'asabiyya* that Ibn Khaldun sought to tackle highly significant for understanding the roots of regional power rule issues, or the positive aspects of sectarianism that became dominant and are relevant to the current case-study of Lebanon, including the Arab and Islamic regions, mainly in assessing sub-state behaviours towards issues of democracy or equal power sharing and whether in endorsing or resisting tyrannical rule.

---

[213] Illing, Sean (2016), "The people's tyrant: what Plato can teach us about Donald Trump"**,** *Vox*, 7 November 2016. Online at https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/7/13512960/donald-trump-plato-democracy-tyranny-fascism-2016-elections

Further, articulating the concepts of Resistance and Rebellion might also represent a sixth type of political regime, while also reflecting a sixth type of human attitude to power rule; this defines the incentive to stand in defiance of political injustice (an ethical divine behaviour against the virus of virtue corruption), such as Imam Hussein's rebellious rejecting (resistance) of the transition to tyrant or tribal supremacist rule – that is, a rejection of a new "false truth" to the concept of power rule, defiant to the truth of equal human justice in Islam.

Pierre Azar argues that this was a point at which Islam marked a historical division of the political roots of this concurrent conflict. It is also important in assessing the historic geopolitical factors of regional sectarian conflicts that are still present in the Sunni-Shia divisions, since Damascus (Syria) was the capital of the Umayyad rulers, and Hussein and his companions were massacred in Karbala (Iraq). Yet the truth remains in the lessons that should be observed from Hussein's massacre – marked by his final words that if his grandfather Mohammad's religion would be saved by his death then he was willing to let the swords take his life away.[214] In other words, his death became an ever-lasting revolution about Truth,[215] and a divine victory in defending the principles of Islam in defiance of the injustices of tyrant rule, and refusing tyranny was to become the 'accepted norm' if acknowledged by him. Instead he relays a message of human resistance and rebellion in the struggle for dignity, or in the search for freedom and justice; this is a continued concern in the post-modern world or for a human civilization still struggling with this issue.[216]

Socrates himself indirectly reflected on resistance in defending his inner divine and virtuous beliefs while facing execution. He refused to escape from prison, or apologize or change his thinking, even if that offended the people of the Republic or its Gods, yet still acknowledging the democracy of the masses who had voted for his execution. Hence, this could also be ascribed to global realities of human resistance, endorsing a message of love, peace and tolerance in defiance of tyranny and against all forms of human slavery or oppression to the right of self-determination.

---

[214] Pierre Azar (2013), "*Al-Hadath* with Samar Abu Khalil", *NTV*, 13 November 2013. [Arabic] http://www.aljadeed.tv/MenuAr/news/DetailNews/AlHadathDetailNews.html?Id=91639   Pierre Azar is an expert in Economic and Geopolitical Studies with a main research focus on the US in International Relations, specifically in the Middle East region.
[215] ibid.
[216] ibid.

This is also reflected in symbols of resistance in modern history, such as Gandhi's principle of peaceful protest in facing the violence of the British Empire, and also inspired by Imam Hussein who attained victory while being oppressed.[217] Or Che Guevara's armed resistance within a revolutionary struggle against American imperialism and its global *'asabiyya* tyranny of oligarchy, or exploitation of democracy in dominating international relations or foreign policy approaches. It becomes evident that the truth of most modern or historical events can be exploited, as in the case of the persecution of the Prophet's family, which is still a taboo issue for the majority of Muslims today.

2.12. Conclusion

The theoretical framework examined in this chapter focused on the issues of state power rule, sovereignty and security in Lebanon or in a complex region like the Middle East. It offered an overview of traditional and modern International Relations and foreign policy theory, designed for penetrated states like Lebanon or the region. It also examined new literature on Lebanese foreign policy in IR theory, mainly by Wilkins, and Abboud and Muller, in addition to an examination of alternative theories related to chaos and violence in the Middle East region. However, it focused mainly on the influence of sub-state forces and factors in relation to sovereignty issues within the state. This can in fact be a complex mission in the midst of the multi-hypocrisies overshadowing Lebanese state sovereignty, especially given the domestic exploitation of political sectarianism amidst regional conflict and instability.

This chapter therefore endorsed a Pluralist Theory approach in investigating state situations like those of Lebanon, or the region. It suggested a quantum theory approach to breaking through current systematic or structured theories that fail to examine the sub-state element in foreign policy or international relations. Again, adopting a domestic-external *omni-balance* examination of foreign policy behaviours, whether in Lebanon or the wider region, it also looked at the historic timeline of events relevant to concurrent or cyclical security, conflict or power rule sovereignty issues. These were explored at all domestic, regional and international levels, and also took into

---

[217] "I learned from Hussein how to be wronged and be a winner, I learnt from Hussein how to attain victory while being oppressed."

account the issue of *'asabiyya* at the Arab state level. With *'asabiyya* reflecting a fine line between individual/group human pride and prejudice, it nevertheless continues to have a huge impact in defining political, ideological, theological and cultural identities in the region, especially in relation to the issue of power rule, or state economic and political sovereignty; it is also very relevant to the issue of sectarianism in Lebanon as well as in the entire Middle East region.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

While the objective of this thesis is to analyse both alternative and systematic theory concepts, the primary objective is to approach this by constructing a subjective foundation for research analysis, a foundation based on the merging of systematic analysis with previously under-researched 'alternative' realisms that interplay at both state and sub-state level. The end goal is not necessarily to alter or endorse debated concepts or misconceptions, but rather to present a fuller scope of research analysis helpful in assessing or understanding this interplay, thereby attempting to possess a more fluid rather than just a fixed assessment. In the case of Lebanon and the region, fixed realisms remain extremely important in the cyclical power hegemony conflict struggles, yet they attract different forms of domestic and external interplay. Hence, the forces on the ground remain the principal actors in resisting or surrendering to such hegemonic conflicts that are important to investigate through a historic timeline analysis.

3.1. 'Meta-Methodology' Overview

Correspondingly, the methodological approach in this paper is to investigate the state issue in a region of conflict and peace disputes that impact upon the security interests of the sub-state forces. An attempt in this direction was motivated by the complexity of the Lebanese political stage, especially in the period right after the Hariri assassination in 2005, which promoted a "Lebanon First" slogan in the search for the sovereign state, but which remained penetrated by constant foreign political interventions or threats of war, mainly by Israel. Thus, this thesis tests and supports the main thesis hypothesis, which argues that Lebanese foreign policy is hostage to the patterns and dynamics of a set of indigenous domestic and foreign factors, affected by a threadbare Arab-Israeli peace and by power conflict struggles in the Middle East region. This is mainly evident in the regional divisions over future relationships with Israel, amidst its continued occupation of Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian territories, and manifested in Lebanon through the constant Israeli violations of integral state sovereignty.

It is an issue surrounded by complex independent and dependent economic, security or political structures – domestic, regional and international – that marginalise concepts of equal civil rights

and political freedoms, or equal economic development opportunities. Attempts to explore the complexities of Lebanese foreign policy require an omni-balanced theoretical analysis. This case study will therefore observe the issue of state sovereignty and its impacts on domestic and foreign policy in the decade after the Hariri assassination, mainly by examining the interplay of: first, power rule disputes; secondly, threats of conflict, war or violence; and thirdly, foreign hegemony intervention at all domestic, regional or international levels. All are factors contributing to Lebanese state security interests, while also harming the sub-state communal forces and influencing their behaviour towards the state in reaction to fixed atmospheres of insecurity and insatiability at both domestic and external geo-political levels.

In a weak state like Lebanon, unable to discourage foreign political interventions, armed threats or invasions, can the state still play a role in helping to deflect the risks on such occasions? What other alternatives might the state still pursue in regaining its sovereignty, whether at the domestic or foreign policy levels? How does this affect behaviour towards the sub-state communal forces, especially when the state is threatened, pressured or restricted from achieving its domestic obligations in facing foreign threats and interventions? And how does the issue of power hegemony and state power rule link to this complexity, in a region of multifaceted conflicts and failed international efforts for peace, replaced by provisional settlements pending constantly-postponed final resolutions?

After the end of civil war in Lebanon, the state remained hostage to regional and international conflict, violence or peace initiatives, while anticipating the attainment of a final Middle East peace agreement that promised economic prosperity and development in a post-war Lebanon but which never materialized. This was an issue that kept political or economic reform a taboo subject in Lebanon as much as it also kept the country in political conflict. Although peace efforts were principally occupied in finding a state solution for the Palestinians, ironically this did not emphasise such aspects as mutual security, political or economic sovereignty rights in any anticipated two-state solution.

Nor did such efforts stress the importance of equal social or individual citizenship rights in a new Palestinian state, or even consider the one civil-state solution that would ensure equal legal,

religious, socio-economic or political rights and freedoms to all the sub-state communal forces in such a state. Although such principles were part of the resolution for a post-civil war Lebanon, they were to be kept on a back burner, since no similar approach was adopted in the international efforts for regional peace, either in international relations behaviour or at the foreign policy level. This dilemma affected the state issue in the region and the role of the sub-state forces, being under-researched or unaccounted for in the dominant bias or systematic theory approach.

At the international level, this issue also continued to be manipulated by a global post-Cold War era that promoted a neo-liberal economic oligarchy by exploiting both human and natural energy resources, stimulating inequality, and endangering states sovereignty. Thus, reflecting on the domestic and regional issues of power rule (*'asabiyya*/sectarianism), or even approaching the concept of power rule at an international level, shaped the issue of foreign interventions and power hegemony in the region, contributing to domestic and external conflicts, threatening state sovereignty and sub-state communal security, and contributing to all these complex inter-dependent issues. This remained evident during the period following the Hariri assassination in 2005, where domestic political partisan sectarian disputes continued to dominate disagreements over conflict issues in the region, affecting state sovereignty. Issues included economic hegemony factors dominant in international relations, and provided current international institutional norms and structures that emphasized the central role of the state, even at the expense of individual or social security rights.

This, in fact, resembled the issue of "sovereign lending", which has been a pervasive aspect of the European international system since the Middle Ages, and of the global system since the nineteenth century.[218] Allowing borrowing by state rulers to help finance their sovereign rule, yet leaving the state's future generations to carry the burden of an accumulating debt are strategies that jeopardize both economic and political sovereignty,[219] and especially the state's natural resources. While systematic theory in IR or foreign policy fails fully to account for these factors, applying Quantum theory would investigate the interplay of all such factors at all three levels –

---

[218] Stephen Krasner (1999), *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 127.
[219] Lee C. Buchheit and Mitu Gulati, (2010), "Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing", United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD, no.198, April. https://unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20102_en.pdf

domestic, regional and international. They would be assessed through the historical timeline of the issue of state sovereign power rule, whether at the political, economic, constitutional or juridical level, and especially in relation to domestic-external geo-patterns and dynamics impacting on social, cultural, theological, ideological, racial, communal or sectarian behaviours. State sovereignty and national security interests would be the main focus in investigating this issue, in a region of instability, conflict, wars and armed invasions, appealing to international interventions under various security pretexts and definitions.

This could, therefore, be a supportive tool for an alternative assessment of IR theory or Foreign Policy behaviour in complex states like Lebanon or the Middle East region; and the hope is that it could also make an additional contribution to what has already been published on Lebanese foreign policy, publications which have been essential for the methodological approach of this thesis. The study highlights the geopolitical reality for Lebanon amidst continued Israeli-Syrian conflict relationships on one hand, and the overall position towards the Palestinian issue on another, in addition to the religious or ethnical supremacy dimensions that contribute a further dilemma in the larger regional conflicts. It does this mainly in terms of the hostile relationships with Israel, where almost nothing has changed in the Lebanese state's official position or in its foreign policy behaviour in support of Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian rights over territories occupied by Israel. These remain as a key prerequisite to the acceptance of any final peace resolution with Israel, where also nothing has changed regarding the domestic and external matters of power rule, conflict or foreign hegemony.

These aspects will be addressed in the chapters that follow. Chapter Four provides a historic overview of the domestic-external issues of power rule, conflict and foreign intervention in Lebanon and the region, examined at all domestic, regional and international levels and emphasising the role and influence of the sub-state actors. Chapter Five examines the historical timeline of the role of the sub-state actors within the state before and after the end of the Civil War until the assassination of Hariri in 2005. Chapter Six looks at these domestic and external issues mainly in the period after the Hariri assassination – whether in relation to conflict with Israel, or to the regional conflict and sectarian power struggles influenced by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Chapter Seven focuses on the period after the Arab Spring of 2011 and related conflicts and international interventions, mainly in the Syrian War and the negative impacts on Lebanon. It reflects on the domestic, regional and international systematic dynamics affecting Lebanese state sovereignty in its domestic and/or foreign policy choices, and the domestic divisions and reactions of sub-state actors amidst security fears over religious fundamentalism and acts of terrorism in Syria and Iraq, and continued threats by Israel. The chapter also attempts to assess the determinants of the positive or negative roles of the sub-state forces on the grounds of contributing towards state sovereignty, or in influencing domestic or foreign policy issues.

Finally, Chapter Eight emphasises the importance of attempting to endorse a pluralist theory approach, including traditional or alternative theory, as reflected in a 'quantum theory' debate. In the case of Lebanon, it is important to examine the positive role of sub-states actors, especially towards the state's security weaknesses as is evident in the conflict with Israel, or from other security conflicts in the region that affect Lebanese state sovereignty. The ability to examine the impact of these issues on domestic political or socio-economic reforms, or national security interests as reflected in the issue of state sovereignty or power rule and hegemony conflicts at both domestic and external levels is highly significant for assessing the patterns and dynamics of Lebanese foreign policy choices or behaviours. In conclusion, the objective of this thesis is not to endorse or oppose the role of the sub-state actors but rather to make it an essential part of the research analysis in order to understand Lebanese foreign policy behavior in Lebanon and the wider region.

3.2. 'Meso-Methodology' Research Reflections

Reliance on reading (especially online) of domestic events in Lebanon, or of news that dominated in Lebanon and the entire region in the period following the Hariri assassination was an asset in carrying out this research; and would have not been possible a couple decades or so ago. In fact, the search for primary and secondary sources for qualitative or interpretative data became easier with rapidly advancing technology and as the public availability of unlimited access to online publications or information increased exponentially. Prominent online newspapers or TV outlets,

including private, public or social media networks, were very stimulating in observing multi-perspectives on a variety of events in Lebanon and the region, and for this study, included numerous political interviews with prominent politicians, political experts or leaders, academic scholars in a variety of related fields, and journalists, diplomats, activists, or individual citizens, all of whom shared different knowledge, views, expressions, experiences or information.

Whether in regard to the economy, constitutional problems, legal or legislative affairs, war and conflict issues, or social and political matters at both domestic and external levels, all were important topics that were shaping or influencing public views, and in many cases attracting a huge Arab audiences or considerable political interest, especially concerning regional conflicts. The diversity of data knowledge and analysis observed during this research reflects an in-depth awareness of the variety of Lebanese political perspectives, and illustrates the significance of the Lebanese media in their freedom of political expression. Even so, they usually remain sharply divided over core domestic/regional issues, and especially over conflict events right across the Lebanese borders. Thus, learning not only about what was occurring in Lebanon but also about other events influencing or influenced by Lebanon was very important, for example, the Lebanonising of the Levant region after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, or what would become an anticipated new power rule in Syria following the conflict in 2011.

3.3. Research Methodology Obstacles in the Arab and Middle East Region

Relatively, there remains a lack of research or understanding of the state concept or of issues in the region. This contributes to the dearth of reforms or scientific research knowledge investments, including also the absence of any comprehensive package of economic planning and cooperation with other countries, or a shortage of collaboration amongst the Arab states as noted by Veale (referring to the late Antoine Zahlan, a prominent Lebanese scientist and academic).[220] Correspondingly, this lack of cooperation makes it more challenging to assess scholarly Arab

---

[220] "Zahlan's insistence that shared concerns and priorities among Arab states should facilitate cooperation in scientific research, remains weak in the Arab world. He points to water as an example of a shared priority among Arab states. Arab scientists should collaborate in fields such as water preservation, desalination and water quality, to reduce costs and maximise results." Laurene Veale (2015), "What is Being Done About the State of Science in the Arab World?", *MIT Technology Review*, 10 February 2015.

research on an international scale, or to access scholarly primary sources important for conducting reputable research.

This is a reality that forces potential Arab scholars and intellectuals to migrate, as noted by Mustafa Hijazi in referring to the multiple factors that impinge on human 'mind wastage' in the Middle East. He observes that this contributes to the region's 'mind wastage', where it enters a process similar to trying to plant fruit trees in waterless soil. It also affects future generations who lack domestic research capabilities and opportunities in their homeland, since research is not only about making an academic research discovery but is part of integrating with a larger academic intellectual strategy that seeks objective examination and analysis. Thus, it even impacts upon postgraduate research studies, especially in the field of social sciences, stifling the energy and minds of students – innovation wastage – who end up dependent on foreign expert knowledge, theories and curriculums.[221]

Hijazi observes that although changes have been taking place, especially in some of the states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), filling the Arab intellectual gap remains a challenge. The capabilities of local experts or the knowledge progress of graduates remain trapped in a routine circle of work obligation regression, limited to very scarce research potentials. By comparison, knowledge has been highly significant in the post-modern world as a process through which to reach and interpret the lofty human ethics of freedom, justice and human dignity, along with political participation and power-sharing opportunities. Knowledge has increasingly been a determining factor in socio-economic shifts as well, especially in increasing production in the state. Instead, the intellectual element in the state ends up misused by the domination of *'asabiyya* or sectarian interests that contribute towards a wastage of the citizens' and the state's concerns, especially in terms of the provision of civic participation or duties and civil public rights in the state institutions.[222]

---

[221] Mustafa Hijazi (2005b), *The Wasted Human: A Social Psychological Analysis* [Arabic] (Beirut: Arab Cultural Centre Press), p. 178.
[222] ibid, pp. 178-179.

Being restricted by the exploitation of sectarian, financial, political, economic, ideological or corporate power and wealth hegemony interests confers a reality that also contributes towards the domination of misconceptions or false knowledge, whether of religious and educational concepts or the acute levels of illiteracy evident in the 50-70 million people remaining under-educated at the Arab regional level.[223] It also contributes towards impoverished, oppressed or unemployed human recruits in 'well-funded' regional or domestic conflicts, especially among young people who lack access or ability to acquire comprehensive knowledge and awareness and easily fall victim to misconceptions or misleading prophecies about 'wars of justice against evil', or power rule injustice. They are also misled into accepting new isolationist power rule identities, such as the attempt to impose an Al-Qaeda-Islamic national state identity on and in Syria and Iraq.

Ironically, this was compatible with Israeli claims to a Zionist-Jewish national state identity, or the US promotion of the idea of sectarian communal federalism across all the Levant or Middle East region. Even at the peace making level, the US-sponsored peace process unfortunately made it clear that there was no anticipation of equal sovereign or democratic rights that would be granted to Palestinians – on the contrary, Israel only sought to establish a proxy security sub-state under Israeli state strategic security hegemony. For Israel, the Palestinians were all along a symbol of evil, fundamentalism and were uncivilized, terrorists or even non-existent incompatible with democracy – one publication even referred to Said as a 'teacher of terrorism' (NY commentary).[224] This was, in other words, another form of Zionist *'asabiyya* - terrorizing, oppressing, threatening or insulting the moral human dignity of the 'other view' in misleading or remanufacturing the truth.

3.4. The State! *Wein heyi al-dawle bi libnan? Leish fi dawle bi Libnan*?

The roots of a multi-sectarian sense of resistance for co-existence remain in the Levant region and date back to ancient history. They are more or less alive in Lebanon, or in a Lebanonised Levant region, but are hostage to the evolution of the civil state experience which has been awaited for

---

[223] Hassan R. Hammoud (2006), "Illiteracy in the Arab World", *AED: Journal of Adult Education and Development* no. 66, (pub. by DVV International). Online at: https://www.dvv-international.de/en/adult-education-and-development/editions/aed-662006/education-for-all-and-literacy/illiteracy-in-the-arab-world/
[224] *Ibid*.

over a century, having been constantly trapped by foreign conflicts and interventions. Hence, protection of equal sectarian and civil citizenship rights remains extremely important in examining and assessing the behaviour of the sub-state communal structures within the state, and ensuring their security is crucial in any transition attempt towards the civil state model (which in itself remains a postponed objective in a post-civil war Lebanon). State evolution is also hostage to the external dimensions of regional conflicts and is exploited by international power hegemony conflicts that have remained unresolved since the Westphalian era.

Despite the ethical foundations reflected in its objectives of respecting state sovereignty, state evolution continues to be exploited by power hegemony competitions as reflected in modern-day United Nations resolutions. These have a considerable impact on Lebanon's position (as a weak state in a biased or divided International Relations structure) towards the concept of equal political sovereignty, thereby reflecting a symmetric division over the concept of Lebanese state sovereignty issues at the domestic level, influenced by organised regional and international structures. Yet all Lebanese seem to agree on a common issue affecting their daily lives: where is the state in Lebanon? "Leish fi dawleh bi Lubnan?" – in fact, symmetric questions most Lebanese continue to pose in hoping for the rise of the state. Such questions have outlived the civil war era and exhausted the majority of Lebanese people who, since the end of the war, have continued to await this rise to a sovereign Lebanon, but are held back by corrupt domestic, regional and international 'political bazaar' compromises.

3.5 Alternative Methodology on the 'Democracy of Equal Citizenship Identity' Research

In their article Fraser and Gordon speak of the power of the words 'Citizen' and 'Citizenship', terms that speak of respect, of rights, and of dignity: "Consider the meaning and emotion packed into the French "Citoyen" of 1789, a word that condemned tyranny and social hierarchy while affirming self-government and status equality… always adding dignity to the original, as in "citizen-soldier", "citizen-worker", "citizen-mother"."[225] The authors also ask why there is no social citizenship in the United States, and suggest that:

---

[225] Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, (1992), "Contract Versus Charity: Why is there no social citizenship in the United States?", *Socialist Review* vol. 22 , no. 3, p. 45.

> The expression "social citizenship" evokes themes from three major traditions of political theory: liberal themes of rights and equal respect, communitarian norms of solidarity and shared responsibility, and republican ideals of participation in public life (through use of "public goods" and "public services") … In general, the idea of social citizenship in a welfare state is out of phase with powerful currents in contemporary US political culture. The connotations of citizenship are positive, powerful and proud, while those of 'welfare' are so negative, weak and degraded that 'social citizenship' here sounds almost oxymoronic.[226]

It could be argued that the basis for "social citizenship" is reasonably functional if not to an extent already present in the Lebanese political system, albeit hostage to external global orientations towards such concepts symmetrical with the corrupt sectarian political oligarchy. In other words, this also reflects on US foreign policy or "pro-democracy" interventions, that marginalize "social contract citizenship" ideals as being the core of indigenous resistance to foreign political or armed interventions, aside that is from the US lack of interest in pressing for electoral law reforms inclusive to all elements of society, especially if this might bring to power forces opposed to its policy in the region.

Even at the US domestic level, Fraser and Gordon suggest that US political culture combines instead "a rich discourse of 'civil citizenship' with a near-total silence about 'social citizenship'…Not only does it presuppose the increasingly problematic unit of the nation-state…but standard conceptions of social citizenship are pervaded by 'androcentrism' and 'ethnocentrism'.[227] Also in relation to Lebanon, social citizenship is mainly pervaded by "androcentrism" and "sectarianism", and effectively silent about a "social citizenship" within a civil state model. However, unlike the US, Lebanon is also dictated by sectarian social and political reality in terms of "civil citizenship", yet combined with a poor "civil citizenship" discourse. Even so, a "sectarian citizenship" structure protects the interests of the ruling political oligarchy, submissive to the foreign political and economic policy structures, whilst the US sponsors itself as a promoter of democracy, despite the odds in its domestic political culture or foreign policy behaviours.

---

[226] ibid, p. 46.
[227] ibid, p. 47.

In other words, in US political culture or psychology there is no need to request, seek or think of new alternative resolutions beyond US hegemony-oriented compatible interests, to endorse, as Chomsky describes it, an individual national pride despite attempts to defend "social citizenship", as evident in the legacy of T. H. Marshall's 1949 essay on "Citizenship and Social Class". In this, as Fraser and Gordon observe, he conceptualizes and defends social citizenship, suggesting that the historical development of modern citizenship was the last of three stages: eighteenth century "civil citizenship", nineteenth century "political citizenship", and finally twentieth century "social citizenship", and that he expected universal educational and health services to help dissolve divergent class cultures into a "unified civilization."[228]

In fact, as Ilcan and Basok show, this was also related to unlimited government spending, adopting the Keynesian economics that dominated international economies towards the end of the Great Depression era during the 1930s, and was further developed after World War Two, leaving countries or their national state sovereignties hostage to huge financial debts that both postponed and escalated an international financial and economic depression.[229] It also contributed, for example, to the global financial crisis in 2008 that threatened an international economic domino-effect chaotic collapse; to the economic crisis in Greece, despite being at local state levels; and continues to threaten negative impacts on the economy of the European Union. On the other hand, the authors conclude that, despite the retreat of the Keynesian era after the exploitation of all financial or natural resources, of greater concern is the fact that government architectures undergoing new and significant economic transformations "have been pursuing this path by attempting to disinvest themselves of the responsibility to meet their citizens' social and economic requirements."[230] They conclude that:

> states have instead engaged individuals, private enterprises, and communities to recreate the institutions of social support, promoting partnerships between the state and the private sector which in most cases still lacks sufficient funding; yet, especially with the decline of the welfare state, becoming more dependent on the voluntary sector.[231]

---

[228] ibid, p. 48.
[229] Suzan Ilcan and Tanya Basok (2004), "Community Government: Voluntary Agencies, Social Justice, and the Responsibilities of Citizens", *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 129-144.
[230] ibid.
[231] ibid.

While promoting free voluntary human solidarity labour and productive energy could be a major reconceptualisation of human labour, voluntary labour might still be exploited without necessarily encouraging public voluntary engagement in the state's political process through attempts to distribute both wealth and power-sharing beyond traditional corporate influence and domination.[232] In comparison, during the state's absence from public services and/or welfare programmes, Lebanon's voluntary labour has been dominant at the sub-state level as well as in security efforts against foreign threats by creating public voluntary efforts to counter such threats, while unfortunately remaining restrained by the state's organised sectarian structures. This has been advanced mainly through charities organised by Lebanese sects which depend on foreign friendship-funding or domestic exploitations of state resources. There is also dependency on Lebanese expatriates and labour migrants, who support their families' domestic living costs in the absence of any strategic economic or social intervention by the state.

3.6. A Progressive Citizenship Psychological Methodology

An issue that continues to reflect the modern-day tyrannical economic and political, neo-liberal global democracy models, exploits the progression of multi-diverse human identities, i.e. from isolationist to individual, nationalist, ideological, partisan, class, sectarian, or tribal global identities. In *The Wasted Human* Mustafa Hijazi theorises that human identity possesses a natural progressive process which clashes at the micro-invisible level, especially in terms of individual human mind existence at the psychological or physical sociological levels: this may be in terms of personal identity related to family, private, peer or hobby group associations, or in terms of social, religious, ideological, sectarian or political identity affiliations.[233] All are influenced by the state's political identity extending to an external level – from multi-identity trans-national behaviours to comprehensive relationships – where the state should be the arbiter in balancing 'asabiyya clashing acts of pride and prejudice, and supporting the natural progressive process in human identity that explores social solidarity contexts beyond national identity complexes.

---

[232] ibid.
[233] Mustafa Hijazi (2005), *The Wasted Human*; *On Wastage Pride and Identity Conflict*, op.cit, pp. 295-298.

One is able to define the misconception between human pride and prejudice, or continued exploitations, as a 'clash of civilizations' – or what the French diplomat and historian Alexis de Tocqueville described in his book *Democracy in America* (1835) as the rule of "tyrannical democracies", which would dominate in his observations of America during the nineteenth century. While he considered that socio-economic and political, or even religious equalities were an advanced example in promoting individual rights and freedoms, he still felt that society lacked the traditional intermediate social structures to mediate group relations with the state. Thus, on the individual level the democratic "tyranny of the majority" could still compromise the individual rights that were usually protected in traditional social hierarchy groups.[234] The irony for Tocqueville was the Americans' pride in their nation's freedom while still embracing racial slavery or the oppression of the Native Americans.[235]

Submission to the concept of liberal democracy advocating corporate-hegemony intermediate power, promoted the concentration of power and wealth in a financially-conditioned social or individual prosperity. The human mind was aware of this reality, even its labour aspect, during the early days of America's nineteenth century Industrial Revolution, during which workers were very conscious of the notion that wage labour was not very different from, or was another form of slavery, but treated as hourly-based slavery.[236] Yet this was denied and forgotten, reflecting a human mind regression against the natural process of human intellectual identity progression. As Chomsky affirms, social class thoughts and ideas, or public acknowledgment of a subconscious contracted slavery, or learning as part of an oppressed social class, later became an individual private matter that it was even forbidden to express.[237]

In other words, regardless of poverty or wealth, if the natural progression of human justice can be guaranteed, thus limiting tyranny and corruption in the state, there will never be a change in the issue of correct political representation and power rule conduct – maintaining a practice of human

---

[234] Alexis de Tocqueville (1835), *Democracy in America* (London: Saunders and Otley), on *History.com* (2009). http://www.history.com/topics/alexis-de-tocqueville accessed 10 June 2017

[235] ibid.

[236] Chomsky, Noam (2015), "Requiem for the American Dream", documentary film by Peter Hutchison, Kelly Nyks and Jared P. Scott, *PF Pictures*, April 2015. Online at http://requiemfortheamericandream.com/the-film/

[237] Ibid: "even today in the US with less than 7 percent of private workers having unions, and even if they do these unions remain behind corporate barriers."

oppression by the state and its domestic-external ruling mechanisms. The state remains hostage to the access or influence of excessive wealth and power, where individual national pride becomes expressed as part of the state's resources and abilities for power and wealth, and is exploited by partisan, sectarian or corporate behaviours, whether towards security or human and natural energy natural wealth. Mainly it will be corporate wealth from armaments and hydrocarbon energy – and therefore able to pay fees for legal prosecutions, for public image and policy firms, and to political lobbies and private media interest groups. Such wealth is capable of misleading the truth, and superseding it by new 'truths' within a lost Truth. Thus, wealth becomes 'corrupt knowledge' of misconceptions and deceit, about the truth of human advancement or academic research knowledge.

3.7. Conclusion

This chapter outlined the methodological approach in assessing the interplay in the misconceptions and alternative conceptions of the issue of power rule, in relation to the causes of conflict relative to human insecurity in the absence of the strong or capable sovereign state. It emphasised the importance of a balanced assessment of systematic and other multi-levels of analysis in approaching the case of Lebanon, the Levant, and/or the rest of the Middle East region, mainly through the inclusion of an assessment of the complex role of sub-state levels in the actions and visions for state sovereignty, identity or social citizenship contracts. This summarizes the mythological analysis pursued throughout the thesis, which is focused on the state issue in the Arab World and Middle East region, and which subscribes to the Lebanese situation in the period following the Hariri assassination in 2005, relative to questions of state sovereignty and power rule issues or to assessing Lebanese foreign policy behaviour, which the following chapters continue to address.

This is dealt with through an in-depth analysis of the historic timeline of conflict and foreign hegemony impacts at the sub-state level that contribute to citizenship insecurity and paranoia. It is reflected mainly in the domestic, regional and international divisions in responding to the civil state issue (especially during the regional conflicts affecting Lebanon), or towards its foreign policy behaviour (particularly *vis-à-vis* reaching a conflict resolution with Israel), where an end to

the Arab-Israeli conflict is beyond the state sovereignty question at the systemic level. Rather it is a question about the type of power rule following a final post-peace resolution or after an imminent war and escalated conflict in the region, since neither peace nor war can bring a certain end to the cycle of conflict and power rule hegemony struggles or foreign interventions in the region, for as long the state issue is not approached alternatively through focusing on the 'social citizenship' bond in the power rule and political democracy dilemma.

CHAPTER FOUR: OVERVIEW OF ANCIENT AND MODERN DOMESTIC-EXTERNAL STRUGGLES DWARFING LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY

Violation of Lebanese state sovereignty was a reality embedded in the ancient and modern history of 1920s Lebanon, but despite becoming an independent state in 1943, the struggle for political and economic sovereignty securing social justice in the state was to continue. Provision of equal social or individual civic and civil citizenship rights by the state remained, exploited by the same dominant domestic-foreign corporate allied forces. And as already discussed, this has contributed to keeping Lebanon stranded in its condensed histories that enhance a fixity and homogeneity.

4.1. A Historical Reflection on the Geo-Dynamics of Ancient Lebanon

From a methodological standpoint, the thesis has so far considered a historical reading of Lebanese foreign policy literature that also builds on foreign policy literature on the Middle East state, in relation to the issue of state sovereignty in assessing foreign policy. In exploring the case of Lebanon in foreign policy and International Relations theory, it has adopting a quantum theory approach which – especially in a region of conflict –tests the historical timeline of the state concept and struggle, and has relevance for modern and ancient history. It has also provided an ancient geo-chaos chronological order that might enable investigation of future crisis-free revelations. Chapter Four aims to examine the ancient history of Lebanon within its regional and international order, in order to compare it to the domestic and external *realisms* of the modern state of Lebanon. States – or state origins – are an ancient human development conception, to organize relationships amongst growing numbers of people within territories or expanding beyond territories.

This could just be a simple vision which imagines the fossils of an ancient city-state that could still shape or affect the purpose of the modern state. It might be interesting to stimulate a more in-depth research by revisiting Lebanon's rich domestic and regional indigenous historic timeline marks that can still define the state's modern-day local cultural, religious, socio-economic or geo-political natural realities, whilst also revealing the common interplay factors of conflicts relative to power rule or regional hegemonic struggles. Alternatively, research might reveal how ancient concepts of fair indigenous free trade relationships became the roots of primitive trade or foreign

relationship interests, whether at an individual, communal or state level. All would contribute to an inherited cultural identity of vibrant realities still present in Lebanon or the Middle East region.

Lebanon retains an ancient geo-civilisational and cultural identity that has also promoted the exchange of knowledge and material trade, as well as a historic identity of indigenous multi-minority geo-sectarian communities. Yet it has always been affected by a natural selection of invisible realities and energies for living human souls and spirits kept hostage to domestic and regional conflicts. Thinking about ancient human governance issues or types of power rule manipulated by religious and economic power authorities, shows them still to be relative to all types of human identities, and it is interesting to observe in them the transition from ancient to modern, post-modern, post-postmodern states or future e-states. Maybe in also witnessing a new millennial transition, from AD and BCE into (feasibly) an ECE (Electronic Common Era).

4.2. When Memory Repeats Itself: Crossroads   Rising and Warring Empires

In an article on the politics of heritage in post-civil war Lebanon, Lucia Volk speaks of "the dynamic and complex relationships among history, memory, and politics in a region often stereotyped as hung up on its past, unable to change, and hostile to modernity."[238] Quoting Maurice Halbwachs, she also reflects that: "History is a record of changes; it is naturally persuaded that societies change constantly... In contrast...memory is a record of resemblances and...is convinced that the group remains the same... Changes that do occur are transformed into similarities."[239] Volk further notes that heritage is "a mode of cultural production that gives the endangered or outmoded a second life as an exhibition of itself",[240] observing that the Lebanese political heritage fought "over access to and distribution of political power and resources in Lebanon, for and against the stability of the larger Levant region, and for and against nationalist and global political ideologies; they also settled personal scores and sought personal enrichment".[241]

---

[238] Lucia Volk (2008), "When Memory Repeats Itself: the Politics of Heritage in Post Civil War Lebanon", *International Journal for Middle East Studies*, Vol.40, no.2, p. 292.
[239] ibid, p. 294 (citing Maurice Halbwachs (1980), *The Collective Memory* (New York: Harper & Row, p. 86).
[240] ibid. (Volk citing Barbara Kirschenblatt-Gimblett (2004), "Intangible Heritage as Metacultural Production", *Museum International*, vol.66, p 56).
[241] ibid, p. 293.

In fact, this was a reality that may well date back to the ancient history of Mount Lebanon, which was a barrier against Eastern or Western invasions during the era of its early Phoenician inhabitants who had found shelter along the coasts of the Mediterranean and benefitted from sea-borne trade sailing westwards. Originating from the earliest Semite tribes which inhabited the region around the sixth millennium BC, the Phoenicians found protection in the rugged mountains of Lebanon, and opportunity in the numerous natural bays and coves that opened the way to the sea, including Greater Phoenicia which stretched from Ras Shamra (Ugarit) in Syria all the way to Mount Carmel overlooking the Mediterranean coast.[242]

Thus, Phoenician foreign policy – perhaps more accurately their relations with neighbouring states – had two facets, the first motivated by their own interests and carried out on their own initiative, and the second based on the attitude of foreign powers towards them."[243] Because of their geographical location at the centre of all the old human civilizations of the ancient world, and by sailing to and from those cities and forming trade colonies across the Mediterranean, the Phoenicians spread trade, prosperity, alphabets, culture, and human knowledge, travelling the length of the three continents of Africa, Asia, and Europe.[244] Although they also faced domestic and external sovereignty struggles they still managed to compromise between the rising regional hegemonies, or attempt resistance if there was harm to their interests.

For example, relations had existed with Egypt since the time of the Pharaohs, who traded in cedar wood with the early Phoenicians, specifically from the city of Byblos, between 2400 and 1800 BCE. Byblos became an Egyptian protectorate, until Asiatic tribes (the Hyksos) invaded and occupied Egypt. In turn the Hyksos were driven out of Egypt following invasion by the Hittites (Indo-Europeans who lived on the Anatolian plateau in the heart of modern-day Turkey), who finally clashed with the Egyptians at the Battle of Qadesh on the Orontes River in 1286 BCE. A status quo of power equilibrium was reached, until the Hittites were defeated by the Aegeans, and this also led to a momentary eclipse of Egyptian influence.[245] However, there was then a period

---

[242] Shereen Khairallah (1965), *This is Lebanon* (Beirut: Khayats), p. 1.
[243] ibid, p. 11.
[244] Röllig, Wolfgang. **"On the Origins of the Phoenicians"**, Bertus 31, 1983, pp 79-93. Online at:
http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/propylaeumdok/1142/1/Roellig_Origin_of_the_Phoenocians_1983.pdf
[245] ibid, p. 9.

during which Phoenicia enjoyed a phase of independence and prosperity for over four centuries (1150-853 BCE). In other words, the ancient land of Phoenicia remained at a crossroads between rising and warring empires – witnessing occasions of both prosperity and setbacks, and contributing to foreign relations or invasions.

Interestingly, most of the invaders, and others who followed, all left their marks at a site north of Beirut, located on the hillside of Nahr al-Kalb (Dog River, which in 2005 became part of UNESCO's 'documentary heritage'). As Volk explains, there are twenty-two inscriptions carved into the rock at the mouth of the river, leaving a memory of a "history book" full of striking similarities. Those from the Phoenician era begin with the three oldest inscriptions commemorating the Egyptian pharaoh Ramses II and his military excursion, undertaken in 1270 BCE to expand his kingdom 'to the north' by conquering ancient Phoenicia.[246] When the Assyrians overthrew the Egyptians and established their rule over the Mediterranean around 1000 BCE, they added six inscriptions at Nahr al-Kalb, next to the Egyptian inscriptions. Another four in the sixth century BCE commemorated the military invasion by the Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar.[247] The Romans also left their mark at Nahr al-Kalb, in a third century AD inscription declaring the construction by Severus's co-emperor Caracalla of a road around the Nahr al-Kalb Hill; this was followed by a fourth century inscription in which the Byzantine governor Proclus declared improvements to the Roman road.[248] By then Phoenician sovereignty and civilization had fully collapsed, and its population had dispersed into the East Mediterranean culture and to the Roman Empire, mostly after the excursions of Alexander the Great who, after a long siege, had successfully invaded the city of Tyre in 352 BC, forcing the remaining Phoenician cities to surrender.

This brought an end to an indigenous Phoenician era that had survived all previous Western or Eastern invasions, yet had become a region that preserved the early roots of Christianity and the early indigenous Christian communities in the Levant (like the prominent Maronite Church).[249]

---

[246] ibid.

[247] ibid, p. 297.

[248] Lucia Volk (2008), op.cit., p. 297.

[249] St Maron's early monastic spiritual traditions and monotheistic Christian beliefs were preserved in the region of Mount Lebanon and in Syria after his death in 410 AD.

Curiously, however, the Nahr al-Kalb inscriptions never mention 'events in Phoenicia'; nor were any Phoenician inscriptions engraved on the rocky slopes to record local practices or reactions or counter-inscriptions by the local people, or by those who followed.[250] Volk observes that the rest of the inscriptions shared a similar memory and in different languages, signalling "the successful defeat of the challenging geography and/or the occupation or liberation of inhabitants of the region by successive invaders".[251] This is always followed by resurrection providing a basis for a new start and a new beginning, as the history of Nahr al-Kalb suggests. Similarly, argues Volk, the commemorative focus on foreign invaders illustrates the precariousness of the modern Lebanese state, whose inability (or unwillingness) to erase foreign influences culminates in foreign forces continuing to have a say in Lebanese affairs.[252]

4.3. From Phoenician Nationalism to Religious Dynasty Sectarianism

As Volk implies, there is a history of rivalries that dominated the regional order, influenced by domestic-external sectarian divisions whether in Christianity, or later in Islam. At the international level, resembling the pre-Islamic Persian Empire (East) and Roman Empires (West), power hegemony competed, while in the Arab region people divided between both empires. Thus, similar political divisions and power rule conflicts continued at both domestic and external levels, beginning with the Umayyad power rule era in the Levant region, or in Lebanon where even before 661 AD they had received local assistance by constructing a navy to counter threats from the Byzantine Empire.[253] Nonetheless, they were still met by local Christian resistance in Mount Lebanon, namely from Maarade.[254] There was also resistance by Muslim opposition (Shia) against shifting the Caliphate rule to an Umayyad Dynasty power rule in 680 AD, endorsing the Sunni sect in Islam.[255]

---

[250] ibid, p. 300. except the two post-Lebanese independence and liberation inscription *stelae*.
[251] ibid, e.g., The fourteenth-century Mamluk *stelae* and the two post-Lebanese independence and liberation inscription *stelae* are written in Arabic. p. 296.
[252] Volk (2008),ibid.., pp. 304-309.
[253] Hamilton A. R. Gibb (1958), "Arab-Byzantine Relations under the Umayyad Caliphate", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers,* 12, pp. 219-233.
[254] M. Moosa (1969), "The Relation of the Maronites of Lebanon to the Mardaites and Al-Jarājima", *Speculum*, vol. 44 no. 4, pp. 597-608. doi:10.2307/2850386
[255] 'Sunni' is the Path of the Prophet and God's Message is in the Holy Book (Qur'an) – technically the term applies to all Muslim sects. It also became promoted as a title for a national Muslim ruling identity. Yet it later became conceived as a sectarian identity in opposition to any alternative political or Muslim sectarian opposition, accused of

Nonetheless, such divisions remained prominent especially as Islam remained hostage to dynasty power rule divisions, whether under Umayyad or Abbassid dynasty rule in 750 AD, that ended in the thirteenth century. As a result, more sectarian identities were to settle in Mount Lebanon, whether Christian or Muslim – and also Jewish – minorities, usually in opposition to the dominant power rule. Yet all still benefitted from trade reaching across the Eastern and Western edges of the Mediterranean Governates to the ruling dynasties that endured. At the geopolitical level, Mount Lebanon and the East Mediterranean coast also became important for detecting external threats, especially regional or international incursions from the West into the Levant, and leading to actions and events supported by some local communities or opposed by others. Sometimes they even became the reason for the introduction of new minority communities, like the Fatimid era (r. 909-1171), which mainly contributed to the settlement of the Druze sect in the Levant region: the Druze had originally begun preaching in South Lebanon, but later settled in Mount Lebanon, as new dynasties and invaders continued to conquer the region.

Yet they were also faced by Western incursions, like the early Crusader invasions of 1095-1291, following the conquest of Jerusalem in 1099 and then heading north to overrun the entire Lebanese and Syrian coasts, thereby prompting local Lebanese resistance by the Druze or some native Christians who retreated into the mountains. Eventually, Tripoli was conquered in 1109, followed by Beirut and Sidon in 1110, with Tyre, after another long siege and stubborn resistance, finally surrendering in 1124.[256] Although the Crusaders left their imprint in the entire Levant region, building towers, churches and castles along the coasts, hills and mountain slopes of Syria, Palestine and Lebanon, they still perpetuated intolerance, violent acts and massacres, that were met with resistance. However, they also entered into alliances or conflicts with the various divided sects or Arab monarchical rulers in the region.[257] All those incursions weakened the Abbasid

causing trouble and divisions between Muslims and working against the state. See Omar K. Miskawi (2007), *Heritage and Dialogue between the Islamic Sects and the Other* (Tripoli, Lebanon: Dar Al-Eman for Print & Publication) [Arabic].

[256] Thomas Collelo, ed. (1987), *Lebanon: A Country Study* (Washington DC: GPO for the Library of Congress). Online at http://countrystudies.us/lebanon/13.htm

[257] Meanwhile, they also sought to establish friendly relations with indigenous minority communities, and with Christian communities, especially the Maronites, but finally moved into union with the Catholic Church, where the Maronites sought to strengthen their ties with the growing European influence and particularly with France during

dynasty which found itself faced with further domestic powers splits and finally with the Mongol invasions from the East, thus bringing its rule to a permanent end by 1258.[258]

4.3.1. An Ottoman Inheritance and a Fixation on Sectarian Dynasty Rule

During the following two centuries the Levant region remained under the influence of various foreign incursions, or regional conflicts, mainly between the Mongols and the Mamluks, and lastly the Ottomans who had permanently defeated the Mamluks by 1517,[259] thereafter ruling most of the Arab region until the end of the First World War in 1918. Yet the Ottomans, like their predecessors, also maintained a dynastic Muslim rule that oppressed any political or religious opposition movements. Moreover, they introduced an official *millet* system that created religious, social and feudal class divisions, not only between the state's Muslim and non-Muslim 'subjects', but also between the Muslim tribal, ethnic or religious sects – as evidenced in Lebanon, the entire Levant region and the Arab world. In other words, they legitimized their rule based on the inheritance of power, ruling in the name of Islam, but distanced from the political ethics, justice and tolerance even of their own Sufi Muslim roots.

The Ottomans instead adopted and inherited the same traditional – though more supremacist – Sunni Muslim sectarian political and social identity for their power rule. Yet, at the intellectual or economic level, the Ottomans were unlike the Abbasids, whose era of power had been open to free knowledge, science, education or literature in the Arab region. Instead they were less keen for human prosperity, or social and economic development among their Arab or non-Arab 'subjects', even suppressing the infrastructure for any advanced agricultural or industrial developments and the social prosperity that were absent in Europe.[260] Trade was eventually destroyed by high taxes (*al-mukuth*) on traders and skilled labourers who were being exploited under the *millet* system, associated with the collecting and submission of taxes by the local feudal and confessional

---

Ottoman rule. France, which had been a major participant in the earlier Crusades, also maintained a cultural curiosity over the ancient Christian history of the region and its early Christian populations.

[258] Contributing to the end of what had been a prosperous era for the exchange of knowledge throughout medieval Europe, marked by the siege of Baghdad and the destruction of its Grand Library (House of Wisdom) in 1258, although substantial amounts of intellectual and cultural knowledge luckily still found its way into Europe.

[259] They first defeated the Mamluks in Syria on 24 August 1516. The Ottomans, who became superior after the 1453 annexation of Constantinople were also in conflict with the Europeans and the Safavid dynasty in Persia, and became alarmed about the Mamluks possibly facilitating a Persian-European alliance.

[260] Maya Shatzmiller (1994), *Labour in the Medieval Islamic World* (Leiden & New York: Brill).

notables to the Caliphate dynasty state rule. The feudal system provided people with lands to farm, but did not offer any socio-economic services or equal citizenship protection by the state in return.

Further, the Ottoman occupation of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453 had contributed towards the closure of the trade routes between Christian Europe and the Arab Muslim Empires, a feature that was particularly pronounced in the Levant region.[261] These routes included the ancient Spice and Scents trade routes (between India, the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of African) as well as the Silk Road which had also contributed to the rise of the pre-Islamic Arab civilisations as early as the second century BC, and provided a network of trade routes that had, since the Han dynasty, expanded all the way from China through central Asia to West Asia (Middle East) to reach the Mediterranean Sea, then continuing through Anatolia straight into Europe. It represented an authentic free trade route that also inspired the exchange of knowledge, language, religion, culture and goods, and brought prosperity to Bedouin, nomads and merchants, while cities, states and civilizations were constructed across southern Asia. Its closure had, therefore, also motivated European colonial expansions in search of new alternative trade routes, paradoxically leading to the discovery of the American continent.

However, while the Europeans ended up dominating all sea routes, Central Asia entered an isolated medieval era, becoming divided between the geo-political interests of the Russian and Chinese empires. This also constrained the interests of the local populations at a time when the ruling powers in both China and Russia were becoming reliant on a European-dominated imperial sea trade – leaving Central Asia in great poverty that led to colonial domination and its financial and cultural decline.[262]

4.4. The Foremost Semi-Sovereign State Models of Mount Lebanon

In Lebanon the Ottomans relied on the local feudal families from as early as 1516, starting with the Assaf dynasty (Banu Assaf Sunni Turkman chieftains) that was prominent under Mamluk rule,

---

[261] Ali Shoukri (2016), "Five Hundred Years since the Ottoman Invasion of the Middle East", June 2016 [Arabic], online at: http://aljaml.com/node/128851
[262] ibid.

and was based in the Keserwan region in the Northern district of Mount Lebanon. The Ottomans also relied on the Maan dynasty (Banu Maan Druze chieftains), based in the Chouf region in the Southern district of Mount Lebanon. Their dynasty reached its peak under Fakhr al-Din II (1591–1635) who eventually dominated all of Mount Lebanon, emphasizing unity between Maronites and Druze, and expanding his rule over all of Lebanon and northern Palestine by the early seventeenth century. He oversaw considerable military and trade development, even taking possession of Palmyra in Syria and building forts to secure his Eastern-Western merchant trade routes. His openness to the West led him to form close ties and secret treaties with the dukes of Tuscany and Florence in Italy in 1603, links that varied from diplomatic relations to extending invitations to construction engineers and agricultural experts.

Towards the end of his reign he even established relations with the French: this was the earliest illustration of French influence in Lebanon.[263] The Maronite college had been founded in Rome during the early period of his rule, and this, for the first time, formally linked Mount Lebanon to the Western world.[264] His increasing power worried the Ottomans, especially as it occurred during a period when ideas of state sovereignty were being extensively debated in Europe; the Ottomans therefore sought to suppress semi-sovereignty, intellectual progress, and prosperity aspirations in Mount Lebanon by ordering his execution in 1635.

This abrupt end to the Maan dynasty was followed by the Shihabi dynasty,[265] originally a Sunni Muslim family that maintained close Christian ties. The Shihabi's aristocratic rule became predominant Mount Lebanon after they had defeated the Druze in the Battle of Ain Dara in 1711; this also led to a population reshuffle into new districts under a well-organised feudal system, as well as to replacement of the Druze strongholds in Mount Lebanon by Maronite Christians. The Shihabi dynasty reached its peak with Bashir Shihab II who attained power in 1789 and carried on a dynasty that lasted until 1840, after having reached new reconciliations and alliances with the Druze and Maronites. Lebanese notables were created to serve the al-Shihabi partisans and were given a voice in public affairs: thus the Shihabi regime appeared as a mixture of monarchy,

---

[263] Shereen Khairallah (1965), op.cit., pp. 45-46.
[264] ibid, p. 43.
[265] Traboulsi (2012), op.cit., pp. 9.

oligarchy and democracy.[266] Even so, there were still constant domestic and regional alliances and counter-alliances, and even invitations for occasional interventions that extended from the new economic and trade dominance of competing European powers.[267]

Although Bashir II attempted to adopt a neutral position in his approach to domestic and external relations, the realities on the ground were more complex. Yet he was able to cope as a result of the rivalries between the local strong powers who managed, due to external and regional events, to eliminate each other over the course of his reign.[268] Bashir II remained a pragmatist throughout his half century of leadership of Mount Lebanon, and continued to promote sectarian tolerance and co-existence, which were important in seeking to establish the foundations and qualities of the sovereign state attributed to him. However, there was no escape to a position of neutrality when regional crisis and war reached Lebanese soil and his inspirations for a sovereign state had to be tested, regardless of any domestic opposition. Muhammad Ali's invasion of Syria in 1831, and the consequent concentration of international attention on Mount Lebanon, created a regional crisis that escalated beyond the capacities of any ruler or Prince/Amir.[269]

4.4.1. A Brief Rehearsal for a Modern State in Mount Lebanon (1831-1840)

Egyptian influence and intervention in the Levant region had started as early as 1818, when Muhammad Ali sent his son Ibrahim Pasha on a military campaign to help the Ottomans eliminate the British-supported Wahhabi state in Hijaz (he also participated later in the failed Ottoman campaigns that sought to contain the 1821 Greek independence rebellion). In return, Muhammad Ali had asked for Syria to be placed under his rule, but was offered only the island of Crete. As a result, he sent his army to the region and in 1831 formed an alliance with Bashir II, while expanding his rule into Syria between 1832-1840 during a revolt against Ottoman rule, promoting an Arab sovereign nationalist state. He had promised to extend Bashir II's rule across the region, but Bashir declined the governorship of an "Arabistan" centralized power in the rest of Syria.[270] He favoured instead being entrusted with police powers to protect the plains around Damascus,

---

[266] Khairallah (1965), pp. 48-50. In the late 1600s, Bashir Shihab I renewed attempts to expand and free Mount Lebanon from the direct influence and control of the Ottoman rulers of Sidon, Acre and Damascus.
[267] ibid, p. 50.
[268] ibid.
[269] Engin Akarli (1993), *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920.* (London: I. B. Tauris), p. 22.
[270] Caesar E. Farah, (2000), *Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861* (I. B. Tauris, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Great Britain), p. 15.

and his rule of Mount Lebanon expanded to include Jabal Amil (Shia South Lebanon), and the port cities of Sidon and Beirut.[271] Subsequently, Beirut revived as a mosaic identity city with cross-sectarian merchant and political capital, which hosted European consuls,[272] and afterwards became the commercial outlet for Mount Lebanon's silk industry.[273]

On the other hand, with the Egyptian forces threatening Istanbul, the Porte finally recognized Muhammad Ali's rule over Syria, while also preparing a counter-offensive with Britain (the British were fiercely opposed to Muhammad Ali who, along with Bashir II, had French support). This also motivated the Maronite Church to support Bashir II, as the French were also traditionally allied with the Maronites. In response, Britain formed an alliance with the Druze, who kept an alignment with the Ottomans in opposition to Muhammad Ali's rule of Syria, forming a rebellion that was crushed by Bashir II in 1832. Hence, although under Egyptian rule, there were attempts to strengthen the Lebanese state foundations by encouraging industry, promoting international trade, empowering administration, fighting corruption, setting up representative councils in towns and cities, and ensuring equal treatment between Christians and Muslims;[274] there was also a complex clash of interests at both domestic and external levels which proved to be equally important.

As a result of state power becoming centralized, feudal chiefs became increasingly less autonomous with regard to administering justice, collecting taxes, and maintaining law and order.[275] While this created the impression of a general resemblance to the predominant form of European feudalism, Mount Lebanon nonetheless demonstrated particular features of its own, which clearly distinguished it from both European and Ottoman prototypes.[276] Samir Khalaf observes that property in itself was not the principal factor in determining social position:

---

[271] Harris, William (2012) *Lebanon: A History, 600-2011* (Oxford University Press), pp. 137-138.
[272] ibid, 137.
[273] Caesar E. Farah, (2000), p. 16.
[274] ibid, p. 12.
[275] Nonetheless, as Fawwaz Traboulsi notes, since the early 1800s efforts had begun to prevent the feudal notables from their dominance or interference in Church matters and to undermine their acts of injustice; this was primarily achieved by keeping back part of the taxes collected from Church-owned lands under Bishop Yusuf Istfan (1759-1823) who, unlike bishops from the previous era came from humble origins (Traboulsi, op.cit.)..
[276] Samir Khalaf (2002). *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 64.

> More precisely, the social honour the notables enjoyed in their respective communities did not vanish with diminished wealth. Given this intimate association between kinship and social status, it is little wonder that the family survived as the fundamental socioeconomic and political unit in society.[277]

It may therefore be concluded that connection to the land was more related to the people on the land than to the property owners. This was always the case in Mount Lebanon, and was particularly true during harsh times, with the land becoming a shelter for its diverse sectarian minorities, and maintaining a fixed affiliation to the notables in facing common struggles in preserving community interests and its members from the various conquerors.

In fact, this also became the sub-state communal incentive for the rise of domestic opposition to the Egyptian influence in Mount Lebanon, aside from external factors or domestic communal divisions. Tensions escalated because of increased military conscriptions, impacting on communal labour support for public and welfare needs that was common under feudal tradition. This was further consolidated by the stationing of troops with local peasants to help with secure payment of taxes and army recruitment, which provoked and added further outrage to the villagers, already angry over prolonged delays in restoring village labour or ending isolation from kinship; as important factors for the security of their economic interests and style of living.

Correspondingly, escalation in regional tensions and international intervention that contributed to new international alliances or compromise agreements, was to prompt further domestic splits and conflict in Mount Lebanon. In 1838, the Ottomans reached an alliance with Britain against Muhammad Ali, agreeing to sign a Trade Convention with the British (who were convinced that their trade routes to India would be safer under an Ottoman-controlled Syria); similar treaties were also signed later that year with the French, Russians, Prussians and Austrians. According to these (and other supplementary treaties signed during 1838-41), "all local monopolies and protectionist trade restrictions were to be abolished for European merchants and their agents. Also, special tribunals were to be created for the settlement of commercial disputes that involved Europeans."[278]

---

[277] Ibid, p. 68.
[278] Engin Akarli (1993), op.cit., p. 3.

However, the Ottomans were further obliged to accept the introduction of a new wave of administrative, economic, social and political reforms/*Tanzimat* in the empire – introduced in 1839 by Sultan 'Abdel Majid, and aimed at the modernization of the empire. Yet this prompted new demands amongst *milet*/sects for equality and social justice across the whole empire, mainly through implementation of the reform promises to include "fair taxation, elimination of the tax-farming system, an end to monopolistic practices and trade restrictions, security of property and life, and the equitable treatment of all subjects before the law, irrespective of their creed".[279]

This also contributed to the escalation of events on the domestic political and security scene in Mount Lebanon, which started in 1838 with a new Druze rebellion that was crushed by Bashir II, again assisted by the Maronites, who had been armed since 1832 to help crush pro-Ottoman rebellions. By 1840, new violence was erupting, mainly influenced by the differing interpretations of the 1839 *tanzimat*/reforms especially regarding equal individual or communal public rights. This created a debate over equal citizenship (Muslim-Christian) rights in the state; for instance the Druze refusal to accept non-Muslims as their equal political associates was causing increased sectarian tensions in Lebanon. It also led to domestic tension and conflict in reaction to new exorbitant taxes and forced labour and military conscription, in the face of foreign threats of war. As a result, the Egyptians asked Bashir II to disarm the population, including the Christians, for fear they would be encouraged to join any new rising communal revolts in Mount Lebanon. The Christians on the other hand protested and refused to hand over their arms, choosing instead to join the Druze, Sunni and Shia in a rebellion.[280] Attempts to establish a new modern state had thus been short-lived.

4.4.2. Paving the Path to Civil War: the Mount Lebanon Partition Plan (1842-1860)

The Ottoman Empire's announcement that equal rights would be adopted for all communal minority citizens to participate in a new system of governance inspired a revolt against Bashir II and his Egyptian allies in Lebanon that was also motivated by the preparations of the British, Russians, Austrians, and Prussians who, as allies of the Ottomans, planned to rescue Syria from its Egyptian occupiers. Russia's participation was intended to widen the rift between France and

---

[279] ibid, p. 24.
[280] Traboulsi, (2012), op.cit., pp. 12-13.

Britain, since France, which maintained friendly relations with both the Maronites and the Pasha of Egypt, found itself divided and facing an awkward diplomatic predicament that positioned it halfway between reconciliation and appeasement.[281] Subsequently, this led to an Egyptian defeat in Syria in 1840, and an end to the rule of Bashir II rule in Lebanon.

However, it also introduced a new European political influence and intervention in Lebanon that opposed the return of an absolute Ottoman rule over Mount Lebanon, particularly in relation to the power rule conflicts that followed Bashir II and led to new sectarian conflicts between the Christians and Druze, who still disputed interpretations of equal citizenship rights under renewed Ottoman rule. Further clashes ensued in 1841 that ousted Bashir III as a potential successor to another Shihabi power legacy. As a result, the Europeans proposed to Sultan 'Abdel Majid the partitioning of Mount Lebanon into a southern Druze district and a northern Christian district. Aiming to avoid any damage to renewed relations with the European Powers, "the Sublime Porte accepted the idea that Mount Lebanon would be formally divided; however, it added ominously that it thought the plan was a recipe for disaster."[282]

At the end of 1842 Mount Lebanon came under a *qa'im maqam* (sub-governor) two-district rule,[283] with its chieftains under the mandate of the Ottoman governor's rule in Sidon, and with the Beirut-Damascus road utilised as an arbitrary demarcation line between them. Ironically, the partition was decided by a joint European-Ottoman committee (which had collectively classified the Lebanese struggle as "age old"),[284] and its deliberations were conducted in the presence of all Lebanese confessional feudal elites. The Ottoman authorities had reservations about the plan, since geo-demographically it would still force Druze or Christian minorities to live under the political authority of the opposite sect in each district.[285]

Moreover, transforming the original uneven social locations of the Druze and Maronite communities into a pattern of uneven socio-economic development contributed, in turn, to the

---

[281] Samir Khalaf (2002), op.cit., pp. 82-83.
[282] Ussama Makdisi (2000), *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press), p. 79.
[283] ibid, pp. 14-15.
[284] Salibi (1965), op.cit.
[285] ibid, p. 89.

deepening sectarian divisions. While peasants and commoners were incited to rebellion and revolution against some of the repressive abuses of feudal society, sparked by a sense of collective consciousness, equal citizenship, and concern for public welfare, all were at one point or another deflected into confessional hostility.[286] Even a population reshuffle was still harmful to the geo-communal roots of the religious minority communities that the Europeans had allegedly come to assist. Ultimately, this 'disaster' assumed its full form during the 1858-1860 rebellions, when growing demands in Mount Lebanon for equality, social rights and justice finally led to a civil sectarian war in May 1860. The rebellions began in the Christian districts, after another *Tanzimat* era had been declared in 1856 as part of the Ottoman struggle to advance the state in accordance with Western standards. This in turn provoked disparate socio-economic demands in a new 'class' struggle between the Christian peasants (influenced by a Church-promoted intellectual struggle) and the traditional notables.

The Ottomans, however, assumed that the new wave of *Tanzimat* was not meant to affect the traditional social order of the high and low, elite and non-elite. Although the Druze peasants shared the same miseries as their Christian counterparts, the new sectarian divisions and territorial partitions had kept them apart from the equal rights rebellions. Sectarian conflicts ended up refuelling the rebellion alongside demands for equality and justice, after various sectarian attacks had been carried out against the Druze and Christian minorities in both partitioned Districts, including the few Shi'a communities that remained around Keserwan.[287] The violent massacres and bloodshed even spread into Syria, and the Ottoman authorities showed very little initiative in protecting the Christians of Damascus, although some Arab and Muslim nationalists came to Syria to help end the massacres.[288]

The war ended in late June 1860 following a European intervention that invited a renewed Ottoman mandate over Lebanon, with all agreeing to the traditional rubric of *mada ma mada* (let

---

[286] Traboulsi (2012), op.cit., p. 98.

[287] Leila Fawaz (1992), *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (London: I. B. Tauris).

[288] There were individual (cross-national indigenous) initiatives in saving innocent lives, such as the courage shown by Shaikh Emir Abdel-Kader, a humanist Sufi Muslim Algerian scholar, who was critical of both Christian and Muslim barbarism. See also Robert Fisk, (2017), "We must look to the past, not Isis, for the true meaning of Islam", *Independent*, 25 May 2017. at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/manchester-attack-muslim-islam-true-meaning-a7754901.html

bygones be bygones).[289] But again, little was done to transform the loyalties and attachments of peasants, including their traditional confessional, feudal and local allegiances which failed to supersede other interests and forms of a strategic national identity.[290] Nor were any of the rebellion's demands for equal citizenship rights or political and economic reforms pursued. They remained answerable to the feudal sectarian chieftains, now collectively sharing power, as 'subjects' of a new Ottoman-European power mandate under the *Règlement Organique* (*mutasarifiyya*), the semi-autonomous sectarian rule announced in 1861. Nonetheless, all these events finally prompted Sultan Abdel Hamid II to alter the *Tanzimat* in 1876 and turn to pan-Islamism, with the intention of attracting Arab Muslim support and blocking the nationalist separatist ideas that had begun to spread within the Arab World,[291] especially after being further inspired after the 1860 War.

In conclusion, a new foreign mandate order was established that postponed the struggle for social and class justice; this duly promoted a renewed sectarian institutionalized administration, whose distributions were again made under a sectarian-demographic base of proportional representation that included all the minority sects in Mount Lebanon.[292] This became the structural foundations and political inheritance bestowed on 1920s Greater Lebanon and citizenship identity in the state. In this regard, Ayubi identifies a unique yet foreign exploited citizenship in the region, noting that:

> [the city-state world order in] the Middle Eastern city, both ancient and mediaeval, is said to have represented *urbs*, a physical agglomeration, rather than *civils*, a space for collective debate and action. … Cosmopolitan Middle Eastern cities, from Baghdad of Harun al-Rashid to Istanbul, Alexandria and Beirut in this century, have exercised a certain charm of diversity, colour and 'street life', sometimes of tolerable co-existence of groups that mingle without joining – but such cities are not usually blessed with active citizenship.[293]

4.4.3. A Mosaic Identity in the City-State of Beirut

Sectarian influence persevered, despite the intellectual and secular advancement evidenced in the high-profile press and numerous publications in Lebanon during the late nineteenth/early twentieth century. This advancement was attributable primarily to the increase in foreign missionary schools

---

289 Makdisi, (2000), op.cit., p. 144.
290 Traboulsi (2012), op. cit., pp. 97-98.
291 Salibi (1965), *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: The Trinity Press), p. 156.
292 Ibid, p. 13.
293 Ayubi (1995), op.cit., p. 398.

(e.g., Maronite-affiliated French Jesuits) in Mount Lebanon and the coastal areas – all providing education that incorporated the various Lebanese sects, and including at the higher educational level the American University of Beirut, established in 1866 with its land contributed by the Druze. Moreover, the Maronite Church had also accumulated considerable economic wealth and a central role in a post-dynasty ruled Mount Lebanon, with its land ownership, which encompassed charities and services, housing monasteries, schools, agricultural land and various other social services. Thus, it also contributed to its central role in demanding Lebanese sovereignty, which envisaged a Lebanese coast with Beirut at the centre as its new economic capital: this was essential to help to secure the flow of merchant trading with Mount Lebanon through its ports.[294]

Yet Beirut ('the wells' in Phoenician) was kept outside the district of the 1861 *mutasarifiyya* rule although its population had increased, mostly during Egyptian rule and following the partition of Mount Lebanon between 1840 and 1860, and it had revived to become a modern merchant city-state, promoting sectarian diversity and inspiring a nationalist and integrationist multi-cultural intellectual identity that did not favour Mount Lebanon's sectarian split. Thus, the city remained a mosaic cultural and trade centre, forming an important regional seaport at the centre of the East Mediterranean coast, and providing new opportunities for trade and economic prosperity for all its inhabitants, especially the Christians who had traditionally been restricted to Mount Lebanon; Beirut's Christian population now tripled to account for half the city's population.[295] On the other hand, the expansion of trade by the Europeans and the formation of new mission stations after 1861 also motivated new migration waves to the West, both Europe and the Americas.

Whether in the search for new trades, education, or economic opportunities, or being in distress because of the prevention by sectarian structures of equal individual opportunities and citizenship rights, these migratory waves reflected the continued socio-economic or political injustices that were dominant in Lebanon and the region. Because of Ottoman failures in its state modernization and reform efforts, the Empire was becoming increasingly burdened by huge debts – also contributing to its collapse towards the end of World War One, and ultimately to the rise of new Lebanese diaspora generations spread across the world.

---

[294] Salibi, p. 13.
[295] ibid.

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 had very negative impacts on Lebanon and the Levant region, which suffered massive poverty and a famine crisis (1915-1918) that became another factor in new waves of Lebanese diaspora. Despite the arrival of French forces on Beirut's shores in September 1918 and Ottoman defeat, advancement towards equal citizenship rights remained hostage to foreign power interests exploiting new nationalist Lebanese, Syrian and Arab identity conflicts. Yet, this entire era also reflected the geo-cultural, intellectual and social traditions of a multi-cultural mosaic identity, promoting a diversity of co-existence that was suppressed at home, but preserved and very well advanced by Lebanese diasporas abroad.

4.4.4. Khalil Gibran and World War I: A Lebanese Realpolitik, and a Nationalist Vision Against the 'Foreign' Enemy Within

In his analysis of the domestic and regional situation in Lebanon during World War One, Khalil Gibran did not absolve the local political feudal establishment of blame for oppressing local people in seeking to extract wealth from an ongoing foreign war, even the cost of the Great Famine. This devastated Syria and Lebanon during the war, and led to lost human lives and a decline in population by almost fifty percent in Mount Lebanon. Gibran observes:

> [T]hey are even stranger than they used to be. The bosses are getting bossier, and the gossips more gossipy. All these things make me hate life. And if it had not been for the cries of the starving which fill my heart, I would not have stayed in this office for one second. And had I been given the choice of death in Lebanon or life among these creatures I would have chosen death."[296]

Gibran had experienced disappointment even before the outbreak of war in 1914, or the 1916 Sykes-Picot British-French Mandate Agreement concerning the Levant. His writings resonated with his fellow Lebanese, in both Lebanon, and the diaspora, as he himself had migrated to America, where he had direct experience of life in the diaspora communities. He promoted his regional, cultural and national origins at a time when, with the occupation of the Levant towards the end of World War One, there was considerable suspicion about Western imperial interests.

---

[296] Khalil Hawi (1972), *Kahlil Gibran: His Background, Character and Works* (Beirut: Arab Institute for Research and Publishing), p. 106. See also Stan Shabaz (2008), "Ask What You Can Do for Your Country: Khalil Gibran", *Assyrian International News Agency*, Posted 15 April 200. at: http://www.aina.org/ata/20080415171605.htm

He had also written of his deep pride in being Lebanese, his admiration for Western civilisation, his hatred of the Ottoman imperial state, and his love for Islam, exploited by conflict. He had even specifically warned that "if Islam does not succeed in defeating the Ottoman state the nations of Europe will dominate Islam"[297] and the region. Hence, "The fall of the Ottoman Caliphate, combined with the European colonial division of the Arab East, left most of the urban Sunni Arab notables confused and perplexed. Rural and majoritarian communities were apparently more agile at perceiving the changes and at making the best social and political use of them."[298] Thus, Gibran saluted Western state citizenship and foreign good-will values,[299] as being common ground for ensuring equal citizenship rights in the state, while also emphasising the diverse multi-confessional identity.

He reiterates that human value, dignity, love and ethics are key to human tolerance and co-existence with their role must be acknowledged at the domestic, social or political level, in advance of any official declaration of loyalty to the state. He places particular emphasis on the common spiritual faith that originates within the Levant region, stating explicitly: "You are my brother and I love you. I love you when you prostrate yourself in your mosque, and kneel in your church, and pray in your synagogue. You and I are sons of one faith – the Spirit."[300] Nonetheless, Gibran's suspicion of Western imperial interests, domestic sectarian-exploited feudal political and economic interests, as well as Western domination of Islam was obvious. Mainly he distrusted the British role that had materialized in support of Wahhabism in Hijaz, and a Muslim dynasty rule in Transjordan, both of which territories became protectorates as a compromise for a Zionist homeland in Palestine – although against the wishes of the majority of local Muslim, Christian and Jewish populations. Eventually, it became a reason for the continued conflict and power struggle issues in the region, marginalizing issues of citizenship security rights, and of systematic oppression of human equality and development opportunities.

[297] Kahlil G. Gibran, (1913), "Visions of the Prophet – an Open Letter to Islam", *Al-Funoon*, 1913 pp. 54-55. He also organized the Syria-Mount Lebanon League of Liberation, under the slogan: "No People must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live." Its programme was "to seek through France and her allies the liberation of Syria and Mt. Lebanon from Turkish rule and Turkish sovereignty, real or nominal." See also Stan Shabaz (2008) ibid.

[298] Nazih Ayubi (1995), op.cit, p.110.

[299] Kahlil G. Gibran, (1926) "To Young Americans of Syrian Origin", *The Syrian World*, vol. 1, no. 1, July 1926.

[300] Alexandre Najjar (2008), *Kahlil Gibran, a biography* (London: Al-Saqi Books), p.150

On the other hand, the British were particularly interested in economic colonial and imperial rule, which was reflected in their domination of maritime trade routes, whereas the French were more interested in cultural conquest, encouraging the concept of the secular francophone state. Ironically, this is even reflected in the French inscriptions at the Nahr al-Kalb site. They begin with Napoleon III who chose to commemorate his arrival in Lebanon after the 1860-61 war and conflict events, by adding an inscription "choosing to write his historical declaration in a layer of plaster that was superimposed on one of the rock *stelae* of Ramses II."[301] Lucia Volk notes that Napoleon's action clearly conveyed France's imperial aspirations, seeking to commemorate Napoleon I's invasion of Egypt in 1798 by 'invading' the Ramses *stela*. She adds that the *stela* was restored in 1919 (following damage inflicted by a Turkish officer in World War One), as a symbol of restoring the new French mandate over Lebanon; or even serving as an "official European declaration of the end of regional empires" ; as she observes, this was a message with a clear implication for both Ottomans and Egyptians.[302]

Three more European inscriptions were added to commemorate significant local World War One battles, specifically "the capture of Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo in 1918; the occupation of Beirut and Tripoli in 1918; and the capture of Damascus in 1920".[303] Interestingly, like the others, none of these war victory inscriptions ever mentioned who the local enemy was; or all those who had fought. Ironically, since the Arab Forces of King Sharif Hussein had fought in 1918 alongside the Allied groups against the Ottomans, they became the deposed enemy the French had fought against to capture Damascus in 1920 from Beirut.[304] Once the British and French had established their formal authority over the region under a League of Nation mandate, they adopted economic liberalisation policies, while securing their legal and commercial superiority within Western-promoted economic or international laws that perfectly aligned with the collaborationist interests of the local bourgeois class.[305]

[301] Lucia Volk (2008), "When Memory Repeats Itself…", op.cit., p. 297.
[302] ibid, pp. 300-301.
[303] ibid, p. 301.
[304] ibid.
[305] Ayubi (1995), op.cit., p. 91.

Again, Gibran's warnings of European supremacy in the Levant were prescient: the rise of a mosaic intellectual state identity was suppressed through promotion of equal civil citizenship rights. On the other hand, Lebanon remained a location for a mosaic intellectual, political, cultural, or economic chaos and anarchy atmosphere, symbolized in its capital Beirut. Paradoxically, this can be attributed to ancient history, given it was a setting within a regional and international political ambiance of conflict, war, peace, or compromise, as with the declarations of defeats and victories in historic events or occasions by the Roman Emperor Titus (before he attained power in 79-81 AD),[306] who had proclaimed his victory over Jerusalem in 70 AD from Beirut, before he headed back to Rome.[307]

4.5. Lebanese Independence: A World War Two Battle Victory Heritage

Nahr al-Kalb has also become a site for commemorating modern history. Thus, the time line extended from the early 1900s to the mid-twentieth century when the Western Allies marked their World War Two battle victories by adding a liberation inscription declaring that: "the First Australian Corps captured Damur, while British, Indian, Australian and Free French Troops captured Damascus, bringing Freedom to Syria and the Lebanon".[308] Volk argues that this was similar to the inscriptions that preceded it, and was intended to mark or symbolize the "make and break of alliances in order to obtain hegemony over the Middle East as part of the colonial project". But she also observes that unlike the previous inscriptions, the Second World War inscription, written in English, marked the start of mentioning the local inhabitants – who thus became directly invoked in the text, even if only in the role of liberated subjects. But again there was no mention of the enemy in the victory or liberation announcement since, ironically, the enemy was also French, allied with Nazi Germany, defeated in 1941. However, the inscription also hinted at a promise of independence, about which Volk comments:

> The Lebanese were liberated from the Vichy French in order to be ruled by the Free French, who, after WWII ended, conceded independence to Syria and Lebanon by withdrawing their troops. At this particular historical juncture,

---

[306] Hassan Hamadeh, (2018), "Ma al-Hadath with Sawsan Safaa", *NBN TV, Kalam Siyasi Channel*, 17 February 2018 [discussion in Arabic]. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=575jO0cKUtk
[307] Flavius Josephus (1559). *The Wars of the Jews* (De Bello Judaico). VII.3.1, VII.5.2, Basle, (originally written 75 AD).
[308] Volk, op.cit., p. 301.

Syrian and Lebanese fates were linked because were both ruled by the same French high commissioner, even in the struggle for 'liberation' to both states.[309]

In other words, Lebanese independence in 1943 came during the war as part of a new Western liberation in a renewed power hegemony transition in the region, inspired by a neo-colonial international order allied with the powerful domestic wealthy sectarian or tribal/family neo-feudal forces. This in fact weakened the position of the liberation movements led by the intelligentsia, the urban masses and army officers, who lacked the reinforcement and support of the wealthy classes. Lebanon and the region was put under a colonial liberal economy structure, in which "pre-capitalist modes of production were not destroyed by the colonial powers, but rather were subjugated to the requirements of capitalist accumulation."[310]

Meanwhile, the foreign intelligentsia's perception and understanding of the region, as Edward Said observed in *Orientalism*, remained afflicted by a traditional bias – where to this extent, "the creation of European academic knowledge about 'the Orient' went hand in hand with military excursions into the area".[311] Even the concept of free travel and movement across the Arab World was to decline, being restricted to the borders of the newly-independent Arab states, especially after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, as illustrated in the closure of the railway between Lebanon and Palestine. This line, which also had its own inscription at Nahr al-Kalb, was inaugurated in 1942 by pre-independence Lebanese President Alfred Naqqash to celebrate "the completion of a railway bridge across the Dog River, connecting Haifa to Beirut and Tripoli."[312] The line had a great impact on the economy and the traditional concepts of indigenous trade, whether in Lebanon or the region. Yet, there were also significant influences by a 'new world order' heritage after the Second World War, which, as Noam Chomsky suggests, "established the basis for modern transnational corporations."[313] This set the stage for large amounts of private US investment in Europe, promoting an American international corporate order and inheriting an imperial international relations hegemony order that presented an advancement of the idea for regenerated

---

[309] ibid, pp. 301-302.
[310] Ayubi, op.cit., p. 96.
[311] Volk, p. 299.
[312] ibíd., p. 297.
[313] Noam Chomsky and Greg & Ruggiero (2002), *The Umbrella of U.S. Power: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy.* (New York: Seven Stories Press), p. 9.

chaos order to the right of wars against other states. It became a political and economic anarchy dependent on a US-dominated Western World order, of power management of international conflicts under exploited pretexts of human rights and freedoms;[314] as has been the case in exploiting the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This reality has dominated the entire Middle East region, becoming hostage to a situation "where 'neo-Keynesianism', the Welfare State, technocracy, indicative planning and labour-management coordination [all became] examples of corporatist practices aiming at intermediation among various interests, with a view to ensuring cross-class compliance with the social and political outcomes envisaged or achieved."[315] The ruling elite retained power and control of all the state's wealth and resources, aiming to strengthen their ruling legitimacy while keeping the state and its institutions dependent on US policies – to this extent, they were unprepared to deal with, and find solutions to, a globally-expanding financial crisis.[316] Divisions between various elements of society remained prominent, especially among the rural groups who, previously marginalised from political practice, were now competing mostly for economic, social or political opportunity in the post-independence modern state. They continued discreetly to preserve their previous sectarian loyalties and, once they reached power, wished to run the state like an obedient, efficient machine.[317]

This was also the case in post-independence Lebanon, where sectarian clientelism remained fairly evident. It also acted as "a mainstream device for the entire system", at the expense of developing an institutional "civil conscience" and overall autonomy of the state, and mostly protected the interests of "financial feudalism" by promoting "pre-capitalist relations of production, and practiced politics via a system of fiefs and sects" , The state would become a network of "policy circles or at least 'policy tribes'", usually exposed or facing challenges when shifting from "micro to macro-politics",[318] and protected by a global-clientelism structure enhancing huge challenges to state governance in international relations, even for strong political leaderships in power. For

---

[314] ibid.
[315] Ayubi (1995), p 187.
[316] ibid., pp. 31-32.
[317] ibid., p.110 (quoting G. Salama, *Al-mujtama' wa al-dawla fi al mashriq al-'arabi*, Beirut, 1987: p.23)
[318] Ayubi, ibid., pp. 168-169. "Such an approach was partly anticipated by Mahdi 'Amil [1979] who viewed the Lebanese state in terms of a 'financial caste'..."

example, in 1942 (a year before Independence in 1943) Lebanese Prime Minister Riad Solh successfully issued government legislation prohibiting generation of wealth gained from wars. Ironically, after independence the law was abolished, in 1944, by the state's prevailing corrupt power and wealth establishments. This made the state captive to a material practice symbolized in a bank-secrecy economic foundation, transferring its intellectual wealth and institutional process to 'human injustice and apartheid' sectarian cantons.[319] It also submitted to a continued heritage promoting conflicts and wars that remained "a requirement in a chaotic universe"[320] of foreign policies or international politics and relations, amidst a divided East-West Cold War global order.

4.6. The Rise of Israeli State Security Hegemony and Palestinian Non-State Armed Resistance

Lebanon remained relatively stable after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and during Cold War conflict events, mainly due to a prominent Egyptian role in the regional and international struggles and the regenerated chaos of power hegemony clashes. An era dictated by compromise, it brought stability to Lebanon that lasted until the 1967 Israeli war against Egypt. Lebanon did not participate in the 1967 War, but politically and publicly there was massive support for the Arab states in solidarity with the Palestinian cause. However, Lebanon did share the consequences of the Arab defeat in the war by having to face a new wave of Palestinian refugees into the country, as well as the permanent suspension of the 1949 Armistice agreement, which had prohibited cross border acts of violence – especially by Palestinians who would wish to return.[321] Hence, Israel felt powerful and victorious after the war and did not want another Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) ceasefire arrangement.[322] It delegated its war actions and ceasefire agreements to the Americans, and its Cold War lobbying with the Soviets, played out at the United Nations.

---

[319] Hassan Hamadeh (2017), "The Issue of Wages and the Decisions by the Constitutional Council and the Arab Region", Radio Interview [Arabic], *Al-Nour Radio*, Beirut 23 September 2017, online at
http://www.alnour.com.lb/episodes/229716/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9
[320] Noam Chomsky and Greg & Ruggiero (2002). Continuing beyond the end of the Cold War, finally reaching to the War on Terror.
[321] The suspension of the Armistice Agreement by default also meant a 'selective' Israeli suspension, engagement or disengagement, in this prohibition.
[322] Frederic C. Hof (1985), *Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanon Frontier, 1916-1984* (Foreword by Philip C. Habib), (Boulder CO: Westview Press), pp. 67-8.

All parties agreed to a ceasefire, although Israel refused to withdraw from the Egyptian territories it had occupied in the Sinai Desert or from the Palestinian Gaza Strip and the Palestinian West Bank that was under Jordan's control, or from most of Syria's territory in the Golan Heights. Also, Lebanese territories at the edge of the Golan Heights, namely the Shebaa Farms, Kfar Chouba Hills and parts of the village of Ghajar remained occupied. Even though a UN-sponsored resolution, UNSCR 242, was issued several months after the ceasefire, confirming the need to reach a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and also demanding "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict",[323] Israel still refused to go. Lebanon did not protest officially over the territories Israel had occupied in Golan, but was included in the consultation over the implementation of UNSCR 242, given its particular interest in reaching a settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem.

On the other hand, the Arab defeat turned Israel into a strong deterrent power in the region as well as a new solid, trusted, and reliable friend and ally of the US which, in its turn, and in acknowledgement of the state of Israel, refused to pressure Israel to pull out from land it had occupied before the Arab attempts to reach a regional peace agreement. Yet the defeat of the Arab states amidst US pressures also led to a transformation in the conflict, which shifted from a state-to-state conflict to a conflict between the state of Israel and Palestinian non-state armed resistance actors, mainly in Lebanon and Jordan. It also included Arab volunteers inspired to challenge Israeli state regional security and power hegemony assertions, as Egypt and Syria, suffering territory and armed losses, became entangled in the international peace resolution initiatives. As a result, South Lebanon became a primary theatre for Israeli-Palestinian armed operations,[324] functioning under a complex scheme of regional and international geodynamics. The rise of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) and the escalation of violence at the Lebanese-Israeli border saw the country divided over choosing a Lebanese state 'neutrality position', or officially endorsing and supporting the Palestinian right to armed resistance against Israel's occupation in Palestine.

---

[323] United Nations Security Council (1967), *Resolution 242*. issued 22 November 1967Retrieved May 2017) https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136
[324] Zittrain L. Eisenberg (1997), "Israel's South Lebanon Imbroglio", *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 4: no. 2, June.

Consequently, Lebanon moved from a peripheral role in the conflict to an immediate engagement in finding resolutions to an internationally and regionally complicated issue. With the escalation of Palestinian attacks from South Lebanon on Israel's northern border, Israeli retaliations were hard on Lebanon. Intensive attacks by Palestinian fighters into Israel from both Jordan and Lebanon in December 1968 triggered Israel into tough armed retaliations.[325] Israeli war planes attacked Beirut International Airport on 28 December 1968 destroying thirteen Lebanese commercial aircraft;[326] the Lebanese government was finally pressured into taking counter measures against the PLO operations in the South, which ended with clashes, thereby becoming a Lebanese domestic and an Arab regional-international dilemma. This led in October 1969 to the Cairo Agreement, sponsored by Nasser, which resolved the issue between the Lebanese army and the PLO by providing for PLO control over the Palestinian refugee camps and demanding full coordination for all PLO activities in support of the Lebanese army, in order not compromise Lebanese state sovereignty.[327]

However, Nasser's death shortly afterwards in September 1970, also meant the death of the Arab guarantor seeking compromise for stability in Lebanon or the region, and not compromising the mutual sovereignties of Lebanon or Arab states. Hence, internal sectarian divisions were to become fostered by new external forces and factors that diminished any post-Nasser Arab nationalist unity aspirations, mainly by dividing Arab unity in support of the Palestinian plight. In Jordan the army, which had initially cooperated and supported the Palestinian resistance, found itself in the month after Nasser's death at war with the PLO and forcefully expelling all its fighters from Jordan after what became known as the "Black September" conflict. This ended the PLO armed presence or resistance into the West Bank. As a result, the PLO moved all its operations into South Lebanon which became a "Fatah-land" under the control of Yasser Arafat, the leading member in the PLO organization, and his Fatah Movement.

Subsequently, a new era of escalating conflict relationships was to erupt between the Lebanese and Israeli states, influenced by a new Israeli-Palestinian armed conflict situation amidst an

---

[325] Robert Fisk (1990), *Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon* (New York: Atheneum), p. 75.
[326] ibid.
[327] William W. Harris (2005), *The New face of Lebanon: History's Revenge* (Princeton NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers), pp. 153-4.

official Arab state retreat from armed conflict with Israel, mainly after the failed 1973 Egyptian-Syrian war against Israel. Meanwhile, the continued escalation in acts of regional conflict and violence was to affect the domestic security situation in Lebanon with the country also facing political crisis and economic difficulties – fruitful conditions for armed conflict labour.

4.7. The Breakdown of the Post-Independence State of Lebanon

Politically, Lebanon remained divided over support for the Palestinian armed struggle, which became entangled with the country's traditional sectarian and neo-feudal political manipulations and overshadowed the domestic struggle for political or economic reform. This mainly concerned issues related to equal political representation and participation in the state, and ensuring equal economic, social or human development citizenship rights, which had been declining with the escalation towards regional conflict even before the outbreak of war in 1967. It created a political split, later framed through a secular left-wing nationalist opposition camp – the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) founded in 1969[328] which opposed the right-wing Maronite-dominated ruling establishment camp that came under the Lebanese Front (LF) organization in 1976.[329] In other words, in addition to the regional or domestic political conflicts that erupted, the Lebanese already had lengthily-postponed political, social or economic state reform issues – e.g., the exploiting of Lebanon's national economic interests for the prosperity of a capitalist and bourgeois social minority. The absence of transparency or political accountability in the Lebanese state turned the economy into a monopolistic structure, strengthening the domination of the corporate commercial and financial establishments, allied to or represented by the political establishment, in control of the state powers at both executive and legislative levels.[330]

Moreover, the economic structure that Michael Chiha had envisioned for Lebanon in 1926 as a compatible hub between East and West – or the sectarian political structure pending the transition

---

[328] The LNM was predominately Muslim and Leftist, mainly representing Kamal Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP); allied with the PLO. Its stronghold was in Muslim majority-populated West Beirut

[329] The LF, mostly representing right wing Maronite Christian players, Chamoun, Gemayel and Franjieh who were powers in the state, was headed by the Kataeb party and its military wing, the Lebanese Forces militia. Its stronghold was in Christian majority-populated East Beirut.

[330] Fawwaz Traboulsi (2012),. *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press), pp 156-193.

to the civil state – was not compatible with regional instability and conflict, especially the rising hegemony threats by Israel that Chiha had feared. Thus, a short-lived Lebanese prosperity, that had boomed in the early 1960s and contributed to the relative stability witnessed across the region following the 1958 crisis, came an end.[331] During that period Lebanon had seen huge economic prosperity and a financial boom, with its banking system attracting oil wealth capital from the Arab Gulf along with business and financial investments across the region and the world. Most prominent was the Intra Bank (owned by Palestinian banker Yousef Beidas), which nevertheless fell into a controversial collapse in October 1966, having contributed mainly to sectarian power exploitations affecting Lebanon's state economy and foreign policy interests in an atmosphere of regional conflict. Intra Bank had almost total control of Lebanon's economy, and had huge institutional and asset wealth, yet domestic, regional or international financial and political rivalries prior the 1967 war, also against Beidas, convinced the government not to even attempt to salvage Intra.[332]

Ironically, these domestic – foreign-oriented – financial or economic rivalries were to be settled straight after the June 1967 war (in the shadow of war). A "commercial monopoly was legally enshrined in the law decree no. 134 of August 1967", limiting foreign companies to exclusive domestic agents, and aiding the growth of a corporate and financial oligarchy that dominated Lebanon's economic and political destiny (for example, by 1973 five families controlled over half of Lebanon's import-export trade).[333] These events officially marked an end to President Chehab's era of administrative and political reform, which faced defeat through the rise of the new isolationist neo-liberal 'money sharks' in Lebanon who dominated the state's economy.[334] These events, along with governance decision-making behaviours, contributed to a doubling of living costs and increasing poverty in Lebanon, along with the war and threats of security instability from 1967 onwards, not to mention the surge in Palestinian refugees, or Lebanese escaping their Southern villages because of the escalating Israeli attacks.[335] Many Lebanese from rural areas of Lebanon also contributed to domestic migration, with most seeking shelter in the Beirut suburbs

---

[331] See the discussion on Chiha and on the 1958 Crisis in Chapter 1 *supra*.
[332] George de Carvalho, (1967), "Fall of the 'Genius from Jerusalem'", *Life Magazine*, 27 January 1967, pp. 87–89.
[333] Traboulsi, ibid., p. 157.
[334] Kamal Dib (2014), *Yousef Beidas: the Intra Empire and Money Sharks in Lebanon.*(Beirut: Dar Al-Nahar) [in Arabic].
[335] ibid, pp. 161-163.

in their search for a living, security, or job opportunities for better economic conditions. Simultaneously a new wave of Lebanese was leaving the country to escape state-enhanced marginalization and poverty, or the domestic conflict that followed from 1975 onwards.

In other words, Lebanon increasingly became hostage to state financial wealth and benefits monopoly exploitation through political dominance concentrated in the hands of feudal oligarchy sectarian cartels. This corrupt environment exploited an armed Palestinian resistance into being bribed by Arab Gulf wealth and symbolic political support for an exhausted 'Palestinian struggle' that had been firmly surrendered at the Arab state level. This mostly occurred after the 1973 war, when the Arab Gulf states had also to invest and deposit their petrodollar capital gains in Western banks, in support of the Western economic recession in Europe and the US after the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo which lasted until mid-March 1974 and led to a sharp increase in oil prices.[336] Hence, the Arab Gulf states had to compensate for international financial and economic losses as a result of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War – which also became the last war fought between Israel and any participant Arab states. Repeated defeats against Israel became consciously embedded in Arab political culture, which became split over the significance of war against an Israel that enjoyed endless American support. Lebanon on the other hand was the most fertile ground on which to fight for the newly-orphaned Arab political struggle, trapped in a conflict which had entered through its back door.[337]

It remained politically split and dominated under domestic, regional and international power hegemony struggles that ended with foreign- and Arab-funded civil war conflicts that later brought formal foreign political or armed invasions into Lebanon. on the domestic security and political levels, the results of the 1972 parliamentary elections in Lebanon were a major setback for the country's rising divisions and led to LNM protests over the way the Lebanese political system blocked participation by all forces in the society (mainly non-sectarian representation in parliament). This escalated into intensive political and economic protests, including the anti-

---

[336] Victor Zarniwitz and Geoffrey Moore (1977), "The Recession and Recovery of 1973-1976", *Explorations in Economic Research*, vol. 4, no 4 (National Bureau of Economic Research and the University of Chicago, October 1977. http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9101.pdf
[337] Farid El Khazen (2000), *The Breakdown of the State of Lebanon: 1967-1976.* (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press), pp. 140-75.

privatization protests of February 1975 by the fishermen of Sidon, and led by the popular Nasserite leader Maarouf Saad against the fishing enterprise Proteine (owned by former President Chamoun), which sought to monopolize the fishing industry.[338]

Saad, who had lost the parliamentary elections in 1972, was strongly opposed to both financial and economic monopolies in the country, which were harmful to the rights of the poor, being framed in political monopoly, and denying nationalist or secular political representation in parliament, the state institutions, or in governance. As a strong supporter of Palestinian rights in Lebanon and Palestinian nationalist right for liberation, Saad openly criticised exploitative or corrupt resistance behaviour, becoming a respected mediator with and amongst Palestinian factions.

Maarouf Saad was brutally assassinated during the anti-privatization protest on 6 March 1975, reportedly by Lebanese Army fire,[339] in a precursor of the violence of the long Lebanese civil war that was to follow soon after. His assassination escalated into further social and political justice protests that finally exploded into civil violence on 13 April 1975, this time following a massacre against a Palestinian civilian convoy crossing in East Beirut, allegedly in retaliation for a Palestinian attack on members of the Christian Phalanges (Ktaeb). This marked the beginning of war, yet enclosed it as a Muslim-Christian conflict. It also lured the Palestinian armed resistance into corrupt sectarian neo-feudal conflicts, thus exploiting the former both domestically and externally.

The country sank into full chaos under unstable political and security threats. Beirut became split into Eastern and Western district quarters dominated by a sectarian hegemony of violence which, by 1976, had contributed to the splitting of the Lebanese army and state institutions. Thus, the LNM opposition drifted away from its political reform protests and into new reform negotiations under fire.[340] The LF on the other hand, announced itself as a resistance force to defend Lebanon

---

[338] Bassil A. Mardelli (2012), *Middle East Perspectives: from Lebanon 1968-1988* (Bloomington IN: iUniverse), p. 260.
[339] Kamal Dib (2004), *Warlords and Merchants: the Lebanese Business and Political Establishment* (Reading: Ithaca Press/Garnet), p. 259.
[340] Traboulsi (2012), op.cit., pp 156-193.

from foreign armed interventions that were threatening Christian as well as Lebanese sovereignty rights in the state. Ironically, it still represented the deep state that dominated power at official domestic and foreign levels, thereby inviting most of the foreign interventions that followed, including the domestic political gap that, with the collapse of the state, was filled by the PLO.

4.8. A Prolonged Civil War of Domestic Conflict, Foreign Intervention, and Resistance

Regional conflict and external intervention, along with the sectarian divisions and some very satisfactory domestic-external funding, prolonged the war in Lebanon, overshadowing any genuine domestic resolution of the state power rule issue in the country which soon became an arena for inter-Arab and international conflict and domination.[341] During the first few months of war, the LNM initiated a transitional resolution, issued in August 1975, assuring democratic reforms in the Lebanese political system and demanding: "abolition of the system of political and administrative sectarian quotas; a voluntary civil code for personal status; a new electoral law based on proportional representation in which Lebanon would become a single electoral district; extensive administrative decentralization, and the convocation of a constituent assembly on a non-sectarian basis."[342] Pierre Gemayel, the Ktaeb leader, accepted the LNM's demands for state secularization, which would ensure distribution to administrative posts in the government based on competence, and would establish the foundations of a move towards the full abolition of sectarianism in the Lebanese political structure and all state posts, including parliamentary representation.[343]

However, as this went into further discussion, including all the sectarian and inter-sectarian powers under a Committee for National Dialogue (CND), sharp divisions became evident within both opposed and allied sectarian representatives over the details, processes, duration, or mechanisms of implementation of the principal agreement, finally becoming exploited by continued violence and foreign intervention. This started with an armed Syrian intervention in June 1976, invited by President Franjieh, to prevent a projected LNM victory in its battles against the LF. Yet the Syrian

---

[341] Michael Johnson (2001), *All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon* (London; I. B. Tauris), pp. 65-67.
[342] Traboulsi, ibid., p. 195.
[343] ibid.

intervention also came under regional divisions and 'shy' approvals, after all previous Arab or Syrian mediation attempts to help in bringing conflict to an end had failed. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who were worried about a PLO-Syrian conflict escalation, also sent troops in November 1976 under the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), which was deployed in Beirut to help mediate and secure peace amongst all parties.[344] The US also mediated the Syrian intervention to prevent any escalation with Israel, while also engaged with Egypt in peace negotiations efforts following the end of the 1973 War.[345]

Syria, however, was concerned about its national security interests and the mechanisms for peace amidst the ongoing conflict across its borders in Lebanon, and in the regional conflict with Israel, which was Assad's greatest worry. Syria was also uneasy about an Israeli intervention in Lebanon since the Ktaeb had established contacts with Israel as early as September 1975, but Israel was still not ready to rush for a military intervention in Lebanon or to provide armed support to the LF free of political concessions.[346] Hence, reading in the 'history book' of Lebanon or the Levant suggests that Syria's political and security stability have always been influenced by events in Lebanon, especially Damascus since the historic path for its Western invasions had usually passed through Beirut.

As for Israel, all its traditional beliefs in seeking a unilateral peace with Lebanon remained associated with supporting an isolationist Maronite political ideology – which had failed in Lebanon (in fact being also one of the main reasons for the country's domestic conflicts). Nevertheless, passions in Israel over reviving special Maronite-Zionist relationships were soon to dominate as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat contested with Syrian President Assad over an Arab peace strategy with Israel.[347] Syria had faced harsh consequences as a result of Sadat's tactics or overall war strategy in 1973, mainly in concealing his real intentions about the war and thereby upsetting an eminent Syrian victory in retrieving the Golan Heights, and raising Syria's suspicions

---

[344] Alexander Orakhelashvili (2011), *Collective Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 314.
[345] Moshe Maoz (1995), *Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 165. Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, supported a Syrian role in Lebanon, especially after comments made by Syria's President Hafez Assad to the effect that "he stood for a settlement with Israel formalized by a peace treaty".
[346] Traboulsi (2012), op.cit., pp. 201-203.
[347] Eisenberg (1997), op.cit.

over Sadat's approach to peace.[348] Finally, news of Sadat's sudden visit to Israel in November 1977 shocked the Syrians and prompted an alteration to their political and security tactics in Lebanon,[349] causing them to retreat from any commitment to crush the PLO and the LNM, yet bringing disappointment to Bashir Pierre Gemayel, who headed the armed wing of the Kataeb (which also became known as the Lebanese Forces – LFs).

 By 1978 Bashir had declared an armed resistance against Syria, clashing with them in demanding the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. An Arab-brokered agreement finally resolved the conflict, forcing the Syrian troops outside Eastern Beirut. Meanwhile, Israel had launched an invasion into South Lebanon (Operation Litani) in March 1978, aimed at pushing the PLO forces away from its borders up to the Litani River. This was in retaliation for an armed operation (led by 19 year-old Dalal Mughrabi with a group of Palestinian and Lebanese militants) that had reached Tel-Aviv. Their aim had been to kidnap hostages to exchange for Palestinian prisoners,[350] while also derailing the Egyptian-Israeli peace discussions between Israeli Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat.[351] At that stage Bashir had also succeeded officially in attracting Israeli financial and arms support while the civil war continued to escalate.

Despite the disparity in the senior command of the LF over relations with Syria, Bashir continued his political escalation against Syria, even assassinating his prominent Christian opponents in the LF (including Tony Franjieh in June 1978, and Dany Chamoun in July 1980). Moreover, as Bashir strengthened his secret relationships with Israel, he also pursued his armed conflict against the Syrians, mainly during the 1981 battles of Zahle in the Beqaa region. Hence, this also marked the beginning of a new chapter in Israeli-Lebanese conflict and peace relations, also influenced, as early as June 1977, by the domestic political scene in Israel and the rise of its right-wing Likud

---

[348] Sadat's political and armed plan was to invade only a limited kilometre range in Sinai in order to heat up negotiations with Israel, thus allowing his friend Kissinger to help him reach a promised US peace agreement with Israel if it accepted to withdraw fully from Sinai.

[349] Marius Deeb (2003), *Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process*. , New York: Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 33-36.

[350] Moshe Brilliant (1978), "Israeli officials Say Gunmen Intended to Seize Hotel", *The New York Times*, 13 March 1978.

[351] Time Magazine (1978), "A Sabbath of Terror", *Time Magazine*, 20 March 1978. Online at: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,919454,00.html

party.[352] Although the 1978 Israeli invasion into Lebanon was internationally condemned and led to UNSCR 425 (which ordered Israel to withdraw immediately from South Lebanon, with a new UN Interim Force In Lebanon – UNIFIL – established in South Lebanon to restore peace and security at the borders[353]), Israel firmly refused to leave, its intention being to maintain its access to, and presence in, the positions it had invaded in South Lebanon, and which had been assigned to its South Lebanon Army (SLA) official proxy militia.[354] The SLA in fact became the underdog for Israel to deflect any international condemnations of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) for committing criminal acts of war against civilians, or using excessive violence, occasionally also against the UNIFIL forces.

On the other hand, the showdown between Syria and Israel over defending their security interests in Lebanon remained, especially with the ongoing regional and international efforts for peace. Seeing Yasser Arafat (leader of the PLO) becoming more favourable towards Sadat's approach for gradual peace, Syria became worried over a split in the Arab ranks concerning a peace resolution with Israel, especially after Sadat had signed a peace agreement with Israel at Camp David in September 1978 (endorsed by US President Jimmy Carter), and had reached an official Peace Treaty with Egypt in March 1979. The Syrians therefore sought to strengthen their approach for peace by improving relations and coordination with the PLO. Israel, however, turned its focus towards the permanent elimination of the PLO in Lebanon, pressurizing Syria through US accusations of sponsoring the PLO's "acts of terror" against Israel or being opposed to the peace efforts in the Middle East. This led, in December 1979, to Syria becoming a host on the USA's list of "State Sponsors of Terrorism".[355]

---

[352] Likud came to power in 1977 after defeating the Israeli left wing for the first time ever in Israeli political history. While the Labour PM, Yitzhak Rabin, was more cautious towards the complications of intervening in Lebanese domestic conflicts, Menachem Begin, the Likud Prime Minister, favoured the armed power option.

[353] United Nations Security Council Resolutions 425. *Israel-Lebanon UNSCR 425*. Issued 19 March 1978. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/425 (Retrieved May 2017)

[354] The SLA was formed mainly of local members of a former Lebanese army battalion unit that had left when the army broke up with the beginning of civil war in 1976; they were annoyed about the PLO presence in the South region. Its command was mainly Maronite; its members were from the local Shia communal majority, or the local Christian, Druze or Sunni communal minorities in South Lebanon who were forced to join its ranks or face the pressure of deportation.

[355] US Department of State, Bureau of Counter Terrorism (n.d.), "State Sponsors of Terrorism." https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm

At the same time, and into the early 1980s, Syria was beginning to be confronted by domestic conflict, mainly through the acts of terror committed by the rebellious Muslim Brotherhood, which increasingly were aggressively crushed by the state. The region was also coming under the influence of Cold War conflicts or regional rebellions, mainly in the exploitation of Islam as a deterrent to Soviet communism. This had started with Sadat, who unleashed the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt as a means of suppressing leftist or Nasserist inspiration in the country, but which in fact led to his assassination by the MB in 1981.

It was also due to the US favouring an Islamic regime in Iran, as opposed to communism, yet also losing Iran as a strategic ally and ending with an Islamic Revolution (January 1978-February 1979) that was inimical to both the US and Israel (the Iranians even turned the Israeli embassy in Tehran over to the PLO;[356]this became the first Palestinian embassy in the region). Finally there was US support for the Mujahedeen war in Afghanistan against the Soviets (December 1979-February 1989). All these developments affected future events in Lebanon, the region, and in international affairs.

4.8.1. Israeli State Peace and a Security Zoning Trap in Lebanon

Despite the state of calm at the Lebanese-Israeli border, unprecedented since 1968,[357] Israel decided to reinvade Lebanon in June 1982 under Operation Peace for the Galilee.[358] This time, having reached the capital, Beirut, they kept away from bombardments and siege until they had finally succeeded in forcing the PLO out of Lebanon at the end of August 1982, under a US-brokered agreement.[359] This strategy led to divided opinions domestically among the Israelis over

---

[356] Brandenburg, Rachel (2010). "Iran and the Palestinians", *The Iran Primer*, United States Institute of Peace. Washington DC .Online at: http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-palestinians
[357] Benny Morris (1999), *Righteous Victims: a History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999* (New York: Knopf), p. 507.
[358] Helena Cobban (1984), *The Palestinian Liberation Organization.*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) p.120. The US envoy to the region Philip Habib had brokered a successful Israeli-PLO ceasefire agreement, preventing escalations since July 1981. Nonetheless, the invasion pretext for eliminating the PLO, which denied involvement, was ironically the assassination attempt on Israel's ambassador in Britain by the Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization, opposed to the PLO.
[359] Allowing the PLO fighters to exit with their arms through the port of Beirut to Tunisia was intended to prevent an Israeli invasion of the city. The US was to ensure the safety of the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut under a Multi-National Force (MNF) that included American, French and Italian peacekeepers.

the impact of their invasion into Lebanon and its capital city Beirut,[360] and became in addition a final test of the new peace agreement with Egypt,[361] which remained unshaken despite Sadat's departure. Therefore it was also significant to defeat the PLO in Lebanon, in order to prevent its international recognition as the representative of the Palestinian people; and to break the thinking and morale of any potential Palestinian liberationists under an Israeli annexation strategy for the West Bank that would limit Palestinian autonomy in their residential areas.[362] Furthermore, the Zionist right wing in power in Israel believed that Arab-Jewish coexistence would never be possible; thus they aimed to strike back strongly against any rising national Palestinian resistance wherever it existed.[363]

This was fairly clearly reflected in the aggressive invasion, which was extremely costly for Lebanon, leaving over 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians dead and many more injured or displaced. Shockingly, Israel had also used highly sophisticated and prohibited weapons in its operations, claiming that its attacks were aimed only at the PLO terrorist organization and not at Lebanon.[364] Moreover, despite the PLO having departed from Beirut, Israel still invaded the city and risked the safety of Beirut's Palestinian refugee camps – where it oversaw the LF Sabra and Shatilla massacre, and slaughtered more than two thousand Palestinian refugees and impoverished Lebanese civilians living there[365] – again in violation of the US brokered agreement. The Syrian forces, on the other hand, had faced major losses at the early stage of the invasion, but were able to deter the Israeli forces as they pushed towards Beqaa – especially in the Sultan Yacoub battle in which the Israelis experienced huge losses. A Syrian army battalion was also trapped in Western

[360] Ariel Sharon (1982), "The Sharon Doctrine", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3, Spring, 1982, pp. 167-172. After winning the June 1981 Israeli elections, PM Begin had more right wing friends and influence inside his cabinet during the war, mainly with General Ariel Sharon, Israel's Defence Minister, in their new vision for Lebanon or the region.

[361] Ilan Pelege (1987), *Begin's Foreign Policy, 1977-1983: Israel's Move to the Right* (New York & London: Greenwood), p. 155.

[362] ibid, pp. 150-51. Begin and Sharon were worried about the international recognition the PLO was receiving in representing the political plight to the Palestinian people, and successfully maintaining ceasefires at the Israeli-Lebanese border, especially since Begin's foreign policy aimed to annex the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories, mainly in the West Bank. In fact, there was neo-Revisionist Zionist vision, represented in the Cabinet by the Likud party and its extreme right-wing forces who were not happy that the PLO could possibly become their diplomatic partner for peace negotiations while maintaining an armed power endorsed by the international community.

[363] Ilan Peleg (2005). **"**The Zionist Right and Constructivist Realism: Ideological Persistence and Tactical Readjustment", *Israel Studies*, vol.10, no.3, pp. 127-153.

[364] Robert Fisk (2002), *Pity the Nation: the Abduction of Lebanon* (new ed.) (NY: Thunder's Mouth Press), p. 197.

[365] ibid, pp. 363-369.

Beirut during the Israeli invasion and fought fiercely alongside the PLO factions, until a US-mediated agreement was reached that secured Syria's withdrawal from Beirut to Lebanon's Beqaa Valley region at the Eastern borders with Syria.

Nevertheless, Israel still failed to achieve its anticipated second peace treaty with Lebanon, after Egypt. Instead it became trapped in sectarian political and ideological complications in the shattered Lebanese state – starting in mid-September 1982 with the assassination (by SSNP member Habib Shartouni, who was a Christian), of Bashir Gemayel, only days before he took office after being elected President a month earlier – which gradually confused Israel's political plan for Lebanon. Moreover, Israeli troops came under attack by the Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF),[366] which marked the rise to new armed resistance against Israel. Subsequently, Israel pulled out from Beirut at the end of September, to be replaced by the returning Multi-National Force (MNF) which included American, French, and Italian peacekeepers, and with Amin Gemayel, Bashir's brother, being elected as Lebanon's new President.

However, the domestic political and security situation remained in jeopardy in the midst of continued armed conflict with Lebanese divisions over a peace resolution with Israel, as a condition for pulling out from the rest of Lebanon. Bashir's Lebanese Forces became an extremist Christian-Maronite front, supported by Israel engaged in a new war against the LNRF. On the other hand, the LNRF remained determined to resist and oppose Israeli armed and political interventions in Beirut, and allied itself with the new Shia Amal Movement that had been led by Nabih Berri since 1980.

In May 1983 Israel attempted to reach a signed peace accord with Lebanon; brokered by the US, it became known as the 17 May Accord but met strong resistance from the LNRF and objections from the Syrians who had been left out of the negotiations.[367] The accord provided with Israel continued surveillance and security control in South Lebanon, thus disregarding any Lebanese state sovereignty or mutual security concerns. Subsequently, the LNRF continued its resistance

---

[366] The LNRF represented the Lebanese Left. It was announced by LCP SG George Hawi as being inclusive of most of the former factions under the LNM umbrella, mainly the PSP led by Walid Kamal Junmblat who had become the new Druze leader following his father's assassination in March 1977.
[367] Helena Cobban (1985), *The Making of Modern Lebanon* (London: Hutchinson), p. 203.

operations against Israeli troops and raising their death toll, which started to put pressure on the Israeli-conditioned resolution for peace.

In September 1983, in an attempt to pressure President Gemayel into officially signing the peace accord, Israel pulled out from the Alay and Shouf regions in Mount Lebanon. This led to clashes between Druze PSP forces and Christian Lebanese Forces, causing civilian massacres and displacement of Christian residents, and bringing back old memories of the 1860 Druze-Maronite Mount Lebanon civil war. Moreover, by the end of 1983 the MNF had withdrawn from Beirut following a series of deadly attacks against French, Italian and US troops by unknown radical Shia militants. The worst, in October 1983, was an attack against the US Marines barracks that killed at least 241 US Marines.[368]

In February 1984 intensive conflicts erupted when President Gemayel assigned a new Lebanese Army unit to take charge of security in West Beirut. Though aimed at disarming all Lebanese militias, it resulted in massive arrests leading to further tensions and accusations of coordination with the Lebanese Forces' militants in East Beirut, and finally ended in armed clashes with Amal and LNRF, forcing them out of West Beirut. American Navy ships also became militarily engaged in bombing PSP and Amal positions in West Beirut.[369]

Nonetheless, on 5 March 1984, and faced strong opposition from Amal and PSP who were represented by Berri and Jumblatt in the government, the Lebanese government renounced the peace accord with Israel, thereby also forcing Gemayel to turn back to the Syrians. The major disappointment this caused for Israel led to its partial withdrawal from Lebanon in February 1985, with the pull-back to South Lebanon and Western Beqaa forming a 'buffer security zone' that could prevent armed attacks into Israel and cut down its military loss.[370] Nonetheless, it also meant occupation of the Shia-concentrated towns and villages in South Lebanon or Beqaa – historically

---

[368] Timothy J. Geraghty (2009), *Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983 – the Marine Commander Tells His Story* (Washington DC: Potomac Books), p. 185.
[369] Robert C. McFarlane (2008). "From Beirut to 9/11", *The New York Times*, 23October 2008. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/opinion/23mcfarlane.html
[370] Helena Cobban (1985), op.cit., p. 203

state-marginalized agricultural communities under feudal monopoly, and traditionally dependent on trade and labour with Palestine.

This contributed to further communal displacement, pushing families already living in the poverty belt of the southern suburbs of Beirut into escaping to the Israeli aggressions in the South that had historically caused its deprived economy. Overall, until the 1982 invasion, the indigenous population in the South had not strongly resisted or opposed Israel's armed intervention in Lebanon, which was blamed on the armed Palestinian presence and the Arab-exploited conflict with Israel. But after ending up with an Israeli and SLA occupation of their lands and villages that replaced the Palestinian armed presence, their lack of security strengthened their resistance sentiment to an armed liberation struggle.[371] Consequently, by 1985 Israel was to encounter a new local enemy in South Lebanon which fought fiercely to liberate the occupied lands that historically, used as agricultural land, had formed the main source of its income.

Yet the dominant fate of the Lebanese state was to remain hostage to the foreign 'states' and domestic sub-states within the state, influenced by an Arab-Israeli peace and conflict situation, and with a newly-acquired resistance that created a new security trap for the state of Israel. From 1985 onwards, especially with the retreat of the LNRF (Lebanese Leftist resistance) by the end of the Cold War, Hezbollah – supported by an Islamic Revolution Iran and an Arab Secular Syria – carried the burden of armed resistance against the Israeli occupation, under the umbrella of the Islamic Resistance In Lebanon (IRIL).

4.9. Conclusion

This chapter looked at how the unique historical diversity of multi-sectarian coexistence in Lebanon, or the conflicts that contributed to foreign interventions, remain associated with its unique geopolitical dynamics. Located in the Levant region, important for its trade and/or modern-day energy resources, this is also a region that marks the beginnings of recorded human history and of human spiritual or material civilizations that are worthy of exploration. It possesses an

---

[371] Laura Eisenberg (1997), op.cit.

ancient timeline of cultural geo-dynamics which began before the beginning of language in human history and contributed to a human mind evolution that has accelerated knowledge since the discovery of the alphabets. These have become the principal means of writing, storing and sharing that knowledge, preserving it in written documents or texts, including religious books, that remain accessible today whether by researchers, scholars or curious individual humans.

Yet the same historical geo-dynamics that could have been the reason why it flourished in Lebanon or the region have also kept the country hostage to its power hegemony conflicts over how to revive its ancient history. Knowledge has been influenced by religious or transnational corporate sectarianism, occasionally becoming a pretext for conflicts in manipulating the search for regional sovereignty. Since its evolution in Westphalia, it has been assessed through comparison with the modern state struggle since reaching the twentieth century, with two Great Wars producing the twenty-first century's current modern state world order. It is an evolution that may be attractive to researchers in the various social and human sciences, mainly in the field of foreign policy affected by international relations, global issues and affairs, or international politics, or by domestic political issues such as those in the Middle East state; all are significant in examining and assessing foreign policy obstacles in the region.

The chapter concludes that it is extremely important to understand the historic demographic, geographic and geopolitical dimensions of Lebanese society in order to make sense of the domestic-external geodynamics in Lebanon's political structure. It again affirms that it is impossible to read or understand the Lebanese situation without examining the state's macro-structural rule and institutions through an alternative pluralist theoretical approach. This will assess the quantum-dimensions of multi-predictable and unpredictable behaviours, events or occasions, at a given time, place, or in situations that influence, or are affected by, the reality on the ground. When investigating the State Quest, especially in regions of conflict, war and violence where readiness and awareness of human security are present (in practical material reality, spiritual or intellectual terms, or through symbolic actions), such an approach is an asset, particularly for investigating state sovereignty. In Lebanon this could be described as hybrid sovereignty within complex quantum sovereignty, regional and domestic orders. Again, it contributes to skilful sub-state individual and communal initiatives, both visible and invisible, that

grow into state projects, either by way of the decision-makers in power or through those who make the "cultural treasures" for the state's free cultural human trades, and beyond. Yet Lebanon still faces regional and international conflict challenges that also contribute to the negative domestic sectarian divisions threatening Lebanese state sovereignty, especially at the economic level, and amidst continued security issues with Israel and its regional rivals, alongside the United States.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE INTERPLAY OF STATES AND SUB-STATES WITHIN A CONFLICT STATE

In considering the active role in conflict resolution of sub-state forces and foreign states within a state facing war and violence amidst complex geo-political, economic or intellectual dynamics, this chapter examines further the interplay between sub-state, state and foreign power authority in reaching an official end to Lebanon's civil war in October 1990, but not ending the causes of conflict. It considers the domestic-external patterns and dynamics around regional peace and conflict faced by Lebanon under the continued Israeli 'security zone' in South Lebanon that lasted until May 2000, as well as Syria's post-civil war regional-international 'security deal' in Lebanon that ended in April 2005. The chapter also continues the scrutiny of Lebanon's historic timeline of domestic and external conflict, hegemony and security issues amidst regional instability and foreign intervention, but remains focused on the behaviour of sub-state forces towards the state, relating mainly to Lebanese politics or to foreign policy decisions influenced by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the regional struggle for peace that affected the sovereign state question in Lebanon, the region, and in international relations, in the post-Cold War era.

5.1. Lebanon: From Multi-Faith Resistance to National Leftist Resistance into Lebanese Islamic Resistance

Interestingly, in further examining behaviour towards sub-state forces amidst civil war, foreign invasions, and regional conflict, Lebanon offers a unique opportunity to examine a new modern history timeline of political Islam and violence in the region, especially in relation to the international or wider regional references *vis-à-vis* the conflict with Israel. In principle, the majority of Lebanese Muslims (Sunni and Shia) supported the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel, but their commitment to this struggle tended to be phrased within a secular-left or Arab-nationalist vernacular and terminology, whether by directly joining armed Palestinian factions or having their own factions, such as the Sunni secular-oriented Popular Nasserites Organization (PNO) or the al-Murabitoun; or the Shia secular-structured Amal Movement. Some Lebanese Sunnis still maintained religious affiliations, forming or joining Islamic-oriented factions such as the Islamic Unification Movement (IUM-Tawhid), founded in Tripoli in 1982, or the Muslim Brotherhood-influenced Islamic Group of Lebanon (Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya), founded in 1964. Even so, none of these Islamic groups was opposed to the state in Lebanon, or against Lebanese

national reconciliation; nor did they take any major role in the domestic conflict in Lebanon.[372] On the contrary they supported the PLO resistance efforts against Israel, and joined the resistance efforts against the Israeli occupation in 1982, although some were also inspired by the newly-rising Muslim Mujahedin war against communism in Afghanistan, especially towards the late 1980s.

However, Lebanese and Palestinian Sunni youth were generally less interested in or attracted to participating in Jihad war in Afghanistan. On the contrary, most young Lebanese and Palestinian Sunnis in Lebanon travelled abroad in pursuit of educational scholarships for study. Some were offered by universities in the Soviet Union, while Saudi-supported funding by the Hariri Foundation, established in the mid-1980s, provided scholarship opportunities to study in Europe or the United States. Furthermore, the Sunni community in Lebanon was also under the leadership of Grand Mufti Shaikh Hassan Khalid, who was well-known for his moderate religious and nationalist views. Strongly opposed to the civil war in Lebanon, Shaikh Khalid had maintained moderate Sunni sentiments, and abhorred the extremist Wahhabi ideology that had invaded the region for Arab Mujahedin recruits in Afghanistan. Indeed, he was opposed to all types of religious violence or extremism and therefore engaged with the Torah, the Bible and the Qur'an when addressing subjects of science or human tolerance and coexistence in Islam. Yet he was assassinated towards the end of the civil war in 1989,[373] almost two years after the assassination of Rashid Karami, the moderate Sunni Prime Minister, in 1987.

In other words, despite the long civil war in Lebanon no Sunni-Shia sectarian sentiments or conflicts whatsoever were to erupt, nor were any such sentiments to rise during Saddam Hussain's eight-year war against Shia Islam and Iran (1980-1988) which, endorsed by the US and Arab Gulf states, he promoted as an Arab-Persian conflict. Notwithstanding Saddam's torture and murder of prominent Iraqi Shia Imams – including Sayed Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr who was persecuted in 1980 for his views and writings in support of the Islamic Revolution – the war against Iran still

---

[372] Tawhid had clashed with the SSNP and the Syrian Army in Tripoli in 1985, after the PLO's return to Tripoli in 1983 led to Syrian intervention in 1985, whereas Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya used to remain neutral and even mediated conflict situations between the Palestinian factions in Sidon, alongside the Popular Nasserite Organization (PNO).
[373] Ihsan A. Hijazi (1989), "Sunni Muslim Chief Killed in Lebanon", *The New York Times*, 17 May 1989, online at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/17/world/sunni-muslim-chief-killed-in-lebanon.html

did not take the shape of a Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict. Even so, like all other events in the region, this war came about during the Cold War era that was embedded in other global ideological conflicts and competitions. In this context, it also formulated for Iran an ideology of anti-repression defended by an Iranian Islamic revolution in a country that was historically opposed to the Cold War dichotomies of a Communist East or the hegemony of Western imperialism,[374] and inherited by an American imperialist supremacy that was regionally symbolized by the state of Israel.

5.1.1. Imam Sadr's Resistance Movement against Oppressive Domestic and Foreign Tyranny

This imperialist supremacy was also opposed by the Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF) which was formed by the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) in opposition to the Israeli invasion in 1982, and by a new Shia-armed Lebanese Islamic resistance movement, Hezbollah, which had emerged in reaction to the newly-announced Israeli security zone in South Lebanon in 1985.

Although inspired and supported by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Hezbollah's main military or ideological nucleus had formed even before the beginning of the revolution in Iran or the civil war in Lebanon, having developed under the Lebanese Resistance Battalions (LRB) or Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya (AMAL). Amal made its first political appearance in 1974, presenting itself as a Lebanese nationalist movement seeking to represent weak, deprived and dispossessed citizens from across all the Lebanese sects that were being marginalized by the state. The Amal Movement itself was officially founded in January 1975 (though with earlier antecedents) as a social and political movement. However, after the disappearance of its cofounder Imam Musa Sadr in 1978 and particularly with the arrival of his second successor Nabih Berri in 1980, many of the movement's leading members had detached themselves from Amal, because of its drift into the civil conflict, allied with LNM,[375] although it also joined the LNRF against Israel in 1982.

---

[374] Following the overthrow of Mosaddegh in a coup d'état engineered by the US in 1953.
[375] J. Palmer-Harik (2004), *Hezbollah: the Changing Face of Terrorism* (London: I. B. Tauris).

In addition to Imam Musa Sadr (who also founded Lebanon's Supreme Islamic Shia Council, which he headed in 1969), Amal was co-founded by parliamentarian Hussein al-Husseini (who became Parliament Speaker in 1984),[376] to represent a nationalist secular-religious Lebanese Shia political movement that sought to replace the dominant family-inherited feudal power leadership in the Shia sect. Hence, Amal was also opposed to the equally pervasive foreign-supported feudal-sectarian political and socio-economic hegemony of all other Lebanese sects, and also called for the abolition of the dominance of political sectarianism, for bringing equal harm to both (inter- or cross intra-) sectarian and secular national Lebanese interests in the state. Moreover, Sadr had constantly emphasised Christian-Muslim unity even before the outbreak of war in 1975. During a visit to a Christian church in Beirut and another in Beqaa he delivered sermons that warned against the risk of sectarian war, emphasising that while Lebanese sectarian diversity was a blessing, political sectarianism was a curse, especially during times of foreign-influenced political strife.[377] Even after the civil war had begun, Sadr remained actively engaged in the organisation of anti-war peace protests, and openly pleaded for Arab support to help end the war, especially after the first Israeli invasion of 1978.

In other words, Imam Sadr, who opposed both domestic corruption and foreign oppression and occupation, sought a multi-sectarian diversity in which his domestic priorities were focused on preventing additional moral or physical injury that resulted from foreign violence and from the domestic, social, and economic injustices inflicted on all indigenous Lebanese human populations. Sadr also supported the Palestinian right of return and resistance against Israel, and reflected strong condemnation of the Israeli revenge attacks on Lebanon, confirming a Lebanese right and obligation to armed resistance. He cited the Prophet's grandson, Imam Hussein, who had reiterated that "individuals have the right, and even an obligation, to make sacrifices in self-defence for the rejection of the rule of tyranny",[378] and accordingly had tried to promote resistance as a legitimate, dignified, moral and ethical human obligation that aimed to fight oppression, yet was conditioned by faith aside from sectarian or religious belongings.

---

[376] Vali Nasr (2006), *The Shia Revival* (New York, W.W. Norton & Company), p. 85.
[377] Giles Trendie, and Abdallah Al-Binni (2012), "The Imam and the Colonel", *Al-Jazeera*, 24 July 2012. Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2012/06/201262711475105411.html
[378] Imam Musa Sadr on Hussein, http://imamsadr.net/News/news.php?NewsID=6254&pnum=1

Correspondingly, Musa Sadr sought support from the PLO in the formation and training of a Lebanese armed resistance battalion (LRB), announced under Amal as the resistance of the faithful to a multi-sectarian resistance by the believers in national armed resistance. The LRB's purpose was to defend civilian communities in South Lebanon, while the state was absent from carrying out its official security obligations, especially amidst the rising domestic divisions in Lebanon over the issue of Palestinian armed resistance. Hence, Sadr's perception of his concepts of multi-sectarian national co-existence, and peaceful rebellion or resistance, also reflected the intellectual Islamic state identity he had promoted.

Something similar had been observed in Iran during the outbreak of its revolution in January 1978, before it drifted away from reform, distracted by external security threats, economic sanctions or the violence of war; however, this also related to the personal history and the influential relationships Sadr had developed in Iran and the region long before the revolution. The Iman was born in Qom, the city to which his great-great grandfather had migrated (from a village in Jabal Amel near the city of Tyre in South Lebanon), after an anti-Ottoman uprising during the nineteenth century.[379] Interestingly, the ancestral grandfather had turned east towards Najaf (in Iraq) and later Isfahan (in Iran), unlike many of the Lebanese diaspora who usually travelled West; yet this also seems to have been influential in Sadr's thinking on concepts of state liberation, resistance to occupation, and economic oppression.

Moreover, at one of Iran's principal Shia Islamic schools in Qom and at other prominent Shia religious schools including Al-Najaf in Iraq, the Imam had been active in debates on awakening Islamic tolerance; while studying in Qom and Najaf during the late 1950s, he had also established a significant network of connections with prominent Iranian, Iraqi and Lebanese Shia and other Muslim scholars and clerics which had developed into close intellectual, political or personal links and family friendships.[380] In Syria, Musa developed a personal relationship with Hafez Assad, who also became friendly with Sadr's network, especially with individuals in the Iranian opposition, since Assad was disappointed by the Shah's leniency towards Israel after the 1973

---

[379] Hussein Chehabi and Rula Jurdi Abisaab (2006), *Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years* (London: I. B.Tauris).

[380] Nadia Von Maltzahn (2015), *The Syria-Iran Axis: Cultural Diplomacy and International Relations in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris), p. 24.

Arab-Israeli war.[381] In fact, the Shah had opposed Arab national interests and had even expressed concerns over pan-Arabism, which he claimed was "rooted in Moscow's influence" in the region, while also complaining about the Palestinian armed resistance which had supported the Iranian opposition groups before the revolution.[382]

In addition, the Shah had also developed relations with Israel, which he had maintained at low visibility levels since as early as 1957. These connections oversaw an arrangement in which Iran's intelligence service (Savak) cooperated with the Israeli intelligence agency (Mossad), a matter about which the Iranian Foreign Ministry was kept in the dark.[383] Even the Iranian military and secret police operatives were secretly trained by Israeli intelligence officers in both Iran and Israel, and Israel had also sold high-tech military equipment to Iran. However, Mossad's training of the Savak also included torture techniques that were then applied in interrogations of the Iranian opposition[384] this, in addition, contributed to an Iranian opposition nationalist hostility with Israel. Thus, such relationships were not just based on power considerations but were also grounded in personal ties to common beliefs that had formed the basis for the Syrian-Iranian alliance after the Islamic revolution.[385] These relationships also facilitated preparations and support for the revolution in Iran, such as the PLO training the first Iranian revolutionaries in Lebanon prior to the Shah's removal.[386]

Although Sadr succeeded in establishing excellent relations with Syria in promoting his Arab-Islamic nationalist vision for the region, his ideological revolutionary and anti-tyrannical appeals seem to have irritated Libya's late President Muammar Gaddafi by challenging his ideological visions;[387] allegedly Gaddafi was responsible for Sadr's kidnap and disappearance during his visit

---

[381] ibid, pp. 23-24.
[382] Trita Parsi (2007), *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.* (New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press), p. 26.
[383] ibid, pp. 27-28.
[384] Ibid, pp. 28-29.

[385] ibid, p. 23.
[386] In October 1978, during the first year of the revolution, when Saddam Hussein (the-then vice-president) expelled Imam Khomeini from his exile in Najaf (where he had been living since 1964), Syria was one of the countries to offer him asylum, before he accepted French asylum. Parsi (2007), ibid., pp. 24-25.
[387] Robert F. Worth, (2011), "Qaddafi's Never-Neverland"", *The New York Times*, 25 September 2011, p. 26, online at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F03E0D9103EF936A1575AC0A9679D8B63&pagewanted=all

to Libya in August 1978.[388] Sadr been seeking support from Libya against Israel's armed aggressions and for help with ending the conflict in Lebanon, only a few days before Libya's First of September Revolution, but was never seen afterwards.[389] His second stop was supposed to have been in Rome, but although his luggage arrived, the Imam was nowhere to be seen.[390]

Unfortunately, Sadr's journey in promoting his objectives in the struggle for political and economic reform, or in protecting Lebanese sovereignty at both domestic and foreign levels, confronted him with never-ending challenges. Paradoxically, while Sadr was at the heart of mediation efforts towards the domestic civil conflict in Lebanon, or in leading Lebanese resistance efforts against an escalated conflict with Israel – just when Egypt was bilaterally negotiating peace with Israel – he was also at the heart of a revolutionary transition in Iran and the region, yet disappeared before witnessing its final outcomes or its future events.

5.1.2. A multi-National Lebanese Political and Armed Resistance Against Israel

Although Amal's LRB-Lebanese Resistance Brigades fought against the Israeli occupation, the movement remained independent from the LNRF (Lebanese National Resistance Front – code named 'Jammoul'). The LNRF, on the other hand, mainly included the Lebanese Communist Party-LCP and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party-SSNP, which in turn included other nationalist powers politically allied with the Druze Socialist Progressive Party (SPP) alongside Amal;[391] who jointly spurned the 17 May Accord through their sectarian representation in governance. Thus, the LNRF took the lead in the armed resistance against Israel, at least until the end of the civil war in Lebanon, as the region entered a new world order after the Cold War era, thereby also ending Soviet financial and/or armed support to keep up with the resistance.

---

[388] Sadr's visit which was intended to unite Arab efforts in deterring Israel's continued incursions into South Lebanon after its March 1978 invasion, has kept his fate a mystery ever since.

[389] Prominent Lebanese and Arab journalists and politicians had attended the celebrations, and some had met Sadr in the same hotel in Tripoli where he was last seen furiously awaiting information on a continuing delayed and undetermined rescheduled appointment with Gaddafi. Gaddafi's guests revealed that they had attended lengthy meetings with him, which had focused on the newly-published *Green Book*, Gaddafi's work of political philosophy, and this had probably kept the Imam waiting and delayed his meeting. Gaddafi would afterwards deny meeting Sadr, and the Libyan authorities claimed that Sadr left Libya to attend another urgent meeting in Europe after failing to meet Gaddafi. See Giles Trendie, and Abdallah Al-Binni, (2012), "The Imam and the Colonel", *Al-Jazeera*, 24 July 2012.

[390] Rome's Airport was penetrated during the Cold War era by hostage, criminal, underground or intelligence actions such as Israeli Mossad and PLO activities… It may well have been a collaborative Italian Mafia VIP kidnap service!

[391] Julie V. G. Rajan (2011), *Women Suicide Bombers: Narratives of Violence* (London & NY: Routledge), p. 153.

Nonetheless, despite the imbalance in armed deterrence power capacity for the LNRF when compared with Israel, this period was to witness fierce blood and flesh resistance, even inside the new Israeli security zone, mainly carried out by Lebanese men and women committing suicide-martyrdom attacks against the occupying Israeli forces, since death and destruction had already spread all across Lebanon. The first of such attacks was carried out in November 1982 by a 17-year-old, Ahmad Qassir,[392] who targeted the Israeli Intelligence and Defense Forces Headquarters in the southern city of Tyre, killing at least 75 Israeli soldiers.

His identity was only revealed after the early rise of Hezbollah – as the Faithful-LRB members – yet was also marked as the beginning of its resistance victories. Other attacks by LRB-Amal followed, like Bilal Fahs and Hassan Qassir, yet most of the rest of the martyrdom attacks afterwards were contributed by the Lebanese secular left under the LRNF – totaling 30 out of 42 martyrdom attacks by all the various resistance forces, from all regions, sects or gender. Most prominent female suicide attacks were by the LRNF's LCP and SSNP factions, from both Christian and Muslim backgrounds, e.g., Lola Abboud (1985), Sanna Mehaidli (1985), Ibtisam Harb (1985) and Norma Abi Hassan (1986, inside the security zone) from the SSNP;[393] or Yasar Mroueh (1983), Wafa Nurddein (1985), and Mariam Khaireddine (1985) from the LCP.[394] They also included Suha Bishara who in 1998 shot and severely injured General Antoine Lahad, the Head of the South Lebanese Army (SLA) in the Israeli-controlled occupied security zone. She was incarcerated in the Khaim prison (released in 1998), Israel's most famous prison inside the Israeli Occupied Zone, under SLA's torture management. The prison contained Lebanese, Palestinians, and various Arab nationals from different ideological or political backgrounds, all of whom shared the same imprisonment, torture and struggle for liberation.

5.1.3. Hezbollah's Inheritance of Sadr's faithful LRB

Correspondingly, the intensified armed resistance attacks became a challenge for Israel even in its occupied security zone in south Lebanon, where it faced another resistance battlefield against

---

[392] David Hirst, (2010), *Beware of Small States. Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East* (London: Faber and Faber), p. 196.
[393] Lamia Shehadeh, ed.(1991), *Woman and War in Lebanon* (Gainesville FL: University Press of Florida), p. 225.
[394] ibid, p. 27.

Hezbollah as a local yet regionally-inspired movement. Hezbollah endorsed the tolerance and coexistence that Sadr had promoted at the beginning of the war, becoming increasingly opposed to engaging in domestic civil conflicts. It was also inspired by prominent civil and ideological resistance leaderships, who continued to follow Sadr's path, such as Sayed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, who had survived a destructive CIA assassination attack in March 1985 with the Bir al-Abed bombing in the Southern district of Beirut[395] that had killed 80 civilians and injured 200,[396] and Shaikh Ragheb Harb who was assassinated by Israel in February 1984 for being strongly vocal against the occupation and refusing any communication with IDF officials[397] Harb had triggered a resistance that depended on the solidarity of a collective human will and decisiveness in action in competing with the financially costly and superior Israeli armed machinery, thereby motivating the people in south Lebanon to rise against the Israeli occupation. This also happened in the city of Nabatieh in 1983 during the Imam Hussein commemoration event (Ashoura), which turned into a rebellion against Israel's armed forces. In effect it became like an Intifada, later inspiring a Palestinian Intifada in 1987, where similar protest acts continued in other towns and villages across south Lebanon.

In 1984 violent protests occurred in Maarakeh after its people refused to allow Israeli armed forces looking for armed resistance fighters to arrest to enter their village. Lacking weapons, they resisted by throwing stones, using kitchen and farming tools, and also throwing boiling oil at the Israeli soldiers.[398] Henceforth, as Hezbollah endorsed the resistance path, Israel began to promote it as a pro-Iranian terrorist and fundamentalist Islamist group – since Iran also had already been on the list since January 1984. Amal on the other hand, along with the LNRF, was driven back into the domestic civil war power conflicts, exploited by the continued regional and international power struggles.

---

[395] Richard Zoglin (1987). "Did A Dead Man Tell No Tales?" *Time Magazine*, 12 October 1987. Online at: http://content.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,965712,00.html

[396] Allegedly the attempt was made, with Saudi Intelligence cooperation, in retaliation for the bombing of the US Marines Barracks in 1983.

[397] Helena Cobban, Helena (2005), "Hizbullah's New Face: In Search of a Muslim Democracy", *Boston Review*, April/May 2005. Online at: http://bostonreview.net/archives/BR30.2/cobban.php

[398] Baladi Attachment (2015), "Marake: The Fifth Southern Symphony" [Arabic], *Al-Akhbar* Newspaper, 5 March 2015. Online at: http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/227510

Disagreements between Syria and the LNRF became an occasional motivation for Amal to clash with and harass members of the LNRF, since Amal also encouraged its control of the Front Resistance Line with the Israeli Occupied Security Zone in south Lebanon. Moreover, Amal became worried about Hezbollah as a political Shia rival in the South, eventually clashing with its members in April 1988 until finally reaching a resolution mediated by Syria and Iran in January 1989.[399] The agreement meant that Amal would continue formally to oversee the armed and political security in South Lebanon, while Hezbollah was to maintain its social, cultural and political non-military activities,[400] in addition to retaining its right to perform invisible armed security attacks against the Israeli occupation forces.

Tension remained between Hezbollah and Amal at least until the end of the civil war, since the entire country remained influenced by the domestic, regional and international power hegemony conflicts. Yet, the agreement was to be re-emphasized in November 1990, having become officially adopted at state level during the post-1989 Taif Agreement period in Lebanon. While Amal officially disarmed as a militia, recruiting the majority of its members in the Lebanese army and security forces in parallel with the other militias, Hezbollah on the other hand maintained its right to keep its arms (invisible) as a legitimate resistance force, in order to carryout underground armed activity attacks against Israel in South Lebanon. Hezbollah's decision to stay away from power and continue to maintain a hidden and discreet armed resistance away in South Lebanon was greatly welcomed by all its other Lebanese opponent parties.[401] Hence, they wished Hezbollah good luck in its 'wasted' efforts to attempt to liberate the South and free its Shia supporters from the chains of Israel's security zone. This was an obligation that neither Lebanese state foreign

---

[399] Magnus Ranstorp (1997), *Hizb'allah in Lebanon* (London & NY: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 101. By 1988 Amal was beginning to compete with Hezbollah over sharing control of its public support and territories, which eventually led to brutal clashes between the parties in the liberated Southern towns and villages that lasted for several months, with Israel watching hawk-like from its security zone. Although Amal and Hezbollah had ended up in armed and political conflicts in 1988 arising out of the foreign hostage crisis, and Amal's siege of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, they nevertheless succeeded, especially after the civil war era, in promoting coordination and a power-sharing mechanism that assured Shia political rights and interests in the Lebanese state. Since Amal was losing its stronghold battle, and most of its fighters were surrendering or defecting to Hezbollah, the Syrians mediated a resolution with Iran, ending the conflict in January 1989.
[400] ibid, p. 102.
[401] Manal Lutfi (2008), "Syria: Between Tehran and Hezbollah", *Asharq Alawsat*,16 June 2008. Online at: https://english.aawsat.com/theaawsat/features/syria-between-tehran-and-hezbollah

policy nor the Lebanese armed forces were capable of resolving; instead they waited for the foreign resolutions for a promised peace in the Middle East.

5.2. The Bloody Path to the Post-War National Reconciliation Ta'if Agreement

The 1989 Ta'if Agreement, which came about because of foreign political or financial interventions and mediations while its details were based on domestic political efforts or conflicts in reaching a resolution, was based largely on the earlier LNM-Ktaeb conflict resolution proposal of August 1975 presented at the Committee for National Dialogue (CND);[402] and on the December 1985 Syrian-mediated Tripartite Agreement that outlined further details on the transition of power at the top ruling level in Lebanon. Its aim was to end conflict in Lebanon, facilitated between the sectarian leaderships of Shia Amal under Nabih Berri, the Druze PSP under Walid Jumblatt, and the Maronite Lebanese Forces (LFs) under Eli Hobeika (who was in command in association with Samir Geagea), yet the LNRF was excluded. The resolution assured the parity of power-sharing between Muslims and Christians under a short transitional period until the primary resolution of the issue had been attained – i.e., the abolition of all forms of political sectarianism in the state – and that the President's powers would also be shared collectively with the Prime Minister and cabinet ministers.[403] Despite his satisfactory renewed alliance with Syria, Lebanese President Amine Gemayel opposed the Tripartite Agreement as did Samir Geagea who, in turn, officially ousted Hobeika from the LFs leadership in January 1986.[404] Hobeika had formed new relations with the Syrians, after having discreetly revealed to them his role in domestic security relations with Israel, including the Sabra and Shatilla massacres.[405]

At the same time, conflict continued in Lebanon: another setback in February 1987 saw the outbreak of fighting between Amal and Jumblatt's PSP in Western Beirut, over Amal's renewed war on the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The PLO had tried to regain its power and

---

[402] Demands included abolition of the system of political and administrative sectarian quotas; a voluntary civil code for personal status; a new electoral law based on proportional representation in which Lebanon would become a single electoral district; extensive administrative decentralization; and the convocation of a constituent assembly on a non-sectarian basis.

[403] Antoine J. Abraham (2008), *Lebanon in Modern Times* (Lanham MD: University Press of America), p. 159.

[404] ibid.

[405] Gary C. Gambill and Bassam Endrawos (2002), "The Assassination of Elie Hobeika", *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, vol. 4, no. 1, January. Online at: https://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0201_11.htm

presence in Lebanon following the partial Israeli withdrawal of 1985, but ended up clashing with Amal in April 1985 over control of the territories freed from the Israelis outside the security zone in South Lebanon. This was also accompanied by political splits between Syria and the PLO, mainly with Arafat,[406] over an Arab regional approach for peace in the Middle East, that unleashed Amal against the PLO. However Amal came under armed pressure from the PSP, the LCP and the SSNP, which led to a renewed Syrian armed intervention in Beirut. The conflict ended in April 1987 when Amal finally lifted its siege of the Palestinian refugee camps and, along with the PSP, surrendered its positions to the Syrian army,[407] the Lebanese government under PM Rashid Karami having requested the Syrian intervention since it was unable to control the war battles in the streets of West Beirut.

President Amin Gemayel, who was in a boycott situation with PM Karami over previous objections to the tripartite agreement, protested that Karami's decision to approach the presidency for consultations over inviting the Syrians back into West Beirut had failed. As efforts took place to resolve the power rule or foreign policy authority issues between the two men, mediation attempts focused on reaching an initial resolution of the political and security situation in Beirut. However, Karami was assassinated by the LFs in June 1987, shattering any further agreement,[408] and by the end of September 1988, Gemayel had left power as his term had ended, with the country remaining politically split and unable to elect a new President.

Before his departure Gemayel had requested Lebanese Army Commander-in-Chief, General Michael Aoun, to head a new interim government that would take power in Lebanon. This was greatly opposed by the Muslim majority since the head of the Army was by custom a Maronite Christian position; they regarded filling the Prime Minister's post from the Sunni-Muslims sect while the Presidency was for Maronite-Christians as breaching the 1943 National Pact (verbal)

---

[406] In November 1985 Arafat made a surprise visit to President Hosni Mubarak, breaking the Arab political boycott with Egypt after having reached a Peace Accord with Israel in 1979.

[407] William E Smith (1987), "Saving a City from Itself", *Time Magazine*, 9 March 1987. Online at: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,963727,00.html

[408] William W. Harris, William W. (2005), *The New face Face of Lebanon: History's Revenge.* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener), p. 218.

agreement.[409] They felt that their sectarian political rights for representation in the state were being threatened, having led to the assassination of PM Karami who was finally replaced by the moderate PM Salim Hoss.

However, since Aoun's interim government refused to acknowledge the Hoss Government, the country became split into two governments, one in West Beirut and the other at the Presidential Palace in Babdaa. With the failure of a political settlement, the Syrians supported the Hoss government and refused to acknowledge Aoun's government or to give it any political legitimacy, and it too became boycotted by all Lebanese parties. On 14 March 1989 Aoun declared a resistance and "Liberation War" against Syria, accusing the Syrians of intervening in Lebanese political affairs and demanding their withdrawal from Lebanon. He also sought an alliance with Syria's strong political rival and neighbour in Iraq, President Saddam Hussein. This led to further Arab political intervention in an attempt to resolve the crisis, especially by the Saudis who feared that further escalation would lead to war between Iraq and Syria. Consequently, in an attempt to resolve the crisis, an Arab Tripartite Committee (ATC) that included Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Morocco, was formed at the League of Arab States (LAS) Summit in Casablanca, in May 1989.[410]

Resolution efforts excluded Aoun and the Hoss Government, and consisted mainly of MPs remaining from the latest elected Parliament in 1972, headed by the House Speaker (since 1984) Hussein El Husseini, and building on the 1983 Geneva and Lausanne Dialogue efforts. Parliamentary terms were being renewed since holding regular sessions had failed after the outbreak of civil war in 1975. These mediated meetings marked a significant success towards the beginning of a final resolution in Lebanon, supported by discreet Saudi, American and Syrian discussions[411] and the final round of negotiations was held in the city of Taif in Saudi Arabia in October 1989. Also present was Rafic Hariri, a Lebanese migrant with a dual Saudi citizenship since 1978. Hariri had been entrusted by Saudi Arabia to pursue their interests in Lebanon,

---

[409] In fact, during the 1952 'White Revolution' that forced President Bishara Khouri to resign from power, and with the absence of a President, General Fouad Shahab was assigned to head an interim government until a President was elected.

[410] Jennifer Widner (2005), Project "Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution: Data and Summaries: Lebanon 1989", (Princeton NJ: Princeton University), accessed at   http://pcwcr.princeton.edu/reports/lebanon1990.html

[411] Michael Hudson, Michael (1997),"Trying Again: Power-Sharing in Post-Civil War Lebanon", *International Negotiation*, 2, 1997, pp. 103–122.

especially since the outbreak of civil unrest in Lebanon. He was a successful businessman and wealthy construction contractor in Saudi Arabia, which also allowed him a significant role in offering bargain rewards during the making of the agreement while mediating the sharp differences amongst the Lebanese political hosts in Ta'if.[412] At the foreign level, the main objective was to reach a written national reconciliation agreement met through political reform, following which could bring an end to civil conflict in Lebanon, while also ensuring regional security and stability.[413]

As a result, the National Reconciliation Agreement (NRA), finally became a written document signed by all attenders on 22 October 1989 in Taif, and ratified in November 1989 by the Lebanese Parliament. MP Rene Mouawad was elected as president, finally filling the presidential post left vacant since Gemayel's departure. However, President Mouawad was assassinated in a car bombing in Beirut following the Independence Day ceremonies on 22 November; this led to speedy foreign intervention and an agreement to elect MP Elias Lehrawi as President, which took place two days after Mouawad's assassination.[414] On the other hand, General Aoun, who was still protesting in Babdaa and enjoying national public protests and support, continued his opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Although the agreement had stipulated that the Syrian troops would withdraw in two years, Aoun rejected *it since* it did not provide a specific time-frame for the Syrian withdrawal. Consequently, no final resolution was reached to bring the war to a full stop in Lebanon, and further implementation of the Ta'if Agreement was put on hold due to further Maronite political divisions that escalated into a major armed conflict in January 1990, at which point the LFs under Geagea's command decided to endorse the Ta'if Agreement. Geagea was seeking an influential role in the Maronite political leadership in a post-war Lebanon, while still competing with Hobeika who had endorsed the Agreement alongside a split Ktaeb, after Gemayel, opposed to the agreement, had left Lebanon.

The Agreement contained the same domestic political reforms that had been decided in the 1985 tripartite agreement, previously rejected by Geagea, and relating mainly to the concessions over

---

[412] Mark W Neal and Richard Tansey (2010), "The Dynamics of Effective Corrupt Leadership: Lessons from Rafik Hariri's Political Career in Lebanon", *The Leadership Quarterly*, no. 21, pp. 33–49.
[413] Augustus R. Norton (1991), "Lebanon after Taif: is the Civil War Over?", *Middle East Journal* vol. 45, no. 3, p. 466.
[414] Kim Murphy (1989), "Lebanon Picks New President; Aoun Defiant", *Los Angeles Times*, 25 November 1989.

presidential powers. This provoked Aoun who declared an 'Elimination War' against the LFs that ended with high casualties on both sides and lasted until the Syrian armed operation that forced Aoun to abandon the Babdaa Presidential Palace in October 1990.[415] Thus ended the final chapter in the Lebanese Civil War and the entrance into a new state era in Lebanon, with Aoun exiled in France.

At the regional and international levels, the Americans were preparing an international coalition for a war campaign against Iraq, supported by the Syrians and in which they decided to participate, placing Aoun's alliance with Saddam as its enemy position thus strengthening the domestic political and armed pretexts to oust him. This also marked a new political era of Saudi-US sponsored Syrian-dominated influence in Lebanon, which remained hostage to Israeli-Syrian conflicts and competitions over regional peace and hegemony issues. Hence, the leaders of the sectarian factions, traditionally accustomed to foreign political intervention, welcomed this new internationally-sponsored Syrian role and special relations with Syria, as emphasized in the Taif Agreement, while enjoying prominent foreign support, whether from the US or even Iran.[416] The Lebanese people, on the other hand, were tired of the long years of war and hoped for a new era of domestic peace and prosperity.

5.2.1. Lessons of War within Lebanon's Domestic and Foreign Orbit

In his conclusions on the lessons of war, Nassif Hitti emphasizes how the role of home-grown violence remains limited in serving one's declared goals, and that in Lebanon, it finally became non-instrumental in making any change. The country's domestic geo-political dynamics, embodied in its historic or well-defined geographic sectarian power zones and political structures, proved that "attempts to use force to expand the natural zone of influence [were] futile and in many cases counter-productive, leading to military defeats."[417] Hence, no sectarian group or any sectarian-dominated secular force (regardless of the non-sectarian slogan it might carry), was

---

[415] Marius Deeb (2003), *Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 168-178.
[416] Imad Salamey (2009), "Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options", *International Journal of Peace Studies* vol. 14, no. 2, Autumn-Winter, pp 83–105.
[417] Hitti (1989), "The Foreign Policy of Lebanon", op.cit., p. 5.

allowed to control the territories of another sect.[418] Regardless of being in either a weak or a strong position, there remained clear political structures of power influence or armed-struggle mediation modes in Lebanon. These were interplayed by the sub-state actors through their independent foreign affiliations, mainly in relation to their domestic alliances or national reconciliation agreements on the ground.

Yet this was also the case with foreign military interventions in Lebanon not necessarily translating into any decisive political resolutions if opposed by the domestic forces on the ground, especially when supported by other foreign powers. This was evident throughout the entire war, in Syria's constant failures when attempting to mediate a conflict resolution in Lebanon. It was also the case with Israel's inability to secure a peace treaty with Lebanon, despite support from its "local Lebanese friends", or with the United States which found itself compelled to abort its mission in Beirut, while Israel was forced to pull out its troops to a new 'security zone' in the South of the country.[419] On the other hand, as Hitti also observes, the culmination of rising sectarianism in Lebanon and in the Middle East in general, portraying "the sect as a nation's ideology", reflected an "inability to deliver a solution out of the domestic stalemates". Instead, this formed an obstacle to any natural political reform evolution outside the domestic and external environments of sectarian exploitation, under various ideological, political and idiosyncratic factors. Even though Hitti anticipated a post-war Lebanon, with "an evolution from sectarian organizations to organizations of the sect and subsequently their self-destruction",[420] the country remained hostage to the cyclical evolution of the rise and fall of sectarian power rule hegemony.

According to Hitti, this was evident in the sectarian revolutions, whether by Shi'a Amal, the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), or the Kata'ib Party (the Phalange), which experienced the height of sectarian nationalism during the civil war era; yet all faced "the emergence of new sectarian groups and forces either within or as an alternative to the main organizations",[421]

---

[418] ibid. Even when the "National leftist" alliance attempted in 1976 to move into the "Christian enclave", by crossing the traditional sectarian geo-demographic/geographic boundaries, it was contained and crushed by Syria.
[419] "The taboo of an open association with Israel and the negative repercussions of sustaining such an alliance in the Arab world were more influential in shaping the allies' behaviour than the military success achieved by Israel. Frustrated with its friends, Israel soon found itself having to rely on naked power to maintain its presence in Lebanon." Hitti, ibid, p. 6.
[420] Hitti (1989), *The Foreign Policy of Lebanon*, op.cit., p. 7.
[421] ibid.

becoming themselves confronted by the same issues or weaknesses faced by the Lebanese state within the region. All ended up promoting services to foreign allies to score benefits and political victories while remaining empty-handed in Lebanon itself, and also coping with the domestically opposed intra- and inter-sectarian rivalries. In other words, despite their 'elastic' ideological group identities, they were all finally forced to cooperate beyond their sectarian differences by forming domestic reconciliations when facing common domestic and external security threats, while also becoming dependent on the arbiter role of the state when seeking international legitimacy to arrive at domestic or foreign conflict resolutions. Hence, survival as a group became the ultimate goal, revolving around security interests and downplaying the ideological, revolutionary or political divisions in order to become mediated by the state institutions.

Finally, from the lessons of war, Hitti asserts that there is an "invisible hand" acting as a balancing mechanism, that arises from a convergence of Arab, regional and international factors, maintaining the rules of the classical balance of power in Lebanon. "This has led to policies of restraint, respect for 'red lines', limited support to an ally in order to maintain control over his actions, and a *de facto* partition that could never be turned into *de jure*…" thus also becoming frustrating to "the maximalist goals of the anti-status quo forces for diminishing the utility of warfare in their strategies."[422] Ironically, it was the same "invisible hand" that signalled a green light to put an end to war in Lebanon, especially amidst preparations for the 1990 Gulf War that paved the way to the 1991 Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid, yet continued to keep a 'red line' on political and economic reform in Lebanon by exploiting state sovereignty and political power rule.

Hitti had warned against this issue even before the official signing of the Ta'if Agreement in 1989, remarking that: "On the foreign policy level, the main outcome will be a policy of abstention or paralysis; either the avoidance of more crises, or the mutual neutralization between the Presidency and the Government."[423] On contributing to an issue regenerating itself, Hitti argues as to where a redistribution of power among the sects might take place:

> For example, a new National Pact à trois to include the newly powerful Shia or
> maybe a National Pact,, a quartet, bringing the Druze into the game as the other

---

[422] ibid, p. 8.
[423] ibid.

contender to this prominent status in the Lebanese sectarian setting. Regardless of what form power sharing takes, it will always reflect cosmetic rather than qualitative change for it will reinforce the basic foundation of the state, its domination by the sect, instead of challenging this cardinal tenet of the Lebanese national fabric. The symptomatic weakness and vulnerability of the state will be preserved as well as the conduit that ensures the strong penetration of the state by its regional milieu.[424]

While all the above points were discussed and disputed in the Ta'if Agreement, they technically became the overlapping practices during the Syrian mandate. No troika or cosmetic quartet resolutions were officially outlined in the Ta'if National Reconciliation Agreement, aside from keeping the tradition of the top three posts in the state, pending political reform. Thus, it was agreed to be a transitional era, since this would still marginalize the rest of the Lebanese minority sects from the top posts, and thus re-manufacture another Lebanese crisis in the future, while remaining powerless to bring a permanent end to the pretexts for civil war. Subsequently, post-Ta'if still came to reflect the worries that Hitti had articulated:

> a fragile peace will be established that does not phase out the new and old detonating elements. They will be controlled or suppressed until a new crisis in the regional milieu reactivates them and breaks the consensus at home, particularly in the area of foreign policy or because of it."[425]

5.2.2. Lebanese Foreign Policy Power Transitions after the Civil War

In fact, the Ta'if Agreement also officially changed or 'confirmed' the long-disputed Lebanese state, Arab identity and belonging.[426] The 1943 National Pact provided Lebanon with a semi-constitutional neutrality, being neither an Eastern nor a Western-belonging state. Thus, after Ta'if, Lebanese state identity was officially emphasized as, or moved towards, an Arab-oriented identity dominated by Syria,[427] in which Lebanon lost the constitutional realities in its traditional Maronite political distinctiveness that favoured a neo-Phoenician identity bridging East and West as a counterbalance to Arabism. On the other hand, little changed at the domestic level after the end of

---

[424] Hitti, 1989, pp. 19-20.

[425] "The symptomatic weakness and vulnerability of the state will be preserved as well as the conduit that ensures the strong penetration of the state by its regional milieu." Ta'if October 1989. Cf. Hitti, ibid, p. 20.

[426] Bassel Salloukh (2006), "The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in Postwar Lebanon", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 39, no. 3: pp. 635–655.

[427] Asad AbuKhalil (2001), "Lebanon One Year After the Israeli Withdrawal", *Middle East Research and Information Project* (MERIP), 29 May 2001. Online at: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero052901

civil war in Lebanon in terms of inheriting the sectarian powers of the state. The secular, cross-sectarian or leftist forces were kept distant from power, as were their demands for the political reforms fought for during the war. That is apart from the Christian political depression and divisions over the Ta'if Agreement having removed the traditional presidential powers enjoyed by the Maronite-Christians and transferred them to the cabinet, and also in terms of foreign policy authorities.[428]

This was meant to ensure the representation of all the official Lebanese sects in both parliament and government to enable the collective participation of all sectarian political powers in the state's decision-making mechanism in domestic and foreign policy affairs. Yet, this became counter-productive in the absence, or in the selective implementation, of political reform; traditionally practised under norms or unwritten agreements that still dominated as an accepted alternative route to reaching last-minute, and usually externally-endorsed, resolutions. The Syrians played such a role during their era, ensuring their dominance by maintaining old practices that also included the cabinet, in order to secure an aligned track with Syria's regional foreign policy.

Thus, external geo-political pretexts also remained dominant in influencing Lebanese foreign policy decisions, whether in choosing or opposing US regional alliances when approaching local or external crises. The Lebanese state has been traditionally hostage to domestic disputes over Arab dependency, independence, or neutrality, splitting Lebanese foreign policy between what Hitti describes a "confrontation accommodation pole" and a "forced accommodation pole". Forced accommodation was illustrated by the pre-civil war presidencies of Suleiman Franjieh (1970-1976) and Charles Hilou (1964-1970), since both made concessions to the Arab pole. The Confrontation accommodation policy was illustrated by President Chamoun, especially at the end of his presidential term during the 1956-1958 crisis in his opposition to Nasser, and worry over Egyptian-Syrian unification; and also by President Gemayel when, at the beginning of his term in 1982-1983 he had endorsed the 17 May Accord opposed by Syria.[429] Later, he illustrated a passive

---

[428] Bassel F. Salloukh, (2008), "The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon", in B. Korany and A. Dessouki, eds., *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization*, new rev. ed. (Cairo: AUC Press), Ch. 8, pp. 286-287.

[429] Hitti: 1989 p. 12

accommodation policy after the rebellion against the agreement by Berri and Jumblatt in February 1984, supported by Syria. Both Presidents were dependent on American support, which only ended with further domestic and regional disputes, leading them both to learn "the hard way a very basic lesson of *realpolitik:* a *détente* with a regional superpower is more rewarding than an *entente* with an underdog."[430]

Henceforth, Hitti adds, a policy of preventive accommodation developed between the confrontation and forced accommodation poles, demonstrated in the avoidance of any disturbing of relations with the Arab pole, thereby producing either a passive preventive accommodation policy (as illustrated by President Elias Sarkis who, between 1976 and 1982, refrained from taking any action that might provoke the Syrians); or an active preventive accommodation policy, as shown by President Shihab's Arab policy between 1958 and 1964, and particularly his rapprochement with Egypt's Nasser,[431] and who, in his turn, had understood the geo-political realities of the region, especially, for example, when Nasser was also involved with the leadership of Syria.[432]

Consequently, Hitti argues, all this reflects the overlapping types of foreign policy behaviour in Lebanon. Hence, in analysing the new transition to post-Ta'if foreign policy, it would usually begin domestically with a similar forced accommodation policy (reconciliation), emphasised in a political agreement and coordination between the President and the Prime Minister. Even if deciding to choose a sovereign foreign policy to protect Lebanon from foreign threats, it could not be distanced from the disputed demands or interests in a divided Arab pole in conflict with Israel. Yet it was still ending in a confrontation pole, and finally generating a Passive or Active preventive accommodation policy, for which it was hard gain Lebanese consent, adding further complexities in analysing and understanding Lebanese foreign policy behaviour.

Salloukh refers to Hitti's observations on Lebanese foreign policy accommodations, suggesting that a Passive preventive accommodation policy could best describe the Syrian era in Lebanon,

---

[430] ibid, p. 16.
[431] ibid, p. 20.
[432] Hitti, 1989, p. 23

(Elias el-Hrawi 1990-1998, and Emile Lahoud 1998-2007).[433] Hence, while "Syria in the post-Ta'if era dominated, or occasionally protected, Lebanon's regional geo-strategic foreign policy interests, the role of the Lebanese presidency remained emphasized in this respect, while the Prime Ministerial role focused on domestic economic and reconstruction efforts."[434] In fact, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri still enjoyed significant private sub-state friendship relations that also enabled him to promote foreign-affiliated economic projects requiring domestic peace, security and stability (mostly evident during Israel's aggressions against Lebanon), thus coordinating mutual interests with the Syrians mainly concerning the peace process at the regional and international levels. Thus, the foreign policy era under the Syrian presence could also be referred to as a Passive and Active preventive accommodation policy. Ironically, while the Lebanese army was strengthened during the Syrian era (mainly by General Emile Lahoud) and the country had retained a fixed foreign policy position towards any international efforts for peace negotiations, sectarian divisions of the army deployment or foreign policy approach were to resurface once again in Lebanon after the Syrian departure in 2005.[435]

Surprisingly this marked another foreign policy transition to an unpredicted confrontation accommodation pole, and a Machiavellian art of 'power during conflict', by PM Fouad Saniora who came to power in the 2005 elections that followed the Syrian departure and took a lead in foreign policy while Lahoud was politically 'sanctioned', thus also becoming an alarming transition for marginalized Maronite-Christian power-sharing rights. Although Ta'if had re-emphasized sectarian political rights and equal power-sharing between Christians and Muslims in the state, the Christians still felt politically insecure,[436] especially with their traditional leaders in exile.[437] They also felt marginalized in the electoral laws that followed, with the majority of their Christian representatives in parliament becoming decided by Muslim majority votes, which also had ab impact on the representation in governance or other state institutions. The Ta'if Accord indicated that abolishing sectarianism would be the ultimate objective of post-war reconciliation

---

[433] Salloukh (2008: p. 295)
[434] ibid, p. 298.
[435] ibid., p. 294.
[436] Paul Salem (1994), "Reflections on Lebanon's Foreign Policy", in Deirdre Collings, ed., *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p. 73.
[437] Or in jail like Geagea in April 1994.

efforts in Lebanon, and would be determined gradually, beginning at the parliamentary elections level, yet this continued to be postponed.

In conclusion, despite Syrian official domination of Lebanese foreign policy, the sectarian militia leaderships that had ruled Lebanon during its civil war altered their power into state political cantons, thereby maintaining their independent, traditional, and historic foreign relations.[438] Their forming of a hegemony within the State, supported by external economic interests or influence over the state's legal, administrative or security institutions dominated by their sectarian-affiliated loyalists, also prevented reform.

5.3. A Stalled Promise for Reform, Wealth, Peace, Stability and Economic Prosperity

Aside from the domestic political divisions in Lebanon – occasionally contributed by or contributing to foreign influence, interventions or invasions into the country or the region – it became evident that the post-peace regional economic and financial rewards, essential for enabling the post-civil war economic transition in Lebanon, had never really materialized. With the US already welcomed as the liberator of Kuwait – endorsed by the Arab and Muslim World in a post-Cold War 'new world order' – Lebanon was to become more Arab-dependent, especially regarding the Arab-Israeli peace process. This was also emphasized in the transition to an Arab identity, or a new Lebanese foreign policy, that was departing from the historic special relations with the West or the traditional neutrality interplay vis-à-vis the West and the Arab/Islamic world.[439] Hence, this affected Lebanon's desired role as a mediator promoting co-existence or common interests between Western and Arab cultures, which was also significant for Lebanese economic interests. Even during the civil war Lebanon had been dependent on both regional and international cash flows that became scarce towards the end of war and led to economic distress, contributing by 1992 to a currency and financial collapse. Yet this also led to the forced resignation of the first post-Ta'if government, which was supposed to carry out the reforms outlined in the agreement but was confronted by domestic disputes relevant to the foreign and economic policies for Lebanon.

---

[438] Salem, ibid, p. 75.
[439] Najem (2005) in Nonneman ed., op.cit., pp. 109-113.

Consequently this led to early parliamentary elections in 1992 (the first since 1972), and the election of Rafiq Hariri who became Prime Minister, promising to reconstruct Lebanon and resolve the economic crisis, dependent on Arab financial investments (yet also adopting a financial borrowing policy dependent on foreign financial support).[440] The Syrians on the other hand, "being blamed for the 1992 economic crisis…were keen to avoid any future liability that would threaten the legitimacy of their dominance."[441] Therefore, they remained fairly uninterested in any intervention in the Lebanese economy in order to avoid carrying its complicated burdens, especially as economic recovery and reconstruction required national partnerships and political stability. These demanded greater effort in a penetrated state like Lebanon, which was still faced with foreign armed presence or occupation in the post-civil war period. According to Ghassan Dibeh, the 1992 financial crisis had effectively destroyed the major pillars of the pre-civil war Lebanese *ancien régime* which had included "a strong currency and price stability, where traditionally Lebanon considered monetary and financial stability as an essential element of its economic development policy and [had] a deeply entrenched culture of an independent central bank, a free financial system and anti-inflationary bias."[442]

Free capital movements and bank secrecy policies, especially after World War One, had been the main factor in Lebanon's economic development, which dismantled the wartime restrictions on currency and capital transfers, thus also making it easy to finance the war while avoiding any conflict with the international market, or becoming dependent on "[the] economic ideology of the liberal state [that] relied heavily on following a liberal trade and payments regime."[443] Moreover, the exchange rate market in Lebanon had traditionally "had an internal mechanism that prevented high instabilities through self-correction mechanisms with the absence of any restrictions."[444] Thus, the political economic structure played the key role "in transforming inflationary episodes, since a persistent inflationary state can be maintained by the demand for inflation by powerful economic actors, such as the state, the financial sector and industry in the case of Lebanon's

---

[440] Bassel F Salloukh,. (2008), "Art of the Impossible: op.cit., p. 303.
[441] Tom Najem (2005), "Lebanon and Europe", op.cit., pp. 100-111.
[442] Ghassan Dibeh (2002), "The Political Economy of Inflation and Currency Depreciation in Lebanon, 1984-92", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 38, no. 1, p. 33.
[443] ibid, p. 52.
[444] ibid.

economic crisis."[445] Correspondingly, the divided interests or competitions of the post-war sectarian-oriented political leaderships were to dominate during the 1992 crisis, endorsed by the foreign interests for peace and stability in the region. They would also determine the fate of political reform in Lebanon, especially "with the possibility of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Israel", and mainly with regard to the electoral law reforms that determine the shape of both legislative and executive political influence in Lebanon.

They therefore focused international attention "on the debate over the electoral process which took place during the summer of 1992",[446] albeit attention that was less keen to pursue reforms that could bring in any political powers opposed to the peace process in Lebanon or the region. As a result, no genuine reforms were pursued in the electoral law for the 1992 elections, which were also boycotted by most of the Maronite-Christians for excluding their strong representatives in exile. Although the 1992 electoral law shifted the 6:5 Christian dominance ratio in Parliament to a 5:5 equal representation ratio between Muslims and Christians, representation by majority Christian votes reflected considerably less than an equal 50 percent, also dictated by the distribution of electoral 'districts'. This made the Christians feel significantly detached from governance or representation in state institutions, and discouraged by the traditional Maronite leadership from forming partnerships in the post-war reconstruction and economic development efforts in the state, all of which came under the personal influence of PM Hariri. It also postponed the implementation of other state institutional or administrative (decentralizing) reforms outlined in the Ta'if agreement, all of which became severely undermined,[447] as well as blamed on external factors, mainly regional peace and conflict.

On the international level, the end of the Gulf War in February 1991 had introduced a 'New World Order', announced by US President George H. W. Bush in his March 1991 speech to the Congress, outlining how new peace and stability would be created in the Middle East, emphasized by closing the gap between Israel and the Arab states, and between the Israelis and the Palestinians.[448] In fact,

---

[445] ibid.

[446] Judith P. Harik and Hilal Khashan (1993), "Lebanon's Divisive Democracy: The Parliamentary Elections of 1992", *Arab Studies Quarterly* vol. 15, no.1, pp. 41-59.

[447] Najem (2005), op.cit, pp. 100-111.

[448] Noam Chomsky (1991), "What We Say Goes: The Middle East in the New World Order", *Z Magazine*, May 1991. Online at: https://chomsky.info/199105__/

Bush's comments were also a response to remarks made by Saddam Hussein during the negotiation process before the American-led armed retaliation on Iraq had begun (Operation Desert Storm, January-August 1991), in implementing UNSCR 660 of August 1990, demanding an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.[449] Saddam had offered, as an alternative, to withdraw from Kuwait if Israel withdrew from all its occupied Arab territories and if Syria pulled its troops from Lebanon,[450] by implementing earlier UN Resolutions: UNSCR 425 (demanding immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon) and UNSCR 242 (regarding Palestinian and Syrian territories).

President Bush was careful to tackle those issues, mentioning Lebanon in his speech to Congress saying: "The war with Iraq is over. The quest for solutions to the problem in Lebanon, in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in the Gulf, must go forward with new vigor and determination. And I guarantee you: no one will work harder for a stable peace in the region than we will."[451] However, after the war had ended, the US emerged as a unipolar world superpower, enhancing a policy focused on strengthening its influence in the region and the worldwide,[452] but also mainly dependent on Israel. In other words, seeking to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Lebanese domestic issue was significant for reaching the necessary regional stability, which in turn was important for facilitating US interests and objectives, both regionally and internationally.

Thus, the quest for peace reflected America's new international foreign policy towards the region, in reaching a resolution of the Lebanese issue, although with both Syria and Israel continuing to remain in Lebanon. Yet it also awakened the seeds of regional sectarian sentiments, especially at the Sunni-Shia level, in protesting, or supporting the American arrival into the region.

5.4. A Post-Ta'if Agreement's Foreign Approach to Israel and Regional Peace Conflicts

---

[449] United Nations Security Council (1990), Resolution "UNSCR 660 – The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait", issued 6 August 1990. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/660(1990)

[450] Fred Moore (compiler) (1993), "Iraq Speaks: Documents on the Gulf Crisis, by Saddam Hussein, Taha Yasin Ramadan, Tariq 'Aziz, Sa'dun Hammadi, Latif Jasim & Saadi Mahdi Salih" (Darby PA:, Diana Publishing Co), p.10

[451] Gerhard Peters, and John T. Woolley (1991), "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict", *The American Presidency Project*, 6 March 1991. Online at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19364

[452] Ilan Peleg (1998), *The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives.* (Albany NY: State University of New York Press), pp. 9-10.

Despite the launch of the Madrid 'Land for Peace' Middle East peace process in October 1991, Israel continued its refusal to pull out of the Lebanese territories it was still occupying in the South. Thus, Lebanon was not to be immune from Israel's domestic and regional political, security or power supremacy interests, which once again aimed at forcing Lebanon to sign a bilateral peace treaty with Israel as a precondition for any pull out from the South. In July 1993, while the world was still at the peak of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiating process, Israel even launched a week-long destructive war campaign against Lebanon (Operation Accountability), ostensibly aimed at eliminating Hezbollah, yet primarily targeting civilians.[453] A ceasefire agreement was finally reached, in the form of an oral agreement mediated by the US and the Syrians, which made it possible for civilians to return and according to which "Israel agreed to refrain from attacking civilian targets in Lebanon while Hezbollah pledged to stop firing rockets into northern Israel."[454] However, aside from its opposition to the peace process, this also indirectly emphasized Hezbollah's right to its armed resistance, strictly targeting the Israeli or SLA troops in the Occupied Zone (who still occasionally violated the agreement).[455]

Nonetheless, despite the September 1993 Israeli-Palestinian agreement that had brought an end to the 1987 Palestinian Intifada (armed struggle) against Israel,[456] and the October 1994 Israeli-Jordanian agreement, Arab disagreements were to arise over the peace process, especially after the assassination of Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995; this led to a marked shift towards the decline in the Arab-Israeli peace process.[457] The Arabs were split into a 'moderate' Arab states

---

[453] Displacing civilian population in the South to put pressure on Lebanon to intervene against Hezbollah's attacks on Israel. Israel bombed South Lebanon ceaselessly for seven days, targeting Lebanese civilians (120 killed) and enacting acts of terror and horror against civilians, leading to huge scores of civilian refugees seeking shelter away from the regions under Israeli bombing.

[454] Naim Qassem (2005), *Hizbullah: The Story from Within.* **(**London: Al-Saqi Books), pp. 109-11.

[455] Lena Jayyusi, and Anne S Roald (2016), *Media and Political Contestation in the Contemporary Arab World: A Decade of Change* (London & NY: Palgrave Macmillan), esp. Chapter 3, by Olfa Lamloum, "Hezbollah Communication Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", pp. 63-89.

[456] Except Hamas, which emerged in 1988 (or Islamic Jihad in 1987) in the wake of the Palestinian Intifada, opposed to the PLO's 1988 Declaration of Independence on a partitioned Palestine, and which was totally against the ongoing peace process in Madrid. See Ramzy Baroud (2017). "Should Hamas Rewrite the Past*?" Dr Ramzy Baroud's Page*, 10 May 2017. Online at: http://www.ramzybaroud.net/should-hamas-rewrite-the-past/

[457] Religious fundamentalism was to become the main obstacle to any peace talks, especially after negotiations on the Israeli-Syrian track reached deadlock. Also, flawed management in the peace negotiation processes resulted in conflicting interpretations over the concessions agreed upon between the Syrians and Rabin before his death. These issues were also influenced by the domestic political splits, especially in Israel, influenced by Rabin's assassination

camp supported by the US, and a Syrian-led camp in support of the Lebanese and Palestinian right to engage in armed resistance. Both were accused of terrorism by Israel which used it as a pretext for delaying the full implementation of the Oslo Agreement or full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the Syrian Golan Heights. In March 1996 Syria refused to attend the Egyptian-American sponsored Sharm al-Shaikh Summit for Peace, as a rejection of Arab, American and Israeli condemnation of Palestinian violence/terrorism, while Israel continually obstructed the peace process by maintaining its armed occupation of Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian territories. Meanwhile, there were no similar condemnations of Israeli state acts of violence, or of its domestic political, religious, or ideological isolationist forces opposed to the peace process – mainly because the Israeli extremist right-wing had come under the leadership of Netanyahu.

As a result, Israel decided to both negotiate and campaign, by launching another destructive war on Lebanon in April 1996 (Grapes of Wrath), and committing horrible civilian massacres with barely any condemnation, [458] yet still failing to defeat Hezbollah. Israeli PM Shimon Perez (in power after Rabin's assassination) had aimed to boost his election campaign in Israel but after losing in his domestic and external security battles, was still beaten by Netanyahu. Correspondingly, as the peace process continued to face constant deadlocks, Israel held on to its occupation in South Lebanon, which contributed to the continued Syrian presence in Lebanon;[459] although agreed upon in the Ta'if Agreement, it had technically become tied to the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, or to achieving a final Arab-Israeli peace resolution. Nonetheless, peace and stability still dominated Lebanese foreign policy interests, as also did support for Hezbollah's resistance in protecting Lebanese civilians while deterring the Israeli occupation; aside from the Syrian or regional Arab competition over their approach towards the peace process. This was officially emphasised in the attempts by PM Hariri in seeking French, Arab and international support to end the Israeli war against Lebanon, and led finally to Syrian-American

---

by Israeli right-wing religious extremism, and by the terror attacks by Palestinian right-wing religious extremism that had already begun before Rabin's assassination.

[458] Thereby motivating Israel less than a month later to carry out its aggressive armed operations against Lebanon, committing harsh civilian massacres and destroying civilian and Lebanese state foundations. In the Qana Massacre Israel bombed the United Nations UNIFIL compound, killing 102 Lebanese civilians who were sheltering there from the aggressive Israeli bombardment. Both the 1993 and 1996 Wars came about amidst Arab political silence or shy condemnations that blamed the armed resistance against Israel for the consequences of war.

[459] Tom Najem (2005) "Lebanon and Europe", op.cit., p. 106.

discussions arriving at the April 1996 Agreement,[460] a written renewal of the terms of the 1993 oral agreement – limiting attacks on civilians – which Israel continues occasionally to violate.

5.4.1. An Invitation to 'Terrorism': Israeli-Occupation Helicopter Gunship Negotiations

By May 1991, the Syrians had already signed the Treaty of Brotherhood, Coordination and Cooperation (TBCC) that provided Syria with control over Lebanese foreign and security affairs, yet with selective enforcement of the domestic reforms in the Ta'if Agreement as a guarantee of the special Lebanese-Syrian sovereign relations. Thus, ceasefire negotiations during the Israeli wars on Lebanon also became a Syrian-US coordination between themselves, and amongst the parties that each country supported in the conflicts. Even regarding Syria's geographical security presence in Lebanon, the Syrian troops had to stay away from the South and were not permitted to cross the Awali river in Sidon;[461] technically also disengaging themselves from ongoing events in the South. As for the Iranians, although Iran did not agree with Syria over the peace process with Israel, they both agreed on Hezbollah's right to resist the Israeli occupation. As Israel kept losing ground in the 'security zone', this gave Syria an advantage in its diplomatic efforts for peace in countering the Israeli security supremacy attitude in the negotiations. On the other hand, and despite its differences over the Ta'if Agreement, Hezbollah prioritized its focus on the spirit of national reconciliation in the Agreement and its resistance against the Israeli occupation.

This position was enhanced by Sayed Abbas Moussawi (active in Hezbollah's Armed Wing) who became Hezbollah's Secretary General (SG) in 1991, although he also highlighted on the issue of sectarianism in the Ta'if Agreement. He strongly opposed a return to the same old sectarian foundations in building the state, as outlined or further emphasized in the Ta'if Agreement; pointing out that this would not be possible, since sectarianism had either been the foundation of oppression and all the miseries in Lebanon's history, or was the original cause of its civil war. He insisted that sectarianism would destroy the country again and could even spill across the entire region and all aspects of life, and instead emphasized the importance of building the state's foundations based on civil non-sectarian citizenship concepts.[462] In fact, Moussawi reflected a

---

[460] Bassel F. Salloukh (2008), "The Art of the Impossible", op.cit., pp. 303.
[461] Adopting Kissinger's 'red lines' as mediated in 1976 in the wake of Syria's intervention in Lebanon.
[462] Abbas Moussawi Speech on Tai'f Agreement.
https://twitter.com/Cuzzzy/status/1342013688463708161

moderate and nationalist approach, attributable to Sadr's reformed and tolerant leadership and critical of the issue of sectarianism or national divisions. Moussawi had also studied in both Najaf and Qom, and inherited Sadr's path of state justice and national resistance, based on wisdom and religious tolerance.

In February 1992, Israel assassinated Moussawi (following a commemorative event for Shaikh Ragheb Harb). He was targeted by an Israeli helicopter airstrike that murdered him alongside his wife and five year-old child.[463] Ironically, the last words in the speech he had made before his assassination, were: "Kill us, our people will become more aware, torture us, they will become more aware, tear us apart and they will become more and more aware",[464] while also reflecting on the path of Imam Hussein.

Moussawi was replaced by his student Sayed Nasrallah, who had also studied in Najaf and Qom[465] in the early 1980s under the companions of Imam Sadr. In his turn, Nasrallah vowed to avenge the murder of Sayed Moussawi and his family by becoming more determined to force Israel out of Lebanon, emphasising Moussawi last words, and promising to maintain the same path. From this time onwards, Hezbollah's armed operations became more prominent in the way they targeted Israeli and SLA security posts, or even carried out infiltrating attacks inside the Israeli-occupied security zone. Even so, Israeli jets, helicopter gunships and mortar attacks continued their civilian massacres, at least until the 1996 April Agreement, as well as their targeting of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon until the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993, and afterwards shifting into Israeli security and assassination campaigns in the West Bank.[466]

---

[463] Gal Luft (2003), "The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing", *The Middle East Quarterly*, vol.10, no.1, pp. 3-13.
[464] Repeated in Nasrallah's speeches.
[465] He travelled to Qom after Saddam Hussein came to power in Iraq and the torture of any pro-Iranian political revolutionary.
[466] While the Palestinian attacks became internationally or regionally condemned. Nasrallah was publicly to salute the Palestinian suicide operations, despite their targeting of Israeli civilians, since Israel had to be deterred from targeting civilians in negotiating its future peace agreements, as had been the case with the assassination of Moussawi and his family, and the war massacres of 1993/1996.

On the other hand, the Israeli war aggressions against Lebanon were also to shift the attention of Al-Qaeda[467] onto Hezbollah's ongoing battle victories against Israel,[468] and were marked in August 1996 in Al-Qaeda's declaration of Jihad against the US,[469] in which Osama Bin Laden openly addressed the issue of blood spilled in Israeli-occupied Palestine, or in Iraq which was suffering under the severe international economic sanctions imposed by the US that were harming innocent civilians. He also mentioned the "horrifying pictures of the massacre of Qana" during the April 1996 Israeli war against Lebanon, saying that they were "still fresh in our memory."[470] In turn, the growing abilities or victories accomplished by Hezbollah in the South were also motivating Palestinian claims to the legitimacy of armed resistance against the Israeli occupation and its exploitations of the peace process in accusing them of terrorism. Ironically, by 1997 the US had decided to put Hezbollah on its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,[471] along with Hamas, which simply made it attract even more domestic and regional public support, mainly for deterring Israeli attacks on civilian targets and rejecting the kidnap and imprisonment of all Lebanese, Palestinian and other Arab rebel fighters who faced torture and humiliation in Israeli jails, or Israeli collaborators in jails such as the SLA Khiam prison in Lebanon.

5.4.2. Losing the Security Battle in the 'Security-Zone'

Nasrallah, in fact, gained great national and regional popularity after his 18-year-old son Hadi had been killed and his body seized by Israel, during an armed operation against Israeli troops in South Lebanon in mid-September 1997. Israel saw this a great opportunity to demand the release of the body of an Israeli soldier and the remains of another twelve from the elite naval commando unit Shayetet 13, who had been killed in an ambush earlier in September after a failed commando operation near the coastal town of Ansarieh, outside the Israeli-occupied security zone,[472] but

---

[467] Al-Qaeda-affiliated Arab Mujahedeen factions had already become active in the region after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, committing acts of terror in Egypt and Algeria.

[468] Lawrence Wright, (2006), *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), p. 307.

[469] Al-Qaeda had already attempted to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993.

[470] Bin Laden, 'Usama (1996). "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places": Bin Laden's Fatwa, republished by Masaryk University (originally in *Al-Quds Al-'Arabi,* August 1996). Online at: https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/jaro2010/MVZ203/OBL___AQ__Fatwa_1996.pdf

[471] US Government, Bureau of Counter Terrorism. https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/

[472] Associated Press (1997), "12 Israelis Killed in Raid in Southern Lebanon", republished in the *New York Times*, 5 September 1997. http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/05/world/12-israelis-killed-in-raid-in-southern-lebanon.html

Nasrallah refused to make any side deal with the Israelis with regard to prioritising his son over other kidnapped Lebanese hostages.

In an interview with *Der Spiegel*, Timor Goksel (former UNIFIL spokesman in Lebanon) observed the Israeli frustration with this, perceiving that Nasrallah's refusal to be seen giving his son special treatment over other prisoners of war drove the Israelis mad.[473] Moreover, during Nasrallah's speech on the night of his son's killing, he also saluted the six Lebanese army soldiers who had been killed and injured by Israel during the attack, sacrificing the same blood as the resistance and civilians. There was no mention of his son in his speech until he had paid tribute to all the others who had been killed during the attacks, then ending his speech by praising God for choosing his son as a martyr in his family.[474] Goksel who had also heard the speech at the home of a pro-Israel Lebanese Christian family in the Israeli-occupied zone said that he had seen them shedding tears after the speech and comparing Nasrallah with other leaders in Lebanon who sent their sons abroad to travel and later inherit the family political leadership business. From which Goksel concluded that, "Nasrallah losing his son in battle and almost trying to write it off ... the way he handled… that was a masterpiece," adding that, to his credit, he was a man of his word, recognized by both friends and enemies.[475] The body of Nasrallah's son was not returned until 1998, as part of a full-prisoner third-party (German) mediated swap deal.[476]

This incident motivated many Lebanese youths to ask to join the resistance, which led Hezbollah in 1998 to open up such an opportunity by initiating a new cross-sectarian resistance armed group under its military wing. This was to be known as the Lebanese Resistance Contingents (LRC) and its membership would eventually include secular, leftist, and non-religious youth urging Lebanese nationalism and enmity toward Israel in opposition to its acts of occupation and oppression in Lebanon and Palestine. Subsequently, this only made it more difficult for Israel to resume its occupation, or to continue successfully linking the Islamic resistance in Lebanon to the Islamist

---

[473] Lucy Fielder (2006), "Nasrallah is Reputed to be a Man of his Word", Part II, *Spiegel Online*, 24 August 2006. Online at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/muslim-hero-nasrallah-has-come-a-433399-2.html
[474] ibid.
[475] ibid.
[476] Ivan Watson (2008), "Lebanese Celebrate the Return of Five Prisoners", *NPR News*, 16 July 2008. Online at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92586233

terrorism boom of the 1990s. Israel was left with a renewed political, media and security intelligence challenge in Lebanon.

Since the early 1990s, Hezbollah had also adopted a political and media information war to expose the false Israeli propaganda reflected in Arab regimes' 'propaganda'. For Hezbollah, this was used as an effective weapon in exposing Israel's denial of military losses and misleading statements denying Hezbollah's success in its armed resistance operations against Israel's troops in the Israeli-Occupied 'Security Zone' of South Lebanon.[477] Also, as far as exposing its position towards the peace negotiations track with Israel was concerned, Hezbollah remained discreet about its political intentions after a final peace agreement was reached. However, in an interview with Nasrallah before the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, he still noted that in the event of a withdrawal occurring Hezbollah, as a resistance movement, would not be an alternative to the Lebanese government's security obligations.[478] Nonetheless, as the toll of Israeli troop casualties increased, this was also stressful on the Israeli domestic front, where pressure had continued to escalate since the crash in February 1997 of two Israeli helicopters carrying soldiers to Lebanon. With the intensified attacks by Hezbollah inside the security zone, Israel had been relying increasingly on flying troops to and within South Lebanon. The crash killed 73 soldiers, and had led to the rise of an Israeli civil opposition movement, the 'Four Mothers'; whose members (women whose sons were among the relatively few fighters carrying the burden of the war) demanded a unilateral withdrawal from the security zone.'[479]

5.5. The Collapse of 'Land for Peace'

Israel was finally forced into a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, without having compelled the Lebanese state to concede to Israel's security conditions that until then had been the pretext for its invasion and occupation. Yet again this was also influenced by the domestic

---

[477] Colin P. Clarke (2017), "How Hezbollah came to dominate information warfare", *The Jerusalem Post*, 17 September 2017. http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/How-Hezbollah-came-to-dominate-information-warfare-505354

[478] Daniel Sobelman (2004), *New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbollah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Jaffa Center for Strategic Studies), p.27. See also Interview with Hizbollah's Secretary General, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, with the journal *Middle East Insight* in February 2000.

[479] Amos Harel, (2017), "20 Years After: the Helicopter Crash That Changed Israel's Fight with Hezbollah", *Haaretz*, February 2017. Online at:
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-the-crash-that-changed-israel-s-fight-with-hezbollah-1.5494030

Israeli political scene, with PM Ehud Barak making an election promise of withdrawal in response to the Four Mothers, and their "Let's Get Out of Lebanon" public campaign.[480] This enabled him win the elections, but not to avoid a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon after failing to reach a peace resolution with Syria. The majority of the Israeli public did not favour departing from the security shield of the Golan Heights, which Barak had decided to abort, while also expecting to make final 'land for peace' concessions to the Palestinians at Camp David in July 2000.[481] Ironically, the Syrian dominance of Lebanese political affairs probably still supported a clear and solid Lebanese foreign policy position regarding the peace negotiations process with Israel that was otherwise dominated by influential sectarian political forces inviting foreign intervention over their domestic or foreign policy divisions, whether towards Israel, Syria, Iran, and the US, or the issue of Palestine.

It therefore prevented any domestic divisions over choosing a unilateral Syrian-Lebanese track in the internationally-sponsored peace negotiation process with Israel, and avoided US pressures forcing Lebanon into bilateral peace negotiations, which Israel was anxious for in order to impose its own security terms for peace. Hitti suggests that attempting a separate peace with Lebanon which would take advantage of its sectarian fabric was always Israel's objective during the civil war – for Lebanon was traditionally portrayed by Israel as "the weakest link in the Arab chain."[482] And as Paul Salem observes, domestic Lebanese divisions became mediated by the Syrians, yet after the civil war, also made foreign policy in Lebanon the main topic that dominated the shape of the domestic political scene.[483] He shows that such traditional divisions occasionally created a 'double negation' over negative pretexts rather than positive objectives, thus devaluing Lebanese foreign policy decisions.[484] Moreover, this also reflects what Najem highlights as the determinants that provided alternative opportunities for Lebanon to continue pursuing an independent Lebanese

---

[480] Greenberg, Joel (1997), "Tel Aviv Journal; 'Out of Lebanon!': Mothers' Cry Rouses Israelis", *The New York Times*, 19 September 1997. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/19/world/tel-aviv-journal-out-of-lebanon-mothers-cry-rouses-israelis.html

[481] Jerome Slater (2002), "Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Israel and Syria, 1948-2001", *International Security*, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 79-106; see also Oren (2001), quoted in Slater (2002), pp.99-100.

[482] Nassif Hitti (1989), p 24.

[483] Paul Salem (1994), "Reflections on Lebanon's Foreign Policy", in Deirdre Collings, ed., *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p. 96.

[484] Ibid, p. 70.

foreign policy, such as the Western-oriented economy and financial dependency that it pursued after the civil war.

This also meant that domestic political and economic conditions in Lebanon were totally different from those in Syria, and occasionally deviated from the state's official foreign policy orientation when confronted with domestic political conflicts,[485] or when, in addition, the Israeli wars on Lebanon were becoming devastating for the country's post-civil war reconstruction efforts.. In other words, the foundations of this foreign policy remained compatible with Lebanon's new Arab identity as outlined in the Ta'if Agreement,[486] which Rafiq Hariri adopted as a new official Lebanese foreign policy that catered to a united Arab position. This had been sensitive to relationships with Syria and its immediate role in the regional conflict with Israel since the start of the Lebanese civil war. Thus, at the official state level, Lebanon had continued to reflect a solidarity with the Arab position while maintaining a hostile position towards Israel since 1948, whereas the Lebanese state's official Foreign Policy focused on international efforts to "implement UNSCR 425 for the full liberation of South Lebanon, the release of all Lebanese detainees in Israeli and South Lebanon Army (SLA) proxy forces' prisons, and the creation of an Arab-Israeli peace resolution that would permanently resolve the Palestinian Refugee problem."[487]

Although this mainly anticipated a fair resolution of the issue of Palestine, which until the Ta'if Agreement had triggered most of the wars and conflicts in Lebanon or the region, the situation remained unresolved. Although Israel had pulled out of Lebanon, it maintained its occupation of a few strategic border territories, including the Shebaa Farms and Kfar-Chouba Hills,[488] and also refused to share the maps of landmines in Lebanon on the borders with Israel. Even so, Israel quickly pulled out of Lebanon on 25 May 2000, although it refused to release the Lebanese detainees in its prisons, or in the Khiam prison which remained under SLA control. They were left to meet their own fate, along with the SLA. Yet the SLA, which felt abandoned by Israel, immediately collapsed after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, leading to the release of all

---

[485] Tom Najem (2005), "Lebanon and Europe: The Foreign Policy of a Penetrated State", op.cit., pp. 100-103

[486] Bassel F Salloukh (2008), "The Art of the Impossible", op.cit., pp. 286.

[487] ibid, p. 296.

[488] ibid, p. 292.

prisoners, thus marking a defeat for Israel's power deterrence image, and a victory for Hezbollah which had also avoided the kidnap, torture, threats or murder of any of the previous Lebanese collaborators from the SLA.

Perhaps they were intended for slaughter in another blood-shedding sectarian civil war, along with the detainees. However, this was prevented by the responsible behaviour adopted by the Resistance, reflecting tolerance in encouraging national reconciliation and resistance to foreign occupation. Scores of SLA members ended up waiting with their families for permission to cross into Israel, uncertain of their future fate. Those who remained were handed to the Lebanese authorities by Hezbollah.[489] Hezbollah, on the other hand, continued its armed resistance struggle with the aim of freeing the rest of the detainees or the Lebanese territories still held by Israel; thus, it continued to undermine Israel's objectives in the unilateral withdrawal. The collapse of peace negotiations on the Israeli-Palestinian track and the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, provoked by Sharon's visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, were mainly responsible for diminishing any further hopes for renewed peace talks. The negotiations had also collapsed at Camp David over the issue of Jerusalem, with Arafat refusing to make any concessions in East Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque,[490] and the further delays in dismantling the pro-right wing Jewish-settlements in the West Bank, amidst denial of the Palestinian Right of Return.[491]

In October 2000 Hezbollah conducted its first military operation against Israel, which occurred at the Shebaa Farms; the three Israeli soldiers who were killed were taken by Hezbollah to conclude a final prisoner swap with Israel, along with an Israeli reserve lieutenant-colonel who had subsequently been lured into Beirut.[492] Further tensions were to escalate in South Lebanon after

---

[489] The majority of the SLA members were handed over to the Lebanese army and brought to military court trials. Most were tried but with easy sentences or received a pardon in 2005, as part of the Lebanese Amnesty Bill after the Hariri Assassination. In fact, Hezbollah had intelligence sources inside the SLA, and had focused on weakening its capacities by targeting its high ranking officers, especially after 1996, when the SLA became limited in its ability to retaliate against Lebanese civilians because of being targeted by Hezbollah. Since many of the SLA members were from local Shia towns and villages in the Occupied Zone, and still maintained family links and relationships outside the security zone, it was therefore easy for Hezbollah to penetrate or motivate against Israel. As Hezbollah intensified its attacks on the SLA it also offered pardons to those who wish to defect.
[490] Ron E Hassner (2009), *War on Sacred Grounds* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press), pp. 78–88.
[491] Gilead Sher (2006), *The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999–2001* (London: Routledge). On the Chief Negotiator for the Israeli team, see p. 247-249.
[492] In January 2004, a prisoner swap mediated by Germany led to the release of 23 Lebanese detainees, about 400 Palestinians and 12 Arab detainees, in exchange for the bodies of three Israeli soldiers and an Israeli reserve colonel.

the Lebanese government decided on the construction of a water pipeline from the Wazzani River to support the local villages on the border with Israel. They had been under Israeli occupation since 1978, which had triggered a water security crisis.[493] Upon the completion of the project in September 2002, PM Ariel Sharon described this as a diversion of water by Lebanon that "would constitute a *casus-belli*".[494] In response, Nasrallah threatened to retaliate "within minutes" to any Israeli attack on Lebanon, which would lead to European, American, Syrian and United Nations mediations assuring Lebanon's rights over the water to be consumed.[495] Nonetheless, the incident had a great significance in re-emphasizing the renewed public legitimacy of Hezbollah's resistance as the Israeli threats on Lebanon continued, and while the Lebanese state, incapable of deterring such threats as efforts for peace, kept heading towards an uneven path.

5.5.1. A Peace-Making Foreign Policy Interplay: Beirut's 2002 Arab Initiative for Peace

While Lebanon remained unable to disengage itself from the cycle of regional violence or peace efforts that continued to be exploited by Israel, its foreign policy priorities remained focused on achieving regional peace. It was important to resolve and bring an end to the issue of Palestine and its negative impacts on Lebanon, as also was solving the problem of Palestinian refugees, a subject that had become marginalized during the peace process, including at the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Even the Arab Initiative for Peace, proposed at the League of Arab States (LAS) Beirut Summit in March 2002, reflected an official Arab concession to the Right of Return. However it was strongly opposed by Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, since the Arab Initiative for Peace also came at the height of the Palestinian Intifada, with Israel escalating its aggression against the Palestinians. The Initiative had actually come into being about a month earlier, in February, in response to a *New York Times* interview with King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia during which the King proposed Israel's full withdrawal from all the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, in accordance with UN resolution 242 as a condition for full Arab normalization of relations with Israel.[496]

---

[493] Ironically, this triggered a water crisis issue with Israel, over claims that the Wazzani River feeds the Hasbani River in Lebanon and finally flows into Israel, becoming a tributary of the Jordan River.

[494] Stefan Deconinck (2006), "The Wazzani incident in the summer of 2002 - a phony war?" Online at: http://www.waternet.be/jordan_river/wazzani.htm

[495] Nicholas Blanford (2002)., "A Lebanese-Israeli water conflict threatens to boil over", The Christian Science Monitor, 21 October 2002. Online at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1021/p08s01-wome.html

[496] Joshua Teitelbaum (2009), *The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects*, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2009, p. 3. Online at: http://www.jcpa.org/text/Arab-Peace-Initiative.pdf

However, during a preparatory pre-Summit visit to Beirut by the Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Saoud , President Lahoud raised objections. He welcomed the initiative but had noted that it was missing the Right of Return. Faisal informed him that the initiative had already been internationally approved in its current form, and that it would be impossible to make any further detailed edits, asking Lahoud instead to work it out with the Syrians. Lahoud insisted that the Right of Return was included in the UN General Assembly's Resolution 194, and that his reservations did not really relate to Syria, since the issue was strictly a pre- and post-civil war Lebanese matter.[497] He claimed that it would violate the constitution that he had been elected to protect, and would also prevent new demographic or territorial divisions in Lebanon that might renew domestic civil-war conflicts and bring harm to state sovereignty.[498] Ironically, at the Summit itself Lahoud's renewed position caused substantial confusion among the US-allied 'moderate' Arab states, as well as threats to boycott the rest of the summit.

Interestingly, as President Lahoud reported, this was to further expose the magnitude of domestic Arab divisions and foreign interventions made during the Summit, including also by Israel. None of the Arab states, including Syria, had paid any serious attention to a concession being made with regard to the Palestinian refugees' Right of Return; in this regard all were relying on the position of the Palestinians themselves and especially that of Arafat who was supposed to have made a live telecom speech from Ramallah on the first day of the conference (but was besieged by the Israelis and accused of leading the Intifada); however Lahoud blocked Arafat's speech (officially blamed on Israel), fearing that he would make such concession under Arab pressure.[499] Although there were attempts at the summit to seek help from Bashar al-Assad to convince Lahoud to alter his position, Assad declined on the grounds that it was an inappropriate gesture while he was on his first visit to Beirut as the new President in Syria.[500] His refusal to interfere, prompted Amr Musa

---

[497] The official Lebanese position on this aspect was outlined in the Ta'if constitution rejecting new citizenships for any refugees in consideration of geo-demographic sensitivities in Lebanon (Article 25/95)

[498] Al-Mayadeen (2017), "President Emile Lahoud: 'From Liberation to Resolution 1559'", *Al-Mayadeen Documentary*, Part 4, Presented by Kareem Baqradoni, 5 March 2017. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=108&v=R9CIuTtnX9I

[499] ibid.

[500] ibid.

and Faisal Bin Saoud to inform the US Secretary of State Colin Powell of the dilemma; he in turn was puzzled by and sceptical about Lahoud's personal and unpredictable stance.

Powell felt that this was creating obstacles to a long international pathway towards a final peace initiative attempt, and therefore consulted Netanyahu who was now the Israeli foreign minister in Sharon's new Cabinet. Netanyahu at his end proposed to Powell that such details could be included in the final statement of the conference and not in the main body of the initiative; yet all those efforts remained blocked by Lahoud's firm position.[501] Lahoud insisted that this was against the principles of the 1991 Land for Peace initiative, which indicated the reaching of a "just" and "agreed upon" solution to the Palestinian refugee question, a priority issue that Lebanon had constantly pursued at the peace negotiating table with Israel,[502] and something that Lahoud was not ready to concede from inside Beirut. Yet given the mutual geo-demographic security dimension of this issue, whether for Lebanon or Israel, PM Sharon was quick to reject the initiative, saying that "it was not worth the ink used in writing it."[503]

At the end of March 2002 Sharon was also to invade Arafat's compound and impose a long siege. This jeopardized the fate of a Saudi-credited Arab peace initiative, especially in the newly-shaped post-9/11 regional order of the 'war on terrorism' (following the destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York) that was threatening the invasion of Iraq, and also hinting at blame being with Syria.

In his State of the Union Address in January 2002, US President George W. Bush had already named Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the Axis of Evil in pinpointing America's common enemies in the War on Terror after Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan had been defeated. They were accused of being state sponsors of terrorism and of seeking weapons of mass destruction and he hinted at Iraq, already suffering from severe economic sanctions, being next on the target list in this latest War. Israel on the other hand, also pursued a foreign policy under Netanyahu that sought US

---

[501] ibid.
[502] Raphael Ahren (2013), "Why is Israel so afraid of the Arab Peace Initiative?" *The Times of Israel,* 18 June 2013. https://www.timesofisrael.com/why-is-israel-so-afraid-of-the-arab-peace-initiative/
[503] Yossi Alpher, Ghassan Khatib, & Charmaine Seit, (2011), "The Bitterlemons Guide to the Arab Peace Initiative: New Thinking on a Key Middle East Proposal", *Bittterlemons*, Jerusalem 2011, p. 33.

international influence, especially at the UN, to undermine its enemies in the region under this 'war on terrorism'.[504]

Thus, Israel sought to delegitimize Hezbollah's resistance or armed presence across its borders, while also exerting pressures on the Syrian role and continued presence in Lebanon, especially after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. This situation pushed Lebanese foreign policy to come under the pressures of regional conflicts and divisions, especially under an immediate pressure by Israel's own foreign policy and regional security interests, whether towards the Palestinians, Syria or Hezbollah in Lebanon, in addition to Iran.

5.6. Punishing Syria In Lebanon

Lahoud's sovereign political behaviour at the Arab League Summit in Beirut was blamed on Syria's intervention in Lebanese foreign policy, which US and Israeli foreign policy interests sought to undermine while also catering to Israeli regional security interests. After the US invasion of Iraq, Colin Powell had visited Syria and Lebanon in May 2003, with three main demands: to stop arming Hezbollah from Syria; maintain stability at the Southern border; and send the Lebanese army to the South to reflect state democratic practice. Lahoud informed Powell that Beirut had been the city of legislation since its early history in Roman times, and that he could not preach to Lebanon about freedoms, rights, justice, and democracy.[505] While in Syria Powell particularly emphasised cutting off relations with Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, which Assad rejected. Subsequently, in December 2003, the US Congress issued a "Syria Accountability Act" bill, aimed at punishing Syria in Lebanon "in restoration of Lebanese sovereignty", while also accusing the regime of supporting terrorism in Iraq and the region. The US also accused Syria of rejecting regional peace efforts,[506] since the Saudis too were still upset, blaming Syria for the failure of the Arab peace initiative, and doubtful about its role in Lebanon and failing to put a leash on Lahoud.

---

[504] "If you take out Saddam's regime, I guarantee you, that it will have enormous positive reverberations on the region." (Netanyahu, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs 2002): @netanyahu https://pic.twitter.com/6zTIE1L8pk
[505] Al-Mayadeen (2017), "President Emile Lahoud…, op.cit.
[506] Bush's initiative of September 2002 – The Roadmap for Peace.

The French on the other hand, who aimed at reviving relations with the US that had been damaged over the invasion of Iraq, reached an agreement (negotiated between President Bush and Chirac) to help drive Syria out of Lebanon, disarm Hezbollah and prevent Lahoud from staying in power. This became interpreted in the September 2004 US-French-sponsored UNSCR 1559, which mainly demanded: a stop to the extension of Lahoud's presidential term in parliament; the withdrawal of all foreign armies from Lebanon; and the disarming of all militias in Lebanon, thus also hinting at Syria and Hezbollah. While Hezbollah considered itself as a resistance movement that was not concerned with Resolution 1559, Parliament still extended Lahoud's term in September 2004.[507] Syria on the other hand did not think of itself as a foreign army in Lebanon: on the contrary it considering itself as having been the reason for Lebanese stability since the end of the civil war. However, Syria finally became pressured to pull out of Lebanon in 2005, after the Hariri assassination.

Although this ended the chapter on foreign armed presence in Lebanon, the country still became politically split over the terms of UNSCR 1559. It also continued to face the costs of the collapsing pathway to peace in the region, both politically and economically, while once again drifting away from almost a century's-worth of long-postponed constitutional, political, socio-economic or even national security reforms. In other words, Lebanon was to remain hostage to what Hitti regards as the second major problem of Lebanese foreign policy – that of the "dependent Arabists' perception of the Lebanese setting", where the "goals pursued through Lebanon and those set for Lebanon are done independently of its national capabilities", thus making Lebanon the "launching pad" in Arab regional or traditional conflicts against Israel or Iran.[508]

---

[507] Mainly with the Resolution's rejection of the extension to President Emile Lahoud's tenure, which created confusion within the micro-Lebanese political scene with Rafiq Hariri's parliamentary coalition voting in support. French President Jacques Chirac was a close friend of Rafiq Hariri, having among other things, backed him in certain business investments while Hariri had supported Chirac's election campaigns. Nevertheless, Hariri was to become very disappointed with Chirac's refusal to acknowledge Hariri's domestic political restrictions, and Chirac was upset with Hariri for disappointing his new friend in the US. All this was represented for Hariri in the influential power of financial corruption, in political or economic exploitations, and blamed on forces like Hezbollah, or on marginalized individuals or social citizenship forces in the state that struggled to maintain dignified living in a financially or economically non-sovereign 'stateless' state. The country also suffered from carrying the burden of the state's debts while promising hydrocarbon wealth remained deep in its seas, continuously threatened by Israeli violation of Lebanese national security, political or economic interests, or the domestic-external neo-oligarchy greed and political cartel interests, extending at the Arab regional level.
[508] Hitti, 1989, p. 15.

In this case it was the "launching pad" to a Lebanese disputed peace initiative, that was prepared independently from Lebanese national interests or capabilities. Saudi Arabia, which had traditionally followed a soft and silent petro-dollar influence on regional political issues was now gradually shifting to open regional power sway and intervention, beginning with its 'initiative for peace' in 2002, its influence on the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003, and its role in Lebanon, where initially it had followed a soft political approach through its relationships with Syria, especially after Hafiz al-Assad's death in 2000: yet this was gradually to become more open after Hariri's assassination in 2005. Nonetheless, in inspecting other alternatives Najem stresses the importance of a European role under the European Union, given the geo-political Mediterranean links with Syria, Lebanon, and Israel.

On the Lebanese-Syrian track, the EU could act as a counterbalance to US pressures in the region, which would provide an opportunity for an "increasing leverage in Europe's relations with both Syria and Lebanon."[509] Especially with France, 'a cornerstone of Lebanese foreign policy since independence', where relations deepened after Jacques Chirac's Presidency, since 1995 provided Chirac's personal relationships with Hariri. Yet the EU had to face its own pressures from the US over any criticisms or opposition to US regional policies, as became evident after the Iraq invasion, with France shifting its views over Lebanon, and also providing the domestic political divisions over Lahoud's presidency.[510]

Moreover, despite the EU's, and particularly France's economic and trade relationships with both Syria and Lebanon, "Europe has never been able to translate these economic factors into particularly significant political influence."[511] Thus, it had very little influence or part to play in terms of pressing for the post-war political reforms necessary to reflect equal power representation in the state. On the other hand, Najem also emphasizes the role of Lebanese expatriate communities, mainly in the EU, such as that of General Michel Aoun, who worked and lobbied tirelessly for French and international support for "authentic Lebanese interests and to impose greater pressure on Syria to withdraw from the country."[512]

---

[509] Najem (2005), in Nonneman, ed., op.cit, p. 121.
[510] Salloukh: 2008, p 303.
[511] Najem 2005: ibid., p. 114.
[512] ibid, p. 119.

5.7. Conclusion

In examining the domestic-external interplay of Lebanese or Middle East foreign policy at all levels, domestic, regional and international, this chapter focused on issues of peace and violence before and after the end of civil war in Lebanon, at both state and sub-state (individual or group) levels. It also inspected the negative impacts on Lebanon after the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference in 1991 as it became hostage to its regional security and power hegemony conflicts while awaiting promises of wealth and prosperity pending the accomplishment of an exploited peace resolution. This affected Lebanon economically and financially, with its speculative currency collapse crisis in 1992,[513] and in the destructive Israeli wars that followed. Finally it arrived at adopting a new economic strategy of mounting financial debts on the state as a pretext for accomplishing the necessary reconstruction efforts in Lebanon that remained unfinished. Efforts to boost domestic peace were given priority in a post-war Lebanon, that would be also compatible at the regional level with the rhythm of peace in the Middle East following the American arrival in the region after the 1991 Gulf War.

Under Lebanon's new President Lahoud, the government of PM Salim Hoss between 1998-2000 sought to achieve domestic, institutional, administrative and other economic reforms, but the collapse of peace meant a further blow for the government formed in August 2000 by Rafic Hariri who had won the elections. To help Lebanon overcome its economic and financial hardship, and as was evident from the 2001 Paris I and 2002 Paris II conferences he, in turn, became dependent on French support, which arrived in the shape of foreign currency loans that were spent on selective economic investments while accumulating additional state national debts.

Thus, despite these efforts, economic prosperity and political stability remained entangled with domestic-external conflicts, determined by an "invisible hand" that also dictated the fate of strategic economic or political reforms. Although the Ta'if Agreement declared that Lebanon was the sole protector of all its people by being a final and permanent home for all its historic local

---

[513] Sahar Al-Attar (2019), "Charbel Nahas: Lebanon is in a pre-crisis phase", *Le Commerce du Levant*, 15 January 2019, https://www.lecommercedulevant.com/article/28809-charbel-nahas-lebanon-is-in-a-pre-crisis-phase

geo-communities (even opposing the granting of new Lebanese citizenships that threatened the country's sectarian demographic balance), the dominant sectarian forces in the state continued to promise reform and prosperity that remained jeopardized, dictated by complex security dynamics on all domestic, regional or international levels.

However, the country could not remain immune to its regional historic friendships, enmities, influences, conflicts or interventions. It was a Lebanese reality of odd events or occasions, and complex domestic-external geo-dynamics, accompanied by a diplomacy of violence, perhaps best described by Fisk as the Israelis being like the Syrians as they moved into Lebanon,[514] with both establishing their mandates under complex domestic, regional and international details that were sometimes impossible to explain, understand, or even predict. They were greeted by Lebanese traditions that always "held fearful portents which were never understood by the recipients."[515] Whether in greeting the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, even in South Lebanon, the Israeli soldiers were pelted with rose water and rice, just as the Syrian soldiers were also greeted in East Beirut in 1976, or the US Marines, including French and Italian paratroopers, greeted in 1983, and even the French invaders in 1920; yet all in the end became forced to depart from Lebanon, with a deep sense of sorrow or humiliation.

---

[514] "…the Israelis came like the Syrians, with expressions of innocence and with promises that they had arrived only to restore the sovereignty of Lebanon. Like all the other armies, they promised to stay not one hour – not one minute – longer than necessary. And then they stayed for months, indeed years, until driven out in pain and indignity. One thing all the armies had in common was a careful explanation of their presence…" Robert Fisk (2002), *Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/The Nation), p. 53.

[515] "The soldiers who arrived were decent men, motivated by a sense of moral purpose and national pride, unaware that Lebanon never rewarded its guests. In several streets, the US Marines and the French paratroopers were pelted with rose water and rice, just as the Israelis had been greeted in East Beirut, and just as the Syrians had been greeted before them. The tradition held fearful portents which were never understood by the recipients." Fisk, ibid, p. 444.

CHAPTER SIX: LEBANON BEFORE AND AFTER THE HARIRI ASSASSINATION

This chapter mostly examines the sub-state domestic interplay of events in the period following the agreed withdrawal of Syrian, and all foreign troops from Lebanon by 2005, and their relevance to the traditional external issues – interplaying at all domestic, regional and international levels – in relation to the power hegemony conflicts impacting on Lebanese state sovereignty. Not long after the assassination of PM Rafic Hariri on St Valentine's Day, 14 February 2005, Syria suddenly became politically accused – domestically, regionally and internationally – of assassinating Hariri, especially by the US which demanded an immediate Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in implementation of UNSCR 1559. This caused a sharp domestic political split in Lebanon, especially over what had initially started as the 'Beirut Spring' protests demanding the truth about Hariri's murder and the ending of all assassinations in Lebanon, and which brought back painful memories of the civil war era.

Yet the split became politicized into an anti-Syrian 'Cedar Revolution' that accused Syria of being responsible for all the domestic issues in the Lebanese state;[516] and even committed acts of violence against Syrian workers in Lebanon. Later it turned into a political movement that became known as the March Fourteenth Coalition (MFC), formed in reaction to another opposition protest that was critical of the false accusations about Syria. In its turn this other protest also developed into a political coalition becoming known as the March Eighth Coalition (MEC), appearing as two 'March Springs' split over a 'Lebanon First' sovereign constituency.

6.1. Integral Lebanonism: The Lebanese Neutrality Debate Before and After the Hariri Assassination

Nassif Hitti's article on Lebanon's foreign policy further describes Lebanese foreign policy as the perception of Lebanon's role and the way its relations are conducted vis-à-vis its environment. He also emphasises the domestic identity dichotomy framework, whether in promoting an integral

---

[516] Anne Marie Baylouny (2009), "US Foreign Policy in Lebanon", in Robert Looney ed., *Handbook on US Middle East Relations*, (London: Routledge), pp. 310-323. Available online as, http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39054/inc_baylouny_US_policyin_Lebanon.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive)

Lebanonist constituency (with Lebanon being the Switzerland of the Middle East) or a dependent Arabist or Islamist constituency (with Lebanon being the Arab Hanoi), and stresses that it underlies the pattern of Lebanese state foreign policy.[517] This dichotomy was to revive in the period after the Hariri assassination and the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, and especially after the Israeli War on Lebanon in 2006, when the domestic political scene in Lebanon reflected new domestic divisions that kept the country separated under 8 March and 14 March split coalitions, and failed to define a 'Lebanon First' constituency as an integral Lebanonist neutrality. Yet practically speaking the domestic alliances that shaped this domestic split reflected a traditional divide over a Western or Eastern – dependent or independent – integral Lebanese state neutrality, that was hard to define in the midst of the recurring cycles of regional violence and instability; and historically exploiting a sovereign Lebanese domestic or foreign policy neutrality.

This was a Lebanese state environment, with hegemonial geo-political and national security supremacies that threatened the geo-dynamics of Lebanese economic or political sovereignty gateways. It was particularly influenced by conflict and enmity relationships between its only neighbours, Israel and Syria. Reasonably, as Hitti stresses, Syria is not only Lebanon's geographical gateway but also its political gateway to the Arab world; it carries more regional geo-political significance in the calculations of foreign powers, where in this respect a strong state in Lebanon could only serve as the main guarantee for Syria's vital interests, while equally protecting Lebanese state interests.[518] As the MEC and MFC became divided, or born, as a result of disagreement over relationships with Syria, this by default took the Lebanese sovereignty debate into disagreement over a Lebanese neutrality or disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict independently from Syria. This was particularly the case with the escalation of Lebanese political divisions after the May 2005 elections over the implementation of UNSCR 1559 *vis-à-vis* domestic disarmament, or even forcing Lahoud outside the Presidency with the Syrians having already withdrawn from Lebanon – also amidst domestic security divisions and accusations with the renewed cycle of assassinations.

---

[517] Nassif Hitti (1989), "The Foreign Policy of Lebanon: Lessons and Prospects for the Forgotten Dimension", *Papers on Lebanon No. 9* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies), pp. 9-11.
[518] Hitti 1989, ibid., p. 23

This in fact brought back the old civil war disputes over support for the Palestinian cause, in terms of Palestinian disarmament in Lebanon, and the future of continued conflict with Israel, a conflict from which Lebanon could not disengage, and neither from its debates. Hence, as Hitti writes in this regard:

> Lebanon's attempts to disengage itself from the conflict proved to be a failure, providing the regional powers directly involved in the conflict with the only opportunity to advance their goals and to influence the politics and objectives of their adversaries… For Israel, Lebanon presented a host of interests ranging from the exploitation of its water resources, to a redrawing of the frontiers after Israel renounced the Armistice agreement, to attempting a separate peace with Lebanon by taking advantage of its sectarian fabric – a goal that Israel has nursed since its inception – to finally trying to break the weakest link in the Arab chain through acts of both interference and intervention. Thus, if total disengagement is impossible for regional and domestic reasons, it remains essential to define the terms of engagement to lessen the vulnerability of Lebanon to the dynamics of the conflict… Lebanon should be motivated less by the symbolic solidarity with the PLO and more by geopolitical and demographic considerations. The indifference to Israel's intentions in Lebanon, the misunderstanding of the dynamics of Palestinian nationalism and the unwillingness to accept a certain level of sacrifice, proved fatal to Lebanon: the illusion of an easy way out of the conflict brought Lebanon more into the conflict, but on terms dictated by others. Instead of looking at the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations in the context of a wider framework of negotiations between Syria and the US whereby the nature of the latter would determine the outcome of the former, they failed to understand.[519]

This affirms what we can still conclude about this aspect, three decades after Hitti's observations and the end of civil war in Lebanon; or a century after Greater Lebanon, whether in terms of conflict with Israeli Zionism, or of Syrian geo-political security issues with incursions into Lebanon since WWI even before and after, as the 'history book' of Nahr al-Kalb also reflects. This also impacts on the rise of the civil state in Lebanon, over which Hitti argues that while there are freedoms of views but not multi-sectarian political freedoms, there is, nevertheless, a geo-political realism of national security awareness of state macro-realpolitik environments, especially in relation to Israel or Syria, in addition to the international manipulations of regional hegemony. Thus, all were to remain an obstacle in achieving a newly disputed integral Lebanonism.

---

[519] Hitti, 1989, op.cit., pp. 24-25. See also the interesting analysis by Ghassan Tueni (1985), *Une Guerre pour les autres* (Paris, Editions Lattes), pp. 336-37; and the account by Wadi Haddad (1985), *Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors* (New York: Praeger Special Studies), pp. 93-4.

6.1.1. A Revived Indigenous Concept of Strength and Victory

Provided the complex domestic, regional and international restrictions were impeded from reaching an integral Lebanese constituency, this also affected an integral Lebanese foreign policy approach. It became hugely disputed over defining an impossible neutrality for a region of conflict, and still failing to try to define new terms of engagement 'to lessen the vulnerability of Lebanon' to the dynamics of the continued conflicts with Israel, whether with the Palestinians after the murder of Arafat in late 2004, or with Syria in Golan, and including the Lebanese territories Israel had remained to occupy alongside the security violations Israel had maintained since its withdrawal in 2000. Nevertheless, all this became an occasion for the promotion of an end objective definition of an 'integral Lebanese neutrality' based on a 'power deterrence neutrality'. It was enhanced by Nasrallah, who quoted Bashir's approach to the concept of resistance towards ensuring Lebanese state sovereignty throughout all of Lebanon's 10452 square km of territories. It set the foundations for the traditional *'integral Lebanonist constituency'* which required a new conceptual approach in a violent region like the Middle East, being quite unlike the stable Swiss or Austrian domestic and regional atmospheres in securing a neutral foreign policy approach.

Alternatively, if Lebanon sought a neutral approach towards its internationally-penetrated regional atmosphere of conflict, this could probably be achieved by possessing an armed *power deterrence* ability. Yet the Lebanese state is denied armaments on both regional and international scales, under Middle East peace pretexts seeking an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This reality was experienced by Egypt during the Cold War, with Nasser struggling under economic and armament sanctions. Even after he became one of the main pioneers in the non-aligned movement (NAM), seeking to promote a neutral position towards the Cold War East-West divisions, he still failed, due to the magnitude of the global hegemony power dichotomies that dominated. Finally, he became more convinced about seeking an armed power deterrence capacity, amidst a global dichotomy of double standard pretexts that were providing exceptional privileges to Israel. Although Nasser died before achieving victory against Israel, his approach for neutrality or peace remained undermined, lacking close observation and public awareness, since the peace mediation discussions imposed by the Americans in exchange for stable foreign relationships with Egypt and USAID economic support, were to involve only the deep state's domestic-external relationships.

Correspondingly, Nasrallah's revival of an 'integral Lebanese constituency' *be*came dependent on a state 'power deterrence neutrality approach', with an outspoken public speech on the truth related to the failures for peace or on the battles of deterrence and victory. Fascinatingly, this could also be reflected in the final inscription added at the Nahr al-Kalb site to commemorate the Israeli withdrawal on 25 May 2000, which was officially marked as a 'Victory Day' celebration by the Lebanese state. Lucia Volk writes that from it emanated a renewed emphasis in Lebanon on the concepts of strength and victory, and the Lebanese role in keeping Lebanon immune from regional tensions. This would also mark the second indigenous or non-foreign inscription added to the Nahr al-Kalb 'history book' since Independence in 1943.

Both were inaugurated by Lebanese Presidents, affirming the departure of foreign occupiers. The first was in 1946, "when Lebanon's President Bechara al-Khoury proclaimed in Arabic the departure of all foreign troops from Lebanese territory; the second time was in 2000, when President Emile Lahoud added a second local Arabic inscription, declaring Lebanon's liberation from occupation."[520] Whether Israeli troops in 2000 or French troops in 1946, both sets of foreign troops remained unnamed in the inscriptions, similar to the other foreign messages that never mentioned those they had defeated.[521]

On the other hand, these inscriptions were later to include Lebanese public scriptures by different protestors, whether they had been opposed to Israel, or to Syria before its withdrawal. For instance, Aoun's supporters occasionally organized anti-occupation, pro-freedom and pro-liberation rallies at Nahr al-Kalb,[522] where they staged their own graffiti protests on the inscriptions, leaving the names of their occupiers in recognition of continued foreign interventions in Lebanon.[523] Hence, as Volk points out, although public monuments are sought by the elite to produce their own cultural and political legitimacy, Nahr al-Kalb became, for the first time, a profoundly Lebanese space used to articulate a post-civil war narrative of victorious or opposed Lebanese communities,

---

[520] Volk, Lucia (2008), "When Memory Repeats Itself: The Politics of Heritage in Post Civil War Lebanon", *International Journal for Middle East Studies*, vol.40, no.2, p. 292, p. 298.
[521] ibid, p. 304.
[522] ibid, p. 307.
[523] ibid, pp. 308-309.

rewriting history when memory could repeat itself.[524] Nevertheless, despite the new victory scripts, Lebanese sovereignty, even at the 'symbolic' level, continued to be tampered with, by both domestic and foreign forces – whether after Lebanese independence, if not even after the era of the Phoenician city-states when Lebanon was technically an order of competing merchant entities. The story book of Nahr al-Kalb also records that it was declared a national heritage site in 1937 ("to protect and seal the site from future modification, tampering, or destruction").

But despite this declaration, this heritage was still modified in all the new scripts that followed afterwards;[525] whether by the foreign victors with domestic mandate authorities or by the domestic rebels, protestors or victors at both state and sub-state levels. For the Lebanese presidents who opened this book of modification, adding their own declarations, this reflected an attempt to have "the last word" by the locals absent from the chapter scripts, argues Volk. Yet, she further notes that the graffiti, the tampering or the destruction that has followed over the years, only proves that the history of the site does not make "any claim to its final closure precarious."[526]

And this indeed reflects on the issue of Lebanese state sovereignty in Lebanon, constantly tampered with at both domestic and foreign levels and becoming a challenge when investigating the grounds for Lebanese foreign policy, mainly in defining an integral Lebanese neutrality in a region of complex conflicts. This remained evident in the decade after the Hariri assassination, despite the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon where, aside from the systematic sectarian political structures, the local sub-state actors were becoming principal power players in debating the concept of state sovereignty, and Lebanese pride and victory with a rhythm of rebellion or resistance.

6.1.2. A Memorandum of Understanding: Persistent Geo-Demographic Identity and Geo-political Security Conflict Realism

Correspondingly, although General Michael Aoun was fiercely opposed to Syria and had previously endorsed UNSCR 1559, he put aside his old enmity with the Syrian state after its

---

[524] ibid, p. 295.
[525] ibid, pp. 298-304.
[526] ibid, p. 304.

departure from Lebanon in April 2005.[527] He emphasised mutual respect for sovereign relationships between Lebanon and Syria, while also emphasising the threats and enmity relationships with Israel. Ironically, though Aoun welcomed new relationships with the Syrian state, the rest of Syria's former allies and beneficiaries in Lebanon demanded the boycotting of relations with Syria while endorsing the newly-rising US-Saudi political intervention and financial influence in Lebanon or the region after the Iraq invasion.[528] Aoun returned from exile just before the elections in May 2005 and ran as an independent candidate from the MEC or MFC, who had both formed national reconciliation election platforms that excluded Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). Although their election coalitions included Amal-Hezbollah plus the MEC allies and Future-PSP/Lebanese Forces plus MFC allies, Aoun still managed to win a Christian majority coalition bloc of 21 seats in Parliament.[529] Walid Jumblatt described this victory as a tsunami, losing dominance in electoral law constitutions that had exploited Christian representation during the Syrian era.

Particularly significant also was Aoun's defeat of the predominantly Christian Qornet Shehwan Gathering (QSG); this was part of the MFC and was strongly opposed to Syria. It had been demanding redeployment of the Syrian troops since 2001, especially after the Israeli exodus in May 2000 had led to a full Syrian withdrawal and full recovery of Lebanese sovereignty.[530] Although the MFC won the majority of seats in parliament, the QSG nominees still suffered a remarkable loss in the elections against Aoun, whom they had rejected. Subsequently, Aoun sought to strengthen relations with the MEC, after ending his ties with the MFC following the elections, and especially with the escalation of domestic political and security divisions in the country.

In fact, Aoun also inherited the discreet political agreements on national reconciliation that Rafiq Hariri had reached with Nasrallah before the February 2005 assassination. The late Mustapha Nasr, a Hariri adviser, reveals that such deals had involved protecting Lebanese state sovereignty

[527] Bassel F. Salloukh, (2008), "The Art of the Impossible", op.cit. p. 296.
[528] ibid pp. 308-309.
[529] Esther Pan (2005). "Lebanon: Election Results", Council on Foreign Relations, June 20, 2005. Online at: http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/lebanon-election-results/p8195
[530] Middle East Mirror (?2001), "Qornet Shehwan Gathering", *The Middle East Mirror*, accessed June 2016. Online at: http://themiddleeastmirror.weebly.com/uploads/7/5/3/0/7530186/qornet_shehwan_gathering.pdf

following UNSCR 1559.[531] Indeed, by February 2006 Aoun (FPM) had even signed an agreement with Hezbollah over common visions to protect Lebanese state sovereignty from continued foreign interventions in Lebanon. This also emphasised concepts of strength, liberation and victory as a common vision reflecting an Integral Integrationist Lebanonism that acknowledged a power deterrence neutrality in reasoning on occasions of foreign threats.

The agreement came in the shape of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Hezbollah and FPM, by Aoun and Nasrallah at the Church of St Michael, coincidentally a day after the Danish Embassy Prophet cartoon protests in Beirut had led to violence and sectarian incitements.[532] The church where the signing ceremony was held is, in fact, located in the neighbourhood of Shiyah in Beirut's southern suburbs, where both Nasrallah and Aoun had grown up.[533]

The MoU reflected an alternative cross-sectarian national reconciliation effort for a mutual co-existence and citizenship partnership, supportive of Lebanese state sovereignty amidst the domestic-external political or security difficulties. Therefore the agreement included ten points, which emphasised National Dialogue to resolve domestic and foreign-related issues in the state; emphasised the concept of Consensual Democrac*y* in governance; stressed the importance of introducing proportional voting into the Electoral Law; recommended cooperation in Building the State to make it capable of protecting its national sovereignty; agreed on the need to resolve the files of those Lebanese Missing During the War; spoke of finding a solution to the Lebanese in Israel who had fled during the Israeli withdrawal in 2000; raised the Question of State Security and the need to unify the efforts of the Lebanese security forces in order to make the state immune from security and assassination crimes; emphasised mutual national strategic and common

---

[531] Muhammad A. Fakih (2018), "The Loss of Prominent Lebanese Journalist Mustapha Nasr", *Al-Mayadeen*, 29 January 2018 [in Arabic]. Online at http://www.almayadeen.net/articles/blogculture/855922/%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B7%D9%81%D9%89-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1/

[532] Kathrine Zoepf and Hassan M. Fattah (2006), "Protesters in Beirut Set Danish Consulate on Fire", *New York Times*, 5 February 2006. Online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/international/middleeast/protesters-in-beirut-set-danish-consulate-on-fire.html

[533] Joseph Hitti, trans. (2006), "Memorandum of Understanding by Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement: Agreement between Général Michel Aoun and Sayed Hassan Nasrallah", translated by J. Hitti for *Voltaire Network*, 6 February 2006. http://www.voltairenet.org/article163916.html

sovereignty interests and special relations in Lebanese-Syrian Relations; confirmed the importance of always maintaining good Lebanese-Palestinian Relations supportive of Palestinian rights, which required a global approach, especially for the Palestinians' Right of Return and their marginalised social rights in their continued human and territorial struggle against Israel; and finally, advocated the Protection of Lebanon and Preserving its Independence and Sovereignty.[534]

In the latter section the MoU outlined that:

> The protection and the preservation of its independence and sovereignty are a national public responsibility and duty, guaranteed by international treaties and the Human Rights Charter, particularly in confronting any threats or dangers from any source that could harm them. Therefore, carrying arms is not an objective in itself. Rather it is an honourable and sacred means that is exercised by any group whose land is occupied, in a manner identical to the methods of political resistance. In this context, Hezbollah's weapons should be addressed as part of a global approach that falls within two bounds: The first bound is the reliance on justifications that meet a national consensus for keeping the weapons, which would constitute a source of strength for Lebanon and the Lebanese people, and the other bound is the definition of objective conditions that would lead to a cessation of the reasons and justifications for keeping those weapons. Since Israel occupies the Shebaa Farms, imprisons Lebanese resistance members and threatens Lebanon, the Lebanese people should assume their responsibilities and share the burden of protecting Lebanon, safeguarding its existence and security and protecting its independence and sovereignty.[535]

Nonetheless, almost all the above points remained nationally-disputed topics, accompanied by shifting and controversial international, regional or domestic events of wars, rebellions, dialogues, or disagreements. On the other hand, even though the agreement was in written form, unlike the traditional verbal bilateral agreements in Lebanon, like its predecessors it still drifted away from tackling the issue of sectarian dominance of governance in Lebanon. The abolition of sectarianism, which had remained a postponed resolution since 1975, was mainly to bring a permanent end to the sectarian-manipulated pretexts for conflict in Lebanon.

Alternatively, the focus was on state security and sovereignty and the emphasis on sectarian tolerance in Lebanon amidst regional and international divisions, whether over the Hariri assassination or the implementation of UNSCR 1559, as well as incitements to acts of sectarian

---

[534] ibid.
[535] ibid., p.180.

violence, hatred, discrimination or fundamentalism, especially after 911, and the US occupation of Iraq. Thus, it was equally related to what had dominated the Lebanese foreign policy equation in both its domestic and regional environment during that decade, among the selective implementation of international resolutions. Here it mainly looked towards conflict with Israel and the issue of Palestine, which the MoU presented as part of a global approach in finding a resolution that would also resolve Hezbollah's security concerns towards keeping its weapons. In other words, as Wilkins also argues:

> [...] any attempts to create a stronger and more coherent Lebanese state with a robust foreign policy need to address the insecurity and injustices felt by different groups in Lebanon which cause them to bandwagon with external actors. This would strengthen the state and enable the government to construct a foreign policy that focuses more on building relations that maximize the security of the Lebanese state within the regional and international systems, than on bolstering the domestic status of different groups within Lebanon.[536]

6.2. A Renewed Lebanese Dialogue: From the 1975 Committee for National Dialogue (CND) to the 2006 National Dialogue RoundTable (NDR)

Henceforth, although both the FPM and Hezbollah supported a domestic political initiative for a Lebanese National Dialogue RoundTable (NDR) in March 2006 to discuss Lebanese sovereignty, the priorities for such an initiative were very distant from the civil war Committee for National Dialogue, which had focused on domestic socioeconomic and political reforms, mainly the abolition of sectarianism. Nonetheless, according to Jeffry Feltman, US Ambassador to Lebanon, who described this meeting in his Wikileaks cables,: "for the first time since the 1989 Taif Accords, Lebanon's political leadership engaged in national 'face-to-face negotiations' inside Lebanon without resorting to a foreign venue… The dialogue was seen to have created a 'spirit of communal cooperation' that did not previously exist.'[537] Feltman also added that "the feeling was that the region and the wider world control Lebanon's prerogatives on the presidency and on foreign relations, making national decision-making dependent on external interests."[538] On the

---

[536] Wilkins (2011), op.cit., p. 180.
[537] WikiLeaks Cables (2006), **"National Dialogue Conference begins on Positive Note"**, US Embassy in Beirut, 3 March 2006. See also Martin Wählisch (2017), "The Lebanese National Dialogue: Past and Present Experience of Consensus-Building", *Handbook on National Dialogues* (Berlin: Berghof Foundation), 2017, pp 8-9. Online at https://berghof-foundation.org/
[538] ibid., p 9.

other hand, the national dialogue was an initiative taken a year after the Hariri assassination by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who invited all the political powers to an official RoundTable for National Dialogue, in an effort to maintain the continuation of the national reconciliation initiative that had been achieved before the elections and during the government formation.

Berri's initiative resulted from the continued escalation in the MEC and MFC political split, especially on the MFC's insistence on boycotting President Lahoud and ending his term with the full implementation of UNSCR 1559,[539] as well as on disarming Hezbollah. Yet those demands had remained hostage to sectarian political restrictions, leading to "what is euphemistically called the 'regime crisis' by demanding the removal of Lahoud despite being portrayed by the MFC as Syrian hold over in Lebanon."[540] Thus, while at the macro level, replacing him was put forward for debate, the traditional domestic political disputes over the Presidency post were to dominate, regardless of the continued foreign political influence in this aspect. Yet with regard to disarmament, in approaching this topic, Hezbollah and the FPM had already laid the foundations for a national strategy while the state was not capable of tackling foreign threats independently. Therefore, discussion on disarmament revolved around reaching agreement for a national defence strategy first, while Lebanon continued to face regional conflict and instability. Mainly this was with Israel since the question of Palestine and refugee issues remained unresolved, or mislaid amidst the absence of international condemnation of the continued Israeli violations of Lebanese state sovereignty.

Similarly the MFC reflected the Ktaeb party (which became part of the MFC after the return of President Gemayel in 2000), and their traditional slogan from pre-war Lebanon – "the strength of Lebanon lies in its weakness". In their case, where an 'integral Lebanese neutrality' would seek protection and guarantees from its regional and international friendships, mainly in the West, and would maintain a neutrality towards regional confrontation with Israel, it would nevertheless remain in solidarity with Palestinian and Arab rights in the struggle against Israel until a final

---

[539] Adnan El-Ghoul (2006), "Harb: Petition Drive will form Legal basis to oust Lahoud", The Daily Star Lebanon, 21 February 2006. Online at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2006/Feb-21/9333-harb-petition-drive-will-form-legal-basis-to-oust-lahoud.ashx

[540] David Schenker (20060, "Lebanese National Dialogue: Avoiding the Hard Question?", Policy Watch, no.1089, March, The Washington Institute.

peace resolution had been reached in the region that ensured the Palestinians' Right to Return. However, on this aspect Hitti argues that Lebanon's neutrality in the Arab-Israeli context, whether conflict or peace, would require a strong Lebanese consensus, and this proved to be impossible within the sectarian political structure dominating the country, since "neutrality as such cannot be dissociated from the identity issue", on the assumption that Lebanon was "not bound by any particular relationship to the Arab world".[541] Moreover, self-neutralization with Lebanon's regional surroundings, as a unilateral declaration independent from the main regional parties involved in the Arab-Israeli issue, "does not constitute a status of permanent neutrality in international law unless it is accompanied by some form of international agreement or recognition."[542]

Hence, with the deterioration of all peace agreements since 1991, recognition had become impossible. On the other hand Hezbollah, representing the MEC, reflected what could probably be ascribed to Bashir Gemayel's 'Integral Lebanonism', as a post-war constituency enhancement that rejected dependency on 'international friendships' or Western protection for the Lebanese. It mainly involved, as Bashir had expressed it, exploiting Christian qualms over Western interests that "sold them for a barrel of oil",[543] or all the foreign wars in Lebanon that were happening under the pretext of protecting state sovereignty and the promotion of regional peace. This prompted Bashir to seek a policy of building military capability and seeking military alliances, with the intention of deterring threats of regional wars instead of being fostered by the West. However the policy still ended in domestic confrontations that harmed Lebanon since, unlike Hezbollah, in seeking such military alliance Bashir's violent domestic behaviour and his foreign relations became linked with Israel. Eventually it ended with the revival of the pre-independence split over an 'isolationist Lebanonism' (dependent on partnership with Israel and the West) vis-à-vis 'integrationist Lebanonism' (dependent on partnership with the Arab states and Lebanese mediatory relations between East and West) that was strongly critical of, and opposed to, the harms brought on the Palestinian people by the state of Israel; while also symbolizing the territorial

---

[541] Hitti, op.cit., p. 14.
[542] ibid, (citing Cyril Black, Richard Falk, Klaus Knorr and Oran Young (1968), *Neutralization and World Politics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 18.)
[543] ibid, (Hitti 1989), pp. 10-13.

barrier to the freedom of movement between the North-South global socio-economic and political horizons.

In this aspect, Nasrallah and Aoun promoted an 'integrationist Integral Lebanonism' that had more in common with Michel Chiha's 'integrationist Phoenicians' political view, and one that had worried over threats of Zionism towards Lebanon even before Lebanese, or Israeli, state Independence. Furthermore, Hezbollah promoted an 'integral Lebanese deterrence neutrality', similar to Bashir's, yet dependent on domestic Lebanese consent in acknowledgment of solidarity between the people, army and resistance efforts, as a national defence strategy in countering foreign threats. At the regional level it acknowledged common Arab and Islamic nationalist security interests in the region. Thus, it also sought to promote cooperation and partnership with the regional states to help deter threats of Israeli hegemony.

Unfortunately, it became limited mainly to Syria and Iran, since the majority of Arab or Middle East states were already divided under the 'moderate' domain of the US regional order and orbiting close to Lebanon. Yet all reflected the contrasts to an aged East-West dichotomy that provided the complex regional realism of conflict, war and violence in a continuous isolationist '*asabiyya* order. It also reflected how Lebanon's domestic or political foreign policy contrasts were failing to Phoenicianise a prosper East-West mediatory integral Lebanonism, surfaced with cultural development and economic prosperity, while failing to promote or pursue the civil-state power-sharing model. Despite the emphasis by both the MEC and MFC on an integral Lebanese sovereignty, they remained split, being distanced from achieving political, economic, legal or social justice reforms in the state, being instead distracted by renewed foreign interventions, armed conflicts and disputed resolutions.

6.3. The Delivery of "*A Faithful Promise*": A Heated Israeli Dialogue of War

While the Lebanese dialogue evolved into a strength and victory debate, brainstorming a power deterrence defence strategy was to be both interrupted and interrogated by an Israeli decision in July 2006 to escalate a war with Lebanon, thereby blowing away the integral neutrality of the Lebanese dialogue. The war came after Hezbollah had undertaken another successful operation

(*Faithful Promise*) by kidnapping two Israeli soldiers in fulfilment of the promise to free the last Lebanese detainee remaining in Israel, namely Samir Kuntar.[544] Although Hezbollah had concluded a third-party mediated prisoner swap in January 2004, Israel refused to hand over Kuntar who had been imprisoned since 1979 after being captured during an armed PFLP operation inside Israel in protest at the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.[545] Israel had refused to release Kuntar before it had uncovered the fate of a lost Israeli pilot, Ron Arad, whose fighter jet was brought down in Lebanon in October 1986. Nonetheless, during his speech for the Prisoners Exchange celebration in 2004, Nasrallah pointed to the "bleeding wounds" that Israel insisted on upholding, saying: "These fools do not learn from their past mistakes" by keeping the Lebanese detainees or the Shebaa Farms, and adding: "had they let them go when they left Lebanon, there would not be a 'prisoner issue' now between Lebanon and the enemy. They opened the door for us and were fools enough to keep Samir Kuntar."[546]

The day the war started, Israel's chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Dan Halutz commented that Hezbollah's capture of the Israeli soldiers would not be negotiated for a prisoner swap, telling Israel's Channel 10, "If the soldiers are not returned, we will turn Lebanon's clock back 20 years."[547] Ironically, Halutz did not have to make any effort to put Lebanon back twenty years on the clock since clockwise, the country was already at this point. In fact, such warnings were also intended to threaten public support or official domestic political alliances with Hezbollah, thereby also aiming to escalate domestic divisions within Lebanon, and test the new 'understanding' with Aoun regarding domestic solidarity in facing Israeli or other foreign threats. Domestic divisions occasionally brought harm to the state, since traditionally the sub-state forces would knowingly decide to work towards the state, or to gamble with state interests to protect or avenge domestic political conflicts or competitions,[548] also taking advantage of foreign interventions.

---

[544] Nubar Hovsepian (2008), *The War on Lebanon* (Northampton MA: Olive Branch Press), p. 8.
[545] Kuntar had been arrested in 1979, aged 17, in an armed operational attack on Israel by the leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which was called the Nasr Operation as a protest against the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Agreement.
[546] Nicholas Noe (2007), *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (*London: Verso), pp. 371-372.
[547] CNN World News (2006). "Israel Authorizes 'Severe' Response to Abductions"*,* 12 July 12, 2006. Online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20060921125544/http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/12/mideast/
[548] Wilkins, op.cit., p. 77.

The Israeli escalation of war on Lebanon in July 2006 also aimed to eliminate Hezbollah and permanently deter any kidnap or military attacks against its troops, even in the Israeli-occupied Lebanese territories. Hence, Israel was also concerned about reemphasizing its armed power deterrence image to its Arab and Palestinian enemies, especially since the 'Lebanese Liberation Spring' of 25 May 2000. This was claimed as something of a 'historic victory' by Hezbollah in winning the long security war against Israel after 22 years of occupation in South Lebanon. In a live speech after the liberation in the town of Bint Jubeil, close to the Israeli border, Nasrallah celebrated the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as an Israeli failure against the resistance, even describing the state of Israel as being 'weaker than a spider's web.'[549] Nonetheless, the Israeli war was to end with failure, especially in permanently eliminating Hezbollah – albeit the war had somewhat boosted Hezbollah's domestic pretext of preserving its weapons or the legitimacy of its resistance in deterring Israeli threats and causing further deterioration of Israel's armed power image.

Hezbollah came out of the war celebrating its success as a 'holy victory' for maintaining its ability to continue to retaliate with rocket attacks into Israel (despite a heavy nonstop Israeli bombardment that lasted for 33 days), thereby preventing an Israeli invasion into Lebanon. Hezbollah even imposed a balance of power and fear, especially in Nasrallah's transparent approach in declaring Hezbollah's next counter-retaliation promises by mastering psychological warfare when puzzlement and lack of transparency dominated on the Israeli side. This came as a shock to Israel's subconscious victorious attitude, both officially and at the public level. Even on the Arab regional level, whilst there was a sense of victory gaining public support against Israel, this was to embarrass the early position of the 'moderate' Arab states who accused Hezbollah of provoking war with Israel and ending with disbelief over the outcome of war.

6.3.1. The Domestic-External Dynamics of the July 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: State or Sub-State Sovereign and Proxy Dichotomies

An in-depth examination of Israel's decision to escalate into a full-scale war provides an extensive analysis of the regional and international dynamics for the decision of war, related also to regional

---

[549] Yaakov Katz (2011), "Security and Defense: The Fly in the Spider Web?" *The Jerusalem Post*, 1 July 2011. Online at: http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Security-and-Defense-The-fly-in-the-spider-web

security power hegemony. Lebanon was divided between two main groups (MEC and MFC) with different foreign political orientations, or foreign affiliations, as Wilkins affirms in describing the details of their behaviours during the War until a ceasefire was reached. Hence, it remains important to examine the systematic domestic-external proxy, friendship or bias relationships; yet it also important to attempt grasp the additional local dimensions beyond, in assessing sub-state or state behaviour. For example, Israel did not necessarily act as a proxy for the US, but continued to behave according to what it regarded as its essential national security and mutual interests, lobbying US foreign policy to influence a common policy approach that was oriented mainly over 'security' objectives.

6.3.1.1. US Dimension of War

Although the war was triggered by the attempt to swap Kuntar, there were also early Israeli-American preparations for this confrontation, mainly with the joint US-Israeli political and security cooperation in fighting the insurgency wars that the US was facing in Iraq, while Israel was also working on a new Middle East 'democratic' political order based on cooperation with all its regional and international allies.[550] As for the US, whether it was motivating or motivated by its regional or Lebanese domestic allies, it was dependent on the Israeli war machine to achieve such objectives. In fact, as Seymour Hersh revealed in his *New Yorker* article in August 2006, the Bush Administration was "closely involved in the planning of Israel's retaliatory attacks."[551] Israel was aware of Hezbollah's intentions, especially after another failed kidnap attack close to the Ghajar village earlier in November 2005,[552] and in April 2006 Nasrallah's assurances that his hopes were "sound and in the right place", and that his remaining for Hezbollah's cause would not "be for much longer now".[553] The Israeli military had already prepared several plans to respond to such a scenario, as Israeli PM Ehud Olmert revealed after the war, defending his position over being blamed for full responsibility for the war outcomes.[554]

---

[550] Tony Karon (2006), "Condi in Diplomatic Disneyland", *Time Magazine*, 26 July 2006. Online at: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1219325,00.html
[551] Seymour M. Hersh, (2006). "Watching Lebanon: Washington's Interests in Lebanon's War", *The New Yorker*, , 21 August 2006. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/08/21/watching-lebanon
[552] Ze'ev Schiff (2006), "Kidnap of Soldiers in July Was Hezbollah's Fifth Attempt", *Haaretz*, 19 September 2006. Online at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/kidnap-of-soldiers-in-july-was-hezbollah-s-fifth-attempt-1.197595
[553] Nicholas Noe, ed.: (2007), Voice of Hezbollah (London: Verso), p 300.
[554] Aluf Benn (2007), "PM: War Planned Months in Advance", *Haaretz* newspaper, 3 March 2007. Online at: http://www.haaretz.com/pm-war-planned-months-in-advance-1.214958

According to Hersh's information, President Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney were convinced "that a successful Israeli Air Force bombing campaign against Hezbollah could ease Israel's security concerns and also serve as a prelude to a potential American preemptive attack to destroy Iran's nuclear installations, some of which are also buried deep underground."[555] Moreover, Bush was interested both in Iran's nuclear sites, and in going after Hezbollah "as part of his interest in democratization, with Lebanon as one of the crown jewels of Middle East democracy."[556] It was also a revival of the 'democracy domino' after Iraq had become a 'terrorism domino'. Bush's 'Baghdad Spring' had become an exploiter of a 'Terrorism Spring' embedded with corporate arms and hydrocarbon energy interests, yet also becoming costly by ending with thousands of US troop casualties and military losses. Therefore this was an opportunity for a final attempt to destroy common enemies in the region, in the name of protecting democracy, while also suspecting Iranian-supported insurgency in Iraq.

In reality the US interest in Lebanon was evident in its continued unlimited political support for the Siniora government as its Lebanese 'democracy project' and in protecting state sovereignty. Yet the Bush Administration's regional policy of "constructive instability", as Satlof suggests, was approaching a critical juncture in Lebanon, with important decisions looming as to how the further implementation of UNSCR 1559 related more generally to other US strategic interests: "…the policy of having an effect throughout the region, from the Atlantic to the Gulf. Inter-Arab dynamics and the survival instinct of Arab leaders together worked to US advantage",[557]

6.3.1.2. Israeli Dimension of War
As for Israel, its initial response after Hezbollah's operation came from the Office of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who described the abduction of soldiers as an "act of war", and promised very harsh consequences for Lebanon if the soldiers were not released. He also stated that: "the

---

[555] Seymour M. Hersh (2006), "Watching Lebanon: Washington's Interests in Lebanon's War", *The New Yorker*, (Annals of National Security), 21 August 2006. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/08/21/watching-lebanon
[556] Robert Satlof (2005), "Assessing the Bush Administration's Policy of 'Constructive Instability'. Part II: Regional Dynamics**,** *The Washington Institute*, 16 March 2005. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assessing-the-bush-administrations-policy-of-constructive-instability-part-
[557] ibid.

morning's events were not a terrorist attack, but the action of a sovereign state that attacked Israel."[558] Accordingly, the Israeli political approach intended to blame the Lebanese state for the raid, and also to hold the Lebanese government responsible for the fate of the Hezbollah-abducted soldiers; especially since Hezbollah was embodied in Lebanese governance, participating for the first time after the Syrian pullout from Lebanon and represented by at least two ministers. Hezbollah's response to Olmert's comments came through its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah who announced that no military operation could return the captured Israeli soldiers, adding that the only possible mean for their release would be through indirect negotiations to reach a prisoner exchange operation.[559] The Israeli Cabinet replied with its decision to attack Lebanon and use its full-scale military power to press for the release of the its captured soldiers. But on 16 July just a few days after the outbreak of war, the Israeli cabinet issued a communiqué stating that Israel's war was against Hezbollah, not Lebanon and its government, due to US support for the Siniora Government.

Aside from Israel's early preparations for war, it would appear that Israel felt obliged to discourage further attempts to kidnap its soldiers, mainly after the Gaza kidnap earlier in June that had also marked the renewal of armed conflict with Hamas in Gaza since Sharon's withdrawal in September 2005. Moreover, the fact that the war was inherited by Olmert – who had become Prime Minister following Sharon's sudden illness and permanent absence from power in April 2006 – might well have made him look like a proxy actor by comparison with Sharon's military combat mind and personality. Thus, this was also an opportunity for Olmert to prove his leadership in Israel as Sharon's successor, albeit becoming dependent on the joint American-Israeli military bureaucratic security minds in tackling the new and complex security deterrence realities that ended in both security failures and political embarrassment. Cooperation with the US could also harm Israel's strategic national security hegemony interests in the region, amidst the rising security and political escalations with Iran, and supporting armed resistance efforts in Iraq, Lebanon or Gaza. Nonetheless, the attempt to crush Hezbollah in Lebanon with the unlimited security and

---

[558] Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister's Office (2006), "PM Olmert: Lebanon is Responsible and will Bear the Consequences", July 2006. http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2006/pages/pm%20olmert%20-%20lebanon%20is%20responsible%20and%20will%20bear%20the%20consequences%2012-jul-2006.aspx
[559] Anon (2006) "Hezbollah Leader Calls for Prisoner Exchange", *Al-Bawaba*, 12 July 2006. Online at: http://www.albawaba.com/news/hizbullah-leader-calls-prisoner-exchange

armed cooperation with the US led to the conclusion that, in a situation against insurgency, an exit strategy was the best win-win solution; this being the traditional Lebanese political heritage of 'no winners and no losers' compromise resolutions.

No doubt Israel still possessed the upper hand, when it evidently decided that the war must stop, just as it had decided it should enter the war, having at one point even claimed that it intended to help with the implementation of UNSCR 1559.[560] For Israel, peace was permitted but only after restoring the 'consciousness of deterrence', as Ariel Sharon, mastermind of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, had stated, noting that he had long advocated for a unilateral withdrawal. However he cautioned that the withdrawal should have been preceded by devastating strikes on Lebanon, including "Syrian interests", as a way of restoring the "consciousness of deterrence" in order to prevent renewed hostilities on the Lebanese border.[561] This had been Sharon's plan but was never pursued, due to his illness. Instead the 2006 War was to restore a consciousness of deterrence *failure* for Israel, where the Israeli decision for war reflected a disproportionate reaction leading to a major war that lasted for more than 33 consecutive days, as the Israeli government's Winograd Committee observed in 2008 when investigating the 2006 War. They concluded that "Israel's inconclusive 33-day war with Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon undermined the military deterrence Israelis consider indispensable to their survival."[562]

Moreover, these conclusions of war were also reflected in the recommendations by the joint Democrat and Republican Baker-Hamilton Commission's Report on Iraq earlier in December 2006 – before the Israeli admission of the misfortunes of its war in Lebanon. The report advised returning to the Arab-Israeli peace negotiating process and ensuring regional cooperation by establishing better relations with Syria and Iran.[563] Hence, although the Israeli war against Lebanon had a major influence on the conclusions reached by the US Commission or by the Israeli Investigative Committee after the war, this did not necessarily categorise the war as a US-Iranian

---

[560] Ely Karmon (2005), "Hizballah as Strategic Threat to Israel", *Heartland: Eurasian Review of Geopolitics*, vol. 2, posted by International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya Israel. www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=921

[561] Kail C. Ellis (2002), *Lebanon's Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-first Century* (Gainesville FL: University Press of Florida), p. 45.

[562] Ellen Knickmeyer (2008), "2006 War Called a 'Failure' for Israel", *Washington Post*, 31 January 2008. Online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013000559.html?noredirect=on

[563] Iraq Study Group (ISG) (2006), *The Baker Hamilton Report* (Tel Aviv: Reut Institute), online at http://reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=1346

proxy war in Lebanon – on the contrary it emphasised the shape of the strategic security alliances. In other words, although the US had immediate support from and coordination with Israel during the war, the Israeli conflict with Lebanon pre-dated both the US arrival in the region and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Hezbollah, for example, would not have been able to win the war without its geo-demographic communal stronghold support at the border with Israel, or its dependence on Syria or Iran for armed support (while lacking Arab support), similar to the Israeli dependence on the US while lacking an Arab interest for support. Which repeatedly emphasizes the natural geo-dynamics of the conflict over regional security dilemmas beyond the 'proxy alienization' dimension, while limiting the acknowledgment of the 'other' as a disincentive to further in-depth analysis.

6.3.1.3. Lebanese Dimension of War

On the other hand, during the negotiations for UNSCR 1701 to bring the war into a halt, and despite PM Siniora's request to press for an Israeli withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms to remove the legitimacy pretext for Hezbollah's continued armed resistance, and his suggestion to place it under UN custody, the Israelis still refused to accept such a proposal.[564] Ironically, the Americans ignored Siniora's approach which, after the war, provided him with the political pretext to continue to exert domestic political pressures in demanding the dismantling of Hezbollah. While Israel had failed to disarm Hezbollah, and refused to pull out from the area around the Shebaa Farms, the Siniora Government was quick to reflect that its decision for deploying the Lebanese Army in South Lebanon, alongside the UNIFIL (who still remained in Lebanon after 2000), was not aimed at disarming Hezbollah.[565] This reflection of disengagement-neutrality had been adopted even from the start of war and, unlike the previous governments of Rafiq Hariri, the Siniora government had fully disengaged itself from any responsibility for the war. It had even criticized Hezbollah for its 'irresponsible' actions at the Southern border and for demanding international and Arab support. Likewise, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and several Arab Gulf states chastised Hezbollah for "unexpected, inappropriate and irresponsible acts"[566] during the early stage of war.

---

[564] Salloukh (2008), op.cit., pp. 308-309

[565] F. Sam Ghattas (2006), "Lebanon sends army south, won't disarm Hezbollah" (Associated Press writer), posted by Ashley Elkins, *Daily Journal News*, 17 August 2006. Online at: http://djournal.com/news/lebanon-sends-army-south-wont-disarm-hezbollah

[566] Hassan M. Fattah (2006), "Militia Rebuked by Some Arab Countries", *New York Times*, 17 July 2006. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/17/world/middleeast/17arab.html

Thus, the MFC also adopted the US-client Arab states position against Hezbollah, and later some of its members continued to oppose a request for a ceasefire, even creating divisions within the MFC itself.[567] This was mostly reflected by Walid Jumblatt spearheading a personal political enmity with Bashar Assad, during which he argued that there was no point in a ceasefire if it did not include a new political order.[568] Ironically at the end of the war, Israel was the side requesting a ceasefire. Yet Nasrallah was also to criticize the Siniora government, the MFC and the traditional 'irresponsible' Arab role, commenting after the end of war on the unethical behaviour of some Lebanese officials towards their own country in joining the request by US officials to urge Israel to pressure Hezbollah to disarm, instead of seeking a ceasefire.[569] There were even attempts by government members to help the US determine Nasrallah's secret location during the war, and according to Nasrallah they also contributed to preventing weapons from reaching the resistance while Israel was heavily bombing Lebanon.[570] MFC leaders had also met US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the US Embassy in Awkar during her visit to Lebanon in support of the Siniora Government. She had remarked disparagingly that Lebanon was witnessing the 'birth pangs' of a New Middle East that would bring an end to war.[571]

President Bush and his advisers were against an immediate ceasefire, and "coined their own term of art, 'cessation of violence', to mean a future without an armed Hezbollah."[572] In fact, details of Rice's visit to the region and to Lebanon in support of her allies, were downplayed;[573] this gave Israel more time to complete its military action in Lebanon and, not wishing to return to the former

---

[567] Wilkins (2011), op.cit., p. 162.

[568] ibid, quoting A. Harel and A. Issacharoff (2008), *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan), p. 117.

[569] ibid.

[570] Jerusalem Post (2006), "Saniora Denounces Nasrallah's Attacks", *Jerusalem Post*, 8 December 2006. Online at: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Saniora-denounces-Nasrallahs-attacks

[571] Washington Post Transcript Wire (2006), "Secretary Rice Holds a News Conference", *Washington Post*, 21 July 2006. Online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/21/AR2006072100889.html

[572] Elaine Shannon (2006), "The Message Behind Rice's Surprise Visit to Beirut", *Time Magazine*, 24 July 2006. Online at: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1218194,00.html

[573] Jonathan Beale (2006), "Diary: Rice's Mid-East mission", *BBC News* 26 July 2006. Online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5205164.stm

status quo,[574] hostilities that continued for almost three additional weeks rather than the option of an instant end to war and violence were the obvious outcome of her visit.[575]

It was also a political giveaway to interpret strong US support for the Siniora government, but was nonetheless kept with no rewards after the war ended, when Israel added further border disputes with Lebanon. This was another example of how, despite their promises of support for democracy and sovereignty in Lebanon or the region, the Americans still treated their Lebanese or other regional Arab allies in pursuit of proxy hegemony interests.[576] It caused further disappointment for Siniora and his *Integral Lebanonist Neutrality* policy, away from concepts of liberation by armed resistance.

This became evident in the Lebanese Round Table for Dialogue whose conditions were determined by the events and outcomes of the 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon, while also testing national alliances. After the war ended the country was in a political deadlock, and in November 2006 Berri attempted to revive the Dialogue, initially by calling for the formation of a unity government and the adoption of a new electoral law to end the political stalemate.[577] However, no agreement could be reached in the midst of the political distrust that prevailed after the war.

6.4. From National Dialogue to National Protest and Conflict

With the collapse of dialogue, the Lebanese domestic front found itself in a political deadlock, and in December 2006 Hezbollah and the FPM, along their MEC alliances, began a peaceful protest campaign for political reform and change in the state, demanding the resignation of the Siniora government and the formation of a national reconciliation government. Emphasizing the role of state security forces and armed forces in protecting the protestors, Nasrallah had stressed that their weapons of resistance would never be involved domestically, nor would they be driven to retaliate

---

[574] Anonymous (2006), "Rice sees bombs as birth pangs", *Aljazeera Archive* 22 July 2006. Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/07/200849132037797119.html

[575] Anon (2006), "Condoleezza Rice visits Beirut to make the war between Israel and Lebanon much longer", *Pravda Report* (Russia), 24 July 2006. http://www.pravdareport.com/world/asia/24-07-2006/83499-condoleezza_rice-0/#sthash.InRCTGvZ.dpuf

[576] H. Wilkins (2011), op.cit., p. 15.

[577] Martin Waählisch (2017), "The Lebanese National Dialogue: Past and Present Experience of Consensus-Building", *Handbook on National Dialogues*, Berlin: Berghol Foundation, March 2017, pp. 9.

with violence during peaceful protests, saying: "We will not lift our weapons in the face of anyone… We will defeat you with our voices."[578] However the Siniora government rejected calls to resign since they were enjoying solid support from the US and Saudi Arabia, both of whom were opposed to Aoun and Nasrallah; thus the protests lasted until May 2008 ending only after another cycle of violence.

Israel was also observing events in Lebanon closely. It was strongly opposed to the return to government of Hezbollah ministers who, along with Amal ministers, had resigned from their positions, mainly because of the government's approach in its negotiations over a UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon, as well as allowing excessive foreign intervention under the pretext of the international investigation into the Hariri assassination. The Israeli position on the protests was clear from comments made by Shmuel Bar, Director of Studies at the Institute for Policy and Strategy near Tel Aviv. As he told Inter-Press Services: "For now, Israel is avoiding carrying out operations in Lebanon because of Siniora… There is some form of ceasefire in existence and we don't want to undermine the Siniora government."[579] However, Bar also stressed that this would change if Hezbollah dominated power in Lebanon by winning a Veto vote in the government. He added if this happened, "Hezbollah will determine what happens in the government… then Israel will cast off these self-imposed shackles".[580]

Ironically, all the sects in Lebanon possess a mutual veto, which is the reason for political conflict and delay since the vetoes place obstacles in the way of genuine consociational democratic rule. With the absence of the powerful, central, and capable state, consociationalism (which is based on "high eternal autonomy, proportionality of representation and mutual veto", as in Holland, Switzerland, or Belgium[581]) has kept the Lebanese state hostage to various regionally- or internationally-sponsored foreign mandates. Yet the topic of Hezbollah in governance is what became the political issue (or was made the pretext) when forming or demanding new

---

[578] Associated Press (2006). "Hezbollah Leader Praises Lebanon Protests", posted by *Vail Daily*, 7 December 2006. Online at: http://www.vaildaily.com/news/hezbollah-leader-praises-lebanon-protests

[579] Peter Hirschberg (2006), "Israel Watchful of Hezbollah Moves", *Inter Press Service*, posted by Electronic Intifada, December 15, 2006. (accessed 17 April 2017) Online at:
https://electronicintifada.net/content/israel-watchful-hezbollah-moves/6611

[580] Anon, (2006). "Saniora Denounces Nasrallah's Attacks**",** *Jerusalem Post*, 8 December 2006. Online at: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Saniora-denounces-Nasrallahs-attacks

[581] Ayubi, 1995), op.cit., p 190.

governments in Lebanon, thus contributing to the extension of political gridlock. Since the Siniora government ignored the resignation of all the Shia ministers in the government (which led to constitutional disputes) the protests were to accelerate, leading finally to clashes and bloodshed between MFC and MEC supporters.[582] In late January 2007 there was a sudden escalation into sectarian clashes following a student argument between the Sunni Future movement (FM)-Druze (PSP) MFC supporters; and the Shia Amal-Hezbollah MEC supporters, at the Beirut Arab University (BAU) near Tariq Jadideh (an FM stronghold).[583] Other youths arrived on the campus to offer support. The FM supporters then surrounded the university on all sides, ordering all government opposition students and the supporters who had come to their aid, to leave the university campus.[584] The situation finally ended with random sniper shootings from building rooftops that left dozens of MEC student supporters injured (with at least two dead), and besieged inside the university for hours, until they were finally freed by the Lebanese army, who also suffered injuries from sniper fire.[585] Allegedly the problem had arisen among new FM militia recruits within the MFC; however, the Lebanese army took no further action in order to avoid possible civil conflict.[586] Nonetheless, this escalation of violence was also in line with other heated political conflicts, mainly over the foreign endorsement of the continued UN resolutions that were being imposed on Lebanon.

6.4.1. The Domestic-Foreign UNSCR Modifications to Lebanese Sovereignty

Henceforth, the MFC continued the 'bandwagon with the US', aiming to strengthen its domestic position by deploying the United Nations Security Council against its local rivals under the pretext of protecting Lebanese state sovereignty, while also seeking "to insulate Lebanon from Syrian intervention."[587] Bassel Salloukh observes that during this period, all future political deadlocks or other UN resolutions mainly associated with UNSCR 1559 continued to demand that Hezbollah should dismantle its weapons and Syria disengage from Lebanon. Thus in May 2006, UNSCR

---

[582] Coinciding with sharp domestic political disputes over UNSCR 1757 (later issued in May under Article 7).
[583] Anon (2007)., "Beirut Under Curfew after Clashes", *BBC News*, 25 January 2007. Online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6299037.stm
[584] Anon (2007), "More Victims of the militia Attacks", *Nasseb.com:Village Journals*, 25January 2007. Online at: http://www.naseeb.com/villages/journals/more-victims-of-the-militias-attacks-67572
[585] ibid.
[586] That was despite the fact that a similar sniper attack had occurred previously, leading to the death of a protestor.
[587] Bassel F. Salloukh (2008), "The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon", in B. Korany and A. Dessouki, eds., *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization*, new rev. ed. (Ch.8 available from ResearchGate, Lebanese American University), pp. 308-309.

1680 called for border delineation and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon; reaffirming previous requests for UN troops to be stationed along the Syrian–Lebanese border. UNSCR 1757, issued in May 2007 demanded (under section 7) the establishment of a tribunal that would investigate Hariri's assassination (of which Syria was accused), and allowed for the use of force by the Security Council to implement the resolution without Lebanese parliamentary approval, while UNSCR 1701, issued after the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon, was "interpreted and used instrumentally by Saniora to try disarm and emasculate Hezbollah."[588]

In referring back to *Rethinking Hezbollah,* Abboud and Muller argue that while it issued this series of UNSC resolutions, the international community used the pretext of emphasizing and protecting Lebanese state sovereignty and democracy, but continued to ignore the implementation of any of the reform mechanisms essential for helping to resolve the domestic and foreign issues that harmed Lebanese state sovereignty. For example, UNSCR 1701 asserts that the Lebanese army "shall spread over all the country to protect Lebanese state sovereignty", while the priority was in fact to make the Lebanese army expand its presence in south Lebanon and become accountable for protecting the border with Israel.[589] Therefore, as Abboud and Muller note, Hezbollah was the main anticipated issue while UNSCR 1701 actually marked a departure from earlier resolutions by shifting away from asserting a sovereign Lebanese state role in seeking to implement the resolutions, mainly in terms of disarming Hezbollah, whereas in all the previous resolutions this had been referred to indirectly, and was treated as a domestic issue to be handled by the Lebanese state.[590] While UNSCR 1559 hinted indirectly at Hezbollah, UNSCR 1701 named Hezbollah directly and held it responsible for the outbreak of the July 2006 War; it also sought to frame Israeli actions of war as forms of self-defence – thereby also rendering "the internationalization of Hezbollah as a threat and danger to regional and global geopolitical interests."[591]

Abboud and Muller also refer to Karim Makdisi's *Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the 'War on Terror'* and his observation that the resolution "marked

---

[588] ibid.
[589] In 2000 the Lebanese army had refused to make any border security commitments with Israel before it pulled out of all the disputed territories in Lebanon, which Israel expanded into or remained to occupy after the 2006 War.
[590] Abboud and Muller (2012), *Rethinking Hezbollah:*, op.cit., p. 88.
[591] ibid, pp. 91-92.

a departure from the linear stream of (re)solutions to deal with the question of Hezbollah", since both the Lebanese state and the UN traditionally approached Hezbollah as a domestic political matter – as evident in the 2004 UNSCR 1559 which kept this part of the implementation of the Ta'if Agreement.[592] As such, this approach was also adopted in preference to an international interventionist tone, as was also the case with the 2007 UNSCR 1757 which authorized the Special Tribunal for Lebanon under Article 7, "indicated as a trial for a crime of terrorism", and later in 2011 openly framing Hezbollah for the Hariri assassination.[593] All depended mainly on the framing of Hezbollah within the "war on terror" context, which meant labelling it as a non-state terrorist organization that threatened global security; "a representation that was the product of mutual Israeli-US urgings (either with us or against us) and a series of UNSCRs that served the regional interests of both states, by delegitimizing Hezbollah as a resistance organisation."[594] Or, with reference to Makdisi's argument, SCR 1701 seemed to localize a global struggle (the issue of regional peace and enmity with Israel or hostile relationships between Israel and Lebanon at the state level), and globalize a local struggle (making Hezbollah as an issue of global terrorism), while "situating Lebanon and its domestic politics at the forefront of global security politics."[595]

6.5. Al-Qaeda in Lebanon: Not!

Ironically, while the 'War on Terror' was mainly focused on al-Qaeda in retaliation for the 9/11attacks in New York (11 September 2001), the presence of al-Qaeda in Lebanon continued to be ignored by the Americans. The US appeared instead to be predisposed towards focusing on Hezbollah and any other Lebanese political forces or individuals allied with the resistance or opposed to the US's regional policies, when in late 2007 it embarked on a policy of "freezing the assets of any Lebanese citizen participating in anti-democratic actions in Lebanon".[596] Domestically, despite all the facts of al-Qaeda's growing influence in Lebanon, foreseen by the Lebanese security forces as a new "golden era" of al-Qaeda influence after 9/11 and the Iraq

---

[592] ibid, p. 92, citing Karim Makdisi (2011), "Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the 'War on Terror'", *International Peacekeeping*, vol.18, no. 1, pp. 4–20.
[593] ibid.
[594] ibid, pp. 90-91
[595] ibid, p. 92.
[596] Anne Marie Baylouny (2009), op.cit., p. 320-321.

invasion, the MFC continued to insist that these were Syrian-Lebanese security-made allegations to distract from the 'truth' of Hariri's murder.

Yet this contrasted with what had been epitomized by such influence and activity in Lebanon between 2004-2008,[597] and even earlier, since the initial signs of al-Qaeda affiliations in 1999 were marked by the assassination by Osbat al-Ansar of four judges in Sidon.[598] In fact, this presence was attributed to the Arab Mujahedin leader in Chechnya, a Saudi national named Samir Saleh Suwaylam (Khataab) who, inspired by Hezbollah's successful armed resistance efforts against Israel, was intending to prepare attacks on Israel in the South.[599] In late 1999, Suwaylam even opened a training camp in the Sir al-Dinniyeh mountains in the Akkar region in northern Lebanon,[600] with Lebanese-American national Bassam Kanj,[601] but ended up clashing with a Lebanese army checkpoint on New Year's Eve 1999 and murdering all troops.[602] This led to a battle with the Lebanese army which eliminated the group, killing Kanj and arresting the remaining members, with the Lebanese Army also losing around a dozen soldiers, although two of Suwaylam's main Lebanese commanders, Ismael Al-Khatib and Ahmed Mikati (from Tripoli) had managed to flee.[603]

---

[597] Elie Al-Ferzli (2012), "Lebanese Defense Minister Ignites Heated Debate Over Al-Qaeda in Lebanon", *Al-Monitor*, 9 January 2012. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/01/arsal-revives-discussion-on-the.html

[598] It was an Al Qaeda-inspired – and Arab Mujahedin-linked – Islamist group in the marginalized Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon that first emerged in Ain El-Hilweh refugee camp in the south of the country, along with other fanatic groups, like Jund al-Sham, becoming an important reference point for Al-Qaeda affiliates. See Mohammed Zaatari (2017), "Saadi Indicted over Sidon Judges' Killings", reposted by Press Reader, *The Daily Star*, 26 October 2017. https://www.pressreader.com/lebanon/the-daily-star-lebanon/20171026/281565176010290

[599] Yousri Foda (2006), "Crossing into the Unknown", Top Secret, Part 2, *Aljazeera TV*, September 2006. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ARSSFP3ywc Or https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/topsecret/2006/9/21/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AC2

[600] Bilal Y. Saad (2008), "Al-Qa'ida's Presence and Influence in Lebanon", Combating Terrorism Center at West Point NY, vol. 1, issue 12, November 2008. https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaidas-presence-and-influence-in-lebanon/

[601] Abu Aisha, a former Mujahedin in Afghanistan who came originally from Tripoli but also held dual Lebanese-US citizenship. Kanj recruited Ahmed Mikati and Ismael Al-Khatib, both from the North. Cf. Global Jihad (2008), "Ahmed Salim Mikati Profile", *Global Jihad Net*, 5 June 2008. Online at: http://www.globaljihad.net/?p=3346 ; also Global Jihad (2009), "Bassam Kanj", *Global Jihad Net*, 24 July 2009. http://www.globaljihad.net/?p=4022

[602] This led President Emile Lahoud, to call for the immediate elimination of the group before any domestic sectarian political deviations could delay such urgent action. The next day, 1 January 2000, the army attacked the group's camp.

[603] Mikati and Al-Khatib escaped and took shelter in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh joining a group called "Tawhid Wal Jihad". See Bilal Y. Saab (2008), "Al-Qa'ida's Presence and Influence in Lebanon", op.cit.

Paradoxically, even then, when the battle was over, former US ambassador in Lebanon David Satterfield requested a visit to the Lebanese Presidential palace to meet Lahoud, accompanied by a senior US official representing the US Attorney-General; yet surprisingly the meeting was to protest about the army's operation against the group, as well as threatening US aid sanctions against the Lebanese Army for having unilaterally used US-made weapons and ammunition in a huge operation and for killing 60 individuals including a US citizen without having given any notification to the Americans.[604] Even though no activity was recorded for Al Qaeda-linked groups in Lebanon after the 911events, renewed Al Qaeda-affiliated activity was to appear again in 2004, while the country in the midst of political tension over UNSCR 1559.

While Suwaylam's group focused mainly on Lebanese and Palestinian Sunni youths in recruiting for the Jihad war against the American occupation in Iraq coordinated by Al-Khatib and Mikati, they were both abducted, along with eight other operatives, in September 2004, and accused of being part of a terrorist cell that planned to attack the Italian Embassy in Beirut.[605] Nevertheless, the US had approved Saudi financial support for fanatic militant groups in Lebanon after the Hariri assassination in 2005 in order to balance Shia influence in Lebanon,[606] which had also contributed towards the revival of Al Qaeda-affiliated groups.

Most interesting was Syrian-Lebanese Shaikh Omar Bakri Fustuq, who had lived in the UK but returned to Lebanon in 2005 (escaping possible arrest by the British authorities after praising the London Bombers in July 2005 as "the fantastic four" – just as he had earlier praised "the fantastic eleven" after 911), having caused substantial official and public offence that eventually resulted in his exile from the country.[607] Bakri who came from North Lebanon was prevented from

---

[604] Over which Lahoud expressed his shock that the meeting had totally ignored any interest in eliminating an extremist Islamist threat, which had attacked the army first and where instead of the Lebanese Army being saluted, it became threatened for its success in rooting out the terror committed by this group.
Al-Mayadeen Documentary (2017), "The Path to the Presidency", Emile Lahoud Presidency, Part 3, Presented by Karim Pacradoni, *Al-Maydeen TV*, 26 February 2017. [Arabic] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1p4DLJn7Nv4
[605] Al-Khatib later died in prison, allegedly as the result of a heart attack that was attributed to harsh interrogation. However, his death was strongly condemned by religious groups in the country, who openly supported Jihad in Iraq. See Yousri Foda (2006), "Crossing into the Unknown", Top Secret, *Aljazeera TV*, September 2006.
Part 1 Posted August 2008, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NmN63NRVRdM
[606] Henrietta Wilkins (2011), op.cit., pp. 62-63, referencing (Sultan 2008: 92-115; and Hersh, 2007)
[607] Martin Jay (2014), "Was Omar Bakri arrested on orders from Syria to shut him up?" *An-Nahar Newspaper*, 26 June 2014. Online at https://en.annahar.com/article/144744-was-omar-bakri-arrested-on-orders-from-syria-to-shut-him-up

returning to the country while it was still under the Syrian presence. In 1982 he had joined the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood rebellion, led by Issam Al-Attar, but was expelled from Syria, moving back to Lebanon and then on to Saudi Arabia, from where he was also expelled, ending up in Britain, and finally returning to Lebanon.[608]

Correspondingly, the Siniora government, supported by the MFC, adopted a policy of security neutrality in its approach towards the new rising radical groups in Lebanon, being ideologically opposed to Hezbollah and its domestic political alliances part of the MEC. This started with the release of imprisoned members of al-Dinniyeh group in July 2005, under an amnesty pardon that also granted freedom to Samir Geagea and the previous members of the SLA.[609]

In fact this came in response to the domestic national reconciliation efforts between the MEC and MFC following the Hariri assassination and the search for a new Lebanese chapter in a 'Lebanon First' understanding.[610] On the other hand, while the US did not indicate any official concern over the release of al-Qaeda affiliates in Lebanon, despite continued al-Qaeda terror attacks both regionally or in Europe, the Lebanese government insisted that there was 'no al-Qaeda in Lebanon'. Nonetheless, Sunni-Shia incitement was to intensify when, in September 2005, al-Qaeda affiliate Abu-Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi declared and led an open war against the Shia in Iraq, accusing them of collaboration with the Americans.[611] Similar accusations were made in Lebanon towards Hezbollah, which was accused of preventing Jihad from South Lebanon into Israel while also being blamed for contributing to the country's domestic Sunni-Shia splits.

6.5.1 Al-Qaeda's Attacks on UNIFIL and the Israeli-Lebanese Border

---

[608] Yotam Feldner (2001), "Radical Islamist Profiles (2): Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad – London", *The Middle East Media Research Institute.* Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 73, 25 October 2001. Online at https://www.memri.org/reports/radical-islamist-profiles-2-sheikh-omar-bakri-muhammad-london

[609] Al-Jazeera News (2005), "Beirut Clashes Follow Geagea Amnesty", *Al-Jazeera*, 18 July 2005. Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/07/2008410134835681483.html

[610] Yet like the post-civil war Amnesty, this lacked initiatives to heal the wounds or eradicate the root causes of war in seeking to achieve the postponed electoral law reforms. It meant the return of occasional tensions or violence, and was constantly affected by the regional conflicts.

[611] Anon, (2005). **"Al-Zarqawi Declares War on Iraqi Shia"**, *Al-Jazeera News*, 14 September 2005. Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/09/200849143727698709.html

At the same time, al-Qaeda was having difficulties in finding new recruits for its war in Iraq, after being criticized for its terrorist attacks in Arab or Muslim countries and all over the world (but never attacking Israel),[612] and especially after the Amman bombing in November 2005.[613] Al-Qaeda therefore began promoting an 'end of days' Grand Battle for Palestine, to be won only by the 'saved sect', that would achieve victory in Iraq.[614] However, al-Qaeda was also at odds with the Palestinians, including Hamas, for initiating a Hudna agreement with Israel which the latter, in its turn, immediately dismissed, describing it as a 'ridiculous' proposal, and moving instead to the assassination of Shaikh Ahmad Yassin in March 2004,[615] followed by Arafat in November. Moreover, al-Qaeda also rejected Hamas's participation in the political process in 2005, with al-Zawahiri commenting that Hamas had become part of an Arab consensus that sold the lands of the Muslims in surrendering to America.[616] Hence, with the aim of boosting its recruitment efforts in Iraq, al-Qaeda affiliates attempted to launch new rocket attacks on Israel, though mainly choosing Lebanon from which to try to achieve this objective. The first of such attempts occurred in December 2005 when a cross border rocket attack was launched into Israel, being sponsored by

---

[612] Barak Mendelsohn (2009), "Al-Qaeda's Palestinian Problem", *Survival*, vol. 51 no.4, 2009, p. 72. Like the three hotels Amman suicide bombings in November 2005 these were particularly damaging to al- Qaeda's reputation and resulted in a steep decline in its image throughout the Muslim world.

[613] Anon (2005), "Producer Dies After Jordan Blast", *BBC News*, 11 November 2005. Online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4427662.stm Paradoxically, the prominent Jordanian-American producer Mustapha Akkad and his daughter Mona were among the dozens of civilians killed and injured in the attacks. Akkad was the executive producer of the Halloween horror film series and the English-directed film *The Message*, released in 1976, that told the story of Prophet Mohammad and the tolerant message of Islam. Akkad had aimed to correct Western Orientalist misconceptions of the savage image of Islam, but when his film was released he was threatened by extreme Islamists who were angry with him for even daring to present Islam in a film; yet it was the same extremist types who killed him.

[614] Yousri Foda (2006), "Crossing into the Unknown", Top Secret, *Aljazeera TV*, September 2006, Part 2 (posted on Youtube August 2008) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ARSSFP3ywc

In fact, Iraq also had its own prophecies during the Jihad recruitments post 2003, also promising a new era of Islamic renaissance in the region, after a great battle that will be happening in Syria marking the approach to the 'end of days' epoch. In Aljazeera Documentary interview in 2008, Sheik Bilal Baroudi (the Imam of one the mosques targeted in the 2013 Tripoli bombings) even spoke of a sayings/hadith attributed to Prophet Mohammad, which says: "The Last Hour would not come until the Romans end up in al-A'maq or in Dabiq [near Aleppo]. An army consisting of the best of the people of the earth at that time will come from Medina [to defeat them], where the Muslim factions would be gathering in Ghouta near Damascus." Baroudi adds that the great battle will occur near the castle of Aleppo where the enemies of Islam will be defeated, in elaboration on the hadith/saying, "They will gather an *army against* you and come *against* you with *80 flags*, each *flag* followed by *12,000* men." He concludes by observing that 'if the Prophets had experienced historically documented Failures in altering Evil-Thinking Minds, then with the Cease of Prophets and the Continued Impossibility to Alter such Minds, the End of Days Must be Coming with No Escape from such Fate'.

[615] James Bennet (2004). "Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike", *The New York Times*, 22 March 2004. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/22/world/leader-of-hamas-killed-by-missile-in-israeli-strike.html

[616] Barak Mendelsohn, (2009), op.cit.

Al-Zarqawi and dedicated to Osama Bin Laden.[617] As a result, this also influenced the rise of extremism by Sunni Salafist groups in Lebanon. Al-Qaeda also inspired groups, such as Bakri Fustuk, that aimed to facilitate operations within the country while benefiting from security vacuums and worsening the political splits that followed the Hariri assassination.

With the Lebanese border with Israel being predominantly Shia, Zarqawi found it expedient to blame his failures or obstacles encountered in fighting Israel, on the Shia – namely Hezbollah. Yet this still influenced the rise of extremism on the moderate Sunni street and also supported the incitement campaign that Zarqawi had already started in Iraq, and which Osama Bin-Laden had initially opposed. Following the 2006 War on Lebanon,[618] Bin-Laden was to criticize Hezbollah directly, mainly over its acceptance of UNSCR 1701 that prevents war with Israel, and that Hezbollah now protects.[619] Thus, more Sunni extremist Salafi or al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Lebanon condemned Hezbollah while also accusing it of being an "enemy of the Sunnis".[620]
Indeed, in April 2006 just two months before the Israeli war on Lebanon, an al-Qaeda-linked cell was detained and accused of planning to assassinate Nasrallah.[621] In addition, al-Qaeda cells were also becoming increasingly active in the Palestinian refugee camps, as became evident from the events at the Nahr al-Barid Camp (north of Tripoli) in May 2007, following an attack by the Fatah Al-Islam group on a Lebanese army checkpoint in which all its troops were massacred. The Army retaliated by entering a long and harsh battle against the group, which lasted until September 2007. But it also led to the total destruction of the camp and the evacuation of all its civilian residents, and in terms of manpower it cost the Lebanese army several hundred casualties before it was finally able to eliminate the group.[622]

---

[617] Anon, (2005). "Al-Qaeda Claims Israel Attack Link", *CNN*, 29 December 2005. Online at http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/12/29/mideast.alqaeda.claim/
[618] Bin Laden and Zawahiri had previously been opposed to Zarqawi's extreme sectarian views towards the Shia, until later becoming convinced by Zarqawi's incitements. Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi had originally urged al-Qaeda's leadership – in a letter as early as 2003 – to "awaken the Sunnis in Iraq by making them feel that they are under threat", and Ayman al-Zawahiri (a former Muslim Brotherhood member) had replied, "we cannot become anti-Shiite, and it is inadmissible to kill people in the streets." Thus, it is important to note that al-Qaeda did not officially endorse enmity against the Shia until after al-Zarqawi's assassination in June 2006, and the Israeli war on Lebanon in July 2006, as outlined earlier in Bin Laden's criticism of Hezbollah.
[619] Elie Al-Ferzli (2012), "Lebanese Defense Minister Ignites Heated Debate Over Al-Qaeda in Lebanon", *Al-Monitor*, 9 January 2012. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/01/arsal-revives-discussion-on-the.html
[620] Robin Wright (2006), "Inside the Mind of Hezbollah", *The Washington Post*, 16 July 2006. Online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/14/AR2006071401401_pf.html
[621] ibid.
[622] Elie Al-Ferzli (2012), op.cit.

Meanwhile, a car-suicide bombing attack was launched by al-Qaeda affiliated groups in June 2007, targeting UNIFIL forces in South Lebanon and killing six soldiers.[623] The attack came after al-Qaeda had also accused Hezbollah of protecting the UNIFIL 'infidel crusader' forces in South Lebanon. Another bombing attack that occurred in December 2007 led to the assassination of Lebanese Army Major General Francois al-Hajj who had led the war at Nahr al-Barid.[624] Other attacks followed, targeting UNIFIL convoys close to Sidon on the highway from Beirut heading South (such attacks, leading to injuries, were to recur in January 2008 and May 2011).[625] However, these attacks continued to meet with low profile condemnation or concern, even by Israel, compared to the accusations of terrorism for which Hezbollah had been framed, despite abiding by UNSCR 1701. Moreover, further rocket attacks were made into northern Israel, and renewed in October 2009.[626] These were attributed to the al-Qaeda-linked Abdullah Azzam Brigade (AAB) [627] under Saudi national Saleh Al-Qaraawi,[628] and again in November 2011,[629] and in August 2013, being on both occasions after the Syrian crisis,[630] but none triggered an Israeli security alarm or a pretext for retaliation.

6.5.2. Lebanese Foreign Political-Merchant: Remanufacturing a Historic Conspiracy Realism

Whether domestically, regionally or internationally, there was a remarkable disregard for al-Qaeda in Lebanon, or for the growth of the new Wahabist or Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated

---

[623] Bilal Y Saab and Magnus Ranstorp (2007), "Al-Qaeda's Terrorist Threat to UNIFIL", *Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies* (Swedish National Defence College) and *Saban Center for Middle East Studies* (The Brookings Institution), June 2007, p. 1. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20070608saab_ranstorp.pdf
[624] The Lebanese Army was also thought of as being a collection of infidel crusaders.
[625] Nada Bakri (2011), "Bombing Attack on Peacekeepers in Lebanon Adds Another Jolt to a Region in Upheaval", *New York Times*, 17 May 2011. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/28/world/middleeast/28lebanon.html
[626] Jack Khoury, Jack (2009).), "Qaida-linked Group in Lebanon Claims Rocket Attack on Israel", *Haaretz*, 29 October 2009. https://www.haaretz.com/news/qaida-linked-group-in-lebanon-claims-rocket-attack-on-israel-1.5162
[627] Anon, (2005). "Scores Arrested in Connection with Aqaba Rocket Attack", *Al-Bawaba News,* 22 August 2005. Online at: https://www.albawaba.com/news/scores-arrested-connection-aqaba-rocket-attack AAB was the group for the al-Qaeda-linked bombing attacks in Egypt and Jordan in 2005.
[628] Thomas Hegghammer (2008), "Abdallah Azzam, Imam of Jihad", in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, *Al-Qaeda in Its Own Words*, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University). In referring to AAB, it carries the name of the late Shaikh Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian refugee from Jordan, who was known to be among the early preachers and organizers of the first Arab mujahedin in Afghanistan. Azzam, who was assassinated in 1989, was also cited as an influence on Bin Laden.
[629] Eli Ashkenaz, Jack Khoury, and Amos Harel (2011), "Al-Qaida Linked Group Claims Responsibility for Katyusha Fire Against Israel", *Haaretz*, 29 November 2011. Online at: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/al-qaida-linked-group-claims-responsibility-for-katyusha-fire-against-israel-1.398495
[630] Haviv R.Gur, and Elie Leshem (2013), "Four rockets fired into north by al-Qaeda-inspired group", *The Times of Israel*, 29 August 2013. Online at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/rocket-falls-in-northern-israel/

fundamentalism that was even encouraged by prominent MFC leaderships. At the regional level, Saudi Arabia had instead worked at channelling covert funding to Sunni extremist insurgents opposed to Syria. Lebanon inherited not only Rafic Hariri's corporate political empire, along with the payroll for its prominent technocrat political advisers, consultants and executives, including media influence, but also Hariri's influential domestic and international friendships which became the main funders of the new political coalition under the MFC. Hariri's Future Movement, which they endorsed on the grounds that it would re-establish its control over the state's political, coercive, judicial, and bureaucratic institutions, while resisting Syrian influence, was particularly influential.[631] Relatively speaking, sectarian tension was already becoming increasingly dominant in Lebanon and in the region, being also influenced by Saudi allegations of seeking to protect Sunni rights from the rising Shia-Iranian influence in Iraq that followed the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Meanwhile, as divisions and security escalations continued in Lebanon, the MFC also continued to exploit both domestic and regional developments, despite the increasing risks of religious fundamentalism or acts of terrorism, a reality asserted by the prominent American journalist Seymour Hersh. After the end of the war in 2006 Jumblatt had met Vice-President Dick Cheney in the US to propose alternative ideas through which to defeat Hezbollah and Syria in Lebanon. Telling Cheney that Syria was the strong link between Iran and Lebanon, and that breaking Syria was key to breaking this link, he recommended that the US should focus its relations on the Syrian opposition, particularly the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB), commenting "the Egyptian won't like it… But if you don't take on Syria we will be face to face in Lebanon with Hezbollah in a long fight, and one we might not win."[632] Having become influential in the MFC Cedar Revolution and a dominant figure under the Siniora Government, Jumblatt secured his relationships with Syrian military and political figures (from the corrupt period in Lebanon) who could contribute to any future potential rebellion.

---

[631] Bassel F. Salloukh, Rabie Barakat, Jinan S. Al-Habbal, Lara W. Khattab and Shoghig Mikaelian (2015), *The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon*, Chapter 2: "A Political History of Sectarian Institutions" (London: Pluto Press), p. 28, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183p3d5.5
[632] Seymour M. Hersh (2007), "The Redirection: Is the Administration's new Policy Benefitting our Enemies in the War on Terrorism?" *The New Yorker*, 5 March 2007.

In Lebanon, such conspiracies culminated in sectarian tensions that provoked acts of violence, as witnessed in Beirut after the start of the national unity protests in December 2006. Ironically, Saddam's execution coincided with the beginning of the MEC protests, as well as the first day of the Muslim Holiday of Sacrifice (*Eid al-Adha*). This was hugely provocative for many Muslims and reflected a contribution towards further sectarian divisiveness,[633] as well as being viewed as a symbol of further Sunni persecution in Lebanon and the region. Although many Iraqis saw Saddam as a dictator, especially after the 1991 Gulf war and the post-war domestic rebellions that contributed to the rise of sectarian tensions, many still regarded him as a prominent Arab leader who, refusing to submit to the Americans, had also bombed Israel with Scud missiles during the Gulf War. In addition he had rejected US economic sanctions, and had continued his open support for the Palestinians and their intifada in 2000 while the rest of the Arab leaders were accusing them of terrorism.

At the same time, sectarian tensions had intensified across the region and also in Lebanon during the period after the assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri.[634] In fact, both executions were held up as a symbol of Sunni oppression in the Levant region, that was becoming exploited into a sectarian instability that threatened the struggle for equal power-sharing in the state – especially as the war and sectarian conflicts continued to escalate significantly in Iraq, thereby also contributing to the rise of Al-Qaeda.

6.6. Ta'if's 2008 Doha Agreement: Domestic-External Peace and Security Endeavours

Meanwhile these moves also fed into further tensions in the Syrian-Saudi regional political division, since Syria, accused of the Hariri murder, was still politically isolated. Yet the main rift remained over how strategically to approach a struggling Arab-Israeli peace negotiation process – primarily with regard to Syria's continued support for armed resistance efforts against Israel, and particularly after renewed Saudi attempts to reaffirm the Arab Initiative for Peace during the March 2007 Arab League Summit in Riyadh. This was in parallel with the Bush Administration's

---

[633] Juan Cole (2006), "Saddam: the Death of a Dictator", 30 December 2006. Online at: https://www.juancole.com/2006/12/for-whom-bell-tolls-top-ten-ways-us.html
[634] Nada Bakri and M. Hassan Fattach (2007), "Hezbollah Strike Brings Beirut to a Virtual Halt", *The New York Times*, 23 January 2007. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/23/world/middleeast/23cnd-lebanon.html

Road Map initiative for peace, which condemned Palestinian terrorism for the failure of peace efforts while also condemning Syria for supporting Hamas and Hezbollah, and for facilitating the movement of insurgents across its borders into Iraq and attacking American troops.[635]

Israel, on the other hand, could not be persuaded to move forward, "notwithstanding Olmert's desire to meet King Abdallah to further explore the proposal, and with Israel bemoaning the lack of Arab efforts to eliminate Hamas and Hezbollah terrorism [from] becoming the preventive pretext to weakening the Saudi initiatives for peace."[636] This escalated the domestic Arab disputes, especially with Syria, and only eased after Syria had announced its acceptance of Turkish-mediated peace negotiation initiatives with Israel in May 2008. Even so, Israel's efforts for peace during 2008 sought mainly to win Arab support, or silence, and to strike and eliminate Hamas by repeatedly pursuing full-scale war on Gaza while continuing to disregard the Palestinian civilian population. The Palestinians had suffered from Israeli-imposed economic sanctions on Gaza since 2006, having come under siege when Hamas had won in the elections. The West Bank too was increasingly blockaded by new security walls, military checkpoints, and enclosures.

Meanwhile, as the political deadlock and security risks continued in Lebanon – which had also contributed to a presidential vacancy crisis since the end of Lahoud's term in November 2007 – events finally led, by early May 2008, to full-scale violence. This was mostly a reaction to the Siniora Government's decision to ban Hezbollah's war communications arsenal (an asset in winning the 2006 War), amidst the continued power-rule conflict, security tensions, and political provocations by MFC leaderships and supporters. As Siniora and the MFC refused to revoke the government decision, Hezbollah was quick to engage in an armed operation, capturing all the MFC militias in and outside Beirut and handing over their members to the Lebanese army. Nasrallah accused the MFC, namely Jumblatt, of seeking civil violence in Lebanon, reminding him of Hezbollah's clear position and public promises on disarmament since the 'quadrat elections

---

[635] Elie Al-Ferzli (2012), On the other hand, the Syrian government was also increasingly accused of submitting to the US by preventing the crossing for Jihad in Iraq; for protecting Israeli security interests in the Golan Heights; and for oppressing Muslim Salafist or extremist groups in Lebanon or Syria by imprisoning them during their attempts to cross the border for Jihad in Iraq. Even so, and apart from any US pressure on Syria, the Syrians were also concerned with their own domestic security, and worked to restrict the movement of such groups, particularly after the rise of sectarian tensions in Iraq, which also highlighted an ideological dispute among Jihadist groups.

[636] Raphael Ahren (2013), "Why is Israel so afraid of the Arab Peace Initiative?" *The Times of Israel,* 18 June 2013. https://www.timesofisrael.com/why-is-israel-so-afraid-of-the-arab-peace-initiative/

agreement'[637] in May 2005 to be followed by a national reconciliation government. At that time Nasrallah, in a public speech during the 2005 Victory Day celebration (again from Bint Jubeil, in commemoration of his first speech after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000), had warned that any hand that reached to take away those weapons was "an Israeli hand that will be cut off", while also emphasising the importance of peace, stability, and national unity against foreign threats.[638] Hence, although Hezbollah's retaliation, politically speaking, was in response to the breach of domestic national unity oral agreements, its action was also largely motivated by the security threats felt at both domestic and external levels.

Following the Hariri assassination, Beirut had mostly become an intelligence hub, penetrated by international and regional security agencies allegedly supporting the investigation into the murder, since domestic security was still suffering from a series of violent incidents and assassinations. Thus, while Hezbollah became suspicious of the new pro-MFC private corporate security firms in the city, whose armed presence was not too distant from Hezbollah's headquarters stronghold, a pre-emptive counter-security operation was already waiting for an excuse to act.

Hence the assassination in February 2008 of Imad Mughniyeh, leader of Hezbollah's armed wing, which had occurred only two months before the armed operation. Mughniyeh was assassinated in a car bomb attack in Damascus, which in itself was indicative of a serious security breach in Hezbollah's home security operations, all the way from Beirut to Damascus. However, it also meant the domestic armed violence that Hezbollah had been trying to avoid for almost a year,[639] since this became the only means of restoring Lebanon's traditional security 'red lines' that were important for avoiding a civil war. In other words, it sought instead to achieve a long-term domestic stability, important for preserving its continued existence and its ability to face the persistent security threats from Israel. Maintaining a safe domestic and external environment was therefore paramount, since conflict with Israel was to remain Hezbollah's unfinished security and

---

[637] Amal-Hezbollah, Future Movement, Socialist Progressive Party, Lebanese Forces
[638] Mark Mackinnon (2005). "Hezbollah chief rejects calls to disarm", *Globe and Mail*, 26 May 2005. In Bint Jbeil Lebanon. Online at: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/hezbollah-chief-rejects-calls-to-disarm/article981006/ Adding: "We are among the biggest proponents of peace, stability and national unity…We don't seek to attack anyone, and we will not allow anyone to attack Lebanon. But, listen to me, if anyone thinks -- anyone -- of disarming the resistance, we will fight them until martyrdom."
[639] Bilal Y. Saab (2008), "Rethinking Hezbollah's Disarmament", *Middle East Policy Council*, May 2008. http://www.mepc.org/rethinking-hezbollahs-disarmament

intelligence battle with the Israeli state. This battle reached beyond the traditional Security Zone combat that Hezbollah had destroyed in Lebanon, by endorsing the original roots of a local multi-faith resistance that had existed even before the invasion of 1978 (and before the appearance of Hezbollah or the coming to power of the Iranian revolution in 1979).

On the other hand, as a result of conflict and violence, the MFC and MEC had finally accepted a League of Arab States (LAS) initiative on 14 May 2008 to end the crisis in Lebanon. The Siniora Government accordingly revoked the decision that had provoked conflict in Lebanon, thus ending the MEC's civil disobedience protests and all armed conflict activities between the two sides. Hence, the MEC was to keep its peaceful Saraya (cabinet building) sit-in protest,[640] until a new national reconciliation agreement was finally reached in Doha-Qatar. This happened after a visit by an Arab League delegation of negotiators, represented by Qatari Foreign Minister Shaikh Hamad bin Jassim and the LAS Secretary General, Amr Moussa, who met all the Lebanese political leaders and invited them to an internationally-endorsed conference in Doha on 21 May 2008 to conclude a final agreement.[641]

Technically, the Doha Agreement was seen as a re-emphasis of the National Reconciliation Ta'if Agreement, with all attending parties agreeing on a new electoral law for the 2009 elections, as well as a national unity government (remaining under Siniora until the elections), and finally concurring that Michael Sulieman, an Army General, would become President. In other words, there was a renewed emphasis on national consent in Lebanese state governance, pending the achievement of the political, legal, constitutional and socio-economic elements outlined in the Ta'if Agreement, and thereby entering another period of postponements (including that of the issue of disarmament of the STL which had been excluded from the agreement). These were to be settled through the continuation of the National Dialogue – which also remained postponed.

6.6.1. The Domestic-External Outcomes

---

[640] Anon (2007), "Breaking News: Live coverage of the war in Lebanon", *Ya Lubnan*, 14 March 2007. Online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20080515002525/http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2008/05/_time_shown_on.php
[641] Anon, (2007). "'Deal reached' on Lebanon Impasse", *Al-Jazeera.com*, 14 May 2007. Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2008/05/200861503720419736.html

Despite the international and regional support for the Doha Agreement, Israel – like Saudi Arabia – again expressed concern over Hezbollah's domination of governance in Lebanon through its representation in the national reconciliation government. On the other hand, this contributed to the sectarian power-sharing mechanism emphasized in the Agreement, as reflected in the compromise reached on the electoral law, instead of attempts to abolish sectarianism as Ta'if had outlined. Regardless, the sectarian political system did not allow Hezbollah to dominate the government, since its representation or vote in the government would still be limited to the Shi'a quota shared with Amal, and could be opposed by counter-sectarian veto. Nonetheless, Israel still openly threatened to strike Lebanon for providing Hezbollah with a continuing legitimacy in the government, only to be faced with counter-deterrence threats by the Hezbollah leadership, threatening the destruction of Israel if carried out its threats against Lebanon.[642]

Alternatively, leaked US diplomatic cables revealed that in his meeting with the US ambassador to Iraq, David Satterfield, in May 2008, Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, had criticized the UNIFIL for making no effort to disarm Hezbollah in South Lebanon, and had secretly proposed setting up an Arab force to fight Hezbollah with US, UN and NATO help, advocating that a Hezbollah victory in Lebanon would mean an Iranian takeover of the country.[643] Ironically, although such criticism had been made despite the attacks on the UNIFIL by Al-Qaeda earlier in February 2008, it still hinted at the continuing threats of war and violence in Lebanon and the region since Israel was also campaigning to bomb Iran's new nuclear power facilities.[644]

Nevertheless, things were to remain calm in Lebanon since the agreement helped to bring back political stability, as well as a return to security cooperation among the state's official security and political forces that even exposed many Israeli intelligence security networks; these were

---

[642] Agence France Presse (AFP) (2008). "Nasrallah threatens to destroy Israel if Jewish state carries out threat to attack Lebanon", *Daily Star and AFP*, 25 August 2008. Online at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2008/Aug-25/51221-nasrallah-threatens-to-destroy-israel-if-jewish-state-carries-out-threat-to-attack-lebanon.ashx

[643] Agence France Presse and Ynet (2010), "Saudi plan for anti-Hezbollah force revealed", *Ynet News*, 12 August 2010. Online at: https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3995992,00.html

[644] Jonathan Steele (2008), "Israel Asked the US for Greenlight to Bomb nuclear sites in Iran", *The Guardian*, 25 September 2008. Online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/25/iran.israelandthepalestinians1
Israeli plans to strike Iran's nuclear sites had been in discussion since 2008, but Olmert was told by President George W Bush that he would not support such attempts, and warned Israel not to expect the US to revise that view for the rest of his presidency, thus abiding by the Baker-Hamilton recommendation – as also did Obama.

uncovered by the Lebanese security forces in 2009-2010.[645] And although new leaked information by the STL in May 2009 (coinciding with Victory Day) raised suspicion that Hezbollah was responsible for the Hariri assassination,[646] Saudi-Syrian relationships were finally to ease, especially after Syria was no longer accused of the Hariri assassination. This also contributed to renewed relations between Lebanon and Syria that included the opening of a Syrian embassy in Lebanon in March 2009. Following the May 2009 elections a National Unity Government was formed under the leadership of Saad Hariri, who in turn visited Syria in December 2009 to emphasise the resumption of relations between the two states.

At the same time, resolving the domestic political splits in Lebanon also contributed to resolving Lebanese foreign policy divisions and marked a continued reality in Lebanese foreign policy behaviour that required analyses of the roles and behaviours of the sub-state forces in the state, being, as Henrietta Wilkins also observes, the "realpolitik forces on the ground".[647] This was important in closing the gap between the 'psychological environment' and the 'operational environment' of the decision-maker, or sub-state influential forces. It was also important in understanding the political chaos or complexities during and after all the Lebanese conflicts, in order to help pursue a foreign policy analysis that would clarify what Hitti, for example, describes as "the predicament of the state's foreign policy", in relation to the three Lebanese ruling constituencies, dominated by sectarian influence and lacking traditional state foreign policy realism.[648] Except, perhaps, for its continued traditional conflict or enmity relationships with Israel, since these have been a principal cause of the harming of Lebanese security or foreign

---

[645] Ronan Bergman (2019), *Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassination* (New York: Random House), pp. 570-596. In fact, aside from the assassination of Emad Mughniyeh in February 2008, contributed to by the CIA, this was the first official assassination attack by Israel since the July 2006 War on Lebanon, and the second since its withdrawal in 2000. Aside from the assassination attack in May 2006 targeting the Hezbollah-allied Majzub brothers in Sidon (from Palestinian Islamic Jihad), Israel had also succeeded in July 2004 in assassinating a senior Hezbollah commander (Ghaleb Awali). This was only verified in 2010, after the arrest of the Israeli spy networks in late 2009.

[646] Erich Follath (2009), "New Evidence Points to Hezbollah in Hariri Murder", *Der Spiegel*, 23 May 2009. Online at: https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/breakthrough-in-tribunal-investigation-new-evidence-points-to-hezbollah-in-hariri-murder-a-626412.html

[647] Wilkins (2011), op.cit., pp. 58-59 (referencing Timur Goksel, 2009). (Goksel, an experienced senior adviser and official spokesman for UNIFIL, dealt with various crises during the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, although he was only able to arrive at solutions that directly involved the forces on the ground, not through dealing with institutions, e.g., the Lebanese foreign ministry which had always proved useless. "It was directly with the army, with Amal or Hezbollah…even the South Lebanese Army (SLA) – which the Israelis were reluctant about; I dealt with everybody I wasn't supposed to deal with because these are the guys that call the shots.")

[648] Nassif Hitti (1989), op.cit., p. 17.

policy interests by keeping the country hostage to both domestic and regional (including international) globally-weighed compromise.

Israel, on the other hand, was becoming less interested in peace negotiations with Syria, which was emerging from the regional and international isolation that had been imposed on it since the Hariri murder in 2005. The breaking point for Israel came after the Iranian-Syrian summit (or friendship summit) in Damascus in February 2010, between Assad and Ahmadinejad and also attended by Nasrallah, which emphasised regional national security and protection of economic cooperation. This brought further disappointment for Israel which, in its Turkish-mediated peace talks with Syria, was always keen to persuade Syria to shift its future relationships away from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas.[649] Instead, Syria's President Assad also defended Iran's right to uranium enrichment and the use of nuclear energy for peace – strongly opposed by Israel – and proposed that Turkey, Syria and Iran should form an Islamic bloc to counter Israel.[650] Hence, both Iran and Syria sought to strengthen relationships further by signing new cooperation agreements, including a visa-scrapping accord, following similar procedures between Turkey and Syria in September 2009. Both states also agreed to put aside their long-running territorial disputes over Alexandretta (Iskenderun) in the Hatay Mediterranean province, achieving a bilateral free-trade agreement in 2007,[651] which they both hoped would spread, bringing regional prosperity. Nonetheless, it still had its short-term negative economic impacts on Syria, which also contributed towards the public distress reflected in the rebellion of 2011.

6.7. The Pre-Arab Spring: Missed Ciphers for Regional Economic Prosperity and Ideal Freedom of Mobility

Lebanon was also promised it would receive a share in a newly-anticipated Levant order with open borders connecting both Iran and Turkey and forming a territorial passage with open access between both Asia and Europe, a new route that would contribute to regional trade developments seeking access through the East Mediterranean ports. This became evident in 2010 when the

---

[649] Ohannes Geukjian (2016), *Lebanon After the Syrian Withdrawal: External Intervention, Power-Sharing,* (London: Routledge), p. 162.
[650] ibid.
[651] Daniel Pipes (2005). "Is the Hatay/Alexandretta Problem Solved?" *Danial Pipes Blog,* 10 January 2005. Online at: http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2005/01/is-the-hatayalexandretta-problem-solved

Lebanese parliament officially approved offshore exploration of hydrocarbon resources in the Mediterranean, pointing to a promising future period of economic development affluence and prosperity. Although this prompted Israel to claim possession of Lebanese maritime border and economic zone rights, the Lebanese state, enjoying regional support, offered strong formal political and diplomatic objections to any additional Israeli violations of Lebanese state sovereignty.[652] In fact, in 2010 Lebanon had witnessed a traffic queue of regional heads-of-state visits to sign new agreements that were responsive to a Lebanese emphasis on developing regional and international friendships and foreign relations in anticipation of a new regional era of affluence. In January 2010, visa requirements between Turkey and Lebanon were lifted, aimed at strengthening relations between the two states;[653] this was followed in February by the Iranian-Syrian Summit.

In July 2010, these events were followed by the unprecedented joint mini-summit in Lebanon between Syrian President Bashar Assad and Saudi King Abdullah, who joined forces to defuse potential Lebanese political tensions over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) that could also bring regional instability.[654] Then in late July the Emir of Qatar, Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani paid a visit to Lebanon, touring South Lebanon to examine the post-war reconstruction outcomes[655] – Sheikh Hamad's first visit had taken place immediately after the end of the 2006 War, when he emphasised that it was a Lebanese and Arab victory that would provide a greater opportunity for peace.[656] Moreover, later in the year, in October 2010, there was also a famous visit by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, which was followed in November by a visit from the Turkish PM Erdogan; both dignitaries received great Lebanese hospitality, despite some opposing voices, such as independent MFC politicians concerned about Iranians or Lebanese Armenians

---

[652] Al-Manar News (2011). "Lebanon Keen to Defend its Wealth", *Al-Manar TV*, 22 July 2011. Online at: http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=22266

[653] TourismTravelVacation (2010), "Turkey, Lebanon lift visa Requirements", *Tourism Travel Vacation Newspaper*, 12 January 2010.

[654] Al-Jazeera (2010), "Emir of Qatar tours south Lebanon", *Al-jazeera News,* 31 July 2010. Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/07/201073114135291407.html

[655] ibid.

[656] Al-Jazeera (2006), "Qatar pledges support to Lebanon", *Aljazeera News*, 22 August 2006. Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/08/2008410112526158784.html

opposed to Turkey. Yet welcoming signs in both Turkish "*Merhaba*", and Persian "*khosh amadid*" were spread all over Beirut and all across the regions that each man had visited.[657]

During his October visit Ahmadinejad was welcomed as a hero in southern Beirut, mainly for his speedy response for urgently-needed shelter support and reconstruction efforts after the 2006 War, and in South Lebanon where he visited Bint Jubeil, where Nasrallah had given his 'spider web' speech. Ahmadinejad also spoke on Maroun Ras Hill (where Israel had encountered major failures during the 2006 War) only kilometres away from the Israeli border, stressing the special relationship with Lebanon in deterring all potential Israeli threats and aggressions.[658] When received by PM Saad Hariri in Beirut, Ahmadinejad had also encouraged the strengthening of relations and cooperation between the two states, and invited and later received Hariri in November on a state visit to Iran that emphasised further cooperation with Iran.[659] Yet it was the last visit for Hariri, given the regional shifts that followed afterwards. Although several formal agreements were made between the two states, Hariri's forced resignation less than two months afterwards and the outbreak of the Syrian crisis put a halt to, or delayed, further developing relationships (such as the lifting of visa requirements which was delayed until 2015).[660] In fact, Rafiq Hariri remained on good terms with Iran, since he understood the significance of the geo-political, geo-demographic and geo-economic strategic relations with a major player.

In the post-Ta'if phase, according to Salloukh, this coincided with Rafsanjani's realist presidency, and "a triangular relationship emerged between Iran, the Lebanese state, and Hezbollah. Al-Hariri later played an instrumental role in strengthening bilateral relations between Iran and Lebanon under the Khatami presidency, especially in the economic sphere."[661] This had also been the case

---

[657] Alexandra Sandels (2010), "Lebanon, Turkey: Erdogan to visit Beirut to forge peace, make deals", *Los Angeles Times*, 23 November 2010. Online at: https://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2010/11/lebanonturkey-erdogan-visit-tribunal-hezbollah-hariri-murder-business-.html
[658] Associated Press (2010). "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad welcomed as hero in Lebanon", *The Guardian*, 13 October 2010. Online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/13/mahmoud-ahmadinejad-visit-lebanon-hezbollah
[659] Mostafavi, Ramon (2010). "Lebanese PM calls in Tehran for Arab-Iran unity", *Reuters*, 28 November 2010. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-lebanon-hariri/lebanese-pm-calls-in-tehran-for-arab-iran-unity-idUSTRE6AR1O120101128
[660] Abubakr Al-Shamahi, (2015). "Iran Waives Visa Requirements for Egypt, Lebanon, Syria nationals", Alaraby New, UK, 29 July 2015. Online at: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2015/7/29/iran-waives-visa-requirements-for-egypt-lebanon-syria-nationals
[661] Salloukh (2009), op.cit., p. 308.

with Turkey, ever since Erdogan's first cabinet in 2003. Hence, Erdogan was welcomed as a hero in Lebanon as well, seemingly inspired by Iran to protect Lebanon from Israeli threats. His visit also emphasized the strengthening of relations with Lebanon while stressing his personal support and friendship for PM Saad Hariri, albeit amidst the new rising domestic political tension over funding the STL.[662] Both men toured Akkar, North Lebanon, visiting a Lebanese town with Turkish origins where Erdogan made a public speech that stressed the joint historic relations with Lebanon, and also underlined Turkey's support for Lebanon against any Israeli provocations.[663] In fact his visit also coincided with the tense relations with Israel that arose after the *Mavi Marmara* ship crisis, fuelling his anti-Israel political sentiments. He also visited Sidon with Hariri, and finally made a visit to Turkish troops who had been positioned in South Lebanon since the 2006 War, while observing some of the UNIFIL forces stationed on the borders with Israel.[664]

Hezbollah on the other hand, continued to present a new reality of armed deterrence security that had long been absent in Lebanon. Thus it continued its media and psychological power deterrence warfare with Israel, initiated by its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, using sarcasm in his criticism of the IDF's exploited security threats on war and peace. In February 2010, in response to remarks by Ehud Barak at an IDF gathering, that hinted at war if Syria and Israel did not resume peace negotiations, Nasrallah responded, in this manner initiating a new deterrence strategy,[665] by vowing to launch rockets at Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion airport if Israel bombed Beirut's Rafic Hariri International airport; this was followed by another statement in May 2010 emphasizing that "Hezbollah can and will attack shipping along Israel's entire coastline if the Israeli navy shells

[662] In fact, the 2008 Doha Agreement had also anticipated a National Dialogue resolution that would reach agreement over renouncing the STL (at the time still accusing Syria), but this kept being postponed by the MFC and led to the government resigning, to be followed by new sharp political disputes in a sort of new Arab Spring era, especially towards Syria. On the other hand, it was still apparent that government resignations in Lebanon always attracted security issues, occasionally contributing to foreign factors and bringing back a new promising era for political reform and stability in Lebanon. On this occasion events were finally halted by an escalating Syrian crisis in 2011 and onwards. Thus, linking Hezbollah to the Hariri assassination in 2011 also meant an opportunity to try and deny political credibility to Hezbollah to prevent it from being allowed participate in governance.
[663] Anon, (2010), "Erdogan, Recep T. Erdogan from Akkar: We Will Continue Supporting Lebanon, Israel Should Stop its Provocations", *Profile News*, 24 November 2010. http://www.profilenews.com/index.php?id=825
[664] Daily Sabah News (2010). "Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan vows to stand by Lebanon", Daily Sabah online, 25 November 2010. Online at:
https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2010/11/25/turkeys_prime_minister_erdogan_vows_to_stand_by_lebanon
[665] Anon, (2010). 'Game Changer: Nasrallah Announces a New Hezbollah Deterrence Strategy", *Qifa Nabki*, 16 February 2010. Online at: https://qifanabki.com/2010/02/16/game-changer-hezbollah-deterrence-israel/

Lebanese infrastructure."[666] In fact, these latter comments by Nasrallah were made during a five-day drill that the Israelis called "Turning Point 4", which was intended to test Israel's preparedness against possible missile strikes from the Gaza Strip and by Hezbollah in Lebanon.[667]

Even though the Israeli-Lebanese border had remained relatively quiet since the end of the war in 2006, aside from the Al-Qaeda affiliated attacks, August 2010 was to witness the first border clash. This time it was between the IDF and the Lebanese army (LAF), after an Israeli mechanical arm had reached over a frontier fence to trim a tree on the Lebanese side of the border.[668] This led to a Lebanese army retaliation, in which a senior Israeli officer was killed on the ground, and an Israeli counter-retaliation that killed two Lebanese soldiers and a Lebanese journalist from Al-Manar Television. On the other hand, while the US criticized the Lebanese army for the incident, it again informed the Lebanese state that the US would stop military aid to Lebanon if it would be used against Israel. Ironically, this indirectly provided legitimacy for Hezbollah to maintain its weapons, since the Lebanese army is forbidden to use any type of arms against Israel, even if it was a US-made rifle that killed the Israeli officer.

This position was rejected and criticized, even by Hezbollah's political opponents such as PM Saad Hariri's late adviser, Mohamed Chatah (assassinated in 2013, and the last political murder since Hariri) who insisted that the suspension of aid was unjustified because it would weaken the government's efforts to build up the Lebanese Army in order to assure Lebanese state sovereignty, and free itself from foreign-influenced armed violence that could only be prevented under the state institution.[669] In this respect, another clash occurred exactly a year afterwards with no casualties reported, but it reflected the continued determination of the Lebanese and the LAF to counter Israeli territorial violations.[670]

---

[666] Nicholas Blanford, and Bilal Y. Saab, (2011). "Hezbollah on Offense", *The National Interest*, 8 March 2011. Online at: https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/hezbollah-offense-4982
[667] Anon (2010), "Nasrallah: We Will Attack Ships Approaching Israel in Future War", *Haaretz*, 25 May 2010. Online at: https://www.haaretz.com/1.5124825

[669] Associated Press and Natasha Mozgovaya (2010). "Lebanon: We'll Reject U.S. Military Aid if Weapons Can't Be Used Against Israel." *Haaretz*, 11 August 2010, online at https://www.haaretz.com/1.5098674
[670] Anshel Pfeffer (2011), "IDF Exchanges Fire With Lebanon Across Border"**,** *Haaretz*, 2 August 2011, online at https://www.haaretz.com/1.5038787

6.8. Conclusion

In assessing the timeline of conflict, security or peace in the period before and after the Hariri assassination this chapter concludes that little has changed in the factors or determinants of Lebanese foreign policy at both state and sub-state levels; except for certain events, occasions, circumstances or players. Rejecting a compromise resolution with Israel was to remain a 'red line' in Lebanese foreign policy; yet relationships with Syria remained principally dictated by the politics of Arab and international compromise, whether in seeking to boycott relationships with Syria, which is geopolitically harmful for Lebanon, or in seeking to emphasise mutual special relationships essential to the 'lifeline' of a Lebanese social heritage economy. Hence, this chapter also examined the exploitation of terrorism in regional conflicts and the cover-up of compromising peace deals, distant from the concept of achieving modern political reforms to state power rule; and marked by the issue of abolishing the hegemony of political sectarianism pertaining to the causes of domestic conflict. Unfortunately, it remains in a state of permanent postponement, a victim of regional conflict and instability, dominated by a global transnational political-corporation hegemony, and oppressive to a local pride of victory and strength.

CHAPTER SEVEN: LEBANON AND THE REGION: A GLOBAL ANARCHY CONFLICT IN A TRANSNATIONAL DOMESTIC-REGIONAL-INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION ORBIT

This chapter examines the domestic and foreign power struggles in Lebanon and the wider Middle East region which continue to impact on the domestic or regional security of the various historic communal, ethnic, religious or sectarian minority groups rooted in the region. It is an issue that contributes to the dominance of '*asabiyya,* or sectarianism, as is the case in Lebanon or the entire Levant region, and is a more trusted security alternative in the absence of equal civic and civil rights in the state. Despite the departure of all foreign troops from Lebanon, abolishing sectarianism became a more difficult mission in the absence of stable domestic or regional environments, as became evident in the period after 2005 or the Arab 'Springs' of 2011, which further contributed to the dominance of political sectarianism. Hence, the sectarian power-sharing order does not necessarily protect the individual or collective interests of the various sectarian-minority groups in Lebanon that come under the dominance of the traditional (secular) sectarian-oriented neo-feudal entities or families,[671] which exploit both national and sectarian interests within the state, and include the manipulation of domestic or regional conflict security issues, towards isolationist economic and cartel business relationships.

In Lebanon, Parliament became a marketplace where "the political and economic elites of the various communities could meet, exchange views, bargain and reach agreements based on compromise, rationalism, tolerance and conciliation."[672] This rationalizes the fact that despite the outbreak of the 1975 Lebanese Civil War in the midst of domestic demands for social justice and correction of political representation in the state, these demands kept being diverted by the dominance of sectarianism and/or foreign interventions in the country, thus benefitting from domestic economic and political corruption. In other words, electoral law and general elections processes remain key in dominating the political schemes in the state, whether at the domestic political and socio-economic level, or at the foreign policy levels, especially with regard to

---

[671] Ohannes Geukjlan, (2016), *Lebanon after the Syrian Withdrawal: External Intervention, Power-Sharing Arrangement* (London, Routledge), p. 20.

[672] Meir Zamir (1997), *Lebanon's Quest: The Search for a National Identity, 1926-39* (London: I. B. Tauris), p. 39.

welcoming new interventions into Lebanon or forcing the state to accept compromise agreements that remain distant from genuine resolutions.

Thus, electoral law is very important for adjusting the power-sharing political structure – while holding out a prospect of permanent success – through ensuring the correct individual, social, party, confessional or secular, representation or participation in the state decision-making process. In other words, regardless of a state's secular or religious political identity, the electoral law remains a very important, albeit disregarded issue in all the 'democracy' pretexts for foreign intervention, despite being the end result of all the macro chaos or crisis, whether in Lebanon or the Middle East region, as this thesis also continues to emphasize.

This became particularly evident in Lebanon with the continued postponement of electoral law reforms for the 2013 general elections (which were delayed until May 2018). It always happens under different pretexts, whether the security impacts from the escalation of violence in Syria after 2011; or the constitutional risks in ending with a political vacancy, which left the presidency position unfilled from May 2014 to October 2016; and the constant attempts to try to push away the transition to a new electoral law. It also became the result of another sectarian political compromise over bilateral agreements, accepting Aoun's presidency while also securing Saad Hariri as head of Cabinet.[673] On the other hand, despite agreeing on an electoral law in 2017,[674] the elections were still postponed until 2018, whilst the electoral system retained the dominance of sectarianism.

7.1. Lebanese Democracy: An Exploited Indigenous Minority Sectarian Power Sharing Rule

---

[673] Aside from Jumblatt, the awkward shifts in alliances until the election of Aoun probably best reflect the political splits within the MEC and MFC coalitions. These were marked in Geagea's LFs and Hariri's FM, with separate bilateral agreements with Aoun's FPM in accepting his nomination. Marada and Berri's Amal refused to vote for Aoun in the Presidential elections; nonetheless they resolutely joined Hezbollah and FPM in either attending or boycotting the Parliamentary sessions while still disputing over naming the president. In fact, Sulieman Franjieh failed to reach an agreement with Aoun after a French initiative to elect Franjieh instead of Aoun as President was accepted by KSA, which caused a split between them. Yet both the MEC and FPM split away from the joint efforts for which they had so stood firmly during their 2006-2008 protests when demanding political reform in the state.
[674] While the new electoral law introduced the concept of proportional voting within narrow sectarian electoral districts, it was structured with a non-sectarian 'preference-vote'.

It was seen that continuity in the elections process would renew the rule of powerful political-corporation elite minorities that possessed all the state's wealth, including its sovereign domestic and external decisions or agreements. In his book *The Wasted Human*, Mustafa Hijazi discusses the issue of political exploitation remarking:

> As a result, the individual vote or political freedom to select could systematically, if not legally, be wasted, where the lack of political knowledge, interest, or awareness could shift the individual or public view in different directions, through the media, for instance. Such issues would have bigger impacts in weaker, economically-oppressed states. This is because barriers to knowledge through systematic human oppression leads to human mind wastage. It dominates the human mind and its potential powers on both domestic and international levels. Alternately, Western civilization renaissance has contributed to the power and possession of knowledge and technology. Thus, human mind manipulation is more significant than human political rights and freedoms, because such domination prevents individual mind awareness and control even in democratic and free entities. Human mind and conscious manipulations could happen under democratic-shaped and tyrant state rule.[675]

Under Lebanese democracy, and more specifically in terms of electoral law, there have been nine different electoral laws drafted for fourteen parliamentary elections since Lebanese independence in 1943;[676] (by 2018 this was 10 drafts and 15 elections) all of which are based on the confessional doctrine of sectarian power-sharing and representation in the Lebanese state. Eli Al-Hindy's working paper, *The Dilemma of Human Rights in Lebanese Electoral* Law, describes this as a human rights dilemma because the electoral law, as enshrined in the Lebanese constitution, outlines two very different forms of representation: it represents all Lebanese citizens equally and fairly, and represents the two main Lebanese religious sects equally and fairly, in accordance with their sub-sects.[677]

Al-Hindy argues that at times this formula may be incompatible and even contradictory, given the shifts in geo-demographic equilibrium. He even blames electoral laws between 1943 and 1972 as major factors in paving the way for the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, and as factors that induced

---

[675] Mustafa Hijazi (2005b), *The Wasted Human*: *a Social Psychological Analysis* (Beirut: Arab Cultural Centre Press), p. 165 [Arabic]
[676] Elie Al-Hindy (2014), "The Dilemma of Human Rights in Lebanese Electoral Laws", Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs and the American University of Beirut, Working Paper Series 21, p. 4.
[677] ibid.

fragmentation and divisions, finally becoming tools to fulfil narrow political power interests.[678] Further, "systemic gerrymandering led to the creation of electoral districts and a distribution of seats that eventually secured the victory of the dominant political groups";[679] organizing elections during the civil war was postponed, while introducing reforms to electoral law was one of the main articles in the Ta'if Agreement and in early agreements on the principles of national dialogue.

In the Lebanese Constitution in its post-Ta'if Agreement or its current post-civil war formulas, "a fossil of the Senate's presence remains in the abrogated Articles 23, 96-100, and in Article 22", that looks ahead towards a post-confessional future for Lebanon: "With the election of the first Parliament on a national, non-confessional basis, a Senate is to be established in which all the spiritual families (*al-ʿāʾilāt al-rūḥiyya*) are represented. Its authority is limited to crucial issues (*al-qaḍāya al-maṣīriyya*)."[680] However, none of this was achieved, and was again postponed in the shape of the latest electoral law that, following five years-worth of extensions to the Parliament, was finally agreed upon in 2017. Neither the US and the French, nor the international community, all of whom had been keen to prevent Lahoud's presidential term elections in 2004 – to 'protect democracy in Lebanon' – reflected any similar concerns over the repeated extensions to the parliamentary terms after 2013, and the vacant presidential post between 2007-2008 and again between 2014-2016. Nor were they concerned about the continued postponement of the implementation of the post-war constitutional reforms that still await the election of the first non-confessional-voting national Parliament.

7.1.1. A Naturally-Reborn Electoral Law Dilemma

The elections held after Ta'if in 1992, 1996, and 2000 were under regionally- and internationally-approved Syrian political mentorship, amidst Christian boycotts and domestic financial bribes. In the 2005 elections, despite the formation of a temporary transitional government under PM Najib Mikati (following the resignation of PM Omar Karami due to the Hariri assassination) to carry on with the preparations for the general elections, all previous discussions concerning electoral law

---

[678] ibid, pp. 4-9.
[679] ibid, p. 10.
[680] Elias Muhanna (2012), "Establishing a Lebanese Senate: Bicameralism and the Third Republic",. CDDRL Working Papers, no. 125 (Stanford CA: Stanford University), online at https://qifanabki.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/senate-paper-elias-muhanna-english.pdf .

reforms were overshadowed by the escalation in both domestic and external events that resulted in political compromise agreements. Thus, public hope for change by the MFC and MEC continued to be disappointed, partly because of the magnitude of the domestic security threats, affected by the foreign political influences dominating the region, and especially because the country immediately came under Saudi-US political and financial authority that competed domestically to fill the political vacuum that had followed the evacuation of Syrian authority in Lebanon in favour of the MFC.

The US position was particularly significant; it preached for democracy in the region but ignored the importance of reform in the constitutional tools by hijacking equal power representation in the state.[681] The Americans were careful to maintain the supposedly 'Syrian mandate' electoral law, on the pretext of not delaying the general elections, and indeed were happy to see their 'anti-Syrian' Lebanese allies win the elections, but they were not pleased that the MEC – namely Hezbollah – was also able to be represented in state power.[682] For them this ended up as "a job only half done", as was argued by members of the Committee on International Relations at the US House of Representatives, just two months after the elections.[683]

Similarly, the 2009 election was held under another transitional or political-settlement electoral law,[684] achieved in Doha with Qatari mediation in May 2008 as a compromise for domestic security and national reconciliation, and with promises of new foreign economic prizes to sustain a hugely-indebted Lebanese economy. New debts had also accumulated after Hariri's assassination, beginning with the Stockholm Conference of August 2006 in support of the Fouad Siniora Government after the devastating Israeli war against Lebanon in July 2006, and followed by Paris III, in January 2007 at the peak of the MFC violence against the MEC-FPM 'reform and change' protests of 2006-2008. At the foreign level the aim was to help Lebanon restore its political sovereignty by meeting its economic and social needs and focusing on support for

---

[681] United States Congress, House of Representatives Committee on International Relations (2005), "Lebanon Reborn? Defining National Priorities and Prospects for Democratic Renewal in the Wake of March 14, 2005", 109th Congress, First Session. Serial No. 109-112, July 28, 2005, pp 1-2.
[682] ibid p 3.
[683] ibid.
[684] Even little electoral constituencies were discussed when re-engineering a 1960 electoral law, for one time only.

financial reform programs,[685] yet reform continued to be postponed. Ironically, in 2005 the Siniora Government even adopted new unconstitutional guidelines on all government expenditure, particularly spending on foreign aid, grants or loans that became disputed domestically, and this also continued in all the governments that followed, without any foreign or American concerns over the checks and balances on all those regionally and internationally facilitated loans, thereby accrediting a penetrated Lebanese economic and financial, even political, structure and ignoring new reform programmes.

In other words, the political disputes in Lebanon had overwhelmingly overshadowed the socio-economic depressions accommodated by foreign hegemony sponsors of regional support. This is criticised by Anne Marie Baylouny in relation to US foreign policy on Lebanon:

> The precarious foundation upon which Lebanon is built has been propped up by US support even as it is further taxed by Israeli military actions. While the US views Hezbollah as the main danger in Lebanon, a larger by some accounts majority of Lebanese instead perceive their danger is Israel. US support for Israel and for the ruling government serves short-term US policy goals of maintaining pro-American elites in power. However, a longer perspective would question the wisdom of this policy. The popularity of the opposition, including Hezbollah, has only increased throughout US opposition to the group and the 2006 war with Israel… In 1958, the US recognized the domestic nature of grievances and the broad support for the opposition as due to the influence of officials on the ground. The isolation of US government officials since the 1980s has exacerbated the reliance upon others for information and advice on Lebanon. Without an independent view of the Lebanese situation, the US will continue to back one side in a domestic conflict without realizing the unpopularity of its ally. Such policies will not keep Lebanese friendly to the US or maintain US priorities in Lebanon when the ruling elite changes.[686]

Thus, accrediting a corrupt political and economic legitimacy under the pretext of protecting democracy or liberal freedoms, is usually interpreted in the general elections process. Also, the

---

[685] Government of France (2001), "Report on International Conference on Lebanon's Reconstruction: the International Community's Economic Aid for Lebanon, 23 February 2001", available from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Relief Web International*, 24 January 2007; online at https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/international-conference-lebanons-reconstruction-international-communitys-economic

[686] Anne Marie Baylouny (2009), "US Foreign Policy in Lebanon", in Robert Looney ed., *Handbook on US Middle East Relations* (London: Routledge), pp. 310-323). https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39054/inc_baylouny_US_policyin_Lebanon.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

elections in Lebanon traditionally entailed vote-buying bribes, and depriving minorities of their equal rights to power representation in the state, [687] while also contributing to political tensions, conflict, or even violence. The 2009 elections were kept hostage to those factors, including the domestic and external pressures in opposition to the MEC winning a majority vote in Parliament. As a result, aside from the abolition of sectarianism, there were no genuine attempts even to correct the sectarian representation in Parliament based on a proportional voting system electoral law.[688] For example, despite the MEC wining almost 55 percent of the popular votes in the 2009 elections (gaining 862,000 votes in comparison to the MFC winning only 718,000 votes), the MFC still won the majority of seats in parliament ending with 72 MPs, while the MEC gained only 56 seats;[689] since the electoral law remained based on a majority-voting system within narrow sectarian electoral districts.

In Lebanon this is a consequence of the sectarian demographic distribution, which has "a significant impact on the formation of the electorate and therefore on the results of the elections as a whole."[690] Although Hariri's government discussed a draft electoral law after the 2009 elections that would introduce proportional representation in the 2013 elections, there were still strong reservations over cutting the number of districts to almost half of what had been envisaged in the 2008 electoral law.[691] This was despite the fact that the Ta'if Agreement had also proposed distribution to the electoral districts based on the wider geo-demographic (multi-sectarian) governorates to help with the transition to a single national electoral district, after agreeing on the abolition of political sectarianism in the state. Thus, the electoral law was to remain a key political issue in the country's postponement the elections until 2018, amidst continued regional conflict

---

[687] Anon (2012), "Election Law Gives Majority to March 8: Experts", *The Daily Star,* Beirut, Lebanon, 10 August 2012. https://www.dailystar.com.lb/GetArticleBody.aspx?id=184098&fromgoogle=1 https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Election+law+gives+majority+to+March+8%3A+experts-a0299069136

[688] The fiercest opposition to a proportionally-based electoral law came from Saad Hariri's Future Movement (FM), which aimed at keeping a Sunni leadership parliamentary majority; and Walid Jumblatt's PSP, which sought to maintain his Druze sectarian geo-demographic and political leadership, supported by their MFC allies – mainly Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces Party (LFs), opposed to the FMP. The issue for them was that the MEC held solid public support at the national level: mainly Nabih Berri's Amal Movement with Suleiman Franjieh's Marada, and other Druze opposition groups allied with Hezbollah and Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. This could enable them win the majority in the elections.

[689] Anon, (2012). "Election Law Gives Majority to March 8: Experts", *The Daily Star,* Beirut, Lebanon, 10 August 2012. Online at: https://www.dailystar.com.lb/GetArticleBody.aspx?id=184098&fromgoogle=1

[690] Al-Hindy (2014), op.cit., pp. 17-19.

[691] ibid.

and instability. Although proportional voting was finally agreed on, the electoral districts continued to be distributed according to the interests of the sectarian powers, hence failing to pursue the full electoral law political reforms that had been awaited since the end of the civil war in 1990 (or even, with regard to the abolition of sectarianism, since the drafting of the first electoral law and constitution in 1926). In other words, the traditional issues entailing political corruption and misrepresentation in the state were still preserved, as also reflected by the processes and outcomes of the 2009 elections.

7.1.2. Lebanon's 2009 Elections: an American Illusion for Promoting Freedom and Democracy in the Middle East

In its final report on the 2009 Lebanese parliamentary elections, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), which was acting as part of the official team of international observers overseeing the elections process, concluded that:

> …with Lebanon's stringent banking secrecy laws, it is very difficult to regulate the money flowing into the country, but reports in local and international media estimate that the money arriving from Saudi Arabia alone, a backer of the March 14 alliance, topped $715 million. All of these actions constitute violations of Article 59 of the 2008 Electoral Law.[692]

This money, whether spent on "purchasing airplane tickets, exchanging money or promising local services", was buying the promise of a vote, and this "has a corrosive effect on democratic institutions and devalues the principle of a free vote cast on the basis of conscience."[693]

At the same time, Robert Worth's report to the *New York Times* on the 2009 election campaign, asserted that the Lebanese elections seemed likely to be among the most expensive ever held anywhere: "Lebanon has long been seen as a battleground for regional influence, and now, with no more foreign armies on the ground, Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region are arming their allies here with campaign money in place of weapons." He observed that the result was a race that had become widely seen as the freest and most competitive to be held in the country for decades, with a record number of candidates taking part; yet it might also have been the most

---

[692] National Democratic Institute (2009). "Final Report on the Lebanese Parliamentary Election", *NDI.org*, 7 June 2009. Online at: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Lebanese_Elections_Report_2009.pdf
[693] ibid, p. 65.

corrupt.[694] It was also clear that the Saudis shared regional interests with the Americans. Worth quotes a Saudi government adviser: "[W]e are putting a lot into this… we're supporting candidates running against Hezbollah, and we're going to make Iran feel the pressure."[695]

In order to win the elections, the 2009 elections even exceeded the traditional 'electoral keys' in which clan votes would be exchanged for "money or services – scholarships, a hospital, repaved roads and so on" that were sought by the poor or marginalized regions; additional foreign money was also contributed to fly "thousands of expatriate Lebanese…to Lebanon, free, to vote in contested districts."[696] With other 'invisible' bribery costs, it is estimated that five billion US dollars were spent on the 2009 elections, according to Global International Info (here it should be noted that USD1.3 million is the permitted election campaigns cost quota in the elections).[697]

This emphasises the mercantilist reality in the Lebanese political scene, since most Lebanese elections have been influenced by foreign conflicts or interests, linked to regional or international political alliances or affiliations, in support of domestic national interests or corporate-sectarian benefits; as the NDI final report also points out:

> Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United States were often the focus of campaign rhetoric, while national issues such as the economy, electricity, education, and health care, took a back seat. An oft-repeated criticism by Lebanese civil society was that candidates lacked actual issue-based campaigns and instead rallied their base by stirring up deep-seated, historic, sectarian sentiments. The role of money in electoral campaigns increasingly meant that the choice of voters was in some cases defined by bribes or the promise of service provision, rather than by policy platforms proffered by candidates.'[698]

Similarly, the NDI further concludes that although the confessional system in the elections was meant to serve as a mechanism that protected sectarian rights in the state ("supplementing the confessional system with other avenues for representation"), there was a clear and urgent need to correct political representation in the state with the aim of preventing a sectarian monopoly of

---

[694] Robert Worth (2009), "Foreign Money Seeks to Buy Lebanese Votes", *New York Times*, 22 April 2009. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/world/middleeast/23lebanon.html?mcubz=3
[695] ibid.
[696] ibid.
[697] Mohamad Shamsdein, (2017), "Hiwar al-Yawm", *OTV*, 8 July 8, 2017. [Arabic] Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xak4tORxb88
[698] National Democratic Institute (2009), "Final Report on the Lebanese Parliamentary Election", op.cit.

power.[699] Thus, the absence of any genuine political reform processes or mechanisms remained manipulated by foreign pretexts preaching for democracy in Lebanon while engaging in financial, economic or political exploitation while disregarding the issue of sectarianism.

7.2. USAID Conspiracy: A Structured Neo-Liberal US Foreign Policy in Lebanon

On the other hand, this issue was also to dominate the regional scene, especially after the Arab Spring of 2011. The promotion of freedom of speech or democratic civil rights, accompanied by USAID, reiterated what remained mere empty talk or titles manipulated by corporate-run democratization. Since the invasion of Iraq, exploiting regional attempts towards integrationist national sovereignty efforts had become dominated by US hydrocarbon energy or arms manufacturing global hegemony interests. In 2010, in a testimony before the subcommittee of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Jeffery Feltman, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, testified alongside Daniel Benjamin, the ambassador and coordinator for counterterrorism stating that:

> [T]he United States provides assistance and support in Lebanon that work to create alternatives to extremism, reduce Hizballah's appeal to Lebanon's youth, and empower people through greater respect for their rights and greater access to opportunity. Through USAID and the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), we have contributed more than $500 million to this effort since 2006. These robust assistance programs represent one facet of our unwavering support for the Lebanese people and a strong, sovereign, stable, and democratic Lebanon. Since 2006, our total assistance to Lebanon has now exceeded $1 billion… $600 million were given to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Force (ISF) out of a conviction that the Lebanese army and police should provide protection for Lebanon's people.[700]

Ironically, while including a budget to undermine Hezbollah in Lebanon and frame it with terrorism, the few million dollars in US armed aid that were left for LAF, in comparison with the ISF, were also bound by restrictions from being used against the State of Israel. Thus, the funds lacked any strategic significance in deterring foreign threats, or in protecting Lebanese state sovereignty, especially from Israel which occasionally threatens Lebanon and annually receives

---

[699] ibid, p. 68.
[700] Jeffery Feltman, and Daniel Benjamin, (2010), "Testimony Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to Discuss Hezbollah", *Foreign Senate Testimony,* 8 June 2010, p. 8. Online at: https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060810%20Feltman-Benjamin%20Testimony.pdf

billions of dollars in corporate security military aid, thereby ensuring "Israel's Qualitative Military Edge" in the Middle East.[701]

In other words, while genuine political reforms were ignored, the region remained under the political dominance of the US, penetrated by domestic and foreign violence that would be enacted against 'the other evil'; and where the dominant local actors would deploy these penetrations to foster their own domestic or external political objectives.[702] In assessing US Foreign Policy in Lebanon after 2005, Anne Marie Baylouny states that economic sanctions or opportunities were to continue to be dominated and manipulated under the global corporate neo-liberal economic policies regulated by the United States, which traditionally supported political ruling elites, open to economic and business relations with the US,[703] or to serving America's political interests in the region by dominating the political sovereignty of the regional states. In fact, prior to the 2009 general elections in Lebanon, Feltman openly linked US aid for Lebanon to the June election, stating in a different testimony: "We anticipate that the shape of the US assistance programs in Lebanon will be evaluated in the context of Lebanon's parliamentary election results and the policies formed by the new Cabinet."[704]

Hence, Hezbollah was blamed for being an obstacle to economic aid and a main threat to Lebanese state sovereignty, from which, as Feltman and Benjamin asserted in their 2010 testimony, the people needed to be freed.

> Lebanese who yearn for a state that represents the aspirations of all Lebanese, we would create the conditions by which Hizballah can, by filling a vacuum, grow even stronger… Moreover, the United States provides assistance and support in Lebanon that work to create alternatives to extremism, reduce Hizballah's appeal to Lebanon's youth, and empower people through greater respect for their rights and greater access to opportunity. [705]

---

[701] Jarrod Bernstein (2011), "Ensuring Israel's Qualitative Military Edge", *Whitehouse Blog*, 17 November 2011. Online at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/11/17/ensuring-israels-qualitative-military-edge
[702] Leon Carl Brown (1984), *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 3-18.
[703] Anne Marie Baylouny, (2009), "US Foreign Policy in Lebanon", op.cit., p. 311.
[704] Nicholas Kimbrell (2009), "Feltman links US aid for Lebanon to Results of June Election", *Daily Star* (Beirut), 26 March 2009. Online at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2009/Mar-26/51910-feltman-links-us-aid-for-lebanon-to-results-of-june-7-election.ashx
[705] Jeffery Feltman and Daniel Benjamin (2010), op.cit., p. 7.

In other words, indirectly linking the fate of Lebanon's economic sovereignty or any aid to Lebanon (depending on the state's behaviour towards conflict with Israel and the role of Hezbollah in that respect), would prompt accusations of keeping the country politically and economically hostage to regional conflicts with Israel and distracting US-Israeli efforts for peace.

Alternatively, Baylouny observes, "altering attitudes was the focus of public diplomacy campaigns in Lebanon" by US foreign policy; and this included aid packages adorned with the slogan "I love life", which was presumably conceived in opposition to Hezbollah's elevation of martyrdom and death,[706] addressed during its 2006 War against Israel. Ironically, US efforts were met by counter-responses that included the slogans "I love capitalism" and "I love sectarianism", which were intended to parody Washington's support for capitalist financial allies and the confessional sectarian order it continued to overlook. Baylouny further observes that at the social, political or cultural level, slogans such as "We love life" largely served to confirm the essential difference between US individualism and the traditional communal solidarity culture,[707] reflecting that:

> …while Washington expanded its economic assistance in recent years, this assistance never dealt with the fundamental lack of social service institutions in Lebanon and the state's confessional bias. American money worked through the state, meaning the money was still allocated on confessional and patron-client lines.[708]

7.2.1. Lebanonising the Middle East: A Fixation on an Isolationist Corporate Sectarianism

Political sectarianism continued to dominate in the Lebanese state and in a new Lebanonised region after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Syrian crisis in 2011, becoming distant from any dialogue that tackled the civil construct of equal social and individual citizenship rights in the state. Baylouny stresses that the Lebanese opposition groups, who continued to call for an end to the confessional system, were not welcome in Washington in the aftermath of the 2005 events.[709] She adds that this left US policy in a 'quandary', claiming to focus on building Lebanese civil society and armed forces or promoting democracy while still persisting in treating Hezbollah as an outside obstacle to such efforts. Despite being a local popular "organization with significant

---

[706] Baylouny, Anne Marie (2009), op.cit., p. 320.
[707] ibid.
[708] ibid.
[709] ibid.

electoral success in Lebanon, it was to remain labelled as a terrorist group by the US, pressuring the Lebanese government to disarm."[710] Such situations were also evident in a Lebanonised Iraq, a region where, at the domestic level, the lack of political accountability, at least in the electoral process, was to remain the main cause of state corruption and *'asabiyya* dominance rule.

Writing in the *New York Times*, close to the 2009 elections, Robert Worth likened this state of electoral affairs as being effectively 're-manufactured in Lebanonised elections' into merchants openly buying votes, paid for with foreign loans, and describing this as a traditional Lebanese merchant practice. He adds that "in a country where the average public school teacher earns less than $700 a month, these payments are a significant source of support for many communities". Paul Salem (Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center), commenting in the same article, also noted that "since the 1990s, more money has been coming in… Unfortunately, the system adjusts to that and in a way comes to expect it, especially among the poor".[711] Correspondingly, most state's income or new debts have been utilised primarily in servicing the accumulating debt interest, which serves only to construct a more economically-marginalized Lebanese social citizenship.

In other words, marginalizing political representation where current electoral laws or national elections processes truly reflect the people's will, simply generate 'bogus' (petrodollar) elections or political practice in the name of democracy.[712] Thus, also at the geopolitical level, the dilemma of state economic or political sovereignty is a persistent issue in the region, especially if it continues to be Lebanonised with both sectarian and financial corruption.

Economics expert Muhammad Zabib quotes a study by Lidia Aswad on the Lebanese state's tax income between 2005 and 2014 which shows that Lebanon was rated first in the world for the concentration of wealth, with only one percent of the Lebanese population positioned at the top of the ladder and owning the biggest shares of state national income and wealth, or also owing or

---

[710] ibid.

[711] Robert Worth (2009), "Foreign Money Seeks to Buy Lebanese Votes", *New York Times*, 22 April 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/world/middleeast/23lebanon.html?mcubz=3

being owed by the state, beating the US, Russia, China and France.[713] In detail the study reflects that:

> Ten percent of Lebanese adults earn 57.1 percent of the state's overall average incomes (estimated at 81,000 Euros per year); 50 percent of Lebanese earn 10.6 percent of the national state income, at an average income of 3,000 Euros per year; 40 percent of Lebanese earn 32 percent of an average annual income of 11,000 Euros; 1 percent (37000 Lebanese) earn more than 23 percent of state income; 0.1 percent (3700 Lebanese) earn 11 percent of state income; 0.01 percent (372 Lebanese) earn 6 percent of state income, with an average income estimated at 8.5 million Euros; and 0.001 percent (37 Lebanese) earn 3.3 percent of state income with an average income of 74 million Euros.
>
> In conclusion, in terms of the gap in the concentration of power and wealth, possessing the highest top 1 percent wealth share in the state. Thus, Lebanon happens to occupy the highest score on the international level coming in at around 39 percent, followed by the US around 37 percent, Russia 36 percent, China 28 percent, and France 23 percent; with 0.05% (6 Lebanese) owning over one third of the state's wealth (91 Billion Dollars).[714]

In other words, beyond Lebanonising the region into confessional sectarian cantons, there remain invisible sectarianisms of financial wealth hegemonies, that dominate at the global level, and beyond the local, regional or international interests of the indigenous national and public forces, aside from their secular or sectarian ideological or political differences, but nonetheless, also exploiting attempts for political or socioeconomic reform using both secular and sectarian tools.

This became obvious in the decade that followed the Hariri assassination when, aside from the domestic divisions over state sovereignty or postponement of political reform blamed on foreign factors, there remained strictly domestic state sovereignty violations. Most alarming were the constitutional violations made at the state fiscal or economic level as early as the 1990s, when Siniora was a Finance Minister. All national development, financial gains and spending or economic strategies came under limitless anarchic spending with no accountable restrictions,

---

[713] Mohammad Zabib (2017), "Nharkhum Said with Malek Sharif", *LBCI TV*, 19 October 2017 (in Arabic). Zabib, a prominent Lebanese economic critic, refers to a paper by Lidia Aswad on "Lebanese State Tax Income between 2005-2014", showing distribution of personal wealth among adults aged 20 years old and above. Estimates obtained included billionaire debts for Lebanon, generalized Pareto interpretation techniques and normalized world wealth distributions (WWD). Sources for other countries' WWD. Figure 10b. Top 1 percent wealth share: Lebanon vs selected countries averaged over 2005-2014 (minute 56). Online at:
https://www.lbcgroup.tv/watch/35383/%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%B2%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A8/ar
[714] Ibid.

especially at the political level, particularly after 2005. According to the former Minister of Labour, Charbil Nahas, the government would be forbidden to collect taxes, or in theory it would become illegal to collect taxes without issuing an Annual Budget. As Nahas argued:

> When there is no fiscal budget in the country then there is no more state to be acknowledged... In a regulation introduced since the 1926 Constitution, it has been clearly stated that annually on 21 October, the government shall submit an official budget; but everything gets postponed in Lebanon, contributing to further economic losses, costs and delays that affect the lives of the average citizen... The current political system is bad and does not benefit Lebanon's citizens. It is exactly like an expired commodity that does no good but causes harm and loss that can be always be avoided if one possesses the will to seek change.[715]

Meanwhile, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Economy and Trade, unemployment in 2014 stood at 24 percent, exceeding 35 percent amongst youth, alongside Lebanon's trade deficit of US$11.77 billion by September 2017, with exports at US$2.12 billion and imports at US$13.89 billion.[716] Although, this could be blamed on the war in Syria since 2011, as in border closures blocking trade routes through Syria, and the refugee crisis that also contributed to the retreating economic situation, yet this also remains related significantly to systematically unaccountable and careless structures and practices of governance in Lebanon or across the Arab region – where reform remains a 'red line' taboo interplayed in conflict, violence or financed peace.

7.2.2. A Middle East 'asabiyya Corporate Rule

This brings back the issue of *'asabiyya* dominance in the history of Arab or Muslim rule, provided by general or universal state- and social-centred corporatism. Or, as Ayubi argues, the modern Arab state, in addition to economic corporatism also has a community-centred corporatism that is tribal, religious, ethnic, or sectarian. In other words, there is a form of traditional *'asabiyya* fundamentalism and dominance in the state's institutions, parliament, administration, army, and political parties – and this extends to all elements in society, whether in government or opposition.[717] Again this is also best illustrated in Lebanon with reference to the more extreme

---

[715] Charbil Nahas (2014), "Political Corruption in the State", Al-Hadath with Nancy Sabaa, *Al-Jadeed TV* (Arabic), 17 November 2014. http://www.aljadeed.tv/MenuAr/news/DetailNews/AlHadathDetailNews.html?Id=149858
[716] Donna Abu-Nasr (2018), "Lebanon Hires McKinsey to Help Revamp the Economy", *Bloomberg*, 8 January 2018, online at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-09/lebanon-hires-mckinsey-to-help-revamp-economy-minister-says
[717] Ayubi, (1995) op. cit, referring to Ibn Khaldoun in Al-Naqib [1991: 92ff], p. 190.

case of community-centred corporatism (i.e. consociationalism) representing the basic formula for the entire political system.[718]

As for the regional aspect, this could resemble what Bernard Lewis referred to after the 1991 Gulf War, as: "…another possibility, which could even be precipitated by fundamentalism, is what has of late become fashionable to call 'Lebanonization'."[719] He argues that most of the states of the Middle East are of recent and artificial construction and are vulnerable to fundamentalism, especially if the central power is sufficiently weakened; there is no real civil society to hold the polity together, and no real sense of a common national identity or overriding allegiance to the nation-state. The state then disintegrates – as happened in Lebanon – and enters a chaos of squabbling, feuding, fighting sects, tribes, regions and parties.[720]

Yet since the 1990s this structure has also continued to be countered by national awakening efforts of civil resistance and rebellion, embedded with an awakening to an 'invisible' or marginalized heritage of strength and victory in the origins of a sovereign state. A comparison of this can be made with Ibn Khaldun's era, when the Muslim Empire was divided into sub-states. As Ayubi notes, regarding the origins of state formation in North Africa, "[this] can historically be traced back to the emergence of power centres capable of enforcing their authority on the adjacent rural centres and tribal confederations, a process the cyclical background of which was well described by Ibn Khaldun.'[721] Nevertheless, whether in the Levant (as in the case of Lebanon) or in the Arab Maghreb (as in the case of Tunisia with its Phoenician heritage), historical state sovereignty struggles were always persistent or in progress – however, they were only finally achieved after the retreat of Ottoman rule. But the new corporate ruling, of both the international and regional order, remained the persistent issue. Ayubi further writes that Tunisia was perhaps the most integrated and centralized of the Maghreb countries, even taking in account the decay of its tribal solitaries and the weakness of its intermediary (shaikhly) leaderships. This, in addition to a higher

---

[718] ibid.
[719] Bernard Lewis (1992), "Rethinking the Middle East", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 4, pp. 99-119. Online at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045312
[720] ibid.
[721] Ayubi, ibid., p. 117.

exposure to external influences – not only European but also Ottoman and Egyptian – paved the way for important reforms.[722]

Interestingly, the Arab rebellion events, and the subsequent Arab Spring events were triggered in Tunisia, in an ethical cry for a heritage of pride and dignity. They started with an individual act of self-rebellion, when Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in December 2010 in protest against the systematic measures of socio-economic and political oppression or humiliation by the state that prevented a dignified living. He committed suicide as a protest against the state and in defence of his human dignity, and his refusal of an imposed life of disgrace was also felt at the individual citizen level across the Arab world, thus triggering a sensation of Arab rebellion over a life of oppression and disgrace, and with the denial of social citizenship rights or better living opportunities not provided by the state. The peaceful rebellions that started in Tunisia, and later in Egypt (before the violent Arab Spring of 2011 had begun), were in 'moderate' US-orbit Arab states, thus reflecting an Arab public trans-national factor, with both countries sharing the same feelings or sensations of the liberation of an oppressed national dignity. This was even reflected in public expressions of solidarity with the Palestinian people, by waving Palestinian flags in their protests as a symbol of equating the Palestinian struggle with their own domestic struggle against the state's oppression and political repression.

This was also clear, for example in Egypt, in the demands to end the peace treaty with Israel that had been widely rejected at the public level, and reflecting great sympathy for the Palestinian struggle; yet when the Muslim Brotherhood came to power this view remained marginalized and unrepresented, similarly to the way their role in Syria became uncertain. Even so, these rebellious efforts for political and economic sovereignty were to meet the same fate as the Palestinian struggle for liberation or the right to self-determination. They become exploited by Western hegemony interests in the region, who accused the Arab people of being terrorists, savage, backward or evil, and belonging to fundamentalist social roots that were incompatible with democracy. Later these efforts became a 'Spring', best described by the late Muhamad Hassanain Haikal (a prominent Egyptian journalist), who noted that the Arab Spring was very similar to the

---

[722] ibid, p. 119.

Arab Revolt of 1914, with the outcomes of a promising victory or change, but hijacked by external forces seeking to maintain a regional power hegemony through a new Sykes-Picot project.

7.2.3. The Wasted Human in Lebanon and the Arab State

In Lebanon, freedom of speech is not necessarily threatened by the state, but from a political aspect, the expression of this freedom to materialize into action remains technically restricted or confronted by various obstacles. Such freedoms remain dependant on obstacles at the state political or social level, especially in terms of restricting individual freedoms outside socio-economic or sectarian endorsement, and this is reflected on all political, social, economic or religious-ideological levels where freedom of speech and expression is allowed in the state but remains restricted by the dominating sectarian boundaries. Yet the non-sectarian forces remain less privileged in this respect, as do even the individual and minority groups that might also be faced by an intra-sectarian (social tyranny) power and wealth-dominant ruling order that exploits the daily lives of an oppressed citizenship.

Thus, aside from the violence of war, there is also the violence of human injury, suffering under the repressed freedom of the "other" view and unable to express itself, by being faced with multi-restrictions despite the shared injury. In other words, the dominant sectarian order builds dependency and fear that overshadows human awareness to a stage that allows full submission to the awaited saviour or leader, who is depended on and trusted to change the oppression. Even in the secular Arab states, given the complex transnational and regional geopolitical, economic, and security threats, it is a case of blind trust and loyalty, surrendered and always renewed to a strong authoritarian leader. Thus, the oppressed general public share the same feeling of submission to a more powerful reality exceeding their capability, and this confuses even further their understanding of democracy and their faith in it.

According to Hijazi, public national priorities deteriorate under such dominant political factors, for example altering to narrow priorities such as protecting honour, pride and dignity, which usually fall in the weaker ring of society, to dominance and control of the woman for example, or seeking pride in sexuality. In the long term, there are attempts to defend self-existence or evolution, yet these fail to provide the essential securities of living, take away hope, or even the

imagining, of a future, instead developing a profoundly suppressed anger. Hijazi adds that, in an attempt to overcome this reality, the human mind sinks into history, digging for stories of pride, and imagines finding hope in stories of the past, dominated by heroes and saviours. However, with the continued and deep feeling of persecution and anger from suppression, the human-self ends up increasing these deep self-pains that can eventually explode with inconsiderate deep enmity in protest against the painful and harmful reality of living.[723]

Again, as the Lebanese political scholar Hassan Hamadeh argues, this falls under the description of "soft systematic violence" where there is in Lebanon a dual political-social tyranny that is reflected in what he describes as its sectarian "prison cantons" or "apartheid" socio-economic-political ruling systems; here, aside from the domination within the sect, "the violation of individual human constitutional rights overshadows the formal masked sectarian political system in the state."[724]

As pointed out by Ilan Pappe, in its masked religious political inspirational aspect, this is quite similar to the Israeli situation, where most Zionists happen to be secularists or do not believe in God, but nevertheless believe in God's promise to them in Palestine.[725] In the Lebanese political scenario, the sectarian political leaderships are non-religious but believe in a Godly promise to them to protect the rights and benefits of the religious sects under their leadership. Indeed, the Lebanese situation applies in most Arab states, especially those that are being further depleted by religious ideologies that continue to rise and dominate the ruins of exhausted nationalist or social citizenship contracts.[726] Or it results in new forms of 'social tyranny' contributed by the official domestic or foreign tyrannical forces dominating the state, thereby reaffirming Ayubi's conclusions on the Arab State and state-society relations – it is certainly the case that "both must prosper together", but not while political tyranny and economic stagnation remain in the state.[727]

---

[723] Mustafa Hijazi, ed. (2005), *Social Backwardness: An Introduction to the Psychology of the Oppressed Human* (6th ed.), (Beirut: Arab Cultural Centre), pp. 45-55. [Arabic]
[724] Hassan Hamadeh, (2017), *Hiwar Al-Yawm OTV*, 9 March 2017. [Arabic] Online at:
http://www.otv.com.lb/beta/v/episode/%EF%BB%BF%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85_%D8%B9_%D8%AF_%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86_%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9_-_%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8_%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB_%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-39495
[725] Ilan Pappe (2006), *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: OneWorld Publications).
[726] Nazih Ayubi (1995), op.cit., p, 458.
[727] ibid.

In other words, when 'social tyranny' becomes the make-up of the state, the domestic intellectual indigenous opposition forces possess a natural right and an obligation to resist at the social or sub-state national level, especially in seeking to protect the state when faced by foreign invasions or exploited interventions exerting a tyrannical foreign dominance on the state itself.

However, this might become a lot more complex, especially in terms of conflict within social or individual identities, in accommodating or rejecting tyranny, whether domestic or foreign, especially in the absence of a welfare state or of solid economic and development structures in a region that is divided in the conflicts between an East and West cyclical global dichotomy. On the other hand, the Arab region could instead be united to become a cultural, political and geographical bridge between such dichotomies. Possibly discussions about a "Confederation of the East", as proposed by Anis Naqash, might finally contribute to finding alternatives to the region's central issue of '*asabiyya* power rule dominance, but first this has to be acknowledged. As he observes:

> The Arab world is diverse in its regional geography, climate, food, colloquialisms, music, language, resources, agriculture, and traditions, while sharing a united sense of Arab culture, language, heritage, politics, music, and traditions; however, natural Arab nationalism lacks the institutional and political tools to interpret this into constructive regional development and cooperation. It resembles a natural human state of nationalism, where, at the international level, this nationalism reaches natural global dimensions embedded in its religious geographical human history, ethics, and civilization. Thus, nationalism in the Middle East region moves beyond the international definition of state nationalism. Its ancient domestic cultural, religious or civilizational geo-demographic diversity also possesses its natural regional dimensions, as defined in the diverse Arab culture represented in three main geographical regions: North Africa or al-Maghreb al-'Arabi; the Levant Region or Bilad al-Sham that connects the Asian Continent to Africa; and the Arabian Peninsula/ Gulf Region at the centre of the universe and the important natural geographical port and sea passage to the Pacific Ocean, parallel with the Silk Road. Nevertheless, it remains a historical misconception that it is a 'savage' region manipulated by domestic, regional and international management to cause un-resolvable well-funded wars, conflicts and terrorism.[728]

Nonetheless, the issue of democracy or political sovereignty in the region also relates to the increase of state power and violence against domestic opposition, which was not matched by a

---

[728] Anis Naqqash (2015), transliterated Arabic title [The Confederation of the East: Political and Identity Conflicts] (Beirut: Moumin Quriash Library) [Arabic].

proportional surge in public accountability, thus continuing to lack moral authority and legitimacy within the democratic practice of state rule.[729] This is particularly pronounced in the systematic oppression through a state's 'legal security' violence against domestic opposition, usually endorsed by foreign influences. This endorsement was lifted in Tunisia and Egypt in the wake of their respective rebellions in 2010-2011, but not in Bahrain, despite its peaceful stance.[730] Its status became hostage to the regional '*asabiyya* dictatorships which, allied with the US, remained accredited as "moderate" Arab states, being subtly moulded by US political and economic influence. The Arab Gulf remains largely distant from securing regional economic or political sovereign interests, while most of the rest of Arab countries are dependent on foreign aid, or economic rewards, and are thus hostage to domestic or foreign political concessions. Ironically, both the US and its allied Arab Gulf states were to endorse a newly-labelled 'Arab Spring', and encouraging the use of violence and armed intervention; this became the scenario in Libya and Syria, and lastly Yemen, finally ending up at war with Saudi Arabia.

7.3. Al-Qaeda Spring from Iraq and Syria into Lebanon

With the escalation of war and sectarian violence in Syria from 2011 onwards, the regional grounds were already fertile for Sunni-Shia oriented tensions. This inspired many Lebanese Sunni Muslims (both secular and religious) who announced their solidarity with the oppressed Sunni Opposition powers in Syria and even Iraq. In Iraq there were increased sectarian tensions towards the end of 2011 as the US completed its withdrawal from the country,[731] while the Arab Spring

---

[729] Malise Ruthven (2002), "New Afterword" to Albert Hourani (1991), *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press), p.466.

[730] Amidst international silence on Bahrain versus Syria or Libya, the Arab Gulf states sent armed troops to Bahrain, under the Arabian Peninsula Shield led by Saudi Arabia, and violently suppressed the peaceful protesters while propagating the myth of strictly sectarian protests, justifying the use of violence under the pretext of international political conflict with Iran (the population of Bahrain being predominantly Shia).

[731] Tim Arango (2013), "Dozens Killed in Battles Across Iraq as Sunnis Escalate Protests Against Government", *The New York Times*, 23 April 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/world/middleeast/clashes-at-sunni-protest-site-in-iraq.html

The majority of the Sunni opposition were former pro-Saddam Baath loyalists or members of the army, including security and state elite; all had been removed from their powers and positions in the post-Saddam era. Subsequently, the new political developments in Iraq were increasingly becoming influenced by the surge of sectarian violence and tension in Syria; especially since the peaceful protests by the Iraqi Sunni opposition, were concentrated in the Sunni dominant provinces of Al-Ramadi and Al-Anbar, at the borders with Syria. Those protests were violently oppressed by al-Maliki's government, ending with severe bloodshed and violence in April 2013.

domino was becoming an 'extremism domino' – witnessed in the return of 'Al-Qaeda and its sisters'. In Syria, on the other hand, while the Revolution became distant from the power-sharing demands seeking political or socio-economic reforms, it was infiltrated by multi-'corporate militancy' factions only united over the removal of Syrian President Bashar Assad.[732] Aside from the Wahhabi-affiliated factions, militant Muslim Brother groups in Syria supported by Turkey and Qatar, all contributed to arm or fund the war, which the Syrian Muslim Brothers had also welcomed, along with tools of violence despite the destruction it could bring to the state or the country.[733] Also openly endorsing the armed conflict against the regime were security forces and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) under a new Free Syrian Army (FSA). The FSA was formed from troops who had defected from the SAA, joined by various rebels, mostly from religiously-affiliated Sunni groups.

However, the FSA was finally to become dominated by the Al-Qaeda-endorsed and affiliated Jabhat Al-Nusra (JAN) in the Levant, or Al-Nusra Front, mainly towards the end of 2011, in a development that became more pronounced after it became clear that Assad would not immediately yield to domestic or international political pressures. JAN was also to be officially endorsed by the Syrian Opposition in 2011, on the grounds that it was the strongest group within the FSA with the ability to defeat Assad – the Opposition even protested about the inclusion of JAN on the US list of terrorist organizations in December 2012, insisting it was a rebel group.[734] Remarkably, this was preceded by the assassination of Bin Laden in May 2011 with the MB inheriting JAN as a 'moderate' Al-Qaeda in Syria, while other innovations were shaping towards an inheritance of other Al-Qaeda-affiliated terror networks, such as the Islamic State in Iraq

---

[732] Being influenced by the early outcomes of the Egyptian rebellion, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) also sought to attain power in Syria – like the Egyptian MB, it sought to mobilize under the secular opposition forces and demand full regime change. Unlike in Egypt, Syria's President did not belong to the American regional orbit, so did not abandon power or accept the participation of the MB in power, which in itself also refused any mediation efforts with Assad offered by Iran. Although the Syrian MB had previously engaged in violent clashes against the regime between 1979-1982, it was very careful not to immediately or prematurely organize on the ground with the outbreak of armed rebellion in late 2011. Traditionally the MB, mainly in Egypt, was opposed to the concept of revolution, vis-à-vis seeking political awards and settlements, or agreement contracts with the state rulers.

[733] South Front Analysis (2017), "Former Qatari Prime Minister Admits Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and US Coordinated Efforts To Support Terrorists In Syria", *South Front*, 27 October 2017. Online at: https://southfront.org/former-qatari-prime-minister-admits-qatar-saudi-arabia-turkey-and-us-coordinated-efforts-to-support-terrorists-in-syria/

[734] Michael Gordon, and Anne Barnard (2012), "U.S. Places Militant Syrian Rebel Group on List of Terrorist Organizations", *The New York Times*, 10 December 2012. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/world/middleeast/us-designates-syrian-al-nusra-front-as-terrorist-group.html

(ISI).[735] Henceforth, Al-Qaeda's presence in Lebanon continued unacknowledged, despite early signs, following the breakout of violence in Syria, of preventing allegations that the heavily-funded armed rebellion in Syria was also being channelled to Al-Qaeda-affiliated and other extremist fanatic groups.

In early 2012, Lebanese Defence Minister Fayez Ghosn (Christian Marada party in the MEC) came under heavy criticism by the MFC for commenting about the infiltration of Al-Qaeda from Syria into Lebanon. He was even being accused of intentions to affiliate the Syrian rebels fighting under the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with Al-Qaeda and terrorism.[736] After these comments, the MFC even sent a delegation – representing Hariri's Future Movement, the Christian Lebanese Forces and the Kataeb (Phalangists), joined by the Muslim Scholars Grouping (MSG) in Lebanon – to visit the town of Arsal on the border with Syria, in support of the Syrian 'rebels' and in rejection of Ghosn's supposed intentions and accusations of inciting Sunni-Shia tensions.[737] While the majority of Lebanese Sunnis supported the FSA and therefore sought to assist its armed rebellion across the border in Syria, especially from Akkar in northern Lebanon or Arsal in the northern Beqaa region, the majority of Lebanese Shia and Christians were becoming suspicious and worried about the supremacist (*takfiri*) religious fundamentalism and extremist rhetoric endorsing the violent massacres in the Syrian revolution.

7.3.1. Rebellion, Resistance, and Terrorism in Syria
In further investigating the rise of Al-Qaeda affiliations or other forms of fundamentalism, the Lebanese domestic scene was to remain hostage to a disputed and rather exploited Lebanese foreign policy position towards Syria. As the rebellion began to shape into an armed conflict towards the end of 2011, Lebanese Sunni towns on the border with Syria began to experience the impact of the ongoing violence across the border, with sporadic Syrian army shelling into their towns. This caused a further Lebanese domestic political split over the Syrian crisis, while

---

[735] Founded by Al-Zarqawi and Abu Baker Baghdadi in 2006. ISI originally took advantage of events to exploit chaos and violence in Syria, infiltrating under Al-Qaeda oriented Jabhat Al-Nusra (JAN) in order to obtain access to free rebel arms before returning to Iraq to form its projected Islamic Caliphate State in both Syria and Iraq. In April 2013, it announced the creation of ISIL, following the defeat of JAN against Hezbollah in Qusair. See Suadad al-Salhy (2013), "Al-Qaeda says it Freed 500 inmates in Iraqi jail-break", *Reuters* 13 July 2013, online https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-alqaeda/al-qaeda-says-it-freed-500-inmates-in-iraq-jail-break-idUSBRE96M0C720130723
[736] Elie Al-Ferzli (2012), op.cit.
[737] ibid.

Lebanese Salafi preachers had gone further by calling for Jihad in support of the uprising in Syria, while also seeking the recruitment of religiously-influenced Lebanese Sunni fighters.[738]

Hence, the battle in Syria, and later Iraq, also became affiliated to an end of time apocalyptic prophecies, as also Mariam Khoury documents as a field reporter for Reuters during the Syrian crisis. Starting with the outbreak of the Syrian protests in March 2011, when turning into violence in Deraa over alleged torture of schoolboys who wrote anti-Assad graffiti on their school's wall; this event was even given its own hadith, saying: "There will be a strife in Sham (Syria) that begins with children playing, after which nothing can be fixed… when it calms down from one side, it ignites from the other... blood will reach knee-level."[739] Nonetheless, a new fate to a righteous 'end of days grand battle' became to overshadow the primary assumption in Syria.

Compatibly, the FSA had also expressed discontent about the Lebanese domestic splits over support for the Syrian revolution, rejecting any Lebanese political criticism or opposition towards the FSA, namely Hezbollah, and condemning any political support for the Syrian state regime or suggestions for a political resolution of alternatives to Assad's departure. Cynically, the Syrian rebellion became a rhetoric of "you are either with us or against us", as well as a matter of Good and Evil that was also preached by the Lebanese Salafi groups, and was reminiscent of Bush's speechifying before the invading of Afghanistan and later Iraq.

---

[738] Marc Abizeid (2014), "Interactive: Lebanon under Syrian rocket fire", *Al-Akhbar* Newspaper, 19 March 2014. Online at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/19088

[739] Mariam Khourany(2014), "Apocalyptic prophecies drive both sides to Syrian battle for end of time", Reuters, 1 April 2014. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-prophecy-insight/apocalyptic-prophecies-drive-both-sides-to-syrian-battle-for-end-of-time-idUSBREA3013420140401

Other cities and towns were later be made part of different prophecies to future protests or battlefields, anticipating bloodshed and the killing of hundreds of thousands of people before finally brining change to the whole countries in the region. Although, many *hadith*/sayings remained disputed, but one *hadith* was common on both sides in the conflict, relates to the confrontation of two huge Islamic armies in Syria, in a great battle near Damascus, and intervention from the north and west of the country. As Khourany's 2014 article-report documents on the thoughts of the rebel fighters in northern Syria who had gathered before the anticipated great battle in Aleppo. The fighters even emphasized on Muslim solidarity and faith in their comments, saying: 'We have here mujahedeen from Russia, America, the Philippines, China, Germany, Belgium, Sudan, India and Yemen and other places… They are here because this what the Prophet said and promised; the Grand Battle is happening.' Moreover, there was a widely-circulated hadith, amongst them, attributed to Prophet Mohammad that said "Al-Sham [Syria] is God's favored land". When asked where the next jihad will be, the Prophet replied: "Go for Sham, and if you couldn't, go for Yemen ...(though) God has guaranteed me Sham and its people." Ironically, while Ghouta, east of Syria's capital became back under state control in 2018; the town of Dabiq in northern Syria near the Turkish border was taken by ISIS in 2014.

In fact, the Shia in Lebanon were to become framed within this context, gradually contributing to Shia communal fears with the escalations of threats voiced against them. As early as December 2011, in an interview by Radwan Mortada (from the Lebanese newspaper *Al-Akhbar*), with FSA members positioned inside the Lebanese borders (under the command of Riad al-Asaad), they openly expressed anti-Shia sentiments on the grounds that Hezbollah did not adopt a position of neutrality in relation to the Syrian crisis as Hamas had done.[740] Most claimed that they had defected from the Syrian army, having refused to take part in massacres perpetrated by the Syrian security forces, and also accused Hezbollah and Iranian fighters of crushing peaceful protests. The FSA group also threatened that after taking down the Syrian regime, they would then take down Hezbollah in Lebanon if Hezbollah did not shift its position towards supporting the Syrian armed rebellion. They stated that they would seek revenge on behalf of the Syrian people, and "after observing that their souls were committed to Hezbollah in 2006, they then committed to turning their rifles on it after they had defeated the Syrian regime."[741]

Nonetheless, having been supported and aided by Syria before and during the 2006 War, or during almost its entire struggle against Israel, Hezbollah continued to insist on political mediation between the Syrian regime and the opposition, emphasizing the rights and demands for reform by the Syrian people. As violence continued to escalate in Syria, directed at both security and armed forces, September 2012 was to mark the first of violent attacks by Syrian rebels who were targeting Lebanese army positions near the border crossings into Syria that had been used for armed trafficking. An official communique observed that "a large number of insurgents attacked a Lebanese army post in the Arsal region, twice in less than a week."[742] Moreover, Al-Qaeda affiliated groups, or Al-Nusra Front were to become more influential taking credit for committing excessive acts of horror in the Syrian conflict. Hezbollah, on the other hand got accused of taking

---

[740] Hamas also being Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated, was to fall into the 'saved sect end of days' sectarian prophecies trap. While initially announcing neutrality towards the Syrian crisis, in February 2012 it finally decided to disengage with the regime in Syria and move its political office under Khalid Meshaal to Doha in Qatar. Arguably, it could be suggested that Hamas did not want to repeat Arafat's decision to support Saddam Hussein in 1990 in the massive regional and international war campaign against Iraq, and end up making the same high power concessions for a peace that could never be achieved.

[741] Radwan Mortada (2011), "FSA in Lebanon: After the Defeat of the Regime in Syria Hezbollah would be Next", *Al-Akhbar* Newspaper [Arabic], 5 December 2011. Online at http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/27099

[742] Al-Nahar (2012). "Free Syrian Army Infiltrates Arsal, Attacks Army Post", *Naharnet*, 22 September 2012. Online at: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/54455

role in the violence in Syria and continued to receive threats from the FSA. In October 2012, FSA spokesman Fahd al-Masri even threatened to bring the fight to Hezbollah's strongholds in the southern suburbs of Beirut for its intervention in Syria.[743] In fact, Hezbollah became increasingly attentive to the situation in Syria especially with acts of violence against Shia minority communities or holy religious sites. In a speech later in October 2012, Nasrallah denied any unusual considerable presence for Hezbollah in Syria, although he reserved the right to join the battle in the future.

Nasrallah did, however, acknowledge that Hezbollah had offered support for the protection of Lebanese-Syrian border towns threatened by 'rebel' militants – mainly in the Qusayr region – and that Hezbollah also maintained a presence in Sayyida Zeinab near Damascus in support of the Syrian security forces guarding the mosque and shrine (of the Prophet's granddaughter), which the terrorist (*takfiri*) militants had threatened to destroy.[744] As Nasrallah affirmed in a speech, this would have been an act against the teachings and ethics of Islam, and could only have provided Israel with a casual pretext for destroying the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.[745] Thus, despite the significance of these fundamentalist threats and ideological misconceptions, they were downplayed by the international community as being part of an ongoing Sunni-Shia conflict, without any clear condemnation over the targeting of international heritage and historic and religious sites.[746]

Apart from Islamic shrines there was also destruction of shrines of other religious minorities, as well as massacres of people in the region, including Christians, as also became evident in Iraq.[747] Oppression, massacres, or the seizing of land and property became part of a strategy in establishing

---

[743] Loveday Morris (2012),"Suicide bombers attack Air Force Intelligence compound on edge of Damascus in the latest sign of Islamist influence", *The Independent*, 9 October 2012. Online at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/suicide-bombers-attack-air-force-intelligence-compound-on-edge-of-damascus-in-the-latest-sign-of-8204351.html

[744] Nasrallah Speech (2012), "Nasrallah Speech on Drone into Israel and Hezbollah Presence in Syria", *TV14vip*, YouTube Channel, 11 October 2012. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2YEF5BrR1b0

[745] ibid.

[746] Pierre Azar (2013), Al-Hadath with Samar Abu Khalil, *NTV*, 13 November 2013. [Arabic] http://www.aljadeed.tv/MenuAr/news/DetailNews/AlHadathDetailNews.html?Id=91639

[747] Yitzhak Nakash (2003), *The Shi'is of Iraq,* 2nd ed. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 28. In fact, such acts by Al-Qaeda also resemble historic Wahhabi provocations in this respect, when during the first Saudi State (1744-1818) the Wahhabis invaded Iraq several times, raiding Shia Muslim shrines and, for example, in 1801 successfully sacking Karbala, committing terror and horrible civilian massacres and twice besieging Najaf.

the state along a path of violence and annexation similar to the path Israel had taken in Palestine, and resembling the history of an Islamic heritage of false misconceptions of violence and *'asabiyya* power dominance repeating itself.[748]

Thus it is very important, as Pierre Azar suggests, to look particularly at Syria and Iraq where Islam marked the early historical divisions that were the political roots of the current conflict,[749] as well as at the issue of Islamist fundamentalism, exploited since the Cold War era in Afghanistan. Ironically, nor was there any serious international condemnation or action taken in Afghanistan in March 2001, when the Taliban leadership ordered the destruction of the world's 2000-year-old and largest standing Buddhas in central Afghanistan, which were blown apart into rubble[750] – this happened a few months before the 9/11 attacks. Instead the US received Sayed Rahmatullah Hashimi, a Taliban envoy and adviser to its leader Mullah Omar, on a mission to improve relations and ease the sanctions on Afghanistan. Ironically, Hashimi commented on the Buddha statues which had survived throughout all periods of Islamic rule, saying that additional aid to save their children from dying of malnutrition in Afghanistan should be more important to the international community than the statues, for which the Taliban had been offered money to restore.[751] For the Taliban's religious scholars, he added, this was an international hypocrisy and humiliation: "if you are destroying our future with economic sanctions, you can't care about our heritage."[752] Sadly, this action still contradicted the ethical message of human and religious tolerance in Islam, as much as the actions by the current post-modern human civilization.

7.4. Lebanese Government Springs: National Domestic and Foreign Dialogue Realisms

---

[748] Ayubi (1995), op.cit., p. 19 (citing Hamid Rabi', *Suluk a-malik fi tadbir al-mamalik...*Vol. 2, Cairo, 1983, pp. 268-93, 288).

[749] Azar (2013), op,cit. It is also necessary to consider historic geopolitical factors that remain present in both Syria and Iraq. ISIS established itself in the same lands over which early Islamic political conflicts or civil wars took place, or that were at the root of historic power rule issues and the monarchical transition during Caliphate rule. Damascus (Syria) was the capital of Umayyad rule following the massacre of Hussein and his companions in Karbala (Iraq).

[750] Barbara Crossette (2001), "Taliban Explains Buddha Demolition", *The New York Times*, 19 March 2001. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/19/world/taliban-explains-buddha-demolition.html

[751] ibid.

[752] ibid.

After the Arab Springs of 2011 and in anticipation of a potential liberation from the foreign dominance of the regional political order, Hezbollah heightened both its political and security deterrence messages for Israel, stressing its commitment to continued support for the Palestinians, and also to entering a new era in achieving the liberation of Palestine. In March 2011, Nasrallah openly threatened that Hezbollah might decide to dispatch units into Galilee should Israel attempt to invade Lebanon – this, in fact, signalled a new tactic of deterrence that had been privately hinted at by Hezbollah fighters since the end of the previous war in August 2006.[753] In July 2011, during the commemoration of the 2006 'Dignity and Victory' war, Hezbollah reflected further confidence in deterrence, particularly regarding the issue of oil and gas deposits in the maritime border areas with occupied Palestine. As Nasrallah stated:

> Today, on the fifth anniversary of the July War, I may as well say with confidence to all the states, governments and companies which would want to come to Lebanon to share in bids and start drilling and digging, that Lebanon is able to provide these companies and their oil and gas facilities with protection. Lebanon is able to do that with all confidence. Do you know why? It's not because it owns a strong air force but rather because those who might attack these facilities have oil and gas. Whoever might attack the future oil and gas facilities in Lebanese regional waters will have their facilities attacked. So let them know that Lebanon is able to do that.[754]

Nasrallah's comments were made following a visit to Lebanon in July 2011 by a US State Department delegation, headed by Fredrick Hoff, special coordinator for the Middle East, for consultation with both Lebanon and Israel over maritime borders. Although Lebanon accepted the preliminary proposals, which agreed to award Lebanon 530 square kilometres of the total Lebanese maritime area of 854 sq.km which Israel disputed, it also proposed that a final ruling on the remainder of the disputed area should be postponed.[755] In this respect, the Lebanese Minister of Energy, Gibran Bassil, defended the Lebanese state's energy and maritime rights, arguing "if the United Nations is unable to implement international law, then it will set precedents that permit the violation of maritime borders across the world".[756] Even so, the issue was to remain disputed,

[753] Blanford and Saab (2011), "Hezbollah on Offense", op, cit.
[754] Hassan Nasrallah (2011), "'Dignity and Victory' Festival Speech by Hassan Nasrallah", *Voltairenet*, 28 July 2011, online at http://www.voltairenet.org/article170913.html
[755] Walid Khadduri (2013), "Lebanon's Oil Future Is Promising", *Al-Monitor*, 22 April 2013, at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/business/2013/04/lebanon-oil-future-promising-reserves.html#ixzz561koqQ00
[756] Anon (2011), "Lebanon Keen to Defend its Wealth", *AlManar TV*, 22 July 2011, online at http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=22266

with Lebanon complaining over Israel's daily violations of Lebanese sovereign maritime, territorial and airspace privileges.

However, at the domestic level, Hezbollah had also become accused of being responsible for the resignation of Saad Hariri, in order to impose its own government in Lebanon. A week before the anticipated official announcement of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in January 2011,[757] Hezbollah's two ministers in the government, joined by MEC allies and FPM ministers totalling eleven in all (more than a third of the 30 cabinet ministers) announced their resignation, thus forcing the entire government to resign, while Hariri was in Washington DC at a meeting with President Barak Obama. Remarkably, Walid Jumblatt, one of the principal pillars of the MFC was also to create an unexpected political 'spring' by shifting the parliamentary majority in favour of the MEC, with Hariri having refused to include Hezbollah in any new government after it had been officially accused by the STL.

Thus, Jumblatt too became a hallmark of the new government, which was eventually headed by Najib Mikati, proposed as a neutral candidate in response to the MFC's opposition to the Syrian regime, and who Jumblatt also continued to promote for having secured an influential political role in the Government. On the other hand, the MFC rejected Mikati's nomination throughout 2011 as a result of his having agreed to distance Saad Hariri from power. Likewise, Hariri's Foreign Minister refused to join Mikati's Cabinet, which the MFC referred to as being "Hezbollah's government" – as also did the US, despite six months of negotiation and working to include both MEC- and MFC-approved ministers in the Cabinet.

However, the STL's accusations against Hezbollah also became an excuse for delegitimizing its role as a resistance movement at both domestic and regional levels, with the intention of continuing to frame it with terrorism while ignoring the expanding 'moderate' Al-Qaeda terror networks in Syria. Gareth Porter observed that, in focusing entirely on Hezbollah, the Special Tribunal (STL) for the Hariri assassination had refused to acknowledge either stronger evidence that al-Qaeda

---

[757] Bassem Mroue (2011), "Tension are High in Beirut amid Regional Talks", *The San Diego Union-Tribune*, 17 January 2011, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-tensions-high-in-beirut-amid-regional-talks-2011jan18-story.html

could be or was responsible for the assassination, or the potential sponsors behind the assassination cell.[758] In fact, the videotape attributed to the Hariri assassination had shown a suicide-bomber (Ahmad Abu Adas)[759] who had perpetrated the attack claiming responsibility on behalf of Al-Qaeda in the Levant, while condemning Hariri for his infidel Saudi affiliations.[760] Ironically, the name of the group also appeared in the video; written in Arabic on a flag behind Abu Adas it read 'Al-Nusra and Jihad Group in the Levant',[761] more or less identical to the name of 'Al-Nusra Front in the Levant' which had appeared after the Syrian revolution in 2011.

Yet, investigation into the assassination continued to become ambiguous, starting with the identity of the suicide bomber and his affiliate support group,[762] and overshadowed by the false witness statements, whether made by countries, groups or individuals that sought to mislead the investigation process,[763] thereby becoming involved in deceiving the tribunal, which in its turn also failed to link all the assassinations that followed Hariri's murder in 2005 up to 2013. Even the Americans and the Israelis refused to share satellite or airspace surveillance images over Lebanon for the day of the assassination.[764] Instead, the STL chose to bring to trial the news chiefs

---

[758] Gareth Porter (2011), "Tribunal Concealed Evidence al-Qaeda Cell may have Killed Hariri", *The Real News* 17 September 2011.
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=7243
 Gareth Porter is a historian, investigative journalist, and military analysist whose work focuses on US foreign policy.
[759] Al-Jadeed (2015), "Hariri Assassination STL Video Report**",** *Al-Jadeed TV*, 20 November 2015. (Arabic Report)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0-oaQb1TUY
In 2015, the STL investigators officially confirmed that evidence collected from the house of Abu Adas house included a list of Hariri's properties or firms in Lebanon, as well as indications that he was becoming influenced by a group of Wahhabi extremists preaching for Jihad in Iraq.
[760] Hassan Illiek (2012), "Hariri Investigation: A Star Witness is Born", *Al-Akhbar Newspaper,* 28 March 2012. Online at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/5741
The video was rejected by the Lebanese anti-Syria opposition who insisted on accusing Syria of the assassination and of fabricating the video. Although it had been confirmed that the assassination was conducted by a suicide attack, then it became alleged that the person who appeared in the video of the assassination was kidnapped by the group who then fabricated the video.
[761] Ahmad Abu Adas "Video", last Accessed February 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJoWFdembtM
[762] A tooth from the suicide bomber was allegedly found but went missing amidst mysterious evidence contradictions and indiscretions. There was also a Group of 13 Lebanese-Australian suspects affiliated to Abu Adas; however the group was mysteriously released and news about it disappeared afterwards.
[763] This was aimed at framing Syria and imprisoning the chief heads of the security forces in Lebanon during the early years of the STL's operation. No suspects deemed responsible for misleading the initial investigation procedures were ever detained. Instead, there was an insistence on accusing Hezbollah, and framing it with terrorism, while ignoring any other conclusions or clear explanations as to the investigation's mysteries – thereby raising even more suspicions about the STL's accusations. Jamil Sayyed STL Statement, Al-Jadeed TV, 6 June 2018. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJd5J6bkFxU
[764] That is despite Hezbollah's disclosure of classified information from hacking Israeli spy warplanes gathering intelligence above Lebanon, with footage that exposed the casual routes taken from Parliament by Hariri's envoy

in 2014 of two prominent Lebanese media networks, *Al-Jadeed* television and *Al-Akhbar* newspaper, on the grounds that they had intervened in the tribunal for allegedly revealing the identity of some key witnesses in the investigation in 2012.[765] Meanwhile, Hezbollah was being accused on the basis of non-material primitive artificial intelligence telecommunication-network evidence; easy to forge through sophisticated technology tools.

In other words, all the suspects in the Hariri murder had some sort of presence, activity or influence in Beirut on the day of the assassination, whether it was the Lebanese security forces, Syrian security forces, Israeli secret Intelligence agents or spy jets (with regular spying activities on Hezbollah), the casual underground security presence for Hezbollah, or Al-Qaeda secret cells that had been engaged in recruitment activities for Jihad since 2003. Nevertheless, the STL remained selective in choosing the suspects and in failing to investigate the truth of all potential uncertainties. Hezbollah was presented as the primary suspect, especially by the US which accused it of being an outlawed criminal terrorism group in Lebanon. Ironically, the US also had its own secret intelligence networks in Lebanon, uncovered by Hezbollah in December 2011. Despite the caution among top CIA officials after the arrest of scores of Israeli spies in 2009, Hezbollah had been able to expose at least two of its networks in Beirut, with Nasrallah describing the American Embassy in Beirut as a "den of spies".[766]

Arguably, Hezbollah did not behave like a criminal cartel organization, or a regular armed militia, or like an anarchistic liberation movement or even a religious terrorist organization such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS, whose typical behaviour would have been to kidnap, torture, behead or simply seek to execute any CIA officers. Ironically, while some of the collaborator networks exposed in 2009

---

and reaching his house; while also exposing how Hezbollah knew of, and ambushed, the IDF commando unit in the 1997 Ansaarieh, almost entirely eliminating the unit.

[765] Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2016), "Al-Jadeed S.A.L. & Ms. Khayat". (STL-14-05)
https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-05
Where in fact, it was apparent that such accusations were intended to silence their criticisms and investigative reporting on the STL, or their politicizing the truth of the assassination – especially since the Lebanese state is obliged to pay a large share of the STL's annual budget.

[766] Associated Press (2011). "Hezbollah Names CIA Spies in Lebanon", *The Guardian*, 13 December 2011. Online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/13/hezbollah-names-cia-spies-lebanon
The identities of ten undercover officers were revealed on Hezbollah's Al-Manar television station, with details of meetings that had taken place between the CIA officers and the paid Lebanese informants at various fast food outlets.

revealed an Israeli penetration of the Lebanese telephone and communications data networks, thereby providing Israeli intelligence with an ability to clone communications data, such data evidence was still presented by the STL in 2011 as a primary solid indicator that linked Hezbollah to having responsibility in the Hariri assassination. Meanwhile domestic political divisions were to continue escalate in Lebanon with the acceleration of conflict in the Syrian crisis.

7.4.1. A Dialogue Declaration in Baabda

In June 2012 there was, rather rashly, a new roundtable initiative for National Dialogue in Lebanon, yet once again it remained distant from any reform discussions, instead becoming overshadowed by the domestic divisions over the Syrian crisis. The MFC re-advocated an integral Lebanonist neutrality, seeking to maintain a neutral position towards the Syrian crisis. However, this was met with reservations by the MEC as it would still keep Lebanon in an non-neutral status because of the conflict and the violent environments that surrounded the country. Moreover, the MFC itself did not apply a neutral approach towards Syria by having openly endorsed the Syrian Revolution against the regime since the early protests. Finally, such an initiative would facilitate the smuggling of foreign arms, new recruits, shelter or financial support as the crisis in Syria turned into an armed conflict. Nonetheless, President Michel Suleiman still initiated the dialogue in attempt to keep Lebanon distant from foreign issues, mainly the Syrian crisis, and to follow up discussions on an official Lebanese national defence strategy that would accommodate Hezbollah's armed capacity.[767]

As a result, an agreement, "the Baabda Declaration", was arrived at to keep the Syrian crisis away from Lebanese affairs. It rejected a buffer zone on the border with Syria (occupied by 'Syrian rebels') as well as smuggling arms and fighters through, or into Lebanon, and using it as a base against Syria. Despite the MFC's reservations about its right to express support for the Syrian revolution, this remained the best solution that could be reached through a consensus agreed upon by all participants, even though they still failed to reach a similar consensus over a defence strategy.[768] While President Suleiman stressed that the Baabda Declaration meant a Lebanese

---

[767] Nicolas Nassif (2012). "Lebanese National Dialogue: Toning Down the Opposition", *Al-Akhbar* newspaper, 12 June 2012, online at http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/8361
[768] Nassif (2012), op.cit.

neutrality approach towards the Syrian conflict, PM Najib Mikati adopted a policy of conflict 'disengagement' neutrality with Syria while maintaining partial national geo-strategic and security interests.[769] At the domestic level Mikati focused on accommodating Hariri's and the MFC's political worries, in addition to maintaining the Lebanese state's payments to the STL and disregarding the MEC's objections. Thus, Mikati also followed his policy of a domestic 'disengagement-neutrality' approach and ruled carefully, frequently coordinating with the Supreme Sunni National Council headed, while the Grand Mufti position was in dispute, by Omar Miskawi, veteran Future Movement former minister.

Mikati's resignation in March 2013, after carrying the burden of the harsh domestic and regional disputes, was also accompanied by a postponement of the May 2013 parliamentary elections – about which, after the Doha Elections, there was still no agreement as to the shape of a new electoral law. His resignation occurred at a point when the country was also coming under huge socio-economic pressures, which contributed to the money-borrowing dependent economy and to the escalation of conflict in Syria. The government continued to be confronted with massive protests by the Teachers and Public Labour Unions demanding implementation of a postponed wage increase, delayed since the late 1990s;[770] while the country also faced the issue of over a million Syrian war refugees, since the state was unable to accommodate the civic rights even of its own citizens. Meanwhile, the political and security power gaps had deepened in Lebanon, causing a huge breach of the Lebanese 'neutrality agreement.'[771] Subsequently, it took Tammam Salam, who was nominated to replace Mikati as Prime Minister, almost a year before the MEC and MFC finally agreed on a 'national interest' government. Yet this led to another path of violence amidst the escalation of war in Syria, with security and terrorism attacks in Lebanon reaching all the way to Beirut.

---

[769] ibid.

[770] Government of France (2001), "Report on International Conference on Lebanon's Reconstruction: the International Community's Economic Aid for Lebanon, 23 February 2001", available from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Relief Web International*, 24 January 2007; online at https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/international-conference-lebanons-reconstruction-international-communitys-economic   Under Hariri, Lebanon became dependent on European Economic Aid, with Paris I (2001) and Paris II (2002): while aid from Paris III (2007) was given to support the Siniora Government during the MEC Protests.
[771] Eli Muhana (2014), "Lebanon's War in Syria", *The New Yorker*, 21 February 2014, online at https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/lebanons-war-in-syria

7.4.2 Hezbollah's Intervention in Syria

In December 2012, Nasrallah had renewed his rejection of sectarian incitements, whether in Lebanon, Syria or Iraq, and criticized the application of religious suicide attacks in domestic conflicts, explaining that this benefitted only the Israeli enemy or the West who, after witnessing such acts, could justifiably accuse Islam of savageness and terrorism. Nasrallah also spoke directly to Al-Qaeda in Syria in a message that warned how acts of violence would only bring harm to the people, history, culture and nations of the region:

> The Americans, the Europeans, and some governments within the Arab and Islamic world laid a trap for you in Syria, and opened a front for you so that you come to it from all over the world, from London, Paris, and from Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates and from Yemen, and from Pakistan and Afghanistan and from, and from… so that you kill each other in Syria, and you fell for this trap.[772]

Nonetheless, new threats of violence continued to escalate in 2013, bringing the conflict into a new era. In January 2013, supporters of the Lebanese FSA and al-Nusra Front killed two Lebanese army officers in retaliation for a security mission in the town of Arsal, and violently mutilated the bodies – in order to send an indirect threatening message to the army to stay away from the area. This marked the beginning of a tense relationship between the Lebanese armed forces and the Syrian militants, along with their extremist supporters in Lebanon, especially for also detaining other soldiers who were finally released only after lengthy negotiations.[773]

Hezbollah in turn had already started preparations for a full-scale armed deterrence engagement in the Syrian conflict. On 25 May 2013 – Victory Day – Nasrallah officially announced a new ongoing pre-emptive war in the border region of Al-Qusayr in Syria, invited by the Syrian state to support its armed forces in its domestic war against *takfiri* terrorism, while also promising a victory in the ongoing battle of Qusayr.[774]

---

[772] Sayyed Nasrallah Speech (2012). "Hezbollah Leader Sayyed Nasrallah Directs a Message to Al-Qaeda in Syria" (English Subtitles), *Middle East Observer*, YouTube, published 21 December 2012. Online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FuQXAgubqwg

[773] Rakan Al-Fakih (2013), "At least two soldiers killed in East Lebanon ambush", *The Daily Star*, 1 February 2013. Online at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/Feb-01/204650-army-patrol-ambushed-in-east-lebanon-several-casua.ashx#axzz2JflCcR28

[774] Sayyed Nasrallah (2013), "Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (HA) – Speech, Eid Muqawamah wa't-Tahrir", *Press TV*, YouTube channel 25 May 2013. Online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHHnYwr2044

At the same time, this also marked a new era in the history of Lebanese foreign security, in which Hezbollah entered a war on foreign soil, and justifying a pre-emptive war on the basis that it would protect Lebanon from prominent security threats, in addition to dangers restricting social, religious, cultural or political freedoms, or other curtailing threats aimed at bringing the Syrian war into Lebanon. In his speech, Nasrallah also invited Lebanon's domestic political forces – whether MFC or Islamic groups who supported the Syrian rebellion including the use of violence, in expressing discontent with the Syrian state's ruling regime – to save Lebanon from domestic political conflict and risks of violence over the Syrian crisis by taking or keeping such quarrels within Syria. Syria was already under an imposed war and there was no need to bring war and destruction into Lebanon as well.[775] Nonetheless, while the 'armed rebels' were already facing defeat by Hezbollah in Qusayr, a strong renewed opposition began to escalate against Hezbollah's intervention in Syria, whether by Lebanese and other fundamentalist groups in support of the Syrian revolution, or by the armed 'rebels' under the FSA and al-Nusra Front (even creating a split amongst the Al-Qaeda factions with the rise of ISIL- the Islamic State in the Levant – as early as April 2013).[776]

A day after Nasrallah's May speech, Beirut was targeted by Grad rocket strikes, fired towards Hezbollah's stronghold in the southern district of Beirut. In commenting on the attacks, FSA commander Ammar al-Wawi told Lebanese TV station LBC that the worse was still to come in following days "if Hezbollah and the Lebanese government do not keep Hezbollah's hands off Syria."[777] Subsequently, this also escalated to more of a 'tit-for-tat' exercise in increasing the

[775] Elias Muhanna (2014), "Lebanon's War in Syria", *The New Yorker*, 21 February 2014, online at https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/lebanons-war-in-syria

[776] Suadad Al-Salhy (2013), "Al-Qaeda Says it Freed 500 inmates in Iraq Jail-Break", *Reuters*, 23 July 2013. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-alqaeda/al-qaeda-says-it-freed-500-inmates-in-iraq-jail-break-idUSBRE96M0C720130723 In April 2013, Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) under Abu Bakr announced the creation of ISIL, despite the objections of Ayman Zawahiri who openly disputed this decision on the grounds that he had not been consulted. This in fact coincided with the defeat of the FSA and JAN in Qusair, at the northern Lebanese border in the Syrian Province of Homs. It was a major defeat for the various armed militants, in combat with the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Hezbollah (announcing its official engagement in the Syrian war), yet also leading ISIL to openly declare its presence, after splitting from Al-Qaeda over control in Syria. JAN officially emphasized its affiliation and loyalty to Al-Qaeda under Zawahiri, while ISI insisted on ISIL in preparation for the promised new state. Its first major strike in Iraq was conducted through a full-scale prison attack campaign that freed hundreds of Al-Qaeda-affiliated or Sunni Opposition inmates.

[777] Ruth Sherlock (2013), "Syria: Rockets target Hizbollah in Beirut", *The Telegraph*, 26 May 2013. Online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10081822/Syria-Rockets-target-Hizbollah-in-Beirut.html

cross-border rocket and shelling attacks by the FSA and al-Nusra by targeting Lebanese towns and villages at the Syrian border. This caused civilian casualties from all Lebanese sects (Sunni, Shia, Druze and Christian), and was followed with a series of horrific suicide bombings that killed and injured hundreds of civilians in Southern Beirut. However, the increased cross-border rocket attacks into Lebanon following the Qusayr battle in April 2013 decreased in June, after the Syrian Arab army (SAA), joined by Hezbollah, started gradually to gain strength and control across the majority of the border territories with Lebanon. This strategy officially ended after the battle of Yabrud in 2014.[778] On the other hand, the biggest challenge for Hezbollah was the suicide bombing attacks, aimed at causing public distress against Hezbollah, while also triggering and exploiting sectarian tensions. While the terrorist attacks brought strong national condemnation and domestic solidarity, they still created an odd twist in Lebanon, influenced by the escalation of sectarian incitements in the intensifying Syrian conflict.

7.4.3. Security Crisis and Political Settlement: Syrian Rebel Al-Qaeda-affiliated Suicide Bombings in Beirut

The first of the security attacks on the southern district of Beirut was in July 2013 through a bomb placed in a parking lot in Ruwais, which injured 50 people but remained unclaimed.[779] A second attack on Beir el-Abed followed in August 2013, claimed as a suicide attack by a group calling itself the "external operations" arm of the Battalions of Aisha Um al-Mumineen; it killed more than 20 Lebanese civilians and injuring over 300;[780] becoming a reminder of the bombing attack that had aimed at assassinating Fadlallah in 1985.[781] Ironically, British and American media outlets described the Beirut attacks as "blasts", although they coincided with the Boston Marathon bombing attack, described as a "terrorist attack."[782] Although this created Lebanese solidarity in

---

[778] Marc Abizeid, (2014). "Interactive: Lebanon under Syrian rocket fire", *Al-Akhbar* Newspaper, 19 March 2014. Online at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/19088

[779] Anon (2013). "Deadly Blast Rocks a Hezbollah Stronghold in Lebanon", *New York Times*, 16 August 2013. Online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/16/world/middleeast/beirut-bombing.html

[780] Loveday Morris, and Suzan Haidamous (2013), "Beirut Car Bomb Kills 21", *The Washington Post*, 15 August 2013. Online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/beirut-car-bomb-kills-18/2013/08/15/25ca49be-05f5-11e3-bfc5-406b928603b2_story.html?utm_term=.69e53363acc9

[781] The residents of the attacked neighbourhoods remained defiant, and reiterated their support for Hezbollah. On the day after the first attack, a large banner stating "Made in U.S.A" was hung from the balcony of a building damaged by the attacks.

[782] Yazan Al-Saadi (2013), "From Boston to Beirut: A Comparison of 'Terror'", *Al-Akhbar Newspaper*, 17 August 2013. Online at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/16748

rejecting any renewed acts of violence and terror in Lebanon, a week later the country was subject to dual bombing attacks, this time in Tripoli, The bombs were aimed at two mosques in Tripoli (al-Taqwa and al-Salam), killing over 40 people and injuring 400 hundred more.[783] No organization officially claimed responsibility for the attacks, but the Imams of the two mosques (Shaikh Salem Rafia and Shaikh Bilal Baroudi, members of the Muslim Scholars Gathering) were prominent supporters of the Syrian rebels and were also critical of Hezbollah's role and position on Syria.

The attacks were later officially blamed on Syrian regime Lebanese collaborators allegedly from the Alawite community in Tripoli. Since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict until around the end of 2014, occasional clashes had in fact occurred in Tripoli, reflecting sectarian tensions between two impoverished city neighbourhoods of Sunni-dominant Bab al-Tabbaneh (supporters of the Syrian rebellion), and Alawite-dominant Jabal Mohsen (supporters of the Syrian regime).[784] Henceforth, attempts to provoke domestic sectarian incitements were also reflected in anti-Iranian political and security messages that took the form of terror suicide attacks, and sought to escalate a security and power deterrence struggle with Hezbollah. The attack occurred in November 2013 and targeted the Iranian Embassy in the Beir Hassan neighbourhood in Beirut. This time it was claimed by the Abdullah Azzam Brigade (AAB)[785] and announced by its new Lebanese leader, Sirajuddin Zureiqat, who had recruited the suicide bombers.

---

[783] Antoine Amrieh and Misbah Al-Alil (2013), "Car Bombs kill 42, wound 400 at North Lebanon Mosques", *The Daily Star*, 23 August 2013. Online at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Aug-23/228408-explosion-heard-in-north-lebanon.ashx

[784] The clashes could be described as a reaction to the 'oppressed human' provoked by sectarian sentiments and leading to violence in 'somehow' financed battles – yet their anger and street battles eventually ended with the end of funding.

[785] Numbers of suicide and rocket attacks were launched on the southern suburbs of Beirut and on Beqaa between 2013 and 2015, claimed by the Abdullah Azzam Brigade (AAB) which was still operating in Lebanon. Hence, despite the arrest of Qarawi in Saudi Arabia in 2012, and the transfer of AAB's leadership to another Saudi national, Majid Muhammad al-Majid, AAB remained a non-security priority – especially for internal Lebanese internal security forces in close relationship with the Saudis and the US, including President Michael Suleiman.
Anon (2013), "Profile: Abduallah Azzam Brigades", *BBC News*, 19 November 2013, online at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25005417

One was a Lebanese youth (Mouin Abu Daher, from Sidon), the other his Palestinian friend (Adnan Mussa Al Mohammad, resident in South Lebanon),[786] and both supported Shaikh Ahmad Assir's movement in Sidon. The Shaikh was a controversial figure in his religious and political views which he shared on local and international media channels, and in his open support for the Syrian rebellion and strong opposition to Hezbollah. He had also incited Sunni-Shia tensions, encouraging Lebanese Sunnis to join the war in Syria, or, as in 2012 shutting the main road through Sidon into South Lebanon for sit-in protests with his supporters. Before his suicide attack, Abu Daher had used Facebook to express his support for Al Qaeda and for Assir, whom he vowed to "avenge" after the Lebanese army (LAF) had crushed the Shaikh's headquarters in June 2013. Assir's supporters had shot at a Lebanese Army checkpoint, leading to troop casualties and ending in a battle with a total loss of 17 soldiers, and the killing and arrest of the group's members.[787] Although he was still free during the attack, Assir then fled but was finally arrested in 2015. In his message, Abu Daher had also claimed that Iran was allied with the US, especially in its war and oppression against Sunnis in the region, and maintained that this was particularly true of Lebanon.

Ironically, the declaration statement on the attack attributed it to the Ziad Jarrah Brigades (the Lebanese component of 9/11). Zureiqat, who read the statement, also unveiled AAB's new Hussein bin Ali Brigades (Imam Ali and Ahlul Beit), which had carried out the attack on the Iranian embassy. He warned that: "Operations in Lebanon will continue, God willing, until two things are achieved: withdrawing the members of Iran's Party [i.e. Hezbollah] from Syria, and releasing our prisoners from the prisons of oppression in Lebanon."[788] Oddly, Zureiqat also called for all Sunni youth to take up arms against Hezbollah, but not against the Lebanese army, which he claimed was, along with Lebanese security, only "a puppet of Hezbollah."[789] Finally, he also claimed that Hezbollah had been the "loyal guard" for Israel since 1996 (or rather the year Hariri lobbied internationally for a written agreement to protect Lebanese civilians from Israeli attacks,

---

[786] Agence France Presse (2013). "Suicide bombers in Beirut attack on Iranian embassy Identified", reposted by *The National,* 24 November 2013. Online at: https://www.thenational.ae/world/suicide-bombers-in-beirut-attack-on-iranian-embassy-identified-1.312901

[787] ibid.

[788] Radwan Mortada (2013), "Has Lebanon Entered the Era of Suicide Bombings?" *Al-Akhbar* Newspaper, 20 November 2013. Online at http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17660

[789] Thomas Joscelyn (2014), "Abdullah Azzam Brigades leader calls on Lebanese people to attack Hezbollah", *Long War Journal*, 14 October 2014. Online at:
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/10/abdullah_azzam_briga_3.php

based on the 1993 war's verbal agreement), and described the 2006 War as "nothing more than breaking the rules of engagement". In his view, Hezbollah had remained in the picture to accept an agreement to legitimize Israel's existence.[790] Then in January 2014, another car bomb attack hit Beirut, this time striking in its southern district, in the heavily-populated civilian neighbourhood of Haret Hreik.[791]

Although no side took responsibility, the FSA and Al-Nusra pledged to continue attacks in revenge for civilian casualties caused by the intervention of Hezbollah in Syria. While the country had been for months with a caretaker government – since the resignation of PM Najib Mikati in March 2013 – with Saad Hariri's FM refusing to form a government with Hezbollah before it disengaged from the Syrian conflict, Lebanon continued to be faced with serious security threats and horror attacks. Subsequently, Hezbollah's deputy Shaikh Naim Qassem pressed for calm and the "quick formation of a national unity cabinet", in support of the unsuccessful attempts by newly-assigned PM Tammam Salam to construct his government.[792] Salam's "national interest government" was eventually announced in February 2014, but AAB was to claim responsibility for further dual suicide attacks on the Iranian Centre in Beirut, and used Twitter to pledge to continue attacks against Hezbollah on Lebanese soil in response to the group's assistance to Assad in Syria and the Alawites in Tripoli.[793] Even so, formation of the government still contributed to a substantial decline in further attempts at suicide or bombing attacks, which became limited to Hermel, Arsal or Beqaa until after the final Battle of Yabroud in April 2014.

This also contributed in February 2014 to the arrest of Naim Abbas – expelled from AAB in 2013 – who revealed that he was the mastermind behind several suicide bombing or rocket attacks in Beirut, which he had carried out in association with Al-Nusra, ISIL and other Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups.[794] On the other hand, political and sectarian tensions were to continue as Lebanon moved

---

[790] ibid.
[791] Oliver Holmes and Stephen Kalin (2014), "Car bomb kills at least five in Hezbollah district of Beirut", *Reuters*, 2 January 2014. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-lebanon-explosion/car-bomb-kills-at-least-five-in-hezbollah-district-of-beirut-idUKBREA010II20140102
[792] ibid.
[793] Laila Bassam and Alexander Dziadosz (2014), "Suicide bombers target Iranian center in Beirut", *Reuters*, 19 February 2014. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-blast-casualties/suicide-bombers-target-iranian-center-in-beirut-idUSBREA1I0PQ20140219
[794] Radwan Mortada (2014), "Naim Abbas: From an Admirer of Hezbollah to its Sworn Enemy**"**, *Al-Akhbar* Newspaper, 13 February 2014. Online at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18617

from a government-formation crisis to a new presidential-vacancy crisis. In fact, the end of President Michael Suleiman's term in May 2014 was also an important factor in that an agreement was finally reached over the government, aimed at preventing the country from entering a constitutional crisis by being unable to form a cabinet without a presidential signature. Although the government crisis was resolved, the country remained vulnerable to further controversial crisis postponements, mainly in the presidential race which entered a parallel postponement track with the parliamentary elections, faced with domestic and foreign vetoes in approving a President to be elected by the same Parliament. Thus, the country remained embroiled in a sharp dispute as to whether to pursue another Lebanese disengagement-neutrality presidential term or a new deterrence-neutrality presidency representing an Integral Lebanonism constituency. This issue was also specifically related to the anticipated foreign policy approach of whichever new president was to be elected, especially towards relations with Syria,

Consequently, this was to be negotiated under the fire of violence in the Syrian crisis, which intensified further, spilling into Iraq and also introducing new regional and international interventions by Iran and the US in 2014,[795] Russia in 2015, and finally Turkey in 2016.[796] All gradually entered a new phase of the war on terrorism,[797] after ISIL's announcement of a new Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) having, by June 2014, captured massive Iraqi and Syrian territories.[798] Even the Iraqi-Syrian borders were torn down, and the same fate was promised for

---

[795] US intervention was delayed until September 2014, only after ISIS had begun to threaten the city of Irbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, and because Iran had also rushed to help. Moreover, the Americans were more concerned to protect the trillion-dollar-valued oil and energy resources of US-dominated corporate firms' investments in Irbil.
[796] David Patrikarakos (2016), "Apocalypse or Bust: The Battle For Dabiq", *Radio Free Europe*, 9 October 2016. Online at https://www.rferl.org/a/tracking-islamic-state-dabiq-battle-apocalypticism/28040703.html
Turkey, like ISIS, had its own prophecies for Dabiq, entering the town on 24 August 2016 after it had finally decided on an armed intervention against ISIS in northern Syria, while the rebels in Aleppo were facing a large battle, which they subsequently lost. This day marked the commemoration of the Marj Dabiq victory against the Mamelukes on 24 August 1516.
[797] On the other hand, the Lebanese state remained to be entangled in this new regional and international power struggle conflict, where towards the end of 2014 Lebanon was signed up by the US and Saudi Arabia to join the new US-led international coalition war against ISIS.
[798] The group gained control of Mosul's central bank as well as massive amounts of American-made weaponry and armoured assault vehicles belonging to the collapsing Iraqi armed forces. ISIS quickly expanded further into Iraq and Syria, dominating the rich hydrocarbon energy sources in the Sunni regions, and successfully obtaining new local recruits while publicizing its intentions to tear down the Iraqi-Syrian border. It also made it clear that the same fate would befall the borders of Jordan and Lebanon. Ironically, there was no mention of any other borders, and not even a declaration of the intention to liberate the lands of Mecca or Jerusalem, essential for Caliphate rule, which might otherwise have been assumed to be a priority. Any public opposition was met with torture, death, terror or public massacres, as publicized in the media.

the Lebanese and Jordanian borders by August 2014.[799] Hence, ISIS was also to compete with Al-Nusra and FSA in Syria, including at the Syrian-Lebanese borders, or the Syrian-Israeli borders in Golan where the Al-Qaeda flag was to replace the Syrian or FSA flags – ironically with hardly any security alarm threats either to or by Israel. In August 2014 the Syrian-Lebanese border witnessed a joint Al-Nusra and ISIS attack on Arsal, which ended with the death of several armed groups and the kidnap of dozens of Lebanese Army and Security forces personnel, culminating in a new national hostage crisis.[800]

7.5. A Deterrence Neutrality Realism Within a Systematic Global Disengagement Neutrality Mechanism

With the new international interventions in Syria, the political establishment in Lebanon began to embark on new disputes over the new security threats at the border, thus preventing the Lebanese Army from taking any firm action to free the soldiers. Thus an armed operation against ISIS and al-Nusra Front at Arsal in the border region with Syria, would require coordination with the Syrian state that was still opposed by the MFC, who insisted that many of the militants in this region were Syrian refugees and rebels. Nonetheless, in September 2014, and despite the presidential vacancy, Lebanon found itself enrolled as an official member of the 'Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS',[801] led by a US global security corporate-anarchy (that excluded Russia, China, Syria and Iran), and which was also opposed to a Lebanese Army operation in Arsal. Subsequently, since Lebanon remained split in its foreign security choices, alliances or decisions (being still under immediate US-Saudi influence), the domestic security situation remained a priority, thus enabling Prime Minister Salam to grasp the reins of security cooperation in the country. Beirut was also recovering from the risks of major suicide bombing attacks, the latest blast having occurred in November

---

[799] Ironically ISIS did not make any similar threats about tearing down the border with Israel. Anon, (2014), "Bulldozing the Border Between Iraq and Syria: The Islamic State", *Vice News*, 14 August 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxX_THjtXOw

[800] Radwan Mortada (2014), "Zureiqat Appointed New Emir of Abdallah Azzam Brigades", *Al-Akhbar* Newspaper, 6 October 2014. Online at http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/21857
In fact, the attack also occurred as a result of the acknowledgment of Al-Qaeda's security threats in Lebanon, leading to the capture of ABB's new leader, al-Majid, by the Lebanese armed forces in late 2013; yet being succeeded after his death, in January 2014, by Lebanese Shaikh Sirajuddin Zureiqat.

[801] United States Department of State (2014), "Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS", 14 September 2014. Online at: https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/bureaus-and-offices-reporting-directly-to-the-secretary/the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis/

2015 with a twin suicide attack in the civilian neighbourhood of Burj al-Barajneh, this time claimed by ISIS.[802]

As for the Lebanese army and security officers detained by al-Nusra and ISIS, their fate was to remain hostage to the politics of disengagement-neutrality, since the Lebanese state position was to continue to abide by international relations constraints, accredited by the US and Europe or by the dominant Arab states, mainly Saudi Arabia, at the regional level. Although the Lebanese Army finally succeeded in December 2015 in conducting a prisoner swap with al-Nusra Front, mediated by Qatar,[803] the fate of those detained by ISIS remained unrevealed. In October 2013, Turkey had in fact also helped with the release of eleven Lebanese Shia hostages kidnapped in Syria (in the Azaz region close to the Turkish border in Northern Aleppo) by Turkish-influenced Syrian rebel factions in May 2012.[804] Yet this only occurred after two Turkish pilots had been kidnapped earlier in August 2013, to pressure Turkey into helping with the release of the hostages. The pilots were finally freed with a ransom in October 2013,[805] after an '*Aman* Rabbi *Aman… yitlaaa Qubtan'* bargain agreement.[806] Turkish troops under UNIFIL also pulled out from South Lebanon; nonetheless, relations remained positive between Lebanon and Turkey, and especially between Hariri and Erdogan.

Hezbollah, on the other hand, was finding itself accused of further terrorism by the US, Israel, and absurdly by the FSA (including its Al-Qaeda affiliates who denounced Hezbollah for acts of oppression and terrorism), as well as by the Muslim Brotherhood. The holders of power in Egypt, they had become very critical of the Syrian regime and of Hezbollah's aggression and

---

[802] Rose T. Buchanan (2015), "Beirut bomb: 'At least 43 dead' in twin Isis suicide blast in Lebanese capital", *Independent*, 12 November 2015. Online at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/beirut-bomb-scores-killed-in-twin-suicide-blast-in-lebanese-capital-a6732156.html

[803] Nour Samaha (2015c), "Lebanese army and al-Nusra Front conduct prisoner swap", *Al-Jazeera*, 2 December 2015. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/2/lebanese-army-and-al-nusra-front-conduct-prisoner-swap

[804] Avi Issacharoff, and TOI Staff (2013), "Turkey to withdraw troops from UNIFIL in south Lebanon", *Times of Israel,* 10 August 2013. Online at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/turkey-withdraws-troops-from-unifil-in-south-lebanon/?fb_comment_id=506843736067781_51761990#f3ad50c1326abf

[805] Hassan Illiek (2013), "Lebanese Hostage Deal: 10 months of Negotiations and $9 Million", *Al-Akhbar Newspaper,* 21 October 2013. http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17370

[806] Daily Star (2013). "Turkish pilots kidnapped in Lebanon appear in video", *Daily Star* (Beirut), 15 October 2013. Online at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Oct-15/234757-turkish-pilots-kidnapped-in-lebanon-appear-in-video.ashx

interventions in Syria, and hinted at entering the conflict,[807] which triggered domestic rebellion that ended in a civil-military coup. Saudi Arabia was to also accuse Hezbollah of terrorism, having become distressed by Qatar's failure in Syria, and blaming it on Hezbollah. In March 2016, Saudi Arabia even pressed for the League of Arab States and the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to list Hezbollah as a terrorist group, allegedly for its "terrorist acts and incitements in Syria, Yemen and in Iraq".[808] In fact, Saudi Arabia had started to reveal obvious unease with Hezbollah since the latter had openly defended Yemen when war broke out in April 2015, and was also upset that Hezbollah had supported the Bahraini rebellion since 2011.

Furthermore, aside from its dedicated coverage of the Palestinian plight, Hezbollah's Al-Manar television coverage of the Bahraini protests and the war in Yemen (including Wahhabi-influenced violence by ISIS or Al-Qaeda affiliate factions in Syria and Iraq) motivated the Saudi-owned Arab-Sat network in December 2015 to drop the broadcasts to Al-Manar, including Al-Mayadeen TV; Nile-Sat also dropped Al-Manar in April 2016.[809] Nonetheless, these actions all failed to discredit, deter or completely crush Hezbollah's support for Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, Iraq or Palestine. On the contrary, Nasrallah maintained his criticism of Saudi Arabia for lacking democratic practices within its own borders while preaching for democracy and human rights in Syria,[810] and was disparaging about Israel which was observing and supporting the Syrian war as a trap for Hezbollah that could bring about its 'imminent' defeat. Hezbollah instead gained new combat arsenals and experience, which became even more worrying for Israel.[811]

---

[807] Manar Mohsen (2013), "Egypt to Aid Syrian Rebels", *Daily News*, 15 June 2013. Online at: https://dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/15/egypt-to-aid-syrian-rebels/
The loss of this war even motivated former Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi to condemn both Assad and Hezbollah, while pledging, in a sectarian-oriented speech in June 2013, to provide support to the Syrian rebels. This however only created further domestic opposition against Morsi who was removed from power in June 2013.
[808] Anon (2016), "GCC declares Lebanon's Hezbollah a terrorist organisation", *Middle East Eye*, 2 March 2016. Online: https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/news/gcc-declares-lebanons-hezbollah-terrorist-organisation-212714095
[809] Anon, (2016). "Arab satellite drops Hezbollah's Al Manar TV", *Al-Nahar* newspaper, 6 April 2016. Online at: https://en.annahar.com/article/348102-hezbollahs-al-manar-goes-off-air-in-lebair-in-lebanon-after-arab-satellite-drops
[810] Also, over silence by the Arab League or the international community to the Saudi alleged Arab/Islamic alliance only committing war crimes, sanctions and destruction in Yemen, subsidising famine, oppression and severe injuries to its people, mainly women and children.
[811] Anon (2015), "Free Syrian Army: Hezbollah is lying, we killed Kuntar, not Israel", *The Jerusalem Post*, 21 December 2015. Online at: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Free-Syrian-Army-Hezbollah-is-lying-we-killed-Kuntar-not-Israel-437951

7.5.1. Power Deterrence Security Imaginings and Realities

In fact, Nasrallah had continued his deterrence speeches in response to continued Israeli threats of war. Only a couple of months before Hezbollah's announcement on its official armed intervention in Syria, Nasrallah threatened, in his Martyr's Day speech in February 2013, to bring Israel into darkness if it should even think of starting a new war against Lebanon: "If you launch missiles at several power-stations in Israel, the whole country will be shrouded in darkness", and added jokingly, "we are used to electricity shortages, but can they stand it?"[812] While Hezbollah was engaged in defending the militant infiltrations on the Syrian-Lebanese borders, it continued to reflect readiness on the southern Lebanese border with Israel. In August 2013 four Israeli soldiers within a commando group who crossed 400 metres inside Lebanon, were injured in a bomb blast for which Hezbollah openly claimed responsibility.[813] Meanwhile, Israeli retaliation came with a security attack through the unclaimed assassination of a Hezbollah commander (Hassan Laqqis) in Beirut in December 2013,[814] but an Israeli soldier was killed a week afterwards in an unclaimed cross-border sniper attack.[815]

Moreover, in early January 2015 Nasrallah even warned Israel of smart-missile retaliatory counter-attacks, capable of reaching and hitting precise targets or causing serious damage inside Israel should Israel decided to launch a war against Lebanon. Nasrallah also renewed his threats that Hezbollah's fighters were still prepared to enter the Galilee and even in fact to enter the territories "beyond the Galilee."[816] However the Israeli response came relatively quickly when only a few days later, an Israeli airstrike rocket attack targeted and killed Jihad Mughniyeh (the son of Imad Mughniyeh), along with six other Hezbollah fighters accompanied by an Iranian general, in

---

[812] Anon, (2013). "Nasrallah threatens to bomb Israeli power stations", *YNet News*, 16 February 2013. Online at: https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4345586,00.html

[813] Yaakov Lappin (2013), "Hezbollah says it struck Israeli troops in southern Lebanon", *The Jerusalem Post*, 14 August 2013. Online at: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hezbollah-says-it-struck-Israeli-troops-in-southern-Lebanon-323086

[814] Ariel Ben Solomon (2013). "Hezbollah says commander killed in Beirut, blames Israel", *Reuters*, Reposted in *Jerusalem Post*, 4 December 2013. Online at: http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Hezbollah-says-commander-killed-in-Beirut-blames-Israel-333934

[815] Lazar Berman and Ilan Ben Zion (2013), "Soldier killed by Lebanese sniper laid to rest", *Times of Israel*, 16 December 2013. Online at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/soldiers-killer-surrenders-to-lebanese-authorities/

[816] TOI and AFP Staff (2015). "Hezbollah threatens to capture the Galilee and 'beyond'", *The Times of Israel,* 15 January 2015. Online at https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-threatens-to-capture-the-galilee-and-beyond/

Quneitra on the Israeli-Syrian border in the Golan Heights area.[817] Hezbollah retaliated less than two weeks later, through a missile attack targeted at the Israeli-occupied Shebaa Farms at the Lebanese border with the Golan Heights; two Israeli soldiers were killed.[818]

The armed response came in late January, during the commemoration of the fallen martyrs of the Quneitra airstrike, and was accompanied by a new warning for Israel. Affirming that the resistance no longer recognized the rules of engagement and that it had the right to respond to the enemy at any time or place, Nasrallah stated that "From now on, if any member of Hezbollah is assassinated, then we will blame it on Israel and reserve the right to respond to it whenever and however we choose."[819] Although Hezbollah's retaliation was interpreted as a violation of UNSCR 1701, the fact that the Shebaa Farms were Lebanese territories and, according to Israel, belonged to the Golan Heights and related to UNSCRs 242 and 338 – a violation of 1701 could therefore also be debated. Thus, it was also a security message for Israel, regarding the continued occupation of both the Shebaa Farms and the Golan Heights.

Nevertheless, Israel sought to test this again in December 2015 through the assassination of Samir Kuntar, who was killed by an Israeli smart-rocket attack that targeted a populated civilian building on the outskirts of Damascus.[820] After his release from prison in 2008, Kuntar had continued his armed resistance struggle against Israel – also as an acknowledgement for the sacrifices made for his release in the 2006 War – becoming a commander in the Hezbollah ranks, despite his Druze or secular-left background. After the outbreak of the war in Syria, he became active in the Golan Heights region in southern Syria, a territorial stronghold of the Druze with whom he made strong contacts, to deter attacks by FSA Al-Qaeda-affiliated factions attempting to control the region, as well as to deter any potential Israeli threats of invasion against Damascus during Syria's domestic

---

[817] Samah Nour, (2015a). "Hezbollah mourns fighters killed in attack", *Al- Jazeera TV*, 19 January 2015, online at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/hezbollah-mourns-fighters-killed-attack-2015119154814642494.html

[818] Nour Samaha (2015b), "Two Israeli soldiers killed in Hezbollah missile attack", *Al-Jazeera TV*, 28 January 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/01/israeli-soldiers-injured-shebaa-farms-missile-attack-150128100642659.html

[819] Anon (2015), "Nasrallah: We No Longer Recognize Rules of Engagement, We Will Go to War if Imposed on us", *Naharnet* 30 January 2015, online at http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/165479

[820] Kate Shuttleworth and Kareem Shaheen (2015), "Lebanese militant leader Samir Qantar killed in Damascus attack", *The Guardian*, 20 December 2015. Online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/lebanese-militant-leader-samir-qantar-believed-killed-in-damascus-attack

unrest. Ironically, after Kuntar's assassination a faction in the FSA even attempted to claim responsibility for the murder, accusing Hezbollah of lying by blaming the attack on Israel.

Israeli threats continued to be the reason for public majority support of Hezbollah's deterrent neutrality-assuring security (which had been absent long before Hezbollah in Lebanon), especially while also facing the FSA, al-Nusra or ISIS threats coming from Syria, or alternatively, winning the battle for Aleppo in late 2016 in support of Russian and Syrian troops, while the US was disengaging due to presidential elections. Eventually this also finally eased or distracted the external political pressures on Lebanon, and contributed to the elections of Aoun as President; after he had been firmly rejected because of his alliance with Hezbollah.[821] Moreover, while the Lebanese Army kept being deflected from taking any action against al-Nusra and ISIS in Arsal (and also to uncover the fate of the hostages taken ISIS; confirmed dead), Hezbollah took the initiative in 2017 for another pre-emptive war in the region, coordinated with the Syrian armed forces (SAA). A joint armed operation was launched from both sides of the border, and by July 2017 had successfully eliminated Al-Nusra from Lebanon.

Whilst the Lebanese army took part in the second battle aimed against ISIS in August 2017, it maintained a discreet coordination with Hezbollah and the Syrian armed troops who had focused their operations from inside the Syrian borders in the Western Qalamoun region. The discretion in this coordination remained attributed to US and Arab political pressures opposed to any formal channels between Lebanon and Syria. Atypically, and despite Lebanon becoming the first country to defeat ISIS in the American-led 'global war to defeat ISIS', the US still threatened that any cooperation with Syria could jeopardize America's military aid to the Lebanese Army.[822] In fact, while scepticism remained over the role of Al-Qaeda in Syria, along with its affiliate foreign

---

[821] That is aside from the occasional restrictions of US influence, as was the case before and after Hariri's murder, and that still affects Lebanese foreign policy behaviour. As in the case of Aoun; despite his old friendship with France, the French did not support his presidential candidacy, but backed the US-Saudi opposition to his foreign ideals and domestic alliance with Hezbollah. His ascent to power came in the middle of a regionally and internationally fatigued disengagement with Lebanon, where the focus shifted more towards the decisive ongoing battles in the Syrian war. Yet official relationships with Syria were kept on hold, awaiting a renewal of regional and international stability.

[822] Tom Perry and Angus McDowall (2017), "Lebanese army, Hezbollah announce offensives against Islamic State on Syrian border", *Reuters News*, 18 August 2017. Online at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-syria/lebanese-army-hezbollah-announce-offensives-against-islamic-state-on-syrian-border-idUSKCN1AZ03G

militant groups (mainly ISIS), a map of the conflict clearly reveals the new global power struggle in the region; especially in securing or blocking the still-pending future global trade and natural-gas pipeline routes that cross between East and West, reaching all the way from Europe into deep Asia through the East Mediterranean and Levant region. Hence, with Iran being the primary gate for China and Russia into the Levant region, unlocking the Turkish gate into Europe and the Israeli gate into Africa remains equally important for regional prosperity, after re-opening the Levant corridor after ISIS or its 'sister' corporation alternatives.

7.6. The Crescent of Crisis and the Levant's Hidden Link: The Chinese Silk Road Bypassing the Risks to US Economic Sanctions

On the other hand, the entire region was to begin witnessing new global power shifts as the sanctions on Iran began to be lifted. Beginning with Russia's surprise military intervention in Syria in late September 2015; signing up independently to the "global coalition to defeat ISIS". While the U.S. saw this as a competition to its interests in the region, China was also keeping a close eye on the Middle East, specially, after lifting the international economic sanctions on Iran imposed since 1979. Iran became very significant to China's new global economic expansions, mainly in the revival to the historic Silk Road – "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) initiative announced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping – trade routes from China into Europe, while also connecting China with West Central and Southern Asia passing through Iran and the Levant region into Africa or Europe.[823] With the support of Russia, this would provide a new major international economic and political competitions to the US, due its inability to control China's new trade routes, in case the U.S. decides to impose economic sanctions on either Russia or China. In other words, while the U.S. maintains domination to the traditional inland or maritime international trade routes, the new announcements to alternative trade routes could undermine its global hegemony interests, especially while the US "underperforming at home and overreaching abroad".[824]

---

[823] Anna Bruce-Lockhart (2016), "Why China is Building a New Silk Road?" World Economic Forum June 26, 2016. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/why-china-is-building-a-new-silk-road
[824] Richard N. Hass (2013), "Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America's House in Order", *Council on Foreign Relations*. Book Review, April 2013. Online at http://www.cfr.org/politics-and-strategy/foreign-policy-begins-home/p29767"
Noted by Richard Haass, former President of the Council of Foreign Relations, where in 2013 he observed that: "US national security depends even more on the United States addressing its crumbling infrastructure, second-class schools, outdated immigration system, and burgeoning debt, something that will require controlling entitlements rather than just raising taxes and cutting discretionary spending.

Correspondingly, this was to motivate the Obama Administration to seek advice from its Cold War 'strategic security expert' veterans namely late US national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (1979-1981) in exploiting a neo-Cold War battle-zone in Syria in America's new global war against ISIS; while Brzezinski also being America's expert in proxy-mujahedeen war recruits in Afghanistan. [825] Paradoxically, during the Cold War Brzezinski's strategy had aimed to contain the Soviets in what he observed in 1979 as an:

> "[A]n arc of crisis stretches along the shores of the Indian Ocean, with fragile social and political structures in a region of vital importance to us threatened with fragmentation. The resulting political chaos could well be filled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries."[826]

This 'Arc of crisis' is principally a Muslim region with multi tribal, sectarian, religious or ethnic bases. It stretches in the states of central and south Asia along the Southern borders to the Soviet Union; crossing into the Middle East region through Iran and reaching all the way to the Horn of Africa. A continued chaos or domination to this region would also keep Russia away from entering the Middle East region crossing through Iran. Thus, also dominating all the Middle East costs, whether at the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean. In other words, the Arc would be split into two halves – one would be in south-central Asia and the other would be in the Middle East, with 'the center of gravity of this arc is Iran, being the world's fourth largest oil producer and for more than two decades a citadel of U.S. military and economic strength in the Middle East.'[827]

Consistently, in 1979 George Lenczowski elaborates on Brzezinski's "arc of crisis" in the Journal of Foreign Affairs, stating:

---

[825] Famous for addressing the Mujahedeen to fight back for their homes and mosques, ending his speech "Your cause is right and God is on your side". This was clearest in Afghanistan, where it supported the Mujahedeen war against the Soviets occupation to the country. The US with its 'protectorate' ally Saudi Arabia, also sought to promote its Muslim extremist Wahhabi sect and fund the Arab fighters (Mujahedeen or Strugglers, formerly under the leadership of Palestinian Abdallah Azzam) who had helped the Afghan Mujahedeen defeat the "communist" Soviets, supported by a Saudi-US inspired holy war, and had returned back home. Becoming under the leadership of wealthy Saudi national Osama Bin Laden after the Mujahedeen victory in Afghanistan, Bin Laden protested American intervention in the Arab Gulf, insisting that protection of the Prophet's holy lands, should be provided by the victorious mujahedeen in Afghanistan and not the Americans.
[826] Iran's Cover Stories (1979), "Iran: The Crescent of Crisis", *Time Magazine*: January 15, 1979: http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19790115,00.html
[827] *Ibid*.

Its strategic position is unequalled: it is the last major region of the Free World directly adjacent to the Soviet Union, it holds in its subsoil about three-fourths of the proven and estimated world oil reserves, and it is the locus of one of the most intractable conflicts of the twentieth century: that of Zionism versus Arab nationalism. Moreover, national, economic and territorial conflicts are aggravated by the intrusion of religious passions in an area which was the birthplace of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and by the exposure, in the twentieth century, to two competing appeals of secular modernization: Western and communist.'[828]

7.6.1. Middle East Peace Crisis: A Business Deal for a Neom-Middle East

This reality is still evidenced at the greater regional level mainly in the exploitation of the long Middle East Peace Process dictating the issue of state sovereignty, development and economic prosperity. Becoming exploited under a new 'deal of the century' aimed at securing new global economic or political hegemony interests harming the sovereign rights to the local populations.[829] Disregarding Palestinian rights, principally their right to self-determination, which the Trump Administration left for the Israelis and Palestinians to contend with. Thus, primarily becoming focused on a corporate 'deal of the century' securing business deals with Saudi Arabia – to more upcoming 'deals' within a Deal of a Century, under various theologically, politically, economically or security exploited prophecies.

Mainly reflected in Shimon Peres's Grand Vision for the Middle East post the 1993 Oslo Agreement with the Palestinians, anticipating peace and prosperity under a Benelux type (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) economic union superstructure linking Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians.[830] In 2016 Israeli political analyst Amotza Asa-el wrote an article on this to the Jerusalem Post, adding that the regional leaders of the Middle East:

---

[828] George Lenczowski (1979). "The Arc of Crisis: It's Central Sector", *Foreign Affairs*: Spring, 1979.

[829] Jack Khoury (2017), "Trump's Ultimate Deal Will 'Die on the Rocks of Jerusalem,' if U.S. Recognizes Israeli Capital, Palestinians Warn", *Haaretz*, December 2017. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/trump-s-ultimate-deal-will-die-on-the-rocks-of-jerusalem-palestinians-warn-1.5627788

In contrast, the main issue is not over reaching a final peace agreement with Israel, but rather in the details of the agreement, especially in revealing that Jerusalem would be fully annexed by Israel becoming the capital to a new Jewish State identity; making Abu-Dis the alternative capital to the Palestinian neighborhoods in the West Bank. Despite, the strong rejection by the Palestinian Authority or Hamas, Trump's announcement to move the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, was also reflected as a nod to an un-met American promise made by his predecessors yet was to expose the ultimate dilemma in the 'deal of the century' over Jerusalem.

[830] Amotza Asa-el (2016), "A Bridge Too Far: Peres's Grand Vision for the Middle East**",** *Jerusalem Post*, 24 October 2016. http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/A-Bridge-Too-Far-Peress-grand-vision-for-the-Middle-East-470720

…would create a common market like Europe's, a military alliance like NATO, and a regional development bank that would do in the Arab world what the World Bank does worldwide. Meanwhile, a super-highway would be built stretching the width of North Africa, ultimately linking Casablanca and Alexandria; fast trains would swoosh up the Nile basin en route to Turkey through Tel Aviv, Latakia and Beirut; electricity grids would serve neighbors such as Egypt and Libya or Syria and Iraq in disregard of borders; and a borderless continuum linking Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and Egypt would shoulder a Red Sea Riviera.[831]

This was referred to as Peres's peace manifesto *The New Middle East*,[832] which was translated into Arabic and published in Cairo by state-owned al-Ahram in 1995, became wrapped in a warning akin to *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.[833] Moreover, there was also a rejection at the Arab intellectual level, or as Asa-el observes:

> Mapping the Arab rejection of Peres's vision – from Syrian poet Nizar Qabbani and Palestinian literary theorist Edward Said to the head of Egypt's artists and performers syndicate, Saad Eddin Wahbe – the late Lebanese- American Arabist Fouad Ajami later wrote grimly in "The Dream Palace of the Arabs": "The Arab political imagination had never really probed in a serious way Israel's place in a region at peace."[834]

Other than the Arab national intellectual rejections to the suspicious Israeli hegemony visions, ironically some of the dominant Arab states leaders and elites 'feared that economic meritocracy, social mobility and political freedom would inevitably unleash.[835] Yet, the entire peace vision was to be shaken since the assassination of Rabin and the halt of the 'land for peace' process, which provoked further extremism and deterrence terrorism attacks on both Israeli-Palestinian sides. Finally, Ehud Barak's failure in 2000 to reach a permanent peace agreement with Syria and the Palestinians, including Lebanon, dealt a devastating blow to Peres's stretching super-highway vision. Instead, further closure was to dominate, witnessing increased Israeli security walls, checkpoints and all possible obstacles to a humane civilian crossing. Nonetheless, as political reform failed following the Arab Spring of 2011, and the Arab states became weaker faced with major economic problems, the revival to Peres's manifesto was to become the spirit to a new 'deal of the century'. Advancing in the new Saudi $500 billion Artificial Intelligence megacity NEOM

---

[831] ibid.

[832] Being the same *New Middle East* Condoleezza Rice had advocated for during the 2006 war on Lebanon, or Peres himself as Prime Minister during the 1996 war, while Israel was tempting the Arabs with the economic rewards in this vision.

[833] Amotza Asa-el (2016),

[834] ibid.

[835] ibid.

in the Tabuk Province[836] – close to Jabal ElLawaz region –[837] skirting the northwest coast of the country on the Red Sea, reaching north into Jordan and across the sea, via a bridge, into Egypt.[838] Ironically, the bridge will be built through the Islands of Tiran and Sanafir which Egypt, which President Sisi conceded to Saudi Arabia, also allowing Israel free international maritime access into the central Red Sea from its Aqaba Gulf, in the South of Israel; not possible if the islands were to remain under Egyptian sovereignty.

Moreover, the bridge will be an alternative to the territorial crossing from Asia into Africa – currently under an Israeli state blockade – thus serving as a new inland between Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, into the Arab Gulf, while Israel 'is working with China to build a railway from Eilat to the Mediterranean; oddly intended to serve as an overland alternative to the Suez Canal.'[839] Yet, supposedly, the substitution of Egypt's suffering economy or political role will be the bridge to directly connect to the new modern architecture and green metropolitan future artificial intelligence NEOM hub;[840] promising jobs or new labor opportunities to the a majority of unemployed public masses in Egypt of across the Arab region, anxious for work-migration in support to their security of living. For Israel this project reflects a *neo-greater middle east* to Peres's economic hegemony vision within a global revival to ancient trade routes from far East into Western Asia (Middle East Arc of crisis). Also reviving an Israeli vision to a farther ancient history era of relationships with the Phoenician city-states of Tyre and Sidon, becoming under the economic influence of King David's kingdoms – sharing common trade interest routes. Also, during King Suleiman who connected the trade routes with the African horn and the maritime and land routes to the Arab Peninsula forming a pact with the Kingdom of Sabaa; in Yemen.[841]

---

[836] As part of the 2030 vision for Saudi Crown Prince Mohamad Bin Salman. The city he envisioned 'for manufacturing, renewable energy, biotechnology, media, and entertainment, filled with skyscrapers, five-star hotels, and robots to free humans from repetitive labor.'
Kirk, Mimi (2017).

[837] Also close to Al-Joef Region, allegedly where Moses's crossing occurred crossing the Red Sea trait.

[838] Mimi Kirk (2017), "Saudi Arabia's $500 Billion Fantasy of a Utopian Megacity**",** *City Lab*, 3 November 2017. https://www.citylab.com/design/2017/11/saudi-arabias-latest-planned-city-costs-500-billion-and-is-insanely-huge/544748/

[839] Joshua Gelernterm (2015), "An Israeli Suez Canal**",** J*erusalem Post*, 7 March 2015. http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/An-Israeli-Suez-Canal-393225

[840] In March 2018, Saudi Arabia and Egypt set up a $10 billion joint fund, with the aim of developing the Egyptian side of NEOM, and a similar joint fund is planned with Jordan.
Mohmmad Ghazal (2018), "Jordan, Saudi Arabia in talks over $500b NEOM project" *Jordan Times*, 10 March 2018. http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-saudi-arabia-talks-over-500b-neom-project

[841] Allegedly also Israelites people original roots, articulates by Dr Fadel Roubai in his ancient text review in Yemen

Although, the project seeks to promote peace in the entire Middle East, yet the geo security, economic or power hegemony scene will still dictate the promises to any prosperity – especially while the regional borders remain blocked or security screened. Mainly also including energy natural energy resources routes competitions in the region. Like the Nabucco pipeline (supported by the US),[842] which was meant to bypass Russian dominance to natural gas supply into Europe, was forced to get cancelled and be replaced by Russia's Trans-Adriatic Pipeline.[843] Yet with the continuation of the war in Yemen and Syria, amidst the Arab divisions over the 'deal of the century' peace concessions, global economic and power hegemony resolutions in the Middle East region remain key in determining the fate to this project. Also impacting the economic and political situation in Lebanon, including the continued security threats by Israel and violations to Lebanese state sovereignty, rejecting any peace agreement with Israel, before an Israeli withdrawal from all Lebanese territories and reaching a final peace resolution with the Palestinians, inclusive to a clear resolution to the refuges issue.

7.7. Systematic Obstacles to Economic Prosperity

Sequentially, although Israeli or regional security threats to the new natural gas wealth anticipated for Lebanon remain, there are still fears about domestic-external financial or economic exploitations in Lebanon which maintains a policy of state financial debts estimated in excess of US$80 billion – among the world's highest at 145 percent of its GDP.[844] Thus, aside from external Israeli threats or regional conflicts, or domestic disagreements to unjust peace concessions for Israel, whilst Lebanon is at the forefront of a new hydrocarbon wealth opportunity in its international waters, the country also possesses inland energy wealth that continues to be exploited

---

[842] Ageta Loskot-Strachota and Nanek Lasocki (2013). "End of Nabucco – end of Southern Gas Corridor?", Energy Post, 27 June 2013. http://energypost.eu/end-of-nabucco-end-of-southern-gas-corridor/
Published in Miller, Judith and Mylroie, Laurie (1990), *Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf.*
 In fact, Nabucco is the name to an 1841 Italian opera on Nebuchadnezzar II, telling the plight of the Jews tortured and exiled by Nabucco II the Babylonian King in 587 BC. Ironically, to whom Saddam Hussein once manifested as his own prophecy, widely portraying himself as a 'latter-day Nebuchadnezzar, the 6th Century B.C. Babylonian ruler, whose memory in the Old Testament has preserved as a conqueror of Jerusalem, the leader who carried the Hebrews into captivity.'
[843] Loskot-Strachota, Ageta and Lasocki, Nanek (2013).
[844] Andrea Rosa (2018), "Risking Israeli dispute, Lebanon signs deal with 3 oil firms", *Associated Press*, 9 February 2018, online at: https://www.apnews.com/b4b5b703f5074eada6a325970745111c

domestically. This includes wasted human energy resources and other natural resources in a Lebanon that is rich with rivers and subterranean natural springs that are being wasted and also threatened by pollution, while the country suffers from a shortage of water. Its mountains are also threatened with falling victim to destructive mining and excavation that serves and benefits corporate interests. In this respect, Charbil Nahas a former Lebanese minister and a prominent political reform activist, stated in an interview that 'denial, irresponsibility and carelessness' was the best description for the code of conduct of all Governments towards the public affairs of the state, and where the business and corporate shareholders in the Lebanese state were the real holders of power in Lebanon. Nahas made this statement in November 2014 – around six months after the presidential vacancy that had begun in May 2014 – adding that political divisions, obstacles or affiliations such as the 8th or 14th March coalitions, might suddenly become non-existent, whereas protecting sectarian and financial interests always dominated.[845]

Nahas also asserted that it was a Lebanese path of chaos where the victim was always the average citizen paying an everyday price for the state's carelessness while its people lived in a constructed misery, protected by this political and financial Establishment in alliance solely to protect its private interests at the cost of the citizenry. This also impacted on the juridical system which, like all Lebanon's state institutions, was manipulated and made non-functional, rather than being protected as an independent state institution able to enforce the rule of law and impose public or individual accountability arbiter measures.[846] Finally, Nahas added that, as long the country was controlled by a group of powerful individuals, whenever they disagreed nothing would get processed in either the government or the state, despite the violation of the Constitution that resulted from their disagreements. The real irony was that when those individuals or forces were in agreement, delayed issues in the state as well as political crises would suddenly evaporate, and solutions would be magically and appropriately introduced, even if such solutions involved constitutional violations. The excuse was always that "the constitution was made to facilitate not complicate."[847]

---

[845] Charbil Nahas (2014), "Political Corruption in the State", *Al-Hadath* with Nancy Sabaa, 17 November 2014 (last retrieved 18 November 2014) Online at:
http://www.aljadeed.tv/MenuAr/news/DetailNews/AlHadathDetailNews.html?Id=149858
[846] ibid.
[847] ibid.

7.8. A Corporate Legitimacy of Violence and an Oppressed Legitimacy of Security

From the foregoing, it is apparent that sub-state forces present on the ground could resist or submit, to continue exist, resisting and coexisting, or submitting to foreign tyrant domestic-oriented power hegemony. As articulated by Abboud and Muller on the legitimacy of the use of violence, the presence of either sub-state or non-state actors who use violence, is an exaggerated pretext to blame on threatening the state's sovereignty, especially if in assertion of also seeking to protect state sovereignty. Including "the extent to which challenges to the state's hold on to violence are taken far more seriously than any other challenges."[848] This does not deny the state its legitimacy and option to use violence. They add that "marauding Somali pirates, hired guns such as Blackwater/X, or organizations like Hezbollah, provide the most compelling challenges, penetrating the façade of mundane and unfortunately seductive discourses of authority and legitimacy and exposing the role of violence, and the extent to which the state relies on violence to maintain its monopolization."[849] Or even the drug cartels in Latin America, which could be similar to Lebanon protected by the state corporate cartel including also black market money laundering, ISIS, Taliban or Al-Qaeda had depended on.

Arguably at the domestic level this could also reflect on the individual citizenship behavior towards law and authority towards the individual right or even legitimacy to the use of violent in enforcing individual interpretations to legal realisation. Even if it is related to road right-of-way bylaws this could in turn become dominated by an individual authority or legitimacy even to the use of violence. Another example could also apply to armed militia groups in the US, which possess the right to unlimited access to the possession of excessive arms, or in the right to claim legitimacy to form a militia in defence of US border territory, especially with Mexico. Especially, in comparing this reality to the US imposed UNSCR 1559 keen to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon,[850] while the Lebanese army remains poorly equipped. Made into a domestic security

---

[848] Abboud and Muller (2012), p. 89.
[849] ibid.
[850] In addition to Hezbollah's continued opposition to Israel for its continued occupation to Arab land, and its support to the Palestinian right to self-defense and their legitimacy to armed resistance, which remained opposed by complex regional and international dimensions. Yet its position continued raising domestic and regional awareness to a global ethical issue met with denial, and silence over Israel's aggressive arrests and systematic state-bullying

force, constantly threatened with US sanctions if aiming to engage with foreign threats, keeping the country in an endless dialogue over the authority and legitimacy to the use of violence. Ironically, a debated legitimacy even in the US raised by President Trump, during his election campaign in 2016, bizarrely reflected by him saying that the "Second Amendment People" could take alternative action against Hillary Clinton vis-a-vis the right to the possession of arms.[851]

A controversial constitutional right sarcastically even praised once by Lebanese AL-Qaeda affiliate Omar Bakri Fustuq when he still resided in the UK. Where in a series of Western media interviews in 2000 Bakri had explained and emphasized his views on encouraging recruits for *Muhajiroun*/migrant Jihad overseas, including his thoughts on paramilitary training for such recruits that were initially happening in Britain and later in the US. One of those interviews was with CNS News on 24 May 2000 – coinciding with the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon – in which he acknowledged that he was 'involved in financing training for volunteers to a Jihad network sent to the U.S., taking advantage of the fact that firearms training with live ammunition was more readily available in America than in Britain. "When we started to go to Afghanistan," Bakri said, "they started to label us terrorists, so now we go to the USA!"'[852]

Ironically, history was to repeat itself in the Syrian war with Al-Qaeda affiliates receiving American support and Saudi funding to defeat the Syrian regime in satisfaction to isolationist Arab or Israeli security interests in the region. Efforts for regime change kept distant from seeking political reform or economic sovereignty. Whether in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq or in settling the issue of Palestine, misery was kept at the domestic level, especially in seeking power sharing resolutions, being constantly faced with economic and political corruption, by 'an invisible enemy that runs in the general-elections, makes its way into power, and cannot be defeated.'[853] In other

measures against Palestinians. Especially woman and children, living under security blocks and closures even suppressed from a liberation struggle, like again evident in Gaza.

[851] Nick Corasaniti, and Maggie Haberman (2016), "Donald Trump Suggests 'Second Amendment People' could Act Against Hillary Clinton", *The New York Times*, 9 August 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/us/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton.html

[852] Media Research Institute (MEMSI). Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 73, 25 October 2001. CNSNews.com, May 24, 2000. https://www.memri.org/reports/radical-islamist-profiles-2-sheikh-omar-bakri-muhammad-london

[853] Hollande, Francois (2012), "My real opponent has no name, no face, no party and does not run for elections, yet it rules France, it is the world of finance." Francois Hollande Elections Campaign, 26 February 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HXENrhEnQ1c

This in reference to former French President Hollande statement during his elections campaign on the role of money in the French political scene.

words, while political accountability becomes exploited by corporate power and wealth, at both domestic and external levels, this also becomes harmful to state sovereignty at both political and economic levels. It could also lead to violence especially when constantly threatened by acts of foreign sanctions, interventions or aggressions.

Hezbollah on the hand, despite its efforts in the war against terrorism, or its continued support for Palestine, it was still to be faced with sanctions and condemnation at both regional and international levels. Where ironically, at the regional level, even the Israeli threats to Lebanon were to become made through Arab media outlets. Namely, in an interview by Saudi newspaper Elaph with a senior IDF officer in March 2016, making open threats to the Lebanese state, that the IDF could bring Lebanon back 300 years if Hezbollah targets the ammonia plants in Haifa, while also welcoming the Saudi-led Arab political backlash against Hezbollah.[854] Yet, Hezbollah maintained its clear agenda of political enmity or open war against Israel, remaining critical to the continued Israeli occupation to Arab land, and committed to deter Israeli security threats to Lebanon. Compatibly, while Israel did not feel threatened or mention any serious worries from ISIS and FSA Al-Qaeda-affiliated or religious fundamentalist factions that had occupied and dominated the border region in the Syrian Golan Heights until at least July 2018, Hezbollah remained highlighted as the bigger threat. In July 2017, speaking from on board the US aircraft carrier *George H.W. Bush* which was visiting Haifa after several months of battle against ISIS in Syria, PM Netanyahu reflected his support of the good against the evil.[855]

7.8.1. An Israeli Mighty Carrier Prophecy

Hence, while covertly aiding ISIS Netanyahu's main concern was to associate its terrorism to the Palestinians, and to continue reflect power and excellent relationships with the US, praising common regional objectives and continued US armed and military support for Israel, stating: "We are here on a mighty aircraft carrier of the United States and a few miles from here, there is another

---

[854] Yasser Okbi, and Maarive Hashavua (2016), "IDF can put Lebanon back 300 years if Hezbollah attacks, officer tells Saudi paper", *The Jerusalem Post,* 8 March 2016, http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/IDF-can-put-Lebanon-back-300-years-if-Hezbollah-attacks-officer-tells-Saudi-paper-447212

[855] Anon (2017), "Aboard US aircraft carrier, Netanyahu hails symbol of 'freedom and victory'", *Times of Israel*, 3 July 2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/aboard-us-aircraft-carrier-netanyahu-hails-symbol-of-freedom-and-victory/

mighty carrier of our common civilization – it's called the State of Israel."[856] Cynically, Netanyahu outlined the true historical functioning for the state of Israel as a mighty armed military-based civilization, maintaining a militarized regional civilization filled with the darkness of oppression and violence. Distant from tolerance, mutual security, power-sharing, and co-existence, including peace exploited by the joint US-Israeli military efforts in the region, which Netanyahu described as being aimed against the haters of the peace that Israel both loves and seeks.[857] In fact, Israel was more worried over the Hezbollah and Iranian presence in the Golan, not al-Qaeda. Golan could potentially provide Hezbollah with a strategic battle ground with advantageous arms supply during any possible war with Israel.[858]

Ironically, whilst Israel refused to pull out from the Shebaa Farms because it falls under UNSCR 242, this could even become the same international pretext for Hezbollah to participate in a Syrian liberation war for the Golan Heights. However, even if Hezbollah (same as Nasrallah did in regard to the Syrian crisis) was to make an offer to leave Lebanon aside in such a future escalating war and invite Israel to fight the war in the Syrian Golan Heights, it could be predicted that Israel would decline. In all its wars on Lebanon Israel sought to exploit the civilian population by committing massacres to deter the efforts of armed resistance by seeking to create public distress accepting surrender.[859]

---

[856] Benjamin Netanyahu (2017), "Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the USS George H.W. Bush docked outside of Haifa", *Sputnik International,* 6 July 2017.
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201707061055270199-netanyahu-calls-israel-carrier-us/

[857] ibid.

[858] Comparing the era of the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon (1978/1982-2000) with the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights (1967/1973 reaching 2018-onwards) in relationship to the international community's commitment, Israel never respected the implementation of UNSCR 425 related to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, like also in UNSCRs 242 and 338 in relationship to the Israeli-annexed Golan. Although Lebanon and Syria were always keen towards the Israeli implementation of those resolutions, Israel remained eager to reject any withdrawal enjoying a US veto to any pressures on Israel to implement its international obligations. Even lastly the Trump administration approving the annexation of Golan to legitimatize the exploitation to its energy resources. In 2000 Israel refused to pull out from the Golan also worried over the strategic security significance in its Heights. On the other hand, as became evident in Israel's South Lebanon 'security zone', this did not achieve any security for Israel but rather brought a deterrence to its armed superiority image. Moreover, rockets fire attacks could still cross into or over any security zone, thus a continued security zone pretext in the Golan could end up turning into a war ploy, even creating a 'hell zone' for Israel.

[859] Nonetheless, Hezbollah would still probably make an early proposition towards this to expose the aggressive Israeli war attitude in determination to bring harm to Lebanon. Yet, the political irony in Lebanon is that, even if Hezbollah offers to resolve its armed conflicts or political enmities with Israel or its new Arab allies outside Lebanon, Hezbollah would still find domestic Lebanese criticism. Heedlessly, whether in the case of a Syrian-Israeli war, or an Iranian-Israeli war, the fate to such conflict could will trigger the war in the Golan Heights where

Hence, the 'deal of the century' which started to materialize after Trump's business, financial, arms, security and political bargains with Saudi Arabia in his visit to the Kingdom in May 2017,[860] was to expose the future hegemonial interest anticipated presented as an Arab-Israeli peace agreement. Aside from the potential negative outcomes to the annexation of Jerusalem,[861] the agreement awards Israel further Palestinian territories and the Syrian Golan height, while pressuring Lebanon to settle with Israeli annexed territorial and maritime border regions.[862] Thus does not reflect on an end resolution to conflict in the region. Additionally, Trump even ignored warnings and criticisms by Amnesty International that he could be accused of being complicit in war crimes by selling arms to the Saudis[863] to prevent the nation's violation of international law via air strikes in Yemen and killing civilians.[864] Sarcastically, with the Saudi deal Trump still achieved his elections campaign promise, commenting in late 2015 that "we should milk Saudi Arabia as much as possible" until the wealthy Sheiks become useless to do business with.[865]

---

thousands of militants could still cross 'into and beyond the Galilee' aiming closer to Jerusalem, if the war becomes triggered over Al-Aqsa mosque.

[860] Rachael Revesz (2017), "Donald Trump signs $110 billion arms deal with nation he accused of masterminding 9/11", *The Independent*, 21 May 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-arms-deal-saudi-arabia-110-billion-911-terrorism-international-law-war-crimes-a7747076.html

[861] Garcia, Feliks (2016), "Donald Trump promises to move US embassy to Jerusalem as Netanyahu praises 'clear support' for Israel", *Independent*, 12 December 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-israel-us-embassy-jerusalem-benjamin-netanyahu-f-35-iran-a7470881.html

Above all, the state of Israel also remains a taboo topic to confront in the US, occasionally challenged by individual intellectuals yet to become faced with accusations of anti-Semitism. Including at the political aspect like in Trump's efforts to deliver his election campaign promise on Jerusalem becoming tantamount to opening Pandora's box of taboo conflicts. In fact, before and after becoming president-elect in late 2016, Trump had promised, and kept meeting his roadmap promise-obligation on Jerusalem, also satisfying Christian evangelical and Zionist theologies. Yet also exposing the issue of the dominance to concentrated power and wealth, contributing to political and military oppression to the issue of Palestine, while alternatively providing godly inspired promises for Jerusalem. Ironically, becoming a multi religious shared prophecy to saved and chosen sects preparing for and awaiting a grand war against tyranny and oppression allegedly being a final decisive battle.

[862] In fact, the renewed escalation to such threats began in early 2018 as Nasrallah vowed to prevent Israel from exploiting Lebanese territorial rights, after Israeli attempts to affix its claims to Lebanese inland and maritime territories, which Lebanon continued to reject along with the Israeli threats while welcoming U.S. mediation outside any pressures. Where in this respect Hezbollah sought to protect a domestic-external inter-sectarian unity, and an intra-sectarian and non-sectarian domestic Lebanese national unity, and a regional Arab national unity, while adopting a pragmatic universal Islamic nationalism.

[863] During his election campaign, Trump was very critical of Saudi Arabia—especially its role in funding terrorism on 9/11– in reference to the classified documents in the investigation implicating Saudi Arabia in those attacks. But his visit to KSA had a price; signing a $109B weapons deal predicted to grow to a $380 billion Saudi investment within 10 years. Could be ascribed as a compensation to what the US has already paid in peace efforts costs, with the annual 3 billion dollars annual armed reward to Israel, and also to Egypt since their 1979 peace agreement.

[864] *Ibid*.

[865] MEP (2015), Donald Trump: We Should Milk Saudi Arabia As much As Possible, And When The Wealthy Sheikhs Becomes Useless We Shall Abandon The Middle-East. *Middle East Press*, 2 September 2015.

7.8.2. A Golan-Galilee War Inertia

In other words, a contextual complexity with localization and geopolitical factors to a transnational geographic reality, where the factor of surprise or non-readiness to facing a creditable enemy, remains an unpredicted determinant element, unseen or considered at ease, leading to lack of serious alternative strategical considerations. A realism to events, occasions or situations, best described by Gareth Stanfield on "intelligence officers familiar with surprise theory and decision makers who had in their possession all the necessary data but still failed to arrive at the correct conclusions."[866] Thus this could be contributed to various predictable or unpredictable war scenarios.[867] "Few militaries in the Middle East or globally that could match the standing of the IDF,"[868] yet even as a powerful military it failed to pursue its early days announced war objectives in the July 2006 War on Lebanon. Thus, this could lead to a renewed status of *inertia* which Israel experienced during the 1973 Yom Kippur War against Egypt and Syria.

An *inertia* Stansfield specifically examines in the situation faced by both Israel and Egypt, where for both "defeat could equate to either absolute destruction (in the case of Israel) or regime change (in the case of Arab states)."[869] Relatively, Israel survival as state remains tied to an unfished war with Syria, which could mean an absolute destruction for Israel if defeated in the next battle. Even with Lebanon, where Israel also escalated its security concern, and in September 2017 announced its largest military drill in almost two decades, targeted at Lebanon. It was a simulated war scenario

---

http://middleeastpress.com/english/donald-trump-we-should-milk-saudi-arabia-as-much-as-possible-and-when-the-wealthy-sheikhs-becomes-useless-we-shall-abandon-the-middle-east/

[866] Stansfield, Gareth (2012) "Israeli-Egyptian (In)-security Yom Kippur War", Section Three, Chapter 21, p. 414. In, Smith, Steve; Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (2012), *Foreign Policy Theories: Actors Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[867] Like for example in militarizing the Revolution in Syria, with the Western Powers becoming dependent on the regional powers that prioritized their immediate attention on conflict over the gains of war before the war is over. Although, it is in the regime's interest to declare it is dealing with a domestic civil-war crisis (provides regime credibility to use violence in protecting the state), the regime insisted that it was facing a war with a regional and international aggression magnitude, which in fact materialized in the years to come. That is aside from the issue of fostering terrorism as a proxy tool at this war, especially in regard of the concept of fighting fire by fire or terrorism by terrorism (like the case of *takfiri* war against Hezbollah, which was met by failure in the attempt bring defeat or destroy Hezbollah in the well-funded Syrian War since it behaved as a resistance groups vis-a-vis terrorist militia or cartel groups). Reflected in the concept of Resistance defended by the national state concept, acknowledging sectarian diversity, versus the one-saved sect fundamentalist ideology (even reflected in regime, tribal, security, partisan or monarchy) state power rule.

[868] Stansfield: 2012, p. 414.

[869] Ibid, p. 416.

that positioned Hezbollah along Israel's northern border, with all Israeli units joining forces to test their readiness to attack Lebanon. And also for readiness provided a possible terrorist infiltration attack that required an unprecedented Israeli evacuation scenario at the Mount Galilee borders, with the possible collapse of the Israeli armed security peace-shield in the Galilee.[870] However, Hezbollah observed the Israeli drill as a continued acknowledgement to it armed deterrence capacity and capability, or seriousness towards countering the Israeli threats and crossing into the Galilee in the next war; to which Nasrallah also warned that the war could bring incalculable consequences whether with Lebanon or Syria.

Hence, this also reflects on "the multi-layered nature of foreign policy problems, and the intricacies of making sense of the foreign policies of a range of actors," as Stansfield articulates. Where he adds:

> It is impossible to exaggerate the effect of the Palestinian–Israeli dispute on the foreign policies of states, and with interests in, the Middle East region. Indeed, it is the existence of Israel and the plight of the Palestinians that drives the foreign policies of Middle East states to such an extent that the conflict can be considered an *idée fixe* among foreign policy concerns. The USA caught between embracing the democratic developments in Arab states, yet needing to assuage Israel's fears of the posture of post Arab Spring governments towards them and the Palestinians. For President Obama … his natural tendency towards supporting the democratization efforts of Arab states was tempered by the need to maintain the domestic support of those significant components of the US electorate who are sympathetic to the Israeli cause.[871]

Evidently, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is also problematic to the foreign policy of Lebanon, since 1948. Subsequently, even if Hezbollah disappears from Lebanon or it integrates into the Lebanese army – aside from the financial burdens that the Lebanese state cannot tolerate – Israel would still be worried about Hezbollah's Smart-Rocket arsenal and armed power even if becomes possessed by the Lebanese state.[872]

---

[870] Gili Cohen (2017), "Israeli Army to Simulate War with Hezbollah in Largest Drill in Decades", *Haaretz*, 5 September 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.810559

[871] Stansfield: 2012, p. 401.

[872] Hence, leaving Israel in a renewed cycle of challenge with Lebanon, best described by Yair Rafeed a former commanding officer of the secret Unit 504 – the Human Intelligence Division – of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), (who was an official witness and 'caterer' to the first Israeli collaboration contacts with officers from the split-Lebanese Army after 1976). He concludes from his experience in Lebanon that on the political and security level

Paradoxically, between 1960 and 1967, Lebanon was a pioneer state in the space rockets program, producing the Arab world's first rockets capable of suborbital flight.[873] The program was started at the Lebanese-Armenian Haigazian College (now University) in Beirut, led by Manoug Manougian, who had grown up in Jericho in the West Bank around 1948. Manoogian completed a Mathematics and Physics degree in Texas, and returned to teach at the College where he turned the science club into the remarkably successful Haigazian College Rocket Society and later to the Lebanese Rocket Society, which was supported by Lebanese President Fouad Chehab, and received funding from the Lebanese Ministry of Education;[874] allegedly even support by Emile Bustani before his death in 1963.

Hence, by 1963, Manougian team had developed the Cedar IV rocket that reached the Karman line – the internationally-agreed space boundary, 100 km above the surface of Earth – and had travelled 200 km (124 miles), which is a little lower than where today's International Space station orbits the earth.[875] However, the program was to face difficulties after President Chehab's term of office had ended in 1964. The last two launchings in 1964 and 1966 had ended with accidents, thus became due to political manipulations in the midst of regional and Cold War ongoing tensions. Mainly also that the program's status being strictly scientific non-armed endeavor, it furthermore lost its funding while also losing all its previous motivated contributors. Moreover, after CIA warnings of Israeli threats, Manougian and his team left Lebanon just before the outbreak of the 1967 war,[876] with the memories of the program becoming faded, and the archival material lost in the civil war.[877] In other words, a step backwards on science and technology to an

---

Israel has always ignored important and decisive considerations on the Lebanese domestic scene. In a documentary statement he notes that Lebanon is a country that requires extensive experience, since it remains a smart state reflected in its people's behaviors. Adding that "in Lebanon, if one asks a six year-old child how much is 'one plus one', the answer that would be given is 'it depends' not two; where 'it depends' is tied to buying and selling; thus in a state like this you must be altogether experienced, smart and wise, since there is no chance there in any tumble." Al-Mayadeen Culture (2012), *The Collaborators*, Al-Maydeen documentary, 3 December 2012, online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=198&v=9Q7-WbPDeRQ

[873] Richard Hooper (2013), "Lebanon's forgotten space programme", *BBC News*, 13 November 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24735423

[874] ibid.

[875] ibid.

[876] ibid.

[877] Joey Ayoub (2013), "The unbelievable true story of the 'Lebanese Rocket Society'", *Hummus for Thought*, 12 March 2013, at https://hummusforthought.com/2013/03/12/lebanese-rocket-society-a-review/

anticipated evolution of knowledge met with regression by a local and global mental systematic human suppression and oppression. Subsequently, preventing the rise to the intellectual state as became evident in Lebanon from 1967 onwards, or the right to the Lebanese state to possess smart-defense weapons.

7.9. Conclusion

In testing the Quantum theory approach a decade after the Hariri assassination, and after the 'Arab Spring' in 2011, this chapter continued to focus on the issue of security, and its relevance to the dilemma of power hegemony dictating both conflict and peace regional issues dominated by global economically- or politically-competing structures exploiting the local inhabitants' rule in resistance to this oppression. Hence, it observed the importance of the thin line between domestic, regional, international and even global politics – assessed beyond and within the state – in examining the foreign policy of Lebanon or the entire Middle East and Arab World regions. It is an extremely vibrant line that remains persistent throughout the Lebanese geo-dynamic atmospheres, which could be useful in evaluating the historical timeline of conflict and peace events, subjugated to corporate violence or terrorism. It could also examine basic human instincts in the ethical and unethical interplay of the art of politics, within a confused knowledge of misconception and truth. This would generate a human insecurity, exploited by corrupt economic, financial, legal or political power hegemony behaviours, while distracting and delaying an intellectual dialogue in resolving concepts of equal power-sharing in the state, to post-peace or war in Middle East conflicts.

It might also discredit a precise interpretation of a sovereign foreign policy, while the current systematic political structures in governance do not necessarily represent the public majority that could be with or opposed to the state's foreign policy approach. Or it might establish a position in the making of agreements, alliances, conflicts or peace resolutions, particularly *vis-à-vis* the Arab-Israeli 'sectarian corporate-dominated' state power sharing and coexistence issue.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

> "Pity the nation that is full of beliefs and empty of religion.
> Pity the nation that wears a cloth it does not weave
> and eats a bread it does not harvest.
> Pity the nation that acclaims the bully as hero,
> and that deems the glittering conqueror bountiful.
> Pity the nation that welcomes its new ruler with trumpeting, and farewells him with
> hooting, only to welcome another with trumpeting again."
>
> (Gibran Khalil Gibran: 1931)[878]

In a fast-evolving human civilization, quantum knowledge might be the future of a new era of human knowledge renaissance that would probably be better able to explain the sciences behind current mysteries, illusions, misconceptions, and unclear or unexplained theories. Likewise, this could be implemented in social sciences, or in further attempts to analyse foreign policy or international relations at the micro-macro (domestic, regional and international) levels during different timelines, events, occasions or situations. More research could possibly be developed in assessing Lebanese or Middle East foreign policy through expanding on the pluralist theoretical framework approach, which this study attempted to set as its guideline in reflecting a quantum-shaped multi-wave structure of un-predictions – or human insight predictions – that might summarize multi-domestic-external interpretations. It could possibly also become a more integrationist approach to multi-empirical social science disciplines that might be significant in assessing and understanding the macro events or structures, as in the complex case of the Lebanese state's domestic or foreign policy behaviours.

In examining the state issue, political change to power rule sharing in Lebanon or the region, would interpret a revolution towards equal representation in governance, able to conduct responsible and accountable sovereign state behaviour, protective of equal individual and social security citizenship rights. It could be interpretive of the multi-sectarian human cultural diversity that is bound into a statehood of social solidarity contract with accountable civil obligation and civic freedoms, but might also be bound into a more responsible global human solidarity contract that would be more aware of the human cycle of power failures leading to conflict, violence and hegemony. The concept of revolution in the timeline of human history has proved that change

---

[878] Khalil Gibran (1931), *The Garden of the Prophets* (London: Arkana 1998).

rarely comes in white revolutions, being always dominated by blood sacrifices, chaos and violence. Understanding a Quantum theoretical approach would provide evidence that white revolution could become the dominant alternative for a more knowledgeable intellectual humanity, by altering the dominance of the cycle of this human 'asabiyya chaos – a realism still maturing throughout humanity's century-by-century timeline, so long dominated by oppression and violence.

Nevertheless, history has also shown integrationist social solidarity 'asabiyya eras that brought peace, stability, commerce, prosperity and development in the region and contributed to the natural ancient geodynamics that still exist today. They have also contributed to a quantum-equated alternative of potential human maturity in white post-conflict peace resolutions, emphasising individual-human beliefs in a conscious social realism. This is a reality that extends to global fundamentalist domestic, regional and international hegemonies, exploiting the power and wealth of human energies and resources, albeit leading to additional human wastage and oppression, as again argued by Hijazi who explains that:

> Global hegemony provides an umbrella cover and protection to local state domestic hegemonies, forming this coalition of systematically-coordinated dominant hegemonies. This human social reality and its domestic and global interacting dimensions are usually ignored by examination of human development failures. The focus mainly rests on 'vacant titles' to political rights and democratic freedoms or economic corruption manipulations, theft, and bribery, yet without shedding light on the wider structure or the root causes. Being the obstacles or preventions to nation states' and individual human development, thereby maintaining the cycle of a corrupt human dominance order, distracted from the real issues, and generating escalated human divisions and extremism.[879]

This contributes towards further tension and extremism within an international community, confused by its Westphalian principles and trying to implement or propose conflict resolution although distant from the local human realities in such conflicts. It is reflected in the separation of religion from the state but not in global conflicts, thus by default defying the international concept

---

[879] Mustafa Hijazi (2005), *The Wasted Human: A Social Psychological Analysis* (Beirut: Arab Cultural Centre Press), p. 164 [Arabic]

of the modern civilized state. Moreover, the absence of independent and objective accountable institutional (and non-politicized) religious debate[880] left nothing but further confusion.

While the issue is the lack of debate over a transparent religious and non-religious power-sharing political contract that is accountable to the state in both civil and civic matters, religion remains to be exploited through the sectarian incitements to war and violence in a region of power hegemony conflicts. Quantum theory is an art through which to explore complex research and case-study situations, especially in zones of conflict and war violence in modern International Relations and Foreign Policy analyses *vis-à-vis* the issue of state sovereignty or power rule.

Chapter Two outlined the theoretical framework adopted for this research analysis. The objective was not to enhance the position of the parties in conflict but rather to maximize the analysis of the omni-balance interplay in the domestic-external security issues of both state and sub-state forces. This was further explained in Chapter Three, which outlined the methodological approach in seeking to follow an alternative analytical method beyond the systematic influences in examining Lebanese foreign policy; focused mainly on analysis of the state concept or power rule issue in Lebanon, the region, or in international relations. This was fairly evident in the political realism of the Arab-Israeli conflict that the thesis hypothesis aimed to articulate with regard to the patterns and dynamics of Lebanese foreign policy. These were seen mainly in the Lebanese-Israeli or Palestinian-Israeli (including Syrian) historic geo-demographic and geopolitical dynamics in the conflict, amidst continued Israeli violations of local civil territorial properties during the occupation. Whether for Chiha, Aoun or Nasrallah, both Syria (as an essential Lebanese geopolitical gateway), and the issue of Palestine and the conflict with Zionism (as a symbol of sectarian conflict, regional injustice and oppression) were to be essential priorities in the issue of Lebanese sovereignty, especially in terms of their refugee problem, which constituted a domestic Lebanese geo-demographic and socio-economic issue as it also included the Syrian war refugees that tripled the number of Palestinian refugees. They were kept hostage to their human miseries

---

[880] Ron E. Hassner (2009), *War on Sacred Grounds* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press), p. 81. Also Menahem Klein (2001), *Shattering a Taboo: the Contacts Towards a Permanent Status Agreement in Jerusalem, 1994–2001* [Hebrew], Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies, pp. 20-21.

and sufferings, remaining marginalized by both Western and Eastern international communities exploiting a penetrated Lebanese foreign policy in a penetrated Middle East region.

As examined in Chapter Four on the ancient and modern history of Lebanon, with a geo-political microscope the Levant region resembles the heart of the earth in the geo-politics of the ancient world's civilizations, possessing a memorable perspective on a sense of both the hearts and minds of its local inhabitants. Thus, the psychological sensations of the region's geopolitical impressions are very important, including the 'lost' religious perceptions of securing a human faith in the truth of God as an individual self-acknowledgement of human humbleness, rather than faith in the faulty contrasts that drift away from this purpose of religions. They are essential in revealing and defending the truth of the ethics of humble political governance, providing a safe environment for an equal citizenship solidarity contract with an earthly power rule. In other words, it ensures the equal participation of sectarian and non-sectarian forces in the state, with security being obligatory in securing equal civic and civil citizenship rights.

This issue was closely examined in Chapter Five which drew out the conclusions and outcomes of the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War that ended with a deplorable postponement in finalizing war and conflict resolutions in Lebanon and the region, particularly when attempting to abolish apartheid political rule in Lebanon, or in ending the continued physical apartheid committed by Israel against indigenous Palestinians. This affirmed the fine edge between both domestic and foreign policies in the region, influenced by the issue of power-sharing hegemony, given the common oppressed civic and civil rights issues influenced by the regional wars and conflicts. It also made Lebanese Foreign Policy hostage to complex domestic and external power hegemony pragmatism. All the influential forces present on the ground within and outside the state contributed to the making of events in Lebanon or the region. Chapter Six sought to examine such impacts in Lebanon before and after the assassination of the Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, in 2005, at which point the country became a conflict zone between all the overlapping domestic and foreign arbiters attempting to redefine its regional and international relations identity. Although the Lebanese presidency had, until the Ta'if Agreement, wielded the most influence over the Lebanese state's foreign policy decisions, in practice there were also considerations of domestic

(sectarian) national consensus, which traditionally kept Lebanon both under and in occasional political deadlocks and crises, especially amidst regional conflicts and instability.

Thus, although the majority of the President's powers, following the Ta'if Agreement, were transferred collectively to the Cabinet, thereby constitutionalizing the traditional domestic national consensus, technically the traditional practice of political conflict remained dominant. This also prevented the full implementation of the Ta'if Agreement, as became evident in the period after the Syrian withdrawal, having previously been blamed for being the obstacle to economic and political reform. Lebanon remained hostage to constitutional violations under contrasting interpretations, manipulated by 'customary' doctrinal norms that reflected the complex power-struggle shifts over disputed national priorities and issues, or foreign policy interests inherited since 1926. At the institutional, political or intellectual level, Beirut remained a constant chaotic and anarchic cityscape, stimulated by complex sectarian, secular, ideological or corporate-dominated state and sub-state political influences, at both domestic and foreign levels. It also included the power/regime macro-structure in relation to the domestic-external process, whereby the dynamics of individual leaders' power and authority, regime legitimacy, decision-makers' preference and choices, seemed also to define foreign policy strategies and tactics.

Traditionally invisible in systematic analysis, yet forming the foreign and domestic threats or violations of Lebanese state sovereignty, such processes were shaped under complex regionally-influenced preferences and choices, or neutrality positions with sovereignty concessions by the decision-makers, especially over regional foreign policy disputes that led to domestic political deadlocks. Also, in terms of state development and economic prosperity, or eliminating poverty, Lebanon remained hostage to 'sovereign lending' economic exploitations, as well as to increased unemployment and socio-economic difficulty. Although the MEC-MFC political crisis between 2006 and 2008 reflected a division over the concept of sovereignty in Lebanon, both coalitions remained dependent on external mediations, especially during times of regionally-affiliated conflicts, thereby breaching Lebanese political sovereignty and postponing domestic reforms, as became evident in the period after the Doha Agreement when the electoral law reforms outlined in Ta'if were postponed. This meant maintaining the post-civil war mutual political right of veto over domestic and foreign policy choices, and playing at odds with Lebanese foreign interests that

had continued ever since the 1943 National Pact with regard to regional or international hegemony interests. Thus, the system was left with occasional disagreements over a neutral Lebanese position amidst a historic cycle of East and West dichotomies, especially at times of regional crisis.

Although a disengagement-neutrality became dominant with regard to Arab regional conflicts, as was examined in the case of Syria after 2005 or after 2011, a continuing atmosphere that was nevertheless maintained towards a deterrence-neutrality with Israel was becoming an impossible contradiction to the codes of state sovereignty practicalities that had been imposed since Israel's unilateral withdrawal in 2000, and were emphasised after 2006. Chapter Seven examined the interplay of Lebanese neutrality realisms, especially amidst the discreet security breaches against Syria or the delayed security coordination with the Syrian state, in the war against terrorism. Yet such tactics met with less success in resolving the Syrian refugees' crisis that became hostage to regional and international delays in reaching a political resolution, mainly because of Saudi and US-influenced, or sponsored, political pressures opposed to relations with Syria or Iran.

Hence, the country was to remain hostage to the mutual political vetoes and the constant disagreements over the shape of, or approach to, an adequate Lebanese political neutrality, disengagement, or re-engagement. All remained disputed, or dependent on considerable regional and international support, whereas a decade after the Hariri assassination it had become evident that the region was also under a new global power hegemony shift, similar to World War One, World War Two, or the post-Cold War era.

This also involved the exploitation of International Community decisions, dependant on corrupt governance influenced by war or peace in the manipulation of Middle East conflicts. A successful Lebanese attempt to engage in the transition to a new power-sharing formula that would ensure equal political representation of all 'social or communal forces' in the state, could possibly have a future 'domino impact' on an Arab region already attentive to the Lebanese political and multi-sectarian liberal diversity scene, and certainly also in finding a fair resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict dilemma, a hostage to peace resolution and critical of co-existence with the 'savage' Palestinians. Hence, there is also the dilemma of the regional and international power rule hegemony; or the dominance of an isolationist '*asabiyya* power rule, equally exploiting

secular and religious democratic political diversity in the state, whether Muslim, Jewish or Christian, opposed to politicised theologies of human supremacy exploitations. Aside from the continued Israeli violations of Lebanese state sovereignty, or the human rights of Palestinians living under occupation, for as long Israel is permitted freely to target Lebanon or Syria without any international deterrence, this would mean a continued reality of war status. There are already increased risks of the region developing to become a conflict zone for an armed rocket race, in preparation for an anticipated Grand Battle.

Unfortunately, the pursuit of socio-economic prosperity catering to human security projects is still exploited by war and greed, while corruption, mainly in the politically-exploited global conflicts in the region when securing oligarchy deals of the century, is also evident in the unethical approach towards resolving the Issue of Palestine. It comes at the cost of weakening and weakened individuals, people or nations, who are subjugated in their time, labour or intellectual freedoms, and oppressed at the state level. Consequently, while Middle East foreign policy is entangled with conflict, violence, hegemony, business or friendship deals, investigating all the domestic, regional and international dimensions is very significant in assessing the foreign policy behaviours in the region, especially since the Middle East or Arab states tend to share similar event causes or impacts in different places or situations, while sharing the same memories that repeat the same cycle of war, crisis, invasion, tragedy, oppression and resistance, whether at the domestic or foreign policy level.

There is also a shared marking of the struggles of resistance, strength, victory, rebellion, or power deterrence to threats of foreign domination in violation of state sovereignty. Pending the revival of a memory of stability, enabling a political formula for communal geo-demographic security providing equal opportunity and freedoms of trade or mobility, will bring about a civilizational prosperity; as marked in an ancient Phoenician Heritage. In this aspect, the Levant remains a significant region in global, cultural and civilizational relationships, especially as it is becoming more complex in shifting towards new 'Eastphalian' and Westphalian dichotomies. Choosing between the two, or none, is not the issue when finding answers or solutions. The issue remains in achieving a multi-civilizational (political, theological, intellectual, etc.) civil solidarity ethical approach to an accountable hybrid-governance state, based on an evolution of human knowledge

(and relevant to an old Arabic maxim – some attribute it to the Prophet): 'Seek knowledge all the way as far as China'. Yet this remains impossible in the impending cultural and civilizational blockades imposed by security walls, sanctions or conflict zones. Paradoxically, reaching China continues to be confronted by the blockading of genuine resolutions for ending the causes of conflict and war that impact on the individual security rights of the indigenous inhabitants of the region.

Aside from the border blockades across the entire Levant, or Middle East region, Lebanon still has to resolve its domestic traffic-jam blockades, still awaiting already spent funding to build a modern transportation infrastructure. Also, at the political or economic performance level, while the Phoenicians seem to have occasional successes in mediating the East and West dichotomies, modern Lebanon – which was founded under this concept – has after all remained strictly dependent on the West; even in the Arab-Western mediatory role it once attracted. Thus, Lebanese state foreign behaviour remains lacking any tactical endorsement of its 'forgotten' geopolitical foundations. It lacks even the memory of the Lebanese state national anthem, which, emphasising Lebanon's geographic position, states that: "Our East is its heart forever Lebanon. Its sea, its land, is the pearl of the two Orients". In other words, while emphasising that it is 'the pearl of the two Orients', the country remains distant from the far Orient which seems to be a forgotten reality for the intellectual foundations of a state vision of Lebanon becoming a centre of balance between East and West. Yet it could be crucial in securing a mediatory multi-diversity character for a role that would offer an alternative atmosphere to the complex chaos that besets the regional-global opportunities...

Appendix

The Ancient Phoenician Routes to Human Civilizational Exchange of Knowledge and Goods

PHOENICIA'S ROUTE

The Phoenician Alphabet ~ 1400 BC

Bibliography

Abboud, Samer N. and Benjamin J. Muller (2012), *Rethinking Hizballah: Legitimacy, Authority, Violence* (London: Routledge).

Abizeid, Marc (2014), "Interactive: Lebanon under Syrian rocket fire", *Al-Akhbar* Newspaper, 19 March 2014. Online at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/19088

Abraham, Antoine J. (2008), *Lebanon in Modern Times* (Lanham MD: University Press of America).

Abramson, Scott (2012), "The Promise and Failure of the Zionist-Maronite Relationship, 1920-1948", MA thesis, Brandeis University, Waltham MA, February 2012.

Abu Adas, Ahmad Video Last Accessed February 2018, aired on Aljazeera TV the day of Hariri Assassination, 14 February 2005. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJoWFdembtM

Abu Khalil, Asa'd (2001), "Lebanon One Year After the Israeli Withdrawal", *Middle East Research and Information Project* (MERIP), 29 May 2001. Online at: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero052901

Abu Khalil, Asa'd (2013), "The Maronite Patriarch on the payroll of Israel", *Angry Arab News Service* blog, 13 January, 2013, citing Yoav Gelber, "From Sharon's Inheritance", paper at ISA/AIS Annual Conference, Banff , Canada (2006). Online at: http://angryarab.blogspot.ca/2013/01/the-maronite-patriarch-on-payroll-of.html

Abu-Nasr, Donna (2018), "Lebanon Hires McKinsey to Help Revamp the Economy", *Bloomberg*, 8 January 2018, online at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-09/lebanon-hires-mckinsey-to-help-revamp-economy-minister-says

Agence France Presse (AFP) (2008), "Nasrallah threatens to destroy Israel if Jewish state carries out threat to attack Lebanon", *Daily Star and AFP*, 25 August 2008. Online at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2008/Aug-25/51221-nasrallah-threatens-to-destroy-israel-if-jewish-state-carries-out-threat-to-attack-lebanon.ashx

AFP and Ynet (2010), "Saudi plan for anti-Hezbollah force revealed", *Ynet News*, 12 August 2010. Online at: https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3995992,00.html

AFP (2013), "Suicide bombers in Beirut attack on Iranian embassy Identified", *Reposted by The National,* 24 November 2013. Online at: https://www.thenational.ae/world/suicide-bombers-in-beirut-attack-on-iranian-embassy-identified-1.312901

Ahmad, Zaid (2012), "Ibn Khaldun and Greek Philosophy: Some notes from the Muqaddima", *Historical Researcher Letter*, vol 2, p. 29: (quoting Franz Rosenthal (1967), *The Muqaddimah:* Vol. 3 [English trans.]

Ahren, Raphael (2013), "Why is Israel so afraid of the Arab Peace Initiative?" *The Times of Israel,* 18 June 2013, online at https://www.timesofisrael.com/why-is-israel-so-afraid-of-the-arab-peace-initiative/

Akarli, Engin (1993), *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (London: I. B. Tauris).

Al-Attar, Sahar (2019), "Charbel Nahas: Lebanon is in a pre-crisis phase", *Le Commerce du Levant*, 15 January 2019. Online at: https://www.lecommercedulevant.com/article/28809-charbel-nahas-lebanon-is-in-a-pre-crisis-phase

Al Bu Said, Badr bin Hamad (2005), "Afterword – Small States' Diplomacy in the Age of Globalization: An Omani Perspective", in Gerd Nonneman, ed. (2005), *Analysing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe* (London: Routledge).

Al-Fakih, Rakan (2013), "At least two soldiers killed in East Lebanon ambush", *The Daily Star*, 1 February 2013. Online at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/Feb-01/204650-army-patrol-ambushed-in-east-lebanon-several-casua.ashx#axzz2JflCcR28

Al-Ferzli, Elie (2012), "Lebanese Defense Minister Ignites Heated Debate Over Al-Qaeda in Lebanon", *Al-Monitor*, 9 January 2012. Online at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/01/arsal-revives-discussion-on-the.html

Al-Gabri, Mohammad Abed (1982), *'Asabiyya and the State: A Reflection on Khaldounian Theory in Islamic History* [in Arabic], **(**Beirut: Dar al-Talia).

Al-Hindy, Elie (2014), "The Dilemma of Human Rights in Lebanese Electoral Laws", Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs & the American University of Beirut, Working Paper Series 21, February 2014.

Al-Jadeed (2015), "Hariri Assassination STL Video Report", *Al-Jadeed TV*, 20 November 2015 [Arabic]) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0-oaQb1TUY

Al-Jazeera (2005), "Beirut Clashes Follow Geagea Amnesty", *Al-Jazeera News*, 18 July 2005. Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/07/2008410134835681483.html

Al-Jazeera (2006), "Qatar pledges support to Lebanon", *Aljazeera News*, 22 August 2006. Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/08/2008410112526158784.html

Al-Jazeera (2010), "Emir of Qatar tours south Lebanon", *Al-Jazeera News,* 31 July 2010. Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/07/201073114135291407.html

Al-Khalili, Jim (2013), "Double Slit Experiment Explained", The Royal Institution, 1 February 2013. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A9tKncAdlHQ

Al-Manar News (2011), "Lebanon Keen to Defend its Wealth", *Al-Manar TV*, 22 July 2011. Online at: http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=22266

Al-Mayadeen Culture (2012), *The Collaborators*, Al-Maydeen documentary, 3 December 2012, online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=198&v=9Q7-WbPDeRQ

Al-Mayadeen TV (2017), "The Path to the Presidency", Emile Lahoud Presidency, Part 3, presented by Kareem Baqradoni, *Al-Mayadeen Documentary*, 26 February 2017. [Arabic] online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1p4DLJn7Nv4

Al-Mayadeen TV (2017), "Abdel Nasser Revisited: Part 4, Nasser and the United States", *Al-Mayadeen Documentary*, 14 May 2017. [Arabic] Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GvCnGEtoLRw

Al-Mayadeen TV (2017), "Abdel Nasser Revisited: Nasser and the Issue of Palestine". *Al-Mayadeen Documentary*, 21 May 2017 [Arabic] Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrAgUSg7uxI

Al-Mayadeen TV (2017), "President Emile Lahoud: 'From Liberation to Resolution 1559'", Part 4, presented by Kareem Baqradoni *Al-Mayadeen Documentary*, 5 March 2017. [Arabic] online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=108&v=R9CIuTtnX9I

Al-Nahar Newspaper (2012), "Free Syrian Army Infiltrates Arsal, Attacks Army Post", *Naharnet*, 22 September 2012. Online at: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/54455

Alpher, Yossi, Ghassan Khatib, and Charmaine Seit, eds. (2011), *The Bitterlemons Guide to the Arab Peace Initiative: New Thinking on a Key Middle East Proposal* (Jerusalem: Bittterlemons), 162p.

Al-Saadi, Yazan (2013), "From Boston to Beirut: A Comparison of 'Terror'", *Al-Akhbar Newspaper*, 17 August 2013. Online at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/16748

Al-Salhy, Suadad (2013), "Al-Qaeda Says it Freed 500 inmates in Iraq Jail-Break", *Reuters*, 23 July 2013. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-alqaeda/al-qaeda-says-it-freed-500-inmates-in-iraq-jail-break-idUSBRE96M0C720130723

Al-Shamahi, Abubakr (2015), "Iran Waives Visa Requirements for Egypt, Lebanon, Syria nationals", *Al-Araby News*, UK, 29 July 2015. Online at: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2015/7/29/iran-waives-visa-requirements-for-egypt-lebanon-syria-nationals

Al-Solh, Raghid (2004), *Lebanon and Arabism, 1936-1945* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies).

Alteras, Isaac (1993), *Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli relations, 1953–1960* (Gainesville FL: University Press of Florida).

Amrieh, Antoine, and Misbah Al-Alil (2013), "Car Bombs kill 42, wound 400 at North Lebanon Mosques", *The Daily Star*, 23 August 2013. Online at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Aug-23/228408-explosion-heard-in-north-lebanon.ashx

Anon (2005), "Scores Arrested in Connection with Aqaba Rocket Attack", *Al-Bawaba News,* 22 August 2005. Online at: https://www.albawaba.com/news/scores-arrested-connection-aqaba-rocket-attack

Anon (2005), "Al-Zarqawi Declares War on Iraqi Shia", *Al-Jazeera News*, 14 September 2005. Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/09/200849143727698709.html

Anon (2005), "Producer Dies After Jordan Blast", *BBC News*, 11 November 2005. Online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4427662.stm

Anon (2005), "Al-Qaeda Claims Israel Attack Link", *CNN*, 29 December 2005. Online at http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/12/29/mideast.alqaeda.claim/

Anon (2006), "Hezbollah Leader Calls for Prisoner Exchange", *Al-Bawaba*, 12 July 2006. Online at: http://www.albawaba.com/news/hizbullah-leader-calls-prisoner-exchange

Anon (2006), "Rice sees bombs as birth pangs. *Al-Jazeera Archive*, 22 July 2006. Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/07/200849132037797119.html

Anon (2006), "Condoleezza Rice visits Beirut to make the war between Israel and Lebanon much longer", *Pravda Report*, Russia, 24 July 2006. Online at: http://www.pravdareport.com/world/asia/24-07-2006/83499-condoleezza_rice-0/#sthash.InRCTGvZ.dpuf

Anon (2006), "Saniora Denounces Nasrallah's Attacks", *Jerusalem Post*, 8 December 2006. Online at: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Saniora-denounces-Nasrallahs-attacks

Anon (2007), "Beirut Under Curfew after Clashes", *BBC News*, 25 January 2007. Online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6299037.stm

Anon (2007), "More Victims of the militia Attacks", *Nasseb.com*, Village Journals, 25 January 2007. Online at: http://www.naseeb.com/villages/journals/more-victims-of-the-militias-attacks-67572

Anon (2007), "Breaking News: Live coverage of the war in Lebanon", *Ya Lubnan*, 14 March 2007. Online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20080515002525/http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2008/05/_time_shown_on.php

Anon (2007), "'Deal reached' on Lebanon Impasse", *Al-Jazeera.com,* 14 May 2007. Online

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2008/05/200861503720419736.html

Anon (2010), "Erdogan, Recep T. Erdogan from Akkar: We Will Continue on Supporting Lebanon, Israel Should Stop its Provocations", *Profile News*, 24 November 2010. Online at: http://www.profilenews.com/index.php?id=825

Anon (2010), 'Game Changer: Nasrallah Announces a New Hezbollah Deterrence Strategy", *Qifa Nabki*, 16 February 2010. Online at: https://qifanabki.com/2010/02/16/game-changer-hezbollah-deterrence-israel/

Anon (2010), "Nasrallah: We Will Attack Ships Approaching Israel in Future War", *Haaretz*, 25 May 2010. Online at: https://www.haaretz.com/1.5124825

Anon (2011), "Lebanon Keen to Defend its Wealth", *Al-Manar TV*, 22 July 2011, online at http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=22266

Anon (2012), "Election Law Gives Majority to March 8: Experts", *The Daily Stars,* Beirut, Lebanon, 10 August 2012. Online at: https://www.dailystar.com.lb/GetArticleBody.aspx?id=184098&fromgoogle=1

Anon (2013), "Nasrallah threatens to bomb Israeli power stations", *YNet News*, 16 February 2013. Online at: https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4345586,00.html

Anon (2013), "Deadly Blast Rocks a Hezbollah Stronghold in Lebanon", *New York Times*, 16 August 2013. Online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/16/world/middleeast/beirut-bombing.html

Anon (2013), "Profile: Abduallah Azzam Brigades", *BBC News*, 19 November 2013, online at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25005417

Anon (2014), "Bulldozing the Border Between Iraq and Syria: The Islamic State", *Vice News*, 14 August 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxX_THjtXOw

Anon (2015), "Nasrallah: We No Longer Recognize Rules of Engagement, We Will Go to War if Imposed on us", *Naharnet* 30 January 2015, online at http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/165479

Anon (2015), "Free Syrian Army: Hezbollah is lying, we killed Kuntar, not Israel", *The Jerusalem Post*, 21 December 2015. Online at: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Free-Syrian-Army-Hezbollah-is-lying-we-killed-Kuntar-not-Israel-437951

Anon (2016), "GCC declares Lebanon's Hezbollah a terrorist organisation", *Middle East Eye*, 2 March 2016. Online: https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/news/gcc-declares-lebanons-hezbollah-terrorist-organisation-212714095

Anon (2016), "Arab satellite drops Hezbollah's Al Manar TV", *Al-Nahar* newspaper, 6 April 2016. Online at: https://en.annahar.com/article/348102-hezbollahs-al-manar-goes-off-air-in-lebair-in-lebanon-after-arab-satellite-drops

Anon (2017), "Aboard US aircraft carrier, Netanyahu hails symbol of 'freedom and victory'", *Times of Israel*, 3 July 2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/aboard-us-aircraft-carrier-netanyahu-hails-symbol-of-freedom-and-victory/

Anon (2018), "Artificial Intelligence: How We Help Machines Learn", *The New York Times*, February 2018. Ref Trevor Darrell, a professor of computer science at the University of California, Berkeley. Online at: https://paidpost.nytimes.com/facebook/artificial-intelligence-how-we-help-machines-learn.html

Anon (n.d.), "Qornet Shehwan Gathering", *The Middle East Mirror*, Online at: http://themiddleeastmirror.weebly.com/uploads/7/5/3/0/7530186/qornet_shehwan_gathering.pdf accessed June 2016.

Arango, Tim (2013), "Dozens Killed in Battles Across Iraq as Sunnis Escalate Protests Against Government", *The New York Times*, 23 April 2013. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/world/middleeast/clashes-at-sunni-protest-site-in-iraq.html

Arjomand, Said Amir (2009), "The Constitution of Medina: a Sociolegal Interpretation of Muhammad's Acts of Foundation of the Umma", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 41, no. 49.

Asa-el, Amotza (2016), "A Bridge Too Far: Peres's Grand Vision for the Middle East**,** *Jerusalem Post*, 24 October 2016. http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/A-Bridge-Too-Far-Peress-grand-vision-for-the-Middle-East-470720

Ashkenaz, Eli, Jack Khoury and Amos Harel (2011), "Al-Qaida Linked Group Claims Responsibility for Katyusha Fire Against Israel", *Haaretz*, 29 November 2011. Online at: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/al-qaida-linked-group-claims-responsibility-for-katyusha-fire-against-israel-1.398495

Associated Press (1997), "12 Israelis Killed in Raid in Southern Lebanon", republished in *The New York Times*, 5 September 1997. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/05/world/12-israelis-killed-in-raid-in-southern-lebanon.html

Associated Press (2006), "Hezbollah Leader Praises Lebanon Protests", posted by *Vail Daily*, 7 December 2006. Online at: http://www.vaildaily.com/news/hezbollah-leader-praises-lebanon-protests

Associated Press and Natasha Mozgovaya (2010), "Lebanon: We'll Reject U.S. Military Aid if Weapons Can't Be Used Against Israel." *Haaretz*, 11 August 2010, online at https://www.haaretz.com/1.5098674

Associated Press (2010), "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad welcomed as hero in Lebanon", *The Guardian*, 13 October 2010. Online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/13/mahmoud-ahmadinejad-visit-lebanon-hezbollah

Associated Press (2011). "Hezbollah Names CIA Spies in Lebanon", *The Guardian*, 13 December 2011. Online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/13/hezbollah-names-cia-spies-lebanon

Avent, Ryan (2018), "How Robots will Break Politics", *The Economist*, 9 January 2018. Online at: https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/05/robots-politics-automation-technology-216220

Ayoub, Joey (2013), "The unbelievable true story of the 'Lebanese Rocket Society'", *Hummus for Thought*, 12 March 2013, at https://hummusforthought.com/2013/03/12/lebanese-rocket-society-a-review/

Ayubi, Nazih N. (1992), *The Arabs and the State Issue* [Arabic] (Beirut: Dar Al-Saqi).

Ayubi, Nazih N. (1995), *Overstating the Arab State* (London: I. B. Tauris).

Azar, Pierre (2013), "*Al-Hadath* with Samar Abu Khalil", *NTV*, 13 November 2013 [Arabic] http://www.aljadeed.tv/MenuAr/news/DetailNews/AlHadathDetailNews.html?Id=91639

Bader al-Din, Asim, and Samir M. Abu Shakra (2011), "Quote Origins: Religion for God, the Homeland for Everyone: Secularism, Politicized Religion and a Critique of Religious Thought", *Al-Hewar* 27 December 2011 [in Arabic] (Beirut: Lebanese Arab Research Centre) https://www.m.ahewar.org/s.asp?aid=119689&r=0

Bakri, Nada and M. Hassan Fattach (2007), "Hezbollah Strike Brings Beirut to a Virtual Halt", *New York Times*, 23 January 2007. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/23/world/middleeast/23cnd-lebanon.html

Bakri, Nada (2011), "Bombing Attack on Peacekeepers in Lebanon Adds Another Jolt to a Region in Upheaval", *New York Times*, 17 May 2011. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/28/world/middleeast/28lebanon.html

Baladi Attachment (2015), "Maarake: The Fifth Southern Symphony", [Arabic], *Al-Akhbar* Newspaper, 5 March 2015. Online at: http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/227510

Baroud, Ramzy (2017), "Should Hamas Rewrite the Past?", *Dr Ramzy Baroud's Page*, 10 May 2017. Online at: http://www.ramzybaroud.net/should-hamas-rewrite-the-past/

Bassam, Laila, and Alexander Dziadosz (2014), "Suicide bombers target Iranian center in Beirut", *Reuters*, 19 February 2014. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-blast-casualties/suicide-bombers-target-iranian-center-in-beirut-idUSBREA1I0PQ20140219

Baylouny, Anne Marie (2009), "US Foreign Policy in Lebanon", in Robert Looney ed., *Handbook on US Middle East Relations* (London: Routledge), pp. 310-323.

Beale, Jonathan (2006), "Diary: Rice's Mid-East mission", *BBC News* 26 July 2006. Online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5205164.stm

Ben Solomon, Ariel (2013), "Hezbollah says commander killed in Beirut, blames Israel", *Reuters*, reposted at *Jerusalem Post*, 4 December 2013. Online at: http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Hezbollah-says-commander-killed-in-Beirut-blames-Israel-333934

Benn, Aluf (2007), "PM: War Planned Months in Advance", *Haaretz Newspaper*, 3 March 2007. Online at: http://www.haaretz.com/pm-war-planned-months-in-advance-1.214958

Bennet, James (2004), "Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike", *The New York Times*, 22 March 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/22/world/leader-of-hamas-killed-by-missile-in-israeli-strike.html

Bergman, Ronen (2019), *Rise and Kill First: the Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassination* (New York: Penguin-Random House).

Berman, Lazar, and Ilan Ben Zion (2013), "Soldier killed by Lebanese sniper laid to rest", *Times of Israel*, 16 December 2013. Online at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/soldiers-killer-surrenders-to-lebanese-authorities/

Bernstein, Jarrod (2011), "Ensuring Israel's Qualitative Military Edge", Whitehouse Blog, 17 November 2011, at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/11/17/ensuring-israels-qualitative-military-edge

Beshara, Adel (2012), *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, Pioneers and Identity* (London: Routledge).

Bin Laden, 'Usama (1996), "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places", Bin Laden's Fatwa, republished by Masaryk University (originally in *Al-Quds Al-'Arabi*, August 1996). Online at: https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/jaro2010/MVZ203/OBL___AQ__Fatwa_1996.pdf

Blanford, Nicholas (2002). "A Lebanese-Israeli water conflict threatens to boil over", *The Christian Science Monitor*, 21 October 2002. Online at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1021/p08s01-wome.html

Blanford, Nicholas and Bilal Y. Saab (2011), "Hezbollah on Offense", *The National Interest*, 8 March 2011. Online at: https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/hezbollah-offense-4982

Brandenburg, Rachel (2010), "Iran and the Palestinians", *The Iran Primer*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC. Online at: http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-palestinians

Brilliant, Moshe (1978), "Israeli officials Say Gunmen Intended to Seize Hotel", *The New York Times*, 13 March 1978.

Brown, Leon Carl (1984), *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Bruce-Lockhart, Anna (2016), "Why China is Building a New Silk Road?" World Economic Forum June 26, 2016. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/why-china-is-building-a-new-silk-road

Buchanan, Rose T. (2015), "Beirut bomb: 'At least 43 dead' in twin Isis suicide blast in Lebanese capital", *Independent*, 12 November 2015. Online at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/beirut-bomb-scores-killed-in-twin-suicide-blast-in-lebanese-capital-a6732156.html

Buchheit, Lee C., and Mitu Gulati (2010), "Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing", United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD, No. 198, April 2010. Online at: https://unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20102_en.pdf

Bustani, Emile (1952), "August 1952 Speech", http://www.emilebustani.org/publications.html

Bustani, Emile (1958), *Doubts and Dynamite: The Middle East Today* (London: Allan Wingate).

Bustani, Emile (1961), *March Arabesque* (London: Robert Hale Limited).

Carvalho, George de (1967), "Fall of the 'Genius from Jerusalem'", *Life Magazine*, 27 January 1967.

Chan, Stephen (2011), "Accidental scholarship and the Myth of Objectivity", in Naeem Inayatullah, ed., *Autobiographical International Relations*: I, IR (London: Routledge).

Chehabi, Hussein, and Rula Jurdi Abisaab (2006), *Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years* (London: I. B. Tauris).

Chiha Foundation, Beirut, archive of publications and writings of Michel Chiha: Online at: http://www.michelchiha.org/international-relations/palestine/79/1/

Chiha, Michel (1964), *Visage et Presence du Liban* (Beirut: Éd. Du Cénacle Libanais), trans. from French by Leo Arnold and Jean Montégu, as "Lebanon at Home and Abroad", re-impression 1994 (Beirut: Michel Chiha Foundation), http://www.michelchiha.org

Chiha, Michel (1969), "Memorandum after the Truce", in *Palestine* (Beirut: Éd. du Trident).

Chomsky, Noam (1991), "What We Say Goes: The Middle East in the New World Order", *Z Magazine*, May 1991. Online at: https://chomsky.info/199105__/

Chomsky, Noam and Greg Ruggiero (2002), *The Umbrella of U.S. Power: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy* (New York: Seven Stories Press).

Chomsky, Noam (2016), *Requiem for the American Dream*, documentary by Peter Hutchison, Kelly Nyks and Jared P. Scott, PF Film Production. Online at http://requiemfortheamericandream.com/the-film/

Chowdhry, Geeta (2007), "Edward Said and Contrapuntal Reading: Implications for Critical Interventions in International Relations", in *Millennium* vol. 36, no. 1.

Clarke, Colin P. (2017), "How Hezbollah came to dominate information warfare", *The Jerusalem Post*, 17 September 2017. http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/How-Hezbollah-came-to-dominate-information-warfare-505354

CNN World News (2006), "Israel Authorizes 'Severe' Response to Abductions"*, July 12, 2006. Online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20060921125544/http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/12/mideast/

Cobban, Helena (1984), *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Cobban, Helena (1985), *The Making of Modern Lebanon* (London: Hutchinson).

Cobban, Helena (2005), "Hizbullah's New Face: In Search of a Muslim Democracy", *Boston Review*, April/May 2005. Online at: http://bostonreview.net/archives/BR30.2/cobban.php

Cohen Gili (2017), "Israeli Army to Simulate War with Hezbollah in Largest Drill in Decades", *Haaretz*, 5 September 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.810559

Cole, Juan (2006), "Saddam: the Death of a Dictator", 30 December 2006. Online at: https://www.juancole.com/2006/12/for-whom-bell-tolls-top-ten-ways-us.html

Collelo, Thomas, ed. (1987), *Lebanon: A Country Study* (Washington DC: GPO for the Library of Congress), online at http://countrystudies.us/lebanon/13.htm

Collins, Randall (2009), "Micro and Macro Causes of Violence", *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, vol. 3.1, pp. 9-22.

Corasaniti, Nick and Haberman, Maggie (2016), "Donald Trump Suggests 'Second Amendment People' could Act Against Hillary Clinton", *The New York Times*, 9 August 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/us/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton.html

Corm, Georges (2017), *La Nouvelle Question d'Orient* [The New Orient Question] (Paris: Ed. La Découverte), https://fr.calameo.com/read/0002150221457d536560d

Cornish, Paul (2016), "Quantum sovereignty: the Westphalian principle and the global governance of cyberspace", \AZQ 23 February 2016, Australia National University. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qqf-pHDE9WQ

Crossette, Barbara (2001), "Taliban Explains Buddha Demolition", *The New York Times*, 19 March 2001. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/19/world/taliban-explains-buddha-demolition.html

Daily Sabah News (2010), "Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan vows to stand by Lebanon", *Daily Sabah online*, 25 November 2010. Online at: https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2010/11/25/turkeys_prime_minister_erdogan_vows_to_stand_by_lebanon

Daily Star (2013), "Turkish pilots kidnapped in Lebanon appear in video", *Daily Star* (Beirut)*, 15 October 2013. Online at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Oct-15/234757-turkish-pilots-kidnapped-in-lebanon-appear-in-video.ashx

Deconinck, Stefan (2006), "The Wazzani-incident in the summer of 2002 - a phony war?" July 2006. Online at: http://www.waternet.be/jordan_river/wazzani.htm

Deeb, Marius (2003), *Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

De Tocqueville, Alexis (1835), *Democracy in America* (London: Saunders and Otley), accessed 10 June 2017 on *History.com* (2009). http://www.history.com/topics/alexis-de-tocqueville

Dib, Kamal (2004), *Warlords and Merchants: the Lebanese Business and Political Establishment* (Reading UK: Ithaca Press/Garnet).

Dib, Kamal (2014), *Yousef Beidas: the Intra Empire and Money Sharks in Lebanon* (Beirut: Dar Al Nahar) [in Arabic].

Dibeh, Ghassan (2002), "The Political Economy of Inflation and Currency Depreciation in Lebanon, 1984-92", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 38, no. 1, January 2002.

Donnan, Hastings and Dieter Haller, eds. (2000), "Borders and Borderlands: An Anthropological Perspective", *Journal of European Ethnology* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press), vol. 30. no.2.

Doyle, Chris (2007), *Michel Chiha and Palestine Editorial Reflections: 1944-54,* (London: Stacy International and CAABU). also Chiha Archives, "International Relations Palestine", Chiha Foundation. Online at: http://www.michelchiha.org/international-relations/palestine/79/1/

Dunne, Tim, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (2013), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Dvorsky, George (2018), "New Report on Emerging AI Risks Paints a Grim Future", *Gizmodo*, 26 February 2018. https://gizmodo.com/new-report-on-ai-risks-paints-a-grim-future-1823191087

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, and Raymond Hinnebusch (1997), *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System* (London: Routledge) (new ed. 2002).

Eisenberg, Laura Zittrain (1997), "Israel's South Lebanon Imbroglio", *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 4, no.2, June.

El-Ghoul, Adnan (2006), "Harb: Petition Drive will form Legal basis to oust Lahoud", *The Daily Star* Lebanon, 21 February 2006. Online at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2006/Feb-21/9333-harb-petition-drive-will-form-legal-basis-to-oust-lahoud.ashx

Ellis, Kail C. (2002), *Lebanon's Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-first Century.* Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

El-Khazen, Farid (2000), *The Breakdown of the State of Lebanon: 1967-1976* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

Emile Bustani Foundation (2013), "Beyond Sea and Sky: The Life and Story of Emile Bustani", Beirut Films, documentary, , 11 September, 2013. [Arabic] Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4JryExfom_c http://mtv.com.lb/Documentaries/Emile_Bustani_-_Beyond_Sea_and_Sky

Fakih, Muhammad A. (2018), "The Loss of Prominent Lebanese Journalist Mustapha Nasr", *Al-Mayadeen*, 29 January 2018 [in Arabic]. Online at https://www.almayadeen.net//investigation/855922/

Farah, Caesar E. (2000), *Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861* **(**London and Oxford: I. B. Tauris and Centre for Lebanese Studies).

Farrell, R. B. (1966), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press).

Fattah, Hassan M. (2006), "Militia Rebuked by Some Arab Countries, *New York Times*, 17 July 2006. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/17/world/middleeast/17arab.html

Fawaz, Leila Tarazi (1992), *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (London: I. B. Tauris).

Fawcett, Louise (2013), *International Relations of the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Feldner, Yotam (2001), "Radical Islamist Profiles (2): Sheik Omar Bakri Muhammad – London", *The Middle East Media Research Institute* (MEMRI), Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 73, 25 October 2001. Online at https://www.memri.org/reports/radical-islamist-profiles-2-sheikh-omar-bakri-muhammad-london

Feltman, Jeffery, and Daniel Benjamin (2010), "Testimony: Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to Discuss Hezbollah", *Foreign Senate Testimony,* 8 June 2010. Online at: https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060810%20Feltman-Benjamin%20Testimony.pdf

Fielder, Lucy (2006), "Nasrallah is Reputed to be a Man of his Word", Part II, *Spiegel Online*, 24 August 2006. Online at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/muslim-hero-nasrallah-has-come-a-433399-2.html

Fischel, Walter J. (1952), *Ibn Khaldûn and Tamerlane* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press)

Fisk, Robert (2017), "We must look to the past, not Isis, for the true meaning of Islam", *Independent*, 25 May 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/manchester-attack-muslim-islam-true-meaning-a7754901.html

Fisk, Robert (2002), *Pity the Nation: the Abduction of Lebanon* (new US ed.), (NY: Thunder's Mouth Press).

Foda, Yousri (2006), "Crossing into the Unknown, Top Secret, Part 1", *Aljazeera TV*, September 2006, posted August 2008. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NmN63NRVRdM

Foda, Yousri (2006), "Crossing into the Unknown", Top Secret, Part 2. *Aljazeera TV*, September 2006. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ARSSFP3ywc.

Follath, Erich (2009), "New Evidence Points to Hezbollah in Hariri Murder", *Der Spiegel*, 23 May 2009. Online at: https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/breakthrough-in-tribunal-investigation-new-evidence-points-to-hezbollah-in-hariri-murder-a-626412.html

Fondation Chiha (Beirut): Chiha Archives, "International Relations Palestine". Online at: http://www.michelchiha.org/international-relations/palestine/79/1/

France, Government of France (2001), "Report on International Conference on Lebanon's Reconstruction: the International Community's Economic Aid for Lebanon, 23 February 2001", available from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Relief Web International*, 24 January 2007; online at https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/international-conference-lebanons-reconstruction-international-communitys-economic

Fraser, Nancy and Linda Gordon (1992), "Contract Versus Charity: Why is there no social citizenship in the United States?", *Socialist Review*, vol. 22, no. 3.

Fregonese, Sara (2012), "Beyond the 'weak state': hybrid sovereignties in Beirut", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (pub. SAGE Journals), June 2012.

Gaddis, John L (1998), *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Gambill, Gary C. and Bassam Endrawos, (2002), "The Assassination of Elie Hobeika", *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, vol. 4, no. 1. Online at: https://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0201_l1.htm

Garcia, Feliks (2016), "Donald Trump promises to move US embassy to Jerusalem as Netanyahu praises 'clear support' for Israel", *Independent*, 12 December 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-israel-us-embassy-jerusalem-benjamin-netanyahu-f-35-iran-a7470881.html

Gelber, Yoav (2006), "From Sharon's Inheritance", paper at the *ISA/AIS Annual Conference*, Banff, Canada, May 2006.

Gelernterm, Joshua (2015), "An Israeli Suez Canal**,** J*erusalem Post*, 7 March 2015. http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/An-Israeli-Suez-Canal-393225

Geraghty, Timothy J, (2009), *Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983 – The Marine Commander Tells His Story.* (Washington DC: Potomac Books).

Gerges, Fawaz A. (1993), "The Lebanese Crisis of 1958: The Risks of Inflated Self-Importance", *Beirut Review*, no.5, 1993, pp. 83–113.

Geukjian, Ohannes (2016), *Lebanon After the Syrian Withdrawal: External Intervention, Power-Sharing,* (London, Routledge).

Ghattas, F. Sam (2006), "Lebanon sends army south, won't disarm Hezbollah", Associated Press Writer. Posted by Ashley Elkins, *Daily Journal News*, 17 August 2006. Online at: http://djournal.com/news/lebanon-sends-army-south-wont-disarm-hezbollah

Ghazal, Mohmmad (2018), "Jordan, Saudi Arabia in talks over $500b NEOM project" *Jordan Times*, 10 March 2018. http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-saudi-arabia-talks-over-500b-neom-project

Gibb, Hamilton A. R. (1958), "Arab-Byzantine Relations under the Umayyad Caliphate", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, no. 12, pp. 219-233.

Gibran, Kahlil G. (1913), "Visions of the Prophet – an Open Letter to Islam", *Al-Funoon* (New York), pp. 54-55.

Gibran, Kahlil G. (1926), "To Young Americans of Syrian Origin", *The Syrian World*, vol. 1, no. 1, July 1926.

Gibran, Kahlil G. (1931 [1998]), *The Garden of the Prophet* (London: Arkana).

Giesen, Bernhard (1987), "Beyond Reductionism: Four Models Relating Micro and Macro Levels", in Jeffrey Alexander et al, eds., *The Micro-Macro Link* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press).

Global Jihad (2008), "Ahmed Salim Mikati Profile", *Global Jihad Net*, 5 June 2008. Online at: http://www.globaljihad.net/?p=3346

Global Jihad (2009), "Bassam Kanj", *Global Jihad Net*, 24 July 2009. Online at http://www.globaljihad.net/?p=4022

Gordon, Michael and Anne Barnard (2012), "U.S. Places Militant Syrian Rebel Group on List of Terrorist Organizations", *The New York Times*, 10 December 2012. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/world/middleeast/us-designates-syrian-al-nusra-front-as-terrorist-group.html

Greenberg, Joel (1997), "Tel Aviv Journal; 'Out of Lebanon!': Mothers' Cry Rouses Israelis", *The New York Times*, 19 September 1997. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/19/world/tel-aviv-journal-out-of-lebanon-mothers-cry-rouses-israelis.html

Gur, Haviv R. and Elie Leshem (2013), "Four rockets fired into north by al-Qaeda-inspired group", *The Times of Israel*, 29 August 2013. Online at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/rocket-falls-in-northern-israel/

Haddad, Wadi (1985), *Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors* (New York: Praeger Special Studies)

Hahn, Peter L. (2006), "Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957", *Presidential Studies Quarterly* vol. 36., no.1.

Halbwachs, Maurice (1980), *The Collective Memory* (New York: Harper & Row)

Hallaq, Hassan (1982), *Lebanon's Position Towards the Palestinian Cause: 1918-1952* (Beirut: Palestinian Research Centre).

Halliday, Fred (2005), *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Hamadeh, Hassan (2017), "Hiwar al-Yawm", *OTV*, March 9, 2017. [in Arabic], online at: http://www.otv.com.lb/beta/v/episode/%EF%BB%BF%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85_%D9%85%D8%B9_%D8%AF_%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86_%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9_-_%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8_%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AB_%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-39495

Hamadeh, Hassan (2017), "The Issue of Wages and the Decisions by the Constitutional Council and the Arab Region", Interview, *Al-Nour Radio*, Beirut 23 September 2017 [in Arabic], online at http://www.alnour.com.lb/episodes/229716/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9

Hamadeh, Hassan (2018), "Ma Al-Hadath with Sawsan Safaa", *NBN TV, Kalam Siyasi Channel*, 17 February 2018 [discussion in Arabic]. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=575jO0cKUtk

Hammoud, Hassan R. (2006), "Illiteracy in the Arab World", *AED: International Journal of Adult Education and Development*, no. 66 (pub. by DVV International) Online at: https://www.dvv-international.de/en/adult-education-and-development/editions/aed-662006/education-for-all-and-literacy/illiteracy-in-the-arab-world/

Harel, A. and A. Issacharoff (2008), *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan).

Harel, Amos (2017), "20 Years After: The Helicopter Crash That Changed Israel's Fight With Hezbollah", *Haaretz*, February 2017. Online at: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-the-crash-that-changed-israel-s-fight-with-hezbollah-1.5494030

Harik, Judith P. and Hilal Khashan (1993), "Lebanon's divisive democracy: the parliamentary elections of 1992", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 1 (Winter).

Harris, William W. (2005), *The New Face of Lebanon: History's Revenge* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers).

Harris, William (2012), *Lebanon: A History, 600-2011* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Haass, N. Richard (2013), "Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America's House in Order", *Council on Foreign Relations*. Book Review, April 2013. Online at http://www.cfr.org/politics-and-strategy/foreign-policy-begins-home/p29767"

Hassner, Ron E. (2009), *War on Sacred Grounds* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press).

Hawi, Khalil (1972), *Kahlil Gibran: His Background, Character and Works* (Beirut: Arab Institute for Research and Publishing).

Hegghammer, Thomas (2008), "Abdallah Azzam, Imam of Jihad", in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, *Al Qaeda in Its Own Words*, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Boston MA: Harvard University, Belknap Press)

Henderson, John T. (1976), "Leadership Personality and War: The Cases of Richard Nixon and Anthony Eden", *Political Science Journal*, vol 28 no.2.

Hersh, Seymour M. (2006), "Watching Lebanon: Washington's Interests in Lebanon's War", *The New Yorker*, 21 August 2006, online at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/08/21/watching-lebanon

Hersh, Seymour M. (2007), "The Redirection: Is the Administration's new Policy Benefitting our Enemies in the War on Terrorism?" *The New Yorker*, 5 March 2007.

Hijazi, Ihsan A. (1989), "Sunni Muslim Chief Killed in Lebanon", *The New York Times*, 17 May 1989, online at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/17/world/sunni-muslim-chief-killed-in-lebanon.html

Hijazi, Mustafa, ed. (2005a), *Social Backwardness: An Introduction to the Psychology of the Oppressed Human*, 6th ed. [Arabic] (Beirut: Arab Cultural Centre Press).

Hijazi, Mustafa (2005b), *The Wasted Human: A Social Psychological Analysis* [Arabic] (Beirut: Arab Cultural Centre Press).

Hinnebusch, Raymond and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds. (2002), *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner) (new expanded ed. 2014).

Hinnebusch, Raymond (2003), *The International Politics of the Middle East* (2nd ed. 2015: (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Hirschberg, Peter (2006), "Israel Watchful of Hezbollah Moves", *Inter Press Service*, posted by Electronic Intifada, December 15, 2006. Online at: https://electronicintifada.net/content/israel-watchful-hezbollah-moves/6611

Hirst, David (2010), *Beware of Small States. Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East* (London: Faber and Faber).

Hitti, Joseph (2006), "Memorandum of Understanding by Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement: Agreement between Général Michel Aoun and Sayed Hassan Nasrallah", translated by J. Hitti for *Voltaire Network*, 6 February 2006. http://www.voltairenet.org/article163916.html

Hitti, Nassif (1989), "The Foreign Policy of Lebanon: Lessons and Prospects for the Forgotten Dimension", *Papers on Lebanon No. 9* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies).

Hof, Frederic C. (1985), *Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanon Frontier, 1916-1984* (Foreword by Philip C. Habib), (Boulder CO: Westview Press).

Hollande, Francois (2012), "My real opponent has no name, no face, no party and does not run for elections, yet it rules France, it is the world of finance." Francois Hollande Elections Campaign, 26 February 2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HXENrhEnQ1c

Holmes, Oliver and Stephen Kalin (2014), "Car bomb kills at least five in Hezbollah district of Beirut", *Reuters*, 2 January 2014. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-lebanon-explosion/car-bomb-kills-at-least-five-in-hezbollah-district-of-beirut-idUKBREA010II20140102

Hooper, Richard (2013), "Lebanon's forgotten space programme", *BBC News*, 13 November 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24735423

Hourani, Albert (1991), *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press)

Hovsepian, Nubar (2008), *The War on Lebanon* (Northampton MA: Olive Branch Press).

Hudson, Michael (1977), "Trying Again: Power-Sharing in Post-Civil War Lebanon", *International Negotiation*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 103–122.

Ibn Khaldun (c.1377), *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press); "Introduction to 2005 edition" by Bruce B Lawrence.

Ilcan, Suzan and Tanya Basok (2004), "Community Government: Voluntary Agencies, Social Justice, and the Responsibilities of Citizens", *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2.

Illiek, Hassan (2012), **"**Hariri Investigation: a Star Witness is Born", *Al-Akhbar Newspaper,* 28 March 2012. Online at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/5741

Illiek, Hassan (2013), **"**Lebanese Hostage Deal: 10 months of Negotiations and $9 Million", *Al-Akhbar Newspaper,* 21 October 2013. http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17370

Illing, Sean (2016), "The people's tyrant: what Plato can teach us about Donald Trump"**,** *Vox*, 7 November 2016. Online at https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/7/13512960/donald-trump-plato-democracy-tyranny-fascism-2016-elections

Imam Musa Sadr on Hussein, http://imamsadr.net/News/news.php?NewsID=6254&pnum=1

Iran's Cover Stories (1979), "Iran: The Crescent of Crisis", *Time Magazine*: January 15, 1979: http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19790115,00.html

Iraq Study Group (ISG) (2006), *The Baker Hamilton Report* (Tel Aviv: Reut Institute), online at http://reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=1346

Israel, Government of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister's Office (2006), "PM Olmert: Lebanon is Responsible and will Bear the Consequences", 12 July 2006. Online at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2006/pages/pm%20olmert%20-%20lebanon%20is%20responsible%20and%20will%20bear%20the%20consequences%2012-jul-2006.aspx

Issacharoff, Avi and TOI Staff (2013), "Turkey to withdraw troops from UNIFIL in South Lebanon", *Times of Israel,* 10 August 2013. Online at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/turkey-withdraws-troops-from-unifil-in-south-lebanon/?fb_comment_id=506843736067781_51761990#f3ad50c1326abf

Jay, Martin (2014), "Was Omar Bakri arrested on orders from Syria to shut him up?" *An-Nahar Newspaper*, 26 June 2014. Online at https://en.annahar.com/article/144744-was-omar-bakri-arrested-on-orders-from-syria-to-shut-him-up

Jayyusi, Lena and Anne S. Roald, eds. (2016), *Media and Political Contestation in the Contemporary Arab World: A Decade of Change* (London & NY: Palgrave Macmillan),

Jerusalem Post (2006), "Saniora Denounces Nasrallah's Attacks", *Jerusalem Post*, 8 December 2006. Online at: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Saniora-denounces-Nasrallahs-attacks

Johnson, Michael (2001), *All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon.* (London: I.B.Tauris).

Joscelyn, Thomas (2014), "Abdullah Azzam Brigades leader calls on Lebanese people to attack Hezbollah", *Long War Journal*, 14 October 2014. Online at: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/10/abdullah_azzam_briga_3.php

Josephus, Flavius (1559), *The Wars of the Jews* (*De Bello Judaico*)*.* VII.3.1, VII.5.2, Basle.

Kalman, Mathew (2010), "Israel returns to Lebanon border and cuts down the tree that sparked deadly military clash", (Mailonline) *Daily Mail,* 4 August 2010. Online at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1299950/Tree-nearly-started-war-Israel-Lebanon.html

Karmon, Ely (2005), "Hizballah as Strategic Threat to Israel", *Heartland: Eurasian Review of Geopolitics*, vol. 2, July, posted by International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Israel. https://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=921

Karon, Tony (2006), "Condi in Diplomatic Disneyland", *Time Magazine*, 26 July 2006. Online at: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1219325,00.html

Katz, Yaakov (2011), "Security and Defense: The Fly in the Spider Web?" *The Jerusalem Post*, 1 July 2011. Online at: http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Security-and-Defense-The-fly-in-the-spider-web

Kaufman, Asher (2014), *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon* (London: I. B. Tauris).

Kennedy, John F. and William Yates (2003), *The Historic Letters Between Kennedy and Nasser* (Doncaster Vic: Nada Publications).

Khadduri, Walid (2013),"Lebanon's Oil Future Is Promising", *Al-Monitor*, 22 April 2013, at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/business/2013/04/lebanon-oil-future-promising-reserves.html#ixzz561koqQ00

Khairallah, Shereen (1965), *This is Lebanon* (Beirut: Khayats).

Khalaf, Samir (2002), *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Khashan, Hilal (2010), "The Evolution of Israeli-Lebanese Relations: From Implicit Peace to Explicit Conflict", in Efraim Karsh, Michael Kerr, and Rory Miller, eds., *Conflict, Diplomacy and Society in Israeli-Lebanese Relations* (London and New York: Routledge).

Khourany, Mariam (2014), "Apocalyptic prophecies drive both sides to Syrian battle for end of time", Reuters, 1 April 2014. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-prophecy-insight/apocalyptic-prophecies-drive-both-sides-to-syrian-battle-for-end-of-time-idUSBREA3013420140401

Khoury, Enver M. (1976), *The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism and Chaos* (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research).

Khoury, Jack (2009), "Qaida-linked Group in Lebanon Claims Rocket Attack on Israel", *Haaretz*, 29 October 2009. https://www.haaretz.com/news/qaida-linked-group-in-lebanon-claims-rocket-attack-on-israel-1.5162

Khoury, Jack (2017), "Trump's Ultimate Deal Will 'Die on the Rocks of Jerusalem,' if U.S. Recognizes Israeli Capital, Palestinians Warn", *Haaretz*, December 2017. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/trump-s-ultimate-deal-will-die-on-the-rocks-of-jerusalem-palestinians-warn-1.5627788

Kiel, Douglas and Euel Elliott, eds. (1996), *Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences: Foundations and Applications* (Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press).

Kimbrell, Nicholas (2009), "Feltman links US aid for Lebanon to Results of June Election", *Daily Star* Beirut, 26 March 2009. Online at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2009/Mar-26/51910-feltman-links-us-aid-for-lebanon-to-results-of-june-7-election.ashx

Kirk, Mimi (2017), "Saudi Arabia's $500 Billion Fantasy of a Utopian Megacity**",** *City Lab*, 3 November 2017. https://www.citylab.com/design/2017/11/saudi-arabias-latest-planned-city-costs-500-billion-and-is-insanely-huge/544748/

Kirschenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara (2004), "Intangible Heritage as Metacultural Production", *Museum International*, vol.66.

Kissinger, Henry (1994), *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster).

Klein, Menahem (2001), *Shattering a Taboo: Contacts Towards a Permanent Status Agreement in Jerusalem, 1994–2001* [Hebrew], (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies).

Knickmeyer, Ellen (2008), "2006 War Called a 'Failure' for Israel", *Washington Post*, 31 January 2008. Online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013000559.html?noredirect=on

Korany, Bahgat and Ali Dessouki, eds. (2008), *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization*, new rev. ed. (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press)

Krasner, Stephen D. (1999), *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press).

Lamloum, Olfa (2016), "Hezbollah Communication Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", in Lena Jayyusi, and Anne S Roald, eds., *Media and Political Contestation in the Contemporary Arab World: A Decade of Change* (London: Palgrave Macmillan)

Lappin, Yaakov (2013), "Hezbollah says it struck Israeli troops in southern Lebanon", *The Jerusalem Post*, 14 August 2013. Online at: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hezbollah-says-it-struck-Israeli-troops-in-southern-Lebanon-323086

Layborn, Keith (2002), *Fifty Key Figures in Twentieth Century British Politics* (London: Routledge).

Lebanon, Government of Lebanon (1926), *The Lebanese Constitution* 'Article 95', Online at https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/lb/lb018en.pdf

Lenczowski, George (1979). "The Arc of Crisis: It's Central Sector", *Foreign Affairs*: Spring, 1979.

Lewis, Bernard (1992), "Rethinking the Middle East", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 4. Online at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045312

Lipton, Bruce H. (2011), *The Biology of Belief: Unleashing the Power of Consciousness, Matter and Miracles*, Library of Congress Control.

Loskot-Strachota, Ageta and Lasocki, Nanek (2013). "End of Nabucco – end of Southern Gas Corridor?", Energy Post**,** 27 June 2013. http://energypost.eu/end-of-nabucco-end-of-southern-gas-corridor/

Luciani, Giacomo, and Ghassan Salame (2015), *The Politics of Arab Integration* (London: Routledge).

Luft, Gal (2003), "The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing" *The Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 3-13.

Lutfi, Manal (2008), "Syria: Between Tehran and Hezbollah", *Asharq Alawsat*, 16 June 2008. Online at: https://english.aawsat.com/theaawsat/features/syria-between-tehran-and-hezbollah

McFarlane, Robert C. (2008), "From Beirut to 9/11", *The New York Times*, 23 October 2008. Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/opinion/23mcfarlane.html

Mackinnon, Mark (2005), "Hezbollah chief rejects calls to disarm", *Globe and Mail*, 26 May 2005. Online at: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/hezbollah-chief-rejects-calls-to-disarm/article981006/

McLuhan, Marshall (1968), *War and Peace in the Global Village* (New York: McGraw-Hill).

McLuhan, Marshall (1969), *Counterblast* (Toronto: McClelland and Steward).

McLuhan, Marshall and Barrington Nevitt (1973), "The Argument: Causality in the Electric World", *Technology and Culture*, vol. 14, no. 1, January.

Makdisi, Karim (2011), "Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the 'War on Terror'", *International Peacekeeping*, vol.18, no. 1, pp.4-20.

Makdisi, Ussama (2000), *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press).

Maoz, Moshe (1995), *Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Mardelli, Bassil A. (2012), *Middle East Perspectives: From Lebanon 1968-1988* (Bloomington IN: iUniverse).

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (n.d.), "About the Emile Bustani Middle East Seminar at the MIT Center for International Studies (est. 1985)" (Boston MA: MIT/CIS). http://cis.mit.edu/events-seminars/emile-bustani-middle-east-seminar

Media Research Institute (MEMSI). Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 73, 25 October 2001. CNSNews.com, May 24, 2000. https://www.memri.org/reports/radical-islamist-profiles-2-sheikh-omar-bakri-muhammad-london

Mendelsohn, Barak (2009), "Al-Qaeda's Palestinian Problem", *Survival*, vol. 51, no. 4. Online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396330903168865

MEP (2015), Donald Trump: We Should Milk Saudi Arabia As much As Possible, And When The Wealthy Sheikhs Becomes Useless We Shall Abandon The Middle-East. *Middle East Press*, 2 September 2015. http://middleeastpress.com/english/donald-trump-we-should-milk-saudi-arabia-as-much-as-possible-and-when-the-wealthy-sheikhs-becomes-useless-we-shall-abandon-the-middle-east/

Miller, Joyce Laverty (1977), "The Syrian Revolt of 1925", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 8, no. 4, pp.545–563.

Miskawi, Omar K. (2007), *Heritage and Dialogue between the Islamic Sects and the Other* (Tripoli, Lebanon: Dar Al-Eman for Print & Publication) [Arabic].

Mohsen, Manar (2013), "Egypt to Aid Syrian Rebels", *Daily News*, 15 June 2013. Online at: https://dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/15/egypt-to-aid-syrian-rebels/

Moore, Fred [compiler] (1993), "Iraq Speaks: Documents on the Gulf Crisis, by Saddam Hussein, Taha Yasin Ramadan, Tariq 'Aziz, Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi, Latif Jasim & Saadi Mahdi Salih", (Darby PA: Diane Publishing Co).

Moosa, M. (1969), "The Relation of the Maronites of Lebanon to the Mardaites and Al-Jarājima", *Speculum,* vol. 44, no.4, pp. 597-608. doi:10.2307/2850386.

Morris, Benny (1999), *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999* (New York: Knopf).

Morris, Benny (2004), *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Morris, Loveday (2012), "Suicide bombers attack Air Force intelligence compound on edge of Damascus in the latest sign of Islamist influence", *The Independent*, 9 October 2012. Online at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/suicide-bombers-attack-air-force-intelligence-compound-on-edge-of-damascus-in-the-latest-sign-of-8204351.html

Morris, Loveday and Suzan Haidamous (2013), "Beirut Car Bomb Kills 21", *The Washington Post*, 15 August 2013. Online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/beirut-car-bomb-kills-18/2013/08/15/25ca49be-05f5-11e3-bfc5-406b928603b2_story.html?utm_term=.69e53363acc9

Mortada, Radwan (2011), "FSA in Lebanon: After the Defeat of the Regime in Syria Hezbollah would be Next", *Al-Akhbar* Newspaper [Arabic], 5 December 2011. Online at http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/27099

Mortada, Radwan (2013), "Has Lebanon Entered the Era of Suicide Bombings?", *Al-Akhbar* Newspaper, 20 November 2013. Online at http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17660

Mortada, Radwan (2014), "Naim Abbas: From an Admirer of Hezbollah to its Sworn Enemy", *Al-Akhbar* newspaper, 13 February 2014. Online at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18617

Mortada, Radwan (2014), "Zureiqat Appointed New Emir of Abdallah Azzam Brigades", *Al-Akhbar* Newspaper, 6 October 2014. Online at http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/21857

Mostafavi, Ramon (2010), "Lebanese PM calls in Tehran for Arab-Iran unity", *Reuters*, 28 November 2010. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-lebanon-hariri/lebanese-pm-calls-in-tehran-for-arab-iran-unity-idUSTRE6AR1O120101128

Mroue, Bassem (2011), "Tension are High in Beirut amid Regional Talks", *The San Diego Union-Tribune*, 17 January 2011, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-tensions-high-in-beirut-amid-regional-talks-2011jan18-story.html

Muhanna, Elias (2012), "Establishing a Lebanese Senate: Bicameralism and the Third Republic", CDDRL Working Papers, No. 125 (Stanford CA: Stanford University), online at: https://qifanabki.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/senate-paper-elias-muhanna-english.pdf

Muhanna, Elias (2014), "Lebanon's War in Syria", *The New Yorker*, 21 February 2014, online at https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/lebanons-war-in-syria

Muhareb, Mahmoud (2008), "Zionist Intelligence: the Beginning of Spying on Arabs", *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi* [Arabic]. Issue 257, November 2008.

Muhareb, Mahmoud (2011), "Secret Negotiations between Israel and Lebanon's Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh", research paper (Doha Institute: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies), August 2011.

Murphy, Kim (1989), "Lebanon Picks New President; Aoun Defiant", *Los Angeles Times*, 25 November 1989.

Nahas, Charbil (2014), "Political Corruption in the State". Al-Hadath with Nancy Sabaa, *Al-Jadeed TV*, 17 November 2014. Online at: www.aljadeed.tv/MenuAr/news/DetailNews/AlHadathDetailNews.html?Id=149858

Najem, Tom P. (2005), "Lebanon and Europe: The Foreign Policy of a Penetrated State", in Gerd Nonneman, ed., *Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge).

Najjar, Alexandre (2008), *Kahlil Gibran, a Biography*, (London: Al-Saqi Books)

Nakash, Yitzhak (2003), *The Shi'is of Iraq,* 2nd ed. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press).

Naqqash, Anis (2015), *The Confederation of the East: Political and Identity Conflicts* [Arabic] (Beirut: Moumin Quraish Library).

Nasr, Vali (2006), *The Shia Revival* (New York, W.W. Norton & Company).

Nasrallah, Hassan (2011), "'Dignity and Victory' Festival Speech by Hassan Nasrallah", *Voltairenet*, 28 July 2011, online at http://www.voltairenet.org/article170913.html

Nasrallah, Sayyed (2012), "Nasrallah Speech on Drone into Israel and Hezbollah Presence in Syria", *TV14vip*, YouTube Channel, 11 October 2012. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2YEF5BrR1b0

Nasrallah, Sayyed (2012), "Hezbollah Leader Sayyed Nasrallah Directs a Message to Al-Qaeda in Syria" (English subtitles), *Middle East Observer*, YouTube, published 21 December 2012. Online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FuQXAgubqwg

Nasrallah, Sayyed (2013), "Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (HA) – Speech, Eid Muqawamah wa'al-Tahrir", *Press TV*, YouTube channel 25 May 2013. Online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHHnYwr2044

Nassif, Nicolas (2012), "Lebanese National Dialogue: Toning Down the Opposition", *Al-Akhbar* newspaper, 12 June 2012, online at http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/8361

National Democratic Institute (NDI) (2009), "Final Report on the Lebanese Parliamentary Election", *NDI.org*, 7 June 2009. Online at: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Lebanese_Elections_Report_2009.pdf

Neal, Mark W. and Richard Tansey (2010), "The Dynamics of Effective Corrupt Leadership: Lessons from Rafik Hariri's Political Career in Lebanon", *The Leadership Quarterly*., no. 21.

Netanyahu, Benjamin (2017), "Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the USS George H.W. Bush docked outside of Haifa", *Sputnik International,* 6 July 2017. https://sputniknews.com/politics/201707061055270199-netanyahu-calls-israel-carrier-us/

Noe, Nicholas, ed. (2007), *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah* (London and New York: Verso).

Nonneman, Gerd (2005), *Analysing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe* (London: Routledge),

Norton, Augustus R. (1991), "Lebanon after Taif: Is the Civil War Over?", *Middle East Journal*, vol.45, no. 3.

Okbi, Yasser and Hashavua, Maarive (2016), "IDF can put Lebanon back 300 years if Hezbollah attacks, officer tells Saudi paper", *The Jerusalem Post,* 8 March 2016, http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/IDF-can-put-Lebanon-back-300-years-if-Hezbollah-attacks-officer-tells-Saudi-paper-447212

Orakhelashvili, Alexander (2011), *Collective Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Palmer-Harik, J. (2004), *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London, I. B. Tauris).

Pan, Esther (2005), "Lebanon: Election Results", *Council on Foreign Relations*, 20 June 2005. Online at: http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/lebanon-election-results/p8195

Pappé, Ilan (2006), *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications).

Parsi, Trita (2007), *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.* (New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press).

Patrikarakos, David (2016), "Apocalypse or Bust: The Battle for Dabiq", *Radio Free Europe*, 9 October 2016. Online at https://www.rferl.org/a/tracking-islamic-state-dabiq-battle-apocalypticism/28040703.html

Peleg, Ilan (1987), *Begin's Foreign Policy, 1977-1983: Israel's Move to the Right* (New York and London: Greenwood).

Peleg, Ilan (1998), *The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Albany NY: State University of New York Press).

Peleg, Ilan (2005), "The Zionist Right and Constructivist Realism: Ideological Persistence and Tactical Readjustment", *Israel Studies* vol, 10, no. 3, pp. 127-153.

Perry, Tom, and Angus McDowall (2017), "Lebanese army, Hezbollah announce offensives against Islamic State on Syrian border", *Reuters News*, 18 August 2017. Online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-syria/lebanese-army-hezbollah-announce-offensives-against-islamic-state-on-syrian-border-idUSKCN1AZ03G

Peters, Gerhard, and John T. Woolley (1991), "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict", *The American Presidency Project*, 6 March 1991. Online at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19364

Pfeffer, Anshel (2011), "IDF Exchanges Fire With Lebanon Across Border", *Haaretz*, 2 August 2011, online at https://www.haaretz.com/1.5038787

Pipes, Daniel (2005). "Is the Hatay/Alexandretta Problem Solved?" *Danial Pipes Blog,* 10 January 2005. Online at: http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2005/01/is-the-hatayalexandretta-problem-solved

Porter, Gareth (2011), "Tribunal Concealed Evidence al-Qaeda Cell may have Killed Hariri", *The Real News*, 17 September 2011. Online at http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=7243

Qassem, Naim (2005), *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: Saqi Books).

Quwais, Abdel Halim (2013), "Khaldounian Thinking on *'asabiyya* [Sectarianism or Group-Prejudice] and Arabism", *Alukah Magazine*, 30 July 2013 [in Arabic], online at www.alukah.net/culture/0/58181

Rajan, Julie V. G. (2011), *Women Suicide Bombers: Narratives of Violence* (London and NY: Routledge).

Ranstorp, Magnus (1997), *Hizb'allah in Lebanon* (London and NY: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd).

Revesz, Rachael (2017), "Donald Trump signs $110 billion arms deal with nation he accused of masterminding 9/11", *The Independent*, 21 May 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-arms-deal-saudi-arabia-110-billion-911-terrorism-international-law-war-crimes-a7747076.html

Ritzer, George, ed. (1990), *Frontiers of Social Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press)

Rogan, Eugene L. and Avi Shlaim (2001), *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Röllig, Wolfgang (1983), "On the Origins of the Phoenicians", *Bertus* 31, pp 79-93. Online at: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/propylaeumdok/1142/1/Roellig_Origin_of_the_Phoenocians_1983.pdf

Rosa, Andrea (2018), "Risking Israeli dispute, Lebanon signs deal with three oil firms", *Associated Press*, 9 February 2018, online at: https://www.apnews.com/b4b5b703f5074eada6a325970745111c

Rosenau, James N. (1997), *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Rosenau, James (2012), "Preface", in S. Smith, A. Hadfield, and T. Dunne, eds. *Foreign Policy Theories: Actors Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Rosenthal, Franz (1967), *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, vol. 3 [English trans.] (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press)

Ruthven, Malise (2002), "New Afterword" to Albert Hourani (1991), *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press).

Saab, Bilal Y. (2008), "Rethinking Hezbollah's Disarmament", *Middle East Policy* (journal of the Middle East Policy Council, Washington DC), vol. 15, no. 3. Online at http://www.mepc.org/rethinking-hezbollahs-disarmament

Saab, Bilal Y. (2008), "Al-Qa'ida's Presence and Influence in Lebanon", *West Point's Combating Terrorism Center* (CTC), vol. 1, no.12, November. Online at: https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaidas-presence-and-influence-in-lebanon/

Saab, Bilal Y. and Magnus Ranstorp (2007), "Al-Qaeda's Terrorist Threat to UNIFIL", *Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College* and *Saban Center for Middle East Studies at The Brookings Institution*, June 2007. Online at, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20070608saab_ranstorp.pdf

Said, Edward (1995), *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books)

Salamé, Ghassan (1988), "Is a Lebanese Foreign Policy Possible?" in Halim Barakat, ed., *Toward a Viable Lebanon* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies).

Salamey, Imad (2009), "Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, vol.14, no. 2, pp 83–105.

Salem, Paul (1994), "Reflections on Lebanon's Foreign Policy", in Deirdre Collings, ed., *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

Salibi, Kamal S. (1965), *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), Reprinted 1966.

Salibi, Kamal (2003), *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered*, (Berkeley CA: University of California Press).

Salloukh, Bassel (2006), "The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in Postwar Lebanon", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 635–655.

Salloukh, Bassel F. (2008), "The Art of the Impossible: The Foreign Policy of Lebanon", in Bahgat Korany and Ali Dessouki, eds., *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization*, new rev. ed. (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press).

Salloukh, Bassel F., R. Barakat, J. S. Al-Habbal, L. W. Khattab and S. Mikaelian (2015), *The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon.* (London: Pluto Press).

Samaha, Nour (2015a), "Hezbollah mourns fighters killed in attack", *Al- Jazeera TV*, 19 January 2015, online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/hezbollah-mourns-fighters-killed-attack-2015119154814642494.html

Samaha, Nour (2015b), "Two Israeli soldiers killed in Hezbollah missile attack", *Al-Jazeera TV*, 28 January 2015, Online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/01/israeli-soldiers-injured-shebaa-farms-missile-attack-150128100642659.html

Samaha, Nour (2015c), "Lebanese army and al-Nusra Front conduct prisoner swap", *Al-Jazeera TV*, 2 December 2015. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/2/lebanese-army-and-al-nusra-front-conduct-prisoner-swap

Sandels, Alexandra (2010), "Lebanon, Turkey: Erdogan to visit Beirut to forge peace, make deals", *Los Angeles Times*, 23 November 2010. Online at: https://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2010/11/lebanonturkey-erdogan-visit-tribunal-hezbollah-hariri-murder-business-.html

Saqf Al Hait, Abdel Azzam (2009), "The Notable Offender", *Radical Justice*, 23 April 2009. Online at: http://www.radicaljustice.net/**1123973/1-مقالات**-the-notable-offender.html

Satlof, Robert (2005), "Assessing the Bush Administration's Policy of 'Constructive Instability'. Part II: Regional Dynamics", *The Washington Institute*, 16 March 2005. Online at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assessing-the-bush-administrations-policy-of-constructive-instability-part-

Schenker, David (2006), "Lebanese National Dialogue: Avoiding the Hard Question?", *Policy Watch* no.1089, March, The Washington Institute.

Schiff, Ze'ev (2006), "Kidnap of Soldiers in July Was Hezbollah's Fifth Attempt", *Haaretz*, 19 September 2006. Online at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/kidnap-of-soldiers-in-july-was-hezbollah-s-fifth-attempt-1.197595

Schilling, David R. (2013), "Knowledge Doubling Every 12 Months, Soon to be Every 12 Hours", *Industry Tap*,19 April 2013. Online at: http://www.industrytap.com/knowledge-doubling-every-12-months-soon-to-be-every-12-hours/3950

Segev, Tom (1986), *1949: The First Israelis* (New York: The Free Press)

Shabaz, Stan (2008), "Ask What You Can Do for Your Country: Khalil Gibran", *Assyrian International News Agency*, posted 15 April 2008. Online at: http://www.aina.org/ata/20080415171605.htm

Shamsdein, Mohamad (2017), "Hiwar al-Yawm", *OTV*, 8 July 2017. [Arabic] Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xak4tORxb88

Shannon, Elaine (2006), "The Message Behind Rice's Surprise Visit to Beirut", *Time Magazine*, July 24, 2006. Online at: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1218194,00.html

Shatzmiller, Maya (1994), *Labour in the Medieval Islamic World* **(**Leiden & New York: Brill).

Shehadeh, Lamia R., ed. (1991), *Woman and War in Lebanon* (Gainesville FL: University Press of Florida).

Sher, Gilead (2006), *The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999–2001* (London: Routledge).

Sherlock, Ruth (2013), "Syria: Rockets target Hizbollah in Beirut", *The Telegraph*, 26 May 2013. Online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10081822/Syria-Rockets-target-Hizbollah-in-Beirut.html

Shiraev, Eric (2014), *International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Shlaim, Avi (1988), "Israeli Interference in Internal Arab Politics: the case of Lebanon", in Giacomo Luciani and Ghassan Salame, eds., *The Politics of Arab Integration* (London: Croom Helm)

Shlaim, Avi (1999), *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (London: Allen Lane).

Shoukri, Ali (2016), "Five Hundred Years since the Ottoman Invasion of the Middle East" [Arabic], June 2016. Online at: http://aljaml.com/node/128851

Shueibi, Imad Fawzi (2015), "Syria between the Civil and the Savage State" [in Arabic], *YouTube*, posted 20 May 2015. Online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ldUXz33nXbU

Shueibi, Imad Fawzi (2016), "The Impact of (Quantum) Metaphysics on Political Science" [in Arabic], *YouTube* posted 6 December 2016. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCevcyfLBVI

Shuttleworth, Kate and Kareem Shaheen (2015), "Lebanese militant leader Samir Qantar killed in Damascus attack", *The Guardian*, 20 December 2015. Online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/lebanese-militant-leader-samir-qantar-believed-killed-in-damascus-attack

Slater, Jerome (2002), "Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Israel and Syria, 1948- 2001", *International Security*, vol. 27, no. 1, Summer 2002, pp. 79-106.

Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, eds. (2012), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Smith, William E. (1987), "Saving a City from Itself", *Time Magazine*, 9 March 1987. Online at: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,963727,00.html

Snyder, Richard Henry Bruck and Burton Sapin (1954), *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press).

Sobelman, Daniel (2004), *New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbollah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon*, (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Jaffa Center for Strategic Studies).

South Front Analysis (2017). "Former Qatari Prime Minister Admits Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and US Coordinated Efforts to Support Terrorists in Syria", *South Front*, 27 October 2017. Online at: https://southfront.org/former-qatari-prime-minister-admits-qatar-saudi-arabia-turkey-and-us-coordinated-efforts-to-support-terrorists-in-syria/

Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2016), "Al-Jadeed S.A.L. & Ms. Khayat". (STL-14-05) https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-05

Sprout, H., and M. Sprout (1956), *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press).

Stansfield, Gareth (2012) "Israeli-Egyptian (In)-security Yom Kippur War", Section Three, Chapter 21, p. 414. In, Smith, Steve; Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (2012), *Foreign Policy Theories: Actors Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Steele, Jonathan (2008), "Israel Asked the US for Green Light to Bomb Nuclear Sites in Iran", *The Guardian*, 25 September 2008. Online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/25/iran.israelandthepalestinians1

Stewart, Desmond (1967), *Orphan with a Hoop: the Life of Emile Bustani* (London: Chapman & Hall).

Tauber, Eliezer (2013), *The Emergence of the Arab Movements* (London: Routledge).

Teitelbaum, Joshua (2009), "The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects", *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*, 2009, p. 3. Online at: http://www.jcpa.org/text/Arab-Peace-Initiative.pdf

Time Magazine (1978), "A Sabbath of Terror", *Time Magazine*, 20 March 1978. Online at: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,919454,00.html

Times of Israel (TOI) and Agence France Presse (AFP) Staff (2015). "Hezbollah threatens to capture the Galilee and 'beyond'", *The Times of Israel,* 15 January 2015. Online at https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-threatens-to-capture-the-galilee-and-beyond/

Traboulsi, Fawwaz (2012), *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Books).

Trendie, Giles, and Abdallah Al-Binni (2012), "The Imam and the Colonel", *Al-Jazeera*, 24 July 2012. Online at: www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2012/06/201262711475105411.html

Tueni, Ghassan (1985), *Une Guerre pour les autres* (Paris, Editions Lattes)

United Nations, General Assembly (1947), "Resolution UNGA 181 – Future Government of Palestine", issued 29 November 1947. Online at:
https://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253

United Nations, General Assembly (1958), Documents: "Charles M. Malik Elected President of the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly", 16 September 1958. Online at:
https://www.unmultimedia.org/s/photo/detail/139/0139959.html

United Nations Security Council (1967), "Resolution UNSCR 242 – Land for Peace", issued 22 November 1967. See
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136

United Nations Security Council (1973), "Resolution UNSCR 338 – Situation in the Middle East", issued 21 October 1973. See
https://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/aa7207d76ef6191285256e53006ad9c1?OpenDocument

United Nations Security Council (1978), "Resolution. UNSCR 425 – Israel-Lebanon", issued 19 March 1978, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/425

United Nations Security Council (1990), "Resolution "UNSCR 660 – The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait", issued 6 August 1990. Online at:
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/660(1990)

United Nations Security Council (2004), "Resolution UNSCR 1559 – Security Council declares support for free, fair presidential election in Lebanon; calls for withdrawal of foreign forces there", issued 2 September 2004. Online at:
https://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sc8181.doc.htm

United Nations Security Council (2006), "Security Council Strongly Encourages Syria to Respond to Lebanon's Request to Delineate Border, Establish Diplomatic Relations", UNSC Resolution 1680, 17 May 2006. Online at https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8723.doc.htm
United Nations Security Council (2006), "Resolution UNSCR 1701 – Security Council Calls For End to Hostilities Between Hizbollah, Israel, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1701", issued 11 August 2006. Online at
https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8808.doc.htm

United Nations Security Council (2007), "Resolution UNSCR 1757 – Security Council authorizes establishment of special tribunal to try suspects in assassination of Rafiq Hariri", issued 30 May 2007, https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9029.doc.htm

United States Congress, House of Representatives Committee on International Relations (2005), *Lebanon Reborn? Defining National Priorities and Prospects for Democratic Renewal in the Wake of March 14, 2005*, 109th Congress, First Session. Serial No. 109-112, July 28, 2005.

United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963", vol.18: Near East, 1962-1963, *Memorandum of Conversation,* Palm Beach*,* Florida, 27 December 1962, "Conversation with Israel Foreign Minister Meir", Online at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d121

United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs (2000), "Foreign Relations of the United States. 1964-1968", Volume XVIII, 3 April 2000, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967*, https://fas.org/sgp/advisory/state/frusmide.html

United States Department of State (2014), "Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS", 14 September 2014. Online at: https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/bureaus-and-offices-reporting-directly-to-the-secretary/the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis/

United States Department of State, Bureau of Counter Terrorism (n.d.), "State Sponsors of Terrorism", online at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm

United States Department of State, Bureau of Counter Terrorism, "List of Foreign terrorist Organizations", current and de-listed, 1997 to present [2020], at https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/

Veale, Laurene (2015), "What is Being Done About the State of Science in the Arab World?", *MIT Technology Review*, 10 February 2015.

Volk, Lucia (2008), "When Memory Repeats Itself: The Politics of Heritage in Post Civil War Lebanon", *International Journal for Middle East Studies*, vol. 40, no.2.

Von Maltzahn, Nadia (2015), *The Syria-Iran Axis: Cultural Diplomacy and International Relations in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris).

Wählisch, Martin (2017), "The Lebanese National Dialogue: Past and Present Experience of Consensus-Building", *Handbook on National Dialogues*, Berlin: Berghof Foundation, March 2017, pp.8-9.

Washington Post Transcript Wire (2006), "Secretary Rice Holds a News Conference", *Washington Post*, 21 July 2006. Online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/21/AR2006072100889.html

Watson, Ivan (2008), "Lebanese Celebrate the Return of Five Prisoners", *NPR News*, 16 July 2008. Online at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92586233

Widner, Jennifer (2005), "Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution: Data and Summaries: Lebanon 1989", (Princeton NJ: Princeton University), accessed at http://pcwcr.princeton.edu/reports/lebanon1990.html

WikiLeaks Cables (2006), "National dialogue conference begins on positive note", 3 March 2006, Beirut: US Embassy. Online at:
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BEIRUT645_a.html

Wilkins, Henrietta C. (2011), "The Making of Lebanese Foreign Policy: the Case of the 2006 Hizballah-Israeli War", PhD thesis, University of Durham, UK.

Worth, Robert (2009), "Foreign Money Seeks to Buy Lebanese Votes", *The New York Times*, 22 April 2009. Online at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/world/middleeast/23lebanon.html?mcubz=3

Worth, Robert F. (2011), "Qaddafi's Never-Neverland", *The New York Times*, 25 September 2011, p. 26, online at:
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F03E0D9103EF936A1575AC0A9679D8B63&pagewanted=all

Wright, Lawrence (2006). *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf).

Wright, Robin (2006), "Inside the Mind of Hezbollah", *The Washington Post*, 16 July 2006. Online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/14/AR2006071401401_pf.html

Zaatari, Mohammed (2017), "Saadi Indicted over Sidon Judges' Killings", reposted by Press Reader, *The Daily Star*, 26 October 2017. Online at:
https://www.pressreader.com/lebanon/the-daily-star-lebanon/20171026/281565176010290

Zabib, Mohammad (2017), "Narkhum Said with Malek Sharif", *LBCI TV*, 19 October 2017 [Arabic], Online at:
https://www.lbcgroup.tv/watch/35383/%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%B2%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A8/ar

Zamir, Meir (1997), *Lebanon's Quest: The Search for a National Identity, 1926-39* (London: I. B. Tauris).

Zarniwitz, Victor, and Geoffrey Moore (1977), "The Recession and Recovery of 1973-1976", in *Explorations in Economic Research*, vol. 4, no. 4, October 1977 (pub. National Bureau of Economic Research and the University of Chicago). http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9101.pdf

Zhao, Quansheng (1996), *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Zoepf, Kathrine and Hassan M. Fattah (2006), "Protesters in Beirut Set Danish Consulate on Fire", *New York Times*, 5 February 2006. Online at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/international/middleeast/protesters-in-beirut-set-danish-consulate-on-fire.html

Zoglin, Richard (1987), "Did A Dead Man Tell No Tales?" *Time Magazine*, 12 October 1987. Online at: http://content.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,965712,00.html