Early Modern British Infantry Combat:
realities, perceptions and the question of modernity, 1642-1746

Submitted by Dukhee Yun to the University of Exeter
as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in History
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Abstract

The early modern era has often been interpreted by both historians and the general public as a transition period between the medieval and modern, when revolutionary changes occurred in almost every aspect of European society, including political mechanisms, technology and religious ideas. It is also widely believed that warfare both prompted and was deeply affected by these changes. By examining the development of the English and later British army, this study seeks to reconsider this narrative of change. Many historians consider that one of the main catalysts for these radical shifts in warfare, and consequently society and culture, was the introduction of new technologies, most notably infantry firepower. These innovations, they argue, brought revolutionary changes in not only military tactics and organisations, but also people's sociocultural perception of warfare. This study calls this thesis into question. Early modern England is traditionally considered by many historians to have lagged behind this 'military revolution' until the late seventeenth century. However, a detailed examination of the development of military theories and battlefield experiences reveals a much more complicated picture. The history of the early modern English and later British army was neither a revolution nor a straightforward evolution prompted by technological innovations. It was, instead, a series of ad hoc adaptations with varying degrees of success. It was this flexibility and adaptability which frequently enabled the English and the British army to overcome the obstacles they faced. Likewise, the manner in which the military and literary classes perceived warfare was far from a simple evolution from the pre-modern mind to the modern one. Different interpretations and understandings of warfare coexisted throughout this period, and many of them appear distinctively pre-modern, even during the Enlightenment. Religion remained a significant force in understanding warfare. Technology, however, played a surprisingly minor role in these discourses, calling into question the grand narrative based on conventional understandings of 'progress' and 'modernity'.

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Preface

On 16th April 1745, the British army finally inflicted a crushing defeat on the charging Highlanders of the Jacobite army at the Battle of Culloden. If we were to imagine the scene of the Culloden battlefield and then look back to another British battlefield a mere century before, the field of Naseby, it might be only natural to feel that a sea change had occurred. In the former, there are red coated infantrymen all armed with muskets, ready to deliver their famous volley fires. In the latter, there is a curious mixture of men, some still cladded in steel armour and helmet and many still holding ancient pikes. They look from completely different worlds: one still not completely out of the ancient and medieval age and the other belonging more to the modern era.

However, is this really true? Besides the equipment and weaponry, did the nature of warfare and battle indeed fundamentally change during these hundred years? Equally, did the mindset of those actually engaged in battle change? Were they aware they were living through such an age of rapid change?

This study is an attempt to answer these questions. The hundred years which it covers are referred to as the 'early modern' period. The term itself implies the notion of change and transition, or even progress, because it suggests that the period shows certain features of modern times as distinct from previous periods. Traditionally, the interpretation of early modern warfare has been related to this notion, due to its close relationship with technological developments. Much debated topics, such as the early modern European 'military revolution' or the 'gunpowder age', are fine examples of this.

There were indeed significant changes. However, the process of these changes was never straightforward, both in people's minds and in the real world. What this study attempts to demonstrate is how complicated the process really was.

Notes on Terminology and Spelling

This study begins before Britain became a political entity and when the British army as a single institution did not yet exist. It does, however, cover the period when both came into existence, prompting questions regarding terminology. The first half of this thesis is predominantly focused on England and its army, although prominent Scottish soldier–author Sir James Turner's work and experience is an important part of the discussion. From the late seventeenth century, covered in the second half of the study, the scope of the study expands and, therefore, the problem of correct naming becomes more complicated, as greater number of Scottish and Irish troops began to fight in the English army, but neither Britain not the 'British Army' were officially in existence until the Act of Union 1707. For convenience's sake, therefore, the thesis uses the term England and the English army until the 1707 and subsequently refers to it as Britain and the British army.

The spellings from direct quotations of primary sources are not modernised.

Introduction

This study concerns early modern England and later Britain's experience of warfare, and its people's responses to it (people here meaning mostly those from the military and literary elite class but by no means confined to them). The study covers period from the time of the British Civil War(s) (1642–51)[1] to the final Jacobite Rising (1745–46). It is, above all, a study of human behaviour and mind and their dynamic interactions in a period of great stress and violence. It aims to provide a better understanding of the experiences of warfare for those who fought in it, and how they reacted to these experiences in various ways, and to also understand those who might have not experienced it directly but nevertheless wrote about it. Through this, it seeks to engage with other related issues, such as the transmission of knowledge, changes and continuities and, above all, the question of 'modernity'.

There is little doubt that early modern period for England and later Britain was a time of great change. During the hundred years covered by this study, it was transformed from what James Scott Wheeler called a 'second-rate European power' into a major world power.[2] Without doubt, this transformation is deeply related to and in many ways a direct consequence of warfare. In other words, the early modern English and later British army and navy were the driving forces of the rise of Britain. Britain during this period experienced near constant conflict, ranging from bloody civil wars to much wider European ones.[3] It falls within the same period when European warfare supposedly experienced a dramatic change, although the extant of these changes and continuities are still debated by

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[1] There is still no clear scholarly consensus on how to refer to this war. The traditional term 'The English Civil War(s)' is still widely used, including in recent works by many scholars such as Diane Purkiss (2006), Blair Worden (2009), Michael Braddick (2009) and Peter Gaunt (2014). Some other scholars such as Charles Carlton (2002), Stanley Carpenter (2005) and Malcom Wanklyn (2010) have preferred 'The British Civil Wars'. In the same sense, 'The Wars of the Three Kingdoms' has also been used to emphasise the war's British character. This paper uses the more neutral term 'The British Civil War'.

[2] James Scott Wheeler, *The Making of a World Power: War and the Military Revolution in Seventeenth Century England* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999), p. 1.

[3] The wars England and later Great Britain fought during the period covered by this study are the British Civil Wars (1642–51), The Anglo–Spanish War (1654–60), The Anglo–Dutch Wars (1652–54, 1665–67, 1672–74), The defence of Tangier (1661–84) The Monmouth Rebellion (1685), The Williamite Conquest of Ireland and Scotland (1688–92), The Nine Years' War (1688–97), The Jacobite Risings of 1715 and 1745, and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48).

scholars.[4] What is clear is that the debates have frequently focused on technological development, which is an important part of the 'military revolution' debate.[5] Among the important technological developments during this period, it is gunpowder that has received the most attention, including the case of Britain.[6] Thus, for many, the early modern period was a time of important changes, especially in military affairs. Indeed, the term 'early modern' itself strongly implies that this period somehow witnessed the birth of 'modernity'.

Such a view, however, raises two questions. The first is the question of the actual experiences of warfare for the contemporary people of the age. The second is how they interpreted the experience. Whether it was a time of great change and, indeed, a birth period of modern warfare can only be answered by reconstructing what happened. Likewise, whether the people understood their time as such can only be answered by examining their own thoughts and words. These two questions are the main focus of this study.

This is not a work of military history in its traditional definition, although it does incorporate certain of its elements. Rather, by using warfare as a keyhole through which to peer, this study seeks a comprehensive understanding of early modern British people's lives, minds and thoughts. This is done by combining insights from works of both old and new military history with other achievements from various fields of historical research.

1. The Key Issues and Historiography

The Military Revolution Debate and Technology

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[4] Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim, '"Then was then and now is now": an overview of change and continuity in late-medieval and early-modern warfare', in *European Warfare 1350-1750*, ed. By Frank Tallet and D. J. B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.1–25 (p. 1).
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] For the most prominent examples, see Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the rise of the West, 1500–1800*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Carlo M. Cipolla, *Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion: 1400-1700* (London: Collins, 1965). For recent arguments about the centrality of firepower in understanding the history of early modern British army, see David Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642–1765* (London: Front Line Books, 2014) and Matthew H. Spring, *With Zeal and Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775–1783* (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 2008).

Despite numerous attacks on Michael Roberts' thesis on the 'military revolution', the idea that Europe's military power underwent a radical change or 'modernisation' which contributed to its eventual world dominance still remains.[7] The basic argument of Roberts' 1967 article is that 'by 1660 the modern art of war had come to birth'; by modern art of war he meant 'mass armies, strict discipline, the control of the state, the submergence of the individual' and 'the use of propaganda, psychological warfare, and terrorism as military weapons'.[8] Roberts argued that this fundamental transformation was initiated by the tactical reforms by Maurice of Orange and Gustav Adolf of Sweden, which enabled their armies to use their firepower more efficiently than their counterparts.[9]

The debate was later reinvigorated by Geoffrey Parker's revision. Instead of confining himself to Maurice and Gustav as Roberts did, Parker included the early modern Spanish army as another pioneer of modern warfare.[10] Furthermore, Parker presented a more fundamental origin of the military revolution than Roberts' tactical reforms: it was the new type of fortress which appeared in Renaissance Italy, the *trace italienne*, which revolutionised European warfare.[11] The significance of Parker's argument is, as Clifford Rogers pointed out, that he raised 'military technology as a causative factor' in the military revolution debate.[12]

Indeed, after Parker, technology became an inseparable factor in the discussion of early modern warfare and even in general early modern history. Among the important technological developments, gunpowder has almost always received the most emphasis. Although numerous criteria have been suggested as establishing the beginning of the early modern European military revolution, most have nonetheless identified gunpowder weaponry as one of the most

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[7] This perspective is well reflected in Armstrong Starkey, *War in the Age of Enlightenment, 1700–1789* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003), p. 35. 'Although they disagree with specific time and space, they concur that Europe witnessed a profound innovation from approximately 1500 to 1800.'

[8] Michael Roberts, 'The Military Revolution, 1560-1660', in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe,* ed. by Clifford J. Rogers (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1995), p. 29.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 13-15.

[10] Geoffrey Parker, 'The "Military Revolution, 1560-1660"-A Myth?', in *The Military Revolution Debate*, ed. By Rogers, pp. 37–54 (p. 39).

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 42–43.

[12] Clifford J. Rogers, 'The Military Revolution in History and Historiography', in *The Military Revolution Debate,* ed. By Rogers, pp. 1–10 (p. 4).

important characteristics. [13] This scholarly consensus is well reflected in Armstrong Starkey's argument that, 'the introduction of gunpowder was fundamental to this revolution, which included the introduction of cannon, artillery fortification, and big-gun sailing vessels'.[14] Russell F. Weigley defined the era from the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631 to the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 as 'the Age of Battles'.[15] In those battles, Weigley concluded that 'firepower' was the key factor, embodying 'a new kind of tactical proficiency'.[16] Similarly, Parker cited the French invasion of Italy in 1494–95 as the beginning of modern warfare. [17] Parker's rationale is identical to that of Weigley: firearms were the catalysts of major change.[18] In many works of early modern military history, the innovations of the string of military reformers, such as Maurice and Gustav, are also interpreted in light of the shifting balance in battle tactics from 'shock' to 'firepower'.[19]

Even the recent works that rebut Euro-centrism are not completely free from such a perspective. To a large extent, scholars on non-European military history have widely accepted the fundamental frame of the 'gunpowder revolution' theory. Tonio Andrade's recent work is one of the most notable examples. In an article co-authored by Hyeok Hweon Kang and Kirsten Cooper (2014), Andrade argued that, 'East Asian developments show striking parallels with European ones, and that the Military Revolution should perhaps be seen not as a European-specific development, but rather than as a Eurasian-wide phenomenon'.[20] One such parallel is the existence of volley-fire tactics and the drill that enabled them. In a more recent work (2016), Andrade named the entire period from the 10th to the mid-15th century as the 'gunpowder age'. According to Andrade, this period began with China as the leading world power in gunpowder technology. After five

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[13] James Raymond, *Henry VIII's Military Revolution: The Armies of Sixteenth-Century Britain and Europe* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), p. 3.
[14] Starkey, *War in the Age of Enlightenment*, p. 35.
[15] Russel F. Weigley, *The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), xi.
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] Parker, *The Military Revolution*, p. 9.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 9–10.
[19] See for one example, Dennis E. Showalter and William J. Astore, *Soldiers' Lives Through History: The Early Modern World* (Westport, Conn: Westview Press, 2007), pp. 61–63.
[20] Tonio Andrade, Hyeok Hweon Kang, and Kirsten Cooper, 'A Korean Military Revolution? Parallel Military Innovations in East Asia and Europe', *Journal of World History*, 25 (2014), 51–84.

hundred years, Europeans had begun to secure pre-eminence, only for China to quickly close the gap. It was not until the eighteenth century that a gap opened again and what Andrade referred to as the 'Great Military Divergence' occurred.'[21] Similarly, Peter Lorge situated the Asian military revolution through the existence of the 'gunpowder revolution'.[22] Lorge also argued that every aspect of early modern warfare in Europe was also evidenced in Chinese warfare.[23] Clearly, in these works, gunpowder technology is the central theme to understanding military innovation during this period.

Interestingly, these scholars who specifically deny the 'European' military revolution show obvious similarities with Parker, who argued that the 'rise of the West' became possible because of Europe's military superiority. Parker indeed acknowledged that the people of East Asia were familiar with many of the key concepts of the military revolution.[24] He particularly emphasised how early modern Japan successfully employed Western firearms.[25] This example is highly significant, as Japan is well known as being the only East Asian nation that successfully 'modernised' itself and developed into a great power during the late-nineteenth century. Once again, it is firearms, and the tactics focused on maximising their effect, that symbolise 'modernity'.

On the other hand, the validity of the military revolution thesis has by no means remained uncontested. For instance, in his 1985 article, David A. Parrott argued that the characteristic of the period often attributed to the military revolution 'was not revolution, but an almost complete failure to meet the challenges posed by the administration and deployment of contemporary armies'.[26] Jeremy Black also argued that there were three 'revolutionary' periods instead of a single 'military revolution', and the nature of the military revolution was 'the clever adaptation of existing ideas to suit local circumstances'.[27] He

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[21] Tonio Andrade, *The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), pp. 297–298.

[22] Peter A. Lorge, *The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 10–21.

[23] Lorge, *The Asian Military Revolution,* p. 73.

[24] Parker, *The Military Revolution,* p. 136.

[25] Geoffrey Parker, 'The Limits of Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, The Battle of Niuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy', *The Journal of Military History,* 71 (2007), 331–372 (p. 333).

[26] David A. Parrott, 'Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War: The 'Military Revolution'', in *The Military Revolution Debate*, ed. Rogers, pp. 227–252 (p. 228).

[27] Jeremy Black, 'A Military Revolution?', in *The Military Revolution Debate,* ed. by Rogers, pp. 95–114 (pp. 110–111).

further argued that military adaptation is a more appropriate term than revolution. [28] Although his argument of three specific periods of military revolutions is debatable, his emphasis on adaptation to suit particular circumstances is an important corrective to the notion of the military revolution as a model to be followed by every army.

John France, a prominent medieval military historian, asserted that 'battle, before modern age, was inevitably, in its crucial stage, a close quarter affair because missile weapons suffered from grave limitations'.[29] He further noted that this 'close-quarter battle fought in close-order formation remained untouched' and 'nothing resembling a "Military Revolution" occurred before the late nineteenth century.'[30] Peter H. Wilson also contended that the 'idea of a military revolution' is based on a largely nineteenth century concept of a 'coherent story of modernization'. He also undermined Roberts' dichotomy by arguing that Gustav Adolph's army at the Battle of Lützen (1632) cannot be simply referred as a 'progressive' force against its 'reactionary' opponent.[31] He further posited that, although 'it has become a historical convention' that the more firepower-oriented Dutch infantry tactics was inherently superior to those of the Spanish army's, 'the distinction is not accurate, nor does it correspond to sixteenth-century military thinking that drew directly on the ancient world for its inspiration.'[32]

In another recent work, Frank Jacob and Gilmar Visioni-Alonzo maintained that 'there never was a military revolution' and 'the changes in the practice of war observed in Europe during the Early Modern period took place on a global scale, occurred numerous times throughout history, and are part of an endless evolutionary process of research and development prompted by immediate threats.'[33] This succinctly summarises the direction in which the most recent academic debates concerning the concept of a military revolution are heading.

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[28] Jeremy Black, *Beyond the Military Revolution: War in the Seventeenth-Century World* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 7.
[29] John France, 'Close Order and Close Quarter: The Culture of Combat in the West', *The International History Review,* 27 (2005), 498–517 (p. 503).
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 507.
[31] Peter H. Wilson, *Lützen* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 113.
[32] Peter H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years' War: Europe's Tragedy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 90.
[33] Frank Jacob and Gilmar Visioni-Alonze, *The Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe: A Revision* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 1.

Nevertheless, the impact of linkage between modernisation and gunpowder weaponry can still be observed easily, as the aforementioned recent works of East Asian military history demonstrate. Another example is Clifford Rogers' thesis that the handgun rapidly changed the face of battle during the early modern period and that 'the importance of missile-firing troops relative to close-combat infantry rose dramatically in most armies.'[34] Even Jacob and Visioni-Alonzo, already mentioned above, argued that the Battle of Salinas (1538) between the Spanish conquistadores and the Incans was 'unusually modern' because it was 'won by the discipline of Pizarro's army and the concentrated and effective use of firepower'.[35] This is an interesting example of how even the scholars who deny the existence of a military revolution more or less accept the crucial importance of discipline and technology as a major element of modern warfare.

The Military Revolution Debate and the Early Modern English/British Army

The debate, and especially the emphasis given to technology, has unsurprisingly affected the discourse on the early modern English and later British army. Many scholars have argued that the early modern English army was far behind its 'modern' continental counterparts. This harsh judgment of the early modern British army has a long history. The main initial focus of the criticism was the Tudor army, but later this was broadened to the Stuart army as well.

Sir Charles Oman contended that the English army was far behind its continental counterparts who were completing the 'triumph of fire-arms' during the sixteenth century.[36] Oman highlighted the conservative attitude of the English in weaponry by noting that 'the English were the latest of all the military nations save the Scots and Spaniards to drop the lance'.[37] He argued that some English writers who wrote on military matters were 'infected with Renaissance

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[34] Clifford J. Rogers, 'Tactics and the face of battle', in *European Warfare 1350–1750*, ed. by Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim, pp. 203–235 (pp. 208–213).
[35] Jacob and Visioni-Alonze, *The Military Revolution*, pp. 35–36.
[36] Sir Charles Oman, 'The Art of War', in *Social England,* 6 Vols., ed. by H.D. Traill (London, 1895), III, p. 70. Also see *A History of The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Methuen & Co, 1937), p. 285.
[37] Oman, *A History of The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*, p. 387.

classicalism, and go back to Aelian and Frontinus for general principles of war'.[38] Conversely, Oman suggested that the British infantry during the Napoleonic Wars gained the upper hand over the French column by the superiority of mass firepower.[39] Thus, firearms became the ultimate marker between the 'backward' sixteenth century English army and the 'modern' early nineteenth-century British army.

Such criticism of the early modern English army has been highly influential and remains so to this day. Charles Cruickshank in the 1960s, David Chandler in the 1970s and Gilbert Millar in the 1980s all presented similar arguments with regard to English 'backwardness'. Cruickshank claimed that England was 'physically separated from the rest of Europe and therefore insulated from military development' on the mainland.[40] He called Oman's picture accurate and asserted that 'the introduction of fire-arms elsewhere in Europe put England temporarily at disadvantage, for there was much reluctance to put aside the long-bow, the nation's traditional weapon.'[41] To his credit, Cruickshank did not simply repeat Oman's thesis. Instead, he criticised Oman for 'making no real attempt to assess the difficulties which the Crown faced'. [42] According to Cruickshank, the fundamental problem was the outdated payment system which relied on individual captains to raise their troops and handicapped the government's control of the finance of the army. In such a system, great difficulty in bearing the growing cost of gunpowder weaponry was inevitable.[43] It is evident from his perspective that, in an age when wars were 'already becoming modern', the English were relatively behind such modernisation, symbolised by gunpowder weaponry.[44]

Millar was more generous than Oman but still maintained that the Tudor army was a 'talented amateur' that operated within its limited experience from the medieval period.[45] Chandler specialised in a later period – the ages of the Duke

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[38] *Ibid.*, p. 382.
[39] Sir Charles Oman, *Studies in Napoleonic Wars*, (London: Methuen & Co, 1929), p. 333.
[40] Charles Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 1.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 281–282.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 281.
[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 281–282.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[45] Gilbert Millar, *Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries* (Charlottesville, VA: Virginia UP, 1980), pp. 16–17.

of Marlborough and Napoleon. Nevertheless, Chandler described the English infantry during the seventeenth century as 'comparatively amateur and immature'.[46]

The tardy adoption of firearms and the preference for traditional edged weapons continued to be blamed for such 'backwardness' of the English army, as can be seen from David Eltis' work.[47] Another recent scholar who has maintained the criticism of the 'backward' English army broadly following Oman's criteria is Roger B. Manning, although his focus is on the seventeenth century. Manning argued that the English preference for an edged weapon against gunpowder is evidence of the 'chivalric revival', and that the English army was essentially amateur, with the possible exception of the New Model Army until 1688.[48] Manning described this 'chivalric revival' as the cultural reaction to the 'military revolution'.[49] His perspective is clearly revealed in the following sentence, which shows a clear similarity with Oman's argument:

> the persistence of older values among swordsmen and gallants who disliked missile weapons and clung to the use of edged weapons such as the sword and the pike, and who engaged in individual displays of honour through dueling, challenges to individual combats on the battlefield and other histrionics, hampered the reception of the technological innovations associated with the military revolution and the pursuit of military and political objectives dictated by the need of the state.[50]

In a review of Charles Carlton's important work, *Going to the Wars* (1992), Manning expressed a similar opinion, asserting that 'the concepts and practices of the military revolution altered British methods of warfare only very slowly. By continental standards, artillery was in short supply and ineffectual. Pikemen, who were vulnerable to musket fire, long continued to outnumber musketeers.'[51] What

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[46] David Chandler, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough* (London: Batsford, 1976), p. 113.
[47] David Eltis, *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995), p. 103.
[48] Roger B. Manning, 'Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century English Armies', *The Journal of Military History,* 71 (2007), 671–699 (p. 671).
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 672.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 673.
[51] Roger B. Manning, 'Review of *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars,*

is clear from these scholars is the stark contrast between the 'traditional edged weaponry' and 'modern gunpowder weaponry'.

As with the military revolution debate in general, there have been other voices. The notion of 'modernity' in military affairs and the 'revolutionary' progress from the 'primitive' or 'pre-modern' warfare of cold steel to the 'modern' warfare of firepower has received serious criticism since the 1990s. Mark Fissel posited that the 'English art of war' was comprised of 'products of a culture characterized by fluidity, adaptability, eclecticism and the ability to synthesise a manner of fighting that fit tactical reality'.[52] Meanwhile, Gervase Phillips maintained that although English warfare was governed by its geographic nature, it was nevertheless heavily influenced by the warfare of the European continent.[53] James Raymond also made similar arguments.[54] Black, likewise, noted that, 'it is by no means clear that military effectiveness should be linked to modernity' by emphasising the military capability of the restored Stuart Monarchy.[55]

Several studies have emerged of early modern British or English battle by both professional and amateur historians. Many of these accept the frame of 'triumph of gunpowder' as a historical fact. Perhaps the best example is Stuart Reid's *Gunpowder Triumphant*.[56] Reid argued that 'the pikeman may cut a dramatic figure, standing grimly in his armour, but when all is said and done the British Civil War was fought and won by musketeers and cavalrymen. Gunpowder was indeed triumphant.'[57] Charles Carlton pinpointed the triumph of gunpowder to a later date. In a recent work, he asserted that 'Culloden was the culmination of military changes that took place in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.'[58] Nevertheless, the influence of the 'gunpowder–modernity' perspective is obvious in both Reid and Carlton's works.

Carlton's interpretation of Culloden connotes that the Jacobite army was a primitive force destined for defeat by the modern 'thin red line' of the British

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1638–1651 by Charles Carlton', *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 24 (1993), 740–742 (pp. 741–742).

[52] Mark Charles Fissel, *English Warfare, 1511–1642* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 282.

[53] Gervase Phillips, *The Anglo-Scots Wars 1513–1550* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), p. 257.

[54] Raymond, *Henry VIII's Military Revolution*, p. 3.

[55] Jeremy Black, *Britain As A Military Power* (London: UCL Press, 1999), p. 271.

[56] Stuart Reid, *Gunpowder Triumphant* (Leigh on Sea, Essex: Partizan, 1987).

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[58] Charles Carlton, *This Seat of Mars: War and the British Isles 1485–1746* (London and New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 171.

army.[59] This is a highly influential and widespread view, because the Jacobites, who made the 'Highlanders' Charge', are commonly understood as one of the best examples of tactical 'primitiveness'. In his 1986 book, James Michael Hill cast new light upon the Jacobite tactics in the wider context of 'Celtic warfare', emphasising their effectiveness. [60] However, he retained the elements of traditional perspective by noting that the Jacobite tactics were somehow 'primitive methods of warfare'.[61] Therefore, the Highlanders' charge was destined to be broken once a modern army realised its technological and organisational potential.[62] More recently, Christopher Duffy also attributed the cause of initial British defeats to the fact that its troops had been trained for combat against a 'sensible' enemy.[63] Therefore, the dichotomy between the 'modern' and 'primitive', and the narrative of the 'triumph of gunpowder', continues.

Another important recent work is David Blackmore's detailed study of the tactical development of the British infantry from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century. In this work, Blackmore focused on the development of British firepower based on platoon firing, but also emphasised the importance of the use of the bayonet in British infantry tactics.[64] Nevertheless, Blackmore maintained a largely traditional view by concluding that the widely held consensus that the British army relied on its firepower is 'justified'.[65]

In 2010, Edward J. Coss published a study of the British soldier under the Duke of Wellington. In it, Coss refuted Oman's interpretation that the British won by firepower alone and showed the importance of the bayonet.[66] If this is true, then it reveals a serious flaw in the conventional narrative of the 'triumph of gunpowder'. If the British army relied so heavily on the bayonet at the early nineteenth century, how could gunpowder weaponry have possibly achieved superiority over edged weaponry during the seventeenth century, as Reid claimed?

Overall, it can be observed that the main issues of the military revolution,

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[59] *Ibid.*
[60] James Michael Hill, *Celtic Warfare 1595–1763* (Edinburgh: Donald, 1986).
[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 75.
[63] Christopher Duffy, *Fight for a Throne: The Jacobites '45 Reconsidered* (Solihull: Helion&C, 2015), p. 354.
[64] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable,* p. 171.
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 167.
[66] Edward J. Coss, *All for the King's Shilling: The British Soldier Under Wellington, 1808–1814* (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 2010), pp. 160–173.

the modernity and technology debates, are also hotly contested in the field of early modern British history. However, one conclusion can be made: the conventional narrative of British military development from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century must be revised. It is this imperative which comprises one of the main purposes of this thesis.

Modernity and Technology

As so far examined, the assumption that technology, especially gunpowder, played a crucial role in revolutionising military affairs during the early modern period and thus contributed to the birth of modern warfare is still widely shared by historians. Far from being confined to the field of military history, this assumption directly influences the interpretations of early modern history in general. Some scholars have regarded the effective use of firearms as a crucial element of modern state formation. For example, while describing the reforms of the seventeenth century Muscovy, Geoffrey Hosking explained that the country's most urgent task was establishing a standing infantry force to 'face up to a modern infantry regiment, equipped with the latest firearms and trained to move in close formation'.[67] Another recent example is Douglas E. Streusand's analysis of three early modern Islamic empires, revisiting William H. McNeill's 'Gunpower Empires' thesis. Streusand argued that although the empires' formations were not entirely dependent on firearms, their ability to use them effectively was indeed a significant factor.[68]

However, what is 'modernity'? The very concept of it is highly ambiguous. For more clarity, two definitions of modernity must be distinguished. First is the meaning of 'modern' as early modern people themselves understood it. Second is how *we* understand it. The word 'modern' or 'moderne' was certainly part of seventeenth-century English (and other European) vocabulary. As Lynn Hunt pointed out, one of the seventeenth century definitions of being modern, according to the Dictionary of the *Académie Française,* is 'opposed to ancient.'[69]

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[67] Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians: From Earliest Times to the Present* (London: Penguin, 2012), pp. 152–154.

[68] Douglas E. Streusand, *Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals* (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 292–293.

[69] Lynn Hunt, *Measuring Time, Making History* (Budapest: Central European University Press,

Thus, Hunt argued that for most early modern Europeans, it was 'a sense of rupture' that influenced their understanding of modernity; it somehow had to be different from previous times. Indeed, some seventeenth-century authors expressed a feeling that their own times were different from the ancient and medieval period, as the following chapters examine.[70] Some of those authors clearly attributed this radical difference to technology.[71]

Things, however, are not always so simple. Although they believed that somehow their world was different from the ancient one and that they were living in a 'modern' age, many early modern people still saw numerous similarities with the ancients and fiercely tried to emulate them.[72] Indeed, as J. G. A. Pocock argued, even the Enlightenment, which was frequently perceived as a harbinger of the modern era, 'may be characterised as the modern challenged by the ancient.'[73] Thus, one of the main focuses of this study is the complicated coexistence of the sense of living in a new era and the veneration of past; the awareness of both changes and continuities.

Apart from the contemporary perspective, whether what we can appreciate as 'modernity' was born during this period, or even whether such a thing as modernity exists, is another matter entirely. Historians are still struggling to define what modernity is and what constitutes it. For example, Hunt provided one definition of it as the 'reliance on reason as the sole standard of truth' and explained that 'it proposes a different standard for determining the validity or values and beliefs, a standard that is not necessarily tied to any particular value or belief' while making clear that this modernity does not have to be the ultimate goal of history.[74] However, it is extremely difficult to answer whether such attitudes widely existed during seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain – or

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2008), p. 49.

[70] Authors such as William Barriffe or Robert Barret frequently used phrases such as 'our moderne discipline' or 'moderne warres'. Their writings are examined in more detail in Chapter 2.

[71] Robert Barret mentioned the 'fierie weapons' as a force of change in his *The Theorike and Practice of Moderne Warres* (London, 1598), p. 2. Sir James Turner also argued that the invention of gunpowder was a catalyst of the birth of modern warfare in his *Pallas Armata, Military Essayes of the Ancient Grecian, Roman, and Modern Art of War Written in the Years 1670 and 1671* (London, 1683), p. 158.

[72] Even the authors cited above who expressed their belief in modernity often also saw parallels between antiquity and their own times.

[73] J. G. A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion: Vol. 1, The Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon, 1734-1764* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1999), p. 106.

[74] Hunt, *Measuring Time, Making History*, p. 86 and p. 119.

anywhere else in Europe. Hunt argued that this sense of modernity only gradually developed from the Renaissance, culminating in the French Revolution.[75] The period this study covers lies in the middle between these two points in history. Whether such a gradual development can be observed during this period is examined throughout the study.

Another traditional definition of modernity is related with religion. As James Muldoon explained, 'if there is any topic that is linked explicitly to the modern world, it is the concept of religious toleration' which was often associated with the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment.[76] Along with the toleration, there are the issues of atheism and secularism which were 'often identified as specifically modern' and also frequently associated with this period of the Renaissance and the Reformation.[77] However, recently this view has lost much of its appeal. Many scholars of religious history have been more sceptical towards the view of a 'clear break from religious and intolerant medieval world and the Reformation as the birth of modern world'.[78] In any case, the violent and often hysterical anti-Catholicism prevalent in Britain during the period this study covers hardly fits the concept of supposedly modern toleration and secularism. Nevertheless, as Scott Dixson pointed out, some scholars still maintain that, in the end the Reformation was one of the forces that prompted the 'genesis of the modern age' as the 'new areas of freedom certainly emerged' during this period.[79] This debate on the relationship between modernity and religion is also relevant to the realm of military affairs as well, as some scholars have argued that this period witnessed the gradual onset of secularisation in the minds of the combatants.[80]

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[75] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[76] James Muldoon, 'Introduction: Bridging the Medieval-Modern Divide', in *Bridging the Medieval-Modern Divide: Medieval Themes in the World of Reformation*, ed. by James Muldoon (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 10.

[77] *Ibid.*

[78] For the formal, see John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nenderman (eds.), *Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration before the Enlightenment* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998). For the latter, see Peter Marhsall, 1517: *Martin Luther and the Invention of the Reformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) pp. 204–206 and C. Scott Dixson, *Contesting the Reformation* (Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) pp. 181–182.

[79] Dixson, *Contesting the Reformation*, p. 181.

[80] Dorothee Sturkenboom, 'Battlefield Emotions in Early Modern Europe: Trends, Key Issues and Blind Spots', in *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination*, ed. by Erika Kuijpers and Cornelis Van Der Haven (London: The Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 271–283 (pp. 272–273).

Some other definitions of modernity are more directly related to military affairs. Famously, Michel Foucault considered discipline and control as the key to modern society. According to Foucault, this became possible only with a 'technical transformation: the invention of the rifle'.[81] This is a familiar story, which is, as previously discussed in detail, still highly influential in discussions of the development of modern warfare and the military revolution. However, as Julius R. Ruff noted, 'many scholars increasingly found Foucault's theories, little grounded in historical research, to be inadequate explanations of behavioural changes in western Europe in early modern period.'[82] Instead, Ruff argued that, during this period, 'state control of violence was tenuous at best.'[83] This suggests a significant flaw in the grand narrative that firepower prompted the birth of a more disciplined, state-controlled, professional – and thus more 'modern' – army.

The relationship between technology and 'modernity' is equally difficult to define. It is undeniable that military technologies, especially gunpowder weaponry, advanced greatly and that the related tactics increased in sophistication during this period. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assert that such developments made the European armies during this period more 'modern' than in previous periods or compared to other armies around the world. Firstly, as clarified above, the nature of 'modernity' is ambiguous at best. Secondly, it is unclear to what extent early modern Europeans considered that their progress in technology distinguished themselves from their own past, or made Europe superior to the rest of the world. Michael Adas argued that, although some early modern Europeans did express 'disparaging assessments of Asian methods and weapons for waging land warfare', they by no means believed that they had overall technological superiority over their Asian counterparts.[84] When they did feel a certain level of superiority, according to Adas, it came from their 'conviction that because they were Christian, they best understood the transcendent truths.'[85] Such a sense of superiority has been a common attitude in human history from antiquity and was

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[81] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison,* trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1977), p. 163.
[82] Julius R. Ruff, *Violence in Early Modern Europe 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 7.
[83] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[84] Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 49.
[85] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

therefore hardly 'modern'. Adas concluded that it was only during the nineteenth century (that is, after the Industrial Revolution) that more Europeans began to see technology as a measure of a superior civilisation.[86] However, it is important to note that Adas did not deny that technology is an important criterion of civilisation. On the contrary, technology was an important tool, albeit far less important than religion until the late eighteenth century, for the Europeans in assessing non-European societies from as early as Renaissance period.[87] The only reason that science and technology were not a source of the sense of European superiority was that Europeans did not surpass all non-European societies' in this regard until the Industrial Revolution.[88] This final argument that technology was always an important measure of civilisation for most Europeans but remained dormant until the industrial revolution is less convincing and appears an oversimplification. This study examines the evidence for this claim.

Another argument regarding technology and warfare comes from Robert L. O'Connell in 1989, who posited that arms development is a 'human, as well as a technological concern' and that they 'interact eccentrically'. The human input is 'products of tradition and, above all, the men who made them.'[89] He argued that although the 'lessons of firearms were largely perceived through minds conditioned by the military beliefs and expectations of the previous era', the emergence of firearms was indeed revolutionary, because it redefined courage from 'ferocious aggressiveness to not flinching' under fire.[90] This statement is, like Foucault's emphasis on discipline, questionable to some extent. In particular, the question of whether the effect of gunpowder was indeed sufficiently powerful to change people's attitudes about war and social value in a revolutionary manner remains an open one. Nevertheless, his argument that technological development and social values interact makes an important point. This study begins from this premise and examines how this interaction between technology and social value worked and what English and British officers and other members of literary class interested in military affairs thought about this interaction, while questioning O'Connell's claim that firearms brought a revolutionary change in

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[86] *Ibid.*, p. 147.
[87] *Ibid.*, pp. 64–68.
[88] *Ibid.*, p. 195.
[89] Robert O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 11–12.
[90] *Ibid.*, pp. 117–119.

social values.

Many other scholars have discussed modernity from many other contexts, such as science, art or medicine, the scope of which is too vast to be covered entirely in this study. Suffice it to state that in many of these areas too, the boundary between pre-modern and modern is becoming increasingly unclear. For example, the Renaissance was traditionally hailed as a great epoch in which more attention began to be given to human anatomy, thus laying a foundation for modern medicine. However, as Virginia Cox pointed out, recent Renaissance scholars have acknowledged that the development of human anatomy was in many ways based on medieval achievements.[91]

In summary, there is no definitive consensus among scholars as to what exactly constitutes 'modernity', nor did the early modern people themselves come to one, although they did use the word 'modern'. However, certain characteristics such as rationality, discipline and technological advance have been proposed by various scholars as factors that made the modern era different from previous periods This sense of 'being different' was also shared by some early modern people. However, there is a danger of such an approach to 'modernity' falling into the trap of the whiggish view of history, as Hunt warned.[92] Furthermore, how exactly the early modern era was different from previous eras, and how people acknowledged the difference (if they did), is another matter. This thesis tackles this question. Along with their mindset, it examines a mechanism of how early modern people perceived new technology and reconciled it to their deeply ingrained understanding of warfare, and then adapted accordingly. Whether the process of adaptation marks a clear break from the past can only be answered through a detailed examination of contemporary ideas and the realities of battle during this period. Through this process of examination, we can determine whether and to what extent the various elements of the characteristics of

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[91] Virginia Cox, *A Short History of the Italian Renaissance* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016), pp. 92–99.

[92] The whiggish view of history originated from the discourse on the English Reformation. The view traditionally saw the Reformation as the watershed in English history, in the sense that it progressed from a supposedly superstitious medieval Catholic past to the rational modern era symbolised by Protestantism. Thus, the history of England was presented as an inevitable march of progress. This traditional view retained its influence in academic discourses until recently and is still influential in the popular understanding of history. For a recent discussion, see the first two chapters of Eamon Duffy, *Saints, Sacrilege & Sedition: Religion and Conflict in the Tudor Reformations* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012).

'modernity' listed by the aforementioned scholars listed can be identified during this period.

Face of Battle and Mechanics of Combat

It is clear that to establish whether the 'military revolution' occurred in early modern England and later Britain, and whether it prompted the birth of modernity in military affairs and, in turn, in society in general, it is essential to first understand what was really happening on the fields of battle themselves. This understanding must include not just the grand tactics of illustrious generals, which have been the subject of traditional military history, but what the soldiers experienced and how they behaved.

The current approach to this aspect of battle is heavily influenced by John Keegan's *The Face of Battle* (1976). Rejecting the traditional 'battle piece' dominated by the tactics of great generals, Keegan focused on what actually happened on the field of battle. In Keegan's battle analysis, individual soldiers cease to be the 'neat symbols on the map' moved by generals in traditional grand-tactical battle narratives. Instead, he paid particular attention to 'the physical circumstances of battle' that affected the 'individual experiences of the battle.'[93]

In describing infantry *mêlée* at the Battle of Agincourt (1415), Keegan considered various factors such as physical impediment, the weaponry used, the 'tumbling effect' caused by crowd pressure.[94] He also argued that 'all infantry actions, even those fought in the closest of close order, are not, in the last resort, combats of mass against mass, but the sum of many combats of individuals'.[95] This is an important statement, because many of the later studies of the mechanics of combat were based upon this premise. In his analysis of the Battle of Waterloo (1815), Keegan used many different theories, such as animal behaviour, that might enable modern readers to understand the psychology of individual soldiers in a musket battle.[96]

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[93] Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, p. 134.
[94] *Ibid.*, p. 101.
[95] *Ibid.*, p. 100.
[96] *Ibid.*, p. 165.

In assessing the effectiveness of firepower and edged weapons, Keegan contended that the most lethal weapons were missiles. He maintained that 'there being no evidence of the armies having crossed bayonets at Waterloo (or any other battle, come to that).'[97] This argument thus reveals that Keegan's thesis is not entirely free from the narrative of the 'gunpowder revolution'.

Keegan's work was highly influential but not without its critics. Most noticeably, Everett L. Wheeler argued that 'Keegan's attack on the "automaton" view of battle is not as valid as many think.' He cites J. Glenn Gray, a World War II combat veteran (unlike Keegan) and philosopher to argue that men in battle could function as automatons.[98] Wheeler also asserted that '"Face of battle" studies tend to overemphasise the individual combatant when, in fact, battle is a social activity of groups, in which collective action and *social* psychology generally prevail over that of the individual.'[99]

Despite this criticism and the fact that it is now in many ways dated, the importance of Keegan's work in understanding the nature and mechanics of combat cannot be downplayed. After all, it was Keegan's attempt that paved the way for the study of battle's 'mechanics', and it is undeniable that research and debates initiated by the 'face of battle' approach have enriched our understanding of the nature of battle. In addition, whether 'collective action and *social* psychology' indeed prevail over individual psychology, as Wheeler argued, requires further discussion, because Wheeler did not cover that matter in detail in his article. As Wheeler cited, Gray argued that 'numerous soldiers enter into a dazed condition in which all sharpness of consciousness is lost' and 'forget about death by losing their individuality.'[100] Wheeler believed this to be a 'useful antidote to the "face of battle" approach.'[101] Although it is certainly true that many soldiers reported becoming insensitive to fear, we must still be cautious before making such a generalisation. There are many other voices from combat soldiers who expressed their fear, stress and disgust in battle.[102] The existence

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[97] *Ibid.*, p. 199.
[98] Everett H. Wheeler, 'Firepower: Missiles and the "Face of Battle"' from Edward Dąbrowa, *Roman Military Studies* (Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press, 2001), pp. 169-184 (p. 174).
[99] *Ibid.*
[100] J. Glenn Gray, *The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle* (Lincoln, Neb: University of Nebraska Press, 1998, Originally published in New York, 1959), p. 102.
[101] Wheeler, 'Firepower', p. 174.
[102] See, for example, Ernie Pyle, *Last Chapter* (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1946), p. 99.

of these testimonies throughout history makes us hesitant to completely agree with the above thesis. This study, therefore, is built upon the basic premise of Keegan's 'face of battle' approach to reconstruct the mechanics of early modern combat while by no means accepting all his arguments.

Since Keegan, there has been very little work of 'face of battle' in the field of early modern military history. With the exception of studies by Carlton, neither has the approach been widely applied to the study of early modern British military history. The result is, as Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim described, a 'rich and nuanced historiography of the relationship between war and society; but it comes at the price of an impoverished understanding of how and why wars were actually waged, of the reasons for military success and failure, and of the consequences.'[103]

On the contrary, in the field of ancient military history, a new generation of scholars has re-examined ancient battles and produced interesting results by adopting the 'face of battle' approach. Their research provides a valuable insight into how current scholars attempt to recreate the mechanics of past combats, including early modern combat, using insufficient sources. For example, in his article published in 2000, Alexander Zhmodikov argued that the principal weapon of the Roman heavy infantrymen was *pila*, not *gladius*, and Roman battles were long-range missile fights, rather than swordfights.[104] Zhmodikov's argument and his interpretation of ancient sources were, in fact, flawed and were duly criticised.[105] Nevertheless, one aspect of his study is significant and relevant to this study in the sense that it challenges the popular image of pre-gunpowder battles, in which hand-to-hand fighting is the most decisive element. This is an important issue, because this study frequently returns to the question of whether the history of battle could be described as a straightforward development from hand-to-hand combat to long-range combat.

Other scholars of ancient warfare, most notably Adrian K. Goldsworthy,

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Harold J. Gordeon Jr., *One Man's War: A Memoir of World War II* (New York: Apex Press, 1999), p. 19. E. B. Sledge, *With the Old Breed: at Peleliu and Okinaw*a (London: Ebury Press, 2010, originally published in Novato, 1981), p. 61.

[103] Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim, 'An overview of change and continuity', in *European Warfare 1350–1750*, ed. by Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim, pp. 1–26 (p. 2).

[104] Alexander Zhmodikov, 'Roman Republican Heavy Infantrymen in Battle (IV–II Centuries BC)', *Historia* 49, 67–78 (p. 78).

[105] Sam Koon, *Infantry Combat in Livy's Battle Narratives* (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2010), p. 21.

Philip Sabin and Sam Koon, have proposed a more persuasive model of ancient Roman infantry combat than Zhmodikov.[106] The important achievement of their studies is that they established a concept of the 'mechanics of combat (or battle)'. This means a focus on what happened when individual units clashed, rather than on battlefield command and manoeuvre, which were the focus of the 'old fashioned' military history.[107] Many of its aspects were based on the study of human psychology, and thus their relevance is not confined to ancient history. How their specific arguments can be applied to the study of early modern English and British warfare is examined in more detail in the following methodology section. What is important to note here is that recent research into ancient warfare has provided valuable clues for a more in-depth understanding of human reaction in extremely stressful conditions. Indeed, as Earl J. Hess pointed out, combat is one of the most complicated human behaviours.[108] Therefore, a clearer understanding of the realities of combat may lead to a better understanding of human motivations and social interaction.

Sociocultural Understanding of Warfare

In his study of early modern French social and cultural history, William Beik defined culture as the 'sense of customary behavior, belief systems, and ritual practices.'[109] This definition can be applied to understanding warfare. War as a cultural phenomenon has been an important subject of academic discussion since as early as the 1970s. Many scholars have debated how social values and customs have affected the practice of combat and warfare in general.[110] The basic consensus from this debate is, as John A. Lynn noted, that military reality

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[106] Adrian Keith Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army At War 100 BC–AD 200* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), Philip Sabin, 'The Face of Roman Battle', *The Journal of Roman Studies* 90 (2000), 1–17., Koon, *Infantry Combat.*

[107] Philip Sabin, 'The Mechanics of Battle in the Second Punic War', *Bulletin of Institute of Classical Studies, Supplement*, No. 67, The Second Punic War A Reappraisal (1996), 59–79 (p. 60).

[108] Earl J. Hess, *The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Realities and Myth* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas), 2008), p. 119.

[109] William Beik, *A Social and Cultural History of Early Modern France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. xiv.

[110] John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (London: Hutchinson, 1993), Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), and John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 2004) are good examples of this debate.

can be 'culturally constructed'.[111]

It is important to note that it can work in other ways as well: just as perception affects reality, it can distort it too. Sometimes, the memory of warfare can be a cultural construction, quite distinct from reality. For example, the famous 'charge of light brigade' at the Battle of Balaclava (1854) was in reality an insignificant military action, but it has been a powerful cultural symbol since it was first reported to the Victorian era British public.[112] It is a reminder that even the contemporary reports of a war are not straightforward descriptions of a fact but often a reflection of contemporary values and belief system. To glean this cultural understanding from early modern writings on military affair is another main goal of this study.

Since the 'cultural turn' during 1990s, the approach to early modern history has changed significantly. As Kevin Sharpe observed, it 'led to a relaxing of the borders between political, social and cultural history.'[113] What was distinctive in this 'cultural turn' was the adoption of historical anthropology; scholars increasingly began to avoid the narrative focused on high politics or high culture and instead paid more attention to other areas, to an extent Burke described as 'the cultural history of everything: dreams, food, emotions, travel, memory, gesture, humour, examinations and so on.'[114] Thus, in writing the social and cultural history of early modern France, Beik defined the culture 'in the anthropological sense' and clarified that he did not 'mean "high" culture.[115] Likewise, to understand the collapse of Stuart monarchy into the Civil War, Sharpe turned to cultural texts which the contemporaries construed with specific meanings or visual symbols, which had similar functions in early modern minds.[116]

Some other issues that began to be discussed from this 'cultural turn' are particularly related to warfare. One important issue is the identities of the combatants, a subject closely linked with gender studies. Gender is one of the

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[111] John A. Lynn, 'The Embattled Future of Academic Military History', *The Journal of Military History,* 61 (1997), 777–789 (p. 787).
[112] Trudi Tate, *A Short History of the Crimean War* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2019), pp. 61–72.
[113] Kevin Sharpe, *Remapping Early Modern England: The Culture of Seventeenth Century Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 392.
[114] Peter Burke, *What is Cultural History?,* 3rd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), pp. 31–40.
[115] Baik, *A Social and Cultural History*, p. xiv.
[116] Sharpe, *Remapping Early Modern England*, pp. 19–20 and p. 243.

most actively debated subjects in academia. As a result of some of these studies, the early modern era has come to be understood as a time of significant changes in the concepts of both femineity and masculinity, and their relationship with power and politics, religion and accepted social norms.[117] Among many issues of gender studies, the concept of masculinity is intimately connected to warfare and violence.

However, until recently, 'the maleness of the military and war' was widely regarded as a natural phenomenon and, therefore, close scrutiny of the question of gender was largely absent from the study of war.[118] This changed after the 1980s as the feminist movement and women's studies began to influence the studies of war, and also as Western armies began to open their doors to women.[119] This led to an impressive array of new studies on the subject. However, as Kagren Hagemann pointed out, there is still a relative dearth of studies concerning gender and pre-modern warfare.[120] In addition, there is a widespread assumption that equates 'gender with women'.[121]

Consequently, there are relatively few studies on masculinity and early modern warfare. The few that there are often present an oversimplified narrative of the evolution of masculine identity. For example, Leo Braudy saw the early modern era as a transition period for a concept of masculinity from medieval chivalry which was, he argued, 'slowly giving way to a world of men literally without shields.'[122] War and the warrior identity, of course, remained an important factor for early modern masculinity: nevertheless, Braudy claimed that a transition in the definition of manhood from 'armor to personality' occurred during the seventeenth century, meaning a greater focus on individualism and

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[117] For a good example, see Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987). For another important study of the seventeenth-century English landed elite's changing sociocultural behaviours and gender roles, see Susan E. Whyman, *Sociability and Power in Late Stuart England: The Cultural Worlds of the Verneys 1660-1720* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[118] Karen Hagemann, 'Introduction: Gender and History of War-The Development of the Research' in *The Oxford Handbook of Gender, War, and the Western World since 1600*, eds. by Karen Hagemann, Stefan Dudink, and Sonya O. Rose (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 1-36 (p. 4.)

[119] *Ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

[120] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[121] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[122] Leo Braudy, *From Chivalry to Terrorism: War and the Changing Nature of Masculinity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), p. 162.

new masculine models 'free from a primary dependence upon war and violence'.[123] Thus, the ideal early modern man was a gentleman–soldier rather than a violent medieval knight or cultured aristocrat. Some aspects of these changes are questionable, and this evolutionary narrative from chivalry to gentleman is somewhat simplistic. Another problem of this evolutionary model is that it overlooks the possible differences between officers and men regarding their perceptions of masculinity. Nevertheless, Braudy's argument provides an important premise on which to build. This study examines whether such a radical transition from medieval chivalry to the early modern gentleman-soldier indeed occurred during this period. It challenges the oversimplification of Braudy's model and instead suggests a more nuanced treatment of the changes and continuities that occurred in the concept of masculinity among soldiers and the literary class during this period. It also considers the impacts of the social gulf between the officers and men in terms of their ideas of masculinity.

There are other works which have focused on masculinity in relation to specific conflicts. A good example is James McPherson's study of the influence of the concept of manhood and honour in nineteenth-century American society on the motivation of American Civil War soldiers.[124] However, as D. J. B. Trim observed, there has been relatively little work of this subject in early modern English and later British warfare. Trim suggested the reason behind this lack of work was because 'military historians have shown little interest in masculinity, and historians of gender and manhood little interest in war or military identity.'[125] One notable exception is Diane Purkiss' study based on texts by and about the British Civil War soldiers.[126] Here, Purkiss demonstrated that the concept of masculinity deeply influenced the events during the war. She contended that the Civil War was an 'opportunity for the creation *and* discharge of tensions implicit in early modern masculinity, a masculinity socially and psychologically

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[123] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[124] James M. McPherson*, For Causes and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 22–25.

[125] D. J. B. Trim, '"Warlike Prowesse and manly courage": Martial Conduct and Masculine Identity in Late Tudor and Early Stuart England', in *Early Modern Military Identity, 1560-1639*, ed. by Matthew Woodcock and Clan O'Mahoney (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2019), pp. 25–55 (p. 27).

[126] Diane Purkiss, *Literature, Gender and Politics during the English Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

constructed.'[127] Although this thesis is not mainly about early modern gender construction, the identity of the combatants is certainly one of its main subjects. It especially focuses on whether the early modern soldiers' self-identification and their interpretation of the experience of war was significantly different from their predecessors or, in other words, somehow more 'modern'.

Emotion is another important product of the 'cultural turn', and emotional expression is closely related to the concept of masculinity and femininity. The history of emotion has been one of the most popular subjects among scholars since. A long-held view was that the human emotion evolved from the primitive, uncontrolled medieval form to more restrictive modern form. In his classic *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, Johann Huizinga described how emotional expressions during the medieval period were direct and absolute both in 'sadness and joy.'[128] Similarly, in his important work *The Civilizing Process* (1939), Nobert Elias suggested that the violent behaviours of the middle ages prompted by uncontrolled emotions came to be 'tamed' during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[129] Later scholars eschewed this evolutionary model that contrast the primitive middle ages with Renaissance modernity. [130] Barbara Rosenwein argued that even during a short time period, the use of emotional languages often varied considerably. Thus, instead of the evolutionary model, Rosenwein introduced the concept of '"emotional communities": groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value-or devalue-the same or related emotions.'[131] This concept is useful in both understanding the emotional expressions of the early modern military class and in overcoming the artificial medieval/modern divide.

This directly led to another significant issue which this study engages in:

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[127] *Ibid.*, p. 231.

[128] Johann Huizinga, *The Autumn of the Middle Ag*es, trans. by Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch (Chigago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996, originally published in 1919 as *Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen*), p. 1.

[129] Andrew Linklater and Stephen Mennell, 'Retrospective: Nobert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigation-An Overview and Assessment' *History and Theory,* 49 (2010), 384–411.

[130] See, for example, the criticism on Elias' thesis and the relevant historiographical analysis in Barbara H. Rosenwein, 'Contrilling Paradigms' in *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, ed. by Barbara H. Rosenwein (Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 233–247.

[131] Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in Early Middle Ages* (Ithaka: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 2.

battlefield emotions. Considering that the battlefield is the place where combatants are normally exposed to extreme dangers and violence, it would be easy to imagine it as a place full of uncontrolled emotions. However, the subject has only recently become the focus of scholarly attention. The general agreement among scholars is that 'sixteenth- and seventeenth-century soldier memoirs mainly report on the military and logistic aspects of war and focus on heroic events in a very terse, factual way.'[132] Despite this agreement, opinions are divided on the question of what this means in terms of emotions, and whether the memoirs indeed lacked emotional expressions.

Yuval Harari, one of the pioneers in this subject, suggested that the Renaissance military memoirists rarely commented upon their emotions because 'they care little about the individual ideal and hardly any memoirist attempts to portray himself as an individual.'[133] Brian Sandberg criticised Harari's argument, claiming that 'he insisted on using modern conception of military memoirs that is anachronistic, attempting to find expressions of an "inner personal reality" by early modern war memoir writers.'[134] Sandberg argued that 'personal narratives of the French Wars of Religion demonstrate that writers did discuss combat experiences in terms of intense and meaningful emotions'.[135] In particular, Sandberg identified certain terms typically employed by the soldier–authors such as 'furieussement (furiously), vivement (lively), or vigorousement (vigorously)' as language the soldiers used to express what they experienced and felt in combat.[136] Here, Sandberg's suggestion appears persuasive. Considering the emotional languages employed in much of the sixteenth and seventeenth century literature and the highly emotional Baroque art of the same period, it would be unnatural to assume that the early modern people were devoid of emotions. Therefore, it is more likely that the early modern soldier–authors, as a particular emotional community which Rosenwein has suggested, had a specific norm in

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[132] Erika Kuijpers and Cornelis van der Haven, 'Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination', in Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800, eds. by Kuijpers and Van Der Haven, pp. 3–21 (p. 10).

[133] Yuval Noah Harari, *Renaissance Military Memoirs: War, History and Identity, 1450–1600* (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2004), p. 45.

[134] Brian Sandberg, ''His Courage Produced More Fear in His Enemies than Shame in His Soldiers': Siege Combat and Emotional Display in the French Wars of Religion' in *Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800*, eds. by Kuijpers and Van Der Haven, pp. 127–148 (p. 133).

[135] *Ibid.*, p. 142.

[136] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

the manner with which they expressed their emotions based on their shared value.

Therefore, expecting early modern soldiers to employ the same language as that of their modern counterparts to express their emotions is illogical. They belonged to different emotional communities. Expecting the same intensity of emotional expressions, considering that most of the early modern battle reports and memoirs are significantly briefer than the modern ones, is unrealistic. Nevertheless, we must avoid assuming that human nature and human feelings were fundamentally different in early modern times than the present day, although the manner in which such feelings were expressed is clearly different and dependent upon the customs and social norms of their times. In the mindset of early modern military theorists, battlefield fear was a contagious evil that could destroy an army and was, therefore, an object of eradication. They argued that, 'death in battle comes to those who are afraid of it; the less fear, the less danger.'[137] Therefore, early modern soldiers would have had difficulty admitting in writing that they experienced fear in combat. However, that does not prove the absence of such emotions. In fact, military theorists' efforts to encourage fearlessness are themselves strong evidence that they were aware of the prevalence of the fear of combat among soldiers.

This study applies the insights provided by these recent debates on soldiers' identities and battlefield emotions to understand the experiences of early modern British soldiers. How they expressed their feelings, and in what languages they did so, is one of the main focuses of this study.

2. Methodology

Sources

The main sources of this study are contemporary texts, mostly written by soldier–authors. These include treatises on military affairs, military manuals, military histories and direct reports of their experiences of war. Other important sources

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[137] Andreas Bähr, 'Magical Swords and Heavenly Weapons: Battlefield Fear(lessness) in the Seventeenth Century', in *Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800*, eds. by Kuijpers and Van Der Haven, pp. 49–69 (p. 59.)

used are books read by the officers for their professions, including classics. Finally, there is the contemporary literature not necessarily directly related to military affairs, such as poetry.

Contemporary military manuals and military treatises are widely available in print and thus one of the most accessible sources. They reveal how contemporary officers thought combat should be, although not exactly how the combat was. They are therefore highly valuable in understanding the theoretical minds of the officers and tacticians. They also show how ideas on warfare were received and transmitted in early modern Britain. However, their value is somewhat limited regarding an understanding of the realities of battle. Above all things, these manuals were specifically written for their fellow officers for use in training their troops for war. Their purpose was, therefore, to inform the other officers how to teach their soldiers to fire their muskets or handle pikes, and how to form a line of battle, how to march or how to build a camp. Naturally, the authors of these manuals must have expected that their targeted readers already knew the most basic details of contemporary battle and therefore most of these manuals do not describe what actually occurs on the battlefield in great detail.

The works of military history written not long after the war are also of value in two ways. First, these histories were based on primary sources, including those that no longer exist today. Sometimes, these histories contained official documents.[138] Second, the officers in particular preferred some of these histories and, therefore, it can be assumed that the contents helped build the officers' perception of battle.[139] It is likely that those works influenced the way those officers conducted their own combat. The most notable works of these kinds were written in the wake of the great achievements of the British army, such as Brigadier General Richard Kane's *Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne* (1745) or John Entick's *The General History of the Late War* (1763–1764). Thus, understandably, many of them tend to celebrate the feats of the British army with possible exaggerations and, therefore, the battle narratives from these military histories cannot be accepted at face-value. However, this is a problem common

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[138] Hamish Scott, 'The Seven Years War and Europe's Ancien Régime', *War in History*, 18 (2011), 419–455.
[139] For the books particularly preferred by eighteenth-century British officers, see Ira D. Gruber, *Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

to every written source and, despite its limitations, the fact that they were written shortly after the events and often by the eyewitnesses make these histories valuable sources, as long as they are read with due caution.

Some contemporary literature concerned about warfare but not necessarily written by soldiers or military theorists can be useful for understanding the mindset of early modern people towards warfare. Some of these are works of art, such as popular songs or poetry. Some are government propaganda or religious sermons. They are neither straightforward reports of war nor objective in their observations of the events. Nevertheless, they show how some people interpreted the events and thus provide a valuable insight into their mental world. These works of art and literature are enormous in quantity and judgement was therefore required in their selection. For example, although paintings are immensely important sources in understanding the contemporary perception of warfare, and deserving of further independent research, the scope of this research had to be confined to textual sources. In addition, these visual imageries are often unrepresentative of the realities of the contemporary battlefields: many were deliberately constructed to evoke classical imaginations or heroic ideals and have only limited value in reconstructing the realities of early modern combat, although it must be acknowledged that some of the textual sources have similar problems. These images are, of course significant sources in understanding how the contemporaries imagined warfare. However, they require a substantially different approach and training from textual study, which makes it virtually impossible to cover them in a single study. It is, nevertheless, hoped that this topic be covered in a follow-up study.

The gap between the theories and realities of combat can be partially covered by consulting the contemporary records of battles. Compared to ancient and medieval warfare, eyewitness accounts of early modern battles are relatively abundant. Many memoirs and letters of the combatants exist. Fortunately, many of the sources describing the British Civil War battles have been published, mainly thanks to the effort of Brigadier General Peter Young. In addition, the British Library holds the Thomason Tract, which is one of the most important primary sources of the Civil War. These printed reports of combatants or witnesses of combat provide important clues for reconstructing tactical detail. Likewise, newspapers and periodicals provide official accounts of battle,

especially from the late seventeenth century.[140] These sources may enable researchers to piece together a general picture of the battle, which is frequently confusing or fragmentary in the accounts of individual witnesses.

There are also many unpublished, archival sources of this nature. Various archives provide other important primary sources, such as those rare documents containing the voices of common soldiers. For example, the Devonshire Record Office stores the testimonies of veterans who fought in the Royalist army during the Civil War, some of whom experienced several major battles.[141] These testimonies provide valuable insights into the nature and realities of the battles and how common soldiers perceived them.

Another important primary source that provides clues about individual soldiers who underwent the ordeal of combat are pensioner's records, registered by the Royal Hospital at Chelsea. These records are located in the National Archives at Kew. These records present valuable insights into the motivation and conditions of the soldiers' services, including combat. They make it easier to reconstruct the mechanics of eighteenth-century combat at an individual level.

Many journals, letters or correspondence of the combatants and other accounts of battles remain unpublished. This is especially true for many eighteenth-century battles, in contrast to the Civil War, in which many of the important sources have already been transcribed by Peter Young. Many of them were written for private audiences and are thus highly valuable in the sense that they provide individual perspectives. Writing journals or diaries became fashionable for some members of the literary elite during the late sixteenth century and became more widespread in the course of the seventeenth century. It was at first considered an act of a religious devotion as a record of the author's inner self, but soon it began to also cover more secular, everyday subjects[142] First and foremost, these diaries and journals were private writings. However, this

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[140] Throughout this study, 'official account' refers to the accounts of battle published by the order of government, or the accounts acknowledged before the publication by an equivalent authority. For example, during the Civil War, the Parliament and the Royalist Councils of War both ordered or authorised publication of the accounts of battles. They are referred to in this study as the 'official Parliamentary account' and 'official Royalist account'.

[141] Mark Stoyle, '"Memories of the Maimed": The Testimony of Charles I's Former Soldiers, 1660–1730,' *The Journals of the Historical Association*, 88 (2003), 204–226 (pp. 212–213).

[142] Margaret Willes, *The Curious World of Samuel Pepys & John Evelyn* (New Haven: Yale University press, 2017), pp. 24–25.

does not guarantee that they reveal the authors' frank thoughts and emotions. As Andreas Bähr observed, seventeenth-century soldiers' diaries generally followed the conventions of contemporary military culture and thus do not reveal personal feelings deemed 'unsoldierly'.[143] Secondly, even though they were written as private documents in the first place, some authors nevertheless expected their writings would be read at least by their families or friends and some even considered publication while writing, so they modified and revised them continuously.[144] Nevertheless, despite these issues, they are essential sources. Firstly, although most of those private writings do not display personal feelings outright, some do in a manner that avoids a direct clash with the contemporary conventions. For example, as Bähr showed, although the authors of the diaries do not admit they were afraid during battle, they report fears they observed from the others and thus enable the reader to also gauge the author's feelings.[145] Secondly, regarding the issue of objectivity and later modifications, it is the same with all other written sources, as mentioned earlier for the case of military histories written after the wars. Therefore, if studied with the same caution applied to other sources, these documents present important individual perspectives which are highly useful in reconstructing both details of particular battles and the contemporary understanding of warfare.

Some unpublished documents are government records, including official reports or petitions. They do not express personal views but provide some important, hard facts of particular battles. Many of these sources can be found at the British Library. The War Office and National Army Museum at Chelsea also hold many of the personal letters, diaries and other official correspondence of the combatants. As for the records of the Jacobite Rising of 1745, many of the sources can be found at various Scottish archives, of which the vast majority are stored at the National Records of Scotland, Edinburgh.

However, despite this relative abundance, there are some serious

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[143] Bähr, 'Magical Swords and Heavenly Weapons', in *Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800*, pp. 52–53.

[144] Willes, *The Curious World*, p. 25. Also, see David Chandler's 'Introduction' in John Marshall Deane, *A Journal of Marlborough's Campaigns during the War of the Spanish Succession 1704-1711* (Society for Army Historical Research Special Publication No. 12, 1984), pp. vii–xviii.

[145] Bähr, 'Magical Swords', in *Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800*, eds. by Kuijpers and Van Der Haven, pp. 49–69 (pp. 52–53).

drawbacks in the potential of these contemporary sources for reconstructing early modern combat. Often, the sources do not pay significant attention to the minute-by-minute details of the battles. This is understandable, because most of the potential readers, some of them combat veterans, already had sufficient knowledge of the actions taking place in battle. Second, there is relatively little testimony from common soldiers who bore the brunt of the physical shock of combat, mainly because the majority of them during this period were illiterate. Last, many accounts of the battles were frequently written a significantly long time after them. There must, therefore, be inevitable corruption of memories, although this problem is by no means exclusive to the early modern battle. The following two passages from contemporary sources exemplify some of these problems:

> Uppon our approach they gave fire with their can[n]on lined amongst their horse dragoneers, Carabines, and pistolls, but finding that did nothing dismay the Kings horse & that they came more roundly to them, with all their fire reserved, iust when our men reserved charged they all began to turne head and we followed an execution uppon them, for 4 miles together: the left wing did the very same where Wilmott com[m]anded: a Great many of them saved their lives by getting our word For God and King Charles: had our reserve of Horse not mistaken but stood still in their place they were com[m]anded we had given them as absolute a defeat both of horse and foot as ever was given, It was equally divided by the foot till night. A troop of their reserve did charge among our foot where they did a great deale of hurt: and took my Lord Lindsey prisoner (who is wounded & my Lord Willoughby: Colonell Vavasor Colonell Lunsford S[i]ʳ Edward Stradling and S[i]ʳ H. Ridley who are all prisoners in Warwick: but ther loss S[i]ʳ Charles Lucas with some others and their troops did suddenly redeeme, for he hath cut of four of their foot regiments, and taken a whole bag full of their foot colours.[146]

The passage quoted above provides some brief detail of both cavalry and infantry

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[146] BL, Harleian MS, 3738, 'A brief relation of the battell at Redhorse field under Edgehil'.

action at the Battle of Edgehill (1642), the first major battle of the Civil War. It presents a general outline of the course of battle: however, it explains virtually nothing about how the cavalrymen and infantrymen wielded their weapons to neutralise their opponents. Here is another example:

> While this was doing, the bodies of the foot met the Kings Regiment of Guard, and the Earle of Lindsies giving the first charge, which was very well disputed a long time, untill the reserve of the Rebells Horse (which had never been charged) charged Our Foot upon the flank, which Our Foot resisted a good while.[147]

This account also describes infantry action at Edgehill. Again, it is extremely hard to imagine how this 'very well disputed' engagement was carried out by individual combatants based on this source alone.

Some sources, mostly memoirs written by the combatants, do provide greater detail. Such accounts are valuable in reconstructing the mechanics of combat, but they are not completely without problems. As Christopher L. Scott, Alan Turton and Eric Gruber von Arni explained in their study of the Battle of Edgehill, many of the available texts were 'written many years after the battle and there are dangers in assuming that all is the result of memory recall and not interpretation developed over the years or modified according to the accounts of others'.[148] In addition, as Malcolm Wanklyn noted, some of the writings appear to be pure fiction or 'journalistic fabrications dressed up in such a way as to appear authentic'.[149] Therefore, these sources must be approached with caution.

Despite such limitations, the reconstruction of a reliable model of the mechanics of mid-seventeenth-century infantry combat is not entirely impossible. The description of battle appears generally realistic, except for a few apparently fictitious writings.[150] Though the narrative could be distorted by hyperbole or by

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[147] BL, TT E. 126 (24), 'A Relation of the Battaile lately fought between Keyton and Edgehill by His Majesties Army and that of the Rebells'.
[148] Christopher L. Scott, Alan Turton and Eric Gruber von Arni, *Edgehill: The Battle Reinterpreted* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2004), p. 52.
[149] Malcolm Wanklyn, *Decisive Battles of the English Civil War* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2006, revised edition 2014), pp. 9–10.
[150] For example, Wanklyn listed Daniel Defoe's *Memoirs of a Cavalier* as a fictitious work. Although now regarded as an entirely fictitious historical novel, it was sometimes seen as a

the pollution of memory, it is doubtful that the combatants significantly deformed the manner in which the combat was carried out. If they did, their authenticity might have been questioned by their contemporaries, who were well aware of the realities of seventeenth-century battle. If used with caution, the great majority of such sources therefore can provide the basis for combat reconstruction.

What surviving sources cannot provide can be supplemented by modern theories about the mechanics of combat.

Modern Theories on Combat

A. New Theories on Ancient Combat

As already mentioned in the historiography section, recent years have witnessed the development of novel theories on ancient infantry battle mechanics that revolutionised the understanding of the nature of hand-to-hand combat.

Most notably, Philip Sabin introduced the concept of the 'dynamic stand-off model' for the reconstruction of the fighting method of ancient Roman infantry.[151] Sabin's model described Roman infantry combat as a 'natural stand-off punctuated by periodic and localized charges into contact.'[152] He argued that the 'terror of cold steel' is a universal phenomenon, regardless of ancient or modern warfare, and this 'mutual dread' of hand-to-hand combat is an essential element to consider when attempting to recreate a model for the mechanics of combat.[153] Because hand-to-hand battle was such an exhausting experience, Sabin maintained that there must be a 'more physically and psychologically sustainable "default state" during the battle.'[154] In such a 'default state', the two opposing lines maintained a 'safety distance' which allowed sporadic missile exchange but no swordfight.[155] Goldsworthy expressed a similar opinion by arguing that the 'hand-to-hand fighting can never have lasted very long, simply

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genuine (at least partially) historical memoir until the early twentieth century.
[151] Philip Sabin, 'The Face of Roman Battle', *The Journal of Roman Studies*, 90 (2000), 1–17.
[152] *Ibid.*, 16.
[153] *Ibid.*, 13.
[154] *Ibid.*, 14.
[155] *Ibid.*

because the physical and emotional strain was enormous.'[156] The resulting picture is a rather tentative or sporadic struggle which produced a low number of casualties, at least until one side was broken and began to flee.

The importance of this suggestion is that, firstly, it dismantled the long-established dichotomy of the more hand-to-hand combat-centred ancient and medieval battle versus the more firepower-centred modern battle. As previously examined, it is gunpowder technology that has received the most attention in discussions of early modern warfare. In contrast, hand-to-hand combat has received little attention, and its role in early modern battle has frequently been downplayed. The recent theories on ancient warfare, however, make it suspect to accept the clear-cut dichotomy between the pre-modern battles dominated by hand-to-hand combat and the 'modern' battles dominated by long-range missile fighting. According to scholars such as Sabin and Goldsworthy, actual hand-to-hand combat occurred for only a short duration of time, and missile throwing was a constant affair during the Roman battle. Everett Wheeler also argued that firepower was much more important for the ancient armies than usually imagined.[157] Julius Africanus calculated that one person was killed per 10 throws of a Roman javelin. Wheeler argued that this ratio is not bad considering that the eighteenth-century musket-armed soldiers most likely hit 10–20 per cent at best and 2–5 per cent at worst.[158] Therefore, it is difficult to assert that the early modern army was radically different or more efficient than ancient armies in terms of firepower.

Secondly, it is important to note that these researches were more based on the study of human psychology than ancient texts. Sabin maintained that 'relying on ancient sources alone as a guide to ancient battle mechanics is so sadly deficient' and therefore 'it is so important to test possible models against wider yardsticks, in the form of the overall characteristic of Roman infantry engagements and the enduring psychological strains upon men in mortal combat.'[159] Likewise, Goldsworthy heavily relied on the theories of modern authors, most notably Ardant du Picq and S. L. A. Marshall. Although there are

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[156] Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War*, p. 224.
[157] Wheeler, 'Firepower', p. 174.
[158] *Ibid.*, pp. 177–179.
[159] Sabin, 'The Face of Roman Battle', 15.

some criticisms to this approach, its advantage is that it can be applied beyond the realm of ancient history.

Certain aspects of early modern battles make the application of these theories more appealing. First, as noted above, it is difficult to argue that early modern firearms were vastly superior to the ancient missiles in terms of efficiency or killing capacity. Secondly, the casualty rates did not rapidly change, at least during the first half of the seventeenth century compared to the ancient period. In several battles from the British Civil War, the estimated casualty rates ranged from 1.3 to 5 per cent.[160] Average casualty rates in ancient Greek and Roman warfare were approximately 5 (for victors) to 20 (for losers) per cent, although in some cases the defeated side suffered losses as high as 90 per cent.[161] It can be safely assumed that 5 per cent casualties were the average rate of loss that occurred during the actual hand-to-hand combat for both sides, and the heavier casualties suffered by the defeated army occurred during their flight. This in turn strongly suggests that the overall mechanics of combat were not significantly altered. Lastly, it is unlikely that the psychological pressure or fear the combatants felt from the stress of hand-to-hand combat was fundamentally different across different ages. Therefore, it seems permissible to also apply concepts such as the 'dynamic stand-off' or 'tentative combat model' to the reconstruction of early modern battle mechanics.

It should be reiterated that such similarities were not mainly due to the fact that the early modern commanders and officers read the Greek and Roman classics (although they did read many of them). Rather, they stemmed more from a largely unchanged human nature, and because the most fundamental mechanics of battle were not radically changed during early modern times: early modern battles were still fought with the mixture of edged and missile weapons, as they were in previous periods, and the scale and extent of the battlefield had not changed significantly.[162] This fundamental similarity is one of the main

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[160] Stuart Peachey, *The Mechanics of Infantry Combat in the First English Civil War* (Bristol: Stuart Press, 1992), p. 23.

[161] Krentz, 'Casualties in Hoplite Battles' *Greek, Roman and Byzantium Studies* 26 (1985, spring), pp. 13–20, Philip Sabin, 'Battle-A. Land Battles', in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare Vol. 1: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome*, ed. by Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees, and Michael Whitby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.399–432 (pp. 413–416).

[162] Many battles during the Civil War were in fact smaller in scale than many ancient battles. In

arguments of this study and is demonstrated throughout the subsequent chapters.

It is clear that classics was a part of standard education for early modern literary class and throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, grammar schools ran their education based on what Barry Coward referred to as a 'classically-based curriculum.'[163] Therefore, it is unsurprising that many officers took inspiration from the examples of classical antiquity. This inspiration is well reflected in an anonymous military treatise written in the seventeenth century proposing a way of ordering infantry that was 'not used in these times but drawne out of the fashions, as well of the Greeks and Romans, as of our forefathers'. The author also suggested the arms were 'made after the Roman fashion'.[164] Likewise, an English diplomat and writer Clement Edmondes, who witnessed Maurice of Nassau's great victory at the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), was convinced the victory was possible because Maurice read and applied Julius Caesar.[165]

However, clearly these early modern soldiers and theorists did not know the 'new models' of the mechanics of ancient combat recreated by late-twentieth and twenty-first-century scholars. In Edmondes' English translation of *Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic Wars*, a drawing depicting Roman battle formation resembles more the contemporary English army. Although they read the classics and tried to learn from them, early modern officers understood them on their own terms. They often identified themselves with antiquity's great commanders, and this became an important part of their military culture.[166] However, it is often the hero's bravery or honour that inspired them rather than the minute details of their tactics.[167] Therefore, it is more relevant to the cultural understanding of warfare than the actual combat. Although it is also clear, as is examined in subsequent chapters, that to some extant inspiration from classical texts influenced behaviour

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addition, early modern battles were usually concluded in a single day, just as ancient and medieval battles were.

[163] Barry Cowards, *Social Changes and Continuity: England 1550-1750* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, originally published in 1988, revised edition published in 1997), p. 86.

[164] BL, Add MS 23224, *Treatieses on Military Tactics*, p. 16.

[165] Clement Edmondes, *Obseruations Upon Caesars Commentaries* (London, 1604), p. 129.

[166] For example, an early modern English reception of Caesar and its influence on the military identity of English officers can be found in Matthew Woodcok, 'The Breviarie of Soldiers': Julius Caesar's Commentaries and the Fashioning of Early Modern Military Identity', in *Early Modern Military Identity*, ed. by Woodcock and O'Mahoney, pp. 56–78.

[167] *Ibid.*, pp. 59–60.

in the field of battle, especially that of the officer class, its influence on overall combat mechanics and on the actions of ordinary soldiers must have been limited.

As mentioned in the historiography section, the new theories on ancient warfare were fundamentally based on the re-reading of 'ancient' sources using insights from 'modern' psychology rather than any newly discovered ancient sources. Likewise, this thesis benefits greatly from the careful re-reading of early modern sources in the light of recent developments of the psychological study of human responses in combat. In this regard, scholars of early modern warfare are in a significantly more advantageous position than those of ancient warfare as there is a much bigger body of available contemporary sources to re-examine.

B. The Killology and Enduring Battle

Another theoretical issue that is helpful in understanding the mechanics of combat is the recent research into the individual soldier's psychological mentality concerning killing and enduring combat. Combat is an act that directly contradicts the most basic human instincts for survival. The factors that enable humans to go through such 'irrational' acts must influence the ways they behave in combat in significant ways. Needless to say, killing comprises an important part of the act of combat. As already mentioned above, this theme is related to the study of emotion. Moreover, it is also related to the study of the 'face of battle' and also of the battle mechanics.

Being an entirely new field of study, 'killology' was invented by Lt. Col. Dave Grossman. At least partly influenced by Keegan, killology discusses the psychology of combat from a different perspective. Grossman, covering ancient to modern eras, boldly argued that most human beings have 'intense resistance' to killing other human beings.[168] This, he claimed, is the main reason for the low casualties incurred during actual combat. According to Grossman, only a handful of 'natural-born killers' are capable of killing others, and these were responsible for the few casualties that did occur. There is an obvious similarity

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[168] Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2009, originally published in 1995), p. 4.

here with the recent studies on ancient combat examined previously, most noticeably with the study by Goldsworthy. The similarity came from the fact that both are heavily influenced by Marshall's theory that only 25 per cent of the combatants fired their weapons. Grossman also cites the animal kingdom as an example. According to him, fights between same species often involve more posturing actions 'designed to convince an opponent' to flee rather than actual violence, making combat a fundamentally psychological phenomenon.[169]

Grossman's argument has been subject to heavy criticism for his overly optimistic view of human nature and its basis upon several outdated and flawed studies on combat. First, his argument that animals in the same species rarely kill each other has been proven incorrect, as Robert Engen demonstrated.[170] For example, chimpanzees do kill each other in conflicts that closely resemble organised warfare and casualty rates can be high in such conflicts.[171] Second, despite the effort of several scientists to prove that violence is not inherent to human nature, Lawrence Keeley showed that primitive human society waged war with astonishingly high casualty rates.[172] Third, and as previously mentioned, Marshall's ratio of fire that formed the basis of Grossman's thesis of the human inability to kill has widely been regarded as problematic by many scholars.[173] Lastly, Grossman's work, along with Marshall's controversial study, heavily relies on anecdotical evidence and works of popular military history, prompting Eliot Cohen to declare it 'a flawed but intriguing study'.[174]

Despite its obvious flaws, however, an advantage of Grossman's approach is that it does attempt to solve the mystery of low casualties in combat in a novel manner. Some parts of his argument are, in fact quite interesting, especially those concerning how the human psychology of combat differs according to the distance between a soldier and the opponent. [175] The

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[169] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[170] Robert Engen, 'Killing for Their Country: A New Look at "Killology"' *Canadian Military Journal*, 9 (2008) 120–128 (pp. 121–122).
[171] Wayne E. Lee, *Waging War: Conflict, Culture, and Innovation in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 11–14.
[172] Lawrence H. Keeley, *War before Civilization* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
[173] Engen, 'Killing for Their Country', 124–127.
[174] Eliot A. Cohen, 'Review of *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* by Dave Grossman', *Foreign Affairs* 75 March/April (1996), 147-148 (p. 148).
[175] Grossman, *On Killing*, pp. 107–137.

psychology of combat, in what Grossman described as the 'killing at edged-weapons range' is particularly relevant to the current study.[176] Again, some of his arguments on hand-to-hand combat carried out by edged weapons are not without their problems. Nevertheless, several examples, and the analysis presented by Grossman, provide useful insights for reconstructing the mechanics of early modern close-quarter battle. In addition, Grossman's analysis on how fear, stress and exhaustion actually act on a soldier's body and mind provides some important insights.[177] Finally, even if we discard his flawed argument that humans are not capable of killing their fellow humans, it still contains a modicum of truth: although humans throughout history have proved perfectly capable of killing each other in a brutal manner, the revulsion to the act of killing has existed simultaneously. As Wayne Lee has rightly highlighted, 'the best and the worst of humanity evolved hand in hand.'[178]

These factors discussed by Grossman do not have to be completely discarded. If used with caution, some of the insights displayed in his study can be useful resources for the purposes of this research.

Understanding how soldiers have enabled themselves to kill their fellow human beings is one problem. Understanding how these soldiers could endure the extreme stress of combat is a second challenge. As previously stated, combat is an act that directly contravenes a human being's most natural instinct for survival. In such a dangerous situation, the most 'rational' or natural decision would be to flee the danger. Why soldiers instead have decided to remain on the field of battle, and how they could endure doing so, has therefore been the subject of intense debate between numerous military historians. Obviously, there is a strong possibility that the motivation for combat influences their behaviour in the field of battle. Therefore, the understanding of the theory of combat motivation is essential in the reconstruction of battle at an individual level.

As previously examined, Marshall created what is called a 'buddy theory'. He argued that what allows infantry soldiers to endure battle 'is the presence, or presumed presence, of a comrade.'[179] Another influential study, which appeared

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[176] *Ibid.*, pp. 120–130.
[177] *Ibid.*, 50–72.
[178] Lee, *Waging War*, p. 11.
[179] S. L. A. Marshall, *Men against Fire: The Problem of Command in Future War* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1947), p. 42.

at approximately the same time, expressed a similar opinion. In their study of the German army during the Second World War, Edmund Shils and Morris Janowitz argued that the most important motivation for combat was 'primary group cohesion'.[180] As Christopher Hamner pointed out, this notion that 'soldiers fight primarily for one another' gained credence and popularity because it 'echoes the firsthand observation of countless generations of soldiers' and it fitted well with the 'popular imagination, a hold that has endured for centuries.'[181]

The highly influential theory of primary group cohesion, however, began to be challenged seriously in the 1990s. In 1991, Omer Bartov attacked the theory of Shils and Janowitz that primary group cohesion, rather than ideology, was the most important combat motivation for individual soldiers of the Wehrmacht. As a result of his examination of the German army in the Eastern Front during the Second World War, Bartov concluded that the heavy casualties suffered by the German army were large enough to destroy cohesion in any unit.[182] The fact that the German soldiers fought tenaciously to the end suggests that primary group cohesion was not the most important factor in explaining the combat motivation of these German units. On the contrary, Bartov argued, morale was sustained by the soldiers' commitment to ideology.[183]

More recently, Anthony King also questioned the concept of primary group cohesion as understood by Shils and Janowitz. King argued that there are many cases in which a cohesive primary group performed poorly in combat, whereas there are also cases of a not particularly bonded group performing well in combat.[184] Furthermore, King noted the adverse effects of primary group cohesion: there are cases 'where small groups become so internally bonded that they ignore or subvert their obligation to the army in which they serve'.[185] In such cases, harsh disciplinary measures frequently had to be introduced to assert

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[180] Edmund Shils and Morris Janowitz, 'Cohesion and Disintegration in Wehrmacht in World War II', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12 (1948), 280–315.

[181] Christopher H. Hamner, *Enduring Battle: American Soldiers in Three Wars, 1776–1945* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2011), p. 173.

[182] Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 29–58.

[183] *Ibid.*, pp. 106–178.

[184] Anthony King, *The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 35.

[185] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

authority over the autonomy of these groups.[186] Thus, primary group cohesion could both promote and destroy combat motivation, depending on the circumstances.

There has been much further discussion about combat motivation. For example, Hew Strachan, in contrast to Bartov, asserted that 'ideological indoctrination, at least *tout seul*, does not seem sufficient to account for high morale' and 'different factors operate in different times in different theatres.'[187] In addition, according to Strachan, the most important motivating factor in modern warfare is training, because it psychologically prepares a soldier for killing and works as the 'best antidote' to fear.[188] King agreed with the centrality of training by arguing that it is training that unifies soldiers 'intellectually and morally' and enables them to 'understand battlefield in common and, therefore, expect to act on it together'.[189] Therefore, according to King, it is the training that builds group cohesion and increases combat effectiveness, not the interpersonal bonding which, in fact, could contribute to the low combat motivation.[190]

More recently, Hamner re-examined many factors, including the group cohesion theory previously suggested as relevant for morale. He argued that interesting continuities and changes could be found, from the soldiers who fought in the linear formations of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century battlefields to the twentieth-century soldiers who fought in a more dispersed manner. According to Hamner, many factors that made soldiers able to fight remained similar despite the technological developments. What changed was 'the mixture and application of various motivators.'[191] The most important unchanging element of combat is the fear and 'the overriding desire to survive.'[192] Hamner's argument is the 'belief that individuals could improve their odds of survival by behaving in specific ways', which worked critically in motivating combatants.[193] If group cohesion mattered, it was because soldiers

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[186] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[187] Hew Strachan, 'Training, Morale, and Modern War', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 41 (2006), 211–227.
[188] *Ibid.*, 7.
[189] *Ibid.*, p. 305.
[190] *Ibid.*, p. 337.
[191] Hamner, *Enduring Battle*, pp. 202–204.
[192] *Ibid.*, p. 207.
[193] *Ibid.*, p. 213.

throughout different periods were aware of the fact they were dependent on each other to survive both physically and emotionally. Therefore, a group does not have to be socially cohesive to achieve task cohesion (which means, according to Hamner, 'a degree to which members of a group share a commitment to some collective goal').[194]

These studies on combat motivation provide valuable insights and tools for reconstructing early modern combat. Hamner's work, especially, is both persuasive and interesting, because it solved the contradiction between the numerous voices of soldiers throughout history expressing that they were fighting for their comrades-in-arms and the modern studies pointing out the weakness of unit cohesion theory. In addition, it also provides a clue to understanding how soldiers have overcome the difficulty of going against their instinct for survival, inherent in all living species.

As with gender and masculinity study, this research is not exclusively the study of combat motivation and killing. However, it is greatly benefited by recent achievements in the field in reconstructing early modern combat. As changing technology and tactical atmosphere influenced the motivating factors, it is equally probable that the individual soldiers' motivation for combat influenced the 'face of battle'. This factor is considered throughout this study.

3. Notes on Structure and the Scope of the Study

This thesis follows a chronological structure: an approximate hundred-year timespan from the outbreak of British Civil War to the end of the Jacobite Rising of 1745. The reason for this structure is that the chronological sequence provides the best way to observe the changes and continuities during this period. Each chapter is subdivided into three sections and each section examines the issues of the development of military theories, the actual experiences of combat and the cultural perceptions of warfare.

It is obvious that a single study cannot cover every aspect of warfare during this period, and therefore must be selective. In examining the realities of

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[194] *Ibid.*, pp. 155–207.

combat, this study focuses on big battles. In early modern European warfare, pitched-battles were relatively rare, whereas sieges and small-scale skirmishes were much more common.[195] Therefore, one might question the decision to focus on battles instead of these small-scale actions. The argument for the importance of sieges and skirmishes is justified in many ways, but it does not necessarily mean that the battles were not important. Despite their limited occurrence, any pitched battle during this period involved the participation of (and loss of) a vast number of people and materials and, therefore, was always a serious concern for the commanders. The battles did not always produce decisive results but, nonetheless, they produced significant short-term impacts. Thus, armies during this period were primarily trained for a full-scale battle. In other words, battle is too important a subject to be neglected. Furthermore, as Satterfield stated, the most basic method of fighting for infantrymen did not differ radically in terms of small-scale skirmishes or large battles[196]. Therefore, selecting important key battles and examining them is appropriate for understanding the basic mechanics of combat and how the doctrines were applied to the realities of the battlefield for the English and later British army during this period.

Even though battles were relatively rare events, it is impossible to cover every single battle the English and later British army fought during this period. In some wars, such as the Jacobite Rising of 1745, pitched battles were sufficiently small in number to be examined in detail in a single study. However, in other wars, such as the British Civil War, battles were much more frequent and, therefore, their study has to be selective. In selecting battles for examination, this thesis therefore applies the following rationales. Firstly, there must be sufficient contemporary sources that enable reconstruction of the combat in detail. Secondly, the battles that provide good examples of a certain type of action, such as a typical pre-planned battle or encounter battle, were selected. Lastly, the battles traditionally perceived as important in the development of an English/British infantry tactic were prioritised, such as the Battle of Boyne River, which has often been considered an important stage in the development of the English platoon firing tactic. For the wars where pitched battles were indeed

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[195] George Satterfield, *Princes, Posts and Partisans: The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands (1673-1678)* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 319–327.
[196] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

sufficiently rare, all battles are examined in detail. For example, during the War of Spanish Succession, the Duke of Marlborough commanded only three pitched battles, and it is therefore possible to examine them all in one chapter.

Chapter One. The Perceptions and Realities of War and Infantry Combat in the Mid-seventeenth Century

This chapter examines military thought and battles from the eve of the British Civil War to the Commonwealth period. As noted by earlier scholars, many authors and soldiers in their writings expressed seemingly conservative attitudes regarding weaponry. Such alleged conservatism has frequently led scholars to assume that England was a military backwater isolated from the European 'Military Revolution'.

This chapter seeks to prove that labelling advocates of gunpowder weaponry as pioneers of modernity is anachronistic and argues that this attitude relies heavily and unjustly on the benefits of hindsight. The first part of this chapter examines several military manuals written and read during this period, and attempts to understand the perception of battle in the seventeenth-century English mind. The second part of the chapter focuses on the actual mechanics of combat, and compares these with the perceptions reflected in manuals. This process aims to demonstrate that the realities were far more complicated than the simplistic narrative dominated by the 'gunpowder-modernity' perspective. The third part covers the contemporary socio-cultural understandings of war. It shows the various understandings of war and the literary devices employed by various authors to express these understandings were heavily influenced by traditional conventions, but at the same time reflects contemporary concerns.

1. The 'Military Revolution' and English 'Backwardness'

Michael Roberts' theory of the military revolution began with the revolution in tactics. It can be summarised in two ways: linear formations for infantry and a return to shock tactics for cavalry.[11] Despite numerous and significant attacks on Roberts' thesis, his basic premise regarding the 'revolution in tactics' has not been fundamentally challenged. Many analyses of the early modern European military development are

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[1] Roberts, 'The Military Revolution, 1560-1660', in *The Military Revolution Debate,* ed. by Rogers, pp. 1-2.

focused on the adoption of allegedly 'innovative' linear formations designed to maximise the effects of the infantry's firepower and the adoption of 'modern' gunpowder weaponry.

Mark Fissel argued that early modern 'nations' specialised in specific 'weapons', and their choices of weaponry reflected their tactical culture.[2] Many scholars, beginning from Charles Oman in the early twentieth century to twenty-first century scholars such as Roger Manning and Charles Carlton (as reviewed earlier in the historiography section) argued that the choices made by early modern English soldiers reflected their conservative tactical culture. For example, many Englishmen in the sixteenth century were reluctant to abandon their traditional weapons, such as bills (or halberds) and longbows. This caused a fierce debate during the late sixteenth century regarding the relative merits of the longbow and the harquebus. Oman dubbed the advocates of gunpowder weaponry, such as Sir Roger Williams, the 'modernists'.[2] Although gunpowder weaponry was victorious over the long-cherished longbow, its adoption was slow. Oman also argued that several English writers who wrote about military matters were 'infected with Renaissance classicalism, and go back to Aelian and Frontinus for general principles of war'. He concluded that the Elizabethan era was a 'very depressing chapter in the history of the English Art of War'.[3]

There is little need to emphasise that Oman's study, conducted nearly a century ago, is very outdated. There has been a growing consensus about putting more emphasis on the adaptive and eclectic nature of English tactical culture than on the dichotomy between 'modern' and 'backward'. For example, Gervase Phillips argued that guns and pikes were integrated within the existing tactical system resulting from the use of longbows and halberds, instead of viewing it as a struggle between 'ancient' and 'modern'.[4] Nevertheless, Oman's dichotomy of 'ancient' and 'modern' has somehow survived in academic discourses. For example, David Eltis posited that 'the half-hearted adoption of firearms in England and the persistence of the longbow delayed the full impact of the military revolution in England'.[5] Carlton, in one of the few

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[2] Fissel, *English Warfare*, pp. 282-283.
[2] Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century,* pp. 380–389.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] Phillips, *The Anglo-Scots Wars 1513-1550*, pp. 256–257.
[5] Eltis, *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe*, p. 103.

studies that actually focused on early modern experiences of war, argued that the English reliance on ancient authors 'tended to ossify tactics', and this was the main reason why there were 'too many' pikemen during the early years of the Civil War.[6]

More recently, Manning asserted that it is not true that the aristocrats in seventeenth-century England had become demilitarised. This late Elizabethan re-militarisation was, however, a consequence of the 'chivalric revival', which focused on individual honour and, as a result, hindered the development of the professional army.[7] He further argued that the English preference for edged weapons against gunpowder was also evidence of the 'chivalric revival' and that the English army was essentially amateur, with the possible exception of the New Model Army, until 1688.[8] Therefore, Manning's studies are among the most recent examples of what can be referred to as the 'gunpowder-modernity' perspective. Thus, it is necessary to examine the validity of the evidence upon which such a perspective rest.

2. Military Theories and Tactical Culture in Early Modern England

The publication of military manuals in England was abundant during the first half of the seventeenth century, indicating a widespread interest in military affairs in society.[9] These books are one of the best indicators of the tactical culture of the period, and provide clues regarding the question of whether it was infected by 'Renaissance classicalism', whether the emphasis on edged weaponry could be called 'backward' and, finally, whether the 'chivalric revival' hampered the military development of early modern England.

2.1. The Problem of 'Renaissance Classicalism'

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[6] Charles Carlton, *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the English Civil Wars, 1638-1651* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 73.
[7] Roger B. Manning, *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 27 and p. 79.
[8] Manning, 'Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century English Armies', 671.
[9] David R. Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier: Military Books and Military Culture in Early Stuart England, 1603-1645* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 1.

There is no doubt that early modern European military theorists and commanders had great respect for classical antiquity. What must be noted here is that the criteria for deciding whether resorting to ancient examples was backward or progressive are often highly ambiguous. For example, as mentioned previously, Oman criticised English Elizabethan military writers for relying on classics, thus contributing to England's military 'backwardness'. However, Maurice of Nassau also drilled his Dutch troops according to ancient military books, including that of Aelian.[10] Instead of being accused of 'backwardness', Maurice has been praised as the creator of the 'first modern army'.[11] This indicates that the concepts of 'modern', 'progressive' or 'backward' are often arbitrary.

Nevertheless, it appears there are certain broad standards in many modern historians' judgments, and they are mainly related to the role of firepower. It is often argued that Maurice's reform was innovative because its tactical system was 'designed to make optimum use of firepower'.[12] Similarly, Maurice's reliance on ancient Roman texts can be considered innovative, precisely because the 'rediscovery' of these texts enabled a 'new understanding of training and discipline', which in turn allowed musketeers to 'produce continuous fire'.[13] Although the ancient authors to whom Maurice referred, most notably Vegetius, had been used for military education throughout the Middle Ages, Lee argued that, during the medieval period, '[Vegetius'] emphasis on regularity and drill had been transmuted into an emphasis on individual skill', and it was the early modern rediscovery that again created interest in drilling.[14] John A. Lynn also maintained that, despite the reading of Vegetius, medieval Europe could not create a 'Greek phalanx' or 'Roman legion'.[15]

Several current medievalists differ, however. According to their studies, medieval infantrymen were quite capable of fighting in a phalanx, Swiss pike blocks or the Scottish schiltron formation providing good examples; furthermore, maintaining

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[10] Parker, *The Military Revolution*, p. 20.
[11] Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, p. 13.
[12] Geoffrey Parker, 'Dynastic War 1494-1650', in *Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West*, *ed. by* Geoffrey Parker, revised edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, originally published in 1995), pp. 146–163 (p. 154).
[13] Lee, *Waging War*, p. 238.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 238-239.
[15] Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*, p. 32.

close-order formation was vitally important for the medieval army, and medieval commanders certainly learned and applied Vegetius' principles when deploying their armies.[16] There are, of course, scholars who are sceptical of whether Vegetius was really used as a textbook by medieval commanders, let alone whether it was actually read by them. For example, Helen Nicholson observed that, although Vegetius was widely read among the clergy, that does not necessarily mean it was also read by the warrior elites.[17] She further argued that the military principle described by Vegetius often consisted of obvious practices 'which any competent and experienced commander would use', regardless of whether they read his work or not.[18] Stephen Morillo also stated 'that European warfare continued to follow Vegetian pattens' simply because medieval commanders' strategic options were restricted by similar conditions (resources, technology, and transport etc.) to those imposed upon the commanders of Vegetius' time.[19] According to these sceptical historians, medieval commanders more likely learned from examples than specific readings. This argument sits well with the thesis of Erik A. Lund, who contended that early modern armies heavily relied on variety of knowledge the officers acquired from wider experience, such as their experience of estate management, and brought to their profession, rather than former military education.[20] Again, the matter is not conclusive as there is some evidence that shows that at least a few medieval commanders and warrior monarchs owned a copy of Vegetius, and it is possible that some of them studied it.[21]

Regardless of whether medieval commanders actually read and applied Vegetius' work, what is clear is there are similarities, greater than often presumed,

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[16] For the phalanx-like formation of the medieval army, see Bernard S. Bachrach and David S. Bachrach, *Warfare in Medieval Europe, c. 400-c. 1453* (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 276-288. For the importance of 'cohesion, discipline and close order' in medieval infantry combat, see Robert W. Jones, *Bloodied Banners: Martial Display on the Medieval Battlefield* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2015), p. 13. For medieval commanders' use of Vegetius as a 'textbook', see Charles R. Bowlus, *The Battle of Lechfeld and Its Aftermath, August 955* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 125-127.

[17] Helen Nicholson, *Medieval Warfare: Theory and Practice of War in Europe, 300-1500* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 15-16.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] Stephen Morillo, 'Battle Seeking: The Context and Limits of Vegetian Strategy', in *The Journal of Medieval Military History Vol. I*, ed. by Bernard S. Bachrach and Kelly DeVries (Woodbridge, Boydell & Brewer, 2002), pp. 21-42 (pp.21-22).

[20] Erik A. Lund, *War for Every Day: Generals, Knowledge, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe, 1680-1740* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), pp. 11-13.

[21] Christopher Allmand, *The De Re Militari of Vegetius: The Reception, Transmission, and Legacy of a Roman Text in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 71.

between ancient and medieval warfare. This, in turn, suggests that there were strong elements of continuity and, if anything, a gradual development in tactics from the medieval period to the early modern period, which throws suspicion on the discourse regarding 'revolutionary' change and the dichotomy between being backward or progressive.

In contrast, expressing a preference for ancient weaponry, instead of using ancient examples to improve firepower as Maurice did, has been severely criticised by many modern historians. Niccolò Machiavelli's preference for pikemen and sword-and-buckler-men has often been cited as one of the worst cases of 'classical romanticism'.[22] Oman's argument that 'he was behind his time in the appreciation of the growing importance of firearms' is most typical.[23] Ben Cassidy noted modern historians' general agreement that 'Machiavelli was so obsessed with copying the military practices of the ancient Greeks and Romans that he was blind to the technological and tactical changes occurring in his own time.[24]

This, in turn, raises two questions. The first is whether such an assessment by many modern historians is valid, and the second is whether early modern England was a negative example of what Oman referred as 'Renaissance classicalism' or what Cassidy aptly phrased as 'classical romanticism', to summarise the criticism against Machiavelli. In fact, such a simplistic understanding of Machiavelli's military theory has already been challenged. Cassidy argued that Machiavelli's love of classical antiquity did not, in fact, make him blind to the tactical realities of the sixteenth century. According to Cassidy, Machiavelli preferred offensive battlefield tactics, and gunpowder weaponry during his time was not yet suited to such action.[25] Furthermore, Cassidy claimed that it is unreasonable to expect Machiavelli to have foreseen the 'smoke-clouded battlefields of Blenheim (1704) or Waterloo (1815)'.[26] This last argument is particularly important, and is relevant to the overall argument of the present study. In any event, Cassidy's study indicates that the tactical realities of sixteenth-century Italy were far more complicated than the simplistic narrative of the

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[22] Ben Cassidy, 'Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive: Gunpowder Weapons in 'The Art of War', *The Journal of Military History* 67, (2003), 381–404 (pp. 381–387).
[23] Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*, p. 94.
[24] Cassidy, 'Machiavelli and the Ideology' 384–385.
[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 403–404.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 383.

'gunpowder revolution' would indicate.

Therefore, we must also re-examine the case of seventeenth-century England. A close reading of contemporary military writings reveals that, despite their general respect for classical antiquity, many English military writers did not blindly follow classical examples. David Lawrence, who conducted the most recent extensive study of early modern English military writings, argued that the English military writers and readers were keenly aware of the changing realities of battles and warfare. They therefore tried to 'move beyond the ancient to ponder the truly "moderne" nature of warfare'.[27] Although this argument makes an important point, there is a problem, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, of defining what constituted 'modern' during this period. Robert Barret's book, *The Theorike and Practice of Moderne Warres* (1598), in which he argued that 'wars are much altered since the fierie weapons first came up' provides the contemporary mind with clues in this regard.[28] In this example, the realisation of the effectiveness and importance of gunpowder is apparent.

> **Gent.** But our bowmen may shoot by vollies, as thicke as hayle in the ayre.
>
> **Capt.** They many shoot thicke, bo small performance, except (as I said) upon naked men or horse. But should there be led but eight hundred perfect harqubuziers, or sixe hundred good musketiers against your thousand bowmen, I thinke your bowmen would be forced to forsake their ground, all premises considered: and moreouer a vollie of musket or harqubuze goeth with more terror, fury, and execution, then doth your vollie of arrows.[29]

It is clear from this passage that Barret had a sense of himself living through a radically changing world. His awareness was closely related to the technological issue. He believed that new gunpowder weaponry was superior to the bow, the weapon with which his medieval predecessors gained Europe-wide fame and which many sixteenth-century Englishmen were still reluctant to discard. However, this superiority is only partially about technology: from the phrase 'more terror, fury, and execution', it

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[27] Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p. 45.
[28] Robert Barret, *The Theorike and Practice of Moderne Warres* (London, 1598), p. 2.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

becomes clear Barret valued firearms' psychological impact more than their killing capacity.

At the same time, it is equally apparent that Barret's work demonstrates clear continuity from the past. With regard to the ideal attacking formation, the captain in the dialogue preferred to maintain a tiny portion of men armed with traditional halberds.[30] Nevertheless, we cannot consider that he was reactionary, nor that he downplayed the role of firearms. As Phillips argued, the gradual integration of the pike and musket into the existing tactical system of the 'halberd and bow' was a distinctive characteristic of early modern English warfare and was a fairly effective adaptation method. Moreover, 'halberd and bow (or bill and bow)' and 'pike and shot' share an important common characteristic in that they are both systems which organically integrated firepower and hand-to-hand combat. Thus, an army could evolve from the formal to the latter naturally. From such a perspective, a brief period of the coexistence of the halberd and of the pike can be seen as a natural part of this evolution and adaptation, rather than a mark of conservatism.

Despite claiming to discuss 'moderne warres', Barret's respect for ancient tactics is unmistakable. The captain argued:

> We should reduce ourselues with such armes as we now use, unto the forme, manner, and course of the auncient Romanes in their *Militia* and discipline of warre, although ages, seasons and inuentions, have altered much and many weapons by them used.[31]

In the passage quoted above, Barret asserted that 'modern' armies must follow Roman discipline. Nevertheless, this can hardly be considered the 'classical romanticism' mentioned previously. Firstly, as clearly expressed in the quoted passage, Barret acknowledged that various changes had occurred between ancient times and the period in which he was writing. Secondly, Barret did not argue for a return to Roman weapons. Instead, he equated ancient weapons with those currently in use in early modern England:

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[30] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

Their people armed with heauie or complete armour, … and for weapon they had a sword, not ouer long, girt unto their left side, … and in their hand a Iauelin or Dart, which they called pilum, the which at the beginning of their fight they did lance or dart at the enemie, unto these we compare our corslets and pykes, whereof we frame our battles, or bataillions: and our armed halbards, partizans, and other short weapon.[32]

Similarly, Barret compared 'their slingers, darters, archers, or crosse-bowes, and such light armed' with early modern 'shot'.[33] Some comparisons might appear arbitrary, but crucially, Barret attempted to borrow from the ancients selectively, not blindly, while acknowledging the change that had occurred in 'modern' warfare.

Such attitudes continued. Clement Edmondes, who published an analysis of Caesar's Gallic War less than ten years after Barret's work, clearly believed that the ancient Roman example had a great impact in the making of modern warfare. An illustration in Edmondes' book portrays the formation of the ancient Roman army as an early modern pike-block, although Edmondes was well aware that Caesar's legionaries were not armed with pikes.[34] In this way, he was certainly making his observation of ancient warfare 'paralel to our moderne Discipline'.[35]

Admittedly, Edmondes emphasised aggressive 'shock' tactics.[36] Shock tactics often entailed hand-to-hand combat using more traditional weapons. This does not, however, necessarily mean that he downplayed the role of firepower. Nor can the emphasis on 'shock tactics' simply be termed 'primitive' in contrast to tactics oriented more towards firepower, as is discussed in further detail later in this chapter. It must be remembered that, as noted in the previous chapter, Edmondes witnessed Maurice's victory at Nieuwpoort personally.[37] He knew the importance of firepower and explained the counter-march of musketeers according to the latest fashion.[38] His work

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[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 32–33.
[34] Clement Edmondes, *Obseruations Upon Caesar's Commentaries* (London, 1604), pp. 28–29.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 129.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 132.
[37] Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier,* pp. 99–100.
[38] Edmondes, *Obseruations*, p. 136.

must therefore be seen as one of the many English efforts to learn from classical antiquity in a critical manner broadly in line with the approach of their continental counterparts.

Another work published a few years later is worth briefly examining, although not because of its good quality. A short military manual entitled *The A, B, C, of Armes*, by an author known only as 'I. T.' was published in 1616. I. T. began with a criticism of Machiavelli's *Art of War;* namely, that Machiavelli, a 'pen-man by profession', dared to 'giue direction to *Mars* and his followers'.[39] I. T.'s criticism of Machiavelli's status as an amateur was probably not entirely correct considering the recent historiographical assessment of the Italian. In fact, Lawrence argued that I. T. himself 'fits the description of a paper soldier' despite his claim to be a veteran soldier, and his work was 'an amateurish contribution to the emerging library of English drill manuals'.[40] Actual descriptions of or instructions for drilling are particularly brief in this already short manual, which means it was largely useless for the training of troops. The rest of the work is devoted to a plea for English soldiers to be better prepared for war and to the need for improved discipline, aided by numerous quotations from classical authors.[41]

Nevertheless, such criticism may be a little harsh, as the work does show some efforts to keep up with the changing realities of contemporary warfare. Above all, I. T.'s argument reflects the military thought at the time in early seventeenth-century England. Since the late sixteenth century, the English choice of weaponry had become standardised, involving only the pike and shot. The few suggestions to adopt sword-and-buckler men largely fell on deaf ears.[42] This tendency is reflected in I. T's argument, as follows:

> If any shall question why in this *A, B, C*, I set downe *postures* onely [sic] for
> two *weapons*, let him pleased to receiue this for satisfaction, all short weapons
> as *Targateers*, Bill-men, or *Holbardeers*, are in these times merely out of vse;
> and *Archerie* is so much controuerted by different opinions, whether

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[39] I. T. *The A, B, C, of Armes, or, an Introduction Directorie whereby the Order of Militarie Exercises May Easily Bee Understood, and Readily Practised, Where, When, and Howoeuer Occasion Is Offered* (London, 1616), A3.
[40] Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier,* p. 154.
[41] *Ibid*, pp. 153–154.
[42] *Ibid*., pp. 175–176.

seruiceable or not *necessarie* for use, and is so *strongly*, and *strangely* opposed, and so *weakely*, & *waueringly* defended; That were it not for those two euer memorable victories, next vunder God, won by them, I mean *Cressy* and *Agincourt*: It would grow questionable, whether euer it were in vse amongst Englishmen.[43]

A certain change from Barret, whose work was published in 1596, is noticeable. Whereas Barret allowed for a small number of halberds, I. T. removed them completely. In addition, the postures for pikemen and musketeers were, although simplified, in line with the standard of the time. I. T. borrowed this directly from Captain Edward Panton's work, and Panton, in turn, was influenced by Jacob de Gheyn, one of the most common sources of tactical instruction.[44] Such training methods appeared almost identically in virtually all manuals written during this time, both published and unpublished.[45] Therefore, although it should not be classed as a first-rate work, the *A. B. C.* was not completely out of touch with the realities. Despite its apparent amateurishness and heavy reliance on classical authors, I. T.'s manual does at least not fit the description of 'classical romanticism'.

Edward Cooke's *The Character of Warre*, published in 1626, is another tactical manual that has been harshly criticised by modern historians. Carlton argued that it was 'complicated and impractical' as well as 'next to useless'.[46] Lawrence castigated it even more severely than he did to I. T. as being 'representative of the worst that English military writers had to offer'.[47] The reason for such criticism, according to Lawrence, is that 'Cooke was content to simply sprinkle the modern amongst the ancient, relying heavily on the content and style of Vegetius'.[48] These criticisms are valid in many ways: In numerous cases, Cooke simply followed ancient authors' instructions without producing any further insights that would have benefited warfare

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[43] I. T. *The A, B, C, of Armes,* C6.
[44] Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier,* pp. 148–153.
[45] For an example of an unpublished manual, see BL Kings MS 265, 1 ' Directions for the postures for the pike' and (f. 6 b) 'postures for the musquet', with 'Instructions how to giue fire marching to the front, to the right, to the left, to the reare, by three motions '. f. 4.
[46] Carlton, *Going to the Wars*, pp. 71–72.
[47] Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier,* p. 216.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 219.

at the time. He picked examples from ancient history and concluded that 'the like many be done by our Battell, if it should be charged as that was'.[49] His work certainly lacks creative insights. Nonetheless, as in the case of I. T., it is doubtful whether Cooke's manual could be defined as 'classical romanticism' considering that Cooke neither downplayed the role of firepower nor advocated the resurrection of swordsmen resembling ancient Roman legionnaires. It is unclear whether contemporary readers would have agreed with the modern scholars' criticisms. It is difficult to find evidence showing whether Cooke's book was used to train soldiers. However, the fact it was printed twice, in 1625 and 1626, suggests it attracted some readers at least.

In any case, the existence of a few mediocre military manuals does not necessarily mean that the military culture of early seventeenth-century England was backward or obsessed with antiquity. A good example is William Barriffe's highly influential manual *Militarie Discipline*, which demonstrates notable practicality and intellect.[50] Admittedly, Barriffe paid respect to the ancient legacies, particularly those related to the counter-march, as the Dutch did:

> Wherefore note, that Countermarches were of ancient use amongst the Greeks many hundred of years since, and from them learned and practices, by many other Nations; and so still continued unto this day.[51]

By contrast, Barriffe clearly acknowledged that not all ancient methods were relevant to his period. For example, he argued that the 'Macedonian Countermarch is rather remembered for its antiquity, then[sic] excellency'.[52] Another passage reveals his attitude even more clearly:

> *Angular facings* were of great repute among the ancients, for their figures called the *Diamond*, the *Wedge*, the *Sheeres*, the *Saw*, and such like, when they made such formes of battell. But in our *moderne discipline*, I conceive

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[49] Edward Cooke, *The Character of Warre, or The Image of Martiall Discipline* (London, 1626), f. 2.
[50] Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p. 216. Lawrence argued that Barriffe's treatise represents 'some of the best' among the contemporaneous English military treatises.
[51] William Barriffe, *Military Discipline, or the Young Artillery man* (London, 1643 edition, first edition published in 1635), p. 45.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

them to be of little or no use, only thus we honour the memory of the ancients in their practice. And some say, they are very fit for *exercise*; for that by their use the *souldier* is made more *apt* and *perfect* in the other.[53]

This not only shows a critical attitude towards ancient authorities, in contrast to Cooke, but also a highly flexible mindset. Although he was aware of their current uselessness in battle, Barriffe still saw some value in these ancient formations in terms of training soldiers. Such flexibility was one aspect of the early modern English military culture which enabled its army to adapt to a changing tactical environment, as is demonstrated throughout this study.

Barriffe's attitude is in line with that of many of the other English writers examined above, beginning with Barret, who emphasised both continuity and change. It is important to note that his *Military Discipline* was, as Lawrence noted, 'one of the most popular seventeenth-century English works on the art of war'.[54] Written shortly before the outbreak of the Civil War, it was printed repeatedly in subsequent years until 1688. This indicates its significant influence on Civil War infantry tactics and the fact that many English officers agreed with Barriffe's approach to the art of war. It further supports the argument that the typical military culture in early modern England was not mere 'classical romanticism'.

It might be argued that early modern English military thinkers and fighting men still preferred edged weapons to gunpowder weapons. As observed previously, Carlton attributed such a preference to the ossification of tactics (because of the reliance on classics, a charge which this study has thus far argued is an unfair one), whereas Manning blamed a 'chivalric revival'. These two concepts are in fact closely related: Manning stated that an important aspect of the chivalric ideal in early modern warfare was the 'preference of the European knightly class for fighting face to face with edged weapons', which was 'deeply ingrained culturally and recalled the methods of warfare of Greek and Roman antiquity'.[55] It is therefore relevant to examine Carlton's and Manning's arguments regarding the early modern English preference for

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[53] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[54] Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p. 216.
[55] Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 134.

traditional weapons together. The next section therefore examines the English emphasis on edged weapons in detail and whether such a preference could be perceived as 'backward', as Carlton and Manning implied.

2.2 The Problem of 'Cold Steel'

As mentioned, major military innovations in early modern Europe have often been explained in terms of the increasing dominance of gunpowder weapons. According to this perspective, early modern England indeed appears to have lagged behind in embracing this development. It is well known that throughout the early seventeenth century, the English army maintained a relatively high percentage of pikemen among its infantry.[56] According to Fissel, in a Gloucestershire muster survey of 1608, pikemen formed approximately 40 to 50 per cent of the militia.[57] This is in sharp contrast to the contemporaneous Dutch army, which rapidly increased the ratio of firearms to pikemen.[58] At first glance, this appears to support the argument that English tactics lagged behind those of continental Europe.

Such an interpretation is, however, problematic in many ways. Firstly, it is far from clear whether the preference for edged weapons embodied a traditionalist mindset during the early seventeenth century. In the late sixteenth century, the pike often embodied a new method of warfare in England compared to the bow and halberd. Barret, who argued that warfare had changed because of firearms, also strongly argued for the effectiveness of the pike in his treatise on 'moderne' warfare:

> But for the plaine field, neither blacke bill, Halbard nor Partizan comparable to the Pike.[59]

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[56] Henrik Langelüddecke, 'The Chief Strength and Glory of This Kingdom: Arming and Training the "Perfect Militia"' in the 1630s, *The English Historical Review*, 118 (Nov., 2003), 1264–1303 (p. 1264).
[57] Mark Charles Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars: Charles I's Campaigns against Scotland, 1638–1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 203.
[58] M. D. Feld, 'Middle-Class Society and the Rise of Military Professionalism: The Dutch Army 1589–1609', in *The Military-State-Society Symbiosis*, ed. by Peter Karsten, (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998), pp. 37–61 (p. 44).
[59] Barret, *The Theorike and Practice*, p. 4.

It is important to remember that Barret's work was published just two years before the beginning of the seventeenth century. This strongly indicates that English military theorists and soldiers in the early seventeenth century could not possibly have considered it reactionary to regard the pike as a weapon for 'modern' warfare.

Secondly, as discussed previously, respect for the ancient legacies was prevalent during this period, and it is certainly possible that this attitude affected the preference for 'ancient' weapons. In his work on the Thirty Years' War, Peter H. Wilson pointed out that seeing firearms as inherently superior to pikemen does not 'correspond to sixteenth-century military thinking that drew directly on the ancient world for its inspiration'.[60] Such thinking largely continued into early seventeenth-century Europe. It was, therefore, a European-wide phenomenon, and thus cannot be sufficient proof of a particularly 'English' tactical backwardness.

Thirdly, despite the conventional narrative that equated Dutch military innovation with the increase in firepower and thus with 'modernity', Maurice's Dutch army did not downplay the role of cold steel. In fact, his army retained sword-and-buckler men, as did the Spanish army, and Maurice stated that he 'found a Target of great use and advantage to the service of pikemen: both for defence, and offence'.[61] One of the reasons for the existence of sword-and-buckler men in the Dutch army was most likely the need to counter the Spanish *Rodeleros*. Similarly, as Marjolein 't Hart observed, the possibility of fighting the Spanish field army in a pitched battle prompted the Dutch army to maintain a certain percentage of pikemen.[62] Although the ratio of pikemen in the Dutch army was always less than half and continued to decrease, this must be seen in light of the fact that the Dutch were extremely reluctant to commit their professional but relatively small army to risky action. This tendency and the geographical features made large-scale pitched battles rare. It is well known that Maurice himself rarely fought a battle.[63] These considerations strongly suggest that a preference for a higher ratio of pikemen or musketeers was not simply a matter of a

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[60] Peter H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years' War: Europe's Tragedy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 90.
[61] B. L. Harley 3638, 'Dutie of a Private Soldier', f. 156 v.
[62] Marjolein 't Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence: Warfare and Commerce in the Netherlands, 1570–1680* (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 60.
[63] Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1984), p. 185.

reactionary attitude or 'ossified' tactics, as Carlton phrased it. The decision involved considerations of the tactics of the main enemy, the geographical or political circumstances, and many other elements.

In fact, whereas English military writers were generally in favour of shock tactics and a higher ratio of pikemen, most did not consider the adoption of sword-and-buckler men, despite the influence of the Dutch ideas or the respect shown towards the Ancients. One of the few exceptions was the manual *Mars His Field, or the Exercise of Armes*, which included postures for both pike-and-buckler men and sword-and-buckler men.[64] Neither was ever adopted in the English army, and few other military writers, not even the amateur writers, advocated their adoption. Lawrence speculated that the reason for publishing these postures was most likely to understand existing Spanish tactics, because the English again decided 'to engage in war with their Spanish enemies'.[65] This again indicates that the English preference for cold steel was not blind obedience to ancient military authorities; rather, just as they learned and applied ancient examples in a critical manner, so did they choose their weaponry. This becomes clearer through a closer examination of many other military treatises.

It is easy to find examples of English military writers emphasising aggressive tactics which employ cold steel. However, it is difficult to find evidence of the ossification of tactics, or of the 'chivalric revival'. Edmondes' analysis of Caesar's campaign and the treatises on modern warfare were examples of applying ancient tactics to modern warfare. In the section on 'moderne training', Edmondes explained the manner of attack using pikes:

There should not charge more at one time than the 5 formost, so that the pikes of the first ranke might be three feete ouer the formost shoulder, and the other fiue ranks should in this close order or nearer if it be possible, follow the other charging, with their pikes aduanced, vntill some occasion should require their charge. In the meane time they should performe their dutie in keeping the fiue formost ranks from retiring, and besides adde strength vnto charge or

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[64] Roger Daniel, *Mars His Fields, or the Exercise of Arms* (London, 1625).
[65] Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p. 176.

shocke.[66]

This gives the impression of a highly aggressive tactic. The fact that the rear ranks were employed to prevent the front ranks from retreating or to support them resembled the combat mechanics of the ancient Greek hoplite phalanx, as many historians understand it. It does not necessarily mean that Edmondes followed ancient examples blindly. Although he clearly believed that the principles found in ancient warfare could be of assistance to warfare in that period, he clarified that he did not 'thinke it fit to mingle the Tacticke Practice of these times with the vse of foregoing ages.'[67]

It is worth re-emphasising that it was the experience of the effectiveness of the latest Dutch tactic at Nieuwpoort that inspired Edmondes to write this book. In fact, as Lawrence pointed out, Edmondes' treatise on modern training was the 'first work printed in English that addressed the Maurician innovations and it would become a model for subsequent drill instructions printed in England over the next two decades'.[68] This is clear from the passage that explains how musketeers should perform a counter-march in the Dutch model.[69]

In other words, Edmondes emphasised both the shock tactics carried out by pikemen and a counter-march by musketeers. His tactics were heavily influenced by the Dutch tactics he had witnessed personally on the battlefield, rather than by the 'classical romanticism' or the 'chivalric revival'. This suggests that the mere fact that an author emphasised shock tactics or the use of cold steel is not sufficient evidence that his tactical mindset was reactionary or 'pre-modern'.

Another factor to consider is Swedish influence, which was as important as the Dutch tactics in seventeenth-century English military thinking. William Watts' *Swedish Discipline* and *Swedish Intelligencer* were both published in 1632 and widely read among the officers and literary public.[70] The Swedish army under Gustav Adolph adopted more aggressive tactics than the Maurician Dutch tactics and thus attempted to maintain a higher ratio of pikemen than the Dutch army.[71] Watts' works introduced

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[66] Edmondes, *Obseruations*, p. 132.
[67] *Ibid.*, p. 129.
[68] Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p. 145.
[69] Edmondes, *Obseruations*, p. 136.
[70] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 13.
[71] William P. Guthrie, *The Later Thirty Years' War: From the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of*

this Swedish doctrine to England in detail.[72] Therefore, the English preference for a higher ratio of pikemen than Dutch practice does not necessarily indicate that English military thought lagged behind contemporary European practices. On the contrary, early modern English military theorists and soldier–authors studied various practices, both ancient examples and contemporary Dutch and Swedish tactics, and adopted them in a manner they considered best suited for the English army.

This is more clearly revealed in Barriffe's *Military Discipline* which, as observed previously, was highly praised by Lawrence as one of the best early modern English military writings. Barriffe was heavily influenced by Dutch tactics, but also was aware of Swedish tactics introduced by Watts.[73] In many ways, Barriffe's approach to infantry weapons was cautious and eclectic, which is, according to Fissel, a distinctive characteristic of the early modern English art of war.[74] For example, Barriffe did not believe that the diverse ways in which the pikes were being handled were all useful. He nevertheless argued that soldiers still needed to learn them, because 'sometimes they may bee usefull, and therefore very requisite to be known to all such as either are, or at least would bee accounted for good souldiers'.[75]

In dividing an army, Barriffe preferred an equal number of pikemen and musketeers, as shown in numerous diagrams in his work.[76] In other words, despite being based on the Dutch method, Barriffe preferred a higher ratio of pikemen than was usual in Dutch practice. This indicates that Barriffe expected a more active role for pikemen, as clearly indicated multiple times in his treatise:

> In this sort the *Battell* may be continued, until they have fired once, twice or oftner over; and that the *Bodies* be come so close together, that the *Pikes* being to *port*, and so at length come to *push of Pike*. Which done, the *Musquettiers* are to *give fire*, either *retreiting*, or else not to *advance* further, then *the half files of Pikes*. For that place (the bodies being come so neere together) they will doe as much *execution*, as if they were even with the *front*. …… The *Pikes*

Westphalia (Westport, Conn: Greenwood 2003), pp. 17-22.

[72] William Watts, *Swedish Discipline* (London, 1632), pp. 80-83.

[73] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 13.

[74] Fissel, *English Warfare*, p. 282.

[75] Barriffe, *Military Discipline*, p. 4.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

being now charged and ready to come to the *push*, the *Musquettiers* are to advance no further than *the Halfe files of pikes*: that so they may do execution with their *shot* and be out of danger of *Pikes*.[77]

This passage describes close co-operation between the pikemen and the musketeers in detail. Here, the pikemen were expected to engage the enemy pikemen in an offensive manner, whereas the musketeers were supposed to support them. It is important to note that the musketeers were required to advance less than the half file of the friendly pike formation to be 'out of danger of *Pikes*'. This indicates that Barriffe believed that pikemen had the ability to harm enemy musketeers. Thus, it is clear that Barriffe did not consider the pike an obsolete weapon.

It is equally clear that Barriffe's attitude cannot simply be called 'classical romanticism' or a 'chivalric revival'. Firstly, there is no evidence that his use of a higher ratio of pikemen than that of the Dutch army stemmed from blind obedience to classical authority. Instead, it is evident that he rejected the uncritical use of outdated tactics out of respect for the ancient legacy, as discussed in the previous section. It is therefore obvious that his tactical mind was not 'ossified' by classical authorities, nor was an important role expected to be played by pikemen as a result of such 'ossification', as Carlton claimed.

Secondly, there is no remark about the pike being a more honourable weapon than firearms, which was in fact quite a common attitude during the early modern period, as Wilson noted.[78] In explaining the 'chivalric revival', Manning argued that 'gentlemen came to perceive that fighting on foot could be honourable, but still preferred edged weapons, such as pikes and swords, to firearms'.[79] Barrife's writing indicates that his emphasis on the role of pikemen was not borne mainly from the cultural notion of the superiority of the edged weapon but rather from technical reason.

Lastly, Barriffe was well aware of the fact that the pike formation was not without weaknesses. As he observed, '*Whole pikes alone are too weak*; because the horsemen carries fiery weapons, and can kill the pike-men at distance'.[80] Barriffe's

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[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 80–81.
[78] Wilson, *The Thirty Years' War*, p. 91.
[79] Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 135.
[80] Barriffe, *Military Discipline*, p. 140.

solution was to arm musketeers with half-pikes, an idea that would be realised later by the invention of the socket bayonet. In any case, for Barriffe, this defect of the 'whole pike' was not a sufficient excuse to neglect pikes completely, because 'for some services they are especially usefull'.[81]

All these considerations strongly support the argument that Barriffe adopted the latest continental tactical ideas in what Fissel and Phillips referred to as a typically English manner: Although he followed the general principle of Dutch methods and ruled out apparently outdated tactics, he integrated the new principles into the existing English tactical system. He considered all possible variables, and therefore tried to prepare the English infantry to meet these challenges. Maintaining a greater percentage of pikemen possibly arose from such a consideration rather than as a result of a reactionary mindset.

However, some military books display certain aspects of what Manning referred to as the 'chivalric revival'. The revival of chivalric values became the dominant code in Elizabethan court culture and widely influenced the aristocracy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A gentleman was typically expected to display both manner and martial virtues.[82] It is therefore only natural that military elites were influenced to varying degrees by this culture. One example is Richard Elton's *The Compleat Body of the Art Military*, in which the second chapter is entitled 'Severall Reasons Why the Pike is the more Honourable Arms'.[83] Here, finally, an argument for a specific weapon's superiority based on a cultural assumption can be found. Elton argued that the pike must be respected for its antiquity:

That the *Pike* is the more honourable *Arms*, it is so in respect of its antiquity, for there hath been the use of the Pike and Spear, many hundred years before there was any knowledge of the Musket, as in many Histories you shall find.[84]

It is not surprising that Manning cited Elton as evidence of the English aristocratic conservatism that 'hindered the technological development of weapons and tactics as

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[81] *Ibid.*, p. 141.
[82] Manning, *Swordsmen*, pp. 60–61.
[83] Richard Elton, *The Compleat Body of Art Military* (London, 1650), p. 2.
[84] *Ibid.*

well'.[85] Manning also argued that, because the potential readers of such military manuals were mainly gentlemen, they 'could not be insensitive to aristocratic prejudices against firearms'.[86] Admittedly, there were prejudices against firearms among the English officer class at the time: Elton reported that 'it hath been ambition of many Gentlemen, both in *Holland, France*, and in these our late unhappy Wars in *England*, to *trail Pikes* with severall Commanders whom they shall think fit'.[87] It must be tempting to see in this a fairly strong 'chivalric' attitude among the English military class. This attitude certainly appears archaic, particularly considering that several historians, as Gregory Hanlon observed, consider the 1630s as a turning point for the mechanics of combat, which changed 'from hand-to-hand affrays with pikes and swords to lengthy firefights.'[88]

However, this may be imposing twentieth and twenty-first century assumptions of modernity and technology to the seventeenth-century officers. As already examined, their understandings of 'modern' warfare were far more complex. Awareness of changes and respect towards the past coexisted in highly complicated manners, and such coexistence was a defining characteristic of the early modern period. Furthermore, it is uncertain to what extent these prejudices actually affected tactics on the battlefield during the Civil War and eventually hampered military development in early modern England. Similarly, it is not at all clear that authors such as Elton can simply be referred to as reactionary and immersed in a romantic bygone ideal. Firstly, a quite different attitude towards weaponry can be found in Elton's passage below:

> I intend not by it to perswade all Souldiers to the handling of the *Pike*, and non to be *Muskettiers*, for that cannot be. I should rather advise all *Captains* that have occasion to raise their Companies to have two thirds of *Muskettiers*, and but one of *Pikes:* … And in my judgement they shall perform better service unto any Nation where they shall be employ'd.[89]

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[85] Manning, *Swordsmen*, pp. 134–135.
[86] Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship to Arms: The Origin of the British Army 1585-1702* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 192.
[87] Elton, *The Compleat Body*, p. 2.
[88] Gregory Hanlon, *Italy 1636: Cemetery of Armies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 7.
[89] Elton, *The Compleat Body*, p. 2.

Elton did not attempt to increase the ratio of pikemen, to the detriment of musketeers, despite his personal preference. Obviously, this was not enough for Manning. In his book, published in 2006, Manning criticised Elton's ratio of pikes to muskets (1:2) because, among contemporaneous European armies, 1:3 or 1:4 was the norm, which means the English were backward compared to European counterparts.[90] This, for Manning, was another example of the negative influence of England's 'chivalric revival'.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that Elton did recommend an increased ratio of musketeers compared to Barriff's recommendation of 1:1 fifteen years earlier. In other words, despite his respect for the 'honourable' pike, Elton did not ignore the increased role of firepower in battle, most likely because he was a veteran soldier who had experienced the realities of the Civil War battles. In addition, there were still good reasons to maintain a substantial number of pikemen in the army, as discussed in greater detail in the next section.

Further revealing remarks from Elton are as follows:

> I shall farther desire the Souldiers (especially those that be of *low* stature) to handle and take delight in the use of Musket; for it is an exceeding great honour to him so to handle his Musket, as that he doth it with ease and in a comely manner, and he that shall become an expert therein; I have often observed this commendation to follow him, by the report of others; Such a one is good Musketeer certainly cannot be idle, but hath gained something more to make him capable of such praise. To conclude, I shall desire the Gentlemen of the *Pikes*, and the Gentlemen of the *Muksettiers* to goe hand in hand like dear brothers, and neither of them envie each other, and in so doing, God will give a blessing to all our undertakings.[91]

Again, from the first sentence, it is evident that the status of pikemen was superior to that of musketeers in Elton's mindset. At the same time, it is equally clear to the reader that Elton's perception of the pike's superiority did not downplay the tactical role of musketeers in battle. In addition, having a lower status did not mean that the skilled

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[90] Manning, *An Apprenticeship to Arms*, p. 192.
[91] Elton, *The Compleat Body*, p. 2.

musketeers could not be good soldiers worthy of praise. As in the case of many other authors examined above, it seems clear that Elton believed in the combined action of cold steel and firepower.

All these observations strongly support the notion that the realities of military thought during the first half of seventeenth-century England were far more complicated than the simplistic dichotomy between a 'modern' tactical mind and an outdated chivalric ideal. It is undeniable that there were notions of the cultural superiority of more ancient weaponry. There were also, however, awareness of the realities of battlefield of their own time. These two notions coexisted and interacted with each other, rather than one completely dominating the other.

Donald Lupton, of the few English military theorists who earned Manning's approval, argued that the pike was an outdated and useless weapon. Lupton's treatise on the pike, according to Manning, 'gives us a rare view from the bottom up'.[92] Lupton accompanied the English expeditionary force during the Thirty Years' War. Although he was a cleric, it is possible, as Lawrence pointed out, that he experienced some action.[93] Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic an argument to conclude that his analysis reflected the most 'modern' realities of battle, unlike those of other contemporaneous writers. Considering that the tactical approaches of many of the other English authors discussed thus far cannot simply be termed pre-modern or archaic, a closer examination of Lupton's argument is necessary before judging whether Lupton's approach was exceptionally 'modern' and therefore more progressive than that of other authors.

In the third section of his treatise, Lupton presented what he believed were the necessary qualities of useful weapons: They must have both defensive and offensive capabilities, be easy to carry, be well made, and be usable 'in all places, and at all times'.[94] Unfortunately, according to Lupton, the pike had none of these qualities. Therefore, he argued, the pike lost 'much of its ancient authority'.[95] He devoted subsequent chapters to demonstrating that the pike did not have these qualities.

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[92] Manning, *Swordsmen*, pp. 134–135.
[93] Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p. 256.
[94] Donald Lupton, *A Warlike Treatise of the Pike, or, Some Experiementall Resolves, for Lessening the Number, and Disabling the Use of the Pike in Warre, with the Praise of the Musquet and Halfe-Pike as Also the Testimony of Brancatio, Concerning the Disability of the Pike* (London, 1642), pp. 38–45.
[95] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

Accordingly, studying aspects of Luton's logic is relevant for the purposes of this study.

In terms of actual combat, one of the most important points Lupton made concerned the pike's defect as an offensive weapon. He argued that the pike could not be a lethal weapon:

> There is not one private Soldier of twenty shall by his utmost strength and skill together runne through a common Corslet, nay, not through a Buff-coat which is good, to wound mortally; and what wisedome or policy is it to have so many standing men in Armes, which are not able to kill the invaders.[96]

Lupton also asserted that, even if the pike could be used effectively against a cavalry charge, 'yet that service was to be accounted defensive only'.[97] In addition, pikemen were not as useful as they once were against the cavalry, because the cavalry were now armed with firearms.[98]

All these considerations led Lupton to an inevitable conclusion, namely that it was better to get rid of pikes in favour of more muskets. He argued that, if the 'full discharge of pikes' was not possible, then at least all the pikemen 'should be expert and able to use the Musquet upon any need or occasion'.[99] The combination of muskets and half-pikes was more useful, because one soldier could use both weapons, and therefore everyone could become a musketeer.[100] It was a theoretically sound idea, similar to that of Barrife's. However, the practicality of arming a soldier with both half-pikes and musket is questionable (above all things, it would have been extremely cumbersome), and the idea was not realised until the adoption of the socket bayonet.

All these calls for more firepower might appear strikingly modern, particularly from the 'gunpowder-modernity' perspective. One of Lupton's concluding arguments, in obvious contrast to Elton's work, seems to demonstrate his 'modern' outlook:

> I will, and doe ingenuously confesse, that the Pike hath the priviledge of the

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[96] *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50.
[97] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[98] *Ibid.*, p. 126.
[99] *Ibid.*, pp. 110–111.
[100] *Ibid.*, pp. 142–153.

Musquet in respect of its Antiquity: But that's no safe conclusion, to say that all old things are the best, and this 'tis pitty to leave off an old Custome, merely because 'tis so. Indeed, where Antiquity holds correspondency with present usefulnes, and when old things retaine their former necessity and benefits in after Ages, I hold they are not to be slighted, but honoured and retained: But wherein 'tis found by experience, that the after times have out-stript the former, and that the latter Inventions are most excellent and usefull, then sure 'tis no Policy to be tied to the practice of our Fore-fathers.[101]

Theoretically, Lupton's logic in the quoted passage is faultless. However, whether such an attitude was absent in the work of other English writers examined in this section, such as Barriffe, is highly questionable. Lupton was not the only English author who argued that outdated tactics and weapons should be replaced. The question is whether pikes and edged weapons were indeed obsolete by the 1640s. The answer to this must be deduced via the close examination of the realities of combat in that period, which is the principal subject of the next section. Here, it is sufficient to highlight that merely suggesting a greater emphasis on firepower does not automatically make the exponent a paragon of 'modernity'. Thus far, this chapter has amply demonstrated that the development of English military thought was much more complicated than that suggested by such a simplistic narrative.

In fact, despite the seemingly flawless logic shown in the passage quoted above, Lupton's argument reveals several weaknesses. For example, his main argument regarding the uselessness of the pike in battle is based mainly on the 'fact' that the pike could not be used effectively to kill the enemy. As mentioned previously, Lupton claimed that the pike could not be used as a 'terror' weapon, because it could not actually harm the enemy.[102] Although it is extremely doubtful whether the pike could not, in fact, be used to kill (as is discussed in detail in the next section), it has already been observed in the previous chapter that the mechanics of combat from ancient times were not mainly about killing the enemy in combat. It is therefore too rash to conclude that the argument against specific weaponry was simply decided by the

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[101] *Ibid.*, pp. 122–123.
[102] *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91.

number of casualties a specific weapon could cause.

As Lawrence observed, Lupton's argument 'had little effect on the tactical considerations of either the Parliamentary or Royalist army where the question of pikes was concerned'. [103] Lupton's treatise was dedicated to the Earl of Essex, who commanded the Parliamentary army at the Battle of Edgehill (1642), the first battle of the Civil War. In that year, although it is uncertain whether it was before or after he read Lupton's treatise, Essex continued to order a supply of pikes for his infantry regiments. [104] One might argue that this is additional evidence of the tactical backwardness of early modern England, because it could be interpreted as indicating that the conservatively minded commanders, steeped in aristocratic prejudices, rejected Lupton's 'modern' proposal. However, the next section shows that these commanders were in fact wise to retain a substantial percentage of pikemen. In addition, the examination of battles and the mechanics of actual combat reveal that the reality was far more complicated than the simplistic narrative of the 'gunpowder revolution', as has been the case for the tactical thought of the period examined thus far.

This section has demonstrated that the development of military theories in early modern England from the late sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century cannot simply be described as backward or reactionary. Although not all the books and manuals published during this period may be classified as first-rate works, most were far from the 'classical romanticism' or the 'chivalric revival'. Even some of the works influenced by such trends were not completely blind to the changing realities of warfare at that time, as Elton's manual clearly reveals.

What can generally be deduced from many English military writings is a cautious but critical approach towards ancient and contemporaneous European military authorities. Although many English writers were open to their influences, they applied such influences to the existing military tradition of England in a gradual and eclectic manner. In fact, such a cautious attitude was not confined to England. As Cassidy pointed out, the early modern period was 'militarily complicated', and 'new

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[103] Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier*, p. 256.
[104] TNA, WO 55/1754/4.

weapon systems were being tried and tested, old ones modified or questioned, and new tactical ideas cautiously attempted'.[105] In such circumstances, it was natural for military commanders to be cautious about completely discarding existing methods of combat. It is worth remembering, as pointed out above, that even Maurice of Nassau, whose tactics were well known for their emphasis on greater firepower, maintained traditionally armed sword-and-buckler men in his army. This was the defining feature of the European-wide military culture in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Early modern England was a part of this culture and the English officers, like its European counterparts, attempted to include new tactical elements, most importantly gunpowder weaponry, in existing tactical traditions. Integrating pikes and firearms into the traditional 'bow and bill' system, which had been highly effective up to that point, is a good example of this adaptation. This can be observed clearly in the works of Barret, Barriffe and many others that adopted new weapon systems but cautiously reserved a place for old weapons.[106] Therefore, in theory at least, there is little evidence that England lagged far behind its continental counterparts. We must therefore examine the actual realities of battle and the mechanics of combat to establish whether English tactical thought, particularly its emphasis on the importance of traditional edged weapons, can indeed be vindicated on the battlefield. This is discussed in detail in the next section.

3. The Realities of Battle: The Mechanics of Infantry Combat

This section aims to reconstruct the realities of infantry combat during the mid-seventeenth century. It explores several battles of the period and attempts to determine whether gunpowder indeed triumphed over more traditional edged weaponry at this time.

Reconstructing pre-modern battles is a difficult process. The difficulty multiplies when we attempt to reconstruct battles that belong to the period in which

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[105] Cassidy, 'Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive', 382. Although Cassidy referred to Machiavelli's era, this situation was in many ways unchanged during the course of the first half of the seventeenth century.
[106] Phillips, *The Anglo-Scots Wars*, pp. 256–257.

hand-to-hand combat still played an important part, because the experience was significantly different to that of modern combat. The nature of the available primary sources further increases this difficulty. Therefore, this section begins by clarifying the problems involved in reconstructing mid-seventeenth century experiences of combat.

3.1. **The Problem of the 'Push of Pike'**

One of the ways in which seventeenth-century combat differed significantly from modern battle was the presence of pikemen in infantry formation. Therefore, the mechanics of the combat between pikemen, often referred to as the 'push of pike', is one of the most difficult parts of early modern battle to reconstruct. This in turn raises two questions. First, how frequent were clashes between opposing pikemen in mid-seventeenth century battles? Some modern historians, most notably Brent Nosworthy, have argued that 'by the close of the Thirty Years' War, the pike ceased to be an offensive weapon and two bodies of men no longer closed to resolve the issue with the push of pike; the effectiveness of musketry made this redundant'.[107] John Lynn also concluded that around the time of Gustav Adolph's death, offensive use of the pike 'seems to have died with him'.[108] The present study examines the validity of such an argument and attempts to discover the relative importance of the pike in this period.

The second question is more difficult to answer: How exactly did the pikemen fight when they indeed clashed with each other? There are insufficient sources to reconstruct the push of pike with any confidence. For instance, a famous eyewitness account of the Battle of Breitenfeld (1631) in the Thirty Years' War described the pikemen's activity as follows:

> We charged them with a salve of muskets, which was repaied, and incontinent our Briggad advancing unto them with push of pike, putting one of their battailes in disorder, fell on the execution, so they were put to the route.[109]

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[107] Brent Nosworthy, *The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689–1763* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990), p. 35.
[108] John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610–1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 457.
[109] Robert Monro, *Monro, His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment (Called Mac-Keyes Regiment) Levied in August 1626 Part II* (London, 1637), p. 66.

In this passage, the Swedish infantry routed their opponents by the push of pike. Nevertheless, the passage gives few details regarding the actual combat. It is not clear how the combatants used their pikes, or how many were actually killed or wounded by these weapons.

Therefore, modern historians' explanations of the push of pike are inevitably speculative. Charles Carlton argued that 'it was not as if two large bodies of pikemen, their weapons held out horizontally, cold bloodedly ran into each other, like two monstrous hedgehogs committing mutual hara-kiri'.[110] In a more recent study, he suggested that the pikemen 'lifted their weapons up, and drew their swords'.[111] His first argument that the typical form of the push of pike was not an act of mutual suicide is plausible, because the infantry hand-to-hand combat that occurred during the Civil War indeed did not produce a great number of casualties.[112] However, this rationale makes his second argument – that the pikemen in fact fought as swordsmen – problematic, because sword fighting in close quarters for a significant length of time would have increased the casualties, which was not the case in the Civil War battles.

Many other historians have presented different theories. Scott, Turton and Arni argued that the pikemen's favourite target to thrust at was the armpit. They also suggested that the low number of casualties can be explained by the fact that armour would have prevented most of the fatal injuries.[113] John Barratt posited that the push of pike was like a 'modern rugby scrum' in which the block of pikemen literally pushed back the enemy formation.[114] However, Barratt also speculated that when both sides were poorly motivated, the 'contest often degenerated into deadlocked "fencing matches" with ineffectually clashing pikes'.[115] More recently, Jonathan Worton argued against both the raising up of the pikes and the rugby scrum model. He maintained instead that 'the push of the opposing pikemen was made in the earlier historical sense of the word, meaning to thrust or stab with a pointed weapon'.[116] Nevertheless, he

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[110] Carlton, *Going to the Wars*, p. 134.
[111] Carlton, *This Seat of Mars*, p. 168.
[112] Stuart Peachey, *The Mechanics of Infantry Combat in the First English Civil War*, p. 22.
[113] Scott, Turton and Arni, *Edgehill*, p. 24.
[114] John Barratt, *The Battle of Marston Moor 1644* (Stroud: History Press, 2008), p. 66.
[115] *Ibid.*
[116] Jonathan Worton, *The Battle of Montgomery, 1644: The English Civil Wars in the Welsh Borderlands*

agrees with the other historians that the push of pike 'did not result in mutual suicidal transfixion of the opposing front ranks, but rather in a form of fencing at spear point between the two lines'.[117]

In general, these recent opinions tend to agree that the main purpose of combat between two pike formations was not necessarily to kill enemy pikemen. Rather, as was the case in ancient Greek and Roman battles, the aim was to break the enemy formation by breaking their morale.

Determining which of these models most closely matches the realities of the seventeenth-century battlefield is extremely difficult, because none are closely supported by contemporary textual evidence. It is most likely that there was great diversity in how the pike combat was waged in various circumstances rather than a single typical form of fighting. The recent debate on the nature of ancient Greek hoplite combat is relevant in this case. John W. I. Lee noted that 'the search for the "typical" phalanx clash, at any rate, has obscured the diversity of activity that could appear in pitched battle between hoplites'.[118] This was probably also the case for early modern battles between pikemen.

This chapter, therefore, examines the different circumstances of several key battles in which the push of pike occurred and attempts to reconstruct the manner in which the combat was performed in each case. In addition, just as the push of pike is one of the most important elements of early modern warfare that makes it distinctive from modern combat, so it is also the most important commonality among early-modern, ancient and medieval battles. Thus, recent studies on ancient and medieval combat are particularly useful in reconstructing early modern pike combat.

3.2. The Battle of Edgehill (1642)

The Battle of Edgehill was a classic set-piece battle, in which two large, similarly armed armies clashed in the open. In fact, the Edgehill battlefield 'was the most open of all

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(Solihull: Helion and Company, 2016), p. 88.

[117] *Ibid.*

[118] John W. I. Lee, 'The Classical Greek Experience', in *The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World,* ed. by J. B. Cambell and Lawrence Title (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 154.

the major Civil War battlefields, with few physical features to give advantage to the attacker or the defender'.[119] Both the Royalist and the Parliamentary armies were arrayed in textbook fashion, with infantry in the centre of the formation and cavalry on both wings. The main concern of the present study is the infantry combat that occurred in the centre.

While both wings of the Royalist cavalry were smashing their parliamentary counterparts, the Royalist infantry advanced towards the Parliamentary infantry. The future King James II was present at the battle and later reported that as the two sides approached, the firefight began:

> When the Royall Army was advanced within musket shot of the Enemy, the foot on both sides began to fire, the King's still coming on, and the Rebell's continuing only to keep their ground.[120]

It appears that the musketry of the Parliamentary infantry was insufficient to halt the Royalist advance. Indeed, this passage shows that the firepower of neither side was sufficient to defeat the other.[121]

In the conventional discourses on the 'military revolution', the infantry formation such as Maruice of Nassau's linear system or Gustav Adolph's Swedish Brigatde system has often been regarded as central to the effective projection of firepower. However, here at Edgehill, the formations adopted by both Royalist and Parliamentary armies did not seem to play a significant role in improving the effectiveness of infantry firepower. The Parliamentary army followed the Dutch linear formation while the Royalist army adopted Swedish formation.[122] Neither of these practices had a decisive impact on the result of the battle. This strongly implies that, in real battles, the role of particular unit formation was not as dominant as theories would suggest. As it will become clearer in the examinations of other battles throughout this study, an army's performance in battle was influenced and limited by numerous different factors. This

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[119] Wanklyn, *Decisive Battles*, p. 38.
[120] James Steiner-Clarke, *The Life of James the Second, King of England, Collected out of Memoirs Writ of His Own Hand* Vol. 1 (London, 1816), p. 12.
[121] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 14.
[122] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

undermines the grand narrative which focus on specific tactical innovations as decisive moments in military history.

David Blackmore attributed this ineffectiveness of firepower to a lack of skill or experience.[123] Inexperience certainly played a significant role, because these armies were newly raised. Thus, although some of the combatants had undoubtedly gained combat experience on the Continent, they had no prior experience of combat as a group. A more fundamental reason for the ineffectiveness of the firefight was, of course, the limitation of the gunpowder weaponry itself. A recent archaeological survey revealed that the opposing infantry lines fired at each other from about 300 yards apart, the maximum range at which a musketeer could hope to hit his target.[124] Such a long-range firefight could hardly have been effective. Furthermore, firearms that used black powder produced an immense amount of smoke.[125] Earl J. Hess argued that until the sophistication of smokeless powder after the American Civil War, the smoke produced by black powder made long-range firefights ineffective.[126] Peter Young, in contrast, noted that despite the limitations of firearms in this period, 'a body of foot six or eight deep was a mark hard to miss'.[127] Other academic and popular military historians have made similar claims.[128] This assumption has served to justify the grand narrative of the triumph of gunpowder in early modern Europe. However, the fact that the volley fire produced by both armies at Edgehill did not prevent them from engaging in lengthy hand-to-hand combat renders this assumption flawed.[129]

Even if the volley fire was well-aimed and hit the target, not every wound was fatal. One former Royalist soldier reported that he 'was Shott & wounded in Fourteene Severall places att one tyme',[130] yet he survived. Another soldier was also known to

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[123] *Ibid.*
[124] Warwick Louth, *The Arte Militaire: The Application of 17th Century Military Manuals to Conflict Archaeology* (Solihul: Helion and Company, 2016), p. 50.
[125] Scott, Turton and Arni, *Edgehill*, p. 110.
[126] Hess, *The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat*, p. 219.
[127] Peter Young, *Edgehill 1642* (Kineton: The Roundwood Press, 1967), p. 112.
[128] See, for example, William P. Guthrie, *The Later Thirty Years' War: From the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of Westphalia* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 2003), p. 18; Donald F. Featherstone, *Armies and Warfare in the Pike-and-Shot Era* (London: Constable, 1998), p. 50.
[129] The type of volley fire both armies employed at Edgehill is not clear. The Parliamentary army was arrayed in the Dutch formation, whereas the Royalist army took the Swedish formation. However, as Blackmore pointed out, there is no contemporary evidence showing whether the Royalist adopted the Swedish volley fire as well. Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, pp. 14–15.
[130] DRO, QS 128/120/001.

have been 'shott in diverse parts of his body and received severall Wounds', but he lived long enough to be called 'aged'.[131] Although it can be argued that these cases were exceptional rather than the rule, such reports nevertheless support the observation that the casualties that occurred during the firefights in the Civil War were in many cases not significant.[132]

Because the infantry firefight failed to achieve any decisive result, both sides closed for hand-to-hand combat. William Barriffe's widely read manual instructed musketeers to 'give fire, either *retreiting*, or else not to *advance* further' while the pikemen moved towards the enemy. With the '*Pikes* being now charged and ready to come to the *push*, the *Musquettiers* are to advance no further than the *Halfe files* of *pikes*'.[133] Such records indicate how the formation moved just before contact. Barriffe mentioned the pikes 'being charged'; according to contemporary manuals, the phrase 'charge your pike' is a command to hold the pike horizontally at shoulder level.[134] Again, the problem lies in determining how exactly the push was carried out: it is extremely hard to know whether the soldiers continued to advance with the pikes held horizontally or whether they lifted them up just before the clash, as Carlton suggested.

In his recent work on battlefield archaeology, Warwick Louth argued that there was a 'clear gap between the two lines', and although the evidence is not definite, it 'possibly suggests the widespread engagement of push of pike'.[135] If true, a stabbing or fencing match using pikes is a more convincing suggestion than physical shoving. Another factor that must be considered is the proportion of armoured pikemen. Stuart Reid quoted Earl of Clarendon's famous remark that 'not one pikemen had a corselet' in the Royalist army at Edgehill and argued that both a pikeman and his armour became an anachronism during the war.[136] Nevertheless, during this early stage of war, armour was still supplied when available, although the Parliamentary army was

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[131] DRO, QS 128/121/008.
[132] Stuart Peachey even argued that 'casualties in most protracted fire fights lasting 10 or more hours were less than 1%', in *The Mechanics of Infantry Combat*, p. 20.
[133] William Barriffe, *Military Discipline, or the Young Artillery Man* (London, 1643 edition, first edition published in 1635), p. 80.
[134] Roger Daniel, *Mars His Fields, or the Exercise of Arms* (London, 1625), p. 11; Jacob De Gheyn, in *The Exercise of Armes: A Seventeenth Century Military Manual*, ed. by David J. Blackmore (London: Greenhill, 1986).
[135] Louth, *The Arte Militaire*, p. 50.
[136] Stuart Reid, *All the King's Armies: A Military History of the English Civil War 1642–1651* (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1998), p. 8.

much better equipped than their Royalist counterparts.[137] Even if only the first line of the Royalist pike block was armoured, it would have prevented most fatal injuries and made them more aggressive. Another clue that the pike combat at Edgehill entailed more than physical shoving is a report of the prowess of several officers who reportedly killed their opponents with their pikes, as shown in the passages quoted below.

In any case, pike combat raged furiously between the infantry troops at the Royalist left and those at the Parliamentary right, as the official Parliamentary account reported:

> Their Foot, which appeared to us, divided into nine great bodies, came up all in Front, and after some playing with the Cannon on both sides, that part of it which was on their Left, and towards our Right wing, came on very gallantly to the Charge, and were as gallantly received.[138]

James II presents more detail regarding this infantry combat:

> So that they came so near to one another that some of the batalions were at push of pike, particularly the regiment of Guards commanded by the Lord Willoughby and the Generall's regiment, with some others; in so much that the Lord Willoughby with his pike kill'd an officer of the Earle of Essex his own regiment, and hurt another. The foot being thus ingaged in such warm and close service, it were reasonable to imagine that one side should run and be disorder'd; but it happened otherwise, for each as if by mutuall consent retired some few paces, and they stuck down their coulours, continuing to fire at one another even till night…[139]

Although James was only nine years old at the time of the battle, this report appears plausible enough. The accuracy of his memory is questionable, but he was in a good

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[137] Scott, Turton and Arni, *Edgehill*, p. 47. Reid also acknowledged that the complete disappearance of the purchase or supply of armour began in early 1643, in *All the King's Armies*, p. 8.
[138] 'The Account of the Battel at Edgehill, Oct. 23. 1642. As published by Order of the Parliament', in Young, *Edgehill*, p. 292.
[139] Clarke, *The Life of James the Second*, p. 12.

position to gather further information about the battle later. Besides, he would become an experienced soldier himself and, therefore, his description of the basic mechanics of combat at least could be taken as a realistic description of typical seventeenth-century infantry combat.

The most interesting element in this passage is that the opposing pikemen withdrew a short distance after the initial clash 'as if by mutuall consent'. This tactic shows a remarkable similarity to Sabin and Goldsworthy's model of Republican Roman heavy infantry combat.[140] Similar to the Roman combat proposed by these scholars, early modern pike combat must have included several lulls instead of just one, as Scott, Turton and Arni argued.[141] This is only natural, because man simply cannot endure exhausting hand-to-hand combat for a long period of time. This notion gives further credibility to the present study's argument regarding the basic similarity between ancient and early modern infantry combat.

Another important point is that James reported that neither side broke throughout the duration of the infantry hand-to-hand combat. This shows the resoluteness of the English infantrymen at Edgehill: they were certainly not afraid to engage in hand-to-hand combat, which was a very risky and exhausting affair. Despite being newly raised and relatively inexperienced, these soldiers were determined fighters. In spite of this determination, the hand-to-hand combat at Edgehill, like the firefight, failed to produce a decisive result.[142] This does not mean, however, that the pike was an ineffective weapon: although the pikemen could not destroy enemy formations, they were not defeated either. At the same time, the length of the fight strongly suggests that only minimal casualties occurred during the pike combat; otherwise, the pikemen could have not continued to fight for a long time without losing their spirit. It must be remembered that only a small number of pikemen among the formation could actually engage in crossing their pikes with the enemy. Nevertheless, that does not alter the fact that the pike combat was an exhausting ordeal, both physically and mentally, for each soldier involved, even if he were not actually present at the 'killing zone'.

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[140] Koon, *Infantry Combat in Livy's Battle Narrative*, p. 21.
[141] Scott, Turton and Arni, *Edgehill*, p. 113.
[142] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 14.

The tide of the battle turned when the reserve Parliamentary cavalry made a counterattack. At first, the charge was a failure:

> The enemy's body of foot, wherein the King's standard was, came on within musquet-shot of us; upon which we observing no horse to encounter withal, charged with them with some loss from their pikes, tho very little from their shot; but not being able to break them, we retreated to our former station.[143]

Scott, Turton and Arni interpreted this passage as evidence that the Royalists were almost out of gunpowder and bullets.[144] This narrative also could be seen as a demonstration of the effectiveness of the pike against a cavalry charge.

Finally, the Parliamentary cavalry broke through the Royalist centre and charged across the field, taking the Royalist guns. Until this point, the Royalist infantry under Sir John Byron had been engaged in a resolute push of pike. This breakthrough greatly disrupted the Royalists:

> The reserve of the Rebells Horse (which had never been charged) charged Our Foot upon the flank, which Our Foot resisted a good while, but at length not being seconded by Our reserve of Horse, which contrary to order, thinking the day was surely wonne, had followed the execution of the Rebells so farre that they could not come in time to relieve them, they were put into some disorder, in which the Kings Standard (the Standard-bea|rer being slaine, and the Lord Willougby seeking to relieve his Father, who fell being shot in the Legge, was together with his Father made Prisoner.[145]

This passage gives the impression of a confused mêlée. It appears that the firefight and hand-to-hand combat were mixed in this part of the battle, because James II reported that Lord Willoughby, who tried to save his father, was wounded by a shot and 'stood undauntedly with his pike in his hand bestriding his father, and in that

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[143] 'Edmond Ludlow's Account', in Young, *Edgehill*, pp. 295–296.
[144] Scott, Turton and Arni, *Edgehill*, p. 126.
[145] BL, TT, E 126(24).

posture wounded one of their Captains in the face.'[146] This *mêlée* was accompanied by a sudden rise in the reports of casualties, which suggests that the majority of injuries and deaths occurred when the formation was disrupted, not during the firefight or the push of pike between two intact lines.

Next, the two Royalist brigades on the right wing intervened, led by John Belasyse:

> In this right wing of the King's foot, my Lord charged with his pike close by my Lord Lindsey, as also very many gallant officers, most of which were killed or taken . . . By this time the horse returned (but too late to our relief) and night approaching His Majesty gave order to retreat back to Edgehill.[147]

Strictly speaking, this charge was repulsed bloodily, but as Scott, Turton and Arni observed, this endeavour 'stemmed the break' and therefore 'saved the day' for the Royalists, who avoided a clear defeat.[148] Interestingly, the pike was employed as an offensive weapon in the battle, contrary to the popular conception that the pike had already lost its offensive capability. Furthermore, in the hand of Belasyse, the pike was used as an individual weapon. This in turn suggests that the use of the pike was diverse.

This brief examination of a few details of the Battle of Edgehill reveals the realities of the mid-seventeenth century battlefield, which was far more complicated than the simplistic narrative of 'gunpowder triumphant'. First, the battle-winning capacity of gunpowder weaponry was severely limited. Firepower did not result in casualties on a large scale, nor did it succeed in breaking or significantly disrupting the enemy formation. As Parliamentary Captain Nathaniel Fiennes reported, the Parliamentary musketeers spent almost all their gunpowder that day, whereas the Royalist musketeers' powder and bullets were possibly exhausted even earlier.[149] Second, the role of pikemen at Edgehill was far from passive: the pike was employed

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[146] Clarke, *The Life of James the Second*, p. 15.
[147] 'A Brief Relation to the Life and Memoirs of John, Lord Belasyse: Written and Collected by his Secretary, Joshua Moon', HMC, 1903, in Young, *Edgehill*, p. 290.
[148] Scott, Turton and Arni, *Edgehill*, pp. 137–138.
[149] BL, TT. E 126 (39), Nathaniel Fiennes, 'A Most True and Exact Relation of Both Battels Fought by his   Excellency and his Forces against the Bloudy Cavelliers', p. 7.

to attack, defend and counterattack. Like muskets, pikes failed to bring about a victory for either side. The weapon, however, played a clear role in preventing a defeat on either side. Third, the similarity of this model of battle with recent theories of ancient combat is striking, particularly in terms of the drawn-out nature of the fight. Neither missiles nor close-quarter weapons caused significant casualties, and they failed to break the enemy formations. Most of the casualties occurred after the Royalist infantry formation was disrupted by the Parliamentary cavalry's counterattack. Such a battle mechanism is essentially identical to numerous ancient pitched battles. In addition, when cavalry was unable to deliver a decisive blow, the fight between two equally resolute and similarly armed infantry formations was also indecisive.

3.3. The Battle of Adwalton Moor (1643)

The Battle of Adwalton Moor has been often neglected compared to larger pitched battles such as Edgehill and Naseby. Despite being smaller in scale, Adwalton Moor is important in that it effectively challenges the narrative of the 'gunpowder modernity' and the 'triumph of gunpowder'. Here, the Parliamentarian army had a greater proportion of musketeers than pikemen, whereas the Royalist army was divided equally between pike and shot. [150] The Duke of Newcastle, William Cavendish, commanded the Royalist army at Adwalton Moor, and his wife, the Duchess of Newcastle, reported:

> For in their Army there were near 5000 Musqueteers, and eighteen Troops of Horse, drawn up in a place full of hedges . . . ready to encounter my Lord's Forces, then contained not above half so many Musqueteers as the Enemy had.[151]

Although the exact number of combatants at Adwalton Moor is elusive, it appears that the Parliamentary musketeers significantly outnumbered their Royalist counterparts

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[150] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 18.
[151] Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle*, The Life of the Thrice Noble, High and Puissant Prince William Cavendish, Duke, Marquess, and Earl of Newcastle* (London, 1872), p. 39.

despite the overall greater numbers of the Royalist infantry.[152] Therefore, according to the conventional grand narrative, the Parliamentary army at Adwalton Moor was decidedly more 'modern' than its Royalist counterpart.

The geography of the battlefield negated the effect of the superior Royalist cavalry, as the Duchess of Newcastle explained:

> There chiefest strength consisting in Horse, and these made useless for a long time together by the Enemy Horse possessing all the plain ground upon the Field; so that no place was left to draw up my Lords Horse, but amongst old Coal-pits: Neither could they charge the Enemy by the reason of great ditch and high bank betwixt my Lord's and the Enemies Troops[153]

The most important characteristic of the Adwalton Moor battlefield was the nature of the ground, which was broken by ditches and 'hedged enclosures' and had a direct impact on the tactics and movements of the engaged troops.[154] These topographical features made this skirmish quite different from the combat on the open field at the Battle of Edgehill.

Under General Lord Ferdinando Fairfax's command, the Parliamentary army assaulted the Royalists positioned in the enclosures.[155] As previously mentioned, the Royalists could not employ their cavalry on such broken ground, so the battle essentially began as an infantry fire fight:

> In the meanwhile the Foot of both sides on the right and left Wings encounter'd each other, who fought from Hedg to Hedg, and for a long time together overpower'd and got ground of my Lords Foot ……. my Lords Horse (wherein consisted his greatest strength) all this while being made, by reason of the ground, in capable of charging;[156]

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[152] David Johnson, *Adwalton Moor 1643: The Battle That Changed a War* (Pickering: Blackthorn Press, 2003), pp. 69–70.
[153] Duchess of Newcastle*, The Life*, p. 39.
[154] Johnson, *Adwalton Moor 1643*, p. 51.
[155] *Ibid.*, pp. 88–89.
[156] Duchess of Newcastle*, The Life*, p. 40.

Although the Royalists were unable to use their cavalry, the enclosures and hedged ditches provided them with natural defences. Thus, thanks to the advantage of the ground, the Royalist musketeers were able to maintain their formation despite being outgunned in a firefight which, the Duchess reported, raged 'for a long time'. At the same time, this situation indicates a certain limitation to the effectiveness of firepower.

Ultimately, the Parliamentary army gained the upper hand and gradually pushed back the Royalist musketeers. It was at this moment that Newcastle finally attempted a cavalry charge to recover the situation.[157] Sir Thomas Fairfax, who commanded the Parliamentary right wing, reported:

> We advanced through the inclosed ground, till we came to the moore, beating the foot that lay in them to their main body. Ten or Twelve troops of horse charged us in the right wing. We kept inclosures, placing our musketeers in the hedges next the moore; which was a good advantage to us who had so few horse.[158]

With the aid of natural barricades provided by hedges and enclosures, the musketeers were highly effective against cavalry attack. Newcastle attempted a second cavalry assault, but the Parliamentary musketeers 'defended ourselves as before, but with much more Difficulty, many having gotten in among us; but were beaten off again, with losse'.[159] Although it was a dangerous moment for the Parliamentary army, they repulsed the Royalist cavalry attack and maintained the initiative.

The Royalist army was on the verge of defeat. Then, according to Fairfax, a certain colonel named Skirton, whose identity is elusive, suggested to 'his general to let him charge once more, with a stand of pikes'.[160] The Duchess described this pike attack as follows:

> At last, the Pikes of my Lords Army having had no employment all the day,

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[157] Johnson, *Adwalton Moor 1643*, p. 90.
[158] Thomas Lord Fairfax, 'A Short Memorial of the Northern Actions During the War There, From the Year 1642 Till 1644', in *A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tract,* ed. by Sir Walter Scott (London, 1811), p. 382.
[159] *Ibid.*
[160] *Ibid.*

were drawn against the Enemies left wing, and particularly those of my Lords own Regiment, which were all stout and valiant men, who fell so furiously upon the Enemy, that they forsook the hedges, and fell to their heels.[161]

This timely counterattack by the Royalist pikemen decisively turned the tide of the battle. A Royalist propagandist press, *Mercurius Aulicus*, reported:

He (Newcastle) presently alighted from his Horse, whent himself to his Foot, and taking a Pike into his hand, bid them *follow him* assuring them, *not a man should go further then he himself would lead them* . . . whereby the Noble Earle so animated the whole Army that they charged with unexpressible courage, and so amazed the Rebels with the bravery of their coming on, that the Rebels soon fell into confusion.[162]

Because this passage contains obvious propaganda, not every detail is convincing. Contrary to Aulicus's claim that the Parliamentary army fell into confusion, Fairfax stated:

Our men maintained their ground till a command came us to retreat, having scarce any way now to it, the enemy being almost round us, and out way to Bradford cut off ……. Of those who fled, there were about sixty killed, and three hundred taken prisoners.[163]

Regardless of the exact details, what is clear from these various accounts is that the pike won the day for the Royalists. Adwalton Moor demonstrates the dangers of relying solely on firearms. From this perspective, the battle provides a direct contradiction to the conventional notion of the triumph of gunpowder. It also clearly contradicts the prevalent notion that the pike had lost its offensive quality and that its whole value became rooted in defending musketeers against cavalry. At Adwalton Moor, the

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[161] Duchess of Newcastle*, The Life*, p. 40.
[162] BL, TT E. 60 (18), Mercurius Aulicus, p. 350.
[163] Lord Fairfax, 'A Short Memorial', p. 383.

cavalry's role was strictly limited because of the topographical conditions, and the Royalist pikemen charged offensively and successfully against the Parliamentary infantry.

Nevertheless, some modern historians have attempted to argue otherwise. For example, Blackmore blamed the defeat of the Parliamentary musketeers mainly on low supplies of ammunition, for 'the Parliamentary musketeers were able to achieve superiority over their opponents and to neutralize any threat from the Royalist pikemen while they had an adequate supply of ammunition'.[164] This viewpoint originated from a conspiracy theory dating from the time of the battle – namely, that a traitor deliberately disrupted an ammunition supply.[165] Given the logistical and administrative limits, the problem of supply could occur anytime.

Even if the Parliamentary musketeers had been supplied with ample ammunition, there is no guarantee that the musketeers could have stopped the pike attack at Adwalton Moor. It must be remembered that at Edgehill, the Parliamentary musketeers nearly spent their bullets and powders without breaking the Royalist pike block. Clearly, sustained musketry might have broken the Royalist pikemen's will to fight, but there was an equal possibility that it might not have. Furthermore, at the time of the Royalist pike attack at Adwalton Moor, the Parliamentary army moved out from the enclosure to the open moor, as Fairfax reported.[166] The ground, therefore, would not have presented a serious hindrance to advancing pikemen, which would have improved their chances of success even if the Parliamentary musketeers had not been short of ammunition.

A close examination of each phase of the Battle of Adwalton Moor shows that the mechanism of victory and defeat was never simple. Firepower was certainly an important part of this mechanism, and the intention here is certainly not to argue that the pike alone won the battle: it is clear that the prolonged firefight prior to the Royalist pike attack was an important part of the fight. Had the Royalist musketeers failed to resist their Parliamentary counterparts for a sufficient length of time, the pike attack might not have materialised. However, there was nothing uniquely modern in this

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[164] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, pp. 17–19.
[165] Johnson, *Adwalton Moor 1643*, pp. 101–102.
[166] Lord Fairfax, 'A Short Memorial', p. 382.

tactical aspect of Adwalton Moor: since ancient times, armies usually had tried to disrupt or soften the enemy battle formation before closing into hand-to-hand combat. This tactic was often undertaken in the hope that the enemy might flee before the armies actually crossed edged weapons. The 'softening' is exactly what occurred at Adwalton Moor, where both the power and weakness of the musket were revealed. When the flaws of the musket emerged, the pikemen exploited these shortcomings successfully. The pikemen at Adwalton Moor demonstrated their capacity to attack the musketeers and that in the right circumstances, they could be a decisive element in the field of battle. Therefore, an army had to maintain a significant portion of pikemen: gunpowder was still far from triumphant.

3.4. The Battles of Stratton and Landsdowne (1643)

The Battles of Stratton and Landsdowne were parts of the campaign in the West Country. These two battles were fought roughly contemporaneously with the Battle of Adwalton Moor. The tactical outlines of these battles share some important elements with Adwalton Moor in that the commanders attempted to gain a decisive result by employing pikemen offensively, albeit with different outcomes. This section examines the mechanics of infantry combat in these two battles and attempts to discover the relative merits of firearms and pikes in them and the reason for the different outcome to Adwalton Moor.

Stratton was an infantry battle. The Parliamentary cavalry was sent away from Stratton, and the Royalist command decided to attack before the enemy cavalry returned. [167] The overall situation was favourable to the Parliamentarians: they outnumbered the Royalists and were entrenched in a strong position on the hill, as noted in the following Royalist report:

> And now were these Westerne Rebells exactly at the highest (for when Rebels *fast* they are commonly most confident) for men, Ordnance, Ammunition, place, Arms, and all other Accommodation never so strong before. [168]

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[167] Stuart Peachey, *The Battle of Stratton 1643* (Bristol, Stuart Press, 1993), pp. 9–10.
[168] BL, TT E. 105 (13), 'A True Relation of the Great Defeat Given to the Rebels by His Majesties Good

Although this report may contain exaggeration, it appears correct that the outnumbered Royalists had to fight on disadvantageous ground with limited ammunition. Despite these drawbacks, the Royalist army at Stratton was an efficient fighting force. It mostly consisted of volunteer units and the Cornish Trained Bands. The volunteer regiments by that time had served 'for about 7 months and had considerable battle experience.'[169] Of course, their Parliamentary counterparts, which consisted of volunteer regiments and Devonshire Trained Bands, were in a similar condition. At least some of these regiments had former combat experience. Combining all these factors, it is safe to conclude that the overall advantage belonged to the Parliamentary army.

The battle began as the Royalist infantry advanced up what the Royalist Commander Sir Ralph Hopton described as 'a very high hill that had very steep ascents to them every way'.[170] The contemporary accounts reported that the fight continued for a long time until the Royalists ran out of ammunition:

In this order on both sydes the fight began Tuesday the 16 day of May 1643. about 5 of the clock in the morning, The Cornish foote pressing those 4 wayes up the Hill towards the Enemy and the Enimy as obstinately endeavouring to keep them downe. The fight continued doubtfull with many countenances of varous events till about three of the clock in the afternoone, by which tyme the ammunicion belonging to the Cornish Army was almost spent.[171]

Yet Sir Ralph and those other noble Gentlemen, did not only prepare to meet the Rebells in the field, but (to the perpetuall honour of the County of Cornwall) assaulted this great Rebellious body in their strong works and trenches, fighting bravely with them for full 10 hours, and when these loyall gentlemen had spent their Ammunition, and had not powder left for one houre longer, they then (with

Subjects of the Country of *Cornwall*, Under the Command of Sr RALPH HOPTON. May 16. 1643', p. 3.
[169] Peachey, *The Battle of Stratton*, p. 36.
[170] Ralph Hopton, in *Bellum Civile: Hopton's Narrative of His Campaign in the West, (1642–1644) And Other Papers*, ed. by Charels E. H. Chadwyck Healey (London, 1902), p. 43.
[171] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

unexpressible valour) fell upon the Rebels with their swords and pikes and fought it out so manfully.[172]

These passages strongly indicate that the first phase of the battle was a prolonged firefight without any significant result and was similar to the first phase of the Battle of Adwalton Moor, though the attackers and defenders were reversed. As in Adwalton Moor, the limitations of firepower were evident: a prolonged firefight that continued until the ammunition was spent neither broke one side's will to fight nor caused sufficient casualties to decide the outcome of the battle.

At this point, Hopton resolved to turn the fight towards hand-to-hand combat. As was the case at Adwalton Moor, the Royalist pikemen advanced:

Sir Bevile Grenvile advanc'd in the head of his Pikes in the way, And Sir Jo: Berkeley led on the muskettiers on each syde of him[173]

This time, the Parliamentary infantry, too, responded in a manner similar to the Royalists at Adwalton Moor: they made an aggressive counter-charge by pikemen against the advancing Royalists:

Major Generall Chudleigh with a stand of Pikes charg'd Sir Bevile Greenvile so smartlie, that there was disorder, Sir Bevil Greenvile, in person overthrown, but being presently relieved by Sir Jo: Berkely.[174]

This passage shows that the initial pike attack by the Parliamentary infantry was fairly effective in causing confusion amongst the Royalist ranks and clearly demonstrates the value of the pike as an infantry shock weapon. The account reveals that the combat between the opposing pikemen was significantly more aggressive than at Edgehill. Neither Hopton nor other contemporary accounts explain why, although the fact that the soldiers were by then more experienced in combat must have played an important

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[172] BL, TT E. 105 (13), p. 3.
[173] Hopton, *Bellum Civile*, p. 43.
[174] *Ibid.*

part. Nevertheless, the combat did not produce many casualties. The account specifies that Grenville was knocked out but not stabbed by the point of a pike. This description of combat possibly indicates that the whole affair was not a mutual stabbing match. Considering the momentum and impetus of the downhill charge, there is a possibility that the pike combat at Stratton resembled a physical clash.

The main difference between Stratton and Adwalton Moor was that the Royalist infantry were not routed by the Parliamentary pike attack. The fact that they had a significant number of pikemen who were willing to fight hand to hand (otherwise they would have not advanced with pike in the first place) could be one of the main reasons for this difference. Hopton reported that Berkeley rescued Grenville and the Royalist charge continued, taking Chudleigh, who led the Parliamentary pike attack, prisoner.[175] The Royalist pikemen and musketeers thus absorbed the impetus of the Parliamentary counter-charge, and finally overwhelmed the Parliamentarians. The Royalist musketeers, having spent their ammunition, must then have aided their pikemen with musket butt and swords in hand-to-hand combat. In such a mêlée, short weapons could be highly effective. The Royalist infantry 'fell upon the Rebels with their swords and pikes' and finally 'routed the Rebels Army, killed many hundreds of them dead in the place, wounded many more; [and] tooke 1700 prisoners'.[176]

The Battle of Stratton shows that one of the most effective means to fight back against enemy pikemen was through one's own pikemen. It also shows the importance of the will to fight in close-quarters combat. It appears that the Royalist infantry at Stratton was able to maintain their resolution throughout the fight despite numerous unfavourable elements. Their confidence in hand-to-hand combat and the knowledge that the pikemen and musketeers would assist each other would have played a strong part in overcoming their initial disorder and continuing to attack. This, in turn, suggests that the battle was decided by many seen and unseen elements functioning in various ways; again, the part played by firepower was limited.

The Battle of Lansdowne Hill was fought near Bath less than two months later and presented a strikingly similar tactical approach to Stratton. After a confused firefight involving musketeers and dragoons, the Royalist pikemen under Grenville

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[175] *Ibid.*
[176] BL, TT E. 105 (13), p. 3.

advanced against the Parliamentary army who were stationed on top of the hill. However, the situation was different from Stratton:

> The Pikes and the horse with the rest of the Muskettiers that advanced up the broade way, as the space would beare, had much to doe, by reason of the disadvantage of the grounde, the Enimye's foote and batteryes being under couvert of theire breast-workes, and theire horse ready to charge upon the verie browe of the Hill; where the King's forces were five times charg'd and beaten back with disorder. There was Sir Bevil Grenvile slayne in the head of his Pikes.[177]

Reid's interpretation of this battle was that the 'musketeers, not the pikemen', eventually won.[178] However, the tactical situation was more complicated than Stratton, mainly because of the constant presence of cavalry. Colonel Henry Slingsby described it thus:

> Sr Beuill Grenvill then stood on the head of his Regiment upon Tughill, who aduanced presently putting all his shott upon his left hand within a wall, and carry'd with him horse on his right hand, the ground being best theire for horse. And he himself lead up his pikes in ht middle: hee gain'd with much gallantry the brow of the hill receiving all their small shott and cannon from their breast worke, and three charges of horse two of which hee stood; but in the third fell with him many of his men: yett had his appearing upon the ground so disorder'd the Enemy, his owne muskeiteires fyring fast vpon theire horse, that they could not stay vpon the ground longer; the Rebells ffootte tooke example by theire horse and quit theire breastworks[179]

Grenville's pikemen were hindered in their advance by the Parliamentary cavalry and suffered from Parliamentary shot. Nevertheless, it is rash to conclude that the pike

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[177] Hopton, *Bellum Civile*, p. 54.
[178] Reid, *Gunpowder Triumphant*, p. 39.
[179] Henry Slingsby, 'Colonel Slingsby's Relation of the Battle of Landsown and Roundway Down', in Hopton, *Bellum Civile*, p. 96.

was useless at Landsdowne. Slingsby reported that the musketeers' firing repulsed the Parliamentary cavalry, but they by no means fought the cavalry alone. One Parliamentary source reported that Sir Arthur Hesilrige, who commanded a Parliamentary cuirassier regiment, 'received a wounde in the thigh at push of pike'.[180] This statement strongly suggests that the Royalist pikemen were engaged heavily in combat.

In other words, the combat at Lansdowne was a combined arms action rather than a mere 'triumph of firepower.' It is possible to argue that here, unlike at Adwalton Moor and Stratton, the musketeers played a decisive part, but it is equally true that they did not win the battle alone. The sources indicated that while the Royalist musketeers delivered firepower against the Parliamentary horse and, later, entrenched the Parliamentary infantry in a flanking attack, the pikemen acted as an anvil. It is doubtful that the Royalist army could have done better if they were composed entirely of musketeers.

Like the other battles examined previously, these two battles selected from the West Country Campaign clearly show that a simplistic narrative of the ascendancy of firepower does not match the complicated realities of mid-seventeenth-century combat. Despite its importance, gunpowder weaponry was not the sole guarantor of victory in battle, and there was no single formula for winning a battle. The outcome of battle was affected by numerous factors, such as topography, the respective use of missile and edged weapons, the timing of the charge and the soldiers' will to fight. Many of these factors were not inherently modern. Furthermore, there is little to suggest that contemporaries saw these battles as a victory or defeat of a 'modern' way of fighting.

3.5. The Battle of Marston Moor (1644)

The Battle of Marston Moor was the largest battle in the Civil War. It occurred on primarily flat moorland characterised by a 'line of hedges and ditches' that separated the opposing two armies.[181] As at Adwalton Moor, these hedges and ditches must

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[180] BL, TT E.60 (12), 'A True Relation of the Great and Glorious Victory Through Gods Providence, Obtained by Sir William Waller, Sir Arthur Hesilrige, and Others of the Parliamentarian Forces', p. 4.
[181] Wanklyn, *Decisive Battles*, pp. 108–110.

have influenced the combat.

The opposing armies were arrayed, as usual, with cavalry at both wings and infantry in the centre. The hedges and ditches provided the Royalists with an ideal defensive position.[182] When the battle began in the late evening, the Parliamentary army advanced. The Parliamentary cavalry at each wing, commanded respectively by Oliver Cromwell and Sir Thomas Fairfax, attacked the Royalist counterparts under the command of Lord Byron and Lord Goring. At the same time, the Parliamentary infantry advanced against the Royalist infantry at the centre. This attack came as a surprise to the Royalist army, negating the effect of its strong defensive position.[183]

The Royalist skirmishers positioned in the ditches were driven out without serious resistance. Young believed that the rain falling at the time would 'extinguish many of the infantry soldiers' matches, and a thin line of skirmishers along a hedge could not hope to hold out with butt-end of musket against formed hedgehog of pikes'.[184] It is easy to imagine the pike block being vulnerable to the musket fire.[185] However, if Young's speculation is true, this would be a contrary example of the musketeers' vulnerability to sudden and determined attack from pikemen.

The Parliamentary infantry made good initial progress. As Barratt described, the two infantry brigades commanded by Major General Lawrence Crowford smashed Rupert and Byron's infantry force and threatened the flank of Tillier's infantry force.[186] The exact nature of the combat is extremely difficult to reconstruct; however, because of the nature of the sources. Captain William Stewart's account is a good example:

> There was a great Ditch between the Enemy and us, which ran along the front
> of the Bat|tell, only between the Earl of Manchesters foot and the enemy there
> was a plain; in this Ditch the enemy had placed foure Brigades of their best
> Foot, which upon the advance of our Battell were forced to give ground, being

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[182] The position of both armies at Marston Moor can be seen in Bernard de Gomme's watercolour. The ditch is a notable natural feature represented in this painting. BL, Add MS 16370.
[183] P. R. Newman and P. R. Robert, *Marston Moor 1644: The Battle of The Five Armies* (Pickering: Blackthrone, 2003), p. 94.
[184] Peter Young, *Marston Moor 1644: The Campaign and the Battle* (Kineton: Roundwood Press, 1970), p. 107.
[185] Carlton, *Going to Wars*, p. 99. Carlton argued that the British failed to learn quickly that the pikemen were vulnerable to musket fire. This argument, however, is unconvincing.
[186] Barratt, *The Battle of Marston Moor*, p. 115.

gallantly assaulted by the E. of Lindsies regiment, the Lord Maitlands Cassilis, and Kelheads, Generall Maior Crawford having overwinged the enemy set upon their flank, and did very good execution upon the enemy, which gave occasion to the Scottish Foote to advance and passe the Ditch.[187]

This account presents a broad tactical outline but does not elucidate how these infantrymen fought each other. Although the Battle of Marston Moor is relatively well documented, most of the sources are vague about details of combat.

As the combat intensified, it became more confused. It was a large-scale infantry clash along a two-mile battle line, 'the whole field had turned into a patchwork of semi-isolated more or less brutal and desperate encounters.'[188] One parliamentary officer's account vividly conveys this atmosphere:

Then the main bodies joyning, made such a noise with shot and clamour of shouts that we lost our eares, and the smoke of powder was so thick that we saw no light but what proceeded from the mouth of gunnes.[189]

Again, specific details of the mechanics of combat are missing. What is certain is that there was a firefight. Another interesting battle report came from the Duchess of Newcastle:

They being as glad of my Lord's Profer as my Lord was of their Readiness, went on with the greatest Courage; and passing through Two Bodies of Foot, engaged with each other not at forty yards distance, received not the least hurt, although they fired quick upon each other; but marched towards a *Scots* Regiment of Foot, which they charged and routed; in which Encounter my Lord himself kill'd Three with his Pages half-leaden Sword.[190]

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[187] BL, TT E.54 (19), 'A Full Relation of the Late Victory Obtained (Through Gods Providence) by the Forces   under the Command of Generall Lesley, the Lord Fairfax, and the Earl of Manchester', p. 6.
[188] Newman and Robert, *Marston Moor 1644*, pp. 101–102.
[189] BL TT E.54 (11) 'A Relation of the Good Successe of the Parliamentary Forces Under the Command of Generall Lesley, the Earl of Manchester, and the Lord Fairfax', A3.
[190] Margaret, *The Life of the Thrice Noble*, pp. 62–63.

Although the primary purpose of this passage is to praise Newcastle's bravery, it nevertheless provides a valuable clue regarding the mechanics of the fight. Blackmore argued that the firing tactic of Civil War armies was transformed after Edgehill, because a prolonged firefight there failed to 'force a conclusion'.[191] In the new strategy, the 'fire was reserved to a range of the length of a pike or two, which is five to ten yards, and then delivered by three ranks firing together. In the case of infantry offensive this was followed by an immediate assault'.[192]

With respect to this battle, the Duchess reported that the two bodies fired from about forty yards apart. If this distance is accurate, the new firing tactic had not been widely adopted by the time of Marston Moor. It is also difficult to determine whether the infantry at Marston Moor switched to hand-to-hand combat or to the push of pike immediately after volley. Written evidence mentioning the existence of the push of pike at this stage of the battle is scarce. Nevertheless, the occurrence of occasional hand-to-hand combat is likely, considering that Newcastle was reported to have fought with his sword.

The infantry combat raged for a long time with no decisive result. This is remarkable, because the Royalist infantry was outnumbered and surprised and lacked effective command.[193] Although some of the units were raw recruits, many were seasoned troops. In particular, Newcastle's army had fought and won at Adwalton Moor.[194] As with the West Country Campaign, Marston Moor illustrates the challenges of defeating an experienced and resolute army in a face-to-face battle even with superior numbers or firepower. Although the relative importance of firefight and hand-to-hand combat at Marston Moor are unclear, it appears that neither were sufficient to break the other side's will to fight or cause significant casualties. This again demonstrates that the power of specific weaponry was still strictly limited.

In the end, the battle was decided by a cavalry fight, which determined the fate of the infantry. Cromwell finally overcame the Royalist cavalry and surrounded the remaining Royalist infantry. This last stand of Newcastle's White Coats has produced several scholarly debates, but the main concern of the present study is the mechanics

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[191] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 16.
[192] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[193] Newman and Robert, *Marston Moor 1644*, pp. 92–93.
[194] Young, *Marston Moor 1644*, pp. 3–5.

of the battle. An archaeological survey demonstrated that 'the closing stages of this battle of the infantry involved little hand to hand fighting'; instead, the Parliamentary musketeers poured volleys against the Royalists, who almost ran out of ammunition to return fire.[195]

It could be tempting to interpret this battle as an example of the vulnerability of the pike block against firearms. However, we must consider the context of this last stand. The pike block being rendered vulnerable to missile fire was not a phenomenon that occurred only in early modern warfare. For example, Christopher Matthew argued that the ancient Roman army handled the Hellenistic pike phalanx by disrupting its formation with javelin.[196] At the same time, the charge of pikemen could be highly effective against musketeers. However, in the closing stage of the Battle of Marston Moor, the Royalist pikemen were unable to charge, largely because they were surrounded and pressured from all sides. In other words, the battle's outcome stemmed from a very peculiar tactical condition and was not a demonstration of the inherent superiority of firearms.

3.6. The Battle of Naseby (1645)

The Battle of Naseby, which destroyed the main Royalist field army, was a typical set-piece battle fought in the open, similar to the Battle of Edgehill. Nevertheless, many tactical elements had changed over the course of three years of fighting. Consequently, many modern historians have concentrated on developments designed to employ more effective firepower.

Most noticeably, Reid argued that after 1643, the Royalists increasingly relied on musketeers rather than pikemen and that the battles began to be dominated by musketeers.[197] Reid cited the Royalist army's marches to Chalgrove, Inverlochy and the relief of York as examples in which task forces were formed of musketeers alone.[198] However, these actions were essentially raid or relief efforts that demanded

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[195] Newman and Robert, *Marston Moor 1644*, pp. 103–104.
[196] Christopher A. Matthew*, An Invincible Beast: understanding the Hellenistic pike-phalanx at war* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2015), p. 397.
[197] Reid, *Gunpowder Triumphant*, pp. 31–33.
[198] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

mobility more than anything else. From this perspective, specific tactical conditions rather than the inherent superiority of firearms were the chief reasons for changes in army composition. In addition, as Reid admitted, the pike was not entirely abandoned.[199] The supply of pikes continued until 1645.[200] For the Naseby campaign, 9000 pike heads were ordered.[201] In addition, after their victory at Naseby, the Parliamentary soldiers plundered the Royalist arms and ammunition wagons, and their booty included pikes.[202] The Parliamentary army appears to have maintained the usual ratio of pikemen and musketeers.[203] These facts all indicate that the pike was still deemed an important and useful weapon.

Reid also argued that at Naseby, the Royalist pikemen discarded their pikes and 'charged alongside the musketeers, sword in hand'.[204] For Blackmore, Naseby provided clear evidence of the use of 'brief, short-range volleys in the assault'.[205] Therefore, it is worthwhile examining whether a significant change in the mechanics of infantry combat occurred at Naseby and whether it influenced the course and the outcome of battle.

The king's army was outnumbered by the Parliamentary army under Fairfax in both infantry and cavalry.[206] Furthermore, the king's army comprised an ill-equipped mixture of the 'shattered remnants of many regiments from various armies and garrisons.'[207] Nevertheless, the Royalist infantry were mostly seasoned veterans who had experienced lengthy service. The more numerous New Model Army, in contrast, was led by experienced officers but included many new recruits.[208] From a tactical standpoint, neither army was at an absolute disadvantage.

As at Edgehill, the Royalists advanced first. Again, as at Edgehill, whereas the Royalist cavalry routed their Parliamentary counterparts, the Royalist infantry,

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[199] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[200] *The Royalist Ordinance Papers: 1642–1646*, transcribed and edited by Ian Roy (Oxford, 1964), p. 150.
[201] Glenn Foard, *Naseby: The Decisive Campaign* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 2005, originally published in 1995), p. 82.
[202] BL TT E.288 (28), 'A More Exact and Perfect Relation of the Great Victory (by God's Providence) Obtained by the Parliaments Forces Under Command of Sir Tho. Fairfax in Naisby Field', p. 4.
[203] Reid, *Gunpowder Triumphant*, p. 42.
[204] *Ibid.*, p. 40.
[205] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 22.
[206] Wanklyn, *Decisive Battles*, p. 173.
[207] Foard, *Naseby*, p. 208.
[208] *Ibid.*, pp. 207–208.

drawn up in two lines at the centre, attacked the New Model infantry, which was likewise arrayed in two lines. The attacking Royalist infantry had to move uphill and was therefore at a certain degree of disadvantage in terms of energy and momentum.[209] Sir Edward Walker, the secretary of Charles I, described the situation as follows:

> Presently our Forces advanced up the Hill, the Rebels only discharging five Pieces at them, but over shot them, and so did their Musquetiers. The Foot on either side hardly saw each other until they were within Carbine shot, and so only made one Volley; ours falling in with Sword and butt end of the Musquet did notable Execution; so much as I saw their Colours fall, and their Foot in great Disorder.[210]

This firing at close range is confirmed in a letter by John Rushworth (then, Fairfax's secretary) that states, 'The Foot charged not each other till they were within twelve paces one of another, and could not charge above twice'.[211] This letter supports Blackmore's theory of the development of Civil War infantry tactics. Considering the fact that the long-range musketry in Civil War battles continuously failed to achieve its goals, it could have been natural for the commanders to adopt firing at close range a reasonable alternative. This means that they acknowledged the limitations of firepower and instead choose immediate hand-to-hand combat rather than a prolonged firefight. This is, therefore, another example that does not fit with the grand narrative of the ascendancy of gunpowder and the victory of modernity.

For the Parliamentary army, however, this tactic again failed to suppress the Royalist advance. The Parliamentary volley did not cause serious casualties amongst the advancing Royalist rank because it was overshot. Overshooting is one of the symptoms of inexperience in a soldier and indicates that the Parliamentary infantry's overall quality at Naseby was not particularly high. Nevertheless, the fact that they succeeded in holding their fire until the Royalists came close indicates that their quality

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[209] Wanklyn, *Decisive Battles*, pp. 175–176.
[210] Sir Edward Walker, *Historical Discourses, Upon Several Occasions* (London, 1705), p. 130.
[211] 'Rushworth's Letter' in Foard, *Naseby*, p. 403.

and the degree of training was not particularly low either.

With regard to the infantry clash, Walker's description is somewhat problematic. He reported that the Royalist infantry made the assault with swords and musket butts. What this means is a little unclear: it means either that the Royalist musketeers, spent of their ammunition, fought with swords and musket butt, or that the Royalist pikemen used their swords instead of the pikes while the musketeers used their muskets as clubs. Reid argued that this indicates that the Royalist pikemen discarded their pikes and thus the push of pike did not occur.[212] The problem is that according to Rushworth, the combatants were 'at push of Pike'.[213] Because these sources do not provide greater detail about the infantry combat at Naseby, it is extremely difficult to judge whether the pike was indeed discarded. However, there are several points that must be considered for speculation.

First, it is highly unlikely that the Parliamentary pikemen discarded their pikes, for they were defending against the Royalist attack and the pike was an excellent defensive weapon because of its length. Second, if Parliamentary pikemen were to have held their pikes horizontally, then charging with short sword and reversed musket would have been suicidal for the Royalist infantry. In ancient battles, for example, Roman legionaries armed with swords could not match a Hellenistic pike phalanx in a frontal clash.[214] Although the Roman legionaries could have used their mobility to attack the flank of the phalanx, it is doubtful whether the outnumbered Royalist infantry could have done so against their Parliamentary counterpart. Roman legionaries were able to disrupt the pike phalanx by throwing their javelin and creating gaps in the enemy line to charge.[215] A similar scenario would have been possible if the Royalist volley had created sufficient disruption among the Parliamentary rank. If, somehow, there was confusion among the Parliamentary rank, it is possible that at least some Royalist pikemen (perhaps the minority of aggressive warriors among the ranks that Marshall and Goldsworthy argued for) drew swords, charged into the disrupted enemy formation and fought more aggressively, especially considering many of them were veteran soldiers. In this manner, Walker's account that the Royalist soldiers attacked

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[212] Reid, *Gunpowder Triumphant*, p. 40.
[213] 'Rushworth's Letter' in Foard, *Naseby*, p. 403.
[214] Matthew*, An Invincible Beast*, p. 394.
[215] *Ibid.*, p. 395.

with swords and musket butt can be conciliated with Rushworth's report that there was a push of pike.

Nevertheless, one Parliamentary account suggested that the Royalist impetus was inadequate to destroy the cohesion of their opponent's line completely:

> The body in the mean while strongly ingaged, our Foot at first charge gained ground of the enemy, with some losse on the enemies part.[216]

Rushworth then described how 'the Enemies Foot gave a little backe, and so did some few of ours'.[217] In other words, as at Edgehill, the opposing formations drew apart temporarily as if by mutual agreement. This, as previously mentioned, is remarkably similar to the mechanics of combat of the Ancient Roman army as described by Goldsworthy and Sabin. The fact that the two sides were able to disengage themselves suggests that this first clash was not a chaotic mêlée: the two armies must have engaged while simultaneously maintaining a little distance without losing their orderly formations.

Then came the second clash. With the support of cavalry, the Royalist infantry broke the first line of the New Model infantry:

> But they being driven on by their horse, at the second charge drove ours to some disorder, but by the care of the Field-Officers was soone drawne into a body again.[218]

This was most likely the point at which some Royalist infantry fought with swords, because the disorder mentioned in the passage above matches Waller's description. As the first line collapsed, the second line of the New Model infantry charged to rescue the situation. According to some modern historians, this was most likely the point at which the Parliamentary Major General Skippon was shot and wounded. [219] Archaeological evidence has suggested that there were firefights between the Royalist

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[216] BL TT E.288 (28), 'A More Exact and Perfect Relation', p. 3.
[217] 'Rushworth's Letter' in Foard, *Naseby*, p. 403.
[218] BL TT E.288 (28), 'A More Exact and Perfect Relation', p. 3.
[219] Foard, *Naseby*, p. 264; Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 22.

success and the charge of the Parliamentary second line.[220]

Nevertheless, neither the firefight nor the ensuing hand-to-hand combat was decisive. The battle, again, was largely decided by the cavalry. Finally victorious, the New Model cavalry attacked the flank and rear of the Royalist infantry:

> Then the right wing of our Horse (wherein the Generall was in person) charged in the Flanke of the blew regiment of the Enemies Foot, who stood to it, till the last man, abundance of them slaine, and all the rest surrounded, wounded, and taken these (the hope of their Infantry) being lost Horse and Foot gave backe, wee advanced after them in order, our Horse flanking our Foot, and after one charge more, became Maskters of all their Infantry, and tooke about three thousand prisoners[221]

At the Battle of Naseby, both sides showed remarkable resoluteness in combat. In particular, despite being outnumbered, the Royalist infantry were willing to fight aggressively in hand-to-hand combat. Their eventual destruction had nothing to do with using pre-modern tactics or technology.

In fact, Naseby demonstrated that developments in firepower, although important, still had clear limitations. Despite the adoption of closer range volleys, firefights again failed to destroy the enemy formation or soften them for hand-to-hand combat. The battle was won instead by classical cavalry encirclement, with infantry acting as an anvil.

3.7 The Battle of the Dunes (1658)

The Battle of the Dunes was a part of the Franco-Spanish War (1635–1659). Here, the Cromwellian English army fought under the command of Marshal Turenne against the Spanish force. It was an excellent test of the capacity of the English army which had gone through the Civil War. The battle is especially worth mentioning for the aggressive employment of pikemen, as at Adwalton Moor, though the attackers in this

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[220] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 22.
[221] Rushworth's Letter' in Foard, *Naseby*, p. 404.

battle were the French and the English. As in many other battles, topography was an important factor: the sandy hills must have seriously impaired the movement of troops and affected their cohesion negatively.[222] The Spanish army held the strong defensive position on the high ground.[223] An English officer described it as 'a great hill naturally fortified'.[224]

Despite the difficult ground, the English infantrymen advanced. The Duke of York (the future King James II) participated in the battle as an ally of the Spanish army and recounted the situation as follows:

> It was Lockart's own Regiment which charged those Spaniards, and was commanded by Lieu'. Coll. Fenwick; who so soon as he came to the bottom of the hill, seeing that it was exceeding steep, and difficult to ascend, commanded his men to halt and take breath for two or three minutes, that they might be more able to climb and do their duty.[225]

Thus, the English infantrymen stopped before the final charge to redress their line, just as Caesar's legionaries did at the battle of Pharsalus, 48 BCE.[226] Such a concerted action in the confusion of battle is never easy. This implies that the English soldiers at the Battle of the Dunes were highly disciplined, veteran units. Indeed, many of them would have served in the Civil War.[227] The English account of the battle indicates that

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[222] The sand hills are a notable topographical character in de Gomm's watercolour. In BL, Add MS 16370

[223] Sir John William Fortescue, *A History of The British Army,* Vol. 1 (Uckfield, East Sussex: The Naval and Military Press Ltd, 2004, first published in 1899–1930), p. 272.

[224] William Clarke Firth, *The Clark Papers: Selections from the Papers of William Clarke, Secretary to the Council of the Army, and to General, Monck and the Commanders of the Army in Scotland, Edited for the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 3, (London, 1899), p. 158.

[225] Clarke, *The Life of James the Second King of England etc Volume 1,* p. 348.

[226] Caesar, *The Commentaries of C. Julius Caesar of His Wars in Gallia; and the Civil Wars betwixt Him and Pompey* (London, 1677), p. 300. Caesar's commentaries were important military texts in early modern England. Although it is not certain to what extent they influenced the infantry tactics of England, it is evident that this seventeenth-century observer of the battle of Pharsalus regarded the impetuous charge of Caesar's legionaries as exemplary. Caesar's men behaved similarly to the English soldiers at the Battle of the Dunes, in contrast to the static defensive postures of Pompey's legions. It can be argued that the early modern English officers were well aware of the details of the battle from their classical learnings, and therefore could have been imitating Caesar's example, either consciously or unconsciously.

[227] John Barratt, Betther *Begging than Fighting: The Royalist Army in Exile in the War against Cromwell 1656-1660* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2016), p. 17.

they used similar tactics to those used in the Civil War: they fired muskets at close range and charged with pikes:

> On hands and knees krept up the hill, and gave the enimies foote [sic] two good volleys, and with our pikes forced them to retreat.[228]

It was a difficult battle for the English. A number of English soldiers were shot, and Colonel Daniel was 'pushed off by a pike, but is not wounded'.[229] James II's more detailed explanation vividly conveys the fierceness of the infantry combat:

> But while they were scrambling up in the best manner they were able, the Lieu. Coll: fell in the middle way, being shott through the body; which yet hinder'd not . . . from leading on his men together with the rest of their Officers, who Stopt not till they came to push of pyke; where notwithstanding the great resistance which was made by the Spaniards, and the advantage they had of the higher ground, as well as, that of being well in breath, when their Enemies were almost spent with climbing, the English gain'd the hill and drove them from off it.[230]

The battle proved that the English infantry, especially pikemen, were competent enough to fight and beat the tercio of the Spanish Army of Flanders. In addition, it showed the aggressive nature of English infantry tactics: they were not afraid to charge against a strong enemy position and engage in hand-to-hand combat. The army demonstrated every aspect of a confident and experienced fighting force. This battle also validated the importance of the pike as an infantry shock weapon, even after the Civil War. The pike was still being used with great effect as an offensive weapon, and a determined force of pikemen could be a decisive factor in battle. In other words, this battle is an important counter-example to the grand narrative of the 'triumph of gunpowder'.

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[228] Clarke, *The Clark Papers*, p. 158.
[229] *Mercurius Politicus*, no. 421, 17–24 June 1658, p. 619.
[230] Clarke, *The life of James the Second*, p. 348.

4. Perceptions of War and Battle

4.1.　The Language of Battle

This section examines the ways in which people understood and expressed warfare and battle. How their understandings and expressions changed over time (or resisted changes) is crucial in tackling the concept of modernity in military affairs. As discussed in the Introduction, many definitions of modernity have been proposed (see the 'modernity and technology' section of Chapter One), and many of these characteristics connote a radical break from the past. Therefore, this section aims to search for such a sense of a break, especially related to the listed characteristics.

The language contemporaries used to describe or analyse a certain object is often key to understanding their mindset. As previously discussed, early modern Europeans generally did not see technological excellence as the measure of the superiority of their society, nor did they believe that technology would determine the fate of their society or civilisation.[231] This appears to also have been true in the sphere of military affairs. An important clue in this respect is provided by Sir James Turner, a veteran of the Thirty Years War and the British Civil War. His book on warfare deeply influenced British officers in the late seventeenth century, and this influence is examined in detail in the following chapter. The current section focuses on the more philosophical aspect of his writing, because it provides a valuable insight into the manner in which a soldier who fought his battles during the mid-seventeenth century understood and made sense of them.

In his book *Pallas Armata*, Turner devoted a chapter to commenting on the writing of the Ancient Greek historian Polybius. In the chapter, Turner objects to Polybius' argument that the Roman legion was superior to the Hellenistic pike phalanx due to the structural flexibility of the legion. Turner argues that the legion did not have inherent advantages over the phalanx, citing several occasions in which the Hellenistic

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[231] Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men*, p. 49.

armies defeated the Roman army, including the victories of Pyrrhus of Epirus.[232] More interestingly, Turner begins the chapter by narrating his own view regarding the determinant of a victory:

> It is a common saying, he who wins plays best; yet it is not universally true, for very often the expertest Gamesters are losers, and so we find it all ages that great Captains, and well train'd Armies have not always been victorious …. To attribute either the justness of a cause, or yet the good or bad order of an Army to contingent events, were to stint the power of Heaven, (Which both the Author and all Pagans then did acknowledg [sic] to be in their gods) and leave nothing to that Eternal Providence which we adore, by the direction whereof the actions of Mortals are govern'd, and is in nothing more visible than the successes and routs of Armies. And therefore the Soveraign Lord of the World takes to himself the Title of Lord of Hosts, the smallest and most inconsiderable accidents in War, (which are all appointed by the finger of the Almighty) being able to produce most unexpected changes, as *Caesar* well observed.[233]

Thus, according to Turner, victory and defeat in a battle were in the hands of God. His attitude appears to be decidedly medieval, although the details are a little more complicated.

The concept of providence has had various meanings throughout history. In one sense, it meant the 'ultimate ordering of the universe by a supreme supernatural being of sublime overriding force', as in the Christian, Ancient Greek and Roman views.[234] However, providence could also mean God's direct intervention in earthly affairs.[235] Sometimes it could be equivalent to the ancient understanding of fate; that is, according to J. G. A. Pocock, 'God's timeless perception as it was to God himself'. [236] Most exemplary was 5th century philosopher Boethius' struggle to

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[232] Turner*, Pallas Armata*, p. 153.
[233] *Ibid.*, p. 150.
[234] Alexandra Walsham, *Providence in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 8.
[235] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[236] J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 39.

understand his political misfortune. He pondered how God could permit '*virtus* to become *fortuna*'s prey'.[237] He found the answer in providence as the 'perfection of the divine vision in which God sees to (or, to human intellects, foresees) all circumstantial things'.[238] Thus, what people see as insecurity or inscrutability is part of God's plan for perfection. Later, providence was often equated with the ancient concept of fortune, which again, according to Pocock, means 'the circumstantial insecurity of political life' in late medieval Italy. This is not fundamentally different from the Boethian understanding.[239] This understanding is expressed in the language Dante used in his *Divine Comedy*.[240] Thus providence, in both Boethius' and Dante's understandings, meant God's inscrutable way, whereby humans had no choice but to believe that the things they could not understand happened according to God's plan.[241]

These different understandings of providence continued to coexist from the medieval to the early modern period. In seventeenth-century England, providentialism was intertwined with Calvinist theology, most prominently in the 'puritan propensity for detecting the finger of God in the most mundane events'.[242] In the Calvinist mind, it was, as Alexandra Walsham phrased, 'the Lord's chosen method of communicating with the predestinate elite'.[243] Frustratingly for many Calvinist ministers, however, the medieval coexistence of providence with Fate and fortune found in Boethius and Dante's works continued to exist among the early modern English populace.[244]

What, then, was James Turner's providence? In the same chapter, he provided a further clue:

Here *Polybius* is at a stand, and gives no reason for it, but that Fortune would have it so. What fortune was to him, that is providence to us. He was ignorant what the wisest of men said long before the foundation of *Rome* was laid, *That there is a time for every purpose under Heaven, a time to kill, and a time to*

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[237] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[238] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[239] *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.
[240] *Ibid.*
[241] *Ibid.*, pp. 39–40.
[242] Walsham, *Providence in Early Modern England*, p. 20.
[243] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[244] *Ibid.*, pp. 20–23.

heal, a time to gain, and a time to lose. And in another place, *That the race is not to the swift, nor the battel to the strong, nor favour to the men of skill, but time and chance happeneth to them all.* (Eccles. Ch. 3. and Ch. 9.) And indeed that happeneth to all, and to everyone, what the eternal hath ordain'd for them. Nor did Polybius know what was reveal'd to Nebuchadnezzar in that dream which Daniel interpreted to him, that the Persians should subdue the Assyrians, the Grecians should ruine the Persians, and the Romans should put a period to the Macedonian Monarchy. There was no stop to be made to the current of the Victories of the Romans whom the Almighty had pre-ordain'd to become Masters of the World.[245]

Here, Turner's rationale appears quite straightforward: The Romans defeated the Macedonians because God had decided it to be so, and it was already revealed in the Bible. This understanding is broadly akin to Dante's understanding of providence, especially Turner's identification of providence as the Christian equivalent of the pagan understanding of fortune. At the same time, a similarity to the Calvinist doctrine of predestination can be glimpsed. This is not surprising, considering that Turner was a Scot and, therefore, would undoubtedly have been familiar with the central doctrine of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, especially as he revealed in his memoir that he had studied the doctrines of both Catholicism and Protestantism.[246] Nevertheless, his providence was different from the pious Puritans' belief in God's direct intervention for the chosen few. Certainly, he fought under Protestant king Gustav Adolph of Sweden during the Thirty Years' War and remained Protestant throughout his life. At the same time, however, he was a staunch Royalist during the Civil War and must therefore have had little in common with the zealous Puritans.

Nicholas Funke, in his study of the relationship between religion and the army of the Holy Roman Empire, showed that even during the confessional conflicts, the armies employed in imperial service remained multi-confessional.[247] He also argued that these German soldiers, despite being deeply religious, remained largely silent on

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[245] Turner, *Pallas Armata,* pp. 153–154.
[246] Sir James Turner, *Memoirs of His Own Life and Times* (Edinburgh, 1829), p. 3.
[247] Nicholas Maximilian Funke, 'Religion and Military in the Holy Roman Empire c. 1500-1600' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Sussex, 2011), p. 73.

confessional matters, unlike the British mercenaries such as Robert Monro who were more outspoken in their Protestant faith.[248] He speculated that this is because these German soldiers were more familiar with their 'multi-confessional milieux', unlike those British soldiers who came from more 'homogenously Protestant backgrounds'.[249] However, Turner's writing shows that, even in this relatively more homogenous Protestant Britain, belief in God and providence could be highly diverse. Turner fought in the same army as Monro during the Thirty Years' War, and they were both Scottish Protestant soldiers. However, Turner's anti-Catholicism was far less virulent than Munro's.[250]

Turner's belief in providence based on his personal experiences is more clearly revealed in another passage:

> If Polybius had liv'd in our days, he might have seen the hand of Heaven distributing Victory (to speak with reverence and submission to the Almighties pleasure) more partially, than he either heard it was awarded in the Hannibalian, or saw it given in the third Punick War: of the first whereof he writes, when he falls upon this discourse with us, He might have seen men of one Nation, arm'd alike, following one and the same method of War, and for any thing I know, of equal Courage, both parties inflam'd, the one with Loyal zeal, the other with rebellious rage, acting their parts very highly on the bloody stage of War; he might have seen, I say, the best of Soveraign Kings lose his Crown and Life, and have his head chopp'd off with an Ax, when the worst of Subjects and greatest of Rebels had his deck'd with Bays.[251]

Here, Turner is discussing the Civil War he himself fought. He fought for both Charles I and Charles II and, therefore, likely truly meant what he wrote in this passage. Turner laments that Charles I, who was the best of kings, was defeated and executed by the worst rebels. Turner claims this was not a result of the goodness of the cause nor of

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[248] *Ibid.*, p. 87.
[249] *Ibid.*
[250] Paul Scannell, *Conflict and Soldiers' Literature in Early Modern Europe* (Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, London, 2015), pp. 82-83.
[251] Turner*, Pallas Armata,* p. 154.

military brilliance. Turner is trying to make sense of this 'injustice' through his understanding of providence. God did not punish the Royalist army and the king, just as the victory of the Romans was not a result of God wanting to punish the Macedonians. Those outcomes simply occurred because they were pre-ordained as God's plan. In this sense, Turner's attitude shows a remarkable similarity to that of Boethius. On other occasions, Turner was capable of using the word providence in a less fatalistic manner by indicating the more active helping hand of God.[252] Therefore, Turner's understanding of providence and his use of the word to interpret historic events, including battles, show strong continuities from the ancient and medieval past, although mixed with the theologies of his own time.

Therefore, the fact that Turner's argument resembles Boethius and Dante does not necessarily mean that he was passively following centuries-old literary conventions. He certainly had an intellectual capacity with which to ruminate on his experiences and compare the realities of warfare with various theories. Further complicating matters is that Turner was not an amateur philosopher of war who simply imagined the battlefield behind his writing desk. His discourse about the more practical aspects of battles (as discussed in detail in the first part of the next chapter, wherein the theoretical aspects of late seventeenth-century military writings is the main issue) shows that he was aware of the effects of the developing military technologies, tactics and weaponry of his time. Therefore, reconciling the two contrasting images could be difficult: the practical soldier Turner and the fatalistic providentialist Turner, who believed that God had already decided the result of the battle. A resolution, perhaps, could be found in that because he was an experienced soldier, Turner knew more than anyone the fundamental unpredictability of battle and warfare. As he himself clearly stated, he witnessed numerous occasions in which neither 'great Captains, and well train'd Armies' nor 'the justness of a cause' brought victory.[253]

It is worth noting that Turner cited the biblical book of Ecclesiastes to support his argument. The book is about the fundamental human incapacity to understand the divine plan. Most biblical scholars agree that it was written during the Hellenistic period, when Jews experienced persecution and warfare which caused a radical rethinking of

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[252] Turner, *Memoirs*, pp. 108–117.
[253] Turner*, Pallas Armata,* p. 150.

the old ideas concerning divine providence.[254] The situation was very similar to what Turner experienced, and it appears from his writing that he felt that way. Thus, Turner might have borrowed language from the ancient and medieval authors, but the subject he was trying to describe was certainly relevant to his own time.

Dorothee Sturkenboom's statement that 'even in early modern wars that were not religiously motivated, providence had an overbearing presence on the battleground' well explains the mindset of Turner and many other of his contemporaries. [255] She also argued that the 'gradual secularisation of soldiers' emotions in the West' meant that 'toward the end of the eighteenth century, God appears to have lost part of his influence.'[256] The reality, however, is more complicated; the attitudes were more mixed during the period this chapter covers. It is true that, as J. R. Hall pointed out, God's presence was both real and highly important for many writers of military manuals and treatises during this period, including those already examined in this chapter, such as Cooke, Barriffe, and of course Turner.[257] However, in contrast to these authors, and especially to Turner's philosophy of war, which was influenced by the doctrine of providence, many reports of actual battles written during this period take more prosaic, matter-of-fact forms, as can be observed in numerous passages quoted at the previous section.

For example, God or providence are not mentioned or hinted at even once in the official Royalist account of the Battle of Edgehill.[258] The official Parliamentary account, on the contrary, reserved some space to discuss God:

We should do our Army a great deal of wrong, and not discharge our Duty of Thankfulness towards God, if we took not the first occasion to declare his goodness, in giving so great a Blessing, as he hath now done to the resolute and unwearied Endeavours of our Soldiers fighting for him in the maintenance

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[254] Michael D. Coogan and Cynthia R. Chapman, *The Old Testament: A Historical and Literary Introduction to the Hebrew Scripture, 4th edition* (New York, 2018), pp. 472–475.
[255] Dorothee Sturkenboom, 'Battlefield Emotions in Early Modern Europe: Trends, Key Issues and Blind Spots', in *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800*, p. 272.
[256] *Ibid.*, pp. 272–273.
[257] J. R. Hall, *Renaissance War Studies* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1983), pp. 487–488.
[258] '*A Relation of the Battel fought between* Keynton *and* Edgehill, *by His Majesty's Army and that of the Rebels*' in Young, *Edgehill*, pp. 262–264.

of his Truth, and for themselves and their Country, in the defence of their Liberties and the Priviledges of Parliament; this makes us give you now a Narration of a blessed Victory which God hath given us upon the Army of the Cavaliers…[259]

Although the passage appears to be a proclamation of God's providence, its tone is more customary than an earnest confession of faith. Moreover, the role of God disappears completely as the real narrative of the battle begins.

Most of the surviving accounts of the battle are similar, although a few exceptions exist, such as Adoniram Bifield's account:

All this hath God enabled our Army to perform …. Mr. Ash was marvellously preserved from the cruelty of four Cavaleers which set upon him, one of them cut off his hat and raised his hair with his sword, but never touched his skin, God hath brought most of our Ministers this night to Warick, Mr. Ash amongst the rest, and Mr. Marshall, whose danger was no less.[260]

Bifield's attribution to divine providence is not surprising considering he was a clergyman. Nonetheless, even in his writing, the role of God is not quite as prominent as it might have been.

Some authors sometimes directly refuted the claim of a victory by divine providence. For example, the Royalist poet John Taylor argued against the claims of the victorious Parliamentarians:

You have abused and mock'd God, with false and forged Thankesgivings, for such Victories as never were, and with your Sophisticated Triumphs of Guns, B.lls, Bonefires, Ballads, Libells, and other Imposture-like expressions, whereby we have been seduc'd and encouraged to give more and more

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[259] 'The Account of the Battel at *Edgehill*, Oct. 23. 1642. As published by Order of the Parliament' in *Ibid.*, p. 306.

[260] Adoniram Bifield, *A letter sent from a worthy divine, to the right honourable, the Lord Mayor of the City of London. Being a true relation of the battaile fought betweene His Majesty, and his Excellence the Earle of Essex*. BL, TT E. 124[21].

Contributions, and buy our owne utter undoeings…[261]

From Taylor's perspective, the Parliamentary victory was not a result of God's providence. Rather, the victory was a result of the money the Parliamentarians extracted from the populace through lies. This shows that not everyone during this period accepted the result of battle and warfare as God's pre-ordained plan.

It must be noted that these more mundane reports of battles contrasting with the philosophical understanding of battle was not a novel or 'modern' phenomenon. These two different styles of writing had coexisted throughout the medieval period. For example, the famous medieval chronicler Jean Froissart preserved in his chronicles an autobiographical account of the Bascot de Mauléon, a mercenary–brigand during the Hundred Years War. It is one of the rare examples of a medieval military memoir,[262] in which Mauléon calmly narrated his military career in a style not radically different from early modern writings:

> We were properly hemmed in and hardly knew which way to face. There was a great set-to with lances, because, as soon as the mounted men reached us, they got off the horses and attacked us fiercely. What hampered us most was what we could not spread out, because we were going along a road with tall hedges and vines on both sides of it. …... I can tell you it was a hard and nasty battle, and we held out for as long as we could, so there were a lot of killed and wounded on both sides.[263]

Here, de Mauléon gives an account of a battle in a very matter-of-fact manner. Perhaps this might be expected from a freebooter captain who was not a sophisticated theorist of war. However, Froissart's own way of writing about battle is frequently similar. His description of the Battle of Sluys (1340) offers a fine example:

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[261] John Taylor, *The generall complaint of the most oppressed, distressed commons of England. Complaining to, and crying out upon the tyranny of the perpetuall Parliament at Westminster*, BL, TT E. 300[15].

[262] Yuval Noah Harari, 'Military Memoirs: A Historical Overview of the Genre from the Middle Ages to the Late Modern Era', *War in History*, 14 (3), (2007), 289-309 (pp. 292–93).

[263] Jean Froissart, selected, translated and edited by Geoffrey Brereton, *Chronicles* (London: Penguin, 1978, originally published in 1968), pp. 286–287.

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Then they sounded scores of trumpets, horns and other instruments and bore down on their enemies to engage them. Fierce fighting broke out on every side, archers and crossbowmen shooting arrows and bolts at each other pell-mell, and men-at-arms struggling and striking in hand-to-hand combat. In order to come closer quarters, they had great iron grappling-hooks fixed to chains, and these they hurled into each others' ships to draw them together and hold them fast while the men engaged. …... It was indeed a bloody and murderous battle. Sea-fights are always fiercer than fights on land, because retreat and fight are impossible.[264]

Despite more vivid details, this passage has structural similarities with de Mauléon's account. Both accounts narrate how the battles occurred, introduce especially dramatic moments in the battles and explain why they were costly. Both were explained entirely in human terms. God did not intervene miraculously, nor is there any sense of the result of the battle being pre-ordained.

This does not mean Froissart was a secular historian. On the contrary, the 'tension between the vicissitudes of Fortune' and the 'over-arching solicitude of divine Providence' is an important background of Froissart's work[265] that can be glimpsed in his 'cyclical' vision employed to describe the political history of England.[266] He remains, however, more secular when describing battles, as the passage above shows. This makes a strong contrast with an earlier medieval chronicler, William of Malmesbury, who interpreted the result of the Battle of Hastings as a direct judgement of God.[267] The medieval attitude towards the role of divine providence in battle was different according to the time and author and was often mixed, and would continue to be so, in the early modern period.

Overall, the language and literary conventions employed by the authors

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[264] *Ibid.*, pp. 63–64.

[265] Peter F. Ainsworth, *Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History: Truth, Myth, and Fiction on the Chroniques* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 239.

[266] *Ibid.*, pp. 306–307.

[267] William of Malmesbury, R. M. Thomson and M. Winterbottom*, Gesta Regum Anglorum, The History of English Kings,* Vol. *2: General Introduction and Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 216.

examined here to describe battles and warfare show strong continuities from the medieval and, to some extent, the ancient past. There is little hint of technological determinism.

4.2.   Battlefield Emotions

As examined in the Introduction, battlefield emotions have recently become a subject of increasing attention among scholars in the study of early modern Europe. The main issue of debate has been whether the early modern soldier–authors expressed their inner feelings through their writings. These feelings include various human emotions such as fear, admiration or grief. Some of them, especially grief, should in many cases be referred to more appropriately as post-battlefield emotions, although it cannot be denied that combatants could feel grief at the loss of their comrade even during the heat of the battle. Not to overcomplicate matters, but the term 'battlefield emotions' in this study covers both battlefield emotions and post-battlefield emotions.

Sandberg argued that describing the intenseness of combat using certain words or phrases could have been a coded method of expressing the fear the soldiers felt during combat, given that fearful expressions were considered un-soldierly. A report of the Battle of Marston Moor quoted in the previous section is a good example:

> Then the main bodies joyning, made such a noise with shot and clamour of shouts that we lost our eares, and the smoke of powder was so thick that we saw no light but what proceeded from the mouth of gunnes.[268]

At first glance, this might appear to be a mere presentation of what occurred without revealing significant emotions. However, seventeenth-century readers who had experience in warfare would have instantly understood the horrors the author had felt. The passage describes in detail the immediate restriction of hearing and visibility imposed upon the author at the moment of the clash between the two armies. It is only

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[268] BL TT E.54 (11) 'A Relation of the Good Successe of the Parliamentary Forces Under the Command of Generall Lesley, the Earl of Manchester, and the Lord Fairfax', A3.

natural that the loss of these most basic senses cannot but cause fear. By narrating such a situation, the author was effectively conveying the emotion he felt on the field of battle to the readers.

Some authors admitted the existence of battlefield fear and its effects even more frankly:

> None delights in the sound of warlike Drums, or in the Alarmes of Warr: but onely they who never tasted the bitterness thereof for he who hath once felt the smart of it, will tremble as oft as he thinks of its approach, or summous thereunto. And therefore we must use or our best skill, and cunning always to avoide war as much as possible we can.[269]

> If an Army consists of raw, young, and freshwater souldiers, who seldome or never saw men wounded or slaine; when they come to see such sights, they will trmble and be confounded with feare, and begin to think rather of flying than fighting. Experience shewes, that knowledge and skill in Military and Martiall discipline doth exceedingly embolden a souldier in battell.[270]

This passage directly contrasts the conventions of early modern military writings. Of course, this is not a military memoir but a study of war, and the author is not admitting he felt fear. Thus, acknowledging the existence of battlefield fear would have been easier for him. Still, the author's diagnosis and solution are remarkably acute and valid. The author's emphasis on discipline and experience as the best remedy for fear corresponds well with modern theories on combat motivation. In addition, as Erin Peters argued, the passage shows both an 'awareness of nonphysical, non-visible wound' in mid-seventeenth-century England and a deep concern of how to cope with it in a country afflicted by civil war.[271] This in turn indicates, despite the terseness of

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[269] BL, TT. E 128(15), Richard Ward, *The Anatomy of Warre, or Warre with the Wofull Fruits, and Effects thereof, Laid Out to the Life* (London, 1642), pp. 5–6.

[270] *Ibid.*, p, 19.

[271] Erin Peters, '"The deep staines these Wars will leave behind": psychological wounds and curative methods in the English Civil Wars', in *Battle-scarred: Mortality, medical care and military welfare in the British Civil Wars,* ed by. David Appleby and Andrew Hopper (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), p. 170.

military writings, that there were emotional expressions among the combatants, and people took those expressions seriously. As can be seen from the passage quoted above, this early modern concern about battlefield emotion was not fundamentally different from the concerns of modern theorists of trauma.

Fear is not the only emotion the early modern English soldier–authors expressed. Sandberg identified an emphasis on displays of courage and honour and the expression of grief as some of the most typical emotions the early modern French soldier-authors showed.[272] There are copious early modern English equivalents. The expression of awe and admiration towards an individual or a group that displayed exceptional bravery is especially prominent. The official Parliamentary account of the Battle of Edgehill provides a good example of this:

> But their Foot, which appeared to us, divided into nine great Bodies, came up all in Front, and after playing with the Cannon on both sides, that part of it which was on their Left, and towards our Right Wing, came on very gallantly to the Charge, and were as gallantly received.[273]

For many Parliamentarians, the Royalist army was an army of the evil councillors who 'engaged his Majesty in a dangerous and bloody Fight against his faithful Subjects' or, at worst, the enemy of God.[274] Nevertheless, as this passage shows, they were not ungenerous in acknowledging their enemy's bravery. A similar endorsement of courage under fire can be found in a Royalist account examined in the previous section on military perspective, and it is worth quoting again:

> So that they came so near to one another that some of the batalions were at push of pike, particularly the regiment of Guards commanded by the Lord Willoughby and the Generall's regiment, with some others; in so much that the Lord Willoughby with his pike kill'd an officer of the Earle of Essex his own regiment, and hurt another. The foot being thus ingaged in such warm and

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[272] Sandberg, 'His Courage Produced More Fear', pp. 131–138.
[273] 'The Account of the Battel at *Edgehill*, Oct. 23, 1642. As published by Order of the Parliament' in Young, *Edgehill*, p. 307.
[274] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

close service, it were reasonable to imagine that one side should run and be disorder'd; but it happened otherwise, for each as if by mutuall consent retired some few paces, and they stuck down their coulours, continuing to fire at one another even till night.[275]

Here, James II displays a refined admiration for the bravery of both sides engaged in the pike combat. As an experienced soldier himself, he clearly expected through his military common sense that one side would be quickly overwhelmed in infantry hand-to-hand combat, thus he wrote 'it were reasonable to imagine that one side should run'. At the field of Edgehill, contrary to such common sense, both sides refused to yield and doggedly carried on fighting. Contemporary readers would have quickly realised that James II was expressing his respect for such courage in this terse text.

When the authors praised an individual's act of bravery, especially that of someone on their side, the expression was even more lavish. A Royalist pamphlet cited in the previous section concerning the Battle of Adwalton Moor praised the earl of Newcastle, describing how the 'Noble Earle so animated the whole Army that they charged with unexpressible courage, and so amazed the Rebels with the bravery of their coming on, that the Rebels soon fell into confusion'.[276] Stemming the tide of battle single-handedly is one of the most typical acts chosen to depict a heroic soldier. The depiction of Newcastle leading his pikemen at Adwalton and thus turning a certain defeat into a great victory fits well with this literary and cultural convention. A similar attitude is found in the account of John Belasyse's feat at Edgehill:

In this right wing of the King's foot, my Lord charged with his pike close by my Lord Lindsey, as also very many gallant officers, most of which were killed or taken. He only received a slight hurt upon his head, and had the good fortune to recover Sir Jacob Ashley, the Major-General, and some others our foot upon the left wing.[277]

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[275] Clarke, *The Life of James the Second*, p. 12.
[276] BL, TT E. 60 (18), Mercurius Aulicus, p. 350.
[277] 'A Brief Relation to the Life and Memoirs', HMC, 1903, in Young, *Edgehill*, p. 290.

In addition to their bravery, both Newcastle and Belasyse are described as charging with a pike in the mould of the traditional heroic warrior. We might glimpse here evidence of the 'chivalric revival' that supposedly slowed England's military innovation. Indeed, Keith Thomas referred to 'quasi chivalric' values, which were frequently in conflict with the pursuit of an actual military aim.[278] For Thomas, figures such as the Earl of Newcastle, who embodied such values during the Civil War, were 'dinosaur[s]' destined to extinction, as a more systematic method of waging war was replacing the old way.[279] However, considering such literary styles as mere nostalgic sentiment or conservatism would be a mistake. Although the way in which these accounts were written is certainly reminiscent of Homeric epics or medieval knight's tales, such attacks with cold steel often produced decisive results in battle. It is worth remembering that Thomas' dinosaur Newcastle actually won an important victory at Adwalton Moor through his 'quasi-chivalric' charge. The ideas or language might have been borrowed from the past, but the content was still relevant.

Grief is another powerful emotion inextricably linked with the battlefield. It is frequently claimed that a strong belief in providence and 'emotional practices existing in early modern armies that praying rituals served to prepare soldiers for combat, and singing hymns helped soldiers to resign themselves to their fate when marching to the field.'[280] However, that belief did not render the expression of grief at loss inappropriate. Despite their strong belief in God and his providence, soldiers were not always calm and fatalistic when faced with the loss of their comrades:

> For all our great vicktorie I have had the greatest loss by the death of your nobell father that ever anie freind did …… he himself killed two his owne hands, whereof one of them had killed poore Jason [sir Edmund Verney's servent], and brocke the point of his standard at push of pike before he fell, which was the last account I could receave of anie of our owne syde of him.[281]

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[278] Keith Thomas, *The End of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 65.
[279] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[280] Sturkenboom, 'Battlefield Emotions', in *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800*, pp. 272–273.
[281] 'Sir Edward Sydenham's Letter to Ralph Verney' in Young, *Edgehill*, p. 291.

In this passage, Sir Edward Dydenham's grief for the heroic death of his friend, Sir Edward Verney, is unmistakable. Naturally, the expression of his grief was the most obvious purpose of writing this letter to the dead man's son, Ralph, although he sided with the Parliamentarians. In addition, Dydenham's grief was even extended to the dead hero's loyal servant.

Sometimes, such emotion was exhibited towards an enemy:

> Many of them were killed upon the place, amongst whom was Sir Edward Varney the King's standard-bearer, who as I have heard from the person of honour, engaged on that side, not out of any good opinion of the cause, but from the sense of duty which he thought lay upon him, in respect of his relation to the King.[282]

This letter recounts the tale of the death of the same man Dydenham wrote about, but from the opposing side. Here, the Parliamentarian soldier Ludlow was clearly moved by the fate of Loyalist Verney and mourned his death. Ludlow argued that Verney fought for the king not for political principles, but out of personal loyalty and the sense of duty, which in turn indicates these were traits considered honourable regardless of one's side. Due to its very nature, the Civil War caused many early modern Englishmen to fight against their countrymen, former friends and, as in the case of the Verney family, against their own families. The emotional situation of those involved directly and indirectly in this conflict must have been highly complicated. Many writings left by the combatants clearly reflect such complexity. The images of a Royalist soldier writing to a Parliamentary soldier to express grief at the death of that soldier's Royalist father, and a Parliamentary soldier looking for a way to pay proper respect to the Royalist enemy he nevertheless regarded as honourable, are highly symbolic of such a situation.

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[282] 'Edmund Ludlow's Account', in Young, *Edgehill*, p. 312.

5. Conclusion

This chapter presented a general outline of the development of tactical theories from the late sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century and compared it with the battles that the English army fought during the mid-seventeenth century. It demonstrated that English tactical thought was far from backward and did not uncritically accept the ancient authorities. As early modern warfare became increasingly complicated, so did the tactical thinking of the theorists and commanders.

The battles covered in this chapter were complex, in that they muddied the conventional dichotomy between modern and primitive or between firepower and edged weapons. Furthermore, they were decided by numerous complicated factors. Firepower was one decisive element but was by no means the single most important factor. Pike played a no less significant role during and after the Civil War. The mechanics of early modern infantry combat were fundamentally similar to those employed in the wars of previous ages. In particular, there are striking similarities between the recent theories on ancient Greek and Roman combat and the mechanics of early modern combat examined in this chapter. The use of gunpowder did not radically alter these mechanics. Likewise, victory and defeat were frequently decided by largely traditional factors, such as the morale and experience of combatants, the timing of the attack, and the effectiveness of cavalry deployment. Therefore, the battles during this period cannot be simply explained as part of the grand narrative of the triumph of gunpowder.

In terms of the perception of war, there is no simple way to describe how early modern English people understood warfare and battle and how they expressed that understanding. Many parts of their understanding were built upon centuries-old literary and cultural conventions. However, their ways of describing warfare and battle were more than mere repetitions of an old *cliché*. Many of the concerns expressed by these writings were highly relevant to the time when they were written and might appear surprisingly 'modern'. Certainly, many of the concerns were not exclusively modern. In other words, the dichotomic categorisation of ancient and modern, or medieval and modern, cannot be applied to this period. The reality has always been more complicated and was particularly so in this period.

Chapter Two. The Perceptions and Realities of War and Infantry Combat in the Late Seventeenth Century

The previous chapter concluded that English military development from the beginning to the middle of the seventeenth century was far more complicated than the simple narrative of the triumph of modern gunpowder weaponry would suggest. Military manuals and treatises produced during this period were neither backward compared to their continental counterparts, nor did they follow the ancient authorities uncritically. Although these manuals emphasised the importance of traditional edged weapons, a close examination of the battles of the British Civil War clearly shows that hand-to-hand combat was still an important part of military doctrine.

The period covered in this chapter presents certain problems. Especially after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, it is often described as a time during which the growing dominance of firepower in battle became apparent. However, considering that the tactical development observed in the previous chapter cannot be defined as a reactionary movement against gunpowder weaponry, it is evident that this conventional narrative requires revision.

This chapter, therefore, attempts to provide a more balanced account of the English tactical development and nature of combat in the late seventeenth century. It first traces the development of English tactical doctrine and then examines several key battles of the period, inquiring whether there was a radical change in that doctrine in this period. Like the previous chapter, contemporary soldiers and the members of literary class' understandings of warfare are analysed as well. Overall, this chapter demonstrates that firepower in this period was neither dominant nor decisive, and the force of supposed 'modernity' was by no means always victorious.

1. Tactical Doctrine and Military Theory in Late Seventeenth-Century England

Many historians have described English military theory during the Restoration period as conservative. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Roger Manning argued that

the English army remained an amateur force, preferring edged weapons to firearms because of its officers' chivalric ideal, until the Dutch influence transformed it after 1688.[1] John Childs argued similarly. Assessing the two most important English military theorists of this period – Sir James Turner and Roger Boyle, the Earl of Orrery – Childs argued that Turner's thoughts were 'sound, sane, and sensible but that his conclusions look backward rather than forward' and that Orrery was 'more parochial than Turner'.[2] This section first investigates these claims by focusing on the military writings and manuals most commonly read in this period. In addition, it compares the situation before and after 1688 to establish whether there was a radical change.

1.1.　　　The Tactical Doctrine for the English Infantry before 1688

At first glance, it appears that the basic tactical drill of the English infantry had changed little from the days of the Civil War. In the first official manual published after the war, directions for musket and pike were almost identical to the manuals before and during it, as observed in the previous chapter.[3] In battle, the English infantry was expected to march very close to the enemy line before firing, as they had during the war:

> Assoon as the Battalion comes to thirty Paces distance from the Enemy, let the Musqueteers Fire, the manner of which Firing shall be ordered them before.[4]

Although the anticipated distance from the enemy line extended a little farther than the more extreme examples during the Civil War, such as the twelve paces at Naseby, it is still quite a close range for the modern eye.

In addition, the role of the pike remained very important. The battalion commander's position was 'to be in the Center of it, at the Head of the Pikes' and the captains and other officers were to march 'with their Pikes in their Hands'.[5] Likewise,

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[1] Manning, 'Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century English Armies', p. 671.
[2] John Childs, *The Army of Charles II* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul [etc.], 1976), p. 63.
[3] *An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline* (London, 1676), pp. 3–2.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 76.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 70–76.

as had been the case during the Civil War, the ratio of two firearms to one pike was maintained.[6] These factors suggest that in the minds of English officers and military theorists, hand-to-hand combat was still an important component of battle.

Such emphasis on hand-to-hand combat is more directly emphasised in the updated official manual published in 1685:

> Those Granadiers on the Right and Left of the battalion, are to Fire as the Musketiers Fire, that is, the Two last Ranks to Fire with the Musketiers, And assoon as Fired are to put their Daggers into their Firelocks. The Front Rank of Granadiers having their Granado's ready, are to kneel when the first Rank of Musketiers kneel, And after the Two last Rank fired, They are to stand up, And when the first Rank of Musketiers Fire, They are to deliver Granado's, And immediately to fix their Daggers in their Firelocks. And when the Musketiers club their Muskets and Fall on, They are to Charge with their Daggers as aforesaid.[7]

Here, the main difference from the 1676 manual is the existence of the grenadiers and the use of the plug bayonet. Nevertheless, it is evident that the basic mechanics of combat remained unchanged. As Blackmore argued, the English infantry was still expected to fire at close range and then charge with musket butt or with cold steel.[8]

A similar emphasis can also be observed in more lengthy treatises on military affairs. A treatise written by George Monck, the Duke of Albemarle, shows a clear continuity with the pre–Civil War doctrine for infantry combat in this regard. Originally written during the war, in his captivity, it was published in 1671. In this work, the emphasis on the importance of pikemen is unmistakable. Although the ratio of two muskets to one pike was becoming the norm during the war, Monck argued that 'for field service you must observe to have as many Pikes as Musqueteers'.[9]

Not surprisingly, the infantry tactic suggested by Monck was as aggressive as the 1676 and 1685 manuals. As in the 1685 manual cited above, Monck recommended

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[6] Childs, *The Army of Charles II*, pp. 62–63.
[7] *An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline* (London, 1685), pp. 128–129.
[8] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 31.
[9] George Monck, *Observations upon Military & Political Affairs* (London, 1671), p. 66.

placing grenadiers at the flanks of a pike division. They were to throw their hand grenades 'in amongst the Enemies Pikemen' to disrupt their ranks before the 'push of pike'.[10] Disrupting enemy formation before the hand-to-hand combat was one of the most common methods of infantry attack from ancient days. In any case, along with the official manuals, this shows that breaking the enemy infantry formation by aggressive attack was still an important objective of combat in the minds of English commanders in this period.

In addition, Monck displayed what can be interpreted as a positive attitude to the employment of pikemen in an offensive manner:

> If you perceive you have more Pikemen in your Army than your Enemy, or if your Pikemen be better armed with Defensive Arms, or with longer Pikes, that you have no advantage of him in your Artillery, nor the Enemy in the ground upon which you are to advance; then make what orderly hast you can, (continually skirmishing with your Enemy with the Van-guard of your Foot) to bring your men to push of Pike with your Enemy.[11]

This passage once again strongly indicates that the perception of the pike as an offensive 'shock' weapon persisted during this period, contrary to the widespread notion that it had lost its status as an offensive weapon after the Thirty Years War because of increased firepower.[12] Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that this was not a 'chivalric' preference for edged weaponry. Rather, Monck recommended the pike attack only when there was a clear possibility of victory. If the enemy could be defeated by artillery, that was fine. However, according to Monck and many other English officers at that time, aggressive assault tactics involving hand-to-hand combat must not be avoided when necessary.

Other treatises on war likewise emphasised aggressive infantry assault and not avoiding the risk of hand-to-hand combat. This can be observed in Orrery and Turner's works, as previously mentioned the most influential English military treatises of the

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 104.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 104–105.
[12] Nosworthy, *The Anatomy of Victory*, p. 35; Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, p. 457.

period. In his work *A Treatise of the Art of War* (1677), Orrery proposed that the musketeers should 'load their Muskets only five or six Pistol Bullets, which will do great Execution, especially Fired near, and then to fall in club Musket; I have Experimented this, and found it attended with great Success'.[13] This, like other works observed so far, shows that the emphasis of infantry attack in this period was more on hand-to-hand combat than firepower, although their use were inseparably related. This tactic, as Orrery himself mentioned, was formed from the experience of combat during the Civil War period.

James Turner did not particularly emphasise firing at close range. Nevertheless he, like the other authors, recommended a rapid assault using cold steel:

> Your advance on an Enemy, in what posture soever he be, should be with a constant, firm, and steady pace; the Musketeers (whether they be on the Flanks, or interlin'd with either the Horse of the Pikes) firing all the while; but when you come within Pistol-shot, you should double your pace, till your Pikes closely serr'd together, charge these, whether Horse or Foot, whom they find before them.[14]

Therefore, it can be confidently argued that the importance of both hand-to-hand combat and edged weapons was a generally agreed-upon matter among the English military thinkers and officers of this period.

Overall, it is certainly true that the essential doctrinal principles of infantry combat had not significantly altered since the days of the Civil War. The English infantry were expected to approach the enemy closely and disrupt its formation by firepower and then finally to charge and engage in hand-to-hand combat. In theory, the firefight was to be carried out only briefly, and the musket butts and pikes were expected to play the decisive role. However, there is little reason to see this doctrine as conservative or reactionary, considering their effectiveness during the Civil War. Likewise, it must be remembered that it was an aggressive attack of the Cromwellian pikemen that won the Battle of the Dunes, as observed in the previous chapter. For

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[13] Roger Earl of Orrery, *A Treatise of the Art of War* (London, 1677), p. 30.
[14] Turner, *Pallas Armata*, p. 305.

the officers of the Restoration period, there was little reason to consider a radical change in infantry combat doctrine.

1.2. The Tactical Doctrine for the English Infantry after 1688

The tactical development of the English army after the Glorious Revolution has often been characterised as focused on its improvement of firepower, represented by a method called 'platoon firing'.[15] Many historians have perceived it as 'a major factor in British success on the battlefield'.[16] In contrast, the role of edged weaponry and hand-to-hand combat in English infantry tactics has been relatively neglected. David Chandler wrote that 'in the 1690s it became rare for infantry to fight hand-to-hand with their opponents, although there were of course notable exceptions'.[17] Likewise, Blackmore argued that during the Nine Years' War, the English army abandoned the 'infantry assault following close-range fire' and that marked 'a significant difference between the tactical methods of the Nine Years War and those of the English Civil War and the campaigns following the Restoration of 1660'.[18]

If that were the case, it could indeed be called a radical change. Whether such a change really occurred on the field of battle and, if so, whether the change made the English army more successful, is the focus of the next section of this chapter. The current section confines itself to the doctrinal issue in this regard.

The first official manual published after the 1685 manual is somewhat ambiguous on this matter. The drill book, *The Exercise of the Foot with the Evolutions*, was published in 1690. It was reprinted in 1693, and this edition included General Hugh Mackay's *The Rules To be Observed by the Body of Infantry…. Encountering with the Enemy in the day of Battel*. Mackay commanded the Williamite army at the Battle of Killiecrankie (1689) and also fought in many other battles. Therefore, it can be assumed that his work reflects his experience of the realities of combat during this period.

The drill manual itself mostly concerns itself with how to handle muskets and

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[15] See, for example, Chandler, *The Art of Warfare*, pp. 75–81.
[16] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 36.
[17] Chandler, *Art of Warfare*, p. 111.
[18] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 66.

pikes, essentially similar to the previous period. Nevertheless, it does show that the pike drill was an important part of the military exercise for the English army during this period, despite the adoption of the plug bayonet. More important, of course, is Mackay's *The Rules*. It is clear that when Mackay wrote this short instruction, the pike was still being used in the English army alongside the bayonet. Moreover, it is evident that the pikemen were still counted as an important part of the army because Mackay recommended, as in the 1676 manual, that 'the colonels, or the commander of the Regiments Post being the Head of the Pikes'.[19]

  As previously mentioned, Blackmore argued that the English infantry had abandoned its 'rapid assault' tactics of the Civil War era. He cites article XVIII of Mackay's rule as evidence of this. Mackay wrote:

> If by a resolute continuance and close fire, the Battalion happen to break the opposite enemy, the Officers must take special care their men do not break after them, but content themselves to make the Granadeers fire amongst them to augment their Terrour and Confusion.[20]

Judging from this passage, it appears that the emphasis was indeed on breaking the enemy formation with firepower. Nevertheless, Mackay did not ignore completely the possibility that the firepower might fail to break the enemy formation:

> That such Regiments as are provided of good bayonets, fixt without the muzzles of their Pieces, may in approaching to the due distance of firing, cause the first rank of the whole Battalion to fix their Bayonets and continuing their march till they close upon the Enemy, make the first rank kneel with the points of their Bayonets upon the Ground, and the other two Ranks closed up, fire over their heads upon the Enemy, who supposing readily all the fire spent, if he happen to stand it, will come upon the bolder to your Battalion, who receiving him with the first Rank, second with the push of pike and Bayonet,

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[19] Major General Hugh Mackay, '*The Rules To be Observed by the Body of Infantry…. Encountering with the Enemy in the day of Battel*'. in *The Exercise of the Foot with the Evolutions, With the Rules of War in the day of Battel, when Encountering with the Enemy* (Edinburgh, 1693), Article XV.
[20] *Ibid.*, Article XIII.

will readily break him whether horse or Foot.[21]

Blackmore interpreted the quoted passage as an example of the bayonet being used as a defensive weapon, rather than an offensive one.[22] However, whether Mackay intended the role of bayonet and pike to be purely defensive is dubious. Indeed, in the passage quoted above, the English infantry was expected to wait and prompt the enemy to attack. Then, the first rank of the English infantry was to give fire, and the second rank was expected to break the enemy with 'the Push of pike and Bayonet'.[23] The more natural interpretation is that the 'breaking of the enemy' includes an offensive or aggressive use of cold steel. In either case, an important fact often ignored is that Mackay considered the occasion of hand-to-hand combat to be a real possibility. If he wrote this article after his defeat at Killiecrankie, the experience certainly would have taught him that firepower was frequently insufficient to stop a determined assault by a fast-moving infantry armed with cold steel.

However, it does seem that the doctrine of English infantry tactics was, as Blackmore argued, becoming less aggressive in the post-1688 period, at least in theory. As previously observed, Mackay forbade breaking formation to pursue the routed enemy. General James Douglass, in an unpublished manual, expressed a similar opinion:

> For now, in our modern way of fighting viz: by platouns alternativly firing, it is
> not aloud ye Infantry to fall in pell mell amongst any troups in confusion, least
> therby they bring themselves in to ane equall disadvantage an so change the
> smyles of fortune in to frouns and threats of loss, therfor whatever confusion
> ye Enemy may be in the Infantry ar not to brake ther Ranks to persheu…[24]

Blackmore cited this passage to support his argument that the English army had abandoned its assault tactic.[25] It indeed appears true that the expected role for English

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[21] *Ibid.*, Article XVII.
[22] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 68.
[23] *Ibid.*, Article XVII.
[24] BL Add MS 27892, Brig. General James Douglass, *Schola Martis, or the Art of War*, f. 253.
[25] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 67.

infantry during this time was shifting towards providing firepower. The instruction from Mackay and Douglass that the infantry must not break formation to pursue the enemy is in stark contrast to Turner's instruction that 'if any part of an army get Victory of those who stand against it, he who commands that part, ought to send some Troops in pursuit of the routed Enemy, and with the rest fall on the Flank of that Batallion which stands next him, and yet keeps ground'.[26]

In other words, the tactics of English infantry became more static and reactive compared to pre-1688 tactics: instead of assaulting the enemy formation and engaging hand-to-hand, they were expected to fire against the attacking enemy and then counter-attack. Blackmore argued that this change was due to the English infantry's ability to present a 'sustainable fire', made possible by platoon firing.[27] However, whether this more firepower-oriented tactic brought success to the English army in the field of battle remains to be determined, and it is this that is the main focus of the second part of this chapter. Furthermore, despite the obvious change of tactics, it is hard to call such a tactical development among the English infantry a radical departure from the past. As has been observed, the prospect of hand-to-hand combat was still very real and edged weapons, whether pike or bayonet, was still valued. In addition, the most fundamental mechanics of combat were, in theory, largely untouched. Before and after 1688, the English infantry was instructed to disrupt the enemy formation with musket fire as best it could and, if necessary, overcome the enemy through hand-to-hand combat.

1.3.   Military Theories in Late Seventeenth-Century England: The Question of Conservatism

Naturally, military doctrines, especially those related to combat, are heavily influenced by military theories that reflect the dominant military culture of the period. This theory can best be observed from the genre that Ira Gruber referred as the 'art of war'.[28] Despite the tactical change discussed in the previous section, the books on the art of

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[26] Turner, *Pallas Armata*, p. 306.
[27] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 67.
[28] Gruber, *Books and the British Army*, pp. 11–12.

war most commonly read by English officers after 1688 were identical to those available before 1688, namely, Orrery's *A Treatise of the Art of War* and Turner's *Pallas Armata*.[29] Older material, such as Richard Elton's *Complete Body of the Art of Military* (1650), was also part of the reading list.[30] Because Elton's work has already been examined in the previous chapter, the current section focuses on Orrery and Turner.

As previously mentioned, some historians have judged the theories of Orrery and Turner as conservative, in so far as this concept is helpful.[31] At first glance, these works do indeed appear conservative, occasionally even reactionary. As observed in the previous section, Orrery and Turner both placed a clear emphasis on edged weapons and hand-to-hand combat. However, there is a conundrum: when the English army was shifting its tactics in a more firepower-oriented direction – thus, more 'modern' or 'progressive' to those who equate gunpowder with modernity – the books that the officers were reading were oriented toward the past. To solve this dilemma, it is necessary to examine closely whether these books and the ideas in them were indeed conservative.

To examine military works and military theories during this period properly, it must be understood that the ancient histories and classics were still widely respected as the source of practical lessons during this period, as they had been in the previous period and would continue to be in the eighteenth century. Like many of their predecessors who wrote about the art of war, Orrery and Turner began their study of it with ancient Greek and Roman warfare.

For Orrery, the ancient soldiers certainly provided an ideal to follow for any 'modern' army. The following passage clearly indicates his admiration for ancient military discipline:

> Neither the Greek, nor the Romans, had stronger, or more vigorous bodies
> than we; and yet their Foot marched in Armor in hot Climates with large Targets,
> heavy Swords, and carried also two Missile Weapons; whereas our Soldiers

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[29] John Childs, *The Nine Years' War and the British Army, 1688-1697: The Operations in the Low Countries* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), p. 83.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] Childs*, The Army of Charles II*, p. 63.

think the Pike or the Musket (often without Swords, always without Armor) to be a Load, which only proceeds from our Relaxing the Military Discipline; which is not only a Reproach to us, but also a great Prejudice.[32]

His respect for the ancient example, however, was not uncritical acceptance of classical authority. He understood that both the combat and the weaponry of his day were 'very different from what was practis'd by the Greeks, and Romans'.[33] He also knew that firepower was driving this change. Nevertheless, he believed that:

> though the use of all Fire-Arms and of Cannon, were Intirely unknown to them, which has much alter'd the manner of making War … yet as to the Main, we owe to them most of our Knowledge: And the Difference seems Little more, t[h]an between Old-fashion'd Plate, hammer'd into New; wherethough the Form is chang'd, yet the Substance remains.[34]

Therefore, like many of the authors examined in the previous chapter, Orrery was attempting to synthesise the timeless lessons from antiquity with the new realities of the early modern battlefield.

It is undeniable that the pike was Orrery's preferred weapon; he described the pikes of the ancient Greek army as 'the very best offensive Arms either to Charge, or to Defend, and of excellent use against Horse'.[35] In the same spirit, Orrery lamented the growing tendency in his time to reduce pikemen:

> Our Foot Soldiers generally are two thirds Shot, and one third Pikes, which I have often lamented; for methinks the Pikes should be at least half, especially in His Majesties Dominions in which are few strong places, and consequently Battles, and Fightings in the Field, are more common than Sieges; and without dispute, the Pike is the usefullest Weapon for the foot.[36]

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[32] Orrery, *A Treatise of the Art of War*, p. 24.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 23.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

Thus, Orrery argued for more pikes and fewer shots.[37] The ratio of 2:1 between musketeers and pikemen became the norm during the Civil War, and Orrery's argument indeed appears to go against the general trend of his time.

However, it must be acknowledged that those who argued for more pikemen – Orrery, Turner and Monck – were all combat veterans of the Civil War. They were not armchair generals, and their military ideas were all grounded in their combat experience. Therefore, even if their argument for more pikemen was not accepted, it cannot be discarded simply as anachronistic nostalgia. Above all, Orrery had his own rationale for his advocacy of more pikemen. In the passage quoted above, he reasons that there were only a few strongly fortified places in the British Isles, and therefore a higher probability of field battles than pitched battles on the home front. Indeed, there were very few modern fortifications in England during the Civil War.[38] Although Orrery's claim that battles were more frequent than protracted sieges might be an exaggeration, battles (both large-scale and small) were frequent enough during the war, and once a battle took place, the pikemen played a very important role, as observed in the previous chapter.

Another reason given by Orrery was his own experience of action in Ireland in 1651. He claimed that, in a battle he commanded against the Irish (the Battle of Knocknaclashy), he experienced the 'goodness of Pikes'.[39] Although he was victorious, his army faced a serious threat from the charge of Irish pikemen during the battle. As with Mackay after Killiecrankie, such experience would have been sufficient reason for him to emphasise the worth of the close-combat weapon.

Besides, Orrery did not completely ignore the importance of firearms; what he argued for was the effectiveness of pikemen 'assisted by Shot'. In addition, Orrery advocated the adoption of the flintlock musket in place of the old matchlock musket. All these considerations suggest that he was far from a mere reactionary in military affairs.

James Turner, like Orrery, also believed there was much to learn from the

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[37] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[38] Parker, *The Military Revolution*, p. 28.
[39] Orrery, *A Treatise of the Art of War*, p. 25.

ancient examples. In his work, *Pallas Armata*, Turner compared early modern armies directly with the ancient Macedonian Phalanx,[40] arguing for the basic similarities between them:

> Our Batallions of Pikes in the Modern Wars would resemble the *Grecian* heavy armed Phalange of Foot, if they were as well arm'd for the defensive as they should be, and as they were one hundred years ago. … I say, that our Infantry of Mukqueteers and Pike-men (if they be well arm'd for the Defensive) resembles the Grecian heavy and light armed Foot, and so do our Cuirassiers and Light Horse represent their Cataphracts and light armed Horse.[41]

Similar arms indicate similar mechanics of combat. In that sense, there were inherent similarities between ancient armies and early modern armies. Therefore, in Turner's eyes, the lessons from classical antiquity were valid for the battles of his own day.

However, it must be emphasised that Turner did not note the continuity alone. He was also well aware of the differences between the warfare of his own age and those of ancient times:

> If I should date the age of the Modern Art of War from the time that Gunpowder was invented, I might perhaps hit right enough at its age, because no doubt Gunpowder made a great alteration on the whole face and body of war.[42]

Thus, it seems that Turner well understood the change brought about by firepower and its growing importance in battle. At the same time, it is equally true that Turner passionately advocated for the importance of the pike, which he referred as 'the Prince of Weapons'.[43] As observed in the previous chapter, one of the harshest critics of the pike in seventeenth-century Britain was Donald Lupton. Turner was Lupton's exact opposite. In fact, Turner devoted an entire chapter of his book to refuting Lupton's

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[40] Turner, *Pallas Armata*, pp. 28–31.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 158.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

claim and to asserting the usefulness of pike.[44] To Lupton's argument that the pike should be discarded completely or, if not possible, then at least all pikemen should be trained to use the musket, Turner answered, a little sarcastically, that:

> We shall be good friends; for he desired if the Pike be not altogether abandon'd, that all who carry it may be taught the use of the Muskquet likewise: and this shall be my hearty desire likewise, provided that all Musqueteers may be taught the use of the pike also, for I conceive it to be very fit, that every Soldier be so train'd, that he may as occasion offers, be ready to make use of both weapons. And for this I hope no discreet Commander will fall out with either Master Lupton, or me.[45]

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, Lupton's argument might appear more 'modern' than Turner's for many present-day readers. Turner's attachment to traditional weapons, on the contrary, might seem reactionary to those familiar with the teleological narrative of the 'triumph of gunpowder'. However, considering that Lupton's seemingly 'modern' argument in fact contains many significant flaws, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, and also considering that Turner and other advocates of the pike in fact never neglected the role of firepower in battle, such a simplistic dichotomy cannot stand. In fact, given his personal background, Turner was a most unlikely person to be considered a military reactionary: he had served in King Gustav Adolph's Swedish army during the Thirty Years' War, an army praised as the paragon of the 'military revolution' by Roberts and many other scholars.[46]

As with Orrery, Turner was not without reasons in his defence of the pike. Like all the authors examined so far, Turner's logic must have been formed from his own experience and knowledge of the realities of combat in his time. He argued that:

> I have seen many weak Regiments composed meerly of Musquetiers, without

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[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 178–186.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 186.
[46] Roberts, 'The Military Revolution, 1560-1660', 13–15. Showalter and Astore, *Soldiers' Lives Through History*, pp. 61–63. See also the historiographical analysis in the Introduction.

one Pikeman in any of them, and surely they were so much weaker for that.[47]

Certainly, the use of pike was gradually declining in many European armies, for a variety of reasons, and Turner clearly knew it. He also understood that the occasions of actual clash between opposing pikemen in battle were limited. However, the important thing for Turner was that the possibility for such clashes was ever-present in battle:

> It is true, the business very oft comes not to push of Pike, but it hath, and may come oft to it, and then Pike-men are very serviceable.[48]

This was one of the most important reasons why many officers, from Monck to Mackay, defended the importance of traditional edged weapons. Seventeenth-century battlefields were full of unpredictable variables. Even if the combat doctrine was changed to a more firepower-oriented approach, many factors, such as weather or ground, made hand-to-hand combat inevitable. The nature of linear battle, often fought at extremely close range, made the possibility of the occurrence of hand-to-hand combat even more real. All this considered, there were sound reasons for commanders to retain the means to fight hand-to-hand combat effectively, even if it might have reduced the maximum firepower the army could produce.

Turner certainly was aware of the complicated nature of battle. As examined in the previous chapter, Turner examined Polybius' famous comparison of the Macedonian phalanx and the Roman legion. His analysis shows that Turner knew the strength and weakness of a pike block, although he argued that a pike-armed phalanx still had an important advantage over a Roman legion armed with the short sword.[49] What is notable in this chapter, however, is not his defence of the strength of the pike phalanx, but rather his conclusion that Roman victory over Macedonia did not mean the Roman art of war or the legionary equipment were inherently superior to those of the Macedonians.[50] As examined in detail in the previous chapter, Turner attributed it

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[47] Turner, *Pallas Armata*, p. 177.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 365.
[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 150–155.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

to the divine providence.[51] Although providence was a religious language, it was at the same time a relevant term for a military man to use to describe the uncertainties of battle. Turner's theories on combat and weapons must have been based on such in-depth understanding of the unpredictable nature of battle.

To conclude, the tactical development of the English infantry during the late seventeenth century shows elements of both change and continuity. Before 1688, the tactical doctrine that was formed during the Civil War – the aggressive charge following a short volley – was maintained. Consequently, the pike and other edged weapons were greatly valued in tactical manuals. After 1688, infantry tactics became more static, and methods of delivering effective firepower began to receive more attention. Nevertheless, there was no sudden, radical departure from the former doctrine. The pike was slow to disappear, and hand-to-hand combat was still a major concern of the officers.

Such changes and continuities are reflected in the books on the art of war that were most widely read during this period. The authors of those books by no means neglected the role of firepower in battle or the changed nature of modern warfare due to the development of new weaponry. Nevertheless, they tried to incorporate these changes into the existing tactical culture, which was mostly built on the legacies of classical antiquity. These authors also strongly believed in the value of pike and argued for the retention – or even the increased use – of this ancient weapon. However, their argument was not a product of mere conservatism, but rather of their own experience and contemplation of the realities of combat in their day.

Indeed, without the benefit of hindsight, it was extremely difficult for these authors to predict how warfare and the mechanics of combat would have developed. This was a time of confusing changes in military affairs. The size of the 'typical' army was growing rapidly, whereas the weaponry was slowly transforming from 'pike and shot' to 'bayonet and shot'. The new weapons and techniques were introduced but, as is more clearly demonstrated in the next part of the chapter, the novelty was not sufficiently strong to neutralise the old tactics completely. In such circumstances, it was only natural for military theorists and officers to be cautious. In this sense, tactical

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[51] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

doctrine and military theories in late seventeenth-century England were neither conservative nor reactionary, as has often been claimed, but prudent.

Nevertheless, an important change occurred. Rather than completely transforming its doctrine, the English army began to experiment with new tactics designed to damage the enemy by firepower rather than aggressive charge. The next section examines the several key battles during this period to discover the result of these new tactics.

2. The Realities of Battle: The Mechanics of Infantry Combat in the Late Seventeenth Century

This second part of the chapter attempts to reconstruct the realities of infantry combat during the late seventeenth century. It was a period of constant warfare, small and large, in which the English armies engaged in battle in many different places, such as Africa, the British Isles and Continental Europe. They fought different kinds of enemies, including the Moors, the Irish and Scottish Jacobites, and the French. Although trained according to the same doctrine and born into the same military culture as that examined in the first part of the chapter, the troops who fought these battles did so under significantly different conditions. In other words, this period presents ample case studies of the elements which affect the mechanics and experiences of combat.

Therefore, the aim of this section is to discover the elements that shaped the form of combat during this period by focusing on several different battles. It attempts to discern whether there was a significant change in the basic mechanics of combat, in comparison with the previous period. Ultimately, it aims to demonstrate that, even during this period, which is often labelled as a transition period from the 'pike and shot' to the more firepower-oriented tactics, the mechanics of combat evolved gradually, and the 'face of battle' was decided by a multitude of complicated factors rather than by gunpowder alone.

2.1. The Late Stuart Army in Combat

As previously examined, many historians have argued that the English army before 1688 was conservative and amateur, and real change came only with the Dutch influence in the form of the 'Glorious Revolution'. The army's weapons and equipment were basically unchanged since the days of the Civil War, and its 'drills and tactics were much the same'.[52] Furthermore, its doctrine was 'steeped in heritage and the lessons of England's own little wars'.[53] Recently, however, the restored Stuart monarchy has begun to be acknowledged for its military capability and its significant place in the development of the British army.[54] However, the remain tendencies to see the reign of William III as a time of tactical improvement, in stark contrast to the pre-1688 period.[55] It is often assumed that the post-1688 English army became more firepower-oriented in its tactical doctrine, mainly due to Dutch influence.[56]

Indeed, as already observed in the previous section, the fundamental doctrine of the late Stuart army displayed significant continuities from the days of the Civil War and thus might appear conservative. However, such continuities do not necessarily mean backwardness. In addition, we must question whether the late Stuart army was essentially a continuation of the Civil War army and whether the Williamite army after 1688 was indeed a radical departure from the past. Therefore, is necessary to examine the late Stuart army's actual records of battles and compare them with its doctrines before judging whether there was a significant improvement that can be attributed to the Glorious Revolution, especially a transformation into an army with a more firepower-oriented doctrine.

2.1.1. Late Stuart Army in the Continent and Tangier

Although the army of Charles II has not been an object of much attention in British military history, its experiences provide valuable case studies showing how the English army synthesised its traditional method of fighting with new experience gained on geographically and culturally diverse battlefields. The British Isles themselves, except

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[52] Childs, *The Army of Charles II*, p. 63.
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] Black, *Britain as a Military Power*, p. 271. For the most recent study, see Stephen Ede-Borrett, *The Army of James II, 1685-1688: The Birth of The British Army* (Solihul: Helion&C, 2017).
[55] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 55.
[56] Pádraig Lenihan, *1690 Battle of the Boyne* (Stroud: Tempus, 2003), p. 161.

for the Covenanter Uprising in Scotland, were free from war during this period, but the army was involved in various conflicts, both in Continental Europe and in Africa.

From 1662 to 1668, the English army was involved in the Portuguese Restoration War with Spain, and during the expedition, it performed impressively at the Battle of Ameixial (1663). Colonel James Apsley, who commanded the English force at the battle, described it thus:

> The English marched on shouting as if victorious, but discharged no shot till they came within push of pike of the enemy, and then they poured in their shot so thick upon them that made them quit their ground and fly towards the left wing, leaving their canon behind them, which were afterwards turned upon them, much to their prejudice. Notwithstanding the rich baggages and coaches and wealthy plunder which were on top of the hill—the English seeing the field not cleared—there was not one man of them stirred out of his rank, but kept close serried together to prevent any second onset, which immediately followed for they were assaulted front, flank and rear by divers of the enemy's troops of horse, but having their fire ready at all hands, they quickly quitted themselves of those troops. This was performed rather with an absolute resolution than any conduct or order, for after soldiers had serried themselves close no officer's voice could be heard, but each soldier would give the word of command either as they saw or feared their enemy, but all this while a man could not but joy to see so vivid a courage and so firm a resolution as was in every common soldier to die by one another.[57]

Blackmore observed that this passage 'offers nothing new in terms of combat doctrine for English infantry' other than the fact that the 'infantry fire is delivered at a typically close range and a counter-attack by cavalry is driven off in typical fashion'.[58]

Nevertheless, the description of the battle reveals several important characteristics of the English army during this period. Firstly, the infantry demonstrated a remarkable degree of discipline. Not only were the soldiers able to refrain from firing

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[57] Historical Manuscripts Commission, *The Manuscripts of J. M. Heathcote, Esq* (London, 1899), p. 104.
[58] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 28.

their muskets until they advanced close to the enemy, but they were also able to restrain from plundering the enemy's baggage. This was in stark contrast to the early stages of the Civil War. Secondly, although they were able to disperse the enemy through firepower, the fact that they advanced within 'push of pike' suggests that they were willing to engage in hand-to-hand combat if necessary. Besides, we cannot rule out the possibility that it was this willingness expressed by the English aggressive charge, not just the thickness of English firepower, that contributed to the breakdown of Spanish morale in this instance. Thirdly, they did not panic when they were attacked by enemy cavalry from all directions. Instead, they formed a close-order formation and calmly repulsed the attack. All these factors suggest that a significant number of them were highly experienced, battle-hardened veterans.[59]

This, along with the other factors described above, was demonstrated in other battles of the war, most notably the Battle of Montes Claros (1665). The English infantry faced the Swiss infantry, under Spanish service, well-known for their reputation in close combat since the fifteenth century. The English employed their usual tactic of approaching close to the enemy, firing a few volleys, and then charging with pikes and clubbed muskets. At Montes Claros, unlike at Ameixial, the enemy infantry did not run away and, therefore, a fierce, close combat ensued. According to a contemporary account, the fighting between the two opposing infantry lines raged around a stone well:

And the two commanders Ingaging one another with their Pikes, the Switzer had the Honour to kill Mr. Shelton, Lieutenant-Colonel to Count *Schomberg*s Regiment of Infantry; upon which Major *Maire* generously, to revenge the Death of his Commandant, attacking likewise the *Switzer* with his Pike, and overthrowing him with such a Blow as the other had giv'n Lieutenant Colonel

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[59] As John Childs observed, there were huge pools of disbanded old Cromwellian veterans during this period. Childs, *The Army of Charles II,* p. 22. In addition, some efforts were taken to recruit former Cromwellian veterans to form the expeditionary force to Portugal. Although, as Jonathan Riley noted, not all of the soldiers enlisted were veterans, and the veterans who did reenlist must have 'grown used to peace.' Nevertheless, the large numbers of the army saw action before and thus must have been more ready to cope with the conditions of battle. Jonathan Riley, *The Lat Ironsides: The English Expedition to Portugal 1662-1668* (Solihul: Helion & Company 2014), pp. 42–49.

Shelton, made them equal in their Fate as in their Courage.[60]

This is a very rare text which vividly shows what close infantry combat in the late seventeenth century was like. Pikes, far from becoming useless as an infantry shock weapon as some historians have argued, were here employed by two opposing infantry lines to great effect. In addition, the passage suggests that this combat was bloody, producing casualties among officers. It is worth recalling that various speculations about the mechanics of pike combat have already been examined in the previous chapter. Among these models, both the relatively bloodless 'fencing at spear point' model and 'rugby scrum' model do not fit with the description of combat at Montes Claros. It is clear that, in this battle, at least some of the combatants genuinely tried to kill their opponents with their pikes. It also strongly suggests that the infantrymen involved in this combat were determined and experienced fighters.

Tactically, these battles show that the infantry combat doctrine formed in the experiences of the Civil War was still valid. The possibility of hand-to-hand combat was still real and, therefore, the need for pike and other close combat weapons was just as strong as before.

However, the combat doctrine familiar to English army soon faced another test, against an army trained in a significantly different method of fighting. In 1661, Tangier was ceded to England by Portugal as a dowry to the English crown. The English garrison subsequently installed at Tangier, however, soon faced an attack by the Moroccan chief, Abn Allah Ghailan.[61] Although Childs referred to the garrison as 'an unholy and impossible mixture of ex–New Modellers, old royalists and Irish Roman Catholics', that at least means that many of them were not without a certain level of combat experience.[62] If, however, the combat doctrine and organisation of the English army had not significantly altered since the Civil War, then the doctrine and organisation of their Moorish counterparts in Tangier could hardly have been called more 'modern'. The Moorish army was, as Childs described, fundamentally a 'feudal'

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[60] Sieur d'Ablancourt, *Memoirs of the Sieur D'Ablancourt. Containing a General History of the Court and Kingdom of Portugal, ... Translated from the French Copy, Printed at Paris, 1701* (London, 1703), p. 164.
[61] John Childs, *General Percy Kirke and the Later Stuart Army* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 31.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

host, a significant portion of whom were armed with conventional lance and scimitars.[63] Nevertheless, it was a formidable fighting force, and the English observers were well aware of the Moorish army's strength. Despite some derogatory remarks made about their lack of European military structure and discipline, there was widespread fear of the Moorish army.[64] Therefore, the situation at Tangier was more complicated than that of a 'modern' army with superior weapon and discipline having a definite advantage over a 'pre-modern' army.

As it turns out, the English army suffered a shocking defeat at the hands of the Moors. In 1664, the small English force (about 500) under the command of Andrew Rutherfold, Earl of Teviot, was trapped by a large Moorish army. The contemporary account reported that the English were all infantry, whereas the Moorish army consisted of both horse and foot.[65] Another contemporary report confirmed this:

> The Governor of Tangier's death with 33 of his best officers, and 500 of his
> Soldiers is confirmed. It was a very great miscariage in so great a Soldier to go
> a League from Town without Horse or Pike;[66]

What is interesting here is the suggestion that Teviot went into this expedition without pikemen. The passage implies that the lack of horse and pike was the cause of Teviot's defeat. Another account supports this:

> If they have had successes against us, it is through our weakness and
> unpreparedness. We have marched against them onely with Muskets and
> Swords, and they have come against us with Horse and Launce: before our
> Men had time to discharge their Muskets, the Horse and the Launce had
> disordered our Men, broken their Ranks, and cut them all to pieces on a sudden.

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[63] Childs, *The Army of Charles II,* pp. 135–140. The Moorish army's feudal character was also noticed by an English observer, who reported that there was 'little or no standing army' and the army was 'made up of their several Divisions, or Companies of *Arabs* scattered about, who know their distinct Monkadems or Colonels under whom they are to fight'. Anon, *The Present Interest of Tangier* (London, 1679), p. 3.
[64] Anon, *The Present Interest of Tangier*, pp. 3–4.
[65] NA CO279/3, ff. 36.
[66] Richard Fanshaw, *Original Letters of his Excellency Sir Richard Fanshaw, During his Embassies in Spain and Portugal* (London, 1702), p. 103.

Had we a wall of Pikes to oppose against them, lined with Muskets, all the Horse of Barbary could do us no mischief, and we might safely march through the Country.[67]

Certainly, this anonymous author's remark must not be accepted at face value, considering that, as Karim Bejjit observed, the author had a clear political agenda in writing this document.[68] Nevertheless, it at least provides some evidence as to the importance his contemporaries attributed to the pike.

The more crucial point is that the English army under Teviot was not defeated because its tactical doctrine or equipment was 'backward'. As mentioned previously, there was nothing inherently more 'modern' in Moorish lance and scimitars than in English muskets and swords. Nor was Teviot defeated by a lack of ability to fight hand-to-hand, for we have already observed that the English soldiers during this period were perfectly capable of close combat. The most fundamental reason for this defeat was the fact that they were ambushed by a superior number of the enemy on disadvantageous ground. The military treatises and manuals examined in the previous section focus mostly on either pitched battle on open ground, small scale skirmish by musketeers, or siege warfare. Confused and unexpected *mêlée* was not the situation the English soldiers were principally trained for.[69] Of course, it is worth remembering that Teviot's defeat was not the only occasion that a well-armed and disciplined European army, forced to fight in inhospitable terrain, was defeated by an indigenous foe employing unfamiliar tactics: the eighteenth and nineteenth century colonial wars provide numerous parallels, the Battle of Isandlwana (1879) being one of the most typical examples.

In contrast, the English army proved far more successful when they, not the enemy, dictated tactics, as Childs observed.[70] On 27 October, 1680, the English garrison under the command of Edward Sackville sallied forth against the besieging

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[67] Anon, *The Present Interest in Tangier*, p. 3.
[68] Karim Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts on Tangier 1661-1684: Imperialism and Politics of Resistance* (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 147.
[69] Anon, *The Present Interest in Tangier*, p. 3. The author criticised how the English army and its commanding officers were ignorant enough to be rued into the fight in a condition advantageous to the Moorish army.
[70] Childs, *General Percy Kirke*, p. 36.

Moors. This time, the English were able to form a battle line in textbook fashion, through which they could maximise their strength.[71] Sir James Halket, then major in one of the regiments in Tangier, emphasised the difference between the English and the Moors in their preparation for battle:

> All the Troops were very near form'd in Battalia, as was designed, with a great silence …….... The Enemy from their place at Arms, with hideous cry and noise, and fireing of small shot upon us, gave the Allarum immediately to their Camp.[72]

Here, the English silence represents a stark contrast to the Moor's noisiness and conveys the impression of English discipline.

What follows was an English assault upon the Moorish trenches. This is a little difficult to reconstruct, as the sources do not provide very detailed accounts. Nevertheless, with careful preparation, it can be concluded that the English moved in text-book fashion, unlike previous times where they surrendered the initiative to the Moors.[73] At the forefront of the English attack were the grenadiers. As observed in the first section of this chapter, the official manual published in 1676 did not mention grenadiers. The 1685 manual did describe how the grenadiers should perform in combat and, although it was five years after the battle, it is unlikely that the grenadiers in 1680 would have fought in a significantly different manner:

> The Plotton of the Battalion of Guards, commanded by Captain Fortney and Lieutenant Mackracken, with the half of the Company of Granadeers ……. with the other half of the Company of Granadeers, were ordered by Colonel Sackville to go and attack the place of Arms, where the Moors Cannon was, which they did with great courage and resolution. The enemy being numerous in that place, stood firmly and defended themselves for a long time, till at last

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[71] *Ibid.*

[72] Sir James Halket, *A Full and True Relation of the Fortunate Victory Gained Over the Moors by the Garrison of Tangier* (London, 1680), p. 1.

[73] Sir James Halket, 'The Diary of Sir James Halkett', in *Journal of Army Historical Research*, *Vol. 1, Special Publication No. 1* ed. by H. M. McCance, (Sheffield: Sir W. C. Leng & Co, 1922), pp. 14–15.

Lieutenant Mackracken, with his Granadeers, advancing up very near to their Trench, and bestowing the Granades liberally amongst them, they began to be in Confusion, and surprised at the execution the Granadeers made amongst them; Whereupon, he with Granadeers, leapt into their Trench amongst them, ..., with the rest of the Granadeers, where they all behaved very valiantly, and beat the Enemy from that place, and made themselves master of that piece of Cannon of the Enemies, that was there, with the loss of several Granadeers and good Souldiers[74]

The action described in this passage certainly bears a strong resemblance to the description of the 1685 manual, which commanded that they 'are to deliver Granado's, And immediately to fix their Daggers in their Firelocks. And when the Musketiers club their Muskets and Fall on, They are to Charge with their Daggers as aforesaid'.[75]

Whether the grenadiers in Tangier were armed with bayonets, as described in the 1685 manual, is uncertain, as Halket's account does not mention it. It is nevertheless certainly possible, considering that, as Childs noted, the earliest mention of bayonet in England is in 1678, and it became regular equipment for a grenadier company.[76] If so, the bayonet would have been more effective as an infantry combat weapon in trench than a 16-foot-long pike.

What is certain is that there was no radical break from the past in the mechanics of combat for English infantry in this battle, despite the presence of grenadiers and possibly a new weapon. The basic principle was to 'soften' the enemy by firepower before contact, and then to complete its destruction through close combat. Halket's report that the English suffered several casualties during the fight for the enemy trenches indicates that the Moors, although shaken by the grenades, did not simply run away. This in turn implies that it required hand-to-hand combat to finally overcome them and capture the trenches. The rest of the battle followed a similar pattern.

Childs described this success as demonstrating that the 'British discipline and

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[74] Halket, *A Full and True Relation*, pp. 1–2.
[75] *An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline* (London, 1685), pp. 128–129.
[76] Childs, *The Army of Charles II,* pp. 61–62.

firepower were usually decisive in the open field'.[77] It is certainly true that the Tangier garrison displayed a remarkable degree of discipline. However, we should exercise caution before also reaching a verdict that firepower was the most decisive element in this battle. As examined so far, many parts of the battle consisted of clashes over trenches and siege works. Once the attacking English soldiers 'leapt into' the trenches, their superior firepower would have meant little in such confined spaces, and the English willingness to 'leap into' the trenches and to engage hand-to-hand with their Moorish opponents should be considered equally decisive as the firepower. The close combat in the trenches must have been a horrible experience for the combatants, as the casualty list provided by Halket indicates. The fact that most of the English soldiers carried out this tough task 'very valiantly', according to Halket, and finally met with significant success, strongly bespeaks a confidence in their method of fighting as well as the effectiveness of English combat doctrine at that time.

Ultimately, battlefield success was made possible by an English doctrine that emphasised both firepower and hand-to-hand combat, its correct application following careful planning (unlike Teviot's action, which brought disaster), and the discipline and determination of the English soldiers. There is nothing really new in these, as they are part of the most fundamental military principles, unchanged throughout history. In other words, it was observing these basic rules faithfully, rather than any novel or 'modern' technology and equipment, which proved decisive.

2.1.2. The Battle of Sedgemoor (1685)

Despite several setbacks, its combat performance in Tangier and Europe proved that the late Stuart army was a generally efficient fighting force: its combat doctrine proved generally effective rather than backward. It is necessary, then, to examine the army of James II in combat. Such an examination enables a truly meaningful comparison to be made with the army of William III as well as an assessment of the real significance of the changes in military affairs brought about by the Glorious Revolution.

James II's role in creating the first professional standing army in Britain has recently been acknowledged by historians.[78] Its baptism under fire came when the

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[77] Childs, *General Percy Kirke*, p. 36.
[78] See, for example, John Childs, *The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution* (Manchester:

Duke of Monmouth landed in Britain to claim James II's crown in 1685. At first glance, the result of the clash between Monmouth's army and the royal troops appears inevitable. Considering the inferiority in firepower of Monmouth's rebel army, many of whom were armed with scythe (hence the popular name of the 'pitchfork rebellion'), the victory of the royal troops seems almost pre-destined. However, a close examination of the battle tells us much more about the mechanics of combat and victory during this period.

Monmouth was a reasonably experienced commander and no stranger to the most up-to-date knowledge of warfare on the European continent. He had fought in the Third Anglo-Dutch War as part of the French army and earned certain distinction as a soldier.[79] Thus, it is unlikely that he simply believed his force could easily beat the much better-armed royal force. Rather, he must have pondered as to how best he could negate his enemy's main strength in firepower while maximising the fighting capacity of his own force. The best solution for him was a surprise night attack.[80]

Nevertheless, it must be noted that even had the plan succeeded, there was no guarantee that Monmouth's troops would have beaten the royal forces in hand-to-hand combat. Indeed, we can speculate that well trained and organised royal army may have also had an upper hand in pike combat. However, in a frenzied *mêlée*, even an inexperienced mob could be effective, especially if they were sufficiently devoted to their Protestant cause. The nature of the Monmouth Rebellion suggests that many of Monmouth's men were politically and ideologically motivated. Many who joined his army were tradesmen from towns and cities, gentlemen or sons of Cromwellian veterans (although not the veterans themselves, who by then were too old to be combatants), not ignorant peasants as the popular epithet 'Pitchfork Rebellion' suggests.[81] Such ideologically committed men might be able to overcome the stress and fear of close combat. In addition, as Childs observed, a scythe could be a highly effective weapon in close combat.[82] Scythe, unlike pike, is a slashing weapon and, since the Battle of Flodden (1513), the English soldiers had rarely seen the slashing

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Manchester University Press, 1980), and, more recently, Ede-Borrett, *The Army of James II, 1685-1688*.
[79] Childs, *General Percy Kirke*, pp. 15–19.
[80] John Evelyn, *The Diary of John Evelyn*, Vol 3 (London: Macmillan, 1906), p. 167.
[81] W. MacDonald Wigfield*, The Monmouth Rebellion: A Social History* (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1980), pp. 34–37.
[82] Childs, *General Percy Kirke*, p. 93.

pole-arm in battle. Such novelty itself could have inspired fear among the royal troops. Indeed, some soldiers of James II' army feared the weapons wielded by Monmouth's army, calling them as 'severall cruell and New invented murthering Weapons as *Sithes* and ye like'.[83]

Therefore, Monmouth had some evidence to expect that his makeshift army would prove effective in close combat, if only he could succeed in bringing them into close quarters with the enemy. One eye-witness account indicates that Monmouth and his officers were confident in this regard, and well aware that it was, in fact, their only possible choice:

> He called the feild officers together and demaunded of them f they thought it advisable to fight if we could surprize them in the night; they all agreed it was; provided it was provided the foot did not entrench, upon which he sent back the spye that brought him the accompt to see if they entrenched or not, who brought answer that they did not, but tooke no notice of the ditch that lay in the way of our march.[84]

Clearly, Monmouth and his officers believed that, as long as the battle was not a costly attack against a well-entrenched enemy, they had an ample chance of success.

The main problem was that the night attack is among the most difficult tasks to accomplish for an inexperienced and under-trained army, however strongly motivated ideologically. Some who comprised Monmouth's army might have had some experience in militia, and it was certainly possible that many of them had handled weapons before. Nevertheless, acting as a unit requires a significant amount of training together; yet this was what Monmouth's newly, and somewhat hastily, raised army most distinctively lacked.

The battlefield was relatively open ground, which added another disadvantage to the rebel army, which was greatly inferior in cavalry compared with the royal army.[85]

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[83] Adam Wheeler, *Iter Bellicosum: Adam Wheeler, His Account of 1685*, Camden Miscellany Vol. XII edited by Royal Historical Society (London, 1910), p. 160. Wheeler was a drummer in the Wiltshire Militia during the rebellion. Although the militia was not actually engaged at Sedgemoor, it seems there were ample stories and rumours about the rebel force's novel weaponry.
[84] BL, Harleian MS 6845, f. 281
[85] Glenn Foard and Richard Morris, *The Archaeology of English Battlefields: Conflicts in the Pre-*

As mentioned in the passage quoted above, a drainage ditch called Bussex Rhyne separated the Royal camp and Monmouth's army. Certainly, this would have caused some disruption to advancing horse and foot. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that it was a significant obstacle considering that it was, as Foard and Morris noted, relatively shallow.[86] The rebel cavalry approached the ditch but encountered the royal cavalry and was fired upon, and from that moment the element of surprise was lost. Monmouth's cavalry fled and Lt. Colonel Nathan Wade, who commanded the vanguard of Monmouth's infantry regiments, discovered the 'King's foote in order'.[87] Nevertheless, Monmouth's infantry fought on and, had they managed to turn the battle into a close-quartered *mêlée*, there could have been some, however slight, hope of success. Wade's account clarifies that this was the intention of Monmouth's army. However, this plan was also frustrated:

> By that time I had putt them in some order and was preparing to pass the ditch (not intending to fire till I had advanced these to our enemyes) Coll. Matthews was come up and began to fire at distance, upon which the Batalion I commanded fired likewise and after that I could not get them to advance.[88]

The original plan is not much different from official doctrine of the English infantry from the Civil War: Advancing close to the enemy without firing, and then charging in hand-to-hand combat after one or two volleys. As examined previously and in this chapter, the English army had been fighting in this fashion in the Civil War, at the Battle of the Dunes, and at Portugal. It had proved highly effective so far, and therefore there was nothing wrong with the plan of Monmouth's infantry at Sedgemoor.

The execution of the plan, however, required experienced and well-trained soldiers, such as the veterans who had fought at the previous mentioned battlefields. Monmouth's soldiers revealed the weakness of unexperienced troops: they stood still and engaged in a long-range firefight. As Adrian Goldsworthy observed in his study of the Ancient Roman army in combat, under extreme stress combatants have been

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Industrial Landscape (York: Council for British Archaeology, 2012), p. 114.
[86] *Ibid.*
[87] Harleian MS 6845, f. 281.
[88] *Ibid.*

'subject to the herd instinct' and tended to 'bunch together'.[89] Sedgemoor seems to have proved this theory correct, as Wade reported that he 'could not get them to advance'.

Monmouth's troops, with insufficient muskets and gunpowder, could not hope to win this match. However, as the Civil War battles examined in the previous chapter demonstrated, this kind of prolonged firefight was rarely decisive and, thus, they 'continued in that station firing for about an houre and an halfe, when, it being pretty light'.[90] The fight continued until finally, many of the rebel troops lost their will to fight. When they began to waver, the cavalry finished the work:

> I perceived all the Batalions on the left running (who as I since understood were broken by the King's horse of the left wing) and finding my own men not inclinable to stand, I caused them to face about and make a kind of disorderly retreat to ditch a great way behind us where wee were charged by a party of horse & dragoons & routed.[91]

This description by Wade matches the official account of the battle:

> The five Companies maintained the Fight against all the efforts of the Enemies, with the loss of a considerable number of men on both sides: At last the Dragoons came up to the Companies with one piece of Cannon and the General on the Head of them, encouraging and desiring them to Charge the Rebels, which they perform'd so vigorously, that they beat them into the middle of the plain Field[92]

The observation of the battle so far makes clear that Sedgemoor cannot simply be summarised as a victory of 'modern' firepower over primitive scythes, as the popular label 'Pitchfork Rebellion' suggests. As described, it was a failure of Monmouth's infantry to charge aggressively upon the royal troops and instigate hand-to-hand

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[89] Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War*, p. 178.
[90] Harleian MS 6845, f. 281.
[91] *Ibid.*
[92] Anon, *A True RELATION Of the late Action and Victory against the Rebels in England, near Bridgewater on Monday the 6. Of July 1685 From several Hands* (Edinburgh, 1685), p. 2.

combat that proved one the most decisive factors contributing to Monmouth's defeat. This failure was mainly due to the inexperience of Monmouth's infantrymen, rather than to the superior firepower of James II's troops. This is not to deny that the firepower of the royal force was one element which greatly helped them win. Nevertheless, the battle was not won by firepower alone.

Above all, it can be observed that the killing capacity of musket was still strictly limited. Although the cover of darkness played a role in this, Monmouth's soldiers were able to hold their line in a firefight against a superior enemy for a long time, despite the fact that they bunched together and provided an easy target for the well-trained royal musketeers.[93] Therefore, it is clear that the royal force did not win the battle with firepower alone. Ultimately, as mentioned above, it was the combination of infantry and cavalry that completed the destruction of Monmouth's forces.

Overall, Sedgemoor was not a clash between a 'modern' and 'pre-modern' army. Monmouth's plan for battle – to withhold fire until the enemy was approached and then charge aggressively after firing in volley – was a standard tactical doctrine for the English army, which means the royal troops had also been trained by the identical doctrine.[94] However, even so, it appears that the royal infantry at Sedgemoor did not follow the official doctrine. When the advance of Monmouth's foot was stalled and began to fire, they responded in kind, rather than advancing to meet them hand-to-hand.

For explanation, we must consider that, in the given circumstance, the royal troops were in a good position to profit from a prolonged firefight. As King James II's account of the battle has it, 'though fired hard, their men being new, shot too high'. Thus, the royal troops could engage in a firefight without concern for serious casualties on their side.[95] In addition, it must again be noted that at least some royal troops were in fear of the rebel scythes. All these factors considered together, it must have been the most rational choice for the royal troops not to charge and engage hand-to-hand until it became clear that Monmouth's forces were sufficiently 'softened'. According to

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[93] Foard and Morris, *The Archaeology of English Battlefields*, pp. 114–117.
[94] *An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline* (London, 1676), p. 76; *An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline* (London, 1685), pp. 128–129.
[95] 'King James's Account of the Battle at Sedgemore', in *Hardwicke State Papers: From 1501 to 1726*, Vol. 2 (London, 1778), p. 310.

James II, the royal troops did not charge until they were sure that there was 'no appearance of rebel horse, and that the pikes of one of their battalions began to shake'.[96] This demonstrates that fighting hand-to-hand posed a considerable risk, even for well-armed and well-trained forces.

In any case, the behaviour of the royal army at Sedgemoor demonstrates their capacity to be flexible. Just as Monmouth selected the tactic that held the greatest promised of success for his under-armed and under-trained forces, the commanders and officers of the royal troops did the same. The official doctrine by which both sides had been trained was virtually identical during the battles at Ameixial, Montes Claros and Tangier, yet the details of the *application* of the doctrine were different in each battle. The English army chose whether to rely more on firepower or cold steel according to the specific circumstances. This throws into doubt the grand narrative, which is the focus of this chapter, that the English army transformed itself into a more firepower-oriented one under Dutch influence after 1688.

For a truly meaningful comparison, we must now turn our attention to the English army in combat after 1688.

2.2. Williamite Army in Combat

The examination so far has challenged the conventional narrative of the radical transformation of the English army into a more firepower-oriented army, represented by the adoption of 'platoon firing', during the reign of King William III and Queen Mary II. The previous section demonstrated that Charles II's and James II's armies did not adhere to the use of edged weaponry dogmatically. This observation is sufficient to argue that the realities of military development in late seventeenth-century Britain are far more complicated and multifaceted than the simplistic narrative of the triumph of 'modern' firepower.

In fact, the dichotomy of an advanced Dutch army preferring firepower and a conservative pre-1688 English army preferring cold steel is also overly simplistic. As

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[96] *Ibid.*, p. 312.

mentioned in Chapter One, the Dutch army retained sword-and-buckler men for quite a long time, whereas the English never seriously considered adopting them.[97] Besides, in terms of military thought, England had never been isolated from influence from the European continent. As in the case of sword-and-buckler men, the English army accepted foreign ideas on their own terms.[98] Dutch military thought was largely a product of the nature of their main enemies, the geographical conditions of the Netherlands, and many other factors. We must assume that the same was true for the English. This section, therefore, focused on how the English adapted themselves to counter their new enemies, and how they accommodated new technology and new ideas to fit their unique conditions, rather than the putative omnipotence of new technology or tactics.

2.2.1. The Battle of the Boyne (1690)

The Battle of the Boyne, fought between the Williamite army and the Jacobite army, has often been regarded as a showcase of the superiority of Anglo–Dutch firepower.[99] Although Lenihan acknowledged that firepower during this time was largely ineffective and its impact was mostly psychological, he nonetheless argued that 'in contrast to the *à prest* attack, Anglo-Dutch attacks relied heavily on firepower' and that it was firepower that carried infantry action at the Boyne.[100] Blackmore also observed that the Boyne was 'one of the first occasions on which platoon firing was successfully tested in battle'.[101] If confined to the occasion of the infantry-versus-infantry clash of the Boyne, this verdict is correct. However, we should be more cautious before deciding that this signals the triumph of 'modern' firepower over a more 'primitive' method of fighting.

The above-mentioned fighting was the only clash between the opposing infantry during the battle. The fight occurred at Oldbridge Ford, one of the three paths that the Williamite army used to cross the Boyne River. William's Dutch Foot Guards attempted

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[97] BL, Harleian MS 3638, 'Dutie of a Private Soldier', f. 156 v.
[98] Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier,* pp. 175–176.
[99] Lenihan, *1690 Battle of the Boyne*, pp. 161–162.
[100] *Ibid.*, pp. 156–163.
[101] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 59*.*

the crossing while James' Irish Guards were guarding the ford. After the Dutch Guardsmen forced the crossing, the Irish Guards counterattacked. After intense combat, the Irish infantry was repulsed. There is little doubt that Dutch firepower played an important role in overcoming the Irish counterattack, as many historians have claimed, considering that almost every written source mentions the effectiveness of it. The account published by the government states that:

> Five of the Enemies came up at the distance of a Pikes length, to beat us back, but our Men Fires so thick upon them, that they were force to retire with the loss of a great many Men, and one of their Colours;[102]

Indeed, the Dutch firing tactics proved their effectiveness on this occasion. However, that does not necessarily mean that it was the sole factor of victory, nor was it the symbolic moment of the triumph of modern firepower over primitive 'Celtic' warfare.

First, it was not a clash of two starkly different methods of warfare. The Irish action at Boyne was not a 'classic Irish or Celtic' warfare, such as the 'Highland charge'. As Manning observed, the favoured tactics of the Irish from the medieval to the Tudor periods was small-scale guerrilla warfare. They used the maximum advantage of terrain – such as swamps or forests – that were unsuitable for pitched battle, for which the regular English army was especially trained. In battle, they fought in mobile warrior bands, relying on individual combat skill.[103] In contrast, at Boyne, the Irish infantrymen fought a pitched battle in a manner not so radically different from the contemporary wars on the European Continent.

Likewise, the Dutch tactic was not fundamentally different from the conventional tactics used in the British Isles since the days of the Civil War, with which James II was quite familiar. For example, the official account reported that the Dutch infantry crossed the river 'with the Water up to their middle, bearing all the Enemies Fire, and not returning it till they came up close them'.[104] This sounds very similar to the typical

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[102] Anon, *An Account of the Victory obtained by the KING in Ireland, on the First day of this Instant July*, 1690 (Edinburgh, 1690), p. 1.
[103] Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 9–10.
[104] *An Account of the Victory*, p. 1.

English infantry tactics from the Civil War, as examined throughout the previous and current chapters. One notable difference is that the Dutch infantry did not charge after the firing. Rather, they engaged in a lengthy firefight, a difference emphasised by many historians. However, it must be remembered that English infantry did not always charge after delivering their volleys, as observed previously in the section covering the Battle of Sedgemoor. Whether to charge with edged weapons or not depended on each particular circumstance and the judgement of individual commanders.

Secondly, this single occasion is insufficient to establish the predominance of firepower over cold steel. As already described, and contrary to the assumption made by several historians, pike was still a formidable infantry shock weapon during the late seventeenth century. However, its effective use largely depended on the skill and experience of the pikemen, as well as on the degree of fear and psychological pressure felt by the enemy. Although the quality of the Jacobite army varied from regiment to regiment, many Irish troops had been only recently raised and were thus were inexperienced. The quality of their officers was also frequently regarded as poor.[105] These were hardly ideal conditions under which to engage in close combat with well-equipped and well-drilled Dutch infantrymen. Besides, the Dutch infantrymen were ready for close combat. One contemporary source stated that:

> Major Arthur, who was at the head of the first Battallion of the guards run the Officer through the body that commanded the Battallion he march'd up too.[106]

This implies that the Irish Guard succeeded in approaching close to the Dutch infantry despite heavy fire. This in turn indicates that firepower was not yet sufficiently powerful to stop an infantry charge without risking hand-to-hand combat. Therefore, an infantry charge using edged weapons was still dangerous for an enemy unwilling to engage hand-to-hand. Unfortunately for the Irish and for King James, the Dutch guardsmen were well ready for it. Another account stated that:

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[105] Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, p. 387.
[106] James Stainer Clarke, *The Life of James the Second, King of England, Collected out of Memoirs Writ of His Own Hand …* Vol. II (London, 1816), p. 399.

That did not hold us back and we fell on them, as much with musket fire as with

bayonets, and drove them off.[107]

This clearly indicates that the Williamite victory at the River Boyne was not the work of firepower alone. An army still needed to combine firepower and cold steel to be an effective fighting force. Another eye-witness account also reported that the Dutch Guards 'charged a Batt of KJ's Guard', which implies that the Williamite infantry fought in a much more aggressive manner than merely standing and firing.[108]

Nor should it be interpreted as the demonstration of the superiority of bayonet to pike in close combat. The defeat of the Irish Guard was the product of numerous factors, as already described, and it must not be attributed to the obsolescence of pike alone. At the Boyne, pikemen took an active part in the fight. The official account acknowledged that some Williamite forces could not fight effectively against Jacobite cavalry because 'they had no Pikes'.[109] Sir Henry Hobart, King William's Gentleman of the Horse, recalled that 'I had a push of Pike, or Falbard in the Village, but it did not pierce my Buff Coat'.[110] Although its killing capacity might be limited, pike was still used in combat, often quite effectively.

Lastly, the contemporaries did not consider the battle a watershed of 'modern' warfare. Although they did acknowledge the effectiveness and significance of Dutch firepower, as is clearly revealed in many sources, they did not attach excessive significance to it. As already observed, the official account and other eye-witness accounts mentioned pike and bayonet just as much as firepower. Even the term used to measure the distance between the two armies, 'at the distance of a Pikes length', clearly indicates the familiarity and importance of this ancient weapon in contemporary minds.[111] The fact that it is also a term used in the description of the Battle of Ameixial speaks to a strong sense of continuity.

A popular conception of the battle can also be gauged from a famous contemporary folk ballad, the 'Boyne Water'. The lyrics do not particularly emphasise

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[107] 'Journal de Jean-Francois de Morsier', in *Soldats Suisses au Service Etranger,* Vol. 7, ed. by A. Jullien (Geneva, 1915), pp. 97–98; from Lenihan, *Battle of the Boyne*, pp. 151–152.
[108] BL, Add MS 78690.
[109] *An Account of the Victory*, p. 2.
[110] Add MS 78690.
[111] *An Account of the Victory*, p. 1.

the shock caused by Dutch firepower. Rather, they focus on the heroic stance of King William, the 'broadsword and caliver' of cavalry combat, and the religious connotation in the battle's result.[112] It is hard to derive any sense of awareness of the dawn of a 'modern' era from this.

Overall, the Jacobite defeat at the Boyne, and especially the defeat of the Irish Guards by Dutch firepower, was hardly a major turning point in the development of early modern military history in either a technological or a cultural sense. It was not the first time that an infantry attack had been held back by the effective use of missile weaponry. Thus, the simple fact that the Irish infantry failed to repulse their Dutch counterparts in hand-to-hand combat does not establish the clear superiority of firepower over edged weaponry. Furthermore, the contemporary mind was not greatly shocked by the work of the firearms at the Boyne. The popular reaction was not akin to that of Charles VII's invasion of Italy in 1494, when the impacts of the French guns terrified the populace, regardless of their real effectiveness.[113]

In fact, the limits of firepower, as employed in platoon firing, had been more clearly demonstrated a year before the Battle of Boyne.

2.2.2. The Battle of Killiecrankie (1689)

William III experienced an initial setback when conquering Scotland. His army, under the command of Lieutenant General McKay, experienced a shocking defeat at the hand of Scottish Jacobites at the Battle of Killiecrankie. This demonstrated that the seemingly primitive Scottish Highlanders' method of fighting could triumph over the firepower of the Government troops, even the latest technique of platoon firing.[114]

McKay described the famous 'Highland Charge' at Killiecrankie in the following manner:

When their fire is over, they throw away their firelocks, and every one drawing

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[112] Dr. Hume, 'The Two Ballads on the Battle of Boyne', *Ulster Journal of Archaeology*, First Series, Vol. 2 (1854), 9–21.
[113] Michael Mallet and Christine Shaw, *The Italian Wars 1494-1559: War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe* (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 182.
[114] Jeremy Black, *European Warfare 1660-1815* (London: UCL Press, 1994), p. 107.

a long broad sword, with his targe (such as have them) on his left hand, they fall a running toward the enemy.[115]

This description, especially abandoning firearms to use swords, certainly looks primitive. However, it has been increasingly argued by many historians that the romanticised image of the fearless Highlanders from a primitive 'warrior society' is misguided.[116] Only a tiny proportion of the clansmen were trained warriors, and it was their job to act as shock troops. The others performed a mainly supporting role.[117]

In fact, the Highlander way of war was a much more complicated product of various factors. As Manning observed, Viscount Dundee, who commanded the Jacobites, was an experienced soldier who was well informed of what occurred on European battlefields.[118] Manning argued that he did not have sufficient time to transform his army into a 'modern' army and, thus, decided to 'make the best use of the Highland warriors'.[119] Therefore, the 'Highlander way' can be seen as the continuation of Celtic warfare, slightly modified by contemporary European influence, applied in accordance with the specific local circumstances.

The problem is whether it deserved to be called significantly 'primitive' in comparison with other contemporary armies. In terms of the English army, as observed in Chapter One, the most common infantry tactic was to approach the enemy closely, wreak havoc among the enemy line via one or two volleys, and then charge into hand-to-hand combat. The most basic mechanics of combat in this regard were not greatly different from the Highlanders' method. The most conspicuous difference is that the Highlanders threw away their firearms and charged with sword and shield. However, it must be remembered that the English musketeers sometimes charged holding their muskets upside down, most notably at Naseby, as examined in the previous chapter. Whether the clubbed musket is more 'modern' than the sword is

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[115] Major General Hugh Mackay, *Memoirs of the War Carried on in Scotland and Ireland* (Edinburgh, 1855), p. 51.

[116] J. Michael Hill, 'Killiecrankie and the Eveloution of Highland Warfare', *War in History,* Vol 1, Issue 2 (July, 1994), 125-139 (p. 128). For more recent discussion, see Charles Singleton*, 'Famous By My Sword': The Army of Montrose and the Military Revolution* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2014), pp. 22–27.

[117] Singleton*, 'Famous By My Sword'*, p. 22–27.

[118] Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, p. 378.

[119] *Ibid.*

debatable.

The key factor in tactics is their effectiveness, not whether their outlook is 'modern' or 'primitive'. As was the case in Monmouth's Rebellion, edged weapons often caused significant psychological damage to inexperienced soldiers. Unfortunately, many of Mackay's Williamite soldiers were inexperienced recruits. The most experienced were those from the Scots Brigade of the Dutch army, which were few.[120] Nevertheless, the existence of the three regiments from the Dutch army means they knew how to execute 'platoon firing'.[121] They did fire 'at the distance of 100 paces by platoons, to discourage the approaching Highlanders meeting with continual fire'.[122]

Blackmore argued that 100 paces was an 'unusually long range at which to open fire'.[123] Indeed, during the Civil War, firefights at a range close as 12 paces were not unknown.[124] Blackmore understood this to be a consequence of an inherent shortcoming of the plug bayonet: the infantry were vulnerable while fixing the bayonets.[125] Indeed, Mackay gave a similar explanation:

> Having taken notice on this occasion that the Highlanders are of such a quick motion, that if a battalion keep up his fire till they be near to make sure of them, they are upon it before our men can come to their second defence, which is the bayonet in the muscle of the musket.[126]

Therefore, Mackay worried that the conventional method of firing at close range might have a dangerous result against a fast-moving enemy. However, another factor must also be considered: the inexperience of most of the Williamite soldiers at Killecrankie.

Mackay claimed that 'all our officers and souldiers were strangers to the Highlanders way of fighting and embattling, which mainly occasioned the consternation many of them were in'.[127] They were mainly raised from the Scottish

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[120] Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, p. 379.
[121] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 57.
[122] Mackay, *Memoirs of the War*, p. 55.
[123] *Ibid.*, p. 57.
[124] 'Rushworth's Letter' in Foard, *Naseby,* p. 403.
[125] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 57.
[126] Mackay, *Memoirs of the War*, p. 55.
[127] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

Lowland, and some of them might have heard about the Highland charge, considering it had been used and earned renown by the army of Montrose during the Civil War. However, mere knowledge is often completely different to actual experience. Thus, it seems clear, as Manning observed, that Mackay did not trust his officers and men.[128] If this was the case, it is highly improbable that the Williamite soldiers trusted their officers and their comrades in arms. These were hardly ideal conditions under which to overcome the fear and extreme stress of hand-to-hand combat.

This was the critical difference between the Boyne and Killiecrankie. At Boyne, the Dutch infantry held their fire until their opponents came close and successfully repulsed them, albeit after fierce fighting. At Killecrankie, Mackay could not select the same option because he himself was acutely aware of the shortcomings of his troops. Therefore, the key differences were not 'modern' firepower or the tactical choice between close and long range; rather, they were much more mundane factors, such as experience and morale.

In a training manual he wrote, Mackay argued that the combination of fire and bayonet will 'readily break him whether horse or Foot'.[129] He must have expected that opening fire at long range and maintaining fire by employing 'platoon firing' would give his troops the best opportunity for victory. However, the result was disappointing for him:

> The part of their forces which stood opposite to Hastings, who had the right of all, before the Generals, Levins and Kenmore's regiments, came down briskly together with their horse, and notwithstanding of a brisk fire, particularly from the General's own battalion, whereby many of the chief gentlemen of the name Macdonald, who attacked it, were killed, pushed their point, after they had fire their light pieces at some distance, which made little or no execution, with sword in hand, tho' in great confusion, which is their usuall way.[130]

Certainly, as the passage indicates, platoon firing took its toll upon the charging

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[128] Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, p. 379.
[129] McKay, *Rules of War for the Infantry*, Article XVII.
[130] Mackay, *Memoirs of the War*, pp. 55–56.

Highlanders. Nevertheless, once they managed to get close, firepower became useless. Sir Ewen Cameron of Lothiel, a Highland chief who fought at the battle, vividly described what might seem a surreal scene for a modern battlefield:

> After this the noise seemed hushed; and the fire ceasing on both sides, nothing was heard for some few moments but the sullen and hollow clashes of broadswords, with the dismal groans and crys of dyeing and wounded men.[131]

It is not true that the cohesion of the Williamite troops completely collapsed at the first impact. Mackay's memoir recounted that one of the officers received eight wounds from a Highlander broadsword.[132] This indicates that at least some of them attempted to take a stand and fight in the hand-to-hand combat. Nevertheless, many of them were already shaken psychologically, and the Highlanders' broadswords overpowered the Williamite bayonets.

The Battle of Killecrankie is often referred to as the Jacobite 'pyrrhic' victory because of the severe casualties – especially heavy among the leadership – that they suffered for it. The victory failed to alter the overall strategic situation, and the Jacobites failed to prevent the Williamite conquest of Scotland.[133] In this sense, Killiecrankie was nothing more than an insignificant sideshow in the grand narrative of the eventual triumph of modern firepower. However, crucially it would take a significantly long time and much blood for the British army to finally overcome the seemingly primitive Highlanders' tactics, as is discussed in more detail in a later chapter. The Highlanders' tactics had their strengths and drawbacks, and so did the Williamite army's. Putting aside the benefit of hindsight, at that moment it was still difficult to assert that the 'modern' firepower of the Williamite army would completely dominate the battlefield in the near future.

Furthermore, Killiecrankie revealed the critical weakness of the firepower-oriented tactics in the late seventeenth century. As Mackay mentioned 'continual fire',

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[131] John Drummond, *of Sir Ewen Cameron of Locheill, Chief of the Clan Cameron: with an introductory account of the history and antiquities of that family and of the neighbouring clans*, ed. by James Macknight (Edinburgh, 1842), pp. 267–268.
[132] *Ibid.*, p.
[133] Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms*, p. 381.

it is undeniable that the concept of 'sustained firepower' was an important topic of the day. It is equally true that many theorists believed, as Mackay did, that sustained fire would be destructive enough to destroy the charging enemy's will to fight. [134] Nevertheless, whether the firepower had that effect on the battlefield was a completely different matter. Killiecrankie demonstrated that infantry firepower was still insufficient to eradicate the possibility of large-scale hand-to-hand combat. If an enemy's troops were determined to bring the fight into hand-to-hand combat, there was a good chance that they would succeed.

In such a situation, the result could vary, but the experience, training and morale of the soldiers certainly played a significant role. As demonstrated at the Boyne, well trained soldiers could withstand an enemy assault. However, green troops, uncertain of their skills and unaccustomed to hand-to-hand combat, could bring about a disaster like Killiecrankie.

2.2.3. The Battle of Steenkirk (1692)

After the Williamite conquest of the British Isles, the English army was mobilised for William's war against Louis XIV's France, the Nine Years' War (1688–1697). This brought a radically new experience of combat to the English army. Compared with the latest English involvement on European Continent, the battles of the Nine Years' War witnessed a dramatic increase in the size of the armies involved. Whether this fundamentally affected the mechanics of English infantry combat is the topic of this section. As mentioned previously, Blackmore argued that 'a significant difference between the tactical methods of the Nine Years War and those of the English Civil War and the campaigns following the Restoration of 1660 is the apparent abandoning of the infantry assault following close-range fire'.[135] Instead, according to Blackmore, the focus became 'sustainable fire' through platoon firing and 'its ability with this new fire system was usually enough to allow English infantry to overcome its usual enemy of the time, the French'.[136] This section examines this claim to establish whether the

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[134] Mackay, *Memoirs of the War*, p. 55.
[135] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 66.
[136] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

Nine Years' War was indeed a major turning point in early modern English military development.

The Battle of Steenkirk was the first large-scale pitched battle that the armies from the British Isles experienced in this war. Due to the completion of the war in Ireland, William was finally able to bring a large army to the Low Countries.[137] The battle was an English and the Allied defeat, and the flawed generalship of William and inadequate coordination between the Allied forces are mainly blamed for it. Nevertheless, at the individual unit level, the English, Scottish and Danish soldiers fought well and earned some acclaim.[138] It is, however, not easy to reconstruct exactly how they fought, partly due to the fact that the whole battle was a very confused affair, and also because most of the contemporary sources do not provide sufficient detail. Nevertheless, like many of the battles examined so far, it is not completely impossible to reconstruct the most fundamental mechanics of combat and draw plausible conclusions from it.

The most important factor to consider in this battle is the geography of the battlefield. Almost every contemporary account emphasises the hedges and ditches scattered on the ground. This makes the conditions of the battlefield significantly similar to those of the Battle of Adwalton Moor and the Battle of Marston Moor examined in Chapter One. Thus, the comparison with these battles further illuminates the change and continuity from the Civil War period.

Using these geographical factors, the French army, under the command of the *Mareschal* of Luxembourg, held a strong defensive position.[139] Naturally, the battle was essentially composed of confused fighting around these hedges and ditches, in which the Allied forces endeavoured to drive the French defenders from their positions, with the French forces counter-charging in turn:

> Sir *Robert Douglass,* with his first Battalion, charg'd several of the Enemies, and beat them from three several Hedges, and had made himself Master of

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[137] Childs, *The Nine Years' War and the British Army 1688-1697*, p. 178.
[138] *Ibid.*, p. 202.
[139] Edward d'Auvergne, *A RELATION Of the Most Remarkable Transactions Of the Last CAMPAIGNE, IN THE Confederate Army, Under the Command of His Majesty of GREAT BRITAIN; AND AFTER, Of the Elector of BAVARIA, IN THE SPANISH NETHERLANDS, Anno Dom. 1692* (London, 1693), p. 40.

the fourth, where going through a Gap to get on the other side, he was unfortunately kill'd upon the spot; all the other Regiments performing equal wonder, and behaving with the same Bravery, and beating the Enemies from their Hedges so far, that in this Hedge-fighting their fire was generally Muzzle to Muzzle, we on the one side, and the Enemy on the other.[140]

So we attacked them att a place cald Steen Kirk and beat them from Hedge to Hedge into their Camp, and possessed owr Selves of their Cannon.[141]

In this kind of confused *mêlée*, there is ample possibility that there were several occasions for hand-to-hand combat. We cannot be sure whether the English infantry made use of pike during the battle because it is difficult to find any mention of this in the contemporary English sources. Certainly, the broken nature of the battleground must have inhibited the use of pike to a certain extent. As in the Tangier campaign described above, bayonet and sword would have been more effective in a *mêlée* in a confined area. In addition, it is extremely demanding to move through difficult terrain while maintaining a cohesive battle line, and it was even more difficult for pikemen.[142] It would hardly have been surprising if the English infantrymen had decided to throw away their pikes that day. Thus, if pike did not play a significant role at Steenkirk, it was probably due to a combination of geographical factors and poor deployment, rather than the obsolescence of the weapon itself. Besides, there is little reason to assume that the English and Allied infantrymen did not use other edged weapons that day.

In addition, it was a French charge armed mainly with pikes and swords that finally turned the tide of the battle.[143] This makes the overall structure of the battle remarkably similar to Adwalton Moor during the Civil War, in which the charge of the Royalist pikemen against Parliamentarian musketeers decided the day. This

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[140] *Ibid.*, p. 42.
[141] BL, Stowe MS 444, 'JOURNAL of the campaign of William III. in the Netherlands, 1692-3, by Lieut.-Col. Jacob Richards, of the field-train of artillery', f. 4.
[142] For the difficulty of maintaining a formation while moving, see Adrian K. Goldsworthy, 'The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle', *War in History*, 4 (1), (1997), 1-26 (p. 7).
[143] G. R. Mork, 'Flint and still: a study in military technology and tactics in seventeenth-century Europe', Smithsonian *Journal of History*, 2 (1967) 25–52.

demonstrates that, despite such heavy fire and difficult ground, pike and conventional edged weapons could still have a decisive effect upon the course of a battle. This is not to argue that cold steel was still superior to firepower at this moment. English firepower was very effective throughout the day, to the extent that it almost succeeded in winning it.[144] However, after the severe fight, the English and other Allied troops must have been physically and mentally exhausted, with their formation scattered over the broken ground, rendering them highly vulnerable to the charge of pike and swordsmen. This clearly indicates that the battle during this period was not a simple question of technology and firing methods; it was much more complicated affair.

Again, many scholars have regarded Steenkirk, like Killiecrankie, as an exception to the inevitable triumph of firepower. Gordon Mork, despite the decisive role pikemen played in the battle, argued that this did not solidify the 'opposition to the new weapons' among the French, because they were greatly impressed by their enemy's superior firepower.[145] David Chandler also maintained that the hand-to-hand combat at Steenkirk was only one of the 'notable exceptions' and the general tendency was nevertheless infantry providing 'static fire'.[146]

Firstly, it is certainly true that the French acknowledged the effectiveness of Allied firepower. However, it is equally important to remember that this effectiveness could not guarantee the English victory. Under the right conditions, cold steel could still defeat firepower, as it had at Adwalton Moor and Killiecrankie. Secondly, despite the growing effectiveness of firepower, the fundamental mechanics of combat had not yet radically changed. The striking similarity between Adwalton Moor and Steenkirk is evidence of this. Lastly, not every contemporary believed that they were living in a new era, such that technology was becoming decisive in battle. The expressions found in many eyewitness accounts of Steenkirk are not significantly different from those of earlier warfare. The English sources mostly emphasise their tenacity and bravery while blaming the superior French numbers or the flawed Allied leadership for their defeat.[147] An emphasis on the superiority of their platoon firing technique is not particularly

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[144] Stowe MS 444, f. 4.
[145] Mork, 'Flint and still', 25–52.
[146] Chandler, *The Art of Warfare*, p. 111.
[147] Stowe MS 444, f. 4. BL, Stowe MS 48, 'Papers of General M. and J. Richards', ff. 21–22. d'Auvergne, *A RELATION*, p. 43.

prominent in their writings.

2.2.4. The Battle of Landen (1693)

The Battle of Landen (or Neerwinden) was another Allied defeat in the war. The battlefield was flat but slippery and there were also hedges, as at Steenkirk. However, as the Allied forces were the defenders this time, this condition of the field worked to their advantage to some degree, although their defensive entrenchments were somewhat crude. The French army, despite their superiority in both cavalry and overall numbers, had to rely on costly frontal assault due to the topographical restrictions.[148]

    As at Steenkirk, the English and their Allies fought tenaciously. The French army attacked the Allied line several times, but was repulsed again and again, without significant loss to the Allied soldiers.[149] However, it was not always easy for the Allies, and occasionally the French succeeded in capturing several Allied positions:

> The King of Great Britain shewed himself Indefatigable on all occasions, leading up several Battalions himself to charge, after having shared the Command with the other Generals. In the mean time the Enemy's Forces were so superior to ours in Number, that two of our Battalions were obliged to give way, and as it were at the same time the others that where placed at the Left ……… and at the same time his Electoral Highness on one side, with his sword in his hand, and the Marquess d'Bedmar on the other, rallied these Battalions that had given way, and led them to the Post which they had lost, and now retook with a mighty slaughter of the Enemy.[150]

This kind of repeated charge and counter-charge involved considerable hand-to-hand combat around hedges, entrenchments and the streets of Neerwinden. As Childs

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[148] Childs, *The Nine Years' War*, pp. 234–237.
[149] Stowe MS 444, f. 15.
[150] Anon, *A Particular Relation of the BATTLE Fought betwixt the Confederate and French ARMIES, on the 29th of July, 1693* (London, 1693), p. 7.

described it, 'the street fighting with muskets, bayonets and grenades swayed to and fro'.[151]

Firepower was certainly an important element in this battle, as the contemporary accounts mention the 'great firing on both sides.'[152] Nevertheless, it was still not powerful enough to stop the repeated charge of enemy forces before the matter devolved into hand-to-hand combat:

> The two Battalions ……. had spent all their Ammunitions by their continual fire for so many hours: The Elector order'd to have Ammunition brought them, but it could not time enough to do business. The King, who left Neerwinden upon the enemy's fresh Attempt upon this Place, led twice the English battalions to the Charge, up to the right of the Retrenchment …… Where they fought with very much bravery as they had done everywhere else.[153]

This reveals an important danger of relying on firepower alone in this period. The English and the Allied forces fired until they had exhausted their ammunitions, yet the French were far from broken. This highlights the still significant limitation of the effectiveness of firepower. In such a situation, an army must be ready to embrace the realities of hand-to-hand combat.

In hand-to-hand combat, the Allied had a further disability. General James Douglass reported that the English and the Dutch were vulnerable to the French attack because they did not possess the socket bayonet:

> We wer all Sencible of the great advantage The duke of Luxenburgs army had over ours by the utility of the Bayonet A (the socket bayonet): & wherewith the French both push'd and fire at once and of a much better defence then our piks were wherby we only lost one third of out fire and for our Bayonets B (the plug bayonet): we could never make use of them till all our shot was spent and then we fixed ther wooden hefts within the calibre of our Muskets which was of So

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[151] Childs, *The Nine Years' War*, p. 239.
[152] *A Particular Relation*, p. 7.
[153] d'Auvergne, *The History of the Last Campaigne*, p. 68.

little consequence that the least strok upon the barall would make them presently fly out whereof I have been often witness.[154]

At first glance, the ability to 'both push'd and fire at once' does not appear a massive advantage: once engaged in close combat, it is extremely doubtful that many infantrymen were able to load and fire. However, if a soldier possessed a socket bayonet, he would have been able to fire until the last moment of physical clash. In contrast, a soldier armed with a plug bayonet had to stop firing to fix the bayonet significantly earlier than one using the socket bayonet. Besides, the knowledge that he can fire and stab simultaneously must have offered a significant psychological comfort for a soldier.

Fortunately for the English, they did not hesitate to adopt this foreign weapon once its effectiveness was recognised:

But at the Battall of Langdaie An 1693 having had the fortun to take a french officer of grenadeer prisoner I brought his firelock and Bayonet with me to the garison of Bridges, wher Gen Ramsay then my Coll aloued me to equip my compy of Granadeers with the Same sort of Bayonets for the follouing campaine.[155]

Although the Battle of Landen was an English and Allied defeat, the experience of defeat taught the English army to further refine itself; the prompt decision to employ the socket bayonet after Landen demonstrates that it had not lost its ability to adapt.

Examining the battles of the Nine Years' War, it becomes apparent that the question of whether the English army abandoned aggressive infantry assault tactics is irrelevant. The form of battle was not decided by the preference of the English army alone. Employing the infantry as a 'source of more or less static firepower' while relying on 'horsemen to decide the ultimate issue', as Chandler put it, often proved an

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[154] BL, Add MS 27892, f. 217.
[155] *Ibid.*

unachievable goal during this period.[156] Too often, geographical restrictions or the simple shortage of sufficient horsemen hindered their employment to deliver a decisive knock-out blow. Because it was still difficult to win by firepower alone, such final blows were often necessary. If an army was not strong in cavalry or if the ground was unsuitable for cavalry action, it had no other choice than to rely on the infantry charge to deliver the final blow. Considering this, for an army to be an effective fighting force it had to be ready for close combat. Most of the battles during this period demonstrate that the English infantry, regardless of its doctrine on firepower, could not avoid hand-to-hand combat.

3. The Perceptions of War and Battle

3.1. The Language of Battle

On the one hand, expecting a strong continuity in the understanding of battle and warfare in Britain from the mid- to late-seventeenth century could be a natural assumption, considering the short time span. On the other hand, we might expect to find a significant change, especially considering the argument that the English army went through an important transformation, beginning in 1688.[157] An examination of the language that the late seventeenth-century English used to describe battles and warfare and a comparison of this language with that of the previous period is essential.

God and divine providence were still a strong presence in the minds of many who were concerned about war. James Turner's *Pallas Armata*, examined in the previous chapter to understand the frame of mind of the soldier–authors who fought during the Civil War, was actually published during the late seventeenth century. It was one of the most widely read books on the theory of war during this period.[158] Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that his discourse on providence as the

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[156] Chandler, *The Art of Warfare*, p. 66.
[157] Manning, 'Styles of Command', 671.
[158] Childs, *The Army of Charles II*, p. 63.

determinant of both a battle and the course of history was not fundamentally different from the views held by many of his contemporaries. Nevertheless, the opinions on providence were highly diverse throughout the sixteenth and early to mid-seventeenth centuries, as they had been during medieval times. This diversity must have also been the case during the late seventeenth century. Some scholars see the late Stuart army as a period of gradual transformation of the British army from a multi-confessional army to an Anglican one.[159] From this perspective, the aftermath of the 'Glorious Revolution' constitutes a crucial period during which these multi-confessional characteristics the army retained under Charles II and James II were dismantled, as symbolised by the purging of Catholics from the military.[160] From a long-term view, this argument contains many truths. However, the process was never easy, and there remained highly diverse religious opinions among the military-literate elites, even after 1688.

Besides Turner's writing, a contemporary document provides a useful insight into the popular anxiety during this period about God's plan for the future. In 1692, in the middle of the Nine Years' War, a pamphlet titled *The Great Prophesy of King William's Success in Flanders* was published.[161] Its author remains unknown, but the text takes the form of an interpretation of older prophesies. Prophesy was a long-established and highly popular genre, especially during times of war or political instability.[162] Not everyone in early modern Britain approved of the genre. Political authorities often feared its potentially seditious effects on the populace.[163] Many Puritan preachers were hostile to it, as they were towards certain strands of belief in providence. Many early modern Protestants believed that 'the gift of prophesy had passed away when the primitive Church came of age'.[164] The Puritans mostly regarded the use of prophesy, magic or astrology to gain knowledge of God's plan,

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[159] See, for a recent example, Liao Ping's PhD thesis, 'Religion and the Making of the Later Stuart Army, 1660-1714' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Oxford, Wolfson College, 2019).
[160] *Ibid.*, pp. 163-165.
[161] Anon, *The Great Prophecy of King William's Success in Flanders, or, The happy fourth year of His Majesty's reign giving several famous predictions of the honour of England, in His glorious actions to be performed this present year, 1692* (Edinburgh, 1692).
[162] Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth-and Seventeenth-Century England* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971).
[163] *Ibid.*
[164] Walsham, *Providence in Early Modern England*, p. 205.

rather than submitting to it passively, as 'symptoms of residual Catholicism'.[165] Despite their wish, however, the Puritans failed to eradicate fortune-telling practices and prophesy, and astrology continued to be popular. Failing in their initial aim, the Puritans, as Walsham observed, attempted to 'Protestantize' this medieval tradition.[166]

The anonymous author of this pamphlet seems to have been aware of such ambivalent attitudes towards the prophesy. The author justified the prophecy by citing a biblical example:

> Though Prophecies, 'tis true, generally meet the same Treatment from the incredulous World, which *Noah*'s Prophetick Sermon of forty years, whilst he was building the Ark, received from the insensible Race of mankind before the universal Deluge.[167]

Nevertheless, it is difficult to see this document as an example of Protestantisation. Many radical Protestants at that time did interpret William III's seizure of the English crown and his subsequent wars as a Protestant crusade. However, this document does not imply that William's expected victory would be a Protestant victory over Catholicism. On the contrary, the prophecy suggests winning would be a victory for both the king of England and 'his Imperial Majesty of *Germany*'; that is, the Holy Roman Emperor, one of Europe's foremost Catholic monarchs.[168] The justifications for war were that the ambition of the king of France was 'laying no little Yoke and Oppression' on his own people, and the kingdom of France's 'Power and Growth has but too long and too truly been the Terour of the World'.[169] Therefore, the Confederacy led by England and the Empire was for the 'Common Cause of Christendom', rather than for Protestantism.[170]

In fact, the prophecy specifically denies that the war should be interpreted as a religious crusade:

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[165] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[166] *Ibid.*, p. 208.
[167] Anon, *The Great Prophecy of King William's success*, p. 1.
[168] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[169] *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.
[170] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

The only thing that hitherto appears most mystical through the whole Prophecy
is, ['Battles for the 'Faith] as if thereby were intimated some *Religious War,*
which indeed is not the present Case of *Europe.*[171]

Rather, the author argues that the war would be 'fought in the Cause of
Righteousnesse, Honour, Justice and Truth, by the Confederacy, for Recovery of so
many Towns, Provinces, Principalities and Kingdoms, torn from 'em by the *Rapine* and
Violence of the French King, or rather by his Treachery and Gold'.[172]

Therefore, this document is closer to royal than to Protestant propaganda.
Despite the widespread claims and wishes of zealous English Protestants, William III
was not always able to present his war against France as a Protestant crusade. As
this document clearly shows, most of William's major allies in Europe were, in fact,
Catholic powers. In addition, apart from the Williamite propagandic justification of war
against France, this prophecy is also built upon centuries-old traditions. The overall
implication in this document is that France had reached the height of its power:

The French King, that aspires at least to be the Head of the World, and indeed
who has but too long stood fair for being so.[173]

In other words, it was considered the right time for such imperious ambition to be
punished:

his is most certain, never was there a more active World than now, and perhaps
the mightiest Wheels are now at work that the great Machine ever set a-
moving.[174]

Fortune's Wheel, or Rota Fortunae, was a popular symbol throughout medieval times,
developed from ancient political thought. For many, as Pocock phrased, a 'wheel that

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[171] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[172] *Ibid.*
[173] *Ibid.*
[174] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

raised and threw down kings was an emblem of the vanity of human ambitions.'[175] In this way, this document shows an example of strong continuity from the past, which the Puritan preachers tried but failed to eradicate. The document is not an example of successful Protestantisation of the previous popular belief systems. At the same time, the pamphlet addresses contemporary concerns as well as contemporary political agendas, including the royal propaganda. This is clearly indicated in the introductory section:

> we have some Reason to believe, that since the present Ferment of *Europe* is too violent to hold long at a stay, and some great Change must suddenly follow; if all those speaking Oracles are not quite silenced, there may be some Propheticks pointing to this present Age.[176]

This prophecy is not unique in not being an example of overtly Protestant propaganda. There are many other contemporary examples from the literature that concern both military and religious matters which eschewed blatant anti-Catholicism.[177] Liao Ping interpreted these as products of pragmatism, designed to avoid antagonising England's Catholic allies.[178] However, the resiliency of old belief and the popular reluctance to abandon long-held tradition in times of anxiety and uncertainty must also be considered. Amid internal revolution, regime change, civil war and great international war, the British populace must have experienced great anxiety and feelings of uncertainty. It must have been difficult to resign themselves to God's often incomprehensible will. This was one of the reasons the old beliefs, as evidenced in this prophecy, retained their validity. It is a particularly fine example of how people in late seventeenth-century Britain understood and contextualised war, and shows how its meaning was highly diverse. The people were not dominated by a single doctrine, and centuries-old symbols were frequently successfully integrated with contemporary concerns.

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[175] Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, p. 78.
[176] Anon, *The Great Prophecy*, p. 1.
[177] Ping, ''Religion and the Making', p. 230.
[178] *Ibid.*, pp. 230-232.

When describing specific battles in detail, late seventeenth-century authors shared strong similarities with their predecessors who fought during the Civil War. The style was frequently brief and matter-of-fact, as it was during the Civil War. Once the focus of a text narrowed down to the details of battle, God and providence tended to disappear from the writings, even in battles such as the Battle of Boyne which had significant religious implications. Sir Henry Hobart did express thanks to God for saving him from the attack of an enemy pikeman.[179] However, God does not dominate Hobart's account of the entire battle. Of course, soldiers during this period were not indifferent to religious matters. Many soldiers were deeply concerned about religion and religious righteousness of their cause.[180] Furthermore, popular songs, poetry, ballads (such as the famous Boyne Water) and paintings often plainly praise the victory of the Protestant army. Nevertheless, as already observed in the case of prophesy, attitudes towards war and religion during this period were diverse and complicated.

Regarding technological issues, the sources indicate that participants did not consider the battles during this period as representing the watershed of 'modern' warfare. Although writers did acknowledge the effectiveness and significance of firepower (as is clearly revealed in many sources), they did not attach excessive significance to it. In contrast, frequently used terms such as 'at the distance of a Pikes length' or 'the push of pike and Bayonet' clearly indicate the familiarity and importance of this ancient weapon in contemporary minds.

The perception of the Nine Years' War is similar. For example, the expressions found in many eyewitness accounts of Steenkirk are not significantly different to those of earlier warfare, especially the Battle of Adwalton Moor during the Civil War:

(A) In the meanwhile the Foot of both sides on the right and left Wings encounter'd each other, who fought from Hedg to Hedg, and for a long time together overpower'd and got ground of my Lords Foot ... At last, the Pikes of my Lords Army having had no employment all the day,

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[179] Add MS 78690.
[180] BL, Stowe MS 444, f. 4. 'Argument concerning praying for King William and Queen Mary' is an example which reveals the significance of religious matters in soldiers' consciences during this period.

were drawn against the Enemies left wing, and particularly those of my Lords own Regiment, which were all stout and valiant men, who fell so furiously upon the Enemy, that they forsook the hedges, and fell to their heels.[181]

(B) Sir *Robert Douglass,* with his first Battalion, charg'd several of the Enemies, and beat them from three several Hedges, and had made himself Master of the fourth, where going through a Gap to get on the other side, he was unfortunately kill'd upon the spot; all the other Regiments performing equal wonder, and behaving with the same Bravery, and beating the Enemies from their Hedges so far, that in this Hedge-fighting their fire was generally Muzzle to Muzzle, we on the one side, and the Enemy on the other.[182]

Here, the similarity between the description of the Battle of Adwalton Moor (A) and that of Steenkirk (B) is so strong that the two passages are almost impossible to distinguish without prior knowledge. The geographical conditions of both battles, especially the hedges mentioned in both accounts, were similar. At the same time, the similarity can be evidence that the author's understandings of battle and the literary style used for battle descriptions had not greatly changed since the days of the Civil War. Other accounts of battles of the war show similar continuities. For example, Colonel Jacob's description of the same battle of Steenkirk also employs similar language:

We attacked them^ att a place cal[le]d Steen Kirk and beat them From Hedge to Hedge into their Camp, and posessed owr Selves of their Cannon w[hic]h we Maintained for above ½ and hower, but the Enemy being suported by the Mar: Beufleurs, who Att that Time arrived w[i]th a Fresh Body of Men, Wee

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[181] Duchess of Newcastle*, The Life*, pp. 39–40.
[182] Edward'Auvergne, *A RELATION Of the Most Remarkable Transactions Of the Last CAMPAIGNE, IN THE Confederate Army, Under the Command of His Majesty of GREAT BRITAIN; AND AFTER, Of the Elector of BAVARIA, IN THE SPANISH NETHERLANDS, Anno Dom. 1692* (London, 1693), p. 40.

were att last overpowred by Numbers, and Forced to Retreat to owr own Posts.[183]

Here, not only the language but also the structure is similar to Duchess of Newcastle's account of the Civil War battle of Adwalton Moor: after a fierce infantry combat along the Hedges, one side finally seizes the initiative only to be driven back by timely arrival of an enemy relief force.

Another example can be found at the account of the Battle of Landen:

at the same time his Electoral Highness on one side, with his sword in his hand, and the Marquess d'Bedmar on the other, rallied these Battalions that had given way, and led them to the Post which they had lost, and now retook with a mighty slaughter of the Enemy.[184]

This depiction of the heroic action of the Elector of Bavaria shows a striking similarity with the manner in which the similar heroic action at the Civil War battle of Edgehill, in which John Belasyse charged with pike and turned the tide of the battle, was described by his secretary, as quoted in the previous chapter.[185]

It is also worth noting that the English accounts of the Nine Years' War mostly emphasised their own tenacity and bravery while blaming the superior French numbers or the flawed Allied leadership for their defeat, as accounts of battles from previous wars had also done. An emphasis on the superiority of their platoon firing technique is not particularly prominent in their writings.[186] Indeed, it is difficult to find any evidence of technological determinism.

There were, of course, exceptions, and the notion of technological and cultural superiority can sometimes be glimpsed when it comes to the war against non-European forces. The writings describing the English campaigns in Tangier is a fine example, in which an anonymous author reporting the situation at Tangier asserted

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[183] BL, Stowe MS 444, 'JOURNAL of the campaign of William III', f. 4.
[184] Anon, *A Particular Relation*, p. 7.
[185] Young, *Edgehill*, p. 290.
[186] BL, Stowe MS 444, f. 4. BL, Stowe MS 481, 'Papers of General M. and J. Richards', ff. 21–22. d'Auvergne, *A RELATION*, p. 43.

the superiority of the English art of war compared to that of their Moorish counterpart.[187]

> Their Foot signifies nothing, their Horse have no guns, or very few, onely [sic] Pistols. For their Infantry, they are unskilful in managing of a Gun, neither have they the courage to stand a shot.[188]

It is interesting that the reasons given for the supposed inferiority of the Moorish army are both technological (guns) and cultural (courage). In addition, further rationale for Moorish inferiority is given by the observation that the Moorish way of war closely resembled how ancient Roman authors described ancient Mauri (the ancient Berber people and the origin of the English word 'Moor') people in war.[189] Thus, the author was arguing that the Moorish army was essentially identical to their distant ancestors the Romans regarded as 'barbarians'.

Nevertheless, it is debatable whether the author's idea can be referred to as technological determinism. Along with the importance of firearms, the superiority of the European army's discipline is amply displayed, as the author argued that the Moors were inferior to the English army because they were undisciplined, without 'Rank and File'.[190] However, it is clear that the author did not believe superior firepower alone could win the battle: they acknowledged the strength of the Moorish cavalry and asserted that the English were beaten because they did not carry pike.[191] Furthermore, it is worth noting that the author relied on ancient Roman authors to disparage the Moorish way of war. For the author, the marks of a superior army or civilisation were still in many respects the ancient authorities rather than 'modern' firepower.

3.2. Battlefield Emotions

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[187] Anon, *The Present Interest of Tangier*, pp. 3–4.
[188] *Ibid.*
[189] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[190] *Ibid.*
[191] *Ibid.*

As the similarities of the language used to describe battles in this period and that of the Civil War clearly reveal, the emotional expressions the soldier–authors employed were equally similar. As during the Civil War, acknowledging exceptional bravery in the dreadful circumstance of intense combat is one of the most common expressions of emotion in late seventeenth-century writings about battle. If we recall the account of the Battle of Steenkirk examined in the previous section, that described a fierce infantry combat in which the opposing soldiers fought 'Muzzle to Muzzle.'[192]

This passage is typical in presenting the difficulties the combatants faced and marvelling at the bravery shown despite such difficulties. The phrase 'Muzzle to Muzzle' would have been sufficient to convey the intensity of the combat to many of the readers, which included many members of the officer class, although of course other literary elites who had various interests would also have read it. The authors, as in the previous period, usually did not express the fear experienced during combat in direct words but preferred to describe the situation that made the combatants afraid. Like the passage quoted above, the report of the battle at Tangier tries to evoke such a feeling by narrating 'the Enemy from their place at Arms, with hideous cry and noise, and fireing of small shot upon us'.[193]

Being undaunted in such a fearful situation was something to be proud of, and such a brave attitude is vividly presented in this boastful account of Sir Henry Hobart at the Battle of Boyne:

I think I may take notice to you, that being upon a white horse, and staying a little still to eat a little bread, and drink, I had 2 feild peices fired at me, one of the Bullets fell near me, these were the first shott, and the King was pleased laughing to tell me I was now Cannon free.[194]

Here, Sir Henry is proud that he was able to sit upon a horse eating and drinking while the enemy fire was falling around him. Another interesting point is William III's sense of humour. It has recently been suggested that the widespread jokes about and among

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[192] d'Auvergne, *A RELATION*, p. 40.
[193] Halket, *A Full and True Relation*, p. 1.
[194] MS 78690.

the soldiers in battle in the seventeenth century were, in fact, an example of the emotional practices of soldiers to manage fear.[195] More importantly, jokes allowed soldiers to express their anxiety without losing their 'self-restraint.'[196] In other words, by joking, they could be emotional to a certain degree while still being masculine and soldierly. William III's jest could have been the result of his effort to relieve the stress of battle. The fact that Henry Hobart recounted this incident is a powerful reminder that intense fear and stress were felt by those present at the battlefield, and these emotions were known to their contemporaries.

As was the case during the Civil War, grief at a loss was a commonly expressed emotion during this period. A report about the English defeat and the death of the Earl of Teviot at Tangier at the hands of the Moors expresses the grief as 'My hart akes and my Verye Soule is greeved in the Relation of this [sa]dd Story'.[197] Numerous other examples report someone with exceptional bravery 'unfortunately kill'd', although the emotion is more tightly controlled in such cases.[198] Pity for the dying and wounded men on the battlefield can also be glimpsed from the reports of the 'dismal groans and crys of dyeing and wounded men.'[199] Of course, the degree of expression of grief varies greatly according to each author. An account of the Battle of Steenkirk simply narrates 'we have lost near 4000 men, and the Enemy many more' and then moves to listing high ranking English officers killed in the battle without any emotional expression.[200]

The account of the Battle of Boyne by Sir Henry Hobart is similar, in that he shows grief or regret towards the slain, but is somewhat more ambiguous:

We pursued th[e]m till dark night; there are 10 peices of Can[ons] taken, a great deal of rich Baggage, led horses, p[er]force 4,600 arms, several Wagons of Powder, and am[m]unition, few Prisoners, for our Soldiers gave no q[uarte]r.[201]

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[195] Johan Verberckmoes, 'Early Modern Jokes on Fearing Soldiers' in *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800*, ed. by Kuijpers and Van Der Haven, pp. 113–124.
[196] *Ibid.*, p. 121.
[197] TNA, CO/279/3/003.
[198] d'Auvergne, *A RELATION*, p. 40.
[199] Drummond, *of Sir Ewen Cameron of Locheill*, p. 268.
[200] Stowe MS 481, f. 22.
[201] BL, Add MS 78690.

At first glance, he appears to show an extremely callous attitude towards the fate of his defeated Jacobite enemies, who were brutally massacred, and the only emotions that can be found are the joy of victory and the rich spoils of war. However, he then immediately describes the following:

> I had the good fortune to take one Dodington, a Maj[o]r of h[orse] and he is now my Prisoner, but much wounded.[202]

It is difficult to read from this short passage, followed directly by the sentence 'our Soldiers gave no quarter', exactly what kind of feeling Hobart was expressing. He could either have been simply relived to rescue a fellow member of the officer class from an indiscriminate killing, or even have been expressing revulsion towards his men for showing no quarter to the defeated enemy by describing the capture of Dodington as 'good fortune'. What seems more apparent is that whereas Hobart did not express grief, he did show feelings of relief.

Relief is relatively easy to find in many accounts of battle during this period. For example, Lt-General Jacob Richards after the Battle of Steenkirk did not show particular grief towards the fellow officers killed in the battle, but did express his relief at discovering that many officers he presumed to be dead were in fact alive:

> Severall of owr Officers w[hic]h we suposed to be killed we heare Since are Prisoners of Warr, and are extreemly well treated. [203]

Although this passage is very terse and does not describe Richards' inner feelings in detail, it must be again noted that such briefness was the convention that many soldier–authors generally followed during this period. Nevertheless, the terms he employed, such as 'extreemly', betray the feelings of relief he must have felt. The author's relief at their own survival is another kind of relief that can be found in the writings of this period. For example, Hobart expressing relief and gratitude to God that

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[202] *Ibid.*
[203] Stowe MS 444, f. 5.

he narrowly survived the attack of an enemy pikeman with only minor injury at Boyne is a good example of the display of vivid emotional expression.[204]

In many ways, the writings on war and battles in late seventeenth-century Britain were fundamentally a continuation from those of the Civil War period. The literary conventions inherited from the rich traditions of ancient and medieval days were continuously used. Technological concerns and the sense of progress related to the new military technologies or tactics rarely appear in such literature. However, the language used vividly expresses the diverse concerns of the late seventeenth-century peoples during this highly complicated and turbulent period.

4. Conclusion

This chapter examined the development of tactical theories of the English infantry during the late seventeenth century as well as its combat record. There were certainly changes: English officers and theorists were beginning to consider more effective ways of presenting their firepower. After 1688, the Dutch influence added more weight to this. The focus on firing tactics came to be on presenting 'continual fire'. Nevertheless, there was no radical break from 1688. The English army was never closed to foreign ideas before 1688. It had always adapted to new situations, and it constantly did so throughout the late seventeenth century. Despite the growing importance of firepower, the attention to hand-to-hand combat did not diminish, and there were good reasons for this. The actual realities of the battles and the contemporary perceptions of battle show remarkably strong continuities from the previous period. Firepower was certainly important, but it was far from omnipotent. The examination of the mechanics of combat during this period clearly reveals its complicated nature. Such complexity demonstrates that late seventeenth-century battle cannot be described simply in terms of what is 'modern' and 'primitive'. Likewise, British people's understandings of warfare and battle during this period remained mostly similar to the previous period, and the ways in which they expressed their

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[204] BL, Add MS 78690.

understandings through their writing display a strong influence of the literary tradition they inherited from the ancient and medieval past. Very little awareness of 'progress' in the modern sense can be found in these writings. Even on the few rare occasions the writings did display certain notions of superiority, both technological or cultural, the expressions were largely shaped by their classical or religious heritage.

Chapter Three. Infantry Combat during the War of the Spanish Succession

The decade this chapter covers is one of the most celebrated periods in British military history, mainly because of the brilliant captain general, the Duke of Marlborough. J. A. Houlding argued that, 'Marlborough's victories were the fruit of the military genius of the commander, and not of any radical departure in the drill and tactics (save for platoon fire) of the individual corps under his command'.[1] In contrast, Blackmore argued that this new technique of platoon fire was a critical innovation that ensured the battlefield success of the British infantry against their French counterparts. Therefore, according to Blackmore, we must 'look past the brilliance of Marlborough and understand what was happening in the ranks and files of his battalions'.[2]

Without a doubt, these two strands of argument have their own merits: the generalship of Marlborough and the combat techniques of the English and later British (after the Acts of Union in 1707) infantry were both important factors that shaped the course of battles and warfare during this period.[3] However, the complicated nature of battles and the reason for the British success compared with the previous period cannot be fully explained by one or two reasons. This chapter, like previous chapters, examines the development of tactical doctrine and the mechanics of combat to understand the achievements and limitations of the British army during this time. The relative role of Marlborough's supposed genius and that of platoon fire is also examined thoroughly in their historical context.

1. Tactical Doctrine and Military Theory in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain

Blackmore argued that the basic doctrine for the British army during Marlborough's campaign remained fundamentally unchanged since the days of William III, except for the platoon firing technique.[4] This is true in some respects. Little, if anything, about the art of war as a theoretical or philosophical subject was written and published during

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[1] J. A. Houlding, *Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army 1715-1795* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 174.
[2] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, pp. 73–74.
[3] Even before the Act of Union, the Scottish and Irish regiments fought alongside the English regiments in William III's army. However, it only became officially 'British' army after the Act.
[4] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 73.

this period. In other words, there was virtually nothing comparable to James Turner's *Pallas Armata* or the Earl of Orrery's *Art of War* in the previous century. This indicates that it is most likely that the general understanding of warfare during the early eighteenth century remained largely identical to Turner's and Orrery's, which borrowed heavily from the ancient Greek and Roman authors. Apart from the book about the art of war, the official training manuals of this period, even those written in accordance with Marlborough's own instructions, are hardly different from the manuals written in the previous period. One of the few meaningful changes that can be observed is a slow disappearance of the pike, and even this was very gradual.

In the regulation for infantry training published in 1701, the pike drill still comprised a significant part. The section includes detailed instructions on how to handle a pike, with little difference from the seventeenth-century manuals.[5] The question is to what extent this instruction was followed. The fact that pikes continued to be issued, however, is beyond doubt. For example, an account describing the supplies of arms to an infantry regiment in 1702 includes a memo noting, 'The Regiment has a sufficient number of Pikes fitt for service'[6]. This indicates that pikes were indeed in service and that the infantry regiments were expected to retain a sufficient number of them. Therefore, the next question is whether the pike was actually used in combat. Judging from the available sources, the push of pike, although very rare, did occur in the early eighteenth century. The storming of the fort during the siege of Venlo (1702) was one of the last occasions that the push of pike was recorded, at least in Western Europe.[7]

There is little reason to interpret all these as signs of backwardness in military thinking at the beginning of the eighteenth century. An army does not have to experience revolutionary changes in its doctrine to be an effective fighting force. The reason behind the continued use of Orrery and Turner's books could simply be their continued relevance. Likewise, the slow disappearance of the pike cannot be definitive evidence of the backwardness or conservatism of British military thought during this

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[5] *The Exercise of the Foot with the Evolutions, According to the Words of Command as also The Forming of Battalions With Directions to be Observed by all Colonels, Captains, and other Officers in His Majesties Armies* (Dublin, 1701), pp. 61–81.
[6] BL, Add MS 61335, f. 65.
[7] Thomas Lediard, *The life of John, Duke of Marlborough: Prince of the Roman empire* (London, 1743), p. 122.

period. As long as the potential enemies retained pikemen and there was, therefore, the possibility of the push of pike, it would have been dangerous to abandon the pike entirely. James Turner's statement in the previous chapter that 'it is true, the business very oft comes not to push of Pike, but it hath, and may come oft to it, and then Pike-men are very serviceable', still had some validity during the early eighteenth century.[8]

It has been often argued or implied that retention of the pike compromised the combat effectiveness of an army because a large proportion of infantry could not use firearms.[9] However, more firearms do not always automatically mean greater fighting capacity. The Swedish army during this period retained the pike longer than many of its Western European counterparts and was well known for its aggressive infantry tactics. Having experienced the Swedish use of the pike, the Russians continued to arm their infantry with pikes as well, especially when they were facing the Swedes.[10] Indeed, there is little evidence that the decision to maintain pikemen among their infantry regiments made either the Swedish or Russian army at the Battle of Poltava (1709) less lethal than their Western European counterparts.

Russia and Sweden by no means neglected firepower. For example, Boris Megorsky observed that the presumption in the Russian army was that the 'pike was good for field battles against European troops, but against Asiatic horse and irregulars it was preferable to have more firepower'.[11] Russia's example strongly indicates that the decision to employ cold steel and firepower was essentially down to the understanding of the country's military leaders regarding its specific needs against its potential enemies based on the army's past experiences, rather than any abstract notions of 'modern' and 'ancient'. As already noted, in the experiences of combat of the English army during the seventeenth century, there was little to prompt it to disregard the importance of edged weaponry. In addition, it is understandable that some English officers were reluctant to abandon the pike completely given that the

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 365.
[9] Many works of early modern military history explain that with the disappearance of pike, the infantry's ability to project firepower and its effectiveness greatly increased. See for example, Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, p. 77 and Archer Jones, *The Art of War in Western World* (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2001), pp. 267–269. Some contemporary soldiers and theorists also expressed similar opinions, Vauban among the most prominent: Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*, p. 457.
[10] Boris Megorsky, *The Russian Army in the Great Northern War 1700-21* (Warwick: Hellion & Company, 2018), pp. 72–73.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

French army, the English army's main opponent since the Nine Years' War, retained it. The occurrence of the push of pike in 1702 justifies their position at least to some extent, because it demonstrated that, despite the increased effectiveness of firearms, infantry hand-to-hand combat could still occur. When it did happen, the best countermeasure against the attack of enemy pikemen was still the pikemen of one's own. Thus, it would have been too risky for an army to discard pike completely, unless its main adversary abolished its use as well.

To understand English and later British military development in its proper context, we must examine how the experience of its most recent war affected English and British ideas of battle during this period. Because the tactical manuals written during the first decades of the eighteenth century show no striking differences from the previous period, it is difficult to discern the direct influence of past wartime experiences. The earliest manual issued in the eighteenth century, for example, is a series of musket and pike drills that are basically identical to their seventeenth-century predecessors.

> The Pike being thus held, you thrust it out strongly forward with both hands, not stirring the Feet in such manner that the Right Hand come to the Left Shoulder, or as far as the Right Hand can reach, pulling it back again, and Charging breast high, as before.[12]

The simple fact is that at the turn of the century, pikemen were expected to engage the enemy with their pikes as had been done throughout the seventeenth century. Certainly, this continuity does not necessarily represent 'backwardness' or conservatism, as the Russian example clarifies. In addition, there is ample possibility that the experience of the defeat at the Battle of Steenkirk at the hands of French pikemen, as examined in the previous chapter, reassured many English officers of the need to retain some proportion of pikemen, although there is no direct evidence from the manual itself.

Another official manual for infantry drill published in 1708 also shows important

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[12] Anon, *The Exercise of the Foot*, pp. 79–80.

elements of continuity. By this time, the pike had been replaced by the socket bayonet; nevertheless, the influence of pike tactics remained strong:

> Charge Your Bayonets Breast High
> 1. Come briskly to your Recover as before.
> 2. Quit your right Hand, and bring it under the Butt of your Piece.
> 3. Face full to the Right, and charge, by placing your Piece against the Breast, over the Bend of your Left Arm, as with a Pike.
> Push Your Bayonet.
> 1. Push it directly outright.
> 2. Bring it again to your Breast.[13]

Compared with the pike drill from the 1701 manual, the similarity is obvious: the basic posture and the movement required to use pike and bayonet are identical. In fact, the 1708 manual explicitly instructs the bayonet to be used 'as with a pike'. Considering that this manual was published to introduce the new drill methods instructed by Marlborough during the War of the Spanish Succession, it is beyond doubt that the experiences of battles in that war strongly influenced the new regulation. Nevertheless, there is no explicit mention of it, and thus it is difficult to see what, and in which ways, these specific experiences influenced the changes and continuities in British tactical doctrine during this period.

There is, however, one notable exception: the unpublished manuscript manual *Schola Martis, or the Arte of War*, written by Brigadier General James Douglass some time after 1714. Douglass fought in the Nine Years' War as a captain and, therefore, his experience of the war against the French army must have heavily influenced his view of battle. Unlike the other manuals published during this period, Douglass' manual makes clear that his ideas were the product of the war. In addition, judging from the contents and the approximate date of writing, it also reflects lessons from the War of the Spanish Succession.

Although already quoted in the previous chapter, one of the most distinctive

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[13] Anon, *The new exercise of firelocks & bayonets; appointed by his Grace the Duke of Marlborough to be used by all the British forces* (London, 1708), p. 6.

instructions on combat in Douglass' manual is worth quoting again:

> Next to be done is to post some squadrons of dragouns hors and Husars conveniently to charge and flank the enemys squadrons and Regmts of foot that advancys to farr out of ther lines, or in case any of them by A superior fire, ar put in confusion to fall in upon them sword in hand, for now, in our modern way of fighting viz: by platouns alternativly firing, it is not aloud ye Infantry to fall in pell mell amongst any troups in confusion, least therby they bring themselves in to ane equall disadvantage an so change the smyles of fortune in to frouns and threats of loss, therfor whatever confusion ye Enemy may be in the Infantry ar not to brake ther Ranks to persheu but ar still to march softly on in full body closing ther files, and making up ther Ranks as the men drops, and so are never out of condition of Battalling or sustaining wher its Required leaving the accomplishment of the victory Intearly to the Cavallry giving no quarters till the victory is determined.[14]

The instruction that the infantry must not break rank to attack the enemy was, in fact, little different from Mackay's instruction published two decades before.[15] Nevertheless, Douglass' manual shows a more clearly divided role between infantry and cavalry: infantry was to provide firepower, and the cavalry was to deliver the decisive blow to the enemy sufficiently weakened by infantry fire. In addition, whereas Mackay's instruction included the 'push of pike and Bayonet' to break the enemy, Douglass completely omitted it. As Blackmore observed, the aggressive charge by infantry after a short volley, which had been the hallmark of English infantry tactics since the Civil War, was no longer the doctrine.[16]

An important context for this instruction was most likely the experience of the battles of the Nine Years' War. As examined in the previous chapter, the battles in which the English infantry were involved during the war were mostly confused *mêlées* that were, without exception, very costly and indecisive affairs. The most effective arm

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[14] BL Add MS 27892, 'Schola Martis', f. 253.
[15] Mackay, '*The Rules To be Observed by the Body of Infantry*', Article XIII.
[16] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, pp. 66–67.

with which to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy was cavalry. The English cavalry, however, was not very strong and was numerically inferior to its French counterparts, which greatly limited the choices for the English army regarding both battleground and battlefield tactics. The reason for this inferiority is unclear in the sources related to the Nine Years' War, but transporting large number of horses across the channel had always been a difficult challenge. Furthermore, the English cavalry had not experienced such large-scale battles in European continent for a long time, and this lack of experience must have affected their efficiency. Based on this lesson, serious efforts were made to improve the quality of cavalry of the English army after the Nine Years' War. [17] Douglass' instruction can be considered both a reflection of this consensus among the English theorists and his own experience. Using the infantry mainly in a supporting role while employing the cavalry to deliver a decisive knock-out blow also became Marlborough's standard tactic during the War of the Spanish Succession.

Besides this change, little in Douglass' manual can be described as distinctively 'modern' or radically different from the previous period. Although Douglass claimed that the 'modern' method of fighting, platoon firing, forbade the infantry to break rank, such forbiddance was by no means a monopoly of the 'modern' way of war. In fact, concern over the maintenance of formation was as old as the days of the ancient Greek phalanx. Many ancient and medieval commanders strictly forbade their soldiers to break rank exactly for the same reason as Douglass: it caused fatal confusion. Therefore, Douglass' instruction was hardly novel. On the contrary, in part, it reaffirms ancient military common sense. It attempted to improve British tactical performance, firmly based on its most recent experiences of combat.

In addition, Douglass by no means absolutely forbade the British infantry to engage in hand-to-hand fighting, nor did he believe that firepower could stop the enemy from approaching into close quarters. As the quoted passage shows, he merely warned against pursuing the defeated enemy 'pell-mell'. If the enemy closely approached, they had to be defeated through hand-to-hand combat. As observed in the previous chapter, it was Douglass himself who strongly advocated the adoption of

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[17] Nicholas Dorrell, *Marlborough's Other Army: The British Army and the Campaigns of the First Peninsular War, 1702-1712* (Solihul: Helion & Company, 2015), p. 18.

the socket bayonet. This hardly makes sense if he believed that infantry no longer had to fight hand-to-hand.

Another reason behind the strict instruction not to break the formation was most likely the fact that the pike was gradually disappearing due to the introduction of socket bayonet. The process was completed when Douglass was writing this manual. According to Blackmore, aggressive infantry attacks to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand combat 'would inevitably leave a battalion in some confusion, making it extremely vulnerable to counter-attack'. The only reason that this hazardous tactic became the norm for the English army during the seventeenth century was the limitation of firepower, which left the aggressive charge the only option to defeat the enemy. However, Blackmore argued that the adoption of platoon firing made this dangerous tactic unnecessary.[18]

This explanation, however, is not entirely satisfactory, for it was never 'inevitable' that infantry attacks would lead to the confusion Blackmore described. Not every seventeenth-century battle degenerated into a confused *mêlée*. As observed in Chapter One, at the Battle of the Dunes, the English infantry were able to maintain and redress their formation while charging against the enemy to hand-to-hand combat. During the seventeenth century, the infantry charge was carried out by a formation that included a significant proportion of pikemen. The pike block was by nature required to maintain formation to be effective. Furthermore, as many of them were armed with 16-feet pikes, it was difficult for infantrymen to run headlong, and thus it was relatively easier to maintain formation. However, with the pike now gone, the commanders and military theorists may have believed that the infantry armed with muskets and bayonets would prove more prone to losing cohesion during the charge than the pike block.

Another weakness of Blackmore's theory is that there was no guarantee that 'platoon firing' would always work and thus render the shock tactic useless. No one could predict with absolute certainty that infantry formations would always remain static and defeat the enemy by firepower alone. It is worth remembering that, despite Mackay's emphasis on the infantry's defensive role and orderly formation, the realities

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[18] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 67.

of the battlefields in the late seventeenth century were often different to such doctrinal ideals. It is not surprising, then, that Douglass, who himself had experienced the same battlefields, was well aware of such uncertainties:

> But in Battaling scarce any set rules houlds, for all must be regulated according to the variety of accidents, as the disposition of the Enemy, the ground you have to fight on, &a:[19]

Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that the British army in battle rigidly followed one standard tactic. In fact, such flexibility was an important aspect of the British method of war throughout history, certainly including the period covered in this study, and one of the most important factors behind its many successes.

In summary, it is true that the emphasis on infantry during this period from the manual was more on providing effective firepower than hand-to-hand combat. It is also true that the English and later British infantry was generally discouraged from employing their traditional tactic: an aggressive charge following a short volley. However, this emphasis was merely a temporary solution to a pressing matter identified by the officers and military theorists of the period based on their past experiences, rather than an example of unstoppable progress towards 'modernisation'. If the latter was the case, it would have been extremely difficult for the British army to return to the seemingly antiquated tactic of an aggressive charge after a short volley during the American War of Independence and the Napoleonic Wars.[20] In addition, as observed in previous chapters, the realities of the battlefield were frequently different to the ideal goal suggested by manuals. The next section examines the key battles the English and later British army under Marlborough fought during the War of the Spanish Succession and the effects of the doctrinal emphasis on infantry firepower on the British army's battlefield performance.

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[19] Add MS 27892, 'Schola Martis', f. 256.
[20] Spring, *With Zeal and With Bayonets Onl*, p. 216.

2. The Realities of Battle: The Mechanics of Infantry Combat in Marlborough's Campaign

This section reconstructs how the British infantry acted in combat by studying the key battles during the war chronologically. In doing so, the chapter explore the changes and continuities from the Nine Years' War to determine whether firearms and the methods by which they were used were decisive elements in battles.

2.1.   The Battle of Schellenberg (1704)

The Battle of Schellenberg was the first major battle of the war for the English and the Allied army under Marlborough. The Schellenberg height was the key to capturing the town of Donauwörth. The height was strongly fortified:

> From thence he (the Duke of Marlborough) saw the Count d'Arco's men hard at work in throwing up an entrenchment on the top of the hill at Schellenberg. As soon as the British troops were all come up, he formed a disposition for attacking them. The hill was in itself very steep and rough, and difficult to ascend. Besides which they had thrown up entrenchment on the summit of it.[21]

A frontal assault against such a strong position had to be, by nature, a very bloody affair. Thus, naturally, a direct assault was not most favoured by the early modern commanders. However, Marlborough ordered an immediate assault. Because he had to leave his heavy artillery behind for the famous manoeuvring from the Netherlands to the Danube and also considering that the main French army under Tallard was approaching, a time-consuming siege or blockade was not possible. Marlborough had little option but the direct and costly assault.[22]

　　　The attack against Schellenberg height was, as expected, bloody. Many of the contemporary English accounts, unfortunately, do not provide sufficient detail of the

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[21] Captain Robert Parker, *Military Memoirs of Marlborough's Campaigns 1702-1712,* ed. by David Chandler (London: Greenhill Books, 1998) p. 32.
[22] *Ibid.*

battle. The horror of combat was only described through vague expressions; this is a constant problem throughout the period covered in this study, as mentioned at the beginning of Chapter Three. Robert Parker's description, for example, is quite brief:

> About six in the afternoon the English guards began the attack, the whole line going on the same time. The thirty squadrons kept in the rear of the foot, as close as the nature of the ground would permit. The enemy maintained their post with great resolution for an hour and ten minutes; by which the whole army being come up, and supporting the attack, at length they gave way, and a terrible slaughter ensued, no quarter being given for a long time. Count d'Arco, with the greater part of them made down the back of the hill to the Danube, where they had a bridge of boats; but this breaking under them, great numbers were drowned.[23]

Due to the terseness of the account, it is difficult to reconstruct from this account how exactly the English infantry attacked and how the defenders 'resolutely' fought back. Robert Stearne's account is similar:

> The British and Dutch began the attack with their usual bravery and resolution, and the enemy defended the batteries and works with obstinate bravery but after about an hour's fighting on the arrival of the Imperialists the valour of our men prevailed they drove the enemy from his entrenchments with tremendous slaughter, pursuing them towards the Danube.[24]

Another account by John Marshall Deane is equally brief but interesting, considering that it is one of the rare first-hand accounts written by a private soldier:

> But no sooner did our Forlorne Hope appear but the enemy did throw in their volleys of cannon balls and small shott among them and made a brave defence and a bold resistance against us as brave loyall hearted gentlemen souldiers

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[23] *Ibid.*
[24] National Army Museum 1968-07-392, 'Journal of Robert Stearne, 1685-1717'.

ought to for there [sic] prince and country, and they being strongly intrenched they killed and mortyfyed abundance of our men both officers and souldirs .... A glorious action it was to be sure for this vigorous and bold attacque held neare 3 hours but with. Gods assistance we driving them out of there works and possessing ourselves of them.[25]

In this passage, it becomes clear that Deane did not describe every course of the battle, although this was also the case with the other authors quoted above. Deane omitted the complicated aspects of charges and counter-charges and instead concentrated on what was most impressive to him, which was, judging from the passage, the defenders' firepower. Sergeant John Wilson's account conveys a similar image but is significantly more detailed:

The front rank had orders every man to sling his firelock and take a faschine in his arms, in ord'r to break the enemy's shott in advancing. After which wee advanced with all courage and vigour in life. And the enemy received us w'th such warmth, both from their own shott and prodigious fire of cartridge shott from their Batteries that they obliged us to retire with considerable loss, and which had likely to have been of great damage further, by the retreat, to putt out second line into confusion and disorder....Notwithstanding all those difficulties, the Grenadeers made a second attack, with as great courage as the former, and was as vigourly rec'd, our right being intirely [sic] beat back again w'th as great loss, if not greater than before. But our three English Battallions .... Having in the attack (though not without loss), obliged the Enemy to give way, by which they made themselves masters of the wood upon the Enemy's right and stood their ground .... W'ch held for the space of three quarters of an hour with continued fire and great slaughter on both sides.[26]

[25] John Marshall Deane, edited and introduced by David Chandler, *A Journal of Marlborough's Campaign During the War of the Spanish Succession 1704-1711 by John Marshall Deane, Private Sentinel in Queen Anne's First Regiment of Foot guard*s (Society for Army Historical Research Special Publication No. 12, 1984), pp. 7–8.
[26] John Wilson, 'The Journal of John Wilson, an "Old Flanderkin Serjeant", who served 1694–1727', in *Military Miscellany II* ed. by David Chandler, Christopher Scott, Marianne M. Gilchrist and Robin Jenkins (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2005), p. 43.

Although all these accounts agree that the battle was fierce and that both sides engaged with great courage, and that the casualties were equally great, a more concrete, detailed picture of the fighting is lacking, except for the notable emphasis on the deadly effects of firepower in Sergeant Wilson's journal. Fortunately, an account from the Franco-Bavarian side gives more valuable detail:

> It would be impossible to describe in words strong enough the details of the carnage that took place during this first attack, which lasted a good hour or more. We were all fighting hand to hand, hurling them back as they clutched at the parapet; men were slaying, or tearing at the muzzles of guns and the bayonets which pierced their entrails; crushing under their feet their own wounded comrades, and even gouging out their opponents' eyes with their nail, when the grip was so close that neither could make use of their weapons.[27]

The most notable point from this passage is the detailed description of the ferocity of the hand-to-hand combat, which sharply contrasts with the English accounts. Another account written by Count d'Arco, the Bavarian commander of the Donauwörth garrison, makes a similar point:

> Your Highness' Troops and Grenadiers were posted in the mouth of Attack, and after their Fire fell twice out upon the Enemy with their Bayonets in their Pieces, and made great slaughter; the Enemy found such gallant Resistance that all their first Ranks were killed, but speedily supplied by others, and your Highness' Troops returned to their Trenches with as much Courage as they went out of them.[28]

It makes an interesting contrast that whereas the English Private Deane and Sergeant Wilson emphasised the intensiveness of Franco-Bavarian fire and the damage the

[27] Jean Martin de La Colonie, *The Chronicles of an Old Campaigner, M. De La Colonie, 1692-1717,* trans. by Walter C. Horsley (London: John Murray, 1904), pp. 184–185.
[28] Francis Hare, *The History of the Campaign in Germany For the Year 1704* (London, 1705), p. 24.

attacking English infantry suffered from it, the Franco-Bavarian source emphasised their use of bayonets. The feat of Franco-Bavarian firepower is entirely missing from d'Arco's and Jean Martinde La Colonie's accounts, whereas the English accounts remain silent on hand-to-hand combat. We can only speculate on the reason for this difference. It could be a reflection of the English doctrinal emphasis on infantry firepower, as observed in the manuals in the previous section. However, it is equally possible that English soldiers such as Sergeant Wilson understood the horror of hand-to-hand combat as a natural part of infantry assault and did not feel it necessary to emphasise it. We cannot be certain which is the best possible reason, but considering both Deane and Wilson's journals were private journals which remained unpublished until relatively recently (although there is tantalising evidence that Deane might have considered publication), it is possible that they recorded what gave the strongest impression on that day, rather than what concerned military doctrines.[29] In other words, it is likely that the defenders' firepower and overcoming it was the most memorable event of the battle for Deane and Wilson, possibly because it was a more fearful or testing experience for them than engaging in hand-to-hand combat.

Whatever the reason and the general English attitude on firepower and hand-to-hand combat, it is almost certain that there was a fierce hand-to-hand fight, which was unavoidable in this kind of repeated infantry charge and counter-charge. It also appears that the English firepower and platoon firing did not play a major role, as Blackmore admitted.[30] This has an important implication: despite the growing emphasis on firepower in manuals, there were still ample problems that could not be solved by firepower alone. The Battle of Schellenberg shows that a frontal assault against enemy fortification was sometimes unavoidable and, therefore, an army still had to be prepared to engage in hand-to-hand combat. For this, a certain skill with edged weaponry was vital. That the English army managed to capture the enemy works despite severe casualties indicates they were able to endure the ordeal of hand-to-hand combat.

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[29] For the evidence of Deane's possible intent to publish, see Chandler's introductory chapter in the journal.
[30] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 75.

2.2.   The Battle of Blenheim (1704)

The Battle of Blenheim is one of the most famous and celebrated victories in the history of the British army. It has been often claimed that the battle established Marlborough's reputation as a great commander.[31] Indeed, Marlborough's tactical finesse is often considered the critical factor in the victory.[32] The battle appears to be a classic example of Marlborough's standard tactic, which was to force pressing attacks first on the enemy's flanks to lure them into strengthening them and then to deliver the final blow to their weakened centre, although this tactic already had been used at Schellenberg.[33] In addition, like all other battles the British army fought during this period, the British infantry's firepower, strengthened with platoon firing, has been identified as another prime factor in the victory. For example, Blackmore argued that in the battle, the British infantry were able to employ platoon firing 'to their full effect.'[34]. For Carlton, this was further demonstration of Marlborough's military genius, because it was Marlborough that 'greatly increased the lethality of his infantry's firepower by using the new flintlock musket in a system of platoon firing'.[35]

There is no doubt that Marlborough's generalship and the English infantry's firepower were both important variables in the course of the battle. Nevertheless, it is hard to avoid the impression that this is an oversimplified explanation for the victory and the battle overall, especially considering the highly complex factors that have affected every course of battle examined in this study so far. Blenheim was a battle that involved men at least as many as those in the main battles of the Nine Years' War examined in the previous chapter. It also involved a significant level of combined action between infantry and cavalry throughout the battle, in contrast to many battles of the Nine Years' War that were largely infantry clashes. These all indicate that the military actions at Blenheim were highly complicated.

The first main action of the English infantry on that day was the attack on the Blenheim village, which formed the right flank of the Franco-Bavarian army, whereas

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[31] David G. Chandler, *Marlborough as Military Commander* (London: Penguin, 2000, originally published in 1973), p. 148. More recently, see Carlton, *This Seat of Mars*, p. 221.
[32] J. R. Jones, *Marlborough* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 93.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 87.
[34] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 76.
[35] Carlton, *This Seat of Mars*, p. 224.

the Allied troops under the command of Prince Eugene of Savoy attacked their left flank. This was the first phase of Marlborough's standard tactic. The first English attack against the Blenheim village was somewhat different from the instruction from the manual or from employing the infantry as a 'source of more or less static firepower', as Chandler described the tactical norm during this period.[36]

> It was now near one a clock, when the Lord Cutts had made the first attack upon Bleinheim Brigadr Genll Row on foot led up his Brigade….And he had proceeded closely and slowly within 30 paces of the Pales about Bleinheim before the Enemy gave their first fire and when this was given there fell a great many brave Officers &Soldiers on our side but yet that did not discourage their Gallant officer Briagdr Rowe from Marching directly to the very Pales, in which he stuck his sword, before he suffer'd a man to fire a piece & then our men gave the first volley in the teeth of the Enemy.[37]

The impression of the English in this passage – advancing without firing, regardless of casualties from enemy fire – is, although courageous, hardly 'modern'. Indeed, the scene bears a striking similarity to the powerful cultural image of later revolutionary wars, which is that of a 'reactionary' army foolishly attacking a 'modern' army that was firing behind cover.[38] For example, traditionally, the Battle of Bunker Hill (1775) during the American War of Independence was culturally interpreted as a 'battle in which every European tradition had been shattered by such fire as the British never had faced.'[39] However, the image of the British redcoats advancing at Bunker Hill against American fire is not radically different from the British at Blenheim. Another similarity can be found in how the 19th century Colonial wars were described. One Victorian history of the Zulu War describes thus the Zulu attack at the Battle of Rorke's Drift (1879):

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[36] Chandler, *The Art of Warfare*, p. 66.

[37] BL, Add MS 61408, 'Letters of Francis Hare, D. D., Chaplain-General to the British army', ff. 159-160.

[38] For this cultural image of revolutionary warfare, see Jeremy Black, *Western Warfare 1775-1882* (Chesham: Acumen, 2001), pp. 13–14.

[39] George F. Scheer and Hugh F. Rankin, *Rebels & Redcoats: The American Revolution Through the Eyes of Those Who Fought and Lived It* (New York: Hachette Books, 1957), p. 60.

…but the greater number, without stopping, moved to the left ……. and made a rush at the wall of mealie-bags. After a short but desperate struggle the enemy was driven back with heavy loss into the bush around the post.[40]

Again, the description of the Zulu attack here could well be the British attack at Blenheim, despite the stereotyped image of the primitive army attacking the modern army. This provides another example of the tenuous divide between pre-modern and modern.

Equally important is what comes next:

His orders were to enter Sword in hand, but the superiority of the Enemy & the advantage of their post, made it impossible And therefore This first Line was forc'd to retire, but without the Brigadr who was left by the side of the Pales by a shott he had received in his thigh.[41]

If there was a specific order to advance with 'sword in hand', as the passage testifies, then it would be natural to assume that the Allied command supposed that the infantry would have to subdue the French garrison at Blenheim through hand-to-hand combat. Furthermore, it is clear from the passage that the infantry's firepower, whether in the form of platoon firing or not, was not the most effective means with which to attack the enemy behind the barricade. Despite the fact that the English infantry discharged their first volley at close range, the French easily repulsed the English. Again, this shows that platoon firing was not all-powerful and could not offer a solution to every situation in battle.

Thus, the English firepower augmented by platoon firing was not sufficient for the English infantrymen to capture Blenheim. This is not to argue that the firepower was in fact insignificant. In certain circumstances, it proved its effectiveness, as Blackmore emphasised.[42]

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[40] Frances E. Colenso, *History of the Zulu War and its Origin* (Frankfort, Il: The Lancer Publishers, 2009, originally published in 1880), p. 304.
[41] *Ibid.*, f. 160.
[42] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 77.

Brigadier Rue led the attack at the head of his own brigade with steady firmness and true military coolness and self possession and his men were equal to their leader in undaunted resolution, soon drove the enemy from the outskirts of the village which they had strongly fortified. The attack then increased in vigour and the enemy were driven into the village, where they were too numerous to act, being wedged up into a dense mass so that our well directed fire produced a murderous effect. We retired about 80 to 80 yards as fast as they attempted to leave the village to put themselves in order to attack us.[43]

In this description, Stearne omitted the failure of the assault by Rowe's brigade and the mortal wound suffered by Brigadier Archibald Rowe. Instead, he focused on the English success in keeping the enemy from counter-attacking by its effective use of firepower. Robert Parker provided similar detail:

The enemy also made several attempts to come out upon us: But as they were necessarily thrown into confusion in getting over their trenches, so before they could form into any order attacking us, we mowed them down with our platoons in such numbers, that they were always obliged to retire with great loss; and it was not possible for them to rush upon us in a disorderly manner, without running upon the very points of our Bayonets.[44]

The first point here is that on this occasion, the specific condition of the battleground inhibited the French move, and the crucial factor of the English firepower was employed with maximum effect. This in turn indicates that, frequently, firepower had to be combined with other factors to be effective. The second is that whereas the English were able to stop the French counter-attack, they were nevertheless still unable to attack and take the village with the assistance of firepower. In other words, the superior technique of platoon firing created at best a stalemate, with considerable casualties on both sides. This did not create a serious problem at Blenheim, because

[43] NAM 1968-07-392, 'Journal of Robert Stearne, 1685 - 1717'.
[44] Parker, *Military Memoirs*, p. 40.

the attack on the village was only part of a larger battle, and regardless, it achieved its object of drawing French strength from the centre to reinforce the village. Nevertheless, it must be noted that relying excessively on firepower to win a battle poses a potential danger.

Another point is that Parker stated that the French could not 'rush upon' the English infantry army because of the English bayonets. This is worthy of note, considering that the English army was not particularly known for its prowess in the employment of the bayonet. As examined in the previous chapter, the English bayonet was repeatedly overpowered by the Highlanders' broadswords, French pike and socket bayonets. In contrast, despite the limited mention of the bayonet in English sources, the English army during the War of the Spanish Succession made a much more formidable appearance than during the previous period, as demonstrated at Schellenberg and now at Blenheim.

Several reasons for this improvement can be listed. First, it is useful to recall that James Douglass blamed the English defeat at the Battle of Landen for the lack of the socket bayonet. [45] Therefore, with its adoption, we can assume the English infantrymen were better prepared for hand-to-hand combat. Second, and equally as important as the technical improvement, the soldiers' experiences may have played a major role. As examined in the previous chapter, the Williamites at Killiekrankie were vulnerable to hand-to-hand combat, because they were inexperienced. As for Marlborough's army, there were relatively plentiful resources for recruits who saw combat during the Nine Years' War. [46] Cases such as the famous female soldier Christian Davis also show that at least some veterans reenlisted. [47] Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the soldiers in Marlborough's army had fought and won as a group at Schellenberg, surviving the vicious hand-to-hand combat during the battle. This experience of victory must have given them considerable confidence as a unit, which was vital to overcome the fear of close combat.

While the fighting raged on both flanks, Marlborough's main effort was finally unfolding at the centre. In the beginning, these actions were charges and counter-

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[45] BL, Add MS 27892, f. 217.
[46] H. C. B. Rogers, *The British Army of the Eighteenth Century* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 19.
[47] Carlton, *This Seat of Mars*, p. 76.

charges between the cavalries:

> Here was a fine plain without hedge or ditch, for the cavalry on both sides to
> shew their bravery; for there were but few foot to interpose, these being mostly
> engaged at the villages.…And now our squadrons charged in their turn, and
> thus for some hours they charged each other with various success, all sword
> in hand.[48]

As is evident here, the fact that the battleground was suitable for cavalry action made this battle significantly different from those of the Nine Years' War. In addition, the improvement in the quality of the English cavalry after the Nine Years' War, as mentioned earlier, may have enabled Marlborough, unlike William III, to choose to fight on such a ground.[49]

Subsequently, the other arms joined the combat, and the fighting at the centre took the form of combined-arms action:

> At length the French courage began to abate, and our squadrons gained
> ground upon them …... At the same time our foot came up, and Colonel Blood
> with nine field-pieces loaded with partridge-shot, fired on their foot, which
> obliged them to quit the horse and stand on their own defence.[50]

This passage implies that, at least at the centre, the battle was carried out broadly according to the doctrine that the infantry and artillery were to provide firepower, whereas the cavalry was to deliver a knock-out blow with the sword. Another source describes a similar sight:

> our gallant fellows began on to press and advance upon to charge them in
> return for all their attention, they charged and drove them before them like
> sheep, they retired to the height where they were first drawn up, here they

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[48] Parker, *Military Memoirs*, pp. 41–42.
[49] Dorrell, *Marlborough's Other Army*, p. 18.
[50] *Ibid.*

made a stand, and with ten battallions of infantry stopped our cavalry until they were supported by the infantry which now advanced against the enemy's foot which they gallantly forced, when the cavalry retrieved the charge and drove the enemy's cavalry not only from their position but from their last hope, they were thrown into disorder took to their heels and fled outright abandoning their infantry to their fate, scarcely a man of those ten battalions escaped with life except those who threw themselves down among the dead and remained as such.[51]

Here, how the cavalry and infantry supported each other is described in more detail. At the same time, the fact that the killing was mainly the cavalry's role is clearly implied. Another source provides more detail regarding the actions of infantry and artillery at the centre:

……… order'd Capt Gibbons to fire Cartrouch shott upon them, which was done with good success, & made a great slaughter of the Enemy. Notwithstanding all this they stood firm & closed their Ranks as fast as they were broke: till being terribly weakened, & put into disorder, they were forc'd to give way, & then our Squadrons fell in among them … cut them down in whole Rankes, as they were seen lying after the Battle.[52]

According to this report, infantry and artillery fire certainly caused significant casualties among the French ranks. Their main role was, however, to disrupt the enemy formation, rather than the killing. Delivering a final killing blow by 'cutting them down' was clearly the cavalry's task. This division of work continued at the final charge, again with 'sword in hand', which virtually concluded the battle.[53]

Thus, the decisive victory for the Allied army was concluded by cavalry sword. This might be interpreted as evidence of the validity of the standard tactic during this period, the combination of static infantry firepower and shock attack delivered by

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[51] NAM 1968-07-392.
[52] BL, Add MS 61408, f. 166.
[53] *Ibid.*

cavalry. However, it must be remembered that to achieve this kind of textbook battle, certain conditions had to be met: a formidable cavalry and suitable battleground were especially essential. Unfortunately, not every battle could meet such conditions.

The Battle of Blenheim provides insights regarding both the achievements and problems of the English army and the nature of combat during this period. The English infantry's platoon firing was certainly an important element of victory. However, its role must not be exaggerated. Its effectiveness had already been demonstrated repeatedly during the Williamite wars examined in the previous chapter, but this effectiveness did not always guarantee victory. In contrast, the English infantry actions at Blenheim, as well as those at Schellenberg, showed that there were clear limitations to what platoon firing could achieve. To attack fortified positions, the English infantry had to be ready for close combat. Both battles also demonstrated that despite the doctrinal emphasis on firepower, the English infantry were not afraid to, and indeed did not avoid, engaging in hand-to-hand combat.

Nevertheless, the sources examined in this section strongly suggest that hand-to-hand combat was not their preferred method of fighting. It appears that the bayonet was mainly employed as a defensive measure against an enemy charge, whether infantry or cavalry. In this sense, Blackmore was correct to observe that the English infantry during this period largely abandoned the aggressive assault tactics usually employed before 1688.[54] Interpreting this change in tactical preference as progress towards 'modern' is, although tempting, too simplistic considering the limitations of firepower. This, in fact, created a potentially serious problem for English and later British infantry tactics, as is discussed in more detail later.

Likewise, the battle showed that to achieve final destruction of enemy forces, aggressive attacks relying on edged weapons were still essential. As has been observed, the cavalry was the preferred option to deliver this attack in the English army during this period. However, this also could be a potential problem, because such a strict division of labour between infantry and cavalry was not always possible. In addition, such a division of roles requires elaborate mutual support between different arms. At Blenheim, this was a brilliant success and in many ways a demonstration of

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[54] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, pp. 66–67.

the ability of Marlborough and the Allied high command, especially considering the difficulty of commanding such a large coalition force. Nevertheless, this elaborate tactic also required many other conditions, such as a suitable battleground or the qualities and morale of the troops. Naturally, a commander could not always take such factors for granted.

Therefore, the Allied success at Blenheim cannot simply be attributed to one or two factors such as platoon firing or Marlborough's military genius. The details of the battle clearly show that the warfare and battles during this period are too complicated to explain in terms of firepower alone. Furthermore, it is clear from the examination of the battle so far that the English army did not win the day because their tactics were more 'modern' than their French counterparts.

2.3.   The Battle of Ramillies (1706)

The Battle of Ramillies has long been praised as one of Marlborough's most decisive battles, although there also has been growing criticism of the very concept of a 'decisive battle' and the 'battle-centric interpretation' of military history.[55] The aim of this study is not to discuss the 'decisiveness' of the battle fought at Ramillies or even the validity of the concept. As already stated, the battles during this period provide ample details about the theories and actual experiences of combat. Furthermore, a set-piece battle like Ramillies is one of the best examples of how the English army planned to fight and actually fought.

The basic outline of the battle is quite similar to that of Blenheim. It began with the English infantry's attack against the Franco-Bavarian left wing while the Allied Dutch Guards were attacking the right, following which Marlborough delivered the main blow to the French centre.

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[55] Jamel Oswald, 'The "Decisive" Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare', *Journal of Military History*, 64.3 (2001), 649–650. For a recent defence of the usefulness of the concept of 'decisive battle' to some extent, see Yuval Noah Harari, 'The Concept of "Decisive Battles" in history' *Journal of World History*, 18.3 (2007), 251–266. For the cultural implications of Ramillies, see *Ramillies: a commemoration in prose and verse of the 300th anniversary of the battle of Ramillies, 1706*, ed. by Demmy Verbeke, David K. Money and Thomas Deneire (Cambridge: Bringfield's Head Press, 2006).

The English infantry's attack, under the command of General Lord Orkney, against the French positioned around the villages of Offus and Autre-Église is particularly interesting, because it closely resembled the attack against the Blenheim village. They advanced through marshy ground, continuously suffering casualties from heavy French fire. One soldier from Hampshire provided vivid detail of the advance:

> They were commanded to cross the marsh by means of fascines and many were shot and maimed or killed, by the French outposts, which they carried and laid down their foundations …. He went on, the Frenchies seemed surprised and showed no mind to fight much. Some of them I saw turned tail and I spiked one of their officers through the gullet and another through the arse, where he spun like bacon upon a spit.[56]

This passage clearly shows that to attack and drive out the enemy, engaging in close combat was frequently unavoidable. Despite Kitcher's claim that the enemy showed little willingness to fight, the passage indicates that the Englishman approached the enemy close enough to stab directly at the opponent's neck. Thus, it was clear that at Ramillies, as at Blenheim, employing infantry only as a source of static firepower was unrealistic.

As at Blenheim, Orkney was not able to take his object. Nevertheless, he succeeded in making the French commander, Marshal Villeroy, move battalions from his centre to reinforce the left.[57] In the meantime, the fighting was raging at the centre, where Marlborough focused his main effort. The most dominant feature of the centre was the village of Ramillies. Thus, infantry action at the centre was more important than at Blenheim. Captain Peter Drake, an Irish soldier serving in the French army, provided a brief description:

> In short, they all left the Field with infinite Disgrace, except Lord *Clare*'s, which ingaged with a *Scotch* Regiment in the *Dutch* service, between whom there

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[56] Account of Tom Kitcher, quoted from James Falkner, *Marlborough's Wars: Eyewitness Accounts 1702-1713* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2005), pp. 102–103.
[57] Chandler, *Marlborough as Military Commander,* p. 175.

were great slaughter; that Nobleman having lost two hundred and eighty-nine private Centinels, twenty-two commissioned Officers, and fourteen Sergeants; yet they not only saved their Colours, but gained a Pair from the Enemy, which we may suppose the *Scotch* did not fare much better than the *Irish.*[58]

This shows that at Ramillies, the opposing troops were engaged in intense close combat, which may have entailed considerable hand-to-hand action.

Nevertheless, the action around the centre was not solely a matter of infantry clashes. As at Blenheim, other arms closely worked together. There was a particularly dangerous moment for the Allied forces when the French cavalry, the renowned Maison du Roi, counter-attacked and threatened the left flank of the Allied infantry. The crisis was narrowly averted mainly due to Marlborough's timely command decision and his personal bravery, or recklessness, depending on one's perspective.[59] After the intense fighting, there was a brief lull on the field, during which time Marlborough gathered more strength at the centre for the final attack, as he did at Blenheim. The Franco-Bavarian command was unaware of this:

> The Elector and Villeroy now found the mistake they committed by weaken their centre and right and sending troops to the left where they were and could be of no use, sent for them ordered them to up the assistance but of the centre, but before they arrived the game was up.[60]

After the pause, the Allied general attack finally came. The troops defending Ramillies continued to resist, but soon the entire Franco-Bavarian army began to crumble:

> the village of Ramilies was attacked by three brigades of foot one British one Prussian and one Hanoverian and who met with a resolute resistance until they saw their main body drawn from the field of battle, and the troops which were to have supported them ordered off ……. at all events without orders they

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[58] Peter Drake, *The Memoirs of Capt. Peter Drake* (Dublin, 1755), p. 83.
[59] Chandler, *Marlborough as Military Commander,* pp. 176–177.
[60] NAM 1968-07-392l.

shifted their quarters and fled out of the village leaving 20 pieces of cannon to the victors who were not at all displeased at observing the celerity of this last movement.[61]

The troops in Ramillies defended themselves to the last, till they saw their troops drove out of the field; upon which they drew off, and made towards their left wing: but were most of them cut to pieces before they could reach it.[62]

By this time the enemyes right wing of Horse being intirely defeated, the Horse on our left fell upon there Foote, on there right, of which they slew great numbers ……. The rest of the enemies Foot was intirely broake. ……. The enemyes Horse clearly abandoned there Foott, and our Dragoons pushing into the village of Auterglisse made a trebble slaughter of the enemy.[63]

Because of the brevity of these eyewitness accounts, a detailed reconstruction of the mechanics of combat is difficult in this final stage of the battle. Just as at Blenheim, the overall impression from these sources is of the relatively clear division of labour between cavalry and infantry. On the plain, the cavalry action was dominant, whereas the attacks against the village, including street fighting, were mainly the role of the infantry, which was reasonable. Colonie, who commanded a Franco-Bavarian brigade, stated, 'So vast was the plain at Ramillies' that it was suitable for large-scale cavalry action and cavalry charges with sword, which was one of the most decisive elements in the battle.[64]

In contrast, remarks about English or Allied firepower are not prominent in the sources. As at Blenheim, it can be assumed that the effectiveness of platoon firing was limited when the English infantry was in the position of attacking the enemy post. It must have been equally limited in confined spaces, such as the streets of Ramillies. At the same time, the sources imply that if the enemy infantrymen fought back resolutely and did not easily break, then driving them out from their post likely required

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[61] *Ibid.*
[62] Parker, *Military Memoirs*, p. 61.
[63] Deane*, A Journal of Marlborough's Campaign*, pp. 35–36.
[64] Colonie, *The Chronicles of an Old Campaigner*, p 305.

close combat. Another similarity with Blenheim was that once they succeeded in driving the enemy out into the open, it was the cavalry's task to ensure their destruction by the sword.

Therefore, Ramillies is an example of a set-piece battle. The quality of the Allied troops, the generalship and the ground all played important parts in the course and result of the battle. These factors were closely intertwined. However, it is unclear how critical the role of infantry firepower was. Although it must have played an important role, it was not the most decisive element in the battle. Certainly, the Allied victory cannot be attributed to 'modern' firepower. Furthermore, even in a typical, carefully planned pitched battle, employing infantry as a static provider of firepower and cavalry as the main source of shock attack once again proved impossible. Although it was clearly demonstrated that cavalry armed with sword was a most effective means of delivering the final killing blow, infantry was required in many different kinds of combat, and firepower could not be effective in all the situations.

2.4.   The Battle of Oudenarde (1708)

The Battle of Oudenarde was another major battle fought and won by Marlborough's army.[65] It has recently been an object of interest because it was the first large-scale action fought by the British army following Marlborough's adoption of a new drill of firing. According to Blackmore, this new experiment was the 'grouping together of a number of platoons that could either fire one by one within the firing or altogether' so the battalions now could 'keep up a continuous, effective and sustained fire'.[66] Oudenarde is particularly interesting, because it hints at the significance of this new method of delivering infantry firepower.

Another point of interest is that it was not a carefully planned battle, but rather an encounter battle that was different from Blenheim and Ramillies.[67] Although the distinction between them is not always clear-cut and Marlborough was clearly

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[65] For recent scholarly discussions on the Battle of Oudenarde, see *1708: Oudenarde and Lille* ed. by David Money (Cambridge: Bringfield's Head Press, 2008).
[66] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, pp. 79–83.
[67] John A Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, originally published in 1999), p. 319.

expecting a battle while marching to Oudenarde, the battle nevertheless occurred when both armies were not yet fully deployed, which was a significant difference between the previous two battles. It therefore offers an important case study of how different conditions affected the behaviour of the British soldiers in combat.

Because it was an encounter battle, Marlborough's favoured tactic of employing infantry and cavalry in a closely cooperative manner was impracticable at Oudenarde. Instead, it was dominated by infantry clashes, although there were some cavalry actions, such as the Hanoverian cavalry charge at the beginning of the battle and the Prussian charge during it.[68] Nevertheless, they were not as predominant as at Blenheim and Ramillies, as Marlborough subsequently explained to the Duchess of Marlborough:

> Our foot on both sides having been al ingaged has occasioned much blood,
> but I thank God the English have suffered less than any of other troupes, none
> of our English horse having ingaged.[69]

Likewise, artillery played little role in both armies, because most of the heavy artillery pieces were left behind, except for a few light regimental guns[70]. Thus, it can be assumed the combined-arms tactics that had brought illustrious successes to Marlborough was not an option at Oudenarde.

The infantry battle was extremely confused and hard-fought:

> The fight was verry desperate on both sides and continued from 5 in the
> evening as long as there was any light left in the sky. In wch. time the enemy
> was beate from hedge to hedge and from breastwork to breastworke, & from
> trench to trench that it was admireable; and one would have thought it
> impossible for them to have lost the battle, they having had so much time for
> to secure themselves as they always do of good strong ground, also getting

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[68] Jeremy Black described it as an 'hard-pounding infantry battle'. Jeremy Black, 'Oudenarde in Context', in Money, *1708*, pp. 26-29 (p. 28).

[69] 'Marlborough to the Duchess 1/12 July, 1708', in John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, *The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence* Vol. 2, ed. by Henry L. Snyder (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), p. 1024.

[70] Chandler, *Marlborough as Military Commander,* p. 216.

into villages and possessing themselves of houses, making every ditch & bank

a breastworke and every quicksett hedge like to a slight wall, or at least a blinde

that wee might not see them.[71]

In this passage, the resemblance to the description of the Battle of Steenkirk, examined in the previous chapter, is striking, despite the adoption of a new firing technique and all the genius of Marlborough and Eugene. This implies the significance of the nature of the battleground for the form of combat. As at Steenkirk, the infantry combat at Oudenarde must have been an aggregation of numerous localised fights over various positions formed around natural or artificial barriers. Sergeant Millner provided more detail about the combat:

Half of our Army, immediately advanced on with undaunted Courage, and vigorously attack'd the Enemies Right Wing next to them, and most open, and elsewhere, with small Shot, as regular and gradual as the Time and Ground permit.[72]

Blackmore interpreted this passage as a demonstration of the British infantry's successful application of the 'controlled and disciplined nature of platoon fire'.[73] It certainly is, and there is no doubt that on the occasion of a prolonged firefight, the British platoon firing must have taken a great toll on the French infantry. However, there is much more to be considered when explaining the battle. In this passage, Sergeant Millner stated that the British infantry presented sustained fire 'as the time and ground permit'. In such a prolonged battle on broken ground, there must have been ample occasions when the time and ground did not permit maintaining steady fire.

The battle lasted several hours, and it is difficult to imagine that both the British and French infantry were engaged in such a prolonged firefight without occasional breaks. The amount of ammunition they carried, and most likely their physical and

[71] John Deane, *A Journal of Marlborough's Campaign*, pp. 59–60.

[72] Serjeant John Millner, *A Compendious Journal of All the Marches, Famous Battles & Sieges* (Uckfield, Reproduced by Royal Military Academy: The Naval and Military Press Ltd, 2004), p. 216.

[73] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 83.

mental capacity, would not have allowed it. The most likely mechanics would be either that one side broke away after engaging in a firefight for a certain duration or charged with bayonets after sensing the wavering of the enemy. Sergeant Millner's next statement supports the latter:

> In short, small Shot continued very brisk and smart on both sides, with several fore Assaults and Repulses, from about Three in the Afternoon till past Nine at night, before it was fully ceased, or the Dispute decided: In which Time, with much to do, to speak the Truth, we drove the Enemy from Ditch to Ditch, from Hedge to Hedge, and from out of one Scrub to another, and Wood, in great Hurry, Disorder, and Confusion.[74]

Driving the enemy 'from Ditch to Ditch, from Hedge to Hedge' would have been difficult to accomplish by firepower alone and thus had to be accompanied by bayonet charge. The French records of the wounded reveal that, although musket shot caused the most wounds, there were nevertheless a number of bayonet wounds.[75] This indicates there were some occasions of bayonet fighting at Oudenarde. Therefore, the Battle of Oudenarde cannot be simply summarised as another demonstration of superior British firepower. The British infantrymen's ability to endure long and hard fighting and their willingness to engage in hand-to-hand combat played an equally, if not a more, important role compared to their platoon firing.

So far, the situation does not appear significantly different to the Steenkirk battle. Nevertheless, the overall fighting efficiency of the British army was clearly improved. At Steenkirk, as described in the previous chapter, the English infantry fought well, but was defeated by the decisive French charge. At Oudenarde, despite numerous charges and counter-charges, the British infantry did not collapse, although there were dangerous moments. In addition, although there were limitations of possible command and control in this kind of battle, the Allied command certainly performed better than at Steenkirk, and all this ultimately proved the critical difference.[76]

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[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 216-217.
[75] Philippe Levrau, 'Crippled by a Musket Shot and a Saber Clash' in Money, *1708*, pp. 60-72 (p. 70).
[76] Jones, *Marlborough*, pp. 161-162.

However, it must again be emphasised that Oudenarde also shows the limitations of what are often considered the decisive elements of battle, such as firepower and military genius. These were all important factors, but they were subject to several conditions. As already noted, the platoon firing of British infantry was effective as long as certain conditions were met, but they could not win the day by firepower alone. Although Marlborough's and Eugene's command were capable and flexible, the standard tactic they employed at Blenheim and Ramillies could not be used at Oudenarde. The complete destruction of the defeated enemy was also impossible:

> We gave them a merry salute, firing into there[sic] verry faces, the wch. they could not abide, but turned tayle and never faced more. And we should have followed them further than we did had we any Horse to have sustained us; but the ground not admitting our Horse to follow us, itt was thought requisite to forbeare.[77]

Therefore, Oudenarde serves as a reminder of the complexity of battle during this period. In addition, it shows that the firing tactic of the British infantry and Marlborough's generalship had their limits and potential dangers as well as strengths. This became clearer as the war progressed.

2.5.   The Battle of Malplaquet (1709)

The Battle of Malplaquet was the bloodiest battle the Duke commanded, with a loss of life that allegedly greatly shocked the British public.[78] Robert Stearne's report that 'the killed and wounded on both sides was enormous' reveals part of this shock.[79] Certainly, all of Marlborough's battles during the War of the Spanish Succession examined so far entailed a high casualty rate. Nevertheless, Malplaquet was distinct because this loss did not result in another great victory: as Oswald pointed out, 'even Marlborough's

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[77] Deane*, A Journal of Marlborough's Campaign*, p. 60.
[78] Jones, *Marlborough*, p. 182.
[79] National Army Museum 1968-07-392.

most ardent supporters acknowledge it was a Pyrrhic victory.'[80] More importantly, this battle reveals some of the serious weaknesses of the British tactical doctrine.

Again, Marlborough tried to implement his standard tactic. He and Eugene planned to attack the French flanks and then deliver the final crushing blow to the French centre. The problem was that due to the nature of the battleground, it was extremely difficult to successfully implement this plan. As Jones observed, unlike at Blenheim and Ramillies, 'there was a one-and-a half mile gap between dense woods' in the French centre, which was hardly ideal conditions to employ cavalry to smash the enemy centre.[81] To make matters worse for the Allies, the French commander Marshal Villars did his best to fortify the French position and made his centre a 'veritable death-trap', as Chandler phrased it.[82] Chandler's speculation that Villars and the French command had appreciated 'Marlborough's *penchant* for central attack' is more than possible.[83] It is natural that the enemy would have learned some lessons after several defeats by the same tactic. This was a serious potential weakness in Marlborough's tactics and a warning against putting too much focus on the military genius of a single individual.

As mentioned, the battlefield was flanked by dense woods at Sars and Lanières. Furthermore, as at Oudenarde, the ground was broken by hedges, which made the employment of cavalry difficult for both armies.[84] Therefore, for most of the day, the fighting was dominated by infantry clashes around the wooded areas and entrenchments, similar in many ways to Oudenarde. The problem was, however, that Marlborough and Eugene tried to employ the tactic that had worked at Blenheim and Ramillies. The Allied right under the command of General Schulenburg was to attack the French left through the wood of Sars, whereas the Allied left, consisting mainly of the Dutch army, was to attack the French right. Once the pressures on the flanks forced Villars to weaken his centre to support the flanks, the Allied centre with its cavalry would deliver the main blow to the French centre.[85]

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[80] Oswald, 'The "Decisive" Battle of Ramillies', 665.
[81] Jones, *Marlborough*, p. 179.
[82] Chandler, *Marlborough as Military Commander,* p. 256.
[83] *Ibid.*
[84] André Courvoisier, *La Bataille de Malplaquet, 1709: L'effondrement de la France évité* (Paris: Economica, 1997), p. 84.
[85] Chandler, *Marlborough as Military Commander,* p. 256.

One important incident is that which occurred during the fighting for the woods of Sars, as reported by Robert Parker:

> Upon this Colonel Kane, who was then at the head of the Regiment, having drawn us up, and formed our Plattoons, advanced greatly toward them, with the six Plattoons of our first fire made ready. When we had advanced within a hundred paces of them, they gave us a fire of one of their ranks: Whereupon we halted, and returned them the fire of our six Platoons at once; and immediately made ready the six Plattoons of our second fire, and advanced upon them gain. They then gave us the fire of another rank, and we returned them a second fire, which made them shrink; however they gave us the fire of a third rank after a scattering manner, and then retired into the wood in great disorder: On which we sent third fire after them, and saw them no more....therefore, there was a fair trial of skill between the two Royal Regiments of Ireland, one in the British, the other in the French service; for we met each other upon equal terms, and there was none else to interpose. We had but four men killed, and six wounded: and found near forty of them on the spot killed and wounded.[86]

Blackmore interpreted this as the 'clearest evidence of the superiority of British platoon firing over French fire by ranks'[87] However, a serious problem is that Parker was not present at the battle. He was training an army in Ireland at that time. As Chandler observed, those who were present at the battle did not mention this incident[88]. Considering that Parker was responsible for teaching the new firing tactic to the infantry regiments from 1708, as Blackmore mentioned, it is perhaps possible that he wanted to emphasise the effects of the training.[89]

Thus, we must be cautious of accepting the significance of the superior firepower of the British infantry at Malplaquet. On the contrary, other sources show that the French were not easily forced by British firepower to give up the wood of Sars.

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[86] Parker, *Military Memoirs*, pp. 88–89.
[87] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 88.
[88] Chandler, *Marlborough as Military Commander,* p. 262.
[89] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 84.

Sergeant Wilson, for example, reported fierce hand-to-hand combat:

> Wee beat them from that post and they beat us back again with as great courage and resolution as wee had them. Whereupon ensued an obstinate engagem't for the space of two hours in which there was a great effusion of blood on both sides; the Armys fireing at each other bayonett to bayonett. And after came to stab each other with their bayonetts and several came so close that they knocked one another's brains out w'th butt end of their firelocks.[90]

This is a rare detailed description of hand-to-hand combat from the British perspective. As noted, the British sources during this period mostly focused on the description of firepower and tended to make only passing remarks about the hand-to-hand combat. Therefore, Wilson's account can be interpreted as an evidence of the intensity of hand-to-hand combat at Malplaquet, which must have been sufficiently horrible to leave a deep impression to him. Clearly, it took considerable hand-to-hand combat for the British army to take the wood. If that was the case, the victory of the Royal Irish regiment by platoon firing must have been rather an isolated incident in the numerous confused encounters in the wood.

Furthermore, the French infantry in their entrenched positions were able to endure the heavy toll of the advancing British infantry even without platoon firing. Such defensive strength of field fortification had already been revealed by the Russian infantry at Poltava. In their well-fortified positions, French firepower was at least as devastating as that of the British, as Sergeant Millner's account demonstrates:

> It is impossible to express the Violence of either Side's Fire z besides the Enemies advantageous Situation, they defended themselves like brave Men, and made all the Resistance that could be expected from the best of Troops; but there could nothing be braver than to see our Foot surmount so many Obstacles, resist so great a Fire, force the Enemies Entrenchments, beat them from thence, and drive them quite out of the Wood.[91]

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[90] John Wilson, *The Journal of John Wilson*, p. 78.
[91] Millner, *A Compendious Journal of All the Marches,* p. 275.

On the French side, la Colonie reported similarly:

> It sustained the full fire of our infantry entrenched therein, and not withstanding the great number killed on the spot, it continued the attack and penetrated into the wood, a success which it owed as mush as being drunk with brandy as to martial ardour. If all our regiments had behaved equally well the enemy's infantry must have been entirely destroyed in this fight, and would never have been able to force their way over our entrenchments.[92]

Although the Frenchman's prejudice against his British foe must be considered, the fact that any mention of British fire is absent from this report is noteworthy. As seen at Blenheim and in other battles, the effectiveness of platoon firing had clear limitations when troops were attacking entrenched positions. This appears to have been little different at Malplaquet. Thus, the British success at the wood must have depended on the tenacity of the British soldiers and their willingness to fight hand-to-hand at least as much as their firepower. This kind of violent infantry *mêlée* raged on both flanks.

Even the Dutch, whose firepower techniques were often considered pioneers for the British, were not able to escape hand-to-hand combat, as the French counter-attacked with bayonets.[93] This is a clear demonstration that there were still many occasions when firepower alone could not win the battle. As André Courvoisier noted, numerous eyewitnesses testified that bayonet fighting was a constant at Malplaquet.[94]

Ultimately, these bloody conflicts at the flanks forced Villars to reinforce there by detaching forces from his centre, as at Blenheim, and thus the costly Allied attacks finally managed to weaken the French centre.[95] However, a decisive cavalry charge like those at Blenheim and Ramillies was again impossible. The ground was full of obstacles and trenches, and the Allied forces first had to clear a way for the cavalry. This was time-consuming.[96] When the Allied cavalry finally moved, the French cavalry

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[92] Colonie, *The Chronicles of an Old Campaigner*, p. 338.
[93] Courvoisier, *La Bataille de Malplaquet*, p. 82.
[94] *Ibid.*, p. 119.
[95] Jones, *Marlborough*, p. 181.
[96] *Ibid.*

were able to respond:

> The result was that the (British) cavalry were at liberty to pass through all the intervals in the entrenchments, and having reformed in the plain beyond, they moved straight upon the Maison du Roi, who likewise advanced to give them battle. The Scotch Guard of the Queen of England, most excellent troops, led the charge, which was a most violent one; and then the two sides, after the confusion of the first shock, disengaged themselves.[97]

After the battle had continued for a while, the French, now exhausted and with their commander Villars wounded, began to retreat. However, they retreated in good order after inflicting heavier casualties on the Allies. Marlborough reported that 'God has blessed us with a victory, we having first beat their foot and then their horse', but later, in a more detailed report, he admitted that 'the battel is extreame glorious for the armes of the Allyes, but our lose is very considerable'.[98]

Jones argued that 'it was faults in the execution of the Allied battle plan that prevented Marlborough and Eugene achieving a total victory'.[99] However, apart from the problem in the execution, we must also consider the problem with the British tactical doctrine. The British emphasis on infantry firepower is clearly revealed from the manuals examined in the first section of this chapter, although the British by no means neglected hand-to-hand combat, as was amply demonstrated at Malplaquet. In any case, Marlborough's preferred tactic involved the improvement of infantry firepower while reserving the 'shock' to the cavalry charge. As repeatedly argued in this chapter, this tactic was most likely to succeed on favourable ground. This potential danger was first observed at Oudenarde and again at Malplaquet, with more serious consequences.

Marlborough's standard tactic per se was not inherently 'modern'. Pinning down the enemy with infantry while delivering a decisive blow by cavalry charge was a tactic

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[97] Colonie, *The Chronicles of an Old Campaigner*, p. 342.
[98] 'Marlborough to Godolphin, 31 August/11 September 1709' and 'Marlborough to Godolphin, 2/13 September 1709', *The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence*, ed. by Snyder pp. 1360–1363.
[99] Jones, *Marlborough*, p. 178.

as old as the days of Alexander the Great.[100] What mattered was how to make this simple tactical principle to work properly in highly complicated battlefield conditions. In this respect, Marlborough's ability as a commander is undeniable. Nevertheless, unlike the days of Alexander the Great, when a commander could expect that well-armoured infantry could pin down enemy forces with few casualties, eighteenth-century infantry that engaged in a prolonged firefight could suffer a significant number of casualties while performing a similar role. Thus, Marlborough's army tended to suffer high casualty rates even when victorious. Moreover, this standard tactic could only result in a complete victory as long as the enemy was obliging. When the French army learned the lesson and fought under a capable commander such as Villars, Marlborough's invincible tactic was transformed at a stroke into a fatally dangerous one.

This is not to deny the effectiveness of the British army as a fighting force, nor the significance of firepower or of Marlborough's generalship. These were all real and present factors affecting the course and result of a battle. Nevertheless, they were not the only factors, and they were subject to numerous other, sometimes unforeseen, elements.

3. The Perceptions of War and Battle

3.1. The Language of Battle

During the late seventeenth century, the writings about battle, except training manuals, reveal surprisingly little about technological changes. Cultural depictions mostly borrowed language from the classical and medieval past or from the Bible to describe the battles. Even more realistic reports of battles were frequently remarkably similar to the depictions of the previous period's battles

However, these writings were not blindly following the literary traditions from the past. Even the languages with deeply religious implications, most typically in

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[100] Waldemar Heckel, *The Conquests of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 78.

reference to divine providence and its role on the battlefield, had highly diverse meanings according to each different author, as in the medieval age. Contemporary concerns and complexities were almost always integrated with the rich traditions of the literary conventions these authors inherited, creating a strong continuity that was by no means out-of-date.

This literary trend largely continued into the early eighteenth century. Except for manuals covering technical matter, such as Douglass' *Schola Martis*, most of the writings on war and battles did not attribute British victory to technological advances nor to the adoption of platoon firing. There are exceptions: most typically Robert Parker's description of the superiority of British firepower at Malplaquet. His claim that 'the manner of our firing was different from theirs; the French at that time fired all by ranks, which can never do equal execution with our Plattoon-firing' is one of the rare examples directly attributing victory to a tactical innovation.[101] However, as mentioned earlier, Parker was not present at the battle and had good reason to exaggerate the impact of platoon fire.

Furthermore, Parker's superior, Marlborough seemed to understand the mechanism of battlefield victory differently. After his victory at Blenheim, he wrote to his wife:

> This day the whole army has returned their thanks to Almighty God for the late success, and I have done it with all my heart, for never victory was soe complet, notwithstanding that they were stronger than we, and very advantageously posted. But believe mee my dear soul, there was an absolute necessity, for the good of the common cause, to make this venture which God has soe blessed.[102]

It could be argued that in this passage, Marlborough was merely following the common literary convention. The tone of his words, however, strongly implies his deep sincerity. He first lists the factors that could have worked against his army and concludes,

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[101] Parker, *Military Memoirs*, pp. 88–89.
[102] 'Marlborough to the Duchess, 7/18 August 1704', *The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence*, ed. by Snyder, p. 353.

therefore, that he owed his victory to God. His view remained, therefore, firmly pre-Enlightenment. This does not mean he was particularly superstitious. He of all men must have been aware that the battle was hard fought and that neither a meticulous plan nor superior firepower guaranteed victory. The battle could at any moment have gone in a very different direction. Such deep understandings of the uncertainties of battle must have sustained the notion of divine providence during this period, just as in Sir James Turner's days.

John Marshall Deane's account of the Battle of Oudenarde shows an interesting similarity:

> The fight was verry desperate on both sides …. And one would have thought it impossible for them to have lost the battle, they having so much time for to secure themselves as they always do of good strong ground, and getting into villages and possessing themselves of houses, making every ditch & bank a breastworke and every quicksett hedge like to a slight wall, or at least a blinde that wee might not see them. So that if God Almightys providence had not protected us and caused there contrivance to be of noe effect, they might, one would have thought, [have] cutt off the one halfe of our army. But thanks be to God who gives noe blessing to there darke endeavours, and I hope never will—for there cause would appeare more plainer and sound more applauseable to the world, although they ware conquered, should they souldier-like give us a fayr field; but that they scarce ever doe.[103]

The structure of Deane's account is remarkably similar to Marlborough's. Deane emphasises the enemy's superior position and argues that, despite their disadvantage, the British won the day because God protected them. Dean was a private soldier, albeit a reasonably well-educated one, but his belief that the battle was decided by God, rather than technology, was shared by the captain-general despite the difference between their ranks and positions in the army. Both Marlborough's letter and Deane's journal are private documents. Marlborough's letter was first intended to be read by

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[103] Deane, *A Journal of Marlborough's Campaign*, pp. 59–60.

his wife and possibly other members of their close circle. Deane's journal was primarily for himself and his close associates, and then possibly for a wider audience if he considered publication (although he did not publish it for unknown reasons). Whether they were intended for publication or not, what is clear is that their intended readers were the members of the literary class, and therefore it is safe to assume that their languages reflected the shared belief of the literary public during this period, or at least what was socially expected to be believed.

The belief that God favoured the British army because of the righteousness of the cause is different from James Turner's seventeenth-century understanding of divine providence. Turner's providence is closer to God's pre-ordained and often inscrutable course of action. According to Turner, the justness of a cause does not guarantee victory. However, considering that highly diverse understandings of providence existed in Turner's day and before, the differences between Turners' conception of providence and that of the early eighteenth-century writers are not surprising.

Divine providence is not the only continuity displayed in the writings on war during this period. Despite the turning of the century and the many visible changes on the battlefield, the disappearance of the pike being the most notable, the symbols and language employed to describe battle are strikingly similar to previous periods. Many ancient, medieval or biblical symbols and metaphors were actively employed. For example, Deane's journal of Marlborough's campaign described a cavalry attack as follows:

> The wch. they did in noble order, and gave them genll. Onset and broke them
> at a great rate, and begun to drive them Jehue-like, and forced to turn tayle
> and runn as lustily as they used to[104]

Jehu, mentioned here, was a biblical king of the northern Kingdom of Israel: a clear biblical symbol. Along with biblical metaphors, motifs borrowed from classical history are also easily found. In a verse dedicated to Marlborough, a poet asked:

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[104] Deane, *A Journal of Marlborough's Campaign*, p. 92.

Chaque jour est marqué par un fait éclatant.

Alexandre, & Caesar, en firent-ils autant?[105]

Symbolism from the classical past is as abundant as in the previous periods. Another ode to Marlborough in a fictional dialogue between 'Mars, the God of War' and 'Plutus, God of Riches' praises his victory, declaring, 'The Power of Gallia shaken'.[106] Here, the comparison with Julius Caesar who conquered 'Gallia' could not be clearer.

In many writings, descriptions of the details of battle are primarily dominated by accounts of human actions. For example, Francis Hare's description of the Battle of Blenheim does not mention God or imply providence. Despite being a clergyman and the chaplain-general of Marlborough's army, Hare's account of battle consists purely of tactical details.[107] However, this should not be seen as evidence of growing secularisation. As observed in previous chapters, writings focusing solely on human actions on the battlefield existed throughout the ancient, medieval and early modern periods. Deane and Hare's writings show that providence and human action continued to coexist in various writings during this period.

3.2.   Battlefield Emotions

The language employed by the soldier–authors to express their emotions during the War of the Spanish Succession also shows striking continuities from the previous period. It is difficult to find direct expressions of battlefield fear and detailed descriptions of other inner emotions. Emotions were displayed through highly restrained and concise language.

The indirect methods employed to convey the frightening circumstances of combat are a typical example of how similar the early eighteenth-century writings on battle are to those of the preceding century. Although the descriptions were often brief and might appear a little dry by modern standards, the authors' choices of specific

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[105] BL, Add MS 61360, f. 20.
[106] *Ibid.*, ff. 42–43b.
[107] BL, Add MS 61408, ff. 158–170.

words convey strong emotional undertones. For example, Robert Parker's description of the attack on Schellenberg is brief, but the words he used to describe the combat, 'a terrible slaughter ensued, no quarter being given', would have been sufficient to evoke the horrific battle scenes in contemporary readers' minds.[108]

The War of the Spanish Succession was distinct from previous wars in the sense that during this period, journals and memoirs written by private soldiers and NCOs began to appear, Private Deane and Sergeant Wilson's journals examined earlier being well-known examples. Of course, there is a question of how typical these soldiers were. Literate, educated private soldiers were certainly not in the majority during this period and this is why, despite the fact that written works from private soldiers did begin to appear, there are still only a handful of them. Chandler even suggested that Private Deane could be of a 'genteel origin', considering his education.[109] That they existed between most of the rank and file and officer class could be the reason why their writings are in general not fundamentally different from those of the officers. In other words, these soldiers and NCOs and their officers might have come from different social backgrounds, and their status in the army were clearly different, but they nevertheless could have shared similar sociocultural perspectives as members of the literary class.

However, the fact that their writings reveal similar perspectives on war to those of their officers does not necessarily mean these private soldiers and NCOs' understanding of war was fundamentally different to that of many other illiterate common soldiers. As we shall see, the common theme of military writings during this period was the languages of religion and honour. There is little to suggest that the soldiers who formed the rank and file of the British army during this period were less religious than their NCOs, the few literary fellow soldiers or the officer class. Likewise, honour was a strongly shared value at every level of early modern European society, from peasants to monarchs.[110] As Peter Wilson observed, early modern armies existed as a distinct group but not one isolated from the society.[111] Therefore, it is

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[108] Parker, *Military Memoirs*, p. 32.
[109] Deane*, A Journal of Marlborough's Campaign,* p. xiii.
[110] Beik, *A Social and Cultural History*, pp. 268–273.
[111] Peter Wilson, 'Warfare in the Old Regime 1648-1789', in *European Warfare 1453-1815*, ed. by Jeremy Black *(*Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 69-95 (pp. 74–75).

highly possible both officers and soldiers and many of the literary public who read their writings shared a broadly similar sociocultural view of warfare.

It has previously been discussed that Private Deane's perception of God's role in battle and presentation of his rationale was highly similar to the thoughts and expressions of the Duke of Marlborough. Both men conveyed the emotion they felt during the battle in the same manner. Likewise, Sergeant John Wilson's account of the same battle at Schellenberg uses a method similar to Robert Parker's:

> And the enemy received us w'th such warmth, both from their own shott and prodigious fire of cartridge shott from their Batteries that they obliged us to retire with considerable loss, and which had likely to have been of great damage further, by the retreat, to putt our second line into confusion and disorder.[112]

Here, words such as 'warmth' and 'prodigious fire' are employed to describe the intensity of the combat that caused 'considerable loss'. The same author's report of vicious hand-to-hand combat at the Battle of Malplaquet quoted in the previous section is one of the best examples of how just a few sentences could convey the horror of such combat to readers through the choice of words:

> Whereupon ensued an obstinate engagem't for the space of two hours in which there was a great effusion of blood on both sides; the Armys fireing at each other bayonett to bayonett. And after came to stab each other with their bayonetts and several came so close that they knocked one another's brains out w'th butt end of their firelocks.[113]

If we were to expect a private soldier to have expressed his feelings in combat in a more frank, unrefined manner or to have admitted feeling fear more honestly, then we would be disappointed. Of course, soldiers' language was sometimes coarser than their upper-class counterparts. For example, Private Tom Kitcher's account from the

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[112] John Wilson, *The Journal of John Wilson*, p. 43.
[113] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

Battle of Ramillies shares his experiences of spiking 'one of their officers through the gullet and another through the arse, where he spun like bacon upon a spit'.[114] However, battle participants rarely expressed battlefield emotions in the manner in which modern readers might expect. As is evident from Sergeant Wilson's account of Schellenberg and Private Deane's account of Oudenarde (as discussed in the previous section), soldiers often calmly narrated what happened during the battles. The fear they surely felt was only indirectly implied through the vivid description of bloody scenes and through their choice of language, as was common for officers in their writings. These linguistic trends were, in many ways, the extension of the convention that the seventeenth-century soldier–authors followed to express the strong emotion they felt on the battlefield. This tradition was widely shared by the early eighteenth-century soldier–authors, regardless of rank.

As in the previous century, the emphasis on individual and collective bravery and honour was another important method for conveying emotion to the reader. This concept is sometimes misunderstood as applying exclusively to the members of the officer class. However, Ilya Berkovich recently argued that an emphasis on honour was an important means with which to combat fear and motivate soldiers in eighteenth-century armies.[115] Furthermore, such emphasis was not merely a tool with which officers would control and encourage the common soldiers. The writings on war during this period clearly show that such a culture of honour was deeply ingrained in and shared by both officers and private soldiers in the early eighteenth-century British army. Such sentiment was extended to the praise of bravery or honourable behaviours of the enemy, most likely because the culture of bravery and honour was universally shared. For example, Deane praised the French defenders at Schellenberg, for they 'made a brave defence and a bold resistance against us as brave loyall hearted gentlemen souldiers ought to for there prince and country'.[116] Deane, as already observed, believed that God was on the side of the British and their allies because God would never bless the 'darke endeavours' of France and her allies. [117]

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[114] Account of Tom Kitcher, from Falkner, *Marlborough's Wars: Eyewitness Accounts*, p.103.
[115] Ilya Berkovich, 'Fear, Honour and Emotional Control on the Eighteenth-Century Battlefield', in *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800*, ed. by Kuijpers and Van Der Haven, pp. 93-110.
[116] Deane*, A Journal of Marlborough's Campaign*, p. 7.
[117] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

Nevertheless, Deane did not hesitate to praise the French soldiers when he believed they were acting as honourably, as soldiers should.

One of the most common phrases used to acknowledge the bravery of a group during this period was 'with great courage (or bravery) and resolution'. The phrase frequently appears in writings by both officers and men:

The enemy maintained their post with great resolution for an hour and ten minutes[118]

The British and Dutch began the attack with their usual bravery and resolution, and the enemy defended the batteries and works with obstinate bravery[119]

his men were equal to their leader in undaunted resolution[120]

Wee beat them from that post and they beat us back again with as great courage and resolution as wee had them.[121]

These passages show the phrase was used to describe the exceptional bravery of both the friendly and enemy armies. The phrase 'with great courage and resolution' was employed in writings on battle during the Civil War and continued to be used throughout the seventeenth century, showing another important continuation of a literary convention from the past. Of course, it could be argued that it was a mere convention rather than sincere admiration. However, considering the deeply ingrained culture of honour in both popular and elite culture during this period, as discussed earlier, it is more likely that many of them were expressions of honest admiration. In this sense, it is meaningful that Private Deane praised the bravery of his French opponents precisely because he believed that they behaved as good soldiers are supposed to in battle.[122] This strongly indicates that there was a shared value in an

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[118] Parker, *Military Memoirs*, p. 32.
[119] NAM, 1968-07-392.
[120] *Ibid.*
[121] John Wilson, *The Journal of John Wilson*, p. 78.
[122] Deane*, A Journal of Marlborough's Campaign*, p. 7.

army as an 'emotional community' regarding a soldier's conduct, which is, in fact, not significantly different from the concept of honour in early modern British society in general (as well as in French society and many others).

The praise for individual heroism and bravery also indicates strong continuity. Francis Hare's description of 'gallant' Brigadier General Row, who stoically advanced undaunted by heavy fire from the village of Blenheim until he stuck his sword into the palisade, is an excellent example.[123] Deane's praise of the royal prince of Hanover (later King George II) is strikingly similar:

> The royal prince of Hanover in this action behaved himself wth. Undaunted courage, exposeing himself in the thickest of the fire at the head of his troops until his horse was shott from under him, & afterwards charged them on foot, sword in hand, bringing off a Ffrench officer prisoner with his own hands.[124]

Both Hare and Deane's accounts place emphasis on the brave individuals' courage under fire and have the phrase 'sword in hand' in common. They present the traditional portrait of a heroic warrior, similar to the classical heroes or medieval knights who constantly appeared in writings on battle throughout the seventeenth century. The concept of soldierly behaviour which is exemplary and therefore worthy of praise was shared by the broad members of the British army during this period, as it can be found in many writings from officers, NCOs and some private soldiers.

Other battlefield emotions examined in previous chapters, such as fear and grief, largely continued to be expressed in similar ways to the previous period. It was still expected that soldiers would be fearless, and thus the soldier–authors mostly did not directly express their fear in their writings but instead described the fearful circumstances in battle, as their predecessors did in the seventeenth century. In contrast, grief at the loss of life was more frankly expressed than the previous period on some occasions. Marlborough, after the Battle of Malplaquet, wrote to the Earl of Godolphin:

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[123] BL, Add MS 61408, ff. 159–160.
[124] Deane, *A Journal of Marlborough's Campaign*, p. 61.

In so great an action it is impossible to gett the advantage but by exposing men's lives; but the lamentable sight and thoughts of itt has given me so much disquiet, that I believe it the chief cause of my illness, for to see so many brave men killed with whome I have lived these eight years, when we thought ourselves sure of a peace.[125]

Here, Marlborough did not discriminate between the death of officers and common soldiers. All those lives lost at battle under his command clearly affected his heart, and he did not hesitate in admitting it.

Similarly, Private Deane expressed the remorse he felt at the Battle of Blenheim:

The village was sett on fire before we came to it by the enemy whereby they thought to have blinded our gunners, but great and grevious were the cryes of the maimed, and those suffering in the flames after we entered this village and none is able to express it but those that heard it.[126]

The passage shows that Deane felt the sympathy for the wounded enemies' agony. The last part of the sentence indicates that this experience traumatised him greatly. He also described the sight of the battlefield post-battle in a similar vein:

I can and will affirm that the earth was covered in a manner for three English miles together with. Dead bodys of both armies soe that from any more such sights good God deliver me.[127]

Marlborough and Deane's writings show that both the captain-general and the private could not be callous to the horrible effects of battles: death and injury, and suffering. Such emotional expressions were rare in the seventeenth century. As examined in previous chapters, the soldier–authors who fought in the seventeenth-century wars expressed their grief at the death of specific individuals they knew but were largely

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[125] 'Marlborough to Godolphin', in *The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence*, ed. by Synder, p. 1381.
[126] Deane*, A Journal of Marlborough's Campaign*, pp. 11–12.
[127] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

silent on the general carnage of combat. They sometimes described the horrible scenes of battle and 'the dismal groans'[128] of wounded men, but nevertheless refrained from describing the horror or sympathy they felt at such sights, unlike Marlborough and Deane here. Although Marlborough and Deane's description may not be as detailed as modern war memoirs, they certainly felt remorse towards their dead or injured friends and foe, and shared their troubled heart with their friends, family and the literary public. Their frankness and the rhetoric they used to deliver it is a small but important new development during this period.

It could be tempting to imagine the battlefields of the early eighteenth century as dominated by the neat lines of the British redcoats, and the Austrian and French Whitecoats exchanging volleys. This appears fundamentally different from the battles of the Civil War, where the battlefield was still full of massive blocks of pikemen. However, many soldier–authors and many of their readers' perception of battles and warfare had more in common with the previous century than is often imagined. The philosophical understanding of God and warfare was similar to that of the previous period, and the language used to report on battle and convey the emotions of the combatants was often surprisingly unchanged.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has examined the development of British tactical doctrine during the early eighteenth century and the nature and experience of combat during Marlborough's campaign of the War of the Spanish Succession. In terms of doctrine, the concern for a more effective method of presenting infantry firepower that began in the late seventeenth century continued. The broad consensus was that infantry should be employed to provide firepower and cavalry for shock attack. Nevertheless, the possibility of hand-to-hand combat by infantry was never overlooked, and most of the

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[128] Drummond, *of Sir Ewen Cameron of Locheill*, p. 268.

British military theorists remained cautious. In the field of battle, this broad principle was sometime successful, and British firepower proved effective on many occasions. However, the British successes were not the result of this firepower-oriented tactical principle alone, nor were they solely the product of the military genius of Marlborough, although all these elements certainly played their part.

Furthermore, the tactical principle could not be expected to be applied one hundred per cent on the battlefield, considering the uncertainties inherent in battle during this period. In fact, Blenheim and Ramillies were the only occasions when this principle was most successfully applied, and even in these cases, the British infantry frequently found themselves engaged in hand-to-hand combat. Oudenarde demonstrated the potential weakness of the standard doctrine, and Malplaquet more clearly revealed the danger. Furthermore, the enormous casualties the British infantry suffered in almost every battle, regardless of victory, remained an unsolved problem.

The popular perceptions of warfare and battle also displayed strong elements of continuity from the past. The writings about war and battle, whether by the combatants or not, show that the understanding of military affairs was still formed by the classical past or by religious mentalities. It is difficult to identify any technological determinism during this period. All these aspects demonstrate that British military history during this period cannot simply be described as showing great progress toward 'modernity' or the triumph of 'modern' firepower.

Chapter Four. The Army and Battle, and Understanding Warfare: The Mid-Eighteenth Century

This chapter covers one of the most significant periods in British military history. After the brief Jacobite Rising in 1715, the kingdom experienced unusual decades of peace, until this was interrupted by a European war and another internal rebellion. The battlefield achievements of the British army during these conflicts were not as spectacular as the period examined in the previous chapter. Historians have also described a dismal picture of the peacetime force, highlighting the lack of proper training and the general neglect of the army.[1]

However, there is a completely different image of the British army during this period, both in academic studies and in the popular imagination. It has been frequently claimed that the British army's mastery of 'modern' firepower was finally achieved during this period, most notably at the Battle of Culloden (1745). More specifically, as Jeremy Black explained, the victory of British defensive firepower over the broadswords of the charging Highlanders at Culloden has often been interpreted as signalling the triumph of modern technology over earlier forms of warfare'.[2] Charles Carlton, for example, recently argued that 'Culloden was the culmination of military changes that took place in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries'.[3] Accordingly, this period represents a critical watershed in the conventional grand narrative of the triumph of gunpowder and the resultant rise of modern warfare. According to these two strands of opinions, strangely, the mid-eighteenth-century British army was both neglected and trained while also simultaneously being the bringer of 'modernity' and technological advances.

Such contradictory claims pose a difficult question. How is it possible for a neglected army so poor in quality and low in number to be described as a champion of 'modernity' in warfare? Surprisingly, such a contradiction does not appear to have been considered a serious problem in the historiography to date. Houlding described

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[1] For the most notable examples, see Houlding, *Fit for Service*, pp. 1–4. Also, see the chapter on the British Army by Stanley D. M. Carpenter in *A Companion to Eighteenth-Century Britain,* ed. by H. T. Dickinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 473–480.

[2] Jeremy Black, *Other Pasts, Different Presents, Alternative Futures* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), pp. 131–132.

[3] Carlton, *This Seat of Mars*, p. 171.

the difficulties of the British army during peacetime but nevertheless argued that the infantry 'had developed a successful (if complicated) system of fire tactics and with it a keen perception of the supremacy of heavy fire over any other form of combat'.[4] Moreover, Stanley D. M. Carpenter argued that despite 'peacetime neglect and low funding', the British army performed 'as well as or better than its adversaries' in part due to its superior firepower.[5] More specifically, Carpenter explained, the British were able to deliver volleys faster than their opponents, and this was a 'tremendous tactical advantage.'[6] Therefore, from this perspective, the British army could still be a force of 'modernisation', because it kept its superiority in firepower. However, these explanations are not entirely satisfactory. This study has, so far, examined the limits of firepower in early modern combat. Mere superiority in firepower could not cure all the ills of the army, especially the lack of combat experience among the soldiers. This chapter traces military development in Britain during this period and suggests a more plausible answer to this intriguing puzzle.

1. Problems during Peacetime

Prior to its participation in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), Britain was largely free from major war, with the exception of small-scale actions against the Jacobites. The Battle of Dettingen (1743) was the first significant pitched battle in which the British army had fought since the Battle of Malplaquet in 1709.[7] In other words, the army saw no major action for more than three decades, which was unprecedented in the period covered in this study.

Numerous historians have described the causes that led to the decreased effectiveness of the British army as a fighting force during this time. First, nearly every historian of this period mentions the widespread public animosity towards the army that began at the time of the Cromwellian military dictatorship and continued until as late as the First World War. Although the glories of Marlborough's victories were

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[4] Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 178.
[5] Carpenter, 'The British Army', pp. 473–479.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 479.
[7] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 95.

proudly remembered, they did not seem to change the public opinions of the army. Stephen Brumwell argued that 'distrust of the soldier went to the very core of the national character'.[8] Similarly, Carpenter described how 'the army chronically suffered from popular dislike and government neglect' in part due to the public perception of soldiers as 'drunken, prone to crime (particularly petty theft), a threat to individual liberty, property and women, and the tool of overweening monarchs.'[9] This could hardly have been ideal conditions under which to motivate individual soldiers.

In terms of combat effectiveness, government neglect must have been a more serious problem than popular dislike. Because of this government animosity, the army suffered from the 'chronic lack of funds.'[10] The deeply ingrained hostility of the governing elite towards the professional standing army is well reflected in a speech by William Pitt the Elder, the Earl of Chatham, made during the War of the Austrian Succession:

> If you take care to discipline the farmer, the day labourer, the mechanic, each of these may become a good soldier, and always prepared to defend the country in case of an attack. Each of these, having another mode of livelihood, may be a good subject also: but the man who solely depends upon arms for bread, can never be a good subject, especially in a free country. For this reason, we ought to maintain as few regular soldiers as possible, both at home and abroad; we ought never to retain them long in service; knowing that very few, afterwards, will turn for their support honest and industrious employments.[11]

Not only is enmity towards the professional army easily discernible in this speech, but there is also praise of the virtues of the citizen soldier, reminiscent of Machiavelli, who made the sharp contrast between the citizen militia and the mercenary army.[12] Of

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[8] Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas 1755-1763* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 55.
[9] Carpenter, 'The British Army', p. 473.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] Francis Thackeray, *A History of the Right Honourable William Pitt, Earl of Chatham: Containing His Speeches in Parliament; a Considerable Portion of His Correspondence, when Secretary of State, Upon French, Spanish, and American Affairs, Never Before Published…* Vol. 1 (London, 1827), pp. 126–127.
[12] Interestingly, the Royal Navy never suffered the public animosity the army had to endure during this period. Apparently, the Machiavellian dichotomy of unreliable professional force and virtuous citizen

course, apart from these philosophical reasons, the fact that Pitt in his political career always advocated overseas trade and a strong navy should also be considered for his argument against the standing army.[13] The state of the British army during this period was generally in line with Pitt's wishes. The regular army in peacetime was maintained at minimum size and only enlarged upon the breakout of conflict, then quickly reduced when the war was over, according to the principle shared by both Whigs and Tories that a large standing army would pose a threat to the constitution.[14]

The second problem was the effectiveness of training for the army. Again, the dominant opinions among historians are not favourable. Houlding, for example, argued that the British army during peacetime could spare very little time for training, mainly because it was constantly performing other duties, most notably those of a police force and a garrison.[15] Therefore, the only opportunity to 'carry on intensive advanced training' was once a war began.[16] Carpenter noted that the opportunity for 'live-fire training' was limited.[17] This is especially surprising considering the frequent emphasis given in conventional narratives of European military history to the role of firepower during this period.

The third problem was that most of those in the rank-and-file lacked combat experience. There is, however, little point in criticising this per se, because it was fundamentally unavoidable in peacetime: how could an army gain combat experience when there was no war to fight?

In addition, the failure of 'professionalisation' has also been the object of frequent criticism, as regiments remained the private property of colonels despite several efforts to reform this practice.[18] Again, the problem of the professionalisation of the British army can be overstated: the practice of regiment being de fact personal property of its commander was widely shared by most of the European states during

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militia was not applied to the navy. Andrew Lambert argued that 'after the trauma of the Commonwealth', the Royal Navy became a 'national institution, one that commanded universal support' mainly due to the naval reform initiated by James II and continued royal patronage afterwards. Andrew Lambert, *Admirals: The Naval Commanders who made Britain Great* (London: Faber, 2008), p. 118.

[13] Jeremy Black, *Pitt the Elder* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 110.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 37–38.

[15] Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 3.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 347.

[17] Carpenter, 'The British Army', p. 477.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 475–476.

this period. In France, for example, the captains and colonels purchased their commissions and equipped their units with their own resources, and 'company or regiment was thus an investment.'[19] The critical difference was that the French army, unlike their British counterpart, was engaged in a major European war – The War of the Polish Succession (1733–35) – during this period. In other words, in terms of professionalisation, the British and French armies during this period were not fundamentally different: they differed mainly in the size of the standing army and its combat experience.

In light of these conditions, it must be admitted that the statement that the 'British army was not at the cutting edge in tactical practice, let alone debate or innovation' during this period contains more than a grain of truth.[20] The British army at this time lacked most of the conditions suggested by historians as elements that enabled soldiers to endure the stress of combat effectively (see the 'Modern Theories on Combat' section in the Introduction). As previously discussed, training for battle, which according to Hew Strachan is the 'best antidote' to fear, was inadequate during peacetime.[21] Furthermore, because the soldiers of a regiment were not living in the barracks or in other military housing during these periods, it was difficult for them to develop group cohesion, which many theorists of combat motivation have stressed as integral to military success.[22] Again, the widespread notion that the British army achieved a 'high level of effectiveness and superiority over their enemies' through the use of firepower during this century increases the oddity of the concurrent structural problems of the army.[23]

Certainty, caution should be exercised before drawing an overtly grim picture of the British army during this period. In fact, its predicament at the time was remarkably similar to that of the early and mid-Republican Roman army (that is, the army prior to the reform of Gaius Marius) which, as identified in Goldsworthy, was 'a curious mixture of a citizen militia and a professional force' and the armies were

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[19] Beik, *A Social and Cultural History of Early Modern France*, p. 209.
[20] Black, *Britain as a Military Power*, p. 62.
[21] Strachan, 'Training, Morale, and Modern War', 5–6.
[22] According to Houlding, one British regiment from 1737–1743 spent '63 percent of its time totally dispersed in billets or upon the march' and it was not an exceptional case. Houlding, *Fit for Service*, pp. 1–2.
[23] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 167.

'impermanent and of very varied quality'. The legions were typically disbanded after each campaign and, therefore, 'its accumulated experience' disappeared with it. When a new conflict occurred, a new army had to be raised and trained again.[24]

Of course, the critical difference between the Republican Roman force and the British army during the first half of the eighteenth century was that the Roman army was almost constantly at war, and thus there were plenty of veterans to recruit.[25] Nevertheless, there were many raw recruits as well, and it is likely that many of the veterans who reenlisted in the newly raised legion had not previously fought as a unit.[26] However, this structural impermanence did not make the Roman army during this period significantly less effective than other more professional standing armies (for example, the armies of the Hellenistic kingdoms which the Romans destroyed), nor did it greatly hinder the Republic's expansion. This implies that a similar problem would not necessarily have been an insurmountable obstacle to the British army becoming an effective fighting force.

Compared to other major contemporary European armies, the lack of combat experience of the British army was certainly a significant disadvantage, but not necessarily an irreparable one. As already examined, the French army had more combat opportunities than its British counterpart, but it shared many structural problems with the British army. The Austrian army was constantly engaged in wars, such as Turkish Wars and the War of the Polish Succession. However, during the reign of Emperor Charles VI, the army was as neglected as the British and was already revealing serious problems in its efficiency.[27] Militaristic Prussia maintained a large, well-disciplined standing army, but the Prussian army from the end of the War of the Spanish Succession to before the War of the Austrian Succession did not participate in major wars, except the small-scale involvement at the War of Polish Succession, and therefore its combat experience was as limited as that of the British army. Thus, most of the major European armies during this period were having their own problems

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[24] Adrian Goldsworthy, *Roman Warfare* (London: Cassell, 2000), pp. 47–49.
[25] As Patricia Southern in her recent work on Roman Britain observed, during the Republic, 'there was an army in the field on an almost permanent basis.' Patricia Southern, *Roman Britain: A New History 55 BC-AD 450* (Stroud: Amberley Publishing, 2013), p. 60.
[26] Goldsworthy, *Roman Warfare*, p. 49.
[27] Charles W. Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1618-1815,* 3rd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 164–167.

to various degrees, and the British army did not uniquely suffer from more serious problems.

As for group cohesion, recent research has suggested that its effectiveness can be developed over a relatively brief duration of time. For example, Christopher Hamner argued that 'a degree to which members of a group share a commitment to some collective goal' is frequently sufficient to achieve a significant degree of unit cohesion.[28] A fine example of this is Republican Roman legionaries, who often found themselves fighting alongside those they did not know until they were placed in the same unit. Likewise, after the defeat at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942–1943, the German command desperately gathered whatever forces were available and formed the 'Armee-Abteilungen (provisional armies)' which possessed, according to Robert Citino, little fighting capacity. Nevertheless, after some months they somehow began to function effectively enough as units. Citino claimed that 'they had at least been working together for months now, and familiarity had bred a sense of confidence'.[29] Considering these ancient and modern examples, there is little reason to assume that the British army regiments would not develop similar group cohesion.

Indeed, despite the limited opportunity for training during peacetime and the fact that many were new recruits hastily gathered after the war broke out, lacking prior combat experience, they had to go through the period of training as a unit once the campaign force was formed. This training period provided some opportunities to build a level of unit cohesion. As King argued, this cohesion built by training could be decisive in combat.[30] Furthermore, these men also shared an identity and a degree of common culture. Recently, Ilya Berkovich argued that the soldiers of the old regime, including British soldiers, shared a 'culture of honour' which 'prompted a sense of corporate identity, professional pride and esprit de corps'.[31] Even if we assume that such a culture was distinctively weak among the British troops, which is unlikely, at the very least they shared one 'collective goal': to survive. In this sense, the British army

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[28] Hamner, *Enduring Battle*, pp. 155–207.
[29] Robert M. Citino, *The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012), pp. 54–64.
[30] King, *The Combat Soldier*, p. 335.
[31] Ilya Berkovich, *Motivation in War: The Experience of Common Soldiers in Old-Regime Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 229.

during this period, despite numerous problems, certainly did not lack the potential to be effective on campaign.

Thus, the condition of the British army and its value as a fighting force during peacetime cannot be simply described in a few sentences. There were certainly structural and other inevitable problems due to the lack of combat experience. How seriously these problems hindered the British army's conduct during war is far less certain. To understand it better, the actual combat performance of the army must be examined. This is covered in more detail later, but first the official army doctrine during this period must be examined. Varied and complex factors influence an army's effectiveness, among which are most certainly doctrines and the understanding of war. The next section discusses how theories on battle for the British army developed during this period.

2. Military Theories and Peacetime Doctrine

As observed in previous chapters, military doctrine and the overall military culture of a specific period was heavily influenced by the lessons and experiences of previous wars. It was even more so during this period. Marlborough's victories left a lasting mark on the British public's memory of its military history. In particular, British officers were proud of the army's achievements under Marlborough and tried to learn from them: histories of Marlborough's campaign and battles were some of the most common books read by British officers during this period.[32] According to Ira Gruber, this produced a negative effect. He argued that 'in the years between the War of the Spanish Succession and War of the Austrian Succession when most of Europe was at peace and when French soldiers were beginning to search for "rules and principles" for warfare, British officers were satisfied with what they had achieved under Marlborough' and shaped 'their tactics to what had succeeded at the turn of the century and eschewing theoretical debates'.[33] If this was true, it meant the British army had significant problems not just regarding its lack of training but more seriously regarding the contents of the training it did conduct. To be fair, of course, it must be added that

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[32] Gruber, *Books and the British Army*, p. 13.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

the reluctance to change the tactics which proved successful in the previous war is by no means unique to the British army during this period.

No significant new book about the 'art of war' was published during this period, and certainly nothing comparable to Turner's *Pallas Armata*, published in the seventeenth century. However, this does not mean that the British understanding of warfare and combat stagnated during this period. Equally, the fact that the British officers' preferred texts were histories of Marlborough's campaign does not necessarily indicate that they uncritically followed the tactics of the previous war.

As Gruber mentioned, one of the most popular books for British officers during this period was Lieutenant General Humphrey Bland's *Treatises of Military Discipline* (1727).[34] Bland was an experienced general who served under Marlborough in the War of the Spanish Succession; he also fought against the Jacobite Rising of 1715.[35] Therefore, we can assume that his experiences in these conflicts were reflected in his work, and he made such an intention clear:

> But considering how few old Officers remain, and that they are diminishing every Day, I hope I shall not be censured for having ventured to commit to Writing the little knowledge I have acquired in Military Matters.[36]

Bland apparently shared his contemporary's confidence in the ability of the British army, noting the 'great Reputation of the British Arms'.[37] However, he lamented that no significant work of this kind had been written since the seventeenth century and stressed the need for a comprehensive new book about war which reflected the changed nature of fighting. His instructions on battle were different from the previous period, a point worth examining. Despite his claim, Bland's work was not a theoretical discourse on warfare like those of Orrery and Turner. Rather, it was closer to a comprehensive training manual for officers. In terms of infantry tactics, it does not represent a significant departure from previous periods. Therefore, it is not surprising that Blackmore argued that 'it contained nothing that would be considered innovative

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 70.
[36] Humphrey Bland, *Treatises of Military Discipline* (London, 1727), a3.
[37] *Ibid.*

by his fellow officers; if anything it looked backward'.[38] Nevertheless, there is an important change which offers evidence of Bland's critical rumination of his own experiences.

As examined in the previous chapter, the basic doctrine for the British army from the late seventeenth century into the eighteenth was that the infantry provides firepower, whereas the cavalry delivers a killing blow to the enemy once sufficiently weakened by infantry fire. In particular, it was observed in the previous chapter that James Douglass strictly forbade infantry charges against the enemy because it would break formation.[39] Bland's instructions, however, note an important difference:

> The commanding Officer of every Battalion should march up close to the Enemy, before he suffers his Men to give their Fire; and it the Enemy have not given theirs he should prevent their doing it, by falling upon them, with the Bayonets on the Muzzles the Instant he as fired, which may be done under the cover of the Smoke, before they can perceive it: So that by the Shock they will receive from your Fire, by being close, and attacking them immediately with your Bayonets, they may, in all Probability, be beat with a very inconsiderable Loss: But if you don't follow your Fire that Moment, but give them time to recover from the Disorder yours may have put them into, the Scene may change to your Disadvantage.[40]

Here, the emphasis on an aggressive bayonet charge clearly contrasts with Douglass's instruction. In terms of doctrine, Bland's tactic closely resembles that used during the days of the Civil War and subsequent periods. This might be seen as corroborating the statement that Bland looked backwards. However, Bland's instruction must not be dismissed simply as a regression to the tactics of earlier periods. It is clearly evident from the passage that the intention behind this change in doctrine was to reduce casualties.

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[38] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 96.
[39] BL Add MS 27892, f. 253.
[40] Bland, *Treatises of Military Discipline*, pp. 133–134.

Despite the illustrious success of the British army under Marlborough during the War of the Spanish Succession, one serious problem remained unsolved: the British army continuously suffered significant casualties in each battle, even when it was victorious. The extent of British losses at the Battle of Malplaquet was especially shocking and, while claiming victory, the British suffered more casualties than the French. However, there was no opportunity to refine the tactics to mitigate this issue because it was the final large-scale battle fought by the British during the war. It is highly likely that Bland, as a first-hand witness of the war, was keenly aware of the problem. His emphasis on a 'very inconsiderable Loss' supports this contention.

As evident from Malplaquet and other battles fought previously, a sustained firefight inevitably led to a great number of casualties for both sides unless one was quickly defeated. In addition, the numerous variables related to the terrain of the battlefield meant that the application of a standard set of tactics was not always possible. In many cases, the British infantry was unable to swiftly overwhelm the enemy by firepower alone. Despite the instructions from their manuals, battles such as Oudenarde and Malplaquet found British infantrymen engaged in prolonged hand-to-hand combat with opposing troops. In light of these experiences, Bland's recommended tactical alternative was certainly not unreasonable. In addition, Douglass's concern about maintaining order was not entirely lost on Bland:

> When any of the Battalions have forced those they attack'd to give way, great Care must be taken by the officers to prevent their Men from Breaking after them; neither must they pursue them faster than the Line advances: For if a Battalion advances out of the Line, it may be attack'd on the Flanks by the Enemy's Horse, who are frequently posted between the first and second Lines for that Purpose. The Commanding Officers must therefore remain satisfied with the Advantage of having obliged the Enemy to give way, and not break the Line by advancing before it in the Pursuit.[41]

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[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 134–135.

Here, Bland's instruction is almost identical to that of Douglass. It can be observed that the fundamental principle remained unchanged: the infantry's role was to break the enemy formation and send them into flight. The difference lay in whether to achieve that goal by sustained firepower or a short volley followed immediately by a bayonet charge. Apparently, Bland judged the first option likely to cause a considerable loss in manpower due to his prior experiences. Regardless of the strengths and weaknesses of his instruction, it is clear that he attempted to learn from the past by critically analysing these experiences.

Not everyone arrived at the same conclusion as Bland. Brigadier General Richard Kane was another subordinate of Marlborough whose work was widely read by British officers during this period.[42] Gruber examined the books preferred by the British officers who served during the mid-eighteenth century, and Kane's book features in the preferred list.[43] His book consists of two parts: the military history of Marlborough's campaign and Kane's own version of a tactical manual. Blackmore argued that surviving evidence indicates Kane's negative opinion of Bland's work.[44] Whether or not this is true, Kane's approach to infantry combat is clearly different from Bland's:

> AS soon as the first Fire is made, the Colonel, without making the least Stop or Hesitation, orders his Drum to beat a second preparative, on which the six Platoons of the second Fire make ready, and go on, as in Figure B: when they have fir'd he immediately beats the third Preparative; on which the six Platoons of the third Fire make ready … And thus the Colonel continues his Firings standing, without Intermission between them. … Let us suppose that the Enemy be returning their Fire, and obstinately maintain their Ground: In this Case the Colonel is to advance upon them … Note, the nearer he approaches the Enemy, the nearer he is to keep to the Battalion; otherwise he would be a particular Mark to them; and then, if he finds they stand their Ground, he gives the Word HALT, on which the Front-Rank kneels and the Rear-Ranks of the

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[42] Gruber, *Books and the British Army*, pp. 30–31.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[44] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 101.

Platoons that are to fire, close forward; … and so he continues his Firings as fast as he can, until he obliges them to give Way, or perhaps, seeing us advance upon them, after the above Manner, they have already given Way.[45]

This passage clearly demonstrates that Kane's objective was to break the formation of the enemy through sustained firepower, a tactic Bland tried to avoid. This indicates that two different methods for the British infantry to follow were suggested and discussed during this period (and it was Bland's method that was implemented, as is discussed later). Whereas Bland expressed concern over excessive casualties, it appears Kane did not.[46] In Kane's account of Marlborough's campaign, there are few indications that the British firepower doctrine could have caused such serious losses. For example, in describing Malplaquet, Kane held the high command largely responsible for the high casualty rate (while simultaneously granting Marlborough a slight exemption from blame):

It was the most desperate and bloody Attack and Battle that had been fought in the Memory of Man; and both our Generals were very much blam'd for throwing away so many brave Men's Lives, when there was no Occasion: It was only rash Thing the Duke of Marlboro' was ever guilty of; and it was generally beliv'd that he was press'd to it by Prince Eugene:[47]

Thus, it appears that, for Kane, there was little reason to change the firepower-centred infantry tactics that had been established since the late seventeenth century.

In that sense, Kane somewhat over-simplified the complex realities of eighteenth-century battle he himself had witnessed. Although his emphasis on sustained firepower and the absolute prohibition on engaging in hand-to-hand combat might appear more 'modern' than Bland's doctrine, Marlborough's battles, as already mentioned, repeatedly proved that such an ideal was unachievable. To be fair, Kane

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[45] Richard Kane, *Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne from 1689, to 1712. Also, A New System of Military Discipline* (London, 1745), pp. 119–120.
[46] There is, of course, no exact definition of 'excessive'. Nevertheless, as observed in the previous chapter, the British public judged the level of casualties suffered at Malplaquet excessive.
[47] Kane, *Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne*, p. 85.

was certainly aware of the inevitable circumstances under which a neat line of fire could not be maintained:

> It rarely happens that two Armies meet in a fair Plain, but one or the other takes to some advantageous Piece of Ground, or throws up an Intrenchment to cover them, so that in attacking them there frequently happens great Disorder and Confusion.[48]

In such circumstances, Kane suggests the following solution:

> Wherefore, in this case, I shall take Notice of another Branch of Discipline, which our authorized Martinet knows nothing of, nor has it been practised many Years … And that is what we call breaking the Battalion … but as 'tis impossible for Battalions to climb Trenches or Ditches, without breaking, and running into great Disorder, and often several Regiments intermingling together, as I have, upon some Occasions, known it; then, surely, a Method ought to be put in Practice, whereby Battalions may know how they many readily form, and draw up in Order again.[49]

Again, there is no mention of hand-to-hand combat. Kane's focus is almost entirely on maintaining formation. This becomes clearer as the instruction continues:

> Suppose our Battalion to be thus train'd up, and that upon some Occasion we have been oblig'd to Break, and run into great Disorder, so that Officers and Soldiers are intermingled, and all in Hurry and Confusion; this is a Consequence which frequently attends the Foot, when they attack the Enemy that are posted behind Intrenchments or Ditches, especially after they got within them; … And suppose that we drove the Enemy out of all their Cover, and are pursuing them into a Plain; the first Thing we are to do is to put ourselves in

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[48] *Ibid.*, p. 128.
[49] *Ibid.*

Order, lest the Enemy's Horse seeing us in Confusion, come and cut us to Pieces.[50]

Here, the priority is to re-form the line as soon as possible, even when the infantry is obliged to break formation to attack the enemy. Thus, the main concern is how to proceed after driving the enemy from their position; there is no mention of how to drive them out. Therefore, it appears that strictly remaining in formation and firing volleys was an ideal state for the infantry. Breaking formation for aggressive action was an exception to be kept to a minimum. In addition, Marlborough's tactical principle that the cavalry should deliver the killing blow was once again confirmed. Maintaining formation was undoubtedly one of the most important elements of early modern combat and, therefore, Kane's advice was generally sound. Nevertheless, considering the highly fluid and unpredictable nature of battle, breaking formation could function as more than an exception. The failure to consider such unpredictable situations, including the unavailability of an effective cavalry force, was a significant problem.

Keen's emphasis on infantry firepower and maintaining formation continues during his discussion of defensive battle:

Upon the Front Rank's advancing up to the Parapet, the second Rank marches up to their Ground, and then makes ready, without waiting the Word of Command, where a Serjeant stand to see them do it, and to hand them up to the Officer. Thus when the Front Rank has fir'd, the Second marches up to the Parapet, where the Officer stands to receive them, and give the Word, Present, and Fire; by which a constant Fire will be maintain'd, and the whole Battalion in constant Motion, and with due Care may be kept in very good Order.[51]

This passage indicates that Kane assumed that sustained firepower should be sufficient to repel an enemy attack. The rationale is identical to that of platoon firing, which had been the standard doctrine since the late seventeenth century. Surprisingly, Kane seemed unconcerned about the eventuality of an enemy breakthrough. If

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[50] *Ibid.*, p. 129.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

sustained firepower had failed to stop the enemy advance, as repeatedly occurred in the previous war, the British infantry trained according to Kane's manual would have faced a significant dilemma.

This total exclusion of the possibility of hand-to-hand combat is the most serious flaw in Kane's seemingly 'modern' instruction. It is difficult to understand why Kane, who himself experienced the complicated and unpredictable nature of combat during the War of the Spanish Succession, was so inflexible in his treatise. Perhaps he genuinely believed that strict adherence to the maintenance of formation could prevent a confused *mêlée* and, thus, a second Malplaquet. However, the criticism of Kane's work can go too far. With the exception of the instruction regarding the bayonet charge, Bland and Kane's treatises have more in common than in contrast. For example, Bland's instruction on defensive battle is almost identical to Kane's:

> As the Breast-Work, Parapet, or Hedge is before the Men, they are obliged to Fire standing, and therefore no more than one Rank can Fire at a time, which begins with the Front Rank, who as soon as they have Fried, are to Form in the Rear, that the Center Rank may March up and Fire; and when they have Fired, they are to Form in the Rear also, that the Rear may March up and do the same. … By this means you may keep almost constant Fire, since the Time between each will be very inconsiderable.[52]

This passage reveals that the maintenance of sustained fire was equally as important for Bland as it was for Kane. Bland and Kane wrote the two manuals most widely read by mid-eighteenth-century British officers, and they disagreed with each other. Certainly, they were in agreement that firepower was important: the area of dispute regarded to what extent the combat should be dominated by firepower when the infantry was 'to engage in the line' in the field.[53]

Thus, it can be concluded that the tactical instructions for the British infantry during this period were clearly developed according to standard practices established in the seventeenth century. There were some variants as to the most effective method

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[52] Bland, *Treatises of Military Discipline*, p 83.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

of attacking the enemy, influenced by recent experiences. In general, there were two strands of thought: one was to charge with bayonets following a very brief firefight, whereas the other focused on breaking the formation of the enemy through sustained fire. Neither was particularly new or innovative: the former was the standard tactic during the mid-seventeenth century, and the latter had become a standard tactic by 1688. Nevertheless, this does not mean these tactics were the products of a reactionary mindset, nor they were doomed to be ineffective on the field of battle. Indeed, their usefulness in combat is examined in detail in the subsequent section. As for the concept of a 'reactionary' mindset, it must be highlighted that the debate over the relative merits of cold steel and firepower was a heated one in continental Europe during the entire eighteenth century. As Gruber noted, Jean Charles de Folard believed that 'soldiers in column equipped with pikes or bayonets would always defeat soldiers in line with muskets and artillery, that shock would ever be superior to fire'.[54] Maurice de Saxe's argument for the re-introduction of the pike is one of the most typical examples of such debate:

> And the rear-ranks, as they are likewise covered by the front, will exercise their
> pikes with more intrepidity, and be capable of doing infinitely more service, than
> if they were armed only with firelocks.[55]

David Chandler denounced Saxe's attitude as 'reactionary', expressing surprise 'that a man as intelligent as Saxe should have been as reactionary as to wish to employ it'.[56] However, considering the nature of combat at the turn of the eighteenth century (as examined in the previous chapter), it is doubtful that Saxe's attitude was derived mainly from a reactionary mindset. In any case, this comparison shows that the development of military thought in Britain was broadly in line with that of the continent. British military thinking might have been more insulated during this period, as Gruber argued, and their reading materials were largely confined to the histories of the Marlborough campaign referenced earlier;[57] nevertheless, the essential infantry

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[54] Gruber, *Books and the British Army*, p. 42.
[55] Maurice de Saxe, *Reveries, or, memoirs concerning the art of war* (Edinburgh, 1759), p. 46.
[56] Chandler, *The Art of Warfare*, p. 67.
[57] Gruber, *Books and the British Army*, p. 13.

tactics included in Saxe were not so different to those of Bland. This suggests that British tactical doctrine was not fundamentally distinct from that of France, even prior to the latter's effect on British military methodology.

Overall, military development in Britain during this period exhibits both strengths and flaws. The inherent difficulties of a peacetime army were clear and worsened by the general hostility of the British to the standing army. Nevertheless, in terms of doctrine and theory, Britain was far from stagnant. As is evident from the examples of Bland and Kane, veteran officers during this period were eager to pass on their wartime experiences to a new generation of officer, and not content to merely imitate Marlborough's tactics uncritically. Although there were some weaknesses and flaws in their theories, British military doctrine, as particularly evident in Kane's work, was steadily, albeit cautiously, developing during this period in a similar direction to its continental counterparts.

3. The Realities and Experiences of Combat

As discussed earlier, the War of the Austrian Succession compelled the British army, following a long interval, to engage in several large-scale pitched battles. The Jacobite Rising of 1745 also resulted in major confrontations in Britain. This section examines some of those battles, especially those which have become highly symbolic in later historiography. By reconstructing the actual experiences of combat during this period, it is possible to understand the results of peacetime training and doctrinal development. In addition, this reconstruction forms the basis for a comparison of contemporary and later understandings of the battles of this period.

3.1. The Battle of Dettingen (1743)

The Battle of Dettingen was fought between the French army and the so-called Pragmatic army formed by the allied British, Austrian and Hanoverian forces.[58] As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the British army faced the French army in major battle for the first time since the Battle of Malplaquet. Therefore, the British conduct at Dettingen and its comparison with that of the War of the Spanish Succession provides useful means with which to measure the influence of the peacetime years.

Dettingen ended in a victory for the Pragmatic army that has often been attributed to the alleged superior firepower and firing discipline of the British infantry vis-à-vis its French counterpart.[59] Many contemporary accounts confirm that it was British firepower that played one of the most decisive roles in the result of the battle.[60] The problem, as examined in the previous section, is that Bland's manual, which was widely used by the British officers during this period for training, did not instruct the use of firepower alone in order to win a battle: it recommended the bayonet charge. Does this mean that the British army did fight and win in a 'modern' manner despite its flawed doctrine? A detailed examination of the battle shows that things are a little more complicated.

The progression of the battle was fairly simple: the French army fairly successfully drove the Pragmatic army into a corner. A French officer later recollected that 'we could have, without any resistance, brought down our enemies, made them surrender arms, or destroyed them (*Nous avons pu, sans coup férir, perdre nos ennemis, leur faire rendre les armes, ou les détruire*)'.[61] However, instead of pressing the advantage and forcing the Pragmatic army to surrender without a fight, the French force chose to risk a pitched battle.[62] As they began their advance, George II also gave the order for the Pragmatic army to advance.[63] The official British account of the battle recounts that 'our Lines halted half Way to the Enemy to give the Soldiers Time to

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[58] There has been no major scholarly work on the battle since the publication of Michael Orr, *Dettingen, 1743* (London: C. Knight, 1972).
[59] Black, *European Warfare 1660-1815*, p. 125.
[60] For example, anon, *British Glory Reviv'd. Being a Complet Collection of All the Accounts, Papers, Expresses, and Private Letters, Relating to the late Glorious Action at Dettingen* (London, 1743), p. 39.
[61] BL Add MS 35363, 'Copie d'une lettre d'un officier Français du Camp de Seligenstatt le 29 juin 1743', f. 40.
[62] Black, *Britain as a Military Power*, p. 62.
[63] The London Gazette, no. 8240.

breathe; and having given a general Shout or Huzza, marched on to the Enemy with great Alacrity'.[64] Maintaining its neat formation was crucial in the era of linear battles. Nevertheless, stopping and redressing the line was no easy task during a battle. It was even more impressive considering that the British infantry had been under heavy French artillery fire before the advance and was already taking significant casualties from these volleys.[65]

As examined in Chapter Two, a similar act was carried out by the English infantry at the Battle of the Dunes in 1658. Julius Caesar's veteran infantry did the same during the Battle of Pharsalus in 48 BCE, a battle often cited as a demonstration of the 'frightening display of their discipline'.[66] This indicates that the British infantry at Dettingen, despite their lack of combat experience. was no less disciplined than the Cromwellian veterans at the Battle of the Dunes or Caesar's veteran legionaries. Despite the enormous chronological gap, this comparison is meaningful. Such similarity could have occurred in part because the eighteenth-century British officers were familiar with the ancient examples due to their classical teachings and consciously tried to imitate them. Caesar's *Commentaries* was one of the most popular books among British officers during this period and, as Gruber pointed out, they 'recommended, discussed, cited, or listed' Caesar's work, although there is no clear evidence that Caesar's particular tactic at Pharsalus influenced the British infantry's similar behaviour at Dettingen.[67] Another possible reason is that the fundamental mechanics of infantry combat in the eighteenth century still had strong elements of continuities from ancient battles and therefore certain behaviours of ancient armies were still relevant on eighteenth century battlefields. Lastly, it is worth noting that the behaviour of Caesar's legionaries at Pharsalus, the Cromwellians at the Dunes, and the British infantry at Dettingen was, in fact, what was expected of well-disciplined soldiers: maintaining formation was extremely important in battle and redressing the line was a natural thing to do. However, again, as mentioned earlier, doing it in the face of enemy was no easy task, and only a reasonably well-trained army could achieve this successfully.

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[64] *Ibid.*
[65] *Ibid.*
[66] Adrian Goldsworthy, *Caesar: The Life of a Colossus* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), p. 521.
[67] Gruber, *Books and the British Army*, p. 155.

This last point also illustrates that the training they received during peacetime, despite all its flaws, was not totally inadequate. Nevertheless, as this passage implies, British infantry actions were by no means perfect:

> A large Squadron of Horse, that happened to be at the Head of the French Line of Foot, upon the Lest of their Center, having kept that Post whilst we were advancing, provoked Part of our Front Line to fire upon them: This occasioned all the Line to fire too soon.[68]

This premature firing was the direct opposite of Bland's instructions. The aim of Bland's doctrine was to avoid a prolonged firefight that might result in excessive casualties. However, such a firefight was exactly what happened at Dettingen. Sources, though, generally agree that it was not the result of British intentions:

> The Major and I (for we had neither Colonel nor Lieutenant-Colonel), before they came near, were employed in begging and ordering the men not to fire at too great distance, but to keep it till the enemy should come near us; but to little purpose.[69]

James Wolfe's account clarifies that the original instruction for the infantry was to hold fire until the distance between them and the enemy was sufficiently shortened. This is confirmed by the report of Colonel Duroue, who specifically stated that it was 'judged that the whole fire had been given without Orders, against the Directions to preserve ours, and first to receive the Enemy's, then giving ours and charging with Bayonets'.[70] Blackmore was, therefore, certainly correct to highlight that 'if Dettingen had been won by firepower alone that had not been the intention'.[71]

Opening fire prematurely could happen very easily on a battlefield, especially when a unit was under sudden attack. Maintaining iron discipline in the face of an enemy assault was, without a doubt, a considerable psychological burden. The British

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[68] The London Gazette, no. 8240.
[69] Beckles Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe* (London: Heinemann, 1909), p. 37.
[70] Quoted from Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 108.
[71] *Ibid.*

infantry at Dettingen displayed a similar level of discipline to the veterans of the Civil War before they were attacked by the French cavalry However, once under attack, the discipline abruptly broke down and the infantry opened fire too early. The lack of combat experience was most likely one of the main variables at play here. This impression was shared by others, as later demonstrated by Marshal Maurice de Saxe's comment that the British at Dettingen were 'unexperienced in war'.[72]

The result was, unsurprisingly, a prolonged firefight. One source stated that the first line of the British infantry 'engaged the first Line of the French; and after a most terrible Fire of half an Hour'.[73] However, it is unnecessary to paint too grim a picture of the British army at Dettingen. Although they failed to defeat their opponents in a single volley and a decisive charge, they at least performed well during the firefight. The first line of the British infantry soon recovered their discipline and drove out their French counterpart in a fierce firefight.[74] The French second and third lines attacked in turn, but were repulsed.[75] There are numerous testimonies of the effectiveness of British firepower at Dettingen. At the same time, multiple sources state that the French infantry failed to respond adequately to the firepower of the British infantry. This is confirmed by French sources:

> The infantry was unable to uphold against the enemy fire and folded, apart from the brigades of Auvergne, Navarre and of the King those who remained alone in the middle of enemy fire, but less exposed than those of Auvergne. There are regiments that returned three times to charge, but they were repulsed and did not wish to cross the line. … The action lasted three hours, after which the infantry no longer wishing to march upon the enemy, we were forced to beat out retreat passing via the gorge and we re-crossed the Main.[76]

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[72] de Saxe, *Reveries*, p. 276.

[73] Anon, *British Glory Reviv'd*, p. 39.

[74] John Roydon Hughes, transcribed by Jeremy Black, 'An Account of Dettingen', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 64.260 (1986), pp. 250–251. Originally from Somerset Record Office, DD/TB 16 FT 18.

[75] Reed Browning, *The War of the Austrian Succession* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 139.

[76] TNA SP 78/228/86, 'Relation de la Bataille d'Ettingen', ff.6–7. 'L'infanterie n'a pu soutenir le feu de celle des ennemis et a plié, hors les brigades d'Auvergne, de Navarre et du Roy qui sont restées seules au milieu du feu des ennemis, mais moins exposées que celle d'Auvergne. Il y a des régiments qui ont retourné trois fois à la charge, mais ils se sont rebutés et n'ont pas voulu mordre. … L'action a duré trois heures, après quoi l'infanterie ne voulant plus marcher aux ennemis, nous avons été obligés de

But prodigious fire from their infantry put our cavalry in turn into disarray. The infantry failed to uphold and our whole right flank folded, the guard regiment of foot soldiers rushed into the Maine where as many were lost by shots as by fire.[77]

It must also be emphasised that the British infantry did not remain in one position while firing, but steadily advanced against the enemy in the process.[78]

Thus, British infantry firepower was generally superior to their French counterparts at Dettingen, and the British infantrymen showed both readiness and a capability to endure enemy fire. Why, then, did they fail to follow their original instructions? The 'herd instinct', mentioned in Chapter 4, offers a useful explanation. As noted repeatedly, the British infantry at Dettingen was mostly inexperienced, and charging into hand-to-hand combat was extremely difficult for inexperienced soldiers. In contrast, corralling together would have provided powerful relief from the stress of combat. Training and group cohesion formed by a shared identity would also have undoubtedly assisted soldiers in their attempts to remain in formation and continue firing on the enemy. However, charging against enemy soldiers with a bayonet was completely different. The bayonet charge inevitably broke any cohesive formation, as the soldiers had to cross a bayonet with the enemy as an individual. Overcoming the fear of such isolation, as well as man's visceral fear of edged weaponry, requires more than discipline and training. Experiences of such combat and soldiers' trust in their comrades (and their ability to engage in hand-to-hand combat) are particularly vital. The British army at Dettingen lacked both these elements.[79]

Nonetheless, the Pragmatic army was victorious, largely through British infantry firepower. It might be argued that this was a more 'modern' method to win a battle than

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faire notre retraite passant par le défilé et nous avons repassé le Main'.
[77] BL Add MS 35363, 'mais un feu prodigieux de leur infanterie a mis notre cavalerie en déroute à son tour. L'infanterie a mal soutenu et toute notre droite entière a plié, le régiment des gardes à pied se précipitant dans le Mayne où il a perdu autant par tires que par le feu'.
[78] The London Gazette, no. 8240.
[79] Similarly, many soldiers of the American Civil War, most of whom had no pre-war military experience and received little training on bayonet fighting, were generally not prepared psychologically to engage in hand-to-hand combat. Jonathan M. Steplyk, *Fighting Means Killing: Civil War Soldiers and the Nature of Combat* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2018), pp. 90–118.

the tactics outlined in official doctrine. However, the reality was more complicated. The Allied victory by firepower at Dettingen was a product of numerous factors, many of which had nothing to do with 'modernity'. Above all, the French army hastily abandoned its favourable position and risked a battle. It is possible that the French army expected the British to be overcome without a serious fight, considering that the overall situation was so unfavourable to them, as one French officer's account implies:

> They should have had to lay down their arms, or flee by way of the mountains; they were without supplies. It was to my great amazement to see them cross the stream, and this obviously disturbed those in our ranks. … It was easy to ascertain due to the lack of order amongst us, after their passage through the stream, that things would not work to our advantage: not a single officer who knew where to place the brigades according to how they advanced. We understood that even the General himself had absolutely no order of battle in mind. Each man was therefore placed by chance.[80]

If this were the case, it may explain why the French infantry psychologically collapsed before the British. Furthermore, it can easily be imagined why 'a Panick [sic] run thro' the French, at seeing our First Line still able to oppose their third, that they turn'd about and Retreated'.[81] Contrary to the French expectation, the British infantry proved more determined than its opponent at the crucial moment of the battle, as Wolfe recounted.[82] However, again, it may have been relatively easier for the British officers than their French counterparts to motivate their men, as it was vital for their own survival to escape the French trap. This, in turn, suggests that the British mastery of infantry firepower was only a small part of the mechanics of victory at Dettingen. Poor leadership on the French side and their psychological unpreparedness played at least

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[80] BL Add MS 35363, 'Il fallait qu'il mît bas les armes, ou qu'il fuît par les montagnes; il était sans ressource. Mon étonnement a été grand de voir passer le ruisseau, et qui dérangeait nécessairement nos rangs. … Il était aisé de juger au peu d'ordre qu'il y avait parmi nous, après le passage du ruisseau, que les choses ne tourneraient pas à notre avantage: pas un seul officier qui sût où placer les brigades à mesure qu'elles avançaient. On comprenait que le Général même n'avait arrangé dans sa tête aucun ordre de bataille. Chacun s'est donc placé au hasard'.
[81] 'An Account of Dettingen', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, p. 251.
[82] Willson, *The Life and Letters*, p. 37.

equally important roles. None of these elements, leadership and morale, are strictly relevant for 'modern' battle alone. In addition, the role of battlefield topography must be considered. While reflecting on the causes of defeat at Dettingen and victory at the Battle of Fontenoy (1745), Marshal Saxe explained that Dettingen was fought in an open field, which made the nervous soldiers prone to flee.[83] The trapped British soldiers, however, had nowhere to flee, and their choice was therefore more limited.

In summary, British victory at Dettingen was not an inevitable triumph of 'modern' firepower. That the battle was largely dominated by a prolonged firefight in fact demonstrates the inexperience of most British soldiers. Although the British infantry's ability to endure this prolonged firefight and the effectiveness of their firepower should not be downplayed, the victory was only possible when these were combined with further, mostly coincidental, factors. In other words, when circumstances were less fortunate for the British, their mastery of firepower was unable to guarantee a similar victory. This is demonstrated more clearly in later battles.

3.2. The Battle of Fontenoy (1745)

About two years after Dettingen, the British and French armies clashed once more at the Battle of Fontenoy. In the interim period, the British army had put great effort into infantry training, especially in terms of improving infantry firepower, as noted by Blackmore.[84] Consequently, the discipline of the British infantry at Fontenoy was much greater than at Dettingen. Likewise, their firepower once again earned the praise of their enemies. Nevertheless, at Fontenoy the French army emerged victorious under the leadership of Marshal Maurice de Saxe. This demonstrates that battles during this period were decided by more than firepower or infantry discipline.

One of the most important and distinctive features of the battle was a sophisticated system of field fortifications created by Saxe. Unlike Dettingen, it was not a headlong clash between two opposing forces on an open field. As noted above, in his memoir Saxe himself described this as the most important determinant of the battle. Immediately after the war, he explained his rationale in more detail:

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[83] Saxe, *Reveries,* p. 349.
[84] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, p. 108.

The enemies attacked us in a position where I drew all the advantage that several years of experience could give me. We can say that the disposition enabled us to win the victory, because having prepared several reserves, it enabled me to bring back fresh corps to the charge.[85]

Even at a time of crisis for the French army during the battle, Saxe explained that 'the posts I had fortified by redoubts held continuously for the entire duration of the battle'.[86] Considering the conditions of the battlefield, Fontenoy was closer to the Battle of Malplaquet during the War of the Spanish Succession than the more recent Dettingen, as Black noted.[87] Similar to Malplaquet, Fontenoy would demonstrate that the role of firepower, even the highly effective and disciplined firepower of the British infantry, could be severely restrained on such disadvantageous terrain. For example, the effects of French fortifications were evident from the beginning of the battle. The Duke of Cumberland, who commanded the British allied army, designed the attack against Fontenoy. He first deployed the Dutch infantry, which formed the left wing of the Pragmatic army, supported by Anglo-Hanoverian forces that composed the right wing. However, the Dutch attacks were twice repulsed by French fire, which came from behind the carefully constructed fortifications and inflicted heavy casualties.[88]

The British and the Hanoverians who fought together as the right flank, however, made better progress. The attack carried out by the Scottish 'Black Watch' regiment is worthy of note. Faced with French entrenchment, the Scotsmen charged aggressively and overwhelmed their position with the use of swords and bayonets.[89] A Highlander named James Campbell was even reported to have killed nine men with

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[85] 'Les ennemis nous ont attaqués dans une position d'où j'ai tire tout l'advantage que quelques années d'expérience ont pu me donner. L'ont peut dire que la disposition nous a fait remporter la Victoire, parce qu'ayant fait plusieurs réserves, elle m'a donné la faculté de ramener toujours des corps frais à la charge'. Maurice de Saxe, 'Lettre du maréchal de Saxe au comte d'Argenson, du camp d'Antoin, le 12 mai 1745' (S. H. A., A 1 3090(2), f. 152), from the appendix of Jean-Pierre Bois, *Fontenoy 1745: Louis XV, arbiter de l'Europe*, 2e edition (Paris: Economica, 2012), p. 139.

[86] 'les postes que j'avais fortifiés par des redoutes ont constamment tenu pendant tout le temps que la bataille a duré', *Ibid.*

[87] Jeremy Black, *European Warfare in a Global Context 1660-1815* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 88.

[88] Bois, *Fontenoy 1745*, pp. 86–87.

[89] Colonel David Stewart, *Sketches of the Character, Manners, and Present State of the Highlanders of Scotland: with Details of the Military Service of the Highland Regiments* Vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1822), p. 249.

his broadsword.[90] This is quite a remarkable feat considering that the British army failed to engage in much hand-to-hand combat at Dettingen. Moreover, the Highland Regiment was not a veteran unit, having only mustered in 1740, and missed the action at Dettingen.[91] The military culture of the Scottish Highlands must have played a significant role. Nevertheless, the Highlanders were not the only members of the British army who showed their willingness to engage in hand-to-hand combat at Fontenoy, which in turn indicates that the overall standard of the British infantry had considerably improved since Dettingen:

> During this March, there was a most terrible Fire of Cannon. We advanced nevertheless to the Enemy, and received their Discharge at the Distance of thirty Paces before we fired. Then Things had a very good Appearance, and there was a fair Prospect of a [sic]compleat Victory.[92]

This passage demonstrates the capacity of the British infantry at Fontenoy to follow Bland's instructions: they advanced until their distance from the enemy had been shortened to 30 paces, the ideal distance, before firing.

A French source testified that British musketry was highly effective and repeatedly fended off French counterstrokes:

> They afterwards made an Attempt to penetrate through our Line of Infantry, in which they succeeded: for their Infantry, who had form'd themselves in a very strong Line of Battle, charg'd; and at the second Charge, penetrated through the Brigade of Guards, who retir'd upon the *Irish* Regiment of *Clare* and *Rott.* Our Cavalry, which advanced before them immediately, could not sustain the terrible Fire made by that Line of Infantry; insomuch. That for more than an Hour, they had a very remarkable and considerable Advantage. Several of our

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[90] Henry Bromley, *A Catalogue of Engraved British Portraits: From Egbert the Great to the Present Time* (London, 1793), p. 313.
[91] Stewart, *Sketches of the Character*, p. 245.
[92] The London Gazette, no. 8430. 12 March 1745.

Squadrons rallied, but were again repuls'd, by the prodigious Fire of the Enemy's Infantry.[93]

However, the British infantry was subject to sustained French cannon and musket fire and, as a French officer later wrote, suffered no less seriously.[94]

> The right wing however advanced with great resolution, & gained ground of the Enemy, but being continually gall'd by the fire; of batterys in the front, & of redoubts in the flanks, & also of a very smart & continued discharge of small Arms, & the left wing not advancing equally with them, they could not maintain the ground they had got, but were obliged to retire; they were twice rallied but without effect, so it was judged necessary about one of the Clock that the Army should retreat.[95]

This statement by the Duke of Cumberland creates a vivid picture of the ordeal the British army had to endure during the battle. Given this, it is quite remarkable that they did not break earlier, especially considering the fact that the advancing British line was eventually transformed into a large column.[96] A column is more manoeuvrable than a line and, as Bois noted, the terrain forced the British infantry into one. However, it also had a serious drawback. John Keegan, in his study of Waterloo, vividly described the factors which led to the destruction of the French columns:

> The men at the front could see their officers, see the enemy, form some rational estimate of the danger they were in and of what they ought to do about it. The men in the middle and the rear could see nothing of the battle but the debris of earlier attacks which had failed-discarded weapons and the bodies of the dead and wounded lying on the ground, perhaps under their very feet. From the front came back to them sudden crashes of musketry, eddies of smoke,

[93] Anon, *The Journal of the Battle of Fontenoy: as it was drawn up, and published by the Order of His Most Christian Majesty. Translated from the French* (London, 1745), p. 6.
[94] BL, Add MS 35363, 'Lettre d'un officier français du camp devant Tournay, datée du 12 mai', f. 84.
[95] TNA, SP/87/17/11, 'Letter to Lord Harrington from William Cumberland: first account of the battle. Dated at camp at Ath', ff. 22-23.
[96] Bois, *Fontenoy 1745*, p. 89.

unidentifiable shouts and, most important, most urgent, tremors of movement, edging them rearward and forcing them, crowdlike, in upon each other. Crowdlike too, in their leaderlessness, in their lack of information, in their vulnerability to rumour, they would have needed very little stimulus, and what that little was we cannot guess ('without any very apparent cause'. Dawson Kelly remarked [his italics] of the fight on his front) to transform them from an ordered mass into a suddenly fugitive crowd, and so carry them off the battlefield.[97]

Keegan's description can be applied seamlessly to the British infantry column at Fontenoy. Nevertheless, the British column not only continued its advance, but, as mentioned above, also repeatedly shattered French counterattacks. [98] Such achievements indicate that the British infantrymen had sufficient confidence in themselves and their leaders to overcome the fear Keegan described, which demonstrates the rapid improvement of the British army after Dettingen. The confidence gained through its victory at Dettingen and the subsequent training implemented must have played a crucial role.

However, accumulated stress and weariness were, in all likelihood, equally great. The terrain was distinctively disadvantageous for the attacking party, a factor worsened by Saxe's elaborate system of fortifications. Although the British capacity to endure continuous fire was quite remarkable, this, along with the growing casualties, must have led to extreme stress and gradually eroded their physical and psychological strength. In general, such a situation provides the opportunity for the defending army to carry out the most effective counterattack. In this regard, French counterattacks, both by cavalry and infantry, had largely failed due to British infantry firepower. Nonetheless, these attacks managed to hinder the British advance and provided Saxe with the opportunity to attempt his final counterattack.[99]

In what Saxe himself called the 'last effort', he gathered the Irish Brigade, Gardes Normandie and Gardes Françaises, along with the Guardes Suisses. The elite

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[97] Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, pp. 172–173.
[98] Bois, *Fontenoy 1745*, p. 90.
[99] Maurice de Saxe, 'Lettre du maréchal de Saxe au chevalier de Folard, 19 juillet 1745' (S. H. A., A 1 3091, f. 36), from the appendix of Bois, *Fontenoy 1745*, p. 140.

cavalry troops (the Carabiniers and the Maison du Roi) were also engaged.[100] This attack was highly aggressive and demonstrates the clear intention to move the fight to hand-to-hand combat. As a French historian later noted, some of the forces Saxe assembled and reorganised for this attack were fragments of the units already shattered by the British,[101] and had already experienced the deadly effectiveness of British infantry firepower. In such a case, charging aggressively would have been a better choice than engaging in another prolonged firefight, which was, somewhat ironically, what Bland had instructed the British army to do.

As intended, the fighting that ensued led to close quarter hand-to-hand combat:

> Now the six *Irish* Regiments, sustained by those of *Normandy* and des *Vaisseaux*, being drawn up in one Line, march'd close up to the Enemy without firing, and put them in confusion, by pushing them with their Bayonets fix'd at the End of Muskets, whilst the Carbineers charg'd them in Flank.[102]

Jean d'Alençon's biography of Saxe conveys a similar image:

> It is scarcely possible to express the impetuosity with which these different corps strike the enemy. They carry out their triple attack … with a concert so perfect, the cavalry with the sword in their hands, and the infantry the bayonet with the end of the rifle, that the immovable and formidable column is finally shaking, is broken, dispersed, and forced to yield to the French a Field of Battle, which it had so long disputed them.[103]

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[100] Saxe, 'Lettre du maréchal de Saxe au comte d'Argenson', *ibid.*, pp. 139–140.
[101] Jean d'Alençon, *Histoire De Maurice Comte De Saxe, Maréchal General De Camps Et Armées De Sa Majeste Tres-chretienne, Duc Elu De Curlande & De Semigalle, Chevalier des ordes de Pologne et de Saxe* (Mittau, 1752), an excerpt from the appendix of Bois, *Fontenoy 1745*, pp. 145–148.
[102] Anon, *The Journal of the Battle of Fontenoy,* p. 7.
[103] 'Il n'est guère possible d'exprimer l'impétuosité avec laquelle ces différens Corps fondent sur l'ennemi. Ils exécutent leur triple attaque … avec un concert si parfait, la cavalerie le sabre à la main, & infanterie la bayonnette au bout du fusil, que l'immobile & formidable colonne s'ébranle enfin, est rompue, dispersée, et forcée de céder aux François un Champ de Bataille, qu'elle leur avoit si longtems dispute'. Jean d'Alençon, *Histoire De Maurice Comte De Saxe*, pp. 147–148.

The intensity of the combat and the 'push' of bayonets strongly implies that the British infantry did not collapse at one single stroke, indicating once again that they were more willing and better able to engage in hand-to-hand combat than at Dettingen. In spite of this, the situation was too disadvantageous to overcome. They had been stopped by earlier French counterattacks and therefore lost momentum, a highly important factor in hand-to-hand combat. As mentioned previously, at this point it is likely that many were exhausted. In addition, they were now under attack from three sides, and the pressure was simply too great to resist further. The combination of all these factors provided the ideal conditions for morale breakdown. Saxe proudly claimed that 'this body of English and Hanoverians was destroyed in a moment'.[104] This was certainly an exaggeration. As already observed, the fighting was intense, and the British army did not collapse all at once. Furthermore, although there was considerable confusion among the British ranks when the French counterattack finally succeeded in dispersing the British column, and their retreat from the field might not have been as orderly as Cumberland claimed, ultimately the Pragmatic army was not destroyed at Fontenoy.[105]

Overall, even though it lost, the British army fought well at Fontenoy and certainly better than at Dettingen. The British infantry generally gained the upper hand in an infantry versus infantry firefight. Nevertheless, the French army succeeded in negating the effectiveness of the British musketry superiority to a considerable degree and via several means: a well-chosen defensive position, field fortifications, timely commitment of reserves, able command, combined arms of infantry and cavalry, and well-placed artillery. British infantry firepower, however effective, was insufficient to overcome these obstacles, although it did take a terrible toll on the French rank-and-file. This again demonstrates that the battles during this period were not destined to be won by the army that had superior firepower. Likewise, it must be pointed out that the French victory, despite all the factors mentioned above, would have been virtually impossible were it not for the willingness of the French to engage in hand-to-hand combat. As the sources indicate, bayonets and swords featured as prominently for

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[104] 'Ce corps d'Anglais et d'Hanovriens a été détruit dans un moment'. Saxe, 'Lettre du maréchal de Saxe au comte d'Argenson', p. 140.
[105] TNA, SP/87/17/11, ff. 22–23.

both armies at Fontenoy as gunpowder. In many ways, the Battle of Fontenoy is a clear demonstration of the complexities of eighteenth-century battles, whereby superiority in firepower was not the only determinant of victory.

3.3. The Battle of Prestonpans (1745)

Concurrently with the War of the Austrian Succession, another conflict raged in Britain: the Jacobite Rising of 1745. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the battles of this rebellion, especially the Battle of Culloden (1746), have frequently been depicted as a clash between primitiveness and modernity, and the outcome has generally been viewed as the final triumph of modern firepower.[106] For example, although acknowledging its effectiveness, J. M. Hill argued that the 'old Gaelic military system was finally overwhelmed by the forces of modern tactical warfare at Culloden'.[107] More recently, Carlton claimed that 'Culloden was the culmination of military changes that took place in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries' that helped produce 'what would become known as the "thin red line"'.[108]

In contrast, Murray Pittock argued that the 'lasting myths' of the primitively armed Jacobite forces are misleading: although it 'suited contemporary Hanoverian propaganda and the heroic traditions of Gaelic verse alike', the difference between the Jacobites and the British was not as great as often assumed.[109] However, Christopher Duffy contended that, in a tactical sense, the Highlanders' method of warfare was strikingly different from that conducted on the continent and with which the British forces were familiar.[110] Nevertheless, Duffy highlighted that the 'forces of Prince Charles were neither the witless savages of legend, nor a uniformly schooled and settled army on the regular pattern' and the 'higher organisation of the army was probably the most advanced in Europe'.[111]

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[106] Black, *Other Pasts, Different Presents, Alternative Futures*, pp. 131–132.
[107] Hill, *Celtic Warfare*, p. 149.
[108] Carlton, *This Seat of Mars*, p. 171.
[109] Murray Pittock, *Culloden* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 40–49.
[110] Christopher Duffy, *Fight for a Throne: The Jacobite '45 Reconsidered* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2015), p. 334.
[111] *Ibid.*, pp. 320-321.

This and the following sections examine three major battles of the Jacobite Rising of 1745 in light of these arguments. By examining the mechanics of combat in these confrontations, this study attempts to clarify whether there was a clear difference between the Jacobites and the British, and whether the eventual British victory at Culloden can be seen as representing the triumph of modernity in military affairs.

The first major battle of the war, the Battle of Prestonpans, resulted in a Jacobite victory. It is highly symbolic that the well-equipped British army was defeated by a poorly outfitted Jacobite army.[112] Does this serve as an exceptional case of the victory of a more primitively armed force against one more technologically advanced, as the cultural depictions of some battles such as the Battle of Isandlwana (1879)? The reality, of course, is much more complex. This section questions the difference between the principal fighting methods of the two armies who fought at Prestonpans, followed by an assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of both armies alongside a more detailed study of the course of the battle.

Discussions regarding the tactical 'difference' between the Highlanders and the British army have mainly focused on the 'Highlanders' charge'. According to Duffy, the contrast was striking, because in continental Europe, the 'charge with cold steel was virtually unknown, and the troops fired mechanically into the smoke with little direct consciousness of the enemy'.[113] In contrast, Pittock argued that the Jacobite army's tactics were just as firepower-oriented as those of the British, and the percentage of soldiers armed with broadswords in fact decreased as the war progressed.[114] Nevertheless, Pittock did not deny the importance of the charge in Jacobite tactics and the fact that the use of the sword was more widespread than in the British army.[115]

However, the Jacobite practice of the 'charge with cold steel' does not necessarily equate to primitiveness. As examined in Chapter Two, the Highlanders' charge during the late seventeenth century was, in fact, not significantly different from its contemporary counterparts. This was no less the case in the mid-eighteenth century. It must be reiterated that one of the most influential British combat doctrines during

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[112] Even Murray Pittock, who argued that the Jacobite forces were not fundamentally different from the British army, admitted that the Jacobites at Prestonpans were not well armed. Pittock, *Culloden*, p. 49.
[113] Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 334.
[114] Murray Pittock, *The Myth of The Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745,* 2nd edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009, first edition published in 1995), pp. 163–168.
[115] Pittock, *Culloden*, pp. 42–46.

this period was Bland's instruction that the infantry must approach the enemy at close range, fire a short volley and immediately charge with bayonets, a method that bears a striking resemblance to the Highlanders' charge. The only notable difference was whether to charge with a bayonet or a broadsword. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the Jacobite method of fighting was, as Duffy claimed, drastically different from those of the contemporary British or continental European armies. Duffy's argument that in continental Europe the 'troops fired mechanically into the smoke with little direct consciousness of the enemy' fits the Battle of Dettingen. However, it is not well-suited to the phases of the Battle of Fontenoy, as examined earlier. Although mechanical firing certainly played a part, both the British and French armies were willing to engage one another with cold steel, and it was the aggressive bayonet charge that proved decisive in determining the final outcome. That the Jacobites preferred the shock tactic of using cold steel does not necessarily mean that they were fundamentally different from contemporary European armies, let alone primitive.

To better demonstrate this point, it is necessary to examine more thoroughly what occurred at Prestonpans. The battle began in earnest with the famous flanking manoeuvre of the Jacobite army. The British army, under the command of General Sir John Cope, hastily changed their position to face the Jacobite attack. Therefore, as Arran Johnston noted, 'Cope's army was not caught out and unprepared as is sometimes assumed'.[116] Ideally, in such a situation, the British army would have had every option to utilise their superior firepower against a poorly armed opponent. However, subsequent developments show that arms and equipment were not sufficient determinants of the course of the battle. In fact, one of the most important factors was the relative qualities of the soldiers of both armies. Although Cope's army was better equipped and received standardised training, they were critically short on combat experience and what Johnston called 'battlefield training'.[117] Cope himself was an experienced general, but his army largely consisted of newly raised regiments.[118] This, in turn, meant that they had, at best, limited opportunity to work as a unit. It was also likely that they were allowed little time to build confidence and faith in each other.

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[116] Arran Johnston, *On Gladsumuir Shall the Battle Be!: The Battle of Prestonpans 1745* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2017), pp. 158–159.
[117] *Ibid.*, p. 54.
[118] Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 132.

Prince Charles Edward's Highlander army differed little from its British adversary in that they were also newly and quite hastily raised.[119] However, as discussed in Duffy, it is important to remember that the Scottish Highlands were not short on experienced soldiers who had trained in European armies.[120] Furthermore, the specific conscription and organisation practices of the Scottish Highlands must be considered. Highland regiments were mobilised through traditional feudal obligations. In other words, the clans were the foundation of the Jacobite army.[121] Although such an army has its weaknesses, the special bond between soldiers and officers can produce a strong *esprit de corps*, which would serve as a great asset in hand-to-hand combat. In contrast, Cope's British army lacked this important sensibility. Nor was the Jacobite army merely an unorganised feudal host, or an armed mob, considering that many Highlanders had already trained in continental Europe; indeed, Prince Charles organised them in accordance with the lines of a conventional army.[122] Therefore, as Pittock argued, the Jacobite army of 1745 was much closer to contemporary European armies 'than the army of 1689' examined in Chapter 4, although they retained the distinctiveness of the military culture of the Highlands and the strengths and weaknesses this entailed.[123]

On balance, at Prestonpans the British and Jacobite armies displayed both strengths and weaknesses. It is difficult to argue that either exhibited indisputable superiority. The British had superior firepower and, as Black observed, were 'more balanced' than the Jacobites in terms of dragoons and artillery.[124] However, they were largely inexperienced, both as individuals and as a group, and unacquainted with one another. The Highlanders had the apparatus of a conventional army but were critically short on firearms and lacked both cavalry and artillery. However, many were veteran soldiers and fought in units consisting of familiar faces, although this could also have presented a weakness in the event of excessive casualties or the 'loss of trusted

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[119] *Ibid.*, p. 322.
[120] *Ibid.*
[121] Johnston, *On Gladsumuir Shall the Battle Be*, p. 77.
[122] Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 324.
[123] Pittock, *Culloden*, p. 37.
[124] Jeremy Black, *Culloden and the '45* (Gloucester: Sutton, 1999), p. 88.

leaders', as Duffy noted.[125] In any case, it was far from the purported clash between modern and primitive armies, and the result was hardly predictable.

Nevertheless, at the particular moments of the first clash, the overall situation favoured the Highlanders, especially psychologically. Although the British army avoided being flanked by timely adjustments of their positions, this must have caused considerable confusion among the ranks and, in turn, increased their anxiety. In addition, the appearance of the Highlanders likely added to their terror:

> Their great guns were followed by a very regular fire of the dragoons on the right and left, and this again by close platoons of all their infantry, which our men received with intrepidity and an huzza, a thing most extraordinary in a militia army undisciplined and untryed, who upon this occasion keept up their fire till they were very near, being always sure that one fire should do should do execution, which they having done, immediately threw down their guns and drawing their broadswords rushed in upon them like a torrent and carried all before them.[126]

This passage suggests that, contrary to their popular image, the Highlanders displayed a remarkable degree of fire discipline. This is corroborated by another source which described how the Highlanders held their fire 'until they were very near, being always sure that their one fire should do execution'.[127] This would have come as a great surprise to the British army, even more so if they had regarded their enemy as a 'militia army undisciplined and tried'.[128] The realisation that the enemy force was in fact composed of disciplined veterans must have shocked the experienced British soldiers, and the prospect of hand-to-hand combat against such an enemy would likely have increased the psychological pressure.

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[125] Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 326.
[126] Anon, 'Journal and Memoirs of P… C… Expedition into Scotland' in *The Lockhart Papers*, by George Lockhart (London, 1817), p. 490.
[127] NRS, RH 4.213, quoted by Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 131.
[128] Anon, 'Journal and Memoirs', p. 490.

The British dragoon and artillery both proved ineffective. The Highlanders' shock tactic succeeded in overwhelming them quickly, and the battle developed into hand-to-hand combat:

> They came on with furious precipitation. This disconcerted all the poor generalls fine disposition and he was in surprize and confusion, the canon was turned and gave 2 or three discharges but they wheeled and formed. The Highland troups battell came on so furiowly that in a moment they were in sword in hand. The dragowns run off at the first fyre. …… The foot stood after the horse were gone, but ther was no orders from the generall what to doe, and all went soon to confusion.[129]

Due to the numerous conditions analysed above, the Highlanders were in a decidedly advantageous position in hand-to-hand combat. To make matters worse, as Duffy argues, the British army was unprepared for this kind of combat.[130] There is further evidence for their unpreparedness in this regard:

> It seems strange that Cope disarmed the Kings' forces of all their most usefull weapon against Highlanders, and when they marched north ordered all there [sic] swords to be laid in Stirling Castle, so that at the time of ingaging not one of them had s sword; they had not there bagenets screwed when they were attacked, and non to give the word of command.[131]

It is indeed strange that the British officers, who were by no means unfamiliar with Highlander tactics, so utterly failed to prepare their men for hand-to-hand combat.[132] Perhaps they thought their superior firepower would prevent the Highlanders from engaging in this type of warfare. If this were indeed the case, such an overconfidence

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[129] Patrick Crichton, *The Woodhouselee MS: A Narrative of Events in Edinburgh and District during the Jacobite Occupation, September to November 1745* (London, 1907), p. 35.
[130] Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 132.
[131] Crichton, *The Woodhouselee MS*, pp. 38–39.
[132] The British army had experienced the Highlanders' way of fighting since the late seventeenth-century wars. In addition, there were Highlanders fighting for the British army at that moment in European battles; an example appears in the previous section about Fontenoy.

was a crucial reason for the British defeat. In addition, the effects of the broadsword, both physical and psychological, must be considered. As a slashing weapon, the wounds inflicted by broadswords were different from those inflicted by stabbing weapons such as bayonets or with projectile weapons such as muskets. In particular, they were certainly bloodier than bayonet or musket wounds. The gruesome nature of the cut inflicted by a broadsword can be glimpsed from the petition of a wounded soldier:

> At the Battle of Preston[pans], in Scotland on the first attack against the rebells, your petitioner was cutt & maimed & lost the use of his right arm.[133]

This kind of wound must have been common in the close combat situations of Prestonpans, considering that the British suffered at least 300 dead and several more wounded.[134] The post-battle report also testifies to the horrible realities of hand-to-hand combat with swords:

> The field of battle presented a spectacle of horror, being covered with heads, legs, and arms, and mutilated bodies, for the killed all fell by sword.[135]

It is easy to imagine the psychological effects of such a grisly sight on the morale of the British soldiers, who were mostly unaccustomed to this kind of combat. Those fighting in Flanders at that time would have encountered similar wounds, inflicted mostly by enemy cavalry, as they did at Fontenoy. However, as already mentioned, many soldiers who fought for the British army at Prestonpans had no prior combat experience. The effects of witnessing considerable volumes of blood and sliced body parts must, therefore, have had an even greater impact on their morale. Inevitably, they could not endure it for long:

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[133] TNA, SP 36/84/2/16, 'The Petition of John Bennett'.
[134] Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 133.
[135] Chevalier de Johnstone, *Memoirs of the Rebellion in 1745 and 1746* (London, 1821), p. 33.

> We have not got the particulars but that it was all over in five minutes, a pannick having seised both the foot and dragoons who ran off.[136]

Although this report appears slightly exaggerated – the British army did put up more resistance than this extremely brief remark suggests – it was nevertheless true that they panicked and were routed within a fairly short period of time.

The Battle of Prestonpans demonstrates that the superiority of firearms or firepower-oriented tactics still did not guarantee victory and also brutally demonstrated the physical and psychological power of cold steel when employed at the right moment. The Jacobite army at Prestonpans successfully minimised their weaknesses and maximised their strengths. Equally, the British failed to exploit their superiority in firearms and cavalry. Furthermore, the battle illuminates the vulnerability of an army inexperienced in hand-to-hand combat. In addition, and somewhat ironically, the battle provides one of the clearest validations of Bland's doctrine that the battalion should immediately attack the enemy 'with the bayonets on the muzzles the instant he has fired', because this will enable them to ensure 'a very inconsiderable loss'.[137] The Jacobite Highlander charge was, in fact, much closer to official British doctrine than the actual actions of the British army at Prestonpans. Indeed, the Highlanders won the battle with considerably fewer losses than the British.

3.4.   The Battle of Falkirk Muir (1746)

The Battle of Falkirk Muir represents another major Jacobite victory. The British gathered a larger army than they had at Prestonpans, formed by the regiments recently returned from Flanders and gained experience from recent battles. They were certainly better qualified to engage the Highlanders than Cope's army. Despite all of this, however, they suffered another defeat. As Duffy claimed, the overconfidence of the British command played a part. General Henry Hawley and his subordinates did not anticipate the Jacobite attack and neglected to reconnoitre the ground properly. The nature of the battleground, what Duffy referred to as the 'uneven rolling plateau

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[136] NLS MS 3733, f. 9. 'Hon. J. Maule to Major Gen. Campbell'.
[137] Bland, *A Treaties of Military Discipline,* p. 133.

of Falkirk Muir' and which the British failed to study thoroughly, also significantly influenced the course of battle.[138]

The battle began as British dragoons advanced up the slopes towards the waiting Jacobite right wing. Captain Masterton, Hawley's aide-de-camp, described the commanding decision as follows:

> The 17th Inst the Rebels was within 5 Miles of our Camp at Falkirk, which made us be very allert all Night, and about Morning had Accts of thire[sic] moveing[sic] towards us, at 12 before Noon we Saw them Marching, and about 3 Miles from us, upon which our Men all Stood to Arms our Dragoons Mounted and was formed in the front of the Camp in a Moment, upon which the Genl sent me to the Dragoons to March immediately up to him which was on a Hill and ordered Genel Huske to follow wt the foot in Two lines.[139]

This passage illustrates the surprise of the British at the unanticipated Jacobite advance. It appears Hawley promptly ordered the dragoons to attack, followed by the infantry. However, ordering the cavalry against a numerically superior infantry that holds the high ground is hardly a sound decision. It is possible that Hawley dangerously underestimated his foe, just as Cope had; he may have believed that the distinctive superiority of the British army, cavalry and firepower would be sufficient to scatter the rebels. That was certainly the assessment following the battle, as recollected by John Home, a volunteer soldier at Falkirk:

> Every person who reads this account, or any other account of the battle of Falkirk, will be apt to think it very strange that General Hawley should order 700 or 800 dragoons to attack 8000 foot drawn up in two lines. It is said, and generally believed, that General Hawley … did not think they were coming to attack his army, … that in this conceit he ordered his dragoons and foot to march up the hill, intercept the rebels, and force them to come to an action.

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[138] Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 297.
[139] TNA, SP 54/27/55B, 'Capt Masterton on the battle of Falkirk', f. 217.

Hence the conflict happened upon a piece of ground which he had never viewed, and was a field of battle exceedingly disadvantageous to his troops.[140]

The Jacobite army, further refuting the popular imagery, demonstrated a high degree of fire discipline, as the following Jacobite account testifies:

Orders were given by his Royal Highness for the first line to march softly forwards (The Second line keeping the useuall Distance) To Drive them from that eminence which was done accordingly with the outmost regularly and Exactness, for when they were within Pistol Shott The Dragoons pusht Down towards us at the Front in order to Brake us; then our men gave part of their fire So apropos that they entirely broke them, douing great Execution.[141]

Other sources also report that the Highlanders were 'particularly enjoined not to fire till the army was within musket-length of them'.[142] A government source also confirmed that the Highlanders opened fire at close range.[143] Receiving such an order and executing it are two very different things. Whether it was musket length or pistol length, the fact that the Highlanders managed to hold fire until the enemy approached so closely demonstrates that they were an experienced and disciplined force. It also shows that, despite their overall inferiority in firepower, they used their limited resources to best effect. The British cavalry's attack collapsed in the face of this strong resistance and this led to a headlong retreat. This, in turn, exposed the vulnerable British infantry to the Highlanders' counterattack.[144] To make matters worse, the condition of the battlefield did not favour the British infantry:

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[140] John Home, *The History of Rebellion in Scotland in 1745* (Edinburgh, 1822), pp. 127–128.
[141] TNA SP 54/27/41B, f.168, 'Jacobite account of the battle of Falkirk'.
[142] de Johnstone, *Memoirs of the Rebellion*, p. 92. Although Chevalier de Johnstone is criticised for romanticising the Jacobite army and thus the credibility of his memoir is questioned, his report that the Jacobites at Falkirk displayed exemplary fire discipline is confirmed by multiple sources.
[143] NLS MS 3733 f.197, 'Account of Battle of Falkirk'.
[144] *Ibid.*

A dreadfull Storm of Rain and wind from the South happened at this instant in the Teeth of Our Army as they marched up that hill which with bad roads and Uneven ground put our Foot out of breath.[145]

Thus, the field of battle prevented the British army from making the most of its strengths. It was decidedly unsuitable for cavalry action while simultaneously not ideal ground for the infantry to form a line to maximise their firepower. Furthermore, rain and wind seriously hampered the use of gunpowder weaponry. However, for the Highlanders, charging downhill provided a welcome opportunity to employ the strength of their leading shock tactic to its full potential:

When they came near the foot of the King's army, some regiments of the first line gave them a fire: the rebels returned the fire, and throwing down their musquets, drew their swords and attacked the regiments in the left of the King's army, both in front and flank: all the regiments in the first line of the King's army gave way, as did most of the regiments of the second line. It seemed a total rout.[146]

And receiveing the fire of the Enemy, they went in Sword in hand and Drove them Down the hill with great Impetuosity and Slaughter.[147]

These accounts depict the battle as, in many ways, a repeat of Prestonpans. The British infantry that formed the right wing of Hawley's army quickly collapsed without serious resistance:

In less than a Minute the Dragoons on the lef[t] went Gallopeing down the Hill, fairly run wasy, whi[ch] Struck Such a panick into our foot, that the whole Second line gave way, (w[hic]h was not in the fire) and am perswaded half the

[145] *Ibid.*
[146] Home, *The History of Rebellion*, p.124.
[147] TNA SP 54/27/41B.

first line did not fire) for such panik God keep me from ever Seeing again that our forces was in) the Rebels pursued down the Hill about ¼ mile.[148]

Thus, it was again panic that caused the British army to collapse. Despite enlisting more veterans than Cope's army at Prestonpans, too many factors were against them: they were already tired by the exhausting upwards march over difficult ground, and the sight of friendly cavalry being routed must have been alarming, not to mention the sight of the charging broadsword-wielding Highlanders who followed closely behind. Even veteran soldiers' morale was liable to fail in such unfavourable circumstances. Nonetheless, not every British regiment collapsed helplessly, likely owing to their prior battlefield experience. Even as the British left wing fled in panic, the right wing bravely stood their ground:

> Two Regiments on the right Barrel's commanded by Lieutennent Colonell Rich and the Ligoniers Foot by Lieutennent Colonell Stenhope with a part of Prue's Regiment all under command of Brigadier Cholmonly made a Noble Stand Firing in Plattoons and saving the Fire of the first rank whereby they keept the Rebels at a due distance Advanced on them and Fired till the Rebels thought proper to run off up the hill faster than they came down.[149]

Facilitated by the right flank, the rest of the British army was able to retreat in relatively short order. The stand of the British right flank was possibly because it was composed of veterans and also, as Duffy claimed, 'Cholmondeley's command was sheltered from the ebb and flow by the ravine'.[150] Thus, the geographical conditions were favourable to the British at this point of the battle. Therefore, it demonstrated that on the ground advantageous for the defenders, the British infantry could stop the Highlander charge.

In summary, the Battle of Falkirk further demonstrated the potential strengths and weaknesses of both armies and how they encountered one another on a highly complex mechanics of battle in the field. The Jacobite army once again demonstrated that they were far from the medieval relic they are frequently portrayed as. Their

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[148] TNA SP 54/27/55B.
[149] NLS MS 3733 f.197.
[150] Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 304.

tactical ability, combined with the specific condition of the topography and poor British leadership, was sufficiently strong to make veteran British regiments flee, even those who 'had stood so firmly at Fontenoy', as Duffy noted.[151] However, the calm response of the British right flank also revealed a potential weakness of the Jacobite army: experienced British regiments positioned in a good defensive position could prevent the Highlanders' approach. Without engaging in hand-to-hand combat, the Highlanders could not have expected the ease with which morale collapsed among the British rank-and-file. Nevertheless, the fact that these conditions needed to be met itself proves that the battles during this period could not be decided by a single factor such as superior firepower or platoon firing. Falkirk illustrates how the various determinants of a battle, such as weather, can be completely out of human control.

3.5.   The Battle of Culloden (1746)

As discussed earlier, the Battle of Culloden has long embodied cultural significance. As Pittock explained, it has been framed:

> as a clash between the old and the new, the traditional and the modern, the backward and the advanced, the tribe and the state, the autocrat and the constitutional monarch, the Catholic and Protestant, the swordsman and the musketeer, the warrior and the soldier, the amateur and the professional, the brute and the civilized, the divisive and the unified, the Highlander and the stranger, the Celt and the Saxon, many other binary oppositions of doubtful historical though compelling rhetorical value.[152]

Although such a dichotomic framing has come under attack in recent years and proven doubtful, as Pittock maintained, the notion persists that it was marked by the triumph of British firepower and serves as the culmination of the long road towards the 'thin

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[151] *Ibid.*
[152] Pittock, *Culloden*, p. 5.

red line'. This section, therefore, examines the details of the battle and investigates whether such a notion is valid.

As a starting point, despite their notable victories against the British, the Jacobite army was not in great condition in the months prior to Culloden. Prince Charles found it increasingly difficult to sustain his army. Thus, his soldiers were mostly unpaid and scattered over the territory, and had little opportunity for military training.[153] In contrast, the Duke of Cumberland, now commanding the British army against the Jacobites, had sufficient time to train his forces.[154] Furthermore, the British army by now had ample combat experience.[155] As mentioned above, many of the British units that fought at Falkirk had fought previously at Dettingen and Fontenoy. What they lacked was the experience of working together as a single unit and any familiarity in fighting against Highlanders. Although the defeat at Falkirk could not have been a pleasant experience, they now possessed valuable knowledge in this regard. Defeat often serves to dishearten the losing side and may negatively influence soldiers when they must face the same enemy once more, but this can be remedied through rigorous training.[156] Therefore, unlike the previous two battles, almost every factor was highly unfavourable for the Jacobites. Nonetheless, Prince Charles had little choice but to risk a battle. His army was suffering from the shortage of provisions and already living on meagre rations:[157]

> The[y] observed with much concern, the want of Provisions. The men had only got a biscuit each that day, & some not even that, & it would prove worse next day, unless they could take provision from the enemy.[158]

Therefore, his choice was either to cast the dice on a single decisive battle or watch his army disperse. His only, and quite possibly faint, hope was that the morale and courage of the Highlanders might overcome the British superiority in all other areas.

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[153] Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 429.
[154] *Ibid.*, p. 425.
[155] Pittock, *Culloden*, p. 83.
[156] For the effect of training on easing the psychological burden and fear in combat, see Hew Strachan, 'Training, Morale, and Modern War' *Journal of Contemporary History*, 41 (2006).
[157] NRS GD 1/53/81/2, 'A Vindication of the conduct of Lord George Murray' f. 5.
[158] NRS GD 1/53/81/1, 'Account of the Battle of Culloden', f. 2.

The fact that he reminded his soldiers about 'what they had done at Preston-pans & Falkirk' reveals the extent of his hope at that time.[159] All he could do was try to raise morale by reminding his troops of their past victories. It appears the experiences of these past victories certainly boosted the morale of the Highlanders on the eve of battle:

> In answer to what you write about the Highland Army having not behaved with their usual bravery, or that some of their principal Officers had not done their duty, which might be the occasion of their late misfortune, I must inform you by all I can learn, the men shewed the utmost eagerness to come to action; nor did I hear of any one Officer, but behaved well so far as the situation & circumstances would allow.[160]

Although the goal of this document is clearly to defend the honour of the Highland army, it is reasonable to assume that the Highlanders were generally well-motivated. Their behaviour in battle, as will be soon discussed, certainly supports this argument. Further retreat would only have prolonged hardship, but a victory in battle would have ended it. In addition, the confidence gained through the two prior experiences of defeating the British army cannot be ignored.

Unfortunately for the Highlanders, and again unlike the battles of Prestonpans and Falkirk, the battleground was extremely disadvantageous for the Jacobite army. In both previous battles they were able to negate British superiority. At Culloden, however, they were drastically exposed to British firepower; the ground was ideally suited for the British to deploy their superior artillery and cavalry.[161] To make matters worse, rainfall turned the field into a 'boggy ground' which served to 'impede the speed of a charge and its ability to roll up the enemy flank'.[162] The Jacobite choice of battleground has been blamed by generations of historians for their defeat. More recently, however, both Pittock and Duffy have argued that the Jacobites had little

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[159] NRS GD 1/53/8/3, 'Col O'Neil's Narrative copied from his own manuscript', f. 3.
[160] NRS GD 1/53/81/1, f. 1.
[161] *Ibid.*
[162] Pittock, *Culloden*, p. 72.

choice over the battlefield, as they had no option but to risk the battle.[163] Thus, in fact, Culloden was a desperate gamble reliant on the faint hope of a dramatic battlefield victory. In other words, to understand the true significance of the battle, we must examine it in its wider strategic context rather than as an isolated incident.

Inevitably, these unfavourable factors began to work immediately against the Jacobites. The British army, stationed on advantageous ground, were able – for the first time in this conflict – to employ their artillery and musketry to their full effectiveness to decimate the charging Highlanders.[164] Unlike past battles where the Highlanders had enjoyed geographical advantages, at Culloden they were forced to traverse a vast distance.[165] It must have been a terrible ordeal for the Highlanders to advance so far under continuous British artillery fire. In fact, even without the impact of the British artillery, the Highlanders' situation was remarkably similar to that of the British infantry at Falkirk. It can therefore reasonably be assumed that the psychological pressure and the stress the Highlanders felt was similar to the British at Falkirk.

In fact, perhaps the most surprising fact about Culloden was that, despite such adverse conditions, the Jacobite attack was still highly lethal. The clash between the Jacobite right flank and the British left flank clearly demonstrates this. When the Highlanders approached, the British opened fire at close range:

When the right wing were within Pistol-shot of the enemy; they received a most terrible, fire not only in front, but also in flank, from those men who were posted, near the stone walls, notwithstanding of which, they went on Sword in Hand, after giving their fire close to the Enemy, & were received by them with their Spontoons & Bayonets, the two Regiments that were upon the Enemy's left, would have been cut in pieces, had they not been supported by other two Regiments from the second line; as it was those two Regiments (being Barrell's and Munro's) had by their own confession two hundred men killed & wounded.[166]

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163 Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 443, Pittock, *Culloden*, p. 65.
164 Black, *Culloden and the '45*, p. 188.
165 Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 465.
166 NRS GD 1/53/81/1, ff.10–11.

Although muskets were notoriously inaccurate during this period, volleys at close range were fairly effective, as many battles examined in this study demonstrate. This was the principal reason why so many authors of military manuals recommended this tactic. The impact of the British volley upon the Jacobite ranks, therefore, must have been devastating, possibly equating to the Jacobite assaults on the British at Prestonpans and Falkirk. At Culloden, the situation was reversed, not because of the primitiveness of the Highlander army, but because the overall situation forced them to fight on unfavourable ground, which allowed the British to gain the upper hand. Nevertheless, the fact that the Highlanders did not collapse against this volley and instead managed to return fire at close range demonstrates their overall quality as a conventional army. They still retained a certain degree of discipline and cohesiveness. The quoted passage testifies that upon returning fire at close range, they charged with swords: their standard tactic.

Recent historians, however, have begun to pay more attention to the Jacobite use of firearms than swords to refute the image of 'savage, primitive Highlanders'. Most notably, Pittock emphasised the intense firefight against the British left flank and argued that the Jacobites were 'probably better shots, relying on targeting rather than weight of firepower', and that it was 'Jacobite firepower followed by a frontal attack that breached the line of the British left'.[167] This argument certainly contains many important points; nevertheless, the importance of the sword for Jacobite tactics need not be completely dismissed. It was both firepower and swords that broke the British formation at Prestonpans and Falkirk, and at Culloden, the Jacobites were simply attempting the same. Moreover, their reliance on swords did not make the Highlander army a primitive relic of a bygone era. As repeatedly observed in this study, the charge with edged weapons immediately following a volley was also a standard tactic for the British army during this period.

The British did not collapse against the Highlander onslaught as they had at Prestonpans and Falkirk. On the contrary, as quoted above in the Jacobite account of the battle, they fought back with their bayonets. James Wolfe also reported that 'twas for some time a dispute between the swords and bayonets; but the latter was found

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[167] Pittock, *Culloden*, p. 89.

by far to be the most destructible weapon. The Regiment behaved with uncommon resolution'.[168] Traditionally, this has been attributed to the Duke of Cumberland's famous new bayonet drill. More recently, however, historians have been sceptical of its effectiveness or even of its very existence. Pittock argued that there is 'no secure evidence that it was of use at Culloden'.[169] He also contended that it was the firepower of the British second line that proved decisive, not bayonets.[170] Duffy also doubted whether Cumberland introduced any 'new' type of bayonet drill.[171] Regardless of this question, there is little doubt that the bayonet and other edged weapons played an important role in this encounter. That Cumberland especially and proudly mentions the British use of bayonets implies that it was an important concern for the British leadership during the battle:

> As their whole first line came down to attack at once, their right somewhat out flanked *Barrel*'s regiment, which was our left, and the greatest part of the little loss we sustained, was there; but Bligh's and Sempil's giving a fire upon those who had out flanked Barrel's foot repulsed them, and Barrel's regiment and the left of Monro's fairly heat them with their bayonets: There was scarce a soldier or officer of Barrell's and that part of Monro's which engaged, who did not kill one or two men each with their bayonets and spontoons.[172]

In addition, the Jacobite account quoted earlier that specifically mentions that they were 'received by them with their Spontoons & Bayonets' strongly implies that the Highlanders, unlike those at Prestonpans and Falkirk, were at least somewhat impressed by the British ability to fight hand-to-hand.[173] Several reasons must be considered here. Firstly, there was no introduction of a novel method for using the bayonet, and both Pittock and Duffy agreed that Cumberland's training was mainly focused on helping the British soldiers to build their morale and confidence.[174] As

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[168] Willson, *The Life and Letters*, p. 68.
[169] Pittock, *Culloden*, p. 89.
[170] *Ibid.*
[171] Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 467.
[172] *The Gentlemen's Magazine and Historical Chronicle* Vol. XVI (London, 1746), p. 210.
[173] NRS GD 1/53/81/1, ff.10–11.
[174] Pittock, *Culloden*, p. 89. Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 467.

noted earlier, Cumberland was able to use the ample time prior to the battle to train his soldiers to fight as a single unit. Confidence and faith in one's comrades are one of the most important factors that enable a soldier to overcome the extreme stress and fear of hand-to-hand combat. Secondly, the British soldiers must have been well aware of their highly favourable location. In addition, they must have watched the Highlanders being slaughtered by their artillery as they charged across the great distance, although they could have not seen the effects of their musket volley clearly due to the heavy smoke produced by the black powder. Nevertheless, the knowledge that the enemy had already suffered, and that their ranks had been substantially thinned prior to direct contact, must have considerably bolstered their morale.

The improved fighting capacity of the British infantry is evidenced through the wounds they suffered. Later, it was reported that the wounds caused by broadswords at Culloden were not lethal in most cases, in contrast to those inflicted at Prestonpans:

> There were many with cuts of the broad-sword, till then uncommon wounds in the hospitals; but these were easily healed, as the openings were large in proportion to the depth, as they bled much at first, and as there were no contusions and eschars, as in gunshot wounds, to obstruct a good digestion.[175]

John Pringle, the author of the passage, was the Duke of Cumberland's surgeon who treated wounded British soldiers after Culloden.[176] According to his observations, the cuts caused by the swords were not deep. In part, this is a weakness inherent to slashing weapons: they can cause considerable bleeding and a wide wound, as Pringle observed, but are often less fatal than thrusting weapons.[177] However, a psychological explanation can also be offered. At close distance, even a slashing weapon can be lethal: it produced severed heads and mutilated bodies at Prestonpans. At Culloden, however, such lethality was greatly reduced. The defiant resistance of the British infantry armed with bayonets must be one important reason. Their bayonets not only prevented the Highlanders from breaking the British ranks and using their

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[175] Sir John Pringle, *Observations on the Diseases of the Army in Camp and Garrison* (London, 2nd edition, 1753), p. 45.
[176] Duffy, *Fight for a Throne*, p. 468.
[177] *Ibid.*

swords with all their effects, but it also must have made them psychologically hesitant to do so.

Recent research on ancient and medieval battles demonstrate that in hand-to-hand combat, 'deep cuts could only have been inflicted when the individual was defenceless, rather than in the actual fighting', as Goldsworthy noted.[178] He also speculated that the 'majority of men, the 75 per cent fighting to stay alive rather than kill the enemy, would have delivered such tentative blows, rather than stronger thrusts or slashes to the head', at least until they were sure that the enemy was vulnerable or 'less able to defend himself'.[179] This is true in many different pre-modern battlefields, even across the globe. Thomas D. Conlan, who specialises in medieval Japanese history, examined the wounds medieval Japanese warriors suffered in swordfights and discovered that many of them were, in fact, mild. He concluded:

> The nature of these wounds also reveals that in combat those with swords approached just near enough to a rival to nick them with the tip of their blades. Samurai did not readily approach an armed opponent, even when they resorted to hand-to-hand combat, instead they remained as far apart as possible, save to inflict the most glancing blows. An incapacitated warrior, or one unaware of his or her rival's presence was more likely to suffer a crushing blow.[180]

This observation provides valuable insight into the psychology behind hand-to-hand combat. It seems highly possible that visceral revulsion or the fear of an edged weapon can make a soldier, even a professional warrior, instinctively reluctant to enter within the reach of the enemy's sword or bayonet. As Jonathan Steplyk argued in his study of the combat in the American Civil War, 'hand-to-hand combat confronts the soldier not only with the potential fear of killing but also the fear of being killed' and therefore 'face-to-face confrontations leave soldiers vulnerable to being psychologically intimidated by the enemy and his weapons'.[181] He quotes a twentieth-century soldier,

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[178] Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War*, pp. 219–220.
[179] *Ibid.*, p. 222.
[180] Thomas B. Conlan, *Weapons and Fighting Techniques of the Samurai Warrior, 1200-1877* (New York: Amber Press, 2008), p. 71.
[181] Steplyk, *Fighting Means Killing*, p. 103.

who explained, 'The thought of cold steel sliding into your guts is more horrific and real than the thought of a bullet doing the same-perhaps because you can see the steel coming'.[182] Thus, unless the opponent appears vulnerable to attack, the fight is mostly tentative. This fits well with the situation of the British left flank at Culloden. The fact that many of the wounds caused by broadswords were shallow suggests that a large percentage of hand-to-hand combat was rather tentative. The British army demonstrated its willingness to defy the Jacobite broadswords with their bayonets. This act made it impossible for the Highlanders to seize the initiative and slaughter their opponents at will, as they had at Prestonpans and Falkirk. In other words, the Highlanders' charge at Culloden did not have the same psychological effect it had at the earlier battles of breaking up the British formation, mainly because the British were ready to face it, both physically and psychologically.

Nevertheless, the psychological pressure felt by the British ranks must still have been significant. Even though the wounds caused by the tentative blows described above were not lethal, the sight of mounting friendly casualties must have nonetheless been disheartening. Furthermore, as Pringle reported, those cut by swords experienced 'much bleeding', even when the wound was not fatal.[183] The sight of blood would have added further stress and fear. In addition, Pringle's medical report identified how the broadsword at Culloden had some capacity to physically hurt opponents, regardless of the severity of the wounds. *The London Magazine* reported that in Barrell's regiment, there were 'upwards of 100 private Men kill'd and wounded'.[184] *The Gentlemen's Magazine* similarly reported that Barrell's regiment suffered 125 casualties (17 killed, 108 wounded).[185] Following mounting British casualties, the Highlanders finally began to make a breakthrough. This demonstrates that the broadsword was still a powerful weapon in close combat once enemy cohesion was broken down.

However, the opportunity for the Highlanders to destroy the British left flank completely and turn against the rest of the army never occurred, due to the British second line. As already examined, a Jacobite officer later reported that 'the two

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[182] *Ibid.*
[183] Pringle, *Observations*, p. 45.
[184] *The London Magazine and Monthly Chronologer* (London, 1746), p. 199.
[185] *The Gentlemen's Magazine and Historical Chronicle,* p. 212.

Regiments that were upon the Enemy's left, would have been cut in pieces, had they not been supported by other two Regiments from the second line'.[186] This is not merely an expression of Jacobite frustration from their perspective. As Wolfe recounted:

> They [Barrell's regiment] were, however, surrounded by superiority, and would have been all destroyed had not Col. Martin with his Regiment (the left of the 2nd line of Foot) mov'd forward to their assistance, prevented mischief, and by well-timed fire destroyed a great number of them and obliged to run off.[187]

Thus, it appears that this was a crucial moment and a crisis for the British army. As Pittock argued and Wolfe's letter clarifies, the superior firepower of the British second line played a decisive role in stopping the Jacobite onslaught and sending them into flight. This was a reassertion of the effectiveness of the two-unit deep linier tactics, which was employed across Europe at that time. Nevertheless, the importance of the British first line's prowess in wielding bayonets must not be downplayed. Although their line was eventually broken by the Highlanders, they managed to hold until the second line came to their assistance. Furthermore, as Wolfe reported, during hand-to-hand combat they managed to inflict casualties against the Highlanders and quite possibly to exhaust them further, which would certainly have made the counterattack of the second line more effective. It has often been argued that a charge with edged weapons rarely led to actual prolonged hand-to-hand combat because 'one side or the other almost always broke before contact'.[188] Culloden serves as one of the rare cases in which neither side broke before contact; both engaged in hand-to-hand combat for some time, incurring significant casualties. This suggests that, due to their training and past experience, both were willing and able to overcome their fear and maintain morale.

Although the hand-to-hand combat increased against the British left flank, the Jacobite left failed to make contact with the British right, mainly due to the marshy ground and British firepower, but also as a result of fear:

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[186] NRS GD 1/53/81/1, ff.10–11.
[187] Willson, *The Life and Letters*, p. 68.
[188] Rory Muir, *Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 88.

The left wing did not attack the enemy, at least did not go in sword-in hand, imagining they would have been flanked by a Regiment of Foot & some Horse, which the enemy brought up at that time, from their second lien or Corps de Reserve.[189]

This again suggests that hand-to-hand combat was essentially a matter of morale. On this section of the battlefield, unlike in previous engagements, it was the Highlanders who lost the confidence to engage in hand-to-hand combat. The British right flank easily repulsed the Jacobite left, and thus the Jacobite army was defeated in full. The pursuit of the British cavalry and infantry destroyed the routed Highlanders.

An examination of the details of the combat at Culloden clearly indicates that it was a far more complicated affair than the simplistic narrative of the 'triumph of firepower'. As noted earlier, Pittock and other historians have recently made a compelling argument that Culloden was not a 'catalyst for the triumph of British modernity'.[190] The Jacobite army was no less conventional than the British; they were certainly not romantic, primitive warriors obsessed with swords.[191] This section, although agreeing with Pittock's points in many ways, has attempted to review the battle through a different lens.

Firstly, the broadsword might not have been as prominent a weapon among the Jacobite rank-and-file as was once believed; the Jacobite army certainly deployed firearms as best they could. Nevertheless, the role of the broadsword and the Highlander charge cannot be downplayed. That the British command saw it as a serious threat is clearly revealed in many sources. British accounts emphasise that British soldiers resolutely fought back with bayonets against the Highlanders' swords, which strongly implies that this was a major concern for Cumberland and the other officers, who were greatly relieved by the result. There is little evidence from archival sources that Highlander swords were considered primitive weapons or relics from the past. In fact, the British bayonet stands out as prominently as the broadsword at Culloden. Instead, when the British army finally became a more efficient unit with higher morale, it exhibited a greater ability to carry out hand-to-hand combat. This is

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[189] NRS GD 1/53/81/1, f. 10.
[190] Pittock, *Culloden*, p. 158.
[191] *Ibid.*

one of the clearest examples of the flaw of the dichotomic view of 'gunpowder (modern) vs cold steel (primitive)'.

Militarily, the British army won at Culloden largely due to reasons similar to the Highlander wins at Prestonpans and Falkirk: they were better trained, more experienced and had better provisions, and they were also able to choose the ground best suited to their strengths. These were important factors, but nothing about them is inherently 'modern'. Even the tactical outlook is far from unique. Examples of an army holding a strong defensive position slaughtering the enemy prior to contact can be found throughout history, such as the medieval battle of Halidon Hill (1333). In this battle, the English archers successfully thinned the ranks of the advancing Scottish infantry, and the Scots failed to break the English line in hand-to-hand combat.[192] Furthermore, the Jacobite army prior to Culloden was in a desperate condition in almost every respect. However, they were not destined to lose and the British were not destined to win: there was a critically dangerous moment for the British during the battle. This testifies to the quality of the Jacobite army: their defeat was not simply the defeat of the sword by gunpowder; many factors other than weaponry influenced the course of the battle.

4. The Perceptions of War and Battle

4.1. The Language of Battle

The mid-eighteenth-century wars provided the British army with an opportunity for various combat experiences in different theatres for the first time since the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. Contact with European armies exposed the British army to the most recent development of military thought on the continent. Of course, at no point during the entire period covered in this study had the English and the British armies been isolated from European military practices. However, the peaceful three decades following the War of the Spanish Succession inevitably reduced the contact with European warfare, compared to the times when many English/British officers and

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[192] Kelly DeVries, *Infantry Warfare In The Early Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1996), pp. 124–125.

soldiers were able to witness and experience first-hand the practices of warfare in Europe. Military setbacks suffered by the French and the Jacobite armies during this period also provided valuable lessons. All these experiences greatly expanded the intellectual milieu of British officers, leading to a rethinking of the theories on warfare.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, after the publication of Turner's *Pallas Armata,* nothing equivalent was published for a long time. This finally changed after the wars examined in this chapter: Colonel Campbell Dalrymple's *A Military Essay*, published in 1761, was the first major work of the theory of war since Turner's. Dalrymple served during the War of the Austrian Succession, and his regiment fought both at Dettingen and Fontenoy.[193] Thus, his work provides a valuable clue to the question of how the British understanding of war had changed following the experiences of wars since Turner's time.[194]

As Gruber noted, the most evident characteristic of Dalrymple's work is the influence of ideas from the European continent.[195] This itself is not especially new, considering that the British military theorists were almost always open to ideas from the continent. Nevertheless, from the end of the War of the Spanish Succession until British participation in the War of the Austrian Succession, British officers tended to rely more on native authorities. After the war, however, books written by Continental authorities, such as Saxe or Folard, rapidly began to replace the works of Bland and Kane.[196] According to Gruber's calculation of the percentage of books read by British officers, after the 1750s, the preference for Bland or Kane either declined or stagnated, whereas the preference for continental authors such as Saxe increased. [197] Dalrymple's work reflects this trend, and the impressions British officers had of Saxe's tactics must have influenced *A Military Essay*.

Another important characteristic of Dalrymple's work is the role of providence. In Turner's work, the ultimate arbiter of a battle and war should be God; God's divine providence had already decided the course of human history from the beginning. Such

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[193] Gruber, *Books and the British Army*, p. 79.
[194] Dalrymple's work certainly cites numerous examples from the War of the Austrian Succession to reinforce his arguments. Campbell Dalrymple, *A Military Essay: Contraining Reflections On the Raising, Arming, Cloathing, And Discipline of the British Infantry And Cavalry* (London, 1761), pp. 57–58.
[195] Gruber, *Books and the British Army*, p. 79.
[196] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[197] *Ibid.*, pp. 280–282.

belief, however diverse in form, continued to influence the mindset of both officers and soldiers for a long time. Dalrymple's work does not cite divine providence as a basis of the philosophy of war – each author's interpretation of the same ancient source reveals their different outlooks. Turner cited Polybius's analysis of the legion and phalanx to present his argument on providence. He argued that neither the inherent superiority of the Roman legion over the Macedonian phalanx nor the justness of either army's cause determined the result of the battle, but God's pre-ordained plan had already determined it.[198]

In his interpretation of Polybius' same discourse, Dalrymple mentions neither God nor providence. His work is concentrated purely on the tactical, factual aspects of the Roman and Macedonian armies.[199] This can be interpreted as evidence of the growing tendency to separate God from the study of war in the genre of the art of war, possibly an influence of the Enlightenment. For example, Saxe's work in this genre greatly influenced the British officers, including Dalrymple, and only remarks on God in passing. Thus, during this period, some studies of war came to understand war as a human affair, rather than part of God's inscrutable plan for human history, representing a step towards the secularisation of military affairs. Therefore, it might be tempting to view Darlymple and Saxe's work as evidence for Sturkenboom's 'gradual secularisation' model, which suggested that after mid-eighteenth century, the influence of God began to be reduced in combatants' minds.[200]

This emphasis on secularisation, however, can go too far. Above all, it must be remembered that some writings on war written during the medieval era, which is often considered by both historians and the general public as subsequently more religious than the Enlightenment period, were in fact quite secular, as examined in Chapter One. It has also already examined that during seventeenth century, when England was suffering from confessional conflicts, attitudes towards providence were mixed. Likewise, during the mid-eighteenth century, apart from these passages on the specific genre of the art of war, many continuities can still be observed, particularly in battle reports. This is especially true in many private recollections of war. For example,

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[198] Turner, *Pallas Armata,* p. 154.
[199] Dalrymple, *A Military Essay*, pp. 136–137.
[200] Sturkenboom, 'Battlefield Emotions', in *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800*, pp. 272–273.

letters written after the British victory at Dettingen make numerous mentions of providence:

> We have, for some Time, been in Pursuit of the noblest Subject, and Thanks to Divine Providence, have begun the Renewal of the *British* Achievements.[201]

> How then must all impartial Europeans, who have the Cause of Freedom at Heart, look upon the Proceedings of some States, who, by their Dilatoriness and Delays, have suffered the General Cause to be so much neglected, that, had not Divine Providence seasonably interposed, the whole Rights of Europe must have been shook from their Basis?[202]

Although the first passage might be mere customary expression, the second passage more clearly expresses a belief in providence. The various trends of beliefs and theories on divine providence during sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Britain have already been discussed, and the opinions expressed in this passage are certainly part of this tradition.

The intervention of God on a more personal level can also frequently be found during this period:

> We lost one General, but several Field Officers kill'd and wounded; however, thank God's Providence, I have escaped this Battle, tho' the second Cannon-ball that was fired took my Right-hand Man's Head off, blew his Face into my Face, and the back Part of his Head into the Air.[203]

> I had my right and left hand men killed twice by My side, and was myself shot thro' the Hat, which I thank God was all I suffered.[204]

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[201] Anon, *British Glory Reviv'd*, pp. 28–29.
[202] *Ibid.*, p. 59.
[203] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[204] Hughes, 'An Account of Dettingen'.

Listing the casualties suffered and giving thanks to God for sparing oneself seems to be a typical literary format during this period. Therefore, it is unclear how sincerely the author believed that God really intervened during the battle. Nevertheless, such a form of writing bears a close similarity with the writings from previous periods, indicating the survival of many elements of literary conventions from the seventeenth century.

We can find the strongest expression of religious terminology in writings related to the war with significant religious implications, the Jacobite War. As expected, such language is mostly found in religious polemics rather than actual battle reports.

As with texts related to the Battle of Boyne in the previous century, religious thoughts were mostly expressed through the form of ballad or poetry. For example:

> Our *Laws* supported, and *Religion* sav'd.
> From *Popish Tyranny*, and *Popish Rage*,
> From *Gallic* Foes, and *Rome's* imposing Chains,
> It's *Inquisition*, and extorting Flaims:[205]

Such an intense display of anti-Catholic polemic reminiscent of confessional propaganda during the Civil War indicates that this thinking was still very much alive in the popular mind during this period. Similar religious polemic can be found, unsurprisingly, in sermons:

> Will the Son of a *Popish* pretender, as to his Religion, bred up at *Rome*, as to his royal Estate, a Pensioner of *France*, will he, I pray you, give you all Preferments, Honours, and Place of Profit?[206]

Of course, these are highly propagandistic writings, directly aimed at people attending churches who are therefore possibly more religiously minded. Nevertheless, they do show that many Protestants (and, of course, the Catholics) genuinely believed that the

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[205] Anon, *The Battle of Culloden; A Poem on the Late Victory: Addrest to his Royal Highness William Duke of Cumberland* (London, 1746), p. 6.
[206] James How, *An Anniversary Sermon, in commemoration of the Victory obtained at the Battle of Culloden by His Majesty's Forces, under the Command of HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF CUMBERLAND over the Rebels, April 16th, 1746* (Glasgow, 1747), p. 11.

hand of God was working on their side.[207] In addition, it must be noted that once they were published, they were distributed to the general public, not just regular churchgoers, to affect their political opinions.

In contrast, most of the immediate reports of the battles themselves did not display the language of confessional polemic. The religious language in these writings was mostly confined to personal thanksgiving to God for saving their lives from dangers of combat, as examined earlier. Perhaps those who experienced the battles first-hand were only too aware that the realities were much more complicated than those confessional polemics allowed. Again, it must be emphasised that this is not a new or 'modern' phenomenon, as it has been continuously observed in the writings discussed in all previous chapters. The language of religion never completely dominated writings on war, neither during the age of confessional conflicts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries nor during medieval times. The importance of God and providence in mid-eighteenth-century writings on war was as diverse as previous periods. However, the occasional hints of growing secular attitudes, as can be glimpsed in Dalrymple's study of war, were still quite tenuous. Therefore, the realities were much more diverse and complicated than Sturkenboom's 'gradual secularisation' model suggests.

In addition, it is worth mentioning that even though Darlymple might have eschewed religious language, his language was still firmly based in the past. As examined earlier, the re-introduction of the pike was one of the most fiercely debated issues in Continental Europe during this period, notably advocated by Saxe and Folard in France. In contrast, it has been argued that the British 'had clearly decided to rely primarily on firepower to defeat their enemies.'[208] Blackmore also observed that 'whilst other nations might have been debating the competing merits of firepower and cold steel, British infantry was still balancing firepower with the use of bayonet', implying the British were somehow more 'modern' or progressive than the French.[209] Dalrymple was one of the British military authorities who voiced rejection of Saxe's idea. His reasoning and the choice of words, however, were not particularly 'modern':

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[207] Pittock, *Culloden*, p, 102.
[208] Gruber, *Books and the British Army*, p. 35.
[209] Blackmore, *Destructive & Formidable*, pp. 136–137.

As to the offensive arms, we must abide by the firelock, and bayonet. A foot soldier has nothing to do with a sword; it is only an incumbrance in the field, and the bayonet wore in quarters will answer the end of it, being near as long as the Roman sword.[210]

Here, Dalrymple's argument is clearly based on the authority of the ancient Roman example, rather than the might of 'modern' technology. His rejection of Saxe's argument does not stem from a modernist attitude. He believed the ancient Roman sword was superior to the Greek spear and applied this comparison to the warfare of his own days: for Dalrymple, Saxe's pike was equivalent to the Greek spear, whereas the British bayonet was the Roman sword.[211]

In contrast to the discourse of the 'triumph of firepower', technological issues were still not the main concern of many of the soldier–authors when describing actual combat. For example, although historians often claim that the British won the Battle of Dettingen by firepower, the combatants' writings show few indications of such an understanding. In most of the memoirs, journals or letters written by those who fought at Dettingen, what receives the most attention is the bravery displayed by the soldiers. This implies that for these authors, both in the frame of understanding battle and in the language they used to reconstruct the battle, there were strong continuities from previous periods. Although many authors emphasised the 'terrible fire', such phrases mostly served to emphasise the ferocity of combat and the dangers the soldiers had to endure rather than the notion of technological superiority.[212]

After this they presented us their third Line in most beautifull order; When My Lord Stair came to the Head of our Regiment and Commended the Bravery of whole Line, and Said he would himself see us make the third attack, Upon which, after Giving him three Huzza's the Enlgish March'd up with Surprising Resolution; But such a Panick run thro' the French, at seeing our First Line

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[210] Dalrymple, *A Military Essay*, p. 42.
[211] *Ibid.,* p. 57.
[212] Anon, *British Glory Reviv'd.*, p. 38.

still able to oppose their third, that they turn'd about and Retreated ober the River with Great expedition.[213]

In this account, the strong implication is that the British triumphed by their bravery and superior morale. It is difficult to discover any notion that the British won by using firepower superior to that of their French counterparts. This emphasis on courage under fire and the language employed to describe it are largely traditional.

Likewise, despite the longstanding popular perception of the Jacobite War in 1745 as the triumph of 'modernity', the writings of the combatants of the war examined in this chapter reveal little evidence of such an interpretation, if any. For example, after the British defeat at Prestonpans, a voice bemoaned a defeat of the King's army by 'a handfull of the Scum of the Highlands'. The defeat was seen as shameful because the King's army never 'stood the fire of the enemy' and not because they were defeated by a savage mob far behind modern times.[214]

Similarly, most of the accounts of the battles of 1745 written by British soldiers, as examined so far, do not emphasise the otherness of the Highlanders or the eccentricity of their tactics. This 'otherness' of the Highlands in relation to the Scottish identity has been a subject of intense debate for a long time, especially regarding its role in forging what Benedict Anderson referred to as the 'Imagined Community' for Scotland. A long-held view since Anderson was of the Highlands as the 'Celtic fringe' of Britain, which was subjugated by the cultural influence from London via the Scottish Lowlands.[215] Against this model, Linda Colley suggested a 'dynamic and multicultural model.'[216] According to Colley, it is indeed true that not only the English but the Lowland Scots regarded the Highland Scots a 'different and inferior race' well into the mid-nineteenth century, despite Sir Walter Scott's efforts to romanticise the Highlands.[217] However, Colley pointed out, such 'otherness' made the Highlands

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[213] Hughes, 'An Account of Dettingen'.
[214] NLS MS 3733, f. 9. 'Hon. J. Maule to Major Gen. Campbell'.
[215] Kenneth McNeil, *Scotland, Britain, Empire: Writing the Highland 1760-1860* (Columbus Oh: Ohio State University, 2007), p. 8.
[216] *Ibid*, pp. 8–9.
[217] Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nations, 1707-1837,* 2nd edition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), p. 15.

attractive for some members of the British elites.[218] Through such cultural interactions, and Highlanders' increasing participation after Culloden in the affairs of the British Empire, the Jacobites were eventually integrated into British identity via multiple and dynamic ways, not in a one-sided and forced manner.[219] Nevertheless, the cultural image of the Jacobites and Highlanders as 'savages', 'primitive and Catholic' survived into the twentieth century.[220] This image of otherness was deeply embedded into the cultural memory of Britain through both positive and negative perceptions of the Jacobites and Highlanders. For some, they were heroic because they were primitive; this image originated from the 1760s with the publication of the early Jacobite memoirs which described the Jacobite army of 1745 as representative of Scotland's traditional, heroic past.[221] For others, they were savage rebels 'to be tamed', and thus what Pittock referred as the 'strong binary frame' was born.[222]

However, this notion of otherness, whether it represents the heroic but tragically doomed vestige of the past, or an alien and primitive 'un-Britishness' to be subdued, is hard to find among the documents written during and immediately after the war. Although the religious polemics examined earlier did portray the Jacobites in such a light, it is more an example of the anti-Catholic, Protestant propaganda prevalent in Britain throughout the period covered in this study, rather than an example of portraying the cultural otherness of the Scottish Highlands. Aside from these polemics, there is little evidence in battle reports that the British regarded the Highlanders' use of swords or the Highlanders' tactics as anachronistic or primitive. For example, the British account of their defeat at Falkirk does not refer to the Jacobite use of swords at all, even though the swords played an important role in the battle. This account strongly indicates that the use of swords in battle during this period was nothing strange to the British soldiers. The account's treatment of the Jacobite army at the battle is similar to the manner in which the British soldier–authors described their French foes at Dettingen or Fontenoy.[223] The same can be said of the Jacobites. A Jacobite account of Prestonpans mentioned that they were 'a militia army

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[218] *Ibid.*, pp. 172–173.
[219] *Ibid.*, p. 131.
[220] Pittock, *Culloden*, p. 133.
[221] *Ibid.*, p. 125.
[222] *Ibid.*, p. 127.
[223] NLS MS 3733, 'An Account of the Battle of Falkirk Muir', f. 97.

undisciplined and untryed'.[224] However, other than that, their way of war and the weapons they used were not fundamentally different from the methods and weapons of the British army. Frequently, the accounts written by the British and the Jacobite soldier–authors employ similar words and followed generally identical literary conventions, to the extent that they are virtually indistinguishable. The combatants' writings show they did not see the war as a clash between modern and medieval armies or between advanced and backward cultures.

4.2.   Battlefield Emotions

In expressing emotions, mid-eighteenth-century writings on battle again show evident continuities from previous periods, further reinforcing the conclusion that the contemporary British people generally did not consider that they were living in an age of radical change. The way the soldier–authors conveyed their emotions and the linguistic choices made for this purpose remained similar to those of the previous century.

Direct expression of battlefield fear was still avoided. The existence of such feelings can often be glimpsed only in descriptions such as the following:

> My Lord *Crawford* led us on, and behaved like a true Son of *Mars*; for when we charged both in Front and Flank, he rode from Right to Left, crying, *Never fear my Boys, this is fine Diversion*:[225]

Another way to convey the fear the combatants felt on the field of battle was by vividly describing the intenseness of combat. This can be best observed when the authors described the prolonged firefight at Dettingen or the horrible hand-to-hand combat with the Jacobites. In such cases, the authors often employed phrases such as 'a Storm of Fire' or 'the Whole heat of their Fire', which was a technique similar to that of the

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[224] Anon, 'Journal and Memoirs', *The Lockhart Papers*, p. 490.
[225] Anon, *British Glory Reviv'd.*, p. 21.

seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century soldier–authors.[226] In addition, the display of feelings of relief provides further means to discern hidden fear:

> At which Nick of Time a Volley of Grape Shot came from the Enemy, which luckily flew over our Heads, otherwise we had all been taken off:[227]

The relief from such narrow survival is itself a powerful emotion. At the same time, such descriptions presuppose a fear for one's life. Numerous remarks expressed thanks to God for surviving battles, which also performed a similar function. Such means of expression are hardly new, as they all had precedents in previous periods.

Keith Thomas viewed the mid-eighteenth century as a period of the decline of traditional military virtues such as bravery and honour. He argued that, influenced by the Enlightenment, war was no longer seen as a glorious but tragic calamity, and that this view 'left little room for classical notions of heroism'.[228] However, the writings from soldier-authors during this period present a different picture. One of the most common emotions displayed in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century writings on battle was admiration towards exceptional bravery and honourable behaviour on the field of battle. Here, Rosenwein's concept of 'emotional community' examined in the Introduction becomes useful again: throughout the periods covered in this study, officers and soldiers shared the same sociocultural values: bravery and honour. Witnessing behaviours on the field of battle deemed appropriate to this value was an emotional experience for these soldier–authors, and they often responded with admiration. This convention continued unbroken to the mid-eighteenth century. Its typical form was to emphasise the danger to which the heroic individuals were exposed and their calm and bravery under such danger. Again, this is highly similar to the literary convention continued from the seventeenth century.

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[226] *Ibid.*, pp. 46–49.
[227] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[228] Thomas, *The Ends of Life*, pp. 74-75.

His Majesty was all the Time in the Heat of the Fire; but is in perfect Health. The Duke received a Shot in his Leg; but the Bone is not hurt: He is very well, and in high Spirits.[229]

The King gave his Orders with the utmost Coolness, tho' nobody was more exposed: The Duke charged thrice, and did not complain of his Wound[230]

These passages reporting on King George II and the Duke of Cumberland's bravery and stoic calm under fire are typical examples of this convention. Peter Wilson noted that this 'culture of forbearance', in which the officers were 'expected to lead by example and disdain danger', was the essence of 'warrior manliness' during this period.[231]

This culture was, in fact, not confined within the officer class. Praise of the bravery of a group takes similar forms. In the account of John Roydon Hughes, already quoted, Hughes first presents the threat posed by the French third line, which was advancing towards the British line in 'most beautifull order'.[232] Contemporary readers with knowledge of the eighteenth-century battlefield must have instantly noted the threat such a beautifully ordered formation could pose and the fear the British soldiers must have felt before it. Hughes then reports how the British calmly marched to face the threat with 'Surprising Resolution' after giving 'three Huzza's'.[233] As in previous periods, 'resolution' was a popular choice of words to describe such situations.

This admiration, again as in previous periods, was frequently extended towards the enemy:

The *Gens d'Arms* behaved most charmingly, they rode up to us on a full Trot, with a broad Sword flung on their Rists, and a Pistol in each Hand, which as soon as they had fired, they flung at our Heads, and fell on Sword in Hand. The

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[229] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[230] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[231] Peter Wilson, 'Wars, States, and Gender in Early Modern European Warfare 1600s 1780s' in *The Oxford Handbook of Gender, War, and the Western World* eds. by Hagemann, Dudink, and O. Rose, pp. 74-95 (pp. 84-88).
[232] Hughes, 'An Account of Dettingen'.
[233] *Ibid.*

Foot, which had been in some Disorder by the Cowardice of our Horses, were not able to stand the Shock.[234]

Even though the French cavalry at Dettingen caused considerable harm to the British infantry, their martial prowess is considered worthy of praise. In this passage, the French cavalry that 'behaved most charmingly' sharply contrasts with the 'Cowardice of our Horses'.

The emphasis on swords is also noteworthy. The phrase 'sword in hand' is one of the most common phrases employed in battle descriptions during this period. It was widely used in writings describing both the War of the Austrian Succession and the Jacobite War, and it was, as observed in the description of the French cavalry attack quoted above, particularly closely related to heroic actions:

> However, we took the French Life-Guards standard; we charged them Sword in Hand when they stood nine File deep, and we but three File deep, and we drove them out of the Field with the Devil to them.[235]

> Sir Robert Rich's Regiment had lost their Standard, and a private Dragoon rode into a Squadron of French Horse, Sword in Hand, and retook it.[236]

Taking and defending the standard was a matter of great honour from the ancient days, and many battlefield braveries occurred in relation to it. Emphasising 'sword in hand' while carrying out this honourable behaviour strongly indicates that the traditional image of the heroic warrior was still very much alive in the minds of the mid-eighteenth-century British people. This also shows that the more traditional emphasis on individual bravery was perfectly aligned with the 'culture of forbearance'

In terms of other emotions examined in earlier chapters, this period likewise does not differ greatly to those before it. The soldier–authors' responses to the death of their comrades or to the sights of the horrors of battlefield varied, but generally the

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[234] Anon, *British Glory Reviv'd.*, p. 39.
[235] *Ibid.*, 41.
[236] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

expressions were terse and restrained, as in previous periods. For example, John Roydon Hughes' account of the Battle of Dettingen reports the loss at Dettingen without much emotion:

> The loss of the French is very Great in Comparison to Ours. … The English at the most, have not lost above 1000. Our Regiment has suffer'd as Much as any. I had my right and left men killed twice by My side, and was myself shot thro' the Hat, which I thank God was all I suffered.[237]

Here, Hughes' feeling of gratitude at his own survival is evident. However, he does not reveal any personal feeling for the loss of lives, whether it was French or English lives, including his 'right and left men.'

There is little evidence to suggest that many officers who wrote their accounts of battles reacted in markedly different ways to the loss of their fellow officers and private soldiers. Although the loss of individual officers did receive a brief mention, unlike those of private soldiers who remained nameless (this should not be surprising considering that naming all the numerous soldiers killed would have been impossible), the emotions expressed at the death of these officers are frequently limited. One account of Dettingen reported the high-ranking British casualties in a fairly indifferent manner, similar to the manner in which Hughes reported the death of his 'right and left men':

> The Persons of distinction who fell on our Side, were only General *Clayton*, and Major *Honeywood*, but the wounded were much more considerable.[238]

It is difficult to read from this sentence what the author felt about death of these two officers, either during or after the battle. Other accounts allowed a little more emotion for their loss: one account described the death of General Clayton and Major Honeywood 'our greatest Misfortune.'[239] Another report describes how Clayton's

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[237] Hughes, 'An Account of Dettingen'
[238] Anon, *British Glory Reviv'd.*, p. 2.
[239] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

death was 'equally regretted by the King, the Officers, and Soldiers.'[240] Nevertheless, none of these accounts reveal anything further of the authors' inner feelings.

Some authors expressed more feelings at the horrible sights of the battlefield than the death of individuals. One account of Dettingen provides a good example of this:

> I assure you that it was the most dismal Prospect human nature can form: The View of so many mangled Bodies, some not quite dead, weltering in their Blood; others, not so desperately wounded, crying out for Help. Though I can truly say, that I was not the least discouraged in the Action, yet this Sight shock'd my very Soul![241]

This is one of the most vivid, graphic descriptions of the sights of a battlefield after the battle during this period. The author frankly shared the shock he felt with the recipient of his letter. Little information about the author and the recipient are available, but the author was a cavalryman, and so we may assume the recipient, with whom the author exchanged letters regularly according to this battle report, belonged to a similar social class. It seems clear that the author had in mind the sociocultural standard required of early modern soldiers that they were not supposed to be afraid. Thus, the author clarified that he was 'not the least discouraged in the Action' before sharing his shock and trauma.

Other accounts show a similar attitude: one account of Dettingen reports that 'the Dead and Wounded are a dismal Sight.'[242] An author of another account of Dettingen claimed, more emotionally, 'Such a Sight as I desire never to see again!'[243] This, of course, was not confined to the reports of the War of the Austrian Succession. The description of the horrible sights after the Battle of Prestonpans during the Jacobite Rising of 1745, in which the field was littered with mutilated body parts, conveys a similar sentiment.[244] These expressions and the emotions indicated by

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[240] *Ibid.*, p. 34.
[241] *Ibid.*, p. 30.
[242] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[243] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[244] de Johnstone, *Memoirs of the Rebellion,* p. 33.

them are very similar to Marlborough or Deane's responses to the horrors of battlefield during the War of the Spanish Succession, as examined in the previous chapter. Thus, a significant continuity can also be found in this aspect.

For a long time, mid-eighteenth-century wars have been interpreted as the culmination of the British infantry firepower-oriented tactic, as seen in the powerful cultural symbol of the 'thin red line'.[245] The period has also often been portrayed as a great watershed of modernity, most typically in the popular depiction of Culloden as a clash between 'the traditional and the modern, the backward and advanced'.[246] However, just as the battlefield realities were not as simplistic as such popular notions, the sociocultural understanding of the wars was also more complicated than such a dichotomy suggests. Rather than displaying a consciousness of living in an era of great military modernisation, contemporary understandings of warfare and battles and the literary means to express these understandings show striking continuities from the past. The understandings and studies of war during this period were neither reactionary nor stagnant. Differences between understandings and small but important changes can be observed, similar to the previous periods this study covers. What cannot be evidenced is the artificial divide between old and new.

5. Conclusion

This chapter examined the development of the British army and its experiences in battles, from the end of the War of the Spanish Succession to the end of the Jacobite Rising. Although the British army suffered from structural problems and an inevitable lack of combat experience during peacetime, it did at least maintain a minimum standard of training. Consequently, the army often suffered reverses at the beginning of the war from which they soon recovered. They were then able to evolve into a more efficient fighting machine, as demonstrated during the War of the Austrian Succession and the Jacobite Rising.

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[245] Carlton, *This Seat of Mars*, p. 171.
[246] Pittock, *Culloden*, p. 5.

British military theory did not radically depart from the past, but it was far from reactionary or stagnant. Although the senior figures in the army were proud of the memories of Marlborough's victories, at least some of them attempted to critically examine the lessons of those battles. The result was the re-emphasis on the aggressive bayonet charge. This instruction, which would prove correct, was not immediately followed due to the lack of combat experience. Nevertheless, as the army's experience grew through the wars examined in this chapter, the British were able to fight more efficiently with bayonets. This ability, along with their willingness to engage in hand-to-hand combat, played a crucial role in the final victory of the British army against the Highlanders during the Jacobite Rising of 1745. This reveals the deeply flawed nature of the popular perception of this period as a final triumph of 'modern' firepower. The battles examined in this chapter, instead, demonstrate that firepower was far from omnipotent, and the course and result of a battle involved many other highly complicated factors. In short, this period was not a decisive turning point towards 'modernity'. Rather, the British army was evolving slowly, with occasional setbacks, and adapting to the given circumstances; if not towards 'modernity', then certainly into a more efficient fighting force.

Conclusion

This study examined the development of early modern British warfare from three perspectives: the doctrines and theories on war, the experiences of combat, and the cultural perceptions of war and battle. It challenged the conventional narrative that the English and later British army was transformed from a military backwater isolated from the European 'military revolution' to a dominant world power by 'modernising' itself, mainly through technological innovations symbolised by more effective infantry firepower. How, then, does this examination help to address the principal issues raised in the introduction?

1. The Military Revolution

As examined in the Introduction, debates on early modern military history have been frequently associated with the issue of technological innovation, especially the adoption of gunpowder weaponry and its effective employment. Its influence is still significant, as demonstrated by recent works on Asian military history. In their attempt to argue against the 'European' military revolution, scholars such as Lorge and Andrade have argued for the existence of the East Asian military revolution based on gunpowder weaponry, revealing the persistently widespread acceptance of the gunpowder revolution thesis.

Likewise, early modern British military history has frequently been interpreted in this light. The application of the military revolution debate in British history can be summarised in two phases. First, during the sixteenth and most of the seventeenth centuries, the English army lagged behind its continental counterparts due to both technological and theoretical reasons: the reluctance to adopt firearms and military theories based on chivalric culture and classical authorities. Second, from the late-seventeenth to the eighteenth century, the English and later British army reformed its tactics along more firepower-oriented lines compared to its continental (mainly French) counterparts and thus enjoyed more success. This study has shown that both views are incorrect.

The intellectual milieu of early modern England concerning warfare was significantly more vibrant than has often been portrayed. Although English military theorists were sometimes cautious when accepting new ideas and had a significant amount of respect for the ancient authorities and military legacies of medieval England, they certainly did not follow the precedents blindly. They knew well of the changes occurring in warfare, and they attempted to adapt to the new realities while using the experience and wisdom of the ancients for guidance. Consequently, there is sufficient evidence of dynamism and diversity in ideas and very little evidence that England lagged far behind its continental counterparts.

These tendencies continued into the late-seventeenth century. Although it has been claimed that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 brought a modernising effect to the English army, particularly via the introduction of the new tactical doctrine of 'platoon firing' and the new professionalism, a close examination of official doctrine during this period reveals no radical break from the past. New weapons and techniques were introduced, but they were integrated cautiously into existing tactical traditions, as in the preceding period.

The turn of the eighteenth century brought seemingly considerable change to the way battles were fought. The infantry pike, one of the last vestiges of ancient and medieval warfare, disappeared from the field and the familiar image of red-coated British infantry replaced that of armoured pikemen. However, military theory continued to be deeply connected with the past. Classical authorities were as respected as they had been in the previous century, and the military treatises published in the seventeenth century were still widely read. Although tactical doctrines emphasised firepower, hand-to-hand combat was not neglected. Changes were often gradual, as is evidenced by the manner in which the pike was slowly replaced by the bayonet. However, there is little evidence of reactionary attitudes among British officers and military theorists. In many cases, they demonstrated adaptability to the changing situation, thus providing a strong case for an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary model. Although this evolution was far from straightforward, as it was often punctured with occasional setbacks, the British army nevertheless generally managed to respond well to the problems it faced and adapted accordingly.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, British military theorists and officers were struggling to solve a serious problem seen in the War of the Spanish Succession – excessive casualties. They also encountered the problems caused by the general neglect of the army and the deterioration of combat effectiveness during three decades of peace. Although not always successful, their ideas show a willingness to evaluate their experiences. Whereas British doctrine and theories during this period demonstrate no radical departure from the past, they were nevertheless evolving gradually in a manner similar to their continental counterparts.

Therefore, the dichotomy of the backward and insular sixteenth and seventeenth century-English army and the progressive and 'modern' eighteenth-century British army cannot stand. Throughout both phases, the English/British army was usually eclectic and flexible in its doctrine and adaptative, albeit cautiously, in its approach towards weaponry and tactics.

2. The Mechanics of Combat

If we compare the outward appearance of the British army at the Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the armies of the Civil War a century earlier, it is tempting to argue that a fundamental change occurred in the army's methods of fighting during those hundred years. At a deeper level, however, a more complicated picture emerges.

Prior to the early modern period, the most fundamental mechanic of infantry was breaking the cohesion of the opposing enemy formation. This was achieved first by infantry missile fire and then by hand-to-hand combat, according to each specific circumstance. Once the break was achieved, the decisive attack was delivered, usually by cavalry, to complete the destruction of the enemy army. These basic mechanics remained largely unchanged in the early modern period despite the adoption of new gunpowder weaponry and, indeed, this was what the English and later British soldiers usually experienced throughout the period covered in this study.

The reason why gunpowder did relatively little to alter the basic mechanics of combat is because frequently, both missile fire and hand-to-hand combat were required to defeat the enemy, just as in ancient and medieval wars. Thus, whereas the pike and musket replaced the medieval spears (or bills), and bows and were in turn

replaced by bayonet and musket, the most fundamental system of the combination of cold steel and missile remained the same.

When the opposing infantrymen were engaged in hand-to-hand combat, it was frequently a tentative affair. Its main aim was more directed towards breaking enemy morale than direct killing, although this does not change the fact it was a horrible ordeal for those involved, both physically and psychologically. Victory often went to those who were able and ready to overcome the horror.

The relative importance ascribed to hand-to-hand combat versus firefight varied according to each circumstance, and it was hardly a straightforward evolution from mainly the former to principally the latter. During the Civil War, the dominant method was to emphasise aggressive infantry assault. From the late-seventeenth to early-eighteenth centuries, armies sought the correct division of labour between infantry and cavalry in providing firepower and shock. Following the bloody and prolonged firefights during the War of the Spanish Succession, an emphasis on aggressive hand-to-hand infantry combat returned. This, along with other bitter experiences of defeat at the hands of French bayonets and Jacobite swords, helped to build the British infantrymen's ability to fight hand-to-hand. By the end of this period, the British army had become a formidable and efficient fighting force – not because it relied more on 'modern' firearms than other armies, but because it was adept at both firearms and bayonets.

Therefore, the history of the English and British armies from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth centuries is far from an unstoppable march towards the triumph of modern firepower. The relative importance of firearms and the more traditional edged weaponry was different for each battle in the period of study. In most cases, superior firepower was not sufficient to guarantee victory. Frequently, armies who were unafraid to engage in hand-to-hand combat and capable of doing so emerged victorious. The combat history of both the English and British armies was a continuous process of finding an appropriate balance between firepower and shock through extensive trial and error, not an advance towards the inevitable victory of 'modernity'.

3. Modernity

As examined, there have been numerous approaches to defining and understanding the nature of modernity. Many criteria have been suggested, such as a break from past authorities, reason, secularisation, discipline, and the notion of progress, to name a few. The question arises, therefore, of how many of these characteristics can be found in military affairs during this period.

The picture that emerges is highly complex. There were certainly notions among the early modern soldiers and theorists that warfare was changing and that new technology, mostly gunpowder, was significantly changing warfare, as military treatises from authors such as Robert Barrett or James Turner show. However, it is surprisingly difficult to find any strong assertion that this new technology had become a dominant factor in warfare or any statement expressing superiority due to its use. It is equally difficult to find any expectations expressed in the contemporary military treatises or accounts of battles that a technologically superior army should win the battle. Likewise, it is difficult to identify any attitudes linking this new technology to progress during this period.

Despite certain awareness of changes, there are numerous examples which show that the contemporary mindset was still firmly based in the ancient and medieval past. For many military theorists, these past examples were still relevant, as clearly demonstrated by several authors' unchanging preference for the medieval longbow or ancient pike during this period. As examined throughout this study, this attitude was not simply one of reactionary conservatism, because the mechanics of combat was not yet entirely dominated by the new technologies.

Reason as a criterion and secularisation are closely related with people's religious attitude. In this regard, the understanding of warfare of much of the English and British people who wrote about war during this period was heavily religious and remained so after what is widely regarded as the end of the era of confessional warfare. Warfare was one of the most disruptive and traumatic events in people's lives. Therefore, people attempted to understand it via inherited knowledge and expressed their understanding by using centuries-old literary conventions. The belief in God and divine providence as the ultimate arbiter on the battlefield persisted strongly throughout the period of this study. Groups and individuals held highly diverse

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perceptions of providence, doubtless due to the influence of Britain's specific religious culture after the Reformation, particularly Puritanism. However, Puritan efforts to replace traditional providentialism entirely never succeeded, and many views show a strong continuity with the medieval past.

It might be argued that gradual secularisation did occur during this period, especially after the mid-eighteenth century when Enlightenment philosophy began to affect literary elites more widely. Campbell Dalrymple's analysis of Polybius written towards its end is certainly more secular than James Turner's late-seventeenth century account. It is thus tempting to conclude that a gradual secularisation occurred around the mid-eighteenth century; an Enlightenment view replacing pre-Enlightenment providentialism. The reality, however, is more complicated. Throughout the period covered in this study, religious languages coexisted with more mundane, matter-of-fact analysis and reports. Sometimes, authors such as Turner displayed both kinds of language in a single work. Such coexistence was always present in writings on war throughout ancient and medieval times and continued through the period. Thus, some aspects of secularisation and reason, another commonly attributed characteristic of modernity, were present but not dominant as they were in previous eras, and it is difficult to find any sustained tendency towards that direction during this period.

This also applied to other standards of modernity. The characteristics of modernity examined in the Introduction, such as the sense of rupture, greater control and discipline, and a more rational and secular attitude, can all be identified during the period covered in this study. However, they were by no means exclusive to this or the 'modern' era. Furthermore, there were equally strong elements of continuities as well as change.

4. Sociocultural Understanding of Warfare-Languages, Identity and Emotion

The issue of modernity in warfare is closely related to the contemporary perceptions and understanding of warfare. These understandings and the ways in which contemporaries expressed them are in many ways decided by contemporary culture. It is culture which, in many cases, dictates people's behaviour and practices. It has

already been explained above how one of the most powerful cultural mechanisms during the early modern period, religion, affected people's understanding of warfare. The other important cultural issue this study examined is combatants' identities and the way they expressed their emotions.

Throughout this period, the descriptions of the brave soldier given by many early modern English and later British authors were in the image of a traditional hero not unfamiliar to ancient and medieval authors. Traditional edged weapons remained an important symbol of this heroic warrior identity throughout, even when the British redcoats were defeating the French at Dettingen and the Highlanders at Culloden, supposedly with their 'modern' firepower. To the end of the period, it was concepts such as acts of individual heroism in the face of danger, valour and honour, rather than technological matters, which received the most frequent attention and praise in numerous war texts. This does not mean that the perceptions were removed from the realities. As this study demonstrated, many aspects of the mechanics of combat retained strong elements of continuities from the past, which in turn means that many of the seemingly traditional perceptions of warfare and warrior identity were still relevant throughout the period.

The language used to convey battlefield emotions also remained mostly traditional. The memoirs, letters and journals of early modern soldiers rarely expressed their emotions in the manner in which modern readers would expect. However, despite some recent arguments, early modern soldier–authors did not eschew emotions; they merely expressed them in different ways according to the literary conventions of their day. Rather than directly stating their feelings, they described their situations in a certain language to convey their feelings, thus avoiding the charge of cowardice. In this manner, they successfully conveyed 'unsoldierly' feelings – such as fear – indirectly, while expressing feelings such as grief or admiration for honourable behaviour more directly. Therefore, the writings of early modern English and later British soldier–authors do not fit the conventional 'gradual evolutionary model' which suggests that the emotional expressions evolved from violent and unrestrained medieval emotions to controlled and disciplined modern emotions, nor were these writings almost completely devoid of 'inner personal realities', as Harari claimed more recently. Throughout the period covered in this study, these soldier–authors continued

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to use similar languages reflecting the shared values between them, and they expressed their emotions according to this value in a manner they considered appropriate for soldiers.

5. Concluding Remarks

This study examined the highly complex process of the development of the British method of studying, fighting and understanding warfare and battles from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth centuries. As was demonstrated, this was not a straightforward process, and the results were far from inevitable. It is not a story of a backward army's evolution through continuous modernisation to become the most significant world power, nor an inexorable march towards the culmination of the 'thin red line'. Rather, the story is one of a continuous process of adaptation through trial and error. This process was often painful and not always successful. The attitude of the British was frequently cautious, leading later generations to call them, unfairly, reactionary. However, despite clear flaws and frequent setbacks, the British army found ways to overcome such obstacles by maintaining a willingness to learn and the flexibility to adapt. The perceptions of war and battles by contemporaries were similar. They were highly diverse and did not follow the model of a straightforward 'evolution' towards the more 'modern' view of war. What might appear to be ancient and medieval understandings of war coexisted with more 'modern' views, suggesting that such categorisation is, in fact, excessively simplistic. These various understandings were in part inherited from the past, but in other ways they were highly relevant to how they understood the events of their own times.

This study attempted to combine recent achievements in various disciplines in order to revaluate and present a persuasive account of early modern British military development and contemporary understandings of it. If it succeeds in highlighting the highly complicated and diverse realities that render a simple assessment impossible, then it has achieved its purpose.

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